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Title: Life of James Buchanan, v. 2 (of 2) - Fifteenth President of the United States
Author: Curtis, George Tickner
Language: English
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[Illustration: JAMES BUCHANAN]
LIFE
OF
JAMES BUCHANAN
FIFTEENTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
BY
GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS
_IN TWO VOLUMES_
VOL. II.
NEW YORK
HARPER & BROTHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE
1883
Copyright, 1883, by GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS.
_All rights reserved._
_Stereotyped by Smith & McDougal._
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
1848-1852.
PAGE
Purchase of Wheatland—Nomination and Election of General 1
Taylor—His Death and the Accession of President
Fillmore—The Compromise Measures of 1850—Letters to Miss
Lane—Public Letters on Political Topics
CHAPTER II.
1852.
The Presidential Nominations of 1852—Election of General 34
Franklin Pierce to the Presidency—Buchanan’s Course in
regard to the Nomination and the Election—His Efforts to
defeat the Whig Candidate
CHAPTER III.
1852-1853.
Personal and Political Relations with the President—Elect 68
and with Mr. Marcy, his Secretary of State—Buchanan is
offered the Mission to England—His own Account of the
Offer, and his Reasons for accepting it—Parting with his
Friends and Neighbors in Lancaster—Correspondence with his
Niece
CHAPTER IV.
1853-1856.
Arrival in London—Presentation to the Queen at Osborne—The 99
Ministry of Lord Aberdeen—Mr. Marcy’s Circular about Court
Costumes, and the Dress Question at the English
Court—Letters to Miss Lane
CHAPTER V.
1853-1856.
Negotiations with Lord Clarendon—The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 126
and Affairs in Central America—The Crimean War and the new
British Doctrine respecting the Property of Neutrals
CHAPTER VI.
1853-1856.
British Enlistments in the United States—Recall of the 134
English Minister at Washington—The Ostend Conference
CHAPTER VII.
1854-1855.
The Social Position of Mr. Buchanan and his Niece in England 142
CHAPTER VIII.
1856.
Return to America—Nomination and Election to the 169
Presidency—Significance of Mr. Buchanan’s Election in
respect to the Sectional Questions—Private Correspondence
CHAPTER IX.
1857-1858.
Inauguration as President—Selection of a Cabinet—The 187
Disturbances in Kansas—Mr. Buchanan’s Construction of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, and of the “Platform” on which he was
elected—Final Admission of Kansas into the Union
CHAPTER X.
1857-1861.
Foreign Relations during Mr. Buchanan’s Administration 211
CHAPTER XI.
1858-1860.
Complimentary Gift from Prince Albert to Mr. Buchanan—Visit 228
of the Prince of Wales—Correspondence with the Queen—Minor
Incidents of the Administration—Traits of
Character—Letters to Miss Lane—Marriage of a young Friend
CHAPTER XII.
1860—March and June.
The so-called “Covode Investigation.” 246
CHAPTER XIII.
Summary of the Slavery Questions from 1787 to 1860—The 262
Anti-Slavery Agitation in the North—Growth and Political
Triumph of the Republican Party—Fatal Divisions among the
Democrats—Mr. Buchanan declines to be regarded as a
Candidate for a second Election
CHAPTER XIV.
1860—October.
General Scott’s “Views.” 297
CHAPTER XV.
1860—November.
Election of President Lincoln—The Secession of South 315
Carolina—Nature of the Doctrine of Secession—President
Buchanan prepares to encounter the Secession
Movement—Distinction between making War on a State and
enforcing the Laws of the United States
CHAPTER XVI.
1860—December.
The President’s Annual Message of December 3, 1860 330
CHAPTER XVII.
1860—December.
Reception of the President’s Message in the Cabinet, in 352
Congress, and in the Country—The firm Attitude and wise
Policy of Mr. Buchanan
CHAPTER XVIII.
1860—December.
General Scott again advises the President—Major Anderson’s 365
Removal from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter—Arrival of
Commissioners from South Carolina in Washington—Their
Interview and Communication with the President—The
supposed Pledge of the _Status Quo_—The “Cabinet Crisis”
of December 29th—Reply of the President to the South
Carolina Commissioners—The anonymous Diarist of the _North
American Review_ confuted
CHAPTER XIX.
December, 1860-January, 1861.
Resignation of General Cass from the Department of 396
State—Reconstruction of the Cabinet which followed after
the Resignations of Messrs. Cobb, Thompson, and Thomas
CHAPTER XX.
1860—December.
The Resignation of Secretary Floyd, and its Cause—Refutation 406
of the Story of his stealing the Arms of the United
States—General Scott’s Assertions disproved
CHAPTER XXI.
November, 1860-March, 1861.
The Action of Congress on the Recommendations of the 418
President’s Annual Message—The “Crittenden
Compromise”—Strange Course of the New York
_Tribune_—Special Message of January 8, 1861
[Illustration: WHEATLAND.]
LIFE OF JAMES BUCHANAN.
--------------
CHAPTER I.
1848-1852.
PURCHASE OF WHEATLAND—NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF GENERAL TAYLOR—HIS
DEATH AND THE ACCESSION OF PRESIDENT FILLMORE—THE COMPROMISE
MEASURES OF 1850—LETTERS TO MISS LANE—PUBLIC LETTERS ON POLITICAL
TOPICS.
At the distance of a little more than a mile from that part of the city
of Lancaster where Mr. Buchanan had lived for many years, and a little
beyond the corporate limits, there had long stood a substantial brick
mansion on a small estate of twenty-two acres known as Wheatland, and
sometimes called “The Wheatlands.” The house, although not imposing, or
indeed of any architectural beauty, was nevertheless a sort of _beau
ideal_ of a statesman’s abode, with ample room and verge for all the
wants of a moderate establishment. Without and within, the place has an
air of comfort, respectability, and repose. It had been for some years
owned and occupied as a summer residence by the Hon. Wm. M. Meredith of
Philadelphia, a very eminent lawyer, who became Secretary of the
Treasury in the administration of President Taylor. The house stands
about half way up a gently rising ground, and has a wide lawn stretching
down to the county road, shaded by oaks, elms, and larches, interspersed
with evergreens. The view from the front of the house, looking to the
west of north, ranges over a broad expanse of the county of Lancaster,
one of the richest of Pennsylvania’s lovely domains, spread out in a map
of highly cultivated farms, and dotted by the homesteads of a wealthy
agricultural population. Behind the house stands a noble wood, which is
reached through the gardens; and from the crown of the hill, in a
southerly direction, the eye ranges over another fine valley of smaller
extent. Coolness and peace pervade this attractive old place, and it is
not singular that a man of Mr. Buchanan’s habits and temperament, who
could not afford time and had no strong tastes for large pursuits of
agriculture, should have coveted this his neighbor’s dwelling.
But he did not break the commandment in seeking it. A treaty between two
persons for the purchase of an estate is not ordinarily a matter of much
interest. But this one was conducted in a manner so honorable to both
parties that a few words may be given to it. The buyer and the seller
had always been on opposite political sides; but they were friends, and
they were gentlemen. In the month of June, 1848, Mr. Buchanan, having
heard that Mr. Meredith wished to sell this property, addressed to him
the following letter:
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. MEREDITH.]
WASHINGTON, June 12, 1848.
MY DEAR SIR:
I have received an intimation from our friends Fordney and Reynolds
that you are willing to sell the Wheatlands, for the price which you
gave Mr. Potter for them. As I intend, in any event, to retire from
public life on the 4th of March next, I should be pleased to become
the purchaser. The terms of payment I could make agreeable to
yourself; and I should be glad if you would retain the possession
until the autumn. In making this offer, I desire to purchase from you
just what you purchased from Mr. Potter, and to pay you the same price
which you paid him. If I have been misinformed in regard to your
desire to sell, I know you will pardon this intrusion.
Yours, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
To this letter Mr. Meredith replied as follows:
[MR. MEREDITH TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
PHILADELPHIA, June 19, 1848.
MY DEAR SIR:—
On my return home a day or two since I had the pleasure of finding
your letter. A month ago, I should probably have accepted your offer,
as I had then an opportunity of securing a place in this neighborhood
that would have suited me better in point of proximity than Wheatland.
I have missed that, and it is now too late to make new arrangements
for my family for the summer. I should not like to occupy the place
after having sold it, for several reasons, and principally because the
certainty of leaving it would tend to render the children
uncomfortable through the season. These little people are imaginative
and live very much on the future, and it would scarcely do to destroy
all their little plans, and schemes, and expectations connected with
the place at the very commencement of their holidays. I will
therefore, with your permission, postpone the subject to the autumn,
when, if I should be disposed to part with the place, I will do myself
the pleasure of writing to you. Of course your offer does not stand
over; but I will certainly make no disposition of the property without
first offering it to you.
With great esteem, I am, sir, yours most respectfully,
W. M. MEREDITH.
In the autumn, Mr. Buchanan again wrote:
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. MEREDITH.]
WASHINGTON, September 25, 1848.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Upon my return to this city, on Saturday night, I found your letter to
Mr. Fordney kindly offering to dispose of Wheatland, including all
that you bought from Mr. Potter, to myself at the price you paid, and
the matting in the house at a valuation. I accept this proposition,
and you may consider the bargain closed.
Of the purchase-money I can conveniently pay $1750 at present, and the
remainder on or before the first of January. If, however, you should
need it sooner, I can procure it without much difficulty.
You can make the deed when you think proper, and the affair of the
matting may be arranged at any time.
With many thanks for your kindness,
I remain yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
In the succeeding month of November, the following letters passed
between the two gentlemen:
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. MEREDITH.]
(Private.) LANCASTER, November 21, 1848.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have seen Mr. Fordney since I came here, who read me a part of your
second letter. From this I infer that you regret you had parted with
Wheatland. Now, my dear sir, if you have the least inclination to
retain it, speak the word and our bargain shall be as if it never had
been. It will not put me to the least inconvenience, as I have an
excellent house in Lancaster. Indeed I feel a personal interest in
having you in the midst of our society; and if you should retain
Wheatland, I know that after you shall be satisfied with fame and
fortune, you will make this beautiful residence your place of
permanent abode.
Please to address me at Paradise P. O., Lancaster county, as I shall
be at my brother’s, near that place, to-morrow evening, where I shall
remain until Thursday evening.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. MEREDITH TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
PHILADELPHIA, November 23, 1848.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Your very kind letter was received yesterday, just as I was going to
court in the morning, where I was kept without dinner till near six. I
was then obliged to attend an evening engagement at seven. I mention
these details to excuse myself for the apparent want of promptness in
replying. I have in the first place to express to you my deep sense of
the courtesy and consideration which induced you to make me the offer
which your letter contains. I cannot accept it, because to do so would
be to take advantage of your friendly impulses, which I ought not and
cannot do. I have no doubt I shall find a place somewhere in the same
county, and hope to call neighbors with you yet. I need not say how
much I regret that Mr. Fordney should have been so indiscreet as to
communicate my letter to you.
My furniture, etc., is now removed, and I will deliver possession at
once, and I wish you heartily, my dear sir, many years of happiness
there.
I am, always your obliged friend and servant,
W. M. MEREDITH.
In December the purchase-money was paid and the deed of the property was
executed by Mr. Meredith. Mr. Buchanan soon afterwards transferred his
household goods to Wheatland, and from that time until his death it was
his permanent abode, when he did not occupy some official residence in
Washington or in London. He removed to Wheatland the furniture which he
had hitherto used in Washington and Lancaster, and made some new
purchases. The style of everything was solid, comfortable, and
dignified, without any show. The library was in the eastern wing of the
house, and was entered by a hall running transversely from the main
hall, which extended through the house from east and west, and was also
entered from the principal parlor. At the window of the library farthest
from the main hall was Mr. Buchanan’s accustomed seat. Long years of
honorable public service, however, and sore trials, are to be traced,
before we reach the period when he finally retired to the repose of this
peaceful retreat. He left office on the 4th of March, 1849, with a fixed
purpose not to re-enter public life. But although he held no public
position during the four years of General Taylor’s and Mr. Fillmore’s
term, he could not avoid taking an active interest in public affairs;
and it will be seen that he was not at liberty to decline all public
service when his party in 1853 again came into power.
But it is now necessary to revert to the spring and summer of 1848, and
to the state of things consequent upon the treaty which had been
concluded with Mexico. The great acquisitions of territory made by the
annexation of Texas, and the cession of New Mexico and California to the
United States, had opened questions on which the Democratic and the Whig
parties occupied very different positions. The acquisition of these
countries was a Democratic measure; and had that party retained its
control of the Federal Government, it is probable that its Northern and
its Southern branches would have united upon some plan for disposing of
the question of slavery in these new regions. The Whigs, on the other
hand, although constituting the opposition, and as such acting against
the administration of Mr. Polk and its measures, were far from being
unanimous in their resistance to the treaty which Mr. Polk proposed to
make with Mexico. There were very eminent Whigs who were opposed to all
acquisitions of new territory, for various reasons, and especially
because of the tendency of such acquisitions to re-open questions about
slavery. There were other very prominent men in the Whig party who were
willing to have New Mexico and California added to the Union, and to
trust to the chances of a harmonious settlement of all questions that
might follow in regard to the organization of governments for those
extensive regions. It may not only now be seen, but it was apparent to
thoughtful observers at the time, that the true course for the Whig
party to pursue, was to adopt as its candidate for the Presidency some
one of its most eminent and experienced statesmen, who would represent a
definite policy on this whole subject, either by an application of the
so-called “Wilmot Proviso,” or what was far better, considering the
sectional feelings involved, by an extension to the Pacific Ocean of the
Missouri Compromise line of division between free and slave territory.
But there came about in the winter of 1848 one of those states of
popular feeling, in which the people of this country have sometimes
taken it for granted that military success, united with certain traits
of character, is a good ground for assuming fitness of an individual for
the highest civil station. Along with this somewhat hazardous assumption
there runs at such times the vague and scarcely expressed idea that the
Presidency of the United States is to be treated as a reward for
distinguished military services. After General Taylor’s return from his
Mexican campaign, in which a series of brilliant victories were gained,
on each occasion with a force numerically inferior to that of the enemy,
he became at once a sort of popular idol. There were a good many
elements in his personal character, which entitled him to strong esteem,
and some which easily account for his sudden popularity. He had a blunt
honesty and sincerity of purpose, which were backed by great strength of
will, and prodigious energy as a warrior. The appellation of “Old Rough
and Ready,” bestowed on him by his soldiers, went straight to the
popular heart. These indications of what has been called “availability”
in the political nomenclature which has acquired a peculiar
significance, were not lost upon that class of Whig politicians who were
most disposed to be on the lookout for such means of political success.
General Taylor, although never a politician, and although, from his
military life, he had rarely even voted at elections, was known to be a
Whig, but, as he described himself, not an “Ultra Whig.” He was at no
pains to seek a nomination for the Presidency, but it was pretty well
known that if it came to him unsought, he would accept it. At the same
time, with the modesty and sincerity that belonged to his honest nature,
he did not affect to conceal his own distrust of his fitness for the
office. It was, with him, a matter which the people of the country were
to decide. If they chose to call him to the office, he would discharge
its duties to the best of his ability. The sagacity of that portion of
the Whigs who expected to win a political victory with such a candidate,
was not at fault. When the Whig national convention, which was to make
the nomination, assembled at Philadelphia in June, (1848), it was found
that both Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster were to be disregarded; and on the
fourth ballotting General Taylor received 171 votes out of 279. It is a
remarkable fact, that although this nomination was made by a national
convention of all the Whigs, several attempts to have it declared by
resolution that it must be accepted as a “Whig” nomination, and to
declare what the principles of the Whig party were, were voted down. One
proposal was to have it declared that Whig principles were “no extension
of slavery—no acquisition of foreign territory—protection to American
industry, and opposition to executive usurpation.” But singularly
enough, these propositions were ruled to be out of order: and although
the nomination of Millard Fillmore of New York, as Vice President, might
seem to give the whole proceeding a Whig aspect, Mr. Fillmore’s name,
unconnected with any annunciation of a distinctive Whig policy, to be
upheld in the election, could do nothing more than to acquire for the
“ticket” such weight as his personal character, not then very
extensively known, could give to it. It was plain enough, therefore,
that the election of General Taylor as President, if it should occur,
would settle nothing in regard to the very serious questions that were
already resulting from the Mexican war.
It was this step on the part of the Whigs—nominating a candidate without
any declared policy—that entailed upon that party, at the beginning of
General Taylor’s administration, the most embarrassing questions, and
increased the danger of the formation of a third party, on the subject
of slavery, whose sphere of operations would be confined to the Northern
States, and which might, for the first time in our political history,
lead to a sectional division between the North and the South.
On the other hand, the Democratic party had to nominate a candidate for
the Presidency who, besides being of sufficient consideration throughout
the country to counteract the popular _furore_ about General Taylor,
would represent some distinctive policy in regard to the new territories
and the questions growing out of their acquisition. The friends of
General Cass, who, although he wore a military title, was not in the
category of military heroes, claimed that his party services and public
position entitled him to the nomination. Mr. Buchanan was by far the
fittest candidate whom the Democrats could have adopted; but he had made
it a rule not to press his claims upon the consideration of his party,
at the risk of impairing its harmony and efficiency. He had adhered to
this rule on more than one previous occasion, and he did not now depart
from it. General Cass was nominated by the Democratic Convention, and
along with the candidate for the Vice-Presidency, W. O. Butler of
Kentucky, he was vigorously supported in the canvass by Mr. Buchanan.[1]
But the Whig candidates, Taylor and Fillmore, received one hundred and
sixty-three electoral votes, being seventeen more than were necessary to
a choice. General Taylor was inaugurated as President on the 4th of
March, 1849. Although he was a citizen of Louisiana and a slaveholder,
he had received the electoral votes of the free States of Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. These, with the votes of Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Florida, had
elected him. All the other States had been obtained for the Democratic
candidates; for although the Northern Whigs who were dissatisfied with
such a candidate as General Taylor, and who had begun to call themselves
“Conscience Whigs,” together with a faction of the Northern Democracy
known as “barn-burners” had put in nomination Ex-President Van Buren of
New York and Mr. Charles Francis Adams of Massachusetts, this singularly
combined party did not obtain the electoral vote of a single State.
Footnote 1:
The “platform” of the Democratic party contained the following
resolution: “That Congress has no power, under the Constitution, to
interfere with, or control the domestic institutions of the several
States; and that such States are the sole and proper judges of
everything pertaining to their own affairs, not prohibited by the
Constitution; that all efforts, by abolitionists or others, made to
induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take
incipient steps in relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the
most alarming and dangerous consequences, and that all such efforts
have an inevitable tendency to diminish the happiness of the people
and endanger the stability and permanency of the Union, and ought not
to be countenanced by any friend to our political institutions.”
Excepting in an indirect manner, this resolution did not enunciate any
specific policy in regard to the newly acquired territories.
While General Taylor, therefore, entered upon the administration of the
Government under circumstances which indicated much popular strength,
the situation of the country, and his want of the higher qualities of
statesmanship and civil experience, were not favorable to his success as
a President of the United States. His cabinet, moreover, was not,
comparatively speaking, a strong one. The Secretary of State, the Hon.
John M. Clayton of Delaware, was scarcely the equal of Mr. Calhoun and
Mr. Buchanan, his immediate predecessors; and his negotiation of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty was one of the most unfortunate occurrences in our
diplomatic history. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Meredith, was
simply an accomplished lawyer and a most estimable gentleman. The
Attorney-General, the Hon. Reverdy Johnson of Baltimore, was a very
eminent advocate in the Supreme Court of the United States, but not a
wise and far-seeing statesman. The ablest man in the cabinet,
intellectually, was the Hon. Thomas Ewing of Ohio. The other Secretaries
were not men of much renown or force. When this administration took
charge of the executive department of the Government, a session of
Congress was not to commence until December, 1849. At that session,
California, which had adopted a State constitution and one that
prohibited slavery, demanded admission into the Union as a free State.
New Mexico and Utah required the organization of territorial
governments. The whole South was in a state of sensitiveness in regard
to these matters, and also in regard to the escape of slaves into free
territory and to the growing unwillingness of many of the people of the
Northern States to have executed that provision of the Constitution
which required the surrender of fugitives from service. General Taylor’s
policy on these dangerous subjects was not a statesman-like or a
practicable one. In his annual message (December, 1849), he recommended
the admission of California as a State; but he proposed that the other
Territories should be left as they were until they had formed State
governments and had applied for admission into the Union. Practically,
this would have involved the necessity for governing those regions
largely by military power; for the peace must be kept between the
inhabitants of Texas and the inhabitants of New Mexico, and between the
United States and Texas, in reference to her boundaries. In the opposite
sections of the Union popular feeling was rising to a point of great
excitement. In the North, the “Wilmot Proviso” was most insisted upon.
In the South, this was resented as an indignity. By the end of January,
1850, the angry discussion of these subjects in Congress had obstructed
almost all public business, and this excitement pervaded the legislative
bodies of the States and the whole press of both sections. It seemed as
if harmony and judicious legislation were impossible.
It was at this extraordinary juncture that Mr. Clay came forward in the
Senate with his celebrated propositions which became known as the
“Compromise Measures of 1850.”[2] The discussion of these measures went
on until the 9th of July (1850), on which day General Taylor died, after
a short illness. His policy was characterized by Mr. Webster as marked
by the foresight of a soldier, but not by the foresight of a statesman.
It was attended with the danger of a collision between the United States
and Texas, which might have led to a civil war. Mr. Fillmore, however,
who as Vice-President succeeded to General Taylor, and who was sworn
into office as President on the 10th of July, was a civilian and was not
without experience as a public man, although not hitherto very
conspicuous. Mr. Webster, Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun[3] had all
strenuously advocated the Compromise Measures. A particular description
of this great settlement must be deferred to a future chapter. But in
order that these measures might receive their consummation, a
reconstruction of the cabinet became necessary. All of the Secretaries
appointed by General Taylor resigned. The State Department was offered
to and accepted by Mr. Webster. Thomas Corwin of Ohio became Secretary
of the Treasury; Charles M. Conrad of Louisiana, Secretary of War;
William A. Graham of North Carolina, Secretary of the Navy; Nathan K.
Hall of New York, Postmaster-General; John J. Crittenden of Kentucky,
Attorney-General; and Alexander H. H. Stuart of Virginia, Secretary of
the Interior. Thus a new Whig administration, pledged to the
pacification of the country by a policy very different from that of
General Taylor, came into the Executive Department. The Compromise
Measures became laws before the adjournment of Congress, which occurred
on the 30th of September; and then came the question whether they were
to be efficacious in quieting the sectional controversies about slavery,
and were to be acquiesced in by the North and the South. Mr. Buchanan,
although not in official life, in common with many other patriotic men
of both the principal parties, lent all his influence to the support of
this great settlement. In November, 1850, he had to address a letter to
a public meeting in Philadelphia, called to sustain the Compromise
Measures, in which he said:
Footnote 2:
Introduced in the Senate, January 29th, 1850.
Footnote 3:
Mr. Calhoun died at Washington on the last day of March, 1850, at the
age of 68.
[LETTER TO A PUBLIC MEETING.]
“WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, Nov. 19, 1850.
. . . . . . . .
I now say that the platform of our blessed Union is strong enough and
broad enough to sustain all true-hearted Americans. It is an
elevated—it is a glorious platform on which the down-trodden nations
of the earth gaze with hope and desire, with admiration and
astonishment. Our Union is the star of the West, whose genial and
steadily increasing influence will at last, should we remain an united
people, dispel the gloom of despotism from the ancient nations of the
world. Its moral power will prove to be more potent than millions of
armed mercenaries. And shall this glorious star set in darkness before
it has accomplished half its mission? Heaven forbid! Let us all
exclaim with the heroic Jackson, ‘The Union must and shall be
preserved.’
And what a Union has this been! The history of the human race presents
no parallel to it. The bit of striped bunting which was to be swept
from the ocean by a British navy, according to the predictions of a
British statesman, previous to the war of 1812, is now displayed on
every sea, and in every port of the habitable globe. Our glorious
stars and stripes, the flag of our country, now protects Americans in
every clime. ‘I am a Roman citizen!’ was once the proud exclamation
which everywhere shielded an ancient Roman from insult and injustice.
‘I am an American citizen!’ is now an exclamation of almost equal
potency throughout the civilized world. This is a tribute due to the
power and resources of these thirty-one United States. In a just
cause, we may defy the world in arms. We have lately presented a
spectacle which has astonished the greatest captain of the age. At the
call of their country, an irresistible host of armed men, and men,
too, skilled in the use of arms, sprang up like the soldiers of
Cadmus, from the mountains and valleys of our confederacy. The
struggle among them was not who should remain at home, but who should
enjoy the privilege of enduring the dangers and privations of a
foreign war, in defence of their country’s rights. Heaven forbid that
the question of slavery should ever prove to be the stone thrown into
their midst by Cadmus, to make them turn their arms against each
other, and die in mutual conflict.
. . . . . . . .
The common sufferings and common glories of the past, the prosperity
of the present, and the brilliant hopes of the future, must impress
every patriotic heart with deep love and devotion for the Union. Who
that is now a citizen of this vast Republic, extending from the St.
Lawrence to the Rio Grande, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific, does
not shudder at the idea of being transformed into a citizen of one of
its broken, jealous and hostile fragments? What patriot had not rather
shed the last drop of his blood, than see the thirty-one brilliant
stars, which now float proudly upon our country’s flag, rudely torn
from the national banner, and scattered in confusion over the face of
the earth?
Rest assured that all the patriotic emotions of every true-hearted
Pennsylvanian, in favor of the Union and Constitution, are shared by
Southern people. What battle-field has not been illustrated by their
gallant deeds; and when in our history have they ever shrunk from
sacrifices and sufferings in the cause of their country? What, then,
means the muttering thunder which we hear from the South? The signs of
the times are truly portentous. Whilst many in the South openly
advocate the cause of secession and union, a large majority, as I
firmly believe, still fondly cling to the Union, awaiting with deep
anxiety the action of the North on the compromise lately effected in
Congress. Should this be disregarded and nullified by the citizens of
the North, the Southern people may become united, and then farewell, a
long farewell, to our blessed Union. I am no alarmist; but a brave and
wise man looks danger steadily in the face. This is the best means of
avoiding it. I am deeply impressed with the conviction that the North
neither sufficiently understands nor appreciates the danger. For my
own part, I have been steadily watching its progress for the last
fifteen years. During that period I have often sounded the alarm; but
my feeble warnings have been disregarded. I now solemnly declare, as
the deliberate conviction of my judgment, that two things are
necessary to preserve this Union from danger:
‘1. Agitation in the North on the subject of Southern slavery must be
rebuked and put down by a strong and enlightened public opinion.
‘2. The Fugitive Slave Law must be enforced in its spirit.’
On each of these points I shall offer a few observations.
Those are greatly mistaken who suppose that the tempest that is now
raging in the South has been raised solely by the acts or omissions of
the present Congress. The minds of the Southern people have been
gradually prepared for this explosion by the events of the last
fifteen years. Much and devotedly as they love the Union, many of them
are now taught to believe that the peace of their own firesides, and
the security of their families, cannot be preserved without separation
from us. The crusade of the Abolitionists against their domestic peace
and security commenced in 1835. General Jackson, in his annual message
to Congress, in December of that year, speaks of it in the following
emphatic language: ‘I must also invite your attention to the painful
excitement produced in the South by attempts to circulate through the
mails inflammatory appeals, addressed to the passions of the slaves,
in prints and various sorts of publications, calculated to stimulate
them to insurrection, and produce all the horrors of a servile war.‘
From that period the agitation in the North against Southern slavery
has been incessant, by means of the press, of State Legislatures, of
State and County conventions, Abolition lectures, and every other
method which fanatics and demagogues could devise. The time of
Congress has been wasted in violent harangues on the subject of
slavery. Inflammatory appeals have been sent forth from this central
point throughout the country, the inevitable effect of which has been
to create geographical parties, so much dreaded by the Father of his
Country, and to estrange the northern and southern divisions of the
Union from each other.
Before the Wilmot proviso was interposed, the abolition of slavery in
the District of Columbia had been the chief theme of agitation.
Petitions for this purpose, by thousands, poured into Congress,
session after session. The rights and the wishes of the owners of
slaves within the District were boldly disregarded. Slavery was
denounced as a national disgrace, which the laws of God and the laws
of men ought to abolish, cost what it might. It mattered not to the
fanatics that the abolition of slavery in the District would convert
it into a citadel, in the midst of two slaveholding States, from which
the Abolitionist could securely scatter arrows, firebrands and death
all around. It mattered not with them that the abolition of slavery in
the District would be a violation of the spirit of the Constitution
and of the implied faith pledged to Maryland and Virginia, because the
whole world knows that those States would never have ceded it to the
Union, had they imagined it could ever be converted by Congress into a
place from which their domestic peace and security might be assailed
by fanatics and Abolitionists. Nay, the Abolitionists went even still
further. They agitated for the purpose of abolishing slavery in the
forts, arsenals and navy-yards which the Southern States had ceded to
the Union, under the Constitution, for the protection and defence of
the country.
Thus stood the question when the Wilmot proviso was interposed, to add
fuel to the flame, and to excite the Southern people to madness.
. . . . . . . .
It would be the extreme of dangerous infatuation to suppose that the
Union was not then in serious danger. Had the Wilmot proviso become a
law, or had slavery been abolished in the District of Columbia,
nothing short of a special interposition of Divine Providence could
have prevented the secession of most, if not all, the slaveholding
States.
It was from this great and glorious old Commonwealth, rightly
denominated the ‘Keystone of the Arch,‘ that the first ray of light
emanated to dispel the gloom. She stands now as the days-man, between
the North and the South, and can lay her hand on either party, and
say, thus far shalt thou go, and no farther. The wisdom, moderation
and firmness of her people qualify her eminently to act as the just
and equitable umpire between the extremes.
It was the vote in our State House of Representatives, refusing to
consider the instructing resolution in favor of the Wilmot Proviso,
which first cheered the heart of every patriot in the land. This was
speedily followed by a vote of the House of Representatives at
Washington, nailing the Wilmot Proviso itself to the table. And here I
ought not to forget the great meeting held in Philadelphia on the
birthday of the Father of his Country, in favor of the Union, which
gave a happy and irresistible impulse to public opinion throughout the
State, and I may add throughout the Union.
The honor of the South has been saved by the Compromise. The Wilmot
Proviso is forever dead, and slavery will never be abolished in the
District of Columbia whilst it continues to exist in Maryland. The
receding storm in the South still continues to dash with violence, but
it will gradually subside, should agitation cease in the North. All
that is necessary for us to do ‘is to execute the Fugitive Slave Law,‘
and to let the Southern people alone, suffering them to manage their
own domestic concerns in their own way......
2. I shall proceed to present to you some views upon the subject of
the much misrepresented Fugitive Slave Law. It is now evident, from
all the signs of the times, that this is destined to become the
principal subject of agitation at the present session of Congress, and
to take the place of the Wilmot Proviso. Its total repeal or its
material modification will henceforward be the battle cry of the
agitators of the North.
And what is the character of this law? It was passed to carry into
execution a plain, clear, and mandatory provision of the Constitution,
requiring that fugitive slaves, who fly from service in one State to
another, shall be delivered up to their masters. The provision is so
explicit that he who runs may read. No commentary can present it in a
stronger light than the plain words of the Constitution. It is a
well-known historical fact, that without this provision, the
Constitution could never have existed. How could this have been
otherwise? Is it possible for a moment to believe that the slave
States would have formed a union with the free States, if under it
their slaves, by simply escaping across the boundary which separates
them, would acquire all the rights of freemen? This would have been to
offer an irresistible temptation to all the slaves of the South to
precipitate themselves upon the North. The Federal Constitution,
therefore, recognizes in the clearest and most emphatic terms, the
property in slaves, and protects this property by prohibiting any
State into which a slave might escape, from discharging him from
slavery, and by requiring that he shall be delivered up to his master.
. . . . . . . .
The two principal objections urged against the Fugitive Slave law are,
that it will promote kidnapping, and that it does not provide a trial
by jury for the fugitive in the State to which he has escaped.
The very same reasons may be urged, with equal force, against the act
of 1793; and yet it existed for more than half a century without
encountering any such objections.
In regard to kidnapping, the fears of the agitators are altogether
groundless. The law requires that the fugitive shall be taken before
the judge or commissioner. They must there prove, to the satisfaction
of the magistrate, the identity of the fugitive, that he is the
master’s property, and has escaped from his service. Now, I ask, would
a kidnapper ever undertake such a task? Would he suborn witnesses to
commit perjury, and expose himself to detection before a judge or
commissioner, and in the presence of the argus eyes of a
non-slaveholding community, whose feelings will always be in favor of
the slave? No, never. The kidnapper seizes his victim in the silence
of the night, or in a remote and obscure place, and hurries him away.
He does not expose himself to the public gaze. He will never bring the
unfortunate object of his rapacity before a commissioner or a judge.
Indeed, I have no recollection of having heard or read of a case in
which a free man was kidnapped under the forms of law, during the
whole period of more than half a century, since the act of 1793 was
passed.
. . . . . . . .
The Union cannot long endure, if it be bound together only by paper
bonds. It can be firmly cemented alone by the affections of the people
of the different States for each other. Would to Heaven that the
spirit of mutual forbearance and brotherly love which presided at its
birth, could once more be restored to bless the land! Upon opening a
volume, a few days since, my eye caught a resolution of a Convention
of the counties of Maryland, assembled at Annapolis, in June, 1744, in
consequence of the passage by the British Parliament of the Boston
Port Bill, which provided for opening a subscription ‘in the several
counties of the Province, for an immediate collection for the relief
of the distressed inhabitants of Boston, now cruelly deprived of the
means of procuring subsistence for themselves and families by the
operation of the said act of blocking up their harbor.‘ Would that the
spirit of fraternal affection which dictated this noble resolution,
and which actuated all the conduct of our revolutionary fathers, might
return to bless and reanimate the bosoms of their descendants! This
would render our Union indissoluble. It would be the living soul
infusing itself into the Constitution and inspiring it with
irresistible energy.”
I select from the letters of Mr. Buchanan to his niece, written in the
years 1850, 1851, and 1852, some of those which indicate his constant
interest in her, and in their home circle of friends, amid the very busy
life which he led even when he was not in any official position:
[TO MISS LANE.]
BEDFORD SPRINGS, August 4, 1850.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I received your letter yesterday and was rejoiced to hear from home,
especially of Mr. ——’s visit to Miss Hetty, which, I know must have
rendered her very happy. I hope he will do better than Mr. —— or Mr.
——.
I have found Bedford very pleasant, as I always do; but we have very
few of the old set, and the new are not equal to them. I will not tell
you how many inquiries have been made for you, lest this might make
you vainer than you are, which to say the least is unnecessary.
I intend, God willing, to leave here to-morrow morning. Six of us have
taken an extra to Chambersburg: Mr. Wilmer and his daughter, Mrs. and
Miss Bridges, Mr. Reigart and myself. I shall leave them at Loudon, as
I proposed, and hope to be at home on Thursday, Friday, or Saturday
next, I know not which.
It was kind in you, and this I appreciate, to say a word to me about
Mrs. ——. Should Miss Hetty marry Mr. ——, I shall bring this matter to
a speedy conclusion one way or the other. I shall then want a
housekeeper, as you would not be fit to superintend: and whose society
would be so charming as that of Mrs. ——-?
Remember me affectionately to Mrs. Dunham and Miss Hetty, and believe
me to be yours “with the highest consideration.”
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, October 12, 1850.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
Mr. McIlvain of Philadelphia, with whom I had contracted to put up a
furnace and kitchen range this week, has disappointed me, and I cannot
leave home until this work shall be finished. He writes me that he
will certainly commence on Monday morning; and if so, I hope to be in
New York the beginning of the week after, say about the 22d instant.
You ask what about your staying at Mrs. Bancroft’s. With this I should
be very much pleased; but it seems from your letter that she did not
ask you to do so. She wished “to see a great deal” of you when you
came to New York, implying that you were not to stay with her all the
time. If she has since given you an invitation, accept it.
Could I have anticipated that you would not pass some time at Governor
Marcy’s, I should have arranged this matter by writing to Mrs.
Bancroft. It is now too late.
I may probably pass a few days at the Astor House in New York; but I
may have to see so many politicians, that I should have but little
time to devote to you. I desire very much to reach New York before the
departure of Mr. Slidell which will be on the 26th instant.
I shall be very glad, if Clementina Pleasanton should accompany you
home, though the leaves are beginning to change color and to fall.
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
Professor Muhlenbergh, having been appointed a professor in
Pennsylvania College (Gettysburg), has ceased to teach school, and
James Henry left for Princeton on Thursday last.
We have no local news, at least I know of none, that would interest
you. I think we shall have very agreeable neighbors in the Gonders at
Abbeville. Please to remember me very kindly to Mr. and Mrs. Robinson
and give my love to Rose.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, January 17, 1851.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I have received yours of the 15th, and we are all happy to learn that
you have reached Washington so pleasantly. I hope that your visit may
prove agreeable; and that you may return home self-satisfied with all
that may transpire during your absence. Keep your eyes about you in
the gay scenes through which you are destined to pass, and take care
to do nothing and say nothing of which you may have cause to repent.
Above all be on your guard against flattery; and should you receive
it, “let it pass into one ear gracefully and out at the other.” Many a
clever girl has been spoiled for the useful purposes of life, and
rendered unhappy by a winter’s gaiety in Washington. I know, however,
that Mrs. Pleasanton will take good care of you and prevent you from
running into any extravagance. Still it is necessary that, with the
blessing of Providence, you should take care of yourself.
I attended the festival in Philadelphia, on the occasion of the
arrival of the steamer “City of Glasgow,” but did not see Lilly
Macalester. Her father thinks of taking her to the World’s Fair in
London. I saw Mrs. Plitt for a moment, who inquired kindly after you.
We are moving on here in the old way, and I have no news of any
interest to communicate to you. Eskridge was out here last night, and
said they were all well in town. I met Mrs. Baker yesterday on the
street with her inseparable companion. She was looking very well.
I have not yet determined whether I shall visit Washington during the
present session; but it is probable that I may, on or about the first
of February.
Give my love to Laura and Clementina, and remember me in the kindest
terms to Mr. and Mrs. Pleasanton.
Miss Hetty and James desire their love to you.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND near LANCASTER, April 7, 1851.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
Supposing that you are now in Baltimore, I send you the enclosed
letter received yesterday. It was inadvertently opened by me; but the
moment I saw it was addressed to “My dear Harriet” it was closed. It
may contain love or treason for aught I know.
Eskridge was here yesterday; but he gave me no news, except that Mary
and he were at a party at Mr. McElrath’s on Wednesday evening last.
The place now begins to look beautiful, and we have concerts of the
birds every morning. Still I fear it will appear dull to you after
your winter’s gaiety. Lewis has gone, and we have a new coachman in
the person of Mr. Francis Quinn, who with his lady occupy the
gardener’s house. They have no children. Mr. C. Reigart will leave
here on Saturday next for the World’s Fair and a trip to the
continent. Your _ci-devant_ lover, Mr. ——, purposes to go likewise;
but many persons think he will not get off on account of the expense.
Mr. and Mrs. Gonder prove to be very agreeable neighbors. They are
furnishing their house and fitting up their grounds with much taste
and at considerable expense.
With my kindest regards for Mr. and Mrs. White and the young ladies, I
remain,
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, Nov. 4, 1851.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I have received your favor of the 29th ultimo, and would have answered
it sooner had I not been absent at Lebanon on its arrival. You appear
to have already got under full sail in Pittsburgh, and I hope your
voyage throughout may be prosperous and happy. If you have found the
place even blacker and dirtier than you anticipated, you will find the
people warm-hearted, generous, kind and agreeable. But do not for a
moment believe that any hearts will be broken, even if you should fail
to pay all the visits to families where you are invited. I know,
however, that you are not so romantic a girl as to take for gospel all
the pretty things which may be said to you.
My dinner to the bride and groom is to come off next Saturday, and I
intend to call upon Mrs. Baker to be mistress of ceremonies. I had to
send for her on Friday last to stay with Mr. and Mrs. Yost, whom I was
compelled to leave, by an engagement to be present at a Jubilee at
Lebanon.
Eskridge was here on Sunday, but brought no budget of news. Indeed, I
believe, there is nothing stirring which would interest you.
I have a friend in Pittsburgh, such as few men ever had, by name Major
David Lynch. He does not move in the first circle of fashionable
society, but he exercises more influence than any other Democrat in
that region. His devotion to me is unexampled. With one such man there
would be no difficulty in Lancaster county. I know that Dr. Speer
don’t like him; but when you visit Mrs. Collins, get Mr. McCandless to
request him to pay you a visit and treat him with the utmost kindness.
His wife is a lady of fine sense; but I presume you will not be asked
to visit her. If you should, make it a point to go.
Miss Hetty and myself are now alone, although I have many calls. For
the last two days, and a great part of the night I have been
constantly at work in answering the letters which have accumulated
during my absence at New York, the Harrisburg Fair and Lebanon.
Miss Hetty desires to be kindly remembered to you. Take care of
yourself. Be prudent and discreet among strangers. I hope you will not
remove the favorable impression you have made. Please to present my
kindest regards to Dr. and Mrs. Speer, Miss Lydia and the family, and
believe me to be,
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—If I believed it necessary, I would advise you to be constant in
your devotions to your God. He is a friend who will never desert you.
Men are short-sighted and know not the consequences of their own
actions. The most brilliant prospects are often overcast; and those
who commence life under the fairest auspices, are often unfortunate.
Ask wisdom and discretion from above. ——, and ——, and —— married
unfortunately. I should like nothing better than to see you well
settled in life; but never think of marrying any man unless his moral
habits are good, and his business or his fortune will enable him to
support you comfortably. So now my postscript is like a woman’s; the
best the last.
[TO MISS LANE.]
Saturday Morning, Nov. 8, 1851.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
Our excellent friend and neighbor, Mr. Gonder, died this morning, and
this event has covered us with gloom. Of course there will be no
dinner party to-day. We are all well and going on as usual.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, Dec. 12, 1851.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I have received your letter of the 6th instant, and am happy to learn
you are still enjoying yourself at Pittsburgh. I have not any news of
interest to communicate, unless it be that Mary and Kate Reynolds went
to Philadelphia on Wednesday last, and James Henry is to be at home
next week. At Wheatland we are all moving on in the old way. My
correspondence is now so heavy as to occupy my whole time from early
morning until late at night, except when visitors are with me.
I still continue to be of the same opinion I was concerning the
Presidency; _but this is for yourself alone_.
My life is now one of great labor, but I am philosopher enough not to
be very anxious.
. . . . . . . .
With my kindest regards for Mrs. Collins and Sis,
I remain yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, near Lancaster, Feb. 24, 1852.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
On my return home from Richmond and Washington, on the day before
yesterday, I received yours of the 9th instant. I am truly grateful
that you have enjoyed your visit to Pittsburgh so much. I have no
desire that you shall return home until it suits your own inclination.
All I apprehend is that you may wear out your welcome. It will be
impossible for me to visit Pittsburgh and escort you home.
. . . . . . . .
Senator Gwin misinformed me as to the value of Mr. Baker’s office. The
salary attached to it is $4000 per annum. He thinks that Mrs. Baker
ought by all means to go to California. I have not seen Eskridge since
my return.
I took Miss —— to Washington and left her there, and am truly glad to
be clear of her.
Whilst in Washington I saw very little of the fashionable society. My
time was almost constantly occupied with the politicians. Still I
partook of a family dinner with the Pleasantons, who all desired to be
kindly remembered to you. I never saw Clementina looking better than
she does, and they all appear to be cheerful. Still when an allusion
was made to her mother, she was overcome at the table and had to leave
it. Mr. Pleasanton is evidently in very delicate health, though he
goes to his office.
I called to see Mrs. Walker, who inquired very kindly for you, and so
did Col. King and others.
The mass of letters before me is “prodigious,” and I only write to
show that you are not forgotten.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, March 13, 1852.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I have received yours of the 9th instant. It was difficult to persuade
you to visit Pittsburgh, but it seems to be still more difficult for
you to leave it. I am, however, not disappointed in this particular,
because I know the kindness and hospitality of the people. There is
not a better or more true-hearted man alive than John Anderson, and
his excellent wife well deserves such a husband. Make out your visit,
which, it is evident, you propose to continue until the middle of
April; but after your return I hope you will be content to remain at
home during the summer. The birds are now singing around the house,
and we are enjoying the luxury of a fine day in the opening spring.
Miss Hetty has just informed me that Mrs. Lane gave birth to a son a
few days ago, which they call John N. Lane. She heard it this morning
at market from Eskridge, whom I have not seen since last Sunday week.
I hope he will be here to-morrow.
The new Court House is to be erected on Newton Lightner’s corner. Its
location has caused much excitement in Lancaster. It enables your
sweetheart, Mr. Evans, Mr. Lightner and Mr. —— to sell their property
to advantage. We have no other news.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—Miss Harriet Lane to me; but Miss Harri_ette_ to the rest of man
and womankind.
[TO MISS LANE.]
SARATOGA SPRINGS, August 8, 1852.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I arrived at this place on Thursday evening last, and now on Sunday
morning before church am addressing you this note........ I find the
Springs very agreeable and the company very pleasant, yet there does
not appear to be so many of the “dashers” here as I have seen. The
crowd is very great, in fact it is quite a mob of fashionable folks.
Mrs. Plitt is very agreeable and quite popular. Mrs. Slidell is the
most gay, brilliant and fashionable lady at the Springs; and as I am
her admirer, and attached to her party, I am thus rendered a little
more conspicuous in the _beau monde_ than I could desire. Mrs. Rush
conducts herself very much like a lady, and is quite popular. She has
invited me to accompany her to Alboni’s concert to-morrow evening, and
I would rather go with her to any other place. Alboni is all the rage
here. I have seen and conversed with her, and am rather impressed in
her favor. She is short and thick, but has a very good, arch and
benevolent countenance. I shall, however, soon get tired of this
place, and do not expect to remain here longer than next Thursday. Not
having heard from you, I should have felt somewhat uneasy, had Mary
not written to Mrs. Plitt. I expect to be at home in two weeks from
the time I started. Mrs. Plitt desires me to send her love to you,
Mrs. Baker and Miss Hetty. Remember me affectionately to Mrs. Baker,
Miss Hetty and James Henry, and believe me to be
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Numerous public letters written by Mr. Buchanan in these years, 1851 and
1852, find their appropriate place here. They exhibit fully all his
sentiments and opinions on the topics which then agitated the country.
[TO COL. GEORGE R. FALL.[4]]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, Dec. 24th, 1851.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I am sorry I did not receive your letter sooner. I might then have
given it the “old-fashioned Democratic” answer which you desire. But I
am compelled to leave home immediately; and if I should not write at
the present moment, it will be too late for the 8th of January
Convention. I must therefore be brief.
My public life is before the country, and it is my pride never to have
evaded an important political question. The course of Democracy is
always straight ahead, and public men who determine to pursue it never
involve themselves in labyrinths, except when they turn to the right
or the left from the plain forward path. Madison’s Report and
Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolutions are the safest and surest guides to
conduct a Democratic administration of the Federal Government. It is
the true mission of Democracy to resist centralism and the absorption
of unconstitutional powers by the President and Congress. The
sovereignty of the States and a devotion to their reserved rights can
alone preserve and perpetuate our happy system of Government. The
exercise of doubtful and constructive powers on the part of Congress
has produced all the dangerous and exciting questions which have
imperilled the Union. The Federal Government, even confined within its
strict constitutional limits, must necessarily acquire more and more
influence through the increased and increasing expenditure of public
money, and hence the greater necessity for public economy and watchful
vigilance. Our Constitution, when it proceeded from the hands of its
framers, was a simple system; and the more free from complexity it
remains, the more powerfully, satisfactorily and beneficially will it
operate within its legitimate sphere.
It is centralization alone which has prevented the French people from
establishing a permanent republican government, and entailed upon them
so many misfortunes. Had the provinces of France been converted into
separate territorial provinces, like our State governments, Paris
would then no longer have been France, and a revolution at the capital
would not have destroyed the Federative Republic.
Had the principles I have enumerated been observed by the Federal
Government and by the people of the several States, we should have
avoided the alarming questions which have arisen out of the
institution of domestic slavery. The people of each State would then,
to employ a homely but expressive phrase, have attended to their own
business and not have interfered in the domestic concerns of their
sister States. But on this important subject I have so fully presented
my views in the enclosed letter to the great meeting in Philadelphia,
held in November, 1850, that it would be useless to repeat them, even
if time would permit.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 4:
From the _Mississippian_ of January 9, 1852.
[TO THE CENTRAL SOUTHERN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION OF VIRGINIA.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, April 10, 1851.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your kind letter of the 2d inst., with the resolutions
adopted by the Central Southern Rights Association of Virginia,
inviting me to address the Association at such time as may suit my
convenience, and to counsel with them “in regard to the best means to
be adopted in the present alarming crisis, for the maintenance of the
Constitution and the Union of these States in their original purity.”
I should esteem it both a high honor and a great privilege to comply
with this request, and therefore regret to say, that engagements,
which I need not specify, render it impossible for me to visit
Richmond during the present, or probably the next month.
The Association do me no more than justice, when attributing to me a
strong desire “for the maintenance of the Constitution, and the Union
of the States in their original purity.”
Whilst few men in this country would venture to avow a different
sentiment, yet the question still remains, by what means can this
all-important purpose be accomplished? I feel no hesitation in
answering, by returning to the old Virginia platform of State rights,
prescribed by the resolutions of 1798, and Mr. Madison’s report. The
powers conferred by the Constitution upon the General Government, must
be construed strictly, and Congress must abstain from the exercise of
all doubtful powers. But it is said these are mere unmeaning
abstractions—and so they are, unless honestly carried into practice.
Like the Christian faith, however, when it is genuine, good results
will inevitably flow from a sincere belief in such a strict
construction of the Constitution.
Were this old republican principle adopted in practice, we should no
longer witness unwarrantable and dangerous attempts in Congress to
interfere with the institution of domestic slavery, which belongs
exclusively to the States where it exists—there would be no efforts to
establish high protective tariffs—the public money would not be
squandered upon a general system of internal improvements—general in
name, but particular in its very nature, and corrupting in its
tendency, both to the Government and to the people; and we would
retrench our present extravagant expenditure, pay our national debt,
and return to the practice of a wise economy, so essential to public
and private prosperity. Were I permitted to address your Association,
these are the counsels I should give, and some of the topics I should
discuss, as the best means “for the maintenance both of the
Constitution and the Union of the States, in their original purity,”
and for the perpetuation of our great and glorious confederacy.
With sentiments of high regard, I remain yours, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO SHELTON F. LEAKE, ESQ., AND OTHER GENTLEMEN.[5]]
Footnote 5:
From the _Lancaster Intelligencer_, February 24, 1852.
RICHMOND, February 12, 1852.
GENTLEMEN:—
On my arrival in this city last evening I received your very kind
letter, welcoming me to the metropolis of the Old Dominion and
tendering me the honor of a public dinner. I regret—deeply regret—that
my visit to Richmond will necessarily be so brief that I cannot enjoy
the pleasure and the privilege of meeting you all at the festive
board. Intending merely to pass a day with my valued friend, Judge
Mason, my previous arrangements are of such a character that I must
leave here to-morrow, or, at the latest, on Saturday morning.
But whilst I cannot accept the dinner, I shall ever esteem the
invitation from so many of Virginia’s most distinguished and estimable
sons as one of the proudest honors of my life. Your ancient and
renowned commonwealth has ever been the peculiar guardian of State
rights and the firm supporter of constitutional liberty, of law, and
of order. When, therefore, she endorses with her approbation any of my
poor efforts to serve the country, her commendation is a sure
guarantee that these have been devoted to a righteous cause.
You are pleased to refer in favorable terms to my recent conduct “at
home in defence of the Federal Constitution and laws.” This was an
easy and agreeable task, because the people of Pennsylvania have ever
been as loyal and faithful to the Constitution, the Union, the rights
of the sovereign States of which it is composed, as the people of the
ancient Dominion themselves. To have pursued a different course in my
native State would therefore, have been to resist the strong current
of enlightened public opinion.
I purposely refrain from discussing the original merit of the
Compromise, because I consider it, to employ the expressive language
of the day, as a “finality”—a fixed fact—a most important enactment of
law, the agitation or disturbance of which could do no possible good,
but might produce much positive evil. Our noble vessel of State,
freighted with the hope of mankind, both for the present and future
generations, has passed through the most dangerous breakers which she
has ever encountered, and has triumphantly ridden out the storm. Both
those who supported the measures of the Compromise as just and
necessary, and those who, regarding them in a different light, yet
acquiesce in them for the sake of the Union, have arrived at the same
conclusion—that it must and shall be executed. They have thus, for
every practical purpose, adopted the same platform, and have resolved
to sustain it against the common enemy.—Why, then, should they
wrangle, and divide and waste their energies, not respecting the main
question, which has already been definitely settled, but in regard to
the process which has brought them, though from different directions,
to the same conclusion? Above all, why should the strength of the
Democratic party of the country be impaired and its ascendency be
jeoparded for any such cause? We who believe that the triumph of
Democratic principles is essential not only to the prosperity of the
Union, but even to the preservation of the Constitution, ought
reciprocally to forget, and, if need be, to forgive the past, and
cordially unite with our political brethren in sustaining for the
future the good old cause of Democracy. It must be a source of deep
and lasting pleasure to every patriotic heart that our beloved country
has so happily passed through the late trying and dangerous crisis.
The volcano has been extinguished, I trust, forever; and the man who
would apply a firebrand, at the present moment, to the combustible
materials which still remain, may produce an eruption to overwhelm
both the Constitution and the Union.
With sentiments of high and grateful respect,
I remain your fellow citizen,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO JOHN NELSON, WM. F. GILES, JOHN O. WHARTON, JOHN MORRIS, CARROLL
SPENCE, AND OTHER CITIZENS OF BALTIMORE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, February 3, 1852.
GENTLEMEN:—
In returning home through your city on Saturday last, I had the
unexpected honor of receiving your kind invitation to partake of a
public dinner at such time as might best suit my own convenience. For
this distinguished and valuable token of your regard, please to accept
my most grateful acknowledgments; and, whilst regretting that
circumstances, which it would be too tedious to explain, will deprive
me of the pleasure of meeting you at the festive board, you may rest
assured that I shall ever highly prize the favorable opinion you
express of my poor public services.
To the city of Baltimore I have ever been attached by strong ties. In
early life I had selected it as the place where to practice my
profession; and nothing prevented me from carrying this purpose into
effect but my invincible reluctance, at the last moment, to leave my
native State. The feeling which prompted me in 1814, during the last
war with Great Britain, to march as a private to Baltimore, a
circumstance to which you kindly allude, resulted from a patriotism so
universal throughout Pennsylvania, that the honor which may fall to
the lot of any one of the thousands of my fellow-citizens who
volunteered their services on that trying occasion, scarcely deserves
to be mentioned.
If I rightly read “the signs of the times,” there has seldom been a
period when the Democratic party of the country, to which you and I
are warmly attached, was in greater danger of suffering a defeat than
at the present moment. In order to avert this catastrophe, we must
mutually forget and forgive past dissensions, suffer “bygones to be
bygones,” and commence a new career, keeping constantly in view the
ancient and long established landmarks of the party. Most, if not all
the great questions of policy which formerly divided us from our
political opponents, have been settled in our favor. No person, at
this day, thinks of re-establishing another national bank, or
repealing the Independent Treasury, or distributing the proceeds of
the public lands among the several States, or abolishing the veto
power. On these great and important questions, the Whigs, after a long
and violent struggle, have yielded; and, for the present, at least,
would seem to stand upon the Democratic platform. The compromise
measures are now a “finality”—those who opposed them honestly and
powerfully, and who still believe them to be wrong, having
patriotically determined to acquiesce in them for the sake of the
Union, provided they shall be faithfully carried into execution.
On what issues, then, can we go before the country and confidently
calculate upon the support of the American people at the approaching
Presidential election? I answer unhesitatingly that we must fall back,
as you suggest, upon those fundamental and time-honored principles
which have divided us from our political opponents since the
beginning, and which from the very nature of the Federal Constitution,
must continue to divide us from them until the end. We must inscribe
upon our banners a sacred regard for the reserved rights of the
States—a strict construction of the Constitution—a denial to Congress
of all powers not clearly granted by that instrument, and a rigid
economy in public expenditures.
These expenditures have now reached the enormous sum of fifty millions
of dollars per annum, and, unless arrested in their advance by the
strong arm of the Democracy of the country, may, in the course of a
few years, reach one hundred millions. The appropriation of money to
accomplish great national objects sanctioned by the Constitution,
ought to be on a scale commensurate with our power and resources as a
nation—but its expenditure ought to be conducted under the guidance of
enlightened economy and strict responsibility. I am convinced that our
expenses might be considerably reduced below the present standard, not
only without detriment, but with positive advantage both to the
government and the people.
An excessive and lavish expenditure of public money, though in itself
highly pernicious, is as nothing when compared with the disastrous
influence it may exert upon the character of our free institutions. A
strong tendency towards extravagance is the great political evil of
the present day; and this ought to be firmly resisted. Congress is now
incessantly importuned from every quarter to make appropriations for
all sorts of projects. Money, money from the National Treasury is
constantly demanded to enrich contractors, speculators, and agents;
and these projects are gilded over with every allurement which can be
imparted to them by ingenuity and talent. Claims which had been
condemned by former decisions and had become rusty with age have been
again revived, and have been paid, principal and interest. Indeed
there seems to be one general rush to obtain money from the Treasury
on any and every pretence.
What will be the inevitable consequence of such lavish expenditures?
Are they not calculated to disturb the nicely adjusted balance between
the Federal and State Governments, upon the preservation of which
depend the harmony and efficiency of our system? Greedy expectants
from the Federal Treasury will regard with indifference, if not with
contempt, the governments of the several States. The doctrine of State
rights will be laughed to scorn by such individuals, as an obsolete
abstraction unworthy of the enlightened spirit of the age. The
corrupting power of money will be felt throughout the length and
breadth of this land; and the Democracy, led on by the hero and sage
of the Hermitage, will have in vain put down the Bank of the United
States, if the same fatal influence for which it was condemned, shall
be exerted and fostered by means drawn from the Public Treasury.
To be liberal with their own money but sparing of that of the Republic
was the glory of distinguished public servants among the ancient
Romans. When this maxim was reversed, and the public money was
employed by artful and ambitious demagogues to secure their own
aggrandizement, genuine liberty soon expired. It is true that the
forms of the Republic continued for many years; but the animating and
inspiring soul had fled forever. I entertain no serious apprehensions
that we shall ever reach this point, yet we may still profit by their
example.
With sentiments of the highest respect, I remain your friend and
fellow-citizen,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
To these should be added an address made at a festival in Philadelphia
on the 11th of January, 1851, on the establishment of a line of
steamships between that city and Liverpool. The account is taken from
the journals of the time.
After Governor Johnston had concluded, Morton McMichael came forward,
and said that he had been instructed by the Committee of Arrangements
to propose the health of an eminent Pennsylvanian who was then
present—one who had represented his State in the National legislative
councils, and had occupied a chief place in the administration of the
National Government, and in regard to whom, however political
differences might exist, all agreed that his high talents, his
unsullied integrity, and his distinguished public services had justly
placed him in the foremost rank, not only of Pennsylvanians, but of
all Americans. He therefore gave
The health of the Hon. James Buchanan.
When Mr. Buchanan rose to reply, there was a whirlwind of cheers and
applause. In the midst of it the band struck up a favorite and
complimentary air, at the end of which the cheering was renewed, and
several minutes elapsed before he could be heard.
Mr. Buchanan, after making his acknowledgments to the company for the
kind manner in which he had been received, proceeded to speak as
follows:—
What a spectacle does this meeting present! It must be a source of
pride and gratification to every true-hearted Pennsylvanian. Here are
assembled the executive and legislative authorities of the
commonwealth, several members from the State to the present Congress,
as well as those elected to the next, and the Board of Canal
Commissioners, enjoying the magnificent hospitality of the city and
the incorporated districts adjacent—all of which, in fact, constitute
but one great city of Philadelphia.
What important event in the history of Philadelphia is this meeting
intended to celebrate? Not a victory achieved by our arms over a
foreign foe. Not the advent amongst us of a great military captain
fresh from the bloody fields of his glory; but the arrival here of a
peaceful commercial steamer from the other side of the Atlantic. This
welcome stranger is destined, as we all trust, to be the harbinger of
a rapidly increasing foreign trade between our own city and the great
commercial city of Liverpool. All hail to Captain Matthews and his
gallant crew! Peace, as well as war, has its triumphs; and these,
although they may not be so brilliant, are far more enduring and
useful to mankind.
The establishment of a regular line of steamers between these two
ports will prove of vast importance both to the city of Philadelphia
and the State at large. And here, let me observe, that the interests
of the city and the State are identical—inseparable. Like man and
wife, when a well-assorted couple, they are mutually dependent. The
welfare and prosperity of the one are the welfare and prosperity of
the other. “Those whom Heaven has joined together, let not man put
asunder.” If any jealousies, founded or unfounded, have heretofore
existed between them, let them be banished from this day forward and
forever. Let them be in the “deep bosom of the ocean buried.”
The great Central Railroad will furnish the means of frequent and
rapid intercommunication between the city and the State. In the course
of another year, Philadelphia will be brought within twelve or
fourteen hours of our Great Iron City of the West—a city of as much
energy and enterprise for the number of inhabitants, as any on the
face of the earth; and, I might add, of as warm and generous
hospitality. I invite you all, in the name of the people of the
interior, to visit us oftener than you have done heretofore. You shall
receive a hearty welcome. Let us become better acquainted, and we
shall esteem each other more.
But will this great undertaking to extend the foreign commerce of
Philadelphia with Europe, by means of regular lines of steamers, prove
successful? To doubt this is to doubt whether the capital,
intelligence, and perseverance, which have assured signal success to
Philadelphia in every other industrial pursuit, shall fail when
applied to steam navigation on the ocean. But after to-night there can
be “no such word as fail” in our vocabulary. We have put our hand to
the plough, and we must go ahead. We dare not, because we cannot, look
back without disgrace; whilst success in foreign commerce will be the
capsheaf—the crowning glory of Philadelphia.
The distance of Philadelphia from the ocean, and the consequent length
of river navigation, have hitherto constituted an obstacle to her
success in foreign trade. Thanks to the genius of Fulton, this
obstacle has been removed, and the noble Delaware, for every purpose
of foreign commerce, is as if it were an arm of the sea. We learn from
the highest authority, that of the pioneer who was an officer in one
of the first steamers which ever crossed the Atlantic, and who has
successfully completed his ninety-ninth voyage, that the difference in
time from Liverpool between New York and Philadelphia is only about
twenty hours. This is comparatively of no importance, and cannot have
the slightest effect on the success of the enterprise.
Fulton was a native citizen of Pennsylvania. He was born in the county
where I reside. And shall not the metropolis of the native State of
that extraordinary man who, first of the human race, successfully
applied steam power to navigation, enjoy the benefits of this
momentous discovery which has changed the whole face of the civilized
world? Philadelphia, in her future career, will gloriously answer this
question.
Philadelphia enjoys many advantages for the successful pursuit of
foreign commerce. Her population now exceeds 400,000; and it is a
population of which we may be justly proud. It is of no mushroom
growth; but has advanced steadily onward. Her immense capital is the
result of long years of successful industry and enterprise. Strength
and durability characterize all her undertakings. She has already
achieved distinguished success in manufactures, in the mechanic arts,
in domestic commerce, and in every other industrial pursuit, and in
the natural progress of events, she has now determined to devote her
energies to foreign commerce.
And where is there a city in the world, whose ship-yards produce finer
vessels? Whether for beauty of model, rapidity of sailing, or
durability, Philadelphia built vessels have long enjoyed the highest
character. Long as I have been in the public councils, I have never
known a vessel of war built in this city, not fully equal to any of
her class afloat on the waters of the world. A few weeks since I had
the pleasure of examining the steamer Susquehanna, and I venture to
say, that a nobler vessel can nowhere be found. She will bear the
stars and the stripes triumphantly amid the battle and the breeze. May
we not hope that Philadelphia steamers will, ere long, be found
bearing her trade and her name on every sea, and into every great
commercial port on the face of this earth?
The vast resources of the State which will be poured into the lap of
Philadelphia, will furnish the materials of an extensive foreign
commerce. And here, in the presence of this domestic family
Pennsylvania circle, may we not indulge in a little self-gratulation,
and may we not be pardoned, if nobody else will praise us, for
praising ourselves. We have every reason to be proud of our State; and
perhaps we ought to cherish a little more State pride than we possess.
This, when not carried to excess, when it scorns to depreciate a
rival, is a noble and useful principle of action. It is the parent of
generous emulation in the pursuit of all that is excellent, all that
is calculated to adorn and bless mankind. It enkindles the desire in
us to stand as high as the highest among our sister States, in the
councils of our country, in the pursuit of agriculture and
manufactures and every useful art. This honorable feeling of State
pride, particularly when the Pennsylvanian is abroad, out of his
native land, will make his heart swell with exultation, if he finds
that Philadelphia has become a great commercial city, her flag waving
over every sea, her steamers to be seen in every port—an elevated
position in which Philadelphia, if she but wills it, can undoubtedly
be placed.
The great and good founder of our State, whose precept and whose
practice was “peace on earth, and good will to man,” immediately after
he had obtained the royal charter, in the spirit of prophetic
enthusiasm declared, “God will bless, and make it the seed of a
nation. I shall have a tender care of the government that it be well
laid at first.”
How gloriously this prediction has been verified! God has blessed it,
and the seed which the founder sowed has borne the richest fruit. We
are indeed a nation, confederated with thirty other sovereign nations
or States by the most sacred political instrument in the annals of
mankind, called the Constitution of the United States. Besides, we are
truly the keystone of this vast confederacy, and our character and
position eminently qualify us to act as a mediator between opposing
extremes. Placed in the centre, between the North and the South, with
a population distinguished for patriotism and steady good sense, and a
devoted love to the Union, we stand as the days man, between the
extremes, and can declare with the voice of power to both, hitherto
shalt thou go, and no further. May this Union endure forever, the
source of innumerable blessings to those who live under its beneficent
sway, and the star of hope to millions of down-trodden men throughout
the world!
Bigotry has never sacrificed its victims at the shrine of intolerance
in this our favored State. When they were burning witches in
Massachusetts, honestly believing at the time they were doing God’s
service, William Penn, in 1684, presided at the trial of a witch.
Under his direction, the verdict was: “The prisoner is guilty of the
common fame of being a witch; but not guilty as she stands indicted.”
And “in Penn’s domain, from that day to this,” says the gifted
historian, “neither demon nor hag ever rode through the air on goat or
broomstick.”
From the first settlement of the province until the present moment,
the freedom of conscience established by the founder, has been
perfect. Religion has always been a question exclusively between man
and his Creator, and every human being has been free to worship his
Maker according to the dictates of his own conscience.
Bigotry, madly assuming to itself an attribute belonging to the
Almighty, has never attempted to punish any one of his creatures for
not adapting his belief to its own standard of faith. We have great
cause to be proud of the early history of Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania, more than any other State of the Union, has been settled
by emigrants from all the European nations. Our population now exceeds
two millions and a quarter; but we cannot say that it is composed of
the pure Anglo-Saxon race. The English, the Germans, the Scotch Irish,
the Irish, the Welsh, the French, and emigrants from every other
European country have all intermingled upon our happy soil. We are
truly a mixed race. And is not this a cause for self-gratulation?
Providence, as if to designate his will that families and nations
should cultivate extended intercourse with each other, has decreed
that intermarriage in the same family shall eventually produce a
miserable and puny race, both in body and in mind; whilst
intermarriages among entire strangers have been signally blessed. May
it then not be probable that the intermixture of the natives of the
different nations is calculated to produce a race superior to any one
of the elements of which it is composed. Let us hope that we possess
the good qualities of all, without a large share of the evil qualities
of either. Certain it is that in Pennsylvania we can boast of a
population which for energy, for patient industry, and for strict
morality, are unsurpassed by the people of any other country.
And what is her condition at present? Heaven has blessed us with a
climate which, notwithstanding its variations, is equal to almost any
other on the face of the earth, and a soil capable of furnishing all
the agricultural products of the temperate zone. And how have we
improved these advantages? In agriculture we have excelled. I have
myself been over a good portion of the best cultivated parts of the
world; but never anywhere, in any country, have I witnessed such
evidences of real substantial comfort and prosperity, such farm-houses
and barns, as are to be found in Pennsylvania. It is true we cannot
boast of baronial castles, and of extensive parks and pleasure
grounds, and of all the other appendages of wealth and aristocracy
which beautify and adorn the scenery of other countries. These can
only exist in countries where the soil is monopolized by wealthy
proprietors and where the farms are consequently occupied by a
dependent tenantry. Thank Heaven! in this country, every man of
industry and economy, with the blessings of Providence upon his honest
labor, can acquire a freehold for himself, and sit under his own vine
and his own fig tree, and there shall be none to make him afraid.
Then in regard to our mineral wealth. We have vast masses of coal and
iron scattered with a profuse hand under the surface of our soil.
These are far more valuable than the golden sands and golden ore of
California. The patient labor necessary to extract these treasures
from the earth, and bring them to market, strengthens the sinews of
the laborer, makes him self-reliant and dependent upon his own
exertions, infuses courage into the heart, and produces a race capable
of maintaining their liberties at home and of defending their country
against any and every foreign foe. Look at your neighboring town of
Richmond. There three millions of tons of coal are annually brought to
market, and the domestic tonnage employed for sending it abroad
exceeds the whole foreign tonnage of the city of New York. All these
vast productions of our agriculture and our mines are the natural
aliments of foreign commerce for the city of Philadelphia.
But this is not all. Our Central Railroad will soon be completed; and
when this is finished, it will furnish the avenue by which the
productions of the great West will seek a market in Philadelphia. It
will connect with a chain of numerous other railroads, penetrating the
vast valley of the Mississippi in different directions, which will
bring the productions of that extended region to seek a market in
Philadelphia.
And with these unexampled materials for foreign commerce, is it
possible that the city of Philadelphia will hold back? Will she not
employ her capital in a vigorous effort to turn to her own advantage
all these elements of wealth which Providence has placed within her
reach? What is the smallest share of foreign commerce to which she is
legitimately entitled? It is at least to import into Philadelphia all
the foreign goods necessary for the supply of Pennsylvania and the far
West, which seek her markets for their productions. She is bound, by
every principle of interest and duty, to bring to her own wharves this
amount of foreign trade, and never as a Pennsylvanian shall I rest
satisfied until she shall have attained this measure of success. Shall
she then tamely look on and suffer her great rival city, of which
every American ought to be proud, to monopolize the profit and
advantages to which she is justly and fairly entitled? Shall New York
continue to be the importing city for Philadelphia? Shall she any
longer be taunted with the imputation that so far as foreign trade is
concerned, she is a mere provincial and dependent city? She can, if
she but energetically wills it, change this course of trade so
disadvantageous to her character and her interests; and the
proceedings of this meeting afford abundant assurances that from this
day forth she is destined to enter upon a new and glorious career. She
must be prepared to encounter and to overcome serious competition. She
must therefore nerve her arm for the struggle. The struggle is worthy
of her most determined efforts.
CHAPTER II.
1852.
THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS OF 1852—ELECTION OF GENERAL FRANKLIN PIERCE
TO THE PRESIDENCY—BUCHANAN’S COURSE IN REGARD TO THE NOMINATION AND
THE ELECTION—HIS EFFORTS TO DEFEAT THE WHIG CANDIDATE.
In arraying themselves for the Presidential election of 1852, the
Democratic and the Whig parties might have had an equal or a nearly
equal reason to look for success, if they had been equally consistent
with their professed principles on the subject of the compromise
measures of 1850. But while the Democrats, both by their “platform” and
their candidate, gave the people of the country reason to believe that
the great national settlement of 1850 was to be adhered to, the Whigs,
although promising as much by their “platform,” did not, in the person
of their candidate and his apparent political connections, afford the
same grounds of confidence. The nominating convention of the Democrats
was the first to be held. It assembled at Baltimore on the 1st of June,
1852. Mr. Buchanan was one of the principal candidates for the
nomination, but it soon became apparent that neither he, General Cass,
Mr. Douglas, Mr. Dickinson, Governor Marcy, or any other of the more
prominent leaders of the party would receive it. The candidate finally
agreed upon was General Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire, a younger man
than most of the others. He had been a Senator in Congress from that
State for five years preceding 1842, and had served with spirit in the
Mexican war as a Brigadier General of Volunteers. As a candidate for the
Presidency, he represented in the fullest and most unqualified manner
the resolution adopted by the convention as a part of its “platform,”
and which pledged him and his party to “resist all attempts at renewing
in Congress, or out of it, the agitation of the slavery question, under
whatever shape or color the attempt may be made.”
On the other hand, the Whig convention, which assembled at Baltimore on
the 16th of June, nominated General Winfield Scott, to the exclusion of
Mr. Webster and President Fillmore, after fifty-two ballotings; and
although the resolutions, with a strength equal to that of the
Democratic “platform,” affirmed the binding character of the compromise
measures of 1850, and opposed all further agitation of the questions
thus settled, as dangerous to the peace of the country, seventy
delegates from free States, who had voted steadily for General Scott as
the candidate, recorded their votes against this resolution, and many
Whig papers in the North refused to be bound by it, and treated it with
utter contumely. The result was the election of General Pierce as
President, and William R. King of Alabama as Vice President, by the
almost unprecedented majority of one hundred and five electoral votes
more than was necessary for a choice. General Scott obtained the
electoral votes of but four States, Massachusetts, Vermont, Kentucky and
Tennessee; forty-two in all.
The reader will be interested to learn from the following private
correspondence how Mr. Buchanan felt and acted before and after the
nomination of General Pierce, and also how one of his prominent rivals,
Governor Marcy, felt and acted towards him and others. It is refreshing
to look back to the good nature and cool philosophy which could be
exhibited by such men in regard to the great stake of the Presidency:
[GOVERNOR MARCY TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
ALBANY, May 31, 1852.
MY DEAR SIR:—
When your very kind letter of the 19th inst. was received, my time was
much taken up by several transient persons passing through this place
to Baltimore for a certain grave purpose. I delayed a reply to it
until this annoyance should be over, but before that happened, I was
unexpectedly called to New York, and have but just returned. This is
my excuse for a seeming neglect.
I assure you I rejoice as much as you do at the removal of all
obstructions, real or imaginary, to the resumption of our free and
friendly correspondence. I needed not your assurance to satisfy me
that your course towards me had been fair and liberal, and you do me
but justice in believing mine has been the same toward you.
Perhaps there has been a single departure from it, which in candor I
am bound to confess, and hope to be able to avoid.
On being called to New York a few days ago, when the delegates were
passing on to Baltimore, Mrs. Marcy proposed to accompany me, but as
she is a zealous advocate of yours, and on that subject has a
propagandist’s spirit, I did not wish to have her associated too
intimately with these delegates, particularly such of them as had
favorable inclinations towards me. I suggested, therefore, that it
would be best for her to delay for a short time her visit.
This little battery (excuse a military figure of speech) has kept up a
brisk fire for you. To this I have not made much objection, but I did
not wish to do anything myself to put it in a position where it would
bear particularly on my friends in this critical moment of the
contest. I submit to your candor to decide whether, if you had a
wife—would that you had one—a glib-tongued wife, who was ever pressing
my pretensions over your own, would you not have manœuvered a
little to restrict her operations, under reversed, but otherwise
similar circumstances? If you declare against my course in this
instance, I shall think you err, and ascribe your error to the fact
that for want of experience you do not know the potency of such an
adversary. An enemy in the camp is more dangerous than one outside of
it.
While in New York, I conversed with many delegates from various
sections of the country and of all kinds of preferences. From what I
heard, I became more and more apprehensive of serious difficulties at
Baltimore. If it be mere preferences the convention will have to
contend with, it might get on without much trouble, but I thought I
discovered a strong feeling of antagonism in too many of the
delegates, particularly towards those who stand in a hopeful position.
Still, I cherish a strong hope of an auspicious result to the party.
If you, who have such fair prospects, have schooled yourself into a
sort of philosophical indifference as to the result, you can readily
conceive how complaisantly I, who scarcely have a place on the list of
those that hope they shall receive it, look upon the result. Those who
never climb up cannot reasonably dread to break their limbs by a fall.
You, too, have got into a “Scott correspondence.” I have read your
letter with pleasure and satisfaction; it goes the whole figure as it
ought to at this time. I had no difficulty in my response except in
regard to the exercise of the veto power. I cannot but think that is a
promise “not fit to be made,” but any objection to meeting it directly
would have been construed to mean more than was intended, and I
responded to that as I did to the other interrogatories.
Very much to my surprise, but not so much to my regret, I find in the
_Journal of Commerce_ of Saturday, two of my private letters, written
last summer to a leading barn-burner, Hon. John Fine, formerly a M. C.
from Governor Wright’s county. They will serve to vindicate my course
and repel the charge much urged against me by Mr. Dickinson and a few
others, of having compromised my position on the adjustment measure in
order to conciliate that section of the party.
The course I pursued towards them, and from which I have never
swerved, but have succeeded in carrying out, is clearly disclosed in
these letters. I had no agency in bringing them out. I have not seen
them since they were written, and did not know that they were to be
published.
Mr. Dickinson and a few of his friends are very decided—not to say
bitter—against me, and scarcely less so against all the other
candidates except General Cass. They are professedly for him. Mr. D.’s
friends—it would be uncharitable to say he himself has any such
thoughts—hope to bring about his nomination, and are shaping things so
far as they can for such a result. They believe that his and their
advocacy of General Cass, and sturdy opposition to all others, will
give him nearly all of the General’s friends in the event he has to be
abandoned, an event which will not deeply grieve them; and they
flatter themselves that the great favor with which Mr. D. is regarded
in the South will render it easy to detach from you and transfer to
him most of your supporters in that quarter. If you and General Cass
are killed off, and he inherits the estate of both, his fortune will
certainly be made. I do not comment upon the practicability of this
theory. Well, if he is nominated, we must turn in and do what we can
for him. Here, where he has been so bitter against the C——rs and
against me, because they are willing to give me their support—where he
denounces them as not belonging to the Democratic party—we shall have
a hard task on our hands, and can hardly hope to give him the vote of
the State; it will therefore be the more necessary that you and your
friends should secure for him that of Pennsylvania. I know it is not
kind to speculate on the chances of another rising upon your downfall,
and therefore I will dismiss the subject; nor is it friendly to
trouble you with this long letter at a critical conjuncture, when you
want your time to cheer and guide your friends at Baltimore.
My epistle would be defective if it did not contain Mrs. M.’s express
desire to be kindly remembered to you.
Yours truly,
W. L. MARCY.
[MARCY TO BUCHANAN.]
ALBANY, June 6, 1852.
MY DEAR SIR:—
In my most hopeful mood, if it can be truly said I have been in such a
state of mind, I did not look to anything but a remote contingent
remainder. I cannot, therefore, say that for myself I feel any
disappointment at the result of the convention.
None of its proceedings—not even some of the latter
ballottings—changed my settled convictions. There was a time when
reflecting sober-minded men felt more than I expected they would feel
at the prospect of success of Young America. Some of the agents and
agencies at work in that direction caused considerable alarm.
I hope the course of my few friends in the convention has given no
dissatisfaction. If they had earlier quitted me, they could not have
gone together for any one, though some would have gone for you. I fear
more than half would have acted with the friends of Cass and Douglas.
They were about equally divided between hunkers and barn-burners, and
it seems to me that no course they could have taken could have changed
the result.
About the time the ballotting commenced, I met with a passage in the
last number of the _Edinburgh Review_ which struck me as ominous of
your fate, and as it is as good consolation as I can offer you, I will
extract it, though it is rather long:
“Men (says Chamfort, a French writer) are like the fiends of
Milton—they must make themselves dwarfs before they can enter into the
Pandemonium of political life in a Republic. (Perhaps, if nature has
made them dwarfs, it is the same thing.) Even in America it is
notorious that men of this stamp (men of pre-eminent genius and
abilities) are all but systematically excluded from high public
office, and at best she recognizes only a single Webster among a
wilderness of Jacksons and Harrisons, Taylors and Scotts.”
“And they must learn per force, painful as the truth must be, that
commanding talents, especially of their order, are not really in
request or needed for the ordinary work of democracy or autocracy.” I
protest against the error in classing Jackson, yet there is in this
extract some consolation for yourself and General Cass.
It does not suit my case, and moreover I am not in a condition to
require consolation either from profane or sacred writings.
What do you think of the nomination of General Pierce? For our own
State, I think it is about as well as any other that could have been
made. I do not like to make an exception. We cannot make much out of
his military services, but he is a likeable man, and has as much of
“Young America” as we want.
I should like to read a letter of sage reflections from you about this
time, as you are of my sect—a _political optimist_, not a better
scholar—I know it will not take you long to digest your
disappointment; but what will your State feel and say in regard to the
result? This is a matter of public concernment. I should like to have
your speculations on that point.
There is a person in my house who has been more solicitous about the
ballotting on your account than on mine and at times exhibited much
exultation at your prospects. Her disappointment is greater than that
of any other one under its roof.
I console her by an assurance of what I really feel, that you or any
one else, so far as happiness is concerned, are better off without a
nomination than with one, even if it was sure to be followed by an
election.
Yours truly,
WM. L. MARCY.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO THE HON. DAVID R. PORTER.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, June 4, 1852.
MY DEAR SIR:—
From the result of the ballottings yesterday, I deem it highly
improbable that I shall receive the nomination. The question will
doubtless be finally decided before this can reach you; and I desire
to say in advance that my everlasting gratitude is due to the
Pennsylvania delegation, the Virginia delegation, and the other
Southern delegations for their adherence to me throughout the
ballottings of yesterday. I can say, with the most sincere truth, that
I feel far more deeply the disappointment of my friends than my own
disappointment. This has not, and will not, cost me a single pang.
After a long and stormy public life, I shall go into final retirement
without regret, and with a perfect consciousness that I have done my
duty faithfully to my country in all the public situations in which I
have been placed. I had cherished the belief that the Democracy of
Pennsylvania had claims upon the Democracy of the country, which if
asserted by the proper men in the proper spirit would be recognized in
my favor. It seems I have been entirely mistaken both as regards my
own standing and the influence of my State. I should not have believed
this, had not our claims been presented and urged by a faithful and
able delegation, fully equal, if not superior, to any which it was in
the power of the State to send.
It is possible, should the nomination for the Presidency fall upon a
Southern gentleman, that a proposition may be made to give
Pennsylvania the Vice Presidency. Should such a contingency arise,
which is not very probable, I shall not, under any circumstances,
consent to the employment of my name in connection with that office.
Indeed should I be nominated for it by the convention, _I would most
assuredly decline_. It is the very last office under the Government I
would desire to hold, and it would be no honor bestowed on good old
Pennsylvania to have it conferred upon one of her sons.
When I speak of final retirement, I only mean that I shall never hold
another office. I shall always feel and take an interest in favor of
the Democratic cause; and this not only for the sake of principle, but
to enable me to serve friends to whom I owe so much.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO THE HON. CAVE JOHNSON.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, June 24, 1852.
MY DEAR SIR:—
If it were possible for me to complain of your conduct, I should give
you a good scolding for not performing your promise. We were all
anxiously expecting you at Wheatland from day to day; and if you had
informed me you could not come I certainly should have met you in
Philadelphia. I was very anxious to see you, and now God only knows
when we shall meet. Whilst life endures, however, gratitude for your
friendship and support shall remain deeply engraved on my heart.
I never felt any longing or anxious desire to be the President, and my
disappointment did not cost me a single pang. My friends were faithful
and true, and their efforts deserved if they could not command
success. Personally, I am entirely satisfied with the result. When
opportunity offers, I hope you will not fail to present my grateful
acknowledgments to Generals Laferty and Polk, and to Messrs. Smith,
Thomas and Shepherd, for their kind and valuable support in the hour
of trial.
It is vain to disguise the fact that Pennsylvania is, to say the
least, a doubtful State. I much fear the result. If defeated, no blame
shall attach to me. I will do my duty to the party and the country.
Both personally and politically General Pierce and Colonel King are
highly acceptable to myself. What an inconsistent race the Whigs are!
They have now ostensibly abandoned their old principles, and placed
themselves on the Democratic platform—Fugitive Slave Law and all. From
this we may expect river and harbor improvements intended to catch the
Southwest; and such a modification of a revenue tariff as they knew
would exactly correspond with the wishes of the Democratic ironmasters
of Pennsylvania. I, however, indulge the hope, nay, the belief, that
Pierce and King can be elected without the vote of Pennsylvania.
I was in my native county of Franklin a few days ago, and whilst there
went to see a respectable farmer and miller, who had ever been a true
and disinterested Democrat. I had been told he would not vote for
Pierce and King, and being both a personal and political friend of my
own, I thought I could change his purpose. In conversation he very
soon told me he would never vote for Pierce. I asked if he would
abandon the principles of his life and vote for the Whig candidate. He
said he never had given and never would give a Whig vote. I reasoned
with him a long time, but in vain. He said the Democracy of the
country ought not to suffer the national convention to usurp the right
of making any man they pleased a candidate before the people. That if
the people yielded this, then a corrupt set of men who got themselves
elected delegates, might, in defiance of the people’s will, always
make a President to suit their own views. That the Democracy had but
one mode of putting this down, and that was, not to ratify the choice
of the convention. He said that for himself he had felt very much
inclined to oppose Mr. Polk for this reason, but had yielded and given
him a cordial support; but if the same game were successfully played a
second time, then the national convention and not the people would
select the President, and the most gross corruption and fraud would be
the consequence. He disliked both General Cass and Mr. Douglas; but
said he would have supported either, because they were known, their
claims had been publicly discussed, and each had a large body of
friends in the Democratic party, and there must be a yielding among
the friends of the different candidates brought forward by the people
of the country.
These were the reasons which my friend gave in the course of a long
conversation. I state them to you, not that the withholding of his
individual vote is of any great importance, but to show how many
Democrats feel. I had heard the same reasons before among the people,
but not so fully discussed; and my letter, published in the _Union_ of
yesterday morning, had a special view to these objections.
They could have scarcely made a respectable fight against me in
Pennsylvania. In many counties my nomination would have shivered the
Whig party. In this county, where the Whig majority at a full election
is 5,000, I do not believe they could have obtained a majority of 500.
But this is all past and gone.
Miss Hetty has but little expectation of being able to procure you a
suitable housekeeper. She will try, however, and should she fall upon
one, will write to you.
Please to present my kindest regards to Mrs. Garland and the little
boys and girls, and believe me ever to be,
Your faithful and grateful friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO JOHN BINNS, ESQ.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, July 26, 1852.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Although I have too long omitted to answer your kind letter, yet you
may rest assured I sympathized with you deeply in your affliction for
the loss of her who had so long been the partner of your joys and your
sorrows.
My own disappointment did not cost me a single pang. I felt it far
more on account of my friends than myself. Faithful and devoted as
they have been, it would have afforded me heartfelt pleasure to
testify my gratitude by something more substantial than words.
Although I should have assumed the duties of the office with cheerful
confidence, yet I know from near observation that it is a crown of
thorns. Its cares carried Mr. Polk to a premature grave, and the next
four years will probably embrace the most trying period of our
history. May God grant us a safe deliverance! With all due admiration
for the military services of General Scott, I should consider his
election a serious calamity for the country.
General Pierce is a sound radical Democrat of the old Jeffersonian
school, and possesses highly respectable abilities. I think he is firm
and energetic, without which no man is fit to be President. Should he
fall into proper hands, he will administer the Government wisely and
well. Heaven save us from the mad schemes of “Young America!”
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO NAHUM CAPEN, ESQ.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, June 26, 1852.
MR DEAR SIR:—
Many thanks for your kind letter. I felt neither mortified nor much
disappointed at my own defeat. Although “the signs of the times” had
been highly propitious immediately before the Baltimore Convention, I
am too old a political navigator to rely with explicit confidence upon
bright skies for fair weather. The Democracy of my own great State are
mortified and disappointed, but I trust that ere long these feelings
will vanish, and we shall be able to present a solid and invincible
column to our political opponents.
The Presidency is a distinction far more glorious than the crown of
any hereditary monarch in Christendom; but yet it is a crown of
thorns. In the present political and critical position of our country,
its responsibilities will prove to be fearful. I should have met them
with cheerful confidence, whilst I know I shall be far more happy in a
private station, where I expect to remain.
With my ardent wishes for the success of the History of Democracy, I
remain
Very respectfully your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO ALEXANDER McKEEVER, ESQ.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, July 26, 1852.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received and perused your kind letter with much satisfaction,
and, like you, I am far better satisfied with the nomination of
General Pierce than I would have been with that of General Cass or any
of the other candidates. I sincerely and ardently desire his election,
as well as the defeat of General Scott, and shall do my duty
throughout the contest in Pennsylvania in every respect, except in
going from county to county to make stump speeches.
It is my intention to address my fellow-citizens of this county, on
some suitable occasion, on the Presidential election, and express my
opinions freely.
My recommendations to the governor were but little regarded, but I
made but very few. I can say with truth that your disappointment
mortified me very much, because upon every principle of political
justice and policy you were entitled to the place. Should it ever be
in my power to serve you, I shall eagerly embrace the opportunity.
It is impossible, as yet, to form any accurate conjecture as to what
will be Scott’s majority in this county; but I cannot believe it will
reach that of General Taylor. I am glad to learn your opinion that the
majority in Delaware county will be less than it was in 1848. Pierce
and King can be elected without the vote of Pennsylvania, but it would
be a burning shame for the Democracy of the Keystone to be defeated on
this occasion.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
The most important service rendered by Mr. Buchanan to his party in this
election—and with him a service to his party was alike a service to his
country—was a speech made at Greensburgh in Pennsylvania, on the 7th of
October, 1852, in opposition to the election of General Scott. It
deserves to be reproduced now, both on account of its clear exhibition
of the political history of that period and the nature of some of the
topics which it discussed.
FRIENDS AND FELLOW-CITIZENS: I thank you most sincerely for the
cordial and enthusiastic cheers with which you have just saluted me. I
am proud, on this occasion, to acknowledge my deep obligations to the
Democratic party of Westmoreland county. The generous and powerful
support which I have received from your great and glorious Democracy
throughout my public career shall ever remain deeply engraved on my
heart. I am grateful for the past, not for what is to be in future. I
ask no more from my country than what I have already enjoyed. May
peace and prosperity be your lot throughout life, and may “The Star in
the West” continue to shine with increasing splendor, and ever benign
influence on the favored Western portion of our Commonwealth for ages
to come!
I congratulate you, fellow-citizens, upon the nomination of Franklin
Pierce and William R. King, for the two highest offices in your gift.
This nomination has proved to be a most fortunate event for the
Democratic party of the country. It has produced unanimity everywhere
in our great and glorious party; and when firmly united we can stand
against the world in arms. It has terminated, I trust forever, the
divisions which existed in our ranks; and which, but a few short
months ago, portended dire defeat in the present Presidential contest.
The North, the South, the East and the West are now generous rivals,
and the only struggle amongst them is which shall do the most to
secure the triumph of the good old cause of Democracy, and of Franklin
Pierce and William R. King, our chosen standard bearers.
And why should we not all be united in support of Franklin Pierce? It
is his peculiar distinction, above all other public men within my
knowledge, that he has never had occasion to take a single step
backwards. What speech, vote, or sentiment of his whole political
career has been inconsistent with the purest and strictest principles
of Jeffersonian Democracy? Our opponents, with all their vigilance and
research, have not yet been able to discover a single one. His public
character as a Democrat is above all exception. In supporting him,
therefore, we shall do no more than sustain in his person our dear and
cherished principles.
Our candidate, throughout his life, has proved himself to be
peculiarly unselfish. The offices and honors which other men seek with
so much eagerness, have sought him only to be refused. He has either
positively declined to accept, or has resigned the highest stations
which the Federal Government or his own native State could bestow upon
him.
Indeed, the public character of General Pierce is so invulnerable that
it has scarcely been seriously assaulted. Our political opponents
have, therefore, in perfect desperation, been driven to defame his
private character. At first, they denounced him as a drunkard, a
friend of the infamous anti-Catholic test in the Constitution of New
Hampshire, and a coward. In what have these infamous accusations
resulted? They have already recoiled upon their inventors. The
poisoned chalice has been returned to their own lips. No decent man of
the Whig party will now publicly venture to repeat these slanders.
Frank Pierce a coward! That man a coward, who, when his country was
involved in a foreign war, abandoned a lucrative and honorable
profession and all the sweets and comforts of domestic life in his own
happy family, to become a private volunteer soldier in the ranks! How
preposterous! And why a coward?
According to the testimony of General Scott himself, he was in such a
sick, wounded, and enfeebled condition, that he was “just able to keep
his saddle!” Yet his own gallant spirit impelled him to lead his
brigade into the bloody battle of Churubusco. But his exhausted
physical nature was not strong enough to sustain the brave soul which
animated it, and he sank insensible on the field in front of his
brigade. Was this evidence of cowardice? These circumstances, so far
from being an impeachment of his courage, prove conclusively that he
possesses that high quality in an uncommon degree. Almost any other
man, nay, almost any other brave man, in his weak and disabled
condition, would have remained in his tent; but the promptings of his
gallant and patriotic spirit impelled him to rush into the midst of
the battle. To what lengths will not party rancor and malignity
proceed when such high evidences of indomitable courage are construed
into proofs of cowardice? How different was General Scott’s opinion
from that of the revilers of Franklin Pierce! It was on this very
occasion that he conferred upon him the proud title of “the gallant
Brigadier-General Pierce.”
The cordial union of the Democratic party throughout the country
presents a sure presage of approaching victory. Even our political
opponents admit that we are in the majority when thoroughly united.
And I venture now to predict that, whether with or without the vote of
Pennsylvania, Franklin Pierce and William R. King, should their lives
be spared, will as certainly be elected President and Vice President
of the United States on the first Tuesday in November next, as that
the blessed sun shall rise on that auspicious day. We feel the
inspiration of victory from the infallible indications of public
opinion throughout our sister States.
Shall this victory be achieved without the voice or vote of
Pennsylvania? No President has ever yet been elected without her vote.
Shall this historical truth be reversed, and shall Pierce and King be
elected in November, despite the vote of the good old Keystone? God
bless her! No—never, never, shall the Democracy of our great and
glorious State be subjected to this disgrace.
And yet, strange to say, the Whigs at Washington and the Whigs
throughout every State of the Union claim the vote of Pennsylvania
with the utmost apparent confidence. To secure her vote was one of the
main inducements for the nomination of General Scott over the head of
Millard Fillmore. Is there one unprejudiced citizen of any party in
the United States, who can lay his hand upon his heart and declare
that he believes General Scott would make as good and as safe a
President as Mr. Fillmore? No, fellow-citizens, all of us must concur
in opinion with Mr. Clay, that Fillmore had superior claims and
qualifications to those of Scott for the highest civil station.
Availability, and availability alone, produced the nomination of
Scott.
The Whigs well knew that the Democrats of the Keystone were in the
majority. What must then be done to secure her vote? Pennsylvania
Democrats must be seduced from their party allegiance—they must be
induced to abandon the political altars at which they have so long
worshipped—they must be persuaded to renounce the principles of
Jefferson and of Jackson, by the nomination of a military hero; and
this hero, too, a most bitter and uncompromising Whig. General Scott
is none of your half-way Whigs—he is not like General Taylor, a Whig,
but not an ultra Whig. He goes the whole. Is there a single Whig
doctrine, or a single Whig principle, however odious to the Democracy,
to which he is not devoted, which he has not announced and taught
under his own hand? If there be, I have never heard it mentioned. Nay,
more: these odious doctrines are with him not merely strong opinions,
but they are absolute convictions, rules of faith and of practice. The
Bank of the United States, the Bankrupt Law, the distribution of the
proceeds of the public lands among the States, the abolishment of the
veto power from the Constitution; in short, all the Whig measures
against which the Democracy of the country have always waged incessant
war—are so many articles of General Scott’s political creed. When
asked, in October, 1841, whether, “if nominated as a candidate for the
Presidency, would you accept the nomination?” after expressing his
strong approbation of all the Whig measures to which I have just
referred, as well as others of a similar character, he answers: “I beg
leave respectfully to reply—Yes; provided that I be not required to
renounce any principles professed above. My principles are
convictions.”
I will do him the justice to declare that he has never yet recanted or
renounced any one of these principles. They are still convictions with
him; and yet the Democracy of Pennsylvania are asked to recant and
renounce their own most solemn and deliberate convictions, and vote
for a candidate for the Presidency, merely on account of his military
fame, who, if elected, would exert the power and influence of his
administration to subvert and to destroy all the essential principles
which bind us together as members of the great and glorious Democratic
party of the Union. Is not the bare imputation, much more the
confident belief, that the Democrats of Pennsylvania will renounce
their birthright for such a miserable mess of pottage, the highest
insult which can be offered to them? The Whigs, in effect, say to you:
We know you are Democrats—we know you are in the majority; but yet we
believe you will renounce the political faith of your fathers, that
you may shout hosannas to a successful general, and bow down before
the image of military glory which we have erected for the purpose of
captivating your senses.
Thank Heaven! thus far, at least, these advocates of availability have
been disappointed. The soup societies and the fuss and feather clubs
have yet produced but little impression on the public mind. They have
failed even to raise enthusiastic shouts among the Whigs, much less to
make any apostates from the Democratic ranks.
What a subject it is for felicitation in every patriotic heart, that
the days have passed away, I trust, forever, when mere military
services, however distinguished, shall be a passport to the chief
civil magistracy of the country!
I would lay down this broad and strong proposition, which ought in all
future time to be held sacred as an article of Democratic faith, that
no man ought ever to be transferred by the people from the chief
command of the army of the United States to the highest civil office
within their gift. The reasons for this rule of faith to guide the
practice of a Republican people are overwhelming.
The annals of mankind, since the creation, demonstrate this solemn
truth. The history of all the ruined republics, both of ancient and
modern times, teaches us this great lesson. From Cæsar to Cromwell,
and from Cromwell to Napoleon, this history presents the same solemn
warning,—beware of elevating to the highest civil trust the commander
of your victorious armies. Ask the wrecks of the ruined republics
scattered all along the tide of time, what occasioned their downfall;
and they will answer in sepulchral tones, the elevation of victorious
generals to the highest civil power in the State. One common fate from
one common cause has destroyed them all. Will mankind never learn
wisdom from the experience of past generations? Has history been
written in vain? Mr. Clay, in his Baltimore speech of 1827, expressed
this great truth in emphatic terms, when he implored the Almighty
Governor of the world, “to visit our favored land with war, with
pestilence, with famine, with any scourge other than military rule, or
a blind and heedless enthusiasm for a military renown.” He was right
in the principle, wrong in its application. The hero, the man of men
to whom it applied, was then at the Hermitage,—a plain and private
farmer of Tennessee. He had responded to the call of his country when
war was declared against Great Britain, and had led our armies to
victory; but when the danger had passed away, he returned with delight
to the agricultural pursuits of his beloved Hermitage. Although, like
Franklin Pierce, he had never sought civil offices and honors, yet he
was an influential and conspicuous member of the convention which
framed the constitution of Tennessee, was their first Representative
and their first Senator in Congress,—afterwards a Judge of their
Supreme Court,—then again a Senator in Congress, which elevated
station he a second time resigned, from a love of retirement. He was
brought almost literally from the plough, as Cincinnatus had been, to
assume the chief civil command. The same observations would apply to
the illustrious and peerless Father of his Country, as well as to
General Harrison. They were soldiers, only in the day and hour of
danger, when the country demanded their services; and both were
elevated from private life, from the shades of Mount Vernon and the
North Bend, to the supreme civil magistracy of the country. Neither of
them was a soldier by profession, and both had illustrated high civil
appointments. General Taylor, it is true, had been a soldier, and
always a soldier, but had never risen to the chief command. It
remained for the present Whig party to select as their candidate for
the Presidency the commanding General of the army, who had been a man
of war, and nothing but a man of war from his youth upwards. This
party is now straining every nerve to transfer him from the
headquarters of the army, to the chair of state, which has been
adorned by Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Jackson, without even a
momentary resignation of his present high office,—without the least
political training,—without any respite, without any breathing time
between the highest military and the highest civil honor. With what
tremendous force does the solemn warning of Mr. Clay apply to the case
of General Scott!
Far be it from me to say or to insinuate that General Scott would have
either the ability or the will to play the part of Cæsar, of Cromwell,
or of Bonaparte. Still, the precedent is dangerous in the extreme. If
these things can be done in the green tree, what will be done in the
dry? If the precedent can be established in the comparative infancy
and purity of our institutions, of elevating to the Presidency a
successful commander-in-chief of our armies, what may be the
disastrous consequences when our population shall number one hundred
millions, and when our armies in time of war may be counted by
hundreds of thousands. In those days, some future military chieftain,
desirous of obtaining supreme power by means of an election to the
Presidency, may point back to such a precedent and say, that in the
earlier and purer days of the Republic, our ancestors did not fear to
elevate the commander of their conquering armies to this, the highest
civil station. Let us not forge chains in advance for our descendants.
The fathers of the Republic were deeply alive to these great truths.
They were warned by the experience of past times that liberty is
Hesperian fruit, and can only be preserved by watchful jealousy. Hence
in all their constitutions of government, and in all their political
writings, we find them inculcating, in the most solemn manner, a
jealousy of standing armies and their leaders, and a strict
subordination of the military to the civil power. But even if there
were no danger to our liberties from such a precedent, the habit of
strict obedience and absolute command acquired by the professional
soldier throughout a long life, almost necessarily disqualifies him
for the administration of our Democratic Republican Government. Civil
government is not a mere machine, such as a regular army. In
conducting it, allowance must be made for that love of liberty and
spirit of independence which characterize our people. Such allowances
can never be made,—authority can never be tempered with moderation and
discretion, by a professional soldier, who has been accustomed to have
his military orders obeyed with the unerring certainty of despotic
power.
Again:—What fatal effects would it not have on the discipline and
efficiency of the army to have aspirants for the Presidency among its
principal officers? How many military cliques would be formed—how much
intriguing and electioneering would exist in a body which ought to be
a unit, and have no other object in view except to obey the lawful
command of the President and to protect and defend the country? If all
the political follies of General Scott’s life were investigated, and
these are not few, I venture to say that nearly the whole of them have
resulted from his long continued aspirations for the Presidency. At
last, he has obtained the Whig nomination. He has defeated his own
constitutional commander-in-chief. The military power has triumphed
over the civil power. The Constitution declares that “the President
shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United
States,” but the subordinate, the actual commander of the army, has
supplanted his superior. What a spectacle is this; and how many
serious reflections might it inspire! In times of war and of danger,
what fatal consequences might result to the country from the fact,
that the President and the commanding General of the army are rival
and hostile candidates for the Presidency! But I shall not pursue this
train of remark. It is my most serious conviction, that General Scott
would have stood far higher, both before the present generation and
posterity, had he never been a candidate for the Presidency. The
office which he now holds, and deservedly holds, ought to satisfy the
ambition of any man. This the American people will determine by a
triumphant majority on the first Tuesday of November next. This will
prove to be one of the most fortunate events in our history—auspicious
at the present time, and still more auspicious for future generations.
It will establish a precedent, which will, I trust, prevent future
commanders-in-chief of the American army from becoming candidates for
the Presidential office.
Again:—To make the army a hot bed for Presidential aspirants will be
to unite the powerful influence of all its aspiring officers in favor
of foreign wars, as the best means of acquiring military glory, and
thus placing themselves in the modern line of safe precedents, as
candidates for the Presidency and for other high civil offices. The
American people are sufficiently prone to war without any such
stimulus. But enough of this.
I shall now proceed to discuss more minutely the civil qualifications
of General Scott for the Presidency. It is these which immediately and
deeply concern the American people, and not his military glory. Far be
it from me, however, to depreciate his military merits. As an American
citizen, I am proud of them. They will ever constitute a brilliant
page in the historical glory of our country. The triumphant march of
the brave army under his command, from Vera Cruz to the city of
Mexico, will be ever memorable in our annals. And yet he can never be
esteemed the principal hero of the Mexican war. This distinction
justly belongs to General Taylor. It was his army which at Palo Alto,
Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey, first broke the spirit of the
Mexican troops; and the crowning victory of Buena Vista completely
disorganized the Mexican army. There Santa Anna, with 20,000 men, the
largest, the best and the bravest army which Mexico has ever sent into
the field, was routed by less than five thousand of our troops. To the
everlasting glory of our volunteer militia, this great, this glorious
victory, was achieved by them, assisted by only four hundred and
fifty-three regulars. The Mexican army was so disorganized—the spirit
of the Mexican people was so subdued, by the unparallelled victory of
Buena Vista, that the way was thus opened for the march from Vera Cruz
to Mexico. Yet God forbid that I should, in the slightest degree,
detract from the glory so justly due to Scott’s army and its
distinguished commander in the battles which preceded their triumphant
entry into the capital of Mexico.
But I repeat, my present purpose is to deal with General Scott as a
civilian—as a candidate for the Presidency, and not as a military
commander.
The sun presents dark spots upon its disc; and the greatest men who
have ever lived, with the exception of our own Washington, have not
been without their failings. Surely General Scott is not an exception
to the common lot of humanity. In his temper he is undoubtedly
irritable and jealous of rivals; whilst the Presidency, above all
other stations on earth, requires a man of firm and calm temper, who,
in his public conduct, will never be under the control of his
passions.
General Scott has quarrelled with General Wilkinson—he has quarrelled
with General Gaines—he has quarrelled with General Jackson—he has
quarrelled with De Witt Clinton—he has quarrelled with the
administration of John Quincy Adams—he has quarrelled with the people
of Florida to such a degree that General Jackson was obliged
reluctantly to recall him from the command of the army in the Seminole
war—he has quarrelled with General Worth, the Marshal Ney of our
military service—he has quarrelled with General Pillow—he has
quarrelled with the gallant and lamented Duncan—and unless report
speaks falsely, he has quarrelled with General Taylor. Whenever any
military man has approached the rank of being his rival for fame, he
has quarrelled with that man. Now, I shall not pretend to decide,
whether he has been in the right or in the wrong, in all or in any of
these quarrels; but this I shall say, that a man possessing such
forethought, discretion and calm temper as the Presidential office
requires, might and would have avoided many or most of these
difficulties. A plain and sensible neighbor of mine asked me, in view
of these facts, if I did not think, should General Scott be elected
President, he would play the devil and break things?
General Scott is, beyond all question, suspicious, when the President
of the United States, above all other men, ought to look upon events
with no prejudiced or jaundiced eye. No man ever exhibited this trait
of character in a stronger light than he has done towards the
administration of Mr. Polk. He was selected by the President to lead
our armies in Mexico, with my humble though cordial assent. The
political life or death of the administration depended upon his
success. Our fate, both in the estimation of the present times and
throughout all posterity, depended upon his success. His defeat would
have been our ruin. And yet he most strangely conceived the notion,
that for the purpose of destroying him we were willing to destroy
ourselves. Hence his belief of a fire in the rear more formidable than
the fire in the front. Hence his belief that, jealous of his glory, we
did not exert ourselves to furnish him the troops and munitions of war
necessary for the conquest of Mexico. Did unjust and unfounded
suspicion ever extend thus far in the breast of any other mortal man?
The admirable and unanswerable letter of Governor Marcy, of April 21,
1848, in reply to his complaints, triumphantly vindicates the
administration of Mr. Polk against all these extraordinary charges.
Let any man carefully and dispassionately read that letter, and say,
if he can, that General Scott, in self-control, temper and
disposition, is fit to become the successor to General Washington, in
the Presidential chair.
The world knows, everybody who has approached him knows, that General
Scott is vainglorious to an excessive degree. Indeed, his vanity would
be strikingly ridiculous, had he not performed so many distinguished
military services as almost to justify boasting. This, however, is an
amiable weakness; and whilst it does not disqualify him from
performing the duties of a President, this itself renders it morally
impossible that he should ever reach that station. Modesty combined
with eminent merit always secures popular applause; but the man who
becomes the trumpeter of his own exploits, no matter how high his
deserts may be, can never become an object of popular enthusiasm and
affection. General Scott’s character, in this respect, is perfectly
understood by the instinctive good sense of the American people. “Fuss
and Feathers!” a volume could not more accurately portray the vanity
of his character than this soubriquet by which he is universally
known. His friends affect to glory in this title, but with all their
efforts they can never render it popular. Napoleon was endeared to his
army by his designation of “the little Corporal;” General Jackson, by
that of “Old Hickory;” and General Taylor was “Rough and Ready;” but
what shall we say to “Fuss and Feathers?” Was such a soubriquet ever
bestowed upon a General who enjoyed the warm affections of his army?
It raises no shout,—it awakens no sympathy,—it excites no
enthusiasm,—it falls dead upon the heart of an intelligent people.
In order further to illustrate the want of civil qualifications of
General Scott for the Presidency, I propose next to discuss his famous
political letters. In these he has written his own political history.
“Oh! that mine enemy would write a book!” was an exclamation of old.
General Scott’s epistles have accomplished this work, though I deny
that he has any enemies among the American people.
In 1848, when speaking of these letters, Thurlow Weed, who at the
present moment is one of General Scott’s most able, distinguished, and
efficient supporters, employs the following language: “In the
character of General Scott there is much, very much to commend and
admire. But the mischief is, there is weakness in all he says or does
about the Presidency. Immediately after the close of the campaign of
1840, he wrote a gratuitous letter, making himself a candidate, in
which all sorts of unwise things were said ‘to return and plague his
friends, if he should be a candidate.’ And since that time, with a
fatuity that seizes upon men who get bewildered in gazing at the White
House, he has been suffering his pen to dim the glories achieved by
his sword.”
The letter to which special allusion is made must be his famous letter
of October 25, 1841. Though not an “old Fogy,” I retain a vivid
recollection of the circumstances under which this letter was written.
It made its appearance the month after the termination of the famous
extra session of Congress, which had been convened by the proclamation
of General Harrison. This session commenced on the 31st May, and
terminated on the 13th September, 1841.
And here, permit me to say, that I do not believe the history of
legislative bodies, in this or any other country, ever presented more
argumentative, eloquent, and powerful debating than was exhibited
throughout this session. Nearly all the important political questions
which had divided the two great parties of the country from the
beginning were most ably discussed. Never did any public body of the
same number present a stronger array of matured talent than the Senate
of that day. There were Clay, Berrien, Clayton, Mangum, Archer,
Preston, and Southard on the Whig side; and Benton, Calhoun, Wright,
Woodbury, Walker, Pierce, and Linn on the side of the Democrats, and
these men were in the meridian of their glory. I would advise every
young Democrat within the sound of my voice to procure and carefully
study the debates of this session.
Mr. Clay was, as he deserved to be, the lord of the ascendant in the
Whig ranks. The Whig majority of both houses was controlled by his
spirit. He was their acknowledged leader, and went to work in dashing
style. Within a brief period, he carried all the great Whig measures
triumphantly through Congress. The Independent Treasury was repealed;
the proceeds of the public lands were distributed among the States;
the Bankrupt Law was passed; and an old-fashioned Bank of the United
States would have been established, had it not been for the veto of
John Tyler, a man who has never been as highly estimated as he
deserves, either by the Democratic party or the country.
Mr. Clay left the Senate, at the close of the session, the
acknowledged leader and the favorite Presidential candidate of the
great Whig party. Under these circumstances, it became necessary for
General Scott to do something to head his great rival and prevent him
from remaining master of the field. He must prove himself to be as
good a Whig as Henry Clay, and in addition a much better Anti-Mason.
It was the common remark of the day, when his letter of October, 1841,
appeared, that he had out-whigged even Henry Clay. This is the
“gratuitous letter, making himself a candidate, in which all sorts of
unwise things were said to ‘return and plague his friends, if he
should be a candidate.’”
This letter is not addressed to any individual, but is an epistle
general to the faithful; and I must do him the justice to say that in
it he has concealed nothing from the public eye. After some
introductory remarks, it is divided into seven heads, which, with
their subdivisions, embrace all the articles of Whig faith as
understood at that day; and in addition, the author presents his views
on “secret or oath-bound societies.”
I shall briefly review some of these articles of General Scott’s
political faith:
1. “The Judiciary.” General Scott expresses his convictions that the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, on all
constitutional questions, should be considered final and conclusive by
the people, and especially by their functionaries, “except, indeed, in
the case of a judicial decision enlarging power and against liberty.”
And how is such a decision to be corrected? Why, forsooth, “any
dangerous error of this sort, he says, can always be easily corrected
by an amendment of the Constitution, in one of the modes prescribed by
that instrument itself.” Easily corrected! It might be so if a
military order could accomplish the object; but an amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, whether fortunately or
unfortunately for the country, is almost a political impossibility. In
order to accomplish it, in by far the least impracticable of the two
modes prescribed, the affirmative action of two-thirds of both Houses
of Congress and of the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States is required. With these obstacles in the way, when will an
amendment of the Constitution ever be made?
But why did such a reverence for the decisions of the Supreme Court
become an article of General Scott’s faith? Simply because General
Jackson had vetoed the Bank of the United States, believing in his
conscience, such an institution to be unconstitutional. He had sworn
before his God and his country to support the Constitution; and he
could not, without committing moral perjury, approve a bill, which in
his soul he believed to be a violation of this great charter of our
liberties. He could not yield his honest convictions, simply because
the Supreme Court had expressed the opinion that Congress possesses
the power to charter such a bank.
But, according to the logic of General Scott, General Jackson and Mr.
Tyler, when bills to charter a Bank of the United States were
presented to them, had no right to form or express any opinion on the
subject of their constitutionality. The Supreme Court had done this
for them in advance. This court is to be the constitutional
conscience-keeper of the President. “Practically, therefore (says
General Scott), for the people and especially their functionaries (of
whom the President is the highest) to deny, to disturb, or impugn,
principles thus constitutionally established, strike me as of evil
example, if not of a direct revolutionary tendency.” A Bank of the
United States must be held constitutional, by the people and their
functionaries, as an article of faith, until two-thirds of both Houses
of Congress and three-fourths of the State legislatures shall reverse
the decision of the Supreme Court by an amendment of the Constitution.
The President must then wait before he can exercise the right of
judging for himself until doomsday. On the same principle, we must all
now hold, as an article of faith, that the odious and infamous
sedition law of the reign of terror is constitutional, because the
judiciary have so affirmed, and this decision never has been, and
never will be, reversed by a constitutional amendment. This is
double-distilled Whiggery of the most sublimated character. Truly,
“there is weakness in all that General Scott says or does about the
Presidency.”
Let us never forget that a Bank of the United States is a fixed idea
with the Whig party, which nothing can ever remove. On this subject,
like the old Bourbons, they forget nothing and learn nothing. They are
inseparably joined to this idol. They believe that a concentration of
the money power of the country, in the form of such a bank, is
necessary to secure the ascendency of the Whig party in the
Government; and there is nothing more certain in futurity than that
they will establish such a bank, should they ever obtain the power.
Experience has taught us a lesson on this subject which we ought never
to forget. Throughout the political campaign of 1840, which resulted
in the election of General Harrison, it was nowhere avowed by the
Whigs, that they intended to charter a Bank of the United States. This
was carefully concealed from the public eye. On the contrary, many of
their distinguished leaders declared themselves hostile to such an
institution, and one of them, Mr. Badger, afterwards a member of the
cabinet, indignantly pronounced the assertion that General Harrison
was in favor of such a bank to be a falsehood. But mark the sequel. No
sooner was Harrison elected and a majority secured in both Houses of
Congress, than the Whigs immediately proceeded in hot haste, at the
extra session, to pass a bill establishing a Bank of the United
States, which would have become a law, but for the veto of John Tyler.
What we have witnessed in 1841, we shall again witness in 1853, _the
veto_ only excepted, should General Scott be elected President and be
sustained by a Whig majority in both Houses of Congress.
2. “The Executive Veto.” To abolish this veto power is another article
of General Scott’s political faith, as announced in his letter of
October, 1841. To be more precise, the General would have the
Constitution amended for the second time, in the same epistle, so as
to overcome the Executive veto “by a bare majority in each House of
Congress of all the members elected to it—say for the benefit of
reflection, at the end of ten days from the return of the bill.” What
a farce! An Executive veto to be overcome and nullified by a bare
majority of the very Congress which had but ten days before sent the
same bill to the President for his approval! Better, far better, adopt
the manly course of abolishing the veto altogether, than to resort to
this subterfuge.
But why has the abolishment of the Executive veto become an article of
Whig faith? Simply because General Jackson and Mr. Tyler each vetoed
bills to establish a Bank of the United States! “Still harping on my
daughter.” The Whigs have determined to destroy the veto power, which
has twice prevented them from creating an institution which they love
above all other political objects. The veto power has saved the
country from the corrupt and corrupting influence of a bank; and it is
this alone which has rendered it so odious to the Whig party.
This power is the least dangerous of all the great powers conferred by
the Constitution upon the President; because nothing but a strong
sense of public duty and a deep conviction that he will be sustained
by the people can ever induce him to array himself against a majority
of both Houses of Congress. It has been exercised but in comparatively
few instances since the origin of the Federal Government; and I am not
aware that it has ever been exercised in any case, which has not
called forth the approving voice of a large majority of the American
people. Confident I am, it is highly popular in Pennsylvania.
“Rotation in office” is the next head of General Scott’s letter.
Throughout the Presidential contest, which resulted in the election of
General Harrison, it was the fashion of the Whigs to proscribe
proscription; and to denounce Democratic Presidents for removing their
political enemies and appointing their political friends to office.
General Scott, in his letter, comes up to the Whig standard in this,
as in all other respects. In his profession of faith, he could not
even avoid a fling against the hero and the sage then in retirement at
the Hermitage. He says: “I speak on this head from what I witnessed in
1829-30 (the commencement of General Jackson’s administration), of the
cruel experiments on a large scale, then made upon the sensibilities
of the country, and the mischiefs to the public interests which early
ensued.”
But what was the Whig practice upon the subject after they had
obtained power? General Jackson was magnanimous, kind-hearted and
merciful, and to my own knowledge he retained a very large proportion
of Whig clerks in the public offices at Washington. I ask how many
Democrats now remain in those offices? Nay, the present administration
has even proscribed old widows whose husbands had been Democrats. In
the city of Lancaster, they removed from the post-office an old lady
of this character, who had performed her duties to the entire
satisfaction of the public of all parties, to make way for a political
(I admit a respectable political) friend. To the credit of General
Taylor’s memory be it spoken, he refused to make war upon this old
lady.
But in this respect, a change has come over the spirit of General
Scott’s dream. Of this the Whigs are satisfied. If they were not,
small would be his chance—much smaller even than it now is, of
reaching the Presidential chair. In his letter, accepting the
nomination, he says:—“In regard to the general policy of the
administration, if elected, I should, of course, look among those who
may approve that policy, for the agents to carry it into execution;
and I would seek to cultivate harmony and fraternal sentiment
throughout the Whig party, without attempting to reduce its members by
proscription to exact conformity to my own views!”
“Harmony and fraternal sentiment throughout the Whig party!” His
charity, though large for Whigs, does not extend to Democrats. He
knows, however, that his own party are divided into supporters of
himself for his own sake, whilst spitting upon the platform on which
he stands—and those who love the platform so well that for its sake
they have even consented, though reluctantly, to acquiesce in his
nomination—into those Free Soil Whigs who denounce the Fugitive Slave
Law, and those Whigs who are devoted heart and soul to its
maintenance. In this dilemma, he will not attempt to reduce the
discordant brethren by proscription to exact conformity to his own
views. Southern Whigs and Northern Free Soilers are therefore both
embraced within the broad sweep of his charity. He seeks to cultivate
harmony and fraternal sentiment among the Seward Whigs and the
National Whigs by seating them all together at the same table to enjoy
the loaves and the fishes. But woe to the vanquished—woe to the
Democrats! They shall not even receive a single crumb which may fall
from the table of the Presidential banquet.
“One Presidential Term,” is the subject which he next discusses. Here
he boggles at one Presidential term. He seems reluctant to surrender
the most elevated and the most lucrative office, next to that of
President, and this, too, an office for life, for the sake of only
four years in the White House. He again, therefore, for the third
time, in the same letter, proposes to amend the Constitution, just as
if this were as easy as to wheel a division of his army on a parade
day, so as to extend the Presidential term to six years. Four years
are too short a term for General Scott. It must be prolonged. The
people must be deprived of the power of choosing their President at
the end of so brief a period as four years. But such an amendment of
the Constitution, he ought to have known, was all moonshine. The
General, then, declines to pledge himself to serve but for one term,
and this for the most extraordinary reason. I shall quote his own
words; he says:—“But I do not consider it respectful to the people,
nor otherwise proper, in a candidate to solicit favor on a pledge
that, if elected, he will not accept a second nomination. It looks too
much like a bargain tendered to other aspirants—yield to me now; I
shall soon be out of your way; too much like the interest that
sometimes governs the cardinals in the choice of a Pope, many voting
for themselves first, and, if without success, finally for the most
superannuated, in order that the election may sooner come round
again.”
He was, then, you may be sure, still a Native American.
To say the very least, this imputation of selfishness and corruption
against the cardinals in the election of a Pope, is in bad taste in a
political letter written by a candidate for the Presidency. It was in
exceedingly bad taste, in such an epistle, thus to stigmatize the
highest dignitaries of the ancient Catholic church, in the performance
of their most solemn and responsible public duty to God, on this side
of eternity. From my soul, I abhor the practice of mingling up
religion with politics. The doctrine of all our Constitutions, both
Federal and State, is, that every man has an indefeasible right to
worship his God, according to the dictates of his own conscience. He
is both a bigot and a tyrant who would interfere with that sacred
right. When a candidate is before the people for office, the inquiry
ought never even to be made, what form of religious faith he
professes; but only, in the language of Mr. Jefferson, “Is he honest;
is he capable?” Far be it from me to charge or even insinuate that
General Scott would desire to introduce religion into party politics;
and yet I consider it exceedingly improper for him, in a political
letter, when a candidate for the Presidency, to have made this charge
against the venerable cardinals of the Catholic church. Such a charge,
emanating from so high a source, could not fail to wound the feelings
of a large and highly respectable Christian community. This has
necessarily, to some extent, brought religious discussions into the
Presidential contest.
“Leading measures of the late extra session of Congress.” This is the
next head of General Scott’s epistle, to which I advert. He swallows
all those leading measures at a single gulp. “If,” says he, “I had had
the honor of a vote on the occasion, it would have been given in favor
of the Land Distribution Bill, the Bankrupt Bill, and the second bill
for creating a Fiscal Corporation, having long been under a conviction
that in peace, as in war, something efficient in the nature of a Bank
of the United States, is not only ‘necessary and proper,’ but
indispensable to the successful operations of the Treasury!”
The Land Distribution Bill. This is emphatically a high toned Whig
measure, which had been once crushed by General Jackson’s message of
December, 1833. Mr. Clay, its illustrious author, was the very
essence, the life and soul of Whiggery. It proposes to distribute the
proceeds of the public lands among the several States. It proposes to
surrender to the several States that immense and bountiful fund
provided by our ancestors, which is always our surest resource, in
times of war and danger, when our revenue from imports fails. In the
days of Jackson, Van Buren and Polk, the Democratic doctrine was,—I
fear it is not so at present,—to preserve this fund in the common
Treasury, as a sacred trust, to enable Congress to execute the
enumerated powers conferred upon them by the Constitution, for the
equal benefit of all the States and the people. Should Congress give
away the public lands to the States, they will deprive themselves of
the power of bestowing land bounties upon the soldiers and the sailors
who fight the battles of your country, and of granting liberal terms
of purchase to those hardy pioneers who make the wilderness to bloom
and to blossom as the rose. What will become of this policy if you
distribute the proceeds of these lands among the States? Then every
State will have a direct interest in preventing any donations of the
public lands, either to old soldiers or actual settlers; because every
acre thus given will so much lessen the dividend to each of the States
interested. Should this Distribution Bill ever prevail, it will make
the States mere dependencies upon the central Government for a large
portion of their revenue, and thus reduce these proud Democratic
sovereignties to the degrading position of looking to the Treasury of
the United States for their means of support. In the language of
General Jackson, “a more direct road to consolidation cannot be
devised.” Such a state of dependence, though exactly in accordance
with the centralizing Whig policy, has ever been abhorred by the
Democrats. But the Distribution Bill is one of the principles, one of
the “convictions,” of General Scott; and so let it pass.
We come now to the Bankrupt Bill, a purely Whig measure, to which
General Scott gives his adhesion.—And such a bill! In no legitimate
sense of the word, was this a bankrupt law. It was merely a new mode
of paying old debts; and the easiest mode which was ever devised for
this purpose in any civilized country. The expansions and contractions
of the Bank of the United States,—the inundations of bank paper and of
shinplasters which spread over the country, had given birth to a wild
and reckless spirit of speculation, that ruined a great number of
people. The speculators wanted to pay their debts in the easiest
manner, and the Whigs wanted their votes. This was the origin of the
bankrupt law. It ruined a great many honest creditors; it paid off a
great many honest debts with moonshine. If my memory serves me, debts
to the amount of $400,000,000 were discharged in this manner. The law,
however, from its practical operation, soon became so odious to the
people, that they demanded its repeal. It was stricken from the
statute book, amidst the execrations of the people, by the very same
Congress which had enacted it, in one year and one month from the day
on which it went into effect. And this is the bill for which General
Scott declares he would have voted, had he been a member of Congress.
Next in order, we come to the Bank of the United States. If General
Scott “had had the honor of a vote, it would have been given for the
second bill creating a Fiscal Corporation.”
Surely the General could never have carefully read this bill. In
derision, it was termed at the time, the “Kite Flying Fiscality.” It
was a mere speculators’ bank, and no person believed it could ever
become a law. In truth, it was got up merely for the purpose of
heading John Tyler, and when reported to the House, it was received,
according to the _National Intelligencer_, with shouts of laughter.
It originated in this manner. A bill had at first passed Congress to
create a regular old-fashioned Bank of the United States. This bill
was vetoed by John Tyler. Afterwards the second bill, or Kite Flying
Fiscality, was prepared by the Whigs to meet some portions of Mr.
Tyler’s veto message, and if possible render it ridiculous. The bill
was passed and was vetoed by President Tyler, as everybody foresaw it
would be. But how General Scott got his head so befogged as to prefer
this thing to the first bill, is a matter of wonder. I venture to say
he was the only Whig in the United States who held the same opinion.
This closes General Scott’s confession of Whig faith; and surely it is
sufficiently ample and specific to gratify the most rabid Whig in the
land. But the General had another string to his bow. It was necessary
not only that he should be as good a Whig as Henry Clay, but that he
should be something besides, something over and above a mere Whig, in
order to render himself more available than his great rival. Hence the
concluding head of his famous epistle, which, like the postscript of a
lady’s letter, contains much of the pith and marrow of the whole. It
is entitled “Secret or Oath-bound Societies.” In it he declares,
although a Mason, that he had “not been a member of a Masonic lodge
for thirty odd years, nor a visitor of any lodge since, except
one,—now more than sixteen years ago.” And such is his abhorrence for
secret societies, that for twenty-eight years he had not even visited
one of those literary societies in our colleges, whose practice it is
to adopt a few secret signs by which their members in after life can
recognize each other.
In order, then, to render himself a more available candidate than
Henry Clay, it was necessary that his net should have a broader sweep
than that of the great Kentuckian. It was necessary that he should be
as good a Whig and a far better Anti-Mason. The Anti-Masonic party was
then powerful in Pennsylvania as well as in other Northern States.
This party numbered in its ranks many old Democrats, and to these Mr.
Clay was not very acceptable. The Anti-Masons were more active and
more energetic than the Whigs. A distinguished Anti-Mason of our State
is reported once to have said, that they were the locomotive, and the
Whigs the burden train. How were they to be enlisted in the ranks of
Scott? The great Kentuckian, with that independent spirit which
characterized him, never yielded to the advances of the Anti-Masons.
He was a Mason himself as well as General Scott; but the General lent
a far more kindly ear to this new party. Hence his remarks on secret
or oath-bound societies. This confession of his faith proved to be
entirely satisfactory; and the Anti-Masons have ever since proved to
be his devoted friends. He thus captured a large division of the
forces which were unfriendly to Mr. Clay. But for the purpose of
embracing the new recruits, it became necessary to coin a more
comprehensive name than simply that of Whigs.
He doubtless thought that a rose by any other name would smell as
sweet. Hence, in his famous letter, he announced himself to be a
Democratic Whig. A white blackbird—a Christian unbeliever. This name
was sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all men of all parties. He
became all things to all men, that he might gain proselytes. I say
what I know, when I declare that this letter, and attempt to supplant
the veteran statesman of Kentucky, was a subject of severe criticism
at the time in Washington city, among men of all parties. Surely, in
the language of Thurlow Weed, “there is weakness in all he says or
does about the Presidency.”
But a good general is always fertile in expedients. His coup-d’œil
embraces the whole field of battle, and he is ever ready to take
advantage of any occurrence which may enable him to seize the victory.
A new political party styling itself the Native American party, began
to loom up in an imposing manner and to present a formidable aspect.
This party must be conciliated. The Native Americans must be prevailed
upon to unite their forces with the Whigs and Anti-Masons, and thus to
form a grand combined army. It therefore became necessary for General
Scott to write a second epistle, which he seems to have done with all
the ardor and enthusiasm of heartfelt sincerity. This is dated from
Washington city, on the 10th of November, 1844, and is in answer to a
letter addressed to him, “in behalf of several hundred Native American
Republicans,” by Geo. W. Reed, Esq., of Philadelphia. This second
epistle proved to be as successful in enlisting the Native Americans
under his banner, as the first epistle had been in enlisting the
Anti-Masons. And why should it not? The General pledged himself, in
the strongest terms, to every dogma which this new party had most at
heart.
He dates his Native Americanism back more than eight years, to “the
stormy election in the spring of 1836,” and his views “were confirmed
in the week [Nov. 1840] when Harrison electors were chosen in New
York.” It was on this occasion in 1840, that, “fired with
indignation,” he sat down with two friends in the Astor House, “to
draw up an address, designed to rally an American party.” What has
become of this address? How precious would it be? I fear it is forever
lost to the world! It would be one of the greatest curiosities of
modern literature. How withering must have been its attack upon the
poor foreigners! We can judge somewhat of its spirit by his epistle to
Mr. Reed. Other Native Americans were satisfied to restore the
naturalization law of “the reign of terror,” and to prohibit
foreigners from becoming citizens until after a residence of fourteen
years. Not so with General Scott. He went a bow-shot beyond. His mind
inclined to “a total repeal of all Acts of Congress on the
subject,”—to a total denial forever of all political rights to every
human being, young, middle-aged, and old, who had happened to be born
in a foreign country.
Having thus placed himself rectus in curia, as the lawyers would say,
with the Native American party, he then proceeds, as their god-father,
to give them a proper name. In this I do not think his choice was
fortunate. It was a difficult task. It must embrace within its ample
outline both Whigs and Anti-Masons, and yet have so much of the odor
of Native Americanism as to make its savor sweet in the nostrils of
the new party. He says, “I should prefer assuming the designation of
American Republicans, as in New York, or Democratic Americans, as I
would respectfully suggest. Democratic Americans would include all
good native American citizens devoted to our country and its
institutions; and would not drive from us naturalized citizens, who,
by long residence, have become identified with us in feelings and
interest.”
“Democratic Americans!” What a name for a Native American party! When
all the records of our past history prove that American Democrats have
ever opened wide their arms to receive foreigners flying from
oppression in their native land, and have always bestowed upon them
the rights of American citizens, after a brief period of residence in
this country. The Democratic party have always gloried in this policy,
and its fruits have been to increase our population and our power with
unexampled rapidity, and to furnish our country with vast numbers of
industrious, patriotic and useful citizens. Surely the name of
‘Democratic Americans’ was an unfortunate designation for the Native
American party!
But General Scott was not content to be considered merely as a
proselyte to Native Americanism. He claimed the glory of being the
founder of the party. He asserts his claim to this distinguished
honor, which no individual will now dispute with him, in the
postscript to his letter of November, 1844, which was read on the 4th
of February, 1847, before the National Convention of Native American
Delegates, at Pittsburg. In this he says, “writing, however, a few
days ago, to my friend Mayor Harper of New York, I half jocosely said,
that I should claim over him and others the foundership of the new
party, but that I had discovered this glory, like every other American
excellence, belonged to the Father of his Country.”
The Native American party an ‘American excellence,’ and the glory of
its foundership, belongs to George Washington! No, fellow-citizens,
the American people will rise up with one accord to vindicate the
memory of that illustrious man from such an imputation. As long as the
recent memory of our revolutionary struggle remained vividly impressed
on the hearts of our countrymen, no such party could have ever
existed. The recollection of Montgomery, Lafayette, De Kalb,
Kosciusko, and a long list of foreigners, both officers and soldiers,
who freely shed their blood to secure our liberties, would have
rendered such ingratitude impossible. Our revolutionary army was
filled with the brave and patriotic natives of other lands, and George
Washington was their commander-in-chief. Would he have ever closed the
door against the admission of foreigners to the rights of American
citizens? Let his acts speak for themselves. So early as the 26th of
March, 1790, General Washington, as President of the United States
approved the first law which ever passed Congress on the subject of
naturalization; and this only required a residence of two years,
previous to the adoption of a foreigner as an American citizen. On the
29th January, 1795, the term of residence was extended by Congress to
five years, and thus it remained throughout General Washington’s
administration, and until after the accession of John Adams to the
Presidency. In his administration, which will ever be known in history
as the reign of terror, as the era of alien and sedition laws, an act
was passed on the 18th of June, 1798, which prohibited any foreigner
from becoming a citizen until after a residence of fourteen years, and
this is the law, or else perpetual exclusion, which General Scott
preferred, and which the Native American party now desire to restore.
The Presidential election of 1800 secured the ascendency of the
Democratic party, and under the administration of Thomas Jefferson,
its great apostle, on the 14th of April, 1802, the term of residence
previous to naturalization was restored to five years, what it had
been under General Washington, and where it has ever since remained.
No, fellow-citizens, the Father of his Country was never a ‘Native
American.’ This ‘American excellence’ never belonged to him.
General Scott appears to have been literally infatuated with the
beauties of Native Americanism. On the 12th November, 1848, he
addressed a letter in answer to one from a certain “Mr. Hector Orr,
printer,” who appears to have been the editor of a Native American
journal in Philadelphia. This letter is a perfect rhapsody from
beginning to end. Among other things equally extravagant, the General
says: “A letter from him (Benjamin Franklin) were he alive, could not
have refreshed me more than that before my eyes. It gives a new value
to any little good I have done or attempted, and will stimulate me to
do all that may fall in the scope of my power in the remainder of my
life.” What a letter must this have been of Mr. Hector Orr, printer!
What a pity it has been lost to the world! The General concluded by
requesting Mr. Orr to send him “the history of the Native party by the
Sunday School Boy,” and also to consider him a subscriber to his
journal.
But soon there came a frost—a chilling frost. Presto, pass, and
General Scott’s Native Americanism is gone like the baseless fabric of
a vision. Would that it left no trace behind! The celebrated William
E. Robinson, of New York, is the enchanter who removes the spell.
The Whig National Convention of 7th June, 1848, was about to assemble.
General Scott was for the third time about to be a candidate before it
for nomination as President. This was an important—a critical moment.
Native Americanism had not performed its early promise. It was not
esteemed “an American excellence,” even by the Whig party. General
Scott was in a dilemma, and how to extricate himself from it was the
question. The ready friendship of Mr. Robinson hit upon the lucky
expedient. On the 8th May, 1848, he addressed a letter to General
Scott, assuming that the General entertained “kind and liberal views
towards our naturalized citizens.” The General answered this letter on
the 29th May, 1848, just ten days before the meeting of the Whig
Philadelphia Convention; and what an answer! After declaring in the
strongest terms that Mr. Robinson had done him no more than justice in
attributing to him “kind and liberal views toward our naturalized
citizens,” he proceeds: “It is true that in a case of unusual
excitement some years ago, when both parties complained of fraudulent
practices in the naturalization of foreigners, and when there seemed
to be danger that native and adopted citizens would be permanently
arrayed against each other in hostile faction, _I was inclined to
concur in the opinion then avowed by leading statesmen, that some
modification of the naturalization laws might be necessary_, in order
to prevent abuses, allay strife and restore harmony between the
different classes of our people. But later experience and reflection
have entirely removed this impression, and dissipated my
apprehensions.”
The man who had warmly embraced Native Americanism so early as 1836,
and had given it his enthusiastic support for twelve years
thereafter—who next to Washington had claimed to be the founder of
this “American excellence;” who, “fired with indignation,” had in
conjunction with two friends in 1840, prepared an address in his
parlor at the Astor House in New York, designed to rally an American
party; who had, in 1844, hesitated between extending the period of
residence before naturalization to fourteen years, and a total and
absolute exclusion of all foreigners from the rights of citizenship
forever, his mind inclining to the latter; who had in the same year
elevated Hector Orr, the Native American printer, to the same level
with our great revolutionary statesman and patriot, Benjamin
Franklin—this same individual, in 1848, declares to Mr. Robinson, that
he had formerly been merely “_inclined to concur in the opinion then
avowed by leading statesmen_, that some modification of the
naturalization laws might be necessary.”
“Oh! what a fall was there, my countrymen!”
And what caused this sudden, this almost miraculous change of opinion?
Why, forsooth, in his recent campaign in Mexico, the Irish and the
Germans had fought bravely in maintaining our flag in the face of
every danger. But had they not fought with equal bravery throughout
our revolutionary struggle, and throughout our last war with Great
Britain? General Scott could not possibly have been ignorant of this
fact. Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane both attest their gallant daring in
defence of the stars and stripes of our country.
The General now seems determined, if possible, to efface from the
memory of man that he had ever been a Native American. His present
devotion to our fellow-citizens of foreign birth knows no bounds. He
is determined to enlist them under his banner, as he formerly enlisted
the Anti-Masons and Native Americans.
Official business, it seems, required him to visit the Blue Licks of
Kentucky; but yet, it is passing strange, that he chose to proceed
from Washington to that place by the circuitous route of the great
Northern Lakes. This deviation from a direct military line between the
point of his departure and that of his destination has enabled him to
meet and address his fellow-citizens on the way, at Harrisburg,
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and other points both in
Pennsylvania and Ohio. Should the published programme of his route be
carried into effect, he will, on his return to Washington from the
Blue Licks, pass through Buffalo, and throughout the entire length of
the Empire State. Nobody, however, can for a single moment
suspect—this would be uncharitable—that his visit to the small and
insignificant States of Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York, when merely
on his way from Washington city to Kentucky could at this particular
period have had any view to the Presidential election! Far be it from
me to indulge such a suspicion; and yet it is strange that General
Scott, throughout his whole route, speaks and acts just as General
Scott would have done had he been on an electioneering tour. He has
everywhere bestowed especial favor upon our adopted fellow-citizens;
but at Cleveland he surpassed himself, and broke out into a rhapsody
nearly as violent as that in which he had indulged in favor of Hector
Orr, the Native American printer. At Cleveland, an honest Irishman in
the crowd shouted a welcome to General Scott. Always ready to seize
the propitious moment, the General instantly exclaimed: “I hear that
rich brogue; I love to hear it. It makes me remember noble deeds of
Irishmen, many of whom I have led to battle and to victory.” The
General has yet to learn that my father’s countrymen, (I have ever
felt proud of my descent from an Irishman,) though they sometimes do
blarney others, are yet hard to be blarneyed themselves, especially
out of their Democracy. The General, unless I am greatly mistaken,
will discover that Irish Democrats, however much, in common with us
all, they may admire his military exploits, will never abandon their
political principles, and desert their party, for the sake of
elevating him or any other Whig candidate to the Presidency.
One other remark:—Were it within the limits of possibility to imagine,
which it is not, that our Washingtons, our Jeffersons, or our
Jacksons, could have set out on an electioneering tour for themselves,
when candidates for the Presidency,—I ask, would they have met and
addressed their fellow-citizens on such topics, and in such a style,
as General Scott has selected? No! friends and fellow-citizens,
gravity, solemnity, and the discussion of great questions of public
policy, affecting the vital interests of the country, would have
illustrated and marked their progress.
General Scott, in his political opinions, is prone to extremes. Not
content with having renounced Native Americanism, not satisfied to
occupy the broad, just and liberal platform in favor of
naturalization, on which the Democratic party have stood, ever since
the origin of the Government, he leaves this far behind. In his
letter, accepting the nomination of the Whig Convention, he declares
himself in favor of such an alteration in our naturalization laws, as
would admit foreigners to the rights of citizenship, who, in time of
war, had served a single year in the army or navy. This manifests a
strange, an unaccountable ignorance of the Federal Constitution. Did
he not know that the power of Congress was confined to the
establishment of “an uniform rule of naturalization?” “Uniform” is the
word. Congress have no power to make exceptions in favor of any class
of foreigners; no power to enact that one man shall be naturalized
after a residence of a single year, and that another shall reside five
years before he can attain this privilege. What uniformity would there
be in requiring five years residence from the honest and industrious
foreigner, who remains usefully employed at home, and in dispensing
with this requisition in favor of the foreigner who has enlisted and
served for one year in the army or navy? General Scott, in order to
accomplish his object, must resort to a fourth amendment of the
Constitution. He would make this sacred instrument a mere nose of wax,
to be twisted, and turned, and bent in any direction which the opinion
or caprice of the moment might dictate.
After this review, I ask you, fellow-citizens, what confidence can be
reposed in the political opinions of General Scott? Is there anything
in them of that firm, stable, consistent and enlightened character
which ought to distinguish the man into whose hands you are willing to
entrust the civil destinies of our great, glorious and progressive
country? What security have our adopted citizens that he may not
to-morrow relapse into Native Americanism? For twelve long years, and
this, too, at a period of life when the judgment ought to be mature,
he remained faithful and true to the Native American party; giving it
all the encouragement and support which his high character and
influence could command; and he only deserted it in 1848, at the
approach of the Whig National Convention. And what opinion must the
Native Americans hold of the man, who, after having been so long one
of their most ardent and enthusiastic leaders, abandoned them at the
time of their utmost need? Above all, does Winfield Scott possess that
calm and unerring judgment, that far-seeing sagacity, and that
prudence, never to be thrown off its guard, which we ought to require
in a President of the United States?
That General Scott is a great military man, the people of this country
will ever gratefully and cheerfully acknowledge. History teaches us,
however, that but few men, whose profession has been arms and arms
alone from early youth, have possessed the civil qualifications
necessary wisely to govern a free people. Of this we have had some
experience in the case of General Taylor, who was both an honest man
and a pure patriot; but like General Scott, had always been a soldier
and nothing but a soldier. It is true that a few favored mortals,
emancipating themselves from the military fetters by which they had
been bound, have displayed high talents as statesmen. Napoleon
Bonaparte is the most remarkable example of this class; but his
statesmanship was unfortunately displayed in the skill with which he
forged fetters for his country.
As an American citizen, proud of the military exploits of General
Scott, I wish from my soul he had never become a candidate for the
Presidency. The defects in his character as a statesman, which it has
now become an imperative duty to present to the people of the country,
would then have been forgotten and forever buried in oblivion. But for
this, he would have gone down to posterity without a cloud upon his
glory. And, even now, it is fortunate for his future fame, as well as
for the best interests of his country, that he can never be elected
President of the United States.
A few words on the subject of General Scott’s connection with the Free
Soilers, and I shall have done. And in the first place, let me say
that I do not believe, and therefore shall not assert, that he is
himself a Free Soiler. On the contrary, I freely admit we have
satisfactory proof, that whilst the Compromise Measures were pending
before Congress and afterwards, he expressed his approbation of them,
but this only in private conversations among his friends. But was this
all the country had a right to expect from General Scott?
The dark and portentous cloud raised by the Abolitionists and
fanatics, which had for many years been growing blacker and still
blacker, at length seemed ready to burst upon our devoted heads,
threatening to sweep away both the Constitution and the Union. The
patriots of the land, both Whigs and Democrats, cordially united their
efforts to avert the impending storm. At this crisis, it became the
duty of every friend of the Union to proclaim his opinions boldly.
This was not a moment for any patriot to envelop himself in mystery.
Under such appalling circumstances, did it comport with the frankness
of a soldier, for General Scott to remain silent; or merely to whisper
his opinions to private friends from the South? A man of his elevated
station and commanding influence ought to have thrown himself into the
breach. But the Presidency was in view; and he was anxious to secure
the votes of the Free Soil Whigs of the Seward school, in the National
Convention. Mr. Fillmore, his competitor, had spoken out like a man in
favor of the Compromise, and had thus done his duty to his country. He
was, for this very reason, rejected by the Whig National Convention,
and General Scott was nominated by the votes and influence of the
Northern Free Soil Whigs.
But the Northern Free Soilers had not quite sufficient strength to
secure his nomination. To render this certain, it was necessary to
enlist a small detachment of Southern Whig delegates. This task was
easily accomplished. To attain his object, General Scott had merely to
write a brief note to Mr. Archer.
This was evidently not intended for the public eye, certainly not for
the Free Soilers. It was, therefore, most reluctantly extracted from
the breeches pocket of John M. Botts, and was read to the Convention,
as we are informed, amid uproarious laughter. In this note, General
Scott, with characteristic inconsistency, whilst declaring his
determination to write nothing to the Convention, or any of its
individual members, at this very moment, in the same note, does
actually write to Mr. Archer, a member of the Convention, that should
the honor of a nomination fall to his lot, he would give his views on
the Compromise Measures in terms at least as strong in their favor, as
those which he had read to Mr. Archer himself but two days before.
This pledge which, on its face, was intended exclusively for Governor
Jones, Mr. Botts, and Mr. Lee, etc., all of them Southern Whigs,
proved sufficient to detach a small division of this wing of the party
from Mr. Fillmore, and these, uniting with the whole body of the
Northern Free Soilers, succeeded in nominating General Scott. After
the nomination had been thus made, the General immediately proceeded
to accept it, “with the resolutions annexed;” and one of these
resolutions is in favor of the faithful execution of all the measures
of the Compromise, including the Fugitive Slave Law.
Now, fellow-citizens, I view the finality of the Compromise as
necessary to the peace and preservation of the Union. I say finality;
a word aptly coined for the occasion. The Fugitive Slave Law is all
the South have obtained in this Compromise. It is a law founded both
upon the letter and the spirit of the Constitution; and a similar law
has existed on our statute book ever since the administration of
George Washington. History teaches us that but for the provision in
favor of the restoration of fugitive slaves, our present Constitution
never would have existed. Think ye that the South will ever tamely
surrender the Fugitive Slave Law to Northern fanatics and
Abolitionists?
After all, then, the great political question to be decided by the
people of the country is, will the election of Scott, or the election
of Pierce, contribute most to maintain the finality of the Compromise
and the peace and harmony of the Union?
Scott’s Northern supporters spit upon and execrate the platform
erected by the Whig National Convention. They support General Scott,
not because of their adherence to this platform, but in spite of it.
They have loudly expressed their determination to agitate the repeal
of the Fugitive Slave Law, and thus bring back upon the country the
dangerous excitement which preceded its passage. They will not suffer
the country to enjoy peace and repose, nor permit the Southern States
to manage their own domestic affairs, in their own way, without
foreign interference.
Who can doubt that these dangerous men will participate largely in the
counsels of General Scott, and influence the measures of his
administration? To them he owes his election, should he be elected. He
is bound to them by the ties of gratitude. He is placed in a position
where he would be more or less than a man, if he could withdraw
himself from their influence. Indeed, he has informed us in advance,
in the very act of accepting the nomination, that he would seek to
cultivate harmony and fraternal sentiment throughout the Whig party,
without attempting to reduce its numbers by proscription to exact
conformity to his own views. What does this mean, if not to declare
that the Free Soil Whigs of the North, and the Compromise Whigs of the
South, shall share equally in the honors and offices of the
Administration? In the North, where by far the greatest danger of
agitation exists, the offices will be bestowed upon those Whigs who
detest the Compromise, and who will exert all the influence which
office confers, to abolish the Fugitive Slave Law. To this sad dilemma
has General Scott been reduced.
On the other hand, what will be our condition should General Pierce be
elected? He will owe his election to the great Democratic party of the
country,—a party truly national, which knows no North, no South, no
East, and no West. They are everywhere devoted to the Constitution and
the Union. They everywhere speak the same language. The finality of
the Compromise, in all its parts, is everywhere an article of their
political faith. Their candidate, General Pierce, has always openly
avowed his sentiments on this subject.
He could proudly declare, in accepting the nomination, that there has
been no word nor act of his life in conflict with the platform adopted
by the Democratic National Convention. Should he be elected, all the
power and influence of his administration will be exerted to allay the
dangerous spirit of fanaticism, and to render the Union and the
Constitution immortal. Judge ye, then, between the two candidates, and
decide for yourselves.
And now, fellow-citizens, what a glorious party the Democratic party
has ever been! Man is but the being of a summer’s day, whilst
principles are eternal. The generations of mortals, one after the
other, rise and sink and are forgotten; but the principles of
Democracy, which we have inherited from our revolutionary fathers,
will endure to bless mankind throughout all generations. Is there any
Democrat within the sound of my voice—is there any Democrat throughout
the broad limits of good and great old Democratic Pennsylvania, who
will abandon these sacred principles for the sake of following in the
train of a military conqueror, and shouting for the hero of Lundy’s
Lane, Cerro Gordo, and Chapultepec?
“Remember, O my friends! the laws, the rights,
The gen’rous plan of power deliver’d down,
From age to age, by your renown’d forefathers,
So dearly bought, the price of so much blood;
O! Let it never perish in your hands,
But piously transmit it to your children.”
CHAPTER III.
1852-1853.
PERSONAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT ELECT AND WITH MR.
MARCY, HIS SECRETARY OF STATE—BUCHANAN IS OFFERED THE MISSION TO
ENGLAND—HIS OWN ACCOUNT OF THE OFFER, AND HIS REASONS FOR
ACCEPTING IT—PARTING WITH HIS FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS IN
LANCASTER—CORRESPONDENCE WITH HIS NIECE.
The private correspondence between Mr. Buchanan and the new President,
General Pierce, and his Secretary of State, will best explain his
relations to this administration; and he has himself left a full record
of the circumstances under which he accepted the mission to England in
the summer of 1853.
[FROM GENERAL PIERCE.]
CONCORD, N. H., November 1, 1852.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Your kind letter of the 26th instant was received yesterday.
Your conclusion as to attending the meeting at Tammany Hall was what I
should have expected, marked by a nice sense of the fitness of things.
The telegraphic despatches received late this evening would seem to
remove all doubt as to the result of the election. Your signal part in
the accomplishment of that result is acknowledged and appreciated by
all. I hope to have the pleasure of meeting you at no distant day.
Your friend,
FRANK PIERCE.
[FROM GENERAL PIERCE.]
CONCORD, N. H, December 7, 1852.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have been hoping ever since the election that I might have a
personal interview with you, if not before, certainly during the
present month. But the objections to such a meeting suggested by you
while I was at the sea-shore now exist, perhaps even with greater
force than at that time. With our known pleasant personal relation a
meeting would doubtless call forth many idle and annoying speculations
and groundless surmises.
An interchange of thoughts with Colonel King (whose returning health
is a source of great joy to me) would also be peculiarly pleasant and
profitable, but here, again, there are obstacles in the way. He cannot
come North, and I cannot go to Washington. Communication by letter is
still open. My thoughts for the last four weeks have been earnestly
turned to the formation of a cabinet. And although I must in the end
be responsible for the appointments, and consequently should follow my
own well-considered convictions, I cannot help saying often to myself
how agreeable it would be to compare conclusions upon this or that
point with Mr. Buchanan. I do not mean to trouble you with the many
matters of difficulty that evidently lie in my path. So far as I have
been able to form an opinion as to public sentiment and reasonable
public expectation, I think I am expected to call around me gentlemen
who have not hitherto occupied cabinet position, and in view of the
jealousies and embarrassments which environ any other course, this
expectation is in accordance with my own judgment, a judgment
strengthened by the impression that it is sanctioned by views
expressed by you. Regarding you with the confidence of a friend, and
appreciating your disinterested patriotism as well as your wide
experience and comprehensive statesmanship, I trust you will deem it
neither an intrusion nor annoyance when I ask your suggestions and
advice.
If not mistaken in this, you will confer a great favor by writing me,
as fully as you may deem proper, as to the launching (if I may so
express myself) of the incoming administration, and more especially in
regard to men and things in Pennsylvania. In relation to appointments
requiring prompt action after the inauguration, I shall, as far as
practicable, leave Concord with purposes definitely formed, and not
likely to be changed.
Should you deem that I ought not thus to tax you, burn the letter, but
give me, as of yore, your good will and wishes.
I shall regard, as you will of course, whatever passes between us as
in the strictest sense confidential.
Very truly, your friend,
FRANK PIERCE.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO GENERAL PIERCE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, December 11, 1852.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Your favor of the 7th instant reached me last evening.
You do me no more than justice in “regarding me with the free
confidence of a friend,” and I can say in all sincerity that, both for
your own sake and that of the country, I most ardently desire the
success of your administration. Having asked my suggestions and advice
“as to the launching of the incoming administration,” I shall
cheerfully give it, with all the frankness of friendship.
Your letter, I can assure you, has relieved me from no little personal
anxiety. Had you offered me a seat in your cabinet one month ago,
although highly gratified as I should have been with such a
distinguished token of your confidence and regard, I would have
declined it without a moment’s hesitation. Nothing short of an
imperative and overruling sense of public duty could ever prevail upon
me to pass another four years of my life in the laborious and
responsible position which I formerly occupied. Within the past month,
however, so many urgent appeals have been made to me from quarters
entitled to the highest respect, to accept the State Department, if
tendered, and this, too, as an act of public duty, in view of the
present perplexed and embarrassing condition of our foreign relations,
that in declining it, I should have been placed in an embarrassing
position from which I have been happily relieved by your letter.
But whilst I say this in all sincerity, I cannot assent to the
correctness of the general principle you have adopted, to proscribe in
advance the members of all former cabinets; nor do I concur with you
in opinion, that either public sentiment or public expectation
requires such a sweeping ostracism. I need scarcely, therefore, say
that the impression which you have derived of my opinion in favor of
this measure, from I know not whom, is without foundation. I should be
most unjust towards my able, enlightened and patriotic associates in
the cabinet of Mr. Polk, could I have entertained such an idea. So far
from it that, were I the President elect, I should deem it almost
indispensable to avail myself of the sound wisdom and experienced
judgment of one or more members of that cabinet, to assist me in
conducting the vast and complicated machinery of the Federal
Government. Neither should I be diverted from this purpose by the
senseless cry of “Old Fogyism” raised by “Young America.”
I think the members of Mr. Polk’s cabinet should be placed upon the
same level with the mass of their fellow-citizens, and neither in a
better nor a worse condition. I am not aware that any of them, unless
it may be Governor Marcy, either expects or desires a cabinet
appointment; and certainly all of them will most cheerfully accord to
you the perfect right of selecting the members of your own cabinet.
Still, to be excluded from your consideration, merely because they had
happened to belong to Mr. Polk’s cabinet, could not be very gratifying
to any of them.
To apply your own metaphor, “the launching of the incoming
administration” will, perhaps, be a more important and responsible
duty than has ever fallen to the lot of any of your predecessors. On
the selection of the navigators to assist you in conducting the vessel
of State, will mainly depend the success of the voyage. No matter how
able or skilful the commander may be, and without flattery, I
cheerfully accord to you both ability and skill, he can do but little
without the aid of able and skilful subordinates. So firmly am I
convinced of this truth, that I should not fear to predict the result
of your administration as soon as I shall learn who are the members of
your cabinet. In former times, when the Government was comparatively
in its infancy, the President himself could supervise and direct all
the measures of any importance arising under our complex but most
excellent system of government. Not so at present. This would no
longer be possible, even if the day consisted of forty-eight instead
of twenty-four hours. Hence, from absolute necessity, the members of
your administration will exercise much independent power. Even in
regard to those questions submitted more directly to yourself, from
want of time to make minute examinations of all the facts, you must
necessarily rely much upon the representations of the appropriate
Secretary. My strong and earnest advice to you, therefore, is not to
constitute your cabinet with a view to harmonize the opposite and
fleeting factions of the day; but solely with the higher and nobler
view of promoting the great interests of the country and securing the
glory and lasting fame of your own administration. You occupy a proud
and independent position, and enjoy a popularity which will render any
able and honest Democrat popular who may be honored by your choice for
a cabinet station, provided they are properly distributed over the
Union. In this respect, you are placed in a more enviable position
than almost any of your predecessors. It was a maxim of old Simon
Snyder, the shrewd and popular Governor of our State, that the very
best man ought to be selected for the office, and if not popular at
the moment, he would soon render himself popular. In view of these
important considerations, I would earnestly recommend to you the
practice of General Washington, never finally to decide an important
question until the moment which required its decision had nearly
approached.
I know that a state of suspense is annoying to the human mind; but it
is better to submit to this annoyance for a season than to incur the
risk of a more permanent and greater evil.
You say that you will leave Concord “with purposes definitely formed
and not likely to be changed.”
But is Concord the best locality in the world for acquiring reliable
information and taking extended views of our whole great country? To
Boston I should never resort for this purpose. Pardon me for
suggesting that you ought not to have your resolution definitely fixed
until after your arrival in Washington. In that city, although you
will find many interested and designing politicians, there are also
pure, honest and disinterested Democratic patriots.
Among this number is Colonel King, whom you so highly and justly
commend. He is among the best, purest and most consistent public men I
have ever known, and is also a sound judging and discreet counsellor.
You might rely with implicit confidence upon his information,
especially in regard to the Southern States, which I know are at the
present moment tremblingly alive to the importance of your cabinet
selections. I might cite the example of Mr. Polk. Although in council
with General Jackson, he had early determined to offer me the State
Department, yet no intimation of the kind was ever communicated to me
until a short time before his arrival in Washington, and then only in
an indirect manner; and in regard to all the other members of his
cabinet, he was wholly uncommitted, until the time for making his
selections had nearly approached.
It is true, he had strong predilections in favor of individuals before
he left Tennessee, but I do not think I hazard much in saying, that
had these been indulged, his administration would not have occupied so
high a place as it is destined to do in the history of his country.
One opinion I must not fail to express; and this is that _the cabinet
ought to be a unit_. I may say that this is not merely an opinion of
mine, but a strong and deep conviction. It is as clear to my mind as
any mathematical demonstration. Without unity no cabinet can be
successful. General Jackson, penetrating as he was, did not discover
this truth until compelled to dissolve his first cabinet on account of
its heterogeneous and discordant materials. I undertake to predict
that whoever may be the President, if he disregards this principle in
the formation of his cabinet, he will have committed a fatal mistake.
He who attempts to conciliate opposing factions by placing ardent and
embittered representatives of each in his cabinet, will discover that
he has only infused into these factions new vigor and power for
mischief. Having other objects in view, distinct from the success and
glory of the administration, they will be employed in strengthening
the factions to which they belong, and in creating unfortunate
divisions in Congress and throughout the country. It was a regard to
this vital principle of unity in the formation of his cabinet which
rendered Mr. Polk’s administration so successful. We were all personal
and political friends, and worked together in harmony. However various
our views might have been and often were upon any particular subject
when entering the cabinet council, after mutual consultation and free
discussion we never failed to agree at last, except on a very few
questions, and on these the world never knew that we had differed.
I have made these suggestions without a single selfish object. My
purpose is to retire gradually, if possible, and gracefully from any
active participation in public affairs, and to devote my time to do
historical justice to the administration of Mr. Polk, as well as to
myself, before the tribunal of posterity. I feel, notwithstanding, a
deep and intense interest in the lasting triumph of the good old cause
of Democracy and in that of its chosen standard bearer, to whose
success I devoted myself with a hearty good will.
The important domestic questions being now nearly all settled, the
foreign affairs of the Government, and especially the question of
Cuba, will occupy the most conspicuous place in your administration. I
believe Cuba can be acquired by cession upon honorable terms, and I
should not desire to acquire it in any other manner. The President who
shall accomplish this object will render his name illustrious, and
place it on the same level with that of his great predecessor, who
gave Louisiana to the Union. The best means of acquiring it, in my
opinion, is to enlist the active agency of the foreign creditors of
Spain, who have a direct interest in its cession to the United States.
The Rothschilds, the Barings, and other large capitalists now control,
to a great extent, the monarchies of continental Europe. Besides,
Queen Christina, who is very avaricious and exercises great influence
over her daughter, the queen of Spain, and her court, has very large
possessions in the island, the value of which would be greatly
enhanced by its cession to the United States. Should you desire to
acquire Cuba, the choice of suitable ministers to Spain, Naples,
England and France will be very important. Mr. Fillmore committed a
great outrage in publishing the Cuban correspondence. Had he, however,
not suppressed a material portion of my instructions to Mr. Saunders,
every candid man of all parties would have admitted, without
hesitation, that under the then existing circumstances it was the
imperative duty of Mr. Polk to offer to make the purchase. Indeed, I
think myself, it was too long delayed.
In my opinion, Mr. Clayton and Mr. Webster have involved our relations
with England in serious difficulties by departing from the Monroe
doctrine.
In Pennsylvania we have all been amused at the successive detachments
of those whom we call guerillas, which have visited Concord to assure
you that serious divisions exist among the Democracy of our State.
There never was anything more unfounded. The party is now more
thoroughly united than it has ever been at any period within my
recollection. Whilst the contest continued between General Cass and
myself, many honest Democrats, without a particle of personal or
political hostility to me, preferred him and espoused his cause simply
because he had been the defeated candidate. That feeling is at an end
with the cause which gave it birth, and these honest Democrats as
heartily despise the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, etc.,
etc., as do my oldest and best friends. In truth the guerillas are now
chiefs without followers. They are at present attempting to galvanize
themselves at home through the expected influence of your
administration. Their tools, who will nearly all be applicants for
office, circulate the most favorable accounts from Concord. They were
scarcely heard of previous to the October election, which was the
battle of the 23d December; but if we are to believe them, they
achieved the victory of the 8th January. These are the men who
defeated Judge —— at the election in October, 1851, by exciting
Anti-Catholic prejudices against him, and who have always been
disorganizers whenever their personal interests came in conflict with
the success of the party. Thank Heaven, they are now altogether
powerless, and will so remain unless your administration should impart
to them renewed vigor. Their principal apprehension was that you might
offer me a seat in your cabinet, but for some time past they have
confidently boasted that their influence had already prevented this
dreaded consummation.
Their next assault will be upon my intimate friend, Judge ——, who
will, I have no doubt, be strongly presented to you for a cabinet
appointment. The Judge is able, honest and inflexibly firm, and did,
to say the very least, as much as any individual in the State to
secure our glorious triumph. I might speak in similar terms of ——. To
defeat such men, they will lay hold of ——, Mr. ——, or any other
individual less obnoxious to them, and make a merit of pressing him
for a cabinet appointment from Pennsylvania.
They calculate largely upon the influence of General Cass, who,
strangely enough, is devoted to them, although their advocacy rendered
it impossible that he should ever be nominated or elected by the vote
of the State.
As a private citizen, I shall take the liberty of recommending to you
by letter, at the proper time, those whom I consider the best
qualified candidates for different offices within our State, and you
will pay such attention to my recommendations as you may think they
deserve. I would not, if I could, exclude the honest friends of
General Cass from a fair participation.... They are and always have
been good Democrats, and are now my warm friends. But I shall ever
protest against the appointment of any of the disorganizers who,
professing Democracy, defeated Judge ——, and not content with
advocating General Cass in preference to myself, which they had a
perfect right to do, have spent their time and their money in abusing
my personal character most foully and falsely.
Even ——, the editor of the ——, whose paper was almost exclusively
devoted to the propagation of these slanders, to be circulated under
the frank of Senator —— throughout the South, for they had no
influence at home, is a hopeful candidate for office, as they profess,
under your administration.
I have now, from a sense of duty, written you by far the longest
letter I ever wrote in my life, and have unburdened my mind of a
ponderous load. I have nothing more to add, except a request that you
would present me kindly to Mrs. Pierce, and believe me to be always,
most respectfully,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[GENERAL PIERCE TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
CONCORD, N. H., December 14, 1852.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Language fails me to express the sincere gratitude I feel for your
kind and noble letter of the 11th inst. I cannot now reply as I ought,
but lose no time in expressing my deep sense of obligation. I ought,
in justice to the citizens of Pennsylvania who have visited Concord
during the summer and autumn, to say that I do not recollect a single
individual who has ventured to make a suggestion in relation to
yourself, calculated in the slightest degree to weaken my personal
regard.
It is far from my purpose to hasten to any conclusion in relation to
my cabinet.
It is hardly possible that I can be more deeply impressed than I now
am as to the importance of the manner in which it shall be cast, both
for the interests of the country and my own comfort. I cannot,
however, view the advantages of my presence at Washington in the same
light with yourself, though having no object but the best interests of
our party and the country; personal inclination and convenience will,
if I know it, have no weight upon my course in any particular.
I must leave for a future time many things I desire to say. Do you
still anticipate passing a portion of the winter at the South?
With sincere regard, your friend,
FRANK PIERCE.
[MARCY TO BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, March 5, 1853.
MY DEAR SIR:—
If not a matter of strict duty, I choose to regard it as a proper
thing to explain my movements to you. A few days after the late
Presidential election, I went south with my son Edmund, about whose
condition as to health I had become alarmed, and am still very
solicitous. In the first week of February, he took a steamer for some
of the West India Islands, and I concluded it to be my duty to return
to my deserted family at Albany. I arrived at Richmond, Virginia,
about the 20th of February, with a disposition to pass on to the North
without going through Washington. As I had never done anything at that
place for which I ought to be ashamed (or rather I thought I had not),
it appeared to me it would be cowardly to run around or through it. I
was very much inclined to go and perchance to stop there a few days.
The doubts which distracted me in regard to my course were almost
entirely removed by a letter from a person whom I had never seen,
suggesting that it might be well for me to be in Washington about the
20th ult. On my appearance there a rumor suddenly arose that I was
certainly to be one of the new cabinet, and the same liberty was taken
with the names of several other persons. I have heard in an
unauthentic way that you had been wise enough to take precautions
against such a use of your name. It is now generally believed here,
and I believe it myself, that I may be in the cabinet of the incoming
administration, and (to confess all) I have been weak enough to make
up my mind to accept a seat if offered one in it. Should it be the
place you filled with so much ability, I may be rash enough not to
decline it. I have told you all; here I am and here I am likely to be,
for a brief period at least.
I do not think you will approve of what I have done. I hope you will
not severely censure me, or the judgment which will put me where I
expect to be. If it is an error, either on my part or that of another,
there are some circumstances to excuse it, but I have not time to
present them in detail.
I hope to have a frank and free intercourse with you. I will go
further, I hope to have—what I know I shall much need—the aid in some
emergencies of your greater experience and better knowledge. It will
give me sincere pleasure to hear from you.
Yours truly,
W. L. MARCY.
On the 30th of March (1853), the President wrote to Mr. Buchanan and
requested him to accept the mission to England. In his reply, Mr.
Buchanan postponed a final answer, and what ensued appears from the
following detailed account, which remains in his hand-writing.
Although gratified with this offer, I felt great reluctance in
accepting it. Having consulted several friends, in whose judgment I
have confidence, they all advised me to accept it, with a single
exception (James L. Reynolds). I left Lancaster for Washington on
Thursday, 7th April, wholly undecided as to my course. On Friday
morning (8th April) I called upon the President, who invited me to
dine with him “_en famille_” that day. The only strangers at the table
were Mr. John Slidell and Mr. O’Conor. After the dinner was over the
President invited me up to the library, where we held the following
conversation:
I commenced by expressing to him my warm and grateful acknowledgments
for the offer of this most important mission, and said I should feel
myself under the same obligations to him whether it was accepted or
declined; that at my age, and contented and happy as I was at home, I
felt no disposition to change my position, and again to subject myself
to the ceremonious etiquette and round of gaiety required from a
minister at a foreign court.
Here the President interrupted me and said: “If this had been my only
purpose in sending you abroad, I should never have offered you the
mission. You know very well that we have several important questions
to settle with England, and it is my intention that you shall settle
them all in London. The country expects and requires your services as
minister to London. You have had no competitor for this place, and
when I presented your name to the cabinet they were unanimous. I think
that under these circumstances I have a right to ask you to accept the
mission.”
To this I replied that Mr. Polk was a wise man, and after deliberation
he had determined that all important questions with foreign nations
should be settled in Washington, under his own immediate supervision;
that he (President Pierce) had not, perhaps, seriously considered the
question.
He promptly replied that he had seriously considered the question, and
had arrived at the conclusion that better terms could be obtained in
London at the seat of power than through an intermediate agent in this
country; and instanced the Oregon negotiation as an example.
From this opinion I did not dissent, but asked: “What will Governor
Marcy say to your determination? You have appointed him Secretary of
State with my entire approbation; and I do not think he would be
willing to surrender to your minister at London the settlement of
these important questions, which might reflect so much honor upon
himself.”
He replied, with some apparent feeling, that he himself would control
this matter.
I interposed and said: “I know that you do; but I would not become the
instrument of creating any unpleasant feelings between yourself and
your Secretary of State by accepting the mission, even if I desired
it, which is not the case.”
He replied that he did not believe this would be the case. When he had
mentioned my name to the cabinet, although he did not say in express
terms I should be entrusted with the settlement of these questions,
yet from the general tone of his remarks they must have inferred that
such was his intention. He added, that after our interview he would
address a note to Governor Marcy to call and see him, and after
conversing with him on the subject he would send for me.
I then mentioned to him that there appeared to me to be another
insurmountable obstacle to my acceptance of the mission. I said: “In
all your appointments for Pennsylvania, you have not yet selected a
single individual for any office for which I recommended him. I have
numerous other friends still behind who are applicants for foreign
appointments; and if I were now to accept the mission to London, they
might with justice say that I had appropriated the lion’s share to
myself, and selfishly received it as an equivalent for their
disappointment. I could not and would not place myself in this
position.”
His answer was emphatic. He said: “I can assure you, if you accept the
mission, Pennsylvania shall not receive one appointment more or less
on that account. I shall consider yours as an appointment for the
whole country; and I will not say that Pennsylvania shall not have
more in case of your acceptance than if you should decline the
mission.” I asked him if he was willing I should mention this
conversation publicly. He said he would rather not; but that I might
give the strongest assurances to my friends that such would be his
course in regard to Pennsylvania appointments.
We then had a conversation respecting the individual appointments
already made in Pennsylvania, which I shall not write. He told me
emphatically, that when he appointed Mr. Brown collector, he believed
him to be my friend, and had received assurances to that effect;
although he knew that I greatly preferred Governor Porter. He also had
been assured that Wynkoop was my friend, and asked if I had not
recommended him; and seemed much surprised when I informed him of the
course he had pursued.
I then stated, that if I should accept the mission, I could not
consent to banish myself from my country for more than two years. He
replied, that at the end of two years I might write to him for leave
to return home, and it should be granted; adding, that if I should
settle our important questions with England at an earlier period, I
might return at the end of eighteen months, should I desire it.
The interview ended, and I heard nothing from the President on Friday
evening, Saturday or Sunday, or until Monday morning. In the mean
time, I had several conversations with particular friends, and
especially with Mr. Walker (at whose house I stayed), Judge Campbell
and Senator Bright, all of whom urged me to accept the mission. The
latter informed me that if I did not accept it, many would attribute
my refusal to a fear or an unwillingness to grapple with the important
and dangerous questions pending between the United States and Great
Britain.
On Sunday morning, April 10th, the _Washington Union_ was brought to
Mr. Walker’s, from which it appeared that the session of the Senate
would terminate on the next day at one o’clock, the President having
informed the Committee to wait upon him, that he had no further
communications to make to the body. At this I was gratified. I
presumed that the President, after having consulted Governor Marcy,
had concluded not to transfer the negotiations to London; because it
had never occurred to me that I was to go abroad on such an important
mission without the confirmation of the Senate. Mr. Walker and myself
had some conversation on the subject, and we agreed that it was
strange the Senate had been kept so long together without submitting
to them the important foreign appointments; as we both knew that in
Europe, and especially in England, since the rejection of Mr. Van
Buren’s appointment, a minister had not the proper prestige without
the approbation of the co-ordinate branch of the Executive power.
On Sunday morning, before dinner-time, I called to see Jefferson
Davis.[6] We had much conversation on many subjects. Among other
things, I told him it was strange that the foreign appointments had
not been agreed upon and submitted to the Senate before their
adjournment. He replied that he did not see that this could make any
difference; they might be made with more deliberation during the
recess. I said a man was considered but half a minister, who went
abroad upon the President’s appointment alone, without the consent of
the Senate, ever since the rejection of Mr. Van Buren. He said he now
saw this plainly; and asked why Marcy had not informed them of
it,—they trusted to him in all such matters. The conversation then
turned upon other subjects; but this interview with Mr. Davis, sought
for the purpose of benefiting my friend, John Slidell, who was then a
candidate for the Senate, has doubtless been the cause why I was
nominated and confirmed as minister to England on the next day.
Footnote 6:
Mr. Davis was Secretary of War.
On Sunday evening a friend informed Mr. Walker and myself that a
private message had been sent to the Senators still in town,
requesting them not to leave by the cars on Monday morning, as the
President had important business to submit to them. This was
undoubtedly the origin of the rumor which at the time so extensively
prevailed, that the cabinet was about to be dissolved and another
appointed.
On Monday morning, at ten o’clock, I received a note from Mr.
Cushing,[7] informing me that “the President would be glad to see me
at once.” I immediately repaired to the White House; and the President
and myself agreed, referring to our former conversation, though not
repeating it in detail, that he should send my name to the Senate. If
a quorum were present, and I should be confirmed, I would go to
England; if not, the matter was to be considered as ended.
Thirty-three members were present, and I was confirmed. On this second
occasion, our brief conversation was of the same character, so far as
it proceeded, with that at our first interview. He kindly consented
that I should select my own Secretary of Legation; and without a
moment’s hesitation, I chose John Appleton, of Maine, who accepted the
offer which I was authorized to make, and was appointed. I left
Washington on Tuesday morning, April 12th.
Footnote 7:
Attorney General.
At our last interview, I informed the President that I would soon
again return to Washington to prepare myself for the performance of my
important duties, because this could only be satisfactorily done in
the State Department. He said he wished to be more at leisure on my
return, that he might converse with me freely on the questions
involved in my mission; he thought that in about ten days the great
pressure for office would relax, and he would address me a note
inviting me to come.
I left Washington perfectly satisfied, and resolved to use my best
efforts to accomplish the objects of my mission. The time fixed upon
for leaving the country was the 20th of June, so that I might relieve
Mr. Ingersoll on the 1st of July.
I had given James Keenan of Greensburg a strong recommendation for
appointment as consul to Glasgow. As soon as he learned my appointment
as minister to England, he wrote to me on the 14th of April, stating
that the annunciation of my acceptance of this mission had created a
belief among my friends there that no Pennsylvanian could now be
appointed to any consulship.
On the 16th of April, I wrote to him and assured him, in the language
of the President, that my appointment to the English mission would not
cause one appointment more or one appointment less to be given to
Pennsylvania than if I had declined the mission.
In answer, I received a letter from him, dated April 21st, in which he
extracts from a letter from Mr. Drum, then in Washington, to him, the
following: “I have talked to the President earnestly on the subject
(of his appointment to Glasgow), but evidently without making much
impression. He says that it will be impossible for him to bestow
important consulships on Pennsylvania who has a cabinet officer and
_the first and highest mission_. Campbell talks in the same strain;
but says he will make it his business to get something worthy of your
acceptance.”
For some days before and after the receipt of this letter, I learned
that different members of the cabinet, when urged for consulates for
Pennsylvanians, had declared to the applicants and their friends that
they could not be appointed _on account of my appointment to London_,
and what the President had already done for the State. One notable
instance of this kind occurred between Colonel Forney and Mr. Cushing.
Not having heard from the President, according to his promise, I
determined to go to Washington for the purpose of having an
explanation with him and preparing myself for my mission. Accordingly,
I left home on Tuesday, May 17th, and arrived in Washington on
Wednesday morning, May 18th, remaining there until Tuesday morning,
May 31st, on which day I returned home.
On Thursday morning, May 19th, I met the President, by appointment, at
9½ o’clock. Although he did not make a very clear explanation of his
conversation with Mr. Drum, yet I left him satisfied that he would
perform his promise in regard to Pennsylvania appointments. I had not
been in Washington many days before I clearly discovered that the
President and cabinet were intent upon his renomination and
re-election. This I concluded from the general tendency of affairs, as
well as from special communications to that effect from friends whom I
shall not name. It was easy to perceive that the object in
appointments was to raise up a Pierce party, wholly distinct from the
former Buchanan, Cass, and Douglas parties; and I readily perceived,
what I had before conjectured, the reason why my recommendations had
proved of so little avail. I thought I also discovered considerable
jealousy of Governor Marcy, who will probably cherish until the day of
his death the anxious desire to become President. I was convinced of
this jealousy at a dinner given Mr. Holmes, formerly of South
Carolina, now of California, at Brown’s Hotel on Saturday, May 21st.
Among the guests were Governor Marcy, Jefferson Davis, Mr. Dobbin, and
Mr. Cushing. The company soon got into high good humor. In the course
of the evening Mr. Davis began to jest with Governor Marcy and myself
on the subject of the next Presidency, and the Governor appeared to
relish the subject. After considerable _bagatelle_, I said I would
make a speech. All wanted to hear my speech. I addressed Governor
Marcy and said: “You and I ought to consider ourselves out of the list
of candidates. We are both growing old, and it is a melancholy
spectacle to see old men struggling in the political arena for the
honors and offices of this world, as though it were to be their
everlasting abode. Should you perform your duties as Secretary of
State to the satisfaction of the country during the present
Presidential term, and should I perform my duties in the same manner
as minister to England, we ought both to be content to retire and
leave the field to younger men. President Pierce is a young man, and
should his administration prove to be advantageous to the country and
honorable to himself, as I trust it will, there is no good reason why
he should not be renominated and re-elected for a second term.” The
Governor, to do him justice, appeared to take these remarks kindly and
in good part, and said he was agreed. They were evidently very
gratifying to Messrs. Davis, Dobbin, and Cushing. Besides, they
expressed the real sentiments of my heart. When the dinner was ended,
Messrs. Davis and Dobbin took my right and left arm and conducted me
to my lodgings, expressing warm approbation of what I had said to
Governor Marcy. I heard of this speech several times whilst I remained
at Washington; and the President once alluded to it with evident
satisfaction. It is certain that Governor Marcy is no favorite.
I found the State Department in a wretched condition. Everything had
been left by Mr. Webster topsy turvy; and Mr. Everett was not
Secretary long enough to have it put in proper order; and whilst in
that position he was constantly occupied with pressing and important
business. Governor Marcy told me that he had not been able, since his
appointment, to devote one single hour together to his proper official
duties. His time had been constantly taken up with office-seekers and
cabinet councils. It is certain that during Mr. Polk’s administration
he had paid but little attention to our foreign affairs; and it is
equally certain that he went into the Department without much
knowledge of its appropriate duties. But he is a strong-minded and
clear-headed man; and, although slow in his perceptions, is sound in
his judgment. He may, and I trust will, succeed; but yet he has much
to learn.
Soon after I arrived in Washington on this visit, I began seriously to
doubt whether the President would eventually entrust to me the
settlement of the important questions at London, according to his
promise, without which I should not have consented to go abroad. I
discovered that the customary and necessary notice in such cases had
not been given to the British government, of the President’s intention
and desire to transfer the negotiations to London, and that I would go
there with instructions and authority to settle all the questions
between the two governments, and thus prepare them for the opening of
these negotiations upon my arrival.
After I had been in Washington some days, busily engaged in the State
Department in preparing myself for the duties of my mission, Mr. Marcy
showed me the project of a treaty which had nearly been completed by
Mr. Everett and Mr. Crampton, the British minister, before Mr.
Fillmore’s term had expired, creating reciprocal free trade in certain
enumerated articles, between the United States and the British North
American provinces, with the exception of Newfoundland, and regulating
the fisheries. Mr. Marcy appeared anxious to conclude this treaty,
though he did not say so in terms. He said that Mr. Crampton urged its
conclusion; and he himself apprehended that if it were not concluded
speedily, there would be great danger of collision between the two
countries on the fishing grounds. I might have answered, but did not,
that the treaty could not be ratified until after the meeting of the
Senate in December; and that in the mean time it might be concluded at
London in connection with the Central American questions. I did say
that the great lever which would force the British government to do us
justice in Central America was their anxious desire to obtain
reciprocal free trade for their North American possessions, and thus
preserve their allegiance and ward off the danger of their annexation
to the United States. My communications on the extent and character of
my mission were with the President himself, and not with Governor
Marcy; and I was determined they should so remain. The President had
informed me that he had, as he promised, conversed with the Governor,
and found him entirely willing that I should have the settlement of
the important questions at London.
The circumstances to which I have referred appeared to me to be
significant. I conversed with the President fully and freely on each
of the three questions, viz: The reciprocal trade, the fisheries, and
that of Central America; and endeavored to convince him of the
necessity of settling them all together. He seemed to be strongly
impressed with my remarks, and said that he had conversed with a
Senator then in Washington, (I presume Mr. Toucey, though he did not
mention the name,) who had informed him that he thought that the
Senate would have great difficulty in ratifying any treaty which did
not embrace all the subjects pending between us and England; and that
for this very reason there had been considerable opposition in the
body to the ratification of the Claims Convention, though in itself
unexceptionable.
The President said nothing from which an inference could be fairly
drawn that he had changed his mind as to the place where the
negotiation should be conducted; and yet he did not speak in as strong
and unequivocal terms on the subject as I could have desired. Under
all the circumstances, I left Washington, on the 31st of May, without
accepting my commission, which had been prepared for me and was in the
State Department. On the 5th of June I received a letter from Governor
Marcy, dated on the first, requesting me to put on paper my exposition
of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty. In this he says nothing about my
instructions on any of the questions between this country and England,
nor does he intimate that he desires my opinion for any particular
purpose. On the 7th of June I answered his letter. In the concluding
portion of my letter, I took the occasion to say: “The truth is that
our relations with England are in a critical condition. Throw all the
questions together into hotchpot, and I think they can all be settled
amicably and honorably. The desire of Great Britain to establish free
trade between the United States and her North American possessions,
and by this means retain these possessions in their allegiance, may be
used as the powerful lever to force her to abandon her pretensions in
Central America; and yet it must be admitted that, in her history, she
has never voluntarily abandoned any important commercial position on
which she has once planted her foot. It cannot be her interest to go
to war with us, and she must know that it is clearly her interest to
settle all the questions between us, and have a smooth sea hereafter.
If the Central American question, which is the dangerous question,
should not be settled, we shall probably have war with England before
the close of the present administration. Should she persist in her
unjust and grasping policy on the North American continent and the
adjacent islands, this will be inevitable at some future day; and
although we are not very well prepared for it at the present moment,
it is not probable that we shall for many years be in a better
condition.”
I also say in this letter to Governor Marcy, that “bad as the treaty
(the Clayton and Bulwer treaty) is, the President cannot annul it.
This would be beyond his power, and the attempt would startle the
whole world. In one respect it may be employed to great advantage. The
question of the Colony of the Bay of Islands is the dangerous
question. It affects the national honor. From all the consideration I
can give the subject, the establishment of this Colony is a clear
violation of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty. Under it we can insist
upon the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Bay of Islands. Without
it we could only interpose the Monroe doctrine against this colony,
which has never yet been sanctioned by Congress, though as an
individual citizen of the United States, I would fight for it
to-morrow, so far as all North America is concerned, and would do my
best to maintain it throughout South America.”
This letter of mine to Governor Marcy, up till the present moment,
June 25, has elicited no response. It may be seen at length in this
book.
Having at length determined to ascertain what were the President’s
present intentions in regard to the character of my mission, I
addressed him a letter, of which the following is a copy, on the 14th
June.
[TO HIS EXCELLENCY, FRANKLIN PIERCE.]
(Private.) WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, June 14,
1853.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have this moment received yours of the 11th instant, and now enclose
you Mr. Appleton’s resignation. I cannot imagine how I neglected to do
this before. It will be very difficult to supply his place.
If you have changed your mind in regard to the place where our
important negotiations with England shall be conducted, you would
confer a great favor upon me by informing me of this immediately. I
stated to you, in our first conversation on the subject, that Mr.
Polk, after due deliberation, had determined that such negotiations
should be conducted under his own eye at Washington; and it would not
give me the slightest uneasiness to learn, that upon reconsideration,
such had become your determination. I should, however, consider it a
fatal policy to divide the questions. After a careful examination and
study of all these questions, and their mutual bearings upon each
other and upon the interest of the two countries, I am fully convinced
that they can only be satisfactorily adjusted all together. Indeed,
from what you said to me of your conversation with a Senator, and from
what I have since learned, I believe it would be difficult to obtain
the consent of two-thirds of the Senate to any partial treaty. The
South, whether correctly or not, will probably be averse to a
reciprocity treaty confined to the British North American possessions;
and it would be easy for hostile demagogues to proclaim, however
unjustly, that the interests of the South had been bartered away for
the fisheries. But the South might and probably would be reconciled to
such a treaty, if it embraced a final and satisfactory adjustment of
the questions in Central America.
If you have changed your mind, and I can imagine many reasons for
this, independently of the pressure of the British minister to secure
that which is so highly prized by his government,—then, I would
respectfully suggest that you might inform Mr. Crampton, you are ready
and willing to negotiate upon the subject of the fisheries and
reciprocal trade; _but this in connection with our Central American
difficulties_;—that you desire to put an end to all the embarrassing
and dangerous questions between the two governments, and thus best
promote the most friendly relations hereafter;—and that you will
proceed immediately with the negotiation and bring it to as speedy a
conclusion as possible, whenever he shall have received the necessary
instructions. Indeed, the treaty in regard to reciprocal trade and the
fisheries might, in the mean time, be perfected, with a distinct
understanding, however, that its final execution should be postponed
until the Central American questions had been adjusted. In that event,
as I informed you when at Washington, if you should so desire, I shall
be most cordially willing to go there as a private individual, and
render you all the assistance in my power. I know as well as I live,
that it would be vain for me to go to London to settle a question
peculiarly distasteful to the British government, after they had
obtained, at Washington, that which they so ardently desire.
I write this actuated solely by a desire to serve your administration
and the country. I shall not be mortified, in the slightest degree,
should you determine to settle all the questions in Washington.
Whether [you do so] or not, your administration shall not have a
better friend in the country than myself, nor one more ardently
desirous of its success; and I can render it far more essential
service as a private citizen at home than as a minister to London.
With my kindest regards for Mrs. Pierce, and Mrs. Means,
I remain, very respectfully, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—I should esteem it a personal favor to hear from you as soon as
may be convenient.
From the important character of this letter and the earnest and
reiterated request which I made for an early answer, I did not doubt but
that I should receive one, giving me definite information, with as
little delay as possible. I waited in vain until the 23d June; and
having previously ascertained, through a friend, that my letter had been
received by the President, I wrote him a second letter on that day, of
which the following is a copy.
[TO HIS EXCELLENCY, FRANKLIN PIERCE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, June 23, 1853.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Not having yet been honored with an answer to my letter of the 14th
inst., I infer from your silence, as well as from what I observe in
the public journals, that you have finally changed your original
purpose and determined that our important negotiations with England
shall be conducted under your own eye at Washington, and not in
London. Anxious to relieve you from all embarrassment upon the
subject, I desire to express my cordial concurrence in such an
arrangement, if it has been made; and I do this without waiting longer
for your answer, as the day is now near at hand which was named for my
departure from the country.[8] Many strong reasons, I have no doubt,
exist, to render this change of purpose entirely proper and most
beneficial for the public interest. I am not at all surprised at it,
having suggested to you, when we conversed upon the subject, that Mr.
Polk, who was an able and a wise man, had determined that our
important negotiations with foreign powers, so far as this was
possible, should be conducted at Washington, by the Secretary of
State, under his own immediate supervision. With such a change I shall
be altogether satisfied, nay, personally gratified; because it will
produce a corresponding change in my determination to accept the
English mission.
I never had the vanity to imagine that there were not many Democratic
statesmen in the country who could settle our pending questions with
England quite as ably and successfully as myself; and it was,
therefore, solely your own voluntary and powerful appeal to me to
undertake the task which could have overcome my strong repugnance to
go abroad. Indeed, when I stated to you how irksome it would be for
me, at my period of life and with my taste for retirement, again for
the second time to pass through the routine and submit to the
etiquette necessary in representing my country at a foreign court, you
kindly remarked that you were so well convinced of this that you would
never have offered me the mission had it not been for your deliberate
determination that the negotiations on the grave and important
questions between the two countries should be conducted by myself at
London, under your instructions; observing that, in your opinion,
better terms could be obtained for our country at the fountain of
power than through the intermediate channel of the British minister at
Washington.
At any time a foreign mission would be distasteful to me; but peculiar
reasons of a private and domestic character existed at the time I
agreed to accept the British mission, and still exist, which could
only have yielded to the striking view you presented of the high
public duty which required me to undertake the settlement of these
important questions. You will, therefore, be kind enough to permit me,
in case your enlightened judgment has arrived at the conclusion that
Washington, and not London, ought to be the seat of the negotiations,
most respectfully to decline the mission. For this you have doubtless
been prepared by my letter of the 14th instant.
With my deep and grateful acknowledgments for the high honor you
intended for me, and my ardent and sincere wishes for the success and
glory of your administration and for your own individual health,
prosperity and happiness, I remain, very respectfully,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
To this letter I received an answer on Tuesday evening, June 28th, of
which the following is a copy:
Footnote 8:
9th July.
[PRESIDENT PIERCE TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 26th, 1853.
MR DEAR SIR:—
I was much surprised by the perusal of your letter of the 23d inst.,
received this morning. I had seen no letter from you since that to
which I replied on the 11th inst., and was mortified that through a
mistake of my own, and from no neglect of my private secretary, it had
been misplaced from a large mail of the 17th, with one or two other
letters, and had thus entirely escaped my notice. The motives which
led me to desire your acceptance of the mission to England were fully
stated, first, I think, in my note addressed to you at Wheatland, and
subsequently in our interview. The general views which were expressed
by me at that interview as to the relative advantages of conducting
the negotiations here or at London has undergone no change. Still, the
present condition of affairs with respect to the fisheries and the
various questions connected therewith has seemed to demand that they
be taken up where Mr. Crampton and Mr. Everett left them. Recent
developments have inspired the belief that the fisheries, the
reciprocity question, etc. will leave no ground of concession which
could be available in the settlement of the questions in Central
America. The threatening aspect of affairs on the coast in the
provinces has of necessity called for several conversations between
Mr. Crampton and the Secretary of State, with a view to keep things
quiet there, and, if practicable, to agree upon terms of a
satisfactory adjustment. To suspend these negotiations at this moment,
in the critical condition of our interests in that quarter, might, I
fear, prove embarrassing, if not hazardous. That a treaty can be, or
had better be, concluded here, I am not prepared to say. I have no
wish upon the subject except that the negotiations be conducted
wherever they can be brought to the most speedy and advantageous
termination. The great respect for your judgment, experience, high
attainments and eminent abilities, which led me to tender to you the
mission to England, will induce me to commit to your hands all the
pending questions between the two countries, unless the reasons for
proceeding here with those to which I have referred, shall appear
quite obvious. I need not say that your declination at this time would
be embarrassing to me, and for many reasons a matter to be deeply
regretted.
I thank you for your generous expressions, and assure you that your
heart acknowledges no feeling of personal kindness to which mine does
not respond. If the tax be not too great, will you oblige me by
visiting Washington again? I trust a comparison of conclusions, with
the facts before us, may conduct to a result mutually satisfactory.
With the highest respect, your friend,
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO PRESIDENT PIERCE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, June 29th, 1853.
MR DEAR SIR:—
Your favor of the 26th inst. did not reach Lancaster until yesterday
afternoon. I had thought it strange that you did not answer my letter
of the 14th instant; but this accidental omission has been kindly and
satisfactorily explained by your favor of the 26th.
It is, perhaps, scarcely necessary for me to repeat my unchanged
purpose to accept the English mission and go to London without delay,
if it be still your determination to intrust me with the settlement of
the reciprocity, the fishery and the Central American questions. I
confess, however, that I do not perceive how it is now possible,
employing your own language, “to suspend negotiations (in Washington)
at this moment” on the reciprocity and fishery questions. I agree with
you that it was quite natural that the negotiations “should be taken
up at once, where Mr. Crampton and Mr. Everett left them.” This could
only have been prevented by an official communication to Mr. Crampton,
upon offering to renew the negotiation, informing him of the fact that
you had appointed me minister to London for the very purpose of
settling these, as well as the Central American, questions.
In regard to our Central American difficulties, I still entertain,
after more mature reflection, the most decided opinions—I might even
say convictions. Whilst these difficulties are all embarrassing, one
of them is attended with extreme danger. I refer to the establishment
by Great Britain of the Colony of the Bay of Islands. This wrong has
been perpetrated, if I understand the question, in direct violation of
the Clayton and Bulwer treaty. Our national honor imperatively
requires the removal of this colony. Its withdrawal ought to be a sine
qua non in any negotiation on any subject with the British government.
With what face could we ever hereafter present this question of
violated faith and outraged national honor to the world against the
British government, if whilst, flagrante delicto, the wrong
unexplained and unredressed, we should incorporate the British North
American provinces, by treaty, into the American Union, so far as
reciprocal free trade is concerned? How could we, then, under any
circumstances, make this a casus belli? If a man has wronged and
insulted me, and I take him into my family and bestow upon him the
privileges of one of its members, without previous redress or
explanation, it is then too late to turn round and make the original
offence a serious cause for personal hostilities. It is the first step
which costs; and this ought to be taken with a clear view of all the
consequences. If I were placed in your exalted and well merited
station, my motto should be, “all the questions or none.” This is the
best, nay, perhaps the only mode of satisfactorily adjusting our
difficulties with that haughty, overreaching and imperious government.
My sole object in agreeing to accept a mission, so distasteful to me
in all other respects, was to try the experiment, under your
instructions, well knowing that I should receive from you a firm and
enlightened support. I still cherish the confident belief we should
have proved successful. It would now seem to be too late to transfer
the negotiation to London; but you may still insist that _all_ the
questions shall be settled together in Washington. They still remain
there just as they were in Mr. Fillmore’s time. Why, then, should Mr.
Crampton have received instructions in two of them, and not in the
third?
But I have said and written so much to yourself and Governor Marcy
upon the danger of dividing these questions, that I shall only add
that, were I a Senator, I could not in conscience vote for the
ratification of any partial treaty in the present condition of our
relations with Great Britain. And here I would beg respectfully to
make a suggestion which, if approved by you, might remove all
difficulties. Let Governor Marcy and Mr. Crampton arrange the
reciprocity and fishery questions as speedily as possible; and then
let me carry the perfected projet with me to London, to be executed
there, provided I shall succeed in adjusting the Central American
questions according to your instructions; but in no other event. In
this manner the reciprocity question, as arranged by the Secretary of
State, might still be used as the powerful lever to force a just
settlement of the Central American questions. Indeed, in communicating
your purpose in this respect to Mr. Crampton, Governor Marcy might
address him a note which would essentially assist me in the Central
American negotiation. As the reciprocity and fishery treaty would not
be submitted to the Senate until December, this arrangement would be
productive of no delay.
I should cheerfully visit Washington, or go a thousand miles to serve
you in any manner, but I doubt whether this would be good policy under
existing circumstances. The public journals would at once announce
that I had arrived in Washington to receive my commission and
instructions, and depart for Europe. Finding this not to be the case,
they would presume that some misunderstanding had occurred between you
and myself, which prevented me from going abroad. Is it not better to
avoid such suspicions? If I should not go to England, a brief
explanation can be made in the _Union_ which will put all right, and
the whole matter will be forgotten in a week. After all, however,
should you still wish me to go to Washington, please to have me
telegraphed, because the mail is almost always two, and sometimes
three days in reaching me.
In regard to myself personally, if the expedient which I have
suggested should not be adopted, or something similar to it, then I
should have no business of importance to transact in London, and
should, against all my tastes and inclinations, again subject myself
to the ceremonies, etiquette and round of gaiety required from a
minister at a foreign court. But this is not all. I should violate my
private and social duties towards an only brother, in very delicate
health, and numerous young relatives, some of whom are entirely
dependent upon me and now at a critical period of life, without the
self-justification of having any important public duties to perform.
So reluctant was I, at the first, to undertake the task which, in your
kindness, you had prescribed for me, that my mind was not finally made
up, until a distinguished Senator bluntly informed me, that if I
shrank from it, this would be attributed to a fear of grappling with
the important and dangerous questions with England which had been
assigned to me, both by the voice of the President and the country.
I regret that I have not time, before the closing of the mail, to
reduce my letter to any reasonable dimensions.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Wednesday, July 6th, at about 6 o’clock in the afternoon, Mr. Mann, the
son of the Assistant Secretary of State, arrives and presents me with a
private letter from Governor Marcy dated on the day previous, and a
sealed package which, upon opening, I found contained my commission and
instructions as minister to Great Britain, without the slightest
reference to the previous correspondence on the subject between the
President and myself, and just as though I had accepted, instead of
having declined the mission, and was now on the wing for London! He was
to find me wherever I might be. He left about sunset or between that and
dark. _Vide_ Governor Marcy’s letter, on page 30.
Thursday morning, July 7, the following letter from the President came
to hand, postmarked Washington, July 4th.
[PIERCE TO BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, July 2, 1853.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Your letter of the 29th ultimo was received this morning, and I have
carefully considered its suggestions. The state of the questions now
under discussion between Mr. Crampton and Governor Marcy cannot with a
proper regard for the public interest, be suspended. It is not to be
disguised that the condition of things on the coast is extremely
embarrassing, so much so as to be the source of daily solicitude.
Nothing, it is to be feared, but the prospect of a speedy adjustment
will prevent actual collision. Mr. Crampton has become so deeply
impressed with the hazard of any ill-advised step on either side that
he left this morning with the view of having a personal interview with
Sir George Seymour. Thus, while I am not prepared to say that a treaty
can be concluded here, or that it will prove desirable upon the whole
that it should be, it is quite clear to my mind that the negotiations
ought not to be broken off; and that, with a proper regard to our
interests, the announcement cannot be made to Mr. Crampton that the
final adjustment of the fishery question must await the settlement of
the Central American questions. Believing that the instructions now
prepared would present my views in relation to the mission in the most
satisfactory manner, they will be forwarded to you to-morrow. I need
not repeat the deep regret your declination would occasion on my part.
What explanation could be given for it, I am unable to perceive.
I am, with the highest respect,
Truly your friend,
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[BUCHANAN TO PIERCE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, July 7, 1853.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Yours of the 2d inst., postmarked on the 4th, did not reach me until
this morning at too late an hour to prepare and send an answer to
Lancaster in time for the southern mail. Young Mr. Mann arrived and
left last evening, a _most decided contre-temps_. Had your letter
preceded him, this would have saved me some labor, and, although a
very placid man, some irritation.
Although the opinions and purposes expressed in my letters of the
14th, 23d and 29th ultimo remain unchanged, yet so great is my
personal desire to gratify your wishes that I shall take the question
under reconsideration for a brief period. I observe from the papers
that you will be in Philadelphia, where I anticipate the pleasure of
paying you my respects. Then, if not sooner, I shall give your letter
a definite answer.
I hope that in the meantime you may look out for some better man to
take my place. You may rest assured I can manifest my warm friendship
for your administration and for yourself far more effectively as a
private citizen of Pennsylvania than as a public minister in London.
From your friend,
Very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MARCY TO BUCHANAN.]
STATE DEPARTMENT, }
(Private) WASHINGTON, July 5, 1853. }
MY DEAR SIR:—
I expected you would be again in Washington before you left for
England, but as this is uncertain, I have concluded to send by the
bearer, Mr. W. G. C. Mann, the instructions which have been
prepared for you. I have preferred to send them in this way lest
they should not reach you in season if entrusted to the mail.
I should have been pleased with an opportunity of submitting them
to you, and having the benefit of any suggestions you might make
thereon; but I shall not have it, as you will not probably be here
before your departure on your mission. The instructions have been
carefully examined by the President, and made conformable to his
views. Should there be other documents than those now sent, which
it would be proper for you to take out, they will be forwarded to
our despatch agent at New York, and by him handed to you.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
W. L. MARCY.
On Monday evening, July 11, 1853, I went to Philadelphia to meet
the President, according to my appointment. I saw him on Tuesday
afternoon at the head of the military procession, as it marched
from Market Street down Sixth to Independence Hall. He was on the
right of General Patterson, and being a good horseman, he appeared
to much advantage on horseback. He recognized me, as he rode
along, at the window of the second story of Lebo’s Commercial
Hotel.
The reception of the President in Philadelphia was all that his
best friends could have desired. Indeed, the Whigs seemed to vie
with the Democrats in doing honor to the Chief Magistrate. Price
Wetherell, the President of the Select Council, did his whole
duty, though in a fussy manner, and was much gratified with the
well-deserved compliments which he received. The dinner at
McKibbins’ was excellent and well conducted. We did not sit down
to table until nearly nine o’clock. The mayor, Mr. Gilpin,
presided. The President sat on his right, and myself on his left.
In the course of the entertainment he spoke to me, behind Mr.
Gilpin, and strongly expressed the hope that I would accept the
mission, to which I made a friendly, but indefinite answer. He
then expressed a desire to see me when the dinner should be ended;
but it was kept up until nearly midnight, the President cordially
participating in the hilarity of the scene. We then agreed to meet
the next morning.
After mature reflection, I had determined to reject the mission,
if I found this could be done without danger of an open breach
with the administration; but if this could not be done, I was
resolved to accept it, however disagreeable. The advice of
Governor Porter, then at McKibbins’, gave me confidence in the
correctness of my own judgment. My position was awkward and
embarrassing. There was danger that it might be said (indeed it
had already been insinuated in several public journals), that I
had selfishly thrown up the mission, because the fishery question
had not been entrusted to me, although I knew that actual
collision between the two countries on the fishery grounds might
be the consequence of the transfer of the negotiation to London.
Such a statement could only be rebutted by the publication of the
correspondence between the President and myself; but as this was
altogether private, such a publication could only be justified in
a case of extreme necessity.
Besides, I had no reason to believe that the President had taken
from me the reciprocity and fishery questions with any deliberate
purpose of doing me injury. On the contrary, I have but little
doubt that this proceeded from his apprehension that the
suspension of the negotiation might produce dangerous consequences
on the fishing grounds. I might add that his instructions to me on
the Central American questions were as full and ample as I could
desire. Many friends believed, _not without reason_, that if I
should decline the mission, Mr. Dallas would be appointed; and
this idea was very distasteful to them, though not to myself.
The following is the substance of the conversation between the
President and myself on Wednesday morning, the 13th of July,
partly at McKibbins’, and the remainder on board the steamer which
took us across to Camden. It was interrupted by the proceedings at
Independence Hall on Wednesday morning.
The President commenced the conversation by the expression of his
strong wish that I would not decline the mission. I observed that
the British government had imposed an absurd construction on the
fishery question, and without notice had suddenly sent a fleet
there to enforce it, for the purpose, as I believed, of obtaining
from us the reciprocity treaty. Under these circumstances I should
have said to Great Britain: You shall have the treaty, but you
must consent at the same time to withdraw your protectorate from
the Mosquito Coast, and restore to Honduras the colony of the Bay
of Islands. That this course might still be adopted at Washington,
and that in this view all the negotiations had better be conducted
there. Without answering these remarks specifically, the
President, reiterating his request that I should accept the
mission, spoke strongly of the danger of any delay, on our part,
in the adjustment of the fishery question, and said that Mr.
Crampton, deeply impressed with this danger, had gone all the way
to Halifax to see Admiral Seymour, for the purpose of averting
this danger. I observed that it was far, very far from my desire,
in the present state of the negotiation, to have charge of the
fishery negotiation at London; but still insisted that it was best
that the Central American questions should also be settled at
Washington. To this he expressed a decided aversion. He said that
serious difficulties had arisen, in the progress of the
negotiations, on the reciprocity question, particularly in regard
to the reciprocal registry of the vessels of the two parties; and
it was probable that within a short time the negotiation on all
the questions would be transferred to me at London, and that my
declining the mission at this time would be very embarrassing to
his administration, and could not be satisfactorily explained. I
replied that I thought it could. It might be stated in the _Union_
that after my agreement to accept the mission, circumstances had
arisen rendering it necessary that the negotiations with which I
was to be entrusted at London, should be conducted at Washington;
that I myself was fully convinced of this necessity; but that this
change had produced a corresponding change in my determination to
accept a mission which I had always been reluctant to accept, and
we had parted on the best and most friendly terms. Something like
this, I thought, would be satisfactory.
He answered that after such an explanation it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to get a suitable person to undertake the
mission. He had felt it to be his duty to offer me this important
mission, and he thought it was my duty to accept it. He said that
if the Central American questions should go wrong in London,
entrusted to other hands than my own, both he and I would be
seriously blamed. He said, with much apparent feeling, that he
felt reluctant to insist thus upon my acceptance of a mission so
distasteful to me.
Having fully ascertained, as I believed, that I could not decline
the mission without giving him serious offence, and without danger
of an open rupture with the administration, I said: “Reluctant as
I am to accept the mission, if you think that my refusal to accept
it would cause serious embarrassment to your administration, which
I am anxious to support, I will waive my objections and go to
London.” He instantly replied that he was rejoiced that I had come
to this conclusion, and that we should both feel greatly the
better for having done our respective duties. He added that I need
not hurry my departure. I told him that although my instructions
gave me all the powers I could desire on the Central American
questions, yet they had not been accompanied by any of the papers
and documents in the Department relating to these questions; that
these were indispensable, and without them I could not proceed. He
expressed some surprise at this, and said he would write to
Governor Marcy that very evening. I told him he need not trouble
himself to do this, as I should write to him myself immediately
after my return home.
This was on the river. I accompanied him to the cars, where I took
leave of him, Mr. Guthrie, Mr. Davis and Mr. Cushing, who all
pressed me very much to go on with them to New York.
[TO CITIZENS OF LANCASTER.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, July 23, 1853.
GENTLEMEN:—
I have received your very kind invitation on behalf of my friends
and neighbors, to partake of a public dinner before my departure
for England.
No event of my past life has afforded me greater satisfaction than
this invitation, proceeding as it does, without distinction of
party, from those who have known me the longest and known me the
best.
Born in a neighboring county, I cast my lot among you when little
more than eighteen years of age, and have now enjoyed a happy home
with you for more than forty-three years, except the intervals
which I have passed in the public service. During this long period
I have experienced more personal kindness, both from yourselves
and from your fathers, than has, perhaps, ever been extended to
any other man in Pennsylvania who has taken so active a part, as I
have done, in the exciting political struggles which have so
peculiarly marked this portion of our history.
It was both my purpose and desire to pass the remainder of my days
in kind and friendly social intercourse with the friends of my
youth and of my riper years, when invited by the President of my
choice, under circumstances which a sense of duty rendered
irresistible, to accept the mission to London. This purpose is now
postponed, not changed. It is my intention to carry it into
execution, should a kind Providence prolong my days and restore me
to my native land.
I am truly sorry not to be able to accept your invitation. Such
are my engagements, that I can appoint no day for the dinner when
I could, with certainty, promise to attend. Besides, a farewell
dinner is at best but a melancholy affair. Should I live to
return, we shall then meet with joy, and should it then be your
pleasure to offer me a welcome home dinner, I shall accept it with
all my heart.
I cherish the confident hope that during my absence I shall live
in your kindly recollection, as my friends in Lancaster County
shall ever live in my grateful memory.
Cordially wishing you and yours, under the blessing of Heaven,
health, prosperity and happiness, I remain
Your friend and fellow-citizen,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Here, in regard to this English mission and other matters, Mr.
Buchanan’s correspondence with his niece, Miss Lane, from February
to August, 1853, will show how tender and how important had now
become their relations to each other.
[TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, Feb. 3, 1853.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I have passed the time quietly at home since I left Philadelphia,
toiling night and day, to reduce the pile of letters which had
accumulated during my absence. I have got nearly through and
intend to pass some days in Harrisburg next week. I have literally
no news to communicate to you. Miss Hetty and myself get along to
a charm. She expects Miss Rebecca Parker here to-day,—the promise
of Mr. Van Dyke. I hope she may come.
I received a letter yesterday from Mr. Pleasanton, dated on the
31st ultimo, from which the following is an extract:
“Clemmy wrote some two weeks ago to Miss Harriet asking her to
come here and spend some time with us. As she has not heard from
her, she supposes Miss Lane to be absent. Be good enough to
mention this to her, and our united wish that she should spend the
residue of the winter and the spring with us. There is much gaiety
here now, though we do not partake of it. We will contrive,
however, that Miss Lane shall participate in it.”
Now do as you please about visiting Washington. I hope you are
enjoying yourself in Philadelphia. Please to let me know where you
have been, what you have been doing, and what you propose to do. I
trust you will take good care of yourself, and always act under
the influence of high moral principle and a grateful sense of your
responsibility to your Creator.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[FROM MISS LANE.]
PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 6, 1853.
MY DEAR UNCLE:—
I still continue to enjoy myself here, and have made many more
acquaintances than I have ever had the opportunity of doing
before. Lent commencing this week may in some degree affect the
pleasures of society, but of that, as yet, we cannot judge. As
regards Washington, I understand perfectly that, as far as you
yourself are concerned, you wish me to do as I feel inclined, but
your disinterested opinions are rather for a postponement of my
visit; these I had quietly resolved to act upon. Should you have
changed your mind or have any advice to give, let me know it at
once, for rest assured I am always happier and better satisfied
with myself when my actions are fully sanctioned by your wishes.
The day after you left we had an elegant dinner at Mrs.
Gilpin’s—many, many were the regrets that you were not present.
Mr. —— treated me with marked attention—drank wine with me first
at table—talked a great deal of you, and thinks you treated him
shabbily last summer by passing so near without stopping to see
him. I tell you these things, as I think they show a desire on his
part to meet you. —— was there, very quiet. How I longed for you
to eclipse them all, and be, as you always are, the life and soul
of the dinner. Thursday Mrs. John Cadwallader’s magnificent ball
came off. I enjoyed it exceedingly, and was treated most kindly.
James Henry received an invitation to it, but did not go. He has
returned to Princeton full of studious resolves.
I found my engagements such as to make it impossible for me to go
to Mrs. Tyler’s last week. I arranged everything satisfactorily to
all parties, and go there to stay to-morrow (Monday). Every
possible kindness has been shown me by Mr. and Mrs. Plitt, and my
visit to them has been delightful.
Mary Anderson remained here but a week on her return from
Washington. I passed a day with them very pleasantly......
No news from Mary yet. I miss her every hour in the day, but will
scarcely be able to count my loss, until I get home where I have
always been accustomed to see her. I had a letter from Lizzie
Porter telling me of her aunt’s death. My best love to Miss Hetty.
Mrs. Plitt sends her love. Hoping to hear from you very soon,
believe me ever, my dear uncle,
Your sincerely affectionate
HARRIET.
[TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, March 15, 1853.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I received yours of the 11th, postmarked the 14th, last night. I
now receive about fifty letters per day; last Saturday sixty-nine;
and the cry is still they come, so that I must be brief. I labor
day and night.
You ask: Will you accept the mission to England? I answer that it
has not been offered, and I have not the least reason to believe,
from any authentic source, that it will be offered. Indeed, I am
almost certain that it will not, because surely General Pierce
would not nominate me to the Senate without first asking me
whether I would accept. Should the offer be made, I know not what
I might conclude. Personally, I have not the least desire to go
abroad as a foreign minister. But “sufficient unto the day is the
evil thereof.” I really would not know where to leave you, were I
to accept a foreign mission, and this would be one serious
objection.
I think you are wise in going to Mr. Macalester’s. You know how
much I esteem and admire Mrs. Tyler, but still a long visit to a
friend is often a great bore. Never make people twice glad. I have
not seen Kate Reynolds since her return, and have had no time to
see any person.
In remarking as I did upon your composition, I was far from
intending to convey the idea that you should write your letters as
you would a formal address. Stiffness in a letter is intolerable.
Its perfection is to write as you would converse. Still all this
may be done with correctness. Your ideas are well expressed, and
the principal fault I found was in your not making distinct
periods, or full stops, as the old schoolmasters used to say. Miss
——’s are probably written with too much care,—too much precision.
We have no news. We are jogging on in the old John Trot style, and
get along in great peace and harmony.
March 19, 1853.
I return you Mr. ——’s appeal, so that you may have it before you
in preparing your answer. The whole matter is supremely
ridiculous. I have no more reason to believe than I had when I
last wrote, that I shall be offered the mission to England. Should
his offer be made, it will be a matter of grave and serious
consideration whether I shall accept or decline it. I have not
determined this question. “Sufficient unto the day is the evil
thereof.” Should it be accepted, it will be on the express
condition that I shall have liberty to choose my own Secretary of
Legation; and from the specimen of diplomacy which Mr. —— has
presented, I think I may venture to say he will not be the man. I
would select some able, industrious, hard working friend, in whose
integrity and prudence I could place entire reliance. In fact, I
have the man now in my eye, from a distant State, to whom I would
make the offer—a gentleman trained by myself in the State
Department. I must have a man of business, and not a carpet
knight, who would go abroad to cut a dash.
Now you may say to Mr. —— that I know nothing of the intention of
the President to offer me the English mission, and that you are
equally ignorant whether I would accept or decline it (and this
you may say with truth, for I do not know myself). If accepted,
however, you presume that I would cast about among my numerous
friends for the best man for the appointment; and whatever your
own wishes might be, you would not venture to interfere in the
matter; that you took no part in such matters. This ought to be
the substance of your letter, which you may smooth over with as
many honeyed phrases as you please.
I think that a visit to Europe, with me as minister, would spoil
you outright, Besides, it would consume your little independence.
One grave objection to my acceptance of the mission, for which I
have no personal inclination, would be your situation. I should
dislike to leave you behind, in the care of any person I know. I
think there is a decided improvement in your last letter. Your
great fault was that your sentences ran into each other, without
proper periods.
Good night! I cannot say how many letters I have written to-day.
Thank Heaven! to-morrow will be a day of rest. I do not now expect
to visit Pittsburgh until after the first of April, though I have
a pecuniary concern there of some importance.
With my kindest regards to Miss Macalester and the family, I
remain, etc.
STATE DEPARTMENT, }
WASHINGTON, May 24, 1853. }
I have received your letter, and have not written until the
present moment because I did not know what to write. It is now
determined that I shall leave New York on Saturday, 9th July. I
cannot fix the day I shall be at home, because I am determined not
to leave this until posted up thoroughly on the duties of the
mission. I hope, however, I may be with you in the early part of
next week. I am hard at work.
I went from Willard’s to Mr. Pleasanton’s last evening. Laura and
Clemmie are well, and would, I have no doubt, send their love to
you if they knew I was writing. I have seen but few of the
fashionables, but have been overrun with visitors.
Remember me kindly to Miss Hetty and to James, and believe me to
be, etc.
NEW YORK, August 4, 1853.
—— —— called to see me this morning, and was particularly amiable.
He talked much of what his father had written and said to him
respecting yourself, expressed a great desire to see you, and we
talked much bagatelle about you. He intimated that his father had
advised him to address you. I told him he would make a very
rebellious nephew, and would be hard to manage. He asked where you
would be this winter, and I told him that you would visit your
relations in Virginia in the course of a month, and might probably
come to London next spring or summer. He said he would certainly
see you, and asked me for a letter of introduction to you, which I
promised to give him. As he was leaving, he told me not to forget
it, but give it to the proprietor of the Astor House before I
left, and I promised to do so. I told him that you had appreciated
his father’s kindness to you, felt honored and gratified for his
(the father’s) attentions, and admired him very much. He knew all
about your pleasant intercourse with his father in Philadelphia.
There was much other talk which I considered, and still consider,
to be bagatelle, yet the subject was pursued by him. As I have a
leisure moment, I thought I would prepare you for an interview
with him, in case you should meet. —— —— is a man of rare
abilities and great wit, and is quite eminent in his profession.
His political course has been eccentric, but he still maintains
his influence. I never saw him look so well as he did to-day. I
repeat that I believe all this to be bagatelle; and yet it seemed
to be mingled with a strong desire to see you.
Saturday Morning, August 6.
...... And now, my dear Harriet, I shall go aboard the Atlantic
this morning, with a firm determination to do my duty, and without
any unpleasant apprehensions of the result. Relying upon that
gracious Being who has protected me all my life until the present
moment, and has strewed my path with blessings, I go abroad once
more in the service of my country, with fair hopes of success. I
shall drop you a line from Liverpool immediately upon my arrival.
With my kindest regards to Miss Hetty, I remain,
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
CHAPTER IV.
1853-1856.
ARRIVAL IN LONDON—PRESENTATION TO THE QUEEN AT OSBORNE—THE MINISTRY
OF LORD ABERDEEN—MR. MARCY’S CIRCULAR ABOUT COURT COSTUMES, AND
THE DRESS QUESTION AT THE ENGLISH COURT—LETTERS TO MISS LANE.
The reader has seen with what reluctance and for what special
purpose Mr. Buchanan accepted the mission to England. He left New
York on the 1st of August, 1853, and landed at Liverpool on the
17th, whence he wrote immediately to his niece; and I follow his
first letter to her with four others, extending to the middle of
October.
[TO MISS LANE.]
ADELPHI HOTEL, LIVERPOOL, August 17, 1853.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I arrived in Liverpool this morning, after a passage of about ten
days and sixteen hours. I was sea-sick the whole voyage, but not
nearly so badly as I had anticipated, or as I was in going to and
returning from Russia. Captain James West, of Philadelphia, the
commander of the Atlantic, is one of the most accomplished and
vigilant officers and one of the most kind and amiable men I have
ever known. I never wish to cross the Atlantic in any but a vessel
commanded by him. We did not see the sun rise or set during the
whole voyage. The weather was either rainy or cloudy throughout,
but many of the passengers were agreeable. Upon arriving here I
found Mr. Lawrence, who came from London to receive me. It is my
purpose to accompany him to London to-morrow, where I shall at
first stay at the Clarendon Hotel. I do not yet know whether I
shall take, or rather whether I can obtain, Mr. Ingersoll’s house
or not. I thought I would have to remain here some days to
recruit; but I had scarcely got upon land before I felt perfectly
well, and have enjoyed my dinner very much—the first meal for
which I felt any appetite since I left New York. I shall write to
you again as soon as I am settled at London, or probably sooner.
Although I left Wheatland with regret and a heavy heart, yet I am
resigned to my destiny, and shall enter upon the performance of my
duties, with God’s blessing, in a determined and cheerful spirit.
I received your letter in New York. I had not supposed there was
any thing serious in Lily’s apprehensions.
In the midst of calls and engagements, I have not time to write
you a longer letter. Please to keep an eye on Eskridge and James
Reynolds, as you promised.
Give my affectionate regard to Miss Hetty and Eskridge, and
remember me to all my friends. In haste, I remain your
affectionate uncle, etc.
LONDON, August 26th, 1853.
I have received your letter written a few days after my departure
from New York, which is mislaid for the moment, and it afforded me
great pleasure. It is the only letter which I have yet received
from the United States.
I was presented to the queen at Osborne, in the Isle of Wight, on
Tuesday last, by the Earl of Clarendon, and delivered her my
letter of credence. She has not many personal charms, but is
gracious and dignified in her manners, and her character is
without blemish. The interview was brief. Mr. Ingersoll,[9] who
accompanied me to take his leave, and myself lunched at the palace
with Lord Clarendon and several of the attachés of royalty. His
conduct towards me is all I could have desired; and Miss Wilcox is
a very nice girl.[10] They will pay a short visit to France and
the continent, and return to the United States in October.
Footnote 9:
His predecessor.
Footnote 10:
Niece of Mr. Ingersoll.
You have lost nothing by not coming to England with me. Parliament
adjourned on last Saturday, and this was the signal for the
nobility and gentry to go to their estates in the country. There
they will remain until next February, and in the mean time London
will be very dull. All gaiety in town is at an end, and has been
transferred to the estates and country seats throughout the
kingdom.
I have not yet procured a house, but hope to do so next week. I
have just paid my bill for the first week at this hotel. I have
two rooms and a chamber, have had no company to dine and have
dined at home but three days, and the amount is £14 7s. 6d., equal
to nearly $75.00.
It is my desire to see you happily married, because, should I be
called away, your situation would not be agreeable. Still you
would have plenty. Whilst these are my sentiments, however, I
desire that you shall exercise your own deliberate judgment in the
choice of a husband. View steadily all the consequences, ask the
guidance of Heaven, and make up your own mind, and I shall be
satisfied. A competent independence is a good thing, if it can be
obtained with proper affection; though I should not care for
fortune provided the man of your choice was in a thriving and
profitable business and possessed a high and fair character. I had
not supposed there was any thing serious in the conversation;
certainly none of your relatives can interpose any just objection.
Be, however, fully persuaded in your own mind, and act after due
reflection; and may God guide you!
It will require some time to reconcile me to this climate. We have
none of the bright and glorious sun and the clear blue sky of the
United States; but neither have we the scorching heat, nor the
mosquitos. I have slept comfortably under a blanket ever since I
have been here, and almost every man you meet carries an umbrella.
The winters, however, are not cold.
Society is in a most artificial position. It is almost impossible
for an untitled individual who does not occupy an official
position to enter the charmed circle. The richest and most
influential merchants and bankers are carefully excluded. It is
true, as we learned, that the niece of a minister at the head of
his establishment does not enjoy his rank. At a dinner party, for
example, whilst he goes to the head of the table, she must remain
at or near the foot. Still, Miss Wilcox has made her way to much
consideration, admiration and respect.
The rage which seems to pervade the people of the United States
for visiting Europe is wonderful. It takes up much time at the
legation to issue passports. London, however, is but a stopping
place. They generally rush to Paris and the continent; and this,
too, wisely, I have no doubt. I would not myself tarry at London
longer than to see the sights. My promise to you shall be kept
inviolate; and yet I have no doubt a visit to Europe with an
agreeable party would be far more instructive and satisfactory to
you than to remain for any considerable length of time with me in
London. I thank my stars that you did not come with me, for you
would have had a dreary time of it for the next six months.
But the despatches are to be prepared and the despatch bag must
close at five o’clock for the steamer of to-morrow. I have time to
write no more, but to assure you that I am always your
affectionate uncle, etc.
September 15, 1853.
On the day before yesterday I received your kind letter of the
28th August, with a letter from Mary, which I have already
answered. How rejoiced I am that she is contented and happy in San
Francisco! I also received your favor of the 18th August in due
time. I write to you this evening because I have important
despatches to prepare for the Department to-morrow, to be sent by
Saturday’s steamer.
How rejoiced I am that you did not come with me! Perceiving your
anxiety, I was several times on the point of saying to you, come
along; but you would see nearly as much fashionable society at
Wheatland as you would see here until February or March next. You
cannot conceive how dull it is, though personally I am content.
The _beau monde_ are all at their country-seats or on the
continent, there to remain until the meeting of Parliament. But
what is worse than all, I have not yet been able to procure a
house in which I would consent to live. I have looked at a great
many,—the houses of the nobility and gentry; but the furniture in
all of them is old, decayed and wretched, and with very few
exceptions, they are _very, very dirty_. I can account for this in
no other manner than that they are not willing to rent them until
the furniture is worn out, and that London is for them like a
great watering place from about the first of March until the first
of August. This hotel, which is the most fashionable in London, is
not nearly equal to the first hotels in Philadelphia and New York,
and yet the cost of living in it, with two rooms and a chamber, is
about $90 per week. The enormous expense [here] and the superior
attractions [there] drive all the American travellers to Paris and
the continent. The _London Times_ has taken up the subject, and is
now daily comparing the superior cheapness and superior
accommodations of the hotels in the United States with those of
London. Here there are no _table-d’hôtes_, and the house may be
full without your knowing who is in it.
I think I have a treasure in the servant (Jackson) I brought with
me from New York. If he should only hold out, he is all I could
desire.
Mr. Welsh surpasses my expectations as a man of business. Colonel
Lawrence, the attaché without pay, is industrious, gentlemanly,
and has been highly useful. He knows everybody, and works as
though he received $10,000 per annum. I venture to say I have as
able and useful a legation as any in London. Lawrence has gone to
Scotland, in company with Miss Chapman and her father, and I think
he is much pleased with her. In truth, she is a nice girl and very
handsome. The Chapmans will return immediately to the United
States.
The Marchioness of Wellesley is suffering from the dropsy, and
she, with her sister, Lady Stafford, remained a few days at this
house. I saw a good deal of them whilst they were here, and they
have been very kind to me. They love to talk about America, and
they yet appear to have genuine American hearts. Lady Wellesley
lives at Hampton Court,—the old historic palace, about fifteen
miles from London, erected by Cardinal Wolsey, and I am going
there to dine with them and see the palace on Saturday...... The
Duchess of Leeds is in Scotland. These three American girls have
had a strange fate. Many of their sex have envied them, but I
think without cause. They are all childless, and would, I verily
believe, have been more happy had they been united to independent
gentlemen in their own country.
It is impossible to conceive of a more elegant and accomplished
lady than Lady Wellesley, and although bowed down by disease, she
still retains the relics of her former beauty. Her younger sister,
Betsy Caton (Lady Stafford), the belle of belles in her day in
America, has become gross and does not retain a trace of her good
looks, except a cheerful and animated countenance. She is
evidently a fine woman, and very much a Catholic devotee. They are
all widows, except the Duchess of Leeds.
Rank, rank is everything in this country. My old friend of twenty
years ago, Mrs. ——, the wife of the partner of the great House of
——, and then a nice little Yankee woman, who had never been at
court, continually talks to me now about the duchess of this and
the countess of that, and the queen, lords and ladies afford her a
constant theme. Her daughter, and only child, who will be
immensely rich, is the wife of ——, and this has given her a lift.
She is still, however, the same good kind-hearted woman she was in
the ancient time; but has grown very large. They are now at their
country-seat at ——, her husband’s business preventing her from
going far away. I have now nearly finished my sheet. I have not
yet had time to see any of the lions. God bless you! Remember me
kindly to Mrs. Hunter. I have written to Clemmie since I have been
here.
From your affectionate uncle, etc.
September 30, 1853.
I have a few minutes to spare before the despatch bag closes and I
devote them to writing a line to you. I have received your very
kind and acceptable letter of the 14th September from Charleston,
and cordially thank you for the agreeable and interesting
information which it contains.
I have not yet obtained a house. It seems impossible to procure
one, in every respect suitable for myself and the legation, for
less than $3500 to $4500. The expense of living in this country
exceeds even what I had anticipated...... I shall preserve my
hotel bills as curiosities.
I did not suppose that your name had reached thus far. I dined the
other day at Hampton Court with Ladies Wellesley and Stafford. Mr.
and Mrs. Woodville of Baltimore were present. Mrs. Woodville said
she did not know you herself, but her youngest son was well
acquainted with you and spoke of you in the highest terms. I found
she had previously been saying pretty things of you to the two
ladies......
I shrewdly suspect that Miss Chapman has made a conquest of
Colonel Lawrence. He went off with her and her father on a visit
to Scotland, and I shall not be much surprised if it should be a
match, though I know nothing. The colonel is quite deaf which is
very much against him.
She is delighted with her travels, is very handsome, and has a
great deal of vivacity...... Upon the whole I was much pleased
with her.
I am sorry I have not time to write you a longer letter. Remember
me very kindly to our friends in Virginia. May God bless you!
Yours very affectionately, etc.
October 14, 1853.
I have received yours of the 28th ultimo. I did not think I would
write to you by to-morrow’s steamer, but have a few minutes left
before the closing of the bag. I am sorry, truly sorry, that you
look upon your trip to England as “the future realization of a
beautiful dream.” Like all other dreams you will be disappointed
in the reality. I have never yet met an American gentleman or lady
who, whatever they may profess, was pleased with London. They
hurry off to Paris, as speedily as possible, unless they have
business to detain them here. A proud American, who feels himself
equal at home to the best, does not like to be shut out by an
impassable barrier from the best or rather the highest society in
this country. My official position will enable me to surmount this
barrier, but I feel that it will only be officially. Neither my
political antecedents nor the public business entrusted to my
charge will make me a favorite with these people, and I shall
never play toady to them.[11] It is true I know very few of them
as yet. They are all in the country, or on the continent, where
they will continue until the opening of the spring. They pass the
spring and part of the summer in London, just reversing the order
in our country.
I do not think well of your going to Philadelphia to learn
French...... Clementina Pleasanton writes me that they will do all
they can to instruct you in speaking that language. You will be
far better with them than at a French boarding house in
Philadelphia.
I saw Mr. and Mrs. Haines, Lily’s friends, last evening. They left
Paris about a week ago. She gave a glowing description of the
delights of that city; but said she would be almost tempted to
commit suicide, should she be compelled to remain long in London.
When you write to Lily please to give her my love. Remember me
very kindly to Mr. Davenport and your relatives, and believe me
ever to be,
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 11:
This anticipation was not realized. He became a great “favorite”
in English society, without any effort beyond the exercise of his
social gifts, in a natural way.
It was just twenty years since, on his return from St. Petersburg,
Mr. Buchanan had passed a short time in England, and made the
acquaintance of some of the public men of that period. This was in
the latter part of the reign of King William IV. In 1853, Queen
Victoria had been on the throne for sixteen years, and the reign was
a very different one from that of her immediate predecessor. The
cabinet was a coalition ministry, and was described by a sort of
nick-name as the “Ministry of all the talents.” It broke down rather
disastrously and suddenly while Mr. Buchanan was in England, but on
his arrival it seemed to have a long lease of power. Lord Aberdeen
was the Premier; Mr. Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord
Palmerston (out of his proper element), was at the head of the Home
Department; Lord Clarendon was Foreign Secretary; the Duke of
Newcastle was Secretary for the Colonies; Mr. Sidney Herbert,
Secretary at War; Lord John Russell was the ministerial leader of
the House of Commons. The other members of the ministry were: Lord
Cranworth, Lord Chancellor; Earl Granville, President of the
Council; the Marquis of Lansdowne, without office; the Duke of
Argyle, Lord Privy Seal; Sir James Graham, First Lord of the
Admiralty; Sir Charles Wood, President of the Board of Control; Sir
William Molesworth, First Commissioner of Public Works. In point of
personal ability and character, this was a strong ministry. It went
to pieces in 1855, in consequence of its want of capacity to conduct
a foreign war, for which neither Lord Aberdeen nor Mr. Gladstone had
any stomach, originally; for which the Duke of Newcastle, who had
become Secretary at War, although an excellent man, had not the
requisite force; and which should, in fact, have been under the
guidance of Lord Palmerston, if there was to be a war with such a
power as Russia, in conjunction with such an ally as Louis Napoleon.
But when Mr. Buchanan came to London, the Crimean war was a good way
in the distance, and it seemed not improbable that he would have a
clear field for the settlement of the questions which had brought
him to England.
It will strike the reader, however, oddly enough, after perusing the
grave account which Mr. Buchanan has given of his reasons for
accepting the mission, and the nature of the topics on which he was
to negotiate, that while the conferences were going on between him
and Lord Clarendon on the subjects which had brought him to London,
he had to encounter a question of court etiquette. The story would
hardly be worth repetition now, if it were not for the amusing
_finale_ of the whole affair. It may be introduced with a little
preface.
On the accession of Queen Victoria, at the early age of eighteen,
the Duke of Wellington is said to have drily remarked, that the
Tories would have little chance under a female sovereign, since he
had no small-talk and Peel had no manners.[12] The Tories did not
find it so in the sequel, for although, when the Whigs had to go out
of power, in 1841, and the Queen had to part with her first official
advisers, it cost her a rather severe personal struggle,—inasmuch as
she is said to have written a very unconstitutional note to her old
friend, Lord Melbourne, lamenting that “the sad, the too sad day has
come at last,”[13]—yet, so wise and faithful had been the political
education which that minister had given to his young sovereign, that
at the very first necessity she gracefully yielded her personal
feelings to her public duty, and made it certain that personal
government, independent of the will of Parliament, had passed away
forever from the public affairs of England. From that time forward,
it seems to have been the accepted doctrine of the British
constitution, that the sovereign is not merely a state pageant, but
is a magistrate raised above the feelings or interests of party,
with a function to perform in the State, which comprehends the right
to be consulted on every question or measure, to offer advice, and
to give a real as well as a formal assent, although bound at all
times to receive as ministers those who can command the confidence
for the time being of the House of Commons. And well and wisely has
the woman whose reign has now extended to the very unusual period of
forty-six years fulfilled this function of a constitutional
sovereign. But her Majesty has long had the reputation of being very
rigid in matters of court etiquette and ceremonial. The truth
probably is, that at the commencement of her reign, the necessity
for giving to the manners of the court a very different tone from
that which had existed in the time of the late king, her uncle,—a
necessity which coincided with her tastes as a lady, and her sense
of what was becoming in her position,—had brought about a good deal
that was regarded by strangers, and by some of her own subjects, as
an unnecessary observance of punctilio. The officials of the court,
whose duty it was to attend to these matters, very likely carried
them farther than the queen’s wishes or commands required. At all
events, the sequel of Mr. Buchanan’s little affair of what dress he
should wear at the queen’s receptions, does not show that her
Majesty attached quite so much importance to it as did her master of
ceremonies.
Footnote 12:
Mr. Justin McCarthy is responsible for this anecdote. “History of
our own Times.” Vol. I.
Footnote 13:
This anecdote is given on private authority.
Governor Marcy, our Secretary of State, was a man of great vigor of
intellect, and for all the important duties of his position an
uncommonly wise and able statesman. But his intercourse with the
world, aside from American politics, had not been extensive. He had
thought proper to issue a circular to the ministers of the United
States in Europe, directing them to appear at the courts to which
they were accredited, “in the simple dress of an American citizen.”
What this might be, in all cases, was not very clear. Our ministers
at foreign courts had hitherto, on occasions of ceremony, worn a
simple uniform, directed for them by the Department, which, whatever
may have been its merits or its demerits as a costume, was
sufficient to distinguish the wearer from “one of the upper court
servants.” All this was now to be changed, and our ministers were to
go to court in the dress of “an American citizen,” unless it should
appear that non-conformity with the customs of the country would
materially impair the proper discharge of their duties. In Mr.
Buchanan’s case, “the simple dress of an American citizen” was an
affair of very easy determination. He wore at all times the kind of
dress in which his figure appears in the frontispiece of the present
volume; and his personal dignity was quite sufficient to make that
dress appropriate anywhere. Although he was a democrat of democrats,
and cared little for show of any kind, he was accustomed to pay that
deference to the usages of society which a gentleman is always
anxious to observe, and to which no one knew better than he how to
accommodate himself. He was the last man in the world to attach
undue importance to trifles, and it may well be supposed he was
annoyed, when he found rather suddenly that the circular of the
Secretary was about to cause a serious difficulty in regard to his
position at the British court. The first intimation he had of this
difficulty is described in a despatch which he wrote to Mr. Marcy on
the 28th of October.
No. 13.
LEGATION, ETC., LONDON, October 28, 1853.
SIR:—
I deem it proper, however distasteful the subject may be, both to
you and myself, to relate to you a conversation which I had on
Tuesday last with Major-General Sir Edward Cust, the master of
ceremonies at this court, concerning my court costume. I met him
at the Traveller’s Club, and after an introduction, your circular
on this subject became the topic of conversation. He expressed
much opposition to my appearance at court “in the simple dress of
an American citizen.” I said that such was the wish of my own
Government and I intended to conform to it, unless the queen
herself would intimate her desire that I should appear in costume.
In that event, I should feel inclined to comply with her majesty’s
wishes. He said that her majesty would not object to receive me at
court in any dress I chose to put on; but whilst he had no
authority to speak for her, he yet did not doubt it would be
disagreeable to her if I did not conform to the established usage.
He said I could not of course expect to be invited to court balls
or court dinners where all appeared in costumes; that her majesty
never invited the bishops to balls, not deeming it compatible with
their character; but she invited them to concerts, and on these
occasions, as a court dress was not required, I would also be
invited. He grew warm by talking, and said that, whilst the queen
herself would make no objections to my appearance at court in any
dress I thought proper, yet the people of England would consider
it _presumption_. I became somewhat indignant in my turn, and said
that whilst I entertained the highest respect for her majesty, and
desired to treat her with the deference which was eminently her
due, yet it would not make the slightest difference to me,
individually, whether I ever appeared at court.
He stated that in this country an invitation from the queen was
considered a command.
I paid no attention to this remark, but observed that the rules of
etiquette at the British court were more strict even than in
Russia. Senator Douglas of the United States had just returned
from St. Petersburg. When invited to visit the czar in costume, he
informed Count Nesselrode that he could not thus appear. The count
asked him in what dress he appeared before the President of the
United States. Mr. Douglas answered in the dress he then wore. The
count, after consulting the emperor, said that was sufficient, and
in this plain dress he visited the emperor at the palace and on
parade, and had most agreeable conversations with him on both
occasions.
Sir Edward then expressed his gratification at having thus met me
accidentally,—said he had just come to town for that day and
should leave the next morning, but would soon do himself the honor
of calling upon me.
Although he disclaimed speaking by the authority of the queen, yet
it appeared both to myself and Colonel Lawrence, who was present,
that they must have had some conversation in the court circle on
the subject. I entertain this belief the more firmly, as Sir
Edward has since talked to a member of this legation in the same
strain.
So then, from present appearances, it is probable I shall be
placed socially in Coventry on this question of dress, because it
is certain that should her majesty not invite the American
minister to her balls and dinners, he will not be invited to the
balls and dinners of her courtiers. This will be to me,
personally, a matter of not the least importance, but it may
deprive me of the opportunity of cultivating friendly and social
relations with the ministers and other courtiers which I might
render available for the purpose of obtaining important
information and promoting the success of my mission.
I am exceedingly anxious to appear “at court in the simple dress
of an American citizen;” and this not only because it accords with
my own taste, but because it is certain that if the minister to
the court of St. James should appear in uniform, your circular
will become a dead letter in regard to most, if not all, the other
ministers and chargés of our country in Europe.
The difficulty in the present case is greatly enhanced by the fact
that the sovereign is a lady, and the devotion of her subjects
towards her partakes of a mingled feeling of loyalty and
gallantry. Any conduct, therefore, on my part which would look
like disrespect towards her personally could not fail to give
great offence to the British people. Should it prove to be
impossible for me to conform to the suggestions of the circular,
in regard to dress “without detriment to the public interest,” and
“without impairing my usefulness to my country,” then I shall
certainly and cheerfully be guided by its earnest recommendation
and “adopt the nearest approach to it compatible with the due
performance of my public duties.” This course I pursued from
choice whilst minister in Russia, and this course I should have
pursued here without any instructions.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
We next get some reference to the dress question in the following
letter to Miss Lane:
LONDON, December 9, 1853.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I received your favor of the 14th ultimo in due time, and thank
you for the information it contained, all of which was interesting
to me.
In regard to your coming to London with Colonel Lawrence and his
lady, should he be married in February next, I have this to say:
Your passage at that season of the year would, unless by a happy
accident, be stormy and disagreeable, though not dangerous. I have
scarcely yet recovered from the effects of the voyage, and should
you be as bad a sailor as myself, and have a rough passage, it
might give your constitution a shock. The month of April would be
a much more agreeable period to cross the Atlantic; and you would
still arrive here in time for the most fashionable and longer part
of the fashionable season.
It is my duty to inform you that a general conviction prevails
here, on the part of Lord Palmerston, the secretary of the
interior, and the distinguished physicians, as well as among the
intelligent people, that the cholera will be very bad in London
and other parts of England during the latter part of the next
summer and throughout the autumn. They are now making extensive
preparations, and adopting extensive sanitary measures to render
the mortality as small as possible. The London journals contain
articles on the subject almost every day. Their reason for this
conviction is,—that we have just had about as many cases of
cholera during the past autumn, as there were during the autumn in
a former year, preceding the season when it raged so extensively
and violently. Now this question will be for your own
consideration. I think it my duty to state the facts, and it will
be for you to decide whether you will postpone your visit until
the end of the next autumn for this reason, or at least until we
shall see whether the gloomy anticipations here are likely to be
realized.
I still anticipate difficulty about my costume; but should this
occur, it will probably continue throughout my mission. It is,
therefore, no valid reason why you should postpone your visit. In
that event you must be prepared to share my fate. So far as
regards the consequences to myself, I do not care a button for
them; but it would mortify me very much to see you treated
differently from other ladies in your situation.
If this costume affair should not prove an impediment, I feel that
I shall get along very smoothly here. The fashionable world, with
the exception of the high officials, are all out of London, and
will remain absent until the last of February or beginning of
March. I have recently been a good deal in the society of those
who are now here, and they all seem disposed to treat me very
kindly, especially the ladies. Their hours annoy me very much. My
invitations to dinner among them are all for a quarter before
eight, which means about half-past that hour. There is no such
thing as social visiting here of an evening. This is all done
between two and six in the afternoon, if such visits may be called
social. I asked Lady Palmerston what was meant by the word “early”
placed upon her card of invitation for an evening reception, and
she informed me it was about ten o’clock. The habits, and customs,
and business of the world here render these hours necessary. But
how ridiculous it is in our country, where no such necessity
exists, to violate the laws of nature in regard to hours, merely
to follow the fashions of this country.
Should you be at Mr. Ward’s, I would thank you to present my kind
love to Miss Ellen. I hope you will not forget the interests of
Eskridge in that quarter. You inform me that Sallie Grier and
Jennie Pleasanton were about to be married. I desire to be
remembered with special kindness to Mrs. Jenkins. I can never
forget “the auld lang syne” with her and her family. Give my love
also to Kate Reynolds. Remember me to Miss Hetty, or as you would
say, Miss Hettie, for whom I shall ever entertain a warm regard. I
send this letter open to Eskridge, so that he may read it and send
it to your direction.
From your affectionate uncle,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
As the court was not in London at the time when this letter was
written, the portentous question of Mr. Buchanan’s costume was not
likely to be brought to an immediate solution. But early in
February, (1854), Parliament was to be opened by the queen in
person. Mr. Buchanan did not attend the ceremony; and thereupon
there was an outcry in the London press. The following extract from
a despatch to Mr. Marcy gives a full account of the whole matter, up
to the date:
You will perceive by the London journals, the _Times_, the
_Morning Post_, the _News_, the _Morning Herald_, the _Spectator_,
the _Examiner_, _Lloyd’s_, &c., &c., copies of which I send you,
that my absence from the House of Lords, at the opening of
Parliament, has produced quite a sensation. Indeed, I have found
difficulty in preventing this incident from becoming a subject of
inquiry and remark in the House of Commons. All this is peculiarly
disagreeable to me, and has arisen entirely from an indiscreet and
rather offensive remark of the London _Times_, in the account
which that journal published of the proceedings at the opening of
Parliament. But for this, the whole matter would probably have
passed away quietly, as I had desired.
Some time after my interview with Sir Edward Cust, the master of
ceremonies, in October last (whom I have never since seen), which
I reported to you in my despatch No. 13, of the 28th of October, I
determined, after due reflection, neither to wear gold lace nor
embroidery at court; and I did not hesitate to express this
determination. The spirit of your circular, as well as my own
sense of propriety, brought me to this conclusion. I did not deem
it becoming in me, as the representative of a Republic, to imitate
a court costume, which may be altogether proper in the
representatives of royalty. A minister of the United States
should, in my opinion, wear something more in character with our
Democratic institutions than a coat covered with embroidery and
gold lace. Besides, after all, this would prove to be but a feeble
attempt “to ape foreign fashions;” because, most fortunately, he
could not wear the orders and stars which ornament the coats of
other diplomatists, nor could he, except in rare instances, afford
the diamonds, unless hired for the occasion.
At the same time, entertaining a most sincere respect for the
exalted character of the queen, both as a sovereign and a lady, I
expressed a desire to appear at court in such a dress as I might
suppose would be most agreeable to herself, without departing from
the spirit of the circular.
It was then suggested to me, from a quarter which I do not feel at
liberty to mention, that I might assume the civil dress worn by
General Washington; but after examining Stuart’s portrait, at the
house of a friend, I came to the conclusion that it would not be
proper for me to adopt this costume. I observed, “fashions had so
changed since the days of Washington, that if I were to put on his
dress, and appear in it before the chief magistrate of my own
country, at one of his receptions, I should render myself a
subject of ridicule for life. Besides, it would be considered
presumption in me to affect the style of dress of the Father of
his Country.”
It was in this unsettled state of the question, and before I had
adopted any style of dress, that Parliament was opened. If,
however, the case had been different, and I had anticipated a
serious question, prudential reasons would have prevented me from
bringing it to issue at the door of the House of Lords. A court
held at the palace would, for many reasons, be a much more
appropriate place for such a purpose.
Under these circumstances, I received, on the Sunday morning
before the Tuesday on which Parliament met, a printed circular
from Sir Edward Cust, similar to that which I have no doubt was
addressed to all the other foreign ministers, inviting me to
attend the opening of the session. The following is extracted from
this circular: “No one can be admitted into the Diplomatic
Tribune, or in the body of the House, but in full court dress.”
Now, from all the attending circumstances, I do not feel disposed
to yield to the idea that any disrespect was intended by this
circular, either to my country or to myself. Since I came to
London, I have received such attentions from high official
personages as to render this quite improbable. What may be the
final result of the question I cannot clearly foresee, but I do
not anticipate any serious difficulties.
In the latter part of February the queen held the first levée of the
season. Mr. Buchanan had signified to the master of ceremonies that
he should present himself at the queen’s levée in the kind of dress
that he always wore, with the addition of a plain dress sword. The
result is given in the course of the following letters to his niece;
and thus, through a happy expedient, assented to cheerfully by the
queen, this Gordian knot was cut by a drawing-room rapier which
never left its sheath. In fact, Mr. Buchanan had already become so
much liked in the royal circle and in society generally, that the
court officials could not longer refuse to let him have his own way
about his reception at the levée, especially after he had dined at
the palace in “frock-dress,” an invitation which was doubtless given
in good-humored compliance with his wishes, and to smooth the way
into the more formal reception.
[TO MISS LANE.]
LONDON, February 18th, 1854.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
According to my calculation, Captain West will leave New York for
Liverpool in the Atlantic on Saturday, the 29th April; and it is
my particular desire that you should come with him, _under his
special care_, in preference to any other person. I shall send
this letter open to Captain West, and if he should transmit it to
you with a line stating that he will take charge of the freight,
you may then consider the matter settled. I shall meet you, God
willing, in Liverpool.
I have no doubt that the lady whom you mention in yours of the 2d
instant would be an agreeable companion, and should she come in
the Atlantic at the same time with yourself, it is all very well;
but even in that event, I desire that you should be under the
special care of Captain West. He is a near relative of our old
friend, Redmond Conyngham, and I have the most perfect confidence
in him both as a gentleman and a sailor. He stays at the Astor
House when in New York, and you had better stop there with your
brother when about to embark.
Had he been coming out two weeks earlier in April, I should have
been better pleased; but on no account would I have consented to
your voyage until near the middle of that month. Yours
affectionately, etc.
LONDON, February 21st, 1854.
I have received your letter of the 2d instant, and am truly
rejoiced to learn that you have recovered your usual good health.
I hope you will take good care of yourself in Washington and not
expose yourself to a relapse.
I intended to write you a long letter to-day, but an unexpected
pressure of business will prevent me from doing this before the
despatch bag closes. I now write merely to inform you that I have
made every arrangement for your passage with Captain West in the
Atlantic, either on Saturday, the 15th, or Saturday, the 29th
April. He does not at present know which, but he will inform you
on his arrival in New York. He will leave Liverpool to-morrow. And
let me assure you that this is the very best arrangement which
could be made for you. You will be quite independent, and under
the special charge of the captain. You will discover that you will
thus enjoy many advantages. If you have friends or acquaintances
coming out at the same time, this is all very well; _but let not
this prevent you from putting yourself under the special charge of
Captain West_; _and you can say that this is my arrangement_. I
wish you to inform me whether you will leave New York on the 15th
or 29th April, so that I may make arrangements accordingly. In
either event I shall, God willing, meet you at Liverpool. I shall
write to Eskridge by the next steamer, and direct him to provide
for your passage. You will of course have no dresses made in the
United States. I am not a very close observer, or an accurate
judge, but I think the ladies here of the very highest rank do not
dress as expensively, with the exception of jewels, as those in
the United States.
I dined on Wednesday last with the queen, at Buckingham Palace.
Both she and Prince Albert were remarkably civil, and I had quite
a conversation with each of them separately. But the question of
costume still remains: and from this I anticipate nothing but
trouble in several directions. I was invited “in frock-dress” to
the dinner, and of course I had no difficulty. To-morrow will be
the first levée of the queen, and my appearance there in a suit of
plain clothes will, I have no doubt, produce quite a sensation,
and become a subject of gossip for the whole court.
I wish very much that I could obtain an autograph of General
Washington for the Countess of Clarendon. She has been very civil
to me, and like our friend Laura is a collector of autographs. She
is very anxious to obtain such an autograph, and I have promised
to do my best to procure it for her. Perhaps Mr. Pleasanton could
help me to one.
The first wish of my heart is to see you comfortably and
respectably settled in life; but ardently as I desire this, you
ought never to marry any person for whom you think you would not
have a proper degree of affection. You inform me of your conquest,
and I trust it may be of such a character as will produce good
fruit. But I have time to say no more, except to request that you
will give my love to Laura and Clemmie, and my kindest regards to
Mr. Pleasanton, and also to Mr. and Mrs. Slidell and Mr. and Mrs.
Thomson, of New Jersey. Ever yours affectionately, etc.
LONDON, February 24, 1854.
Mr. Peabody handed me at the dinner-table the enclosed, which he
made me promise to send to you. Mr. Macalester had mentioned your
name to him.
The dress question, after much difficulty, has been finally and
satisfactorily settled. I appeared at the levée on Wednesday last,
in just such a dress as I have worn at the President’s one hundred
times. A black coat, white waistcoat and cravat and black
pantaloons and dress boots, with the addition of a very plain
black-handled and black-hilted dress sword. This to gratify those
who have yielded so much, and to distinguish me from the upper
court servants. I knew that I would be received in any dress I
might wear; but could not have anticipated that I should be
received in so kind and distinguished a manner. Having yielded
they did not do things by halves. As I approached the queen, an
arch but benevolent smile lit up her countenance;—as much as to
say, you are the first man who ever appeared before me at court in
such a dress. I confess that I never felt more proud of being an
American than when I stood in that brilliant circle, “in the
simple dress of an American citizen.” I have no doubt the circular
is popular with a majority of the people of England. Indeed, many
of the most distinguished members of Parliament have never been at
court, because they would not wear the prescribed costume.
I find lying on the table before me a note from the Duchess of
Somerset, which possibly Laura might be glad to have as an
autograph. She prides herself on being descended in a direct line
from Robert the Third of Scotland.
With my love to Laura and Clemmie, and my best regards to Mr.
Pleasanton, I remain, in haste, yours affectionately, etc.
LONDON, March 10, 1854.
I have received yours of the 16th ultimo, from Philadelphia, and
am rejoiced to learn from yourself that your health has been
entirely restored. For several reasons I should have been glad you
had gone to Washington at an early period of the winter, as I
desired, and I hope you went there, as you said you would, the
week after the date of your letter.
You have not mentioned the name of Miss Wilcox in any of your
letters, and from this I presume you have not made her
acquaintance. I regret this, because she was much esteemed among
her acquaintances here, and many persons whom you will meet will
make inquiries of you concerning her. She talked of you to me.
I shall soon expect to learn from you whether you will leave New
York with Captain West for Liverpool on the 15th or 29th April.
God willing, I shall meet you at Liverpool. I should be very glad
if Mrs. Commodore Perry would accompany you. I am well acquainted
with her, and esteem her highly. Still, I repeat my desire, that
in any event you should come with Captain West on one of the two
days designated. I have no news of any importance to communicate.
I am getting along here smoothly and comfortably, determined to
make the best of a situation not very agreeable to me. My health
has absolutely required that I should decline many 7½ and 8
o’clock dinner invitations, and evening parties commencing at 10½
and 11 o’clock.
I venture to predict that you will not be much pleased with
London, and I desire that you should not be disappointed. You must
not anticipate too much, except from seeing the sights. These are
numerous and interesting, from their historical associations. I
have been making inquiries concerning a maid for you.
Please to remember me, in the kindest terms, to Mr. Pleasanton,
and give my love to Laura and Clemmie. Ever yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
In a despatch to Mr. Marcy, written soon after his appearance at the
Queen’s levée, Mr. Buchanan said: “I have purposely avoided to
mention the names of those with whom I have had interviews on this
subject, lest it might expose them to censorious remarks hereafter;
but having mentioned that of Sir Edward Cust, the master of
ceremonies, in my despatch No. 13, of the 28th October last, it is
but an act of simple justice to state, that at the court on
Wednesday last, his attentions to me were of the kindest and most
marked character, and have placed me under many obligations. In the
matter of the sword, I yielded without reluctance to the earnest
suggestion of a high official character, who said that a sword, at
all the courts of the world, was considered merely as the mark of a
gentleman, and although he did not mention the queen’s name, yet it
was evident, from the whole conversation, that this was desired as a
token of respect for her Majesty. He had, on a former occasion,
expressed the hope that I would wear something indicating my
official position, and not appear at court, to employ his own
language, in the dress I wore upon the street. I told him promptly
that I should comply with his suggestion, and that in wearing a
sword at court, as an evidence of the very high regard which I felt
for her Majesty, I should do nothing inconsistent with my own
character as an American citizen, or that of my country. I might
have added that as ‘the simple dress of an American citizen’ is
exactly that of the upper court servants, it was my purpose from the
beginning to wear something which would distinguish me from them. At
the first, I had thought of United States buttons; but a plain dress
sword has a more manly and less gaudy appearance. I hope I am now
done with this subject forever.”
So that, after all, it appears plainly enough that, so far as the
queen herself was concerned, her Majesty’s wish was only that the
representative of the nation nearest in blood to her own, should
honor his country by paying to her a mark of respect, by a token
that would indicate the official position in which he stood before
her. As soon as Mr. Buchanan perceived this, he acted as became him,
and from that time forward he was as welcome a guest in the royal
circle as any one who entered it.
[FROM SECRETARY MARCY.]
(Private and confidential.) WASHINGTON, January 3, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have just finished a despatch in answer to Lord Clarendon’s last
on British recruitment in the United States. You will be startled
at its length, and I consider it objectionable in that respect,
but the peculiar character of the one to which it is a reply
rendered a review of the whole subject unavoidable. You are
requested to read it to Lord Clarendon, but I presume he will do
as I did when his was presented to me by Mr. Crampton—I moved to
dispense with the reading, or rather had it read by the title, and
received the copy.
I do not mean to trouble you with any other comments upon it, but
merely to remark that you will find that I have been very mindful
of your kind suggestion. The _suaviter in modo_ has really very
much impaired the _fortiter in re_. The manner I am quite sure
will please Lord Clarendon, but I presume the matter will not. I
really believe he does not know how offensively British officers
have behaved in this recruiting business; but he had the means of
knowing all about it, and when it was made a grave matter of
complaint it should have been investigated. After the issues of
fact and of law made in the case, and the refusal on the part of
Great Britain to do anything which could be regarded as a
satisfaction, it was not possible to avoid the recall of Mr.
Crampton.
You will see by the papers here that the debate in the Senate on
the Central American question has opened finely. I do not think
that advocates even among any of the factions can be found who
will attempt to justify the conduct of the British ministry in
that affair.
The correspondence on the subject appears in the “_The Union_” of
this morning and you will receive it as soon as you will this
letter. We shall all be very anxious to learn how it has been
received by the British government and people.
The people of the United States are not in a very good humor
towards the British government at this time, yet there is great
calmness in the public mind, which indicates a settled purpose to
stand for their rights.
The strengthening the British fleet in this quarter was regarded
as a harmless menace. Our people rather admired the folly of the
measure than indulged any angry feelings on account of it. The
comments of the British press and the miserable pretexts got up as
an excuse for that blunder have provoked some resentment, which
the course of the British cabinet in regard to the Central
American questions and recruiting in the United States will not
abate.
We are willing—more—anxious to be on friendly terms with our
“transatlantic cousins,” but they must recollect that we do not
believe in the doctrine of primogeniture. The younger branch of
the family has equal rights with the elder.
I am unable to say to you one word in regard to your successor.
Who he will be and when he will be sent out, I think no living man
now knows.
Yours truly,
W. L. MARCY.
[TO MR. MARCY.]
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, }
(Private.) LONDON, January 11, 1856. }
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 23d ultimo, and am greatly
disappointed neither to have received the message nor any inkling
of what it contains. Long expectation has blunted the edge of
curiosity here, and it will not make the impression it would have
done four weeks ago.
I shall expect your answer to Lord C. with much interest, and
shall do all in my power to give it its proper effect with his
lordship. For my own part, I should have been inclined to cut the
Gordian knot as soon as I possessed clear proof of Mr. Crampton’s
complicity, and I am persuaded this was expected at the time in
this country. No doubt, however, yours is the more prudent course.
You say that if I can settle the Central American difficulty, and
you the recruitment question, they may blow what blast they please
on any of their organs. That you can perform the latter there can
be no doubt; the former is a sheer impossibility during the
administration of Lord Palmerston.[14] Any attempt of the kind
will only more deeply commit this government and render it more
difficult for a succeeding government to do us justice. It is
still my impression there will be peace in Europe before the
season for opening the next campaign; and this will leave England
in such a state of preparation for war as she has never been at
any former period. This may act as a stimulus to the reckless and
arrogant propensities of Lord P., which have been so often
manifested by him in his intercourse with other nations.
I have more than once had occasion to admire your self-possession
and “sang-froid,” but never was it more strikingly illustrated
than in the concluding and, as it were, incidental sentence of
your letter: “I do not learn that the President has his mind
turned towards any one for your successor, or for secretary of
legation.” This is cool. I had confidently expected that
immediately after Mr. Appleton’s arrival in Washington, I should
hear of the appointment of my successor, and I felt assured that
if there had been need, you would have “_turned_” the President’s
mind towards a subject in which I felt so deep an interest.
As I have on more than one occasion informed you, I do believe
that had it been possible for the new minister to be here for a
fortnight before my departure this would have been greatly to his
benefit, and perhaps to that of the country. This is now
impossible. My nephew left me yesterday for Naples and Home, and I
was truly sorry not to be able to accompany him, as he speaks
French like a Parisian, and Italian tolerably well, and would,
therefore, have been highly useful. I am again left with no person
except Mr. Moran (who, to do him justice, performs his duties to
my entire satisfaction), and yet the President’s mind has not been
“_turned_ towards any one,” even for secretary of legation. I
hope, at least, that a secretary may arrive before the 12th
February, as it would have a better appearance to leave the
legation in his charge than in that of the consul.
You seem to take it hard that your former assistant should be
acting in concert with Don Magnifico Markoe, still one of your
lieutenants, in favor of the nomination of Mr. Dallas, and well
you may. Such ingratitude towards yourself is a proof of the
depravity of human nature. But there is one consolation. As
somebody says: “The vigor of the bow does not equal the venom of
the shaft.” I misquote, and don’t recollect the precise language.
I still think there will be peace. France and Turkey both desire
it, and Russia needs it. John Bull is still for war, but this only
to recover his prestige. He has incurred immense expense in
getting ready and don’t want to throw his money away. If peace
should remove Lord P., this would be a most happy consummation.
Had Mrs. M. been in your place, the President’s mind would ere
this have been “_turned_” towards somebody for my successor.
Please to present her my kindest regards, and believe me to be,
Yours very respectfully, etc.,
Footnote 14:
Lord Palmerston had then recently become premier in place of Lord
Aberdeen.
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, }
LONDON, January 18, 1856. }
I have an hour ago received your despatch of the 28th ultimo, and
have only had time to give it a cursory perusal. I have not yet
read the despatch of Lord Clarendon to which it is an answer. It
appears to me to be of characteristic clearness and ability, and
its tone is excellent. Still its conclusion will startle this
government. I have had an appointment with Lord Clarendon
postponed more than once, on account of the dangerous illness of
his mother. She died on Sunday morning last, and his lordship
informed me through his private secretary that as soon after the
event as possible he would appoint a time for our meeting.
The Central American questions are well and ably stated in the
message received two or three days ago. I know from reliable
authority that Lord Palmerston “has very strong views on the
subject.” The _Times_ is a mighty power in the State; and I have
adopted means, through the agency of a friend, to prevent that
journal from committing itself upon the questions until after its
conductors shall have an opportunity of examining the
correspondence. These means have hitherto proved effectual. The
correspondence has now arrived, and the _Times_ may indicate its
views to-morrow morning. The tone of the other journals has not
been satisfactory; and the _Daily Telegraph_ has been evidently
bought over, and become hostile to the United States within the
last four days, as you will perceive from the number which I send.
Should the _Times_ take ground against us, it is my purpose to
have an edition of that part of the message relating to Central
America, and the correspondence, published in pamphlet form, and
circulated among members of Parliament and other influential
persons. Should the expense be great, I may call upon you to pay
it out of the contingent fund.
A few hasty remarks upon the present condition of affairs in this
country. The Austrian proposals, as you will see by the papers,
have been accepted by the czar. This is distasteful to the British
people who have made vast preparations, at an enormous expense, to
recover their military and naval _prestige_ in the next campaign.
But peace is evidently desired by Louis Napoleon and the French,
by the Turks and by the Sardinians. It still continues to be my
opinion that peace will be made. In this state of affairs, the
British people being sore and disappointed and being better
prepared for war than they have ever been, Lord Palmerston, whose
character is reckless and his hostility to our country well known,
will most probably assume a high and defiant attitude on the
questions pending between the two countries. The British people
are now in that state of feeling that I firmly believe they could
be brought up to a war with the United States, _if they can be
persuaded that the territory in dispute belongs to themselves_.
This, absurd as it is, may be done through the agency of a press
generally, if not universally, hostile to us. I make these remarks
because you ought to know the truth and be prepared for the worst.
_Certainly not with a view of yielding one iota of our rights to
Great Britain or any other power. Most certainly not._
I understand from friends that it is now stated by British
individuals in conversation, how easy it would be for them in
their present state of preparation, and with our feeble navy, to
bring a war with us to a speedy and successful conclusion. In this
they would be wofully mistaken.
I have great hopes, however, that the peace will upset Lord
Palmerston. The session of Parliament will commence with a
powerful opposition against him.
Do contrive by some means to hasten the construction of a railroad
to the Pacific and to increase our navy. Such a road is as
necessary for war purposes as the construction of a fort to defend
any of our cities.
I have not time to write more before the closing of the bag.
I deeply regret to find that so late as the 3d of January you are
_unable_ to say one word to me in regard to my successor. For this
cause, I think I have good reason to complain.
With my kind regards always to Mrs. Marcy, I remain
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—I ought not to forget to say that the President’s message has
received great commendation among enlightened people in this
country. I am sorry you did not inform me at an earlier period
that it was the President’s intention to demand the recall of Mr.
Crampton, etc., that I might have prepared them for such a result.
[TO NAHUM CAPEN, ESQ.]
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, }
LONDON, January 18, 1856 }
MY DEAR SIR:—
...... Many thanks for your friendly wishes. They are cordially
reciprocated. Your kindly feelings towards myself have doubtless
greatly magnified my popularity at home, but were the Presidency
within my reach, which I am far from believing, I might then
exclaim:
“Will fortune never come with both hands full?
She either gives a stomach and no food,
Or else a feast and takes away the stomach.”
I cannot yet say when I shall return home, but I expect by every
steamer to hear of the appointment of my successor. Indeed, I have
been greatly disappointed in being detained here so long. After my
relief it is my purpose to pay a brief visit to the continent. At
the latest, God willing, I expect to be at home some time in
April—possibly before the end of March.
Without a secretary of legation, my letters must be brief. For
this I know you will excuse me.
With my best wishes for your health and happiness, I remain
always,
Very respectfully, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MR. MARCY.]
LONDON, January 25, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
From present appearances the Central American questions can lead
to no serious difficulties with England. Public opinion would here
seem to be nearly altogether in favor of our construction of the
treaty. Such I learn, is the conversation at the clubs and in
society; and with the _Times_, as well as the _Daily News_ on our
side, and this in accordance with public sentiment, we might
expect a speedy settlement of these questions, if any statesman
except Lord Palmerston were at the head of the government. He
cannot long remain in power, I think, after peace shall have been
concluded. I expect to go to Paris after the 12th of February, and
may write to you from there, should I have a conversation with
Louis Napoleon. I shall see Lord Clarendon early next week, and
you may expect by the next steamer to hear the result of my
reading your despatch to his lordship.
I still continue firm in the belief that peace will be concluded,
though it is manifestly distasteful to the British people.
I met Sir Charles Wood, the first lord of the admiralty, at dinner
the other day, and had some fun with him about sending the fleet
to our shores. He said they had only sent a few old hulks, and
with such vessels they could never have thought of hostilities
against such a power as the United States; and asked me if I had
ever heard that one of them approached our shores. I might have
referred him to the Screw Blocks. The conversation was altogether
agreeable and afforded amusement to the persons near us at the
table. He said: “Buchanan, if you and I had to settle the
questions between the two governments, they would be settled
speedily.” I know not whether there was any meaning beneath this
expression.
I consider this mission as a sort of waif abandoned by the
Government. Not a word even about a secretary of legation, though
Mr. Appleton left me more than two months ago. With the amount of
business to transact, and the number of visits to receive, I have
to labor like a drayman. Have you no bowels?
The reports, concerning our officers, received from the Crimea,
are highly complimentary and satisfactory, and the people here are
much gratified with the letter received from the Secretary of War,
thanking General Simpson for his kindness and attention towards
them.
Before I go away I intend to get up a letter from Lord Clarendon
and yourself, manifesting your sense of the manner in which Mr.
Bates performed his duty as umpire. As he will accept no pay, it
is as little as you can do, to say, “thank you, sir.”
I am informed there is a publisher in London about to publish the
Central American correspondence in pamphlet form, believing it
will yield him a profit.
I have just received a letter from Mason, written in excellent
spirits, praising Mr. Wise, his new secretary. For poor me, this
is sour grapes. Never forgetting my friend, Mrs. Marcy,
I remain yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO GOVERNOR BIGLER.]
LONDON, February 12, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I did not receive your kind and friendly letter of the 21st ultimo
until last evening, and although oppressed by my public duties
to-day, I cannot suffer a steamer to depart without bearing you an
answer.
We had been friends for many years before our friendship was
suspended. The best course to pursue in renewing it again is to
suffer bygones to be bygones. In this spirit I cordially accept
your overtures, and shall forget everything unpleasant in our past
relations. When we meet again, let us meet as though no
estrangement had ever existed between us, and it shall not be my
fault if we should not remain friends as long as we both may live.
I wish you an honorable and useful career in the Senate.
I had hoped to return home with Miss Lane in October last, but a
succession of threatening incidents has occurred in the relations
between the two countries which has kept me here until the present
moment. And even now I do not know when I can leave my post. My
private business requires that I should be at home on the 1st of
April, but no pecuniary consideration can induce me to desert my
public duty at such a moment as the present. I trust, however,
that by the next steamer I shall hear of the appointment of my
successor.
In regard to the Presidency to which you refer, if my own wishes
had been consulted, my name should never again have been mentioned
in connection with that office. I feel, nevertheless, quite as
grateful to my friends for their voluntary exertions in my favor
during my absence, as though they had been prompted by myself. It
is a consolation which I shall bear with me to my dying day, that
the Democracy of my native state have sustained me with so much
unanimity. I shall neither be disappointed nor in the slightest
degree mortified should the Cincinnati Convention nominate another
person; but in the retirement, the prospect of which is now so
dear to me, the consciousness that Pennsylvania has stood by me to
the last will be a delightful reflection. Our friends Van Dyke and
Lynch have kept me advised of your exertions in my favor.
I am happy to inform you that within the last fortnight public
opinion has evidently undergone a change in favor of our country.
The best evidence of this is perhaps the friendly tone of Lord
Palmerston’s speech on Friday night last. His lordship has,
however, done me injustice in attributing to me expressions which
I never uttered, or rather which I never wrote, for all is in
writing. All I said in relation to the matter in question was that
I should have much satisfaction in transmitting a copy of Lord
Clarendon’s note to the Secretary of State. I never had a word
with Lord Palmerston on the subject.
The moment has arrived for closing the despatch bags, and I
conclude by assuring you of my renewed friendship.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MR. MARCY.]
(Private and confidential.) LONDON, February 15, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 27th ultimo, and although the
contents are very acceptable, yet, like a lady’s letter, its pith
and marrow are in the two postscripts, informing me that Mr.
Dallas had been offered and would probably accept this mission. By
the newspapers I learn that his nomination had been sent to the
Senate. It is long since I have heard such welcome news. But there
is some alloy in almost every good, and in my own joy, I cannot
but sympathize with you for the loss of Mr. Markoe, who, the
papers say, is to be appointed the secretary of legation. Pray
bear it with Christian resignation.
I need not say that I shall do all I can to give Mr. Dallas a fair
start.
I have two things to request of you:
1. Although I have no doubt the omission of Lady Palmerston to
invite me to her first party was both intentional and significant
_at the time_, yet I should be unwilling to leave the fact on
record in a public despatch. I will, therefore, send you by the
next steamer the same despatch, number 119, of the 4th instant,
with that portion of it omitted. When you receive this, please to
withdraw the first despatch and keep it for me until my return.
2. Should you, in your friendly discretion, deem it advisable
under the circumstances, please to have an editorial prepared for
the _Union_, stating the facts in my last despatch (a duplicate of
which is now sent you), in relation to the remarks of Lord
Palmerston as to my expression of satisfaction with the apology
contained in Lord Clarendon’s note of the 16th July. I send you
with this a pamphlet which has just been published here on this
subject. I know the author. He is an Englishman of character.
Several members of Parliament have called upon me for information,
but my position requires that I should be very chary. I have
furnished some of them with copies of Hertz’s trial, among the
rest Mr. Roebuck. I met him afterwards in society, and it was
evident the pamphlet had strongly impressed him with Mr.
Crampton’s complicity. Still it is not to be denied that Lord
Palmerston’s speech on Friday last, in relation to this subject,
has made a strong impression here, as it has done on the
continent, judging by the facts stated in my despatch.
I know from the tone of your letter that you would consider me
in a state of mental delusion if I were to say how indifferent I
feel in regard to myself on the question of the next Presidency.
You would be quite a sceptic. One thing is certain that neither
by word nor letter have I ever contributed any support to
myself. I believe that the next Presidential term will perhaps
be the most important and responsible of any which has occurred
since the origin of the Government, and whilst no competent and
patriotic man to whom it may be offered should shrink from the
responsibility, yet he may well accept it as the greatest trial
of his life. Of course nothing can be expected from you but a
decided support of your chief.
Never forgetting my excellent and esteemed friend, whose influence
I shrewdly suspect put you in motion in regard to the appointment
of a successor, I remain, as always,
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO HIS HOUSEKEEPER, “MISS HETTY.”]
LONDON, February 15, 1856.
MY DEAR MISS HETTY:—
Although greatly hurried to-day, having heavy despatches,
according to my rule I suffer not a steamer to pass without
answering your letters. Your last of the 26th ultimo was most
agreeable. You give me information concerning the neighbors which
I highly prize. Every thing about home is dear to me, and you can
scarcely realize how much pleasure I feel in the prospect of being
with you ere long, should a kind Providence spare my life and my
health. I have had no secretary of legation with me for several
months, and I have had to labor very hard. I hope to experience
the delight of being idle, or rather doing what I please, at
Wheatland.
After many vain entreaties, Mr. Dallas has at length been
appointed my successor, and I expect him here by the end of this
month. Whether I shall return immediately home, or go to Paris for
a few weeks, I have not yet determined. The former I would greatly
prefer; but March is a very rough month to pass the Atlantic, and
I suffer wretchedly from sea-sickness all the time. I am now,
thank God, in good health, and I do not wish to impair it on the
voyage......
I wish John Brenner joy in advance of his marriage. Remember me
kindly to Mr. Fahnestock and your sister, and to all our neighbors
and friends, and tell them how happy I shall be to meet them once
more. Remember me, also, most kindly, to Father Keenan......
With sincere and affectionate regard, I remain always your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO HIS NIECE, MRS. BAKER.]
LONDON, February 16, 1855.
MY DEAR MARY:—
It is not from the want of warm affection that I do not write to
you oftener. I shall ever feel the deepest interest in your
welfare and happiness. This omission on my part arises simply from
the fact that Harriet and yourself are in constant correspondence,
and through her you hear all the news from London, and I often
hear of you. I am rejoiced that you are contented and happy. May
you ever be so!
I have determined to return home in October next, God willing, and
to pass the remnant of my days, if Heaven should prolong them, in
tranquillity and retirement. After a long and somewhat stormy
public life, I enjoy this prospect as much as I have ever done the
anticipation of high office.
England is now in a state of mourning for the loss of so many of
her brave sons in the Crimea. The approaching “season” will, in
consequence, be dull, and this I shall bear with Christian
fortitude. The duller the better for me; but not so for Harriet.
She has enjoyed herself very much, and made many friends; but I do
not see any bright prospect of her marriage. This may probably be
her own fault. I confess that nothing would please me better than
to see her married, with her own hearty good will, to a worthy
man. Should I be called away, her situation would not by any means
be comfortable.
We are treated with much civility here, indeed with kindness,
according to the English fashion, which is not very cordial. Such
a thing as social visiting does not exist even among near friends.
You cannot “drop in of an evening” anywhere. You must not go to
any place unless you are expected, except it be a formal morning
call......
It is said that the queen is, and it is certain the British people
are, deeply mortified at the disasters of her troops in the
Crimea. If the men had died in battle this would have been some
consolation, but they have been sacrificed by the mismanagement of
officials in high authority. The contrast between the condition of
the French and English troops in the Crimea has deeply wounded
British pride. Indeed, I am sorry for it myself, because it would
be unfortunate for the world should England sink to the level of a
second-rate power. They call us their “cousins on the other side
of the Atlantic,” and it is certain we are kindred......
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
CHAPTER V.
1853-1856.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH LORD CLARENDON—THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY AND
AFFAIRS IN CENTRAL AMERICA—THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE NEW BRITISH
DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE PROPERTY OF NEUTRALS.
The reader has seen that when Mr. Buchanan left home to undertake
the duties of United States minister in England, it was the
understanding between the President and himself that he should have
full power to deal with the Central American question in London, and
that the fishery and reciprocity trade questions would be reserved
to be dealt with by the Secretary of State.[15]
Footnote 15:
Full powers in regard to the Central American question were
afterwards transmitted to him at London.
But of course the President expected to be informed from time to
time of the steps taken in the negotiation concerning the affairs of
Central America, and Mr. Buchanan both expected and desired to
receive specific instructions on this and all other topics in the
relations of the two governments that might be discussed in the
course of his mission. It was at a very interesting and critical
period in the affairs of Europe that he arrived in England. Although
the war between England and France, as allies of Turkey, on the one
side, and Russia on the other, known as the Crimean war, was still
in the distance, its probability was already discernible. How this
great disturbance affected the pending questions between the United
States and England, and introduced a new and unexpected difficulty
in their relations, will appear as I proceed.
Mr. Buchanan, according to his invariable habit in all important
transactions, kept the records of his mission with great care.
Transcripts of the whole are now before me, in two large MS.
volumes; and they form a monument of his industry, his powerful
memory, and his ability as a diplomatist. The greater part of his
negotiations with Lord Clarendon were carried on in oral discussions
at official but informal interviews. Regular protocols of these
discussions were not made, but they were fully and minutely reported
by Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Marcy, as they occurred; and it is most
remarkable with what completeness, after holding a long
conversation, he could record an account of it. These conversations
show, too, how wide was his range of vision in regard to the affairs
of Europe, of Cuba, of Central America, and of all the topics which
he had to discuss; how well versed he was in public law, and how
thoroughly equipped he was for the position which he occupied. It is
not strange that he should have left in the minds of the public men
in England who had most to do with him, an impression that he was a
statesman of no common order.[16] His first official interview with
Lord Clarendon took place on the 22d of September, 1853. It had
been, and continued to be, very difficult to get the attention of
the English secretary to the questions pending between the United
States and England, on account of the critical state of the Turkish
question; and when Lord Clarendon did have a conference with Mr.
Buchanan, he did not profess to be so well informed on the affairs
of Central America as he felt that he ought to be, although Mr.
Buchanan found him attentive, courteous and able. In the course of
many interviews, occurring from time to time between the 22d of
September, 1853, and the 16th of March, 1854, at which last date
Lord Clarendon communicated to Mr. Buchanan the declaration which
had been prepared for the queen’s signature, specifying the course
which she intended to pursue towards neutral commerce during the war
with Russia, then already declared,—topics that are now of great
historical interest, and some of which have still a practical
importance, were discussed with great frankness and urbanity. They
related at first to the Central American questions, and the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the fisheries and reciprocity of trade, Cuba
and its slavery, slavery in the United States, and the inter-state
relations of Europe. As the war approached, and when it was finally
declared, the principles of neutrality, privateering, and many other
topics came within the range of the discussion; and it was very much
in consequence of the views expressed by Mr. Buchanan to Lord
Clarendon, and by the latter communicated to the British cabinet,
that the course of England towards neutrals during that war became
what it was. When Lord Clarendon, on the 16th of March, 1854,
presented to Mr. Buchanan a _projet_ for a treaty between Great
Britain, France and the United States, making it piracy for neutrals
to serve on board of privateers cruising against the commerce of
either of the three nations, when such nation was a belligerent, the
very impressive reasons which Mr. Buchanan opposed to it caused it
to be abandoned.[17]
Footnote 16:
I cannot find room in this volume for these very interesting and
graphic despatches. It is not improbable that the two volumes of
this biography will be followed by a supplemental volume, in which
they can be fully given. The Government of the United States has
never published more than a small part of them.
Footnote 17:
I find in Mr. Buchanan’s private memorandum book the account of
this matter in his handwriting, given in the text. It is much more
full than that contained in his despatches to Mr. Marcy.
Thursday, March 16, 1854.
Called at the Foreign Office by the invitation of Lord Clarendon.
He presented me a printed treaty in blank, which he proposed
should be executed by Great Britain, France and the United States.
The chief object of it was that all captains of privateers and
their crews should be considered and punished as pirates, who,
being subjects or citizens of one of the three nations who were
neutral, should cruise against either of the others when
belligerent. The object undoubtedly was to prevent Americans from
taking service in Russian privateers during the present war. We
had much conversation on the subject, which I do not mean to
repeat, this memorandum being merely intended to refresh my own
memory. His lordship had before him a list of the different
treaties between the United States and other nations on this
subject.
I was somewhat taken by surprise, though I stated my objections
pretty clearly to such a treaty. Not having done justice to the
subject in my own opinion, I requested and obtained an interview
for the next day, when I stated them more fully and clearly. The
heads were as follows:
1. It would be a violation of our neutrality in the war to agree
with France and England that American citizens who served on board
Russian privateers should be punished as pirates. To prevent this,
Russia should become a party to the treaty, which, under existing
circumstances, was impossible.
2. Our treaties only embraced a person of either nation who should
take commissions as privateers, and _did not extend to the crew_.
Sailors were a thoughtless race, and it would be cruel and unjust
to punish them as pirates for taking such service, when they often
might do it from want and necessity.
3. The British law claims all who are born as British subjects to
be British subjects forever. We naturalize them and protect them
as American citizens. If the treaty were concluded, and a British
cruiser should capture a Russian privateer with a naturalized
Irishman on board, what would be the consequence? The British law
could not punish him as an American citizen under the treaty,
because it would regard him as a British subject. It might hang
him for high treason; and such an event would produce a collision
between the two countries. The old and dangerous question would
then be presented in one of its worst aspects.
4. Whilst such a treaty might be justly executed by such nations
as Great Britain and the United States, would it be just, wise or
humane to agree that their sailors who took service on board a
privateer should be summarily tried and executed as pirates by
several powers which could be named?
5. _Cui bono_ should Great Britain make such a treaty with France
during the existing war. If no neutral power should enter into it
with them, it could have no effect during its continuance.
6. The time may possibly come when Great Britain, in a war with
the despotisms of Europe, might find it to be exceedingly to her
interest to employ American sailors on board her privateers, and
such a treaty would render this impossible. Why should she
unnecessarily bind her hands?
7. The objections of the United States to enter into entangling
alliances with European nations.
8. By the law of nations, as expounded both in British and
American courts, a commission to a privateer, regularly issued by
a belligerent nation, protects both the captain and the crew from
punishment as pirates. Would the different commercial nations of
the earth be willing to change this law as you propose, especially
in regard to the crew? Would it be proper to do so in regard to
the latter?
After I had stated these objections at some length on Friday, the
17th of March, Lord Clarendon observed that when some of them were
stated the day before, they had struck him with so much force
after reflection, that he had come to the office from the House of
Lords at night and written them down and sent them to Sir James
Graham. In his own opinion the treaty ought not to be concluded,
and if the cabinet came to this conclusion the affair should drop,
and I agreed I would not write to the Department on the subject.
If otherwise, and the treaty should be presented to the Government
of the United States, then I was to report our conversation.
In the conversation Lord Clarendon said they were more solicitous
to be on good terms with the United States than any other nation,
and that the project had not yet been communicated even to France.
(Vide 1 Kent’s Commentaries, 100. United States Statutes at large,
175, Act of March 3d, 1847, to provide for the punishment of
piracy in certain cases. Mr. Polk’s message to Congress of
December 8, 1846.)
General conversation about privateering.
The object of the treaty was to change the law of nations in this
respect, and Lord Clarendon said that if England, France and the
United States should enter into it, the others would soon follow.
The project contained a stipulation that the person who took a
commission as a privateer should give security that he would not
employ any persons as sailors on board who were not subjects or
citizens of the nation granting the commission.
March 22, 1854. At her majesty’s drawing-room this day, Lord
Clarendon told me that they had given up the project of the
treaty, etc., etc.
The whole object of the negotiation in reference to the affairs of
Central America was to develop and ascertain the precise differences
between the two governments in regard to the construction of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty. As the negotiation had become interrupted by
the war with Russia, and as it was not probable that it could be
brought to a definite issue while that war continued, Mr. Buchanan
desired to return home. But Mr. Marcy earnestly desired him to
remain, saying in answer to his request to be relieved: “The
negotiation cannot be committed to any one who so well understands
the subject in all its bearings as you do, or who can so ably
sustain and carry out the views of the United States.” Mr. Buchanan
therefore remained and pressed upon Lord Clarendon a further
discussion of the subject, saying in a formal note:
“The President has directed the undersigned, before retiring from
his mission, to request from the British government a statement of
the positions which it has determined to maintain in regard to the
Bay Islands, the territory between the Sibun and Sarstoon, as well
as the Belize settlement and the Mosquito protectorate. The long
delay in asking for this information has proceeded from the
President’s reluctance to manifest any impatience on this
important subject whilst the attention of her Majesty’s government
was engaged by the war with Russia. But as more than a year has
already elapsed since the termination of the discussion on these
subjects, and as the first session of the new Congress is speedily
approaching, the President does not feel that he would be
justified in any longer delay.”
There had been submitted by Mr. Buchanan to Lord Clarendon on the
6th of January, 1854, a detailed statement of the views of the
United States, which was not answered until the 2d of May following.
On the 22d of July Mr. Buchanan made an elaborate reply, containing
a historical review of all the matters in dispute. It reduced the
whole controversy respecting the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to the
following points:
What, then, is the fair construction of the article? It embraces
two objects. 1. It declares that neither of the parties shall ever
acquire any exclusive control over the ship canal to be
constructed between the Atlantic and the Pacific, by the route of
the river San Juan de Nicaragua, and that neither of them shall
ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same or
in the vicinity thereof. In regard to this stipulation, no
disagreement is known to exist between the parties. But the
article proceeds further in its mutually self-denying policy, and
in the second place, declares that neither of the parties ‘will
occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any
dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any
part of Central America.’
We now reach the true point. Does this language require that Great
Britain shall withdraw from her existing possessions in Central
America, including ‘the Mosquito coast?’ The language peculiarly
applicable to this coast will find a more appropriate place in a
subsequent portion of these remarks.
If any person enters into a solemn and explicit agreement that he
will not “occupy” any given tract of country then actually
occupied by him, can any proposition be clearer, than that he is
bound by his agreement to withdraw from such occupancy? Were this
not the case, these words would have no meaning, and the agreement
would become a mere nullity. Nay more, in its effect it would
amount to a confirmation of the party in the possession of that
very territory which he had bound himself not to occupy, and would
practically be equivalent to an agreement that he should remain in
possession—a contradiction in terms. It is difficult to comment on
language which appears so plain, or to offer arguments to prove
that the meaning of words is not directly opposite to their
well-known signification.
And yet the British government consider that the convention
interferes with none of their existing possessions in Central
America; that it is entirely prospective in its nature, and merely
prohibits them from making new acquisitions. If this be the case,
then it amounts to a recognition of their rights, on the part of
the American Government, to all the possessions which they already
hold, whilst the United States have bound themselves by the very
same instrument, never, under any circumstances, to acquire the
possession of a foot of territory in Central America. The
mutuality of the convention would thus be entirely destroyed; and
whilst Great Britain may continue to hold nearly the whole eastern
coast of Central America, the United States have abandoned the
right for all future time to acquire any territory, or to receive
into the American Union any of the states in that portion of their
own continent. This self-imposed prohibition was the great
objection to the treaty in the United States at the time of its
conclusion, and was powerfully urged by some of the best men in
the country. Had it then been imagined that whilst it prohibited
the United States from acquiring territory, under any possible
circumstances, in a portion of America through which their
thoroughfares to California and Oregon must pass, and that the
convention, at the same time, permitted Great Britain to remain in
the occupancy of all her existing possessions in that region,
there would not have been a single vote in the American Senate in
favor of its ratification. In every discussion it was taken for
granted that the convention required Great Britain to withdraw
from these possessions, and thus place the parties upon an exact
equality in Central America. Upon this construction of the
convention there was quite as great an unanimity of opinion as
existed in the House of Lords, that the convention with Spain of
1786 required Great Britain to withdraw from the Mosquito
protectorate.
As Lord Clarendon in his statement had characterized “the Monroe
Doctrine” as merely the “dictum of its distinguished author,” Mr.
Buchanan replied that “did the occasion require, he would cheerfully
undertake the task of justifying the wisdom and policy of the Monroe
doctrine, in reference to the nations of Europe as well as to those
on the American continent;” and he closed as follows:
But no matter what may be the nature of the British claim to the
country between the Sibun and the Sarstoon, the observation
already made in reference to the Bay Islands and the Mosquito
coast must be reiterated, that the great question does not turn
upon the validity of this claim previous to the convention of
1850, but upon the facts that Great Britain has bound herself by
this convention not to occupy any part of Central America, nor to
exercise dominion over it; and that the territory in question is
within Central America, even under the most limited construction
of these words. In regard to Belize proper, confined within its
legitimate boundaries, under the treaties of 1783 and 1786, and
limited to the usufruct specified in these treaties, it is
necessary to say but a few words. The Government of the United
States will not, for the present, insist upon the withdrawal of
Great Britain from this settlement, provided all the other
questions between the two governments concerning Central America
can be amicably adjusted. It has been influenced to pursue this
course partly by the declaration of Mr. Clayton on the 4th of
July, 1850, but mainly in consequence of the extension of the
license granted by Mexico to Great Britain, under the treaty of
1826, which that republic has yet taken no steps to terminate.
It is, however, distinctly to be understood that the Government of
the United States acknowledge no claim of Great Britain within
Belize, except the temporary ‘liberty of making use of the wood of
the different kinds, the fruits and other products in their
natural state,’ fully recognizing that the former ‘Spanish
sovereignty over the country’ now belongs either to Guatemala or
Mexico.
In conclusion, the Government of the United States most cordially
and earnestly unite in the desire expressed by ‘her majesty’s
government, not only to maintain the convention of 1850 intact,
but to consolidate and strengthen it by strengthening and
consolidating the friendly relations which it was calculated to
cement and perpetuate.’ Under these mutual feelings, it is deeply
to be regretted that the two governments entertain opinions so
widely different in regard to its true effect and meaning.
In this attitude the controversy was necessarily left by Mr.
Buchanan, when his mission finally terminated; and its further
history, so far as he is concerned in it, belongs to the period when
he had become President of the United States.
CHAPTER VI.
1853-1856.
BRITISH ENLISTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES—RECALL OF THE ENGLISH
MINISTER AT WASHINGTON—THE OSTEND CONFERENCE.
Two topics entirely unexpected by Mr. Buchanan when he accepted the
mission to England must here claim some attention. The first relates
to an occurrence which brought upon the United States the necessity
of demanding a recall of the British minister who then represented
the queen’s government at Washington. This was Mr. John F. Crampton,
a well-meaning and amiable gentleman, who had long resided in this
country as secretary of the British legation, and had been made
minister some time previously, but whose zeal in the service of his
government had led him into a distinct violation of our neutrality
in the war between England and Russia. It is altogether probable
that in his efforts to promote enlistments of men to serve in that
war, Mr. Crampton did not keep within the letter of his
instructions. It was, at all events, somewhat difficult, for a good
while, to convince Lord Clarendon that Mr. Crampton was personally
implicated in the unlawful acts which were undoubtedly done. But
there was but one course for the American government to pursue. The
history of this affair is somewhat curious.
When in April, 1854, Mr. Marcy had occasion to acknowledge the
receipt from Mr. Crampton of a note stating the new rule that would
be observed by Great Britain, in the war with Russia, towards
neutrals, after expressing his gratification, and, at the same time,
saying that the United States would have been still more gratified
if the rule that “free ships make free goods” had been extended to
all future wars to which Great Britain should be a party, he took
the precaution to remind Mr. Crampton in courteous terms of the
severe restrictions imposed by our laws against equipping
privateers, receiving commissions, or enlisting men within our
territories to take any part in a foreign war. Lord Clarendon, too,
at a later period (April 12, 1855), wrote to Mr. Crampton that “the
law of the United States, with respect to enlistment, however
conducted, is not only very just but very stringent, according to
the report which is enclosed in your despatch, and her Majesty’s
government would on no account run any risk of infringing this law
of the United States.”[18] For a time, Mr. Crampton acted
cautiously, but in the course of the summer of 1855, Mr. Marcy
received evidence which convinced him that the British minister was
personally implicated in carrying out arrangements for sending men
to Nova Scotia, under contracts made in the United States to enlist
as soldiers in the British army after their arrival in Halifax; and
that the means for sending them had been supplied by him and other
British functionaries. Mr. Buchanan was first instructed to bring
this matter to the attention of Lord Clarendon, before Mr.
Crampton’s direct agency in it had become known to our Government.
His letter of July 6, 1855, to Lord Clarendon, was a forcible
presentation of the grounds on which the United States complained of
such doings as an infraction of their laws and a violation of their
sovereignty. A long correspondence ensued, which was conducted at
times with some approach to acrimony, but which never actually
transcended the limits of diplomatic courtesy. At length the proofs
that Mr. Crampton was a party to this unlawful proceeding became so
forcible that the British government yielded to the request that he
might be recalled, and he was transferred to another diplomatic
post. The whole affair was attended at one time with serious risk of
an interruption in the friendly relations of the two countries. Mr.
Marcy’s course in the correspondence was greatly tempered in its
tone by the advice which he received from Mr. Buchanan, although the
hazard of an unfortunate issue of the trouble was much enhanced by
the sending of an unusual naval force to the coasts of the United
States, which the British government ordered while this affair was
pending, but without any special reference to it.
Footnote 18:
A copy of this note was delivered to Mr. Marcy in the course of
the month of May, 1855.
The so-called “Ostend Conference,” which at the time it occurred
made a great deal of noise, and in which Mr. Buchanan was directed
by his Government to participate, requires but a brief explanation.
It was not a meeting in any sense suggested by him, nor was there
anything connected with it which should have given rise to alarm.
When in the summer of 1856 he had become the nominee of the
Democratic party for the Presidency, as is usual on such occasions,
biographical sketches of his public and private character were
prepared and circulated. Among them was a small volume in duodecimo
form of 118 pages, written with far greater ability and precision
than was common in such ephemeral publications intended for
electioneering purposes. Its account of the whole matter of the
“Ostend Conference” is so exact and lucid that I do not hesitate to
quote it as a true history of that proceeding:[19]
Footnote 19:
The copy of this little biography which is before me is entitled,
THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF JAMES BUCHANAN of Pennsylvania.
Twentieth thousand. New York: Published by Livermore & Rudd, 310
Broadway, 1856. It was published anonymously, but I am informed
that the name of the author was Edward F. Underhill.
THE OSTEND CIRCULAR.
It is the rare good fortune of Mr. Buchanan to have sustained a
long career of public life with such singular discretion,
integrity, and ability, that now, when he is presented by the
great national party of the country as their candidate for the
highest dignity in the Republic, nothing is seriously urged by
political hostility in extenuation of his merit, save the alleged
countenance to filibuster enterprise and cupidity, inferred by his
enemies from a strained interpretation of the recommendations and
views of the Ostend Conference. The political opponents of Mr.
Buchanan call upon his supporters to vindicate the claim they
assert in behalf of Mr. Buchanan to conservatism, by reconciling
that assumption with his participation in the American Diplomatic
Conference at Ostend and Aix la Chapelle, and with his adoption
and endorsement, jointly with the ministers of the United States
to France and Spain, of the views and recommendations addressed by
the three ambassadors to the Department of State, on the 18th of
October, 1854, in the letter commonly known as the Ostend
Manifesto. The circumstance that the opposition meet the
nomination of Mr. Buchanan with no other objection impugning his
qualifications for the Presidential trust, cannot fail to confirm
the popular belief in the justice and wisdom of the judgment that
governed the Cincinnati convention in selecting a statesman so
unassailable in the record of his political life, and so little
obnoxious to personal censure and distrust, as the candidate of
the great national party of the Union for the highest dignity in
the Republic. For it is demonstrable that an erroneous impression
exists as to the purport of the Aix la Chapelle letter; and that
the policy therein declared by Mr. Buchanan and his associates, is
identical with that which has uniformly been regarded and avowed
as the policy of the United States in respect to the Island of
Cuba. And a belief endeavored to be inculcated, that the policy of
the Ostend conference was adopted in consultation or co-operation
with the Red Republicans of Europe, is equally erroneous. This
belief has originated in another supposition equally unfounded,
that Mr. Soulé was in league with the leaders of the European
revolutionary movement. The truth is, that fundamental differences
existed between the policy of Mr. Soulé and Mazzini, Ledru Rollin,
Kossuth, and Louis Blanc; and besides which fact it is well known
that these revolutionary leaders themselves were agreed only upon
one point, the necessity of revolution, and that they seldom speak
to one another. The policy of the revolutionary party of Europe in
reference to Cuba was this. They desired the United States to
assist the Democratic party of Spain in creating a revolution at
Madrid, which should dethrone the queen, and place the Democratic
party in power, by the establishment of a republic, and then leave
Cuba at her option to either remain a portion of the Spanish
republic, or seek annexation to the United States. This concession
to the United States was to be in return for material aid
furnished in effecting the Spanish revolution. The revolution thus
accomplished was intended to be the initiative of further
revolutions on the Continent. The Pyrenees range of mountains
which forms the boundary line between France and Spain are
populated on either side by the most liberal men in either empire,
the great mass of the inhabitants being Republican; and could a
republic be established in Spain, the Pyrenees would not only
furnish points from which to begin their revolutionary designs
against France, but would form a barrier behind which they could
defend themselves against any attack which Louis Napoleon might
make. The revolution accomplished in France, Kossuth and Mazzini
would have but little difficulty in overthrowing the power of
Austria in Hungary and Italy. Such were the objects which the
revolutionary leaders of Europe had in view in endeavoring to
secure the influence of the United States Government in support of
their policy.
It is needless to say, that neither the Ostend conference nor the
cabinet at Washington gave any countenance to this policy. The
Ostend conference looked at the Cuba question solely from an
American point of view, and quite disconnected from the conflicts
and interests of European politics, or the aspirations of
revolutionary leaders. On this account, so far from that policy
receiving the favor of the Red Republicans, they were as pointed
in their hostility to it as any of the monarchical organs of
Europe, and did not hesitate to privately, and sometimes publicly,
denounce Mr. Soulé for having signed the Ostend circular, as
recreant to the expectations which they had formed in regard to
him. Mr. Buchanan from first to last opposed the policy which
would lead to the United States becoming involved in the European
struggle, and held strictly to the American view of the question,
in accordance with which the Ostend letter was framed.
The conference at Ostend had its origin in the recommendation of
Governor Marcy, who justly conceived that the mission with which
Mr. Soulé was charged at the court of Spain might excite the
jealousy of other European powers, and that it was important for
the purpose of facilitating the negotiations there to be
conducted, that explanations should be made to the governments of
England and France, of the objects and purposes of the United
States in any movement that events might render necessary, having
in view the ultimate purchase or acquisition by this government of
the Spanish Island of Cuba. The object of the consultation
suggested by Mr. Marcy was, as stated in a letter to Mr. Soulé,
“to bring the common wisdom and knowledge of the three ministers
to bear simultaneously upon the negotiations at Madrid, London and
Paris.” These negotiations had not necessarily in view the
transfer of Cuba to this country; though that was one of the modes
indicated, and seemingly the most effective, of terminating the
constantly recurring grievances upon the commerce of the United
States, upon the honor of its flag, and the personal rights of its
citizens, which disturbed the cordial relations of the two
countries, and infused acrimony into their intercourse connected
with the prosecution of commerce. Another expedient which Governor
Marcy regarded with favor, was the independence of the Island
under the Creole sovereignty. At that time, in the summer of 1854,
apprehensions of some important change in the social and political
condition and relations of Cuba, were generally felt in this
country. Rumors prevailed, founded on the then recent decrees and
modifications of law pertaining to the servile condition, that it
was in contemplation to establish the domination of the blacks in
the Island; that the slaves were to be freed and armed, and that
an extensive introduction of native Africans was to be resorted to
as a means of re-enforcing the strength of the dominant party.
Such, indeed, was the policy of Great Britain; first, to keep
alive the slavery agitation in the United States, not from motives
of philanthropy, but, by thus inciting internal discord between
the people of different sections of the Union, the United States
would be prevented from turning its attention to further schemes
of territorial extension; and second, to flood Cuba with negroes
under a system of apprenticeship, in order to render it valueless
to the United States. The execution of such a scheme was regarded
as eminently dangerous to the peace and safety of this country,
and was one which the United States could not suffer, as the
inevitable effects of such a policy, carried out, would be, sooner
or later, to induce a servile insurrection in the Southern States.
With a colony containing a million and a half of free negroes,
immediately off our shores, an expedition could at any time be
organized under European aid, and sent from Cuba to our Southern
States to incite a rebellion, with all its attendant horrors,
among the slaves. Mr. Soulé was instructed to ascertain whether it
was in contemplation, and, if so, to seek to prevent it from being
carried out, and to avert its baleful consequences to ourselves,
by negotiating, first, for the purchase of Cuba, and if that were
impracticable, then for the independence of the Island. It was not
the greed of territorial expansion that prompted the instructions
which convoked the Ostend conference; nor was that sentiment the
controlling one that prompted the adoption by its members of the
recommendations embodied in the Aix la Chapelle letter. The
document is too long to publish at length, but the material
passage which contains the doctrines which the opposition would
fain lead the people to believe are dangerous, is subjoined:
“But if Spain, deaf to the voice of her own interest, and actuated
by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to
sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, what
ought to be the course of the American Government under such
circumstances? Self-preservation is the first law of nature with
states as well as with individuals. All nations have at different
periods acted upon this maxim. Although it has been made the
pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in the partition of
Poland, and other similar cases which history records, yet the
principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized.
The United States has never acquired a foot of territory except by
fair purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and
voluntary application of the people of that independent state, who
desired to blend their destinies with our own. Even our
acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to the rule, because,
although we might have claimed them by the right of conquest, in a
just war, yet we purchased them for what was then considered by
both parties a full and ample equivalent. Our past history forbids
that we should acquire the Island of Cuba without the consent of
Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We
must, in any event, preserve our own conscious rectitude and our
own self-respect.
“While pursuing this course, we can afford to disregard the
censure of the world, to which we have been so often and so
unjustly exposed. After we shall have offered Spain a price for
Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been
refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba
in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace
and the existence of our cherished Union? Should this question be
answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine,
we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the
power. And this, upon the very same principle that would justify
an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if
there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying
his own home. Under such circumstances, we ought neither to count
the cost nor regard the odds which Spain might enlist against us.
“We forbear to enter into the question whether the present
condition of the Island would justify such a measure. We should,
however, be recreant to our duty—be unworthy of our gallant
forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should
we permit Cuba to be Africanized and to become a second St.
Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and
suffer the flames to extend to our neighboring shores, seriously
to endanger or actually to consume the fair fabric of our Union.
We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending
towards such a catastrophe....
“JAMES BUCHANAN,
“JOHN Y. MASON,
“PIERRE SOULÉ.
“Aix la Chapelle, October 18, 1854.”
One brief sentence in the above describes the purport and
substance of the whole document: “Our past history forbids that we
should acquire the Island of Cuba without the consent of Spain,
unless justified by the great law of self-preservation.” If the
acquisition of the Island should become the very condition of our
existence, then if Spain shall refuse to part with it for a price
“far beyond its present value,” we shall be justified “in wresting
it” from her, “upon the very same principle that would justify an
individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor, if
there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying
his own home.”
This doctrine is not original with the Ostend conference, nor did
it emanate from filibustering cupidity, nor is it a mere party
issue. It has been as broadly asserted, and as confidently and
ably advocated, by a Whig statesman and administration, as in the
Ostend manifesto. Mr. Everett, United States Secretary of State,
in his letter to the British and French ministers declining the
alliance tendered by them to guarantee the possession of Cuba to
Spain for all coming time, defends his refusal, on the ground that
the United States have an interest in the condition of Cuba which
may justify her in assuming dominion over it—an interest in
comparison with which that of England and France dwindles into
insignificance.
The truth is, that its doctrines are the reverse of filibusterism,
which means an unlawful, unauthorized depredation of individuals
on the territory of countries with which we are at peace. The
Ostend circular recommends no suspension or repeal of the
neutrality laws, no modifications of the restrictions imposed by
our traditional policy and statutes upon the acts of individuals
who choose to filibuster; but it declares that, whenever an
occasion arrives for a hostile act against the territory of any
other nation, it must be by the sovereign act of the nation,
through its regular army and navy. So inconsistent are the
doctrines of the Ostend circular with filibusterism, that the
publication of that document resulted in the cessation of all
filibustering attempts against Cuba. But this is not the only
result. The acts of aggression upon our citizens and our commerce,
by the authorities in Cuba, prior to the Ostend conference, were
of a character to seriously imperil the relations between the two
countries. But since the Ostend conference, most of those
difficulties have been settled, and the remainder are now in the
course of settlement; and as the legitimate result of the bold and
determined policy enunciated at Ostend, there has not since been a
single outrage against the rights of our citizens in Cuba. A
vacillating or less determined course on the part of our ministers
would have only invited further aggression.
Thus it will be seen that the letter upon which the charge is
based by no means justifies the imputation. It only proves that,
under circumstances threatening actual danger to the Republic,
and in order to preserve its existence, the United States would
be “justified, by the great law of self-preservation,” in
acquiring the Island of Cuba without the consent of Spain. In
its careful preclusion of filibustering intent and assumption,
it shows the predominance of a conservative influence in the
Congress, which the country may safely attribute to the weight
of Mr. Buchanan’s counsels and character. It is obviously
manifest from the tenor of the document, that the construction
so sedulously contended for by the opponents of Democratic rule,
is that which was most earnestly deprecated by the prevailing
sentiment of its framers. Events were then in progress, and a
perilous catastrophe seemed to impend, that asked of American
statesmanship the exercise of all the decision, prudence and
energy at its command, to regulate and guide the one in such a
way as, if possible, to stay or avert the other. The local
administration in Cuba had become alarmed for its safety, and,
influenced by apprehension and terror of American filibusters,
had already adopted measures of undiscriminating aggression upon
the United States Government, by dishonoring its flag and
violating the rights of its citizens, which, if persisted in,
would inevitably have led to war. Nor was this the only danger;
for it was industriously affirmed by those in the interests of
Spanish rule, that the Island was to be “Africanized,” and
delivered over to “an internal convulsion which should renew the
horrors and the fate of St. Domingo”—an event to which, as Mr.
Everett truly declares in his letter to the British and French
ministers, declining the proposed alliance to guarantee Cuba to
Spain, both France and England would prefer any change in the
condition of that Island—not excepting even its acquisition by
the United States. Under the circumstances, nothing less than so
decided a manifestation of determined energy and purpose as was
made through the instrumentality of the Ostend conference, would
probably have prevailed to prevent that very struggle for the
conquest of Cuba, which it is now alleged to have been its
purpose to precipitate. And thus, as often happens in the
conduct of affairs, the decision and firmness which seemed
aggressive and menacing, facilitated a pacific and satisfactory
solution of difficulties that threatened war.
CHAPTER VII.
1854-1855
THE SOCIAL POSITION OF MR. BUCHANAN AND HIS NIECE IN ENGLAND.
The social position of Mr. Buchanan and his niece in England can be
described only by making extracts from letters. Miss Lane joined her
uncle in London in the spring of 1854, and remained with him until
the autumn of 1855. An American minister at the English court, at
periods of exciting and critical questions between the two nations,
is very likely to experience a considerable variation in the social
barometer. But the strength of Mr. Buchanan’s character, and the
agreeable personal qualities which were in him united with the
gravity of years and an experience of a very uncommon kind, overcame
at all times any tendency to social unpleasantness that might have
been caused by national feelings excited by temporary causes.
Letters written by Miss Lane from England to her sister Mrs. Baker
have been placed in my hands. From such letters, written in the
freedom of sisterly affection, I can take but very few extracts.
Many most eligible opportunities occurred which might have fixed the
fate of this young lady away from her own land; and it appears from
one of her uncle’s letters that after her return to America a very
exalted personage expressed regret that she had not been “detained”
in England. It was entirely from her own choice that she was not.
[MISS LANE TO MRS. BAKER.]
56 HARLEY STREET, LONDON, Friday Feb. 9, 1855.
I have no letter from you, dearest sister, since I last wrote, but
shall continue my fortnightly correspondence, though my letters
are written so hastily that they are not what they should be. We
are luxuriating in a deep snow, with a prospect of being housed,
as nobody thinks of sleighing in England—indeed there are no
sleighs. I returned home on Friday last, and really spent four
weeks near Liverpool most happily, and truly regretted when our
charming trio was broken up—we were so joyous and happy
together...... Mr. and Mrs. Brown and Miss Hargraves came up with
me, and Laly, after remaining a few days at the hotel, came to
stay with me. She will remain until Thursday, and is a sweet, dear
girl.
To my great regret Mr. Welsh talks of going to the United States
on the 24th. I hope he may yet change his mind, for I shall miss
him so much, as there is no one in the legation I can call upon
with the same freedom as I do on him. Our secretary is not yet
appointed; it is said Mr. Appleton has received an offer of the
place; if he should come, uncle will be perfectly satisfied, as he
was his first choice. The Lawrences talk of going upon the
continent in March...... Mr. Mason continues to get better, but I
would not be surprised to hear of their anticipated return, as I
am sure his health would be much better in Virginia than in
Paris......
They have had great trouble here in forming a new ministry, and I
am sorry Lord Aberdeen has gone out, as he is a great friend of
the United States, and Lord Palmerston, the new prime minister, is
not. London is still dull, but begins to fill up more since
Parliament is in session. The war affects everything; there are no
drawing-rooms announced as yet, and it is doubted whether there
will be any, at least until after Easter. The queen returns to
town the middle of this month. Uncle is well, and seems to escape
the cold that is so prevalent. There are few Americans here now,
and the “Arctic” will deter them from crossing in such numbers to
the World’s Fair in Paris in May. We have had canvas-back duck
sent us lately, and it really takes one quite home again. How you
would have enjoyed them. Do you have them in California? Mr. ——
still continues in London. He has called since my return, but
unfortunately I was not at home; however I like his remaining so
long in London with no other attraction...... —— was in London for
two hours the other day, and passed one here. His sister continues
very ill. Do write me often, dear sister. I dare say your time is
much occupied now, but send a few lines.
MARCH 2d, 1855.
I did not send you a letter last week, dear sister, for I was not
very well and writing fatigued me. I am much better now, and as
the weather has become much milder, I hope my cold will pass
entirely off. I have your letters of Dec. 31st and Jan. 15th, and
think you have indeed been lucky in presents. There is not much of
that among grown persons here; they keep Christmas gaily, and the
children receive the presents......
Every thing is worn in Paris standing out. Skirts cannot be too
full and stiff; sleeves are still open, and basque bodies, either
open in front or closed; flounces are very much worn. I had some
dresses made in Paris that I wish you could see.
Uncle wrote you ten days ago, direct to California. He is in good
health and spirits, and likes much to hear from you. We have dined
with the queen since I wrote. Her invitations are always short,
and as the court was in mourning and I had no black dress, one
day’s notice kept me very busy...... I ought to have black
dresses, for the court is often in mourning, and you know I belong
to it; but the season being quiet, I did not expect to go out to
any court parties. The queen was most gracious, and talked a great
deal to me. Uncle sat upon her right hand, and Prince Albert was
talkative, and altogether we passed a charming evening. The
Princess-Royal came in after dinner, and is simple, unaffected,
and very child-like—her perfect simplicity and sweet manners are
charming. Every thing of course was magnificent at the table—gold
in profusion, twelve candelabras with four candles each; but you
know I never can describe things of this sort. With mirrors and
candles all around the room, a band of delicious music playing all
the time, it was a little like fairy-land in its magnificence. We
had another band after dinner, while we took tea. Every thing is
unsettled here about the war and the ministry, and, really,
England seems in a bad way at present. It is positively stated
that the Emperor Napoleon is going to the Crimea, in opposition to
the advice of all his friends.
MARCH 23d, 1855.
I have your bright, cheerful letter of Jan. 31st, dear sister, and
rejoice in your good spirits. I have not been quite well for a few
weeks, suffering from cold—the weather has been so dreadful—so
that I have gone out but little; indeed, there seems to be a gloom
over everything in the gay line this year. Archbishop Hughes dined
with us on his way to the United States. He spoke of remembering
me in Washington at uncle’s, where he never saw me, and of course
it was you. We have given one large dinner this year, and I am
sorry it is time for them to commence. Our old butler, Cates, was
ill at the time, and on last Tuesday the honest old creature died.
We all felt it very much, as he was a capital servant, and so
faithful—my right-hand man. We dined two and twenty on the 10th,
English and Americans, and it passed off very well. Wednesday was
“fast-day,” and universally unpopular. They said, “we fast for the
gross mismanagement by the ministers of our affairs in the
Crimea,” and all such things. There is great satisfaction at the
czar’s death, and not the same respect paid by the court here that
there was in France. Mr. Appleton, our new Secretary, has arrived,
and will be presented to her Majesty on Monday. On Thursday, the
29th, will be the first drawing-room. I shall not go. It will not
be a full one, as it comes before Easter, and it is rumored that
the Emperor and Empress of the French are coming in April. Unless
required to present Americans, I shall not go to more than two
this year. It is so expensive—one cannot wear the same dress
twice. There are usually four during the season.
I have given up all idea of returning home before June, and most
likely not until uncle does in October; but I highly approve of
your plan to pay us a visit upon our return. As to my going to
California, you know how I should like it for your sake, but uncle
would never hear of my taking such a journey. It is different with
you; you return to see _every one_......
April 20th, 1855.
I have yours of February 28th, and am delighted to hear you are so
snug and comfortable. Uncle positively talks of my return in June,
and he has really been so good and kind that if he thinks it best,
I must not oppose it. He is not going to charge me with any money
I have drawn, makes me a present of my visit here, and has
gratified me in every thing. He gives up his house on the 7th of
July, and will go to some place in the country, near London. If he
kept it until October, he would have to pay for several months
more, and it will economize a little to give it up—every thing is
so enormous here. I hope you have better luck about getting to
church, as I think you have been living very like a heathen. Much
obliged for the postage stamps. There are some alterations in the
postage law lately; every thing must be prepaid.
The emperor and empress arrived here on Monday last, and went
immediately to Windsor. All London is mad with excitement and
enthusiasm, and wherever they move throngs of people follow them.
Yesterday they came to Buckingham Palace, and went into the city
to be present at a magnificent entertainment at Guildhall. There
never was such a crowd seen. In the afternoon at five they
received the diplomatic corps at the French Embassy, and I had a
long talk with her Majesty, who was most gracious and affable. She
is very striking, elegant and graceful. She wore a green silk,
flounced to the waist with seven or eight white lace flounces,
white lace mantle, and white crape bonnet and feathers. We go to
the palace to-night to an evening party, and there I shall even
have a better opportunity of seeing them. I was disappointed in
the emperor’s appearance—he is very short. Last night they
accompanied the queen, in state, to the opera, and there was a
grand illumination all over the city. I drove out to see it, but
there was such a crush of carriages, men, women and children, that
I was glad to get home. They were asking from fifty to one hundred
guineas for boxes at the opera, and from ten to forty for single
stalls. To-morrow the imperial guests depart, and London will
again return to its sober senses. There does not seem to be much
gaiety in prospect, but really this visit seems to be the only
thing thought of. The Masons are not coming to pay me a visit.
Betty has gone to Nice with her father, for his health. It is said
the queen will go to Paris at the opening of the exposition in
May. Ellen Ward’s marriage is postponed until the fifth of June,
by her father’s request. Mr. T. writes he has taken a state-room
on the Baltic, which was to sail on the 18th. He has talked of
this visit so long that I would not be surprised to hear it ended
in nothing. Lu has every thing planned and fixed and _destined_ to
take place just as she _wishes_, even that I am to be married in
my travelling dress and very quietly. I was at the Crystal Palace
on Tuesday, which is truly the most fairy-like and exquisitely
beautiful thing that could be made. The royal party go there
to-day. The building far exceeds in magnificence the one erecting
now in Paris. Mr. —— has lost his favorite sister, and is in great
distress, so I have not seen him for a time. I have made another
conquest, who comes in the true American style, _every day_. He is
rich and keeps a yacht, which costs him £2000 a year. Beaux are
pleasant, but dreadfully troublesome......
MAY 3d, 1855.
I have yours, dear sister, of March 16th, and really your account
of the failures and rascals among your Californians is quite
frightful......
London is looking up in the way of gaiety, though the war is still
a sad weight upon many hearts. Yesterday (Wednesday) I attended
the second drawing-room of the season. You remember I was not
quite well at the first, and did not go. It was a very full and
brilliant one. I wore a pink silk petticoat, over-skirts of pink
tulle, puffed, and trimmed with wreaths of apple blossoms; train
of pink silk, trimmed with blonde and apple blossoms, and so was
the body. Head-dress, apple blossoms, lace lappits and
feathers.[20] There will be one more in celebration of the
birth-day on the 19th. Her Majesty was very gracious to me
yesterday, as was also the prince. On Wednesday next there is to
be a state ball at Buckingham Palace, which we shall of course
attend. On Monday Mrs. Shapter and I ran down to Brighton on the
sea-side, and returned on Tuesday night. We enjoyed it very much,
and I am sure the change was beneficial to both. I had two
splendid rides upon horseback along the water. Mrs. Shapter goes
away for a week on Saturday, and I shall miss her dreadfully. You
have doubtless heard of the attempt to assassinate the Emperor
Napoleon since his return from London. The diplomatic corps are
invited to be present at the singing of the Te Deum in the chapel
of the French Embassy on Sunday next, in celebration of the
emperor’s escape......
I have seen ——, and he ordered his gardener to send me from the
country all the roses he had in bloom, for the drawing-room.
Preceding the box came a sweet little note, which I of course
answered in a _tender_ way. Mr. ——, the man of the yacht, is
getting quite desperate, as he is ordered to join his regiment for
a month. He is constantly sending me flowers, and after his visit
to-day, despatched a magnificent bouquet. He is a very nice
fellow, and I really am sorry...... Uncle of course knows and sees
every one who comes to the house, and places _such confidence in
me_ that he gives himself no uneasiness. I have as many beautiful
flowers now, as my drawing-room can well hold. I wish I could see
you, dear Maye, and hope you can come home for a nice long visit
when we return. June is still _talked_ of for my return. I do not
know how it will be. My best love to Mr. B.
Footnote 20:
On their return home from that drawing-room, Mr. Buchanan said to
his niece: “Well, a person would have supposed you were a great
beauty, to have heard the way you were talked of to-day. I was
asked if we had many such handsome ladies in America. I answered,
‘Yes, and many much handsomer. She would scarcely be remarked
there for her beauty.’” This anecdote is taken from a book
published at New York in 1870, entitled, LADIES OF THE WHITE
HOUSE, by Laura Carter Holloway. Deducting a little from the
somewhat gushing style in which the biographical sketches in this
book are written, it is reliable in its main facts, and it does no
more than justice to Miss Lane’s attractions and to the high
consideration in which she was held in English society.
FRIDAY, July 13th, 1855.
I have not had a letter from you in a long time, and hope “no news
is good news.” London is going through the usual routine of balls
and parties, and has nearly exhausted itself of its yearly labors.
Lord Raglan’s death has been very much felt, and throws many
families into mourning. Miss Steiner, one of the young ladies who
stood bridesmaid with me at Miss Jackson’s wedding, is now staying
with me. She is a sweet girl; came on Wednesday and I think will
leave on Monday. Her brother has just returned from America, and
expresses himself much pleased with all he saw. We have dined with
the Archbishop of Canterbury since I wrote you, which will please
Uncle Edward. He lives in Lambeth Palace, the residence of the
ancient archbishops, and we dined in the grand baronial reception
hall. We have had two large dinners, and give another next
Thursday, which will end our large entertainments, I dare say. We
went to Oxford the day of the Commemoration, and uncle had
conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Civil Law. It was most
gratifying and agreeable.[21] The same evening the queen gave her
last concert, and we were obliged to return to town. The King of
the Belgians is now on a visit to the queen, and they have all
gone to Osborne. The season is very nearly over, and I am really
glad to be done with lengthy dinners and crowded hot balls for a
while. I have now ...... a man of high position, clever and
talented, very rich, and the only fault to find is his age, which
is certainly great, as he will be sixty next year. He has a
daughter who is a widow, and I might pass for _her_ daughter. But
I really like him very much, and know how devoted he would be. I
should have everything to my heart’s best satisfaction, and go
home as often as I liked. But I will write no more about it......
Uncle is well and has passed this season remarkably well. I have
partially engaged a state-room for August 25th, but scarcely think
I will go then. The steamers are going so full now that it is
necessary to engage a long time before.
We have been giving Friday evening receptions since June 15th, and
next Friday, the 20th, will be the last; we have had six. I hear
the exhibition in Paris is improving, and that will bring even
more Americans. As Miss Steiner and I are going out, I must stop
writing and get ready. How constantly I wish for you, and trust,
dear sister, whether I return to America or remain in England,
that it will not be many months before I see you once more. Love
to Mr. B. and yourself, from
Your ever affectionate
HATTIE.
Footnote 21:
This mention of the Commemoration Day at Oxford, where Mr.
Buchanan, along with the poet Tennyson, received the degree of D.
C. L., does not do justice to the scene. The students, after their
fashion, greeted Miss Lane’s appearance with loud cheers, and on
her uncle they bestowed their applause vociferously.
[TO MRS. BAKER.]
LONDON, October 6, 1854.
MY DEAR MARY:—
I received your letter in due time, of the 14th July, and should
have answered it long ere this, but that I knew Harriet wrote to
you regularly. I wrote to you soon after my arrival in London, but
you have never acknowledged that letter, and as you have said
nothing about it in yours of the 14th July, I fear it has
miscarried.
If I do not write often it is not because you are not freshly and
most kindly remembered. Indeed I feel great anxiety about your
health and prosperity, and am rejoiced that you appear to be happy
in San Francisco. You are often, very often, a subject of
conversation between Harriet and myself.
We set out for Belgium to-morrow, where I have important public
business to transact. I take Harriet along to enable her to see a
little of the continent, and I may perhaps have time to accompany
her along the Rhine.
I cannot be long absent, because the business of this legation is
incessant, important, and laborious.
Thank God! I have been enjoying my usual health here, and am
treated as kindly as I could have expected. And yet I long to
return home, but must remain nearly another year to fulfill my
engagement with the President when I most reluctantly consented to
accept the mission. Should a kind Providence prolong my days, I
hope to pass the remnant of them in tranquillity and retirement at
Wheatland. I have been kindly treated by the world, but am
heartily sick of public life. Besides a wise man ought to desire
to pass some time in privacy before his inevitable doom......
I hope to be able to take Harriet on a short visit to Paris before
her return to the United States. I have but little time to write
to-day after my despatches, and determined not to let another post
for California pass without writing. Remember me kindly to Mr.
Baker, and believe me to be with warm and sincere affection and
regard
Your uncle,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MISS LANE IN PARIS.]
LONDON, November 10, 1854.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I do not regard the article in the Pennsylvanian; but if Mr. Tyson
has really become a “know-nothing,” this would be a different
matter. It would at least, in some degree, modify the high opinion
which I had formed of him from his general character and his known
ability.
I accompanied Mrs. Lawrence to the new lord mayor’s banquet last
evening. I got the lady mayoress to substitute her in your
place...... There were no ladies of foreign ministers present and
none I believe were invited, so that there would have been no
other mode of introducing you except through the lady mayoress.
The new lord mayor was exceedingly and specially civil to me.
I wish you to make out your visit to Paris. We can get along
without you here, though you may think this impossible. Mr. Welsh
informs me that Mr. Mason will accompany you home; at this I
should be greatly rejoiced. The news, I fear, is too good to be
true. Much pleasure as it would afford me to see him, and have him
under my roof, I do not wish this unless he desires to pay me a
visit of some duration, and see the wonders of London. If it be
merely to accompany you and nothing more, it would be another
matter. This would be carrying civility too far.
If I have felt anxious about you, just consider the unaccountable
marriages which —— and —— have both made.
Many of your friends make kind inquiries after you. With my
kindest regards to Mr. and Mrs. Mason and the family, I remain,
Yours affectionately, etc.
LONDON, Jan. 20, 1855.
I have received yours of yesterday. In answer I say, do just as
you please and then you will please me best. I desire that whilst
you remain in England, you should enjoy yourself prudently and
discreetly in the manner most agreeable to yourself. If you desire
it, there can be no objection to a visit to Miss Hargreaves.
I send the letters received by the last steamer. I got one myself
from Mr. Macalester who says, “Please to say to Miss Harriet that
‘Job’ will be out in the spring, provided the ...... gentleman is
disposed of (as he could wish) in the interim.”
For my part, my impressions are favorable to “Job,” although I
consider him rather a cold lover to wait for a whole year. He does
not know that you will be home in the spring, and that he may
spare himself the voyage, nor did I so inform Mr. Macalester.
I dine to-day “en famille” with General D’Oxholme. With my regards
to all, I remain,
Yours affectionately, etc.
January 31, 1855.
...... In regard to Miss Hargreaves, our loves are mutual. I
admire her very much. Return her my love, with all my heart; but
alas! what signifies the love of a man nearly sixty-four.
I have accepted Mr. Atkinson’s invitation both for you and myself.
August 18, 1855.
I enclose a letter to you from Mr. H. Randall which I opened,
seeing that it came from Manchester, and believing it was about
the shawls. I have sent the two shawls mentioned in the letter as
requested to Messrs. —— & Co., and informed Mr. Randall where you
are, and that you would not be in London until Monday the 27th
instant.
There is no news of any consequence. I dined yesterday with Sir
Richard Pakenham at the Traveller’s Club, and we had a pleasant
time of it. I shall meet him again at dinner on Tuesday next at
Count Lavradio’s, to which you were also invited.
Sir Richard is a sensible man. He has absolutely resigned, and has
only been prevailed upon to attend the coronation of the young
king of Portugal as British Minister. He will be back from Lisbon
in October. He says he is determined not to wear out his life from
home, but pass the remnant of his days among his relatives and
friends in Ireland. I am persuaded he has not the least idea of
marrying a young wife, though younger than Sir F. He was born in
’97 and Sir F. in ’96. I am in favor of a considerable disparity
between the ages of husband and wife for many reasons, and should
be especially so in your case. Still I do not think that your
husband ought to be more than double your age.
August 20, 1855.
I enclose you a number of letters, including all received by the
“Atlantic.” There is one, I presume, from Lady Ouseley. I wrote to
her and informed her of the circumstances of your visit to the
Isle of Wight, and your intention to pass some time with me at the
Star and Garter before proceeding to Lancashire, and our intention
then to visit them and Miss Gamble.
I learn by a letter from John H. Houston that poor Jessie is very
ill of a typhoid fever, and her recovery doubtful, to say the
least. Brother Edward had been sent for, and was expected.
I have received instructions from Governor Marcy on the Central
American questions, which render it almost morally certain that
from their nature they cannot be executed before the 30th of
September; with declarations that I am the most proper person,
etc., etc., etc., to carry them into effect, and not a word about
my successor. Indeed, Mr. Hunter, the chief clerk, writes me as
follows, under date of August 6th: “I hear nothing as to who is to
be your successor. It is no doubt a difficult question to decide.”
August 23, 1855.
I know nothing at present which will prevent me from accompanying
Mr. Appleton to the Isle of Wight. Why should I not occasionally
take “a spree” as well as Mr. Shapter? You may, therefore, secure
me a room in the hotel, should this be deemed necessary. I shall
be there some time on Saturday. Till then, farewell!
August 28, 1855.
I opened a letter for you from Glasgow. It is dated on the 24th,
and announces the sending of the two shawls—“grey centre, with
black and scarlet border.” They have not yet been received,
neither had those I returned been received.
There was no letter for you by the “Asia.” I send the three last
_Heralds_. Poor Mr. Lawrence had been given up.[22] There were no
longer any hopes of his recovery. Col. L. is still in Paris. His
brother and lady are, I understand, in London, and will leave for
home by the “Arago,” from Southampton, to-morrow.
I had not a word from Washington, official or unofficial—nothing
about poor Jessie. We had a very pleasant time on our return from
Black Gang Chine, and indeed throughout our excursion. The
Shanklin Chine is much more picturesque than the Black Gang
affair. No news.
Footnote 22:
The Honorable Abbot Lawrence, of Boston.
Miss Lane returned to the United States shortly before the date of
this letter.
LONDON, October 12, 1855.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I have been watching the weather since you departed, and it has
been as favorable as I could have desired. If the winds and the
waves have been as propitious as my wishes and my hopes induce me
to believe, you will have had a delightful voyage. Good luck to
you on your native soil! I miss you greatly; but know it was for
your good that you should go home in this delightful weather,
instead of encountering a winter passage.
Every person I meet has something kind to say of you. You have
left a good name behind, and that is something, but not more than
you deserve.
Poor Lady Ouseley has lost her son. I have not seen her since this
sad event, but of course have called.
I have met Lady Chantrey, Mrs. Shapter, the D’Oxholmes, etc.,
etc., but need not repeat what they said.
Sir Henry Holland called on Wednesday immediately after his
return, and expressed both sorrow and disappointment that he had
not seen you before your departure. He desired me to present you
his kindest regards, and says, God willing, he will call upon you
next summer in the United States.
Take good care not to display any foreign airs and graces in
society at home, nor descant upon your intercourse with titled
people:—but your own good sense will teach you this lesson. I
shall be happy on my return to learn that it has been truly said
of you, “she has not been a bit spoiled by her visit to England.”
I forgot to tell you I had seen the good duchess, who said many
extravagant things about you.
I received a letter from Mrs. Plitt by the last steamer, directed
to you, with instructions that if you had left I might open and
read and then burn it, all which I have done.
I wrote to Miss Hetty by the Southampton steamer on Wednesday
last, and sent two of the _Posts_.
I shall give up the house towards the end of the month. Mr.
Appleton now occupies your room, and renders himself quite
agreeable.
I have not seen Grey[23] since you left; but she says she did put
up your slippers in the black bag. I shall make it a point to see
her and talk with her before she finally leaves the house. She has
been absent, but is backwards and forwards.
I heard nothing from Washington by the last steamer respecting
myself. I shall present my letter of recall, and take leave of the
queen soon after it arrives. As you know, I am heartily tired of
my position. But what then? I do not wish to arrive in the United
States before the meeting of Congress. I am uncertain what I shall
do, but will always keep you advised, having confidence that you
will not talk about my intended movements......
Louis Napoleon at the present moment wields more real power than
ever his great uncle did. All the potentates in Europe dread him,
and are paying court to him. He has England in leading strings
nearly as much as Sardinia. How have the mighty fallen!
Mr. Ward came to the legation to take leave of you a few moments
after you left on Friday morning. Consols have been falling,
falling continually for the last week, and this makes him
melancholy.
Mrs. Shapter promised to write by the steamer. She has arranged
the account you left with her in a satisfactory manner. She has
not yet sent her letter, which I shall transmit by the bag.
Mrs. Lawrence called this morning to take leave of me. She appears
to be much rejoiced at the prospect of getting home.
Footnote 23:
Miss Lane’s English maid.
October 19, 1855.
Whilst I write, I congratulate myself with the belief that under
the blessing of Providence, you are again happily in your native
land and among kind friends. The passage of the Baltic from New
York to Liverpool was one of the smoothest and most agreeable ever
made. Hence we have every reason to believe that the Atlantic
enjoyed the same favorable weather.
I had a very pretty note from Mrs. Sturgis on the 15th instant,
presenting me with a water melon, in which she says: “I was sorry
not to say ‘good bye’ to Miss Lane in person, but we did not
forget to drink her health and a prosperous voyage, and we feel
how very much we shall miss her and her praises another
season.[24]” Of course I answered this note in a proper manner.
The good but eccentric duchess always speaks of you in terms of
warm affection and regard, and sends her kindest love.
Mr. and Mrs. Alston, of South Carolina, and Mr. Elliott, the
Commissioner of that State at the Paris Exhibition, passed last
Sunday evening with us. She is a superior woman, and withal quite
good looking and agreeable.
I received the enclosed letter from Mary to you on Monday last, by
the Baltic. Knowing from unmistakable signs that it came from
Mary, I opened it merely to ascertain that she was well. I
purposely know but little of its contents. I wrote to her
yesterday, and invited her to pay us a visit next spring, offering
to pay the expenses of her journey. I suggested that it would
scarcely be worth her while to pay us a visit for less than a
year, and that in the mean time, Mr. Baker’s expenses would be
much reduced, and he would have an opportunity of arranging his
affairs.
Doctor and Mrs. Le Vert, formerly Miss Octavia Walton, are now
here. Strangely enough, I had never met her before. She is
sprightly, talkative and animated, but does not seem to understand
the art of growing old gracefully. I shall make a favorable
impression on her, I trust, by being a good listener. I have not
seen her daughter, but they are all to be with me some evening
before their departure, which will be in the Arago on the 24th
instant.
I have not received my letter of recall, and entertain but little
hope that it will be sent before General Thomas shall reach
Washington. I will keep you advised. I dine to-day with General
D’Oxholme.
The repulse of the Russians at Kars astonishes me. The Turks and
the French have acquired the glory of the present war. Our mother
England is rather upon the background.
Sir William and Lady Ouseley are most deeply affected by the loss
of their son. I saw her last night for the first time since the
sad event, and most sincerely sympathized with her. She became
calmer after the first burst of grief was over, and talked much
about you. On request of Sir William I write to-day to Mrs.
Roosevelt, giving her the sad information.
Lady Stafford requests me by letter to give you her warmest
regards, and to tell you she hopes Heaven will bless you both in
time and eternity.
Mrs. Shapter looks delicate. I saw her yesterday. She said she
would write, but I have not yet received her letter. Should it
come, I shall send it by the despatch bag.
Footnote 24:
Mrs. Russell Sturgis.
October 26, 1855.
I have but little time to write before the closing of the mail,
having been much and unexpectedly engaged to-day.
Almost every person I meet speaks kindly of you. I dined with Lady
Talbot de Malahide on Tuesday last, and she desired me specially
to send you her kindest love. Doctor, Madame and Miss Le Vert
passed last Sunday evening with me. She is a most agreeable
person. I think it right to say this of her, after what I wrote
you in my last letter.
I dine to-day with Lady Chantrey, where I am to meet Dr. Twiss.
Grey left yesterday morning on a visit to her relatives in
Devonshire. I made her a present of a sovereign to pay her
expenses there, besides paying her week’s wages. I have enlisted
Lady Chantrey warmly in her favor, and I hope she may procure a
place.
I received by the last steamer a private letter from Governor
Marcy, in answer to mine requesting my letter of recall. He
informs me it had been sent and was then on its way. There is
something mysterious in the matter which I cannot explain. It has
not yet arrived, though it ought to have been here before your
departure. Before that, I had received despatches Nos. 109 and
111. Despatch No. 110—the intermediate one—has not yet come to
hand. I presume my letter of recall was in the missing despatch. I
have my own suspicions, but these do not attach to Governor Marcy.
His letter was frank and friendly, and was evidently written in
the full conviction that I would have received my recall before
his letter could reach me. Some people are very anxious to delay
my return home.
Now the aspect of things has changed. The British government has
recently sent a considerable fleet to our coasts, and most
inflammatory and absurd articles in reference to the object of
this fleet have appeared in the _Times_, the _Globe_, and the
_Morning Post_. I have no doubt they will be republished all over
the United States. The aspect of affairs between the two countries
has now become squally; and Mr. Appleton will not consent to
remain here as chargé till the new minister arrives. In this he is
right; and consistently with my honor and character, I could not
desert my post under such circumstances. I may, therefore, be
compelled to remain here until the end of December, or even
longer. This will depend on the time of the appointment of my
successor, which may not be until the meeting of Congress. It is
possible that Mr. Appleton may return home by the Pacific on the
3d November. He is very anxious I should consent to it, which,
however, I have not yet done.
I trust I may hear of your arrival at home by the Pacific on
to-morrow. The foggy and rainy weather has commenced, and the
climate is now dreary. Mr. and Mrs. John Wurts, of New York,
passed the evening with me yesterday. He is an old friend and she
an agreeable lady. They will return by the Pacific.
November 9th, 1855.
I have received your favors of the 21st and 22d October. I thank
Heaven that you have arrived at home in health and safety. The
weather since your departure has been such as you know prevails at
this season, and London has been even too dull for me, and this is
saying much for it.
I received my letter of recall, dated on the 11th September, last
Monday, the 5th instant, with an explanation from Governor Marcy
of the mistake which had occasioned its delay. Had this been sent
on the 11th September, I might with all convenience have
accompanied you home, either on the 6th or, at latest, on the 20th
October.
The storm which has been raised in England in regard to the
relations between the two countries renders it impossible that I
should leave the legation at the present moment. Mr. Appleton has
at length reluctantly consented to remain until my departure, and
this relieves me from much embarrassment. I now hope to be at home
early in January, but this for the present you had better keep to
yourself. I may in the meantime probably visit Paris.
I regret that such unfounded reports respecting Mr. Mason’s health
should reach the United States.
You speak to me concerning the Presidency. You of all other
persons best know that even if there were no other cogent reasons,
the state of my health is not such as would enable me to undergo
the intense anxiety and fatigue incident to wearing that crown of
thorns. Of course I wish nothing said about the state of my
health.
My friends in Pennsylvania constitute the ablest and most honest
portion of the Democratic party. They now have the power in their
own hands, and they ought, _for their own benefit, not mine_, to
take care that Pennsylvania shall be represented by proper persons
in the national convention. They can, if they will, exert such a
powerful influence as to select the best man for the country from
among the list of candidates, and _thus take care of themselves_.
This would be my advice to them, were I at home. I hope they may
follow it. As far as I can learn, President Pierce is daily
growing stronger for a renomination.
I enclose you a note which I have received from the Duchess of
Somerset.
I know not whether Mrs. Shapter will write to you to-day. I
communicated your kind messages, with which she appeared to be
much gratified, and spoke of you most affectionately.
You will be gratified to learn that Sir —— does not bear malice.
Mr. Bedinger in writing to me from Copenhagen on the 4th instant,
says: “I saw them both several times. Sir —— and his charming
niece (for so I found her), told me much of yourself and your
charming niece, who they said had recently left you for America.”
I have a very long despatch for to-day, and must bid you adieu.
May God be with you to protect and direct you. Be prudent and
circumspect and cautious in your communications to others. There
are very few people in the world who can keep a secret. They must
tell or burst.
November 16th, 1855.
I have received your favor of the 30th ultimo, per the Atlantic.
General Webb’s advice is likely to be followed, very much against
my own will. I am now in the midst of the storm, and my sense of
duty leaves me no alternative but to remain at my post until the
danger shall have passed away, or until President Pierce shall
think proper to appoint my successor. Mr. Appleton goes home by
this steamer. The President had sent him a commission as chargé ad
interim, to continue from my departure until the arrival of my
successor. I resisted his importunities to go home as long as I
could, but the last letter from his wife was of such a character
that I could no longer resist. He is a _perfect_ secretary, as
well as an excellent friend. He has been in the house with me
since your departure, and I shall not now give the house up for
the present. The little cook has done very well.
I presume that ere this you know that Colonel Forney has come out
openly in favor of the renomination of General Pierce. You know
that I considered this almost unavoidable. General Pierce placed
him in the _Union_, and has maintained him there and afforded him
the means of making a fortune. Besides, he is the editor of the
President’s official journal. Under these circumstances, he could
not well have acted otherwise, and I do not blame him for it.
Still he will be severely attacked, and in self-defence will be
obliged to come out and say that he has acted thus because I had
determined not to become a candidate for nomination before the
national convention; and this defence will be nothing more than
the truth. This will possibly place Mr. Dallas and General Pierce
as rival candidates before the Democracy of Pennsylvania, which
might prove unfortunate. _But still be quiet and discreet and say
nothing._
If I had any views to the Presidency, which I have not, I would
advise you not to remain longer in Philadelphia than you can well
avoid. A large portion of my friends in that city are bitterly
hostile to those whom you must necessarily meet there. I presume,
without knowing, that Governor Bigler will be the candidate of the
administration for the Senate.
Lady Ouseley desires me to send you her kindest love, and I
believe she entertains for you a warm affection. I have not seen
her to deliver your message since the receipt of your letter. Lady
Alice Peel, Lady Chantry and others send their kind regards. I
dine with Mrs. Shapter to-morrow.
I shall write by the present steamer to James Henry to come out
here immediately, as I may be detained until January or February,
and I shall want some person to be in the house with me. Could I
have foreseen what has come to pass, I might have been selfish
enough to retain you here. I can scarcely see the paper for a
“yellow fog.” I wish you could call to see John G. Brenner and his
wife.
Give my love to brother Edward and his family.
November 23d, 1855.
I have received your favors of the 5th and 6th instants, and
immediately posted your letters to the duchess, Lady Ouseley and
Miss Hargreaves.
The weather here has been even more disagreeable than usual for
the season, and I have had a cough and clearing of the throat
exactly similar to your own last winter. I have not used any
remedies for it, and it is now, thank Heaven, passing away. Since
Mr. Appleton left, I have got Mr. Moran to sleep in the house with
me.
Lady Ouseley has been quite unwell, but she was able to ride out
in my carriage yesterday...... She says, “when you write to Miss
Lane, pray give her my best love, with many thanks for her kind
note, which I will answer as soon as I am better.”
In a letter from Mrs. Roosevelt, dated on the 13th ultimo, in
which, after mentioning that she had learned your intention to
return home, she invites you to make her house your home while in
New York, etc., etc. I have written to her to-day, thanking her
for her kind invitation, and expressing the desire that you should
know each other better.
I agree with you in opinion that Mr. —— is not the man to succeed
in public life, or in captivating such fastidious ladies as
yourself; but yet I have no doubt he is a good and amiable man, as
he is certainly well informed. Much allowance ought to be made for
wounded vanity. But I admit I am no judge in these matters, since
you inform me that Mr. —— has been the admiration of Philadelphia
ladies.
Mr. Van Dyke does not properly appreciate Mr. Tyler. I like them
both very much, as well as their wives.
Van Dyke is able, grateful, energetic and influential, and should
he take care of himself, will yet win his way to a high position.
Do not forget to present my love to Lily Macalester and my kind
regards to her father and Mrs. Lathrop.
I know of no news here which would interest you much. A few dinner
parties are now given, to which I have been invited. I dine to-day
with Monckton Milnes, and on Tuesday next with Sir Henry and Lady
Holland.
Many kind inquiries are still made about you. I wish you would
inform Eskridge without delay that I attach great importance to
the immediate transfer of the Michigan Central Railroad stock
about which I wrote to him by the last steamer. I hope, however,
that ere this can reach you he will have attended to this
business.
In one respect, at least, I am now deemed a man of great
importance. In the present uneasy condition of the stock exchange,
an incautious word from me would either raise or sink the price of
consols.
I see much of Mr. Ward, and he is _thoroughly American_ in our
present difficulties. This has raised him much in my estimation.
London, November 2, 1855.
I have but truly a moment to write to you. We did not learn your
arrival by the Pacific, which I had expected with much interest.
Lord Clarendon told me yesterday that the queen had expressed her
regret not to have seen you before your departure. He said she had
heard you were to marry Sir ——, and expressed how much she would
have been gratified had you been detained in England. We had some
talk about the disparity of your ages, which I have not time to
repeat, even if it were worth repeating. I said it was supposed
Sir —— was very rich. “Yes,” he said, “enormously.”
There is a great muss here at present about the relations between
the two countries, but I think it will all eventually blow over
and may do good. Everybody is now anxious to know something about
American affairs; and both in the press and the public we have
many powerful defenders against the measures adopted by Lord
Palmerston’s government.
November 30, 1855.
I have received your favor of the 12th instant from Lancaster. Ere
this can reach you Mr. Appleton will have seen you and told you
all about my affairs. I have but little to say to you of any
consequence.
I saw the duchess two or three days ago, and she spoke in
raptures, as is her wont, about your “beautiful letter” and
yourself. She begged me to say to you she would soon answer it.
I shall deliver your message to Mrs. Sturgis as soon as she shall
appear in public after her confinement........ Among the ancient
Jews she would have been considered a prodigy and a blessing. I
like her very much.
Van Dyke’s message is like himself. He is a kind and true-hearted
fellow. I am persuaded, however, he does Tyler injustice. His
being for Wise was but another reason for being for myself. He had
written me several letters of a desponding character. He thought
the State was going all wrong,—great danger of Dallas, etc., and
attributed all to my refusal to be a candidate, and not returning
home at the time I had appointed.
By the last steamer, however, I received a letter from him of a
character altogether different......
I shall be anxious to learn what plans you have adopted for the
winter.
The enclosed letter from Lady Chantrey was handed to me by
Charles. In a hurry I opened it. “Why,” said he, “that is to Miss
Lane, and was brought here from Lady Chantrey.” I now take the
cover off, and enclose it to you, assuring you that I have not
read a single word of it.
December 14, 1855.
I have nothing of interest to communicate by this steamer. The
past week has been dull, gloomy, and cold for the season. The
walks in the park are covered with snow, and I find them very
slippery. The winter has set in with unusual severity, whilst the
price of provisions is very high. God help the poor in this vast
Babel! Their sufferings will be dreadful.
Although I have not suffered, either from ennui or despondency,
yet I shall hail the arrival of James Henry with pleasure. I think
it may be of service to him to be with me a month or six weeks.
I am extremely sorry to learn that “Mrs. Plitt’s health is very
bad.” She is a woman among a thousand. Most sincerely and deeply
do I sympathize with her. Give her my kindest love.
I have heard nothing of the six shawls since your departure, but I
have already written to Mr. Randall, and requested him to send me
the bill, which I shall pay as soon as received......
I have received your furs from Mrs. Shapter, and shall send them
to New York by the “Arago,” which will leave Southampton on the
19th instant. They are packed in a nice little box directed to the
care of George Plitt, Esquire. I shall, through Mr. Croshey, get
Captain Lines himself to take charge of them and pay the duty.
Please to so arrange it that some friend at New York may be ready
to receive them and refund him the duty which he may have paid.
I have again inadvertently opened a letter addressed to you which
I enclose, and I assure that I did not read a single word in it,
except “My dearest Hattie.” I can, therefore, only guess who is
the writer.
I started out yesterday and paid three very agreeable visits to
the Countess Bernsdorff, Lady Palmerston, and the Duchess of
Somerset. I found them all at home, and had a nice little chat
with each. The duchess told me Lord Panmure had been with her, and
had been quite extravagant in his praises of what he termed my
able, friendly, and discreet conduct in the late difficulties
between the two countries. But for me, he said, these might have
produced serious consequences. The duchess, as usual, spoke
extravagantly in your praise, and desired her love to you.
I presume that Mrs. Lane and yourself have had a fine time of it
hearing Rachel. She is quite competent to understand and
appreciate the beauties of French tragedy. However this may be,
she possesses as much knowledge in this line as thousands of
others who will be quite enraptured with Rachel’s acting. I am
glad you are on good and friendly terms with her...... From
present appearances the war will end before the spring. This will
be the case should the czar accept the terms suggested by Austria
and consented to by the allies.
December 21, 1855.
Since the date of my last letter I have received the news of the
death of poor Mary.[25] I need not inform you of my devoted
attachment to her, and she deserved it all. Poor girl! she had her
own troubles, and she bore them all with cheerful patience. She is
now at rest, I trust, in that heavenly home where there is no more
pain and sorrow. Her loss will make the remainder of my residence
here, which I trust may be brief, dreary and disconsolate.
How happy I am to know that you are with Mrs. Plitt! She has a
warm heart, and a fine intellect, and will, better than any other
person, know how to comfort and soothe you in your sorrow. I am
thankful that you are now at home.
With Mrs. Plitt’s kind letter to me came that from Mrs. Speer to
you, and one from Lieutenant Beale to myself. I shall always
gratefully remember his kindness and that of his wife. His letter
was just what it ought to have been. I wrote to Mrs. Plitt from
Southampton by the “Arago,” which left on Wednesday last.
The death of poor Mary has been your first serious sorrow, because
you were too young to feel deeply the loss of your parents. Ere
this can reach you a sufficient time will have elapsed for the
first natural overflowings of sorrow. I would not have restrained
them if I could. It is now time that they should moderate, and
that you should not mourn the dead at the expense of your duties
to the living. This sad event ought to teach you the vanity of all
things human and transitory, and cause you to fix your thoughts,
desires, and affections on that Being with whom “there is no
variableness or shadow of turning.” This will not render you
gloomy, but will enable you the better to perform all the duties
of life. In all calamitous events we ought to say emphatically:
“Thy will be done.” At the last, all the proceedings of a
mysterious Providence will be justified in another and a better
world, and it is our duty here to submit with humble resignation.
Although my course of life has been marked by temporal prosperity,
thanks be to Heaven, yet I have experienced heart-rending
afflictions, and you must not expect to be exempt from the common
lot of humanity. I have not seen Mrs. Shapter, but I sent her Mr.
Beale’s letter, which she returned with a most feeling note. She,
also, wrote to you by the “Arago.”
You will know sooner in the United States than I can at what time
I shall be relieved. I shall now expect to hear by the arrival of
every steamer that my successor has been appointed. Should he
arrive here within a month or six weeks, I still have an idea of
running over to the continent; but I have yet determined upon
nothing. I have a great desire to be at home.
Footnote 25:
Mrs. Baker.
December 28, 1855.
I have received your favor of the 11th instant with the copy of
Mr. Baker’s letter, which I have read with deep interest. I wrote
to you last week on the subject of poor Mary’s death, which I
deeply deplore. I hope that ere this can reach you your mind will
have been tranquillized on that sad event. It would have been
wrong, it would have been unnatural, had you not experienced
anguish for the loss of so good, kind-hearted, and excellent a
sister.
Still, the loss is irreparable, grief is unavailing, and you have
duties to perform towards yourself as well as your friends. To
mourn for the dead at the expense of these duties would be sinful.
We shall never forget poor Mary, her memory will always be dear to
us; but it is our duty to bow with submission to the will of that
Being in whose hands are the issues of life and death. You know
what a low estimate I have ever placed upon a woman without
religious principles. I know that in your conduct you are guided
by these principles, more than is common in the fashionable world;
but yet if this melancholy dispensation of Providence should cause
you to pay more attention than you have done to “the things which
pertain to your everlasting peace,” this would be a happy result.
I have lost many much-loved relatives and friends; but though age
becomes comparatively callous, I have felt and feel deeply the
loss of Mary and Jessie. Poor Jessie! She died breathing my name
with her devotions. What can I do—what shall I do for her
children?
I send by the bag to the department a letter from the duchess, to
whom, I believe, I have not mentioned our loss.
Sir William and Lady Ouseley dined with me a few days ago. There
were no persons present except ourselves. She sincerely
sympathizes with you. Time begins to produce its healing influence
on her grief, though both she and poor Sir William have been sadly
cast down by their calamity.
James Henry arrived here on Christmas evening after a passage of
three weeks which he evidently enjoyed. He talks to Mr. Ward
knowingly about every part of a sailing vessel. His plan of travel
is quite extensive, far too much so for the sum he intends to
expend. I shall gradually cut it down to more reasonable limits.
No news yet of the appointment of my successor, notwithstanding
the efforts of Mr. Appleton. I have not received the President’s
message, but expect it on Monday with much anxiety. Should I then
hear nothing of a successor or secretary of legation, I shall give
them formal notice that I will present my letter of recall on a
particular day; and should no person arrive in the meantime, that
I will leave the legation in charge of General Campbell.
January 4, 1856.
I have received yours of the 17th ultimo, and am pained to learn
that you neither see your friends nor take exercise since your
return to Philadelphia. Your grief for poor Mary’s death, or at
least the manifestation of it, exceeds all reasonable limits, and
I am truly sorry that you have not more self-command. Although I
know it is sincere, and it ought to be deep, yet you ought to
recollect that the world are severe censors.
In regard to the bringing of dear Mary’s remains from San
Francisco to Lancaster or Franklin county, I have not a word to
say. This must be left to her nearer relatives. She sleeps as
sweetly on the distant shores of the Pacific as she could do on
any other spot of earth, and her disembodied spirit will be
equally near to you wherever you may wander. Still I know it is a
sort of instinct of nature to desire to have the tombs of our
friends near us; and even if I had any right to object, I should
not exercise it. Do as you please, and I shall be content......
James Henry is with me very busy and persevering in sight-seeing.
I am sorry I do not feel it proper to detain him with me. The
carnival comes so early this year that he must soon be off, as he
intends to take Naples en route to Rome. I get along very well
with Mr. Moran, though the labor is too great for one man to
perform. In truth I cannot answer all the letters I receive, and
attend to my appropriate duties. I shall, however, endeavor to
write you a few lines every week. Friends still inquire after you
with great kindness.
January 11, 1856.
I have received your favor of the 25th ultimo, together with an
agreeable little note from Mrs. Plitt, for which give her my
thanks.
James Henry left us yesterday afternoon. He had drawn all his
plans with mathematical precision, and I did not like to mar them.
He was to go direct to Naples, and be at Rome during the carnival,
so that he had but little time. He is a calculating, and I think a
determined boy....... He has certainly made a favorable impression
here on the persons with whom he has been in company, especially
on Lady Holland. The dinner went off extremely well; some of them
said _almost_ as well as if you had been present. As you would
probably like to know the company, I will tell you:
Mr. and Madame Tricoupi, the Count and Countess de Lavradio, Count
Bernstorff, the Brazilian Minister and Madame Moreiro, the Swedish
Minister and Baroness Hochschild, the Danish Minister and Madame
D’Oxholme, Mr. and Mrs. Comyn, Sir Henry and Lady Holland, Lady
Talbot de Malahide, R. Monckton Milnes, and J. Buchanan Henry,
Esq.
Count Colloredo had the commands of the queen, and could not
attend. Countess Bernstorff was ill. Baron Bentinck had an
engagement in the country, and so had Mr. and Mrs. Musurus. So you
have the list of invitations as well as of those who attended. I
expect to leave the house next week.
I very often think of poor Mary, and shall always cherish her
memory with deep affection. I trust that ere this your grief has
moderated, and that you begin to bear your loss with the
philosophy of a Christian, and with humble resignation to the
Divine will.
James desired me to send his love to you, and say that he would
write to you from Rome.
January 25, 1856.
Without a secretary of legation, I have so much business to
transact and so many persons to see, that I must give great
offence by necessarily failing to answer the letters of my friends
on your side of the Atlantic. I have not yet heard of the
appointment of my successor from Washington; but the last steamer
brought out a report, on which some of the passengers thought
reliance might be placed, that Governor Toucey either had been or
would be appointed. It would be difficult to make a better
selection. In all this matter, they have treated me discourteously
and improperly. By every steamer since the return of Mr. Appleton
to the United States, I had a right to expect news of a new
appointment. I have written more than once _emphatically_ upon the
subject, and they are now fully apprised that I shall leave the
legation next month, and entrust its affairs to General Campbell,
should neither minister nor secretary in the mean time appear.
The Central American questions might now, I think, be easily
settled with any other premier than Lord Palmerston. Since the
publication of the correspondence here and the articles in the
_Times_ and _Daily News_ in our favor, there would seem to be a
general public opinion that we are right. This, I think, renders
it certain that serious difficulties between the two countries
cannot grow out of these questions. I enclose you an article from
the _Morning Advertiser_, but little calculated to do me good in
the United States. What on earth could have induced the editor to
write such an article is a mystery. So far as regards any effect
it may produce upon the Presidency, I feel quite indifferent.
There is a profound wisdom in a remark of Rochefoucauld, with
which I met the other day: “Les choses que nous desirons
n’arrivent pas, ou, si elles arrivent, ce n’est, ni dans le tems,
ni de la manière que nous auraient fait le plus de plaisir.” I had
a letter yesterday from Judge Mason, dated on the 23d, giving me a
pressing and cordial invitation to stay with him when I visit
Paris. This, I believe, I shall accept, at least for part of my
brief visit. He is much pleased with Mr. Wise, his new secretary
of legation. James B. Henry, he says, who took the despatches to
him, “remained but a few hours in Paris, hurrying to Marseilles to
take a steamer for Italy.” I have not heard from him since he
left, nor did I expect to hear so soon.
Mrs. Shapter has been quite unwell, but is now down-stairs again.
I have not seen her since the date of my last.
We had quite an agreeable dinner party at Lord Woodehouse’s on
Wednesday last. I had a very pleasant conversation with the
Countess Persigny, who speaks English very prettily, though not
yet fluently. She is evidently proud of being the grand daughter
of Marshal Ney, and well she may be. We had quite a _tête à tête._
She, or rather the count, has been very civil to me of late. The
woman-killer, for whom, as you know, I have very little respect,
and with whom I have had no intercourse for a considerable period,
seems determined that I shall be on good terms with him. I
suffered as usual the penalty of this dinner—a sleepless and
uncomfortable night. Dinner invitations are again becoming
numerous, but I shall accept none except from those to whom I feel
under obligations for past kindness. Your name still continues to
be mentioned with kindness by your friends and acquaintances. I
sent the other day by the “Frigate Bird,” to Charles Brown, the
collector, a portrait of the justly celebrated John Hampden, from
our friend MacGregor,[26] intended to be presented to Congress,
and have requested Mr. Brown to keep it for me till my return. I
also sent two boxes containing books and different articles—one of
them champagne and the other wine. These might be sent to
Eskridge. Please to tell Mr. Plitt about them, who, if he will
call on Mr. Brown, will hear all about the picture. I have neither
room nor time to write more.
Footnote 26:
James MacGregor, Esq., M. P.
February 1st, 1856.
I have but little time to write to-day.
Parliament was yesterday opened by the queen. I need not describe
the ceremony to you, as you have already witnessed it. What struck
me most forcibly was the appearance in the diplomatic box of a
full-blooded black negro as the representative of his Imperial
Majesty of Hayti.
I have received a letter from James Henry, dated at Rome on the
20th ultimo...... Realities never correspond with the expectations
of youth.
I had confidently expected to receive by the Atlantic, whose mails
and despatch bag have just come to hand, an answer to my last most
urgent request for the appointment of my successor and the
immediate appointment of a secretary of legation, but in this I
have been disappointed. Not one word in relation to the
subject......
I wish I had time to write you more. This steamer will carry a
most important despatch to Washington.
February 8th, 1856.
Our latest dates from New York are to Saturday, the 19th of
January. We have had no Collins or Cunard steamer during the
present week. Since the first spell of cold weather, the winter
has been open, damp and disagreeable.
I have gone a good deal into society since the meeting of
Parliament, because it is my duty to embrace every opportunity of
conversing with influential people here on the relations between
the two countries. _The Morning Advertiser_ has been publishing a
series of articles, one stating that high words had passed between
Lord Clarendon and myself, at the foreign office, and that he had
used violent expressions to me there; another that I had, because
of this, declined to attend Lady Palmerston’s first reception; and
a third, which I have not seen, that Sir Henry Bulwer and myself
had been in conference together with a view of settling the
Central American questions. Now all this is mere moonshine, and
there is not a shadow of truth in any one of these statements.
I went to Count Persigny’s on the evening of Shrove Tuesday, and
had quite an agreeable time of it. There were a number of
distinguished persons present, though not a crowd. Many kind
inquiries were made respecting yourself. I dine to-day at Sir
Henry Holland’s, on purpose to meet Macaulay, should his health
enable him to be present. On Tuesday at Mr. Butt’s, and on
Wednesday at Lord Granville’s, where there will be a party in the
evening.
I met the “woman-killer” —— in the ante-chamber of the foreign
office on Wednesday last. He now seems determined to be such good
friends with me, that in good manners I must treat him kindly.
Knowing my tender point, he launched out in your praises, and said
such extravagant things of you as I could scarcely stand,
notwithstanding my weakness on this subject. Fortunately for me,
before he had concluded, he was summoned to Lord Clarendon,
greatly to my relief.
I think they will hesitate about sending me away, even if Mr.
Crampton should receive his passports. Mr. Cobden told me the
other evening at the Reform Club that Mr. Willcox, the member of
Parliament from Southampton, had said to Lord Palmerston: “Well,
you are about to send Buchanan away;” and his reply was, “If
Buchanan should remain until I send him away, he will be here to
all eternity.” This, however, is _à la mode_ de Palmerston, and
means but little one way or the other. I only repeat it as one of
his jokes, and my hesitation on the subject is not in the
slightest degree founded on this remark.
I should infer that my Presidential stock is declining in the
market. I do not now receive so many love letters on the subject
as formerly, always excepting the ever faithful Van Dyke and a few
others. Heaven bless them! I see the best face has been put on
Bigler’s election, but still it is an ugly symptom. Declining
prospects give me no pain. These would rather afford me pleasure,
were it not for my friends. Pierce’s star appears now to be in the
ascendant, though I think it is not very probable he will be
nominated. Heaven only knows who will be the man.
February 15, 1856.
Nothing of importance has occurred since I wrote you last. I have
been out a good deal, deeming it my duty at the present crisis to
mingle with influential society as much as possible. Everywhere
you are kindly remembered. Lord and Lady Stanhope have been very
particular in their inquiries about you, and say much which it
would be gratifying to you to hear. I promised to Mr. and Mrs.
Butt, that I would transmit you their kind compliments. The
Duchess of Somerset begged me to say to you, that at the date of
her letter to you, she had not heard of your affliction.
I trust that Mr. Dallas may soon make his appearance in London, as
I am exceedingly anxious to be relieved from my present
position...... What will you say to my reconciliation with
Governor Bigler? He addressed me _such a letter_ as you have
scarcely ever read. It was impossible for me to avoid giving it a
kind answer. I accepted his overtures, and informed him that it
would not be my fault if we should not always hereafter remain
friends. He had often made advances to me indirectly before, which
I always declined. This seems to be the era of good feeling in
Pennsylvania. Davy Lynch’s letters, for some months past, have
been quite graphic and amusing. He says that “the Eleventh hour
Buchanan Legion” at Harrisburgh have unanimously elected him a
member, for which he kindly thanked them, and at the same time
advised them to work hard and diligently to make up for lost time.
They responded that their exertions should be directed with a view
to throw my old fogy friends into the shade.
Notwithstanding all this, the signs of the times are not very
auspicious to my experienced eye, and I shall be neither
disappointed nor sorry should the Cincinnati convention select
some other person. It will, however, be always a source to me of
heartfelt gratification, that the Democracy of my native State
have not deserted me in my old age, but have been true to the
last.
I am truly sorry to hear of Mr. Randall’s affliction. He is an
able and true hearted man, to whom I am much attached. Please to
remember me to him and Mrs. Randall in the kindest terms.
Your uncle John has died at a good old age, with a character for
integrity which he well deserved. He had a kind and excellent
heart. As he advanced in life, his peculiarities increased, and
apparently obscured his merits, in his intercourse with his
relations and friends. But still he possessed them. For many years
after he came to Lancaster we were intimate friends, and we always
continued friends.
I trust that Mr. Dallas may arrive by the next Collins steamer. It
is my intention to act handsomely towards him. I thank Heaven that
a successor has at last been appointed. Whether I shall return
home soon after his arrival or go to the continent I cannot at
present determine. On the 18th December last I paid Mr. Randall
for the six shawls, and have his bill and receipt.
At Lord Granville’s dinner on Wednesday, the Marquis of Lansdowne
and Mr. Ellice said very pretty things about you. Colonel Seibels,
our minister at Brussels, is now here with me, and I am delighted
to see him. He will remain until after the queen’s levee on the
20th. I shall leave the house on Tuesday next, on which day the
inventory is to be taken, and shall most probably go to the
Clarendon.
February 22, 1856.
Another week has passed, and I am happy to inform you that you are
still freshly remembered by your friends and acquaintances on this
side of the Atlantic. I delivered up possession of the house to
the agent of Mrs. Lewis on Tuesday morning last, with the
exception of the offices, and went to Fenton’s, because I could
not obtain comfortable apartments at the Clarendon. I retain the
offices for the present at the rate of £10 per month, awaiting the
arrival of Mr. Dallas. I earnestly hope he may be here in the
Pacific, which is expected at Liverpool on Wednesday or Thursday
next. The two house agents, on the part of Mrs. Lewis and myself
respectively, have been employed on the inventory ever since
Tuesday morning, and have not yet finished.
I expect to be all ready, upon the arrival of Mr. Dallas, either
to go home or go to the continent, according to the then existing
circumstances. At present I am quite undetermined which course I
shall pursue.
You will see by the _Morning Post_ that I presented Col. Seibels
at the levee on Wednesday. He paid me a visit for a week, and his
society afforded me great pleasure. He is both an honorable and
agreeable man, as well as a tried and sincere friend. I dine with
Lord and Lady Palmerston to-morrow, and with the Lord and Lady
Mayoress on Wednesday, and on Thursday attend the wedding of Miss
Sturgis and Mr. Coleman at 11 o’clock at the Church of “St. John,
Robin Hood,” close to the Robin Hood Gate of Richmond Park. Mr.
Sturgis’s country residence is close to this church.
I receive letters from home, some of which say, with reference to
the Presidency, “Come home immediately,” and others, “Stay away a
while longer.” I shall not regulate my conduct with any view to
this office. If it be the will of Providence to bestow upon me the
Presidency, I shall accept it as a duty, a burden and a trial, and
not otherwise. I shall take no steps to obtain it.
Mrs. Shapter’s health is delicate, and John has been quite unwell.
I shall not fail to leave her some token of my great regard before
I leave London. She richly deserves it.
February 29th, 1856.
...... I dined with the queen on Wednesday last, and had a
pleasant time of it. I took the Duchess of Argyle in to dinner,
and sat between her and the princess royal. With the latter I had
much pleasant conversation. She spoke a great deal of you and made
many inquiries about you, saying how very much pleased she had
been with you. The queen also spoke of you kindly and inquired in
a cordial manner about you. Indeed, it would seem you were a
favorite of both. There has been a marked and favorable change of
feeling here within the last month towards the United States. I am
now made something of a lion wherever I go, and I go much into
society as a matter of duty. The sentiment and proceeding at the
Mansion House on Wednesday last were quite remarkable. Perhaps it
is just as well I received the command to dine with the queen on
that day.
I am yet in ignorance as to the time when Mr. Dallas may be
expected to arrive. The moment I learn he has arrived in
Liverpool, I shall apply for my audience of leave and joyfully
surrender the legation to him with the least possible delay.
March 7th, 1856.
I received your two letters of February 15th and 19th on Monday
last, on my return from Mr. Lampson’s, where I went on Saturday
evening. Both Mr. and Mrs. Lampson talked much and kindly of you,
and desired to be remembered to you...... I shall expect Mr.
Dallas about the middle of next week, and intend soon after his
arrival to cross over to Paris. I hope to be at home some time in
April, but when, I cannot now inform you.
I am glad to learn that you purpose to go to New York. It was very
kind in you to jog my memory about what I should bring you from
Paris. I know not what may be the result. Nous verrons.
Becky Smith is a damsel in distress, intelligent and agreeable,
and a country-woman in a strange land. Her conduct in London has
been unexceptionable and she is making her way in the world. She
has my sympathy, and I have given her “a lift” whenever I could
with propriety.
I delivered your letter to the Duchess of Somerset on Monday last,
and she was delighted with it. She handed it to me to read. It was
well and feelingly written. I was sorry to perceive that you
complained of your health, but you will, I trust, come out with
the birds in the spring, restored and renovated. I am pleased with
what you say concerning Senator Welsh. In writing to me, I think
you had better direct to me at Paris, to the care of Mr. Mason,
giving him his appropriate style, and you need not pay the
postage; better not, indeed. But you will scarcely have time to
write a single letter there before I shall have probably left. I
shall continue to write to you, but you need not continue to write
to me more than once after the receipt of this, unless I should
advise you differently by the next steamer.
Mr. Bates is quite unwell, and I fear he is breaking up very fast.
At the wedding of Miss Sturgis the other day, as I approached to
take my seat beside Madame Van de Weyer, she said: “Unwilling as
you may be, you are now compelled to sit beside me.” Of course I
replied that this was no compulsion, but a great privilege. Mrs.
Bates complained much that Mrs. Lawrence has not written to her.
March 14, 1856.
I tell you the simple truth when I say I have no time to-day to
write to you at length. Mr. Dallas arrived at Liverpool yesterday
afternoon, and is to leave there to-morrow at nine for London; so
the consul telegraphed to me. I have heard nothing from him since
his appointment. I expect an audience of leave from the queen
early next week, and shall then, God willing, pass over to the
continent.
I have this morning received your two letters of the 25th and
29th, and congratulate you on your arrival in New York. I hope you
may have an agreeable time of it. Your letter of the 25th is
excellent. I like its tone and manner very much and am sorry I
have not time to write you at length in reply. I am also pleased
with that of the 29th. I send by the bag the daguerreotype of our
excellent friend, Mrs. Shapter. I have had mine taken for her. I
think hers is very good. I saw her yesterday in greatly improved
health and in fine spirits.
March 18, 1856.
The queen at my audience of leave on Saturday, desired to be
kindly remembered to you.
The Marquis of Lansdowne at parting from me said: “If Miss Lane
should have the kindness to remember me, do me the honor to lay me
at her feet.”
Old Robert Owen came in and has kept me so long that I must cut
this letter short. I go to Paris, God willing, on Thursday next,
in company with Messrs. Campbell and Croshey our consuls. I send a
letter from James which I have received open.
BRUSSELS, March 27, 1856.
I write this in the legation of Colonel Siebels. He and I intend
to go to-morrow to the Hague on a visit to Mr. Belmont, from which
I propose to return to Paris on Tuesday or Wednesday next. It is
my purpose, God willing, to leave for Havre for home in the Arago
on Wednesday, the 9th of April. I do not believe that a more
comfortable vessel, or a better or safer captain exists. All who
have crossed the Atlantic with him speak in the same terms both of
his ship and himself.
I shall return to Mr. Mason’s at Paris, because I could not do
otherwise without giving offence. What a charming family it is.
Judge Mason, though somewhat disabled, has a much more healthy
appearance, and in the face resembles much more his former self,
than he did when attending the Ostend conference. The redness and
sometimes blueness of his face have disappeared, and he now looks
as he did in former years.
I shall defer all accounts of my doings on the continent until
after we meet. I may or I may not write to you once more before
embarking.
You might let Eskridge and Miss Hetty know at what time I shall
probably be at home, though I do not wish it to be noised abroad.
You cannot calculate our passage to be less than two weeks. Should
I reach my native shore on my birth-day, the 23d April, I shall
thank God and be content. The Arago takes the southern route to
keep clear of the ice.
CHAPTER VIII.
1856.
RETURN TO AMERICA—NOMINATION AND ELECTION TO THE
PRESIDENCY—SIGNIFICANCE OF MR. BUCHANAN’S ELECTION IN RESPECT TO
THE SECTIONAL QUESTIONS—PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.
Mr. Buchanan arrived at New York in the latter part of April, 1856,
and there met with a public reception from the authorities and
people of the city, which evinced the interest that now began to be
everywhere manifested in him as the probable future President. With
what feelings he himself regarded the prospect of his nomination by
his party, and his election, has appeared from his unreserved
communications with his friends. That he did not make efforts to
secure the nomination will presently appear upon other testimony
than his own. He reached Wheatland in the last week of April, and
there he remained a very quiet observer of what was taking place in
the political world. Before he left England, he had been informed
that a Democratic convention of his own State had unanimously
declared him to be the first choice of the Pennsylvania Democrats
for the Presidency. To this he had made no formal or public
response; but on the 8th of June he was waited upon by a committee
from this convention, and he then addressed them as follows:
GENTLEMEN:—
I thank you, with all my heart, for the kind terms in which, under
a resolution of the late Democratic State Convention, you have
informed me that I am “their unanimous choice for the next
Presidency.”
When the proceedings of your convention reached me in a foreign
land, they excited emotions of gratitude which I might in vain
attempt to express. This was not because the Democracy of my
much-loved State had by their own spontaneous movement placed me
in nomination for the Presidency, an honor which I had not sought,
but because this nomination constitutes of itself the highest
evidence that, after a long course of public services, my public
conduct has been approved by those to whom I am indebted, under
Providence, for all the offices and honors I have ever enjoyed. In
success and in defeat, in the sunshine and in the storm, they have
ever been the same kind friends to me, and I value their continued
confidence and good opinion far above the highest official honors
of my country.
The duties of the President, whomsoever he may be, have been
clearly and ably indicated by the admirable resolutions of the
convention which you have just presented to me, and all of which,
without reference to those merely personal to myself, I heartily
adopt. Indeed, they met my cordial approbation from the moment
when I first perused them on the other side of the Atlantic. They
constitute a platform broad, national, and conservative, and one
eminently worthy of the Democracy of our great and good old State.
These resolutions, carried into execution with inflexibility and
perseverance, precluding all hope of changes, and yet in a kindly
spirit, will ere long allay the dangerous excitement which has for
some years prevailed on the subject of domestic slavery, and again
unite all portions of our common country in the ancient bonds of
brotherly affection, under the flag of the Constitution and the
Union.
The Democratic National Convention assembled at Cincinnati soon
afterwards, and from a gentleman who was present, although not a
member of the body—my friend, Mr. S. L. M. Barlow of New York—I have
received an account of what took place, which I prefer to quote
rather than to give one of my own, which could only be compiled from
the public journals of the time:
In February, 1856, I was in London, with a portion of my family,
and had lodgings at Fenton’s Hotel, St. James Street. Shortly
after I reached London, Mr. Buchanan, who was then our minister at
the court of St. James, gave up his own residence and came to the
same hotel with us, where for some weeks he remained, taking his
meals in our rooms. I had known Mr. Buchanan for some years, but
never intimately until this time. During my stay in London, I
became much interested in his nomination for the Presidency, and
frequently spoke to him about the action of the National
Democratic Convention to be held in Cincinnati in June, 1856, and
expressed to him the hope that he would be the nominee of the
party. He said that so great an honor could hardly be expected to
fall to his lot, as he had made little effort to secure the
nomination, and his absence for so long a time from home had
prevented any organization of his friends to that end, save what
Mr. Slidell in Louisiana, Mr. Schell in New York, and his own
nearest political friends in Pennsylvania, had been able to
effect, and that he thought it very unlikely that he could receive
the nomination. After a few weeks in London, Mr. Buchanan joined
us in a visit to the continent, remaining in Paris about ten days,
and he then embarked for the United States.
I returned to New York in the early part of May, and shortly
afterwards went to Cincinnati, upon business connected with an
unfinished railroad, in which I was interested, and as the day for
the meeting of the convention approached, I was surprised to find
a lack of all organization on behalf of the friends of Mr.
Buchanan, and was satisfied that his nomination was impossible,
unless earnest efforts to that end were made, and at once.
I had taken a large dwelling-house in Cincinnati for my own
temporary use, and shortly before the meeting of the convention, I
wrote to my political friends in Washington who were friendly to
him, telling them the condition of things, and that unless they
came to Cincinnati without delay, I thought Mr. Buchanan stood no
chance for the nomination. Among others I wrote to Mr. Slidell,
Mr. Benjamin, Mr. James A. Bayard, and Mr. Bright, all of whom
were then in the United States Senate. I promised them
accommodations at my house, and, much to my gratification, they
all answered that they would make up a party and come to
Cincinnati, to reach there the day before the meeting of the
convention. Before the time of their arrival, prominent Democrats
from all sections of the country had reached Cincinnati, and the
friends of Mr. Douglas were very prominent in asserting his claims
to the nomination, through thoroughly organized and noisy
committees.
A consultation was held at my house, the evening before the
meeting of the convention, and it was evident that if the New York
delegation, represented by Mr. Dean Richmond and his associates,
who were known as the “Softs,” secured seats, that the nomination
of Mr. Douglas was inevitable. The other branch of the New York
Democrats, who called themselves “Hards,” was represented by Mr.
Schell as the head of that organization.
When the convention was organized, Senator James A. Bayard, of
Delaware, was made chairman of the Committee on Credentials, and
to that committee was referred the claims of the two rival
Democratic delegations from New York. The remainder of that day,
and much of the night following, were passed in the earnest and
noisy presentation of the claims of these two factions to be
represented in the convention, each to the exclusion of the other,
and it was soon discovered that a majority of this committee was
in favor of the “Soft,” or Douglas delegation. A minority of this
committee, headed by Mr. Bayard, favored the admission of one-half
of the delegates of each branch of the party, so that the vote of
New York in the convention might be thereby equally divided
between Mr. Douglas and Mr. Buchanan. The preparation of the
minority report to this end occupied all the night, and it was not
completed until nine o’clock of the following morning, the hour of
the meeting of the convention. So soon as we could copy this
report, I took it to Mr. Bayard, the convention being already in
session.
On the presentation of the majority, or Douglas report, it was
moved by the friends of Mr. Buchanan that the minority report
should be substituted, and this motion, after a close vote, was
adopted by the convention. As was foreseen, by thus neutralizing
the vote of New York, dividing it between the two candidates, Mr.
Buchanan retained sufficient strength to secure the nomination,
which was then speedily made. There can be little doubt that this
result was achieved almost wholly by the efforts of the friends of
Mr. Buchanan, who were induced at the last moment to come to
Cincinnati. Our house became the headquarters of all the friends
of Mr. Buchanan. Every move that was made emanated from some one
of the gentlemen there present, and but for their presence and
active cooperation, there is little doubt that Mr. Douglas would
have been nominated upon the first ballot after organization.
Mr. Slidell was naturally the leader of the friends of Mr.
Buchanan. His calmness, shrewdness and earnest friendship for Mr.
Buchanan were recognized by all, and whatever he advised was
promptly assented to. At his request, I was present at all
interviews with the delegates from all parts of the country, which
preceded Mr. Buchanan’s actual nomination. I heard all that was
said on these occasions, and when the news of the nomination came
from the convention to our headquarters, Mr. Slidell at once said
to me: “Now, you will bear me witness, that in all that has taken
place, I have made no promises, and am under no commitments on
behalf of Mr. Buchanan to anybody. He takes this place without
obligations to any section of the country, or to any individual.
He is as free to do as as he sees fit as man ever was. Some of his
friends deserve recognition, and at the proper time I shall say so
to him, and I think he will be governed by my suggestions, but if
he should not be, no one can find fault, as I have made no
promises.”
After the election, at the request of Mr. Buchanan, I met him on
the occasion of his first visit to Washington, before the
inauguration. I went to his room with Mr. Slidell. He had then
seen no one in Washington. In this first interview, Mr. Slidell
repeated to him, almost verbatim, the language which he had used
to me in Cincinnati, as to the President being entirely free and
uncommitted by any promise or obligation of any sort, made to
anybody, previous to his nomination.
I do not know that the matters to which I have alluded will be of
any interest to you, but I have recalled them with much pleasure
as showing, contrary to the generally received opinion as to Mr.
Buchanan’s shrewdness as a politician and “wire-puller,” that when
he left London, there was no organization or pretence of
organization in his favor, that could be considered effective or
likely to be useful, outside of the efforts of a few personal
friends in the South, in Pennsylvania and New York; and before he
returned to America, he evidently saw that he had little chance of
success before the convention. The same marked absence of
organization, and of all political machine-work, was evident up to
the day before the meeting of the convention, when the friends of
Mr. Buchanan, whom I had thus suddenly called together, made their
appearance in Cincinnati.
Mr. Buchanan’s opposition to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise
left him without support from the ultra Southern leaders, many of
whom believed that Mr. Douglas would be less difficult to manage
than Mr. Buchanan. Louisiana was controlled through the personal
influence of Messrs. Slidell and Benjamin, and Virginia was from
the beginning in favor of Mr. Buchanan’s nomination. Apart from
these States, the South was for Pierce or Douglas. Mr. Buchanan’s
strength was from the North, but it was unorganized.
To that time, no one had undertaken to speak for him. There were
no headquarters where his friends could meet even for
consultation. There was no leader—no one whose opinions upon
questions of policy were controlling, and but for this almost
accidental combination of his friends in Cincinnati, it was
apparent that Mr. Buchanan could not have been nominated, simply
because of this utter lack of that ordinary preliminary
organization necessary to success, which was by his opponents
alleged to be the foundation of his strength, but which in fact
was wholly without existence.
Mr. Slidell undertook this task, and before the meeting of the
convention Mr. Buchanan’s success was assured.[27]
Footnote 27:
The prominence given by Mr. Barlow to Mr. Slidell, as an active
and earnest friend of Mr. Buchanan, led me to ask him to add a
sketch of that distinguished man; and I have been at the greater
pains to show the strong friendship that subsisted between Mr.
Buchanan and Mr. Slidell, because, as will be seen hereafter, when
the secession troubles of the last year of Mr. Buchanan’s
administration came on, this friendship was one of the first
sacrifices made by him to his public duty, for he did not allow it
to influence his course in the slightest degree; and although he
had to accept with pain the alienation which Mr. Slidell and all
his other Southern friends, in the ardor of their feelings, deemed
unavoidable, he accepted it as one of the sad necessities of his
position and of the time. I think he and Mr. Slidell never met,
after the month of January, 1861. The following is Mr. Barlow’s
sketch of John Slidell:—
“He was born in the city of New York in 1795; was graduated at
Columbia College in 1810, and entered commercial life, which he
soon abandoned for the study of the law. He removed to Louisiana
in 1825, and was shortly afterwards admitted to the bar of that
State. In 1829 he was appointed United States district attorney
for the Louisiana district by President Jackson, and from that
time took an active part in the politics of the State. He was soon
recognized, not only as one of the ablest and most careful
lawyers, but as the practical political head of the Democratic
party of the Southwest.
“In 1842 he was elected to Congress from the New Orleans district.
In 1845 he was appointed by President Polk as minister to Mexico.
This mission was foredoomed to failure. The annexation of Texas
made a war with Mexico inevitable, but the broad sense shown by
Mr. Slidell in his despatches from Mexico was fully recognized by
the administration of President Polk, and his views were
maintained, and his advice was followed, to the time of the
breaking out of hostilities.
“In 1853 he was elected to the United States Senate to fill an
unexpired term, and in 1854 was again elected for a full term,
which had not expired when the secession of Louisiana in 1861 put
it at an end.
“He was shortly afterwards sent to France as a commissioner on
behalf of the Confederate States. On his voyage to that country he
was taken from the British steamer ‘Trent,’ and was imprisoned at
Fort Warren in Boston Harbor. His release by President Lincoln,
under the advice of Mr. Seward, will be remembered as one of the
most exciting and important incidents in the early history of the
war. He remained in Paris as the Commissioner of the Confederate
States until the termination of the rebellion, and during that
period was probably the most active and effective agent of the
Confederacy abroad.
“His influence with the government of Louis Napoleon was very
great, and at one time, chiefly through his persuasion, the
emperor, as Mr. Slidell believed, had determined to recognize the
Confederacy; but fortunately this political mistake was averted by
the great victory gained by General McClellan over the Confederate
army at Antietam.
“In 1835 Mr. Slidell was married to Miss Mathilde deLande, of an
old Creole family of Louisiana. He died at Cowes in England in
1871. His pure personal character, his indomitable and coercive
will, his undoubted courage, and his cool and deliberate good
sense gave him a high place among the advisers of the Confederate
cause from its earliest organization to its final collapse.
“One of his most striking characteristics, for which he was noted
through life, was his unswerving fidelity to his political
friends. From the lowest in the ranks to those of the highest
station, who were his allies and advocates, not one was forgotten
when political victory was secured, and no complaint was ever
justly made against him for forgetfulness of those through whom
his own political career was established, or to whom, through his
influence, the success of his political friends was achieved.
“With strangers Mr. Slidell’s manners were reserved, and at times
even haughty, but to those who were admitted to the privacy of his
domestic life, or who once gained his confidence in politics, he
was most genial, gracious, and engaging.”
When officially informed of his nomination by a committee, Mr.
Buchanan, on the 16th of June (1856), made this simple and
straightforward answer:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication
of the 13th inst., informing me officially of my nomination by the
Democratic National Convention, recently held at Cincinnati, as a
candidate for the office of President of the United States. I
shall not attempt to express the grateful feelings which I
entertain towards my Democratic fellow-citizens for having deemed
me worthy of this—the highest political honor on earth—an honor
such as no other people have the power to bestow. Deeply sensible
of the vast and varied responsibility attached to the station,
especially at the present crisis in our affairs, I have carefully
refrained from seeking the nomination, either by word or by deed.
Now that it has been offered by the Democratic party, I accept it
with diffidence in my own abilities, but with an humble trust
that, in the event of my election, Divine Providence may enable me
to discharge my duty in such a manner as to allay domestic strife,
preserve peace and friendship with foreign nations, and promote
the best interests of the Republic.
In accepting the nomination, I need scarcely say that I accept, in
the same spirit, the resolutions constituting the platform of
principles erected by the convention. To this platform I intend to
conform myself throughout the canvass, believing that I have no
right, as the candidate of the Democratic party, by answering
interrogatories, to present new and different issues before the
people.
In all Presidential elections which have occurred for the past fifty
years, the State election in Pennsylvania, occurring in the autumn
before the election of a President, has been regarded as of great
importance. The Republican party was now in the field, with General
Fremont as its candidate, and with the advantage which it had
derived in all the free States from the consequences of the repeal
of the Missouri Compromise, the passage of the so-called
“Kansas-Nebraska Act,” which had been followed in Kansas by an
internecine contest between pro-slavery and anti-slavery settlers. A
brutal personal assault upon Senator Sumner, of Massachusetts, by a
rash and foolish Southerner, had added fuel to the already kindled
sectional flame of Northern feeling. The precise political issue
between the Democratic and Republican parties, so far as it related
to slavery, concerned of course slavery in the Territories. It was
apparent that if the Republicans should gain the State of
Pennsylvania in the State election of October, there was a very
strong probability, rather a moral certainty, that the electoral
votes of all the free States in the Presidential election would be
obtained by that party, while there was no probability that it would
prevail in a single slave-holding State. The political issue,
therefore, was whether the sectional division of the free and the
slave States in the election of a President was to come then, or
whether it was to be averted. The State election in Pennsylvania, in
October, turned in favor of the Democrats. Her twenty-seven
electoral votes were thus morally certain to be given to Mr.
Buchanan in the Presidential election. In the interval, a large body
of his friends and neighbors assembled at Wheatland, and called him
out. His remarks, never before printed, are now extant in his
handwriting. He said:
MY FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS:—
I am glad to see you and to receive and reciprocate your
congratulations upon the triumph of the Democrats in Pennsylvania
and Indiana.
It is my sober and solemn conviction that Mr. Fillmore uttered the
words of soberness and truth when he declared that if the Northern
sectional party should succeed, it would lead inevitably to the
destruction of this beautiful fabric reared by our forefathers,
cemented by their blood, and bequeathed to us as a priceless
inheritance.
The people of the North seem to have forgotten the warning of the
Father of his Country against geographical parties. And by far the
most dangerous of all such parties is that of a combined North
against a combined South on the question of slavery. This is no
mere political question—no question addressing itself to the
material interests of men. It rises far higher. With the South it
is a question of self-preservation, of personal security around
the family altar, of life or of death. The Southern people still
cherish a love for the Union; but what to them is even our blessed
confederacy, the wisest and the best form of government ever
devised by man, if they cannot enjoy its blessings and its
benefits without being in constant alarm for their wives and
children.
The storm of abolition against the South has been gathering for
almost a quarter of a century. It had been increasing by every
various form of agitation which fanaticism could devise. We had
reached the crisis. The danger was imminent. Republicanism was
sweeping over the North like a tornado. It appeared to be
resistless in its course. The blessed Union of these States—the
last hope for human liberty on earth—appeared to be tottering on
its base. Had Pennsylvania yielded, had she become an abolition
State, without a special interposition of Divine Providence, we
should have been precipitated into the yawning gulf of
dissolution. But she stood erect and firm as her own Alleghanies.
She breasted the storm and drove it back. The night is departing,
and the roseate and propitious morn now breaking upon us promises
a long day of peace and prosperity for our country. To secure
this, all we of the North have to do is to permit our Southern
neighbors to manage their own domestic affairs, as they permit us
to manage ours. It is merely to adopt the golden rule, and do
unto them as we would they should do unto us, in the like
circumstances. All they ask from us is simply to let them alone.
This is the whole spirit and essence of the much abused Cincinnati
platform. This does no more than adopt the doctrine which is the
very root of all our institutions, and recognize the right of a
majority of the people of a Territory, when about to enter the
Union as a State, to decide for themselves whether domestic
slavery shall or shall not exist among them. This is not to favor
the extension of slavery, but simply to deny the right of an
abolitionist in Massachusetts or Vermont to prescribe to the
people of Kansas what they shall or shall not do in regard to this
question.
Who contests the principle that the will of the majority shall
govern? What genuine republican of any party can deny this? The
opposition have never met this question fairly. Within a brief
period, the people of this country will condemn their own folly
for suffering the assertion of so plain and elementary a principle
of all popular governments to have endangered our blessed
Constitution and Union, which owe their origin to this very
principle.
I congratulate you, my friends and neighbors, that peace has been
restored to Kansas. As a Pennsylvanian I rejoice that this good
work has been accomplished by two sons of our good old mother
State, God bless her! We have reason to be proud of Colonel Geary
and General Smith. We shall hear no more of bleeding Kansas. There
will be no more shrieks for her unhappy destiny. The people of
this fine country, protected from external violence and internal
commotion, will decide the question of slavery for themselves, and
then slide gracefully into the Union and become one of the sisters
in our great Confederacy.
Indeed, viewed in the eye of sober reason, this Kansas question is
one of the most absurd of all the Proteus-like forms which
abolition fanaticism has ever assumed to divide and distract the
country. And why do I say this? Kansas might enter the Union with
a free constitution to-day, and once admitted, no human power
known to the Constitution could prevent her from establishing
slavery to-morrow. No free-soiler has ever even contended that she
would not possess this power.
The result of the election shows, with great distinctness, the
following facts: 1st. That Mr. Buchanan was chosen President,
because he received the electoral votes of the five free States of
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois and California (62 in
all), and that without them he could not have been elected. 2d. That
his Southern vote (that of every slave-holding State excepting
Maryland) was partly given to him because of his conservative
opinions and position, and partly because the candidate for the
Vice-Presidency, Mr. Breckinridge, was a Southern man. 3d. That
General Fremont received the electoral vote of no Southern State,
and that this was due partly to the character of the Republican
party and its Northern tone, and partly to the fact that the
Republican candidate for the Vice Presidency (Mr. Dayton, of New
Jersey), was a citizen of a non-slaveholding State. General Fremont
himself was nominally a citizen of California. This election,
therefore, foreshadowed the sectional division which would be almost
certain to happen in the next one, if the four years of Mr.
Buchanan’s administration should not witness a subsidence in the
sectional feelings between the North and the South. It would only be
necessary for the Republicans to wrest from the Democratic party the
five free States which had voted for Mr. Buchanan, and they would
elect the President in 1860. Whether this was to happen, would
depend upon the ability of the Democratic party to avoid a rupture
into factions that would themselves be representatives of
irreconcilable dogmas on the subject of slavery in the Territories.
Hence it is that Mr. Buchanan’s course as President, for the three
first years of his term, is to be judged, with reference to the
responsibility that was upon him to so conduct the Government as to
disarm, if possible, the antagonism of section to section. His
administration of affairs after the election of Mr. Lincoln is to be
judged simply by his duty as the Executive, in the most
extraordinary and anomalous crisis in which the country had ever
been placed.
I take from the multitude of private letters written or received
during and after the election, a few of the most interesting:—
[FROM THE HON. JAMES MACGREGOR.]
HOUSE OF COMMONS, June 20, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I am, indeed, very happy to receive to-day the decision with
regard to you at Cincinnati, and God grant the result be as
successful as I wish. The feeling in this house, and I am sure in
the country, is, I believe firmly, such as you could wish. I wish
that miserable dispute about Central America were dissipated; for
my part, I believe that if not only Central America, but all
Spanish America, south of California, were possessed and governed
by an Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American race, the more would the
progress of civilization, the progress of industry and commerce,
and the happiness of mankind be advanced.
I went over to Paris a few days after you left for Havre. Saw much
of Mr. Mason, Mr. Corbin and Mr. Childs. The latter drew me a most
able statement relative to the disputes with America, which I made
good use of, on my return, with Lord Palmerston.
You will observe that even the meretricious _Times_, which I send
you a copy of, is coming to be more reasonable; although I cannot
trust that journal, which, I believe, was truly characterized by
O’Connell, in the House of Commons, as representing “the sagacity
of the rat and the morality of a harlot.” I write in great haste
for the post; but believe me always, and with my very kindest
regards to Miss Lane,
Faithfully yours,
J. MACGREGOR.
[TO WILLIAM B. REED, ESQ.]
Monday Morning, July 7, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I return Mr. Stevenson’s letter with thanks. He appears to be “a
marvellous proper man.” There never was a more unfounded falsehood
than that of my connection with the bargain, or alleged bargain.
At the time I was a young member of Congress, not on terms of
intimacy with either Jackson or Clay. It is true I admired both,
and wished to see the one President and the other Secretary of
State; and after Mr. Clay had been instructed by the Kentucky
legislature to vote for Jackson, I believed my wish would be
accomplished. It must have been then that I had the conversation
with Mr. Clay, in Letcher’s room, to which Colton refers, for I
declare I have not the least trace on my memory of any such
conversation. Had I known anything of the previous history of
Jackson and Clay, I could not have believed it possible that the
former would appoint the latter Secretary. A conversation of a few
minutes with Jackson on the street on a cold and stormy day of
December, fully related by me in 1827, and a meeting with Mr. Clay
in Letcher’s room, and a conversation perfectly harmless as
stated, have brought me into serious difficulties.
Your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO THE HON. JAMES C. DOBBIN.[28].]
BEDFORD SPRINGS, August 20, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Your favor of the 13th instant did not reach me at the Bedford
Springs until I was about leaving, hence the delay of my answer. I
did not reach home until the night before the last.
I congratulate you, with all my heart, on the result of your
election. The population of the old North State is steady and
conservative. Of it you may be justly proud. The Southern States
now promise to be a unit at the approaching Presidential election.
Maryland is still considered doubtful, but the changes in our
favor have been great within the last three weeks. The letters of
Messrs. Pierce and Pratt have had a happy effect.
I am glad to learn that our foreign affairs are assuming a
favorable aspect. I most heartily approved of the dismissal of Mr.
Crampton, and would have been quite as well satisfied had he been
sent home in the last autumn. About the present condition of the
Central American questions I knew nothing until the receipt of
your letter, except from the revelations in the British
Parliament, which I know, from experience, are not reliable. Mr.
Dallas said nothing to me about his instructions or the views of
the President, and, of course, I did not solicit his confidence.
The question of the Bay Islands is too clear for serious doubt.
Lord Aberdeen, the purest and most just of British statesmen, when
premier gave it up, as is shown by my correspondence with the
State Department, and it is highly probable Great Britain may make
a virtue of necessity, and surrender these islands to Honduras to
whom they clearly belong.
I am glad to learn that the President enjoys good health,
notwithstanding the fatigue, troubles, and responsibility incident
to his position. I concur with you in opinion as to the character
of his manly and excellent address on the receipt of the
intelligence from Cincinnati. It was no more than what might have
been expected from him by all who knew him. My aspirations for the
Presidency had all died four years ago, and I never felt the
slightest personal interest in securing the nomination. It was
easy to foresee the impending crisis, and that the Union itself
might depend on the result of the election. In this view, whilst
we all have everything near and dear to us of a political
character at stake, the President of all men has the deepest
interest in the result. My election, so far as I am personally
concerned is a very small matter; but as identified with the
leading measures of his administration, the preservation of the
Constitution and the Union, and the maintenance of the equality of
the States, and of the right of the people of a Territory to
decide the question of slavery for themselves, in their
constitution, before entering the Union, it is a subject of vast
and transcendant importance.
Most cordially reciprocating your friendly sentiments towards
myself, and wishing you all the blessings which you can desire, I
remain, as ever, very respectfully,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 28:
Secretary of the Navy under President Pierce.
[TO NAHUM CAPEN, ESQ., OF BOSTON.]
WHEATLAND, August 27, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
On my return from Bedford Springs on Monday night, I found your
favor of the 22d instant, and your manuscript. The latter I have
endeavored to find the time to read with care, but this has been
impossible. I have, therefore, only been able to glance over it.
It is written with characteristic ability, and that portion of it
which gives extracts from my speeches has been prepared with much
labor and discrimination. I have not seen the manuscript of any
biography of mine before publication, nor have I read any one of
them since, and this simply because I did not choose to be
identified with any of them.
For my own part, I consider that all incidental questions are
comparatively of little importance in the Presidential question,
when compared with the grand and appalling issue of union or
disunion. Should Fremont be elected, he must receive 149 Northern
electoral votes at the least, and the outlawry proclaimed by the
Republican convention at Philadelphia against fifteen Southern
States will be ratified by the people of the North. The
consequence will be _immediate_ and inevitable. In this region,
the battle is fought mainly on this issue. We have so often cried
“wolf,” that now, when the wolf is at the door, it is difficult to
make the people believe it; but yet the sense of danger is slowly
and surely making its way in this region.
After reflection and consultation, I stated in my letter of
acceptance substantially, that I would make no issues beyond the
platform, and have, therefore, avoided giving my sanction to any
publication containing opinions with which I might be identified,
and prove unsatisfactory to some portions of the Union. I must
continue to stand on this ground. Had it not been for this cause,
I should have embraced your kind offer, and asked you to prepare a
biography for me, and furnished the materials. Indeed, I often
thought of this.
I am deeply and gratefully sensible of your friendship, and
therefore most reluctantly adopt the course towards you which I
have done to all other friends under like circumstances.
In the cursory glance I have been able to take of your manuscript,
I observed one or two errors. In page 37 of No. 1, my allusion was
to Mrs. Adams, and not to Mrs. Jackson. I entered college at the
age of sixteen, not of fourteen, having been previously prepared
for the Junior class. It is not the fact that I accepted no
compensation for trying the widow’s cause. “Millions for defence,
but not a cent for tribute,” was not original with me.
I am so surrounded, I regret I cannot write more, and still more
deeply regret that my omission to sanction your very able
manuscript may give you pain. I sincerely wish you had referred it
to the National Committee, or to the committee in your own State.
We are fighting the battle in this State almost solely _on the
great issue_, with energy and confidence. I do not think there is
any reason to apprehend the result, certainly none at the
Presidential election, so far as Pennsylvania is concerned.
In haste, I remain always, very respectfully, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO WILLIAM B. REED, ESQ.]
WHEATLAND, September 8, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 5th inst. I do not recollect the
names of the two members of the Society of Friends to whom you
refer; but should you deem it important, I can, with some trouble,
find the original letter. I have no doubt Dr. Parrish was one of
them. He, William Wharton and Joseph Foulke were the three
gentlemen referred to in my remarks on the 25th April, 1836, in
presenting the petition of the Society of Friends against the
admission of Arkansas, etc. They not only acquiesced in my course,
but requested me to procure for them a number of copies of the
_National Intelligencer_ containing my remarks, and left
Washington entirely satisfied. (Vide the volume of the Register of
Debates, to which you refer, pages 1277 and 1278.)
I cannot procure the _London Quarterly_ in Lancaster. I took the
Reviews in England, but neglected to order them since my return. I
have no doubt it does me great injustice. I was so popular
personally in England, that whenever I appeared at public dinners,
etc., I was enthusiastically cheered; but now they are all for
Fremont ......, and a dissolution of the Union.
I am gratified that you have sent me Mr. Stevenson’s letter. I
have no doubt he is a gentleman of fastidious honor as well as
much ability. Although a patient and much-enduring man, I have
never had patience about “the bargain and sale story.” So far as I
am concerned, it all arose from the misapprehension by General
Jackson of as innocent a conversation on the street, on my part,
as I ever had with any person. I cannot charge myself even with
the slightest imprudence. And then, as a rebutter, a conversation
equally innocent, in Letcher’s room, about the particulars of
which I have no more recollection than if it had never taken
place. Still, I have not the least doubt it has been stated
accurately; because it is just what I would have said under the
circumstances, and in entire ignorance of the nature of the
personal relations between General Jackson and Mr. Clay. Blair’s
exposé has fallen dead, so far as I can learn.
(Private and confidential.) WHEATLAND, September 14, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have at length found, and now enclose, the letter to which you
refer. I have very often spoken in the Senate on the subject of
slavery in the different forms which the question has assumed, but
have not the time at the present moment to look over the debates.
I have recently received a letter from Governor Wright, of
Indiana, who informs me it would be of great importance in that
State should the _National Intelligencer_ come out in favor of the
Democratic candidates. He had heard, as we have done, that such
was the intention of its editors, after the adjournment of
Congress. But they have at length come out in favor of Fremont. I
say this, because they scout the idea that the Union would be in
danger from his election...... Better they had at once raised the
Republican flag. This opinion they have expressed, notwithstanding
I am in the daily receipt of letters from the South, which are
truly alarming, and these from gentlemen who formerly opposed both
nullification and disunion. They say explicitly that the election
of Fremont involves the dissolution of the Union, and this
immediately. They allege that they are now looking on calmly for
the North to decide their fate. When I say from the South, I refer
to the States south of the Potomac. These evidences of public
determination first commenced in the extreme South; but now the
same calm and determined spirit appears to pervade Virginia.
Indeed, the most alarming letter I have received has been from
Virginia, and this, too, from a prudent, tranquil and able man,
who has for some years been out of public life from his own
choice. The remarks of the _National Intelligencer_ will either
serve to delude the Northern people, or the Southrons are
insincere. God save the Union! I do not wish to survive it.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—I refer to the article in the _Intelligencer_ of the 11th
instant, headed, “The Balance Wheels of the Government.” One
gentleman informs me that the men who were our contemporaries when
the States lived in peace with each other, before the slavery
excitement commenced, have passed away, and they have been
succeeded by a new generation, who have grown up pending the
slavery agitation. He says that they have been constantly assailed
by the North, and now have as much hatred for the people of New
England as the latter have for them; and many now deem that it
would be for the mutual advantage of all parties to have a
Southern Confederation, in which they can live at peace. I have
received such communications with regret and astonishment.
[TO A CITIZEN OF CALIFORNIA.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, PENN., Sept. 17, 1856.
SIR:—
I have received numerous communications from sources in
California, entitled to high regard, in reference to the
proposed Pacific Railroad. As it would be impossible for me to
answer them all, I deem it most proper and respectful to
address you a general answer in your official capacity. In
performing this duty to the citizens of California, I act in
perfect consistency with the self-imposed restriction
contained in my letter accepting the nomination for the
Presidency, not to answer interrogatories raising new and
different issues from those presented by the Cincinnati
convention, because that convention has itself adopted a
resolution in favor of this great work. I, then, desire to
state briefly that, concurring with the convention, I am
decidedly favorable to the construction of the Pacific
Railroad; and I derive the authority to do this from the
constitutional power “to declare war,” and the constitutional
duty “to repel invasions.” In my judgment, Congress possess
the same power to make appropriations for the construction of
this road, strictly for the purpose of national defence, that
they have to erect fortifications at the mouth of the harbor
of San Francisco. Indeed, the necessity, with a view to repel
foreign invasion from California, is as great in the one case
as in the other. Neither will there be danger from the
precedent, for it is almost impossible to conceive that any
case attended by such extraordinary and unprecedented
circumstances can ever again occur in our history.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
To B. F. WASHINGTON, Esq., Chairman of the Democratic State
Central Committee of California.
[TO JOSHUA BATES, ESQ., LONDON.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, Nov. 6, 1856.
MR DEAR SIR:—
I received in due time your kind congratulatory letter of the 10th
July, which I should have immediately answered had I been able to
express a decided opinion as to the result of the Presidential
election. It was one of the most severe political struggles
through which we have ever passed. The preachers and fanatics of
New England had excited the people to such a degree on the slavery
questions, that they generally prayed and preached against me from
their pulpits on Sunday last, throughout that land of “isms.” Your
information from Massachusetts was entirely unfounded—Boston is a
sad place. In that city they have re-elected to Congress a
factious fanatic, ...... who, in a public speech, said that we
must have an anti-slavery Constitution, an anti-slavery Bible, and
an anti-slavery God.
Whilst the British press, by their violent attacks, did me much
good service, I very much regretted their hostile publications,
because it was and is my sincere desire to cultivate the most
friendly relations with that country. The _Times_ does England
much injury, at least in foreign nations; it has made the English
unpopular throughout the continent, and keeps alive the ancient
prejudice which still exists in large portions of our country. In
very many of the Democratic papers, throughout the late canvass,
beautiful extracts from the _Thunderer_, the _Chronicle_, and
other English journals, were kept standing at the head of their
columns. But enough of this. I most sincerely hope the Central
American questions may be settled before the 4th of March. I know
nothing of their condition at present. I never doubted in regard
to the true construction of the treaty, nor did I ever consider it
doubtful. The purest and the wisest statesmen I met in England
agreed with me in regard to the construction of the treaty. If we
are to be as good friends as I desire we may be, your government
ought to be careful to select the proper man as minister, and not
send us some government pet simply because they have no other
provision for him. I have said much to Lord Clarendon on this
subject before I had the slightest idea of becoming President. By
the bye, I like his lordship personally very much, as well as Lord
Palmerston. They are both agreeable and witty companions, as well
as great statesmen. I should like them much better, however, if
their friendly feelings were a little stronger for this country. I
have no doubt they both, as you say, expressed their satisfaction
at the prospect of my becoming President. This was, however, at an
early day. They have probably since changed their opinion. I have
been a good deal quizzed by private friends since I came home,
[because] I spoke in strong and warm terms of the kindness and
civility which had been extended to me in England, and of the vast
importance to both countries and to the world that friendly
feelings between the two countries should be cherished by the
governments and people of each. How often have the articles from
British newspapers been cast up to me as a comment upon my
remarks. They have, however, produced no effect upon my feelings.
I was delighted to see Sir Henry Holland, and to gossip with him
about valued friends and acquaintances on the other side of the
water. Please to remember me very kindly to Mrs. Bates, and Miss
Lane desires me to present her warm regards to you both. It is
long since I have heard from Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[FROM THE HON. EDWARD EVERETT.]
BOSTON, Dec, 8th, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
....... I can hardly congratulate you on your election, first,
because I did not vote for you (unless upon the theory that every
vote given to Fillmore was in effect given to you), and second,
because I fear that to be chosen President is not a thing upon
which a friend is to be congratulated, in the present state of the
country.
You have my best wishes, however, for a prosperous administration.
I devoutly hope that you will be able to check the progress of
sectional feeling. The policy of the present administration has
greatly impaired (as you are well aware) the conservative feeling
of the North, has annihilated the Whig party, and seriously
weakened the Democratic party in all the free States.
Though much opposed to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, we
could have stood that, but the subsequent events in Kansas gave us
the _coup de grace_. Those events, and the assault on Mr. Sumner,
gave its formidable character and strength to the Republican
nomination. You can do nothing directly to prevent the occurrence
of events like the assault, but you may, even in advance of the
4th of March, do much to bring about a better state of things in
Kansas, and prevent the enemies of the Constitution from
continuing to make capital out of it.
I am, dear sir, with much regard and sincere good wishes,
Very truly yours,
EDWARD EVERETT.
[TO THE HON. JOHN Y. MASON.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, December 29, 1856.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Ere this can reach Paris, you will doubtless have received my
letter to Miss Wight. I shall not repeat what I have said to her,
because such is the pressure now upon me that I have scarce time
to say my prayers. This I can say in perfect good faith, that the
man don’t live whom it would afford me greater pleasure to serve
than yourself. In this spirit I have determined that you shall not
be disturbed during the next year, no matter what may be the
pressure upon me. I am not committed, either directly or
indirectly, to any human being for any appointment, but yet I
cannot mistake the strong current of public opinion in favor of
changing public functionaries, both abroad and at home, who have
served a reasonable time. They say, and that, too, with
considerable force, that if the officers under a preceding
Democratic administration shall be continued by a succeeding
administration of the same political character, this must
necessarily destroy the party. This, perhaps, ought not to be so,
but we cannot change human nature.
The great object of my administration will be to arrest, if
possible, the agitation of the slavery question at the North, and
to destroy sectional parties. Should a kind Providence enable me
to succeed in my efforts to restore harmony to the Union, I shall
feel that I have not lived in vain.
I beg of you to say nothing to any of your colleagues in Europe
about your continuance in office during the next year. Had it been
announced I had informed you, in answer to Miss Wight, that you
should continue indefinitely in office, this would have done both
you and myself injury. We know not what may transpire in 1857, and
therefore, in reference to the mission after that period, I can
say nothing. “Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.”
Even if I had the time, I could not communicate any news to you
which you will not see in the papers. The pressure for office
will be nearly as great as though I had succeeded a Whig
administration.
With my kind and affectionate regards to Mrs. Mason and your
excellent family, and cordially wishing you and them many a happy
Christmas and many a prosperous New Year, I remain, always,
Very respectfully your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—In reading over my letter, I find it is quite too cold in
reference to Mary Ann, and therefore I beg to send her my love.
CHAPTER IX.
1857-1858.
INAUGURATION AS PRESIDENT—SELECTION OF A CABINET—THE DISTURBANCES IN
KANSAS—MR. BUCHANAN’S CONSTRUCTION OF THE KANSAS-NEBRASKA ACT,
AND OF THE “PLATFORM” ON WHICH HE WAS ELECTED—FINAL ADMISSION OF
KANSAS INTO THE UNION.
From the communication which has been furnished to me by Mr. James
Buchanan Henry, I select the following account of the period
preceding the inauguration of his uncle as President, on the 4th of
March, 1857:
Soon after Mr. Buchanan’s election to the Presidency, he sent for
me—I was in Philadelphia, where I had begun the practice of the
law—to come to Wheatland. He then told me that he had selected me
to be his private secretary, and spoke to me gravely of the
temptations by which I should probably be assailed in that
position. Soon afterwards prominent men and politicians began to
make their way to Wheatland in great numbers, and the stream
increased steadily until the departure of Mr. Buchanan for
Washington.
In addition to personal attendance upon the President-elect, I
soon had my hands full of work in examining and briefing the daily
mails, which were burdened with letters of recommendation from
individuals, committees and delegations of various States, in
regard to the cabinet appointments and a few of the more important
offices. Mr. Buchanan was also preparing his inaugural address
with his usual care and painstaking, and I copied his drafts and
recopied them until he had it prepared to his satisfaction. It
underwent no alteration after he went to the National Hotel in
Washington, except that he there inserted a clause in regard to
the question then pending in the Supreme Court, as one that would
dispose of a vexed and dangerous topic by the highest judicial
authority of the land. When the time came to leave Wheatland for
the capital, preliminary to his inauguration, Mr. Buchanan, Miss
Lane, Miss Hetty and I drove into Lancaster in his carriage,
escorted all the way to the railway station by a great and
enthusiastic crowd of Lancaster citizens and personal friends,
with a band of music, although it was very early on a bleak winter
morning. I remember his modestly remarking upon the vast crowd
thus doing reverence to a mortal man. At the station he was met by
an ardent personal and political friend, Robert Magraw, then
president of the Northern Central Railroad, and received into a
special car, built for the occasion, and the windows of which were
in colors and represented familiar scenes of and about Wheatland.
After receiving ovations all along the way, especially at
Baltimore, the President-elect and party arrived safely in
Washington. We were somewhat fearful that Mr. Buchanan might be
seriously embarrassed during the inaugural ceremonies from the
effects of what was then known as the National Hotel disease, a
disorder which, from no cause that we could then discover, had
attacked nearly every guest at the house, and from the dire
effects of which many never wholly recovered. Dr. Foltz, a naval
surgeon, whose appointment in the service, many years before, Mr.
Buchanan had assisted, was in constant attendance upon him, and I
remember that he and I went together to the Capitol in a carriage
just behind the one that conveyed the retiring President and the
President-elect, and that he had occasion to administer remedies.
The inauguration ceremonies, the ball, and the first reception at
the White House by the new President, were very largely attended
and successful. It happened that they took place during a short
era of good feeling among all shades of politics and party, but
unhappily an era of peace destined soon to terminate in bitter
discord over the Lecompton Constitution, or Kansas question, and
by the more disastrous following appeal to the passions of the two
great political sections of the North and the South, which so
nearly ended the administration in blood. The dinners at the White
House, during the first year, were attended by Republicans as well
as Democrats, with great seeming friendship and good-will.
The Inaugural Address of the new President was as follows:
FELLOW-CITIZENS: I appear before you this day to take the solemn
oath “that I will faithfully execute the office of President of
the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.”
In entering upon this great office, I most humbly invoke the God
of our fathers for wisdom and firmness to execute its high and
responsible duties in such a manner as to restore harmony and
ancient friendship among the people of the several States, and to
preserve our free institutions throughout many generations.
Convinced that I owe my election to the inherent love for the
Constitution and the Union which still animates the hearts of the
American people, let me earnestly ask their powerful support in
sustaining all just measures calculated to perpetuate these, the
richest political blessings which Heaven has ever bestowed upon
any nation. Having determined not to become a candidate for
re-election, I shall have no motive to influence my conduct in
administering the government except the desire ably and faithfully
to serve my country, and to live in the grateful memory of my
countrymen.
We have recently passed through a presidential contest in which
the passions of our fellow-citizens were excited to the highest
degree by questions of deep and vital importance; but when the
people proclaimed their will, the tempest at once subsided, and
all was calm.
The voice of the majority, speaking in the manner prescribed by
the Constitution, was heard, and instant submission followed. Our
own country could alone have exhibited so grand and striking a
spectacle of the capacity of man for self-government.
What a happy conception, then, was it for Congress to apply this
simple rule—that the will of the majority shall govern—to the
settlement of the question of domestic slavery in the Territories!
Congress is neither “to legislate slavery into any Territory or
State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people
thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic
institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of
the United States.” As a natural consequence, Congress has also
prescribed that, when the Territory of Kansas shall be admitted as
a State, it “shall be received into the Union, with or without
slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at the time of their
admission.”
A difference of opinion has arisen in regard to the point of time
when the people of a Territory shall decide this question for
themselves.
This is, happily, a matter of but little practical importance.
Besides, it is a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to
the Supreme Court of the United States, before whom it is now
pending, and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally
settled. To their decision, in common with all good citizens, I
shall cheerfully submit, whatever this may be, though it has ever
been my individual opinion that, under the Nebraska-Kansas act,
the appropriate period will be when the number of actual residents
in the Territory shall justify the formation of a constitution
with a view to its admission as a State into the Union. But be
this as it may, it is the imperative and indispensable duty of the
government of the United States to secure to every resident
inhabitant the free and independent expression of his opinion by
his vote. This sacred right of each individual must be preserved.
That being accomplished, nothing can be fairer than to leave the
people of a Territory free from all foreign interference, to
decide their own destiny for themselves, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States.
The whole territorial question being thus settled upon the
principle of popular sovereignty—a principle as ancient as free
government itself—everything of a practical nature has been
decided. No other question remains for adjustment; because all
agree that, under the Constitution, slavery in the States is
beyond the reach of any human power, except that of the respective
States themselves wherein it exists. May we not, then, hope that
the long agitation on this subject is approaching its end, and
that the geographical parties to which it has given birth, so much
dreaded by the Father of his Country, will speedily become
extinct? Most happy will it be for the country when the public
mind shall be diverted from this question to others of more
pressing and practical importance. Throughout the whole progress
of this agitation, which has scarcely known any intermission for
more than twenty years, whilst it has been productive of no
positive good to any human being, it has been the prolific source
of great evils to the master, the slave, and to the whole country.
It has alienated and estranged the people of the sister States
from each other, and has even seriously endangered the very
existence of the Union. Nor has the danger yet entirely ceased.
Under our system there is a remedy for all mere political evils in
the sound sense and sober judgment of the people. Time is a great
corrective. Political subjects which but a few years ago excited
and exasperated the public mind have passed away and are now
nearly forgotten. But this question of domestic slavery is of far
graver importance than any mere political question, because,
should the agitation continue, it may eventually endanger the
personal safety of a large portion of our countrymen where the
institution exists. In that event, no form of government, however
admirable in itself, and however productive of material benefits,
can compensate for the loss of peace and domestic security around
the family altar. Let every Union-loving man, therefore, exert his
best influence to suppress this agitation, which, since the recent
legislation of Congress, is without any legitimate object.
It is an evil omen of the times that men have undertaken to
calculate the mere material value of the Union. Reasoned estimates
have been presented of the pecuniary profits and local advantages
which would result to different States and sections from its
dissolution, and of the comparative injuries which such an event
would inflict on other States and sections. Even descending to
this low and narrow view of the mighty question, all such
calculations are at fault. The bare reference to a single
consideration will be conclusive on this point. We at present
enjoy a free trade throughout our extensive and expanding country,
such as the world has never witnessed. This trade is conducted on
railroads and canals—on noble rivers and arms of the sea—which
bind together the north and the south, the east and the west of
our confederacy. Annihilate this trade, arrest its free progress
by the geographical lines of jealous and hostile States, and you
destroy the prosperity and onward march of the whole and every
part, and involve all in one common ruin. But such considerations,
important as they are in themselves, sink into insignificance when
we reflect on the terrific evils which would result from disunion
to every portion of the confederacy—to the north not more than to
the south, to the east not more than to the west. These I shall
not attempt to portray; because I feel an humble confidence that
the kind Providence which inspired our fathers with wisdom to
frame the most perfect form of Government and Union ever devised
by man will not suffer it to perish until it shall have been
peacefully instrumental, by its example, in the extension of civil
and religious liberty throughout the world.
Next in importance to the maintenance of the Constitution and the
Union is the duty of preserving the government free from the
taint, or even the suspicion, of corruption. Public virtue is the
vital spirit of republics; and history shows that when this has
decayed, and the love of money has usurped its place, although the
forms of free government may remain for a season, the substance
has departed forever.
Our present financial condition is without a parallel in history.
No nation has ever before been embarrassed from too large a
surplus in its treasury. This almost necessarily gives birth to
extravagant legislation. It produces wild schemes of expenditure,
and begets a race of speculators and jobbers, whose ingenuity is
exerted in contriving and promoting expedients to obtain public
money. The purity of official agents, whether rightfully or
wrongfully, is suspected, and the character of the government
suffers in the estimation of the people. This is in itself a very
great evil.
The natural mode of relief from this embarrassment is to
appropriate the surplus in the treasury to great national objects,
for which a clear warrant can be found in the Constitution. Among
these I might mention the extinguishment of the public debt, a
reasonable increase of the navy, which is at present inadequate to
the protection of our vast tonnage afloat, now greater than that
of any other nation, as well as to the defence of our extended
seacoast.
It is beyond all question the true principle, that no more revenue
ought to be collected from the people than the amount necessary to
defray the expenses of a wise, economical, and efficient
administration of the government. To reach this point, it was
necessary to resort to a modification of the tariff; and this has,
I trust, been accomplished in such a manner as to do as little
injury as may have been practicable to our domestic manufactures,
especially those necessary for the defence of the country. Any
discrimination against a particular branch, for the purpose of
benefiting favored corporations, individuals, or interests, would
have been unjust to the rest of the community, and inconsistent
with that spirit of fairness and equality which ought to govern in
the adjustment of a revenue tariff.
But the squandering of the public money sinks into comparative
insignificance as a temptation to corruption when compared with
the squandering of the public lands.
No nation in the tide of time has ever been blessed with so rich
and noble an inheritance as we enjoy in the public lands. In
administering this important trust, whilst it may be wise to grant
portions of them for the improvement of the remainder, yet we
should never forget that it is our cardinal policy to reserve
these lands, as much as may be, for actual settlers, and this at
moderate prices. We shall thus not only best promote the
prosperity of the new States and Territories by furnishing them a
hardy and independent race of honest and industrious citizens, but
shall secure homes for our children and our children’s children,
as well as for those exiles from foreign shores who may seek in
this country to improve their condition, and to enjoy the
blessings of civil and religious liberty. Such emigrants have done
much to promote the growth and prosperity of the country. They
have proved faithful both in peace and in war. After becoming
citizens, they are entitled, under the Constitution and laws, to
be placed on a perfect equality with native-born citizens, and in
this character they should ever be kindly recognized.
The Federal Constitution is a grant from the States to Congress of
certain specific powers; and the question whether this grant
should be liberally or strictly construed, has, more or less,
divided political parties from the beginning. Without entering
into the argument, I desire to state, at the commencement of my
administration, that long experience and observation have
convinced me that a strict construction of the powers of the
Government is the only true, as well as the only safe, theory of
the Constitution. Whenever, in our past history, doubtful powers
have been exercised by Congress, these have never failed to
produce injurious and unhappy consequences. Many such instances
might be adduced, if this were the proper occasion. Neither is it
necessary for the public service to strain the language of the
Constitution; because all the great and useful powers required for
a successful administration of the Government, both in peace and
in war, have been granted, either in express terms or by the
plainest implication.
Whilst deeply convinced of these truths, I yet consider it clear
that, under the war-making power, Congress may appropriate money
towards the construction of a military road, when this is
absolutely necessary for the defence of any State or Territory of
the Union against foreign invasion. Under the Constitution,
Congress has power “to declare war,” “to raise and support
armies,” “to provide and maintain a navy,” and to call forth the
militia to “repel invasions.” Thus endowed, in an ample manner,
with the war-making power, the corresponding duty is required that
“the United States shall protect each of them [the States] against
invasion.” Now, how is it possible to afford this protection to
California and our Pacific possessions, except by means of a
military road through the Territories of the United States, over
which men and munitions of war may be speedily transported from
the Atlantic States to meet and to repel the invader? In the event
of a war with a naval power much stronger than our own, we should
then have no other available access to the Pacific coast, because
such a power would instantly close the route across the isthmus of
Central America. It is impossible to conceive that, whilst the
Constitution has expressly required Congress to defend all the
States, it should yet deny to them, by any fair construction, the
only possible means by which one of these States can be defended.
Besides, the Government, ever since its origin, has been in the
constant practice of constructing military roads. It might also be
wise to consider whether the love for the Union which now animates
our fellow-citizens on the Pacific coast may not be impaired by
our neglect or refusal to provide for them, in their remote and
isolated condition, the only means by which the power of the
States, on this side of the Rocky Mountains, can reach them in
sufficient time to “protect” them “against invasion.” I forbear
for the present from expressing an opinion as to the wisest and
most economical mode in which the Government can lend its aid in
accomplishing this great and necessary work. I believe that many
of the difficulties in the way, which now appear formidable, will,
in a great degree, vanish as soon as the nearest and best route
shall have been satisfactorily ascertained.
It may be proper that, on this occasion, I should make some brief
remarks in regard to our rights and duties as a member of the
great family of nations. In our intercourse with them there are
some plain principles, approved by our own experience, from which
we should never depart. We ought to cultivate peace, commerce, and
friendship with all nations; and this not merely as the best means
of promoting our own material interests, but in a spirit of
Christian benevolence towards our fellow-men, wherever their lot
may be cast. Our diplomacy should be direct and frank, neither
seeking to obtain more nor accepting less than is our due. We
ought to cherish a sacred regard for the independence of all
nations, and never attempt to interfere in the domestic concerns
of any, unless this shall be imperatively required by the great
laws of self-preservation. To avoid entangling alliances has been
a maxim of our policy ever since the days of Washington, and its
wisdom no one will attempt to dispute. In short, we ought to do
justice, in a kindly spirit, to all nations, and require justice
from them in return.
It is our glory that, whilst other nations have extended their
dominions by the sword, we have never acquired any territory
except by fair purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, by the
voluntary determination of a brave, kindred, and independent
people to blend their destinies with our own. Even our
acquisitions from Mexico form no exception. Unwilling to take
advantage of the fortune of war against a sister republic, we
purchased these possessions, under the treaty of peace, for a sum
which was considered at the time a fair equivalent. Our past
history forbids that we shall in the future acquire territory,
unless this be sanctioned by the laws of justice and honor. Acting
on this principle, no nation will have a right to interfere or to
complain if, in the progress of events, we shall still further
extend our possessions. Hitherto, in all our acquisitions, the
people, under the protection of the American flag, have enjoyed
civil and religious liberty, as well as equal and just laws, and
have been contented, prosperous, and happy. Their trade with the
rest of the world has rapidly increased, and thus every commercial
nation has shared largely in their successful progress.
I shall now proceed to take the oath prescribed by the
Constitution, whilst humbly invoking the blessing of Divine
Providence on this great people.
In the selection of his cabinet, the President followed the
long-established custom of making it a representation of the
different portions of the Union, so far as might be consistent with
a proper regard for personal qualifications for the different posts.
The cabinet, which was confirmed by the Senate on the 6th day of
March, 1857, consisted of Lewis Cass, of Michigan, Secretary of
State; Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury; John B.
Floyd, of Virginia, Secretary of War; Isaac Toucey, of Connecticut,
Secretary of the Navy; Aaron V. Brown, of Tennessee, Postmaster
General; Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior;
and Jeremiah S. Black, of Pennsylvania, Attorney General. So far as
was practicable within the limits of a selection which, according to
invariable usage and sound policy was confined to the Democratic
party, this cabinet was a fair representation of the Eastern, the
Middle, the Western and the Southern States.
The state of the country, however, when this administration was
organized, was ominous to its internal peace and welfare. The
preceding administration of President Pierce had left a legacy of
trouble to his successor in the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.
Had it not been for this ill-advised step, the country might have
reposed upon the settlement of all the slavery questions that was
made by the “Compromise Measures” of 1850. How the flood-gates of
sectional controversy were again opened by the repeal of the earlier
settlement of 1820, and how this repeal tended to unsettle what had
been happily settled in 1850, is a sad chapter in our political
history.
The repeal of the Missouri Compromise was effected in the following
manner: In the session of 1854, Senator Douglas, chairman of the
Senate Committee on Territories, reported a bill for the
establishment of a Territorial government in Nebraska. It did not
touch the Missouri Compromise; and, being in the usual form, it
would probably have been passed without much opposition, but for the
intervention of a Senator from Kentucky, Mr. Dixon. He gave notice,
on the 16th of January, that when the bill should be reached in its
order, he would move a section repealing the Missouri Compromise,
both as to Nebraska and all other Territories of the United States.
Mr. Dixon was a Whig, and Mr. Douglas was a prominent and most
energetic Democrat, who had long been an aspirant to the Presidency.
Conceiving the idea that a new doctrine respecting the sovereign
right of the people of a Territory to determine for themselves
whether they would or would not have slavery while they were in the
Territorial condition, would better reconcile both sections of the
Union than the continuance of the Missouri Compromise, he introduced
a substitute for the original bill, which, after dividing Nebraska
into two Territories, calling one Nebraska and the other Kansas,
annulled the Missouri Compromise in regard to these and all other
Territories. This he called, “Non-intervention by Congress with
slavery in the States or Territories,” which his bill declared was
the principle of the settlement of 1850, although that settlement
had not only not invalidated the Missouri Compromise, but that
Compromise had been expressly recognized in the case of Texas. Mr.
Dixon expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with Mr. Douglas’s
new bill, and the latter, being a man of great power, both as a
debater and as a politician, carried his bill through the two
Houses, and persuaded President Pierce to approve it. It was long
and disastrously known as “the Kansas-Nebraska Act.”
Its discussion in Congress was attended with heats such as had not
been witnessed for many years. It laid the foundation for the
political success of the party then beginning to be known as the
Republican, and it produced the hopeless disruption of the
Democratic party when its nomination for the Presidency next after
Mr. Buchanan’s was to be made. Proud, disdainful of the predictions
made by others of the danger to the Union arising from his measure,
confident in his own energies and his ability to unite the
Democratic party in the South and in the North upon his principle of
“non-intervention,” Mr. Douglas gained a momentary triumph at the
expense of his own political future, of the future of his party, and
of the peace of the Union. For a time, however, it seemed as if he
had secured a following that would insure the acceptance of his
principle. All the Southern Senators, Whigs and Democrats, with two
exceptions,[29] and all the Northern Democratic Senators, with three
exceptions,[30] voted for his bill. The Whig Senators from the
North, and those who more distinctively represented the Northern
anti-slavery, or “Free-soil” sentiment, voted against it; but the
latter hailed it as a means that would consolidate the North into a
great political organization, with freedom inscribed upon its
banners. Mr. Buchanan, it will be remembered, was at this time in
England.
Footnote 29:
Mr. Bell, of Tennessee, and Mr. Clayton, of Delaware.
Footnote 30:
Messrs. Allen and James, of Rhode Island, and Mr. Walker, of
Wisconsin.
He has said that although down to this period the anti-slavery party
of the North had been the assailing party and kept the people of the
South in constant irritation, yet, “in sustaining the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise the Senators and Representatives of the Southern
States became the aggressors themselves.”[31] And it was one of the
worst features of this aggression that it was made under the lead of
a Northern Democrat; for if the repeal of the Missouri Compromise
was a boon offered to the South, they could say that it was a boon
offered from the North.[32]
Footnote 31:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 28.
Footnote 32:
It must be remembered that this took place long before the case of
“Dred Scott” had been acted upon in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
The fatal effects of this measure were two-fold; first in unsettling
what had been settled in 1850, and secondly in precipitating a
struggle in Kansas as between the pro-slavery and the anti-slavery
parties, which, although it was local, spread itself in opposite
sympathies throughout the North and the South. The Compromise
Measures of 1850 had settled every possible question in relation to
slavery on which Congress could then or ever afterwards act.
Such was the general repose of the country upon these topics when
President Pierce was inaugurated, that he congratulated the country
upon the calm security now evinced by the public mind, and promised
that it should receive no shock during his official term, if he
could prevent it. But the shock came within two years, and it came
because the repeal of the Missouri Compromise threw open again the
whole question of slavery in the Territories, to remain an unending
sectional controversy until it had divided one great national party,
built up a new and sectional party, and finally rent the Union into
a geographical array of section against section.
The more immediate and local effect remains to be described. Kansas
at once became the theatre where the extreme men of both sections
entered into a deadly conflict, the one party to make it a free, the
other to make it a slaveholding Territory and State. Congress having
abdicated its duty of fixing the character of the Territory by law,
one way or the other, the beauty of Mr. Douglas’s principle of
“non-intervention,” now become popularly known in the political
jargon of the day as “squatter sovereignty,” had ample room for
development. What one party could do, on this principle, the other
could do. The Southern pro-slavery settler, or his sympathizer in
the Southern State which he had left, could claim that his slaves
were property in Kansas as much as in Missouri, or Tennessee, or
Kentucky. The Northern anti-slavery settler, or his sympathizer in
the Northern State from which he had come, could contend that
slavery was local and confined to the States where it existed.
Fierce war arose between the parties in their struggle for local
supremacy; both parties were respectively upheld and supplied by
their sympathizers in the near and in the distant States, North and
South; scenes of bloodshed and rapine ensued; and the bitter fruits
of opening a fine Territory to such a contest were reaped in an
abundance that made sober men stand aghast at the spectacle.
It was when Mr. Buchanan entered upon the duties of the Presidency
that this condition of things in Kansas came to its culmination. The
pro-slavery party in the Territory, in general violent and lawless
enough, in one respect kept themselves on the side of law. They
sustained the Territorial government which had been organized under
the Act of Congress, and obtained control of its legislature. The
anti-slavery party repudiated this legislature, alleging, with some
truth, that frauds and violence had been committed in the election.
To meet this wrong they committed another. They held a convention at
Topeka, framed a State constitution, elected a governor and
legislature to take the place of those who were governing the
Territory under the organic law, and applied to Congress for
admission into the Union. They had thus put themselves out of pale
of law. Congress at the end of a violent struggle rejected the
application for admission into the Union, under the Topeka
constitution, and recognized the authority of the Territorial
government. This took place in the session of Congress which
terminated on the day before Mr. Buchanan’s inauguration. As
President of the United States, he had no alternative but to
recognize and uphold the Territorial government. The fact that the
legislature of that government was in the hands of the pro-slavery
party, made the course which he adopted seem as if he favored their
pro-slavery designs, while, in truth, he had no object to subserve
but to sustain, as he was officially obliged to sustain, the
government which Congress had recognized as the lawful government of
the Territory.
This government at once proceded to call a convention, to assemble
at Lecompton, and frame a State constitution. It was now the
President’s hope that the anti-slavery party would cease their
opposition to the Territorial government, obey the laws, and elect
delegates to the Lecompton convention in sufficient number to insure
a free constitution. But for the ten months which followed from the
4th of March, 1857, to the first Monday in January, 1858, this party
continued to adhere to their Topeka constitution, and to defy the
Territorial government. In the meantime the peace had to be kept by
troops of the United States to prevent open war between the two
parties.
The President, soon after his inauguration, sent the Hon. Robert J.
Walker to Kansas, as Territorial governor, in place of Governor
Geary, who had resigned. Governor Walker was directed, if possible,
to persuade the anti-slavery party to unite with their opponents in
forming a State constitution, and to take care that the election of
delegates to the convention should be conducted so as to express the
true voice of the people on the question of slavery or freedom. The
governor performed this duty with entire impartiality. The laws
which provided for the election of delegates to the convention, and
for the registration of voters, were just and equitable. The
governor administered them fairly; he exhorted the whole body of
registered electors to vote. Nevertheless, the party that adhered to
the Topeka government and refused to recognize the Territorial
legislature, stayed away from the polls. The consequence was that a
large majority of pro-slavery delegates were elected to the
convention which was alone authorized, under the principles which,
in this country, recognize the sovereignty of the people, and
require it to be exercised through the ballot-box, under the
superintendence of the existing government, to form a constitution.
While these things were taking place in Kansas, in the summer of
1857, while a portion of the inhabitants were in a state of
rebellion against the only government that had any lawful authority;
while the friends of freedom were setting the example of disloyalty
to the established authority of the Territory, and the friends of
slavery were, in one respect, the law-abiding part of the community;
while the revolutionary Topeka legislature was in session, claiming
to be the lawful legislature, and a turbulent and dangerous military
leader was at the head of the anti-slavery party, in open opposition
to the only lawful government of the Territory, presses and pulpits
throughout the North teemed with denunciations of the new President,
who had not allowed revolutionary violence to prevail over the law
of the land. At length there came from the State of Connecticut a
memorial to the President, signed by forty-three of its
distinguished citizens, among them several eminent clergymen,
imputing to him a violation of his official oath, and informing him
that they prayed the Almighty to preserve him from the errors of his
ways. To this he replied with spirit and with a clear exposition of
the mistakes into which ignorant zeal in the cause of freedom had
led those who thus addressed him. His reply, dated August 15, 1857,
is worthy of being reproduced:
“When I entered upon the duties of the Presidential office, on the
fourth of March last, what was the condition of Kansas? This
Territory had been organized under the Act of Congress of 30th
May, 1854, and the government in all its branches was in full
operation. A governor, secretary of the Territory, chief justice,
two associate justices, a marshal, and district attorney had been
appointed by my predecessor, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, and were all engaged in discharging their respective
duties. A code of laws had been enacted by the Territorial
legislature, and the judiciary were employed in expounding and
carrying these laws into effect. It is quite true that a
controversy had previously arisen respecting the validity of the
election of members of the Territorial legislature and of the laws
passed by them; but at the time I entered upon my official duties,
Congress had recognized this legislature in different forms and by
different enactments. The delegate elected to the House of
Representatives, under a Territorial law, had just completed his
term of service on the day previous to my inauguration. In fact, I
found the government of Kansas as well established as that of any
other Territory. Under these circumstances, what was my duty? Was
it not to sustain this government? to protect it from the violence
of lawless men, who were determined either to rule or ruin? to
prevent it from being overturned by force? in the language of the
Constitution, to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed?’
It was for this purpose, and this alone, that I ordered a military
force to Kansas to act as a posse comitatus in aiding the civil
magistrate to carry the laws into execution. The condition of the
Territory at the time, which I need not portray, rendered this
precaution absolutely necessary. In this state of affairs, would I
not have been justly condemned had I left the marshal and other
officers of a like character impotent to execute the process and
judgments of courts of justice established by Congress, or by the
Territorial legislature under its express authority, and thus have
suffered the government itself to become an object of contempt in
the eyes of the people? And yet this is what you designate as
forcing ‘the people of Kansas to obey laws not their own, nor of
the United States’; and for doing which you have denounced me as
having violated my solemn oath. I ask, what else could I have
done, or ought I to have done? Would you have desired that I
should abandon the Territorial government, sanctioned as it had
been by Congress, to illegal violence, and thus renew the scenes
of civil war and bloodshed which every patriot in the country had
deplored? This would, indeed, have been to violate my oath of
office, and to fix a damning blot on the character of my
administration.
“I most cheerfully admit that the necessity for sending a military
force to Kansas to aid in the execution of the civil law, reflects
no credit upon the character of our country. But let the blame
fall upon the heads of the guilty. Whence did this necessity
arise? A portion of the people of Kansas, unwilling to trust to
the ballot-box—the certain American remedy for the redress of all
grievances—undertook to create an independent government for
themselves. Had this attempt proved successful, it would of course
have subverted the existing government, prescribed and recognized
by Congress, and substituted a revolutionary government in its
stead. This was a usurpation of the same character as it would be
for a portion of the people of Connecticut to undertake to
establish a separate government within its chartered limits for
the purpose of redressing any grievance, real or imaginary, of
which they might have complained against the legitimate State
government. Such a principle, if carried into execution, would
destroy all lawful authority and produce universal anarchy.”
And again: “I thank you for the assurances that you will ‘not
refrain from the prayer that Almighty God will make my
administration an example of justice and beneficence.’ You can
greatly aid me in arriving at this blessed consummation, by
exerting your influence in allaying the existing sectional
excitement on the subject of slavery, which has been productive of
much evil and no good, and which, if it could succeed in attaining
its object, would ruin the slave as well as his master. This would
be a work of genuine philanthropy. Every day of my life I feel how
inadequate I am to perform the duties of my high station without
the continued support of Divine Providence, yet, placing my trust
in Him and in Him alone, I entertain a good hope that He will
enable me to do equal justice to all portions of the Union, and
thus render me an humble instrument in restoring peace and harmony
among the people of the several States.”
The condition of Kansas continued for some time longer to be
disturbed by the revolutionary proceedings of the adherents of the
Topeka constitution. The inhabitants of the city of Lawrence
undertook to organize an insurrection throughout the Territory. This
town had been mainly established by the abolition societies of the
Eastern States. It had some respectable and well behaved citizens,
but it was the headquarters of paid agitators, in the employment of
certain anti-slavery organizations. It became necessary for Governor
Walker to suppress this threatened insurrection. The military leader
of the Free State party undertook, in July, to organize his party
into volunteers, and to take the names of all who refused
enrollment. The professed purpose of this organization was to
protect the polls at an election in August of a new Topeka
legislature. Many of the conservative citizens, who had hitherto
acted with the Free State party, were subjected to personal outrages
for refusing to be enrolled. To meet this revolutionary military
organization, and to prevent the establishment of an insurrectionary
government at Lawrence, the Territorial Governor had to retain in
Kansas a large body of United States troops. The insurgent general
and his military staff denied the authority of the Territorial laws,
and counselled the people not to participate in the elections
ordered under the authority of the Lecompton convention.[33]
Footnote 33:
Governor Walker’s despatches to the Secretary of State, July 15th,
20th and 27th, 1857.
The Lecompton convention, which met for the second time on the 2d of
September, and then proceeded to frame a State constitution,
adjourned on the 7th of November. Although this constitution
recognized slavery, the convention took steps to submit the question
to the people of the Territory, in a free ballot, by all the white
male inhabitants, before it should be sent to Congress for admission
into the Union. It would have been more regular to have submitted
the whole constitution to the people, although the organic Act did
not require it; but on the question of slavery, which was the vital
one, it can not be pretended that the convention acted unfairly. The
election was directed to be held on the 21st of December, (1857),
and the ballots were to be “Constitution with Slavery,” and
“Constitution with no Slavery.” Thus the opportunity was again
presented for the people of the Territory to vote upon the question
on which they were divided; and again the anti-slavery party, with
the exception of a few hundred of the voters, abstained from voting.
The result was that there were 6,226 votes in favor of the
“Constitution with Slavery,” and only 569 against it.
The Lecompton constitution provided for holding an election of State
officers, a legislature and a member of Congress, on the first
Monday of January, 1858. The President sent instructions to the
Territorial governor which secured a peaceable election. A larger
vote was polled than at any previous election. The party which had
previously refused to vote, now changed their tactics. They elected
a large majority of the members of the legislature, and the
political power of the proposed new State was therefore in their
hands. But for their previous factional resistance to the authority
of the Territorial government, they might have attained this result
at a much earlier period.
On the 30th of January, 1858, the President received the so-called
Lecompton constitution from the president of the convention, with a
request that it be laid before Congress. And here it is necessary to
pause, for the purpose of a just understanding of the grounds on
which the President recommended the admission of Kansas with this
constitution. He was assailed with almost every epithet of
vituperation of which our language admits, as if he was responsible
for and in favor of the pro-slavery feature of this constitution. A
simple and truthful consideration of his official duty under the
organic Act by which the Territory was organized, and a candid
recital of the reasons on which he urged the admission of the State
with this constitution, will enable my readers to determine with
what justice he was treated in this matter.
Mr. Buchanan was elected President upon a political “platform,”
adopted by the Cincinnati Convention, which nominated him, and
which, like all the platforms of that period, dealt, among other
things, with the vexed subject of slavery in Territories. But the
Cincinnati platform of the Democratic party did not affirm the right
of a Territorial legislature to establish or to prohibit slavery:
nor did it admit the doctrine of “popular sovereignty,” as applied
to a people while in the Territorial condition. What it did affirm
was, that at the period when the people of a Territory should be
forming and adopting a State constitution, they should be allowed to
sanction or exclude slavery as they should see fit. This distinction
has of course no interest at the present day. But in the condition
of the Union in the year 1856, this distinction was of great
practical importance. The political men who framed the Cincinnati
platform had to consider how they could present to the people of the
United States a principle of action on this exciting topic of
slavery in the Territories, that would be consistent with the rights
of slave-holding and non-slaveholding States in the common property
of the Union, and at the same time affirm as a party doctrine a
basis of proceeding that could be safely applied in any Territory
and that would maintain its true relation as a Territory to the
Government of the United States. If they were in pursuit of votes
for their candidate, it should also be remembered that they were
preparing for a great national party a set of political principles
that would live and be active for a long time to come. Mr. Douglas
had caused the Missouri Compromise to be swept away; he had procured
the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which had affirmed something
that was both new and strange in the politics of this difficult
subject. This was, that in creating the body politic known as a
Territory of the United States, Congress should neither legalize nor
prohibit slavery while the Territorial condition continued, but that
the same species of “popular sovereignty” should be held to be
inherent in the people of a Territory that is inherent in the people
of a State, so that they could act on the subject of slavery for
themselves from the time of their first entry into the Territory and
before they had been authorized to form themselves into a State. The
ad captandum phrase “popular sovereignty” procured for this theory
many adherents. But it was irreconcilable with what others asserted
to be the true relation of a Territory to the Congress of the United
States, and equally irreconcilable with the claim of the Southern
slaveholder to go into a Territory with his property in slaves and
to maintain there that property until the State constitution had
sanctioned or prohibited it. The framers of the Cincinnati platform
did not propose to elect a President on this basis. They therefore
did not affirm that a Territorial legislature, or the people of a
Territory, should be allowed to act on the subject of slavery in any
way; but they proclaimed as their doctrine that when the people of a
Territory, acting under the authority of an organic law, should
frame and adopt a State constitution, they should be at liberty to
make their State free or slave as they might see fit.
Before this period the Cincinnati platform was silent; and it was
silent because its framers did not see fit to trammel themselves or
their candidate with a doctrine of “popular sovereignty”
irreconcilable with the governing authority of Congress, and also
because in this matter of slavery there was a question of property
involved. When, therefore, Mr. Buchanan accepted the Cincinnati
platform, and was elected upon it, he went into the office of
President without being in any way committed to the doctrine of
“popular sovereignty,” as expounded by Mr. Douglas.
But the Kansas-Nebraska Act was both a bone of contention between
two portions of the Democratic party and a law of the land. As
President, Mr. Buchanan had only to construe and administer it. It
contained, as explanatory of the purpose of Congress in abolishing
the Missouri Compromise restriction, the following declaration: “It
being the true intent and meaning of this Act not to legislate
slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom,
but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate
their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States.” This was in one respect
ambiguous, and in another not so. It was ambiguous in not clearly
defining the time at which this right to form their own domestic
institutions was to be considered as inhering in the people of a
Territory. It was unambiguous in subordinating the exercise of this
right to the Constitution of the United States. In carrying out the
law, the President had to consider what was the limitation imposed
by the Constitution of the United States upon the operation of this
newly created right. This brought before him the action of the
Supreme Court of the United States on the subject of slave property
in the Territories, which had occurred a few days after his
inauguration.
Whatever may be said of the action of the Supreme Court in the
well-known case of “Dred Scott,” in regard to its being technically
a judicial decision, there can be no doubt as to what a majority of
the judges meant to affirm and did affirm in their respective
opinions.[34] This was that property in slaves, being recognized as
a right of property by the Constitution of the United States,
although established only by the local law of a particular State,
travelled with the person of the owner into a Territory; and while
the Territorial condition continued, such property could not be
abolished by the legislation of Congress or the legislation of the
Territorial government. Mr. Buchanan always regarded this as a
judicial decision of this question of property; and as the
construction of the Kansas-Nebraska Act was by its express terms to
be determined by the court, he considered it his duty to regard the
period of time on which the people of Kansas were to decide the
question of slavery or no slavery to be at the formation and
adoption of a State constitution. This was the clear deduction to be
drawn from the constitutional doctrine which had been enunciated by
a majority of the judges.
Footnote 34:
I have more than once publicly expressed my belief that there was,
technically speaking, no judicial decision in that case. But
others, among them President Buchanan, always regarded it as a
“decision.”
Hence it was that all his official influence was exerted, through
the Territorial government, to induce the people of Kansas to act on
the question of slavery at the proper time and in the only practical
way: namely, by voting for delegates to the convention called under
the authority of the Territorial laws, and then voting on the
constitution which that convention should frame. It certainly was no
wish of his to have Kansas become a slaveholding State; he could
have no motive in the whole matter but to get it decided what her
domestic condition was to be, by the ballot-box instead of the
rifle, by voting and not by fighting. He could, by no sort of
justice, be held responsible for the result which was produced by
the refusal of the anti-slavery party to vote; and when the
Lecompton constitution reached him, he could not avoid submitting it
to Congress. He submitted it with a strong recommendation that
Kansas be received into the Union under it. His reasons for this
recommendation are now to be stated.
1. The Lecompton constitution was republican in form, and it had
been framed and voted upon in a free and open ballot, which the
convention had directed to be taken on the all-important question of
slavery. 2. The question of slavery was thus localized, confined to
the people whom it immediately concerned, and banished from the
halls of Congress, where it had been always exerting a baneful
influence upon the country at large. 3. If Congress, for the sake of
those who had refused to exercise their power of excluding slavery
from the constitution of Kansas, should now reject it because
slavery remained in it, the agitation would be renewed everywhere in
a more alarming form than it had yet assumed. 4. After the admission
of the State, its people would be sovereign over this and every
other domestic question; they could mould their institutions as they
should see fit, and if, as the President had every reason to
believe, a majority of the people were opposed to slavery, the
legislature already elected under this constitution could at once
provide for amending it in the proper manner. 5. If this
constitution should be sent back by Congress because it sanctioned
slavery, a second constitution would have to be framed and sent to
Congress, and there would be a revival of the slavery agitation,
both in Congress and throughout the Union. 6. The speedy admission
of Kansas, which would restore peace and harmony to the whole
country, was of infinitely greater consequence than the small
difference of time that would be required for the people to exercise
their own sovereign power over the whole subject after they had
become a State, compared with the process of a new convention to be
held under the auspices of the Territorial government.[35]
Footnote 35:
See the President’s message of February 28, 1858, submitting the
Lecompton constitution. In describing the President’s views on
this subject I have not only relied upon his messages and other
official papers, but I have drawn them also from an elaborate
private paper in his hand-writing, which is of too great length to
be inserted textually in this work. It relates to the construction
of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, a construction which he felt bound to
adopt in consequence of the views taken of the subject of slavery
in Territories by the Supreme Court, as he said in his inaugural
address that he should do. In this MS., he speaks of “The infamous
and unfounded assertion of Mr. ——, that in a conversation with
Chief Justice Taney, he [the Chief Justice] had informed him in
advance of the inaugural what the opinion [of the court] would
be.”
“This message,” says Mr. Buchanan, “gave rise to a long, exciting,
and occasionally violent debate in both Houses of Congress, between
the anti-slavery members and their opponents, which lasted for three
months. In the course of it, slavery was denounced in every form
which could exasperate the Southern people, and render it odious to
the people of the North; whilst on the other hand, many of the
speeches of Southern members displayed characteristic violence. Thus
two sessions of Congress in succession had been in a great degree
occupied with the same inflammatory topics, in discussing the
affairs of Kansas.”[36] At length, however, an Act which had been
reported by a committee of conference of both Houses, admitting
Kansas into the Union as a State under the Lecompton constitution,
was passed in the Senate by a vote of 31 to 22, and in the House by
a vote of 112 to 103, and was signed by the President on the 4th of
May, 1858.[37] The validity of the proceedings in Kansas which had
produced the Lecompton constitution was expressly admitted by the
preamble of this statute.
Footnote 36:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 45.
Footnote 37:
II U. S. Laws, p. 269. In the Senate, Mr. Douglas voted with the
minority, as did a few anti-Lecompton Democrats in the House.
[_Congressional Globe_, 1857-8, pp. 1899, 1905.] The Act was
carried by a party vote.
But the Act annexed a condition precedent to the final admission of
the State under this constitution. This related, not to slavery, but
to the public lands within the territory. The ordinance of the
convention which accompanied the Lecompton constitution demanded for
the State a cession of the public lands more than six times the
quantity that had ever been granted to any other State, when
received into the Union. Congress would not assent to such an
exaction. It was therefore provided that the people of the State
should vote upon a proposition reducing the number of acres to be
ceded to the same number that had been granted to other States; and
that when this proposition should have been ascertained by the
President’s proclamation to have been accepted, the admission of the
State, upon an equal footing with all the other States, should be
complete and absolute. But the condition was never fulfilled. The
people of Kansas rejected it on the 2d of August, 1858, and the
Lecompton constitution thus fell to the ground. “Notwithstanding
this,” Mr. Buchanan observes, “the recognition by Congress of the
regularity of the proceedings in forming the Lecompton constitution,
did much good, at least for a season. It diverted the attention of
the people from fighting to voting, a most salutary change.”[38]
Footnote 38:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 46.
In his next annual message, of December 6, 1858, the President said:
When we compare the condition of the country at the present day
with what it was one year ago, at the meeting of Congress, we have
much reason for gratitude to that Almighty Providence which has
never failed to interpose for our relief at the most critical
periods of our history. One year ago the sectional strife between
the North and the South on the dangerous subject of slavery had
again become so intense as to threaten the peace and perpetuity of
the confederacy. The application for the admission of Kansas as a
State into the Union fostered this unhappy agitation, and brought
the whole subject once more before Congress. It was the desire of
every patriot that such measures of legislation might be adopted
as would remove the excitement from the States and confine it to
the Territory where it legitimately belonged. Much has been done,
I am happy to say, towards the accomplishment of this object
during the last session of Congress.
The Supreme Court of the United States had previously decided that
all American citizens have an equal right to take into the
Territories whatever is held as property under the laws of any of
the States, and to hold such property there under the guardianship
of the Federal Constitution, so long as the Territorial condition
shall remain. This is now a well-established position, and the
proceedings of the last session were alone wanting to give it
practical effect.
The principle has been recognized, in some form or other, by an
almost unanimous vote of both Houses of Congress, that a Territory
has a right to come into the Union either as a free or a slave
State, according to the will of a majority of its people. The just
equality of all the States has thus been vindicated, and a
fruitful source of dangerous dissension among them has been
removed.
While such has been the beneficial tendency of your legislative
proceedings outside of Kansas, their influence has nowhere been so
happy as within that Territory itself. Left to manage and control
its own affairs in its own way, without the pressure of external
influence, the revolutionary Topeka organization, and all
resistance to the Territorial government established by Congress,
have been finally abandoned. As a natural consequence, that fine
Territory now appears to be tranquil and prosperous, and is
attracting increasing thousands of immigrants to make it their
happy home.
The past unfortunate experience of Kansas has enforced the lesson,
so often already taught, that resistance to lawful authority,
under our form of government, cannot fail in the end to prove
disastrous to its authors.
The people of Kansas, from this time forward, “left to manage their
own affairs in their own way, without the presence of external
influence,” found that they could decide this question of slavery by
their own votes, and that the stimulus and the materials for
fighting, which had been supplied to them from the Northern or the
Southern States, were poor means in comparison with the ballot-box.
The anti-slavery party were numerically the strongest; and having
now given up all factious resistance to the Territorial government,
they were able, under its auspices, to establish a free
constitution, under which the State was admitted into the Union on
the 29th of January, 1861. But the effect of this struggle,
precipitated by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and carried
on for a period of seven years, was most disastrous to the peace and
harmony of the Union. It fixed the attention of both sections of the
Union upon a subject of the most inflammatory nature. On the one
hand, the Democratic party, which extended throughout all the
States, slaveholding and non-slaveholding, and which had elected Mr.
Buchanan by the votes of both free and slave States, no longer had a
common bond of party union in a common principle of action on the
question of slavery in Territories. A portion of the party, under
the lead of Mr. Douglas, and known as “the Northern Democracy,”
rejected the doctrine enunciated by the Judges of the Supreme Court,
and still adhered to their principle of “popular sovereignty.” The
residue of the party, calling themselves “the Old Democracy,”
adhered to what they regarded as the decision of the court,
maintained that the time for the people of a Territory to act on the
subject of slavery was when forming and adopting a State
constitution, and that in the previous period, the equal right of
all the States in the common property of the Union could be
respected only by confining the power of the people of a Territory
to the time of adopting a constitution. On the other hand, the new
party, to which these events had given birth, and into which were
now consolidating all the elements of the anti-slavery feeling of
the free States, rejected entirely the principle enunciated by a
majority of the Supreme Court, maintained that the Southern
slave-holder could have no right to hold as property in a Territory
that which was property at all only under the local law of a
slave-holding State, and proclaimed that Congress must, by positive
statute, annul any such supposed right in regard to all existing and
all future Territories. If these conflicting sectional feelings and
interests could have been confined to the practical question of what
was to be done in the Territories before they should become States,
there might have been less danger resulting from their agitation. In
the nature of things, however, they could not be so confined. They
brought into renewed discussion the whole subject of slavery
everywhere, until the North and the South became involved in a
struggle for the Presidency that was made to turn almost exclusively
upon this one topic. But how this came about, and how it resulted in
an attempted disruption of the Union, must be related hereafter.
CHAPTER X.
1857-1861.
FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING MR. BUCHANAN’S ADMINISTRATION.
The internal affairs of the country during the administration of Mr.
Buchanan occupied so much of the public attention at the time, and
have since been a subject of so much interest, that his management
of our foreign relations has been quite obscured. Before I approach
the troubled period which witnessed the beginning of the Southern
revolt, I shall describe, with as much brevity as I can use,
whatever is most important in the relations of the United States
with other countries, that transpired during his Presidency.
It will be seen, hereafter, from what he recorded in his private
papers at the time of the resignation of General Cass from the State
Department, in the latter part of the year 1860, that Mr. Buchanan
had to be virtually his own Secretary of State, until Judge Black
succeeded to that office. This was less irksome to him than it might
have been to other Presidents, because of his great familiarity with
the diplomatic history of the country, and his experience in the
diplomatic service. His strong personal regard for General Cass,
whose high character, as well as his political standing in the party
of which they were both members, and the demand of the Western
States, had been the reasons for offering to him the Department of
State, made Mr. Buchanan patient and kind towards one who did not
render him much aid in the business of that office. Mr. Buchanan,
too, was a man who never shrank from labor. His industry was
incessant and untiring; it did not flag with his advancing years;
and it was an industry applied, in foreign affairs, to matters of
which he had a fuller and more intimate knowledge than any American
statesman of his time who was living when he became President of the
United States. His private papers bear ample testimony to the minute
and constant attention which he gave to the foreign relations of the
country, and to the extent of his employment of his own pen. He
wrote with great facility, precision and clearness, from a mind
stored with historical information and the principles of public law.
There was no topic and no question in the foreign relations of the
United States on which his knowledge did not come readily and
promptly to his hand. In this respect, with the exception of Mr.
Jefferson and Mr. John Quincy Adams, we have as yet had no President
who was his superior, or his equal. Like them, he had passed through
the office of Secretary of State, as well as through very important
foreign missions; an advantage which always tells in the office of
President, when it is combined with the qualifications that are
peculiar to American statesmanship.
First in importance, if not in dignity, the relations of the United
States with England, at any period of our history, and the mode in
which they were handled, are topics of permanent interest. How often
these two kindred nations have been on the verge of war, and how
that peril has been encountered and averted cannot cease to be
instructive. Nor is it of less consequence to note the course of a
President, who, during an administration fraught with the most
serious hazards to the internal relations of the United States with
each other, kept steadily in view the preservation of peace and good
will between the United States and Great Britain, while he abated
nothing from our just claims or our national dignity. Mr. Buchanan
left to his successor no unsettled question between these two
nations, that was of any immediate importance, and he left the
feeling between them and their respective governments in a far
better condition than he found it on his accession to the
Presidency, and in a totally different state from that which ensued
after the beginning of our civil war.
But when he became President, two irritating and dangerous questions
were pending, inherited from former administrations. The first of
these related, as we have seen, to the British claim of a
protectorate over the Mosquito coast, and to the establishment of
colonial government over the Bay Islands; territories that belonged
respectively to the feeble republics of Nicaragua and Honduras. It
has been seen in a former chapter how the ambiguity of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty had led the British government to adopt a
construction of it which would support these claims, and which would
justify the pretension that by that treaty the United States had
receded from what was called the “Monroe Doctrine.” This treaty,
concluded in 1850 by the administration of General Taylor, was
supposed in this country to have settled these questions in favor of
the United States, and that Great Britain would withdraw from the
territories of Nicaragua and Honduras. But she did not withdraw. Her
ministers continued to claim that the treaty only restrained her
from making future acquisitions in Central America, and that the
true inference from this was that she could hold her existing
possessions. It was, as has been seen, in the hope of settling this
question, that Mr. Buchanan accepted the mission to England in 1853.
Why it was not settled at that time, has been already stated in
detail. It remained to be amicably and honorably settled, under his
advice and approbation, after he became President, by treaties
between Great Britain and the two Central American States, in
accordance with the American construction of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty.
The long standing question in regard to the right of search came
into the hands of President Buchanan at a moment and under
circumstances that required the most vigorous action. The
belligerent right of search, exercised by Great Britain in the
maritime wars of 1812, had been a cause of constant irritation to
the people of this country. In progress of time, England undertook
to assert a right to detain and search merchantmen on the high seas,
in time of peace, suspected of being engaged in the slave trade.
There was no analogy, even, in this to the belligerent right of
visitation and search, whatever the latter might comprehend. An
accommodation, rather than a settlement, of this claim was made in
the treaty of 1842, negotiated between Lord Ashburton and Mr.
Webster, by which each nation agreed to keep a squadron of its own
on the coast of Africa, for the suppression of the slave trade when
carried on under their respective flags, or under any claim or use
of their flags, or by their subjects or citizens respectively.
Although this stipulation was accompanied by a very forcible
declaration made by Mr. Webster, under the direction of President
Tyler, that the American Government admitted of no right of
visitation and search of merchant vessels in time of peace, England
did not wholly abandon or renounce her claim of a right to detain
and search all vessels on the high seas which the commanders of her
cruisers might suspect to be slave traders. In the spring of 1858, a
number of small cruisers which had been employed in the Crimean war
was despatched by the British government to the coast of Cuba and
the Gulf of Mexico, with orders to search all merchantmen suspected
to be engaged in the slave trade. The presence of these cruisers,
acting under such orders, in waters traversed in all directions by
American vessels engaged in the foreign and coastwise trade, became
most alarming. Nor was the alarm lessened by the manner in which the
orders were carried out. Many American vessels were stopped and
searched rudely and offensively. A loud call was made upon the
President to interfere. A general indignation broke forth in all
quarters of the Union. President Buchanan, always vigilant in
protecting the commerce of the country, but mindful of the
importance of preventing any necessity for war, remonstrated to the
English government against this violation of the freedom of the
seas.
Still, the occasion required, in the opinion of the President, that
remonstrance should be backed by force. Great Britain had thought
proper, without warning, to send a force into waters filled with
American commerce, with orders to do what she had not the smallest
right to do. It was a very aggressive proceeding to be taken against
the commerce of a nation that had always denied the alleged right of
search as a right to be exercised in time of peace for any purpose
whatever. A very large naval force was at once despatched to the
neighborhood of Cuba, by order of the President, with instructions
“to protect all vessels of the United States on the high seas from
search or detention by the vessels of war of any other nation.” Any
one of the cruisers sent on this mission could have resisted a ship
of the largest class. The effect was most salutary. The British
government receded, recalled their orders, abandoned the claim of
the right of search, and recognized the principle of international
law in favor of the freedom of the seas. This was the end of a long
controversy between the two governments.[39]
Footnote 39:
The Senate, although at a late period, unanimously approved of the
instructions given to the Secretary of the Navy, and by him
carried out. (See _Congressional Globe_, 1858-9, p. 3061; Senate
Documents, vol. IV, p. 3, Report of the Secretary of the Navy.)
During the whole of Mr. Buchanan’s administration our relations with
Mexico were in a complicated and critical position, in consequence
of the internal condition of that country and of the danger of
interference by European powers. Mr. Buchanan has himself concisely
and accurately described the state of things in Mexico at the time
of his accession to the Presidency, and down to the end of the year
1859, and I therefore quote his description, rather than make one of
my own:
That republic has been in a state of constant revolution ever
since it achieved its independence from Spain. The various
constitutions adopted from time to time had been set at naught
almost as soon as proclaimed; and one military leader after
another, in rapid succession, had usurped the government. This
fine country, blessed with a benign climate, a fertile soil, and
vast mineral resources, was reduced by civil war and brigandage to
a condition of almost hopeless anarchy. Meanwhile, our treaties
with the republic were incessantly violated. Our citizens were
imprisoned, expelled from the country, and in some instances
murdered. Their vessels, merchandise, and other property were
seized and confiscated. While the central government at the
capital were acting in this manner, such was the general
lawlessness prevailing, that different parties claiming and
exercising local authority in several districts were committing
similar outrages on our citizens. Our treaties had become a dead
letter, and our commerce with the republic was almost entirely
destroyed. The claims of American citizens filed in the State
Department, for which they asked the interposition of their own
Government with that of Mexico to obtain redress and indemnity,
exceeded $10,000,000. Although this amount may have been
exaggerated by the claimants, still their actual losses must have
been very large.[40]
Footnote 40:
List of Claims, Senate Executive Documents, p. 18, 2d session
35th Congress, President’s Message.
In all these cases as they occurred our successive ministers
demanded redress, but their demands were only followed by new
injuries. Their testimony was uniform and emphatic in reference to
the only remedy which in their judgments would prove effectual.
“Nothing but a manifestation of the power of the Government of the
United States,” wrote Mr. John Forsyth, our minister in 1856, “and
of its purpose to punish these wrongs will avail. I assure you
that the universal belief here is, that there is nothing to be
apprehended from the Government of the United States, and that
local Mexican officials can commit these outrages upon American
citizens with absolute impunity.”
In the year 1857 a favorable change occurred in the affairs of the
republic, inspiring better hopes for the future. A constituent
congress, elected by the people of the different States for this
purpose, had framed and adopted a republican constitution. It
adjourned on the 17th February, 1857, having provided for a
popular election to be held in July for a president and members of
congress. At this election General Comonfort was chosen president
almost without opposition. His term of office was to commence on
the 1st of December, 1857, and to continue for four years. In case
his office should become vacant, the constitution had provided
that the chief justice of Mexico, then General Juarez, should
become president, until the end of the term. On the 1st December,
1857, General Comonfort appeared before the congress then in
session, took the oath to support the constitution, and was duly
inaugurated.
But the hopes thus inspired for the establishment of a regular
constitutional government soon proved delusive. President
Comonfort, within one brief month, was driven from the capital and
the republic by a military rebellion headed by General Zuloaga;
and General Juarez consequently became the constitutional
president of Mexico until the 1st day of December, 1861. General
Zuloaga instantly assumed the name of president with indefinite
powers; and the entire diplomatic corps, including the minister
from the United States, made haste to recognize the authority of
the usurper without awaiting instructions from their respective
governments. But Zuloaga was speedily expelled from power. Having
encountered the resistance of the people in many parts of the
republic, and a large portion of the capital having “pronounced”
against him, he was in turn compelled to relinquish the
presidency. The field was now cleared for the elevation of General
Miramon. He had from the beginning been the favorite of the
so-called “Church party,” and was ready to become their willing
instrument in maintaining the vast estates and prerogatives of the
Church, and in suppressing the Liberal constitution. An assembly
of his partisans, called together without even the semblance of
authority, elected him president, but he warily refused to accept
the office at their hands. He then resorted to another but
scarcely more plausible expedient to place himself in power. This
was to identify himself with General Zuloaga, who had just been
deposed, and to bring him again upon the stage as president.
Zuloaga accordingly reappeared in this character, but his only act
was to appoint Miramon “president substitute,” when he again
retired. It is under this title that Miramon has since exercised
military authority in the city of Mexico, expecting by this
stratagem to appropriate to himself the recognition of the foreign
ministers which had been granted to Zuloaga. He succeeded. The
ministers continued their relations with him as “president
substitute” in the same manner as if Zuloaga had still remained in
power. It was by this farce, for it deserves no better name, that
Miramon succeeded in grasping the presidency. The idea that the
chief of a nation at his own discretion may transfer to whomsoever
he please the trust of governing, delegated to him for the benefit
of the people, is too absurd to receive a moment’s countenance.
But when we reflect that Zuloaga, from whom Miramon derived his
title, was himself a military usurper, having expelled the
constitutional president (Comonfort) from office, it would have
been a lasting disgrace to the Mexican people had they tamely
submitted to the yoke. To such an imputation a large majority
proved themselves not to be justly exposed. Although, on former
occasions, a seizure of the capital and the usurpation of power by
a military chieftain had been generally followed, at least for a
brief season, by an acquiescence of the Mexican people, yet they
now rose boldly and independently to defend their rights.
President Juarez, after having been driven from the city of Mexico
by Zuloaga, proceeded to form a constitutional government at
Guanajuato. From thence he removed to Vera Cruz, where he put his
administration in successful operation. The people in many
portions of the republic rallied in its support and flew to arms.
A civil war thus began between the friends of the constitution and
the partisans of Miramon. In this conflict it was not possible for
the American people to remain indifferent spectators. They
naturally favored the cause of President Juarez, and expressed
ardent wishes for his success. Meanwhile Mr. Forsyth, the American
minister, still continued at the city of Mexico in the discharge
of his official duties until June, 1858, when he suspended his
diplomatic relations with the Miramon government, until he should
ascertain the decision of the President. Its outrages towards
American citizens and its personal indignities towards himself,
without hope of amendment or redress, rendered his condition no
longer tolerable. Our relations, bad as they had been under former
governments, had now become still worse under that of Miramon.
President Buchanan approved the step which Mr. Forsyth had taken.
He was consequently directed to demand his passports, to deposit
the archives of the legation with Mr. Black, our consul at the
city of Mexico, and to proceed to Vera Cruz, where an armed
steamer would be in readiness to convey himself and family to the
United States.[41]
Footnote 41:
Letter of General Cass to Mr. Forsyth, July 15th, 1858. Senate
Documents, 1858-1859, vol. i., p. 48
Thus was all diplomatic intercourse finally terminated with the
government of Miramon, whilst none had been organized with that of
Juarez. The President entertained some hope that this rupture of
diplomatic relations might cause Miramon to reflect seriously on
the danger of war with the United States, and might at least
arrest future outrages on our citizens. Instead of this, however,
he persisted in his course of violence against the few American
citizens who had the courage to remain under his power. The
President, in his message of December, 1859,[42] informs Congress
that “murders of a still more atrocious character have been
committed in the very heart of Mexico, under the authority of
Miramon’s government, during the present year. Some of these were
worthy only of a barbarous age, and if they had not been clearly
proven, would have seemed impossible in a country which claims to
be civilized.” And in that of December, 1860, he says: “To cap the
climax, after the battle of Tacubaya, in April, 1859, General
Marquez ordered three citizens of the United States, two of them
physicians, to be seized in the hospital at that place, taken out
and shot, without crime, and without trial. This was done,
notwithstanding our unfortunate countrymen were at the moment
engaged in the holy cause of affording relief to the soldiers of
both parties who had been wounded in the battle, without making
any distinction between them.”
Footnote 42:
House Journal, p. 207.
“Little less shocking was the recent fate of Ormond Chase, who was
shot in Tepic, on the 7th August, by order of the same Mexican
general, not only without a trial, but without any conjecture by
his friends of the cause of his arrest.” He was represented to
have been a young man of good character and intelligence, who had
made numerous friends in Tepic, and his unexpected execution
shocked the whole community. “Other outrages,” the President
states, “might be enumerated; but these are sufficient to
illustrate the wretched state of the country and the unprotected
condition of the persons and property of our citizens in Mexico.”
“The wrongs which we have suffered from Mexico are before the
world, and must deeply impress every American citizen. A
government which is either unable or unwilling to redress such
wrongs, is derelict to its highest duties.”
Meanwhile, the civil war between the parties was conducted with
various success, but the scale preponderated in favor of the
constitutional cause. Ere long the government of Juarez extended
its authority, and was acknowledged in all the important ports and
throughout the sea-coasts and external territory of the republic;
whilst the power of Miramon was confined to the city of Mexico and
the surrounding States.
The final triumph of Juarez became so probable, that President
Buchanan deemed it his duty to inquire and ascertain whether,
according to our constant usage in such cases, he might not
recognize the constitutional government. For the purpose of
obtaining reliable information on this point, he sent a
confidential agent to Mexico to examine and report the actual
condition and prospects of the belligerents. In consequence of his
report, as well as of intelligence from other sources, he felt
justified in appointing a new minister to the Mexican republic.
For this office Mr. Robert M. McLane, a distinguished citizen of
Maryland, was selected. He proceeded on his mission on the 8th
March, 1859, invested “with discretionary authority to recognize
the government of President Juarez, if on his arrival in Mexico he
should find it entitled to such recognition, according to the
established practice of the United States.” In consequence, on the
7th of April, Mr. McLane recognized the constitutional government
by presenting his credentials to President Juarez, having no
hesitation, as he said, “in pronouncing the government of Juarez
to be the only existing government of the republic.” He was
cordially received by the authorities at Vera Cruz, who have ever
since manifested the most friendly disposition toward the United
States.
Unhappily, however, the constitutional government, though
supported by a large majority, both of the people and of the
several Mexican States, had not been able to expel Miramon from
the capital. In the opinion of the President, it had now become
the imperative duty of Congress to act without further delay, and
to enforce redress from the government of Miramon for the wrongs
it had committed in violation of the faith of treaties against
citizens of the United States.
Toward no other government would we have manifested so long and so
patient a forbearance. This arose from our warm sympathies for a
neighboring republic. The territory under the sway of Miramon
around the capital was not accessible to our forces without
passing through the States under the jurisdiction of the
constitutional government. But this from the beginning had aways
manifested the warmest desire to cultivate the most friendly
relations with our country. No doubt was therefore entertained
that it would cheerfully grant us the right of passage. Moreover,
it well knew that the expulsion of Miramon would result in the
triumph of the constitutional government and its establishment
over the whole territory of Mexico. What was, also, deemed of
great importance by the President, this would remove from us the
danger of a foreign war in support of the Monroe doctrine against
any European nation which might be tempted, by the distracted
condition of the republic, to interfere forcibly in its internal
affairs under the pretext of restoring peace and order.[43]
Footnote 43:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 267 _et seq._
It is now necessary to trace the President’s policy in regard to
these Mexican affairs, for the remainder of his term after the
commencement of the session of Congress in December, 1859. He saw
very clearly that unless active measures should be taken by the
Government of the United States to reach a power with which a
settlement of all claims and difficulties could be effected, some
other nation would undertake to establish a government in Mexico,
and the United States would then have to interfere, not only to
secure the rights of their citizens, but to assert the principle of
the “Monroe Doctrine,” which, according to the long standing
American claim, opposes European establishments upon any part of
this continent. He had his eye especially at this time upon the
Emperor of the French, whose colonizing policy for France was well
known, and who, Mr. Buchanan was well informed, was exercising,
through his minister, great influence over Miramon. It was morally
certain that if our Congress did not give the President the means
necessary either to uphold the constitutional government of Juarez,
or to compel the government of Miramon to do justice to our
citizens, he would be involved in the necessity for counteracting
the designs of Louis Napoleon. If this would be an interference with
the internal affairs of a foreign nation, contrary to our long
avowed policy, was not this an exceptional case? Mexico was our
neighbor, with whom our social, commercial and political relations
were very close. She had no settled government. Without the friendly
aid of some external power, she could have no government that could
preserve her internal peace, or fulfill her treaty obligations. She
was, as Mr. Buchanan forcibly said, “a wreck upon the ocean,
drifting about as she is impelled by different factions.” What power
could more safely and appropriately undertake to assist her in
establishing a settled government than the great neighboring
Republic of the United States, whose people and rulers could have no
desire to see her depart from the principles of constitutional and
republican institutions? And if the United States had wrongs of
their own citizens for which to seek redress and indemnification
from the Mexican nation, was that a reason for refusing to do
whatever might appropriately be done towards assisting any
government which the Mexican people might be disposed to support and
acknowledge, to acquire the position and authority of a legitimate
representative of the nation? It seemed to President Buchanan that
there were but two alternatives: either to march a force into Mexico
which would be sufficient to enable the constitutional government to
reach the capital and extend its power over the whole republic, or
to let things drift in uncertainty until Louis Napoleon should
interfere. If the United States would act in concert with the
constitutional government, the President believed that their consent
and co-operation could be obtained. If the United States did
nothing, the French would enter the country and the whole condition
of affairs would become more complicated than they had ever been.
Accordingly, the President, in his message to Congress, of December
19th, 1859, recommended the passage of a law, authorizing him, under
such conditions as Congress might deem expedient, to employ a
sufficient military force to enter Mexico for the purpose of
obtaining indemnity for the past and security for the future. After
explaining the necessity and expediency of this step, and pointing
out in what manner this force could aid the constitutional
government of Juarez, he said that if this were not done, “it would
not be surprising should some other nation undertake the task, and
thus force us to interfere at last, under circumstances of increased
difficulty, for the maintenance of our established policy.” The
entire session of 1859-60 passed away without any notice being taken
in Congress of this recommendation. The attention of that body was
absorbed in discussions about slavery, and in shaping the politics
of the next Presidential election. If the President’s recommendation
about Mexico had been discussed, we might have been able to judge
whether his political opponents were fearful that more territory
would be acquired from Mexico, for the further extension of slavery.
But in regard to any such result of the mode in which the President
proposed to secure an indemnification of the claims of our citizens,
it is to be observed that according to the terms of his
recommendation, it would rest entirely with Congress to fix the
preceding conditions of the intervention, and that if a treaty were
to follow or precede, it would have to be ratified by the Senate.
The President again brought this subject before Congress by his
annual message of December, 1860. Mr. Lincoln had now been elected
President and the foreign relations of the country would in three
months be in his hands. At this time, however, it had become still
more necessary for the United States Government to determine, and to
determine promptly, whether it would leave American citizens to the
mercy of Miramon’s government, or whether it would do something to
establish the constitutional government of Juarez. Again the
President repeated the warning that foreign powers would interfere
if this matter were to be much longer neglected, although at that
moment informal and verbal assurances had been given by some of the
European diplomatists in Mexico that such interference was not
intended. Congress, however, spent the whole winter of 1860-61 in a
dreary discussion of our internal affairs, without either making any
effort to arrest the spread of secession by conciliatory measures,
or doing anything to strengthen the hands of the President or his
successor.
But it had been for some time apparent to Mr. Buchanan that our
relations with Mexico could not be left in the condition in which
they stood. Both to satisfy the long deferred claims of our
citizens, and to prevent foreign interference with the internal
affairs of Mexico, he had instructed Mr. McLane to make a treaty
with the Constitutional government. On the 14th of December, 1859, a
“Treaty of Transit and Commerce” was signed between the Mexican
Republic and the United States, and also a “Convention to enforce
treaty stipulations, and to maintain order and security in the
territory of the Republics of Mexico and the United States.” Great
advantages of trade, transit and commerce were secured by these
arrangements. The United States was to pay $4,000,000 for the
surrender of certain Mexican duties, two millions to be paid down,
and two millions to be reserved and distributed to the American
claimants who could prove their injuries. With the two millions to
be placed in the hands of the constitutional government, it was
expected that it would be able to expel the usurping government from
the capital and establish itself over the whole territory of the
republic. All acquisition of further Mexican territory was thus
avoided. If this treaty had been approved by the Senate of the
United States, the empire of Maximilian would never have been heard
of. The American negotiator, Mr. McLane, in his despatch to the
Secretary of State, dated on the day this treaty and convention were
signed at Vera Cruz, expressed his apprehension that if they were
not ratified, further anarchy would prevail in Mexico, until it
should be ended by interference from some other quarter. The
President submitted the treaty and the convention to the Senate on
the 24th of January, 1860. They were neither of them approved.
Mexico was left to the interference of Louis Napoleon; the
establishment of an empire, under Maximilian, a prince of the House
of Hapsburg, followed, for the embarrassment of President Lincoln’s
administration while we were in the throes of our civil war, and the
claims of American citizens were to all appearance indefinitely
postponed.
The relations of the United States with Spain at the commencement of
Mr. Buchanan’s administration, and the manner in which he dealt with
them, have been described by him as follows:
Our relations with Spain were in a very unsatisfactory condition
on his accession to power. Our flag had been insulted, and
numerous injuries had been inflicted on the persons and property
of American citizens by Spanish officials acting under the direct
control of the Captain General of Cuba. These gave rise to many
but unavailing reclamations for redress and indemnity against the
Spanish government. Our successive ministers at Madrid had for
years ably presented and enforced these claims, but all without
effect. Their efforts were continually baffled on different
pretexts. There was a class of these claims called the “Cuban
claims,” of a nature so plainly just that they could not be
gainsayed. In these more than one hundred of our citizens were
directly interested. In 1844 duties were illegally exacted from
their vessels at different custom houses in Cuba, and they
appealed to the Government to have these duties refunded. Their
amount could be easily ascertained by the Cuban officials
themselves, who were in possession of all the necessary documents.
The validity of these claims was eventually recognized by Spain,
but not until after a delay of ten years. The amount due was
fixed, according to her own statement, with which the claimants
were satisfied, at the sum of $128,635.54. Just at the moment when
the claimants were expecting to receive this amount without
further delay, the Spanish government proposed to pay, not the
whole, but only one-third of it, and this provided we should
accept it in full satisfaction of the entire claim. They added
that this offer was made, not in strict justice, but as a special
favor.
Under these circumstances, the time had arrived when the President
deemed it his duty to employ strong and vigorous remonstrances to
bring all our claims against Spain to a satisfactory conclusion.
In this he succeeded in a manner gratifying to himself, and it is
believed to all the claimants, but unfortunately not to the Senate
of the United States. A convention was concluded at Madrid on the
5th March, 1860, establishing a joint commission for the final
adjudication and payment of all the claims of the respective
parties. By this the validity and amount of the Cuban claims were
expressly admitted, and their speedy payment was placed beyond
question. The convention was transmitted to the Senate for their
constitutional action on the 3d May, 1860, but on the 27th June
they determined, greatly to the surprise of the President, and the
disappointment of the claimants, that they would “not advise and
consent” to its ratification.
The reason for this decision, because made in executive session,
cannot be positively known. This, as stated and believed at the
time, was because the convention had authorized the Spanish
government to present its Amistad claim, like any other claim,
before the Board of Commissioners for decision. This claim, it
will be recollected, was for the payment to the Spanish owners of
the value of certain slaves, for which the Spanish government held
the United States to be responsible under the treaty with Spain of
the 27th October, 1795. Such was the evidence in its favor, that
three Presidents of the United States had recommended to Congress
to make an appropriation for its payment, and a bill for this
purpose had passed the Senate. The validity of the claim, it is
proper to observe, was not recognized by the convention. In this
respect it was placed on the same footing with all the other
claims of the parties, with the exception of the Cuban claims. All
the Spanish government obtained for it was simply a hearing before
the Board, and this could not be denied with any show of
impartiality. Besides, it is quite certain that no convention
could have been concluded without such a provision.
It was most probably the extreme views of the Senate at the time
against slavery, and their reluctance to recognize it even so far
as to permit a foreign claimant, although under the sanction of a
treaty, to raise a question before the Board which might involve
its existence, that caused the rejection of the convention. Under
the impulse of such sentiments, the claims of our fellow-citizens
have been postponed if not finally defeated. Indeed, the Cuban
claimants, learning that the objections in the Senate arose from
the Amistad claim, made a formal offer to remove the difficulty by
deducting its amount from the sum due to them, but this of course
could not be accepted.[44]
Footnote 44:
Buchanan’s Defence, pp. 258-260; written and published in
1865-’66.
The following account of an expedition which President Buchanan
found it necessary to send to Paraguay, is also taken from his
Defence of his Administration:
The hostile attitude of the government of Paraguay toward the
United States early commanded the attention of the President. That
government had, upon frivolous and even insulting pretexts,
refused to ratify the treaty of friendship, commerce and
navigation, concluded with it on the 4th March, 1853, as amended
by the Senate, though this only in mere matters of form. It had
seized and appropriated the property of American citizens residing
in Paraguay, in a violent and arbitrary manner; and finally, by
order of President Lopez, it had fired upon the United States
steamer Water Witch (1st February, 1855), under Commander Thomas
J. Page of the navy, and killed the sailor at the helm, whilst she
was peacefully employed in surveying the Parana river, to
ascertain its fitness for steam navigation. The honor, as well as
the interests of the country, demanded satisfaction.
The President brought the subject to the notice of Congress in his
first annual message (8th December, 1857). In this he informed
them that he would make a demand for redress on the government of
Paraguay, in a firm but conciliatory manner, but at the same time
observed, that “this will the more probably be granted, if the
Executive shall have authority to use other means in the event of
a refusal. This is accordingly recommended.” Congress responded
favorably to this recommendation. On the 2d June, 1858,[45] they
passed a joint resolution authorizing the President “to adopt such
measures, and use such force as, in his judgment, may be necessary
and advisable, in the event of a refusal of just satisfaction by
the government of Paraguay, in connection with the attack on the
United States steamer Water Witch, and with other matters referred
to in the annual message.”[46] They also made an appropriation to
defray the expenses of a commissioner to Paraguay, should he deem
it proper to appoint one, “for the adjustment of difficulties”
with that republic.
Footnote 45:
U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. xi, p. 370.
Footnote 46:
U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. xi, p. 319.
Paraguay is situated far in the interior of South America, and its
capital, the city of Asuncion, on the left bank of the river
Paraguay, is more than a thousand miles from the mouth of the La
Plata.
The stern policy of Dr. Francia, formerly the Dictator of
Paraguay, had been to exclude all the rest of the world from his
dominions, and in this he had succeeded by the most severe and
arbitrary measures. His successor, President Lopez, found it
necessary, in some degree, to relax this jealous policy; but,
animated by the same spirit, he imposed harsh restrictions in
his intercourse with foreigners. Protected by his remote and
secluded position, he but little apprehended that a navy from
our far distant country could ascend the La Plata, the Parana,
and the Paraguay, and reach his capital. This was doubtless the
reason why he had ventured to place us at defiance. Under these
circumstances, the President deemed it advisable to send with
our commissioner to Paraguay, Hon. James B. Bowlin, a naval
force sufficient to exact justice should negotiation fail.[47]
This consisted of nineteen armed vessels, great and small,
carrying two hundred guns and twenty-five hundred sailors and
marines, all under the command of the veteran and gallant
Shubrick. Soon after the arrival of the expedition at
Montevideo, Commissioner Bowlin and Commodore Shubrick proceeded
(30th December, 1858) to ascend the rivers to Asuncion in the
steamer Fulton, accompanied by the Water Witch. Meanwhile the
remaining vessels rendezvoused in the Parana, near Rosario, a
position from which they could act promptly, in case of need.
Footnote 47:
Message, 19th Dec. 1859.
The commissioner arrived at Asuncion on the 25th January, 1859,
and left it on the 10th February. Within this brief period he had
ably and successfully accomplished all the objects of his mission.
In addition to ample apologies, he obtained from President Lopez
the payment of $10,000 for the family of the seaman (Chaney) who
had been killed in the attack on the Water Witch, and also
concluded satisfactory treaties of indemnity and of navigation and
commerce with the Paraguayan government.[48] Thus the President
was enabled to announce to Congress, in his annual message
(December, 1859), that “all our difficulties with Paraguay had
been satisfactorily adjusted.”
Footnote 48:
United States Pamphlet Laws, 1859-60, p. 119, appendix.
Even in this brief summary it would be unjust to withhold from
Secretary Toucey a commendation for the economy and efficiency he
displayed in fitting out this expedition.[49] It is a remarkable
fact in our history, that its entire expenses were defrayed out of
the ordinary appropriations for the naval service. Not a dollar
was appropriated by Congress for this purpose, unless we may
except the sum of $289,000 for the purchase of seven small
steamers of light draft, worth more than their cost, and which
were afterwards usefully employed in the ordinary naval service.
Footnote 49:
Report of Secretary Toucey, 2d Dec., 1859; Sen. Doc., 1859-60,
vol. iii, p. 1137.
It may be remarked that the President, in his message already
referred to, justly observes, “that the appearance of so large a
force, fitted out in such a prompt manner, in the far distant
waters of the La Plata, and the admirable conduct of the officers
and men employed in it, have had a happy effect in favor of our
country throughout all that remote portion of the world.”
The relations between the United States and China had been governed
for twelve years by the treaty made in 1844, by Mr. Caleb Cushing,
under the instructions of Mr. Webster as Secretary of State. This
treaty had provided for its own amendment at the expiration of
twelve years from its date, and it devolved on Mr. Buchanan’s
administration to institute the negotiations for this purpose, His
own account of these negotiations, although greatly condensed, is
all that need be here given:
The same success attended our negotiations with China.[50] The
treaty of July, 1844, with that empire, had provided for its own
revision and amendment at the expiration of twelve years from its
date, should experience render this necessary. Changes in its
provisions had now become indispensable for the security and
extension of our commerce. Besides, our merchants had just claims
against the Chinese government, for injuries sustained in
violation of the treaty. To effect these changes, and to obtain
indemnity for these injuries, the Hon. William B. Reed was sent as
minister to China. His position proved to be one of great
delicacy. England and France were engaged in war against China,
and urged the United States to become a party to it. They alleged
that it had been undertaken to accomplish objects in which we had
a common interest with themselves. This was the fact; but the
President did not believe that our grievances, although serious,
would justify a resort to hostilities. Whilst Mr. Reed was,
therefore, directed to preserve a strict neutrality between the
belligerents, he was instructed to coöperate cordially with the
ministers of England and France in all peaceful measures to secure
by treaty those just concessions to commerce which the civilized
nations of the world had a right to expect from China. The Russian
government, also, pursued the same line of policy.
Footnote 50:
Message, 8th December, 1857, p. 14.
The difficulty, then, was to obtain for our country, whilst
remaining at peace, the same commercial advantages which England
and France might acquire by war. This task our minister performed
with tact, ability and success, by the conclusion of the treaty of
Tientsin of the 18th June, 1858, and the two supplemental
conventions of Shanghae of the 8th November following.[51] These
have placed our commercial relations with China on the same
satisfactory footing with those of England and France, and have
resulted in the actual payment of the full amount of all the just
claims of our citizens, leaving a surplus to the credit of the
Treasury. This object has been accomplished, whilst our friendly
relations with the Chinese government were never for a moment
interrupted, but on the contrary have been greatly strengthened.
Footnote 51:
United States Pamphlet Laws, 1861-’62, p. 177, appendix.
CHAPTER XI.
1858-1860.
COMPLIMENTARY GIFT FROM PRINCE ALBERT TO MR. BUCHANAN—VISIT OF THE
PRINCE OF WALES—CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE QUEEN—MINOR INCIDENTS OF
THE ADMINISTRATION—TRAITS OF CHARACTER—LETTERS TO MISS
LANE—MARRIAGE OF A YOUNG FRIEND.
There are good reasons for believing that the regard which was
always expressed by the members of the royal family of England for
Mr. Buchanan and his niece was something more than a dictate of
policy towards the great nation that he had represented at their
court. One token of this regard, which came after he had been made
President, was certainly intended as a personal reminder of the
pleasant intercourse which he had with the queen and her husband,
and of the liking for him which their eldest daughter had often and
artlessly manifested. When the Princess Royal was married to the
crown prince of Prussia in 1858, her father sent, not to the
President of the United States, but to Mr. Buchanan, a copy of the
medal struck in honor of the marriage, accompanied by this note:
[PRINCE ALBERT TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, Feb. 16, 1858.
MY DEAR MR. BUCHANAN:—
The belief that your recollection of the time passed by you in
England will have made you feel an interest in the late happy
marriage of our eldest daughter, induces me to send for your
acceptance a medal struck in commemoration of that event. You
will, I think, be able easily to recognize the Princess Royal’s
features; the likeness of Prince Frederick William is also very
good.
Trusting that your health continues unimpaired, notwithstanding
the manifold duties of your high and responsible office, in which
hope the queen joins with me, I remain, ever, my dear Mr.
Buchanan, yours truly,
ALBERT.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO PRINCE ALBERT.]
WASHINGTON CITY, March 13, 1858.
SIR:—
I have had the honor to receive from Lord Napier your very kind
note of the 13th ultimo, with the medal struck in commemoration of
the marriage of the Princess Royal with Prince Frederick William.
Whilst in England I had upon one or two occasions the privilege of
meeting and conversing with the Princess Royal, which caused me to
form a very high estimate of the excellence of her character, and
to feel a deep interest in her prosperity and happiness. May her
destiny prove fortunate, and her married life be crowned by a kind
Providence with all the blessings which it is the lot of humanity
to enjoy.
With my most respectful regards to the queen. I remain truly
yours,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
When the President in June, 1860, learned that the Prince of Wales
would visit Canada, he hastened to write to the queen, and to extend
a national invitation to the Prince to come to Washington. The
following are the letters which passed between the President and the
queen:
[THE PRESIDENT TO QUEEN VICTORIA.]
WASHINGTON CITY, June 4, 1860.
TO HER MAJESTY QUEEN VICTORIA:—
I have learned from the public journals that the Prince of Wales
is about to visit your Majesty’s North American dominions. Should
it be the intention of His Royal Highness to extend his visit to
the United States, I need not say how happy I shall be to give him
a cordial welcome to Washington. You may be well assured that
everywhere in this country he will be greeted by the American
people in such a manner as cannot fail to prove gratifying to your
Majesty. In this they will manifest their deep sense of your
domestic virtues, as well as the conviction of your merits as a
wise, patriotic, and constitutional sovereign.
Your Majesty’s most obedient servant,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[QUEEN VICTORIA TO THE PRESIDENT.]
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, June 22, 1860.
MY GOOD FRIEND:—
I have been much gratified at the feelings which prompted you to
write to me inviting the Prince of Wales to come to Washington. He
intends to return from Canada through the United States, and it
will give him great pleasure to have an opportunity of testifying
to you in person that those feelings are fully reciprocated by
him. He will thus be able at the same time to mark the respect
which he entertains for the Chief Magistrate of a great and
friendly state and kindred nation.
The Prince will drop all royal state on leaving my dominions, and
travel under the name of Lord Renfrew, as he has done when
travelling on the continent of Europe.
The Prince Consort wishes to be kindly remembered to you.
I remain ever your good friend,
VICTORIA RA.
The Prince arrived in Washington early in October, 1860, and he and
the principal persons in his suite became the guests of the
President at the White House, where they remained until the 6th of
that month. During this visit there was an excursion to Mount
Vernon, to afford the Prince an opportunity to see the tomb of
Washington. The Prince and his suite, accompanied by a considerable
number of invited guests, were taken to Mount Vernon on the revenue
cutter, Harriet Lane, a vessel of the revenue service, which had
been named for the President’s niece by the Secretary of the
Treasury. The President and Miss Lane were of the party. The
incidents of the visit are well known, but there is an anecdote
connected with it which should be repeated here, because it
illustrates Mr. Buchanan’s scrupulous care in regard to public
money. The Secretary of the Treasury had given liberal orders for a
supply of refreshments to be put on board the cutter. When the
President heard that the bills for this and other expenses of the
excursion were about to be audited and paid at the Treasury, he
directed them to be sent to him. They were not paid at the Treasury,
but the whole expense was defrayed by a private arrangement between
the President and Mr. Cobb, the Secretary.[52]
Footnote 52:
I believe these bills were paid by Mr. Cobb, from his own private
means. The whole affair was gotten up by him, and the President
and Miss Lane went as invited guests. It is proper to say here
that the entertainment of the Prince and his suite at the White
House entailed a good deal of expense, for extra servants and
other things, and that Congress was never asked to defray any part
of it. Mr. Buchanan would never hear of any suggestion that the
extraordinary charges of his position should fall upon any fund
but his salary and his private income.
[THE PRESIDENT TO QUEEN VICTORIA.]
WASHINGTON, October 6, 1860.
TO HER MAJESTY, QUEEN VICTORIA:—
When I had the honor of addressing your Majesty in June last, I
confidently predicted a cordial welcome for the Prince of Wales
throughout this country, should he pay us a visit on his return
from Canada to England. What was then prophecy has now become
history. He has been everywhere received with enthusiasm, and this
is attributed not only to the very high regard entertained for
your Majesty, but also to his own noble and manly bearing. He has
passed through a trying ordeal for a person of his years, and his
conduct throughout has been such as became his age and station.
Dignified, frank and affable, he has conciliated wherever he has
been the kindness and respect of a sensitive and discriminating
people.
His visit thus far, has been all your Majesty could have desired,
and I have no doubt it will so continue to the end.
The Prince left us for Richmond this morning with the Duke of
Newcastle and the other members of his wisely selected suite. I
should gladly have prolonged his visit had this been possible
consistently with previous engagements. In our domestic circle he
won all hearts. His free and ingenuous intercourse with myself
evinced both a kind heart and good understanding. I shall ever
cherish the warmest wishes for his welfare.
The visit of the Prince to the tomb of Washington and the simple
but solemn ceremonies at this consecrated spot will become a
historical event and cannot fail to exert a happy influence on the
kindred people of the two countries.
With my respectful regards for the Prince Consort,
I remain your Majesty’s friend and obedient servant,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[SIR HENRY HOLLAND TO THE PRESIDENT.]
BROOK STREET, LONDON, November 2, 1860.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:—
In writing to you thus soon after my return to England, my first
and foremost object is, to thank you once again, which I do very
warmly, for all your kindness during my last visit at Washington.
In the course of a life somewhat checquered with various
incidents, in various places, I know not that I ever enjoyed five
days so much;—including under this expression both the time of the
royal visit, and that which I afterwards passed with you alone.
The Executive Mansion is lost to me for the future, if even I ever
return to America; but you I trust will preserve to me hereafter
the regard and friendship which it is pleasant to me to possess.
The letter you entrusted to my care was in the hands of the queen
exactly fourteen days after I had received it from you. It will
give you pleasure, I know, to learn (which I presume you will
afterwards do in some way from the queen herself), how very much
she was gratified by it. Both Lord Palmerston and Lord John
Russell have expressly and strongly mentioned this to me.
All England, as far as I can see and hear, is delighted with the
reception of the Prince in the United States. It has produced a
strong impression here;—reciprocated I hope and believe in
America.
The squadron which brings him home has not yet been heard of; but
as they have now been twelve or thirteen days at sea, the arrival
can not be long delayed. Probably to-day may bring some
intelligence. I shall be impatient to see again the several
members of the Prince’s suite, and to hear their detail of all
that followed after our parting at Washington. They will all, I am
persuaded, come back with the same strong sentiment they had at
that time regarding their reception in the United States.
You will see that the European continent is still laboring under
the same strange political complications;—enlivened, if I may so
phrase it, by an occasional battle, but obscured by a dark haze
over the future. Lord Palmerston tells me that he believes it will
all end rightly, and I am willing to believe him, though I do not
see my way towards this result. Many games are evidently at this
moment played underhand—not like the open and frank bowling of the
ten-pin courts. Our excellent ally, Louis Napoleon, comes under
this suspicion, while some suspect that he, between Church and
State affairs, is under as much perplexity as his neighbors. It
seems even doubtful whether the compulsory concession of the
Emperor of Austria will satisfy Hungary, or leave him free for the
contingencies of an Italian campaign. If a general war can be
avoided, it is the utmost the most sanguine dare hope for. For the
present the great interest is concentrated on the spot where the
King of Naples still makes a show of resistance to the King of
Sardinia and Garibaldi,—a matter that a few days must decide. Then
comes the question of the Pope and Rome,—a still more complex and
delicate affair, with interests rooted all over Europe.
In England we are happy and prosperous, despite our indifferent
harvest,—better, however, than at one time expected. But we shall
be fed out of your abundance, if need there be.
The telegraphic news from China seems good as far as it goes, but
we shall need the details to know its full import. Lord Palmerston
tells me that the last despatches led them to believe that the
Emperor of China was very desirous, or at least not unwilling,
that his army should be defeated, to rescue himself from the hands
of a war party at Pekin, which overruled him in his own wishes.
Chinese rumors are very apocryphal documents.
I must not intrude further upon your time, by what, after all, is
little more than may be drawn from the newspapers of the day. In
bidding you farewell, my dear Mr. President, I have but again to
repeat the expressions of acknowledgment for kindnesses received,
and of cordial regard and respect, with which I remain,
Ever yours most faithfully,
H. HOLLAND.
[QUEEN VICTORIA TO THE PRESIDENT.]
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 19, 1860.
MY GOOD FRIEND:—
Your letter of the 6th ultimo has afforded me the greatest
pleasure, containing, as it does, such kind expressions with
regard to my son, and assuring me that the character and object of
his visit to you and to the United States have been fully
appreciated, and that his demeanor and the feelings evinced by him
have secured to him your esteem and the general good will of your
countrymen.
I purposely delayed the answer to your letter until I should be
able to couple it with the announcement of the Prince of Wales’s
safe return to his home. Contrary winds and stress of weather have
much retarded his arrival, but we have been fully compensated for
the anxiety which this long delay has naturally caused us, by
finding him in such excellent health and spirits, and so delighted
with all that he has seen and experienced in his travels.
He cannot sufficiently praise the great cordiality with which he
has been everywhere greeted in your country, and the friendly
manner in which you received him; and whilst, as a mother, I am
grateful for the kindness shown him, I feel impelled to express,
at the same time, how deeply I have been touched by the many
demonstrations of affection personally toward myself, which his
presence has called forth.
I fully reciprocate towards your nation the feelings thus made
apparent, and look upon them as forming an important link to
cement two nations of kindred origin and character, whose mutual
esteem and friendship must always have so material an influence
upon their respective development and prosperity.
The interesting and touching scene at the grave of General
Washington, to which you allude, may be fitly taken as the type of
our present feeling, and I trust of our future relations.
The Prince Consort, who heartily joins in the expressions
contained in this letter, wishes to be kindly remembered to you,
as we both wish to be to Miss Lane.
Believe me always your good friend,
VICTORIA R.
It is noteworthy that this graceful and cordial letter was written
on the eve of that great convulsion which was so soon to put in
imminent peril the perpetuity of this Union and the very existence
of our Government. To the feelings of the queen and her husband
towards this country, secured by President Buchanan’s wise and
well-timed reception of the Prince of Wales, and the demonstrations
everywhere made towards him in this country, the queen’s subjects
and the people of the United States owe it, that in the dark and
dangerous hour of our civil war, the many irritating causes of
alienation were not allowed by the sovereign of England to disrupt
the bonds of peace or the neutrality of her government between the
warring sections of this Republic. When we look back to the state of
feeling that at one time existed in England towards our Government,
and remember how many British statesmen of great consequence made
serious mistakes, it is but simple historical justice to impute to
the queen and her husband a moderating and restraining influence;
and if that influence had been wanting, there can be no rational
doubt that there would have been a recognition of the Confederate
States, not merely as a belligerent and a _de facto_ power, but as a
permanent and established government, and possibly as an ally of
Great Britain.
[FROM B. MORAN.]
LONDON, June 29th, 1860.
MY DEAR SIR:—
The publication of your invitation to the Prince of Wales to
become your guest has caused a great deal of happiness in England,
and the newspapers generally speak highly of the act. I send,
herewith, an editorial from the _Morning Chronicle_ of to-day, in
which there are some deserved and well-expressed compliments. The
British people have more respect for you than for any President
since Washington, and I have never seen a personal attack on you
in any English journal. Whenever you are spoken of, it is in a
tone of regard, and never in a carping spirit.
We are almost run down with visitors from home. From forty to
seventy are here daily, and I have to see them all. I have my
hands full. This is comfort to me, for I would be unhappy without
employment.
...... I hope you will not take offence when I say that I hope the
Baltimore Convention have nominated you, notwithstanding your
declinature to be a candidate. And if such be the case, you will
be elected triumphantly. We are anxiously waiting for news on this
point.
With best regards to yourself and Miss Lane, I am
Ever faithfully yours,
B. MORAN.[53]
Footnote 53:
Mr. Moran was one of the secretaries of the American legation
under Mr. Dallas.
Both with reference to this visit of the Prince of Wales, and to
some other incidents of the administration, and to certain traits of
Mr. Buchanan’s character, I insert here an extract from Mr. J.
Buchanan Henry’s communication to me, before I proceed to the trying
period of “secession,” which is to occupy a large part of the
remaining pages of this volume.
As private secretary, I had to be in my office, a room on the
southwest corner of the second story adjoining that of the
President, whenever he was there, which was from eight in the
morning until luncheon at one o’clock, and from that time until
five, when, with rare exceptions, he took an hour’s walk. I doubt
whether Mr. Buchanan used his coach and horses a dozen times a
year, except during the summer when he was at the “Soldier’s
Home;” then he drove in to the executive mansion in the morning
and out in the evening. He greatly preferred the exercise of
walking, with its exchange of kindly personal greetings with
friends. On returning from this daily exercise he dined with the
members of his household. It was not then etiquette for the
President to accept dinner or other invitations, for the wise
reason, I believe, that any discrimination would have been
impossible without giving offence, and universal acceptance would
have been impossible. Once a week Mr. Buchanan caused some of the
Cabinet members and their wives to be invited to dinner “en
famille” and as there was but little ceremony and all were
agreeable guests, with common and identical interests for the most
part, I remember that these were most pleasant little
entertainments. During the winter, or properly during the session
of Congress, there was what might be called a State dinner, once a
week, an entertainment of a much more formal and formidable
character, in the large dining-room, capable of seating about
forty persons. The first of these dinners was, I think, given to
the Justices of the Supreme Court, the next to the Diplomatic
Corps, then to the members of the Senate, and the House of
Representatives, including each member in his turn, according to
official seniority, except in a very few cases where individuals
had by discourtesy or offence rendered such an invitation
improper. Miss Lane and I attended to the details of these social
matters, including dinner and party attending, making visits,
etc., for the President. Among the most troublesome of these
duties was the proper assigning of precedence to the guests at
these so-called state dinners; a delicate task in these Washington
entertainments, as any neglect would pretty surely give offence.
Miss Lane, from natural aptitude and tact and the experience she
had in London whilst her uncle was minister there, managed these
details very cleverly. I had the difficult and worrying task at
these dinners, in the short time between the arrival of the forty
odd guests in the drawing-room and the procession into the great
dining-room, of ascertaining the name of each gentleman and
telling him what lady he was to take in, and probably introducing
the parties to each other. It was sometimes a very _mauvaise quart
d’heure_ of expectation for me; as I was pretty sure to find at
the last moment, when the President was leading the procession to
the table, that some male guest, perhaps not accustomed to such
matters, had strayed away from his intended partner, leaving the
lady standing alone and much embarrassed. I had then to give them
a fresh start.
As private secretary I was charged with the expenditure of the
library fund, the payment of the steward, messengers, and also of
the expenditures of the household which were paid out of the
President’s private purse. I might here mention that these latter
expenditures generally exceeded the President’s salary in the
winter months, because President Buchanan enjoyed entertaining and
entertained liberally from inclination. In summer the social
entertaining being much less, and the President being at the
Soldier’s Home, a modest but pretty stone cottage on the hills
near Washington, the expenses were much less. Taking the year
through, the salary of $25,000 was nearly sufficient to pay the
actual expenses of the executive mansion, but nothing beyond that,
or to allow the President to save any part of it; but on the
contrary, I think he had to draw upon his private means to a
considerable extent.
My first duty was to organize the private secretary’s office. I
had a set of books or records carefully prepared, in which could
be briefly entered the date of receipt of any letter or
communication addressed to the President, the name of the
writer—subject-matter condensed to the utmost—dates and substance
of answer, if any, to what department referred, and date of such
reference. If the letter contained a recommendation for
appointment to office, these records indicated the office, the
name of the applicant and by whom recommended. Such communications
as the President ought to see I folded and briefed and took them
to him every morning at eight o’clock and received his
instructions as to the answer I should make, and in some instances
he would answer them himself, if of a purely personal nature.
Either he or I would then endorse upon all letters “Respectfully
referred to the Secretary of State,” War, or otherwise, according
as the communication in subject matter related to the business of
that department; and once a day I would enclose them, as they
accumulated, in large envelopes, with printed addresses, and
despatch them by the messenger to the several departments. By this
system I could recall any letter or communication of any kind by
reference to the entries on my books, whenever the President
desired them for action. This was the routine of the Executive
Office.
It will hardly be credited that this simple and natural course of
business gave the pretext at a later day, and I can scarcely
suppress my indignation as I think of it, for that infamous
“mare’s nest,” discovered by Covode of Pennsylvania, a member of
the House of Representatives, and for the investigation of which
he obtained a committee with full powers. The letters of General
Patterson and others to which it related, were simply referred to
the Secretary of the Navy according to the ordinary and proper
routine of business in the Executive Office, as I have above
described, and were endorsed exactly as thousands of others had
been either by the President or by me, and such endorsement had
therefore no signification whatever. It was a cruel and malicious
pretence to infer that the Secretary of the Navy would attach any
importance whatever to the mere act of reference by the President
himself because a multitude of such papers were similarly endorsed
either by him or by me every day.
There would have been no room to keep such a mass of papers in the
White House, and they would have been out of place there, as they
related to the business of the several cabinet officers, and yet
upon this miserable basis was the “Covode investigation” erected,
and the first attempt ever made to soil a spotless public life,
extending over more than forty years in every exalted station of
our Government, as member of the legislature of Pennsylvania, many
years member of the House of Representatives, Senator of the
United States, twice diplomatic representative of the nation at
the two principal courts of Europe, Secretary of State of the
United States, and finally President of the Republic. The meagre
partisan fruits of the investigation when made, and the refusal,
to its credit be it said, of a bitterly hostile opposition in the
House to propose even a censure, clearly showed its baseless
character.
The committee, with well simulated delicacy, never summoned me to
appear and testify, but sent for my clerk, and after examining him
were glad, it seems, to drop it. I dwell upon this matter, because
in a long career of public service it is the only attempt ever
made to impeach Mr. Buchanan’s public or private integrity. He
himself felt it very bitterly, and I think it will be admitted
that he administered a wholesome and deserved rebuke to the House
in his special message of protest. Although the result
demonstrated that there was not the most gossamer pretext for the
charge made by Covode, I think Mr. Buchanan’s friends can be well
pleased at its having been made, and its futility exposed, as it
leads to the fair conclusion for history, that Mr. Buchanan was
invulnerable to any assaults upon the honor of his public or
private life. Surely this is much to be able to say of a public
servant, and a nation capable of breeding many such public men can
justly congratulate itself.
Another feature of Mr. Buchanan’s public life I will refer to,
which possibly may not now be esteemed a great virtue. I mean his
dislike of nepotism. Not unnaturally, there were members of our
family who would have been very glad to have obtained civil or
other appointments during his administration. But such was Mr.
Buchanan’s freely expressed repugnance to using his public
authority for the advantage of his relatives, that I am not aware
that any of them even made application to him for office of any
kind. Public policy clearly indicates the propriety and
desirability of the President’s private secretary being, if
possible, a blood relation, upon the ground that the honor and
interests of the President and his high office can be most safely
entrusted to one having an interest in his good name and fame, and
therefore more guarded against temptation of any kind. I therefore
do not consider the selection of myself, or my cousin Mr. James
Buchanan, who followed me, as any exception to what I have stated.
To such an extent did I know that my uncle disliked the appointing
of relatives to office, that I never dared to tell him of my
desire to be appointed to the paymaster corps of the navy, a
position which from my nomadic tastes I had long coveted, and I
concluded to save myself the mortification of a refusal. I could
exercise no influence with him for myself. As an instance of this,
I will mention that when the Hon. John Cadwalader, late Judge of
United States Circuit Court of Eastern Pennsylvania, was appointed
to that judgeship by Mr. Buchanan, he tendered me the clerkship of
his court, a permanent and honorable position, and one that I
should have been willing to accept. Judge Cadwalader had been my
legal preceptor, and for years my warm personal friend, so that
the proffered position would have been in every way agreeable and
proper. Although I was then residing in New York as a private
citizen, I consulted Mr. Buchanan as to its acceptance by me, and
on finding that he entertained serious reasonable objections to my
doing so, I declined the compliment. The President said the public
might justly infer that there had been some previous understanding
between him and the new judge, and that however erroneous such a
conclusion would be, it would be natural. Inasmuch, therefore, as
my acceptance might work injury, both to the President and his
excellent appointee, I quickly made my decision. These little
events, unknown to the public, will serve to illustrate the
delicate sense of right and the very appearance of right, which so
strongly marked his public service.
Among the minor but interesting incidents of the administration, I
may mention the receipt of the first message by the new ocean
telegraph from the British sovereign, and the President’s reply to
it. As the cable became silent almost immediately after, the
public were for a long time in doubt whether any message had
really been transmitted over the wonderful wire under the sea. I
well remember the reception of the message, and I had it and the
draft of the President’s reply in my possession for years
afterwards as a curiosity.
You doubtless know all about the visit of the Prince of Wales to
President Buchanan, and the pleasant social incidents following in
its train. The Duke of Newcastle, Lord St. Germains and Sir Henry
Holland—the latter an old friend of the President’s—in the
Prince’s suite, were also guests at the White House. I was then
residing in New York, and was sent for by my uncle to my old
quarters in Washington, to assist in entertaining these
distinguished persons, who, though entertained at the private
expense of Mr. Buchanan, were nevertheless looked upon, and
properly so, as the guests of the nation.
Probably among the most interesting, and I may say touching,
incidents of this visit, was a trip made by the royal guest and
suite, in company with the President, to Mount Vernon. I well
remember the whole party—the tall, venerable form of the
President, the youthful Prince, and the other guests representing
the highest social order in Great Britain, standing bare-headed in
front of the tomb of Washington. It was a most impressive and
singular spectacle, and I have often thought it would make a very
striking subject for a large historical painting. The Prince
planted a small tree near the tomb in commemoration of his visit,
but I have never learned whether it grew. Many interesting
incidents occurred in this visit, but I shall not repeat them. I
will only say that I never saw a more agreeable or unrestrained
intercourse of a social character—for the visit had no political
significance whatever, and the Queen and the Prince subsequently
expressed their appreciation of the President’s hospitality, the
former in an autograph letter, and the latter both by letter and
the presentation of a three-quarter length portrait, painted by
one of Britain’s greatest artists. The value of this was enhanced
by the delicacy which marked its presentation _after_ Mr. Buchanan
had retired to private life as a simple citizen. These letters and
portrait are now in the possession of my cousin, and also the
autograph letter of the Prince Consort to Mr. Buchanan on the
occasion of the marriage of the Princess Royal, in which he uses
some pleasant expressions of a personal character, and referring
back to Mr. Buchanan’s residence in London as minister. I think
the era of good feeling between America and England, and
especially the enduring friendship of the Queen herself for the
United States, so decidedly shown by her during our terrible war,
may be traced as one of the happy results of the visit of the
Prince of Wales to the President. The kindly feelings of these two
great nations towards each other, a _rapprochement_, now so
marked, had, I think, its beginning at that period.
Another trait of Mr. Buchanan I must not omit alluding to. He made
it an invariable rule, as President, to accept no gifts or
presents of any value, even from the most intimate friends, and it
was part of my duty to return them at once, with a kind but
emphatic declination, telling the donor that the President had
made it a rule, not to be broken, that he could accept no gifts;
and I was directed, at the same time, to express his thanks for
the friendly intentions in all cases where it seemed probable that
it was not a bold effort to purchase favor, and from purely
selfish motives. A number of costly gifts were thus returned.
After a personal intercourse with Mr. Buchanan from my boyhood,
more or less intimate, and therefore having had an opportunity to
judge, I can conscientiously say that I never knew a man of purer
private life, or one actuated by nobler or more upright motives.
He was, to us around him, an object of unbroken respect and
reverence. I can truly aver that I never heard him express an
ignoble sentiment, or do an act that could diminish that respect
and reverence. He was strong willed, rather austere, and somewhat
exacting to those around him, but always and in all things the
Christian gentleman. This was the impression made upon me as a
youth, and now, as I look back from later life, I see no cause to
change or modify my estimate of his character. His only fault, if
fault it be, was a too great readiness to forgive and conciliate
those who had been his enemies, regarding it as a triumph for his
principles and a vindication of his motives. And yet this has been
at times attributed to him as a weakness.
Mr. Buchanan had an extraordinary memory, and could repeat
verbatim much of the classic authors of his college days, and I
remember he often put me to shame, when I was yet in the midst of
my books, by questions that I failed to answer to my satisfaction.
He was also a remarkably fluent and agreeable conversationalist—a
rare and valuable gift—and it was one of my greatest pleasures to
listen to him, when in congenial company, relating anecdotes of
his great contemporaries in public life at home, and incidents
occurring during his missions in St. Petersburgh and later in
London. This quality made him a most agreeable companion among
men, and an especial favorite with the fair sex, whose friendship
in turn he appreciated and enjoyed to the end of his life. The
correctness of his own private life, and his association with only
the nobler of the other sex, resulted in his never entertaining or
expressing cynical views of them, so common in men’s later years.
I do not know if you have any account of Mr. Buchanan’s personal
appearance or dress. The best likeness of him is a miniature
portrait on ivory, by Brown of Philadelphia, now in the possession
of his brother, the Rev. Dr. Buchanan. I have an oil photograph
painted in 1857, which is excellent; also a bust in marble by a
Boston sculptor, which is good. My cousin has a half-length
portrait, painted by Eicholtz about the year 1833. His figure and
general appearance whilst President is very accurately represented
in a full-length engraving by Buttre of New York. On the whole, I
think it is the best average representation of him extant. Healy
executed a portrait of Mr. Buchanan at the White House, but he was
an impatient sitter, and I do not think it was very successful.
Mr. Buchanan, in his sketch of the four last months of his
administration, gives a short account of a remarkable naval
expedition ordered by him to Paraguay, to settle certain
difficulties with that republic. This naval demonstration on a
considerable scale was entirely successful, and resulted in a
permanent peace with that country ever since. It had, however,
this most uncommon feature to distinguish it, that it cost the
United States not one dollar beyond the usual small annual
appropriation for the navy. I sometimes wonder whether any other
such expedition of its size and importance, in this or any other
country, can show such an example of economy, honesty and
efficiency and success combined, as did this.
[TO MISS LANE, IN NEW YORK.]
WASHINGTON, May 20th, 1858.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
Learning that you were about to purchase furniture in New York
[for the White House], I requested Doctor Blake to furnish me a
statement of the balance of the appropriation unexpended. This
balance is $8,369.02. In making your purchases, therefore, I wish
you to consider that this sum must answer our purpose until the
end of my term. I wish you, therefore, not to expend the whole of
it, but to leave enough to meet all contingencies up till 4th
March, 1861. Any sum which may be expended above the appropriation
I shall most certainly pay out of my own pocket. I shall never ask
Congress for the deficiency.
Who should make his appearance this morning but Mr. Keitt.[54]
After talking about other matters for some time, he said he was
married. I expressed strong doubts upon the subject, when he
insisted that he was actually and _bona fide_ married. The lady is
Miss Sparks, whom he has been so long addressing.
With my kind regards to Mr. and Mrs. R., I remain, etc.
Footnote 54:
Of South Carolina. Pronounced Kitt.
[TO MISS LANE, IN PHILADELPHIA.]
October 15th, 1858.
We have not yet heard from you since you left us. I hope you
arrived safely in Philadelphia, and did not contract a hoarseness
in talking on the way. We get along very nicely since your absence
and will give a big dinner on Thursday next. I have not seen any
of your lady friends since your departure, and can therefore give
you no news.
Well! we have met the enemy in Pennsylvania and we are theirs.
This I have anticipated for three months, and was not taken by
surprise, except as to the extent of our defeat. I am astonished
at myself for bearing it with so much philosophy.
The conspirators against poor Jones have at length succeeded in
hunting him down. Ever since my election the hounds have been in
pursuit of him. I now deeply regret—but I shall say no more. With
the blessing of Providence, I shall endeavor to raise him up and
place him in some position where they can not reach him.
Judge Black, General Anderson of Tennessee, Mr. Brenner, and Mr.
Van Dyke dined with me yesterday, and we had a merry time of it,
laughing, among other things, over our crushing defeat. It is so
great that it is almost absurd.
We will present a record of success at the meeting of Congress
which has rarely been equalled. We have hitherto succeeded in all
our undertakings.
Poor bleeding Kansas is quiet, and is behaving herself in an
orderly manner; but her wrongs have melted the hearts of the
sympathetic Pennsylvanians, or rather Philadelphians. In the
interior of the State the tariff was the damaging question, and in
defeating Jones, the iron interest have prostrated a man who could
render them more service than all the Republican Representatives
from Pennsylvania. He will be a loss to the whole country in the
House of Representatives.
I have heard nothing of the good and excellent Robert since you
left us. He is a man among a thousand. I wish I could say so much
for his brother.
It is growing late and I must retire. I sleep much better now, but
not near so well as at the Soldiers’ Home.
May 13th, 1859.
I send you an oration received from Hon. William Porcher
Miles,[55] and franked by him to yourself. A precious
recognition!......
I wrote a long letter to Mrs. Roosevelt, ten days ago, and left it
on my table open. It marvellously disappeared, and I had neither
courage nor time to copy it from memory. I know not what has
become of it, but it contains nothing which might not be published
in the _New York Herald_. My respect and admiration for Mrs.
Roosevelt, to be sure, appear in the letter; but this is well
known and does me honor. It is possible that in clearing my own
table I may have by mistake torn this letter up with other
manuscripts; but I can not believe it.
I have but little news. Mr. Magraw came to us on Saturday last and
still remains, much to my gratification. We get along very
comfortably and quietly. Miss Hetty is very busy. Washington, they
say, is extremely dull. I called yesterday at Mr. Thompson’s, just
before dinner. The lady was not at home. She had gone to a
travelling circus and show in company with Mrs. Gwin, her sister
and Miss Lucy. I made no remark to Mr. Thompson on receiving the
information, except that you would certainly have been of the
party had you been in Washington.
I met Mrs. Conrad and her daughters on the street the other day
and walked with them some distance. She does not appear to have
seen much of Lord Lyons. I think he keeps himself very much to
himself. Count Sartiges has been here several times. I shall miss
him more than I would any of the foreign ministers.
Footnote 55:
Of South Carolina.
May 14th, 1859.
I send you the enclosed letter from Mr. ——, of New York. It speaks
for itself. He seems to be a warm-hearted German, and I would
advise you to address him a few lines. In acknowledging the
compliment, I have said I would send his letter to you at Judge
Roosevelt’s. You have been hailed as “The Great Mother of the
Indians,” and it must gratify you to learn that your adopted
countrymen desire to perpetuate your name by giving it to their
children.
Two of the Secretaries and myself were to have visited Baltimore
to-day to select a site for the Federal Courts; but we agreed to
postpone our visit until Monday to enable them to attend a dinner
given by Lord Lyons to-day to the members of the cabinet. It is
quite probable we shall be accompanied on Monday by Mrs. Thompson,
Mrs. Gwin and other ladies.
What means the ominous conjunction between Mr. Van Buren and Mr.
Douglas at the —— Hotel. I do not, however, consider it ominous at
all, though others do.
Sir William ought to have been very careful in obeying his
instructions, especially after his former experience in South
America. The British government are not at all pleased with him.
We know this from Lord Lyons.
Here I was called away after ten at night, to hear the music of
the Knights Templars. It was, I think, excellent; though I am, as
you know, no great judge. Good-night! My affectionate regards to
Mrs. Roosevelt and my respectful compliments to the Judge.
Mr. Thompson and myself intend to set out for Chapel Hill on
Monday, 10th instant. I think Mr. Magraw will accompany us. They
are making great preparations to receive us. I hope you are
enjoying yourself. Stay as long as it affords you pleasure. We are
getting along very well. Miss Hetty is very busy in having things
put in order for the summer.
May 18th, 1859.
I return Lady Ouseley’s letter. When you write please to remember
me to her in the very kindest terms. I should be sorry indeed to
think I should never meet her again.
The conduct of Sir William has been most decidedly disapproved by
Lord Malmesbury. Of this we have the official evidence. I am truly
sorry he did not obey his instructions. But of this say nothing to
Mrs. Roosevelt.
Our two successful diplomatists, Messrs. Reed and Bowden, with
their ladies, are to dine with me to-day _en famille_. Mr. Cobb
now dines here regularly.
I never laughed as much on any one day as on Monday last at
Baltimore and on the way.
Remember me always most affectionately to Mrs. Roosevelt, and very
kindly to the Judge.
June 10th, 1859.
I have received your favor of yesterday. We returned to Washington
on Tuesday morning last from our visit to North Carolina. On
Wednesday morning Miss Hetty left for Wheatland with my full and
entire approbation, and I wish to say to you emphatically, that
you need not return home on my account. I shall be rejoiced to see
you whenever you may think proper to return; but I get along both
comfortably and happily in the absence both of Miss Hetty and
yourself.
I am sorry to find that your excursion to West Point on the
Harriet Lane, has been made the subject of newspaper criticism on
yourself. This is most ungallant and ungentlemanly. The practice,
however, of employing national vessels on pleasure excursions, to
gratify any class of people, is a fair subject of public
criticism. You know how much I condemned your former trip on the
same vessel, and I did not expect you would fall into a second
error. The thing, however, is past and gone, and let it pass.
After a fair time shall have elapsed, it is my purpose to cause
general orders to be issued by the Treasury and Navy Departments
to put a stop to the practice.
I am truly rejoiced to learn that James Henry is succeeding in his
practice.
I have not the least idea of paying the price you mention for a
cane. Let it pass for the present. I will get Mr. Baker to attend
to it.
Washington has been very quiet but very agreeable since you left.
I dined yesterday with Mrs. Thompson. Mrs. Gwin and her sister and
Mr. Cobb were the only persons present out of the family. We had a
merry time of it. The same party are to dine with Mrs. Gwin on
Tuesday next.
It was with the utmost reluctance I removed Mr. ——, though his
removal was inevitable. His brother —— has done him much injury. I
have known him long, and can say with truth that I know not a more
unprincipled man in the United States. I wished to avoid the
publication of Mr. Holt’s report, but Mr. —— and his brother made
this impossible. The trio are now all together in happy communion,
I mean ——, ——, and ——, the last the most contemptible of the set.
I have just had long and interesting letters from Jones and
Preston. They are both pleased, and both get along well. The
former evidently stands well with the Austrian government, and
gives us valuable information.
I remain, yours affectionately, etc.
BEDFORD SPRINGS, August 22, 1860.
I have only time to write a line before Mr. Wagner, the messenger
of Mr. Thompson, leaves. I am well, and the water is producing its
usual good effect. The company is reduced very much, though what
remains is agreeable and respectable. My visits from the
neighborhood are numerous.
Give my love to Lily. If things proceed as from appearances we
might anticipate she will soon be on the diplomatic corps, but I
yet entertain doubts whether she will stand fire at the decisive
moment.
Many inquiries have been made about you here, and regrets
expressed that you did not accompany me. In haste, yours
affectionately,
[FROM MISS MACALESTER.]
GLENGARRY, TORRISDALE, Oct. 8, 1860.
MY DEAR MR. BUCHANAN:—
You have always evinced such a kind and anxious interest in regard
to my matrimonial arrangements, that I feel it a duty, as well as
a pleasure, to relieve your solicitude on the subject, by assuring
you that I at last really am engaged. I consider you entirely
responsible for this result, my dear Mr. Buchanan, for you so
terrified me last spring and summer by your forebodings, and made
me so fully realize my almost hopeless condition and approaching
_superannuation_, that I determined to trifle no longer with time.
I think, therefore, I may fairly claim your kind wishes and
congratulations upon my escape from the prospect of a dreary
spinsterhood, and in due season I shall also claim your
fulfillment of a promise made long ago, and frequently repeated
since, to be present at my wedding when that incomprehensible
event takes place. _En attendant_, believe me always, my dear Mr.
Buchanan,
With truest love yours,
LILY L. MACALESTER.
[TO MISS MACALESTER.[56]]
WASHINGTON, October 10, 1860.
MY DEAR LILY:—
I have received your favor of the 10th, announcing your
engagement, and most sincerely and ardently do I hope that your
marriage may prove auspicious and secure your future happiness and
prosperity. I need not assure you that I feel all the interest
which devoted friendship can inspire in your permanent welfare.
I had thought that “the prospect of a dreary spinsterhood” would
not have impelled you into an engagement, without saying a word to
your superannuated bachelor friend, but when young ladies have
determined to marry they will go ahead.
May you enjoy all the blessings in your matrimonial state which I
ardently desire, and you so richly deserve. Always your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 56:
This lady, daughter of Charles Macalester, Esq., of Philadelphia,
married Mr. Berghmans, Secretary of the Belgian Legation in
Washington. He died about ten years since.
CHAPTER XII.
1860—March and June.
THE SO-CALLED “COVODE INVESTIGATION.”
Reference has been made by Mr. Henry, in a part of his communication
quoted in the last chapter, to a proceeding in the House of
Representatives, which has been called the “Covode Investigation.”
It is proper that a detailed account of this occurrence should be
here given.
Among the lower, or rather the lowest, political tactics,
inculpation of a retiring administration has often been resorted to
for promoting the success of the opposite party, and it seems not
infrequently to have been the calculation that the effect produced
would be in proportion to the grossness of the imputations. Mr.
Buchanan could not hope to escape calumny. None of his predecessors,
not even the most illustrious of them all, not even Washington
himself, had escaped it. Scarcely any of them, however, had been
made the object of this kind of attack, by a method so base and by
means so foul, as those to which President Buchanan was now to be
subjected. Before any of the troubles of secession arrived, before
either of the political parties had made its nomination for the next
Presidential election, it was determined that an assault should be
made upon him that would render him and his administration odious to
the people of the country.
It is certainly unavoidable, perhaps it is well, that free
governments should be administered by parties. In a vigilant,
jealous and active opposition, there is great security against the
misuse of power by those who hold it. But the freedom of opposition,
like the freedom of the press, can easily degenerate into
licentiousness; and the greater the latitude allowed by the
political maxims or habits of a people, the greater will be the
danger of abuse of that right of criticism and inculpation which is
essential to liberty, to purity, and to the public interests.
Happily, there are some restraints upon the exercise of this right,
imposed by the forms of procedure which our Constitution
has prescribed when the conduct of the executive branch of
the Government is to be called in question by the House of
Representatives. When these restraints are violated, as they were
violated against President Buchanan, there is but one judgment for
history to pronounce. Those who institute a proceeding that is out
of the limits of their constitutional function, for the purpose of
exciting hatred of one who fills for the time a coördinate and
independent department of the Government, and who conduct such a
proceeding in secret, leave upon the records of the country a
condemnation of themselves; and it is some evidence of the progress
which a people are making in freeing their partisan warfare from
such abuses, if we are able to say, as probably we can say, that
such a proceeding would not be tolerated at the present day by any
portion of the people of this country, as that which was begun and
prosecuted against President Buchanan in the spring and summer of
1860.
The House of Representatives was at this time under the control of a
majority held by the opponents of the administration. If they had
reason to believe that the President had been guilty of an exercise,
or of any attempt at an exercise, of improper influence over
legislation, or that he or any of his subordinate executive officers
had defeated, or attempted to defeat, the execution of any law, or
that he had failed or refused to execute any law, their course was
plain. In regard to the President, it was their duty to make a
specific charge, to investigate it openly, and to impeach him before
the Senate, if the evidence afforded reasonable ground to believe
that the charge could be substantiated. In regard to his
subordinates, their power to investigate was somewhat broader,
because, as a legislative body, the House of Representatives might
have occasion to remedy by legislation any future wrongs of the same
kind. But over the President, they had no authority of investigation
or inquiry, excepting as the impeaching body to which the
Constitution had committed the duty of accusation. By no
constitutional propriety, by no precedent and no principle, could an
accusation of official misconduct on the part of the President be
brought within the jurisdiction of the House, excepting by the
initiation of a proceeding looking to his impeachment. Any
proceeding, aside from the impeaching process, could have no object
and no effect but to propagate calumny, without opportunity for
exculpation and defence; and from the beginning to the end of this
extraordinary persecution every step was marked by the design with
which it was originated.
It began by the introduction of a resolution, offered in the House
by Mr. Covode, a member from Pennsylvania, on the 5th March, 1860;
and to make way for its introduction, he moved and obtained a
suspension of the rules. This was of course by previous concert. The
Speaker, after the reading of the resolution, ruled that it was not
debatable. Attempts were made by different members to point out the
absence from the resolution of any specific or tangible charge, or
to extract from the mover some declaration that he had been informed
or believed that the President had been guilty of some official
misconduct, within the generality and vagueness of the inquiry that
he proposed to have made. All these efforts were put down by the
Speaker and by clamorous cries of “order.” It became evident that
the resolution was to pass, as a foregone conclusion, without a
moment’s consideration of its character or its terms. Under the
operation of “the previous question,” it was adopted, and the mover
was afterwards placed by the Speaker at the head of the committee
which he called for. Thus, so far as there was any accuser, that
accuser was made the principal judge who was to try the accusation;
and by the terms of the resolution, all the accusation that was made
was wrapped in the following vague and indefinite language:
_Resolved_, That a committee of five members be appointed by the
Speaker, for the purpose, first, of investigating whether the
President of the United States, or any officer of the Government,
has, by money, patronage, or other improper means, sought to
influence the action of Congress, or any committee thereof, for or
against the passage of any law appertaining to the rights of any
State or Territory; and, second, also to inquire into and
investigate whether any officer or officers of the Government
have, by combination or otherwise, prevented or defeated, or
attempted to prevent or defeat, the execution of any law or laws
now upon the statute book, and whether the President has failed or
refused to compel the execution of any law thereof.
The committee, under the mover of the resolution as chairman,
proceeded to make, with closed doors, a general investigation into
every thing that any enemy of the President could bring to them.
Never, in the history of parliamentary proceedings, since they
ceased to be made the instruments of mere partisan malice, had there
been such a violation of constitutional principles and of every
maxim of justice. A secret inquisition into the conduct of a
President of the United States, not conducted in the forms or with
the safeguards of the impeachment process, without one specific
accusation, was a proceeding unknown alike to the Constitution and
to the practice, the habits and the instincts, of the people of the
United States. The President was left to learn what he could of the
doings of this committee from what they permitted to leak into the
public prints, or from other sources. More concerned for the safety
of his successors in the great office which he held than for his own
reputation, but not unmindful of the duty which he owed to himself,
he transmitted to the House, on the 28th of March, the following
message, embracing a dignified and energetic protest against this
unexampled proceeding:
TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:—
After a delay which has afforded me ample time for reflection, and
after much and careful deliberation, I find myself constrained by
an imperious sense of duty, as a coördinate branch of the Federal
Government, to protest against the first two clauses of the first
resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 5th
instant, and published in the _Congressional Globe_ on the
succeeding day. These clauses are in the following words:
“_Resolved_, That a committee of five members be appointed by the
Speaker, for the purpose, 1st, of investigating whether the
President of the United States, or any other officer of the
Government, has, by money, patronage, or other improper means,
sought to influence the action of Congress, or any committee
thereof, for or against the passage of any law appertaining to the
rights of any State or Territory; and 2d, also to inquire into and
investigate whether any officer or officers of the Government
have, by combination or otherwise, prevented or defeated, or
attempted to prevent or defeat, the execution of any law or laws
now upon the statute book, and whether the President has failed or
refused to compel the execution of any law thereof.”
I confine myself exclusively to these two branches of the
resolution, because the portions of it which follow relate to
alleged abuses in post offices, navy yards, public buildings, and
other public works of the United States. In such cases inquiries
are highly proper in themselves, and belong equally to the Senate
and the House as incident to their legislative duties, and being
necessary to enable them to discover and to provide the
appropriate legislative remedies for any abuses which may be
ascertained. Although the terms of the latter portion of the
resolution are extremely vague and general, yet my sole purpose in
adverting to them at present is to mark the broad line of
distinction between the accusatory and the remedial clauses of
this resolution. The House of Representatives possess no power
under the Constitution over the first or accusatory portion of the
resolution, except as an impeaching body; whilst over the last, in
common with the Senate, their authority as a legislative body is
fully and cheerfully admitted.
It is solely in reference to the first or impeaching power that I
propose to make a few observations. Except in this single case,
the Constitution has invested the House of Representatives with no
power, no jurisdiction, no supremacy whatever over the President.
In all other respects he is quite as independent of them as they
are of him. As a coördinate branch of the Government he is their
equal. Indeed, he is the only direct representative on earth of
the people of all and each of the sovereign States. To them, and
to them alone, is he responsible whilst acting within the sphere
of his constitutional duty, and not in any manner to the House of
Representatives. The people have thought proper to invest him with
the most honorable, responsible, and dignified office in the
world, and the individual, however unworthy, now holding this
exalted position, will take care, so far as in him lies, that
their rights and prerogatives shall never be violated in his
person, but shall pass to his successors unimpaired by the
adoption of a dangerous precedent. He will defend them to the last
extremity against any unconstitutional attempt, come from what
quarter it may, to abridge the constitutional rights of the
Executive, and render him subservient to any human power except
themselves.
The people have not confined the President to the exercise of
executive duties. They have also conferred upon him a large
measure of legislative discretion. No bill can become a law
without his approval, as representing the people of the United
States, unless it shall pass after his veto by a majority of
two-thirds of both Houses. In his legislative capacity he might,
in common with the Senate and the House, institute an inquiry to
ascertain any facts which ought to influence his judgment in
approving or vetoing any bill. This participation in the
performance of legislative duties between the coördinate branches
of the Government ought to inspire the conduct of all of them, in
their relations toward each other, with mutual forbearance and
respect. At least each has a right to demand justice from the
other. The cause of complaint is, that the constitutional rights
and immunities of the Executive have been violated in the person
of the President.
The trial of an impeachment of the President before the Senate on
charges preferred and prosecuted against him by the House of
Representatives, would be an imposing spectacle for the world. In
the result, not only his removal from the Presidential office
would be involved, but, what is of infinitely greater importance
to himself, his character, both in the eyes of the present and of
future generations, might possibly be tarnished. The disgrace cast
upon him would in some degree be reflected upon the character of
the American people who elected him. Hence the precautions adopted
by the Constitution to secure a fair trial. On such a trial it
declares that “the Chief Justice shall preside.” This was
doubtless because the framers of the Constitution believed it to
be possible that the Vice-President might be biassed by the fact
that “in case of the removal of the President from office,” “the
same shall devolve on the Vice-President.”
The preliminary proceedings in the House in the case of charges
which may involve impeachment, have been well and wisely settled
by long practice upon principles of equal justice both to the
accused and to the people. The precedent established in the case
of Judge Peck, of Missouri, in 1831, after a careful review of all
former precedents, will, I venture to predict, stand the test of
time. In that case, Luke Edward Lawless, the accuser, presented a
petition to the House, in which he set forth minutely and
specifically his causes of complaint. He prayed “that the conduct
and proceedings in this behalf of said Judge Peck may be inquired
into by your honorable body, and such decision made thereon as to
your wisdom and justice shall seem proper.” This petition was
referred to the Judiciary Committee; such has ever been deemed the
appropriate committee to make similar investigations. It is a
standing committee, supposed to be appointed without reference to
any special case, and at all times is presumed to be composed of
the most eminent lawyers in the House from different portions of
the Union, whose acquaintance with judicial proceedings, and whose
habits of investigation, qualify them peculiarly for the task. No
tribunal, from their position and character, could in the nature
of things be more impartial. In the case of Judge Peck, the
witnesses were selected by the committee itself, with a view to
ascertain the truth of the charge. They were cross-examined by
him, and everything was conducted in such a manner as to afford
him no reasonable cause of complaint. In view of this precedent,
and, what is of far greater importance, in view of the
Constitution and the principles of eternal justice, in what manner
has the President of the United States been treated by the House
of Representatives? Mr. John Covode, a Representative from
Pennsylvania, is the accuser of the President. Instead of
following the wise precedents of former times, and especially that
in the case of Judge Peck, and referring the accusation to the
Committee on the Judiciary, the House have made my accuser one of
my judges.
To make the accuser the judge is a violation of the principles of
universal justice, and is condemned by the practice of all
civilized nations. Every free-man must revolt at such a spectacle.
I am to appear before Mr. Covode, either personally or by a
substitute, to cross-examine the witnesses which he may produce
before himself to sustain his own accusations against me, and
perhaps even this poor boon may be denied to the President.
And what is the nature of the investigation which his resolution
proposes to institute? It is as vague and general as the English
language affords words in which to make it. The committee is to
inquire, not into any specific charge or charges, but whether the
President has, “by money, patronage, or other improper means,
sought to influence,” not the action of any individual member or
members of Congress, but “the action” of the entire body “of
Congress” itself, “or any committee thereof.” The President might
have had some glimmering of the nature of the offence to be
investigated, had his accuser pointed to the act or acts of
Congress which he sought to pass or to defeat by the employment of
“money, patronage, or other improper means.” But the accusation is
bounded by no such limits. It extends to the whole circle of
legislation; to interference “for or against the passage of any
law appertaining to the rights of any State or Territory.” And
what law does not appertain to the rights of some State or
Territory? And what law or laws has the President failed to
execute? These might easily have been pointed out had any such
existed.
Had Mr. Lawless asked an inquiry to be made by the House whether
Judge Peck, in general terms, had not violated his judicial
duties, without the specification of any particular act, I do not
believe there would have been a single vote in that body in favor
of the inquiry. Since the time of the Star Chamber and of general
warrants, there has been no such proceeding in England.
The House of Representatives, the high impeaching power of the
country, without consenting to hear a word of explanation, have
indorsed this accusation against the President, and made it their
own act. They even refused to permit a member to inquire of the
President’s accuser what were the specific charges against him.
Thus, in this preliminary accusation of “high crimes and
misdemeanors” against a coordinate branch of the Government, under
the impeaching power, the House refused to hear a single
suggestion even in regard to the correct mode of proceeding, but,
without a moment’s delay, passed the accusatory resolutions under
the pressure of the previous question. In the institution of a
prosecution for any offence against the most humble citizen—and I
claim for myself no greater rights than he enjoys—the Constitution
of the United States, and of the several States, require that he
shall be informed, in the very beginning, of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, in order to enable him to prepare
for his defence. There are other principles which I might
enumerate, not less sacred, presenting an impenetrable shield to
protect every citizen falsely charged with a criminal offence.
These have been violated in the prosecution instituted by the
House of Representatives against the executive branch of the
Government. Shall the President alone be deprived of the
protection of these great principles, which prevail in every land
where a ray of liberty penetrates the gloom of despotism? Shall
the Executive alone be deprived of rights which all his
fellow-citizens enjoy? The whole proceeding against him justifies
the fears of those wise and great men who, before the Constitution
was adopted by the States, apprehended that the tendency of the
Government was to the aggrandizement of the legislative at the
expense of the executive and judicial departments.
I again declare emphatically that I make this protest for no
reason personal to myself; and I do it with perfect respect for
the House of Representatives, in which I had the honor of serving
as a member for five successive terms. I have lived long in this
goodly land, and have enjoyed all the offices and honors which my
country could bestow. Amid all the political storms through which
I have passed, the present is the first attempt which has ever
been made, to my knowledge, to assail my personal or official
integrity; and this as the time is approaching when I shall
voluntarily retire from the service of my country. I feel proudly
conscious that there is no public act of my life which will not
bear the strictest scrutiny. I defy all investigation. Nothing but
the basest perjury can sully my good name. I do not fear even
this, because I cherish an humble confidence that the Gracious
Being who has hitherto defended and protected me against the
shafts of falsehood and malice will not desert me now, when I have
become “old and gray-headed.” I can declare, before God and my
country, that no human being (with an exception scarcely worthy of
notice) has, at any period of my life, dared to approach me with a
corrupt or dishonorable proposition; and, until recent
developments, it had never entered into my imagination that any
person, even in the storm of exasperated political excitement,
would charge me, in the most remote degree, with having made such
a proposition to any human being. I may now, however, exclaim, in
the language of complaint employed by my first and greatest
predecessor, that I have been abused “in such exaggerated and
indecent terms as could scarcely be applied to a Nero, to a
notorious defaulter, or even to a common pickpocket.”
I do, therefore, for the reasons stated, and in the name of the
people of the several States, solemnly protest against these
proceedings of the House of Representatives, because they are in
violation of the rights of the coördinate executive branch of the
Government, and subversive of its constitutional independence;
because they are calculated to foster a band of interested
parasites and informers, ever ready, for their own advantage, to
swear before _ex parte_ committees to pretended private
conversations between the President and themselves, incapable,
from their nature, of being disproved, thus furnishing material
for harassing him, degrading him in the eyes of the country, and
eventually, should he be a weak or a timid man, rendering him
subservient to improper influences, in order to avoid such
persecutions and annoyances; because they tend to destroy that
harmonious action for the common good which ought to be
maintained, and which I sincerely desire to cherish between
coördinate branches of the Government; and, finally, because, if
unresisted, they would establish a precedent dangerous and
embarrassing to all my successors, to whatever political party
they might be attached.
JAMES BUCHANAN.
WASHINGTON, March 28, 1860.
This message was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, a
majority of whom, through their chairman, on the 9th of April,
reported resolutions against its constitutional doctrines, which the
House adopted on the 8th of June, by a party vote, and the
proceedings of the Covode Committee went on until the 16th of that
month. Mr. Train, of Massachusetts, one of the committee, then
reported to the House a great mass of testimony which had been taken
from all sorts of willing witnesses against the President, but
without a single resolution accusing or censuring either him or any
member of his cabinet. This was, in one sense, as he has himself
said, “a triumphant result for the President.”[57] But the movers in
this business had attained their object, in procuring and spreading
before the country the means of traducing the President; means which
rested for the most part on perjury, and for the residue were
colored by personal or political hostility. It was impossible for
Mr. Buchanan to allow this to pass without further notice. It is
more than probable that the further notice which he took of it
prevented a repetition of this kind of proceeding, when, on a future
occasion, another President of the United States incurred the
hostility of a dominant majority in the House of Representatives. On
the 22d of June he sent to the House the following additional
message:—
Footnote 57:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 218.
“TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:—
“In my message to the House of Representatives of the 28th March
last, I solemnly protested against the creation of a committee, at
the head of which was placed my accuser, for the purpose of
investigating whether the President had, ‘by money, patronage or
other improper means, sought to influence the action of Congress,
or any committee thereof, for or against the passage of any law
appertaining to the rights of any State or Territory.’ I protested
against this because it was destitute of any specification;
because it referred to no particular act to enable the President
to prepare for his defence; because it deprived him of the
constitutional guards, which, in common with every citizen of the
United States, he possesses for his protection; and because it
assailed his constitutional independence as a coördinate branch of
the Government. There is an enlightened justice, as well as a
beautiful symmetry, in every part of the Constitution. This is
conspicuously manifested in regard to impeachments. The House of
Representatives possesses ‘the sole power of impeachment;’ the
Senate ‘the sole power to try all impeachments;’ and the
impeachable offences are ‘treason, bribery, or other high crimes
or misdemeanors.’ The practice of the House, from the earliest
times, had been in accordance with its own dignity, the rights of
the accused, and the demands of justice. At the commencement of
each judicial investigation which might lead to an impeachment,
specific charges were always preferred; the accused had an
opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses, and he was placed in
full possession of the precise nature of the offence which he had
to meet. An impartial and elevated standing committee was charged
with this investigation, upon which no member inspired with the
ancient sense of honor and justice would have served, had he ever
expressed an opinion against the accused. Until the present
occasion, it was never deemed proper to transform the accuser into
the judge, and to confer upon him the selection of his own
committee.
“The charges made against me, in vague and general terms, were of
such a false and atrocious character, that I did not entertain a
moment’s apprehension for the result. They were abhorrent to every
principle instilled into me from my youth, and every practice of
my life, and I did not believe it possible that the man existed
who would so basely perjure himself as to swear to the truth of
any such accusations. In this conviction I am informed I have not
been mistaken. In my former protest, therefore, I truly and
emphatically declared that it was made for no reason personal to
myself, but because the proceedings of the House were in violation
of the rights of the coördinate executive branch of the
Government, subversive of its constitutional independence, and, if
unresisted, would establish a precedent dangerous and embarrassing
to all my successors. Notwithstanding all this, if the committee
had not transcended the authority conferred upon it by the
resolution of the House of Representatives, broad and general as
this was, I should have remained silent upon the subject. What I
now charge is, that they have acted as though they possessed
unlimited power, and, without any warrant whatever in the
resolution under which they were appointed, have pursued a course
not merely at war with the constitutional rights of the Executive,
but tending to degrade the presidential office itself to such a
degree as to render it unworthy of the acceptance of any man of
honor or principle.
“The resolution of the House, so far as it is accusatory of the
President, is confined to an inquiry whether he had used corrupt
or improper means to influence the action of Congress or any of
its committees on legislative measures pending before them.
Nothing more, nothing less. I have not learned through the
newspapers, or in any other mode, that the committee have touched
the other accusatory branch of the resolution, charging the
President with a violation of duty in failing to execute some law
or laws. This branch of the resolution is therefore out of the
question. By what authority, then, have the committee undertaken
to investigate the course of the President in regard to the
convention which framed the Lecompton constitution? By what
authority have they undertaken to pry into our foreign relations,
for the purpose of assailing him on account of the instructions
given by the Secretary of State to our minister in Mexico,
relative to the Tehuantepec route? By what authority have they
inquired into the causes of removal from office, and this from the
parties themselves removed, with a view to prejudice his
character, notwithstanding this power of removal belongs
exclusively to the President under the Constitution, was so
decided by the first Congress in the year 1789, and has
accordingly ever since been exercised? There is in the resolution
no pretext of authority for the committee to investigate the
question of the printing of the post-office blanks, nor is it to
be supposed that the House, if asked, would have granted such an
authority, because this question had been previously committed to
two other committees—one in the Senate and the other in the House.
Notwithstanding this absolute want of power, the committee rushed
into this investigation in advance of all other subjects.
“The committee proceeded for months, from March 22d, 1860, to
examine _ex parte_, and without any notice to myself, into every
subject which could possibly affect my character. Interested and
vindictive witnesses were summoned and examined before them; and
the first and only information of their testimony which, in almost
every instance, I received, was obtained from the publication of
such portions of it as could injuriously affect myself, in the New
York journals. It mattered not that these statements were, so far
as I have learned, disproved by the most respectable witnesses who
happened to be on the spot. The telegraph was silent respecting
these contradictions. It was a secret committee in regard to all
the testimony which could by possibility reflect on my character.
The poison was left to produce its effect upon the public mind,
whilst the antidote was carefully withheld.
“In their examinations the committee violated the most sacred and
honorable confidences existing among men. Private correspondence,
which a truly honorable man would never even entertain a distant
thought of divulging, was dragged to light. Different persons in
official and confidential relations with myself, and with whom it
was supposed I might have held conversations, the revelation of
which would do me injury, were examined. Even members of the
Senate and members of my own cabinet, both my constitutional
advisers, were called upon to testify, for the purpose of
discovering something, if possible, to my discredit.
“The distribution of the patronage of the Government is by far
the most disagreeable duty of the President. Applicants are so
numerous, and their applications are pressed with such
eagerness by their friends both in and out of Congress, that
the selection of one for any desirable office gives offence to
many. Disappointed applicants, removed officers, and those who
for any cause, real or imaginary, had become hostile to the
administration, presented themselves, or were invited by a
summons to appear before the committee. These are the most
dangerous witnesses. Even with the best intentions, they are
so influenced by prejudice and disappointment, that they
almost inevitably discolor truth. They swear to their own
version of private conversations with the President without
the possibility of contradiction. His lips are sealed and he
is left at their mercy. He cannot, as a coördinate branch of
the Government, appear before a committee of investigation to
contradict the oaths of such witnesses. Every coward knows
that he can employ insulting language against the President
with impunity, and every false or prejudiced witness can
attempt to swear away his character before such a committee
without the fear of contradiction.
“Thus for months, whilst doing my best at one end of the avenue to
perform my high and responsible duties to the country, has there
been a committee of the House of Representatives in session at the
other end of the avenue, spreading a drag-net, without the shadow
of authority from the House, over the whole Union, to catch any
disappointed man willing to malign my character, and all this in
secret conclave. The lion’s mouth at Venice, into which secret
denunciations were dropped, is an apt illustration of the Covode
committee. The Star Chamber, tyrannical and odious as it was,
never proceeded in such a manner. For centuries there has been
nothing like it in any civilized country, except the revolutionary
tribunal of France, in the days of Robespierre. Now, I undertake
to state and to prove that should the proceedings of the committee
be sanctioned by the House, and become a precedent for future
times, the balance of the Constitution will be entirely upset, and
there will no longer remain the three coördinate and independent
branches of the Government—legislative, executive, and judicial.
The worst fears of the patriots and statesmen who framed the
Constitution in regard to the usurpations of the legislative on
the executive and judicial branches will then be realized. In the
language of Mr. Madison, speaking on this very subject, in the
forty-eighth number of the _Federalist_: ‘In a representative
republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited both
in the extent and duration of its power, and where the legislative
power is exercised by an assembly which is inspired by a supposed
influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own
strength, which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions
which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable
of pursuing the objects of its passions by means which reason
prescribes, it is against the enterprising ambition of this
department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and
exhaust all their precautions.’ And in the expressive and pointed
language of Mr. Jefferson, when speaking of the tendency of the
legislative branch of Government to usurp the rights of the weaker
branches: ‘The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely
the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation
that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and
not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would
surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it turn their
eyes on the Republic of Venice. As little will it avail us that
they are chosen by ourselves. An elective despotism was not the
government we fought for, but one which should not only be founded
on free principles, but in which the powers of government should
be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as
that no one could transcend their legal limits without being
effectually checked and controlled by the others.”
“Should the proceedings of the Covode committee become a
precedent, both the letter and spirit of the Constitution will be
violated. One of the three massive columns on which the whole
superstructure rests will be broken down. Instead of the Executive
being a coördinate, it will become a subordinate branch of the
Government. The presidential office will be dragged into the dust.
The House of Representatives will then have rendered the Executive
almost necessarily subservient to its wishes, instead of being
independent. How is it possible that two powers in the State can
be coördinate and independent of each other, if the one claims and
exercises the power to reprove and to censure all the official
acts and all the private conversations of the other, and this upon
_ex parte_ testimony before a secret inquisitorial committee—in
short, to assume a general censorship over the others? The idea is
as absurd in public as it would be in private life. Should the
President attempt to assert and maintain his own independence,
future Covode committees may dragoon him into submission by
collecting the hosts of disappointed office-hunters, removed
officers, and those who desire to live upon the public treasury,
which must follow in the wake of every administration, and they,
in secret conclave, will swear away his reputation. Under such
circumstances, he must be a very bold man should he not surrender
at discretion and consent to exercise his authority according to
the will of those invested with this terrific power. The sovereign
people of the several States have elected him to the highest and
most honorable office in the world. He is their only direct
representative in the Government. By their Constitution they have
made him commander-in-chief of their army and navy. He represents
them in their intercourse with foreign nations. Clothed with their
dignity and authority, he occupies a proud position before all
nations, civilized and savage. With the consent of the Senate, he
appoints all the important officers of the Government. He
exercises the veto power, and to that extent controls the
legislation of Congress. For the performance of these high duties
he is responsible to the people of the several States, and not in
any degree to the House of Representatives.
“Shall he surrender these high powers, conferred upon him as the
representative of the American people, for their benefit, to the
House, to be exercised under their overshadowing influence and
control! Shall he alone of all the citizens of the United States
be denied a fair trial? Shall he alone not be ‘informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation’ against him? Shall he alone
not ‘be confronted with the witnesses’ against him? Shall the
House of Representatives, usurping the powers of the Senate,
proceed to try the President through the agency of a secret
committee of the body where it is impossible he can make any
defence, and then, without affording him an opportunity of being
heard, pronounce a judgment of censure against him? The very same
rule might be applied, for the very same reason, to every judge of
every court in the United States. From what part of the
Constitution is this terrible inquisitorial power derived? No such
express power exists. From which of the enumerated powers can it
be inferred? It is true the House cannot pronounce the formal
judgment against him of ‘removal from office,’ but they can, by
their judgment of censure, asperse his reputation, and thus, to
the extent of their influence, render the office contemptible. An
example is at hand of the reckless manner in which this power of
censure can be employed in high party times. The House, on a
recent occasion, have attempted to degrade the President by
adopting the resolution of Mr. John Sherman, declaring that he, in
conjunction with the Secretary of the Navy, “by receiving and
considering the party relations of bidders for contracts, and the
effect of awarding contracts upon pending elections, have set an
example dangerous to the public safety, and deserving the reproof
of this House.”
It will scarcely be credited that the sole pretext for this vote
of censure was the simple fact that in disposing of the numerous
letters of every imaginable character which I daily receive, I
had, in the usual course of business, referred a letter from
Colonel Patterson, of Philadelphia, in relation to a contract, to
the attention of the Secretary of the Navy, the head of the
appropriate department, without expressing or intimating any
opinion whatever on the subject; and to make the matter, if
possible, still plainer, the Secretary had informed the committee
that “_the President did not in any manner interfere in this case,
nor has he in any other case of contract since I have been in the
department_.” The absence of all proof to sustain this attempt to
degrade the President, whilst it manifests the venom of the shaft
aimed at him, has destroyed the vigor of the bow.
To return, after this digression. Should the House, by the
institution of Covode committees, votes of censure, and other
devices to harass the President, reduce him to subservience to
their will, and render him their creature, then the well-balanced
Government which our fathers framed will be annihilated. This
conflict has already been commenced in earnest by the House
against the Executive. A bad precedent rarely if ever dies. It
will, I fear, be pursued in the time of my successors, no matter
what may be their political character. Should secret committees be
appointed with unlimited authority to range over all the words and
actions, and, if possible, the very thoughts of the President,
with a view to discover something in his past life prejudicial to
his character, from parasites and informers, this would be an
ordeal which scarcely any mere man since the fall could endure. It
would be to subject him to a reign of terror from which the
stoutest and purest hearts might shrink. I have passed
triumphantly through this ordeal. My vindication is complete. The
committee have reported no resolution looking to an impeachment
against me, no resolution of censure, not even a resolution
pointing out any abuses in any of the executive departments of the
Government to be corrected by legislation. This is the highest
commendation which could be bestowed on the heads of these
departments. The sovereign people of the States will, however, I
trust, save my successors, whoever they may be, from any such
ordeal. They are frank, bold, and honest. They detest delators and
informers. I therefore, in the name and as the representative of
this great people, and standing upon the ramparts of the
Constitution which they “have ordained and established,” do
solemnly protest against these unprecedented and unconstitutional
proceedings.
There was still another committee raised by the House on the 6th
March last, on motion of Mr. Heard, to which I had not the
slightest objection. The resolution creating it was confined to
specific charges, which I have ever since been ready and willing
to meet. I have at all times invited and defied fair investigation
upon constitutional principles. I have received no notice that
this committee have ever proceeded to the investigation.
Why should the House of Representatives desire to encroach on the
other departments of the Government? Their rightful powers are
ample for every legitimate purpose. They are the impeaching body.
In their legislative capacity it is their most wise and wholesome
prerogative to institute rigid examinations into the manner in
which all departments of the Government are conducted, with a view
to reform abuses, to promote economy, and to improve every branch
of the administration. Should they find reason to believe, in the
course of their examinations, that any grave offence had been
committed by the President or any officer of the Government,
rendering it proper, in their judgment, to resort to impeachment,
their course would be plain. They would then transfer the question
from their legislative to their accusatory jurisdiction, and take
care that in all the preliminary judicial proceedings, preparatory
to the vote of articles of impeachment, the accused should enjoy
the benefit of cross-examining the witnesses, and all the other
safeguards with which the Constitution surrounds every American
citizen.
If, in a legislative investigation, it should appear that the
public interest required the removal of any officer of the
Government, no President has ever existed who, after giving him a
fair hearing, would hesitate to apply the remedy. This I take to
be the ancient and well-established practice. An adherence to it
will best promote the harmony and the dignity of the intercourse
between the coördinate branches of the Government, and render us
all more respectable both in the eyes of our own countrymen and of
foreign nations.
JAMES BUCHANAN.
WASHINGTON, June 22, 1860.
This last message was referred to a select committee, with
instructions to report at the next session. But no report was ever
made, and legislative action on the doings of the “Covode Committee”
thus came to an end. But in the country the materials for
calumniating the President continued to be used as they were
originally designed to be. It will be interesting to know something
more of the feelings of Mr. Buchanan on the subject, as expressed in
a private letter to the editor and proprietor of a great New York
journal.
[TO JAMES GORDON BENNETT, ESQ.]
(Private and Confidential.) WASHINGTON, June 18th, 1860.
MR DEAR SIR:—
I thought I never should have occasion to appeal to you on any
public subject, and I knew if I did, I could not swerve you from
your independent course. I therefore now only ask you as a
personal friend to take the trouble of examining yourself the
proceedings of the Covode Committee and the reports of the
majority and minority, and then to do me what you may deem to be
justice. That committee were engaged in secret conclave for nearly
three months in examining every man, _ex parte_, who, from
disappointment or personal malignity, would cast a shade upon the
character of the Executive. If this dragooning can exist, the
Presidential office would be unworthy of the acceptance of a
gentleman.
In performing my duty, I have endeavored to be not only pure but
unsuspected. I have never had any concern in awarding contracts,
but have left them to be given by the heads of the appropriate
departments. I have ever detested all jobs, and no man, at any
period of my life, has ever approached me on such a subject. The
testimony of —— contains nothing but falsehoods, whether for or
against me, for he has sworn all round.
I shall send a message to the House in a few days on the violation
of the Constitution involved in the vote of censure and in the
appointment and proceedings of the Covode Committee. I am glad to
perceive from the _Herald_ that you agree with me on the
Constitutional question. I shall endeavor to send you a copy in
advance.
With my kindest regards to Mrs. Bennett, I remain, very
respectfully,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
CHAPTER XIII.
SUMMARY OF THE SLAVERY QUESTIONS FROM 1787 TO 1860—THE ANTI-SLAVERY
AGITATION IN THE NORTH—GROWTH AND POLITICAL TRIUMPH OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY—FATAL DIVISIONS AMONG THE DEMOCRATS—MR.
BUCHANAN DECLINES TO BE REGARDED AS A CANDIDATE FOR A SECOND
ELECTION.
As the reader is now approaching the period when, for the first time
in our political history, a President of the United States was
elected by the votes of the free States alone, a retrospective view
of those events which preceded and contributed to that result is
necessary to a correct understanding of the great national schism of
1860-61.
The beginning of the year 1860 found the people of the United States
in the enjoyment of as great a measure of prosperity as they had
ever known. It was to close with a condition of feeling between the
two sections of the Union entirely fatal to its peace and
threatening to its perpetuity. In the future of our country there
will come a time when our posterity will ask, why should there ever
have been any “North” or any “South,” in the sense in which those
divisions have been marked in so long a period of our national
history. When the inquirer learns that from the time of the
formation and establishment of the Constitution of the United
States, the existence of slavery in certain States was nearly the
sole cause of the sectional antagonism typified by those terms, he
will have to trace, through various settlements, the successive
adjustments of questions which related to this one dangerous and
irritating subject.
This portion of our national history is divided into distinct
stages, at each of which some thing intended to be definite and
final was reached. It is also filled by the disastrous influence of
causes which unsettled what had once been determined as a series of
compacts between the sections; causes which continued to operate
until the year that witnessed the beginning of a great catastrophe.
The Constitution of the United States, so far as it related in any
way to the condition of slavery, was the result of agreements and
adjustments between the Northern and the Southern States, which have
been called “compromises.” It is not material to the present purpose
to consider either the moral justification for these arrangements,
or whether there was an equality or an inequality as between the two
sections, in what they respectively gained or conceded. Both
sections gained the Union of the whole country under a system of
government better adapted to secure its welfare and happiness than
it had known before; and what this system promised was abundantly
fulfilled. The precise equivalent which the Southern States
received, by the settlement made in the formation of the
Constitution, was the recognition of slavery as a condition of
portions of their population by a right exclusively dependent upon
their own local law, and exclusively under their own control as a
right of property; and to this right of property was annexed a
stipulation that the master might follow his slave from the State
whence he had escaped into any other State, and require him to be
given up, even if the law of that other State did not recognize the
condition of servitude. One other concession was made by the
Northern States: that although the slaves of the Southern States
were regarded as property, they should be so far considered as
persons as to be reckoned in a certain ratio in fixing the basis of
representation in the popular branch of Congress, and by consequence
in fixing the electoral vote of the State in the choice of a
President of the United States. The special equivalent which the
Northern States received for these concessions was in the
establishment of what is called “the commercial power,” or the power
of Congress to regulate for the whole country the trade with foreign
nations and between the States; a power which it was foreseen was to
be one of vast importance, which was one of the chief objects for
which the new Union was to be formed, and which proved in the event
to be all, and more than all, that had been anticipated for it.
Viewed in the light of mutual stipulations, these so-called
“compromises” between the two sections were laid at the basis of the
Constitution, forming a settlement fixed in the supreme law of the
land, and therefore determinate and final.
Contemporaneously with the formation of the Constitution, and before
its adoption, the Congress of the Confederation was engaged in
framing an ordinance for the government of the Northwestern
Territory, a region of country north and west of the Ohio, which
Virginia and other States had ceded to the United States during the
war of the revolution. From this region the ordinance excluded
slavery by an agreement made in that Congress between the Northern
and the Southern States. The Constitution did not take notice of
this Northwestern Territory by its specific designation, but it was
made to embrace a provision empowering the new Congress “to make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and all other
property of the United States,” and also a provision for the
admission into the Union of new States, to be formed out of any
territory belonging to the United States. For a long period after
the adoption of the Constitution, these two provisions, taken
together, were regarded as establishing a plenary power of
legislation over the internal condition of any territory that might
in any way become the property of the United States, while it
remained subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, and down
to the time when its inhabitants were to be permitted to form
themselves into a State that was to be admitted into the Union upon
an equality with all the other States. Under this process, between
the years 1792 and 1820, nine new States were admitted into the
Union; five of them with slavery and four of them without it. Of
these, three were formed out of parts of the Northwestern Territory,
and they therefore derived their character as free States from the
admitted force of the ordinance of 1787; while the others were not
within the scope of that ordinance, but derived their character from
the legislative authority of Congress under the Constitution.
It was not until the year 1820 that this recognized practice of
admitting a State into the Union as a free or as a slave State,
according to the character of its early settlement, and the
legislation which governed the Territorial condition, incurred any
serious danger of interruption. But in that year, Missouri, which
was a part of the territory ceded in 1803 by France to the United
States under the name of Louisiana, was in a condition to seek
admission into the Union. Slavery had existed there from the first
settlement of the country, and when it became necessary to authorize
the free inhabitants to form a State constitution, preparatory to
admission into the Union, it was certain that, if left to
themselves, they would not abolish a domestic relation that had long
existed among them, and in which no inconsiderable part of their
wealth was involved. It was proposed to require them to abolish it,
as a condition precedent to the admission of the State into the
Union. On this so-called “Missouri Restriction,” a violent sectional
struggle ensued in Congress, which ended in what has since been
known as the “Missouri Compromise.” This was embodied in the organic
act, passed on the 6th of March, 1820, which authorized the people
of the then Territory of Missouri to form a State constitution and
government. The compromise consisted, on the one hand, in the
omission of the proposed restriction as a condition of admission
into the Union, and, on the other hand, in a guarantee of perpetual
freedom throughout all the remainder of the Louisiana territory
lying north of the parallel of 36° 30´. This was accompanied,
however, by a proviso, which saved the right to reclaim any person
escaping into that region, from whom labor or service was lawfully
claimed in any State or Territory of the United States. The parallel
of 36° 30´ was adopted as the line north of which slavery or
involuntary servitude might not be permitted to exist as an
institution or condition recognized by the local law, because it was
assumed as a practical fact that north of that line the slavery of
the African race could not, from the nature of the climate, be
profitably introduced, whilst it was equally assumed that in those
portions of the Louisiana purchase south of that line, the habits of
the contiguous States, and the character of the climate would induce
a settlement by persons accustomed to hold and depend upon that
species of labor in the cultivation of the soil, and in the wants of
domestic life. The principle of the Missouri Compromise, therefore,
as a final settlement made between the two sections of the Union in
respect to the whole of the Louisiana purchase, was that north of
the parallel of 36° 30´, slavery could never be introduced, but that
south of that line, slavery might be established according to the
will of the free inhabitants. Regarded in the light of a division of
this vast territory, this compromise secured to the North quite as
much as, if not more than, it secured to the South. Regarded in the
light of a settlement of a dangerous and exciting controversy, on
which the whole Union could repose, the Missouri Compromise disposed
of the future character of all the territory then belonging to the
United States, not including the Northwestern Territory, the
character of which was fixed by the ordinance of 1787. For a quarter
of a century afterward, the two sections of North and South rested
in peace upon the settlement of 1820, so far as discussion of the
subject of slavery in the halls of Congress could be induced by the
application of new States to be admitted into the Union. But in
1845, when Texas, a foreign, an independent, and a slave State, was
annexed to the Union, the subject of an increase in the number of
slave States came again into discussion, in which angry sectional
feeling was carried to a dangerous point. Texas was finally admitted
into the Union as a slaveholding State, with a right to divide
herself into four new States, with or without slavery; but one of
the express conditions of the annexation was a recognition of the
Missouri Compromise line, so that north of that line no new State
could be framed out of any portion of Texas unless slavery should be
excluded from it. The wisdom and policy of the Missouri Compromise
were thus again recognized, and it remained undisturbed for a period
of thirty-four years from the time of its enactment, as a covenant
of peace between the North and the South.
The war between the United States and Mexico, which was terminated
by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, resulted in the
acquisition by the United States of a vast region of country which
was not embraced by the Missouri Compromise. At the time of this
acquisition, Mr. Buchanan earnestly advocated the extension of the
line of 36° 30´ through the whole of this new territory to the
Pacific Ocean, as the best mode of adjustment.
It is not necessary in this historical sketch to dwell on the
advantages or disadvantages of this plan. All that needs to be said
about it here is, that it commended itself to Mr. Buchanan as a plan
more acceptable to the people of both sections of the Union than any
other that could be devised. It was defeated by the proposal of the
so-called “Wilmot Proviso,” which aimed to exclude slavery from all
possible introduction into any part of this newly acquired
territory, without regard to the principle of division which was the
characteristic of the Missouri Compromise, and without recognizing
any claim of the slaveholding States to an equal enjoyment of the
common territory of the Union, in the manner in which they asserted
that claim. The Southern claim was that of a right to emigrate into
any Territory of the United States, with slaves, as part of the
property of the emigrant, just as a Northern man could emigrate into
such a Territory with whatever personal property he chose to take
with him. When, therefore, the admission of California as a State,
and the organization of Territorial governments for the other
provinces of Mexico that had been ceded to the United States came
before Congress, they came accompanied by a great sectional
excitement, that was partly due to the anti-slavery agitation that
had been going on in the North, and partly to the struggle for an
increase of the political power of the free States on the one side,
and of the slave States on the other, according as the future
character of these new acquisitions might be determined.
Having now reached the year 1850, the reader stands at a period at
which the character of freedom had been long impressed upon the
whole of the Northwestern Territories; at which the character of the
whole region of the Louisiana purchase had been for thirty years
determined by the principle of the Missouri Compromise; and at
which, what remained to be done was to adjust, by a final
settlement, the future character of the territory acquired from
Mexico, and to act upon any other questions concerning slavery that
demanded and admitted legislation by Congress. There were two such
questions that did not relate to the newly acquired territory. One
of these concerned the toleration of the domestic slave trade in the
District of Columbia, the abolition of which was loudly demanded by
the North. The other related to a Southern demand of a more
efficient law for the extradition of fugitives from service.
The Thirty-first Congress, assembled in December, 1849, was the one
which enacted the series of measures known as the “Compromise of
1850,” and which settled all the slavery questions that remained for
adjustment. In respect to the territory that had been acquired from
Mexico, there was danger for a time that all harmony of action would
be frustrated by the so-called “Wilmot Proviso,” which aimed to
impose as a fundamental condition of any legislation respecting any
part of that territory, a perpetual exclusion of slavery. Mr.
Buchanan was out of public office at this time, but his influence
was exerted in his own State, with success, to prevent the passage
by her legislature of instructing resolutions in favor of that
proviso. This led the way for its rejection by Congress. On the 4th
of February, 1850, resolutions favoring the proviso were laid upon
the table of the House of Representatives in Congress, by the vote
of 105 to 75. This important vote was followed in the Senate by five
measures, designed by Mr. Clay and supported by Mr. Webster and Mr.
Calhoun, which, after a long discussion, became laws in September,
1850, with the general concurrence of both the Whig and the
Democratic parties. The first of these Acts consisted of a new and
more efficient law for the extradition of fugitives from service, to
take the place of the old law of February 12th, 1793, which bore the
signature of Washington. By reason of a decision of the Supreme
Court, made in 1842, which had determined that Congress could not
constitutionally require State magistrates to perform a duty which
the Court declared to be one pertaining exclusively to the Federal
power, the law of 1793 had become almost inoperative. Although the
decision of the Court left the States at liberty to allow their
magistrates to act in such cases, many of the Northern States had
passed laws to prohibit them from rendering any official aid to the
claimant of a fugitive from service. It had become necessary,
therefore, for Congress to provide officers of Federal appointment
to execute an express mandate of the Federal Constitution. This was
the purpose of the new law of 1850.
The second of these “compromise measures” was an Act for the
immediate admission of California into the Union, as a free State,
embracing its whole territory, both south and north of the line of
the Missouri Compromise. The third and fourth measures were Acts for
the establishment of Territorial governments in New Mexico and Utah,
which secured to them respectively the right of admission as States
into the Union, “with or without slavery as their respective
constitutions might require.” The Act relating to New Mexico
declared that “no citizen of the United States shall be deprived of
his life, liberty or property in said Territory, except by the
judgment of his peers and the laws of the land;” thus making, from
abundant caution, a provision of the Federal Constitution obligatory
upon the Territorial legislature. Thus these two Acts, along with
the Missouri Compromise, comprehended all the territory belonging to
the United States, whether derived from Mexico or from France; there
was no territory remaining for the Wilmot Proviso to act upon, and
consequently the agitation of that proviso was excluded from the
halls of Congress. Moreover, the Act for establishing the Territory
of New Mexico withdrew from the jurisdiction of a slave State all
that portion of Texas which lay north of the parallel of 36° 30´, by
including it within the boundary of New Mexico. The fifth of the
compromise measures of 1850 was a law abolishing the domestic slave
trade within the District of Columbia.
It is not singular that a final settlement, which disposed of all
the slavery questions on which Congress could in any way act, should
have been acceptable to the people of the whole Union, excepting the
extremists of the two sections. The abolitionists of the North
denounced it, because it admitted of the possible and theoretical
establishment of slavery in New Mexico, notwithstanding the patent
fact that neither the soil nor the climate of that region could ever
make it a profitable form of labor, and because it recognized and
provided for the execution of that provision of the Constitution
which required the extradition of fugitives from service. The
extreme men of the South disliked the settlement, because it
admitted the great and rich State of California as a free State. But
when the Presidential election of 1852 approached, the general
approval of this settlement was made manifest. The national
convention of the Whig party nominated as its candidate for the
Presidency General Scott, who was supposed to be somewhat closely
affiliated, both personally and politically, with public men who
opposed and continued to denounce the compromise. But in their
“platform” the Whigs pledged themselves to maintain it as a binding
settlement, and to discountenance all attempts in or out of Congress
to disturb it. The Democratic national convention not only made
equally emphatic declarations of their purpose to maintain this
settlement inviolate, but by nominating a candidate who could not be
suspected of any lukewarmness on this, the great political question
of the time, they secured a majority of the electoral votes of both
free and slave States that was almost unprecedented. General Pierce
received 254 electoral votes out of 296, or 105 votes more than were
necessary to a choice. All the free States, excepting Massachusetts
and Vermont, and all the slave States, excepting Kentucky and
Tennessee, gave him their electoral votes. Never did a party come
into power with greater strength, and never was there a more
distinct political issue than that which placed General Pierce at
the head of the Government. The people at large distrusted the
soundness of the Whig candidate and his friends upon the compromise
of 1850, and being determined to maintain that settlement as final,
and to have no more agitation of slavery questions in Congress, they
entrusted the destinies of the country to the Democratic party.
But as not infrequently happens, the Democrats were in a majority so
large that it became unwieldy; and before the administration of
General Pierce had closed, a step was taken that was to lead to the
most serious consequences. This step was the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise. The settlement, or “compromise” of 1850, made by the
consentaneous action of the North and the South, rested, as on a
corner stone, upon the inviolable character of the settlement of
1820, known as the Missouri Compromise. To preserve that earlier
compromise intact, was to preserve the later one; for if the
settlement made in 1820 in regard to all the territory derived from
France should be renounced, the door would be open for the
renunciation of the settlement made in 1850 respecting New Mexico
and Utah. Sweep away the compact which dedicated the whole Louisiana
territory north of 36° 30´ to perpetual freedom, and which gave to
the South whatever parts of it below that line might be adapted to
slave labor, and all Territories everywhere would be subject to a
new contention over the dogma that slavery did or that it did not go
into every Territory by virtue of a right derived from the
Constitution of the United States. There was no security for the
peace and harmony of the country, but to act upon the principle that
the settlement of 1850 rested for its foundation upon the inviolable
character and perpetual duration of the settlement of 1820.
But in all free countries governed by political parties, and
especially at times when the party in power is in an extraordinary
majority, there are always men who feel that they are wiser than
others, and who are apt to couple their own aims as statesmen,
looking to the highest honors of their country, with new plans for
the management of public affairs. Such a man was the late Stephen
A. Douglas, a Senator in Congress from the State of Illinois from
1847 until his death, in 1861; a distinguished leader of the
Democratic party, who had been several times a candidate for the
nomination by his party to the Presidency. This very able man, who
had a considerable body of friends attached to him from his
energetic and somewhat imperious qualities, had been a strenuous
supporter of the Compromise of 1850, and had rendered very
efficient service in the adoption of that settlement. He seems to
have been somewhat suddenly led, in 1854, to the adoption of the
idea that it would be wise to repeal the Missouri Compromise, and
that in its place might be substituted a doctrine that the people
of a Territory have the same right and ought to have the same
sovereign power, while in the Territorial condition, to shape
their domestic institutions in their own way, as the people of a
State. He does not appear to have had the foresight to see that
the practical application of this doctrine would lead, in the
circumstances of the country, to a sectional struggle for the
possession and political dominion of a Territory, between
slaveholders and non-slaveholders, without the superintending and
controlling authority of Congress to prevent such a conflict by
determining the character of the Territory one way or the other.
As he could not remove the Missouri settlement without attacking
the constitutional power of Congress to legislate as it might see
fit on the condition of a Territory, he boldly determined to make
that attack, and to put in the place of the authority of Congress
the doctrine of “popular sovereignty” as a substitute for
Congressional legislation on the relations of master and slave.
When this ill-advised legislation, which tended in the most direct
manner to concentrate into political organization the Northern
dislike of slavery, received the sanction of the President,
General Pierce, on the 30th of May, 1854, Mr. Buchanan was out of
the country. He never approved of it, and had he been at home, it
is quite certain that it would have encountered his strenuous
opposition.
Turning now aside from the history of these successive settlements,
and the modes in which they were unsettled, in order to appreciate
the condition of feeling between the two sections of the Union at
the time when the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency was
effected exclusively by the electoral votes of the free States, the
reader should learn something of the history of the anti-slavery
agitation in the North; something of the effort to extend the
political power of the slave States as a barrier against anticipated
encroachments upon Southern rights; and something of the causes
which led to the assertion of the supposed right of State secession
from the Union, as a remedy against dangers apprehended to be in
store for the people of the South.
By the universal admission of all persons, whatever were their
sentiments or feelings concerning slavery, the Constitution of the
United States conferred no power upon Congress to act on it in any
State of the Union. This was as much acknowledged by the early
abolitionists as by all other men. They regarded the Constitution as
a “pro-slavery” instrument. They admitted that the supreme law of
the land recognized and to a certain extent upheld the principle
that slaves were property; and they therefore sought for a
justification of their attacks upon the Constitution in what they
denominated the “higher law,” which meant that when the individual
citizen believes that the moral law is in conflict with the law of
the land, the latter cannot rightfully bind his conscience or
restrain his conduct. Proclaiming it to be sinful to live in a
political confederacy which tolerated slavery anywhere within its
limits, they began by denouncing the Constitution as a “league with
death and a covenant with hell;” and it was not long before this
doctrine of the higher law was preached from pulpits and
disseminated by numerous publications in the New England States. The
dates of the organized anti-slavery societies are important to be
observed, because of the spontaneous movement in Virginia towards
the removal of slavery which shortly preceded them. The New England
Anti-slavery Society was organized in Boston, on the 30th of
January, 1832; the New York Society in October, 1833; and the
National Society at Philadelphia in December, 1833. Affiliated local
societies of the same kind sprang up at once in many towns and
villages of the North. At the time when these organizations were
first gathered, and for a long period thereafter, there was no
pending question upon the subject of the extension of slavery into
Territories of the United States. The country had been reposing
since 1820 upon the Missouri settlement; it was not until 1845 that
any addition of slave territory was threatened; and at the moment
when the first anti-slavery society was organized in Boston,
Virginia was on the verge of emancipating her slaves. Accordingly,
the nature, purposes and methods of the Northern anti-slavery
agitation between the year 1832 and the annexation of Texas in 1845,
and thence to the year 1860, form a most important subject of
political study.
The founders of the Northern anti-slavery societies, while taking
their stand in opposition to the Constitution, had yet, in all that
they asked Congress to do, to address themselves to a public body
every member of which had taken an oath to support that instrument.
In their own communities, those who carried on the agitation could
appeal to the emotional natures of men, women and children upon the
wrongs and the sin of slavery, and fill them with hatred of the
slaveholder, without discriminating between questions on which the
citizens of a non-slaveholding State could and those on which they
could not legitimately act. A great moral force of abhorrence of
slavery could thus be, and in fact was, in process of time
accumulated. This force expended itself in two ways; first, in
supplying to the managers of the agitation the means of sending into
the Southern States, pamphlets, newspapers and pictorial
representations setting forth the wrongs and cruelties of slavery.
For this purpose, the mails of the United States had, by the year
1835, been so much used for the circulation in the South of matter
which was there regarded as incendiary and calculated to promote
servile insurrections, that President Jackson deemed it to be his
duty to propose legislation to arrest such abuses of the post
office. Congress did not adopt his recommendation, and the abuse
remained unchecked.[58] Another mode in which the anti-slavery
agitation expended itself was in petitions to Congress. During the
session of 1835-6, and for several of the following years, Congress
was flooded with what were called “abolition petitions.” On some of
them Congress could legitimately act: such as those which prayed for
the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and in the
forts, arsenals, and dock-yards of the United States situated in
slaveholding States. On others, which petitioned for a dissolution
of the Union on account of the existence of slavery in some of the
States, or for action on the subject of slavery in general, Congress
of course could do nothing. A question arose whether such petitions
could be received at all, which led to a very memorable and a very
excited discussion of the right of petition. Not only was a large
part of the time of Congress taken up with these topics, but the
opposing representatives of the two sections were guilty of excesses
in crimination and recrimination, which foreshadowed the formation
of two geographical parties, one Northern and the other Southern,
having nothing but slavery as the cause of their division.
Footnote 58:
See the message of President Jackson, December 3, 1835. It is not
intended in the text to express any opinion whether the abuse
could or could not have been restrained in the way proposed. The
fact that the President of the United States deemed it his duty to
make this recommendation attests the character of the abuse which
he sought to remedy.
One of the questions to which those who are to come after us will
seek for an answer, will be, what was the justification for this
anti-slavery agitation, begun in 1832 and continued for a period of
about ten years, during which there was no special effort on the
part of the South to extend the area of slavery? What, again, was
the unquestionable effect of this agitation in producing a revulsion
of feeling on the whole subject of slavery among the slaveholders
themselves? Was the time propitious for the accomplishment of any
good? Were the mode, the method, and the spirit of the agitation
such as men would resort to, who had a just and comprehensive sense
of the limitations upon human responsibility?
The time was most unfortunate. The Southern conscience did not then
need to be quickened or enlightened on the inherent wrong of African
slavery; nor did it need to be told that the system was one that
inflicted many evils upon society. Plans of emancipation, which the
Southerners themselves were far better fitted to form than any one
who was a stranger to their social condition, had already begun to
be considered by enlightened men in more than one of the older
Southern States. All that could be done by others who were beyond
their limits, to aid them in any aspect of the subject, was limited
by just such restraints as apply to any evil existing in a community
to which it is confined, and on which strangers can offer nothing
but the most considerate and temperate discussion of remedies
originating among those who have the burthen to bear. The grand
error of our early abolitionists was that they would not observe the
limitations of human duty. They were either citizens or residents of
non-slaveholding States. Foreigners, in respect to this matter, to
the States in which slavery existed, they carried on their
discussions, publications and organizations in communities whose
public opinion could have but an extremely narrow and subordinate
right to act on the subject at all. They either disregarded the fact
that the Constitution of the United States could never have been
established if it had not recognized the exclusive right of each
Southern State to govern the relation of master and slave—nay, that
the foreign slave trade without that Constitution could not have
been ended when it was, if at all—or else they denounced the
Constitution as an emanation from the bottomless pit. Grant that the
relation of servitude was a moral wrong, that the idea that man can
hold property in man was repugnant to the law of nature or the law
of God; grant that the political system of the Union, as our fathers
made it, ought to have been reformed by their descendants;—were
there no moral restraints resting upon those who enjoyed the
advantages and blessings of a Union which had been purchased by
certain concessions to the slaveholder? Did not the Constitution
itself provide for regular and peaceful changes which the progress
of society and the growing philanthropy of the age might find to be
necessary to the fuller practical development of the great truths of
liberty? Was there no way to deal with slavery but to attack the
slaveholder as a sinner, stained with the deepest of crimes against
God and his fellow-men? Was there nothing to be done to aid him in
ridding himself of the burthen of his sin, by discussing with him
the economical problems of his situation? Was it necessary for
strangers to demand instant and unqualified manumission, regardless
of what was to follow? Was it necessary to assail the Constitution
as an unholy covenant with sin, and, rejecting its restraints, to
disregard the wisdom that takes human nature as it is, that is
careful not to provoke reaction, that looks before and after, and
shapes its measures with a rational forecast of their adaptation to
the end?
Whilst it is not to be denied that our “Abolitionists” were men of a
certain kind of courage developed into rashness, of unbounded zeal,
of singular energy, of persistent consistency with their own
principles of action, and of that fanatical force which is derived
from the incessant contemplation of one idea to the exclusion of all
others, it must nevertheless be said that they were not statesmen.
There was no one among them of whom it can be said that he acted
with a statesmanlike comprehension of the difficulties of this great
subject, or with a statesman’s regard for the limitations on
individual conduct. Their situation was very different from that of
the public or private men in England, who gallantly led the early
crusade against the slave trade, or of those who afterwards brought
about emancipation in the British colonies. Whatever Parliament
thought fit to do in regard to slavery under the British flag or in
the British dominions, it had ample power to do, and what Parliament
might be made to do, was for the nation to determine. An English
statesman or philanthropist had, in either character, no
constitutional restraints to consider. He had to deal with both
moral and economical questions, and he could deal freely with
either. He could use argument, persuasion, invective, or
denunciation, and he could not be told by the Jamaica slaveholder,
you have entered into a solemn public compact with me which secures
to me the exclusive cognizance of this domestic relation, and by
that compact you purchased the very existence of the general
government under which we both live. But a citizen of the United
States, or a foreigner, taking his stand in a free State, stirring
up popular hatred of the slaveholder, sending into the Southern
States publications which were there regarded as incendiary,
persuading legislative bodies in the North to act against one of the
express conditions of the Federal Union, and renouncing all
Christian fellowship with Southern churches, surely violated the
spirit and in some respects the letter of the Constitution. He
provoked a sudden revulsion of feeling in the South, and brought
about a state of opinion which aimed to maintain slavery by texts of
scripture, by the examples of other nations, by the teachings of
Christ and his apostles, by the assumed relations of races, by the
supposed laws of public economy, and the alleged requirements of a
southern clime. He promoted, by an effect as inevitable as the
nature of man, a purpose to defend slavery through an increase of
its political power, to which a multiplication of slave States would
make a large addition. He thus sowed the wind, and, left to another
generation to reap the whirlwind.
These assertions must not be left unsupported by proof, and the
proof is at hand. In all periods of our history, prior to the civil
war, Virginia exercised great influence over the whole slaveholding
region. I have said that she was on the verge of emancipation when
the first anti-slavery society was organized in the North; and
although half a century has since elapsed, there are those living
who, like myself, can recollect that she was so. But to others the
fact must be attested by proof. It may be asserted as positively as
anything in history that, in the year 1832, there was nowhere in the
world a more enlightened sense of the wrong and the evil of slavery,
than there was among the public men and the people of Virginia. The
movement against it was spontaneous. It reached the general assembly
by petitions which evinced that the policy and justice of
emancipation had taken a strong hold on the convictions of portions
of the people of the State, whom no external influence had then
reached, and who, therefore, had free scope. Any Virginian could
place himself at the head of this movement without incurring
hostility or jealousy, and it was a grandson of Jefferson, Mr.
Jefferson Randolph, by whom the leading part in it was assumed.
Mr. Randolph represented in the assembly the county of Albemarle,
which was one of the largest slaveholding counties of the State. He
brought forward a bill to accomplish a gradual emancipation. It was
debated with the freedom of men who, undisturbed by external
pressure, were dealing with a matter of purely domestic concern. No
member of the house defended slavery, for the day had not come when
Southern men were to learn that it was a blessing, because those who
knew nothing of its burthens told them that it was a curse. There
could be nothing said anywhere, there had been nothing said out of
Virginia, stronger and truer, in depicting the evils of slavery,
than was said in that discussion by Virginia gentlemen, debating in
their own legislature a matter that concerned themselves and their
people. But finding that the house was not prepared for immediate
action on so momentous a subject, Mr. Randolph did not press his
bill to a vote. A resolution, however, was adopted, by a vote of 65
to 58, which shows what was the condition of the public sentiment of
Virginia at that moment. It declared, as the sense of the house,
“that they were profoundly sensible of the great evils arising from
the condition of the colored population of the commonwealth, and
were induced by policy, as well as humanity, to attempt the
immediate removal of the free negroes; but that further action for
the removal of the slaves should await a more definite development
of public opinion.”
Mr. Randolph was again elected by his constituents, upon this
special question. But in the mean time came suddenly the
intelligence of what was doing at the North. It came in an alarming
aspect for the peace and security of the whole South; since it could
not be possible that strangers should combine together to assail the
slaveholder as a sinner and to demand his instant admission of his
guilt, without arousing fears of the most dangerous consequences for
the safety of Southern homes, as well as intense indignation against
such an unwarrantable interference. From that time forth,
emancipation, whether immediate or gradual, could not be considered
in Virginia or anywhere else in the South. Public attention became
instantly fixed upon the means of resisting this external and
unjustifiable intermeddling with a matter that did not concern those
who intermeddled. A sudden revulsion of public sentiment in Virginia
was followed by a similar revulsion wherever Southern men had begun
to consider for themselves what could be done for the amelioration
of the condition of the colored race and for ultimate emancipation.
As the Northern agitation went on, increasing in bitterness and
gathering new forces, Southern statesmen cast about for new devices
to strengthen the political power of their section in the Federal
Government. These devices are to be traced to the anti-slavery
agitation in the North as their exciting cause, as distinctly as
anything whatever in the history of sectional feeling can be traced
back from an effect to a cause which has produced it.
But this was not the whole of the evil produced by the anti-slavery
agitation. It prevented all consideration by the higher class of
Northern statesmen of any method of action by which the people of
the free States could aid their Southern brethren in removing
slavery; and it presented to Northern politicians of the inferior
order a local field for cultivating popularity, as the excitement
went on increasing in violence and swept into its vortex the voters
whose local support was found to be useful. That there was a line of
action on which any Northern statesman could have entered,
consistently with all the obligations flowing from the letter and
the spirit of the Federal Constitution, is perfectly plain.
While it was impracticable for the people of the North to act
directly upon slavery in any State through the Federal Government,
it was not impracticable for that Government to follow, with
cautious steps, in auxiliary measures to aid what it could not
initiate. There were States which were becoming ripe for changes in
the condition of their colored population. Of course such changes
could be proposed, considered and acted upon only in each of those
States, as a measure that concerned its own domestic condition. But
there were many ways in which the Federal Government, without
transcending its constitutional powers, could incidentally assist
any State in what the State had of itself determined to do. The line
which separated what the Federal power could legitimately and
properly do from what was prohibited to it by every political and
moral consideration, was not difficult to be discovered. For
example, if the State of Virginia had in 1832-33 adopted any system
for colonizing her negroes, what was there to prevent the Federal
Government from granting a portion of the public lands for such a
purpose? If the subject of prospective emancipation had been
approached in this manner, without the disturbance produced by the
anti-slavery societies of the North, who can doubt that experiments
of the utmost consequence could have been tried, and tried
successfully, in a country possessing an almost boundless public
domain? But the sudden irruption of those societies into the field,
their disregard of all prudential and all constitutional restraints,
their fierce denunciations of the slaveholder, their demand for
instant and unqualified manumission, at once converted a question
which should have remained a matter for joint and friendly
coöperation of the two sections, into a struggle for political
supremacy of one section over the other in the councils of the
Federal Government. All measures and tendencies in the South, which
might have opened the way for subsidiary aid on the part of the
Federal power, were at once arrested; and it became a study with
Southern statesmen how they were to raise new barriers for the
defence of slavery, by increasing the political power of their
section within the Union. The old barriers had become, in their
eyes, but a feeble defence against those who proclaimed that the
Union itself was an accursed thing, and that if immediate
emancipation of the slaves was not adopted, the Union ought to be
broken up.
While it is true that the doctrines of the abolitionists were at
first regarded by the great body of the Northern people as the
ravings of fanatics, insomuch that they were sometimes subjected to
popular violence, they were nevertheless making progress. Year after
year the agitation was carried on in the same spirit, and year after
year the excitement on the whole subject of slavery continued to
grow until it reached a fresh impulse in the proposed annexation of
Texas. It should in justice be remembered that the effort at that
period to enlarge the area of slavery was an effort on the part of
the South, dictated by a desire to remain in the Union, and not to
accept the issue of an inherent incompatibility of a political union
between slaveholding and non-slaveholding States. It was not at this
period that the Southern States embraced, or were much disposed to
embrace, the doctrine of “secession.” The views of the nature of the
Union, maintained by their most distinguished and powerful
statesman, Mr. Calhoun, in 1830-33, led logically to the deduction
that every State has, by the terms of the Federal compact, a right
to quit the Union when, in its own judgment, it deems that step
necessary. But no considerable body of persons in the South, out of
his own State, accepted his premises or followed them to their
conclusion, until long after he was in his grave; nor did he himself
propose secession as a remedy against what he and the whole South
regarded as the unwarrantable aggressions of the Northern
abolitionists. He aimed to strengthen the political power of his
section within the Union, and his whole course in regard to the
acquisition of Texas shows his conviction that if that country were
not brought under our dominion, there would be an exposed frontier,
from which England and the American abolitionists would operate
against slavery in the Southern section of the United States. The
previous history of the Union shows very plainly that prior to the
commencement of the Northern anti-slavery agitation, the political
equilibrium between the two sections had not been seriously
disturbed.
At the period which I am now considering, the public men of the
North who acted an important part in national affairs, and who
belonged, as Mr. Buchanan unquestionably did belong, to the higher
class of statesmen, had to act with a wise circumspection on this
subject of slavery. There was nothing that such a man could do, if
he regarded his public duty with an American statesman’s sense of
public obligation, but to stand aloof from and to discountenance
what was wrong in the doings of the anti-slavery agitators. In this
course of conduct he had often to discriminate between conflicting
claims of constitutional rights that unquestionably belonged to
every citizen of the United States, and acts which no citizen had a
right to do, or which it was in the highest and plainest sense
inexpedient to allow him to do. In these conflicts, right and wrong
became at times so mixed and intricate, that it required a resolute
and clear intellect to separate them, and a lofty courage in meeting
obloquy and misrepresentation. It was an easy matter, in the
exciting period of those slavery questions, to impute to a Northern
man of either of the great political parties of the time, a base
truckling to the South for his own ambitious purposes. After ages
must disregard the ephemeral vituperation of politics, and must
judge the statesmen of the past by the situation in which they
stood, by the soundness of their opinions, by their fidelity to
every unquestionable right, by the correctness of their policy, and
by the purity of their characters and their aims. There has been a
passionate disposition in our day to judge the public men of the
North, who had to act in great and peculiar crises of the sectional
conflict, and who did not give themselves up to a purely sectional
spirit, by a standard that was inapplicable to their situation,
because it was unjust, illogical and inconsistent with the highest
ideas of public duty in the administration of such a Government as
ours.
The anti-slavery agitation, begun in the North at the time and
carried on in the mode I have described, is to be deplored, because
of the certainty that sudden emancipation, which was alone
considered or cared for by the abolitionists, must be fraught with
great evils.
In whatever way sudden, universal and unqualified emancipation was
to be enforced, if it was to happen the negro could not be prepared
for freedom. He must take his freedom without one single aid from
the white man to fit him to receive it. Wise and thoughtful
statesmen saw this—the abolitionist did not see it. Men who had
passed their lives in the business of legislation and government,
knew full well, not only that the fundamental political bond of the
Union forbade interference by the people of the free States with the
domestic institutions of the slave States, but that emancipation
without any training for freedom could not be a blessing. Men who
had passed their lives in an emotional agitation for instant freedom
did not see or did not care for the inevitable fact, that freedom
for which no preparation had been made could not be a boon. When the
emancipation came, it came as an act of force applied in a civil war
and in the settlements which the war was claimed to have entailed as
necessities. No preparatory legislation, no helpful training in
morality and virtue, no education, no discipline of the human being
for his new condition, had prepared the negro to be a freeman.
While, therefore, it may be and probably is true, that the whites of
our Southern States have reason to rejoice, and do rejoice, in the
change which they deprecated and against which they struggled, it is
not true that the colored race have the same reason for
thankfulness. The Christianity and the philanthropy of this age have
before them a task that is far more serious, more weighty and more
difficult, than it would have been if the emancipation had been a
regulated process, even if its final consummation had been postponed
for generations. To this day, after twenty years of freedom, the
church, the press, society and benevolence have to encounter such
questions as these:—Whether the negro is by nature vicious,
intractable, thriftless—the women incurably unchaste, the men
incurably dishonest; whether the vices and the failings that are so
deplorable, and apparently so remediless, are to be attributed to
centuries of slavery, or are taints inherent in the blood. Who can
doubt that all such questions could have been satisfactorily
answered, if the Christianity of the South had been left to its own
time and mode of answering them, and without any external force but
the force of kindly respectful coöperation and forbearing Christian
fellowship.
It is a cause for exultation that slavery no longer exists in the
broad domain of this Republic—that our theory and our practice are
now in complete accord. But it is no cause for national pride that
we did not accomplish this result without the cost of a million of
precious lives and untold millions of money.
The repeal of the Missouri Compromise during the administration of
President Pierce (May, 1854), followed, as it was three years
afterwards, by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States,
that Congress could not constitutionally prohibit slavery in a
Territory of the States, gave a vast impetus to the tendencies which
were already bringing about a consolidation of most of the elements
of the anti-slavery feeling of the North into a single political
party. When Mr. Buchanan became the nominee of the Democratic party
for the Presidency, although the repeal of the Missouri Compromise
had already taken place, the decision of the Supreme Court in the
celebrated case of “Dred Scott” had not occurred,[59] and
consequently the Republican party, for this and other reasons, had
not acquired sufficient force to enable it to elect its candidate,
General Fremont. But during the administration of Mr. Buchanan, the
scenes which occurred in Kansas and which were direct consequences
of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, with the added excitement
which followed the announcement by a majority of the judges of the
Supreme Court of doctrines which the people of the North would not
accept, there was a field for sectional political action, such as
the Union had never before known. So that when the Republican party,
in the spring of 1860, assembled its delegates in convention at
Chicago, for the nomination of its candidates for the Presidency and
the Vice Presidency, adopted a “platform” on which no Southern man
of any prominence could place himself, and selected Northern
candidates for both offices, it was plain that the time had come
when there was to be a trial of political strength between the two
sections of the Union.
Footnote 59:
This case was decided in March, 1857, just after Mr. Buchanan’s
inauguration.
The “Chicago platform,” on which Mr. Lincoln was nominated and
elected as the candidate of the Republican party, while repudiating
with great precision the idea that Congress could in any way act
upon slavery in the States, contained the following resolution on
the subject of slavery in the Territories of the United States:
“That the normal condition of all the territory of the United
States is that of freedom; that as our republican fathers, when
they had abolished slavery in all our national territory, ordained
that 'no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law,' it becomes our duty, by legislation,
whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain this provision
of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it; and we
deny the authority of Congress, of a Territorial legislature, or
of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any
Territory of the United States.”
On the motives that dictated the assertion of this doctrine, I have
no speculations to offer, for I am not dealing with motives. That it
was a new political doctrine, and that it was a new departure in the
legislation of Congress on this subject of slavery in Territories
cannot be doubted. It rejected entirely the principle on which
Congress had acted for many years, for there had been acts of
Congress which had given legal existence to slavery in a Territory,
and acts of Congress which had prohibited it. It rejected the
principle of the Missouri Compromise, which had sanctioned an agreed
division of the Territories into those where slavery might not and
those where it might be allowed. It rejected all claim of right on
the part of the Southern slaveholder to take his slave property into
a Territory and have it there recognized as property while the
Territorial condition remained. It was a reading of the Constitution
diametrically opposed to the Southern reading. The political men who
framed this “platform” doubtless considered that the time had come
for a direct antagonism between the North and the South on this
subject, so that it might be decided by the votes of the people in a
Presidential election, whether the Southern claim for recognition of
slave property in any Territory of the United States, wherever
situated, was to prevail or be rejected. That such antagonism was
the consequence and the purpose of this declaration of a new
principle of action on this subject will be denied by no one.
It is equally certain that a political party could not come into the
field in a contest for the Presidency upon such a declaration,
without drawing into the discussion the whole subject of slavery as
a domestic institution, or a condition of society, both in States
and Territories. The intention was to draw a well defined line
between the relations of Congress to slavery in the States and the
relations of Congress to slavery in the Territories. Yet in the
excitements of a Presidential canvass, the Republican party of
necessity gathered into its folds those who had been for years
regardless of that distinction, and who assailed slavery in the
regions which were under the legislative power of Congress for the
purpose of assailing it everywhere. The campaign literature, the
speeches, the discussions, which dwelt on “the irrepressible
conflict” between slavery and freedom, and which proclaimed the
issue to be whether the United States would sooner or later become a
slaveholding nation or a free-labor nation—whether the Northern
States were to remain free or to become slave States—set forth with
great distinctness in the writings and the harangues, could have no
other effect than to array the two sections of the Union in a bitter
hostility, while in the South there were those who believed, or
affected to believe, that the people of the North, if successful in
electing a President upon this basis, would put forth all their
efforts to destroy slavery everywhere, as an institution
incompatible with the continued existence of freedom in the North.
All this hazard might, however, have been encountered and parried if
the Democratic party had been in a condition to nominate a suitable
candidate upon a “platform” fit to be opposed to that of the
Republicans, and capable of commending itself alike to Northern and
Southern voters. But when this party assembled in convention at
Charleston, on the 23d of April, 1860, it was in no condition to do
any good to the Union or to itself. If Mr. Buchanan had been a
younger man, and had been disposed to be a second time a candidate
for the Presidency, he might have united his party upon a basis of
action in regard to this dangerous matter of slavery in the
Territories, that would have commanded the support of a sufficient
number of States, Northern as well as Southern, to have elected him.
But he was averse to any longer continuance in public life, and he
was well aware how much Mr. Douglas had done which had tended to
divide the Northern and the Southern wings of his party. On the 14th
of April, 1860, he sent to Charleston the following letter, which
put an end to the idea, so far as it may have been entertained, of
his being regarded as a candidate for the nomination by the
Democratic National Convention.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO HON. ARNOLD PLUMER.]
WASHINGTON CITY, April 14, 1860.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I address you not only as a delegate from Pennsylvania to the
Charleston Democratic National Convention, but as an old and
valued friend. Whilst trusting that no member of that body will
propose my name as a candidate for reëlection, yet, lest this
might possibly prove to be the case, I require you, then,
immediately to inform the Convention, as an act of justice to
myself, that in no contingency can I ever again consent to become
a candidate for the Presidency. My purpose to this effect was
clearly indicated both in accepting the Cincinnati nomination, and
afterwards in my inaugural address, and has since been repeated on
various occasions, both public and private. In this determination
neither my judgment nor my inclination has ever for a moment
wavered. Deeply grateful to the great Democratic party of the
country, on whose continued ascendancy, as I verily believe, the
prosperity and perpetuity of our Confederate Republic depend, and
praying Heaven that the Convention may select as their candidate
an able, sound and conservative Democrat, in whose support we can
all cordially unite.—I remain, very respectfully, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
It is not at all difficult to see what Mr. Buchanan would have
recommended if he had been asked to shape the action of his party.
It is well known that he held it to be both right and expedient to
recognize the claim of Southern emigrants into the Territories to an
equal participation in the common domain of the Union, so far as to
have their property in slaves admitted during the continuance of the
Territorial condition. But he would have qualified this claim of
right by the application of the principle of the Missouri
Compromise; that is, by admitting it in Territories south of the
line of 36° 30´, and by excluding it in Territories north of that
line. This had been the former practice of Congress, and there could
be no good reason now for not expecting the people of the North to
make this concession to the South, excepting that Mr. Douglas had
indoctrinated a portion of the Northern Democrats with his panacea
of “popular sovereignty,” which was just as unacceptable to the
South as the principles of the “Chicago platform.”
Accordingly, when the Democratic Convention assembled at Charleston,
it soon found itself in an inextricable confusion of opinions as to
the nature and extent of the powers of a Territorial legislature,
and as to the authority and duties of Congress, under the
Constitution of the United States, over slavery in the Territories.
While it was in the power of this Democratic Convention to
antagonize the Republican party with a platform, simple, reasonable
and just to all sections, on which the votes of all sections could
be asked, it became divided into a Northern and a Southern faction,
and wholly lost the opportunity of appealing to a national spirit of
harmony and good-will. The Northern faction, inspired by Mr.
Douglas, insisted on the adoption of his principle of “popular
sovereignty,” which ignored the Southern claim of a property right
protected by the Constitution. The Southern faction insisted on the
recognition of that right, in a way that ignored the governing
authority of both Congress and Territorial legislature.
Without some compromise, there could be no common platform and no
common candidate. After many ineffectual attempts to agree upon a
platform, and after some secessions of Southern delegates, fifty
ballotings for a candidate were carried on until the 3d of May. The
highest number of votes received at any time by Mr. Douglas was
152½, 202 being necessary to a nomination. The other votes were
scattered among different Northern and Southern men. The convention
then adjourned, to meet at Baltimore on the 18th of June, with a
recommendation that the party in the several States fill up all
vacancies in their respective delegations.[60] The result was that
when assembled at Baltimore, a dispute about the delegations
entitled to seats ended in a disruption of the convention into two
bodies, the one distinctly Northern, the other distinctly Southern.
The Northern Democratic Convention nominated Mr. Douglas as its
candidate, of course upon his platform of “popular sovereignty.” The
Southern Democratic Convention nominated Mr. Breckinridge as its
candidate, upon a platform of coequal rights of all the States in
all the Territories. Thus perished every hope of uniting the
Democratic party upon a political basis that would antagonize the
Republican platform in a sensible manner, and afford a reasonable
chance of preventing a sectional political triumph of the North over
the South, or of the free over the slave States.[61]
Footnote 60:
It appears from the following letter, written by General Dix to
Mr. Buchanan, after the Charleston Convention had adjourned, that
the course of the New York delegation in that body was not
acceptable to their constituents:
NEW YORK, May 9, 1860.
MY DEAR SIR:—
The course of the New York delegation at Charleston has caused
great dissatisfaction here, and earnest efforts will be made
before the meeting at Baltimore to induce a change of action on
the part of the majority. Mr. Douglas is not the choice of the
Democracy of this State; and if he were, we think it most
unreasonable to attempt to force on the States which must elect
the Democratic candidate (if he can be elected), a man they do not
want. We hope for the best, but not without the deepest concern.
I took the liberty of sending to you the address of the Democratic
General Committee of this city, published about three weeks ago.
It takes substantially the ground of the majority report from the
Committee on Resolutions at Charleston, and we think the New York
delegation should have supported them. I believe this is the
general feeling in this State. It certainly is in this city and
the southern counties. I have thought it right to say this to you,
and to express the hope that the New York delegation will go to
Baltimore prepared to sustain a candidate who will be acceptable
to our Southern friends. At all events, no effort will be spared
to bring about such a result.
I am, dear sir, sincerely yours,
JOHN A. DIX.
Footnote 61:
It should be said that the convention, when assembled at
Baltimore, became divided into two conventions, in consequence of
the withdrawal of the delegations of some of the most southern of
the Southern States, after they found that the friends of Mr.
Douglas were determined to thrust him upon them as the candidate.
It has been said that this was done to prevent any nomination, and
thereby to prepare the way for a dissolution of the Union. It is
more reasonable to believe that it was done to prevent the
nomination of a particular candidate. But if these delegates had
remained, Mr. Douglas could not have been nominated, and a
compromise candidate might have been selected, so as to preserve
the unity and strength of the party. For this reason, the
withdrawal was rash and unwise, for it brought into the field a
distinctly Southern Democratic candidate, with a distinctly
Southern platform. Mr. Douglas obtained the electoral vote of no
Southern, and Mr. Breckinridge obtained the electoral vote of no
Northern State.
Mr. Buchanan, after the two factions of the Democratic party had
made their nominations, pursued the course which became him as an
outgoing President. As a citizen, he had to choose between Mr.
Breckinridge and Mr. Douglas. The former represented more nearly the
political principles of Mr. Buchanan than any other candidate whom
he could support, and it was to Mr. Breckinridge that he gave all
the support which it was proper for him to give to any one. But his
views of the whole situation are apparent in the following letter,
written in July, 1860:—
[MR. BUCHANAN TO C. COMSTOCK.]
WASHINGTON, July 5, 1860.
DEAR SIR:—
I have received yours of the 3d inst., and although I do not write
letters on the subject to which it refers, I have determined to
address you a few lines.
The equality of the States in the Territories is a truly
Democratic doctrine which must eventually prevail. This is all for
which I have ever contended. The Supreme Court of the United
States,—a coördinate branch of the Government, to which the
decision of this question constitutionally belongs, have affirmed
this equality, and have placed property in slaves upon the same
footing with all other property. Without self-degradation, the
Southern States cannot abandon this equality, and hence they are
now all in a flame. Non-intervention on the part of Congress with
slavery in the Territories, unless accompanied by non-intervention
on the part of the Territorial legislatures, amounts to nothing
more in effect than to transfer the Wilmot Proviso from Congress
to these legislatures. Whilst the South cannot surrender their
rights as coequal States in the confederacy, what injury can it
possibly do to the Northern States to yield this great Democratic
principle? If they should not do this, then we will have the
Democratic party divided, South and North, just as the Methodist
Church has been divided, and another link binding the Union
together will be broken. No person can fairly contend that either
assemblage at Baltimore, at the time the nominations were made,
was a Democratic National Convention; hence every Democrat is free
to choose between the two candidates. These are, in brief, my
sentiments. I regret that they so widely differ from your own. You
have taken your own course, which you had a perfect right to do,
and you will, I know, extend a similar privilege to myself.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
The sole part that was taken by President Buchanan, in any public
manner, in the election of 1860, was in a speech which he made from
the portico of the White House, on the evening of July 9th, when a
great crowd assembled in front of the mansion and called him out. In
the course of his remarks, he said:
I have ever been the friend of regular nominations. I have never
struck a political ticket in my life. Now, was there anything done
at Baltimore to bind the political conscience of any sound
Democrat, or to prevent him from supporting Breckinridge or Lane?
[“No! no!”] I was contemporary with the abandonment of the old
Congressional convention or caucus. This occurred a long time ago;
very few, if any, of you remember it. Under the old Congressional
convention system, no person was admitted to a seat except the
Democratic members of the Senate and House of Representatives.
This rule rendered it absolutely certain that the nominee, whoever
he might be, would be sustained at the election by the Democratic
States of the Union. By this means it was rendered impossible that
those States which could not give an electoral vote for the
candidate when nominated, should control the nomination and
dictate to the Democratic States who should be their nominee.
This system was abandoned—whether wisely or not, I shall express
no opinion. The National Convention was substituted in its stead.
All the States, whether Democratic or not, were equally to send
delegates to this convention according to the number of their
Senators and Representatives in Congress.
A difficulty at once arose which never could have arisen under the
Congressional convention system. If a bare majority of the
National Convention thus composed could nominate a candidate, he
might be nominated mainly by the anti-Democratic States against
the will of a large majority of the Democratic States. Thus the
nominating power would be separated from the electing power, which
could not fail to be destructive to the strength and harmony of
the Democratic party.
To obviate this serious difficulty in the organization of a
National Convention, and at the same time to leave all the States
their full vote, the two-thirds rule was adopted. It was believed
that under this rule no candidate could ever be nominated without
embracing within the two-thirds the votes of a decided majority of
the Democratic States. This was the substitute adopted to retain,
at least in a great degree, the power to the Democratic States
which they would have lost by abandoning the Congressional
convention system. This rule was a main pillar in the edifice of
national conventions. Remove it and the whole must become a ruin.
This sustaining pillar was broken to pieces at Baltimore by the
convention which nominated Mr. Douglas. After this the body was no
longer a national convention; and no Democrat, however devoted to
regular nominations, was bound to give the nominee his support; he
was left free to act according to the dictates of his own judgment
and conscience. And here, in passing, I may observe that the
wisdom of the two-thirds rule is justified by the events passing
around us. Had it been faithfully observed, no candidate could
have been nominated against the will and wishes of almost every
certain Democratic State in the Union, against nearly all the
Democratic Senators, and more than three-fourths of the Democratic
Representatives in Congress. [Cheers.]
I purposely avoid entering upon any discussion respecting the
exclusion from the convention of regularly elected delegates from
different Democratic States. If the convention which nominated Mr.
Douglas was not a regular Democratic convention, it must be
confessed that Breckinridge is in the same condition in that
respect. The convention that nominated him, although it was
composed of nearly all the certain Democratic States, did not
contain the two-thirds; and therefore every Democrat is at perfect
liberty to vote as he thinks proper, without running counter to
any regular nomination of the party. [Applause and cries of “three
cheers for Breckinridge and Lane.”] Holding this position, I shall
present some of the reasons why I prefer Mr. Breckinridge to Mr.
Douglas. This I shall do without attempting to interfere with any
individual Democrat or any State Democratic organization holding
different opinions from myself. The main object of all good
Democrats, whether belonging to the one or the other wing of our
unfortunate division, is to defeat the election of the Republican
candidates; and I shall never oppose any honest and honorable
course calculated to accomplish this object.
To return to the point from which I have digressed, I am in
favor of Mr. Breckinridge, because he sanctions and sustains the
perfect equality of all the States within their common
Territories, and the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States, establishing this equality. The sovereign States of this
Union are one vast partnership. The Territories were acquired by
the common blood and common treasure of them all. Each State,
and each citizen of each State, has the same right in the
Territories as any other State and the citizens of any other
State possess. Now what is sought for at present is, that a
portion of these States should turn around to their sister
States and say, “We are holier than you are, and while we will
take our property to the Territories and have it protected
there, you shall not place your property in the same position.”
That is precisely what is contended for. What the Democratic
party maintain, and what is the true principle of Democracy is,
that all shall enjoy the same rights, and that all shall be
subject to the same duties. Property—this Government was framed
for the protection of life, liberty, and property. They are the
objects for the protection of which all enlightened governments
were established. But it is sought now to place the property of
the citizen, under what is called the principle of squatter
sovereignty, in the power of the Territorial legislature to
confiscate it at their will and pleasure. That is the principle
sought to be established at present; and there seems to be an
entire mistake and misunderstanding among a portion of the
public upon this subject. When was property ever submitted to
the will of the majority? [“Never.”] If you hold property as an
individual, you hold it independent of Congress or of the State
legislature, or of the Territorial legislature—it is yours, and
your Constitution was made to protect your private property
against the assaults of legislative power. [Cheers.] Well, now,
any set of principles which will deprive you of your property,
is against the very essence of republican government, and to
that extent makes you a slave; for the man who has power over
your property to confiscate it, has power over your means of
subsistence; and yet it is contended, that although the
Constitution of the United States confers no such power—although
no State legislature has any such power, yet a Territorial
legislature, in the remote extremities of the country, can
confiscate your property!
[A VOICE. “They can't do it; they ain't going to do it.”]
There is but one mode, and one alone, to abolish slavery in the
Territories. That mode is pointed out in the Cincinnati platform,
which has been as much misrepresented as anything I have ever
known. That platform declares that a majority of the actual
residents in a Territory, whenever their number is sufficient to
entitle them to admission as a State, possess the power to “form a
constitution with or without domestic slavery, to be admitted into
the Union upon terms of perfect equality with the other States.”
If there be squatter sovereignty in this resolution, I have never
been able to perceive it. If there be any reference in it to a
Territorial legislature, it has entirely escaped my notice. It
presents the clear principle that, at the time the people form
their constitution, they shall then decide whether they will have
slavery or not. And yet it has been stated over and over again
that, in accepting the nomination under that platform, I endorsed
the doctrine of squatter sovereignty. I suppose you have all heard
this repeated a thousand times.
[A VOICE. “We all knew it was a lie!”]
Well, I am glad you did.
How beautifully this plain principle of constitutional law
corresponds with the best interests of the people! Under it,
emigrants from the North and the South, from the East and the West
proceed to the Territories. They carry with them that property
which they suppose will best promote their material interests;
they live together in peace and harmony. The question of slavery
will become a foregone conclusion before they have inhabitants
enough to enter the Union as a State. There will then be no
“bleeding Kansas” in the Territories; they will all live together
in peace and harmony, promoting the prosperity of the Territory
and their own prosperity, until the time shall arrive when it
becomes necessary to frame a constitution. Then the whole question
will be decided to the general satisfaction. But, upon the
opposite principle, what will you find in the Territories? Why,
there will be strife and contention all the time. One Territorial
legislature may establish slavery and another Territorial
legislature may abolish it, and so the struggle will be continued
throughout the Territorial existence. The people, instead of
devoting their energies and industry to promote their own
prosperity, will be in a state of constant strife and turmoil,
just as we have witnessed in Kansas. Therefore, there is no
possible principle that can be so injurious to the best interests
of a Territory as what has been called squatter sovereignty.
Now, let me place the subject before you in another point of view.
The people of the Southern States can never abandon this great
principle of State equality in the Union without self-degradation.
[“Never!”] Never without an acknowledgment that they are inferior
in this respect to their sister States. Whilst it is vital to them
to preserve their equality, the Northern States surrender nothing
by admitting this principle. In doing this they only yield
obedience to the Constitution of their country as expounded by the
Supreme Court of the United States. While for the North it is
comparatively a mere abstraction, with the South it is a question
of co-equal State sovereignty in the Union.
If the decrees of the high tribunal established by the
Constitution for the very purposes are to be set at naught and
disregarded, it will tend to render all property of every
description insecure. What, then, have the North to do? Merely to
say that, as good citizens, they will yield obedience to the
decision of the Supreme Court, and admit the right of a Southern
man to take his property into the Territories, and hold it there
just as a Northern man may do; and it is to me the most
extraordinary thing in the world that this country should now be
distracted and divided because certain persons at the North will
not agree that their brethren at the South shall have the same
rights in the Territories which they enjoy. What would I, as a
Pennsylvanian, say or do, supposing anybody was to contend that
the legislature of any Territory could outlaw iron or coal within
the Territory? [Laughter and cheers.] The principle is precisely
the same. The Supreme Court of the United States have
decided,—what was known to us all to have been the existing state
of affairs for fifty years,—that slaves are property. Admit that
fact, and you admit everything. Then that property in the
Territories must be protected precisely in the same manner with
any other property. If it be not so protected in the Territories,
the holders of it are degraded before the world.
We have been told that non-intervention on the part of Congress
with slavery in the Territories is the true policy. Very well. I
most cheerfully admit that Congress has no right to pass any law
to establish, impair or abolish slavery in the Territories. Let
this principle of non-intervention be extended to the Territorial
legislatures, and let it be declared that they in like manner have
no power to establish, impair or destroy slavery, and then the
controversy is in effect ended. This is all that is required at
present, and I verily believe all that will ever be required.
Hands off by Congress and hands off by the Territorial
legislature. [Loud applause.] With the Supreme Court of the United
States I hold that neither Congress nor the Territorial
legislature has any power to establish, impair or abolish slavery
in the Territories. But if, in the face of this positive
prohibition, the Territorial legislature should exercise the power
of intervening, then this would be a mere transfer of the Wilmot
proviso and the Buffalo platform from Congress, to be carried into
execution in the Territories to the destruction of all property in
slaves. [Renewed applause.]
An attempt of this kind, if made in Congress, would be resisted by
able men on the floor of both houses, and probably defeated. Not
so in a remote Territory. To every new Territory there will be a
rush of free-soilers from the Northern States. They would elect
the first Territorial legislature before the people of the South
could arrive with their property, and this legislature would
probably settle forever the question of slavery according to their
own will.
And shall we for the sake of squatter sovereignty, which, from its
nature, can only continue during the brief period of Territorial
existence, incur the risk of dividing the great Democratic party
of the country into two sectional parties, the one North and the
other South? Shall this great party which has governed the country
in peace and war, which has raised it from humble beginnings to be
one of the most prosperous and powerful nations in the world—shall
this party be broken up for such a cause? That is the question.
The numerous, powerful, pious and respectable Methodist Church has
been thus divided. The division was a severe shock to the Union. A
similar division of the great Democratic party, should it
continue, would rend asunder one of the most powerful links which
binds the Union together.
I entertain no such fearful apprehensions. The present issue is
transitory, and will speedily pass away. In the nature of things
it cannot continue. There is but one possible contingency which
can endanger the Union, and against this all Democrats, whether
squatter sovereigns or popular sovereigns, will present a united
resistance. Should the time ever arrive when Northern agitation
and fanaticism shall proceed so far as to render the domestic
firesides of the South insecure, then, and not till then, will the
Union be in danger. A united Northern Democracy will present a
wall of fire against such a catastrophe!
There are in our midst numerous persons who predict the
dissolution of the great Democratic party, and others who contend
that it has already been dissolved. The wish is father to the
thought. It has been heretofore in great peril; but when divided
for the moment, it has always closed up its ranks and become more
powerful, even from defeat. It will never die whilst the
Constitution and the Union survive. It will live to protect and
defend both. It has its roots in the very vitals of the
Constitution, and, like one of the ancient cedars of Lebanon, it
will flourish to afford shelter and protection to that sacred
instrument, and to shield it against every storm of faction.
[Renewed applause.]
Now, friends and fellow-citizens, it is probable that this is the
last political speech that I shall ever make. [A VOICE. “We hope
not!”] It is now nearly forty years since I first came to
Washington as a member of Congress, and I wish to say this night,
that during that whole period I have received nothing but kindness
and attention from your fathers and from yourselves. Washington
was then comparatively a small town; now it has grown to be a
great and beautiful city; and the first wish of my heart is that
its citizens may enjoy uninterrupted health and prosperity. I
thank you for the kind attention you have paid to me, and now bid
you all a good-night. [Prolonged cheering.]
The observations contained in this chapter on the anti-slavery
agitation have been made because that agitation and its consequences
are great historical facts, necessary to be considered in a just
appreciation of the conduct of any American statesman who acted an
important part in national affairs during the quarter of a century
that preceded the civil war. The detail of Mr. Buchanan’s course on
this subject, down to the time when he became President, has been
given, and need not be repeated.
He was one of the earliest of the public men of the North to
discover and to point out the tendency of this agitation. That he
denounced it boldly and sincerely cannot be denied, even by those
who may not have held, or who do not now hold, the same opinions
concerning the “abolitionists” and their measures. He endeavored, at
an early period, to keep his own State of Pennsylvania free from the
adoption of such dogmas as the “higher law,” and to have its people
appreciate the mischiefs which the anti-slavery societies were
producing in the South. It is easy to impute this course to his
political relations to the Democratic party and to the dictates of
his own ambition as one of its principal Northern leaders, who, in
any future prospect of political honors beyond those which his own
State could bestow, might have to look to Southern support. But is
there no sensible, patriotic, sound and unselfish motive, no honest
and well grounded conviction, discoverable in what he did and said?
If his opinions about this agitation were substantially in
accordance with those of wise and judicious men, who could not have
been influenced by party spirit or personal objects, they may claim
to have been sincere and just, as certainly as they may claim to
have been courageously uttered.
It will not be doubted that when the abolition agitation began,
there was at least one man in the North, who, from his deep and
fervid interest in whatever concerned the rights of human nature and
the welfare of the human race, from his generous love of liberty and
his philanthropic tendencies, might be expected to welcome any
rational mode of removing the reproach and the evil of slavery from
the American name and the condition of American society. Such a man
was that celebrated New England divine, William Ellery Channing.
What his feelings were about the slavery that existed in our
Southern States, all who know anything of his character and his
writings know full well. His position as a clergyman and his
relations to the moral and spiritual condition of the age, put out
of the question the possibility of any political motive, other than
that broad, high and comprehensive view of public policy which was
above all the interests of party, and beyond all personal
considerations. If such a man foresaw the dangerous tendencies of
the abolition agitation, conducted in and from the North, and at the
same time discovered that the evil of slavery ought to be and might
be dealt with in a very different spirit and by far other means, it
is rational to conclude that men in public life and in political
positions might well place themselves in opposition to the spread of
such principles and the adoption of such methods as those of the
anti-slavery societies of the North. It was, in truth, the one thing
which it was their duty, as statesmen, to do.[62]
Footnote 62:
Dr. Channing’s attention was first drawn to the Northern
anti-slavery agitation in the year 183-, and there is nowhere on
record a more remarkable prophecy than that which he then made of
the effect of this agitation upon the people of the South. It is
contained in a letter which he then wrote to Mr. Webster, and
which has been public ever since the publication of Mr. Webster’s
collected works.
CHAPTER XIV.
1860—October.
GENERAL SCOTT'S “VIEWS.”
While during the month of October (1860) President Buchanan was
anxiously watching the course of public events, he was surprised by
receiving from General Scott, the General-in-chief of the Army, a
very extraordinary paper. It was written on the 29th of October,
from New York, where the General had his headquarters, and was
mailed to the President on the same day. On the 30th the General
sent a corrected copy to the Secretary of War, with a supplement.
These papers became known as General Scott’s “views.” He lent copies
of them to some of his friends, to be read; and although they did
not immediately reach the public press, their contents became pretty
well known in the South through private channels. From them the
following facts were apparent:
FIRST.—That before the Presidential election, General Scott
anticipated that there would be a secession of one or more of the
Southern States, in the event of Mr. Lincoln’s election; and that
from the general rashness of the Southern character, there was
danger of a “preliminary” seizure of certain Southern forts, which
he named.
SECOND.—That the secession which General Scott deprecated was one
that would produce what he called a “gap in the Union;” that he
contemplated, as a choice of evils to be embraced instead of a
civil war, the allowance of a division of the Union into four
separate confederacies, having contiguous territory; and that he
confined the use of force, or a resort to force, on the part of
the Federal Government, to the possible case of the secession of
some “interior” States, to reestablish the continuity of the
Federal territory. This he considered might be regarded as a
“correlative right,” balancing the right of secession, which he
said might be conceded “in order to save time.”
THIRD.—That his provisional remedy, or preliminary caution, viz:
The immediate garrisoning of the Southern forts sufficiently to
prevent a surprise or _coup de main_, was confined to the possible
or probable case of a secession that would make a “gap” in the
Union, or break the continuity of the Federal territory. He
excluded from the scope of his “provisional remedies” the
secession of Texas, or of all the Atlantic States south of the
Potomac, as neither would produce a “gap” in the Union.
FOURTH.—That for the application of his “provisional remedies,” he
had at his command but five companies of regular troops, to
prevent surprises of the nine Southern forts which he named; and
that as to “regular approaches,” nothing could be said or done
without calling for volunteers.
FIFTH.—That in the meantime the Federal Government should collect
its revenue outside of the Southern cities, in forts or on board
ships of war: and that after any State had seceded, there should
be no invasion of it, unless it should happen to be an “interior”
State.
SIXTH.—That the aim of his plan was to gain eight or ten months to
await measures of conciliation on the part of the North, and the
subsidence of angry feelings in the South.
If these “views,” palpably impracticable and dangerous, had remained
unknown in the hands of the President, there would have been no
necessity for commenting on them in this work, especially as
subsequent events rendered them of no importance. But they did not
remain unknown. They became the foundation, at a later period, of a
charge that President Buchanan had been warned by General Scott,
before the election of Mr. Lincoln, of the danger of leaving the
Southern forts without sufficient garrisons to prevent surprises,
and that he had neglected this warning. Moreover, in these “views,”
the General-in-chief of the Army, addressing the President, had
mingled the strangest political suggestions with military movements,
on the eve of a Presidential election which was about to result in a
sectional political division. It is therefore necessary for me to
bestow upon these “views” a degree of attention which would
otherwise be unnecessary.
These papers were addressed by the General-in-chief of the Army of
the United States to a President who utterly repudiated the alleged
right of secession, by any State whatever, whether lying between
other States remaining loyal, or on the extreme boundary of the
Union. Becoming known to the Southern leaders who might be disposed
to carry their States out of the Union in the event of Mr. Lincoln’s
election, they would justify the inference that in one case at
least, that of a secession which did not make a “gap” in the Union,
the General-in-chief of the Federal Army would not draw his sword to
compel the inhabitants of the seceded region to submit to the laws
of the United States. In regard to the “provisional remedies” which
the general advised, let it be observed that if the President had
had at his disposal the whole army of the United States, the
introduction into the Southern forts of a larger or a smaller force,
at such a moment, however officially explained, could have been
regarded in the South only as a proof that President Buchanan
expected secession to be attempted, and that he was preparing for a
civil war, to be waged by him or his successor. The right of the
Federal Government to place its own troops in its own forts, without
giving offence to any one, was perfectly apparent; but it was
equally apparent that on the eve of this election, or during the
election, or at any time before any State had adopted an ordinance
of secession, such a step could not have been taken as anything but
an indication that the Federal Government was preparing to prevent
by force the people of any State from assembling to consider and act
upon their relations to the Government of the United States. Now a
very great part of the popular misapprehension of President
Buchanan’s policy, purposes and acts, which has prevailed to the
present day, has arisen from the total want of discrimination
between what the Federal Government could and what it could not
rightfully do, in anticipation of the secession of a State or
States. It has been a thousand times inconsiderately asked, why Mr.
Buchanan did not nip secession in the bud.
In the first place, the Federal Government, however great might be
the physical force at its command, could at no time have done
anything more than enforce the execution of its own laws and
maintain the possession of its own property. To prevent the people
of a State, by any menace of arms, from assembling in convention to
consider anything whatever, would have been to act on the assumption
that she was about to adopt an ordinance of secession, and on the
farther assumption that such an act must be forestalled, lest it
might have some kind of validity. The Executive of the United States
was not bound, and was not at liberty, to act upon such assumptions.
There were many ways in which a State convention could peacefully
take into consideration the relations of its people to the Federal
Union. They might lawfully appeal to the sobriety and good feeling
of their sister States to redress any grievances of which they
complained. There might be, we know that in point of fact there was,
a strong Union party in most of the Southern States, and the
President of the United States, in the month of October, 1860, would
have been utterly inexcusable, if he had proclaimed to the country
that he expected this party to be overborne, and had helped to
diminish its members and weaken its power, by extraordinary
garrisons placed in the Southern forts, in anticipation of their
seizure by lawless individuals, when such an exhibition must
inevitably lead the whole people of the South to believe that there
was to be no solution of the sectional differences but by a trial of
strength in a sectional civil war. Mr. Buchanan was far too wise and
circumspect a statesman to put into the hands of the secessionists
such a means of “firing the Southern heart,” before it was known
what the result of the Presidential election would be. It was his
plain and imperative duty not to assume, by any official act, at
such a time, that there was to be a secession of any State or
States.
But, in the second place, even if other good reasons did not exist,
there were but five companies of regular troops, or four hundred
men, available for the garrisoning of nine fortifications in six
highly excited Southern States. How were they to be distributed?
Distributed equally, they would have amounted to a reinforcement of
forty-four men and a fraction in each fort. In whatsoever
proportions they might be distributed, according to the conjectured
degree of exposure of the various posts, the movement could have
been nothing but an invitation of attack, which the force would have
been entirely inadequate to repel. The whole army of the United
States then consisted of only eighteen thousand men. They were, with
the exception of the five companies named by General Scott,
scattered on the remote frontiers and over the great Western plains,
engaged in the protection of the settlers and the emigrant trains;
and for this duty their numbers were, and had long been, and have
ever since been, notoriously inadequate. At a later period, after
President Buchanan had retired from office, General Scott, in a
controversy in the public prints which he thought proper to provoke
with the ex-President, referred to six hundred recruits in the
harbor of New York and at Carlisle barracks in Pennsylvania, which,
added to the five companies mentioned in his “views,” would have
made a force of one thousand men; and while he admitted that this
force would not have been sufficient to furnish “war garrisons” for
the nine Southern forts, he maintained that they would have been
quite enough to guard against surprises. But it is to be noted that
in his “views” of October, 1860, he made known to the President that
there were _only_ the five companies, which he named, “within reach,
to garrison the forts mentioned in the views;” and, moreover, he was
mistaken, in November, 1862, in supposing that he had obtained these
recruits when he wrote his “views,” nor did he, in October or
November, 1860, in any manner suggest to the President that there
were any more than the five companies available. Had he made any
military representations to the President before the election, other
than those contained in his “views,” it cannot be doubted that they
would have received all the consideration due to his official
position and his great military reputation.[63]
Footnote 63:
It is a remarkable fact that when President Lincoln was
inaugurated, five months after General Scott sent his “views” to
President Buchanan, and it was feared that the inauguration might
be interrupted by violence of some kind, he was able to assemble
at Washington but six hundred and fifty-three men, of the rank and
file of the army. This number was made up by bringing the sappers
and miners from West Point. Yet, down to that period, no part of
the army, excepting the five companies referred to by General
Scott in his “views,” had been disposed of anywhere but where the
presence of a military force was essential to the protection of
the settlers on the frontiers and the emigrants on the plains. No
one could have known this better than General Scott, for it was
his official duty to know it, and it is plain that his “views”
were written with a full knowledge of the situation of the whole
army.
But General Scott’s “views” produced, and ought to have produced, no
impression upon the mind of the President. That part of them which
suggested a military movement was entirely impracticable. The
political part, which related to the aspects of secession, its
possible admission in one case and its denial in another, was of no
value whatever to anybody but those who believed in the doctrine.
With the exception of such circulation of these “views” as General
Scott permitted by giving copies of them to his friends, they
remained unpublished until the 18th of January, 1861. On that day
they were published, by General Scott’s permission, in the _National
Intelligencer_ at Washington, the editors saying that they had
obtained a copy of them for publication because allusion had been
made to them both in the public prints and in public speeches. This
document, therefore, in an authentic shape, was made public in the
midst of the secession movement, after the States of South Carolina,
Florida, Mississippi and Alabama had adopted their ordinances of
secession, and while the people of Georgia, Louisiana, Texas and
Arkansas were deliberating upon their course.[64] The President at
that time passed over this publication in silence, for reasons which
he afterwards assigned in the public controversy between General
Scott and himself in October and November, 1862.
Footnote 64:
At the time of this publication of General Scott’s “views,” of the
States which seceded before the attack on Fort Sumter, four had
adopted ordinances of secession, and three had not acted. The
eighth State, Arkansas, did not act until after Sumter.
And here it may be appropriate, before proceeding farther with the
narrative, to advert to a suggestion which has been again and again
repeated in a great variety of forms, by those who have criticised
Mr. Buchanan’s course in regard to the reinforcement of the Southern
forts. General Scott himself, after the election of Mr. Lincoln, in
the middle of December, 1860, in a note which he addressed to the
President, referred to the course pursued by President Jackson in
regard to nullification, in 1832-33; and it has long been one of the
current questions, asked as if it were unanswerable,—why did not Mr.
Buchanan imitate the firmness, boldness and decision with which
General Jackson dealt with the “Nullifiers,” and proceed to garrison
the Southern forts before the election of Mr. Lincoln? Having
already shown the impracticability of such a step, from the want of
the necessary forces, and its great political inexpediency even if
the necessary force had been within his reach, it only remains for
me to point out that there was no parallel between the situation of
things under General Jackson in 1832-33, and the state of the
country under President Buchanan in 1860-61. South Carolina stood
alone in her resistance to the collection of the revenue of the
United States, in 1832-33; nor, whatever might be the steps which
she would have the rashness to take in preventing the execution of a
single law of the United States within her borders, there was no
danger that any other State would become infected with her political
heresies, or imitate her example. What General Jackson had to do was
to collect the revenue of the United States in the port of
Charleston. For this purpose, prior to the issue of his
proclamation, and while the so-called ordinance of nullification was
pending in the convention of South Carolina, he took preliminary
steps, by placing in the harbor a sufficient military and naval
force to insure the execution of a single Federal statute, commonly
called the “tariff.” For this purpose he had ample authority of law,
under the Act of March 3, 1807, which authorized the employment of
the land and naval forces, when necessary, to execute the laws of
the United States through the process of the Federal tribunals. He
had, moreover, the necessary forces practically at his disposal. So
far as these forces would consist of troops, their proper
destination was Fort Moultrie in Charleston harbor; but their
presence in that fort was deemed necessary, not to prevent an
anticipated seizure of it by the State authorities, but to aid in
the execution of the revenue law in case it should be resisted. For
this purpose, in March, 1833, he sent a small military force to Fort
Moultrie, and a sloop of war, with two revenue cutters, to
Charleston harbor. General Scott was sent to Charleston to take the
command of these forces, if it should become necessary for them to
act. He arrived there on the day after the passage of the
Nullification ordinance. The proclamation of General Jackson, the
passage of Mr. Clay’s Compromise Tariff Bill, and the passage of the
Force Bill, put an end to any actual collision between the State and
the Federal authorities.
How different was the state of the country in 1860, before the
election of Mr. Lincoln! A generation of men had grown up in the
South, many of whom held the supposed right of State secession
from the Union as a cardinal feature of their political and
constitutional creed. The sole ground for any apprehension of a
practical assertion of this doctrine was the contingent election of
a President nominated upon a “platform” obnoxious to the people of
the slaveholding States. In such a state of affairs, was it for a
President, whose administration was to expire in five months, to
adopt the foregone conclusion that the Republican candidate would be
elected, and to add to this the further conclusion that his election
would be followed by a secession of States, which the people of the
North would take no conciliatory steps to prevent after the
Republican candidate had been elected? Was President Buchanan to
throw a military force into the Southern forts, even if he had had a
sufficient force within his reach, and thus to proclaim to the whole
people of the South, the loyal and the disloyal, that in his
judgment there would be but one issue out of the election of Mr.
Lincoln—an issue of physical force between the two sections of the
country? In what condition would this have placed his successor, and
the great political party which was aiming to obtain for that
successor the control of the Government? Surely Mr. Lincoln and his
political supporters would have had the gravest reason to complain,
if Mr. Buchanan, before the election, had, by any act of his own not
palpably and imperatively necessary, caused it to be believed by the
whole Southern people that there was and could be no alternative but
to put their anticipated dangers, their alleged grievances, and the
doctrine of secession along with them, at once to the arbitrament of
the sword. We have it on Mr. Buchanan’s own solemn assertion, the
sincerity of which there can be no reason to doubt, that he
considered it his highest duty so to shape his official course
during the remainder of his term, as to afford to the secessionists
of the South no excuse for renouncing their allegiance to the
Federal Union, and to hand the government over to his successor,
whoever he might be, without doing a single act that would tend to
close the door of reconciliation between the two sections of the
country, then unfortunately divided by the political circumstances
of the pending election. This was the keynote of his policy, formed
before the election of Mr. Lincoln, and steadily followed through
every vicissitude, and every changing aspect of the great drama
enacting before his eyes. It is easy to reason backward from what
occurred, and to say that he should have garrisoned the Southern
forts, in anticipation of their seizure. History does not, or should
not, pass upon the conduct of statesmen in highly responsible
positions, by pronouncing in this _ex post facto_ manner on what
they ought to have anticipated, when men of equally good
opportunities for looking forward did not anticipate what
subsequently occurred. It was not the belief of the leading public
men in the Republican party, before the election of Mr. Lincoln, the
men who were likely to be associated with him in the Government,
that there would be any secession. If they had believed it, they
would certainly have been guilty of great recklessness if they had
not acted upon that belief, at least so far as to warn the country,
in their respective spheres, to be prepared for such an event. It is
one of the most notorious truths in the whole history of that
election, that the political supporters of Mr. Lincoln scouted the
idea that there was any danger of secession to be apprehended.
General Scott’s suggestion of such danger to Mr. Buchanan, in the
month of October, 1860, and the impracticable advice which he then
gave, if it had been published before the election, would have been
laughed at by every Republican statesman in the country, or would
have been indignantly treated as a work of supererogation,
unnecessarily suggesting that the election of the Republican
candidate was to be followed by an attempted disruption of the
Union. Undoubtedly, as the event proved, the political friends of
Mr. Lincoln were too confident that no secession would be attempted;
and into that extreme confidence they were led by their political
policy, which did not admit of their allowing the people of the
North to believe that there could be any serious danger to the
country in their political triumph. If the people of the North had
believed in that danger, the Republican candidate would not have
been elected. It did not become the Republican leaders, therefore,
after the election, and it never can become any one who has
inherited their political connection, to blame Mr. Buchanan for not
taking extraordinary precautions against an event which the
responsible leaders of the party, prior to the election, treated as
if it were out of all the bounds of probability.[65]
Footnote 65:
It will be seen that I do not regard the election of Mr. Lincoln
as a defiance of the South, nor do I consider that the threats of
secession, so far as such threats were uttered in the South, had
much to do with the success of the Republican candidate.
Multitudes of men voted for that candidate in no spirit of
defiance towards the South, and his popular vote would have been
much smaller than it was, if it had been believed at the North
that his election would be followed by an attempted disruption of
the Union.
And here, too, it is well to advert to a charge which relates to
Mr. Buchanan’s administration of the Government prior to the
election of his successor. This charge, to which a large measure
of popular credence has long been accorded, is, that the Secretary
of War, Mr. Floyd, had for a long time pursued a plan of his own
for distributing the troops and arms of the United States in
anticipation of a disruption of the Union at no distant day. But
such a charge is of course to be tried by a careful examination of
facts, and by a scrupulous attention to dates. One of the most
important facts to be considered is, that Secretary Floyd, who
came in 1857 into Mr. Buchanan’s cabinet from Virginia—a State
that never had, down to that time and for a long period
thereafter, many secessionists among her public men—was not of
that political school until after he left the office of Secretary
of War. He was a Unionist, and a pronounced one, until he chose,
as a mere pretext, to say that he differed with the President in
regard to the policy which the President thought proper to
pursue.[66] But from the fact that he became a secessionist and
denounced the President, after he left the cabinet, and the
foolish boast which he made that he had, while Secretary of War,
defeated General Scott’s plans and solicitations respecting the
forts, the inference has been drawn that he had good reason for
advancing that claim upon the consideration of his new political
allies in the Southern section of the country. Mr. Floyd by no
means appears to me to have been a man of scrupulous honor. The
fact that he had been compelled to resign his place on account of
a transaction in no way connected with the secession of any State,
led him, in a spirit of sheer self-glorification, to give
countenance to a charge which, if it had been true, would not only
have reflected great discredit on the President, but which would
have involved the Secretary himself in the heinous offence of
treachery to the Government whose public servant he was. No man
could have thus overshot his own mark, who had a careful regard
for facts which he must have known: for no one could have known
better than Mr. Floyd that he had no influence whatever in
defeating any plans which General Scott proposed to the President
in his “views” of October, 1860, and no one could have known
better than he that the troops and arms of the United States had
not been distributed with any sinister design. But Mr. Floyd’s
subsequent vaporings, after he left the cabinet, misled General
Scott into the belief that there had been great wrong committed
while he was Secretary of War, and caused the General, in October
and November, 1862, to give his sanction to charges that were
quite unfounded.
Footnote 66:
See _post_, for the history of Secretary Floyd’s resignation.
It is proper to hear Mr. Buchanan himself, in regard to his refusal
to garrison the Southern forts in October or November, 1860,
according to the recommendations in General Scott’s “views.”
This refusal is attributed, without the least cause, to the
influence of Governor Floyd. All my cabinet must bear me witness
that I was the President myself, responsible for all the acts of
the administration; and certain it is that during the last six
months previous to the 29th December, 1860, the day on which he
resigned his office, after my request, he exercised less influence
on the administration than any other member of the cabinet. Mr.
Holt was immediately thereafter transferred from the Post Office
Department to that of War; so that, from this time until the 4th
March, 1861, which was by far the most important period of the
administration, he [Mr. Holt] performed the duties of Secretary of
War to my entire satisfaction.[67]
Footnote 67:
Letter from Mr. Buchanan to the Editors of the _National
Intelligencer_, October 28, 1862.—If the reader chooses to consult
the controversy of 1862 between General Scott and Mr. Buchanan, he
will find there the sources from which General Scott drew his
conclusions. One of them was information given to him while the
controversy was going on, in a telegram from Washington, sent by a
person whose name he did not disclose. A reference to Mr.
Buchanan’s last letter in the controversy will show how he
disposed of this “nameless telegram.” The period when the alleged
improper transfers of arms into the Southern States were said to
have occurred was, as Mr. Buchanan states, long before the
nomination of Mr. Lincoln, and nearly a year before his election.
General Scott’s reply to this shows that in 1862 he had convinced
himself that the revolt of the Southern States had been planned
for a long time before the nomination of Mr. Lincoln, and that it
was to be carried out in the event of the election of any Northern
man to the Presidency. It had become the fashion in 1862, in
certain quarters, to believe, or to profess to believe, in this
long-standing plot. There are several conclusive answers to the
suggestion: 1st. It is not true, as a matter of fact, that at any
time before the nomination of Mr. Lincoln, there were any
transfers of arms to the South which ought to have led even to the
suspicion of the existence of such a plot. 2d. That it is not
true, as a matter of fact, that at any time after Mr. Lincoln’s
nomination, and before his election, there were any transfers of
arms whatever from the Northern arsenals of the United States into
the Southern States. 3d. That after Mr. Lincoln’s election, viz.,
in December, 1860, a transfer of ordnance from Pittsburgh, in
Pennsylvania, to Mississippi and Texas, which had been ordered by
Secretary Floyd a few days before he left office, was immediately
countermanded by his successor, Mr. Holt, by order of the
President, and the guns remained at Pittsburgh. 4th. That the
entire political history of the country, prior to the nomination
of Mr. Lincoln, and prior to the Democratic Convention at
Charleston, does not afford a rational ground of belief that any
considerable section of the Southern people, or any of their
prominent political leaders, were looking forward to a state of
parties which would be likely to result in the election of any
Northern man, under circumstances that would produce a conviction
among the people of the Southern States that it would be unsafe
for them to remain in the Union. Even after the nomination of Mr.
Lincoln, and after the division of the Democratic party into two
factions, resulting in the nomination of two Democratic candidates
(Breckinridge and Douglas), with a fourth candidate in the field
(Bell), nominated by the “Old Line Whigs,” it was not so morally
certain that the Republican candidate would be elected, as to give
rise, before the election, to serious plots or preparations for
dissolving the Union. Mr. Lincoln obtained but a majority of
fifty-seven electoral votes over all his competitors. It was the
sectional character of his 180 electoral votes, out of 303,—the
whole 180 being drawn from the free States—and the sectional
character of the “platform” on which he was nominated and elected,
and not the naked fact that he was a Northern man, that the
secessionists of the cotton States were able to use as the lever
by which to carry their States out of the Union. Undoubtedly the
Southern States committed the great folly of refusing to trust in
the conservative elements of the North to redress any grievances
of which the people of the South could justly complain. But I know
of no tangible proofs that before the nomination of Mr. Lincoln
there was any Southern plot to break up the Union in the event of
the election of any Northern man. The reader must follow the
precipitation of secession through the events occurring after the
election, before he can reach a sound conclusion as to the causes
and methods by which it was brought about. He will find reason to
conclude, if he studies the votes in the seceding conventions of
the cotton States prior to the attack on Fort Sumter, that even in
that region there was a Union party which could not have been
overborne and trampled down, by any other means than by appeals to
unfounded fears, which the secession leaders professed to draw
from the peculiar circumstances of the election. He will find
reason to ask himself why it was, in these secession conventions,
rapidly accomplished between December, 1860, and February, 1861,
the Unionists were at last so few, and he will find the most
important answer to this inquiry in the fact that it was because
the advocates of secession, from the circumstances of the
election, succeeded in producing the conviction that the whole
North was alienated in feeling from the South, and was determined
to trample upon Southern rights. It is a melancholy story of
perversion, misrepresentation and mistake, operating upon a
sensitive and excited people. But it does not justify the belief
that the secession of those States was the accomplishment of a
previous and long-standing plot to destroy the Union; nor, if such
a plot ever existed, is there any reason to believe that any
member of Mr. Buchanan’s cabinet was a party to it. General Scott,
in 1862, adopted and gave currency to charges which had no
foundation in fact, and which were originated for the purpose of
making Mr. Buchanan odious to the country.
The General, however, went further than the adoption of charges
originated by others. He claimed credit for himself for the
discovery and prevention of the “robbery” of the Pittsburgh
ordnance. In his letter of November 8, 1862, he said:
“Accidentally learning, early in March (!), that, under this
_posthumous_ order, the shipment of these guns had commenced, I
communicated the fact to Secretary Holt, acting for Secretary
Cameron, just in time to defeat the robbery.” This was a tissue of
absurd misstatements. Copies of the official papers relating to
this order are before me. The order was given by the Ordnance
Office on the 22d of December, 1860. The shipment of the guns was
never commenced. General Scott had nothing to do with the
countermand of the order. On the 25th of December, certain
citizens of Pittsburgh telegraphed to the President that great
excitement had been caused there by this order, and advising that
it be immediately revoked. Floyd was Secretary of War when the
order was given for the removal of the guns, but at that time he
was not a secessionist, or aiding the secessionists. He tendered
his resignation of the office on the 29th of December, under
circumstances which will be fully related hereafter. It was
promptly accepted, and Mr. Holt was appointed Secretary of War _ad
interim_. By the President’s direction, Mr. Holt countermanded the
order, and the guns remained at Pittsburgh. Judge Black, at the
President’s request, investigated the whole affair, and made the
following brief report to the President on the 27th: “Mr.
President: The enclosed are the two orders of the War Department.
I suppose the forts happened to be in that state of progress which
made those guns necessary just at this time, and they were
directed to be sent without any motive beyond what would have
caused the same act at any other time.
Ever yours,
J. S. BLACK”.
Finally, it only remains for me to quote Mr. Buchanan’s more
elaborate account of his reasons for not acting upon General
Scott’s “views” of October, 1860, which he gave in the account of
his administration, published in 1866.[68]
Footnote 68:
_Mr. Buchanan’s Administration on the Eve of the Rebellion._ New
York: D. Appleton & Co., 1866. This book will hereafter be
referred to as “_Mr. Buchanan’s Defence_.” The history and reasons
for this publication will be found in a future chapter.
Such, since the period of Mr. Lincoln’s election, having been
the condition of the Southern States, the “views” of General
Scott, addressed before that event to the Secretary of War, on
the 29th and 30th October, 1860, were calculated to do much
injury in misleading the South. From the strange inconsistencies
they involve, it would be difficult to estimate whether they did
most harm in encouraging or in provoking secession. So far as
they recommended a military movement, this, in order to secure
success, should have been kept secret until the hour had arrived
for carrying it into execution. The substance of them, however,
soon reached the Southern people. Neither the headquarters of
the army at New York, nor afterwards in Washington, were a very
secure depository for the “views,” even had it been the author’s
intention to regard them as confidential. That such was not the
case may be well inferred from their very nature. Not confined
to the recommendation of a military movement, by far the larger
portion of them consists of a political disquisition on the
existing dangers to the Union; on the horrors of civil war and
the best means of averting so great a calamity; and also on the
course which their author had resolved to pursue, as a citizen,
in the approaching Presidential election. These were themes
entirely foreign to a military report, and equally foreign from
the official duties of the Commanding General. Furthermore, the
“views” were published to the world by the General himself, on
the 18th January, 1861, in the _National Intelligencer_, and
this _without the consent or even previous knowledge of the
President_. This was done at a critical moment in our history,
when the cotton States were seceding one after the other. The
reason assigned by him for this strange violation of official
confidence toward the President, was the necessity for the
correction of misapprehensions which had got abroad, “both in
the public prints and in public speeches,” in relation to the
“views.”
The General commenced his “views” by stating that, “To save time
the right of secession may be conceded, and instantly balanced by
the correlative right on the part of the Federal Government
against an _interior_ State or States to reestablish by force, if
necessary, its former continuity of territory.” He subsequently
explains and qualifies the meaning of this phrase by saying: “It
will be seen that the 'views' only apply to a case of secession
that makes a _gap_ in the present Union.” The falling off (say) of
Texas, or of all the Atlantic States, from the Potomac south [the
very case which has since occurred], was not within the scope of
General Scott’s provisional remedies. As if apprehending that by
possibility it might be inferred he intended to employ force for
any other purpose than to open the way through this _gap_ to a
State beyond, still in the Union, he disclaims any such
construction, and says: “The foregoing views eschew the idea of
invading a seceded State.” This disclaimer is as strong as any
language he could employ for the purpose.
To sustain the limited right to open the way through the _gap_, he
cites, not the Constitution of the United States, but the last
chapter of Paley’s “Moral and Political Philosophy,” which,
however, contains no allusion to the subject.
The General paints the horrors of civil war in the most gloomy
colors, and then proposes his alternative for avoiding them. He
exclaims: “But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines
that political madness may contrive, and there would be no hope of
reuniting the fragments except by the laceration and despotism of
the sword. To effect such result the intestine wars of our Mexican
neighbors would, in comparison with ours, sink into mere child’s
play.
“A smaller evil” (in the General’s opinion) “would be to allow the
fragments of the great Republic to form themselves into new
Confederacies, probably four.”
Not satisfied with this general proposition, he proceeds not only
to discuss and to delineate the proper boundaries for these new
Confederacies, but even to designate capitals for the three on
this side of the Rocky Mountains. We quote his own language as
follows: “All the lines of demarcation between the new unions
cannot be accurately drawn in advance, but many of them
approximately may. Thus, looking to natural boundaries and
commercial affinities, some of the following frontiers, after many
waverings and conflicts, might perhaps become acknowledged and
fixed;
“1. The Potomac River and the Chesapeake Bay to the Atlantic. 2.
From Maryland along the crest of the Alleghany (perhaps the Blue
Ridge) range of mountains to some point on the coast of Florida.
3. The line from, say the head of the Potomac to the West or
Northwest, which it will be most difficult to settle. 4. The crest
of the Rocky Mountains.”
“The Southeast Confederacy would, in all human probability, in
less than five years after the rupture, find itself bounded by the
first and second lines indicated above, the Atlantic and the Gulf
of Mexico, with its capital at, say Columbia, South Carolina. The
country between the second, third, and fourth of those lines
would, beyond a doubt, in about the same time, constitute another
Confederacy, with its capital at probably Alton or Quincy,
Illinois. The boundaries of the Pacific Union are the most
definite of all, and the remaining States would constitute the
Northeast Confederacy, with its capital at Albany. It, at the
first thought, will be considered strange that seven slave-holding
States and part of Virginia and Florida should be placed (above)
in a new Confederacy with Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, etc. But when
the overwhelming weight of the great Northwest is taken in
connection with the laws of trade, contiguity of territory, and
the comparative indifference to free soil doctrines on the part of
Western Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, it is evident
that but little if any coercion, beyond moral force, would be
needed to embrace them; and I have omitted the temptation of the
unwasted public lands which would fall entire to this
Confederacy—an appanage (well husbanded) sufficient for many
generations. As to Missouri, Arkansas, and Mississippi, they would
not stand out a month. Louisiana would coalesce without much
solicitation, and Alabama with West Florida would be conquered the
first winter, from the absolute need of Pensacola for a naval
depot.”
According to this arrangement of General Scott, all that would be
left for “the Northeast Confederacy” would be the New England and
Middle States; and our present proud Capitol at Washington,
hallowed by so many patriotic associations, would be removed to
Albany.[69]
Footnote 69:
It is worthy of special remark that General Scott, in his
autobiography recently published, vol. ii, p. 609, entirely
omits to copy this part of his views on which we have been
commenting; so also his supplementary views of the next day,
though together they constitute but one whole. He merely copies
that which relates to garrisoning the Southern forts.
It is easy to imagine with what power these “views,” presented so
early as October, 1860, may have been employed by the disunion
leaders of the cotton States to convince the people that they
might depart in peace. Proceeding from the Commanding General of
the army, a citizen and a soldier so eminent, and eschewing as
they did the idea of invading a seceded State, as well as favoring
the substitution of new Confederacies for the old Union, what
danger could they apprehend in the formation of a Southern
Confederacy?
This portion of the “views,” being purely political and
prospective, and having no connection with military operations,
was out of time and out of place in a report from the commanding
General of the Army to the Secretary of War. So, also, the
expression of his personal preferences among the candidates then
before the people for the office of President. “From a sense of
propriety as a soldier,” says the General, “I have taken no part
in the pending canvass, and, as always heretofore, mean to stay
away from the polls. My sympathies, however, are with the Bell and
Everett ticket.”
After all these preliminaries, we now proceed to a different side
of the picture presented by the General.
In the same “views” (the 29th October, 1860), he says that, “From
a knowledge of our Southern population, it is my solemn conviction
that there is some danger of an early act of rashness preliminary
to secession, viz., the seizure of some or all of the following
posts: Forts Jackson and St. Philip, in the Mississippi, below New
Orleans, both without garrisons; Fort Morgan, below Mobile,
without a garrison; Forts Pickens and McRea, Pensacola harbor,
with an insufficient garrison for one; Fort Pulaski, below
Savannah, without a garrison; Forts Moultrie and Sumter,
Charleston harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison, and
the latter without any; and Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, without a
sufficient garrison. In my opinion all these works should be
immediately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take any one
of them by surprise or _coup de main_ ridiculous.”
It was his duty, as commanding general, to accompany this
recommendation with a practicable plan for garrisoning these
forts, stating the number of troops necessary for the purpose, the
points from which they could be drawn, and the manner in which he
proposed to conduct the enterprise. Finding this to be impossible,
from the total inadequacy of the force within the President’s
power to accomplish a military operation so extensive, instead of
furnishing such a plan, he absolves himself from the task by
simply stating in his supplemental views of the next day (30th
October) that “There is one (regular) company at Boston, one here
(at the Narrows), one at Pittsburg, one at Augusta, Ga., and one
at Baton Rouge—in all five companies, only, within reach, to
garrison or reënforce the forts mentioned in the 'views.'”
_Five companies only, four hundred men, to garrison nine
fortifications scattered over six highly excited Southern States.
This was all the force “within reach” so as to make any attempt to
take any one of them by surprise or coup de main ridiculous._
He even disparages the strength of this small force by applying to
it the diminutive adverb “_only_,” or, in other words, merely,
barely. It will not be pretended that the President had any power,
under the laws, to add to this force by calling forth the militia,
or accepting the services of volunteers to garrison these
fortifications. And the small regular army were beyond reach on
our remote frontiers. Indeed, the whole American army, numbering
at that time not more than sixteen thousand effective men, would
have been scarcely sufficient. To have attempted to distribute
these five companies among the eight forts in the cotton States,
and Fortress Monroe, in Virginia, would have been a confession of
weakness, instead of an exhibition of imposing and overpowering
strength. It could have had no effect in preventing secession, but
must have done much to provoke it. It will be recollected that
these “views,” the substance of which soon reached the Southern
States, were written before Mr. Lincoln’s election, and at a time
when none of the cotton States had made the first movement toward
secession. Even South Carolina was then performing all her
relative duties, though most reluctantly, to the Government,
whilst the border States, with Virginia in the first rank, were
still faithful and true to the Union.
Under these circumstances, surely General Scott ought not to have
informed them in advance that the reason why he had recommended
this expedition was because, from his knowledge of them, he
apprehended they might be guilty of an early act of rashness in
seizing these forts before secession. This would necessarily
provoke the passions of the Southern people. Virginia was deeply
wounded at the imputation against her loyalty from a native though
long estranged son.
Whilst one portion of the “views,” as we have already seen, might
be employed by disunion demagogues in convincing the people of the
cotton States that they might secede without serious opposition
from the North, another portion of them was calculated to excite
their indignation and drive them to extremities. From the
impracticable nature of the “views,” and their strange and
inconsistent character, the President dismissed them from his mind
without further consideration.
It is proper to inform the reader why General Scott had five
companies only within reach for the proposed service. This was
because nearly the whole of our small army was on the remote
frontiers, where it had been continually employed for years in
protecting the inhabitants and the emigrants on their way to the
far west, against the attacks of hostile Indians. At no former
period had its services been more necessary than throughout the
year 1860, from the great number of these Indians continually
threatening or waging war on our distant settlements. To employ
the language of Mr. Benjamin Stanton, of Ohio, in his report of
the 18th February, 1861, from the military committee to the House
of Representatives: “The regular army numbers only 18,000 men,
when recruited to its maximum strength; and the whole of this
force is required upon an extended frontier, for the protection of
the border settlements against Indian depredations.” Indeed, the
whole of it had proved insufficient for this purpose. This is
established by the reports of General Scott himself to the War
Department. In these he urges the necessity of raising more
troops, in a striking and convincing light. In that of 20th
November, 1857,[70] after portraying the intolerable hardships and
sufferings of the army engaged in this service, he says: “To
mitigate these evils, and to enable us to give a reasonable
security to our people on Indian frontiers, measuring thousands of
miles, I respectfully suggest an augmentation of at least one
regiment of horse (dragoons, cavalry, or riflemen) and at least
three regiments of foot (infantry or riflemen). This augmentation
would not more than furnish the reinforcements now greatly needed
in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington
Territory, Kansas, Nebraska, and Minnesota, leaving not a company
for Utah.”
Footnote 70:
3 Senate Documents, 1857-'58, p. 48.
Again, General Scott, in his report of November 13, 1858,
says:[71] “This want of troops to give reasonable security to our
citizens in distant settlements, including emigrants on the
plains, can scarcely be too strongly stated; but I will only add,
that as often as we have been obliged to withdraw troops from one
frontier in order to reinforce another, the weakened points have
been instantly attacked or threatened with formidable invasion.”
Footnote 71:
Senate Executive Documents, 1858-'59, vol. ii., part 3, p. 761.
The President, feeling the force of such appeals, and urged by the
earnest entreaties of the suffering people on the frontiers,
recommended to Congress, through the War Department, to raise five
additional regiments.[72] This, like all other recommendations to
place the country in a proper state of defence, was disregarded.
From what has been stated it is manifest that it was impossible to
garrison the numerous forts of the United States with regular
troops. This will account for the destitute condition of the nine
forts enumerated by General Scott, as well as of all the rest.
Footnote 72:
Senate Documents, 1857-'58, vol. iii., p. 4.
When our system of fortifications was planned and carried into
execution, it was never contemplated to provide garrisons for them
in time of peace. This would have required a large standing army,
against which the American people have ever evinced a wise and
wholesome jealousy. Every great republic, from the days of Cæsar
to Cromwell, and from Cromwell to Bonaparte, has been destroyed by
armies composed of free citizens, who had been converted by
military discipline into veteran soldiers. Our fortifications,
therefore, when completed, were generally left in the custody of a
sergeant and a few soldiers. No fear was entertained that they
would ever be seized by the States for whose defence against a
foreign enemy they had been erected.
Under these circumstances it became the plain duty of the
President, destitute as he was of military force, not only to
refrain from any act which might provoke or encourage the cotton
States into secession, but to smooth the way for such a
Congressional compromise as had in times past happily averted
danger from the Union. There was good reason to hope this might
still be accomplished. The people of the slaveholding States must
have known there could be no danger of an actual invasion of their
constitutional rights over slave property from any hostile action
of Mr. Lincoln’s administration. For the protection of these, they
could rely both on the judicial and the legislative branches of
the Government. The Supreme Court had already decided the
Territorial question in their favor, and it was also ascertained
that there would be a majority in both Houses of the first
Congress of Mr. Lincoln’s term, sufficient to prevent any
legislation to their injury. Thus protected, it would be madness
for them to rush into secession.
Besides, they were often warned and must have known that by their
separation from the free States, these very rights over slave
property, of which they were so jealous, would be in greater
jeopardy than they had ever been under the Government of the
Union. Theirs would then be the only government in Christendom
which had not abolished, or was not in progress to abolish,
slavery. There would be a strong pressure from abroad against this
institution. To resist this effectually would require the power
and moral influence of the Government of the whole United States.
They ought, also, to have foreseen that, if their secession should
end in civil war, whatever might be the event, slavery would
receive a blow from which it could never recover. The true policy,
even in regard to the safety of their domestic institution, was to
cling to the Union.
CHAPTER XV.
1860—November.
ELECTION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN—THE SECESSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA—NATURE
OF THE DOCTRINE OF SECESSION—PRESIDENT BUCHANAN PREPARES TO
ENCOUNTER THE SECESSION MOVEMENT—DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAKING WAR
ON A STATE AND ENFORCING THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES.
On the 6th of November, 1860, one hundred and eighty Republican
electors of President were chosen by the people of eighteen of the
free states. This determined that Abraham Lincoln was to be
President of the United States for four years from the 4th of March,
1861. As soon as the result of the election was known, the
legislature of South Carolina passed a law for the assembling of a
convention of the people of the State on the 17th of December. The
delegates to the convention were promptly chosen; and when they had
been elected, it was manifest that the assumed right of secession
was about to be exercised by that one of the Southern States in
which attachment to the Union had been for more than thirty years
confined to a few of the wiser and more considerate of her people.
The great man whose political teachings had indoctrinated a
generation with views of the Federal Constitution which, when
logically carried out, would reduce it to a mere league between
independent States dissoluble at the pleasure of its separate
members for causes of which they were separately to judge, had
passed away. I have already had occasion to observe that, while Mr.
Calhoun did not at any time contemplate secession, and while he was
strongly attached to the Union as he understood its fundamental
principle, his political doctrines, assuming the correctness of his
premises, led logically and correctly to the conclusion that the
people of any State could absolve themselves from the obligation to
obey the laws, and to submit to the authority of the United States.
He and those who acted with him in South Carolina during the period
of “Nullification” proposed to apply this State dispensing power to
a single obnoxious law of the United States, without breaking the
whole bond which connected South Carolina with her sister States.
But it was the inevitable result of his political principles that,
if a State convention could absolve its people from the duty of
obeying one law of the United States, by pronouncing it to be
unconstitutional, the same authority could withdraw the State wholly
from the Union, upon her judgment that to remain in it longer was
incompatible with her safety or her interests. The radical vice of
this whole theory was that it assumed the cession of political
powers of legislation and government, made by the people of a State
when they ratified the Constitution of the United States, to be
revocable, not by a State power or right expressly contained in the
instrument, but by a right resulting from the assumed nature of the
Constitution as a compact between sovereign States. The Secession
Ordinance of South Carolina, adopted on the 20th of December, 1860,
which became the model of all the other similar ordinances, exhibits
in a striking manner the character of the theory. It professed to
“repeal” the ordinance of the State which in 1788 had ratified the
Constitution of the United States, and all the subsequent acts of
the legislature which had ratified the amendments of that
Constitution, and to dissolve the union then subsisting between
South Carolina and other States under the name of the “United States
of America.” In other words, the people of South Carolina, assembled
in convention, determined that a cession or grant of political
sovereignty, which they had made to the Government of the United
States in 1788, in an irrevocable form, and without any reservation
save of the powers of government which they did not grant, could yet
be revoked and annulled, not by the right of revolution, but by a
right resulting as a constitutional principle from a compact made
between sovereign and independent political communities. This method
of regarding the Government of the United States as the depositary
of certain powers to be held and exercised so long as the sovereign
parties to the agreement should see fit to allow them to remain, and
to be withdrawn whenever one of the parties should determine to
withdraw them, constituted the whole basis of the doctrine of
secession. If the premises were correct, the deduction was sound.
If, on the other hand, the cession of certain powers of political
sovereignty made by the people of a State when they ratified the
Constitution of the United States constituted a Government, with a
right to rule over the individual inhabitants of that State in the
exercise of the powers conceded, the individuals could no more
absolve themselves collectively, than they could separately, from
the political duty and obligation to obey the laws and submit to the
authority of that Government, especially when that Government
contained within itself, by one of the provisions of its
Constitution, both the means and the right of determining for the
people of every State, whether the laws enacted by Congress were in
conformity with the grants of political power embraced in the
instrument which created it. The grant of the judicial power of the
United States estopped the people of every State from claiming a
right to pass upon the constitutional validity of any exercise of
its legislative or executive authority. Such are the contrasted
theories of the Constitution which were now to come into collision,
after the Constitution had long been administered and acted upon as
an instrument of government embracing a true and rightful
sovereignty over the people of every State in the exercise of
certain enumerated powers.
It is important to observe, however, that this claim of rightful
sovereignty over the inhabitants of every State was not a denial of
the inherent right of revolution, or the right to renounce a
political allegiance, and to make that right available by physical
force, in case of intolerable oppression or arbitrary assumption of
power. The political institutions of this country had their origin
in the exercise of the right of revolution, and however shaped or
administered, they can never be made to exclude it. It is difficult,
in studying the political principles on which individuals or masses
of men acted, or on which they supposed themselves to be acting,
during the period at which I have now arrived, to discriminate
between the right of revolution and the right of secession, as
distinct principles governing their personal conduct. In many minds
they became blended; in many there was but little attention paid to
any such distinction; in many there was nothing more than a state of
excitement, worked into an uncontrollable apprehension of danger
which was stimulated by the political leaders of a section
peculiarly exposed to such apprehensions by what had long been
occurring on the dangerous subject of their social and domestic
condition. But on the threshold of the secession movement, there are
certain things to be carefully noted. The first is, that in the
public proceedings of South Carolina, and of the other States which
followed her example, it was the alleged constitutional right of
secession from the Union, and not the inherent right of revolution,
on which the action was professedly based. The second is, that the
State of South Carolina led the way, in the hope and belief that she
might compel the other cotton States to follow, while it was at
least doubtful whether they would do so, and while it was manifest
that their course would depend very much upon events that could not
be foreseen. This condition of affairs in the months of November and
December imposed upon President Buchanan two imperative duties. In
the first place, he had to encounter the alleged right of secession
asserted, or about to be asserted, by the State of South Carolina;
to meet her public proceedings by a denial of any such right, and to
exercise all the powers with which he then was, or with which he
might thereafter be, clothed by Congress, to prevent any obstruction
to the execution of the laws of the United States within her
borders. In the next place, he had, so far as the Executive of the
United States could so act, to isolate the State of South Carolina
from the other States of that region, and to prevent, if possible,
the spread of the secession movement. What he might be able to do in
this regard would depend, of course, upon future events, and upon a
careful adaptation of his means to his ends. If, notwithstanding all
he could do, the fury of secession was to rapidly sweep through the
cotton States, he could not prevent the formation of some kind of
Southern confederacy. But the very first duty which he had to
perform he proceeded promptly to execute, as soon as it was apparent
that South Carolina was about to adopt an ordinance of secession.
This was to encounter publicly and officially the alleged right of
secession, to define clearly and explicitly to Congress and to the
country the powers which he possessed, or did not possess, for
meeting this exigency; and to announce his policy. By so doing, he
might prevent the spread of the secession movement, if Congress
would aid him by adopting his recommendations. Preparatory to what
he was about to say in his annual message to the Congress which was
to assemble in the early part of December, he required from the
Attorney General (Mr. Black) an official answer to the following
questions:[73]
1. In case of a conflict between the authorities of any State and
those of the United States, can there be any doubt that the laws
of the Federal Government, if constitutionally passed, are
supreme?
2. What is the extent of my official power to collect the duties
on imports at a port where the revenue laws are resisted by a
force which drives the collector from the custom house?
3. What right have I to defend the public property (for instance,
a fort, arsenal and navy yard), in case it should be assaulted?
4. What are the legal means at my disposal for executing those
laws of the United States which are usually administered through
the courts and their officers?
5. Can a military force be used for any purpose whatever under the
Acts of 1795 and 1807, within the limits of a State where there
are no judges, marshal or other civil officers?
Footnote 73:
The President’s letter to the Attorney General, requiring his
opinion on these questions, bears date on the 17th of November,
1860.
[OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.]
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, November 20, 1860.
SIR:—
I have had the honor to receive your note of the 17th, and I now
reply to the grave questions therein propounded as fully as the
time allowed me will permit.
Within their respective spheres of action, the Federal Government
and the government of a State, are both of them independent and
supreme, but each is utterly powerless beyond the limits assigned
to it by the Constitution. If Congress would attempt to change the
law of descents, to make a new rule of personal succession, or to
dissolve the family relations existing in any State, the act would
be simply void; but not more void than would be a State law to
prevent the recapture of fugitives from labor, to forbid the
carrying of the mails, or to stop the collection of duties on
imports. The will of a State, whether expressed in its
constitution or laws, cannot, while it remains in the Confederacy,
absolve her people from the duty of obeying the just and
constitutional requirements of the Central Government. Nor can any
act of the Central Government displace the jurisdiction of a
State; because the laws of the United States are supreme and
binding only so far as they are passed _in pursuance of the
Constitution_. I do not say what might be effected by mere
revolutionary force. I am speaking of legal and constitutional
right.
This is the view always taken by the judiciary, and so universally
adopted that the statement of it may seem commonplace. The Supreme
Court of the United States has declared it in many cases. I need
only refer you to the _United States vs. Booth_, where the present
Chief Justice, expressing the unanimous opinion of himself and all
his brethren, enunciated the doctrine in terms so clear and full
that any further demonstration of it can scarcely be required.
The duty which these principles devolve, not only upon every
officer, but every citizen, is that which Mr. Jefferson expressed
so compendiously in his first inaugural, namely:—“to support the
State Governments in all their rights as the most competent
administrations for their domestic concerns, and the surest
bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies,” combined with “the
preservation of the General Government in its whole constitutional
vigor as the sheet anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad.”
To the Chief Executive Magistrate of the Union is confided the
solemn duty of seeing the laws faithfully executed. That he may be
able to meet this duty with a power equal to its performance, he
nominates his own subordinates, and removes them at his pleasure.
For the same reason, the land and naval forces are under his
orders as their commander-in-chief. But his power is to be used
only in the manner prescribed by the legislative department. He
cannot accomplish a legal purpose by illegal means, or break the
laws himself to prevent them from being violated by others.
The acts of Congress sometimes give the President a broad
discretion in the use of the means by which they are to be
executed, and sometimes limit his power so that he can exercise it
only in a certain prescribed manner. Where the law directs a thing
to be done without saying how, that implies the power to use such
means as may be necessary and proper to accomplish the end of the
legislature. But where the mode of performing a duty is pointed
out by statute, that is the exclusive mode, and no other can be
followed. The United States have no common law to fall back upon
when the written law is defective. If, therefore, an act of
Congress declares that a certain thing shall be done by a
particular officer, it cannot be done by a different officer. The
agency which the law furnishes for its own execution must be used
to the exclusion of all others. For instance, the revenues of the
United States are to be collected in a certain way, at certain
established ports, and by a certain class of officers; the
President has no authority, under any circumstances, to collect
the same revenues at other places by a different sort of officers,
or in ways not provided for. Even if the machinery furnished by
Congress for the collection of the duties should by any cause
become so deranged or broken up that it could not be used, that
would not be a legal reason for substituting a different kind of
machinery in its place.
The law requires that all goods imported into the United States
within certain collection districts shall be entered at the proper
port, and the duty thereon shall be received by the collector
appointed for and residing at that port. But the functions of the
collector may be exercised anywhere at or within the port. There
is no law which confines him to the custom-house, or to any other
particular spot. If the custom-house were burnt down, he might
remove to another building; if he were driven from the shore, he
might go on board a vessel in the harbor. If he keeps within the
port, he is within the law.
A port is a place to which merchandise is imported, and from
whence it is exported. It is created by law. It is not merely a
harbor or haven, for it may be established where there is nothing
but an open roadstead, or on the shore of a navigable river, or at
any other place where vessels may arrive and discharge, or take in
their cargoes. It comprehends the city or town which is occupied
by the mariners, merchants, and others who are engaged in the
business of importing and exporting goods, navigating the ships
and furnishing them with provisions. It includes, also, so much of
the water adjacent to the city as is usually occupied by vessels
discharging or receiving their cargoes or lying at anchor and
waiting for that purpose.
The first section of the act of March 2, 1833, authorized the
President in a certain contingency to direct that the custom-house
for any collection district be established and kept in any secure
place within some port or harbor of such district, either upon
land or on board any vessel. But this provision was temporary, and
expired at the end of the session of Congress next afterwards. It
conferred upon the Executive a right to remove the site of a
custom-house not merely to any secure place within the legally
established port of entry for the district—that right he had
before—but it widened his authority so as to allow the removal of
it to any port or harbor within the whole district. The enactment
of that law, and the limitation of it to a certain period of time
now passed, is not, therefore, an argument against the opinion
above expressed, that you can now, if necessary, order the duties
to be collected on board a vessel inside of any established port
of entry. Whether the first and fifth sections of the act of 1833,
both of which were made temporary by the eighth section, should be
reënacted, is a question for the legislative department.
Your right to take such measures as may seem to be necessary for
the protection of the public property is very clear. It results
from the proprietary rights of the Government as owner of the
forts, arsenals, magazines, dock-yards, navy-yards, custom-houses,
public ships, and other property which the United States have
bought, built, and paid for. Besides, the Government of the United
States is authorized by the Constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 8) to
“exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever ..... over
all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the
State in which the same shall be for the erection of forts,
magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.” It
is believed that no important public building has been bought or
erected on ground where the legislature of the State in which it
is, has not passed a law consenting to the purchase of it, and
ceding the exclusive jurisdiction. This Government, then, is not
only the owner of those buildings and grounds, but, by virtue of
the supreme and paramount law, it regulates the action and
punishes the offences of all who are within them. If any one of an
owner’s rights is plainer than another it is that of keeping
exclusive possession and repelling intrusion. The right of
defending the public property includes also the right of recapture
after it has been unlawfully taken by another. President Jefferson
held the opinion, and acted upon it, that he could order a
military force to take possession of any land to which the United
States had title, though they had never occupied it before, though
a private party claimed and held it, and though it was not then
needed nor proposed to be used for any purpose connected with the
operations of the Government. This may have been a stretch of
Executive power, but the right of retaking public property in
which the Government has been carrying on its lawful business, and
from which its officers have been unlawfully thrust out, cannot
well be doubted, and when it was exercised at Harper’s Ferry, in
October, 1859, everyone acknowledged the legal justice of it.
I come now to the point in your letter, which is probably of the
greatest practical importance. By the act of 1807, you may employ
such parts of the land and naval forces as you may judge necessary
for the purpose of causing the laws to be duly executed, in all
cases where it is lawful to use the militia for the same purpose.
By the act of 1795 the militia may be called forth “whenever the
laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution
thereof obstructed in any State by combinations too powerful to be
suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by
the power vested in the marshals.” This imposes upon the President
the sole responsibility of deciding whether the exigency has
arisen which requires the use of military force; and in proportion
to the magnitude of that responsibility will be his care not to
overstep the limits of his legal and just authority.
The laws referred to in the act of 1795 are manifestly those which
are administered by the judges, and executed by the ministerial
officers of the courts for the punishment of crime against the
United States, for the protection of rights claimed under the
Federal Constitution and laws, and for the enforcement of such
obligations as come within the cognizance of the Federal
Judiciary. To compel obedience to these laws, the courts have
authority to punish all who obstruct their regular administration,
and the marshals and their deputies have the same powers as
sheriffs and their deputies in the several States in executing the
laws of the States. These are the ordinary means provided for the
execution of the laws; and the whole spirit of our system is
opposed to the employment of any other except in cases of extreme
necessity arising out of great and unusual combinations against
them. Their agency must continue to be used until their incapacity
to cope with the power opposed to them shall be plainly
demonstrated. It is only upon clear evidence to that effect that a
military force can be called into the field. Even then its
operations must be purely defensive. It can suppress only such
combinations as are found directly opposing the laws and
obstructing the execution thereof. It can do no more than what
might and ought to be done by a civil posse, if a civil posse
could be raised large enough to meet the same opposition. On such
occasions, especially, the military power must be kept in strict
subordination to the civil authority, since it is only in aid of
the latter that the former can act at all.
But what if the feeling in any State against the United States
should become so universal that the Federal officers themselves
(including judges, district attorneys and marshals) would be
reached by the same influences, and resign their places? Of
course, the first step would be to appoint others in their stead,
if others could be got to serve. But in such an event, it is more
than probable that great difficulty would be found in filling the
offices. We can easily conceive how it might become altogether
impossible. We are therefore obliged to consider what can be done
in case we have no courts to issue judicial process, and no
ministerial officers to execute it. In that event, troops would
certainly be out of place, and their use wholly illegal. If they
are sent to aid the courts and marshals, there must be courts and
marshals to be aided. Without the exercise of those functions
which belong exclusively to the civil service, the laws cannot be
executed in any event, no matter what may be the physical strength
which the Government has at its command. Under such circumstances,
to send a military force into any State, with orders to act
against the people, would be simply making war upon them.
The existing laws put and keep the Federal Government strictly on
the defensive. You can use force only to repel an assault on the
public property and aid the courts in the performance of their
duty. If the means given you to collect the revenue and execute
the other laws be insufficient for that purpose, Congress may
extend and make them more effectual to those ends.
If one of the States should declare her independence, your action
cannot depend upon the rightfulness of the cause upon which such
declaration is based. Whether the retirement of the State from the
Union be the exercise of a right reserved in the Constitution, or
a revolutionary movement, it is certain that you have not in
either case the authority to recognize her independence or to
absolve her from her Federal obligations. Congress, or the other
States in convention assembled, must take such measures as may be
necessary and proper. In such an event, I see no course for you
but to go straight onward in the path you have hitherto
trodden—that is, execute the laws to the extent of the defensive
means placed in your hands, and act generally upon the assumption
that the present constitutional relations between the States and
the Federal Government continue to exist, until a new code of
things shall be established either by law or force.
Whether Congress has the constitutional right to make war against
one or more States, and require the Executive of the Federal
Government to carry it on by means of force to be drawn from the
other States, is a question for Congress itself to consider. It
must be admitted that no such power is expressly given; nor are
there any words in the Constitution which imply it. Among the
powers enumerated in Article 1st, Section 8, is that “to declare
war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules
concerning captures on land and water.” This certainly means
nothing more than the power to commence and carry on hostilities
against the foreign enemies of the nation. Another clause in the
same section gives Congress the power “to provide for calling
forth the militia,” and to use them within the limits of the
State. But this power is so restricted by the words which
immediately follow that it can be exercised only for one of the
following purposes: 1. To execute the laws of the Union; that is,
to aid the Federal officers in the performance of their regular
duties. 2. To suppress insurrections against the State; but this
is confined by Article IV, Section 4, to cases in which the State
herself shall apply for assistance against her own people. 3. To
repel the invasion of a State by enemies who come from abroad to
assail her in her own territory. All these provisions are made to
protect the States, not to authorize an attack by one part of the
country upon another; to preserve the peace, and not to plunge
them into civil war. Our forefathers do not seem to have thought
that war was calculated “to form a more perfect Union, establish
justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” There was undoubtedly a
strong and universal conviction among the men who framed and
ratified the Constitution, that military force would not only be
useless, but pernicious, as a means of holding the States
together.
If it be true that war cannot be declared, nor a system of
general hostilities carried on by the Central Government against
a State, then it seems to follow that an attempt to do so would
be _ipso facto_ an expulsion of such State from the Union. Being
treated as an alien and an enemy, she would be compelled to act
accordingly. And if Congress shall break up the present Union by
unconstitutionally putting strife and enmity and armed hostility
between different sections of the country, instead of the
domestic tranquility which the Constitution was meant to insure,
will not all the States be absolved from their Federal
obligations? Is any portion of the people bound to contribute
their money or their blood to carry on a contest like that?
The right of the General Government to preserve itself in its
whole constitutional vigor by repelling a direct and positive
aggression upon its property or its officers cannot be denied. But
this is a totally different thing from an offensive war to punish
the people for the political misdeeds of their State government,
or to enforce an acknowledgment that the Government of the United
States is supreme. The States are colleagues of one another, and
if some of them shall conquer the rest, and hold them as
subjugated provinces, it would totally destroy the whole theory
upon which they are now connected.
If this view of the subject be correct, as I think it is, then the
Union must utterly perish at the moment when Congress shall arm
one part of the people against another for any purpose beyond that
of merely protecting the General Government in the exercise of its
proper constitutional functions.
I am, very respectfully, yours, etc.,
J. S. BLACK.
The soundness of Mr. Black’s answers to the questions stated by the
President does not admit of a doubt. Those who have assailed him and
the President who acted upon his official advice, have done so with
very little regard to the supreme law of the land. They have not
perceived the path in which the President had to move in the coming
emergency, and they have overlooked the imperative obligation which
rested upon him not to assume powers with which he had not been
clothed by the Constitution and the laws. However certain it was
that South Carolina would undertake to place herself out of the pale
of the Union, no coercion could have been applied to her in her
political capacity as a State, to prevent her from taking that step,
without instantly bringing to her side every other State whose
sympathies were with her on the subject of slavery, however they
might hesitate in regard to secession as a remedy against the
apprehensions which were common, more or less, the people of the
whole slaveholding section. Even if the President had not been
restrained by this consideration, he had no constitutional power to
declare, no authority to prosecute, and no right to institute a war
against a State. He could do nothing but to execute the laws of the
United States within the limits of South Carolina, in case she
should secede, by such means as the existing laws had placed in his
hands, or such further means as the Congress which was about to
assemble might see fit to give him, and to maintain the possession
of the public property of the United States within the limits of
that State. What the existing means were, for either of those
purposes, was clearly pointed out by his official adviser, the
Attorney General. For the execution of the laws, these means might
wholly fail him, if the Federal civil officers in South Carolina
should renounce their offices and others could not be procured to
take their places. For maintaining possession of the public property
of the United States, he had to act wholly upon the defensive, and
at the same time he had no power to call for volunteers for this
purpose, and no military force within his reach but the five
companies of regular troops referred to by General Scott in his
“views” presented on the 30th of October, and the naval forces at
his command. No part of the army could be withdrawn from the
frontiers without leaving the settlers and the emigrants exposed to
the ravages of the Indians, even if the gravest reasons of public
policy had not forbidden such movements before Congress could take
into consideration the whole of the unprecedented and abnormal state
of the Union.
There is one part of Mr. Black’s opinion on which it is proper to
make some observations here, because it has a prospective bearing
upon the basis on which the civil war is to be considered to have
been subsequently prosecuted. It is not of much moment to inquire
how individual statesmen, or publicists, or political parties, when
the war had begun and was raging, regarded its legal basis; but it
is of moment, in reference to the correctness of the doctrine acted
upon by President Buchanan during the last four months of his
administration, to consider what was the true basis of that
subsequent war under the Constitution of the United States. The
reader has seen that Mr. Black, in his official opinion, not only
rejected the idea that the President could constitutionally make war
upon a State of his own volition, but that he did not admit that the
power to do so was expressly or implicitly given to Congress by the
Constitution. What then did the Attorney General mean by instituting
or carrying on war against one or more States? It is obvious, first,
that he meant offensive war, waged against a State as if it were a
foreign nation, to be carried on to the usual results of conquest
and subjugation; second, that he fully admitted and maintained the
right of the Federal Government to use a military force to suppress
all obstructions to the execution of the laws of the United States
throughout the Union, and to maintain the possession of its public
property. This distinction was from the first, and always remained,
of the utmost importance. It became entirely consistent with the
recognition, for the time being, of a condition of territorial civil
war, carried on by the lawful Government of the Union to suppress
any and all military organizations arrayed against the exercise of
its lawful authority; consistent with the concession of the
belligerent character to the Confederate government as a _de facto_
power having under its control the resources and the territory of
numerous States; consistent also with the denial to that government
of any character as a power _de jure_; and alike consistent with a
purpose to suppress and destroy it. So far as the war subsequently
waged was carried on upon this basis, it was carried on within the
limits of the Constitution, and by the strictest constitutional
right. So far as it was carried on upon any other basis, or made to
result in anything more than the suppression of all unlawful
obstructions to the exercise of the Federal authority throughout the
Union, it was a war waged outside of the Constitution, and for
objects that were not within the range of the powers bestowed by the
Constitution on the Federal Government. In a word, the Federal
Government had ample power under the Constitution to suppress and
destroy the Confederate government and all its military array, from
whatever sources that government or its military means were derived,
but it had no constitutional authority to destroy a State, or to
make war upon its unarmed population, as it would have under the
principles of public law to destroy the political autonomy of a
foreign nation with which it might be at war, or to promote
hostilities against its people.
Doubtless, as will be seen hereafter when I come to speak of that
part of the President’s message which related to this topic of
making war upon a State, the language made use of was capable of
misconstruction, and certain it is that it was made the subject of
abundant cavil, by those who did not wish that the President should
be rightly understood; as it was also made a subject of criticism by
the Attorney General when the message was submitted to the cabinet.
The language chosen by the President to express his opinion on the
nature and kind of power which he believed that the Constitution had
not delegated to Congress, described it as a “power to coerce a
State into submission which is attempting to withdraw, or has
actually withdrawn from the Confederacy.” This was in substance a
description of the same power which the framers of the Constitution
had expressly rejected. It was before the Convention of 1787 in the
shape of a clause “authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole
against a delinquent State,” which Mr. Madison opposed as “the use
of force against a State,” and which he said would look more like a
declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would
probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all
previous compacts by which it might be bound. On another occasion,
Mr. Madison said that “any government for the United States, formed
on the supposed practicability of using force against the
unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary
and fallacious as the government of the [old] Congress.” When,
therefore, after the rejection of the idea of using force to
restrain a State from adopting an unconstitutional proceeding, the
framers of the Constitution proceeded to create a government endowed
with legislative, judicial and executive power over the individual
inhabitants of a State, and authorized it to use the militia to
execute the laws of the Union, they made and left upon our
constitutional history and jurisprudence a clear distinction between
coercing a State, in its sovereign and political character, to
remain in the Union, and coercing individuals to obey the laws of
the Union. Mr. Buchanan might then reasonably assume, that a
distinction thus clearly graven upon the constitutional records of
the country would be known and recognized by all men; and although
the expression to “coerce a State by force of arms to remain in the
Union,” might, if severed from the accompanying explanation of its
meaning, be regarded as ambiguous, it will be found hereafter that
it was not so used as to justify the inference that if a State were
to undertake to secede from the Union, the President would disclaim
or surrender the power to execute the laws of the Union within her
borders. It will be found also, by adverting to the Attorney
General’s answers to the President’s questions, that there was in
truth no real difference of opinion between them on this
subject.[74]
Footnote 74:
Mr. Jefferson Davis, who represents, with as much logical
consistency as any one, the whole of the doctrine or theory of
secession, has always maintained that the distinction between
coercing a State, and coercing the individual inhabitants of that
State to submit to the laws of the United States, is no
distinction at all: that the people of the State are the State;
and that to use a military force to execute the laws of the United
States upon individuals, within the limits of a State that has
seceded from the Union, is to make war upon the State. (See his
speech in the Senate, January 10, 1861, and his recent work on the
_Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government_. Index, _verb._
“Secession.”) Let us, for a moment, inquire whether Buchanan’s
distinction was answered “by reason of its very absurdity.” 1. The
States, in their corporate and political capacity, are not the
subjects or objects of Federal legislation. The legislative powers
of the Federal Constitution are not intended to be exercised over
States, but they are intended to be exercised over individuals. An
act of Congress never commands a State to do anything; it commands
private individuals to do a great many things. The States are
prohibited by the Constitution from doing certain things, but
these prohibitions execute themselves through the action of the
judicial power upon persons. No State can be acted upon by the
judicial power at the instance of the United States. Every
inhabitant of a State can be acted upon by the judicial power, in
regard to anything that is within the scope of the legislative
powers of the Constitution. 2. The coercion of individuals to
obey the laws of the United States constitutes the great
difference between our present Constitution and the Articles of
Confederation. 3. The right to use force to execute the laws of
the United States, by removing all obstructions to their
execution, not only results from the power to legislate on the
particular subject, but it is expressly recognized by the
Constitution. The character of that force and the modes in which
it may be employed, depend both on direct constitutional
provision, and on the legislative authority over all the people of
the United States in respect to certain subjects and relations.
All this will be conceded to be true, so long as a State remains
in the Union. Does it cease to be true, when a State interposes
her sovereign will, and says that the laws of the United States
shall not be executed within her limits, because she has withdrawn
the powers which she deposited with the General Government? What
does this make, but a new case of obstruction to the execution of
the Federal laws, to be removed by acting on the individuals
through whom the obstruction is practically tried? And if, in the
removal of the obstruction, the use of military power becomes
necessary, is war made upon the State? It is not, unless we go the
whole length of saying that the interposition of the sovereign
will of the State _ipso facto_ makes her an independent power,
erects her into a foreign nation, and makes her capable of being
dealt with as one enemy is dealt with by another. To deny the
right of the United States to execute its laws, notwithstanding
what is called the secession of a State, is to impale one’s self
upon the other horn of the dilemma: for if that right does not
exist, it must be because the State has become absolutely free and
independent of the United States, and may be made a party to an
international war. Mr. Buchanan saw and constantly and
consistently acted upon the true distinction between making war
upon a State, and enforcing the laws of the United States upon the
inhabitants of a State.
CHAPTER XVI.
1860—December.
THE PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 3, 1860.
The Constitution makes it the duty of the President, from time to
time, to give to the Congress information of the state of the Union,
and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient. Custom has made the commencement of
each session of Congress a regular occasion for the discharge of
this duty, and has also established the propriety of performing it
at other times, whenever the President deems it necessary. It was
the purpose of this provision of the Constitution to make the
President a special guardian of the interests of the Union, by
making him the official witness of its condition to the legislative
department, and by giving to his recommendation of measures a high
claim upon its consideration. The performance of this duty involves
a wide range of observation over the whole condition of the country
at a given time, and it imposes upon Congress the correlative duty
of giving serious heed and prompt attention to any recommendations
which the President may make. No other functionary in the Government
is in a position to know so well as the President what the interests
of the Union from time to time demand at the hands of Congress, and
no other is clothed with this power of making official and therefore
weighty recommendations of measures requiring legislative action. No
state of parties, no objects of party policy, can excuse the
individual members of a Congress from the duty of giving immediate
attention to whatever suggestions the President may make in the
exercise of this great function as the constitutional adviser of the
legislature, and as guardian of the interests of the Union. At the
same time, it is to be remembered that this function is only an
advisory one; that it in no way enlarges the powers of the
Executive; and that the President can at no time exercise any powers
but those with which he has been clothed by the Constitution or by
the laws which have been passed in pursuance of its provisions.
Never was there an occasion when it was more necessary that this
duty should be performed by the President firmly, intelligibly,
boldly, conscientiously, than it was in the crisis existing at the
commencement of the session of Congress in December, 1860. Never was
it more imperatively necessary that Congress should at once take
into its “consideration” the measures recommended by the President.
The force of that term, as it is used in the Constitution, is not
limited to a mere reference of the President’s recommendations to
committees. It implies action, prompt and decisive action, one way
or the other, in proportion to the gravity of that condition of the
Union which the President has brought to the attention of the
Legislature. The President is entitled to know, and to know
speedily, whether the Congress concurs with or differs from him. The
country is entitled to know whether its Chief Magistrate is to be
clothed with the further powers for which he may have asked in order
to meet a given emergency; whether the Congress accepts, or refuses
to accept, his construction of the Constitution in regard to new and
difficult questions that have arisen; and whether, if the Congress
does not concur with the President, it has any other policy to
propose and carry out, adequate to the dangers that may be impending
over the Union. An examination of the course of President Buchanan
in the crisis to which we have now arrived conducts to the inquiry
whether he performed his duty, as he should have done, and whether
the Congress performed theirs according to the obligation that
rested upon them.
The “state of the Union,” of which the President had to give
Congress official information, was entirely unprecedented. That it
was alarming, cannot be doubted. It matters little whether the
people of the North felt much alarm. Popular opinion, so far as it
was not manifested by the depression of business and of the public
funds, did not reflect the gravity of the crisis. It was not
generally believed that an election of a President, conducted in a
regular and orderly manner, although it had resulted in the triumph
of a party obnoxious to the feelings of the Southern people, because
of its supposed hostility to them, would be or could be made the
occasion for a permanent disruption of the Union. And this was about
the only aspect in which the popular mind of the North regarded the
whole matter for a considerable period after the election. It was
not generally perceived that an entirely new question had arisen,
which made a peril of a new and formidable nature. The alleged
constitutional right of a State to withdraw itself from the Union,
on its own judgment that its interests or safety were no longer
compatible with its continuing as a member of it, although it had
long been theoretically discussed in many ways by individuals of
more or less importance, was now about to be asserted and acted upon
by the people of South Carolina. How was this crisis to be met? That
it was entirely out of all previous experience, that it was a
situation full of peril, that it entailed the consideration of
questions of Federal power never yet solved, because they had never
before arisen, was plain. That the President of the United States,
the official sentinel on the great watch-tower of the Union,
regarded its condition as one of imminent danger, was enough for the
Congress to know. That popular opinion in the North did not fully
comprehend the danger affords no excuse for any omission of duty,
any lack of wisdom or forethought, any failure to act promptly or
patriotically, which history may find reason to impute to those who
held the legislative power.
Mr. Buchanan, as the reader has seen, so soon as he had reason to
believe that South Carolina was about to put in practice its alleged
right of withdrawing from the Union, proceeded to take the opinion
of his official adviser in regard to his constitutional powers and
duties in such an emergency. Individually, he needed no man’s advice
upon such questions, for he was as able and well instructed a
constitutional jurist as any one who had ever filled the office of
President of the United States; familiar with all the teachings and
all the precedents of his predecessors, and abundantly learned in
the doctrines of the great judicial expounders of the Constitution.
But in his official capacity it was both proper and necessary that
he should call to his aid the sound judgment and the copious
learning of his Attorney General, before proceeding to discharge his
constitutional duty of giving to Congress information of the state
of the Union. He began to prepare his annual message immediately
after he had received the Attorney General’s answers to his
questions. The message was read to the cabinet before it was printed
in the usual form for communication to Congress. The members of the
cabinet, including General Cass, the Secretary of State, and with
the exceptions of Mr. Cobb, Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr.
Thompson, Secretary of the Interior, warmly and emphatically
approved of it.[75] Messrs. Cobb and Thompson objected to so much of
the message as denied the right of secession, and to that part of it
which maintained the duty of defending the public property and
collecting the revenue in South Carolina. These questions having now
become vital, the two dissenting members of the cabinet, soon after
the message had been sent to Congress, resigned their places.[76]
Footnote 75:
Judge Black made a criticism, which will be adverted to hereafter.
Footnote 76:
Their resignations will be noted hereafter, as well as that of
General Cass, concerning whom see the President’s memorandum,
_post_.
Let it be remembered, then, that this message was prepared to be
submitted to Congress before the South Carolina Convention had
adopted its ordinance of secession. Surely, therefore, there can be
no just ground for imputing to the President any lack of preparation
to meet the threatened contingency of a secession of one or more
States, according to the measure of his official duty and powers. In
examining this message, of which I shall speak in conformity with my
most serious convictions, the reader should note that it had to be
prospective in its recommendations, in order that Congress might be
fully possessed of the methods of action which the President
intended to propose as the legitimate, as well as the expedient,
course to be pursued. But this was not the whole of the
constitutional duty that rested upon the Executive. He had, in
discharging his duty of giving to Congress information of the state
of the Union, to treat so far of the causes which had brought about
that condition as to point out measures of conciliation, as well as
measures for the exercise of authority. He had to recognize the
palpable fact that the two sections of the Union, the slaveholding
and the non-slaveholding States, stood divided from each other upon
a question which involved more of feeling than of practical
consequence; a feeling that had been aggravated on each side into an
undue importance by the circumstances of the late election. This
question related to the claim of Southern slaveholders to have their
right of property in slaves recognized in Territories of the United
States, whenever they should go there with such property. It was a
claim which the most considerate of those who asserted it most
strongly regarded as essential to the equality of their States as
members of the Union, in reference to the right of occupation of the
common property of all the States. It was based, to be sure, by many
who asserted it, upon a questionable proposition, which was that the
right of property in a slave, recognized by the local law of a
State, travelled with the person of the owner into a Territory of
the United States, without any law of the Territory to uphold it,
and even against a prohibition imposed by the legislative authority
which governed the Territory. But when has it been known in the
history of conflicting popular feelings, that the nature of such a
claim has diminished the fervor with which it has been defended,
when it has come to be regarded as a great political right, of
importance to those who assert it? Practically, it was not a matter
of importance to the slaveholding States, because there was no
Territory of the United States at that time in which slave labor
could become profitable, or in which the negro, in a state of
slavery, could thrive. But an exaggerated feeling of the political
importance of this supposed right had taken possession of the
Southern mind. On the other hand, there had come about in the North
an equally exaggerated sense of the importance of asserting in every
possible form of public action, that the Territories were dedicated
to freedom from slavery, and were to be so regarded forever. It was
chiefly upon this, as a fundamental principle of the future
legislation of the Union, that the Republican candidate had been
elected by the votes of the people of the free States.
Under these circumstances, no President of the United States, in
discharging his constitutional duty of giving to Congress
information of the state of the Union, could have avoided a
reference to this condition of conflicting sectional feelings and
determinations, especially at a moment when one of the Southern
States was about to act upon the assumption that the election of the
Northern candidate evinced a hostile disposition in the North
towards the people and the social institutions of the South, too
dangerous to be disregarded. If, by fairly holding the balance
between the two sections, President Buchanan could suggest any
course of conciliation and compromise that could be adopted without
impairing the authority of the Federal Government or weakening its
rights, it was his duty to point it out. The adoption of such a
course by Congress would certainly smooth the way for President
Lincoln, because it would leave South Carolina alone in her attitude
of secession, would tend with great force to prevent any of the
other cotton States from following her example, and would render a
civil war extremely improbable, because it would remove one great
cause for the spread of secession beyond the borders of that State.
When the recommendation of the message is examined with
impartiality, it will be found that it proposed an explanatory
amendment of the Constitution which was entirely reasonable, and
which would have terminated the existing dissensions, so far as they
depended upon this particular question.
But those dissensions had other causes, which it was equally the
duty of the President to bring before Congress and the country. For
a long period of time, the anti-slavery agitation in the North, not
confined to the question of slavery in the Territories, had awakened
apprehensions in the South for their domestic peace and safety. It
was undoubtedly but reasonable to expect the Southern people to rely
on the conservative force of Northern public opinion, to guard
against interference with slavery in the States by any form of
public action through the General Government, by whatever party it
might be administered. But who could insure them against the
consequences of such lawless acts as John Brown’s “raid” into
Virginia, undertaken in 1859, with the avowed purpose of producing a
slave insurrection? This occurrence, which was only a little more
than a twelvemonth old when Mr. Buchanan prepared his annual message
of December 3, 1860, had produced a sadder impression on the
Southern people against the Union than any previous event had ever
caused.[77] This painful impression was deepened by the popular
honors paid in the North to this man’s memory as a martyr in the
cause of liberty, for whom the prayers of churches were offered, and
who, after he had died the death of a felon, was canonized as a
saint, mouldering in the body in the grave, but in spirit marching
on to the accomplishment of his mission of liberator of the slaves.
Such fanaticism might well be regarded with serious alarm by a
people who dwelt surrounded in every relation of life by a slave
population of another race, in many communities outnumbering the
Whites. Yet this was not all that tended to alienate the people of
the South from the Union. A provision of the Constitution which was
adopted by its framers as a fundamental condition of the new Union
that it aimed to establish, for the execution of which legislation
had been provided in 1793,—legislation which bore the name of
Washington himself, and which had been amended and strengthened in
1850 by a solemn Congressional agreement,—had been for seven years
resisted by combinations of individuals in the North, and by State
laws of obstruction that had no less of nullification as their
spirit and purpose than the nullifying ordinance of South Carolina,
by which she formerly undertook to obstruct another law of the
Union. It was impossible for the Southern People not to place this
resistance to the extradition of fugitive slaves among their
grievances. It was a real grievance, and one that, considering the
nature of the Constitutional mandate and stipulation, it was right
that they should complain of.
Footnote 77:
John Brown’s seizure of the armory, arsenal, and rifle factory of
the United States at Harper’s Ferry occurred October 16, 1859.
Was the President of the United States, standing at the threshold of
the secession movement, measuring as he was bound to do with a
comprehensive grasp the condition of the Union, to be silent
respecting these things? Was he, if he spoke to the South, warning
her that the election of Abraham Lincoln was no cause for her
attempting to leave the Union, and expounding to her the utter
futility of the doctrine of secession as a constitutional right—was
he to say nothing to the North of the duty which rested upon her to
remove all just causes of complaint, and thus to render secession
inexcusable to the Southern people themselves? A supreme ruler,
placed as Mr. Buchanan was at the period I am now considering, had a
complex duty to perform. It was to prevent, if he could, the
formation of any sort of Southern Confederacy among the cotton
States, and thereby to relieve his successor from the necessity of
having to encounter more than the secession of South Carolina. She
could be dealt with easily, standing alone, if Congress would clothe
the President with the necessary power to enforce the laws of the
Union within her limits. Backed by a new confederacy of her
contiguous sisters, containing five millions of people, and
controlling the whole cotton production of the country, the problem
for the new President would indeed be a formidable one. To prevent
this, certain measures of conciliation were deemed by President
Buchanan, in as honest and as wise a judgment as any statesman ever
formed, to be essential. When the reader has examined his
recommendations of constitutional amendments, along with the
practical measures for which he applied, and which Congress did not
adopt, he will have to ask himself, if Congress had done its duty as
the President performed his, is it within the bounds of probability
that Mr. Lincoln would have been embarrassed with the question about
the forts in Charleston harbor, or that the Montgomery government
would have ever existed, or that South Carolina, unaided and
undirected by that new confederacy, would ever have fired on Sumter?
As the internal affairs of the country claimed the first attention
of the President, and occupied a very large part of his message, I
quote the whole of what it said on this very grave topic:
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:—
Throughout the year since our last meeting, the country has been
eminently prosperous in all its material interests. The general
health has been excellent, our harvests have been abundant, and
plenty smiles throughout the land. Our commerce and manufactures
have been prosecuted with energy and industry, and have yielded
fair and ample returns. In short, no nation in the tide of time
has ever presented a spectacle of greater material prosperity than
we have done, until within a very recent period.
Why is it, then, that discontent now so extensively prevails, and
the union of the States, which is the source of all these
blessings, is threatened with destruction?
The long continued and intemperate interference of the Northern
people with the question of slavery in the Southern States has at
length produced its natural effects. The different sections of the
Union are now arrayed against each other, and the time has
arrived, so much dreaded by the Father of his Country, when
hostile geographical parties have been formed.
I have long foreseen, and often forewarned my countrymen of the
now impending danger. This does not proceed solely from the claim
on the part of Congress or the Territorial legislatures to exclude
slavery from the Territories, nor from the efforts of different
States to defeat the execution of the fugitive slave law. All or
any of these evils might have been endured by the South, without
danger to the Union (as others have been), in the hope that time
and reflection might apply the remedy. The immediate peril arises,
not so much from these causes, as from the fact that the incessant
and violent agitation of the slavery question throughout the North
for the last quarter of a century has at length produced its
malign influence on the slaves, and inspired them with vague
notions of freedom. Hence a sense of security no longer exists
around the family altar. This feeling of peace at home has given
place to apprehensions of servile insurrections. Many a matron
throughout the South retires at night in dread of what may befall
herself and her children before the morning. Should this
apprehension of domestic danger, whether real or imaginary, extend
and intensify itself, until it shall pervade the masses of the
Southern people, then disunion will become inevitable.
Self-preservation is the first law of nature, and has been
implanted in the heart of man by his Creator for the wisest
purpose; and no political union, however fraught with blessings
and benefits in all other respects, can long continue, if the
necessary consequence be to render the homes and the fire-sides of
nearly half the parties to it habitually and hopelessly insecure.
Sooner or later the bonds of such a Union must be severed. It is
my conviction that this fatal period has not yet arrived: and my
prayer to God is, that he would preserve the Constitution and the
Union throughout all generations.
But let us take warning in time, and remove the cause of danger.
It cannot be denied that for five and twenty years the agitation
at the North against slavery has been incessant. In 1835,
pictorial handbills and inflammatory appeals were circulated
extensively throughout the South, of a character to excite the
passions of the slaves, and, in the language of General Jackson,
“to stimulate them to insurrection and produce all the horrors of
a servile war.” This agitation has ever since been continued by
the public press, by the proceedings of State and county
conventions, and by abolition sermons and lectures. The time of
Congress has been occupied in violent speeches on this never
ending subject; and appeals, in pamphlet and other forms, indorsed
by distinguished names, have been sent forth from this central
point and spread broadcast over the Union.
How easy would it be for the American people to settle the slavery
question forever, and to restore peace and harmony to this
distracted country! They, and they alone, can do it. All that is
necessary to accomplish the object, and all for which the slave
States have ever contended, is to be let alone and permitted to
manage their domestic institutions in their own way. As sovereign
States, they, and they alone, are responsible before God and the
world for the slavery existing among them. For this the people of
the North are not more responsible, and have no more right to
interfere, than with similar institutions in Russia or in Brazil.
Upon their good sense and patriotic forbearance, I confess, I
still greatly rely. Without their aid it is beyond the power of
any President, no matter what may be his own political
proclivities, to restore peace and harmony among the States.
Wisely limited and restrained as is his power under our
Constitution and laws, he alone can accomplish but little for good
or for evil on such a momentous question.
And this brings me to observe, that the election of any one of our
fellow-citizens to the office of President does not of itself
afford just cause for dissolving the Union. This is more
especially true if his election has been effected by a mere
plurality and not a majority of the people, and has resulted from
transient and temporary causes, which may probably never again
occur. In order to justify a resort to revolutionary resistance,
the Federal Government must be guilty of “a deliberate; palpable,
and dangerous exercise” of powers not granted by the Constitution.
The late Presidential election, however, has been held in strict
conformity with its express provisions. How, then, can the result
justify a revolution to destroy this very Constitution? Reason,
justice, a regard for the Constitution, all require that we shall
wait for some overt and dangerous act on the part of the President
elect, before resorting to such a remedy. It is said, however,
that the antecedents of the President elect have been sufficient
to justify the fears of the South that he will attempt to invade
their constitutional rights. But are such apprehensions of
contingent danger in the future sufficient to justify the
immediate destruction of the noblest system of government ever
devised by mortals? From the very nature of his office, and its
high responsibilities, he must necessarily be conservative. The
stern duty of administering the vast and complicated concerns of
this Government affords in itself a guarantee that he will not
attempt any violation of a clear constitutional right.
After all, he is no more than the Chief Executive officer of the
Government. His province is not to make but to execute the laws;
and it is a remarkable fact in our history that, notwithstanding
the repeated efforts of the anti-slavery party, no single act has
ever passed Congress, unless we may possibly except the Missouri
Compromise, impairing in the slightest degree the rights of the
South to their property in slaves. And it may also be observed,
judging from present indications, that no probability exists of
the passage of such an act by a majority of both Houses, either in
the present or the next Congress. Surely, under these
circumstances, we ought to be restrained from present action by
the precept of Him who spake as man never spoke, that “sufficient
unto the day is the evil thereof.” The day of evil may never come
unless we shall rashly bring it upon ourselves.
It is alleged as one cause for immediate secession, that the
Southern States are denied equal rights with the other States in
the common Territories. But by what authority are these denied?
Not by Congress, which has never passed, and I believe never will
pass, any act to exclude slavery from these Territories. And
certainly not by the Supreme Court, which has solemnly decided
that slaves are property, and like all other property their owners
have a right to take them into the common Territories and hold
them there under the protection of the Constitution.
So far, then, as Congress is concerned, the objection is not to
anything they have already done, but to what they may do
hereafter. It will surely be admitted that this apprehension of
future danger is no good reason for an immediate dissolution of
the Union. It is true that the Territorial legislature of Kansas,
on the 23d February, 1860, passed in great haste an act over the
veto of the Governor, declaring that slavery “is and shall be
forever prohibited in this Territory.” Such an act, however,
plainly violating the rights of property secured by the
Constitution, will surely be declared void by the judiciary,
whenever it shall be presented in a legal form.
Only three days after my inauguration, the Supreme Court of the
United States solemnly adjudged that this power did not exist in a
Territorial legislature. Yet such has been the factious temper of
the times that the correctness of this decision has been
extensively impugned before the people, and the question has given
rise to angry political conflicts throughout the country. Those
who have appealed from this judgment of our highest constitutional
tribunal to popular assemblies, would, if they could, invest a
Territorial legislature with power to annul the sacred rights of
property. This power Congress is expressly forbidden by the
Federal Constitution to exercise. Every State legislature in the
Union is forbidden by its own constitution to exercise it. It
cannot be exercised in any State except by the people in their
highest sovereign capacity when framing or amending their State
constitution. In like manner it can only be exercised by the
people of a Territory, represented in a convention of delegates,
for the purpose of framing a constitution preparatory to admission
as a State into the Union. Then, and not until then, are they
invested with power to decide the question whether slavery shall
or shall not exist within their limits. This is an act of
sovereign authority and not of subordinate Territorial
legislation. Were it otherwise, then indeed would the equality of
the States in the Territories be destroyed and the rights of
property in slaves would depend not upon the guarantees of the
Constitution, but upon the shifting majorities of an irresponsible
Territorial legislature. Such a doctrine, from its intrinsic
unsoundness, cannot long influence any considerable portion of our
people, much less can it afford a good reason for a dissolution of
our Union.
The most palpable violations of constitutional duty which have yet
been committed consist in the acts of different State legislatures
to defeat the execution of the fugitive slave law. It ought to be
remembered, however, that for these acts neither Congress nor any
President can justly be held responsible. Having been passed in
violation of the Federal Constitution, they are therefore null and
void. All the courts, both State and national, before whom the
question has arisen, have, from the beginning, declared the
fugitive slave law to be constitutional. The single exception is
that of a State court in Wisconsin; and this has not only been
reversed by the proper appellate tribunal, but has met with such
universal reprobation, that there can be no danger from it as a
precedent. The validity of this law has been established over and
over again by the Supreme Court of the United States with
unanimity. It is founded upon an express provision of the
Constitution, requiring that fugitive slaves who escape from
service in one State to another shall be “delivered up” to their
masters. Without this provision, it is a well known historical
fact that the Constitution itself could never have been adopted by
the convention. In one form or other, under the acts of 1793 and
1850, both being substantially the same, the fugitive slave law
has been the law of the land from the days of Washington until the
present moment. Here, then, a clear case is presented, in which it
will be the duty of the next President, as it has been my own, to
act with vigor in executing this supreme law against the
conflicting enactments of State legislatures. Should he fail in
the performance of this high duty, he will then have manifested a
disregard of the Constitution and laws, to the great injury of the
people of nearly one-half of the States of the Union. But are we
to presume in advance that he will thus violate his duty? This
would be at war with every principle of justice and of Christian
charity. Let us wait for the overt act. The fugitive slave law has
been carried into execution in every contested case since the
commencement of the present administration; though often, it is to
be regretted, with great loss and inconvenience to the master, and
with considerable expense to the Government. Let us trust that the
State legislatures will repeal their unconstitutional and
obnoxious enactments. Unless this shall be done without
unnecessary delay, it is impossible for any human power to save
the Union.
The Southern States, standing on the basis of the Constitution,
have a right to demand this act of justice from the States of the
North. Should it be refused, then the Constitution, to which all
the States are parties, will have been wilfully violated by one
portion of them in a provision essential to the domestic security
and happiness of the remainder. In that event, the injured States,
after having first used all peaceful and constitutional means to
obtain redress, would be justified in revolutionary resistance to
the Government of the Union.
I have purposely confined my remarks to revolutionary resistance,
because it has been claimed within the last few years that any
State, whenever this shall be its sovereign will and pleasure, may
secede from the Union in accordance with the Constitution, and
without any violation of the constitutional rights of the other
members of the Confederacy. That as each became parties to the
Union by the vote of its own people assembled in convention, so
any one of them may retire from the Union in a similar manner by
the vote of such a convention.
In order to justify secession as a constitutional remedy, it must
be on the principle that the Federal Government is a mere
voluntary association of States, to be dissolved at pleasure by
any one of the contracting parties. If this be so, the Confederacy
is a rope of sand, to be penetrated and dissolved by the first
adverse wave of public opinion in any of the States. In this
manner our thirty-three States may resolve themselves into as many
petty, jarring, and hostile republics, each one retiring from the
Union without responsibility whenever any sudden excitement might
impel them to such a course. By this process a Union might be
entirely broken into fragments in a few weeks, which cost our
forefathers many years of toil, privation, and blood to establish.
Such a principle is wholly inconsistent with the history as well
as the character of the Federal Constitution. After it was framed,
with the greatest deliberation and care, it was submitted to
conventions of the people of the several States for ratification.
Its provisions were discussed at length in these bodies, composed
of the first men of the country. Its opponents contended that it
conferred powers upon the Federal Government dangerous to the
rights of the States, whilst its advocates maintained that, under
a fair construction of the instrument, there was no foundation for
such apprehensions. In that mighty struggle between the first
intellects of this or any other country, it never occurred to any
individual, either among its opponents or advocates, to assert or
even to intimate that their efforts were all vain labor, because
the moment that any State felt herself aggrieved she might secede
from the Union. What a crushing argument would this have proved
against those who dreaded that the rights of the States would be
endangered by the Constitution. The truth is, that it was not
until many years after the origin of the Federal Government that
such a proposition was first advanced. It was then met and refuted
by the conclusive arguments of General Jackson, who, in his
message of the 16th January, 1833, transmitting the nullifying
ordinance of South Carolina to Congress, employs the following
language: “The right of the people of a single State to absolve
themselves at will, and without the consent of the other States,
from their most solemn obligations, and hazard the liberty and
happiness of the millions composing this Union, cannot be
acknowledged. Such authority is believed to be utterly repugnant
both to the principles upon which the General Government is
constituted, and to the objects which it was expressly formed to
attain.”
It is not pretended that any clause in the Constitution gives
countenance to such a theory. It is altogether founded upon
inference, not from any language contained in the instrument
itself, but from the sovereign character of the several States by
which it was ratified. But is it beyond the power of a State, like
an individual, to yield a portion of its sovereign rights to
secure the remainder? In the language of Mr. Madison, who has been
called the father of the Constitution, “It was formed by the
States—that is, by the people in each of the States acting in
their highest sovereign capacity, and formed, consequently, by the
same authority which formed the State constitutions. Nor is the
Government of the United States, created by the Constitution, less
a government, in the strict sense of the term, within the sphere
of its powers, than the governments created by the constitutions
of the States are within their several spheres. It is, like them,
organized into legislative, executive, and judiciary departments.
It operates, like them, directly on persons and things; and, like
them, it has at command a physical force for executing the powers
committed to it.”
It was intended to be perpetual, and not to be annulled at the
pleasure of any one of the contracting parties. The old articles
of confederation were entitled “Articles of confederation and
perpetual union between the States;” and by the thirteenth article
it is expressly declared that “the articles of this confederation
shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the union shall
be perpetual.” The preamble to the Constitution of the United
States, having express reference to the articles of confederation,
recites that it was established “in order to form a more perfect
union.” And yet it is contended that this “more perfect union”
does not include the essential attribute of perpetuity.
But that the Union was designed to be perpetual, appears
conclusively from the nature and extent of the powers conferred by
the Constitution on the Federal Government. These powers embrace
the very highest attributes of national sovereignty. They place
both the sword and the purse under its control. Congress has power
to make war and to make peace; to raise and support armies and
navies, and to conclude treaties with foreign governments. It is
invested with the power to coin money, and to regulate the value
thereof, and to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several States. It is not necessary to enumerate the other
high powers which have been conferred upon the Federal Government.
In order to carry the enumerated powers into effect, Congress
possesses the exclusive right to lay and collect duties on
imports, and, in common with the States, to lay and collect all
other taxes.
But the Constitution has not only conferred these high powers upon
Congress, but it has adopted effectual means to restrain the
States from interfering with their exercise. For that purpose it
has in strong prohibitory language expressly declared that “no
State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation;
grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of
credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment
of debts; pass any bill of attainder, _ex post facto_ law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts.” Moreover, “without the
consent of Congress no State shall lay any imposts or duties on
any imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection laws,” and if they exceed this
amount, the excess shall belong to the United States. And “no
State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of
tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into
any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign
power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”
In order still further to secure the uninterrupted exercise of
these high powers against State interposition, it is provided
“that this Constitution and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which
shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
The solemn sanction of religion has been superadded to the
obligations of official duty, and all Senators and Representatives
of the United States, all members of State legislatures, and all
executive and judicial officers, “both of the United States and of
the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to
support this Constitution.”
In order to carry into effect these powers, the Constitution has
established a perfect Government in all its forms, legislative,
executive, and judicial; and this Government to the extent of its
powers acts directly upon the individual citizens of every State,
and executes its own decrees by the agency of its own officers. In
this respect it differs entirely from the government under the old
confederation, which was confined to making requisitions on the
States in their sovereign character. This left in the discretion
of each whether to obey or to refuse, and they often declined to
comply with such requisitions. It thus became necessary for the
purpose of removing this barrier, and, “in order to form a more
perfect union,” to establish a Government which could act directly
upon the people and execute its own laws without the intermediate
agency of the States. This has been accomplished by the
Constitution of the United States. In short, the Government
created by the Constitution, and deriving its authority from the
sovereign people of each of the several States, has precisely the
same right to exercise its power over the people of all these
States in the enumerated cases, that each one of them possesses
over subjects not delegated to the United States, but “reserved to
the States respectively or to the people.”
To the extent of the delegated powers the Constitution of the
United States is as much a part of the constitution of each State,
and is as binding upon its people, as though it had been textually
inserted therein.
This Government, therefore, is a great and powerful government,
invested with all the attributes of sovereignty over the special
subjects to which its authority extends. Its framers never
intended to implant in its bosom the seeds of its own destruction,
nor were they at its creation guilty of the absurdity of providing
for its own dissolution. It was not intended by its framers to be
the baseless fabric of a vision, which, at the touch of the
enchanter, would vanish into thin air, but a substantial and
mighty fabric, capable of resisting the slow decay of time, and of
defying the storms of ages. Indeed, well may the jealous patriots
of that day have indulged fears that a government of such high
powers might violate the reserved rights of the States, and wisely
did they adopt the rule of a strict construction of these powers
to prevent the danger. But they did not fear, nor had they any
reason to imagine that the Constitution would ever be so
interpreted as to enable any State by her own act, and without the
consent of her sister States, to discharge her people from all or
any of the federal obligations.
It may be asked, then, are the people of the States without
redress against the tyranny and oppression of the Federal
Government? By no means. The right of resistance on the part of
the governed against the oppression of their governments cannot be
denied. It exists independently of all constitutions, and has been
exercised at all periods of the world’s history. Under it, old
governments have been destroyed and new ones have taken their
place. It is embodied in strong and express language in our own
Declaration of Independence. But the distinction must ever be
observed that this is revolution against an established
government, and not a voluntary secession from it by virtue of an
inherent constitutional right. In short, let us look the danger
fairly in the face; secession is neither more nor less than
revolution. It may or it may not be a justifiable revolution; but
still it is revolution.
What, in the meantime, is the responsibility and true position of
the Executive? He is bound by solemn oath, before God and the
country, “to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and
from this obligation he cannot be absolved by any human power. But
what if the performance of this duty, in whole or in part, has
been rendered impracticable by events over which he could have
exercised no control? Such, at the present moment, is the case
throughout the State of South Carolina, so far as the laws of the
United States to secure the administration of justice by means of
the federal judiciary are concerned. All the federal officers
within its limits, through whose agency alone these laws can be
carried into execution, have already resigned. We no longer have a
district judge, a district attorney, or a marshal in South
Carolina. In fact, the whole machinery of the Federal Government
necessary for the distribution of remedial justice among the
people has been demolished, and it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to replace it.
The only acts of Congress on the statute book, bearing upon this
subject, are those of the 28th February, 1795, and 3d March, 1807.
These authorize the President, after he shall have ascertained
that the marshal, with his posse comitatus, is unable to execute
civil or criminal process in any particular case, to call forth
the militia and employ the army and navy to aid him in performing
this service, having first by proclamation commanded the
insurgents “to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective
abodes within a limited time.” This duty cannot by possibility be
performed in a State where no judicial authority exists to issue
process, and where there is no marshal to execute it, and where,
even if there were such an officer, the entire population would
constitute one solid combination to resist him.
The bare enumeration of these provisions proves how inadequate
they are, without further legislation, to overcome a united
opposition in a single State, not to speak of other States who may
place themselves in a similar attitude. Congress alone has power
to decide whether the present laws can or cannot be amended so as
to carry out more effectually the objects of the Constitution.
The same insuperable obstacles do not lie in the way of executing
the laws for the collection of the customs. The revenue still
continues to be collected, as heretofore, at the custom-house in
Charleston, and should the collector unfortunately resign, a
successor may be appointed to perform this duty.
Then, in regard to the property of the United States in South
Carolina. This has been purchased, for a fair equivalent, “by the
consent of the legislature of the State,” “for the erection of
forts, magazines, arsenals,” etc., and over these the authority
“to exercise exclusive legislation,” has been expressly granted by
the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt
will be made to expel the United States from this property by
force; but if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer
in command of the forts has received orders to act strictly on the
defensive. In such a contingency the responsibility for
consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the
assailants.
Apart from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be
practicable, the Executive has no authority to decide what shall
be the relations between the Federal Government and South
Carolina. He has been invested with no such discretion. He
possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing
between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that
State. This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the
power of recognizing the dissolution of the Confederacy among our
thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no resemblance to the
recognition of a foreign _de facto_ government, involving no such
responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on his part, be a
naked act of usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to
Congress the whole question in all its bearings. The course of
events is so rapidly hastening forward that the emergency may soon
arise when you may be called upon to decide the momentous question
whether you possess the power, by force of arms, to compel a State
to remain in the Union. I should feel myself recreant to my duty
were I not to express an opinion on this important subject.
The question fairly stated is: Has the Constitution delegated to
Congress the power to coerce a State into submission which is
attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn, from the
Confederacy? If answered in the affirmative, it must be on the
principle that the power has been conferred upon Congress to
declare and to make war against a State. After much serious
reflection, I have arrived at the conclusion that no such power
has been delegated to Congress or to any other department of the
Federal Government. It is manifest, upon an inspection of the
Constitution, that this is not among the specific and enumerated
powers granted to Congress; and it is equally apparent that its
exercise is not “necessary and proper for carrying into execution”
any one of these powers. So far from this power having been
delegated to Congress, it was expressly refused by the convention
which framed the Constitution.
It appears from the proceedings of that body that on the 31st May,
1787, the clause “_authorizing an exertion of the force of the
whole against a delinquent State_,” came up for consideration. Mr.
Madison opposed it in a brief but powerful speech, from which I
shall extract but a single sentence. He observed: “The use of
force against a State would look more like a declaration of war
than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered
by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by
which it might be bound.” Upon his motion the clause was
unanimously postponed, and was never, I believe, again presented.
Soon afterwards, on the 8th June, 1787, when incidentally
adverting to the subject, he said: “Any government for the United
States, formed on the supposed practicability of using force
against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would
prove as visionary and fallacious as the Government of Congress,”
evidently meaning the then existing Congress of the old
Confederation.
Without descending to particulars, it may be safely asserted that
the power to make war against a State is at variance with the
whole spirit and intent of the Constitution. Suppose such a war
should result in the conquest of a State, how are we to govern it
afterwards? Shall we hold it as a province and govern it by
despotic power? In the nature of things we could not, by physical
force, control the will of the people and compel them to elect
Senators and Representatives to Congress, and to perform all the
other duties depending upon their own volition, and required from
the free citizens of a free State as a constituent member of the
Confederacy.
But, if we possessed this power, would it be wise to exercise it
under existing circumstances? The object would doubtless be to
preserve the Union. War would not only present the most effectual
means of destroying it, but would banish all hope of its peaceful
reconstruction. Besides, in the fraternal conflict a vast amount
of blood and treasure would be expended, rendering future
reconciliation between the States impossible. In the meantime, who
can foretell what would be the sufferings and privations of the
people during its existence?
The fact is, that our Union rests upon public opinion, and can
never be cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war.
If it cannot live in the affections of the people, it must one day
perish. Congress possesses many means of preserving it by
conciliation; but the sword was not placed in their hand to
preserve it by force.
But may I be permitted solemnly to invoke my countrymen to pause
and deliberate, before they determine to destroy this, the
grandest temple which has ever been dedicated to human freedom
since the world began. It has been consecrated by the blood of our
fathers, by the glories of the past, and by the hopes of the
future. The Union has already made us the most prosperous, and ere
long will, if preserved, render us the most powerful nation on the
face of the earth. In every foreign region of the globe the title
of American citizen is held in the highest respect, and when
pronounced in a foreign land it causes the hearts of our
countrymen to swell with honest pride. Surely, when we reach the
brink of the yawning abyss, we shall recoil with horror from the
last fatal plunge.
By such a dread catastrophe, the hopes of the friends of freedom
throughout the world would be destroyed, and a long night of
leaden despotism would enshroud the nations. Our example for more
than eighty years would not only be lost, but it would be quoted
as conclusive proof that man is unfit for self-government.
It is not every wrong—nay, it is not every grievous wrong—which
can justify a resort to such a fearful alternative. This ought to
be the last desperate remedy of a despairing people, after every
other constitutional means of conciliation had been exhausted. We
should reflect that, under this free Government, there is an
incessant ebb and flow in public opinion. The slavery question,
like everything human, will have its day. I firmly believe that it
has reached and passed the culminating point. But if, in the midst
of the existing excitement, the Union shall perish, the evil may
then become irreparable.
Congress can contribute much to avert it, by proposing and
recommending to the legislatures of the several States the remedy
for existing evils which the Constitution has itself provided for
its own preservation. This has been tried at different critical
periods of our history, and always with eminent success. It is to
be found in the fifth article, providing for its own amendment.
Under this article, amendments have been proposed by two-thirds of
both Houses of Congress, and have been “ratified by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the several States,” and have
consequently become parts of the Constitution. To this process the
country is indebted for the clause prohibiting Congress from
passing any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or of the right
of petition. To this we are, also, indebted for the Bill of
Rights, which secures the people against any abuse of power by the
Federal Government. Such were the apprehensions justly entertained
by the friends of State rights at that period as to have rendered
it extremely doubtful whether the Constitution could have long
survived without those amendments.
Again, the Constitution was amended by the same process, after the
election of President Jefferson by the House of Representatives,
in February, 1803. This amendment was rendered necessary to
prevent a recurrence of the dangers which had seriously threatened
the existence of the Government during the pendency of that
election. The article for its own amendment was intended to secure
the amicable adjustment of conflicting constitutional questions
like the present, which might arise between the governments of the
States and that of the United States. This appears from
contemporaneous history. In this connection, I shall merely call
attention to a few sentences in Mr. Madison’s justly celebrated
report, in 1799, to the legislature of Virginia. In this, he ably
and conclusively defended the resolutions of the preceding
legislature, against the strictures of several other State
legislatures. These were mainly founded upon the protest of the
Virginia legislature against the “alien and sedition acts,” as
“palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution.” In
pointing out the peaceful and constitutional remedies—and he
referred to none other—to which the States were authorized to
resort on such occasions, he concludes by saying, “that the
legislatures of the States might have made a direct representation
to Congress, with a view to obtain a rescinding of the two
offensive acts, or they might have represented to their respective
Senators in Congress, their wish that two-thirds thereof would
propose an explanatory amendment to the Constitution, or
two-thirds of themselves, if such had been their option, might by
an application to Congress, have obtained a convention for the
same object.” This is the very course which I earnestly recommend,
in order to obtain an “explanatory amendment” of the Constitution
on the subject of slavery. This might originate with Congress or
the State legislatures, as may be deemed most advisable to attain
the object.
The explanatory amendment might be confined to the final
settlement of the true construction of the Constitution on three
special points:
1. An express recognition of the right of property in slaves in
the States where it now exists or may hereafter exist.
2. The duty of protecting this right in all the common Territories
throughout their Territorial existence, and until they shall be
admitted as States into the Union, with or without slavery, as
their constitutions may prescribe.
3. A like recognition of the right of the master to have his
slave, who has escaped from one State to another, restored and
“delivered up” to him, and of the validity of the fugitive slave
law enacted for this purpose, together with a declaration that all
State laws impairing or defeating this right, are violations of
the Constitution, and are consequently null and void. It may be
objected that this construction of the Constitution has already
been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States, and what
more ought to be required? The answer is, that a very large
proportion of the people of the United States still contest the
correctness of this decision, and never will cease from agitation,
and admit its binding force, until clearly established by the
people of the several States in their sovereign character. Such an
explanatory amendment would, it is believed, forever terminate the
existing dissensions, and restore peace and harmony among the
States.
It ought not to be doubted that such an appeal to the arbitrament
established by the Constitution itself would be received with
favor by all the States of the Confederacy. In any event, it ought
to be tried in a spirit of conciliation before any of these States
shall separate themselves from the Union.
When I entered upon the duties of the Presidential office, the
aspect neither of our foreign nor domestic affairs was at all
satisfactory. We were involved in dangerous complications with
several nations, and two of our Territories were in a state of
revolution against the Government. A restoration of the African
slave trade had numerous and powerful advocates. Unlawful military
expeditions were countenanced by many of our citizens, and were
suffered, in defiance of the efforts of the Government, to escape
from our shores for the purpose of making war upon the unoffending
people of neighboring republics with whom we were at peace. In
addition to these and other difficulties, we experienced a
revulsion in monetary affairs, soon after my advent to power, of
unexampled severity, and of ruinous consequences to all the great
interests of the country. When we take a retrospect of what was
then our condition, and contrast this with its material prosperity
at the time of the late Presidential election, we have abundant
reason to return our grateful thanks to that merciful Providence
which has never forsaken us as a nation in all our past trials.
With respect to the supposed right of secession as a deduction from
the nature of the Union, as established by the Constitution—a theory
on which the secessionists from the first desired the whole issue to
be based, with all its resulting consequences—I shall close this
chapter with the remark that, after a long familiarity with our
constitutional literature, I know of no document which, within the
same compass, states so clearly and accurately what I regard as the
true theory of our Constitution, as this message of President
Buchanan. Had I the power to change it, I would not alter a word.
The President, after stating a case which might justify revolution
under this as under all other governments, after all peaceful and
constitutional means to obtain redress had been exhausted, proceeded
to discuss the supposed constitutional right of secession, with the
power of a statesman and the precision of a jurist.[78]
Footnote 78:
Mr. Buchanan, in constructing this great argument, doubtless had
very important sources from which to draw his reasoning, in Mr.
Webster’s replies to Mr. Hayne and Mr. Calhoun, in General
Jackson’s great proclamation and message in the time of
nullification, in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the writings of Hamilton, Madison and others of the
early expounders of the Constitution. But who can justly deny to
him the merit of concentrating his materials into a powerful
statement, of that theory of our Constitution on which the
rightfulness of the late civil war must rest in history, or be
left without any justification but the power of numbers and the
principle that might makes right!
Among all the reproaches that have been cast upon President
Buchanan, none has been more persistently repeated than that which
has imputed to him a “temporizing policy;” and the doctrine on which
he denied that the Federal Government could make aggressive war upon
a State for the purpose of preventing her from seceding from the
Union, has been represented as the strongest proof of his want of
the vigor necessary for the emergency. Little are the objectors
aware that the policy of Mr. Lincoln’s administration, until after
the attack on Fort Sumter, was identical with that of Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. Lincoln’s policy was largely shaped by his Secretary of State,
Mr. Seward; and there can be no better authority than Mr. Seward’s
for proof of that policy.[79]
Footnote 79:
The following extracts are taken from an official letter addressed
by Mr. Seward, as Secretary of State, to Mr. C. F. Adams, who had
just gone abroad as United States Minister to England. The letter
bears date April 10th, 1861. “You will hardly be asked by
responsible statesmen abroad, why has not the new administration
already suppressed the revolution. Thirty-five days are a short
period in which to repress, chiefly by moral means, a movement
which is so active whilst disclosing itself throughout an
empire...... He (President Lincoln) believes that the citizens of
those States, as well as the citizens of the other States, are too
intelligent, considerate, and wise to follow the leaders to that
destructive end (anarchy). For these reasons, he would not be
disposed to reject a cardinal dogma of theirs, namely, that the
Federal Government could not reduce the seceding States to
obedience by conquest, even although he were disposed to question
that proposition. But, in fact, the President willingly accepts it
as true. Only an imperial and despotic government could subjugate
thoroughly disaffected and insurrectionary members of the state.
This federal, republican country of ours is of all forms of
government the very one which is most unfitted for such a labor.
Happily, however, this is only an imaginary defect. The system has
within itself adequate, peaceful, conservative and recuperative
forces. Firmness on the part of the Government in maintaining and
preserving the public institutions and property, and in executing
the laws where authority can be exercised without waging war,
combined with such measures of justice, moderation and forbearance
as will disarm reasoning opposition, will be sufficient to secure
the public safety, until returning reflection, concurring with the
fearful experience of social evils, the inevitable fruits of
faction, shall bring the recusant members cheerfully into the
family, which, after all, must prove their best and happiest, as
it undeniably is their most natural home.” He then goes on to show
that the calling of a national convention, by authority of
Congress, will remove all real obstacles to a re-union, by
revising the Constitution, and he adds: “Keeping that remedy
steadily in view, the President on the one hand will not suffer
the Federal authority to fall into abeyance, nor will he on the
other hand aggravate existing evils by attempts at coercion which
must assume the form of direct war against any of the
revolutionary States.” It is impossible for human ingenuity to
draw a sensible distinction between the policy of President
Lincoln, as laid down by Mr. Seward just before the attack on Fort
Sumter, and the policy adopted and steadily pursued by President
Buchanan; and it is to be hoped that the world will hereafter hear
no more reproaches of President Buchanan, because he denied the
authority of the Federal Government to make aggressive war upon a
State to compel it to remain in the Union, or because he proposed
conciliatory measures looking to an amendment of the Constitution.
CHAPTER XVII.
1860—December.
RECEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE IN THE CABINET, IN CONGRESS,
AND IN THE COUNTRY—THE FIRM ATTITUDE AND WISE POLICY OF MR.
BUCHANAN.
Reference has already been made to what took place when this annual
message was read to the cabinet, before it was transmitted to
Congress. Recent revelations made by Judge Black in the public
prints disclose the nature of an objection made by him to the
expression “to coerce a State into submission, which is attempting
to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn, from the Confederacy.” His
criticism did not apply to the legal proposition of the message, in
which he entirely concurred; but his apprehension was that the
expression would be read superficially, and be misunderstood. The
President did not think so, nor did the other members of the
cabinet. It is only necessary for me to repeat that the message
clearly and unequivocally pointed out that the coercive power of the
Federal Government was necessarily confined and must be applied to
the execution upon individuals of the laws of the United States; and
that it explicitly stated, with proper references to the proceedings
of the framers of the Constitution, that a power to coerce a State
by force of arms was expressly rejected by them, since it would, if
applied, be equivalent to a declaration of war against the State by
the Government of the Union. But the apprehension felt by the
learned Attorney General was caused, I presume, by his anxiety
concerning the reception of the message in the South and among the
secessionists. It was their misconstruction that he feared. He could
not well have supposed that Northern statesmen, grounded at least in
the fundamental principles of the Constitution usually accepted at
the North, and with the clear distinction put before them in the
message between coercing a State and coercing individuals, would
impute to the President an intention to renounce the right to use
force in the execution of the laws and the protection of the public
property of the Union. In point of fact, as the sequel will show,
nearly the whole Republican party, after the message became public,
without any rational excuse for such a misconstruction, saw fit to
treat the message as a denial by the President of any power to
enforce the laws against the citizens of a State after secession,
and even after actual rebellion. If this was what the Attorney
General anticipated, it would seem that the President, having taken
great care to make clear the distinction, was not bound to suppose
that a merely partisan spirit of misrepresentation would be applied
to such a document as this message, to the extent of utterly
perverting its meaning. On the other hand, the disunionists did not
misunderstand or misconstrue the message. They saw clearly that it
not only denounced secession, but that while it enunciated the
doctrine that the Federal Government could not apply force to
prevent a State from adopting an ordinance of secession, it could
and must use force, if need be, to execute its laws, notwithstanding
the secession. This was a doctrine opposed _toto cælo_, and in all
its branches, to the secessionist’s theory of the Constitution. It
met them upon their own ground, for it utterly denied that a State
ordinance of secession could absolve its people from obeying the
laws of the United States. Accordingly they denounced the message;
and upon their theory of the Constitution they denounced it rightly.
All friendly intercourse between the leading disunionists in
Congress and the President ceased after the message became public;
and from the multitude of private letters which reached the
President from the South, now lying before me, it is apparent that
throughout that section he was regarded, alike by the enemies and
the friends of the Union, as having made the issue on which the
secessionists desired to have the whole controversy turn. They were
just as ready to accept the issue of a constitutional power in the
Federal Government to enforce its laws after secession, as they were
to accept the issue of coercing a State to remain in the Union.
As soon as the message was published, “thick as autumnal leaves that
strew the brooks in Vallambrosa,” private letters of approbation
were showered upon the President from all quarters of the North. The
most diverse reasons for praising his policy marked this
heterogeneous correspondence. The Democrat, who was afraid to have a
civil war begin under a Democratic administration, predicted that it
would destroy his party forever. The pious “abolitionist,” who saw
the finger of God in everything, and who prayed daily for a
separation of the free and the slave States, so that the reproach of
tolerating slavery might no longer rest upon the Constitution of his
country, hailed the annunciation of a policy which he thought
destined, in the course of Providence, to work out the result which
he longed to see. The Quaker, who abhorred war and bloodshed, hoped
that “thee” would preserve peace at any price. The man of business,
looking to his material interests and to the commercial advantages
of the Union, deprecated a civil war which would disturb the natural
current of affairs, and would end where no man could foresee.
Thoughtful citizens, who comprehended more within their range of
reflection than was common with their neighbors, recognized the
wisdom and the necessity of the conciliatory steps which the
President had recommended. The speculative jurist, meditating in his
closet upon what he supposed might be a panacea for this disordered
condition of the body politic, sent his recommendations. Nearly all
of these classes, in their various ways of looking at such a crisis,
were on the whole gratified that the President had afforded to the
country a breathing spell, had solemnly called upon Congress to
reflect, and had at the same time called upon it to act in the
manner best adapted to meet the emergency. Very few desired
aggressive measures to be taken, which would put the Federal
Government in the attitude of making war upon a State.
These numerous private communications, coming from the people, were
addressed to one of the most self-reliant of men, who had surveyed
the whole field that was before him, who had firmly settled the
general policy which it was his duty to follow, and who was as calm
and collected in this great trial as he had ever been in any
situation of his life, while he was neither insensible to or
careless of its weighty responsibilities. It has been one of the
fashionable errors concerning Mr. Buchanan to impute to him, from
age or some other cause, a lack of firmness and self-possession in
this perilous emergency. He has been spoken of as having lost his
faculties, or as being bewildered by the perplexities of his
situation. There never was a more unfounded imputation. It is an
imputation to which no one who was closely in contact with him gave
at the time any countenance whatever. It will appear, as I go on,
that, of the members of his cabinet who were most concerned in all
his official acts during the last months of his administration, not
one formed at that time the opinion that he was wanting in firmness,
decision, or energy, however any of them may have differed with him
from time to time in regard to particular steps or measures. The
President who sent to Congress the message on which I commented in
the last preceding chapter, was certainly equal to the occasion. How
he felt, and what he said of his situation, the reader will be
interested to learn by the following extract from a confidential
letter which he wrote to a gentleman in New York on the 20th of
December:
I have never enjoyed better health or a more tranquil spirit than
during the past year. All our troubles have not cost me an hour’s
sleep or a single meal, though I trust I have a just sense of my
high responsibility. I weigh well and prayerfully what course I
ought to adopt, and adhere to it steadily, leaving the result to
Providence. This is my nature, and I deserve neither praise nor
blame for it. Every person who served with me in the Senate in
high party times would avouch the truth of this statement.
Mr. Buchanan may have made mistakes. If I had discovered them I
should not have hesitated to point them out. But that his policy was
sound; that it was the only policy that could have had any chance of
preserving the Union without a civil war; that his motive was
eminently patriotic; that with a serene and superb patience he
incurred the risk of obloquy and misrepresentation for the sake of
his country; all this should be the judgment of any impartial mind.
Nay, more: I do not hesitate to say that no man can justly accuse
him of vacillation, weakness, or timidity. A statesman who has a
great task to perform in a national peril, does not always pursue a
rigid line of action, without regard to the varying course of
events. He determines, first of all, on the grand object which he
wishes to accomplish. If he keeps that object constantly in view, he
must necessarily vary his steps as the changing aspects of public
affairs require; and one supreme test of his capacity and wisdom as
a statesman is to be found in his ability to adapt himself to new
situations, and at the same time not to lose sight of the capital
object of all his exertions. As a diplomatist, in the highest sense
of that term, Mr. Buchanan had few equals in his time, nor have
there been many men in our history who were in this respect his
superiors. As his course in the inception and progress of the
secession movement is developed, it will be seen that the
explanation of many of his acts, which have been the most
misunderstood or misrepresented, is to be found in the necessity for
palliating the danger of an armed collision, at moments when such a
collision would have destroyed all hope of a peaceful solution of
the sectional difficulties. That at such moments he sacrificed any
principle to the management of the immediate question in hand, or
imperilled any national interest, or that he ever departed in any
essential respect from the great object of his policy, will not be,
or ought not to be, the judgment of those who may follow this
narrative to the end.
The dis-Unionists of South Carolina, aided by the leading
secessionists in Congress from other States of the South, as will
be seen hereafter, tried hard to entrap him. They never once
succeeded. They meant to draw from him an admission in some form
that a State could constitutionally secede from the Union; for
they were sorely provoked that he had denied the right of
secession in his message, and when South Carolina had actually
adopted her ordinance, it became with them a capital point to
extort from him a surrender of the forts in Charleston harbor,
which would imply that the ordinance had transferred them to the
State. They anticipated that if they could once drive him from the
position of his message, the Democratic party of the North,
looking upon him as its representative, would never encourage or
support a war for the recovery of those possessions. They knew
that he deprecated and was seeking to avoid a war; and they
believed that if he could be compelled to admit that South
Carolina was out of the Union, other States would quickly join her
in the same movement. But the truth is, that, with all their
astuteness, the secessionists were individually and collectively
no match for a man who had in former days contended with the most
crafty politicians of Russia, who had encountered and encountered
successfully the ablest among the British statesmen of that age,
and who knew more of public law and of our constitutional
jurisprudence than all the dis-Unionist leaders in the South. In
addition to all the resources which Mr. Buchanan had in his own
person and his experience as a statesman, he had a very important
resource in his Attorney General, and in some of the other
gentlemen who joined his cabinet after it became necessary to
reconstruct it; and if, in the pressure that was made upon him by
the secessionists, and in the hurry of encountering their devices,
there was any danger that his determinations might be unskillfully
shaped, it was abundantly guarded against by the suggestions of
his advisers.
By the public press of the North, the message was of course received
according to party affinities. There were many leading articles
which regarded it as sound and wise; many which treated it as a kind
of “treasonable” giving away of the Union. The general tone,
however, of the more moderate journals was hopeful, and the papers
of this class based their hopes of a peaceful issue out of all the
difficulties upon the President’s recommendations. Still, the
utterances of the press did not show that even then the public mind
of the North fully grasped the extreme gravity of the situation; and
if these utterances of the press are to be taken as the best proof
of the state of the public mind in the North, without the aid of
one’s personal recollections and observation, it might be inferred
that the message had not produced the impression that it ought. But
the great mass of private letters which reached Mr. Buchanan are a
better index of what was passing in men’s minds; and they show
unmistakably that if the Congress had vigorously acted as he
advised, the public mind of the North was preparing to sanction and
to welcome the course which he recommended, however diverse were the
reasons or the motives which prevailed with the individual
writers.[80]
Footnote 80:
This mass of private letters is so great, and so fully represents
various classes of the community, that I have felt entirely
warranted in treating it as the best evidence of the currents of
public opinion, as they were setting immediately after the
publication of the message. The President could do nothing more
with such a correspondence than to have each letter carefully read
by a competent private secretary, and its contents duly noted for
his information. The whole of it gave him the means of knowing the
feelings of the people far better than he could know them by
reading the public prints.
The letters which reached the President from the South, after the
promulgation of his message, were almost as numerous as those which
came from the North, but they did not exhibit such a variety in the
motives and feelings that animated the writers. They were from men
who represented two principal classes of persons, the Unionists and
the dis-Unionists. The latter wrote in a bold, defiant and turbulent
spirit. They made it quite clear that they cared nothing for the
distinction between coercing a State and coercing individuals, and
that they held a State ordinance of secession to be perfectly
efficacious to absolve its people from obeying the laws of the
United States. They declared that any movement of troops or
munitions of war into the Southern States would instantly be
accepted as proof of a design to prevent peaceable secession, would
promote bloodshed and inaugurate civil war. Many of these persons
were terribly in earnest; but if any of them wrote in the
expectation that they could operate upon the President’s fears, and
thus prevent him from carrying out his announced purpose to execute
the laws and preserve the public property of the Union, they
“reckoned without their host.” While he made it apparent to Congress
that at that time he was without the necessary executive powers to
enforce the collection of the revenue in South Carolina, in case she
should secede, he did not fail to call for the appropriate powers
and means. And in regard to the application of all the means that he
had for protecting the public property, it will be seen hereafter
that he omitted no step that could have been taken with safety, and
that when the day for the inauguration of his successor arrived,
Major Anderson not only held Fort Sumter, but had held it down to
that time in perfect confidence that he could maintain his position.
The letters from Union men in the South evinced that there was in
all the cotton States, excepting in South Carolina, a strong body of
men who were not disposed to coöperate in a dismemberment of the
Union, and in the destruction of the Government under which they and
their fathers had always lived and prospered. They therefore, from
their positions, were able to tell Mr. Buchanan how important it was
that the Federal Government should not become the aggressor; how
vital it was that it should act on the defensive; and how necessary
it was that the North, acting through Congress, should adopt the
conciliatory measures which he had recommended; measures that would,
in regard to the Territories, give the South nothing but a barren
abstraction, and that would, in regard to the extradition of
fugitives, give the South only what it had a perfect right to
demand. Although all this was entirely apparent to the President
without the information which these letters gave him, these
expressions of the feelings, opinions and hopes of the Unionists of
that region were a strong confirmation of the wisdom of his policy.
The tone of the Southern press respecting the message was in general
violent and inflammatory, but with many noteworthy exceptions. But
as in the North, so in the South, the private letters to the
President were a better index of the currents of feeling and opinion
than anything that could be found in the utterances of the press.
In Congress, when the message was received, there was a singular
state of parties. First, there were the Republicans, flushed with
their recent political triumph in the election of Mr. Lincoln, and
entirely indisposed to make any concessions that would militate, or
seem to militate, against the dogmas of the “Chicago Platform.” This
party was purely sectional in its composition, tendencies and
purposes. Next were the representatives of the Southern States, most
of whom held theoretically to the State right of secession. This
party was a sectional one, also; but, as will hereafter be shown,
there were a few Southern men in Congress who did not believe in the
doctrine of secession, who favored no extreme demands of the South,
and who acted throughout with a steady purpose to preserve the peace
of the country and the integrity of the Union. Thirdly, there were
the Northern Democrats, represented by such Senators as Mr. Douglas,
Mr. Bigler and Mr. Bright, who could act as mediators between the
extreme sectional parties of North and South. It was to such a
Congress that the President addressed his message, at a moment when
South Carolina was about to secede from the Union, and when the
danger was that all the other cotton States would follow her
example. He was convinced that an attempt of those seven States to
form a confederacy, independent of the United States, could not be
overcome without a long and bloody war, into which the other
Southern States, commonly called from their geographical situation
the border States, would sooner or later be drawn. A great army
would be needed to encounter even the cotton States, and no free
institutions in the world had ever survived the dangers to which
such an army had exposed them. To prosecute a civil war would entail
upon the Federal Government a debt which could not be calculated;
and although the taxation necessary to uphold that debt might be
thrown upon posterity, in part, yet the commercial, manufacturing,
agricultural, mechanical and laboring classes must be at once
exposed to ruinous burthens. To avert such calamities, by the
employment of all the constitutional powers of his office, was his
supreme desire.[81] It was the great misfortune of his position,
that he had to appeal to a Congress, in which there were two
sectional parties breathing mutual defiance; in which a broad and
patriotic statesmanship was confined to a small body of men who
could not win over to their views a sufficient number from either of
the sectional parties to make up a majority upon any proposition
whatever.
Footnote 81:
Buchanan’s Defence, pp. 112-113.
The message was unsatisfactory to both of the sectional parties. Mr.
Jefferson Davis, in the Senate the ablest and most conspicuous of
the secessionist leaders, now committed the grand error of his
career as a statesman in this national crisis. He denounced the
message because of its earnest argument against secession, and
because the President had expressed in it his purpose to collect the
revenue in the port of Charleston, by means of a naval force, and to
defend the public property. Mr. Davis did not need to make this
issue with the President, or to make any issue with him, unless he
was determined to encourage South Carolina to leave the Union, and
to encourage the other cotton States to follow her. His own State
had not then seceded, and whether she would do so depended very much
upon his course. However strongly and sincerely he may have believed
in the right of secession, the President had afforded to him and to
every other Southern statesman an opportunity to forestall any
necessity for a practical assertion of that right, by giving his
voice and his vote for measures of conciliation that ought to have
been satisfactory to every Southern constituency and every Southern
representative. It was a capital mistake, for Mr. Davis and the
other secessionist leaders, to separate themselves from the
President, and afterwards to endeavor to extort from him an
admission that South Carolina had gone out of the Union, and that
the laws of the United States could not be executed within her
limits, or the possession of the forts in her harbor be maintained.
Mr. Calhoun would not have thus acted. He would have exerted his
whole power to procure concessions fit to be offered by the North,
and to be received by the South, before he would have encouraged his
State to secede from the Union in advance of the decision that no
such concessions would be made.
The spirit of the Republican Senators towards the message may be
seen from the very unjust representation of its tenor made by Mr.
Hale of New Hampshire, who said that in substance its positions
were: 1. That South Carolina has just cause to secede from the
Union. 2. That she has no right to secede. 3. That we have no right
to prevent her. So far from saying or intimating that South Carolina
had just cause to secede from the Union, the President had in the
message carefully and explicitly drawn that distinction between the
right of revolutionary resistance to intolerable oppression, and the
supposed right of State secession from the Union on account of
anticipated danger; a distinction which Madison, Jefferson, Jackson
and Webster always made when dealing with the subject. That
distinction was not more clearly and emphatically made by Mr.
Webster in his encounters with Mr. Hayne and Mr. Calhoun, than it
was made by Mr. Buchanan in this message. And if Mr. Hale had been
disposed to do justice to the message, instead of employing a
witticism that might be remembered by persons who would not take the
pains to understand such a public document on a subject of such
fearful gravity, he would have admitted what all men should then
have admitted, and what afterwards became the only justifiable basis
of the civil war: that to coerce a State to remain in the Union is
not, but that to enforce the execution of the laws upon the
individual inhabitants of the States is, a power that the Government
of the United States can constitutionally exercise. There was one
member of that Senate, who was no disunionist, who understood the
President rightly, and who knew well what the Constitution would or
would not authorize. This was Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee,
afterwards President of the United States.
“I do not believe,” said Mr. Johnson, “the Federal Government has
the power to coerce a State, for by the eleventh amendment of the
Constitution of the United States it is expressly provided that you
cannot even put one of the States of this Confederacy before one of
the courts of the country as a party. As a State, the Federal
Government has no power to coerce it; but it is a member of the
compact to which it agreed in common with the other States, and this
Government has the right to pass laws, and to enforce those laws
upon individuals within the limits of each State. While the one
proposition is clear, the other is equally so. This Government can,
by the Constitution of the country, and by the laws enacted in
conformity with the Constitution, operate upon individuals, and has
the right and the power, not to coerce a State, but to enforce and
execute the law upon individuals within the limits of a State.”[82]
Footnote 82:
Speech in the Senate, December 18, 1860. _Congressional Globe_, p.
119.
It was well for the country that at this early period Mr. Buchanan
had the wisdom to foresee and the firmness to enunciate the only
doctrine that could save the Government of the United States from
the consequences of making war upon a State, and at the same time
enable it to suppress all insurrectionary resistance to its
constitutional authority. It might suit the secessionists to claim
that their States would become, by their ordinances of secession,
independent nations, capable as such of waging war against the
United States, or of having it waged upon them by the United
States, if such was the pleasure of the latter. It might suit them
to put the alternative of such a war against the consent of the
United States to their peaceful renunciation of their connection
with the Federal Government. It might suit them to confound all
the distinctions between revolutionary resistance to a government
because some actual oppression has been suffered from it, and the
secession of States from the American Union because future
oppression is to be feared. It might suit them to say that to
coerce the individual inhabitants of a State to obey the laws of
the United States, after the State has absolved them from that
obligation by its sovereign will, is the same thing as to coerce a
State to remain in the Union. But this was not a dispute about
words; it was a controversy about the substantive powers of a
constitutional Government; a great question of things, and of
things drawing after them the most important consequences. If
there was to be a war, it was a matter of supreme importance what
that war was to be, in its inception. Mr. Buchanan did not mean
that its character, if it must come, should be obscured. He did
not mean that it should be a war waged aggressively by the United
States to prevent a State from adopting an ordinance of what she
might call secession. He did not mean to concede the possibility
that the Federal Government could begin or carry on a war against
a State, as a power which could by its own act erect itself into a
nation to be conquered and subdued and destroyed, as one nation
may conquer, subdue and destroy another. Knowing that such a
recognition of the potency of an ordinance of secession would be
fatal to the future of the whole Union, and knowing from long
study of the Constitution how the laws of the United States may be
enforced upon individuals notwithstanding that their State has
claimed a paramount sovereignty over them, or a paramount
dispensing power, he left upon the records of the country the
clear line of demarcation which would have to be observed by his
successor, and which would make the use of force, if force must be
used, a war, not of aggression, but of defence; a war not for the
conquest and obliteration of a State, but a war for the assertion
of the authority of the Constitution over the individuals subject
to its sway. It was only by treating secession as a nullity, and
by acting upon the principle that the people of a State would be
equally bound to obey the laws of the United States after
secession as they had been before, that the President could
furnish to Congress any principle on which force could be used. It
is not remarkable that the secession leaders should have rejected
his doctrine. But it is strange, passing strange, that Northern
men should have misrepresented it. Yet there was not a single
public man in the whole North, in all the discussion that followed
this message, on the Republican side, who saw, or who, if he saw,
had the candor to say, that the President had furnished to
Congress a principle of action that would alone prevent secession
from working the consequences which its advocates claimed for it,
or that could prevent the conquest and subjugation of States as
foreign nations. And now, when we look back upon the war that
ensued, and when we measure the disparity of force that enabled
the United States eventually to prevail over the exhausted
Southern Confederacy, there are no people in the whole Union who
have more cause than the secessionists themselves, to be grateful
to President Buchanan for not having admitted the possibility of
legitimate war upon the States that seceded; while for the people
of the whole Union there remains a debt of gratitude to him, for
having laid down the principle that saved them from crushing the
political autonomy of those States, in a war that could have had
no result but to reduce them to the condition of subjugated
provinces.
CHAPTER XVIII.
1860—December.
GENERAL SCOTT AGAIN ADVISES THE PRESIDENT—MAJOR ANDERSON'S REMOVAL
FROM FORT MOULTRIE TO FORT SUMTER—ARRIVAL OF COMMISSIONERS FROM
SOUTH CAROLINA IN WASHINGTON—THEIR INTERVIEW AND COMMUNICATION
WITH THE PRESIDENT—THE SUPPOSED PLEDGE OF THE STATUS QUO—THE
“CABINET CRISIS” OF DECEMBER 29TH—REPLY OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE
SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSIONERS—THE ANONYMOUS DIARIST OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN REVIEW CONFUTED.
On the 12th of December General Scott arrived in Washington from New
York, where he had been ill for a long time. Since the presentation
of his “views” of October 29th-30th, the President had not heard
from him on the subject of the Southern forts. On the 11th of
December Major Anderson, then at Fort Moultrie, and in no danger of
attack or molestation by the authorities of South Carolina, had
received his instructions from Major Buell, Assistant Adjutant
General of the Army, who had been sent by the President expressly to
Fort Moultrie, in order that Anderson might be guided in his course
with reference to all probable contingencies.[83] The South Carolina
convention had not assembled when Anderson received his
instructions. General Scott, on the 15th of December, had an
interview with the President, in which he urged that three hundred
men be sent to reinforce Anderson at Fort Moultrie. The President
declined to give this order, for the following reasons: First,
Anderson was fully instructed what to do in case he should at any
time see good reason to believe that there was any purpose to
dispossess him of any of the forts. Secondly, at this time, December
15th, the President believed—and the event proved the correctness of
his belief—that Anderson was in no danger of attack. He and his
command were then treated with marked kindness by the authorities
and people of Charleston. Thirdly, the President, in his annual
message, had urged upon Congress measures of conciliation by the
adoption of certain amendments of the Constitution; and Mr.
Crittenden’s propositions, of substantially the same character as
those of the President, called the “Crittenden Compromise,” were
before the Senate. Strong hopes were at this time entertained
throughout the country that Congress would adopt these or some other
measures to quiet the agitation in the South, so that South
Carolina, in case she should “secede,” would be left alone in her
course. Under all these circumstances, to have sent additional
troops to Fort Moultrie would only have been, as Mr. Buchanan
afterward said, “to impair the hope of compromise, to provoke
collision and disappoint the country.”[84]
Footnote 83:
The instructions will be quoted hereafter.
Footnote 84:
See the controversy between General Scott and Mr. Buchanan in
1862; Mr. Buchanan’s letter of October 28, 1862.
On the same day, General Scott sent a note to the President,
reminding him of General Jackson’s measures in regard to the
threatened nullification of the tariff in 1833; an occasion, the
circumstances of which bore little resemblance to the situation of
the country in December, 1860, as I have already had reason to say
in commenting on General Scott’s “views” of October 29th-30th.
In the controversy which General Scott had with Mr. Buchanan in
1862, in the _National Intelligencer_, the General reported the
President as saying to him, on the 15th of December, 1860, among
other reasons for not reinforcing Anderson at that time, that he
should await the action of the South Carolina convention, in the
expectation that a commission would be appointed and sent to
negotiate with _him_ (the President) and Congress, respecting the
secession of the State, and the property of the United States within
the borders of that State; and that if Congress should decide
against the secession, he would then send a reinforcement, and would
telegraph to Anderson to hold the forts against any attack. General
Scott made two palpable mistakes in thus representing what the
President said to him on the 15th of December, 1860.[85] In the
first place, as will presently appear, the President never gave any
person or persons claiming to represent South Carolina to understand
that he would receive a commission to negotiate with _him_ for an
admission of the right of secession, or for a surrender of the
forts. In his annual message, he had most distinctly and
emphatically declared that, as an executive officer, he had no power
whatever to hold such a negotiation, but that it belonged to
Congress to deal with the property of the United States as it should
see fit; and that it was his duty to maintain the possession of the
forts until Congress should authorize and direct him to surrender
them. When commissioners were subsequently appointed by the State of
South Carolina, they were told by the President that he could not
receive them in a diplomatic character, and that he would not
himself negotiate with them for a surrender of the forts. In the
next place, the President could not have told General Scott that he
would send a reinforcement to Anderson in a certain contingency, and
would then telegraph him to hold the forts. Anderson had already
received instructions to hold them, and had been directed how to
act.
Footnote 85:
Mr. Buchanan said, in 1862, that he had no recollection of some of
the details of the conversation imputed to him by General Scott,
and that the General’s memory must be defective. See Mr.
Buchanan’s letters of 1862, in the _National Intelligencer_.
Mr. Buchanan has said—and it deserves to be quoted—that “it is
scarcely a lack of charity to infer that General Scott knew at the
time he made this recommendation (on the 15th of December), that it
must be rejected. The President could not have complied with it, the
position of affairs remaining unchanged, without at once reversing
his entire policy, and without a degree of inconsistency amounting
almost to self-stultification.” He adds:
This, the General’s second recommendation, was wholly unexpected.
He had remained silent for more than six weeks from the date of
his supplemental “views,” convinced, as the President inferred,
that he had abandoned the idea of garrisoning all these forts with
“the five companies only” within his reach. Had the President
never so earnestly desired to reinforce the nine forts in
question, at this time, it would have been little short of madness
to undertake the task with the small force at his command. Without
authority to call forth the militia, or accept the services of
volunteers for the purpose, this whole force now consisted of six
hundred recruits, obtained by the General since the date of his
“views,” in addition to the five regular companies. Our army was
still out of reach on the remote frontiers, and could not be
withdrawn during midwinter in time for this military operation.
Indeed, the General had never suggested such a withdrawal. He knew
that had this been possible, the inhabitants on our distant
frontiers would have been immediately exposed to the tomahawk and
scalping knife of the Indians.
While he was unwilling at this moment to send reinforcements into
the harbor of Charleston, and thereby to incur the risk of provoking
the secession of other States, the President did not neglect the use
of any means that were in his power to prevent the secession of
South Carolina. He sent the Hon. Caleb Cushing to Charleston, with a
letter to Governor Pickens, in which he said:
From common notoriety I assume the fact that the State of South
Carolina is now deliberating on the propriety and necessity of
seceding from the Union. Whilst any hope remains that this may be
prevented, or even retarded, so long as to enable the people of
her sister States to have opportunity to manifest their opinion
regarding the matters which may have impelled the State to take
this step, it is my duty to exert all the means in my power to
avoid so dread a catastrophe. I have, therefore, deemed it
advisable to send to you the Hon. Caleb Cushing, to counsel and
advise with you, in regard to the premises, and to communicate
such information as he may possess concerning the condition of
public opinion in the North touching the same. I need scarcely
add, that I entertain full confidence in his integrity, ability,
and prudence. He will state to you the reasons which exist to
prevent, or to delay, the action of the State for the purpose
which I have mentioned.
But notwithstanding the efforts of the President to induce the
authorities and people of South Carolina to await the action of
Congress and the development of public opinion at the North on the
recommendations of his message, events were hurrying on in that
State with fearful rapidity. The leading spirits in the
secession movement did not desire the success of the President’s
recommendations. Encouraged, not by anything that they could find in
the message, or by anything that they could learn of the President’s
intentions, but by what they had learned of the “views” of the
General in Chief of the Federal army, and by other indications of
the same kind, they determined to try secession, in the belief that
the people and Government of the United States would not resort to
war. They initiated and conducted their measures with a supreme and
lofty disregard of all the consequences, because they believed that
they could throw the onus of those consequences upon the Government
of the Union. It was in vain that they were warned by the President
that their doctrine of secession, pushed to its results, would
oblige him to meet their claim, by virtue of a State ordinance, of
dispossessing the United States of the property which belonged to
the Government, with all the means at his disposal. It is one of the
most singular political phenomena recorded in history, that under
such a system of Government as ours, men should have believed not
only that a State ordinance of secession would dissolve all the
relations between the inhabitants of that State and the Government
of the United States, but that it would _ipso facto_ transfer to the
State property which the State had ceded to that Government by
solemn deeds of conveyance. The principle of public law on which
this claim was supposed to be based, involved in its application the
assumption that South Carolina, becoming by her own declaration a
nation foreign to the United States, was entitled to take peaceable
possession of all the property which the United States held within
her limits, and to forbid the vessels of the United States from
entering her waters in order to reach that property. Upon any view
of the nature of the Federal Constitution, even upon the theory that
it was a mere league between sovereign States, dissoluble in regard
to any State at the will of its people, it would not have followed
that the ordinance of dissolution would divest the title of the
United States to their property. Yet it is an undeniable fact that
the people and authorities of South Carolina initiated and carried
out their secession, upon the claim that their interpretation of the
Federal Constitution must be accepted by the whole country; that
their fiat alone made them an independent nation; that it divested
the United States of whatever property the Government held within
their borders; and that if these claims were not submitted to, the
consequence would be that South Carolina must make them good by all
the power she could use. The subsequent change of attitude, by which
it was proposed to negotiate and pay for the possession of the
property, or the theory that the forts were built by the Federal
Government for the protection of the State, should not lead any
historian to overlook the demand which the authorities of the State
first presented at Washington, or the manner in which it was met by
President Buchanan.
On the 20th of December, the Convention of South Carolina, without a
dissenting voice, adopted an ordinance of secession, which purported
to dissolve the connection between the State of South Carolina and
the Government of the United States. A copy of the ordinance, with
the signatures of all the members, and with the great seal of the
State, was formally transmitted to the President. On the 22d, three
eminent citizens of the State, Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams
and James L. Orr, were appointed to proceed to Washington, to treat
with the Government of the United States concerning the new
relations which the ordinance was supposed to have established
between that Government and the people of South Carolina. The
commissioners arrived in Washington on the 26th. On the next
morning, intelligence reached them that on the night of the 25th,
Major Anderson had secretly dismantled Fort Moultrie, spiked his
cannon, burnt his gun-carriages, and transferred his troops to Fort
Sumter, as if he were about to be attacked. This information they
sent to the President.
Before proceeding with an account of what followed this occurrence,
in the interview between the President and the commissioners, this
movement of Major Anderson must be carefully described. It has been
much praised as a bold, skillful and wise act, dictated by a purpose
to make the people of South Carolina feel that the Government of the
United States was not to be trifled with; and the merit of Major
Anderson has been magnified by the suggestion that if he had been
promptly reinforced, after the removal, he never would have been
driven out of Fort Sumter and out of the harbor of Charleston. The
simple truth is, that Anderson was a brave, vigilant and faithful
officer, acting under instructions which had been carefully given to
him, and which allowed him a considerable latitude of judgment in
regard to remaining in Fort Moultrie or removing to any other of the
forts within the limits of his command. He was a man of Southern
birth, and all his sympathies were with the South on the questions
pending between the two sections. This is avowed in a private letter
written by him on the 11th of January, 1861, to a friend in
Washington, a copy of which is now lying before me. But he was as
true as steel to his military duty as an officer of the United
States. He had lost, as he says in this letter, all sympathy with
the persons then governing South Carolina, and he had now begun to
distrust the purposes of the State authorities. Fort Moultrie was
the weakest of all the forts in that harbor belonging to the United
States. From the erection of batteries on the shore which commanded
this fort, and from other indications taking place after the
adoption of the secession ordinance, Anderson believed that the
State authorities were about to proceed to some hostile act, and
therefore thought the contingency contemplated by his instructions
had arrived. He may have been mistaken in this; but neither the
appearances at the time, nor the subsequent action of South
Carolina, show that he was so. At all events, he acted as any
prudent and faithful officer would have acted under the same
circumstances; and in order to be able to defend himself better than
he could in Fort Moultrie, and with no purpose of attacking the city
of Charleston or of making any aggression whatever, he transferred
his command to Fort Sumter. The people and authorities of South
Carolina chose to consider that his occupation of this fort was an
aggressive act, and that he must be ordered back again to Fort
Moultrie, or be dislodged; a demand which of itself shows that the
State of South Carolina, in the event that her secession should not
be submitted to by the Federal Government, expected a civil war and
meant to be in the best condition to meet it.
The intelligence of Anderson’s removal to Fort Sumter was received
by the President with surprise and regret. He was surprised, because
all his previous information led him to believe that Anderson was
safe at Fort Moultrie. He regretted the removal, because of its
tendency to impel the other cotton States and the border States into
sympathy with South Carolina, and thus to defeat the measures by
which he hoped to confine the secession to that State. But he never
for an instant, then or afterwards, doubted that Anderson’s removal
was authorized by his instructions; although he did not suppose that
the authorities of the State would attack him, while their
commissioners were on the way to Washington for the avowed purpose
of negotiating. It is scarcely needful to discuss the question
whether South Carolina had good reason to regard this movement of
Anderson’s as an act of aggression. In such a state of affairs and
of men’s feelings, it was to be expected that complaints would be
made of hostile intentions, if any plausible reason could be found
for them. But any indifferent person, looking back upon the events,
and considering that Anderson was acting under a President who was
doing everything in his power to prevent a collision of arms, must
see that even if the President had specifically ordered the removal,
it was nothing more than a defensive act, done in order to secure
the forces of the Government in the occupation of its own forts, and
that it could not have been an aggressive movement, unless it should
be conceded that those forces had no right to be in Charleston
harbor at all.
But there is one assertion which it is now necessary to examine, in
relation to this removal, because it has been made the foundation of
a charge against the personal good faith and the sound judgment of
President Buchanan. It is the charge that previous to Anderson’s
removal, the President had pledged himself to preserve the _status
quo_ in Charleston harbor, until commissioners to be appointed by
the convention of South Carolina should arrive in Washington, and
some result of a negotiation should be reached. The first and only
interview between the President and the commissioners occurred on
the 28th of December. What occurred should be related in the
President’s own words:
It was under these circumstances that the President, on Friday,
the 28th December, held his first and only interview with the
commissioners from South Carolina. He determined to listen with
patience to what they had to communicate, taking as little part
himself in the conversation as civility would permit. On their
introduction, he stated that he could recognize them only as
private gentlemen and not as commissioners from a sovereign State;
that it was to Congress, and to Congress alone, they must appeal.
He, nevertheless, expressed his willingness to communicate to that
body, as the only competent tribunal, any propositions they might
have to offer. They then proceeded, evidently under much
excitement, to state their grievances arising out of the removal
of Major Anderson to Fort Sumter, and declared that for these they
must obtain redress preliminary to entering upon the negotiation
with which they had been entrusted; that it was impossible for
them to make any proposition until this removal should be
satisfactorily explained; and they even insisted upon the
immediate withdrawal of the Major and his troops, not only from
Fort Sumter, but from the harbor of Charleston, as a _sine qua
non_ to any negotiation.
In their letter to the President of the next day, they repeat
their demand, saying;[86] “And, in conclusion, we would urge upon
you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of
Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing menace
which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent
experience shows, threatens to bring to a bloody issue questions
which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.” This
demand, accompanied by an unmistakable threat of attacking Major
Anderson if not yielded to, was of the most extravagant character.
To comply with it, the commissioners must have known, would be
impossible. Had they simply requested that Major Anderson might be
restored to his former position at Fort Moultrie, upon a guarantee
from the State that neither it nor the other forts or public
property should be molested; this, at the moment, might have been
worthy of serious consideration. But to abandon all the forts to
South Carolina, on the demand of commissioners claiming to
represent her as an independent State, would have been a
recognition, on the part of the Executive, of her right to secede
from the Union. This was not to be thought of for a moment.
Footnote 86:
Ex. Doc., H. R., vol. vi, No. 26, p 6.
The President replied to the letter of the commissioners on
Monday, 31st December. In the meantime information had reached him
that the State authorities, without waiting to hear from
Washington, had, on the day after Major Anderson’s removal, seized
Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, the custom house, and post office,
and over them all had raised the Palmetto flag; and, moreover,
that every officer of the customs, collector, naval officer,
surveyor, appraisers, together with the postmaster, had resigned
their appointments; and that on Sunday, the 30th December, they
had captured from Major Humphreys, the officer in charge, the
arsenal of the United States, containing public property estimated
to be worth half a million of dollars. The Government was thus
expelled from all its property except Fort Sumter, and no Federal
officers, whether civil or military, remained in the city or
harbor of Charleston. The secession leaders in Congress attempted
to justify these violent proceedings of South Carolina as acts of
self-defence, on the assumption that Major Anderson had already
commenced hostilities. It is certain that their tone instantly
changed after his removal; and they urged its secrecy, the hour of
the night when it was made, the destruction of his gun-carriages,
and other attendant incidents, to inflame the passions of their
followers. It was under these circumstances that the President was
called upon to reply to the letter of the South Carolina
commissioners, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the troops of
the United States from the harbor of Charleston. In this reply, he
peremptorily rejected the demand in firm but courteous terms, and
declared his purpose to defend Fort Sumter by all the means in his
power against hostile attacks, from whatever quarter they might
proceed. (_Vide_ his letter of the 31st December, 1860, Ex. Doc.
No. 26, H. R., 36th Congress, 2d Session, accompanying President’s
message of 8th January, 1861.) To this the commissioners sent
their answer, dated on the 2d January, 1861. This was so violent,
unfounded, and disrespectful, and so regardless of what is due to
any individual whom the people have honored with the office of
President, that the reading of it in the cabinet excited
indignation among all the members. With their unanimous
approbation it was immediately, on the day of its date, returned
to the commissioners with the following indorsement; “This paper,
just presented to the President, is of such a character, that he
declines to receive it.” Surely no negotiation was ever conducted
in such a manner, unless, indeed, it had been the predetermined
purpose of the negotiators to produce an open and immediate
rupture.
In the intended reply of the commissioners, dated January 2, 1861,
which the President returned to them, it was asserted in a variety
of offensive forms that the removal of Major Anderson to Fort Sumter
was a violation of a pledge which the President had previously given
not to send reinforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor, and
not to change their relative military status. The same thing had
been asserted in their letter to the President of December 28th, and
it was emphatically and distinctly denied in his answer of the 31st.
Is it true, then, as a matter of fact, that such a pledge had ever
been given?
1. By his annual message of December 3d, the President stood pledged
to the country to exercise all his constitutional powers to maintain
possession of the public property, in case of the secession of any
State or States. 2. There is no possible channel through which the
President could have given the supposed pledge of the _status quo_,
excepting at an interview which took place between him and the South
Carolina members of Congress on the 10th of December. If the
President then gave such a pledge, it follows that at the end of a
week from the date of his annual message he tied his own hands, in
advance of the secession of that State, in a manner utterly
inconsistent with the purpose declared in his message. 3. The
circumstances attending Major Anderson’s removal from Fort Moultrie
to Fort Sumter, and the manner in which the President received and
acted upon the information after it reached him and down through
every succeeding day of his administration, repel the idea that
before the removal he had said or done anything to warrant the
authorities of South Carolina in assuming that he was bound to order
Anderson back to Fort Moultrie, or not to reinforce him at Fort
Sumter. Anderson received his instructions on the 11th of December,
through Assistant Adjutant General Buell, to whom they were given
verbally by the Secretary of War, and by whom they were reduced to
writing, at Fort Moultrie, after he (Buell) arrived there. When
reduced to writing, they became the President’s orders, by which
Anderson was to be guided. The orders were given with reference to
the following contingency: The President believed that, under
existing circumstances, the State of South Carolina would not attack
any of the forts in Charleston harbor, whilst he allowed their
_status quo_ to remain. But in this he might be mistaken. In order
to be prepared for what might possibly happen after the State should
have “seceded,” the Secretary of the Navy had stationed the war
steamer Brooklyn, in complete readiness for sea, in Hampton Roads,
to take on board for Charleston three hundred disciplined troops,
with provisions and munitions of war, from the neighboring garrison
of Fortress Monroe. In this attitude of the secret preparations of
the Government, Anderson’s instructions were given to him, in the
manner above described, and when they had been reduced to writing
and delivered to him by Buell, they read textually as follows:
You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War, that a
collision of the troops with the people of the State shall be
avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with
reference to the military force and forts in this harbor, which
shall guard against such a collision. He has, therefore, carefully
abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any
measures which might add to the present excited state of the
public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he
feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain
possession of the public works, or interfere with their occupancy.
But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may
possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems
it proper that you shall be prepared with instructions to meet so
unhappy a contingency. He has, therefore, directed me verbally to
give you such instructions. You are carefully to avoid every act
which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression, and for that
reason you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to
take up any position which could be construed into the assumption
of a hostile attitude, but you are to hold possession of the forts
in this harbor, and if attacked you are to defend yourself to the
last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you,
perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack
on or an attempt to take possession of either one of them will be
regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command
into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its
power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar
defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to
proceed to a hostile act.
The President, when the text of the instructions reached him,
directed the Secretary of War to modify them in one particular.
Instead of requiring Anderson to defend himself to the last
extremity—which was not demanded by any principle of honor or any
military rule—he was required to defend himself until no reasonable
hope should remain of saving the fort in which he might happen to
be. This modification was approved by General Scott.
The instructions, therefore, under which Anderson acted, authorized
him to remove his force to any other of the three forts whenever
either of them should be attacked, or an attempt should be made to
take possession of it, or whenever he might have tangible evidence
of a design to proceed to a hostile act. In all this, the Government
was acting on the defensive, and was empowering its officer to put
his force into either of its forts where, in his judgment, his power
of resistance would be most increased. To suppose, therefore, that
after these instructions had gone to Anderson, the President made an
agreement with certain members of Congress from South Carolina, that
the _status quo_ in Charleston harbor, in respect to the three
forts, should not be changed, is to suppose something in the highest
degree incredible.
4th. The communication between the President and the South Carolina
members of Congress was both in writing and in two personal
interviews. The written communication remains. Of what took place at
the last interview there is an account by Mr. Buchanan himself,
founded on memoranda which he made immediately after these gentlemen
had left his presence. The first personal interview took place on
the 8th of December. The conversation related to the best means of
avoiding a hostile collision between the Federal Government and the
State of South Carolina. The President desired that the verbal
communication should be put in writing, and brought to him in that
form. Accordingly on the 10th of December, the same gentlemen
brought to him the following letter, signed by five members of
Congress from South Carolina, and dated on the previous day:
TO HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES BUCHANAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express
to you our strong convictions that neither the constituted
authorities nor any body of the people of the State of South
Carolina will either attack or molest the United States forts in
the harbor of Charleston previously to the action of the
convention, and we hope and believe, not until an offer has been
made through an accredited representative to negotiate for an
amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and the
Federal Government, provided that no reinforcements shall be sent
into those forts, and their relative military status remain as at
present.
JOHN MCQUEEN,
WM. PORCHER MILES,
M. L. BONHAM,
W. W. BOYCE,
LAWRENCE M. KEITT.
WASHINGTON, December 9, 1860.
The following memorandum is indorsed upon the original letter, in
the handwriting of the President:
Monday morning, 10th December, 1860, the within paper was
presented to me by Messrs. McQueen, Miles and Bonham. I objected
to the word “provided,” as this might be construed into an
agreement on my part which I never would make. They said nothing
was further from their intention. They did not so understand it,
and I should not so consider it. Afterwards, Messrs. McQueen and
Bonham called, in behalf of the delegation, and gave me the most
positive assurance that the forts and public property would not be
molested until after commissioners had been appointed to treat
with the Federal Government in relation to the public property,
and until the decision was known. I informed them that what would
be done was a question for Congress and not for the Executive.
That if they [the forts] were assailed, this would put them
completely in the wrong, and making them the authors of the civil
war. They gave the same assurances to Messrs. Floyd, Thompson and
others.
Mr. Buchanan’s subsequent account of the interview at which this
letter was delivered to him in person, reads as follows:
Both in this and in their previous conversation, they declared
that in making this statement, they were acting solely on their
own responsibility, and expressly disclaimed any authority to bind
their State. They, nevertheless, expressed the confident belief
that they would be sustained both by the State authorities and by
the convention, after it should assemble. Although the President
considered this declaration as nothing more than the act of five
highly respectable members of the House from South Carolina, yet
he welcomed it as a happy omen, that by means of their influence
collision might be prevented, and time afforded to all parties for
reflection and for a peaceable adjustment. From abundant caution,
however, he objected to the word “provided” in their statement,
lest, if he should accept it without remark, this might possibly
be construed into an agreement on his part not to reinforce the
forts. Such an agreement, he informed them, he would never make.
It would be impossible for him, from the nature of his official
responsibility, thus to tie his own hands and restrain his own
freedom of action. Still, they might have observed from his
message, that he had no present design, under existing
circumstances, to change the condition of the forts at Charleston.
He must, notwithstanding, be left entirely free to exercise his
own discretion, according to exigencies as they might arise. They
replied that nothing was further from their intention than such a
construction of this word; they did not so understand it, and he
should not so consider it.[87]
Footnote 87:
This account, although written and published in 1866 (Buchanan’s
Defence, p. 167), was founded on and embodied the substance of the
private memorandum made by the President on the back of the
letter, immediately after the termination of the interview. Two of
the gentlemen who signed the letter, Messrs. Miles and Keitt,
published at Charleston an account of this interview, in which
they did not intimate that anything in the nature of a pledge
passed on either side. (See Appleton’s “American Annual
Cyclopedia” for 1861, p. 703.)
No one, therefore, I presume, will now question that I am fully
justified in asserting, as I do, that Mr. Buchanan gave no pledge,
express or implied, formal or informal, that no reinforcements
should be sent into Charleston harbor, or that the military status,
as it existed at the time of this interview, should remain
unchanged, or that he in any way fettered himself on the
subject.[88] To have done so in advance of the action of the South
Carolina convention, or at any other time, would have been an act of
inconsistency and folly quite beyond anything that the worst enemy
of the President could have ever desired to impute to him.
Footnote 88:
Mr. Jefferson Davis, although not directly asserting that the
President gave any pledge not to send reinforcements or not to
permit the military _status_ to be changed, says that “the South
Carolinians understood Mr. Buchanan as approving of that
suggestion, although declining to make any formal pledge;” and he
adds, that after Anderson’s removal from Moultrie to Sumter, the
authorities and people of South Carolina considered it “as a
violation of the implied pledge of a maintenance of the _status
quo_,” and he gives this as a reason why the remaining forts and
other public property were at once seized by the State. (Davis,
Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, I., 212-213.) If the
South Carolina members of Congress told Mr. Davis that the
President assented to or approved of their _proviso_, they told
him what was not true. He does not say that they ever did tell him
so. If they gave their own people and State authorities to
understand that there was any implied pledge of a maintenance of
the _status quo_, the fact was exactly the other way. They have
never said that they gave their people and authorities so to
understand Mr. Buchanan’s language.
But the South Carolina commissioners having asserted in their letter
of December 28th, that the removal of Major Anderson from Moultrie
to Sumter was a violation of a pledge that had been given by the
President, it became important that the denial should instantly
follow the assertion. The President, relying not only on his
recollection, but on his written memoranda of his conversation with
the South Carolina members of Congress, which completely refuted the
assertion, did not, in the first draft of an answer to the
commissioners, which he prepared with his own hand, repel the
assertion as flatly and explicitly as he might have done. He
evidently did not at once see that unless he expressly and pointedly
denied the assertion, he might be construed as giving an implied
assent to it. He was considering how he could best carry on this
conference with persons whom he could not receive in the official
character in which they came, and with whom he could only deal as
distinguished citizens of South Carolina; and his first attention
was directed to the means of convincing _them_ that the people of
South Carolina could have no excuse for breaking the peace, because
it was not his purpose to reinforce Major Anderson unless the
authorities of the State should make it absolutely necessary to do
so. But to three members of his cabinet, Judge Black, Mr. Holt, and
Mr. Stanton, the omission of the President to give a pointed and
explicit denial to the assertion of a pledge not to change the
military status, appeared a fatal defect in the paper which the
President had drawn up. They were also apprehensive that the first
and the concluding paragraph of his proposed answer would be
regarded as acknowledging the right of South Carolina to be
represented near the Government of the United States by diplomatic
officers, as if she were a foreign nation. As the draft of an answer
which the President had prepared is not in existence, and as the
paper of objections presented by Judge Black to the President did
not quote the paragraphs objected to, although that paper has been
preserved, it is impossible to judge how far the criticism was
right, or was called for. Certain it is that at the first and only
interview which the President had with those commissioners, he told
them in the plainest terms that he could only recognize them as
private gentlemen, and not as commissioners of an independent State.
He also told them that as to any surrender to South Carolina of the
forts, within her limits, or any propositions concerning a sale of
them, he, as President, had no authority, and that the only tribunal
to which they could apply was Congress. I am inclined to believe
that it was the repetition of this suggestion of an appeal to
Congress, which caused the three members of the cabinet to fear that
the paragraphs to which they objected might be considered as
implicitly yielding to the commissioners the point of their
diplomatic character. But it is not necessary to speculate about
this, because the President’s draft of an answer is no longer
accessible, and because it is evident from all that occurred that
the President, in drawing up that form of his answer, meant to hold
open a door to the commissioners which it would be perfectly proper
for him to allow them to enter, if they chose. He meant to give them
an opportunity to stipulate that if Major Anderson were restored to
his former position, their State would not molest either Fort
Moultrie or any of the other forts or property of the United States.
Instead of this, their demand from first to last was the withdrawal
of all the troops of the United States from the harbor of
Charleston, and an abandonment of all the forts to South Carolina;
which, if acceded to by the Executive, would have been a recognition
by him of her right to secede from the Union. “This,” says Mr.
Buchanan, “was not to be thought of for a moment;” and I know of no
evidence that he thought of it or contemplated it, when he was
writing his first draft of an answer to the South Carolina
gentlemen. On the contrary, he steadily resisted it to the end of
the conference, and ever afterward.
Another point on which the three members of the cabinet differed
from the President was in regard to having any negotiation at all
with these gentlemen. It would seem from the paper of objections
presented to the President by Judge Black, that the President was at
first disposed, in the answer which he had prepared, to express his
regret that the commissioners were unwilling to proceed further with
the negotiation, after they had learned that he would not receive
them as diplomatic agents and would not comply with their extreme
demands. Here, then, was a ground for a real, but temporary,
difference of opinion between the President and three members of his
cabinet. On the one side, the President, holding these South
Carolina gentlemen firmly in the attitude of private citizens of
great weight and influence in their State, but denying to them any
diplomatic character which he could recognize, and making them to
clearly understand that the Executive would not withdraw the troops
or surrender the forts, might well and wisely have considered that
if he could draw from them any proposition which it would be fit for
him to present to Congress, that body would have to express an
authoritative opinion on the asserted right of secession. The great
object of preserving the peace of the country, and of gaining time
for angry passions to subside, might thus be gained. On the other
hand, Judge Black and his two colleagues, considering, as the
President considered, that these South Carolina citizens could not
be recognized as commissioners of a foreign State, held that there
could legally be no negotiation with them, whether they were willing
or not. Reduced to the ultimate difference, the question was whether
there should be no further conference at all, because it could have
no legal force, or whether there might still be useful further
communication with them as private citizens, whose propositions, if
they chose to make any in that capacity, the President could submit
to Congress for such action as that body might think proper.
There was still another objection made to the President’s draft of
an answer, which can be better appreciated, because the words which
he proposed to use were quoted in Judge Black’s paper of objections.
These were the words: “Coercing a State by force of arms to remain
in the Confederacy—a power which I do not believe the Constitution
has conferred upon Congress.” This was the same criticism which
Judge Black had made upon the message of December 3d, in which none
of his colleagues had agreed with him. He now renewed the objection,
representing to the President that the words were too vague and
might have the effect (which he was sure the President did not
intend) to mislead the commissioners concerning his sentiments.
Judge Black’s criticism was that to coerce the inhabitants of a
State to obey the laws of the United States, a power which the
President had always asserted, and meant still to assert, was in one
sense to coerce the State to remain in the Union.
Another thing which Judge Black and his two colleagues deprecated
was that the President’s answer should contain the most remote
implication that Major Anderson acted without authority in removing
his force to Fort Sumter. But what there was in the President’s
draft of an answer to give rise to such an implication does not
appear.
I should not have adverted to these objections to the President’s
proposed answer to the South Carolina commissioners, if Judge
Black’s paper of objections to it had not been given to the world;
nor should I have deemed it necessary to consider or describe
anything but the official answer that was actually sent. I hold that
a supreme ruler, who acts with constitutional advisers, is entitled
to be judged in history, not by what he may have written but did not
use, nor by the greater or less necessity for a different paper, nor
by the advice or the assistance which he received; but that he
should be judged by his official act. But as this difference between
President Buchanan and three members of his cabinet in regard to
this particular paper, led to what has been called a “cabinet
crisis,” and as the objections submitted to him have been published,
it is my duty to meet the whole occurrence squarely and directly.
It might be an interesting inquiry, how far a “cabinet crisis” had
become necessary. But of this, the gentlemen who composed the
cabinet were entitled to judge, because their personal honor and
patriotism were involved in the question of their remaining in the
cabinet, if they believed that the President was about to change his
policy. They appear to have at first supposed that the President,
after South Carolina had adopted an ordinance of secession, was
about to make such a change in his policy as would virtually reverse
his position, and would finally lead to an admission of the right of
secession, a result which would inevitably destroy him and his
administration. In this, it is certain that they were mistaken. The
President had not contemplated any such change in his position. I am
justified in asserting this strongly.
Only four days before this cabinet crisis culminated, the President
wrote a private letter to an editor in Washington whose paper was
supposed to be his organ, strongly rebuking him for an editorial
article favoring secession, and informing him that he (the
President) must take steps to make known in some authentic way that
the paper was not an organ of his administration.
Further than this, in every interview which the President had held
before the 29th December, with any persons claiming to represent the
people of South Carolina, he had uniformly and firmly declared that
on the vital point of withdrawing the troops and surrendering the
forts, he should make no concession whatever. But between the 17th
and the 21st of December, an occurrence took place, which has a most
important bearing upon the question whether the President had,
before the 29th of December, determined to make any change in his
attitude towards the people and authorities of South Carolina.
It will be remembered that the South Carolina ordinance of secession
was adopted on the 20th of December. Before that time, however, the
Governor of South Carolina, Mr. Pickens, saw fit to send a special
messenger to Washington, with a letter from himself to the
President, written at Columbia on the 17th of December, demanding
that Fort Sumter be delivered into his (the Governor's) hands. This
letter was written eight days before Major Anderson’s removal to
Sumter.[89] The following memorandum in the President’s handwriting
describes what took place when the Governor’s messenger arrived in
Washington:
Footnote 89:
The remarkable fact that this demand was made before South
Carolina had “seceded,” and before Anderson’s removal, although
the demand was subsequently withdrawn, shows how early the
Executive of South Carolina had formed the determination to treat
the presence of the United States troops in Charleston harbor as
an offence against the dignity and safety of the State.
On Thursday morning, December 20th, 1860, Hamilton, late marshal
of South Carolina, sent especially for this purpose, presented me
a letter from Governor Pickens, in the presence of Mr. Trescot,
dated at Columbia, South Carolina, 17th December (Monday). He was
to wait until this day (Friday afternoon) for my answer. The
character of the letter will appear from the answer to it, which I
had prepared. Thursday night, between nine and ten o'clock, Mr.
Trescot called upon me. He said that he had seen Messrs. Bonham
and McQueen of the South Carolina delegation; that they all agreed
that this letter of Governor Pickens was in violation of the
pledge which had been given by themselves not to make an assault
upon the forts, but leave them in _status quo_ until the result of
an application of commissioners to be appointed by the State was
known; that Pickens, at Columbia, could not have known of the
arrangements. They, to wit, Bonham, McQueen, and Trescot, had
telegraphed to Pickens for authority to withdraw his letter.
Friday morning, 10 o'clock, 21st December.—Mr. Trescot called upon
me with a telegram, of which the following is a copy from that
which he delivered to me:
December 21st, 1860.—You are authorized and requested to withdraw
my letter sent by Doctor Hamilton immediately.
F. W. P.
Mr. Trescot read to me from the same telegram, that Governor
Pickens had seen Mr. Cushing. The letter was accordingly
withdrawn.
The following is the draft of the answer to Governor Pickens which
the President was writing with his own hand when he was notified
that the Governor’s letter was withdrawn. Of course the answer was
not concluded or sent; but it shows with the utmost clearness that
the President’s position on the subject of secession was taken, and
was not to be changed by any menace of “consequences,” coming from
those who were disposed to be, as they must be, the aggressors, if
any attempt should be made to disturb the Federal Government in the
possession of its forts.
WASHINGTON, December 20, 1860.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 17th inst., by Mr. Hamilton.
From it I deeply regret to observe that you seem entirely to have
misapprehended my position, which I supposed had been clearly
stated in my message. I have incurred, and shall incur, any
reasonable risk within the clearly prescribed line of my executive
duties to prevent a collision between the army and navy of the
United States and the citizens of South Carolina in defence of the
forts within the harbor of Charleston. Hence I have declined for
the present to reinforce these forts, relying upon the honor of
South Carolinians that they will not be assaulted whilst they
remain in their present condition; but that commissioners will be
sent by the convention _to treat with Congress_ on the subject. I
say with _Congress_ because, as I state in my message, “Apart from
the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the
Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations
between the Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been
invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change
the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to
acknowledge the independence of that State. This would be to
invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the
dissolution of the confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign
States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign
_de facto_ government, involving no such responsibility. Any
attempt to do this would, on my part, be a naked act of
usurpation.”
As an executive officer of the Government, I have no power to
surrender to any human authority Fort Sumter, or any of the other
forts or public property in South Carolina. To do this, would on
my part, as I have already said, be a naked act of usurpation. It
is for Congress to decide this question, and for me to preserve
the status of the public property as I found it at the
commencement of the troubles.
If South Carolina should attack any of these forts, she will then
become the assailant in a war against the United States. It will
not then be a question of coercing a State to remain in the Union,
to which I am utterly opposed, as my message proves, but it will
be a question of voluntarily precipitating a conflict of arms on
her part, without even consulting the only authorities which
possess the power to act upon the subject. Between independent
governments, if one possesses a fortress within the limits of
another, and the latter should seize it without calling upon the
appropriate authorities of the power in possession to surrender
it, this would not only be a just cause of war, but the actual
commencement of hostilities.
No authority was given, as you suppose, from myself, or from the
War Department, to Governor Gist, to guard the United States
arsenal in Charleston by a company of South Carolina volunteers.
In this respect you have been misinformed. I have, therefore,
never been more astonished in my life, than to learn from you that
unless Fort Sumter be delivered into your hands, you cannot be
answerable for the consequences.
It was, then, on the President’s first draft of an answer to the
South Carolina commissioners, after the secession ordinance had been
passed, and upon nothing that had previously occurred, that the
cabinet crisis arose. On the evening of December 29th, the
President’s proposed draft of an answer to the commissioners was
read to the cabinet. It was not much discussed, for it was not the
habit of the ministers to criticise state papers which the President
had himself prepared. But on the following day, Judge Black informed
Mr. Toucey, the Secretary of the Navy, of his purpose to resign, if
this paper, as written by the President, should be delivered to the
commissioners. The President sent for Judge Black, and handed him
the paper, with a request that he modify it to suit himself, and
return it immediately. Judge Black then prepared his memorandum for
the President’s consideration, in which Mr. Holt and Mr. Stanton
concurred. The answer, which was to be sent to the commissioners,
was modified accordingly, and when sent it read as follows:[90]
Footnote 90:
Mr. Jefferson Davis has erroneously given to this letter the date
of December 30th. Its true date was December 31st. (See Mr.
Davis’s Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. I., p.
592.)
[ANSWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSIONERS.]
WASHINGTON, December 31, 1860.
GENTLEMEN:—
I have had the honor to receive your communication of 26th inst.,
together with a copy of your “full powers from the Convention of
the people of South Carolina,” authorizing you to treat with the
Government of the United States on various important subjects
therein mentioned, and also a copy of the ordinance bearing date
on the 20th inst., declaring that “the union now subsisting
between South Carolina and other States, under the name of 'the
United States of America,' is hereby dissolved.”
In answer to this communication, I have to say that my position as
President of the United States was clearly defined in the message
to Congress of the 3d instant. In that I stated that, “apart from
the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the
Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations
between the Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been
invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change
the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to
acknowledge the independence of that State. This would be to
invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the
dissolution of the confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign
States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign
_de facto_ government—involving no such responsibility. Any
attempt to do this would, on his part, be a naked act of
usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress the
whole question, in all its bearings.”
Such is my opinion still. I could, therefore, meet you only as
private gentlemen of the highest character, and was entirely
willing to communicate to Congress any proposition you might have
to make to that body upon the subject. Of this you were well
aware. It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be
made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possesses the
power, as to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the
parties in regard to the possession of the Federal forts in the
harbor of Charleston, and I, therefore, deeply regret that, in
your opinion, “the events of the last twenty-four hours render
this impossible.” In conclusion, you urge upon me “the immediate
withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston,” stating
that, “under present circumstances, they are a standing menace,
which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our present
experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue
questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.”
The reason for this change in your position is that, since your
arrival in Washington, “an officer of the United States acting as
we (you) are assured, not only without your (my) orders, has
dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most
important extent, the condition of affairs under which we (you)
came.” You also allege that you came here “the representatives of
an authority which could at any time within the past sixty days
have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which
upon pledges given in a manner that we (you) cannot doubt,
determined to trust to your (my) honor rather than to its own
power.”
This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those alleged
pledges, and in what manner they have been observed. In my message
of the 3d of December last, I stated, in regard to the property of
the United States in South Carolina, that it “has been purchased
for a fair equivalent 'by the consent of the legislature of the
State, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,' etc., and
over these the authority 'to exercise exclusive legislation' has
been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not
believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States
from this property by force; but, if in this I should prove to be
mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders
to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency, the
responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the
heads of the assailants.” This being the condition of the parties
on Saturday, 8th December, four of the representatives from South
Carolina, called upon me and requested an interview. We had an
earnest conversation on the subject of these forts, and the best
means of preventing a collision between the parties, for the
purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for
prudential reasons, that it would be best to put in writing what
they said to me verbally. They did so accordingly, and on Monday
morning the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper
signed by all the representatives from South Carolina, with a
single exception, of which the following is a copy:
“TO HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES BUCHANAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
“In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express
to you our strong convictions that neither the constituted
authorities, nor any body of the people of the State of South
Carolina, will either attack or molest the United States forts in
the harbor of Charleston, previously to the action of the
convention, and, we hope and believe, not until an offer has been
made, through an accredited representative, to negotiate for an
amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and the
Federal Government, provided that no reinforcements shall be sent
into those forts, and their relative military _status_ shall
remain as at present.
”JOHN MCQUEEN,
“WILLIAM PORCHER MILES,
”M. L. BONHAM,
“W. W. BOYCE,
”LAWRENCE M. KEITT.
“WASHINGTON, December 9, 1860.”
And here I must, in justice to myself, remark that, at the time
the paper was presented to me, I objected to the word “provided,”
as it might be construed into an agreement on my part, which I
never would make. They said that nothing was further from their
intention; they did not so understand it, and I should not so
consider it. It is evident they could enter into no reciprocal
agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have
authority to do this, and were acting in their individual
character. I considered it as nothing more, in effect, than the
promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for
the purpose expressed. The event has proved that they have
faithfully kept this promise, although I have never since received
a line from any one of them, or from any member of the convention
on the subject. It is well known that it was my determination, and
this I freely expressed, not to reinforce the forts in the harbor
and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually
attacked, or until I had certain evidence that they were about to
be attacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered
it as a happy omen that peace might still be preserved, and that
time might thus be gained for reflection. This is the whole
foundation for the alleged pledge.
But I acted in the same manner I would have done had I entered
into a positive and formal agreement with parties capable of
contracting, although such an agreement would have been, on my
part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible.
The world knows that I have never sent any reinforcements to the
forts in Charleston harbor, and I have certainly never authorized
any change to be made “in their relative military _status_.”
Bearing upon this subject, I refer you to an order issued by the
Secretary of War, on the 11th instant, to Major Anderson, but not
brought to my notice until the 21st instant. It is as follows:
“Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson, First
Artillery, commanding Fort Moultrie, South Carolina:
“You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a
collision of the troops with the people of this State shall be
avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with
reference to the military force and forts in this harbor, which
shall guard against such a collision. He has, therefore, carefully
abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any
measures which might add to the present excited state of the
public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he
feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain
possession of the public works, or to interfere with their
occupancy. But, as the counsel of rash and impulsive persons may
possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems
it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so
unhappy a contingency. He has, therefore, directed me, verbally,
to give you such instructions.
“You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend
to provoke aggression; and, for that reason, you are not, without
evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which
could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude; but
you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor and, if
attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The
smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy
more than one of the three forts; but an attack on, or an attempt
to take possession of, either of them will be regarded as an act
of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of
them which you deem most proper to increase its power of
resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive
steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed
to a hostile act.
”D. P. BUTLER, Assistant Adjutant General.
“FORT MOULTRIE, SOUTH CAROLINA, December 11, 1860.
“This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell.
“JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War.”
These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson
before his removal to Fort Sumter, with a single exception in
regard to a particular which does not, in any degree, affect the
present question. Under these circumstances it is clear that Major
Anderson acted upon his own responsibility, and without authority,
unless, indeed, he had “tangible evidence of a design to proceed
to a hostile act” on the part of the authorities of South
Carolina, which has not yet been alleged. Still he is a brave and
honorable officer, and justice requires that he should not be
condemned without a fair hearing.
Be this as it may, when I learned that Major Anderson had left
Fort Moultrie, and proceeded to Fort Sumter, my first promptings
were to command him to return to his former position, and there to
await the contingencies presented in his instructions. This could
only have been done, with any degree of safety to the command, by
the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. But before any
steps could possibly have been taken in this direction, we
received information, dated on the 28th instant, that “the
Palmetto flag floated out to the breeze at Castle Pinckney, and a
large military force went over last night (the 27th) to Fort
Moultrie.” Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting
or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you
have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without,
but against my orders, on the very next day after the night when
the removal was made, seized by a military force two of the three
Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and have covered them
under their own flag, instead of that of the United States. At
this gloomy period of our history, startling events succeed each
other rapidly. On the very day (the 27th instant) that possession
of these two forts was taken, the Palmetto flag was raised over
the Federal custom house and post office in Charleston; and on the
same day every officer of the customs—collector, naval officer,
surveyor, and appraisers—resigned their offices. And this,
although it was well known, from the language of my message, that
as an executive officer I felt myself bound to collect the revenue
at the port of Charleston under the existing laws. In the harbor
of Charleston we now find three forts confronting each other, over
all of which the Federal flag floated only four days ago; but now,
over two of them this flag has been supplanted, and the Palmetto
flag has been substituted in its stead. It is under all these
circumstances that I am urged immediately to withdraw the troops
from the harbor of Charleston, and am informed that, without this,
negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do.
Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible
contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any
communication between myself and any human being. But the
inference is, that I am bound to withdraw the troops from the only
fort remaining in the possession of the United States in the
harbor of Charleston, because the officer then in command of all
the forts thought proper, without instructions, to change his
position from one of them to another. I cannot admit the justice
of any such inference.
At this point of writing I have received information, by telegram,
from Captain Humphreys, in command of the arsenal at Charleston,
that “it has to-day (Sunday the 30th) been taken by force of
arms.” It is estimated that the munitions of war belonging to the
United States in this arsenal are worth half a million of dollars.
Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add
that, while it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter, as a portion of
the public property of the United States, against hostile attacks
from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I may
possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defence can
be construed into a menace against the city of Charleston.
With great personal regard, I remain, yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
In all that related to this cabinet crisis of December 29th, I can
see nothing but the prompt action of a wise statesman and a
patriotic President, in preventing a disruption of his cabinet upon
a draft of a State paper, in which expressions had been used that
might have given rise to inferences which the President never
intended should be drawn. Among all Mr. Buchanan’s claims to stand
in history as a great man, be the criticisms made by the three
members of his cabinet on his proposed answer to the South Carolina
commissioners more or less important, there is no one act which
better entitles him to that rank, than the sacrifice which he made
on this occasion of all pride of opinion in respect to the best mode
of doing what he and his advisers alike meant to do, in order that
the country might not, at this critical juncture, be deprived of the
services of men whose services were important to her, and in order
that the Government of the Union might not be placed in a false
position. He had formed no new policy on the subject of secession,
or any new views of his public duty. He never had but one policy,
from the beginning of the secession movement to the 4th of March,
1861. Of that policy no concession of the right of secession, or of
any claim founded on it, ever formed a part.[91]
Footnote 91:
In the _North American Review_, during the year 1879, certain
papers were published under the title of “Diary of a Public Man,”
without disclosure of the authorship. These papers purported to be
passages from a diary kept by a person in some public, or _quasi_
public, position in Washington, during the autumn and winter of
1860-61. Inquiry by the author of this work has failed to elicit
any information of the name of the writer, the editor of the
_Review_ declining to disclose it. The statements made in these
papers are therefore anonymous, and readers will judge how far
they should be regarded as reliable materials of history. There
is, however, one of these statements, which it is my duty to
notice, because the unknown writer professes to make it on the
authority of Senator Douglas. It purports to have been committed
to writing on the 28th of February, 1861, and is as follows:
“Before going, Senator Douglas had a word to say about President
Buchanan and the South Carolina commissioners. He tells me that it
has now been ascertained that the President nominated his
Pennsylvania collector at Charleston on the very day, almost at
the very moment, when he was assuring Colonel Orr, through one of
his retainers, that he was disposed to accede to the demands of
South Carolina, if they were courteously and with proper respect
presented to him. They rewrote their letter accordingly, submitted
it to the President’s agents, who approved it and sent it to the
White House. This, Senator Douglas says, was on January 3d, in the
morning. The commissioners spent the afternoon in various places,
and dined out early. On coming in, they found their letter to the
President awaiting them. It had been returned to them by a
messenger from the White House, about three o'clock P. M., and on
the back was an indorsement, not signed by any one, and in a
clerkly handwriting, to the effect that the President declined to
receive the communication. They ordered their trunks packed at
once, and left for home by way of Richmond, on the four o'clock
morning train, feeling, not unreasonably, that they had been both
duped and insulted.”—(_North American Review_, vol. cxxix, p.
269.)
There are a very few grains of truth in this story, mixed with a
great deal of untruth. Mr. Douglas may have found it floating
about Washington, and may have repeated it to the diarist who
remains shrouded in mystery. The nomination of a collector for the
port of Charleston was made to the Senate on the same day on which
the President returned the letter of the commissioners. This was
on the 2d of January, not the 3d. But it cannot be true that the
President, through any channel, assured Colonel Orr that he was
disposed to accede to the demands of South Carolina, if
courteously and with proper respect presented to him; or that they
had written one letter which was in improper terms, and then wrote
another in proper terms, and sent it, after it had been submitted
to “the President’s agents,” and been by them received. The actual
occurrence was as follows: The sole personal interview which the
President had with the commissioners was on the 28th of December.
On the 29th they presented to him in writing their demand for the
withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston as a
preliminary step to any negotiation. On the 31st the President’s
answer, settled in a meeting of the cabinet, was transmitted to
them. It was a positive and distinct refusal to withdraw the
troops. The reply of the commissioners, dated on the 2d of
January, reached the White House at about three o'clock on that
day, while the cabinet was in session. “It was,” says Mr.
Buchanan, “so violent, unfounded, and disrespectful, and so
regardless of what is due to any individual whom the people have
honored with the office of President, that the reading of it in
the cabinet excited much indignation among all the members.”
(Buchanan’s Defence, p. 183.) The President thereupon wrote upon a
slip of paper, which is now before me, the following words: “This
paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character
that he declines to receive it.” This slip he handed immediately
to his private secretary, to be indorsed on the commissioners'
letter. Of what then happened, I find the following memorandum in
the handwriting of the secretary:
JANUARY 2, 1861.
The paper which, I am told, came in this envelope, was handed to
me by the President at about 3:30 o'clock, with instructions to
enclose it in an envelope and direct it to Hon. R. W. Barnwell,
James H. Adams and James S. Orr, and to deliver it to them or
either of them. I directed it accordingly, and proceeded to the
lodgings of the gentlemen addressed in Franklyn Row. I was
informed at the door by a servant that neither of the gentlemen
were in. Having met Mr. Trescot at the door, I inquired whether
he would receive the paper. He declined to do so, on the ground
that he had no official connection with the gentlemen to whom it
was addressed. At my request he then proceeded with me to the
room which these gentlemen occupied for business purposes, and,
also at my request, witnessed the deposit of the paper upon a
table in that room; the same room in which I found two of the
gentlemen—Messrs. Barnwell and Adams—on a previous occasion
(Monday last), when I delivered to the first-named gentleman a
letter similarly addressed from the President. While I was in
the room Hon. Jefferson Davis and Senator Wigfall came in, the
first of whom certainly, and the latter probably, did see the
paper deposited, as stated. This memorandum made within an hour
after the delivery or deposit of the paper. 68
A. J. GLOSSBRENNER,
Private Secretary to the President.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE.
The next thing that happened was, that after the reading in the
Senate of the President’s special message of January 8th, Mr.
Jefferson Davis produced and had read in the Senate, a copy of
the commissioners' insulting letter. “Such,” says Mr. Buchanan,
“was the temper of that body at the time, that it was received
and read, and entered upon their journal...... It is worth
notice, that whilst this letter of the commissioners was
published at length in the _Congressional Globe_, among the
proceedings of the Senate, their previous letter to the
President of the 28th of December, and his answer thereto of the
31st, were never published in this so-called official register,
although copies of both had accompanied his special message. By
this means, the offensive letter was scattered broadcast over
the country, whilst the letter of the President, to which this
professed to be an answer, was buried in one of the numerous and
long after published volumes of executive documents.”[92] The
story related to the unknown diarist, as he says, by Senator
Douglas, implies that the commissioners, at some time between
the 31st of December and the 2d of January, wrote an uncourteous
and improper reply to the President’s letter of December 31st,
and then substituted for it a courteous and proper one, which
they submitted to “the President’s agents,” who approved of it
and sent it to the White House! That the President, through any
agent, had signified to the commissioners that he was disposed
to accede to their demands, if presented in courteous and proper
terms, is an assertion that is contradicted by the whole tenor
of his letter of December 31st, and by his uniform and steady
refusal to entertain the proposition of an executive surrender
of the forts to South Carolina. Down to the moment when the
commissioners received the President’s letter of December 31st,
he had no occasion to make with them any condition relating to
the _manner_ of their reply; and to suppose that at any time he
meant to allow his compliance with their demands to turn upon
the language in which they presented them, is simply absurd.
What he may have signified to them was, that he would refer
their demands to Congress; not that he would entertain and act
upon them himself. This we know that he did, at the personal
interview on the 28th of December; and he did it in order “to
bring the whole subject before the representatives of the people
in such a manner as to cause them to express an authoritative
opinion on secession and the other dangerous questions then
before the country, and adopt such measures for their peaceable
adjustment as might possibly reclaim even South Carolina
herself; but whether or not, might prevent the other cotton
States from following her evil and rash example.”[93] The
President did not expect that Congress would authorize him to
surrender the forts; but he did believe that it would be
beneficial to have Congress declare that the whole doctrine of
secession was one that could not be accepted by any department
of the Federal Government, as he had declared that it could not
be accepted by the Executive. The South Carolina commissioners,
in their letter of December 28th, claimed that the State has
“resumed the powers she delegated to the Government of the
United States, and has declared her perfect sovereignty and
independence;” that unless Major Anderson’s removal to Fort
Sumter was explained in a satisfactory manner, they must suspend
all discussion of the arrangements by which the mutual interests
of this independent State and the United States could be
adjusted; and then, as a preliminary to any negotiation, they
urged the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of
Charleston, with a distinct intimation of a “bloody issue” if
this should be refused. The President was thus brought to the
alternatives of an Executive admission of the independence of
South Carolina, by reason of her secession, and a withdrawal of
the troops as a consequence, or a bloody issue of questions that
ought to be settled amicably. The President’s answer of the 31st
of December, being a rejection of what was demanded of him,
although entirely courteous, so irritated the commissioners that
they wrote the reply which he returned to them.[94] The truth
is, that this reply contained so many offensive and unfounded
imputations of past bad faith on the part of the President, that
it was impossible for him to receive it. The grossest of these
imputations I have already dealt with.
Footnote 92:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 184.
Footnote 93:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 184.
Footnote 94:
A copy of this intended reply may be found in Mr. Jefferson
Davis’s work, vol. i., Appendix G.
The diarist of the _North American Review_ has related another
story, on the authority of a person whose name, as well as his own,
he conceals, which imputes to Major Anderson a motive of a most
extraordinary character, for taking possession of Fort Sumter. We
thus have the anonymous fortified by the anonymous—_ignotum per
ignotum_—as the historical basis of belief. The statement is that
the diarist’s informant, who had just come from Montgomery and had
passed through Charleston, where he conversed with Major Anderson,
told the diarist, on the 6th of March (1861), in Washington, that
Anderson intended to be governed in his future course by the course
of his own State of Kentucky; that if Kentucky should secede,
Anderson would unhesitatingly obey the orders of a Confederate
secretary of war; that he meant to retain the control of the
position primarily in the interests of his own State of Kentucky;
and that for this reason he removed from Fort Moultrie where he was
liable to be controlled by the authorities of South Carolina.[95]
The diarist took his informant to President Lincoln, who heard the
tale repeated, but parried it by one or two of his characteristic
jests, and the diarist was disappointed in not being able to divine
how Mr. Lincoln was affected by the narrative. It will require
something more than this kind of unsupported and unauthenticated
nonsense to destroy Major Anderson’s reputation as a loyal officer
of the United States. What he might have done with his commission,
in case Kentucky had joined the Southern Confederacy, is one thing.
What he would have done with Fort Sumter is a very different matter.
His answer to a letter of General Dix does not accord with the
account of his intentions given by the unknown informant of the
unknown diarist.[96]
Footnote 95:
_A North American Review_, vol. cxxix, pp. 484-485.
Footnote 96:
See the correspondence between General Dix and Major Anderson,
_post_.
CHAPTER XIX.
December, 1860,—January, 1861.
RESIGNATION OF GENERAL CASS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE—RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CABINET WHICH FOLLOWED AFTER THE
RESIGNATIONS OF MESSRS. COBB, THOMPSON, AND THOMAS.
Serious and embarrassing as was the situation of the country, it was
not to have been expected that the first person to leave an
administration, which had worked together with entire harmony for
nearly four years, would be the Secretary of State, General Cass. I
shall make but few comments on this occurrence. The correspondence
which took place between General Cass and the President, and a
memorandum made by the latter at the time, sufficiently show what
degree of necessity there was for the General’s resignation. With
reference to the reason which he assigned for it, the date of his
letter is important to be observed. He tendered his resignation at a
time when every consideration of prudence forbade the sending of
further military or naval forces into the harbor of Charleston;
after his advice on this point had been overruled by the opinions of
all the other members of the cabinet, and of the President; before
the State of South Carolina had adopted her ordinance of secession;
and while the collector of the revenue at Charleston was still
faithfully, and without molestation, performing his duties. If it
was the General’s sagacity which led him to foresee that the State
would “secede,” that the collector would resign, and that the
revenue would have to be collected outside of the custom house, and
by some other officer, his suggestions could not be carried out by
the President without authority of law, and the whole subject was
then before Congress, submitted to it by the President’s annual
message, in which the General himself had fully concurred. That the
General regretted his resignation, and would have withdrawn it, if
permitted, is now made certain by the President’s memorandum, which
I shall presently cite.
[SECRETARY CASS TO THE PRESIDENT.]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, December 12th, 1860.
SIR:—
The present alarming crisis in our national affairs has engaged
your serious consideration, and in your recent message, you have
expressed to Congress, and through Congress to the country, the
views you have formed respecting the questions, fraught with the
most momentous consequences, which are now presented to the
American people for solution. With the general principles laid
down in that message I fully concur, and I appreciate with warm
sympathy its patriotic appeals and suggestions. What measures it
is competent and proper for the Executive to adopt under existing
circumstances, is a subject which has received your most careful
attention, and with the anxious hope, as I well know, from having
participated in the deliberations, that tranquillity and good
feeling may be speedily restored to this agitated and divided
Confederacy.
In some points which I deem of vital importance, it has been my
misfortune to differ from you.
It has been my decided opinion, which for some time past I have
urged at various meetings of the cabinet, that additional troops
should be sent to reinforce the forts in the harbor of Charleston,
with a view to their better defence, should they be attacked, and
that an armed vessel should likewise be ordered there, to aid, if
necessary, in the defence, and also, should it be required, in the
collection of the revenue; and it is yet my opinion that these
measures should be adopted without the least delay. I have
likewise urged the expediency of immediately removing the custom
house at Charleston to one of the forts in the port, and of making
arrangements for the collection of the duties there, by having a
collector and other officers ready to act when necessary, so that
when the office may become vacant, the proper authority may be
there to collect the duties on the part of the United States. I
continue to think that these arrangements should be immediately
made. While the right and the responsibility of deciding belong to
you, it is very desirable that at this perilous juncture there
should be, as far as possible, unanimity in your councils, with a
view to safe and efficient action.
I have, therefore, felt it my duty to tender you my resignation of
the office of Secretary of State, and to ask your permission to
retire from that official association with yourself and the
members of your cabinet, which I have enjoyed during almost four
years, without the occurrence of a single incident to interrupt
the personal intercourse which has so happily existed.
I cannot close this letter without bearing my testimony to the
zealous and earnest devotion to the best interests of the country,
with which, during a term of unexampled trials and troubles, you
have sought to discharge the duties of your high station.
Thanking you for the kindness and confidence you have not ceased
to manifest towards me, and with the expression of my warmest
regard both for yourself and the gentlemen of your cabinet, I am,
sir, with great respect,
Your obedient servant,
LEWIS CASS.
[THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL CASS.]
WASHINGTON, December 15th, 1860.
SIR:—
I have received your resignation of the office of Secretary of
State with surprise and regret. After we had passed through nearly
the whole term of the administration with mutual and cordial
friendship and regard, I had cherished the earnest hope that
nothing might occur to disturb our official relations until its
end. You have decided differently, and I have no right to
complain.
I must express my gratification at your concurrence with the
general principles laid down in my late message, and your
appreciation, “with warm sympathy, of its patriotic appeals and
suggestions.” This I value very highly; and I rejoice that we
concur in the opinion that Congress does not possess the power,
under the Constitution, to coerce a State by force of arms to
remain in the Confederacy.
The question on which we unfortunately differ is that of ordering
a detachment of the army and navy to Charleston, and is correctly
stated in your letter of resignation. I do not intend to argue
this question. Suffice it to say, that your remarks upon the
subject were heard by myself and the cabinet, with all the respect
due to your high position, your long experience, and your
unblemished character; but they failed to convince us of the
necessity and propriety, under existing circumstances, of adopting
such a measure. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy, through
whom the orders must have issued to reinforce the forts, did not
concur in your views; and whilst the whole responsibility for the
refusal rested upon myself, they were the members of the cabinet
more directly interested. You may have judged correctly on this
important question, and your opinion is entitled to grave
consideration; but under my convictions of duty, and believing as
I do that no present necessity exists for a resort to force for
the protection of the public property, it was impossible for me to
have risked a collision of arms in the harbor of Charleston, and
thereby defeated the reasonable hope which I cherish of the final
triumph of the Constitution and of the Union.
I have only to add that you will take with you into retirement my
heartfelt wishes that the evening of your days may be prosperous
and happy.
Very respectfully yours,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
The following memorandum, relating to the resignation of General
Cass, is now before me in the President’s handwriting:
Tuesday, Dec. 11th, 1860.
General Cass announced to me his purpose to resign.
Saturday, December 15th.
Judge Black, in the evening, delivered me General Cass’s letter of
resignation, dated on Wednesday, December 12th.
I was very much surprised on the 11th December to learn from
General Cass that he intended to resign. All our official
intercourse up till this moment had been marked by unity of
purpose, sentiment and action. Indeed, the General had always been
treated by me with extreme kindness. This was due to his age and
his high character. Most of the important despatches which bear
his name were written, or chiefly written, for him by Mr.
Appleton, Judge Black and myself. His original drafts were
generally so prolix and so little to the point, that they had to
be written over again entirely, or so little was suffered to
remain as to make them new despatches. All this was done with so
much delicacy and tenderness, that, to the extent of my knowledge,
General Cass always cheerfully and even gratefully assented. So
timid was he, and so little confidence had he in himself, that it
was difficult for him to arrive at any decision of the least
consequence. He brought many questions to me which he ought to
have settled himself. When obliged to decide for himself, he
called Mr. Cobb and Judge Black to his assistance. In the course
of the administration I have been often reminded of the opinion of
him expressed to me by General Jackson.
I had been at the War Department a short time before General Cass
was appointed minister to France. In the course of conversation,
he made particular inquiries of me as to what I thought an
American minister would have to expend at the principal courts
abroad. I told him what it had cost me at St. Petersburg, and what
would be the probable cost at London and Paris.
The next time I met General Jackson, I said to him, “So you are
going to send General Cass to Paris.” His answer was, “How do you
know that?” I said, “I can't tell you, but I believe it.” His
reply was, “It is true. I can no longer consent to do the duties
both of President and Secretary of War. General Cass will decide
nothing for himself, but comes to me constantly with great bundles
of papers, to decide questions for him which he ought to decide
for himself.”
His resignation was the more remarkable on account of the cause he
assigned for it. When my late message (of December, 1860) was read
to the cabinet before it was printed, General Cass expressed his
unreserved and hearty approbation of it, accompanied by every sign
of deep and sincere feeling. He had but one objection to it, and
this was, _that it was not sufficiently strong against the power
of Congress to make war upon a State for the purpose of compelling
her to remain in the Union_; and the denial of this power was made
more emphatic and distinct upon his own suggestion.
On Monday, 17th December, 1860, both Mr. Thompson and Judge Black
informed me that they had held conversations with General Cass on
the subject of his resignation, and that he had expressed a desire
to withdraw it, and return to the cabinet. I gave this no
encouragement. His purpose to resign had been known for several
days, and his actual resignation had been prepared three days
before it was delivered to me. The world knew all about it, and
had he returned, the explanation would have been very
embarrassing. Besides, I knew full well that his fears would have
worried the administration as well as himself, in the difficult
times which were then upon us. His great error was, that he would
assume no responsibility which he could possibly avoid.
There is strong reason to think that General Cass was mistaken in
saying in his letter to the President that he had proposed in the
cabinet to remove the Charleston custom house to one of the forts or
to appoint a new collector. In a draft of the President’s answer to
General Cass, prepared by Judge Black, but which the President did
not use, it is stated that none of the members of the cabinet had
any recollection of such a proposal. But if it had been made, it
would have been improper to collect the revenue in any other than
the ordinary way, and at the proper place, without new legislation,
or at least until circumstances had made a military collection
absolutely necessary.
It is not to be doubted that the resignation of General Cass was a
misfortune to the administration, because it gave to its enemies
opportunity to say that he distrusted either the present or the
future course of the President. But his place was immediately
supplied by the appointment of Judge Black as Secretary of State.
Edwin M. Stanton became Attorney General, in the room of Judge
Black.[97]
Footnote 97:
How Mr. Stanton came to receive this appointment, may be learned
by referring to a private letter from Mr. Buchanan, quoted
hereafter.
In the early part of January, 1861, while the President was still
engaged in considering the measures proper to be adopted in regard
to Fort Sumter, other changes in the cabinet took place. After the
resignations of General Cass, Governor Floyd, and Mr. Cobb, the
cabinet stood as follows: Jeremiah S. Black, of Pennsylvania,
Secretary of State, Philip F. Thomas, of Maryland, Secretary of the
Treasury, Joseph Holt, of Kentucky, Secretary of War, Isaac Toucey,
of Connecticut, Secretary of the Navy, Jacob Thompson, of
Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior, Horatio King, of Maine,
Postmaster General, Edwin M. Stanton, of Pennsylvania, Attorney
General. Mr. Thomas, who had been Commissioner of Patents, was made
Secretary of the Treasury in the place of Mr. Cobb, on the 8th of
December. He resigned on the 11th of January, and the President
immediately invited General Dix to fill the office. General Dix at
once repaired to Washington, and during the remainder of the
administration he was the guest of the President at the White House.
His society, and his important aid in the administration of the
Government, afforded to Mr. Buchanan the highest satisfaction.[98]
On the resignation of Mr. Thompson as Secretary of the Interior,
that department was not filled, but the duties were ably and
faithfully performed by Moses Kelly, the Chief Clerk, until the
close of the administration. The circumstances attending the
resignations of Messrs. Thompson and Thomas are sufficiently
disclosed by the correspondence.
Footnote 98:
General Dix had for some time held the office of Postmaster in the
City of New York; a place he consented to fill under the
circumstances disclosed in the following letter to President
Buchanan:
NEW YORK, May 14,1860.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 12th inst., and am greatly
indebted to you for your kind suggestion in regard to the
appointment of commissioners under the treaty with Paraguay. I
should regret very much to decline any service in which you think
I could be useful. I am at this moment very much occupied here
with matters which concern the comfort of my family, and I should
wish, before giving a final answer, to communicate with my wife,
who is in Boston. I had scarcely read your letter before I
received a note from Mr. Schell, who desired to see me in regard
to the astounding defalcation in the city post office. He said it
was deemed important to place some one in the office in whom the
administration could confide, and that my name had been suggested
among others. Now, my dear sir, you can readily understand that it
is a place I do not want, and could not consent to hold for any
length of time. But, as I said to Mr. Schell, if you desire it,
and think I can be of any service to your administration, in
cooperating with the proper department to put matters on a right
footing, I should not, under the peculiar circumstances, feel at
liberty to disregard your wishes. In other words, I think you have
the right, under the exigencies of the case, to command the
services of any friend. I am, dear sir, sincerely yours,
JOHN A. DIX.
For an account of General Dix’s connection with the New York post
office, and of his services to Mr. Buchanan’s administration as
Secretary of the Treasury, see his Life, by his son, the Rev.
Morgan Dix, S. T. D., recently published by Harper & Brothers.
[SECRETARY THOMPSON TO THE PRESIDENT.]
WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan 8, 1861.
TO HIS EXCELLENCY, JAMES BUCHANAN, PRESIDENT U. S.:—
SIR:—It is with extreme regret I have just learned that additional
troops have been ordered to Charleston. This subject has been
frequently discussed in cabinet council, and when on Monday night,
31st of December ult., the orders for reinforcements to Fort
Sumter were countermanded, I distinctly understood from you, that
no order of the kind would be made without being previously
considered and decided in cabinet. It is true that on Wednesday,
January 2d, this subject was again discussed in cabinet, but
certainly no conclusion was reached, and the War Department was
not justified in ordering reinforcements without something [more]
than was then said. I learn, however, this morning, for the first
time, that the steamer Star of the West sailed from New York on
last Saturday night with two hundred and fifty men under Lieut.
Bartlett, bound for Fort Sumter. Under these circumstances I feel
myself bound to resign my commission as one of your constitutional
advisers into your hands. With high respect your obedient servant,
J. THOMPSON.
[THE PRESIDENT TO MR. THOMPSON.]
WASHINGTON, January 9, 1861.
SIR:—
I have received and accepted your resignation on yesterday of the
office of Secretary of the Interior.
On Monday evening, 31st December, 1860, I suspended the orders
which had been issued by the War and Navy Department to send the
Brooklyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumter. Of this I informed
you on the same evening. I stated to you my reasons for this
suspension, which you knew from its nature would be speedily
removed. In consequence of your request, however, I promised that
orders should not be renewed “without being previously considered
and decided in cabinet.”
This promise was faithfully observed on my part. In order to carry
it into effect, I called a special cabinet meeting on Wednesday,
2d January, 1861, in which the question of sending reinforcements
to Fort Sumter was amply discussed both by yourself and others.
The decided majority of opinions was against you. At this moment
the answer of the South Carolina “commissioners” to my
communication to them of the 31st December was received and read.
It produced much indignation among members of the cabinet. After a
further brief conversation I employed the following language: “It
is now all over, and reinforcements must be sent.” Judge Black
said, at the moment of my decision, that after this letter the
cabinet would be unanimous, and I heard no dissenting voice.
Indeed, the spirit and tone of the letter left no doubt on my mind
that Fort Sumter would be immediately attacked, and hence the
necessity of sending reinforcements there without delay.
Whilst you admit “that on Wednesday, January 2d, this subject was
again discussed in cabinet,” you say, “but certainly no conclusion
was reached, and the War Department was not justified in ordering
reinforcements without something [more] than was then said.” You
are certainly mistaken in alleging that no “conclusion was
reached.” In this your recollection is entirely different from
that of your four oldest colleagues in the cabinet. Indeed, my
language was so unmistakable, that the Secretaries of War and the
Navy proceeded to act upon it without any further intercourse with
myself than what you heard or might have heard me say. You had
been so emphatic in opposing these reinforcements, that I thought
you would resign in consequence of my decision. I deeply regret
that you have been mistaken in point of fact, though I firmly
believe honestly mistaken. Still it is certain you have not the
less been mistaken. Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. THOMPSON TO THE PRESIDENT.]
WASHINGTON CITY, January 10, 1861.
TO HIS EXCELLENCY, JAMES BUCHANAN, PRESIDENT OF U. S.:—
DEAR SIR:—In your reply to my note of 8th inst., accepting my
resignation, you are right when you say that “you (I) had been so
emphatic in opposing these reinforcements that I (you) thought you
(I) would resign in consequence of my decision.” I came to the
cabinet on Wednesday, January 2d, with the full expectation I
would resign my commission before I left your council board, and I
know you do not doubt that my action would have been promptly
taken, had I understood on that day that you had decided that
“reinforcements must now be sent.” For more than forty days, I
have regarded the display of a military force in Charleston or
along the Southern coast by the United States as tantamount to
war. Of this opinion you and all my colleagues of the cabinet have
been frankly advised. Believing that such would be the
construction of an order for additional troops, I have been
anxious, and have used all legitimate means to save you and your
administration from precipitating the country into an inevitable
conflict, the end of which no human being could foresee. My
counsels have not prevailed, troops have been sent, and I hope yet
that a kind Providence may avert the consequences I have
apprehended, and that peace be maintained.
I am now a private citizen, and, as such, I am at liberty to give
expression to my private feelings towards you personally.
In all my official intercourse with you, though often overruled, I
have been treated with uniform kindness and consideration.
I know your patriotism, your honesty and purity of character, and
admire your high qualities of head and heart. If we can sink all
the circumstances attending this unfortunate order for
reinforcements—on which, though we may differ, yet I am willing to
admit that you are as conscientious, as I claim to be—you have
been frank, direct, and confiding in me. I have never been
subjected to the first mortification, or entertained for a moment
the first unkind feeling. These facts determined me to stand by
you and your administration as long as there was any hope left
that our present difficulties could find a peaceful solution. If
the counsels of some members of your cabinet prevail, I am utterly
without hope. Every duty you have imposed on me has been
discharged with scrupulous fidelity on my part, and it would give
me infinite pain even to suspect that you are not satisfied.
Whatever may be our respective futures, I shall ever be your
personal friend, and shall vindicate your fame and administration,
of which I have been a part, and shall ever remember with
gratitude the many favors and kindnesses heretofore shown to me
and mine.
I go hence to make the destiny of Mississippi my destiny. My life,
fortune, and all I hold most dear shall be devoted to her cause.
In doing this, I believe before God, I am serving the ends of
truth and justice and good government. Now, as ever, your personal
friend,
J. THOMPSON.
[THE PRESIDENT TO MR. THOMPSON.]
WASHINGTON, January 11, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Without referring to any recent political question, your favor of
yesterday has afforded me the highest degree of satisfaction. You
know that for many years I have entertained a warm regard for you,
and this has been greatly increased by our official and personal
intercourse since you became a member of my cabinet. No man could
have more ably, honestly, and efficiently performed the various
and complicated duties of the Interior Department than yourself,
and it has always been my pride and pleasure to express this
opinion on all suitable occasions. I regret extremely that the
troubles of the times have rendered it necessary for us to part;
but whatever may be your future destiny, I shall ever feel a deep
interest in your welfare and happiness.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[SECRETARY THOMAS TO THE PRESIDENT.]
WASHINGTON, D. C., January 11, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
It has not been in my power, as you are aware, to agree with you
and with a majority of your constitutional advisers, in the
measures which have been adopted in reference to the present
condition of things in South Carolina; nor do I think it at all
probable that I shall be able to concur in the views which you
entertain, so far as I understand them, touching the authority
under existing laws, to enforce the collection of the customs at
the port of Charleston.
Under such circumstances, after mature consideration, I have
concluded that I cannot longer continue in your cabinet without
embarrassment to you, and an exposure of myself to the just
criticisms of those who are acquainted with my opinions upon the
subject. I, therefore, deem it proper to tender my resignation of
the commission I now hold as Secretary of the Treasury, to take
effect when my successor is appointed and qualified. In doing so,
I avail myself of the occasion to offer you the assurance of the
high respect and regard which, personally, I entertain for you,
and with which I have the honor to be,
Your friend and obedient servant,
PHILIP F. THOMAS.
[THE PRESIDENT TO MR. THOMAS.]
WASHINGTON, January 12, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your letter of yesterday, resigning the office of
Secretary of the Treasury, to take effect when your successor
shall be appointed and qualified.
I very much regret that circumstances, in your opinion, have
rendered it necessary. Without referring to those circumstances, I
am happy to state, in accepting your resignation, that during the
brief period you have held this important office, you have
performed its duties in a manner altogether satisfactory to
myself.
Wishing you health, prosperity, and happiness, I remain,
Very respectfully, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
CHAPTER XX.
1860—December.
THE RESIGNATION OF SECRETARY FLOYD, AND ITS CAUSE—REFUTATION OF THE
STORY OF HIS STEALING THE ARMS OF THE UNITED STATES—GENERAL
SCOTT'S ASSERTIONS DISPROVED.
Among the assertions made by the South Carolina commissioners in
their letter to the President of December 28th, there was one to
which it is now specially necessary to advert. “Since our arrival,”
they said, “an officer of the United States, acting, as we are
assured, not only without, but against your orders, has dismantled
one fort and occupied another, thus altering to a most important
extent the condition of affairs under which we came.” The person who
assured them that Anderson had acted without and against the
President’s orders, was Mr. Floyd, the Secretary of War, who had
instructed Buell what orders to give to Anderson, and who knew well
what the orders were. This brings me, therefore, to the point at
which Mr. Floyd’s conversion took place, from an avowed and
consistent opponent of secession to one of its most strenuous
supporters:—a conversion which was so sudden, that between the 23d
of December and the arrival of the South Carolina commissioners, on
the 26th, the Secretary boldly assumed a position entirely at
variance with all his previous conduct, and thereafter became an
intimate associate with disunion Senators, who had always, to this
point, condemned his official conduct. The cause of this remarkable
change was the discovery, by the President, of an act implicating
Mr. Floyd in a very irregular proceeding, which had no connection
whatever with the relations between the Federal Government and the
State of South Carolina, or with the subject of secession.
On the 22d of December, the President learned that 870 State bonds
for $1,000 each, held in trust by the Government for different
Indian tribes, had been abstracted from the Interior Department by
one Godard Bailey, the clerk who had charge of them, and had been
delivered to William H. Russell, a member of the firm of “Russell,
Majors & Waddell.” Upon examination, it was found that the clerk had
substituted for the abstracted bonds bills delivered to him by
Russell, drawn by his firm on Floyd as Secretary of War, and by
Floyd accepted and indorsed, for the precise amount of the bonds,
$870,000. The acceptances were thirteen in number, commencing on the
13th of September, 1860, the last one of the series, dated December
13th, 1860, being for the precise sum necessary to make the
aggregate amount of the whole number of bills exactly equal to the
amount of the abstracted bonds. Bailey stated that he held the
acceptances “as collateral security for the return of the bonds.”
What happened on this discovery should be told in Mr. Buchanan’s own
words, as I find them in his handwriting, in a paper drawn up
apparently for the information of some one who was entitled to know
the facts.
I do not recollect the precise time when I had the only
conversation which I ever held with Governor Floyd on the subject
of your inquiry. It was most probably soon after Mr. Benjamin had
the interview with myself, the particulars of which I cannot now
recall; but it is proper to state that I learned from another
source that acceptances of Mr. Floyd had been offered for discount
in Wall Street.
When I next saw Secretary Floyd I asked him if it were true that
he had been issuing acceptances to Russell & Company on bills
payable at a future day. He said he had done so in a few cases.
That he had done this in no instance until after he had
ascertained that the amount of the bills would be due to them
under their contract, before the bills reached maturity; that the
trains had started on their way to Utah, and there could be no
possible loss to the Government. That the Government at that time
was largely indebted to Russell & Company, and the bills which he
had accepted would be paid, when they became due, out of the
appropriation for that purpose. I asked him, under what authority
he had accepted these drafts. He said, this had been done under
the practice of the Department. I said, I had never heard of such
a practice, and if such a practice existed, I considered it
altogether improper, and should be discontinued. I asked him if
there was any law which authorized such acceptances. He said there
was no law, he believed, for it, and no law against it. I replied,
if there was no law for it, this was conclusive that he had no
such authority. He said, I need give myself no trouble about the
matter. That the acceptances already issued should be promptly
paid out of the money due to Russell & Company, and he would never
accept another such draft. I might rest perfectly easy on the
subject. I had not the least doubt that he would fulfill his
promise in good faith. He never said another word to me upon the
subject. I was, therefore, never more astonished than at the
exposure which was made that he had accepted drafts to the amount
of $870,000, and that these were substituted in the safe at the
Interior Department, as a substitute for the Indian bonds which
had been purloined.
I took immediate measures to intimate to him, through a
distinguished mutual friend, that he could no longer remain in the
cabinet, and that he ought to resign. I expected his resignation
hourly; but a few days after, he came into the cabinet with a bold
front, and said he could remain in it no longer unless I would
instantly recall Major Anderson and his forces from Fort Sumter.
There were, as Mr. Buchanan states, besides the acceptances lodged
in the Interior Department, other acceptances of Floyd’s, as
Secretary of War, afloat in Wall Street. Of course, Mr. Floyd was
aware of this; and having been told by the President that he must
resign, he boldly determined to resign on a feigned issue, making
for himself a bridge on which he could pass over to the secession
side of the great national controversy.
The arrival of the South Carolina commissioners in Washington on the
26th December, afforded to the Secretary an opportunity to concoct
his impudent pretext. It is impossible to suppose that he believed
either that Anderson had acted without orders or against orders, or
in violation of any pledge given by the President. The orders were,
in one sense, his own; and as to any pledge, he could not have been
ignorant of what really took place between the President and the
South Carolina members of Congress on the 10th of December. When he
instructed Major Buell in the orders that were to be given to
Anderson, the Secretary was, in giving those orders, loyal to the
Government whose officer he was, and his conduct in regard to the
acceptances was unknown to the President. When the South Carolina
commissioners arrived in Washington, he was a man whose resignation
of office had been required of him by the President. He learned that
the commissioners were about to complain that Anderson had violated
a pledge. Taking time by the forelock, he entered a session of the
cabinet on the evening of the 27th, the next day after the arrival
of the commissioners, and, in a discourteous and excited manner,
read to the President and his colleagues a paper which, on the 29th,
he embodied in a letter of resignation, that read as follows:
[SECRETARY FLOYD TO THE PRESIDENT.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, December 29th, 1860.
SIR:—
On the evening of the 27th instant, I read the following paper to
you, in the presence of the cabinet:
“COUNCIL CHAMBER, EXECUTIVE MANSION, }
“DECEMBER 27TH, 1860. }
SIR:—
“It is evident now, from the action of the commander at Fort
Moultrie, that the solemn pledges of this Government have been
violated by Major Anderson. In my judgment, but one remedy is now
left us by which to vindicate our honor and prevent civil war. It
is in vain now to hope for confidence on the part of the people of
South Carolina in any further pledges as to the action of the
military. One remedy only is left, and that is to withdraw the
garrison from the harbor of Charleston altogether. I hope the
President will allow me to make that order at once. This order, in
my judgment, can alone prevent bloodshed and civil war.
“JOHN B. FLOYD,
“Secretary of War.
“TO THE PRESIDENT.”
I then considered the honor of the administration pledged to
maintain the troops in the position they occupied; for such had
been the assurances given to the gentlemen of South Carolina who
had a right to speak for her. South Carolina, on the other hand,
gave reciprocal pledges that no force should be brought by them
against the troops or against the property of the United States.
The sole object of both parties to these reciprocal pledges was to
prevent collision and the effusion of blood, in the hope that some
means might be found for a peaceful accommodation of the existing
troubles, the two Houses of Congress having both raised committees
looking to that object.
Thus affairs stood, until the action of Major Anderson, taken
unfortunately while commissioners were on their way to this
capital on a peaceful mission, looking to the avoidance of
bloodshed, has complicated matters in the existing manner. Our
refusal, or even delay, to place affairs back as they stood under
our agreement, invites collision, and must inevitably inaugurate
civil war in our land. I can not consent to be the agent of such a
calamity.
I deeply regret to feel myself under the necessity of tendering to
you my resignation as Secretary of War, because I can no longer
hold it, under my convictions of patriotism, nor with honor,
subjected as I am to the violation of solemn pledges and plighted
faith.
With the highest personal regard, I am most truly yours,
JOHN B. FLOYD.
In a subsequent note to the President, Mr. Floyd offered to perform
the duties of the War Department until his successor had been
appointed. Without taking any notice of this offer, and with the
contemptuous silence that could alone have followed such conduct,
the President instantly accepted his resignation, and Postmaster
General Holt was transferred to the War Department _ad interim_.
Thus passed out of the service of the United States John B. Floyd,
once, like his father, Governor of Virginia. He was a man fitted by
nature, by education, and by position, for better things than such
an ending of an official career. He was no secessionist from
conviction, and until the discovery of his irregular acts in issuing
acceptances of his Department, he never pretended to be. He seems to
have been stung by a consciousness that his letter of resignation
was in a bad tone. On the 30th of December he addressed to the
President a letter of apology, which, so far as I know, remained
unanswered.
[MR. FLOYD TO THE PRESIDENT.]
WASHINGTON, December 30th, 1860.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I understand from General Jefferson Davis that you regard my
letter of resignation as offensive to you. I beg to assure you
that I am deeply grieved by this intelligence. Nothing could have
been further from my wish, and nothing more repugnant to my
feelings. If there is any sentence or expression which you regard
in that light, I will take sincere pleasure in changing it. The
facts and the ideas alone were in my mind when I penned the
letter, and I repeat that nothing could have been further from my
intention than to wound your feelings. My friendship for you has
been and is sincere and unselfish. I have never been called upon
by an imperious sense of duty to perform any act which has given
me so much pain, as to separate myself from your administration,
and this feeling would be greatly aggravated by the belief that in
this separation I had said anything which could give you pain or
cause of offence.
I beg to assure you that I am very truly and sincerely your
friend,
JOHN B. FLOYD.
But justice must be done to Mr. Floyd, badly as he conducted himself
after the discovery of his irregular and unauthorized acceptances of
drafts on his Department. The impression has long prevailed among
the people of the North that the Confederate States did their
fighting with cannon, rifles and muskets treacherously placed within
their reach by Mr. Buchanan’s Secretary of War. The common belief
has been that Mr. Floyd had for a long time pursued a plan of his
own for distributing the arms of the United States in the South, in
anticipation of a disruption of the Union at no distant day. General
Scott, in 1862, took up this charge in his public controversy with
Mr. Buchanan, and endeavored to establish it. He signally failed.
The General, in 1862, thought that he had discovered that the revolt
of the Southern States had been planned a long time before the
election of Mr. Lincoln, and that it was to be carried out in the
event of “the election of any Northern man to the Presidency.” It
had become a sort of fashion, in 1862, in certain quarters, to
believe, or to profess to believe, in the existence of this long
standing plot. There never was a rational ground for such a belief.
It is not true, as a matter of fact, that at any time before the
nomination of Mr. Lincoln, there was any transfer of arms to places
in the Southern States, to which any suspicion of an improper design
ought to attach. It is not true that at any time after Mr. Lincoln’s
nomination and before his election, there was any transfer of arms
whatever from the Northern arsenals of the United States into the
Southern States. The political history of the country, prior to the
nomination of Mr. Lincoln and prior to the Democratic Convention at
Charleston, does not warrant the belief that any considerable
section of the Southern people, or any of their prominent leaders,
were looking forward to a Presidential election likely to be so
conducted and so to terminate, as to produce among them the
conviction that it would be unsafe for them to remain in the Union.
Even after Mr. Lincoln’s nomination, and after the division of the
Democratic party into two factions, resulting in the nomination of
two Democratic candidates (Breckinridge and Douglas), with a fourth
candidate in the field, Mr. Bell, nominated by the “old line Whigs,”
it was not so morally certain that the Republican candidate would be
elected, as to give rise, before the election, to serious plots or
preparations for breaking up the Union. Mr. Lincoln obtained but a
majority of 57 electoral votes over all his competitors. It was the
sectional character of his 180 electoral votes out of 303—the whole
180 being drawn from the non-slaveholding States—and the sectional
character of the “platform” on which he was elected, and not the
naked fact that he was a Northern man, that the secessionists of the
cotton States were able to use as the lever by which to carry their
States out of the Union. It is necessary to follow the precipitation
of the revolt through the various steps by which it was
accomplished, after the election of Mr. Lincoln, before one can
reach a sound conclusion as to the causes and methods by which it
was brought about. Whoever studies the votes in the secession
conventions of the cotton States prior to the bombardment of Fort
Sumter, will find that even in that region there was a strong Union
party in all those States excepting South Carolina, which could not
have been overborne and trampled down, by any other means than by
the appeals to popular fears which the secessionists drew from the
peculiar circumstances of the election. He will find reason to ask
himself why it was that in these successive conventions, rapidly
accomplished between December, 1860, and February, 1861, the
Unionists were unable to prevail; and he will find the most
important answer to this inquiry in the fact that it was because the
advocates of secession were able, from the circumstances of the
election, to produce the conviction that the whole North was
alienated in feeling from the South, and determined to trample on
Southern rights. It was this that worked upon a sensitive and
excited people. It was not the accomplishment of a long meditated
plot to destroy the Union.
But if there ever was such a plot, there is not the slightest
ground for believing that Secretary Floyd, or any other member of
Mr. Buchanan’s cabinet, was a party to it. It was, however, in
1862, one of the means resorted to in order to make the Buchanan
administration odious, that this charge was made against the
Secretary of War; and when it was adopted by General Scott, it was
supposed that his authority had given weight to it. He saw fit to
put it in his public controversy with Mr. Buchanan in the
following form: That Secretary Floyd “removed 115,000 extra
muskets and rifles, with all their implements and ammunition, from
Northern repositories to Southern arsenals, so that on the
breaking out of the maturing rebellion, they might be found
without cost, except to the United States, in the most convenient
positions for distribution among the insurgents. So, too, of the
one hundred and forty pieces of heavy artillery, which the same
Secretary ordered from Pittsburgh to Ship Island in Lake Borgne
and Galveston in Texas, for forts not erected. Accidentally
learning, early in March, that, under this posthumous order the
shipment of those guns had commenced, I communicated the fact to
Secretary Holt (acting for Secretary Cameron) just in time to
defeat the robbery.”[99]
Footnote 99:
General Scott’s letter of November 8, 1862, published in the
_National Intelligencer_.
The anachronisms of this assertion, when it met the eye of Mr.
Buchanan in November, 1862, and its apparent ignorance of the facts,
may well have amazed him. The whole subject had undergone a thorough
investigation by a committee of the House of Representatives in the
winter of 1860-61, in consequence of the rumors which had been sent
afloat after the resignation of Secretary Floyd. The new Secretary
of War, Mr. Holt, not waiting for the exercise of the power
conferred on the committee to send for persons and papers, threw
open all the records of the Ordnance Bureau. The resolution ordering
the investigation was adopted on the 31st of December, 1860, and the
committee were authorized to report in preference to all other
business. It appeared that there were two Acts of Congress under
which Secretary Floyd had proceeded. One was an Act of March 3d,
1825, authorizing the Secretary of War to sell any arms, ammunition,
or other military stores, which, upon proper inspection, should be
found unfit for the public service. The other was a long standing
act for arming the militia of the States, by distributing to them
their respective quotas of arms. Whatever was done under either of
these laws was necessarily done by the officers and attachés of the
Ordnance Bureau. Nothing could have been done clandestinely, or
without being made a matter of record. At the head of the Ordnance
Bureau was Colonel Craig, one of the most loyal and faithful of the
many loyal and faithful officers of the army. Under him was Captain
(afterwards General) Maynadier, as chivalrously true an officer as
the United States ever had. Without the knowledge of these officers,
the Secretary of War could not have sold or removed a musket. The
investigations of the Congressional committee embraced four
principal heads: 1st. What arms had been sold? 2d. What arms had
been distributed to the States? 3d. What arms had been sent for
storage in Southern arsenals of the United States? 4th. What
ordnance had been transferred from Northern arsenals of the United
States to Southern forts?
1. Under the first of these inquiries the committee ascertained and
reported that, in the spring of 1859, 50,000 muskets, part of a lot
of 190,000, condemned by the inspecting officers “as unsuitable for
the public service,” were offered for sale. They reported the bids
and contracts, some of which were and some were not carried out. The
result of actual sales and deliveries left many of them in the hands
of the Government. In speaking of these muskets generally, Colonel
Craig testified before the committee that it was always advisable to
get rid of them whenever there was a sufficient number of the new
rifled muskets to take their places, the old ones not being strong
enough to be rifled. In the spring of 1859, therefore, a year before
the nomination of Mr. Lincoln, as Mr. Buchanan has well said, if the
cotton States were then meditating a rebellion, they lost an
opportunity to buy a lot of poor arms condemned by the inspecting
officers of the United States.[100] The only Southern State that
made a bid was Louisiana, which purchased 5000 of these condemned
muskets, and finally took but 2500. One lot was bid for by an agent
of the Sardinian government, who afterwards refused to take them on
some dispute about the price which he had offered.
Footnote 100:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 228.
2. In regard to arms distributed to the States and Territories since
January 1st, 1860, the committee ascertained and reported that the
whole number of muskets distributed among all the States, North and
South, was 8423. These were army muskets of the best quality; but
neither of the States of Arkansas, Delaware, Kentucky, North
Carolina, or Texas, received any of them, because they neglected to
ask for the quotas to which they were entitled. The other Southern
and Southwestern States, which did apply for their quotas, received
2091 of these army muskets, or less than one-fourth. Of long range
rifles of the army calibre, all the States received, in 1860, 1728.
Six of the Southern and Southwestern States, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, received in
the aggregate 758 of these long range rifles, and the two other
Southern States received none. The eight Southern States received in
the aggregate a less number of muskets and rifles than would be
required to properly equip two full regiments.
3. In relation to arms transferred to the Southern arsenals of the
United States, the committee ascertained that on the 29th of
December, 1859, nearly eleven months before the election of Mr.
Lincoln, and several months before his nomination, the Secretary of
War ordered Colonel Craig to remove one-fifth of the old flint-lock
and percussion muskets from the Springfield armory in Massachusetts,
where they had accumulated in inconvenient numbers, to five Southern
arsenals of the United States, for storage. The order and all the
proceedings under it were duly recorded. No haste was resorted to:
the arms were to be removed “from time to time, as may be most
suitable for economy and transportation,” and to be placed in the
different arsenals “in proportion to their respective means of
proper storage.” This order was carried out by the Ordnance Bureau
in the usual course of administration, without reference to the
President. Of these muskets, entirely inferior to the new rifled
musket of the United States army, 105,000 were transferred to the
Southern arsenals under this order. There were also transferred
under the same order, 10,000 of the old percussion rifles, of an
inferior calibre to the new rifled muskets then used by the army.
These constituted the 115,000 “extra muskets and rifles” which
General Scott asserted, in 1862, had been sent into the South to arm
the insurgents, who, he supposed, were just ready to commence the
civil war eleven months before Mr. Lincoln’s election. Colonel
Maynadier, in a letter which he addressed to a Congressional
committee on the 3d of February, 1862, said of this order of
December 29th, 1859, that it never occurred to him that it could
have any improper motive, for Mr. Floyd was “then regarded
throughout the country as a strong advocate of the Union and an
opponent of secession, and had recently published a letter in a
Richmond paper which gained him high credit in the North for his
boldness in rebuking the pernicious views of many in his own State.”
It should be added that no ammunition whatever was embraced in the
order, and none accompanied the muskets.
4. On the subject of heavy ordnance ordered by Secretary Floyd to
be sent from Pittsburgh to two forts of the United States then
erecting in the South, the committee found and reported the
following facts: On the 20th of December, 1860, nine days before
his resignation, Secretary Floyd, without the knowledge of the
President, gave to Captain Maynadier a verbal order to send to the
forts on Ship Island and at Galveston the heavy guns necessary for
their armament. Proceeding to carry out this order, Captain
Maynadier, on the 22d of December, sent his written orders to the
commanding officer of the Alleghany arsenal at Pittsburgh,
directing him to send 113 “Columbiads” and 11 32-pounders to the
two Southern forts. When these orders reached Pittsburgh, they
caused a great excitement in that city. A committee of the
citizens, whose letter to the President lies before me, dated
December 25th, brought the matter to his personal attention, and
advised that the orders be countermanded. The guns had not been
shipped. Four days after this letter was written, Secretary Floyd
was out of office. Mr. Holt, the new Secretary, by direction of
the President, immediately rescinded the order. The city councils
of Pittsburgh, on the 4th of January, 1861, sent a vote of thanks
for this prompt proceeding, to the President, in which they
included the new Attorney General, Mr. Stanton, and the new
Secretary of War, Mr. Holt.
With this transaction General Scott had nothing whatever to do. Yet,
in 1862, he at first thought that he discovered, early in March,
1861, something that happened in the December and January previous,
and that he interfered just in time “to defeat the robbery!” It will
be noticed that the General claimed to have given this information
to Secretary Holt while he was acting for Secretary Cameron; that
is, in March, after the close of Mr. Buchanan’s administration, and
before Mr. Cameron, Mr. Lincoln’s Secretary of War, had taken
possession of the Department. So that the inference naturally was
that Mr. Buchanan had allowed his administration to expire, leaving
this “posthumous order” of Secretary Floyd in force after Mr.
Lincoln’s accession, and that but for General Scott’s interposition
it would have been carried out; although the whole affair was ended
before the 4th day of January, on information received from the
citizens of Pittsburgh and promptly acted upon by President Buchanan
and Secretary Holt, without any interference whatever by General
Scott![101]
Footnote 101:
When this extraordinary blunder was brought to the General’s
attention, in his controversy with Mr. Buchanan, in 1862, he said
that the only error he had made was in giving March instead of
January as the time when the order was countermanded, and that
this error was immaterial! He still insisted that he gave the
information to Mr. Holt that the shipment had commenced, and that
he stopped it. It is certainly most remarkable that he did not see
that time was of the essence of his charge against the Buchanan
administration, for his charge imputed to that administration a
delay from January to March in countermanding the order, and
claimed for himself the whole merit of the discovery and the
countermand. He would better have consulted his own dignity and
character if he had frankly retracted the whole statement. But
probably the story of the Pittsburgh ordnance, as he put it, has
been believed by thousands, to the prejudice of President
Buchanan. (See the letters of General Scott, published in the
_National Intelligencer_.)
CHAPTER XXI.
November, 1860-March, 1861.
THE ACTION OF CONGRESS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S
ANNUAL MESSAGE—THE “CRITTENDEN COMPROMISE”—STRANGE COURSE OF THE
NEW YORK “TRIBUNE”—SPECIAL MESSAGE OF JANUARY 8, 1861.
It is now necessary to turn to what took place in Congress upon the
recommendations of the President’s annual message. There were but
two courses that Congress could pursue in this most extraordinary
emergency. It must either preserve the Union by peaceful measures,
or it must provide the President and his successor with the military
force requisite to secure the execution of the laws and the
supremacy of the Constitution. It was plain that in this, as in all
similar cases of threatened revolt against the authority of a
regular and long established government, mere inaction would be a
fatal policy. After the State of South Carolina should have adopted
an ordinance of secession, it would be too late to accomplish
anything by merely arguing against the constitutional doctrine on
which the asserted right of secession depended. That right was
firmly held by multitudes of men in other States, and unless the
Government of the United States should, by conciliatory measures,
effectually disarm the disposition to exercise it, or effectually
prepare to enforce the authority of the Constitution after secession
had taken place, it was morally certain that the next two or three
months would witness the formation of a Southern Confederacy of
formidable strength. To the Executive Department it appropriately
belonged to suggest the measures of conciliation needful for one of
the alternatives of a sound and safe policy, and to execute the laws
by all the means with which the Executive was then or might
thereafter be clothed by the legislature. But the Executive could
not in the smallest degree increase the means which existing laws
had placed in his hands.
There was all the more reason for prompt action upon the President’s
pacific recommendations, in the fact that the Government of the
United States was wholly unprepared for a civil war. The nature of
such a war, the character of the issue on which it would have to be
waged, and the natural repugnance of the people of both sections to
have such a calamity befall the country, all tended to enhance the
duty of preventing it by timely concessions which would in no way
impair the authority of the Constitution. It is true that
potentially the Government had great resources in its war making
power, its taxing power, and its control over the militia of the
States. But inasmuch as a sudden resort to its ultimate powers, and
to their plenary exercise was at this moment fraught with the
greatest peril, there can be no question that the duty of
conciliation stood first in the rank of moral and patriotic duties
incumbent upon the representatives of the States and the people in
the two houses of Congress. Next in the relative rank of these
duties, to be performed, however, simultaneously with the first of
them, stood the obligation to strengthen the hands of the Executive
for the execution of the laws and the preservation of the public
property in South Carolina, which was manifestly about to assume the
attitude of an independent and foreign State. Whether either of
these great duties was performed by the Congress, to which President
Buchanan addressed his annual message and his subsequent appeals;
what were the causes which produced a failure to meet the exigency;
on whom rests the responsibility for that failure, and what were the
consequences which it entailed, must now be considered. Mr. Buchanan
has said that this Congress, beyond question, had it in its power to
preserve the peace of the country and the integrity of the Union,
and that it failed in this duty.[102] Is this a righteous judgment,
which history ought to affirm?
Footnote 102:
Buchanan’s Defence, chapter vii.
In the Senate, after the reading of the President’s message, so much
as related to the present agitated and distracted condition of the
country and the grievances between the slaveholding and the
non-slaveholding States, was referred to a select committee of
thirteen members. The composition of this committee was most
remarkable. It consisted of five Republicans: Senators Seward,
Collamer, Wade, Doolittle, and Grimes, all of them from
non-slaveholding States, and all prominent adherents of that
“Chicago platform” on which Mr. Lincoln had been elected; five
members from slaveholding States, Senators Powell, Hunter,
Crittenden, Toombs, and Davis, and three “Northern Democrats,”
Senators Douglas, Bigler, and Bright. It was understood that the
three last named Senators were placed upon the committee to act as
mediators between the Northern and the Southern sections which the
ten other members represented. Under ordinary circumstances, a
committee would have shaped its report by the decisions of a
majority of its members, if they could not be unanimous. But at the
first meeting of this committee, on the 21st of December, the day
after that on which South Carolina passed her ordinance of
secession, an extraordinary resolution was adopted, that no
proposition should be reported as the decision of the committee,
unless sustained by a majority of each of the classes comprising the
committee, and it was defined that the Senators of the Republican
party were to constitute one class, and Senators of the other
parties were to constitute the other class. Thus, while there were
eight members of the committee who might, by concurring in any
proposition, ordinarily determine the action of the body, it could
not become the decision of that body unless it was supported by the
votes of a separate majority of the five Republican members. It was
said that the reason for this restriction was that no report would
be adopted by the Senate, unless it had been concurred in by at
least a majority of the five Republican Senators. Valid or invalid
as this reason may have been, the restriction is a remarkable proof
of the sectional attitude of the Northern Senators, of the
responsibility which they assumed, and of the willingness of the
majority of the Southern Senators to have the Republican members of
the committee exercise such a power and bear such a responsibility.
The sequel will show how a committee thus composed and thus tied
down was likely to act.
On the 22d, Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, a Senator whose name will
be forever venerated for the patriotic part which he took throughout
the proceedings of this Congress, submitted to the committee a
“Joint Resolution,” which he had already offered in the Senate, and
which became known as “the Crittenden Compromise.” It proposed
certain amendments of the Constitution which would reconcile the
conflicting claims of the North and the South, by yielding to the
South the right to take slaves into the Territories south of the
parallel of 36° 30´, and excluding slavery from all the Territories
north of that line: with the further provision that when any
Territory north or south of that line, within such boundaries as
Congress might prescribe, should contain a population requisite for
a member of Congress, it should be admitted into the Union as a
State with or without slavery, as the State constitution adopted by
the people might provide. When it is considered that the people of
the slaveholding States claimed that the Supreme Court of the United
States had already decided that slaves might be taken as property
into any Territory and be there held as property, under a
constitutional right resulting from the common ownership of the
Territories by the States composing the Union, the “Crittenden
Compromise,” if accepted, would be a sacrifice by the South with
which the North might well be content. Whatever were the technical
reasons which could be alleged to show that the Supreme Court had
not made a determination of this question that was binding as a
judicial decision, it was nevertheless true that a majority of the
judges had affirmed in their several opinions the claim of every
Southern slaveholder to carry his slaves into the Territories of the
United States and to hold them there as property, until the
formation of a State constitution. President Buchanan always
regarded the case of “Dred Scott” as a judicial decision of this
constitutional question. But whether it was so or not, the claim had
long been asserted and was still asserted by the people of the
Southern States; and if it was still open as a judicial question, as
the Republican party contended, and if it could be resisted as a
political claim by one section of the Union, it was equally open to
the other section to treat it as a political controversy, which
required to be disposed of by mutual concession between the
slaveholding and the non-slaveholding States. The Republican party,
confined exclusively to the non-slaveholding States, had, by their
political platform in the late Presidential election, treated the
action of the Supreme Court as a nullity, and had affirmed as a
cardinal doctrine of their political creed that slavery should
forever be excluded, by positive law, from all the Territories of
the United States. The circumstances under which the Democratic
party came into the political field in that election did not show
that this party universally took the opposite side; but the votes of
the Southern States in the election show most clearly that the
people of those States still asserted the claim which they held to
have been affirmed by the highest judicial tribunal in the country.
If, therefore, the Crittenden Compromise should be accepted by the
South, it could not be denied that the South would sacrifice a claim
which her people were practically unanimous in asserting as a right.
On the other hand, what would the North lose by that compromise? It
would lose nothing but an abstraction; for there was no Territory
south of 36° 30´ but New Mexico, and into that Territory slave labor
could never be profitably introduced, on account of the nature of
the country.[103] While, therefore, the North would by this
compromise yield nothing but a useless abstract concession to the
South, and would gain, in fact, all the vast territory north of the
compromise line as free territory forever, the Republican party
would undoubtedly have to sacrifice the dogma of the “Chicago
platform.” Whether that dogma ought to have been held paramount to
every other consideration, is a question on which posterity will
have to pass.
Footnote 103:
All the remaining territory south of the line of 36° 30´ was an
Indian reservation, secured to certain tribes by solemn treaties.
It was not yet too late to make this peace-offering to the South.
Mr. Crittenden’s proposition was offered to the committee before any
of the Government forts in the Southern States had been seized, when
no State excepting South Carolina had “seceded,” and when no
convention of the six other cotton States had assembled. Well might
Mr. Buchanan say that the moment was propitious. Well might the
patriotic Crittenden say, in addressing his colleagues on the
committee: “The sacrifice to be made for its preservation (the
Union) is comparatively worthless. Peace and harmony and union in a
great nation were never purchased at so cheap a rate as we now have
it in our power to do. It is a scruple only, a scruple of as little
value as a barleycorn, that stands between us and peace, and
reconciliation, and union; and we stand here pausing and hesitating
about that little atom which is to be sacrificed.”
But this admirable and unselfish statesman was then to learn that
there are states of men’s minds and characters when, fixed by the
antecedents and committals of party, eloquence does not convince,
facts are powerless; when the “barleycorn” becomes a great and
important object; when mole hills become mountains, and when fear of
constituents dominates over all other fears. Yet it cannot be
doubted that there was really very little reason to fear that the
constituencies of Northern Senators would hold them to a strict
account for voting in favor of the Crittenden Compromise. Public
feeling almost everywhere hailed it as the promise of peace and of
the perpetuity of the Union. Nevertheless, all the five Republican
members of the committee voted against it. This secured its
rejection, under the resolution that had been adopted by the
committee. But the singular fact is to be added that two Senators
from the cotton States, Messrs. Davis, of Mississippi, and Toombs,
of Georgia, also voted in the same way.
Readers will look in vain through Mr. Jefferson Davis’s recent work
for a satisfactory explanation of this vote. But an explanation may
perhaps be found in his whole course from the beginning of the
session to his withdrawal from the Senate in the month of January,
1861, after the State of Mississippi had seceded. No impartial
person can, it seems to me, read Mr. Davis’s own account of his
public conduct at this crisis, without reaching the conclusion that
whatever aid he may at any time have been disposed to render in the
pacification of the country was at all times neutralized by his
attitude in regard to the right of secession. From first to last he
insisted that South Carolina, after she had adopted an ordinance of
secession, should be regarded by the Government of the United States
as an independent power. He was active in promoting the objects for
which her commissioners came to Washington in the last week of
December. He demanded that the troops of the United States should be
withdrawn from the forts in Charleston harbor; that those forts
should be surrendered to the paramount sovereignty of a State now
become a foreign nation; and he scouted and ridiculed the idea that
the Federal Executive could employ a military force in executing the
laws of the United States within the dominion of a State which had
withdrawn the powers that she had formerly deposited with the
General Government. There was something singularly preposterous in
this demand that a great government, which had subsisted for more
than seventy years, and had always executed its laws against all
combinations of an insurrectionary character, whether created by
individuals or by State authority, should now “thaw and resolve
itself into a dew,” before the all-consuming energy of a State
ordinance; should accept the secession theory of the Constitution as
the unquestionable law of the land, at the peril of encountering a
civil war. How could measures of conciliation and concession be of
any value, though tendered by the Federal Government, if that
Government was in the same breath to admit that it had no
constitutional power to enforce its authority if the offer of
conciliation and concession should be rejected? Yet Mr. Davis’s
ground of quarrel with President Buchanan was that he would not
admit the right of secession. He could not either persuade or drive
the President into that admission; and surely there can be no
stronger proof of the integrity, fidelity and firmness of the
President than this one fact affords.
Mr. Davis takes credit to himself and other Southern Senators for
having intervened to prevent the authorities of South Carolina from
making any attack upon the forts, so that a civil war might not be
precipitated while measures for the settlement of the sectional
difficulties were pending. No one need deny that those Senators are
entitled to all the credit that justly belongs to such efforts. But
why were those efforts made, and by what were they all along
accompanied? They were made in order that there might be no
bloodshed brought about, which would cause the other cotton States
to recoil from the support of South Carolina in her assertion of the
right of secession; and they were always accompanied by the demand
that the Federal Government should permit the peaceable secession of
any State, even to the extent of refraining from enforcing its laws
and from holding its property within the dominions of any State that
should choose to secede. This idea of peaceable secession, and all
that it comprehended, was founded on the wild expectation that the
two classes of States, slaveholding and non-slaveholding, after an
experimental trial of separate confederacies, would find some system
of union, some basis of reconstruction, other than the basis of the
Constitution of the United States. Whatever claims of statesmanship
may belong to those who entertained this chimerical project, they
could hardly press it upon others as a reason for treating the
Constitution of the United States as a system of government
confessedly destitute of any authority or power to execute its own
laws or to retain its own existence. But this is just what Mr. Davis
denounced President Buchanan for not admitting; and he therefore, to
the extent of his influence, counteracted the President’s great
object of isolating the State of South Carolina by measures that
would quiet the agitation in other slaveholding States, and at the
same time would prepare the necessary means for executing the laws
of the United States within the limits of that one State, in case
she should adopt an ordinance of secession.
On the other hand, the Republican Senators on the Committee of
Thirteen who voted against the Crittenden Compromise had no such
policy to actuate them as that which governed Mr. Davis. They had no
reason for refusing their aid to the President that could be founded
on any difference of opinion as to the constitutional duty of the
Executive. They knew that he was asking for means to uphold the
authority of the Constitution in South Carolina, at the same time
that he was urging measures which would prevent other States from
joining her in the secession movement. What explanation of their
conduct is possible and will leave to them the acquittal of
patriotic purposes, I am not aware. But the fact is, that at no time
during the session did a single Republican Senator, in any form
whatever, give his vote or his influence for the Crittenden
Compromise, or for any other measure that would strengthen the hands
of the President either in maintaining peace or in executing the
laws of the United States. Whether the spirit of party led them to
refuse all aid to an outgoing President; whether they did not
believe that there would be any necessity for a resort to arms;
whether they did not choose, from sectional animosity, to abate
anything from the “Chicago platform;” whatever was the governing
motive for their inaction, it never can be said that they were not
seasonably warned by the President that a policy of inaction would
be fatal. That policy not only crippled him, but it crippled his
successor. When Mr. Lincoln came into office, seven States had
already seceded, and not a single law had been put upon the statute
book which would enable the Executive to meet such a condition of
the Union.
Not only is it manifest that the Crittenden proposition was
reasonable and proper in itself, but there is high authority for
saying that it ought to have been embraced by every Republican
Senator. While it was pending before the Committee of Thirteen,
General Duff Green, a prominent citizen of Mississippi, visited Mr.
Lincoln, the President-elect, at his home in Springfield, Illinois.
Mr. Green took with him a copy of Mr. Crittenden’s resolutions, and
asked Mr. Lincoln’s opinion of them. The substance of what Mr.
Lincoln said was reported on the 28th of December to President
Buchanan, in the following note:
[GENERAL DUFF GREEN TO PRESIDENT BUCHANAN.]
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 28, 1860.
DEAR SIR:—
I have had a long and interesting conversation with Mr. Lincoln. I
brought with me a copy of the resolutions submitted by Mr.
Crittenden, which he read over several times, and said that he
believed that the adoption of the line proposed would quiet, for
the present, the agitation of the slavery question, but believed
it would be renewed by the seizure and attempted annexation of
Mexico. He said that the real question at issue between the North
and the South was slavery “propagandism,” and that upon that issue
the Republican party was opposed to the South, and that he was
with his own party; that he had been elected by that party, and
intended to sustain his party in good faith; but added, that the
question on the amendments to the Constitution and the questions
submitted by Mr. Crittenden belonged to the people and States in
legislatures or conventions, and that he would be inclined not
only to acquiesce, but to give full force and effect to their will
thus expressed. Seeing that he was embarrassed by his sense of
duty to his party, I suggested that he might so frame a letter to
me as to refer the measures for the preservation of the Union to
the action of the people in the several States, and he promised to
prepare a letter, giving me his views, by 9 a.m. to-morrow. If his
letter be satisfactory, its purport will be communicated to you by
telegraph.
Yours truly,
DUFF GREEN.
I know of no evidence that Mr. Lincoln prepared the letter which he
promised. No account of it appears to have reached Mr. Buchanan by
telegraph or otherwise. It is probable that Mr. Lincoln, feeling
more strongly the embarrassment arising from his party relations,
reconsidered his determination, and excused himself to General
Green. But what his opinion was is sufficiently proved by the note
which General Green dispatched from Springfield, and which must have
reached Mr. Buchanan at about the time when the committee of
thirteen made their report to the Senate that they were unable to
agree upon any general plan of adjustment of the sectional
difficulties. This report was made on the 31st of December.
The last ten days of the year were thus suffered to elapse without
anything being done to arrest the rising tide of secession in the
seven cotton States. Most of these States had suspended or delayed
their action until it could be known whether there was to be any
concession made by the Republican party as represented in Congress.
They now rapidly accomplished their secession measures. The
conventions of Florida on the 7th of January, Mississippi on the
9th, Alabama on the 11th, Georgia on the 19th, Louisiana on the
25th, and Texas on the 5th of February, adopted ordinances of
secession by great majorities. These ordinances were followed by a
general seizure of the public property of the United States within
the limits of those States, after the example of South Carolina.
Among the discouraging influences which now operated with a double
mischief to counteract the efforts of those who aimed to confine
secession to the State of South Carolina, must be mentioned the
course of one of the most prominent papers of the North. No journal
had exercised a greater power in promoting the election of Mr.
Lincoln upon the “Chicago platform” than the _New York Tribune_. It
was universally and justly regarded as a representative of a large
section of the Republican party. Its founder and chief editor,
Horace Greeley, was a man of singular mould. Beginning life as a
journeyman printer, he learned in the practice of type-setting the
compass and power of the English language. In the course of a long
experience as a public writer, he acquired a style of much energy,
and of singular directness. But, without a regular education and the
mental discipline which it gives, he never learned to take a
comprehensive and statesmanlike view of public questions. His
impulses, feelings, and sympathies were on the side of humanity and
the progress of mankind. But these generous and noble qualities were
unbalanced by a sense of the restraints which the fundamental
political conditions of the American Union imposed upon
philanthropic action. He was, therefore, almost incapable of
appreciating the moral foundations on which the Union was laid by
the Constitution of the United States. He felt deeply the inherent
wrong of African slavery, but he could not see, or did not care to
see, that the Union of slaveholding and non-slaveholding States
under one system of government for national purposes was caused by
public necessities that justified its original formation, and that
continued to make its preservation the highest of civil obligations.
He did not, like many of the anti-slavery agitators, renounce the
whole of the Constitution. But while he was willing that the North
should enjoy its benefits, he was ever ready to assail those
provisions, however deeply they were embedded in the basis of the
Union, which recognized and to a qualified extent upheld the slavery
existing under the local law of certain States. When, therefore, the
long political conflict between the two sections of the country
culminated in a condition of things which presented the alternatives
of a peaceful separation of the slave and the free States, or a
denial of the doctrine of secession and the consequences claimed for
it, Mr. Greeley threw his personal weight, and the weight of his
widely circulated journal, against the authority of the General
Government to enforce in any way the obligations of the
Constitution. He did not much concern himself with the distinction
between coercing a State by force of arms from adopting an ordinance
of secession, and coercing individuals after secession to obey the
laws of the United States. From the period immediately before the
election of Mr. Lincoln, after his election, and for a time after
his inauguration, Mr. Greeley opposed all coercion of every kind. He
maintained that the right of secession was the same as the right of
revolution; and after the cotton States had formed their confederacy
and adopted a provisional constitution, he tendered the aid of his
journal to forward their views. He thus, on the one hand, joined his
influence to the cry of the professed abolitionists who renounced
the Constitution entirely, and on the other hand, contributed his
powerful pen in encouraging the secessionists to persevere in
separating their States from the Union.
Mr. Greeley’s secession argument, drawn from the Declaration of
Independence and the right of revolution, was a remarkable proof of
the unsoundness of his reasoning powers. Because the right of
self-government is an inherent right of a people, he assumed that
men cannot be required to perform their covenanted obligations. He
could not see, he said, how twenty millions of people could
rightfully hold ten, or even five, other millions in a political
union which those other millions wished to renounce. But if he had
ever been in the habit of reasoning upon the Constitution of the
United States as other men reasoned, who did not accept the doctrine
of State secession, he could have seen that when five millions of
people, exercising freely the right of self-government, have
solemnly covenanted with the twenty millions that they will obey the
laws enacted by a legislative authority which they have voluntarily
established over themselves and over all the inhabitants of the
country, the moralist and the publicist can rest the right to use
compulsion upon a basis which is perfectly consistent with the
principles of the Declaration of Independence, and which those
principles do in truth recognize.
In fact, however, Mr. Greeley, by his public utterances at this
great crisis, bettered the instructions of the secessionists
themselves. He taught them that the Crittenden Compromise, or any
other measure of conciliation, need not be considered. They had only
to will that they would leave the Union, and they were out of it,
and at liberty to care nothing about concessions from the North. And
in the same way, he taught those of the North, on whom rested the
immediate duty of preventing the spread of the secession movement,
that all measures of conciliation were useless, for the right of
secession, as he maintained, was bottomed on the Declaration of
Independence, and neither persuasion nor coercion ought to be used
against the exercise of such a right. Such political philosophy as
this, proclaimed by a leading organ of the Republican party, created
difficulties for a President situated as Mr. Buchanan was after the
election of his successor, which posterity can not overlook.[104]
Footnote 104:
Mr. Greeley’s utterances must be cited, that I may not be supposed
to have in any way misrepresented him. But three days after Mr.
Lincoln’s election, the New York _Tribune_ announced such
sentiments as the following: “If the cotton States shall become
satisfied that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we
insist on letting them go in peace. _The right to secede may be a
revolutionary one_, BUT IT EXISTS NEVERTHELESS...... We must ever
resist the right of any State to remain in the Union and nullify
or defy the laws thereof. TO WITHDRAW FROM THE UNION IS QUITE
ANOTHER MATTER; and whenever a considerable section of our Union
shall deliberately resolve to go out, WE SHALL RESIST ALL COERCIVE
MEASURES DESIGNED TO KEEP IT IN. We hope never to live in a
Republic whereof one section is pinned to another by bayonets.”
And again on the 17th December, three days before the secession of
South Carolina: “If it [the Declaration of Independence] justified
the secession from the British Empire of three millions of
colonists in 1776, _we do not see why it would not justify the
secession of five millions of Southrons from the Federal Union in
1861_. If we are mistaken on this point, why does not some one
attempt to show _wherein_ and why? For our part, while we deny the
right of slaveholders to hold slaves against the will of the
latter, _we cannot see how twenty millions of people can
rightfully hold ten, or even five, in a detested Union with them
by military force_. ...... _If seven or eight contiguous States
shall present themselves authentically at Washington_, saying, ‘We
hate the Federal Union; we have withdrawn from it; we give you the
choice between acquiescing in our secession and arranging amicably
all incidental questions on the one hand, and attempting to subdue
us on the other,’ _we would not stand up for coercion, for
subjugation, for we do not think it would be just_. We hold the
right of self-government, _even when invoked in behalf of those
who deny it to others_. So much for the question of principle.”
In this course the _Tribune_ persisted from the date of Mr.
Lincoln’s election until after his inauguration, employing such
remarks as the following: “Any attempt to compel them by force to
remain would be contrary to the principles enunciated in the
immortal Declaration of Independence, contrary to the fundamental
ideas on which human liberty is based.”
Even after the cotton States had formed their confederacy, and
adopted a provisional constitution at Montgomery, on the 23d
February, 1861, it gave them encouragement to proceed in the
following language: “_We have repeatedly said, and we once more
insist_, that the great principle embodied by Jefferson in the
Declaration of American Independence, that governments derive
their just powers from the consent of the governed, is sound and
just; _and that if the slave States, the cotton States or the Gulf
States only, choose to form an independent nation_, THEY HAVE A
CLEAR MORAL RIGHT TO DO SO. _Whenever it shall be clear that the
great body of Southern people have become conclusively alienated
from the Union, and anxious to escape from it_, WE WILL DO OUR
BEST TO FORWARD THEIR VIEWS.”
Seeing how fatally wrong was the course of this erratic journalist,
and how much depended on the success of the Crittenden Compromise,
the President endeavored to enlist in its behalf another great
journal of the North, which was conducted by a person on whom he
thought he could rely, and whose paper was professedly independent
of party politics. The following private letter to the editor of the
New York _Herald_ attests how earnestly Mr. Buchanan was bent upon
the improvement of every chance by which the spread of secession
might be prevented:
[MR. BUCHANAN TO JAMES GORDON BENNETT.]
(Private and confidential.) WASHINGTON, December 20, 1860.
MY DEAR SIR:—
You wield the most powerful organ in the country for the formation
of public opinion, and I have no doubt you feel a proportionate
responsibility under the present alarming circumstances of the
country. Every person here has his own remedy for existing evils,
and there is no general assent to any proposition. Still, I
believe the tendency is strong, and is becoming stronger every
day, towards the Missouri Compromise, with the same protection to
slaves south of 36° 30´ that is given to other property. The South
can lose no territory north of this line, because no portion of it
is adapted to slave labor, whilst they would gain a substantial
security within the Union by such a constitutional amendment. The
Republicans have for some years manifested indignation at the
repeal of this compromise, and would probably be more willing to
accept it than any other measure to guarantee the rights of the
South. I have stated my favorite plan in the message, but am
willing to abandon it at any moment for one more practicable and
equally efficacious. If your judgment should approve it, you could
do much by concentrating and directing your energies to this
single point. My object, when I commenced to write, was simply to
express my opinion that existing circumstances tended strongly
toward the Missouri Compromise; but, with pen in hand, I shall
make one or two other remarks.
I do not know whether the great commercial and social advantages
of the telegraph are not counterbalanced by its political evils.
No one can judge of this so well as myself. The public mind
throughout the interior is kept in a constant state of excitement
by what are called “telegrams.” They are short and spicy, and can
easily be inserted in the country newspapers. In the city journals
they can be contradicted the next day; but the case is different
throughout the country. Many of them are sheer falsehoods, and
especially those concerning myself......
With my kindest and most cordial regards to Mrs. Bennett, I
remain, very respectfully, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Although defeated before the Committee of Thirteen, Mr. Crittenden
did not abandon the cause of peace and Union. His proposed
compromise, it was now apparent, could not be carried as an
amendment of the Constitution by the requisite two-thirds vote of
Congress. But an appeal could be made to the people, if a majority
of both Houses would send the question to them; and if this majority
could be obtained in time, he and others had good reason to believe
that the course of secession in the six remaining cotton States
could be stayed. He therefore postponed by his own motion the
further consideration of his proposed amendment, and on the 3d of
January, 1861, before any State excepting South Carolina had
seceded, he introduced a substitute for it, in the shape of a joint
resolution, by which he proposed to refer his compromise to a direct
vote of the people in the several States, so that they could
instruct their representatives to give it the initiatory shape of a
constitutional amendment. This course of action was not provided for
in the amending clause of the Constitution, and it was, without
doubt, extraordinary. But there was nothing in the Constitution
inconsistent with it; it would not set aside any of the forms by
which amendments of the Constitution must be initiated and adopted;
and the circumstances of the country were so extraordinary that any
means of reaching public opinion would be entirely proper. Moreover,
it was not an unprecedented step, for State legislatures and other
public bodies had frequently recommended various amendments of the
Constitution. Mr. Crittenden’s resolution justified itself by its
own terms. It read as follows:
“Whereas, the Union is in danger, and, owing to the unhappy
divisions existing in Congress, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for that body to concur in both its branches by the
requisite majority, so as to enable it either to adopt such
measures of legislation, or to recommend to the States such
amendments to the Constitution, as are deemed necessary and proper
to avert that danger; and, whereas, in so great an emergency, the
opinion and judgment of the people ought to be heard, and would be
the best and surest guide to their representatives: Therefore,
_Resolved_, That provision ought to be made by law, without delay,
for taking the sense of the people and submitting to their vote
the following resolution [the same as in his former amendment], as
the basis for the final and permanent settlement of those disputes
that now disturb the peace of the country and threaten the
existence of the Union.”
The President now interposed the weight of his office, by a special
message to Congress, dated on the 8th of January. What had occurred
between him and the South Carolina commissioners has been detailed.
Of this occurrence, and of the position of affairs in Charleston
harbor, Congress was now officially informed by the special message;
the residue of it was devoted to the expediency and necessity of
allowing the people to express their sentiments concerning the
proposition of Mr. Crittenden.
TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
At the opening of your present session I called your attention to
the dangers which threatened the existence of the Union. I
expressed my opinion freely concerning the original causes of
those dangers, and recommended such measures as I believed would
have the effect of tranquilizing the country and saving it from
the peril in which it had been needlessly and most unfortunately
involved. Those opinions and recommendations I do not propose now
to repeat. My own convictions upon the whole subject remain
unchanged.
The fact that a great calamity was impending over the nation was
even at that time acknowledged by every intelligent citizen. It
had already made itself felt throughout the length and breadth of
the land. The necessary consequences of the alarm thus produced
were most deplorable. The imports fell off with a rapidity never
known before, except in time of war, in the history of our foreign
commerce; the Treasury was unexpectedly left without the means
which it had reasonably counted upon to meet the public
engagements; trade was paralyzed; manufactures were stopped; the
best public securities suddenly sunk in the market; every species
of property depreciated more or less; and thousands of poor men,
who depended upon their daily labor for their daily bread, were
turned out of employment.
I deeply regret that I am not able to give you any information
upon the state of the Union which is more satisfactory than what I
was then obliged to communicate. On the contrary, matters are
still worse at present than they then were. When Congress met, a
strong hope pervaded the whole public mind that some amicable
adjustment of the subject would speedily be made by the
representatives of the States and of the people, which might
restore peace between the conflicting sections of the country.
That hope has been diminished by every hour of delay; and as the
prospect of a bloodless settlement fades away, the public distress
becomes more and more aggravated. As evidence of this, it is only
necessary to say that the Treasury notes authorized by the act of
17th December last were advertised, according to the law, and that
no responsible bidder offered to take any considerable sum at par
at a lower rate of interest than twelve per cent. From these facts
it appears that, in a government organized like ours, domestic
strife, or even a well-grounded fear of civil hostilities, is more
destructive to our public and private interests than the most
formidable foreign war.
In my annual message I expressed the conviction, which I have long
deliberately held, and which recent reflection has only tended to
deepen and confirm, that no State has a right by its own act to
secede from the Union, or throw off its Federal obligations at
pleasure. I also declared my opinion to be that, even if that
right existed and should be exercised by any State of the
Confederacy, the Executive Department of this Government had no
authority under the Constitution to recognize its validity by
acknowledging the independence of such State. This left me no
alternative, as the Chief Executive officer under the Constitution
of the United States, but to collect the public revenues and to
protect the public property so far as this might be practicable
under existing laws. This is still my purpose. My province is to
execute, and not to make the laws. It belongs to Congress,
exclusively, to repeal, to modify, or to enlarge their provisions,
to meet exigencies as they may occur. I possess no dispensing
power.
I certainly had no right to make aggressive war upon any State,
and I am perfectly satisfied that the Constitution has wisely
withheld that power even from Congress. But the right and the duty
to use military force defensively against those who resist the
Federal officers in the execution of their legal functions, and
against those who assail the property of the Federal Government,
is clear and undeniable.
But the dangerous and hostile attitude of the States toward each
other has already far transcended and cast in the shade the
ordinary executive duties already provided for by law, and has
assumed such vast and alarming proportions as to place the subject
entirely above and beyond executive control. The fact cannot be
disguised that we are in the midst of a great revolution. In all
its various bearings, therefore, I commend the question to
Congress, as the only human tribunal, under Providence, possessing
the power to meet the existing emergency. To them, exclusively,
belongs the power to declare war, or to authorize the employment
of military force in all cases contemplated by the Constitution;
and they alone possess the power to remove grievances which might
lead to war, and to secure peace and union to this distracted
country. On them, and on them alone, rests the responsibility.
The Union is a sacred trust left by our revolutionary fathers to
their descendants; and never did any other people inherit so rich
a legacy. It has rendered us prosperous in peace and triumphant in
war. The national flag has floated in glory over every sea. Under
its shadow American citizens have found protection and respect in
all lands beneath the sun. If we descend to considerations of
purely material interest, when, in the history of all time, has a
confederacy been bound together by such strong ties of mutual
interest? Each portion of it is dependent on all, and all upon
each portion, for prosperity and domestic security. Free trade
throughout the whole supplies the wants of one portion from the
productions of another, and scatters wealth everywhere. The great
planting and farming States require the aid of the commercial and
navigating States to send their productions to domestic and
foreign markets, and to furnish the naval power to render their
transportation secure against all hostile attacks.
Should the Union perish in the midst of the present excitement, we
have already had a sad foretaste of the universal suffering which
would result from its destruction. The calamity would be severe in
every portion of the Union, and would be quite as great, to say
the least, in the Southern as in the Northern States. The greatest
aggravation of the evil, and that which would place us in the most
unfavorable light both before the world and posterity, is, as I am
firmly convinced, that the secession movement has been chiefly
based upon a misapprehension at the South of the sentiments of the
majority in several of the Northern States. Let the question be
transferred from political assemblies to the ballot-box, and the
people themselves would speedily redress the serious grievances
which the South have suffered. But, in Heaven’s name, let the
trial be made before we plunge into armed conflict upon the mere
assumption that there is no other alternative. Time is a great
conservative power. Let us pause at this momentous point and
afford the people, both North and South, an opportunity for
reflection. Would that South Carolina had been convinced of this
truth before her precipitate action! I, therefore, appeal through
you to the people of this country to declare in their might that
the Union must and shall be preserved by all constitutional means.
I most earnestly recommend that you devote yourselves exclusively
to the question how this can be accomplished in peace. All other
questions, when compared with this, sink into insignificance. The
present is no time for palliatives; action, prompt action, is
required. A delay in Congress to prescribe or to recommend a
distinct and practical proposition for conciliation may drive us
to a point from which it will be almost impossible to recede.
A common ground on which conciliation and harmony can be produced
is not unattainable. The proposition to compromise by letting the
North have exclusive control of the territory above a certain
line, and to give Southern institutions protection below that
line, ought to receive universal approbation. In itself, indeed,
it may not be entirely satisfactory; but when the alternative is
between a reasonable concession on both sides and a destruction of
the Union, it is an imputation upon the patriotism of Congress to
assert that its members will hesitate for a moment.
Even now the danger is upon us. In several of the States which
have not yet seceded, the forts, arsenals, and magazines of the
United States have been seized. This is by far the most serious
step which has been taken since the commencement of the troubles.
This public property has long been left without garrisons and
troops for its protection, because no person doubted its security
under the flag of the country in any State of the Union. Besides,
our small army has scarcely been sufficient to guard our remote
frontiers against Indian incursions. The seizure of this property,
from all appearances, has been purely aggressive, and not in
resistance to any attempt to coerce a State or States to remain in
the Union.
At the beginning of these unhappy troubles, I determined that no
act of mine should increase the excitement in either section of
the country. If the political conflict were to end in a civil war,
it was my determined purpose not to commence it, nor even to
furnish an excuse for it by an act of this Government. My opinion
remains unchanged, that justice as well as sound policy requires
us still to seek a peaceful solution of the questions at issue
between the North and the South. Entertaining this conviction, I
refrained even from sending reinforcements to Major Anderson, who
commanded the forts in Charleston harbor, until an absolute
necessity for doing so should make itself apparent, lest it might
unjustly be regarded as a menace of military coercion, and thus
furnish, if not a provocation, a pretext for an outbreak on the
part of South Carolina. No necessity for these reinforcements
seemed to exist. I was assured by distinguished and upright
gentlemen of South Carolina[105] that no attack upon Major
Anderson was intended, but that, on the contrary, it was the
desire of the State authorities, as much as it was my own, to
avoid the fatal consequences which must eventually follow a
military collision.
Footnote 105:
Messrs. McQueen, Miles, Bonham, Boyce, and Keitt, members of the
House of Representatives from South Carolina, on the 8th of
December, 1860.
And here I deem it proper to submit, for your information, copies
of a communication, dated December 28, 1860, addressed to me by R.
W. Barnwell, J. H. Adams, and J. L. Orr, “commissioners” from
South Carolina, with the accompanying documents, and copies of my
answer thereto, dated December 31.
In further explanation of Major Anderson’s removal from Fort
Moultrie to Fort Sumter, it is proper to state that, after my
answer to the South Carolina “commissioners,” the War Department
received a letter from that gallant officer, dated December 27,
1860, the day after this movement, from which the following is an
extract:
“I will add, as my opinion, that many things convinced me that the
authorities of the State designed to proceed to a hostile act”
[evidently referring to the orders dated December 11, of the late
Secretary of War]. “Under this impression, I could not hesitate
that it was my solemn duty to move my command from a fort which we
could not probably have held longer than forty-eight or sixty
hours to this one, where my power of resistance is increased to a
very great degree.” It will be recollected that the concluding
part of these orders was in the following terms: “The smallness of
your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one
of the three forts; but an attack on, or attempt to take
possession of either one of them, will be regarded as an act of
hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them
which you may deem most proper to increase its power of
resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive
steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed
to a hostile act.”
It is said that serious apprehensions are, to some extent,
entertained, in which I do not share, that the peace of this
District may be disturbed before the 4th of March next. In any
event, it will be my duty to preserve it, and this duty shall be
performed.
In conclusion, it may be permitted to me to remark that I have
often warned my countrymen of the dangers which now surround us.
This may be the last time I shall refer to the subject officially.
I feel that my duty has been faithfully, though it may be
imperfectly, performed; and whatever the result may be, I shall
carry to my grave the consciousness that I at least meant well for
my country.
JAMES BUCHANAN.
WASHINGTON CITY, Jan. 8, 1861.
It is a painful part of an historian’s duty to reflect upon the
conduct of public men, who had it in their power at least to show a
willingness to save their country from the calamity of civil war,
and who appear to have been indifferent to everything but the dogmas
of a party platform. This special message of President Buchanan, in
the circumstances of the moment, was entitled to the gravest
attention and respect. It ought to have produced immediate assent to
its recommendation, on the part of Republican Senators, whom it
would have relieved from their previous committals to the “Chicago
platform” by a reference of the questions in dispute to the people
of the country. The venerable age of the President, his long
experience in public affairs, his unquestionable patriotism, his
approaching retirement from public life, his manifest desire to
leave the Government to his successor unembarrassed by anything but
the secession of South Carolina, should have conciliated the support
of some at least, if not of all, of the Republican Senators. But, as
it is now my melancholy duty to show from the record, not one
Republican Senator ever voted for Mr. Crittenden’s resolution, the
adoption of which the President so strongly recommended. Memorials
of the most earnest character, coming from all quarters of the
North, even from New England, urging the passage of the Crittenden
Compromise, were heaped upon the table of the Senate.[106] On the
14th of January, Mr. Crittenden made an unsuccessful effort to have
his resolution considered. It was postponed to the following day. On
the 15th, every Republican Senator voted for its further
postponement, to make room for the Pacific Railroad Bill. On the
16th, Mr. Crittenden obtained, by a majority of one vote—all the
Republican Senators voting nay—the consideration of his resolution.
Parliamentary tactics were then resorted to by the Republicans to
defeat it. Mr. Clark, a Republican Senator from New Hampshire, moved
to strike out the whole preamble and body of the resolution, and to
substitute in its place another preamble and resolution of an
entirely opposite character, and affirming the dogma of the Chicago
platform in relation to slavery in the Territories. For this motion
there were 25 yeas to 23 nays; all the Republican Senators voting in
the affirmative.[107] Buried under the Clark amendment, Mr.
Crittenden’s resolution remained for more than six weeks, until the
2d of March, when it was too late for final action upon it. But on
that day a vote was taken upon it, and it was defeated by 19 votes
in the affirmative and 20 in the negative.[108]
Footnote 106:
See the Index to the Journal of the Senate for this session, pp.
494, 495, 496. One of these memorials, coming from the City
Councils of Boston, had the signatures also of over 22,000
citizens, of all shades of political character. Senate Journal of
1860-’61, p. 218.
Footnote 107:
The Clark amendment, which smothered Mr. Crittenden’s resolution,
prevailed, because six secession Senators refused to vote against
it, preferring to play into the hands of the Republicans. They
were Messrs. Benjamin and Slidell, of Louisiana; Iverson, of
Georgia; Hemphill and Wigfall, of Texas; and Johnson, of Arkansas.
Had they voted with the Senators from the border States and the
other Democratic members, the Clark amendment would have been
defeated, and the Senate would on that day, before the secession
of any State excepting South Carolina, have been brought to a
direct vote on Mr. Crittenden’s resolution.
Footnote 108:
“It is proper,” Mr. Buchanan said, “for future reference that the
names of those Senators who constituted the majority on this
momentous question, should be placed upon record. Every vote given
from the six New England States was in opposition to Mr.
Crittenden’s resolution. These consisted of Mr. Clark, of New
Hampshire; Messrs. Sumner and Wilson, of Massachusetts; Mr.
Anthony, of Rhode Island; Messrs. Dixon and Foster, of
Connecticut; Mr. Foot, of Vermont; and Messrs. Fessenden and
Morrill, of Maine. The remaining eleven votes, in order to make up
the 20, were given by Mr. Wade, of Ohio; Mr. Trumbull, of
Illinois; Messrs. Bingham and Chandler, of Michigan; Messrs.
Grimes and Harlan, of Iowa; Messrs. Doolittle and Durkee, of
Wisconsin; Mr. Wilkinson, of Minnesota; Mr. King, of New York; and
Mr. Ten Eyck, of New Jersey. It is also worthy of observation,
that neither Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, Mr. Simmons, of Rhode
Island, Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, Mr. Seward, of New York, nor Mr.
Cameron, of Pennsylvania, voted on the question, although it
appears from the journal that all these gentlemen were present in
the Senate on the day of the vote. It would be vain to conjecture
the reasons why these five Senators refrained from voting on an
occasion so important.” (Buchanan’s Defence, p. 143.)
CHAPTER XXII.
1861—January, February, and March.
THE “PEACE CONVENTION”—FORT SUMTER—THE STAR OF THE WEST FIRED UPON
IN CHARLESTON HARBOR—ANDERSON’S TEMPORARY TRUCE—THE HARBOR OF
PENSACOLA AND FORT PICKENS—THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
EX-PRESIDENT TYLER AND PRESIDENT BUCHANAN.
The vote of the Senate on the 16th of January, by which Mr.
Crittenden’s resolution was defeated by the tactics of the
Republicans, aided by six of the Southern Senators, made it apparent
that some extraordinary interposition could alone save the Union.
For such interposition there was still time, if it could be promptly
exerted, and Congress could be induced to listen to it. It came from
the State of Virginia, and as Mr. Buchanan has given a succinct and
accurate account of this movement, which resulted in the assembling
at Washington of the body called “The Peace Convention,” I
transcribe it into these pages:
These great and powerful commonwealths [the border States] still
remained faithful to the Union. They had hitherto stood aloof from
secession, and had manifested an earnest desire not only to remain
in the Union themselves, but to exert their powerful influence to
bring back the seceding sisters. Virginia had ever ranked as chief
among the Southern States, and had exercised great influence over
their counsels. She had now taken the lead in the grand design to
save the Union, and it became the duty of the President to render
her all the aid in his power in a cause so holy. Every reflecting
man foresaw that if the present movement of Virginia should fail
to impress upon Congress and the country the necessity for
adopting a peaceful compromise, like that proposed by Mr.
Crittenden, there was imminent danger that all the border slave
States would follow the cotton States, which had already adopted
ordinances of secession, and unite with them in an attempt to
break up the Union. Indeed, as has been already seen, the Virginia
legislature had declared that, in case of failure, such a
dissolution was “inevitable.”
The Peace Convention met on the 4th February.[109] It was
composed of one hundred and thirty-three commissioners,
representing twenty-one States. A bare inspection of the list
will convince all inquirers of the great respectability and just
influence of its members. Among them there were many venerable
and distinguished citizens from the border States, earnestly
intent upon restoring and saving the Union. Their great object
was to prevail upon their associates from the North to unite
with them in such recommendations to Congress as would prevent
their own States from seceding, and enable them to bring back
the cotton States which had already seceded. It will be
recollected that on the 4th February, when the Peace Convention
assembled, six of the cotton States, South Carolina, Alabama,
Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, and Florida, had already
adopted ordinances of secession; and that but four days
thereafter (8th February) deputies from these States had adopted
and published at Montgomery, Alabama, a Provisional Constitution
for the so-called Confederate States. The Union was then
crumbling to pieces. One month only of the session of Congress
remained. Within this brief period it was necessary that the
Convention should recommend amendments to the Constitution in
sufficient time to enable both Houses to act upon them before
their final adjournment. It was also essential to success that
these amendments should be sustained by a decided majority of
the commissioners both from the Northern and the border States.
It was, however, soon discovered that the same malign influence
which had caused every Republican member of Congress to oppose
the Crittenden Compromise, would probably defeat the patriotic
purpose for which the Convention had assembled.
Footnote 109:
_Cong. Globe_, 1860-61, p. 125.
On Wednesday, the 6th February, a resolution was adopted,[110] on
motion of Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky, to refer the resolutions of
the General Assembly of Virginia, and all other kindred subjects,
to a committee to consist of one commissioner from each State, to
be selected by the respective State delegations; and to prevent
delay they were instructed to report on or before the Friday
following (the 8th), “what they may deem right, necessary, and
proper to restore harmony and preserve the Union.”
Footnote 110:
Official Journal of the Convention, pp. 9 and 10.
This committee, instead of reporting on the day appointed, did not
report until Friday, the 15th February,[111] and thus a precious
week was lost......
Footnote 111:
Ibid., p. 42.
The amendments reported by a majority of the committee, through
Mr. Guthrie, their chairman, were substantially the same with the
Crittenden Compromise; but on motion of Mr. Johnson, of Maryland,
the general terms of the first and by far the most important
section were restricted to the _present_ Territories of the United
States.[112] On motion of Mr. Franklin, of Pennsylvania, this
section was further amended, but not materially changed, by the
adoption of the substitute offered by him. Nearly in this form it
was afterwards adopted by the Convention.[113] The following is a
copy: “In all the present Territory of the United States north of
the parallel of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes of north
latitude, involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, is
prohibited. In all the present Territory south of that line, the
status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now
exists, shall not be changed; nor shall any law be passed by
Congress or the Territorial legislature to hinder or prevent the
taking of such persons from any of the States of this Union to
said Territory, nor to impair the rights arising from said
relation; but the same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in
the Federal courts, according to the course of the common law.
When any Territory north or south of said line, within such
boundary as Congress may prescribe, shall contain a population
equal to that required for a member of Congress, it shall, if its
form of government be republican, be admitted into the Union on an
equal footing with the original States, with or without
involuntary servitude, as the Constitution of such State may
provide.”
Footnote 112:
Ibid., p. 21.
Footnote 113:
Ibid., p. 70.
Mr. Baldwin, of Connecticut, and Mr. Seddon, of Virginia, on
opposite extremes, made minority reports, which they proposed
to substitute for that of the majority. Mr. Baldwin’s report
was a recommendation “to the several States to unite with
Kentucky in her application to Congress to call a convention
for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, to be submitted to the legislatures of the several
States, or to conventions therein, for ratification, as the
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by
Congress, in accordance with the provisions in the fifth
article of the Constitution.”[114]
Footnote 114:
Official Journal, pp. 24 and 25.
Of the two modes prescribed by the Constitution for its own
amendment, this was the least eligible at the existing crisis,
because by far the most dilatory. Instead of calling upon
Congress, then in session and which could act immediately, to
propose specific amendments to the legislatures of the several
States, it adopted the circuitous mode of requesting these
legislatures, in the first instance, to apply to Congress to call
a convention. Even should two-thirds of them respond in the
affirmative to this request, the process would necessarily
occasion a delay of years in attaining the object, when days were
all-important. This would entirely defeat the patriotic purpose of
the Peace Convention. It was called to obtain, if possible, a
direct vote of two-thirds of both Houses before the end of the
session in favor of such amendments as it might recommend. Could
such a vote be obtained, it was confidently expected by the
friends of the Union that its moral influence would, for the
present, satisfy the border States; would arrest the tide
beginning to rise among their people in favor of secession, and
might enable them to exercise an effective influence in reclaiming
the States which had already seceded. Affairs were then so urgent
that long before the State legislatures could possibly ask
Congress to call a convention as required by Mr. Baldwin’s
proposition, the cause of the Union might be hopeless. It was,
therefore, rejected.
This proposition of Mr. Baldwin, evasive and dilatory as it was,
nevertheless received the votes of eight of the twenty-one
States.[115] These consisted of the whole of the New England
States, except Rhode Island, and of Illinois, Iowa and New York,
all being free States. This was an evil omen.
Footnote 115:
Ibid., p. 63.
The first amendment reported by Mr. Seddon differed from that of
the majority, inasmuch as it embraced not only the present but all
future Territories.[116] This was rejected.[117] His second
amendment, which, however, was never voted upon by the Convention,
went so far as distinctly to recognize the right of secession.
Footnote 116:
Official Journal, pp. 26, 27 and 28.
Footnote 117:
Ibid., p. 28.
It cannot be denied that there was in the convention an extreme
Southern rights element, headed by Mr. Seddon. This manifested
itself throughout its proceedings. These show how naturally
extremes meet. On more than one important occasion, we find the
vote of Virginia and North Carolina, though given in each case by
a bare majority of their commissioners, side by side with the vote
of Massachusetts and Vermont. It would be too tedious to trace the
proceedings of the Convention from the report of the committee
made by Mr. Guthrie until its final adjournment. It is sufficient
to say that more than ten days were consumed in discussion and in
voting upon various propositions offered by individual
commissioners. The final vote was not reached until Tuesday, the
26th February, when it was taken on the first and vitally
important section, as amended.[118]
Footnote 118:
Ibid., p. 70.
This section, on which all the rest depended, was negatived by a
vote of eight States to eleven. Those which voted in its favor
were Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and Tennessee. And those in the negative were
Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
York, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Vermont and Virginia. It is
but justice to say that Messrs. Ruffin and Morehead, of North
Carolina, and Messrs. Rives and Summers, of Virginia, two of the
five commissioners from each of these States, declared their
dissent from the vote of their respective States. So, also, did
Messrs. Bronson, Corning, Dodge, Wool and Granger, five of the
eleven New York commissioners, dissent from the vote of their
State. On the other hand, Messrs. Meredith and Wilmot, two of the
seven commissioners from Pennsylvania, dissented from the majority
in voting in favor of the section. Thus would the Convention have
terminated but for the interposition of Illinois. Immediately
after the section had been negatived, the commissioners from that
State made a motion to reconsider the vote, and this prevailed.
The Convention afterwards adjourned until the next morning. When
they reassembled (February 27), the first section was adopted, but
only by a majority of nine to eight States, nine being less than a
majority of the States represented. This change was effected by a
change of the vote of Illinois from the negative to the
affirmative, by Missouri withholding her vote, and by a tie in the
New York commissioners, on account of the absence of one of their
number, rendering it impossible for the State to vote. Still,
Virginia and North Carolina, in the one extreme, and Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont, in the other,
persisted in voting in the negative. From the nature of this vote,
it was manifestly impossible that two-thirds of both Houses of
Congress should act favorably on the amendment, even if the delay
had not already rendered such action impracticable before the
close of the session.
It would be useless to refer to the voting on the remaining
sections of the amendment, which were carried by small
majorities.[119] The Convention, on the same day, through Mr.
Tyler, their president, communicated to the Senate and House of
Representatives the amendment they had adopted, embracing all the
sections, with a request that it might be submitted by Congress,
under the Constitution, to the several State legislatures. In the
Senate this was immediately referred to a select committee, on
motion of Mr. Crittenden. The committee, on the next day (28th
Feb.),[120] reported a joint resolution (No. 70) proposing it as
an amendment to the Constitution, but he was never able to bring
the Senate to a direct vote upon it.[121] Failing in this, he made
a motion to substitute the amendment of the Peace Convention for
his own.[122] This he prefaced by declaring that he looked upon
the result of the deliberations of that body “as affording the
best opportunity for a general concurrence among the States, and
among the people.” He, therefore, “had determined to take it in
preference to his own proposition, and had so stated to many of
the members of the Convention.” He further said that he had
“examined the propositions offered by that Convention; they
contain, in my judgment, every material provision that is
contained in the resolution called the Crittenden Resolution.” He
also had adopted this course “out of deference to that great body
of men selected on the resolution of Virginia, and invited by
Virginia herself. The body having met, and being composed of such
men, and a majority of that Convention concurring in these
resolutions, I think they come to us with a sanction entitling
them to consideration.” Mr. Crittenden’s reasons failed to
convince the Senate, and his motion was rejected by a large
majority (28 to 7).[123] Then next in succession came the
memorable vote on Mr. Crittenden’s own resolution, and it was in
its turn defeated, as we have already stated, by a majority of 20
against 19.
Footnote 119:
Senate Journal, pp. 332, 333.
Footnote 120:
Ibid., p. 437.
Footnote 121:
Ibid., p. 384.
Footnote 122:
_Cong. Globe_, 1860-’61, p. 1404.
Footnote 123:
Senate Journal, p. 386.
We cannot take leave of this venerable patriot, who so wisely
appreciated the existing danger, without paying a just tribute to
the vigor and perseverance of his repeated efforts to ward off
from his country the direful calamity of disunion and civil war.
Well did he merit the almost unanimous vote of the Virginia
Convention, on the 11th March, tendering him the thanks of the
people of Virginia for “his recent able, zealous, and patriotic
efforts in the Senate in the United States, to bring about a just
and honorable adjustment of our national difficulties.”[124] This
vote, we may remark, was far from being complimentary to the
conduct of a majority of their own commissioners (Messrs. Tyler,
Brockenbrough, and Seddon) in the Peace Convention.
Footnote 124:
_National Intelligencer_, March 14, 1861.
In the House of Representatives, the amendment proposed by the
Convention was treated with still less respect than it had been by
the Senate.[125] The Speaker was refused leave even to present
it.[126] Every effort made for this purpose was successfully
resisted by leading Republican members. The consequence is that a
copy of it does not even appear in the Journal.
Footnote 125:
_Cong. Globe_, pp. 1331, 1332, 1333.
Footnote 126:
House Journal, pp. 446, 448, 449.
Although the amendment was somewhat less favorable to the South,
and ought, therefore, to have been more acceptable to the North
than the Crittenden amendment, yet, like this, it encountered the
opposition of every Republican member in both Houses of Congress.
Nevertheless, it presented a basis of compromise which, had it
been conceded by the North, might and probably would, have been
accepted by the people of the border States, in preference to the
fearful alternative of their secession from the Union.
However urgent were the reasons for the adoption by Congress of the
Crittenden Compromise, or the propositions submitted to it by the
Peace Convention, the question now recurs whether the President in
the meantime did his duty and his whole duty, in keeping a vigilant
eye upon the proceedings in South Carolina and other Southern
States. To answer this question, it is necessary to go back to the
point of time at which the first commissioners from South Carolina
left Washington without having obtained from the President a promise
to withdraw Major Anderson’s force from the harbor of Charleston, or
any stipulation not to send him reinforcements. This point of time
is the 2d day of January, 1861, the day on which the commissioners
dated their reply to the President’s letter of December 31st; a
reply couched in terms so disrespectful and arrogant that by the
unanimous advice of the cabinet it was returned to them as a paper
unfit to be received. “From that time forward,” says Mr. Buchanan,
“all friendly political and personal intercourse finally ceased
between the revolutionary Senators and the President, and he was
severely attacked by them in the Senate, and especially by Mr.
Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse had been of the coldest
character ever since the President’s anti-secession message at the
commencement of the session of Congress.”[127]
Footnote 127:
Letter of October 28, 1862, in the controversy with General Scott,
published in the _National Intelligencer_ of November 1, 1862. As
a specimen of the intercourse between the President and the
secession Senators, after the messages of December 3d and January
8th, take the following notes:—
[JOHN SLIDELL TO PRESIDENT BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, January 27, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have seen in the _Star_, and heard from other parties, that
Major Beauregard, who had been ordered to West Point as
Superintendent of the Military Academy, and had entered on the
discharge of his duties there, had been relieved from his command.
May I take the liberty of asking you if this has been done with
your approbation? Very respectfully, yours,
JOHN SLIDELL.
[PRESIDENT BUCHANAN TO JOHN SLIDELL.]
WASHINGTON, January 29, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
With every sentiment of personal friendship and regard, I am
obliged to say, in answer to your note of Sunday, that I have full
confidence in the Secretary of War; and his acts, in the line of
his duty, are my own acts, for which I am responsible.
Yours, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
The first event occurring at this time in the Executive Department,
which it is important to notice here, was an application made by
General Scott to the President, on Sunday, the 30th of December, by
the following note:
December 30, 1860.
Lieutenant General Scott begs the President of the United States
to pardon the irregularity of this communication. It is Sunday,
the weather is bad, and General Scott is not well enough to go to
church. But matters of the highest national importance seem to
forbid a moment’s delay, and, if misled by zeal, he hopes for the
President’s forgiveness.
Will the President permit General Scott, without reference to the
War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two
hundred and fifty recruits, from New York harbor, to reinforce
Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles,
ammunition, and subsistence stores?
It is hoped that a sloop-of-war and cutter may be ordered for the
same purpose as early as to-morrow.
General Scott will wait upon the President at any moment he may be
called for.
The President’s most obedient servant,
WINFIELD SCOTT.
General Scott was evidently not aware, when he wrote this note, that
the late Secretary of War, Floyd, was out of office. The President,
having substituted Mr. Holt in his place as Secretary _ad interim_,
was under no necessity whatever to act without the knowledge of that
Department. He proceeded therefore to act promptly and in the usual
manner upon the General’s recommendation. He received the General’s
note on the evening of Sunday, the 30th of December. On the morning
of Monday, the 31st, he gave instructions to the War and Navy
Departments; the orders were issued on that day; and in the evening
General Scott called upon the President and informed him that the
Secretaries had issued the orders and that they were in his (the
General’s) possession. The orders were that the sloop-of-war
Brooklyn, with troops, military stores, and provisions, was to sail
forthwith from Fortress Monroe to Fort Sumter. It could not be true,
therefore, as was afterwards asserted by General Scott, that “the
South Carolina commissioners had already been many days in
Washington and no movement of defence (on the part of the United
States) was permitted.” The commissioners arrived in Washington on
the 27th of December. On the 30th they received the President’s
answer. General Scott’s request was made to the President on the
30th, and on the 31st the orders for the Brooklyn to sail were in
his hands. The commissioners’ insolent reply to the President was
not delivered to him until the 2d of January. The Brooklyn was
already under orders, but the orders were not despatched from
Washington on the 31st for a reason that will presently appear.
It is now to be stated how a mercantile steamer, The Star of the
West, came to be substituted for the Brooklyn, and to sail on this
expedition. And here General Scott’s memory was utterly at fault in
1862. He then publicly stated that the President refused to allow
any attempt to be made to reinforce Fort Sumter, because he was
holding negotiations with the South Carolina commissioners; and that
“afterwards Secretary Holt and myself [General Scott] endeavored, in
vain, to obtain a ship-of-war for the purpose, and were finally
obliged to employ the passenger steamer Star of the West.” It is
most extraordinary that the General should have made this
misstatement. The Star of the West was substituted for the Brooklyn
by his own advice. “At the interview already referred to,” says Mr.
Buchanan, “between the General and myself, on the evening of Monday,
the 31st of December, I suggested to him that, although I had not
received the South Carolina commissioners in their official
capacity, but merely as private gentlemen, yet it might be
considered as an improper act to send the Brooklyn with
reinforcements to Fort Sumter until I had received an answer from
them to my letter of the preceding day; that the delay could not
continue more than forty-eight hours. He promptly concurred in this
suggestion as gentlemanly and proper, and the orders were not
transmitted to the Brooklyn on that evening. My anticipations were
correct, for on the morning [afternoon] of the 2d of January I
received their insolent note, and sent it back to them. In the
meantime, however, the General had become convinced, on the
representations of a gentleman whom I forbear to name, that the
better plan, as the Secretaries of War and the Navy informed me, to
secure secrecy and success, and reach the fort, would be to send a
fast side-wheel steamer from New York with the reinforcement.
Accordingly, the Star of the West was selected for this duty. The
substitution of this steamer for the Brooklyn, which would have been
able to defend herself in case of attack, was reluctantly yielded by
me to the high military judgment of General Scott.”[128]
Footnote 128:
Letter from Mr. Buchanan to the _National Intelligencer_, October
28, 1862.
In consequence of this change, a short time had to elapse before the
Star of the West, then at New York, could take on board the
reinforcements. She sailed from New York on the 5th of January. On
that day General Scott sent a despatch to his son-in-law, Colonel
Scott, to countermand her departure, but it was not received until
after she had gone to sea. The countermand was given for two
reasons: first, because a despatch received by Mr. Holt on that day
from Major Anderson stated in effect that he felt secure in his
position; and secondly, and more emphatically, because on the same
evening information reached the War Department that a heavy battery
had been erected among the sand hills, at the entrance of Charleston
harbor, capable of destroying any unarmed vessel that might attempt
to enter.[129] Satisfied that there was no present necessity for
sending reinforcements, and that when sent they ought to go in a
vessel of war, the Government, with General Scott’s full
concurrence,[130] after learning that the countermand had not
reached the Star of the West before she sailed, took steps to
overtake her. The following memorandum now lies before me:
Footnote 129:
See a statement published by Mr. Holt in the _National
Intelligencer_, dated March 5, 1861.
Footnote 130:
When General Scott wrote and published, in 1862, his criticisms on
Mr. Buchanan’s course, he said that the Star of the West, “but for
the hesitation of the master, might, as is generally believed,
have delivered at the fort the men and subsistence on board.” He
had forgotten that he had sent his own order to the commander of
the troops on board that vessel, which would inform him that the
Brooklyn was coming to aid and succor him, and that in case he
could not land at Fort Sumter, he was to turn back and land his
troops at Fort Monroe and discharge the ship! With what propriety
then could the General blame the master of the ship for not making
an attempt which the General knew he could not make without the
support of the Brooklyn?
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.
A despatch was forwarded, night of January 7, through the agency
of the Navy Department, to the officer commanding recruits on
board the steamship Star of the West, in almost exactly these
words:
“This communication will be handed you by the Commander of the
United States Steamer sloop-of-war Brooklyn.
“The object of his mission is twofold. _First_, to afford aid and
succor in case your ship be shattered or injured; _second_, to
convey this order of recall, in case you cannot land at Fort
Sumter, to Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, there to await further
orders.
“In case of your return to Hampton Roads, send a telegraphic
message here at once from Norfolk.
”WINFIELD SCOTT.
“P. S.—Land your troops at Fort Monroe and discharge the ship.
“W. S.”
The Star of the West arrived off the harbor of Charleston on the 9th
of January, and being fired upon as she was attempting to enter the
harbor, by order of Governor Pickens, she returned without entering.
It is, therefore, now necessary to go forward, and covering
everything that was done or omitted by the President thereafter, in
regard to Fort Sumter, to inquire into another charge made by
General Scott in 1862, that the President was under the
embarrassment of a truce or armistice, which continued for the
remainder of the administration. It seems that late in the month of
January, there was a project considered, between the General,
Secretaries Holt and Toucey, and certain naval officers, with the
knowledge of the President, for sending three or four small steamers
belonging to the coast survey to the relief of Fort Sumter. General
Scott, in 1862, declared that he had but little doubt this
expedition would have been successful, but that it was “kept back by
something like a truce or armistice, made here, embracing Charleston
and Pensacola harbors, agreed upon by the late President and certain
principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, etc., and
this truce lasted to the end of that administration.”
It is perhaps not remarkable that the history of this period of Mr.
Buchanan’s administration should have been so widely misunderstood,
when one considers the nature of the materials from which the
history thus far written has been derived. General Scott, from his
official position, knew that no truce or armistice whatever was
entered into by the President with anybody, embracing the two
harbors of Charleston and Pensacola; that in regard to Pensacola,
there was a special arrangement, in no way connected with the state
of things in Charleston; and that in regard to Charleston, there was
only a temporary agreement between Major Anderson and Governor
Pickens, that was terminable on a certain event, and that lasted but
for a short time. To separate things entirely distinct in their
nature, but which General Scott saw fit to blend together in making
his imputations upon the President’s conduct, is now my imperative
duty.
The only truce that was made in reference to Charleston was an
actual truce of arms made between Governor Pickens and Major
Anderson, on the 11th of January, 1861, without the President’s
previous knowledge, and consequently it could not have been the
result of any conference between the President and certain
secessionists then in Washington or elsewhere. The Star of the West,
sailing under the American flag, was fired upon and turned back on
the 9th of January. This outrage required Major Anderson’s instant
notice. If he had immediately opened fire from Fort Sumter upon the
adjacent batteries which sent their shot across the bow of that
vessel, he would have been justified by his position as an officer
of the United States commanding a fort which existed for the
protection of all vessels having a right to enter the harbor, and
especially for the protection of all vessels bearing the flag of the
United States. He was under no obligation whatever to recognize
South Carolina as a power foreign to the United States; but if he
had chosen, he might have considered the firing on this vessel as an
act of war, which South Carolina had instituted against the United
States. He took what he considered as the most prudent course that
was open to him. He sent a flag of truce to the Governor, stating
that he presumed the act was unauthorized, and therefore that he had
not returned the fire, but demanding an official disavowal of the
act within a reasonable time, otherwise he should consider it an act
of war and should fire on any vessel within the reach of his guns
which might attempt to enter or leave the harbor. It is quite
evident that if he had adhered to this purpose, the civil war would
then have commenced; for the attitude of South Carolina was that of
a power claiming complete independence of the United States, and her
preparations for driving the United States out of the harbor were
prosecuting with great vigor. But the affair took an unexpected,
although for the moment it may have been a fortunate turn. The
Governor did not disavow, but justified, the act of firing on the
Star of the West, and on the 11th of January he sent two members of
his executive council to Major Anderson, with instructions to
present to him “considerations of the gravest public character, and
of the deepest interest to all who deprecate the improper waste of
life, to induce the delivery of Fort Sumter to the constituted
authorities of South Carolina, with a pledge on its part to account
for such public property as may be in your charge.”
It is difficult now to look back upon those transactions, and to
describe them with the coolness which history should preserve.
Without the least consideration for the duty incumbent upon the
President of the United States under his official oath, the
“constituted authorities of South Carolina” assumed from the first
a position which they calculated, not without reason, would be
supported by the secession leaders of the other cotton States.
Their attitude was that their secession ordinance had completely
severed the State from all connection with the United States; that
the latter power was an intruder in her dominions, holding
fortifications which were a standing affront to the dignity and a
peril to the safety of the State; that these fortifications must
be surrendered to the paramount territorial sovereignty of the
State; and that as to the property of the United States which they
contained, the State would account for it. The alternative plainly
presented was that war must ensue, if these demands were not
complied with. It is almost impossible to understand how sane men
could have imagined that the Executive Government of the United
States could be made to yield to such a demand; but the
explanation is to be found in the three facts, that the South
Carolina leaders meant to make the issue on the whole doctrine of
secession in such a shape as would secure the support of some
other States and their representatives in Washington; that they
had reason to count confidently upon the support of the latter;
and that they believed that President Buchanan could be induced or
driven into a compliance with their demands, if they presented the
alternatives of a complete admission of their right to secede
peaceably on the one hand, and civil war on the other.
Perhaps the only thing that Major Anderson could prudently do, after
what he considered as a demand upon him for a surrender of the fort,
was to do precisely what he did, namely, to refer the whole matter
to Washington. His answer to the Governor, sent on the same day, was
that he could not comply with the demand, but that “should your
Excellency deem fit, prior to a resort to arms, to refer the matter
to Washington, it would afford me the sincerest pleasure to depute
one of my officers to accompany any messenger you may deem proper to
be the bearer of your demand.” This proposition was accepted by the
Governor, and he commissioned the Attorney General of the State, the
Hon. J. W. Hayne, to proceed to Washington and make the same demand
on the President that had been made on Major Anderson. Major
Anderson, on his part, sent one of his officers, Lieutenant J.
Norman Hall, as his deputy, to await the President’s decision. The
two gentlemen arrived in Washington together, on the evening of
January 13th, 1861.
There was thus established between Major Anderson and the Governor
of South Carolina a temporary truce of arms, which related to no
locality but the harbor of Charleston, and would terminate when
Major Anderson should receive his instructions how to act. On the
one side, South Carolina, in an armed attitude, demands of Major
Anderson the surrender of a fort of the United States, with a plain
intimation that if he does not surrender it he must be driven out of
it. On the other hand, Major Anderson, who, as the commanding
officer of the United States in that harbor, has a just cause for
retaliation on account of the attack on the Star of the West,
proposes a suspension of all hostilities until he can receive the
instructions of his Government. The proposal being accepted and
acted upon, the circumstances constituted what President Buchanan,
with entire accuracy, and citing the language of Vattel, calls “a
partial truce, under which hostilities are suspended only in certain
places.”[131] But the President was greatly surprised by this state
of things. The truce made it alike impossible for Major Anderson to
ask for, or the Government to send him, reinforcements, while it
lasted. All that could be done by the President was to learn what
the South Carolina messenger or envoy had to say, and then to decide
again that Fort Sumter could not and would not be surrendered. When
this had been done, the truce would be ended.[132]
Footnote 131:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 144.
Footnote 132:
See Ex. Doc., H. R., vol. ix., No. 61. The reader who consults the
documents without prejudice cannot fail to be struck with the
arrogance of tone and the extreme nature of the demands, that mark
all the papers that emanated from the South Carolina authorities
at this period. Nor can he fail, I think, to see that President
Buchanan, while he exercised great patience, bore himself
throughout with the dignity that belonged to his position. When a
paper became too outrageous to be tolerated, it was promptly
returned.
Colonel Hayne called upon the President on the morning of the 14th
of January, stating that he bore a letter from Governor Pickens to
the President, which he would deliver in person on the next day.
Remembering his experience with the former commissioners from South
Carolina, the President declined to hold any conversation with
Colonel Hayne on the subject of his errand, and requested that all
communications should be made in writing, to which Colonel Hayne
assented. On the 15th the Governor’s letter was not delivered to the
President; it was held back on the advice of certain Southern
Senators. The following memorandum, drawn up by the President on the
16th, will explain what those Senators were then trying to
accomplish:
Wednesday afternoon, at 4 P. M., January 16.
Senator Clay (of Alabama) called. He began by assigning reasons
why I should withdraw Major Anderson and his troops from Fort
Sumter. I told him that it was quite out of the question for me to
hold verbal communication on this subject. Although I relied
implicitly upon his honor, yet there would be mistakes with the
best intentions. He concurred in this opinion, but said he would
never repeat to any human being what had passed between him and
me. I thought, however, I would leave no room for doubt on the
important point, and I told him I would not, under any
circumstances, withdraw the troops from Fort Sumter. He spoke of
the inauguration of civil war in Charleston as a dreadful
calamity. I answered that the troops were there in a small number,
in the possession of a fort which I firmly believed belonged to
the United States, to act purely on the defensive; and if
assaulted by the authorities of South Carolina, on them would rest
the exclusive responsibility of commencing civil war. I believed
South Carolina still to be a part of the Confederacy.
He then (and I am not certain he did not mention it before) said
he had come from the seceding Senators to suggest to me some plan
by which the effusion of human blood might be spared at
Charleston. I told him any proposition of this kind must be
reduced to writing—that without this I could not consider it.
Still, he went on and said there was a truce agreed upon, so long
as Colonel Hayne was here. I told him I had understood that there
had been. He said they wanted him to remain a few days, and submit
a proposition to the government of South Carolina, to agree that
Major Anderson should be placed in his former position; that the
Government should have free access to him; that he should buy all
the provisions he wanted in Charleston; and that he should not be
disturbed if I would not send him additional reinforcements. I
again said that I could not take any proposition into
consideration unless it were reduced to writing. He said he
understood this perfectly. But [he] went on to say that the truce
might be extended until the meeting at Milledgeville, or even till
the 4th March. I told him that the truce would continue until
Colonel Hayne left here, which I supposed would be in a few days;
that Lieutenant Hall had been informed by Colonel Hayne that he
might go to see his sick sister in New York, provided he was back
on Friday evening. I told him I could say nothing further on the
subject of the truce, nor could I express any opinion on the
subjects to which he had referred, unless the proposition were
reduced to writing, and presented to me in a distinct form. He
said I need be under no apprehensions as to the security of the
fort. He had just come from Jefferson Davis, who said it could not
be taken; and Lars Anderson had informed him that Major Anderson
said he did not require reinforcements. He got up and said he
would go to those who had sent him, and it would be for them to
decide upon the proposition. I then said to him, emphatically,
that Colonel Hayne could not possibly be authorized to send any
propositions to Charleston until they had been first submitted to
myself and cabinet and agreed to. He said certainly not, that this
was a necessary preliminary. I repeated again that I could not
even consider any verbal proposition. He said he understood that
perfectly; that he would not have anything to do with it himself
without this. He then asked me when the cabinet would meet. He
believed it was to-morrow, and they would not have time to come to
an understanding so soon. I said that the regular day was Friday.
He said that would give them time, and so he went away.
In the course of conversation I told him that I felt as much
anxiety to prevent a collision and spare the effusion of blood as
any man living; but this must be done in consistency with the
discharge of all my duties as laid down in my annual message and
my late special message. That I could not, and would not, withdraw
Major Anderson from Fort Sumter.
What ensued after this interview between the President and Senator
Clay can be best related in the President’s own words. Every
statement that he makes in the following narrative is founded on and
supported by the written correspondence.
Colonel Hayne, the commissioner from South Carolina, as already
stated, arrived in Washington on the 13th January. He bore with
him a letter from Governor Pickens addressed to the President. On
the next morning he called upon the President, and stated that he
would deliver this letter in person on the day following. The
President, however, admonished by his recent experience with the
former commissioners, declined to hold any conversation with him
on the subject of his mission, and requested that all
communications between them might be in writing. To this he
assented. Although the President had no actual knowledge of the
contents of the Governor’s letter, he could not doubt it contained
a demand for the surrender of the fort. Such a demand he was at
all times prepared peremptorily to reject. This Colonel Hayne must
have known, because the President had but a fortnight before
informed his predecessors this was impossible, and had never been
thought of by him in any possible contingency. The President
confidently expected that the letter would be transmitted to him
on the day after the interview, when his refusal to surrender the
fort would at once terminate the truce, and leave both parties
free to act upon their own responsibility. Colonel Hayne, however,
did not transmit this letter to the President on the 15th January,
according to his promise, but withheld it until the 31st of that
month. The reason for this vexatious delay will constitute a
curious portion of our narrative, and deserves to be mentioned in
some detail. (_Vide_ the President’s message of 8th February,
1861, with the accompanying documents, Ex. Doc., H. R., vol. ix.,
No. 61.)
The Senators from the cotton States yet in Congress appeared,
strangely enough, to suppose that through their influence the
President might agree not to send reinforcements to Fort Sumter,
provided Governor Pickens would stipulate not to attack it. By
such an agreement they proposed to preserve the peace. But first
of all it was necessary for them to prevail upon Colonel Hayne not
to transmit the letter to the President on the day appointed,
because they well knew that the demand which it contained would
meet his prompt and decided refusal. This would render the
conclusion of such an agreement impossible.
In furtherance of their plan, nine of these Senators, with
Jefferson Davis at their head, addressed a note to Colonel Hayne
on the 15th January, requesting him to defer the delivery of the
letter. They proposed that he should withhold it until they could
ascertain from the President whether he would agree not to send
reinforcements, provided Governor Pickens would engage not to
attack the fort. They informed the Colonel that should the
President prove willing in the first place to enter into such an
arrangement, they would then strongly recommend that he should not
deliver the letter he had in charge for the present, but send to
South Carolina for authority from Governor Pickens to become a
party thereto. Colonel Hayne, in his answer to these Senators of
the 17th January, informed them that he had not been clothed with
power to make the arrangements suggested, but provided they could
get assurances with which they were entirely satisfied that no
reinforcements would be sent to Fort Sumter, he would withhold the
letter with which he had been charged, refer their communication
to the authorities of South Carolina, and await further
instructions.
On the 19th January this correspondence between the Senators and
Colonel Hayne was submitted to the President, accompanied by a
note from three of their number, requesting him to take the
subject into consideration. His answer to this note was delayed no
longer than was necessary to prepare it in proper form. On the 22d
January it was communicated to these Senators in a letter from the
Secretary of War. This contained an express refusal to enter into
the proposed agreement. Mr. Holt says: “I am happy to observe
that, in your letter to Colonel Hayne, you express the opinion
that it is ‘especially due from South Carolina to our States, to
say nothing of other slaveholding States, that she should, so far
as she can consistently with her honor, avoid initiating
hostilities between her and the United States or any other power.’
To initiate such hostilities against Fort Sumter would, beyond
question, be an act of war against the United States. In regard to
the proposition of Colonel Hayne, ‘that no reinforcements will be
sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that public peace will
not be disturbed by any act of hostility towards South Carolina,’
it is impossible for me to give you any such assurances. The
President has no authority to enter into such an agreement or
understanding. As an executive officer, he is simply bound to
protect the public property so far as this maybe practicable; and
it would be a manifest violation of his duty to place himself
under engagements that he would not perform this duty, either for
an indefinite, or limited, period. At the present moment it is not
deemed necessary to reinforce Major Anderson, because he makes no
such request and feels quite secure in his position. Should his
safety, however, require reinforcements, every effort will be made
to supply them.”
It was believed by the President that this peremptory refusal to
enter into the proposed agreement, would have caused Colonel Hayne
immediately to present the letter he had in charge and thus
terminate his mission, thereby releasing both parties from the
obligations of the truce. In this expectation the President was
disappointed. The secession Senators again interposed, and advised
Colonel Hayne still longer to withhold the letter from the
President, and await further instructions from Charleston. In his
answer of 24th January to their note containing this advice, he
[Col. Hayne] informs them that although the letter from the
Secretary of War “was far from being satisfactory,” yet in
compliance with their request he “would withhold the communication
with which he was at present charged, and refer the whole matter
to the authorities of South Carolina, and would await their
reply.” On the 30th this reply was received, and on the next day
Colonel Hayne transmitted to the President the letter of Governor
Pickens demanding the surrender of the fort, with a long
communication from himself. This letter is dated “Headquarters,
Charleston, January 12, 1861,” and is as follows:
“SIR:—
“At the time of the separation of the State of South Carolina
from the United States, Fort Sumter was, and still is, in the
possession of troops of the United States, under the command of
Major Anderson. I regard that possession as not consistent with
the dignity or safety of the State of South Carolina, and have
this day [it was the day previous] addressed to Major Anderson a
communication to obtain possession of that fort by the
authorities of this State. The reply of Major Anderson informs
me that he has no authority to do what I required, but he
desires a reference of the demand to the President of the United
States. Under the circumstances now existing, and which need no
comment by me, I have determined to send to you Hon. I. W.
Hayne, the Attorney-General of the State of South Carolina, and
have instructed him to demand the delivery of Fort Sumter, in
the harbor of Charleston, to the constituted authorities of the
State of South Carolina. The demand I have made of Major
Anderson, and which I now make of you, is suggested by my
earnest desire to avoid the bloodshed which a persistence in
your attempt to retain possession of that fort will cause, and
which will be unavailing to secure to you that possession, but
induce a calamity most deeply to be deplored. If consequences so
unhappy shall ensue, I will secure for this State, in the demand
which I now make, the satisfaction of having exhausted every
attempt to avoid it.
“In relation to the public property of the United States within
Fort Sumter, the Hon. I. W, Hayne, who will hand you this
communication, is authorized to give you the pledge of the State
that the valuation of such property will be accounted for by this
State, upon the adjustment of its relations with the United
States, of which it was a part.”
On the 6th February, the Secretary of War, on behalf of the
President, replied to this demand, as well as to the letter of
Colonel Hayne accompanying it. Our narrative would be incomplete
without this admirable and conclusive reply. It is as follows:
“WAR DEPARTMENT, February 6, 1861.[133]
“SIR:—
“The President of the United States has received your letter of
the 31st ultimo, and has charged me with the duty of replying
thereto.
“In the communication addressed to the President by Governor
Pickens, under date of the 12th January, and which accompanies
yours now before me, his Excellency says: ‘I have determined to
send to you the Hon. I. W. Hayne, the Attorney General of the
State of South Carolina, and have instructed him to demand the
surrender of Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston, to the
constituted authorities of the State of South Carolina. The demand
I have made of Major Anderson, and which I now make of you, is
suggested because of my earnest desire to avoid the bloodshed
which a persistence in your attempt to retain possession of that
fort will cause, and which will be unavailing to secure to you
that possession, but induce a calamity most deeply to be
deplored.’ The character of the demand thus authorized to be made
appears (under the influence, I presume, of the correspondence
with the Senators to which you refer) to have been modified by
subsequent instructions of his Excellency, dated the 26th, and
received by yourself on the 30th January, in which he says: ‘If it
be so that Fort Sumter is held as property, then, as property, the
rights, whatever they may be, of the United States, can be
ascertained, and for the satisfaction of these rights the pledge
of the State of South Carolina you are authorized to give.’ The
full scope and precise purport of your instructions, as thus
modified, you have expressed in the following words: ‘I do not
come as a military man to demand the surrender of a fortress, but
as the legal officer of the State—its Attorney General—to claim
for the State the exercise of its undoubted right of eminent
domain, and to pledge the State to make good all injury to the
rights of property which arise from the exercise of the claim.’
And lest this explicit language should not sufficiently define
your position, you add: ‘The proposition now is that her [South
Carolina’s] law officer should, under authority of the Governor
and his council, distinctly pledge the faith of South Carolina to
make such compensation, in regard to Fort Sumter and its
appurtenances and contents, to the full extent of the money value
of the property of the United States, delivered over to the
authorities of South Carolina by your command.’ You then adopt his
Excellency’s train of thought upon the subject, so far as to
suggest that the possession of Fort Sumter by the United States,
‘if continued long enough, must lead to collision,’ and that ‘an
attack upon it would scarcely improve it as property, whatever the
result; and if captured, it would no longer be the subject of
account.’
“The proposal, then, now presented to the President, is simply an
offer on the part of South Carolina to buy Fort Sumter and
contents as property of the United States, sustained by a
declaration in effect, that if she is not permitted to make the
purchase, she will seize the fort by force of arms. As the
initiation of a negotiation for the transfer of property between
friendly governments, this proposal impresses the President as
having assumed a most unusual form. He has, however, investigated
the claim on which it professes to be based, apart from the
declaration that accompanies it. And it may be here remarked, that
much stress has been laid upon the employment of the words
‘property’ and ‘public property’ by the President in his several
messages. These are the most comprehensive terms which can be used
in such a connection, and surely, when referring to a fort or any
other public establishment, they embrace the entire and undivided
interest of the Government therein.
“The title of the United States to Fort Sumter is complete and
incontestable. Were its interest in this property purely
proprietary, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, it might
probably be subjected to the exercise of the right of eminent
domain; but it has also political relations to it of a much higher
and more imposing character than those of mere proprietorship. It
has absolute jurisdiction over the fort and the soil on which it
stands. This jurisdiction consists in the authority to ‘exercise
exclusive legislation’ over the property referred to, and is
therefore clearly incompatible with the claim of eminent domain
now insisted upon by South Carolina. This authority was not
derived from any questionable revolutionary source, but from the
peaceful cession of South Carolina herself, acting through her
legislature, under a provision of the Constitution of the United
States. South Carolina can no more assert the right of eminent
domain over Fort Sumter than Maryland can assert it over the
District of Columbia. The political and proprietary rights of the
United States in either case rest upon precisely the same ground.
“The President, however, is relieved from the necessity of further
pursuing this inquiry by the fact that, whatever may be the claim
of South Carolina to this fort, he has no constitutional power to
cede or surrender it. The property of the United States has been
acquired by force of public law, and can only be disposed of under
the same solemn sanctions. The President, as the head of the
executive branch of the Government only, can no more sell and
transfer Fort Sumter to South Carolina than he can sell and convey
the Capitol of the United States to Maryland or to any other State
or individual seeking to possess it. His Excellency the Governor
is too familiar with the Constitution of the United States, and
with the limitations upon the powers of the Chief Magistrate of
the Government it has established, not to appreciate at once the
soundness of this legal proposition. The question of reinforcing
Fort Sumter is so fully disposed of in my letter to Senator
Slidell and others, under date of the 22d of January, a copy of
which accompanies this, that its discussion will not now be
renewed. I then said: ‘At the present moment it is not deemed
necessary to reinforce Major Anderson, because he makes no such
request. Should his safety, however, require reinforcements, every
effort will be made to supply them.‘ I can add nothing to the
explicitness of this language, which still applies to the existing
status.
“The right to send forward reinforcements when, in the judgment of
the President, the safety of the garrison requires them, rests on
the same unquestionable foundation as the right to occupy the
fortress itself. In the letter of Senator Davis and others to
yourself, under date of the 15th ultimo, they say: ‘We therefore
think it especially due from South Carolina to our States—to say
nothing of other slaveholding States—that she should, as far as
she can consistently with her honor, avoid initiating hostilities
between her and the United States or any other power;‘ and you now
yourself give to the President the gratifying assurance that
‘South Carolina has every disposition to preserve the public
peace;’ and since he is himself sincerely animated by the same
desire, it would seem that this common and patriotic object must
be of certain attainment. It is difficult, however, to reconcile
with this assurance the declaration on your part that ‘it is a
consideration of her [South Carolina’s] own dignity as a
sovereign, and the safety of her people, which prompts her to
demand that this property should not longer be used as a military
post by a government she no longer acknowledges,’ and the thought
you so constantly present, that this occupation must lead to a
collision of arms and the prevalence of civil war. Fort Sumter is
in itself a military post, and nothing else; and it would seem
that not so much the fact as the purpose of its use should give to
it a hostile or friendly character. This fortress is now held by
the Government of the United States for the same objects for which
it has been held from the completion of its construction. These
are national and defensive; and were a public enemy now to attempt
the capture of Charleston or the destruction of the commerce of
its harbor, the whole force of the batteries of this fortress
would be at once exerted for their protection. How the presence of
a small garrison, actuated by such a spirit as this, can
compromise the dignity or honor of South Carolina, or become a
source of irritation to her people, the President is at a loss to
understand. The attitude of that garrison, as has been often
declared, is neither menacing, nor defiant, nor unfriendly. It is
acting under orders to stand strictly on the defensive; and the
government and people of South Carolina must well know that they
can never receive aught but shelter from its guns, unless, in the
absence of all provocation, they should assault it and seek its
destruction. The intent with which this fortress is held by the
President is truthfully stated by Senator Davis and others in
their letter to yourself of the 15th January, in which they say:
‘It is not held with any hostile or unfriendly purpose toward your
State, but merely as property of the United States, which the
President deems it his duty to protect and preserve.’
“If the announcement so repeatedly made of the President’s pacific
purposes in continuing the occupation of Fort Sumter until the
question shall have been settled by competent authority, has
failed to impress the government of South Carolina, the forbearing
conduct of his administration for the last few months should be
received as conclusive evidence of his sincerity, And if this
forbearance, in view of the circumstances which have so severely
tried it, be not accepted as a satisfactory pledge of the peaceful
policy of this administration toward South Carolina, then it may
be safely affirmed that neither language nor conduct can possibly
furnish one. If, with all the multiplied proofs which exist of the
President’s anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with which
he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall assault
Fort Sumter, and peril the lives of the handful of brave and loyal
men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our common country
into the horrors of civil war, then upon them and those they
represent must rest the responsibility.
“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
“J. HOLT,
“Secretary of War.
“HON. I. W. HAYNE,
“Attorney General of the State of South Carolina.
“P.S.—The President has not, as you have been informed, received a
copy of the letter to yourself from the Senators, communicating
that of Mr. Holt of the 22d January.”
Footnote 133:
H. R. Ex. Doc., 1860-’61, vol. ix, Doc. No. 61.
This letter of Mr. Holt, though firm and decided in character, is
courteous and respectful, both in tone and in terms. It reviews
the subject in an able and comprehensive manner, explaining and
justifying the conduct of the President. Unlike the letters to
which it is a response, it contains no menace. In conclusion, it
does no more than fix the responsibility of commencing a civil war
on the authorities of South Carolina, should they assault Fort
Sumter and imperil the lives of the brave and loyal men shut up
within its walls. It does not contain a word or an expression
calculated to afford just cause of offence; yet its statements and
its arguments must have cut Colonel Hayne to the quick. To reply
to them successfully was impossible. He, therefore, had no resort
but to get angry. Following in the footsteps of his predecessors,
on the 8th February he addressed an insulting answer, not to
Secretary Holt, as usage and common civility required, but
directly to the President. He then suddenly left Washington,
leaving his missile behind him to be delivered after his
departure. From his conduct he evidently anticipated its fate. His
letter was returned to him on the same day, directed to
Charleston, with the following indorsement: “The character of this
letter is such that it cannot be received. Colonel Hayne having
left the city before it was sent to the President, it is returned
to him by the first mail.” What has become of it we do not know.
No copy of it was retained, nor have we ever heard of it since.
What effect this letter of Mr. Holt may have produced upon the
truculent Governor of South Carolina we shall not attempt to
decide. Certain it is, from whatever cause, no attack was made
upon Fort Sumter until six weeks after the close of Mr. Buchanan’s
administration. The fort remained unmolested until South Carolina
had been for some time a member of the Confederate States. It was
reserved for Mr. Jefferson Davis, their President, to issue the
order for its bombardment, and thus formally to commence the civil
war. This he did with a full consciousness that such would be the
fatal effect; because in the letter from him and other Southern
Senators to Colonel Hayne, of the 15th January, both he and they
had warned Governor Pickens that an attack upon the fort would be
“the instituting hostilities between her [South Carolina] and the
United States.”
Thus ended the second mission from South Carolina to the
President, and thus was he relieved from the truce concluded by
Major Anderson. But in the mean time, before the termination of
this truce, the action of the General Assembly of Virginia,
instituting the Peace Convention, had interposed an insurmountable
obstacle to the reinforcement of Fort Sumter, unless attacked or
in immediate danger of attack, without entirely defeating this
beneficent measure.
The attention of the reader must now be directed to the harbor of
Pensacola. To unravel and correct the misrepresentations which
have been accepted as part of the history of Mr. Buchanan’s
administration, is no agreeable, but it is a very necessary duty. If
General Scott, at this period of his life, had not been a man very
far advanced in years and burthened with increasing infirmities, he
ought to be held to a severer responsibility than I am disposed to
apply to him, on account of the entirely unwarrantable imputations
which, with great personal inconsistency, he allowed himself to cast
upon Mr. Buchanan, after the latter had retired to private life, and
after new men had come into power who made it their policy to blame
the preceding President.
Pensacola, a town in the western end of the State of Florida, is on
a broad bay of the same name, which opens into the Gulf of Mexico.
The narrow entrance is commanded by Fort Pickens, built on the
extreme western point of Santa Rosa Island, and standing boldly upon
the Gulf. This fortress, unlike Fort Sumter, could be relieved at
any time by a naval force, which nothing could assail before the
fort was reached. Florida “seceded” on the 10th of January. The
command of the State troops was assumed by Colonel William H. Chase,
previously an officer of the United States corps of engineers. These
State forces suddenly expelled a small body of United States troops
from the town of Pensacola and the adjacent navy yard. This body of
regular troops was under the command of Lieutenant Slemmer, an
officer of the artillery, and it consisted of between seventy and
eighty men. They took refuge in Fort Pickens. Unless relieved, they
were in great danger of being captured by a much superior force, and
they were in pressing need of provisions. General Scott’s charge
against Mr. Buchanan, made in a paper which he presented to
President Lincoln in 1861, and which he called a report, was couched
in the following language:
“The Brooklyn, with Captain Vogdes’ company alone, left the
Chesapeake for Fort Pickens about January 22d, and on the 29th,
President Buchanan having entered into a _quasi_ armistice with
certain leading seceders at Pensacola and elsewhere, caused
Secretaries Holt and Toucey to instruct, in a joint note, the
commanders of the war vessels off Pensacola, and Lieutenant Slemmer,
commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to
land Captain Vogdes’ company unless the fort should be attacked.
That joint note I never saw, but suppose the armistice was
consequent upon the Peace Convention at Washington, and was
understood to terminate with it.”
The facts are as follows:
1. General Scott not only saw the joint order issued by Secretaries
Holt and Toucey, but he approved of it entirely. This is made
certain by a note written by Mr. Holt to the President, on the day
the order was issued, the 29th of January, informing him of the
fact. The original of this note was sealed up by the President and
put away. It reads as follows:
[SECRETARY HOLT TO THE PRESIDENT.]
“MY DEAR SIR:—
“The words [of the joint order] are ‘the provisions _necessary_
for the supply of the fort you will land.’ I think the language
could not be more carefully guarded. If, on communication with the
fort, it is found that no provisions are needed, then none will be
landed.
“I have the satisfaction of saying that on submitting the paper to
General Scott, he expressed himself satisfied with it, saying that
there could be no objection to the arrangement in a military point
of view or otherwise.
“Sincerely yours,
“J. HOLT.”
2. The Brooklyn, which, after her return from her cruise in search
of the Star of the West, had lain in Hampton Roads ready for any
emergency, sailed on the 24th of January for Fort Pickens, with
Captain Vogdes’ company of artillery, from Fortress Monroe, and with
provisions and military stores. Previous to this, the Secretary of
the Navy, as a measure of precaution, had withdrawn from foreign
stations all the war vessels that could be spared, and the home
squadron was thus made unusually large in the Gulf of Mexico.[134]
Footnote 134:
Writing on the 25th of June, 1861, to Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Toucey
says: “The naval force assembled at Pensacola under your
administration consisted of the steamship Brooklyn, the frigate
Sabine, the sloop of war Macedonian, the steamer Wyandotte, and
for a time the sloop of war St. Louis. Without including the
troops on board the Brooklyn, this squadron could have thrown a
reinforcement of six or seven hundred men into Fort Pickens at any
time.”
3. The circumstances which led to the joint order of January 29th
were the following: On the 28th, four days after the Brooklyn
sailed, Senators Slidell, of Louisiana, Hunter, of Virginia, and
Bigler, of Pennsylvania, received a telegraphic despatch from
Senator Mallory, then at Pensacola, with a request that it be laid
before the President. It gave the most positive assurances of both
Mallory and Chase that no attack would be made on the fort, if its
present status should be allowed to remain, and it expressed an
anxious desire to preserve peace. Notwithstanding these assurances,
the President was careful not to tie his own hands, in regard to
Pensacola, as they had been tied for a time by Major Anderson, in
regard to Charleston. The Brooklyn might not arrive in time to
preserve Fort Pickens, or to supply it with provisions, which must,
if needed, be thrown in at every hazard: and while it was of the
utmost importance that no collision should occur at that point, and
at a moment when the Peace Convention was about to assemble, it was
equally important that Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase should be made
to understand that the fleet in the Gulf of Mexico would act, at a
moment’s warning, not only in the event of any attack upon the fort,
but whenever the officer in command should observe that preparations
were making for an attack. A cabinet council was accordingly held on
the day on which the President saw Mr. Mallory’s despatch to the
three Senators, and with the approbation of every member of the
cabinet, the President directed the Secretaries of War and of the
Navy to issue the following joint order, and to transmit it
immediately by telegraph to the naval officers in the Gulf,
including the commander of the Brooklyn, and to Lieutenant Slemmer:
WASHINGTON, January 29, 1861.
To JAMES GLYNN, Comdg. the “Macedonian,” Captain W. S. WALKER,
Comdg. the “Brooklyn,” and other Naval Officers in command, and
1st Lieut. A. J. SLEMMER, First Artillery, commanding Fort
Pickens, Pensacola, Florida:—
In consequence of the assurances received from Mr. Mallory in a
telegram of yesterday to Messrs. Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler, with
a request it should be laid before the President, that Fort
Pickens would not be assaulted, and an offer of an assurance to
the same effect from Col. Chase, for the purpose of avoiding a
hostile collision, upon receiving satisfactory assurances from Mr.
Mallory and Col. Chase that Fort Pickens will not be attacked, you
are instructed not to land the company on board the Brooklyn,
unless said fort shall be attacked, or preparations shall be made
for its attack. The provisions necessary for the supply of the
fort you will land. The Brooklyn and the other vessels of war on
the station will remain, and you will exercise the utmost
vigilance, and be prepared at a moment’s warning to land the
company at Fort Pickens, and you and they will instantly repel any
attack on the fort. The President yesterday sent a special message
to Congress, commending the Virginia Resolutions of Compromise.
The commissioners of different States are to meet here on Monday,
the 4th of February, and it is important that during their session
a collision of arms should be avoided, unless an attack should be
made, or there should be preparations for such an attack. In
either event the Brooklyn and the other vessels will act promptly.
Your right and that of the other officers in command at Pensacola
freely to communicate with the Government by special messenger,
and its right in the same manner to communicate with yourself and
them, will remain intact as the basis on which the present
instruction is given.[135]
J. HOLT, Secretary of War,
ISAAC TOUCEY, Secretary of the Navy.
Footnote 135:
This order, which was given by the Secretary of War to Captain
Vogdes, was founded on and embodied a memorandum of instructions
drawn up by the President himself, which now lies before me in his
handwriting:
“You are instructed, for the purpose of avoiding a hostile
collision, not to land your company and stores at Fort Pickens,
upon receiving satisfactory assurances from Major Chase and Mr.
Mallory that the fort will not be attacked. The Brooklyn and the
other vessels of war in the vicinity will remain, and she will
land the company and provisions and defend Fort Pickens, should it
be attacked, exercising the utmost vigilance. The President
yesterday sent a special message to Congress commending the
Virginia Resolutions of Compromise. The commissioners of different
States are to meet here on Monday next, 4th February. During their
session, a collision of arms ought to be avoided, unless an attack
should be made on Fort Pickens, and then it must be repelled.”
4. On the morning of the same day on which this joint order was
issued, Senator Bigler called at the White House, but being unable
to wait for an interview with the President, he dictated to the
private secretary the following message to the President:
“I have seen Mr. Slidell and Mr. Hunter. They both think it very
important that collisions should be avoided, and have no doubt of
the truth of all that Mr. Mallory has said. They think also that
the Brooklyn might be very properly kept there to succor the fort
in case of attack. Of course no despatch will be sent to Mr.
Mallory, unless authorized by you. You might send such a despatch
to the Senate Chamber, as you may desire to have sent.”
(Taken down from Mr. Bigler’s dictation, he being unable to remain
on account of meeting of tariff committee.
A. J. G.[136]
Tuesday morning, January 29, 1861.)
Footnote 136:
A. J. Glosbrenner, private secretary to the President. The
original memorandum in Mr. Glosbrenner’s handwriting is before me.
5. On the arrival of the joint order at Pensacola, Mr. Mallory and
Colonel Chase gave to the naval and military commanders of the
United States the assurances which the order required. The Brooklyn
did not reach Pensacola until the 5th of February. But under the
order the fort was supplied with provisions, and made perfectly
secure from any attack. No attack was made, and the fort remained in
the possession of the Government from that time forward.
It is thus apparent that, with reference to Fort Pickens, the whole
arrangement, although it amounted to a qualified armistice, differed
absolutely from that made by Major Anderson with Governor Pickens,
in regard to Fort Sumter. Anderson agreed to a temporary suspension
of arms on both sides. The President, in respect to Fort Pickens,
instructed the naval and military officers to defend the fort
against any attack, and not to wait for an actual attack, but to
succor Lieut. Slemmer on the instant that they perceived any
preparations for attacking him. It is impossible to suggest in what
way the President could have more effectually protected the rights
of the Government, on the eve of the assembling of the Peace
Convention. Fort Pickens, with the Brooklyn, the Macedonian, and
other war vessels in its immediate neighborhood, and in the hands of
Lieut. Slemmer, was just as safe as if ten thousand men had been
thrown into it, while the precautions taken prevented any outbreak
that would, if any had occurred, have prostrated the hope with which
the country was looking to the labors of the Peace Convention.
How great were the anxieties felt by the Virginians whose State had
proposed that assembly, may be seen from an account which may now be
given of the informal intercourse between ex-President Tyler and
President Buchanan. Mr. Tyler was alarmed when he arrived in
Washington and heard that the Brooklyn had sailed with troops for
some Southern fort. As all eyes and thoughts were then directed to
the harbor of Charleston, Mr. Tyler took the readiest means to
ascertain what he could respecting the Brooklyn’s destination. On
the evening of January 25th, he addressed to the President the
following note:
[MR. TYLER TO THE PRESIDENT.]
Friday evening, January 25, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
The enclosed telegraphic despatch is this moment received. May I
be permitted to hope that it is based on an unfounded report. If
not, will you do me the favor to inform me on what day the
Brooklyn sailed, and whether she has recruits for any Southern
fort, and if so, which?
With high regard, yours most truly,
JOHN TYLER.
The President’s answer was as follows:
[PRESIDENT BUCHANAN TO MR. TYLER.]
January 25, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have just received your note. The orders were given to the
Brooklyn, I believe, on Monday or Tuesday last—certainly before
your arrival in this city. She goes on an errand of mercy and
relief. If she had not been sent, it would have been an
abandonment of our highest duty. Her movements are in no way
connected with South Carolina.
Your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Mr. Tyler returned to Richmond on the 29th, and before he left the
following notes were exchanged between him and the President:
[MR. TYLER TO THE PRESIDENT.]
BROWN’S HOTEL, January 28, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I leave the city to-morrow morning for the brief interval that
elapses between this and the meeting of the [Peace] commissioners
on the 4th February. In making my adieus, which I would do in
person but for engagements which prevent, I desire to express my
pleasure at hearing your message read to-day in the Senate, and to
tender to you my acknowledgments for the facilities you have
afforded me of acquitting myself of the mission with which my
State entrusted me. I feel but one regret in all that has
occurred, and that is in the sailing of the Brooklyn, under orders
issued before my arrival in this city. I hope, however, that she
sailed with such instructions as, if followed, will prevent any
collision. There is nothing that I more sincerely desire than that
your administration may close amid the rejoicings of a great
people at the consummation of the work of a renewed and more
harmonious confederacy.
Will you pardon me for calling your attention to the rumor
contained in the newspapers of the morning, which state that
active proceedings are in course of execution at Fortress Monroe,
in planting cannon upon the land side of the fort, with their
muzzles turned landward and overlooking the country? If this be
so, Mr. President, is such proceeding either appropriate or
well-timed? I shall do no more than call your attention to the
circumstance, and leave it without comment, with this single
remark: that when Virginia is making every possible effort to
redeem and save the Union, it is seemingly ungracious to have
cannon levelled at her bosom.
With my most cordial wish for your success in steering the ship of
State amid the critical relations of the country,
I am, dear Sir, truly and faithfully yours,
JOHN TYLER.
[PRESIDENT BUCHANAN TO MR. TYLER.]
WASHINGTON, January 28, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your note of this evening, and am happy to learn
that you were pleased at hearing my message read to-day in the
Senate. It expresses my sincere and cordial sentiments. My best
wishes attend you on your journey home and for your safe return to
this city on the 4th February. I shall then hope to see more of
you.
I shall make it a point to inquire to-morrow morning into the
rumors in the newspapers, to which you refer, in relation to
Fortress Monroe.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Mr. Tyler was again in Washington on the 4th of February, to attend
the sessions of the Peace Convention, of which he was made the
presiding officer. On the 7th the members of that body were received
by the President. On the 8th Mr. Tyler, still anxious in regard to
the situation of things in Charleston, called upon the President,
and I find in the handwriting of the latter the following account of
their interview:
Friday, February 8th, 1861.
President Tyler and his lady called to see me at about three
o’clock in the afternoon. They informed me that Colonel Hayne
became much excited on the perusal of Mr. Holt’s last letter, and
considered it highly insulting in its character. I told him that
this must be a mere pretext,—there was nothing in that letter
unkind or disrespectful, and certainly there was no intention to
write anything but what was respectful, as its whole tenor would
prove.
In answer to it I had received one of the most outrageous and
insulting letters from Colonel Hayne which had ever been addressed
to the head of any government. He told me he would send for
Colonel Hayne, and get him to withdraw the letter. I told him
Colonel Hayne had left that morning at six o’clock, and his letter
was not delivered to me until between eleven and twelve.
He asked me if he might telegraph to Governor Pickens what I had
said relative to the character of Mr. Holt’s letter. I told him
certainly he might, he was at perfect liberty to do so. The letter
would speak for itself, and I asked him if he had read it, and he
said he had not.
He then asked me and urged upon me to permit him to telegraph to
Colonel Hayne that I would not send reinforcements to the garrison
if Governor Pickens would pledge himself that he would not attack
it. I told him this was impossible. I could not agree to bind
myself not to reinforce the garrison in case I deemed it
necessary. That Mr. Holt’s letter showed that these reinforcements
had not yet been ordered, but that the character of Colonel
Hayne’s letter was such that these might be immediately necessary.
Mr. Tyler strongly urged that I should withdraw the garrison, and
urged reasons to that effect. I told him this was quite
impossible—that I could never voluntarily surrender the property
of the United States which it was my solemn and imperative duty to
protect and defend. (He afterwards addressed me a note, urging the
same policy, which I did not answer.)
In order to prevent all mistakes, I told him explicitly, as he was
about departing, that he was not authorized to telegraph anything
to Governor Pickens except as to the character of Mr. Holt’s
letter; that it was not insulting or disrespectful, but, on the
contrary, it was kind and respectful in its tone, and was so
intended both by the writer and myself. I then informed him that I
had sent Colonel Hayne’s letter back to him. He said such a letter
was highly improper, addressed to the head of a government.
[MR. TYLER TO THE PRESIDENT.]
Saturday evening, February 9, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I communicated to Governor Pickens what passed between us as to
Mr. Holt’s letter, and I am happy to say that the reply, received
a moment ago, leaves me no ground to fear any early disturbance.
The whole subject is referred to the convention at Montgomery, as
I plainly infer. The conclusion is in these words: “Everything
which can be done consistently with the honor and safety of this
State to avoid collision and bloodshed, has been and will be the
purpose of the authorities here.”
Thus, my dear sir, the inquietude you expressed may be dismissed.
Very truly and faithfully yours,
JOHN TYLER.
It will be remembered, that on the 19th of February, the President
received information from Philadelphia, by a copy of a telegram said
to have been forwarded from Governor Pickens through Augusta to
Montgomery, that the Governor was urging an immediate attack on Fort
Sumter. This information the President at once communicated to Mr.
Tyler. The following notes disclose what Mr. Tyler learned:
[MR. TYLER TO THE PRESIDENT.]
Tuesday, February 19, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I do not believe a word of it. My last despatch from Judge
Robertson is wholly different. I am at the moment so engaged that
I cannot hasten to you. I will as soon as I can.
Respectfully, your friend,
JOHN TYLER.
Wednesday, February 20, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I despatched the telegram at about 5 o’clock. No answer yet.
Perhaps it was referred to Montgomery, or time may not have been
given to respond before the close of the office. A consultation of
cabinet may have been required. In short, many things of a similar
nature may have occurred. General Davis will be written to to-day.
No attack can be made without orders from Montgomery.
Truly yours,
JOHN TYLER.
Two o’clock P.M., February 20, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have this moment received a telegram from Charleston. The
Governor says: “Received your message; know nothing about the
report you speak of; no one is authorized to speak for me; things
must stand without any movement in force.” I would send the
despatch, but the latter part of it relates to another matter.
Truly and sincerely your friend,
JOHN TYLER.
BROWN’S HOTEL, February 24, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I think you may rely upon tranquillity at the South. Since you
left me I have made particular inquiries. General Davis has been
written to and will be written to. He is advised to send a
commissioner, and to go to Charleston himself to represent and
quiet all things. In fact, from information from one directly from
Richmond, and who travelled with merchants from the South going
North, the probability is that he is now in Charleston. The fact
may probably be announced in the papers to-morrow. Every one that
I have seen, secessionists and others, concur with myself in the
improbability of any movement until a commissioner shall come on
here and a failure in the mission.
Truly and faithfully yours,
JOHN TYLER.
The explanation of the last of these notes is that Mr. Jefferson
Davis had assumed at this time, at Montgomery, the office of
President of the Confederate States. His inaugural address was
delivered on the 18th of February, and his cabinet was organized
immediately thereafter. In compliance with the intimation sent by
Mr. Tyler, steps were at once taken by Mr. Davis to send
commissioners to Washington. It was, therefore, not the “cue” of the
Confederate government to have an immediate attack made on Fort
Sumter. Mr. Davis did not go to Charleston, but he doubtless exerted
there, for a time, the influence which Mr. Tyler desired.
CHAPTER XXIII.
1861—January, February, and March.
INTERVENTION OF VIRGINIA TO PREVENT A COLLISION OF ARMS—EX-PRESIDENT
TYLER’S MISSION TO THE PRESIDENT—THE PRESIDENT’S PREPARATIONS TO
REINFORCE ANDERSON, IN CASE OF NECESSITY—THE MONTGOMERY CONGRESS
AND THE CONFEDERATE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT—MR. LINCOLN’S JOURNEY
TO WASHINGTON—THE NEGLECTS OF CONGRESS.
To a right understanding of these complicated affairs that were
occurring in the months of January and February, many threads
require to be taken up separately, and interwoven in the narrative.
The last messenger or envoy from South Carolina, Colonel Hayne, was
in Washington from the 13th of January to the 8th of February,
during which period, as the reader has seen, the President’s hands
were so far tied by Major Anderson’s truce, that reinforcements
could not be sent to him while it lasted. But after this temporary
truce began, and before it terminated, there occurred another
intervention, altogether different from that of any of the Senators.
This was the action of the General Assembly of Virginia, which,
besides instituting the Peace Convention, took, at the same time, a
step which interposed an insurmountable obstacle to the
reinforcement of Fort Sumter, unless it should be attacked, or be in
immediate danger of attack. There is no reason to doubt that what
the State of Virginia then did was done in entire good faith, and
with an honorable and beneficent purpose to preserve the peace of
the country. At all events, the President was not at liberty to
regard her action in any other light, nor was he disposed to do so.
On the 19th of January, ten days after the affair of the Star of the
West, and six days after the arrival of Colonel Hayne in Washington,
the General Assembly of Virginia, among their other proceedings,
appointed ex-President Tyler a commissioner to the President of the
United States, and Judge John Robertson a commissioner to the State
of South Carolina and the other States which had seceded, or might
thereafter secede, with instructions to procure a mutual agreement
to “abstain from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision
of arms between the States and the Government of the United States,”
pending the proceedings of the Peace Convention. Mr. Tyler, who was
also a member of the Peace Convention, arrived in Washington on the
23d of January, two weeks before the departure of Col. Hayne. On the
following day, he presented the resolutions of his State to the
President, at the same time assuring him that the efforts of
Virginia to secure peace and a reconstruction of the basis of the
Union depended for their success on her being allowed to conduct
them undisturbed by any outside collision. The resolutions of
Virginia requested the President, and not Congress, to enter into
the proposed agreement. The President, already informed unofficially
of the tenor of the resolutions, was then preparing a special
message to Congress on the subject.[137] What occurred at this first
interview between Mr. Tyler and the President will appear from the
following memorandum the original of which is in the President’s
handwriting:
Thursday morning, January 24, 1861.
Mr. Tyler called and delivered me his credentials, and we had a
conference. I foreshadowed to him the principal points of my
message as [it was] delivered. He preferred that I should enter
into the arrangement myself. We discussed this question for some
time, and I was decided that I had no power. He then expressed an
apprehension that my message might precipitate action in Congress.
I told him I thought not. I sent for Governor Bigler that he might
consult him on this point, but Governor Bigler had gone to the
Senate.
Friday morning, 25th.
Mr. Tyler called again, and Mr. Bigler came. I read to him the
principal points of the message. He was anxious it should be sent
that day, and I immediately proceeded to put it in form. I told
him it should be sent in that day, or at latest on Saturday
morning. But the Senate adjourned over till Monday at an early
hour, and my purpose was thus defeated.
Footnote 137:
Message of January 28, 1861.
Mr. Buchanan has said that while he had no constitutional power to
enter into the agreement proposed, it was due to its intrinsic
importance and to the State of Virginia, which had manifested so
strong a desire to restore and preserve the Union, that the proposal
should be submitted to Congress.[138]
The President, accordingly, in his message of the 28th January,
submitting the Virginia resolutions to Congress, observed in
regard to this one, that “however strong may be my desire to enter
into such an agreement, I am convinced that I do not possess the
power. Congress, and Congress alone, under the war-making power,
can exercise the discretion of agreeing to abstain ‘from any and
all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms’ between this
and any other Government. It would, therefore, be a usurpation for
the Executive to attempt to restrain their hands by an agreement
in regard to matters over which he has no constitutional control.
If he were thus to act, they might pass laws which he would be
bound to obey, though in conflict with his agreement. Under
existing circumstances, my present actual power is confined within
narrow limits. It is my duty at all times to defend and protect
the public property within the seceding States, so far as this may
be practicable, and especially to employ all constitutional means
to protect the property of the United States, and to preserve the
public peace at this the seat of the Federal Government. If the
seceding States abstain ‘from any and all acts calculated to
produce a collision of arms,’ then the danger so much to be
deprecated will no longer exist. Defence, and not aggression, has
been the policy of the administration from the beginning. But
whilst I can enter into no engagement such as that proposed, I
cordially commend to Congress, with much confidence that it will
meet their approbation, to abstain from passing any law calculated
to produce a collision of arms pending the proceedings
contemplated by the action of the General Assembly of Virginia. I
am one of those who will never despair of the Republic. I yet
cherish the belief that the American people will perpetuate the
union of the States on some terms just and honorable for all
sections of the country. I trust that the mediation of Virginia
may be the destined means, under Providence, of accomplishing this
inestimable benefit. Glorious as are the memories of her past
history, such an achievement, both in relation to her own fame and
the welfare of the whole country, would surpass them all.”
This noble and patriotic effort of Virginia met no favor from
Congress. Neither House referred these resolutions of her General
Assembly to a committee, or even treated them with the common
courtesy of ordering them to be printed. In the Senate no motion
was made to refer them, and the question to print them with the
accompanying message was debated from time to time until the 21st
February,[139] when the Peace Convention had nearly completed its
labors, and after this no further notice seems to have been taken
of the subject. In the House the motion to refer and print the
Virginia resolutions, made by Mr. Stanton, of Ohio, on the day
they were received, was never afterwards noticed.[140] This
mortifying neglect on the part of the Representatives of the
States and of the people, made a deep and unfortunate impression
on the citizens of Virginia.[141]
Footnote 138:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 206.
Footnote 139:
_Cong. Globe_, pp. 590, 636.
Footnote 140:
H. J., p. 236. _Cong. Globe_, p. 601.
Footnote 141:
Buchanan’s Defence, pp. 207, 208.
The President having laid this whole matter before Congress, with
whom it appropriately belonged, the question now recurs whether he
omitted any thing that it was in his power to do, during the session
of the Peace Convention. It was manifestly his duty to be prepared,
to the extent of all the means at his command, when Anderson’s truce
had terminated, to send him reinforcements, should Anderson request
them, or should it be known from any other quarter that Fort Sumter
was in danger of attack. Congress might not, as it did not, assume
any part of its just responsibility; and it was not known until some
days after the termination of Major Anderson’s truce, on the 6th of
February, that the Governor of South Carolina had determined to
respect the wishes of the Virginia Legislature, and refrain from
attacking the fort while the Peace Convention was sitting.[142]
Footnote 142:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 209.
Without waiting to know how Congress might treat this proposal of
the Virginia General Assembly, the President, on the 30th of
January, addressed the following note to the Secretary of War, Mr.
Holt:
WASHINGTON, January 30th, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
It is time we should have decided whether it is practicable with
the means in our power, considering the obstacles interposed in
the harbor of Charleston, to reinforce Major Anderson at Fort
Sumter, should the action of the authorities of South Carolina, or
his request, render this necessary. The high military attainments
and just reputation of General Scott render his advice on this
subject of the greatest importance. Should reinforcements be
deemed practicable, then, in consultation with him, a plan ought
to be devised in advance to accomplish the object. I should be
gratified to see General Scott, the Secretary of the Navy, and
yourself, at twelve o’clock to-day, or any other hour most
convenient to yourselves, to talk over this and other matters.
Your friend very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
The result of the conference appointed by this note has been given
by Mr. Buchanan himself:
After several consultations, an expedition for this purpose was
quietly prepared at New York, under the direction of Secretary
Toucey, for the relief of Fort Sumter, the command of which was
intrusted to his intimate friend, the late lamented Commander Ward
of the navy. This gallant officer had been authorized to select
his own officers and men, who were to rendezvous on board the
receiving-ship, of which he was then in command. The expedition
consisted of a few small steamers, and it was arranged that on
receiving a telegraphic despatch from the Secretary, whenever the
emergency might require, he should, in the course of the following
night, set sail for Charleston, entering the harbor in the night,
and anchoring if possible under the guns of Fort Sumter.
It is due to the memory of this brave officer to state that he had
sought the enterprise with the greatest enthusiasm, and was
willing to sacrifice his life in the accomplishment of the object,
should such be his fate, saying to Secretary Toucey, this would be
the best inheritance he could leave to his wife and children.[143]
Footnote 143:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 210.
This expedition did not sail. It consisted of a few small vessels
borrowed from the Treasury Department, with two or three hundred
men. While it was preparing, the Peace Convention was in session;
and as it had become known to the President that the authorities of
South Carolina were then respecting the appeal of the General
Assembly of Virginia to avoid collision, it would have broken up the
Peace Convention to send reinforcements to Major Anderson, unless he
asked for them; and it would inevitably have led to an immediate
assault upon the fort, which would have been the signal for a civil
war. These considerations caused some delay in issuing the orders to
Commander Ward. In point of fact, Major Anderson not only did not
ask for reinforcements, but on the 30th of January, the day on which
the President summoned the Secretaries of War and the Navy and
General Scott to a conference, Anderson wrote to the War Department
that he hoped no attempt would be made to throw in supplies; that it
would do more harm than good. From later advices received from him,
it became apparent that this small expedition under Commander Ward
could not enter the harbor of Charleston without a fearful sacrifice
of life. It was therefore kept back, but kept in readiness, at New
York, until the 5th day of March, on which day President Lincoln was
fully informed of it, and of the circumstances which had prevented
its sailing, by the retiring Secretary of War, Mr. Holt, with the
concurrence of President Buchanan.
Without anticipating, however, what occurred on the last day of Mr.
Buchanan’s administration, and on the day following, it is only
needful to say here that Fort Sumter remained unmolested by any
actual attack, until some time after Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration,
although the disposition of the authorities of South Carolina
continued to be as hostile as ever. On the 4th of February, a
Congress of the States which had then seceded was held at Montgomery
in Alabama. These were the States of South Carolina, Mississippi,
Florida, Alabama, Georgia and Louisiana. The delegates to this
Congress were appointed by conventions of their respective States.
This body framed a provisional constitution for the new Confederacy,
which they styled the “Confederate States of America.” It was
adopted by the Congress on the 8th of February, and was to continue
in force for one year, unless it should be superseded at an earlier
period by a permanent organization. Jefferson Davis was elected
President, and Alexander H. Stephens Vice President, of the new
Confederacy. No popular election of Congress was ordered, but the
legislative powers were vested “in this Congress now assembled,
until otherwise ordered.”[144]
Footnote 144:
The reader who desires to examine the provisional constitution
will find it in Mr. Jefferson Davis’s work on the Rise and Fall of
the Confederate Government, Appendix.
The authorities of South Carolina immediately began to look to the
Montgomery government for direction. On the 14th of February, a
telegraph operator in Augusta, Georgia, transmitted a despatch from
Charleston to Montgomery, urging the Southern Congress to do
something definite in regard to Fort Sumter, and asking whether the
Congress would appoint a General to lead the attack, or whether it
should be done under the superintendence of Governor Pickens, who
said, “the fort must be taken before Lincoln takes his seat.”[145]
Comparing the date on which information of this despatch reached
President Buchanan (February 19th), with what was taking place in
Washington at that time, it will appear that the administration
could not, while the Peace Congress was still in session, do
anything more than to prepare secretly the small expedition under
Commander Ward, and hold it in readiness to sail, whenever Major
Anderson should signify that he considered his position as insecure.
From information which reached the President from other quarters, he
was satisfied that the Montgomery Congress would not approve of the
taking of Fort Sumter before Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration. The great
body of the persons composing the Montgomery government were too
cool and too wary in their plans to promote, at that time, the hasty
and hot-headed schemes of their friends in South Carolina. They were
still bent upon procuring the peaceable assent of the Federal
Government to the separation of their States from the Union.[146]
Footnote 145:
My authority for this statement is a letter written on the 19th of
February to President Buchanan from Philadelphia, by an intimate
friend of his, giving an extract from a letter from the telegraph
operator, dated at Augusta on the 14th, and reciting the substance
of the despatch which the operator had that day forwarded. The
letter reached Mr. Buchanan on the same day on which it was
written.
Footnote 146:
On the 15th of February, the Montgomery Congress provided for the
appointment by their President-elect of three commissioners to the
Federal Government, for the negotiation and settlement of a
peaceful separation.
They did not mean to initiate a war, although most of them saw
clearly that there _would be_ war, while they denied that there
_ought to be_ one. At all events, they meant to have it appear to
the world that they had done everything they could to procure a
peaceable acquiescence in their secession from the Union. Under
these circumstances, President Buchanan, who now had less than three
weeks of his official term remaining, and who could not anticipate
that commissioners of the new Confederacy would reach Washington
while he was President (they were not appointed until the 25th of
February), could only leave the position of things in regard to Fort
Sumter in the best possible attitude for his successor. This
attitude was, to hold privately all the means that the Government
then had for relieving Fort Sumter, in readiness, to be used by his
successor as circumstances might require.
In the mean time, as the 4th of March was drawing near, Mr. Lincoln,
the President-elect, was making his journey from Springfield towards
Washington, delivering public speeches on the way, the tenor of
which was that retaining the forts and other property of the United
States in the seceded States was not coercion, that there need be no
war, and that there was no occasion for any alarm, as “nobody was
hurt.” From these strange utterances of Mr. Lincoln, as he
approached the capital, the only inference that could be drawn was
that he considered the country to be in no danger, and that there
would be no occasion to use force. It has been claimed, and not
without some reason, that Mr. Lincoln’s speeches on this journey
encouraged the secessionists to believe that they could negotiate a
peaceable and final separation of their States from the Union. But
at all events, Mr. Lincoln’s travelling speeches justified the
course that had been pursued by Mr. Buchanan; for Mr. Lincoln’s
attitude as the incoming President was that the use of force must be
confined to the preservation of the property of the United States in
the seceded States, against all attempts to forcibly dispossess the
Federal Government. How the war was precipitated, after Mr.
Lincoln’s inauguration, is a distinct topic. On the day of his
inauguration, he was perfectly at liberty, so far as depended upon
anything done or forborne by his predecessor, to refuse all
communication with the Montgomery commissioners, and to use all the
means that his predecessor had ever had for reinforcing Fort Sumter.
He was doubtless surprised, as his predecessor was, by being
informed on the 5th day of March, that Fort Sumter could not be held
without a force of fifteen or twenty thousand men, to destroy the
batteries that had been erected around it; and had the Congress,
which expired on the day of his inauguration, made the provisions
for the emergency which Mr. Buchanan urged upon them, no member of
Mr. Lincoln’s administration would have had any occasion to
temporize with the Southern commissioners in any form, concerning
the retention of that fortress.
And here it may be well to recapitulate distinctly what President
Buchanan urged Congress to do and what it neglected to do. He has
himself so clearly stated this, that I cannot do better than to
quote his words:
We have already seen that Congress, throughout the entire session,
refused to adopt any measures of compromise to prevent civil war,
or to retain first the cotton or afterwards the border States
within the Union. Failing to do this, and whilst witnessing the
secession of one after another of the cotton States, the
withdrawal of their Senators and Representatives, and the
formation of their Confederacy, it was the imperative duty of
Congress to furnish the President or his successor the means of
repelling force by force, should this become necessary, to
preserve the Union. They, nevertheless, refused to perform this
duty, with as much pertinacity as they had manifested in
repudiating all measures of compromise.
1. At the meeting of Congress, a Federal Judiciary had ceased to
exist in South Carolina. The District Judge, the District
Attorney, and the United States Marshal had resigned their
offices. These ministers of justice had all deserted their posts
before the act of secession, and the laws of the United States
could no longer be enforced through their agency. We have already
seen that the President, in his message, called the attention of
Congress to this subject, but no attempt was made in either House
to provide a remedy for the evil.
2. Congress positively refused to pass a law conferring on the
President authority to call forth the militia, or accept the
services of volunteers, to suppress insurrections which might
occur in any State against the Government of the United States. It
may appear strange that this power had not long since been vested
in the Executive. The Act of February 28, 1795,[147] the only law
applicable to the subject, provides alone for calling forth the
militia to suppress insurrections against State governments,
without making any similar provision for suppressing insurrections
against the Government of the United States. If anything were
required beyond a mere inspection of the act to render this clear,
it may be found in the opinion of Attorney General Black, of the
20th November, 1860. Indeed, it is a plain _casus omissus_. This
palpable omission, which ought to have been instantly supplied,
was suffered to continue until after the end of Mr. Buchanan’s
administration, when on the 29th July, 1861, Congress conferred
this necessary power on the President.[148] The framers of the Act
of 1795 either did not anticipate an insurrection within any State
against the Federal Government, or if they did, they purposely
abstained from providing for it. Even in regard to insurrections
against a State government, so jealous were they of any
interference on the part of the Federal Government with the rights
of the States, that they withheld from Congress the power to
protect any State “against domestic violence,” except “on the
application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened).” Under the Act of 1795,
therefore, the President is precluded from acting, even upon his
own personal and absolute knowledge of the existence of such an
insurrection. Before he can call forth the militia for its
suppression, he must first be applied to for this purpose by the
appropriate State authorities, in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution. It was the duty of Congress, immediately after their
meeting, to supply this defect in our laws, and to confer an
absolute authority on the President to call forth the militia, and
accept the services of volunteers, to suppress insurrections
against the United States, whenever or wherever they might occur.
This was a precautionary measure which, independently of existing
dangers, ought long since to have formed a part of our permanent
legislation. But no attempt was ever made in Congress to adopt it
until after the President’s special message of the 8th January,
1861, and then the attempt entirely failed. Meanwhile the aspect
of public affairs had become more and more threatening. Mr.
Crittenden’s amendment had been defeated before the Committee of
Thirteen, on the last day of December; and it was also highly
probable that his proposition before the Senate to refer it to a
vote of the people of the States, would share the same fate. South
Carolina and Florida had already seceded, and the other cotton
States had called conventions for the purpose of seceding. Nay,
more, several of them had already seized the forts, magazines, and
arsenals within their limits. Still all this failed to produce any
effect upon Congress. It was at this crisis the President sent his
special message to Congress (8th January, 1861), by which he
endeavored to impress them with the necessity for immediate
action. He concealed nothing from them. Whilst still clinging to
the fading hope that they might yet provide for a peaceful
adjustment of our difficulties, and strongly recommending this
course, he says: “Even now the danger is upon us. In several of
the States which have not yet seceded, the forts, arsenals, and
magazines of the United States have been seized. This is by far
the most serious step which has been taken since the commencement
of the troubles...... The seizure of this property, from all
appearances, has been purely aggressive, and not in resistance to
any attempt to coerce a State or States to remain in the Union.”
He also stated the well-known fact that our small army was on the
remote frontiers, and was scarcely sufficient to guard the
inhabitants against Indian incursions, and consequently our forts
were without sufficient garrisons.
Footnote 147:
1 Stat. at Large, p. 424.
Footnote 148:
12 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 281.
Under these circumstances he appeals to Congress in the following
language: “But the dangerous and hostile attitude of the States
toward each other has already far transcended and cast in the
shade the ordinary executive duties already provided for by law,
and has assumed such vast and alarming proportions as to place the
subject entirely above and beyond executive control. The fact
cannot be disguised that we are in the midst of a great
revolution. In all its great bearings, therefore, I commend the
question to Congress, as the only human tribunal, under
Providence, possessing the power to declare war, or to authorize
the employment of military force in all cases contemplated by the
Constitution; and they alone possess the power to remove
grievances which might lead to war, and to secure peace and union
to this distracted country. On them, and on them alone, rests the
responsibility.”
Congress might, had they thought proper, have regarded the
forcible seizure of these forts and other property, including that
of the Branch Mint at New Orleans, with all the treasure it
contained, as the commencement of an aggressive war. Beyond
question the cotton States had now committed acts of open
hostility against the Federal Government. They had always
contended that secession was a peaceful constitutional remedy, and
that Congress had no power to make war against a sovereign State
for the purpose of coercing her to remain in the Union. They could
no longer shelter themselves under this plea. They had by their
violent action entirely changed the position they had assumed; and
instead of peacefully awaiting the decision of Congress on the
question of coercion, they had themselves become the coercionists
and assailants. This question had, therefore, passed away. No
person has ever doubted the right or the duty of Congress to pass
laws enabling the President to defend the Union against armed
rebellion. Congress, however, still shrunk from the responsibility
of passing any such laws. This might have been commendable had it
proceeded from a sincere desire not to interpose obstacles to a
compromise intended to prevent the effusion of fraternal blood and
restore the Union. Still, in any event, the time had arrived when
it was their duty to make at the least contingent provisions for
the prosecution of the war, should this be rendered inevitable.
This had become the more necessary as Congress would soon expire,
and the new Congress could not be convened for a considerable
period after the old one had ceased to exist, because a large
portion of the Representatives had not then been elected. These
reasons, however, produced no effect.
The President’s special message[149] was referred, two days after
its date (10th January), by the House of Representatives to a
special committee, of which Mr. Howard, of Michigan, was chairman.
Nothing was heard from this committee for the space of twenty
days. They then, on the 30th January, through Mr. John H.
Reynolds, of New York, one of its members, reported a bill[150]
enabling the President to call forth the militia or to accept the
services of volunteers for the purpose of protecting the forts,
magazines, arsenals, and other property of the United States, and
to “recover possession” of such of these as “have been or may
hereafter be unlawfully seized or taken possession of by any
combination of persons whatever.” Had this bill become a law, it
would have been the duty of the President at once to raise a
volunteer or militia force to recapture the forts which had been
already seized. But Congress was not then prepared to assume such
a responsibility. Mr. Reynolds accordingly withdrew his bill from
the consideration of the House on the very day it was reported. On
his own motion it was recommitted, and thus killed as soon as it
saw the light. It was never heard of more.
Footnote 149:
_Cong. Globe_, p. 316.
Footnote 150:
Ibid., p. 645, bills of H. R., No. 698.
Then, after another pause of nineteen days, and only a fortnight
before the close of the session, the Committee on Military
Affairs, through Mr. Stanton, of Ohio, their chairman, on the 18th
February reported another bill[151] on the subject, but of a more
limited character than that which had been withdrawn. It is
remarkable that it contains no provision touching the recovery of
the forts and other property which had been already seized by the
delinquent States. It did no more than provide that the powers
already possessed by the President, under the Act of 1795, to
employ the militia in suppressing insurrections against a State
government, should be “extended to the case of insurrections
against the authority of the United States,” with the additional
authority to “accept the services of such volunteers as may offer
their services for the purpose mentioned.” Thus all hostile action
for the recovery of the forts already seized was excluded from the
bill. It is difficult to conceive what reasonable objection could
be made to this bill, except that it did not go far enough and
embrace the forts already seized; and more especially as when it
was reported we may recollect that the Confederate Congress had
already been ten days in session at Montgomery, Alabama, and had
adopted a Provisional Constitution. Notwithstanding all this, the
House refused to act upon it. The bill was discussed on several
occasions until Tuesday, 26th February. On that day a motion was
made by Mr. Corwin, of Ohio, to postpone its consideration until
Thursday, the 28th February.[152] Mr. Stanton, the reporter of the
bill, resisted this motion, stating that such a postponement would
be fatal to it. “It will,” said he, “be impossible after that to
have it passed by the Senate” (before the 4th March). He,
therefore, demanded the ayes and noes; and notwithstanding his
warning, Mr. Corwin’s motion prevailed by a vote of 100 to 74, and
thus the bill was defeated.
Footnote 151:
Ibid., p. 1001. bill 1003, H. R.
Footnote 152:
_Cong. Globe_, p. 1232.
It may be proper to observe that Mr. Corwin, whose motion killed
the bill, was a confidential friend of the President elect, then
present in Washington, and was soon thereafter appointed minister
to Mexico.
But even had Congress passed this bill, it would have proved
wholly inefficient for want of an appropriation to carry it into
effect. The Treasury was empty; but had it been full, the
President could not have drawn from it any, even the most trifling
sum, without a previous appropriation by law. The union of the
purse with the sword, in the hands of the Executive, is wholly
inconsistent with the idea of a free government. The power of the
legislative branch to withhold money from the Executive, and thus
restrain him from dangerous projects of his own, is a necessary
safeguard of liberty. This exists in every government pretending
to be free. Hence our Constitution has declared that “no money
shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of
appropriations made by law.” It is, therefore, apparent that even
if this bill had become a law, it could not have been carried into
effect by the President without a direct violation of the
Constitution.
Notwithstanding these insuperable obstacles, no member of either
House, throughout the entire session, ever even proposed to
raise or appropriate a single dollar for the defence of the
Government against armed rebellion. Congress not only refused to
grant the President the authority and force necessary to
suppress insurrections against the United States, but the
Senate, by refusing to confirm his nomination of a collector of
the customs for the port of Charleston, effectually tied his
hands and rendered it impossible for him to collect the revenue
within that port. In his annual message he expressed the opinion
that “the same insuperable obstacles do not lie in the way of
executing the [existing] laws for the collection of customs on
the seaboard of South Carolina as had been interposed to prevent
the administration of justice under the Federal authority within
the interior of that State.” At all events he had determined to
make the effort with the naval force under his command. He
trusted that this might be accomplished without collision; but
if resisted, then the force necessary to attain the object must
be applied. Accordingly, whilst informing Congress “that the
revenue still continues to be collected as heretofore at the
custom house in Charleston,” he says that “should the collector
unfortunately resign, a successor may be appointed to perform
this duty.” The collector (William F. Colcock) continued
faithfully to perform his duties until some days after the State
had seceded, when at the end of December he resigned. The
President, immediately afterwards, on the 2d January, nominated
to the Senate, as his successor, Mr. Peter McIntire, of
Pennsylvania, a gentleman well qualified for the office. The
selection could not have been made from South Carolina, because
no citizen of that State would have accepted the appointment.
The Senate, throughout their entire session, never acted upon
the nomination of Mr. McIntire; and without a collector of
customs duly appointed, it was rendered impossible for the
President, under any law in existence, to collect the revenue.
But even if the Senate had confirmed Mr. McIntire’s nomination, it
is extremely doubtful whether the President could lawfully have
collected the revenue against the forcible resistance of the
State, unless Congress had conferred additional powers upon him.
For this purpose Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, on the 3d January,
1861,[153] the day after Mr. McIntire’s nomination to the Senate,
reported a bill from the Judiciary Committee, further to provide
for the collection of duties on imports. This bill embraced
substantially the same provisions, long since expired, contained
in the Act of 2d March, 1833, commonly called “the Force Bill,” to
enable General Jackson to collect the revenue outside of
Charleston, “either upon land or on board any vessel.” Mr.
Bingham’s bill was permitted to slumber on the files of the House
until the 2d March, the last day but one before Congress
expired,[154] when he moved for a suspension of the rules, to
enable the House to take it up and consider it, but his motion
proved unsuccessful. Indeed, the motion was not made until so late
an hour of the session that even if it had prevailed, the bill
could not have passed both Houses before the final adjournment.
Thus the President was left both without a collector of customs,
and most probably without any law which a collector could have
carried into effect, had such an officer existed. Mr. Bingham’s
bill shared the fate of all other legislative measures, of
whatever character, intended either to prevent or to confront the
existing danger. From the persistent refusal to pass any act
enabling either the outgoing or the incoming administration to
meet the contingency of civil war, it may fairly be inferred that
the friends of Mr. Lincoln, in and out of Congress, believed he
would be able to settle the existing difficulties with the cotton
States in a peaceful manner, and that he might be embarrassed by
any legislation contemplating the necessity of a resort to hostile
measures.
Footnote 153:
_Cong. Globe_, p. 236, bills H. R., No. 910.
Footnote 154:
H. Journal, p. 465.
The 36th Congress expired on the 3d March, 1861, leaving the law
just as they found it. They made no provision whatever for the
suppression of threatened rebellion, but deliberately refused to
grant either men or money for this purpose. It was this violation
of duty which compelled President Lincoln to issue a proclamation
convening the new Congress, in special session, immediately after
the attack on Fort Sumter.[155]
Footnote 155:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 153, _et seq._
It is proper to state that President Lincoln did not accord to the
Montgomery Commissioners any official reception as representatives
of an independent government. But as will hereafter appear, his
Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, through the intervention of
distinguished persons in Washington, held much informal intercourse
with them in regard to the evacuation of Fort Sumter, the result of
which was that the commissioners left Washington believing, or
professing to believe, that they had been duped by a promise to
withdraw the troops, which had not been fulfilled, but, on the
contrary, that secret preparations were making by Mr. Lincoln’s
government to send reinforcements. This has always been assigned as
the excuse for the attack on Fort Sumter.[156]
Footnote 156:
In the 1st vol. of Mr. Jefferson Davis’s work, “Rise and Fall of
the Confederate Government,” will be found a full statement of the
Confederate side of the story relative to the intercourse between
the commissioners and Mr. Seward. I refer to it without either
assent or dissent, as it is not my province to examine the truth
or falsity of the charge made against the Lincoln administration.
It will be seen from the letters written by Mr. Stanton to Mr.
Buchanan during March and the early part of April (quoted _post_),
what opinion Mr. Stanton formed from all the information that he
could obtain, respecting the course of the new administration.
CHAPTER XXIV.
1861—February and March.
COMMISSIONERS FROM THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT—MR. JEFFERSON DAVIS’S
STATEMENT THAT THEY WERE INVITED BY PRESIDENT BUCHANAN CALLED IN
QUESTION.
It is now my duty to examine a statement made by Mr. Jefferson Davis
in his recent work, to the effect that Confederate commissioners
were appointed and sent to Washington from Montgomery, partly, at
least, in consequence of a suggestion made to him by President
Buchanan. The statement is in these words: “It may here be
mentioned, in explanation of my desire that the commission, or at
least a part of it, should reach Washington before the close of Mr.
Buchanan’s term, that I had received an intimation from him, through
a distinguished Senator of one of the border States,[157] that he
would be happy to receive a commissioner or commissioners from the
Confederate States, and would refer to the Senate any communication
that might be made through such a commission.”[158]
Footnote 157:
Mr. Hunter, of Virginia.
Footnote 158:
Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. i., p. 264.
This intimation, if it was ever made, was, as Mr. Davis describes
it, that the President would himself receive a diplomatic agent or
agents from the Confederate States, and would, as is the customary
and constitutional course on extraordinary occasions, consult the
Senate, not Congress, upon any communication that such agent or
agents might desire to make. Mr. Davis, although he names Mr.
Hunter, of Virginia, as the person through whom he received this
intimation, quotes no letter or telegram from that gentleman; so
that a judgment cannot be formed upon the character of this alleged
intimation. There is not the least trace among Mr. Buchanan’s
private papers of his ever having made to Mr. Hunter such a
suggestion in writing. If it was made orally—considering his habit
of keeping memoranda of important conversations, especially with the
Southern Senators—it is highly probable that he would not have
omitted to record this one. No such memorandum has been found after
the most diligent search. One is left, therefore, to the
probabilities of the case, which are all against the correctness of
Mr. Davis’ statement. No imputation is here made upon Mr. Davis’
veracity; but it evidently requires something more in the nature of
proof than anything he has given, to justify the belief that
President Buchanan ever expressed his willingness to receive
commissioners from the Confederate States, to negotiate with the
diplomatic department of the Government for a peaceable
acknowledgment of the independence of those States. The mere
reception of such commissioners and a reference of their
communication to the Senate, would have been tantamount to an
admission that the Confederate government could be treated with as
an independent power.
1. In the letter addressed by Mr. Davis to the President, dated on
the 27th of February, 1861, and which he describes in his book as
“of a personal and semi-official character,” introducing Mr.
Crawford, the first commissioner to arrive in Washington, and asking
for him “a favorable reception corresponding to his station,” he did
not in any manner signify that he was sending Mr. Crawford to
Washington in compliance with an intimation which he, Mr. Davis, had
received from Mr. Buchanan. This he would naturally have said, in
such a personal letter, if he at that time was acting upon such an
intimation from Mr. Buchanan, because it would have been an
unanswerable ground on which to ask for a favorable reception of the
commissioner. The appeal _ad hominem_ would not have been left out
of such a letter.
2. Mr. Davis was well aware that President Buchanan had steadily
refused to accord any diplomatic or official character to the South
Carolina commissioners, as representatives of a foreign or
independent power, and that he had conferred with them only as
private and eminent citizens of their State. Mr. Davis was also
aware that the President had never offered to entertain, and had
never entertained, a proposition to refer to any other body than
Congress, the question of the standing of any seceded State. He had
acted in the same way towards Colonel Hayne, when he came from
Governor Pickens to demand the surrender of Fort Sumter; and again,
early in February, when the Hon. Thomas J. Judge presented himself
as a commissioner from the seceded State of Alabama, the President,
as Mr. Davis doubtless knew, refused to receive him in any capacity
but that of a distinguished citizen of Alabama, referring to his
several previous messages to Congress as proof that he could not
recognize Mr. Judge in the character which he claimed. All this had
transpired a good while before Mr. Davis sent Mr. Crawford to
Washington. On the other hand, ex-President Tyler had been received
by the President as a commissioner from the State of Virginia, which
had not seceded, and did not then propose and was not likely to
secede from the Union. Yet, the world is asked to believe that
President Buchanan, through a third person, sent an intimation to
the President of the Confederate States, that he would be happy to
receive a diplomatic agent of that government, and would consult the
Senate upon what that agent had to propose.
3. The date of Mr. Crawford’s departure from Montgomery, “on or
about February 27th,” the date of his arrival in Washington, “two or
three days before the expiration of Mr. Buchanan’s term of office,”
and the fact that Mr. Buchanan declined to receive him or to send
any message to the Senate touching the subject of his mission,
militate strongly against the correctness of the assertion that he
went there in consequence of an intimation from Mr. Buchanan that
such an agent would be received. If such an intimation had been
given, the President could have had no excuse for refusing to hold
any communication with the agent, even if he did not arrive until
the last two or three days of the administration.
4. Mr. Crawford, in a manuscript account which he furnished to Mr.
Davis of his “recollections of events connected with” his mission,
represents Mr. Buchanan as “panic-stricken;” in “a state of most
thorough alarm, not only for his home at Wheatland, but for his
personal safety;” that he was “afraid of a public visit” from the
commissioner whose appointment he had himself suggested, and whom he
had promised to receive.[159] Mr. Crawford is not alone in imputing
“panic” to Mr. Buchanan. It was a common mode, both with Mr.
Buchanan’s Northern and his Southern enemies, to represent him as
bewildered, confused, timorous, not only during the last days, but
during the last months of his administration. This was their way of
accounting for conduct which, for very opposite reasons, they
disliked. It has been my duty, in investigating day by day every act
of his official and private life during this period, to penetrate
into his closet, if I may so express myself, and to form an opinion
respecting the effect upon him of the great and critical events with
which he had to deal. The materials for such an opinion, when one
has access to the written evidence of what such a statesman was
doing from day to day and from hour to hour, are almost as ample as
if one had all the while been at his side and sate at his board. It
seems to me the veriest folly, to speak of a man as panic-stricken
or bewildered, who was daily and hourly answering with his own hand
the most important public despatches, and the most familiar private
letters, in the manner appropriate to each; recording with his own
pen important conversations; holding cabinet councils; giving
directions and transacting with punctuality and order the
multifarious business of a great office; attending to his own
private concerns, and grasping firmly the helm of state amid waves
that rose higher and were more dangerous than any through which the
good ship had ever floated; entertaining friends, enjoying the
delights of social intercourse, writing at one time the gravest and
most important messages to Congress, and then congratulating a young
lady friend on her approaching marriage, in as graceful and charming
a little note as a woman ever received. I cannot give to the reader
an adequate idea of what I have gone through, in the study of these
last four months of Mr. Buchanan’s official life. I can only say
that on me it has produced the impression of great versatility of
powers, immense industry, complete self-command, unshaken firmness,
and undeviating consistency. That a man of nearly seventy years
should have encountered, as he did, what he had to encounter, with
so little sign of fear, is the best proof of an undaunted temper and
a serene self-possession. The gossip of Pennsylvania Avenue, and the
tattle of secession circles, supposed him to be panic-stricken;
while he sate in the White House the most remarkable instance, in
those tumultuous times, of the _mens aequa in arduis_.[160]
Footnote 159:
As Mr. Crawford had no interview with President Buchanan, he could
have had none but hearsay evidence of Mr. Buchanan’s state of
mind.
Footnote 160:
I have had occasion heretofore to speak of the multitudes of
letters received by the President from all quarters of the
country, after the promulgation of his annual message of December
3d. The inundation was scarcely less during the months of January
and February; and as a general rule, when an answer was necessary
or expedient, he made the original draft of it himself. In almost
all cases, he noted on the back of letters or other papers which
he received, the name of the writer, the date, and the date of the
answer. But was he wasting his energies, it may be asked, in the
duties of a mere clerk? Turn to his messages; consider the almost
daily cabinet consultations, and the incessant attention which he
had to give to the state of things in the South, the proceedings
of Congress, the condition of public opinion in the North, and the
deliberations of the Peace Convention, as well as to the ordinary
business of the Government.
It seems to be quite evident from Mr. Tyler’s note of February 24th,
to the President, that so far as any suggestion of a commission to
be sent by Mr. Davis to Washington proceeded from that city, it
proceeded from Mr. Tyler himself, and those gentlemen of his own
State who, acting with him, were endeavoring to ward off any attack
upon Fort Sumter. Mr. Davis became President of the Confederate
States on the 18th of February. But before that date, Mr. Tyler was
actively engaged in efforts to prevent an armed collision at
Charleston; and as it was well known that Mr. Davis would be the
President of the new confederacy whose delegates had assembled at
Montgomery, Mr. Tyler and the other Virginians looked to him to
prevent any outbreak in South Carolina. But I know of nothing that
can connect Mr. Buchanan with the suggestion of a commission, beyond
Mr. Davis’s statement, which is wholly unsupported by proof. The
fair inference from all that occurred is, that the commission was
sent to Washington to take the chances of being received by the
out-going or the incoming administration, as circumstances might
admit. As the first commissioner did not leave Montgomery until the
27th of February, it could not have been expected that Mr. Buchanan
would take the responsibility of binding his successor by
negotiating with a diplomatic agent of the Confederate States during
the last three days of his administration; nor is it probable that
Mr. Davis, whose last words in the Senate of the United States
arraigned Mr. Buchanan severely for his course towards South
Carolina, had, as President of the Confederate States, received from
Mr. Buchanan an intimation that was equivalent to an invitation from
one potentate to another to send a commission for the adjustment of
all differences between their two governments.
“He is advised to send a commission,” said Mr. Tyler to Mr.
Buchanan. Advised by whom? “By me, Mr. Tyler, and those Virginians
who are acting with me,” is plainly to be read between the lines of
Mr. Tyler’s letter of February 24th to the President. No one can
doubt that Mr. Buchanan’s account of his administration, published
in 1866, was written with perfect candor. If he had ever sent to Mr.
Davis the intimation which that gentleman says he received from him
through a third person, inviting commissioners from the Confederate
Government, he would have stated the fact, together with his reasons
for it. He never shrank from assigning reasons for any thing that he
ever did. Yet not only does he make no allusion to the Montgomery
commissioners, but any one who reads his fair and considerate
comments on the peace policy pursued by Mr. Lincoln down to the
attack on Fort Sumter, ought to be convinced that there was no need
for the presence of Confederate commissioners in Washington, coming
there on the suggestion of Mr. Buchanan, to negotiate matters that
would have to be referred to the Senate, although it is highly
probable that Mr. Tyler may have desired that a commissioner be sent
to arrange amicably for an agreement by the Confederates not to
attack Fort Sumter.
CHAPTER XXV.
1861—February and March.
TROOPS AT THE CAPITAL—INAUGURATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN—IMPORTANT
AND ALARMING DESPATCHES FROM MAJOR ANDERSON—MR. HOLT’S
COMMUNICATION TO PRESIDENT LINCOLN—ATTITUDE IN WHICH MR.
BUCHANAN LEFT THE GOVERNMENT TO HIS SUCCESSOR—HIS DEPARTURE FOR
WHEATLAND.
As the administration was drawing to its end, great uneasiness was
felt by many persons in Washington for the safety of the capital and
the Government. Rumors of a conspiracy to seize the city and to
prevent the inauguration of the President-elect filled the air.
Among those who were affected by these rumors was the Secretary of
State, Judge Black. With characteristic energy, on the 22d of
January, being prevented by illness from attending the cabinet
meeting of that day, he addressed to the President a long and
earnest private letter, setting forth the grounds of his belief that
the existence of such a conspiracy was highly probable, and that at
all events, even if it were doubtful, the Government ought to be
prepared for the worst. The President, although at first he did not
share these apprehensions, was not the less vigilant in the
discharge of his executive duties, or the less disposed to give due
weight to Judge Black’s impressive arguments. He would have had
everything needful done in a manner not to excite public
observation, if the matter had not been broached in Congress. His
message of the 8th of January had been referred on the 10th, in the
House of Representatives, to a select committee of five members,
consisting of Messrs. Howard, of Michigan, Branch, of North
Carolina, Dawes, of Massachusetts, John Cochrane, of New York, and
Hickman, of Pennsylvania. On the 25th this committee were
instructed, by a resolution offered by Mr. Grow, of Pennsylvania,
“to inquire whether any secret organization hostile to the
Government of the United States exists in the District of Columbia;
and if so, whether any official or employé of the city of
Washington, or any employées or officers of the Federal Government,
in the Executive or Judicial Departments, are members of it.” Before
this committee had reported, steps had been taken by the Executive
to assemble quietly at Washington a small body of the regular
troops. This at once aroused the jealousy of certain members from
the border States. On the 11th of February, a resolution, offered by
Mr. Burnett, of Kentucky, was adopted in the House, calling upon the
President to furnish to the House, if not incompatible with the
public service, “the reasons that have induced him to assemble a
large number of troops in this city, why they are kept here, and
whether he has any information of a conspiracy on the part of any
portion of the citizens of the country to seize the capital and
prevent the inauguration of the President-elect.”
On the 14th of February the select committee reported all the
testimony they had taken, and expressed their unanimous opinion that
the evidence produced before them did not prove the existence of a
secret organization at Washington, or elsewhere, for purposes
hostile to the Government.
Thereupon Mr. Branch, of North Carolina, introduced another
resolution, condemning the quartering of troops at the capital.
In the meantime, the Secretary of War, Mr. Holt, on the 18th of
February, made a full report to the President, in response to Mr.
Burnett’s resolution of the 11th, setting forth the reasons for the
assembling of the troops, and officially declaring that their
presence “is the result of the conclusion arrived at by yourself and
cabinet, on the proposition submitted to you by this department.” On
the 20th, Mr. Holt addressed to the President the following private
note:
[MR. HOLT TO THE PRESIDENT.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, Feb. 20, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
I inclose a copy of the resolution referred to in the paper which
I had the honor to address to you on yesterday, and trust I shall
be pardoned for saying that I shall be very unhappy, if this
defence—truthful and tempered as it is—is not permitted to reach
the country. The act of assembling troops at the capital, and
providing for the inauguration of your successor under the shelter
of their guns, is one of the gravest and most responsible of your
administration. It constitutes, indeed, an epoch in the history of
our institutions, and as the circumstances surrounding you fully
justify the measure, they should be frankly and fearlessly set
forth to the world. For this step your administration has been,
and still continues to be, mercilessly denounced, and of this
denunciation, as you are aware, a large part has fallen to my
share. I have been defamed in my own State, and in the towns of my
nearest relatives and friends, and I confess that I have not yet
attained to the Christian philosophy of bearing such things as an
ox led to the slaughter, without opening my mouth. Congress is now
engaged in spreading broadcast over the country, through the
efforts of your enemies and mine, a report intended to show that
the safety of the capital has never been menaced, and of course
that all your preparations here have been prompted by cowardice,
or the spirit of despotism. _Now_ is the time to meet this
calumny. A few weeks hence the memory of the measure assailed will
be swallowed up by the heady current of events, and nothing will
remain but the wounds to the reputation and sensibilities of your
friends who gave to that measure their honest and zealous support.
I do not ask you to adopt my report as your own, but to submit it
simply as the views entertained by the War Department, and for
which its head should alone be held responsible.
The helplessness of my position for all purposes of self-defence,
without your kind cooperation, must be my apology for the
solicitude expressed.
Very sincerely your friend,
J. HOLT.
The President did not at once concur in Mr. Holt’s views of the
necessity for making public the reasons which had governed the
Executive in ordering the troops to Washington. In a memorandum
which now lies before me in his handwriting, he says:
After the Committee of Five had reported all the testimony which
could be collected in the case, with their opinion upon the result
of it, the President did not deem it necessary to answer Mr.
Burnett’s resolution. Understanding, however, that he and other
members considered it disrespectful to the Union, not to return an
answer, he [on the 2d of March] sent a message to the House, in
response to the resolution.
This was in ample season to inform everybody that the troops were in
Washington to secure a peaceful inauguration of his successor
against all possibility of danger; the imputations cast upon his
administration in the meantime were of less immediate consequence.
The table given below shows the number of troops present in the city
on the 27th of February, and until after the 4th of March.[161]
Footnote 161:
Regular troops present in the City of Washington, February 27,
1861.
_Officers._ _Enlisted
men._
Field and Staff 4 4
1st Artillery, Light Battery, I 4 81
2d Artillery, Light Battery, A 4 78
West Point, Light Battery 4 12 70 229
1st Artillery, Foot Company, D 3 50
2d Artillery, Foot Company, E 2 72
2d Artillery, Foot Company, H 2 65
2d Artillery, Foot Company, K 3 52
Engineer, Sappers, and Miners 3 13 81 320
Det. Mtd. Recruits 3 81
Recruits attached 23
Total 32 653
Respectfully submitted for the information of the
President,
ADJ. GENL,. OFFICE, S. COOPER,
February 28, 1861. Adj. Genl.
The following is the material part of the special message of March
2, 1861:
These troops were ordered here to act as a _posse comitatus_ in
strict subordination to the civil authority, for the purpose of
preserving peace and order in the City of Washington, should this
be necessary before or at the period of the inauguration of the
President-elect. I was convinced that I ought to act. The safety
of the immense amount of public property in this city, and that of
the archives of the Government, in which all the States, and
especially the new States in which the public lands are situated,
have a deep interest; the peace and order of the city itself and
the security of the inauguration of the President-elect, were
objects of such vast importance to the whole country, that I could
not hesitate to adopt precautionary measures. At the present
moment, when all is quiet, it is difficult to realize the state of
alarm which prevailed when the troops were first ordered to this
city. This almost instantly subsided after the arrival of the
first company, and a feeling of comparative peace and security has
since existed, both in Washington and throughout the country. Had
I refused to adopt this precautionary measure, and evil
consequences, which good men at the time apprehended, had
followed, I should never have forgiven myself.
Some of these troops were in Washington on the 22d of February. It
appears that ex-President Tyler was disturbed by learning that they
were to form part of the customary parade on Washington’s Birthday.
President Buchanan made the following reply to his remonstrance:
[THE PRESIDENT TO MR. TYLER.]
WASHINGTON, February 22, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I find it impossible to prevent two or three companies of the
Federal troops here from joining in the procession to-day with the
volunteers of the District, without giving serious offence to the
tens of thousands of the people who have assembled to witness the
parade. The day is the anniversary of Washington’s birth—a festive
occasion throughout the land—and it has been particularly marked
by the House of Representatives. These troops everywhere else join
such processions, in honor of the birthday of the Father of his
country, and it would be hard to assign a good reason why they
should be excluded from this privilege in the capital founded by
himself. They are here simply as a _posse comitatus_ to aid the
civil authority, in case of need. Besides, the programme was
published in the _National Intelligencer_ of this morning without
my knowledge.[162]
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 162:
The War Department having considered the celebration of this
national anniversary by the military arm of the Government as a
matter of course.
Among the interesting occurrences of that day, as part of the
history of the time, it is now proper to quote a private
correspondence between General Dix and Major Anderson.[163]
Footnote 163:
A copy of this correspondence was sent by General Dix to Mr.
Buchanan, after the latter had retired to Wheatland. See _post_.
[GENERAL DIX TO MAJOR ANDERSON.]
WASHINGTON, March 4, 1861.
MY DEAR MAJOR:—
I have just come from the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, and in a
day or two more I expect to be relieved from my duties as
Secretary of the Treasury and return to my family after my short,
but laborious and responsible term of official service. I shall
send you, by the same mail which takes this note, my answer to a
call made upon me by the House of Representatives for instruction
in regard to certain transactions in the extreme Southern States.
It discloses a demoralization in all that concerns the faithful
discharge of official duty, which, if it had pleased God, I could
have wished never to have lived to see. The cowardice and
treachery of General Twiggs is more disheartening than all that
has transpired since this disgraceful career of disloyalty to the
Government commenced. No man can help feeling that he is himself
stained in reputation by this national degradation. I can hardly
realize that I am living in the age in which I was born and
educated.
In the midst of these evidences of degeneracy—in the face of the
humiliating spectacle of base intrigues to overthrow the
Government by those who are living upon its bounty, and of a
pusillanimous or perfidious surrender of the trusts confided to
them, the country turns with a feeling of relief, which you cannot
understand, to the noble example of fidelity and courage presented
by you and your gallant associates. God knows how ardently I wish
you a safe deliverance! But let the issue be what it may, you will
connect with your name the fame of historical recollections, with
which life itself can enter into no comparison. One of the most
grateful of my remembrances will be that I was once your
commanding officer. I write in haste, but from the heart, and can
only add, may God preserve you and carry you in triumph through
the perils of your position! I have never doubted if you were
assailed that the honor of the country would be gloriously
vindicated, and the disgrace cast upon it by others would be
signally rebuked by your courage and constancy.
I am, my dear Major, faithfully your friend,
JOHN A. DIX.
P.S.—It is gratifying to know that your State remains faithful to
the Union. My kind regards to Lieutenant Hall.
[MAJOR ANDERSON TO GENERAL DIX.]
FORT SUMTER, S. C., March 7, 1861.
MY DEAR GENERAL:—
Thank you. Many thanks to you for your whole-souled letter of
March 4th. One such letter is enough to make amends for a life of
trial and of discomfort.
My position is not a very enviable one, but still, when I consider
how God has blessed me in every step I have taken here, I have not
the least fear of the result. I have written to the Department
very fully, and the administration now know my opinion, and the
opinion of each individual officer of this command, of the
strength of the force necessary for forcing an entrance into this
harbor.
You speak of the disgraceful incidents developed in your report to
Congress. I had already read some of your correspondence, and was
shocked at the developments they made. The faithful historian of
the present period will have to present a record which will sadden
and surprise. It would seem that a Sirocco charged with treachery,
cunning, dishonesty, and bad faith, had tainted the atmosphere of
portions of our land; and alas! how many have been prostrated by
its blast! I hope that ere long we shall see symptoms of
restoration, and that a healthier wind will recover some of those
who have given way to the blast. A long life of honest devotion to
every duty, moral and social, may cause their course to be
forgiven, but it cannot be forgotten. The South Carolinians are on
the _qui vive_ to-night; why, we know not. They have four guard
boats in the stream, instead of the usual number of late, _two_. I
cannot believe, though, that General Beauregard, lately of the
Engineer Corps, would make an attack without having given formal
notice of his intention to do so. My rule is, though, always to
keep a bright lookout. With many thanks, my dear General, for your
most kind and welcome letter, I am, as ever, your sincere friend,
ROBERT ANDERSON.
The last day of the administration had now come. Mr. Buchanan was to
be relieved of the burthens of office, and they were to be devolved
on his successor. On that morning extraordinary despatches from
Major Anderson were delivered at the War Department. In Mr.
Buchanan’s handwriting I find, among his private papers, the
following account of what took place concerning this sudden
revelation of the position of affairs in the harbor of Charleston:—
Monday, March 4, 1861. The cabinet met at the President’s room in
the Capitol, to assist me in examining the bills which might be
presented to me for approval, between the hours of ten and twelve
of that day, when my own term and that of Congress would expire.
Mr. Holt did not attend until after eleven o’clock. At the first
opportunity, he informed us that on that morning he had received
extraordinary despatches from Major Anderson, saying that without
a force of some twenty or thirty thousand men to capture the
batteries which had been erected, he could not maintain himself at
Fort Sumter, and he [Mr. Holt] intended at once to communicate
these despatches to President, Lincoln. The cabinet had some
conversation on the subject that evening at Mr. Ould’s.
Tuesday morning, 5th March, we saw Mr. Holt at the War Department.
He there read us what he had written to President Lincoln in
communicating these despatches to Mr. Holt, giving his reasons for
his astonishment. He referred to his own letter to Major Anderson
after he had taken possession of Fort Sumter, offering him
reinforcements, and the repeated letters of the Major stating that
he felt secure, and finally a letter, after the affair of the Star
of the West, stating that he did not desire reinforcements. He
concluded by referring to the expedition which had been prepared
at New York under the direction of General Scott, to sail at once,
in case the Major should be attacked or ask for reinforcements.
This was small, consisting of two or three hundred men with
provisions.
On Tuesday afternoon, 5th March, Mr. Holt told me he had sent the
papers to President Lincoln.
This is the last I have heard of it, from any member of the
cabinet or any friend at Washington, up till this day (Saturday
morning), 9th March, at half-past ten A.M.
The following is Secretary Holt’s letter to President Lincoln:
WAR DEPARTMENT, March 5, 1861.
SIR:—
I have the honor to submit for your consideration several letters
with inclosures, received on yesterday from Major Anderson and
Captain Foster, of the Corps of Engineers, which are of a most
important and unexpected character. Why they were unexpected will
appear from the following brief statement:—
“After transferring his forces to Fort Sumter, he [Major Anderson]
addressed a letter to this Department, under date of the 31st
December, 1860, in which he says: ‘Thank God, we are now where the
Government may send us additional troops _at its leisure_. To be
sure, the uncivil and uncourteous action of the Governor [of South
Carolina], in preventing us from purchasing anything in the city,
will annoy and inconvenience us somewhat; _still we are safe_.‘
And after referring to some deficiency in his stores, in the
articles of soap and candles, he adds: ‘Still we can cheerfully
put up with the inconvenience of doing without them for the
satisfaction we feel in the knowledge that we can command this
harbor _as long as our Government wishes to keep it_.’ And again,
on the 6th January, he wrote: ‘My position will, should there be
no treachery among the workmen whom we are compelled to retain for
the present, enable me to hold this fort _against any force which
can be brought against me_; and it would enable me, in the event
of war, to annoy the South Carolinians by preventing them from
throwing in supplies into their new posts, except by the aid of
the Wash Channel through Stone River.’
“Before the receipt of this communication, the Government, being
without information as to his condition, had despatched the Star
of the West with troops and supplies for Fort Sumter; but the
vessel having been fired on from a battery at the entrance to the
harbor, returned without having reached her destination.
“On the 16th January, 1861, in replying to Major Anderson’s
letters of the 31st December and of 6th January, I said: ‘Your
late despatches, as well as the very intelligent statements of
Lieutenant Talbot, have relieved the Government of the
apprehensions previously entertained for your safety. In
consequence, it is not its purpose at present to reinforce you.
The attempt to do so would no doubt be attended by a collision of
arms and the effusion of blood—a national calamity, which the
President is most anxious to avoid. You will, therefore, report
frequently your condition, and the character and activity of the
preparations, if any, which may be being made for an attack upon
the fort, or for obstructing the Government in any endeavors it
may make to strengthen your command. Should your despatches be of
a nature too important to be intrusted to the mails, you will
convey them by special messenger. Whenever, in your judgment,
additional supplies or reinforcements are necessary for your
safety or for a successful defence of the fort, you will at once
communicate the fact to this Department, and a prompt and vigorous
effort will be made to forward them.’
“Since the date of this letter Major Anderson has regularly and
frequently reported the progress of the batteries being
constructed around him, and which looked either to the defence of
the harbor, or to an attack on his own position; but he has not
suggested that these works compromised his safety, nor has he made
any request that additional supplies or reinforcements should be
sent to him. On the contrary, on the 30th January, 1861, in a
letter to this Department, he uses this emphatic language: ‘I do
hope that no attempt will be made by our friends to throw supplies
in; their doing so would do more harm than good.‘
“On the 5th February, when referring to the batteries, etc.,
constructed in his vicinity, he said: ‘Even in their present
condition, they will make it impossible for any hostile force,
other than a large and well-appointed one, to enter this harbor,
and the chances are that it will then be at a great sacrifice of
life;‘ and in a postscript he adds: ‘Of course, in speaking of
forcing an entrance, I do not refer to the little stratagem of a
small party slipping in.‘ This suggestion of a stratagem was well
considered in connection with all the information that could be
obtained bearing upon it; and in consequence of the vigilance and
number of the guard-boats in and outside of the harbor, it was
rejected as impracticable.
“In view of these very distinct declarations, and of the earnest
desire to avoid a collision as long as possible, it was deemed
entirely safe to adhere to the line of policy indicated in my
letter of the 16th January, which has been already quoted. In that
Major Anderson had been requested to report ‘at once,’ ‘whenever,
in his judgment, additional supplies or reinforcements were
necessary for his safety or for a successful defence of the fort.’
So long, therefore, as he remained silent upon this point, the
Government felt that there was no ground for apprehension. Still,
as the necessity for action might arise at any moment, an
expedition has been quietly prepared and is ready to sail from New
York, on a few hours’ notice, for transporting troops and supplies
to Fort Sumter. This step was taken under the supervision of
General Scott, who arranged its details, and who regarded the
reinforcements thus provided for as sufficient for the occasion.
The expedition, however, is not upon a scale approaching the
seemingly extravagant estimates of Major Anderson and Captain
Foster, now offered for the first time, and for the disclosures of
which the Government was wholly unprepared.
“The declaration now made by the Major that he would not be
willing to risk his reputation on an attempt to throw
reinforcements into Charleston harbor, and with a view of holding
possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thousand
good and well-disciplined men, takes the Department by surprise,
as his previous correspondence contained no such intimation.
“I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
“Your obedient servant,
”J. HOLT.
As the question of peace or war was now to turn on what might happen
at Fort Sumter, it is incumbent on me to give a brief summary of the
position in which Mr. Buchanan left the Government to Mr. Lincoln.
It is for some other pen than mine to unravel the dark story in
which is involved the true history of the informal negotiations
between Mr. Lincoln’s administration and the Confederate
commissioners, in regard to the evacuation of Fort Sumter;
negotiations out of which those commissioners came with the
professed belief that they had been tricked, and which were swiftly
followed by an order from Montgomery to expel Anderson from that
post. It is not for me to sit in judgment on that transaction. I
have not the means of penetrating the councils of the Lincoln
administration, such as I have had for understanding those of his
predecessor. I leave to others to explain the truth or falsity of
the accusation which has undertaken to justify the bombardment of
Fort Sumter and the initiation of a civil war, in which less than
thirty days saw the practical transfer of the Confederate Government
from Montgomery to Richmond. But it will not be stepping out of my
province, if I now describe the situation in which Mr. Buchanan
handed over the Government to his successor.
There was now an actual revolt of six States, having about five
millions of inhabitants, free and slave, with an organized
provisional government, based on the alleged right of States to
secede from the Union. Seven other slaveholding States, having
more than thirteen millions of inhabitants, free and slave,
still held aloof from the Southern Confederacy, still remained
loyal to the Government of the United States, still were
represented in the new Congress along with the whole North and
the whole West. It had been Mr. Buchanan’s policy, from the very
first, to save these so-called border States from joining the
Southern Confederacy.[164] He could not prevent the formation of
that Confederacy among the cotton States, without exercising
powers which the Constitution had not conferred upon him. To
make aggressive war upon a State, or its people, in order to
prevent it or them from doing an unconstitutional act, or
because one had been committed, was clearly not within the
constitutional powers of the Executive, even if it was within
the constitutional powers of Congress. The question has often
been asked, why did Mr. Buchanan suffer State after State to go
out of the Union? Why did he not prevent their adoption of
ordinances of secession? Why did he not call on the North for
volunteers, and put down the rebellion in its first stage? The
question is a very inconsiderate one, but it shall be answered.
In the first place, Mr. Buchanan had no power to call for
volunteers under any existing law, and to make such a call
without law, was to step outside of the Constitution, and to
look to a future indemnification by Congress. Why he did not
take such a step has been explained by him so lucidly and
exactly, that I have only to quote his words:
Urgent and dangerous emergencies may have arisen, or may hereafter
arise in the history of our country, rendering delay disastrous,
such as the bombardment of Fort Sumter by the Confederate
government, which would for the moment justify the President in
violating the Constitution, by raising a military force without
the authority of law, but this only during a recess of Congress.
Such extreme cases are a law unto themselves. They must rest upon
the principle that it is a lesser evil to usurp, until Congress
can be assembled, a power withheld from the Executive, than to
suffer the Union to be endangered, either by traitors at home or
enemies from abroad. In all such cases, however, it is the
President’s duty to present to Congress, immediately after their
next meeting, the causes which impelled him thus to act, and ask
for their approbation; just as, on a like occasion, a British
minister would ask Parliament for a bill of indemnity. It would be
difficult, however, to conceive of an emergency so extreme as to
justify or even excuse a President for thus transcending his
constitutional powers whilst Congress, to whom he could make an
immediate appeal, was in session. Certainly no such case existed
during the administration of the late President. On the contrary,
not only was Congress actually in session, but bills were long
pending before it for extending his authority in calling forth the
militia, for enabling him to accept the services of volunteers,
and for the employment of the navy, if necessary, outside of ports
of entry for the collection of the revenue, all of which were
eventually rejected. Under these circumstances, had the President
attempted, of his own mere will, to exercise these high powers,
whilst Congress were at the very time deliberating whether to
grant them to him or not, he would have made himself justly liable
to impeachment. This would have been for the Executive to set at
defiance both the Constitution and the legislative branch of the
Government.[165]
Footnote 164:
President Buchanan kept before him all the while a table of the
Southern States, with the dates of their several secessions, their
populations, resources, and other facts, noted by himself,
discriminating the cotton and the border States in separate
groups.
Footnote 165:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 161.
This paragraph reveals, better than anything else he ever wrote, his
character as an American statesman. He was the last of a race of
eminent public men who had been bred in a profound reverence for the
Constitution and intimate knowledge of it. With his great
contemporaries of an earlier period, he may have differed upon the
construction of particular powers; he belonged to the school of
strict construction, while some of the famous men with whom he had
contended in former days were more lax in their interpretations. But
on the fundamental questions of the nature of the Union, the
authority of the Federal Government, and the means by which it was
to enforce its laws, there was no distinction between the school of
Jackson and Buchanan and the school of Clay and Webster. Moreover,
there was not one of his very eminent Whig antagonists, not even
Webster, whose loyalty to the Constitution—loyalty in the truest and
most comprehensive sense—the loyalty that will not violate, any more
than it will fail to assert, the just authority of such an
instrument—was more deep and fervid than Buchanan’s. This had been,
if one may use such an expression, the ruling passion of his public
life, from the time when he knew anything of public affairs. He was
not a man of brilliant genius, nor had he ever done any one thing
that had made his name illustrious and immortal, as Webster did when
he defended the Constitution against the heresy of nullification.
But in the course of a long, useful and consistent life, filled with
the exercise of talents of a fine order and uniform ability, he had
made the Constitution of his country the object of his deepest
affection, the constant guide of all his public acts. He was in
truth conspicuously and emphatically open to the reproach, if it be
a reproach, of regarding the Constitution of the United States with
what some have considered as idolatry. This trait in Mr. Buchanan’s
public character must not be overlooked, when the question is asked
to which I am now making an answer. How, in the long distant future,
the example of his fidelity to the Constitution contributed to its
restoration, after a period of turmoil and of more than neglect of
its principles, is worthy of reflection.
In the next place, during the time of the formation of the
provisional confederacy of the cotton States, not only was Congress
in session, and not only did it neglect to do anything to strengthen
the hands of the Executive, but if the President had, without the
authority of law, issued a call for volunteers, it would not have
been responded to. It is true that some Northern legislatures passed
resolutions tendering men and money to the United States. But how
could such offers have been accepted and acted upon by the
Executive, without the authority of law? How could a regiment, or an
army of regiments, have been marched by the President into Georgia
or Mississippi, to prevent the adoption of a secession ordinance?
What but a declaration of war, made by the only war-making power,
would have protected officers and men from being in the condition of
trespassers and brigands, from the moment they set foot on the soil
of a Southern State on such an enterprise? War, war upon a State or
a people, must have a legal basis, if those who wage it are to be
entitled to the privileges and immunities of soldiers. On the other
hand, to enforce the laws of the United States against obstructions
put in the way of their execution by individuals or unlawful
combinations, was not to make war. But for this purpose, President
Buchanan could not obtain from Congress the necessary means.
Moreover, the public mind of the North was at that time intent upon
the measures by which it was hoped that all differences between the
two sections of the Union might be composed, and a call for
volunteers would have been regarded as fatal to any prospect of
adjustment, and would therefore have been little heeded. It required
all the excitement which followed the bombardment of Fort Sumter,
all the monstrous uprising of the North produced by that event, to
secure a response to President Lincoln’s irregular call for
seventy-five thousand men, in April, 1861.
But it was in the power of President Buchanan to hold the border
States back from the secession movement until his successor could
take the reins of Government, and this duty he successfully
performed. Notwithstanding the failure of Congress to second his
efforts to preserve the Union unbroken by anything but the secession
of South Carolina; notwithstanding the failure of the Peace
Convention to propose anything that Congress would accept, Virginia,
North Carolina, Maryland, Kentucky, even Tennessee and Missouri, had
not seceded, or taken steps to secede, on the 4th of March, 1861.
The same conservative sentiment which still animated the best
portion of the people of those States, kept them from the vortex of
secession. They did not yet regard the election of Mr. Lincoln by a
purely sectional vote of the non-slaveholding States as a sufficient
cause for breaking up the Union. They still looked to his
administration for measures that would prevent a civil war; still
looked to the Federal Government for a redress of all the grievances
of which any of the States could complain. So that when Mr. Buchanan
laid down and Mr. Lincoln took up the powers of the Executive, the
problem which remained for the latter, and which Mr. Buchanan left
for him in the best attitude that it could be made to assume, was
how still to keep those border States from joining the Southern
Confederacy, as they had been kept from it hitherto.
This was largely, almost exclusively, a matter for the Executive,
unless, indeed, he should think it best to call the new Congress,
then legally existing, together immediately, and insist on its doing
what the preceding Congress had neglected. This course was not at
once adopted, and consequently everything depended upon the dealing
of the Executive with the Confederate commissioners, who were then
in Washington, respecting the evacuation of Fort Sumter. Mr.
Buchanan had in no way trammelled his successor by negotiations with
those commissioners. He had, in fact, declined all intercourse with
them; and it was entirely optional with Mr. Lincoln to do the same
thing, as it was entirely open to him to determine whether he would
or would not order the evacuation of that fort, and to shape his
measures accordingly. Thus far, an attack upon Major Anderson’s
position had been prevented by the efforts of Virginia, and by the
prudent course pursued by Mr. Buchanan. It was to be expected that
the Southern commissioners would be most persistent in their
demands; that they would seek the aid of influential persons who
might desire to see the peace of the country preserved, and who
would be willing to hazard so much of a recognition of the new
Confederacy as a _de facto_ power, as would be involved in a
compliance with its immediate demands respecting Sumter. But by no
act, or word, or omission of the outgoing President, had his
successor been placed under any obligation to yield to those
demands, or even to consider them. That the military situation had
become such that Anderson could not be maintained in his position
without sending a considerable army to his relief, was not due to
President Buchanan’s unwillingness to send him reinforcements, but
it was a consequence of Anderson’s not asking for them until he was
so surrounded with fortifications and powerful batteries that he
could not be relieved without a force many times greater than all
that the Government then had at its command.
Mr. Lincoln, therefore, assumed the Government without a single
admission by his predecessor of the right of secession, or of any
claim founded on it; without any obligation, other than the duty of
preventing a civil war, to hold even an informal negotiation with
the Confederate commissioners; with thirteen millions of people in
the border States still in the Union, and not likely to leave it,
unless blood should be shed. It may be that in one sense it was
fortunate that the first gun was fired on and not from Fort Sumter.
But into that question it is not needful for me to enter. My
province is fulfilled, if I have correctly described the condition
in which Mr. Buchanan left the Government to his successor.
Excepting on the short drive from the White House to the Capitol, in
the same carriage, on the 4th day of March, according to the
graceful custom of inaugurating a new President, and in the public
ceremony of the day, there is no reason to suppose that Mr. Buchanan
and Mr. Lincoln ever met. All that is known is that Mr. Lincoln’s
demeanor, while in the carriage, produced upon Mr. Buchanan the
impression that he had no fears for his personal safety or the
safety of the capital. But it does not appear that at that or any
other time, Mr. Lincoln sought to know what his predecessor could
tell him. It is too much the habit of our public men to live and act
and confer only with their party associates. Unless it be in the
conflicts of public debate, they learn nothing of the views,
purposes, motives, and very little of the acts, of their political
opponents. If ever there was an occasion when this habit needed to
be broken, it was when one of these men was putting off and the
other was assuming the great duties of the Presidency. Mr. Buchanan
could not seek a conference with his successor on the state of
public affairs; his successor did not seek or apparently desire one.
How much there was that Mr. Buchanan could have communicated to Mr.
Lincoln, and how much it concerned the interest of the Republic that
the latter should learn, must be apparent from what has been gone
over in the preceding pages. Such a conference, if it had served no
other good purpose, would have fixed Mr. Lincoln’s attention upon
the extreme importance of so guiding the intercourse between his
administration, or any member of it, and the Confederate
commissioners, as to prevent all pretext for an assault upon Fort
Sumter.
Mr. Buchanan was detained by his private affairs in Washington until
the 9th day of March. On that day, he departed for Wheatland,
accompanied by Miss Lane and the other members of his household.
----------------------------
TROOPS AT THE CAPITAL.
The anonymous diarist of the _North American Review_, writing on
the 4th day of March, the day of Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration,
records his great disgust at the presence of troops in Washington,
and attributes it to “the mischievous influence of the Blairs.” It
is to be hoped that the statement which I have made will be
considered as sufficient proof of the source from which the first
suggestion of this very prudent and proper precaution came. There
was no single moment of time and no place in the Union, during the
whole period of Mr. Buchanan’s Presidency, at which the presence
of a military force was more necessary than it was at Washington
on the day of Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration; for, notwithstanding the
absence of any tangible evidence of a conspiracy to seize the city
or to interrupt the proceedings, yet, as Judge Black forcibly
remarked in his letter to the President, preparation could do no
possible harm, in any event, and in the event which seemed most
probable, it was the country’s only chance of salvation. If, then,
at this most critical time and place, there could be assembled
only 653 men of the rank and file of the army, a part of them
being the sappers and miners drawn from West Point, what a
commentary does this fact afford, upon the charge that President
Buchanan neglected his duty, by not garrisoning the Southern forts
in the month of October, 1860. At that time, the whole number of
seaboard forts of the United States was 57; the proper complement
for war garrisons of these forts would require 28,420 men; and
their actual garrisons were 1,334 men, 1,308 of whom were at
Governor’s Island, New York, Fort McHenry, Maryland, Fortress
Monroe, Virginia, and Alcantraz Island, San Francisco. The regular
army, when recruited to its maximum, was only 18,000 men; actually
it was not much over 16,000. At no time could any part of it have
been withdrawn from the remote frontiers; and of the 1,308 men
distributed at the five points above named, very few could have
been transferred to the nine Southern forts mentioned by General
Scott in his “views” of October, 1860. The Military Committee of
the House of Representatives, in their Report of February 18,
1861, said: “Unless it is the intention of Congress that the
forts, arsenals, clock yards and other public property, shall be
exposed to capture and spoliation by any lawless bands who may
have the inclination to commit depredations upon it, the President
must be armed with additional force for their protection.”
Accordingly, they reported a bill authorizing the President to
call out the militia, but it was never acted upon. (See Report, H.
R. No. 85, 36th Cong., 2d Session, and Bill No. 1,003.)
CHAPTER XXVI.
1861.
JOURNEY FROM WASHINGTON TO WHEATLAND—WELCOME FROM FRIENDS AND
NEIGHBORS—THE RANCOR OF THE TIMES MAKES REFUTATION A DUTY OF THE
AUTHOR—THE STORY OF THE “CABINET SCENE”—MR. SEWARD'S CHARGE
AGAINST THE LATE ADMINISTRATION—PICTURES AND CURIOSITIES SAID TO
HAVE BEEN CARRIED AWAY FROM THE WHITE HOUSE—MISS LANE AND THE
ALMANACH DE GOTHA—PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS AT WHEATLAND INVENTED
AND PUT INTO THE MOUTH OF MR. BUCHANAN AND HIS GUESTS.
At my request, a citizen of Lancaster, Mr. W. U. Hensel, has
furnished for this work the following account of Mr. Buchanan’s
journey from Washington to Wheatland:
Local pride and personal admiration for Mr. Buchanan had always
contributed to his strength at home in popular contests. In the
County of Lancaster, which to this day remains one of the
strongholds of the anti-Democratic party, Mr. Buchanan received
8731 votes to 6608 for Fremont and 3615 for Fillmore. In the city
the utmost hopes of his friends were more than realized by a
plurality of 1196, about four times the usual Democratic majority,
and a majority over Fillmore and Fremont of 864. In the little
township of Lancaster, on the outskirts of the city, in which Mr.
Buchanan’s suburban home was situated, and which the _New York
Herald_ called “The Wheatland district,” the average opposition
majority of sixty was reduced to four. The interest and affection
with which he was regarded at home was testified by the escort of
an immense body of citizens of all parties which accompanied him
from his house to the railroad station, when he left for
Washington on March 2, 1857. The whole population of the city and
vicinity seemed to have turned out upon the occasion, and the
severity of the weather did not chill their enthusiasm. His
immediate escort to the capital consisted of the local military
company, the Fencibles, committees of council, representatives of
Franklin and Marshall College, of the board of trustees of which
institution he was president, and a number of personal friends.
On his expected return to Wheatland, after the close of his term,
a citizens’ meeting appointed a committee of his neighbors and
friends to escort him on his way. When those gentlemen arrived in
Washington and, through their chairman, Hon. H. M. North,
acquainted the President with their mission, he was deeply moved
by the manifestation of good feeling toward him. A small military
escort accompanied him and his friends to the railroad station in
Washington, en route for Lancaster. They stopped over in
Baltimore, and during the evening the ex-President received a
large number of its citizens. In response to a serenade given him
about eleven o’clock in the evening, at Barnum’s Hotel, he spoke
as follows:
“MY FRIENDS:—
“I thank you most cordially for this honor, and a long period of
time must elapse before memory shall fail to record it. The music
is admirable indeed, and the delicious strains cannot fail to
gratify the taste of any person whose genius or talents lead him
to such a high accomplishment. But the music is nothing at all
compared to the motives and feelings which prompted the
compliment. I thank you from the bottom of my heart for your kind
sentiments therein expressed.
“There are some who are ever ready to pay homage to those who are
about entering upon the cares of office, influenced doubtless by a
principle of self-aggrandizement; but you pay your attentions to
an old man going out of office, and now on his way to a retired
and peaceful home. For many years I have experienced a deep regard
for the interests of Baltimore, have rejoiced in her prosperity,
and sympathized in her temporary misfortunes; and now one of the
strongest feelings of my heart is, that she may continue an
extension of her limits, enjoy an increase of trade and an
abundance of labor for her deserving laboring classes.
“I must ask you to excuse this brief speech. I could say much
more, but the night is advancing, and I forbear to detain you. My
public history is before the people of this country, and whilst it
does not behoove me to speak of it, I assure you of my willingness
that they shall judge me by my kind regard for all the citizens of
Baltimore; and that God may prosper and bless them all is the
sincere prayer of an honest heart.”
The Battalion and Baltimore City Guards having been added to his
escort, the homeward journey was resumed on the next morning, and
at York and other points on the road there were demonstrations of
popular welcome. At Columbia, Pa., a town on the Susquehanna
River, on the west border of Lancaster County, he was welcomed at
the gates of his own county by a committee of about one hundred
and fifty citizens of Lancaster, and delegates from Columbia and
surrounding towns and villages, who had gathered there to receive
him when his foot first fell upon the soil of the district which
claimed him as peculiarly its own. As the train which carried him
and his friends and the popular escort, now swelled to many
hundreds, neared the city, there was firing of cannon, pealing of
bells, and the formation of a procession to escort the party
through the streets of the city. The cars were stopped at the city
limits, and Mr. Buchanan was conducted into an open barouche,
drawn by four gray horses, and with a great civic and military
display he entered the city, and passing through its principal
streets, was taken to the public square. The procession halted and
broke ranks, and an immense citizens’ meeting was organized, in
the presence of which Wm. J. Preston, Esq., on behalf of the
Baltimore City Guards, addressed Mayor Sanderson, consigning the
ex-President to his old friends and neighbors. After the band had
played “Home Again,” the Mayor, addressing Mr. Preston, returned
the thanks of the citizens to his company for their courtesy to
Mr. Buchanan, and then, turning to the guest of the occasion,
welcomed him back to his home. Mr. Buchanan, in responding to this
speech, said:
“MR. MAYOR, MY OLD NEIGHBORS, FRIENDS AND FELLOW-CITIZENS:—
“I have not language to express the feelings which swell in my
heart on this occasion: but I do most cordially thank you for this
demonstration of your personal kindness to an old man, who comes
back to you ere long to go to his final rest. And here let me say
that, having visited many foreign climes, my heart has ever turned
to Lancaster as the spot where I would wish to live and die. When
yet a young man, in far remote Russia, my heart was still with
friends and neighbors in good old Lancaster. [Applause.]
“Although I have always been true to you, I have not been so true
to you as you have been to me. Your fathers took me up when a
young man, fostered and cherished me through many long years. All
of them have passed away, and I stand before you to-day in the
midst of a new generation. [A voice in the crowd—“I saw you mount
your horse when you marched to Baltimore in the War of 1812.”] The
friendship of the fathers for myself has descended on their
children. Generations of mortal men rise, and sink, and are
forgotten, but the kindness of the past generation to me, now so
conspicuous in the present, can never be forgotten.
“I have come to lay my bones among you, and during the brief,
intermediate period which Heaven may allot me, I shall endeavor to
perform the duties of a good citizen, and a kind friend and
neighbor. My advice shall be cheerfully extended to all who may
seek it, and my sympathy and support shall never be withheld from
the widow and the orphan. [Loud applause.] All political
aspirations have departed. What I have done, during a somewhat
protracted public life, has passed into history. If, at any time,
I have done aught to offend a single citizen, I now sincerely ask
his pardon, while from my heart I declare that I have no feeling
but that of kindness to any individual in this county.
“I came to this city in 1809, more than half a century ago, and
am, therefore, I may say, among your oldest citizens. When I
parted from President Lincoln, on introducing him to the Executive
Mansion, according to custom, I said to him: “If you are as happy,
my dear sir, on entering this house as I am in leaving it and
returning home, you are the happiest man in this country!” I was
then thinking of the comforts and tranquillity of home, as
contrasted with the troubles, perplexities, and difficulties
inseparable from the Presidential office. Since leaving
Washington, I have briefly addressed my friends on two or three
occasions, but have purposely avoided all allusions to party
politics, and I shall do so here.
“There is one aspiration, however, which is never absent from my
mind for a single moment, and which will meet with a unanimous
response from every individual here present, and that is, may God
preserve the Constitution and the Union, and in His good
providence dispel the shadows, clouds, and darkness which have now
cast a gloom over the land! Under that benign influence we have
advanced more rapidly in prosperity, greatness and glory than any
other nation in the tide of time. Indeed, we had become either the
envy or admiration of the whole world. May all our troubles end in
a peaceful solution, and may the good old times return to bless us
and our posterity! [Loud and prolonged applause.]”
At the conclusion of his remarks, he seated himself in his
carriage, and was escorted out through the main street leading
westward to Wheatland, on the way passing under an arch spanning
the street, and with other signs of popular enthusiasm attending
the occasion. When the procession reached Wheatland, the city
guards were drawn up in front of the house, and to the music of
“Home, Sweet Home,” he ascended the portico and re-entered upon
the scenes of that tranquillity in which it was his desire to
spend the rest of his days. Briefly addressing the military
company drawn up in review before him he said, that he regarded
that day as one of the proudest of his life. He thanked the
officers and members for their handsome escort, so freely tendered
him, and held it especially significant, as he was now a private
citizen only. He regretted that having just reached his home, he
was not prepared to entertain them. The doors of his house had
been always open, the latch-string was out. At any other time when
they felt disposed to call, either as a company or individuals,
they should receive a very cordial welcome. On behalf of the
guards, Mr. Preston responded at length, expressing their
gratification at having the privilege of attending the President,
and witnessing the cordiality and universal honor with which he
had been received here. Late at night Mr. Buchanan was serenaded
by the musical bodies of Lancaster.
And now that he had reached his home among those who best knew and
who venerated him, and had sate himself down for whatever enjoyment
of private life remained to him, it would seem that at least the
respect and the forbearance of all his countrymen, if not their
gratitude and applause, would have followed him in his retreat. He
had been “so clear in his great office;” he had so wisely and
conscientiously discharged its most important trusts; he had been so
free from the corruption that assails the supreme dispenser of
patronage and power; he had so well expounded the fundamental law
that must govern the course of public affairs in the perilous
condition that awaited them; he had done so much to secure for his
successor a safe path in which to walk; he had left to that
successor so little that could embarrass and so much that could
guide him, that it would seem as if his errors would have been
outweighed by the good that he had tried to do, as if all the
virtuous and noble of the land would have interposed to shield him
from censure. Nay, it would seem that he had accumulated a claim for
tender consideration, large beyond the ordinary measure of such a
fund. He had sacrificed on the altar of his country friendships of
long years of mutual confidence and service; of that confidence and
service which unite, in the strong bond of such a connection, the
lofty spirits who lead together the political parties of a great and
free country. In the discharge of his public duty, he had wounded
and alienated hearts in which he had ever been held, and hoped
always to be held, in affection and honor. To a man in the decline
of life, such losses are serious things; and this man had more of
them, far more, than usually falls to the lot of a statesman, even
in the changing fortunes of the longest public life. His countrymen
in general knew little of what his Presidency had cost him, or, if
they knew anything of the rupture of such ties, they gave him no
credit for the sacrifice.
Human nature, at its best, has enormous weaknesses, even if it has
also great strength. Those who succeeded to the control of the
Federal Government could not resist the temptation to assail their
predecessors; as if the shortcomings of predecessors could excuse
their own mistakes; as if crimination of those who had laid down
responsibility could help those who had taken it up. But such is the
natural, perhaps the inevitable course of things in free governments
when a change of parties takes place, and especially in times of
extreme public danger. Mr. Buchanan was pursued in his retirement
with more than usual ferocity. The example that was set in high
places infected those of low degree. Men said that he was a
secessionist. He was a traitor. He had given away the authority of
the Government. He had been weak and vacillating. He had shut his
eyes when men about him, the very ministers of his cabinet, were
plotting the destruction of the Union. He was old and timid. He
might have crushed an incipient rebellion, and he had encouraged it.
He had been bullied at his own council board by a courageous
minister who had rebuked his policy and stayed him from a pernicious
step. He had carried off from the official palace of the Republic
ornaments that belonged to the nation. He had foolishly endeavored
to have a member of his family catalogued among the royal families
of the world.
Some of these slanders were low enough in their origin, but not too
low to be echoed by a careless or a shameless press. Some of them
began in high quarters, and spread through all ranks of society.
Some would have been of moment, if they had been true; some had only
their own frivolity and falsehood to give them currency; but when do
frivolity and falsehood arrest the currency of a lie?
The reader who has followed me through the foregoing pages, has been
enabled to pass judgment upon some of the most serious of the
reproaches with which this statesman was visited. But there are
other specific charges which remain to be noticed: and if, in this
final refutation, I begin with an accusation that borrowed some
dignity from its source, and then have to descend to things that no
origin and no authority could dignify, I must plead the simple
nature of my duty as the excuse. If I seem to the reader to pile
Pelion upon Ossa, he must not forget the sources from which have
been derived the erroneous popular impressions which have so long
prevailed concerning these affairs.
When Mr. Seward became Secretary of State under President Lincoln,
he thought it proper to signalize his official correspondence with
some of our representatives abroad, with many discursive views and
statements about our internal affairs. However necessary it may have
been to possess our ministers at the courts of Europe with the
policy which the new administration intended to pursue in regard to
the threatened revolution, in order that they might enlighten the
statesmen of Europe on the subject, it was hardly to have been
expected that an American Secretary of State would, in his official
correspondence, inculpate a preceding administration of his own
government, even if it had not been one of his own party. But in the
letter addressed by Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, on the 10th of April,
1861, from which I have already had occasion to quote, speaking of
what was the state of things when he came into office, he said:
The Federal marine seemed to have been scattered everywhere except
where its presence was necessary, and such of the military forces
as were not in the remote States and Territories were held back
from activity by vague and mysterious armistices, which had been
informally contracted by the late President, or under his
authority, with a view to postpone conflict until impracticable
concessions to disunion should be made by Congress, or at least
until the waning term of his administration should reach its
appointed end.[166]
Footnote 166:
This despatch became public soon after the commencement of the
session of Congress which began in December, 1861.
It is unnecessary for me to add anything to what has already been
said concerning the situation of the military forces at the time
when the secession movement began, or concerning the facts or
reasons for the only armistice, or understanding in the nature of an
armistice, “contracted by the late President,” (in regard to
Pensacola,) or the temporary truce of arms entered into by Major
Anderson in the harbor of Charleston. There was nothing “mysterious”
about either of these arrangements; nothing that could not be
plainly read on the records of the War and Navy Departments. And in
regard to the position of every vessel of the Navy, the records of
that Department, if Mr. Seward had taken the trouble to examine them
before he penned the charge that “the Federal marine seemed to have
been scattered everywhere except where its presence was necessary,”
he would have been able to say something more than was intended to
be conveyed by the word “seemed,” whatever that may have been, for
he would have had before him the facts. With respect, too, to
“impracticable concessions,” Mr. Seward might have compared his own
policy, pursued for some time after he became Secretary of State,
with that of the preceding administration. Mr. Toucey, Mr.
Buchanan’s Secretary of the Navy called on Mr. Seward at the State
Department soon after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, and found
that “the tenor of his [Mr. Seward’s] language was altogether for
peace and conciliation.” “I was as strongly impressed with it,” says
Mr. Toucey, “as Judge Campbell appears to have been on another
occasion.”[167] But upon the matter of fact respecting the position
of the naval forces, the following correspondence between Mr.
Buchanan and Mr. Toucey exhibits in full detail the situation of the
whole navy in the month of December, 1860, and the following months:
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. TOUCEY.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, July 20, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Your favor of the 5th ultimo was duly received, and should long
since have been answered, but truly I had nothing to communicate
except to reiterate my warm attachment and respect for yourself,
and I know this was not necessary.
I perceive by the papers that Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, has had a
resolution adopted by the Senate, asking the President for
information of the nature of the _quasi armistice_ at Fort
Pickens, referred to in his message, etc.
As I was able, I have written in scraps a historical review of the
last four months of my administration, not, however, intending
that it should be published in my name. I consider it a complete
vindication of our policy. This is placed in the hands of Judge
Black and Mr. Stanton, to enable them to use the facts which it
contains in case of an attack against me in Congress. They write
that it is not probable any such attack will be made; but I
received their letter the day before the motion of Mr. Grimes.
General Dix, the Judge, and Mr. Stanton unite in the opinion that
nothing in our defence should be published at present, because
they do not believe the public mind is prepared to receive it, and
this would have the effect of producing violent attacks against me
from the Republican press, whilst we have very few, if any,
journals which would be willing to answer them; ——- _sed quere de
hoc_. I send you a copy of that portion of my review relating to
Fort Pickens. It is not so precise as the rest, because I have not
the necessary official papers in my possession. I perceive from
your letter you have a distinct recollection of the whole affair.
Would it not be wise and prudent for you to write to some friend
in Washington on the subject—Mr. Thomson, of New Jersey, or some
other person....
I think you ought to pay immediate attention to this matter. It
affords a fair opportunity to relieve yourself from the false and
unfounded charge made against you that you had not vessels at hand
to meet the emergency. The first paragraph of your letter to me
presents facts which would put the charge to flight.
My health is in a great degree restored, but I recover strength
slowly. My letter is so long that I shall not advert to the
disastrous condition of our public affairs. Miss Lane unites with
myself in cordial wishes for your health and prosperity, and with
kindest regards to Mrs. Toucey.
Ever your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 167:
MS. letter from Mr. Toucey to Mr. Buchanan, June 5, 1861.
[MR. TOUCEY TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
HARTFORD, July 31, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 20th. Senator Thomson took
offence last winter because I refused to give his brother a
command out of course in preference to his seniors, and although I
think, from his more recent intercourse, that it has passed away,
yet I am unwilling to make a request of him. The records of the
Navy Department will show, that on the 24th of December, 1860, the
sloop of war St. Louis, carrying twenty guns, was ordered from
Vera Cruz to Pensacola; that on the 5th of January, 1861, the
sloop of war Macedonia, carrying twenty-two guns, then at
Portsmouth (N. H.), ready for sea, was ordered by telegraph to
proceed to Pensacola; that on the 9th of January, 1861, the
frigate Sabine, carrying fifty guns, was ordered from Vera Cruz to
Pensacola; that the steam sloop of war Brooklyn, carrying
twenty-five guns, was ordered to Pensacola with two companies of
regular troops and a supply of military stores for Fort Pickens,
and arrived there early in February; that the U. S. steamer
Wyandotte, carrying five guns, was there doing effective service;
that the armed storeship Relief was there doing good service, and
was ordered to remain there; that the U. S. steamer Crusader,
carrying eight guns, having gone from her cruising ground, on the
coast of Cuba, to Pensacola for repairs, was ordered to proceed to
Tortugas, and on the arrival of the troops sent there, to return
immediately to Pensacola, and it being reported by the newspapers
that she had arrived at New Orleans, she was, on the 10th of
January, by telegraph to New Orleans, ordered to return
immediately to Pensacola, where she would find her orders. The
Relief left Pensacola with prisoners and the families of officers
for New York in violation of her orders, for which her commander
was tried and condemned by courtmartial. The Crusader missed her
orders. When the Brooklyn, the Sabine, the Macedonian, the St.
Louis, and the Wyandotte were lying before Pensacola, the force
being larger than was necessary, the St. Louis, her term of
service having expired, was ordered to New York. Whether her
orders had reached her before the 4th of March, I am not able to
say. At this time the home squadron consisted of the Powhatan,
Sabine, Brooklyn, St. Louis, Pocahontas, Pawnee, Mohawk,
Waterwitch, Wyandotte, Crusader, Cumberland, Macedonian and
Relief. The sloop of war Plymouth, the practice ship, was at
Norfolk in good condition. The U. S. steamer Anacosta was in
commission at Washington. The frigate Constitution, having been
thoroughly repaired, was anchored at Annapolis, in aid of the
Naval Academy. The great steam-ships Colorado, Minnesota and
Mississippi, at Boston, and the Wabash at New York, had been
thoroughly repaired, and could put to sea in two weeks; the
Merrimac, at Norfolk, in three weeks; the Roanoke, in dock at New
York, in six weeks. Of the above vessels, fourteen are steamers,
eight ships of the line; the Alabama, Virginia, Vermont, Ohio,
North Carolina, New York, Columbus and Pennsylvania, lying at the
navy yards, had been, on the 1st of December last, recommended by
the Department, in pursuance of the report of a board of naval
officers, to be converted into steam frigates, but Congress did
not make the necessary appropriation. The frigates Brandywine,
Potomac, St. Lawrence, Columbia and Raritan were at the navy
yards, and the same board of officers had recommended that when
repaired they should be razeed and converted into sloops. The
sloops of war Perry, Dale, Preble, Vincennes, Jamestown and
Germantown had, within a few months, returned from their regular
cruises on the coasts of Africa and South America and the East and
West Indies, and were at the navy yards awaiting repairs. Congress
had twice cut down the estimates of the Department for repairs a
million dollars. Of the thirty-seven steam vessels in the navy,
twenty had been added to it while I was at the head of the
Department. While we had this force at home, the Mediterranean
squadron consisted of but three vessels, the Susquehanna, Richmond
and Iroquois; the Brazil squadron, of the Congress, Seminole and
Pulaski; the East India squadron, of the Hartford, Saginaw,
Dacotah and John Adams; the Pacific squadron, of the Lancaster,
Cyane, St. Mary’s, Wyoming and Narragansett; the African squadron,
of the San Jacinto, Constellation, Portsmouth, Mohican, Saratoga,
Sumter and Mystic. The Niagara was on her way to carry home the
Japanese ambassadors; the Vandalia to relieve the John Adams. I
make this detailed statement that you may see that there is not
the slightest ground for anxiety as to the course of your
administration in reference to the naval force at Fort Pickens, in
the home squadron, or in the foreign squadrons. I concur with
Judge Black and others, that a publication at this time is not
expedient, because it would provoke attack; because it would not
be heard; because the best time for it is at the moment when the
tide of public sentiment begins to ebb and to set in the opposite
direction, which will inevitably soon take place. The public
cannot fail to see that affairs have taken a downward direction
with fatal velocity since the 4th of March, and that a series of
measures could not have been devised more exactly adapted to
divide the country and break the Government to pieces, than that
which has been pursued by your successor.
Mrs. Toucey unites with me in presenting to yourself and to Miss
Lane our most respectful regards.
Ever faithfully your friend,
I. TOUCEY.
There was a peculiar, not to say a most offensive injustice, in
representing Mr. Buchanan’s policy as having for its object “to
postpone conflict until impracticable concessions to disunion should
be made by Congress, or at least until the waning term of his
administration should reach its appointed end.” There was nothing
impracticable in what Mr. Buchanan urged Congress to do, nor was
there any “concession to disunion” in his recommendations. Moreover,
he used his utmost exertions to strengthen the hands of his
successor, as well as his own, so that the Executive might be able
to meet any conflict that might arise. There now lie before me four
printed bills, three of which show what President Buchanan
endeavored to make Congress do. One of them is a bill introduced
into the Senate by Mr. Bigler, on the 14th of January, 1861, “to
provide for taking the sense of the people of the several States on
certain proposed amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.”
This bill went rather beyond any “concessions” or proposed
recommendations made by the President. It was read twice and ordered
to be printed, but was never acted upon. The other three bills
embodied measures urgently asked for by the administration, and they
underwent the personal revision of the President, as appears from
his MSS. notes on the copies furnished to him, which are now in my
possession. The first was a bill reported on the 30th of January,
1861, from the select committee on the President’s message of
January 8th, and was entitled, “a bill further to provide for
calling forth the militia of the United States in certain cases.” It
would, if enacted, have enabled the President to accept the services
of volunteers to protect the forts and other public property of the
United States, and to recover their possession if it had been lost.
The second was a bill reported in the House by the same committee on
the 30th of January, 1861, “further to provide for the collection of
duties on imports.” This bill was drawn with a special view to the
condition of things in the port of Charleston. The third of these
bills, for giving the President powers which the exigency demanded,
was reported by the Committee on Military Affairs, in the House, and
was, on the 20th of February, 1861, ordered to be printed, pending
its second reading. It was “a bill supplementary to the several acts
now in force to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.” The
laws then in force provided for calling forth the militia only when
the State authorities asked for protection against insurrections
aimed at the State governments, or in cases of foreign invasion. The
new bill was designed to provide against insurrections aimed at the
authority of the United States. Not one of these bills was ever
acted upon by that Congress; so that when “the waning term” of Mr.
Buchanan’s administration expired, the Executive was without the
appropriate means to collect the revenue outside of custom-houses,
or to call out the militia to suppress insurrections against the
United States, or to call for volunteers, and had but a mere handful
of regular troops within reach, even to guard the city of Washington
on the day of Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration, or to execute any law of
the United States that might meet with resistance.[168]
Footnote 168:
See Senate Bill, No. 537, 36th Congress, 2d session; House Bills,
Nos. 968, 969, 1003, same Congress, same session.
For a long time after the month of February, 1862, there was current
a story about a “cabinet scene,” said to have occurred in Mr.
Buchanan’s cabinet in February, 1861, in which Mr. Stanton, then
Attorney General, had, by a threat of resignation, backed by a
similar threat by other ministers present, compelled the President
to recede from something that he proposed to do. This story first
became public in an English newspaper, on the 9th of February, 1862,
and was immediately copied and extensively circulated in this
country. The following correspondence discloses the public origin of
this story, and gives it its appropriate refutation:
[THE HON. AUGUSTUS SCHELL TO THE HON. J. S. BLACK.]
NEW YORK, July 28th, 1863.
DEAR SIR:—
You will find below an extract from a letter published in the
London _Observer_ on the 9th of February, 1862, subscribed with
initials T. W. The signature is known to be that of Mr. Thurlow
Weed, of Albany, who was at the time in London.
“In February, Major Anderson, commanding Fort Moultrie, Charleston
harbor, finding his position endangered, passed his garrison by a
prompt and brilliant movement over to the stronger Fortress of
Sumter. Whereupon Mr. Floyd, Secretary of war, much excited,
called upon the President to say that Major Anderson had violated
express orders and thereby seriously compromised him (Floyd), and
that unless the Major was immediately remanded to Fort Moultrie,
he should resign the War Office.
“The cabinet was assembled directly. Mr. Buchanan, explaining the
embarrassment of the Secretary of War, remarked that the act of
Major Anderson would occasion exasperation at the South; he had
told Mr. Floyd that, as the Government was strong, forbearance
toward erring brethren might win them back to their allegiance,
and that that officer might be ordered back.
“After an ominous silence, the President inquired how the
suggestion struck his cabinet.
“Mr. Stanton, just now called to the War Office [under President
Lincoln], but then Attorney General, answered: ‘That course, Mr.
President, ought certainly to be regarded as most liberal towards
“erring brethren,” but while one member of your cabinet has
fraudulent acceptances for millions of dollars afloat, and while
the confidential clerk of another—himself in Carolina teaching
rebellion—has just stolen $900,000 from the Indian Trust Fund, the
experiment of ordering Major Anderson back to Fort Moultrie would
be dangerous. But if you intend to try it, before it is done I beg
that you will accept my resignation.’ ‘And mine,’ added the
Secretary of State, Mr. Black. ‘And mine, also,’ said the
Postmaster General, Mr. Holt. ‘And mine, too,’ followed the
Secretary of the Treasury, General Dix.
“This of course opened the bleared eyes of the President, and the
meeting resulted in the acceptance of Mr. Floyd’s resignation.”
Inasmuch as you were a member of Mr. Buchanan’s cabinet, and one
of the persons alluded to among the members of his cabinet who
dissented from the proposition alleged to have been made by Mr.
Floyd, I have thought it not improper to call upon you to state
whether the subject matter of Mr. Weed’s communication is or is
not true.
As for myself, I do not believe it to be true, and regard it as
one of the numerous slanders which have been disseminated to
reflect discredit upon the late excellent President of the United
States. I shall esteem it a favor if you will inform me, by
letter, of the precise circumstances attending the action of Mr.
Buchanan’s cabinet, at the time of the transaction referred to, if
any such took place, to the end that the public may be truthfully
informed of the actual occurrence.
I have written this letter without the knowledge of Mr. Buchanan,
solely for the purpose that the public record of Mr. Buchanan’s
administration may be vindicated from a charge which those who
know him, as you and I do, can not but feel has originated from
personal or political malice.
Yours very respectfully,
AUGUSTUS SCHELL.
[JUDGE BLACK TO MR. SCHELL.]
YORK, August 6, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Your letter of July 28th, which I have but just now received,
calls my attention to a statement published in the London
_Observer_, over the signature of T. W. I am asked if the
occurrence, there said to have taken place at a cabinet council in
February, 1861, is true or not, and you desire me to inform you of
the precise circumstances attending the action of Mr. Buchanan’s
cabinet at the time of the transaction referred to.
The latter part of this request is more than I can comply with at
present. All the circumstances set out with precision would, I
suppose, fill a moderate sized volume; and anything short of a
full account would probably do wrong to the subject. Besides, I am
not convinced that the truth would be received now with public
favor, or even with toleration. The time when justice shall be
done draws near, but is not yet.
But the story you transcribe from the London paper is wholly
fictitious. Major Anderson passed his garrison to Fort Sumter,
not in February, 1861, but in December, 1860. General Dix was
not then a member of the cabinet...... The real cause of Floyd’s
retirement from office had no connection with that affair.[169]
Mr. Stanton made no such speech as that put into his mouth by T.
W., or any other speech inconsistent with the most perfect
respect for all his colleagues and for the President. Neither
Mr. Stanton nor Mr. Holt ever spoke to the President about
resigning, upon any contingency whatever, before the incoming of
the new administration.
I am, with great respect, yours,
J. S. BLACK.
Footnote 169:
Ordering Anderson back to Fort Moultrie.
For many years, the source from which Mr. Weed received any part
whatever of this story, remained shrouded in mystery. Judge Black at
one time had traced it to Colonel George W. McCook, of Ohio; and he
received from that gentleman a qualified promise to make known, at a
future period, the source from which he (Colonel McCook) derived his
information. But Colonel McCook was, at the time he gave this
promise, about to become a Republican candidate for the office of
Governor of Ohio. He lost the election, and died soon after. It was
not until I began to write the present work that I learned, from a
gentleman now residing in Philadelphia, Mr. George Plumer Smith, who
Mr. Weed’s informant was, and how Mr. Weed became possessed of a
story which he repeated in print, with some variation and a great
deal of inaccuracy. Mr. Smith furnished to me in February, 1882, the
following statement, and authorized me to make use of it:
STATEMENT.
In October, 1861, while at Willard’s Hotel, in Washington, I met
an old friend, Colonel George W. McCook, of Steubenville, Ohio,
where I had known him as partner in law practice with Mr. Edwin M.
Stanton, whom, also, I knew while in Ohio, and afterwards in
Pittsburgh, where I was a merchant.
Colonel McCook and I had many conversations about the outlook then
of affairs, and we agreed that history might yet with us repeat
itself, and possible catastrophes make demand for a leader who, by
the will of the loyal people, would be called to assume powers
outside the Constitution. And we both agreed that, in such dire
contingency, Mr. Stanton would be the man.
The Colonel then, with the dramatic gesture and forcible language
which his surviving friends would recall, told me of the scene in
the cabinet when Governor Floyd overshot himself in his demands on
Mr. Buchanan, etc., and of Mr. Stanton’s lead in demanding
Secretary Floyd’s dismissal, etc., etc., which account I readily
believed authentic, and treasured it in my memory.
I was at that time detained in Washington to decide whether I
would go abroad to make purchases of certain supplies for the
Quartermaster’s Department, and sailed a few days after the last
conversation with Colonel McCook.
I made contracts in Paris, and, about the middle of November, I
went down to Havre to expedite my first shipment, and there met
with Mr. Thurlow Weed and his party, just arrived. I had some
previous acquaintance with him, and during my stay abroad had
frequent occasion to see him.
I closed up my business in Paris on the 28th January, 1862, on
which day it was telegraphed from Ireland that “_Frederick P.
Stanton_” was appointed to the War Department in Washington.
Going over to London the next day, I called on Mr. Weed, then
there, and the mails not yet to hand. He was under the impression
the new Secretary was the former Governor of Kansas. But when it
was corrected I called again, and found him very desirous of
information about Mr. Edwin M. Stanton’s previous life and
character, which I gave him, including, of course, the cabinet
scene, as told me by Colonel McCook, then fresh in my
recollection. But Mr. Weed did not speak of writing it out for
publication, and I really regretted to find it, in his own
practical adaptation for the newspaper, in the _Observer_, on the
Sunday morning following. I took care to address copies to Mr.
Stanton, Colonel McCook, General Meigs, and others.
Early in March following, I was in Washington, settling my
accounts, and, by Mr. Stanton’s invitation, called at his house.
After tea, he led me into his library, when at once he asked: “Who
furnished Thurlow Weed with the statements in the _Observer_ which
you sent me?”
I then fully detailed how it all came about, and of Colonel
McCook’s being in Washington when I left, and giving me the
particulars of the cabinet scene, etc. Mr. Stanton reflected for
some minutes, when he said: “McCook should not have talked of such
matters; and, in his way, he has exaggerated what did occur; but”
pausing again, he continued, “I have not time now to be watching
and correcting what may be told of last winter’s troubles in Mr.
Buchanan’s cabinet, in which I was an unwilling member; besides,
many of my old Democratic friends now turn the cold shoulder to me
in the changed relations which duty to my country has laid upon
me.”
I was, indeed, glad that the statement seemed to have attracted
but little attention, and hoped it would pass out of remembrance.
But when Vice President Wilson reproduced it in the _Atlantic
Monthly_, and was answered by Judge Black, I thought it my duty to
write to Colonel McCook, reminding him of the occasion on which he
told me of the cabinet affair, as I told its outlines to Mr. Weed,
etc., and asking his (Colonel McCook’s) permission to correct much
which had been added to his original narrative; but I had no reply
from him; and not long after he died—suddenly, poor fellow.
I had not then personal acquaintance with Judge J. S. Black, but
had opportunity to explain to a friend in York what I knew of the
matter, and he mentioned what I had told him to the Judge.
I met the latter at Cape May, in 1876, and had a long conversation
about the reported scene, which, he said, would be fully explained
in, I understood him, a publication he had in preparation.
I can only add my often and sincere regret that I should have been
concerned, in any way, in doing injustice to Mr. Buchanan, in the
trying scenes he had to encounter.
GEO. PLUMER SMITH.
PHILADELPHIA, February 8, 1882.
The reader should now peruse an extract from a private letter,
written by Mr. Buchanan to his niece, Miss Lane, immediately after
he had heard that Mr. Stanton had been appointed by President
Lincoln Secretary of War. It shows, in addition to the internal
evidence which the story of the “cabinet scene” carried within
itself for its own refutation, that Mr. Stanton was a very unlikely
person to have played the part imputed to him in that account.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, January 16, 1862.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
...... Well, our friend Stanton has been appointed Secretary of
War. I presume, without knowing, that this has been done by the
influence of General McClellan. I have reason to believe they are
very intimate. What are Mr. Stanton’s qualifications for that, the
greatest and most responsible office in the world, I cannot judge.
I appointed him Attorney General when Judge Black was raised to
the State Department, because his professional business and that
of the Judge, especially in California cases, were so intimately
connected that he could proceed in the Supreme Court without
delay. He is a sound, clear-headed, persevering and practical
lawyer, and is quite eminent, especially in patent cases. He is
not well versed in public, commercial or constitutional law,
because his professional duties as a country lawyer never led him
to make these his study. I believe him to be a perfectly honest
man, and in that respect he differs from ——. He never took much
part in cabinet councils, because his office did not require it.
He was always on my side, and flattered me _ad nauseam_.[170]
Footnote 170:
It will be noted from the date of this letter that it was written
before the story of the “cabinet scene” became current, and
therefore Mr. Buchanan could not have been led by that story to
give to a member of his family this description of Mr. Stanton’s
demeanor towards himself. See also the letters of Mr. Stanton to
Mr. Buchanan, quoted _post_.
In the confidential letters of Mr. Buchanan, hereafter to be quoted,
his feelings about this story will be fully disclosed. The story
carried within itself a plain implication that he had been grossly
insulted by four members of his cabinet, an insult, which if it had
ever occurred, would have been instantly followed by their dismissal
from office. He was not a man to brook such an indignity, nor was
there a man among all those who were falsely said to have offered
it, who would have dared to be guilty of it. The contradiction given
to it by Judge Black, in his letter to Mr. Schell, was not
immediately published.
How Mr. Stanton came to leave this falsehood without contradiction,
and what he said about it after he had assumed new political
relations, and after he learned the source from which Mr. Weed
received it, the reader has seen from the statement of the gentleman
who communicated it to Mr. Weed, and who received it from Col.
McCook.
I must now descend to slanders of a nature almost too contemptible
for notice, but as they gave Mr. Buchanan much annoyance, I do not
think it fit to withhold all exhibition of his feelings about them.
His own letters explain what they were:
[DR. BLAKE TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON CITY, December 19, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
A friend has called my attention to a description of the
President’s levee on the first page of the New York —— of
yesterday’s date, from which I make the following extract: “Next
we come to the Red Room. This is properly Mrs. Lincoln’s reception
room. Everything in it is new except the splendid old painting of
Washington. The fine pictures of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert
and other members of the royal family, presented to the President
of the United States for the President’s mansion by the Prince of
Wales, that hung upon the walls of this room, are missing. I learn
that they were removed to Wheatland with Mr. Buchanan. He also
took away from the White House a large number of the Chinese or
Japanese curiosities, intended, upon presentation, for the
mansion. All these are missing.” According to my recollection, the
Prince of Wales presented to Miss Lane three engravings, one of
his mother, another of his father, and the third of himself. They
were hung in the Red Room. Whether Miss Lane took them with her to
Wheatland I cannot say, but presume she did, as _they_ were _her
property_. There were no Chinese curiosities presented during your
administration. The Japanese curiosities presented, I believe,
through the late Commodore Perry to ex-President Pierce, remained
in the house when I ceased to be Commissioner of Public Buildings.
The presents made to you by the Japanese embassy were, by _your
directions_, deposited by me in the Patent Office, with _the
original list_ of the articles. I took a receipt for them from the
proper officer, which I delivered to you, and doubt not you still
have it in your possession. My first impulse on reading the base
insinuation of the _——’s_ correspondent, was to publish
immediately a flat and indignant contradiction of it; but on
consultation with a friend, who seemed to consider it unworthy of
notice, I concluded I had better write to you and learn from you
whether silent contempt, or a publication stamping it with
falsehood, would be the most proper method of treating the
slanderous imputation.
Very truly yours,
JNO. B. BLAKE.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, December 19, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
In looking over the New York —— of yesterday, I observe that his
Washington correspondent states that I took away from the White
House the pictures of Queen Victoria, Prince Albert, and other
members of the royal family, presented to me for the Presidential
mansion by the Prince of Wales. I trust that neither the President
nor Mrs. Lincoln had any connection with this statement.
Likenesses of the Queen and Prince, with four of the children of
the royal family, were sent to Miss Lane in loose sheets, with
many kind messages, by the Prince of Wales, immediately before he
left for England. I think they were borne by Lord Lyons. Miss Lane
had them plainly framed at her own expense, and hung them up in
the Red Room until she should return to Wheatland. I am also
charged with having taken away from the White House a large number
of Chinese and Japanese curiosities intended upon presentation for
the mansion. You are aware that after the Japanese embassadors
left, I sent everything that had been presented by them to me to
the Patent Office. There were at the time two young ladies staying
at the White House, and before the embassadors left they presented
Miss Lane and each of them some trifling Japanese curiosities.
What they received I do not know, but since the receipt of the ——
I have inquired of Miss Hetty, and I certainly would not give
twenty dollars for the whole lot. Miss Lane is absent in New York,
and I cannot find her keys......
I send you the enclosed as something like what might be published.
If you would call on Lord Lyons, to whom I enclose a letter, and
say you called at my request, he would tell you all about the
pictures of the Queen and Prince Albert, and their children......
Thank God! my health I may say is entirely restored. How glad I
should be to see you! Miss Lane has been absent in New York for
some time, and I do not expect her home until after New Year.
From your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO DR. BLAKE.]
LANCASTER, December 20, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have this moment received your favor of yesterday. I wrote to
you yesterday on the subject of your letter, and suggested a mode
of contradiction. I now find that you took the precaution of
having a list made of the Japanese articles, and obtaining a
receipt from the Patent Office. The statement may, therefore, be
made still stronger.[171]
The friend who advised you not to publish a contradiction
committed a great mistake. The charge is mean and contemptible, as
well as false, and if it were true, it would make me a mean and
contemptible fellow. It is just the thing to circulate freely. I
have no doubt Lord Lyons will give you a statement in writing
concerning the pictures.
Wishing you many a merry Christmas, and many a happy New Year, I
remain always your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 171:
The Patent Office receipts are now before me. The work entitled
“Ladies of the White House,” contains a letter from Lord Lyons
about the trifling presents made by the Prince of Wales to Miss
Lane.
One other charge of a similar nature must now be intruded upon the
notice of the reader. The following contradiction of it was drawn up
by Mr. Buchanan himself for publication, but I do not know whether
it was in fact published.
EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN.
There has recently been published in the New York _Tribune_ a
letter dated at Gotha on the 12th August, and purporting to have
been written by Bayard Taylor, which contains the following: “In
this place is published the _Almanach de Gotha_, the most
aristocratic calendar in the world, containing the only reliable
pedigrees and portraits of the crowned heads. Well, last summer
the publisher was surprised by the reception of a portrait of Miss
Harriet Lane, forwarded by her uncle, with a request that it be
engraved for next year’s _Almanach_, as our Republican rulers had
a right to appear in the company of the reigning families.”
We are authorized to say that this statement in regard to
Ex-President Buchanan is without the least shadow of foundation.
He never forwarded such a portrait to the publisher of the Gotha
_Almanach_; never made such a request, and never had any
correspondence of any kind, directly or indirectly, with that
gentleman. He was, therefore, surprised when this absurd charge
was a few days ago brought to his notice by a friend.
I might multiply these misrepresentations of Mr. Buchanan’s acts,
his sentiments and opinions, into a catalogue that would only
disgust the reader. The sanctity of his domestic circle at
Wheatland, after his retirement from the Presidency, and during the
early stages of the civil war, was invaded by pretended accounts of
his conversation, which were circulated in the issues of newspapers
that were unfriendly to him, and which fed a diseased appetite for
scandal that could only have existed in a state of unexampled
excitement produced by the varying fortunes of the Federal arms. It
was indeed a wild and phrensied credulity that could give currency
to such falsehoods as were told of him, falsehoods that had no
excuse for their origin, or for the credence which they received. It
was a state of things which those who are too young to remember it
can scarcely conceive, and which those who lived through it must now
look back upon with horror.
How he bore himself through all this flood of detraction and abuse;
how he never wavered amid disaster or victory, in his firm
determination to uphold with all his influence the just authority of
the Federal Government; how he prayed for the restoration of the
Union and the preservation of the Constitution; how he opened his
purse to relieve the suffering and cheer the hearts of the brave men
who were fighting the battles of their country, his private
correspondence abundantly proves.
In the seven years which intervened between the end of his
Presidency and his death, he had, besides the occupation of
preparing the defence of his administration, and of entertaining
friends, the occupation of writing letters. He was not one of those
statesmen who, after a long life of great activity in the
excitements of politics and the business of office, cannot be happy
in retirement. He had many resources, and one of the chief of them
was his pen. Letter-writing was a sort of necessity of his mind, and
it is now well that he indulged it. It is in his familiar letters
during these last seven years of his life that his character comes
out most vividly and attractively, and in nothing does it appear
more winning, or more worthy of admiration than it does in the
steadfast evenness of temper with which he bore unmerited and
unprovoked calumny, and the serenity with which he looked to the
future for vindication.
CHAPTER XXVII.
1861.
CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. STANTON, MR. HOLT, GENERAL DIX AND OTHERS.
After his retirement to Wheatland, Mr. Buchanan received many
letters from three members of his cabinet, all of whom afterwards
held high office under President Lincoln,—namely, Mr. Stanton, Mr.
Holt, and General Dix. His relations with Judge Black, Mr. Toucey
and Mr. King continued to be very intimate, but the letters of the
three other gentlemen should specially receive the attention of the
reader, because their subsequent positions render them peculiarly
important witnesses to the course of Mr. Buchanan’s administration.
The letters received or written by Mr. Buchanan during the remainder
of the year 1861, are here given in their chronological order; but
it should be noted that this period is divided by the bombardment of
Fort Sumter, which began on the 11th of April, 1861.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, Sunday, March 10, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
The dangerous illness of my youngest child for the last three days
must be my apology for not writing to you until to-day. I shall
now endeavor to give you as full information as I possess of the
state of public affairs in Washington. At the depot, on the
afternoon of your departure, I parted with Mr. Holt and Mr.
Toucey, and have not seen them since then. The cabinet was, as you
know, nominated and confirmed that day. The next morning Mr.
Seward took possession of the State Department, and Mr. Bates was
shortly afterwards qualified and commissioned as Attorney General.
Before this was done, Mr. Seward sent for me and requested me to
draw up a nomination of Mr. Crittenden for Judge of the United
States Court. I did so, and gave it to him. My understanding was
that the nomination would be immediately sent in. But it has not
been sent, and the general understanding is that it _will not be_.
The rumor is that the _red blacks_ oppose it, and also many of the
Democrats, and that Mr. Holt will be nominated. He appears now to
be the chief favorite of the Republicans. At the time that Mr.
Seward sent for me, he also gave me some comments of General
Scott’s on the report made by Mr. Holt in relation to Major
Anderson and Fort Sumter. The remarkable character of these
comments induced me to ask permission (which was granted) to show
them to General Dix; and I designed also to procure a copy of them
for you, if possible, but I have not been able to see Mr. Seward
since he sent for the paper. These comments stated that they were
written at night, at the General’s quarters, and in the absence of
his papers. This may account for what I suppose to be errors in
respect to material facts. These errors relate
1st. To the sending of the Star of the West. This is attributed to
Mr. Toucey’s being unwilling to furnish the Brooklyn for that
expedition. My understanding was that Mr. Toucey wanted to send
the Brooklyn, and that General Scott and Mr. Holt preferred the
other mode, and overruled Mr. Toucey.
2d. The second point was that on subsequent consultations General
Scott urged the sending of a military and naval force to relieve
Major Anderson, but that Mr. Toucey made such difficulty about
furnishing the ships that it was abandoned. My understanding was
that General Scott _never urged_ the sending of any force to
Sumter, but only to be ready to do so if necessary; and that he
agreed with you in opinion that the state of political affairs in
the border States, and the reports of Major Anderson, made it
expedient _not_ to send any force unless Sumter was attacked.
3d. A third point relates to what General Scott calls an informal
truce entered into by you with certain persons from seceding
States, under which the reinforcement of Sumter and Fort Pickens
was suspended. My recollection in respect to that transaction is
that Mr. Holt and General Scott concurred _with you_ in that
arrangement, which, when proposed in cabinet, was opposed by Judge
Black and myself.
In his conversation with me, Mr. Seward mentioned that Mr. Lincoln
and his cabinet, when this subject came up, would desire me to be
present, and also Mr. Holt. I told him that if _all of the late
cabinet_ were requested to be present I would have no objection,
but I did not think it proper _unless all_ were present. He said
that of course the invitation would be extended _to all_. As I
never heard any thing more on the subject, I suppose that they
have found it only necessary to consult Mr. Holt, who continued
acting as Secretary of War. Mr. Seward has been sick for several
days, but the first time that I see him my intention is to ask for
a copy of General Scott’s comments for you.
I am perfectly satisfied that Major Anderson _will be withdrawn_.
Scott agrees with Anderson as to the force required to relieve
Sumter, and evidently favors withdrawal of the troops. The same
thing will no doubt be done in respect to Fort Pickens. The
Montgomery commissioners have not yet applied for an audience.
Various conjectures are made in respect to whether they will be
received. I am also convinced by the general tone prevailing here
that there is not the least design to attempt any coercive
measure. A continuation of your policy _to avoid collision_ will
be the course of the present administration. General Dix gave up
the Treasury Department Thursday, and went home Friday morning. He
on all occasions speaks of you with kindness and regard. Mr. Holt
is the only one of your cabinet yet in office—the probability is
that he will receive the nomination of Supreme Judge as a reward
for what he terms his efforts to arrest the downward course of
public affairs at the time he became Secretary of War. The
resignations of General Cooper and Colonels Lay and Withers show
that the feeling of secession in Virginia is growing stronger.
Judge Campbell has his resignation prepared, and will send it in
on the 15th of this month. This will be the most serious
resignation that has yet occurred, not only on account of his high
character and eminent qualities, but also because it affects a
branch of the Government hitherto untouched by the contagion of
secession.
Judge Black left town with his family yesterday. He is to return
on Monday. The scramble for office is terrific. It is said that
Lincoln takes the precaution of seeing no strangers alone. The
reception on Friday is reported to have been an immense mob.
I beg you to present my compliments to Miss Lane, and shall ever
remain, with sincere regard,
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. HOLT.]
WHEATLAND, March 11, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have not heard a word from any member of my late cabinet since I
left Washington, except a letter from Mr. Stanton, received
yesterday. I had expected to hear often, especially from Judge
Black and yourself. Meanwhile the Northern papers are teeming with
what I know to be misrepresentations as to expressions used by
yourself concerning my conduct. From our first acquaintance I have
had the most implicit confidence in your integrity, ability and
friendship, and this remains unchanged. Pray enlighten me as to
what is going on in Washington.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO JAMES GORDON BENNETT, ESQ.]
WHEATLAND, March 11, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Will you be kind enough to direct the _Herald_ to be sent to me at
Lancaster? I have been quite lost without it.
I am once more settled at this, my quiet home, and one of my first
impulses is to return you my cordial and grateful thanks for the
able and powerful support which you have given me almost
universally throughout my stormy and turbulent administration.
Under Heaven’s blessing the administration has been successful in
its foreign and domestic policy, unless we may except the sad
events which have recently occurred. These no human wisdom could
have prevented. Whether I have done all I could, consistently with
my duty, to give them a wise and peaceful direction towards the
preservation or reconstruction of the Union, will be for the
public and posterity to judge. I feel conscious that I have done
my duty in this respect, and that I shall, at last, receive
justice. With my very kindest regards to Mrs. Bennett, I remain,
Sincerely and respectfully your friend,
b JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, March 12, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
It is now the universal impression in this city, that Sumter and
Pickens will both be surrendered. The _National Republican_
(Lincoln organ) says that it was determined on at the cabinet
meeting Saturday. Enclosed I send you a slip from the New York
_Tribune_ of Monday, 11th. Harvey, the telegraphic correspondent,
is intimate and in daily association with Mr. Holt, but he surely
can have no warrant for the assertion in the article referred to.
Cameron was sworn into office yesterday.[172] The administration
is now completely organized, but demands for office necessarily
must occupy their chief attention. I have not seen any of the
cabinet, or any leading Senator of that party, since the date of
my last letter.
Floyd is here. Russell has been discharged from the indictment
against, him. All accounts here represent the secession feeling in
Virginia to be rapidly strengthening and extending. It would not
surprise me to see Virginia out in less than ninety days, and
Maryland will be close at her heels. Lincoln and the family at the
White House are represented to be greatly elated at Douglas
joining in defence of the new administration. It is said to be the
chief topic of conversation with visitors at the Executive
mansion.
You will notice in the _Tribune_ an article signed “One who sees
the facts,” which is quite sharp on Major Anderson, and the writer
evidently agrees with you in respect to the Major’s course.
Glossbrenner started home this morning.
With great respect, I remain, yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
Footnote 172:
As Secretary of War.
[MR. HOLT TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, March 14, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have read, with amazement and much sorrow, the statement
contained in your kind letter of the 11th inst., just received,
that the Northern papers are teeming with misrepresentations of
expressions, said to have been used by myself, concerning your
conduct. As I read but few of these papers, it is not surprising
that such calumnies should have escaped my notice; but I am
astonished that they should not have been mentioned to me by some
of our common friends. Having no knowledge whatever of the nature
or details of these misrepresentations, of course I can offer you
no explanation or refutation of them. This much, however, may be
safely affirmed, that if they impute to me expressions in any
degree disparaging to yourself personally or officially, they are
utterly false. I gave to your administration an earnest and
sincere support, first from a high sense of duty to my country,
and next out of regard for yourself personally. What I thus
supported, I will never cease to defend.
I feel a gratitude that words cannot convey, for the declaration
that, in despite of all these fabrications and perversions of a
profligate press, your confidence remains unshaken. Be assured
that I have not, and never will, do aught unworthy of the trust
that you so generously repose. I have labored to deserve your
friendship, which has lavished upon me honors and distinctions for
which I am, and shall continue to be, grateful with every throb of
my life. No greater mortification could befall me than to fear
even that you regarded me insensible to these kindnesses, or
capable of being less than your devoted friend, now and hereafter,
here and everywhere.
I think you have little reason to disquiet yourself about the
calumnies of the press. The enthusiasm which greeted you in your
progress homeward shows how these things have impressed the
popular heart. You will not have to live long to witness the
entombment of the last of the falsehoods by which your patriotic
career has been assailed. If you are not spared until then, you
need have no fear but that history will do you justice.
I have not met with any member of your cabinet, except Governor
Toucey, since we separated on Monday night. I remained in the War
Department until the Monday following, when General Cameron was
qualified. I have seen the President but once since, and then on a
matter of business about which he wished the information which he
supposed my connection with the War Department would supply.
Having no means of knowing the plans and purposes of the
administration, I can only say I am well satisfied its policy will
be decidedly pacific and conciliatory. I should not be surprised
to learn, any morning, that Fort Sumter had been evacuated. As
Fort Pickens can be retained without a collision, it may be
differently treated. All is tranquil here, and the tone of feeling
prevailing is constantly increasing in hopefulness and confidence.
The indications from the border States are very encouraging. The
popular mind is rapidly becoming tranquilized. This accomplished,
and the revolution will die out. Excitement is the aliment on
which it feeds, and without this it could scarcely subsist for
sixty days. The work of transferring the offices is going on, but
not rapidly or remorselessly. The temper of the Republicans seems
greatly changed from what it was during their conflict for power.
I believe every effort will be made to preserve the Government,
and I have more hope of the result now than I have had for the
last three months.
With kind regards to Miss Lane, I am, very respectfully,
Your sincere friend,
J. HOLT.
[GENERAL DIX TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
NEW YORK, March 14, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I left Washington on Friday (Mr. Chase having relieved me on the
preceding day[173]), went to Boston on Saturday, passed Sunday
with my wife and daughter, and returned to this city on Monday. I
am at this moment annoyed with the apprehension that I may be
obliged to go to Washington to-morrow. If so, I will advise you of
the cause.
When we parted, there was a feeling of doubt as to my friend Major
Anderson. I wrote him a letter the day his despatches were
received—in fact, the night after our meeting at Mr. Ould’s house,
in which I alluded in the strongest terms of reprobation to the
treachery of some of the officers of the Government in the South,
contrasting it with his own courage and constancy. I made no
allusion to his despatches. I have received a letter from him
which is perfectly satisfactory. I will in a few days send you
copies of mine to him and his answer.
I envy you the quietude of Wheatland. There is none here. The
excitements are wearisome in the extreme. The people are now
agitated by the intelligence that Fort Sumter is to be abandoned.
Here, I think, there will be no decided demonstration of
disapproval. But in the country it will be different. The
disappointment will be very great, and it will go far to turn the
current against the new administration. Your record will brighten
in proportion. Of course, an attempt will be made to cast the
responsibility on you. But there is a complete defence, as we
know.
I shall never forget the six happy weeks I passed with you. The
remembrance of your kindness, and that of Miss Lane, will always
be among my brightest retrospections. Nothing would afford me so
much gratification as to be able to do something in return for
your contributions to my happiness and comfort. With my kind
regards to her, I am, dear sir,
Sincerely and faithfully yours,
JOHN A. DIX.
Footnote 173:
As Secretary of the Treasury.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, March 14, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
Your favor was received last evening. I shall take care of it so
that when required it may be returned.
There is no doubt of Sumter being evacuated; report says the order
has gone, but that, I think, is doubtful. You will have noticed
the resolution introduced yesterday by Mr. Douglas in the Senate.
That looks like a comprehensive platform for relinquishing
everything in the seceded States, and even those that sympathize
with them. To me it seems like the first step towards a strictly
Northern non-slaveholding confederacy.
In the last two days nothing has occurred here to my knowledge but
what you will see in the newspapers. There has been no further
action in respect to the Supreme Judgeship. It is generally
understood that Crittenden will not be nominated. Judge Campbell
has reconsidered his resignation, and will not resign immediately.
The Court adjourns to-day. I am now writing in the Supreme Court
room. If the Court ever reassembles, there will be considerable
change in its organization. Judge Grier went home sick two days
ago. Judge McLean is reported to be quite ill. Lincoln will
probably (if his administration continues four years) make a
change that will affect the constitutional doctrines of the Court.
The pressure for office continues unabated. Every department is
overrun, and by the time that all the patronage is distributed the
Republican party will be dissolved. I hope that peace and
tranquillity, with cessation from your intense labors, will long
preserve you in health and happiness.
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
P. S.—The Supreme Court have just decided Mrs. Gaines’s case in
her favor—four judges to three—the Chief Justice, Grier, and
Catron _dissenting_. They have also decided that the Federal
Government _has no power_ to coerce the Governor of a State to
return a fugitive from justice, although it is his duty to comply
with the demand.
Yours, etc.,
E. M. S.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, March 16, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
Notwithstanding what has been said in the papers and the universal
reports here during the last week, the order for the removal of
the troops from Sumter has not, as I am assured, yet been given.
Yesterday it was still under debate. Every day affords proof of
the absence of any settled policy or harmonious concert of action
in the administration. Seward, Bates and Cameron form one wing;
Chase, Miller, Blair, the opposite wing; Smith is on both sides,
and Lincoln sometimes on one, sometimes on the other. There has
been agreement in nothing. Lincoln, it is complained in the
streets, has undertaken to distribute the whole patronage, small
and great, leaving nothing to the chiefs of departments. Growls
about Scott’s “imbecility” are growing frequent. The Republicans
are beginning to think that a monstrous blunder was made in the
tariff bill, and that it will cut off the trade of New York, build
up New Orleans and the Southern ports, and leave the Government no
revenue—they see before them the prospect of soon being without
money and without credit. But with all this, it is certain that
_Anderson will be withdrawn_. I do not believe there will be much
further effort to assail you. Mr. Sumner told me yesterday that
Scott’s _proposed order_ was based upon purely military reasons
and the limited military resources of the Government. The
embarrassments that surrounded you they now feel; and whatever may
be said against you must recoil as an argument against them. And
in giving reasons for their action, they must exhibit the facts
that controlled you in respect to Sumter.
Mr. Holt has gone to New York. I have not seen him. When he called
on me I happened to be from home, and when I called he was absent.
Judge Black is here, and I suppose intends to remain for some
time. He is staying at Harrison’s. I hope to be able to procure a
copy of Mr. Holt’s letter and General Scott’s comments next week,
and I intend to call and see the General and have a talk with him.
With sincere regard, I remain,
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, March 16, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Yours of yesterday was received this morning, and its arrival
telegraphed. I do not think there will be any serious effort to
assail your administration in respect to Fort Sumter. That would
imply a coercive policy on their part, and hostility to your
pacific measures. The tendency of General Scott’s remarks was
rather to impute blame to Mr. Toucey than to any one else. And as
Mr. Holt and the General concurred in everything done or written,
their concurrence will defend you.
I will procure the papers you desire, and forward them, and will
make you a visit as soon as the illness of my child will suffer me
to leave home. In the meantime, I shall write to you often, and
apprise you of what is going on.
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO GENERAL DIX.]
WASHINGTON, March 18, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Many thanks for your kind letter of the 14th instant. I shall ever
recollect with pleasure and satisfaction your brief sojourn with
us at the White House, and with gratitude the able and successful
manner in which you performed the duties of your arduous and
responsible office.
You might envy me the quiet of Wheatland were my thoughts not
constantly disturbed by the unfortunate condition of our country.
The question of the withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter at
first agitated the public mind in this vicinity; but my impression
is that the people are now becoming gradually reconciled to it.
There is a general desire for peace. As a military movement,
General Scott’s name will go far to sustain Mr. Lincoln. After
Major’s Anderson’s letter, received on the 4th March, it was very
doubtful whether he could be reinforced by the means within the
power of the Government. The only alternative would have been, to
let the Confederate States commence the war on him, and if the
force had been so superior as to render successful resistance
impossible, after the honor of the flag had been maintained, then
to authorize him to capitulate. Indeed, I presume such, or nearly
such, was the purport of the instructions.
It is probable an attempt will be made, as you suggest, to cast
the responsibility on me. But I always refused to surrender the
fort and was ever ready to send reinforcements on the request of
Major Anderson.
I thank God that the revolution has as yet been bloodless,
notwithstanding my duty, as prescribed in my annual message, has
been performed as far as this was practicable.
With my kindest regards to Mrs. Dix, I remain always, sincerely
and respectfully,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. HOLT TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, March 20, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
On reaching home last evening, I had the pleasure of receiving
yours of the 16th inst., and now hasten to inclose the copy of my
letter to the President, as requested. I think you need have no
apprehension that either yourself or friends will be called upon
for any elaborate vindication of your policy in reference to Fort
Sumter; events are hurrying on too rapidly for that. You will ere
this have seen Breckinridge’s speech in the Senate, connected with
the movement now making by his friends in Kentucky, through an
irregular popular convention gathered from the highways and
hedges, to force the legislature to the adoption of a
revolutionary policy. This demonstration on his part is regarded
as very significant. Kentucky voted against him, on the
_suspicion_ merely that he was a disunionist; after this avowal, I
doubt not, her condemnation of him will be far more decided.
I very much fear an early recognition on the part of France of the
new Confederacy, which, followed as it would speedily be by
others, would go far to consolidate the Southern republic. The
bait for the material interests of Europe has been adroitly
prepared, and cannot be long resisted. But I think such a step by
a friendly government taken within ninety days after the revolt of
the States ought to be treated almost as _casus belli_. Fort
Sumter, I presume, is about to be evacuated, which will do much to
allay popular excitement in South Carolina, and thus take away the
aliment on which the revolution is feeding. Still there will
remain military complications in the South, for the peaceable
adjustment of which fears may well be entertained.
You have my sincere thanks for your kind invitation to visit
Wheatland. It would afford me the greatest pleasure to do so, and
I trust that events may yet place this gratification within my
reach.
Very respectfully and truly your friend,
J. HOLT.
[GENERAL DIX TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
NEW YORK, March 28th, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I intended to have sent you long ere this a copy of my letter to
Major Anderson, and his reply. Mine was written on the evening of
the inauguration, after the consultation at Mr. Ould’s; and it was
intended to encourage him if he was true, or to cut him to the
heart if he was false. You know, however, that I would not doubt
his honor and good faith. I should have sent the correspondence
last week, but I was urged to go to Washington to see Mr. Chase in
regard to the new loan. The request came from the Government, and
I could not decline it. I found the Secretary well informed in
regard to the condition of the finances, and think he will acquit
himself with credit.
When I left (on Saturday last), I do not think the administration
had any settled policy. It was merely drifting with the current,
at a loss to know whether it were better to come to an anchor, or
set sail. There had not been at that time a full cabinet meeting;
and I know that the foreign appointments had been made without
consulting the Secretary of the Treasury. I believe Mr. Lincoln is
acting on the theory of advising, in regard to appointments, with
the head of the Department under which they properly fall, and
with none of the others.
Will you please to say to Miss —— that I have the assurance she
desired in regard to her nephew.
My wife and daughters are in Boston, and I am very desolate.
I think it is decided to withdraw Major Anderson, without holding
your administration to any responsibility for it. The attempt, as
must be seen, would not only be fruitless, but absurd.
The loan of eight millions will be taken next week on favorable
terms. If the bids for the stock are not satisfactory, Mr. Chase
has the alternative of issuing Treasury notes, payable in
two years, and convertible into stock. This privilege of
convertibility will enable him to place them at par. But it would
be better, if he can get a fair price for the stock, to take it,
and get the eight millions out of the way for twenty years.
I beg to be kindly remembered to Miss Lane, and am, my dear sir,
with sincere regard,
Faithfully yours,
JOHN A. DIX.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, April 3d, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
Although a considerable period has elapsed since the date of my
last letter to you, nothing has transpired here of interest but
what is fully detailed in the newspapers. Mr. Toucey left here
last week. Judge Black is still in the city. General Dix made a
short visit at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury. Mr.
Holt, I think, is still here, but I have not seen him for several
days. You of course saw Thompson’s answer and Mr. Holt’s reply. I
have not had any intercourse with any of the present cabinet,
except a few brief interviews with Mr. Bates, the Attorney
General, on business connected with his Department. Mr. Lincoln I
have not seen. He is said to be very much broken down with the
pressure that is upon him in respect to appointments. The policy
of the administration in respect to the seceding States remains in
obscurity. There has been a rumor, for the last two or three days,
that, notwithstanding all that has been said, there will be an
effort to reinforce Fort Sumter; but I do not believe a word of
it. The special messenger, Colonel Lamon, told me that he was
satisfied it could not be done. The new loan has been bid for, at
better rates than I anticipated; and I perceive General Dix was
one of the largest bidders at the highest rates. The new Tariff
Bill seems to give the administration great trouble; and
luckily it is a measure of their own. The first month of the
administration seems to have furnished an ample vindication of
your policy, and to have rendered all occasion of other defence
needless. The rumors from Richmond are very threatening; secession
is rapidly gaining strength there.
Hoping that you are in the enjoyment of good health and happiness,
I remain, as ever,
Yours,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
P. S.—12 o’clock. The Secretary of the Treasury has determined to
reject all the bids for the new loan under 94. This gives him
$3,099,000 only of eight millions called for. He could have
obtained the whole amount at 93½. Riggs thinks the Secretary has
made a great mistake in not taking the whole sum, and that he will
not get as good terms as 93½ in future. There are no bids here
taken.
E. M. S.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, April 10th, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
I am rejoiced to learn by yours of the 8th instant, received this
morning, that your good health continues. Mrs. Stanton desires to
return her thanks for your kind invitation. It would give her
great pleasure to make you a visit, if the care of young children
permitted her to leave home. Before long I hope to have the
pleasure of paying my respects to you at Wheatland.
Enclosed I send you a copy of General Scott’s “views,” as
published in the _Intelligencer_. The first I ever heard of them
was when they were read in cabinet by Floyd on the 27th of
December. I have been hoping to procure for you a copy of General
Scott’s “observations” upon Mr. Holt’s last letter respecting
Sumter, but as yet have not succeeded. I saw Mr. Holt on Sunday. I
had supposed he might have some knowledge of the designs of the
administration and the purpose of the recent military and naval
movements; but he said he had none. He has received a curious
letter from General Twiggs, the substance of which is “that the
power to dismiss an officer of the army without trial has been
exercised, and he does not dispute it; but Mr. Holt has _assumed
the right_ to apply epithets the propriety of which he will
discuss with General Holt, whenever he has the honor of meeting
him personally.” What would he have thought of the epithet
“cowardice” which you struck out of Mr. Holt’s order? Mr. Seaton,
when I called on him this morning, expressed his gratification to
hear of your good health, and spoke of you with much kindness. He
says he has no knowledge of the movements or policy of the
administration but what he finds in the New York papers, has not
seen Lincoln since the inauguration, and has no intercourse with
the cabinet. Doctor Gwin has just returned from Mississippi. He
speaks with great confidence of the stability and power of the
Confederacy, and evidently sympathizes strongly with them. Every
day impresses stronger conviction upon the public mind here that
armed collision will soon take place. Lincoln has appointed his
partner, Colonel Lamon, marshal. He is to enter upon the office
Friday; and Selden says he gives as a reason for doing so
immediately that apprehensions are entertained of a hostile attack
upon Washington. But I think that apprehension is as groundless as
the rumor that hurried Lincoln from Harrisburg to Washington.
I beg you to present my kindest regards to Miss Lane. The rumor
continues rife that she is soon to return to this city. Mrs.
Stanton and myself will be happy to welcome her. I shall continue
to keep you advised of any thing of interest that may transpire
here, and hope that your life may long be spared in health and
happiness.
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
P.S.—12 o’clock. It is certain that the administration is
panic-stricken for some cause. They commenced this morning an
active enrolment of the militia of the District. Chew, of the
State Department, was sent last week to Charleston. I have just
been told that he went with a formal note to Governor Pickens—that
the administration designed to succor Major Anderson—that fourteen
ships would be sent—that they meant only to supply provisions, but
if there was any resistance forces would also be sent in. It is
now reported as coming from one of the commissioners that the
_batteries have_ _opened on Sumter_. Soldiers are also being
placed in the Departments. This is the last rumor on the Avenue.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, April 11, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
The letter of Twiggs is in accordance with his character, and
shows how richly he deserved the epithet with which he would have
been branded on the records of the country and before the world
but for your forbearance. The cowardly effort to insult and wound
you is worthy of one who betrayed his trust and traitorously
surrendered the arms and colors of his Government. The idle threat
to visit Lancaster shows that “braggart” is to be added to traitor
and coward, in order to designate his full measure of infamy.
I showed your letter and the copy of Twiggs’ letter to Mr. Holt.
He thought it ought to be published by you, but I do not. It would
be dignifying the creature too much. I enclose a copy of his
letter to Mr. Holt. You will observe that the same contemptible
threat of personal vengeance is made in it. But it is gratifying
to know that Twiggs feels so acutely the sting of his dismissal,
and that all the whitewashing of the Confederate States affords
him no relief. I have applied to the War Office for copies of the
several orders relating to Twiggs, and shall probably have them
to-morrow, and will forward them to you.
There is great “soldiering” in town the last two days. The yard in
front of the War Office is crowded with the District Militia, who
are being mustered into service. The feeling of loyalty to the
Government has greatly diminished in this city. Many persons who
would have supported the Government under your administration
refuse to be enrolled. Many who were enrolled have withdrawn, and
refuse to take the oath. The administration has not acquired the
confidence and respect of the people here. Not one of the cabinet
or principal officers has taken a house or brought his family
here. Seward rented a house “while he should continue in the
cabinet,” but has not opened it, nor has his family come. They all
act as though they meant to be ready “to cut and run” at a
minute’s notice—their tenure is like that of a Bedouin on the
sands of the desert. This is sensibly felt and talked about by the
people of the city, and they feel no confidence in an
administration that betrays so much insecurity. And besides, a
strong feeling of distrust in the candor and sincerity of Lincoln
personally and of his cabinet has sprung up. If they had been
merely silent and secret, there might have been no ground of
complaint. But assurances are said to have been given and
declarations made in conflict with the facts now transpiring in
respect to the South, so that no one speaks of Lincoln or any
member of his cabinet with respect or regard.
The facts about Sumter it is impossible to ascertain, for the
reasons that have been mentioned, for no one knows _what to
believe_. The nearest conjecture I can form is this:—
1st. That the Baltic has been sent with provisions for Sumter.
2d. That the Powhatan has been sent with forces to land and attack
the batteries.
3d. That a _secret_ expedition, independent of General Scott, has
been sent, under charge of Fox, to make an effort to land in the
night at Sumter.
The refusal to admit Captain Talbot to Sumter may prevent concert
of action with Major Anderson, and I think the whole thing will
prove a failure. There is no excitement here. People are anxious,
but the sensation telegrams sent from here are without any
foundation. It is true, however, that Ben McCullough has been here
on a scouting expedition, and he carefully examined all the
barracks and military posts in the city, and said that he expected
to be in possession of the city before long. He stayed all night
at Doctor Gwin’s. This has a business aspect. It is believed that
a secession ordinance will be passed by the Virginia convention
to-day.
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO J. BUCHANAN HENRY.]
(Without date.)
. . .
The Confederate States have deliberately commenced the civil war,
and God knows where it may end. They were repeatedly warned by my
administration that an assault on Fort Sumter would be civil war,
and they would be responsible for the consequences. The last of
these warnings happens to be before me, and is contained in the
last sentence of Mr. Holt’s letter to Mr. Hayne, of February 6th,
1861. It is as follows: “If, with all the multiplied proofs which
exist of the President’s anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness
with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall
assault Fort Sumter and peril the lives of the handful of brave
and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our common
country into the horrors of civil war, then upon them, and those
they represent, must rest the responsibility.”
I have been entirely well since my return home, until within the
last few days, when I have suffered from sharp twinges of
rheumatism in my legs.
With my kindest regards to your wife, I remain, very
affectionately,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, April 12, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
We have the war upon us. The telegraphic news of this morning you
will have seen before this reaches you. The impression here is
held by many: 1st, that the effort to reinforce will be a failure;
2d, that in less than twenty-four hours from this time Anderson
will have surrendered; 3d, that in less than thirty days Davis
will be in possession of Washington.
Yours truly, EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO GENERAL DIX.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, April 19, 1861.
MY DEAR GENERAL:
I need scarcely say I was much gratified with your letter to Major
Anderson, as well as with his answer. You placed, in an eloquent
and striking light, before him the infamous conduct of General
Twiggs and others, and his response was manly and loyal. By the
bye, I some time since received an insulting letter from General
Twiggs, dated in Mississippi on the 30th ultimo. Its conclusion is
as follows: “Your usurped right to dismiss me from the army might
be acquiesced in, but you had no right to brand me as a traitor;
this was personal, _and I shall treat it as such_, not through the
papers, but _in person_. I shall, most assuredly, pay a visit to
Lancaster, for the sole purpose of a _personal interview_ with
you. So, sir, prepare yourself. I am well assured that public
opinion will sanction _any course_ I may take with you.”
I have paid no attention to this note, and entertain but little
apprehension from the threats of this hoary-headed rebel. My fate,
however, is, in some respects, hard. After my annual message of
the 3d December, in which I made as able an argument as I could
against secession, and indicated my purpose to collect the revenue
and defend the Federal forts in South Carolina, etc., the Southern
friends of the administration fell away from it. From the line
prescribed in this message, I am not conscious that I have
departed a hair’s breadth, so far as it was practicable to pursue
it. I was ready and willing at all times to attempt to collect the
revenue, and, as a necessary preliminary, I nominated a collector
to the Senate. You know the result.
After my explosion with the commissioners of South Carolina at the
end of December, the Southern Senators denounced me on the floor
of the Senate; but after my message to Congress of the 8th
January, one of them at least abused me in terms which I would not
repeat. In that message I declared that “the right and the duty to
use military force defensively against those who resist the
Federal officers, in the execution of their legal functions, and
against those who assail the property of the Federal Government,
is clear and undeniable;” and more to the same purpose.
Warning was repeatedly given that if the authorities of South
Carolina should assail Fort Sumter, this would be the commencement
of a civil war, and they would be responsible for the
consequences. The last and most emphatic warning of this
character, is contained in the concluding sentence of Mr. Holt’s
final and admirable answer to Mr. Hayne of the 6th of February. It
is as follows: “If with all the multiplied proofs which exist of
the President’s anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with
which he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall
assail Fort Sumter, and peril the lives of the handful of brave
and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our common
country into the horrors of civil war, then upon them and those
they represent must rest the responsibility.” This letter has been
published, but seems to have been forgotten. I perceive that you
are to be President of the great Union meeting. Would it not be
well, in portraying the conduct of South Carolina in assailing
Fort Sumter, to state that this had been done under the most
solemn warnings of the consequences, and refer to this letter of
Mr. Holt? Nobody seems to understand the course pursued by the
late administration. A quotation from Holt’s letter would
strengthen the hands of the present administration. You were a
member of the cabinet at its date, and I believe it received your
warm approbation. Hence it would come from you with peculiar
propriety.
Had I known you were about to visit Washington on the business of
the Treasury, I should have urged you to call at Wheatland on your
return. You would then, as you will at all times, be a most
welcome visitor.
They talk about keeping secrets. Nobody seems to have suspected
the existence of an expedition to reinforce or supply Fort Sumter
at the close of our administration.
The present administration had no alternative but to accept the
war initiated by South Carolina or the Southern Confederacy. The
North will sustain the administration almost to a man; and it
ought to be sustained at all hazards.
Miss Hetty feels very much indebted to you, and you are frequently
the subject of kind remembrances in our small family circle.
Please to present my kind regards to Mrs. Dix.
From your friend always,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[GENERAL DIX TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
NEW YORK, April 24, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
As chairman of a committee of citizens having the war in charge,
every moment of my time is engrossed, and I have only time to
thank you for your kind and important letter. It reached me just
as I was going to the great meeting on Saturday. I enclose a paper
giving my remarks. You will see the use I have made of your
letter. I had no time to correct, add or abridge, as my remarks
were in type before I left the stand, and, indeed, were in
circulation in the streets.
There was one passage in your letter I was very anxious to read to
the meeting. I have never taken a liberty with a private letter,
though I was never so strongly tempted. The sentence I allude to
is this: “The present administration had no alternative but to
accept the war initiated by South Carolina or the Southern
Confederacy. The North will sustain the administration almost to a
man; and it ought to be sustained at all hazards.” May I use the
foregoing, if I think it proper and a fit occasion presents
itself? Many of our political friends express great gratification
at the statement your letter enabled me to make.
I will write more fully in a few days, and am, with sincere
respect and regard,
Your friend,
JOHN A. DIX.
P.S.—The Republicans here have behaved very well. They placed me
at the head of the Committee on Resolutions, and gave a majority
of the Committee to us. The resolutions, with one exception, were
drawn by me.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO GENERAL DIX.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, April 25, 1861.
MY DEAR GENERAL:—
I have just received your favor of yesterday, with the New York
_Times_ containing your remarks as president of the great Union
meeting. They were excellent and appropriate, and I am much
indebted to you for them. I had read them before in the Sunday
_Herald_.
Since the day and hour that I delivered my message, on the 3d
December last, I have never departed from it for a single moment.
The argument which it contained against secession, and the
determination it expressed to collect the revenue and protect the
property of the United States, produced an instantaneous
alienation of the Southern Senators. After my difficulties with
the South Carolina commissioners, this became a violent and
settled hostility, and I was openly denounced by them on the floor
of the Senate.
Supposing that Fort Sumter would then be attacked, the expedition
of the Star of the West was organized and prepared by General
Scott. Before it sailed, however, information was received from
Major Anderson and some other sources, I do not recollect what,
which, in the opinion of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy
and General Scott, rendered it unnecessary. It was then
countermanded by General Scott; but the countermand did not reach
New York until after it had sailed. But you know all this.
I have no doubt of the loyalty and good faith of Major Anderson.
His forbearance must be attributed to his desire of preserving
peace and avoiding a hostile collision. When the Major, in a firm
and patriotic manner, refused to surrender the fort to Beauregard,
it seems he informed him that his provisions would last but a few
days. What an outrage it was, after this information, to fire on
the fort.
I remain, most truly,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—In regard to the sentences in my letter, it might have been
well, and I think it would have been, to read them. It is now
probably too late, unless another good opportunity would seem to
justify.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. BAKER.]
WHEATLAND, April 26, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
What on earth has become of my friends in Philadelphia? It is some
time since I have heard from any of them. But almost every day I
receive violent, insulting and threatening anonymous letters from
that city. Now, I am not easily moved, but I should like to know
whether I am in danger of a personal attack from there, so that I
may be prepared to meet it. They know not what they would do;
because, when my record is presented to the world, all will be
clear as light.
In Lancaster there was at first considerable feeling against me,
but that has subsided very fast. My old friends seem to be
faithful and true. The speech of General Dix at New York threw
some light upon the subject, and had a happy effect here. This,
united with General Twiggs’ threatening letter, at once arrested
the tide. Has the speech of General Dix been published in any of
the Philadelphia papers?
My old friend —— has not been near me since my return, and I am
told he is very bitter.
The officers, and I may add, the men of the two Ohio regiments
here have the most friendly dispositions. Great numbers of them
have visited me.
I receive the kindest letters from New York. Is there any danger
of disturbance to the public peace in Philadelphia?
What has become of Judge Black? I know not where he is. He may be
still in Somerset. I wrote to him there at his own request some
time ago, but have received no answer. The attack on Fort Sumter
was an outrageous act. The authorities at Charleston were several
times warned by my administration that such an attack would be
civil war, and would be treated as such. If it had been made in my
time it should have been treated as such.
From your friend, as ever,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. STANTON.]
WHEATLAND, May 6, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
The last two letters which I received from you are both dated on
the 12th April, and were acknowledged by me on the 17th. I have
heard nothing either from yourself or Mr. Holt since the assault
upon Fort Sumter. That you have written I entertain not a doubt,
because you were to keep me advised of anything of interest which
might transpire at Washington. The mails have been very irregular.
Whether our friend Holt is in Washington or in Kentucky or
whereabout is unknown to this deponent. Black is somewhere, as
quiet as a mouse.
The first gun fired by Beauregard aroused the indignant spirit of
the North as nothing else could have done, and made us a unanimous
people. I had repeatedly warned them that this would be the
result. I had supposed, and believed, that it would be the policy
of Mr. Lincoln’s administration to yield to the popular impulse,
and banish, at least for the present, all party distinctions. In
this I have been, most probably, mistaken. I judge from the answer
of Mr. Seward, Jr., to an inquiry propounded to him about some
arrangement with the enemy, in which he goes out of his way to
say, that the days for such things had passed away since the 4th
of March. I suppose he alluded to the arrangement made not to land
the forces, but merely the supplies, at Fort Pickens whilst the
Peace Convention were in session, unless the revolutionists should
manifest a disposition to assail it. I have not got in my
possession copies of the orders issued by Messrs. Holt and Toucey
on that occasion, with the full approbation of General Scott. If
Mr. Holt be in Washington, I would thank you to obtain from him a
copy of this military order. I shall write to Mr. Toucey to-day
for a copy of the naval order.
Upon reëxamination of the whole course of my administration, from
the 6th November, 1860, I can find nothing to regret. I shall at
all times be prepared to defend it. The Southern Senators became
cold after my message of the 3d December, and bitterly hostile
after my explosion with the first South Carolina commissioners.
After this our social relations ceased; and all because I would
not consent to withdraw the troops from Fort Sumter, nor would I
agree not to reinforce them; but, under all circumstances,
uniformly declared that I would send reinforcements whenever
requested by Major Anderson, or the safety of the fort required
them. I am sorry you have not been able to procure for me General
Scott’s _critique_ on Mr. Holt’s letter to President Lincoln. I
hope Mr. Holt himself has a copy of it.
We live here in content and quiet, and see our friends in a social
way. The officers of the Ohio regiments visit us occasionally, and
are quite agreeable men, and most of them are Democrats. We had a
visit from Mr. Sherman yesterday.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. J. C. G. KENNEDY.]
WHEATLAND, LANCASTER, May 13, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Many thanks for your kind letter of May 11th received this day. My
letter to Mr. Seaton had no other object in view than to suggest
hints to be used by him if he thought proper. I have kept no copy
of it, though I have a general recollection of what it contains.
If there is nothing personally harsh or offensive in it towards
those officers who have abandoned their flag notwithstanding their
oaths, I can perceive no objection to its publication with the
explanation you propose to be given. I do not think there is
anything harsh or offensive in it. I have been quite unwell for a
week or ten days; the last few days I have been confined to my
bed. I believe, with the blessing of God, I may weather this
storm, though it has been severe. It is very inconvenient for me
at the present moment, when all the world is alive, to be sick in
bed. Please to present me in the kindest terms to Mr. Seaton, and
believe me always to be sincerely and respectfully your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, May 16, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
Your letter by Mr. Magraw was received, and I designed to send an
answer by him, but he left here without my knowledge. On the 20th
of April, the day after the Baltimore riot, and again on Blue
Tuesday, the day before the arrival of the New York regiments, I
wrote to you. These letters will probably reach you some time, if
they have not already arrived; but I regret their miscarriage, as
they kept up a regular chain of Washington events from the date of
Lincoln’s first proclamation after the capture of Sumter, and
since that time incidents have passed so rapidly that I cannot
recall them in their order.
The fling of Mr. F. W. Seward about “negotiations” would merit a
retort if there were an independent press, and the state of the
times admitted discussion of such matters. The negotiations
carried on by Mr. Seward with the Confederate commissioners
through Judge Campbell and Judge Nelson will some day, perhaps, be
brought to light, and if they were as has been represented to me,
Mr. Seward and the Lincoln administration will not be in a
position to make sneering observations respecting any negotiations
during your administration. It was in reference to these that Jeff
Davis in his message spoke with much severity. You no doubt
observed his allusion to informal negotiations through a person
_holding a high station_ in the Government of the United States,
and which were participated in by other persons holding stations
equally high. I have understood that Judge Campbell was the person
alluded to, and that Judge Nelson and, perhaps, Judge Catron were
the other persons cognizant of Mr. Seward’s assurances respecting
the evacuation of Fort Sumter.
Mr. Holt is still here. Judge Black has been absent some weeks,
but returned night before last. Mr. Holt stays at home pretty
closely, and I have met him very seldom, though I occasionally
hear of his visiting some of the Departments. The state of affairs
is tolerably well detailed in the public prints. But no
description could convey to you the panic that prevailed here for
several days after the Baltimore riot, and before communications
were reopened. This was increased by reports of the trepidation of
Lincoln that were circulated through the streets. Almost every
family packed up their effects. Women and children were sent away
in great numbers; provisions advanced to famine prices. In a great
measure the alarm has passed away, but there is still a deep
apprehension that before long this city is doomed to be the scene
of battle and carnage. In respect to military operations going on,
or contemplated, little is known until the results are announced
in the newspapers. General Scott seems to have _carte blanche_. He
is, in fact, the Government, and if his health continues, vigorous
measures are anticipated.
For the last few days I have been moving my family, my former
residence being made unpleasant by troops and hospitals
surrounding me. In the present state of affairs, I do not like to
leave home, or I would pay you a visit, but no one knows what may
happen any day, or how soon the communications may be again
interrupted. Marching and drilling is going on all day in every
street. The troops that have arrived here are in general
fine-looking, able-bodied, active men, well equipped, and
apparently ready and willing for the service in which they are
engaged. Your cordial concurrence in the disposition to maintain
the Government and resist aggression gives great satisfaction, and
I am pleased to observe a letter from you in the _Intelligencer_
of this morning.
I beg you to present my compliments to Miss Lane. There are many
stories afloat among the ladies in the city that would amuse her,
but as they are no doubt told her by lady correspondents, it is
needless for me to repeat them. I hope you may continue in the
enjoyment of good health, and remain with sincere regard,
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[TO J. BUCHANAN HENRY.]
WHEATLAND, LANCASTER, }
(Confidential.) Friday, May 17, 1861. }
MY DEAR JAMES:—
I have been quite unwell for the last fortnight, during the last
week I have been in bed; still, thank God, I believe I am now
convalescent, though, as yet I am exceedingly weak. I should be
glad to see you here on private and public business, but not if
your absence should operate seriously to your prejudice. We
should also be happy to see Mr. Schell here. The termination of
the late administration ought not to break up the bonds of
mutual friendship which it produced. There is no part of my
administration which was considered with greater care and
pursued with more firmness than that between the 6th November,
the day of Mr. Lincoln’s election, and the 4th of March last.
Although nearly all upon record, the public seem to have
forgotten it. It has become necessary now to revive the public
memory, and I know of no journal in the country so proper to do
this as the _Journal of Commerce_. Mr. Hallock, of that valuable
paper (I believe I am correct in spelling the name), has always
been a friend. I would thank you to call upon him, present him
my kind and grateful regards, and say that with his permission I
will send him some documents. There never was a moment of time
when my administration were not ready and willing to reinforce,
or attempt to reinforce, and supply Fort Sumter, if Major
Anderson had called for such reinforcement or supply. On the 6th
of November, when Lincoln was elected, the whole force at my
command was just five companies, and neither of them full. They
did not exceed in the whole three hundred men. The ——, however,
from a spirit of malignity, and supposing that the world may
have forgotten the circumstance, takes every occasion to blame
me for my supineness; it will soon arrive at the point of
denouncing me for not crushing out the rebellion at once, and
thus try to make me the author of the war...... No extent of
abuse, general or particular abuse, that —— could pour out upon
me would induce me to prosecute him; but this is an attempt to
bring not only my character, but my life into danger by
malignant falsehood. It would be one of those great national
prosecutions, such as have occurred in this and other countries,
necessary to vindicate the character of the Government.
I want you to bring on with you Wheaton’s Elements of
International Law—the seventh edition, and no other. I see it is
published for sale in Boston at $6, and presume it can be had in
New York. If the _Journal of Commerce_ publishes a tri-weekly
paper, please to have it sent on to me immediately. You might,
confidentially and quietly, consult with —— whom it is best to
employ to conduct this business in its preliminary stages.[174]
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 174:
His purpose to institute a prosecution for libel was abandoned by
the advice of friends.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, May 19, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
You will see in the New York papers Judge Campbell’s report of the
negotiations between himself and Mr. Seward, to which I referred
in my letter of last week. They had been related to me by the
Judge about the time they closed. Mr. Seward’s silence will not
relieve him from the imputation of deceit and double-dealing in
the minds of many, although I do not believe it can justly be
imputed to him. I have no doubt he believed that Sumter would be
evacuated as he stated it would be. But the war party overruled
him with Lincoln, and he was forced to give up, but could not give
up his office. That is a sacrifice no Republican will be apt to
make. But this correspondence shows that Mr. Frederick Seward was
not in the line of truth when he said that negotiations ceased on
the fourth of March. The New York _Evening Post_ is very severe on
Judge Campbell, and very unjustly so, for the Judge has been as
anxiously and patriotically earnest to preserve the Government as
any man in the United States, and he has sacrificed more than any
Southern man rather than yield to the secessionists. I regret the
treatment he has received from Mr. Seward and the _Post_.
Nothing new has transpired here since my last letter. I am
perfectly convinced that an attack will be made, and a battle
fought for this city before long. With sincere regard, I remain,
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. HOLT TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
(Confidential.) WASHINGTON, May 24, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I had the pleasure of receiving yours of the 21st inst. from the
hands of Mr. Magraw. I had previously observed with pain notices
in the public papers of your illness, and it is therefore with
great gratification that I learn you are convalescing, though
still confined to your room. I thank you sincerely for your kind
invitation to visit Wheatland, and regret much that it is not in
my power at once to do so. My engagements, however, are such that
I cannot leave Washington for the present, though I hope to be
able to see you in the course of the summer.
I would gladly give you any assistance in my power in the
preparation of the paper to which you refer, but fear any aid I
could render would be of little avail to you. I have preserved no
memoranda of the transactions you propose to treat, and although
my memory might be trusted as to their substance, it would in all
probability be at fault in regard to their details. In reference
to the latter, I would rather defer to your own recollection, or
to that of other members of the cabinet. As a historical document,
I concur with you that the preparation of such a document is a
“necessity;” but I cannot perceive that there is any reason for
haste in its completion, or any expediency in its early
publication. The country is so completely occupied by the fearful
and absorbing events occurring and impending, that you could not
hope at present to engage its attention. Besides, from what I have
observed in the public papers, I cannot discover that your
administration is being so assailed upon the points alluded to as
to require any elaborate vindication at your hands...... I suppose
you have seen the prominent Southern papers—including Governor
Floyd’s organ at Richmond—in which is set forth as his especial
glory the aid given to the revolution by the War Department during
the year 1860.
You have, I believe, copies of all of Major Anderson’s letters,
and it may be copies, also, of a part of those received from Fort
Pickens. As the fate of the latter fortress is still undetermined,
I doubt if the Government would give copies of any correspondence
in regard to it. Colonel Anderson’s letters and those to him from
the Government, during my brief connection with the War
Department, formed, I think, a sufficient defence of the policy
pursued during that time.
...... I have had two brief but satisfactory interviews with
Colonel Anderson. He is thoroughly loyal, and if he ever had any
sympathy with the revolutionists, which I am now far from
believing, I think the ferocious spirit in which the siege and
cannonade of Sumter were conducted crushed it out of him. We did
not discuss at all the policy of your administration in regard to
Sumter, but he said in general terms that he was satisfied all
that had occurred was providential—that the course pursued had
been the means of fixing the eyes of the nation on Sumter, and of
awakening to the last degree its anxieties for its fate: so that
when it fell its fall proved the instrumentality of arousing the
national enthusiasm and loyalty, as we now see them displayed in
the eager rush to maintain the honor of the flag. The approval of
his course, of which you speak, relates, I presume, to his defence
of Sumter. I have not heard that the administration has expressed
any formal censure of your policy.
Now that the South has begun an unprovoked and malignant war upon
the United States, accompanied by an insolent threat of the
capture of Washington, and with an open avowal that the only
Southern right now insisted on is the right of dismembering the
Republic, I am decidedly in favor of prosecuting the struggle
until the citizens of the seceded States shall be made to obey the
laws as we obey them. I believe it can be done. It will cost much
blood and many millions of treasure, but, if it cost billions, the
preservation of such a government would be well worth the
expenditure.
With kind remembrances to Miss Lane, I am
Very sincerely your friend,
J. HOLT.
[GENERAL DIX TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
NEW YORK, May 28th, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Ever since I wrote you last I have been busy night and day, and am
a good deal worn down by my labors on the Union Defence Committee,
and by superintending the organization and equipment of nine
regiments, six of which I have sent to the field, leaving three to
go to-morrow and the day after. The post of Major General of
Volunteers was tendered to me by Governor Morgan, and I could not
decline without subjecting myself to the imputation of hauling
down my flag, a thing altogether inadmissible. So I am in harness
for the war, though the administration take it easy, for I have
not yet been accepted, and there are rumors that there are too
many Democratic epaulettes in the field. There seems to be no fear
at Washington that there are too many Democratic knapsacks. New
York has about 15,000 men at the seat of war, without a general
except Sanford, who has gone on temporarily. How is it, my dear
sir, that New York is always overlooked (or nearly always) except
when there are burdens to be borne? As to this Generalship, it was
unsought, and I am indifferent about it entirely. I am willing to
give my strength and my life, if need be, to uphold the Government
against treason and rebellion. But if the administration prefers
some one else to command New York troops, no one will acquiesce
half so cheerfully as myself.
I should be very glad if I could look in upon you, though it were
but for a moment; but if I am ordered South, I suppose I shall be
needed at once. My whole division will be in the field by Sunday
next.
Miss Lane has not made her promised visit. I will merely suggest
the inviolability of promises by keeping my own. I engaged to send
her a photograph for her second album, and beg to give her,
through you, the choice of a variety. I beg also to be most
cordially remembered to her. Our excellent friend, Mr. ——, wanted
a note or letter of Major Anderson’s, written at Fort Sumter, and
I take the liberty, not knowing his address, to send it to you.
I fear the impatience of the country may interfere with General
Scott’s plan of getting a large force on foot, disciplining it
thoroughly until October, and then embodying it, and marching
through the Southern country in such numbers as to render
resistance vain. Partisan movements without any definite result
only serve to irritate and excite to new effort.
I am, my dear sir, with best wishes, in which my wife unites,
Sincerely and faithfully your friend,
JOHN A. DIX.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, June 8, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
Your friends here are very much gratified by Judge Black’s report
of improvement in your health. The accounts we have had occasioned
a great deal of solicitude concerning you; but I trust that you
may now be speedily restored. I have not written to you for some
time because there was nothing to communicate that would cheer or
gratify you. While every patriot has rejoiced at the enthusiastic
spirit with which the nation has aroused to maintain its existence
and honor, the peculation and fraud that immediately spring up to
prey upon the volunteers and grasp the public money as plunder and
spoil has created a strong feeling of loathing and disgust. And no
sooner had the appearance of imminent danger passed away, and the
administration recovered from its panic, than a determination
became manifest to give a strict party direction, as far as
possible, to the great national movement. After a few Democratic
appointments, as Butler and Dix, everything else has been
exclusively devoted to Black Republican interests. This has
already excited a strong reactionary feeling, not only in New
York, but in the Western States. General Dix informs me that he
has been so badly treated by Cameron, and so disgusted by the
general course of the administration, that he intends immediately
to resign. This will be followed by a withdrawal of financial
confidence and support to a very great extent. Indeed, the course
of things for the last four weeks has been such as to excite
distrust in every Department of the Government. The military
movements, or rather inaction, also excite great apprehension. It
is believed that Davis and Beauregard are both in this
vicinity—one at Harper’s Ferry, the other at Manassas Gap—and that
they can concentrate over sixty thousand troops. Our whole force
does not exceed forty-five thousand. It is also reported that
discord exists between the cabinet and General Scott in respect to
important points of strategy. Our condition, therefore, seems to
be one of even greater danger than at any former period, for the
consequence of success by the secessionists would be far more
extensive and irremediable than if the Capital had been seized
weeks ago. Ould is reported as having gone off and joined the
secessionists. Harvey, the new minister to Spain, it is
discovered, was a correspondent with the secessionists and
communicated the designs and operations of the Government to Judge
McGrath. It is supposed he will be recalled. Cassius Clay has been
playing the fool at London by writing letters to the _Times_,
which that paper treats with ridicule and contempt. The impression
here is that the decided and active countenance and support of the
British government will be given to the Southern Confederacy. Mr.
Holt is still here, but I seldom see him. Judge Black is also
here. I should have visited you, but dare not leave town even for
one night. Our troops have slept on their arms nearly every night
for a week, anticipating attack. Hoping to hear of your
restoration to good health, I remain as ever,
Truly yours,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, June 12, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
I had written to you the day before your letter was received, and
am very glad to learn that your health is still improving. Shortly
after the 4th of March, I saw Mr. Weaver, and told him to let me
know in case there should appear any disposition to interfere with
him, and I would exert myself to have him retained. He expressed
himself so confidently of his security, that any interposition of
mine would have appeared gratuitous, if not impertinent. But
before your last letter reached here, he called and said he had
been removed. He said he did not desire to be reinstated in it,
preferring to enter the military service, and desiring a captain’s
commission. While I think his restoration might be accomplished,
the other is more doubtful, as it is generally understood that Mr.
Cameron has bestowed all the military posts. I shall, however, do
all in my power to accomplish what Mr. Weaver desires, on account
of the interest you take in his welfare.
We have this morning disastrous news from Fortress Monroe. The
rumor is that the sacrifice of life at Bethel Bridge was very
great, and it is in a great measure attributed to the incompetence
of the commanding officer. There is much reason to fear that other
disasters from similar cause will occur. The recent appointments
in the army are generally spoken of with great disapprobation.
General Dix is very much chagrined with the treatment he has
received from the War Department, and on Saturday I had a letter
declaring his intention to resign immediately. He would, in my
opinion, be a serious loss to the service. The rumored appointment
of Cummings, of _The Bulletin_, as Brigadier General and
Quartermaster General, has produced very general dissatisfaction
and distrust. The appointment has been announced as having been
certainly made, but I do not believe that it has been.
I had a letter this week from your friend General Harney. He feels
himself very badly treated by the administration. Last month he
was ordered to Washington without any reason but suspicion of his
loyalty. Being satisfied on that point, he was restored to his
command, and is now again superseded, without any explanation, and
is disgraced by being left without any command.
Since this letter was commenced, the brother of General Butler has
arrived from Fort Monroe, and reports the whole loss of our troops
at fourteen killed and forty-four wounded. This is so greatly
below the former reports, which set down our loss at over one
thousand, that it affords great relief. There is great anxiety to
hear from Harper’s Ferry. The movement in that direction a few
days ago you have no doubt seen in the papers. Much apprehension
is felt here as to the expedition, and there is some uneasiness
lest an attack on this city will be induced by withdrawal of so
large a portion of the military force. Harvey’s treachery is much
talked of. The foreign indications by yesterday’s steamer are
considered more favorable than heretofore.
I beg you to present my compliments to Miss Lane; and with sincere
regard I remain,
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, June 20, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
On the day that my last letter was written, I had an interview
with Secretary Smith, in relation to Mr. Weaver, and explained to
him the nature of the service you had rendered to Mr. Lincoln, and
also the engagement that Mr. Doolittle had made _after_ that
service had been rendered, and as an expression of his sense of
the obligation. Mr. Doolittle had also placed a letter on file, as
he promised to do, but not making any explanation. I am gratified
to learn this morning that Mr. Weaver has been restored to his
clerkship, and also that he has received an appointment as first
lieutenant in the army, for which I applied on his behalf. You
will no doubt be pleased that the administration has properly
appreciated the favor you rendered.
Hoping that your health is still improving, I remain,
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. HALLOCK.]
(Private.) WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, June 29,
1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
My nephew, J. Buchanan Henry, informed me of the very satisfactory
conversation with you some time since. I should have written to
you some time ago but for my long illness. Since I have been able
to write, I have been making memoranda so as to present in one
connected view the acts of my administration since the troubles
commenced in South Carolina. When presented (but the proper time
has not, I think, arrived), they will, unless I am greatly
mistaken, prove to be a triumphant vindication in every
particular.
In the mean time, it is asked why I did not nip this great
revolution in its bud, by garrisoning the forts in the Southern
States and sending reinforcements to Forts Moultrie, Sumter and
Castle Pinckney, in the harbor of Charleston. I shall let General
Scott answer this question. I send you a copy of his “Views,”
addressed to the War Department, and finally published at length,
doubtless under his own authority, in the _National Intelligencer_
of January 18th, 1861. They are dated on the 29th and 30th
October, 1860, more than a week before the Presidential election.
After reading them, you will admit that they constitute an
extraordinary document. Indeed, they tend to prove what has been
often said of the gallant General, that when he abandons the sword
for the pen he makes sad work of it. They were extensively
published and commented upon in the South, but attracted but
little attention in the North. My present purpose, however, is
only to prove from them the utter impossibility of garrisoning
these forts.
You will observe that on the 29th October, he enumerates nine
of them in six of the Southern States; but he submits no plan
for this purpose, and designates no troops to accomplish this
great and extensive military operation. This it was his duty
to do as Lieutenant General. In writing, the next day, October
30th, he seems to have been struck with the absurdity of the
recommendation. In this supplement he states: “There is one
regular company at Boston, one here at the Narrows, one at
Portsmouth, one at Augusta, Ga., and one at Baton Rouge, _in
all, five companies only within reach_ to garrison or
reinforce the forts mentioned in the ‘Views.’” Five companies
containing less than 400 men to garrison and reinforce nine
fortifications scattered over six of the Southern States!
Nearly the whole of our small army were at the time stationed on
the remote frontiers of our extensive country to protect the
inhabitants and emigrants against the tomahawk and scalping knife
of the savage; and at the approach of winter, could not have been
brought within reach for several months. They were employed for
this purpose as they had been for years. At the period when our
fortifications were erected, it was not contemplated that they
should be garrisoned, except in the event of a foreign war, and
this to avoid the necessity of raising a large standing army. No
person then dreamed of danger to the States. It is a remarkable
fact, that after months had elapsed, and we had, at the instance
of General Scott, scoured the whole country for forces to protect
the inauguration, all the troops we could assemble at Washington,
rank and file, amounted to six hundred and thirty. This fact is
stated by me in a message to the House of Representatives. To have
sent four hundred men to Charleston after the Presidential
election to garrison and defend three forts, an arsenal, a custom
house, navy yard, and post office, would have only been to provoke
collision. I believed that the public property was safer without
than it would have been with such an utterly inadequate force.
Besides, whoever was in Washington at the time must have witnessed
the strong expression of sentiment by the other Southern States
against any attack by South Carolina against the public property.
For the reason it was not their policy to make the attack. In my
message, therefore, of the 3d December, I stated: “It is not
believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States
from this property by force.” In this belief I was justified by
the event—as there was no trouble until after Major Anderson
retired from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, as he had a right to
do, first having spiked his cannon and burnt the gun carriages.
But I am proceeding beyond what I had intended, which was to state
the impossibility of reinforcing the forts with the troops “within
reach.” There are other very important questions arising out of
these transactions which, for the present, I forbear to touch.
They will all appear in due time. The _Journal of Commerce_, from
its very great ability and prudent character, exercises great
influence over the country. I do not intend, for the present, to
appear, either directly or indirectly, as an author. I have merely
deemed it advisable to recall your attention to facts, all of
which are of record, so that you might, if you should think it
advisable, be able to answer the question: Why did the late
President not send troops to the forts at Charleston and the other
Southern forts? I send you a copy of my message in pamphlet form,
from which I have never departed.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[GENERAL DIX TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, June 28, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
It is with great gratification that I am assured, from several
sources, that your health is improving. I was not aware, until I
received your letter, that you had been so ill, for I place but
little reliance on what the newspapers say.
After a long delay I received my appointment as Major General. The
President, whom I saw the day before yesterday, assured me that it
was not intentional, and that he had no other purpose than to
appoint me. I shall enter on my active duties in a few days.
Everything is quiet in this city. As late as last evening the
enemy was also quiet, and, I think, has no intention of advancing.
The weather is very warm, as it always is here in June, and the
season for active operations will soon be over, until after the
first frost.
I hope Miss Lane is well, and that your health may be completely
restored. I beg you to give her my kind regards, and to accept
assurances of my sincere respect. I am, dear Sir,
Unchangeably your friend,
JOHN A. DIX.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. KING.]
(Private.) WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, July 13,
1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
My late severe illness has hitherto prevented me from
acknowledging the receipt of your kind letter of May last. Rest
assured that this delay did not proceed from any want of regard
for you or your family. On the contrary, I shall ever cherish the
most friendly feelings and ardent wishes for the prosperity of
both. I should be glad to hear from you as often as may be
convenient, and, although I recover my strength but slowly, I
think I may promise to be a more punctual correspondent.
The future of our country presents a dark cloud, through which my
vision cannot penetrate. The assault upon Fort Sumter was the
commencement of war by the Confederate States, and no alternative
was left but to prosecute it with vigor on our part. Up and until
all social and political relations ceased between the secession
leaders and myself, I had often warned them that the North would
rise to a man against them if such an assault were made. No
alternative seems now to be left but to prosecute hostilities
until the seceding States shall return to their allegiance, or
until it shall be demonstrated that this object, which is nearest
my heart, cannot be accomplished. From present appearances it
seems certain that they would accept no terms of compromise short
of an absolute recognition of their independence, which is
impossible. I am glad that General Scott does not underrate the
strength of his enemy, which would be a great fault in a
commander. With all my heart and soul I wish him success. I think
that some very unfit military appointments have been made, from
which we may suffer in some degree in the beginning, but ere long
merit will rise to its appropriate station. It was just so at the
commencement of the war of 1812. I was rejoiced at the appointment
of General Dix, and believe he will do both himself and the
country honor.
In passing North or South, I should be most happy if you would
call and pay us a visit at Wheatland. You shall receive a most
hearty welcome, especially if you should be accompanied by your
lady and Miss King.
With my kindest regards to them, I remain, very respectfully,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—Miss Lane desires to be kindly remembered to Mr., Mrs. and
Miss King.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, July 16, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
Your favor with the continuation of the historical sketch was duly
received. Last evening Judge Black and General Dix met at my
house, and we consulted together in regard to it. We concur in
opinion that a publication at present would accomplish no good.
The public mind is too much excited on other topics to give
attention to the past, and it would only afford occasion for fresh
malignant attacks upon you from ——. His day, I think, is rapidly
passing; and, at all events, a stronger impression will hereafter
be produced when the public feeling is more tranquil. The
narrative appears to me to be a clear and accurate statement of
the events of the period to which it relates, with one exception
of no material consequence, in respect to which the recollection
of Judge Black, General Dix and myself is somewhat different from
the statement. Speaking of the order to the Brooklyn not to
disembark the forces sent to Pickens unless that fort were
attacked, you mention it as having been made with the entire
unanimity of your cabinet and the approval of General Scott. That
he approved it is fully shown by Mr. Holt’s note to you; but our
recollection is that in the cabinet it was opposed by Judge Black,
General Dix and myself. I do not know that there is now any reason
to question the wisdom of the measure; it may have saved Pickens
from immediate attack at that time; and I have understood that
General Scott says that Pickens could not have been successfully
defended if it had then been attacked, and that he speaks of this
as a blunder of the Confederates. In this view the wisdom of the
measure is fully vindicated; and at the time it was supported by
the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, to whose
Departments the subject appertained.
So far, however, as your administration is concerned, its policy
in reference to both Sumter and Pickens is fully vindicated by the
course of the present administration for forty days after the
inauguration of Lincoln. No use was made of the means that had
been prepared for reinforcing Sumter. A Republican Senator
informed me a short time ago that General Scott personally urged
him to consent to the evacuation of both Sumter and Pickens; and
it is a fact of general notoriety, published in all the papers at
the time and never contradicted, that not only the General, but
other military men who were consulted, were in favor of that
measure.
Whatever may be said by ——’s malignity now, I think that the
public will be disposed to do full justice to your efforts to
avert the calamity of civil war; and every month for a long time
to come will, I am afraid, furnish fresh evidence of the magnitude
of that calamity. The impression that Mr. Weaver had received an
army appointment proved to be a mistake; it was another Weaver who
was appointed. General Dix is still here. He has been shamefully
treated by the administration. We are expecting a general battle
to be commenced at Fairfax to-day, and conflicting opinions of the
result are entertained. With sincere regard, I remain as ever,
Truly yours,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, July 26, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
Three days ago I received the enclosed letters, under cover
addressed to me. Upon reading the first sentence, I perceived
there must be some mistake, and turning over the leaf saw that the
address was to Judge Black, and I therefore return them unread. I
should have handed them to him, but have not seen him since they
were received, and am informed that he left here some days ago.
The dreadful disaster of Sunday can scarcely be mentioned. The
imbecility of this administration culminated in that catastrophe;
an irretrievable misfortune and national disgrace never to be
forgotten are to be added to the ruin of all peaceful pursuits and
national bankruptcy, as the result of Lincoln’s “running the
machine” for five months.
You perceive that Bennett is for a change of the cabinet, and
proposes for one of the new cabinet Mr. Holt, whose opposition to
Bennett’s appointment was bitter and intensely hostile. It is not
unlikely that some change in the War and Navy Departments may take
place, but none beyond those two Departments until Jeff Davis
turns out the whole concern. The capture of Washington seems now
to be inevitable; during the whole of Monday and Tuesday it might
have been taken without any resistance. The rout, overthrow, and
utter demoralization of the whole army is complete. Even now I
doubt whether any serious opposition to the entrance of the
Confederate forces could be offered. While Lincoln, Scott, and the
cabinet are disputing who is to blame, the city is unguarded, and
the enemy at hand. General McClellan reached here last evening.
But if he had the ability of Cæsar, Alexander, or Napoleon, what
can he accomplish? Will not Scott’s jealousy, cabinet intrigues,
and Republican interference thwart him at every step? While hoping
for the best, I cannot shut my eyes against the dangers that beset
the Government, and especially this city. It is certain that Davis
was in the field on Sunday, and the secessionists here assert that
he headed in person the last victorious charge. General Dix is in
Baltimore; after three weeks’ neglect and insult he was sent
there. The warm debate between Douglas’s friend Richardson and
Kentucky Burnett has attracted some interest, but has been
attended with no bellicose result. Since this note was commenced,
the morning paper has come in, and I see that McClellan did not
arrive last night, as I was informed he had. General Lee was after
him, but will have to wait a while before they can meet.
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, August 31, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I am sorry that any cause has prevented you from paying me a
visit. I trust your kind purpose will not be long suspended. The
memory of your last visit causes Miss Lane and myself to be
anxious that it should be repeated. I rejoice to learn that you
and yours are all in good health. May this precious blessing be
long continued to you and them.
I agree with you that nothing but a vigorous prosecution of the
war can now determine the question between the North and the
South. It is vain to talk of peace at the present moment. The
Confederate States, flushed with their success at Bull’s Run,
would consent to nothing less than a recognition of their
independence, and this is impossible to grant under any
conceivable circumstances. I have much faith that General
McClellan is “the coming man.”
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[HON. RICHARD COBDEN TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
MIDHURST, SUSSEX, Sept. 5, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
It is rather more than two years since I had the pleasure of
seeing you, and in that interval, what events have occurred!
I think it is no exaggeration to say that there are few Americans
who have been more deeply and painfully interested than myself in
the deplorable civil conflict which is now raging on your
continent.
The subject is so distressing to my feelings, that I avoid as much
as possible all correspondence with my American friends. But after
the friendly reception which I experienced from you at Washington,
I should be sorry if our intimacy were to be impaired owing to any
neglect on my part. I have been abroad nearly the whole time since
my return from the States, chiefly in France and Algiers, but am
now settled down at home. My health is improved, and if I can be
quiet and avoid public meetings, I hope to continue to escape from
a return of my bronchial affection.
I hope you are well, and that you will be good enough to let me
hear from you. Or if you cannot find time to write, pray let me
have a letter from my amiable young friend, your niece, to whom I
beg to be most kindly remembered.
I will not enter on the subject of your domestic troubles. My
experience in our Crimean war led me to the conclusion that from
the moment when the first drop of blood is shed reason and
argument are powerless to put an end to war. It can only be
terminated by its own self-destroying and exhaustive process.
This, however, I will say, that of all the questions ever
subjected to the ordeal of battle, that which is the ground of
quarrel between the Northern and Southern States of your Union
seems the least adapted for the arbitrament of the sword.
I feel very anxious that nothing should arise to put in jeopardy
the relations between England and your country.
I remember listening with great satisfaction to General Cass,
whilst I was at Washington, when he narrated to me the
satisfactory settlement of the various questions in debate between
the two countries, and I will venture to offer the opinion that
history will do justice to the successful foreign policy of your
administration. (It would be very presumptuous in me, a foreigner,
to pass judgment on your internal policy.)
Should it happen that you are in communication with General Cass,
will you kindly remember me to him?
The subject of the blockade is becoming more and more serious. I
am afraid we have ourselves to blame for not having placed the
question of belligerent rights on a better footing. I remember
that after the Congress of Paris had agreed to abolish
privateering, Mr. Marcy proposed to go a step further, and exempt
private property altogether from capture. This was objected to, I
believe, by our government; afterwards, I remember, your
newspapers advocated the abolition of blockades altogether. I have
the impression that your government, I mean your Presidency, would
have agreed to the Paris declaration, with the addition of a
clause for making private property (not contraband of war) sacred
at sea, and another clause doing away with blockades altogether,
excepting as regards articles contraband of war—am I correct in
this supposition?
Mr. Bright is well, but, like myself, feels your civil war almost
with the sorrow of a private affliction.
Mr. Milner Gibson is on a yachting excursion. He has grown a
little stouter and somewhat grey with the cares of office.
Believe me, yours very sincerely,
R. COBDEN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO HON. GEORGE G. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, September 4th, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have this morning received your favor of yesterday. I rejoice to
learn that when you visit me you will be accompanied by two of
your grand-daughters; and the sooner the better. We shall give you
and them a most cordial welcome.
In regard to any public use of the opinions expressed in my
letter, in favor of the prosecution of the war, I would rather,
for the present, you would withhold them. Of course I have kept no
copy and know not how they are expressed. Every person who has
conversed with me knows that I am in favor of sustaining the
Government in a vigorous prosecution of the war for the
restoration of the Union. An occasion may offer when it may be
proper for me authoritatively to express this opinion for the
public. Until that time shall arrive, I desire to avoid any public
exhibition.
When a private letter of mine was published some time since,
condemning the desertion of the flag by the officers of the army
and the navy, you know it was made the occasion to abuse me by the
Black Republican papers. Knowing our relations of intimate
friendship, it would be said that we had concocted a plan to bring
me before the public in self-defence in an indirect manner.
Ever your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[JUDGE BLACK TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, September 9th, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
There seems to be a dead pause here in everything but making
appointments and contracts. If there is to be a battle, nobody
knows it, not even those who are to fight it, unless by
conjecture. But it is not easy to see how it can be avoided very
long. The ground that Beauregard leaves McClellan to stand upon is
getting narrower every day. But each has a wholesome fear of the
other. It is terrible enough to think of the momentous interests
at stake upon the issue. And that issue may be determined by the
state of the weather, the condition of the ground, or the
slightest blunder of an officer.
Mrs. Gwynn, it seems, was not arrested. I told you I did not
believe either that she had been arrested or given the cause of
accusation which was alleged against her. It was another lady of
the same name—Mrs. Gwynn of Alexandria—who sewed up plans and
documents in shirts, unless, indeed, the whole story is a fable
invented by that “perfectly reliable gentleman” who has been
engaged in furnishing lies for the newspapers as far back as I can
remember.
Mr. Glossbrenner furnished me a fair copy of the _paper_ before I
left York. I shall soon have it in shape. I have already made some
progress in it.
My regards to Miss Lane, and believe me
Yours truly,
J. S. BLACK.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. JOHN B. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, September 12th, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your kind favor of the 7th instant, and owe you
many thanks for it, as well as for Mr. Stanton’s report. It puts
to rest the assertion that a single columbiad or cannon ever
reached the Southern States in 1860 or 1861, and they are not
fighting us with our own weapons. Floyd’s order was arrested
before its execution. About the small arms, there does not appear
to be any thing out of the usual course of administration and
distribution. They were ordered there so long ago as December,
1859.
I have never received the bound copies of the Public Documents of
the 35th Congress, though I recollect that Mr. Glossbrenner or
some other person told me before I left Washington that Mr.
Wheeler was boxing them up for me. I expect to see Mr. G. in a few
days, and shall inquire of him.
I owe you very many thanks for the order you have obtained from
Mr. Smith for the documents of the 36th Congress; and please to
present my kind regards to Mr. Kelly.
We must, I presume, soon hear of a battle or of a retreat of the
Confederate forces. Our all is embarked on board a ship which is
approaching the breakers. This is no time to investigate why she
was brought into this sad condition. We must save her by an united
effort. We must prosecute the war with the utmost vigor. May God
grant us a safe deliverance and a restoration of the Union!
Miss Lane desires to be most kindly remembered to you.
Your friend always,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—Pardon me for having omitted to acknowledge your favor of the
8th August, in answer to mine of the 5th. General Twiggs has sent
me another insolent and threatening letter, in which he exults in
the fact that my likeness had been ordered from the Rotunda. I
know not know what will become of it. It is condemned as a
likeness by good judges.[175]
Footnote 175:
[MR. HOLT TO MR. WM. B. REED.]
(Private.) WASHINGTON, September 16th, 1868.
DEAR SIR:—
I did not at once reply to your note of the 11th instant, because
of a belief that a copy of the order dismissing Twiggs would
answer your purpose. Learning, however, from a telegram in the
hands of Doctor Blake that you prefer I shall respond formally to
your inquiry, I have done so. Should you make any public use of
this communication, I beg that you will see personally to a
correction of the proofs.
If you will examine Mr. Buchanan’s correspondence you will
probably find one or more abusive letters from Twiggs on the
subject of his dismissal. They might assist you in establishing
“the truth of history.”
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
J. HOLT.
P.S.—The Government did all in its power to protect itself from
Twigg’s meditated treachery by relieving him from his command, _as
soon as its apprehensions in regard to him were excited_, and if
it failed it was because, owing to the disturbed condition of the
country, the order was slow in reaching him, and because when it
did reach him, availing himself of the temporary absence of his
successor, _he disobeyed the order and surrendered a Department of
which he had no longer the command_.
J. H.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. KING.]
WHEATLAND, September 18, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I am gratified to learn, by your favor of the 13th, that your
visit here was agreeable to yourself and Miss King, and we,
therefore, trust that it may be soon repeated. I need not say that
both Miss Lane and myself will be most happy to see you both
again, and give you a cordial welcome.
You recollect the correspondence between Mr. Holt and Mr.
Thompson. The last letter of Mr. Thompson to Mr. Holt was
published in the tri-weekly _National Intelligencer_ of March
19th, 1861, and was dated at Oxford on March 11th. Mr. Holt, I
believe, replied to this letter; but, if so, I cannot find his
reply in the _Intelligencer_. I should be much obliged to you if
you could procure me a copy of this reply. Poor Thompson! He
committed a sad wrong against his country, from which he can never
recover. He had been the devoted friend and admirer of Mr. Holt,
but in the end he afforded just cause to that gentleman for his
severe answer.
How Mr. Holt came to be so far mistaken, in his letter of May 31st
to Kentucky, as to state that the revolutionary leaders greeted me
with all hails to my face, I do not know. The truth is that, after
the message of the 3d of December, they were alienated from me;
and, after I had returned the insolent letter of the first South
Carolina commissioners to them, I was attacked by Jefferson Davis
and his followers on the floor of the Senate, and all political
and social intercourse between us ceased. Had the Senate confirmed
my nomination of the 2d January of a collector of the port of
Charleston, the war would probably have commenced in January,
instead of May. I am collecting materials for history, and I
cannot find a note from Mr. Slidell to myself and my answer
relative to the very proper removal of Beauregard from West
Point.[176]
I think I must have given them to Mr. Holt. He was much pleased
with my answer at the time. If they are in his possession, I
should be glad you would procure me copies. They are very brief.
The ladies of Mr. S.’s family never after looked near the White
House.
I think I can perceive in the public mind a more fixed, resolute
and determined purpose than ever to prosecute the war to a
successful termination, with all the men and means in our power.
Enlistments are now proceeding much more rapidly than a few weeks
ago, and I am truly glad of it. The time has passed for offering
compromises and terms of peace to the seceded States. We well know
that, under existing circumstances, they would accept of nothing
less than a recognition of their independence, which it is
impossible we should grant. There is a time for all things under
the sun; but surely this is not the moment for paralyzing the arm
of the national administration by a suicidal conflict among
ourselves, but for bold, energetic and united action. The
Democratic party has ever been devoted to the Constitution and the
Union; and I rejoice that, among the many thousands that have
rushed to their defence in this the hour of peril, a large
majority belong to that time-honored party.
I sat down to write you a few lines, but find that my letter has
swelled into large proportions.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 176:
See the correspondence, _ante_.
[FROM JOSHUA BATES.]
LONDON, September 20, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have to thank you for your valued letters of the 12th and 13th
ult., which I have read with great interest. I think you give too
much importance to newspaper attacks. Judging by my own feelings,
I should say readers of newspapers do not believe a word of these
attacks, but put them down to party tactics. Lord Palmerston, in
the last session of Parliament, in answering a speech of Mr.
Horsman, who complained that the _Times_ had abused him and
ridiculed his speeches, remarked, that he always thought that he
(Lord P.) was the best abused of any man in the Kingdom, but he
was not disturbed by it. A gentleman once applied to Lord
Melbourne for advice whether he should accept a seat in the
cabinet which was offered him. Lord M. said: “If you do not mind
being abused daily in the newspapers, you will find office very
pleasant; but if your happiness is at all disturbed by such abuse,
you had best not take office.” Gallatin’s theory was that no man
ever did his duty that was not abused by the newspapers. I never
had a doubt that you would execute the high duties of the office
of President of the United States with honor to yourself and great
advantage to the country; and I feel sure that your great public
services will be approved by the country at no distant day. It was
shameful that Congress should leave you without the power to stop
the rebellion before it had become so formidable. I have, however,
full faith in the patriotism of the people of the free States;
that they will punish rebels, and preserve the Constitution, I
have no doubt. Secession is out of the question. Who would ever
lend money to a Government of the United States, if aware that it
could be broken up any day by a right of any State to secede? This
government will, I think, do nothing more. The want of cotton will
be severely felt at Manchester the coming winter. By that time I
hope the Southern States will give in. The remittance by Miss
Lane, to whom, pray, give my kind regards, has been placed to her
credit, and subject to her orders, in the books of Baring Brothers
& Co. (£2,000), subject to interest at 4 per cent. per annum.
I remain, my dear Sir, with the highest respect,
Very truly yours,
JOSHUA BATES.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO A COMMITTEE OF THE CITIZENS OF CHESTER AND
LANCASTER COUNTIES.]
WHEATLAND, September 28, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
I have been honored by your kind invitation, as Chairman of the
appropriate committee, to attend and address a Union meeting of
the citizens of Chester and Lancaster counties, to be held at
Hagersville on the first of October. This I should gladly accept,
proceeding as it does from a much valued portion of my old
Congressional district, but advancing years and the present state
of my health render it impossible.
You correctly estimate the deep interest which I feel “in common
with the citizens who will there be assembled, in the present
condition of our country.” This is, indeed, serious, but our
recent military reverses, so far from producing despondency in the
minds of a loyal and powerful people, will only animate them to
more mighty exertions in sustaining a war which has become
inevitable by the assault of the Confederate States upon Fort
Sumter. For this reason, were it possible for me to address your
meeting, waiving all other topics, I should confine myself to a
solemn and earnest appeal to my countrymen, and especially those
without families, to volunteer for the war, and join the many
thousands of brave and patriotic volunteers who are already in the
field.
This is the moment for action; for PROMPT, ENERGETIC and UNITED
action; and not for discussion of PEACE PROPOSITIONS. These, we
must know, would be rejected by the States that have seceded,
unless we should offer to recognize their independence, which is
entirely out of the question. Better counsels may hereafter
prevail, when these people shall be convinced that the war is
conducted, not for their conquest or subjugation, but solely for
the purpose of bringing them back to their original position in
the Union, without impairing, in the slightest degree, any of
their Constitutional rights. Whilst, therefore, we shall cordially
hail their return under our common and glorious flag, and welcome
them as brothers, yet, until that happy day shall arrive, it will
be our duty to support the President with all the men and means at
the command of the country, in a vigorous and successful
prosecution of the war.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO J. BUCHANAN HENRY.]
WHEATLAND, October 21, 1861.
MY DEAR JAMES:—
I have mislaid your last letter, and have not answered it sooner,
awaiting information that my account had been settled and the
balance struck in the Chemical Bank. I think there would be no
risk, and if so, no danger in sending a bank book or the
certificate of loan by mail. I believe that New York Loan is
registered, and without coupons—but there is no hurry in either
case.
I am determined to sell all my seceded State bonds this fall for
what they will bring. North Carolinas will probably command $60,
and I would sell at that price to-morrow, but dislike to send the
certificates by mail. These loans may rise or sink in the market,
as the Bulls or the Bears may prevail; but after the war is over,
let it terminate as it may, these States will be so exhausted as
not to be able to pay, be they never so willing. As you sometimes
deal in stocks, I give you this _confidentially_ as my opinion.
We have never heard a word from or of our good friend Schell since
he left us. How is he? or what has become of him?
I think it is now time that I should not merely defend but
triumphantly vindicate myself, or cause myself to be vindicated
before the public, though my friends still urge me to wait.
I believe it is universally believed that Floyd stole guns and
sent them to the South. There is not a word of truth in it, as is
proved by a report of the Committee on Military Affairs to the
House of Representatives on the 18th February last, Mr. Stanton, a
Black Republican, being chairman. It is true that at a late period
of the administration, Floyd made the attempt to send a
considerable number of columbiads and thirty-two pounders to Ship
Island and Galveston, but I arrested the order, through the
Secretary of War, before a single gun was sent.
We are expecting Mrs. Roosevelt, and I shall be delighted to see
her, though we shall not be able to entertain her as I could
desire. I have never at any period since I commenced housekeeping,
been able to get a good cook, or even a tolerably good one, except
at Washington, and we now have one of the worst. We shall,
however, give her a hearty welcome.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P. S.—For what price can New York Loan be obtained in the market?
Have the Messrs. O’Brien my Virginia certificate in their
possession? The Confederates have not confiscated State loans in
their infamous act, and I presume there would be no difficulty in
assigning it.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. KING.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, November 12, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
You will confer a great favor upon me if you can obtain a
half-dozen of copies of Mr. Stanton’s report from the Committee on
Military Affairs, made on the 18th February, 1861 (No. 85),
relative to the arms alleged to have been stolen and sent to the
South by Floyd. This report, with the remarks of Mr. Stanton when
presenting it, ought to have put this matter at rest, and it did
so, I believe, so far as Congress was concerned. It has, however,
been recently repeated by Cameron, Reverdy Johnson and others, and
I desire these copies to send to different parts of the Union, so
that the falsehood may be refuted by the record. I am no further
interested in the matter than, if the charge were true, it might
argue a want of vigilance on my part.
I perceive that Mr. Holt has got a .... from the Secretary of War,
and I learn from those who read Forney’s _Press_ that Stanton is
the counsel and friend of McClellan, who is, I trust and hope,
“the coming man.”
By the bye, it is difficult to imagine how it was possible to
mystify so plain a subject, under the laws of war, as an exchange
of prisoners with the rebels, so as to make it mean a recognition
in any form, however remote, of their Confederacy. It admits
nothing but that your enemy, whether pirate, rebel, Algerine or
regular government, has got your soldiers in his possession, and
you have his soldiers in your possession. The exchange means
nothing beyond. The laws of humanity are not confined to any other
limit. The more barbarous and cruel the enemy, the greater is the
necessity for an exchange; because the greater is the danger that
they will shed the blood of your soldiers. I do not apply this
remark to the Confederate States, and only use it by way of
illustration. I believe they have not treated their prisoners
cruelly.
They do not seem to understand at Washington another plain
principle of the law of nations, and that is, that whilst the
capture and confiscation of private property at sea is still
permissible, this is not the case on land. Such are all the
authorities. The Treaty of Ghent recognized slaves as private
property, and therefore they were to be restored; and we paid for
all our army consumed in Mexico. The rebels have violated this law
in the most reckless manner.
But why am I writing so? I have materials put together which will
constitute, unless I am greatly mistaken, not merely a good
defence, but a triumphant vindication of my administration. You
must not be astonished some day to find in print, portraits drawn
by myself of all those who ever served in my cabinet. I think I
know them all perfectly, unless it may be Stanton.
I hope Miss King has entirely recovered. Please present me to her
very kindly, as well as to Mrs. King. I am now alone, Miss Lane
being in New York; but thank God! I am tranquil and contented,
sound, or nearly so, in body, and I trust sound in mind, and ever
true to my friends.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[GENERAL DIX TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
BALTIMORE, December 2, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I enclose you a proclamation, rather out of date, but not the less
valuable, I trust, for having been sent out on the very day John
Cochrane proclaimed the infamous and cowardly scheme of arming
slaves against their masters.
I believe every State north of South Carolina and Mississippi may
be reclaimed by a just and enlightened policy. The abolitionists
will make a powerful effort to drag the country into the
emancipation of slaves. But I am confident they will fail.
Fortunately this project cannot be separated from the support of
Fremont, and it will for that reason, I think, be condemned by the
friends of the administration.
The _Herald_ said my proclamation was inspired by the President. I
do not yet know whether he approves it. It was put forth without
consulting any one. I knew I was right; and when this conviction
is strong, I never consult friends, for fear they may differ with
me.
It has been a source of great gratification to me to hear, as I
have frequently from Mr. Magraw, of your improved health. That you
may live to see this unhappy contest ended, and good fellowship
restored again is the sincere wish of, dear sir, yours very
respectfully and truly,
JOHN A. DIX.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, December 2, 1861.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I have received your letters of the 20th and 30th ultimo, and in
compliance with the request in the latter return you Judge Black’s
opinion. I have heard nothing from him since his call on the way
to York after parting from you at the Continental.
I hope you are enjoying yourself. Indeed this cannot fail to be
the case with such a charming lady as Mrs. Roosevelt. We get along
very comfortably and pleasantly at Wheatland. I received a letter
yesterday from Annie Buchanan offering to pay me a visit; but I
advised her to defer it until after your return. Indeed this would
be no place for her at present. I wish you, however, to remain at
New York just as long as you find it agreeable.
I am glad to learn that Judge Nelson believes that Captain Wilkes
can be sustained by public law in the seizure of Mason and
Slidell. I place great reliance upon his judgment, but at the
first we shall probably receive a terrific broadside from the
English journals.
The more I saw of the Misses Johnston, I liked them the better.
They are fine women.
I often see the Nevins and am glad of it. I dine to-day at Harry
Magraw’s. The dinner is given to Bishop Wood.
With my kindest regards to the Judge and Mrs. Roosevelt, I remain
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. KING.]
WHEATLAND, December 10, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received a package directed in your well-known hand; and
upon opening it discover a letter directed to Miss Lane, which I
shall forward to her, with a beautiful pair of slippers and fan;
the former, I presume, for myself.
Miss Lane has been in New York since early in November, and I know
not when she will return.
Presuming that the slippers are a New Year’s gift from Miss King
to myself, I desire to express my grateful thanks to her for this
token of her regard. Present to her my kindest wishes for her
health, prosperity, and happiness.
I wish I had something to write to you about which might interest
you; but my life glides on so smoothly that I should scarcely know
how time passes, were it not for the terrible condition of the
country. I never expected to see the day when the Federal
Government would assume the power of issuing a paper currency,
much less of making it a legal tender.
With my kindest regards to Mrs. and Miss King, I remain
Always your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—Your letter of the 18th November is the last I have heard
from any member of my late cabinet. I have kind friends at
Washington, however, who occasionally give me the news. I was glad
to see that Judge Black had been appointed reporter to the Supreme
Court. The position is respectable, though a descent......
[MR. BUCHANAN TO THE HON. RICHARD COBDEN.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, PENN., }
December 14, 1861. }
MY DEAR SIR:—
I ought long since to have answered your letter of September; but
a protracted illness, from which, thank God! I have some time
since recovered, has left me far behind with my correspondence. It
is my sincere desire always to cherish the intimacy which
commenced between us in better and happier days. I deeply regret
that the feelings of friendship between the people of the two
countries are not what they were when we parted at Washington more
than two years ago. The public journals on both sides of the water
have contributed much to produce this result. Still the masses on
our side are far from being hostile to the English people, whilst
they entertain a very high regard for Queen Victoria.
I trust that the seizure of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board the
Trent may be viewed in what I consider its proper light by the
British ministry. A neutral nation is the common friend of both
belligerents, and has no right to aid the one to the injury of the
other. It is, consequently, very clear, under the law of nations,
that a neutral vessel has no right to carry articles contraband of
war to any enemy, to transport his troops or his despatches. These
principles are well settled by British authority. And Sir W.
Scott, in the case of the Atalanta (Wheaton, 566) informs us that
the writers on public law declare “that the belligerent may stop
the ambassador of his enemy on his way.” And why not? If it be
unlawful to carry despatches, with the greater reason it must be
unlawful to carry ministers who write despatches, and to whom
despatches are addressed, who are the agents of one belligerent
government on their way to a neutral country for the express
purpose of enlisting its government in the war against the other.
In some respects it would have been better had Captain Wilkes
seized the Trent and brought her into port. It would then have
become a purely judicial question, to be decided upon precedent
and authority by the appropriate court of admiralty, and the two
governments would not then have been brought face to face as they
are now confronting each other. Under all the circumstances, I do
not think that this seizure presents a justifiable cause of
quarrel on the part of the British government, and I trust you may
take this view of the subject.
In reference to your question in regard to blockade, no
administration within the last half century, up to the end of my
term, would have consented to a general declaration abolishing
privateering. Our most effectual means of annoying a great naval
power upon the ocean is by granting letters of marque and
reprisal. We could not possibly, therefore, have consented to the
Paris declaration which would have left the vessels (for example
of Great Britain or France) free to capture our merchant vessels,
whilst we should have deprived ourselves of the employment of the
force which had proved so powerful in capturing their merchant
vessels. Hence the proposition of Mr. Marcy to abolish war upon
private property altogether on the ocean, as modern civilization
had abolished it on the land. I do not think that a proposition
was ever made to abolish blockade. I certainly have no
recollection of it.
I am rejoiced to learn that Mr. Bright is well; I was afraid, when
I left England, that his health was in an unpromising condition.
Please to remember me in the kindest terms to him and Mr. Gibson.
Miss Lane is in New York; if she were at home, she would have many
kind messages to send you.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, December 19th, 1861.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I have received your favor of the 18th instant, and am truly sorry
to learn the death of my friend Mr. Lanahan. At one period I was
very much attached to him, and I still continue to entertain for
him cordial feelings of kindness......
You ask my opinion on the Slidell and Mason affair, and whether
there is danger of a war with England. I think, as a fair
deduction from British authorities, that Captain Wilkes might have
seized the Trent and brought her into port for adjudication. Had
he done this, it would have become a judicial question, and the
two nations would not have been brought front to front in
opposition to each other. That he only seized the commissioners
and let the vessel go was an act intended for kindness on his
part. Certainly, a war can not grow out of this question, unless
Great Britain desires it, without very bad management on our side.
My kindest regards to the Judge and Mrs. Roosevelt.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, December 21, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have just received your kind letter of the 19th instant, and, in
answer, I think I may say that my health is restored. The swelling
in my legs and feet has disappeared, and I now walk to Lancaster
with great enjoyment.
You advise me to keep quiet, which I shall do for the present. I
shall bide my time, under a perfect conviction that my
administration cannot only be satisfactorily defended, but
triumphantly vindicated.
I wish with all my heart that I could be with you at the meeting
of your children and grandchildren on Christmas; but this is out
of the question. The happy faces and innocent gambols of children
have always had a charm for me. May you live many days in health
and prosperity to enjoy such meetings around the family altar. As
I cannot be present at the hospitable board, I hope you will drink
my health in a glass of the old Custom House Madeira.
I am, like you, a passenger in the omnibus; and, although nothing
could tempt me again to become a driver, yet I cannot avoid
feeling deep anxiety for my country. I trust the danger of a war
with England has passed away; but, if such a disastrous event
should occur, it will be a war created by the newspapers. With my
kindest regards to Mrs. Leiper and all your patriarchal family, I
remain,
Very respectfully, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—Your sweetheart, Miss Lane, has been absent several weeks in
New York, and I do not expect her home until after the New Year. I
sincerely wish she felt more of a disposition than she does to
bind herself in the silken cords which you describe.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, December 25th, 1861.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I have received your favor of yesterday and am happy to inform you
that Doctor Blake has contradicted the picture and Japanese
falsehood in the _National Intelligencer_ of yesterday. You have
probably ere this seen it.
I have passed a very sober, quiet and contented Christmas. I went
to hear Mr. Krotel in the morning and came immediately home. It is
the first day for many a day that I have had no visitors. Miss
Hetty and myself dined together very pleasantly.
Poor Prince Albert! I think in many respects he was to be pitied.
His position was very awkward, but he sustained it with becoming
dignity. He could not assume the position of William the Third and
say, if I am not to be king and am to be placed in a subordinate
position to the queen, I shall return to Holland.
I intend to give Harry Magraw a dinner on Saturday next, but I can
not rival the dinner which he gave when last at home. No such
dinner has ever been given in Lancaster, at least to my knowledge.
I have not received a line from Judge Black nor seen him since he
called here after meeting you in Philadelphia. I am glad he has
been appointed reporter to the Supreme Court.
I enclose you an invitation from Mr. and Mrs. Wharton. I have
answered my own, and informed them that I would send yours to you
in New York. You will judge whether you ought to answer.
I wish you to remain in New York just as long as this may be
agreeable to yourself and to Mr. and Mrs. Roosevelt. You would
have a dull time here at this season.
Please to remember me in the kindest terms to the Judge and Mrs.
Roosevelt, with my ardent wishes that they may pass many years
together in peace, prosperity and happiness.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, December 30, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 27th instant, and thank you most
kindly for your efficient agency in correcting the slander of the
correspondent of the New York ——. Lord Lyons’ letter is quite
satisfactory.
Thank Heaven there is now no danger of an immediate war with
England. That Mason and Slidell would be surrendered to John Bull
I had expected for some time, from the editorials and
correspondence of the New York _Herald_, which is evidently in the
confidence of the administration or some members of it.
I know nothing of what is going on in Washington, except from the
papers. From them I perceive that Judge Black has been appointed
Reporter of the Supreme Court, and that General Cameron has
conferred upon Mr. Holt the appointment of Auditor of General
Fremont’s accounts. I believe that Stanton and Horatio King have
not yet been provided for.
I have not seen an account of your marriage; but this, I expect,
will come along some day. How happy I should be to see you here. I
now soon expect Miss Lane.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
1862-1864.
PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.
The residue of my task can be easily and best performed by tracing
in his correspondence the course of Mr. Buchanan’s remaining years.
As the letters quoted in the last chapter disclose, his tranquillity
was disturbed only by his anxiety for the country, and by the
attacks which were made upon his reputation. He lived through the
whole of the war, through the first administration of Lincoln, the
nomination of McClellan as the Democratic candidate for the
Presidency, the second election of Lincoln, his assassination and
the accession of President Johnson. The new and critical public
questions that arose, the events that marked the wavering fortunes
of the country, found him the same in feeling and opinion about the
necessity for a complete suppression of all the military array of
the Confederate States, and the restoration of the authority of the
Federal Constitution. It would have been quite natural, if the mode
in which he was treated had caused him to shut himself up in a
stolid indifference to the success of the Federal arms. But his
nature was too noble, his patriotism was too genuine, to allow the
insults and injuries that were heaped upon him to affect his love
for that Union in whose service forty years of his life had been
passed. It is needless for me to enlarge upon the character of his
patriotism; for it is attested by every sentiment and feeling that
he was expressing from day to day in his most familiar and
unpremeditated correspondence with his friends. But it is an
important part of my duty to describe with accuracy the steps that
he meditated and that he finally took, for the vindication of the
course of his administration during the last five months of his
term.
It has already been seen that soon after his retirement to
Wheatland, he began to collect and arrange the materials for a
defence; and that he was dissuaded from immediate publication by the
friends who believed that he could not get the public ear. He
withheld the publication of the book until the war was virtually
over; and, in fact, he did not cause it to be published until some
time after the Presidential election of 1864, for it was no part of
his object to promote by it the immediate success of the Democratic
party. What he meant to do was to leave behind him an exact and
truthful account of his administration “on the eve of the
rebellion.” The extent to which it obtained the public attention may
be judged by the fact that five thousand copies of it were sold,
mostly in the course of two years after its first publication, which
was in the year 1866.[177] The sale was not as large as might have
been expected, partly in consequence of the temper of the times, and
partly because it was written in the third person, which made it a
little less lively narrative than it might have been. But although
his name was not put on the title page, the preface disclosed
plainly that he was the author. It was entirely his own work. The
style is clear and strong, and its accuracy has not been—indeed, it
could not well be—seriously questioned. Its statements were chiefly
founded on the public documents of the time to which they related,
and the information furnished to him by the gentlemen of his cabinet
who could assist his recollection. He did not make a direct use, by
quotation, of those ample stores of proof which he held among his
private papers, and which he left for the future use of his
biographer.
Footnote 177:
The preface bears date in September, 1865; and the publishers
entered it for copyright in that year. But the imprint of the copy
which I have used bears date in the year 1866. Mr. Buchanan made
no arrangement with the publishers for any pecuniary profits on
this book, and never received any.
It will be seen from the letters which I am about to quote, that
after the publication of this book, he intended to have prepared,
under his own direction, a full biography, in justice, he said, to
himself and the great men whom he had known and with whom he had
acted. He continued through the remainder of his life to collect
materials for this purpose. Various arrangements were made from time
to time for carrying out this object, but none of them took effect,
partly because of his increasing bodily infirmities, and partly
because he could not have exactly the assistance that he needed. His
intellectual faculties continued, as his correspondence abundantly
shows, to be unimpaired to the last; and such was the tenacity of
his memory, his vast experience, his fund of amusing as well as
important anecdotes, and his thorough acquaintance with the politics
of the time through which he had lived, that an historical work from
his pen, or one written under his immediate direction, would have
been of inestimable value. As it was, he collected a very great mass
of materials for the elucidation of his own history and of the
history of the country from 1820 to 1860. But these materials
remained in an undigested state down to the time of his death; and
when he executed his last will, he inserted in it a provision for
the preparation of a biography, which did not take effect as he had
designed, for a reason to which I have referred in the preface of
the present work. He had acted history, had lived history, and he
was eminently qualified to write history.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, January 3d, 1862.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I have received your favor of the 31st ultimo, directed to me as
the Hon. James Buchanan, and not ex-President Buchanan, which I
was glad to observe. In compliance with its request, I enclose you
a check......
There are things in Mr. Seward’s letter to Lord Lyons which will
furnish the British Government with a pretext to take offence, if
they so desire. When we determined to swallow the bitter
pill,[178] which I think was right, we ought to have done it
gracefully and without pettifogging.
No notice seems to have been taken of the publication of Mr.
Seward’s letter to Mr. Adams, of the 30th November. It may have
been well to write this letter, but to publish it under the
authority of the Government was unwise. It states: “I have never
for a moment believed that such a recognition [of the Confederate
States] could take place without producing immediately a war
between the United States and all the recognizing powers. I have
not supposed it possible that the British government could fail to
see this,” etc., etc. This will be treated as an impotent threat,
by that malignant anti-American journal, the _Times_, and possibly
by a portion of the British people.
You may tell Judge Roosevelt that I have been no little astonished
to find in the excellent _Journal of Commerce_ articles to prove
that the Federal Government possesses, under the Constitution, the
power to issue a paper currency and to make it a legal tender; and
this upon the principle that it has not been expressly prohibited.
They seem to have lost sight of the great principle that Congress
has no power except what is expressly granted or necessarily
implied.[179] Mr. Webster did once darkly intimate on the floor of
the Senate that Congress might authorize the issue of a paper
currency, and whilst it was opposed by the entire Democratic
party, it met no favor with the Whig party. Mr. Clay’s most
strongly urged argument against the Independent Treasury was, that
it might lead to a Government paper currency. I do not recollect
that in my day it was ever claimed, even by the most violent
consolidationist, that a creditor could be forced to take either
the paper of the Bank of the United States or the Government, in
payment of a debt. If the Judge has it convenient, I wish he would
look at my speech in favor of the Independent Treasury, delivered
in the Senate on 29th September, 1837......
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 178:
The surrender of Mason and Slidell.
Footnote 179:
Mr. Buchanan must have referred to communications, not to
editorial opinions. The editorial views of the _Journal of
Commerce_ have always been opposed to the views which he
controverted.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO JUDGE WOODWARD.]
WHEATLAND, September 5th, 1863.
DEAR SIR:—
Until I received your note this morning, the fact that I had
written to you in July last had not for weeks recurred to my
memory. I expected no answer. I probably ought not to have written
at all on the subject of the Conscription Law. Had I reflected for
a moment that you were a Judge of the Supreme Court, as well as
the Democratic candidate for Governor, I should have refrained. My
abhorrence throughout life has been the mixing up of party
politics with the administration of justice. I perceived that in
New York the party were fast making the unconstitutionality of the
Conscription Law the leading and prominent point in the canvass,
and I wrote (I believe with good effect) to an able and
influential friend, guarding him against it, and referring to Mr.
Monroe’s opinion. At the same time it occurred to me that a word
of caution to you confidentially, _as a candidate, not as a
Judge_, might not be inappropriate.
I consider that on the result of your election vaster issues
depend, both for weal and for woe to our country, than on that of
any other gubernatorial canvass ever held in Pennsylvania. I am,
therefore, anxious for your success, and believe it will be
accomplished. My information, though not as extensive as in former
times, proceeds from honest and sound judging Democrats. It is
given voluntarily, and is generally, though not universally,
cheering.
I beg you not to answer this note.
Very respectfully yours,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO JAMES BUCHANAN HENRY.]
WHEATLAND, January 7, 1863.
MY DEAR JAMES:—
I have received your favor of the 5th instant, and am much
indebted to you for Mr. Adams’ oration. I send you the price.
Mr. Croswell has not written to me. It is now out of time for the
publication of an article in reply to Weed’s letter and the
election story. I do not believe that Mr. C. intends to publish
such an article; and I desire that nothing further should be said
to him on the subject. Let him do as he pleases.
I feel very solicitious about the course of Governor Seymour and
the New York Democracy. He will be surrounded by men of principle
in proportion to their interest. I know them well. I trust that
they may not produce a reaction. I have much confidence in
Governor Seymour himself, and regret that he has been obliged to
“back out” in regard to the Police Commissioners.
I owe you many thanks for your kind letter of the 24th ultimo. I
have been calm and tranquil under the abuse I have received, and
would be positively happy were it not for the troubles of the
country. I am much indebted to General Scott for his attack. My
vindication against his charges has been of great service to me
throughout the country south and west of New York. Of this I have
daily evidence. My statements have not, to my knowledge, been
attacked even by the Republican papers. I have no confidence in
the ——, knowing by whom it is controlled. But all things will, at
last, come right.
. . . . . . .
.
Harriet Buchanan is still here, but will return home to-morrow.
“The two Pollies” and Miss Hetty send you their kindest regards.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, January 11, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received yours of the 9th instant, and can assure you I do
not entertain the least idea of making any publication at present,
but shall remain where you have placed me, on the rock of St.
Helena. I am content to bide my time, and not even give to the
world the official documents which I have collected and arranged,
although they would place me above reproach.
I think, under all the circumstances, the administration acted
wisely in surrendering Mason and Slidell. I say nothing of the
accompanying despatch of Seward or of the publication of his
letter to Mr. Adams.
Miss Lane has not yet returned from New York, and I know not when
to expect her.
From your friend always,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. KING.]
WHEATLAND, January 28, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 23d instant, and had heard from
Miss Lane on the subject of the slippers. She has not yet returned
from New York. I desire to repeat my warm thanks to Miss King for
her valued token of regard.
I have just read the rhapsody of —— over the appointment of Mr.
Stanton......
I do most earnestly hope that our army may be able to do something
effective before the 1st of April. If not, there is great danger,
not merely of British, but of European interference. There will
then be such a clamor for cotton among the millions of operatives
dependent upon it for bread, both in England and on the continent,
that I fear for the blockade.
From my heart I wish Stanton success, not only for his own sake,
but that of the country. He is a great improvement on his
immediate predecessor. I believe him to be a truly honest man, who
will never sanction corruption, though he may not be quite able to
grapple with treason as the lion grapples with his prey. I would
rather he had not retained the assistant of the late Secretary and
appointed another of the same; but they are both keen and
energetic.
With my kindest regards to Mrs. King and Annie Augusta, I remain,
very respectfully,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. JOHN A. PARKER.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, February 3, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 28th ultimo, and was grateful to
learn that you had arrived safely in New York. I am sorry to
believe that a letter from me would do you no good at Washington.
Nevertheless, it is proper I should state that when South
Carolina, in 1850 or 1851, invited Virginia to coöperate with her
in the adoption of secession measures, you were active and
efficient in procuring the passage of resolutions by the General
Assembly of your State, refusing to comply with the invitation. I
know that you went to Richmond for this purpose, on the advice of
the late Colonel King and myself, and I learned at the time, from
reliable sources, that you contributed much in producing this
happy result. I do not recollect the precise terms of the
resolutions either of South Carolina or Virginia.
Would that Virginia had persisted in this wise and patriotic
course! Had she done so, she might have become the happy
instrument of bringing back the cotton States and restoring the
Union. Her rash conduct in rushing out of the Union after these
States had, by assaulting and capturing Fort Sumter, commenced the
civil war, has done herself irreparable injury, as well as
inflicted a great calamity upon the whole country.
What have been your opinions concerning secession after 1851, and
until you left the United States, I cannot state, though I have no
reason to doubt their loyalty. You certainly never expressed any
different sentiment to me in all our intercourse. I need not say
that I am wholly ignorant of your present opinions or purposes on
this subject.
I need not assure you that it would afford me sincere satisfaction
to serve you. In case of need, I would advise you to appeal to Mr.
Lincoln himself. He is, I believe, an honest and patriotic man,
with a heart in the right place. The bad health of Mrs. Parker
will be a prevailing argument with him in favor of permitting you
to return to your family, after more than a year’s absence in the
public service, unless powerful reasons should exist against such
a permission.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, February 10, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 5th instant. Glad as I would
have been to see Mr. Carlisle and yourself during the last week, I
was almost satisfied you did not come. The weather was very
unfavorable, and besides _mirabile dictu_! I had a sharp onset
from the gout. Your visit, I hope, will not be long delayed. The
birds already begin to sing at early morn, and the willows are
assuming the livery of spring.
And, so, Mr. Pearce thinks it is a matter of no importance that I
should go down to history as having put my hand into the Treasury
and drawn out $8000 more than was appropriated, to gratify my
personal vanity in furnishing the White House. Thus the fact
stands recorded in the proceedings of Congress, and in the debate
in the House it is made, by Mr. Stevens, a precedent for allowing
Mr. Lincoln to draw from the Treasury $11,000 more than was
appropriated. This is the staple of Mr. Stevens’s argument, the
Representative from my own district. And does Mr. Pearce suppose,
in opposition to these uncontradicted statements before the Senate
and the House, that any man will ever pore over the appropriation
bills to correct the error? Alas for craven fear!
Although I shall never again become an active politician I intend
to take care of Mr. Bright, should there be any necessity for it,
as I think there never will be. His day in Indiana was passed
before his last election to the Senate, if election it could be
fairly called. He can no longer block the way against the
elevation of such able, eloquent, and rising men as Mr. Voorhees.
In any other state of public affairs than the present, the
gentlemen of the cabinet referred to by Thurlow Weed would have
immediately contradicted his charge. Had it even been true, then
their honor would have required this. Since the origin of the
Government there has been no case of violating cabinet confidence
except one, and the great man who was betrayed into it by violent
prejudice was destroyed. It is moral perjury, and no cabinet could
exist if the consultations were not held sacred. The charge of
Thurlow Weed is, therefore, in effect, that some one member of the
cabinet has disclosed to him a cabinet secret, and authorized him
to publish it to the world. General Dix, now at the head of the
police in Baltimore, though worthy of a better place, is one of
the _dramatis personae_, though he was not in the cabinet until a
considerable time after Floyd had resigned. The very day after the
explosion in regard to Indian bonds, I informed Mr. Floyd, through
his relative, Mr. Breckinridge, that I would expect him to resign.
He did so, and informed me that Floyd appeared to be very much
struck with the information. Up until that time Floyd had been
uniformly opposed to the secession party. The escape of Major
Anderson, two or three days thereafter, from Fort Moultrie to Fort
Sumter at midnight, first spiking his cannon and burning his gun
carriages, afforded Floyd an opportunity, as he supposed, to
expire in a blaze of glory.
I am at a loss to know what to do in this matter. I know the enemy
wish to draw my fire in a straggling manner. I wish it, at once,
to embrace and refute the whole line of charges, and I know that
when the entire truth is told my enemies will be confounded, and
by the blessing of God I shall be safe at every point. I shall
decide nothing for two or three days. I may hear from some member
of the cabinet implicated. It would be strange if General Dix
should patiently submit to the charge, though not a member of the
cabinet at all at the time. You may read this letter to our friend
Carlisle, and converse with him on the subjects, of course,
confidentially.
Miss Lane desires to be very kindly remembered to you.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—I forgot to observe that the escape of Major Anderson from
Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter took place on Christmas night, 1860,
but Weed has it in February, 1861. Floyd left the cabinet in
December.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. KING.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, February 10th, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 6th, and am rejoiced that Annie
Augusta is about to be married, with your approbation. I need not
say how heartily I wish that she may be happy......
That Stanton is an able and an honest man there can be no doubt. I
wish him success with all my heart and soul, and he promises very
fairly......
Apropos—you speak of Bright’s expulsion from the Senate. I will
copy a letter which I have just written to Senator Saulsbury, who
sent me his speech upon the subject.
“(Private.)
“MY DEAR SIR:—
“Many thanks for your able speech on the expulsion of Mr. Bright.
I have read it with much interest. The question was purely
judicial, and ought to have been so considered. Still, even in
this point of view, there was room for honest differences of
opinion. Whilst I had reason to believe at the time that Mr.
Bright sympathized with the ultras of the cotton States in
condemning my absolute refusal, in December, 1860, on the demand
of the self-styled commissioners from South Carolina, to withdraw
the troops from South Carolina, yet I had no idea, until I read
his letter and late speech, that he remained in the same state of
feeling after the inauguration of the hostile Confederacy.
“I had always entertained the warmest friendship for Mr. Bright,
and manifested this on every proper occasion whilst I was
President, and therefore felt deep sorrow when I saw the letter to
the President of that Confederacy, recommending a gentleman whose
business it was to dispose of a great improvement in fire-arms;
and this it now appears, was so much a matter of course with him,
that he has forgotten he had ever written such a letter.”
I thank you for the extract from the _Star_ containing an account
of Mrs. Lincoln’s party. I am glad there was no dancing. I had
refused this, even on the carpet, to the earnest request of the
Prince of Wales. The reasons are obvious why balls should not be
given in the White House.
Your conversation with Stevenson was strange. If there be any
member of Jeff Davis’s cabinet in favor of reconstruction, Hunter
must be the man.
I trust that our late victories may be the prelude to those more
decided, and that ere the spring opens we may be in such a
condition as to afford no pretext to England and France to
interfere in our domestic affairs.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. BOYD.]
(Private.)
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, February 17, 1862.
MY DEAR MADAM:—
I was happy to receive your note of the 10th instant. It reminded
me of earlier and happier times, which I trust may speedily
return. If I could be instrumental in restoring peace to the land
in the manner you suggest, or in any other manner, this would fill
my heart with joy. But I see not what can now be done by any man
in the North. The Confederate States commenced this unhappy war
for the destruction of the Union, and until they shall be willing
to consent to its restoration, there can be no hope for peace. We
should hail their return under the Constitution with delight. But
the idea of a recognition of their independence, and a consequent
dissolution of the Confederacy which has rendered us prosperous
and happy in peace and triumphant and glorious in war, cannot be
entertained for a moment. This would be the death knell of their
own safety and welfare, and would destroy the prestige and
character of our country throughout the world.
With every wish for your happiness, I remain, very respectfully,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. STANTON.]
(Private.) WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, February
25, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have thought it a duty of friendship to inform you that the two
letters which you describe in yours to me of the 16th May last, to
wit: that of “the 24th of April, the day after the Baltimore
riot,” and that written “on the Blue Tuesday, the day before the
arrival of the New York regiments,” never reached me. I hope they
may not be in improper hands.
I deem it my right to ask for a copy of the orders issued by the
Secretary of War to the commander of the Brooklyn about the last
of January or beginning of February, 1861, by which the safety of
Fort Pickens was secured, together with the telegraphic despatch
which preceded them, addressed to Messrs. Hunter, Slidell and
Bigler (I believe), of the Senate. Your particular attention must
have been drawn to this subject a few days after the 4th of March,
1861, because in your letter to me of the 14th of that month you
state your recollection to be, that Mr. Holt and General Scott
concurred with me in that arrangement, which you say, “when
proposed in cabinet was approved by Judge Black and myself.”
Although you now belong to an administration which has manifested
intense hostility to myself, and whose organ, at least in this
State, is the _Philadelphia Press_, yet, notwithstanding our
changed relations, I wish you all the success and glory in your
efforts to conquer the rebellion and restore the Union, which your
heart can desire. If I might be permitted to intimate a word of
advice, it would be to write as little as possible for the public
eye. Let your actions speak for themselves, and so far as I can
judge, they have spoken loudly in your favor.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, February 26th, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 21st instant, and owe you many
thanks for your prompt and successful attention to my requests.
You do all things well. It is strange that Mr. Fessenden should
have doubted as to the propriety and necessity of correcting his
assertion that I had expended $8000 more in furnishing the White
House than had been appropriated by Congress for this purpose.
I am very happy to learn that you intend to pay us a visit, and
this “before a great while;” and you were entirely correct in
informing our friend Carlisle that he would, also, receive a
cordial welcome. The sooner the better; but the country now
presents its most gloomy aspect. It is covered by snow, and this
is not sufficient to enable us to sleigh. In a day or two, I hope,
the snow will disappear. Please drop a line to me two or three
days before your departure from Washington, so that I may
certainly be at home on your arrival and send for you to
Lancaster......
Your interview with Stanton was entirely satisfactory. Whenever I
choose to dissipate all the slanders against my administration,
this can be done effectually. It is strange, passing strange, that
the barefaced falsehood of the stealing of arms by Floyd (who is
certainly no better than he ought to be), which was nailed to the
counter more than a year ago by the Report of the Committee on
Military Affairs from Mr. Stanton, should have been repeated again
and again, until it is now almost universally believed. I observe
in Colonel Maynadier’s letter, published in the _National
Intelligencer_, a statement of what is the truth in regard to
Floyd. He was persistently and openly opposed to secession and the
seceders, and was not on terms with their leaders until the
exposure of his connection with the abstracted bonds. Informed at
that time it was expected he should resign, he retired with a
flourish, under the assumed cover of being a violent secessionist
and therefore unwilling to remain longer in the cabinet.
Bright has got what he deserved, though the precedent may be and
doubtless is dangerous. He was thoroughly in league with Davis, or
at least in their hostility to myself. His attack upon me in his
speech was without any foundation, and was doubtless intended to
enlist Republican votes.
Miss Lane desires me to renew to you “the assurance of her
distinguished consideration.”
Ever your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—Maynadier, in his letter dated February 3d, 1862, to the
Potter Committee, says: “He (Floyd) had recently published over
his own signature [this was probably about November, 1860], in a
Richmond paper, a letter on this subject [secession] which gained
him high credit at the North for his boldness in rebuking the
pernicious views of many in his own State.” I do not wish you to
hunt for this letter. Its worth would not be equal to the trouble.
It was, I believe, published in the _Richmond Examiner_, though
possibly the _Enquirer_. It would now be a great curiosity.
Nobody, I presume, in Washington, files these papers.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO JUDGE BLACK.]
WHEATLAND, March 4, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 1st instant, but, I regret,
without the opinion. I am happy to say you are entirely mistaken
in supposing that I suffer from low spirits. I am astonished at my
own health and spirits, and the zest with which I enjoy the calm
pleasures with which Providence has blessed me. It is true that I
regret I had not called the attention of the public nearly a year
ago to certain historical facts furnished by official documents,
which would have relieved me from imputations affecting my
character and, in some degree, that of my party; but I excuse
myself by the consideration that I was too unwell to suffer my
mind to play with a healthy and vigorous action. I am not at all
astonished to learn that _your_ “_views and mine are so far out of
accord_,” and that in my administration I first conceded too
much to the South, and afterwards too much to the present
administration. My policy was well matured, at least by myself,
and was clearly and distinctly presented in the messages of
December, 1860, and January 8th, 1861. From these I never
consciously swerved. The first was approved by every member of the
cabinet except Thompson and Cobb, and to the last I believe there
was no objection. After a full and careful review, I would not, if
I could, alter this policy in any particular. I should have been
glad could you have taken time to run your eyes over the paper
delivered to you by Mr. Glossbrenner, and to have informed me of
any mistakes which, in your judgment, I may have made in regard to
facts. Our opinions may be at variance, but I should be truly
sorry to present ourselves in opposition to each other in regard
to matters of fact.
As to my course since the wicked bombardment of Fort Sumter, it is
but a regular consequence of my whole policy towards the seceding
States. They had been informed over and over again by me what
would be the consequences of an attack upon it. They chose to
commence civil war, and Mr. Lincoln had no alternative but to
defend the country against dismemberment. I certainly should have
done the same thing had they begun the war in my time; and this
they well knew. I am not conscious that the bad conduct of the
South toward me, sustained, I believe, by Bright alone of the
Northern Senators, has prejudiced my judgment against them. He has
got his reward, though perhaps not in a very legitimate manner.
I hope you may be able to find the paper, the last sheets of which
were handed to you by Mr. Stanton. It would be a great loss to me.
On your postscript in relation to General Cass I shall not remark,
further than to say it is not in accordance with my recollection.
Notwithstanding our misunderstandings, I hope we may ever continue
to be friends. Towards you my heart is in the right place. If I
should publish against your advice, it will be because throughout
my life I have refuted slander on the spot, when worthy of
refutation, without regard to consequences. I think I owe this to
the Democracy of Pennsylvania, which is now exhibiting
unmistakable symptoms of a new and vigorous life, and indications
of a continued attachment to myself.
I presume I need scarcely invite you to pay me a visit. This I
promise, however, that if you will come and bring Mrs. Black
along, I shall not introduce any subject which will give you pain,
or on which we can possibly differ.
From your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO HON. ISAAC TOUCEY.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, March 19, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I cannot deny myself the pleasure of expressing the great
satisfaction I have felt in perusing your testimony before Hale’s
committee. I never saw it until a few minutes ago. I knew well how
unjust the charges were against you, and anticipated your
triumphant vindication whenever you should be called upon to make
it, and, therefore, it is not more conclusive than I had expected.
Forney set the report afloat that I was engaged in writing a
history of my administration, life, and times. There is no truth
in this; but it is true that I have collected and arranged the
necessary documents, which might be put in form at any moment, to
justify all my proceedings in regard to the South, since the
election of Mr. Lincoln. Your testimony alone was wanting to make
them perfect. I wish very much I could see you. I could scarcely
ask you to pay me a visit, unless you should take this on your
way, should you have occasion to visit Washington. I need not say
how cordial would be our welcome to Mrs. Toucey and yourself.
How strange have been the fortunes of your colleagues Holt, Dix,
and Stanton! I was somewhat mortified when Holt accepted an
auditorship under Cameron to investigate Fremont’s accounts. I
have a warm regard for General Dix, and think he deserves a better
place than the head of the Baltimore police, where he can acquire
no glory. I wish he were in the field at the head of a proper
command.
My health is excellent, considering my age and late severe
illness. I am contented, and should enjoy myself very much but for
the troubles of the country; still my spirits are cheerful. After
a careful review of all that I have done, or omitted to do, since
the unfortunate 6th of November, 1860, I can lay my hand on my
heart, and say that I have nothing to repent of. Our constant
agreement in all important measures is a solace and comfort, and
endears you to me in a peculiar manner. May you and yours be ever
prosperous and happy.
With my warm and respectful regards to Mrs. Toucey, as well as
those of Miss Lane, I remain,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, April 2, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your kind letter of the 31st ultimo. I had duly
received yours of the 20th, and ought to have answered it, but
truly had nothing to say. Besides, I excuse myself by the
agreeable anticipation that I expect soon to enjoy the pleasure of
seeing you.
I am glad you brought the attention of Judge Black to Weed’s
letter. I have heard from him since, and expect every day to see
him...... A statement was made by an official of Government in a
foreign newspaper, that they [members of my cabinet] had one after
the other offered me the grossest insult. Had such a scene
transpired in my cabinet, they should not have been in office
fifteen minutes. I do not distrust the friendship of Judge Black.
On the contrary, I have no doubt of his devoted attachment, but I
presume he is unwilling to stand alone in the contradiction of the
slander. General Dix might, perhaps, join him; but let it pass, my
time will come.
I am decidedly in favor of prosecuting the war with vigor to a
successful termination; but still I consider it bad policy
unnecessarily to exasperate the Southern people. The insult
offered to the memory of Mr. Calhoun, by changing the name of Fort
Calhoun to Fort Wool, will sink deep into the hearts of the people
of the cotton States—men, women, and children. It was my fortune
to differ from this great and pure man on many important
questions, but his character was so elevated that Clay and Webster
and others pronounced eulogies upon him in the Senate and in the
House after his decease. He died ten years before the commencement
of the troubles, and even before the compromise of 1850. I do not
think the administration will derive much honor from having
attainted his memory. But “_de gustibus non est disputandum_.” Had
he been living, I do not think we should be involved in our
present difficulties.
We live in the hope of soon seeing you. This is a charming spring
day, and the country begins to assume the livery of early spring,
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
(Private.) WHEATLAND, May 17, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I take the chance that this acknowledgment of the receipt of your
acceptable letter of the 15th may reach you before you leave for
New York. I wish you would pass this way either going to or
returning from that city; but this would be too much to ask. This
country is now clothed with rich and beautiful verdure. The next
time you come, and I trust this may be before long, pray bring
your trunk with you.
I have neither seen Judge Black nor heard from him since you left
us. I hope none of my friends will trouble him again about the
Thurlow Weed letter.
In all free countries, fidelity to the head of the government on
the part of the members of his cabinet, whilst belonging to his
political family, has ever been considered both a point of honor
and duty, and has rarely, if ever, been violated. Whilst at
liberty to contract new political engagements, if they should
betray to their new friends or the public what had transpired in
the old cabinet, without the consent of its head, they would be
held justly infamous. If, therefore, the statement made by Weed
were as true as it is infamously false, the irresistible
implication would be that he had received the information from a
member of the cabinet, and thus all of those implicated would be
exposed to the charge until it was brought home to the guilty
individual.
Thurlow Weed is understood to be an agent of the Government. To
serve them he abandoned his position as head of the lobby in the
New York legislature and went to Europe. Whilst in London, he
publishes a letter in a London journal and attaches his own name
to it, stating that Messrs. Stanton, Holt, Dix and Black had
grossly insulted me in cabinet council, and had used expressions
to me which, if true, would have caused their instant removal. Is
this falsehood, proceeding from a _quasi_ official source,
contradicted by any of them?..... Notwithstanding all, I except
Judge Black. I believe his heart is in the right place......
Miss Lane intends to leave here for New York on Thursday next, and
will be at James Henry’s. She would be much gratified to meet you
there.
I fear the carriage is a bad speculation.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, May 27, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 22d, and am always rejoiced to
learn that you are healthy and happy. Neither of us can say:—
“That in our youth we never did apply
Hot and rebellious liquors to our blood,”
though, with the blessing of Providence, we both enjoy “a green
old age.” If we have not been abstemious, we have been temperate,
and used the blessings in our way without abusing them.
Miss Lane is now absent. She left here on Thursday last on a visit
to her uncle at Oxford Church, and her cousin, James B. Henry, on
Staten Island. You always live in her kind memory.
I feel more and more deeply every day for the sad condition of our
country. May the Almighty Governor of the world pardon the
national sins and corruptions of this people, and restore the
Constitution and the Union, and perpetuate our civil and religious
liberties! Without His interposition, I can see no determinate end
to our troubles.
My health is as good as usual. Ever your friend,
Very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MISS SEATON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, June 23, 1862.
MY DEAR MR. BUCHANAN:—
My father, at my request, allows me to be his deputy in
acknowledging, with many thanks, your kind and interesting
letter relative to the graceful note and gift from the Prince of
Wales. He desires me to say that he thinks it would be well to
publish the Prince’s letter, as the fact of your having received
it has been made public; while the cordial and friendly
sentiment expressed by the Prince for the American people, and
for yourself as their chief, would undoubtedly be welcomed by
the country. My father thinks that, so far from there being any
impropriety in making the letter public, justice to the Prince
seems rather to make it necessary; and he will be happy to make
the _Intelligencer_ the medium of communicating it, should you
so desire. Pray let him know, or, rather, may I not say, let
_me_ be the recipient of your decision, for I have not yet had
the pleasure of placing your autograph among my otherwise
valuable collection, where it would hold, I need not say, a
choice place, not only from the warm personal regard I entertain
for you, dear Mr. Buchanan, but from the fact that I consider
you the last constitutional President we shall ever see. At a
moment when passion whirled the country to frenzy, you had the
true courage to refrain—to abide within the limits marked out by
the Constitution for the Executive. Were you still with us, I
for one believe that we should not now be engaged in this
fearful fratricidal strife. Let me not, however, enter upon this
saddest of themes; how sad you, in your peaceful home, can
hardly conceive; and you and Miss Lane may congratulate
yourselves at not being made unhappy by the sight of a conflict
which has uprooted society here, separated friends and families,
severed the dearest ties. Your reign was a peaceful one; would
that it were just beginning.
I am glad to assure you of the continued health of my parents, who
are in the possession of all that makes old age valuable—love,
reverence, and troops of friends, among whom they have so long
numbered you as one best appreciated. We rejoice to learn that you
bear the honors of your years so well, and I trust that you may
continue to possess the blessing of my father’s activity and
youthfulness of spirits, which are a marvel to us all, although
his next birthday will ring out seventy-seven! I hope that Miss
Lane is still as lovely and charming as I always thought her. Tell
her that when —— sailed last week for England, I regretted that he
was not accompanied by one whom I should be well pleased to see
our representative just now at Balmoral.
I suppose we can hardly expect ever to see you here; yet I hope
that we may meet again; but if not, your sweet message induces me
to think that I shall be still kindly remembered. Pray let it be
so. What a volume I am sending you; can you pardon me for such an
infliction?
With warm regards to yourself from my parents, and my cordial
remembrance to Miss Lane, believe me, dear Mr. Buchanan,
Always very sincerely yours,
JOSEPHINE SEATON.
The following is the letter of the Prince of Wales to Mr. Buchanan,
referred to by Miss Seaton. It was written while the Prince was on
his travels in the East. The full length portrait of himself, which
accompanied it, painted by Sir John Watson Gordon, remained at
Wheatland until Mr. Buchanan’s death. It is now the property of Mr.
Johnston.
[THE PRINCE OF WALES TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
JAFFA, March 29, 1862.
DEAR MR. BUCHANAN:—
Permit me to request that you will accept the accompanying
portrait as a slight mark of my grateful recollection of the
hospitable reception and agreeable visit at the White House on the
occasion of my tour in the United States.
Believe me that the cordial welcome which was then vouchsafed to
me by the American people, and by you as their chief, can never be
effaced from my memory.
I venture to ask you, at the same time, to remember me kindly to
Miss Lane, and believe me, dear Mr. Buchanan,
Yours very truly,
ALBERT EDWARD.
[MR. DERRICK TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1862.
DEAR SIR:—
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the
2d inst., enclosing a check for $100, as a contribution to the
fund for the Pennsylvania Soldiers’ Relief Association, and to
express to you the thanks of the committee of that association,
appointed to solicit contributions, for your very liberal and
unsolicited donation. I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
A. H. DERRICK.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. WM. FLINN.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, July 12, 1862.
DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 10th instant, and you will
please to accept my thanks for the two missing numbers of the
_Globe_ and the _Congressional Directory_. Be good enough, also,
to present my acknowledgements to Mr. Shiel for the _Directory_,
and say I appreciate it highly as a token of his regard. By the
same mail I received a copy of the Blue Book under the frank of
Mr. Hunter, and directed in the handwriting of good Mr. Faherty. I
presume you caused this to be sent; but whether or not, you need
give yourself no further trouble in this matter.
Miss Lane regrets very much that she was not at home during your
visit, but hopes that it will not be long until you repeat it.
I am glad to learn that Miss Jones has made so good a match. I
hope her father may be prosperous and happy. I have not heard from
him nor of him since a few days after you left Wheatland.
I wish I had some news which might interest you. The suspense was
dreadful whilst the fight was proceeding near Richmond, and I felt
greatly relieved when I learned that General McClellan and our
brave army had escaped destruction. His strategy was admirable,
but I am at loss to know why he did not occupy his present
position from the beginning. Mystery yet hangs over the whole
affair, though I feel very confident that when all is unravelled
McClellan will be justified.
With my kindest regards to Mrs. Flinn, I remain always
Truly your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, July 12th, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have not answered your letter of the 1st instant, awaiting the
answer of Stackpole and Pierre; but as they have not yet come to
hand, I presume I need not expect them. I shall be right glad to
see them, though much obliged to you for your prudent caution.
I am glad to learn that Senator Wright talks of paying me a visit
on his return to Indiana. You may say to him that if he should, he
shall receive a cordial welcome.......
We felt the deepest anxiety during the fight before Richmond, and
I felt a heavy pressure removed from my heart when we learned that
McClellan and his brave army were safe. Without doubt his change
of position in the face of a superior army evinced great skill in
strategy; but why was the wrong position originally selected? I
still feel great confidence in McClellan, and with all my heart
wish him success. Still, there is a mystery in the whole affair
which time alone can unravel.
Please to remember me most kindly to Messrs. Carlisle and Riggs.
How happy I should be to see both, or either of them.......
Mr. Shunk was here a few days ago, who came from Judge Black’s in
company with our C. J. Lowry. The Judge had too bad a headache to
leave home, and therefore sent his son-in-law.
Miss Lane desires to be most kindly remembered to you.
From your friend always,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[SIR HENRY HOLLAND TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
BROOK STREET, LONDON, July 18th, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Your letter, which I received through Lord Lyons, was very welcome
to me, as an expression of your friendship and regard—even the
more welcome, in this sense, from its coming amidst these
troublous and ungenial times, when all old feelings and relations
seem to be perverted or put aside. I scarcely know whether it is
more pleasurable or painful to look back to those few happy days
at Washington in October, 1860. Pray tell Miss Lane, with my
affectionate regards, that I have not written to her lately, from
a difficulty in writing at all to America during the present state
of things. No letter could be written without referring to them,
and no such reference could be made without pain; nor could any
comment be possible, where every issue to this unhappy struggle is
shrouded in such perfect darkness. I have letters now lying before
me from Mr. Everett and Thurlow Weed (the latter dated as late as
the 5th July, from New York), and I see from both how completely
events have belied all calculation, and how little is seen, or can
safely be conjectured, as to the future. Lord Lyons, too, has been
breakfasting with me this morning, and we have been talking at
length over all the recent and present events of the cabinet at
Washington and the armies in the field. He professes the same
inability to form a judgment as to the issues of the war. The
universal opinion here is (and it has been mine from the very
outset) that it must end in separation, in some form or other, and
that the really important point now is, what shall be the border
line. I have the conviction (which I expressed in a former letter)
that the course followed during the last few months of your
Presidency was that best fitted to avert this misfortune, had it
been possible to do so. All succeeding events, even down to these
late terrible battles in front of Richmond, confirm me in this
impression. It was well worth the effort made to win the South
back, by gentle and generous means. The issue, thus far, shows how
completely an opposite course of action has failed of effect. I
will quit this subject, however, the rather so, as I have but a
few more minutes in which to write, and the mail goes to-day.
The Prince of Wales has returned from his long journey in Egypt,
Syria and Greece, in thorough health, and with great benefit in
every way. He has been a great comfort to the Queen since his
return. The Queen is in good health, but still deeply sorrowing
over what is hardly less a grief to the country than to herself.
She does her public work admirably, as usual, but wishes no public
appearances this year. I received from her, three days ago, two
beautiful and affecting volumes connected with the memory of the
Prince Consort. Your letter came to my hands while I was writing
to thank her for them.
We are all prosperous here, save the distress in the cloth
manufacturing districts, from the want of the raw material. It
seems likely that Parliament will have to make some provision
against the probable increase of this distress, as the year goes
on.
Last year I went to Constantinople, and Athens, and some parts of
Asia Minor. This year I shall first pay some visits in the extreme
north of Scotland (the Duke of Sutherland, Edward Ellis, etc.),
and then go into Spain. Lady H. and my daughter go to Switzerland
for a few weeks.
I must hasten to a close. Again let me ask you to keep me in Miss
Lane’s remembrance, and to believe me ever, my dear sir,
Yours very faithfully,
H. HOLLAND.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, July 25, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favors of the 10th and 23d instants. Miss
Lane is greatly indebted to you for your photograph, which has
been placed in her book.
How long I ought in silence to bear ——’s slanders is now a serious
question. I have not seen his late speech at Harrisburg, but
understand from a friend that it charges me with being in constant
correspondence with foreign governments, urging the recognition of
the Confederacy. This is in substance a charge of treason, without
the shadow of a pretext, and ought to be punished by an appeal to
our courts of justice. Miss Lane desires to be kindly remembered
to you.
Your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, August 6, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I write to thank you for your letter of the 24th ultimo, and for
Mr. O’Sullivan’s letters. He is an able and clear headed man. I
have read them according to your request.
—— is one of those inflictions which give me but little trouble.
His malignity without a cause almost amounts to insanity. He
cannot avoid abusing me. In this manner base minds relieve
themselves from the weight of obligations to their benefactors. I
have never read his speech. You speak of it as if it had been a
meeting of “the Republican and Douglas parties.” You may rest
assured that no such thing exists as a Douglas party in this
State. The former members of it are now thorough Democrats. The
very few exceptions, such as ——, ——, ——, and —— are the blackest
of Black Republicans. They had “a war meeting” in Lancaster on
Saturday last. It was not large, though many good Democrats came
to attend it. The first speaker was ——, and he led off in abuse of
me. Many then left. It is represented as an overwhelming meeting,
but it was, in truth, a comparatively small affair.
—— is doing Mr. Lincoln’s administration great injury. He is
exasperating the Democratic party against it, because he speaks as
if he were on confidential terms with the President...... The
Democratic party are the support of the war for the Constitution
and the Union, _as they were_, and yet they are denounced as
traitors by such scamps as ——. This cannot long endure. But I have
spent too much time on such a ——.
We have had much company during the last month; but we hear
nothing of Carlisle and Riggs. How rejoiced we shall always be to
see you!
My own health continues good. Miss Lane desires to be most kindly
remembered to you.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—Would it not be well to send the carriage to New York for
sale?
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, August 15, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I was much gratified to learn from yours of the 9th instant the
favorable opinions entertained of my administration by Messrs.
Saulsbury and Washington. Such opinions begin to be a little more
common than they were a year ago, and they will be still more
common in another year......
We are all alive here with recruiting, and many, very many of our
best young men are entering the service. The present is believed
to be the crisis of the war, and for this reason they come forward
to do their duty.
I wish I had some news to communicate which would be agreeable to
you. We are proceeding in the same “John Trot” style as when you
left us. My health is as good as usual, and better than I deserve.
Miss Lane desires to be most kindly remembered to you.
By the bye, I enclose you a copy of a note addressed by me to Mr.
Lincoln on the 21st October last, which neither he nor his private
secretary has ever had the civility to answer. I presume he has
been made to believe by —— who enjoys and will betray his
confidence that I have opposed him in the war for the restoration
of the Union. I would make no appeal to him; but if you are on
terms with the private secretary, you might inquire after the
books. They came to me from poor Benton, whose name is written in
each volume.
From your friend, as ever,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. HUGHES.]
(Private.) WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER,
September 1, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received yours of the 29th ultimo, and regret that you
should have been prevented from paying me your intended visit. I
need not say you should have received a cordial welcome. I hope
you may ere long pay Wheatland a visit, when, without reserve, we
can talk over together the sad condition of the country, and the
course which ought to be pursued by the Democratic party in the
present dangerous emergency. It has ever been the bulwark of the
Constitution and the Union, and its action must now be in unison
with its glorious past history. My age and my position admonish me
to leave it in the care and guidance of younger men, and I rejoice
that you are now at the helm.
The next Congress will be by far the most important that has ever
assembled under the Constitution, and I deeply regret that any
difficulty should have arisen in the selection of a candidate for
the York district. I had hoped that Mr. Glossbrenner might have
been the man, because I know he is sufficiently firm and true for
the crisis. If my interference should promise any good, I shall
interfere.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, October 28, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I thank you sincerely for your kind letter of caution and advice.
I now send you my answer to General Scott. This was forced upon me
by a voluntary attack, which was little expected. Although I did
not altogether trust him, our relations since I ordered him to
Washington had been of a very friendly character.
You will please to take the document immediately to the office of
the _Intelligencer_. I cannot doubt that they will publish it
immediately. I leave it unsealed, so that you may first look over
it, if you think proper; but you will please to seal it up before
delivery. Mr. Carlisle might also see it, if this could be done
without delay.
I would thank you to immediately acknowledge its receipt. I should
be glad you could examine the proof; but this I presume is
impossible.
I have no doubt they will publish it, though their remarks
preceding Scott’s statement are unfriendly. This I could not have
expected from Col. Seaton.
Your friend always,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. C. E. BENNETT.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, October 29, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have this moment received your letter of the 25th instant,
informing me that a number of ladies and gentlemen of Cincinnati
had formed themselves into a reading club, and had honored me by
adopting a resolution calling it after my name. I need not say how
much this token of their regard has touched the heart of an old
public servant in retirement. It shall be gratefully remembered.
The association, conducted with wise and persevering effort,
cannot fail to prove highly useful both to its own members and to
society. The solitary reading of an individual for mere pastime is
of comparatively little value either to himself or to others. The
information thus acquired soon passes away, and is forgotten,
unless fixed upon the memory and impressed upon the heart by an
interchange of opinions with congenial spirits. The participation
of ladies in the duties of the association is calculated to
exercise the most happy influence. It will promote refinement,
religion and morality among its members.
May the “Buchanan Reading Club” flourish and produce good fruit
long after he, whose name it bears, shall have been gathered to
his fathers.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, November 7, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Many thanks for your kind letter of the 29th ultimo. You have, no
doubt, frequent occasions to defend me, and I am truly grateful
that you embrace them with the ardor of friendship. None doubt
your ability.
When the troubles were approaching, I determined prayerfully upon
my course, from which I never departed. This was done after much
reflection, and had my earnest advice and recommendations been
followed, we should have had no war. It is now alleged if I had
plunged into hostilities with four or five hundred men, at an
early period, this would have terrified the South into submission.
General Scott’s attack upon me was most unexpected and causeless.
Perhaps it may prove all for the best.
I owe you many thanks for the copy of “Plain Facts,” etc., and I
should feel much indebted to you for half a dozen more copies. I
have looked over it with great interest. It has revived many
agreeable memories.
I congratulate you on having become a grandfather, and trust that
the boy may prove an honor to yourself and a distinguished and
useful citizen of his country.
I do not intend to remove from this place. I simply joined a
friend in purchasing a farm in Chester County, because at the
moment he was unable to pay for the whole of it. He desired it for
a residence, and as soon as he is able to pay for my half I shall
convey it to him.
I am truly rejoiced to learn that the Government is doing you a
simple act of justice. My health, thank God! continues good for a
man of my age.
Miss Lane desires to be kindly remembered to you.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, November 13, 1863.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I have received your letter of the 11th instant with Judge Black’s
opinion, and am glad that you have at length decided.
I enclose a letter directed to you. The Misses Johnstons will not
leave until next week. By them I shall send the package for Mrs.
Stevens, and another package, I presume, from the convent at
Georgetown, which Father Keenan gave me a few days ago. Father
Balf, his associate, brought it from Reading, where it had been
carried by a Mrs. McManus. It must have been on the way for some
time.
I shall go to the bank and make out your list of taxable property,
including your horse and your gold watch. I know not how I omitted
to enclose you the circular. Horses and watches are included in
it.
Please to remember me very kindly to Mr. Royal Phelps, and tell
Mr. Schell I heartily sympathize with him in the loss of his
election. It is a consolation to know that the people of his
district will be the greatest sufferers by his defeat.
My health and strength, I thank God, appear to be daily improving,
and we get along in great tranquility and peace. Miss Hetty is
very kind and attentive, and has been all I could desire since you
left.
With my affectionate regards to Mrs. Roosevelt and my best
respects to the Judge,
I remain yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P. S.—Judge Black, as Dr. Nevin informs me, went to Washington on
Monday last. I shall be prepared, I think, before the meeting of
Congress without his aid.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO JAMES BUCHANAN HENRY.]
WHEATLAND, November 22, 1862.
MY DEAR JAMES:—
I have received your favor of the 19th instant, and am happy to
learn that my manuscript is safe in Mr. Schell’s hands. You
suggest that it might be proper to extend it so as to embrace the
history of my whole administration. I fear I am not able to
undertake the task. Besides, this would require my presence in
Washington, or that of some trusty person, to collect and arrange
the documents......
Things move on as usual at Wheatland. Judging from the number of
letters and papers I receive, I infer that my letter to General
Scott has been well received by the public.
I expected ere this to have seen in the _Intelligencer_ a short
reply which I made to General Scott’s last. I probably should have
made no reply, but for his introduction of the “stolen arms.”
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, November 27, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your letters of the 24th and 25th instants, and I
am placed under additional obligations. I am already so much in
debt to you, and have so little means of payment, that I shall
have to take the benefit of the insolvent law. I am also greatly
obliged to my old and valued friend Colonel Seaton for his
fairness and kindness.
The cause of the delay is curious, and was entirely beyond your
control.
I should be sorry if General Scott would pursue the controversy
further. I do not charge him with intentional misrepresentation,
for of this I believe him to be incapable; but his memory is more
impaired than even I had believed. He has got a great many things
jumbled together, and does not seem to have any distinct ideas of
what has passed since he came to Washington in December, 1860. I
was rejoiced when he left the command of the army, though things
do not seem to have much improved since.
I do not see ——’s paper, but I understand that he is on a new tack
of downright falsehood. He announces that political assemblies
have been held at Wheatland, and even mentions the names of
gentlemen present, without the shadow of foundation. Judge Black
and Wm. B. Reed are always two of the _dramatis personæ_. It is
months since I have seen either, though I often hear from the
latter, though not from the former.
I have taken no part in party politics since my return from
Washington further than to express my opinions on current events
to a few personal friends and to give my vote. They (the ——’s),
have now got me up for Senator, when they well know that there is
no office which I should think for a moment of accepting.
I am in my usual health. Miss Lane is not at home this evening, or
she would send her kindest regards.
I send you the $2 which you paid for the _Intelligencers_.
Ever your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, December 6, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 30th ultimo, and am gratified
that you think so well of my letters to General Scott. That the
editor of the Boston _Post_ should not have published them, is to
me a matter of astonishment, little reason as I have to be
astonished at any event. Throughout New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
the great West, they have been extensively republished and, I
think, have done much good. New England, however, except
Connecticut, is a sealed book. General Scott has, I believe, made
a final reply, but it has not yet reached me. This I shall not
answer, unless it contains something imperatively requiring it. I
have but few copies, and I cannot supply the demand. I send you
one of each.
I fear that your History of Democracy, of which I think highly, is
so far behind that it will require years for you to overtake the
present time. This period would furnish you ample illustrations of
the conservative wisdom of its principles.
You ask me what I think of Messrs. Holt, Stanton and Dickinson. I
cannot answer this question without going too much into detail.
Miss Lane desires to be very kindly remembered to you. Should you
visit Washington, we should be most happy to see you, either on
your way or your return.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—Please to pardon me for having inadvertently written on two
sheets.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO HON. ISAAC TOUCEY.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, December 6, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Yours of the 19th ultimo afforded me sincere pleasure. I had
written to you several months ago, and from the fact it was never
acknowledged, I inferred it had never been received. I should be
glad to know whether I was correct.
My answers to General Scott have been well received throughout
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the Western States, and have, I
think, produced a good effect. Not so, in New York and New
England, with the exception of Connecticut. I am informed they
were not published in Greene’s Boston _Morning Post_!! So much for
gratitude.
I perceive this moment by the papers that Scott has written a
third letter. I shall not reply to it unless something in it
should render this absolutely necessary.
I wonder that General Scott has not alluded to the resignation of
General Cass. I have not heard from the old gentleman since we
separated. It may become necessary that I should allude to his
offer and desire to withdraw his resignation and return to the
cabinet.
In a memorandum made by me some time after the event, I state as
follows: “On Monday, December 17, 1860, both Mr. Thompson and
Judge Black informed me that they had held conversation with
General Cass on the subject of his resignation, and that he had
expressed a desire to withdraw it and return to the cabinet. I
gave this no encouragement. His purpose to resign had been known
for several days, and his actual resignation had been prepared
three days before it was delivered to me. The world knew all about
it, and had he returned the explanation would have been very
embarrassing,” etc. Am I correct?
I send you a copy of the joint order of Mr. Holt and yourself. I
wrote to you before, as I have already stated (the letter may not
have been received), on the subject of the preparation of a
statement by yourself in regard to your course in the Navy
Department during the last months of the administration. I know
you took measures to prepare for the approaching troubles with a
wise precaution. Your testimony before the Hale Committee proves
this to be the fact.
Miss Lane desires to be kindly remembered to Mrs. Toucey and
yourself. I wish we could enjoy the privilege of seeing you both
at Wheatland.
With my kindest regards to Mrs. Toucey, I remain always,
Very respectfully, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—Please to acknowledge this in a line on its receipt. You can
afterwards write.
[SENATOR SAULSBURY TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
“_Resolved_, That after it had become manifest that an
insurrection against the United States was about to break out in
some of the Southern States, James Buchanan, then President, from
sympathy with the conspirators and their treasonable project,
failed to take necessary and proper measures to prevent it.
Wherefore he should receive the censure and condemnation of the
Senate and the American people.”
SENATE CHAMBER, WASHINGTON, Dec. 15, 1862.
HON. JAMES BUCHANAN:
DEAR SIR:—
Above is a copy of the resolution just offered in the Senate, by
Mr. Davis, of Kentucky. We let the Republicans manage the question
of its present consideration. Trumbull objected. My impression is
that it will be the occasion for great misrepresentation and abuse
of yourself and your administration, but whether the Senate will
be so unjust as to pass the resolution, under the circumstances,
may be doubtful. Those with whom you were most intimate are not
here to defend you. I shall, of course, protest against it, and if
you think it prudent to convey me any information to aid me in
opposing the resolution, I should be happy to receive it.
Your obedient servant,
W. SAULSBURY.
Have you copies of your letters in reply to General Scott?
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, December 16th, 1862.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have just received your favor of the 15th instant. I think you
will come to the conclusion that I ought not to publish. I have
also received Mr. Davis’ resolution, which I consider infamous.
If, two years after a Presidential term has expired, the Senate
can go back and try to condemn and execute the former incumbent,
who would accept the office? Besides, the charge is wholly without
foundation, as is established by my letters to General Scott. I
have sent some copies of them to Senator Saulsbury, who sent me a
copy of the resolution......
Unless the resolution is the result of a caucus, I should hardly
think it could pass the Senate. I may have occasion for Mr.
Carlisle’s professional services before the termination of the
proceedings.
From your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO JAMES BUCHANAN HENRY.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, December 19, 1862.
MY DEAR JAMES:—
I have received yours of the 15th instant, with your description
of the property on Staten Island. I have no doubt it is a correct
representation. The distance from the landing, thirty minutes’
walk and two miles from your own house is an objection; but the
idea of keeping four men servants and such an establishment as
would be necessary, is scarcely consistent with my means. I have
lost heavily by the troubles of the times, and I wish to preserve
the principal of what I am worth (chiefly) for my family. Besides,
in my peculiar position, which you perfectly understand, my
purchase or removal would give occasion to fresh rumors of a
disagreeable character. I have about $15,000 in currency, which I
am very desirous to invest, and I wish you could assist me in
doing it. I presume an investment in this property would yield but
a small interest as rent. I might add that the Democracy of
Pennsylvania, now just rising into power, to which I owe so much,
would be outraged at my abandonment of the State in my old age.
You have doubtless witnessed the infamous attempt of Senator Davis
to pass a resolution of censure on myself; and, although it has
failed, the spirit to do me injustice still prevails in the
Republican party. They will, at last, without the least just
cause, endeavor to cast the responsibility of the war upon myself.
Although this is simply ridiculous in itself, they will endeavor
to make it appear a reality.
There is some malignant person in New York who sends me
disagreeable slips from New York papers, which I generally burn
without reading. In the last one, my eye was caught by ——, printed
at the head of a low caricature on myself. I just thought that Mr.
—— had made a bad selection of ——. If this gentleman had not
offered to correct Thurlow Weed’s lies, I should have had this
done in some other manner. The time has now passed. I presume he
was afraid; and certainly he was under no obligation to assume
this task.
Mr. John Quincy Adams delivered an address before the New York
Historical Society on the 30th April, 1839, _which I very, very
much_ desire to obtain. I spoke earnestly to Mr. Schell about it
the last time he was here, but I suppose he has forgotten it. I
would give any reasonable price for a copy. I wish very much that
you would procure me one. If this cannot be done, you might find
it in some of the public libraries, and make a copy for me from
pages 68 and 69, of what he says on the subject of secession.
We are getting along here in the usual style. I am not
disheartened, but, trusting in God, I hope my enemies will obtain
no advantage over me.
The two Harriets and Miss Hetty desire to be kindly remembered to
Mrs. Henry and yourself.
With my kindest regards to her, I remain,
Yours very affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MRS. CALEB B. SMITH TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WASHINGTON, December 26th, 1862.
HONORED SIR:—
Your check for $30 was duly received. Your benevolent wishes have
been accomplished. Our Christmas feast was all that we could have
anticipated, and many a poor soldier’s heart did “leap for joy.”
With many thanks, I am
Yours respectfully,
MRS. CALEB B. SMITH.
Per C. M. M.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. J. J. ROOSEVELT.]
WHEATLAND, February 14, 1863.
MY DEAR MADAM:—
I often hear of your health and happiness through Harriet, but
have determined to hear directly from yourself, if I can
accomplish this by addressing you a letter. It is now “the auld
lang syne” since we first met; but to save all unpleasant
feelings, I was then much older than yourself. You captivated me
at once, and I have ever since remained faithful and true, and am
now, in my old age, your devoted friend. I should be a happy, as I
am a contented, man, were it not for the calamities of the
country. Still, I enjoy the consciousness that for many years I
warned my countrymen of the approaching danger; and during my
administration I did every thing in my power to preserve the
Union. Until I began to write history, I never fully appreciated
the part which those called the Douglas Democrats had in hastening
the catastrophe. Had they, at Charleston, simply consented to
recognize the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott
case, the Democratic party would not have been divided. This was
all on which the Southern delegates insisted. They said truly that
it made no difference to them, in point of fact, whether slavery
was abolished in the territories by act of Congress, according to
the Republican creed, or by an act of the Territorial Legislature,
according to the creed of squatter sovereignty. The delegation
from New York, headed by Dean Richmond, by their refusal to submit
to the constitutional laws of the land, as declared by the Supreme
Court, committed a fatal blunder. It would be curious to speculate
what might have been the present condition of the country, had the
Fernando Wood, instead of the Dean Richmond delegates, been
admitted at Charleston. Still, all this affords no excuse for the
conduct of the secessionists, and for their attack on Fort Sumter.
I have been twice disappointed in not seeing Prince John.[180] He
is now, I perceive, figuring extensively in politics, and, I
trust, successfully. He is able, eloquent, witty and eccentric. He
sometimes carries too much sail for his ballast, but I like him
very much. Why cannot he and Judge Roosevelt take a run to
Wheatland? How much good it would do me to see them!
I have not heard from our much valued friend, Augustus Schell, for
a long time.
Is it not strange that among a population so numerous, and so
intelligent and enterprising as ours, the war has not yet produced
one great General. McClellan is the best among them, unless it may
be Rosecrans. During the French Revolution there sprang up, often
from the ranks, Generals of the first order, possessing dash and
strategy, and capable of conducting a war of invasion in the most
efficient manner.
I sometimes hear of Lady Ousley, through Miss Lane. I rejoice that
her daughter is so well married, and shall ever hear of her health
and prosperity with the greatest satisfaction. When you write,
please to remember me to her in the kindest terms. Remember me,
also, kindly to Sir William.
Miss Lane feels the death of her brother very sensibly.
It would require much ingenuity to reconcile the apparently
conflicting statements of M. Mercier and Mr. Seward. These
will not, I think, lead to any serious consequences. The
difficulty here arises from the modern practice of publishing
indiscriminately diplomatic correspondence.
Please to remember me most kindly to the Judge, and believe me
ever to be
Respectfully and affectionately your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 180:
Mr. John Van Buren, to whom this _soubriquet_ was long applied.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO NAHUM CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, February 23, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received yours of the 16th instant, and I can scarcely tell
you how much obliged I feel for it and the enclosed papers. In
consequence of your information, I have been able to find
everything I sought.
I feel how important it would be for myself to publish a
collection of my speeches on the different subjects to which you
refer, and especially on slavery; but I am too old and too lazy to
undertake the task. There are a few of these speeches which might
be useful to the country when they reach the point of examining
seriously the acts of the present administration outside of the
war.
Miss Lane and myself were highly gratified with your last
interesting visit. You became more like a member of the little
family than ever before. The information of which you possess so
inexhaustible a store was communicated in a familiar manner, and
we enjoyed your conversation very much. How delighted we should
always be to see you, but your distance forbids the hope that we
can often enjoy this pleasure.
Miss Lane left me on Tuesday last on a visit to her Uncle Edward
near Philadelphia. I sent your letter after her.
I wish I had some news to communicate which might prove
interesting to you. I know nothing of this kind for the present,
and to speculate concerning the future in the terrible condition
of our country would be vain labor.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, March 19, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 12th instant, and always rejoice
to hear of your good health and prosperity.
I have been absent for a few days on a visit to a friend in
Chester county, and on my return home I was rejoiced to find
Governor Porter. We passed a very pleasant time together, talking
of old times, and of the present as well as the past.
Miss Lane has not been at home for several weeks. She has been on
a visit to her uncle and his family at Oxford Church.
I wish I had some news to communicate which would be interesting
to you. I have almost ceased to speculate upon the future
condition of our country, and yet I entertain much hope that all
will yet be well. I cannot entertain the idea of a division of the
Union. May God, in His good providence, restore it!
From your friend, as ever,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, March 20, 1863.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I send you a letter just received from Mrs. Roosevelt in the very
condition it came to hand, and yet I scarcely believe it has been
violated. The envelope directed to me was open just as I send it.
The talented and faithful Spencer will soon deliver a lecture on
temperance. He has invited the girls to attend, and promised to
procure them tickets. That it will be able and eloquent you will
not doubt.
Two or three days ago I received a letter from old Mary Wall. She
writes to me, she says, because Miss Hetty and yourself have been
married and left Wheatland. Who are the happy and well governed
husbands she does not mention. Poor old thing! She must be in a
forlorn condition. I have enclosed her letter to Doctor Blake, and
requested him to inquire into her situation. Miss Hetty says she
might probably be admitted into Christ Church Hospital in West
Philadelphia. She is, I believe, a good Episcopalian, and has
several hundred dollars, if any body would take the trouble of
collecting it for her. I sincerely pity her.
Please to return the enclosed to brother Edward. Your purchases,
Miss Hetty says, have all arrived.
With love to all, yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, March 21, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I am much indebted to you for the _Daily Globe_ of April, 1862,
containing your letter to the editor. I was not aware that this
had been published by Mr. Rives, and I think you were, also,
ignorant of it. But it is just the thing.
I enclose you a letter, which I have received from Mary Wall. Pray
keep it a profound secret that Miss Lane and Miss Hetty have both
been married. I should like to know who are their husbands. I pity
the old woman, and would cheerfully contribute to her wants, but I
cannot pay her expenses to England. Besides, she would be in
greater want of money there than she is here. There is an
excellent Episcopal Institution for such persons in Philadelphia,
and I think through the influence of Miss Lane she might obtain a
home in it. What property has she? I cannot make this out from her
letter. Is she a member in full communion with the Episcopal
Church? Miss Hetty thinks she is. Miss Harriet has been absent for
some time. From your benevolent heart I know you will take
pleasure in answering these questions. Above all, do not let the
old woman know anything of the Episcopal Institution, lest she
might be disappointed. I do not know that they would charge her
anything for her living; but if they should, it would be a trifle.
If she had anything to give, this might facilitate her admission.
I very often think most affectionately of you and other
friends in Washington. But why should I tax their time by
asking them to write answers to letters of mine containing no
news. Correspondence ought to be an interchange of equivalents
between friends. I have no news to give, and to write letters
on the beauty of virtue and on the fitness of things to those
who are already virtuous, and are just what they ought to be,
would be a vain labor. I wish I had something to communicate
which might provoke a long letter from you in reply. My life
is tranquil and monotonous, although I see much company,
especially from my own State. Ere a month, I shall enter my
seventy-second year, should I live so long, and my health is
excellent, considering my age. If you could know how glad I
should be to see you, and to talk over with you past and
present events, you would never fail to come this way on your
route to New Jersey and New York.
I regret very much the fate of your able, honest, and time-honored
court. I feel a warm personal regard for C. J. Dunlop. Such acts
of wanton tyranny will surely return to plague the inventors.
There will be a “tit for tat.” Why could not the Judge Advocate
General, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel of
cavalry, have saved his brother-in-law?
I perceive by the _Intelligencer_ that Judge Black has gained his
great Quicksilver Mine cause. This alone ought to make him rich.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, April 10, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I ought ere this to have acknowledged your very welcome letter of
the 21st and 26th ultimos. Your letters are always gratifying to
me, and I regret that I can give you so little in return. To
attempt to furnish you political news would be truly sending coals
to Newcastle.
I do not think it necessary at present to republish your letter in
refutation of Mr. Fessenden’s statement. Thanks to your kindness,
it is now of record in the _Globe_, and I presume it has been of
course transferred to the _Congressional Globe_. You might look.
My defence has been greatly enlarged, and will be published in due
time. I do not think this is the proper moment. Thanks to General
Scott, I need not now be in so great a hurry.
I am truly rejoiced to learn that our good and large hearted
friend Sullivan has recovered his health. May blessings rest upon
his “frosty pow!”
I am sorry to learn that Dr. Jones has had a severe attack of
gout...... He is one of my most esteemed friends, and is a
faithful and true man. May he live and prosper for many years!
Miss Lane had an idea of visiting Mr. Berghman’s, but not since
the death of her brother. She is still in Philadelphia, but I
expect her home in a week or ten days. The loss of her brother has
made a deep impression upon her. She, although the youngest, is
now the last of her father’s children.
Our friend Carlisle sent me the brief of his argument in the
case of the Brilliante. I perused it at the time with great care
and great satisfaction. His points are presented in lucid and
convincing order; and in my humble judgment he ought to have
gained the cause. I know not why I did not acknowledge the brief
at the time it was received. This I ought to have done. Judge
Black, who was here yesterday, spoke of his argument in the
highest terms. By the bye, the Judge really seems to be
embarrassed with his money. He is at a loss to know what to do
with it. I gave him advice on this subject, but whether he will
follow it, I know not. I am truly sorry that Mr. Carlisle has
felt it to be his duty to refuse to take the oath prescribed by
the new court. I do not know what it contains. If he cannot
conscientiously take it, there is an end of the question. If he
has refused simply because the court has no right to require it,
I think he has not acted prudently. He is an able and honorable
man, and a discriminating and powerful lawyer, and I fear he may
suffer in a pecuniary view. Please to remember me to him in the
most friendly terms.
Poor Mary Wall! If she has determined to return to England, I
shall cheerfully contribute to pay her expenses. You may set me
down for $20.
Could you not pay me a visit, and bring Mr. Carlisle with you,
when the spring fairly opens?
From your friend, as ever,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—Miss Hetty, of whom you kindly inquire, has entirely
recovered her health, and is now larger than I ever saw her. I
cannot keep her in the house, or prevent her from working in the
garden or about the lawn.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. NAHUM CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, May 8, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I owe you many thanks for President Lord’s picture of
Abolitionism. It is clearly and forcibly written, and proceeding
from a New England clergyman, it is almost miraculous.
I fear you are too sanguine in predicting that in another year
there will be great changes in favor of Democracy in the New
England States. The clergy have taught the people there that
slavery is a mortal sin demanding extirpation.
The mass of the Democracy in this State is as true to the
Constitution and the Union as the needle to the pole. With the
exception of a few fanatics, they are not extreme. They will obey
the laws, and await the process of the ballot-box for redress.
Unless something unexpected should occur, they will elect their
governor in October by a large majority.
From the current of events, it is to be apprehended that it will
be long before the Democracy can obtain a majority in the Senate.
The people already begin to speculate upon this subject. They say
it would be unjust that the six New England States with a
population scarcely greater than that of New York, should have a
representation in the Senate equal to that of New York,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri combined, not
to speak of Western Virginia, and the thinly peopled Territories
soon to be admitted as States. For my own part I am willing to
follow where the Constitution leads, trusting to Providence for
the final result. Still I should be rejoiced if even a single
Senator could be elected from New England.
Miss Lane came home for a few days a brief time ago; but returned
to her uncle’s to be confirmed and admitted as a member of the
Episcopal Church. When she next returns, I have no doubt she will
be too happy to write to you.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, May 18, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
In answer to your request of the 11th instant:—I regret that I
have not a single copy of the Documents to which you refer, except
those forming a part of the entire set of Documents for 1860-61.
It is but a few weeks since I gave the last copy to a friend. I
have received Judge Parker’s Letters and Address, for which please
to accept my thanks. You inform me in your note of the 14th, that
you enclose me a slip containing facts upon a subject alluded to
in our conversation when you were at Wheatland. _This I have not
received._
Miss Lane has not yet returned and my evenings are rather
solitary. Still I resign myself in a philosophic and, I trust,
Christian spirit to the privations inseparable from old age. I
wish, with all my heart, that I had a few neighbors like yourself.
I try to think as little of public affairs as possible; but they
will ever intrude. If I could be of any service, I should
sacrifice all to restore the Union; but as I can contribute
nothing towards the accomplishment of this most desirable object,
I relieve my mind from the subject as much as possible.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS LANE.]
MY DEAR MISS LANE:—
I enclose you a letter from James S. Lane, which, under your
general license, so far as your Uncle John’s estate is concerned,
I took the liberty of opening.
Lancaster is in a state of agitation and alarm. They have
determined, on motion of Mr. Hager, to defend the city to the last
extremity. I do not consider the danger great, so far as we are
concerned. It may be otherwise at Harrisburg. You had better
remain at your Uncle Edward’s; because if you were to return home,
if there were any danger, I should send you back. I suppose you
are aware that Doctor Nevin has sent Alice and Blanche to New
York. I do not think we are in any serious danger in Lancaster;
but if we were, you could not by possibility remain.
Mr. Swarr is here, and I want to send this to town by him. In
haste
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, July 8, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your note of the 5th instant, with the article
enclosed. This I have read with much satisfaction. It is the
philosophy of politics applied to our present unfortunate
condition.
It is probable the rebels might have paid a flying visit to
Lancaster had not the bridge across the Susquehanna at
Wrightsville been burnt down. I remained quietly at home, and
would not have removed under any circumstances. They were within
eleven miles of us.
I am at a loss for precise dates, which you can supply. When was
the Anti-Slavery Society organized at Boston, and when did
Thompson arrive in this country, and how long did he remain? By
answering these questions, if convenient, you will greatly oblige
me.
Miss Lane is now at home, and desires to be most kindly remembered
to you. My health is as good as usual.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, July 23, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received the _National Intelligencer_ containing the well
deserved eulogy on our deceased friend Mr. Sullivan. I saw a
notice of his death some days before in the Philadelphia _Age_,
and immediately wrote a letter of sympathy to his widow, an
excellent woman, worthy of such a husband. I felt deeply the death
of Mr. Sullivan, from our ancient friendly social relation which
had continued without interruption for many years.
By the bye, you do not seem to have been aware, as I was not
myself until a few days ago, that my franking privilege had been
abolished. It was first brought to my notice by the receipt of
letters and packages in the form of letters marked with double
postage because not prepaid. The Postmaster General, in his
instructions, ought to have noticed this. It was hardly consistent
with the dignity of Congress, whilst retaining the privilege of
its own members, to strike at Mrs. Harrison, if she is still
living, Mrs. Polk, Mr. Fillmore, General Pierce, and myself. But I
care nothing about it. This privilege, in all its forms, ought to
be entirely abolished. Members of Congress have abused it to an
enormous extent. Neither the Queen nor any member of the British
Parliament can frank a letter.
I have not been so well for some days. My rheumatism has partially
returned with strong symptoms of dyspepsia. I propose going to the
Bedford Springs some day next week, should nothing occur to
prevent.
The draft gives much dissatisfaction in this county, especially
among poor men with large families dependent for support on their
labor. The laws, however, will not here be forcibly resisted.
How glad I should be to meet you, and other old Washington
friends; but this seems to be impossible.
Unless some great and unforeseen change should take place, Judge
Woodward will be elected governor of our State by a large
majority.
Miss Lane desires me to present her kindest regards.
From your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. SCHELL.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, July 25, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
It is so long since I have heard from you that I wish to know what
has become of you, and how you are enjoying yourself.
Although taking no active part in politics, I have yet been
observing, with great interest, the events that are passing. I
have been much gratified with Governor Seymour’s course, but fear
he is now about to fall into an error. The conscription law,
though unwise and unjust in many of its provisions, is not, in my
opinion, unconstitutional. The Constitution confers upon Congress
in the clearest terms the power “to raise and support armies,”
without any other limitation except that “no appropriation of
money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.” How
shall these armies be raised? Can this only be done by voluntary
enlistment? Or may not Congress resort to a conscription law as a
necessary and proper means, such as is employed by other nations
for this purpose?
I think the confusion on the subject has arisen from the blending
the restricted power over the militia, an entirely distinct
question, with that of the general power in Congress to raise
armies.
But I merely make these suggestions. It would be very unfortunate
if, after the present administration have committed so many clear
violations of the Constitution, the Democratic party should place
itself in opposition to what I think must be the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States on this question.
I have not been so well as usual for the last few days. I intend
to go to Bedford towards the end of next week, if nothing should
prevent, and shall take Miss Hetty along with me, whose robust
health has been giving way for some time past. Miss Lane and Miss
Buchanan will remain at home. I would request you to accompany me
there, but I know the company will be small, and the place would
not be agreeable to you, under these circumstances.
From the last letter received from James Henry I fear he will lose
his excellent wife. I sympathize with him deeply in this gloomy
prospect. Her loss to him would be irreparable. May Heaven avert
it!
Cannot my fifteen Tennessee five per cent. bonds be now sold at a
rate bearing a just proportion to the price of the six per cent.
bonds?
“The signs of the times” in this State indicate the election of
Judge Woodward by a large majority. Unless some great and
unexpected change should take place, such I confidently predict
will be the result.
Miss Lane and Miss Buchanan desire to be very kindly remembered to
you.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. BAKER.]
WHEATLAND, July 26, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have no news to communicate of the least importance, and write
only to keep the chain of friendship bright between you and
myself. My health has not been as good as usual for the last few
days, but the visit to the Bedford Springs will, I think, be of
service to me. The fabled fountain to restore youth has never yet
been discovered, and there is no remedy for old age but Christian
philosophy and resignation. By the bye, should you have business
at Broad Top, how happy I should be to have your company thus far,
or until the end of the journey, should you desire to use the
water. There has been, and probably will be, but little company
there, and Farmer Baker must, I presume, stay at home at this busy
season. We propose to leave on Thursday next. I shall take Miss
Hetty with me, whose health has been declining for some time. Miss
Lane and Annie Buchanan will remain at Wheatland.
What has become of the visit of Mr. Read and yourself, from which
I had anticipated so much pleasure? I have heard nothing either
from or of Mr. Dillon for a long time. Doctor Sample passed a day
and night with me last week. We had a most agreeable time talking
over “old times” and our memories of men of the past generation.
He is old and feeble in body, and somewhat deaf, but his intellect
is still clear. He seems to be contented with his lot, and in him
Christianity has disarmed the fear of death.
. . . . . . .
.
. . . . . . .
.
. . . . . . .
.
Please to remember me in the kindest terms to Mrs. Baker, Mrs.
Hopkins and the other members of your most agreeable family. So
much for Sunday morning before going to church.
Ever your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS LANE.]
BEDFORD SPRINGS, August 3, 1863.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
We arrived here safe and sound on Friday last before dinner. I
hardly ever passed a more uncomfortable day than that on which I
left, having suffered the whole day with a violent diarrhœa. At
night Mrs. Baker gave me a dose of your friend Brown’s
Anti-Cholera mixture, which cured me outright. The water has had
its usual good effect upon me, and I think I needed it much. No
healing fountain can cure old age; but with God’s blessing it may
assist in gently sloping the way which leads to death.
The company here consists of about one hundred and fifty, and I
think there is fully that number. There are many sensible and
agreeable people among them; but they are not very gay. On
Saturday night they made the first attempt to get up a cotillion,
and it partly succeeded, but they wanted the buoyancy and
brilliancy of former times.
There are several naughty secession girls here from
Baltimore,—some of them very bright. My principal amusement has
been with them, and I am really inclined to believe they give
General Schenck a hard time of it. The stories they tell of how
they provoked him are truly amusing. They praise General Wool, and
I have no doubt they flatter him into a compliance with many of
their wishes. They speak rather contemptuously of our friend
General Dix, but Schenck is their abomination.
I treat them playfully, and tell them I love them so, that it
would be impossible for me ever to consent to part from them, and
that the shocking idea has never once entered my head of living in
a separate confederacy from them. I am like Ruth, and that they
must not entreat me from following after them. We must be one and
indivisible. I hear accounts from the other side, and it is
certain the Baltimore women must give General Schenck a rough road
to travel.
Our little party is very agreeable. Mrs. Nevin is as gay as a girl
let loose from school after a long session of hard service. I
could hardly tell you how much she enjoys herself. Miss Hetty gets
along quietly and well. Her manners are ladylike, and she behaves
with perfect propriety. Mrs. Baker is very good and very ladylike;
and Miss Swarr is modest but cheerful. I need not speak of Messrs.
Swarr, Baker, Carpenter, and North. We are all grateful. There
have been many kind inquiries after you, but a watering place is
like the world, even the grandest performers are soon forgotten.
Mr. Babcock, of the Yeates Institute, preached here last night,
but I did not hear him. Those who did, say he preached very well.
I never saw him to my knowledge.
I am treated by all with kindness and respect. I saw Mrs. Patton
and Miss Hamilton on Saturday evening. The health of the latter is
evidently improving.
Give my love to Miss Annie, Elizabeth Speer Buchanan, and remember
me kindly to Mrs. Fahnestock. I hope you are all getting along
happily.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, September 22, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
It afforded me great pleasure to learn from yours of the 14th
instant, that you still enjoy health and happiness. May this yet
continue for years to come! I have recently had a severe and very
painful attack of rheumatism, but it has nearly passed away.
I met Mr. Kelly at the Bedford Springs, and we talked very kindly
of you and yours. I found my old friends there as kind and as
enthusiastic as ever. My visit was very agreeable.
I cannot anticipate the result of the Governor’s election, as I
was able to do in former years, when I took an active part in
politics. The news, however, is generally cheering. It is the most
important State election which has ever been held in Pennsylvania.
God grant us a safe deliverance!
I saw Judge Woodward when he was in Lancaster at our great meeting
on Thursday last, though I did not attend the meeting. He seems to
be in fine spirits, and will, if elected, make an excellent
Governor. Governor Porter and Judge Black were with us. The
Governor’s health is still good, and he is as shrewd and observant
as ever. Judge Black’s speech will, I think, make a noise in the
world. It is able and eloquent, and _very strong_.
I hope nothing may occur to prevent you from visiting me the next
time you entertain so good an intention. This I hope may ere long
occur.
Miss Lane desires to be very kindly remembered to you. We expect a
visit to-day from Sir Henry Holland, and she is busy in making
preparations.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—I saw an account of the great meeting to which you refer, and
was happy to perceive that you are still in the harness.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, December 5, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Your favor of the 24th October was well worthy of an immediate
answer, but my life here glides along so quietly and tranquilly as
to afford no incidents worth communicating.
The quarrel among the Republicans to which you refer will not, I
think, subserve the immediate interests of the Democratic party.
They cannot afford to divide. The main object of them all is to
abolish every vestige of slavery, and they differ only as to the
best means of accomplishing it. The difference between them, as I
understand it, is between tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee. Whilst the
Sumnerites would convert the States in rebellion into Territories,
to be governed as such under the laws of Congress, the Blairites,
preserving the name of States, would place them under the military
government of the President. In either case, they can only be
restored to the Union provided slavery is abolished. The more
extreme party will probably prevail, because such is the nature
and history of revolutions. The Blairs will be crushed, unless
they shall speedily repent. This they will not hesitate to do,
should their interests so dictate.
The Democratic party must rely upon themselves and await events. I
see the Democratic members have been holding meetings preparatory
to the assemblage of Congress. On their prudence, firmness and
decision much will depend. Their platform, if it be wise, will
give tone to the party throughout the country. With the vanity of
age, I think I could construct one which would unite and
strengthen the party, but no person consults me on such a subject.
I agree with you that, however much we may condemn Secretary
Chase’s official conduct, he is a gentleman by education and
personal demeanor. He is, in my judgment, by far the ablest member
of the cabinet, not excepting even Abraham himself. The skill,
however, with which he has obtained loans and managed the paper
money machine, will only make the crash, when it shall occur, the
more terrific. His adroit management may delay, but cannot prevent
it. As long as he can issue greenbacks with one hand as currency,
and receive them with the other for national loans, the crazy
vessel may be kept afloat.
Well! we see from the papers that Washington is to be gay and
extravagant beyond all former example during the approaching
winter. Shoddy will make a grand display. How much your society,
formerly the best in the country, must have changed! Mrs. Ogle
Tayloe was here about a fortnight ago, sighing over the memory of
past days.
We have been more gay than usual at Wheatland for the last few
months, and have seen a good deal of company. I have not been out
of the county since you were here, but they will have it that I am
now in England.
I have thought several times of accepting your kind offer to
attend to ——. He is an ungrateful little scamp, and no reason
exists why I should not sell his property. I think I shall soon
send you all the papers which will prove how much he has
bamboozled me. I wish you would talk to Mr. Riggs upon the
subject.
Miss Lane and Miss Hetty both desire to be most kindly remembered
to you. We all unite in the expression of regret that we cannot
see you oftener.
With my kindest regards to Doctor Jones, I remain,
Always your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO HON. GEORGE G. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, December 21, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your kind favor, and am always rejoiced to learn
your continued health and happiness. May you live to enjoy a merry
Christmas and a happy New Year, and a number of such, until, in a
good old age, you shall be peacefully gathered to your fathers in
well-grounded Christian hope.
The storm of persecution against me, as you intimate, has nearly
spent itself, though the _Herald_ and the _Tribune_, both of which
I take, occasionally strike me a blow. My time will, however, soon
come. I am now much more fully prepared than I was a year ago. I
view it as a merciful dispensation of Providence that the report
of General Scott to President Lincoln has been published during my
lifetime, and this through his own folly.....
Miss Lane desires her kindest remembrance to you. I need not say
we shall always be most happy to see and welcome you at Wheatland.
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, December 31, 1863.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 28th instant, and am content to
leave the —— affair to be managed by Mr. Riggs in the manner he
proposes. Still I should be much obliged to you to keep a sharp
look out over the matter. The conduct of Leonard and his wife has
been all it should not have been.
We now seem to be rapidly treading the paths of all former
Republics. A large standing army necessarily produces some
ambitious commander-in-chief possessing its confidence.
Fortunately for the country, no general having the pre-eminence
over all the rest has yet made his appearance, unless Grant may
prove to be the coming man. At the termination of the war, it will
probably be more difficult to get clear of the army than it was to
raise it.
The time has now arrived when with perfect safety the Democrats in
Congress might erect a secure platform; but will they do it? What
can be expected from a party at the head of which is..... A man of
the first consideration ought to have been selected as.....; and
above all, he ought not to have been one of those who broke up the
National Convention at Charleston. Mr. Lincoln would be less
dangerous to the Republic than an unprincipled military chieftain
whom the army would follow to any extremity. My health is as
usual. Miss Lane desires to be kindly remembered to you.
Ever your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, January 14, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Miss Lane and myself have received your Christmas greetings with
peculiar pleasure, and trust you may live many years in health and
prosperity.
With you I believe that the madness of men will eventually yield
to conservative counsels; _but not soon_. In this respect, I
differ both from you and Governor Seymour. I yet perceive no
evidence of a change so happy. It may, however, come suddenly with
the crash of the paper system, which, sooner or later, is
inevitable. The Democratic party is not yet prepared to act with
power and unanimity. They would, at the present moment, divide,
should they attempt to erect a platform. And yet, in my opinion,
the time has arrived when a platform could be constructed which
would stand against all external shocks and would carry the
principles of the glorious old party triumphantly through the
breakers.
Have you ever thought of the danger to our institutions from the
disbandment of a standing army of a million of men, one-fourth at
least being negroes? Will they patiently and quietly consent, with
arms in their hands, to return to the labors and duties of private
life, and to earn their living by the sweat of their brow? What
does history teach in this respect? I trust in God it may be so.
As to Christianity: it seems now to consist in preaching war
instead of peace. In New England, I presume, the masses are
tolerably united in favor of the gospel of war. In this portion of
the world there is considerable division, though the higher law
doctrine of the abolitionist would seem to be in the ascendant.
The state of public opinion in this quarter was naively
illustrated the other day by a young lady who called to see me.
She said that the church in their town (Presbyterian) had been
vacant for several months, though they gave a good salary. “When,”
said she, “a preacher comes to us on trial, and we are pleased
with him, after he goes away, they begin to inquire whether he is
a Republican or Democrat. If found to be a Republican, the
Democrats oppose him, and if found to be a Democrat, the
Republicans oppose him; and so, between the two, it is hard to
tell whether we shall ever have another preacher.”
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, January 27, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I am just recovering from a rather severe illness and was only
able on yesterday to leave my room. I find your two letters of
January 16 and January 20, and am scarcely in a condition to do
more than thank you for them.
My publication is ready for the press; but the Democrats have made
no issue on which to fight the Presidential battle...... The
Republicans care not a button how much we complain of their
unconstitutional measures, their change of the war from its
original purposes, etc., etc., so long as we give them a vigorous
material support. From present appearances, Mr. Lincoln will be
re-elected, unless some Republican military chieftain should
supply his place, or our finances should break down.
All I have to say in regard to the Floyd acceptances is that the
“gentleman of high respectability” is altogether mistaken in
regard to myself, and, I have no doubt, is equally so in regard to
Governor Toucey.
A Senator first informed me that drafts on the War Department,
payable at a future day and accepted by Governor Floyd, were on
change in New York. I immediately sent for Mr. Floyd and asked him
if it were true. He told me that Russell & Co., in order to enable
them to send provisions to the army in Utah, had to anticipate
their credit, and as these drafts were only payable after the
money had been earned, there could be no danger. There were but
three or four of them. I asked him by what law he was authorized
to issue such acceptances. He said there was no law for it, but it
had been the practice of the office. I told him it must at once be
discontinued—that if there was no law for it, it was against law.
He told me the few drafts already accepted should be immediately
paid, and he would never issue another. I rested satisfied, and
was greatly astonished when, some months after, the fraud was
discovered, and the subject placed before the committee of the
House. Mr. Holt, in all he did, acted under my direction and with
my assent.
Miss Lane desires to be most kindly remembered to you. I wish I
could drop in for a day at Mount Ida.
Ever your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. SCHELL.]
WHEATLAND, February 12, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 9th instant. I had supposed that
James Henry would have informed you of the reason I had not
visited New York. When making the necessary preparations to leave
home, I had a violent and very painful attack of rheumatic gout.
Although I have now recovered from this, I still walk with
difficulty, and am not yet in a condition to visit your city.
I agree with you that the future of the Democratic party is
discouraging. At the moment when it was clearly demonstrated
that the administration, departing from the principle of
conducting the war for the restoration of the Union as it was,
and the Constitution as it is, had resolved to conduct it for
the subjugation of the Southern States and the destruction of
slavery, the party had then an opportunity of making a noble,
and probably a successful issue with their opponents. That time
has now passed, and the leaders of our party, beginning at New
York, notwithstanding the change in the programme of our
opponents, are still nearly as demonstrative in the support of
the war as the Republicans. No party can succeed without a great
issue, broadly placed before the people.
We are getting on here as usual, just as you left us. Harriet
Buchanan is still with us, and you are often the subject of
agreeable conversation in our little group.
I send you a check for the wine, and remain, very respectfully,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, March 14, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your letter of the 1st instant. You may well have
expected to hear from me ere this, in answer to yours of the 1st
February. I am sorry to say, however, that, about the time of its
receipt, I again had an attack of rheumatism in my legs still more
violent and painful than the former, which confined me for a
considerable time to my bed and to my chamber, because I could not
set my feet on the ground. Thank God! I think I have entirely
recovered from it, except that I still hobble in my gait. I am,
however, daily improving.
Would that I were able to visit your Arcadia in the month of June
and receive your cordial welcome; but this is an enjoyment which I
fear is not reserved for me.
I owe you many thanks for your very kind offer to cause my record
to be stereotyped and to superintend the work. Your services would
be invaluable, but I do not consider it of sufficient importance
for stereotyping. By the bye, a friend the other day sent me a
copy of Appleton’s Cyclopædia for 1861, which I find, to my
surprise, contains a tolerably fair representation of the last
months of my administration, so far as the facts were known to the
author. It is, however, greatly deficient in many particulars.
Still, there is throughout a spirit of candor manifested, to which
I have not been lately accustomed.
I hope your meeting in New York may result in good for the country
and the Democratic party. So far as I can learn and observe, there
will be very great difficulty in erecting a platform on which the
party can unite. It now embraces all shades of opinion, from the
prosecution of the war with as much vigor as the Republicans,
notwithstanding the violations of the Constitution, down to peace
[with the Confederate government], which means neither more nor
less than recognition. I say that this means recognition, because
I entertain not the least idea that the South would return to the
Union, if we were to offer to restore them with all the rights
which belonged to them, as expounded by the Supreme Court, at the
time of their secession. Besides, I regret to say, many good
Democrats in Pennsylvania begin to be inoculated with abolition
principles. I could construct a platform which would suit myself;
but what is right and what is practicable are two very different
things. For the latter we must await the course of events until a
short time before the meeting of the convention. I entertain a
warm regard both for Mr. Reed and Mr. O’Conor, but I believe both
may be called extreme peace men. Have you ever reflected upon what
would be the embarrassments of a Democratic administration, should
it succeed to power with the war still existing and the finances
in their present unhappy condition?
The Democrats of New Hampshire, with General Pierce, have fought a
noble battle worthy of a better fate. I was much pleased with the
article you were kind enough to send me.
Miss Lane desires to be most kindly remembered to you. Whilst it
is highly improbable that we shall drop in upon you at Mount Ida,
I hope it is certain you may drop in upon us at Wheatland during
the approaching spring or summer. The bluebirds and other
songsters are now singing around me, and the buds are ready to
burst; but yet we have all kinds of weather in the course of a
single day.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. VIELE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, May 2, 1864.
MY DEAR MADAM:—
I must crave a thousand pardons for not having complied with your
request and sent you my autograph, with a sentiment for your
album. I need not assign the reasons for this omission, but if you
should think it proceeded from want of respect for yourself, you
would be greatly in error. On the contrary, although I have never
enjoyed the pleasure of your acquaintance, yet from what I have
learned of your character and intellectual accomplishments, I
shall be proud to hold a place in your personal esteem.
Congratulating you on the unexampled success of the New York Fair
for the relief of our brave and disabled soldiers, to which you
yourself have contributed in no small degree, I remain,
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. TOUCEY.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, May 13, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
It is long since I have heard from you, and I desire to learn that
Mrs. Toucey and yourself are as comfortable and happy as my
earnest wishes prompt.
During the past winter I have suffered severe attacks of painful
rheumatism in both legs. The disease has finally retreated into my
right hand and arm, and is now, I trust in God, passing away. I
still, however, write with considerable pain.
I earnestly desire that you could be with me for a few days. The
publication which I propose to make has for some time been
substantially, I may almost say, literally prepared. I think the
simple statement of facts in their natural order affords a
conclusive vindication of our administration for the last four
months of its duration. The preface contains a historical sketch
of the rise and progress of abolition, of the Charleston
Convention, of the Peace Convention, etc., etc. I have had no
person to assist me in its preparation, to make suggestions, or
even to verify the facts, though these are mostly official......
The season is delightful, and why cannot Mrs. Toucey and yourself
pay us a visit? Did we part at Washington never again to enjoy the
society of each other? I trust in God not......
The Judge, notwithstanding all this, is perfectly true to our
administration. He talks very openly and without disguise against
the present administration, and, before our last gubernatorial
election, made a speech of greater severity and power against
Lincoln (and published it) than any delivered throughout the
campaign. Judge Black and his family visit me occasionally, and he
is just as agreeable as ever. His practice in the Supreme Court
has been very lucrative, and he is now becoming a rich man.
Miss Lane unites with me in cordial regards to Mrs. Toucey, and
expresses an ardent hope that you may both pay us a visit.
From your friend, always,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. TOUCEY TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
HARTFORD, May 25, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:
I was very happy to receive your letter of the 13th inst. It gave
me information which I had long been wishing to obtain. Let me
rejoice with you that you have regained your accustomed power of
locomotion without the discomfort of bodily pain. I think the time
has come when the history of the last four months of your eventful
administration may be given to the public, with good results. Mrs.
Toucey’s health is so delicate and precarious, that I fear we
shall not be able to accept your kind invitation, for which we are
very grateful to you and to Miss Lane. Still, I trust that we
shall meet again and enjoy the opportunity of conferring together
upon the events of the last seven years, so interesting to us all.
It will be my greatest pleasure to contribute anything in my power
to the history you have in hand, although I think you need no aid
from any quarter; and as to giving “the last finishing touches,”
that is what you have always been accustomed to do yourself; and
while I appreciate your kindness, it would be absurd for me to
think of aiding Praxiteles to give the finishing polish to his
work. I send you herewith a printed copy of my testimony before
the Senate Committee, which embraces all the facts with regard to
Norfolk, Pensacola, and, incidentally, the Home squadron. The
testimony was divided into two parts by the committee for their
convenience. The note appended to it is strictly correct, and in
three lines answers the grossly false accusation that the navy was
sent abroad in the interest of secession. The truth is, the
squadrons at the different foreign stations were all of them very
small, had not been augmented in proportion to the increase of our
commerce, and none of them could be diminished without sacrificing
its safety and the interests and safety of those engaged in it. It
is not, I suppose, now treason to say “Blessed are the
peacemakers.” It was the cardinal point of your policy to preserve
the peace of the country, and thereby most surely preserve the
union of these States on the existing basis of the Constitution;
and it would have been a most startling departure from that policy
to have recalled our foreign squadrons, and thus, with lunatic
rashness, defeat it at the outset, and precipitate at once the
wretched consequences which have since followed its abandonment,
to the utter ruin of the country. I thank God that we can wash our
hands of any such criminality. There is one fact which has never
transpired—which at the time was shrouded in the greatest
secrecy—which was not communicated to any of my colleagues in the
cabinet—which rested with the late gallant Commander Ward, a
friend of mine from his youth, who fell on the Potomac in the
early stage of the war. He was stationed at New York in command of
the receiving ship. It was arranged with him that, on receiving a
telegraphic despatch from me, he should, in the course of the
following night, set sail from New York with a force of small
vessels, and relieve the garrison of Fort Sumter, entering the
harbor in the night and anchoring, if possible, under the guns of
the fort. He sought the desperate enterprise with the greatest
enthusiasm, and was willing to sacrifice his life, saying that the
sacrifice would be the best inheritance he could leave to his wife
and children. He left Washington, after repeated interviews with
me, with instructions to select his officers, select and prepare
his men on board of the receiving ship, and make every preparation
which he could make without exciting suspicion, so that he could
set sail in a few hours, whenever the emergency should arise. In
regard to the wish of General Cass to withdraw his resignation, I
knew nothing personally, but remember well that the subject was
brought up in cabinet meeting; that Judge Black and Mr. Thompson
seemed to know all about it, as if they were privy to it; and that
after some discussion you deemed it inadmissible. The times are
sadly out of joint. I had not supposed it possible that any
administration could, in the short space of three years, do the
work of destruction so effectually. Still I trust that, in the
boundless stores of Infinite mercy, there may yet be some
deliverance for the country.
Mrs. Toucey unites with me in the kindest regards to yourself and
Miss Lane. I am, my dear Sir, with the highest consideration and
regard, always
Your friend,
ISAAC TOUCEY.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, June 20th, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I am always rejoiced to hear that you are still in the enjoyment
of a green and happy old age, surrounded by grateful and
prosperous children and grandchildren. May this long be the lot
from Providence of Mrs. Leiper and yourself!
You inquire for my health, and I am glad to inform you it is as
good as I can expect. After suffering much during the past winter
and early spring from rheumatic gout, I have been for several
weeks free from pain, though I still hobble a little in walking.
You inform me you have a good deal to talk to me about when we
meet. I hope this may be ere long. I need not assure you how happy
I always am to see you.
Your friend, Miss Lane, desires to be most kindly remembered to
you. After passing the whole winter and spring at home, I am glad
she has determined to visit the Bedford Springs about the middle
of July. Whether I shall accompany her is uncertain. I believe it
is natural for old men to be reluctant to leave home. At least,
such is my feeling.
What an extraordinary speech Mr. Lincoln has made to the Union
Leaguers at Philadelphia! They have promised with a shout to march
to the front at his call and shed their blood, if need be, in the
cause of their country. I have no doubt he will afford them the
opportunity. Nobody believes they will embrace it. They will
still, however, fight the Copperheads at home.
Your friend, as ever,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. J. B. BAKER.]
WHEATLAND, July 15th, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
As the rebel raid is over, Miss Lane will leave for the Bedford
Springs on Tuesday next, and will go to Huntingdon that evening.
She would be very glad if Emily and yourself should accompany her.
I desire to go, but have not yet determined.
When will the purchase money for the Pim property be payable? If
at the present moment, it would not be convenient for me; but
still I can borrow.
I learn that Doctor Carpenter and your uncle Newton are to visit
you to-morrow. I do hope you will be able to arrange all affairs.
Your friend, as ever,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, August 5th, 1864.
MY DEAR MISS LANE:—
I arrived here this afternoon, baggage all safe, a few minutes
after three o’clock. I never had so agreeable a ride on a railroad
car. I would advise you, by all means, in returning home, to stay
all night at Huntingdon and come by the cars on the next morning.
I told Mr. Miller......, and I wish you to stay at his house. We
parted from Mrs. Pegram, Miss Brent, and Mr. Jackson, at
Harrisburg—a sorry parting.
I found all things in good order on my arrival. Mrs. Fahnestock is
still here and so is Miss Harriet Parker.
Governor Curtin, as you will have perceived, has called for the
services of 30,000 volunteers to defend the State against the
rebels.
I scarcely know to what ladies to send my love at Bedford, but I
wish you to deliver it especially to the ladies who gave me a
parting kiss. The fragrance of their lips is as fresh as at the
first moment. I hope you and Harriet will behave with all proper
respect to your venerable aunt. Remember me most kindly to Mrs.
Wade. I hope she will place you under proper restraint, a thing I
have never been able to accomplish. Give my best love to Harriet.
I entertain no fears for you at the Springs. It is possible,
however, that the rebels may succeed in cutting the railroad track
between Huntingdon and Harrisburg, which would put you to some
inconvenience on returning home; but be not alarmed.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—From a telegram sent by Mr. Scott to Altoona, it would seem
he considers that place to be in danger.
[TO HIS NEPHEW, JAMES BUCHANAN.]
WHEATLAND, August 6th, 1864.
MY DEAR JAMES:—
I have received your favor of the 3d instant, and am truly
rejoiced to learn that your prospects are so favorable in the oil
region. Until I read your letter, I had supposed your brother
Edward was a partner with you; but as you do not mention his name,
I conclude this is not the case......
I passed more than a fortnight very agreeably at the Springs. Miss
Lane desired to remain until your father should go to Bedford. I
am now sorry I did not bring her and Harriet Buchanan home with
me, although I do not consider them in any danger at the Springs.
What I fear is that the railroad may be cut and travel interrupted
somewhere between Huntingdon and Harrisburg. Newton Lightner is
still at the Springs, and I hope they may return with him. The
people of Lancaster are in great alarm and are about to remove
their valuables......
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, August 23, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor and it affords me great pleasure to
learn that Mrs. Leiper and yourself propose to pay us a visit some
time after the 1st September. The sooner the better. I need not
promise both a cordial welcome. Please write a day or two before
so that the carriage may meet you at the cars.
It did not occur to me that your former letter might have referred
to that one which I wrote in favor of Forney’s election to the
Senate. If it had, I should have spared you some trouble.
Miss Lane returned from the Springs on Friday last and desires to
be kindly remembered to Mrs. Leiper and yourself.
The address of Mr. Lincoln’s “To whom it may concern,” has given a
great impulse to the reaction already commenced before its date. I
have no doubt he is anxious to correct the blunder; but cannot
believe, as the New York _Herald’s_ correspondent states, that he
has employed Judge Black to visit Canada for this purpose.
Very affectionately, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, August 25, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favors of the 1st and 17th insts., together
with a copy of your letter to Mr. Van Dyke as Chairman, all of
which I have read with much interest. The meeting of the Chicago
Convention is so near at hand that it would be vain to enter into
political speculations. The proceedings of this body, whatever
they may be, will constitute a new and important era in the
history of the Democratic party. From all appearances McClellan
will be nominated. Whether for good or for evil time must
determine. The platform will present the greatest difficulty.
Whilst we are all in favor of peace, it may be too pacific. We
ought to commence negotiations with the South and offer them every
reasonable guarantee for the security of their rights _within the
Union_. If they will accept this and engage to meet us in a
general convention of all the States, then I should be in favor of
an armistice. A general proposition for peace, and an armistice
without reference to the restoration of the Union, would be in
fact a recognition of their independence. For this I confess I am
far from being prepared.
It is my impression that the South have no idea of making peace
without recognition. In this I trust I may be mistaken.
Your article on “swapping horses” is both witty and true, and has
afforded us much amusement.
In regard to Miss Lane’s coal lands: I think it would be
impossible, scattered as the heirs are, and some of them needy, to
obtain the consent of all to lease them. It is in the power of any
one of them to force a sale by legal proceedings. This was
threatened; but has not yet been attempted. In that event, which
is highly probable, we ought to be prepared to purchase; and from
the nature of law proceedings we shall have sufficient time to be
ready. Your services and influence may then become very
beneficial...... Miss Lane will write to you whenever anything
shall occur respecting the lands.
I shall decide when and how I shall publish after seeing the
proceedings at Chicago. I cannot think the work deserves to be
stereotyped.
Miss Lane desires to be most kindly remembered to you.
My health is as usual. We passed our time very agreeably at the
Springs.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO HIS NEPHEW, J. BUCHANAN HENRY.]
WHEATLAND, September 22, 1864.
MY DEAR JAMES:—
I was very much gratified with your last letter, as I always am to
hear good tidings of yourself and your little boy. May God have
you both under His holy keeping! I should have written to you more
than ten days ago, but for an accident which has caused me much
pain, and confined me to my room, and a great part of the time to
bed, since last Sunday week. On that evening whilst taking a walk
on the turnpike I fell with great force, and the concussion was so
violent that on the next day I found myself unable to walk, and
for several days I could not stand. I can now walk across the
floor and my strength is gradually returning. In other respects I
am well. The doctor thought that the severe fall might bring back
the rheumatism; but it has not done so, except in a slight
degree......
No man except General McClellan could have been nominated at
Chicago. The Convention was neither more nor less than a
ratification meeting of the decree of the people. He would not
have been my first choice; but I am satisfied. God grant he may
succeed! Peace would be a great, a very great blessing; but it
would be purchased at too high a price at the expense of the
Union. I have never yet been able to tolerate the idea of Southern
recognition.
Mr. Schell will, I think and earnestly hope, accept my invitation
to pay us a visit during the present or next month. We should all
be glad you would accompany him; but not at the expense of your
important business...... Miss Hetty has made apple butter for you
which, in the estimate of those who use such an article, is
pronounced excellent. She says, however, that you never write to
her as you did formerly.
Miss Harriet and Miss Hetty desire me to present their kindest
love to you, and I remain
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, October 5, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have just received your favor of the 3d instant. Whilst I do not
concur in opinion with our valued friend, Mr. Sparks, that there
is no difference between the Chicago platform and General
McClellan’s letter of acceptance, I am cordially willing to give
him my vote.
On retiring from the Presidential office, I expressed the
determination to follow the example of my Democratic predecessors,
and refrain from taking an active part in party politics. Still, I
am as much of a Democrat, and as devoted to Democratic principles,
as I ever have been. Peace, although a great blessing and greatly
to be desired, would be too dearly purchased at the expense of the
Union, and I, therefore, like the letter of General McClellan.
In answer to your inquiry, I am but slightly, if at all,
acquainted with General McClellan. I must certainly have seen him,
but have no recollection of his person.
As to the result of the election in this State, I can express no
opinion. I hear, from those who visit me, of great changes
everywhere in our favor; but it cannot be denied that, since the
victories of Farragut, Sherman, and the prospects of General
Grant, an impression has been made, more or less extensively, that
the Southern States will speedily submit. I wish to God this were
true. It is certain, however, that the expectation has gone far to
embolden the Republicans. But why speculate? Tuesday next will
decide the vote of Pennsylvania at the Presidential election,
unless it should be very close.
My record is all ready, but I do not intend to publish until after
the Presidential election. The truth which it contains would not
make it a very acceptable document, especially to the friends of
the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, of Squatter Sovereignty,
and of those Douglas supporters who broke up the Charleston
Convention. It would not be very acceptable to ——, nor to ——, and
that class of politicians.
Miss Lane desires to be most kindly remembered to you, and I
remain always,
Very respectfully your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, October 26, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 18th instant, and regret to
learn from it that Mrs. Leiper and yourself have abandoned the
purpose of paying us a visit. I anticipated much pleasure from
this visit. I now meet very few who can converse with me from
their own knowledge of the distant past; and it is always a source
of high gratification to meet an old friend like yourself, even
older than I am, with whom I have ever been on terms of intimacy.
We are both at a period of life when it is our duty to relax our
grasp on a world fast receding, and fix our thoughts, desires and
affections on one which knows no change. I trust in God that,
through the merits and atonement of his Son, we may be both
prepared for the inevitable change.
I am truly sorry to learn that you have not been very well. My own
health is now good, except some rheumatic feeling in the legs.
I experience, with you, the desire to stay at home. This comes
from old age, and is a merciful dispensation of Providence,
repressing the desire to mingle much with the outside world when
we are no longer capable of its enjoyments. Peace and tranquillity
suit us best.
Though feeling a deep interest in it, I speculate but little on
the result of the approaching election. When I was behind the
scenes I could generally predict the event; but not so now. I
confess I was most agreeably surprised that we had carried the
Congressional election on the home vote, and now indulge the hope
that we may have a majority over the soldiers’ vote and all on the
8th November. In this, however, I do not feel very great
confidence.
Please to present my kind regards to Mrs. Leiper, and say how
sorry I am not to have been able to welcome her at Wheatland. I
should still insist on your promised visit, but Miss Lane left
home yesterday, to stay I do not know how long.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. HASSARD.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, November 8, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 31st ultimo, inquiring whether
there is any truth in the statement that President Polk, in 1846,
had solicited Arch-Bishop Hughes to accept a special mission to
Mexico, and I regret that I cannot give this question a very
definite answer. I shall cheerfully, however, state all my
knowledge on the subject.
There were at this period many Catholic soldiers in the army of
General Taylor on the Rio Grande; and I suggested to President
Polk that it was our duty to provide them chaplains of their own
Christian denomination. To this he cheerfully assented. In
consequence, I addressed the letter, in May, 1846, to which you
refer, to Bishop Hughes (not then Archbishop), inviting him to
come to Washington. He was then in Baltimore, attending the
Provincial Council of Bishops. He immediately came to the State
Department, accompanied by Bishop ——, of Dubuque.
When I communicated to Bishop Hughes the desire of the President
to send Catholic chaplains to the army, and to obtain his advice
and assistance to carry this into effect, both Bishops warmly
approved the measure. They immediately proceeded to the Jesuits’
College in Georgetown, to obtain the services of two suitable army
chaplains. After a few hours they returned, evidently much
gratified with their success, and informed me, in enthusiastic
terms, that every professor in the College, both old and young,
had volunteered to go to the army. The Bishops, however, came to
the conclusion that it would be more expedient to select the
chaplains from among the priests outside of the college, and
accordingly Father McElroy and Father Rey, of the Jesuit Society,
were appointed for this arduous and dangerous service. It is due
to these pious and good men to say they faithfully and usefully
performed their spiritual duties to the soldiers, and with much
satisfaction to the administration. One of these, Father Rey, was
afterwards murdered by brigands, near Monterey.
It occurred to the President, whilst the Bishop was in Washington,
and most probably at an earlier period, that, should he consent to
visit Mexico, he might render essential services in removing the
violent prejudices of the Mexicans, and especially of their
influential clergy, which then prevailed against the United
States, and thus prepare the way for peace between the two
Republics. In this I heartily concurred. Independently of his
exalted character as a dignitary of the church, I believed him to
be one of the ablest and most accomplished and energetic men I had
ever known, and that he possessed all the prudence and firmness
necessary to render such a mission successful.
The President and the Bishop had several conversations on this
subject; but at none of these was I present. I have not the least
doubt, however, from what I heard the President say, that this
mission was offered to him, and that he declined it.
The President, much as he desired to avail himself of the Bishop’s
services, could not at the time offer him anything more
acceptable. He could not appoint a new envoy to the Mexican
Government so soon after they had refused, in an insulting manner,
to receive our former minister. Paredes was, at that time, the
Revolutionary President of Mexico. He owed his elevation to his
extreme and violent hostility to the Government and people of the
United States. Besides, his army had just commenced the war by
crossing the Rio Grande and attacking a detachment of our troops.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, November 21, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
From your last letter I incline to believe that you bear our
defeat with Christian fortitude. Your preceding letter was written
with such glowing confidence and joyful hope, that Miss Lane and
myself had some amusement over it, as we had no expectation of
General McClellan’s election from the beginning, most ardently as
we desired it. If one seriously asks himself the question, in what
condition would the Democratic party be, with all the terrible
difficulties and embarrassments surrounding it, had it been
successful, he will find grounds for consolation in defeat. It has
shown its strength and has performed its duty, and can well afford
to bide its time. Meanwhile, it will be a watchful guardian over
the Constitution.
Now would be the time for conciliation on the part of Mr. Lincoln.
A frank and manly offer to the Confederates, that they might
return to the Union just as they were before they left it, leaving
the slavery question to settle itself, might possibly be accepted.
Should they return, he would have the glory of accomplishing the
object of the war against the most formidable rebellion which has
ever existed. He ought to desire nothing more.
In that event, the exasperated feelings of mutual hate would soon
subside. If the parties would not love each other, they must
entertain greater mutual respect for one another than ever existed
before. There would be no new collision between them for a hundred
years. The Republicans in this part of the world are not exultant.
They have won the elephant, and they will find difficulty in
deciding what to do with him.
I feel some pity for Stanton, on his sick bed. I have no doubt of
his personal integrity, and that his acceptance of the Department
has been a great pecuniary loss to him. He has served Lincoln
faithfully, if not very ably or discreetly, and yet the
Republicans themselves do not speak well of him......
I rarely see and but seldom hear of Judge Black. I presume he must
now be in Washington. He must be getting very rich.
I very seldom hear from Mr. Toucey. He is a gentleman of the old
school, full of principle and honor.
I have not the least feeling against our good friend Flinn on
account of _that resolution_, but esteem him as highly as ever. I
am convinced he had no part in it. It was altogether à la
Florence.
Miss Lane has been at her uncle Edward’s for several weeks, and
will not be home till the beginning of December, and then Buchanan
Henry will accompany her. In the meantime, Miss Annie Buchanan, a
very intelligent and agreeable girl, is staying with me. She, as
well as Miss Hetty, desires to be kindly remembered. We all wish
you would spend the Christmas holidays with us.
Remember me kindly to Doctor Jones and Mr. Carlisle. Had the
latter accepted the position in the cabinet which I offered, I
should have had one ex-member of it, both able and willing to
render me valuable assistance, and this he could have done with
very little loss of hours.
Your letters are always highly acceptable, and I shall ever
remain, most sincerely,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, December 28, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of Christmas day, and cordially return
you my best wishes for your health, prosperity and happiness. I
agree in opinion with General McClellan, that it is fortunate both
for himself and the Democratic party that he was not elected. But
I consider the defeat of Governor Seymour as most unfortunate. But
doctors will differ.
Miss Lane received your favor respecting the coal lands in
Philadelphia, but she is now at home. These consist of about 2,300
acres, situate in Broad Top Township, Bedford County, near the
railroad connecting the Pennsylvania Railroad at Huntingdon, with
the mines. This road is in full operation, and over it there is
now conveyed large quantities of excellent coal to market. I have
no doubt of the great value of these lands, though they have not
been further explored than to ascertain there is abundance of coal
in them. Miss Lane’s interest in them is about one-eleventh, and
she is entirely opposed to their sale, but I have no doubt this
will be forced by some of her co-heirs. As yet she has received no
notice of the institution of proceedings for this purpose, but is
expecting it daily. The parties to whom you refer ought to examine
the lands, for there is not a doubt they will be sold in the
spring.
Miss Lane desires to be kindly remembered to you.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—My health has been good for several months.
CHAPTER XXIX.
1865-1868.
MARRIAGE OF MISS LANE—LETTERS TO HER AND OTHER PERSONS.
In the year 1866, Mr. Buchanan had the happiness of seeing his
niece, Miss Lane, married to Mr. Henry E. Johnston, of Baltimore. It
seems that this engagement was first made known to him in October,
1865, when Miss Lane was absent from Wheatland. He writes to her as
follows:
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, October 21, 1865.[181]
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I received yours of the 18th yesterday. We will talk the matter
over in regard to Wheatland after your return. I believe you say
truly that nothing would have induced you to leave me, in good or
evil fortune, if I had wished you to remain with me. Such a wish
on my part would be very selfish. You have long known my desire
that you should marry, whenever a suitor worthy of you, and
possessing your affections, should offer. Indeed it has been my
strong desire to see you settled in the world before my death. You
have now made your own unbiased choice; and from the character of
Mr. Johnston I anticipate for you a happy marriage, because I
believe, from your own good sense, you will conform to your
conductor, and make him a good and loving wife. Beware of
unreasonable delays in the performance of the ceremony, lest these
may be attributed to an improper motive.
I have no news to communicate of the least importance; besides, I
hope to see you by the middle of the next week at the latest.
Blanche and Martha paid me a brief visit yesterday,—better late
than never, and so I told them.
Governor Porter was here two days during the present week. He and
I began political life nearly together, and we can talk over the
men and measures of the “auld lang syne” for the last fifty years.
His visits are always agreeable to me.
Among your numerous friends you ask only for Punch,[182] and this
in the postscript, which is said to contain the essence of a
lady’s letter. He is a companion which I shun as much as possible,
not being at all to my liking. I believe, however, his health is
in a satisfactory condition.
The proceedings of a majority of the Episcopal Convention have
afforded me great satisfaction.
If the opportunity should offer, please to remember me with great
kindness and respect to Bishop Hopkins. I have no doubt his
preaching extempore is excellent.
Give my love to Mrs. Reigart, and be sure you place an indelible
mark on _that_ stocking. Should I again get the gout, how it will
solace the pain.
Miss Hetty desires to be kindly remembered to Maria and yourself.
With my love to Maria, I remain,
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 182:
It seems from the following letter from Dr. Blake to Mr. Buchanan,
that Miss Lane was in Washington in March, 1865, at the second
inauguration of President Lincoln.
[DR. BLAKE TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
HIS EXCELLENCY, JAMES BUCHANAN:—
MY DEAR SIR:—Your favor of the 21st inst. did not reach me until
the 23d. On the following day I saw Miss Lane, and had the same
pleasure yesterday. I expect to call on her to-morrow in company
with some ladies who wish to pay their respects to her on your and
her own accounts. She will not require any attention from me, as
her reception hours are occupied by the many friends and admirers
who visit her. At Mrs. Lincoln’s afternoon reception she was the
observed of all observers, and she was constantly surrounded by
crowds of acquaintances, and persons desirous of being introduced
to her. She, I am sure, must be highly gratified by her visit, as
nothing has occurred to mar the pleasure of it.
Our city is full of strangers, who have been attracted among us by
the approaching inauguration. There is nothing new, and I have
nothing of local interest to communicate at this time.
Very truly your friend,
JOHN B. BLAKE.
Footnote 181:
A favorite dog.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS LANE.]
WHEATLAND, November 30, 1865.
MY DEAR HARRIET:—
I enclose two letters. That from Mr. Capen I opened, supposing it
might require immediate attention; but when I discovered the
subject of it I ceased to read. I go to town to-day, and shall
keep this open, so that if other letters should arrive I will
enclose them.
I go to York on Saturday, having received a very kind and pressing
invitation from the Shunks. Rebecca was ill in bed, and that is
the reason why I had not heard from them. I have not a word from
either Mr. Schell or James Henry. I infer there is nothing
encouraging to write about the book. A strong attempt is making to
cry it down in New York, but it will make its own way. No news.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Miss Lane’s marriage took place at Wheatland on the 11th of January,
1866. The note of invitation to one of their most valued friends was
written on the same day on which he received from Mr. Johnston a
deed of settlement which that gentleman made in favor of his
intended wife.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO COLONEL J. B. BAKER.]
WHEATLAND, January 6, 1866.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Miss Lane requests me to invite you in her name to her wedding on
Thursday, the 11th inst. The ceremony will be between 12 and 1
o’clock. It is to be a private affair. No cards of invitation have
been issued. I hope you will not fail to countenance us with your
presence.
Your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. JOHNSTON.]
WHEATLAND, January 6, 1866.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 4th, with the deed, which
I think has been well and carefully prepared. For this
purely voluntary act of your kindness Miss Lane feels
herself greatly indebted, and you will please to accept my
cordial acknowledgments.
Had I been consulted, I should have preferred that my name had not
appeared as a trustee, having determined, at my advanced age, to
relieve myself, as far as possible, from all worldly affairs; but,
as the chief burden will rest upon your brother Josiah, who is
abundantly competent to perform the duty, I shall cheerfully
accept the trust. Besides, this will place upon record, for
whatever it may be worth, my entire approbation of the marriage.
With sentiments of warm regard, I remain,
Very respectfully your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, February 24, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 21st instant, and rejoice to
learn that your health has so much improved. I trust that the
genial air of the spring and the active exercise to which you have
been all your life accustomed, may restore you once more to
perfect health. Thank God! my own health has been good thus far
throughout the severe and inclement weather.
I duly received your letter of the 17th January, and have been
under the impression it was answered. I have often since thought
of the description which you gave of your happy Christmas meeting
with your children and grandchildren under the old paternal roof,
and what heartfelt satisfaction it must have afforded to Mrs.
Leiper and yourself. I trust that several more such family
reunions may be in reserve for you, though we have both attained
an age when we cannot expect much time in this world, and when we
ought to be preparing to meet our God in peace.
I had not learned, until the receipt of your last, that Mr.
Lincoln had joined the Church. Let us hope, in Christian charity,
that the act was done in sincerity. The old Presbyterian Church is
not now what it was in former years. The last general assembly has
thoroughly abolitionized it.
I confess I was much gratified at the capture of Charleston. This
city was the nest of all our troubles. For more than a quarter of
a century the people were disunionists, and during this whole
period have been persistently engaged in inoculating the other
slave States with their virus. Alas, for poor Virginia! who has
suffered so much, and who was so reluctantly dragged into their
support.
Miss Lane is now on a visit to Mrs. Berghman’s (the daughter of
Charles Macalester), in Washington city.
From your friend always,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. FLINN.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, April 18, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I was much astonished to learn from yours of the 17th that you had
not received the bond and mortgage. At least ten days before the
1st of April, I enclosed the bond and mortgage to you, with a
regular power of attorney, duly stamped and acknowledged,
authorizing the recorder of deeds from Alleghany county to enter
satisfaction on the record. My letter inclosing these papers was
placed in the post office at Lancaster on the day after its date
by a friend who happened to be at Wheatland, and the postage was
paid. What can have become of it, I cannot conjecture. It must
have gone astray, as many letters do. Should it not soon turn up,
I shall send another power to enter satisfaction. Not knowing the
name of the recorder, I gave the power to him by his official
title, which is sufficient. Should it prove to be necessary to
have a new power, please to state his name.
I thank you for the information relative to the assassination of
President Lincoln, though I had received the news of this
deplorable event before it came to hand. The ways of Divine
Providence are inscrutable; and it is the duty of poor, frail man,
whether he will or not, to submit to His mysterious dispensations.
The war—the necessary war—forced upon us by the madness of the
rebels, we all fondly hoped was drawing to a triumphant conclusion
in the restoration of the Union with a return to friendly
relations among all the States, under the auspices of Mr. Lincoln.
At such a moment the terrible crime was committed, which hurried
him into eternity, and God only knows what may be the direful
consequences. I deeply mourn his loss, from private feelings, but
still more deeply for the sake of the country. Heaven, I trust,
will not suffer the perpetrators of the deed, and all their guilty
accomplices, to escape just punishment. But we must not despair of
the Republic.
I have known President Johnson for many years. Indeed, he once
honored me with a visit at Wheatland. That he has risen from an
humble station to the highest political position of the Union, is
evidence both of his ability and his merits. He is (certainly he
used to be) a man of sound judgment, excellent common sense, and
devoted to the elevation and welfare of the people. I wish him
success, with all my heart, in performing the arduous and
responsible duties which have been cast upon him. I shall judge
him fairly, as I ever did his lamented predecessor, though my
opinions may be of but little importance. I hope he may exercise
his own good judgment, first weighing the counsels of his advisers
carefully, as was ever the practice of the first and greatest of
our Presidents, before the adoption of any decided resolution. The
feelings naturally springing from the horrid deed ought first to
have a few days to subside, before a final committal of the
administration to any fixed policy.
I have weighed your suggestion with care, but regret to say I
cannot agree with you. Such an act would be misrepresented.[183]
With my kind regards to Mrs. Flinn, I remain always your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 183:
His correspondent had urged him to “write a few lines on the death
of Mr. Lincoln, which will soothe the bitter prejudices of the
extremists of his party against you and your friends.”
[MR. BUCHANAN TO THE HON. J. W. WALL.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, April 27, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Upon a reperusal of your letter of the 30th ultimo, I consider it
my duty to furnish a specific denial of the statement, by
whomsoever made, that I refused you the mission to Rome, “because
of a doubt as to the genuineness of your Democracy.” Any such
statement is without the least foundation. Indeed, according to my
best recollection, those who professed to be the best friends both
of yourself and of Mr. Stockton, never intimated a suspicion
either of your Democracy or your ability. On the contrary, they
expressed much anxiety that you should be the Democratic candidate
for Congress in your district.
Permit me to observe, as your father’s friend, and as your own (if
you will allow me so to be), that I regretted very much the tone
and manner in which you say that “the Republicans will sweep the
State of New Jersey next fall.” You ought to recollect that the
life of a public man under this, and indeed under all popular
governments, is exposed to many vicissitudes. For this, whilst
ever keeping steadily in view a sacred regard for principle, he
ought to be prepared. His true policy is to “bide his time,” and
if injustice has been done him, it is morally certain that the
people will, in the long run, repair it. Indeed, this very
injustice, if borne with discreet moderation and firmness, often
proves the cause of his eventual benefit. Do not mar your future
prospects by hasty actions or expressions which may be employed to
your injury. Still believe “there is a better day coming,” and
prepare the way for it.
I was seventy-four on Sunday last, and, considering my advanced
age, I enjoy good health as well as a buoyant spirit.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. KING.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, April 27, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Rest assured that I was much gratified to receive your favor of
the 22d. If I was indebted a letter to you, I am sorry for it,
because I entertain no other feeling towards you but that of
kindness and friendship.
In common with you, I feel the assassination of President Lincoln
to be a terrible misfortune to our country. May God, in his mercy,
ward from us the evils which it portends, and bring good out of
this fearful calamity. My intercourse with our deceased President,
both on his visit to me, after his arrival in Washington, and on
the day of his first inauguration, convinced me that he was a man
of a kindly and benevolent heart, and of plain, sincere and frank
manners. I have never since changed my opinion of his character.
Indeed, I felt for him much personal regard. Throughout the years
of the war, I never faltered in my conviction that it would
eventually terminate in the crushing of the rebellion, and was
ever opposed to the recognition of the Confederate government by
any act which even looked in that direction. Believing, always,
secession to be a palpable violation of the Constitution, I
considered the acts of secession to be absolutely void; and that
the States were, therefore, still members, though rebellious
members, of the Union......
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO REV. P. COOMBE.]
WASHINGTON, May 2, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 29th ultimo, proposing that I
should endow a Professorship in Dickinson College for the
education of poor students who do not possess the means of
educating themselves. The object is highly praiseworthy, but I
regret to say I do not feel myself at liberty to advance $25,000
for this purpose. Under existing circumstances my charities,
including those to relatives who require assistance, are
extensive, and the world is greatly mistaken as to the amount of
my fortune. Besides, if I should hereafter conclude to endow a
Professorship, whilst I highly approve the theological doctrines
of the Methodist Episcopal Church, I could not prefer a college
under its direction to a college of the Presbyterian Church, in
which I was born and educated, or to the German Reformed College,
in my immediate vicinity, in which I have taken a deep interest
ever since its origin at Mercersburg, near the place of my
nativity.
I might add that Dickinson College, when I was a student, was not
conducted in such a manner as to inspire me with any high degree
of gratitude for the education I received from my “_Alma Mater_.”
This was after the death of Dr. Nesbit and before a new President
had been elected. I am truly happy to believe that it is now well
and ably conducted under the auspices of a Christian Church
founded by John Wesley, whose character I have ever held in
highest veneration, and whose sermons I have read over and over
again with great interest.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK EVENING POST.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, May 11, 1865.
SIR:—
In the New York _Tribune_ of yesterday I read, with no little
surprise, an extract from the _Evening Post_ (which I do not see),
stating in substance that the Cincinnati Democratic convention of
June, 1856 (not “May”), had come to “a dead lock” on the evening
before Mr. Buchanan’s nomination, and had adjourned until the next
morning, with a fair prospect that it would meet only to adjourn
_sine die_; but that in the meantime, arrangements were made to
secure his nomination as soon as the convention should reassemble,
in consequence of pledges given by his friends. The nature of
these pledges, according to the article in the _Post_, was openly
avowed by Judge Black on the floor of the convention immediately
after nomination had been made. According to it: “A silence ensued
for a few moments, as if the convention was anticipating something
prepared, when Judge Black, of Pennsylvania (afterwards Attorney
General under Buchanan), rose in his place and made a set speech,
in which he proceded to denounce ‘Abolitionism’ and ‘Black
Republicanism’ very freely, and to argue that the States
possessed, under the Constitution, the right of secession. He went
further, and told the convention that if the nominee was elected,
and a Black Republican should be elected as his successor, he [Mr.
Buchanan] would do nothing to interfere with the exercise of it.
This pledge was ample, and was accepted by the Southern leaders.”
You will doubtless be astonished to learn that Judge Black,
afterwards Mr. Buchanan’s Attorney General, by whom this pledge is
alleged to have been made, and through whom the evident purpose
now is to fasten it upon Mr. Buchanan, _was not a delegate to the
Cincinnati convention, nor was he within five hundred miles of
Cincinnati during its session_. _Instead of this, he was at_ _the
very time performing his high official duties as a Judge of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania._
It may be added, that from the date of General Jackson’s message
of January, 1833, against South Carolina nullification and
secession, until that of his own message of December, 1860, and
indeed since, no public man has more steadfastly and uniformly
opposed these dangerous and suicidal heresies than Mr. Buchanan.
Had any person, in or out of the convention, dared to make a
pledge in his behalf on this or any other subject, such an act
would have been condemned a few days thereafter by the terms of
his letter accepting the nomination. In this, after expressing his
thanks for the honor conferred, he says that: “Deeply sensible of
the vast and varied responsibility attached to the station,
especially at the present crisis in our affairs, _I have carefully
refrained from seeking the nomination, either by word or deed_;”
and this statement is emphatically true.
A few words in regard to the alleged “dead lock” in the Cincinnati
convention, at the time of its adjournment on the evening of the
5th June, after fourteen ballots had been taken for a candidate.
It appears from its proceedings, as officially published, that on
each of these ballotings Mr. Buchanan received a plurality, and on
the sixth, attained a majority of all the votes of the convention,
but not the required two-thirds. On the fourteenth and last ballot
on that evening, the vote stood 152½ for Mr. Buchanan, 75 for
Pierce, 63 for Douglas, and 5½ for Cass. This being the state of
the case, when the convention assembled the next morning the New
Hampshire delegation withdrew the name of General Pierce, and the
Illinois delegation withdrew that of Judge Douglas, in obedience
to instructions from him by telegraph, on the day before the
ballotings had commenced. After this, the nomination of Mr.
Buchanan seemed to be a matter of course. He had never heard of “a
dead lock” in the convention, or anything like it, until he read
the article in the _Post_.
It may be proper to state that Colonel Samuel W. Black, of
Pittsburg, was a delegate to the Cincinnati convention from
Pennsylvania, and being well known as a ready and eloquent
speaker, “shouts were raised” in the convention for a speech from
him immediately after the nomination was announced. To these he
briefly responded in an able and enthusiastic manner. From the
identity of their surnames, had this response, reported with the
proceedings, contained the infamous pledge attributed to Judge
Black, or anything like it, we might in charity have inferred that
the author of the article had merely mistaken the one name for the
other. But there is nothing in what Colonel Black said which
affords the least color for any such mistake.
Colonel Black afterwards sealed his hostility to secession with
his blood. At an early stage of the war, he fell mortally wounded
on the field of battle, whilst gallantly leading on his regiment
against the rebels.
I doubt not you will cheerfully do me justice by publishing this
letter, and I would thank you for a copy of the paper.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. NAHUM CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, May 13, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your note of the 11th, with the slip from the
Boston paper not named. The astounding answer to it is, that Judge
Black was not a delegate to the Cincinnati Convention, was not
within five hundred miles of Cincinnati during its session, but
was at the time performing his duties on the Bench, as Judge of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Although convinced that he was
not present, in order to make assurance doubly sure, I sent him a
telegram on the subject. His answer is as follows: “I was _not_ at
Cincinnati in 1856, or at any other time in my life. I was not a
member of, or an attendant upon the Democratic Convention.” This
is a clincher.
When I saw the article from the New York _Evening Post_ in the New
York _Tribune_, I addressed a letter to the editor, and fearing he
might be unwilling to publish such a damning condemnation of his
article, _a la mode_ —— of Boston, I sent a duplicate to the
_Tribune_.
I forwarded your note with the enclosure to Judge Black, but, like
Gallio, he cares for none of these matters.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[TO HORACE GREELEY, ESQ., EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK “TRIBUNE.”]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, May 23, 1865.
SIR:—
In courtesy I ought to thank you, as I do sincerely, for your
offered use of the _Tribune_ for “any explanation, comment or
disclaimer” of the acts of my administration during the last six
months of its existence. This kind offer should be cordially
accepted, but, admonished by advancing years, of which you give me
warning, I some time since compiled a history of it during this
period, chiefly from the proceedings of Congress and other
official and reliable documents, too long for publication in the
_Tribune_. This has not been published hitherto, because of my
reluctance, for several reasons, to obtrude myself upon public
attention during the prosecution of the war, now happily
terminated, in the suppression of the rebellion.
Though we have been “life-long” political opponents, as you truly
observe, I have for many years been a constant reader of the
_Tribune_. This I have done to obtain a knowledge of the
principles and policy of the Republican party, from their ablest
and most influential expounder; and one who, whilst contending
against political opponents, has had the courage and candor to
present to the public the Democratic propositions and principles
he assailed. I would, therefore, put it to yourself, whether it
was quite compatible with this character to assume that my
contradiction of an article in another journal, relating to
matters of fact, dating as far back as the Cincinnati Convention
of June, 1856, had been intended as a defence of the acts of an
administration which did not come into existence until nine months
afterward; and thereupon to pronounce the conclusion “that Mr.
Buchanan’s letter has not vindicated Mr. Buchanan’s career.” Mr.
Buchanan has carefully refrained, for four long years, from any
attempt to vindicate his “career” as President, except so far as
this was forced upon him in his controversy with General Scott,
and this course he shall still continue to pursue, until the
publication of his historical sketch.
Indeed, his recent letter to the editor of the New York _Post_
would never have been written had the editor republished from his
files the old article, as published nearly nine years before
(though never known to Mr. B. until a few days ago), with any
comments he might have thought proper. That of which Mr. Buchanan
now complains is that the new article, though ostensibly based
upon the old, presents a statement of facts essentially different,
in a most important particular, from the original; and this, too,
with the evident object of injuring his character. This change
consists in substituting for the name of Colonel Black, who _was_
a delegate to the Cincinnati Convention, that of Judge Black, who
_was not_; and, at the same time, referring to the fact that “the
Judge was afterward Attorney General under Mr. Buchanan.” Whence
this radical change, if not to bring home to Mr. Buchanan a
complicity in the infamous pledge which the last article falsely,
but in express terms, attributes to Judge Black? Had the facts
stated in this article, on the authority of the editor of the
_Post_, remained without contradiction, they would have been taken
for granted by the public, to the lasting and serious injury to
the reputation both of Judge Black and Mr. Buchanan.
It is but justice to the reputation of a brave and lamented
officer to repeat that, in his ardent and impassioned remarks
before the convention, evidently without previous preparation,
there is not the least color for attributing to Colonel Black a
pledge which would have been a serious imputation upon the fair
fame of a man who was without fear and without reproach.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[SECRETARY STANTON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, June 16, 1865.
DEAR SIR:—
Your note of the 14th inst., enclosing Mr. Tate’s letter, has just
reached me, and I have ordered the immediate release of Lieutenant
Tate and his three friends, with transportation from Johnson’s
Island to Alabama. I hope that you are in the enjoyment of good
health, and beg you to present my compliments to Miss Lane.
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO A FRIEND.]
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received yours of the 10th instant, and annex a receipt. I
had not thought of charging interest.
Should you need one or two thousand dollars in the fall, I shall
be happy to accommodate you. Please to give me notice as long in
advance as may be convenient.
My health is as usual.
I begin to doubt seriously whether President Johnson will do, but
still hope for the best.
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. LEIPER.]
WHEATLAND, June 19, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I was glad to perceive, from the _Jeffersonian_, that you were
well enough to preside and to speak at your late Democratic county
meeting. From the tenor of your last letter, I was fearful you
would not be able to perform this duty. I am truly thankful that I
was mistaken. Our thread of life is already so long that the Fates
cannot have much of it in reserve. May God grant that we shall
both be ready to welcome our Saviour at His coming, whensoever He
may arrive.
Thank Heaven! we have lived to witness the return of peace. I do
not pretend to speculate on the future course of President
Johnson. Of the past there can be no doubt. Until the close of my
administration, no man had a better Democratic record, unless we
may except his effort to give away the public lands to actual
settlers. With this exception, I received his uniform support.
My health is wonderfully good, considering my age. It has been so
for the last six months, but I make no calculation for the future.
I am happy to perceive that you are living over your life in your
grandchildren. This is a source of enjoyment which I do not
possess, yet I congratulate you upon it with all my heart. May
they all be as prosperous and happy as your heart can desire!
Miss Lane desires me to present her affectionate regards to you.
From your friend, as ever,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. TOUCEY.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, August 3, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 29th ultimo, with the
accompanying communication. It is too late to make use of them in
my book, the manuscript of which is now in the hands of the
Appletons, and I am from week to week receiving the proofs, but
not in such quantities as I could desire. They publish it at their
own risk, and are stereotyping it. From present appearances, it
will not be published for a month or six weeks. Still, when I
wrote it, your testimony before the committee was in my
possession, and I think you will say I have made good use of it.
I have heard that the legislature of Connecticut have restored
your portrait, and that of Governor Seymour, to their appropriate
places among the Governors. Is this true? It was a shameful act to
have removed them.
Judge Black was here a few days ago. He informs me that Mr. and
Mrs. [Jacob] Thompson left Halifax for France on the steamer some
weeks ago, and that the money deposited by him in Canada belonged
to himself. It is well for him he has made his escape......
My health is very good, considering my age. I lead a tranquil and
contented life, free from self-reproach for any of the acts of my
administration. How much I wish to see Mrs. Toucey and yourself!
Miss Lane desires to be most kindly remembered to both. Please to
present my warmest regards to her, and remember me kindly to
Governor Seymour.
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. TOUCEY TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
HARTFORD, September 18, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your letter inquiring who persuaded General Scott
to take the “Star of the West” instead of the “Brooklyn,” to send
reinforcements and provisions to Fort Sumter in 1861. I am not
able to answer the question, except by saying that I did not. Who
did persuade him to make the change is entirely unknown to me. I
always supposed that he was induced to send the “Star of the West”
by advisers outside of the administration. Of course I cannot
answer for Mr. Holt, but I never suspected that he was the author
of that measure.
If you can do it without any inconvenience, I should be glad to
receive from you a copy of the joint order of Mr. Holt and myself
to the Military and Naval Forces at Pensacola, which we issued
during the session of the Peace Convention. You may remember that
I applied for a copy to Mr. Welles, and he declined to give it. I
may have occasion to make some use of it.
Mrs. Toucey unites with me in most respectful and kindest regards
to yourself and Miss Lane.
Very truly yours, with the highest respect,
ISAAC TOUCEY.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO THE HON. C. J. FAULKNER.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, October 21, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have this moment received your favor of the 19th inst. Whilst
attributing to me patriotic motives for my official acts when
President, you express the opinion that I had erred in some of my
recommendations and measures of policy. To this, as a reasonable
man, I can have no objection, for I may have committed many
errors. But when you add that I would probably myself admit such
to be the fact, I must say that you are mistaken. I pursued a
settled consistent line of policy from the beginning to the end,
and, on reviewing my past conduct, I do not recollect a single
important measure which I should desire to recall, even if this
were in my power. Under this conviction I have enjoyed a tranquil
and cheerful mind, notwithstanding the abuse I have received, in
full confidence that my countrymen would eventually do justice. I
am happy to know that you still continue to be my friend, and I
cordially reciprocate your kindly sentiments, wishing that you may
long live in health and prosperity.
I thank you for the slip from the _National Intelligencer_, which
I have no doubt contains a correct representation of your conduct
whilst Minister in France. I learned from Mr. Magraw the cause of
your arrest soon after you had been discharged. I am happy to say
that through God’s mercy I enjoy unusual health for a man now in
his seventy-fifth year.
Miss Lane is not at home or she would certainly return you her
kind remembrances.
Very respectfully your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MANTON MARBLE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, November 4, 1865.
DEAR SIR:—
I have received, through your favor of the 29th ultimo, the
invitation of the Managing Committee to become an honorary member
of the Manhattan Club, and I cheerfully and gratefully accept this
token of their regard.
It is proper I should thank the Committee for their kind
recognition of my long services in the cause of Democracy.
Convinced that its principles spring from the very essence of the
Constitution, I know they can never die whilst this shall survive.
All that is required to render them again triumphant, as they were
in the days of Jefferson and Jackson, is that the party, without
concealment or reserve, shall, as then, with unity of spirit,
persistently present and uphold them before the American people in
their native truth, simplicity and grandeur. I am too old to take
part in this glorious task, but, were I twenty years younger, I
should once more devote myself to its accomplishment, firmly
believing that this would be the triumph of law, liberty and
order, and would best secure every interest—material, social and
political—of all classes of my countrymen.
Yours very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, November 25, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
You will have seen ere this that my little book has been launched
on a stormy ocean. I thank God that I have lived to perform this
duty. It will be severely criticised, but the facts and
authorities cited cannot be demolished.
. . . . . . .
Miss Lane desires to be most kindly remembered to you.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[REV. DR. NEVIN TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
November 30, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Please accept my sincere thanks for the copy of your new work just
placed in my hands. I shall hold it in high value for what I
conceive to be its intrinsic historical importance, and also as a
cherished monument of your personal friendship and favor. It gives
me pleasure to find that it is in the way of gaining wide
attention in the country, and I look upon it as a significant
tribute to its power that so little effort has been made thus far
(so far as I know), in quarters where it might have been expected,
to meet it in the way of earnest controversy and contradiction.
For the case is not one in which people of sense can persuade
themselves that the argument is to be disposed of finally, either
by blind general abuse, or by any affectation of silent
indifference and contempt. That your last days may be your best
days, and that they may be followed by a brighter happiness in
heaven, is the prayer of
Your affectionate friend,
J. W. NEVIN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. BAKER.]
WHEATLAND, December 25, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your kind favor of the 21st, and also the grand
Christmas turkey, of which I entertain the warmest anticipations.
Although we Presbyterians make no fuss over Christmas, yet we do
not altogether despise the good things which it brings in its
train as kept by the outside barbarians......
I heartily rejoice with you that you have completed the barn.
With my warmest wishes that you and yours may enjoy many a merry
Christmas and many a happy New Year, I remain as ever your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO A FRIEND.]
WHEATLAND, December 30, 1865.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of yesterday, and cannot consent that
you shall be put to any inconvenience, or be obliged to sell your
railroad shares at so low a price for the want of $1,000. I shall,
therefore, send you a check for that amount on the 2d January, and
send a check to our friend for $800, with a positive promise to
send him the remaining $1,000 on the 1st February.
I shall be very happy to see Mr. Phillips and yourself on any day
next week; but on the week following a great event is to take
place, at which, I hope, you may be present, though it will be
almost strictly private. If Mr. Phillips cannot come on the week
commencing on New Year’s day, then we must postpone his visit
until the week commencing on the 15th January.
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—I send a pair of canvas-backs.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. FLINN.]
(Without date.)
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received the book, and am indebted to you for having
procured it for me.
I am glad to learn that you soon propose to write me a longer
letter.
The rebels, when at Wrightsville, were within eleven miles of us.
No Democrat, within my knowledge was, in the least degree, alarmed
for his personal safety. Not one of my personal or political
friends, male or female, thought of leaving Lancaster. Miss Lane
entertained no fears. I doubt not, however, that they have made
sad havoc among the horses of my tenant in Franklin county. I
trust that General Lee may speedily be driven across the Potomac.
He would never have been here had not —— been such a poor devil.
Your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. JOHNSTON.]
WHEATLAND, January 18, 1866.
MY DEAR MRS. JOHNSTON:—
I have received your kind letter, but not until Tuesday, when I
thought it uncertain whether an answer would reach you at Boston.
I am much gratified with its tone, and think you have embarked on
the sea of matrimony with a fair prospect that the voyage may be
happy. This will, in a great measure, as I have often told you,
depend upon yourself. I hope you may perform your domestic duties
with as much dignity and propriety as you have manifested in your
_quasi_ public life. I long to see you an affectionate wife and an
exemplary matron. You are now .... and have experienced enough of
the life of the world to conclude that most of it is vanity and
vexation of spirit. I trust you have heart and sense enough to be
happy in your new condition. You will find it far better, to a
well-balanced mind, than the flash and excitement produced by the
admiration and flattery of the world. I expect great things from
you, and trust I may not be disappointed.
The girls are still here, and render themselves quite agreeable.
I think the wedding went off properly and prosperously. Every
guest was pleased. I almost lost my heart to Emily and Bessy. I
liked them very much, and I think your association with them will
prove highly agreeable. I have but little news to communicate. The
Misses Steenman and Mr. and Mrs. Brinton have been here since you
left, making anxious inquiries concerning you, which I was able to
answer in a manner highly pleasing to myself. Mr. and Mrs. Swarr
are about to attend the funeral of Mr. Mellon, their relative, in
Philadelphia.
I am rejoiced that Mr. Johnston and Mr. Schell get along so well
together. There is not now, and never has been, any reason why
they should not. Mr. Schell is certainly one of the excellent of
the earth, and there is no man living whom I esteem more highly.
I return you Sir Henry Holland’s letter, and I am almost tempted
to send him a copy of my book, on your account, as he desires.
Still, my opinion of his conduct, on his last visit to the United
States, has not changed. Perhaps it was too much to expect from a
London Doctor, that he would forego the honor of reviewing the
army of the Potomac, or the society of Thurlow Weed, Miss Rebecca
Smith and Mr. Everett, for the sake of visiting an old man at
Wheatland, who was proscribed by the grand dignitaries of the
empire.
We have good sleighing here, and have been enjoying it moderately.
With my kindest regards to Mr. Johnston, I remain,
Yours ever affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, January 19, 1866.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 16th instant, and am happy to
learn that no “fair one” has come athwart your regard for your old
friends. I know that your heart is so expanded, that love and
friendship will both find suitable quarters in it.
I shall deliver your very kind message to Mrs. Johnston, but do
not expect to see her for a considerable time. She left here with
Mr. Johnston on the day of the wedding, and is now, I believe, in
New York. When they will go to Baltimore I do not know, but
believe that soon after they intend to visit Cuba. I know that
Mrs. Johnston would be delighted to receive your felicitations
under your own hand. Her address will be Mrs. Henry E. Johnston,
No. 79 Monument Street, Baltimore. I thank you for the offer to
send me Mr. De Leon’s review, but I do not wish to have it. If
there is anything disagreeable in it, _as is doubtless the case_,
some person will be sure to send it to me. There is a violent and
brutal attack on the book and on me in Beecher’s _Independent_,
and I know not the number of extracts from the paper containing
it, which I have received anonymously. The book is quietly making
its own way, under the disadvantage of a very high price. Several
thousands have been already sold, and the Appletons inform me the
demand is still increasing.
I am truly happy to learn that my good old friend Dr. Jones is so
well pleased with the book. Please to present him my very kindest
regards.
Thank you for delivering my message to Mrs. Clay. She is charming,
and has behaved beautifully in her trying situation.
When the opportunity offers, please to return my very kindest
regards to Mrs. Dr. Houston. She is, indeed, an excellent woman,
and I owe her many obligations.
I ought to thank you for the reports “of the condition of the
_National_ Metropolitan Bank.” In these I observe you have
blended specie with other lawful money, but the amount of each
you have not designated. These reports have led to a train of
reminiscences. The Democratic party, under the lead of General
Jackson, put down _one_ national bank as both unconstitutional
and inexpedient. There are now more than sixteen hundred such
banks. All over the country, on account of their enormous
profits, these have enlisted great numbers of Democrats as
stockholders, and they will constitute the most formidable
obstacle to the triumph of the Democratic party. But this event
must come sooner or later. I presume our friend Carlisle did not
receive the book I sent him.
——, I perceive, has returned to Washington. Of all the absurd
things I have encountered in my life, the cause of his enmity to
me is the most absurd. I did him the greatest kindness which I
could do to a father or a friend, by causing the lover of his
daughter, to whom I was warmly attached, to be sent away quietly,
instead of making the case a subject of diplomatic correspondence
with the —— government.
I sat down to write you a few lines, and I have now written an
unconscionably long letter.
From your friend, as ever,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS HENRIETTA BUCHANAN.]
WHEATLAND, March 20, 1866.
MY DEAR HENRIETTA:—
I have recently had a photograph taken of myself, and as in duty
bound I enclose you one of the first copies. They say it is a good
likeness, and it certainly resembles the original, so far as old
age and wrinkles are concerned.
I hope Annie and Harriet do not persecute you since their return
home. I hope you have as kind a friend to take your part against
them as you found at Wheatland.
We are living along here very quietly, but servants are our great
trouble. We have no boy at present, our chambermaid is about to
get married, and the cook is going to housekeeping with her
husband. On the first of April, for any thing I know at present,
we shall be left in the vocative......
I have not heard from Mrs. Johnston since she left New York, but
the papers inform us that she and Mr. Johnston have arrived at the
Havana.....
I received a letter two or three days ago from your brother James,
who is evidently far behind the time. He expresses the hope that
Mr. and Mrs. Johnston are now living comfortably at Baltimore. I
fear that the five Miss Buchanans do not keep their brother well
posted in regard to current events.
Please to give my kind love to all, not excepting Annie and
Harriet, if they have treated you with proper respect, and believe
me to be ever
Yours very affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. JOHNSTON.]
WHEATLAND, July 18th, 1866.
MY DEAR NIECE:—
I have received yours of the 12th, and desire to express my
sympathy for your sufferings from the extreme heat of the weather.
I have received a letter from Annie giving me an agreeable account
of her visit to you, and stating what good a housekeeper you are,
and how happy you are in your domestic relations. God grant this
may ever continue! She says Mr. Johnston and yourself are looking
forward to your paying me a visit in August, and that he is very
anxious you should go to the country for a while. You know that my
house is ever open to you, and you shall always receive a cordial
welcome. The same, I am certain, will be extended to you whether I
am at home or not. I feared, from your former life, that you might
be inclined to leave home too often, and, therefore, I guarded you
against such an inclination, but whenever you come here, you know
how much pleasure your society would afford me, and this would be
increased by that of Mr. Johnston.
I enclose you the last letter of Mrs. ——, and I confess I am
disappointed that your name is not mentioned in it. Please to
return it to me. I had only thought of going to Saratoga to meet
her, and when informed she would not be there, I determined to go
to Bedford, because I really require the use of the water. I
intend to take Thomas with me, who has behaved very well since his
last escapade. I do not anticipate a pleasant visit. The place
will swarm with Republican intriguers. —— and —— have gone there
in advance of the main column. The latter, though professing
Democracy, will take part in all their intrigues on the Senator
and other questions......
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. JOHNSTON.]
BEDFORD SPRINGS, July 30th, 1866.
MY DEAR NIECE:—
I have received your favor of the 25th, and would answer it at
greater length, but this will be delivered to you by Miss Goughey
Carroll who can tell you all the news. My time passes pleasantly
enough, and everybody is kind. I shall leave here with Mr. North
on Monday, the 6th August, unless some friend should arrive in the
meantime with whom I can travel home at a later period. Thomas is
useless, and worse than useless. I shall send him home to-day or
to-morrow.
You inquire, is there any possibility of Clymer’s election? If I
am to believe the shrewdest calculators in the State—I don’t
pretend to give my own opinion—he will certainly be elected. Such
is Governor Porter’s opinion, though he thinks that on joint
ballot there will be a majority in the legislature against us. If
so, a Republican will be elected Senator, and among the list of
candidates,—_such candidates_, there is very little choice.
Cameron’s chance is, I think, the best. You have doubtless
observed that Thaddeus Stevens has made the _amende honorable_ for
having charged us with spending more than the $20,000
appropriated.[184].....
With my kind regards to Mr. Johnston, I remain
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—If you so desire, you might come to Wheatland by the 8th
August, whether I am at home or not.
Footnote 184:
For furnishing the White House.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, August 10, 1866.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I returned the day before yesterday from a visit to the Bedford
Springs, from which I derived much benefit. Indeed my health is
now quite as good as I can reasonably expect, considering my age.
You ask my opinion as to the course which the approaching
convention ought to pursue. Whilst I do not feel myself competent
to state in detail what ought to be their proceedings, yet one
thing is certain; they ought, neither directly nor indirectly, to
break up the organization of the old Democratic party by forming
anything like a new party. Leaving this as it is, and must ever
remain, they ought to confine themselves pretty much to the
question of reconstruction, and to the admission of Senators and
Representatives from the Southern States.
Our most prudent and far-seeing politicians, as they inform me,
believe that Mr. Clymer will be elected governor, and this would
be the beginning of the end. But drop the principles and the name
of Democracy, and our case would be hopeless. In regard to what
your history should contain, I have nothing to say. Of this you
are unquestionably the best judge. It possibly might appear to be
an anachronism to introduce the events of the late war. But you
know best.[185]
From your friend very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 185:
This refers to Mr. Capen’s great work, “The History of Democracy;
or, Political Progress Historically Illustrated,” by Nahum Capen,
LL.D. The first volume was published in 1875.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS JANE BUCHANAN.]
WHEATLAND, August 10, 1866.
MY DEAR JANE:—
Your letter of the 19th July was duly received, and would have
been sooner acknowledged, but for my engagements at Bedford. I
returned home on Tuesday afternoon, after a very agreeable visit,
and one, I think, beneficial to my health. As in duty bound, I
called to see the Nevins yesterday, and had the pleasure of
meeting the bishop in embryo, and Cecil, as well as Doctor and
Mrs. Nevin, and Blanche. I find that during my absence, all the
younger branches of the family have been diligently employed in
croquet. They won a match to which they were challenged by the
townspeople, which gives them great satisfaction, and they are
eager to enter the lists with Jennie Roland. Has it never occurred
to a lady of your sedate character, that croquet, like dancing or
any other innocent and healthful amusement, may be carried to
excess?...... Your future uncle, Rev. Dr. Alfred Nevin, has, I
fear, sustained a damaging defeat in his controversy with Judge
Black on the subject of political preaching. Can you not persuade
your father to come to the rescue...... The little house at the
entrance of the park looks rather shabby, but I have promised you
to put it in order, and on this you may rely.
You seem to have suffered much from the heat. Philosophers have
calculated how many thousand years would be required to cool a
ball of iron as large as the earth, but as your body is not very
large, I trust that ere this you have become cool, and been
relieved from the headache. I trust that Lois is also learning to
live like other people.
—— was expected to return from Cape May last evening, where she
had been for some time with her brother ——. I think she manifested
a want of taste in not cultivating the “three rowdies.” Certain it
is, sinner as I am, I found them very agreeable. I think she
should marry, and to this I would have no objection, if her
yoke-fellow should be a proper person.
I expect Mrs. Johnston here from the 15th to the 20th. I shall,
indeed, be very glad to see her. The Baltimoreans whom I met at
Bedford say she never looked better, and that she appears to be
very happy. God grant that her marriage may prove prosperous, and
that she may not neglect the things which belong to her
everlasting peace!
Miss Hetty is as busy as ever, and although we now have a good
waiter and cook and two good girls, yet her employment is
incessant. She could not live without work. I have never known her
to take so much to any of our visitors as she did to the three
croquet players.
I have now nearly filled my sheet with a grave letter, and hope
you will ponder over its contents.
Give my kindest love to your father and mother, as well as the
rest, especially to Lois, for whom this letter is partly intended.
Never again call her Lodi.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, October 2, 1866.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I was greatly amused and pleased with the graphic description of
your dream which placed me in the pulpit. We have sore need of
such preachers as you saw in your vision. I fear that infidelity
and indifference to religion are making rapid advances in our
country. Away with political preachers!
I rejoice to learn your advancement in the very important history,
and earnestly desire that the blessing of Heaven may rest upon
your labors.
In answer to your inquiry about the probable result of our
governor’s election, I can say but little of my own knowledge. Our
most discreet friends, however, calculate with considerable
confidence on the election of Clymer. The President’s pilgrimage
to the tomb of Senator Douglas has done the cause no good. It
would have been better had he rested on the issue as it was made
by the Philadelphia Convention.
Mrs. Johnston returned to Baltimore a fortnight since in good
health and spirits. I intend to pay her a visit soon after the
election.
Your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO CHARLES GRAFFEN.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, December 22, 1866.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I regret deeply that I did not see the Philadelphia firemen at
Wheatland on their recent visit to Lancaster. A visit from them
would have been a gratification and an honor which I should have
highly prized. Unfortunately, I did not receive Mr. Howell’s note
of the 18th, appointing the time at half-past nine o’clock of the
next morning for the purpose, until the afternoon of the 19th at
five o’clock. Instead of this being sent to me by messenger, it
was deposited in the post office, and thus it did not come to hand
more than seven hours after the time appointed for the visit. I
would thank you to explain the circumstances to any of the firemen
whom you may happen to meet, should you deem this necessary. I
should be deeply mortified could any of them suppose I had been
wanting in the high respect to them so eminently their due.
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MESSRS. OSBORN AND BALDWIN.]
(Private.) WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, December
26, 1866.
GENTLEMEN:—
I received, on last evening, the New Haven _Daily Register_,
containing an extract from Abbott’s Lives of the Presidents. This
is a repetition and concentration of all the slanders which were
in circulation against myself during the first years of the war,
notwithstanding their falsehood has been since established by
clear and conclusive official evidence. For your very able and
searching reply to Mr. Abbott’s statements, please to accept my
most cordial thanks. As the work purports to be history, I may
possibly notice it in the only manner which would make its author
feel how much injustice he has done me. I remain, very
respectfully and gratefully,
Yours,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO THE REV. E. Y. BUCHANAN.]
WHEATLAND, December 29, 1866.
MY DEAR EDWARD:— I have received your favor of the 26th, and am
truly happy to learn that you and yours are in the enjoyment of
good health, and that you have received so many substantial tokens
of regard from your parishioners. May it be ever thus! My own
health, thank God! is as good as it was when we parted in
Philadelphia. Your kind wish that the good Lord may spare me to
see many Christmases will scarcely be realized. This, at my
advanced age, I cannot expect. May He enable me to be always
prepared for my latter end!
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
Mr. and Mrs. Shunk passed the evening at ——’s a few days ago, and
I was sorry to learn that a principal portion of the entertainment
was spirit-rapping and communications from the spirits.
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
My dinner at Judge Cadwalader’s was more than usually agreeable.
With my best love to your lady and family, I remain, as ever,
Your affectionate brother,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. JOHNSTON.]
WHEATLAND, February 12, 1867.
MY DEAR NIECE:—
I was glad to receive your favor of the 6th, after so long an
interval. Poor Mrs. Jenkins was buried yesterday, and Miss Old and
myself were invited as mourners. Her death made a deep impression
upon me. I have been intimately acquainted with her ever since I
first came to Lancaster, and was groomsman at her wedding. Her
life is all before me, and, with some slight failings, it is a
beautiful picture. Her social and domestic character were nearly
all that could have been desired. Whether in prosperous or adverse
fortunes, she was ever the same kind wife, mother and friend. I
was always attached to her.
My own health is now pretty much as usual, though after my dinner
in Philadelphia, which was all I could have desired, I had a
pretty sharp attack of rheumatism, which confined me to Wheatland
for a week, but thank God! it has passed away. Like Achilles, I
was wounded in the heel, and, funny enough, it passed out at the
little toe......
I knew that Henrietta Jane would render herself agreeable wherever
she went, and am not at all surprised that the Carrolls are
unwilling to part from her. This shows they are sensible
people......
I have not seen Mrs. Franklin since the receipt of your letter.
When I do I shall not fail to inform her how much gratified you
were with the present......
I regret to say that the slippers are much too large for me, and,
therefore, I have not worn them; but, as a token of your regard, I
value them as highly as if they were a good fit.
We have no local news of much importance, except that everybody is
to be married. The engagement of young Mr. —— to Miss ——, so soon
after the death of ——, is thought by some to be strange.
On Thursday last, Jane Slaymaker, Harriet Old and Mrs. Lane passed
the day with me on their own invitation, and it was a most
agreeable day. Mrs. Jenkins was not considered at all dangerously
ill on that day, though she died on the next. Mrs. Shunk was not
with us, having gone over to York to look after her house. She is
now here, as agreeable as ever, though Mr. Shunk has gone to
Philadelphia for a few days. I see the Nevins as often as usual.
The Doctor and Mrs. Nevin, Blanche and Wilberforce, were all at
the funeral, though the Bishop in embryo was not present. I
presume he has returned to his studies, as his mother said nothing
about him, and I forgot to ask her for him......
With my kind regards to Mr. Johnston, I remain,
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. SHUNK.]
WHEATLAND, March 7th, 1867.
MY DEAR MADAM:—
On this auspicious anniversary of your birth, permit me to present
my cordial wishes that you may enjoy many, very many, returns of
it in peace, prosperity and happiness.
Please to accept the enclosed trifle as a birthday token of my
affection and esteem for one whose society, during the last few
months, has imparted a charm to my old age, the memory of which
shall never be effaced from my heart. Deeply regretting that you
must so soon leave me, I am, and ever shall remain,
Your much attached friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. NAHUM CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, April 29th, 1867.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your favor of the 14th instant, and have perused,
with much interest, your letter to the Rev. Mr. Blagden. The
subject of it, which you treat so ably, has attracted but little
attention in this part of the country; still, some symptoms are
apparent that the Republicans in this State intend to make capital
out of it. In this, I think, they will entirely fail. Lager beer,
especially among the Germans, and old rye will be too strong for
them. Still, intemperance is a great curse to our people, but it
will never be put down by laws prohibiting the sale of all
intoxicating liquors......
Mrs. Shunk left me more than a month ago, and is now at her
father’s, in Washington, with her husband. They will all return to
York on the adjournment of the Supreme Court. She is one of the
most charming persons I have ever known. I ought to add that Mr.
Shunk’s health is far from being good.
I have been endeavoring for the last two days to prepare an index
for my book, but find great difficulty in the task.
The result of the spring election throughout our State has been
favorable to the Democratic party; but we have of late years been
so accustomed to defeat, that I shall not, too sanguinely,
calculate on success in October.
Your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. NAHUM CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, June 11, 1867.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Your kind letter of the 30th April would long ere this have been
answered, but for an _intensely painful_ attack of rheumatic gout,
several weeks ago, from the effects of which I am now slowly
recovering. The index was, of course, abandoned, probably forever.
I cannot think for a moment of imposing the task upon you, by
accepting your friendly offer. I am now in my seventy-seventh
year, an age when my mind should be disembarrassed, as much as
possible, from all worldly affairs.
I trust, for your sake, that the “Grand Hotel” may be a great
success, and may fill your pockets with stores of gold.
I am glad that the Radical postmaster of Boston has been directed
by the Department to apply to you for advice respecting the postal
service. “Better late than never” to recognize the value of your
improvements and your wise policy in removing the post office.
I no longer give any minute attention to passing political events;
but I confess I entertain much apprehension from the efforts now
being made to indoctrinate the negroes of the South with the
belief that they are entitled to a portion of their old masters’
real estate. When will Massachusetts stay her hand?
What is to become of the Supreme Court of the United States—the
conservative branch of the Government? When I recall the names of
the pure, able and venerable men who have filled the office of
Chief Justice, from John Jay to Roger B. Taney, and witness the
efforts of the present Chief Justice to drag the judicial ermine
through the dirt to propitiate radicals, I cannot help thinking we
have fallen upon evil times. But I am now an old fogy.
Should Judge Sharswod be nominated for Judge of our Supreme Court
by the Judicial Convention this day, I venture the prediction that
the Democratic party will triumph in his election in October.
Your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. BAKER.]
WHEATLAND, July 16, 1867.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Shortly after your last letter to me, several weeks ago, I wrote
to Mr. Reed and invited him to Wheatland in the most cordial
manner. I have received no answer from him, and think it probable
he may have never received my letter; and yet, none of my letters
between this and Philadelphia has ever miscarried. When you see
him, I would thank you to ascertain how the matter is. I do not
like to write myself under the circumstances.
Mr. and Mrs. Johnston will leave here on Thursday for Bedford, but
I shall not accompany them. I am literally weak in the knees. Do
you go anywhere this summer? I have some idea of visiting Long
Branch or Cape May, for a few days, for sea bathing, but am
reluctant to leave home.
I suppose you are now in the midst of your harvest, enjoying the
delights of a country life and enacting the character of Farmer
Baker. May your barn overflow with plenty!
With my kindest regards to Mrs. Baker, Miss Emily and all, I
remain,
Very respectfully, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. JOHNSTON.]
CAPE ISLAND, NEW JERSEY, August 14, 1867.
MY DEAR NIECE:—
I have received your favor of the 12th, and am rejoiced to learn
that you are now at Wheatland, where I hope you may remain until
the change of the season. You say nothing of the health of
baby;[186] but from your silence I infer this to be good. I do not
know exactly when I shall leave this place, but I think early next
week. I have been much pleased with my visit here, and have, I
think, been strengthened, but much more by the sea air than the
bathing. I am not quite certain that the latter agrees with me. We
have had a great crowd all the time; but the weather has been
charming and the company agreeable.
Mr. Bullitt of Philadelphia gave me a dinner the other day, which
I only mention from the awkward situation in which I was placed by
not being able to drink a drop of wine.
I am very well, thank God! Mr. Reed is expected this afternoon,
and Judge Black to-morrow.
With my kindest regards to Mr. Johnston and Miss Hetty, I remain
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P.S.—I ought not to omit to mention the obligations I am under to
Mr. Baker for his kindness and attention.
Footnote 186:
This child, James Buchanan Johnston, an object of the fondest
interest to his great-uncle, grew to be a fine and very promising
youth of fifteen, of great loveliness of character and marked
intellectual powers. He died in Baltimore on the 25th of March,
1881. His younger brother, Henry, the only remaining child of Mr.
and Mrs. Johnston, was taken by his parents to Europe in the
autumn of 1881. He died at Nice on the 30th of October, 1882. Dark
clouds have gathered over lives that were once full of happiness
and hope.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. SHUNK.]
WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, September 2, 1867.
MY DEAR MRS. SHUNK:—
I know you will be glad to learn that I have so far recovered as
to be able to sit up and write to you my first letter since the
commencement of my very dangerous illness. Thank God! the doctor
gives me reason to believe I am now out of danger, and it has been
His holy will to spare me a little longer.
Next to heaven, my thoughts have been fixed upon a preparation of
my biography, as an act of justice to myself and the great men
with whom I have been associated. This work shall be immediately
prosecuted. I was rejoiced to learn from your favor of the 5th
ultimo that Mr. Shunk will give me the notes and the review.
Indeed, without the notes I know not how I could get along in
regard to my earlier life. I hope he will send me all, as all will
be useful. The slightest note will revive my memory......
I shall ever remember with heartfelt gratification the period
during which I enjoyed your charming society at Wheatland. I trust
you may visit me again before Mrs. Johnston leaves for Baltimore,
which will be on the first proximo.
With kind love to your mother, Mary and Jane, and my regards for
Mr. Shunk, I remain faithfully and affectionately your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
P. S.—You will please to deliver the notes and review to the
bearer hereof, your old friend, James B. Henry, who will await
your convenience.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO J. BUCHANAN HENRY.]
WHEATLAND, September 23, 1867.
MY DEAR JAMES:—
I regret to say that I have not received Benton’s “Thirty Years,”
which you sent me by express some ten days ago. It has certainly
not reached the office at Lancaster. Will you look after it, and,
if not found, send me the receipt? I now need it.
The baby has been very sick, but probably not more so than what
often happens to children in their teething. Harriet became
alarmed and sent for Mr. Johnston, who is now here, but will leave
this morning. The child is greatly better, but has yet got no
tooth. He proposes to return and take his wife home the beginning
of next week......
My health and strength are improving daily, but, in opposition to
the doctor, I do not think the obstruction is entirely removed.
Yours affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, November 2, 1867.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Since the receipt of your favor of the 17th ultimo, I have had
another attack of my old enemy, the gout, in a severe form, from
which I am just now recovering. This is the only reason why I have
not sooner answered your letter and thanked you for your delicious
pears. I shall use them as time mellows them. Please to present my
grateful acknowledgments to Mrs. Raney for her contribution to the
delicious fruit which has afforded so much pleasure to her
father’s old friend.
I hear perhaps once a week from Mr. and Mrs. Johnston. Both, as
well as the little baby, are well.
I reciprocate your congratulations on the result of the late
elections, and I do not doubt that New York, New Jersey and
Connecticut will do their duty to the country. Still, it may be
too late to restore material prosperity to the Southern States.
The establishment of negro suffrage throughout their limits, as
well as negro government, will nearly destroy the production of
the articles which rendered both them and New England so
prosperous. I have always been very much of an optimist, but I
confess I have now greater fears for the future than I had during
the war. Should New England teaching in the South produce a war of
races, commenced by the negroes for rights in the soil of their
masters, which they claim under the teachings of Sumner, Stevens,
and other self-styled philanthropists, the result would be too
horrible for contemplation. But enough.
Your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, October 19, 1867.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received your congratulations on the result of the late
elections with heartfelt pleasure. For this we are mainly indebted
to the attempts on the part of Congress to grant suffrage to the
negroes, although there are many other good causes for the
reaction in the popular mind. Negro emancipation is a fixed fact,
and so let it remain forever; but the high privilege of voting can
only be constitutionally granted by the Legislatures of the
respective States.
I am happy to inform you that, under the blessing of Providence,
my health has been restored to its former condition. Indeed, I
believe I am better than I was before my attack.
I have no news which would interest you except the old declaration
that I am now, and always shall be,
Sincerely your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. BAKER.]
WHEATLAND, October 31, 1867.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have just received a letter from Sample, who expresses a strong
desire to remain on the farm, and says that the impression he
intended to leave must have arisen from the fact that he has been
looking out for a farm for his brother. I shall not remove him.
The sting of the poisonous insect, whatever it may have been, is
now converted into a painful attack of gout in my left hand and
wrist. I have not been able to attend to the biography, or prepare
for Mr. Reed. I presume, however, that the trial of Jeff. Davis
will occupy all his thoughts until after it shall be over.
With my kindest regards to Mrs. Baker and my love to Emily,
I remain, always your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. SCHELL.]
WHEATLAND, November 9, 1867.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I have received a proxy, to be signed by me, from Robert L. Banks
to H. Henry Baxter, to vote my shares in the New York Central Road
Company, at the approaching election for directors. Before filling
it up, I desire to know whether it is in accordance with your
wishes. I desire to vote according to your wishes.
You have done nobly in New York at the recent election, and your
Democracy have earned the gratitude of the whole country. _The
opposition to Negro Suffrage in the South_, as well as in the
North, has been the principal cause of our triumph everywhere.
Abandon this, and we are gone. The Constitution, as expounded by
the Democratic fathers, ought to be our watch-word. It is long
enough and wide enough to cover all our interests, and needs not
to be enlarged to suit our present size, as recommended by the
_World_. Emancipation is now a constitutional fact, but to
prescribe the right and privilege of suffrage belongs exclusively
to the States. This principle the Democracy must uphold in
opposition to the Reconstruction Acts.
I am getting along as usual, and have had much company of late.
The Misses Pleasonton have been with me for some weeks, and I find
their society very agreeable. I am sorry to say they will leave in
a few days.
Your friend, as ever,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. JOHNSTON.]
WHEATLAND, November 14, 1867.
MY DEAR SIR:—
. . . . . . .
.
. . . . . . .
.
I know how cordially welcome I would be at your house, but I fear
I shall not be able to pay you a visit for months to come. Like
all old men, I feel a very strong reluctance to leave home. The
idea of becoming dangerously ill away from home deters me from
going abroad. Although relieved from acute pain in my left hand
and arm, yet my hand is still so weak and swollen that I cannot
carve, and it is but a few days since I ceased to have the meat on
my own plate cut up for me. And to add to all this, my left eye is
now as black as if I had been fighting with shillelahs at
Donnybrook Fair. On Saturday last, supposing that I was at the
head of the steps on the front porch, I took a step forward as if
on the level, and fell with my whole weight on the floor, striking
my head against one of the posts. Thanks to the thickness and
strength of my skull, it was not broken, and the only bad
consequence from it is a very black eye. How soon this will
disappear I know not. I sincerely and devoutly thank God it is no
worse. During all this time, the Misses Pleasonton have been a
great comfort to me, and I am truly sorry they will leave me on
Tuesday next. I do not fear, however, that I shall be miserable
without them. I have had a good deal of transient company this
fall. But what a long rigmarole I have written.
. . . . . . .
.
. . . . . . .
.
. . . . . . .
.
I rejoice to learn that the baby is thriving so finely. Please to
remember me kindly to Miss Snyder, and with my best love to
Harriet,
I remain, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. JOHNSTON.]
WHEATLAND, December 9, 1867.
MY DEAR NIECE:—
I have received yours of the 3d instant, and am happy to learn
that baby has recovered from the effects of his trip to New York.
You need not be sorry to hear that James left me as soon as I gave
him notice that I would not want him after the 1st January. I have
obtained a much better man, a Frenchman, for the month of
December. Indeed, he is so good, I shall be sorry to part from
him.
I was truly sorry to hear of the death of my kinsman, Mr. Russell.
He was an able and excellent man. It appears that he died a Roman
Catholic, which, doubtless, gratified his wife and family. I wrote
to her the day after I received the paper from you.
I perceive, by a cable despatch, that Mrs. Eustis is dead. I
sincerely sympathize with her father, although he behaved badly to
me, notwithstanding I rendered both her and him the greatest
service in my power. I always liked her very much......
I wrote a few days ago for Henrietta Jane, with a request that
either Harriet or Lois might accompany her. Edward’s answer,
without mentioning the name of Harriet, informed me that Lois
would follow Henrietta in two or three weeks. Thereupon, I wrote
to Henrietta, giving Harriet a kind and pressing invitation to
come in the meantime. It is doubtful whether she will accept it.
Henrietta is to be here on Wednesday, as well as Emily Baker, so
that I may expect a gay house......
I have no local news to give you beyond what you see in the
_Intelligencer_. The Nevins are as kind as usual. Blanche is an
excellent reader. The Doctor passed an evening with me a few days
ago. Robert has undoubtedly received great attentions from the
clergy in England, and has preached there once, if not oftener. I
was sorry to learn he was obliged to go to France on account of
his health.
I hardly know what to say in regard to my own health, though it
has been pretty good for the last two or three days. Even had Mr.
Reed been able to come here, I felt so dull and listless as to be
almost incapable of mental exertion. Writing was a great labor to
me. I have felt bright for a few days.
I fully realize the truth of the Psalmist’s expression, that “The
days of our years are three score and ten, and if, by reason of
strength, they be four score years, yet is their strength labor
and sorrow, for it is soon cut off, and we fly away.”
Nevertheless, I am neither dejected nor sorrowful, but preserve a
calm and tranquil spirit, thank God! My left hand is still feeble,
but is gradually growing stronger.
It is quite impossible that I should pay you a visit during the
holidays, though you must know I would be very happy to see you.
With my kind regards to Mr. Johnston, I remain, as ever, yours
affectionately,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO DR. BLAKE.]
WHEATLAND, December 25, 1867.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I owe you many thanks for your biographical sketch of Mr. Jones. I
have perused it with great interest and pleasure. It is a worthy
tribute to an excellent man. At the request of the first Mrs.
Webster and Mrs. George Blake, I accompanied them to the house of
Mrs. Mattingly, a few days after the alleged miracle had been
performed, and heard her own relation of all the circumstances
attending it from her own lips.
I have, also, to thank you for the report of the Secretary of the
Treasury.
Thank God! my own health is now pretty good—quite as good as a man
of my age has any reason to expect.
I have been cheered by the company of the Misses Pleasanton, and
after their departure by that of two of my nieces, the daughters
of my brother, and Miss Baker, who are still with me. They have
made the house gay and agreeable.
I have no local news to communicate which would be of any interest
to you.
I saw a telegram, some weeks ago, announcing the death of Mrs.
Eustis, and sincerely sympathize with her father on account of his
sad bereavement.
I presume the interest due on the Virginia bonds, on the 1st
January next, will not be paid. Should I be mistaken, please to
inform me of it, so that I may send you a draft on John B. Martin,
Cashier, for $220, as I did before.
Wishing you, with all my heart, long life, health and prosperity,
I remain, ever very respectfully,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MRS. JOHNSTON.]
WHEATLAND, January 1st, 1868.
MY DEAR NIECE:—
I have received yours of the 27th ultimo, and am rejoiced to know
that your health is good as well as that of baby. I sincerely and
ardently pray for your boy long life, happiness and prosperity,
and that he may become a wise and a useful man, under the blessing
of Providence, in his day and generation. Much will depend on his
early and Christian training. Be not too indulgent, nor make him
too much of an idol.
. . . . . . .
.
. . . . . . .
.
. . . . . . .
.
Miss Emily’s party passed off very well. She is gay, sprightly and
agreeable, and has much more information than I had supposed. Her
father is my best and most useful friend, who is always ready to
serve me, and I wished to treat his daughter kindly.
Harriet and Henrietta are still with me, but the former, I regret
to say, will leave some time next week......
We have no local news of interest. The Nevins and myself get along
kindly, as usual.
With my kindest regards to Mr. Johnston, I remain,
Yours, with great affection,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MISS BAKER.]
WHEATLAND, January 1, 1868.
MY DEAR EMILY:—
I have received your kind note of the 29th, and can assure you we
all missed you very much, and I was almost broken-hearted at your
departure. Still, I think I shall survive in the hope that you may
visit us again during the winter. I thank you for the _Church
Journal_. It must be a paper according to your own heart. I think
I can see you standing gracefully on the highest pinnacle of
Ritualism, and taking your flight over to Romanism. You will not
have a difficult passage to the dome of St. Peter’s.
John Strube has, I believe, got a place for the winter, but, I
have no doubt, he will gladly go to your father as a gardener in
the spring.
The two girls and Miss Hetty send their kindest love to you.
With my very best wishes for your health, prosperity and
happiness, I remain, respectfully and affectionately
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. NAHUM CAPEN.]
WHEATLAND, January 11, 1868.
MY DEAR SIR:—
Many thanks for your kind New Year’s greeting! The friendship and
good wishes which you express for me are cordially reciprocated.
May you live many years in health, peace and prosperity, and may
your great work prove to be a triumph for yourself and a lasting
benefit for your country! I think you were right in not turning
away from it to write a volume of four hundred pages, as a
political hand-book for the next Presidential campaign. Such a
volume would be highly useful and important, but it may well be
prepared by Messrs. Burke and Gillet. Should they undertake the
task, I would suggest that you recommend to them a careful perusal
of the debates and proceedings of Congress during the extra
session, after the election of General Harrison (first Session of
27th Congress, 1841). Mr. Burke was then a member of the House.
Thank God! I now enjoy reasonably good health.
Your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
CHAPTER XXX.
1868.
DEATH OF MR. BUCHANAN—HIS CHARACTER AS A STATESMAN, A MAN AND A
CHRISTIAN.
Notwithstanding the prospect of longer life with which the year 1868
began for Mr. Buchanan, the end was drawing near. The world and the
world’s interests faded away, the unknown future opened before him,
and naught earthly remained for the strong old man, bound down by
the infirmities of age, but the tender care of those who had
assembled to soothe and cheer him.
When in health, he was very fond of having bright and cultivated
women about him, and in sickness he was peculiarly dependent on
their ministrations. For him, there had never been wife or child.
But he was specially blest by female kindred, who never failed or
faltered in their devotion to him. There were present at Wheatland,
during his last illness, his brother, the Rev. Dr. Buchanan; Miss
Henrietta Buchanan, daughter of that gentleman; Mr. and Mrs.
Johnston; Mr. Henry, and the ever faithful “Miss Hetty.” Kind
neighbors were at hand, among whom his friend, the Rev. Dr. Nevin,
was one of the most assiduous. Doctor Buchanan was obliged to return
to his home, near Philadelphia, two days before the death occurred,
at which time the event was apparently not very near. Miss Henrietta
Buchanan, whose absence from her uncle’s room, even for a short
time, made him impatient, as well as Mrs. Johnston and Miss Parker,
watched him with the utmost tenderness to the last. So did the
others whom I have named. His death, the immediate cause of which
was rheumatic gout, occurred on the morning of June 1st, 1868, in
his 78th year. His last hours were free from suffering, and his mind
was clear. Miss Annie Buchanan says, in a communication addressed to
me:—
In his last year he began to feel that he was very old, and looked
forward to death, and spoke as if he expected it constantly. Not
that his health was such as to create this expectation, for it was
as good as persons of his age usually enjoy. He had a very severe
illness soon after his return from Washington.
He had, previous to that illness, been unusually strong and well,
but afterwards I do not think he was quite so much so. He had
attacks of gout, more or less severe, at intervals, up to the time
of his death. He had, besides, an illness which came upon him
during a short visit which he paid to Cape May, which prostrated
him so much that it was necessary to take him home as a sick man.
Each one of these illnesses made him realize more clearly that his
hold on life was very weak, that the “silver cord would soon be
loosed,” and he devoted himself to making all necessary
preparations for that great event. His affairs were all arranged
with exactness, so as to cause as little confusion as possible
after his death. He chose the exact spot for his last resting
place, saying, either as expressing a desire or as predicting a
fact, that he would lie alone. Having carefully arranged all his
plans, he waited, with faith and hope, for the final change which
would open to him the real and satisfying life. When the dreaded
messenger came, those who loved him knew that rest had come to him
at last, and that his “faith had changed to glad fruition.”
The funeral obsequies of the late President took place at Lancaster,
on the 4th of June, with every imposing demonstration that was
consistent with a proper respect for his unostentatious character. I
need not describe the scene, or recapitulate the ceremonies by which
the event of his death was marked throughout the country. They may
be read in the public journals of the time. But from the funeral
sermon, preached over his remains by the Rev. John W. Nevin, D.D.,
President of Franklin and Marshall College, an extract must be
permanently recorded in these pages, at the close of the present
chapter.
It is unnecessary for me to undertake a formal and elaborate
portrayal of Mr. Buchanan’s character as an American statesman. It
has been exhibited in the foregoing pages, and the reader does not
need to be farther assisted by me in his estimate of the public
character of the man. But there are some observations which should
be made by the author of this work, before citing the testimony of
those who stood to him in the relations of near kindred, or of
personal friendship.
There may be persons who will be disposed to think that he should
not have allowed himself, in his old age, to be disturbed by the
attacks that were made upon him by the press after his retirement
from public life. But such persons should remember that he had to
administer the Executive Government at a very trying period, and
that many of the charges that were subsequently made against him
involved his integrity as a statesman, and the oath of office which
every President must take to preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States. Moreover, I cannot, for one,
subscribe to the philosophy which assumes that a statesman should be
indifferent to what is said of him by his contemporaries, or to what
is made to pass into the materials of history, if it be not
corrected. It must be admitted that in all free countries there is
prurient appetite for detraction, and our American world is
certainly not free from it. A considerable part of the public, in a
certain sense, enjoys disparagement of the characters of very
eminent public men. If this were not so, the press would at least be
more careful and more conscientious than it often is. The
absolute freedom of the press is of the utmost consequence. Its
licentiousness is best restrained by the moral sense of the
community, in the case of the higher statesmen; and to the extent to
which this restraint does not operate, vast mischief may be done. It
is impossible for posterity to know how to estimate any man who has
filled a conspicuous place in history, if the materials for a sober
judgment are to be looked for only in the criticisms or laudations
of the contemporary press; nor is it generally in the power of
posterity to determine what deduction is to be made from the
assertions or opinions of contemporaries, on account of the rancor
of party or the malice of individuals. If Mr. Buchanan had not taken
the pains, which he did take, to collect and preserve the most ample
proof of his acts, his purposes, and his efforts as President of the
United States, he would have gone down to future ages in a light
utterly false, simply because he happened to be the object of
enormous misrepresentations from motives of party policy or personal
ill-will, without the protection which the community should have
thrown around him at the time. That this protection was to a great
degree wanting, is doubtless due to the existence of public danger,
and to the passions which may find their excuse in the fact that in
many minds they had their origin in patriotism, whilst in many the
origin was of the basest description. That he, who was the object of
all this misconception and misrepresentation, forbore, as long as
there was serious danger to the institutions of the country, to
demand the public attention as he might have demanded it, and calmly
relied on the judgments of the future, is to be accounted to him for
a praise and a public spirit of no ordinary kind. No man was ever
treated with greater injustice than he was during the last seven
years of his life by a large part of the public, and yet he bore it
with dignity and with an unchanged love of country.
In regard to his moral and religious character and his personal
virtues, I should not feel that I had done my duty if I did not here
say what has impressed me in my study of the man.
His strong family affections, his engaging social qualities, his
fidelity to friends, and his forgiving temper towards those who had
injured him, or from whom he had once been estranged, are well
known. To those who stood in the relation of friends, he was ever a
most generous benefactor. Many a man received from him pecuniary aid
which prevented disaster and ruin, and which could not be repaid by
political service, for in many cases the individual never had it in
his power to repay in anything but the simple discharge of the
pecuniary obligation. This had been his habit all his life, as I
learn from a full examination of his private papers, and he did not
cease from it when political service was no longer needed. His
tender of such aid often came without solicitation. He would not
allow a friend whom he valued to incur serious loss, when he knew of
the danger, and could supply the means of averting it. For what was
justly his due, he expected and required performance; but he was
always a forbearing and considerate creditor. For the poor, he ever
had a tender and thoughtful feeling. The city of Lancaster holds in
perpetual trust, under his will, a benefaction of a peculiar kind,
which marks the nature of his charities, and was large for one of
his means.
That he did not enrich himself out of the public, or receive gifts,
or accumulate money by means of the opportunities afforded by his
public positions, or give way to the weakness of nepotism, should,
perhaps, not be mentioned to his praise, if it were not that his
example in these respects has become conspicuous by contrast.
No charge against his moral character or personal virtue has ever
been made to my knowledge. It was doubtless his early Presbyterian
training by religious parents that saved him, amid all the
temptations of a long and varied life and the widest social
experience, from any deviation from the path of virtue. The tongue
of scandal, the prying curiosity of the censorious, or of those who
are always ready to drag down others to their own level, never could
fasten upon his intercourse with the other sex any cause for
suspicion, nor could the wiles of the impure ever ensnare him. It is
believed by those who knew him best that his life was in this
respect absolutely without stain, as his conversation although very
often gay and festive, is known to have always been free from any
taint of impurity. He was a man of too much refinement to be guilty
of indelicacy in anecdote or illustration, or to allow of it in his
presence.
The reader who has perused what I have written and quoted must have
seen that there are scattered all through his life traces of a
strong religious tendency and religious habits, a deep sense of
religious obligation, a belief in the existence and government of
God, and a full faith that this world is not the only sphere of
man’s existence. That he had a habit of daily prayer, according to
the injunction which said, “Enter into thy closet,” is perfectly
well authenticated.
There may be men of the world who will smile when they read of a
statesman, in a grave juncture of public affairs in which he had to
deal with the passions and ambitions of individuals and with the
conflicting feelings and interests of great communities, seeking
guidance from his Maker. Prayer in the midst of party politics and
the business of official life may possibly provoke the cold derision
of some part of mankind. Whether it is or is not efficacious in
human affairs—whether a resort to it is a sign of weakness or of
strength, is just as men think and feel. Be it one way or the other,
I did not dare to withhold this trait of character, which was
revealed in the simplest manner in a confidential letter, in which
he said of himself that he weighed well and prayerfully the course
that he ought to adopt, at a time most critical for his country and
for himself. I leave it for such estimate as the religious or the
irreligious world may form, according to their respective
tendencies, adding, however, that what he said of himself on that
special occasion appears, on the testimony of those who knew him
best, to have been in accordance with the habit of his life.
There was, in truth, no fanaticism in this man’s nature, no cant in
his speech or writing, whatever of either there may have been in
those stern Puritans of an earlier age, in whom policy and valor and
worldly wisdom and statecraft were strangely mixed with a religious
enthusiasm which made them feel that they were the chosen of the
Lord. The blood that he drew from a remote ancestry of pious
Scotchmen had been tempered by the practical sense of our American
life, and yet it had not lost the conviction of man’s relation to
his God.
When he was about to embark on the mission to Russia a female friend
of his in Lancaster, Mrs. E. J. Reigart, presented him with a copy
of the book called “Jay’s Exercises.” This was a book of short
sermons, or lessons, for every day in the year, each on some
appropriate text of Scripture, and was much in use among
Presbyterians. The style was quaint, and the comments on the various
texts were marked by a good deal of excellent sense and much
religious feeling. Mr. Buchanan made daily use of it through the
remainder of his life, wherever he was. On its margin he noted the
dates of his embarkation for Liverpool, of his arrival there, and at
London, Hamburg and Lubeck. The text and lesson for the day on which
he arrived at Lubeck, on his way to St. Petersburg, read somewhat
oddly:
“May 26th. _Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine
inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy
possession._ Psalm ii. 8.—The heathen—the uttermost parts of the
earth—viewed in the representations of Scripture and the reports of
historians, travellers and missionaries, seem a very unenviable
acquisition. If it is true that the whole world lieth in wickedness,
it seems fitter to be the inheritance and possession of Satan than
the Son of God. But two things are to be taken into the account.
Notwithstanding the present condition of the estate it contains very
_valuable_ and _convertible_ materials.”
That he did not make what is called a public profession of religion
until a late period of his life is accounted for in an interesting
paper which I have received from the Rev. William M. Paxton, D.D.,
pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, in the City of New York.
Dr. Paxton, in answer to my inquiry, kindly wrote to me on the 11th
of April, 1883, as follows:
In the month of August, in the year 1860, Mr. Buchanan, then
President of the United States, visited the Bedford Springs, in
the State of Pennsylvania. I happened to be present when the stage
arrived, and having had a previous personal acquaintance with him,
was one of the first to bid him welcome.
A day or two afterwards, as he passed me in the hall, he stopped
and said, “May I take the liberty of sending for you to come to my
room, when I can find leisure for a conversation?” To this I
replied that it would give me great pleasure to obey such a call.
The next day the invitation came, through his private secretary,
and when we were seated alone, he turned to me and said, “I sent
for you to request that you will favor me with a conversation upon
the subject of religion. I knew your father and mother in early
life, and, as you have some knowledge of my family, you are aware
that I was religiously educated. But for some years I have been
much more thoughtful than formerly upon religious subjects. I
think I may say that for twelve years I have been in the habit of
reading the Bible and praying daily. I have never had any one with
whom I have felt disposed to converse, but now that I find you
here, I have thought that you would understand my feelings, and
that I would venture to open my mind to you upon this important
subject, and ask for an explanation of some things that I do not
clearly understand.” When I had assured him that I would be
gratified to have such a conversation, he began immediately by
asking, “Will you be good enough to explain to me what an
experience of religion is?” In answer, I opened to him the Bible
account of our sinful estate, and of the necessity of regeneration
by the Spirit of God, and of atonement through the sacrifice of
our Lord Jesus Christ. He then began to question me, as closely as
a lawyer would question a witness, upon all the points connected
with regeneration, atonement, repentance and faith. What surprised
me was that his questions were not so much of a doctrinal as of an
experimental character. He seemed anxious to understand how a man
might know that he was a Christian, and what conscious experiences
entered into the exercises of repentance and faith. It is needless
for me to detail the particulars of the conversation. It gave me
an opportunity of speaking to him in the most simple and familiar
way. When I related the experience of some eminent Christian, or
used a simple illustration, such as I have employed in Sabbath
school addresses, he seemed much gratified, and proceeded to put
his questions to draw out still more definite explanations. He
particularly was anxious to understand how faith receives and
appropriates the Lord Jesus Christ, and how a man may know that he
believes. He put himself in the position of a little child, and
asked questions in the simplest manner. Sometimes he asked me to
go over an explanation a second time, as if he wished to fix it
upon his memory. His manner was so earnest, and his mind was
evidently so deeply engaged, that I was strongly impressed with
the conviction of his entire sincerity.
After the more experimental points had been disposed of, he asked
a few purely doctrinal questions, the answers to which he received
without any disposition to enter upon a discussion. At the close
of the conversation, he asked particularly what were the
conditions of membership in the Presbyterian Church, and what were
the points upon which an applicant for admission would be
examined. The conversation lasted, probably, from two to three
hours. After sitting quiet for a few minutes, he said, “Well, sir,
I thank you. My mind is now made up. I hope that I am a Christian.
I think I have much of the experience which you describe, and, as
soon as I retire from my office as President, I will unite with
the Presbyterian Church.” To this, I replied, “Why not _now_, Mr.
President? God’s invitation is _now_, and you should not say
_to-morrow_.” To this he answered, with deep feeling, and with a
strong gesture, “I must delay, for the _honor of religion_. If I
were to unite with the Church _now_, they would say hypocrite from
Maine to Georgia.” I felt the truth of his answer, and did not
continue my urgency.
This closed our conversation, but, as Mr. Buchanan remained at the
Springs for some time, he seemed to seize every opportunity, when
he met me in the hall or in the parlor, to ask some question which
he had been pondering, or to repeat some passage of Scripture upon
which his mind had been dwelling, and ask how I understood it. For
example, meeting me in the passage, he asked me the meaning of the
verse, “The bruised reed he will not break: the smoking flax he
will not quench;” and when I explained the figures, and showed how
beautifully they expressed the tenderness of our Lord, he seemed
to exhibit the most simple-hearted gratification.
I take pleasure in giving these recollections for record, because
I have never entertained a doubt of the entire honesty of Mr.
Buchanan’s religious impressions. I did not agree with him in
politics, or feel any sympathy with his public career; but I think
that he is entitled to this testimony from one who was placed in
circumstances to judge fairly of the reality of his religious
convictions. The purpose which President Buchanan expressed to me
of uniting with the Church was fulfilled. He connected himself
with the Presbyterian Church in Lancaster, Pa., immediately after
his retirement from the Presidential chair.
Mr. J. Buchanan Henry concludes his communication to me, from which
I have already quoted, as follows:
In personal appearance Mr. Buchanan was tall—over six feet, broad
shouldered, and had a portly and dignified bearing. He wore no
beard; his complexion was clear and very fair; his forehead was
massive, white and smooth; his features strong and well marked,
and his white hair was abundant and silky in texture; his eyes
were blue, intelligent and kindly, with the peculiarity that one
was far and the other near sighted, which resulted in a slight
habitual inclination of the head to one side—a peculiarity that
will be remembered by those who knew him well. He dressed with
great care, in black, wearing always a full white cravat, which
did not, however, impart to him anything of a clerical aspect. He
was, on the whole, a distinguished looking and handsome man, and
his size and fine proportions gave a dignity and commanding air to
his personal presence. His manner and bearing had much of the
old-fashioned courtly school about it.[187]
Footnote 187:
The frontispiece of the first volume of this work is from a
portrait painted by Eicholtz for Mr. Buchanan’s sister, Mrs.
Lane, just before he went to Russia. It was engraved for this
work by Sartain, of Philadelphia. The frontispiece of the second
volume is a full length, by J. C. Buttre, of New York, engraved
for this work, in a reduced size, from a larger plate by the
same artist.
I do not think he was a very easy or fluent public speaker, but
what he had to say always commanded attention, even among his
great compeers in the Senate.
Mr. Buchanan’s parents were Presbyterians, and he always evinced a
preference for that form of worship. He was a regular attendant
upon church services, both at Washington and in Lancaster, being a
pew holder and an always generous contributor to both the building
and maintenance of Christian worship. I have known him to give a
thousand dollars at a time in aid of building funds for churches
of all denominations, and many of his most faithful friends were
members of the Roman Catholic communion. He was, to my knowledge,
always a sincere believer in all the cardinal doctrines of
Christianity, had no eccentricities of religious belief, but
accepted Christianity as a divine revelation and a simple rule for
the conduct of human life, and relied upon it for the guidance of
his own life. He certainly always pressed their force upon my
cousin and myself, in our family intercourse under his roof, as
his wards. I remember that she and I always hid away our secular
newspaper or novel on Sunday if we heard him approaching, as we
were otherwise pretty sure to get a mild rebuke for not better
employing our time on Sunday, either in good works, or at least in
better reading.
The candid student of history, intent only on getting at the very
truth without fear, favor or prejudice, after the perusal of
President Buchanan’s plain exposition of the threatenings of the
impending rebellion, as set forth in his message of December,
1860, and the message of January 8, 1861, must ask the question,
why did not the Congress, sole constitutional depositary of the
power to raise armies or to call out the militia, then and there,
by proper legislation, authorize the President to stamp out the
incipient revolt by voting the money for and the authority to
employ any necessary military force to accomplish the legitimate
end? I have reason to know that the President would not have
hesitated to faithfully execute any law which Congress might then
have enacted. Why, then, did Congress, from December to March,
with the plain facts fully brought to their attention by President
Buchanan, and in the face of such imminent public peril, neglect
to perform its constitutional function, or to vote either supplies
or men? What more could President Buchanan have legally done?
Should he have become an usurper, and declared himself Dictator,
after the fashion of South America? The conclusion must be, that
Congress, from some inexplicable reason, saw fit to abdicate its
functions, leaving its powers dormant at the most critical period.
Can it have been from any unworthy partisan motive? It could not
have been from doubt of its possessing the authority. Whilst
President Buchanan held, and rightly held, that he could find no
authority in the Constitution to coerce the States, _as States_,
or mere legal entities, he clearly enunciated the true doctrine of
the constitutional power of the National Government to fully
enforce its laws, by acting coercively upon the persons of all
citizens when in revolt or resistance to its authority, wherever
they might be, and whether as individuals or massed together in
armies. That doctrine then set forth by Mr. Buchanan was
unpopular, but it stands to-day confessed to be the only true
construction of the Constitution. After the flames of a four
years’ civil conflagration had beaten against the text, no
important writer on the organic law held any other construction to
be tenable. Its present universal acceptance proves the sagacity
and correctness of Mr. Buchanan’s views at that early date.
If there was any more marked political bias of Mr. Buchanan’s
mind than any other it was that of an almost idolatrous respect
and reverence for the Constitution. He had been educated and
lived in the old constitutional school of statesmanship, and
wholly believed in the wisdom and perfection of that great
organic law devised by the founders and builders of our
Government. He fully and ardently believed in its sufficiency
for all purposes, whether of peace or war. Perhaps such a faith
as was entertained by that race of statesmen would be considered
by the present lax school as savoring of political fetichism.
Certainly there were many who so regarded it, and who rather
contemptuously avowed in Congress that their views and measures
were, in many instances, extra-constitutional. To me, at least,
this knowledge of Mr. Buchanan’s political religion, so to
speak, explains why he did not for an instant contemplate the
usurpation—for usurpation it would have been, pure and simple—of
the constitutional prerogatives of Congress to declare war, or,
at least, to precipitate war: or by seizing the persons of the
Southern members of Congress and of the State authorities who
were working to secure the secession of their several States.
Congress was in session, and it was, that being the case, only
for the President to lay the facts before that body and obey
their behest, whether for peace or war. No belief that the
American people would have condoned his usurpation, if made, or
have upheld his extra-constitutional act, such as calling for
volunteers, or declaring war, or making an aggressive war, would
have justified him in assuming the prerogatives of Congress,
then actually in session. Although such an act might have made
him the most popular idol in American history, I do not think he
could have been tempted to break his solemn oath to support the
Constitution, by ignoring its plainest provisions. “Nothing
succeeds like success.” I am sometimes asked why Mr. Buchanan
did not “take the responsibility?” Such a course would have
remained impossible to him, with his views of his duty, and I
think that in time he will be applauded, not blamed, for his
self-sacrificing devotion to what he regarded as the right,
rather than seeking his own personal popularity by illegal
means.
I cannot close without a few words upon my uncle’s views upon
slavery. He simply tolerated it as a legal fact under our
Constitution. He had no admiration for it whatever. I know of a
number of instances in which he purchased the freedom of slaves in
Washington, and brought them to Pennsylvania with him, leaving it
to them to repay him if they could out of their wages. His
constant recognition of the legal existence of slavery in the
South, and its right to protection so long as it legally existed
there, rendered him liable to misrepresentation at the North and
to misconception at the South; the one regarding him as an
apologist of slavery, and the other as its open friend, whereas he
was neither. He was only desirous to see the Constitution and laws
obeyed, and did, emphatically, not believe in the so-called
“Higher Law.” In fact I cannot but regard Mr. Buchanan as having
been cruelly misrepresented at the North and betrayed by the
South, which began its unjustifiable secession when quite safe
from any invasion of its Constitutional rights. The Southern
leaders did not hesitate to precipitate what they knew would be
disastrous to his benign administration, if it did not actually
terminate it in blood. It was, too, the grossest ingratitude to
the Democratic party, which had always stood like a wall of fire
between the South and its assailants in the North.
Mr. Buchanan, to the day of his death, expressed to me his abiding
conviction that the American people would, in due time, come to
regard his course as the only one which at that time promised any
hope of saving the nation from a bloody and devastating war, and
would recognize the integrity and wisdom of his course in
administering the Government for the good of the whole people,
whether North or South. His conviction on this point was so
genuine that he looked forward serenely to the future, and never
seemed to entertain a misgiving or a doubt.
The day is now not very far off when the American people will
appreciate his faithful services to the Republic, his stainless
character and his exalted patriotism.
The remainder of Miss Annie Buchanan’s very interesting paper is as
follows:
The society in Lancaster, at the time of my uncle’s early
residence there, must have been quite above the average in
intellectual culture and in social qualities. He was very fond, in
the latter part of his life, of conversing about those times, and
told a great many anecdotes of them and of the people who
flourished in them. Unfortunately, they have gone from our memory,
only leaving behind faint outlines of their former interest.
My uncle had the most delightful way of throwing himself back into
the past scenes of his life, and, as it were, living them over
again. He would tell you the whole position of affairs, make you
understand the point of the story thoroughly, and then laugh in a
most infectious way. When he was in a vein of conversation, and
felt in the humor for going back into the past, a whole room full
of people would sit all the evening, listening with delight, no
one daring to interrupt, except in order, by some leading question
or remark, to draw him out to talk more freely.
After his return from Washington, it was his constant habit to
come into the parlor after tea, and there to spend the evening,
with whatever members of the family might be staying with him.
After listening, as he often did, to reading for an hour, he would
begin to converse, and it was a rare treat to be a sharer in these
conversations. I knew it to be a great privilege, thoroughly
appreciated it at the time, but now that those evenings are
forever gone, with what mingled feelings of delight and regret I
look back upon them! They always ended at ten o’clock, and he very
seldom sat up much after that hour, even when he had guests in the
house who did not care to retire so early. “The time for all good
Christians to be in bed,” he would say, and, bidding good-night,
would leave us to remain as long as we saw fit.
Of course my uncle was not always in the vein of talking in the
way I have described, and sometimes much preferred having others
to talk to him. I have often been struck with the easy grace with
which he, who had been so much a man of the world, and had
associated with men and women of the highest culture, could take
and show the greatest interest in the rather uninteresting details
given by some humble neighbor about the sayings and doings of his
family and establishment. My uncle was a Democrat, not only in
political principle, but in the large and true democratic sense.
He looked upon his neighbors, even those who were plain and
uneducated, as his fellow-men, and treated them accordingly.
I remember his talking to me very earnestly about visiting and
relieving the sick and the poor, and trying to make me realize
that Christianity which could lack this fruit must be worthless.
On one occasion, when I was quite a child and on a visit to
Wheatland, I saw him go anxiously to the window and look upon the
night, which was cold and stormy, with sleet and snow, and I heard
him say, “God help the poor to-night!” I mention this because very
soon after, I think the next day, he sent some money, quite a
large sum, to the mayor of Lancaster, to buy fuel for the poor.
The same idea he carried out, when he made a provision in his last
will for this very purpose.
My uncle was very generous to those who were in need, and very
many were the persons whom he helped by gifts and loans, who would
otherwise have been in great straits. He was not lavish in his
expenditures. He knew exactly what he was spending, spent nothing
foolishly, was careful of what money he had, and was anxious to
invest what he had in such a way as that it should be
remunerative, so that when he gave, he did it from principle,
because he wished to do a kindness, or because he thought it was
right to do it. His heart made him always anxious to ameliorate
the miseries of those around him.
He was very much interested in his family and their welfare, and
to him it was that each and all looked for advice or assistance.
While he did not hesitate to speak sternly when he thought duty
required it—sometimes even more so than was necessary—he was
always ready, even at the same time, to lend a helping hand. He
was the oldest child of my grandfather who lived to grow up, and
this fact, together with his eminent uprightness and wisdom, made
him to be looked upon by all the different branches of the family
as their head. Our particular family have great reason to remember
his kindness, and we look back with great pleasure to the many
visits of months at a time which we paid him, at his request, both
at Wheatland and in Washington. After his death, we felt that we
had lost the friend who, next to our own father, cared most for
us, and one on whose sympathy and kindness we could most depend.
The accompanying qualities in my uncle’s character to his kindness
were his justice and integrity. No debt of his was ever knowingly
left unpaid. Even the return he made for his taxes was often
larger than that of most of his neighbors, because he scrupulously
returned an accurate account of his possessions to the assessors.
He would not have retained in his possession the smallest sum
which he thought to justly belong to another.
And this honesty showed itself quite as much in relation to public
affairs as to his own. He was honest even about his time. While he
was President, his time was given most scrupulously to his work.
He entered his office at nine o’clock in the morning and remained
there until four o’clock, when he would take a walk before dinner,
which was at five o’clock. After dinner he generally spent a large
part of the evening attending to business; and this was the case
not for some months of the year only, but for the _whole_ year.
Except while he was making a short trip into North Carolina and
during a visit of about two weeks each year at Bedford Springs,
which was necessary to his health, he remained at his post for the
four entire years. I remember hearing some members of his cabinet
say that he loved work for work’s sake. I do not know whether this
was the case or not, but certain it is that he did a great deal of
work. He always went over carefully, himself, every matter
presented to him by his cabinet officers, and tried to possess
himself with all the ins and outs of what was going on under his
administration.
It surprises me very much to read insinuations to the effect that
he was not _the_ President. I knew quite intimately nearly all the
members of his cabinet, and heard a good deal of their
conversation, and I know with what respect they spoke of him, and
that the whole tone of their conversation was that he was the
master.
There was a peculiarity of his mind which may possibly account to
some extent for this mistaken impression. It very often happened
that when some new idea or proposition was suggested to him, he
would, at the first blush, entirely disapprove of it, so that any
one not well acquainted with him, might think the case was
hopeless. When he had time, however, to think about it, and if
some one would quietly give him the points of the case, and draw
his attention more particularly to it, he would sometimes make up
his mind in quite an opposite way from that which he had at first
intended. After, however, he had once definitely and positively
come to a decision, he was unchangeable. What he considered to be
right he did, and no fear of consequences could alter his purpose.
And the value of this quality to him will be understood when we
remember that after his return home from Washington he did not
seem to regret his course while there. I never heard him say that
he wished he had acted differently in the troublous times through
which he had passed. He knew that the steps he had taken had been
with the single earnest aim and desire of preserving the country
from disunion and war; and that being the case, his having failed
in his endeavor did not trouble his conscience at all. “I acted
for some time as a breakwater,” he said, “between the North and
the South, both surging with all their force against me.”
I say did not touch his _conscience_. His _heart_ was greatly
distressed. I remember the morning on which the news came of the
ships being sent to the relief of Fort Sumter. “I fear Governor
Chase is bringing war upon his country,” was his sad exclamation,
and from that time until peace was declared, his true and loyal
heart grieved over the distress and misery of his country.
I remember an incident early in his administration, which shows
his integrity in the matter of his duty. A young man was sentenced
to be hung in Washington for murder, who had, for some reason,
enlisted great interest for himself among members of his church
(Roman Catholic), and not only the mother of the condemned man,
but several clergymen and Sisters of Charity, also, waited upon my
uncle to importune him for a pardon. My uncle’s feelings were
greatly enlisted, and I heard him say that he had gone over the
case three times, in order that, if possible, he might find some
reason that would make it right to grant a pardon. But finding, as
he did at last, that there absolutely was no such reason, he said
the law must have its way, and the young man was executed.
Another great characteristic of my uncle was his independence of
spirit. He would not be under obligation, for gifts, to any one
while he was in office, and in fact he did not like to be so at
any time. I remember the ——’s were very anxious to present a grand
piano to my cousin, soon after she went to Washington, but my
uncle positively declined allowing her to accept it. When the
Japanese commissioners came, bringing with them curious and costly
gifts, some of which were intended for the President, he sent them
all to the Patent Office, as the property of the country. He even
went so far as to insist, at all times, upon paying his fare
whenever he travelled, never receiving a pass, even when he was
out of office. He would have been horrified at the idea of
travelling free while he was President. I have often heard him
say, “I will pay my way while I can afford it. When I cannot
afford to pay I will stay at home.” The salary of the President
during my uncle’s administration was $25,000. So far from being
made any richer by his office, he was obliged to supplement some
of his own private means each year, in order that the becoming
hospitality and mode of living might be kept up at the White
House.
As long as I can remember my uncle, he was a religious man,
becoming more and more so as his life drew near its close. His
knowledge of the scriptures was very thorough, and whatever doubts
he may have had in his earlier life, had been dissipated by the
rays of the Sun of Righteousness. He was, certainly, during the
latter years of his life, a strong and firm believer in Jesus
Christ as his Saviour. It was his constant habit, after his return
from Washington, to read daily in the New Testament, and a large
part of Sunday he spent in studying that and books founded upon
its teachings. A devotional book, Jay’s Morning and Evening
Exercises, was his constant companion, and he read a great deal in
the sermons of the great French preacher, Massillon, a French copy
of which he had and often quoted. He conversed much about the
Gospel and its teachings, and one could easily tell that he was
deeply interested in the subject.
It was his practice, during all his life, to attend church on
Sunday morning, and some effect of his early teaching, which very
strongly inculcated the hallowing of the Lord’s day, was shown
when he was in St. Petersburg. It was the custom there for even
the most devout, after they had attended service through the day,
to go to balls and festivities in the evening of Sunday. My uncle
thought that he could not be excused from attending the Emperor’s
balls, but made it a rule never to dance on Sunday evening, and so
caused great surprise to some of his friends there, especially
when he explained to them that in America the manner prevalent in
Russia of spending Sunday evening would be thought quite shocking.
To show how my uncle respected the religious sense of the
community, I will mention, that when the Prince of Wales was
visiting him in Washington, and when a large company had been
invited to do the Prince honor, my uncle would not consent to
having any dancing at it. He took this position, not that he
disapproved himself of dancing, but he thought that it would cause
scandal to the religious people of the country if there were to be
a dance there in the White House. “I am the servant of the
people,” was his motto, and with this feeling in his mind he
toiled, he lived and acted, always trying to prevent anything from
being done which would give offence to that people.
I remember dining with him, in company with a lady who seemed to
be a thoroughly worldly woman, one whose life had been spent in
public and among worldly people. I do not remember the whole
conversation, or how my uncle came to say it, but I remember his
remark, “I say my prayers every day of my life.” The lady looked
up at him in surprise, and questioned, thinking he was jesting.
“No,” said my uncle, “I am not jesting, I have always said my
prayers.” I will only add, while on this subject, that not only
did my uncle attend church constantly on Sundays, but he was very
particular to omit his ordinary avocations, and to make it a day
of rest, through all his life.
There was one thing very noticeable in my uncle’s conversation
during those years which he spent at Wheatland, after his return
from Washington. He conversed very little on the political matters
of the day, and, particularly, he showed remarkably little
bitterness towards those whose indifference and even hatred
towards himself showed themselves so strongly when power and
influence had passed out of his hands. Occasionally, certainly, he
could not help speaking his mind about one or two particularly
flagrant cases, but as a general thing he passed over their
conduct in silence. He was not fond of picking people to pieces,
and his inclination was rather to speak and think kindly of his
neighbors.
My uncle was quite stout, although not at all overgrown, and you
could not see him without observing that he was a person of
distinction. Although he was of so stout a build his foot was
rather small, and I often noticed how lightly and quickly he
walked. He was very quick of apprehension, and there was very
little going on around that he did not know and understand. He has
told me that when he was in his prime his hearing was so acute
that he could often hear whispering in the adjoining room, and he
very often heard things not intended for him to hear.
Owing to a difference which there was between his eyes, one being
near and the other far-sighted, he held his head to one side,
particularly when looking at any person or thing. When listening
to any one he would hold his head in this way, close one eye and
gaze very steadily, and so conveyed the impression that he was
looking the speaker through and through. I have heard him say that
he did not know until he was forty or fifty years of age the cause
of this habit. Some friend walking with him suggested to him to
try his eyes and see if he could not see better, at a distance,
with one than with the other, when, to his surprise, he discovered
that with one eye he could not distinguish the landscape at all,
while with the other he could see very far. Whether this
peculiarity was the cause of his long continued sight I do not
know, but the fact is that up to the time of his death he was able
to read everything without the aid of glasses. He found, however,
during the last year of his life, or perhaps a little longer, that
when he read fine print at night, which he often wished to do, it
strained his eyes, and for these occasions he procured a pair of
spectacles, but he never used them at any other time.
He had a very peculiar way of reading at night. No matter how many
lights might be in the room he always had a candlestick and
candle, which he held before his eyes, and by that means read his
paper or book. As he grew older we often felt quite anxious for
fear his paper might take fire, and, occasionally, on the next
morning a hole would be found burnt in it, but, as far as I can
recollect, nothing more serious ever came of his reading in this
way.
My uncle was an extensive reader and had a good memory for what he
had read. His reading embraced all classes of literature, and he
conversed intelligently on all subjects. He continued to read a
great deal after his return to Wheatland, and enjoyed being read
to. Near the end of his life, however, he remarked to me one day,
“I am tired of reading; I don’t seem to care about it any more,”
and, as if that were the case, he might at that time be often seen
sitting without either book or paper, whereas formerly, when not
conversing, he was almost always reading.
My uncle’s political life had been an unusually long one, and, in
consequence, his remembrance of the sayings and doings of the
great people of his time was very interesting. I have heard him
say that the first President whom he had met was President Monroe,
“a gentlemanly man, wearing a blue coat and metal buttons,” and
after him he had more or less acquaintance with all the
Presidents. It was, in great part, on account of this wonderful
fund of personal knowledge which he possessed, that his friends
urged him to have a book written which should contain, not only
the facts of his own life, but also the reminiscences which he was
fond of narrating.
He was very fond of ladies’ society, and was all his life in the
habit of entertaining them at his house. During his different
residences in Washington, while in London and St. Petersburg, as
well as in Lancaster, he was very hospitable, and greatly enjoyed
the society of his friends in his own house. When he finally
returned to Wheatland, he saw much less of society than he had
ever done before, and, I have no doubt, his life must have seemed
very monotonous to him, but he never complained at all, and was
remarkably cheerful and happy.
I have written these pages at the request of my father, hoping
that some things in them may be of service to Mr. Curtis, in
forming an estimate of the character of my uncle. They have no
claim whatever to any literary merit, and are only an effort to do
some honor to one so truly loved and so deeply mourned. To me,
though it would be a great joy to know that men recognized the
wisdom and greatness of his actions, it would be of far greater
account to have them realize his goodness, nobility, honor,
self-sacrifice, courage and honesty. There may, and must, always
be a difference of opinion about questions of polity and
administration, but the true elements of greatness lie in the soul
of man, and are of far higher value than praise and popular
estimation, often attained through a turn of Fortune’s wheel.
I close this memorial chapter with some extracts from the sermon
preached by Dr. Nevin at the funeral of Mr. Buchanan. Dr. Nevin
chose for his text the words: “I would not have you to be ignorant,
brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not, even
as others which have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and
rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring
with Him.”
...... In connection with this momentous subject, the occasion on
which we are now met together is full of more than ordinary
interest and significance, such as may well invest it with the
most profound solemnity for all who are here present.
We have before us, and will be called soon to follow to the grave,
the mortal remains of James Buchanan, the fifteenth President of
the United States; who, after taking an active part in the
politics of this great nation for half a century, having filled
the highest places of honor and trust in the gift of his country,
and having represented her for a long time with prominent
distinction in the diplomacy of the civilized world, has now, at
the advanced age of almost four score years, been gathered to his
fathers, and enrolled on the catalogue of the great and
illustrious dead. His name has been famous, not simply through his
own merits, but through association, also, with the leading
political characters and the leading political interests of the
times in which he lived.
He belonged to a generation of eminent statesmen, giants in their
day, whose names were once household words in the land, but who,
in him as their representative, we can all feel have passed away
forever from the drama of our national life. There is something
peculiarly affecting in this thought. He was the last link that
held us in communication with that buried age; and in parting with
Mr. Buchanan, it is as though we were called to part again with
Clay, and Webster, and Benton, and Calhoun, and Jackson, and Cass,
and the whole political world to which they belonged. Now, more
than ever, their age has become to us, in view especially of the
late war, like the years before the flood. Then the occasions with
which he has been intimately connected, especially in the latter
part of his public life, have been of the most momentous, as well
as the most difficult and trying character, involving in the end a
crisis which amounted to a full revolution for our own country,
while it made itself felt, also, as of truly world-historical
importance for the age at large.
This is not the place nor the time, of course, to enter into any
consideration of Mr. Buchanan’s public career, or to pronounce any
judgment in particular on the policy of his administration as
President of the United States. The time, indeed, has not yet come
for a fair and competent historical verdict on this subject, in
any quarter. We stand too near the vast and mighty struggle
through which we have just passed, and from whose surging billows
we have not yet fully escaped, to understand it properly, or to
estimate fairly its moral and political merits.
Only this much, in justice to the dead, I may be permitted to say,
in the form of two general observations:
In the first place, we have no right to judge Mr. Buchanan’s
conduct at the beginning of our late civil troubles by the course
of events subsequently, when the contingent became actual, and the
problematical certain, in many ways, which only the eye of
Omniscience could previously foresee. How far this ex post facto
judgment (cruel and wrongful in history, full as much as ex post
facto statutes in legislation), has been carried in the case
before us, all who care to look into the matter can easily see and
know. Every man, every public man especially, has a right to
demand that his opinions and actions should be measured by the
circumstances and conditions of his own time, and not by the
circumstances and conditions of another and, it may be, a wholly
different time. Any other mode of judgment is at once grossly
unhistorical, grossly unphilosophical, and I will also add,
grossly unchristian.
My other observation is, that whatever may be thought by others,
now or hereafter, of Mr. Buchanan’s Presidential administration on
the eve of the rebellion, he himself never changed his mind in
regard to the righteousness or wisdom of the course which he saw
proper to pursue. That his own policy was thwarted and overwhelmed
by another policy, altogether different, never led him to believe
that, in the circumstances of the country, as they then were, his
own policy was not right. “Had I to pass through the same state of
things again,” he would say, calmly but firmly, “I do not see,
before God, how I could act otherwise than as I did act.”
This, of course, does not prove that his course was the wisest and
best for the exigencies of that fearfully volcanic time, as they
came to view afterwards in the lava flames of our civil war; but
no one who was intimately familiar, as I have been, with the last
years of Mr. Buchanan’s life, could doubt, at all events, the
sincerity of his own convictions, thus expressed in regard to the
closing portions of his political career.[188] Whether absolutely
wise or not in all his counsels, he was, in this time that tried
men’s souls, honest, at least, conscientious and patriotically
true to what he conceived to be the highest interests of his
country.
Footnote 188:
Only a few days before his death, in a conversation with
Mr. Swarr, when the hope was expressed that he might still
live to see his public life vindicated, he spoke on this
subject as follows: “My dear friend, I have no fear of the
future. Posterity will do me justice. I have always felt,
and still feel, that I discharged every duty imposed on me
conscientiously. I have no regret for any public act of my
life; and history will vindicate my memory from every
unjust aspersion.”
But these political surroundings of the present solemnity, however
they must unavoidably crowd upon our thoughts while we are engaged
in it, form not, by any means, what we should all feel to be, for
us now, its main interest. The relations of time, however
otherwise vast and momentous, are here to-day, swallowed up and
made small by the relations of eternity. Mr. Buchanan has passed
away, not simply as a politician and a statesman, but as a
Christian; and this it is we now feel, standing by his coffin and
his grave, to be a distinction of infinitely higher account than
all the honors and dignities of his life, under any other form.
These, at best, are but of ephemeral significance and worth. One
generation of politicians passeth away and another generation
cometh. Where are the voices that, thirty or forty years ago,
filled our Congressional halls and electrified the land with their
eloquent words? Kings and Presidents, the princes of the
earth—terrestrial gods, as they are sometimes called—die like
other men. “All flesh is as grass, and all the glory of man as the
flower of grass; the grass withereth, and the flower thereof
falleth away, but the word of the Lord endureth forever.” And
where do we find this enduring word of the Lord in full presence
and power, save in the Logos Incarnate, our Lord Jesus Christ, who
is the Alpha and Omega of the whole creation, the same yesterday,
to-day and forever?
Happily, the venerable sage of Wheatland, as he has sometimes been
called, sought and found here what he himself was ready to
acknowledge as something better than all the greatness of the
world; an humble but strong trust in the atoning righteousness of
Christ, which brightened the whole evening of his life, which
proved to be the strength of his spirit, when heart and flesh
began to fail, and which now makes his death but the quiet sleep
that precedes the morning of the resurrection. He died in the
Lord; this is our great comfort in following him to the grave. We
sorrow not as those who have no hope. “For if we believe that
Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus
will God bring with him.”
In some sense, Mr. Buchanan was a religious man, we may say, all
his life. Brought into the Presbyterian church by baptism in his
infancy, he enjoyed at the same time the unspeakable advantage of
an early Christian training, which made itself felt more or less
sensibly on all his character and conduct in later years. In
serious conversation with me on this subject less than a year ago,
he referred, with moistened eyes and faltering voice, to the
lessons that had been instilled into him as a boy, especially by
his pious mother. She had taught him to pray; and her presence, as
an invisible ministering spirit, seemed to hold him to the duty,
as it were in spite of himself, through the whole of his
subsequent public life. Whatever of worldliness there might be in
his thoughts and ways otherwise, his conscience would not allow
him to give up the outward exercise, at least, of some private as
well as public, forms of devotion. He made it a point to read the
bible, honored the Sabbath, and observed more or less faithfully
stated times for secret prayer.
His general character, at the same time, was always good. Those
who stood nearest to him in his public life, and who knew him
best, have ever united in bearing the most favorable testimony to
what he was in this view. He has been known and spoken of on all
sides as a true gentleman of the old school, distinguished for his
personal integrity, a man of honorable spirit, upright in his
deportment, and beyond the common measure virtuous in his manners.
He was unquestionably one of the purest in mind, and most
exemplary in life, belonging to the generation of public men,
which has now come to a close in his death. It is, indeed,
something wonderful, that in his peculiar circumstances he should
have been able to pass through such a long life of exposure to all
forms of corruption and sin, so generally unscathed as he seems to
have been by the fiery ordeal. In this respect, he is worthy of
lasting admiration, and may well be held up as an example for the
study and imitation of younger candidates for political
distinction coming after his day. When will all our public men lay
to heart, as they ought, that true oracle of the olden time: “The
memory of the just is blessed; but the name of the wicked shall
rot?”
All this, however, Mr. Buchanan himself very well knew, fell short
of what was required to make him a Christian in the full sense of
the term; and as he advanced in life accordingly, he seems to have
turned his mind more and more seriously to the necessity of
becoming a follower of the Saviour in a more inward and strict
way. This practical discipleship he believed himself to have
reached in some measure years before he withdrew from political
life. Yet, he made then no open profession of his faith, in the
way of what is commonly called joining the church, under the idea
that there was some reason for postponing it in the peculiar
circumstances in which he stood as a public man. That idea, of
course, was a serious mistake, as he himself acknowledged it to be
afterwards, when earnestly spoken with on the subject. He ought to
have joined the church sooner, he said, and especially before he
left Washington. As it was, he took this important step in due
course of time, subsequently, after full serious consideration, by
connecting himself in form with the Presbyterian church of
Lancaster, which had been his regular place of worship previously,
where he continued to worship afterwards, and in communion with
which he has now departed this life, “looking for the general
resurrection in the last day, and the life of the world to come.”
It was my privilege to converse with him frequently on religious
subjects, during these his last years, and I can say his mind
seemed to be always clear and remarkably firm, as well as
consistent, in the apprehension of Christianity, under its
simplest and most commonly acknowledged evangelical form. He had
studied carefully, I may be allowed to state, the Heidelberg
Catechism (that most œcumenical, and in some respects most
genial of all the Reformed Protestant Confessions), and he was
accustomed to speak highly of it at all times, as being a summary
of religious truth, to which he could cordially subscribe as the
full expression of his theological faith.[189]
Footnote 189:
Conversing with his executor and friend, Mr. Swarr, in regard to
his decease, a short time before it took place, he took occasion
to say, in the way of dying testimony: “The principles of the
Christian religion were instilled into my mind in my youth; and
from all I have observed and experienced in the long life
Providence has vouchsafed to me, I have only become more
strengthened in the conviction of the Divine character of the
Saviour, and the power of atonement through His redeeming grace
and mercy.”
More particularly, however, it was during the last summer, that I
had the opportunity of coming to the most intimate knowledge of
his Christian views and hopes, on the occasion of his returning
home from Cape May, under an attack of a strange sickness which
threatened at the time to carry him to the grave. The sickness was
attended with but little bodily pain, and it left his mind
perfectly clear and free, while yet it was of such a character as
to produce in his own mind the strong impression that it would end
in his death. In these solemn circumstances, I had interviews with
him day after day for some time, in which I talked with him, and
prayed with him, as a dying man; and in which he talked also most
freely himself with regard to his own condition, giving utterance
to his views and feelings in a way which furnished the most
satisfactory and pleasing evidence that religion had become with
him, indeed, a deeply-settled principle in the soul, and such a
conviction of faith as could not be shaken by the powers either of
earth or hell. Let it be sufficient here to say, that he was able
to resign himself with full filial confidence and trust into the
hands of God as a faithful Creator and Saviour, and that he found
Him an all sufficient help in his time of need. At the same time,
his faith was far more than a vague trust merely in God’s general
goodness and mercy. It was most explicitly the humble, penitent
reliance of one who knew himself to be a sinner, on the mercy of
God secured to men through His Son Jesus Christ. At this time,
especially, more than before, he was brought to see and feel the
importance of simply looking to Jesus (in the spirit of St. John’s
gospel and of the Apostle’s Creed), as being Himself the sum and
substance of the whole Christian salvation. His mind fastened with
peculiar interest on the text: “Lord to whom shall we go? Thou
hast the words of eternal life. And we believe and are sure that
Thou art that Christ the Son of the living God.”[190]
Footnote 190:
These pastoral conferences—_horæ vespertinæ_ they might be
called, held as they were mostly in the autumnal twilight, on
what seemed to be for us the utmost verge of time—were
peculiarly interesting and solemn to myself, as they were always
most cordially welcomed also by Mr. Buchanan. There was no
reserve or hesitation in his manner. His habitual diplomatic
caution was gone. At the same time there was no excitement or
agitation in his mind. He was perfectly calm, and had no fear of
death whatever. Still it was full before him, and he had no
disposition to hide from himself its awful presence. He wished
to be talked with as a man who felt himself to be on the borders
of the eternal world, and who was fully awake to the dread
issues of the life to come. But with all this, his spirit abode
in quiet confidence and peace, and the ground of his trust
throughout was the mercy of God through the righteousness of
Jesus Christ. There was nothing like enthusiasm, of course, in
his experience; the general nature of the man made that
impossible. His religion showed itself rather in the form of
fixed trust in God, thankfulness for His past mercy, and general
resignation to His holy will. In these twilight hours, thus
circumstanced, it could not be but that central regard was had
continually to the person of Jesus Christ, and the significance
of the Christian redemption as comprehended in the idea of His
coming in the flesh. This Christological way of looking at the
gospel was in some measure new to Mr. Buchanan, or at least it
had not taken hold of his mind, as he confessed, in the same
manner before. Now, however, it gave him great satisfaction, and
he considered it one special benefit of his sickness, that it
had taught him to see in the simple exercise of “looking to
Jesus” what he found to be, for himself, at least, the most
consoling and the most strengthening practice of Christian
faith.
Altogether it was a death-bed experience, full of tranquil light
and peace, the calm evening sunset of a long life, which seemed to
be itself but the brightening promise of a new and far better life
beyond the grave.
His late sickness, which has now terminated in his death, was more
prostrating for him throughout, both in body and in mind, than
that of which I have just spoken. Through it all, however, his
views and feelings in regard to religion he declared to be, in the
prospect of quitting the world, just what he had over and over
again witnessed them to be before. He bowed with entire submission
to his Heavenly Father’s will. His last intelligible word, indeed,
whispered in the ear of anxious affection bending over him, as he
was turned somewhat painfully upon his bed, and felt, no doubt,
that the end had come—after which he fell away into the gentle
sleep that some hours later closed the scene—was the short
Christian prayer: “O Lord, God Almighty, as Thou wilt!” Thus he
passed away. His trust was in Christ crucified and risen from the
dead, and in Christ alone. He died in the full faith of the
gospel, and in the joyful hope of having part at last in the
resurrection of the body and the life everlasting.
He sleeps in Jesus. Be this his epitaph; the last and crowning
honor of his long, illustrious life; the richest ornament of his
public, no less than of his private memory and name. Be this also
the consolation of his sorrowful friends as they look upon that
venerable majestic form here lying in state before us, and are
called now to follow it in slow melancholy procession to the
grave. We sorrow not as others, which have no hope; for if Jesus
died and rose again, them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring
with Him. The aged statesman has been gathered to his fathers full
of years, like a shock of corn fully ripe and laden with fruit; he
has served his country well, and enjoyed its honors largely, in
his generation; he has left behind him a fair example of justice,
benevolence, integrity and truth, a bright record indeed, of
honorable and virtuous character in all respects. In all this we
find matter for thankful satisfaction, and occasion for bowing in
meek submission to the Divine will, which has now at last removed
him from our sight. But, through all this, at the same time, we
triumph and rejoice most of all, as Christians, in what we know to
have been his Christian death, and in the assurance that we have,
therefore, of his being still with us, and near to us, in Christ.
To Whom, now let us offer our united and unfeigned thanks for that
victory over death and the grave, which he has obtained for us and
for all who sleep in Him; while we pray also for power to follow
the faith of those who have gone before us, “that we may enter at
death into their joy, and so abide with them in rest and peace,
till both they and we shall reach our common consummation of
redemption and bliss in the glorious resurrection of the last
day.” _Amen._
The remains of James Buchanan lie in a beautiful rural cemetery near
the city of Lancaster, beneath a simple monument, which records only
the date of his birth and of his death, and the fact that he was the
fifteenth President of the United States. It is well that the soil
of Pennsylvania holds his ashes, for he was the most eminent
statesman yet given by that great commonwealth to the service of the
country since the Constitution of the United States was established.
INDEX.
ABERDEEN, LORD, Course of, on Oregon question, i., 568;
Is informed by Mr. McLane of Mr. Buchanan’s despatch on Oregon
Question, 558;
Gives information that Oregon treaty is approved, 604.
ABERDEEN LORD, Premier, ii., 104;
Ministry of, ii., 105, 107.
ADAMS, CHAS. F., Nomination of, ii., 9.
ADAMS, JAMES H., Commissioner from South Carolina, ii., 370.
ADAMS, JOHN QUINCY, Candidate at popular election of 1824, i.,
38;
Received unanimous votes of what States, 39;
Election of, by House of Representatives, 44;
Opposition to, who composed, 57;
Administration, who were friends of, 58;
Minority of friends in Congress, 70;
Reference to election of, in 1825, 506;
Reference to administration of, 511, 394;
Referred to by Mr. R. P. Letcher, 514;
On secession, ii., 603.
AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, i., #219#.
ALABAMA, Secession of, ii., 42.
ALBERT, PRINCE, of Prussia, i., 207.
ALBERT, PRINCE, ii., 112.
ALEXANDER, EMPEROR, of Russia, i., 155, 221.
ALFONSKOI, Russian physician, i., 195, 196, 198.
ALLEN, WILLIAM, U. S. Senator, reference to, on Texas question, i.,
519; ii., 195, note.
AMERICA, CENTRAL, Negotiations with Lord Clarendon concerning, ii.,
126 et seq.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE, i., 201.
AMERICAN SYSTEM, Mr. Buchanan’s views of, i., 76.
ANDERSON, MAJOR, Removal of, from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter,
ii., 365, 370;
Temporary truce of, 449 et seq.;
Extraordinary despatches from, 497;
Letter of, to General Dix, 496, 518.
ANNE, EMPRESS, of Russia, i., 204.
ANNEXATION. (See Texas.)
ANNUNCIATION, Cathedral of, i., 199.
ANTI-MASONS, who were called, i., 231.
ANTOINE, REV. FATHER, Abbot of monastery, i., 202.
APPLETON, JOHN, of Maine, Mr. Buchanan’s Secretary of Legation in
London, ii., 179.
APPROPRIATION, ANNUAL, Motion to strike out salary of minister to
Russia, i., 129.
ARGYLE, DUKE of, Lord Privy Seal, ii., 105.
ASHBURTON, LORD, i., 504.
ASSUMPTION, Cathedral of, i., 199.
ATHERTON, CHAS. G., i., 519.
ARTHUR, PRINCE, Son of Princess Lieven, i., 217.
AUTHOR, Refutation a duty of the, ii., 511, 517.
BAKER, J. B., Letter to, ii., 622.
BAKER, MRS. GEO. W., Niece of Mr. Buchanan, i., 531, note;
Death of, ii., 159.
BALDWIN, MR. JUSTICE, Death of, i., 561, 26.
BALTIMORE LADIES, Spirit of, in 1863, ii., 612.
BANCROFT, GEO., Letter of, to Mr. Buchanan, i., 590;
Mission to England, 574, 575.
BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, i., 184;
Mr. Buchanan an early opponent of, 15.
BANK QUESTION, Retrospective view of, i., 411, 416.
BANKRUPT ACT of 1841, Mr. Buchanan’s speech on, i., 461.
BANKRUPTCY, Meaning of, under the constitution, i., 30.
BANKRUPTCY BILL, Discussion on, in 1821-22, i., 31.
BARBOUR, GOV. JAMES, of Virginia, i., 606.
BARBOUR, PHILIP P., i., 26.
BARGAIN AND CORRUPTION, i., 41, 56;
Unfounded charges of, 43;
Mr. Buchanan’s course in regard to, 41, 56;
Revival of, i., 506.
BARLOW, S. L. M., MR. (of New York), quoted, i., 22, note;
Account by, of proceedings of Cincinnati Convention, ii., 170 et
seq.
BARNWELL, ROBERT W., Commissioner from South Carolina, ii., 370.
BASHNIA, SOUCHAREVA, i., 196.
BATES, JOSHUA, Partner of Baring Bros. & Co., i., 226, and
note.
BEALE WILLIAM, State Senator, i., 10.
BELL, MR., Senator from Tennessee, ii., 195, note.
BENTON, THOMAS H., Opposed to administration of John Q. Adams, i.,
58;
Politics of, 232;
Resolutions of, on surplus money, 243;
Resolutions of, in relation to defence of U. S., in case of war
with France, 268;
Expunging resolution of, 291, 293, 294, 305,
306;
Antipathy of, to paper currency, 496;
Subject of vituperation by his party, 510;
Hue and cry against, 512;
Pretensions of, to Presidency, 517;
References to, 519, 528;
Conduct and speech of, on Oregon question, 559;
Course of, on Oregon question, 570;
Reference to, 612.
BERNARD, GENERAL, Reference to, as favoring General Jackson’s
election, i., 55.
BERNSDOFF, COUNTESS, ii., 159.
BERRIEN, J. MACPHERSON, Reference to, i., 545.
BEVERLY, CARTER, Conversation of, with General Jackson on incidents
preceding the election of Mr. Adams, i., 49;
Visit of, to General Jackson, 49.
BIGLER, MR., U. S. Senator, Note of, to President, ii., 465.
BILLS IN CONGRESS, Conscription, 1815, i., 9;
Bill for relief of surviving officers of revolution, 58;
Panama appropriation, 67;
Alteration of tariff, 75;
Cumberland Road, 81;
To amend and extend judicial system, 95;
To repeal 25th section of judiciary act, 110;
Fortification Bill, 240;
Removal of executive officers, 281;
Removal of the public deposits from the Bank of the United
States, 291;
To restrain use of mails for the circulation of incendiary
publications, 338;
To accept services of volunteers for defence of frontiers,
368;
To prevent interference of Federal officers with elections,
378;
For the renewal of the charter of United States Bank, 413;
To rescind the Specie Circular, 417;
To authorize issue of Treasury notes, 422;
To prevent Pennsylvania Bank from reissuing and circulating notes
of old bank, 423;
For a bank with power to establish offices of discount, 459;
To create a Fiscal Corporation of the United States, 459;
Bankrupt Act, 461.
BIRNEY, JAMES G., Anti-slavery candidate for Presidency, i.,
543.
BLACK, JEREMIAH S., ATTORNEY GENERAL, ii., 194;
Letter of, 309;
Opinion of, 319;
Objects to the answer of President Buchanan to commissioners,
379;
Fears of, in regard to inauguration of Lincoln, 491, 514;
Letter of, to Mr. Schell, 519;
Letter of, to Mr. Buchanan, 562.
BLAKE, DR., Letters to, ii., 601, 614.
BLAKE, JOHN B., Letters of, to Mr. Buchanan, ii., 524, 525.
BLIGH, MR., British Minister at Russian court, i., 150;
Accompanies Mr. Buchanan as far as Cronstadt, 217.
BONAPARTE, NAPOLEON, References to, i., 198, 222.
BORGO, COUNT POZZO DI, Conversation with Mr. Buchanan, i.,
175;
Called on by Mr. Buchanan, 220;
Mr. Buchanan dines with, 222;
Reference to conversations with, by Mr. Buchanan, 234.
BRANCH, MR., ii., 491.
BRECKINRIDGE, MR., Candidate for Vice Presidency, ii., 177;
Nominated by Southern Democratic Convention, 288.
BRIGHT, JESSE D., Senator from Indiana, ii., 360.
BROGLIE, DUC DE, Visited by Mr. Buchanan, i., 221;
Conversation of, with Mr. Buchanan in 1833, 234;
Reference to his note to Mr. Barton, 239;
His assurance to Mr. Livingston, 252;
Conduct of, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 271;
Letter to, by Mr. Livingston, 273;
Famous letter of, to Chargé at Washington, 274;
Letter of, to M. Pageot, 279.
BROWN, AARON V., Postmaster General, ii., 194.
BROWN, JAMES, Senator in Congress from Louisiana when Mr. Buchanan
entered that body, i., 25.
BROWN, SIR WILLIAM, Mr. Buchanan dines with, at his country house,
i., 137, 138 and note.
BRUNNOW, BARON DE, Reference to request of, i., 167.
BUCHANAN, Family of, Scotch-Irish, i., 1, 3.
BUCHANAN, MISS ANNIE, On Mr. Buchanan’s character and last days,
ii., 674 et seq.
BUCHANAN, GEO. W., Brother of the President, i., 3;
Letter of, to his brother James, 109.
BUCHANAN, JOHN, Grandfather of the President, i., 3.
BUCHANAN, MRS., Mother of the President, Letter of, to her son
James, i., 134;
Death of, 209, note.
BUCHANAN, JAMES, Father of the President, i., 1;
Letters of, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14.
BUCHANAN, JAMES, the President, His autobiographical sketch, i.,
1 et seq.;
Birth of, 4;
Education, 4;
College career, 4, 6;
Admitted to the bar, 7;
A Federalist in politics, 8;
Volunteers in the War of 1812, 8;
On defence of the country, 8, 10;
Oration of, on July 4th, 1815, 12;
Elected to the legislature, 8;
Re-elected to the legislature, 14;
Counsel for an impeached Judge, 16;
Rising to eminence as a lawyer, 17;
Suffers a great disappointment in love, 17 et seq.;
Elected to Congress, 23;
First debate of, relative to military establishment, 30;
Speech on tariff of, 1823-4, 36;
Professional income, 37;
Scandals as to supposed agency of, for Mr. Clay, 40;
Action of, in regard to, 41;
First acquaintance with General Jackson and Mr. Clay, 41;
Interview with General Jackson at Seven Buildings, 42;
Letter of, to General Jackson, 44;
Integrity of, 51;
Letters of, to Mr. Ingham, 51, 54;
Letter of, to General Jackson, 55;
Opposition of, to administration of John Q. Adams, 58;
Speech of, in support of bill for relief of officers of
Revolution, 59;
Speech of, on Panama Mission, 65;
Remarks on slavery, 68;
Opposes Mr. Chilton’s resolution on abolition of offices,
71;
Replies to Mr. Everett, 72;
Powers as a debater, 74;
Views of, on tariff, 74;
Speech on tariff, 74;
Replies to Mr. Sprague on tariff, 75;
Views on subject of navy, 78;
Opposition of, to administration, how carried on, 80;
Speech of, on appropriation for surveys, 80;
Course of, on Cumberland Road, 81;
Speech on Cumberland Road, 82;
Speech of, against second election to Presidency, 92;
Action of, in election of General Jackson, 94;
Report of, on judicial system, 95;
Chairman of judiciary committee, 95;
Re-election of, to Congress in 1828, 95;
Speech of, on judiciary act, 95;
Supports bill on judiciary system, 99, 100;
Favors increase of Supreme Court Judges, 104;
Views on judicial appointments, 105;
Report of, on recommendation of judiciary committee, 107;
Trial of Judge Peck, 108;
Speech as a manager of the impeachment, 108;
Letter from his brother George, 109;
Remarks on twenty-fifth section of judiciary act, 113;
Spoken of as candidate for Vice Presidency, 122;
Letter of, to George Plitt, 122;
Qualifications of, for great success at bar, 123;
Letters from his brother George, 124, 125, 126;
Letters of, to Mr. Eaton, 130, 131;
Letter of, to General Jackson, 134;
Letter of, to his brother Edward, 138;
Diary of, on journey from Lancaster to Europe, 136;
From London to St. Petersburg, 140;
Letter of, to General Jackson, 142;
Letter of, to his brother Edward, 144;
Letter of, to John B. Sterigere, 146;
Letter of, to his brother Edward, 147;
Letter of, to General Jackson, 149;
Letter of, to his brother Edward, 152;
Letter of, to Mrs. Slaymaker, 154;
Letter from his mother, 158, note;
Letter of, to his brother Edward, 159;
Letter of, to General Jackson, 164;
Interview with Count Nesselrode, on commercial treaty, 165;
Despatch of, to Secretary of State at Washington, 167;
Commercial treaty, summary of, by, 168;
Letter of, to General Jackson, on maritime treaty, 174;
Failure of the latter, 174;
Despatch of, to Secretary of State, 176;
Letter of, to Secretary of State at Washington, 181;
Letter of, to Mr. Sterigere, 189;
Journey of, to Moscow, 192;
Arrives at home, 227;
Elected to the Senate, 228;
Senator’s duties, 230, note;
Remarks of, on relations with France, 236;
Reply of, to Mr. Clay, in relation to France, 238;
Remarks of, on President’s message in regard to France, 238;
Position of, in relation to France, 236;
Vindicates an amendment to fortification bill, 241;
Surplus revenue, remarks on resolution of Mr. Benton concerning,
243;
Speech of, on power of removal by the President, 282;
Speech of, on expunging resolution, 293;
Views of, on censure of President by Senate, 292;
Course of, as to slavery, 315;
Remarks on slavery, 316;
Remarks on reception of Quaker memorial, 319 et seq.;
Presents a petition from Society of Friends, 337;
Remarks of, on bill to restrain circulation of incendiary
publications, 340 et seq.;
Remarks of, in favor of admission of Michigan, 358;
Remarks of, on bill for services of volunteers for defence of
frontiers, 368;
Speech of, on interference of Federal officers with elections,
378 et seq.;
Speech of, in support of bill against Pennsylvania Bank,
423;
Relations of, to political warfare on the currency question,
449 et seq.;
Letters of, 452-457;
On the administration of President Tyler, 459;
Reply of, to Mr. Clay on veto power, 460, 472 et seq.;
Opposes bankrupt law of 1841, 461 et seq.;
Describes the Exchequer Board, 471;
Opposes ratification of treaty with England, 504;
Reference to conversation of, in 1825, 507;
Letters of, 509, 511;
Third election of, to the Senate, 515;
Proposed nomination of, for Presidency, 516;
Withdraws from canvass, 517;
Letters of, 518, 519, 523, 524 et seq.;
Domestic and social life of, 531;
Letters of, to Miss Lane, 533;
Domestic circle of, 534;
Private fortune of, 535, note;
Letters of, to Miss Lane, 536 et seq.;
Remarks of, on annexation of Texas, 545;
Becomes Secretary of State, 547;
Interviews with Mr. Pakenham at State Departments, 555;
Despatch of, to Mr. McLane, 558;
Letters of, 559, 574;
Despatch of, to Mr. King, on Texas question, 584;
Action of, in regard to Texas, 585, 586;
Despatch to Mr. Slidell on Mexican question, 595;
Further instructs Mr. Slidell, 596;
Position of, as to Presidency, ii., 8;
Reference to, 9;
Letters of, to his niece, 11 et seq.;
Supports compromise measures, 11;
Letter of, to Central Southern Rights Association of Virginia,
23;
Letter of, to Shelton F. Leake and others, 24;
Letter of, to John Nelson, William F. Giles, etc., 26;
Address of, to citizens of Philadelphia, 28;
Candidate for nomination, 34;
Letters of, 39, 40, 41, 42;
Speech of, at Greensburgh, Penn., in 1852, 43 et seq.;
Offered mission to England by President Pierce, 76;
Conversation of, with Mr. Pierce on English mission, 76 et seq.;
Letters of, to President Pierce, 69, 83 et seq.;
Declines a farewell dinner in Lancaster, 93;
Letters to Miss Lane, 94 et seq.;
Arrives in Liverpool, 99;
Visits Lord Clarendon, 100;
Conversation of, with Sir Edward Cust, on court etiquette, 107 et
seq.;
Letters of, to Miss Lane, 109, 112 et seq.;
Attends the Queen’s first levee of the season, 112;
Dines with the Queen, 113;
Letters of, to Mr. Marcy, 117 et seq., 119, 121;
Letter of, to Mr. Capen, 120;
Letters of, to Gov. Bigler and Mr. Marcy, 122, 123;
Letter of, to his housekeeper, Miss Hetty Parker, 124;
Letter of, to his niece, Mrs. Baker, 124;
Social position of, in England, 142;
Letters of, to Mrs. Baker and Miss Lane, 148 et seq.;
Returns to United States, 169;
Nomination of, for the Presidency, 170;
Letters of, to Messrs. Wm. B. Reed, James C. Dobbin, Nahum Capen,
178-181;
Letter of, on Pacific Railroad, 183;
Letter of, on Presidential election, 183;
Letter of, on subject of mission, 185;
Inauguration of, as President, 187;
Inaugural address of, 188 et seq.;
Cabinet of, 193;
Upholds the Territorial government in Kansas, 197;
Results of this action, 198;
Position of, as President, in regard to slavery, 202 et seq.;
Administration of, 211;
Foreign relations of United States during this period, 211 et
seq.;
Policy of, in regard to Mexico, 219;
Messages of, to Congress, Dec., 1859, 220, Dec., 1860, 221;
Complimentary gift to, from Prince Albert, 228;
Letters of, to Queen Victoria, 229, 231;
Letters of, to Miss Lane, 240 et seq.;
Protest against action of House of Representatives, 249 et seq.;
Letter of, to Mr. J. G. Bennett, 261;
Letter of, to Arnold Plumer on election, 286;
Letter of, to C. Comstock, 289;
Speech of, from White House, 290;
Soundness of views of, on anti-slavery, 295, 296;
Course of, in 1860, after Mr. Lincoln’s election, 304 et seq.;
Letter of, to editors of Lancaster _Intelligencer_, Oct., 1862,
307;
Refuses to garrison Southern forts, 307;
Reasons of, for not acting upon General Scott’s views, 309 et
seq.;
Letter of, to Attorney General Black, 319;
History of annual message of Dec., 1860, 330 et seq.;
Message of Dec., 1860, 337 et seq.;
Reception of message in cabinet, Congress and country, 352;
Account by, of General Scott’s second recommendation, 367;
Letter of, to Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, 368;
Interview of, with South Carolina commissioners, 372, 377;
Result of the interview, 374;
Orders of, to Major Anderson, respecting the forts, 375;
Reference to conversation of, with General Jackson, 381;
Draft of proposed answer to commissioners, 384;
Modified by Judge Black, 386;
Letter of, to General Cass, 398;
Memorandum of, on resignation of General Cass, 399;
Action of Congress on annual message, 418 et seq.;
Letter of, to James Gordon Bennett, 431;
Special message of, to Congress, 433 et seq.;
Course of, reviewed, 444 et seq.;
Attacked by Jefferson Davis, 444;
Interview of, with Senator Clay, of Alabama, 452 et seq.;
Letters of, to Mr. Tyler, 466, 467;
His account of an interview with, 468;
Message of, of Jan. 28th, 1861, quoted, 473;
His action in regard to Fort Sumter 474;
Note of, to Mr. Holt, 474;
Conference of, with General Scott and Mr. Holt, 475;
His account of the neglects of Congress, 478;
No suggestion made by, to Mr. Davis, of Confederate
commissioners, 485 et seq.;
Special message of, 494;
Note of, to Mr. Tyler, 495;
Knowledge of, and reverence for, Constitution, 502;
His interview with Mr. Lincoln, 505;
Departure of, for Wheatland, 506;
Letter of, to Mr. Toucey, 514;
Letter of, to Miss Lane, 522;
Letter of, to Judge Black, 523;
Letter of, to John B. Blake, 524;
Noble conduct of, 526;
Letters of, to Messrs. Holt and Bennett, 530;
Letters of, to General Dix, 535;
Letters of, to Mr. J. B. Henry, 541, 548;
Letter of, to Mr. J. C. G. Kennedy, 546;
Letter of, to General Dix, 542, 544;
Letter of, to Mr. Stanton, 545;
Letter of, to Mr. Baker, 545;
Letter of, to Dr. John B. Blake, 562;
Letter of, to Mr. Hallock, 555;
Letter of, to Mr. King, 557;
Letters of, to Mr. Leiper, 559, 561;
Letters of, to Mr. King, 563, 567, 569, 579, 582, 636;
Letters of, to Mr. Bates, 565;
Letter of, to a committee of the citizens of Lancaster County,
etc., 565;
Letters of, to J. B. Henry, 566, 578, 598, 601, 657;
Letters of, to Miss Lane, 569, 571, 572, 576, 597, 605, 609, 612,
623, 631, 632;
Letter of, to Mr. Cobden, 570;
Letters of, to Mr. Leiper, 572, 578, 588, 593, 604, 613, 615,
622, 624, 627, 633, 641;
Letter of, to Charles Graffin, 651;
Letter of, to J. W. Wall, 635;
Letter of, to Messrs. Osborne and Baldwin, 652;
Letter of, to Rev. P. Coombe, 636;
Letter of, to Miss Jane Buchanan, 650;
Letters of, to Dr. Blake, 573, 580, 584, 587, 588, 591, 594, 595,
598, 601, 605, 606, 609, 614, 615, 629, 646, 661;
Letter of, to Judge Woodward, 577;
Letters of, to J. Buchanan Henry, 578, 598, 625;
Letter of, to John A. Parker, 579;
Letter of, to Mrs. Boyd, 583;
Letter of, to Mr. Stanton, 583;
Letter of, to Judge Black, 585;
Letters of, to Isaac Toucey, 586, 599, 620, 641;
Letters of, to Wm. Flinn, 591, 634, 645;
Letter of, to Mr. Hughes, 595;
Letter of, to C. E. Bennett, 596;
Letters of, to Mr. Capen, 596, 599, 604, 607, 608, 609, 616, 617,
618, 624, 626, 630, 639, 644, 649, 651, 654, 655, 657, 658,
663;
Letters of, to Mr. Schell, 610, 617;
Letters of, to Mr. Hassard, 627;
Letter of, to Mrs. Viele, 619;
Letters of, to Mr. J. B. Baker, 611, 622, 633, 644, 655, 658;
Letter of, to James Buchanan, 623;
Letter of, to Mr. Johnston, 633, 659;
Letter of, to editor of _Evening Post_, 637;
Letter of, to Horace Greeley, 639;
Letter of, to a friend, 641, 645;
Letter of, to C. J. Faulkner, 643;
Letter of, to Manton Marble, 643;
Letters of, to Mrs. Johnston, 645, 648, 649, 653, 656, 660, 662;
Letter of, to Miss Henrietta Buchanan, 647;
Letter of, to Rev. Ed. Y. Buchanan, 652;
Letter of, to Mrs. Shunk, 654, 656;
Letter of, to Mr. Schell, 659;
Letter of, to Miss Baker, 662;
Death of, 664;
His character as a statesman, a man and a Christian, 664 et seq.
BUCHANAN, WM. SPEER, Brother of the President, i., 3;
Death of, 158.
BULOW, BARON, Dines at Prince Lieven’s, i., 224;
Dines at Lord Palmerston’s, 225.
BURKE, EDMUND, Quoted, i., 302;
His use of word “expunge,” 310.
BURNETT, MR., From Kentucky, ii., 491.
BURR, AARON, Visits Talleyrand, i., 225.
BUTLER, W. O., Nomination for Vice Presidency, ii., 8.
BUTTRE, JOHN C., Engraver, Referred to, ii., 240.
CABINET, CRISIS, ii., 383, 385;
Reconstruction of, 400;
Scene in, 518, 521;
Letter of Mr. Schell to Judge Black concerning, 518 et seq.;
Judge Black’s reply, 519, 520;
John B. Floyd, 518;
Pretended remarks of Messrs. Black, Holt, Stanton, Dix, etc., in
the cabinet, 519.
CALDERON, MADAME, Wife of Spanish minister, letter to Mr. Buchanan,
i., 618.
CALHOUN, JOHN C., Secretary of War under President Monroe, i.,
24;
Vice President, 94;
In the Senate, 232;
Remarks on relations with France, 239;
Illustration referred to, 288;
Position towards slavery in District of Columbia, 315;
Votes against memorials being received, 319;
References to, 322, 333, 341, 343;
Reference to a bill of, 345;
Report on defence of Western frontiers, 372 et seq.;
Secretary of State under President Tyler, 543;
Popularity on entering Senate, 559;
Political death referred to, 570;
Letter to Mr. Buchanan, 576;
Plan for bringing Texas into the Union, 581;
Reference to, ii., 9;
Death of, 10, note;
Correct conclusion from doctrines of, 315;
Senator from South Carolina, 361.
CALIFORNIA, Demand to be admitted into the Union, ii., 9.
CAMBRELENG, CHURCHILL C., Enters House of Representatives with Mr.
Buchanan, i., 25.
CAMIDGE, REV. MATTHEW, Pastor of English chapel in Moscow, i.,
199;
Dines at Mr. Cavenaugh’s, 204.
CAMPBELL, G. W., Memorial from bar of Nashville, in relation to
seventh circuit, i., 96.
CAMPBELL, JUDGE, ii., 514.
CANCRENE, COUNT, Minister of Finance at St. Petersburgh, opposition
to commercial treaties, i., 152, 162, 166,
168.
CANNING, SIR STRATFORD, Ambassador from England, refused by the
Emperor of Russia, i., 216.
CARLISLE, ii., 607.
CARLOS, DON, Possible succession to throne of Spain, i., 149.
CAROLINA, SOUTH, Celebrated ordinance adopted by, in 1832, i.,
183;
Secession, ii., 316, 319;
Commissioners from, arrival in Washington, 367;
Ordinance of secession adopted by convention of, 370;
Attitude of, 369, 372;
Demands of her commissioners, 372, 375;
President Buchanan’s draft of answer to the commissioners of,
385;
The reply which was sent, 386, 392.
CASS, LEWIS, i., 559, 570;
Position in regard to Presidency, ii., 8;
Nomination for Presidency, 8;
Candidate for nomination, 34;
Influence of, 74;
Secretary of State, 193;
Letter of, 217, note;
Resignation of, 396;
Letter to President Buchanan, 397.
CASTLEREAGH, LORD, i., 161.
CATHARINE, EMPRESS of Russia, Character of, i., 154.
CATHARINE SECOND, of Russia, i., 204.
CATON, BETSY, Younger sister of Lady Stafford, ii., 102.
CATRON, MR. JUSTICE, Conversation with President Jackson, i., 235,
note;
Reference to, 529, note.
CAVENAUGH, MR., Dinner given by, i., 204.
CHAMFORT, French writer, quoted, i., 38.
CHANNING, REV. WM. E., Quoted, on anti-slavery, ii., 296, and note.
CHANTRY, LADY, ii., 153.
CHARLESTON, Democratic convention at, ii., 287.
CHASE, ORMOND, Fate in Mexico, ii., 218.
CHASE, WM. H., Commander of State troops in Pensacola, Florida,
ii., 461.
CHATHAM, LORD, Reference to letters of, i., 533.
CHEVES, LANGDON, i., 26.
CHICAGO CONVENTION which nominated McClellan, ii., 624.
CHILTON, MR., Resolutions on curtailing expenses of Government, i.,
70.
CHINA, Relations of United States with, ii., 226;
Amendment of treaty with, ibid.
CLARENDON, COUNTESS, Asks for autograph of Gen. Washington, ii.,
113.
CLARENDON, LORD, Foreign Secretary, ii., 104, 116;
Action on Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 126, 133, 135, 184.
CLARKE, JAMES, Candidate for election to Senate in 1834, i.,
228.
CLAY, HENRY, Reference to, i., 26;
Candidate for the Presidency in 1824, 38;
Course in regard to, 39;
Reference to Mr. Buchanan in 1827, 53;
Views on subject of protection, 74;
Candidate of Whigs for the Presidency, 231;
Leader of Whig party in 1832, 231;
Reference to, 232;
Resolution on removal of deposits, 291;
References to, 295, 297, 301, 302;
Course on slavery, 333;
Reference to remarks of, 347;
References to, 496, 502, 503, 506;
Conversation in Jan., 1825, 507;
Secretary of State under J. Q. Adams, 511;
His meaning in “carrying the war into Africa,” 514;
Whig candidate for Presidency, 520;
His position in regard to annexation of Texas, 544.
CLAY, Senator from Alabama, President Buchanan’s memorandum of
visit from, ii., 452, 454.
CLAY, J. RANDOLPH, Reference to, i., 558;
Letter to, 560.
CLAYTON-BULWER Treaty, ii., 82;
Negotiations with Lord Clarendon concerning, 126, 133;
Ambiguity of, 212.
CLAY, HENRY, Compromise measures of, ii., 10, 47.
CLAYTON, JOHN M., Senator from Delaware, references to, i.,
232, 263;
Secretary of State, ii., 9.
CLAYTON, JOSHUA, ii., 195, note.
CLINTON, DE WITT, ii., 49.
COBB, HOWELL, Secretary of Treasury, ii., 193.
COBDEN, HON. RICHARD, Letter to Mr. Buchanan, ii., 560.
COCHRANE, JOHN, From New York, ii., 491.
COLCOCK, WM. F., United States Collector at Custom House in
Charleston, resigns, ii., 483.
COLEMAN, MISS ANNE C., Betrothed to Mr. Buchanan, ii., 17 et seq.;
Their engagement broken off, 17;
Sudden and melancholy death of, 17, 22;
Lasting sorrow produced by it, 21, 22.
COLEMAN, ROBERT, Father of Miss Anne C. Coleman, i., 17,
21.
COLOGNE, Mr. Buchanan visits, i., 219.
COMMERCIAL TREATY between United States and Russia, when and where
signed, i., 169, 170.
COMPROMISE MEASURES, Supported by Messrs. Webster and Calhoun, ii.,
10;
Become a law, 11.
COMPROMISE, The Crittenden, ii., 421.
CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, First Assembly at Montgomery, ii., 476;
Of what States composed, ibid.
CONFERENCE, OSTEND, ii., 136.
CONGRESS, The fatal inaction of, ii., 420 et seq.
CONNECTICUT, Memorial to President Buchanan; his reply, ii., 199 et
seq.
CONRAD, CHAS. M., Secretary of War, ii., 11.
CONSCRIPTION ACT, Constitutionally valid, ii., 610.
CONSTANTINOPLE, i., 195.
CONSTITUTION, Nature of the United States, as understood by Mr.
Buchanan, i., 283.
CONVENTION between United States and France, i., 234.
CONVENTION, The Peace, ii., 439, 445;
Mr. Buchanan’s account of, 439, 444.
CORRUPT COALITION, Charge of, between Adams and Clay, i., 44.
CORWIN, THOMAS, Secretary of Treasury, ii., 11.
COURT COSTUMES, Mr. Buchanan’s course in regard to, ii., 110, 116.
COVE GAP, President Buchanan’s birthplace, i., 2.
COVODE INVESTIGATION, Account of, ii., 246 et seq.;
Mr. Buchanan’s message on, 254, 260.
CRAMPTON, MR., British minister, ii., 81;
Recall demanded by the United States, 134.
CRANWORTH, LORD, Lord Chancellor, ii., 104.
CRAWFORD, JOHN, Candidate at Presidential election in 1824, i.,
38, 45.
CRAWFORD, MR., Commissioner from Confederate States, ii., 486;
Representations of Mr. Buchanan by, 487.
CRITTENDEN COMPROMISE, History and rejection of, ii., 420 et seq.
CRITTENDEN, JOHN J., Senator from Kentucky, i., 378, 379;
Attorney General, ii., 11.
CRONSTADT, Mr. Buchanan visits, i., 217.
CUMBERLAND ROAD, Bill for, discussion of, i., 32, 33;
Historical Sketch of, 82, 83.
CUSHING, CALEB, ii., 78, 80;
Visit to Charleston, 368;
Letter delivered by, 368.
CUST, SIR EDWARD, Interview with Mr. Buchanan, ii., 111.
CUTHBERT, ALFRED, Senator from Georgia, i., 355, 357.
DALGOROUSKI, PRINCESS, A friend of Mr. Buchanan, i., 155.
DALLAS, GEO. M., Vice President, i., 528.
DASCHKAW, COUNT, Grand Master of Ceremonies at St. Petersburg, i.,
206.
DAVIDSON, DR., Principal of Dickinson College, i., 4.
DAVIS, JEFFERSON, Secretary of War, Conversation in regard to
appointments, ii., 78, 81;
Theory of, on secession, 328, note;
Senator from Mississippi, 360;
Vote on Crittenden Compromise, 423;
Course on secession, 424 et seq.;
Assumes the Presidency of the Confederate States, 470, 484, note,
485 et seq., 489.
DAVIS, JOHN, Senator from Massachusetts, i., 345.
DAVYDOFF, MR., Accompanies Mr. Buchanan to the American Institute,
i., 201.
DAYTON, MR., Candidate for Vice Presidency, ii., 177.
DEDAL, MR., Dines at Prince Lieven’s, i., 224.
DEMOCRATS, Who were, in 1828, i., 52;
Who were, in 1832, 231, 232.
DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, Course in 1860, ii., 287 et seq.;
Becomes divided, 288, note;
Factions of, 289.
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, Platform of, ii., 8, note.
DERRICK, A. H., Letter to Mr. Buchanan, ii., 591.
DEVITCHER, Monastery of, i., 198.
DIARIST, The anonymous, confuted, ii., 393, 395.
DIARY of a public man, ii., 391, note.
DICKERSON, MAHLON, Senator from New Jersey, i., 58.
DICKINSON, DANIEL S., Candidate for nomination, ii., 34.
DICKINSON COLLEGE, Mr. Buchanan a graduate of, i., 4-6.
DINO, DUCHESSE DE, Wife of Prince Talleyrand’s nephew, Dines at
Prince Lieven’s, i., 224.
DIPLOMATIC INTRIGUES, i., 167.
DIX, JOHN A., Letter of, to Mr. Buchanan, ii., 288, note;
Secretary of Treasury, 401;
Letters of, 401, 495, 514;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 533, 537, 543, 551, 556, 568.
DIXON, MR., Senator from Kentucky, ii., 194.
DOUGLAS DEMOCRATS, ii., 603.
DOUGLAS, MR., Candidate for nomination, ii., 34;
Author of Kansas-Nebraska Act, 195;
Discussion by, 195 et seq.;
Nomination of, 288, 360.
DROGOMIROV, BARRIER DE, i., 198.
DUANE, MR., Secretary of Treasury, i., 205, 297.
DURHAM, LORD, How received at St. Petersburg, i., 150.
EATON, JOHN H., Reference by General Jackson in 1827, i., 53;
Colleague and friend of General Jackson in Senate, 42;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 130, 131, 132.
ELDON, LORD, Reference to letters of, i., 533.
ELECTIONS, Interference of Federal officers with, i., 378;
Result of, in 1856, ii., 177;
Author’s comments upon, 177.
ELIZABETH, EMPRESS of Russia, Reference to, i., 204.
ELLMAKER, AMOS, Letter of, i., 19;
Candidate for election to the Senate in 1834, 231.
ELLSWORTH, MR., Action in regard to impeachment of Judge Peck, i.,
108.
EMINENT MEN in Congress, notices by Mr. Buchanan, i., 25-30.
ENGLAND, Threatened war with, i., 553;
Relation of the United States towards, ii., 212;
Her protectorate over the Mosquito coast, 212.
ESTCOURT, COLONEL BUCKNALL, British Commissioner to United States,
i., 604.
ESTERHAZY, PRINCE, Dines at Prince Lieven’s, i., 224;
Dines at Lord Palmerston’s, 225.
ETIQUETTE, A question of court, met by Mr. Buchanan, ii., 105 et
seq.
EVERETT, EDWARD, Supports administration of John Q. Adams, i.,
58;
Peroration of, 63, note;
Action on impeachment of Judge Peck, 108;
Reference to, ii., 81;
Letter to Mr. Buchanan, 184.
EWING, THOMAS, Senator from Ohio, i., 232;
Reference to, ii., 9.
EXECUTIVE OFFICERS, Removal by President, i., 281;
President Jackson attacked for, 281.
EXPUNGING RESOLUTION of Mr. Benton, i., 291.
FAIRFIELD, JOHN, Reference to, i., 519.
FARRAGUT, ADMIRAL, Victories of, ii., 626.
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE, Power of, i., 405.
FEDERAL OFFICERS, Interference of, i., 379, 398.
FEDERALISM in 1820, i., 23.
FEDERALISTS, Opposition to the War of 1812, i., 8;
A political sermon, 8, note.
FERDINAND, KING of Spain, Reported death contradicted, i.,
149.
FIGLEMONT, COUNT, Austrian Ambassador at Russian Court, i.,
143.
FILLMORE, MILLARD, Accession to Presidency, ii., 10, 35, 45, 81.
FLORIDA, Secession of, ii., 427.
FLOYD, JOHN B., Secretary of War, ii., 193;
Resignation of, 406, 409 et seq.;
Supposed distribution of arms by, 411, 416.
FORCE BILL, Introduction of, into the Senate, i., 183.
FOREIGN RELATIONS during Mr. Buchanan’s administration, ii., 211,
227.
FORSYTH, JOHN, Minister to Mexico in 1856, quoted, ii., 215.
FORTIFICATION BILL, Amendment of, i., 240;
Opposed by Mr. Webster and Mr. Clay, 240;
Vindication by Mr. Buchanan, 241;
Fails to become a law, 242.
FOULKE, JOSEPH, Member of Society of Friends, ii., 181.
FRANCE, Conduct of, i., 234 et seq.;
How viewed by Mr. Buchanan, 236;
Danger of war with, 237;
Recommendation by President of partial non-intercourse with,
237;
Mr. Buchanan’s opinion of this measure, 238 et seq.;
Mediation of Great Britain, 280.
FRANKING PRIVILEGE, ii., 610.
FRANKLIN, WALTER, Judge, impeached, and defended by Mr. Buchanan,
i., 16.
FRELINGHUYSEN, THEODORE, Senator from New Jersey, i., 232.
FREMONT, GENERAL, Candidate for Presidency, ii., 177.
FRIENDS, RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF, Memorial of reception in Senate, i.,
319;
Mr. Buchanan’s views concerning, 320 et seq.
“GALAXY”, Knot of young men from South Carolina, i., 26.
GALITZIN, PRINCE, Dinner given by, i., 211.
GALLATIN, ALBERT, Eligibility to Senate, i., 304;
Reference to, by Mr. Letcher in 1825, 508.
GALLIARD, JOHN, Senator from Louisiana, i., 25.
GEARY, Governor of Kansas, Resignation of, ii., 198.
GEORGE IV., King of England, i., 217, note;
Friendship for Prince Esterhazy, i., 225.
GEORGIA, Secession of, ii., 427.
GERMAINS, LORD ST., Guest at White House, ii. 238.
GEVERS, MR., Accompanies Mr. Buchanan as far as Cronstadt, i.,
217.
GLADSTONE, HON. WM., Chancellor of Exchequer, ii., 104.
GORHAM, BENJAMIN, Enters House of Representatives with Mr.
Buchanan, i., 25;
Opposes the new tariff, 36.
GOVERNMENT, CONFEDERATE, Commissioners sent from, 485, 490.
GOVERNMENT, Federal and State, i., 401;
Attitude left in by Mr. Buchanan, ii., 501, 506.
GRAHAM, SIR JAMES, First Lord of the Admiralty, ii., 105.
GRAHAM, WM. A., Secretary of Navy, ii., 11.
GRANT, GENERAL, Rising reputation of, ii., 626.
GRANVILLE, EARL, President of Council, ii., 104.
GREELEY, HORACE, Action on secession, ii., 427 et seq.;
Opposition to coercion, 428.
GREEN, DUFF, References to, i., 55;
Visits President elect, Mr. Lincoln, ii., 426;
Letter of, 426.
GRETSCH, MR., Editor of the _Bee_, at St. Petersburg, i., 198;
Visits the cathedral with Mr. Buchanan, 199.
GRIER, MR. JUSTICE, Successor of Mr. Justice Baldwin, i., 563,
note.
GRIMES, MR., of Iowa, ii., 514.
GROW, MR., of Pennsylvania, ii., 491.
GRUNDY, FELIX, Senator from Tennessee, Reference to, as, i.,
96;
Reference to remarks of, 346.
GUADALUPE-HIDALGO, Treaty of, signed i., 601.
GUIZOT, M., Present at death-bed of Princess Lieven, i., 218, note;
Reference to, 568.
HALE, JOHN P., Senator from New Hampshire, ii., 361.
HALL, NATHAN K., Postmaster General, ii., 11.
HAMILTON, ALEXANDER, Reference to, i., 225.
HARRIS, MR., American chargé d’affaires in Paris, i., 219.
HASTINGS, WARREN, Impeachment of, i., 302.
HAYNE, J. W., Visits the President, ii., 452, 487.
HAYNE, ROBERT G., Senator from South Carolina, i., 58;
Debate with Mr. Webster on nullification, i., 183;
Reference to, ii., 161.
HENRY, J. BUCHANAN, Domestic circle of Mr. Buchanan described by,
i., 534;
Reference to, ii., 161;
Account of inauguration by, 187;
Account of incidents of administration, 235;
On Mr. Buchanan’s character, 671 et seq.
HENSEL, W. U., Account of ex-President Buchanan’s journey from
Washington to Wheatland, ii., 507 et seq.
HERALD, The New York, President Buchanan’s appeal to editor of,
ii., 431.
HERBERT, SIDNEY, Secretary of War, ii., 104.
HEYTESBURY, LORD, English ambassador at Russian court, i.,
143.
HICKMAN, MR., of Pennsylvania, ii., 491.
HOLLAND, LADY, Reference to, i., 218;
ii., 161.
HOLLAND, SIR HENRY, Reference to, ii., 151;
Letter to Mr. Buchanan, 231;
Guest at White House, 238;
Letter to Mr. Buchanan, 592.
HOLT, J., Secretary of War, Note to President concerning Fort
Pickens, ii., 462;
Letter to officers at Fort Pickens, 464 and note;
Answer to demand by Governor Pickens for surrender of Fort
Sumter, 457 et seq.;
Note to President on defence of Washington City, 492;
Memorandum of President on, 493;
Letter to President Lincoln, 498;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 531, 536, 550.
HOPKINS, MR., of Lancaster, Mr. Buchanan studies law with, i.,
7.
HOUSTON, GEN. SAMUEL, Conversations in 1824-5 on election of Gen.
Jackson, i., 514, note.
HUGHES, BISHOP, Offered a mission to Mexico, ii., 627, 628.
HUNTER, SENATOR, ii., 485.
IMPEACHMENT of Judge Franklin, i., 16;
Ably defended by Mr. Buchanan, 17;
Of Judge James H. Peck, managers appointed to conduct the, on
part of House of Representatives, 108;
Article of, prepared by Mr. Buchanan, 108.
INCENDIARY PUBLICATIONS, Bill to restrain use of mails for
circulation of, i., 338;
Mr. Webster’s remarks on, 339.
INGERSOLL, MR., American Minister at London, ii., 100.
INSTRUCTION, Doctrine of, i., 229, 230;
Mr. Webster’s views on, quoted, 230, note.
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, Meaning of, i., 35;
Mr. Buchanan’s course in regard to, 79, 80 et seq.
ISCHERMOFF, Reference to, i., 195.
IVAN VELIKOI, Belfry of St. John’s Church, Moscow, i., 197.
JACKSON, ANDREW, The President, Candidate for Presidency in 1824,
i., 38;
Receives unanimous vote of what States, 39;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 45, 47, 48, 49;
Wrong impressions concerning Mr. Buchanan’s conversation, 1824-5,
50;
Integrity of, 51;
Letter to Mr. Buchanan, 52;
Increased popularity in 1826, 70;
Election of, to Presidency, 94;
Supposed illiteracy of, 129, note;
Letter to Mr. Eaton, 132;
Course in regard to Russian complaint of American press,
176;
Proclamation against nullifiers, 183;
Views on nullification, 185;
Regard for Emperor of Russia, 213;
References to, 224, 228;
Second election of, 231;
Opposition in Senate to administration of, 231 and note;
Message in regard to France in 1834, 235, note;
Reception in Paris as a threat, 237;
Partial non-intercourse with France recommended by, 237;
Reference to action of, by Mr. Buchanan, 255;
Reference to, by Mr. Buchanan, 257, 258;
Reference to message of, 272;
Secretary of Treasury removed by, 281;
Attacked by opposition for removal, 281;
Speech of Mr. Buchanan on bill regulating removals, 281 et
seq.;
Second administration of, 315;
Special recommendation in Dec. 1835, 338;
Devotion of followers of, 407;
Reference to, ii., 47, 49;
Message of, 274, note;
Action of, against nullifiers, 302, 361;
Excitement on election of Mr. Adams in 1825, 506, 508, 514.
JAMES, MR., Senator from Rhode Island, ii., 195, note.
JAY, JOHN, Reference to, i., 506.
JEFFERSON, THOMAS, Reference by Mr. Buchanan to administration of,
i., 263;
Reference to message of, to Congress, 265;
Reference to, by Mr. Letcher, 507;
References to, ii., 47, 212, 361.
JOHN, THE THIRD, of Russia, Reference to marriage of, i., 198.
JOHNSON, ANDREW, The President, ii., 362.
JOHNSON, Governor of Pennsylvania, ii., 28 et seq.
JOHNSON, REVERDY, Attorney General ii., 9.,
JUDGE, THOMAS J., Commissioner from Alabama, ii., 487.
JUDICIARY ACT, Proposed repeal resisted by Mr. Buchanan, i.,
111;
Report on, 111;
Twenty-fifth section of, 114.
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, Views on extension of Circuit Courts, i.,
95.
JUDICIAL SYSTEM, i., 95;
Mr. Buchanan’s views on, 95 et seq.
KANSAS, Conflict of parties in, ii., 197;
Convention of anti-slavery party at Topeka in, 197;
Mr. Buchanan’s letter on, 199, 208.
KANSAS-NEBRASKA Act, ii., 204.
KARAMSEN, MR., Russian historian, i., 203.
KENT, GOVERNOR, Reference to death of, i., 512.
KENTUCKY, Resolution of legislature on election of 1824, i.,
39.
KERN, COL. JACOB, Speaker of Senate of Pennsylvania, i., 228.
KING, JOHN P., Senator, i., 324.
KING, REV. DR. JOHN, Pastor in Mercersburg, i., 4, 5.
KING, RUFUS, Senator, i., 25;
Remarks of, 304.
KING, WM. R., Senator, elected to Vice Presidency, ii., 35, 40, 43,
69.
KREMER, GEORGE, Reference to, by General Jackson, i., 55.
KRUDENER, BARON, Reference to, i., 152;
Russian minister at Washington, i., 162;
Action as minister, 175.
LAFAYETTE, GENERAL, Visited by Mr. Buchanan, i., 220;
Policy of, 221;
Loss of popularity in France, 221;
Loses confidence in Louis Philippe, 221;
Assists in regard to French treaty, 223;
References to, by Mr. Buchanan, 244.
LANCASTER, City of, Alarm at, in 1863, ii., 609.
LANE, ELLIOTT ESKRIDGE, Reference to, i., 531.
LANE, JAMES B., Reference to, i., 531.
LANE, MARY ELIZABETH SPEER, Sister of Miss Harriet, Reference to,
i., 531.
LANE, MISS HARRIET, Niece of Mr. Buchanan, i., 22;
Is brought to Lancaster, 531;
Education conducted by Mr. Buchanan, 531;
Where finished, 532;
Becomes a member of Mr. Buchanan’s household, 534;
School-girl life, 535;
Social position in England, ii., 142;
Letters to Mrs. Baker, 142, 146, note, 147, note;
Accompanies Mr. Buchanan from Washington to Wheatland in 1861,
506;
marriage of, 631, 632.
LANE, MRS. ELLIOTT T., i., 531.
LANSDOWN, MARQUIS OF, Reference to, ii., 104.
LAVAL, COUNT, Chief censor of Russian Press, i., 150.
LAWRENCE, HON. ABBOTT, ii., 151.
LAW, SALIQUE, Abolition of, by Ferdinand of Spain, i., 149.
LAZAREFF, MESSIEURS, Armenian noblemen, founders of Armenian
Institute, i., 201.
LECOMPTON, Convention of slavery party at, ii., 198, 201, 202;
The constitution of, 206.
LE FEVRE, DR., Physician of British embassy at Russian court,
Reference to, i., 148.
LEIGH, BENJAMIN W., Senator from Virginia, Reference to, i.,
323;
Action on slavery, 335.
LEIPER, MR., Letters to, ii., 604, 613, 622, 624.
LETCHER, R. P., Conversation in Jan., 1825, ii., 507, 509;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 510, 512;
Reference to, 514.
LIEVEN, PRINCESS, Reference to, i., 217;
Dinner at, 224, 225.
LINCOLN, ABRAHAM, The President, Reference to, ii., 301, note;
Troops present at inauguration of, 301, note;
Election to Presidency, 315;
Policy shaped by Mr. Seward, 351, note;
President elect, journey to Washington, 477, 478;
Tenor of his public speeches on the way, 477, 478;
Action of, towards Montgomery commissioners, 484;
Inauguration of, 497;
Mr. Buchanan’s account of events on March 4th, 1861, 497;
Address “to whom it may concern,” 624.
LIVINGSTON, EDWARD, Senator from Louisiana, Action on proposed
abolition of offices, i., 71;
Becomes Secretary of State, 132, note;
Letter to Mr. Buchanan, 132, 135.
LOMONOSOFF, MR., Dines at Prince Lieven’s, i., 224.
LORD, REV. DR., On abolitionism, ii., 607.
LOUIS PHILIPPE, KING, Course toward Russia, i., 149;
References to, 221, 223, 233;
Character of, 571.
LOUISIANA, Secession of, ii., 427.
LOWNDES, WILLIAM, Representative from South Carolina, Reference to,
i., 25;
Character described by Mr. Buchanan, 26, 27 et seq.,
29, #note:f9.
LOWTHER, LORD, Reference to, i., 218.
LYTTLETON, LADY, Reference to, i., 604.
MACALESTER, LILY L., Letter to Mr. Buchanan, ii., 244;
Mr. Buchanan’s answer, 245.
MACGREGOR, HON. JAMES, Letter on election, to Mr. Buchanan, ii.,
178.
MACON, NATHANIEL, Senator from Georgia, Reference to, i., 25,
58.
MADISON, JAMES, The President, Reference to, on President’s power
to remove officers, i., 285;
Reference to, on sedition law, 390;
Reference to, as a member of Mr. Jefferson’s cabinet, 508;
References to, ii., 47, 161;
Opposed to use of force against a State, 327.
MAILS. See Incendiary Publications.
MALAHIDE, LADY TALBOT DE, Reference to, ii., 153.
MANGUM, WILLIE P., Senator from North Carolina, Reference to, i.,
331.
MARCY, WM. L., Candidate for nomination, ii., 34;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 35 et seq., 75, 80, 81, 90;
Secretary of State, 106;
Despatch to Mr. Buchanan, 111, 116;
Course of, 135.
MARITIME TREATY, Report of Mr. Buchanan on, to Secretary of State,
i., 172.
MARKLEY, PHILIP S., Advocate of Mr. Clay for Presidency in 1824,
i., 42;
Conversation with Mr. Buchanan in 1824, 51, 54.
MARLY, PALACE OF, Reference to, i., 207.
MARTIN, DR., Reference to, i., 518.
MATUSCERVIE, COUNT, Resident at English palace at Peterhoff,
Reference to, i., 206.
MAURY, MRS. SARAH M., Letters to Mr. Buchanan, i., 610,
612, 613, 614, 615.
MAXIMILIAN, EMPIRE OF, Reference to, ii., 222.
MCCLELLAN, GEORGE B., Nomination for Presidency, ii., 624, 625;
His letter of acceptance commended, 626.
MCCOOK, GEORGE W., Ohio, Reference to, ii., 520.
MCDUFFIE, GEORGE, Opposes Mr. Chilton’s resolution of abolition of
offices, i., 71;
Manager on impeachment of Judge Peck, 108.
MCINTIRE, PETER, Nominated by President as United States Collector
at Custom House in Charleston, ii., 483;
Senate refuses to act upon nomination, 483.
MCLANE, LOUIS, Reference to, i., 26;
Opposed to administration of John Q. Adams, 58;
Letter to Mr. Buchanan, 191;
Becomes Secretary of State, 191, note;
Despatch to, by Mr. Buchanan, 212;
Reference to interview of M. Serrurier with, 254;
Reference to letter to M. Serrurier, the French minister,
255;
Minister of United States at London, 553;
Letter from Mr. Buchanan, 558;
Reference to ability of, by Lord Lansdown, 569;
Recalled from London, 574.
MCLANE, ROBERT M., Minister to Mexico, Reference to, ii., 218;
Treaty made by, 222.
MERCERSBURG, Early residence at, by Mr. Buchanan’s father, i.,
2.
MEREDITH, WM. M., Correspondence with Mr. Buchanan in regard to
Wheatland, ii., 2, 3 et seq.;
Secretary of Treasury, 9.
MESSAGE, President’s annual, of Dec., 1858, Reference to, ii., 108;
Special, of Jan. 8th, 1861, Reference to, 433, 438.
METTERNICH, PRINCE, Feeling towards American people, i., 225.
MEXICO, Origin of war with, i., 579;
War declared, 599;
Consequences of war with, ii., 5;
Relations of United States with, 215;
Description of, by Mr. Buchanan, 215 et seq.
MICHAEL, ST., THE ARCHANGEL, Cathedral, visited by Mr. Buchanan,
i., 199.
MICHEL, GRAND DUKE, Reference to, i., 207.
MICHIGAN, Admission into the Union, i., 358;
Speech by Mr. Buchanan in favor of admission, 358 et seq.
MILITIA, In the service of the United States, i., 16.
MINISTER, ENGLISH, Recall of the, ii., 135.
MISSION TO ST. PETERSBURG, Correspondence with Mr. Buchanan as to,
i., 130, 131, 132.
MISSISSIPPI, Secession of, ii., 427.
MISSOURI COMPROMISE, The repeal of, ii., 194;
The effect, 185, 197.
MISSOURI COMPROMISE LINE, Mr. Buchanan’s course on, i., 544.
MOLESWORTH, SIR WM., First commissioner of public works, Reference
to, ii., 105.
MONROE DOCTRINE, Characterized by Lord Clarendon, ii., 132.
MONROE, JAMES, Administration of, i., 23-37;
First and second elections of, 23;
Cabinet of, 24;
Veto message on Cumberland Road bill, 35;
Speech of Mr. Buchanan on, 82 et seq.;
Message of, on Cumberland Road, 87.
MONTGOMERY COMMISSIONERS, Appointment of, to Washington, ii., 477.
MORAN, B., Secretary of American Legation, Letter to Mr. Buchanan,
ii., 234.
MORE, HANNAH, Comment of, upon Pope, i., 574.
MORTIER, MARSHAL, Duke of Treviso, French ambassador at Russian
court, i., 143;
Dinner given to, 149;
Called upon by Mr. Buchanan, 220.
MOSCOW, Visit to, by Mr. Buchanan, i., 194;
Appearance described, 194 et seq.
MUHLENBERG, PETER, Reference to, by Mr. Letcher, i., 513.
MYER, DOCTOR, An agent from St. Petersburg, i., 197.
NAPOLEON III., EMPEROR, Attempted assassination of, ii., 146;
Power of, 152;
Designs in regard to Mexico, 220;
Interference of, 222.
NAVIGATION, Interests of, i., 78.
NEGRO SUFFRAGE, Reference to, ii., 658, 659.
NELSON, JOHN, of Maryland, Mr. Buchanan enters House of
Representatives with, i., 25.
NEOPHYTE, Russian archimandrite, i., 204.
NESSELRODE, COUNT, Return of, to the capital, i., 149;
Reference to, by Mr. Buchanan, 152;
Head of Russian chancery, 161;
Descent of, 161;
Feelings of, towards Mr. Buchanan, 162;
Undisposed towards commercial treaty, 162;
Interview with, described by Mr. Buchanan, 167;
Action on commercial treaty, 165 et seq.;
Freedom of American press not understood by, 180;
Interview with Mr. Buchanan, 207, 210;
Mr. Buchanan takes leave of, 215.
NEUTRALS, Conduct of England towards, ii., 134.
NEVIN, REV. DR., Letter to Mr. Buchanan, ii., 644;
His funeral sermon, preached at the obsequies of Mr. Buchanan,
681.
NEWCASTLE, DUKE OF, Secretary for the Colonies, ii., 104;
Guest at White House, 238.
NICHOLAS, EMPEROR, of Russia, Reference to, i., 142;
Referred to, by Mr. Buchanan, 223.
NICHOLAS, MR., Senator from Louisiana, i., 310.
NIESCHOUCHIN, Garden of, i., 198.
NILES, MR., American chargé d’affaires at Paris, i., 249.
NOVASELSOFF, MADAME, Mr. Buchanan dines with, i., 195.
NOVOGOROD, Mr. Buchanan visits, i., 193.
NULLIFICATION, Debate on, in the Senate, i., 183;
Ordinance of, 185 and note.
O’CONOR, CHARLES, Political opinions of, ii., 619.
OFFICIAL ORGAN, Charges against, by Baron Krudener, Russian chargé
at Washington, i., 175;
Mr. Buchanan’s interview with Count Nesselrode on this subject,
180 et seq.
OMPTEDA, PRINCE, Dines with Lord Palmerston, i., 225.
OREGON, Dispute between England and United States on title to
territory of, i., 551 et seq.;
Mr. Buchanan’s course as Secretary of State in regard to,
552;
Cabinet consultation in regard to, 555;
Mr. Buchanan’s interview with Mr. Pakenham, British minister at
Washington, 555 et seq.;
Settlement of Oregon question, 560, 577. See note.
ORLOFF, Aide de Camp of Emperor, Reference to, i., 195.
ORR, JAMES L., Commissioner from South Carolina, Reference to, ii.,
377.
OSTEND CIRCULAR, The, Reference to, ii., 136 et seq.
OTHO, PRINCE, of Bavaria, Reference to, i., 248.
OUROUSSOFF, PRINCE, Visited by Mr. Buchanan, i., 196,
202.
OUSELEY, SIR WILLIAM AND LADY, Reference to, ii., 153, 160.
OXFORD, Commemoration day at, ii., 147, note.
PAGEOT, M., Reference to letter of Duke de Broglie to, i.,
259;
French chargé d’affaires at Washington, Action of, on French
treaty, 275.
PAKENHAM, MR., British minister at Washington, Course on Oregon
question, i., 552, 553, 554 et seq.
PALMERSTON, LORD, Dines at Prince Lieven’s, i., 224;
Referred to by Mr. King, 569;
Home Department, ii., 104, 109;
Premier, 118, 123, 184.
PANAMA, President’s message on mission to, i., 64.
PARAGUAY, Expedition to, ii., 224;
Account of, by Mr. Buchanan, 224 et seq.
PAREDES, Declared President of Mexico, i., 593;
Refuses to receive Mr. Slidell, 599.
PARIS, Mr. Buchanan arrives at, i., 219.
PARKER, MISS HETTY, Mr. Buchanan’s housekeeper, i., 534.
PARLIAMENT, Opening of, Mr. Buchanan’s absence from, ii., 110.
PARTIES, State of, i., 57, 231.
PASCHKOFF, MADAME, Party given by, i., 199.
PAXTON, REV. WM. M., D.D., Conversation of, with Mr. Buchanan, on
religion, ii., 670 et seq.
PEACE CONVENTION, Account of, by Mr. Buchanan, ii., 439 et seq.
PECK, JAMES H., Impeachment of, course of Mr. Buchanan on, i.,
107, 109.
PEDRO, DON, Reference to, i., 149.
PEEL, SIR ROBERT, Timidity of, i., 218;
Course on Oregon, 566, 574.
PENSACOLA, Harbor of, Reference to, ii., 461.
PENNSYLVANIA, Invasion of, by the Confederates, ii., 609.
PETERHOFF, Fete of, attended by Mr. Buchanan, i., 206.
PETITION, The right of, Reference to, i., 323, 338.
PICKENS, FORT, Charge of General Scott in regard to, ii., 461 et
seq., 465;
Qualified armistice respecting, 465.
PICKENS, F. W., Governor of South Carolina, Letter to Mr. Buchanan,
i., 608;
Letter to the President, quoted, ii., 383;
Letter to President demanding surrender of Fort Sumter, 456;
His urgency to have Fort Sumter taken, 476.
PIERCE, GEN. FRANKLIN, Nomination for Presidency, ii., 34;
Election of, 35, 40, 43;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 68, 74, 80;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan on English Mission, 86 et seq.;
The President, reception of, in Philadelphia, 91.
PINCKNEY, WILLIAM, Action in Federal convention on word “expunge,”
i., 310.
PLEASONTON, STEPHEN, Reference to, i., 538, note.
POINSETT, JOEL R., Mr. Buchanan enters House of Representatives
with, i., 25.
POLAND, Conduct of Russia in, i., 175, 179;
Debate in House of Commons on affairs of, 213.
POLEVOY, MR., Editor of Moscow _Telegraph_, Reference to, i.,
202.
POLIGNAC, PRINCE, Reference to, i., 218.
POLK, JAMES K., The President, Opposes administration of John Q.
Adams, i., 58;
His chances of election in 1844, 511;
Election to Presidency, 520, 543;
Letter to Mr. Buchanan, 522;
Administration of, 579;
Attitude towards Texas, 582, note;
Letter to Mr. Buchanan, 589;
Administration of, ii., 81.
POLYCARPE, an archimandrite, i., 204.
PORTER, ALEXANDER, Senator, References to, i., 328, 333,
335.
PORTRAITS of Mr. Buchanan, ii., 672, note.
POUSSIN, MAJOR GENERAL, Reference to, i., 220.
PRESIDENT, Election in 1824, i., 38;
Election of, devolves upon House of Representatives, 39;
Ineligibility of, 92.
PRESS, AMERICAN, Complaints about, i., 175;
Mr. Buchanan’s course in regard to, 175;
Baron Sacken’s imprudent note, 177;
Liberty of, 345.
PRESTON, WM. C., Senator from South Carolina, Remarks on abolition
of slavery referred to, i., 321, 335;
Course on Texas, 370, 376.
PRUSSIA, KING OF, Reference to, i., 219.
PUBLIC DEPOSITS, Removal from Bank of United States, i., 291.
QUAKER MEMORIAL, Reception in Senate, i., 319;
Mr. Buchanan’s remarks concerning, 319 et seq.
“RADICALS” in 1820-21, Reference to, i., 24.
RANDOLPH, JOHN, of Roanoke, Reference to, i., 26;
Character of, 29;
Opposes administration of John Q. Adams, 58;
Minister to Russia, 129;
Reference to, 189;
Death of, 205.
RANLETT, CAPTAIN, Reference to, i., 207.
RASOUMOFFSKY, COUNT, Russian nobleman, References to, i., 200.
READ, JOHN M., Reference to, by Mr. Buchanan, i., 527.
“REBEL RAID” into Pennsylvania, ii., 622.
REPUBLICANS, NATIONAL, Who were called, in 1825, i., 57.
REPUBLICAN PARTY comes into the field, ii., 174.
RESIGNATION OF GEN. CASS, ii., 396, 401;
Of J. Thomson, 401, 405;
Of Philip F. Thomas, 404 et seq.;
John B. Floyd, 406, 410, 415.
RESOLUTION offered in the Senate censuring Mr. Buchanan, ii., 600,
601.
RETRENCHMENT, Political cry of, i., 70;
Discussion of, 70;
Mr. Buchanan’s course on, 72.
RIGNY, COUNT DE, Reference to note to, by Mr. Livingston, i.,
245;
Reference to, 257;
Mr. Livingston’s conference with, 269.
RIVES, W. C., Senator from Virginia, Reference to, i., 379.
ROGERS, HON. MOLTON C., Reference to, i., 41, note.
ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIESTS sent to the army by President Polk, ii.,
627, 628.
ROMANOFF, House of, i., 204.
ROOSEVELT, MR. JAMES J., i., 518, note.
ROOSEVELT, MRS. JAMES J., i., 518.
ROWAN, JOHN, Senator from Kentucky, Reference to, i., 58.
RURICK, Family of, Reference to, i., 203.
RUSH, RICHARD, Reference to, i., 45;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 572, 573, 604, 605,
607.
RUSSELL, LORD JOHN, Reference to, i., 569;
Ministerial leader of House of Commons, ii., 104.
RUSSIA, THE EMPRESS OF, Reference to, i., 143;
Despotism in, 187.
SACKEN, BARON, Russian chargé at Washington, i., 175;
Reference to letter to Secretary of State, 175;
Course on subject of American press, 176.
SERGEANT, JOHN, Representative from Pennsylvania, Reference to, i.,
26;
Character of, 29;
Candidate of Whigs for Vice Presidency, 231.
SAULSBURY, SENATOR, Letter from, ii., 601.
SAUVEUR, ST., Cathedral visited by Mr. Buchanan, i., 198.
SCHUYLER, GENERAL, Reference to, i., 225.
SCOTT, DRED, Case of, ii., 205.
SCOTT, GEN. WINFIELD, Placed in command of United States army, i.,
601;
His plan of campaign, 603;
Claim of, to the command, 605;
Nomination for Presidency, ii., 35;
Electoral votes obtained by, 35, 45, 47;
Civil qualifications for Presidency, 49;
Views of, 297, 314;
Mr. Buchanan’s reasons for not acting upon them, 309, 314;
Arrival in Washington, 365;
Interview with President Buchanan, 365;
Advises the President, 365, 368;
Blunder of, 416 et seq.;
Note to President, 445;
Action of, 445 et seq.;
Memorandum for Secretary of War, 448;
Charge against Mr. Buchanan, 462.
SEARCH, RIGHT OF, How dealt with by President Buchanan, ii., 213 et
seq.
SEATON, MISS JOSEPHINE, Letter to Mr. Buchanan, ii., 589.
SEFTON, THE EARL AND COUNTESS OF, Reference to, i., 224.
SENATE, The great leaders in the, i., 233.
SERRURIER, MR., References to, by Mr. Buchanan, i., 257,
260.
SÉVIGNÉ, MADAME DE, Reference to letters of, i., 534.
SEWARD, WM. H., Letter to C. F. Adams, ii., 351, note;
Action as Secretary of State towards Montgomery commissioners,
484;
Charge against Mr. Buchanan concerning Federal marine, 513.
SEYMOUR, HORATIO, as Governor, ii., 610.
SHERMAN, GENERAL, Victories of, ii., 626.
SIERGE, ST., Shrine of, i., 202.
SILSBEE, NATHANIEL, Senator from Massachusetts, Reference to, i.,
58.
SLAVERY, First introduction of subject in the Senate, i., 315;
Petitions for abolition of, 315;
Subject again discussed, 338;
Summary of the questions on, ii., 262, 285;
Under the Constitution, 263 et seq.;
Anti-, organization of Societies of, 273;
Attacks upon, 275 et seq.;
Emancipation in Virginia, 277 et seq.
SLIDELL, JOHN, Mission to Mexico, i., 591, note;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 593, 601;
Letter to President Polk in regard to Mexico, 603;
Sketch by Mr. Barlow, ii., 173, note;
Note to Mr. Buchanan, 445, note;
Mr. Buchanan’s reply, 445, note.
SLOAN, MR., Member of House from Ohio, i., 507.
SMITH, GEO. PLUMER, Statement by, of origin of cabinet scene, ii.,
520 et seq.
SMITH, MRS. CALEB B., Letter to Mr. Buchanan, ii., 602.
SMITH, SAMUEL, Senator from Maryland, Reference to, i., 58.
SMITH, WILLIAM, from South Carolina, Reference to, i., 25;
Senator, 58.
SMOLENSKO, TOWN OF, Reference to, i., 198.
SMYTH, MR., Senator from Virginia, Proposed amendment of
Constitution by, i., 92.
SOCIETY OF FRIENDS, Petition to abolish slavery in District of
Columbia, i., 332.
SOMERSET, DUCHESS OF, References to, ii., 114, 159.
SOPHIA, ST., Church of, visited by Mr. Buchanan, i., 193;
Princess, married whom, 198;
Daughter of, 198.
SOUTHARD, SAMUEL L., Secretary of Navy, Reference to, i., 24, note;
Senator from New Jersey, 232;
References to, by Mr. Buchanan, 244, 358, 361.
SPAIN, Relations of the United States with, ii., 222;
Described by Mr. Buchanan, 222 et seq.
SPARKS, JARED, Letter to Mr. Buchanan, i., 505.
SPECIE PAYMENTS, Suspension of, during war of 1812, i., 14.
SPEER, ELIZABETH, Mother of President Buchanan, Her marriage, i.,
3, 4.
SPEER, JAMES, Grandfather of President Buchanan, and his wife, Mary
Patterson, i., 3.
SPENCER, AMBROSE, Manager, on part of House, on impeachment of
Judge Peck, i., 108.
SPRAGUE, PELEG, Speech on tariff, i., 74;
Motion of, 75.
STACKELBERG, BARON, Visits Imperial House of Education with Mr.
Buchanan, i., 195.
STAFFORD, LADY, Reference to, ii., 163.
STANTON, EDWIN M., Reference to, ii., 514;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 528, 531, 533, 534, 535, 538, 539, 540,
541, 547, 549, 552, 553, 554, 558, 559, 640.
STAR OF THE WEST, Fired upon, ii., 447 et seq.;
Arrival off harbor of Charleston, 448.
STATE RIGHTS, Virginia principles of, i., 24.
STATUS QUO, Supposed pledge of, ii., 375, 382.
STEIGLITZ, BARON, Conversation with Count Cancrene, i., 171.
STEPHENS, ALEXANDER H., Vice President of the Southern Confederacy,
ii., 476.
STERIGERE, JOHN B., Letter of Mr. Buchanan to, i., 524.
STEUBEN, BARON, Reference to map obtained from library of, i.,
506.
STEVENSON, ANDREW, Enters House of Representatives with Mr.
Buchanan, i., 25.
STORRS, HENRY R., Manager, on part of House, on impeachment of
Judge Peck, i., 108;
Action of, 108.
STUART, ALEXANDER H. H., Secretary of Interior, ii., 11.
STURGIS, MRS. RUSSELL, ii., 152.
SULLIVAN, JOHN, Reference to, i., 542, note;
Death of, ii., 609.
SUMNER, SENATOR, Assault upon, ii., 175.
SUMTER, FORT, Reference to, ii., 302, note, 445;
Governor Pickens’ demand for the surrender of, 456;
The President’s reply, 457, 460.
SUTHERLAND, JOEL B., Candidate for election to Senate in 1834, i.,
228.
TALLEYRAND, PRINCE, Reference to, i., 161;
Dines at Prince Lieven’s, 224.
TANEY, ROGER B., Letter to Mr. Buchanan, i., 133;
References to, 175, 297.
TAPPAN, BENJAMIN, U. S. Senator, Reference to, i., 519.
TARIFF of 1823-4, Discussions on, i., 36, 74.
TAYLOR, GEN. ZACHARY, Military movement of, in Texas, i., 596;
The President, Character of, ii., 6;
Nomination of, for Presidency, 7;
Election of, 8;
Administration of, 9 et seq.;
Death of, 10, 49.
TCHENCHINE, MR., Principal Director of Alexander Institution,
Reference to, i., 201.
TELEGRAPHIC DESPATCH to Montgomery from Charleston via Augusta,
ii., 476.
TENNYSON, The poet, Reference to, ii., 147, note.
TEXAS, Independence of, i., 368;
Affairs of, 370;
Petition of Philadelphia citizens on, 370;
Annexation to the Union, 543, 562;
Negotiation with, 580;
Proposed admission into the Union, 580;
Secession of, ii., 427.
THAL, MR., Accompanies Mr. Buchanan to the Barrier of Drogomirov,
i., 198.
THOMPSON, JACOB, Secretary of Interior, ii., 194;
Resignation of, 401 et seq.;
Secretary of the Treasury, resignation of, 404.
THOMPSON, MR. JUSTICE, Appointment to Supreme Court, i., 24, note.
TICKNOR, GEORGE, Letter from Paris, quoted, i., 237.
TIVER, a Russian town, Reference to, i., 193.
TOD, MR. JOHN, Mr. Buchanan enters House of Representatives with,
i., 25.
TOUCEY, ISAAC, Secretary of Navy, References to, ii., 193, 513;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 515, 620, 642.
TRACY, ALBERT H., of Buffalo, Reference to, i., 26.
TREATY between United States and England, Negotiation of, i.,
504.
TREATY, COMMERCIAL, with Russia, i., 161.
TRIBUNE, The New York, Strange course of, ii., 427, 430.
TROOPS at the Capital, ii., 491, 492, 495, 506.
TROSTZA, Monastery of, i., 202, 203.
TRUCE, Temporary, of Major Anderson, ii., 449, 454.
TSCHERBATOFF, PRINCESS, Reference to, i., 153.
TSIDORE, Monk, Reference to, i., 204.
TYLER, JOHN, President, References to, i., 495, 528, note;
Marriage of, 529, note;
Cabinet of, 543;
Attitude towards Texas, 581;
Letters of, to President Buchanan, ii., 466, 467, 469;
Commissioner, 472;
Interview with the President, 472;
Note of, 489.
UNITED STATES. See Constitution.
VAIL, AARON, American chargé in London, Reference to, i., 146;
Dines at Prince Lieven’s, 224.
VAN BUREN, JOHN, Reference to, ii., 603.
VAN BUREN, MARTIN, Senator from New York, Reference to, i.,
25, 58;
Secretary of State, 132, note;
Vice President, 231;
Democratic candidate for Presidency in 1837, 232;
Reference to, 394;
Pretensions to Presidency, 517;
Reference to, 519;
Conduct of, 524;
Relations to election of 1844, reference to, 550;
Attitude towards Texas, 581;
Nomination of, ii., 9.
VERNON, MOUNT, Reference to, ii., 230.
VETO POWER, Mr. Buchanan’s reply to Mr. Clay on, i., 472,
504, 550.
VICTORIA, QUEEN, Satisfaction in regard to Oregon settlement, i.,
604;
Cabinet of, ii., 104;
Ministry of, 105;
Accession of, 105;
Letters to Mr. Buchanan, 231, 233.
VIRGINIA, Intervention to prevent war, ii., 471, 478;
President Buchanan’s message to Congress, 479, 484.
VOLUNTEERS, President Buchanan’s reasons for not calling for, ii.,
501.
WALES, PRINCE OF, Arrives in Washington, ii., 230;
Becomes a guest at the White House, 230;
Letter to Mr. Buchanan, 590.
WALKER, ROBERT J., Secretary of Treasury under President Polk, i.,
540;
Territorial Governor of Kansas, ii., 198;
Instructions given to, by President, 198;
Attempted insurrection suppressed by, 201.
WALL, GARRET D., Senator from New Jersey, Reference to, i.,
379.
WALWORTH, REUBEN H., Enters House of Representatives with Mr.
Buchanan, i., 25.
WARD, COMMANDER, Expedition organized for, ii., 621.
WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT, Message in 1796, referred to, i., 364;
Reference to, ii., 47, 60.
WEBSTER, DANIEL, Speech on the war of 1812, i., 13, note;
Supports administration of John Q. Adams, 58;
Becomes a Senator, 58, note;
Views on subject of protection, 74;
Debate in Senate on nullification, 183;
Views on question of instruction, 230, note;
Opposes administration of General Jackson, 232;
References to, 263, 267;
Construction of Constitution by, 284;
On expunging resolution, 292, 306;
Reference to, 328;
Opposes bill to restrain use of mails for incendiary
publications, 339, 344, 350, 351,
353, 357;
Treaty negotiated by, in 1842, 504;
Retires from President Tyler’s cabinet, 543;
Attitude towards Texas, 581, note;
Opinion on Texas question, 582;
Secretary of State, ii., 11, 35;
Relations to question of right of search, 213, 361.
WEED, THURLOW, Reference to, ii., 51.
WELLESLEY, MARCHIONESS OF, Sister of Lady Stafford, ii., 102.
WELLINGTON, DUKE OF, Described by Princess Lieven, i., 218;
Reference to ii., 105.
WESSENBERG, BARON, Dines at Prince Lieven’s, i., 224;
Dines at Lord Palmerston’s, 225.
WHARTON, WILLIAM, Reference to, ii., 181.
WHEATLAND, Purchase of, by Mr. Buchanan, ii., 1, 3.
WHEATON, HENRY, Author of Elements of International Law, i., 218,
note.
WHIGS, Who were called, i., 231;
Rivalry among, 409.
WHITE, HUGH L., Senator from Tennessee, i., 58;
References to, 290, 306.
WICKLIFFE, CHARLES, Reference to, i., 108.
WILCOX, MISS, Niece of Mr. Ingersoll, Reference to, ii., 100.
WILLIAM IV., Reference to, ii., 104.
WILMOT, PROVISO, Reference to, i., 544.
WOOD, SIR CHARLES, President of the Board of Control, References
to, ii., 105, 121.
WOODBURY, MR. JUSTICE, Reference to, i., 175.
WRIGHT, Governor of Indiana, Reference to, ii., 182.
WRIGHT, SILAS, JR., References to, i., 331, 332,
366, 519, 522.
YATES, JAMES BUCHANAN, Reference to, i., 536, note.
ZAITSOVA, Inn at, i., 193.
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Transcriber’s Note
On p. 395, the second footnote has no anchor in the text. It is
presumed to have been intended to follow the closing paragraph.
The use of quotation marks is sometimes ambiguous, where opening
or closing marks are missing. These have been rectified, where the
voice or context clearly indicates the correct reading.
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected,
and are noted here. Since a large portion of the text is quoted
material, consideration was given to any apparent idiosyncrasies.
The references are to the page and line in the original. Those
references prefixed with ‘i’ refer to the page, column and line in
the Index.
The following issues should be noted, along with the resolutions.
5.3 transferred his household go[o]ds to Added.
Wheatland
11.22 [“]WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER Added to balance
closing quote.
15.15 taken before the judge or Removed.
commiss[s]ioner
45.42 as well as others of a simil[i]ar Removed.
character
52.18 his views on “secret or oath-bound Removed.
societies.[’]”
54.43 I admit a respecta[c/b]le political Replaced.
61.7 This ‘American excellence’ never Removed.
belonged to him.[”]
123.1 the Se[c]retary of State Added.
131.14 dominion over Nicara[ug/gu]a Transposed.
145.1 would never hear of my taking such a Added.
journey[.]
254.5 and the procee[e]dings of the Covode Removed.
Committee
256.14 [“]The committee proceeded for months Added.
259.1 ‘removal from office,[”/’] Replaced.
276.17 derived from the incessant Replaced.
co[m/n]templation of one idea
308.67.88 J. S. BLACK[”]. Added.
311.38 Fort Morgan, below Mobile, without a Removed.
garr[r]ison
438.108.21 on an occasion so important.[”] Added.
457.1 [“]In the communication Added.
460.26 [‘/“]The character of this letter is Replaced.
such
473.23 Defence, and not aggress[s]ion Removed.
493.38 in response to the resolution.[”] Removed.
503.16 I know not [k]now what will become of Added.
it.
505.4 even Tennessee[e] and Missouri Removed.
506.38 Alca[n]traz Island _sic_
509.11 Mr. Buchanan, in re[s]ponding to this Added.
speech
518.41 [“]MY DEAR SIR:— Removed.
521.36 which you sent me?[”] Added.
576.6 his fund of amusing as well [as Added.
]important anecdotes,
614.8 the immediate interests of the Replaced.
Democratic party[,/.]
676.4 in such a way as that it should be Transposed.
re[num/mun]erative
683.5 [“]Happily, the venerable sage of Removed.
Wheatland
i701.1.29 MONTGOMERY COMMIS[S]IONERS Added.
i702.2.4 PASCHKOFF[S], MADAME Removed.
i705.1.11 STACK[LE/EL]BERG, BARON Transposed.
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