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Title: The War in Syria, Volume 2 (of 2)
Author: Napier, Charles
Language: English
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THE
WAR IN SYRIA.
BY
COMMODORE SIR CHARLES NAPIER, K.C.B.,
_&c._, _&c._, _&c._
----------
_IN TWO VOLUMES._
---
VOL. II.
------------------------------------
LONDON:
JOHN W. PARKER, WEST STRAND.
---
M.DCCC.XLII.
LONDON:
HARRISON AND CO., PRINTERS,
ST. MARTIN’S LANE.
CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
Gale on the Egyptian and Syrian Coasts—The Author’s return 1
to Marmorice Bay—Letters from the Admiral, the General and
the Ambassador regarding the Convention—The Author’s
Replies—Letter of the Admiral to Mehemet Ali—Commotion
occasioned by the Convention—Admiral’s Letter to the
Admiralty—Instruction of the 14th November—Captain
Fanshawe dispatched to Alexandria—Instruction to the
Admiral
CHAPTER II.
Captain Fanshawe’s proceedings at Alexandria—Letter from 20
Mehemet Ali to the Admiral—Official Report of Captain
Fanshawe—Letter of Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier—English
Ships again ordered to the Coast of Syria—Part of the
Convention carried into effect by the Admiral
CHAPTER III.
Captain Fanshawe’s Arrival at Constantinople—Interview with 33
the Grand Vizier—Conference of Ambassadors and Rechid
Pacha—Conduct of Lord Ponsonby; his Letter to Lord
Palmerston—The Porte accepts the submission of Mehemet
Ali—Letter of Rechid Pacha to the Ambassador and of the
Vizier to Mehemet Ali—Captain Fanshawe returns to
Marmorice
CHAPTER IV.
Disinclination of the Porte to confer the Hereditary 41
Pachalic on Mehemet Ali—Departure of the Turkish
Commissioners—Their orders—Opposition of the Austrian,
Prussian, and Russian Ministers to the views of Lord
Ponsonby—Lord Palmerston’s opinion of his conduct—Rewards
conferred on the Officers of the Squadron at Acre—News
from England—Approval of the Convention—Instruction of the
15th of December—Lord Palmerston’s Letter to Lord
Ponsonby—Prince Metternich and Count Nesselrode, in
approval of the Convention
CHAPTER V.
The Author ordered to Alexandria to carry the Convention 61
into effect—Interviews with the Pacha and Boghos
Bey—Letter from Boghos Bey explaining the Pacha’s
Intentions—Lieut. Loring dispatched to see the Evacuation
of Syria carried into effect; his Instructions—Letters to
the Chief Officers in Syria—Arrival of the Turkish
Commissioners at Alexandria-Surrender of the Turkish
Fleet—Bad Faith of the Turks-Correspondence between the
Author and Boghos Bey respecting the Cotton Crop—The
Commercial Treaty
CHAPTER VI.
The Author visits Cairo—The Mahmoudieh Canal—Fire on board 76
the Steamer—Voyage up the Nile—Appearance of the
Country—Condition of the People—Arrival at Cairo—Visit to
Abbas Pacha—Palace of Schoubrah—Establishments of the
Pacha—Industry of the Arabs—Visit to the Pyramids—Quit
Cairo
CHAPTER VII.
Letter from Captain Stewart—Apprehended Treachery of the 89
Turkish Authorities—Question of the Syrian Troops—Double
dealing of Mehemet Ali—The Author’s Letters to the chief
British and Turkish Officers—Letter to the Admiral
CHAPTER VIII.
Affairs in Syria—Letters of Sir Charles Smith to Lord 97
Palmerston—Course that ought to have been pursued after
the Battle of Boharsof—Ignorance as to Ibrahim’s Movements
and Intentions—General Michell to Lord Palmerston—M.
Steindl’s Report respecting the Advance upon Gaza—Captain
Stewart to the Admiral—General Michell’s and Captain
Stewart’s Opinion as to Lord Ponsonby’s
Orders—Correspondence between Captain Stewart and General
Jochmus
CHAPTER IX.
Examination of the Conduct of General Jochmus regarding 119
Ibrahim Pacha’s Retreat—Sir Robert Stopford styled by him
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces—The General’s
Reports to Sir Robert Stopford—Unwillingness of the
Admiral to prolong the War—Reported Destruction of the
Egyptian Army—Advance upon Gaza—Colonel Alderson’s
Narrative of the Skirmish of Medjdel
CHAPTER X.
General Jochmus’s farther Reports to Sir Robert 134
Stopford—Destruction of the Magazines at Maan—Ignorance as
to Ibrahim’s movements—Ibrahim crosses the Jordan to
Jericho, and menaces Jerusalem, while supposed to be
wandering in the Desert—General Jochmus’s Account of the
Movements of Ibrahim—Reported Destruction of his
Infantry—Ibrahim did not intend to enter Palestine—His
Statement to Colonel Napier
CHAPTER XI.
Fruitless Journey of the Envoys sent in quest of Ibrahim 141
Pacha—Arrival of part of the Egyptian Army at
Gaza—Promised Neutrality of the Turks—The Egyptians
informed of the Cessation of Hostilities by the English
Officers—Terms recommended by Mr. Wood to be imposed upon
Ibrahim Pacha—Colonel Napier’s Narrative of the Retreat of
Ibrahim Pacha
CHAPTER XII.
Conduct of Mr. Wood—His Letter to the Seraskier examined—His 157
Advice disregarded by the British Officers—Mission of
Colonel Alderson to Gaza—Colonel Rose’s Account of the
State of Ibrahim’s Army—Colonel Alderson’s Character of
Ibrahim Pacha—Death of General Michell
CHAPTER XIII.
Detail of the Retreat of the Egyptians—Treacherous 172
Intentions of the Turkish Authorities—Decided Conduct of
the British Officers—Guarantees exchanged—Fright of Rechid
Pacha—Letter from Ibrahim to the Seraskier—The Author’s
Letters to Lords Minto and Palmerston
CHAPTER XIV.
Contradictory Statements as to the Numbers of the Egyptian Army—Reason
for abiding by the Reports of the
British Officers—Colonel Alderson’s Detail of the 182
Retreat—General Jochmus’s Statement—Lieut. Loring’s
Mission
CHAPTER XV.
Embarkation of the Egyptians—Mode in which it was 191
conducted—Departure of Ibrahim Pacha—Retreat of Souliman’s
Division—Complete Evacuation of Syria—Letter of Lord
Ponsonby—Delivery of the Turkish Fleet—Anxiety of Mehemet
Ali for the safety of his Army—Letter from Boghos Bey to
the Author on the subject
CHAPTER XVI.
Examination of the Conduct of the Allied Ministers at 199
Constantinople—Lord Ponsonby’s Propositions regarding the
Hereditary Government of Egypt—Approved by the other
Allied Ministers, but on consideration rejected by
them—Lord Palmerston’s Conversation with the Turkish
Minister—Note of the Four Powers in favour of the
Hereditary Tenure
CHAPTER XVII.
Determination of the Allied Courts to secure the Hereditary 214
Pachalic for Mehemet Ali—Correspondence between Baron
Stunner and Lord Ponsonby—Decisive Instructions from Lord
Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby—Conference of the Allied
Ministers with Rechid Pacha—Project for settling the
Egyptian Question—Lord Ponsonby’s Observations at the
Conference—The Firmans decided on—Refusal of Lord Ponsonby
to allow the English Consul-General to return to
Egypt—Lord Ponsonby’s Letter to Rechid Pacha
CHAPTER XVIII.
Delay in forwarding the Firmans to Mehemet Ali—Instructions 226
to the Commissioner—The Author’s Visit to the Egyptian
Flag-ship—Substance of the Firmans—Objections of the
Pacha—The Author’s Advice—Letter to Lord Palmerston—The
Author’s last Interview with Mehemet Ali—Return to
Malta—Correspondence with Sir Robert Stopford—Return to
England
CHAPTER XIX.
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London—Protocol of the 244
5th March—Note of Chekib Effendi—Note of the 13th of
March—Lord Palmerston’s explanation of the Views of the
Allies regarding the Hereditary Tenure—Conference of the
16th March—Protocol—Endeavour to include France in a
Convention for closing the Straits of the Dardanelles and
Bosphorus—False Position of the Porte—Views of Lord
Ponsonby and of the other Ambassadors—Instructions of the
Austrian and British Governments—Opinions of M.
Guizot—Turkish Plan of Settlement—Note of the 10th May
CHAPTER XX.
Colonel Napier’s Account of his Missions to Egypt—Seizure of 259
the Maronite and Druse Emirs and Sheikhs—Their Condition
in Egypt—Their Return to Syria—False Assertions of the
French—Mission for the Liberation of the Syrian
Soldiers—Difficulty of ascertaining their Number—Bad Faith
of the Pacha—Infamous Proposal of a Turkish Officer—Sudden
termination of the Negotiation—Suspicious conduct of the
Egyptians—Liberation of the Syrians
CHAPTER XXI.
Prince Metternich’s Orders to the Internuncio—Lord 267
Ponsonby’s Correspondence with Baron Stürmer—Hesitation of
the Porte—Message from Lord Ponsonby to Rifat Pacha—The
new Firman granted—Accepted by Mehemet Ali—Termination of
the Eastern Question
CHAPTER XXII.
Review of the Turco-Egyptian Question—Mehemet Ali not the 275
Aggressor—Hostile Preparations of the
Porte—Representations of the Allied Powers—What Interests
affected by the Independence of Mehemet Ali—Views of
France—Designs of Russia
CHAPTER XXIII.
Errors of the Pacha—His proper Course of 285
Action—Mismanagement of Ibrahim Pacha in Syria—Gain or
Loss of Turkey by the acquisition of Syria—Conduct of the
Turks in Lebanon—Quarrels of the Mountaineers—Ill
treatment of the Prince—Consequent hatred of Turkish
rule—Conclusion
APPENDIX.
I. Instructions given by the Sultan to Hafiz Pacha, found at 299
the Turkish Head-Quarters after the battle of Nizib
II. Translation of a Petition (in Copy) from the Nations and 303
Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon and Syria, to Sultan Abdul
Medjid of Constantinople
Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to his 306
Excellency the British Ambassador
Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to his 308
Excellency the French Ambassador
III. Letter from Commodore Napier to Lieut.-Colonel Hodges 310
IV. Extract of Letter from Commodore Napier to Admiral the 313
Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, G.C.B.
V. Instructions to Captain Fanshawe, on his Mission to 316
Alexandria
VI. Protocol of the Conference held at the house of the 318
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte, the
20th of December, 1840, between the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, on one part, and the Representatives of Austria,
Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, on the other
VII. Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Napier to Sir Charles 329
Napier
VIII. Letter from Boghos Bey to Sir Charles Napier 332
ERRATA.
Vol. I., p. 88, line 16, _for_ southward, close to the castle, _read_
northward, close to the castle.
Vol. II., p. 41, line 3, _for_ 22nd November, _read_ 11th December.
” p. 199, line 4, _for_ Opposed, _read_ Approved.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE WAR IN SYRIA.
CHAPTER I.
Gale on the Egyptian and Syrian Coasts—The Author’s return to Marmorice
Bay—Letters from the Admiral, the General and the Ambassador
regarding the Convention—The Author’s Replies—Letter of the Admiral
to Mehemet Ali—Commotion occasioned by the Convention—Admiral’s
Letter to the Admiralty—Instruction of the 14th November—Captain
Fanshawe dispatched to Alexandria—Instruction to the Admiral.
Among the reasons that induced me to enter into negotiation with the
Pacha of Egypt, it will be recollected that I have mentioned the
uncertain state of the weather, which rendered it possible that the
British squadron might at any minute be blown off the coast; and I found
that I had concluded my arrangements only just in time. For I had hardly
got the Prometheus away, on the 28th of November, 1840, when it began to
blow, which freshened to a gale in the night; the morning brought more
moderate weather, but towards dusk it came on with great violence, and
lasted thirty-six hours. The Powerful was struck by a heavy sea, which
started her fore-channels and endangered the fore-mast; the new rigging
of the Rodney and Cambridge had given out so much, that their masts
became insecure, and seeing no further necessity for keeping the
squadron at sea, I proceeded to Marmorice Bay, where I anchored on the
8th of December, and was much gratified to be received by the squadron
with three cheers, and the rigging manned, with the same enthusiasm I
had before experienced on joining the squadron off Alexandria.
Captain Henderson, of the Gorgon, first communicated to me that my
Convention had been rejected by the Admiral, which I have reason to
believe he approved of in the first instance, but was overruled by the
authorities in Syria. Next morning the Princess Charlotte and
Bellerophon arrived from Beyrout. They had experienced the same gale we
did off Alexandria, and rode it out in St. George’s Bay; the
Bellerophon, driven from the anchorage at Beyrout, was obliged to cut
her cable and make sail, and after scraping the land as far down the
coast as Latakia, was saved by a miraculous shift of wind; great credit
is due to Captain Austin, and the officers and crew of the Bellerophon,
for saving the ship. The Pique was obliged to cut away her masts to
prevent her going on shore at Caiffa; and the Zebra parted and was
thrown on the beach, with the loss of two men only. The Austrian
squadron quitted the coast of Syria with the English, and the French
vessels of war remained.
On the Admiral’s arrival at Marmorice, letters from himself, Sir Charles
Smith, and Lord Ponsonby, were put into my hand. I insert them here,
together with the replies.
“Princess Charlotte, St. George’s Bay,
Beyrout, December 2, 1840.
“Sir,
“I have received, by the Prometheus, your letter and the Convention
which you have entered into with Boghos Bey, for the evacuation of
Syria.
“I am sorry to say that I cannot ratify, or approve of this measure:
setting aside the unauthorized manner and the unnecessary haste with
which so important a document was executed, with the Commander-in-Chief
within two days’ sail of you, the articles of that Convention, if
carried into execution, in the present state of affairs in Syria, would
be productive of much more evil than good, and occasion much
embarrassment. You will immediately stop the Egyptian transports from
coming to this coast; and should any arrive, I have given orders that
they should return to Alexandria.
“I am, &c.,
(Signed) “ROBERT STOPFORD, _Admiral_.
“Commodore Napier, C. B., H.M.S. Powerful,
Senior Officer off Alexandria.”
“H.M.S. Powerful, Marmorice Bay,
December 14, 1840.
“Sir,
“I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd of
December, disapproving of the Convention I had entered into with the
Egyptian Government for the evacuation of Syria and the surrender of the
fleet. I have only to regret, that what I did with the best intentions,
and believed to be in accordance with the views of the Allies, should
not have met your approbation.
“I beg to assure you that, it was not from any want of respect to you
that I did not communicate with you before signing it, but it was under
the impression that it was of the utmost importance to seize the
opportunity, when the Pacha was highly incensed against France, to bring
him, without loss of time, to terms without the mediation of that power.
“I have also to acknowledge the receipt of the copy of a letter you have
sent me from Lord Ponsonby, the original of which, I presume, is gone to
Alexandria, and I beg to inclose you a copy of my reply.
“I have &c.,
(Signed) “C. NAPIER, _Commodore_.”
“The Hon. Sir R. Stopford,
Commander-in-Chief, &c., &c., &c.”
“Head Quarters, Beyrout,
30th November, 1840.
“Sir,
“Had you fortunately abstained from honouring me with your letter of the
27th instant, I should have been spared the pain of replying to it. I am
not aware that you have been invested with special powers or authority
to treat with Mehemet Ali as to the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptian
troops; and if you have such special powers and authority, you have not
taken the trouble of acquainting me therewith.
“The Convention into which you have entered has been, as relates to the
advanced stage of military events in Syria, more than attained by the
retreat of Ibrahim Pacha. If therefore, you have unknown to me, had
authority to treat, I must decline to be a party to recommending the
ratification of the said Convention; and if unauthorised to treat, such
Convention is invalid, and is, by me, protested against as being highly
prejudicial to the Sultan’s cause, in as far as it has, or may have,
relation to the operations of the army under my command. It is needless
for me to add that a copy of this protest shall be forwarded to Her
Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
“I have, &c.,
“C. F. SMITH, _Major-General_,
“_Commanding the Forces in Syria_.”
“Commodore Napier, C.B.,
H.M.S. Powerful.”
“H.M.S. Powerful, Marmorice,
January 6, 1841.
“Sir,
“Had I unfortunately abstained from writing to you, and the Admiral had
quited the coast, you would have had just cause to have complained of my
want of courtesy.
“When I left Beyrout, Sir Robert Stopford was Commander-in-Chief of the
allied forces by sea and land, it was therefore unnecessary for me to
communicate to you what my powers were, as on him alone devolved the
duty of approving or disapproving of my Convention. He disapproved of
it, and Ibrahim Pacha returned to Damascus. I quite disagree with you
that the Convention was prejudicial to the interests of the Porte, and I
am happy to say it has been approved of (with the exception of the
guarantee) by Her Majesty’s Government, and I am now going to Alexandria
to see it carried into execution.
“I have, &c.,
“CHARLES NAPIER, _Commodore_.”
“To Sir Charles Smith, &c., &c.,
Gibraltar.”
“Sir, “Therapia, December 7, 1840.
“I had the honour last night to receive your communication of a
Convention, dated Medea steamer, Alexandria, 27th November, 1840, signed
Charles Napier, Commodore, and Boghos Bey.
“I immediately laid that Convention before the Sublime Porte, and
acquainted my colleagues, the Austrian Internuncio, the Prussian Envoy,
and the Russian Chargé d’Affaires, with it. It is my duty to acquaint
you that the Sublime Porte has made a formal protest against your acts,
declaring you have no power or authority whatever to justify what you
have done, and that the Convention is null and void.
“My colleagues above-mentioned, and myself, entirely concur with the
Sublime Porte, and declare that we are ignorant of your having the least
right to assume the powers you have exercised; and that we consider the
Convention null and void, _ab initio_.
“It is my duty to call upon you to abstain from every attempt to carry
your Convention into execution, in any degree whatever, and to state
that you are bound by your duty to Her Majesty, to continue to act with
the ships under your command, as you did act before you assumed the
right to make the aforesaid Convention, and as you would have acted in
conformity with your orders, if that Convention had never been made by
you.
“I have sent a copy of this dispatch to Admiral the Hon. Sir Robert
Stopford, and also to Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “PONSONBY.”
“To Commodore Napier.”
“H.M.S. Powerful, Marmorice Bay,
Dec. 14, 1840.
“My Lord,
“The Commander-in-Chief has sent me a copy of a letter addressed to me
by your Lordship, the original of which I presume has been sent to
Alexandria; this letter states that the Porte has made a formal protest
against my acts, and that the Convention is null and void, in which your
Lordship and your colleagues entirely concur, and you call upon me to
abstain from carrying it into execution.
“In reply to which I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship that I never
had the least idea that the Convention could be carried into execution
without the authority of the Porte and the Commander-in-Chief, to whom
the whole correspondence was addressed; therefore I cannot see the
necessity of the formal protest of the Porte against my acts. The
Convention simply tied down Mehemet Ali to abandon Syria immediately,
and give up the Turkish fleet when the Porte acknowledged his hereditary
title to govern Egypt; and on these conditions I agreed to suspend
hostilities.
“I was led to believe from Lord Palmerston’s letter to your Lordship
that I had followed up the views of the Allied Powers; I was led to
believe, from letters I have received from different members of the
Government, that they were most anxious to settle the Eastern Question
speedily; I was led to believe, from your Lordship’s correspondence, _*
* * * *_ that Lord Palmerston was anxious to finish everything; that he
had not good information about Egypt; but that your Lordship thought if
I was at liberty to act, Alexandria would not long be in the possession
of Mehemet Ali; and this opinion your Lordship risked, though you had
never seen the place, and confessed yourself entirely ignorant of the
art of war. I saw clearly that your Lordship had an erroneous impression
about Alexandria, and I was convinced that nothing could be done against
it without a military force, and at a proper season, and my being driven
off the coast has confirmed that opinion.
“I further knew that the French Consul-General, and other French agents
at Alexandria, were doing all they could to prevent Mehemet Ali from
submitting, still holding out hopes of assistance from France.
“Under all these circumstances I thought I was serving my country, and
the cause of the Sultan, in tying down Mehemet Ali to immediately
evacuate Syria, and give up the Turkish fleet when acknowledged, and I
knew perfectly well that the Convention did not tie down the Sultan; and
I firmly believe that if Thiers’ ministry had not fallen, all I have
done would have been approved, and I think it still will be approved. I
have thought it necessary to make these explanations to your Lordship,
and I beg at the same time to observe, that it appears to me that your
Lordship has assumed a tone, in the latter part of your letter, that you
are by no means authorized to do. I know my duty to Her Majesty full as
well as your Lordship, and I have always done it, and it is the
Commander-in-Chief alone who has the right to point out to me how I am
to act, and I trust, should your Lordship have any further occasion to
address me, it will be done in a different style.
“I have sent a copy of this to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and I trust
your Lordship will send a copy to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.
“I have, &c.
(Signed) “CHAS. NAPIER, _Commodore_.”
“The Right Hon. Lord Ponsonby.”
I also insert the Admiral’s letter to Mehemet Ali, acquainting him that
he had disapproved the Convention, couched in no very measured terms. An
admiral may disapprove of the acts of a junior officer, even with
severity if he pleases, but I believe it is not usual in addressing a
foreign prince, to convey to him the opinion he has formed of his second
in command.
“Princess Charlotte, St. George’s Bay, Beyrout,
December 2, 1840.
“Highness,
“I am sorry to find that Commodore Napier should have entered into a
Convention with your Highness for the evacuation of Syria by the
Egyptian troops, which he had no authority to do, and which I cannot
approve of, or ratify.
“Your Highness’s Envoy, Abdel Amen Bey, has consulted with the General,
commanding the troops, as to his best manner of proceeding to Ibrahim
Pacha. The General having good reason to suppose that Ibrahim Pacha had
left Damascus, (a great part of his army having left it a few days since
going to the southward, upon the Mecca road,) could not guarantee a safe
conduct for your Highness’s Envoy further than Damascus. He therefore
returns to Alexandria, having done all in his power to execute your
Highness’s instructions.
“I hope this letter will reach your Highness in time to stop the
transports which Commodore Napier writes me are coming to the coast of
Syria for the purpose of embarking part of the Egyptian army. Should any
of them arrive here, they will be ordered to return to Alexandria.
“I hope this hasty and unauthorized Convention will not occasion any
embarrassment to your Highness. It was no doubt done from an amicable
motive, though under a limited view of the state of affairs in Syria;
but it will not lessen my earnest desire most readily to adopt any
measure which may tend to a renewal of that amity and good feeling which
I trust hereafter may subsist between England and your Highness, the
terms of which I am happy to hear are now in a state of progress with
the Allied Powers.
“ROBERT STOPFORD, _Admiral_.”
“To his Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha.”
The Ambassador wrote also to the Admiral and to the different
authorities in Syria and Egypt, calling upon them to repudiate my
Convention, and in fact no means were neglected by him to prevent the
settlement of the Eastern Question, and do as much mischief to Mehemet
Ali as possible.
The reader will allow this was tremendous odds against me: the
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, the General commanding in
Syria, Lord Ponsonby, and the four Ambassadors, the Sultan and all the
Divan, against an Old Commodore. The whole corps diplomatique, (for on
this point even the French minister agreed,) were up in arms—they
thought their trade was gone—nevertheless I was not dismayed. I felt
satisfied at Alexandria I was right, and I felt still more satisfied at
Marmorice, when I found our squadron, with the exception of the
steamers, had abandoned the coast, and left Ibrahim to himself. Why he
did not take advantage of it is not my affair—he ought to have done it.
In the fleet we had conventionalists and non-conventionalists: the
Captains who were off Alexandria were satisfied I was right; those who
were not, with few exceptions, were satisfied I was wrong. For my part I
had only to wait patiently the first arrival from England, to announce
either that I was a blockhead, or that I had taken a more correct view
of the affairs of the East, than either Admirals, Generals, Ambassadors,
Sultans, or Divans.
The letter of Sir Robert Stopford to the Admiralty, acquainting their
Lordships that he had rejected my Convention, clearly shows that he was
not aware of Ibrahim’s movements. The Admiral writes under date of the
1st of December, from Beyrout.
“Sir,
“I beg to transmit for their Lordships’ information the copy of a
Convention which Commodore Napier has entered into with Mehemet Ali, the
correspondence leading thereto having been transmitted by him from
Alexandria.
I beg you will further acquaint their Lordships that I do not feel
myself authorized to enter into this Convention; and the Egyptian troops
being already on their retreat by the Mecca road to Egypt, I cannot
consider this as a concession from Mehemet, but the consequence of their
late discomfitures, and the inimical state of the country towards them.
“I have, &c.,
“ROBERT STOPFORD.”
“R. More O’Ferrall, Esq.”
Now, it is well known that Ibrahim did not finally leave Damascus till
the 29th of December; so that it appears by the Admiral’s letter, that
nothing was known at Beyrout of Ibrahim’s movements; and, after the
squadron left the coast, there was nothing to hinder him falling upon
Beyrout; I know that there were strong fears there that he would do so,
and General Michell, as will hereafter appear, requested the Admiral
would send some ships of war back.
Before the Admiral arrived at Marmorice, he fell in with the Megæra,
bringing the Instruction of the 14th of November, which was given to
satisfy Austrian etiquette, Prince Metternich not entirely approving of
the instruction of the 15th of October, his reasons for which he
afterwards explained.
“Foreign Office, Nov. 14, 1840.
“The instruction addressed to Lord Ponsonby on the 15th of October last,
in consequence of a deliberation which had taken place between the
Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia,
recorded the propriety of the Representatives of the Four Courts at
Constantinople being authorized to announce to the Sublime Porte, ‘that
their respective Governments, in conformity with the stipulations of the
seventh paragraph of the Separate Act annexed to the Convention of July
15, deem it their duty strongly to recommend to the Government of his
Highness, that, in case Mehemet Ali should submit without delay, and
should consent to restore the Ottoman fleet, to withdraw his troops from
the whole of Syria, from Adana, Candia, Arabia, and the Holy Cities, his
Highness should be pleased not only to reinstate Mehemet Ali in his
functions as Pacha of Egypt, but at the same time to grant him the
hereditary investiture of the said pachalic, according to the conditions
laid down in the Convention of July 15, it being well understood that
this hereditary title should be liable to revocation, if Mehemet Ali, or
one of his successors, should infringe the aforesaid conditions.’
“The advantage of addressing the Sublime Porte a communication couched
in the sense above-mentioned, was unanimously admitted by the Four
Courts.
“Nevertheless, in order to make still more apparent the just respect
which is due to the rights of his Highness, the Cabinet of Vienna was of
opinion that the advice which the Representatives of the Four Powers
should be called upon to address to the Divan, relative to the
reinstatement of Mehemet Ali in the pachalic of Egypt, ought not to be
put forth at Constantinople, until after Mehemet Ali should have taken
the preliminary step of applying to his Sovereign for pardon, submitting
himself to the determination of his Highness.
“Taking into consideration that this opinion of the Cabinet of Vienna
serves as a fresh proof of the respect which the Courts, parties to the
Convention of July 15, entertain for the inviolability of the Sultan’s
rights of sovereignty and independence; considering, moreover, the
necessity of speedily bringing the existing crisis in the Levant to a
pacific solution, in conformity with the true interests, as likewise
with the dignity of the Porte; the Plenipotentiaries of the said Courts
have unanimously resolved to adopt the course above pointed out, in
order that Mehemet Air’s application for pardon and his submission
should precede the friendly measures which the Allied Representatives
will be instructed to adopt, in order to incline the Porte to grant its
pardon to Mehemet Ali.
“With this view, the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers being desirous
of hastening as much as possible the moment when it will be possible for
those measures to take place at Constantinople, have judged it fitting
to cause to be pointed out without the least delay to Mehemet Ali, the
way which is still open to him to regain the pardon of his Sovereign,
and to obtain his reinstatement in the pachalic of Egypt,
notwithstanding the decisive events which have declared themselves
against him.
“In consequence it was further agreed to communicate to the Ambassador
of the Sublime Porte, Chekib Effendi, the present Memorandum, as
likewise the instruction thereunto annexed.
(Initialed) N.
P.
B.
B.
Upon the receipt of this document, and a special instruction of the same
date, the Admiral immediately dispatched Captain Fanshawe, with the
following letter, to communicate with the Pacha. His orders were, to
proceed to Alexandria and demand an interview with Mehemet Ali, in the
presence of Boghos Bey, and communicate the instructions of Her
Majesty’s Government. He was not to refuse Mehemet Ali’s answer even if
he expressed a desire to obtain the hereditary government of Egypt.
“Princess Charlotte, at Sea, off Cyprus,
December 6, 1840.
“Highness,
“I have now the honour to transmit to your Highness, by Captain
Fanshawe, the Captain of my flag-ship, the official authority from the
British Government, in the name of the four Allied Powers, to maintain
your Highness in the pachalic of Egypt, upon condition, that within
three days after the communication made to you by Captain Fanshawe, you
agree to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sultan, and finally evacuate
Syria.
“Let me beseech your Highness to take these terms into your serious
consideration; and I implore the Almighty God to impress upon your mind
the benefit you will bestow on a distracted country by an early
compliance with the decision of the four Allied Powers.
“Captain Fanshawe is fully authorized to receive your Highness’s final
decision.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “ROBERT STOPFORD, _Admiral_.”
“To his Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha.”
The further conduct of the Admiral was to be guided by the following
instruction, of November 14, from Lord Palmerston to the Admiralty.
“With further reference to my letters of this day, I am to signify to
your Lordships the Queen’s commands that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford
should be informed that he is not in any degree to suspend his
operations, or to relax his efforts, on account of the communication
which he is instructed to make to Mehemet Ali; but, on the contrary, he
should continue to push on with vigour his operations for the purpose of
expelling the Egyptians from the whole of Syria, and he should not
slacken in his exertions, till he learns from Constantinople that an
arrangement has been made with Mehemet Ali.”
The reader must bear in mind that, at the date of these instructions,
the capture of Acre was not known at the Foreign Office, nor was my
Convention signed.
CHAPTER II.
Captain Fanshawe’s proceedings at Alexandria—Letter from Mehemet Ali to
the Admiral—Official Report of Captain Fanshawe—Letter of Mehemet
Ali to the Grand Vizier—English Ships again ordered to the Coast of
Syria—Part of the Convention carried into effect by the Admiral.
The mode in which this new negotiation of points which he naturally
considered as already settled, was received by the Pacha, will best
appear from his own letter, and Captain Fanshawe’s report.
“Most Honourable Admiral Sir Robert Stopford,
“I have received the two letters which you addressed to me, the first by
the channel of Hamid Bey, who had been entrusted with a despatch for my
son Ibrahim Pacha, and the second by Captain Fanshawe, of your
flag-ship. I am delighted with the friendship which you evince towards
me, and I hasten to act in the sense which you point out in your
official dispatch. I consequently address a petition to the Sublime
Porte under flying seal, and in order that the contents thereof may be
known to you, I add a French translation to it. I hope that my
compliance will be appreciated by the Allied Powers, and in asking a
continuance of your friendship, I flatter myself that your good offices
will ensure me their good will.
(Signed) “MEHEMET ALI.”
“H.M. Steam-vessel Megæra, at Sea,
December 12, 1840.
“Sir,
“I have the honour to report to you my proceedings in the service on
which you ordered me.
“I arrived off Alexandria in this vessel early on the morning of the
8th, and finding no English man-of-war off the place, proceeded into the
port, and sent for Mr. Larking, Her Majesty’s Consul, whom I requested
to inform Mehemet Ali that I was charged by you to make a communication
to him from Her Majesty’s Government, and for which purpose I demanded
an interview with him in the presence of Boghos Bey.
“At noon I went to the palace with Mr. Larking, and had an audience with
Mehemet Ali: after delivering your letter to him and passing a few
compliments, I read to him my extract from Lord Palmerston’s
instructions, which was interpreted to him by his Dragoman, and then
presented to him, expressing my hope that his compliance with what it
required, would restore a good understanding between the Sultan and
himself. He alluded to the recent Convention, and said he had promised
all this before to Commodore Napier, if Egypt was guaranteed to him, and
that he never departed from his word.
“I replied, I had no guarantee to offer; but he would perceive that,
though you had not been able to ratify that Convention, you had lost no
time in communicating the instructions received from your Government,
and in expressing your own disposition to conciliate; and that I hoped
he would merit the wish which I knew you had expressed, and take some
immediate steps for the restitution of the Turkish fleet, which I
regretted to observe was making no preparation for sea; that the words
in my note with reference to the fleet were ‘immediate,’ and ‘without
delay;’ and I was sure his giving directions for that part of it which
could be most expeditiously equipped proceeding to you at Marmorice,
would be regarded in a favourable light, both at London and at
Constantinople.
“Mehemet Ali said earnestly, he had always wished to give the fleet up
to his master; that I might pledge myself that it should be ready to
deliver to me, or to any officer that might be sent by the Porte to take
charge of it, and that he would send his own officers and men to assist
in navigating it, if he was reinstated in Egypt; adding, ‘If I give up
the fleet, what security have I, having already given orders for the
evacuation of all the places referred to?’
“I told him he must look for his security in the good faith and friendly
disposition of the English Government, and in the influence it might
have with the Sultan and the Allied Powers. He seemed rather disposed to
yield on this point, but gave no positive answer. I then stated that my
time was limited; he said he had no wish for delay; the documents which
I had given him should be forthwith translated, and brought again under
his consideration, and that I should have his answer in French to take
to you as soon as possible. I replied, I was authorized to take his
final answer to Constantinople, and that I must be furnished with his
written engagement to convey thither; and as I concluded it would be
written in Turkish, I must have a translation of it also, that I might
be satisfied it contained all that was required. This was immediately
assented to, Mehemet Ali saying, he was always ready to make his
submission to the Sultan, and that he would promise all that was asked,
if he was allowed to remain quiet in Egypt. This ended the conference.
“In the evening, Mr. Larking and myself had an interview by appointment
with Boghos Bey, who said it was Mehemet Ali’s desire to meet the views
of the Allied Powers, and that he was pleased with the English
mediation, but that he considered that he had already the promise of the
hereditary government of Egypt, and he was afraid there would be
difficulties raised at Constantinople, and that there was one Power
(Russia) not so well disposed to see such a termination to the question.
I told Boghos Bey, that he must be aware the Allied Powers could not
regard Mehemet Ali since his deposition by the Sultan in the same light
as before, and that he must make his submission; and that I was sure, if
he would without delay send such part of the Turkish fleet as could be
got ready to Marmorice, it must tend to conciliate all parties, and be a
proof of the entire sincerity of his intentions.
“I then called his attention to the limit of my stay at Alexandria, and
to the necessity that the written engagement I was to receive should be
so worded that I could not hesitate to convey it. Boghos assured me he
would use his influence to prevent any obstacle; that he was to attend a
Council with Mehemet Ali directly, at which the translated copies would
be discussed and the answer decided upon, which he thought would be
quite satisfactory. This Council, however, I learnt was not so
harmonious as Boghos Bey expected, and nothing was then decided. On the
following morning (Wednesday) Mr. Larking received a summons, and had an
interview with Mehemet Ali and Boghos Bey, which was more favourable;
and I was informed I might expect a translation of the engagement early
on the following day, and that it would contain all that was asked; but
Mr. Larking did not find Mehemet Ali disposed to let any part of the
fleet go first,—a point which I had requested him to urge again,—saying,
they all came, and should all go together. I did not, however, receive
the translations of the letters to the Vizier and yourself, which I now
inclose, until ten o’clock yesterday morning, but then accompanied by a
notice that Mehemet Ali was ready to receive me. On perusing the letter
to the Vizier, it appeared to me to be so complete an engagement, in all
points required, without any especial stipulation about Egypt, and that
though the terms of submission might be somewhat equivocal, it came
within the view of Lord Palmerston’s instructions, and that I could not
hesitate to be the bearer of it. I therefore repaired to the palace with
Mr. Larking, and had, I consider, a satisfactory interview with Mehemet
Ali. I pointed out to him that I did not feel that the expressions in
his letter to the Vizier, relating to the fleet, came up to the promise
which he had made me the other day, and that I saw no appearance yet of
preparation, and that I or some one else might return very soon to claim
the fulfilment of that pledge. Mehemet Ali said he had given orders
already on the subject, and repeated earnestly that the fleet should be
ready to quit the port, as far as he was concerned, five days after the
arrival of the officer to whom the Sultan wished it to be delivered.
“I then remarked that on the subject of Candia there might be some
delay, as I understood the Pacha there had not submitted to the Sultan;
and as I thought it probable the Porte might be prepared to send troops
immediately to take possession of that island, I proposed that I should
be the bearer of a letter to the Pacha of Candia, directing him to yield
it to the Turkish authorities; to which Mehemet Ali immediately
assented, and ordered one to be written. I hope these points, therefore,
may be taken as an earnest of his sincerity, though I am quite of
opinion, that unless the Sultan gives him the hereditary pashalic of
Egypt, he will be very much disposed to fight for it—or, at any rate, to
give further trouble. This letter to the Pacha of Candia being ready, I
received it with those to the Vizier and yourself (all which I herewith
transmit), all under flying seals, from Mehemet Ali’s hands, and took my
leave of him. Boghos Bey then requested to speak with me on one or two
subjects, by Mehemet Ali’s desire, which were—1st. His wish to be
allowed to send some of his steam-vessels to Gaza or El-Arish to receive
the sick, wounded, women and children, of Ibrahim Pacha’s army who might
be entering Egypt by that route, and who would be thus spared a painful
and tedious march, saying that Commodore Napier’s Treaty embraced that
subject. I replied, that though you had not been able to confirm the
Commodore’s Convention, you would, I was sure, for the cause of
humanity, be now ready to meet Mehemet Ali’s wish, and that I would
communicate with the senior officer of our ships off the port on the
subject, who would allow vessels, going strictly for that purpose, to
pass freely. 2ndly. That in case of any of our ships of war coming to
the port, the commanders should be desired to conform rigidly to the
quarantine regulations. I told him they always had, and always would do
so, and reminded him of the quarantine you had passed yourself in
August, and said that whatever our Consul told the captains was required
by the regulations of the port would be abided by; for Mr. Larking had
an idea that they might contemplate some new regulations which might
affect the ships or officers to be sent down for the Turkish fleet.
“At 1 P.M. yesterday we sailed from Alexandria, and off the port
communicated with Her Majesty’s ship Carysfort, and I delivered to
Captain Martin two letters (copies of which I inclose) which I had
thought it right to address to the senior officer of Her Majesty’s ships
off Alexandria, and of which I hope you will approve; we are now
proceeding to join your flag at Marmorice.
“I cannot close this report, without expressing how much I benefited by
Mr. Larking’s ready and cordial assistance, and by the information I was
able to obtain from him, and also from the zeal and attention of Mr.
John Chumarian, the Dragoman.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “ARTHUR FANSHAWE, _Captain_.
“P.S.—We left the Ambuscade, small French frigate, a corvette, and
steam-vessel at Alexandria; the latter, I understand, was to start for
France to-day; the Bourgainville, brig, sailed for Beyrout, the day of
our arrival.”
“The Hon. Sir R. Stopford, G.C.B.”
On the 13th of December Captain Fanshawe returned from Alexandria, and
after delivering the Pacha’s reply to the Admiral, proceeded to
Constantinople with his answer to the Vizier, which, like a clever
diplomatist, he had taken care to base on the Convention, and it does
appear to me quite astonishing that so determined a man as the Pacha
certainly is, and as he had shown himself, should have listened at all
to the Instruction of the 14th of November, which had the material
difference from that of the 15th of October, of not containing the
hereditary title; the very fact of our appearing to have changed our
mind in so short a period, ought to have awakened his suspicion, because
he could not know that that change originated with Austria, who however,
as will presently be seen, got alarmed at the rejection of the
Convention, and distinctly stated that Mehemet Ali should be confirmed,
and that she would have nothing to do with any attack that might be
meditated on Alexandria.
“17 Chewal, 1256.
(Dec. 11, 1840.)
“After the usual Titles.
“Commodore Napier, of the British fleet, informed me by a despatch dated
from before Alexandria, the 22nd of November, N.S., that the Great
Allied Powers have requested the Sublime Porte to grant me the
hereditary Government of Egypt, on the conditions laid down by them;
that is, that I shall give up the Imperial fleet which is in the Port of
Alexandria, and that the Egyptian troops shall retire from Syria, and
re-enter Egypt.
“The Commodore required that diligence should be used in preparing the
fleet, in order to its being delivered up, and in withdrawing the troops
from Syria.
“After some correspondence and some discussions with the Commodore on
this matter, these conditions were accepted, and an authentic Act,
manifesting that it is expected that the favour of him who is the shadow
of God should be granted, and serving as a document to both parties, was
concluded and signed.
“In consequence, I wrote to my son, Ibrahim Pacha, your servant, to come
immediately to Egypt with the Egyptian troops concentrated at Damascus,
and with the persons in his employment, and others, and I even sent to
him a person expressly for this purpose, whom I despatched in a
steam-vessel procured by the Commodore.
“I have just received from Ibrahim Pacha, overland, a despatch dated the
1st of Ramazan, (October 27,) according to which, he was to set out,
with all his people, from Damascus, the 3rd or 4th of Chewal (the 28th
or 29th of November). Thus, it may be looked upon as certain that he
commenced his march at the specified time.
“And now, in the meanwhile, I receive from the Admiral of the British
fleet, his Excellency Sir Robert Stopford, an official despatch written
off Cyprus, on the 6th of December, and couched in the sense mentioned
below. The Admiral sent to me, at the same time, a copy of the
instructions which he had received from his Excellency Lord Palmerston.
I see by this communication, that it has been stipulated that I must
renew my submission to the Sublime Porte, restoring the Imperial fleet,
and causing Syria, Adana, Candia, the Hedjaz, and the two Holy Cities,
to be evacuated by the Egyptian troops.
“I perceive that the obtaining my pardon, that my re-admission into the
good graces of my Sovereign and master, to whose service I take this
opportunity of dedicating my fortune and my life, and the gracious
acceptance by His Imperial Majesty of my most humble submission, are the
effects of the noble efforts of the high Allied Powers; and thoroughly
grateful for all this, I have taken measures for restoring the Imperial
fleet. People are actively employed in putting the vessels into a good
state; and on the receipt of a firman, making known in what manner it
shall have pleased His Imperial Majesty that the fleet shall be
delivered up and despatched, I will hasten to conform myself to the
sovereign will by carrying the said firman into execution.
“In like manner, as I am ready to withdraw all the Egyptian authorities
who are in the Island of Candia, in the Hedjaz, and in the two Holy
Cities, on the arrival of His Imperial Majesty’s firman in that respect,
the above-mentioned places shall be evacuated without delay by the
Egyptian authorities.
“Thus, then, when your Excellency shall, if it please God, have taken
cognizance of my prompt submission, carried into effect as above, you
will be pleased to lay it at the feet of the clemency of my most august
and most powerful Sovereign and Master, of whom I am so proud to be the
faithful and submissive servant, and to employ your good offices, in
order to cause a man advanced in age, and faithful, who has grown old in
his service, to experience without ceasing the effects of his sovereign
clemency.
“He who can ordain, will ordain.
(L.S.) “MEHEMET ALI.”
The Admiral in the mean time, in consequence of an application from
General Michell, who now commanded the English force in Syria, (Sir
Charles Smith having returned to England,) sent Captain Stewart, in the
Benbow, and several small ships, to Beyrout, with instructions to
suspend hostilities until the result of Mehemet Ali’s submission was
known; and also authorized the Pacha to send steamers to Caiffa to bring
away the sick and wounded; thus putting into execution a part of the
rejected Convention.
CHAPTER III.
Captain Fanshawe’s Arrival at Constantinople—Interview with the Grand
Vizier—Conference of Ambassadors and Rechid Pacha—Conduct of Lord
Ponsonby; his Letter to Lord Palmerston—The Porte accepts the
submission of Mehemet Ali—Letter of Rechid Pacha to the Ambassador
and of the Vizier to Mehemet Ali—Captain Fanshawe returns to
Marmorice.
It has already been shown, that notwithstanding the rejection of the
Convention communicated to Mehemet Ali by Captain Fanshawe, he, on the
11th of December, in a letter to the Grand Vizier, sent his
unconditional submission; that letter reached Constantinople on the 16th
of the same month. Captain Fanshawe, on his arrival, gave in a report of
his proceedings to the Ambassador, couched in much the same terms as
that to the Admiral already given, and on the 18th he had an audience of
the Grand Vizier.[1] The Captain was accompanied by Mr. Pisani, and by
Captain Codrington and Captain Williams, and he informed the Vizier that
he had been ordered by the Admiral to convey to Alexandria a summons to
Mehemet Ali to make his submission; this submission he now conveyed to
him in an open letter, which he begged to deliver. The Grand Vizier,
after having read Mehemet Ali’s letter, said, “The Porte is already
aware of these conditions, as is known; but I can tell you nothing upon
this great question which the Sublime Porte is treating with the Allied
Courts, and which consequently has become a question of foreign policy,
belonging entirely to the department of Foreign Affairs, which is
acquainted with all the circumstances relating to it better than I am.
The Porte will take this question into consideration with the
representatives of the Allied Courts, and his Excellency the Minister
for Foreign Affairs will make known the intentions of the Porte to the
Allies; I beg you, M. le Capitaine, in the mean time, not to consider my
acceptance of this letter from you as an acceptance of its contents.”
Captain Fanshawe replied that he also was in nowise authorized to enter
into the details of this affair, and that he would learn the result from
Lord Ponsonby. The Captain said that Mehemet Ali had given him his word
that he would deliver over the Turkish fleet to whatever officer the
Porte shall direct to conduct it hither. The Vizier replied, “The fleet
is ours; Alexandria is our country; we are perfectly sure of having the
fleet sooner or later.” The Captain took the opportunity of speaking of
peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. The Grand Vizier replied,
“Peace is made between two governments, and not between a sovereign and
one of his rebel subjects.”
The letters given clearly show that Mehemet Ali could do no more. He
promised to deliver up the fleet, Candia, Syria, and the Holy Cities.
The Grand Vizier replied, as has been shown: “The fleet is ours;
Alexandria is ours;” and when Captain Fanshawe talks to him about peace,
he said, “Peace is made between two Governments; and not between a
sovereign and one of his rebel subjects.” This indeed was talking big;
the Grand Vizier forgot that Mehemet Ali had twice nearly knocked at the
gates of Constantinople, and had he not been interfered with, would have
dethroned his Master.
What does the Ambassador do? Though he was quite aware that every hour
the Eastern Question remained unsettled, a European war was
imminent—though he knew that France had intimated that we were not to
touch Egypt—though he knew the British fleet had left the coast of Syria
and Egypt in consequence of bad weather—yet the Ambassador, acting on
his own responsibility, to gratify his dislike of Mehemet Ali, did all
he could to keep the question open, though he must have known the Allies
were anxious to bring it to a close; and if he had had the power, I
know, would have risked the whole British fleet to ensure the Pacha’s
destruction. Annexed is his letter to Lord Palmerston, furnishing an
account of the Conference which the arrival of Mehemet Ali’s letter gave
rise to.
“My Lord, “Therapia, December 28, 1840.
“I received this afternoon the Protocol of the conference held at the
house of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 20th instant, at which
were present Rechid Pacha, and the Representatives of the Four Allies,
and the dragomans of Austria and England, and M. Francheschi, who made
the Protocol which I have now the honour to inclose[2].
“I have little need to explain to your Lordship the grounds upon which I
acted; submission is the first mentioned of the conditions, upon which I
am ordered to give advice to the Sublime Porte, and it is also the most
important, the others being insignificant, as things have turned out. My
duty is to see that submission has been made by Mehemet Ali—real
submission, and there are many things to make it very doubtful if
Mehemet Ali has submitted, and has not taken this matter as concessions
forced upon the Sultan by the Allies for the purpose of establishing him
in Egypt with indefinite power. Your Lordship’s instructions would not
authorize me to say that such a submission is the submission
contemplated by Her Majesty’s Government, and as I do not think it
proper for me, under the circumstances in which I am placed, to declare
that it is not a submission, I have declined giving any opinion at all
on the point, and said I would await the decision of it by the Sublime
Porte, having stated what counsel I shall have to offer in the name of
my Government, if the Sublime Porte accept the submission.
“Your Lordship has always declared that the Sultan is the sole judge and
arbiter of his own interests; and you will see, in the Protocol, that
the Representatives united cordially in disavowing intentions to act
upon the Sultan except by counsel alone. I saw this with satisfaction,
because endeavours have not been wanting to inspire the Ottoman
Ministers with some jealousy of the prepotency of the Four Powers.
“It will appear, I think, in the Protocol, that I am not alone in
thinking the submission may be subject to doubt, for the Internuncio
says that Mehemet Ali has made a commencement of submission. This may be
so, for the interest of Mehemet Ali is to accept the boon offered him,
as he gives nothing for it in return; but my orders from my Government
are not subject to be modified by me, and I cannot take upon myself the
responsibility of acting without the most positive authority in a
question like the present.
“I will send a messenger to acquaint your Lordship with the
determination of the Sublime Porte whenever I am informed of it.
“I send the copy of the Protocol which was sent to me by his Excellency
the Internuncio.
“The Protocol is substantially correct in statement of what passed, but
there are errors in its report of expressions.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “PONSONBY.”
The reader will observe, without my pointing it out, from his own
letter, and still more from the Protocol, with what diplomatic art the
British Ambassador, in opposition to the opinion of the other Ministers,
endeavours to gain time. Had he been instructed so to do, he would have
shown himself a good diplomatist; but the contrary was the case. Rechid
Pasha writes from Constantinople, under date of the 26th of November, to
Chekib Effendi at Paris, “That Lord Palmerston was favourable to the
reinstatement of Mehemet Ali, and that instructions had been sent to the
Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject.” Besides that, he knew of
the instructions that Captain Fanshawe had communicated to Mehemet Ali,
and which he accepted.
And no Minister of Foreign Affairs could have shown his want of
confidence in his Ambassador more distinctly than Lord Palmerston did,
by sending his instruction of the 14th of November direct to Sir Robert
Stopford, thus completely throwing the Ambassador overboard. And well he
did; for he decidedly would have found some means of putting it aside,
as he did my Convention. In fact, his Lordship was the cleverest of
Ambassadors for evading orders, and, indeed, managed to transfer
Downing-street to Constantinople.
The Sultan, however, appeared to be satisfied with Mehemet Ali’s
submission; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to Lord Ponsonby,
thus:
“The Sublime Porte,
December 27, 1840.
“Monsieur l’Ambassador,
“I have lost no time in laying before the Sultan the Protocol of the
Conference of the 20th of this month; and I am commanded to acquaint
your Excellency, that His Imperial Majesty, wishing to prove by a fresh
act the moderation of his sentiments, is disposed to accept the
submission of Mehemet Ali, and only awaits the fulfilment of the
conditions imposed upon him by the Memorandum of the 14th of November,
to consider that submission as complete, and to confirm Mehemet Ali in
the Pachalic of Egypt.
“With the view of hastening that fulfilment, and of thus proving more
clearly his desire to lend himself, as far as is in his power, to the
views of his august Allies, the Sultan has decided that Yaver Pacha
(Admiral Walker) and Mazloum Bey shall proceed immediately to Egypt as
his Commissioners to receive the Ottoman fleet, and to ascertain that
the places described in the Memorandum of the 14th of November are
evacuated by the troops of Mehemet Ali.
“I am commanded at the same time to request your Excellency will have
the goodness to instruct Her Britannic Majesty’s Admiral to assist
according to the 4th paragraph of the Separate Act of the Convention of
the 15th of July, at the restoration of the fleet to the said
Commissioners.
“Receive, &c.,
(Signed) “RECHID,
“_Minister for Foreign Affairs_.”
The Vizier, too, at the same time, wrote as follows to Mehemet Ali:
“I have taken cognizance of the contents of the good despatch which you
addressed to me dated the 17th Chewal, (the 11th of December,) and which
has also been laid before His Imperial Majesty.
“It appears, from your Highness’s communication, that you intend really
to make your submission to his Highness, and that in proof of this you
have decided immediately to restore the Imperial fleet, and to
surrender, without delay, certain places situated out of Egypt.
“The intentions and good disposition which you have thus evinced, being
a happy omen that the good system and the good proceedings which are
desired, will be adopted and carried into execution, his Highness has
duly appreciated them.
“In all its affairs, in all its proceedings, the Sublime Porte, guided
by feelings of justice, makes it a rule never to exceed the bounds of
moderation.
“On this account his Highness is disposed to accept your submission with
favour, and to grant your Highness his full pardon.
“As soon then as, in conformity with your engagements, the Imperial
fleet shall have left the harbour of Alexandria, and shall be despatched
with all its officers and crews, some well-known persons excepted, and
with all its equipments and stores, and the places already known shall
have been made over without delay to the Commissioners of the Sublime
Porte, and when these acts shall be accomplished, that is to say, when
positive intelligence of this shall have arrived here, it is decidedly
resolved that then his Imperial Majesty will deign to reinstate your
Highness in the Government of Egypt. These views of his Highness, and
the pacific and benevolent opinions of the Great Powers, being quite in
accordance upon this point, this resolution has been officially made
known to the representatives of the Allied Courts.
“His Excellency Mazloum Bey, one of the principal servants of the
Sublime Porte, Member of the Council of Justice, and formerly Mousteshar
of the Admiralty, is charged with the execution of the necessary
instructions; and the Ferik of the Imperial navy, the most distinguished
Yaver Pacha, is charged to receive the Imperial fleet and bring it here.
“We leave to your wisdom to do what is necessary.”
On the 30th of December Captain Fanshawe wrote as follows to the Admiral
from on board the Stromboli, off Tenedos, and soon after joined him at
Marmorice.
“Sir,
“With reference to your orders to me to proceed to Constantinople, and
to my letter to you of the 18th instant, I have now the honour to
acquaint you that I had no communication from his Excellency Lord
Ponsonby from that date until the 27th, when I received a letter from
him, relative to the conveyance of Turkish Commissioners in this vessel
to Alexandria; and I beg to inclose you copies of the correspondence
that in consequence passed between his Lordship and myself, through Mr.
Doyle, on the subject; and also to state, that, in pursuance of the
intimation from his Lordship, that he was ‘not aware of anything within
his competency’ which could be the cause of my detention at
Constantinople, and having yesterday afternoon received the accompanying
despatch from him for you, I quitted the Golden Horn in the Stromboli,
at 9 P.M. yesterday, and am proceeding in her to rejoin you at
Marmorice.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “ARTHUR FANSHAWE, _Captain_.”
The despatch referred to inclosed a copy of the official note from the
Porte[3], announcing the appointment of the Commissioners, and
requesting the assistance of the British ships to bring home the Ottoman
fleet from Alexandria.
Footnote 1:
See p. 22. The report is given in the _Levant Papers_, Part III., p.
138.
Footnote 2:
See Protocol in the Appendix.
Footnote 3:
See page 39.
CHAPTER IV.
Disinclination of the Porte to confer the Hereditary Pachalic on Mehemet
Ali—Departure of the Turkish Commissioners—Their orders—Opposition
of the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Ministers to the views of
Lord Ponsonby—Lord Palmerston’s opinion of his conduct—Rewards
conferred on the Officers of the Squadron at Acre—News from
England—Approval of the Convention—Instruction of the 15th of
December—Lord Palmerston’s Letter to Lord Ponsonby—Prince Metternich
and Count Nesselrode, in approval of the Convention.
Though the Porte accepted the submission of Mehemet Ali, it was in no
hurry to act, and when it did get in motion, it was far from doing what,
I presume, three out of the four Representatives wished and expected.
The Commissioners did not leave Constantinople till the 6th of January,
and they had no power to confer the hereditary pachalic on Mehemet Ali;
and instead of carrying orders to General Jochmus to suspend
hostilities, they brought orders to demand the arms and guns of
Ibrahim’s army; which demand was supported by Mr. Wood, the emissary of
the Ambassador, and also by General Jochmus[4].
The Austrian Internuncio saw through this intrigue; and on the 7th of
January, in an interview with Rechid Pacha, announced to him that the
four Powers had decided on applying for the hereditary succession for
Mehemet Ali. This produced a correspondence—far too long for me to give
here, but which may be seen in the Government volume of _Levant Papers_.
From this correspondence it appears that the Austrian, Russian, and
Prussian Ministers decided to act without Lord Ponsonby, in consequence
of directions from the Ministers in London, based upon the Convention
they had previously rejected. The English Ambassador does not appear to
have received his instructions till the 10th of January, though they
were dated the 17th of December. I should like to see the reply Lord
Palmerston made to the Ambassador on learning that he had rejected the
Convention; why it is suppressed, is easily accounted for. It ought to
be explained how, on the 7th of January, the Internuncio received his
dispatches which must have passed through the hands of Prince Metternich
at Vienna, whilst the English Ambassador only received his on the 10th.
The delay might have caused great embarrassment, and indeed at such a
critical moment it was not desirable that a disagreement even for three
days should have existed between Lord Ponsonby and the other Ministers.
The Governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as well as their
Ambassadors at Constantinople, saw how things were going on in the East.
They wrote peremptorily to those personages to settle the question; and
Prince Metternich requested Lord Beauvale to state to Lord Palmerston
that, in case the Porte should hesitate to accede to the recommendation
of the Allied Powers to confer the hereditary government on Mehemet Ali,
his court could not be compromised by such hesitation[5].
Lord Beauvale also wrote to Lord Palmerston on the 17th of January[6],
that the Turkish Commissioners going to Alexandria were not empowered to
grant the hereditary pachalic, and in consequence, Austria would
withdraw her support from the Sultan, and would disavow any attack on
Ibrahim Pacha.
Lord Palmerston, in a letter to the Ambassador, of the 26th of
January[7], does not exactly find fault with his Excellency for not
taking Mehemet Ali’s offer as a complete submission, but he tells him
the advice in his Lordship’s instructions of the 15th of October[8]
might have been given. This appears a pretty broad hint, and I suppose
diplomatic etiquette did not admit of any thing stronger.
On the 17th of December despatches were received in Marmorice Bay from
England. The Commander-in-Chief was appointed Governor of Greenwich
Hospital; I was directed to hoist a red broad pennant, and was made a
Commander of the Bath; the Captains commanding ships at Acre were made
Companions; and a large promotion went through all classes of officers
who were fortunately present at the bombardment. On the 27th a new Pacha
arrived from Constantinople on his way to Syria, with orders to send to
Adrianople Izzet Pacha, who had created so much discontent throughout
the country, and to report on the state and condition of Ibrahim’s army.
This Pacha was the bearer of letters of thanks to the Admiral and others
employed in Syria, with the exception of myself, who have never received
any acknowledgment from the Turkish Government up to the present day.
The Admiral strongly recommended this new Pacha to suspend hostilities,
and I also advised him to control General Jochmus, who was a young man
ambitious of military glory, and more likely to make war than peace.
On the 5th of January, 1841, the Megæra arrived from England. I was
aware she must either bring my sentence of acquittal or condemnation,
and having been already denounced by the wise men of the East, I felt it
was not impossible that their opinion might have influenced the judgment
of the Ministers of the West, if unfortunately their protests had
arrived in London before my despatches from Alexandria. I had, however,
taken precautions to prevent this, which fortunately succeeded, and they
were left to their own calm judgment, which decided in my favour.
I had a party dining with me that day, when numerous letters, public and
private, were put into my hand by the officer of the watch. I laid them
on the table, determined not to run the risk of spoiling my dinner by
bad news, and not requiring good to give me an appetite. After the
inward man had been well fortified, I ventured to open a letter from
Lord Minto, which, to my great satisfaction, announced to me that the
Government were satisfied with what I had done, with the exception of
the Guarantee. I received also letters from various members of the
Government, and an official one from the Admiral, inclosing an
instruction from Lord Palmerston to the Admiralty, bearing date Dec. 15,
1840, some extracts from which I subjoin[9]:
“I have to request your Lordships to convey to Commodore Napier the
approval of Her Majesty’s Government of the steps taken by him on this
occasion, though without any instructions to that effect, and upon his
own responsibility, to carry into execution the arrangements
contemplated by the Treaty of the 15th of July, and to put an end to the
contest in the Levant.
“But the instruction given by your Lordships to Sir Robert Stopford in
pursuance of my letter of the 14th of November[10], will have reached
Sir Robert Stopford a few days after he received from Commodore Napier a
report of the result of his negociation at Alexandria; and it is
uncertain whether Sir Robert Stopford will have considered the
instruction of the 14th of November as superseding Commodore Napier’s
arrangement, or whether he will have looked upon Commodore Napier’s
arrangement as superseding that instruction.
“In this state of things, Her Majesty’s Government must postpone a final
communication with respect to the arrangement made by Commodore Napier,
till they learn, as they probably will in a few days’ time, what course
Sir Robert Stopford took upon the receipt of the instruction of the 14th
of November. But there is one part of the Articles signed by Commodore
Napier and Boghos Bey, upon which it is necessary that an instruction
should immediately be sent to Sir Robert Stopford.
“In the first Article, Boghos Bey, on the part of Mehemet Ali, takes two
engagements: the one is to order the Egyptian troops to evacuate Syria;
the other is to restore the Turkish fleet. The first engagement was to
be fulfilled immediately, and was to be conditional only upon the
promise of Commodore Napier that he would, in his capacity of commander
of the British fleet before Alexandria, suspend hostilities against
Alexandria, and every other part of the Egyptian territory. The other
engagement was eventual, and was to be fulfilled as soon as Mehemet Ali
should have received an official notification that the Porte grants him
the hereditary government of Egypt, and that this concession is, and
shall continue to be, under the guarantee of the Four Powers. Now it is
necessary that Sir Robert Stopford should lose no time in making known
to Mehemet Ali that this last demand of his, that the Four Powers should
guarantee to him the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt, if
that grant should be made to him by the Sultan, cannot be complied with.
“That which the Four Powers will do, is to recommend to the Porte to
make the concessions specified in the communication which Sir Robert
Stopford has been instructed to convey to Mehemet Ali.”
A despatch of the same tendency was addressed (Dec. 17) by Viscount
Palmerston to the Ambassador[11], in which he remarks,—
“A doubt may have been felt by your Excellency and your colleagues what
steps you should take in pursuance of the instructions contained in my
despatch of the 15th of October, and in the corresponding instructions
sent from Vienna, Petersburgh, and Berlin; because those instructions,
modified by the subsequent letter to the Admiralty of November 14,
contemplated the unconditional submission of Mehemet Ali to the Sultan,
as a preliminary to the advice to be given to the Porte to reinstate
Mehemet Ali in the Government of Egypt; and, on the contrary, Mehemet
Ali, in the demands which he sets forth in the first Article of the
Agreement, signed on the 27th of November, engages to restore the fleet
only on two conditions,—the one being, that the Sultan should grant him
hereditary tenure in the Government of Egypt,—and the other being, that
such grant on the part of the Sultan should be placed under the
guarantee of the Four Powers.
“It appears to Her Majesty’s Government that the fact that Mehemet Ali
attached the first of these conditions to his restoration of the fleet,
need not prevent the Porte from making to him that concession. For, in
fact, those Articles of Agreement were substantially a complete
surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali; and he was led to suppose, that in
asking for hereditary tenure, he was only asking that which the Porte
was willing to give. But the second condition, namely, the guarantee of
the Four Powers, is one which cannot be complied with; and your
Excellency should, on this point, give to the Porte the same
explanations which Sir Robert Stopford has been instructed, in pursuance
of my letter to the Admiralty of the 15th instant, to give to Mehemet
Ali.
“It has been reported, but upon what authority is not known, that the
Porte was, towards the end of November, but before it had heard of the
submission of Mehemet Ali, disinclined to revoke the decree which had
deprived him of the Government of Egypt. It is not unnatural that such a
feeling should have existed at that time in the mind of the Turkish
Government, but Her Majesty’s Government hope that subsequent events,
and the unanimous advice of the Four Powers, will have removed these
objections on the part of the Porte, and will have led the Porte to
accept the settlement effected by Commodore Napier’s arrangement, or by
the subsequent more ample submission of Mehemet Ali.”
Lord Palmerston’s letter to Lord Ponsonby, acknowledging the receipt of
the Ambassador’s letter announcing the rejection of the Convention, as I
have before said, has never been published; it would be a curious
document, and I dare say will come to light some day or other; but Lord
Palmerston’s despatch to Lord Ponsonby after receiving my despatches, is
clear enough; he tells the Ambassador plainly, that it does not signify
whether Sir Robert Stopford adopted my Convention or his subsequent
instruction of the 14th of November; that the articles of agreement were
substantially a complete surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali; and he
was led to suppose, on asking for the hereditary tenure, he was only
asking that which the Porte was willing to give; but that the guarantee
could not be complied with.
Prince Metternich also agreed with Lord Palmerston, and directed the
Internuncio to co-operate with Lord Ponsonby in carrying out the
instructions of the 17th; and moreover tells Lord Beauvale very plainly
that in case the Porte hesitates to confer the hereditary Pachalic on
Mehemet Ali, his Court will not admit that the Allies could be
compromised by such hesitation. Count Nesselrode also states to Lord
Clanricarde, that it is unfortunate that the Sultan had not been
disposed, or advised, to concede the hereditary government to Mehemet
Ali.
Shortly before this (December 22,) Count Nesselrode wrote to Baron
Brunnow at London, in terms that show his full approval of the
Convention, except the guarantee[12].
“I hasten to reply to the despatch which your Excellency has done me the
honour to address to me under date of the 27th November (9th Dec.), and
the arrival of which was almost immediately preceded by that of the
reports which you entrusted to the Marquis of Clanricarde. Before
entering further into detail upon the principal subject of that
despatch, my first desire, M. le Baron, is to communicate to you the
lively satisfaction with which the Emperor received the happy
intelligence of the submission of Mehemet Ali. The Treaty of London has
at last been executed in spite of all opposition. It has been so to its
fullest extent, and that without having cost the Powers who were parties
to it any compromise, or any concession to be regretted. There is
nothing, even including the armed demonstration with which the British
squadron accompanied its summons at Alexandria, which has not stamped
its result with a character still more favourable to the consideration
of the alliance. Have the goodness, M. le Baron, to offer our sincere
congratulations to Lord Palmerston upon this result, which we consider
as a common triumph of his and of our policy.
“The Eastern Question thus settled, it now remains to record and confirm
the solution thereof by a final transaction in which France should
concur. You have already, in anticipation of this event, been put in
possession of the views and intentions which our august Master
entertains upon this subject. Much more will the Emperor be disposed to
accede to the plan which Lord Palmerston has proposed to you, because it
simplifies still further the transaction which is to be concluded. His
Majesty, then, could not but approve the motive which leads Lord
Palmerston to desire that the details of the special arrangement, by
virtue of which the Sultan shall grant to Mehemet Ali the investiture of
Egypt, should not be embodied in the text of the agreement. Accordingly,
M. le Baron, if the bases of the proposed agreement should be such as
have been stated to you by the Principal Secretary of State, and if the
French Government should decide upon accepting it, the Emperor would
authorize you to concur in it.”
The Count also wrote as follows, under date of 4th January, 1841, to M.
Titow, at Constantinople[13]:—
“I lost no time in laying before the Emperor your despatch of the 28th
of November, in which you reported to us the late events which have
taken place at Alexandria, as well as the determination of the Porte to
refuse its sanction to the arrangement concluded by Commodore Napier.
“It certainly belongs to his Highness alone to determine finally the
extent of the sacrifices which it is expedient for him to make, in order
to secure the pacification of his empire, and that Sovereign ought not
to doubt that the Emperor desires sincerely that that pacification may
be effected upon conditions as little unfavourable as possible to the
Porte.
“But, the more our august Master has at heart the defence of the
interests of the Sultan, the more would His Imperial Majesty consider
himself as failing in the friendship which he bears to his Highness, if
he did not seriously recommend him, at this decisive moment, to consider
with calmness and moderation the present posture of affairs, and to be
on his guard against illusions and hopes which in the end may never be
realized.
“But a few months since, even at the period of the signature of the
Convention of July 15, the Porte could not have hoped in so short a time
to have reduced Mehemet Ali to the powerless state to which he is now
reduced; and it is hardly to be doubted, that it would a little while
ago have granted to him the hereditary succession, if it had been
possible for it by that means to hasten a definitive arrangement, in the
interests of general peace.
“The military operations of the Allies in Syria have, since, been
crowned with the most decided success. Nevertheless, when the Porte in a
moment of irritation, determined to pronounce the deprivation of Mehemet
Ali, the Powers did not hesitate to declare their opinion upon the
subject, and to make known the conditions upon which it appeared to them
that the Sultan should not hesitate to reinstate the Pacha in the
hereditary administration of Egypt.
“It is certainly true that the Porte has never hitherto received an
official communication of the advice which the Allied Powers thought it
their duty to tender to it, but the Porte is perfectly aware of the
nature and tendency of the instructions of the 15th of October, which
have acquired European publicity; it is equally acquainted with the
measures determined upon on the 14th of November in London, and with the
step which Sir Robert Stopford was instructed to take, and the only
object of which was to secure the execution of the preceding
instructions.
“It would now be impossible for the Four Allied Powers to retract their
former declarations. Already the British Cabinet has not hesitated an
instant to declare itself in favour of the advantages which result from
the cessation of hostilities between the Porte and Mehemet Ali; but
while it fully appreciates the object which Commodore Napier had in
view, in undertaking upon his own responsibility to hasten the
submission of the Pacha; while it fully approves of all the conditions
which that officer has imposed upon him; the Cabinet of London has not
thought fit to take upon itself a formal guarantee with respect to the
right of hereditary succession which the Sultan might confer upon
Mehemet Ali.
“We are firmly convinced that the other Powers will readily adhere to
this opinion of England; not one of them will, in fact, take upon itself
a guarantee, which would become as burdensome for those Powers, as it
would be incompatible with His Highness’s rights of Sovereignty.
* * * * *
“The Cabinet of London appears to be more than ever impressed with the
necessity of furthering, by all possible means, the pacification of the
East, and of putting an end to the doubts which the Divan appears to
entertain with respect to the real intentions of the Allies. Have the
goodness then, Sir, to unite with Lord Ponsonby, in holding to the
Ministers of the Porte the language which Lord Palmerston has lately
prescribed to the English Ambassador, and which, we have no doubt, will
be equally supported by the Representatives of Austria and Prussia.”
Nothing could be more gratifying to me than that my first essay at
diplomacy should have received the sanction of the great powers of
Europe, and I presume such a sanction was not very palatable to the
gentlemen who took a different view of Eastern affairs.
Footnote 4:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 274, 276.
Footnote 5:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 151.
Footnote 6:
Ibid., p. 159.
Footnote 7:
Ibid., p. 159.
Footnote 8:
See Vol. I., p. 249.
Footnote 9:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 87.
Footnote 10:
See page 15.
Footnote 11:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 88.
Footnote 12:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 121.
Footnote 13:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 152.
CHAPTER V.
The Author ordered to Alexandria to carry the Convention into
effect—Interviews with the Pacha and Boghos Bey—Letter from Boghos
Bey explaining the Pacha’s Intentions—Lieut. Loring dispatched to
see the Evacuation of Syria carried into effect; his
Instructions—Letters to the Chief Officers in Syria—Arrival of the
Turkish Commissioners at Alexandria—Surrender of the Turkish
Fleet—Bad Faith of the Turks—Correspondence between the Author and
Boghos Bey respecting the Cotton Crop—The Commercial Treaty.
The day after the arrival of the Megæra, I waited on the
Commander-in-Chief, who directed me to proceed to Alexandria, and see
the Convention carried out. I arrived there in the Stromboli on the 8th
January, when the Pacha sent one of his officers to compliment me, and
invite me to the Palace.
Between seven and eight in the evening I waited on Boghos Bey, and
delivered the Admiral’s and Rechid Pacha’s letters[14], and an extract
of Lord Palmerston’s instruction, dated the 15th of December, beginning
with the words, “Now it is necessary that Sir Robert Stopford[15].”
Boghos Bey did not seem much disappointed at the refusal of the Allies
to give a guarantee, but expressed his dissatisfaction at the word
“hereditary” not appearing in the letter of Rechid Pacha to the British
Ambassador, and expressed his fears that there would be some difficulty
with the Pacha, who fully expected on his submission, the hereditary
Pachalic of Egypt would be conferred on him.
I was now introduced to the Pacha, who was far from being in good
humour, and evidently disappointed at the communication Boghos Bey had
previously made to him; he nevertheless invited me to sit on the divan
beside him, and gave me a pipe.
I acquainted his Highness that I was authorized to allow vessels to
proceed to Caiffa, to embark the sick, wounded, women, children, and any
part of the Egyptian army, and that I should send a British officer with
the person to whom he entrusted his instructions to Ibrahim to evacuate
Syria. I also told him that I should give every assistance to fit out
the Turkish fleet, which I was sorry to observe was in the same state I
had left them.
He replied it was not his fault; that after the agreement I had made
with him the officer had been sent back from Syria, and the agreement
disallowed.
I remarked that that difficulty was now obviated, that the Convention
had been approved of in London, with the exception of the guarantee.
To this he observed that he did not care so much about the guarantee,
but that the word “hereditary” had been left out, whereas in Lord
Palmerston’s dispatch to Lord Ponsonby, dated the 15th of October, and
which had been made public, it was distinctly stated that the Porte
would be strongly recommended to confer on him the hereditary Pachalic,
and that in M. Guizot’s speech to the French Chambers he had declared
that the Allies would recommend it; and finally, that the agreement
signed by Boghos Bey and myself stipulated that the fleet should be
delivered up on receiving the official account that the Sublime Porte
would confer on him the hereditary government of Egypt; that
notwithstanding this, in Lord Palmerston’s instructions of the 14th of
November, communicated to him by Captain Fanshawe, the word “hereditary”
had been left out; but nevertheless he had entirely submitted himself to
the will of the Sultan, and asked for no terms, being convinced he would
be confirmed in the fullest sense.
There was so much truth in these observations that I did not endeavour
to controvert them, and soon after took my leave, promising to call on
Boghos Bey next morning, when the papers were translated.
In my next interview with Boghos Bey he again spoke of the
disappointment and dissatisfaction of the Pacha. He said he had done
everything to gain the good will of England; that the interests of Great
Britain and Egypt were identified; that at one time England had
encouraged him, and even permitted Egyptians to enter her dockyards and
ships to gain instruction, and that now she wanted to put him down
altogether. All this he very naturally attributed to Lord Ponsonby, and
Mehemet Ali often said, he was not at war with either Turkey or England,
but with the English Ambassador.
I told him I was not without hopes that the British Government would
still use their influence with the Porte to obtain that point, and that
I should do everything in my power to forward the Pacha’s wishes, and I
had reason to believe they would be complied with.
He requested me to read the part of Lord Palmerston’s letter, approving
of the Convention[16], which I consented to do, but he must consider it
a private communication; he listened to this with much satisfaction, and
said, if I would communicate it to the Pacha, it would go a great way to
tranquillize his mind.
In the morning I waited on the old man, and read to him the other part
of Lord Palmerston’s instructions, which had some effect in putting him
in good humour; he talked a good deal about the difficulty of quitting
Syria till the spring without a great loss of life and stores, and was
anxious that the women, children, and sick should be allowed to embark
at Beyrout, Sidon, or the most convenient place, should the army be
still at Damascus.
There is no doubt whatever that he had sent orders to Ibrahim to
withdraw, but was probably afraid that he would not obey them when he
heard of his fathers submission without being certain of the hereditary
pachalic being conferred, and he was anxious, in the event of his
staying at Damascus, to free him of his incumbrances.
I observed that the weather was now better than when the Convention was
signed, and was improving every day; that I had no authority to allow
any embarkation either at Beyrout or Sidon, but that I should write to
the officer in command to give every facility in his power, and that I
felt satisfied the best way to insure the British Government pressing
the point of the hereditary pachalic was, by throwing no difficulties in
the way; that, whether or no, his son must succeed him, and as to a
guarantee, he had shown it was more necessary to guarantee the Porte
against him, than him against the Porte. The old man was tickled at this
observation, and consented to all I asked, and next morning Boghos gave
it me in writing, as follows:
“Commodore, “Alexandria, Jan. 10, 1841.
“The object of the letter which I have the honour to address to you, is
to recapitulate, according to the desire which you have expressed to me,
the words which you heard from the mouth of the Viceroy, my master,
himself, in your conversation yesterday evening.
“The delay which has occurred in the evacuation of Syria is not
dependent on the will of his Highness. In consequence of the Convention
concluded with you on the 27th of November last, Hamid Bey was sent to
Syria, to carry the Viceroy’s orders to Ibrahim Pacha. You know,
Commodore, the reasons which hindered that superior officer from
fulfilling his mission, and you are acquainted with the nature of the
obstacles which prevented the despatches of his Highness from reaching
their destination.
“The Viceroy, always desirous to give you a fresh proof of his readiness
to fulfil his engagements, proposes to dispatch a steam-vessel this very
day to take back to Syria Hamid Bey, who will be charged, in conjunction
with the English officer appointed by you, to deliver the orders to the
General-in-Chief of Egyptian army. As soon as Ibrahim Pacha shall be
made acquainted with them, he will immediately effect the evacuation of
Syria, despatching, if it is in his power to do so, the women, children,
and sick, towards Caiffa, and marching himself towards Egypt, should he
not be already in motion with his army to effect his retreat in that
direction. Immediately on our being made acquainted, by the return of
Hamid Bey, with the measures taken by Ibrahim Pacha in execution of the
orders of his Highness, and as soon as we shall have acquired the
certainty that the sick, women, and children, belonging to the Egyptian
army have been able to proceed to Caiffa, his Highness will send
transports to that port to secure their return to Egypt.
“With respect to the Ottoman fleet, I can only confirm what I had
formerly the honour of writing to you, Commodore; it is ready to put to
sea.
“Such is the substance of the terms in which the Viceroy expressed
himself to you, Commodore. His Highness, in thus giving you a fresh
proof of his deference to the decisions of the Allied Powers, is
convinced that they will hasten the execution of the Treaty of the 15th
of July, by obtaining in his favour the hereditary government of Egypt;
and that they will show their intention of securing the pacification of
the East, by placing it on an imperishable foundation.”
The Egyptian steamer Generoso started on the second day after my
arrival, with one of the Pacha’s officers and Lieutenant Loring, to whom
I gave the following instructions:—
“H.M.S. Carysfort,
January 10, 1841.
“Sir,
“Pursuant to directions from the Commander-in-Chief, you will accompany
Hamid Bey in the Egyptian steam-boat Generoso, to the coast of Syria.
“You will recommend him first to proceed to Acre, and you will deliver
the accompanying letter to the officer commanding the Allied troops.
“You will consult with him on the best way of proceeding to Ibrahim
Pacha’s head-quarters, and you will demand a proper escort (if
necessary) for your own protection and that of the Egyptian officer who
accompanies you. The object of your mission is to see the evacuation of
Syria carried into effect, and you will remain with Ibrahim Pacha as
long as you think it necessary, and then return to Alexandria.
“I have, &c.,
“CHAS. NAPIER.”
“Lieutenant Loring, H.M.S. Carysfort.”
I wrote also to the senior Naval and Military officers in Syria.
“H.M.S. Carysfort,
January 10, 1841.
“Sir,
“The bearer of this letter is charged by me, (agreeably to the orders of
Sir Robert Stopford, in consequence of directions of Lord Palmerston, to
carry my Convention into effect,) to proceed with Hamid Bey to Ibrahim
Pacha’s head-quarters, and deliver to him the order of Mehemet Ali, for
the immediate evacuation of Syria.
“It is Sir Robert Stopford’s directions that every facility is given for
the embarkation of the sick, the wounded, the women and children, and
others of the Egyptian army, at Caiffa.
“But it appears to me, (if there be no objection, of which I cannot be a
judge,) they may be permitted to embark at any other place if more
convenient.
“The officer charged with the despatches to Ibrahim Pacha, will
necessarily concert with him and with you on this point, as will also do
the officer charged to see the evacuation carried into effect.
“It is needless to observe, that as Mehemet Ali has made his submission
to the Porte, and is reinstated in the Pachalic of Egypt, it is of the
utmost importance that Ibrahim should not be disturbed in his
evacuation, but should be protected and assisted in every manner, so as
to cause as little loss of life as possible.
“I have, &c.,
“CHAS. NAPIER.”
“To the Officer commanding the
Allied Forces in Syria.”
“Sir,
“I have the honour to inform you that I am directed by the
Commander-in-Chief to permit the women, children, sick, wounded, and
others of the Egyptian army, to embark at Caiffa, and that Lieut. Loring
is charged to see the evacuation of Syria carried into effect, and is
accompanied by Hamid Bey, who is the bearer of orders to Ibrahim Pacha
to evacuate Syria forthwith.
“It is possible there may be other places on the coast of Syria more
convenient for the embarkation than Caiffa, (of which I cannot be a
judge, not knowing the position of Ibrahim’s army;) in that case you
will concert with the officer commanding the Allied army, and act
accordingly.
“As soon as it is ascertained where the embarkation will take place, the
steamer will return here, and transports will be sent to receive them.
“I need not observe, that as Mehemet Ali has sent his submission to the
Porte, which has been accepted, and is now reinstated in the Pachalic of
Egypt, every facility should be given to Ibrahim Pacha to evacuate
Syria, in order that it may be done with as little loss of life as
possible.
“I have, &c.,
“CHAS. NAPIER.”
“To the Senior Naval Officer
at Acre or Ascalon.”
The Turkish Commissioners, Yaver Pacha (Admiral Walker,) and Mazloum
Bey, arrived at Alexandria on the 10th January, and were graciously
received by Mehemet Ali, who gave directions that the fleet should be
immediately given up, and Admiral Walker hoisted his flag on the 11th at
noon, under a salute from the batteries at Alexandria, and the Egyptian
men-of-war and steamers were put at their disposal, and they were
ordered to be entertained at the Pacha’s expense. My friend, Admiral
Walker, took up his residence with me, and in the morning of the 13th I
visited him on board the Mahomedie, and afterwards waited on all the
Turkish and Egyptian Admirals, when as much powder was burnt as would
have fought a good action.
I dispatched the Stromboli with the important intelligence of the
delivery of the Turkish fleet, to Sir Robert Stopford, at Marmorice Bay,
on the 11th of January, supposing that the Eastern Question was brought
to a close, but the sequel will show that it was not yet over.
I shall here make a comparison between the conduct of Sir Robert
Stopford and Lord Ponsonby. Both rejected my Convention, and I believe
it was the first time they ever agreed. When Captain Fanshawe returned
from Alexandria, the Admiral, I think, saw his error, because he wrote
to Syria to order a suspension of hostilities, and permitted the
embarkation of the sick and wounded. Lord Ponsonby, on the other hand,
did every thing he possibly could to gain time, and more than that, the
British Ambassador wrote to General Jochmus, a Turkish officer, and
desired him not to suspend hostilities, as is positively stated in
General Michell’s letter to Lord Palmerston, dated December 31, 1840,
and as we shall shortly see, he gave the same directions to his
emissary, Mr. Wood; and the very steamer that brought the Commissioners
to Alexandria, as I shall show hereafter, was the bearer of orders to,
if possible, destroy Ibrahim’s army: so much for the good faith of the
Turks[17]. Admiral Walker was quite ignorant of this as well as myself,
and thinking every thing was settled with Turkey, I very naturally
turned my attention to English interests at Alexandria.
Boghos Bey had announced his intention of selling the crop of cotton on
the 20th of February, and continuing the sale the first of every
succeeding month. The British merchants complained of the difficulty
they had in becoming purchasers under this arrangement; they alleged
that if they imported cash to purchase the cotton, it might be put up at
such a price that they would either be obliged to take it at a loss, or
re-export their specie, and they requested I would use my influence with
Boghos Bey to get him to put it up at public sale. I thought their
request so reasonable, that I immediately went to Boghos Bey, and
suggested to him, that the cotton in question should be put up at public
sale, when it is sure to fetch its real value, and the merchants would
then have a fair chance of becoming purchasers; that this system was
invariably followed by the East India Company, and they found it to
answer their purpose and satisfy the public.
I also took the opportunity of asking Boghos Bey whether the Pacha
intended to execute the Commercial Treaty of the 16th of August, 1839,
which, I assured him, the British Government would insist upon; and that
I felt certain, if the Pacha would allow it to take its course, he would
not only gain many friends in England, but it would engage Lord
Palmerston more strongly to push the point of the hereditary government.
I told him that as I had signed the Convention of the 27th of November,
which had been approved of, I felt bound in honour to do all in my power
to carry it out, and that no argument I could make use of would weigh
more than being able to write to Lord Palmerston that the Commercial
Convention was in full operation.
I also expressed to his Excellency my satisfaction at the loyal manner
in which His Highness had acted throughout the whole affair of the
evacuation of Syria, and the delivery of the fleet, and I trusted it
would have its due weight at Constantinople. The substance of this I put
in writing, and requested Boghos Bey to give me a reply, which he did
next morning.
“Commodore, “Alexandria, Jan. 15, 1841.
“After having informed you, Commodore, that I had made known to the
Viceroy, my master, the friendly letter which you wrote to me on the
14th of this month, I had the honour to accompany you this morning to
his Highness, and in the conversation which ensued, you have been
enabled to convince yourself, Commodore, of the sincerity of his
sentiments and conduct. All the means which we possess have been placed
at the disposal of the Admiral Yaver Pacha to facilitate the departure
of the Ottoman fleet, which is ready to put to sea; the retreat of the
Egyptian troops is being carried into effect in Syria; the garrisons in
Candia, Arabia, and the Holy Cities, only wait the arrival of the forces
to replace them, in order to maintain the tranquillity of those
countries.
“With regard to commerce, his Highness, who is desirous to dedicate to
it all his care, in conformity with the desire which has been expressed,
has been hitherto prevented from doing so by the occupation of the war.
In a few days he will proceed to the provinces to complete such
arrangements as may, without a violent shock to the administration of
the country, put him in a position to fulfil the conditions of the
Treaty to which he has given his acquiescence. The Viceroy trusts that
the time will be granted him, which is indispensable to work this
change, to be effected to the satisfaction of all.
“I have, &c.,
“BOGHOS JOUSSOUF.”
Footnote 14:
See page 39.
Footnote 15:
See page 51.
Footnote 16:
See page 49.
Footnote 17:
See Chapters XI. and XII.; and also _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp.
203, 268, 275.
CHAPTER VI.
The Author visits Cairo—The Mahmoudieh Canal—Fire on board the
Steamer—Voyage up the Nile—Appearance of the Country—Condition of
the People—Arrival at Cairo—Visit to Abbas Pacha—Palace of
Schoubrah—Establishments of the Pacha—Industry of the Arabs—Visit to
the Pyramids—Quit Cairo.
Things appeared to go on so smoothly at Alexandria, and anticipating no
further difficulty in Syria, I took this opportunity of proceeding to
Cairo, to gain as much information as I could relative to the interior
of the country. The Pacha put his own steam-boat at my disposal, and
sent one of his officers as interpreter; and who, I afterwards found,
was likewise charged with paying the expenses of my journey. A palace in
the neighbourhood of Cairo was also put at my disposition, both of which
civilities I declined.
We embarked in a very tolerable boat on the 24th of January, and
proceeded by the Mahmoudieh Canal to Atfeh, where it joins the Nile. The
boat was dragged by horses at a good pace, and the distance, forty-eight
miles, was accomplished in about seven hours. At Atfeh there is a
tolerable inn, where we stopped.
According to a statement in Russell’s _Egypt_, this canal was begun by
Mehemet Ali in October, 1819, and finished early in December of the same
year. It is forty-eight miles long, eighteen feet deep, and ninety feet
broad. It is said that 250,000 persons were employed in cutting it, and
that 30,000 men, women, and children perished in the undertaking; but I
believe this number to be much exaggerated. Before the construction of
this canal, the produce of Upper Egypt was brought down the Nile in
boats to Damietta, and there transhipped into sailing vessels; and, in
fine weather, even open boats frequently undertook the voyage to
Alexandria. This occasioned much loss of time; and as they were
frequently wrecked, much destruction of life and property; for which
reasons Mehemet Ali decided on undertaking the construction of this
Grand Canal. Unfortunately for the inhabitants, the Pacha was anxious to
see his work completed in a short space of time, and the poor Fellahs
were driven in from the country like a flock of sheep, and set to
work,—the greater part unprovided with tools, and all ill-fed, and
unpaid; exposed on a scanty allowance of water to the heat of a broiling
sun by day, and with little or no shelter from the noxious dews at
night.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be wondered that the destruction of
human life was immense; but the Pacha troubled himself little about
their sufferings. He saw his work rapidly progressing; and the first
boat started just two months after its commencement. The Mahmoudieh
Canal, though certainly a grand undertaking, is, nevertheless,
incomplete; there are no locks at either end to communicate with the
Nile and the harbour of Alexandria; the goods are landed at the latter
place, and carried by railroad to the canal close by; and when they
arrive at Atfeh, are again disembarked, and transported to the Nile,
which is shut out by a badly constructed barage. The Nile, in the lowest
season, is below the canal; and the canal is several feet above the sea
in the harbour of Alexandria. It makes a considerable circuit round the
eastern end of the lake Mareotis; and, I believe, had a skilful engineer
been employed, it might have been greatly shortened.
At daylight on the morning of the 25th we embarked in one of the Pacha’s
steamers. I was accompanied by Mr. Larking, the English Consul, and his
lady,—the former in very bad health,—by Captain Martin, Mr. Waghorn,—the
active agent for the transport of goods and passengers (and indeed the
first projector of the enterprise) up the Nile and across the
Isthmus,—and several officers of the Carysfort. Mr. Larking has the
management of a farm belonging to a relation of his, on the banks of the
canal, which he conducts as nearly after the English method as the
difference of the country will allow. There was a very good house on the
estate, besides other extensive buildings.
Mrs. Larking was a capital caterer; and we owe to that amiable lady the
good cheer we met with in our passage up the Nile. The steamer was none
of the best as to speed; but her accommodations were good.
We had not proceeded many miles when she was discovered to be on fire in
the coal-bunkers. We ran her alongside the bank; and Mr. Larking, who
was ill, and could hardly walk, was with difficulty got on shore,
together with Mrs. Larking and his child. The decks were ript up; and,
notwithstanding the noise and confusion amongst the Arab crew, with the
assistance of the officers, we managed to get the fire under, without
materially injuring the boat. On examination, we found the beams of the
vessel were too close to the chimney; and after being completely
charred, they took fire, and ignited the coals. This was not a good
beginning; but was attended with no other consequence than the delay of
a few hours. The current was running down between two and three miles an
hour; and, although the wind was generally in our favour, we made little
progress, and were easily passed by the light country boats,
notwithstanding their miserable equipments. The Nile in most parts is
about a quarter of a mile wide; and the water not being low, was easily
navigated. Boats of all sizes crowd the river, conveying to Alexandria,
corn, chopped straw, cotton, and various other products of the upper
country. Most of these boats were the property of the Pacha, for he
monopolized the greater part of the trade, as well as most of the
produce of the country; and if I may judge by their appearance, Mehemet
Ali was as bad a ship’s husband, as he was an agriculturist; but he has
a mania of doing every thing himself. He was rapidly making himself
owner of all the land in Egypt, as well as of all the trade. It is a
common custom with him, when his crops are ready, to force the Fellahs
to leave their own villages to work on his property. At the same time,
he seizes all the boats on the river to bring down his produce, caring
very little what becomes of the property of others. This becomes
peculiarly oppressive when the Nile is rapidly rising, as it often
happens that the whole of their produce is swept away during the time
they are employed to save the Pacha’s.
When the wind blows down the river, the passage of the boats is very
slow. There is no towing path; no horses or mules; the crew land, and
they manage to tug their boats along from ten to twenty miles a day,
varying according to the size of the boat. The descent down, owing to
the current, unless the wind is very strong, may be about fifty or sixty
miles in the twenty-four hours; and considerably more when the wind is
fair.
Egypt in the Delta is about 160 miles wide; but when you ascend the
river, and are clear of the Delta, it narrows to from 11 to 20 miles,
and is shut in by sand-hills and mountains on each side. The country is
richly cultivated, and well irrigated, but in a very primitive manner.
The villages are raised considerably above the plain; but, nevertheless,
are sometimes much inconvenienced by a high Nile, and are of the most
miserable description. The people are poorly dressed in coarse blue
cotton shirts and petticoats; but their wants seemed few; and I saw no
appearance of discontent or unhappiness amongst them.
At sunset on the second day, in passing round a point where there was a
considerable bend in the river, the Pyramids opened to our view,
apparently only a few miles off; their gigantic size gave them this
appearance, though their distance could not have been less than thirty
miles. We continued our route during the night, and at daylight we
stopped considerably below Boulac, the Wapping, it may be called, of
Cairo. From thence we decided to prosecute our journey on foot. As the
vapour that hung over the river became dissipated by a brilliant sun
rising over the Mokhattan hills, on one hand appeared the spires,
mosques, and minarets of the City of Victory, whilst on the other its
beams gilded that part of the seven wonders of the world, the gigantic
relics of antiquity, the Pyramids. About an hour’s pleasant walk, under
the shade of a fine avenue of sycamore trees, brought us to the
comfortable hotel of Mr. Waghorn, to whose perseverance and activity we
owe the comparatively easy traject across the isthmus to Suez. By the
time we had dressed and breakfasted, our guide returned from the
Citadel, where I had sent him to announce our arrival to Abbas Pacha,
the grandson of Mehemet Ali, and the Governor of Cairo. Eleven was the
hour appointed to wait upon his Excellency, who sent a brilliant
cavalcade to conduct us to his palace, consisting of splendid Arab
horses, proudly champing their golden bits, under a profusion of crimson
velvet trappings, each led by a sais, or groom, and a tolerable coach
dragged by four cream-coloured horses; the coach we consigned to the
junior of the party, Captain Martin; Captain Williams and myself
preferred the horses. In this manner we entered the Citadel, the scene
of so many brilliant achievements, and of so many bloody deeds. Memory
failed not to recall one of the most appalling of the latter that
tyranny ever planned or perfidy carried into effect. The foul murder of
the Mamelukes will for ever be a deep stain on the character of Mehemet
Ali. It is true they were troublesome gentlemen, and had they lived
would, in all probability, have destroyed the Pacha; but nothing can
excuse the treacherous manner in which he accomplished his object.
Such were our feelings as we passed the gates so securely closed on that
fearful occasion, and as we cast a glance on these, on the appalling
height of these once blood-stained battlements, we could not help
admiring the bold spirit which ventured on such a leap, and wondering
how he survived to tell the tale. The place known as the Mameluke’s Leap
is near the gateway, the fall between thirty and forty feet. The horse
was crushed on the spot, but, strange to say, the bold rider escaped
unhurt, and lived for many years afterwards at Constantinople.
Abbas Pacha, the grandson of Mehemet Ali, has long been known for his
hatred to anything having the resemblance of a Frank, and this is little
to be wondered at, considering the education he has received. His
character is none of the best; he is devoid of talent, and much more
feared than either loved or respected. However, all things considered,
he received us with tolerable politeness. Pipes and coffee were
produced, and we were invited to take seats on the Divan. His appearance
is not much in his favour, being a dull heavy man, much more resembling
a butcher than a Pacha. After a short conversation on indifferent
subjects we took our leave, and were conducted through the different
apartments of the Palace, which were both elegant and comfortable. From
the Citadel we proceeded to the country palace and gardens of Schoubrah,
which we approached under the shadow of a noble avenue of Egyptian
sycamore, whose thick foliage rendered it quite impervious to the rays
of the sun. The palace of Schoubrah, built a few years back by the
Pacha, cost an immense sum of money, and as we strolled through the
delightful gardens, and inspected the fountains and kiosks, constructed
at immense expense, we could not repress a feeling of sorrow that the
ruler who had raised such a structure for his own ease and convenience,
had not turned more of his attention to the comforts of the poor Arabs,
who are lodged in the most miserable mud huts at the very gates of the
palace.
During the short period of our stay at Cairo, time did not hang heavily
on our hands. The crowded and covered bazaars, the mosques, the tombs of
the Caliphs and Mamelukes, together with the numerous manufactories and
institutions established by the Pacha, successively occupied much of our
time, and fully engaged our attention.
Had the Pacha shown a little more judgment and a little more nature in
the establishment of these institutions he would have deserved more
credit, but he has a mania of going ahead, and thinks that Egypt should
have manufactories of her own of all sorts, and be independent of other
nations; and really when we look at his founderies for cannon, his
manufactory for arms, and the industry with which the Arabs work, it is
quite surprising. Most of his establishments are directed by English or
French men; in the musket manufactory there is an Englishman, and he
assured me that the industrious manner in which the Arabs were working
on the day we inspected the establishment was their usual habit; if so,
I certainly never saw so much activity in any manufactory in my life.
The Pacha has begun to find out that the cotton and cloth manufactories,
&c., are far from profitable, and many of these establishments were shut
up, and the workmen discharged.
Amongst the scientific institutions, which are nearly all under the
management of Frenchmen, may be reckoned the hospital, with the schools
of surgery and medicine attached to them, under the superintendence of
Clot Bey; the academy of drawing, and that of mathematics; the students
being all taken from the class of common Fellahs, and, like the rest of
the Pacha’s subjects, compelled to work at whatever he thought fit, and
toil they do from morning to night, in hopes of being one day employed
as civil engineers, or draughtsmen.
The second day following our arrival we devoted to a pilgrimage, which
we could not but fulfil: a visit to the Pyramids.
After traversing the fine olive grounds and gardens planted by Ibrahim,
on what were formerly unsightly and huge heaps of rubbish, we crossed
the Nile at the Island of Rhoda, where he has likewise carried
cultivation to great perfection, and landed on the western bank, at
Gezeh, famed for the action that took place between the French and the
Mamelukes; the conquerors thought perhaps it would be more grand if
dignified as La Bataille des Pyramids, of which it is certainly in view.
Each of our party being duly accommodated with that most useful of all
animals in Egypt, a little jackass, after traversing fields waving with
the richest luxuriance of cultivation, we in due time reached the foot
of the first of those stupendous monuments the “Pyramids,” that of
Cheops; then, and not till then, were we aware of the huge mass at the
foot of which we stood. But descriptions without end have been written
of these stupendous works, and they rise as a memento of the folly of
those who consumed so much labour and time in raising such useless
fabrics. As numberless conjectures as to their purposes have been
ventured by various writers, I shall not increase the list, but refer
the reader to Belzoni, Wilkinson, Vyse, or fifty others.
On my return to Cairo I learned by telegraph that intelligence of
importance had arrived at Alexandria, which required my immediate
presence; this put an end to all the projects we had formed of further
exploring this interesting country, and next morning we bad adieu to
Cairo and its wonders, and soon found ourselves steaming down the broad
Nile, with the current in our favour, but a strong northerly wind right
in our teeth.
CHAPTER VII.
Letter from Captain Stewart—Apprehended Treachery of the Turkish
Authorities—Question of the Syrian Troops—Double dealing of Mehemet
Ali—The Author’s Letters to the chief British and Turkish
Officers—Letter to the Admiral.
Halfway down the river I met Colonel Napier, with the following letter
from Captain Stewart, who had come to Gaza to prevent, if possible, a
collision between the Turks and the Egyptians.
“Gaza, January 25, 1841,
Monday, 1½h., P.M.
“My dear Commodore,
“I arrived here with Colonel Rose and Rechid Pacha about an hour ago, in
the Hecate.
“We have been induced to come, from the suspicions and jealousies
entertained by the Turks, _* * *_ of the intentions of Ibrahim Pacha, in
concentrating such a formidable force in this place.
“The Turks have advanced all their forces on Jerusalem, Hebron, and
Medjdel, and we become somewhat anxious that _* *_ would bring on a
collision.
“They assure us here, that the retirement shall be commenced to-morrow
morning, by two regiments of cavalry and two more in the afternoon; and
we send this news back to Jaffa, which will keep all right and safe.
“But the point of the Syrian conscripts being allowed to remain in their
own country, is one of great difficulty and great importance, inasmuch
as the Turks have received positive and late instructions to insist upon
it. Achmet Pacha, (who commands here,) says, he will restore them the
moment he receives the order. Meantime a list of those who may be in the
first retiring regiments is to be given to me, and so soon as leave for
the Syrians to remain arrives, every one of them shall be returned.
“Rechid Pacha assures us that Mehemet Ali gave his word of honour to the
Turkish Commissioners at Alexandria, that they should all be permitted
to leave the Egyptian ranks previous to passing the frontiers; and it is
to obtain this order, without a moment’s loss of time, that I send off
the steamers. I beg of you to return the authority by the quickest
_possible conveyance_, be it Hecate or any other already coaled. The
Turks attach great importance to this article. They are now in force as
well of cavalry as of infantry, all the cavalry from the north having
joined, _* * *_
* * * * * *
“I have now no fears but all will go well. Ibrahim Pacha is expected
here to-morrow, and I shall wait here to see him, and, indeed, until I
hear from Alexandria.
“Poor gallant, excellent, General Michell died at Jaffa yesterday of
fever and ague, caught by exposure and fatigue. Colonel Bridgeman now
commands, and will do everything well. _* * * *_
* * * * * *
“In haste,
“Yours very faithfully,
(Signed) “HOUSTON STEWART.”
“To Commodore
Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.”
The Turks, not aware of the strength of the Egyptians, seemed to await a
good excuse to attack them, and this I feared would be afforded them, by
the fact that many of the Syrians had accompanied the Egyptian army; the
Turks had orders to demand them, and it was stoutly refused by the
Egyptians, who had no orders on the subject.
I had before spoken to Mehemet Ali about these people, and he objected,
under the plea that it would disorganize Ibrahim’s army even more than
the retreat, and if they were allowed to join the Turks they might be
turned against him. This was much more than probable, and I in
consequence consented that they should be delivered up at Gaza. Mehemet
Ali in this case did not keep his word.
Colonel Napier, accompanied by Capt. Ward, had seen Boghos Bey and also
the Pacha, on the subject of these despatches. Mehemet Ali declared to
them that he had settled with Masloum Bey that they were to come into
Egypt, and be sent back from thence. This was not true. I do not believe
any such arrangement was entered into with Masloum: on the contrary, he
demanded them, and on the Pacha appealing to me I consented to their
coming as far as Gaza. The Turks had shown so little good faith since
the commencement of the retreat that I am not at all surprised that
Ibrahim should put no confidence in them.
On my return to Alexandria I brought the subject of the Syrian troops
before the Pacha, who expressed a great unwillingness to leave them
behind; and as there was no way of obliging Ibrahim to do this but by
violence, and as it is more than probable the Turks would have had the
worst of it, I thought it much better, under all circumstances, not to
proceed to this extremity, and I wrote as follows to Captain Stewart,
and General Jochmus, inclosing a copy of the Convention, in order that
the Turks might have no pretext whatever to use force; which I have no
doubt they would have done when Ibrahim’s army was weakened by the
detachments that were embarked, and sent across the Desert, had it not
been for the presence of the British officers, who, however, though with
difficulty enough, managed to keep them quiet till the evacuation was
completed.
“H.M.S. Carysfort, Alexandria,
Feb. 2, 1841.
“Sir,
“I beg to inclose you the copy of a Convention entered into by myself
and the Egyptian Government, which Convention has been approved of by
the British Government and the Allies, and I have been sent by Sir
Robert Stopford to carry it into execution.
“I have authorized his Highness the Pacha to send frigates and
transports to Gaza, to embark any part of the Egyptian army he thinks
fit, and it is my direction that you afford them every facility in your
power to accomplish this, as well as to facilitate their retreat by
land.
“You will call upon the Turkish authorities to support you in this, and
should you find any impediment thrown in the way, you will, in the name
of the Allied Powers, protest against it in the most solemn manner, as
contrary to the existing treaties, as contrary to the custom of
civilized nations, as contrary to the laws of humanity, and contrary
even to the interests of the Porte.
“The Syrian troops are not to be embarked against their own free will,
but if you have any suspicion that General Jochmus will use them against
the Egyptians they had better be disarmed, or even be allowed to go into
Egypt; in fact, do any thing to avoid a collision.
“I have, &c.,
“CHAS. NAPIER, _Commodore_.
“P.S. I have written this to avoid any misunderstanding, though my
letter of the 11th, delivered to you by Lieut. Loring, appears
sufficiently explicit. The Stromboli is to be sent back immediately.”
“Captain Houston Stewart, C.B.,
H.M.S. Benbow,
Or, the Senior Naval Officer, Gaza.”
-------
“H.M.S. Carysfort, Alexandria,
Feb. 2, 1841.
“Sir,
“I have the honour of inclosing you the copy of a Convention entered
into by myself and the Egyptian Government, which has been approved of
by the Allies, and I have been directed to see it carried into
execution.
“I send you this Convention, because I understand the Turkish
authorities, (notwithstanding my letter to you on the 11th of January,
sent by Lieut. Loring,) have put difficulties in the way of carrying it
into execution, and have even meditated an attack on the Egyptian army.
“I have authorized Mehemet Ali to send frigates or transports to Gaza to
embark any portion of the Egyptian army he sees fit, and I have directed
Captain Stewart to give them every facility; and I call upon your
Excellency, in the name of the Allied Powers, to desist from any hostile
measure.
“Relative to the question of the Syrians, I have directed Captain
Stewart not to embark them against their will.
“Should the Turkish authorities, (at the head of which I believe you
are,) impede in any way the retreat of the Egyptian army, I have
directed Captain Stewart to protest against it in the most solemn
manner, in the name of the Allies, as contrary to the existing treaties,
as contrary to the custom of civilized nations, as contrary to the laws
of humanity, and contrary even to the interests of the Porte.
“I have, &c.,
“CHARLES NAPIER, _Commodore_.”
“His Excellency Jochmus Pacha,
Commander-in-Chief, Forces, Syria.”
I wrote a short letter to the same purport to Colonel Bridgeman, and
also communicated the state of affairs to the Admiral, then at Malta:—
“H.M.S. Carysfort, Alexandria,
Feb. 4, 1841.
Sir,
“In my letter to you of the 23rd of January I informed you of the
arrival of Ibrahim Pacha at Gaza, which I find was a mistake; he marched
with the rear-guard, and arrived at Gaza on the 31st.
“I received a private letter from Captain Stewart, dated the 23rd
January, informing me he was very apprehensive that the Turkish
authorities would seize any opportunity to bring on a collision between
the Turks and Egyptians, and in fact the former had advanced, and
skirmished with the outposts, and then made rather a precipitate
retreat.
“I inclose copies of letters I wrote to Captain Stewart, General
Jochmus, and Colonel Bridgeman.
“Yesterday I again heard from Captain Stewart, announcing the arrival of
Ibrahim Pacha at Gaza, and his intention of immediately retiring again
into Egypt; he had collected at Gaza 25,000 men, including about 6000
cavalry, in good order; this formidable force will, I have no doubt,
keep the Turks quiet.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) CHAS. NAPIER, _Commodore_.”
“The Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, &c.,
Malta.”
CHAPTER VIII.
Affairs in Syria—Letters of Sir Charles Smith to Lord Palmerston—Course
that ought to have been pursued after the Battle of
Boharsof—Ignorance as to Ibrahim’s Movements and Intentions—General
Michell to Lord Palmerston—M. Steindl’s Report respecting the
Advance upon Gaza—Capt. Stewart to the Admiral—General Michell’s
and Captain Stewart’s Opinion as to Lord Ponsonby’s
Orders—Correspondence between Captain Stewart and General Jochmus.
It will now be necessary to go back to Syria, and give an account of
what took place there after the rejection of the Convention.
It appears, by Sir Charles Smith’s letter to Lord Palmerston, dated
November 24th, 1840[18], that Ibrahim retired from Zachle and Malaka on
the 21st of that month.
Without at all putting my experience in comparison with Sir Charles
Smith’s, I must differ in opinion from him about the propriety of
attacking Ibrahim Pacha. When Sir Charles Smith took command of the
troops, Ibrahim had lost Sidon, been beat on the heights of Ornagacuan
and Boharsof, and been forced to evacuate Beyrout, Tripoli, and the
passes of the Taurus, and retire on Zachle. My opinion at the time was
for a forward movement. Ibrahim ought not to have been allowed to
concentrate at Zachle and Malaka. He ought not to have been allowed
breathing-time, and most probably the greater part of his army would
have deserted or been captured. I cannot say the Turkish troops were
well organized, but, nevertheless, they had done very well; their wants
were few, and after getting possession of Beyrout, the means of
transport was not wanting, and they were capital marchers. I do not say
that we ought to have followed them across the plain of the Bekaa
without cavalry, but we ought to have followed him up to Zachle and
Malaka, and afterwards been guided by circumstances. It appears that he
was enabled to collect 50,000 men at Damascus, of which 30,000 were
effective. Such a force being collected, there was a very good reason
for accepting a Convention, but a very bad one for rejecting it.
Sir Charles Smith further writes, under date of the 29th of
November[19], that the troops from Aleppo had commenced their retreat
from Damascus on El Mezereib on the 26th instant, and that Ibrahim Pacha
had ordered his secretaries to be ready to depart with him by the same
route, and the whole of the force under his command had moved, or was in
order of march. On comparing dates, it is impossible that Ibrahim’s army
could have moved from Damascus on the 26th, as he only left Zachle on
the 21st, the distance from thence to Damascus being three days’ march,
and it surely would have required more than two days to put in motion an
army of 50,000. I am disposed to think the intelligence was incorrect.
It is not impossible that a division might have gone to El Mezereib, but
I do not believe that Ibrahim began his final retreat till the 29th of
December.
Sir Charles further writes from Beyrout, under date of the 6th of
December[20], that a courier from Alexandria had stopped the progress of
the Egyptian army in retreat, and that Ibrahim Pacha, by intelligence of
the 2nd from Damascus, “had returned to the city, with the intention of
quartering his whole force within the walls, wisely preferring, to the
hazard of a retreat through the Desert, the guarantee of the Convention
for embarking all he possesses, (plunder as well as military stores,) at
the points we hold on the coast; such stipulation having been made clear
to his understanding, as being binding on the Allies. The contrary,
however, being the fact, he will now find himself, (accidentally as it
were,) master of a stronghold in the heart of Syria, of which he had
been virtually, if not totally, bereaved.”
How a courier could stop the progress of the Egyptian army I cannot
comprehend. The Convention was signed on the 27th of November; on the
28th Mehemet Ali sent an officer to Beyrout by a British steamer, with
orders to Ibrahim to commence his retreat; the Egyptian was to be
accompanied by a British officer to see it carried into execution. What
object, then, could Mehemet Ali have in sending a courier, even if it
was possible, which he declared it was not, in consequence of the
distracted state of the country, to order them to return? It will be
seen, by my correspondence with Boghos Bey, that Mehemet Ali always
objected to embarking his troops. I proposed that he should do so,
thinking it much better for the peace and happiness of the country, that
they should proceed by sea to Alexandria in preference to marching
through a country where the inhabitants would be exposed to all the
devastations of a retiring army. I never contemplated that his army
should be destroyed after signing a Convention; quite the contrary. The
moment the Convention was signed, Mehemet Ali could only be considered
the Sultan’s servant, and the Egyptian troops the Sultan’s army, and not
a hair of their heads ought to have been touched; and as to embarking
plunder, no part of the Convention sanctioned that, and if it had been
permitted, the blame would have rested with our own officers.
I cannot either understand how Ibrahim Pacha could have known of the
Convention which only left Alexandria on the 28th in the afternoon, so
as to have allowed him time, had he quitted Damascus on the 27th, to
return on the 2nd of December; nor can I understand how he could suppose
the Convention should be binding on the Allies, when it was immediately
rejected by the authorities in Syria, and his officer sent back without,
I believe, landing at Beyrout; nor do I see how he had either been
virtually or totally bereaved of his stronghold in Syria, seeing that if
he had ever quitted Damascus and returned, it was his own act and deed.
Sir Robert Stopford received the intelligence of Ibrahim’s retreat at
Marmorice Bay on the 13th of January, which he communicated to the
Admiralty, adding, “my orders to Commodore Sir Charles Napier may by
this time have been the means of facilitating his retreat[21].”
Captain Stewart writes to the Admiral from Jaffa, January the 10th[22]:
“General Jochmus reached this from Jerusalem yesterday morning early;
and we find that he has given such orders as will complete a line of
twenty-eight battalions betwixt this place and Jerusalem, and that all
will be in position by sunset this evening. The chief object of this
advance seems to be to induce Ibrahim Pacha to retire by the Desert, and
not by the coast. We have been somewhat in doubt and suspense as to
which road he would retire by; but news reached the Seraskier last
night, which is believed to be authentic, stating, that Ibrahim’s
vanguard was already thirteen hours’ march to the south-east of
El-Mezereib, and that, consequently, there was no longer any doubt of
his taking the Desert route. It is very difficult to get information,
and still more so to know how much to believe; but my own opinion, and
(what is of much more importance,) General Michell’s opinion is, that
Ibrahim is positively evacuating Syria. General Michell and I are both
determined to confine ourselves strictly to precautionary and defensive
measures; and we shall use every endeavour to prevail on our allies to
do the same, and not to obstruct, but rather to facilitate, Ibrahim’s
retreat.” By this it appears that Captain Stewart and General Michell
had also orders to facilitate Ibrahim’s retreat; and with the exception
of the irregulars and mountaineers harassing, and occasioning some
losses, unavoidable in a retreating army, but very much exaggerated by
the officers sent by General Jochmus, who reports them to have lost
10,000 or 15,000 men, on the 5th of January nothing had been done by the
Turkish army who occupied Acre, Jerusalem, defiles of D’Jenin, Jaffa,
and Ramla.
General Michell writes to Lord Palmerston, dated Acre, December 31,
1840[23]:—
“On the departure of Sir Charles Smith, the Sultan’s commission was
delivered to General Jochmus, and a few days afterwards he left Beyrout
for Sidon, and proceeded thence with some light cavalry to Hasbeyah in
the hill country on the Upper Jordan, for the purpose of giving
encouragement and direction to the mountaineers, and of obtaining
accurate intelligence concerning the Egyptian army.
“The most vague and conflicting accounts were arriving daily as to the
intentions of Ibrahim Pacha. He had concentrated his forces about
Damascus, and the general belief was that he would immediately commence
his retreat to Egypt.
“General Jochmus, notwithstanding his nearer approach to Damascus, has
been still kept in doubt as to what is going on there; but he seems to
be fully of opinion that Ibrahim Pacha is about to move, and that he
will, if possible, retreat on Gaza. His proposal, therefore, is to cause
the Egyptian Army to be harassed on its flanks and rear by the mountain
levies, and having assembled the regular Turkish troops at points along
the coast, to operate with them as occasions may offer, in the defiles
between the Jordan and the coast. In the mean time General Jochmus has
been very desirous of attacking Gaza, and of capturing or destroying the
provisions which are said to be in store there for the Egyptian army,
and he has repeatedly urged my co-operation for this purpose with
men-of-war or steamers on the coast. There have been, however, and are
still, many difficulties opposed to such an undertaking. The whole of
the fleet had taken shelter at Marmorice, leaving only one steamer to
watch the wreck of the Zebra in the Bay of Acre, besides the Hecate,
which brought me to Beyrout; yet three French vessels, a corvette, and
two brigs of war, remained upon the coast and were generally at anchor
near Beyrout. I took the earliest opportunity of making this known to
the Admiral, Sir Robert Stopford, and he most kindly and promptly sent
Captain Houston Stewart with the Benbow, seventy-two, and the Hazard
sloop. They arrived on the 24th of December, but the heavy surf
prevented their communication with the shore, and it was not until the
27th that I could get the detachments of artillery and sappers, which
came from England in the Hecate, disembarked at Acre. In the mean time,
however, Lieutenant-Colonel Colquhoun of the Artillery, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson of the Engineers, had made a visit to that
fortress, and likewise to Tyre and Sidon.
“The Admiral, while he sent me this naval aid, expressed a great
unwillingness to have it employed against Gaza or in any offensive
operations; first, on account of the storms prevailing at this season;
secondly, because the negotiations opened by Captain Fanshawe were still
pending, and he had consented to a request, made by the Pacha of Egypt,
Mehemet Ali, that Egyptian steamers might go off Gaza to embark the
sick, the women, and the children, of Ibrahim Pacha’s army, for
Alexandria.
“Captain Houston Stewart had instructions from the Admiral based upon
these reasons; and they of course weighed also with me as to any
operations against Gaza; besides I had received information of the
Egyptian force there, and at El-Arish, having been largely reinforced.
“Nothing has been seen of the Egyptian steamers from Alexandria, to
receive the sick of Ibrahim Pacha’s army. When that permission was given
by Captain Fanshawe, it was supposed the army was already on its march
to Gaza, and not likely to linger at Damascus. Probably Ibrahim Pacha
delays his movement from that city, now, in consequence of the
Convention commenced with his father by Captain Fanshawe. Our situation
will be very embarrassing until the negotiations are terminated, since
any act of hostility on our part may be construed into a breach of
faith, and may disturb arrangements half concluded. I am, therefore,
anxiously expecting orders from Lord Ponsonby upon the subject. In the
meantime his Excellency’s latest instructions to General Jochmus, and
upon which he is prepared and resolved to act with energy, dictate a
continuance of offensive operations.”
As I have before stated, we now see the Commander-in-Chief of the allied
force by sea and land giving directions to his officers to facilitate
the retreat of Ibrahim Pacha, and the Austrian Ambassador declaring he
would disavow any attack upon him, thereby maintaining good faith with
Mehemet Ali; and the Ambassador at Constantinople giving orders to his
general to continue offensive operations, thereby compromising not only
the honour of England but of the Allied Powers.
M. Steindl, in a letter to Baron Stürmer, dated the 10th of January,
writes from Jaffa[24],—
“General Jochmus, escorted by 100 Turkish cavalry, continued in the mean
time to traverse the mountains of the Naplouse and the districts
situated between the Jordan and the Haouran, in order to assemble as
many mountaineers as possible. He formed several corps of them, the
command of which he entrusted to M. Dumont and Count Szechenyi, his
aides-de-camp, for the purpose of harassing Ibrahim Pacha during his
retreat, whilst he ordered Omar Pacha, who was stationed at Ramla, with
2500 men, to form a junction with a portion of the garrisons of Jaffa
and of Jerusalem, and to attempt a sudden attack upon Gaza, in order
there to burn the considerable magazines of provisions which Mehemet Ali
had caused to be transported thither to facilitate the retreat of his
son’s army by that road.
“The English loudly disavowed this attack, less, as it appears, because
they despaired of success, than because Admiral Stopford had indicated
to Mehemet Ali that town as the place where the Egyptians should
concentrate themselves to be embarked for Alexandria, in case an
arrangement could be brought about between the Sultan and his vassal.
For this purpose, Rechid Mehemed Pacha, appointed Chief of the Staff at
head-quarters, was sent on the 5th instant from St. Jean d’Acre to
Tiberias to General Jochmus, with orders to invite him to proceed to
Jaffa to be present at a great council of war, whilst the same order was
sent by Tatar to Omar Pacha, with a prohibition against attacking Gaza.
General Jochmus arrived here in the course of yesterday, still leaving
his aides-de-camp at the head of the armed peasantry.”
On the 17th of January Captain Stewart again writes to the
Commander-in-Chief from Jaffa[25]:—
“My letter of the 10th instant[26], forwarded by Gorgon, would inform
you of General Michell’s and my own determination to confine ourselves
strictly to precautionary and defensive measures. It will be therefore
necessary to explain the circumstances attending a late advance of the
Turkish troops upon Gaza, and for this purpose I transmit herewith
copies of a letter I addressed to General Jochmus, immediately after our
last conference on the 12th instant, also of a note which I received
from General Michell, after he had reached Ramla, and my reply to that
note, sent by a staff officer to General Michell, at Ashdod.
“General Michell expressed, in the most decided and unequivocal terms,
his disapprobation of the expedition. We both appealed to the Seraskier,
who refused to put his written veto on the advance, without which
General Jochmus declared he would persevere, and accordingly he left
Jaffa for Ramla within an hour. General Michell then felt that he was in
a peculiarly awkward position, but with the true spirit of an English
soldier determined to accompany and render every assistance to the
Turkish generals.
“I also felt myself bound, notwithstanding my protest, to go down with
the Vesuvius and Hecate, and make a demonstration on the coast,
especially as I thought I might render material assistance, by either
threatening a descent on the Egyptians’ rear to the southward of Gaza,
by which their retreat on El-Arish would be endangered, or in case of
the Turks retreating, protecting with the great guns that hazardous
operation.
“At 4 A.M. of Friday the 15th, we weighed in the Vesuvius and Hecate,
and proceeded as far as Ascalon, when the weather became so thick, and
blew so hard, with a heavy increasing sea, that after showing ourselves
again off Jaffa, I requested Captain Henderson to run out fifteen or
twenty miles for an offing, bank up the fires, and put the vessels under
canvass. At 2 A.M. on the 16th, it being then more moderate, we bore up,
and at daylight we put the steam on and steered towards Ascalon, but on
getting sight of the beach, the surf was so excessive as to preclude all
hope of being able to communicate with the shore for many hours to come.
We therefore unwillingly returned off Jaffa, where we were not able to
effect a landing until sunset, when I found General Michell just
returned, having preceded the returning Turkish troops. The Seraskier
had reached Jaffa about two hours previous to General Michell.
“I ought to have stated, that by General Michell’s desire, twenty-five
marines were embarked on board the Vesuvius under command of Lieutenant
Anderson, and a like number on board the Hecate; these have all since
been disembarked here.”
General Michell writes to Capt. Stewart[27], “Mr. Wood is prepared to
give us in writing very powerful arguments in favour of a continuation
of active offensive operations; his letter from Lord Ponsonby, after
Captain Fanshawe’s arrival at Constantinople, is strong upon the
subject.” To which Stewart replies[28], “We know Lord Palmerston’s and
the British Government’s wishes and orders. Lord Ponsonby’s orders must
with us be subordinate to Lord Palmerston’s; we have promised the
Admiral that we will act strictly on precautionary and defensive
principles.”
Captain Stewart’s letter to General Jochmus, above referred to, and the
reply, were as follow:
“British Head-quarters, Jaffa,
January 12, 1841, 3 P.M.
“Sir,
“In order that there may be no misapprehension on the subject of our
conferences yesterday and to-day, I think it right to put the
particulars into writing.
“When Rechid Pacha came to General Michell and myself yesterday morning,
he stated that Ibrahim Pacha’s army being now fairly entered on the
Desert, there could be no reason for the 3000 Egyptian men quartered at
Gaza being permitted to remain there, and asked us if we would concur in
an advance which should have the effect of ridding the Syrian country of
the plunderers. General Michell and I both said that our instructions
being to facilitate the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians, there
could be no political reason to prevent our co-operation, and that,
provided the forces advanced were so great as to make resistance
hopeless, and certain information received of Ibrahim Pacha having
advanced south of any road by which he could march upon Gaza, there
appeared to be none of a military nature.
“Very shortly after this, Rechid Pacha returned with your Excellency,
when the same points were distinctly stated, and you expressed your
conviction of the impossibility of Ibrahim’s coming upon Gaza; that we
should advance close to it, and you would send notice to the Egyptian
troops, that they might have twenty-four hours to retreat, after which
you would attack and occupy Gaza. Rechid Pacha said he would go
immediately to Jerusalem, from whence he would write positive
information, upon which we might safely rely; that we should not move
from this place until we received his communications. After his
departure, General Michell and I paid your Excellency two visits, in
which we found out, on examination of maps and Egyptian officers who had
deserted from Gaza, that it was not only possible but very probable that
Ibrahim might come on Gaza by the end of the Dead Sea, and that he might
reach it within two days of the time in which your troops could. You
then avowed that your aim was not to facilitate his retreat, but to
annihilate his army, and prevent a single Egyptian getting back to his
own country.
“The Seraskier Zacharias Pacha, your Excellency, General Michell, and
myself had a meeting this forenoon, at which you stated it to be your
determination to advance; that you had ordered the troops at Jerusalem
to make a combined movement on Gaza with those from Ramla; and that 6000
men and 1400 cavalry (900 of them being irregular), with twenty-four
guns, would attack Gaza, destroy the provisions, and immediately retire,
leaving two battalions in the place; that if Ibrahim Pacha appeared you
would retire, and that, if he pressed you, you could retreat on the
mountains near Jerusalem. There appeared to General Michell and to me
such an evident and imminent hazard in this operation, and so inadequate
an object to be gained, so much evil would result from a retrograde
movement, such disaster from defeat, that I declared I could be no party
to it, and that so long as it was not ascertained beyond doubt that
Ibrahim Pacha was not coming on Gaza, I could not afford any naval
co-operation.
“It is with sincere pain that I have come to this resolution; your
Excellency has had no reason to doubt the hearty co-operation hitherto
of Her Britannic Majesty’s naval forces in promoting the Sultan’s cause;
but I should be betraying my trust, and acting in direct opposition to
my orders, if I concurred in any operations which had for their object
the prevention or suspension of Ibrahim Pacha’s evacuation of Syria.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “HOUSTON STEWART,
“_Captain and Senior Officer commanding
H.B.M. ships and vessels on the Coast of Syria_.”
“Head-quarters, Jerusalem,
“January 25, 1841.
“Sir,
“I had the honour to receive your letter of the 12th of January only on
the 17th, and active operations have prevented my answering this before.
“It would be superfluous to enter now into any details on its varied
contents, since fortune and victory have declared on all sides for me by
the total rout of the Egyptians, thus consoling me, in a certain degree,
for that want of confidence in my judgment which it is evident you
entertain, with respect to my operations in the field. Unskilful as I
may be deemed as a military commander, it must at least be confessed,
from the recent march of events, that I am certainly a very fortunate
one. I must, however, most distinctly advert to, and refute two points
upon which a great part of the critical acumen, contained in the letter
in question, appears to be erroneously based; stating first, that I am
not aware of any person in Syria being in the secret of my operations,
and cognizant of all my plans, until after their execution, since I
consider secresy the mainspring of success; and secondly, that I do not
admit the right of any naval officer, on a special station, to attempt
to control those operations, in the way you have thought proper to
assume, upon the same principle, as I suppose would guide you, were I to
presume to give you a lesson on the best mode of managing your ship. At
the same time I am, and have always been, most happy to receive any
opinion or explanation, provided they be given with the courtesy and
respect due to the General intrusted with the operations of the army.
“It is to me a matter of regret, that after the transcendant services
rendered by the British fleet in the very last operation, you should
have thought proper to decline any naval co-operation in the projected
movements on Gaza, but it certainly is to me much more a cause of
surprise, that you should have thought proper to write an official
letter, on an occasion where naval co-operation could not even make any
serious impression on the inland position of the enemy, and where the
sole column of Ramleh was more than doubly sufficient to attain my
object. It is well known, that after the defeat of part of the Egyptian
cavalry at El-Maishdell on the 15th instant, the enemy never ventured
again to meet our troops beyond the river Ascalon, although I advanced
our cavalry, which was not half his in number, on the following day, and
left it encamped within an hour and a half’s march of Gaza, whilst, at
the same time, I sent the infantry and artillery into Jaffa, on account
of the inclement weather and impracticable state of the roads. Under
these circumstances, it would, in my opinion, have been perfectly
consistent with your responsibility, not to have given any naval
assistance in this operation, but without officially declining it after
my return to Jaffa, the more so, as I fully agreed with you on the
impossibility of the steamers being of any immediate use; but it seems
to have been your particular desire to have made the whole transaction a
matter of official correspondence, which, although I do not decline, I
would fain hope is now brought to a close.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “A. JOCHMUS, _Lieut.-General_,
“_Commanding the Army of Operation_.”
“To Capt. Houston Stewart, R.N.,
Commanding the Naval Forces off Jaffa.”
Footnote 18:
_Major-General Sir C. F. Smith to Viscount Palmerston._
My Lord, Head-quarters, Beyrout, Nov. 24,
1840.
I have great satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship that a prudent
adherence to my instructions from the Foreign Office has struck a
heavier blow on the army of Ibrahim Pacha than a series of general
actions could have achieved. Each succeeding victory could only have
withdrawn us so much farther from our resources, without advancing, in
any degree, the cause we have in hand. I take not merit to myself,
unless it be for my forbearance. For the number and the nature of the
troops under my command, and the extended line of coast I have to
guard, compelled me to be strictly on the defensive in the towns
already in our possession, whilst a forward movement would have been
unmilitary and unmeaning.
Wearied in waiting for an opportunity of practising his
well-disciplined cavalry and artillery upon a detachment of Turkish
infantry, Ibrahim, on the 21st instant, broke up from Zachle and
Malaka in full retreat on Damascus, where he now is with 30,000 men,
including 7000 cavalry and artillery. He has pushed a corps of 3000
irregular cavalry to El Mezereib, on the road towards Mecca,—the only
route now open to him for a final retreat into Egypt,—whither I
calculate on his going the moment he receives from Alexandria the
political news brought by the Oriental.
In as far as regards the sway of Mehemet Ali in Syria, I look upon the
military part of the question as determined.
I have, &c.,
(Signed) C. F. SMITH, _Major-Gen. Commanding_.
P.S. The Emir Effendi and other chiefs who left Ibrahim near Damascus,
report his force to exceed 50,000, of whom 40,000 are said to be
effective.
C.F.S.
Footnote 19:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 119.
Footnote 20:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 119.
Footnote 21:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 163.
Footnote 22:
Ibid., p. 164.
Footnote 23:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 202.
Footnote 24:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 204.
Footnote 25:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 265.
Footnote 26:
See p. 103.
Footnote 27:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 268.
Footnote 28:
Ibid., p. 268.
CHAPTER IX.
Examination of the Conduct of General Jochmus regarding Ibrahim Pacha’s
Retreat—Sir Robert Stopford styled by him Commander-in-Chief of
the Allied Forces—The General’s Reports to Sir Robert
Stopford—Unwillingness of the Admiral to prolong the War—Reported
Destruction of the Egyptian Army—Advance upon Gaza—Colonel
Alderson’s Narrative of the Skirmish of Medjdel.
Whether Sir Robert Stopford, as commanding the allies by sea and land,
wrote also to General Jochmus, as well as to General Michell and Captain
Stewart, I am not aware. In the official correspondence laid before
Parliament Sir Robert Stopford’s orders to these officers do not appear,
and we only learn the fact from General Michell and Captain Stewart’s
letters, but it is evident though General Jochmus commanded the army of
operation he still considered himself under Sir Robert Stopford’s
orders, for he writes to him officially from Jaffa, on the 13th of
January, 1841[29], sending him the details of his operations, in which
he styles him Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces. It appears by his
letter that he took charge of the army of operation on the 16th of
December, 1840; at that period he could not have known of the submission
of Mehemet Ali, and therefore he was quite right to make his
arrangements for driving Ibrahim from Damascus, particularly after the
rejection of the Convention, but he must have been quite aware of his
submission by the 22nd, the day he shifted his head-quarters to Hasbeya.
In one paragraph of the General’s letter he says Ibrahim had resolved to
maintain himself as long as he could in Damascus; in another he states,
that should circumstances force him to retire he had determined to march
by El Mezereib, the bridge of Moïadjumah on the Jordan, D’Jenin, Ramla,
and Gaza, to El-Arish, and this was corroborated by the Admiral having
authorized the embarkation of the sick, wounded, and women at Gaza, and
the Carysfort frigate being then in the harbour of Alexandria. What does
this prove? Why that General Jochmus must have known of the Pacha’s
submission, and of the unwillingness of the Admiral to prolong the war.
In the next paragraph he writes (remember this is to his
Commander-in-Chief, who disapproved of carrying on hostilities), “Under
such circumstances I considered it a most positive duty on my part to
defeat the intention of the Egyptian commander, and oblige him to quit
Damascus, and follow the route of the Desert; for if a Convention had
actually been signed while Ibrahim Pacha remained at Damascus, the
military question remained undecided, and the complete conquest of Syria
by the allied arms could be denied on the ground of our inability of
driving a much superior force from its capital; while, if the Egyptian
army made forcibly its way through Palestine to El Arish, its losses and
sufferings would be small, the country being rich in every resource, and
large government stores existing still at Safed, Tiberias, Ramla, and
Gaza.” Now what does this mean? that neither General Jochmus nor Lord
Ponsonby, under whose orders it appears, by General Michell’s letter, he
was acting[31], cared one straw about conventions or submission, but
were determined, if they could, to destroy as many human beings as
possible to give éclat to themselves, and please the Sultan or his
ministers. After describing what his plans were, the General writes, “It
was at this time, and it remains still, my firm conviction[30], that
victory would have crowned the Sultan’s arms in a few hours, and that
the whole of Ibrahim’s army would have been annihilated, or obliged to
surrender; the only force of his still in some state of organization
being his cavalry, and they would have been of no use in the rocky
grounds of D’Jenin.”
Here the General reckoned without his host, for there was no necessity
for Ibrahim passing by D’Jenin at all. He might have kept through the
extensive plains of Esdraelon, until he arrived at the defiles of Kakoun
between Mount Carmel and the Naplouse range, which he must have
traversed to gain the sea shore; at this point he might have been
attacked advantageously. But it appears that Ibrahim had no intention of
taking that route; his apparent hesitation at El Mezereib for three days
was probably, as General Jochmus says, to reconnoitre the Jordan, but he
had another object in view, and which it will be seen he executed with
great skill. By General Jochmus’s account he appears to have arrived at
Remtha on the 7th or 8th of January, 1841; and on the 9th a foraging
party was repulsed near Es-Salt.
“The Egyptian army,” says the General, “fairly launched into the
Desert[32], has not since been authentically heard of. When last seen,
between El Mezereib and Kalat Mefrek, its infantry was reduced to 15,000
disorderly men; its artillery, though still numerous, was utterly
disorganized, principally by desertion.”... We shall shortly see where
this wandering, disorganized army next makes its appearance.
Ibrahim, the reader already knows, quitted Damascus on the 29th of
December, 1840; General Jochmus says he left in consequence of his
military dispositions, and being blocked up within the walls of
Damascus; but surely irregular troops only, without either pay or
commissariat, were not capable of blocking up an army of upwards of
50,000 men, including about 8000 cavalry, known to be in splendid order,
150 pieces of artillery, together with 4000 or 5000 irregulars, for he
does not acquaint the Commander-in-Chief that there were any regular
Turkish troops near Damascus. The fact is, Ibrahim had received orders
from Mehemet Ali to return to Egypt, he knew of the enemy’s army
advancing by land, and it would have been imprudent, even if he had not
received orders, any longer to have delayed his retreat. Captain De l’Or
reports that in three days he lost 10,000 men and 20 guns. “The hail and
intense cold,” writes the General, “caused numerous deaths amongst the
nearly naked soldiery, in summer clothing, and the sword of the fierce
and revengeful Haouranees, the victims of Ibrahim’s abominable
oppression, was unmerciful to small detachments of straggling
deserters.” All this reputed loss of life took place after Mehemet Ali’s
submission, and after that submission was known, and the unfortunate
wretches destroyed, _if they were destroyed_, were the Sultan’s own
subjects.
General Jochmus also tells the Commander-in-Chief the valour of the
Imperial and Allied troops had done much in the conquest of a vast
country like Syria, in a short period of glory and success. How he makes
this out I am at a loss to know, for up to this time the Allied and
Imperial troops had not fired a shot since the capture of Acre, so if
the reports sent to General Jochmus were correct the whole mischief was
done by the mountaineers and irregular cavalry.
“The God of battle,” says the General, “may lead Ibrahim and his
shattered forces through the desert, and bring some troops back to the
banks of the Nile.” (We shall shortly see how many he brought to the
banks of the Nile.) “I have taken, as in duty bound, such means as may
as much as possible delay his march or diminish his chance of escape.”
And again, “It is to me an agreeable duty to state to your Excellency
the perfect unanimity which has actuated all the men of the Turkish and
allied forces during these late and extensive operations[33], which by
mere strategic combinations and movements, and with very little loss of
life, have produced great and important results; the clear proof of
Ibrahim’s having lost Syria by force of arms, and without negotiations,
the salvation of Palestine from pillage and destruction, and finally,
the enormous loss of the Egyptian General, only as far as El-Mezereib,
since he left Damascus, without calculating those reserved for him by
the sufferings of the Desert.”
By this dispatch one would suppose that the gallant General had been
destroying the Russians, the natural foes of the Porte, and not the
Egyptians, who had submitted to Turkish sway, and who ought to have been
preserved instead of destroyed. What could have been the use of all this
boasted destruction of human life? Syria would have been evacuated, the
country would have suffered less, and humanity would not have been
outraged, had not a single Turkish soldier quitted his cantonments, or
at least, had they confined themselves to precautionary and defensive
measures, so strongly recommended by General Michell and Captain
Stewart.
We now come to General Jochmus’ report of the affair of Gaza[34],
against which it has already been shown that both General Michell and
Captain Stewart protested so strongly. It appears the division intended
for the attack arrived at El-Medjdel on the 15th of January, where it
halted. Here the General changed his mind, and decided on returning to
Jaffa, and against this movement General Michell protested as strongly
as he had before done against the advance: the first he thought quite
unnecessary, and the last he thought quite improper.
Before the General retired, a party of the enemy’s irregular horse
reconnoitred his position, and were fired upon by several field-pieces
planted in an open grove, in advance of Medjdel. At this moment Colonel
Rose, who had been in search of some stray baggage with a small party of
irregular horse, accidentally coming up, charged them in the most
gallant style, and beat them; this being observed by Captains Harvey and
Wilbraham from the Turkish camp, they sallied out with a few horse,
joined Rose, and pursued the enemy for a considerable time, until the
Colonel was severely wounded, when the pursuit ended. Whether it is to
this that the General alludes I do not know, but it appears strange that
no mention is made of the British officers in the dispatch to Sir Robert
Stopford.
The account of this affair, by Colonel Alderson, of the Royal Engineers,
one of the British officers engaged, is so graphic that it cannot fail
to be highly interesting to the reader. I give it at length:
“We selected an encampment at the outskirts of the village of Medjdel,
but whilst the tents were being pitched, the assembly sounded, and it
was understood the enemy were advancing to attack our position.
“It appeared that Colonel Rose, not being able to find his servant and
baggage mule, had taken the Gaza road, to ascertain if they were in
advance, and in doing this fell in with one of our picquets patroling
the outskirts of the village; and, whilst in their company, perceived
some cavalry advancing, the main body of which appeared to consist of
several hundred men, with a picquet like our own in front. Having
therefore sent to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the advance of the
enemy, and finding that our troops were forming, he induced the Turkish
picquet to charge that of the enemy. Whilst Colonel Rose, who was
gallantly leading them on, was in the act of cutting down one of the
enemy, he received two slight wounds,—one in the breast and the other in
the back.
“By this time the whole of the Turkish force had got under arms, and the
light artillery were placed in position, and opened fire on the main
body of cavalry, now within cannon-shot. The fire of the artillery took
effect, and, as we afterwards learned, killed their colonel. They
retired immediately, and our irregular cavalry commenced the pursuit.
“I had, with two other officers, gone to Ascalon to ascertain if it were
possible to communicate with the steamers, and finding it not so, owing
to the heavy sea and thick state of the weather, was returning with
them, when we heard the report of the artillery, and putting spurs to
our horses, and gaining the summit of the high sandy ridge separating
the sea shore from the plain of Medjdel, (or possibly those of Ascalon,
the scene of the encounter of Richard Cœur-de-Leon and Saladin, at
the end of the twelfth century,) perceived our regular cavalry at the
caravanserai forming, and several other horsemen, apparently flying or
pursuing.
“We were not long in coming up with them, and found Colonel Bridgeman
and Major Wilbraham encouraging the irregular cavalry to pursue and
attack the flying foe. We joined them, and for upwards of an hour
continued the pursuit, the regular cavalry bringing up the rear, though
at a slower pace.
“As it may never be my lot to witness so extraordinary a sight again, as
the one which now took place, I will endeavour in a few words to explain
the affair of Medjdel. The irregular cavalry, on both sides, appeared to
consist of several tribes; each tribe had its standard bearer, and
little drums or tom-toms[35]. The standard-bearer is, I suppose,
selected for his bravery; as he gallops in advance, shouting with all
his might, when his followers rush up to defend the standard. If the
enemy is too strong, and he has to retire, they cover his retreat; the
object appearing, in each case, to out-manœuvre each other,
principally by feats of horsemanship. If the retiring party are
under-horsed, their pursuers seldom fail to do execution. If, on the
other hand, they have a superiority, the retreat is a feint only to
separate a portion from the main body, when they suddenly wheel round
and become in turn the assailants, cutting down those in advance before
they can rejoin their companions.
“There did not appear, as far as I could see, any desire to cross spears
or weapons. Their dress was of the most picturesque description, from
the embroidered mushalla to the simple sheepskin; nor were their arms
less various,—the musket with the bayonet fixed, the lance, blunderbuss,
pistol, sabre, dagger, and crease; and I confess the danger appeared to
me greater from our own troops in our rear, who were firing over our
heads, than from the retiring foe, who had to turn half-round to
discharge his piece, whilst his horse was at speed. Our pursuit lasted
for upwards of an hour, during which time about twenty-five of the enemy
were killed, and twenty-seven taken prisoners; when, finding General
Jochmus did not advance from his position, and the regular cavalry had
halted on a high sand-hill, some distance in the rear, we counselled our
motley brothers in arms, with whom we were enabled to communicate
through Major Wilbraham, to call together their separate tribes, and
return to the camp, as the enemy had now joined their main body, and we
were no match for them.
“We returned by the Gaza road, our pursuit having been on the sandy
hills, partially covered with grass, between it and the sea.
“The rain fell in torrents, and we returned to as wretched an encampment
as I ever remember to have witnessed. Late that night General Michell,
having received no communication from General Jochmus, sent a staff
officer to ask for the orders. They were, to march at daylight,—not,
however, to our surprise, on the road to Gaza, but back to Jaffa,
General Jochmus assigning as a reason, that the heavy rains had rendered
the roads impassable for artillery.
“General Michell had not been consulted, nor had any questions been
asked of Colonel Bridgeman, Majors Robe and Wilbraham, or myself, as to
the state of the Gaza road, although we had been nearly halfway to that
place. I will merely add, (having, since that period, twice travelled
the road by daylight,) that nearly the whole of it is a sandy soil, and
I should say the rain which had fallen had rather been beneficial than
otherwise.
“If we had disapproved of the expedition in the first instance, how much
greater was our mortification at having to abandon it after having come
in contact with the enemy.
“We learned afterwards that the Egyptian cavalry, with whom we had been
engaged at Medjdel, was making its customary reconnoissance to ascertain
if any movement had been made on the part of the Turks, as well as to
forage: and that, in all probability, the action had been brought on by
the dashing conduct of Colonel Rose in charging their advanced picquet.”
Footnote 29:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 288.
Footnote 30:
_General Michell to Viscount Palmerston._
December 31, 1840.
Our situation will be very embarrassing until the negotiations are
terminated, since any act of hostility on our part may be construed
into a breach of faith, and may disturb arrangements half concluded. I
am, therefore, anxiously expecting orders from Lord Ponsonby upon the
subject. In the meantime his Excellency’s latest instructions to
General Jochmus, and upon which he is prepared and resolved to act
with energy, dictate a continuance of offensive operations.
Footnote 31:
Alluding to the probability of his retiring by D’Jenin.
Footnote 32:
He does not give the date.
Footnote 33:
Captain Stewart and General Michell do not confirm this.
Footnote 34:
_General Jochmus to Admiral Stopford._
Head-quarters, Jaffa,
Jan. 17, 1841.
Sir,
I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that on the 14th instant
I directed a division of ten battalions of infantry, 1800 irregular
and Tatar horse, 150 regular cavalry, and 14 pieces of artillery, to
march from Ramla towards Gaza.
This latter village is abandoned by the enemy, who has a flying camp
of 1200 regular and 1800 irregular horse, with eight pieces of horse
artillery, at three-quarters of an hour’s march south of Gaza, whence
he draws his forage and provisions: but ravages, at the same time, the
country, carrying off cattle and mules to a great extent from most of
the villages south of Ramla.
The object of my movement was the protection of these villages, but
principally the destruction of the enemy’s provisions at Gaza, in case
Ibrahim Pacha, distressed in the Desert, should have struck off south
of the Dead Sea towards Gaza.
On the 14th of January the division encamped at Ashdod; on the 15th it
could only make a march of three hours to El-Meshdel on account of the
incessant heavy rain, which poured down ever since it left Ramla.
Towards the afternoon, a reconnoitring party of the enemy of 500 horse
approached the camp; but the commanding officer making a very silly
manœuvre was taken in flank and rear by about 400 or 500 of our
cavalry, who pursued him for two hours, taking between forty and fifty
prisoners, and killing and wounding as many. Our loss was about four
killed and twelve wounded.
Hearing nothing positive about Ibrahim’s immediate approach, and the
low country towards Gaza having become a complete marsh by the
continued floods of rain up to the 16th in the evening, and the troops
having been completely drenched day and night in the bivouacs, I
suspended the movement, and sent the infantry and guns to Jaffa,
advancing, at the same time, the cavalry detachments to the
neighbourhood of Ascalon and some villages towards the river of that
name, with their head-quarters at El-Mesde, intending to resume the
operations the moment the ground had become practicable; but on my
arrival here, informed officially of the complete submission of
Mehemet Ali Pacha, and the consequent cessation of the state of
rebellion of his army, our troops have been ordered to cease offensive
hostilities. His Excellency the Seraskier Ahmed Zacharias Pacha
commanded in person since we left Ramla.
I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. JOCHMUS, _Lieut.-Gen._
Footnote 35:
“Very small kettle-drums, or basins, about six inches in diameter,
covered with a parchment, and fixed on each side of the pommel of the
saddle as holster-pieces are, and beat with pieces of leather straps.
They make a monotonous noise, and always accompany Arab cavalry.”
CHAPTER X.
General Jochmus’s further Reports to Sir Robert Stopford—Destruction of
the Magazines at Maan—Ignorance as to Ibrahim’s movements—Ibrahim
crosses the Jordan to Jericho, and menaces Jerusalem, while supposed
to be wandering in the Desert—General Jochmus’s Account of the
Movements of Ibrahim—Reported Destruction of his Infantry—Ibrahim
did not intend to enter Palestine—his Statement to Colonel Napier.
To proceed with General Jochmus, I may remark that a letter of his to
the Admiral, of the 20th of January[36], clearly shows what little
reliance could be placed in the reports that were made to him, of the
state of Ibrahim’s army from all quarters. After giving an account of
the destruction of 230 camel-loads of grain by the Baron Dumont, at
Maan, after Souliman Pacha had provisioned himself, and marched on Suez,
with the greatest part of the artillery, women, and children, he states,
“The army itself, of which the second column was to sleep at Maan on the
11th, seeing its provisions burnt, had been obliged to countermarch, and
is now wandering in the Desert harassed on all sides by Bedouin tribes.
Its state seems to be dreadful, and all over the country through which
the Baron Dumont came back to Kerek, he saw the bodies of small
detachments which had been cut off by the Bedouins.”
We look in vain for a confirmation of this in Baron Dumont’s report[37].
The Baron talks of the quantity of grain he destroyed, of the forty-four
camels he captured, and forty he found dead, which are included in the
eighty-four taken in one night, but not one word of dead bodies
destroyed by the Bedouins, or of Ibrahim’s army wandering in the Desert;
and so far were they from wandering in the Desert pursued by the Arabs,
that on the very day that the magazines at Maan were said to be
destroyed, Ibrahim, hearing of the movement on Gaza, crossed the Jordan
at Jericho, menaced Jerusalem, and forced Hussein Pacha to return to
Abugosh. Having succeeded in this point, he recrossed the Jordan, passed
to the south of the Dead Sea, and arrived at Gaza without any person
knowing what had in the meantime become of him, as will shortly be seen
by Lieut. Loring’s report.
In another report to the Admiral, dated from Jerusalem, January 28[38],
the General, in giving an account of the passage of the Jordan by the
Egyptians, says: “On the 14th a corps was reported to have crossed the
Jordan, and bivouacked (near Jericho) at Reyha. Hassan Pacha, encamped
at Abugosh, three hours south-west of Jerusalem, marched, towards the
evening, on the 15th instant; but the Egyptian division, hearing of his
approach, immediately recrossed the Jordan, with a heavy loss in drowned
and killed, the waters of that river having risen more than a foot
during the incessant rains of the 14th and 15th of January; and the
Arabs falling upon the troops during the passage, and in the nearly
impracticable passes of the Dead Sea.
“The enemy’s column above-mentioned proved to be the shattered remains
of the corps, called by Mehemet Ali ‘The Guards,’ amounting to from 4000
to 5000 men, and two cavalry regiments, with a battery of artillery,
forming the rear-guard of the army, under the personal command of
Ibrahim Pacha. The artillery, and one of the regiments, had remained at
some distance on the left bank of the river, and the movement was
evidently a desperate attempt to march by any way on Gaza or El Arish.
“The forlorn situation of this corps,” adds the General, “will be seen
from the two inclosed reports of Mehemed Rechid Pacha, Chief of the
Staff, and of Riza Pacha, commanding the cavalry[39]. I do not estimate
the loss of this army so great as the latter; but certainly, after
comparing all the reports, it amounts to 1,000 or more men, and eight
pieces of artillery, which latter, although with the column at Es-Salt,
were unquestionably not at Kerek on the 19th instant, whither Ibrahim
had retired after continual skirmishes with the Arabs. The Governor of
Jerusalem had sent his son, Hadgi Hafiz, to ascertain whether the
artillery had been buried in the desert mountain or not.
“Such was the isolated position of this last corps of the Egyptian army,
that its Commander-in-Chief had lost all means of communication with his
remaining forces, and that, although Hamid Bey and the Commissioners
from Egypt were from the 19th to the 23rd at El-Chalil, trying by all
means to establish a communication with Ibrahim either by the north or
south of the Dead Sea, it proved a vain attempt, notwithstanding that,
during the same days, the above column under the Pacha was at Kerek,
surrounded by the Arabs of the country, who had been reinforced by the
tribes of Beni Sackr and Beni Hennedy, arrived from the depths of the
Desert in consequence of the orders sent them from Jerusalem on the 8th
of January, through Baron Dumont.
“The distance from El-Mezereib to Kerek is, at the utmost, five days’
march. Ibrahim Pasha left the former place on the 6th or 7th of January,
and after fifteen days was still at Kerek, having continually marched
and counter-marched in the desert mountains in search of food, or from
having been stopped in the mountain defiles. According to the statement
of the son of the Chieftain of Abugosh, a Captain in the Guards, who
deserted on the 21st instant from Kerek, and had been with the column
ever since it quitted Damascus and El-Mezerib, Ibrahim marched from the
latter place to Bilka, thence back north to Es-Salt, again south to
Kerek and back to Jericho; obliged to recross the Jordan, he for a
second time returned to Kerek, having lost his guns, ammunition, and
stores, during the continued and very harassing attacks, day and night,
of the Arab bands intent on plunder.
“My last reports from El-Chalil of the 28th of January (twenty-two days
after Ibrahim’s leaving El-Mezereib, and thirty-one after his retreat
from Damascus) state that Hamid Bey, despairing of communicating with
Ibrahim Pacha, had resolved to return to Gaza, and thence to Egypt.”
Here it appears that General Jochmus himself began to doubt the reports
that were made him. We have before seen[40] that Captain De l’Or
reported Ibrahim to have lost 10,000 men on his march to El-Mezereib,
though he had 10,000 cavalry to cover his retreat, and was only followed
by 3000 or 4000 irregulars, who must have been ill provisioned.
It never could have been Ibrahim’s intention to have taken the Jaffa
road to Gaza, unless he intended to fight a battle, which he hardly
would have risked, with his rear guard only, and after having detached
Souliman to Suez; moreover he must have known of the submission of
Mehemet Ali, and would certainly not have provoked the hostility of the
European Powers by a breach of faith, and it is well for the Turks he
did not, for by all accounts his army was not in the state they supposed
it was, and his cavalry was in excellent order.
Colonel Napier was with the corps of Hassan Pacha, who, although he had
an opportunity of attacking Ibrahim, was too wise to attempt it. The
Colonel saw Ibrahim Pacha afterwards at Alexandria, and he declared to
him that the passage of the Jordan was a mere feint, which completely
succeeded; and, moreover, that had he been attacked by the Turkish army,
they would have been cut to pieces by his cavalry.
CHAPTER XI.
Fruitless Journey of the Envoys sent in quest of Ibrahim Pacha—Arrival
of part of the Egyptian Army at Gaza—Promised Neutrality of the
Turks—The Egyptians informed of the Cessation of Hostilities by the
English Officers—Terms recommended by Mr. Wood to be imposed upon
Ibrahim Pacha—Colonel Napier’s Narrative of the Retreat of Ibrahim
Pacha.
On the 30th January, General Jochmus writes from Jaffa to the Admiral:
“Hamid Bey, Major Wilbraham, and Selim Bey (the Turkish Commissioner,)
after fruitless attempts to communicate with the Pacha (Ibrahim), have
returned to Gaza[41].”
This is not to be wondered at: no assistance was given them, as will be
seen hereafter by Lieutenant Loring’s report, and they were reluctantly
obliged to return to Gaza on the 22nd of January. Ahmed Menikli Pacha
had arrived there the day before with the main body of the cavalry, and
Ibrahim himself came in on the 31st, with the rest of the army, the
greater part of whom must have been resurrection men, as we have seen
they had been destroyed in the retreat.
It has been seen that General Jochmus’s report of the 17th of January,
to the Admiral, of the affair of Gaza[42], affirms that he intended to
resume his operations when the ground became practicable, but on his
arrival at Jaffa he was officially informed of the complete submission
of Mehemet Ali, and the consequent cessation of the state of rebellion
of his army; “our troops,” he adds, “have been ordered to cease
offensive hostilities. His Excellency, the Seraskier Ahmed Zacharias
Pacha, commanded in person since we left Ramla.” I presume General
Jochmus means that Lieutenant Loring arrived with my despatches to the
authorities in Syria.
These despatches were certainly sufficient authority for the Allies to
suspend all hostilities against Ibrahim Pacha, but we shall see that
notwithstanding the opinion of the British officers, difficulties were
endeavoured to be thrown in the way, both by General Jochmus and Mr.
Wood. It has before been shown that both General Michell and Captain
Stewart, in consequence of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and the
instructions from Sir Robert Stopford, had decided on taking only
precautionary measures, and the Turkish authorities, acting under the
Admirals orders, were bound to follow the same course, notwithstanding
any directions to the contrary they might have received from the
Ambassador at Constantinople, whose orders, Captain Stewart justly
remarks, must be subordinate to those of Lord Palmerston.
Two days after my despatches arrived at Jaffa the Seraskier received his
instructions from Constantinople; the nature of them will appear in Mr.
Wood’s Protest, at which I shall presently arrive: nevertheless the
Seraskier, after holding a council, gave General Michell and Captain
Stewart a positive assurance that no further act of hostility should
take place, and that he had no wish to deprive Ibrahim Pacha of either
his arms, baggage, or guns[43]. The Seraskier was a wise man, he knew
very well he had not the power to deprive him of either the one or the
other. Captain Stewart and General Michell most properly wrote to
Ibrahim Pacha and the Egyptian officer in command at Gaza, to inform
them of the cessation of hostilities[44], and of their intention to give
every possible facility for the evacuation of Syria, and the embarkation
of the women, children, and sick at Caiffa, or any other more convenient
port; and Captain Arbuthnot and Colonel Colquhoun were despatched with
the letters to Ibrahim Pacha and the Egyptian officer commanding at
Gaza, and they were instructed to protest against any act of hostility
the Turks might commit[45].
So ignorant were the Turkish authorities of the movements of Ibrahim,
who they fancied was wandering in the Desert, without an army, that on
the very day on which Captain Stewart signed the instructions to Captain
Arbuthnot and Colonel Colquhoun, to insist on Ibrahim retiring by Gaza
in successive columns of 3000 men each, Ahmed Menikli Pacha arrived at
Gaza with the main body of Ibrahim’s cavalry in excellent order, and the
infantry in three columns. Ibrahim himself bringing up the rear was
shortly expected: and on that day also General Jochmus and Mr. Wood, the
emissary of Lord Ponsonby, wrote to the Seraskier[46] to inform him that
the Baron Dumont having destroyed the magazine at Maan, Ibrahim’s army
being cut in two, and gone back in thorough disorder, and his 150 guns
being already in their power, according to the official orders read at
the council of the preceding day Ibrahim would only be allowed the
choice of two conditions,—viz.
“1. To march upon El-Arish by the south of the Dead Sea, also upon Suez,
with the men, arms, and conveyance which he now possesses.
“2. To come in detachments of 3000 men by Gaza upon El-Arish, leaving
his cannon in our hands, in consideration of the power which is granted
to him of being permitted to follow this road, provided that he leaves
all the Syrians in their country.”
The march of Ibrahim on Gaza, by the south of the Dead Sea, shows very
clearly that he never had the intention of entering Palestine, and that
his crossing the Jordan was a manœuvre to mislead the Turks, in which
he completely succeeded, and arrived safe at Gaza, without having
encountered a single outpost of the Turkish army.
Colonel Napier was attached to the Turkish division that Ibrahim forced
to return to Jerusalem: the following is the Colonel’s account of their
movements, as well as of what he knew of Ibrahim’s retreat.
“Junior United Service Club,
December, 1841.
“You wish me to give you some information as to the retreat of Ibrahim
Pacha from Damascus. All the notes I took at the time being with my
baggage at Gibraltar, I cannot be very accurate in dates; but will
furnish whatever I remember on the subject from the time you left me at
Beyrout in November 1840, until my embarkation at Gaza for Egypt, in
January 1841.
“When the Powerful left St. George’s Bay, I think the Princess
Charlotte, the Benbow, and Bellerophon remained off Beyrout, with a
steamer and a couple of Austrian vessels.
“From the time of your driving back Ibrahim,—in the action of the 10th
of October,—from the heights of Boharsof, nothing certain had been
known at Beyrout relative to his movements, and we,—to all
_appearance_,—remained in a state of complete inactivity.
“We continued quietly in our quarters all November, which leisure I
employed in learning Arabic, in visiting the neighbouring parts of
Lebanon, and keeping up the acquaintance I had been enabled to
form,—through your introductions,—with the principal Emirs and Sheikhs
of the mountain, with several of whom I became very intimate.
“About the latter end of November, I was sent with Colonel Bridgeman to
make a reconnoissance on the enemy, who was supposed to be still at
Zachle. On arriving there we found he had retired across the Boccah two
days before. Next morning, Colonel Bridgeman and myself, each
accompanied by some fifty or sixty irregular horse, pushed on in
different directions towards them. The Colonel fell in with a body of
300 or 400 cavalry deserters from the Egyptian army, whom he brought
back to Zachle;—whilst I traversed the range of the Anti-Lebanon, and
descending into the plain of Damascus reached the village of Zebdeni,—a
few hours’ distant from that city,—on which the Egyptians had fallen
back; the last of their rear-guard having left that place on the
previous day.
“It was now certain that Ibrahim occupied Damascus, but whether or not
he intended to make it his winter quarters was still unknown. However,
the good people of Beyrout considered his presence even at the holy city
of ‘El Sham,’ as much too near to be pleasant; and when the gale of wind
of the 2nd of December drove all our vessels from the coast, serious
apprehensions were entertained, that some fine morning he would walk
quietly into the town;—which undertaking he might have accomplished with
little or no opposition.
“Things continued in this state at Beyrout, till the beginning of
December, at which period I received written instructions to the
following effect from Sir Charles Smith: ‘That I was in the first
instance to proceed to the head-quarters of the Emir Bechir with certain
communications, and then to go, without loss of time, to Naplouse; that
Selim Pacha would have orders notifying my official employment within
his pachalic, and requiring him to attend to any requisition I might
make (with the exception of troops,) on the garrison of Acre.
“Having arrived at Naplouse, I was to order Soulyman Abdul Hadi, the
Governor of that place, to levy 1500 men within his district, and with
these I was to do my best to guard the passes of Agiloun, Djebail Khalil
(Hebron), or Khan Younus[47]; directing my movements according to the
intelligence I should receive of the enemy.
“I was further instructed to ‘investigate and inquire into the conduct
of the said Governor of Naplouse;—he being suspected of adhering to the
Egyptian interests,—and to ascertain whether there was any foundation
for the numerous complaints preferred against him from different
quarters.’
“In the execution of this ‘important trust[48],’ I was left to the
guidance of my own military judgment. In fact, I had a sort of
independent roving commission, which pleased me much, and I lost no time
in proceeding to take up my command.
“It was evident, from the nature of these instructions, that we were
still completely in the dark as to the line of retreat which Ibrahim
Pacha might eventually fix on.
“I was surprised to find, on arriving at my destination, that,—contrary
to the tenor of my instructions,—no notification had been received by
the authorities, as to the nature of the mission on which I was about to
be employed; and had it not been for the kindness of Selim Pacha, I
should have found myself placed in an extremely awkward predicament.
“Not to lose time, whilst my ‘forces’ were being assembled, I went to
Jerusalem, to ascertain the state of the Turkish garrison there,—and had
an interview with Sheikh Abderrahman, the chief of the Bedouin tribes
about Hebron, who was said to be able to bring into the field 10,000
men. After strongly urging on him the necessity of assembling his people
to be ready to strike a blow,—as I had still some days to spare,—I
determined, with 100 horsemen, to push across the river Jordan and the
Agiloun hills, in order to gain some positive intelligence of the enemy,
about whom the most contradictory reports were now afloat.
“Amongst other things, it was however positively said that he was making
El Mezerib his head-quarters, preparatory to passing the Jordan at the
bridge of Moïadjumah[49], a few miles south of Lake Tiberias; for this
point, I therefore, in the first instance proceeded, and having
carefully reconnoitred the neighbouring ground, I sent from thence a
report to General Michell[50], and also to Selim Pacha, requesting that
some barrels of gunpowder might be immediately forwarded from Acre for
the destruction of the old Roman arch, which here singly spanned the
river.
“Crossing the Jordan on the 31st December,—accompanied by Captain Laué,
Count Tchezeni, and Mr. Hunter,—the following day we pushed on to
Hareemi, a small village on the elevated plateau overlooking the
fortress of El Mezerib. The greatest consternation prevailed here
amongst the inhabitants, who were flying in every direction, as it was
reported the Egyptian advanced guard was already at Mezerib, and would
push on the next day to Hareemi, which was only a few miles distant.
“Having come thus far, I was determined to obtain all the information in
my power,—and accordingly, at daylight on the morning of the 2nd January
1841, I got my troop in their saddles, with the design of making a
forward movement,—but, as soon as I had expressed my intention of
proceeding direct to El Mezerib, the greater part positively refused to
advance, and the remainder only followed with the utmost reluctance.
After proceeding thus for two or three miles, we observed, on the
opposite side of a ravine, a number of horsemen,—probably a vidette of
the enemy, whom we could easily have driven in;—but this sight was quite
enough for my brave troops; with the exception of the European party and
my dragoman, one and all took to their heels; I returned alone to
Naplouse; nor did I ever again behold my valiant cavalry[51]!
“However, appearances strongly leading to the supposition that the
Moïadjumah bridge was the point on which Ibrahim was directing his army,
I lost no time in hurrying thither the mountaineers who had been already
assembled at Naplouse; and, on the 5th of January, I marched off my
first detachment of a few hundreds,—certainly not the most
soldierlike-looking fellows in the world,—to Jennin, which I had fixed
on as the point of assembly.
“After despatching as many of these ragamuffins as could be gathered
together, I myself proceeded to Jennin, and arriving there late at
night, found General Jochmus and his aide-de-camp, Captain De l’Or; the
latter very much elated at the wonderful exploits he said he had
recently been performing on the rear of the Egyptian army.
“To my surprise, however, I learnt that the General had given orders for
my Naplousians to return, in consequence, as he said, of the positive
intelligence received, that Ibrahim no longer intended taking the route
of Jennin. This was all very well; but having been placed in command by
the British General, I did not at all consider myself under the orders
of Jochmus Pasha; and accordingly told him, that since he had divested
me of my command, he might do what he pleased with the mountaineers, of
whom I washed my hands; and immediately mounting my horse, I made the
best of my way to Jaffa, not sorry at having an opportunity of going to
what was now likely to become the scene of active operations before
Gaza.
“Shortly after reaching Jaffa, I was sent by General Michell, along with
Reschid Pacha, to accompany and advise the movements of the left column
of the Turkish army, consisting of twelve battalions, and a dozen
field-pieces. This body was then concentrated at Jerusalem, and
instructed to join the main force in a contemplated advance on Gaza. The
whole Turkish army, including 3000 of the Emir Beschir’s cavalry, might
have amounted to between 22,000 and 25,000 men, distributed as follows:
“At Jerusalem, near Jaffa and Ramlah, 21 battalions of regular
infantry,—each battalion consisting of about 500 men,—with 18 field
pieces.—At Medjdel (to the south of Jaffa) 3500 regular cavalry.—At
Hebron 3000 irregular cavalry, composed of the Desert tribes. These,
together with the Emir Beschir’s people, were now to the number of
20,000 men concentrated on the southern frontier of Syria. The garrisons
of Beyrout and Acre being added, will make up the Turkish force to the
above amount.
“On the 13th of January, the column moved from Jerusalem, but had
scarcely proceeded half a dozen miles when intelligence arrived that
Ibrahim had crossed the Jordan at Jericho, and was advancing in our rear
on Jerusalem.
“It was resolved to halt for the night at Abou Hosh, and should this
intelligence be confirmed, to return at daybreak to Jerusalem. The news
proved correct; and we accordingly fell back on the Holy City, which we
re-occupied on the following day.
“Ibrahim Pacha had positively crossed the river; but from the incessant
rain, which for the last three days had fallen,—as I concluded he could
not possibly have got over a larger number than our own force,—as his
men were, moreover, wearied and starved, whilst our’s were fresh,—I
proposed, that after giving our people a few hours’ rest, we should
immediately advance and strike a blow, whilst his army was yet separated
by a deep and rapid torrent; and I wrote as follows to Reschid Pacha,
who, from having been educated in France, spoke and wrote the French
language with the greatest fluency:
“Jérusalem, ce 15 Janvier,
à 7 heures du soir.
“Mon Général,
“Cette pluie continue aura tellement grossi le Jourdan, qu’il sera
maintenant impossible d’y faire passer des troupes. Il n’est pas
probable que le nombre de l’ennemi qui si trouve maintenant sur la rive
droite, excède de beaucoup nos propres forces.
“Marchons demain matin une heure avant le jour, avec dix battaillons, et
fions nous à la fortune de la guerre et de nos bonnes épeés. Il me sera
superflu d’obsérver que nous ne pouvons pas éspérer que cette pluie dure
beaucoup plus long temps.
“‘Tout à vous.
“‘E. E. NAPIER,
‘_Asst. Adjt.-Gén._”
“‘A Son Excellence Reschid Pasha,
Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée Ottomane, &c.
“Reschid Pasha’s reply was:
“'Mon cher Napier,
“‘Après que vous m’avez quitté j’ai vu un Arabe qui a été à Reyha
(Jericho) qui a causé avec Ibrahim, cet Arabe m’a dit qu’il pouvait
avoir à peu près trois mille hommes d’infantérie; et qu’il n’avoit point
de canons; cet homme pretend qu’ Ibrahim est parti de Reyha ce matin de
bonne heure en prenant le chemin de Chalil, ce qui indiquerait de la
part de l’ennemi l’intention de se rendu à Gaza; si cette nouvelle est
réelle, il ne faudrait pas hésiter un instant d’attaquer l’ennemi;
puisque nous avons plus d’infantérie que lui, nous avons des canons, et
si cette coquette qu’on appelle la ‘Fortune’ n’est pas avec nous: c’est
le Diable.
“‘Tout à vous,
“‘MEHMED RESCHID PASHA.”
“‘Au Major-Général[52] Napier,
&c. &c. &c.’
“Now, although the feasibleness of an attack on the Egyptians was hereby
fully allowed;—although Reschid Pasha at the time imagined that Ibrahim
was exposing his right flank in this rumoured advance on Hebron
(Chalil);—and although I not only urged, but entreated them to make the
attempt, the Turks were afraid to try the experiment; and it was decided
that the following day we should make a reconnoissance, which
accordingly took place, when we found Jericho in flames, and that
Ibrahim, after its destruction, had just recrossed the Jordan, and thus
slipped through our fingers!
“His object had evidently been to delay our junction with head-quarters,
and having effected this purpose, he was at present retiring unmolested
by the south of the Dead Sea.
“I now proposed to make a diagonal movement by Mount Hebron to try and
cut him off in that direction, as we heard that General Jochmus had
already advanced on Gaza, which, ere this, we concluded must have been
captured.
“Notwithstanding my urgent entreaties for expedition, _two_ days elapsed
ere we reached Hebron, a distance of about twenty-two miles!
“The Osmanlis, I plainly saw, still feared their old conqueror; and, on
our arrival at Hebron,—meeting there Major Wilbraham and Lieutenant
Loring, R.N., the bearers of your Convention to Ibrahim Pacha,—the
exuberant joy of the Turkish Chiefs, at the termination of hostilities,
led them, in some slight degree, to infringe the injunction of the
Prophet.
“E. NAPIER.”
“To Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.”
Footnote 36:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 294.
Footnote 37:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 295.
Footnote 38:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 295.
Footnote 39:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 295. Tahir Bey reports that after
Ibrahim re-crossed the Jordan, he lost all his infantry, and arrived
at Kerek with his cavalry only.
Footnote 40:
See page 124.
Footnote 41:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 298.
Footnote 42:
See page 128.
Footnote 43:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 270.
Footnote 44:
Ibid., pp. 271, 272.
Footnote 45:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 272.
Footnote 46:
Ibid., p. 276.
Footnote 47:
“The latter,—by the bye,—being no pass at all, but an open place in
the plains to the eastward of Gaza.”
Footnote 48:
Although these instructions from Sir Charles Smith were so termed,—and
Colonel Napier has documents from his successor, General Michell, to
prove that they were satisfactorily executed,—it appears strange that
this mission of the Colonel’s should never have been publicly made
known.
Footnote 49:
“Moïadjumah, literally meaning the ‘meeting of the waters.’”
Footnote 50:
“He had lately succeeded Sir Charles Smith.”
Footnote 51:
“Mr. Wood, in one of his official reports, gives General Jochmus the
credit of this reconnoissance, whereas I am not aware that the latter
was, at this period, ever across the Jordan.”
Footnote 52:
This title was conferred in consequence of a promise made by the
Sultan, through Lord Ponsonby, that Colonel Napier should receive the
nishan or order of that rank—which promise has as yet been kept with
true “Turkish faith.”
CHAPTER XII.
Conduct of Mr. Wood—His Letter to the Seraskier examined—His Advice
disregarded by the British Officers—Mission of Colonel Alderson to
Gaza—Colonel Rose’s Account of the State of Ibrahim’s Army—Colonel
Alderson’s Character of Ibrahim Pacha—Death of General Michell.
I do not think blame can be attached to General Jochmus for having done
all he could to cripple Ibrahim, if he was acting under proper
authority; but whether his orders were from the English Ambassador or
the Sultan is not clear: both General Michell and Captain Stewart speak
of the Ambassador’s orders[53]. If so, I do not think he was justified
in obeying them; on the other hand, if his orders were from the Sultan’s
minister, or from the the Seraskier, he was quite right. I think,
however, he put too much reliance in the reports that were made to him
of numerous loss inflicted on the Egyptian army, which he speaks of with
much complacency, and which I hope and believe was very much
exaggerated.
As to Mr. Wood, he was quite in a different capacity, and what right he
had, as a British subject, to put the interpretation he did on Sir
Robert Stopford’s orders, I do not know.
In the first paragraph of his letter[54], he says the women and sick
were to be embarked, and that Ibrahim Pacha must provide other means of
withdrawing his army; now the despatches say, women, sick, and others of
the Egyptian army, which meant any portion that Ibrahim thought proper;
but even if the term was not clear, as Syria was to be evacuated without
delay, why was Mr. Wood to take upon himself to point out the way in
which it ought to be done?
In the second paragraph he says that it is “understood that Ibrahim must
re-enter Egypt by the Desert, or by El Arish, which is the direct road,
and the easiest; and by leaving the road free, we act in conformity with
the desire of Mazloum Bey and of the Commodore, to offer every facility
for his retreat without compromising our military position.”
Mazloum Bey, in his letter to the Seraskier, read before the council,
according to Mr. Wood, says the impression at Constantinople was that
the Egyptian army was disorganized; but that Commodore Napier undeceived
him, and pretended that it was in a situation to resist the Imperial
army, and that he did not venture to insist on Mehemet Ali giving up the
Syrian conscripts, and his arms, guns, and military stores, agreeably to
the orders of the Porte; but as they were on the spot, they must be the
best judges whether or no they ought to insist on these two conditions.
I do Mazloum Bey the justice of saying that he was much wiser than the
Divan, for had he proposed those terms, Mehemet Ali would not have given
up one ship.
Mr. Wood then goes on to advise, that in consequence of the complete
disorganization of the Egyptian army, the want of provisions, and the
small number of men capable of resistance, the destruction of Maan, the
passage over the Desert of Souliman, and the retrograde movement of
Ibrahim Pacha with a handful of men without artillery, and as there was
now nothing to fear from their antagonist, he should be obliged to ask
permission to come to Gaza, which should only be granted on condition of
giving up the Syrian troops, his guns, stores, and arms.
According to Mr. Wood’s reasoning, this would be, affording him “the
facilities required by Mazloum Bey and Commodore Napier;” and “if he
persisted in coming to Gaza without those conditions, he would be the
aggressor, and must trust to the consequences.”
He finishes by saying, this is his humble opinion, founded on mature
reflection; and he cannot conceal from himself the danger of Ibrahim
coming to Gaza, where he might recruit his army, and allow his father to
negotiate more advantageously. “Even now,” he adds, “his General at Gaza
has instructions not to attack us, but to deliver up Gaza only with his
life. From such facts, your Excellency may judge of the bad faith of the
vassal who refuses to surrender his arms on the demand of his Sovereign,
which renders his submission incomplete, and even doubtful.” Really, Mr.
Wood is a true disciple of the Ambassador’s school; he does not perceive
that not the Egyptians, but the Turks, were guilty of bad faith from
beginning to end; and that, if the officer at Gaza had delivered it up,
Ibrahim’s army would have been compromised.
Fortunately for the honour of the Porte there were wiser men on the spot
who decided to follow neither the advice of the General nor that of the
Diplomatist, and I should like to have seen the faces of these latter
when they heard of the arrival of Ibrahim’s cavalry, and the near
approach of the infantry.
Next day the accounts came in of the arrival of the Egyptians, and
Captain Stewart most wisely sent Colonel Alderson, at the desire of
General Michell, with instructions[56], very properly saying nothing
about the advance by columns of 3000 men. The mode in which Colonel
Alderson acquitted himself of his delicate mission may be best told in
his own words[55]:—
“Being selected for this duty, I left Jaffa on the afternoon of the
22nd, with my instructions, and arrived the following day at Gaza. I
immediately waited on the commanding officer, Achmet Menekli Pacha, the
General of Cavalry, who had arrived two days previous, with eight
regiments of cavalry, after much fatigue and suffering, and annoyance
also from the attacks of the Arabs in the interest of the Turkish
authorities.
“On my first interview with the Egyptian General, I urged the necessity
of their immediately commencing their retreat, so as not to assemble a
large force in Gaza. At first this was stated to be impossible till the
arrival of Ibrahim, or orders from him to that effect, but the following
morning, on going to see the General at the camp, he agreed to commence
the retreat on the 26th, if Ibrahim did not in the mean time arrive, and
that a brigade of cavalry, (two regiments) should march daily.
“On the 25th, five regiments of infantry arrived, and on the day
following, five more, each consisting of four battalions; they were
evidently much fatigued and reduced in numbers, and stated that they had
not had rations for the last seven, nor water for the last three days.
“This day Captain Houston Stewart arrived in the Hecate, with Colonel
Rose, who came to go in search of Ibrahim, Rechid Pacha, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Napier. We all went to the General Achmet Menekli
Pacha’s quarters, to urge the propriety of not obliging the Syrians to
return to Egypt, but, as he said he had no powers to interfere, it was
determined on sending off a letter to Commodore Napier[57], for an order
from Mehemet Ali to this effect, as well as to order Ibrahim to retire
in columns of 3000 men, and not assemble a large force at Gaza.
“On the 28th a council was held, at which Captain Stewart and myself
attended.
“We requested that a pledge should be given that Ibrahim would, on his
arrival, carry into execution the orders of his father, Mehemet Ali, for
the evacuation of Syria. This was at once done without the slightest
hesitation. Indeed Hourschid Pacha, a fine old man, with a magnificent
white beard, who commanded the irregular force, stated he had been forty
years in Mehemet Ali’s service, and during the whole of that period had
never once known Ibrahim to refuse to obey his father’s orders.
“On receiving this guarantee we, in the name of the united forces of
Great Britain, pledged ourselves that no molestation or obstacle should
be put in the way of such evacuation, nor any advance of the Turkish
troops at Medjdel take place, until I had reported the evacuation
complete.
“This pledge was approved and confirmed by the Seraskier at Jaffa[58],
and the evacuation went on afterwards with confidence.
“This measure had become absolutely necessary from the Egyptians’
evident want of confidence in the Turks; they feared that as soon as
they had so far weakened their force at Gaza as to be incapable of
resistance, the Turks might attack them.
“Colonel Rose having been also sent in search of Ibrahim, with a copy of
the Convention, and a letter from General Michell and Captain Stewart,
after much disappointment, arising from the determination on the part of
the Arabs not to conduct any one to Ibrahim, if indeed they knew where
to find him, fell in with him on the 31st (January), in the Desert,
about four hours from Gaza, which town he entered with him between 4 and
5 P.M. the same afternoon.
“The General-in-Chief appeared much fatigued, and very unwell, and had
no doubt suffered much on the journey round the east and south sides of
the Dead Sea. He brought with him about 5000 troops.”
Colonel Rose, soon after this, went to Constantinople, and upon his
arrival at Therapia, made a report to Lord Ponsonby on the state of
Ibrahim’s army, which differs a good deal from that of the other
officers. I give a short extract from the document[59].
“When I came up with Ibrahim Pacha’s column, there were two lines of
videttes flanking it towards the Syrian side,—mounted and dismounted
cavalry—to prevent desertion. I rode for several miles along the column,
which was in great disorder—in fact it was quite broken up; groups of
men in twos and threes, some armed, some not, others hardly able to
walk. I saw two standards, one without any escort, the other with a
guard of two men: they must have belonged to battalions which had been
broken up on account of their casualties. Ibrahim Pacha’s own horses had
had no barley that day; the troops had been three days without water,
and had subsisted chiefly on mule and donkey flesh, which sold at a high
price: 200 determined cavalry might have swept away all that part of the
column which I saw (I entered it at about two-thirds of its length,)
with great ease.
“Ibrahim Pacha did not appear pleased when I gave him Mehemet Ali’s
letter. He was agitated, and it took him five minutes to read it,
although it only consisted of four lines. Whilst he was thus employed,
his camel-rider and chief groom were also endeavouring to read it over
his shoulder. I rode with him for about four hours, and accompanied him
to Gaza; he spoke with considerable bitterness of the Turks. He said,
‘Why have you turned out the Seraskier[60]?’ I said that the Turkish
Government had, I believed, recalled him, because they were not
satisfied with his conduct. He answered, ‘Oh! they are all alike; they
smoke all day, and have people to wash their hands.’ I said, ‘The
present Seraskier is a very good man and soldier.’ ‘Oh yes,’ he replied,
‘as long as he is in the saddle; as soon as he sits down he will rob
like the rest’—on which he laughed very much. ‘I am the only man,’ he
said, ‘to manage the Arabs and Bedouins, who never had any master before
me. I could and did cut off their heads, which the Turks never will do.
Lord Palmerston from London, and Lord Ponsonby from Constantinople, will
have to come here to manage Syria.’ I said, that certainly they had done
so much without coming to the country, that there was no knowing what
they might effect, were they actually to do so. He did not look pleased.
It appeared to me that he was either affecting high spirits, or that he
had been drinking too much. He drank frequently from a bottle which hung
in front of his saddle, and I was informed by an Egyptian Colonel of
Artillery that it was filled with claret. He talked and laughed
constantly with his servants. He is now suffering under a very bad
attack of the jaundice, his eyes and head being quite yellow.
“His reception at Gaza was remarkable: the people flocked from curiosity
to see him, but his entry formed a singular contrast to that of the
Turkish troops into the different towns and villages which they had
occupied for the first time. In the latter case, the reception was
enthusiastic, the men lining the roads and saluting us with all the
varieties of an Eastern welcome, and the women crowding the house-tops
and making with their tongues that extraordinary noise which is meant to
denote extreme pleasure; but with Ibrahim Pacha there was a look of
deep-rooted dislike on the faces of the people, which even their dread
of him could not conceal. He, contrary to the Eastern fashion, saluted
no one,—not one saluted him; certainly, as an inhabitant afterwards said
to me, ‘Not a tongue nor a heart blessed him.’”
Colonel Alderson had necessarily some intercourse with Ibrahim Pacha,
and his character of that renowned personage is well worth quoting.
“From the frequent opportunities I had of seeing and conversing with
Ibrahim Pacha, (if asking questions through an interpreter deserve that
name,) it may be expected of me to give some description of this
extraordinary man. His appearance fully corresponds with his known
character, a voluptuous despot; one who, to all the vices of the East,
adds that of great indulgence in the table.
“He is considerably past his prime, being I believe fifty-six or
fifty-seven years old, and very fat, with a large full projecting eye, a
handsome nose, (like all natives of the East,) a broad forehead
projecting over the eyes, then suddenly retiring very much,
strongly-marked eyebrows, and a thin gray moustache.
“He is evidently a man of considerable talent, and when called for, of
great energy, and appeared to have the most unbounded control over those
by whom he was surrounded, partly from fear, partly from the known
energy and cruelty of his character, and the confidence they had in his
succeeding in what he undertakes.
“His smile was anything but agreeable, and would, I think, have sat on
his features, whether ordering an execution or welcoming a guest.
“When amongst his generals, if in a good humour, he showed it by
practical jokes, pulling the beard of one, hitting another with his
fist, or pushing them about; they seemed to bear it as you would the
fondling of a tamed lion or tiger whelp which his master assured you was
quite safe, but which you felt might end in something less agreeable if
you resented any of his rough jokes.
“He has, however, the character of possessing considerable personal
courage, and is counted a good soldier, though many think he owes much
of his success to the talents of Souliman Pacha.
“I did not pay him many gossiping visits, because he was deficient in
the usual forms of Eastern courtesy, seldom offering coffee, never
pipes; besides, having been so lately in arms against him, I felt I had
no right to intrude myself excepting when required to do so in the
execution of my duty. This he remarked, and sent his German physician to
me to complain of my avoiding him, with some flattering compliments
about me as a soldier, and the regard he had for the profession.
“I consequently waited on him next day with Lieutenant Loring, R.N.; he
received us with loud expressions of joy, made us sit down, ordered
coffee, and, asking if we liked music, sent for an Arab band, consisting
of a violin, like a tenor, but with five strings, a dulcimer, and
guitar, with two men who sang; the music itself was bearable, but when
the men commenced singing at the top of their voices it was anything but
harmonious. His Highness certainly has no very refined taste in music.
“He was, when we entered, surrounded by his generals playing vingt-un
for handfuls of gazees (dollars); he showed his character here too,
always ready to back his own play, and was loud in his expressions of
delight when successful. He apologized for being found so employed, but
said, they had nothing else to do there, but that when at Cairo they had
their farms to attend to and plenty of business to occupy their time.”
The second day after the departure of Colonel Alderson, that good and
gallant officer General Michell fell a sacrifice to the climate and the
fatigue he suffered on the Gaza expedition, and Colonel Bridgeman
succeeded to the command.
Colonel Alderson remarks, “The cold caught by General Michell, that
wretched night of incessant rain, that followed the affair of Medjdel,
under single canvass, acting on a delicate frame, arising from repeated
wounds received in an hundred fights, together with, I firmly believe,
the mortification he felt at the result of the movement on Gaza, brought
on a fever, under which poor Michell sank in a few days. He died at
Jaffa on the 24th of January, at noon.
“It falls to the lot of few soldiers to earn so high a reputation in the
profession as Brigadier-General Michell had done; fewer still, who to
these high military acquirements have united a mind so highly
cultivated. He was too well known in the military world to enable me to
add anything to his well-earned reputation. I may, however, be
permitted, as a friend, to say that, having been his constant companion
since we left Spain together, I deeply felt and deplored his loss; and
that a life so valuable to his country should have been _thus_ so
prematurely cut off.
“His remains were deposited in a vault hastily constructed by the
British sappers, in what is called the English, or South-Eastern
Bastion, at Jaffa, for which a marble slab is now preparing at Malta, as
a slight memorial of the great respect and esteem in which he was held
by his brother officers.”
Footnote 53:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 203, 268.
Footnote 54:
Letter to the Seraskier and Hussein Pacha, dated January 21, 1841.
_Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 275, 276.
Footnote 55:
_Memorandum for Colonel Alderson’s guidance._
Jaffa, January 22, 1841.
Accounts having been received by the Seraskier that a considerable
number of Egyptian troops have advanced towards Gaza, his Excellency
has requested that an English officer of rank and discretion should
proceed to the quarters of the Egyptian officer commanding the troops
in that neighbourhood, to act as Conservator of the Peace. In all
probability the Egyptian Commandant will not feel himself authorized
to order any of these troops to retire until he shall receive
directions from Ibrahim Pacha; but you will point out to him the
evident necessity that exists for the avoidance of any the smallest
act of hostility or plunder, if he would not break the Convention and
renew the war. So long as you are satisfied that he is acting in good
faith, and doing everything possible to maintain order and peace
towards the Turkish troops and inhabitants of the neighbourhood, you
will remain with him, taking occasion at all times to point out and to
urge upon him the propriety of hastening, by any means in his power,
the evacuation of Syria, in the terms of Mehemet Ali Pacha’s order to
his son Ibrahim Pacha. Should you have reason to object to any of his
proceedings, you will at once remonstrate and protest: should he
persist, you will formally take your leave, and immediately return to
the British head-quarters, giving notice that you have done so to the
officer commanding the nearest post of the Ottoman troops, and putting
him on his guard. You will communicate with head-quarters as
frequently as possible, and notify as exactly as you can the number
and state of the Egyptian troops in that district.
You will have with you copies of the letters which have been forwarded
to Ibrahim Pacha, and of Commodore Sir Charles Napier’s letters from
Alexandria to General Michell and to Captain Stewart. The Seraskier
Pacha has declared that he has no design to deprive the Egyptians of
their arms, baggage, or guns; and that he wishes, by every fair and
safe means, to facilitate the retirement from Syria of the Egyptian
forces. Copies of the instructions given to the officers sent to
Ibrahim Pacha, and to accompany General Jochmus, will also be
furnished to you: and you will observe that the immediate evacuation
of Syria is the principal object to which all others are to be
considered as secondary.
By desire of GENERAL MICHELL,
(Signed) HOUSTON STEWART.
Footnote 56:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 307.
Footnote 57:
See page 89.
Footnote 58:
See these documents in pages 176-178.
Footnote 59:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 329.
Footnote 60:
“Izzet Pacha.”
CHAPTER XIII.
Detail of the Retreat of the Egyptians—Treacherous Intentions of
the Turkish Authorities—Decided Conduct of the British
Officers—Guarantees exchanged—Fright of Rechid Pacha—Letter
from Ibrahim to the Seraskier—The Author’s Letters to Lords
Minto and Palmerston.
On the 22nd of January General Jochmus wrote to the Seraskier from
Jerusalem[61] that as Ibrahim had passed to the south of the Dead Sea,
with his disorganized army, there was no necessity for negociation, and
that Baron Dumont corroborated the complete defeat of the Egyptians. (I
suppose he means the taking of Maan, defended by twenty men, for we have
had no account of any action, therefore there could not be a defeat.)
The Baron appears to have been within gun-shot of Ibrahim’s columns and
did not see the artillery; it was therefore concluded that the guns were
buried in the Desert, but I believe it will be found that they all
arrived safe at Cairo; at all events we have not heard of their having
been dug up.
“The cavalry,” observes the General, “are reduced to 2500 horses and 700
dismounted horsemen, in a miserable condition, and if it had not been
for the Convention”—(oh! that Convention!)—“two battalions, in the
almost impracticable passes of Wadi-el-Ghor, would have been sufficient
to stop the columns.” To catch a bird you must put salt on his tail,—to
stop the columns they must have come _through_ the Ghor, which,
according to Col. Napier, they never did, having only _crossed_ it to
the south of the Dead Sea, on their way to Gaza.
Hassan Pacha, who commanded the division to which Colonel Napier was
attached, reported that he had sent a safe conduct to Achmet Menikli
Pacha, commander of the Egyptian cavalry, and that his officer conducted
him to Gaza. Colonel Napier knows nothing of this, nor does Lieutenant
Loring, who, after communicating with this division, set out in search
of Ibrahim, of whom he could get no tidings, and returned to Gaza;
therefore the safe conduct must have existed only in Hassan Pacha’s
imagination, or if he did send it, it certainly never arrived; but if it
was sent, more shame to the Turkish authorities, who not only meditated
attacking Ibrahim, fancying his army was destroyed, but had actually
given orders to that effect. This Captain Stewart ascertained from
Rechid Pacha, who admitted that orders had been sent to General Jochmus
to act upon Ibrahim’s line of march, and impede it as much as possible,
abstaining at the same time from any direct attack. But as Ibrahim’s
troops began to arrive in a very different state from that which this
gentleman expected, he changed his mind and set out for Jaffa, post
haste, overtook the courier with the letter, and put it into Colonel
Bridgeman’s hands, who immediately protested in the council against such
proceedings[62], which would compromise the honour both of Great Britain
and Turkey, after the guarantees that had been exchanged between Captain
Stewart, Colonels Rose and Alderson, and the Egyptian Generals[63]. This
decided conduct of Colonel Bridgeman had the desired effect; promises
were given that no hostile movement should be made, but every possible
assistance should be afforded. These assurances were kept, but more
owing to the strength of Ibrahim than to the good faith of the Turkish
authorities; and as for Rechid, the officer who recommended the movement
against Ibrahim, I am informed by an eye-witness, that he went into
Ibrahim’s presence with fear and trembling, using the words, “_Il
m’assassinera_,” and absolutely stooped down and kissed the hem of his
garment.
On the arrival of Ibrahim Pacha he approved of the conduct of his
Generals, and made the following reply to the Seraskier:—
“Your Highness,
“I am going from Syria for Egypt. Your letter has reached me; the
Egyptian troops are concentrating in Gaza, and when they have their
necessary supplies, they will go immediately according to your wishes.
“I have written this to you in a friendly manner and have sent it to
your Highness.
(Signed) “IBRAHIM.”
Being duly informed of the arrival of Ibrahim, and how affairs were
going on in Syria, I wrote as follows to Lord Minto and Viscount
Palmerston:—
“Carysfort, Alexandria,
February 5, 1841.
“My Lord,
“Ibrahim Pacha arrived at Gaza on the 31st, with the rear-guard of the
Syrian army; he has brought from Syria between 20,000 and 30,000 men,
including 6000 cavalry in good order.
“The Turkish authorities at Jaffa were very much disposed to find a
pretence to attack him, and I believe nothing but his strong force
prevented it. He has already commenced his march across the Desert, and
in a week hence there will not be an Egyptian soldier in Syria.
“It was arranged that the Syrians, if any were with the army, were to
return from Gaza, but I suspect Ibrahim was afraid to disorganize his
army by letting them go. Captain Stewart was there, and I wrote to him
to say they were not to be embarked, unless he had a suspicion that the
Turks intended using them against Ibrahim; in that case, I recommended
them to be disarmed, or even allowed to retire into Egypt; in fact, he
was to do anything to avoid a collision, and as there are an abundance
of Egyptians in Turkey, it will be an easy matter to exchange them.
“I dined with the Pacha yesterday; he is quite satisfied now his army is
safe, and I am sure if the Porte will now let him alone he will improve
this country much; but he is apprehensive they will demand some part of
his fleet, and otherwise vex him. He looks to England to protect him,
and if we do, he will become our vassal if we wish it; in fact, there is
nothing we can ask in reason that he will not do. Next to Egypt being a
colony of England, it is best that it should be an independent power,
paying tribute to the Porte. Our commerce to India will become very
extensive; and the facility of travelling become easier every day. He
intends putting a lock from the canal into the Nile, to enable
passengers to go from hence to Cairo without moving from the steam-boats
that are to be established, and I have no doubt ere long a railroad will
be made from Cairo to Suez; the distance is eighty-four miles. Four in
hand may be driven across the desert at present.
“I shall remain here, (unless ordered to the contrary,) till I hear the
last man is out of Syria. I think the sooner the Consuls return the
better. I have not heard a word about them.
“I have, &c.,
“CHARLES NAPIER.”
“To the Right Hon. Earl Minto.”
-------
“H.M. Steam-vessel Stromboli, Alexandria,
February 6, 1841.
“My Lord,
“In my last communication to your Lordship, I mentioned that Ibrahim
Pacha had arrived at Gaza. I was mistaken; he arrived on the 31st of
January, with the rear-guard of his army, the whole consisting of
between 30,000 and 40,000 men in good order. The Turkish authorities
were very much disposed to interrupt them; and indeed, General Jochmus
did advance on Gaza, (contrary to the opinion of General Michell,) with
the intention of attacking him, but retreated rather precipitately. I
have written in very strong terms to him, and have instructed Captain
Stewart to protest against any attempt he may make; and by the last
accounts I had from him, all is quiet. Ibrahim began to retire across
the Desert on the 1st, and I apprehend by the 15th there will not be an
Egyptian soldier in Syria. The Pacha has not yet received the hereditary
title from the Porte, but I trust your Lordship will push the point; he
has all the desire to throw himself into the arms of England.
“I dined with him a few days ago. I have had a good deal of conversation
with him and Boghos Bey about abolishing the Slave Trade, and I have
some hopes of carrying that point before I leave this, which will not be
till after the arrival of the Liverpool on the 16th. I have made him
quite understand that nothing will gain him so many friends as such a
measure.
“I have, &c.,
“CHARLES NAPIER.”
“To Lord Viscount Palmerston.”
Footnote 61:
_General Jochmus to the Seraskier._
Head-quarters, Jerusalem,
27 Zilkadé, 1257, (Jan. 22, 1841,) 11 A.M.
I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I arrived here
yesterday evening. Lieutenant-General Hassan Pacha also returned here
yesterday from Chalil-Rachman; and Selim Pacha, with the brigade of
Chalid Pacha, will be here to-day, so that this evening a force of
twenty-one battalions, and eighteen guns will be assembled at
Jerusalem. The cavalry of Riza Pacha will this evening or to-morrow
morning join that of the Murchardsou, who must have arrived yesterday
evening at El-Chalil. The forces, in the central positions in which
they are, ought to be more than sufficient to support our negotiations
with Ibrahim, if they should have taken place; but as the latter must
be, according to the statements of all the deserters, to the south of
the Dead Sea, there is no longer any occasion for negotiation. His
army is in complete disorder, for want of provisions, owing to the
capture of Maan: and all the deserters state, that even before
reaching the magazines (now burnt), the whole infantry subsisted for
four or six days upon camel’s flesh. I found Baron Dumont here, who
corroborates the complete defeat of the Egyptians. As he saw the three
first columns pass within gun-shot, and as in the second where,
according to all accounts, the artillery ought to have been, he only
saw a great number of camels and mules, it is generally believed here
that Ibrahim has buried his cannons in the Desert.
The third column only of his infantry was seen, reduced to 5000 men; a
separate body at Jufila of 2000 men, who were some days since with
Ibrahim Pacha near to Kerek: all these people were half dead with
hunger. The losses of Ibrahim in men, in horses, and in beasts of
burden, in passing the Jordan, were very great. Finally, his
Excellency Hassan Pacha upon the news of peace, sent a safe conduct to
Ahmed Menikli Pacha, commander of the Egyptian cavalry, and gave him
to understand that he would not attack him in his retreat, provided
that he did not come to plunder the villages near to Chalil. Ahmed
Menikli Pacha, conducted by an officer of Hassan Pacha, then chose the
road towards Gaza in his retreat upon Egypt. The cavalry, reduced to
2500 horses and 700 dismounted horsemen, was in the most miserable
condition: and had it not been for the Convention, two battalions in
the almost impracticable passes of the Wadi-el-Ghor, one day south of
Chalil, would have been sufficient to stop that column. It appears to
be very necessary for the troops coming towards Gaza to withdraw, in
order that there may never be more than 3000 men at a time in this
place. I request your Excellency to communicate this letter to General
Michell.
I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. JOCHMUS, _Lieut-General_.
P.S. There is plenty of barley at El-Chalil, and there are other
provisions there, but rice and butter must be sent there.
Footnote 62:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 315.
Footnote 63:
_Guarantee by Menikli Pacha, and the other Chief Officers of
the Egyptian Army, at present encamped near Gaza._
Gaza, January 28, 1841.
We, the Undersigned, being assembled in council with Commodore Houston
Stewart, Royal British Navy, and Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson, Royal
Engineers, after the discussion which has taken place, have pledged
ourselves, that his Highness Ibrahim Pacha will, on his arrival at
Gaza, execute the orders of his Highness Mehemet Ali, the Viceroy of
Egypt, for the evacuation of Syria, and that he will not make any
movement whatever against those orders; for all of which we give our
signatures and affix our seals.
(Signed) AHMED MENIKLI, _Gen. of Division_; KOURCHID, _Gen. of
Division_; SELIM, _Gen. of Division_; AHMED DRAMALY, _Gen. of
Division_; ISHMAEL, _Gen. of Brigade_; IBRAHIM, _Gen. of
Brigade_; MAHMOUD BEY, _Capt. Navy_.
-------
_Captain Houston Stewart and Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson to Menikli
Ahmed Pacha and the other Chief Officers of the Egyptian Army at
present encamped near Gaza._
Gaza, January 28, 1841.
In consequence of the written guarantee which you have now given us,
making yourself responsible that his Excellency Ibrahim Pacha, as well
as yourselves, will implicitly obey, and forthwith carry into effect
with perfect good faith, the orders of his Excellency Mehemet Ali
Pacha for the evacuation of Syria by the whole of the Egyptian army:
We, Houston Stewart, Captain of Her Britannic Majesty’s ship Benbow,
and Senior Naval Officer on the coast of Syria, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Ralph Carr Alderson, Royal Engineers, representing here the united
forces of Great Britain, do pledge ourselves that no molestation nor
any obstacle be put in the way of such evacuation, and that you are
perfectly safe in diminishing your forces here as fast as possible;
and, further, that provided you continue to make that diminution to
the satisfaction of the said Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson, we promise
to insist with his Excellency the Seraskier, Zacharias Pacha,
Commanding-in-Chief the Ottoman forces, that no advance shall be made
by the Turkish troops now at Megdill, nor Governor be sent to Gaza,
until Colonel Alderson shall have reported the evacuation complete;
and we promise, that if the Turkish authorities refuse to ratify and
accept any one of these conditions, we will immediately, and in
perfect honourable faith, give you notice thereof.
(Signed) HOUSTON STEWART.
R. C. ALDERSON.
-------
_Guarantee by the Seraskier, the Moustechar Effendi, and
Lieutenant-General Jochmus._
We, the Undersigned, upon the received declaration of his Excellency
Menikli Ahmed Pacha and the other Egyptian Generals and Officers, to
carry forthwith into execution the entire evacuation of Syria and the
Desert, consent and promise faithfully to abstain from any hostile
movement, according to the promise given by Commodore Stewart and
Colonel Alderson, with the proviso that the forces at present near and
at Gaza, march on El-Arish within seven days from this, embarking such
men in transports as are sick, unfit for campaign, and unable to march
according to Colonel Alderson’s judgment, and provided no movement is
made by any Egyptian force at Gaza, east or northward.
Given under our hand and seal at the Imperial head-quarters of Jaffa,
January 30, 1841.
(L.S.) MOUSTECHAR EFFENDI, _Seraskier_,
JOCHMUS, _Lieutenant-General_.
CHAPTER XIV.
Contradictory Statements as to the Numbers of the Egyptian
Army—Reason for abiding by the Reports of the British
Officers—Colonel Alderson’s Detail of the Retreat—General
Jochmus’s Statement—Lieutenant Loring’s Mission.
It appears rather difficult to get at the exact amount of Ibrahim’s
army, either when it left Damascus, or when its two divisions arrived at
Gaza and Akaba. In the _Levant Papers_ are several statements upon the
subject; but they are rather contradictory[64]. This is not to be
wondered at, as the framers of some of them must have been sorely
puzzled to account for the numbers, who, in spite of famine, cold, and
“the sword of the fierce and revengeful Haouranees[65],” unquestionably
made their appearance[66] at the places I have named. I shall,
therefore, prefer to abide by the statements of the British officers at
Gaza, who had no former reports to bolster up, and who undoubtedly have
described things precisely as they fell under their observation.
By Colonel Bridgeman’s report[67], Ibrahim brought to Gaza 15,000
infantry and 6000 or 7000 cavalry. Lieutenant Loring, who was charged by
me with superintending the evacuation, gave the infantry at 23,550 men,
and the cavalry 6440, independent of Souliman’s division of 5000 men,
and 175 pieces of artillery[68] who marched from El-Mezereib to Akaba
and Suez, by the way of Maan, at which latter place he provisioned
himself for his march, arrived safely at Cairo, and by all the
information I received at Alexandria, and what Souliman Pacha
communicated to Colonel Napier at the former place, he did not lose a
gun, and the Colonel was himself an eye-witness to the excellent state
of his cavalry. This enumeration of Lieutenant Loring’s does not include
the noncombatants.
Colonel Alderson, who was with the naval officer, carried up the amount
of Ibrahim’s army to 33,000 men[69], besides Souliman’s force. He
remarks, in a private document with which I have keen favoured:
“It appears Ibrahim commenced his retreat from Damascus on the 29th of
December to El-Mezereib: at the latter place he divided his forces into
five columns[70]: 1st, the artillery and guns[71], women, &c., _via_ the
Desert and Suez, under Souliman Pacha; 2nd, the cavalry, consisting of
ten regiments, under Achmet Menekli Pacha; two of them (the cavalry of
the Guards) were recalled to join Ibrahim, after he recrossed the
Jordan, near Jericho; the 3rd and 4th, each consisting of five regiments
of infantry; and lastly Ibrahim himself, with three regiments of foot
guards, the two cavalry regiments of the guard as before stated, and
from 300 to 400 Arnauts, Henadi, and 300 rifles. Each of these last four
divisions had orders to make the best of their way to Gaza.
“When they left Damascus they had only sixteen days’ provisions, in
addition to which they obtained a small supply of flour at El-Mezereib.
The cavalry were sixteen days on the march, the infantry twenty-seven
and twenty-eight, and Ibrahim’s corps thirty-four. Small supplies were
occasionally received from the villages, but they avoided the great
towns, and made for the Dead Sea, which they kept sight of, and
approached as near as the nature of the country would allow.”
Colonel Alderson, who was an eye-witness of their arrival at Gaza, and
collected all the information he could, states that Ibrahim left
Damascus with 62,499 souls, including women and children; there arrived
at Gaza, independent of women and children, 27,000 regular troops, of
which 4250 were cavalry, and 3200 irregulars; the garrison of Gaza
consisted of 2800 men. Thus, then, 33,000 men either embarked from Gaza
or marched from thence between the 23rd of January and the 19th of
February, besides 9215 under Souliman Pacha, who marched to Suez.
Colonel Alderson’s account stands thus:
Arrived at Gaza 30,200
Marched with Souliman 9,215
Regular troops missing 8,859
Irregular troops supposed to have gone to their 8,440
homes
Women and children supposed to have arrived at 2,000
Gaza
Perished 3,786
—————
62,500
Be it remembered this loss of human life took place after the submission
of Mehemet Ali on the 11th of December, and the greater part after his
submission had been accepted by the Porte. The poor sufferers had taken
no interest in the contest, but had been dragged from their homes to
gratify the ambition of Mehemet Ali; why, then, after his submission
were they not allowed to retire in safety? Where was the merit of
forcing Ibrahim through the Desert, when he might have taken the
shortest road to Gaza, where he had depôts of provisions? These men lost
their lives, not in open war with the Turkish army, which they never
saw, but were plundered and butchered by the Arabs; therefore there was
no great credit due to those who were the authors of such measures,
barbarous in themselves, and, as I have already shown, contrary to the
opinion of Austria, (who would most probably be supported by the Allied
Powers,) who had declared they would disavow any attack on Ibrahim
Pacha[72].
General Jochmus, in his letter to Sir Robert Stopford, dated the 15th of
February[73], states the remains of Ibrahim’s army to be 19,000 men; and
from the reports of the Turkish and European staff-officers sent to
ascertain the numbers, the estimate, he says, is quite correct. General
Jochmus makes his calculation from the reports of his officers, which
must be received with caution. Captain de L’Or gave Ibrahim’s losses in
five days at 10,000 men; this was considered by the English officers
very much exaggerated, nor do I see how Ibrahim and Souliman, who were
both good generals, could have met with such a loss, unpursued as they
were by a regular army, and having nearly 10,000 cavalry to cover their
retreat and protect them from the few irregulars that followed them, and
who, if they did not behave better than those Colonel Napier had under
his command[74], would never have come within sight of them, and it is
more than probable, picked up the stragglers only.
Lieutenant Loring, in his report[75]; states that he did not reach
Caiffa till the 15th of January; the weather had been very boisterous
and the steamers were hardly seaworthy. Having procured horses at Acre,
he proceeded along the coast, through Tortura and Cesarea, and arrived
on the 17th at Jaffa, where were stationed the greater part of the
Turkish forces, having returned from their demonstration on Gaza the day
before.
On the same evening, by the advice of General Michell, he proceeded to
Jerusalem in company with Major Wilbraham and Selim Bey, who was the
bearer of a letter from the Seraskier to Ibrahim; he was also provided
with a firman to the Governor and Scheiks to assist them on the road. On
arriving at Jerusalem they found Hassan Pacha had marched on Halil
(Hebron) with 8000 men and six pieces of artillery.
Thither they proceeded and arrived the same evening. On acquainting
Hassan Pacha with their mission, he was easily persuaded to return to
Jerusalem; they then pushed forward, but instead of getting information
from the authorities, Abder Rahman, the scheik of the El-Halil district,
plainly told them that he would neither give them information nor
assistance, and there is no doubt whatever he was acting under orders
from the Turkish authorities. Abder Rahman must have known where
Ibrahim’s army was, because he had just returned from Maan, to which
place he had accompanied the Baron Dumont on his excursion to destroy
the magazines; in which, however, the Baron failed, as Souliman’s
division had passed through the day before and pretty nearly cleared the
stores. Finding it impossible to advance with any prospect of meeting
Ibrahim, they returned to Gaza, where they found Achmet Menekli Pacha
had arrived with the greater part of the cavalry. He made bitter
complaints of the conduct of the Arabs, and Lieutenant Loring
immediately proceeded to Jaffa to remonstrate with the Turkish
authorities on the conduct of their officers. From Jaffa he returned to
Gaza with Captain Stewart and Colonel Rose, accompanied by Rechid Pacha,
and everything appeared settled in an amicable manner with Achmet Pacha
to facilitate as much as possible the evacuation of Syria.
Mr. Loring was present some hours after, when Rechid Pacha, to the utter
astonishment of the British officers, declared his intention of
immediately returning to Jaffa, confessing at the same time that he had
sent orders for the advance of the Turkish troops to endeavour to cut
off the communication between the division at Gaza and those hourly
expected from the Desert. As has been already shown[76], the spirited
remonstrance of Captain Stewart and Colonel Bridgeman put a stop to this
infamous proceeding.
Footnote 64:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 292, 301, 307, 366, 367.
Footnote 65:
See page 124.
Footnote 66:
See General Jochmus’s letter and accompanying statement, in _Levant
Papers_, Part III., pp. 305-307.
Footnote 67:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 282, 332.
Footnote 68:
Ibid., pp. 309, 310.
Footnote 69:
Ibid., p. 307.
Footnote 70:
“Does not this division of Ibrahim’s army at El-Mezereib at once
convince any military man that he considered peace as concluded; and
that a want of provisions was the only enemy he had to fear? he
therefore divided his troops, so that one arm should not retard the
other.
“Cavalry, by forced marches, were enabled to get on faster than the
infantry, encumbered as they were by women, &c., and barley was no
doubt very scarce.
“In a military point of view, either in advancing or retreating in an
enemy’s country, it would be considered very injudicious to have
infantry without cavalry on the route; that Ibrahim knew this well,
his sending for the two regiments of cavalry of the guard, on finding
at Rieha (Jericho) that the Turkish troops were in position to resist
his march _via_ Hebron, fully shows.”
Footnote 71:
“The number of the guns has been variously stated, but I believe they
were between 150 and 200.”
Footnote 72:
See pp. 46, 54.
Footnote 73:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 305.
Footnote 74:
See page 151.
Footnote 75:
A private document furnished by him to me. His public report appears
in the _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 309.
Footnote 76:
See pages 175, 176.
CHAPTER XV.
Embarkation of the Egyptians—Mode in which it was conducted—Departure of
Ibrahim Pacha—Retreat of Souliman’s Division—Complete Evacuation of
Syria—Letter of Lord Ponsonby—Delivery of the Turkish Fleet—Anxiety
of Mehemet Ali for the safety of his Army—Letter from Boghos Bey to
the Author on the subject.
The season of the year was very unpropitious for embarking troops on the
coast of Syria, nevertheless Mehemet Ali, who had no idea of
difficulties or the risk he ran of losing his ships at Gaza, which is at
the very bottom of the Mediterranean, and from whence there is no escape
should the wind blow on the land, sent three transports, two steamers,
two corvettes, and a brig of war, from Alexandria, with directions to
carry the troops to Damietta. The surf is generally so high on the coast
that six days out of seven embarking troops is attended with great
danger. The Egyptian admiral and generals were indefatigable in their
exertions; they seldom left the beach night or day, and Ibrahim himself,
when he recovered, was frequent in his attendance. The poor Arabs,
whether sick or well, were obliged to strip, take their clothes on their
heads, and wade up to their armpits, and were then bundled into the
boats like so much lumber; the women and children were treated in the
same manner. Human life is little thought of amongst either Turks or
Egyptians.
Ibrahim Pacha remained to the last, and embarked on the 18th of February
on board the Hadji Baba, and landed at Damietta; the same day a regiment
of cavalry or of cuirassiers, and two corps of irregular horse, marched
for El-Arish, and the town was shortly after taken possession of by a
Turkish regiment of cavalry.
As to the retreat of Souliman Pacha’s column I am not able to speak very
particularly. Some documents that would have given the whole detail, had
they arrived, have not reached me. I believe, however, that after
parting from the main body at El-Mezereib on the 4th of January, the
column reached Maan on the 13th, supplied themselves with provisions,
and then pursued their route to Akaba, where the guns and stores were
embarked and carried to Suez, to which port the troops repaired
overland, and arrived there in tolerable condition and with very little
loss, reaching Cairo about the middle of February.
Thus terminated the evacuation of Syria, and after comparing the
different reports, the loss of the Egyptians could not have been less
than 10,000 men, (besides women and children,) the greater part of whom
most probably deserted, and were destroyed by the Arabs. The Turkish
army never came in contact with them, except in the affair at Medjdel;
they were, however, followed and harassed by irregulars, and also
suffered from want of provisions; but under all circumstances the
retreat seems to have been well conducted. Ibrahim’s crossing the Jordan
was a masterly manœuvre; it alarmed the Turks, saved Gaza, and
greatly facilitated his arrival there. The Turkish army appear to have
followed a very prudent course by taking up a position to cover
Jerusalem, Acre, and Jaffa, thereby securing those places against a
breach of faith on the part of Ibrahim, had he entertained any notion of
the sort; and it is just as well they never came in contact: Ibrahim was
well provided with cavalry, and that is an arm of which the Turkish
soldiers are very apprehensive, and I have no idea they could have
maintained themselves steady enough in square to resist an attack of
cavalry.
Had the Convention been adopted by Sir Robert Stopford in the first
instance the loss of life incurred in this retreat might have been
saved, and the country would have suffered much less than it did.
Nothing has been gained by its rejection; it stipulated for the delivery
of the Turkish fleet, the evacuation of Syria, and the confirmation of
Mehemet Ali in the hereditary government of Egypt, all of which have now
been obtained, with the loss, it is true, of some thousands of human
beings, who were not at all interested in the war. General Jochmus
thinks that the military question has been decided, and that the Turks
drove Ibrahim out of Syria; it is very certain that Ibrahim marched out
of Syria, harassed by the different tribes, but the Turkish army might
just as well have been at Constantinople; in fact, they were just where
they ought to have been, and the only fault committed by the Turkish
authorities was giving directions to the different tribes to harass
Ibrahim’s retreat, which was quite improper after the unconditional
submission Mehemet Ali sent to the Porte by Captain Fanshawe. This
submission, too, was well known in Syria at the time they were thus
acting, for we learn from Captain Stewart that on the 9th of January the
Gorgon arrived at Jaffa, bringing the news that the Pacha’s submission
had been accepted by the Porte[77].
The British Ambassador, I find, has not hesitated to take upon himself
the responsibility of the attempts made by General Jochmus to destroy
Ibrahim’s whole army. The following is his letter to Lord Palmerston,
for he shall speak for himself:—
“My Lord, “Therapia, February 23, 1841.
“I transmit copy of one of General Jochmus’s despatches to Admiral Sir
Robert Stopford[78], that I may insure its being known to your Lordship,
as it affords information essential to a correct judgment of the affairs
of this country.
“It is shown in the despatch, that had it not been for the perseverance
of General Jochmus in taking measures against Ibrahim Pacha, it would
have been easy for Ibrahim to remain with his army in Damascus until,
the arrangement with Mehemet Ali having been completed, he might have
retreated with a great unbroken force to Egypt, instead of having his
army defeated and nearly destroyed, and wholly demoralized.
“Had Ibrahim remained at Damascus, the military question would have been
undecided, and it would have been easy to assert that victory might
still have been on the side of the Pasha, had Mehemet Ali thought it
politic to continue the war.
“If Ibrahim had taken back to Egypt his large army unharmed, Mehemet Ali
would possess a force that might encourage him to resist, and might
possibly make him stronger than ever. The energy of General Jochmus has
rendered all doubt and delusion on the subject of the military question
impossible, and has shown, that under able command the Turkish troops
are more than a match for the Egyptian army and General; his energy has
also taken from Mehemet Ali the best means he could have to support
resistance, and therefore has afforded the best ground for hoping he
will submit.
“All this good is due to the energy of General Jochmus. The praises
General Jochmus gives to those who have done good service, are proofs of
his honourable and just feelings.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “PONSONBY.”
“Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston.”
I have already mentioned the arrival of the Turkish Commissioners at
Alexandria, and the formal delivery of the fleet[79] on the 11th of
January, which sailed on the 20th of that month from Alexandria; and the
greatest credit is due to Admiral Walker for his exertions in fitting
out that fleet, many of which were obliged to be lightened even to their
ballast, and take in their guns and stores outside; this they did
without anchoring, and got clear of the land before sunset. Mehemet Ali
having parted in good faith with this valuable deposit, became alarmed
about the fate of his son and his army, and though he complained little
to me in person, desired Boghos Bey to write to me on the subject.
“Commodore, “Alexandria, Jan. 30, 1841.
“I have the honour of informing you that, according to the last
despatches received from Gaza, almost all the Egyptian army is already
assembled in that town; that it is believed there that Ibrahim Pacha
will arrive to-day or to-morrow; that although the cavalry regiments are
already on their way towards Egypt, the infantry being too much
fatigued, it will be desirable on every account to transport it to Egypt
by sea, and thus, according to the desire of both parties, to spare the
loss of men; but that the English officers who are in authority at Gaza
object to the Egyptian troops embarking with their arms, a circumstance
which appears inexplicable, it being mentioned in the Convention
concluded between you and the Egyptian Government, that the Egyptian
troops should be transported to Egypt by sea with their arms and
baggage. Seeing, then, this opposition on the part of the English
officers, it appears probable that they are not acquainted with the
contents of the Convention above-mentioned. You are therefore requested,
Commodore, to write to the authorities at Gaza, in order that they may
no longer oppose the Egyptian troops embarking with their arms and
baggage for Alexandria; to send your letter to His Excellency Abbas
Pacha, so that it may reach his address in time; and to have the
goodness also to inform me of it, in order that a sufficient number of
vessels may be sent to Gaza.
“Receive, Commodore, &c.,
“BOGHOS JOUSSOUF.”
“To Commodore Napier,
&c., &c., &c.”
In consequence of this application, I wrote the letters to the British
and Turkish authorities in Syria already given[80], and did everything I
could to tranquillize the Pacha’s mind, and assured him that I felt
perfectly satisfied Captain Stewart would do all in his power to oblige
the Turks to keep faith.
Footnote 77:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 164, 311.
Footnote 78:
Ibid., p. 288; and p. 119, _et seq._ of this volume.
Footnote 79:
See page 71.
Footnote 80:
See pp. 92, 95.
CHAPTER XVI.
Examination of the Conduct of the Allied Ministers at
Constantinople—Lord Ponsonby’s Propositions regarding the Hereditary
Government of Egypt—Approved by the other Allied Ministers, but on
consideration rejected by them—Lord Palmerston’s Conversation with
the Turkish Minister—Note of the Four Powers in favour of the
Hereditary Tenure.
It is now proper to examine a little into the conduct of the Allied
Ministers at Constantinople, who, of course, had some influence over the
Porte, and exercised it, in framing the Hatti Sheriff reinstating
Mehemet Ali in the government of Egypt; and I shall take the _Levant
Correspondence_ to guide me in my criticism; for although a great deal
of that is no doubt suppressed, there still remains enough to form an
opinion on the wisdom of the Allied Ministers.
I shall take the British Ambassador in hand first, as he had more
influence, and took a more prominent part than the Ambassadors and
Ministers of the other powers.
After the news of the surrender of the Turkish fleet arrived at
Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby wrote to the Internuncio and to M.
Titow[81], recommending conditions which should be attached to the grant
of the hereditary pachalic of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, which they approved
of in the first instance, but on reconsideration, they, like wise men,
rejected.
Lord Ponsonby, in his letter to Lord Palmerston[82], states, that he
will follow his Lordship’s instructions of the 17th of December, and do
all he can to secure the Sultan against the evil designs of Mehemet Ali,
and preserve the people of Egypt in future from the oppression which
they have hitherto endured. “I am convinced there is no way of doing
both, so certain, as that which your Lordship says you wish would be
taken, viz.: taking the collection of the revenue out of the hands of
the Pacha.” I see nothing of the sort in Lord Palmerston’s letter; he
gives an opinion that the Porte will be able to make certain regulations
for the government of Egypt, but not one word is said about the
collection of the revenue; and surely it was not statesmanlike of Lord
Ponsonby advising the Porte to impose conditions on Mehemet Ali which
they had no power of enforcing, for Lord Ponsonby knew full well that
neither England, or the other Powers, could touch Egypt, without
provoking a war with France. He says, “The Austrians desire to put a
sudden end (as they suppose they can do) to the question here, by
yielding every thing to the Pacha. Your Lordship desires to establish
future security both for the Sultan and his Egyptian subjects. My duty
is to follow your orders; but could I be shaken in that duty by the
exertions of the Austrians, I should be still deterred from acting with
them for such a purpose, by my own knowledge that all this question is
to be most rigidly scrutinized in Parliament, and that severe censure
would fall upon me if I deviated from your instructions[83].”
I do indeed hope that Parliament will scrutinize his conduct, and
ascertain whether or not it is true that the Ambassador instructed
General Jochmus to follow up hostilities after the submission of Mehemet
Ali[84], and thereby cause the death of some thousands of human beings,
which was just as bad, if not worse than the chase of the negroes in
Nubia, of which Lord Ponsonby speaks with such horror[85]. The only
difference between the two is, that the chase of the negroes was the
custom of the country, whereas the chase of the Egyptians from Syria was
not according to the custom of civilized nations, as it was carried on
after the submission of Mehemet Ali, and when there was not the least
necessity for it.
The British Ambassador, in writing to Baron Stürmer and M. Titow, quotes
the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Articles of the Treaty of the 15th of July[86],
and makes a budget for the Pacha, showing the resources of Egypt in the
year 1833[87] to be 62,778,750 piastres, while the expenditure was only
49,951,500, which may have been correct or not; but it appears to me
that the tribute Mehemet was to pay to the Porte on his being reinstated
in the government of Egypt, ought to have been fixed by the state of the
revenue and expenditure in 1841, when the war ceased.
The proposition his Excellency makes is, that the Sultan should issue a
firman, giving the hereditary government of Egypt to Mehemet Ali; but he
is to bear in mind that Egypt was just to be considered like any other
pachalic of the Turkish empire, and at a future time he should be made
acquainted with the nature and extent of his administrative powers[88].
All this would have been very well had the power of the Porte alone put
down Mehemet Ali, and then had the means of enforcing the firman; but
the Ambassador must have known full well, that had Mehemet Ali been left
to himself, he could have dictated terms to the Sultan, and that, even
after all the losses he met with in Syria, occasioned by the Allied
Powers, and the losses he met with in his retreat by the bad faith of
the Turks, he was still in a position to resist the whole power of the
Turkish empire.
M. Titow, as well as Baron Stürmer and Count Königsmark, as I have
before stated, at first agreed with Lord Ponsonby[89], but asked his
opinion about the restrictive clause relating to the nomination of the
successor of Mehemet Ali. Their approval of the British Ambassador’s
proposal seems to have thrown his Excellency off his guard, and he wrote
to M. Titow:
“I reply at once to your question, and I say that I think it will be
more prudent to keep everything like specific arrangement for the
settlement that will flow from the assertion and establishment of the
Sultan’s sovereign authority and right. You will observe that I used the
expression, ‘hereditary in the family of Mehemet Ali,’ which cannot tie
up the Sultan’s right to specify the mode in which the succession shall
take place; and if it should be argued hereafter that the succession
should be in the direct line, (and, as it is called, by representation,)
the answer would be easy, that nothing of the sort is known to Turkish
law, nor is usual in the East, succession being commonly regulated by
very different principles.
“I do not see any inconvenience in leaving this matter untouched, but I
do fear that any thing that might give Mehemet Ali ground for discussion
and dispute at this moment might be inconvenient, and would be seized
upon by him. He cannot deny the Sultan’s sovereignty, which he has
already admitted; it will be impossible for him to refuse the hereditary
right, as it is expressed, without denying, at the same time, the
sovereignty of the Sultan already acknowledged.”
The alteration of the opinion of the Allied Ministers only appears in
Lord Ponsonby’s letter to Baron Stürmer two days after, in which he
withdraws his proposal[90]. He, however, alludes to a letter from Baron
Stürmer, communicating this change of opinion, in which the Baron asks,
“Have we any right to act according to our fancies, when the route we
have to pursue is clearly traced to us?”
To which Lord Ponsonby replies, “Certainly not; and in conformity with
your just notions, I will continue to act, without the smallest
deviation, upon the instructions of December 17, which have already been
made known to you, but which, to avoid error, I transcribe _literatim_
from the document.
“‘It will indeed be necessary, that in reinstating Mehemet Ali in the
Pachalic of Egypt, care should be taken to make such arrangements as
would protect the people of Egypt from a continuance of the tyrannical
oppression by which they have of late years been crushed, and should
secure the Sultan against a renewal of those hostilities which have
compelled him to have recourse to the aid of his Allies. But the means
of effecting all these purposes may be found in the stipulations of the
Treaty of the 15th of July, without removing Mehemet Ali from his
Pachalic. The Treaty says, that all the laws of the Turkish Empire, and
all the Treaties of the Porte, shall apply to Egypt, just as much as to
any other province of the Sultan’s dominions; and the land and sea
forces which may be maintained by the Pacha of Egypt, shall be part of
the forces of the empire, and be kept up for the service of the State.
“‘Under these stipulations, the Sultan will of course be able, by an
exercise of his legislative authority, to establish unity of flag, and
of military and naval uniform, throughout all his provinces; to limit
the number of troops which each province shall, according to its
population, maintain; to regulate the mode of enforcing the
conscription, so as to protect the people from undue burthens and
oppressive levies; to fix the number and class of ships of war which
shall belong to the several naval ports of his dominions; to fix the
manner in which commissions in the army and navy shall be granted in his
name, and by his authority; to determine that a single monetary system
shall prevail throughout all his dominions, and that there shall be but
one Mint. The Treaty specifies, that none but the legal imposts should
be levied in Egypt, which will secure the people from undue exactions;
and the execution of the Convention of 1838, by which all monopolies are
to be abolished, will at once free the industry of the people of Egypt
from those oppressive restrictions which have hitherto kept the great
mass of the population in the most abject poverty, and which have
gradually thrown out of cultivation extensive tracts of land that were
formerly tilled and productive.
“‘By such means it seems to Her Majesty’s Government, that future
security might be afforded, both to the Sultan and to his Egyptian
subjects, against the disposition of Mehemet Ali to rebel against his
Sovereign, and to oppress the people of the province he would have to
govern.’
“The above constitute the sole rule I can follow, and they are the only
words I am at liberty to use in the counsel I shall consent to give to
the Sublime Porte.”
The reader will observe these instructions were merely general, and
ought to have been followed only so far as the Porte had the power of
enforcing them; besides, at the time they were given, Lord Palmerston
was not aware what force Mehemet Ali had in Egypt; and there is not a
word in these instructions to lead Lord Ponsonby to suppose that Lord
Palmerston would have recommended the Porte to set aside Ibrahim Pacha,
which was evidently Lord Ponsonby’s aim.
His Lordship finishes his letter to the Baron by observing, that as
Mehemet Ali had rejected the Treaty of the 15th of July, the Allies are
free to act as they think proper. However free they might have been,
they always declared they should abide by the basis of the Treaty of the
15th of July, which was acknowledged by my Convention, and also by the
instructions of the 15th of October, which Lord Palmerston quotes in his
despatch of the 17th of December,—that despatch which the British
Ambassador takes for the guide of conduct, viz.: “Your Excellency and
your colleagues will, of course, have given to the Porte the advice
specified in my despatch of the 15th of October to your Excellency:” and
again, “In fact these articles of agreement were substantially a
complete surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali, and he was led to
suppose, that in asking for hereditary tenure, he was only asking that
which the Porte was willing to give[91].”
Lord Palmerston writes still more strongly to the Ambassador, under date
of the 29th January[92], in which, relating a conversation he had had
with the Turkish Minister in London, he says, in reply to the
unwillingness of the Porte to grant the hereditary pachalic communicated
to him by Chekib Effendi, “I said, that in all affairs, one must be
content with what is practicable, and not endanger what has been
obtained by striving after that which is unattainable. I said, that it
is clear that Mehemet Ali has made his submission in the expectation
that he should obtain hereditary tenure in Egypt: now if, after all,
this tenure were to be refused to him, what would probably be the
consequence?—renewed revolt, or an attitude, at least, of passive
resistance. What would then be the remedy? Such a state of things could
not be allowed to continue, because if it lasted, it would amount to the
separation of Egypt from the Turkish Empire. But the Sultan, has not, at
present, naval or military means sufficient to enforce his authority, in
such a case, over Mehemet Ali in Egypt. The Sultan, would, therefore, be
obliged to have recourse for aid to his Allies. But the measures
hitherto agreed upon by the Four Powers in virtue of the Treaty of July,
are confined to the expulsion of the Egyptians from Syria, Arabia, and
Candia, and to the driving of Mehemet Ali’s forces and authorities back
within the limits of Egypt. If, then, the Sultan were to apply to the
Four Powers for assistance to attack Mehemet Ali in Egypt itself, a new
deliberation of the Conference would become necessary.
“Now, I said to Chekib, I could tell him beforehand what would be the
result of that deliberation, if the assistance asked for by the Sultan
were required in consequence of the Sultan’s refusal to comply with the
advice given him by the Four Powers, to confer upon Mehemet Ali
hereditary tenure of his Egyptian pachalic. I said I knew perfectly well
that the Four Powers would decline giving the Sultan such assistance;
and what then would happen? Why, the Sultan would, in consequence, find
himself, for want of sufficient means of his own, obliged to grant to
Mehemet Ali, with a bad grace, and after an ineffectual attempt to avoid
doing so, that which he might now make a merit of conferring willingly;
and thus, instead of performing, as he now may do, an act of sovereign
power, at the suggestion of his Allies, he would appear to all the world
as making an extorted concession to a subject.
“I said that I would not attempt to represent as being of no value or
importance a sacrifice which is unquestionably a great one, because such
a representation could not convince the Sultan. But I begged Chekib
Effendi to request his Government to consider the immense importance of
the moral and physical strength which the Sultan has gained by the
events of the few last months, and to remember that all which the Sultan
has gained, Mehemet Ali has lost. That thus their relative positions
have been so entirely changed, that the Pacha can never again become
really dangerous or seriously troublesome to the Sultan, if the Sultan
avails himself properly of the stipulations of the Treaty of July; and
if he shall well organize his army, navy, and finances, and shall place
those branches of his public service upon an efficient footing. I
desired Chekib Effendi to bear in mind that the Sultan has recovered,
for his direct authority, the whole of Syria, Arabia, and Candia; points
which, with reference to military, naval, financial, and religious
considerations, are of the utmost importance, and for the recovery of
which the Sultan would, at this time last year, have gladly made very
considerable sacrifices. I further reminded him, that a faithful
execution of that stipulation of the Treaty of July, which says, that
all the laws and treaties of the empire are to apply to Egypt as to any
other province, will afford a most essential security for the sovereign
authority of the Sultan. I therefore requested Chekib Effendi to urge
his Government to conclude this matter without further delay, because it
is of great importance for all parties concerned, that it should be
brought to a final settlement as soon as possible.
“Chekib Effendi promised me to write to Rechid Pacha to this effect, and
he said that he had no doubt that the Sultan will comply with the advice
of his Allies.”
The day after this conversation, and in conformity with Lord
Palmerston’s views, the Allied Ministers sent a note to Chekib Effendi,
expressing their opinion that the Sultan should confer on the
descendants of Mehemet Ali in the direct line, the Pachalic of
Egypt[93].
Footnote 81:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 221.
Footnote 82:
Ibid., p. 207.
Footnote 83:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 208.
Footnote 84:
I think there could not be much difficulty in proving that he did give
such orders, when we consider the terms in which his Lordship speaks
of General Jochmus’s conduct, in his letter to Viscount Palmerston,
already given. See p. 195.
Footnote 85:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 226.
Footnote 86:
See Appendix, Vol. I.
Footnote 87:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 219.
Footnote 88:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 221.
Footnote 89:
Ibid., p. 222.
Footnote 90:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 224.
Footnote 91:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 88, 89.
Footnote 92:
Ibid., p. 169.
Footnote 93:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 171.
CHAPTER XVII.
Determination of the Allied Courts to secure the Hereditary Pachalic for
Mehemet Ali—Correspondence between Baron Sturmer and Lord
Ponsonby—Decisive Instructions from Lord Palmerston to Lord
Ponsonby—Conference of the Allied Ministers with Rechid
Pacha—Project for settling the Egyptian Question—Lord Ponsonby’s
Observations at the Conference—The Firmans decided on—Refusal of
Lord Ponsonby to allow the English Consul-General to return to
Egypt—Lord Ponsonby’s Letter to Rechid Pacha.
Before the last communication could reach the British Ambassador, indeed
before it was written, Baron Stürmer in a letter of the 7th of
January[94], had told him that Prince Metternich had written in the most
peremptory terms, that the Four Courts had pronounced _that the
hereditary succession in the functions of the Government of Egypt should
be granted to the family of Mehemet Ali_, and he finishes by condoling
with Lord Ponsonby, that the Allies have destroyed the hope they both
had of seeing the power of Mehemet Ali crumble to pieces. He adds, “My
part is played, and it only remains for me to await in silence the
orders which my Government may be pleased to transmit to me, and execute
them scrupulously.”
The English Ambassador, in no way daunted, replies[95], “It is wholly
indifferent what may be the private opinion of any of us as to this
question, which is the affair of our Governments, and for which none of
us are responsible; but it is another thing to act ‘without orders,’ and
I will not incur ‘that’ responsibility, and therefore I must decline
acting in concert with you until I am authorized to take the steps you
propose, by instructions to that effect. It is necessary I should
acquaint our colleagues and the Ottoman Ministers with my position, and
I shall do so without loss of time. I have been told by the best
authority, including yourself, if I mistake not, that your Government
had not decided to grant the hereditary right to Mehemet Ali; and at the
Conference it did appear that you had no authority to mention that
point. This matter, however, is not of a very recent date, and it is not
at all impossible that more than one alteration may have taken place in
the language or opinion of that Government, and that which is erroneous
now, may have been right before, or possibly may be so again, for in
this affair there has been a perpetual fluctuation of circumstances. If
my Government has not sent me orders, it cannot be for want of time, as
they would have reached me through Vienna as soon as the instruction you
have received.”
The Ambassador wrote in the same sense to M. Titow and Count
Königsmark[96], complaining of the breathless haste they were proceeding
in, in recommending the hereditary succession, and urging every argument
to prevent it in the first instance; all of which happily failed, and at
last he got decided instructions from home, which produced a couple of
short notes to the other Ministers and M. Pisani.
“My dear Sir, “Therapia, Jan. 10, 1841.
“I hasten to acquaint you, that in consequence of what I have received
from my Government by the messenger who has just arrived here, I have
instructed my Dragoman to inform his Excellency the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, that the British Government advises the Sublime Porte to grant
to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “PONSONBY.”
“To M. Titow.“
“Sir, “Therapia, Jan. 10, 1841.
“You will acquaint his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that
I am ordered to counsel the Sublime Porte, in the name of the British
Government, to grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “PONSONBY.”
“To M. Frederick Pisani.”
Lord Palmerston, in a short letter of February 10[97], approves of the
Ambassador’s conduct, without stating whether it was the long
correspondence to endeavour to induce the Allied Ministers not to
recommend the grant of the hereditary tenure, or the short
correspondence recommending the grant to be confirmed.
Notwithstanding that Lord Ponsonby had been foiled in his first attempt
to prevent the Porte from conferring the hereditary pachalic on Mehemet
Ali, he was not discouraged, and returned to the charge with fresh
vigour, on the question of attaching such conditions to the hereditary
title, as would render it worse than useless; and I have shown that on
reflection, the Allied Ministers altered their opinion, and Lord
Ponsonby in consequence withdrew his proposal.
On the 4th of February the Allied Ministers were invited to a conference
with Rechid Pacha, who laid before them his project of definitively
settling the Egyptian question, which was as follows:—
“Hereditary succession of Egypt granted on condition that all the
Treaties and all the laws of the empire shall be applied to Egypt as to
every other part of the Ottoman empire.
“The Sultan reserves to himself to choose among the male descendants of
Mehemet Ali whom he shall please. The heir chosen for the Government of
Egypt shall not have the title of Vizier until he shall have received
the investiture of the Sultan, and after such investiture he shall be
styled Vizier, and treated like the other Viziers of the empire.
Considering the advanced age of Mehemet Ali, he is exempted from
proceeding to the capital; his successors are under an obligation to do
so.
“As the Porte contemplates an improvement in its coinage, the money
which Mehemet Ali may coin in Egypt should have the same alloy and value
as that of the Sultan.
“All appointments to civil and military employments must proceed from
the Sultan, and all promotions emanate from His Highness; wherefore
Mehemet Ali is prohibited from appointing to any employment, and making
provision for any office without the authorisation and consent of His
Highness; in order, however, to leave him means of military
organisation, he is permitted to appoint up to the rank of captain
inclusive.
“The tribute to be paid yearly shall be fixed separately.
“The distinctive marks (nischan) of every rank, as well civil as
military, are to be ordained by His Highness.
“The uniforms, as well civil as military, must resemble those worn by
the civil and military officers of the Sultan, the whole adapted to the
climate; it being well understood that the cut and shape must be
absolutely the same.
“With respect to the garrison for the maintenance of good order in
Egypt, the Porte proposes from 20,000 to 25,000 troops.
“The conscription which in the other provinces furnishes one man in a
hundred, shall not in Egypt furnish more than one in two hundred.
“The Government of Egypt has always been bound to provide for the wants
of the Holy Cities; Mehemet Ali must therefore, as a faithful subject,
act in conformity with what is imposed on him by the situation of
Governor of Egypt[98].”
Lord Ponsonby, being first called upon for his opinion, stated, he had
no objection to offer, but after his colleagues had spoken he should
make some observations on the Tribute. The other Ministers gave their
assent to the propositions of Rechid Pacha; the arguments they used Lord
Ponsonby does not report to Lord Palmerston, as they would appear in the
Protocol, but which Protocol is not, I suppose for some wise purpose,
inserted in the _Levant Papers_. We must, then, content ourselves with
the British Ambassador’s own observations. He begins by stating, that
Mehemet Ali having been deposed, and the Porte appealed to, to reinstate
him, sufficiently proves that the Treaty of the 15th of July does not
bind the Allies. His Lordship, I believe, was singular in this opinion,
for it has been distinctly and repeatedly stated by the Allied Ministers
both in London, Vienna, and Constantinople, that the Treaty of the 15th
of July should be the basis of the settlement of the Egyptian question;
and in no part of the correspondence does it appear that the Allies
approved of the deposition of Mehemet Ali, and it may therefore be
fairly inferred that they entirely disapproved of it.
His Lordship takes for granted the Treaty is not an absolute rule, and
thus observes:
“If the Treaty be not the absolute rule, why are we to counsel the
Sublime Porte to take a measure that was adopted in that Treaty, at a
time when affairs were in a state totally different from their actual
state? The Treaty was a compromise with Mehemet Ali, and all its
stipulations were conditional, and with a view to engage him to accept
it. Mehemet Ali decided to refuse the Treaty, and to try the chance of
arms. He has been vanquished, and he has made unconditional submission
to his Sovereign. How then can the Treaty be obligatory upon the Allies,
(of whom the Sultan is one,) to take the measures framed for another
position of affairs which has ceased to exist?
“If then the Treaty be not obligatory upon the Allies, the counsel to be
given by us to the Ottoman Porte is to be based upon the instructions we
have received from our Courts; and we are not to advise the Porte to
adopt measures that are impossible to be reconciled one with another,
and contradictory, so as that one measure, if adopted, shall defeat
almost every other measure which we are ordered to recommend.”
The document is much too long, but may be seen in the _Levant Papers_.
The burden of it is, that Mehemet Ali should be crippled in his finances
to prevent him doing further mischief; and the Ambassador finishes by
saying, “I have reason to believe my colleagues entertain an opinion
different from mine. They have had before them for their consideration
the instructions from Lord Palmerston so often referred to. They are
possibly better able to interpret them than I may be, but I understand
them in the sense I have described; and it is for others, not for me, to
decide, and to take such part as they may esteem the best. Those whom I
have now addressed can judge, as well as I can do, what is the opinion
of the British Government. My opinion is of little importance, excepting
to myself, but I must stand before my country and justify my acts[99].”
All this would have been right enough if the Porte had the power to
enforce it, but not having the power, they only exposed their own
weakness to Mehemet Ali, and gave him an opportunity of treating their
overtures with the contempt they deserved.
On the 15th of February Rechid Pacha officially delivered to M. Pisani,
Lord Ponsonby’s dragoman, copies of the firman granting the hereditary
succession, the firman for governing the provinces bordering on Egypt,
as likewise an official note to the four Ministers, and a letter from
the Vizier to Mehemet Ali[100], communicating to them at the same time,
that the Consuls might proceed to Alexandria in the steam-boat, which
would leave in the afternoon without fail. This information had been
privately communicated by the dragoman to Lord Ponsonby on the 13th.
Nothing was, however, further from his Lordship’s intention than
allowing the British Consul-General to return. He appears to have been
dissatisfied because he was not consulted before the measure was decided
on, and he informed the Turkish Minister that he should not require the
Consul-General to return, because it might not suit the British
Government to establish the Consul-General on the same footing as
before; that Mehemet Ali might refuse; and lastly, that Colonel Hodges
could not leave Constantinople so suddenly[101]. Of these three
arguments the only valid one seems to be, the probability of Mehemet
Ali’s refusing the conditions; but even granting that, it would have
been more politic to have sent the Consuls with the Turkish Commissioner
who bore the firmans, with orders to persuade Mehemet Ali, if possible,
to accept them, and to signify to him at the same time that the flags
would not be hoisted till that point was arranged. They being on the
spot, and in an official capacity, furnished with instructions from the
Ambassador at Constantinople, would have seen how far it was possible
for Mehemet Ali to accept the firman without risking the tranquillity of
Egypt, and would necessarily have more influence on the Pacha than I
could have, being totally unprovided with instructions, and not having
received a single line from the Ambassador to guide my conduct.
On the 15th of February Lord Ponsonby wrote officially to Rechid
Pacha[102], disowning having had any thing to do with the firman, and
stating that he never had been consulted at all, or knew any thing about
it, till every thing was decided, and ordered to be sent to Alexandria.
The fact is, the Porte saw that Lord Ponsonby was determined to keep the
question open, and therefore arranged the firman without asking his
advice. What that advice might have been is hard to say; but we must
infer that had he been consulted, the firman would have been much more
stringent than it was, and which, as it turned out, was not palatable to
the Pacha, who absolutely constrained the Porte to alter it, and give
him more favourable terms; in this, as we shall see, he was supported by
the majority of the Ambassadors.
Footnote 94:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 183.
Footnote 95:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 185.
Footnote 96:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 185, 192.
Footnote 97:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 197.
Footnote 98:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 229.
Footnote 99:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 229.
Footnote 100:
See these documents in the _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 247-252.
Footnote 101:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 239, 240.
Footnote 102:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 325.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Delay in forwarding the Firmans to Mehemet Ali—Instructions to the
Commissioner—The Author’s Visit to the Egyptian Flag-ship—Substance
of the Firmans—Objections of the Pacha—The Author’s Advice—Letter to
Lord Palmerston—The Author’s last Interview with Mehemet Ali—Return
to Malta—Correspondence with Sir Robert Stopford—Return to England.
Although it had been distinctly stated to Mehemet Ali in the Vizier’s
letter of the 12th of January, (in consequence of the remonstrance of
the Allies)[103], that he should be confirmed in the hereditary
government of Egypt after the delivery of the fleet and his complete
submission, still the confirmation was delayed for a considerable time,
and the firman did not arrive at Alexandria until the 20th of February,
and was brought by Said Muhib Effendi, who was instructed to read the
firman[104] in full divan, and if rejected by the Pacha, he was to
exhort him to receive it. He was also the bearer of the fez and the
nisham of the Vizier, which Mehemet Ali was to wear on the day the
firman was read. He was to inform him, that in consequence of his
advanced age, the Sultan did not require him to go to Constantinople to
receive his investiture, but that one of his sons was expected to thank
the Sultan in person for the signal favour conferred on his father. He
was further instructed, in the event of Mehemet Ali’s remonstrating
against any part of the firman, to send back the steamboat for further
orders; but in the event of the Pacha’s rejecting the firman, he was to
demand that the rejection should be in writing.
The day after the arrival of the firman, Mehemet Ali visited the
Liverpool steamer, and from thence invited me on board the Egyptian
Admiral’s ship. The old man appeared in low spirits, but nevertheless,
he seemed proud of pointing out the cleanliness and order that reigned
in every part of his ship. On entering the cabin, the whole of the guns
were fired at once, and the rest of the squadron followed the example of
the flag-ship. He conducted me through every part of this magnificent
vessel, and it was quite impossible to conceive any ship better fitted
in every respect. After the inspection the drums beat to quarters, and
in less than three minutes she was ready for action. The men were well
trained, and the guns exercised with great alacrity, though not quite in
the style of the Excellent. The magazine was opened, the powder-boxes
handed up, the rigging stoppered, fire-engines and buckets at hand, and
large tubs full of water were placed along both the lower and main deck
in great abundance. After the gun exercise, a party were paraded with
their cutlasses and muskets, and it was altogether surprising to see how
well the poor Arabs went through their exercises. The yards were then
manned; but in this part of their manœuvres they were not quite so
expert.
After the exercises were over, we retired into the cabin, and I ventured
to ask if he was satisfied with the news from Constantinople, at which
he shook his head, and expressed a desire to see me in his palace. On
arriving there he begged me to sit beside him on the divan, pipes and
coffee were called for as usual, and through the medium of his
interpreter, he communicated the substance of the firman[105], which he
also gave me in writing; it is as follows:—
“Egypt within its ancient limits is granted to you and to your male
descendants on the following conditions:
“1st. When there shall be a decease of the incumbent, the Porte shall
select among his heirs the person who shall best suit it, who will be
summoned to Constantinople to receive the investiture. The present
concession does not involve any precedence over the other Viziers, and
the Governor in whose favour it is made shall, as regards the title and
the other prerogatives, only enjoy the advantages which are assigned to
him.
“2nd. The Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané, and the other fundamental laws of
the empire, as likewise the treaties present or future with foreign
Powers, shall be executed in Egypt.
“3rd. All the duties and all the revenues of Egypt shall be collected in
the name of the Sultan; and as the Egyptians form a portion of the
subjects of the Grand Signior, the rules adopted in the rest of the
empire for the collection of the taxes shall be observed in Egypt. In
order that the Sultan may be well assured that the people are not
over-taxed, a fourth part of the gross revenue arising either from
customs-duties, tenths, or all other duties, shall appertain to the
Sultan, and be in the place of tribute; the other three-fourths shall be
applied to the liquidation of the charges of collection and of the
expenses concerning the internal administration, the maintenance of the
troops, the household of the Viceroy, and the contributions in kind
allotted every year to the Holy Cities. The preceding arrangements shall
take effect from the first day of the year 1257 (the present time), and
be carried into execution for five years, at the expiration of which
term, provision will be made according to the circumstances and
condition of Egypt. In order that the duties may not be levied
arbitrarily, and in a manner prejudicial to the people, the Sultan,
having undertaken to watch over the interests of his subjects, considers
that the presence of a comptroller of finance is necessary in Egypt: you
will conform yourself to the order which shall hereafter be sent to you
on this subject.
“4th. Measures are about to be taken at Constantinople in order that the
money may be coined of the same die, as likewise of the denomination and
weight corresponding with its value; the money coined in Egypt in the
name of the Sultan must be so at the rate adopted.
“5th. During peace, Egypt can be protected by 18,000 soldiers; this
number shall not be exceeded; and as the land and sea forces of Egypt
are at the disposal of the empire, the Porte, in case of war, will fix
the augmentation which it is requisite to give to them. In the other
parts of the empire, the soldier, after a service of five years, is
free; this rule shall be enforced in Egypt. Consequently, there shall be
chosen from the existing army, and according to the periods of service,
20,000 men, of whom 18,000 shall serve in Egypt, and 2000 shall be sent
to Constantinople. Every year a ballot shall be had, in conformity with
the rules of equity, and in proportion to the population of each
district, for the levy of 4000 men, of whom 3600 shall be incorporated
into the troops of Egypt, and 400 shall be sent to Constantinople, the
whole to replace those who are discharged. The soldiers liberated from
service shall not be re-enlisted. It is possible that as regards the
material, the troops cannot be clad in Egypt as they are at
Constantinople, but as regards the shape of the clothing, the badges,
and the standards, they shall be wholly alike. The same is the case with
regard to the naval forces.
“6th. The Viceroy of Egypt cannot confer ranks except up to that of
Solkal-Aghassi (adjutant-major); as regards the superior ranks, they
must be applied for to the Sublime Porte.
“New ships of war shall not be built without the permission of the
Porte.
“The continuance of the hereditary succession being subject to the
execution of each of these fundamental dispositions, in case of
non-execution, the concession of hereditary succession will be revoked.”
Another firman conferred upon the Pacha the government (not hereditary)
of the provinces of Nubia, Darfour, Kordofan, and Sennaar. This firman
forbids the incursion of the troops into these provinces, who had been
permitted to seize the inhabitants, male and female, and retain them as
slaves in lieu of pay. He was also prohibited from reducing the slaves
to the state of eunuchs, a common practice in Egypt.
The Pacha pointed out to me how impossible it was to comply with the
firman relative to the hereditary title. That in the first place, with
respect to the Porte choosing his successor from any of his family, that
it was a blow directed against Ibrahim Pacha, which was both unjust and
impolitic. That he was his eldest son, and well worthy of succeeding
him; besides which, even if he consented to such a condition, it was by
no means clear that Ibrahim would, and even if he did, it would sow the
seeds of dissension in his family. That as to the appointment of his
officers, it had always been the practice to allow the Pacha of Egypt to
appoint them up to the rank of General, and that the proposed
restrictions would dissatisfy the army, and probably cause a mutiny. The
3rd Article, stipulating that he was to pay a fourth of the revenue of
Egypt to the Porte, appeared to him oppressive to Egypt. He asked my
advice how to act in his present position. This was a delicate question;
I had no instructions from home, nor from the Admiral, who was at Malta,
and no communication of any description from Lord Ponsonby, and simply a
letter from Colonel Hodges, stating the fact of the firmans having been
sent, and his opinion that the conditions would not be accepted by the
Pacha.
The reasons the Pacha gave for rejecting parts of the firman were so
just and so strong, that I did not hesitate to express my opinion that
they ought not to be accepted, and I advised him to write to the Porte,
and respectfully point out the impossibility of his accepting such
terms.
I knew in doing this I was taking a good deal of responsibility on
myself, as it was probable these terms had been suggested to the Porte
by some of the Ambassadors, if not by all; but, being on the spot, and
seeing that should Ibrahim, who was at the head of a large army, resist,
and be supported in his resistance by the officers of the army, which
was pretty certain, the whole country would be thrown into confusion, I
knew I should incur censure for not taking upon myself the
responsibility of advising the Pacha to adopt what I thought was the
safest course. Had the British and the other Consuls been at Alexandria,
I should have left it entirely to them.
The following is my letter to Lord Palmerston, relating the whole
occurrence:—
“Stromboli, Alexandria,
Feb. 23, 1841.
“My Lord,
“I have the honour of inclosing the translation of the Hatti Scherif,
which was brought here by the Turkish Commissioner on the 21st.
“The Pacha has accepted the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Articles, and the part of
the 6th which regards the construction of men of war; he begs the
Sublime Porte to modify Article 3 as being oppressive to Egypt.
“The first article he considers quite inadmissable, as it would not be
acceded to by Ibrahim Pacha, would cause discord in his family, and a
civil war at his death. He also objects to the part of Article 6 which
relates to the appointment of officers; hitherto they have all been
appointed by him, with the exception of General of Division, and a
sudden deviation from that system would disorganize the army, and bring
his authority into contempt.
“The Pacha has repeatedly consulted me on this subject; and it is a most
delicate situation to be placed in, as I cannot know what instructions
your Lordship may have given to Lord Ponsonby; but judging of the
intentions of the Allies from the Treaty of the 15th July, I cannot
think it was contemplated by the Allies to attach such a condition to
the hereditary title, and I did not hesitate to tell His Highness as
much. It is true I might have preserved silence; but placed as the Pacha
at present is, he is sure of turning to some one for advice, and that
person would have been the French Consul-General, out of whose hands I
have kept him since my arrival here; in fact, he looks up to England for
protection and advice, and I believe I am the only person he consults.
“There is a separate firman giving him the pachalic of Nubia for life,
with the condition that the chase should be suppressed, and no more
eunuchs made. This he has no objection to; and he regrets the Sublime
Porte has not taken the initiative and abolished slavery. I have urged
him strongly to do this at once; but he says it is surrounded with so
many difficulties, that the people’s minds must be prepared before he
can venture on such a measure.
“Mr. Larking goes home in the Liverpool in bad health; and he will
explain to your Lordship the position of this country, and the anxiety
of the Pacha for the friendship of England. The Consuls are not yet
arrived from Constantinople, which is to be regretted. I don’t know that
I have any right to stay now my mission is finished. Syria is entirely
evacuated, and many lives have been lost in consequence of the rejection
of the Convention, and the menacing attitude of the Turks, which obliged
Ibrahim Pacha to go round the Dead Sea, instead of marching straight on
Gaza.
“After the honourable manner the Pacha has behaved about the fleet, it
is to be regretted the Porte should have pressed him so hard,
particularly as I do not see how they can enforce their demands, and I
do not apprehend the Allies will risk another armament to enforce them.
“The Scheiks and Emirs are arrived at Cairo; and they will be sent to
Syria immediately on their arrival here.
“_February 24._ I saw the Pacha last night; he had a very long
conversation with the Turkish Minister, who seems to be aware of the
impossibility of imposing such terms on the Pacha, and he has sent his
steamer to Constantinople for fresh instructions. I do hope they will be
more reasonable at Constantinople. I do not think it would have been
possible to have concocted a better plan to throw discord and confusion
into a country, than the terms they have proposed to him. Egypt is
making rapid strides to improvement, and is now beginning to feel the
advantages of Mehemet Ali’s system. He is, it is true, an Oriental, and
has many mistaken notions; but he must be treated with kindness and
consideration.
“A good many Syrians have come into Egypt with the Egyptian army. I have
demanded their immediate release; and for the first time, had rather a
warm discussion with him on the subject. He promises to send them to
their homes; but not till he hears from Constantinople. I regret this,
because it will furnish his enemies with weapons against him; but I
cannot wonder at his being irritated, because he has not been treated
well. He behaved so honourably about the fleet, that he deserved some
consideration. Imposing such a heavy tribute on him, will have either
the effect of stopping improvement in Egypt, or if he goes on with his
public works, he will have to oppress the people, and he was on the
point of reducing the poll-tax, when the Hatti Scherif arrived.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “CHARLES NAPIER.
“To Viscount Palmerston.
“P.S. I have this moment received a letter from Boghos Bey, promising
the release of the Syrian troops.”
My last interview with the Pacha was not of a very pleasant nature; for
the first time, he neither offered me a pipe, nor took one himself, and
was in very ill humour. I pressed him hard about the Syrians, which he
evaded; and I told him I should speak to him no more on the subject, but
should address an official letter to Boghos Bey; this I did, and he
answered, promising their immediate release.
Next morning the Pacha set out for Cairo to see Ibrahim, who, for some
reason or other, had declined coming to Alexandria. Seeing that I could
be of no further use here, I made up my mind to proceed to join the
Powerful in Marmorice Bay, and accordingly paid a parting visit to
Boghos Bey. The old man was very civil, and informed me he had orders to
present me with a snuff-box set in brilliants. Boghos Bey had before
pressed me to receive a large present as a _souvenir_ from the Pacha,
which I declined, as being contrary to our rules and regulations; but in
this instance he pressed the box, saying it was an Eastern custom, and
the grand _souvenir_ should be given at a later period. I replied that I
should have had no objection to have taken a small keepsake of little
value from the Pacha; but that in my last interview, I did not think he
had behaved well, and evaded giving me any answer about the Syrian
troops, in which I thought he had not kept his word. I added that he
might rely upon it the British Government would insist on the
performance of his promise.
I then took leave of Boghos Bey, left Alexandria on the 1st of March,
and arrived at Marmorice Bay on the 3rd. I there found orders to proceed
to Malta, where I arrived on the 22nd, and was placed in quarantine. The
day after my arrival I received a letter from the Commander-in-Chief,
which left me in doubt whether the Government had repented their
approval of my Convention or not. The letter and answer I insert,
together with the Admiral’s further reply:—
“Princess Charlotte, Malta,
March 15, 1841.
“Sir,
“I am desired by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint
you, that whatever may have been the political considerations which
induced Her Majesty’s Government to sanction a Convention entered into
under the circumstances in which you felt yourself placed, their
Lordships fully concur in my opinion of the injury and inconvenience to
which Her Majesty’s service may be exposed by a junior officer taking
upon himself such a responsibility, which can only be justified by the
event as in the present instance.
“I am, &c.,
“ROBERT STOPFORD, _Admiral_.
“Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.,
H.M.S. Powerful.”
* * * * *
“H.M.S. Powerful,
Malta, March 28, 1841.
“Sir,
“Had I not received a letter from the Admiralty direct, together with
private ones from Lords Minto and Palmerston, approving of the
Convention I entered into with Mehemet Ali, which Convention was based
on the Treaty of the 15th of July, and approved of by the great Powers
of Europe, who are now carrying it out, I should have considered your
letter of the 15th of March, communicating their Lordships’ opinion, as
intended to convey a sort of censure.
“I am quite aware, when an officer takes upon himself the responsibility
I did, there must be strong reasons to justify him; I took the same
responsibility at Sidon and Boharsof, and had I been defeated I incurred
the same risk of censure, and I trust, as long as I can benefit my
country by incurring responsibility, I shall always possess strength of
mind to do it.
“I take this opportunity of observing how much I regret that you should
have found it necessary, in disapproving of my Convention, to have
expressed yourself in such harsh terms of me to Mehemet Ali, which
placed me in a most unpleasant situation at Alexandria.
“I have, &c., “CHAS.
NAPIER,
“To Admiral the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Malta.”
* * * * *
“Princess Charlotte, at Malta,
March 23, 1841.
“Sir,
“I do not intend to enter into the political merits of your Convention
with Mehemet Ali, which has been subsequently sanctioned by Her
Majesty’s Government, but as Commander-in-Chief upon this station I
think I should have signally failed in my duty if I had not represented
to the Admiralty any act of an officer under my command which I
considered to be contrary to the rules and customs of the naval service.
“I am not aware of any harsh expression towards your proceedings, in my
letter to Mehemet Ali, as I consider the words ‘hasty and unauthorized’
perfectly justifiable under the circumstances of the case, and which
accounted for my refusing to ratify the Convention.
“I am, &c.,
“ROBERT STOPFORD, _Admiral_.
“Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.,
H.M.S. Powerful.”
On the 31st of the same month, having obtained a month’s leave of
absence, I hauled down my broad pennant, and proceeded to England in the
Oriental steamer, and arrived at Liverpool in the middle of April.
Footnote 103:
_The Grand Vizier to Mazloum Bey._
19 Zilkadé, 1256. (12 January, 1841.)
In the letter which I wrote and sent by your Excellency to his
Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha, there is nothing clear or precise relative
to the hereditary succession to the Government of Egypt. It is said,
in general terms, that he shall be reinstated in the Government of
Egypt. It is then probable, it is to be presumed, that his Highness
will conceive suspicions in this respect; and it is for this reason
that it has been judged necessary to give the following explanations
upon this point.
As the letter which Mehemet Ali Pacha sent to me, and by which he
offered his submission to His Imperial Majesty, commenced by making
mention of the Convention which had been concluded between him and
Commodore Napier, and as the Sublime Porte had not accepted that
Convention, which it regarded as null and of no effect, it was thought
that if I had spoken in my letter of the hereditary succession, it
would have been, in substance, to recognise the Convention, and that
is the reason why it was omitted to speak of it.
Nevertheless, His Imperial Majesty, whose goodness and favours are
shed over his servants truly submissive, entertaining with regard to
Mehemet Ali Pacha the benevolent intentions which are in unison with
the sentiments of moderation by which the High Allied Powers are
animated, it is certain that as soon as he shall have proved by facts,
as has been declared in my letter, the submission which he has
offered, by immediately restoring the Ottoman fleet, and by making
over, without delay, to the Commissioners of the Sublime Porte, the
countries which are known to be in question, and which are situated
out of Egypt, His Highness will be pleased to reinstate him in the
government of Egypt, with right of hereditary succession.
The requisite conditions laid down by the Treaty of Alliance, and
other points connected with those conditions, are about to be settled;
and as all this will be arranged at the same time that the investiture
of the hereditary succession shall take place, I abstain for the
moment from entering into details upon this subject.
However, it is important that His Highness should know in a few words
what is doing, and that he should be apprized beforehand, that if a
single one of the conditions which shall have been laid down, is not
observed, the hereditary succession will be abolished.
You will therefore formally ratify to Mehemet Ali, on the part of His
Imperial Majesty, in case that, in conformity with what has been said
above, his submission shall be a fact, the conditional hereditary
succession aforesaid. And in order altogether to dispel the doubts
which he might have in this respect, and to inspire him with entire
confidence, you will even allow him, if necessary, to see my present
official despatch.
Such are the orders of the Sultan, in conformity with which you will
be careful to act, and it is for this purpose that I write to you the
present despatch.
Footnote 104:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 242.
Footnote 105:
The firmans are given at length, as are also the instructions of the
Turkish Envoy, and the official notifications connected with the
affair, in the _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 241-254.
CHAPTER XIX.
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London—Protocol of the 5th
March—Note of Chekib Effendi—Note of the 13th of March—Lord
Palmerston’s explanation of the Views of the Allies regarding the
Hereditary Tenure—Conference of the 16th March—Protocol—Endeavour to
include France in a Convention for closing the Straits of the
Dardanelles and Bosphorus—False Position of the Porte—Views of Lord
Ponsonby and of the other Ambassadors—Instructions of the Austrian
and British Governments—Opinions of M. Guizot—Turkish Plan of
Settlement—Note of the 10th May.
When Lord Palmerston heard from Sir Robert Stopford that the Turkish
fleet had arrived at Marmorice Bay, and that Ibrahim Pacha had reached
Gaza, he immediately assembled the Foreign Ministers, and, on the 5th of
March, they agreed to a Protocol to the following effect[106]:—
1. That Mehemet Ali had submitted, and asked for pardon.
2. That he had delivered the Ottoman fleet to the Commissioners.
3, 4. That he had evacuated Syria; and that the Turkish authority was
established there and in Candia.
5. That the Sultan had accepted the submission, and pardoned Mehemet
Ali, his children, and adherents.
6. That the Sultan had announced his intention of reinstating Mehemet
Ali with hereditary succession.
The conditions settled on the 15th of October and 14th November[107],
being thus fulfilled, the assembled Ministers determined that the
Consuls of the Four Powers should now return to Alexandria.
On the 11th of March, Chekib Effendi, the Ottoman Minister, communicated
to Lord Palmerston[108] that the Porte had restored Mehemet Ali, and
forwarded him the firmans I have already mentioned, and requested his
Lordship to communicate them to the other Ambassadors in London, and he
desired an answer to the official communication; whereupon Lord
Palmerston again assembled the Foreign Ministers on the 13th of
March[109], and they drew up a Collective Note, expressing their lively
satisfaction at the event, and communicating to the Ottoman Minister
that they had heard from Alexandria, under date of the 24th of February,
that Mehemet Ali had admitted, without reserve, that the treaties and
laws of the empire should apply to Egypt in the same way as to the other
provinces of the empire. That he had acceded to the regulation of the
monetary system, the service and uniform of the troops, and the building
of the ships. That he had replaced under the orders of the Sultan, the
land and sea forces, and, in fact, that at the present moment he had put
himself in the situation of a subject, and that it appertains to the
Sultan alone to settle the internal administration, and take into
consideration the wishes which Mehemet Ali has submitted to the Sultan.
The Ministers finish the Note by stating, “The Undersigned are fully
assured that these explanations, conceived in a sincere spirit of
conciliation, would be received by the Sultan in the same manner in
which he has constantly received the advice already given by his
Allies,—advice disinterested and sincere, which His Highness has justly
appreciated, when he accomplished, by an act of clemency, a work of
pacification which his Allies had frankly aided him in effecting.”
Lord Palmerston wrote at the same time to Lord Ponsonby[110],
transmitting the Note of the Plenipotentiaries, and remarking that
doubts might arise out of the wording of the first Article of the
Hatti-Sheriff, which specifies the conditions to be imposed upon Mehemet
Ali. “The wording of that Article might lead to the supposition, that
the Sultan intended to reserve to himself to choose upon each vacancy in
the pachalic of Egypt, any one of the descendants of Mehemet Ali,
without regard to any fixed rule whatever; and that thus the principle
of hereditary tenure would be rendered illusory.
“Her Majesty’s Government conceive, that this was by no means the
intention of the Porte, and that what was meant to be established by the
condition above-mentioned is, that while, on the one hand, the Sultan
grants to the descendants of Mehemet Ali in the direct male line
hereditary succession in the pachalic of Egypt, the Sultan reserves his
own sovereign rights intact, by declaring, that those descendants shall
not succeed as a matter of course and of inherent right, as would be the
case with the rulers of an independent state, but shall each in turn
receive his appointment from the Sultan, and by a separate act of the
Sultan’s sovereign power.
“If this is a correct view of the meaning of the Article in question,
there can be no difficulty on the part of the Porte in giving such an
explanation thereof as will remove all misunderstandings; and the Porte
might say, that is the intention of the Sultan that this right of
selection shall in all cases he exercised in favour of the next male
heir to the deceased Pacha, unless, by infancy or by physical
incapacity, such male heir should be incapable of taking charge of the
administration of the province, in which case the person next in
relationship to the deceased Pacha would be appointed in his stead. The
Sultan might, at the same time, make it to be clearly understood, that
it is his intention that Ibrahim shall succeed to Mehemet.”
Lord Palmerston was also of opinion that it would not be difficult to
settle the affair of the tribute, and that the Allies had purposely
abstained from entering into the question; and that relative to the
appointment of the officers, could be easily arranged.
On the 16th of March the Allied Ministers in another conference[111]
conceiving the Eastern Question settled, engaged the French Government
to rejoin the European family, and they initialed a Convention
recognising the right of the Porte to shut the passage of the
Dardanelles and Bosphorus against ships of war of all nations. The
Protocol was as follows:—
“The difficulties in which His Highness the Sultan was placed, and which
decided him to apply for the support and the assistance of the Courts of
Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, being now removed, and
Mehemet Ali having made towards His Highness the Sultan the act of
submission which the Convention of the 15th of July was designed to
bring about, the Representatives of the Courts, parties to the said
Convention, have considered that, independently of the execution of the
temporary measures resulting from that Convention, it is of essential
importance to record in the most formal manner, the respect which is due
to the ancient rule of the Ottoman empire, in virtue of which it has at
all times been prohibited for ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter
the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.
“This principle being from its nature one of general and permanent
application, the respective Plenipotentiaries, provided with the orders
of their Courts to this effect, have been of opinion that, in order to
manifest the agreement and union which regulate the intentions of all
the Courts in what concerns the maintenance of the peace of Europe, it
would be proper to record the respect which is due to the
above-mentioned principle, by means of an arrangement in which France
should be invited to concur, at the invitation, and agreeably to the
wish, of the Sultan.
“This arrangement being calculated to afford to Europe a pledge of the
union of the Five Powers, Her Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, agreeably to an understanding with the
Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers, undertook to bring this matter to
the knowledge of the French Government, requesting it to take part in an
arrangement by which, on the one hand, the Sultan should declare his
firm resolution to maintain for the future the above-mentioned
principle; the Five Powers, on the other hand, should announce their
unanimous determination to respect that principle and to conform
themselves thereto.
“(Initialed) E. N.
P.
B.
B.
C.
On the 6th of March Mehemet Ali’s and Said Muhib Effendi’s letters to
the Vizier arrived at Constantinople[112]. Mehemet Ali’s, in respectful
terms, and with great clearness, pointed out the impossibility of his
consenting to the first, third, and part of the sixth articles of the
Firman; the other articles he cheerfully acceded to. The Commissioner
makes a long report of the arguments he used to induce Mehemet Ali to
consent, and the very clever way he evaded them; and it must be admitted
the old Pacha had the best of the argument.
The Porte, as might have been expected, was now in a false position;
France had so far joined the Allies as to initial the Treaty for
shutting the Dardanelles, but it was not likely she would now attempt to
coerce Mehemet Ali or even advise him to yield; and under this
embarrassment Rechid Pacha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote to
the Ministers for advice. Lord Ponsonby did not hesitate to entirely
agree with Rechid Pacha that the application of Mehemet Ali to change
some of the articles of the Firman was no proof of submission[113]. The
Firman, says the Ambassador, is an order, and no subject can refuse to
obey an order and be considered submissive; he does not admit that he
petitioned for a change, but he asserts that he disobeys. I cannot read
Mehemet Ali’s letter in that sense. After giving his reasons why the
hereditary succession should go by right of primogeniture, which appear
to me convincing, he states, “It is evident, moreover, that his
Highness, moved by sentiments of clemency, desires the maintenance of
repose and tranquillity, and it is for that reason that I request that
the question of the hereditary succession may be settled as has been
stated above.” Surely this may be considered petitioning, and in a
moderate way too, when we recollect that Mehemet Ali knew full well that
the Porte had no means of enforcing these orders.
What the Ambassador says of the preparations Mehemet Ali was making for
resistance is incorrect. I was at Alexandria at the time, and I saw no
new preparations; there were a few men completing his unfinished works,
which were so ill constructed that if not attended to they would have
crumbled to pieces. He was certainly reorganizing his army, after the
retreat, which was absolutely necessary; but even had he been preparing
for resistance could he be blamed? The Firman that was sent to him was
so perfectly absurd that no man in his senses, with an army of 50,000 or
60,000 man, and upwards of 10,000 cavalry, would have accepted such
terms from a weak master; and no set of men, possessed of common
understanding, and knowing the relative position of the Porte and
Mehemet Ali, would have counselled such a Firman. The Ambassador
finishes by recommending the Porte to do nothing till they have heard
from Great Britain.
Baron Stürmer was a wiser man, and he recommended the Porte to seek some
means of acceding to the entreaties of Mehemet Ali without compromising
the dignity of the Sultan[114]. Baron Königsmark and M. Titow declined
giving an opinion till they received further instructions[115].
On the 29th of March Rechid Pacha and Ahmed Fethi Pachi were displaced,
and succeeded by Rifat Bey, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Tahir
Pacha, as Capudan Pacha.
On the 31st March Prince Metternich, seeing no end to this question,
instructed Baron Stürmer to inform the Divan, that if they did not adopt
the modifications to the Firman recommended by the Conference of London,
the Emperor of Austria would withdraw altogether from the alliance.
Prince Metternich writes most strongly; he observes, “The contents of
your despatch of the 17th of March attract our most serious attention,
because they prove the existence of a position without precedent in the
annals of diplomacy. What, for example, has been the result of the very
precise instructions of the 30th of January? What attention have the
Divan, and the agents of the Four Courts, paid to the opinion expressed
in that document? On the one hand we see the Porte undecided as to the
course which it will have to take on the subject of the representations
of Mehemet Ali against certain articles of the Firman; and on the other,
the Representatives of the Four Powers ignorant how to counsel from the
very clear words of the Collective Note above mentioned; in truth, M. le
Baron, it is impossible to make it out.” This is pretty strong language,
which he follows up by saying, “The instructions I sent you on the 26th
of March have replied, by anticipation, to your scruples, and I flatter
myself you will have considered those instructions as anticipating the
orders which each of you have applied for, and not have hesitated to
offer the advice they contain.
“Nevertheless, as in the course of this affair we have already been
exposed to see ourselves deceived in our expectations, I now direct you
to invite your colleagues to a conference, and acquaint them that the
Emperor enjoins you to insist on the Divan admitting the modifications
which the other Courts desire, for the interest even of the Porte, to
see introduced into certain articles of the Firman. And should your
colleagues decline doing so, you are to take the step prescribed, either
alone or with those who will join you; and should the Porte refuse to
listen, the Emperor will consider himself as restored to entire liberty
of position and action[116].”
Lord Palmerston writes under date of the 10th of April[117]; that he
conceives his former despatches and the Collective Notes are sufficient
to guide Lord Ponsonby in the advice he shall give, and that it is
important the dispute between the Porte and Mehemet Ali should be
settled as soon as possible, and that the Government do not think the
objection stated by the Ambassador, “that it would not be proper for the
Sultan to negotiate with Mehemet Ali,” ought to weigh against the
extreme urgency of coming to a final settlement, and that no settlement
can be made without a direct communication. “On some points,” his
Lordship adds, “Mehemet Ali has reason on his side, in others he is
clearly and decidedly wrong.” The Sultan ought, therefore, without
delay, to modify the Firman in the objectionable parts, and explain that
other parts cannot be altered without a departure from the terms of the
Treaty of the 15th of July.
Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Ponsonby more peremptorily on the 21st of
April, inclosing a copy of Prince Metternich’s letter to Baron Stürmer,
and acquainting his Lordship that Her Majesty’s Government concur in the
view taken of the matter by the Austrian Government, and are prepared to
take the same course[118].
M. Guizot in a conversation with Mr. Bulwer at Paris, took the same view
of the 1st, 3rd, and 6th articles of the Firman I had done, and admitted
he disapproved of some of Mehemet Ali’s pretensions, and had taken care
to tell him so; and that the only way to settle the dispute was by the
Allies pressing the Porte on one side, and France pressing Mehemet Ali
on the other[119].
On the 27th of April, Chekib Effendi, the Ottoman Minister in London,
submitted to Lord Palmerston a new plan[121], which was little better
than the first: the Porte offered to confer the Government of Egypt,
after the death of Mehemet Ali, either on Ibrahim Pacha or any other son
that Mehemet Ali might select, on condition that afterwards, the right
of selection should devolve on the Porte; if that was not approved of,
it was proposed that one of his descendants should be chosen by the
members of his family and by the chief people of the country, and
proposed to the Sublime Porte, which choice should be confirmed, and the
person nominated by the Sultan; the other articles remained the same.
Who could have put this wild scheme into the heads of the Divan, it is
not easy to conceive; this plan would certainly have settled the
succession on Ibrahim Pacha, but on failure it would have given rise to
intrigues without measure, and also have put the dignity of the Porte in
a worse position than at once fixing the hereditary succession in the
family of Mehemet Ali as he wished. The Plenipotentiaries met in London
on the 10th of May, and very adroitly passed over the new proposition of
Chekib, and repeated their opinion that the succession should go in the
right line, from father to son. As to the tribute, they recommended that
it should be fixed at a stated sum, subject to revision at certain
periods, and they conceived that the difficulty which had arisen
relative to promotion, could only be considered as of secondary
importance. They finish by saying that they persist in their views
communicated to the Porte in the Collective Notes of the 30th of
January, 13th of March, and by the Protocol of the 5th of March[120],
and that they look upon the submission formally made by Mehemet Ali as
absolute, and in consequence the Turco-Egyptian question
terminated[122].
Footnote 106:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 235.
Footnote 107:
See Vol. I., p. 249; Vol. II., p. 15.
Footnote 108:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 241.
Footnote 109:
Ibid., p. 263.
Footnote 110:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 326.
Footnote 111:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 321.
Footnote 112:
See these documents in the _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 341, 353.
Footnote 113:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 371.
Footnote 114:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 372.
Footnote 115:
Ibid., p. 374.
Footnote 116:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 378.
Footnote 117:
Ibid., p. 364.
Footnote 118:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 385.
Footnote 119:
Ibid., p. 382.
Footnote 120:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 389.
Footnote 121:
See pages 171, 244, 245.
Footnote 122:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 404.
CHAPTER XX.
Colonel Napier’s Account of his Missions to Egypt—Seizure of the
Maronite and Druse Emirs and Sheikhs—Their Condition in Egypt—Their
Return to Syria—False Assertions of the French—Mission for the
Liberation of the Syrian Soldiers—Difficulty of ascertaining their
Number—Bad Faith of the Pacha—Infamous Proposal of a Turkish
Officer—Sudden termination of the Negotiation—Suspicious conduct of
the Egyptians—Liberation of the Syrians.
I have already mentioned that on my way down the river from Cairo, in
February, 1841, I met Colonel Napier. He had been dispatched from Syria
by Colonel Bridgeman, with orders to bring back the Scheiks and Emirs
for whose restoration to liberty I had stipulated in my correspondence
with Boghos Bey[123]. The Colonel’s own account of this mission, and of
a subsequent one in which he was employed by the Foreign Office to
procure the release of the Syrian troops carried into Egypt, is as
follows:—
“Shortly before the allied forces landed in Syria, several of the most
influential Maronite and Druse chieftains[124] of Mount Lebanon being
seized by Ibrahim Pacha, were, together with a great number of their
servants and dependants, embarked on board an Egyptian vessel at Acre.
On arriving at Alexandria, these unfortunate people, after being loaded
with chains, and subjected to every species of indignity, were sent up
the Nile to the remote regions of Sennaar, there to work at the Pacha’s
recently discovered gold mines.
“One of Commodore Napier’s stipulations with Boghos Bey being the
emancipation of these mountain chiefs[125], after the evacuation of
Syria by the Egyptians I was sent by Colonel Bridgeman, then in command
of the British troops, to accompany these Emirs and Scheiks back to
their own country.
“On my arrival in Egypt, in February, 1841, I immediately proceeded on
the purport of my mission, and ascended the Nile in quest of my charge.
Mehemet Ali, I learnt, had already sent orders for their liberation, and
I met them all at Cairo on their way to Alexandria. Finding them here in
the most complete state of destitution, clothed in rags, without money,
and in want of the common necessaries of life, I made several
representations on the subject to the authorities, which were, however,
disregarded; and it was only through the active mediation of that
gallant old soldier Souliman Pacha (who had just returned across the
Desert) and on his and my repeated applications, that daily rations were
at last served out to these unfortunate people.
“After numerous vexatious delays, the order for them to proceed to
Alexandria at length arrived; a fine Egyptian corvette was placed at my
disposal for their conveyance, and about the middle of March, 1841, I
had the satisfaction of landing them, (with one exception[126],) in
safety at Beyrout, where they were received with the greatest
enthusiasm.
“Although the return of these Emirs and Scheiks may entirely be
attributed to Commodore Napier, the French merchants and priests in
Beyrout and Lebanon had the assurance to arrogate to themselves the
merit of the act, and widely spread this report in the mountains, which
assertion, however, I as flatly contradicted, and completely succeeded
in disproving this false and barefaced assertion. Shortly after this I
rejoined my regiment at Gibraltar.
“The Commodore, in thinking of his mountain friends, had not neglected
the interests of the unfortunate Syrian soldiers, who, having been
pressed into the Egyptian service, were, on the evacuation of Syria,
unwillingly dragged after Ibrahim Pacha to the ‘Land of Bondage.’ The
Commodore’s stipulation with Boghos Bey on the subject was, ‘that as
soon as the evacuation of Syria should be effected, the whole of these
men should be immediately sent back to their country.’ However, time
wore on, and as Mehemet Ali showed no symptoms of fulfilling his
promise, the writer was again sent to Egypt by the Foreign Office, with
directions to exact from the Pacha the accomplishment of his engagement
to Sir Charles Napier as to the Syrian soldiers, and to accompany those
soldiers back to their country. Armed with ‘full powers[127],’ I left
the Rock on the 26th of May, and arriving at Alexandria about a month
later, at once set about the performance of my task, and this I very
soon discovered would be no easy one.
“In the first place, it was difficult to ascertain the exact number of
surviving Syrians of Ibrahim’s army who had arrived in Egypt,
particularly as every obstacle was industriously thrown in the way of
obtaining such information. The Egyptian authorities estimated the
number of survivors at so low a figure as 3000; however, from all the
information I was able to collect, I concluded the sum total to amount
to about 10,000 or 12,000; nor was I much out in this calculation,
though the extremes of heat and cold, the griping hand of hunger and
thirst during the winter retreat over the plains of the Haouran, and
across the sands of the Desert, to say nothing of the plague which had
been raging in Egypt since their return to the latter country;—all these
circumstances combined,—had made sad havoc amongst their devoted bands.
“The Pacha at first sheltered himself under the plea of not being able
to take any steps in the matter until he had received the sanction of
the Sultan, and thus gained a month or six weeks, until a communication
was sent and answer returned from Constantinople. The reply of the Porte
arrived in the shape of a Turkish officer of the rank of ‘Meeralaï,’
(Colonel), who, whatever might be his secret instructions, came with
professed orders for the immediate liberation of the Syrians. Still no
great alacrity was manifested to comply with these injunctions. Time
passed away; the month of August arrived, and with it Colonel Barnett,
the British Consul-General, who joined me in urging the fulfilment of an
engagement which the Pacha continued as perseveringly, to evade.
Mustapha Bey, the Turkish Commissioner, _apparently_ united with us in
our request; but it may not be here irrelevant to remark, as an instance
of what reliance may be placed on Turkish faith and honour, that this
person had the audacity to propose to me the _enlèvement_ of Mehemet Ali
on the occasion of a proposed visit of the latter to Her Majesty’s
steamer Medea; adding, that taking the old gentleman captive to
Stamboul, would ensure the fortune of us both! I was strongly inclined
to turn the tables on the fellow, by letting the Pacha into the secret;
but the consequence would probably have been fatal to the offender, who,
after all, was perhaps no worse than the majority of Oriental
diplomatists.
“How long the negotiation might otherwise have been protracted is hard
to say; but, luckily about this time, my representations received great
additional weight from the unexpected appearance of a couple of British
line-of-battle ships at Alexandria, the Rodney and Calcutta having
received orders to station themselves off that port. Accordingly, on the
7th of September, I received a communication from Boghos Bey, stating
that the first detachment of Syrian soldiers, to the amount of 1100,
would embark in two of the Pacha’s vessels on the following, and sail
the succeeding day, offering me, at the same time, accommodation on
board; which offer, however, was politely declined.
“Fully relying on the accuracy of this statement, I was, on the
following day (the 8th), not a little surprised to find that the
vessels, with these troops on board, had gone out of port early on
_that_ morning. I immediately communicated the circumstance to the
Consul-General, and as suspicions were entertained at the time that the
Pacha had,—with the concurrence of the Porte,—some design of sending
troops to Candia, we concluded that the destination of the people, who
were thus clandestinely smuggled off, might not be for Syria. Under this
impression, Captain Maunsell, of the Rodney, was immediately
communicated with, and he ordered the Egyptian vessels to be watched by
the Calcutta and Medea, in which latter vessel I embarked.
“But whatever their originally proposed destination might have been,
under this goodly escort, the first batch of Syrians arrived in safety
at Beyrout on the 14th of September, and being duly handed over by me to
the British and Turkish authorities,—Col. Rose and Selim Pasha,—were
shortly afterwards followed by the remainder of their unfortunate fellow
exiles, to the amount of 10,000, who returned to their native shores in
the most miserable plight, without pay, many in rags, and the greater
part with several months’ arrears due to them, some even to the extent
of from twenty to twenty-four months!
“So much for the faith, justice, and honour of His Highness Mehemet Ali
Pacha!”
Footnote 123:
See Vol. I., pp. 254-278.
Footnote 124:
“_Maronite Emirs or Princes._—1. Emir Hyder of Solymah. 2. Emir Faoul
Shehab. 3. Emir Faris Shehab. 4. Emir Youssouf Shehab. 5. Emir Mahmoud
Shehab. 6. Emir Abdallah Umrad. 7. Emir Ali Kaid Bey. 8. Emir Ali
Faris.
“_Druse Scheiks or Chieftains._—9. Scheik Hamoud Naked. 10. Scheik
Kassim. 11. Scheik Abbas. 12. Scheik Nickul el Cassim (a Christian).
“And about sixty followers.”
Footnote 125:
See the correspondence on this subject in Vol. I., pp. 254,
258, _et seq._
Footnote 126:
“The Emir Youssouf, the son of the Emir Solyman Shehab, of El Haded,
who died of fever in Upper Egypt.”
Footnote 127:
_Viscount Palmerston to Lieutenant-Colonel Napier._
(Extract.) Foreign Office, May 14, 1841.
I have to instruct you, immediately on the receipt of this despatch,
to proceed to Alexandria to demand from Mehemet Ali the release of the
Syrian soldiers, whom he promised Sir Charles Napier to dismiss; and
you will accompany those soldiers back to Syria.
I have applied to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to provide
you with a passage on board the steam-vessel which conveys the mail
from Gibraltar to Malta; and the Admiral at Malta will be instructed
to send you on to Alexandria, and also to make arrangements for
conveying the Syrian soldiers, when released by Mehemet Ali, from
Egypt to the coast of Syria.
You will report your proceedings in execution of this instruction
directly to me, and also to Colonel Bridgeman, or the officer
commanding the British detachments on shore in Syria, to whose orders
you will be subject while employed on this service; and who will be
instructed to direct you to return to your regiment when the service
is completed.
I inclose a despatch to Colonel Hodges, directing him to join you in
demanding from Mehemet Ali the release of these Syrians; and you will
deliver the same to Colonel Hodges, if he should be at Alexandria,
when you arrive there. But you will not delay making the demand, if
Colonel Hodges should not have arrived.
CHAPTER XXI.
Prince Metternich’s Orders to the Internuncio—Lord Ponsonby’s
Correspondence with Baron Stürmer—Hesitation of the Porte—Message
from Lord Ponsonby to Rifat Pacha—The new Firman granted—Accepted by
Mehemet Ali—Termination of the Eastern Question.
The peremptory orders of Prince Metternich to Baron Stürmer, to settle
the Egyptian question, arrived on the 12th of April at Constantinople,
whereupon the Baron wrote to Lord Ponsonby to inform him that his
colleagues of Russia and Prussia had agreed to hold to the Porte an
uniform language, and requesting to know if he could count on his
Lordship’s concurrence in this instance[128].
I give his Lordship’s answer in full, that the reader may judge for
himself: it is an exquisite piece of diplomacy, and judging from it, it
would be extremely difficult to decide whether the Ambassador had
followed his instructions or not.
“Therapia, April 14, 1841. “Monsieur l’Internonce,
“I had the honour to receive this day at a few minutes before 4 o’clock
your Excellency’s official Note dated the 13th instant, and I reply to
it without a moment’s delay. Your Excellency has communicated to me a
despatch you have received from Vienna, containing directions for the
conduct your Excellency is to pursue, and your Excellency expresses your
desire that I should act in co-operation with your Excellency and both
our colleagues of Russia and Prussia, in furtherance of the measure you
are directed to adopt. If I am not in error, the measure you are to
take, is to make known to the Sublime Porte the opinions and views of
the Conference at London, as that opinion, or those views, are stated
and exposed in the Collective Note of the Representatives of the Four
Powers addressed to Chekib Effendi, and dated 13th of March, 1841, and
in Lord Palmerston’s instructions, dated 16th of March, 1841, and
addressed to me.
“I have already had the honour to acquaint you, that I had not only made
known to the Ottoman Minister the contents of those documents, stating
at the same time the opinion I entertained of the anxiety of the Allies
to bring the Egyptian Question to a termination at any rate; but I also
communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the Collective Note and
Lord Palmerston’s instructions in original. Your Excellency will
therefore be satisfied that I have already done in my individual
capacity that which is so fervently urged in the despatch your
Excellency has received.
“Your Excellency will, I am sure, have the goodness to acquaint me what
you and our colleagues may desire to have done further for making known
the opinion and views of the Conference to the Sublime Porte; I mean the
mode of acting. Your Excellency is, no doubt, fully informed of the fact
that the Ottoman Ministers have come to a decision to modify the Article
of succession to the government of Egypt, with the view of rendering it
agreeable to the wishes of the Conference; that the Ottoman Ministers
have also modified, with a similar intention, the Article of the
military rank to be conferred by the Pacha of Egypt; and that they are
engaged in considering in what manner the Article of tribute may be
modified so as to meet the views of the Conference.
“Your Excellency is also acquainted with the disposition manifested in
the instructions sent by Rechid Pacha to Chekib Effendi, to arrange this
last-mentioned point; and no doubt your Excellency will esteem that to
be an evidence from which we may draw the conclusion, that the Sublime
Porte is desirous to gratify the wishes of the High Allies of the
Sultan, and may be supposed likely to act in the spirit of concession
whenever the wishes of those Powers shall have been made known to the
Sublime Porte.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “PONSONBY.”
“The Baron de Stürmer.“
His Lordship, under the same date, writes to Lord Palmerston that the
Porte had given way to the wish of the Allies, and come to the
resolution that the government of Egypt should be inherited by the
eldest son; that Mehemet Ali should have the right to appoint officers
to the army below the rank of General of Brigade, and that the tribute
should be fixed at a stated sum.
The Porte, still in doubt, or wishing for delay, asked Lord Ponsonby
what were his precise notions relative to the execution in Egypt of the
laws of the Sublime Porte as laid down in the Separate Act of the Treaty
of Alliance, as it could not know what the Allied Powers would say
should Mehemet Ali not fulfil that part of the Treaty. To which Lord
Ponsonby replies, that he is quite ignorant what will be the opinion of
the Allies on this point, and he therefore cannot give advice.
Baron Stürmer, though an old diplomatist, seems to have been puzzled
with Lord Ponsonby’s letter to him, and did not reply. This called forth
another letter, which with the reply I give.
“Monsieur l’Internonce, “Therapia, April 19, 1841.
“On the 14th instant I had the honour to receive an official Note from
your Excellency desiring me to inform you if I was disposed to
co-operate with your Excellency and our colleagues in carrying into
effect the instructions received from our Courts, &c., &c.
“I had the honour to reply to your Excellency’s note the same day, and
after having, at some length, explained what my conduct had been, (being
desirous to concur with my colleagues,) I requested your Excellency to
have the goodness to inform me in what way your Excellency and our
colleagues desired that I should act, in furtherance of the instructions
of our Governments.
“This is the fifth day since I sent my note, and not having had the
honour to hear from you, I take the liberty to express my hope, that
your Excellency will favour me with a reply, as it is necessary for me
to state to my Government everything connected with this affair.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “PONSONBY.”
“The Baron de Stürmer.”
* * * * *
“M. l’Ambassadeur, “Constantinople, April 21, 1841.
“I received yesterday morning the letter which your Excellency did me
the honour to address to me the day before yesterday.
“The Sultan having at length adopted with regard to the Pacha of Egypt
resolutions in conformity with the advice and wishes of his august
Allies, and those resolutions having yesterday been announced to us
officially, our task, it appears to me, is accomplished. The question
which you have the goodness to ask me, M. l’Ambassadeur, as to the kind
of co-operation which my colleagues of Russia and Prussia and myself
expected from you, becomes therefore unnecessary.
“If I have not replied to that same question which was already contained
in your letter of the 13th of this month, it is because you had assured
me therein that you had done everything which had depended upon you, by
communicating to the Porte the acts of the Conference of London and Lord
Palmerston’s instructions of the 16th of March, and in acquainting it at
the same time with the strong desire of the Allied Powers to see the
Egyptian affair terminated ‘at any rate.’ Now, that was precisely what
we wished to propose to your Excellency to do, and there remained
nothing more for us to ask you.
“Be pleased, &c.,
(Signed) “STURMER.”
“Viscount Ponsonby.”
The Porte, though they expressed their satisfaction with the plan
proposed by the Representatives of the Four Powers, were extremely slow
in following it out, and the British Ambassador, who seemed now to be
disciplined into obedience by Prince Metternich and Lord Palmerston’s
peremptory instructions, on the 12th of May directed his dragoman to
tell Rifat Pacha that if any further delay took place, he should feel it
necessary to call upon his colleagues to support him in inquiring of the
Sublime Porte the cause of the delay[129]. This letter quickened the
motions of the Divan; and on the 22nd of May the new Firman was laid
before the Allied Ministers, and approved of by them[130]. This Firman
complied with Mehemet Ali’s demands; it left Constantinople on the 2nd
of June, arrived at Alexandria on the 7th, was accepted by Mehemet Ali,
and was publicly read on the 10th[131].
Thus terminated this long protracted question, which might have been as
easily settled after the signing of my Convention on the 28th November,
1840, as it was on the 10th June, 1841, and without at all compromising
the honour or dignity of the Porte, who the reader has seen was, through
the rejection of my arrangement, obliged to make concession to a
conquered vassal. Who was the principal adviser of the Sultan the reader
will be able to judge by what I have stated; and if that is not
sufficiently satisfactory, he may turn over the _Levant Correspondence_,
where he will find that the British Ambassador, even at the eleventh
hour, lent a willing ear to every report which designing people were too
happy to make to him, prejudicial to Mehemet Ali.
Footnote 128:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 417.
Footnote 129:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 433.
Footnote 130:
Ibid., p. 435.
Footnote 131:
Ibid., p. 472.
CHAPTER XXII.
Review of the Turco-Egyptian Question—Mehemet Ali not the
Aggressor—Hostile Preparations of the Porte—Representations of the
Allied Powers—What Interests affected by the Independence of Mehemet
Ali—Views of France—Designs of Russia.
The Syrian and Egyptian question being now brought to a close, by the
total evacuation of the former country, and Mehemet Ali’s establishment
in the hereditary pachalic of Egypt almost on his own terms, it is time
to inquire what has been gained by measures that had well nigh plunged
Europe into a war, the end of which no man could have foreseen.
I think every impartial man who has read the correspondence must allow
that Mehemet Ali was not the aggressor. It is quite true he was anxious
to be independent, and no wonder that a man who had acquired such
extensive possessions by the sword should be desirous of emancipating
himself from a weak master. I am not going to justify Mehemet Ali’s
first invasion of Syria: that would have been the time for the Allies to
have discouraged him, and a naval force sent off Acre would have been
quite sufficient to have put an end to his ambitious designs; but
nothing of the sort was done. Mehemet Ali was allowed to follow up one
victory after another, till his road to Constantinople was open, and the
Turks, having been refused assistance by their friends, called in the
Russians to protect them; and the Treaty of Kutayah settled for that
time the Eastern question.
The Allied Powers, on learning that preparations were making for war at
Constantinople, instructed their Ambassadors to urge the Porte to
preserve peace. At the same time Russia took the initiative, and
instructed her Consul to desire Mehemet Ali to recall Ibrahim, and to
withdraw the Egyptian army to Damascus. What right had Russia, after
consenting to the Treaty of Kutayah, to make such a proposal? Would it
not have been safer and wiser, had the Allied Powers preserved the
_status quo_, or even persuaded the Porte to acknowledge Mehemet Ali at
once, and confer on him the government of the countries he had
conquered, stipulating at the same time that he should establish a
milder government in his extensive possessions? It had been proved that
Turkey, weak as she was, was entirely incapable of governing her distant
provinces; and would it not have been better to have given her a
powerful ally who would have been interested in protecting her against
her natural enemy, Russia, than curtailing his power, by restoring
provinces which she had not been able to govern, and at best giving her
a discontented vassal? It may be argued that such a proceeding would
have been dismembering the Turkish empire: I answer, that was already
done by the Treaty of Kutayah, and it would have been much safer to have
let things alone.
Candia, which was entirely separate both from Egypt and Syria, might
have been restored to the Porte; this would have given her more real
strength than she is ever likely to receive from her very imperfect
possession of Syria.
Let us now examine whose interests would have been affected by giving
Mehemet Ali independence. No power in Europe is so much interested in
keeping well with Mehemet Ali as Great Britain, and no power is more
aware of that than France; for in the very first conversation Count Molé
had with Lord Granville[132] he alluded to the subject, and the French
Government have never let slip an opportunity of doing acts of kindness
to Mehemet Ali, so as to keep him as much out of our hands as possible,
and I fear they have too well succeeded. France had opened a
considerable trade with Egypt, and she entertained great fears that
English enterprise would supplant her; no wonder, then, that she should
have befriended the Pacha in every possible way. France is as well aware
as we are, that steam navigation having got to such perfection, Egypt
has become almost necessary to England as the half-way house to India,
and indeed ought to be an English colony. Now if we wished to weaken
Mehemet Ali, with a view, in the event of the breakup of the Turkish
empire, which is not far distant, to have seized Egypt as our share of
the spoil, we were perfectly right in our policy; or even, had we not
looked so far ahead, it might, perhaps, have been politic to have
confined Mehemet Ali to Egypt, so that in the event of his stopping the
road to India by Suez, we might have the road of the Euphrates open, one
remaining in the possession of the Ottoman empire, and the other in that
of the Pacha of Egypt. It is not, however, usual for a Government to
quarrel with their own interests, and it is so decidedly the advantage
of the Pacha of Egypt to facilitate, by every possible means, the
passage across the Isthmus of Suez, that on the whole I believe the
soundest policy of Great Britain would have been to have supported
Mehemet Ali, and I have not the smallest doubt that when France saw we
were committed against him, she seized that opportunity of quitting the
alliance in order to make the Pacha her firm friend.
France, however, though she had all the desire to protect the Pacha,
even at the risk of war, with match lighted ready to put to the gun,
hesitated, and, fortunately for Europe at large, Louis Philippe had
either not nerve to begin the strife, or being desirous of preserving
peace, refused to adopt M. Thiers’ plan of sending the French fleet to
Alexandria. The Ministers resigned, and Europe was saved from a general
conflagration.
What aid France actually promised to the Pacha, or whether she ever
decidedly promised him any, we do not know, but it is not to be supposed
he would have resisted the wishes of the Allied Powers without some hope
of assistance at the last moment. The fall of Acre opened the Pacha’s
eyes; he turned his back on France, and listened to English counsels,
which guided him for a while. But the hostile conduct of our Ambassador
at Constantinople so disgusted him, that he again turned to France, who
received him with open arms, and thus completely destroyed the English
influence in Egypt.
I think I have shown that England had no immediate reason to clip the
Pacha’s wings, and that France supported him because England was against
him. To Prussia it must have been quite indifferent whether Mehemet Ali
kept possession of Syria or not; nor do I see what interest Austria
could possibly have in displacing him—quite the contrary. Russia cannot
be a pleasant neighbour to Austria; and the Porte is a feeble ally. By
raising Mehemet Ali the Porte would have been strengthened; and indeed,
the Pacha, in possession of Syria and Egypt, would have been as much
interested in controlling the power of Russia as the Sultan himself. Who
then was to gain by reducing the power of Mehemet Ali? Russia! and
Russia alone.
The Emperor of that great and powerful state saw clearly that the
duration of the Ottoman empire was drawing to a close; and that, sooner
or later, Russia would be the greatest gainer by its dissolution. It is
not then to be wondered at that she should be content to wait her time,
and accept the legacy that would fall in to her at its demise; and all
she had to do was to prevent a skilful practitioner coming to her
assistance. That practitioner was Mehemet Ali; and had he been supported
by France, England, Austria, and Prussia, his independence, granted by
the Porte and guaranteed by those Powers, would have been a far greater
blow on Russia than she has received for many years; and which blow, I
have no doubt, she would have used every effort to avert. We, however,
fell into her views; the Treaty of the 15th of July was signed; Mehemet
Ali has been sent back to Egypt; the Syrian provinces restored to the
Porte, and she has become weaker than ever.
Various reasons have been given for Mehemet Ali’s obstinate refusal to
listen to the advice of the Allies. At one time it was supposed he was
backed by Russia, who wished for an excuse to come to Constantinople for
the second time; and, indeed, after the battle of Nizib, and the
defection of the Turkish fleet, that was my opinion. To check Russia, I
always thought that the combined fleets should have proceeded at once to
Constantinople, which was the thing, of all others, the Emperor wished
to avoid; and Count Nesselrode distinctly stated to Count Medem, that if
a French fleet appeared in the sea of Marmora, he would withdraw the
Ambassador, and then take such measures as he saw necessary to
re-establish the independence of the Porte[133].
When France began to take a different view of the question from the
other Powers, and support Mehemet Ali, Russia at once came forward, and
despatched Baron Brunnow to England with a letter from the Emperor to
the Queen. Part of the proposal of Russia was that the French and
English should appear off Alexandria, while the Russian fleet should
anchor in the Bosphorus. This France most properly and most decidedly
objected to. Lord Palmerston took the same view; and though he expressed
himself perfectly satisfied with the good intentions of Russia, he was
of opinion that if it was necessary for a Russian force to appear in the
Bosphorus, a British force should be there also. To this, as might be
expected, Baron Brunnow objected, and lamented that the British
Government had not more reliance on the good faith of Russia. After
various discussions, unnecessary to enter upon here, Russia gave up the
point of being the sole protector of Constantinople, and consented to a
small English force being sent there in the event of the Russian fleet
appearing in the Bosphorus[134]. France in consequence withdrew from the
alliance, and the Four Powers decided so far to fall into the views of
Russia as to put down Mehemet Ali, who was the best supporter the
Ottoman empire could have had, and give back Syria to the Porte, and
thereby accelerate her fall.
The defection of France brought the other Powers closer together; and
the insurrection breaking out in Lebanon hastened the signing of the
Treaty of the 15th of July. We have seen that the movement was put down
by the energy of the Pacha; and that he refused the conditions that were
offered to him, and determined to defend himself; and, under all
circumstances, I think he was right. He had good intelligence from
Constantinople; he knew the Turkish Government could only spare a very
small force; he knew we had only 1500 marines in the fleet; he was quite
certain that Prussia would send no troops to Syria; and he did not think
that Austria would; and he was sensible that Great Britain, Austria, and
Prussia, would be very unwilling to call in the military assistance of
Russia, which would also be disagreeable to the Porte. Besides this, he
had a very large army in Syria, which had always been victorious, and
was well commanded, and the season of the year was far advanced, and not
a safe harbour or anchorage (with the exception of Scanderoun, which was
too far distant) on the coast where our ships could take shelter in the
winter. In addition to all this, he was backed by France, and was
determined to put every thing to the hazard of a die; and had his views
been properly followed up, he must have succeeded.
Footnote 132:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., p. 1.
Footnote 133:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., p. 307.
Footnote 134:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., p. 553.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Errors of the Pacha—His proper course of Action—Mismanagement of Ibrahim
Pacha in Syria—Gain or Loss of Turkey by the Acquisition of
Syria—Conduct of the Turks in Lebanon—Quarrels of the
Mountaineers—Ill treatment of the Prince—Consequent hatred of
Turkish rule—Conclusion.
The first error Mehemet Ali committed was not immediately ordering
Ibrahim to march on Scutari after the battle of Nizib. At that time the
Allies had not come to a final arrangement, and the British and French
fleets were not collected in Besika Bay. Had he done that at once,
Russia would certainly have come down to Constantinople with a fleet and
army; France would have got alarmed, and probably ordered her fleet up
the Dardanelles; Great Britain would have done the same. Russia would
have urged the Porte to prevent it, which she would have been obliged to
have complied with, and the probability is that Europe would have been
set by the ears, and in the struggle Mehemet Ali would most likely have
retained the government of Syria; indeed, both France and England would
have been obliged to have made use of Mehemet Ali against Russia, and
the Porte, who must have joined with Russia in preventing the fleets
from forcing the Dardanelles. His second error was, in not concentrating
his army the moment he resolved on resisting the decision of the Allies.
At the time we landed in D’Jounie Bay, the Egyptian army in Syria could
not have consisted of less than 80,000 men of all arms. They were
distributed, it is true, in various parts of the country. Ibrahim Pacha
ought to have divined our plan of operations the moment we landed; he
ought also to have ascertained from his spies, (which we could not
prevent,) the number of our troops, and the works we were throwing up,
which of themselves showed our weakness. He must have also known how
slow the mountaineers were in coming in in the first instance for arms.
Seeing all this, had he acted with vigour, and set his troops in motion
from Tripoli, he would first have saved D’Jebail, then occupied Gazir,
and prevented the Emir Abdallah from joining our standard. Had Osman
Pacha advanced at the same time from Balbeck, and occupied Antura and
the strong ground in front of our advanced posts, while Souliman Pacha,
strengthening himself at Beyrout with a couple of thousand men from
Sidon, might have marched with his army from Beyrout, and occupied the
convents and high grounds above the Nahr-el-Kelb, and threatened an
advance at the same time at the mouth of the river, he would, in the
first place, have prevented a single mountaineer from joining our
standard, and the overwhelming force which he would have mustered almost
within shot of us, would have been quite sufficient, without firing a
gun, to have made us pack up our traps and carry the Turkish troops to
Cyprus. By some strange fatality he remained inactive; we gained
confidence; were successful in all our enterprises; desertion began in
Ibrahim’s army, which was just as likely to have begun in our’s; and
when at last Ibrahim made an effort, and advanced to Beckfaya and
Boharsof, instead of collecting the whole of his forces, and driving us
from Ornagacuan, he did not bring half his troops, and allowed himself
to be attacked on both flanks, front and rear, and was defeated. Still
the game was not up with him; withdrawing his troops from Tripoli,
Aleppo, Adana, and concentrating the whole at Zachle, Malaka, and
Damascus, and seeing we hesitated in following up our successes, he
ought to have taken advantage of the absence of the squadron at Acre,
and the weakening of the garrison at Beyrout, and pushed on the latter
place, which he would have taken with ease, and found abundance of
provisions. He should then have marched on Sidon, which probably would
have shared the same fate.
These movements being communicated to the Governor of Acre, would have
encouraged him to hold out; and if he was forced to withdraw, he could
have joined Ibrahim, and again marched on Acre, where they would have
found a practicable breach; and most certainly, at that season of the
year, the British squadron would not have remained in so open an
anchorage.
Such vigorous measures would have had a great effect on France, and
there is no knowing what might have happened. This was not done; and
Ibrahim, without making one effort to draw our attention from Acre, or
to profit by our absence, remained inactive, and to his astonishment,
heard of the surrender of that renowned fortress, which he had not in
the least calculated upon. Still his cause was not lost; our troops were
divided in Beyrout, Sidon, Tyre, and Acre, and, I believe, we had also
some at Tripoli.
The gale of the 29th of November alarmed the Admiral for the safety of
the squadron. The coast was abandoned, except by a steamer or two, and
there was nothing whatever to have prevented Ibrahim from again
advancing, and recovering all his losses, and which he would have been
perfectly justified in doing when the Convention was rejected. Why he
did not, to every military man acquainted with the country, and with our
weakness, must be a matter of surprise.
Had any of these operations I have described been put in force, Mehemet
Ali would have been now in Syria, and a war among the European Powers in
all probability would have been raging.
We will now examine what Turkey has gained by the recovery of the Syrian
provinces. She has got back her fleet, which will never be of the least
use to her, and is an expensive floating ornament to the Seraglio.
Situated as the Turkish empire is, with a rapid stream cutting her in
two, it is evident her only proper defence is a fleet of steamboats;
with these, and the Bosphorus and Hellespont properly fortified, she may
defy attacks either from the north or the south, and have a rapid means
of communicating with her islands and possessions on the Syrian coasts,
and of suddenly transporting troops to any part of her extensive empire.
The Turks are not sailors, and never will be, and are therefore much
better adapted to serve in vessels moved by steam than in line-of-battle
ships, where seamanship cannot be dispensed with.
The Porte has regained Syria, and with it a most extensive kingdom and
discontented population, and instead of keeping her army at home to
defend her against Russia, her natural enemy, she is obliged to maintain
a large force in Syria to keep down her justly irritated subjects, whom
she has neither the talent nor inclination to govern either with
prudence or decency. Syria is divided, as before, into pachalics, and
influential Turks are appointed, as usual, to govern them. There is
neither law nor justice. The Turk sits all day smoking his pipe, and the
people are plundered by their underlings as usual; and they now feel
they were better off under the government of Mehemet Ali than they are
now under their former masters. They pay the taxes they formerly did
under the Porte; they pay Mehemet Ali’s taxes in addition, and are
plundered into the bargain by their old rulers. Property of every
description is less protected than it was, trade destroyed, and the
roads insecure throughout the country. As for Mount Lebanon, whose
population was the first to come forward and join our bands, and whose
position the Allies and the Turks themselves promised to alleviate—how
have they been treated? As yet they have received little or no
remuneration for the burning of their villages and destruction of their
property by Ibrahim Pacha, in revenge for their having joined the
standard of the Sultan. They have been badly paid for the losses we
ourselves caused them at D’Jounie, at Beyrout, Acre, and Sidon. The old
feuds between the Maronites and Druses, which had nearly subsided, have
been fomented by their rulers, and I fear Mehemet Ali himself, as might
have been foreseen, has not been altogether blameless in assisting to
set them by the ears.
In the course of my work it has been shown that the Maronites were the
first to take up arms in the cause of the Sultan. The Druses being more
under the influence of the old Emir Bechir, came forward at a later
period, and when the war was nearly finished, they became jealous of the
Maronites; and the Turks, instead of by prudent management discouraging
these feelings, rather fomented them, with the view of weakening both.
The mountaineers had been armed during the insurrection, and they are
looked upon more as enemies, than friends who had assisted in bringing
them back to power.
In the beginning of November, 1841, about the period when the taxes for
the support of the local government were to be raised, the chiefs of the
Druses requested the Grand Prince to attend at Deir-el-Kamar, the seat
of government, to consider how the taxes were to be distributed; this
being acceded to, they sent orders to the different tribes to come armed
to the meeting, which was certainly not a very peaceable way of settling
who was to bear the burden of taxation. These tribes concealed
themselves in the houses of the Scheiks of the family of Abu Bekr, in
Deir-el-Kamar, and, without provocation, sallied out of their houses,
set fire to the town in several places, and plundered and murdered
several of the peaceable inhabitants. The Maronites, taken entirely by
surprise, suffered very considerably at first, but being rallied by
their leaders took up arms, and a regular battle ensued, which lasted
with occasional intermission for several days. The Prince defended
himself in his palace, but seeing the Druses were the strongest,
repeatedly sent to Selim Pacha, who commanded the Ottoman troops at
Beyrout, for assistance; none, however, arrived. This was exactly what
the Turks wanted—the more men killed on each side, and the more
exasperated they became against each other, the better they were
satisfied. “Divide and Govern,” was their motto.
When the news of this unfortunate rencontre came to the knowledge of our
gallant Consul-General, Colonel Rose, he immediately set out for the
mountains, and at imminent hazard to himself, succeeded in putting an
end, for a time, to the broil. Unfortunately, however, the Maronite
Christians hearing of the danger of their countrymen at Deir-el-Kamar,
sent a strong force to relieve them; this, as might be expected, again
brought the Druses into the field, and again the Grand Prince sent to
Selim Pacha, but his appeal to him was in vain, and the Druses being the
strongest, he was besieged in his palace for twenty-four days.
Instead of Turkish troops being sent to put down the insurrection and
relieve the Prince, he received orders to repair to Beyrout; and his
provision and ammunition being expended, he was obliged to capitulate
with the Druse Scheiks, who guaranteed his safety and that of his
retinue and their property; and though the negotiations were carried on
through the medium of the messenger sent by Selim Pacha, no sooner had
the Prince quitted his residence, than the Druses rushed upon them,
seized their arms, horses, and clothes, and even stripped them to their
shirts. The Prince himself did not escape this indignity. On his arrival
at Beyrout he made strong and repeated representations to Selim Pacha,
and entreated him to assist in putting down the civil war, but in vain.
The fact is, Selim Pacha was acting under the orders of the Porte, who
only wanted a good excuse to put an end to the government of the ruling
Prince.
Shortly after this the Porte threw off the mask; the Grand Prince was
arrested and sent to Constantinople, and Omar Pacha, a German who had
entered into the Turkish service, and served under my orders in Syria,
was appointed by the Porte Governor of Lebanon. He may be a good man
enough; but certainly, a Christian having changed his religion was not a
fit man to govern the Christians of Lebanon. The poor Prince has lost
the whole of his property, and his family is brought to ruin. This is
the gratitude of the Porte; this is the reward he has obtained for his
eminent services; and this is the way the Ottoman Government have
treated their allies.
We are informed by Sir Robert Peel that our Ambassador at Constantinople
has protested against these acts, and also against the Porte sending
Albanian troops (who are little better than barbarians) into Syria, and
that they have promised to remove Omar Pacha, and restrict the services
of the Albanians to garrison duty only. How far the Porte will keep
their promise we shall see; but, I confess, with such a man as Izzet
Pacha at the head of the Turkish Government, and who is only putting
into execution what he planned when in Syria, and for which he was
recalled, I confess I have no reliance upon him, or indeed upon any
Turkish Pacha. They are all alike, and quite incapable of preventing the
fate of the Ottoman empire, which is tottering to its base, and the
sooner it goes the better; it is unworthy of preserving.
Had my advice been followed, and the seaports of Lebanon, the Bekaa, and
Anti-Lebanon, been put under the jurisdiction of the Grand Prince,
assisted by a council of the powerful Emirs, and the Turkish troops
removed entirely from his territory, causing him to pay a reasonable
tribute to the Porte, the whole Mountain would have been bound by
gratitude to the Sultan, and would have assisted him to keep the rest of
Syria in order. As it is now, there is nothing but the most inveterate
hatred existing against the Turkish Government; and I most sincerely
hope the different sects will unite, and make a noble effort to drive
their miserable and tyrannical rulers out of their fine country.
Cultivation and commerce would then revive; a field would be opened to
British enterprise, and we might recover the influence we had in the
mountains, and which has been lost, in consequence of the inhabitants
believing that we have not made use of our power to obtain from the
Porte all that was so liberally promised them when we were in want of
their assistance.
* * * * *
I cannot close this work without returning my best thanks to all the
officers and men who served in the squadron that Sir Robert Stopford did
me the honour of putting under my command. The very laborious services
they performed in D’Jounie Bay is above all praise; this was no question
of sending a Lieutenant and a working party on shore; the whole of the
ships’ companies were constantly employed, headed by their Captains.
Captain Reynolds was my second in the landing at D’Jounie, and continued
his unremitted exertions till he was sent off Alexandria. Captain
Berkeley was my second on the attack at Sidon, and both of us regretted
that I could not employ him in the assault on shore; but it was
absolutely necessary that he should remain on board the Thunderer to
regulate the firing as we advanced, and to cover our retreat if
necessary. Nor am I less obliged to Captain Maunsell, of the Rodney, who
was my ambassador to Mehemet Ali, and who with great decision landed at
once at the Palace and opened the negotiations. Indeed, all the
officers, both of the Navy and Marines, as well as Selim Pacha, General
Jochmus, Omar Bey, and the whole of the Turkish officers, did their duty
to my entire satisfaction, and I should be but too proud to command such
a force on another occasion. The merits of Admiral Walker are too well
known to make it necessary for me to say one word in his praise.
I must also take this opportunity of thanking the Commander-in-Chief for
having placed the Allied force under my direction when the ill health of
Sir Charles Smith obliged him to proceed to Constantinople.
APPENDIX.
--------------
No. I.
INSTRUCTIONS given by the SULTAN to HAFIZ PACHA, found at the Turkish
Head-Quarters after the battle of Nizib[135].
_Plan of march of the Army of the Sultan against
Egypt, in nine Articles._
Seeing that the Egyptian Government will never submit to its Sovereign,
it is very probable that in the approaching summer it may declare and
obtain its independence. As all my efforts and all my calculations have
been useless, there is nothing but war which will render me master of
that province, and which will unite it to the empire of the Osmanlis,
and for its execution and success good dispositions must be taken.
ART. I.—For the success of this enterprise, rigorous laws must be
established; in the public orders the grade of Seraskier shall be
promised to all the Ferik Pachas, if they do not betray their trust or
intrigue; but if they fail in their duties, they shall be immediately
turned out of the service.
ART. II.—According to this plan, the army ought to consist of from
60,000 to 70,000 men, with 120 pieces of cannon, as follows: 40,000
infantry, 15,000 cavalry, 5,000 artillery and engineers, and the
remaining 10,000 irregular troops.
ART. III.—Wherever the enemy shall be met, he should be attacked by the
artillery; it is necessary that the Commander-in-Chief should exercise
the artillery daily in line of battle.
ART. IV.—To prevent the Egyptians from making a sudden attack upon
Marash, it is necessary that this town be fortified and guarded by a
strong body of troops. After having taken these measures, the
Commander-in-Chief will march upon Aleppo, and from thence to Damascus,
and then to Acre, to take possession of that fortress, and not to lose
time in obtaining possession of all the said towns. After the capture of
Acre, he must leave a strong body of troops in that place, and march
direct upon Egypt. The taking of Acre shall be considered the first
conquest of this war; this enterprise may, perhaps, be accomplished
within four or five months; and if the Egyptian Government does not
return under the dominion of the empire, let the Commander-in-Chief know
that the war will be indefinite, and he must take measures in
consequence; for the conquest of Egypt being the second achievement,
four or five months will be necessary for the success of this second
enterprise. According to this calculation, the important possession of
Syria and Egypt will require eleven months or a year to accomplish.
ART. V.—According to the information we have, Solyman Pacha is not
content with his position. A man of so much importance should be got rid
of. An officer should be sent to him to endeavour by all means to gain
him over to our side. Solyman Pacha being a European, one of our French
officers must be sent to him to endeavour to gain him over to us.
ART. VI.—Mehemet Ali, up to the present time, has given no higher grade
to Arabs than that of Captain, whilst to Christians he gives the rank of
Colonel, General, and Pacha; in our camp, there are Arabs who have the
rank of Pacha. Such being the case, he who deserts to us with thirty
soldiers, shall receive the rank of Lieutenant; and he who deserts with
from thirty to one hundred soldiers, the rank of Captain; and if a
Commandant deserts with his battalion, the rank of Colonel; and those
who intrigue in the Egyptian army to make the soldiers revolt, whether
he be an officer or Colonel, shall obtain high grades with us. In order
to put this project into execution, it is necessary to write
proclamations and to scatter them in the Egyptian camp by means of
spies.
ART. VII.—The Druses, the Mutualis, who are in the Egyptian army, the
chiefs of tribes, and the people who are under the dominion of Mehemet
Ali, should be encouraged by promises to embrace our party. Accordingly
their intentions should be seconded, and they should be granted all they
desire; and the better to succeed in this enterprise, it is necessary
that Hafiz Pacha should have with him 7000 or 8000 purses, to distribute
money where he judges it convenient and useful.
ART. VIII.—In the army of Mehemet Ali Pacha, there are a great many
European _employés_, by means of whom all his plans and projects may be
known. It is necessary, in order to be well informed, to send spies
among them, in order that the success of the war, which is about to open
in the approaching summer, may be ensured.
ART. IX.—In order to disembark 10,000 or 12,000 men at Tripoli, the
squadron must be put in movement, and as soon as the _corps d’armée_
shall march from Marash, it is necessary to enter into communication
with the Druses, the Mutualis, and other Cabaïles. For the success of
this enterprise, thirty or forty pieces of field artillery, from 10,000
to 15,000 muskets, with ammunition and _materiél_, must be prepared to
be sent by sea on the first demand. The persons charged with this
enterprise should employ all their diligence in order that these affairs
may terminate as soon as possible.
No. II. See Vol. I., page 18.
TRANSLATION of a PETITION (in Copy) from the NATIONS and INHABITANTS of
MOUNT LEBANON and SYRIA, to Sultan ABDUL MEDJID of Constantinople.
A PETITION.
We humbly supplicate, at the threshold of the Divan of the Mighty
Sovereign, the Benevolent and Just, the Venerated Authority and Daring
Lion, the Lord of the Sword and of the Pen—(viz. of Death and Mercy)—the
Shadow of God over the Earth, our Honoured Sultan, Abdul Medjid Khan,
may God perpetuate the days of his flourishing reign for ever and ever,
Amen.
That the frightful tyranny and the horrible oppression and cruelty under
which Mehemet Ali Pacha has belaboured us—(he who pretends to be as one
of your Majesty’s slaves, but who, in fact, has dared to be treacherous
to your most illustrious and venerated defunct Father, of blessed
memory, and whose abode now may be Paradise)—have compelled us to throw
ourselves at the feet of your Imperial Throne, which is adorned with the
rays of justice and mercy,—spreading our supplicating arms towards your
Majesty’s paternal and sublime clemency, that you may be pleased to turn
your eye towards our protection and safety,—knowing as we do how vast
and extensive the equity of your Majesty’s Government, which is so
renowned throughout the world.—and how immense and unlimited your
Majesty’s mercy and clemency; wherefore our hearts burn with the fire of
the desire of attaining that happiness also, which is enjoyed by all
those fortunate beings who are your subjects. What crime have we
committed to cause your Majesty’s resplendent face to be turned away
from us, and thereby we should be left to be thrashed under the edges of
an unbearable tyranny and of an insupportable iniquity and oppression,
while our fathers and forefathers, ever since a period of four hundred
years, have continually enjoyed the happiness and comfort of the
protection of your Majesty’s Imperial Standard? We are their sons, and
prepared to follow their steps, that we may inherit the same happiness
which they enjoyed for so many centuries, to the great glory of your
Majesty’s Imperial Dynasty.
We therefore pray and supplicate your paternal benignity and clemency
not to abandon us, and to let it be said that a vast and numerous
population has been left to be immolated as a sacrifice to the selfish
ambition and sordid avarice of a single man, a tyrant, totally void of
feeling and humanity, who not only proved himself ungrateful to, and
forgetful of, your Majesty’s great bounty to him, but dared, most
perfidiously, to turn his sword towards your sacred person. Seeing
ourselves thus placed in this most wretched and miserable condition,
bordering on the last degree of our total ruin and annihilation, we have
got up and raised your Majesty’s mighty Standard in defence of the
legitimate and lawful rights of your Imperial Sovereignty over us, for
which we shall continue to fight to the last breath of our existence;
and therefore we trust to the Divine aid of the Almighty, and in your
Majesty’s assistance, to overpower that common enemy of yours and ours,
and to drive him away from your dominions.
Hence, we again supplicate and implore the Throne of your Majesty’s
universal mercy and clemency, to turn your royal face towards us with
your mighty aid and assistance,—especially, our said enemy having
stopped all the roads against us by land and also by sea, and thereby
prevents us receiving any supply of the necessary warlike stores we are
in need of; and as we have no fleet to oppose his, we most earnestly
entreat your Majesty to afford us the needful recourse for the opening
of the roads, &c.; otherwise, we shall be, God forbid, unavoidably
placed in a most distressing state, and in imminent ruin. But no, never
will your Majesty’s imperial and paternal mercy and benevolence allow
such a disastrous calamity to befall us! And we pray the Almighty God to
preserve your sacred person, and to perpetuate the days of your glorious
reign with happiness and victory.
Signed and Sealed by your Majesty’s Slaves.
(No Date) THE NATION OF MUTUALI.
THE NATION OF DRUSE.
THE CHRISTIAN NATION.
FARIS HONEISH, &c., &c.
LETTER addressed by the INHABITANTS of MOUNT LEBANON to his Excellency
the BRITISH AMBASSADOR.
After the usual Compliments, (Translation.)
The humanity which so eminently distinguishes all the acts of the
British Government,—the readiness with which it steps forward to the
assistance of the oppressed,—the anxiety that it displays to make
the people of the East share in the benefits enjoyed by that portion
of their fellow-creatures that are blessed with happier
Governments,—embolden the Syrians to appeal to England for her
mediation to rescue them from the destruction with which Mehemet Ali
threatens them now.
Since the invasion of Syria by Mehemet Ali, he has trampled us under
foot by an oppression which knows no bounds, and by a tyranny the most
atrocious and cruel.
For the last eight years, we have acceded to all his demands, and
because he has left us nothing more to give him, he menaces us with
extermination; nor will his unbounded rapacity be satisfied until he
drinks the very blood of our children, and satiates the licentiousness
of his soldiers with the honour of our families. Driven to despair, we
have taken up arms for the defence of our lives, and to guard our
dwellings from fire and ourselves from the sword with which he threatens
to erase us from among nations.
Abandoned by the world, we implore the protection of Great Britain. In
the humanity of her Government, and in the generosity of one of the
greatest and most powerful nations, rest all our hopes in this cruel
crisis. All that we demand is, to be allowed to return to our legitimate
Sovereign Abdul Medjid,—a natural desire coming from loyal subjects. Why
should two millions and a-half of His Highness’ subjects be sacrificed
to the personal ambition of one man, who himself, forgetful of the
benefits conferred upon him, has turned his sword against the bosom of
his own Sovereign?
We have but one prayer,—we seek but to be allowed to enjoy, in common
with the rest of His Highness’ subjects, the rights and privileges
secured to them by the Hatti-Sheriff; and it is in this hope that we
submit our petition to your Excellency, praying that you will be pleased
to lay it before the “Divan” of Great Britain, the Ally of our august
Master Abdul Medjid, with a request that we may be honoured with a
speedy glad tidings, before we are utterly destroyed by the Governor of
Egypt.
May the Almighty prolong the days of your Excellency with happiness to
the end of time.
(Signed) (L.S.) PRINCE FARIS SHEHAB.
(L.S.) EMIR HAIDAR.
(L.S.) SHEIK FARIS HABEISH, &c.
THE MARONITE NATION.
THE DRUSE NATION.
THE MUTUALIS.
LETTER addressed by the INHABITANTS of MOUNT LEBANON to his Excellency
the FRENCH AMBASSADOR.
(Literal Translation from the Arabic.)
After the usual Compliments,
The painful news that have reached us by the newspapers, have struck a
terrible blow to Syria,—they have torn the hearts of men, women, and
children, now menaced to be exterminated by Mehemet Ali, to whom France
has deigned to grant her powerful protection. Can she be possibly
ignorant of the evils this man has made us suffer since fortune has made
him master of Syria? They are innumerable. Suffice it to say, that the
most distressing vexations, and the most cruel oppression, have driven
us to despair, and have renewed in us the ardent desire of returning to
the paternal government of our august Sovereign, Abdul Medjid. Is not
this a legitimate desire from a loyal people? France, a nation so great,
so magnanimous, that has extended liberty everywhere, that has for ages
spilt so much blood to establish it in her own Government, refuses us
to-day her powerful influence to obtain the enjoyment of the same good!
The French press says, “that France will not admit of any arrangement
that has for basis the restitution of Syria to its legitimate
Sovereign.” Can it be so? the Syrians cannot believe it! The French
nation, so generous, so civilized, cannot desire to see us crushed by a
systematic oppression which alone distinguishes the Egyptian Government
from others.
We wish but to be allowed to return to the protection of our legitimate
Sovereign, whom we have not ceased to obey for the last four hundred
years. We demand but to participate in the privileges and rights of the
Hatti-Sheriff which our gracious Sovereign has granted to all his
faithful subjects, without exception, without distinction. We appeal to
the French Government—we supplicate the French nation at large, to
assist us to obtain our demand. The most atrocious tyranny has compelled
us to take up arms for the defence of our lives and the honour of our
families, from the brutality of the Egyptian soldiery, or to bury
ourselves in the ruins of our country. Our cause is a just one; and as
such, we sincerely trust that the French Government will not abandon us
in a moment so dangerous.
It is with this hope we submit to your Excellency this, our prayer,
begging that you will be pleased to lay it at the feet of the throne of
your august Master, the Ally of our gracious Sovereign, Abdul Medjid.
(Signed) (L.S.) PRINCE FARIS SHEHAB.
(L.S.) PRINCE YOUSUF SHEHAB.
(L.S.) EMIR HAIDAR, &c., &c.
THE MARONITE }
THE DRUSE } NATIONS.
THE MUTUALI }
No. III.
LETTER from Commodore NAPIER to Lieut.-Col.
HODGES.
H.M.S. Powerful, Beyrout,
July 15, 1840.
My dear Hodges,
I received your letter and postscript of the 10th and 13th of July, and
I think you are as cautious a diplomatist as if you had been at it for
the last twenty years; you do not make a single remark upon what my
opinions were relative to this expedition of Mehemet Ali. I do not feel
that there is any responsibility on me whatever; I am positively forbid
to meddle with anything that Mehemet Ali may do, as long as he lets
alone British persons and property; and however I disapprove of this, I
can only obey.
The Pacha’s troops marched out yesterday morning, and although they met
with no resistance, they set the whole country in a blaze, convents and
all. I wrote a very strong letter to the Egyptian Admiral, which I
begged him to communicate to Abbas Pacha, a copy of which accompanies
this. Mr. Wood was sent here by Lord Ponsonby, and he came off a few
days ago, bringing petitions from the poor Mountaineers to the Sultan
and the French and English Ambassadors; he landed again early this
morning, and brings off news that the insurgents are divided amongst
themselves, have been abandoned by many of their chiefs, are badly
armed, and, by all I can collect, unless they are succoured with arms
and ammunition, the insurrection will be put down very shortly, and thus
will finish all hope of Syria being released from the power of Mehemet
Ali, by the efforts of the inhabitants themselves, and the question will
become more complicated than ever; all of which might have been avoided,
had the Admiral had instructions how to act, or had he taken upon
himself, which I feel assured would have been approved of by our
Government at home. I am surprised the mission of Mr. Wood has not been
notified to you, as he certainly was sent here by Lord Ponsonby, and I
have the Admiral’s order to facilitate him, and even to send the Cyclops
back when he has any particular communication to make.
Should Mehemet Ali come this way, the shortest way of putting an end to
all doubts would be to seize him. I do not say I am prepared for so bold
a step, but if I see much cruelty and devastation going on, I don’t know
whether I should not be very much disposed to do it, unless he came
accompanied by such a force as would render the success doubtful; but I
have no idea that he will come, because I believe all will be settled
without him, and you will find that the strength of the insurgents has
been very much magnified. You seem to think that Mehemet Ali is on his
last legs, but I think this will strengthen him very much; he is
evidently backed up by the French, that is clear by the language held by
all the French officers, and we have Thiers’ speech, which is plain
enough. You say, if we act with vigour and determination, we shall carry
through Lord Palmerston’s policy without the aid of any foreign power;
but, my good friend, the opportunity is lost, his troops are landed and
his squadron by this time is in Alexandria, and I do not see now where
our vigour and determination can be applied.
_July 20._—It was only yesterday I could get anything positive about the
Egyptians. Our Consul knows nothing, and he will believe nothing against
the Syrians, but a Frenchman has read me a letter from Souliman Pacha,
saying the insurrection was put down; and another from his secretary,
detailing the whole of their operations. It appears they marched as far
as Hammana, about eight hours from here, and met less than a couple of
hundred of the insurgents, whom the Albanians disposed of, and the Emir
Bechir sent to desire them to submit, and give up their arms, which many
of them have done. I was not satisfied with this, and last night I went
down in the Cyclops, and sent on shore at Zouk and Jebel, when they
informed me that the son of Emir Bechir had been there and told them. It
is a pity you had not a vessel to have sent earlier information, but
even that would have made no difference, as nothing would have been
done; it serves them right for their behaviour to me, and I hope you
will tell Lord Palmerston so. I shall keep this open till the last
moment.
_July 21._—The Indian mail is just arrived; I have no more news. I wish
you could come this way, for I fear there is no chance of my going to
Alexandria; I shall, however write to the Admiral by the Austrian
steamer, which I expect hourly.
Believe me, &c.,
CHARLES NAPIER.
No. IV. See Vol. I., page 52.
EXTRACT of LETTER from COMMODORE NAPIER to ADMIRAL the Honourable Sir
ROBERT STOPFORD, G.C.B.
D’Journie, Head-Quarters of the Army
of Lebanon, September 16, 1840.
In execution of your order of the 9th instant, I removed the whole of
the Turkish troops from the transports and the marines of the squadron
into the steamers. The Dido and Wasp took up an anchorage well up to
Beyrout Point, in order to draw Souliman Pacha’s attention from the
position I intended to disembark at. Soon after daylight, the squadron
and steamers you had put under my orders weighed; the Turkish squadron,
under Admiral Walker, weighed also; and the whole, with the exception of
Zebra, who flanked the Egyptian camp, worked up to Beyrout Point, where
a considerable force of the enemy was in position.
When the breeze freshened, the whole bore up for D’Journie. Castor and
Hydra anchored close to Dog River, landed the Turkish troops, and
completely blocked up the pass leading to D’Journie.
The Powerful and Pique, Gorgon, Cyclops and Phœnix, followed by the
Turkish squadron, ran into the bay of D’Journie, and landed the troops
in an incredibly short time, owing to the excellent arrangement of
Captain Reynolds, who took charge of the landing. Admiral Walker put his
troops on shore at the same moment with great celerity and order; a
position was then taken up, and the artillery landed, the few Albanians
stationed here retiring without firing a shot. The Carysfort and Dido
went off D’Jebel, about three leagues to the northward, to act against a
strong tower, garrisoned by Albanian troops.
D’Journie is a good-sized bay, with a promontory projecting considerably
into the sea. A road from Beyrout lies along the shore, and is
practicable for infantry, artillery, and cavalry: this road the Revenge
covered. The road from Tripoli leads also along shore, and the Wasp and
Phœnix covered a gorge, over which it would be necessary to pass. Two
roads lead from Baalbec by Antura, where an excellent position was taken
up by two battalions of Turks, supported by five companies of marines.
The left of this is protected by an impassable gorge, the right rests on
the sea, Dog River separating it from high ground in front.
The first day the inhabitants who had been driven into the mountains,
came in slowly for arms, but these few took them with great avidity, and
hastened to the mountains to drive away the Emir Bechir’s troops, and
open the mountain passes,—this done, the mountaineers have flocked in in
great numbers, with the Sheiks, who have crowded to the standard of the
Sultan.
I beg to inclose Captain Martin’s reports of the occupation of D’Jebel
and Batroun, in which he speaks highly of Captain Austen, of the
Cyclops, and of the officers employed[136].
I regret the loss he met with; it was not to be avoided. The inhabitants
of this city are most warlike and determined, and many Albanians have
suffered by their severity.
Ibrahim Pacha reconnoitred our positions the day before yesterday.
I have sent a battalion of Turks in advance of Gazir to open the
country, and give due notice, should he endeavour to turn our left by
that road, which he will have some difficulty in doing, as the country
is covered by the broadsides of the ships.
I have much reason to be satisfied with the zeal of the whole of the
officers and seamen employed: their exertions in completing our lines,
under Mr. Aldrich, of the Engineers, is beyond all praise.
Permit me, sir, to congratulate you on the first success of the army of
Lebanon. You, yesterday, were witness of the arrival of his Highness the
Emir Abdallah, the Governor of the district of Kesrouan, and of the
enthusiasm of the mountaineers; and if this continues, I have every
reason to think that the Egyptian army will be obliged to retire from
the sea-coast, and the mountains of Lebanon.
I have, &c.
CHARLES NAPIER, _Commodore_.
No. V. See Vol. II., page 17.
INSTRUCTIONS for CAPTAIN FANSHAWE, on his MISSION to ALEXANDRIA.
By the Honourable Sir ROBERT STOPFORD, &c.
Having received instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty to send a competent officer to Alexandria, in order to make a
communication to Mehemet Ali, the substance of which is stated in a
letter from Viscount Palmerston to their Lordships of the 14th of
November, of which you will receive a copy,—it is my direction you
proceed forthwith in H.M. steam vessel Megæra to Alexandria, taking with
you the Dragoman named in the margin[137], and on your arrival, after
communicating with the senior officer, who will give you every support,
you will demand to have an interview with Mehemet Ali, in the presence
of Boghos Bey, in order to make to Mehemet Ali a communication from Her
Majesty’s Government. When admitted you will be guided in all respects
by the directions contained in the said letter; and further, should the
written document which Mehemet Ali may deliver to you, for the purpose
of being transmitted to Constantinople, contain an expression of a
desire, on the part of Mehemet Ali, to obtain hereditary tenure of the
Pachalic of Egypt, you will not decline to receive and convey the
document on that account, provided it shall also contain the engagements
mentioned in the aforesaid letter. You will also state that if Mehemet
Ali, as a proof of his desire for conciliation, expresses his readiness
to restore the fleet immediately, you will offer in my name every
assistance in conducting it to Marmorice, where it will be placed at the
Sultan’s disposal; and making the senior officer acquainted with the
result, you will return in the Megæra, and join me at Marmorice.
Should the senior officer be at any distance from the port, you will not
go out of your way, but communicate with him on your return from
Alexandria.
Given on board the Princess Charlotte, off Cyprus, 6th Dec. 1840.
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD, _Admiral_.
By command of the Commander-in-Chief,
(Signed) JOHN LOUDON, _Secretary_.
Captain Fanshawe, H.M.S. Princess Charlotte.
No. VI. See Vol. II., page 36.
PROTOCOL of the Conference held at the house of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Sublime Porte, the 20th of December, 1840, between
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on one part, and the
Representatives of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, on
the other.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ You are aware, gentlemen, that a letter
was addressed by Mehemet Ali to the Sublime Porte, and you are
acquainted with its contents. The Sublime Porte yesterday received
likewise the Memorandum of the Conference of London of the 14th of
November. The Sublime Porte directs me to ask you, gentlemen, if Mehemet
Ali by this letter has complied with the spirit of the Memorandum, and
if his submission ought to be considered as real?
_Ambassador of England._ I think that it belongs to the Sultan alone to
decide this point.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ Up to this time there have only been
words on the part of Mehemet Ali; if he executes the promises made in
the letter, then his submission may be considered as real.
_Ambassador of England._ I leave to my Colleagues to decide upon that
point. As for me, I see nothing before me at present which can authorize
me in explaining myself, or in giving an opinion.
_Internuncio of Austria._ With the view of relieving myself from all
responsibility, and of making the views of my Government in so important
a matter clearly manifest, I have deemed it fitting to give my vote in
writing. I will now read it to the Conference:—
“I have read over and over again with the most scrupulous attention the
letter which Mehemet Ali has just addressed to the Grand Vizier, and on
which I am called upon to pronounce my opinion. I have found nothing in
it which is not correct. The tone which pervades it has appeared to me
to be altogether proper. It might have been desirable that no allusion
had been made to the Convention of Commodore Napier; but we are all
agreed that it would have been much more so that the Convention in
question had never been concluded; and Mehemet Ali, by referring to it,
has only made use of an advantage which has been gratuitously offered to
him. Besides, it was Captain Fanshawe alone who should have represented
to him that an act which the Allied commanders had declared null and of
no effect, ought not to be mentioned in the letter to the Grand Vizier.
But I will not dwell on this point, which, after all, is now only of
secondary interest. I return to Mehemet Ali’s letter. In this letter the
Pacha declares himself ready to do all that is required of him, and in
this respect his submission appears to me entire.
“I should then be of opinion that this submission should be accepted;
that an officer of his Highness should be sent to Alexandria; that
Mehemet Ali should be enjoined to deliver up to him the Ottoman fleet;
that, according to the terms of the Separate Act of the Convention of
the 15th of July, the Allied commanders should be invited to assist at
such delivery; that the Pacha should be summoned to evacuate the
provinces or cities of the Ottoman empire still occupied by the Egyptian
troops, and situated beyond the limits of Egypt; finally, that the Grand
Vizier, in replying to his letter, should announce to him that when once
these conditions should be entirely fulfilled, his Highness, from
deference to his Allies, would be pleased to reinstate him in his
functions as Pacha of Egypt. This advice is what the Conference of
London wished that we should give to the Sublime Porte, in case Mehemet
Ali should yield to the summons about to be made to him. As for the
tribute, the land and sea forces, and the laws which must govern Egypt,
those points have been settled beforehand by the Convention of the 15th
of July, and it will be sufficient to execute in this respect the
stipulations contained in the IIIrd, Vth, and VIth Articles of the
Separate Act annexed to the Convention.
“I should consider as in every respect to be regretted any hesitation on
the part of the Porte to comply with the advice of its Allies. The most
brilliant successes have crowned their efforts in Syria; those successes
have surpassed our calculations, our anticipations, our expectations.
Syria has returned to the rule of his Highness, and thus the principal
object of the alliance is accomplished. To proceed further does not
enter into the views of the Allied Powers; the Conference of London has
pronounced with sufficient distinctness in this respect. The Sublime
Porte may doubtless have good reasons to desire the destruction of
Mehemet Ali; but as it has not the means of effecting it itself, the
task of doing so would devolve upon its Allies. Now would it desire, in
return for the services which they have rendered to it, to involve them
in an undertaking which would endanger the general peace, so ardently
desired by all people, and so happily maintained up to the present time?
“It is especially towards France that the attention of our Governments
is at present directed; that Power is entitled to their respect and
their consideration; and if the menacing and warlike attitude of the
Thiers Ministry could not stay them in their course towards the end
which they proposed to themselves, and which they have attained, they
appear henceforth to be desirous to dedicate all their care to keep well
with the Ministry which succeeds it, and whose language announces a
prudent, moderate, and conciliatory policy. They must consequently enter
into its position, make allowances for the difficulties by which it is
surrounded, and not expose it to be hurried along against its will in a
false course. In the present state of sentiments in France an
unlooked-for event might subvert everything; and is it not for the
interest of all and for that of justice, that they should frankly unite
themselves with those who govern France, to prevent a like calamity?”
The Internuncio thereupon reads the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth
paragraphs of the Separate Act of the 15th of July.
_Envoy of Prussia._ I partake of the opinion of the Internuncio. Mehemet
Ali’s proceeding appears to me in fact to be in conformity with the
spirit of the Memorandum. I think besides, that Mehemet Ali having
solicited his pardon of the Sultan, the Sublime Porte ought not to act
with too great severity against him; that, on the contrary, it ought to
lend itself to explanations, and to evince consideration and moderation,
not only for the interest of the Porte itself, but also for the general
interest of Europe.
_Chargé d’Affaires of Russia._ In all that relates to the general
question the views of my Government cannot differ from those of the
three other Courts, its Allies; my instructions are founded on that
principle. In the special question which forms the object of this
Conference, the existing documents ought to point out to us the course
and the rules to be observed; now this course and these rules appear to
me to be already laid down by the Memorandum of the Conference of London
on the 14th of November, and by Lord Palmerston’s despatch of the 15th
of October. The Memorandum had not yet reached me from my Government; it
is the Internuncio who has had the goodness to communicate it to me; I
have only received Lord Palmerston’s despatch, which is mentioned, and I
conceive that I shall conform to the meaning of these documents, by
joining, under existing circumstances, in the vote pronounced by the
Internuncio.
_Ambassador of England._ The question, I repeat, appears to me to depend
upon the fact of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and the Sultan appears
to me to be the sole judge in such a question: he alone has the right to
decide. If the Sublime Porte informs us that the Sultan has accepted
Mehemet Ali’s submission, that he is satisfied with it, the orders of my
Government enjoin me, in such a case, to advise the Porte to grant to
Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt. Until that time, until
the Porte communicates to us the decision of the Sultan, I must abstain
from giving any advice, any opinion.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ There are different kinds of submission.
Mehemet Ali might, for example, have come himself, according to our
usages, or have sent some one to implore his pardon; but that is not
what we mean. The Memorandum requires that Mehemet Ali should restore
the fleet, that he should evacuate certain countries. He writes that he
will do all this; if he accomplishes these promises, the Sublime Porte
will be able to credit his submission, but the letter cannot of itself
alone be considered as a real submission.
_Internuncio of Austria._ The letter is a commencement of submission. If
the Sublime Porte demands the delivery of the fleet, if Mehemet Ali
restores it, and if he evacuates the countries specified in the
Memorandum, his submission will certainly be then complete.
_Chargé d’Affaires of Russia._ It is certain that we shall not be able
to consider the submission of Mehemet Ali as completed until he shall
have restored the fleet, and evacuated the Holy Cities, as well as the
other places specified in the Memorandum; but for the present we should
abide by the text of the Memorandum and of the instruction addressed by
the Admiralty to Admiral Stopford, wherein mention is made of a letter
to be delivered by Mehemet Ali to the officer commissioned to notify to
him the decision of the Conference of London.
_Internuncio._ What more could Mehemet Ali do? He must begin by saying
that he submitted, and he could not, at the same instant, carry into
effect all the conditions of his submission.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs_, alluding to what the Ambassador for
England had said, observes, that up to the present time there had been
no question of hereditary succession.
_Internuncio._ I am not at this moment called upon to discuss that
point, on which I have no precise instruction; but, the case occurring,
I shall conform myself altogether on that matter to what the Ambassador
of England shall do.
_Ambassador of England._ For my part, I have precise orders to advise
the Porte to grant hereditary succession to Mehemet Ali, so soon as it
shall apprize us that the Sultan is satisfied with the submission of
Mehemet Ali; but such advice can only be conditional; I have not the
right to judge of the reality of the submission, and I must wait, before
giving it, for the Sultan to pronounce himself on the fact of the
submission.
_Internuncio._ As for me, I must repeat it, I look upon the letter of
Mehemet Ali, as a first step towards his submission.
_Ambassador of England._ It will not be in my power to act in the sense
of the instructions of my Government, until the Sublime Porte shall have
declared that it considers the submission of Mehemet Ali as complete.
But I cannot demand of the Sultan any declaration whatever on that
matter, for I should think that I trenched upon his rights. It is for
his Majesty to decide.
_Envoy of Prussia._ I think, as I have already said, that the Sublime
Porte ought not, in the present case, to act with too great severity,
and I must always exhort it to act with moderation.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ The Porte has never wished to act with
severity; facts have already proved it. It does not wish to do so even
now. It wishes, on the contrary, to act in concert with its Allies; and
although it is doubtless for the Sultan to decide on the submission of
Mehemet Ali, nevertheless, as his Allies have declared their intentions
in the Memorandum, I have thought it right to consult their
Representatives to know whether Mehemet Ali’s proceeding is in
conformity with the spirit of the Memorandum: but, since their opinions
are at variance, they might refer to the decision of the Conference of
London.
_Internuncio._ But there is no variance between us; we all think that
Mehemet Ali’s submission, in order that it should be complete, must be
followed by the execution of the conditions which are imposed upon him.
I think, moreover, that to refer the question to the decision of the
Conference of London would be to appeal from the Conference to the
Conference, and lose time in useless adjournments.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ I think that Mehemet Ali must first
execute the conditions imposed upon him; as for the hereditary
succession, that is another question upon which I am not prepared to
explain myself.
_Internuncio_ once more declares, that when the time arrives, he will
concur in the steps of the Ambassador of England on that point, and the
_Envoy of Prussia_ makes the same declaration.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ You are aware, gentlemen, that on his
accession to the throne the Sultan had granted to Mehemet Ali the
hereditary administration of Egypt; he rejected that favour. Still
later, with the view of sparing the shedding of blood, the Treaty of
July 15 granted it to him; Mehemet Ali equally rejected it. It was
necessary to have recourse to measures of coercion, and the Sultan
withdrew this favour from him. At present it appears to me that there
can no longer be a question of a right in favour of Mehemet Ali, and the
Sultan is free to take his decision on this point.
_Representatives_ unanimously admitted that the Sultan possesses his
entire freedom of action in this respect, and that Mehemet Ali could not
appeal to any right.
_Envoy of Prussia_ added, that any concession in favour of Mehemet Ali
could only be considered as an effect of the Sultan’s generosity; for
the independence of his Highness is the object of the Convention of July
15; but the more advantageous the Sultan’s position is at the present
time, the more will it perhaps allow him to be generous.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ Since Mehemet Ali has rejected the
Treaty of July 15, that Treaty no longer exists for him, and other
conditions might be imposed on Mehemet Ali.
_Internuncio._ But the Treaty continues to exist for us.
_Ambassador of England._ I declare that, in my opinion, Mehemet Ali has
now no right; that the Sultan is master to take the course which he
shall consider fitting, and that we can only afford him our advice.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs_, addressing himself to the Internuncio,
says to him: Your Excellency began by saying, that if the Sultan is
satisfied with the letter of Mehemet Ali, his submission ought to be
accepted. But Mehemet Ali has already written a thousand letters of the
same kind. Can any faith be placed in his letters? It is evident besides
that there is some trick even in this last letter. For example, he
speaks of Commodore Napier’s Convention, which is a void act, in order
to come to the subject of hereditary succession.
_Internuncio._ That is true; but this letter, given in consequence of a
summons made to him by the English Admiral in the name of the Four
Powers, cannot be compared to all those which he has addressed of his
own accord to the Sublime Porte, and specifically to Hosrew Pacha.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ You understand, gentlemen, that in any
case it is necessary that the Porte should have time to reflect upon
this matter.
_Internuncio._ Assuredly, an affair of this kind cannot be concluded in
a day; it is, doubtless, necessary that your Excellency should be able
to concert with your colleagues, and take the orders of the Sultan.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs_ observes, that having to submit to the
Council and to the Sultan his report on the Conference of this day, he
is desirous of knowing, definitely, what is the conclusion which he
should communicate to them.
_Representatives_ reply that their opinion being recorded in the present
Protocol, they refer themselves to it.
_Ambassador of England._ I repeat that I must wait for the decision of
the Sultan to give the advice which is enjoined to me by the orders of
my Government.
_Internuncio_ observes once again how much it would be to be regretted
if the Porte should not conform with promptitude to the wish expressed
by the Allied Courts in the Memorandum of the 14th of November.
No. VII.
LETTER from Lieutenant-Colonel NAPIER to Sir CHARLES NAPIER.
My dear Father, Cairo, February 16, 1841.
I have just returned from a visit to Souliman Pacha, who is a fine
hearty old soldier, and begs to be remembered to you, saying it will be
some time ere he forgets the _cannonnade_ you gave him. I told him how
much you were annoyed at his house having been plundered at Beyrout,
assuring him that the English had nothing to do with it; to which he
replied that he was aware that he was under an obligation on that
account to the Austrians; but he said that some things of his which you
had ordered to be sent to him, had been seized by the _douane_ at
Beyrout, and amongst others some arms from Persia, which he valued much
as curiosities. When his house was plundered all his papers was
destroyed; amongst others some military works of his in manuscript,
which had cost him the labour of years.
Ibrahim Pacha was present at Beckfaya, and mentioned your having taken
off your hat. He was also in person at the crossing of the Jordan, when
we returned in such a hurry to Jerusalem. He says it was merely a
demonstration, which answered the purpose for which it was intended, and
which caused him to gain three marches on us. We had altogether a most
interesting conversation, which lasted upwards of an hour, and during
which he was civil in the extreme, shaking me repeatedly by the hand,
and ended by desiring to be most particularly remembered to you.
_Feb. 17._—Souliman Pacha has just called on me; he is a fine old
fellow. I gave him a bottle of porter; he drank your health, and told me
to let you know he had done so heartily.
He brought back with him 8000 troops of artillery, who were much
harassed by the Arabs from Akaba. He says he put to death every one of
them whom he caught. I did not like to ask him if he had many Syrians
amongst his troops; but I am sorry to inform you that there are a great
many here, who have arrived with the troops from Gaza.
About eight regiments of infantry are now encamped near this, the last
of which arrived yesterday from Gaza, which they left on the 4th
instant; and from what I can learn from the men, they were forced to
accompany the Egyptians. Besides the infantry, a couple of regiments of
lancers have come, some irregular Mogrebins (from the Deserts of Libya),
and some irregular _Turkish_ cavalry _from Anatolia_; I believe about
200. The horses, particularly those of the lancers, are in good
condition, and it is lucky for me that I could not get my mountain
horsemen to approach them[138], as they would have eaten us without
salt. I dine with Souliman the day after to-morrow, and manage to spend
my time pleasantly enough; but I am anxious to hear from our
head-quarters, and have as yet been able to learn nothing positive about
the Emirs, but have sent to Thebes to obtain information.
* * * * * *
The disturbances have already begun in the Hedjaz since the Egyptian
troops have been withdrawn; and a Prophet, calling himself King of the
Land and Sea, has already set up the standard of a religious warfare. _*
* * *_
Your affectionate son,
E. NAPIER.
--------------
No. VIII.
LETTER from BOGHOS BEY to Sir CHARLES
NAPIER.
Commodore, Alexandria, June 19, 1841.
I hasten to acknowledge the receipt of the letter, dated May 27, with
which you have honoured me. Having placed it before His Highness the
Viceroy, I am desired to express his grateful acknowledgements for the
friendly expressions it contains.
On the two points, “of the return of some Syrian soldiers who are still
here, and of the regulation of the monopoly,” which form the principal
object of your letter, I believe that I cannot do better than
transcribe, Commodore, the words which His Highness proffered in reply,
as I have obtained authority to transmit them to you.
“I cannot see the motive why my friend Napier should be in any
difficulty; he who has talked with me, who has seen all, and doubtless,
with his penetration, understood all. No one is ignorant that since the
signing of the Convention with him the difficulty of the question could
not have been made smoother; the affair having been submitted to
different conditions, has been prolonged by negotiations with the Envoy
of the Sublime Porte; and whilst the conditions were under
consideration, they could not be executed, neither could they consider
my conduct strange, still less suppose that I was thereby breaking my
word. Thank God, it is now arranged to the satisfaction of the parties;
the Firman has arrived, and has been solemnly read in public with the
usual ceremonies. I am now only under the necessity of submitting to the
clemency of my Sovereign as to the quota of the tribute. I have already
conferred on this subject with his Envoy here, who is on the point of
setting out, and the matter is almost arranged. Now that the moment has
arrived to put successively into execution the conditions contained in
the above-mentioned Firman, my friend Napier will very soon learn that
what I talked to him about, that what I said to him concerning the
monopoly, will be effected in a manner to promote the interests of the
country; and I hope that his friendship for me will be more than ever
strengthened.”
In sending you, Commodore, on the part of His Highness, the preceding
communication, I am desired also to present his friendly salutations,
and I avail myself of this opportunity in my own person to reiterate the
assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honour to be,
Commodore,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
BOGHOS JOUSSOUFF.
THE END.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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HARRISON AND CO., PRINTERS,
ST. MARTIN’S LANE.
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BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
---
_In Two Volumes, Post Octavo, with Plans, price 21s._,
AN ACCOUNT
OF
THE WAR IN PORTUGAL
BETWEEN DON PEDRO AND DON MIGUEL.
--------------
OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.
“The personal character of the Author is not only impressed upon almost
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appearance the most important of the leaves out of a hero’s life,
written by himself. It is Cæsar’s Commentaries in the first person,
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on the one hand, and over-weening egotism on the other hand.”—_Tait’s
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“This is a very graphic account of the affairs in which the gallant
author figured so nobly, and added fresh lustre to the name of
Napier.”—_News._
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Footnotes:
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Transcriber’s Note
Hyphenation has been retained as printed. Where a word is hyphenated on
a line break, the hyphen is retained or removed depending on instances
elsewhere in the text.
The printer provided a short list of errata for this volume. The changes
indicated there have been incorporated into this text.
In the Table of Contents, the page indicated for Appendix I (p. 301)
should be p. 299, and has been corrected.
The title of Appendix No. VI (Protocol) was misprinted as No. V.
The first footnote, on p. 33, has no anchor in the text. This has been
added at an appropriate point.
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and
are noted here. The following issues should be noted, along with the
resolutions. The references are to the page and line in the original.
40.4 is disposed to acce[e]pt the submission Removed.
41.3 the 17th Chewal, (the [22nd of November/11th Per Errata.
of December,)
90.21 the quickest _possible co[u/n]veyance_ Inverted.
114.6 after which you[ you] would attack Redundant.
148.6 “[‘]Having arrived at Naplouse, I was to order Removed.
185.17 who was [an-eye witness/an eye-witness] Misplaced.
199.4 [Opposed/Approved] by the other Allied Per Errata.
Ministers
222.5 for their consi[ed/de]ration Transposed.
224.11 it was possible for Mehe[n/m]et Ali Replaced.
242.7 by incurring responsibi[li]ty Inserted,
242.22 I do not intend to[ ]enter into the political Inserted.
merits
262.6 showed no symptoms of fulfil[l]ing Inserted.
262.11 back to their country[,/.] Replaced.
303.26 that you may[ be] pleased to turn your eye Inserted.
318.1 No. V[I]. See Vol. II., page 36 Added.
332.6 with which you have honoured me[.] Added.
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