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Title: Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Volume II
Author: Various
Language: English
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[Cover Illustration]
TRIALS
OF
WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10
[Illustration]
VOLUME II
NUERNBERG
OCTOBER 1946-APRIL 1949
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C. — Price $2.75 (Buckram)
CONTENTS
_The Medical Case_
(Introductory material and basic directives under which trials
were conducted together with Chapters I-VIII-E of Medical Case
are printed in Volume I.)
Page
VIII. Evidence and Arguments on Important Aspects of the Case
(cont’d) 1
F. Necessity 1
G. Subjection to Medical Experimentation as Substitute
for Penalties 44
H. Usefulness of the Experiments 61
I. Medical Ethics 70
1. General Principles 70
2. German Medical Profession 86
3. Medical Experiments in other Countries 90
IX. Ruling of the Tribunal on Count One of the Indictment 122
X. Final Plea for Defendant Karl Brandt by Dr. Servatius 123
XI. Final Statements of the Defendants, 19 July 1947 138
XII. Judgment 171
The Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 172
The Charge 173
Count One 173
Count Two and Three 174
Count Four 180
The Proof as to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 181
Permissible Medical Experiments 181
The Medical Service in Germany 184
The Ahnenerbe Society 188
Karl Brandt 189
Handloser 198
Rostock 208
Schroeder 210
Genzken 217
Gebhardt 223
Blome 228
Rudolf Brandt 235
Mrugowsky 241
Poppendick 248
Sievers 253
Rose 264
Ruff, Romberg, and Weltz 272
Brack 277
Becker-Freyseng 281
Schaefer 285
Hoven 286
Beiglboeck 290
Pokorny 292
Oberheuser 294
Fischer 296
Sentences 298
XIII. Petitions 301
XIV. Affirmation of Sentences by the Military Governor of the
United States Zone of Occupation 327
XV. Order of the United States Supreme Court Denying Writ of
Habeas Corpus 330
Appendix 331
Table of Comparative Ranks 331
List of Witnesses in Case 1 332
Index of Documents and Testimony 336
_The Milch Case_
Introduction 355
Order Constituting Tribunal 357
Members of Military Tribunal II 359
Prosecution Counsel 359
Defense Counsel 359
I. Indictment 360
II. Arraignment 365
III. Opening Statements 366
A. Opening Statement for the Prosecution 366
B. Opening Statement for the Defense 377
IV. Selections from the Documents and Testimony of Witnesses of
Prosecution and Defense 385
A. Slave Labor 385
1. General Slave Labor Program in Germany 385
2. The Central Planning Board 444
3. The Jaegerstab 524
4. Generalluftzeugmeister 596
B. Medical Experiments 623
C. Curriculum Vitae and Excerpts from the Testimony of
the Defendant Milch 633
V. Closing Statements 690
A. Closing Statement of the Prosecution 690
B. Closing Statement of the Defense 730
VI. Final Statement of the Defendant, 25 March 1947 772
VII. Judgment 773
A. Opinion and Judgment of the United States Military
Tribunal II 773
B. Concurring Opinion by Judge Michael A. Musmanno 797
C. Concurring Opinion by Judge Fitzroy D. Phillips 860
VIII. Petitions 879
A. Extract from Petition for Clemency to Military
Governor of United States Zone of Occupation 879
B. Petition to the Supreme Court of the United States
for Writ of Habeas Corpus 883
IX. Affirmation of Sentence by the Military Governor of the
United States Zone of Occupation 887
X. Order of the United States Supreme Court, 20 October 1947,
Denying Writ of Habeas Corpus 888
Appendix 889
List of Witnesses in Case 2 889
Index of Documents and Testimony 891
VIII. EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS ON
IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE CASE—Continued
F. Necessity
a. Introduction
The defense generally argued that the medical experiments took place
because of military necessity or the national emergency presented by
war. The defendant Sievers argued that his participation in various
experiments was a necessary part of his participation in a resistance
movement in Germany. The defendant Hoven argued that the concentration
camp inmates, who were killed by him or with his approval and knowledge,
were selected by the camp leadership which had been formed by the
political inmates themselves. Hoven also argued that the inmates killed
were all dangerous criminals who collaborated voluntarily with the SS,
and if they would not have been removed, the political inmates would
have been exterminated by these criminals and by the SS. He concluded
that it was therefore necessary, in order to prevent greater harm,
either to kill these “stool pigeons” personally or to give his approval
for their extermination.
On the argument of military necessity and national emergency, extracts
from the final plea for the defendant Gebhardt are included on pages 5
to 12. On the general question of necessity, extracts are included from
the examination of the defendant Karl Brandt by Judge Sebring on pages
29 to 30, and from the cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert
witness, Dr. Andrew C. Ivy on pages 42 to 44. The prosecution discussed
the general question of necessity in its opening statement.
The argument of the defendant Sievers that his participation was
necessary in connection with resistance to the Nazi leadership appears
in his final plea, an extract from which is given on pages 13 to 25.
From the evidence supporting the claim of Sievers, extracts from the
testimony of defense witness Dr. Friedrich Hielscher are included on
pages 30 to 41. The prosecution’s reply to Sievers’ special defense was
made, in part, in the prosecution’s closing statement, an extract of
which appears on pages 4 to 5. The argument of the defendant Hoven that
the killing of concentration camp inmates, of which he was accused, was
justifiable homicide appears in his final plea, an extract of which is
set forth on pages 25 to 28. The prosecution’s reply to this special
defense is set forth in the closing brief against the defendant Hoven,
an extract of which will be found on pages 2 to 4.
b. Selections from the Argumentation of the Prosecution
_EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF AGAINST DEFENDANT HOVEN_
* * * * *
(Hoven) tried to justify the killings [of concentration camp inmates] by
stating that these inmates were informers, spies, and stool pigeons of
the SS and therefore had to be exterminated. He said that if they had
been permitted to carry on with their activities, the illegal camp
management would have been wiped out and the criminal inmates in the
camp would have gained the upper hand. Hoven’s attempt at justification
for the killing of inmates of concentration camps is, of course, no
defense. It may well be true that Hoven sympathized and even
collaborated with the illegal camp management. It may also be true that
some of his victims may have been killed by him on the basis of
suggestions put forward by this illegal camp management. But it goes
without saying that these political prisoners, who instigated the murder
of their opponents, were in no position to judge whether it was really
necessary to kill them for the sake of the camp community. They only
judged this emergency from their own point of view, i.e., from the point
of view of the benefit of themselves. Hoven himself had no judgment at
all in this respect and simply made himself the willing and bought tool
of a small clique in the camp, who undoubtedly often tried to eliminate
not only persons whose activities were considered detrimental to the
well-being of their fellow inmates, but also personal opponents and
enemies. That Hoven was corrupted by the inmates and paid for his
murders is proved by the testimony of several witnesses.
Kogon testified:
“I can only conclude that both motives, the political motive and
the motive of corruption, were active in the case of Dr. Hoven.
_If Dr. Hoven expressed any desire—and he expressed many
desires—then these wishes were always filled._” (_Tr. p.
1213._)
“_He himself expressed many wishes constantly and all possible
advantages were given him by such people whom he had saved._”
(_Tr. p. 1214._)
Kirchheimer testified to the same effect. (_Tr. p. 1346._) The defense
witness Pieck painted pictures for Hoven and his family, and the defense
witness Horn in his affidavit stated that Hoven was very corrupt. The
prisoners knew it and they corrupted him in every possible manner and
made him gifts of furniture, underwear, and food. There were periods in
which complete workshops were erected for Hoven in which thirty or more
inmates were working.
Pieter Schalker testified before the Dutch Bureau for the Investigation
of War Crimes in Amsterdam that Hoven played an exceptionally evil role
and had innumerable deaths on his conscience owing to completely
inadequate medical attention. In later years, when it became obvious
that Germany would be defeated, he changed his attitude towards the
inmates. (_NO-1063, Pros. Ex. 328._) When Schalker was interrogated by
the commissioner of the Tribunal on the motion of defense counsel, he
amplified his statement by saying that Hoven stole the food which was
furnished for the experimental subjects in Block 46 and also obtained
other items such as shoes, toys, and women’s clothing.
The testimony of the affiant Ackermann, who was an inmate in the
pathological department under Hoven, proves that Hoven participated in
the customary brutal crimes in concentration camps. He said—
“Dr. Hoven stood once together with me at the window of the
pathological section and pointed to a prisoner, not known to me,
who crossed the place where the roll calls were held. Dr. Hoven
said to me: ‘I want to see the skull of this prisoner on my
writing desk by tomorrow evening.’ The prisoner was ordered to
report to the medical section, after the physician had noted
down the number of the prisoner. The corpse was delivered on the
same day to the dissection room. The postmortem examination
showed that the prisoner had been killed by injections. The
skull was prepared as ordered and delivered to Dr. Hoven.”
(_NO-2631, Pros. Ex. 522._)
Hoven also approved the beating of concentration camp inmates.
(_NO-2313, Pros. Ex. 523_; _NO-2312, Pros. Ex. 524._) One of these
inmates died.
On 20 August 1942, Hoven suggested to the camp commander of Buchenwald
that the reporting of deaths of Russian political prisoners be
discontinued in order to save paper. He said—
“It is requested that the question should be examined whether it
is necessary to issue reports of the death of political
Russians. According to a direction issued last week, an issue of
only one form was required. This may effect a saving of paper,
but as political Russians are for the greatest number among the
dead prisoners at the present time, more time and paper could be
saved if these death reports were dropped. Notifications of
death could be made as before, as for the Russian prisoners of
war.” (_NO-2148, Pros. Ex. 570._)
The proof has shown that beside the sixty inmates who were admittedly
killed by him, Hoven participated in the killing of many other inmates
of the Buchenwald concentration camp who suffered from malnutrition and
exhaustion. He selected the victims for the transports who were later
killed in the Bernburg Euthanasia Station. His defense that all his
activities were done only for the benefit of the political inmates in
the concentration camp is clearly ridiculous and without foundation.
It is interesting to note that Hoven’s defense that he killed for
idealistic motives is the same he used in the proceedings against him in
1944, only then his alleged idealistic motive was “to prevent a scandal
in the interest of the SS and the Wehrmacht.” (_NO-2380, Pros. Ex. 527_;
see also, _NO-2366, Pros. Ex. 526_.)
* * * * *
_EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING STATEMENT OF THE
PROSECUTION_[1]
* * * * *
In Sievers we have an unresisting member of a so-called resistance
movement. He asks the Tribunal to free him from guilt for his bloody
crimes on the ground that he was really working as an anti-Nazi
resistance agent. Nor was he a latecomer to the resistance movement;
according to him, he has been resisting since 1933. Yet in those 14
years, yes to this very day, he has not performed one overt act against
the men who ran the system he now professes to have always detested. He
joined the Nazi Party as early as 1929 and the SS in 1935. He stayed
with Himmler’s gang until the last days of the collapse. He came to
Nuernberg in 1946, not to give evidence of the horrible crimes of which
he had first-hand knowledge, but to testify in defense of the SS. During
his testimony before the International Military Tribunal, he
consistently denied any knowledge of, or connection with, crimes
committed by the Ahnenerbe of the SS. It was left to the
cross-examination of Mr. Elwyn Jones to prove him the murderer and
perjurer that he is. Nor did he show any signs of resistance in this
trial except to the manifold crimes with which he is charged. Not one
new fact did he reveal to this Tribunal, although specifically asked to
tell all he knew. If asked today, he will assure one and all that there
is not a guilty man in the dock, and least of all himself. But, for
purposes of argument, let us concede the truth of his many lies. It does
not harm our case. It is not the law that a resistance worker can commit
no crime and, least of all, against the people he is supposed to be
protecting. It is not the law that an undercover agent, even an FBI
agent, can join a gang of murderers, lay the plans with them, execute
the killings, share the loot, and go his merry way. Many are the
policemen who have been convicted for taking part in crimes they were
entrusted to prevent. No, the sad thing is that this collector of living
Jews for transformation into skeletons has only one life with which to
pay for his many crimes.
* * * * *
c. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense
_EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT
GEBHARDT_[2]
* * * * *
_The State Emergency and War Emergency as Legal Excuse_
The evidence proved furthermore that the experiments to test the
effectiveness of sulfanilamide were necessary to clarify a question
which was not only of decisive importance for the individual soldier and
the troops at the front but above and beyond this care for the
individual, it was of vital importance for the fighting power of the
army, and thus for the whole fighting nation. All efforts to clarify
this question by studying the effect of casual wounds failed. Although
drugs of the sulfanilamide series—the number of which amounts to
approximately 3,000—had been tested for more than 10 years, it was
impossible to form an even approximately correct idea of the most
valuable remedies. It was impossible to clarify this question in
peacetime by the observation of many thousands of people with casual
wounds and by circularized inquiries. Nor could a clear answer be found
to this question of vital importance to many hundreds of thousands of
soldiers by observation of the wounded in field hospitals during the
war. In this argumentation it is impossible and also unnecessary to
examine details of the problem of wound infection and its control in
modern warfare. I may assume that the importance of this question is
known to the Tribunal and needs no further proof since this question not
only played a part in the German Army but was a matter of special
research and measures in the armies all over the world.
In 1942 the conditions in the German Army and in the Medical Services of
the Wehrmacht became intensified only insofar as with the beginning of
the campaign against the Soviet Union new difficulties presented
themselves in this sphere, too. In the campaigns against Poland and
France it had been possible to master the wound infections by the usual
surgical means, but the difficulties in the war against the USSR
increased beyond all measures. It is unnecessary to examine the reasons
for this more closely here. It is clear that they resulted from the
great distances and poor traffic conditions, but they were also caused
by climatic conditions prevailing there.
The fighting power of the German Army was so affected by the heavy
casualties that it was impossible to allocate a correspondingly large
number of experienced surgeons to the main dressing stations in order to
control bacterial wound infection with surgical measures.
During the presentation of evidence the difficult situation in which the
German armies found themselves in the winter of 1941-42 on the Moscow
front and in the south around Rostov was repeatedly stressed. Here it
was demonstrated clearly that the German Wehrmacht, and with it the
German people, were involved in a life and death struggle.
The leaders of the German Wehrmacht would have neglected their duty if
confronted with these facts, had they not attempted to solve, at any
price, the problem as to which chemical preparations were capable of
preventing bacterial wound infection and, above all, gas gangrene, and
also whether effective means could be found at all. Whatever the answer
to this question was, it had to be found as soon as possible in order to
avert an imminent danger and to throw light on a question which was
important to the individual wounded soldier as well as to the striking
power of the whole army. After the failure of all attempts to solve the
problem through clinical observation of incidental wounds and other
methods, and, in view of the particularly difficult situation and
especially of the time factor, there was nothing left but to decide the
question through an experiment on human beings. The responsible leaders
of the German Wehrmacht did not hesitate to draw the conclusions
resulting from this situation, and the head of the German Reich, who was
at the same time Commander in Chief of the German Wehrmacht, gave orders
for a final solution of this problem by way of large scale
experimentation.
Let us examine the legal conclusions to be drawn from this situation as
it existed in 1942 for the German Wehrmacht and therefore for the German
state—in particular regarding the assumption of an existing national
emergency.
The problem of emergency and the specific case of self-defense has been
regulated in almost all criminal codes in a way applicable only to
individual cases. The individual is granted impunity under certain
conditions when “acting in an individual emergency arising for himself
or others”. The administration of justice and legal literature, however,
recognize that even the commonwealth, the “state,” can find itself in an
emergency, and that acts which are meant to and actually do contribute
to overcome this emergency may be exempt from punishment.
1. First of all, the question has been raised whether the conception of
self-defense, conceived to cover individual cases, can be extended to
include a state self-defense, meaning a self-defense for the benefit of
the state and the commonwealth. The answer to this question was a
unanimous affirmative.
2. The same reasoning, however, as applied to self-defense is also
applicable to the conception of an emergency, as embodied, for example,
in Section 54 of the German Penal Code and in almost all modern systems
of penal law. These provisions, too, were originally conceived to cover
individual cases. But, using them as a starting point, legal literature
and the administration of justice arrive at a recognition in principle
of a national emergency with a corresponding effect. With regard to the
definition of the concept of an emergency generally given in the penal
laws, the application of these provisions to the state, while justified
in itself, can only be effected in principle.
When the idea of an emergency is applied to the state and when the
individual is authorized to commit acts for the purpose of eliminating
such a national emergency, here, as in the case of the ordinary
emergency determined by individual conditions, the objective values must
be estimated. The necessary consequences of conceding such actions on
the part of the individual must be that not only is he absolved from
guilt, but moreover his acts are “justified”. In other words, the
so-called national emergency, even though it is recognized only as an
analogous application of the ordinary concept of emergency in criminal
law, is a legal excuse. But what does “application” in principle to the
cases of national emergency mean? Whether a national emergency is
“unprovoked” or not, whether, for example, the war waged is a “war of
aggression” can obviously be of no importance in this connection. The
existence of the emergency only is decisive. The vital interests of the
commonwealth and the state are substituted for the limitation of
individual interests. Summarizing, we can define the so-called national
emergency as an emergency involving the vital interests of the state and
the general public which cannot be eliminated in any other way. As far
as such emergency authorizes action, not only may a legal excuse be
assumed but a true ground for justification exists.
I shall examine later how far an erroneously assumed national emergency,
a so-called putative emergency, is possible and is to be considered as a
legal excuse. What consequences arise from this legal position in the
case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt?
1. As proved by the evidence the general situation in the various
theaters of war in the year 1942 was such that it brought about an
“actual”, that is, an immediately imminent danger to the vital interests
of the state as the belligerent power and to the individuals affected by
the war. The conditions on the eastern front in the winter of 1941-42 as
they have been repeatedly described during the submission of evidence
created a situation which endangered the existence of the state, through
the danger of wound infection and the threat to the survival of the
wounded and the fighting strength of the troops arising therefrom.
It must be added that the past World War was fought not only with man
and material but also with propaganda. In this connection I refer to the
statements of the defendant Gebhardt in the witness stand as far as they
concern information given to him by the Chief of Office V of the Reich
Security Main Office, SS Gruppenfuehrer Nebe. This information shows
that at that particular time the enemy tried to undermine the fighting
spirit of the German troops with pamphlets describing the organization
and material of the German Wehrmacht Medical Service as backward, while
on the other hand praising certain remedies of the Allied Forces, for
instance penicillin, as “secret miracle weapons”.
2. The assumption of a state of national emergency presupposes that the
action forming the subject of the indictment was taken in order to
remove the danger. By this is meant the objective purpose of the action,
not just the subjective purpose of the individual committing the action.
The question, therefore, is whether the sulfanilamide experiments were
an objectively adequate means of averting the danger. This, however,
does not mean that the preparations really were an adequate means of
expertly combatting the danger. According to the evidence there can be
no doubt that these assumptions really did exist.
3. Finally, there must not be “any different way” of eliminating the
national emergency. One must not misunderstand this requirement. Not
every different way, which could be pursued only by corresponding
violations, excludes an appeal to national emergency. The requirement
mentioned does not mean that the way of salvation pursued must
necessarily be the only one possible. Of course, if the different
possibilities of salvation constitute evils of different degrees, the
lesser one is to be chosen. It must also be assumed that a certain
proportion should be kept between the violation and the evil inherent in
the danger. In view of the fact, however, that in the present case many
tens of thousands of wounded persons were in danger of death, this
viewpoint does not present any difficulty here.
According to the evidence there can be no doubt that a better way could
not have been chosen. On the contrary, it has been shown that in
peacetime as well as in wartime everything was tried without success to
clarify the problem of the efficacy of sulfanilamides. And the fact,
too, that prisoners were chosen as experimental subjects who had been
sentenced to death and were destined for execution, and to whom the
prospect of pardon was held out and actually granted cannot be judged in
a negative sense. This fact cannot be used as an argument when examining
the legal viewpoint, because participation in these experiments meant
the only chance for the prisoners to escape imminent execution. In this
connection I refer to the explanations I have already given in
connection with the so-called probable consent.
_Excuse_
In addition to the general national emergency discussed, the literature
of international law recognizes also a special war emergency. According
to this, “in a state of self-defense and emergency, even such actions
are permitted which violate the laws of warfare and therefore
international law.” But in the sense of international law the “military
necessity of war” which by itself never justifies the violation of the
laws of warfare differs from self-defense and emergency. Emergency and
necessity of war, however, are different concepts. The emergency due to
which the self-preservation and the self-development of the threatened
nation are at stake justifies, according to general principles
recognized by the national laws of all civilized countries, the
violation of every international standard and thus also of the legal
principles of the laws of warfare. When applying the concepts of
self-defense and emergency as recognized by criminal and international
law, the illegality of violations committed is excluded if the nation
found itself in a situation which could not be relieved by any other
means.
In this connection the following must be pointed out:
I have already explained that the experimental subjects, on whom
the sulfanilamide experiments forming the subject of this case
were performed, came under German jurisdiction, even if one
holds the opinion that Poland’s case was not one of genuine
“debellatio” but only of “ocupatio bellica”.[3] However,
whatever opinion one might hold with regard to this question,
there can be no doubt that assuming an emergency according to
international law, the performance of the experiments would have
been justified even if at the time the experimental subjects had
still been citizens of an enemy nation. Decisive for the
regulation of the conditions of such persons according to
international law are the “Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land” annexed to the Hague Convention, dated
18 October 1907. According to the above statements, however,
even a violation of such special conventions, as contained for
instance in the special prohibitions of Article 23, is justified
during a genuine war emergency. The fact that the special
conditions characterizing a real war emergency are existent
invalidates the objection that citizens of another country
should not have been used for the experiments.
_The Evaluation of Conflicting Rights and_
_Interests as Legal Excuse_
According to well-considered opinions, we must start from the premise
that the defendants, both in principle and in procedure, are to be tried
according to German criminal law. They lived under it during the period
in question and were subject thereto. For this reason I wish to approach
one more viewpoint which should be considered independently, and in
addition to the legal excuses already mentioned, when judging the
conduct of the defendants.
For many years the legal provisions for emergency cases have proved
inadequate. For a long time an endeavor was made to fill the gaps with
theoretical explanations of a general nature, and finally the Reich
Supreme Court handed down basic decisions expressly recognizing an
“extra legal emergency”. The considerations on which they were based are
known as the “objective principle of the evaluation of conflicting
rights and interests.” In the legal administration of the Reich Supreme
Court and in further discussions this principle, to be sure, is combined
with subjective considerations of courses of action taken by the
perpetrator in the line of duty. Therefore it is necessary to discuss
both considerations, that of evaluating conflicting rights and interests
and that of compulsion by duty together, even if we must and shall keep
them distinctly separated for the time being.
The consideration of an evaluation of conflicting rights and interests
as legal excuse is generally formulated as follows:
“Whoever violates or jeopardizes a legally protected right or
interest of lesser value in order to save thereby a legally
protected right or interest of greater value does not act in
violation of the law.”
The lesser value must yield to the greater one. The act, when regarded
from this point of view, is justified, its unlawfulness—and not merely
the guilt or the perpetrator—is cancelled out.
This so-called principle of evaluating conflicting rights and interests
is first of all a formal principle which establishes the precedence of
the more valuable right or interest as such. This formal evaluation
principle requires on its part a further material evaluation of the
rights or interests comparatively considered. This evaluation again
requires the adoption of the law and its purport to the general attitude
of a civilization and, finally, to the conception of law itself.
Let us examine the conclusions to be drawn from this legal situation in
our case: Agreement and so-called likely agreement, just as well as a
national emergency and a war emergency, constitute special legal
justifications, the recognition of which allows us to dispense with a
recourse to the general principle of evaluating conflicting rights and
interests. The latter retains its subsidiary importance. Furthermore,
those two special legal justifications refer in their purport to a fair
and equitable way of thinking as well as to the proportional importance
of various types of evils; thus they themselves include the conception
of evaluating conflicting rights and values. For this reason, among
others, the following must be explained in detail at this point:
A national emergency and a war emergency were unmistakably in existence
in 1942. Every day the lives of thousands of wounded were endangered
unless the threatening wound infection could be checked by the
application of proper remedies and the elimination of inadequate
remedies. The danger was “actual”. Immediate help had to be provided.
The “public interest” demanded the experimental clarification of this
question. The evidence has shown that the question could not be
clarified by experiments on animals or by the observation of incidental
wounds.
The last word on this question, however, is not said merely by reference
to the public interest. Opposed to the public interest are the
individual interests. The saying “necessity knows no law” cannot claim
unlimited validity. But just as little can the infringement on
individual interests in order to save others be considered as “contrary
to good morals”. The evidence has shown that the members of the
resistance movement of Camp Ravensbrueck who were condemned to death
could only escape imminent execution if they submitted to the
experiments which form the subject of this indictment. There is no need
to examine here and now whether the experimental subjects did give their
consent or whether they presumably would have consented, if, from their
personal point of view and in the full knowledge of the situation, they
could have made a decision within the meaning of an objective judicial
opinion based on probability. What really matters is the question of
whether after a just and fair evaluation of the interests of the general
public and the real interests of the experimental subjects, the
defendant could conclude that, all circumstances considered, the
execution of the experiments was justifiable. Without doubt this
question can be answered in the affirmative. Quite apart from the
interest of the state in the execution of the experiments, participation
in the experiments was in the real and well-considered interest of the
experimental subjects themselves, since this participation offered the
only possibility of saving their lives through an act of mercy.
* * * * *
_The Defendant’s Erroneous Assumption of an Emergency_
(_Putative Emergency_)
I have already mentioned the circumstances which justify the assumption
of a national emergency and a war emergency caused by the special
conditions prevailing in 1942. If these conditions actually prevailed,
the illegality of the act and not only the guilt of the perpetrator
would be excluded for reasons previously enumerated. If the defendant
had erroneously assumed circumstances which if they really had existed
would have justified a national emergency and a war emergency, then,
according to the general principles already mentioned, the intent of the
defendant and thus his guilt would also be eliminated in this respect.
The evidence, especially the defendant’s own statements on the witness
stand, leaves no doubt that, when the experiments began in 1942, he had
assumed the existence of such circumstances which were indeed the
starting point and motive for ordering and carrying out these
experiments.
* * * * *
_EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT
SIEVERS_[4]
* * * * *
May I remind you of the exciting part of my case in chief which dealt
with Sievers’ participation in the resistance against the National
Socialist government and administration. By putting forward his activity
in a resistance movement, the defendant Sievers does not endeavor to
obtain a mitigation of an eventual condemnation. In my opinion, this
activity must under all circumstances result in his acquittal, even
though, contrary to expectation the High Tribunal should tend towards
the opinion that Sievers had participated in the accused crimes.
In the first place it is my intention to discuss a series of legal
questions that have at all times been acknowledged in the criminal law
of all civilized nations. It is not by any means the task of the High
Tribunal to apply any special article of law, but, from general legal
and legal-philosophical principles, to lay down a rule finding and
creating a new law to meet a new situation. It need hardly be said that
first and foremost I am supporting my own client. But in your verdict,
you, your Honors, are not judging only this defendant. Beyond this
particular case your verdict has a far more extensive, general, nay,
world-wide importance. For it is the first time that a tribunal of such
importance is to decide upon the actions of a member of a resistance
movement. Consequently, your judgment is a fundamental one and a
signpost for our time for many, many other defendants and accused men in
this connection who have stood before this Tribunal or will be brought
before other courts. Your decision for all time extends to cover
thousands and thousands of men who, at some time, may be put in the
position of opposing some criminal system of government by similar means
as Sievers did. On this our globe there are still autocracies and
totalitarian dictatorships and it requires only little foresight to
realize that other dictatorships may involve other international
entanglements and wars of the most horrible nature. Furthermore, in the
future, mankind will again and again be in sore need of courageous men
who for the sake of their nation and for the welfare of mankind oppose
themselves to such dangerous doings. It is for such champions and for
such groups of champions that your verdict will be a criterion and a
signpost. You are deciding in advance the future possibilities and the
sphere of action of future resistance movements against criminal
governments and their chiefs. You are offered the opportunity of
checking such movements by your verdict. But you are also able to give
them the safety necessary for their dangerous enterprise and the success
of their proceedings. How and where would such helpers be found in
future if, apart from the immediate peril, they have to reckon with the
additional danger of being called to account by the very people for whom
they risked their lives? And therefore, your Honors, with your verdict
in the Sievers case you take upon you a responsibility before the whole
world and for all time to come, a responsibility as is seldom placed
upon a tribunal. But on the other hand you can also say with pride that
with this judgment you render an immeasurable service to the world in
its struggle for peace and justice.
Therefore the reasons for your verdict in the Sievers case are so
immensely important, far more important than the trifling Sievers case
can be in the universal history of all times. I am forced to detail the
particulars of these problems.
It goes without saying that the member of a resistance movement can only
refer to his resistance, if this resistance is lawful. This will not
always be the case; for, political crime and similar actions committed
for political motives are crimes and will remain such. He who removes a
political adversary only to take his position or to open the way for his
partisans acts unlawfully and is liable to punishment. The situation,
however, becomes different if not only a political discussion is
interrupted by murder, but where a tyrant whose government is inscribed
with bloody letters in the annals of mankind is at last felled to the
ground. In this case the perpetrator is supported by an acknowledged
excuse. This excuse is self-defense.
According to the German Penal Code, Article 53, an action is not
punishable if it is committed in self-defense. And self-defense is such
defense as is necessary to ward off from oneself or another person an
imminent unlawful attack.
These principles are, however, not only German legal stipulations. They
are legal values of all nations and all times. To a large extent they
tally with human sentiments and are termed “the great law of defense.”
They are already found in Roman law in the formulation “vim vi expellere
[repellere] licet”—force may be driven out by force—and have been
enthusiastically taken over by English common law and by American law,
as stated by Wharton, “Criminal Law”, paragraph 613. They authorize
every individual to ward off injury from himself or another person with
all necessary means at his command. From this point of view too the
struggle against a criminal government threatening the peace of the
world, preparing aggressive wars, ready without any purpose or need to
plunge the whole world into immeasurable misery from sheer striving for
power, from presumption and conceit; struggle and resistance against
such a government and such guidance are lawful and permissible, no
matter by what means they may be carried on. Since the end of the war
even, the opinion has been maintained more and more that such a struggle
is not only lawful and permissible but is even the duty of every
individual. Is not the collective guilt of the whole German nation
substantiated by the charge that it witnessed the doings of the Nazi
government without interfering at least with a secretly clenched fist in
its pocket? Murder and manslaughter, bodily injury and restriction of
liberty inflicted upon the potentates and responsible men of such a
system are acts of self-defense for the benefit of peace and mankind.
They are lawful and exempt from punishment; they are a duty if there is
no help possible in any other way.
From times immemorial this question concerning the lawfulness and duty
of committing political murder has engaged not only lawyers but also a
large number of poets and philosophers. Friedrich von Schiller justified
the murder committed on Gessler as the last desperate attempt to escape
slavery. Thus the juridical vindication of murdering a criminal tyrant
is paralleled by its high moral estimation.
But it may happen that not only the real assailants come to grief. He
who has to ward off an attack may be forced to implicate a third person
hitherto not involved. This case too is provided for in the German Penal
Code and is termed “necessity”. The regulation of Article 54 runs as
follows: “No punishable act has been committed when the
act—self-defense apart—was committed in an emergency, which could be
met in no other way, to escape a present danger to the life or body of
the perpetrator or a relative of his.”
The legal codes of all nations and all ages have been compelled to face
the problem of the conflict between two legal values which can only be
solved by hurting or even annihilating one of the two. Justice cannot
insist with utter consistency upon the individual respecting foreign
rights and sacrificing his own at all costs and under any circumstances.
A Frenchman says to this question: “Cette théorie est admirable pour des
saints et pour des héros, mais elle n’est point faite pour la vulgaire
humanité”—“This theory is admirable for saints and heroes, but it is
not for common humanity”—[Pradier—Fodéré, vol. I, page 367, Traité du
droit international public européen et américain.] “Quod non est licitum
in lege, necessitas facit licitum”—“What is not permitted by law,
necessity makes permissible”—[says the Roman law], and the French
lawyer Rossi says: “L’acte ne peut être excusable lorsque l’agent cède à
l’instinct de sa propre conservation, lorsqu’il se trouve en présence
d’un peril imminent, lorsqu’il s’agit de la vie.”—“The act can be
excused only when the perpetrator yields to the instinct of
self-preservation, when he finds himself faced with imminent danger,
when life itself is at stake.”—An old German legal proverb runs:
“Necessity knows no law.” Last but not least, American law deals with
this problem under the name “necessity” (_Wharton, “Criminal Law,” par.
642_), a literal translation of the German expression “Not”. So by
virtue of necessity a shipwrecked sailor may push his fellow-sufferer
from the board which is too small to save both of them. If applied to
resistance movements against criminal governments, these principles mean
that third persons hitherto unconcerned may also be involved, if there
is no other alternative, if “Not”, “necessitas”, “necessity” requires it
peremptorily and unavoidably.
You, your Honors, are called upon to bring the principles of
“self-defense” and of “necessity”, “this great law of defense” to their
common denominator, to apply them to the Sievers case and thus insert
them into the unwritten rules of the international relations of public
and political law. The Anglo-Saxon legal way of thinking and the
principles of natural law will give you valuable support in forming the
verdict.
Now I can turn to the specific case of Sievers.
In order to judge his actions the following questions are of a decisive
importance: Was there a German resistance movement at all? Did the
Hielscher group belong to this resistance movement? Was this group to be
taken seriously and what were its aims? Was Sievers a member of this
group and what were his tasks? What was his attitude in performing these
tasks? Were there also other possibilities for him? It has frequently
been maintained that there was no German resistance movement. But _the
German resistance existed_.
I must, however, confess that the question “Where was this resistance?”
readily suggests itself to such people as are not acquainted with the
internal conditions of Germany, above all during the war. I must also
grant the fact that scarcely more than Stauffenberg’s plot with its
staggering consequences came before the public.
He who puts such a question completely misjudges the conditions under
which the whole resistance movement had to work against the Nazi
Government. He forgets that up to the fatal date of 20 July 1944, he had
also no idea of the group round Stauffenberg. I am therefore all the
more forced to give a concise exposition of the situation which in the
Third Reich everybody opposing the Nazi Government had to face.
From the very beginning it was the aim of the authoritarian government
to get hold of every German man, every German woman, all children, and
old men in order to bring them up in the spirit of the new method of
government. The totalitarian striving for power did not stop short at
personal freedom. It removed professional and economic organizations,
cultural and social institutions, some of which were reestablished in
another form, subject to the control of the Nazi Government.
It was against this state of things that the struggle set in from the
very beginning. Nothing would be more wrong than to believe that this
struggle could be waged in the open street with large quantities of
propaganda material, display of physical force, with fire arms, bombs,
war, and rumors of war. Even in the trade unions, the most consistent
and resolute adversaries of the new government in 1933, such a method
was not possible. This government kept a tight rein over the whole
public apparatus controlling in an increasing degree the private spheres
through the organizations of the SD, Gestapo, etc. The ambiguous
stipulations of the law against malicious acts or insults to the state
and party (Heimtueckegesetz) made possible the imprisonment of people
even for accidental deprecatory remarks. Political discrimination and
the constant danger of being sent to a concentration camp were the
effects of many innocent remarks. No newspaper could have been found to
agitate against the oppressors. But if handbills were secretly
distributed the contents of which defamed the Nazi government, the whole
apparatus of the police, Gestapo, SD, etc., was set in motion. The
possession of weapons was considered circumstantial evidence of
treasonable enterprises and meant capital punishment for the imprudent.
It must be added that there was a widely extended spy system sticking to
everybody’s heels. One had even to guard oneself against one’s nearest
relations and children.
These few words concerning the internal situation of Germany were
necessary as an answer to the absurd question put in Stockholm to the
witness Hielscher: “Why did you not speak in the open market place
[publicly]?” (_Tr. p. 5935._)
The most obvious kind of opposition was offered by the two great
Christian churches. How much and how often were the antichrist and his
false prophets not preached against, how many clergymen of all
confessions were sent to prisons, penitentiaries, concentration camps,
nay, to death? It is true, the churches could venture forth more openly
than other people. For they did not intend to participate in a
_forcible_ removal of the system, in the killing of its leaders and
representatives, in the fight with arms. But the nonecclesiastical
resistance groups had realized that the Nazi dictatorship could not be
overthrown without violence; they were not subject to the
political-philosophical impediments and restrictions of the churches,
they could not throw off the mask until the day of action had dawned. Up
to that time they were condemned to be silent, they had to camouflage,
acting on the old principle of all conspirators: “Never speak of your
aim, but always think of it!” If they had forgotten this principle,
sooner or later unquestioningly they would have been betrayed by a spy
and liquidated by the Gestapo. They would never have got as far as
action. Did not the group round Stauffenberg act in this way too? Who
knew of its existence before the bomb burst in Hitler’s headquarters on
20 July 1944? The same was the case with all the other resistance groups
which unfortunately no longer had the possibility of acting and some of
which were traced and secretly killed in spite of this.
The fact that all of them existed is proved, however, by the small
number of publications: the pamphlets of Emil Henk, of Franklin L. Ford
and other authors, and Neuhaeusler’s book, “Cross and Swastika”.
But downright classical witnesses are the numerous bloody victims whom
the People’s Court of Justice [Volksgerichtshof] and the Gestapo had
sent to the concentration camps and to death.
One of these groups was the group around Hielscher, a member of which
was the defendant Sievers.
_There was a Hielscher group, it existed, it acted._ Hielscher himself
is an unimpeachable witness of this. In connection with 20 July 1944, he
was imprisoned for three months and was to be hanged. Hielscher’s
illegal activity is sworn to by many other no less trustworthy
witnesses. As the first of them I mention the political emigrant Dr.
Borkenau, who had been working against National Socialism at least since
1928. He had known Hielscher since 1928. He speaks of his hostility to
National Socialism, of a “sharp attitude”. At that time he frequently
negotiated and conspired with Hielscher, who set forth the methods of
his fight. During his emigration, Dr. Borkenau watched Hielscher’s
activity from abroad and again and again he heard: “Hielscher keeps on
fighting”. If we are told so by an emigrant, we may well believe it.
Another witness who never lost connection with Hielscher was Dr. Topf,
who himself was an active member of the resistance movement. He too
described Hielscher as a violent antagonist of National Socialism,
working and struggling unswervingly. I refer to the many affidavits
which I presented in this connection.
It does not speak against Hielscher’s oppositional activity that he did
not stand out more in public. For him too, camouflaging up to the moment
of decision was an imperative requirement, and Dr. Borkenau calls it a
downright masterpiece that he so eminently succeeded in doing so.
_Sievers was a member of the Hielscher group_
There cannot be the least doubt of this fact. Apart from all the
testimony, the whole personality of my client excluded any Nazi
attitude. His nature and his development necessarily made him a decisive
adversary of Hitler’s system of oppression, terror, and murder. Both his
origin and the interests of his youth brought him into contact with
people who kept aloof as much as possible from the Nazi way of thinking.
He was the son of a director of ecclesiastical music; he pursued
historical and religious studies. His nature led him to the Boy Scouts,
in short to such interests as National Socialism calumniated with all
its powers of ridicule and combated violently with stubborn dislike. All
those persons who either testified or in affidavits gave evidence about
his character describe him as follows: an upright man with lofty ideals
of deeply rooted humanity and a strong sense of law and justice. If you
combine this picture of Sievers painted by notorious anti-Fascists with
all the authenticated aid that Sievers bestowed on victims of Nazism, it
is only a small step to the conviction that Sievers was also a member of
a resistance movement.
Perhaps the prosecution may say: “I do not believe all these stories,
for both Hielscher and Sievers did not achieve anything.”
That would wrong Sievers to a high degree, your Honors! Other resistance
groups too had the misfortune that they had not more opportunity to act.
The witness Hielscher exposed very clearly the reasons why a standstill
was inevitable after the failure of the plot on 20 July 1944. As
Hielscher and his associates could no longer depend upon the army, they
were compelled to start again from the very beginning.
What were the intentions and the mission of the defendant Sievers within
the Hielscher group? Hielscher himself answers that. Sievers’ tasks were
of two kinds: (1) Gathering news from the immediate proximity of Himmler
as basis for the disposal of the resistance forces with regard to place,
time, and kind of action. (2) Sievers was not only a spy and a scout; at
the moment of action he was destined and ready to do away with Himmler.
These two tasks require a double legal examination: Were they in
themselves permissible, lawful, or even a duty? The answer to this
question is to be found in the principles which I evolved in the idea of
self-defense in the sphere of political struggle. What measures was he
allowed to take? To what extent could he venture to advance into the
domain of criminality? To what extent could he involve uninitiated third
persons in his plans, even actual victims of Nazism? The rules of
“necessity” lead the way for judging and solving this problem.
In taking up the first question I can be relatively brief. After all we
know today, it is an irrefutable fact that Hitler and his accomplices
terrorized the German Nation and the whole world in a criminal way and
with criminal means, that from the beginning they were an immediate
peril to peace and all civilization and that finally the worst
apprehensions turned to ghastly reality. Therefore the first
prerequisite for the defense of “necessity” is beyond all doubt a
present illegal attack on the highest goods of mankind. To put it in the
words of the German Penal Code that was the “necessity” (“not”) which
was to be warded off.
But we also know that this defense was not to be accomplished with the
normal means of a democratic parliamentary system. I described the truly
diabolical organization by which it had been rendered impossible to make
use of these means. Thence follows that the removal of Hitler and his
accomplices was the only possible expedient to break and smash this
system. Less hard and violent means were not available.
As a matter of course it follows that Hielscher’s plan to do away with
Himmler had become legal and compulsory for those in the position to
execute it. After the evidence of Hielscher and other trustworthy
witnesses, it cannot be denied that Sievers had been charged with this
task.
If it was justified to do away with Himmler, the accompanying and
preparing scouting-activity was justified too.
Before answering the question to what extent Sievers could involve third
persons, I have to sketch in a few lines the tactics of Hielscher and
the position of Sievers.
It was not in vain that Hielscher himself gave full particulars on this
question. We also heard other witnesses, Dr. Borkenau, Dr. Topf. Sievers
clearly outlined his tasks. All this evidence is in such unanimous
agreement that no doubt of its truth could arise.
Hielscher was one of the first and few people who realized that the way
to take measures against the system could be only from within the ranks
of the party itself. He had gained the firm conviction that a prospect
of success could be seen only by doing away with the heads of the Nazi
Government and assuming the government from the top and that nothing,
nothing at all, was to be anticipated from a revolution of the people
from below. A revolution of such a kind would have been of no avail, as
it would very quickly have been stifled in torrents of blood.
The knowledge of these facts required four groups of measures to be
taken, the particulars of which Hielscher detailed on 15 April:
Preparation of the undertaking by a well-camouflaged
organization of trusted men and spies within the ranks of the
NSDAP, i.e., the Trojan Horse policy.
Placing suitable courageous men in positions as near as possible
to leading personages of Nazism, the most dangerous of whom was
Himmler.
Doing away with Himmler and other leaders of the Nazi Government
upon a given cue.
Taking over the government by an organization prepared in
advance.
In spite of all liberty of action granted to the “activists” of his
group, Hielscher had realized that success could only be expected if
everybody, in strict discipline, obeyed his orders only. This was the
only way for him to hold the reins and to give the cue at the right
moment. Here I must emphasize that within the scope of this
indispensable discipline, Sievers in all details acted in complete
unison with Hielscher, that in all important moments he described the
real state of affairs and asked for his instructions. In this way
Hielscher obtained ample information of everything enacted around
Sievers and of what Sievers did himself. Sievers was nothing but the
tool in the hands of the leader of the movement. Therefore, your Honors,
your verdict affects Sievers’ commissioner, Hielscher, in just the same
way as Sievers himself. Hielscher is condemned together with Sievers, as
he is acquitted with Sievers. With the same courage of responsibility
with which he placed Sievers and other accomplices in most dangerous
positions, Hielscher could declare at the end of his evidence that he
not only took but also _claimed_ the whole responsibility for all the
deeds with which his follower Sievers would be charged as a result in
this trial.
Hielscher sketches the task of Sievers as follows: In the belly of the
Trojan horse, i.e., under the color of eager and enthusiastic
cooperation his duty would be (_a_) to scout and to spy, (_b_) profiting
by his influence, to place other persons in similar positions for the
same purposes, or in places where they would be given the possibility of
working undisturbed, (_c_) to back endangered members of the resistance
movement and if possible to rescue them, and finally (_d_) to do away
with Himmler at the moment of action.
This last item was the essential point of the task of my client. All the
other tasks were inferior to this aim and assignment, they only served
to prepare and support it. It is from this point of view that his whole
conduct must be understood and all his acts judged.
What did Sievers achieve in the sphere of this task?
I cannot reiterate all the details that I set forth in the first part of
my plea. I came to the conclusion that Sievers did not make himself
guilty of complicity or assistance in the facts charged in the
indictment. If, however, you suppose with the prosecution that Sievers
is to be found guilty of some of the counts of the indictment, it is my
task to justify this conduct before the forum of a concept of justice
transcending codified law, and to expound it to the Tribunal.
How did it come about that in 1942 Sievers remained in his position when
the Ahnenerbe came into contact with medical experiments which possibly
might assume a criminal character? We must not forget that Sievers was
assigned the removal of Himmler and that in the Hielscher group he was
the only person who could have been entrusted with such a task. Properly
speaking, in Hielscher’s group he had the key position; the success or
failure of the whole enterprise depended on him alone. For Himmler was
the most dangerous personality in the Nazi system, because in his
quality of Chief of the Police and Commander of the Reserve Army all the
internal political armed forces were concentrated in his hand.
Consequently he had the power of nipping in the bud every rebellion.
Himmler was able to rule without Hitler, whereas Hitler could not rule
without Himmler. The latter was to be done away with first. Should
Himmler be overlooked or should he somehow succeed in escaping, the
whole enterprise would be endangered. Himmler’s importance is therefore
the measure of the importance of Sievers, who had to be ready for the
decisive blow in Himmler’s immediate proximity. To ask if this post
could be abandoned is to answer it in the negative.
As Sievers was fully conscious of the importance of such a decision, he
became involved in the greatest internal conflict of his life. Of two
evils, the worse had to be avoided and the smaller to be endured, or
both of them to be shunned.
To do the latter would certainly have been the most convenient solution.
That Sievers got into this conflict amply demonstrates his consciousness
of responsibility, his love of justice and humanity. As to the struggle
with his soul, he certainly did not succeed in getting the better of
himself. Too many questions depended on his decision, not only for
himself but above all for the resistance movement as a whole. We must
try to look into the soul of a man, who, on the one hand, was exposed to
the pressure of an enormous aversion to the approaching threatening
events and, on the other hand, knew only too well that in his position
he could no longer fulfill his task if he obeyed his personal impulses.
Perhaps it would have been possible for Sievers to leave his office
without creating a great sensation and without considerable disadvantage
for himself. Could he not have retired to cooperate in some innocuous
scientific research? But in doing so Sievers would have been a runaway,
a deserter. In his agony of soul, Sievers applied to Hielscher who after
mature consideration and deliberation came to the decision: _Sievers
will stay!_
For the post in Himmler’s proximity could not be renounced. If Sievers
abandoned it, Hielscher would be under the necessity of entrusting him
with another position near Himmler or of replacing him by another member
of the movement with the same task. Was this possible? Would he,
remaining near Himmler, have not time and again come into the same
dilemma? Was it possible to wait and see? Could it be expected that
another man would be more successful? Would not Sievers, in spite of all
circumspection, have raised suspicion in substantiating his withdrawal?
For to do so openly and with protest would have been downright madness.
Imagine only the danger he would have conjured up for himself and his
associates! What could his withdrawal have availed? One more question:
if Sievers’ withdrawal could have prevented the human experiments at
all, that would have been only a partial success. For as to the aim in
its totality, the removal of Himmler and the Nazi Government, nothing
would have been gained but a further delay of the decision or the
impossibility of achieving it because of the loss of the key position.
As still more victims of the Nazi Government would have been the result,
a partial success had to be sacrificed in favor of the great aim.
If you try to answer these questions there cannot be the least doubt
that the decision Hielscher arrived at was the only possibility.
That brings me to the last, to the most important point of my defense,
to the question:
“How was Sievers to act in his position?”
Without any doubt, he was compelled to make certain concessions. He was
forced to camouflage, i.e., to accommodate himself outwardly to his
surroundings which he was going to spy on and to remove. Every spy has
to camouflage and I do not betray a secret in mentioning that in wartime
many a man donned the uniform of the enemy. It is generally known that
in 1942 the French General Giraud performed his escape from German
captivity in the uniform of a German general.
When Sievers was a member of the party from 1929 to 1931, when later on
he joined the NSDAP and the SS again, when he filled higher positions in
these organizations, when he held the position of Reich Manager of the
Ahnenerbe and suffered himself to be promoted to a higher rank in the
SS, without any doubt at all that was part of the camouflage measures
which Hielscher, Dr. Borkenau, Dr. Topf, and other witnesses call the
indispensable prerequisite, the compulsory mask for the tasks of the
defendant Sievers.
Nobody will pretend that these camouflages which were to render possible
a legally approved, nay, desirable aim, are in themselves punishable and
illegal. Sievers’ outward membership in the SS is therefore excused by
its camouflage purpose. And it is equally unobjectionable that
occasionally he played the part of a good Nazi. The duty of doing so had
expressly been urged upon him by Hielscher. The career of the organizer
or an active member of a German underground movement would have found a
sudden end if he had not behaved like a Nazi.
All the more seriously must I turn to the question of Sievers’ consent
to and further participation in the human experiments and the
establishment of the collection of skeletons, in which third persons
suffered bodily injury.
Here the question is raised where are the bounds of necessity if it
involves actions which in themselves are punishable facts. The answer to
this question is the essential point of the Sievers case.
The legal orders of the world set up the principle: “_The legal values
damaged by the action committed under necessity, must not be of a
disproportionally greater value than the protected and rescued legal
value._” That is the principle of proportion concerning which Wharton
[“Criminal Law”], paragraph 642, says, “Sacrifice of another’s life,
excusable when necessary to save one’s own.”
What were the competing legal values in the Sievers case?
On the one hand, there was the civilization of the world, the peace of
the earth, humanity, the lives and existence of millions of men
threatened and hurt by Hitler’s criminal government. Such actions are
called crimes against peace and humanity by the new international law
which threatens them with the severest punishments. The Allied Nations
considered these legal values worthy of their soldiers enthusiastically
going to war and death for them.
On the other hand, you will find the lives of individuals, their bodily
safety, the respect and esteem of their personality, their liberty and
the free expression of their will, certainly legal values of no less
high value. There may have been hundreds of victims. But it was a meager
number in comparison with the multitudes that Hitler, Himmler, and their
accomplices had already murdered and continued murdering.
My question runs: Which of the two contending legal values is more
valuable from the point of view of proportion?
I am far from excusing the ghastly crimes that happened in the
concentration camps or even minimizing them, but with all my abhorrence
for them I cannot help answering: The protection of civilization and
humanity deserves preference over the life and health of individuals,
deplorable as the inevitable sacrifices may be. So finally it was
necessary, absolutely requisite, to put up with the violation of the
less valuable legal values and to rescue the more precious, the whole.
Sievers’ remaining at his post in the Ahnenerbe was absolutely necessary
for the removal of Himmler.
Of course it would not be difficult to state _post festum_ that Sievers
could have acted differently, that he ought not have advanced thus far.
But up to now nobody has been able to tell us _how_ he should have
acted. Even the public prosecutor did not try to make a concrete
proposal.
* * * * *
_EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT
HOVEN_[5]
* * * * *
In two further parts of my closing brief I dealt with the killings which
Dr. Hoven either undertook himself or which were undertaken with his
knowledge.
In part (b) of the closing brief, I stated that these killings had no
connection with the euthanasia plan.
I further stated that it can be considered proved that Dr. Hoven killed
only two prisoners himself, and that about 50 or 60 prisoners were
killed by order of those responsible for the German and foreign
political prisoners with the knowledge of Dr. Hoven.
I have set forth a legal evaluation of these killings in a further
paragraph under (e) of the closing brief.
The legal arguments as set forth in the closing brief are taken from the
work of the well-known American criminologist Wharton, _Criminal Law_.
The first part of this argument contains, under (e), the literal
quotations from this book.
According to common law, the killing of a man can be either murder,
manslaughter, excusable homicide, or justifiable homicide. Excusable
homicide and justifiable homicide are not punishable.
The present American law does not differentiate between justifiable
homicide and excusable homicide. I refer to my closing brief,
particularly to the statements of Wharton in his book _Criminal Law_,
12th edition, volume I, 1932, pages 826 to 879. According to Wharton,
excuse and justification for a homicide are either repulsion of
felonious assault, or prevention of felony.
The right of self-defense, i.e., repulsion of felonious assault, is
restricted to a narrowly defined number of persons.
On the other hand, everybody is entitled to prevent a crime. I refer to
the details contained in my legal arguments of my closing brief.
Killing a man to prevent a felonious crime requires the following
conditions which are set forth in my closing brief:
(1) The perpetrator must have the bona fide belief that the
commission of a felonious crime is immediately impending. It is
not a condition that such a crime would actually have been
committed. The bona fide belief of the accused is quite
sufficient. In this connection I refer to the legal arguments of
the closing brief.
(2) This belief of the accused must not be negligently adopted.
(3) There must not be any other possibility of preventing a
crime than the killing of a person. In other words—the killing
must be the only means available to prevent the crime.
The prosecution’s assertion in its final plea, “One must not kill five
to save five hundred”, therefore, cannot be considered generally valid
either from the point of view of German or American law.
On the basis of the statements of the prosecution, I have not been able
to see clearly whether that sentence had reference only to the
justification of experiments on human beings or else to the killings
which were carried out by Dr. Hoven or with his knowledge.
The justification of the killings is materially distinguished from that
of the experiments. Those spies, stool-pigeons, and traitors, for whose
killing Dr. Hoven accepted responsibility when in the witness stand, had
planned to commit serious crimes against their fellow prisoners.
Therefore, if the three prerequisites which I mentioned are given, we
are concerned with cases of justifiable or excusable homicide.
In my closing brief, I elaborately explained that these conditions
existed in the case of all the killings for which Dr. Hoven accepted the
responsibility.
The defendant Dr. Hoven had the conviction and good faith that the spies
and traitors, who were killed by him or with his knowledge, were about
to commit serious crimes, resulting in the death of numerous inmates of
the Buchenwald concentration camp. During his examination on the witness
stand, Dr. Hoven gave a thorough description of this.
The decision on these killings was not reached by Dr. Hoven alone. Dr.
Hoven had no cause for that. It was not his life that was endangered by
those spies or traitors. It was, on the contrary, the committee of
political German and foreign prisoners, many of whom are today holding
high office in their countries. Those persons guaranteed to Dr. Hoven
that only such individuals would be killed who already had been active
and would continue to be active as spies and as traitors. These
statements by Dr. Hoven were expressly confirmed by a number of
witnesses who were heard on this subject. These observations may be
found in the affidavits I submitted. Above all it has been proven that
only such people of whom Dr. Hoven held that conviction were done away
with. Dr. Hoven testified to that effect and it has been reaffirmed by
the witnesses Dorn, Dr. Kogon, Seegers, and Hummel.
In his interrogation of 23 October 1946, Dr. Hoven stated expressly that
he killed or knew only of the killings of such persons of whom he was
certain that their deaths were necessary to save the lives of a
multitude of political prisoners from the various countries. At that
early date he expressly emphasized that he refused to carry out any of
the killing orders of the Camp Commander Koch; the prisoners who were
covered by these orders were put into the hospital or hidden in some
other way by Dr. Hoven.
Dr. Hoven had not negligently adopted the conviction that their killing
was essential for the salvation of huge numbers of prisoners.
This is proved first of all by the testimony of the witness Dorn, who
gave many details as to the means and methods employed by Dr. Hoven and
the illegal camp administration in becoming convinced of the necessity
for the killings. Dr. Hoven supplemented those statements. Furthermore,
they were corroborated by the testimony of the witnesses Hummell, Dr.
Kogon, Seegers, Philipp Dirk, Baron von Pallandt, and van Eerde through
their affidavits.
Actually, the prevention of the planned crimes, i.e., the mass murder of
a multitude of German and foreign political prisoners, could be
accomplished only through the killing of the spies and traitors. There
was no other means. What should Dr. Hoven have done to prevent the
crimes planned by the spies and traitors? Those spies collaborated with
the SS camp commanders to carry out Himmler’s program to destroy the
political prisoners. To whom should Dr. Hoven have turned? Perhaps to
the SS camp commanders who worked with the spies and traitors? Or
perhaps to the Gestapo or to the police who worked under Himmler’s
orders?
There was no other way but the one which Dr. Hoven chose in order to
prevent crimes. I showed that with details in my closing brief. There I
assembled the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and defense
who were heard on this point.
Here, I merely wish to stress the following statements by witnesses:
In this courtroom, Dr. Kogon, a convinced Christian and a deeply
religious man, said: “There was really no other possibility for the men
of the illegal camp administration. I, as a convinced Christian, do not
deny those men the right to have killed people in an emergency who in
collaboration with the SS endangered the lives of individuals or of
many.”
The witness Pieck stated: “It may be that the liquidation of many
political prisoners and of SS spies employed in the camp may make Dr.
Hoven a murderer in the eyes of many; yet, for me and others who
understood the real situation he was a soldier fighting on our side and
risking a great deal.”
Pieck expressed the same opinion also in a letter to the Dutch Ministry
of Justice, a letter that was co-signed by the City Council of Amsterdam
and Mr. Droering, head of a department of the State Institute for War
Documentation in The Hague.
Pieck is one of the few who is best equipped to answer these questions,
for he belonged to the committee of German and foreign political
prisoners which formed itself at Buchenwald.
Father Katjetan, presently Supreme Abbot of one of the largest religious
orders in Czechoslovakia, a former prisoner of the concentration camp
Buchenwald, declared, in the presence of witness Dr. Horn, that those
killings were an inevitable necessity for the preservation of the
inmates who had been abandoned by justice in the camp.
Even the prosecution witness Roemhild had to admit on the stand that it
would have been impossible to save 20,000 prisoners if those spies or
traitors whom Dr. Hoven killed or of whose killing he knew had remained
alive.
Let me ask in this connection: What would have happened if a man of
Kushnir Kushnarev’s caliber had not been killed, and if the murder of
the Russian prisoners of war in the Buchenwald camp had been continued?
Would Dr. Hoven not stand before this Tribunal even then? Then, would
not the same charge be made against Dr. Hoven as the one levelled
against the Japanese Governor of the Philippines who was tried before an
American Military Court for not having prevented atrocities and abuses?
* * * * *
d. Evidence
_Testimony_
Page
Extract from the testimony of defendant Karl Brandt 29
Extracts from the testimony of defense witness Dr. Friedrich 30
Hielscher
Extract from the testimony of prosecution expert witness Dr. 42
Andrew C. Ivy
EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT[6]
_EXAMINATION_
* * * * *
JUDGE SEBRING: Witness, this question of the necessity for an
experiment, is it your view that it is for the state to determine the
extreme necessity for such an experiment and that thereafter those who
serve the state are to be bound by that procedure? I think you can
answer that “yes” or “no”.
DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT: This trial shows that it will be the task of the
state under all circumstances basically to clarify this question for the
future.
Q. Witness, as I understood your statements a moment ago, they were that
the physician, having once become the soldier, thereafter must
subordinate such medical-ethical views as he may have when they are in
conflict with a military order from higher authority, is that true?
A. I didn’t want to express it in that form. I did not mean to say that
the physician, the moment he becomes a medical officer, should change
his basic attitude as a physician. Such an order can in the very same
way be addressed to a physician who is not a soldier. I was referring to
the entire situation as it prevailed with us in Germany during the time
of an authoritarian leadership. This authoritarian leadership interfered
with the personality and the personal feelings of the human being. The
moment an individuality is absorbed into the concept of a collective
body, every demand which is put to that individuality has to be absorbed
into the concept of a collective system. Therefore, the demands of
society are placed above every individual human being as an entity, and
this entity, the human being, is completely used in the interests of
that society.
The difficult thing, and something which is hard to understand
basically, is that during our entire period, and Dr. Leibbrandt referred
to that, everything was done in the interests of humanity so that the
individual person had no meaning whatsoever, and the farther the war
progressed, the stronger did this principal thought appear. This was
designated in the end as “total war,” and in accordance with that, the
leaders of the state gave orders quite generally and demanded that
orders be carried out. It was very tragic for a number of persons, not
only within the framework of these experiments, but also in other
situations that they had to work under such orders. Without considering
the entire situation as it prevailed in Germany, one cannot understand
the question of these particular experiments at all.
* * * * *
EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS
DR. FRIEDRICH HIELSCHER[7]
_DIRECT EXAMINATION_
DR. WEISGERBER: Witness, your name is Friedrich Hielscher?
WITNESS HIELSCHER: Friedrich Hielscher.
Q. You were born on 31 May 1902 in Plauen, and you are now living in
Marburg, that is right?
A. Yes.
Q. What is your profession?
A. I am a scholar.
Q. And since when have you taken an active part in politics?
A. Since 1927.
Q. Did you belong to a definite political ideology?
A. No. I had a group of students to whom I expounded my historical and
philosophical theories and ideas.
Q. How did it happen that you became an opponent of the NSDAP so early?
A. From the information available to me I knew the personal inferiority
of the National Socialist leaders. I could observe that they were
constantly lying and that what they really wanted was undesirable.
Q. Did you believe, as early as 1928, that the NSDAP would come to
power?
A. No, not in 1928. In 1930, after the first election battle at which
the Party was victorious, I considered it possible. In 1931 I considered
it probable. In 1932 I felt that it was certain.
Q. Did you join any definite political party with the intention of
combating the NSDAP?
A. No. I considered it impossible for any of the 33 German parties, with
their bureaucratic methods, to be able to prevent a fascist
dictatorship, or if it had come into existence, to overthrow it.
Q. What methods did you think were the right ones?
A. The fascist dictatorship is a mass machine in a technical age.
Therefore it seemed to us to be out of the question, when confronting
such a mass body, to act openly. It seemed impossible to carry out
propaganda publicly. We were convinced that the only thing possible was
to form very small cadres which would not be recognizable to an outsider
and which at the proper time could be employed for a coup d’etat.
Q. Then that was more or less the method of the Trojan Horse?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you, in your ideas and in your efforts to combat this movement
alone or did you have associates?
A. First, a selected group of my students were willing to collaborate in
this illegal work; second, I knew quite a number of personages of
various political backgrounds with whom I agreed that this regime would
not last.
Q. That was before 1933?
A. That was around 1933—1932-33.
Q. Now came the 30th of January 1933, the so-called seizure of power,
and now your real work began. How and when did you apply your method of
the Trojan Horse?
A. This group of my students, who were willing to collaborate, I made
into an illegal organization, with dues, secrecy, and other necessary
conditions, and I appointed people who were willing and suitable to get
into important Party positions.
Q. When and how did you meet the defendant Wolfram Sievers?
A. As far as I can recall, I met Sievers about 1929, on one of my
historical-philosophical lecture trips. He was a Boy Scout at that time.
He spoke up during the discussion and we took a liking to each other.
Q. Did Sievers show at that time that he was opposed to the NSDAP?
A. That was a matter of course with the people with whom I had anything
to do at all.
Q. And did you consider him suitable to work in your circle?
A. Yes.
Q. In 1929 Sievers joined the NSDAP. Was that done with your knowledge?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you advise him to do so or how did it come about? There had to be
some special reason, since you were both opponents of this political
party.
A. That was the first time, aside from 1923, when the NSDAP was talked
about, and it was useful to know what was going on in this growing
machine—were there any people of good will within the machine, what
were the leaders doing, what plans were being made, what organization
was being set up.
Q. Then first of all you wanted to find out what intentions the NSDAP
had?
A. Yes, and specifically in the youth work, because that had to be the
most important in the long run.
Q. Now, in 1931 Sievers resigned from the NSDAP again; did he do that
with your knowledge?
A. Yes.
Q. On your orders?
A. Yes, one might say that. We discussed it, and I considered it the
thing to do.
Q. Now, why should he suddenly leave the Party since he had been sent
into the Party with the definite purpose of getting information?
A. He had found out what he was to find out, the nature and the make-up,
especially of the youth organization. It was just as inferior as we had
thought, and even at that time it was so corrupt that without any
further plan—and we had no plan at the time—without any further plan
it was not necessary to have him continue.
Q. Now, in the year 1933, Sievers, as the Tribunal has already been
told, again joined the NSDAP; was this also done on your behalf?
A. Yes. At that time we were already a thoroughly organized
organization. We were already asking for volunteers, who were willing
and who were capable of working up in the sense of the Trojan Horse.
Sievers seemed suitable, and he was willing.
Q. Were you able to get him any position within the Party?
A. No. I was not able to help him to obtain any position, and in the
second place I had no intention of telling the individual persons whom I
trusted, in detail, what they were to do.
Q. Then it was up to the skill of the individual to get into a position
from which he would be able to carry out the assignment which you gave
him?
A. Yes.
Q. And how did Sievers obtain this position?
A. He got into this with Hermann Wirth in the Ahnenerbe.
Q. Who was Hermann Wirth?
A. Hermann Wirth was a rather crazy student of pre-history, who had
excellent material and terrible concepts.
Q. Was Wirth already in contact with the Ahnenerbe at that time?
A. As far as I know he was one of the founders.
Q. Then, as you say, Sievers got in contact with Wirth, and through
Wirth he got into the Ahnenerbe?
A. Yes. He was there from 1935 on as Reich Business Manager.
Q. Now, did you give Sievers any specific assignment in the spirit of
your movement?
A. As soon as it was clear that there was a possibility of exploiting
Himmler’s racial romancing and half-education, the assignment developed
to gain Himmler’s confidence with the aid of the Ahnenerbe and to get as
close to him as possible. We, that is my group, were among the people
who very early recognized the special personal danger of Himmler, and in
the second place from the beginning we had been determined that one day
we would have to overthrow the Party regime by force, and for that
purpose one has to get as close as possible to the most dangerous man.
Q. And what were the duties which Sievers had this time? When he first
belonged to the NSDAP, you said he was to get information about the
intentions of the youth movement of the NSDAP.
A. This time, of course, he had to get as many details as he could from
the office of the Reich Leader SS, and transmit them to us. We had to
protect people. We had to build up camouflage positions. We had to help
the other people and in turn to remain unrecognized.
Q. And how did Sievers carry out these duties?
A. Well, it will be best if I begin with myself. I myself was known and
considered undesirable by the Party leadership.
Q. You mean the NSDAP?
A. Well, yes, of course. The Party leaders knew me and considered me
undesirable. I had already been under arrest and had had my house
searched. I was watched by the Gestapo, and in order to build up my
organization I needed to be able to travel anywhere without arousing
suspicion. Consequently, Sievers gave me a fake research assignment,
which was to study Indo-Germanic culture, customs of the annual
festivals.
Q. Sievers said during direct examination that he himself could not
issue any research assignments; you said that you received a fake
research assignment from him; wasn’t this research assignment actually
issued by the curator, Professor Wuest?
A. Yes. If things were going well, and Wuest was in a good mood, or had
been drinking with Sievers, it was possible to persuade him to do
something, and so he succeeded in persuading Wuest that I was efficient
for this research assignment, and so I was given this assignment. And
what concerned Indo-Germanic customs could be found anywhere. I was
given a false pass as a section chief, though I was not a section chief,
and was not a member of the SS nor the Ahnenerbe.
Q. And with this pass you were able easily to get visas to go abroad?
A. Not necessarily. I needed a little more for that purpose, but it was
easier.
Q. Then the actual purpose of this fake research assignment was that
you, who were a suspect, might appear in a more harmless light and would
be able to move rather freely and without supervision?
A. Yes.
* * * * *
Q. What did Sievers do in order to further the activities of your
organization?
A. For instance, he took care of supplying all information which was of
importance. He told us what troops of the Waffen SS were in Germany
during the war. He gave us fake official trips and he worked out a plan
for an assassination, which was to be carried through by our group in
case the generals’ plan did not come off. We all thought it was not safe
to rely on the generals. In March 1944, Werner Haften told me by order
of Stauffenberg that one would have to take into account the fact that
the generals would have to be moved into action by a certain
assassination and everyone was to make his own preparations, in case he
had any, in such a manner as if he was the only one active. That was the
situation in March 1944. We worked out a substantial plan to remove, if
possible, Himmler and Hitler simultaneously, but in case of doubt
Himmler himself. We were of a completely different opinion there than
the other groups.
Q. What concrete preliminary work was done for the assassination in your
group?
A. Sievers was the only one in our group who came into question
regarding that assassination because he was the only one so close to
Himmler. He was therefore assigned this task and we worked out this
matter as far as the detailed plan was concerned; all that was necessary
now was to press the button.
Q. And for what period of time was this assassination intended?
A. We started our preparations in the year 1943, and we could have
started at the earliest at the end of 1943. Then we finally thought of
the middle of 1944 because Schulenburg and Luening told me that the
generals would be ready around that time.
Q. Well, an assassination is a matter for quick decision. Is it not
true, therefore, that all these long preparations that you are telling
us about are rather surprising?
A. The following would have to be taken into consideration: Around
Himmler and Hitler there was a strong guard, a strong ring of guards,
through which none could get unless he was carefully searched and
checked. Secondly, and that I already emphasized, one did not have to be
quite sure that the generals would carry out that assassination, but one
had to be sure that a sufficient number of generals were ready to remove
the National Socialist system immediately after the assassination, for
the elimination of just these two people would have no political purpose
whatsoever. We did not intend to carry out a Putsch but we intended to
remove a political system, a political order, and for that reason we had
to wait until the situation became right and the generals were ready.
Q. Now, the question crops up whether these plans for the assassination
of Hitler and Himmler were only in your fantasy, or the fantasy of your
collaborators, or was there any real basis or concrete preparation for
such assassination?
A. I already said that the preparations had been worked out in the
detailed technical points insofar as the location, the shooting, etc.,
were concerned.
Q. And who would have assassinated Himmler and Hitler?
A. Sievers was to do that and a few young men belonging to my
organization.
Q. And why was it in effect not carried out?
A. After the Stauffenberg assassination had failed, the Wehrmacht
circles that came into question were eliminated by Himmler and therefore
it was no longer possible to remove that system. The only consequence of
any attempted assassination would have been—since the foreign political
situation would not have changed—that the people would have said again,
“This is the stab in the back for the victorious front line.”
Q. What did Sievers do to further your activity in addition to what you
have already said?
A. He, for instance, supported my representative, Arnold Deutelmoser,
when he was put on the list of those who were to be removed under the
pretext of the assassination which took place in Munich at the
Buergerbraeu. He also protected Bomas who was working in the
Netherlands. He protected Dr. Schuettelkopf whom we had sent into the
RSHA and it was possible for him in turn to send me to Sweden. He saved
Niels Bor, Professor Seyb of Oslo University, and he saved a number of
Norwegian students, etc.
Q. Do you know that Sievers informed you about Himmler’s double play in
the case of the minister Popitz, and that as a consequence he saved that
entire group against measures by Himmler?
A. Yes. The following thing happened. One day Sievers approached me and
said that he had just heard Himmler ridicule in a close circle an
attempt on the part of Popitz. He said that Minister Popitz with the
mediation of the lawyer Lampe had approached Himmler and tried to
persuade him to bring about a change of the National Socialist system,
perhaps by removing Hitler. He said Himmler thought it was very funny
that these men had so little sense as to think of him in that
connection. Thank God one could enter negotiations with them because
certainly nobody in the country was behind these people, but it did seem
that these gentlemen had many foreign political relationships and it
would be advisable to find out what in effect was behind it all and to
enter into negotiations with them. We were quite surprised about the
naive attitude shown by Himmler, and I sent Deutelmoser to Reichwein
whom I knew had connections with Popitz. In that way Popitz was warned.
Reichwein was so surprised and hardly wanted to believe the situation.
I was asked to participate in a conference, and Reichwein after having
convinced himself that all of this was true promised to warn all of the
gentlemen concerned in Berlin and then asked Deutelmoser, who was to go
to Norway shortly thereafter to notify Reichwein’s friend, Stelzer, the
present Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, in order to see that
he, too, took the necessary precautionary measures. In this way we hoped
that a number of these people had actually been saved. Popitz, however,
himself was careless and was captured.
Q. This conspiracy could not have been carried out unless you had the
necessary financial means at your disposal. How did you get these means?
A. Everyone of our people, be it man or woman, had agreed to give up ten
percent of their monthly income for that illegal work. Many gave a
substantially larger sum.
Q. How about Sievers?
A. Sievers gave more than he had to.
Q. Do you know the case of the three hundred Norwegian students who on
the basis of Sievers’ intervention were released from the concentration
camp Buchenwald?
A. Yes. Terboven, or some other official in Norway, disliked some
demonstration which occurred there, and as a result arrested three
hundred students. Through some dark channels they were brought into the
concentration camp at Buchenwald. Sievers found out about that, and if I
remember correctly, he was in a position to see to it that these
students were released from the concentration camp, making use of
Himmler’s Nordic ideas to this end.
Q. In that case you think that Sievers’ activity was substantially
important for your resistance movement?
A. Yes. That was true of my organization, for he protected and covered
me as its chief, and, secondly, as far as I know, he was the only man
belonging to any resistance movement who was as close as he to the Reich
Leader SS. If any other group had brought any such information as he
did, I would have noticed that it could have only come from the same
source.
Q. Witness, I shall have a document handed to you which was submitted by
the prosecution. This is Document NO-975, Prosecution Exhibit 479. It is
a letter sent by Sievers to Dr. Hirt. Would you please look at that
letter?
A. Yes.
Q. This letter contains a tone of voice which seems to indicate that he
tried to cover Dr. Hirt’s activity. Dr. Hirt was working in the
Anatomical Institute of the Strasbourg University. I assume, for reasons
which we shall mention later, that you know Hirt’s name. How do you
explain that tone in this letter?
A. I think that this is very proper and praiseworthy. I would have
thought it very foolish of Sievers if he adopted any other tone in any
of his official correspondence. It was his task to say “yes” but act in
a negative way. There couldn’t have appeared any pretense of any
disapproval on his part. The more active one had to be in an
anti-National Socialist way, the more one had to speak in favor of
National Socialism.
Q. I shall now turn to another complex of questions. Sievers is indicted
in this trial as having participated in a number of crimes. Did Sievers
at any time tell you about the so-called research assignments of Dr.
Rascher and Dr. Hirt who was just mentioned? These were experiments
carried out in the concentration camps.
A. Sievers, as far as I remember, came to me in the year 1942 and told
me very excitedly that Himmler in his desire to extend the Ahnenerbe
Society had embarked on the thought of including experiments on human
beings in the work of the Ahnenerbe Society. He said that he did not
succeed in frustrating that. He said that he had no desire whatsoever to
participate in these horrible acts and asked me what to do. At that time
we considered this horrible situation very thoroughly and thought of
what we could do. It was quite clear to us what the SS intended here,
and it was questionable whether responsibility could be assumed for any
such acts, whether it would be advisable to be the instrument of Himmler
if he embarked on any such acts, measures where human beings were
degraded to the level of insects.
The following considerations proved to be decisive for us: If Sievers
left, not one person, not one subject in these experiments would be
saved. If Sievers stayed there as a technical secretary, he could throw
sand into that machinery and would, perhaps, be in a position to save
somebody. In addition, the entire plan and the entire overthrow of the
Party stood or fell with Sievers staying at his post. The experiments on
human beings were only part of this horrible Party system, and one had
to concentrate on the decisive points in order finally to remove
everything, and, as I have said before, there was no other way into the
staff of the Reich Leader SS. We therefore concluded that if Sievers
resigned because of that, it was sure that he would be eliminated and
probably all the people he had ever entrusted with a research
assignment, and everything that we had done so far would be lost if he
left, and if anyone was to be saved at all, he could only be saved by
Sievers remaining at his post.
Q. If I have understood you correctly, Sievers at first wanted to resign
from his position as Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe?
A. Yes. That is correct.
Q. Did Sievers approve of these arguments which you and your friends put
forward in favor of his staying with the Reich Leader SS as the Reich
Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe? Did he do it immediately or only
after trying to persuade him for some time?
A. This took a number of days, because Sievers, according to his nature,
was softer than many of us and did not want to agree with us. We finally
had to appeal to his sense of duty and persuade him that he had to do it
and that it was the only way.
Q. Among other matters, it was considered that by Sievers remaining at
his post, there would be a possibility of mitigating these horrible
experiments?
A. The chance wasn’t very great but we were convinced that this would be
the only way possible, if at all. Then it could only be done in that
manner. If I may say so, this was such a horrible situation that we
always had to come back to it and we were very lucky at least to have
the hope of saving a number of people. Other opponents of the SS system
have told me about similar dilemmas which were just as difficult, and
where the alternative was yet more horrible, and where persons,
according to my belief and knowledge, acted correctly. If the Tribunal
would permit me I could relate a few almost incredible situations which
were even worse.
PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: In what connection are these narrations, Witness?
WITNESS HIELSCHER: In connection with the question as to whether it was
morally justifiable to enable Sievers to remain at his post.
PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: Such matters as that would not be material in
this inquiry.
* * * * *
_CROSS-EXAMINATION_
* * * * *
MR. HARDY: Now, what did Sievers ever tell you about the Sievers-Hirt
skeleton collection? Did he ever tell you about that?
WITNESS HIELSCHER: Yes. He told me that Himmler had ordered—as far as I
know, it was in connection with Jewish commissars who were under this
terrible execution order which was valid in the East—that some of them
were to be selected and used for the skeleton collection. The order was
from Himmler, as Sievers reported to me.
Q. And did you know what they were going to do with these people?
A. Yes. It was the same as in the experiments. There a danger of death
was a possibility; here it was certain.
Q. You knew, of course, that they were going to stand these people up,
pick them out, select them according to size, take their anatomical
measurements, then ship them to Natzweiler and at Natzweiler kill them,
then deflesh them, then send the skeletons to the Strasbourg University
for collection? And you knew that?
A. Yes.
Q. A fine thing for a resistance man to be involved in, isn’t it?
A. The situation, as I have said repeatedly, was as follows: We made no
distinction in the real evaluation of the skeleton collection and other
experiments in which there was this so-called “volunteering” and in
which the result was the same—in our eyes, they were the same thing. I
should like to emphasize one more thing. Does one have the moral right
to tolerate a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil?
Q. Just a moment. Now in connection with the skeleton collection, do you
further know that they dispensed with the idea of taking Jewish
commissars but selected Jewish inmates of concentration camps?
A. Yes. What particular persons were selected I do not know, of course,
but I knew that a number of Jews were to be gassed and were selected for
this anthropological collection. That was the same case as in the Ghetto
of Lodz. The Jewish commander of the Ghetto—that was Lieutenant
Rosenblatt—after he had gained confidence in me because I had gone in
with a false pass, said personally to me: “I was picked out by the SS.
When a new group of Jews comes into this Ghetto of Lodz and crowds the
Ghetto, I have to select exactly the same number of Jews and I know that
they will be gassed. That is, I was selected by the SS to determine who
is to be gassed. Now, I ask you in the name of God, Mr. Hielscher, you
are a Christian, what am I to do? I had nothing to do with that. I have
asked the Rabbis. I have asked the old people themselves, and we have
come to the conclusion that I must stay in this office. At least I can
determine the persons—I can at least select the oldest people who can’t
stand life in a ghetto and perhaps, in this way, perhaps I will be able
to save the life of one person. These two old people that I am telling
you about were about seventy years old. There were five Christians among
the Jews. At least I was able to see that these two old people were
gassed together. They asked me to tell their daughter that we were able
to achieve at least that. Tell me, did I do right or not?” That is still
more horrible because the man could not even reduce the number. I was
ashamed that the people who were in charge of this camp were called
Germans. But I said: “You have acted right and you are justified in the
eyes of God.”
Q. Now, Dr. Hielscher, I assume that the defense counsel has shown you
all the documents concerning the skeleton collection. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. There won’t be any need for me to go over them. You have stated in
connection with the one document that was presented to you today on the
stand that this was a very praiseworthy act on the part of Sievers in a
negative way. Since you are familiar with all the skeleton collection
documents—I had intended to go into each one but I will just go into
that one. That is Document NO-088, Prosecution Exhibit 182. This is a
document which was written by Sievers. You will see that his signature
appears thereon. Do you recognize the signature at the bottom of the
letter?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, Sievers here is proposing a way in which they can destroy the
skeleton collection so that it will not be known to any one—that is, to
the Allies when they overrun Strasbourg. And you will notice, two-thirds
of the way through, the one paragraph that states: “The viscera could be
declared as remnants of corpses apparently left in the anatomical
institute by the French.” You see that?
A. Yes.
Q. “In order to be cremated.” Now this is an idea of one Wolfram
Sievers, wherein he is suggesting that these, or the results of these
criminal activities be left so that they may, by the Allies, be blamed
on to the French, and bearing in mind, of course that the French, as
well as the United States, Great Britain, and other Allies were equally
as interested as the resistance movements in defeating the Nazi regime,
were they not?
A. I have already said that it was Sievers’ duty to say “yes” and to act
negatively, but, of course, I did not praise this action, but I praised
the vocabulary, the formulation. He spoke like a Nazi. The concrete
question in such a case was simply as follows: Can anyone be saved here
or not? If no one can be saved, what can I do to keep up the appearance
of a Nazi since I know that Obersturmbannfuehrer Neuhaus suspects that I
have some contact with the resistance movement? Sievers, since the 20th
of July, or rather since my arrest, was constantly seeing to it that his
actions looked like Nazi actions, insofar as no one was actually killed;
that was part of his duty, part of the mask without which the
organization could not operate.
Q. Yes. But from this letter does it not suggest that he was willing to
allow an innocent Frenchman to answer for the crimes which flowed out of
this skeleton collection activity?
A. If you show me—
Q. I have asked you—does it not appear from this letter, this letter
signed by Sievers, that he was willing to allow a Frenchman to suffer
for the crimes committed during the course of the collection of these
skeletons?
A. Yes. The letter quite deliberately, I believe, creates this
impression. That was the purpose of it, like all such letters.
* * * * *
EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION EXPERT WITNESS
DR. ANDREW C. IVY[8]
_CROSS-EXAMINATION_
* * * * *
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, take the following case. You are in a city in
which the plague is raging. You, as a doctor, have a drug that you could
use to combat the plague. However, you must test it on somebody. The
commander, or let us say the mayor of the city, comes to you and says,
“Here is a criminal condemned to death. Save us by carrying out the
experiment on this man.” Would you refuse to do so, or would you do it?
WITNESS DR. IVY: I would refuse to do so, because I do not believe that
duress of that sort warrants the breaking of ethical and moral
principles. That is why the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention were
formulated, to make war, a barbaric enterprise, a little more humane.
Q. Do you believe that the population of a city would have any
understanding for your action?
A. They have understanding for the importance of the maintenance of the
principles of medical ethics which apply over a long period of years,
rather than a short period of years. Physicians and medical scientists
should do nothing with the idea of temporarily doing good which, when
carried out repeatedly over a period of time, would debase and
jeopardize a method for doing good. If a medical scientist breaks the
code of medical ethics and says, “Kill the person,” in order to do what
he thinks may be good, in the course of time that will grow and will
cause a loss of faith of the public in the medical profession, and hence
destroy the capacity of the medical profession to do its good for
society. The reason that we must be very careful in the use of human
beings as subjects in medical experiments is in order not to debase and
jeopardize this method for doing great good by causing the public to
react against it.
Q. Witness, do you not believe that your ideal attitude here is more or
less that of a single person standing against the body of public
opinion?
A. No I do not. That is why I read out the principles of medical ethics
yesterday, and that is why the American Medical Association has agreed
essentially to those principles. That is why the principles, the ethical
principles for the use of human beings in medical experiments, have been
quite uniform throughout the world in the past.
Q. Then you do not believe that the urgency, the necessity of this city
would make a revision of this attitude necessary?
A. No, not if they were in danger of killing people in the course of
testing out the new drug or remedy. There is no justification in killing
five people in order to save the lives of five hundred.
Q. Then you are of the opinion that the life of the one prisoner must be
preserved even if the whole city perishes?
A. In order to maintain intact the method of doing good, yes.
Q. From the point of view of the politician, do you consider it good if
he allows the city to perish in the interests of preserving this
principle and preserving the life of the one prisoner?
A. The politician, unless he knows medicine and medical ethics, has no
reason to make a decision on that point.
Q. But as a politician he must make a decision about what is to happen.
Shall he coerce the doctor to carry out the experiment, or shall he
protect the doctor from the rage of the multitude?
A. You can’t answer that question. I should say this, that there is no
state of no politician under the sun that could force me to perform a
medical experiment which I thought was morally unjustified.
Q. You then, despite the order, would not carry out the order, and would
prefer to be executed as a martyr?
A. That is correct, and I know there are thousands of people in the
United States who would have to do likewise.
Q. And do you not also believe that in thousands of cities the
population would kill the doctor who found himself in that position?
A. I do not believe so because they would not know. How would they know
whether the doctor had a drug that would or would not relieve? The
doctor would not know himself, because he would have to experiment
first.
Q. Witness, I put a hypothetical case to you. If we are to turn to
reality other questions would arise. I simply want to hear now your
general attitude to this problem. You are then of the opinion that a
doctor should not carry out the order. Are you also of the opinion that
the politician should not give such an order?
A. Yes. I believe he should not give such an order.
Q. Is this not a purely political decision which must be left at the
discretion of the political leader?
A. Not necessarily. He should seek the best advice that he can obtain.
Q. If he is informed that this one experiment on this one prisoner would
save the whole city, he may give the order despite the fact that the
doctor does not wish to carry it out, is that what you think?
A. He could then give the order, but if the doctor still believed that
it was contrary to his moral responsibilities, then the doctor should
not carry out the order.
Q. That is another question, whether or not he carries it out, but in
such cases you consider it is permissible to give that order, is that
what I understood you to say?
A. After he has obtained the best advice on the subject which he can
obtain.
Q. Then he can give the order. Yes or no?
A. Yes.
* * * * *
G. Subjection to Medical Experimentation as Substitute
for Penalties
a. Introduction
Several of the defendants argued that medical experiments, alleged as
criminal, upon concentration camp inmates were justified because they
were a substitute for penalty or punishment previously imposed on the
experimental subjects. Counsel for the defendant Gebhardt argued that
the experimentation amounted to a complete pardon as sentences of death
had been imposed and hence that the experimentation, not always deadly,
saved human lives. The prosecution’s argument on this point is
illustrated by an extract from the closing statement, set forth on pages
44 to 49. On this general question, selections have been taken from the
closing brief for the defendant Karl Brandt and from the final plea of
the defendant Gebhardt. These appear below on pages 49 to 56. The
following selections from the evidence appear in pages 56 to 61: extract
from the direct examination of the defendant Mrugowsky;
cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert witness, Dr. Andrew C.
Ivy.
b. Selection from the Argumentation of the Prosecution
_EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING STATEMENT OF THE
PROSECUTION_[9]
* * * * *
Another of the rather common defenses urged by the defendants is that
the experimental subjects were criminals condemned to death who,
provided they survived the experiment, were rewarded by commutation of
their sentence to life imprisonment in a concentration camp. For one who
has even the slightest knowledge of the conditions in concentration
camps and the life expectancy of an average inmate, this alleged defense
assumes the aspect of a ghastly joke. We need only recall the remark
made by one of the women used by Rascher to reward his frozen victims in
Dachau, who when asked by him why she had volunteered for the camp
brothel, replied: “rather half a year in a brothel than half a year in a
concentration camp.” But the defects in this spurious defense run much
deeper. Concentration camps were not ordinary penal institutions, such
as are known in other countries, for the commitment of persons convicted
of crimes by courts. The very purpose of concentration camps was the
oppression and persecution of persons who were considered undesirable by
the Nazi regime on racial, political, and religious grounds. Hundreds of
thousands of victims were confined to concentration camps because they
were simply Jews, Slavs, or gypsies, Free Masons, Social Democrats, or
Communists. They were not tried for any offense and sentenced by a
court, not even a Nazi court. They were imprisoned on the basis of
“protective custody orders” issued by the RSHA. Tens of thousands were
condemned to death on the single order of Himmler, who, as Gebhardt put
it so well, “had the power to execute thousands of people by a stroke of
his pen.” (_Tr. p. 4025._) There were, indeed, a relatively small group
of inmates who might be classed as ordinary criminals. These were men
who had served out their sentences in an ordinary prison and then were
committed to concentration camps for still further detention. A
memorandum of 18 September 1942 by Thierack, the Minister of Justice,
concerning a conversation with Himmler, tells us the fate of those
unfortunates:
“The delivery of anti-social elements from the execution of
their sentence to the Reich Leader SS to be worked to death.
Persons under protective arrest, Jews, gypsies, Russians and
Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs and
Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to the
decision of the Reich Minister for Justice.” (_654-PS, Pros. Ex.
562._)
The proof in this case has demonstrated beyond all doubt that so-called
criminals sentenced to death were very rarely used in any of the
experiments. True it is that Himmler said prisoners condemned to death
should be used in those high-altitude experiments where the
long-continued activity of the heart after death was observed by the
experimenters. He was generous enough to say that if such persons could
be brought back to life, then they were to be “pardoned” to
concentration camp for life. But even this unique amnesty had no
application to Russians and Poles, who were used exclusively in those
experiments.
But, assuming for the moment, that this alleged defense might have a
mitigating effect under some circumstances, it certainly has no
application to this case. Be it noted that this is an affirmative
defense by way of avoidance or mitigation. There has been no proof
whatever that criminals sentenced to death by an ordinary court could
possibly be executed in a concentration camp. Such matters were within
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, not Himmler and the SS. The
experimental subjects we are dealing with are those that Himmler could
condemn by a “stroke of his pen.” If the inmate used in the experiments
was condemned for merely being a Jew, Pole, or Russian, or, for example,
having had sexual intercourse with a Jew, it does not answer the
criminal charge to say that the victim was doomed to die.
Experimentation on such a person is to compound the crime of his initial
unlawful detention as well as to commit the additional crime of murder
or torture. As has been said by another tribunal, “Exculpation from the
charge of criminal homicide can possibly be based only upon bona fide
proof that the subject had committed murder or any other legally
recognized capital offense; and, not even then, unless the sentencing
tribunal with authority granted by the state in the constitution of the
court declared that the execution would be accomplished by means of a
low-pressure chamber.”[10]
In this connection, it might be noted that German law recognized only
three methods of execution, namely, by decapitation, hanging, and
shooting. (_German Penal Code, Part I, Section 13; Reichsgesetzblatt
[Reich Law Gazette], 1933, Part I, p. 151_; _Reichsgesetzblatt 1939,
Part I, p. 1457_.) Moreover, there is no proof that any of the
experimental subjects had their death sentence commuted to any lesser
degree of punishment. Indeed, in the sulfanilamide crimes it was the
experiment _plus_ later execution for at least six of the subjects.
Since the defendants Gebhardt, Fischer, and Oberheuser have put
particular stress on this alleged defense, I should like to make a few
remarks in that connection, but it should be remembered that they apply
with equal force to most of the other defendants. Gebhardt, speaking for
his co-defendants Fischer and Oberheuser, took the position that the
Polish women who had been used in the sulfanilamide experiments had been
condemned to death for participation in a resistance movement and that
by undergoing the experiments voluntarily or otherwise, they were to
have their death sentences commuted to some lesser degree of punishment,
provided they survived the experiments. This was no bargain reached with
the experimental subjects; their wishes were not consulted in the
matter. It was, according to Gebhardt, left to the good faith of someone
unnamed to see to it that the death sentences were not carried out on
the survivors of the experiments. Certainly Gebhardt, Fischer, and
Oberheuser assumed no responsibility or even interest in that regard.
It should be pointed out that the proof shows that the experimental
subjects who testified before this Tribunal were never so much as
afforded trial; they had no opportunity to defend themselves against
whatever crimes they were said to have committed. They were simply
arrested and interrogated by the Gestapo in Poland and sent to the
concentration camp. They had never so much as been informed that they
had been _marked for_, not sentenced to, death. Article 30 of the
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to
the Hague Convention, specifically provides that even a spy “shall not
be punished without previous trial”.
Gebhardt would have the Tribunal believe that _but for_ the experiments
all these Polish girls would be dead; that he preserved the evidence
which was used against him. Nothing could be further from the truth.
There is no proof in the record that these women would have been
executed if they had not undergone the experiments. The witness Maczka
is living proof of the contrary. She was arrested for resistance
activities on 11 September 1941 and shipped to Ravensbrueck on 13
September. She was not an experimental subject yet she lives today.
Substantially all of the Polish experimental subjects arrived in
Ravensbrueck in September 1941. These girls had not been executed by
August 1942 when the experiments began. There were some 700 Polish girls
in that transport. There is no evidence that a substantial number were
ever executed even though most of them were not experimented on.
The proof submitted by the prosecution has shown beyond controversy that
these Polish women _could not have been legally executed_. The right to
grant pardons in cases of death sentences was exclusively vested in
Hitler by a decree of 1 February 1935. On 2 May 1935, Hitler delegated
the right to make negative decisions on pardon applications to the Reich
Minister of Justice. On 30 January 1940, Hitler delegated to the
Governor General for the occupied Polish territories the authority to
grant and deny pardons for the occupied Polish territories. By edict
dated 8 March 1940, the Governor General of occupied Poland ordered
that—
“The execution of a death sentence promulgated by a regular
court, a special court, or a police court martial, shall take
place only when my decision has been issued not to make use of
my right to pardon.” (_NO-3073, Pros. Ex. 534._)
Thus, even though we assume _arguendo_, that the experimental subjects
had all committed substantial crimes, that they were all properly tried
by a duly constituted court of law, and that they were legally sentenced
to death, it is still clear from these decrees that these women could
not have been legally executed until such time as the Governor General
of occupied Poland had decided in each case not to make use of his
pardon right. There has been no proof that the Governor General ever
acted with respect to pardoning the Polish women used in the
experiments, or, for that matter, any substantial number of those not
used in the experiments. The only reason these 700 Polish women were
transported from Warsaw and Lublin to Ravensbrueck, in the first place,
was because the Governor General had not approved their execution.
Otherwise they would have been immediately executed in Poland. At the
very least, these women were entitled to remain unmolested so long as
the Governor General took no action. He may never have acted or, when he
did, he may have acted favorably on the pardon. Who is to say that the
majority of these 700 women did not live through the war even though
they did not undergo the experiments? Certainly it was incumbent on the
defense to prove the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence. This
it did not do by any evidence.
The defendants Gebhardt, Fischer, and Oberheuser certainly cannot claim
that they believed in good faith that the Polish women could have been
legally executed. Even the camp doctor, Schiedlausky, knew that the
Governor General had to approve each execution. Moreover, the large
number of 700 women being sentenced to death at this early stage of the
war was enough to put any reasonable person on notice that something was
wrong.
Additionally, the uncontroverted evidence proves that survival of the
experiments was no guarantee whatever of avoiding execution in any
event. At least six of the experimental subjects were proved to have
been executed after having survived the experiments. It was not a
question of the experiment _or_ execution but rather the experiments
_and_ execution. Indeed, in February 1945, an effort was made to execute
all of the experimental subjects but, because of confusion in the camp
due to the war situation, the experimental subjects were able to obtain
different identification numbers and so avoid detection.
But even if one takes the case of the defense at its face value, the
Tribunal is in effect asked to rule that it is legal for military
doctors of a nation at war to experiment on political prisoners of an
occupied country who are condemned to death, to experiment on them in
such a way that they may suffer death, excrutiating pain, mutilation,
and permanent disability, all this without their consent and in direct
aid of the military potential of their enemy. There would, of course, be
no valid reason for limiting such a decision to civilian prisoners; the
experiments would certainly have been no worse had they been performed
on Polish or American prisoners of war. It is impossible to consider
seriously this ghoulish ruling being sought for by the defense.
c. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense
_EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT
KARL BRANDT_
* * * * *
_The Medical Experiments as Substitute for Penalty_[11]
The indictment embraces certain medical experiments, which are called
war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to paragraphs 10 and
15 of the indictment, these experiments are designated as crimes, as a
violation of the general principles of criminal law as evolved from the
penal law of all civilized nations, as well as violations of the
national penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were
committed. An indication of their punishable character was seen in the
fact that the experiments were carried out _without the consent of the
persons experimented upon_.
We must examine whether this _consent_ of the person subjected to
experiments is always necessary or whether it can be replaced _by an
order of the state_ through the penal administration, and further, if
the same law applies to the execution of sentences on foreigners. If
consent to the human experiment by the person experimented on can be
replaced by an order of the state, then the person responsible for the
experiment cannot be punished in cases where the experiments were
carried out through the _official penal administration in accordance
with the order_.
No _legal regulations_ regarding the question of admissibility of
medical experiments in civilized countries are _known_. However, it is a
fact that such experiments have been carried out to a greater or lesser
extent within the memory of man in all countries and up till now have
remained unopposed. But with the development of medical knowledge and
modern methods of research, experiments on human beings have increased
considerably. Today, when research, to solve its problems and meet its
challenges, has advanced into the most widely differentiated spheres,
they are considered absolutely necessary. Accordingly, human experiments
will continue to increase with the progress of science and the _problem_
that this trial has raised will always be _urgent_.
Moreover, reference is made to the opinion of the Washington anatomist,
E. V. Cowdry, on the necessity of human experiments in cancer research
(_Karl Brandt 50, Karl Brandt Ex. 56_), and the order for human
experiments on the part of the British Military Government for Professor
McCance in Wuppertal. The knowledge of such experiments on human beings
was, as literature shows, at first limited to medical specialist circles
and the official authorities concerned. Only in recent times has _the
public_ been cautiously informed. (_Becker-Freyseng 60, Becker-Freyseng
Ex. 58._) Complete instruction of the public is only necessary so that,
in case of an eventual discussion, sound judgment of the actions of the
researcher may be possible.
Reference is also made to the remarkable publication on the malaria
experiment on 800 prisoners in the United States, published in the
widely circulated periodical “Life” (_Karl Brandt 1, Karl Brandt Ex.
1_). The number of the imprisoned persons to be experimented upon was
even more than 2,000, according to the radio account submitted.
Repeated reports on such experiments have so far been _received without
opposition_ by specialist circles, the authorities, and also the general
public. From that can be gathered what in principle is considered
permissible and right by competent authorities and the public. The
experiments actually carried out are a mirror of the existing laws and
one can by way of _legal sociological investigation find the norms of
law_ that have validity. This is done where the law is not codified. In
the same manner, the International Military Tribunal has derived the
existing international law on the basis of its phenomena and the same
procedure leads to the determination of the common law. Inasmuch as
positive regulations exist in the United States which are contradictory
to the law derived from the phenomena, these legal regulations must be
produced or else the _conclusions_ that can be drawn from the
experiments must be regarded _in favor of the defendant_ as valid law
and an expression of fundamental principles of punishment.
The defense has in the present situation only very limited literature at
its disposal for the comprehension and explanation of these legally
important facts of the case. However, the little that is available is
already so revealing that one must come to the conclusion that medical
experiments on human beings are not only admissible on principle, but in
addition, that it also does _not_ violate _the basic principles of
criminal law_ of civilized nations to carry out _experiments on
convicts_.
The _question_ today is not whether experiments on human beings may be
carried out but only under what circumstances and _how_ these
experiments may be undertaken. Moreover, the prosecution itself has
declared that human experiments are admissible on principle.
It is not intended here to go into the experiments which were made on
the healthy and the sick and _corpus vile_ at the _time_ when modern
research was in _its infancy_ and without participation of government
authorities. Insight into those times can be obtained from the book by
the Russian physician _Wressajew_ “Confession of a Physician” (_Karl
Brandt 48, Karl Brandt Ex. 55_), published about 1900. The book reveals
some of the experiments that were then known to medical experts and it
follows that the governments did not interfere but in the interest of
medical progress permitted such experiments without trying to protect
the individual as the person experimented upon. The states then either
_considered_ such experiments _compatible with criminal law_, or they
acquiesced in the camouflaging of the “voluntariness” of the person
experimented upon which was customary in consideration of the law. No
governmental intervention as the result of such medical experiments is
known.
With the development of health administrations, _governmental
supervision_ has been increasingly instituted in all countries and one
can consider all that was admitted in medical experiments with the
consent of the administration and without opposition as the _sediment of
the existing law_. This is true particularly of recent times where
governmental direction is on the increase.
Particular attention must be given here to the experiments in state
institutes on convicts and those sentenced to death.
* * * * *
_EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR
DEFENDANT GEBHARDT_[12]
* * * * *
_The Agreement by the Experimental Persons as Legal Justification_
I shall now deal with the individual reasons for the exclusion of
injustice and guilt, which according to the result of the evidence
preclude the culpability of the defendant’s behavior. I am hereby taking
into consideration that the assumption of only one of the reasons for
the exclusion of punishment which we shall now deal with suffices to
justify the defendant’s behavior and to exonerate him of the offense in
the sense of a personal culpability because of his commission or
omission. The individual reasons for the exclusion of culpability are
discussed without taking into consideration whether the examination of
any further similar reasons is superfluous, since the assumption of
another reason for the exclusion of culpability suffices to secure the
intended success. Evidence has proved that the experiments for testing
sulfanilamides were carried out, to begin with, on fifteen professional
male criminals who had been sentenced to death. Had they survived the
experiments, they would have been granted a pardon therefor. Considering
that this part of the experiment is not a subject of the indictment, I
need not go into detail about it.
To the second and third group (the sulfanilamide experiments) belonged
as experimental subjects members of the Polish Resistance Movement, who,
in view of their activity in this illegal movement, had been sentenced
to death by German courts martial.
It is a principle of German criminal law that in any case the consent of
the offender precludes the illegality of the action. This principle is
not only found in German law but is an established part of practically
all legal systems. Consequently, we have to examine the question whether
the experimental subjects gave their consent to the experiments. When
examining the question whether legally effective consent had been given,
it will not matter so much whether the experimental subjects expressly
declared their consent. However, if generally acknowledged principles
are applied, one may presume that they expressed their consent in some
obvious manner. It is clear that consent could also have been given
tacitly and by conclusive action.
However, it is true that all the female witnesses examined in court
testified that they did not give their consent to the experiments. The
Tribunal, in evaluating these facts, will have to take into
consideration that these witnesses were in a special position at that
time, as they also are today. It stands to reason that under these
circumstances many things may appear different to them today from the
way they actually happened five years ago. It might be true that the
experimental subjects did not give their actual consent to these
experiments. It might even be true that they were not asked before the
experiments whether they consented to the experiments. Nevertheless this
would not exclude the possibility that, considering their position at
that time and being certain that they could not escape execution in any
other way, they nevertheless did consent to the experiments, however
tacitly. This supposition would coincide with the fact that, for
instance, none of the experimental subjects had ever made any complaint
or mentioned to the defendant Fischer, who had regularly changed the
dressings, that they did not consent to the experiments.
_The Presumed Consent of the Experimental Subjects as
Legal Justification_
The illegality of an action is excluded not only if the injured person
agreed either actually or tacitly, but if there could have been a
possible consent. These are the cases where the consent of the injured
person could be expected normally, but where for some reason or another
such a consent was actually not given. Numerous attempts have been made
in legal literature and also in judicial decisions to do justice to this
situation which so often occurs in practice. Not all of these theories
need to be discussed since the decisive points of view have by now been
clarified. At first an attempt was made to settle this question by
applying the law referring to unauthorized acting for and on behalf of
another person. Serious objections were raised against this transfer of
concepts of civil law to criminal law. The criminal idea of consent is
to be extended instead to include so-called supposed consent. I
understand this as an objective judicial judgment based on
probabilities, namely, that the person concerned would have given his
consent to the action from his personal point of view if he had fully
known and realized the situation. Wherever such a judgment could be
applied, it should have the same effect as the judicial finding of an
actual consent.
However, other courts and scientists base their reason for justification
upon “action for the benefit of the injured person”. If correctly
viewed, no actual contradiction to an assumed comment could be seen
therein. On the contrary one may say perhaps that this could be
considered as an independent argument for justification.
In modern literature and judicial practice, the tendency prevails to
combine the two last mentioned viewpoints by demanding them
cumulatively. It is not comprehensible, however, why such simultaneous
existence of two arguments for justification should be required when
each argument in itself is decisive.
A well-known teacher of criminal law in Germany stated the following
conception of this idea: “Should the injured person not consent, the
action in his behalf and for his benefit is to be considered lawful if
his consent could have been expected according to an objective judgment.
The primary justifying argument here is not that the injured person has
waived his right of decision, but that a positive action was performed
for his benefit.”
The practical result, in spite of the theoretical objections raised
against such a combination, could hardly be different. For the
“objective judicial sentence based on probabilities,” here applied for,
which is decisive and upon which the so-called supposed consent would
have to be based, will regularly result from an action that under given
circumstances is performed for the “benefit of the injured person.”
Applying these general principles to the sulfanilamide experiments,
there can hardly be any doubt that the experimental subjects would have
agreed if they had been fully aware of their position. The experimental
subjects had already been sentenced to death and their participation in
these experiments was the only possibility for them to avoid execution.
If the Tribunal now tries to assess the probability that the
experimental subjects would have agreed to submit to those experiments
if they had had full knowledge of the position and the certainty of
their eventual execution, there can in my opinion be very little doubt
as to the result of this examination.
Nor can there be two opinions regarding the question whether, under
circumstances prevailing at that time, the utilization of the prisoners
for these experiments was “in the interest of the wounded”.
The evidence has shown that the other members of the Polish Resistance
Movement, who were sentenced to death by court martial and who were in
the concentration camp at Ravensbrueck awaiting the confirmation of the
verdict which was given by the Governor General of the occupied Polish
territory, were really shot only after a complicated and protracted
procedure. Their participation in these medical experiments was the only
chance for them as condemned persons to save their lives. Their
participation in these experiments was not only in their interest but it
also seems to be inconceivable that the prisoners, if they had been
fully aware of their position and had known of the forthcoming
execution, would not have given their consent for the experiments.
* * * * *
_The Defendant’s Erroneous Assumption of an Agreement by the
Experimental Subjects_
The evidence has shown that the experimental subjects in Camp
Ravensbrueck were not selected by the defendant Karl Gebhardt nor by any
of the other defendants, but that the selection was made by the
competent agency within the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin or the
political department of the Ravensbrueck concentration camp. During the
conference at the beginning of July 1942, in which the conditions for
the experiments were agreed upon, it was expressly assured that the
experimental subjects were persons sentenced to death who were to be
pardoned if they survived the experiments.
In view of the fact that the defendant Gebhardt did not himself select
the experimental subjects and that, on the other hand, no complaints of
any kind on the part of the experimental subjects were ever reported to
him,—the defendant Fischer was not in a position to make any personal
observations along these lines either—we now must examine the question
of the legal position of the defendant Gebhardt if he erroneously
assumed the consent of the experimental subjects.
In criminal law it is a generally recognized principle that there can be
no question of intentional action if there existed an erroneous
assumption of justificatory facts. This principle can also be found in
Article 59 of the German Penal Code.[13] But beyond that, this legal
principle may be considered one of the principles which is generally
valid and which is derived from the general principles of the criminal
law of all civilized nations, thus representing an inherent part of our
modern conception of criminal law. In application of this principle—and
even if the Court does not consider the consent of the experimental
subjects as proved and, therefore, does not provide the prerequisites
for a legal excuse for objective reasons—we still cannot assume an
intentional act on the part of the defendant Gebhardt if he acted under
the “erroneous assumption of consent by the experimental subjects.”
_The Erroneous Assumption of Probable Agreement_
The same applies if the defendant Gebhardt erroneously assumed a
probable consent of the experimental subjects. We do not mean here an
erroneous assumption with regard to the legal suppositions of such a
one, but the erroneous assumption of such facts, which, had they
existed, would have induced the Tribunal to recognize the “probable
consent.” I am referring here to my argumentation for the legal excuse
represented by the “probable consent,” which I understand as “an
objective opinion concerning the law, based on probability and according
to which the person concerned would have consented to the act from his
own personal standpoint, if he had been fully aware of the
circumstances.” Provided that the defendant Dr. Gebhardt assumed the
existence of such circumstances which seems certain according to the
evidence, and even if he did so erroneously, the intent and thus the
crime in this case would also be excluded according to the generally
acknowledged principle.
* * * * *
d. Evidence
_Testimony_
Page
Extract from the testimony of defendant Mrugowsky 56
Extract from the testimony of prosecution expert witness Dr. 60
Andrew C. Ivy
EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY[14]
_DIRECT EXAMINATION_
* * * * *
DR. FLEMMING: You know that General Taylor, in his opening speech, said
that this experiment with aconitine had not been conducted in order to
find an antidote to aconitine but in order to ascertain how long it
takes to kill a human being in this manner. Please tell the Tribunal
whether this concerned an experiment.
DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY: This was not an experiment in the actual sense of
the word. It was the legal execution of five thieves, and some special
facts were to be ascertained during this execution. The details were as
follows: One day the chemist of the Reich Criminal Police Office, Dr.
Wittmann, came to me. He asked me to attend an execution as the official
doctor. As the reason for this request he added that in the General
Government in Poland a high official had been injured when he was
attacked with a revolver; that the bullet had inflicted only a harmless
flesh wound, but nevertheless the person had died after a few hours with
symptoms of poisoning. The person who had attacked him had been
arrested, and the rest of the ammunition was a hollow ball which
contained a crystallized poison. The Chemical Institute of the Reich
Criminal Police Office tested this and found that it was aconitine. The
ammunition was of Russian origin. There is no aconitine in Germany; it
is imported. The question was whether this was the first case of the
beginning of poison warfare against Germany. We had been expecting such
a method of warfare for some time. For that reason there was not only
criminal interest in clearing up this case but a general interest of the
greatest importance. This ammunition was to be tested on five thieves
who were to be executed anyhow, and it was to be seen whether this
crystallized poison contained another poison which had not been found in
the chemical tests. The remainder of the original Russian ammunition was
to be used, and also German ammunition which had been made in imitation
of the Russian. At the same time—and this was the main purpose of the
experiment—it was to be discovered how much time would elapse between
the injury and the appearance of the symptoms of poisoning, in order, if
necessary, to be able to use an antidote. This question was of such
great importance because an antidote to aconitine is hardly known, and
if this had actually been the beginning of poison warfare, then efforts
would have to be made immediately to find an antidote. Therefore, the
head of the Reich Criminal Police Office asked me, and the Chief of the
Criminal Technical Office also asked me, to participate in the execution
myself, although that was not actually my work; but Dr. Wittmann said he
did not know of any toxicologist except one in Berlin; they had all been
drafted, and as a bacteriologist I had a certain amount of experience in
symptoms of poisoning connected with bacteria and, therefore, he asked
me to take over this job. I was rather unwilling to do so. I pointed out
to Dr. Wittmann that the regular police in Vienna had a pharmacologist
who was very experienced and I suggested that he should be called upon;
but this was not done because of the poor communications resulting from
the air warfare. Since, on the other hand, this question was doubtless
of great significance and should not be postponed, I finally declared
myself willing to fulfill this request. In accordance with the purpose
of this job, I made not only the usual report, but a rather more
detailed report on the symptoms of poisoning. There is the report which
we have here in this prosecution document.
Q. You have said that this ammunition which was captured was of Russian
production. How can that be proved?
A. The prosecution itself proved that. To this Document NO-201,
Prosecution Exhibit 290, some files were attached which were not
included in my report. There are three drawings of cross-sections of
these bullets which were made and handed in to the Institute. The
heading is “Poison bullet from a Russian pistol, calibre 7.65” and
details about the construction of this bullet.
Q. You say that this photostatic copy of the drawings of the bullet was
not part of your report. How is that shown? Will you compare the stamps
in the diary?
A. The report which I handed in is dated 12 September 1944, and then the
next day it was received by the Criminal Technical Office, and the
receipt stamp carried the number “Secret 53”. The drawings, however,
have a different secret journal number, that is, 15-1944. If the number
G-53 was in September then, if the distribution of letters received is
assumed to be even throughout the year, I should assume that the Reich
Criminal Police Office received these drawings in March of the same
year. At that time I did not know anything about this attack, and the
experiment had not been started yet. Nor did I know any details about
the possibility of such poison warfare.
Q. Who was present at the execution?
A. Dr. Ding, who happened to be in Berlin and whom I took with me in
order to support my observations; it was he who conducted the actual
medical examination. I, myself, merely ascertained the occurrence of
death. Also Dr. Wittmann, representing the Criminal Technical Institute;
also a representative of the camp commandant, I believe the adjutant;
and an Untersturmfuehrer who performed the execution, that is, actually
shot the people. It is possible that there were others whom I do not
remember and whose names I do not know.
Q. Did you investigate in any way who these people were who were
executed, and by what court they had been condemned to death?
A. I talked with the people; they understood German; they were
apparently Germans. I considered them ethnic Germans [Volksdeutsche] of
whom we had large numbers in Germany at that time. On the other hand, I
knew that in concentration camps executions were carried out, and I had
been told that this was an official matter and that there had to be an
official representative of the camp commandant present. The fact that
such a representative was present at this execution was sufficient for
me to assume that the matter actually was official and, on the other
hand, I had no opportunity to be informed of the sentence or anything
like that.
Q. Then you did not see the death sentence order before it was carried
out?
A. No. I did not have the opportunity because the doctor is merely
called in to an execution to ascertain when death occurs, but I am
convinced that it was not my duty to examine the sentence order, for I
had nothing to do with the actual execution. The order was given by the
representative of the camp commandant; someone who was attached to the
commandant’s office actually shot the people, and I was merely there to
ascertain when death occurred and to note the symptoms of poisoning, but
Dr. Ding did the latter for me. The official information from a high
authority was sufficient proof to me for the legality of the execution.
Q. In the case of two of the five thieves, the poison had no effect. You
saw the suffering of the other three from the poison; why did you not
shorten this suffering?
A. The sight of this execution was one of the most horrible experiences
of my life. On the other hand, I could not shorten the symptoms for in
the first place there was no antidote against aconitine available. If it
is in the circulation, then there is no possibility of removing it. In
the second place, it was the express purpose to find out how long the
symptoms of poisoning last in order in later cases to be able to use an
antidote, which it was hoped would soon be discovered.
Q. Did you know that executions in Germany can only be carried out by
shooting, by hanging, or by beheading, and did you not have any
misgivings when this execution was carried out in a different way?
A. I am not a jurist; I do not know the methods of execution. On the
other hand, I have already said that in my opinion the state itself has
the right to determine the method of death for its citizens in wartime
and doubtless has the right to determine the method of an execution.
Here the suspicion had arisen that poison war was beginning against
Germany. This seemed to be supported by the finding of poison Russian
ammunition. Since the investigations were carried out by the highest
authorities in the Reich, I had no doubt about the juridicial
admissibility upon which I, as a doctor, had no influence.
PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: Witness, were each of these men struck by more
than one bullet or only by one bullet each?
DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY: Each one was shot only once in the thigh; two of
these five persons were immediately killed by another shot, because the
first shot of the poison ammunition had hit the artery in the thigh and
their suffering was immediately stopped; but the others had only flesh
wounds and after a certain period of time, symptoms of poisoning
appeared; that was three people.
DR. FLEMMING: Did you have anything else to do with the previous history
of this execution?
MRUGOWSKY: No.
* * * * *
EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION EXPERT WITNESS
DR. ANDREW C. IVY[15]
_CROSS-EXAMINATION_
* * * * *
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I should like to ask your permission to
put to the witness a small newspaper notice from the newspaper “The
People” of 3 March 1946. This is an English newspaper. Regarding the
defendants before the IMT, the following was stated: “The opinion of
some people is that they should be condemned very soon.” Then it says:
“Others believe that they should be made to expiate their crimes by
helping to cure cancer, leprosy, and tuberculosis as experimental
subjects.”
Is the thought of atonement contained therein?
WITNESS DR. IVY: Yes, but it is expressed in a hysterical manner.
Q. Yes. I agree with you.
Witness, do you believe that if a person does not volunteer for an
experiment, the state can order such atonement?
A. No.
Q. Do you not believe that you can expect something of a prisoner that
goes beyond his actual sentence if at the same time people outside
prison are subject to such burdens?
A. No. Those ideas were given up many years ago in the science and study
of penology. The primary objective of penology today is reformative, not
punitive, not expiative.
Q. Witness, is that the recognized theory of penology throughout the
whole world today?
A. It may not be the recognized theory throughout the whole world today,
but it is the prevailing theory in the United States. There is one other
aspect that is quite large and essential, and that is the protective
aspect of imprisonment to protect society from a habitual criminal.
Q. Witness, if a soldier at the front is exposed to an epidemic and can
be almost certain that he will catch typhus and deserts and hides behind
the protecting walls of a prison, would you not consider it justifiable
if he is persuaded to volunteer for an experiment that concerns itself
with typhus?
A. Will you read the question again?
Q. If a soldier deserts from the front where typhus is raging for fear
that he too will contract typhus and prefers to be imprisoned in order
thus to save himself, do you think it is right for him to be persuaded
while he is serving his sentence to subject himself to a typhus
experiment?
A. As a volunteer? Yes.
Q. I see. And would you not take a step further, if this prisoner says,
“No, I refuse, because if I do this there wouldn’t have been any point
in my deserting; I deserted in order to save myself. My buddies may die
but I would just prefer not to.”
A. The answer to that question is no.
Q. Don’t you admit that one can hold a different view in this matter?
A. Yes, but I don’t believe it could be justified.
* * * * *
H. Usefulness of the Experiments
a. Introduction
Both by testimony and argument the defense claimed that the medical
experiments had generally been useful in furthering medical science,
that in some cases the experiments alleged as criminal had increased the
speed of the progress of medical science, and that in some cases there
was no other alternative for the development of medical science except
to conduct experiments on human beings. The prosecution, in addition to
arguing that voluntary participation by the subject of experimentation
was a prerequisite of legal experiments, argued that the experiments
turned out to be entirely useless for medical science and human
progress, and that in some cases it was doubtful if considerations of
medical science played any controlling role in the decision to conduct
the experiments.
Selections from the defense argumentation have been made from the final
pleas for the defendants Becker-Freyseng and Beiglboeck. Extracts from
these final pleas appear below on pages 62 to 64. A part of the opening
statement of the prosecution (vol. I, p. 37 ff.) was devoted to this
topic. Defense evidence on the usefulness of the experiments has been
selected from the direct examination of the defendants Mrugowsky and
Rose. Extracts from their testimony appear below on pages 66 to 70.
b. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense
_EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR
DEFENDANT BECKER-FREYSENG_[16]
* * * * *
At the moment I consider one factor above all to be material. It is the
following question: Was everything done, when the sea-water experiments
were being planned, to furnish all data required for establishing the
necessity of the experiments? And I think I can definitely answer this
question in the affirmative.
The defense has proved the high sense of responsibility applied to the
inquiry on the necessity of the sea-water experiments. Scientists of
international reputation, like Professor Dr. Eppinger and Professor
Heubner, were consulted, and they definitely answered this question in
the affirmative. More cannot be expected or demanded in the way of a
sense of responsibility. In my opinion, the mere fact that these
scientists were asked their opinion on the issue in question shows that
everything was done on the part of the Chief of the Medical Service of
the Luftwaffe and his office to reach the right decision in this
question.
With regard to the purely objective judgment of the sea-water
experiments and their necessity, I should like to refer to the
statements made in my closing brief for Dr. Becker-Freyseng.
At this point, I should, however, like to add the following: The
prosecution has tried to make out that it was the purpose of these
sea-water experiments to decide whether Berkatit removes the salt from
sea water. This contention of the prosecution has in no way been proved.
I must stress here again, most emphatically, that this was never the
purpose of the sea-water experiments.
All people concerned realized that Berkatit does not remove the salt
from sea water. The question which was to be clarified and which
necessitated the experiments was rather the following: Under the action
of the vitamins contained in Berkatit, will the kidneys be capable of
producing a urine with a higher sodium chloride concentration than is
normally the case? Dr. Eppinger answered this question neither in the
affirmative nor in the negative; he stated that this question could be
decided only by experiment.
In addition there was another question to be decided, as to whether in
case of shipwreck it would be more desirable to endure thirst, or
whether marooned fliers should be advised to drink small quantities of
salt water. In 1942-1944 this question was also raised in the United
States and England and there, too, human experiments were carried out.
But all these individual questions were only part of the great issue of
how shipwrecked persons could be helped to escape the agony and danger
of dying from thirst. These issues were the basis for the experiments
conducted in 1944. In my opinion it is not admissible to construe
arbitrarily another issue today and to contend on the basis of such
issue, which never existed, that these experiments were not necessary.
These medical issues alone necessitated the experiments. There were
other issues too, to which I want to make short reference.
Until 1944 the world lacked an agent to make sea water drinkable. Such
an agent was an absolute necessity. Nobody denied even then that
Wofatit, developed by the defendant Schaefer, would have been an ideal
agent for this purpose. It was, however, equally clear that this agent
could only be manufactured by withdrawing the necessary raw material,
namely silver, from other war-essential uses.
Furthermore, it was not denied that Berkatit did not require critical
raw materials in the same measure. Another circumstance to be considered
was that Berkatit could have been produced in existing plants, whereas
it would have been necessary to erect new plants for the production of
Wofatit. Accordingly, these technical reasons favored the introduction
of Berkatit. It can hardly be denied that it was necessary for a medical
officer conscious of his responsibilities in war to consider these
reasons when reaching a decision. Incidentally, the expert of the
prosecution, Professor Ivy, also stated that these reasons were
definitely worthy of consideration.
Accordingly it had to be clarified, whether Berkatit could not, after
all, be introduced for distribution to persons facing the risk of
shipwreck, and the inquiry into this question was all the more necessary
as, according to the opinion of Professor Eppinger and Professor
Heubner, Berkatit apparently contained vitamins which eliminated the
risks incurred by human beings when drinking sea water. Whether the
opinion of the experts, Heubner and Eppinger, was right or not, could,
at that time as today, only be established by experiment.
Hence if the defendant Dr. Becker-Freyseng, who examined all these
factors and applied all precautions possible, became convinced in 1944
that the experiments could not be avoided, and if, from this viewpoint,
in his official capacity as a consultant (Referent) he reported to his
highest authority at that time, Professor Dr. Schroeder, that he
considered the experiments necessary, then, in my opinion, he can in no
way be charged under criminal law on that account.
Therefore, in my opinion, it has been proved that Dr. Becker-Freyseng
considered these experiments necessary and that he was entitled to
consider them necessary. And this question alone can be made the basis
for an inquiry into his guilt under criminal law.
With regard to this point, I would like in conclusion to refer to the
testimony of Professor Dr. Vollhardt. This world-famous physician, this
research scientist, recognized as such in international circles, upon
whom, only a few weeks ago, on the occasion of his 75th birthday, the
highest German decoration of science was bestowed, namely the Goethe
Medal for Art and Science, a ceremony in which nearly all European
countries, also America, joined, stated before this high Tribunal, and I
quote:
“I regarded it as sign of a sense of responsibility that in view
of the increasing number of flying accidents, the sea-emergency
question was taken up and these experiments were launched.”
Insofar, I consider it proved that the planning of these experiments was
in no way objectionable.
* * * * *
_EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR
DEFENDANT BEIGLBOECK_[17]
* * * * *
Even medical science on both sides had to assist warfare. I have before
me the index of the best known scientific English periodicals from the
war period, “The Lancet” and “Nature”. Now, after the war, General T. J.
Betts of the United States War Department and Professor W. T. Sinsteat
of the British Supply Office declared that the captured German
scientific results accomplished during the war were of the greatest use
for the economic progress of British and American industry. Even the
terrible freezing experiments of Dr. Rascher proved to be of greatest
use for America in the war against Japan. (_Becker-Freyseng 31,
Becker-Freyseng Ex. 18._)
c. Evidence
_Defense Documents_
Doc. No. Def. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
Becker-Freyseng Becker-Freyseng Extracts from Harper’s 65
31 Ex. 18 Magazine entitled “Secrets
by the Thousand” by C.
Lester Walker.
_Testimony_
Extract from the testimony of defendant Mrugowsky 66
Extracts from the testimony of defendant Rose 69
BECKER-FREYSENG DOCUMENT 31
BECKER-FREYSENG DEFENSE EXHIBIT 18
EXTRACTS FROM HARPER’S MAGAZINE ENTITLED “SECRETS BY THE THOUSAND” BY C.
LESTER WALKER
Someone wrote to Wright Field recently saying he understood this country
had got together quite a collection of enemy war secrets, that many were
now on public sale, and could he, please, be sent everything on German
jet engines. The Air Documents Division of the Army Air Force answered:
“Sorry—but that would be fifty tons.”
Moreover, that fifty tons was just a small portion of what is today
undoubtedly the biggest collection of captured enemy war secrets ever
assembled. If you always thought of war secrets—as who hasn’t—as
coming in sixes and sevens, as a few items of information readily handed
on to the properly interested authorities, it may interest you to learn
that the war secrets in this collection run into the thousands, that the
mass of documents is mountainous, and that there has never before been
anything quite comparable to it.
* * * * *
One Washington official has called it “the greatest single source of
this type of material in the world—the first orderly exploitation of an
entire country’s brainpower”.
How the collection came to be goes back, for beginnings, to one day in
1944 when the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff set in motion a colossal
search for war secrets in occupied German territory. They created a
group of military-civilian teams, termed the Joint Intelligence
Objectives Committee, which was to follow the invading armies into
Germany and uncover all her military, scientific, and industrial secrets
for early use against Japan. These teams worked against time to get the
most vital information before it was destroyed, and in getting it
performed prodigies of ingenuity and tenacity.
* * * * *
III
In matters of food, medicine, and branches of the military art, the
finds of the search teams were no less impressive. And in aeronautics
and guided missiles they proved to be downright alarming.
* * * * *
“As for medical secrets in this collection”, one Army surgeon has
remarked, “some of them will save American medicine years of research;
some of them are revolutionary—like, for instance, the German technique
of treatment after prolonged and usually fatal exposure to cold.”
This discovery—revealed to us by Major Alexander’s search already
mentioned—reversed everything medical science thought about the
subject. In every one of the dread experiments the subjects were most
successfully revived, both temporarily and permanently, by immediate
immersion in hot water. In two cases of complete standstill of heart and
cessation of respiration, a hot bath at 122° brought both subjects back
to life. Before our war with Japan ended, this method was adopted as the
treatment for use by all American Air-Sea Rescue Services, and it is
generally accepted by medicine today.
EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY[18]
_DIRECT EXAMINATION_
* * * * *
DR. FLEMMING: I further submit an excerpt from the testimony of
Generalarzt Dr. Schreiber which he made on 26 August 1946 before the
International Military Tribunal. This can be found in the transcript of
the International Military Tribunal for that date. This is Mrugowsky
Document 27. I offer it as Mrugowsky Exhibit 45. Answering the question,
“What scientific value did the experiments [typhus experiments in
Buchenwald] of the specialist Ding have”? Generalarzt Dr. Schreiber
answered, “In my opinion they had no scientific value at all because
during the war we had already gained much experience and collected a
great deal of data in this field. We were thoroughly acquainted with the
composition and qualities of our vaccine and no such tests were required
any longer. Many of the vaccines examined by Ding were not used any more
at all and were rejected.”
Would you define your position to that statement?
DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY: I do not know how Schreiber could have expressed
that opinion, nor do I know whether he is in possession of full
knowledge of the results of this work. I never discussed this question
with him and I therefore cannot examine it. This much is clear, however,
that Schreiber is speaking of a later period of time, for the vaccines
that were no longer produced were not produced because the experiments
of Ding had proved their inferiority. The epidemiological examination of
the various vaccines during the war only originates from a later period,
in particular the years 1943 and 1944. The exploitation of these
experiences only originates from the last years of the war and it is,
therefore, my opinion that this testimony of Schreiber is incorrect.
Q. I am interrupting you and I shall have Handloser Exhibit 14 shown to
you. We are here concerned with an excerpt of a scientific thesis by
Geheimrat Otto. Do you know Geheimrat Otto?
A. Yes, I know Geheimrat Otto. He is probably the best typhus expert not
only in Germany but in Europe, who has dealt with typhus all his life.
Q. From this excerpt you will see that Geheimrat Otto says, still in
1943:
“While the efficacy of lice vaccines has already been tested on
a large scale in Poland, Ethiopia, and China, and the vaccine
has proved its value, it is still necessary to gather
large-scale practical experiences with lung and vitelline
membrane vaccines. In animal experiments they have proved of
equal value with the former.”
Would you say something on that?
A. Professor Otto says here that even in the year 1943 the vitelline
membrane vaccine and the vaccines from lungs of animals were not
sufficiently known. That confirms what I have just testified and that is
in answer to Dr. Schreiber’s statement.
Q. The witness Bernhard Schmidt, who was interrogated here, stated that
human experiments were superfluous for the purpose of testing vaccines
and that the value of the individual typhus vaccines could have been
ascertained in an epidemiological way. What is your opinion in that
connection?
A. This is my opinion also. It is my opinion that these tests could have
been carried out in an epidemiological manner. I represented that point
of view before Grawitz and Himmler from the very beginning.
Q. You stated yesterday that to test this matter in an epidemiological
way, a large number of persons would have had to be vaccinated and
compared with a large number of persons who were not vaccinated. Would
such a long experiment have been possible considering the circumstances
prevailing during the war?
A. Such a test would have been possible. It was actually introduced by
me within the framework of the ministry. It is a matter of course,
however, that the results can only be collected at a very late date and
can only be exploited at a much later date. In the case of the entire
experiment we were concerned with bridging over this space of time.
Q. In carrying out this examination one could have found that one
vaccine has only a very small effectiveness, as was actually found out
in the case of the Behring vaccine. In that case would you say that the
mortality of persons vaccinated with the inferior vaccine would have
been much greater than the entire amount of fatalities as they occurred
in Buchenwald? You know that the statement regarding the fatality
figures fluctuated between 100 and 120.
A. That could be assumed to be the case with certainty. A comparison is
the manner in which all tests are carried out in this field. I shall
give you a few examples for that. When Emil von Behring in the year 1890
discovered the diphtheria serum, it was at first used by a physician of
the Berlin Charité in the case of diphtheria-infected children. He
treated about 1,200 children suffering from diphtheria with that serum.
He registered a mortality rate in the case of these children, in spite
of the treatment, of approximately 22 percent. Just as many children did
not receive the serum but were treated in a different manner. In this
group the mortality rate was double, approximately 44 percent. These 240
or 250 children who died, and who were in that control group could
certainly have been saved if they had been given the blessing of that
diphtheria serum. But that was in reality the purpose of that test and
one had to take into account that a larger ratio of fatalities would
result in the group to be compared and that then the value of the serum
would be recognized.
Q. I think that this example will suffice. In that case you are really
admitting that an objection against experiments in Buchenwald could not
be justified?
A. During the war I did not work on any disease as ardently as on
typhus. I treated thousands of patients who fell ill with typhus and
examined them. I believe that in the case of such an experience one
gains some knowledge of the disease. I often considered that question
and I hold the opinion that my objection at the time was perhaps not
justified by events. On the other hand, it is my opinion that in the
case of every task one has to keep the question in mind whether one is
in a position to execute that task. I must admit even today that in
spite of the success of the experiments, which cannot be denied, I would
act similarly in yet another position and would assume the same attitude
as I assumed at that time. Even today I would not be prepared to carry
out any such experiments personally or have them carried out upon my
responsibility, although success undoubtedly would come about.
EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT ROSE[19]
_DIRECT EXAMINATION_
* * * * *
DR. FRITZ: What do you know about the reasons for this protest (against
experiments) being ignored and the typhus experiments being carried out
in spite of it?
* * * * *
DEFENDANT ROSE: The Buchenwald experiments (with typhus vaccine) had
four main results. First of all, they showed that belief in the
protective effect of Weigl vaccine was a mistake, although this belief
seemed to be based on long observation. Secondly, they showed that the
useful vaccines did not protect against infection, but almost certainly
prevented death, under the conditions of the Buchenwald experiments.
Thirdly, they showed that the objections of the biological experts to
the vitelline membrane vaccines and to the lice vaccines were
unjustified, and that vitelline membrane, rabbit lungs, and lice
intestines were of equal value. We learned this only through the
Buchenwald experiments. This left the way open to mass production of
typhus vaccines.
The Buchenwald experiments showed in time that several vaccines were
useless. First, the process according to Otto and Wohlrab, the process
according to Cox, the process of Rickettsia Prowazeki and Rickettsia
murina, that is, vaccine from egg cultures; secondly, the vaccines of
the Behring works which were produced according to the Otto process, but
with other concentrations; finally the Ipsen vaccines from mouse liver.
The vaccines of the Behring works were in actual use at that time in
thousands of doses. They always represented a danger to health. Without
these experiments the vaccines, which were recognized as useless, would
have been produced in large quantities because they all had one thing in
common: their technical production was much simpler and cheaper than
that of the useful vaccines. In any case, one thing is certain, that the
victims of this Buchenwald typhus test did not suffer in vain and did
not die in vain. There was only one choice, the sacrifice of human
lives, of persons determined for that purpose, or to let things run
their course, to endanger the lives of innumerable human beings who
would be selected not by the Reich Criminal Police Office but by blind
fate.
How many people were sacrificed we cannot figure out today; how many
people were saved by these experiments we, of course, cannot prove. The
individual who owes his life to these experiments does not know it, and
he perhaps is one of the accusers of the doctors who assumed this
difficult task.
I. Medical Ethics
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
a. Introduction
In a case involving the charge that human beings were subjected to
medical experiments of many kinds under varying circumstances, it was
inevitable that questions of medical ethics became a part of the proof
and the argumentation.
The prosecution’s rejoinder to the statement of the defendant Rose
appears on page 71. As illustrations of the defense position on medical
ethics, extracts have been taken from the final pleas for the defendants
Gebhardt and Beiglboeck. These appear on pages 71 to 77. Considerable
testimony was given on this question by defendants and by expert
witnesses, and appears on pages 77 to 86. Selections from this testimony
have been taken from the direct examination of the defendant Rose, the
cross-examination of the prosecution witness Professor Werner
Leibbrandt, and from the direct examination of the prosecution witness
Dr. Andrew C. Ivy.
The judgment of the Tribunal deals at some length with the medical
ethics applicable to experimentation on human beings (p. 181 ff.).
b. Selection from the Argumentation of the Prosecution
_EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING STATEMENT
OF THE PROSECUTION_[20]
* * * * *
In view of the clear and unequivocal proof of the defendant Rose’s
participation in the typhus murders of Buchenwald he can only plead that
he didn’t enjoy doing what he did, that he objected to the experiments
at the Third Meeting of the Consulting Physicians of the Wehrmacht in
May 1943. But this is his condemnation, not his salvation. In March 1942
he was in Buchenwald and saw what was being done. In May of the same
year he asked Mrugowsky to test a vaccine for him in those experiments.
Four inmates were killed as a result. In May 1943, he objected to the
experiments in what he describes as strong terms. But in December, he
was again instigating still another experiment which resulted in the
murder of six men. He is a living example of a man who could have
abstained from participating in these crimes without threat of harm to
his person or position by any agency of the Nazi Government. He was not
arrested and tried by the SS because of his objection. He was not
committed to a concentration camp. In spite of that, he voluntarily
participated in these same crimes to which he said he objected. With his
knowledge, prestige, and position, he is even more culpable than the
miserable and inexperienced Ding who actually performed the experiments
in the murder wards of Buchenwald.
* * * * *
c. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense
_EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR
DEFENDANT GEBHARDT_[21]
* * * * *
_The Principles of Medical Ethics and the Applicable Law_
During the hearing of evidence, views were repeatedly given on the
question of which principles of medical ethics are to be considered when
performing experiments on human beings. In my opening statement before
the evidence was submitted I pointed out that in the case of these
defendants there is no reason to examine fundamental questions of
medical ethics in these proceedings. Law and ethics are measured by
different standards which sometimes contradict each other. The same
applies to the principles of general ethics as well as to those of a
particular profession. A deed offending the recognized principles of
medical ethics does not necessarily constitute a crime. Only the cogent
precepts of the law can be used as the basis for a verdict, and not the
unwritten regulations and convictions existing inside a profession.
However, it cannot be concluded from this that the principles of medical
ethics and their practical application were of no importance at all in
these proceedings. These principles cannot, of course, be applied
directly. At the same time there is no doubt that the principles of
medical ethics and above all their practical application in recent
decades can play an indirect part insofar as they have to be taken into
consideration when interpreting the law. However, evidence has now
proved that in recent decades and even earlier, numerous experiments
were carried out on human beings, and, moreover, on persons who did not
volunteer for such purpose. In this respect I refer to the statements of
the expert Professor Dr. Leibbrandt, witness for the prosecution. I
furthermore refer to the extensive evidence submitted by the prosecution
on this question from which it appears that in numerous cases
experiments were carried out on human beings, of the nature and degree
of danger of which they could not have been aware and to which they
would never have agreed voluntarily. The only conclusion which can be
drawn from these facts is that during recent decades views on this
question have changed in the same way as the relations between the
individual and the community in general have changed. In this connection
I need not give the detailed reasons which led to this development. It
is a fact that, at least in Europe, the state and the community have
taken a different attitude toward the individual. However differently
one may write about the change in these relations in detail, one thing
is certain, namely, that the state has more and more taken possession of
the individual and limited his personal freedom. This is evidently one
of the accompanying facts of technics and the modern mass-state. It must
be added that the development of medicine in the course of the last
decades has led to discriminating formulations of questions which can no
longer be solved by means of the laboratory and animal experiments.
The evidence has shown that not only in Germany and perhaps not even
primarily in this country, the reorganization of the relationship
between community and individual has resulted in new methods in the
sphere of medical science. In nearly all countries experiments have been
performed on human beings under conditions which entirely exclude
volunteering in a legal sense.
Immediate consequences arise for the interpretation of the law from this
change of medical views and above all from the change in medical
practice, since the essence of the law is universal and abstract and
naturally does not state the limits and the conditions under which
experiments on human beings are permissible and the borderline of the
criminality of such an experiment. The real practice regarding this
question is all the more important for the interpretation of the law
since almost every law, including Control Council Law No. 10, contains
standard rudiments of case facts, which means that determination in a
particular case can only be the outcome of a judicial judgment. No
special proof is needed to show that the question when and within what
limits medical experiments are admissible calls for a judicial judgment,
and that this cannot be established without taking practical experience
into consideration, not only in Germany but also outside Germany. The
standard rudiments of case facts are part of the legal facts and deal
with illegality as characteristic of the punishable act. Actual medical
practice inside and outside Germany, however, has not only to be
considered when examining the question as to whether the actions
constituting the subject of the indictment are illegal, but above all it
is fundamentally important when answering the further question as to
whether the actions constituting the subject of this procedure
constitute a criminal offense. In view of the fact that a criminal
offense is not likely to be a permanent psychological fact but a
standard computed fact in the sense of a personal reproach, the Court
for this reason also will not overlook the fact that particularly during
the last years, even outside Germany, medical experiments were performed
on human beings who undoubtedly did not volunteer for these experiments.
The unity of law and the indivisibility of its basic idea exclude
judging one and the same fact simultaneously according to different
legal principles and standards.
I shall comment later on the question of whether the defendants in the
performance of the experiments which constitute the indictment acted
primarily in their capacity as physicians, or whether their conduct—if
a just decision is to be rendered—must no longer be regarded from the
viewpoint of war service as medically trained research scientists.
* * * * *
_EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR
DEFENDANT BEIGLBOECK_[22]
* * * * *
If one confronts the doctor with that type of scientist who, with the
test tube in his laboratory, with the syringe or the surgical knife in
his hand, steps on animal and human corpses, in order so fanatically to
satisfy his scientific instinct, then we very decidedly object to such a
scientist. We have found this type in the documents of this trial in the
person of Dr. Rascher, whose name casts a dark shadow over the
proceedings. Dr. Leibbrandt, the protector of medical ethics, would
therefore have rendered a good service to German science if, in his
capacity as a psychiatrist, we had pointed out that Rascher, this sadist
and psychopathist, had nothing whatsoever to do with real science.
It is my duty as a defense counsel to emphasize energetically that it is
not permissible to construct from local coincidences any connection
between my client and Rascher and his system.
The scientific research worker sees his task in the discovery of the
unknown in order to equip the doctor with new weapons in his fight for
human life. I briefly want to demonstrate with two examples why the
modern medical profession cannot renounce the scientific research work
that was impossible without great efforts and sacrifices (1) giving a
brief description of the development of modern surgery; (2) mentioning
the school to which the defendant Beiglboeck belonged as a pupil and a
teacher. I do not give this second example in order to glorify my
country, but because the particular influence of its teachers is
decisive for the spiritual standard of the personality.
At the beginning of modern surgery stands that mighty figure of English
surgery, Joseph Lister, whose great idea it was that the surgeon should
not fight the inflammation of the wound but should prevent its cause,
i.e., germs entering externally.
Thanks to bacteriology, anti-sepsis was changed into asepsis.
Over the entrance gate of the General Hospital in Vienna we read the
words “Saluti et solatio aegrorum—Dedicated to the health and
consolation of the sick.” These words not only demand the highest
accomplishment of the doctor’s duties but are the motive for the most
successful work in the large field of medical research. Theory and
practice joined together in order to become a piece of living humanity.
I would go beyond the limits of my task if I mentioned all the names
that spread the glory of Vienna University throughout the world. But
their penetration into the world of the unknown was always a hazardous
enterprise which demanded courage and sacrifice.
I want to quote the words of one of the great doctors, Professor
Wagner-Jauregg, who says in his book “Fever and Infection Therapy”,
“The vaccination against malaria was certainly a risk, the
outcome of which could not be foreseen. It was dangerous for the
patient himself and this to a much higher degree than the
treatment with tuberculin and other vaccines, and it also was a
danger for the surroundings and even for the community.”
And, on page 136, it states “Three patients died after having been
vaccinated with blood infected with malaria tropica and not with malaria
tertiana”; and “The tragic outcome of this experiment was discouraging,
and only a year later could the author decide to proceed with the
malaria vaccinations * * *.”
Nobody talks of these victims today, but Wagner-Jauregg’s revolutionary
discovery is known and adopted throughout the world and has become the
common property of all peoples for the benefit of suffering mankind.
These doctors who knew that the fight against disease and death was a
thorny path were all more than ready to sacrifice their own lives.
The real scientist and the real doctor, therefore, do not oppose each
other. However, the scientist must not forget that nature is the
expression of the divine will and that only this cognition can save him
from the “hybris”, the boundlessness which for the Greek tragedians was
the greatest vice of mankind.
Above all, the words of the greatest German physician, Theophrastus
Bombastus von Hohenheim, called Paracelsus, must be applied to both
scientist and doctor “The doctor grows with his heart, he comes from God
and is enlightened by Nature—the best of all drugs is Love.”
My learned colleagues have compiled a long list of documents on human
experiments especially from the Western democracies. It would be unjust,
however, to conceal the enormous benefit of the human experiment. The
fact that Paul Ehrlich dared to release his drug “Salvarsan” before it
had been sufficiently tested saved thousands from the dangerous
consequences of one of the worst epidemics. The fact that Strong took
the responsibility upon himself to perform the probably very dangerous
experiment with plague bacilli made it possible to vaccinate thousands
of persons and to save them from almost certain death. The fact that
Strong was in a position to prove that beri-beri was a disease caused by
a deficiency, and that Goldberger proved the same for pellagra, made it
possible to fight this deficiency and to liberate entire countries from
one of their worst diseases.
With regard to the criminal law, however, and the judgment of crimes
against humanity, it is the decisive result that in other countries,
too, under their own generally prevailing medical and ethical
convictions, doctors carried out similar or the same experiments for the
benefit of scientific research or in consideration of a crisis in their
country.
When I said that the surroundings had an influence on the doctor’s
attitude, I did not mean the second determining factor of our
individuality, the material influence on the organism which might modify
or mitigate the influence of the actual conditions at the time upon the
decisions of a physician.
Concentration camp, militarism, and peoples’ court—three important
pillars of the Third Reich—they have collapsed. They are not to be
forgotten, however, when examining the guilt of the individual. Every
German had to fear them in one form or another. And then came the war.
War was once called “the steel bath of the peoples”. Heraklit called it
“the father of all things”. I can only repeat the judgment of the IMT
that “war is the evil itself.” This is true to the highest degree for
the last war. It was a total, a terrible war. Even medical science on
both sides had to assist warfare. I have before me the index of the best
known scientific English periodicals from the war period, “Lancet” and
“Nature”. Now, after the war, General T. J. Betts of the United States
War Department and Professor W. T. Sinsteat of the British Supply Office
have declared that the captured German scientific accomplishments during
the war were of the greatest use for the economic progress of British
and American industry. Even the terrible freezing experiments of Dr.
Rascher proved to be of the greatest use for America in the war against
Japan. (_Becker-Freyseng 31, Becker-Freyseng Ex. 18._) And what about us
soldiers? We stood in the air-raid shelters, the Socialist beside the
Party member. We did not complain. We saw villages go up in flames,
innocent women and children become the victims of air raids. We saw our
country, the Fatherland, in distress, and, even if we hated Hitler and
his followers like the plague, we believed that we had to fulfill our
duty to our country to the bitter end. One cannot explain these things,
they have to be experienced. In such times a doctor is placed
unwillingly between Scylla and Charybdis, between his concept of his
profession and his duty as a soldier. It is easy today to say with
pathos from an academic chair “_numquam nocere!_” A man does not say
now, “I was a member of the resistance. Day in and day out I was trying
to help persons who were racially and politically persecuted.” He says,
“Then, like everyone else, I merely did my duty.”
Abraham Lincoln, one of the greatest Americans, said in a speech before
the American Congress in 1862, “The dogmas of the quiet past are
inadequate to the stormy present. * * * In the face of new events we
must think and act in a new way.”
With this I intend to conclude my statements about medical ethics and to
repeat the words which Liek wrote at the end of his book, “The Doctor
and His Mission”, “If we want to abolish undesirable conditions in
medicine, we must follow our conscience—to help and to heal, that is,
today as always, the mission of the doctor.”
* * * * *
d. Evidence
_Testimony_
Page
Extracts from the testimony of defendant Rose 77
Extracts from the testimony of prosecution witness Professor 80
Werner Leibbrand
Extracts from the testimony of prosecution expert witness Dr. 82
Andrew C. Ivy
EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT ROSE[23]
_DIRECT EXAMINATION_
* * * * *
DR. FRITZ: You heard the lecture which Dr. Ding gave on his experiments
at the Third Conference of Consulting Physicians in the Section for
Hygiene and Tropical Hygiene?
DEFENDANT ROSE: Yes. That was the time when I protested openly against
this whole method.
Q. Well, what happened?
A. Dr. Ding gave his lecture in a camouflaged form as in his article for
the Journal of Hygiene and Infectious Diseases. Therefore, the
unsuspecting listener could not tell that it was about experiments on
human beings.
When the discussion began, I commented on the results of these
experiments. That part of my statement is contained in the record of the
conference. It is Document Rose 38, which has already been submitted.
(_Rose 38, Rose Ex. 10._) I do not intend to read these remarks, I
simply want to point out that one can find there what I said about the
technical aspect of the experiments and about the results.
Then I spoke of the ethical side of the whole thing and this part of my
statement has been stricken from the record. I cannot, of course,
reproduce today the exact wording but only the sense of what I said. I
said more or less as follows: As important and as basic as the results
may have been, they were nevertheless achieved at the cost of a number
of human lives. We as hygienists should object against a life and death
experiment being performed as the prerequisite for the introduction of a
vaccine. So far, the customary procedure had been the testing with
animal experiments and subsequent determination of tolerance by human
beings and epidemiological exploitation. This procedure had proved its
value. We had to stick to it and we couldn’t let other political and
state authorities force us to conduct human experiments. I spoke much
longer at the time. I spoke for at least ten minutes. Ding replied that
he could pacify my conscience. The experimental subjects had been
criminals condemned to death. My answer was: I knew that myself. I was
not interested in the individuals concerned but in the principle of
human experiments in testing vaccines. At this comment Professor
Schreiber interrupted the discussion. He said he protested against my
criticism and if we wanted to discuss basic ethical questions we could
do that during the recess. He would have this part of the discussion
stricken from the record and that was done. After the meeting various
participants came to me and we discussed the whole matter. Some agreed
with me; others were convinced that in such an important question human
experiments were justified. Of course, those people who [_sic_] believed
Ding’s assurance that the subjects were criminals condemned to death. I
no longer remember the individual men with whom I talked during the
recess and I don’t know who was in favor and who was against it. The
only one I remember is Professor Mrugowsky because he spoke as an SS
member and the experiments had been conducted by an SS doctor, and
because I thought that Mrugowsky was Ding’s superior in every way. Of
course, I remember that Mrugowsky of all people came and said that, in
principle, he agreed with me, and that he had expressed similar
misgivings to Grawitz and that Grawitz had rejected his misgivings. Then
I also learned from Mrugowsky that Himmler was behind all these
experiments.
* * * * *
DR. FRITZ: Did you later discuss the matter of experiments on human
beings before a large group of people?
DEFENDANT ROSE: Yes. That happened once again before a large number of
people, but it was not about typhus experiments. It must have been about
October 1944. The question at hand then was grippe. There was a meeting,
a rather large meeting at which grippe vaccine was discussed. A number
of people reported on the vaccines which they had developed in the
laboratory. Among others, Professor Herzberg reported on a vaccine made
from dead grippe virus, and Professor Haagen on a vaccine made from
living avirulent grippe virus, which he had already tested on personnel
at the Strasbourg clinic. Someone in the meeting, I don’t remember who,
suggested that the Haagen tests had been insufficient, and that this
vaccine should be tested on a larger number of persons. There was no
mention of concentration camps then but of student companies. I had
considerable misgivings about such experimental vaccination and
expressed them. I said that I considered the experimental basis
inadequate for these vaccines to be used on human beings. I was not
convinced that the virus had been sufficiently attenuated. There was a
danger that the vaccine would lead to infection, and one could not take
that responsibility on one’s self. It was first of all intended to
observe the effectiveness of the protection by determining whether
people fell ill of grippe in natural ways after being vaccinated. Then
someone else made the suggestion that this would take too long, and we
did not know whether there would be an influenza epidemic during that
time, and that therefore after the vaccines the subject should be
infected with a virulent virus. Since I had already expressed objections
to the vaccination, I opposed this proposal even more strongly, and the
result of this discussion was that infections were not carried out, but
it was decided to carry out the vaccination. Whether these vaccinations
were carried out or not, I do not know. At any rate I read no order to
the effect that anyone should perform the vaccinations nor did I ever
read a report that the vaccinations were carried out. Only later on in
imprisonment did I hear that similar experiments, such as were then
discussed, and of which I disapproved, were carried out by the British
Medical Service on German PW’s. Genzken probably participated personally
in this, but I had heard about this before in the internment hospital
Karlsruhe where there were people who had experienced these
vaccinations.
* * * * *
EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS
PROFESSOR WERNER LEIBBRANDT[24]
* * * * *
_CROSS-EXAMINATION_
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you stated that the performance of experiments
on human beings, as is the subject of the indictment here, can be
ascribed to biological thought. What do you mean by biological thought?
WITNESS LEIBBRANDT: By biological thought I mean the attitude of a
physician who does not take the subject into consideration at all, but
for whom the patient has become a mere object, so that the human
relationship no longer exists, and a man becomes a mere object like a
mail package.
Q. You spoke of thinking as a biologist. Do I understand that you see
therein an action belonging to biological thought?
A. An exaggeration of the purely mechanical or biological point of view,
because the physician is not merely a biologist, he is also a biologist.
Primarily, however, a physician is a man who assists the human being and
not a scientific judge of biological events.
Q. Could there not be other causes for the experiments, such as a
collective state thinking?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, you used the expression “demoniac order”. What do you mean
by that?
A. By demoniac order I mean the following: If I define as a basis for
medical activity merely the maintenance and safeguarding of the
substance of the nation according to blood, the result is that
everything which falls outside this pretense has to be cleared away.
That is a mild expression of what actually happened, namely,
extermination.
Q. Then your demoniac order only refers to the blood aspect. Could it
not be applied to the purely state collective aspect as well?
A. Could you give an example so that I can understand it better?
Q. I mean that experiments were undertaken and that the voluntary act of
the individual is replaced by the act of the state, namely, by the
voluntary approval given by the state.
A. Between the collective idea and the state order on the one hand and
the medical individual on the other, there stands something rather
important—the human conscience.
* * * * *
Q. Professor, if all these experiments were actually conducted, and also
as you said this morning and as Moll’s book shows, Moll alone published
approximately six hundred works about thousands of such experiments (on
human beings), must one not say that wide circles of medical men judge
the question of experiments on human beings under certain conditions
differently from you—from an ethical point of view?
A. That I cannot say, because even Moll writes at the end of this work
that it is part of a physician’s morals to restrain his urge for natural
research in favor of the basic medical attitude as laid down in the oath
of Hippocrates, namely, to cause no arbitrary harm to his patient.
Q. But in your opinion, Professor, how should a doctor work in the
interest of suffering humanity in cases where, as you have just said,
there is no possibility of experiments on animals?
A. The concept of humanity is a very dangerous concept. It is most
dangerous of all for the physician. For the physician, the individual
stands above all humanity and the individual unfortunately has sunk very
low in these last few years.
Q. I believe that you have not quite answered my question. I asked: How
do you think the doctor should solve certain questions even in the
interest of the individual—questions which cannot be tested with animal
experiments and test tubes, as is the case with malaria for instance.
This is a problem which must be cleared up if he is to help his
suffering patients.
A. That is naturally a very difficult question. But in the end the main
thing will always be that a risk must have certain limits.
Q. Thank you. Now I come to another point. This morning, Professor, you
expressed disapproval about a book which the defendant Mrugowsky wrote
on medical ethics. May I ask, have you read this book?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know Mrugowsky personally?
A. No.
Q. Then you do not know his ethical point of view?
A. I said that it was quite an ironical joke of world history for
someone to quote the high medical ethics of Hufeland in the form of
excerpts from his writings, as far as I remember, with a few connecting
words and to combine these quotations in a modest little volume, while
on the other hand we now know how it was entangled organizationally with
the deeds under discussion here. I am only speaking about the
entanglement and not about the objective guilt which has not yet been
proved.
Q. And from where else do you infer Mrugowsky’s entanglement with the
facts under discussion here, apart from the fact that he is one of the
defendants indicted?
A. After all, he was the Chief of the SS Hygienic System, and the
medical principles of an ethical nature personified by the SS have
become clear to me during the last few years. There seems to me to be a
large gap between these two things, between these deeds of SS medical
ethics and the ethics of Hufeland. I might perhaps understand how a man
like Mr. Haubhold could be enthusiastic about a one-sided interpretation
of political medicine by Josef Peter Frank in the 18th century. But I
cannot understand how the SS ethics can be connected up with the honest
ethics of Christian Hufeland.
Q. Professor, you just told us you do not know Mrugowsky at all?
A. No.
Q. Then how can you express a judgment on his personal ethical attitude?
You are merely judging from the fact that he belonged to the SS. Before
you express such an opinion as you are doing, before you talk about a
joke of world history, must you not first know the personal attitude of
the person you are criticizing, and is it not quite possible that his
personal attitude was such as is expressed in this book?
A. I don’t believe that one can hold a leading position in the SS and
then talk about such personal ethics, unless, of course, in ethical
questions one does what is called double bookkeeping.
Q. But you admit that all your criticism is pure assumption, in no way
based on personal knowledge of the person criticized?
A. I do not know Mr. Mrugowsky.
Q. Thank you. I have no more questions.
EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION EXPERT
WITNESS DR. ANDREW C. IVY[25]
_DIRECT EXAMINATION_
* * * * *
MR. HARDY: Now, Professor Ivy, before adjournment you were beginning to
discuss medical ethics in the United States.
* * * * *
Do you have there also the principles and rules as set forth by the
American Medical Association to be followed?
WITNESS DR. IVY: Yes.
Q. What was the basis on which the American Medical Association adopted
those rules?
A. I submitted to them a report of certain experiments which had been
performed on human subjects along with my conclusions as to what the
principles of ethics should be for use of human beings as subjects in
medical experiments. I asked the association to give me a statement
regarding the principles of medical ethics and what the American Medical
Association had to say regarding the use of human beings as subjects in
medical experiments.
Q. Would you kindly pass up to me that ruling of the principles put out
by the American Medical Association? This apparently isn’t what I am
referring to, Doctor. Do you have a publication which is published by
the American Medical Association entitled “Principles of Ethics
Concerning Experimentation on Human Beings”?
A. Not with me here.
Q. Well now, you have, first of all, a basic requirement for
experimentation on human beings, “(1) the voluntary consent of the
individual upon whom the experiment is to be performed must be
obtained.”
A. Yes.
Q. “(2) The danger of each experiment must be previously investigated by
animal experimentation,” and “(3) the experiment must be performed under
proper medical protection and management.”
Now, does that purport to be the principles upon which all physicians
and scientists guide themselves before they resort to medical
experimentation on human beings in the United States?
A. Yes. They represent the basic principles approved by the American
Medical Association for the use of human beings as subjects in medical
experiments.
JUDGE SEBRING: How do the principles which you have just enunciated
comport with the principles of the medical profession over the civilized
world generally?
A. They are identical, according to my information. It was with that
idea in mind that I cited the principles which were mentioned in this
circular letter from the Reich Minister of the Interior dated 28
February 1931 to indicate that the ethical principles for the use of
human beings as subjects in medical experiments in Germany in 1931 were
similar to those which I have enunciated and which have been approved by
the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association.
MR. HARDY: Is it possible that in some field of scientific research
investigation by animal experimentation would be inadequate?
A. Will you repeat that question? I did not get it.
Q. Is it possible in some fields of medical research that
experimentation or investigation on animals would be inadequate?
A. Yes. The experiment on trench fever is a very good example.
Q. How would you investigate the danger of the experiment prior to
resorting to the use of human beings?
A. The hazard would have to be determined by a careful study of the
natural history of the disease.
Q. Does malaria also fall into that category?
A. We can use animals to some extent in malarial studies, canaries and
ducks, for example, develop malaria; and in research designed to
discover a better drug for the treatment of malaria we can use Avian
Malaria as a sort of screen method to detect which compounds might be
employed with some assurance and might be effective in human malaria. In
that way we decrease the random and unnecessary experimentation on man.
Q. To your knowledge have any experiments been conducted in the United
States wherein these requirements which you set forth were not met?
A. Not to my knowledge.
MR. HARDY: Your Honor, I have no further questions concerning medical
ethics to put to Dr. Ivy; however, I do have one question concerning the
high-altitude experiments which I wish to go back to at the conclusion
of that complex, in high altitude, and I will have completed my direct
examination.
PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: The Tribunal has no questions of the witness. Do
I understand that you have completed your examination of the witness?
MR. HARDY: No. I have not; I have a further question to put to him, but
I was going to leave the case of medical ethics.
PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: We have no questions on that subject; you may
proceed.
MR. HARDY: Dr. Ivy, in medical science and research is the use of human
subjects necessary?
WITNESS DR. IVY: Yes, in a number of instances.
Q. Is it frequently necessary and does it perform great good to
humanity?
A. Yes. That is right.
Q. Do you have an opinion that the state, for instance, the United
States of America, could assume the responsibility of a physician to his
patient or experimental subject, or is that responsibility solely the
moral responsibility of the physician or scientist?
A. I do not believe the state can assume the moral responsibility that a
physician has for his patient or experimental subject.
DR. SEIDL: I object to this question in that it is a purely legal
question which the Court has to answer.
DR. SAUTER (for the defendants Ruff and Romberg): If I am not mistaken,
a document was read this morning which said that the state assumes the
responsibility. I believe that I am not mistaken in this. I also want to
point out something else, gentlemen, in order to supplement what Dr.
Seidl just said.
The question asked here is always what the opinion of the medical
profession in America is. For us in this trial, in the evaluation of
German defendants, that is not decisive. In my opinion the decisive
question is for example, in 1942, when the altitude experiments were
undertaken at Dachau, what the attitude of the medical profession in
Germany was. From my point of view as a defense counsel I do not object
if the prosecution asks Professor Ivy what the attitude or opinion of
the medical profession in Germany was in 1942. If he can answer that
question, all right, let him answer it, but we are not interested in
finding out what the ethical attitude of the medical profession in the
United States was. In my opinion a German physician who in Germany
performed experiments on Germans cannot be judged exclusively according
to an American medical opinion, which moreover dates from the year 1945
and was coded in the years 1945 and 1946 for future use; it can also
have no retroactive force.
PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: The first objection imposed by Dr. Seidl might be
pertinent if the question of legality was concerned, a legal
responsibility, that would be a question for a court. The question of
moral responsibility is a proper subject to inquire of the witness.
As to Dr. Sauter’s objection, the opinion of the witness as to medical
sentiment in America may be received. The counsel’s objection goes to
its weight rather than to admissibility. The witness could be asked if
he is aware of the sentiment in America in 1942 and whether it is
different from this of the present day or whether it does not differ.
The witness may also be asked whether he is aware of the opinion as to
medical ethics in other countries or throughout the civilized world. But
the objections are both overruled.
MR. HARDY: It is your opinion, then, that the state cannot assume the
moral responsibility of a physician to his patient or experimental
subject?
WITNESS DR. IVY: That is my opinion.
Q. On what do you base your opinion? What is the reason for that
opinion?
A. I base that opinion on the principles of ethics and morals contained
in the oath of Hippocrates. I think it should be obvious that a state
cannot follow a physician around in his daily administration to see that
the moral responsibility inherent therein is properly carried out. This
moral responsibility that controls or should control the conduct of a
physician should be inculcated into the minds of physicians just as
moral responsibility of other sorts, and those principles are clearly
depicted or enunciated in the oath of Hippocrates with which every
physician should be acquainted.
Q. Is the oath of Hippocrates the Golden Rule in the United States and
to your knowledge throughout the world?
A. According to my knowledge it represents the Golden Rule of the
medical profession. It states how one doctor would like to be treated by
another doctor in case he were ill. And in that way how a doctor should
treat his patient or experimental subjects. He should treat them as
though he were serving as a subject.
Q. Several of the defendants have pointed out in this case that the oath
of Hippocrates is obsolete today. Do you follow that opinion?
A. I do not. The moral imperative of the oath of Hippocrates I believe
is necessary for the survival of the scientific and technical philosophy
of medicine.
* * * * *
2. GERMAN MEDICAL PROFESSION
a. Introduction
The position of the German medical profession under the Hitler regime
was the subject of argument by both prosecution and defense. The
prosecution discussed the matter in the early part of its opening
statement (vol. I, p. 29 ff.). Selections from the argumentation of the
defense on this point have been taken from the final plea for the
defendant Blome and from the closing brief for the defendant Rostock.
These appear on pages 86 to 90.
b. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense
_EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR
DEFENDANT BLOME_[26]
* * * * *
Furthermore, I have another matter at heart, especially in my capacity
as defense counsel for this defendant: Blome was Deputy Reich
Physicians’ Leader; he will, therefore, to a certain degree, easily be
regarded as the representative of the German medical profession during
the Hitler regime. Now, there is great danger that the entire German
medical profession will be identified with its former leader, Dr. Conti,
and with the crimes he was charged with during this trial; the German
medical profession fears that those crimes which, _in fact_, were
committed by _individual_ doctors, who may have been rightly charged,
are to be taken as typical of the entire medical profession. Indeed,
during the last months we could hear in the press and on the radio that
the entire medical profession was here in the prisoners’ dock;
unfortunately, by thus generalizing, the matter was presented as though
the entire medical profession was corrupt and that the majority of
German physicians had committed such crimes or at least approved them,
as stated here in the indictment at the trial. This conception is wrong
and unjust. The German medical profession numbered about 80,000 members
and if we add the Wehrmacht physicians and the official physicians, one
arrives at about 100,000 physicians. Now let us compare with this total
number the small number of physicians and researchers here in the dock.
There are altogether 20 men. Of what importance is such an insignificant
number for the judging of the entire profession? If out of 5,000 German
physicians one single person committed a crime, it is impossible to draw
a conclusion from these few exceptions regarding the behavior and morals
of the whole class. And even if we suppose that perhaps another few
hundred physicians and researchers not here in the dock had taken part
in the “experiments on human beings” and in the “euthanasia action”, the
number of guilty persons in comparison with the total number of the
entire profession is still too small to entitle one to consider the
entire profession as criminal, and morally inferior because some
individuals committed a wrong.
There is yet another point of view. It stands to reason that not all
experiments on human beings can be excused and justified, not even
during a time of total warfare and under a dictatorship, and no decent
person would ever think of excusing the way and manner in which the
Hitler State carried out the “Euthanasia Program.” However, it is an
incontestable fact that large-scale experiments on human beings cannot
altogether be avoided and are, in fact, carried out throughout the whole
world, and that there are different viewpoints concerning the problem of
euthanasia, even to a limited extent in the circles of conscientious
physicians when this is carried out on a proper legal basis, and when,
in addition, full precautions are taken to prevent abuses. It must not
be overlooked that the deterioration of the medical profession claimed
in connection with this trial is connected exclusively with the problem
of experiments on human beings and with euthanasia, but that no
accusations are made against the professional practice of the German
physicians in any other respects; there are especially no accusations
referring to the relationship between the sick patient and the physician
whom he had chosen as a helper and confidant to restore his health. This
confidence in the attending physician felt by the patient has remained
completely untouched by this trial.
We Germans have our own opinion about our physicians, we know their
conscientiousness and willingness to render help; especially during the
war we have been able to observe and appreciate their readiness to
sacrifice themselves; we know that the good qualities that made the
German physicians and researchers a model in former decades were not
lost during Hitler’s time, and it would be a pity if the abuses, which
have been revealed and proved by this trial, should serve to undermine
the confidence of the German people in their physicians and expose them
to the contempt of all civilized nations.
Individual researchers, who out of ambition or a passion for research
did not value a human being’s life more than that of a rabbit, should
not be considered representative of the German physicians’ profession,
nor should those physicians of the concentration camps, who for lack of
a conscience or for some other wicked reason gave fatal injections to
prisoners or tortured them to death, be regarded as representative of
the German medical profession. No. Representative of a model German
physician during Hitler’s time, too, is the non-political, practicing
physician, who, even if he did perhaps formally belong to the Party,
strongly opposed from the bottom of his heart all kinds of violence and
intolerance, who is closely bound to his nation and its needs, the
practicing physician who cared for his patients in the most devoted
manner day after day and night after night during the time of total war
and fearful bombardments, which is especially hard for a physician; or
who as military physician served at the front far from home, from his
practice, from his family, fairly sharing all the hardships, dangers,
and privations with his soldiers. And the surgeon who, as director of
his clinic, operated and cured and helped from morning till night
wherever he could help without having time to breathe, let alone to take
part in political activity, he also is representative of the model
German physician during Hitler’s time too.
I do not know what verdict you will arrive at respecting one or the
other of these defendants; but, as defense counsel of the former Deputy
Reich Physicians’ Leader, I beg you to make it clear by your verdict
that in judging the defendant, if you must condemn him, you do not
condemn and defame the entire German medical profession, but that the
abuses which were committed were individual acts such as, perhaps,
happened in all professions during Hitler’s time without necessitating a
condemnation of the entire profession. These were individual acts
arising perhaps partly from personal criminal tendencies of individual
fanatics, partly from being connected with the excesses of a total war
in a dictatorship of unscrupulous violence.
If beside the 23 defendants there is a 24th sitting in the dock,
invisible to our eye, he is not of the German medical profession but the
SS spirit of Himmler and of a dozen other murderers of millions of
people. This spirit might have led a fanatic to forget his professional
ethics and to commit crimes. But the entire medical profession remained
sound and conscious of its duty.
May your verdict not completely rob the German people of their
confidence in their physicians but restore it to them, and I have no
doubt that after the present crisis has been overcome and in more normal
circumstances, the German medical profession will prove to its people
that as a body it never forgot nor will ever forget the professional
ethical commandments of the Hippocratic oath.
* * * * *
_EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR
DEFENDANT ROSTOCK_
_Introduction_
Mr. President, your Honors:
The great English historian and sociologist, Thomas Carlyle, once said,
“Your life, and were you the humblest of human beings, is not a wild
dream but a lofty fact.” I do not want to speak to you in this courtroom
without first recalling this saying and thereby seeing before my eyes
the picture of the great number of our fellow human beings whose lives
have really become a wild dream. The fact on which this trial is based,
that defenseless human beings were used by doctors of my country for
experiments and in part died after suffering tortures, cannot be denied.
I, myself, would doubt the clarity of my judgment as a German jurist if
I did not realize that general human rights, such as the fundamental
standards anchored in all civilized nations, have been violated thereby.
Medical science should bring help and healing to suffering humanity. I
am proud to state that it was German doctors who, in the last century,
saved millions of human beings from the most serious and fatal diseases
by their research. Let me remind you only of names such as Robert Koch,
Emil von Behring, Paul Ehrlich, Theodor Billroth, and August Bier, or
medicines such as Germanin, atabrine, Salvarsan, diphtheria serum,
tetanus serum, and many others. If it were possible to achieve such
decisive results in any other way, this would only confirm the actual
truth, that no one, no matter how highly placed and no matter how
important his aims, has the right to lower other human beings to the
level of guinea pigs by force. How could a man venture to dispose in
that way of the life and health of his fellow men, be they ever so
humble? It seems to me that this involves a fundamental contradiction to
the duty of the doctor, a violation of the dignity of the individual,
and a presumption which cannot remain without horrible results. There
may be doubtful cases, there may be borderline cases, but the solution
of these questions can be based on only one principle, which is that all
creatures in human form have an equal right to life and health. Humanity
would be in a sad state if again and again there were not volunteers
from the ranks of physicians and laymen who made themselves available
for experiments, conscious of their contribution toward saving and
healing other human beings. But how can a man dare simply to designate
others to suffer and die, when they, too, like to live and be free from
want and fear, just like he himself? * * *
3. MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
a. Introduction
The practice of medical experimentation upon human beings in other
countries was brought out by the defense in an effort to show that the
medical experimentation in which these defendants engaged was not
criminal. Extracts from the argumentation of the defense have been
selected from the closing briefs for the defendants Karl Brandt and
Ruff. These appear below on pages 90 to 93. From the evidence on this
question, the following appear below on pages 95 to 121: Selections from
defense documents, followed by extracts from the cross-examination of
one of the prosecution’s expert witnesses Dr. Andrew C. Ivy and an
extract from the cross-examination of the defendant Rose.
b. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense
_EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR
DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT_
* * * * *
Reference has furthermore been made to the _extraordinarily large number
of persons_ available _for experiments_. With regard to the experiments
made and on the basis of the evidence of this trial, experiments on a
large scale have been made only in rare cases, and these may be compared
in size with experiments on a large scale outside of Germany, as they
were made even in peacetime; reference is made once more to the malaria
experiment. (_Karl Brandt 1, Karl Brandt Ex. 1._)
If one considers the _number of persons sentenced to death_ who were
subjected to experiments, the number is comparable to those eleven
condemned persons for the poison experiment in Manila. (_Becker-Freyseng
60a, Becker-Freyseng Ex. 59._)
One should compare, among others, the plague experiments by Strong in
1912 on 900 convicts, including an experiment on 42 persons some of whom
were persons sentenced to death, and the typhus experiments by Hamdi on
153 persons. (_Becker-Freyseng 60a, Becker-Freyseng Ex. 59._)
If the number of condemned persons used for experiments in these
proceedings appears high, it should be taken into consideration that the
number of persons sentenced to death under the laws of war is also
unusually high. For the protection of the country, criminal laws are,
during wartime, applied more rigorously in all countries in order to
guarantee safety at home during the absence of the male population at
the front. The number of ordinary criminals who have been punished on
account of acts committed by taking advantage of war conditions, and
especially of the blackout, is already unusually high; it is, therefore,
not even necessary to include herein the persons sentenced for political
crimes.
In this connection the viewpoint of the _English scholar Mellenby_ of
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine deserves special
consideration. (_Becker-Freyseng 60, Becker-Freyseng Ex. 58._) In the
well-known medical journal “The Lancet” of 1 December 1946, this doctor
quotes particularly the _political conditions_ in Germany as decisive
and as an excuse for the accused persons. One may not, therefore,
subsequently refer to the general conditions in Germany during the war
years in order to judge the _acts committed during this time_ more
severely.
The number of human guinea pigs used in the experiments alleged by the
prosecution is about 2,000. The number of human guinea pigs known to the
defense from published data amounts to more than 11,000 persons. If
among those, minor experiments are also to be found, it may be supposed
that the experiments published contain only the material fit to be known
to the public. Publications show the results but not the sacrifices and
undesirable incidents. That which the defense can present is not the
result of an exhausting criminal investigation.
Looking at only these experiments which were considered fit for
publication, one cannot possibly come to the conclusion that they were
made only with volunteers. I refer in this connection to the compilation
of experiments in Document Karl Brandt 117, Karl Brandt Exhibit 103,
namely 32 experiments on at least 1,580 persons: they are experiments on
persons sentenced to death, prisoners and soldiers, women and girls; the
experiments are often carried out in such a way that it cannot be
presumed the subjects volunteered.
Voluntary service of the human guinea pigs has not been claimed either;
only in two cases has it specifically been pointed out. The volunteers
in one of these experiments were medical students. Outstanding in this
document are 13 experiments with at least 223 children. One cannot
assume that the parents had given their consent. In this connection
reference is made to Document Karl Brandt 93, Karl Brandt Exhibit 29,
regarding the experiments of Professor McCance.
_EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR
DEFENDANT RUFF_
* * * * *
Experiments which time and again have been described in international
literature without meeting any opposition do not constitute a crime from
the medical point of view. For nowhere did a plaintiff arise from the
side of the responsible professional organization, or from that of the
administration of justice, to denounce as criminal the experiments
described in literature. On the contrary, the authors of those reports
on their human experiments gained general recognition and fame; they
were awarded the highest honors; they gained historical importance. And
in spite of all this, are they supposed to have been criminals? No! In
view of the complete lack of _written_ legal norms, the physician, who
generally knows only little about the law, has to rely on and refer to
the admissibility of what is generally recognized to be admissible all
over the world.
The defense is convinced that the Tribunal, when deciding this problem
without prejudice, will first study the many experiments performed all
over the world on healthy and sick persons, on prisoners and free
people, on criminals and on the poor, even on children and mentally ill
persons, in order to see how the medical profession in its international
totality answers the question of the admissibility of human experiments,
not only in theory but also in practice.
It is psychologically understandable that German research workers today
will, if possible, have nothing to do with human experiments and will
try to avoid them, or would like to describe them as inadmissible even
if before 1933 they were perhaps of the opposite opinion. However,
experiments performed in 1905-1912 by a highly respected American in
Asia for the fight against the plague, which made him famous all over
the world, cannot and ought not to be labelled as criminal because a
Blome is supposed to have performed the same experiments during the
Hitler period (which, in fact, however, were not performed at all); and
experiments for which, before 1933, a foreign research worker, the
Englishman Ross, was awarded the Nobel prize for his malaria
experiments, do not deserve to be condemned only because a German
physician performed similar experiments during the Hitler regime. One
should not say that experiments, where different diseases or different
drugs from those referred to in this trial were dealt with, have no
connection with the charges of this indictment because of this
difference and that, therefore, they are of no importance as evidence.
In the foreground there stands the basic question as to the conditions
under which such experiments are permissible; whether they refer to
plague or typhus, to tuberculosis or jaundice, is a secondary question
which concerns the medical expert more than the jurist.
Decisive for this trial is the question whether the conditions under
which experiments were performed by the defendants were those
internationally recognized as for the experiments which were performed
by foreign research workers with the approval of all civilized humanity.
If one wants to arrive at a just and satisfactory decision, one must
disregard the fact that here German research workers are accused. On the
contrary, one has to strive toward obtaining an international basis to
represent the present international opinion on human experiments, one
which for decades, if not for centuries, will form the criterion for the
permissibility of human experiments. We, as jurists, can only render a
service to the development of medical science and therewith to humanity
if we endeavor to establish an incontrovertibly clear view of today’s
international opinion on human experiments, whether these experiments
were performed by Germans or by foreigners.
c. Evidence
_Defense Documents_
Doc. No. Def. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
Karl Brandt 1 Karl Brandt Ex. 1 Extract from “Life” 95
Magazine concerning
malaria experiments on
convicts in U. S.
penitentiaries.
Becker-Freyseng Becker-Freyseng Statement of Professor 95
60 Ex. 58 Dr. Hans Luxenburger and
Dr. Hans Halbach
concerning the report on
experiments on human
beings in world
literature
(Becker-Freyseng 60a,
Becker-Freyseng Ex. 59).
Becker-Freyseng Becker-Freyseng Extracts from report on 96
60a Ex. 59 experiments on human
beings in world
literature; excerpts from
various newspapers and
medical weeklies.
Karl Brandt 117 Karl Brandt Excerpts from the 103
Ex. 103 dissertation “Infection
Experiments on Human
Beings” by Alfred
Heilbrunn of the Hygiene
Institute of the
Wuerzburg University,
1937, concerning
experiments on human
beings in other
countries.
_Testimony_
Extracts from the testimony of prosecution expert witness Dr. 110
Andrew C. Ivy.
Extract from the testimony of defendant Rose 118
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT KARL BRANDT 1
KARL BRANDT DEFENSE EXHIBIT 1
EXTRACT FROM “LIFE” MAGAZINE CONCERNING MALARIA EXPERIMENTS ON CONVICTS
IN UNITED STATES PENITENTIARIES
_Extract from “Life”, Vol. 18, Nr. 23 of June 4, 1945_
_Prison Malaria_
Convicts expose themselves to disease so doctors can study it.
In three United States penitentiaries men who have been imprisoned as
enemies of society are now helping science fight another enemy of
society. At the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, the Illinois
State Penitentiary, and New Jersey State Reformatory some 800 convicts
volunteered to be infected with malaria so medical men can study the
disease. The experimenters, who are directed by the Office of Scientific
Research and Development, have found prison life ideal for controlled
laboratory work with humans. Their subjects all eat the same food, sleep
the same hours, and are never far away. The prisoners are not pardoned
or paroled for submitting to infection.
Prison malaria experiments underline the fact that malaria is still a
very serious medical problem. In the United States there are 1,000,000
cases a year. The existing drugs (mainly quinine and atabrine) control
malaria but cannot keep it from recurring long after the original
infection. The goal of malaria research is to find a new drug which will
cure the disease permanently.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT BECKER-FREYSENG 60
BECKER-FREYSENG DEFENSE EXHIBIT 58
STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR DR. HANS LUXENBURGER AND DR. HANS HALBACH
CONCERNING THE REPORT ON EXPERIMENTS ON HUMAN BEINGS IN WORLD LITERATURE
(SEE ALSO BECKER-FREYSENG 60a, BECKER-FREYSENG EX. 59)
_Experiments on Human Beings as Viewed in World Literature_
I, Professor Dr. med. Hans Luxenburger, specialist in nervous diseases,
resident at 35, Liebigstrasse, Munich, and I, Dr. ing. and Dr. med.
Erich Hans Halbach, physician, of Prien-Chiemsee, have first been
advised that we shall render ourselves liable to punishment if we give a
false affidavit. We declare under oath that we have ascertained the
correctness of the enclosed excerpts of scientific works and books, that
is to say, with respect to the excerpts bearing the following numbers:
1, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47,
48, 54 * * * by comparison with the original; with respect to the
numbers 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 19, 41, 43, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 by
certified photostatic copies, copies, translations or excerpts submitted
to us by attorney at law Dr. Edmund Tipp.
We made the report “Experiments on Human Beings as Viewed in World
Literature” to the best of our knowledge for presentation as evidence
before the American Military Tribunal I in the Palace of Justice,
Nuernberg, Germany.
Munich, 14 April 1947
[Signed] Prof. Dr. Hans Luxenburger
Dr. Hans Halbach
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT BECKER-FREYSENG 60a
BECKER-FREYSENG DEFENSE EXHIBIT 59
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON EXPERIMENTS ON HUMAN BEINGS IN WORLD LITERATURE;
EXCERPTS FROM VARIOUS NEWSPAPERS AND MEDICAL WEEKLIES
_Excerpt from the Certified Translation_
_Author_: Ladell, W.S.S. (Med. Research Committee).
_Title_: Effects after Taking Small Quantities of Sea-Water. An
experimental study. (From the research staff, National Hospital, Queen
Square).
_Quotation_: The Lancet No. 6267 (October 1943) page 441.
_Purpose_: Contribution to the physiology of persons who received the
same food and drinking water as shipwrecked persons in lifeboats.
Studies regarding the effect of the drinking of sea water on the
chloride balance, urea excretion, urine amount, and loss of body weight
of shipwrecked persons.
_Procedure_:
1. Three experimental persons, after one day without water, drank
240 cc. fresh water and 180 cc. sodium chloride 3.5 percent solution
daily for 4½ days.
2. Ten experimental persons, after one day without water, drank
540 cc. fresh water and 180 cc. sea water daily for 5 days; the
following 4 days, 5 of these experimental persons drank 60 cc. fresh
water daily, the following 4 days the other 5 experimental persons
drank 60 cc. fresh water and 180 cc. sea water daily.
3. Eleven experimental persons, after one day without water, drank
540 cc. fresh water daily for 5 days; 6 of these experimental persons
received 60 cc. water and 180 cc. sea water daily for the following 4
days.
4. Two experimental persons, after one day without water, drank
370 cc. fresh water each for 2 days, for the following 3 days daily
240 cc. fresh water each, plus 400 cc. sea water, the next 36 hours
only 600 cc. sea water.
All experimental persons moreover took only sea-rescue emergency
rations in limited quantities, with 1 gr. sodium chloride at the
most.
_Experimental persons_: 17 experimental persons from a naval hospital
submitted “voluntarily to the severe experimental conditions”, without
physical injury.
_Excerpt from Certified Report 19_
_Author_: Cameron and Karunaratne.
_Quotation_: Journal of Pathology and Bacteriology 42, 13 (1936).
_Purpose_: Studies of the poisonous effect of carbontetrachloride on
human beings (report).
_Experiment_: Carbontetrachloride is administered to healthy criminals
before their execution. The effect of the poison on the liver is
determined by way of an autopsy. (Therapeutical normal doses 3.0 cc.:
maximum dose 5.0 cc.)
2 test persons receive twice 6 cc. (Nichols and Hampton)
3 test persons receive twice 4 cc. (Docherty and Nichols)
2 test persons receive twice 5 cc.^{*} (Docherty and Burgess)
1 test person receive twice 5 and 3 cc.^{*} (Docherty and Burgess)
3 test persons receive twice 10 cc. (Leach, Haughwout and Ash)
^{*} with subsequent laxative.
_Result_: In some cases changes in the liver, in others none.
_Test persons_: 11 criminals sentenced to death.
_Excerpt from Original 20_
_Author_: Lt. Col. Kendall, A.E., Lt. Col. Dickinson, S.P., Lt. Col.
Forrester, J.S.
_Title_: The Treatment of Bacillary Dysentery in Chinese Soldiers with
Sulfaguanidine and Sulfadiazine.
_Quotation_: American Journal of Medical Science 211,103 (January,
1946).
_Purpose_: Page 103: “The opportunity to make controlled observations of
the efficacy of sulfaguanidine and sulfadiazine in the treatment of
acute bacillary dysentery has recently presented itself to us. In an
Army general hospital in northeastern India caring for Chinese and
American troops, we have observed many hundreds of cases within the
past year. It early became apparent that we were dealing with a
relatively benign form of the disease with a uniformly favorable
outcome. Under these circumstances, it seemed both justifiable and
important to utilize the opportunity to determine to what extent
sulfonamide therapy shortened the course of the disease or otherwise
favorably influenced its course.”
_Experiment_: “The present communication describes the results of such
an investigation, carried out in the 7-month period from June through
December 1943, in which the results of treatment were compared in 334
Chinese patients with bacillary dysentery, one-third received
sulfaguanidine and one-third, sulfadiazine.”
_Results_: Page 109: “Neither drug shortened the course of the disease,
ameliorated the symptoms, nor altered the eventual outcome.”
_Test persons_: 334 Chinese soldiers patients.
_Excerpt from the Original Report No. 23_
_Author_: See below.
_Title_: Trench Fever Report of Commission Medical Research Committee,
American Red Cross, University Press 1918. Trench Fever, Bruce, Final
Report of the War Trench Fever Investigation Committee, Journal of
Hygiene 1921, page 258.
_Quotation_: Reference in Kolle-Kraus-Uhlenhut, Manual of Pathogenic
Micro-organisms. VIII/1, 1302, (1930).
_Purpose_: “The American Commission (President: Strong, Members: Swift,
Ople, McNeal, Beetjew, Pappenheimer, Peacoc, Rapport) interpreted its
task in a preponderantly practical way, trying to clarify the methods
of transmission and to safeguard the troops from infection. The
English Commission (President: Bruce. Members: Harvey, Bacot, Byam,
Trench, Arkwright, Fletcher, Hird, Plimmer) set itself the task of
investigating the disease completely and thoroughly, particularly also
the causative agent.”
_Experiment_: “The experiments of the English-American Commissions,
those of transmitting Quintana with the entire blood were largely
positive, and the intravenous injection showed better results than the
intramuscular and particularly the subcutaneous.
“Experiments for the transmission of lice were carried out by the
English and American Commissions on the two bases: The bite of lice
and the rubbing in of infected lice secretion.”
The first announcement of the American Commission on successful
transmission of lice came on 14 February 1918; the first successful
experiment on the transmission of lice of the English Commission on 9
March.
_Transmission Experiments_:
with Plasma positive in 7 cases
with Serum negative
with red blood corpuscles positive 3 times in 4 experiments
with blood from skin which has negative
been scratched
_Infection_:
with secretion of lice positive
with sputum and saliva positive once in 4 experiments
with urine of patients rubbed into positive 5 times in 8 experiments
the skin
through the conjunctiva positive
through the urethra not successful
through the mouth not successful
through food and drink not successful
_Experimental persons_: Approximately at least 100
_Result_: Clarification of the etiology and the methods of transmission.
_Excerpts from the Original Report No. 25_
_Author_: Hamdi.
_Title_: Results of Immunization Tests against Typhus.
_Quotation_: Journal for Hygiene 1916, 82. Quoted in
Kolle-Kraus-Uhlenhut, Manual of Pathogenic Micro-organisms VIII/2,
1204 (1930).
_Purpose_: See title.
_Experiment_: “By means of virulent blood of patients, Hamdi was in a
position to check on a large number of persons who had been treated
before partly with the blood of patients (80), partly with the blood
of reconvalescents (54), partly with a mixture of both blood types
(19) * * *. Upon the infection with the blood of patients, none of the
thrice protectively vaccinated persons became ill, two out of seven
persons who had been protectively vaccinated only twice became ill.”
_Experimental persons_: “In the first place, these experiments concerned
persons who had been sentenced to death for crimes,”
“* * * large number * * *.”
_Result_: Effectiveness of protective vaccination was proved.
_Excerpt from Original Report No. 26_
_Author_: Doerr, R.
_Title_: Pappataci Fever and Dengue.
_Quotation_: Kolle-Kraus-Uhlenhut, Manual of Pathogenic Micro-organisms
VIII/1, 501 et seq. (1930).
_Purpose_: Research in Etiology and Transmission of Pappataci Fever.
_Experiment_: II. Pappataci Fever. Page 508: “The organism circulates in
the blood of the patients during the first 24 hours after the
beginning of the fever. Its presence is betrayed only from the
pathogenicity (infectivity) of the blood for healthy and receptive
(not immune) human beings. If such an individual were to be injected
with the blood of a subcutaneously feverish person he would fall ill *
* * of a fever attack typical in every respect. This experiment was at
first successfully performed by Doerr (1908), later by Doerr and Russ
in the Hercegovina, by Birt in Malta, by Tedeschi and Napolitani in
Italy, by Lepine (Three Days Fever in Syria, Bull. Soc. path. exot.
_20_, 251, 1927) in Syria. The experiment was repeated by Kligler and
Ashner in Palestine and furnished positive results in about 35 single
experiments. In this connection it must be considered that, almost
without exception, the inoculated persons lived in areas free from
epidemics and phlebotomus so that an accidental natural infection was
out of the question from the beginning.”
Page 513: “But Whittingham and Rook brought infected phlebotomus
from Malta to England. They succeeded in breeding imagines from the
eggs of flies laid in England and infecting human beings by the bites
of these flies, that is producing fever attacks. In this way, the
question of where the virus of the Pappataci fever remains over the
winter would apparently be answered.”
_Experimental persons_: About 35.
_Result_: Determination and confirmation of the etiology and the method
of transmission.
_Report After the Original No. 33_
_Author_: Goldberger, Joseph (USA Public Health Service 1914).
_Quoted from_: Bernhard Jaffe, Scientists in America, Overseas Edition
Incorporated, New York 1944, page 401 et seq.
_Purpose_: Proof that pellagra is a deficiency disease.
_Experiment_: One-sided deficiency diet (restricted in quality) which
caused 7 severe cases of pellagra.
_Experimental persons_: 12 voluntary prisoners of the Rankin-Prison-Farm
to whom their freedom was promised after survival of the experiment,
with the agreement of the governor of the state. All survived and were
set free.
_Excerpt from Original 44_
_Author_: Fraenkel, E.
_Title_: Report on Infectious Colpitis Epidemica Observed in Children.
_Quoted from_: Arch. Path. Anath. a. Physiol. (Virchow) _99_, 251
(1885).
_Purpose_: Page 263: Confirmation of the suspicion of an “infection of
the conjunctiva caused by vaginal secretion.” Animal tests showed
negative results.
_Experiment_: Page 263: “By chance I had the possibility to inoculate
the vaginal secretion (of sick women) into the conjunctiva of 3
children patients who were in the final stage of the disease (two were
suffering from atrophia infantum, the third from cheesy pneumonia) * *
*.”
Page 264: “The two pus-producing patients had suffered for
several weeks from their colpitis.”
_Result_: 2 children died—1½ and 2 days after the inoculation without
showing any reactions. The third child contracted conjunctivitis,
which healed after treatment, and died on the 10th day.
_Experimental subjects_: 3 moribund children.
_Excerpt from Original 48_
_Author_: Current Comment. Summary of a study taken from Epidemiology
Unit No. 50.
_Title_: Cholera Studies in Calcutta.
_Quotation_: Journal of the American Medical Association _130_, 790
(1946).
_Aim_: Page 790: “* * * control experiment on the treatment of cholera *
* *.”
_Experiment_: Page 790: “* * * in a highly endemic or epidemic area of
India, patients were taken in rotation as they were admitted to the
hospital and assigned to the following group according to the
treatment given:
A, sulfaguanidine;
B, control;
C, sulfadiacine;
D, penicillin; and
E, sulfadiacine and penicillin combined.
All patients received supportive treatment in the form of i.v.
hypertonic and isotonic solution of sodium chloride and oral
stimulants as indicated of offset dehydration, emaciation, and
circulatory failure.”
_Result_: Page 791:
1. Patient treated with plasma in addition to chemo-therapy:
death rate: zero.
2. Patients receiving chemo-therapy alone: death rate 1.1
percent.
3. Control group consisting of all patients who had not received
treatment or who had insufficient treatment or only supportive
treatment: death rate 38.3 percent.
“The dramatic effect of plasma is still more evident if the shock
or collapse cases are segregated and tabulated. There were, in all,
78 severely ill patients in that group. The results in the group
showed a mortality rate of 95.8 percent for the control group, 15.8
percent for the chemo-therapy, and no mortality in the group treated
with plasma plus chemo-therapy.”
_Experimental subjects_:
No numbers given, presumably several hundred, nonvoluntary as
clinical serial tests.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT KARL BRANDT 117
KARL BRANDT DEFENSE EXHIBIT 103
EXCERPTS FROM THE DISSERTATION “INFECTION EXPERIMENTS ON HUMAN BEINGS”
BY ALFRED HEILBRUNN OF THE HYGIENE INSTITUTE OF THE WUERZBURG
UNIVERSITY, 1937, CONCERNING EXPERIMENTS ON HUMAN BEINGS IN OTHER
COUNTRIES
_Excerpt from “Infection Experiment on Human Beings”_
Inaugural Dissertation for the Attainment of the Degree of a Doctor of
Medicine at the Friedrich-Wilhelm University of Berlin;
submitted by: Alfred Heilbrunn,
Hofgeismar (Hesse Nassau) 1937
From the Hygiene Institute of Wuerzburg University. (Dean: Professor M.
Knorr)
Printed by: F. W. Gadow and Son, Hildburghausen.
(The pamphlet is in the library of the Erlangen University.)
* * * * *
_MALARIA_
Infection experiments with malaria take up much space in literature. The
desire to acquire an exact knowledge of this disease, so important to
various countries, makes this fact appear quite understandable.
Therefore, numerous experiments on human beings were carried out even
before the discovery of the plasmodium malariae and without knowledge of
the transmission by anopheles. In the following enumeration, these
experiments will be quoted chronologically, thus giving a picture of how
the knowledge of the etiology, the infectiousness and the transmission
of malaria, was discovered through infection experiments on human
beings.
1. (LV 7) * * * SALISBURY (quoted from Mannaberg: Malaria Diseases,
Vienna 1899. Nothnagel, Special Pathology and Therapy II 2.) * * *
Experiment: * * * Two * * * men * * * after 12 and 14 days, fell ill
with typical tertiana. The same experiment in a second case again turned
out a positive result.
2. (LV 8) * * * DOCHMANN (Dochmann: The Doctrine of febris intermittens.
St. Petersburg Medical Journal. No. 20, quoted from Virchow-Hirsch 1880)
* * *. His experiments * * *. 1st experiment: He inoculated * * * a
healthy 30-year-old man subcutaneously with * * * feverish chills.
* * * * *
2d experiment: * * * Inoculation of three men * * *
1st man: * * * fever
2d man: Only passing indisposition.
3d man: Stayed completely well.
3d experiment: Inoculation of a woman * * *
* * * shivering fits, fever, * * *
3. (LV 9) * * * GERHARD (Gerhard: quoted from Olpp: Famous Tropical
Physicians Publ. Quello, Tuebingen) * * * transmitted * * * malaria from
a sick person to a healthy one through subcutaneous blood injections.
* * * * *
4. (LV 10) * * * MARCHIAFAVA and CELLI (Marchiafava and Celli: New
Research on Malaria Infection, Progress of Medicine, 1885, 787, 795) * *
* Five experiments were carried out on patients suffering from nervous
disorders.
1. Experiment: Experimental subject a 17-year-old man with myelitis
transversa * * *
* * * progress of fever
* * * spasm * * *
* * * swelling of the spleen * * *
An examination of the blood gave an excellent confirmation of the
malaria nature of the fever attacks * * *
2. Experiment: Experimental subject a 68-year-old man with hemichorea.
* * * * *
Characteristic attack of malaria, * * * moderate spleen tumor.
3. Experiment: Experimental subject a 32-year-old man with multiple
sclerosis.
* * * * *
* * * characteristic attacks, spleen tumor.
* * * * *
4. Experiment: Experimental subject a 47-year-old man with multiple
sclerosis.
* * * * *
No pathological manifestations in the blood picture.
5. Experiment: Experimental subject a 23-year-old man with poliomyelit.
ant.
* * * * *
* * * fever * * *
These experiments showed that—
(1) in the blood of malaria patients, corpuscles were often
found in the interior of the red blood corpuscles in amoeboic
movement and susceptible to coloring with aniline.
(2) the disease is transmissible, and that the same amoeboic
formations were found in the blood of the experimental subjects
as in the blood of the donors. The scientists carried on the
work on the basis of these results and came to the conclusion
that these amoeboic corpuscles were the morbific agents of
malaria. In order to be quite sure they made another inoculation
experiment.
Experimental subject was a 43-year-old man with paralysis
agitans.
* * * * *
* * * continual subnormal temperature accompanied by bad general
condition . . .
* * * plasmodia moving in the blood * * *
5. (LV 11) The experiments of MARCHIAFAVA and CELLI are confirmed by a
whole series of other Italian authors. I found the experiments in the
book of MANNABERG (page 7) in the form of tables and reproduce them here
in the same way. (vide pages 10-13) * * *
(LV 12) CELLI (Celli: quoted from Mannaberg (7)) had several
persons in the Roman hospital S. Spirito drink water from the
Pontinc Marshes and from the marshes near Rome and found that
these persons did not contract malaria.
(LV. 13) BRANCALEONE (Brancaleone: quoted from Mannaberg (7))
repeated the same experiment in Sicily with the same negative
result.
(LV. 14) ZERI (Zeri: quoted from Mannaberg (7)) had 9 persons,
for a period of 5-20 days, drink 1.5 litres of water each (in
toto 10-60 l.) from a malaria district; he let 16 persons inhale
the same water when sprayed. He administered it to 5 persons per
rectum: none of the experimental persons got malaria. Also
SALOMONE MARIO (LV. 15: Mario quoted from Mannaberg (7))
registered the same negative result.
* * * * *
No results were found in support of the water theory. It only
remained to examine whether mosquitoes transmitted malaria
through their sting.
6. (LV. 18) * * * BASTIANIELI (vide Mannaberg (7)) * * * To imitate the
sting of the mosquito he did nothing but insert the point of the Pravaz
syringe, moistened with malaria blood, under the skin. That sufficed in
some cases to produce a severe case of malaria.
* * * * *
7. (LV. 20) * * * 1895 ROSS (Ross, page 9) let 4 mosquitoes of the
species anopheles suck themselves full on the Indian Abdul Radir who had
numerous crescent-shaped formations in his blood, and on 25 May he let
the twenty-year-old Lutschmann, who was stated never to have been sick
before, be stung by them. On 5 June the latter contracted fever which
lasted for 3 days.
* * * * *
8. (LV. 23) In 1917 WAGNER-JAUREGG (Wagner-Jauregg: Psych. neurol.
weekly 1918) introduced artificial malaria infection to cure progressive
paralysis. Following this, now experiments were initiated.
* * * * *
9. (LV. 25) F. MUEHLENS and W. KIRSCHBAUM (Muehlens and Kirschbaum:
Further Parasitological Observations on Artificial Malaria Infection of
Paralytics. Archives for Ship and Tropical Hygiene 1924, Vol. 28, No. 4,
page 131) in 1924 report on artificial malaria infection for the
treatment of paralysis.
* * * * *
_DIPHTHERIA_
* * * * *
Despite the Behring therapeutic serum and the protective vaccine
developed by Behring, the field of diphtheria immunity has always
interested various research experts. Their efforts were all directed
toward developing safe, _active_ immunity.
48. (LV. 137) As early as 1902 DZIERGOWSKY (Dziergowsky, quoted from
Seeligmann and Happe: The Position of the Active Protective Vaccine
against Diphtheria. Result of Hygiene 11, 1930) reported on several
experiments to protect human beings against diphtheria by a number of
subcutaneous injections with a gradually increasing dose of
Diphtheria-Toxin.
* * * * *
49. (LV. 138) BLUMENAU (Blumenau, page 137) worked on this principle in
1909. He soaked cotton wads in undiluted toxin and placed them
alternately in the right and then in the left nostril of children from
3-12 years of age. He attained an antitoxin titer increase of up to 10
A.E. per ccm. of serum.
50. (LV. 139) BANDI and GAGNONI worked with killed bacteria (Bandi and
Gagnoni, page 137). They injected measles convalescents with a 4-day-old
crush of diphtheria bacilli cultures on agar which had been killed at
55° Centigrade * * *.
51. (LV. 141) BOEHME and RIEBOLD (Boehme and Riebold, One Way of Active
Immunization against Diphtheria, Munich Medical Weekly 1924, 232) were
the first to use living diphtheria bacilli for vaccination of human
beings. After extensive experiments on guinea pigs, they proceeded to
experiment on human beings. They used a diphtheria lymph, which they
named Diphcutan, a mixture of living, highly toxic diphtheria bacilli
cultures in N_{a}C1. Sixty-two persons were vaccinated with this lymph
with 10-20 scratches each on the upper arm. Those vaccinated were—
22 children from 1½-5 years of age,
11 children from 6-10 years of age,
17 children from 10-15 years of age,
2 youths from 15-20 years of age, and
9 adults from 20-50 years of age.
* * * * *
52. (LV. 142) EBERHARD (Eberhard, Contributions toward active
Immunization against Diphtheria. Hygiene Journal 105, page 614) tested 4
different vaccines produced by the Marburger Behringwerke for their
suitability for immunization of humans and for use in public vaccination
stations.
* * * * *
53. (LV. 143) BAYER used the lymph suggested by BOEHME and RIEBOLD
(Bayer, On active Immunization against Diphtheria. Yearbook of Infant
Therapeutics 1925, 273) and vaccinated 87 children with it * * *.
54. (LV. 144) MUELLER and MEYER (Mueller and Meyer, Diagnosis and
Immunization of children threatened with Diphtheria. Journal of Infant
Therapeutics 39, 405, 1925). They also checked the experiments by BOEHME
and RIEBOLD with the same methods, vaccinated 53 children who had shown
a positive reaction to the SCHICK test.
* * * * *
_TYPHUS_
55. (LV. 149) REITANO (Reitano, quoted from Rontal, Journal of
Bacteriology 1933 III, page 112) vaccinated human beings with virus
contained in dog ticks and produced typhus.
56. (LV. 150) One immunization experiment dating from the World War cost
the lives of 50 Turkish soldiers. In the year 1915 immunization
experiments against typhus were to be carried out in the hospitals of
the 3d Turkish Army with inactivated blood from a diseased person. The
doctor concerned took the blood from typhus convalescents and injected
it, as HAMDI (Hamdi, On the Results of Immunization Experiments against
Typhus-Exanthem. Hygiene Journal, 1916, 235) reports without having
inactivated it, into 120 soldiers. Each received 5 ccm. subcutaneously.
One soldier died after 14 days, others contracted typhus which, however,
progressed in a satisfactory manner. After this the doctor vaccinated
another 310 soldiers in the same way. Of these, 174 became ill and 49
died. On the average the incubation period was 12 days.
* * * * *
_PLAGUE_
62. (LV. 165) * * * BULARD (A. F. Bulard, De Moru, The Oriental Plague,
Paris 1839) * * *
* * * * *
Experiments continued to be carried out on condemned persons. On 17
August at 8 o’clock in the morning, 18-year-old Ibrahim Hassan, who had
been condemned to death, was dressed in the shirt, underwear, and jacket
of a person seriously ill with the plague. Immediately after this he was
placed in the bed of one of the patients which was still warm from the
patient’s fever. Until 21 August there was no sign that even the
slightest infection had taken place. No symptoms of the disease had
developed. On the evening of the same day, however, he complained of a
slight headache, loss of energy started, the blood circulation
accelerated * * *
A Plague Bubo developed in the left groin * * * 25 August: Further
vomiting of dark green matter. The tongue is dry and has a slightly
brackish appearance. The pulse is light and quick. Respiration is jerky,
the features are distorted. In the night death occurs.
On 7 August at 8 o’clock in the evening, Mohammed Ben Ali who has been
condemned to death was dressed in the shirt, underwear, and jacket of a
person seriously ill with the plague. Immediately thereafter he was
placed in the patient’s bed. Until the 22d no symptoms of disease. On
the morning of the 23d severe outbreak of the disease. Tottering gait,
then walking impossible. Extreme loss of energy, appearance of being
seriously ill * * *
* * * * *
On 18 August we inoculated a person condemned to death with blood
through 4 vaccinational cuts in the fold of the right arm. This blood
was taken from a head vein of a plague patient who had been ill for 2
days * * *
On 22 and 30 August a second person, condemned to death, with a
plethoric constitution and of strong build was inoculated with blood.
The first time in a fold of the left arm and in the right groin area,
the second time in the opposite positions. On the area of the
vaccination only the natural reddening and infections caused by the
vaccination instrument appeared, nothing else.
* * * * *
“A third person condemned to death was inoculated with the fluid taken
from a Plague Bubo in the groin and in the shoulder. This same person
had dressed in the clothes of a plague patient 20 days previously and
had contracted the plague with all its severe symptoms. The skin and
tissue of this experimental subject remained refractory towards any
absorption of the poison. Even when the inoculation with blood was
repeated 8 days later, no disease resulted.”
* * * * *
_SMALLPOX_
In 1791, the teacher Plett of Holstein successfully vaccinated three of
his landlord’s children in Starkendorf near Kiel. Later on when an
epidemic occurred they did not contract the disease, while their
brothers and sisters which had not been vaccinated fell sick.
81. (LV. 220) JENNER started from these premises. (Jenner, quoted from
Paschen, K.Kr.U., Manual on pathological micro-organisms, T. VIII, 1,
P821). In his first test, he inoculated with variola 16 persons who had
suffered from cowpox previously. They did not fall sick.
In 1796, a milkmaid who suffered from a finger injury contracted an
infection when milking a cow sick with cowpox. She developed a case of
cowpox. With the contents of one pustule, Jenner vaccinated a boy. The
boy developed typical vaccine pustules at the vaccination area of his
arm. Two weeks later, Jenner carefully inoculated the boy on both arms
with new pustule matter. No sickness ensued, and a second inoculation
also was negative. Thus, clear proof was furnished that cowpox
transmitted to human beings possessed the same protective value as that
produced in animals.
However, another epidemic was necessary before Jenner’s success was
recognized. In this instance he inoculated 6 children directly from the
cow. They developed a slight infection, and a subsequent inoculation
failed.
The success of Jenner’s experimental infections on human beings have
resulted in a blessing for all mankind inasmuch as his fundamental
experiments on human beings have caused the extermination of variola in
all countries that have compulsory vaccination.
EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION EXPERT
WITNESS DR. ANDREW C. IVY[27]
* * * * *
_CROSS-EXAMINATION_
DR. SAUTER: Witness, you are an expert in the field of aviation
medicine?
WITNESS DR. IVY: Yes.
Q. May I ask you what fields within aviation medicine you have worked on
specifically, because my clients, who are recognized specialists in this
field, attach importance to ascertaining precisely what fields you have
worked in particularly?
A. I have worked particularly in the field of decompression or pressure
drop sickness, and I have also worked in the field of anoxia or exposure
to altitude repeatedly at a level of 18,000 feet to ascertain if that
has any effect in the causation of pilots’ fatigue.
Q. At what time did you specifically concern yourself with the fields
you have just named? Was that before the Second World War, during the
Second World War, or was it earlier than that?
A. My interest in these fields of aviation medicine, including free fall
which I did not mention, started in 1939.
Q. Regarding your specific work in this field, Witness, you have also
issued publications. I believe you spoke of two publications. Did I
understand you correctly, or were there more?
A. There were two in the field of decompression sickness. There was one
publication in the field of the effects of repeated exposure to a mild
degree of oxygen lack. My other work has not yet been published but was
submitted in the form of reports to the Committee on Aviation Medicine
of the National Research Council of the United States.
Q. When were these two papers published of which you just told us; when,
and were they printed by a publishing house? Did they appear in a
journal or a periodical?
A. One appears in the Journal of Aviation Medicine either in September
or October of 1946. The other appears in the Journal of the American
Medical Association in either December or January 1946 or 1947. The
publication on the effect of repeated exposure to mild degrees of oxygen
lack at altitude appears in the quarterly bulletin of Northwestern
University Medical School and part of the work, insofar as its effect on
the elimination of the basis in the urine is concerned, appeared in the
Journal of Biological Chemistry around 1944 or 1945, I am not sure of
that date.
Q. Theretofore, Witness, you had thus made no publication in the field
of aviation medicine before the papers of which you just gave the dates
of publication?
A. The question is not clear.
Q. You just gave us the titles of the publications you have published
and when; now I ask whether before the dates you just gave, you did not
have any publications in the field of aviation medicine?
A. No. My first research started in 1939.
Q. You, yourself, have carried out experiments too; is that not so?
A. Yes.
Q. With human experimental subjects, of course?
A. Yes, and on myself.
Q. And with a low pressure chamber?
A. Yes.
Q. Were these frequent experiments, or were the experiments in which
you, yourself, took part only infrequent in number?
A. The experiments in which I took part were infrequent in number
compared to the total number of experiments which I performed.
Q. Did you take part in these experiments as the director of the
experiments, as the person responsible, or were you usually the
experimental subject yourself?
A. I served in both capacities. For example, I have frequently gone to
the altitude of 40,000 feet to study the symptoms of bends with an
intermediate pressure device, which we produced in our laboratory. I
have been to 47,500 feet on three or four occasions, on one occasion at
52,000 feet for half an hour. I have frequently been to 18,000 feet
without supplemental oxygen in order to study the effect of the degree
of oxygen lack present there for my ability to perform psycho-motor
tests.
Q. Can you tell us approximately during what year you began these
experiments of your own?
A. In 1939.
Q. 1939; did you at this time carry out explosive decompression
experiments too? Witness, one moment please, the English for that is
“explosive decompression.” That is thus the experiment in which one
ascends slowly to a certain height, let us say 8,000 meters, and then
all at once suddenly one is brought up to a height of 15,000 meters;
that is, first slowly up to 8,000 and then suddenly to, let us say,
15,000—that is what I understand under the term “explosive
decompression” experiment, and my question is: whether you also carried
out such experiments and if so when and to what extent?
A. I carried out over one hundred experiments on explosive decompression
in various laboratories on animals, the rabbit, the dog, the pig, and
the monkey. I did not serve as a subject myself in experiments on
explosive decompression, but a student who was trained with me in
physiology, Dr. J. J. Smith, did the first experiments on explosive
decompression in which human subjects were used, at Wright Field. I am
familiar with the work which Dr. Hitchcock did on this subject at Ohio
State University in which he studied some one hundred students under
conditions of explosive decompression.
Q. To what altitude, Witness; to what maximum altitude did you carry
your own explosive decompression experiments?
A. In animals it was up to 50,000 feet; in the case of human subjects,
the maximum was 47,500 with pressure breathing equipment.
Q. This altitude you reached in your own experiments. Now, Doctor, it
would interest me to know to what maximum altitude have any experiments
in explosive decompression been carried in America; what do you know
about this maximum altitude?
A. I believe that 47,500 or slightly above is the maximum.
Q. Witness, do you know the German Physiologist Dr. Rein; Professor
Rein, do you know his name; R-e-i-n from Goettingen?
A. Yes.
Q. At the moment he is the Ordinarius for Physiology at Goettingen, he
is a rector at the university and a member of the Scientific Advisory
Committee for the British Zone. On the basis of your own knowledge, do
you consider Professor Rein an authoritative scientist in the field of
physiology and aviation medicine?
A. I consider him an authoritative physiologist, I am not acquainted
with his work in the field of aviation medicine.
Q. Mr. President, I previously put in evidence—I want to recall that
now—an expert opinion from this Dr. Rein regarding Dr. Ruff. (_Ruff 5,
Ruff Ex. 3._) This expert testimony is from Professor Rein.
In your own experiments, Witness, you also used conscientious objectors,
is that not so? Did I understand you correctly?
A. Yes, in some of the experiments.
Q. Will you tell us why you used conscientious objectors? Were they
particularly adapted for these experiments; or what was the reason for
you, as one conducting experiments, to use especially conscientious
objectors?
A. It was their duty, their volunteer duty to render public service.
They had nothing else to do but to render public service. In the
experiments in which we used the conscientious objectors, they could
devote their full attention to the experiments. Many of the subjects,
which I have used, have been medical students or dental students, who
besides serving as subjects had to attend their studies in schools. In
the experiments we did on the conscientious objectors, they could not
attend school at the same time and carry on or perform all the tests
they were supposed to perform. For example, we used a group of
conscientious objectors for repeated exposure to an altitude of 18,000
feet without the administration of supplemental oxygen. These tests
involved the following of a strict diet, they involved the performance
of work tests and psycho-motor tests, which required several hours every
day to perform. Another group of conscientious objectors that I used
were used for vitamin studies in relation to fatigue.
These conscientious objectors had to do a great deal of carefully
measured work during the day as well as to perform psycho-motor tests so
medical students or dental students could not be used. We had to have
subjects who could spend their full time on the experiments.[28]
* * * * *
Q. Witness, from the answers that you have given so far, I am still not
clear in my mind precisely why you hit upon conscientious objectors in
particular as the experimental subjects. You said there were two groups
of them: some were in prison and some had to perform public service.
From the latter group you took your experimental subjects, but please
give me a clear answer to the question: Why did you specifically use
such conscientious objectors for your altitude experiments?
A. They could devote full time to the experimental requirements. They
did not have to do any other work as was the case of medical students or
dental students, the only other type of subjects that I had available to
me.
Q. Doctor, these persons were obliged to perform public service. If
these conscientious objectors had not been there or if they had been
used for public service, then you would not have had any experimental
subjects. There must be a specific reason why you specifically used
conscientious objectors and I ask you, please, to tell me that reason.
A. Well, we could not have done the experiments unless the conscientious
objectors had been available. That is the answer to your question.
Q. Could you not have used prisoners, even conscientious objectors who
refused to do public service and were therefore in prison without doing
any work? Could you not have used them?
A. Well, that would have meant that I and my assistants would have to go
to the prison which was quite a distance away. The conscientious
objectors could come to us at the university where they could live in
the university dormitory or in the university hospital.
Q. Doctor, if your experiments were really important—perhaps important
in view of the state of war—then it is difficult to understand why the
experiments could not have been carried out in a prison, let us say.
Other experiments have been carried out in prisons to a large extent,
and on another occasion. Doctor, you told us that you simply had to get
in touch with the prisoners; you simply wrote them a letter or you put
up a notice on the bulletin board and then, to a certain extent, you had
prisoners available. Can you give me no other information as to why you
used specifically and only conscientious objectors?
A. No. If it had been convenient and necessary for me to use prisoners,
I believe that we could have had prisoner volunteers for this work.
Q. Witness, were you ever in a penitentiary as a visitor?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you see there how the criminals condemned to death were housed?
A. Yes.
Q. Are they completely at liberty there or are the criminals condemned
to death locked up in their cells?
A. They were locked up in their cells.
Q. Now, can you please tell us how a criminal condemned to death is to
see the notice that you would put on the bulletin board? You told us
today that it was very simple—you simply put a notice on the bulletin
board—and for hours now I have been trying to figure out how a criminal
condemned to death, who is locked up in his cell, is going to see that
notice on the bulletin board.
A. While these prisoners are taken out for their meals, they can pass by
a bulletin board, or a piece of paper with the statement on it which I
read can be placed in their cells for reading or, as a large group in
the dining room, the statement can be read to them.
Q. Are criminals condemned to death together at meals in America? So far
as I know, there too the criminal condemned to death is given his food
through an opening in the cell door; he cannot eat in a common mess
hall.
A. Yes. But you must recall that I did not specify that the criminals
which were used for malaria experiments were prisoners condemned to
death; neither did I specify that if I were to go to a penitentiary to
see if I could get volunteers for a nutrition experiment that I should
select prisoners condemned to death.
Q. If you are speaking here of condemned criminals as experimental
subjects, are you speaking of criminals condemned to death or just of
criminals who have just received some sentence or other?
A. I have not used prisoners or criminals condemned to death. You have
been using that statement. I have used prisoners.
Q. You spoke only of prisoners then?
A. That is correct.
Q. Are those prisoners in pre-trial imprisonment who have not yet been
put on trial or are those prisoners who have already received some
sentence?
A. Prisoners who have already received some sentence.
Q. In other words, prisoners who have been condemned or sentenced?
A. But not necessarily to death.
Q. Yes, other sentences, aside from the death sentence, included. Did
you as a scientist interest yourself in the question of why a person was
sentenced, for what crimes he was sentenced?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you at least concern yourself with the question whether the man
was condemned, was sentenced by a regular court or a court martial, or
an extraordinary court?
A. None of these prisoners would have been sentenced by a court martial;
they would have been sentenced by an ordinary civilian court.
Q. How do you know? Did you see the personal files of these prisoners or
did you see the opinions and sentences on the basis of which the
prisoner had been incarcerated?
A. Only on the basis of the type of prisoner that would be incarcerated
in a certain penitentiary.
Q. How do you, as a doctor, know exactly what sort of prisoner is
incarcerated in this penitentiary and what sort of prisoner is
incarcerated in another prison? How do you know that?
A. That’s a matter of common knowledge to one who reads the newspapers,
the press, and who is generally informed on such matters. In a Federal
penitentiary then you might have prisoners who have been incarcerated
because of court martial.
Q. Are inmates of Federal penitentiaries used for experiments too, as
far as you know?
A. Yes. They may be.
Q. In other words, political prisoners too, that is, prisoners who were
condemned by a court martial or by another court?
A. We have no political prisoners in the United States.
Q. Are not prisoners condemned for high treason or treason and the like?
Those are political crimes.
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. For conspiring with the enemy during the war; such cases have not
only arisen but they have also been punished, and you must know that
from reading your newspaper, Professor; those are political prisoners.
Do you not have those in America?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Doctor, if I understood you correctly, you stated this morning that a
medical experiment with fatal consequences is to be designated either as
an execution or as a murder; is that what you said?
A. I did not say that.
Q. What did you say then?
A. It was more or less as I quoted it, as I remember, I said that under
the circumstances which surrounded the first death in high-altitude
experiments at Dachau, which Dr. Romberg is alleged to have witnessed,
Dr. Rascher killed the subject; that the death could be viewed only as
an execution or as a murder; and if the subject were a volunteer, then
his death could not be viewed as an execution.
Q. Witness, in your opinion, is there a difference whether the
experiments are to be traced back to the initiative of the experimenter
himself, or whether they are ordered by some authoritative office of the
state which also assumes the responsibility for them?
A. Yes. There is a difference, but that difference does not pertain, in
my opinion, to the moral responsibilities of the investigator toward his
experimental subject.
Q. I cannot understand that, Doctor. I can imagine that the state gives
an experimenter the order, particularly during wartime, to carry out
certain experiments, and that in peacetime, on his own initiative, the
researcher would not carry out such experiments unless he was ordered to
by the state. You must recognize this difference yourself.
A. That does not carry over to the moral responsibility of the
individual to his experimental subject. I do not believe that the state
can assume the responsibility of ordering a scientist to kill people in
order to obtain knowledge.
Q. Witness, that is not the question. I am not interested in whether the
state can order some one to murder; I am interested in the question
whether, in your opinion, the state can order, let us say dangerous
experiments, experiments in which perhaps fatalities may occur. In
America, too, deaths occurred several times in experiments; what is your
view on this?
A. The state, as far as I know, in the United States of America has
never ordered scientists to perform any experiment where death is likely
to occur.
Q. Doctor, I did not say where death was probable, I said where death is
possible, and I ask you to answer the question I put to you. If deaths
are probable, then you are correct, then it is murder. If deaths are
possible, then I want to know what you say to that. And, let me remind
you, Doctor, that even in the American Air Force deaths did occur; in
other words, death was possible.
A. Yes, I agree that it is possible for deaths to occur accidentally in
experiments which are hazardous. As I said in my testimony under such
conditions when they do occur, their cause is investigated very
thoroughly as well as the circumstances surrounding the death.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, you spoke yesterday of a number of experiments carried out
in the United States and in other countries outside of Germany. For
example, pellagra, swamp fever, beri-beri, plague, etc. Now, I should
like to have a very clear answer from you to the following question. In
these experiments which you heard of partly from persons involved in
them and partly from international literature, did deaths occur during
the experiments and as a result of the experiments or not? Professor, I
ask you this question because you said yesterday that you examined all
international literature concerning this question and, therefore, have a
certain specialized knowledge on this question.
A. I also said that when one reviews the literature, he cannot be sure
that he has done a complete or perfect job.
So far as the reports I have read and presented yesterday are concerned,
there were no deaths in trench fever. There were no deaths mentioned, to
my knowledge, in the article on pellagra. There were no deaths
mentioned, to my knowledge, in the article on beri-beri, and there were
no deaths in the article, according to my knowledge, in Colonel Strong’s
article on plague. I would not testify that I have read all the articles
in the medical literature involving the use of human beings as subjects
in medical experiments.
Q. And, in the literature which you have read, Witness, there was not a
single case where deaths occurred? Did I understand you correctly?
A. Yes. In the yellow fever experiments I indicated that Dr. Carroll and
Dr. Lazare died.
Q. That is the only case you know of?
A. That’s all that I know of.
* * * * *
EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT ROSE[29]
_CROSS-EXAMINATION_
* * * * *
MR. MCHANEY: Now, would the extreme necessity for the large scale
production of typhus vaccines and the resultant experiments on human
beings in concentration camps have arisen had not Germany been engaged
in a war?
DEFENDANT ROSE: That question cannot simply be answered with “yes” or
“no”. It is, on the whole, not very probable that without the war,
typhus would have broken out in the German camps, but it is not
altogether beyond the bounds of possibility because in times of peace
too typhus has broken out in individual cases from time to time. The
primary danger in the camps is the louse danger, and infection by lice
also occurs in times of peace. If typhus breaks out in a camp that is
infected with lice, a typhus epidemic can arise in peacetime too, of
course.
Q. But Germany had never experienced any difficulty with typhus before
the war. Isn’t that right?
A. Not for many decades, no.
Q. You stated that nine hundred persons were used in Dr. Strong’s plague
experiments?
A. Yes, I know that number from the literature on the subject.
Q. What is the usual mortality in plague?
A. That depends on whether it is bubonic plague or lung pest. In one,
namely, bubonic plague, the mortality can be as high as sixty or seventy
percent. It also can be lower. In lung pest, the mortality is just about
one hundred.
Q. How many people died in Dr. Strong’s plague experiments?
A. According to what his reports say, none of them died, but this result
could not have been anticipated because this was the first time that
anyone had attempted to inoculate living plague virus into human beings,
and Strong said in his first publication in 1905 that he himself was
surprised that no unpleasant incidents occurred and that there was only
severe fever reaction. That despite this unexpectedly favorable outcome
of Strong’s experiments the specialists had considerable misgivings
about this procedure can be seen first of all from publications where
that is explicitly stated; for example, two Englishmen say that,
contrary to expectations, these experiments went off well but
nevertheless this process cannot be used for general vaccination because
there is always the danger that, through some unexpected event, this
strain again becomes virulent. Moreover, from other works that Strong
later published it can be seen that guinea pigs and monkeys that he
vaccinated with this vaccine died not of the plague, but of the toxic
affects of the vaccine. All these difficulties are the reason why this
enormously important discovery which Koller and Otto made in 1903, and
Strong in 1905, has only been generally applied, for all practical
purposes, since 1926. That is an indication of the care and fear with
which this whole matter was first approached, and Strong could not know
ahead of time that his experiments would turn out well. I described here
the enormous concern that Strong felt during all these months regarding
the fact that that might happen which every specialist feared, viz.,
that the virus would become virulent again. That is an enormous
responsibility.
Q. Be that as it may, nobody died. That is a fact, isn’t it?
A. If anyone did die, the publications say nothing about it. There were
deaths only among the monkeys and guinea pigs that are mentioned in the
publication. If human beings died, there is no mention in the
publication. It is generally known that if there are serious accidents
in such experiments as this, they are only most reluctantly made public.
Q. Now, Professor, I have no wish to limit you but, as I understand it,
you have explained these things in considerable detail during the four
days in which you have already testified. If you can give a short answer
to my question that is all I want. If I want any further explanation
I’ll ask you for it.
Now, what is the normal death rate in beri-beri?
A. That depends on the medical care given. If the care is good, the
mortality is zero, and if they have no medical care at all, then a lot
of them die.
Q. Sixty to eighty percent would probably die if they were not treated.
Is that right?
A. Beri-beri lasts for many, many months before a person dies, and
usually one does not die of beri-beri in sixty days—that would be a
severe case.
Q. How many people did Strong use in his beri-beri experiments? Is
twenty-nine all you know about?
A. So far as I know from the literature, the number was twenty-nine.
Q. Well, it says in the literature that he used only twenty-nine. Is
that right?
A. So far as I know, yes.
Q. And one of those died?
A. According to what the literature says, one of them died.
Q. What is the mortality in typhus?
A. That varies enormously. It depends on the epidemic. In some epidemics
the mortality is five percent. In general, you count on a mortality of
twenty percent. In the Serb-Albanian epidemic in 1915, there was a
mortality of seventy percent, but that mortality rate is so
extraordinarily high that it is generally assumed that probably, in
reality, there were more cases of typhus than were actually reported.
Q. Well, we could take roughly five to thirty percent as the mortality.
Is that right?
A. Yes. That is what the textbooks generally say.
Q. What was the mortality in the Buchenwald experiments, Professor?
A. In the controlled cases in the experiments that I knew of, the
mortality rate was thirty percent.
Q. Among the controls, you figured thirty percent?
A. Yes. There were ten control persons in the first group of
experiments, and of them, three died.
Q. Three died? Well, but I assume that you have read through the Ding
diary and let us assume for the moment that it is correct. Didn’t you
say that they also used control persons in the four or five other series
of experiments?
A. In the controlled cases where they were testing the vaccine, the
general mortality rate was thirty percent. But then there were these
therapeutic experiments in which, according to the diary, blood
infections were undertaken and, in this case, the diary does mention an
unusually high mortality rate.
Q. Well, Professor, for your information, we have figured out five
control series in the Ding diary, and I mean by controls those that were
not treated with anything. The mortality ranges between fifty-four to
one hundred percent and averaged eighty-one percent. Do you accept those
figures as correct? I mean, do you think that’s right?
Q. No. That does not correspond with the impression I got from the
numbers in the diary, but I did not calculate it so precisely as all
that. I looked at the individual experiments and it is true that, for
instance, in these therapeutic experiments, Ding’s work mentions a
mortality of something like fifty to fifty-five percent, and then there
is one series that deals with blood infection where of twenty people, I
believe nineteen died.
Q. Let me put it to you, Professor, is it not a fact that they were not
dealing with epidemic typhus in Buchenwald, but with a super-typhus,
developed from man to man passage, which was much more virulent and much
more deadly than any typhus you could expect in an epidemic?
A. That I cannot judge because I have no knowledge of the work done in
Buchenwald and can only refer to what Ding’s diary says, which I regard
as unreliable.
Q. Well, if you regard it as reliable, Doctor, and if you figure out the
deaths among the untreated control persons and find a mortality which
averaged eighty-one percent, will you not, as a scientist and an expert
on tropical diseases, concede that they had developed a highly virulent,
something we might call a super-typhus, in Buchenwald? Isn’t that right,
Professor?
A. As a scientist, I am accustomed to state my opinion on the basis of
reliable documentation and not on the basis of such falsifications which
are produced for a special purpose.
Q. I can appreciate that you do not regard the document as reliable,
Professor, but we will investigate that a little later.
* * * * *
-----
[1] Closing statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 14 July
1947, pp. 10718-10796.
[2] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 15 July 1947, pp.
10874-10911.
[3] See section on Status of Occupied Poland under International Law,
vol. I, pp. 974-979.
[4] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 16 July 1947, pp.
11020-11048.
[5] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18 July 1947, pp.
11268-11288.
[6] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7 Feb. ’47, pp. 2301-2661.
[7] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 15, 16
Apr. 1947, pp. 5926-5994.
[8] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 12, 13,
14 June 1947, pp. 9029-9824.
[9] Closing statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 14 July
47, pp. 10718-10796.
[10] United States _vs._ Erhard Milch. Concurring Opinion of Judge
Musmanno, vol. II, sec. VII, B.
[11] See also excerpts from the closing brief for the defendant Karl
Brandt (Section VIII E, vol. I, pp. 983-990).
[12] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 15 July 47, pp.
10874-10911.
[13] Art. 59 of the German Penal Code reads:
“If a person in committing an offense did not know of the
existence of circumstances [Tatumstaende] constituting the
factual elements of the offense as determined by statute
[gesetzlicher Tatbestand] or increasing the punishment, then
these circumstances may not be charged against him.
“In punishing an offense committed through negligence, this
provision applies only insofar as the lack of knowledge does not
in itself constitute negligence for which the offender is
responsible.”
[14] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 26, 27,
28, 31 March, 1, 2, 3 Apr. 47, pp. 5000-5244, 5334-5464.
[15] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 12, 13,
14, 16 June 47, pp. 9029-9324.
[16] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18 July 47, pp.
11289-11309.
[17] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 17 July 47, pp.
11128-11152.
[18] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 26, 27,
28, 31 March, 1, 2, 3 Apr. 47, pp. 5000-5244, 5334-5464.
[19] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25 April 47, pp. 6081-6484.
[20] Closing statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 14 July
1947, pp. 10718-10796.
[21] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 15 July 47, pp.
10874-10911.
[22] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 17 July 47, pp.
11128-11152.
[23] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25 April 1947, pp. 6081-6484.
[24] Professor of History of Medicine at Erlangen University.
Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 27 Jan. 1947,
pp. 1961-2028.
[25] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 12, 13,
14 June 1947, pp. 9029-9324.
[26] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 16 July 47, pp.
10972-10994.
[27] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 12, 13,
14, 16 June 47, pp. 9029-9324.
[28] To the question of conscientious objection in the United States,
see Section VIII E—Voluntary Participation of Experimental Subjects,
cross-examination of Dr. Ivy (vol. I, p. 944 ff.).
[29] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25 April 47, pp. 6081-6484.
IX. RULING OF THE TRIBUNAL ON COUNT
ONE OF THE INDICTMENT[30]
PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: The Secretary General will note for the record
the presence of all the defendants in Court.
The Tribunal will now announce its ruling on the motion of certain
defendants against Count I in the indictment concerning the charge of
conspiracy.
_MILITARY TRIBUNAL I_
Count I of the indictment in this case charges that the defendants,
acting pursuant to a common design, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly
did conspire and agree together to commit war crimes and crimes against
humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10, Article 2. It is
charged that the alleged crime was committed between September 1939 and
April 1945.
It is the ruling of this Tribunal that neither the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal nor Control Council Law No. 10 has
defined conspiracy to commit a war crime or crime against humanity as a
separate substantive crime; therefore, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction
to try any defendant upon a charge of conspiracy considered as a
separate substantive offense.
Count I of the indictment, in addition to the separate charge of
conspiracy, also alleges unlawful participation in the formulation and
execution of plans to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity
which actually involved the commission of such crimes. We, therefore,
cannot properly strike the whole of Count I from the indictment, but
insofar as Count I charges the commission of the alleged crime of
conspiracy as a separate substantive offense, distinct from any war
crime or crime against humanity, the Tribunal will disregard that
charge.
This ruling must not be construed as limiting the force or effect of
Article 2, paragraph 2 of Control Council Law No. 10, or as denying to
either prosecution or defense the right to offer in evidence any facts
or circumstances, occurring either before or after September 1939, if
such facts or circumstances tend to prove or to disprove the commission
by any defendant of war crimes or crimes against humanity as defined in
Control Council Law No. 10.
-----
[30] Tr. pp. 10717-10718, 14 July 47.
X. FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT[31]
BY DR. SERVATIUS
Mr. President, your Honors:
I cannot comment on all the questions which the prosecution brought up
this morning. I must limit myself to a few things and can refer to my
closing brief where I have gone into considerable detail on all these
questions.
This morning I heard the detailed legal arguments advanced by the
prosecutor. I have commented particularly on these legal questions in my
closing brief, and I will now merely make a few brief comments.
The prosecution assumes that Law No. 10 is an independent law. This is
not correct, for it designates itself explicitly as a law for the
execution of the London Charter and declares that Charter to be an
integral part of the law.
Now, the sole purpose of the London Charter is to punish disturbances of
international legal relations, and not what has happened or is happening
somewhere within an individual state. Any other interpretation would put
an end to the conception of sovereignty, and it would give right of
intervention into the affairs of other states.
In the trial before Tribunal III, Case No. 3, against Flick et al.,[32]
General Taylor referred to an alleged right of intervention, quoting a
considerable amount of literature with regard to this right of
intervention into the internal affairs of another country.
I have ventured to refer to the position taken concerning this by one of
the four signatory powers of the London Charter, a signatory power which
was itself the victim of intervention in the name of civilization, the
Soviet Union. I have attached the said literature to part I of my
closing brief.
The Soviet Union drew a clear inference from the intervention to which
it had been exposed by the Entente at the end of the First World War and
obtained an alteration in the text of the London Charter, under which
intervention would have been possible, by insisting that the text, which
was ambiguous in consequence of the punctuation, be altered by the
insertion of a comma. This comma was so important that the
representatives of the four signatory powers met on purpose to discuss
it.
It results therefrom that the internal affairs of a country cannot be
affected by the London Charter and, consequently, by Law No. 10.
Punishment by this Tribunal of acts committed by Germans against Germans
is therefore inadmissible.
The prosecution further discussed at length this morning another
question, that is the question of conspiracy. I have also commented on
that in my closing brief. I will merely make a brief reply here to the
prosecution.
The point of view of the defense, that a charge of conspiracy as an
independent offense is inadmissible, was confirmed by the Tribunal’s
decision of today. In that way the leak in the dike, so to speak, was
stopped, and one cannot let the ocean pour into the land from the other
side by declaring the conception of conspiracy admissible under common
law.
The conception of conspiracy is really only a technical expedient of the
jurists. Its purpose is to effect, beyond the number of accomplices in
the true sense of the word, other persons who are considered deserving
of punishment, but who cannot be proved guilty of complicity.
This may be done where the law against conspiracy is common law. If,
however, this law is introduced in Germany after the event and applied
to facts which have occurred in the past, this would mean that by a
detour of the law of procedure new conceptions of offense would be
introduced into material law. This would amount to an _ex post facto_
law and is, therefore, illegal according to legal principles generally
recognized.
The purpose of enlarging the circle of participants cannot be attained
under Law No. 10 by breaking up the conception of conspiracy into its
component parts and introducing forms of complicity hitherto unknown in
Germany.
Now, I shall read my statement proper:
In the closing statement against the defendant Karl Brandt the
prosecution discussed very little the counter-evidence brought forward
by the defense in the course of the proceedings. They relied to a large
extent on evidence already advanced in the indictment.
The affidavits of the defendants themselves play a special part in
support of the prosecution. For the defendant Karl Brandt they are
important with respect to his position and consequent knowledge of the
event referred to in the indictment.
If these affidavits contain imputations they can only be used, according
to the Tribunal’s statement, against the affiants themselves. As far as
they involve the defendant Karl Brandt, however, they have been
clarified in respect to the decisive issues. But in spite of this
correction the first statements may prejudice credibility unless good
reasons justify such correction.
Here the result of interrogations made in the initial proceedings is in
contradiction to the evidence given before the Tribunal. On the basis of
practical experience, German law considers as valid evidence only the
result of an interrogation made by a judge. The reason is the lack of
impartiality which may be found, quite naturally, in the case of an
interrogating official who is to conduct the prosecution. The capacity
of the interrogator to elicit the truth impartially depends on his
character, his training, and his professional experience.
The qualification of the interrogators has been attacked here by the
defense, but the prosecution has made no effort to substantiate it.
In order to form a judgment it is also important to know the general
lines on which the prosecution carries out its interrogations. Under
German law the prosecutor also has to ascertain and put forward
exculpating material when investigating a case personally or through
assistants. As to American procedure, Justice Jackson clearly rejected
this principle during the trial before the International Military
Tribunal and said he could never serve two masters.
This critical view of the affidavits is confirmed by their contents,
which frequently show the struggle between the interrogator and the
interrogated person. He is no classical witness who says, “I believe,”
“I presume,” “as far as I remember,” and so on, for he shows thereby
that he can give no positive information. And such testimony becomes
completely worthless if conclusions are drawn in the form of, “It would
have been impossible for him,” “he might have known,” “perhaps he was
the highest authority,” and so forth.
Not only individual words thus demonstrated that the testimony is
composed of conclusions, but whole parts of the reports show the same
character.
In view of all this, the defendants’ contentions are to be believed,
that they raised objections but succumbed to the weight of the prepared
record presented to them and signed, trusting that they would have an
opportunity later to clarify deficiencies and to state their true
opinion.
This criticism of the defendants’ affidavits is also called for in the
case of the affidavits given by the witnesses for the prosecution. Facts
are recorded therein which the witnesses did not know themselves, but
which they had only heard about, and which they presumed after having
been made to believe them by persuasion. The individual cases in which
objections are to be raised on these lines have been dealt with in the
closing brief.
The charges advanced against the defendant Karl Brandt include medical
experiments on human beings and euthanasia. In both cases the defendant
is charged with having committed crimes against humanity.
The press comments on the proceedings, anticipating the sentence and
publishing articles about base characters and depravity. Pamphlets with
striking titles appear.
On the other hand the Tribunal will make itself acquainted with the
literature collected by the defense as evidence. If one reads this
literature one loses one’s self-confidence and cannot conclude without
admitting that these are problems which persons not considered criminals
tried to solve before the defendants. These are problems of the
community. The individual may make suggestions for their solution, but
the decision is the task of the community and therefore of the state.
The question is how great a sacrifice may the state demand in the
interest of the community? This decision is for the state alone.
How the state decides depends on its free discretion, and finds its
limit only in the rebellion of its citizens. In obeying the orders of
his state, the defendant Karl Brandt did no wrong. If sentence is passed
against him, it would be a political sentence against the state and the
ideology it represents.
One can condemn the defendant Karl Brandt only by imposing on him the
duty of rebellion and the duty of having a different ideology to his
environment.
It is contended that the state finds its limits in the eternal basic
elements of law, which are said to be so clear that anyone could discern
their violation as a crime, and that loyalty to the state beyond these
limits is therefore a crime. One forgets that eternal law, the law of
nature, is but a guiding principle for the state and the legislator and
not a counter-code of law which the subject might use as a support
against the state. It is emphasized that no other state had made such
decisions up to now. This is true only to a certain extent. It is no
proof, however, that such decisions were not necessary and admissible
now. There is no prohibition against daring to progress.
The progress of medical science opened up the problem of experiments on
human beings already in the past century, and eventually made it ripe
for decision. It is not the first time that a state has adopted a
certain attitude with regard to euthanasia with a change of ideology.
Only the statesmen decide what is to be done in the interests of the
community, and they have never hesitated to issue such a decision
whenever they deemed it necessary in the interest of their people.
Thereupon their rules and orders were carried through under the
authority of the state, which is the basis of society.
Inquisition, witch trials, and revolutionary tribunals have existed in
the name of the state and eternal justice, and the executive
participants did not consider themselves criminals but servants of their
community. They would have been killed if they had stood up against what
was believed to be newly discovered eternal justice. What is the subject
to do if the orders of the state exceed the customary limits which the
individual himself took for inviolable according to tradition.
What did the airman think who dropped the first atomic bomb on
Hiroshima? Did he consider himself a criminal? What did the statesmen
think who ordered this atomic bomb to be used. We know from the history
of this event that the motive was patriotism, based on the harsh
necessity of sacrificing hundreds of thousands to save their own
soldiers’ lives. This motive was stronger than the prohibition of the
Hague Convention, under which belligerents have no unlimited right in
the choice of methods for inflicting damage on the enemy.
“My cause is just and my quarrel honorable,” says the king. And
Shakespeare’s soldier answers him: “That’s more than we know.” Another
soldier adds: “Ay, or more than we should seek after; for we know enough
if we know we are the king’s subjects; if his cause be wrong, our
obedience to the king wipes the crime out of us.”
It is the hard necessity of the state on which the defense for Karl
Brandt is based against the charge of having performed criminal
experiments on human beings.
Here also—in addition to the care for the population—the lives of
soldiers were at stake, soldiers who had to be protected from death and
epidemics. In Professor Bickenbach’s experiment, the issue was the lives
of women and children who without 45 million gas masks would have been
as unprotected against the expected gas attack as the Japanese were
against the atomic bomb. Biological warfare was imminent, even praised
abroad as cheaper and more effective than the atomic bomb.
Is it really against the law and all political morals if the state in
such a situation provides for the expected emergency and orders the
necessary medical experiments to be performed on its own citizens? As
applied to foreigners such procedure is limited in principle. In my
closing brief I have discussed the exceptions.
What is to be done is decided not by the physician but by the political
leader. Even the expert Dr. Ivy had to grant him the fundamental
authority.
The question is why, with the legal position so clear, a man like Keitel
refused to have such experiments carried out in the Wehrmacht, and why
some of the defendants themselves try to disprove any connection with
the experiments. The answer is that a measure may be as unavoidable as
war and yet be abhorred in the same way.
Unlike Professor Ivy, these men certainly considered these experiments
an evil, and their desire was not to become involved in them personally,
if possible, and not to allow troops to participate in them who should
not be burdened with such questions and who had no insight into the
necessity of the measures to be taken. In spite of everything, Germany
was not yet so “communized” that all private feelings in the individual
had disappeared.
The prosecution opposes to this necessity the condition of absolute
voluntariness.
It was a surprise to hear from the expert Professor Ivy that in the
penitentiaries many hundreds of volunteers were pressing for admission
to experiments, and that more volunteered than could be used. I do not
want to dispose of this phenomenon with irony and sarcasm. There may be
people who realize that the community has the right to ask them for a
sacrifice. Their feeling of justice may tell them that insistence on
humanity has its limits. If humanity means the appeal to the strong not
to forget the weak in the abundance of might and wealth, the weak should
also make their contribution when all are in need.
But what if in the emergency of war the convicts, and those declared to
be unworthy to serve in the armed forces, refuse to accept such a
sacrifice voluntarily, and only prove an asocial burden to state and
community and bring about the downfall of the community? Is not
compulsion by the state then admissible as an additional expiation?
The prosecution says “No”. According to this human rights demand the
downfall of human beings.
But there is a mixture of voluntariness and compulsory expiation,
“purchased voluntariness.” Here the experimental subject does not make a
sacrifice out of conviction for the good of the community but for his
own good. The subject gives his consent because he is to receive money,
cigarettes, a mitigation of punishment, etc. There may be isolated cases
of this nature where the person is really a volunteer, but as a rule it
is not so.
If one compares the actual risk with the advantage granted, one cannot
admit the consent of these “voluntary prisoners” as legal, in spite of
all the protective forms they have to sign, for these can only have been
obtained by taking advantage of inexperience, imprudence, or distress.
Looking through medical literature, one cannot escape the growing
conviction that the word “volunteer”, where it appears at all, is used
only as a word of protection and camouflage; it is hardly ever missing
since the struggle over this problem became acute.
I will touch only briefly on what I have explained in detail in my
closing brief. No one will contend that human beings really allowed
themselves to be infected voluntarily with venereal disease; this has
nowhere been stated explicitly in literature. Cholera and plague are
also not minor inconveniences one is likely to undergo voluntarily for a
trifle in the interest of science. Above all, it is not customary to
hand over children for experimental purposes, and I cannot believe that
in the 13 experiments carried out on a total of 223 children, as stated
in Document Karl Brandt 117, Karl Brandt Exhibit 103, the mothers gave
their consent. Would not the mothers have deserved the praise of the
scientist for the sacrifice they trustfully made in the interest of
science, praise which is otherwise liberally granted to real volunteers
in reports on experiments?
Is it not likely to have been similar to the experiments carried out by
Professor McCance? (_Karl Brandt 93, Karl Brandt Ex. 29._) The German
authorities who condemn the defendants in a particularly violent form
have no objection to raise here against the order to hand over weakling
children to a research commission for experimental purposes. The
questionnaires which the Tribunal approved for me in order to get
further information about this matter have not been answered as the
higher authorities did not give permission for such statements to be
made. This silence says enough; it is proof of what is supposed to be
legal today in the line of “voluntariness”.
It is repeatedly shown that the experiments for which no consent was
given were permitted with the full knowledge of the government
authorities. It is further shown that these experiments were published
in professional literature without meeting any objection, and that they
were even accepted by the public without concern as a normal phenomenon
when reports about them appeared in popular magazines.
This happens at a time when the same press is stigmatizing as crimes
against humanity the German experiments which were necessary in the
interests of the state. Voluntariness is a fiction; the emergency of the
state hard reality.
In all countries experiments on human beings have been performed by
doctors, certainly not because they took pleasure in killing or
tormenting, but only at the instigation and under the protection of
their state, and in accordance with their own conviction of the
necessity for these experiments in the struggle for the existence of the
people.
The German doctor who acted in conformity with the German regulations
can no more be punished than the American doctor who complied with the
requests of his state in the way which is customary there.
Justice is indivisible.
To what extent is the defendant Karl Brandt implicated in the medical
experiments?
The prosecution says he is implicated in almost all the experiments and
refers to his position and his connections. They state that he was the
highest Reich authority in the medical spheres; there, however, they are
misled by an error in translation, for Karl Brandt only had the powers,
regulated in a general way, of an “Oberste Reichsbehoerde” [Supreme
Reich Authority], and the practice of those powers was restricted to
special cases.
This is apparent from the three known decrees and from the explanation
thereof given by witnesses. Moreover, Karl Brandt was not given these
functions until 1944 when these experiments were practically finished,
as is shown by the time schedule submitted to the Tribunal for
comparison.
It has been proved that the defendant Karl Brandt himself, in a
broadcast, publicly called his position as Reich Commissioner a
“Differential”. In fact, Karl Brandt’s task was not to order but to
adjust; it was a task designed to fit his character.
We have also learned from the presentation of evidence that the
defendant Karl Brandt did not have the machinery at his disposal for
issuing orders which was necessary for a supreme Reich authority; he
lacked the staff and the means. No one who is acquainted with a
government administration will think it possible that, under these
circumstances, the defendant Karl Brandt might have been able to enforce
his point of view against the resistance of the old agencies; no one
will even think it probable that anything would have been done to
facilitate such an attempt by the “new master”.
Consequently, Karl Brandt’s position was not such as to justify the
conclusion drawn by the prosecution as to his general knowledge. There
was no official channel by which everything was bound to come to his
knowledge, for he was not the superior of other authorities.
It is true that the defendant Karl Brandt was supposed to be informed
about fundamental matters, that he had the right to intervene, and so
on. But these were only possibilities, not in conformity with conditions
in practice. We have seen that Conti opposed him and that Himmler
prohibited direct contact with Karl Brandt within his sphere.
Therefore Karl Brandt can be brought into connection only with the
events in which he participated directly.
Here it is first of all striking that the defendant Karl Brandt, who is
supposed to have been the highest authority, appears only very rarely.
There are three so-called troop experiments: the testing of drinking
water, concentrated food, and an ointment for burns.
Further, three medical experiments are connected with the defendant Karl
Brandt. The hepatitis experiments, which he is said to have suggested,
were not carried out. While that research was continued during the
following years, Karl Brandt, who is said to have sponsored it
particularly, is mentioned by none of the numerous witnesses and
experts, and his name is not mentioned in any document. Is it not,
therefore, a plausible explanation that Grawitz confused the names?
The second case is the request to hand over 10 prisoners for two days
for an experiment not named. This cannot refer to a real medical
experiment, for such an experiment cannot be carried out in such a short
time with the necessary tests and observations. The speedy return of the
experimental subjects indicates that the experiment was not dangerous.
Finally, the defendant Karl Brandt is connected with the phosgene
experiments by Bickenbach, which caused the death of four Germans
sentenced to death. But precisely here Bickenbach’s affidavit shows that
the defendant Karl Brandt was outside the whole framework of the
experiment in Himmler’s sphere, and that he was merely approached to
mediate. The order came from Himmler. The experiments must have seemed
innocuous to the defendant Karl Brandt since Bickenbach wanted to carry
them out on himself.
On the other hand, there was the state emergency and the enormous
importance of the discovery that the taking of a few urotropin tablets
might give the ardently desired protection to all against the expected
gas attack and, as the result of the experiment shows, actually did so.
Now the prosecution endeavors to establish a connection of Karl Brandt
with the other experiments via the Reich Research Council. It is true
that one can establish such a connection theoretically on paper, but the
links of the chain break when one examines them closely. Only the head
of the specialized department decided on the so-called research
assignments, and he only investigated whether the aim was necessary for
war, not how the experiment was to be carried out. He could not inform
others of matters about which he did not know himself.
The defendant Karl Brandt is further charged with not having protested
in one case when he heard about deaths caused by experiments on persons
sentenced to death in the well-known lecture on sulfanilamide. I must
point out that even if this experiment had been inadmissible, silence
would not be a crime, for assent after the act is without importance in
criminal law, and one can only be connected with plans and enterprises
as long as they have not been concluded.
Now the prosecution has introduced in its closing brief a new charge
holding the defendant Karl Brandt responsible for negligence. In this
respect I should like to point out that no indictment for negligence has
been brought in, and that the concept of crime against humanity
committed by negligence cannot exist.
Therefore, it will be sufficient to emphasize that the alleged
negligence depends on the existence of a duty of supervision and the
right to give orders through other agencies. In every state the spheres
of competence are separated, and it is not possible for everyone to
interfere in everything on the basis that everyone is responsible for
everything.
The prosecution says that the defendant Karl Brandt ought to have used
his influence and availed himself of his intimate relations with Hitler
to stop the experiments. Even presuming that he was aware of the facts
as crimes, his guilt would not be of a legal, but only of a political or
moral nature. Until now nobody has been held criminally responsible for
the conduct of a superior or a friend; the question of criminal law,
however, is the only one the Tribunal has to consider. As a matter of
fact this close relationship did not exist. The defendant Karl Brandt
was the surgeon who had to be in attendance on Hitler; Dr. Morell, the
latter’s personal physician, soon tried to undermine the confidence
placed in Karl Brandt so that he was given commissions which removed him
further and further from the sphere of his medical activity.
The alleged intimate relations were eventually crowned by the dictation
of a death sentence against Karl Brandt without his having been granted
even a hearing on the charges advanced against him.
If one sums up everything relating to the medical experiments and
follows to a large extent the charges of the prosecution, it is an
established fact that it is not shown that the defendant Karl Brandt
participated in any way in experiments on prisoners of war and
foreigners, or that he was cognizant of them. Therefore, no war crime or
crime against humanity has been committed, and consequently punishment
under Law No. 10 is excluded. I refer in this connection to the legal
arguments in my closing brief.
The second problem is euthanasia.
The authorization of 1 September 1939 was issued before the period of
the medical experiments, at a time when the defendant Karl Brandt was
still closely attached to the Fuehrer’s headquarters and to Hitler as an
accompanying physician.
In my closing brief I have explained in detail that the defendant Karl
Brandt did not participate in the Action 14 f 13, with the “special
treatment” of prisoners in concentration camps, occurrences which were
given the name of euthanasia only here in the trial.
Neither did the defendant Karl Brandt take any part in the extermination
of Jews in Auschwitz, which again has nothing in common with the idea of
euthanasia.
I have further shown that the so-called “wild euthanasia”, which was
carried out simultaneously with and immediately after legal euthanasia,
was not instigated by Karl Brandt. The stopping of euthanasia in August
1941 has been proved, and therefore that was the end of the defendant
Karl Brandt’s duties; for what would have been the meaning of this
cessation if, after it, increased activity was to set in? The contacts
of Karl Brandt after the cessation have been clarified as being the
consequence of his activities connected with evacuation for air
protection. Where the name of the defendant Karl Brandt is mentioned
otherwise, it obviously serves only as means of information for
uninformed people who never saw or heard anything of him themselves.
I shall deal here with euthanasia only to the extent that it is
officially dealt with under the ordinance of 1 September 1939.
Concerning the “Reich committee”, I refer to my closing brief.
The presentation of evidence has established that the defendant Karl
Brandt actually had no “administrative and medical office” from which
the whole organization might have been administered. On the contrary, it
is a fact that Bouhler declared himself solely responsible for the
procedure; this is testified to by unequivocal documents.
Nor has any regulation or instruction become known which was issued by
Karl Brandt. Not a single document was signed by him. He made no
speeches and conducted no discussions.
But what did he do and what was his duty?
His duty was not to carry out euthanasia; he was only to be informed in
special cases in order to be able to report to Hitler. This was in
conformity with the existing conditions—his presence at and
simultaneous attachment to the Fuehrer’s headquarters, and to Hitler.
Only once was Karl Brandt seen active, and that is in the negotiations
with Pastor von Bodelschwingh, which led to the result, amazing for us,
that the defendant Karl Brandt won Bodelschwingh’s sympathy, and after
the collapse the latter said in a radio interview that Brandt was an
idealist but not a criminal.
But the defendant Karl Brandt took note of interrogation forms, he
inspected a registrar’s office, and he co-signed the authority for
physicians to execute euthanasia.
What could the defendant Karl Brandt learn from the forms?
The prosecution thinks that Jews and foreigners were to be affected in
the first instance. The affidavit by the director of the Jewish lunatic
asylum, in which all the insane Jews of Germany were concentrated,
proves that this was not the case.
The prosecution says that all persons unfit for work were to be killed
as “useless eaters”. But it is a fact that even work-houses were
requested to give information only about cases of really grave insanity.
What did the defendant Karl Brandt know about the procedure?
He knew that the authorization which was issued was not an order given
to the doctor, but only conferred on him the right to act on his own
responsibility after the most careful consideration of the patient’s
condition. This was a clause inserted in the ordinance of 1 September
1939 on Karl Brandt’s initiative.
The defendant Karl Brandt knew that the specialists, whom he did not
know, were chosen by the Ministry of the Interior, and that the experts
were eminent men in their special spheres.
The defendant Karl Brandt also knew that the authorities concerned saw
no reason to object to the execution of the measure, and that even the
chief jurists of the Reich declared the legal foundations to be
irreproachable, after having been informed of the facts.
Within this framework the defendant Karl Brandt approved of official
euthanasia and supported it.
But the prosecution even calls euthanasia a thousand-fold murder. In
their opinion there was no formal law, and it is alleged that the expert
Dr. Lammers confirmed this.
Yes, but he also stated that even an informal ordinance was valid. Even
an order issued by the Fuehrer had the force of law, as can be clearly
seen from the indisputable effects of such orders, in particular in
relation to foreigners.
But for the defendant Karl Brandt it is of no importance whether the
ordinance of 1 September 1939 was actually valid or not; the only
important thing is that he had reason to believe it was valid and that
he could rely on this opinion.
German courts have already dealt with cases of the practice of
euthanasia; but these cases occurred after the official procedure had
been stopped, as at Hadamar, or after persons had been killed who could
never have come under the powers conferred by the ordinance, or other
crimes were committed.
It should be observed that these sentences always confirm the base
motives of the offenders. On the other hand, these courts were concerned
with the question of public law only to the extent that they confirm
that no formal law was available. In one case the court restricted
itself to information given by a member of the prosecution staff in the
trial before the International Military Tribunal.
The real objections to euthanasia are not based on a formal point of
view, but rather on the same reasons which are advanced against the
admissibility of the medical experiments.
Even an insane person of the lowest grade may not be killed it is said.
No human being may presume to kill another human being.
But the right to kill in war is accepted in international law, and
public law allows the suppression of a revolt by violence.
What prevents the state from ordering killing in the sphere of
euthanasia too?
The answer is that there is no motive which might justify an action of
this kind.
The economic motive of eliminating “useless eaters” is certainly not
sufficient for such measures. Such a motive was never upheld by the
defendant Karl Brandt; it was apparently mentioned by others as an
accompanying contingency and later taken up by counter propaganda.
The defendant Karl Brandt considered the motive of pity for the patient
to be the decisive one. This motive is tacitly accepted for euthanasia
on the deathbed, and doctors in all countries increasingly acknowledge
it.
In former times the courts were repeatedly concerned with killings
committed out of pity, and in sensational trials, juries found offenders
not guilty who freed their nearest relatives from the torment of life.
Who would not have the desire to die while in good health rather than to
be forced by all the resources of medical science to continue life
degraded to an animal’s existence! Only misguided civilization keeps
such beings alive; in the normal struggle for existence Nature is more
charitable.
But the legislator has hitherto refrained from giving authority to kill
in such cases. But he can solve the problem if he wants to. The reasons
for his restraint are exactly those which led in this case to the
disguising of those measures and to the secrecy observed. There is the
fear of base intrigues concerning inheritance, the mental burden of the
relatives, and so on. The individual does not want to bear this burden,
nor is he able to do so. It can be taken over only by the state, which
is independent of the desires of those concerned.
That such is the will of the great majority of those who really come
into touch with these problems was shown by the result of the inquiry
conducted by Professor Meltzer, which has been offered in evidence. It
was carried out by him many years ago in order to obtain an argument
against euthanasia and its principal supporters, Binding and Hoche. He
obtained the reverse of what he had himself expected as an expert.
But I see a third motive which unconsciously plays an important part; it
is the idea of sacrifice.
A lunatic may cause the mental and economic decay of a family and also
ruin it morally.
If healthy human beings make great sacrifices for the community and lay
down their lives by order of the state, the insane person, if he could
arouse himself mentally and make a decision, would choose a similar
sacrifice for himself.
Why should not the state be allowed to enact this sacrifice in his case
and impose on him what he would want to do himself?
Is the state to be forbidden to carry out such euthanasia until the
whole world is a hospital, while the creatures of nature keep
unblemished through what is believed to be the brutality of Nature?
The decision as to whether such an order given by the state is
admissible or not depends on the conception of the social life of
mankind and is, therefore, a political decision.
Neither the defendant Karl Brandt nor anyone else who participated in
legalized euthanasia would ever have killed a human being on his own
authority, and in the German sentences passed the blameless former life
of the persons stigmatized as mass-murderers is always emphasized.
This is a warning to be cautious. Did they really commit brutalities, or
were they sentenced only because they were not in a position to swim
against the tide of times and to oppose it with their own judgment?
A Christian believing in dogma will turn away in pity from this way of
thinking. But if the order to use euthanasia to the desired limited
extent was really in such contradiction to the commandment of God that
everyone could realize it, then it is incomprehensible why Hitler, who
never withdrew from the church, was not excommunicated.
This must remove the burden of guilt which one now wants to pile up.
Then humanity would have clearly realized at the time that in this
devilish struggle man cannot prevail for God stands for Justice.
If there are offenders there are many co-offenders, and one understands
Pastor Niemoeller saying: “We are all guilty.”
This is a moral or a political guilt, but cannot be shifted to a single
person as criminal guilt.
I have thus shown the fundamental lines along which the actions of the
defendant Karl Brandt have to be judged.
The primary consideration for the judgment of this Tribunal is that no
prisoners of war or foreigners were submitted to euthanasia with the
knowledge or the desire of the defendant Karl Brandt.
Thus the defendant Karl Brandt cannot be punished under Law No. 10 on
this count either. What happened between Germans is not subject to the
decision of this Tribunal.
Finally, the defendant Karl Brandt is also charged with having been a
member of the SS, an organization which has been declared criminal.
Evidence to show that the defendant Karl Brandt knew of a criminal aim
of this organization and approved of it must be brought by the
prosecution. A reference to the general assertions in these proceedings
is not sufficient proof, for precisely here the prosecution cannot
prevail with their assertions in regard to Karl Brandt.
As to the details, I refer to the statements made in my closing brief.
The fact that the defendant Karl Brandt was the only member of the SS
who at the same time retained his position as a medical officer in the
army shows that his honorary rank in the SS was really only a formality,
and that he was no true member of this organization.
When the defendant Karl Brandt testified here that he wore the uniform
of the SS with pride, this only shows that he, like the majority of the
SS men, knew nothing about the criminal aims. In judging the
organization of the SS, the International Military Tribunal was aware
only of a small part of the whole, looking, so to speak, through a
keyhole into a dark corner.
Nor could the defendant Karl Brandt have any personal knowledge of
Himmler’s secrets, for Himmler rejected him personally, as is shown by a
number of affidavits. Since the defendant Karl Brandt could not obtain
information even in his own sphere of medicine, how is he to have
obtained knowledge of other matters?
I do not want to repeat the affidavits which give information about the
basic attitude of the defendant Karl Brandt and show that he adopted an
attitude which was incompatible with the mentality supposed to be
typical of the SS. In this connection I merely refer to the statements
made by Pastor Bodelschwingh, Dr. Gerstenmaier, Meyer-Bockhoff, Philipp
Prince of Hesse, and others.
If I, as the defense counsel, consider Karl Brandt’s conduct as a whole
and see the wounds he has received in the struggle of life, I must
acknowledge that he is a man and not a criminal.
For the Tribunal’s decision, however, the only conclusive fact is that
the defendant Karl Brandt did not disturb the circle of international
law, for he committed no war crimes and consequently no crimes against
humanity. I, therefore, ask that defendant Karl Brandt be acquitted.
-----
[31] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 14 July 47, pp.
10797-10817.
[32] United States _vs._ Friedrich Flick et al. See vol. VI.
XI. FINAL STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANTS,
19 JULY 1947
A. Final Statement of Defendant Karl Brandt[33]
There is a word which seems so simple—order; and how colossal are its
implications. How immeasurable are the conflicts which hide behind the
word obey. Both affected me, obey and order, and both imply
responsibility. I am a doctor and on my conscience lies the
responsibility of being responsible for men and for life. Quite
dispassionately the prosecution has brought the charge of crime and
murder and they have raised the question of my guilt. It would have no
weight if friends and patients were to shield me and speak well of me,
saying I had helped and I had healed. There would be many examples of my
actions during danger and my readiness to help. All that is now useless.
As far as I am concerned I shall not evade these charges. But the
attempt to vindicate myself as a man is my duty towards all who believe
in me personally, who trusted in me and who relied upon me as a man as
well as a doctor and a superior.
No matter how I was faced with the problem, I have never regarded human
experiments as a matter of course, not even when no danger was entailed.
But I affirm the necessity for them on grounds of reason. I know that
opposition will arise. I know things that disturb the conscience of a
medical man, and I know the inner distress that afflicts one when ethics
of every form are decided by an order or obedience.
It is immaterial for the experiment whether it is done with or against
the will of the person concerned. For the individual the event seems
senseless, just as senseless as my actions as a doctor seem when
isolated. The sense lies much deeper than that. Can I, as an individual,
detach myself from the community? Can I remain outside and do without
it? Could I, as a part of this community, evade it by saying I want to
live in this community, but I don’t want to make any sacrifices for it,
either of body or soul? I want to keep a clear conscience. Let them see
how they can get along. And yet we, that community and I, are somehow
identical.
Thus I must suffer these contradictions and bear the consequences, even
if they remain incomprehensible. I must bear them as my lot in life,
which allocates to me its tasks. The meaning is the motive—devotion to
the community. If on its account I am guilty, then on its account I will
be answerable.
There was war. In war, efforts are all alike. Its sacrifices affect us
all. They were incumbent upon me. But are those sacrifices my crime? Did
I tread on the precepts of humanity and despise them? Did I pass over
human beings and their lives as if they were nothing? Men will point at
me and cry “euthanasia”, and falsely, “the useless”, “the incapable”,
“the worthless”. But what actually happened? Did not Pastor
Bodelschwingh, in the middle of his work at Bethel last year, say that I
was an idealist and not a criminal? How could he say that?
Here I am, subject of the most frightful charges, as if I had not only
been a doctor, but also a man without heart or conscience. Do you think
that it was a pleasure to me to receive the order to permit euthanasia?
For 15 years I had toiled at the sickbed and every patient was to me
like a brother. I worried about every sick child as if it had been my
own. My personal lot was a heavy one. Is that guilt?
Was it not my first thought to limit the scope of euthanasia? Did I not,
the moment I was included, try to find a limit and demand a most
searching report on the incurables? Were not the appointed professors of
the universities there? Who could there be who was better qualified? But
I do not want to speak of these questions and of their execution. I am
defending myself against the charge of inhuman conduct and base
intentions. In the face of these charges I fight for my right to humane
treatment! I know how complicated this problem is. With the utmost
fervor I have tortured myself again and again, but no philosophy or
other wisdom helped me here. There was the decree and on it there was my
name. It is no good saying that I could have feigned sickness. I do not
live this life of mine in order to evade fate if I meet it. And thus I
assented to euthanasia. I fully realize the problem; it is as old as
mankind, but it is not a crime against man nor against humanity. It is
pity for the incurable, literally. Here I cannot believe like a
clergyman or think as a jurist. I am a doctor and I see the law of
nature as being the law of reason. In my heart there is love of mankind,
and so it is in my conscience. That is why I am a doctor!
When I talked at the time to Pastor Bodelschwingh, the only serious
admonisher I knew personally, it seemed at first as if our thoughts were
far apart; but the longer we talked and the more we came into the open,
the closer and the greater became our mutual understanding. At that time
we were not concerned with words. It was a struggle and a search far
beyond the human sphere. When the old Pastor Bodelschwingh left me after
many hours and we shook hands, his last words were: “That was the
hardest struggle of my life.” For him as well as for me that struggle
remained; and the problem remained too.
If I were to say today that I wish this problem had never come upon me
with its convulsive drama, that would be nothing but superficiality in
order to make me feel more comfortable in myself. But I am living in
these times and I see that they are full of antitheses. Somewhere we all
must make a stand. I am fully conscious that when I said “Yes” to
euthanasia I did so with the deepest conviction, just as it is my
conviction today, that it was right. Death can mean deliverance. Death
is life—just as much as birth. It was never meant to be murder. I bear
a burden, but it is not the burden of crime. I bear this burden of mine,
though with a heavy heart, as my responsibility. I stand before it, and
before my conscience, as a man and as a doctor.
B. Final Statement of Defendant Handloser[34]
During my first interrogations here in Nuernberg, in August 1946, the
interrogator declared to me:
First, you have been the Chief of the Army Medical Service. Whether or
not you knew of inadmissible experiments does not matter here. As the
Chief, you are responsible for everything.
Secondly, do not make the excuse that among other nations the same or
similar things have happened. We are not concerned with that here. The
Germans are under indictment, not the others.
Thirdly, do not appeal to your witnesses. They, of course, will testify
in your favor. We have our witnesses, and we rely upon them.
Those were the guiding principles of the prosecution up to the last day
of these proceedings. They have remained incomprehensible to me, because
I always believed a criminal to be a man who did wrong, and because I
was of the opinion that even the prosecution endeavored to be objective,
at least after the end of the presentation of evidence. The final plea
by the prosecution, however, has shown me that I made a mistake. The
speech by the prosecution did not take into account the material
submitted in evidence, but it was a summarized repetition of one-sided
statements by the prosecution without taking into account that which was
submitted in the course of the presentation of evidence in my case.
I am quite convinced that the high Tribunal has gained a true impression
of my activity and of my attitude. Just as I have tried throughout my
entire life to fulfill the tasks allotted to me by fate according to the
best of my capacity and in the full knowledge of my responsibility, so
have I also tried to stand this most serious task before this Court with
the aid of the strongest weapon which I possess—that is the truth.
If there is anything which could console me for the mental suffering of
the last months, it is the consciousness of knowing that before this
Court, before the German people, and before the people of the world, it
has been made clear that the serious general charges of the prosecution
against the Medical Corps of the German Armed Forces have been proved to
be without any foundation.
It can be seen how unjust these charges were by the fact that no charges
have been raised or any proceedings initiated against a single leading
doctor of the German Armed Forces in combat or at home. As the last
Medical Inspector of the Army, and as Chief of the Medical Service of
the Armed Forces of Germany, I think with pride of all the medical
officers to whose untiring devotion countless wounded and sick patients
of this dreadful war owe their lives and cure and their possibilities of
existence. Never and nowhere were the losses of an army medical corps
greater than those among the medical officers of the German Armed Forces
in carrying out their duties.
More than 150 years ago, the motto and guiding principle created for
German military doctors and their successors was “Scientiae, Humanitati,
Patriae” (For Science, Humanity, and Fatherland). Like the medical
officers in their entirety I also have remained true to that guiding
principle in thought and in deed. Realizing the outcome of the events of
these recent times, may the joint endeavors of all the nations succeed
in avoiding in future the immeasurable misfortune of war, the dreadful
side of which nobody knows better than the military doctor.
C. Final Statement of Defendant Rostock[35]
I have nothing to add to the pertinent statements by my defense counsel,
Dr. Pribilla, regarding the individual points of the indictment in this
trial; but with regard to the general position of German medical science
during this war, there are a few words, which I would like to say from
this dock.
During my direct examination I have already stated why I, as the Chief
of the so-called “Science and Research” department undertook to work for
medical science as late as 1943 and 1944. At that time the problem was
to avoid, or at least to minimize, the great and acute danger of
teaching and research, and with that Germany’s universities, becoming
completely destroyed. When this had been prevented at the very last
moment, there arose the task and the duty of improving the means and the
possibilities of basic research which had been more and more restricted
in the course of the war, and through dwindling resources research in
Germany would have come to a standstill. Due to the chaotic development
of the last year of the war, success was comparatively small. There
were, however, some results and there were a few things which were saved
after the end of the war.
Today through the evidence produced in this trial, I know the reasons
which paralyzed the work at the time. It was the striving for power on
the part of certain organizations which used the effective support of
certain executive departments of the Third Reich who held unrestricted
power. It was the principle of totalitarianism which these organizations
followed particularly in the case of what they called the “university
science”. It was there, however, that we had founded the tradition of
German science recognized the world over. In contrast to that, their
aim, as shown in some of the testimonies given in this trial and some of
the documents submitted, was to found a “politically directed science”
of their own. That was the reason why my personal efforts and those of
the health and medical services, which I have referred to in this trial,
did not achieve complete success. Today, at the end of this trial, that
is now clear to me. At that time, in the year 1944, we did not know of
this masterly camouflaged and, therefore, so very dangerous opponent to
that branch of science with which I myself had grown up.
Throughout my life I have never worked for one form of a state or
another, or for any political party in Germany, but simply and solely
for my patients and for medical science.
D. Final Statement of Defendant Schroeder[36]
It is very difficult for a defendant to find the right final words here.
In methodical, detailed work throughout the last months, the defense has
tried to rebut the charges of the prosecution.
When now the prosecution states in its final plea that details do not
matter so much, but that the entire complex of questions has to be
considered as a whole, that one has to look at matters as at a bundle of
sticks, not as individual branches and twigs of the bundle. If,
furthermore, the prosecution refers to a sentence pronounced in the Far
East by an American Military Court, by which a Japanese general and
military commander was sentenced only because, as a commander, he bore
the responsibility for all the acts of his troops, regardless of whether
he ordered them, knew of them, approved of them, or did not even know of
them—if, gentlemen of the Tribunal, these principles are decisive for
proceedings, then I have to ask, why bother at all to start proceedings
of that kind, to prepare them, and to carry them out? Those decisions
could be made much more quickly.
What can I, as a defendant, bring against these arguments? That can be
said in a few words: myself, my work, my acts as a doctor and a soldier
in 35 years of service. Not the craving for glory and honor was the
purport of my life’s work, but the firm intention to put my entire
capacity, my full knowledge, into the service of my beloved Fatherland;
to help the soldier, as a physician, to heal the wounds caused by
wartime and peacetime service, both as a physician for the individual,
as well as a medical officer for the mass of troops which were in my
care.
That was the aim and object of my work. I do not believe that I have
deviated from that path. My eyes always looked towards the final goal:
to help and to heal.
E. Final Statement of Defendant Genzken[37]
During my testimony I stated before the Tribunal that I took no part in
the types of experiments of which I am accused. I have nothing to add to
what my defense counsel Dr. Merkel has said. I have striven to lead a
decent life as a doctor and as a soldier. If my fatherly concern for my
2,500 doctors and 30,000 men of the Medical Service of the Waffen SS was
mentioned here in this courtroom, it is nevertheless my duty to speak
from this place on behalf of those men who, in the majority, were decent
and brave doctors and medical attendants. I am proud to have been their
leader, a leader of those who sacrificed their lives and blood with
unceasing fervor to help me in building up the organization of the
Medical Service of the Waffen SS, and to overcome the tremendous losses
among the ranks of our comrades at the front.
The soldiers of the Waffen SS have proved to history—in the focal
points of uncounted battles during an uneven struggle—that they could
rank among the finest troops on this earth as far as training,
efficiency, readiness of sacrifice, soldierly valor, and contempt of
death were concerned. Actions of modern warfare have presented to some
extent a picture of murder and horror on both sides. Who dares to raise
his head before God and gainsay that?
The men of the Waffen SS went as vanquished into captivity, out of
unimaginable physical and mental war distress. That captivity was not
free of bloodshed, ill-treatment and degradation of various kinds. To
the men of the Waffen SS there was added to the weight of such captivity
the frightful realization of the fact that their supreme commander,
Himmler, had misused their cloak of honor and deceived them, that they
had been cheated and then deserted by him. These decent men of the front
Waffen SS certainly did not deserve that fate, the fate of being branded
as members of a criminal organization.
My request and my wish is that our former opponents should realize the
honest idealism of these victims, do justice to it, and give them back
belief in justice.
F. Final Statement of Defendant Gebhardt[38]
I wish to thank the high Tribunal for having granted me an opportunity,
in the witness box, to describe my personal position in 1942 in such
detail.
The historical situation at that time placed me in a totalitarian state
which, in turn, placed itself between the individual and the universe.
Virtues in the service of the state were paramount virtues. Beyond that
I do not know anywhere where the intellect was not debased as a tool for
war. Everywhere, in some way values and solutions were put into the
service of the war. And here again, in the intellectual field, the first
step is the decisive one. I may be permitted to recall that in the war
of nerves, it was propaganda with and for “medical preparations” which
caused the first step, the order to examine the question of
sulfanilamides.
In my final statement today may I be permitted to describe my entire
attitude. In doing so, I may perhaps utilize the most important of the
four American freedoms, that is to say the freedom of speech, until the
very end in such a way that I will refrain from any denunciation or from
incriminating others.
Without exaggerating the importance of my own person, a physician can
only be measured according to his conception of medical science.
Basically, I was neither a cold technical specialist nor a pure
scientist. I believe that I have always tried, for example when carrying
out surgical experiments, to see every disease as a human condition of
suffering. I did not look on my task as something to serve my own
advantage, or as a cheap gesture of theoretical pity, but as a personal
active support to the trembling existence of the suffering patient. My
goal as a physician was not so much purely technical therapy for the
individual patient, as therapeutical care for the particularly
underprivileged group of the poor, the children, the cripples, the
neurotics.
I am anxious that it should be believed that it was not due to moral
baseness nor to the selfish arrogance of the scientist that I came into
contact with experiments on human beings. On the contrary, during the
entire period in question I had experiments in my field of research
carried out on animals. It was only because I was the competent
responsible surgical expert that I was informed about the imminent
experiments on human beings in my field of surgery, which had been
ordered by the state authorities. After the order had been given, it was
no longer a question of stopping these experiments, but the problem was
the method of their execution.
My problems as an expert consisted of the following: For one, the
experiments that had been ordered had to be of practical scientific
value, for the purpose of testing immunization to protect thousands of
injured and sick. On the other hand, I considered humane safety measures
for the experimental subjects most important. The main point for me was
never the purpose and the object of the experiments, but the manner in
which they were carried out. To realize that in a humane way I did not
remain aloof and restrict myself to theoretical instruction in the field
of surgery, but I myself took part, with my clinic and with all its
safety measures.
I hope that this will show that in carrying out experiments I tried with
the best of intentions to act primarily in the interest of the
experimental subjects. We did not take advantage of the unlimited
opportunities given us by Himmler, that is to say, the surgical
experiments were not followed by others. I believe that as far as was
possible at that chaotic period I fulfilled my duty as an expert,
because these experiments did not increase in the field of surgery in
spite of the crescendo of the catastrophic policy. My desire was to help
and not to give a bad example.
In seeing my responsibility in this way I, of course, made a decision
for myself. I hope that hitherto I have always faced criticism, even
from foreign countries, without any secrecy, but also without any
feeling of guilt for my activities as an expert.
Through these activities, however, as a military physician, not through
my own initiative, I was brought into contact with concentration camps.
I can understand how heavily that deadly shadow must lie upon anyone who
was ever active there. In the ghostly phenomenon of that sphere, which
at that time was unknown to me as well, we can now in retrospect begin
to realize the frightfulness of the negative ideology of extermination
becoming combined secretly with the negative selection of the guards.
Only from the documents of the international trial have we been able to
see definitely that of the 35,000 guard troops, only 6,000 were SS men
who were unfit for combat. The rest were scum, conscripts, foreigners,
etc., who with the greatest injustice and to our bitter shame were given
the same Waffen SS uniform as we wore at the front. As head of a
well-known clinic, known for its measures of safety, in the interest of
the experimental subjects, within the framework of my duty as an expert
as I saw it, I got in touch with concentration camp doctors. As far as
it was at all possible I tried to exclude that atmosphere from my sphere
of work. That my counter-actions went beyond purely clinical safety
measures for the experimental subjects may, I think, be seen from the
following fact: Of the several thousand foreign inmates of this
concentration camp—among whom, as we were told here, there were at
least seven hundred Polish women—only 200 were turned over to the Red
Cross at the end of the war. Of these two-hundred, however, sixty were
my experimental subjects, as was proved.
Just as I have tried to clarify my actions as a doctor and to explain my
good intentions and possibilities for influence, so my final thought
should be devoted to self-criticism, above all as regards on my moral
obligation.
In a parody on the words of Heinrich Heine we see today that: “Just to
have been an SS man is fate in itself”. Although I believe and hope that
in that terrible confusion between the decent Waffen SS and the
executive organization, I did my duty as a specialist, an officer, and a
human being, I still feel bound to make every form of reparation for
this confusion. My possibilities for doing that of course are limited.
Without seeking sensation I offered to undergo an experiment on myself
as proved, and that without any surgical safety measures, as soon as the
first opportunity arose. My responsibility for the execution of the
experiments carried out with good intention, and especially for those
who were my subordinates, I have emphasized. I have a further criticism
and responsibility, which I spoke of not only now in the dim light of my
own defense but already in May 1945 on the day when Himmler released us
from our oath and from our orders, and he himself left his post without
reserve. It was my endeavor with others to prevent any illegal
continuation of an SS conception, and for that purpose to take the
burden off the shoulders of our credulous youth by making the SS
generals responsible.
Today as a private individual I can only repeat what I am ready to do,
at least as far as my former professional standing is concerned.
Where, in spite of my earnest endeavors, reproach and guilt seem to
cloud the picture in the sphere for which I was responsible, may the
consequences affect me in such a way that I may make the path easier for
the younger men who, believing in me, also joined the SS as surgeons. I
believe that this pile of rubble, Germany, with its wasted biological
material, cannot afford to let these fine young doctors perish in camps
and in other inactivity. Also I know every measure which would make the
work easier for the old German universities and their respected
teachers.
I have summarized my point of view in order to help avoid possible
mistakes. From unwholesome social conditions it is a pathological and
deceptive escape, then as well as today—here and everywhere, to unite
and combine spiritual with economic and political concepts. It is a
disastrous error to confuse the organized unanimity of voices with
harmony. Destructive criticism only brings intolerant lack of
cooperation, which interrupts all cohesion. The private as well as the
public conscience cannot be subjugated to any official virtue, nor to
any temporal moral principles. It can only find its place within a
God-given order.
In the spirit of “earthly constructive pessimism”, as I wrote before the
war, in this alone consideration for the painful reality of this social
catastrophe seems to be found.
My last sentence is to express our personal gratitude to Dr. Seidl who
has stood by the side of my colleagues and myself so conscientiously and
with such human kindness.
G. Final Statement of Defendant Blome[39]
I have testified quite openly before this high Tribunal that
particularly up to the outbreak of war I was a confirmed National
Socialist and follower. I have also explained why I became a Party
member in 1931, and that because political conditions in Germany at the
time were moving with giant strides towards a final conflict between
Communism and National Socialism, as a result of the economic chaos and
the impotence of the German governments after 1919. I have said that I
joined the National Socialist Party because I rejected the dictatorial
form of the Communist system. In my book “The Doctor in the Struggle”,
which was put to me by the prosecution here in cross-examination, I also
explained why I went over to National Socialism. This book, however,
which was published in 1941, at the time of Germany’s greatest
victories, clearly shows my repudiation of the Second World War, to
which I do not refer with a single word, not even a hint, although my
experience in the First World War takes up considerable space in this
book.
After the First World War, Germany was in great difficulties. The
situation became progressively worse and more unbearable, when at the
turn of the thirties the economic crisis spread throughout the world and
even seized hold of the United States. At that time I realized that in
such hard times a nation which is drifting toward despair seeks a leader
and follows him in blind confidence as soon as he can show great
successes.
That in the case of Hitler these were only sham successes or temporary
successes the German people realized only gradually, only step by step,
and only at a time when it was too late to shake off the dictatorship
again by their own strength. For years the German people were deceived
by the leaders as to the true situation. With deliberately lying
propaganda, Hitler’s governmental system until the last moment kept
proclaiming final victory to the German people, even in the winter of
1944, and even in the spring of 1945, when the Reich cabinet and the
Party leaders long knew that a terrible collapse was imminent. This
governmental system thus irresponsibly imposed on the exhausted body of
the German nation still further useless losses of life and property.
Since the collapse, particularly since the International War Crimes
Trial at Nuernberg, we see clearly that this frivolous method of
betrayal of their own people was a fitting part of the systematical
murder of foreign peoples and races by the millions.
I believe that there is no other example in history of the boundless
confidence of a people in their leader being so boundlessly misused and
disappointed.
The German people were blinded in their faith in their Fuehrer, in a
leader who constantly pretended to them and the world a love of peace, a
humane character, a selfless care for the people. Thus the German people
became the victim of a political gambler. His unrestrained supreme power
apparently knew only the choice between ruling and destroying. Hitler’s
ambition, as I know and judge it today, had only one aim: _At any price_
to go down in history as a great man. Hitler achieved this goal 100
percent. He went down in history as one of the greatest tyrants of all
time, tremendous in his mania for ruling, tremendous in his brutality in
the achievement of his ends, not hesitating even at the murder of his
best friends, his oldest followers, if they were in his way.
Relying upon the blind confidence of his deceived people, Hitler created
a system in which all individualism, all sentiment of freedom, all
personal opinion of the citizens was nipped in the bud and turned into
slavery.
He succeeded in this with the aid of a very small circle of closest
associates, who had fallen under his hypnotic influence, in part perhaps
themselves deceived by this man, but who became willing tools in his
hand for the enslavement of the German people and the decimation of
whole nations.
Under the fatal influence of a clever, deliberately lying propaganda,
against which even other countries were as good as powerless, the German
people and the German doctor, too, believed that they were following an
honorable leader and serving a good cause; they all considered it the
highest moral duty not to desert the Fatherland in times of emergency
and particularly in wartime, but to do their duty to the very extreme,
especially since in this war the life or death of the nation was at
issue.
During the times of total warfare, the times of air raids, hunger, and
the danger of epidemics, working conditions for the German doctor were
terribly hard; so difficult that today one can hardly imagine what
German doctors accomplished in those days for friend and foe alike.
Whether we twenty doctors here in this dock are accused justly or
unjustly, it is a great injustice in any case to defame German doctors
in general in public, as is constantly being done. As former Deputy
Reich Physicians’ Leader I know conditions in the German medical
profession during the Hitler period, and I must say even today that in
its _totality_ the German medical profession was efficient, decent,
industrious, and humane. Their willingness to work under the most
difficult conditions that one can imagine, their unselfishness to the
utmost, their courage and their helpfulness were exemplary. Beyond all
praise were in particular the numerous old doctors who were already
living in retirement and who, in spite of their great age, returned to
the service of the sick, and those innumerable women doctors who,
married, and often the mothers of many children, deserted their
household duties for the difficult work of medical practice during
wartime.
The whole German people knew this, in whose midst and under whose eyes
the German medical professions spent the years of distress and fright,
and who, therefore, will continue to place unlimited confidence in
German doctors.
Of myself I can say that I have always, particularly during the Hitler
period, devoted all my efforts to keeping the medical profession at a
high scientific and ethical level and to developing it. And I found in
this effort the full support of all German doctors, including the most
famous scientists and chief physicians of medical institutions.
Well-known scholars throughout the world supported this work, which was
_above_ [unintelligible] parties and enjoyed an international
reputation.
But in the course of this trial it has become clearer to me day by day
just how criminal the Hitler system was, to which I sacrificed in good
faith many years of my life, and I am so deeply moved inside me that I
must confess to myself: For years I held a responsible position in a
system which today I must curse just as much as I curse all those who
forced upon the German people such a tyranny of crime and debasement of
man.
It was my mistake that I stayed in the post where fate had placed me and
in which I had hoped to be able to do good for our people and my
profession. It would often have been simpler to give up this post when I
began to realize, step by step, the depravity of the Third Reich. If I
did not do so, but stayed at my post until the bitter end, I did this
because I considered it my duty, especially in the hard times of total
war, and because again and again I succeeded either in protecting the
medical profession from harm or in preventing crimes against humanity.
Even today I would have to consider it cowardice if I had left my post
in 1941 or 1942 only to bring myself to safety or to evade threatened
responsibility.
I feel myself free of the guilt of ever having committed or furthered
crimes against humanity.
H. Final Statement of Defendant Mrugowsky[40]
My attorney and I made every effort during my examination on the witness
stand and by means of the considerable evidence which we submitted to
refute the charges which have been raised against me, just as much as we
tried to assist in ascertaining the truth.
The outcome of the trial and the evidence against me is in the hands of
the Tribunal and the closing brief, and in the reply to comprehensive
documentation of the prosecution. I am firmly confident on the basis of
this trial that this high Tribunal will examine the evidence objectively
and carefully. Thus in my final speech I merely would like to draw your
attention to the fact that my life in its entirety was solely devoted to
my profession and my science. It was my aim, not by any means to
represent some political ideology, but to go to the university and to
reach the position of a free and independent doctor and scientist.
The prosecution has charged us, the defendants, with destructive
tendencies which were supposed to have been the causes of our actions. I
know that I am free of such tendencies. They never occurred to my
collaborators and myself at any time. In the Waffen SS too, the troops
of which were among the bravest divisions of the German Armed Forces,
such tendencies never played a part.
As far as my own concepts of the ethical duties of the doctor are
concerned, they are contained in my book regarding medical ethics, and I
believe always to have acted according to the principles of that book
and lived according to them. My life, my actions, and my aims were
clean. That is why now that at the end of this trial I can declare
myself free of personal guilt.
I. Final Statement of Rudolf Brandt[41]
Now, after this trial has reached its final stage, my conscience is
confronted with the question of whether I consider myself guilty or
innocent. My responsibility, in my opinion, is to be tested by a
threefold question:
First, did I participate in the experiments directly and
actively?
Second, did I at least have any knowledge of the criminal
character of the experiments on human beings?
Third, what, if I had known, could have been my attitude towards
Himmler?
What my basic opinion is of crimes against humanity I did not only
declare myself on the witness stand but this has also been testified to
by a very competent foreign witness, a Swedish medical counsellor, Felix
Koersten.
Before this Tribunal and in the full knowledge of what I say I confess
that I abhor—and did abhor—any crime against humanity in the years
past and during my activity as a so-called personal Referent of Himmler.
But I also frankly declare that perhaps during the course of these last
years my way of thinking was not always in my conscious mind as it is
today. But I never participated in a crime against humanity knowingly,
intentionally, or with premeditation when passing on the letters,
orders, etc., which Himmler issued to third persons, and the result of
which was the commission of cruelties on human beings.
I am confident that from the evidence and from the content of the
various defense affidavits the Tribunal will be convinced that in truth
my real sphere of power did in no way correspond to the face value of my
official position. My real sphere of power was extremely small. It did
not exceed that of a well-paid stenographer in the office of an
influential man in Germany. If the Tribunal were to start from this
fact, it would approach reality much closer than the prosecution did in
its indictment.
I got into contact with Himmler when I was a young, immature man who
came from a family in modest circumstances. Nothing else but my ability
as a stenographer, which I had obtained through my industry, was the
reason for that, and this was my position until the last days of the
German collapse, in spite of promotions in rank. At that time I was only
too glad to get that job because it enabled me to support my parents
financially.
When I started work with Himmler, I got, without intermediate stages,
into an agency, the chief of which was to combine, among other
functions, the highest executive powers in his hands a short time
afterwards.
I am convinced that I would not sit here under a grave indictment if I
had had the opportunity to continue my education, if I had made a start
in a subordinate agency, and had risen little by little into a higher
position. Unfortunately, I have always been a lone wolf as long as I
lived, and I never was fortunate enough to have an older friend who
could have corrected my political inexperience and my gullibility.
If, however, through all those years, I represented Himmler’s ideology,
I did so only because I did not know the criminal part of Himmler’s
character. Since I lived, so to speak, divorced from the world around me
and was only devoted to my more than plentiful work, I only learned
after the collapse what stupendous crimes are to be booked on Himmler’s
account.
The evidence has shown that I neither knew a concentration camp nor had
anything to do with concentration camps in my official capacity; nor had
any influence on the system of the concentration camps, their
administration and management, nor on the treatment of prisoners. For
this reason I didn’t know the measure of the tragedies which were
enacted there.
Those matters, into which I had sufficient insight during my restless
daily activities to permit me to distinguish between good and evil, were
on a plane where they need not shun the light of sun.
I do not deny that some of the documents submitted here by the
prosecution went through my hands, but I do deny—and I pray the
Tribunal may believe me—that I knew the contents of the documents
particularly the reports and therefore the essential core of the human
experiments.
I know that appearances are against me. Only these external appearances
led the prosecution to indict me in this trial and to pass their comment
on me during their closing speech, without penetrating to the bottom of
matters. This way they arrived at a completely wrong appraisal which
does not correspond to the facts and overrates my position and my
activities.
These appearances which speak against me will be dispelled as soon as my
real position will be considered in which I found myself as
[administrative officer] so-called personal Referent of Himmler for many
years. On the witness stand I testified to the truth, which has been
confirmed by witnesses who knew the real facts from their own
experience.
It does not run counter to experience that among thousands of incoming
and outgoing items of mail—that is, hundreds of thousands during the
course of the years—there should be an insignificantly small number of
documents which a personal Referent on the orders of his chief, passes
on to third persons without knowing their contents more closely, the
more so if they concern matters which have nothing to do with the normal
duties of the personal Referent.
I believe that an American tribunal will know how to appraise the
foregoing, though I am rather afraid that the situation as it existed in
Germany during the years before the collapse and prevailed in high
government agencies will never really be brought home to American
judges.
Therefore, I refuse to discuss again my position at that time and the
ignorance of criminal experiments on human beings which was the
consequence thereof. In this respect I agree with my defense counsel.
Neither need I fear Professor Ivy’s statement who declared that even a
layman must have been outraged by reading the reports of Rascher,
because the fact that the layman should have read the passages of the
reports wherefrom the obvious violation of human dignity is evident was,
as a matter of fact, the natural prerequisite for Professor Ivy’s
opinion, and that prerequisite did not exist in my case.
In accordance with the truth I repeat what I have said in the witness
stand, that I had a general knowledge of experiments on human beings, I
can no longer say when and on what particular opportunity I gained that
knowledge. But this fact alone does not deserve death, because I never
had the feeling that I had participated in such crimes by my activity in
the personal Referat [administrative office].
Such a knowing participation demands that the personal Referent knows
the contents and the import of Himmler’s letters, orders, etc., and
passes them on in spite of this knowledge of the contents and their
import. I just said that appearances are against me, but I believe I did
prove that I did not possess that knowledge. I pray the Tribunal to
follow the line of this evidence and, I think, this is not asking too
much since the experience of everyday life speaks in my favor.
The various affidavits which I have submitted and which were the subject
of excited argument have found their explanation. In some points I have
erred and I have tried to correct my errors. I did not want to speak an
untruth knowingly which might be detrimental or unfavorable to a third
person. I ask the Tribunal not to forget that I was in a very low
general condition when I signed these affidavits. Only a few months
previously I weighed only forty-four kilograms; consequently my mental
power was reduced to a minimum.
During my activities which stretched over many years I exclusively acted
on the express orders of Himmler without ever making a decision on my
own initiative. I may take it that this fact has fully been proved.
The question what attitude I should have assumed had I known the details
of inhuman experiments I can only answer in a hypothetical way. Had I
had an approximate knowledge, as I have it today, I would have struggled
against passing on such an order by virtue of my general view on
questions of humanity. Since, however, I did not have that knowledge it
could not come to any opposition on my part. I ask that consideration be
given to the fact that during all those years, I regarded matters which
were in my field from my own point of view, and tried to live up to my
own ideals. I saw my duty in carrying out my task faithfully and in the
conduct of a clean, personal life. I always strove not to cause any
damage to any human being, but to understand the situation of any person
in need of help, and then to help him as I myself would have wished to
be helped or treated had I been in his position. I remind you of the
statement of the witness Meiner, on 21 March 1947.
The fact that my signatures are on the documents which have been
submitted by the prosecution has moved me deeply because my entire view
of humanity and the principles of humanity is quite opposed to that.
What I understand by humanity, also begins to apply to the small details
of life also for me.
In spite of my good intentions, and this I say in answer to a question
put in the beginning—in spite of my good intentions I was drawn into a
guilt, I see it as a guilt into which human beings can be involved by
tragic circumstances without any intention on their part. But the
recognition of this guilt was sufficient to shake severely my mental and
moral balance.
J. Final Statement of Defendant Poppendick[42]
I joined the SS at a time not to commit crimes, but because a number of
my friends whom I knew to be idealists were members of the SS. Their
membership caused me to join. That I thereby became a member of a
criminal organization was unimaginable for me at that time, just as it
is incomprehensible for me today.
My activity in the Main Race and Settlement Office was devoted to the
problem of the family, an activity which in view of the destructive
tendencies during the period of the First World War seemed important to
me. If my expectations as a physician were disappointed in more than one
point, at least I considered myself justified to hope that in the end
this activity would have positive results. The intentions were always
toward a constructive policy for the good of the family. Never did I
have anything to do with negative population policies, such as the
sterilization program of the state. The assertion of the prosecution
that positive and negative population policies belong together as the
two sides of one and the same program, is erroneous.
Then there were purely organizational reasons which brought about my
direct subordination under the office of that man whose name today has
such an inhuman sound—I mean Grawitz. The impression which the
prosecution has rendered of my activity and position in Grawitz’ office
is not in accordance with the facts, in spite of some features which
seem to support the assertions made by the prosecution.
As for medical experiments on inmates—experiments on human beings were
nothing surprising to me, nor anything new. I knew that experiments were
carried out in clinics. I knew that the modern achievements of medical
science had not been brought about without sacrifices. However, I do not
recall that in experiments in clinics the voluntariness of the person to
be experimented on was an absolute requirement, which now seems to be
taken as a matter of fact, according to the discussions in this trial. I
knew furthermore, that some scientific problems can only be solved by
experiments in series with conditions remaining constant, and that
therefore soldiers and particularly soldiers in camps are used for
experiments in all countries. Under these circumstances it did not
appear surprising to me that during the war, scientists also carried out
experiments in series in concentration camps. I did not have the least
cause to assume that these scientists in the camps would go beyond the
scope of that which otherwise everywhere in the world of science was
customary. What I knew about medical experiments in the SS was, in my
opinion, as little connected with criminal matters as those experiments
of which I knew from my clinical experience before 1933.
In March of this year a young doctor, Dr. Mitscherlich, in a very
one-sided way, published material for an indictment under the already
prejudiced title, “The Dictates of Contempt for Human Life”. Of the
problematic there was little in this book. The basis for a judgment and
a conviction were clearly given. During the very last days, however, the
chief of Dr. Mitscherlich, a well-known Professor from Heidelberg,
Weizsaecker, published a study on the fundamental questions belonging to
this subject under the title “Euthanasia and Experiments on Human
Beings”, which he submitted to the defendants. But here now fortunately
we find an entirely different language. The problem itself becomes
obvious. If one reads this booklet then the extent of the problem with
its complications becomes clear.
The oath of Hippocrates, according to Weizsaecker, has nothing to do
with the problem. Weizsaecker applies entirely different ethical norms.
Rightly, medicine of today as a whole is studied, not only the German
medicine under Hitler. It shows that experts who consider themselves
competent even today are only in the middle of their endeavor to clarify
the problems at the basis, that being the first requirement for their
solution.
Before this trial all of these matters were no problems for me. I did
not know of any transgressions. Moreover, I was always convinced that
anything which came to my knowledge about experiments on human beings in
clinics of the state before 1933, and within the scope of the SS in
later years, were conscientious efforts of serious scientists to the
good of mankind.
The ethical foundation of these matters also seemed to be there until
this trial. Therefore, after sincere examination of my conscience, I
cannot find any feelings of guilt and expect with a clear and peaceful
conscience the verdict of the Tribunal.
K. Final Statement of Defendant Sievers[43]
Your Honors, in his opening plea, my defense counsel already stated
quite openly and frankly that all events were going to be presented with
which I was in any way connected, and in this hour which is so important
to me, I can state to the best of my conscience that when I furnished my
defense counsel with information, and during my own examination on the
witness stand, I always spoke the full truth.
I have, in fact, had the satisfaction to hear my testimony confirmed by
a witness for the prosecution. During my examination as a witness on the
stand, I said quite truthfully that the experimental subjects to whom I
had talked in connection with the last experiment in Natzweiler had
confirmed to me that they were voluntary subjects. Witness Nales,
witness for the prosecution, confirmed my testimony during his
examination on the 30th of June in this courtroom.
With regard to the charge of participation in the malaria experiments, I
have stated that I had nothing to do with malaria experiments. Witness
Vieweg, called by the prosecution, confirmed this testimony of mine, as
also did witness Stoehr.
I testified that the two experimented subjects whom I met in connection
with the altitude experiments, in reply to a question by me, confirmed
specifically that they had volunteered. Witness Neff of the prosecution
confirmed this voluntary status of the witnesses. Likewise Dr. Romberg
during his direct examination stated on the strength of his own
knowledge that my testimony was correct. The only experimental subject
whom I met in connection with the typhus experiments upon my definite
question regarding the voluntariness of his testimony, confirmed that
this was so. My testimony was also confirmed through the affidavit of a
former prisoner, and witness, Grunzenhuber, contained in my second
document book.
The prosecution believed that they had to charge me with having placed
myself at the disposal of the IMT on the behalf of the SS. This was
rather a peculiar statement considering my own defense in this trial. I
explained when I was on the stand that without my own initiative, in
fact against my own will, the defense counsel for the SS called me in
order to use me as a witness. Attorney Pelckmann, then defense counsel
of the SS, has confirmed the correctness of my statements in an
affidavit. According to that, I immediately informed Pelckmann at the
time in writing regarding my former membership in the resistance
movement against the National Socialist regime and told him I was not a
suitable witness. At the same time I presented attorney Pelckmann with a
copy of my letter, in which I placed myself at the disposal of the
International Military Tribunal as a witness as early as 20 December
1945, as the IMT record shows. I have stated my regrets on this same
witness stand, that my preparedness to aid justice and to help in
prosecuting past crimes was not accepted and that considerable evidence
was thus destroyed.
As early as August last year, I furnished the prosecution with a report
about my activities in the resistance movement, indicating again my
willingness. This was passed over, however, when I stated that I was not
prepared to sign affidavits which were not completely true. I openly and
frankly stated at that point that I did not understand this action. I
had to do this, and I could do it because I had been looking for truth
and right at the risk of my life, undaunted, even during the time of
tyranny. Was one now to be a collaborator in methods which I thought had
passed with the National Socialist regime; and which, as remains my firm
conviction, would never lead to a true pacification of this world such
as we all desire? I am mentioning this with regret and only because I
have always claimed that I myself, and my statements, in responsible
situations, deserve to be believed. The prosecution did not only feel in
a position to doubt my credibility, but they even consented to call me a
liar during their argument, against their better knowledge and their
better conscience. Consequently, I had to draw your attention to the
testimony of various witnesses which confirmed, in full, my testimony on
the stand in these complicated matters. I can truly be satisfied that it
was not up to me, but to the prosecution’s own witnesses, to contradict
the incorrect statements made against me. History will honor such
action, and judge the persistent attempt to stick to preconceived ideas.
There is no blessing connected with it. I am only sorry for those who
are misguided by false ideas. My firm conviction that this high Tribunal
will fully believe my testimony during my defense is based on these
facts.
In this connection, with reference to the experiences which I have just
described, I am forced to say how on the other hand it calmed and
strengthened me, and gave me confidence to see with what wisdom, calm,
and patience this high Tribunal stood above matters and disclosed a
conduct of trial in which one could feel sheltered; all my friends, who
fought in the secret resistance movement with me and repeatedly attended
this trial in the audience, share these sentiments with me.
I have explained to you, your Honors, for what reasons I was in
immediate, direct contact with the NSDAP and the SS. I have told you how
I always tried to prevent the Ahnenerbe from becoming involved in
medical research. This attempt failed, due to the ambitious attitude of
Himmler. Only on the strength of my own feelings had I to find an
attitude with regard to this new question of experiments on human
beings. I did not approve of them, and I attempted to take the
consequence, which could only be that I immediately resigned from my
post as the Reich manager of the Ahnenerbe. I think the testimony of the
witness Hielscher, in this stand, and the affidavits from witness
Deutelmoser, witness Dellmann, witness Schmitz, and others prove beyond
doubt that I had the true intention of resigning from the Ahnenerbe. And
these witnesses have also clearly testified why I didn’t do so, not
because of personal ambition, not for reasons of comfort, or for what
other low reasons might be attributed to me in this point. It was due to
the persistent urging on the part of my political friends that I
remained, in order to serve further the task which had taken me to the
NSDAP and the SS. Inwardly I rejected contact with human experiments
even as I refused to be a follower of the NSDAP and of the ideology they
represented. Outwardly, I had to live up to the name of a National
Socialist if I was to hold on to the political ideal to which I had
devoted myself since 1929 and not endanger it. In his affidavit, witness
Niebhausen, who was the most important member in the circle of the
secret German resistance, and who has acted on behalf of Dr. Kempner
too, and who is obviously a personality beyond reproach, says that his
illegal activity which continued for five years would have been quite
impossible without my assistance. I do not, indeed, know what the
prosecution is prepared to recognize as being a resistance against the
Nazi regime, if not even such activities as these. It is not necessary
to relate again all the details which have been testified to in this
courtroom.
That in true recognition of the consequences which might be daily
expected for myself and my family I devoted myself to resistance,
continued in it undaunted, and never abandoned it, is now the only
reason why I find myself in this dock. For that reason, I look forward
to the judgment of this Tribunal with confidence, due to my conviction
that I have lived for a good cause and acted on it, on behalf of
something which—then as today—filled me with true belief.
L. Final Statement of Defendant Rose[44]
Mr. President, may it please the Tribunal, the scientists who are among
the defendants in this trial are confronted with a principal difficulty,
the fact that purely scientific questions have been made political,
ideological questions by the prosecution. In the opening speech by the
Chief of Counsel, General Taylor, the political and ideological nature
of the indictment has been expressed as clearly as possible.
A subject of the personal charges against myself is my attitude toward
experiments on human beings ordered by the state and carried out by
other German scientists in the field of typhus and malaria. Works of
that nature have nothing to do with politics or with ideology, but they
serve the good of humanity, and the same problems and necessities can be
seen independently of any political ideology everywhere, where the same
dangers of epidemics have to be combated.
Just as Claus Schilling, in his malaria research, had to make
experiments with human beings, before him and after him malaria
scientists of various nations had to carry out experiments on human
beings. Just as Haagen, on his own initiative, but with the approval of
competent authorities of the state, tested the value of a new, living
typhus vaccine, before him that was done in the course of fighting
plague by your great compatriot, Richard B. Strong, when he experimented
on natives of the Philippines, who were not American citizens, with the
approval of your government.
Just as Dr. Ding, on the instruction of the highest and decisive
authorities of the German civilian health administration, tested the
value of the typhus vaccine on humans in times of greatest typhus
danger, others have done so before him in less pressing emergencies,
sometimes in agreement with, sometimes upon the instruction of their
governments.
From the witness stand I testified about the actual role which I played
in regard to the charges of human experiments with malaria and typhus.
And I have explained from the witness stand the legal evaluation of my
actions, and they have been submitted to you by my defense counsel, Dr.
Fritz. I need not add anything to it. But, as a matter of principle, I
stated my attitude towards the experiments on human beings in medical
research, not first of all in this courtroom, but also when the National
Socialist German Government was at the height of its limitless power. At
that time I was cut short by a man, Professor Schreiber, who about a
year ago in this very courtroom, claimed to be a defender of medical
ethics.
The fact is undoubted that human experiments, which were exactly the
same as those, the participation in which I am unjustly charged with,
have been carried out in other countries, above all, in the United
States which has indicted me. That has led the prosecution to place the
center of gravity of its charges upon the outside conditions of the
persons put at my disposal for experiments by the German authorities. In
that connection the question of whether they were voluntary was put into
the foreground. I shall not discuss the question as to what extent the
doctor who is charged with the experiments is responsible for these
external, formal questions, at least a doctor who was so far removed
from the experiments themselves as I was. But in connection with the
principal question of subjects being volunteers, I have to make a few
statements. A trial of this kind presents probably the most unsuitable
atmosphere to discuss questions of medical ethics. But since these
questions have been raised here, they have to be answered. Everyone who,
as a scientist, has an insight into the history of dangerous medical
experiments, knows with certainty the following fact. Aside from the
self-experiments of doctors, which represent a very small minority of
such experiments, the extent to which subjects are volunteers is often
deceptive. At the very best they amount to self-deceit on the part of
the physician who conducts the experiment, but very frequently to a
deliberate misleading of the public. In the majority of such cases, if
we ethically examine facts, we find an exploitation of the ignorance,
the frivolity, the economic distress, or other emergency on the part of
the experimental subjects. I may only refer to the example which was
presented to the Tribunal by Dr. Ivy when he presented the forms for the
American malaria experiments.
You yourselves, gentlemen of the Tribunal, are in a position to examine
whether, on the basis of the information contained in these forms,
individuals of the average education of an inmate of a prison can form a
sufficiently clear opinion of the risks of an experiment made with
pernicious malaria. These facts will be confirmed by any sincere and
decent scientist in a personal conversation, though he would not like to
make such a statement in public. That I myself am, on principle, an
opponent of the idea of dangerous experiments on human beings is known
to you gentlemen of the Tribunal.
The state, however, or any human community which, in the interest of the
well-being of the entire community, did not want to forego the
experiments on human beings, only bases itself on ethical principles as
long as it openly assumes the full responsibility which arises
therefrom, and imposes sacrifices on enemies of society to atone for
their crimes and does not choose the method of apparent voluntary
submission, which imposes the risk of the experiment on the experimental
subjects, who are not in a position to foresee the possible
consequences.
The prosecutor in his plea criticized the preponderance of affidavits
during the presentation of evidence on the part of the defense. The
difficulties which exist for a defendant in prison in the Germany of
today to acquire other documents are almost prohibitive. In order to
give a few examples: When the malaria experiments of Schilling were
discussed, the prosecution, among other material, submitted to the
Tribunal an excerpt from the well-known Dachau sentence concerning the
statements contained therein about the number of victims in these
experiments. I have stated in the witness box that I would rather sit
here as a defendant than put my signature on the opinion which would
confirm these statements. How right I was in making that statement can
be seen from a letter by Professor Allenby of the University of London
which, unfortunately, has only now been received by my defense counsel,
in which he termed the statement that 300 experimental subjects had
died, a grotesque untruth. My defense counsel in his final plea has
quoted the passage of that letter.
The prosecution at that time when the excerpt of the Dachau sentence was
submitted, promised that the entire files of the Dachau trial would be
put at our disposal. Unfortunately, all my efforts to gain an insight in
these files have been in vain.
When State Secretary Dr. Conti during the war was toying with the idea
to commission Professor Schilling, who was at that time in Italy, with
malaria research in Germany, I, at that time, Chief of the Tropical
Medical Department of the Robert Koch Institute, was first of all
assigned by the Reich Ministry of the Interior to give an opinion. In
this opinion, for reasons which I have explained in the witness box, I
rejected Schilling’s plan. Had one followed my advice, the experiments
by Schilling in Dachau would never have taken place. In the course of
these proceedings I made all efforts to come into the possession of that
opinion but in this case also I was unsuccessful, although that opinion
in two copies is in the hands of the military government, possibly even
in this building.
Also, in vain, I attempted to get the file note, so important for my
defense, which I dictated to the witness Block about my conferences with
State Secretary Conti and President Gildemeister, after I had gained
knowledge about the conduct of the typhus experiments in Buchenwald.
What little correspondence I had with Professor Haagen is apparently
entirely in the hands of the prosecution. In spite of that, it has been
submitted only in part to you. That fact offered an opportunity to the
prosecution to interpret passages taken out of the context incorrectly.
Unfortunately, I have no opportunity to force anyone to submit the
missing documents which would clarify matters in my favor.
To evaluate the work of Haagen, and my defense counsel has pointed that
out already, the statement of an unbiased expert would have been of
decisive importance. Therefore, I can only regret that the interrogation
of the Frenchman Georges Blanc for whom I applied and who has the best
knowledge in this field, did not take place, although he had volunteered
to appear before this Tribunal as an expert.
Professor Lecrout, Director of the Institute Pasteur in Paris, was
frequently in Nuernberg during this trial. After an interview, the
prosecution refrained from calling him as an expert witness to clarify
some difficult questions resulting from the work of Haagen. I ask the
high Tribunal to draw its conclusions from these facts and to assure
that the lack of these pieces of evidence should not result in a damage
to my interests.
Prosecutor McHaney has explained in his plea that one still had to find
that doctor among the defendants who would have subjected himself to
such experiments as are covered by the indictment here. I do not feel
that that concerns me. Not only from the statement which I have made
here before you but also from my case history, which was available to
the authorities of the prison long before indictment, it can be seen
that not only did I repeatedly offer myself as an experimental subject
to test vaccines but that frequently in my official capacity and in my
research work I gave myself injections with cholera, typhus, malaria and
hepatitis epidemica and that I am still suffering from the consequences.
Finally, Prosecutor McHaney has asserted in his plea that all of those
indicted here are guilty of murder, and that includes me too. If the
Tribunal were to look at the present problem from this point of view, I
would regret having said a single word in my defense. However, if you
believe me, that in all actions of mine which have been discussed here,
I was only moved by sincere devotion to duty, then I put my fate with
confidence into your hands.
M. Final Statement of Defendant Ruff[45]
May it please the Tribunal: As far as the written and oral statements of
my defense counsel are concerned which deal with the points of the
indictment, and as far as my activities as a doctor and scientist are
concerned, I have nothing or hardly anything to add. I can only repeat
today what I said at the end of my examination when I was on the stand.
After detailed inquiry into my conscience, I still today hold the belief
that I never sinned against my duty as a man and as a doctor.
N. Final Statement of Defendant Brack[46]
Your Honor, I cannot be described as one of the earliest followers of
Hitler. In 1929, I joined the NSDAP when more than six million German
voters were already backing Hitler. His later successes during the years
of peaceful reconstruction consolidated my conviction that he had
forever liberated Germany from the misery in which it seemed to have
fallen. For all those years I had no reason to have any misgivings with
regard to Hitler’s personality. Therefore I also believed in the
legality of the euthanasia decree as it emanated directly from the head
of the state. The state officials and doctors, competent for me at that
time, told me that euthanasia had always been an endeavor of mankind and
was morally as well as medically justified. Therefore, I never doubted
the legal character of the euthanasia decree.
In this connection, however, I was assigned duties, the extent and
importance of which I could not foresee. Neither my training nor my
qualifications sufficed for this task. Nobody can deny, however, my good
faith in its justification. I frankly admitted what I did in the
framework of the euthanasia measures and tried to prove that my
collaboration was merely of a subordinate nature and exclusively
directed by human aspects. I cannot be made responsible for later
actions carried out by other offices and without my knowledge. These
were the measures which I deeply regretted, in which the prohibition of
the inclusion of foreign nationals and Jews was infringed.
Through my activity in the Fuehrer’s Chancellery, I early became
acquainted with the Gestapo terror. The testimonies of my witnesses
prove how I fought against them and the concentration camp system. I did
so because I felt that I was obliged to help those who suffered from
arbitrariness and oppression. I did not do it because I already
recognized in it at that time symptoms of a leadership that always and
only knew arbitrariness and oppression.
But this is particularly the reason why I was so shocked about the
misuse of some of the euthanasia institutions for the Action 14 f 13;
this action affected particularly those persons whose detention I
considered unjust, and which I therefore opposed. It was only in this
courtroom, however, that I learned of this action.
That I did not hate the Jews has been proved by numerous documents.
Without hatred of the Jews, however, participation in the extermination
of Jews is unthinkable. The measures of suppression to which the Jews
were subjected forced me to give them the same assistance within my
competence as I accorded to the political persecutees. Thus during the
course of the years I helped hundreds of thousands of persons by my
activity. Thus only could the sterilization suggestions come into
existence. They were nothing but an attempt to prevent the extermination
of innumerable Jews.
In spite of all the efforts of my defense counsel, it was impossible to
procure the witnesses who could testify to this effect. They preferred
to evade their responsibility of serving the truth. I am utterly alone.
I must leave it to this high Tribunal to ascertain on the basis of the
presented expert scientific opinions that all my proposals were actually
so formulated as to show my convictions of their harmlessness, and the
impossibility of realizing them.
I must also leave it to the Tribunal to judge whether a man who intended
the extermination of the Jews would apply for service with the army,
just at the moment when the aim which he is alleged to have pursued was
achieved, and the extermination measures had started. Or does it not
appear paradoxical to assume that one and the same man should give his
approval of the extermination of the Jews, and in fact aid such a
program, and, at the same time, save Jews he has never known, such as
Georgii, Passow, Meyer, Warburg, and others, from these measures?
I can only emphasize that particularly the sterilization suggestions to
Himmler appeared to me to be the last possibility to take any action to
save Jewry. Had I been indifferent to the Jewish fate, I would not be
accused today. But I also tried in this respect, as was my habit, to
give assistance and I am still convinced, that it had at least delaying,
if not preventative effect. It is certain that many Jews were in this
way saved from destruction. The realization that such proposals should
never have been made by me on the strength of my medical knowledge, my
capacities, or my position at the time, even to the best of my
intention, is something I could not reach until this trial was in
progress. My good intention, which was the basis of these proposals, and
my good will to help by means of them cannot be denied by anybody, and
can in no event be understood as my conscious cooperation in the
extermination of the Jews.
O. Final Statement of Defendant Romberg[47]
In the course of this trial, I have had full opportunity to speak in my
defense. With special gratitude we realize the great opportunity offered
to us, of which we took advantage, which was given by the possibility of
individually questioning Professor Ivy in this trial. I have seen how
the Tribunal itself, by a precise questioning, clarified the facts, and
to the statements made by my defense counsel I have nothing to add,
because they are the truth.
P. Final Statement of Defendant Becker-Freyseng[48]
Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I also was given opportunity
to submit all the statements and the evidence required to refute the
charges of the indictment. For that I have to thank the Tribunal and my
defense counsel, Dr. Tipp. But I have nothing to add to it. For all the
irrelevant, spiteful talk with which outside circles believed they had
to twist around the objectivity of these proceedings like thorn bushes,
the verdict of this Tribunal must be and will be the appropriate answer.
I look forward to it with the firm conviction that I never failed in my
duty to mankind as a physician and scientist, and as a soldier to my
Fatherland.
Q. Final Statement of Defendant Weltz[49]
I have nothing to add to the statement made by my defense counsel. I
thank Dr. Wille for his efforts made in my defense.
R. Final Statement of Defendant Schaefer[50]
May it please the Tribunal, since I consider myself entirely innocent, I
have nothing more to add. I ask to be acquitted, if possible, even
before the verdict.
S. Final Statement of Defendant Hoven[51]
I have nothing to add to Dr. Gawlik’s plea of yesterday. I would at this
point like to thank my defense counsel for the considerable help he has
given me.
T. Final Statement of Defendant Beiglboeck[52]
May it please the Tribunal, the experiments which I conducted, I did not
carry out on my own initiative, neither according to the plans of my
own, nor spontaneously. The medical part was played with the knowledge
and approval of my clinical teacher, and civilian superior for more than
ten years, I was a disciple of Eppinger. During those ten years I had
come to know and respect his ways of thought and his superior knowledge.
My relations to him were based on deep personal gratitude and
awe-inspired devotion. If there was anything which he considered right
and important, then for psychological reasons alone, it would have been
difficult for me to believe the contrary.
The experiments were to solve the problem of saving human life and that
had to be approved. It was a military order which compelled me to carry
them out in the atmosphere of a concentration camp. I struggled against
it, and was inwardly opposed to it, and tried to avoid the task, but I
was not successful. So I had to carry it out.
May it please the Tribunal, in your evaluation of this fact, please do
not fail to consider that this did not happen in times of peace, nor in
a country which granted its citizens individual freedom of decision in
all matters, personal and professional, but during the bitter days of a
most horrible war. What I carried out, I did in accordance with a plan
previously determined and specified. I did not overstep the limits of my
task. I had to require of my experimental subjects to undergo hardships;
they suffered from thirst with all of its unpleasant sensations, with
its physical and mental characteristics. It was in the nature of the
experiments, and this could not be avoided. I did not, however, do this
without first informing myself by an experiment on my own system of what
I expected them to undergo, nor did I expect it of anyone else, unless I
was firmly convinced that he undertook it voluntarily. It is not true to
say that I might have forced anybody to do it, neither psychologically,
by reprisals, nor by threat, nor by force of arms. Many eyewitnesses
have agreed that my conduct was never brutal or inhuman towards any of
the experimental subjects under my care. Among these witnesses are even
some who were brought here to testify against me.
At last, in the final stage of this trial, one experimental subject
could be found who thought it appropriate to introduce a dramatic note
in an atmosphere artificially created. You will decide how much
credibility you will attribute to this witness. Based on a layman’s
misinterpretation of nondangerous, indeed harmless medical procedures,
combined with the uncertain recollection emotionally presented by more
or less distorting and misconstruing my motives, the attempt was made to
lend an impression to my experiments and to my own personality.
In contradiction to that, a few others who came from the concentration
camp and who loved the truth have painted another picture which reveals
that my behavior in the medical sense, as well as from the human point
of view, was correct, to say the least. By my experiments, no human life
was sacrificed, nor did they result in any lasting damage to their
health. I also believe, I have proved that I intervened for the inmates,
as far as that was within my power and that I did not consider my
experimental subjects as individuals of an inferior type whom I could
well afford to ill-treat, for ideological reasons, as has been charged.
For over 15 years as a physician, I always felt the strongest
responsibility for those entrusted to my care. Thousands who were my
patients will confirm it. My assistants and colleagues have testified to
it. I was never directed by any sentiment other than that of a human
being and of a physician. The experiments as they were actually
conducted never went beyond what can be justified by the physician. I
consider myself free of guilt as a physician and as a human being.
U. Final Statement of Defendant Pokorny[53]
Your Honors, during this trial I have often asked myself what I should
have done at the time in order to record my true motive for the letter I
had written to Himmler. But I believe that at the time when I dispatched
this letter, I could not do anything else but to talk to the people in
whom I had confidence and who I knew would not betray me, and confide in
them my true reasons.
If today, this letter, which is against me, may seem objective, then
this is a fact with which I must bear, although to the end I must say in
correspondence with the truth that selfish reasons were not the cause of
my writing this letter, but that letter was written because at the time
I had heard facts about Himmler’s plans, and, because at that time in my
position, standing lonely and slandered because of my family
implications in a small town in Czechoslovakia, I felt that I was able
to take the action described.
I retain the hope that you, my judges, will draw your conclusions from
my conduct and the situation in which I found myself at the time, and
will come to the conviction that the true motive was a different one
than that which is objectively shown by this letter, and that you will
not sentence me but will believe me in what I have not only told you, my
judges, but others previously during my interrogations and what I have
told my friends, at a time when this present situation had not arisen,
in order to clarify my motives as being true.
With this hope I am looking forward to your judgment, and in that
connection I am thinking of my children who, for years now, have lived
under the protection of an allied power, and who will not believe that
their father, after everything that he has suffered, could possibly have
acted as an enemy to human rights.
V. Final Statement of Defendant Oberheuser[54]
I have nothing to add to the statements I have made from the witness box
under oath. In administering therapeutical care, following established
medical principles, as a woman in a difficult position, I did the best I
could. Moreover, I fully agree with the statements made by my defense
counsel and will refrain, at this late stage of the trial, from making
any further statements.
W. Final Statement of Defendant Fischer[55]
Your Honors, when this war began I was a young doctor, 27 years of age.
My attitude towards my people and my Fatherland took me to the front
line as an army doctor. I there joined an armored division, where I
remained until I was incapacitated due to the loss of an arm. For only a
very brief period, during these years of war, I worked as a medical
officer in a military hospital back home. There too, my conception of my
duties was directed by the wish to serve my country. During this time of
my work at home, I received the order, the execution of which made me a
subject of the indictment of this trial.
The order for my participation in the experiments originated from my
highest medical and military superior and was passed on to me, as the
assistant and first lieutenant, through Professor Gebhardt. Professor
Gebhardt was the famous surgeon and much honored creator of Hohenlychen.
He was a scientific authority whom I looked up to with reverence and
confidence. As a general of the Waffen SS he was my unconditional
military superior. I believed him, that I had been earmarked by him to
assist in the solution of an urgent medical problem which was to bring
help and salvation to hundreds of thousands of wounded soldiers, and
which was to be a cure for them; and I believed that this problem would
mean a question of life and death to my people who were fighting for
their existence. I believed unconditionally that this order had come to
me from the head of the state, and that its execution was a necessity
for the state. I considered myself first as bound by this order, as were
the thousands of soldiers whom I had seen walk to their deaths during my
years at the front, following an order by the state. This moving
impression from the front bound me doubly, particularly since I had had
the privilege during that time of working in a hospital at home. I
considered myself, particularly at home, doubly bound like every soldier
at the front to obey the order of my Fatherland unconditionally.
What this order demanded from me had been introduced as a method of
modern medicine in all civilized countries. I was only concerned in the
clinical part of it, and that was taking place just as a course of
treatment in the institute of Hohenlychen, or any other clinic. What I
did was what was ordered, and I did nothing beyond that order. I
believed that I, as a simple citizen, did not have the right to
criticize the measures of the state, particularly not at a time in which
my country was engaged in a struggle for life and death.
I hope that through my unconditional service at the front and through my
two wounds, I have shown that I did not only expect others to make
sacrifices at this time, but that I was prepared at any time to
sacrifice myself with my life and my health. Within the scope of the
order given to me I did what I could, in my limited position as an
assistant doctor, for the life of the experimental subjects and for an
exact and proper clinical development of the experiment. I never could
expect and foresee that deaths would occur. When such fatalities did
occur, contrary to all expectation, I was as shaken by that event as I
was by the death of a patient in our clinic. After that, the experiments
were immediately discontinued, and I went back to the front.
Together with Professor Gebhardt, I reported about these experiments to
the German public. Like many other Germans, there are many things which,
in retrospect, I see more clearly today and in another light than in the
past years. In my young life I have tried to be a faithful son of my
people, and that brought me into this present miserable position. I only
wanted what was good. In my life I have never followed egotistical aims,
and I was never motivated by base instincts. For that reason, I feel
free of any guilt inside me. I have acted as a soldier, and as a soldier
I am ready to bear the consequences. However, that I was born a German,
that is something about which I do not want to complain.
-----
[33] Tr. pp. 11311-11314.
[34] Tr. pp. 11315-11316.
[35] Tr. pp. 11316-11317.
[36] Tr. p. 11318.
[37] Tr. pp. 11318-11319.
[38] Tr. pp. 11319-11324.
[39] Tr. pp. 11325-11328.
[40] Tr. pp. 11328-11329.
[41] Tr. pp. 11330-11335.
[42] Tr. pp. 11335-11338.
[43] Tr. pp. 11338-11342.
[44] Tr. pp. 11342-11347.
[45] Tr. pp. 11347-11348.
[46] Tr. pp. 11348-11351.
[47] Tr. p. 11351.
[48] Tr. p. 11352.
[49] Tr. p. 11352.
[50] Tr. p. 11352.
[51] Tr. p. 11352.
[52] Tr. pp. 11352-11355.
[53] Tr. pp. 11355-11356.
[54] Tr. p. 11356.
[55] Tr. pp. 11356-11358.
XII. JUDGMENT
Military Tribunal I was established on 25 October 1946 under General
Orders No. 68 issued by command of the United States Military Government
for Germany. It was the first of several military tribunals constituted
in the United States Zone of Occupation pursuant to Military Government
Ordinance No. 7, for the trial of offenses recognized as crimes by Law
No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany.
By the terms of the order which established the Tribunal and designated
the undersigned as members thereof, Military Tribunal I was ordered to
convene at Nuernberg, Germany, to hear such cases as might be filed by
the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes or his duly designated
representative.
On 25 October 1946 the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes lodged an
indictment against the defendants named in the caption above in the
Office of the Secretary General of Military Tribunal at the Palace of
Justice, Nuernberg, Germany. A copy of the indictment in the German
language was served on each defendant on 5 November 1946. Military
Tribunal I arraigned the defendants on 21 November 1946, each defendant
entering a plea of “not guilty” to all the charges preferred against
him.
The presentation of evidence to sustain the charges contained in the
indictment was begun by the prosecution on 9 December 1946. At the
conclusion of the prosecution’s case in chief the defendants began the
presentation of their evidence. All evidence in the case was concluded
on 3 July 1947. During the week beginning 14 July 1947 the Tribunal
heard arguments by counsel for the prosecution and defense. The personal
statements of the defendants were heard on 19 July 1947 on which date
the case was finally concluded.
The trial was conducted in two languages—English and German. It
consumed 139 trial days, including 6 days allocated for final arguments
and the personal statements of the defendants. During the 133 trial days
used for the presentation of evidence 32 witnesses gave oral evidence
for the prosecution and 53 witnesses, including the 23 defendants, gave
oral evidence for the defense. In addition, the prosecution put in
evidence as exhibits a total of 570 affidavits, reports, and documents;
the defense put in a total number of 901—making a grand total of 1,471
documents received in evidence.
Copies of all exhibits tendered by the prosecution in their case in
chief were furnished in the German language to the defendants prior to
the time of the reception of the exhibits in evidence.
Each defendant was represented at the arraignment and trial by counsel
of his own selection.
Whenever possible, all applications by defense counsel for the procuring
of the personal attendance of persons who made affidavits in behalf of
the prosecution were granted and the persons brought to Nuernberg for
interrogation or cross-examination by defense counsel. Throughout the
trial great latitude in presenting evidence was allowed defense counsel,
even to the point at times of receiving in evidence certain matters of
but scant probative value.
All of these steps were taken by the Tribunal in order to allow each
defendant to present his defense completely, in accordance with the
spirit and intent of Military Government Ordinance No. 7 which provides
that a defendant shall have the right to be represented by counsel, to
cross-examine prosecution witnesses, and to offer in the case all
evidence deemed to have probative value.
The evidence has now been submitted, final arguments of counsel have
been concluded, and the Tribunal has heard personal statements from each
of the defendants. All that remains to be accomplished in the case is
the rendition of judgment and the imposition of sentence.
THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL
The jurisdiction and powers of this Tribunal are fixed and determined by
Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany. The pertinent portions of
the Law with which we are concerned provide as follows:
ARTICLE II
“1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:
* * * * *
“(_b_) _War Crimes._ Atrocities or offenses against persons or
property constituting violations of the laws or customs of war,
including but not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian
population from occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity.
“(_c_) _Crimes against Humanity._ Atrocities and offenses,
including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in
violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.
“(_d_) Membership in categories of a criminal group or
organization declared criminal by the International Military
Tribunal.
“2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in
which he acted is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in
* * * this Article, if he (_a_) was a principal or (_b_) was an
accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or
abetted the same or (_c_) took a consenting part therein or
(_d_) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its
commission or (_e_) was a member of any organization or group
connected with the commission of any such crime * * *.
* * * * *
“4. (_a_) The official position of any person, whether as Head
of State or as a responsible official in a Government
Department, does not free him from responsibility for a crime or
entitle him to mitigation of punishment.
(_b_) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of
his Government or of a superior does not free him from
responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in
mitigation.”
The indictment in the case at bar is filed pursuant to these provisions.
THE CHARGE
The indictment is framed in four counts.
COUNT ONE—_The Common Design or Conspiracy._ The first count of the
indictment charges that the defendants, acting pursuant to a common
design, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree
together to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in
Control Council Law No. 10.
During the course of the trial the defendants challenged the first count
of the indictment, alleging as grounds for their motion the fact that
under the basic law the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to try the
crime of conspiracy considered as a separate substantive offense. The
motion was set down for argument and duly argued by counsel for the
prosecution and the defense. Thereafter, in one of its trial sessions
the Tribunal granted the motion. That this judgment may be complete, the
ruling made at that time is incorporated in this judgment. The order
which was entered on the motion is as follows:
“It is the ruling of this Tribunal that neither the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal nor Control Council Law No.
10 has defined conspiracy to commit a war crime or crime against
humanity as a separate substantive crime; therefore, this
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try any defendant upon a charge
of conspiracy considered as a separate substantive offense.
“Count I of the indictment, in addition to the separate charge
of conspiracy, also alleges unlawful participation in the
formulation and execution of plans to commit war crimes and
crimes against humanity which actually involved the commission
of such crimes. We, therefore, cannot properly strike the whole
of count I from the indictment, but, insofar as count I charges
the commission of the alleged crime of conspiracy as a separate
substantive offense, distinct from any war crime or crime
against humanity, the Tribunal will disregard that charge.
“This ruling must not be construed as limiting the force or
effect of Article 2, paragraph 2 of Control Council Law No. 10,
or as denying to either prosecution or defense the right to
offer in evidence any facts or circumstances occurring either
before or after September 1939, if such facts or circumstances
tend to prove or to disprove the commission by any defendant of
war crimes or crimes against humanity as defined in Control
Council Law No. 10.”
COUNTS TWO AND THREE—_War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity._ The
second and third counts of the indictment charge the commission of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. The counts are identical in content,
except for the fact that in count two the acts which are made the basis
for the charges are alleged to have been committed on “civilians and
members of the armed forces [of nations] then at war with the German
Reich [* * *] in the exercise of belligerent control”, whereas in count
three the criminal acts are alleged to have been committed against
“German civilians and nationals of other countries.” With this
distinction observed, both counts will be treated as one and discussed
together.
Counts two and three allege, in substance, that between September 1939
and April 1945 all of the defendants “were principals in, accessories
to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with
plans and enterprises involving medical experiments without the
subjects’ consent * * * in the course of which experiments the
defendants committed murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures,
atrocities, and other inhuman acts.” It is averred that “such
experiments included, but were not limited to” the following:
“(_A_) _High-Altitude Experiments._ From about March 1942 to
about August 1942 experiments were conducted at the Dachau
concentration camp, for the benefit of the German Air Force, to
investigate the limits of human endurance and existence at
extremely high altitudes. The experiments were carried out in a
low-pressure chamber in which the atmospheric conditions and
pressures prevailing at high altitude (up to 68,000 feet) could
be duplicated. The experimental subjects were placed in the
low-pressure chamber and thereafter the simulated altitude
therein was raised. Many victims died as a result of these
experiments and others suffered grave injury, torture, and
ill-treatment. The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Schroeder,
Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers, Ruff,
Romberg, Becker-Freyseng, and Weltz are charged with special
responsibility for and participation in these crimes.
“(_B_) _Freezing Experiments._ From about August 1942 to about
May 1943 experiments were conducted at the Dachau concentration
camp, primarily for the benefit of the German Air Force, to
investigate the most effective means of treating persons who had
been severely chilled or frozen. In one series of experiments
the subjects were forced to remain in a tank of ice water for
periods up to 3 hours. Extreme rigor developed in a short time.
Numerous victims died in the course of these experiments. After
the survivors were severely chilled, re-warming was attempted by
various means. In another series of experiments, the subjects
were kept naked outdoors for many hours at temperatures below
freezing. * * * The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser,
Schroeder, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick,
Sievers, Becker-Freyseng, and Weltz are charged with special
responsibility for and participation in these crimes.
“(_C_) _Malaria Experiments._ From about February 1942 to about
April 1945 experiments were conducted at the Dachau
concentration camp in order to investigate immunization for and
treatment of malaria. Healthy concentration camp inmates were
infected by mosquitoes or by injections of extracts of the
mucous glands of mosquitoes. After having contracted malaria the
subjects were treated with various drugs to test their relative
efficacy. Over 1,000 involuntary subjects were used in these
experiments. Many of the victims died and others suffered severe
pain and permanent disability. The defendants Karl Brandt,
Handloser, Rostock, Gebhardt, Blome, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky,
Poppendick, and Sievers are charged with special responsibility
for and participation in these crimes.
“(_D_) _Lost (Mustard) Gas Experiments._ At various times
between September 1939 and April 1945 experiments were conducted
at Sachsenhausen, Natzweiler, and other concentration camps for
the benefit of the German Armed Forces to investigate the most
effective treatment of wounds caused by Lost gas. Lost is a
poison gas which is commonly known as mustard gas. Wounds
deliberately inflicted on the subjects were infected with Lost.
Some of the subjects died as a result of these experiments and
others suffered intense pain and injury. The defendants Karl
Brandt, Handloser, Blome, Rostock, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, and
Sievers are charged with special responsibility for and
participation in these crimes.
“(_E_) _Sulfanilamide Experiments._ From about July 1942 to
about September 1943 experiments to investigate the
effectiveness of sulfanilamide were conducted at the
Ravensbrueck concentration camp for the benefit of the German
Armed Forces. Wounds deliberately inflicted on the experimental
subjects were infected with bacteria such as streptococcus, gas
gangrene, and tetanus. Circulation of blood was interrupted by
tying off blood vessels at both ends of the wound to create a
condition similar to that of a battlefield wound. Infection was
aggravated by forcing wood shavings and ground glass into the
wounds. The infection was treated with sulfanilamide and other
drugs to determine their effectiveness. Some subjects died as a
result of these experiments and others suffered serious injury
and intense agony. The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser,
Rostock, Schroeder, Genzken, Gebhardt, Blome, Rudolf Brandt,
Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Becker-Freyseng, Oberheuser, and Fischer
are charged with special responsibility for and participation in
these crimes.
“(_F_) _Bone, Muscle, and Nerve Regeneration and Bone
Transplantation Experiments._ From about September 1942 to about
December 1943 experiments were conducted at the Ravensbrueck
concentration camp, for the benefit of the German Armed Forces,
to study bone, muscle, and nerve regeneration, and bone
transplantation from one person to another. Sections of bones,
muscles, and nerves were removed from the subjects. As a result
of these operations, many victims suffered intense agony,
mutilation, and permanent disability. The defendants Karl
Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Oberheuser,
and Fischer are charged with special responsibility for and
participation in these crimes.
“(_G_) _Sea-Water Experiments._ From about July 1944 to about
September 1944 experiments were conducted at the Dachau
Concentration camp, for the benefit of the German Air Force and
Navy, to study various methods of making sea water drinkable.
The subjects were deprived of all food and given only chemically
processed sea water. Such experiments caused great pain and
suffering and resulted in serious bodily injury to the victims.
The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, Schroeder,
Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers,
Becker-Freyseng, Schaefer, and Beiglboeck are charged with
special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.
“(_H_) _Epidemic Jaundice Experiments._ From about June 1943 to
about January 1945 experiments were conducted at the
Sachsenhausen and Natzweiler concentration camps, for the
benefit of the German Armed Forces, to investigate the causes
of, and inoculations against, epidemic jaundice. Experimental
subjects were deliberately infected with epidemic jaundice, some
of whom died as a result, and others were caused great pain and
suffering. The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Rostock,
Schroeder, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick,
Sievers, Rose, and Becker-Freyseng are charged with special
responsibility for and participation in these crimes.
“(_I_) _Sterilization Experiments._ From about March 1941 to
about January 1945 sterilization experiments were conducted at
the Auschwitz and Ravensbrueck concentration camps, and other
places. The purpose of these experiments was to develop a method
of sterilization which would be suitable for sterilizing
millions of people with a minimum of time and effort. These
experiments were conducted by means of X-ray, surgery, and
various drugs. Thousands of victims were sterilized and thereby
suffered great mental and physical anguish. The defendants Karl
Brandt, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Brack,
Pokorny, and Oberheuser are charged with special responsibility
for and participation in these crimes.
“(_J_) _Spotted Fever (Fleckfieber)[56] Experiments._ From about
December 1941 to about February 1945 experiments were conducted
at the Buchenwald and Natzweiler concentration camps, for the
benefit of the German Armed Forces, to investigate the
effectiveness of spotted fever and other vaccines. At
Buchenwald, numerous healthy inmates were deliberately infected
with spotted fever virus in order to keep the virus alive; over
90 percent of the victims died as a result. Other healthy
inmates were used to determine the effectiveness of different
spotted fever vaccines and of various chemical substances. In
the course of these experiments 75 percent of the selected
number of inmates were vaccinated with one of the vaccines or
nourished with one of the chemical substances and, after a
period of 3 to 4 weeks, were infected with spotted fever germs.
The remaining 25 percent were infected without any previous
protection in order to compare the effectiveness of the vaccines
and the chemical substances. As a result, hundreds of the
persons experimented upon died. Experiments with yellow fever,
smallpox, typhus, paratyphus A and B, cholera, and diphtheria
were also conducted. Similar experiments with like results were
conducted at Natzweiler concentration camp. The defendants Karl
Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, Schroeder, Genzken, Gebhardt, Rudolf
Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers, Rose, Becker-Freyseng,
and Hoven are charged with special responsibility for and
participation in these crimes.
“(_K_) _Experiments with Poison._ In or about December 1943 and
in or about October 1944 experiments were conducted at the
Buchenwald concentration camp to investigate the effect of
various poisons upon human beings. The poisons were secretly
administered to experimental subjects in their food. The victims
died as a result of the poison or were killed immediately in
order to permit autopsies. In or about September 1944
experimental subjects were shot with poison bullets and suffered
torture and death. The defendants Genzken, Gebhardt, Mrugowsky,
and Poppendick are charged with special responsibility for and
participation in these crimes.
“(_L_) _Incendiary Bomb Experiments._ From about November 1943
to about January 1944 experiments were conducted at the
Buchenwald concentration camp to test the effect of various
pharmaceutical preparations on phosphorus burns. These burns
were inflicted on experimental subjects with phosphorus matter
taken from incendiary bombs, and caused severe pain, suffering,
and serious bodily injury. The defendants Genzken, Gebhardt,
Mrugowsky, and Poppendick are charged with special
responsibility for and participation in these crimes.”
In addition to the medical experiments, the nature and purpose of which
have been outlined as alleged, certain of the defendants are charged
with criminal activities involving murder, torture, and ill-treatment of
non-German nationals as follows:
“7. Between June 1943 and September 1944 the defendants Rudolf
Brandt and Sievers * * * were principals in, accessories to,
ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected
with plans and enterprises involving the murder of civilians and
members of the armed forces of nations then at war with the
German Reich and who were in the custody of the German Reich in
exercise of belligerent control. One hundred twelve Jews were
selected for the purpose of completing a skeleton collection for
the Reich University of Strasbourg. Their photographs and
anthropological measurements were taken. Then they were killed.
Thereafter, comparison tests, anatomical research, studies
regarding race, pathological features of the body, form and size
of the brain, and other tests were made. The bodies were sent to
Strasbourg and defleshed.
“8. Between May 1942 and January 1944[57] the defendants Blome
and Rudolf Brandt * * * were principals in, accessories to,
ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected
with plans and enterprises involving the murder and mistreatment
of tens of thousands of Polish nationals who were civilians and
members of the armed forces of a nation then at war with the
German Reich and who were in the custody of the German Reich in
exercise of belligerent control. These people were alleged to be
infected with incurable tuberculosis. On the ground of insuring
the health and welfare of Germans in Poland, many tubercular
Poles were ruthlessly exterminated while others were isolated in
death camps with inadequate medical facilities.
“9. Between September 1939 and April 1945 the defendants Karl
Brandt, Blome, Brack, and Hoven * * * were principals in,
accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and
were connected with plans and enterprises involving the
execution of the so-called ‘euthanasia’ program of the German
Reich in the course of which the defendants herein murdered
hundreds of thousands of human beings, including nationals of
German-occupied countries. This program involved the systematic
and secret execution of the aged, insane, incurably ill, of
deformed children, and other persons, by gas, lethal injections,
and divers other means in nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums.
Such persons were regarded as ‘useless eaters’ and a burden to
the German war machine. The relatives of these victims were
informed that they died from natural causes, such as heart
failure. German doctors involved in the ‘euthanasia’ program
were also sent to the eastern occupied countries to assist in
the mass extermination of Jews.”
Counts two and three of the indictment conclude with the averment that
the crimes and atrocities which have been delineated “constitute
violations of international conventions * * *, the laws and customs of
war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal
laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries
in which such crimes were committed, and of Article II of Control
Council Law No. 10.”
COUNT FOUR—_Membership in Criminal Organization_: The fourth count of
the indictment alleges that the defendants Karl Brandt, Genzken,
Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers, Brack, Hoven,
and Fischer are guilty of membership in an organization declared to be
criminal by the International Military Tribunal, in that each of these
named defendants was a member of the SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONAL
SOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the SS)
after 1 September 1939, in violation of paragraph 1 (_d_) Article II of
Control Council Law No. 10.
Before turning our attention to the evidence in the case we shall state
the law announced by the International Military Tribunal with reference
to membership in an organization declared criminal by the Tribunal:
“In dealing with the SS the Tribunal includes all persons who
had been officially accepted as members of the SS including the
members of the Allgemeine SS, members of the Waffen SS, members
of the SS Totenkopf Verbaende, and the members of any of the
different police forces who were members of the SS. The Tribunal
does not include the so-called riding units * * *.
“The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the
Charter the group composed of those persons who had been
officially accepted as members of the SS as enumerated in the
preceding paragraph who became or remained members of the
organization with knowledge that it was being used for the
commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the
Charter, or who were personally implicated as members of the
organization in the commission of such crimes, excluding,
however, those who were drafted into membership by the State in
such a way as to give them no choice in the matter, and who had
committed no such crimes. The basis of this finding is the
participation of the organization in war crimes and crimes
against humanity connected with the war; this group declared
criminal cannot include, therefore, persons who had ceased to
belong to the organizations enumerated in the preceding
paragraph prior to 1 September 1939.”
THE PROOF AS TO WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY
Judged by any standard of proof the record clearly shows the commission
of war crimes and crimes against humanity substantially as alleged in
counts two and three of the indictment. Beginning with the outbreak of
World War II criminal medical experiments on non-German nationals, both
prisoners of war and civilians, including Jews and “asocial” persons,
were carried out on a large scale in Germany and the occupied countries.
These experiments were not the isolated and casual acts of individual
doctors and scientists working solely on their own responsibility, but
were the product of coordinated policy-making and planning at high
governmental, military, and Nazi Party levels, conducted as an integral
part of the total war effort. They were ordered, sanctioned, permitted,
or approved by persons in positions of authority who under all
principles of law were under the duty to know about these things and to
take steps to terminate or prevent them.
PERMISSIBLE MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS
The great weight of the evidence before us is to the effect that certain
types of medical experiments on human beings, when kept within
reasonably well-defined bounds, conform to the ethics of the medical
profession generally. The protagonists of the practice of human
experimentation justify their views on the basis that such experiments
yield results for the good of society that are unprocurable by other
methods or means of study. All agree, however, that certain basic
principles must be observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical and legal
concepts:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of
choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit,
duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion;
and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements
of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding
and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there
should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the
experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects
upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation
in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent
rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the
experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be
delegated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the
good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and
not random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of
animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the
disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will
justify the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an _a priori_ reason
to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps,
in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as
subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by
the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the
experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided
to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of
injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through
all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the
experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at
liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical
or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be
impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be
prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probably
cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and
careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment
is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental
subject.
Of the ten principles which have been enumerated our judicial concern,
of course, is with those requirements which are purely legal in
nature—or which at least are so clearly related to matters legal that
they assist us in determining criminal culpability and punishment. To go
beyond that point would lead us into a field that would be beyond our
sphere of competence. However, the point need not be labored. We find
from the evidence that in the medical experiments which have been
proved, these ten principles were much more frequently honored in their
breach than in their observance. Many of the concentration camp inmates
who were the victims of these atrocities were citizens of countries
other than the German Reich. They were non-German nationals, including
Jews and “asocial persons”, both prisoners of war and civilians, who had
been imprisoned and forced to submit to these tortures and barbarities
without so much as a semblance of trial. In every single instance
appearing in the record, subjects were used who did not consent to the
experiments; indeed, as to some of the experiments, it is not even
contended by the defendants that the subjects occupied the status of
volunteers. In no case was the experimental subject at liberty of his
own free choice to withdraw from any experiment. In many cases
experiments were performed by unqualified persons; were conducted at
random for no adequate scientific reason, and under revolting physical
conditions. All of the experiments were conducted with unnecessary
suffering and injury and but very little, if any, precautions were taken
to protect or safeguard the human subjects from the possibilities of
injury, disability, or death. In every one of the experiments the
subjects experienced extreme pain or torture, and in most of them they
suffered permanent injury, mutilation, or death, either as a direct
result of the experiments or because of lack of adequate follow-up care.
Obviously all of these experiments involving brutalities, tortures,
disabling injury, and death were performed in complete disregard of
international conventions, the laws and customs of war, the general
principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all
civilized nations, and Control Council Law No. 10. Manifestly human
experiments under such conditions are contrary to “the principles of the
law of nations as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of
public conscience.”
Whether any of the defendants in the dock are guilty of these atrocities
is, of course, another question.
Under the Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence every defendant in a
criminal case is presumed to be innocent of an offense charged until the
prosecution, by competent, credible proof, has shown his guilt to the
exclusion of every reasonable doubt. And this presumption abides with a
defendant through each stage of his trial until such degree of proof has
been adduced. A “reasonable doubt” as the name implies is one
conformable to reason—a doubt which a reasonable man would entertain.
Stated differently, it is that state of a case which, after a full and
complete comparison and consideration of all the evidence, would leave
an unbiased, unprejudiced, reflective person, charged with the
responsibility for decision, in the state of mind that he could not say
that he felt an abiding conviction amounting to a moral certainty of the
truth of the charge.
If any of the defendants are to be found guilty under counts two or
three of the indictment it must be because the evidence has shown beyond
a reasonable doubt that such defendant, without regard to nationality or
the capacity in which he acted, participated as a principal in,
accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, or was
connected with plans or enterprises involving the commission of at least
some of the medical experiments and other atrocities which are the
subject matter of these counts. Under no other circumstances may he be
convicted.
Before examining the evidence to which we must look in order to
determine individual culpability, a brief statement concerning some of
the official agencies of the German Government and Nazi Party which will
be referred to in this judgment seems desirable.
THE MEDICAL SERVICE IN GERMANY
Adolf Hitler was the head of the Nazi Party, the German Government, and
the German Armed Forces. His title as Chief of the Government was “Reich
Chancellor”. As Supreme Leader of the National Socialist German Workers’
Party, commonly called the NSDAP or Nazi Party, his title was “Fuehrer”.
As head of Germany’s armed military might he was “Supreme Commander in
Chief of the German Armed Forces [Supreme Commander of the German Armed
Forces], or Wehrmacht”.
The staff through which Hitler controlled the German Armed Forces was
known as the “Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht” (OKW). The chief of this
staff was Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel.
Under the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht were the Supreme [High]
Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Supreme [High] Command of
the Navy (OKM) was headed by Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz. The Supreme
[High] Command of the Army (OKH) was headed by Field Marshal Walter von
Brauchitsch until December 1941, and thereafter by Hitler himself. The
Supreme [High] Command of the Air Force (OKL) was headed by Reich
Marshal Hermann Goering.
Each of the three branches of the Wehrmacht maintained its own medical
service.
_Army Medical Service._ The defendant Handloser was the head of the Army
Medical Service from 1 January 1941 to 1 September 1944. While in this
position he served in two capacities, namely; as Army Medical Inspector
and as Army [Heeres] Physician. These positions required the maintenance
of two departments, each separate from the other. At one time or another
there were subordinated to Handloser in these official capacities the
following officers, among others: Generalarzt Professor Schreiber and
Professor Rostock; Oberstabsaerzte Drs. Scholz, Eyer, Bernhard Schmidt
and Craemer; Oberstabsaerzte Professor Gutzeit and Professor Wirth;
Stabsarzt Professor Kliewe and Professor Killian, and Stabsarzt Dr.
Dohmen. Under his supervision in either or both of his official
capacities were the Military Medical Academy, the Typhus and Virus
Institute of the OKH at Cracow [Krakow] and Lemberg [Lvov], and the
Medical School for Mountain Troops at St. Johann.
_Luftwaffe Medical Service._ From the beginning of the war until 1
January 1944 Hippke was Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe.
On that date the defendant Schroeder succeeded Hippke and remained in
that position until the end of the war.
Subordinated to Schroeder as Chief of the Medical Service of the
Luftwaffe were the following defendants: Rose, who was consulting
medical officer on hygiene and tropical medicine; Weltz, who was chief
of the Institute for Aviation Medicine in Munich; Becker-Freyseng, a
consultant for aviation medicine in Schroeder’s office; Ruff, the chief
of the Institute for Aviation Medicine in the German Experimental
Institute for Aviation in Berlin; Romberg, Ruff’s chief assistant, who
toward the end of the war attained the position of a department head at
the Institute; Schaefer, who, in the summer of 1942, was assigned to the
staff of the Research Institute for Aviation Medicine in Berlin to do
research work on the problem of sea emergency; and Beiglboeck, a
Luftwaffe officer who performed medical experiments on concentration
camp inmates at Dachau in July 1944 for the purpose of determining the
potability of processed sea water.
Under Schroeder’s jurisdiction as Chief of the Luftwaffe Medical Service
was the Medical Academy of the Luftwaffe at Berlin.
_SS Medical Service._ One of the most important branches of the Nazi
Party was the Schutzstaffel of the NSDAP, commonly known as the SS.
Heinrich Himmler was chief of the SS with the title of Reichsfuehrer SS,
and on his personal staff, serving in various and sundry official
capacities was the defendant Rudolf Brandt.
The SS maintained its own medical service headed by a certain Dr.
Grawitz, who held the position of Reich Physician SS and Police.
_Medical Service of the Waffen SS._ The SS branch of the Nazi Party, in
turn, was divided into several components, of which one of the most
important was the Waffen, or Armed, SS. The Waffen SS was formed into
military units and fought at the front with units of the Wehrmacht. Such
medical units of the Waffen SS as were assigned to the field, became
subordinated to the Medical Service of the Army, which was supervised by
Handloser.
The Chief of the Waffen SS Medical Service was the defendant Genzken.
His immediate superior was Reich Physician SS and Police Grawitz.
Six other defendants in the dock were members of the Medical Service of
the SS, under Grawitz, namely; Gebhardt, who in 1940 became surgical
adviser to the Waffen SS and who in August 1943 created and took over
the position of chief clinical officer of the Reich Physician SS and
Police; Mrugowsky, who became Chief of the Hygiene Institute of the
Waffen SS under Genzken in November 1940, and when the Institute was
taken from Genzken’s supervision on 1 September 1943 and placed under
direct subordination to Grawitz, remained as chief; Poppendick, who in
1941 was appointed Chief Physician of the Main Race and Settlement
Office in Berlin and who in 1943 also became chief of the personal staff
of the Reich Physician SS and Police; Hoven, who from the beginning of
1941 until July 1942, served as the assistant, and from then to
September 1943, as chief physician at the Buchenwald concentration camp;
Fischer, an assistant physician to the defendant Gebhardt; and finally
the defendant Oberheuser, who in December 1940 became a physician at the
Ravensbrueck concentration camp, and thereafter, from June 1943 until
the end of the war, served as an assistant physician under the defendant
Gebhardt at Hohenlychen.
_Civilian Medical Service._ Throughout the war the Civilian Medical
Services of the Reich were headed by a certain Dr. Leonardo Conti. Conti
had two principal capacities (1) he was the State Secretary for Health
in the Ministry of the Interior of the Government; in this capacity he
was a German civil servant subordinated to the Minister of the
Interior—first Wilhelm Frick and later, Heinrich Himmler; (2) he was
the Reich Health Leader of the Nazi Party; in this capacity he was
subordinated to the Nazi Party Chancellery, the Chief of which was
Martin Bormann. In his capacity as Reich Health Leader, Conti had as his
deputy the defendant Blome.
_Reorganization of Wehrmacht Medical Service._ In 1942 a reorganization
of the various medical services of the Wehrmacht was effected. By a
Fuehrer decree of 28 July 1942, Handloser became Chief of the Medical
Services of the Wehrmacht, while at the same time retaining his position
as Chief Physician of the Army and Army Medical Inspector. Under the
decree referred to, Handloser was given power and authority to supervise
and coordinate “all tasks common to the Medical Services of the
Wehrmacht, the Waffen SS and the organizations and units subordinate or
attached to the Wehrmacht.” He was also commanded “to represent the
Wehrmacht before the civilian authorities in all common medical problems
arising in the various branches of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen SS and
organizations and units subordinate or attached to the Wehrmacht” and
“to protect the interests of the Wehrmacht in all medical measures taken
by the civilian authorities.”
Handloser thus became supreme medical leader in the military field, as
was Conti in the civilian health and medical service.
By a subsequent Fuehrer decree of 7 August 1944 Handloser was relieved
of his duties as Chief Physician of the Army and Army Medical Inspector,
but retained his position as Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service.
By the decree of 28 July 1942 pursuant to which Handloser became Chief
of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht, the defendant Karl Brandt
became empowered, subordinate only to, and receiving instructions
directly from, Hitler “to carry out special tasks and negotiations to
readjust the requirements for doctors, hospitals, medical supplies,
etc., between the military and the civilian sectors of the Health and
Medical Services.” The decree also directed that Brandt “is to be kept
informed about the fundamental events in the Medical Service of the
Wehrmacht and in the Civilian Health Service” and “is authorized to
intervene in a responsible manner.”
A subsequent decree issued 5 September 1943 extended the powers of the
defendant Karl Brandt by providing: “The plenipotentiary for the Medical
and Health Services * * * is charged with centrally coordinating and
directing the problems and activities of the entire Medical and Health
Service according to instructions. In this sense this order applies also
to the field of medical science and research, as well as to the
organizational institutions concerned with the manufacture and
distribution of medical material. The plenipotentiary for the Medical
and Health services is authorized to appoint and commission special
deputies for this sphere of action.”
By a later decree of 25 August 1944 Karl Brandt was made Reich
Commissioner for Sanitation and Health for the duration of the war; the
decree providing:
“In this capacity his office ranks as highest Reich Authority”
and he is “authorized to issue instructions to the offices and
organizations of the State, Party, and Wehrmacht which are
concerned with the problems of the medical and health services.”
Thus, by this series of decrees, the defendant Karl Brandt, within this
sphere of competence, became the supreme medical authority of the Reich
subordinate to no one but Hitler.
Three of the defendants are not physicians.
The first is the defendant Brack who became subordinated to Bouhler at
the time the latter was appointed Chief of the Chancellery of the
Fuehrer, in 1934, and remained with Bouhler throughout the war.
The second is the defendant Rudolf Brandt who, from the time he joined
the staff of Himmler in 1933, served for a twelve-year period in varying
capacities. At first Rudolf Brandt was a mere clerk in the staff of the
Reichsfuehrer SS but by 1936 had risen to chief of the personal staff of
Himmler. In 1938 or 1939 he became Himmler’s liaison officer to the
Ministry of the Interior and particularly to the Office of the Secretary
of the Interior. When Himmler became Minister of the Interior in 1943
Rudolf Brandt became Chief of the Ministerial Office; when Himmler
became President of the Ahnenerbe Society, Rudolf Brandt became liaison
officer between Himmler and the Reich Secretary of the Ahnenerbe
Society, defendant Wolfram Sievers.
The third is the defendant Sievers, who was a member of Himmler’s
personal staff and Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe Society from
1 July 1935 until the end of the war.
THE AHNENERBE SOCIETY
The Ahnenerbe Society, of which Sievers was Reich Business Manager, was
in existence as an independent entity as early as 1933. On 1 July 1935
the Ahnenerbe became duly registered as an organization to conduct or
further “research on the locality, mind, deeds and heritage of the
Northern race of Indo-Germans and to pass on the results of this
research to the people in an interesting manner.” On 1 January 1942 the
Society became part of the personal staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS and
thereby a section of the SS. Its management was composed of Heinrich
Himmler as President, Professor Dr. Wuest, Rector of the University of
Munich, as Curator, and the defendant Sievers as Reich Business Manager.
Subsequently, during the same year, the Institute of Military Scientific
Research was established as a part of the Ahnenerbe. Its purposes are
defined in a letter written by Himmler to Sievers, which directed the
following with reference to the Ahnenerbe:
“1. To establish an Institute for Military Scientific Research.
2. To support in every possible way the research carried out by
SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Professor Dr. Hirt and to promote all
corresponding research and undertakings.
3. To make available the required apparatus, equipment,
accessories and assistants, or to procure them.
4. To make use of the facilities available in Dachau.
5. To contact the Chief of the SS Economic and Administrative
Main Office with regards to the costs which can be borne by the
Waffen SS.”
In its judgment, the International Military Tribunal made the following
findings of fact with reference to the Ahnenerbe:
“Also attached to the SS main offices was a research foundation
known as the Experiments Ahnenerbe. The scientists attached to
this organization are stated to have been mainly honorary
members of the SS. During the war an institute for military
scientific research became attached to the Ahnenerbe which
conducted extensive experiments involving the use of living
human beings. An employee of this institute was a certain Dr.
Rascher, who conducted these experiments with the full knowledge
of the Ahnenerbe, which were subsidized and under the patronage
of the Reichsfuehrer SS who was a trustee of the
foundation.”[58]
We shall now discuss the evidence as it pertains to the cases of the
individual defendants.
The evidence conclusively shows that the German word “_Fleckfieber_”
which is translated in the indictment as “spotted fever” is more
correctly translated by “typhus.” This is admitted, and in this
judgment, in accord with the evidence, we use the word typhus instead of
“spotted fever.”
KARL BRANDT
The defendant Karl Brandt is charged with special responsibility for,
and participation in, Freezing, Malaria, Lost Gas, Sulfanilamide, Bone,
Muscle and Nerve Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water,
Epidemic Jaundice, Sterilization, and Typhus Experiments, as alleged
under counts two and three of the indictment. He is also charged in
counts two and three with criminality in connection with the planning
and carrying out of the Euthanasia Program of the German Reich. Under
count four of the indictment he is charged with membership in the SS, an
organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal.
Karl Brandt was born 8 January 1904 at Muehlhausen, Alsace, then a
portion of Germany, studied medicine, and passed his medical examination
in 1928. He joined the National Socialist Party in January 1932, and
became a member of the SA in 1933. He became a member of the Allgemeine
SS in July 1934 and was appointed Untersturmfuehrer on the day he joined
that organization. During the summer of 1934 he became Hitler’s “Escort
Physician”—as he describes the office.
He was promoted to the grade of Obersturmfuehrer in the Allgemeine SS on
1 January 1935, and in 1938 was classed as deferred in order that in
case of war he might be free to serve on the staff of the Reich
Chancellery in Hitler’s headquarters. During the month of April 1939
Karl Brandt was promoted to the rank of Obersturmbannfuehrer in the
Allgemeine SS. In 1940 he was transferred from the Allgemeine SS to the
Waffen SS, in which commissions were equivalent to those of the army. On
30 January 1943 he received a grade equivalent to that of major general
in the Waffen SS, and on 20 April 1944 was promoted to the grade of
lieutenant general in that organization. Having at some previous date
been relieved as Hitler’s escort physician, he was again appointed as
such in the fall of 1944. On 16 April 1945 he was arrested by the
Gestapo, and the next day was condemned to death by a court at Berlin.
He was released from arrest by order of the provisional government under
Doenitz on 2 May 1945. On 23 May 1945 he was placed under arrest by the
British authorities.
By decree bearing date 28 July 1942, signed by Hitler, Keitel, and
Lammers, Karl Brandt was invested with high authority over the medical
services, military and civilian, in Germany. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this
decree, referring to Karl Brandt, read as follows:
“3. I empower Professor Dr. Karl Brandt, subordinate only to me
personally and receiving his instructions directly from me, to
carry out special tasks and negotiations to readjust the
requirements for doctors, hospitals, medical supplies, etc.,
between the military and the civilian sectors of the Health and
Medical Services.
“4. My plenipotentiary for Health and Medical Services is to be
kept informed about the fundamental events in the Medical
Service of the Wehrmacht and in the Civilian Health Service. He
is authorized to intervene in a responsible manner.”
By decree bearing date 5 September 1943, signed by Hitler and Lammers,
Brandt’s authority was strengthened. This decree reads as follows:
“In amplification of my decree concerning the Medical and Health
Services of 28 July 1942 (RGBL. I, P. 515) I order:
“The plenipotentiary for the Medical and Health Services,
General Commissioner Professor Dr. med. Brandt, is charged with
centrally coordinating and directing the problems and activities
of the entire Medical and Health Services according to
instructions. In this sense this order applies also to the field
of medical science and research, as well as to the
organizational institutions concerned with the manufacture and
distribution of medical material.
“The plenipotentiary for the Medical and Health Services is
authorized to appoint and commission special deputies for his
spheres of action.”
By further decree bearing date 25 August 1944, signed by Hitler,
Lammers, Bormann, and Keitel, Karl Brandt received further authority.
This decree reads:
“I hereby appoint the General Commissioner for Medical and
Health matters, Professor Dr. Brandt, Reich Commissioner for
Sanitation and Health [Reich Commissioner for Medical and Health
Services] as well, for the duration of this war. In this
capacity his office ranks as highest Reich authority.
“The Reich Commissioner for Medical and Health Services is
authorized to issue instructions to the offices and
organizations of the State, Party, and Wehrmacht, which are
concerned with the problems of the Medical and Health Services.”
Prosecution Exhibit 445, a letter bearing date at Munich, 9 January
1943, signed by Conti and marked “Strictly Confidential” directed to the
Leaders of Public Health Gau Offices of the National Socialist German
Workers’ Party, refers to a decree of the Fuehrer on “Suspending the
Pledge to Secrecy in Special Cases.” The letter continues:
“For your strictly confidential information I am sending
attached Fuehrer decree and the circular letter I am writing on
that subject to the heads of the medical chambers.”
Another portion of the exhibit consists of a copy of Conti’s letter,
also bearing date 9 January 1943, to the heads of the medical chambers,
and reads as follows:
“Strictly Confidential.
“Subject: Fuehrer decree on suspension of pledge to secrecy in
special cases.
“Gentlemen:
“I am sending you enclosed a Fuehrer decree which I received
from Professor Dr. Brandt.
“Communications having bearing on the Fuehrer decree should be
directed to the following address: Professor Doctor Karl Brandt,
Personal Attention, Berlin W8, Reich Chancellory.
“It is left to the discretion of the physician who is handling
the case whether he wishes to acquaint the patient with the
information himself.”
Hitler’s decree, bearing date 23 December 1942, reads as follows:
“I not only relieve physicians, medical practitioners and
dentists of their pledge to secrecy towards my Commissioner
General Professor Dr. med. Karl Brandt, but I place upon them
the binding obligation to advise him—for my own
information—immediately after a final diagnosis has established
a serious disease, or a disease of ill-boding character, with a
personality holding a leading position or a position of
responsibility in the State, the Party, the Wehrmacht, in
industry, and so forth.”
Concerning this matter Karl Brandt testified that the decree “in special
cases” relieved German physicians from one of the generally accepted
principles of medical practice.
From the year 1942 to the end of the war Karl Brandt was a member of the
Reich Research Council and was also a member of the Presidential Council
of that body.
Karl Brandt, then, finally reached a position authorizing him to issue
instructions to all the medical services of the State, Party, and
Wehrmacht concerning medical problems (Hitler Decree bearing date 25
August 1944). The above decrees of Hitler disclose his great reliance
upon Karl Brandt and the high degree of personal and professional
confidence which Hitler reposed in him.
It may be noted that by the service regulation governing the Chief of
the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht, issued by Keitel 7 August 1944,
the chief of those medical services was required to pay due regard to
the general rules of the Fuehrer’s Commissioner General for Medical and
Health Departments. The regulation contained the following:
“3. The Chief of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht will
inform the Fuehrer’s Commissioner General about basic events in
the field of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht.”
By a pre-trial affidavit made by the defendant Handloser and put in
evidence by the prosecution, Handloser makes the statement that Karl
Brandt was his “immediate superior in medical affairs.”
SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS
Certain sulfanilamide experiments were conducted at Ravensbrueck for a
period of about a year prior to August 1943. These experiments were
carried on by the defendants Gebhardt, Fischer, and Oberheuser—Gebhardt
being in charge of the project. At the Third Meeting of the Consulting
Physicians of the Wehrmacht held at the Military Medical Academy in
Berlin from 24 to 26 May 1943, Gebhardt and Fischer made a complete
report concerning these experiments. Karl Brandt was present and heard
the reports. Gebhardt testified that he made a full statement concerning
what he had done, stating that experiments had been carried out on human
beings. The evidence is convincing that statements were also made that
the persons experimented upon were concentration camp inmates. It was
stated that 75 persons had been experimented upon, that the subjects had
been deliberately infected, and that different drugs had been used in
treating the infections to determine their respective efficacy. It was
also stated that three of the subjects died. It nowhere appears that
Karl Brandt made any objection to such experiments or that he made any
investigation whatever concerning the experiments reported upon, or to
gain any information as to whether other human subjects would be
subjected to experiments in the future. Had he made the slightest
investigation he could have ascertained that such experiments were being
conducted on non-German nationals, without their consent, and in
flagrant disregard of their personal rights; and that such experiments
were planned for the future.
In the medical field Karl Brandt held a position of the highest rank
directly under Hitler. He was in a position to intervene with authority
on all medical matters; indeed, it appears that such was his positive
duty. It does not appear that at any time he took any steps to check
medical experiments upon human subjects. During the war he visited
several concentration camps. Occupying the position he did, and being a
physician of ability and experience, the duty rested upon him to make
some adequate investigation concerning the medical experiments which he
knew had been, were being, and doubtless would continue to be, conducted
in the concentration camps.
EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE EXPERIMENTS
Karl Brandt is charged with criminal responsibility for experiments
conducted for the purpose of discovering an effective vaccine to bring
about immunity from epidemic jaundice. Grawitz, by letter dated 1 June
1943, wrote Himmler stating that Karl Brandt had requested his
assistance in the matter of research on the causes of epidemic jaundice.
Grawitz stated that Karl Brandt had interested himself in this research
and desired that prisoners be placed at his disposal. The letter further
stated that up to that date experiments had been made only on animals,
but that it had become necessary to pursue the matter further by
inoculating human beings with virus cultures. The letter stated that
deaths must be anticipated, and that eight prisoners who had been
condemned to death were needed for the experiments at the hospital of
the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen. Under date of 16 June 1943
Himmler acknowledged the letter from Grawitz and directed that eight
criminals in Auschwitz, Jews of the Polish Resistance Movement condemned
to death, should be used for experiments which should be conducted by
Dr. Dohmen at Sachsenhausen. Karl Brandt’s knowledge of experiments on
non-German nationals is clearly shown by the foregoing.
LOST (MUSTARD) GAS EXPERIMENTS
It is clear from the record that experiments with Lost gas were
conducted on concentration camp inmates throughout the period covered by
the indictment. The evidence is that over 200 concentration camp
inmates, Russians, Poles, Czechs, and Germans, were used as experimental
subjects. At least 50 of these subjects, most of whom were
nonvolunteers, died as a direct or indirect result of the treatment
received.
Karl Brandt knew of the fact that such experiments were being conducted.
The evidence is to the effect that he knew of Lost gas experiments
conducted by Bickenbach at Strasbourg during the fall of 1943, in which
Russian prisoners were apparently used as subjects, some of whom died.
A letter written by the defendant Sievers to the defendant Rudolf
Brandt, dated 11 April 1944, points to the fact that Karl Brandt knew of
still other such experiments. The letter states, that in accordance with
instructions he, Sievers, had contacted Karl Brandt, at Beelitz, and had
reported to him concerning the activities of a certain Dr. Hirt, who the
evidence shows had been experimenting with Lost gas upon concentration
camp inmates at Natzweiler. In the letter, Sievers states, further, that
Karl Brandt had told him that he would be in Strasbourg in April and
would then discuss details with Dr. Hirt.
Knowledge of the conduct of at least some of the experiments was
confirmed by Karl Brandt when he testified in his own behalf. He stated
that pursuant to competent authority he had engaged in studies
concerning defense measures against poison gas. He admitted receiving a
report from Hirt, and that one reading the report could reach the
conclusion that human beings had been experimented upon in connection
with injuries from Lost gas.
FREEZING, MALARIA, BONE, MUSCLE AND
NERVE REGENERATION AND BONE TRANSPLANTATION,
SEA-WATER, STERILIZATION,
AND TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS
The evidence does not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Karl Brandt is
criminally responsible on account of the experiments with which he is
charged under these specifications.
The defendant Karl Brandt certainly knew that medical experiments were
carried out in concentration camps upon human subjects, that the
experiments caused suffering, injury, and death. By letter bearing date
26 January 1943 Karl Brandt wrote to Wolff at the Fuehrer’s (Hitler’s)
headquarters asking if it were possible to carry out “nutritional
experiments” in concentration camps. The nature of the desired
experiments does not appear, nor does the evidence show whether or not
such experiments were ever made. The letter, however, indicates Brandt’s
knowledge of the fact that human subjects could be made available for
experimentation.
Defendant Rudolf Brandt, by letter dated 4 September 1944, wrote
Baumert, evidently a member of Himmler’s staff, stating that Karl Brandt
had telephoned and requested that Himmler direct that 10 prisoners from
Oranienburg should be made available as of the next day for two days to
test a certain drug. The letter stated that the prisoners would not be
injured by the test.
It appears from an official note filed by Kliewe of the Army Medical
Inspectorate, dated 23 February 1944, referring to a conversation with
the defendant Blome on that date, that experiments concerning biological
warfare connected with plant parasites, etc., had been made; that up to
that date no experiments had been conducted in the field of human
medicine; but that such experiments were necessary and were in
contemplation. The memorandum continues:
“Field Marshal Keitel has given permission to build;
Reichsfuehrer SS and Generalarzt Professor Brandt have assured
him of vast support. By request of Field Marshal Keitel the
armed forces are not to have a responsible share in the
experiments, since experiments will also be conducted on human
beings.”
It is significant that Hitler’s Chief of Staff should deem it advisable
to direct that the Wehrmacht should have nothing to do with experiments
on human subjects.
EUTHANASIA
Defendant Karl Brandt is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with criminal activities in connection with the euthanasia
program of the German Reich, in the course of which thousands of human
beings, including nationals of German occupied countries, were killed
between 1 September 1939 and April 1945.
On his own letterhead Hitler, at Berlin, 1 September 1939, signed a
secret order reading as follows:
“Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt, M.D., are charged with the
responsibility of enlarging the authority of certain physicians
to be designated by name in such a manner that persons who,
according to human judgment, are incurable can, upon a most
careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be accorded a
mercy death.”
Bouhler was holding a high office in the NSDAP. He was not a physician.
The foregoing order was not based on any previously existing German law;
and the only authority for the execution of euthanasia was the secret
order issued by Hitler.
The evidence shows that Bouhler and Karl Brandt, who were jointly
charged with the administration of euthanasia, entered upon the duties
assigned them in connection with the setting up of processes for
carrying out the order. A budget was adopted; the method of determining
candidates for euthanasia was established; a patients’ transport
corporation was organized to convey the selected patients to the gassing
chambers. Questionnaires were prepared which were forwarded to the heads
of mental institutions, one questionnaire to be accomplished concerning
each inmate and then returned to the Ministry of the Interior. At the
Ministry the completed questionnaires were examined by so-called
experts, who registered their professional opinions thereon, returned
them to the appropriate office for final examination, and orders were
issued for those patients who by this process were finally selected for
extermination. Thereafter the condemned patients were gathered at
collection points, from whence they were transported to euthanasia
stations and killed by gassing.
Utmost secrecy was demanded of the executioners throughout the entire
procedure. Persons actively concerned in the program were required to
subscribe a written oath of secrecy and were warned that violation of
that oath would result in most serious personal consequences. The
consent of the relatives of the “incurables” was not even obtained; the
question of secrecy being deemed so important.
Shortly after the commencement of operations for the disposal of
“incurables”, the program was extended to Jews, and then to
concentration camp inmates. In this latter phase of the program,
prisoners deemed by the examining doctors to be unfit or useless for
labor were ruthlessly weeded out and sent to the extermination stations
in great numbers.
Karl Brandt maintains that he is not implicated in the extermination of
Jews or of concentration camp inmates; that his official responsibility
for euthanasia ceased at the close of the summer of 1941, at which time
euthanasia procedures against “incurables” were terminated by order of
Hitler.
It is difficult to believe this assertion, but even if it be true, we
cannot understand how this fact would aid the defendant. The evidence is
conclusive that almost at the outset of the program non-German nationals
were selected for euthanasia and exterminated. Needless to say, these
persons did not voluntarily consent to become the subjects of this
procedure.
Karl Brandt admits that after he had disposed of the medical decisions
required to be made by him with regard to the initial program which he
maintains was valid, he did not follow the program further but left the
administrative details of execution to Bouhler. If this be true, his
failure to follow up a program for which he was charged with special
responsibility constituted the gravest breach of duty. A discharge of
that duty would have easily revealed what now is so manifestly evident
from the record; that whatever may have been the original aim of the
program, its purposes were prostituted by men for whom Brandt was
responsible, and great numbers of non-German nationals were exterminated
under its authority.
We have no doubt but that Karl Brandt—as he himself testified—is a
sincere believer in the administration of euthanasia to persons
hopelessly ill, whose lives are burdensome to themselves and an expense
to the state or to their families. The abstract proposition of whether
or not euthanasia is justified in certain cases of the class referred to
is no concern of this Tribunal. Whether or not a state may validly enact
legislation which imposes euthanasia upon certain classes of its
citizens is likewise a question which does not enter into the issues.
Assuming that it may do so, the Family of Nations is not obligated to
give recognition to such legislation when it manifestly gives legality
to plain murder and torture of defenseless and powerless human beings of
other nations.
The evidence is conclusive that persons were included in the program who
were non-German nationals. The dereliction of the defendant Brandt
contributed to their extermination. That is enough to require this
Tribunal to find that he is criminally responsible in the program.
We find that Karl Brandt was responsible for, aided and abetted, took a
consenting part in, and was connected with plans and enterprises
involving medical experiments conducted on non-German nationals against
their consent, and in other atrocities, in the course of which murders,
brutalities, cruelties, tortures and other inhumane acts were committed.
To the extent that these criminal acts did not constitute war crimes
they constituted crimes against humanity.
MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
Under count four of the indictment Karl Brandt is charged with being a
member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows that
Karl Brandt became a member of the SS in July 1934 and remained in this
organization at least until April 1945. As a member of the SS he was
criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the indictment.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Karl Brandt guilty,
under counts two, three, and four, of the indictment.
HANDLOSER
Under counts two and three of the indictment the defendant Handloser is
charged with special responsibility for, and participation in,
High-Altitude, Freezing, Malaria, Lost (Mustard) Gas, Sulfanilamide,
Bone, Muscle and Nerve Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water,
Epidemic Jaundice, and Typhus Experiments.
The charge of participation in the high-altitude experiments has been
abandoned by the prosecution, and hence will not be considered further.
Handloser was a professional soldier, having been commissioned in the
Medical Department of the German Army in 1910. During the First World
War he rose to the position of commanding officer of a division medical
unit, and on 1 September 1939 he was appointed Chief Medical Officer of
the 14th German Army. After service in the field, on 6 November 1940 he
was appointed Deputy Army Medical Inspector. He became Army Medical
Inspector on 1 January 1941, and the following April was given the
additional appointment of Chief Medical Officer of the field forces,
holding both positions until 28 July 1942, when he became Chief of the
Wehrmacht Medical Service. He retained also his other appointment and
performed the duties of both positions. He was retained in his position
as Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service on 1 September 1944, but
relieved of the duties pertaining to the other office which he had
theretofore held, he having exercised the functions of both offices
until the date last mentioned. His professional career is more
particularly described above.
Handloser states that prior to his last appointment in 1944 he was
authorized to issue “instructions,” but not orders—testifying that
after his latest appointment he had authority to issue orders to the
chiefs of the medical services of all branches of the Wehrmacht. He also
had jurisdiction over scientific medical institutes, etc., as designated
by the service regulations promulgated at the time of his last
appointment. While the chief medical officers of the army, navy, and
Luftwaffe were under their appropriate military superiors, Handloser had
authority to coordinate the activities of all the Wehrmacht medical
services and to establish their coordinated action. As to the Waffen SS,
his authority extended only to such units of that organization as were
attached to and made part of the Wehrmacht.
Handloser testified that the utilization of medical material and
personnel were, insofar as the Wehrmacht was concerned, within his
jurisdiction after the entry of the decree of 28 July 1942, and that
upon occasion he called meetings of the chief medical officers of the
Wehrmacht and specialists in appropriate fields of medicine, in an
effort to avoid duplication of certain research problems in connection
with malaria, typhus, paratyphus, and cholera.
As Army Medical Inspector he was also _ex officio_ president of the
Scientific Senate, but testified that this body did not meet after 1942.
As an army physician he denied any special knowledge concerning
scientific problems peculiarly affecting the navy or the Luftwaffe; but
on an organization chart prepared by him and received in evidence as
Prosecution Exhibit 9 he is shown as subordinated to Karl Brandt and as
Chief of the Medical Service of the Wehrmacht occupying the position of
superior over the Army Medical Service and the chiefs of the Medical
Services of the Navy and Luftwaffe and certain other subordinate
agencies pertaining to the Wehrmacht. The chart also indicates his
authority over the Chief of the Medical Office [Service] of the Waffen
SS and components of the Waffen SS when attached to the Wehrmacht.
It appears that Handloser had much to do in connection with the calling
of meetings of the “Consulting Physicians”; that he designated some of
the subjects to be discussed at these meetings; and that his
subordinate, Schreiber, arranged the details.
At the Second Meeting of Consulting Surgeons held 30 November to 3
December 1942 at the Military Medical Academy, he addressed those
present (referring to the meeting as “This Second Work Conference
East”), observing that representatives of the three branches of the
Wehrmacht, of the Waffen SS and Police, of the Labor Service, and the
Organization Todt, were also present. He called attention to the
presence of Conti, Head of the Medical Services in the Civilian Sector.
At the Fourth Meeting of Consulting Physicians held at Hohenlychen, 16
to 18 May 1944, Karl Brandt—in addressing the meeting—said that
Handloser, a soldier and a physician, was “responsible for the use and
the performance of our medical officers”.
Schreiber, until 30 May 1943 a close subordinate of Handloser in his
capacity of Army Medical Inspector, was a member of the Reich Research
Council, paying particular regard to the control of epidemics as his
special field. Schreiber frequently reported to Handloser, with whom he
had worked for some years.
FREEZING EXPERIMENTS
Professor Dr. Holzloehner, who with Drs. Finke and Rascher performed
freezing experiments on concentration camp inmates at Dachau, made
reports on at least two occasions to groups of army physicians
concerning cold and freezing problems. The first such report was made at
a meeting held on 26 to 27 October 1942, which was called to consider
problems concerning cold. Schreiber, who held a responsible position
under Handloser from 1 April 1942 to 31 May 1943, was present at this
meeting, as was Craemer, head of the Mountain Medical School of the army
at St. Johann, which was also under Handloser’s jurisdiction. During the
meeting and after Holzloehner had made his report, Rascher also made
statements before the meeting concerning these experiments, from which
it was obvious that statements contained in the reports were based upon
observations made by experimenting on human beings. From the two reports
it was clear that concentration camp inmates had been experimented upon
and that some deaths had resulted.
Holzloehner was invited to lecture again upon this subject at the Second
Meeting of the Consulting Physicians of the Wehrmacht, held 30 November
to 3 December 1942, at the Military Medical Academy at Berlin. Handloser
heard this talk by Holzloehner and testified that the matter of cold and
freezing was one of the most important problems to the army.
We think it manifestly clear from the evidence dealing with freezing
that Handloser had actual knowledge that such experiments had been
conducted upon inmates at Dachau concentration camp, during the course
of which suffering and deaths had resulted to the experimental subjects.
SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS
Handloser is charged with participation in the sulfanilamide experiments
conducted by the defendant Gebhardt. These experiments were conducted at
Ravensbrueck concentration camp during a period extending from 20 July
1942 to August 1943 upon concentration camp inmates without their
consent. While these experiments were still in progress Gebhardt was
invited to present a report on his research findings at the Third
Meeting of the Consulting Physicians held on 18 and 19 May 1943, at the
Military Medical Academy in Berlin. Handloser was present at that
meeting; in fact, he had addressed the meeting prior to Gebhardt’s
giving his report.
As stated elsewhere, Gebhardt made a frank and candid report of what he
had been doing at Ravensbrueck; honestly telling the group that his
experimental subjects were not volunteers but were concentration camp
inmates condemned to death, who had been given the hope of reduction of
sentence should they survive the experiments. By means of charts to
illustrate his lecture, he made it clear that deaths had occurred among
the human subjects. When on the witness stand, the defendant Gebhardt
testified that prior to the meeting of consulting physicians he had
discussed with either Schreiber or the defendant Rostock the subject
matter of the lecture to be given, and that at that time Schreiber had
stated that he had received data concerning the experiments through
official channels.
At that time Schreiber was a direct subordinate of the defendant
Handloser, and we think it may be fairly assumed that Schreiber’s
knowledge was the knowledge of Handloser. However, be that as it may,
the evidence is clear that Handloser heard the lecture by Gebhardt, as
well as a subsequent lecture on the same subject matter given by the
defendant Fischer. There can be no question, therefore, but that when
Handloser came away from the meeting he was fully informed of the fact
that medical experiments were being conducted in Ravensbrueck
concentration camp with inmates who were nonvolunteers. Moreover, he
knew that deaths had occurred among the experimental subjects.
After the meeting of consulting physicians had ended, Gebhardt returned
to Ravensbrueck and conducted several more series of sulfanilamide
experiments. The subjects used for the later experiments were Polish
women who had been condemned to Ravensbrueck without trial, and who did
not give their consent to act as experimental subjects. Three of these
were killed by the experiments.
TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS
Under counts two and three of the indictment Handloser is charged with
special responsibility for, and participation in, typhus experiments
conducted in the Buchenwald concentration camp which were supervised by
a certain Dr. Ding, and like experiments conducted in the Natzweiler
concentration camp by a certain Dr. Haagen. As shown elsewhere in the
judgment, these experiments were unlawful and resulted in deaths of
non-German nationals.
There can be no question but that in 1941 typhus was a potential menace
to the German Army and to many German civilians. The use of an adequate
typhus vaccine was therefore a matter of prime importance. The
distribution of vaccines to the Wehrmacht was within the control of
Handloser. In the exercise of his functions he was also interested in
typhus vaccine production.
The Typhus and Virus Institutes of the OKH at Cracow [Krakow] and
Lemberg [Lvov] were engaged in the production of the Weigl vaccine from
the intestines of lice. This vaccine was thought to be effective, but
the production procedure was complicated and expensive; hence,
sufficient quantities of this vaccine could not be furnished. Another
vaccine—the so-called Cox-Haagen-Gildemeister vaccine, produced from
egg-yolk cultures—could be quickly produced in large quantities, but
its protective qualities had not been sufficiently demonstrated.
Evidence is before the Tribunal that the general problem was discussed
at a meeting held in Berlin, 29 December 1941, attended by Dr. Bieber of
the Ministry of Interior; Gildemeister; Dr. Scholz, a subordinate of
Handloser; two physicians of the “governing body of the Government
General”; and three representatives of the Behring Works. It is stated
in the minutes of this conference that—
“The vaccine which is presently being produced by the Behring
Works from chicken eggs shall be tested for its effectiveness in
an experiment.”
For the purpose above referred to, Dr. Demnitz of the Behring Works
would contact Dr. Mrugowsky. The minutes of the meeting were prepared by
Bieber, under date 4 January 1942.
A copy of the minutes of the meeting last referred to was forwarded to
the Army Medical Inspectorate at Berlin. It thus appears that a
representative of Handloser’s office, Scholz, attended the meeting, and
that a copy of the minutes was forwarded to the Army Medical
Inspectorate.
There is also evidence that on the same day a conference was held
between the defendant Handloser, Conti of the Ministry of Interior,
Reiter of the Health Department of the Reich, Gildemeister of the Robert
Koch Institute, and the defendant Mrugowsky, at which time it was
decided to establish a research station at Buchenwald concentration camp
to test the efficacy of the egg-yolk, and other vaccines on
concentration camp inmates. As a result of the conference an
experimental station was established at Buchenwald under the direction
of Dr. Ding, with the defendant Hoven acting as his deputy.
Inasmuch as some of this information comes from Prosecution Exhibit 287,
referred to as the “Ding Diary”, a discussion of the document is now
appropriate.
Dr. Ding (who later changed his name to Schuler) was a very ambitious
man who was apparently willing to engage in any professional activity
which he thought might further his medical career. He gladly seized upon
the opportunity to conduct experiments on concentration camp inmates in
connection with the vaccine study.
Every German officer holding a position comparable to that held by Dr.
Ding was required to keep a journal or diary showing his official
activities. It appears that Ding kept two diaries. Ding’s personal diary
containing official and personal entries and work reports has
disappeared; his official log or journal concerning his work at
Buchenwald is the document in evidence. This diary was kept by one Eugen
Kogon, an inmate at Buchenwald. He made the actual entries and Ding
verified and signed them.
Kogon, an Austrian subject, testified for the prosecution. We learn from
his testimony that he was a former newspaper editor and held other
highly responsible positions. He was sent by the German authorities to
Buchenwald in 1939 as a political prisoner. In April 1943 he was
assigned to Ding as a clerk or assistant. For many months prior to that
time, however, he had been on extremely friendly terms with Ding and as
a consequence was completely familiar with Ding’s operations. Indeed, so
close was the attachment that during the first half of the year 1942
Ding had dictated the first portion of the diary which is in evidence,
and Kogon had transcribed it. After officially becoming Ding’s assistant
in 1943 all correspondence of every nature with which Ding was concerned
passed through the hands of Kogon.
The diary came into Kogon’s possession at the breaking up of the camp,
and remained in his possession, as he testified, until he delivered it
to the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes at Nuernberg.
It is manifest that the entries in the diary were often not made on the
day they bear date; but this does not mean that it has no probative
value. Almost every entry in the diary is personally signed by Ding.
Time and again the entries in the diary have been corroborated by other
credible evidence. The defendants themselves who were familiar with
operations at Buchenwald have confirmed the entries in important
essential particulars. We consider the diary as constituting evidence of
considerable probative value, and shall give to the entries such
consideration as under all circumstances they are entitled to receive.
The first entry in the Ding diary, under date of 29 December 1941, reads
as follows:
“Conference between Army Sanitation Inspection [Inspector],
General Chief Surgeon Professor Dr. Handloser; State Secretary
for the Department of Health of the Reich, SS Gruppenfuehrer Dr.
Conti; President Professor Reiter of the Health Department of
the Reich; President Professor Gildemeister of the Robert Koch
Institute (Reich Institution to Combat Contagious Diseases) and
SS Standartenfuehrer and Lecturer (Dozent) Dr. Mrugowsky of the
Institute of Hygiene, Waffen SS, Berlin.
“It has been established that the need exists, to test the
efficiency of, and resistance of the human body to, the typhus
serum extracted from egg yolks. Since tests on animals are not
of sufficient value, tests on human beings must be carried out.”
This entry preceded by only a few days the actual commencement of the
experiments on concentration camp inmates to determine the efficiency of
the egg-yolk vaccine.
It seems certain that the foregoing entry in the Ding diary was written
or rewritten at some date later than that which it bears, but the entry
may be accepted as evidence of probative value to the fact that it was
agreed by some persons in authority that experiments with vaccine
prepared from egg yolks be made on concentration camp inmates at
Buchenwald. The next entry in the diary bears date 2 January 1942, and
reads as follows:
“The concentration camp Buchenwald is chosen for testing the
typhus serums. SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Ding is charged with these
tests.”
Handloser testified that many conferences concerning typhus vaccine took
place and that he was interested in the testing of chicken-egg vaccine
“on a sufficient number of persons in a certain vicinity, that is,
within an area where typhus had already occurred or there was imminent
danger existing.” He also testified that during the summer of 1941 he
met Mrugowsky, who was recommended to him by Schreiber, Handloser’s
subordinate. He also testified that he discussed the matter of the
chicken-egg vaccines with Gildemeister and Conti. Handloser testified
that he was present at many conferences, both at the front and in rear
echelons, where such matters were discussed. Mrugowsky, in a letter
dated 5 May 1942, reported to Eyer (who was a subordinate of Handloser)
of the Typhus and Vaccine Institute of the High Command at Cracow
[Krakow], describing the results of the first series of experiments
carried out in Buchenwald. The experiments covered both the Weigl and
egg-yolk vaccines. This report called attention to the fact that two
experimental subjects had died.
An entry in the Ding diary dated 8 February 1943 states that Dr. Eyer
and Dr. Schmidt, a hygienist on the staff of the Medical Inspectorate,
visited the Typhus and Virus Institute at Buchenwald. Schmidt, a
subordinate of Handloser from 1942 until August 1944, stated that he and
Eyer had visited Buchenwald. He testified that his visit was concerned
only with yellow fever vaccine tests which were being carried out at
that station. This statement by the witness is not convincing. From the
Ding diary it appears that infected lice were received by Ding prior to
30 November 1942. If this is correct, these lice could have come only
from an institute under control of the army over which Handloser had
jurisdiction.
Ding reported on his activities at the meeting of the Consulting
Surgeons of the Wehrmacht held in May 1943 in Berlin. Handloser was
present at that meeting but may not have heard the report, the report
having been made to the hygiene section, which was presided over by
Schreiber, Handloser’s subordinate. Defendant Rose, having heard the
report, openly objected to the character of the experiments carried out
at Buchenwald. Schreiber, then, had full knowledge of the nature of the
experiments there carried on. Rose’s vigorous objection was doubtless a
subject of general interest.
Handloser testified that on at least two occasions he discussed with
Mrugowsky matters connected with vaccines against typhoid, typhus and
other diseases. He stated that he was unable to fix the dates of these
conferences.
The entries in the Ding diary clearly indicate an effective liaison
between the Army Medical Inspectorate and the experiments which Ding was
conducting at Buchenwald. There is also credible evidence that the
Inspectorate was informed of medical research carried on by the
Luftwaffe. The experiments at Buchenwald continued after Handloser had
gained actual knowledge of the fact that concentration camp inmates had
been killed at Dachau as the result of freezing; and that inmates at
Ravensbrueck had died as victims of the sulfanilamide experiments
conducted by Gebhardt and Fischer. Yet with this knowledge Handloser in
his superior medical position made no effort to investigate the
situation of the human subjects or to exercise any proper degree of
control over those conducting experiments within his field of authority
and competence.
Had the slightest inquiry been made the facts would have revealed that
in vaccine experiments already conducted at Buchenwald, deaths had
occurred—both as a result of artificial infections by the lice which
had been imported from the Typhus and Virus Institute of the OKH at
Cracow [Krakow] or Lemberg [Lvov], or from infections by a virulent
virus given to subjects after they had first been vaccinated with either
the Weigl, Cox-Haagen-Gildemeister, or other vaccines, whose efficacy
was being tested. Had this step been taken, and had Handloser exercised
his authority, later deaths would have been prevented in these
particular experiments which were originally set in motion through the
offices of the Medical Inspectorate and which were being conducted for
the benefit of the German armed forces.
These deaths not only occurred with German nationals, but also among
non-German nationals who had not consented to becoming experimental
subjects.
OTHER EXPERIMENTS
The defendant Handloser is also charged with special responsibility for,
and participation in, Malaria, Lost Gas, Bone, Muscle and Nerve
Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water, and Epidemic Jaundice
Experiments. In our view the evidence is insufficient to show any
criminal connection of the defendant Handloser with regard to these
experiments.
The law of war imposes on a military officer in a position of command an
affirmative duty to take such steps as are within his power and
appropriate to the circumstances to control those under his command for
the prevention of acts which are violations of the law of war. The
reason for the rule is plain and understandable. As is pointed out in a
decision rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States, entitled
Application of Yamashita, 66 Supreme Court [Reporter] 340-347, 1946—
“It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops
whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders or efforts of
their commander would almost certainly result in violations
which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its
purpose to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war
from brutality would largely be defeated if the commander of an
invading army could with impunity neglect to take reasonable
measures for their protection. Hence the law of war presupposes
that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the
operations of war by commanders who are to some extent
responsible for their subordinates.”
What has been said in this decision applies peculiarly to the case of
Handloser.
In connection with Handloser’s responsibility for unlawful experiments
upon human beings, the evidence is conclusive that with knowledge of the
frequent use of non-German nationals as human experimental subjects, he
failed to exercise any proper degree of control over those subordinated
to him who were implicated in medical experiments coming within his
official sphere of competence. This was a duty which clearly devolved
upon him by virtue of his official position. Had he exercised his
responsibility, great numbers of non-German nationals would have been
saved from murder. To the extent that the crimes committed by or under
his authority were not war crimes they were crimes against humanity.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Siegfried Handloser
guilty under counts two and three of the indictment.
ROSTOCK
The defendant Rostock is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in,
Malaria, Lost (Mustard) Gas, Sulfanilamide, Bone, Muscle and Nerve
Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water, Epidemic Jaundice, and
Spotted Fever Experiments.
Rostock was a physician of recognized ability. From 1933 to 1941 he
occupied successively the positions of senior surgeon of the Surgical
Clinic in Berlin, Professor of Surgery of the University of Berlin, and
Deputy Director of the University Clinic. In 1941 he was appointed
Director of the Surgical Clinic, and in 1942 he became Dean of the
Medical Faculty of the University of Berlin. Prior to the war he had
joined the NSDAP, and in 1939 he was assigned to military duty as a
consulting surgeon. In 1942 he was appointed consulting surgeon to the
Army Medical Inspectorate and was subordinate to the Military Medical
Academy in Berlin. He attained the rank of brigadier general, medical
department (reserve). In 1943 he was appointed Chief of the Office for
Medical Science and Research, a department under the supervision of
defendant Karl Brandt, in which position Rostock remained until the end
of the war. From the time he received the last mentioned appointment,
Rostock acted as Brandt’s deputy on the Reich Research Council.
As Karl Brandt’s deputy Rostock was his agent in the field of medical
science and research—Rostock being charged with the duty of
coordinating and directing problems and activities concerning the
medical health service insofar as science and research were concerned.
Rostock was informed concerning medical research conducted by the
several branches of the Wehrmacht. As head of the Office for Science and
Research, he assigned research problems and designated some as “urgent”.
It was his duty to avoid duplication of work in scientific research and
to decide whether or not a suggested problem was worthy of a research
assignment. It is clear that Rostock and Karl Brandt were intimate
friends of years standing.
The prosecution does not contend that Rostock personally participated in
criminal experiments. It vigorously argues, however, that—with full
knowledge that concentration camp inmates were being experimented
upon—he continued to function upon research assignments concerning
scientific investigations, the result of which would probably further
experiments upon human beings. The prosecution then argues that his
knowledge concerning these matters, considered together with the
position of authority which he occupied in connection with scientific
research and the fact that he failed to exercise his authority in an
attempt to stop or check criminal experiments, renders him guilty as
charged.
In this connection the prosecution relies upon its Exhibit 457, a
document which bears date at Berlin, 14 September 1944. It is headed,
“Commissioner for Medical and Health Matters,” followed by “The Delegate
for Science and Research.” Below appears:
“List of medical institutes working on problems of research
which were designated as urgent by the discussion on research on
26 August 1944 in Beelitz.
“(Summary according to the 650 orders for research submitted to
us.)”
The document then contains a list of research assignments numbered “1”
to “45.” Numbers 42 and 44 read as follows:
“_Strasbourg_
“42. Hygiene Institute (Haagen) virus research
* * * * *
“44. Anatomical Institute (Hirt) Chemical warfare agents.”
The document bears Rostock’s signature. Five of the problems concern
hepatitis research, and three, virus research.
It appears from the evidence that Rostock’s duties included the
avoidance of duplication in the distribution of assignments for medical
research. If the head of the medical department of a branch of the
Wehrmacht assigned to some particular physician or institute a
particular scientific or medical problem, a copy of the assignment would
be forwarded to Rostock, who would then coordinate the matter by
ascertaining whether or not that assignment was being worked on by some
other agency or whether it would lead to worthwhile results. Who
classified as “urgent” the 45 of the 650 orders for research does not
appear; but it may be assumed that Rostock approved that classification.
Doubtless Rostock knew that experiments on concentration camp inmates
were being conducted. He presided over the meeting of surgeons held in
May 1943, and there heard statements that experimental subjects had been
artificially infected. Doubtless he knew that the experiments were
dangerous and that further experiments would probably be conducted.
However, it does not appear that either Rostock or any subordinate of
his directed the work done on any assignment concerning criminal
experiments. Certain of these experiments were classified as “urgent” at
a “discussion on research” as above set forth. Nothing in the
designation of any such assignment as appears in Prosecution Exhibit 457
contains on its face anything more than a matter of proper scientific
investigation.
The record does not show that the position held by Rostock vested in him
any authority whatsoever other than as above stated. No experiments were
conducted by any person or organization which was to the least extent
under Rostock’s control or direction.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Paul Rostock
is not guilty as charged under the indictment, and directs that he be
released from custody under the indictment when this Tribunal presently
adjourns.
SCHROEDER
The defendant Schroeder is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in,
High-Altitude, Freezing, Sulfanilamide, Sea-Water, Epidemic Jaundice,
Typhus and other vaccines, and Gas Experiments. The prosecution has
abandoned the charge that he participated in the sulfanilamide
experiments and hence that subject will not be considered further.
The defendant served as a medical officer with the infantry during the
First World War. In the period prior to 1931 he was attached as medical
officer to a number of military units. On 1 January 1931 he was
transferred to the Army Medical Inspectorate as a consultant (Referent)
on hospital matters and therapeutics with the rank of Oberstabsarzt
(major). In 1935 Schroeder became chief of staff to Generalarzt Hippke
in the newly established Medical Department of the Reich Ministry for
Aviation. He retained this position after Hippke was made Inspector of
the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe in 1937. In February 1940 Schroeder
was appointed air fleet physician for Air Fleet II with the rank of
Generalstabsarzt (major general). On 1 January 1944 he replaced Hippke
as Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe. Simultaneously he was
promoted to Generaloberstabsarzt (lieutenant general), which was the
highest rank obtainable in the medical services. As Chief of the Medical
Service of the Luftwaffe, all medical officers of the German Air Force
were subordinated directly or indirectly to Schroeder. After he became
Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe his immediate superior was
Handloser, who was Chief of the Medical Service of the Wehrmacht.
HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS
These experiments were performed at Dachau concentration camp for the
benefit of the Luftwaffe during the year 1942. Details of the
experiments are discussed in other portions of this judgment.
During the period from 1941 to the end of 1943 the defendant Schroeder,
in his position as air fleet physician of Air Fleet II, was in the
operational zone of Air Fleet II, which comprised the Mediterranean
area. He did not become Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe
until 1 January 1944. There is no evidence that while air fleet
physician he exercised or could have exercised any control over
experiments then being conducted for the benefit of the Luftwaffe.
EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE EXPERIMENTS
Schreiber, a member of Handloser’s staff, who presided over a conference
held in Breslau in June 1944 for the purpose of co-ordinating jaundice
research, assigned groups of physicians to work together on jaundice
problems. Dohmen, Gutzeit, and Haagen were assigned to one of these
groups. On 27 June 1944 Haagen, a Luftwaffe officer, wrote his
collaborator Kalk, a consultant to Schroeder, asking, “Could you in your
official position take the necessary steps to obtain the required
experimental subjects?”
The record shows that Haagen subsequently conducted epidemic jaundice
experiments on prisoners at Natzweiler concentration camp. There is no
evidence, however, to establish Schroeder’s criminal connection with
these experiments. At most, all that can be said for this evidence is
that Schroeder may have gained knowledge of the experiments through
Kalk, a member of his staff—but even that fact has not been made plain.
FREEZING EXPERIMENTS
Freezing experiments were carried out at Dachau concentration camp for
the benefit of the Luftwaffe, during the year 1942. Details of these
experiments are discussed elsewhere in this judgment.
It is conclusively shown from the evidence dealing with freezing that as
early as the year 1943 Schroeder had actual knowledge that such
experiments had been conducted upon inmates at Dachau concentration
camp, during the course of which suffering and deaths had resulted to
the experimental subjects.
TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS
Experiments in connection with typhus were conducted at Schirmeck and
Natzweiler concentration camps during the years 1942, 1943, and 1944.
The details of these experiments are discussed elsewhere in this
judgment.
The experiments were carried out by a Luftwaffe medical officer,
Professor Dr. Haagen. As a medical officer of the Luftwaffe he was
subject to Schroeder’s orders after the latter became Chief of the
Medical Service of the Luftwaffe. The office of Schroeder issued and
approved the research assignments pursuant to which these experiments
were carried out. It provided the funds for the research. One of the
chief collaborators in the program was the defendant Rose, consultant to
the Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe.
Correspondence was carried on between Haagen and the Chief of Staff for
the defendant Schroeder with reference to whether a typhus epidemic
prevailing at Natzweiler was connected in any manner with the vaccine
research then being conducted. The office of the Chief of the Medical
Service of the Luftwaffe received reports on the experiments from which
it could be clearly perceived that typhus vaccine experiments were being
performed on concentration camp inmates.
While the experiments were in progress, Schroeder admits having visited
Haagen at Strasbourg, but denies that he talked with Haagen about the
experiments. The defendant’s assertion that the experiments were not
discussed does not carry conviction.
As has been pointed out in this judgment, the law of war imposes on a
military officer in a position of command an affirmative duty to take
such steps as are within his power and appropriate to the circumstances
to control those under his command for the prevention of acts which are
violations of the law of war.
This rule is applicable to the case of Schroeder. At the time he became
Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe, Schroeder knew of the
fact that freezing experiments for the benefit of the Luftwaffe had been
carried out at Dachau concentration camp by Luftwaffe medical officers.
He knew that through these experiments injury and death had resulted to
the experimental subjects. He also knew that during the years 1942 and
1943, typhus vaccine research had been carried out by the Luftwaffe
officer, Haagen, for the benefit of the Luftwaffe Medical Service, at
Natzweiler and Schirmeck concentration camps—and had he taken the
trouble to inquire, he could have known that deaths had occurred as a
result of these experiments.
With all this knowledge, or means of knowledge, before him as commanding
officer, he blindly approved a continuation of typhus research by
Haagen, supported the program, and was furnished reports of its
progress, without so much as taking one step to determine the
circumstances under which the research had been or was being carried on,
to lay down rules for the conduct of present or future research by his
subordinates, or to prescribe the conditions under which the
concentration camp inmates could be used as experimental subjects.
As was the case with reference to the freezing experiments at Dachau,
non-German nationals were used as experimental subjects, none gave their
consent, and many suffered injury and death as a result of the
experiments.
GAS EXPERIMENTS
Experiments with various types of poison gas were performed by Luftwaffe
Officer Haagen and a Professor Dr. Hirt in the Natzweiler concentration
camp. They began in November 1942 and were conducted through the summer
of 1944. During this period a great many concentration camp inmates of
Russian, Polish, and Czech nationality were experimented on with gas, at
least 50 of whom died. A certain Oberarzt Wimmer, a staff physician of
the Luftwaffe worked with Hirt on the gas experiments throughout the
period.
We discussed the duty which rests upon a commanding officer to take
appropriate measures to control his subordinates, in dealing with the
case of Handloser. We shall not repeat what we said there. Had Schroeder
adopted the measures which the law of war imposes upon one in position
of command to prevent the actions of his subordinates amounting to
violations of the law of war, the deaths of the non-German nationals
involved in the gas experiments might well have been prevented.
SEA-WATER EXPERIMENTS
Sea-Water experiments were conducted on inmates of Dachau concentration
camp during the late spring and summer of 1944. The defendant Schroeder
openly admits that these experiments were conducted by his authority.
When on the witness stand he related the circumstances under which these
experiments were initiated and carried through to completion.
As related by Schroeder the experiment on making sea water drinkable was
a problem of great importance. Two methods were available in Germany,
each of which to some extent had been previously tried, both on animal
and on human subjects. These were known as the Schaefer and the Berkatit
processes. Use of the Schaefer method on sea water produced a
satisfactory liquid essentially the same in its effects and potable
qualities as ordinary pure drinking water. The Schaefer process,
however, called for quantities of silver, which were thought to be
unavailable. Use of the Berka process, however, resulted merely in
changing the taste of sea water, thus making it more palatable, without
at the same time doing away with danger to health and life which always
results from consuming considerable quantities of untreated sea water.
Materials were available for the Berka process, but Schroeder did not
feel that it could be adopted until more was known of the method. At
Schroeder’s direction, the defendant Becker-Freyseng arranged for a
conference to be held at the German Air Ministry in May 1944 to discuss
the problem. Present at the conference, among others, were Berka and the
defendants Becker-Freyseng and Schaefer.
There is no doubt that the conference was well informed, and discussed
all current data upon the subject. Such fact appears from the minutes of
the meeting, in which it is stated:
“* * * Captain (med.) Dr. Becker-Freyseng reported on the
clinical experiments conducted by Colonel (med.) Dr. von Sirany,
and came to the final conclusion that he did not consider them
as being unobjectionable and conclusive enough for a final
decision. The Chief of the Medical Service is convinced that, if
the Berka method is used, damage to health has to be expected
not later than 6 days after taking Berkatit, which damage will
result in permanent injuries to health and—according to the
opinion of N.C.O. (med.) Dr. Schaefer—will finally result in
death after not later than 12 days. External symptoms are to be
expected such as dehydration, diarrhea, convulsions,
hallucinations, and finally death.”
It was concluded at this meeting that it would be necessary to perform
further sea-water experiments upon human beings in order to determine
definitely whether or not the Berkatit method of treating sea water
could be safely employed and used in connection with the German war
effort. These experiments were planned to be carried on in group series,
each of which would require six days, and would be made upon human
beings in this order: one group would be supplied only with
Berkatit-treated sea water; a second group would receive only ordinary
drinking water; a third group would receive no water of any kind; the
fourth group was to be given such water as was generally provided in
emergency sea-distress kits, then used by German military personnel.
In addition to the first experiment it was agreed that a second
experiment should be conducted. The notes of the meeting which deal with
the second experimental series read as follows:
“Persons nourished with sea water and Berkatit, and as diet also
the emergency sea rations.
“Duration of experiments—12 days.
“Since in the opinion of the Chief of the Medical Service,
permanent injuries to health, that is, the death of the
experimental subjects, has to be expected, as experimental
subjects such persons should be used as will be put at the
disposal by the Reichsfuehrer SS.”
On 7 June 1944 Schroeder wrote to Himmler through Grawitz asking for
concentration camp inmates to be used as subjects in the sea-water
experiments, which letter reads in part as follows:
“Highly Respected Reich Minister:
“Earlier already you made it possible for the Luftwaffe to
settle urgent medical matters through experiments on human
beings. Today again, I stand before a decision which, after
numerous experiments on animals as well as human experiments on
voluntary experimental subjects, demands a final solution. The
Luftwaffe has simultaneously developed two methods for making
sea water potable. The one method, developed by a medical
officer, removes the salt from the sea water and transforms it
into real drinking water; the second method, suggested by an
engineer, leaves the salt content unchanged, and only removes
the unpleasant taste from the sea water. The latter method in
contrast to the first, requires no critical raw material. From
the medical point of view this method must be viewed critically,
as the administration of concentrated salt solutions can produce
severe symptoms of poisoning.
“As the experiments on human beings could thus far only be
carried out for a period of four days, and as practical demands
require a remedy for those who are in distress at sea up to 12
days, appropriate experiments are necessary.
“Required are 40 healthy test subjects, who must be available
for 4 whole weeks. As it is known from previous experiments that
necessary laboratories exist in the concentration camp Dachau,
this camp would be very suitable * * *”
Various other parties took part in correspondence upon this application,
one of the writers suggesting that Jews or persons held in quarantine be
used as experimental subjects. Another correspondent nominated asocial
gypsy half-breeds as candidates for the treatment. Herr Himmler decided
that gypsies, plus three others for control purposes, should be
utilized.
In fairness to the defendant it should be stated that he contests the
translation of the second sentence in the first paragraph of the letter
written by him to Himmler, which the prosecution interprets as meaning
that experiments could no longer be conducted on voluntary subjects, and
that the words “demands a final solution” meant that involuntary
subjects in concentration camps should be employed. Regardless of
whether or not the letter quoted by us is a correct translation of the
German original, the evidence shows that within a month after the letter
was sent to Himmler through Grawitz, sea-water experiments were
commenced at Dachau by the defendant Beiglboeck.
The method by which the experimental subjects were chosen is not known
to the defendant Schroeder. As he explained from the witness stand with
reference to his letter and the subsequent procedure, “I sent it away
only after I had consulted [about] the possibility of the experiment
with Grawitz, and after I had informed him how the whole thing was
thought [of] by us, so that he could pass on this information to Himmler
in case it became necessary. Then this letter was sent off, and after
possibly four weeks when Beiglboeck had arrived at Dachau—in the
meantime, he was given an opportunity to carry out this work. Whatever
lay in between that, how in the administrative way this was organized,
we never learned * * * it was an inter-office affair * * *. We only saw
the initial point and the end point of this route.”
Thus began another experiment conducted under the auspices of the
defendant Schroeder, wherein the initiator of the experiment failed to
exercise the personal duty of determining that only consenting human
subjects would be used, but left that responsibility to others. Again is
demonstrated the case of an officer in a position of superior command
who authorizes the performance of experiments by his subordinates while
failing to take efforts to prescribe the conditions which will insure
the conduct of the experiments within legally permissible limits.
The evidence shows conclusively that gypsies of various nationalities
were used as experimental subjects. Former inmates of Auschwitz
concentration camp were tricked into coming to Dachau with the promise
that they were to be used as members of a labor battalion. When they
arrived at Dachau they were assigned to the sea-water experimental
station without their consent. During the course of the experiment many
of them suffered intense physical and mental anguish.
The Tribunal finds that the defendant Schroeder was responsible for,
aided and abetted, and took a consenting part in, medical experiments
performed on non-German nationals against their consent; in the course
of which experiments deaths, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, and other
inhuman acts were committed on the experimental subjects. To the extent
that these experiments did not constitute war crimes they constitute
crimes against humanity.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Oskar Schroeder
guilty under counts two and three of the indictment.
GENZKEN
The defendant Genzken is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in,
Sulfanilamide, Spotted Fever, Poison, and Incendiary Bomb Experiments.
The prosecution has abandoned the two latter charges and hence they will
not be considered further. The defendant is also charged under count
four of the indictment with membership, after 1 September 1939, in an
organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal—namely, the SS.
Genzken was commissioned in the Medical Service of the German Navy in
1912 and served through the First World War in that capacity. From 1919
to 1934, he engaged in the private practice of medicine. He joined the
NSDAP in 1926, and in October 1934 he was again commissioned as a
reserve officer of the naval medical department. On 1 March 1936 he was
transferred to the medical department of the SS, with the rank of major,
and assigned to the medical department of a branch of the SS, which in
the summer of 1940 became the Waffen SS. He served as chief surgeon of
the SS hospital in Berlin, and was director of the department charged
with supplying medical equipment and with the supervision of medical
personnel in concentration camps. He was also medical supervisor to
Eicke, the head of all the concentration camps, which were within
Genzken’s jurisdiction insofar as medical matters were concerned. In May
1940, Genzken was appointed Chief of the Medical Office of the Waffen SS
with the rank of senior colonel, Grawitz being his medical superior. He
retained this position until the close of the war. In 1942 he was
designated as Chief of the Medical Service of the Waffen SS, Division D
of the SS Operational Headquarters. On 30 January 1943 he was appointed
Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant in the Waffen SS.
SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS
The sulfanilamide experiments referred to in the indictment were
conducted by the defendants Gebhardt, Fischer, and Oberheuser at
Ravensbrueck concentration camp between 20 July 1942 and August 1943.
During this period of time, four of the medical branches of the Waffen
SS were under Genzken, including Office XVI, Hygiene, of which the
defendant Mrugowsky was chief.
It is submitted by the prosecution that the evidence proves Mrugowsky to
have given support and assistance to these experiments, and that,
consequently, Genzken becomes criminally liable because of the position
of command he held over Mrugowsky. It is also urged that because Genzken
attended the meeting in Berlin at which Gebhardt and Fischer gave their
lecture on the experiments, this likewise shows criminal connection.
That Mrugowsky rendered assistance to Gebhardt in the sulfanilamide
experiments at Ravensbrueck is clearly proved. Mrugowsky put his
laboratory and co-workers at Gebhardt’s disposal. He furnished the
bacterial cultures for the infections. He conferred with Gebhardt about
the medical problems involved. It was on the suggestion of Mrugowsky’s
office that wood shavings and ground glass were placed in artificially
inflicted wounds made on the subjects so that battlefield wounds would
be more closely simulated. It also appears that Blumenreuter, who was
the chief of Office XV under Genzken’s direction, may have furthered the
experiments by furnishing surgical instruments and medicines to
Gebhardt.
The Tribunal finds that Genzken was not present at the Berlin meeting.
Although Mrugowsky and Blumenreuter may have aided Gebhardt in his
experiments, the prosecution has failed to show that it was done with
Genzken’s direction or knowledge.
The prosecution, therefore, has failed to sustain the burden with regard
to this particular specification.
TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS
The series of experiments which are the subject of this specification
were conducted at Buchenwald concentration camp and began in January
1942. SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Ding, who was attached to the Hygiene
Institute of the Waffen SS, was in charge of these experiments—with the
defendant Hoven serving as his deputy.
Until 1 September 1943 both Mrugowsky, the Chief of the Hygiene
Institute, and Ding, were subordinate to Genzken. Until the date last
mentioned the chain of military command in the field of hygiene and
research was as follows: Himmler-Grawitz-Genzken-Mrugowsky-Ding.
Prior to 1939 Ding had been camp physician at Buchenwald, and as such
was subordinate to Genzken. During the early months of the war Genzken
served as an army surgeon in the field, Ding being his adjutant. During
the fall of 1941 Ding returned to Buchenwald and Genzken to his office
at Berlin. During their service in the field Genzken and Ding had become
warm personal friends. Ding was attached to the Hygiene Institute of the
Waffen SS and was engaged in typhus research for the Institute. Genzken
testified that Mrugowsky and the Hygiene Institute were in his chain of
command prior to 31 August 1943. He further testified that after the
date last mentioned his office had nothing to do with Ding save to
provide money for Ding’s expenses, there being no other budget from
which money was available. Mrugowsky testified that Genzken was his
superior officer until 1 September 1943, and knew that the Hygiene
Institute was working on the problem of providing an efficient vaccine
against typhus. It is admitted that Ding was carrying out medical
experiments on concentration camp inmates in order to determine the
effect of various typhus vaccines.
It is not contended that such experiments were not carried out. In the
course of these experiments two buildings or “blocks” were used. The
experiments were conducted in Block 46, and when satisfactory vaccine
was decided upon, Block 50 was used for the preparation of vaccines.
During the course of the experiments with vaccines in March 1942, Ding
himself contracted typhus. Genzken testified that he was aware of the
fact that concentration camp inmates were subjected to experiments, but
stated that he was not advised as to the method of experimentation.
It is clear that the experiments necessary to decide upon a satisfactory
vaccine preceded by a considerable period the production of the vaccine.
Genzken testified that vaccine production began in December 1943, that
the production establishment only moved into Block 50 in the middle of
August, and that when production actually began “this establishment had
already come under the agency of Grawitz and it was not subordinated any
more” to him.
Under date of 9 January 1943 the Ding diary contains a lengthy entry
stating that by Genzken’s order the typhus research station became the
“Department of Typhus and Virus Research,” that Dr. Ding would be head
of this department, and that during his absence defendant Hoven would
act in his place. The entry further stated that Ding was appointed chief
department head for special missions in hygiene, etc. The Ding diary is
discussed elsewhere in this judgment. Considering the demonstrated
desire of Ding for his personal aggrandizement, this entry is not
entitled to entire credit, as written. It refers to Genzken as “Major
General”—which rank he did not receive until a few weeks after 9
January 1943. The entry, however, has some probative value upon the
question of Ding’s status during the year 1943.
Genzken testified that he “approved” the establishment of Ding’s
department for vaccine research. He also testified that his department
furnished necessary funds from its budget for Ding’s investigations.
From the evidence it appears that prior to 1 September 1943, Mrugowsky
reported regularly to Genzken, on an average of once per week, either
orally or in writing.
Under date 5 May 1942, Mrugowsky signed a written report upon the
subject, “Testing Typhus Vaccines.” This report went to six different
offices: the first copy, to Conti; the second copy, to Grawitz; and the
third copy, to Genzken. The report commences: “The tests of four typhus
vaccines made by us on human subjects at the instigation of the Reich
Health Leader Dr. Conti had the following results * * *”. It is stated
that the mortality of victims of typhus during an epidemic “was around
30 percent” and that “during the same epidemic four groups of
experimental subjects were vaccinated with one each” of the four types
of vaccine described in the beginning of the report.
“The experimental subjects were mostly in their twenties and thirties.
Care was taken when selecting them that they did not come from typhus
districts and also to ensure an interval of four to six weeks between
the protective vaccination and the outbreak of the clinical symptoms of
the disease. According to experience this period is imperative to
achieve immunity.”
The effects of the four vaccines tested were described as follows. The
report on the Weigl vaccine states that “nobody died”. The report on the
Gildemeister and Haagen vaccine also states that no deaths occurred. The
report on the Behring-Normal vaccine states that one person died. The
experiment with the Behring-Strong vaccine reports one death.
The last paragraph of the report states: “In the last two groups the
symptoms were considerably stronger than in the first groups * * *. No
difference between the two vaccines of the Behring Works was observed.
The attending physicians stated that the general picture of the disease
in group four was rather more severe compared with that of the patients
of group three.”
In a summation, Mrugowsky recommended the use of a vaccine “produced
according to the chicken egg process, which, in its immunization effect,
is equal to the vaccine after Weigl.”
“The effectiveness of protection depends on the method used in making
the vaccine.”
Of course, experiments with vaccines, conducted because of the urgent
need for the discovery of a protective vaccine, would lead to scant
results unless the subjects vaccinated were subsequently in some manner
effectively exposed to typhus, thereby demonstrating the effectiveness
or noneffectiveness of the vaccination. While Mrugowsky’s report, above
referred to, makes no reference to an artificial infection, it does
state without further explanation that two deaths occurred, and in the
last paragraph, quoted above, compares the severity of “the diseased”
between groups three and four.
On cross-examination Mrugowsky testified that Dr. Ding was to lecture at
a meeting of consulting surgeons in the spring of 1943, and that the
witness informed Genzken concerning “the intended amount of vaccines to
be produced by the SS.” Mrugowsky testified that he gave Genzken this
information for three reasons: first, that Genzken had to be advised of
the fact that Ding, as a member of the Waffen SS, was to give a lecture
to the surgeons; second, that Genzken should be informed concerning “the
effectiveness of a number of vaccines to be used for troops”; third,
that Genzken should know when he could expect the first production of
vaccines for the SS and the amounts he could count on for each month.
Mrugowsky further testified:
“The conference with Dr. Genzken was extremely brief. As far as
I remember we were standing close to his desk. I told him that
the various vaccines which I mentioned to him had a different
effect; I told him that the effect varied as to the length of
the temperature and a reduction of fatalities; and I told him
that after having vaccinated the entire SS we could count on
some protective effect for all soldiers. On that occasion I
showed him a few charts which Ding had handed over to me at that
time, the same charts which Ding reproduced in his paper, and I
used these charts in order to explain the effectiveness of the
vaccines to him.”
Q. “The mortality figures and the temperature figures could be
derived from these charts, couldn’t they?”
A. “Yes. If I remember correctly, on the heading of these charts
the information was given what the day of the infection was.
This entire conference was very brief and it is quite possible
that Dr. Genzken—who was only concerned with the most important
points which he had to know—it is quite possible that he
overlooked that. I had no cause to point it out to him in
particular since I was not reporting to him about Ding’s series
of experiments but was only reporting to him about the
protective value of various vaccines which he, as medical chief,
had to know. These were two completely different points of
view.”
The Tribunal is convinced that prior to 1 September 1943, Genzken knew
the nature and scope of the activities of his subordinates, Mrugowsky
and Ding, in the field of typhus research; yet he did nothing to insure
that such research would be conducted within permissible legal limits.
He knew that concentration camp inmates were being subjected to cruel
medical experiments in the course of which deaths were occurring; yet he
took no steps to ascertain the status of the subjects or the
circumstances under which they were being sent to the experimental
block. Had he made the slightest inquiry he would have discovered that
many of the human subjects used were non-German nationals who had not
given their consent to the experiments.
As the Tribunal has already pointed out in this judgment, “the duty and
responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon
each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It
is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to
another with impunity.”
We find that Genzken, in his official capacity, was responsible for,
aided and abetted the typhus experiments, performed on non-German
nationals against their consent, in the course of which deaths occurred
as a result of the treatment received. To the extent that these
experiments did not constitute war crimes they constituted crimes
against humanity.
MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
Under count four of the indictment Genzken is charged with being a
member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows that
Genzken became a member of the SS on 1 March 1936 and voluntarily
remained in that organization until the end of the war. As a
high-ranking member of the Medical Service of the Waffen SS he was
criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the indictment.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Karl Genzken
guilty, under counts two, three, and four of the indictment.
GEBHARDT
The defendant Gebhardt is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in,
High-Altitude, Freezing, Malaria, Lost Gas, Sulfanilamide, Bone, Muscle
and Nerve Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water, Epidemic
Jaundice, Sterilization, Typhus, Poison, and Incendiary Bomb
Experiments.
The defendant Gebhardt held positions of great power and responsibility
in the Medical Service of the SS in Nazi Germany. He joined the NSDAP in
1933 and the SS at least as early as 1935. He took part in the Nazi
Putsch of 1923, which aimed at the overthrow of the so-called Weimar
Republic, the democratic government of Germany, being then a member of
the illegal Free Corps, “Bund Oberland.” When, in 1933, the hospital at
Hohenlychen was founded, Gebhardt was appointed chief physician of this
institution. In 1938 he became the attending physician to Himmler. He
was also personal physician to Himmler and his family. In 1940 Gebhardt
was appointed consulting surgeon of the Waffen SS and, in 1943, chief
clinical officer (Oberster Kliniker) of the Reich Physician SS and
Police, Grawitz. In the Allgemeine SS Gebhardt attained the rank of a
Gruppenfuehrer (major general), and in the Waffen SS the rank of major
general in the reserve.
SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS
The purpose for which these experiments were undertaken is defined in
counts two and three of the indictment.
In the Ravensbrueck concentration camp during a period from 20 July 1942
until August 1943, the defendant Gebhardt, aided by defendants Fischer
and Oberheuser, performed such experiments upon human subjects without
their consent. Gebhardt personally requested Heinrich Himmler’s
permission to carry out these experiments, and attempts to assume full
responsibility for them and for any consequences resulting therefrom. He
himself personally carried out the initial operations.
While it is not deemed strictly necessary in this judgment to describe
in any detail the procedure followed in performing these experiments, a
brief statement will now be made thereon. The first experimental
subjects consisted of 15 male concentration camp inmates used during
preliminary experiments in July 1942, but later 60 Polish women, who
were experimented on in 5 groups of 12 subjects each.
In the first series of experiments the healthy subjects were infected
with various bacteria, but resulting infections were not thereafter
considered sufficiently serious to furnish an answer to the problem
sought to be solved and further experiments were then undertaken.
Dr. Gebhardt has admitted that in the second series of experiments three
of the subjects died as a result of the treatment received. All of these
subjects were persons who had been selected by the concentration camp
authorities and who were not consulted as to their consent or
willingness to participate. Notwithstanding this, however, the
experimental subjects protested against experiments both orally and in
writing, stating that they would have preferred death to continued
experiments, since they were convinced that they would die in any event.
An examination of the evidence presented to this Tribunal in connection
with sulfanilamide experiments performed upon unwilling and
nonconsenting concentration camp inmates indicates conclusively, that
participating human subjects were used under duress and coercion in
experiments performed upon their bodies; that persons acting as subjects
incurred and suffered physical torture and the risk of death; that in
the experiments here discussed at least five deaths of subjects were
caused therefrom.
It is claimed by Dr. Gebhardt that all of the non-German experimental
subjects were selected from inmates of concentration camps, former
members of the Polish Resistance Movement, who had previously been
condemned to death and were in any event marked for legal execution.
This is not recognized as a valid defense to the charge of the
indictment.
The Polish women who were used in the experiments had not given their
consent to become experimental subjects. That fact was known to
Gebhardt. The evidence conclusively shows that they had been confined at
Ravensbrueck without so much as a semblance of trial. That fact could
have been known to Gebhardt had he made the slightest inquiry of them
concerning their status. Moreover, assuming for the moment that they had
been condemned to death for acts considered hostile to the German forces
in the occupied territory of Poland, these persons still were entitled
to the protection of the laws of civilized nations. While under certain
specific conditions the rules of land warfare may recognize the validity
of an execution of spies, war rebels, or other resistance workers, it
does not under any circumstances countenance the infliction of death or
other punishment by maiming or torture.
BONE, MUSCLE AND NERVE REGENERATION AND BONE
TRANSPLANTATION EXPERIMENTS
These experiments were carried out in Ravensbrueck concentration camp
during the same time, and on the same group of Polish women used in the
sulfanilamide experiments. Upon these Polish inmates three kinds of bone
operations were performed—artificially induced fractures, bone
transplantations, bone splints—the conditions of the operations being
specially created in each particular case. Some girls were required to
submit to operations several times. In one instance small pieces of
fibula were taken out; in another instance the periosteum of the leg was
removed. Cases occurred where subjects were experimented on by
deliberately fracturing their limbs in several places and testing the
effect of certain treatments. In at least one case bone incisions were
performed on a subject six different times. In another case the shoulder
blade of a subject was removed.
Further recital of these activities is as unnecessary as were the
operations themselves. The testimony heard and exhibits filed and
examined by the Tribunal conclusively sustain the allegations of the
indictment with reference to the experiments mentioned therein.
SEPSIS (PHLEGMON) EXPERIMENTS
A witness whose testimony must be accepted as credible testified
concerning these experiments in which concentration camp inmates were
used without their consent and were thereafter infected with pus. He
testified as to at least two series of experiments which resulted
fatally for 12 of the subjects.
The prosecution claims, and it is likely that these biochemical
experiments which were performed in the Dachau concentration camp were
complementary to and formed parts of the sulfanilamide experiments in
Ravensbrueck. The evidence, however, is not sufficient to establish the
criminal connection of Gebhardt with these experiments.
SEA-WATER EXPERIMENTS
Dr. Gebhardt’s position, which has been mentioned in this judgment as
that of an official and personal associate of Heinrich Himmler—part of
whose duties concerned concentration camp medical experiments, was
partially defined by an order issued by Himmler 15 May 1944 directing
that an opinion from Gebhardt would be required before any experiments
thereafter could be carried out on such human subjects. This order
stated that all medical experiments to be carried out at the
concentration camps had to have Himmler’s personal approval. It appears,
however, that while the application for permission to carry out
experiments involving human subjects was required to be obtained from
Himmler—yet before such application could be examined, a critical
opinion of the chief clinical officer of the SS, Dr. Gebhardt,
concerning its technical aspects was required to accompany it. Complying
with this order Gebhardt, in reference to sea-water experiments, wrote—
“I deem it absolutely right to support the Luftwaffe in every
way and to place a general physician of the Waffen SS at
disposal to supervise the experiments.”
This alone is deemed to be sufficient to show that Dr. Gebhardt knew
about, and approved, the performance of the sea-water experiments as
charged in the indictment.
STERILIZATION EXPERIMENTS
Details of the sterilization experiments will be dealt with elsewhere in
this judgment; and it is unnecessary to repeat them here, except to the
extent necessary to inquire the part, if any, taken by Gebhardt therein.
On 7 and 8 July 1942 a conference took place between Himmler, Gebhardt,
SS Brigadefuehrer Gluecks, and SS Brigadefuehrer Clauberg, to discuss
the sterilization of Jewesses. Dr. Clauberg was promised that the
Auschwitz concentration camp would be placed at his disposal for
experiments on human beings and animals, and he was requested to
discover by means of fundamental experiments a method of sterilizing
persons without their knowledge. During the course of the conference,
Himmler called the special attention of all present “to the fact that
the matter involved was most secret and should be discussed only with
the officers in charge and that the persons present at the experiments
or discussions had to pledge secrecy.”
From this evidence it is apparent that Gebhardt was present at the
initial meeting which launched at least one phase of the sterilization
program in the concentration camps, and thus had knowledge and gave at
least passive approval to the program.
HIGH-ALTITUDE, FREEZING, MALARIA, LOST GAS, EPIDEMIC
JAUNDICE, TYPHUS, POISON, AND INCENDIARY BOMB EXPERIMENTS
Details as to the origin of and procedure followed in these experiments
are discussed elsewhere in this judgment, and will not be repeated. Our
only concern is to determine to what extent, if any, the defendant
Gebhardt took part in the experiments.
In these enterprises the defendant seems not to have taken any active
part, as he did in the sulfanilamide experiments and in other programs.
It may be argued that his close connection with Heinrich Himmler creates
a presumption that these experiments were conducted with Gebhardt’s
knowledge and approval. Be that as it may, no sufficient evidence to
that effect has been presented, and a mere presumption is not enough in
this case to convict the defendant.
Attention has been given to the brief filed by counsel for the defendant
Gebhardt. For the most part it is unnecessary to discuss the theories
presented in this brief, for the reason that the main reliance of the
defense seems to be that in his connection with the experiments charged
in the indictment, Dr. Gebhardt acted as a soldier in the execution of
orders from an authorized superior. We cannot see the applicability of
the doctrine of superior orders as a defense to the charges contained in
the indictment. Such doctrine has never been held applicable to a case
where the one to whom the order is given has free latitude of decision
whether to accept the order or reject it. Such was the situation with
reference to Gebhardt. The record makes it manifestly plain that he was
not ordered to perform the experiments, but that he sought the
opportunity to do so. Particularly is this true with reference to the
sulfanilamide experiments: Gebhardt, in effect, took them away from
Grawitz to demonstrate that certain surgical procedures advocated by him
at the bedside of the mortally wounded Heydrich at Prague in May of 1942
were scientifically and surgically superior to the methods of treatment
proposed by Dr. Morell, Hitler’s personal physician. The doctrine,
therefore, is not applicable. But even if it were, the fact of such
orders could merely be considered, under Control Council Law No. 10, as
palliating punishment.
Another argument presented in briefs of counsel attempts to ground
itself upon the debatable proposition that in the broad interest of
alleviating human suffering, a state may legally provide for medical
experiments to be carried out on prisoners condemned to death without
their consent, even though such experiments may involve great suffering
or death for the experimental subject. Whatever may be the right of a
state with reference to its own citizens, it is certain that such
legislation may not be extended so as to permit the practice upon
nationals of other countries who, held in the most abject servitude, are
subjected to experiments without their consent and under the most brutal
and senseless conditions.
We find that Gebhardt, in his official capacity, was responsible for,
aided and abetted, and took a consenting part in medical experiments
performed on non-German nationals against their consent; in the course
of which deaths, maiming, and other inhuman treatment resulted to the
experimental subjects. To the extent that these experiments did not
constitute war crimes they constituted crimes against humanity.
MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
Under count four of the indictment Gebhardt is charged with being a
member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal, namely the SS. The evidence shows that
Gebhardt became a member of the SS at least as early as 1933 and
voluntarily remained in that organization until the end of the war. As
one of the most influential members of the Medical Service of the Waffen
SS he was criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and
crimes against humanity as charged under counts two and three of the
indictment.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Karl Gebhardt
guilty under counts two, three and four of the indictment.
BLOME
The defendant Blome is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with personal responsibility for, and participation in
Malaria, Lost Gas, and Sulfanilamide Experiments, the extermination of
tubercular Poles, and the execution of the Euthanasia Program. Proof has
also been adduced for the purpose of showing that he participated in the
freezing bacteriological warfare, and blood coagulation experiments.
The charge with reference to sulfanilamide experiments has been
abandoned by the prosecution and hence will not be considered further.
The defendant Blome studied medicine at Goettingen and received his
medical degree in 1920. From 1924 to 1934 he engaged in private
practice. In the latter year he was summoned to Berlin where, in 1935,
he reorganized the German medical educational system. He also acted as
adjutant in the central office of the German Red Cross and as business
manager of the German Physicians’ Association, which position he held
until the end of World War II. In 1938 he became President of the Bureau
of the Academy for International Medical Education. From 1939 on Blome
acted as deputy for Dr. Leonardo Conti who was leader of the German
Physicians’ Association, Head of the Main Office for Public Health of
the Party, and Leader of the National Socialist Physicians’ Association.
In 1941 he became a member of the Reich Research Council, and in 1943
was appointed Plenipotentiary for Cancer Research, connected with the
research commission for protection against biological warfare.
Blome joined the SA in 1931 and became the chief medical officer of the
SA in the province of Mecklenburg. In 1934 he was appointed a province
office leader, and in the SA he attained a rank equivalent to that of
major general. In 1943 he was awarded the highest decoration of the Nazi
Party.
As Plenipotentiary for Cancer Research, it was his duty to determine
which research problems should be studied and to assign such problems to
scientists best fitted to investigate them.
FREEZING EXPERIMENTS
The prosecution argues that Blome is criminally responsible for
participation in the freezing experiments as charged in the indictment.
In the subparagraph which particularly refers to freezing, Blome is not
named among the defendants charged with special responsibility for the
experiments. Moreover, the record does not contain evidence which shows
beyond a reasonable doubt that Blome bore any responsible part in the
conduct of the freezing experiments.
MALARIA EXPERIMENTS
The evidence is insufficient to disclose any criminal responsibility of
the defendant in connection with the malaria experiments.
LOST GAS EXPERIMENTS
The evidence is insufficient to disclose any criminal responsibility of
the defendant in connection with these experiments.
EXTERMINATION OF TUBERCULAR POLES
The basis for the prosecution’s case against the defendant in this
regard is to be found in a series of letters with reference to the
tuberculosis menace in the Reichsgau Wartheland, which had been overrun
by the German Reich and settled by its citizens.
During the year 1941 the German Government began a program of
extermination of the Jewish population of the eastern occupied
territories. On 1 May 1942 Greiser, the German Military Governor of
Reichsgau Wartheland, wrote Himmler advising him that “as to the 100,000
Jews in the district, the ‘special treatment’ approved by Himmler was
about completed.” The letter then continued:
“* * * I ask you for permission to rescue the district
immediately, after the measures taken against the Jews, from a
menace which is increasing week by week, and use the existing
and efficient special commandos for that purpose.
“There are about 230,000 people of Polish nationality in my
district who were diagnosed to suffer from tuberculosis. The
number * * * infected with open tuberculosis is estimated at
about 35,000. This fact has led in an increasingly frightening
measure to the infection of Germans who came to the Warthegau
perfectly healthy * * *. A considerable number of well known
leading men, especially of the police, have been infected lately
and are not available for the war effort * * *. The ever
increasing risks were also recognized and appreciated by the
deputy of the Reich Leader for Public Health, Comrade Professor
Dr. Blome * * *.
“Though in Germany proper it is not possible to take appropriate
draconic steps against this public plague, I think I could take
responsibility * * * to have cases of open tuberculosis
exterminated among the Polish race here in the Warthegau. Of
course, only a Pole should be handed over for such an action who
is not only suffering from open tuberculosis, but whose
incurability is proved and certified by a public health officer.
“Considering the urgency of this project I ask for your approval
in principle as soon as possible. This would enable us to make
the preparations with all necessary precautions now to get the
action against the Poles suffering from open tuberculosis under
way, while the action against the Jews is in its closing stages.
“Heil Hitler!
“GREISER”
Two days later Koppe, the police leader on Greiser’s staff, wrote to
Rudolf Brandt restating Greiser’s proposal and urging Brandt to call the
matter to Himmler’s attention. Brandt promptly acknowledged the letter,
advising Koppe that the proposal had been referred to the Chief of the
Security Police for opinion, but that the final decision would rest with
Hitler.
On 9 June 1942 the Chief of the Security Police rendered his opinion to
Himmler: “I have no scruples against having the protectorate members and
stateless persons of the Polish race * * * who are afflicted with open
tuberculosis, submitted to the special treatment in the sense of the
proposal of Gau Leader Greiser. * * * The individual measures, though,
will first have to be discussed thoroughly with the Security Police, in
order to carry out the execution with the least possible attraction of
attention.” The opinions thus rendered undoubtedly received the full
approval of Himmler, for on 27 June 1942 Rudolf Brandt passed on to
Greiser a letter from Himmler containing the following decision:
“Dear Comrade Greiser:
“I have no objection to having protectorate people and stateless
persons of Polish origin who live within the territory of the
Warthegau and are infected with tuberculosis handed over for
special treatment as you suggest; as long as their disease is
incurable * * *. I would like to request, however, to discuss
the individual measures in detail with the Security Police
first, in order to assure inconspicuous accomplishment of the
task * * *.
[Signed] “H. HIMMLER”
The Himmler letter was acknowledged by Greiser on 21 November 1942,
Greiser advising Himmler that in pursuance of the permission given him
to apply “special treatment” to tubercular Poles he had made
arrangements for an X-ray examination of all people in the territory,
but that now that “special treatment” had been approved, Blome, Deputy
Chief of the Public Health Office of the NSDAP was raising objections to
its execution. A copy of Blome’s letter to Greiser was enclosed for
Himmler’s information.
Blome’s letter to Greiser is dated 18 November 1942. It opens by
recalling various conversations between the writer and Greiser
concerning the campaign against tuberculosis in the Warthegau, and then
proceeds to consider the matter in detail; the letter proceeding:
“With the settlement of Germans in all parts of the Gau, an
enormous danger has arisen for them * * *. What goes for the
Warthegau [* * *] also holds true for the other annexed
territories * * *.
“Therefore, something basic must be done soon. One must decide
the most efficient way in which this can be done. There are
three ways to be taken into consideration:
“1. Special treatment of the seriously ill persons,
“2. Most rigorous isolation of the seriously ill
persons,
“3. Creation of a reservation for all TB patients.
“For the planning, attention must be paid to different points of
view of a practical, political and psychological nature.
Considering it most soberly, the simplest way would be the
following: Aided by the X-ray battalion, we could reach the
entire population, German and Polish, of the Gau during the
first half of 1943. As to the Germans, the treatment and
isolation is to be prepared and carried out according to the
regulations of Tuberculosis Relief. The approximately 35,000
Poles who are incurable and infectious will be ‘specially
treated’. All other Polish consumptives will be subjected to an
appropriate cure in order to save them for work and to avoid
their causing contagion.”
Blome then proceeds, stating that he has made arrangements for
commencement of the “radical procedure”, but suggests that some
assurance should be procured that Hitler would agree to the project. The
letter then goes on to say—
“I could imagine that the Fuehrer, having some time ago stopped
the program in the insane asylums, might at this moment consider
a ‘special treatment’ of the incurably sick as unsuitable and
irresponsible from a political point of view. As regards the
Euthanasia Program it was a question of people of German
nationality afflicted with hereditary diseases. Now it is a
question of infected sick people of a subjugated nation.”
Blome then voices the opinion that if the program is put into execution,
it cannot be kept secret and will be made the basis for much adverse and
harmful propaganda both at home and abroad. He suggests accordingly that
before the program is commenced all points of view should again be
presented to Hitler.
Continuing, Blome writes that if Hitler should forbid the radical
proposal suggested by Greiser, three other solutions were open (1)
consumptives and incurables could be isolated with their relatives; (2)
all infectious consumptives might be strictly isolated in nursing
establishments; (3) the consumptives might be resettled in a particular
area. If the latter plan were adopted, the sick could reach the assigned
territory on foot, and thus save the costs of transportation.
Blome’s letter finally concludes—
“After a proper examination of all these considerations and
circumstances, the creation of a reservation, such as the
reservations for lepers, seems to be the most practicable
solution. Such a reservation should be able to be created in the
shortest time by means of the necessary settlement. Within the
reservation one could easily set up conditions for the strict
isolation of the strongly contagious.
“Even the case of the German consumptives represents an
extremely difficult problem for the Gau. But this cannot be
overcome, unless the problem of the Polish consumptives is
solved at the same time.”
The evidence shows that the letter from Greiser to Himmler, with Blome’s
suggestions enclosed, was acknowledged by Himmler on 3 December 1942
with the following final decision:
“Dear Party Comrade Greiser:
“I have received your letter of 21 November 1942. I, too,
believe that it would be better to take into consideration the
misgivings set forth by Party Member Dr. Blome. In my opinion it
is impossible to proceed with the sick persons in the manner
intended, especially since, as you have informed me, it will be
possible to exploit the practical results of the tests only in
six months.
“I suggest you look for a suitable area to which the incurable
consumptives can be sent. Besides the incurables, other patients
with less severe cases of tuberculosis could quite well be put
into this territory, too. This action would also, of course,
have to be exploited with the appropriate form of propaganda.
“Before writing you this letter I again thoroughly thought over
whether the original idea could not in some way be carried out.
However, I am convinced now that it is better to proceed the
other way.”
The prosecution maintains that this series of letters which have been
referred to establishes the criminal participation of the defendant
Blome in the extermination of tubercular Poles. We cannot follow the
argument. It is probable that the proposal to isolate tubercular Poles,
as suggested by Blome and approved by Himmler, was at least partially
carried out; although the record discloses but little with reference to
what actually transpired. It may be that in the course of such a program
Poles may have died as the result of being uprooted from their homes and
sent to isolation stations; but the record contains no direct credible
evidence upon the subject. Blome explained from the witness stand his
letter to Greiser by saying that it was written in order to prevent the
extermination program of tubercular Poles from being put into execution.
Certainly, his letter indicates on its face that he opposed the “special
treatment” suggested by Greiser.
We cannot say, therefore, that the explanation offered is wholly without
substance. It at least raises a reasonable doubt in our minds concerning
the matter. Blome knew Hitler and Himmler. He well knew that any
objections to “special treatment” based on moral or humanitarian grounds
would make but small impact upon the minds of men like these Nazi
leaders. He knew, moreover, that before Greiser’s proposal for
extermination would be abandoned a plan which appeared to be better must
be suggested. If viewed from the standpoint of factual and psychological
considerations, it cannot be held that the letter was not well-worded
when considered as an attempt to put an end to the plan originally
adopted, and to bring the substitution of another plan not so drastic.
Whatever may have been its purpose, the record shows that, in this
particular, the letter did in fact divert Himmler from his original
program and that as a result thereof the extermination plan was
abandoned.
EUTHANASIA PROGRAM
Blome is charged with criminal responsibility in connection with the
Euthanasia Program, but we are of opinion that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the charge.
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
The prosecution contends that the evidence in the case established
Blome’s guilt in connection with research concerning different forms of
bacteriological warfare. Blome, who was plenipotentiary for cancer
research in the Reich Research Council, admits that the problem of
cancer research was allied with the research commission for protection
against biological warfare. He admits further, that he was placed in
charge of an institute near Poznan in which the problems of biological
warfare were to be investigated, but states that the work being done at
the Poznan institute was interrupted in March 1945 by the advance of the
Russian army.
This latter fact seems to be confirmed by the evidence. In this
connection Schreiber appeared as a witness before the International
Military Tribunal. His testimony given there has been received in
evidence before this Tribunal. From the testimony it appears that Blome
visited Schreiber at the Military Medical Academy, Berlin, during March
1945 and stated to him that he, Blome, had abandoned his institute in
Poznan due to the advance of the Russians, but before leaving had
attempted to destroy his installations as he feared that the Russians
might discover that preparations had been made in the institute for
experiments on human beings.
Counsel for the prosecution has brought to our judicial notice a finding
by the International Military Tribunal in its judgment wherein it is
found that—
“In July 1943 experimental work was begun in preparation for a
campaign of bacteriological warfare; Soviet prisoners of war
were used in the medical experiments, which more often than not
proved fatal.” (_See “Trial of the Major War Criminals”, Vol. I,
p. 231._)
It is submitted by the prosecution that this finding of the
International Military Tribunal, when considered in connection with
other evidence in the case, requires this Tribunal to find the defendant
Blome guilty under the indictment.
The suggestion is not tenable. It may well be that defendant Blome was
preparing to experiment upon human beings in connection with
bacteriological warfare, but the record fails to disclose that fact, or
that he ever actually conducted experiments. The charge of the
prosecution on this item is not sustained.
POLYGAL EXPERIMENTS
The prosecution has introduced evidence which suggests that Blome may be
criminally responsible for polygal experiments conducted by Rascher at
Dachau, in which Russian prisoners of war were used as experimental
subjects. In our view the evidence does no more than raise a strong
suspicion; it does not sustain the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Kurt Blome not
guilty as charged under the indictment and directs that he be released
from custody under the indictment when this Tribunal presently adjourns.
RUDOLF BRANDT
Under counts two and three of the indictment the defendant Rudolf Brandt
is charged with special responsibility for, and participation in,
High-Altitude, Freezing, Malaria, Lost Gas, Sulfanilamide, Bone, Muscle
and Nerve Regeneration and Bone Transplantation, Sea-Water, Epidemic
Jaundice, Sterilization, and Typhus Experiments. He is also charged
under these counts with criminal responsibility for the murder of 112
Jews for the purpose of completing a Skeleton Collection for the Reich
University of Strasbourg, for the murder and ill-treatment of tubercular
Poles, and for the Euthanasia Program carried out by the German Reich.
Under count four of the indictment he is charged with membership in an
organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal.
The prosecution has abandoned the charge of participation in the bone,
muscle and nerve regeneration and bone transplantation experiment;
hence, it will not be considered further.
The defendant Rudolf Brandt joined the Nazi Party in 1932. He was
commissioned a second lieutenant in the SS in 1935. In approximately ten
years he rose to the rank of SS colonel. He is one of the three
defendants in the case who is not a physician.
From the commencement of his career in the Nazi organization until his
capture by the Allied Forces in 1945 he was directly subordinate to and
closely associated with the leader of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, and he
had full knowledge of his chief’s personal and official interests and
activities.
To Himmler, Rudolf Brandt was first of all an important and trusted
clerical assistant. The record shows him to have been an unusually
proficient stenographer. That is the road by which he finally arrived at
a position of considerable power and authority as personal Referent on
Himmler’s Personal Staff, Ministerial Counsellor in the Ministry of the
Interior, and a member of the Ahnenerbe. Acting for Himmler during his
absences, Rudolf Brandt, in these positions, had a tremendous
opportunity to and did exercise personal judgment and discretion in many
serious and important matters.
HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS
These experiments extended from March to August 1942. Their details are
dealt with elsewhere in this judgment. A portion of the evidence in this
specification consists of correspondence between the defendant Rudolf
Brandt and various others in the German military service who were
personally engaged in, or were closely connected with, the physical
details of the experiments performed. The correspondence just previously
mentioned was admitted in evidence, is well authenticated, and even
standing alone, without additional oral testimony—of which there was
also plenty—is deemed amply sufficient to disclose beyond reasonable
doubt that except for the sanction and diligent cooperation of the
defendant Rudolf Brandt, or someone occupying his position, the
high-altitude experiments mentioned in the indictment could not have
been conducted.
Taken altogether, the evidence on this item discloses that during the
period between March and August 1942, certain medical experiments were
conducted at the Dachau concentration camp in Germany for the benefit of
the German Air Force, to determine the limits of human endurance and
existence at extremely high altitudes. Various human beings,
unwillingly, and entirely without their consent, were required and
compelled to, and did participate in the aforesaid experiments as
subjects thereof. The said nonconsenting subjects were prisoners of war,
German civilians and civilians from German occupied territory, whose
exact citizenship, in many cases, could not be ascertained. Among the
experimental subjects there were numerous deaths, estimated by witnesses
at 70 or 80, resulting directly from compulsory participation in the
experiments. Exact data on the total fatalities cannot be stated, but
there is convincing evidence that during the last day’s operation of the
high-altitude experiments, five participating and nonconsenting subjects
died as the result thereof. The greater number of the experimental
subjects suffered grave injury, torture and ill-treatment.
FREEZING EXPERIMENTS
In this experiment, or series of experiments, Rudolf Brandt is
established as an intermediary and necessary aid between Heinrich
Himmler, who authorized the work to be done, and those who were
appointed by him actually to perform the ruthless task. Evidence is
conclusive that Rudolf Brandt at all times knew exactly what
experimental processes would be carried out. He knew that the procedure
followed was to select from the inmates at Dachau such human subjects as
were considered most suitable for experimental purposes. He knew that no
consent was ever deemed necessary from the persons upon whom the
experiments were to be performed. He knew that among the experimental
subjects were non-German nationals, including civilians and prisoners of
war.
The exact number of deaths cannot be ascertained from the evidence, but
that fatalities occurred among the experimental subjects has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
LOST (MUSTARD) GAS EXPERIMENTS
On this specification, an affidavit of the defendant Rudolf Brandt which
is confirmed by other evidence reads substantially as follows:
“Towards the end of the year 1939, experiments were conducted at
the Sachsenhausen concentration camp on persons who were
certainly not all volunteers, in order to ascertain the efficacy
of the different treatment of wounds inflicted by Lost gas. Lost
is a poisonous gas which produces injurious effects on the
epidermis. I think it is generally known as mustard gas. * * *
Therefore, experiments were conducted on inmates of
concentration camps. As far as I understand, the experiments
consisted of inflicting wounds upon various parts of the bodies
of the experimental subjects and infecting them thereafter with
Lost. Various methods of treatment were applied in order to
determine the most effective one * * *.
“In the second half of 1942, Hirt (Dr. August Hirt) together
with * * * who served in the Luftwaffe, initiated experiments on
inmates of the Natzweiler concentration camp. The inmates for
these as well as other experiments were simply chosen by Pohl’s
office, the Economic and Administrative Main Office, WVHA. In
order to be employed for such purposes, the experiments on human
subjects with Lost gas had been carried on during the years 1943
and 1944 in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp as well as in
the Natzweiler concentration camp. The result was that some of
the inmates died.”
In the course of the gas experiments above referred to, testimony in the
record discloses that a considerable amount of correspondence was
carried on by persons concerned (except the experimental subjects
themselves), and it appears that some, at least, of this was referred to
Rudolf Brandt for action, upon which he personally intervened
sufficiently to associate himself actively with the conduct of the work
being done. And so he must be regarded as criminally responsible.
STERILIZATION EXPERIMENTS
Rudolf Brandt is charged, as in the indictment set forth, with special
responsibility under the above heading. The means by which sterilization
experiments or processes were to be made or utilized included X-ray
treatment, surgery, and drugs.
No specific instances of any drug being actually used have been clearly
shown by oral testimony, or exhibits herein submitted in evidence. In
reference to the X-ray and surgery methods of sterilization, however,
Rudolf Brandt is shown by the evidence to have taken a moving part in
the preparation of plans, and in their execution, sufficient to justify
the Tribunal in finding his criminal connection therewith. An affidavit
executed by the defendant Rudolf Brandt reads as follows:
“Himmler was extremely interested in the development of a cheap,
rapid sterilization method which could be used against enemies
of Germany, such as the Russians, Poles, and Jews. One hoped
thereby not only to defeat the enemy, but to exterminate him.
The capacity for work of the sterilized persons could be
exploited by Germany, while the danger of propagation would be
eliminated. This mass sterilization was part of Himmler’s racial
theory; particular time and care were devoted to these
sterilization experiments.”
We learn from the record that persons subjected to treatment were
“young, well-built inmates of concentration camps who were in the best
of health, and these were Poles, Russians, French, and prisoners of
war.”
It goes without saying that the work done in conformity with the plans
of Himmler, substantially aided by the cooperation of Rudolf Brandt,
brought maiming and suffering to great numbers of people.
TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS
Medical experiments ostensibly conducted to benefit Germany in the
prevention of typhus fever were carried on in the Natzweiler
concentration camp beginning with the year 1942. The details of these
experiments have been dealt with elsewhere in this judgment.
In the evidence it is proved that not less than 50 experimental subjects
died as a direct result of their participation in these typhus
experiments. Persons of all nationalities were used as subjects.
Regarding these enterprises, Rudolf Brandt, in his own affidavit, admits
that these experimental subjects did not volunteer but were conscripted
and compelled to serve without their consent being sought or given.
Inasmuch as information on the typhus experiments, both before and after
their performance, was furnished, as a matter of course, to Himmler
through Brandt, the defendant’s full knowledge of them is regarded as
definitely proven.
Here, again, the managing hand of the defendant is shown. The smooth
operation of these experiments is demonstrated to have been contingent
upon the diligence with which Rudolf Brandt arranged for the supply of
quotas of suitable human experimental material to the physicians at the
scene of the experiment.
In view of these proven facts, the defendant Rudolf Brandt must be held
and considered as one of the defendants responsible for performance of
illegal medical experiments where deaths resulted to the nonconsenting
human subjects.
SKELETON COLLECTION
In response to a request by Rudolf Brandt, on 9 February 1942 the
defendant Sievers, business manager of the Ahnenerbe, submitted to him
certain data on the alleged desirability of securing a Jewish skeleton
collection for the Reich University of Strasbourg. The report furnished
to the defendant Brandt contained among other things the following:
“By procuring the skulls of the Jewish Bolshevik Commissars, who
personified a repulsive yet characteristic humanity, we have the
opportunity of obtaining tangible scientific evidence. The
actual obtaining and collecting of these skulls without
difficulty could be best accomplished by a directive issued to
the Wehrmacht in the future to immediately turn over alive all
Jewish Bolshevik Commissars to the field police.”
On 27 February 1942, Rudolf Brandt informed defendant Sievers that
Himmler would support the enterprise and would place everything
necessary at his disposal; and that Sievers should report again in
connection with the undertaking.
Testimony and exhibits placed before this Court are abundantly
sufficient to show that the plan mentioned was actually put into
operation; that not less than 86 people were murdered for the sole
purpose of obtaining their skeletons. Much more could be said in
reference to this revolting topic, but it would add nothing to the
judgment. The fact that Rudolf Brandt showed an initial interest and
collaborated in the undertaking is enough to require a finding that he
is guilty of murder in connection with the program.
MALARIA, SEA-WATER, AND EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE EXPERIMENTS; AND THE
CHARGE OF THE MURDER AND MISTREATMENT OF POLES
It appears to be well established that Himmler sponsored, supported,
furthered or initiated each of these enterprises. Doubtless Brandt knew
what was going on, and perhaps he helped in the program. The evidence is
not sufficient, however, to justify such a finding.
The Tribunal finds that the defendant Rudolf Brandt was an accessory to,
ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, was knowingly connected
with plans and enterprises involving, and was a member of an
organization or group connected with, the commission of medical
experiments on non-German nationals, without their consent, in the
course of which experiments murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures,
atrocities, and other inhuman acts were committed; and the murder of no
less than 86 non-German Jews for a skeleton collection. To the extent
that these crimes were not war crimes they were crimes against humanity.
MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
Under count four of the indictment Rudolf Brandt is charged with being a
member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows that
Rudolf Brandt became a member of the SS in 1933, and remained in this
organization until the end of the war. As a member of the SS he was
criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the indictment.
An extremely persuasive and interesting brief on behalf of the defendant
Rudolf Brandt, filed by his attorney, has received careful attention by
this Tribunal. Therein it is urged that Rudolf Brandt’s position under
Heinrich Himmler was one of such subordination, his personal character
so essentially mild, and he was so dominated by his chief, that the full
significance of the crimes in which he became engulfed came to him with
a shock only when he went to trial. This plea is offered in mitigation
of appalling offenses in which the defendant Brandt is said to have
played only an unassuming role.
If it be thought for even a moment that the part played by Rudolf Brandt
was relatively unimportant when compared with the enormity of the
charges proved by the evidence, let it be said that every Himmler must
have his Brandt else the plans of a master criminal would never be put
into execution.
The Tribunal, therefore, cannot accept the thesis.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Rudolf Brandt
is guilty under counts two, three and four of the indictment.
MRUGOWSKY
The defendant is charged under counts two and three of the indictment
with special responsibility for, and participation in, Freezing,
Malaria, Sulfanilamide, Typhus, Poison, Epidemic Jaundice, and
Incendiary Bomb Experiments. Charges were made concerning certain other
medical experiments, but they have been abandoned by the prosecution.
Mrugowsky joined the NSDAP in 1930 and the SS in 1931. He ultimately
rose to the rank of senior colonel in the Waffen SS.
In 1938 Mrugowsky became a member of the staff of the SS medical office,
as hygienist. At the beginning of 1939 he founded the Hygiene
Bacteriological Testing Station of the SS in Berlin, whose purpose was
to combat epidemics in the SS garrison troops of the Waffen SS. In 1940
the station was enlarged and renamed the “Hygiene Institute of the
Waffen SS.” Mrugowsky became its chief and at the same time Chief of the
Office for Hygiene in the Medical Service of the Waffen SS under
Genzken.
In his dual capacity Mrugowsky was answerable to Genzken in all
questions concerning epidemic control and hygiene in the Waffen SS, but
as Chief of the Hygiene Institute, was military superior and commander
of the Institute and its affiliated institutions with power to issue
orders.
The Medical Service of the Waffen SS was reorganized on 1 September
1943. Mrugowsky and the Hygiene Institute were transferred from under
Genzken and became directly subordinated to Grawitz as Reich Physician
SS and Police. By this transfer Mrugowsky became chief hygienist under
Grawitz, but remained Chief of the Hygiene Institute.
TYPHUS AND OTHER VACCINE EXPERIMENTS
The details concerning the vaccine experiments conducted at Buchenwald
concentration camp have been related elsewhere in this judgment and
hence the details need no further discussion.
As pointed out in the case against Handloser, there is evidence in the
record that on 29 December 1941 a conference was held in Berlin attended
by Mrugowsky at which the decision was reached to begin research tests
at Buchenwald to determine the efficacy of egg yolk, and other vaccines
as protection against typhus. As a result of the conference, such an
experimental station was established at Buchenwald under the direction
of Dr. Ding with the defendant Hoven acting as his deputy.
Except for a few tests conducted early in 1942, all experiments were
carried out in Block 46—so-called clinical block of the station. In the
autumn of 1943 a vaccine production department was established in Block
50 and this also came under the supervision of Dr. Ding-Schuler.
It would burden this judgment unnecessarily to narrate in detail the
various tests and experiments carried out by Ding at Buchenwald as a
result of the decisions reached at higher levels. All of them conformed
to a more or less uniform pattern, with certain groups of inmates being
inoculated with vaccines, other groups (known as control groups) being
given no immunization, and finally both groups being artificially
infected with a virulent virus, and the results noted upon the
experimental subjects.
We learn from the Ding diary, the authenticity and reliability of which
has been discussed at length in other portions of the judgment, the
methods employed, and the results obtained in at least some of the
experiments.
For example: In “Typhus vaccination material research series I”, which
began on 6 January 1942, 135 inmates were vaccinated with Weigl,
Cox-Haagen-Gildemeister, Behring-Normal, or Behring-Strong, vaccines; 10
persons were used for control. On 3 March 1942 all test subjects,
including control persons, were artificially infected with virulent
virus of Rickettsia-Prowazeki furnished by the Robert Koch Institute.
Five deaths occurred; three in the control group and two among the
vaccinated subjects.
In “Typhus vaccine, research series II”, from 19 August to 4 September
1942, 40 persons were vaccinated with two different vaccines; 19 persons
were used for control. Subsequently all were artificially infected with
virulent virus; four deaths among the control persons occurred.
The entries in the diary concerning “Typhus vaccine experimental series
VII” read as follows:
“28 May 43-18 June 1943: Carrying out of typhus vaccination for
immunization with the following vaccine (1) 20 persons with
vaccine ‘Asid’, (2) 20 persons with vaccine ‘Asid Adsorbat’, (3)
20 persons with vaccine ‘Weigl’ of the Institute for Typhus and
Virus Research of the High Command, Army (OKH) Krakow (Eyer) * *
*. All experimental persons got very serious typhus. 7 Sept. 43:
Chart and case history completed. The experimental series was
concluded. 53 deaths (18 with ‘Asid’) (18 with ‘Asid Adsorbat’)
(9 with ‘Weigl’) (8 control) 9 Sep. 43: Charts and case
histories delivered to Berlin. Dr. Ding, SS Sturmbannfuehrer.”
Concerning “Typhus vaccine experimental series VIII” began on 8 March
1944 the following entry appears in the diary:
“Suggested by Colonel M.C. of the Air Corps, Professor Rose
(Oberstarzt) the vaccine ‘Kopenhagen’ (Ipsen-Murine-vaccine),
produced from mouse liver by the national serum institute in
Copenhagen, was tested for its compatibility on humans. 20
persons were vaccinated for immunization by intramuscular
injection * * *, 10 persons were contemplated for control and
comparison. 4 of the 30 persons were eliminated _before_ the
start of the artificial injection because of intermittent
sickness * * *. The remaining experimental persons were infected
on 16 April 44 by subcutaneous injection of 1/20 cc. typhus sick
fresh blood * * *. The following fell sick: 17 persons
immunized: 9 medium, 8 seriously; 9 persons control, 2 medium, 7
seriously * * *. 2 June 44: The experimental series was
concluded. 13 June 44: Chart and case history completed and sent
to Berlin. 6 deaths (3 Kopenhagen) (3 control). Dr. Ding.”
“Typhus vaccine experimental series IX” began on 17 July 1944. Twenty
persons were immunized with the vaccine “Weimar” produced by the
department for Typhus and Virus Research of the Hygiene Institute of the
Waffen SS; and for comparison, another group of 20 persons were
immunized with vaccine “Weigl” produced from lice by the Army High
Command (OKH) in Cracow [Krakow]. Still another group of 20 persons were
used for the control group. On 6 September 1944 the 60 experimental
persons were infected with fresh blood “sick with typhus” which was
injected into the upper arm. As a result, all experimental persons
became sick, some seriously. The narration of this experimental series
closes with the cryptic report: “4 Nov 44: Chart and case history
completed, 24 deaths (5 ‘Weigl’) (19 Control). Dr. Schuler.”
These entries are but few of the many which we have taken at random from
the Ding diary, dealing with the sordid murders of defenseless victims
in the name of Nazi medical science. Many more could be set forth if
time and space permitted. An analysis of the Ding diary discloses that
no less than 729 concentration camp inmates were experimented on with
typhus, at least 154 of whom died. And this toll of death takes no
account of the certain demise of scores of so-called “passage” persons
who were artificially infected with typhus for the sole purpose of
having at hand an ever-ready supply of fresh blood “sick with typhus” to
be used to infect the experimental subjects.
There is some evidence to the effect that the camp inmates used as
subjects in the first series submitted to being used as experimental
subjects after being told that the experiments were harmless and that
additional food would be given to volunteers. But these victims were not
informed that they would be artificially infected with a highly virulent
virus nor that they might die as a result. Certainly no one would
seriously suggest that under the circumstances these men gave their
legal consent to act as subjects. One does not ordinarily consent to be
the special object of a murder, and if one did, such consent would not
absolve his slayer.
Later, when news of what was happening in Block 46 became generally
known in the camp, it was no longer possible to delude the inmates into
offering themselves as victims. Thereupon, the shabby pretense of
seeking volunteers was dropped and the experimental subjects were taken
arbitrarily from a list of inmates prepared by the camp administration.
Other experiments were also carried out in Block 46 of Buchenwald to
test typhoid, para-typhoid A and B, and yellow fever.
As in the typhus experiments, nonconsenting human subjects were used,
including not only German criminal prisoners but also Poles, Russians,
and Frenchmen, both civilians and prisoners of war.
In all the typhus experiments, death resulted to many experimental
subjects. As to each of these experiments the evidence is overwhelming
that they were carried out by Ding under the orders or authority of the
defendant Mrugowsky.
POISON EXPERIMENTS
On 11 September 1944 Mrugowsky, Ding, and a certain Dr. Widmann carried
out an experiment with aconitin nitrate projectiles in the Sachenshausen
concentration camp. Details of the experiment are fully explained by a
“Top Secret” report of the sordid affair in a letter written by the
defendant Mrugowsky to the Criminological Institute, Berlin. The letter
follows:
“Subject: Experiments with aconitin nitrate projectiles.
To the Criminological Institute
Attn: Dr. Widmann
Berlin
“In the presence of SS Strumbannfuehrer Dr. Ding, Dr. Widmann,
and the undersigned, experiments with aconitin nitrate
projectiles were conducted on 11 September 1944 on 5 persons who
had been condemned to death. The projectiles in question were of
a 7.65-mm caliber, filled with crystalized poison. The
experimental subjects, in a lying position, were each shot in
the upper part of the left thigh. The thighs of two of them were
cleanly shot through. Even afterwards, no effect of the poison
was to be observed. These two experimental subjects were
therefore exempted.
“The entrance of the projectile did not show any peculiarities.
Evidently, the arteria femolaries of one of the subjects was
injured. A light stream of blood issued from the wound. But the
bleeding stopped after a short time. The loss of blood was
estimated as having been at the most ¾ of a liter, and
consequently was on no account fatal.
“The symptoms of the condemned three showed a surprising
similarity. At first no peculiarities appeared. After 20-25
minutes a motor agitation and a slight ptyalism set in but
stopped again. After 40 to 45 minutes a stronger salivation set
in. The poisoned persons swallowed repeatedly, but later the
flow of saliva became so strong that it could not even be
overcome by swallowing. Foamy saliva flowed from their mouths.
Then choking and vomiting set in.
“After 58 minutes the pulse of two of them could no longer be
felt. The third had a pulse rate of 76. After 65 minutes his
blood pressure was 90/60. The sounds were extremely low. A
reduction of blood pressure was evident.
“During the first hour of the experiment the pupils did not show
any changes. After 78 minutes the pupils of all three showed a
medium dilation together with a retarded light reaction.
Simultaneously, maximum respiration with heavy breathing
inhalations set in. This subsided after a few minutes. The
pupils contracted again and their reaction improved. After 65
minutes the patellar and achilles tendon reflexes of the
poisoned subjects were negative. The abdominal reflexes of two
of them were also negative. The upper abdominal reflexes of the
third were still positive, while the lower were negative. After
approximately 90 minutes, one of the subjects again started
breathing heavily, this was accompanied by an increasing motor
unrest. Then the heavy breathing changed into a flat,
accelerated respiration, accompanied by extreme nausea. One of
the poisoned persons tried in vain to vomit. To do so he
introduced four fingers of his hand up to the knuckles into his
throat, but nevertheless could not vomit. His face was flushed.
“The other two experimental subjects had already early shown a
pale face. The other symptoms were the same. The motor unrest
increased so much that the persons flung themselves up, then
down, rolled their eyes, and made meaningless motions with their
hands and arms. Finally the agitation subsided, the pupils
dilated to the maximum, and the condemned lay motionless.
Masseter spasms and urination were observed in one case. Death
occurred 121, 123 and 129 minutes after entry of the projectile.
“_Summary._ The projectiles filled with approximately 38 mg. of
aconitin nitrate in solid form had, in spite of only
insignificant injuries, a deadly effect after two hours.
Poisoning showed 20 to 25 minutes after injury. The main
reactions were: salivation, alteration of the pupils, negative
tendon reflexes, motor unrest, and extreme nausea.
“MRUGOWSKY
“SS Lecturer Oberfuehrer and Office Chief.”
The defendant attempts to meet this charge with the defense that the
subjects used in this experiment were persons who had been condemned to
death and that he, Mrugowsky, had been appointed as their legal
executioner.
One need but read the letter introduced in evidence to arrive at the
conclusion that the defense has no validity. This was not a legal
execution carried out in conformance with the laws and rules of war, but
a criminal medical experiment wherein wounds were inflicted on prisoners
with the sole end in view of determining the effectiveness of poisoned
bullets as a means of taking life. The hapless victims of this dastardly
torture were Russian prisoners of war, entitled to the protection
afforded by the laws of civilized nations. As has been said, in
substance, in this judgment: While under certain specific conditions the
rules of land warfare may recognize the validity of an execution by
shooting, it will not under any circumstances countenance the infliction
of death by maiming or torture.
SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS
That Mrugowsky rendered assistance to Gebhardt in the sulfanilamide
experiments at Ravensbrueck is plainly shown by the record. Mrugowsky
put his laboratory and co-workers at Gebhardt’s disposal. He furnished
the cultures for the infections. It was on the suggestion of Mrugowsky’s
office that wood shavings and ground glass were placed in the wounds of
the subjects so that battlefield wounds would be more closely simulated.
GAS OEDEMA EXPERIMENTS
Toward the end of 1942 a conference was held in the Military Medical
Academy, Berlin, to discuss the effects of gas oedema serum on wounded
persons. During the conference, several cases were reported in which
wounded soldiers who had received gas oedema serum injections in large
quantities suddenly died without apparent reason. Mrugowsky, who
participated in the conference, expressed the possibility that perhaps
the deaths had been due to the phenol content of the serum. As a step
toward solving the problem Mrugowsky ordered Dr. Ding-Schuler, his
subordinate, to take part in a euthanasia killing with phenol and to
report on the results in detail.
In pursuance of the order given, Dr. Ding and the defendant Hoven killed
some of the concentration camp inmates at Buchenwald with phenol
injections and Ding reported his findings to his superior officer,
Mrugowsky, as required by the order.
FREEZING, INCENDIARY BOMB, AND EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE
EXPERIMENTS
As to these items the Tribunal is of the view that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the charges.
It has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
Mrugowsky was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a
consenting part in, and was knowingly connected with plans and
enterprises involving medical experiments on non-German nationals,
without their consent, in the course of which experiments, murders,
brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhuman acts
were committed. To the extent that these crimes were not war crimes they
were crimes against humanity.
COUNT FOUR
Under count four of the indictment, the defendant is charged with being
a member of an organization declared criminal by the International
Military Tribunal, namely, the SS.
The evidence proves that Mrugowsky joined the NSDAP in 1930 and
voluntarily became a member of the Waffen SS in 1931. He remained in
these organizations throughout the war. As a member of the Waffen SS, he
was criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity as discussed in this judgment.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Joachim
Mrugowsky is guilty under counts two, three, and four of the indictment.
POPPENDICK
The defendant Poppendick is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with personal responsibility for, and participation in,
High-Altitude, Freezing, Malaria, Sulfanilamide, Sea-Water, Epidemic
Jaundice, Sterilization, Typhus, and Poison experiments. He is charged
under count four with being a member of an organization declared
criminal by the judgment of the International Military Tribunal.
The charges with reference to high-altitude and poison experiments have
been abandoned by the prosecution and hence will not be considered
further.
Poppendick studied medicine at several German universities from 1921 to
1926 and passed his state examination in December of the latter year. He
joined the NSDAP on 1 March 1932 and the SS on 1 July following. He rose
to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the SS and to the rank of senior
colonel in the Waffen SS. He was also a member of a Nazi Physicians’
Association. In August 1935 he was appointed as a physician in the Main
Race and Settlement Office in Berlin and became chief physician of that
office in 1941. He held the latter appointment until the fall of 1944.
From 1 September 1939 until sometime in 1941, Poppendick was on active
duty in the army as a surgeon. During the latter year he resumed his
duties with the Race and Settlement Office in Berlin. Between 1939 and
1943, he performed some duties as a member of the staff of the Reich
Physician SS and Police, Dr. Grawitz, taking care of special
assignments.
In the fall of 1943 Poppendick was made Chief of the Personal Office of
Grawitz, which position he retained until the end of the war.
FREEZING EXPERIMENTS
The evidence is that Poppendick gained knowledge of the freezing
experiments conducted by Rascher at Dachau, as the result of a
conference held between Rascher, Grawitz, and Poppendick on 13 January
1943 for the purpose of discussing certain phases of the research. The
evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Poppendick was
criminally connected with these experiments.
MALARIA EXPERIMENTS
The prosecution contends that Poppendick is criminally responsible for
the malaria experiments conducted by Dr. Schilling at Dachau. Dr.
Ploetner was engaged in the malaria experiments as a subordinate of
Schilling. Sievers’ Diary, which is in evidence, contains a notation
that on 23 May 1944 Grawitz, Poppendick, Ploetner, and Sievers held a
conference, which had probably been arranged by Poppendick three days
previously by telephone. The subject of the conference is not disclosed
by the diary entry, but it appears elsewhere in the diary that on 31 May
1944 Grawitz sanctioned Ploetner’s collaboration with Schilling.
Poppendick testified as a witness on his own behalf that he had heard
that Schilling was carrying on special investigations at Dachau
concerning immunity from malaria. He stated further that his knowledge
of the nature of the investigations went no further. The record does not
contradict his testimony.
The Tribunal finds that the evidence does not disclose beyond a
reasonable doubt that Poppendick was criminally connected with the
malaria experiments.
SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS
Poppendick attended the Third Meeting of Consulting Surgeons at the
Military Medical Academy, Berlin, and heard lectures by Gebhardt and
Fischer concerning the sulfanilamide experiments, which have been
discussed elsewhere in this judgment. Under date of 7 September 1942 he
signed a certificate to a true copy of a report, concerning
sulfanilamide experiments which had been conducted at Ravensbrueck, made
by Gebhardt to Grawitz. Grawitz forwarded the report, or a certified
copy thereof, to Himmler.
We are of the opinion that Poppendick had knowledge of the criminal
nature of the experiments conducted by Gebhardt and Fischer at
Ravensbrueck, but the defendant’s criminal connection with any such
experiments has not been proved by the evidence.
SEA-WATER EXPERIMENTS
The evidence does not disclose beyond a reasonable doubt that Poppendick
was criminally implicated in these experiments.
EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE EXPERIMENTS
The evidence does not disclose beyond a reasonable doubt that Poppendick
was criminally implicated in these experiments.
STERILIZATION EXPERIMENTS
Poppendick was Chief Physician of the Main Race and Settlement Office.
The judgment of the International Military Tribunal found that this
office was “active in carrying out schemes for Germanization of occupied
territories according to the racial principles of the Nazi Party and
were involved in the deportation of Jews and other foreign nationals.”
(_See the “Trial of the Major War Criminals,” Vol. 1, p. 270._)
Testifying before this Tribunal, Poppendick stated that the Nazi racial
policy was twofold in aspect; one policy being positive, the other,
negative in character. The positive policy included many matters, one
being the encouragement of German families to produce more children. The
negative policy concerned the sterilization and extermination of
non-Aryans as well as other measures to reduce the non-Aryan population.
According to Poppendick’s testimony, he was not concerned with the
execution of negative, but only with positive measures.
By letter dated 29 May 1941 Grawitz wrote to Himmler concerning a
conference held on 27 May 1941 at which Dr. Clauberg was present, and
discussed his “new method of sterilization of inferior women without an
operation.”
Poppendick by letter dated 4 June 1941, which referred to a previous
telephone conversation with Grawitz, wrote Rudolf Brandt stating that he
was enclosing “the list of physicians who are prepared to perform the
treatment of sterility” as requested by Himmler. The list referred to is
evidently the same as was contained in a letter from Grawitz to Himmler,
dated 30 May 1941, which stated: “In the following, I submit a list of
specialists in charge of the treatment of sterility in women according
to the method of Professor Clauberg.”
It is shown by the evidence that Clauberg later carried out
sterilization experiments on Jewesses at Auschwitz. Similar experiments
were carried out in other concentration camps by SS doctors who were
subordinate to Grawitz. It is evident that Poppendick knew of these
sterilization experiments, although it is not shown that he was
criminally connected with them.
TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS
It is not clear from the evidence that Poppendick was criminally
connected with, or had knowledge of, the nature of the typhus
experiments at Buchenwald, or the type of subjects upon which they were
conducted.
INCENDIARY BOMB EXPERIMENTS
There is some evidence in the record to the effect that after incendiary
bomb experiments were completed at Buchenwald, reports of the
experiments were forwarded to Poppendick and Mrugowsky. It is evident
that through the reports Poppendick gained knowledge of the nature of
the experiments, but the record fails to show criminal responsibility of
the defendant in connection therewith.
PHLEGMON EXPERIMENTS
The evidence clearly proves Poppendick’s knowledge of these experiments,
but it fails to show the defendant’s criminal connection therewith.
POLYGAL EXPERIMENTS
The record does not show Poppendick’s knowledge of or connection with
these experiments.
HORMONE EXPERIMENTS
The prosecution contends that the evidence shows Poppendick’s criminal
responsibility in connection with a series of experiments conducted at
Buchenwald by Dr. Varnet, a Danish physician who claimed to have
discovered a method of curing homosexuality by transplantation of an
artificial gland.
Under date 15 July 1944, Poppendick wrote to Dr. Ding at the
concentration camp Buchenwald as follows:
“By request of the Reichsfuehrer SS the Danish doctor SS
Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Varnet has been given opportunity to
continue his hormone research with the SS, particularly the
development of his artificial gland. The Reichsfuehrer SS
anticipates certain results from the treatment of homosexuals
with Vamet’s artificial gland. The technical preparations have
come to such a point that experiments on human beings can be
started within a reasonable space of time.
“As SS Standartenfuehrer Dr. Lolling informed me, the
concentration camp Weimar-Buchenwald has been directed to make
available 5 prisoners for SS Sturmbannfuehrer Varnet’s
experiments. These prisoners will be made available to SS
Sturmbannfuehrer Varnet by the camp physician at any time.
“SS Sturmbannfuehrer Varnet intends to go to Buchenwald shortly
in order to make certain necessary preliminary tests on these
prisoners. In case there will be special laboratory tests, you
are requested to assist Varnet within the scope of your
possibilities.
“Particulars on Varnet’s research were sent today to the camp
physician of Weimar-Buchenwald for his information.”
There is evidence that during the summer of 1944 Dr. Varnet conducted
the experiments referred to in Poppendick’s letter. However, the
nationality of the prisoners used for the experiments is not shown, nor
has it been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the experiments were
harmful or caused death, or injury to the experimental subjects.
We have given careful consideration to the evidence concerning the
charges made by the prosecution against the defendant Poppendick.
Certainly the evidence raises a strong suspicion that he was involved in
the experiments. He at least had notice of them and of their
consequences. He knew also that they were being carried on by the SS, of
which he was and remained a member.
But this Tribunal, however, cannot convict upon mere suspicion; evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary. The evidence is insufficient to
sustain guilt under counts two and three of the indictment.
MEMBERSHIP IN A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
The defendant Poppendick is charged with membership in an organization
declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal, namely, the SS. Poppendick joined the SS in July 1932. He
remained in the SS voluntarily throughout the war, with actual knowledge
of the fact that that organization was being used for the commission of
acts now declared criminal by Control Council Law No. 10. He must,
therefore, be found guilty under count four of the indictment.
With reference to the nature of punishment which should be imposed under
such circumstances, the International Military Tribunal has made the
following recommendation:
“1. That so far as possible throughout the four zones of
occupation in Germany the classifications, sanctions, and
penalties be standardized. Uniformity of treatment so far as
practical should be a basic principle. This does not, of course,
mean that discretion in sentencing should not be vested in the
Court; but the discretion should be within fixed limits
appropriate to the nature of the crime.
“2. Law No. 10 * * * leaves punishment entirely to the
discretion of the trial court even to the extent of inflicting
the death penalty.
“The De-Nazification Law of 5 March 1946, however, passed for
Bavaria, Greater Hesse, and Wuerttemberg-Baden, provides
definite sentences for punishment in each type of offense. The
Tribunal recommends that in no case should punishment imposed
under Law No. 10 upon any members of an organization or group
declared by the Tribunal to be criminal exceed the punishment
fixed by the De-Nazification Law. No person should be punished
under both laws.”
(_See “Trial of the Major War Criminals,” Vol. 1, p. 257._)
In weighing the punishment, if any, which should be meted out to the
defendant for his guilt by reason of the charge contained in count four
of the indictment, this Tribunal will give such consideration to the
recommendations of the International Military Tribunal as may under the
premises seem meet and proper.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds the defendant Helmut Poppendick not guilty
under counts two and three of the indictment, and finds and adjudges the
defendant Helmut Poppendick guilty as charged in the fourth count of the
indictment.
SIEVERS
The defendant Sievers is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in,
High-Altitude, Freezing, Malaria, Lost Gas, Sea-Water, Epidemic
Jaundice, and Typhus Experiments, and with extermination of Jews to
complete a skeleton collection. Under count four of the indictment, he
is charged with being a member of an organization declared criminal by
the judgment of the International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS.
The prosecution has abandoned the charge of participation in the
Epidemic Jaundice experiments, and hence, this charge will not be
considered further.
Sievers is one of the three defendants who are not physicians. He joined
the NSDAP in 1929 and renewed his membership in the Nazi Party in 1933.
He joined the SS at the end of 1935 on the suggestion of Himmler. In
this organization he attained the rank of a Standartenfuehrer (colonel).
From 1 July 1935 until the war ended, Sievers was a member of Himmler’s
personal staff and Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe Society.
According to a statute of 1 January 1939, the purpose of the Ahnenerbe
was to support scientific research concerning the culture and heritage
of the Nordic race. The Board of Directors was composed of Himmler as
president, Dr. Wuest as curator, and Sievers as the business manager.
Sievers was responsible for the business organization administration and
the budget of the Ahnenerbe. The place of business was Berlin. Sievers
supported and participated in the medical experiments which are the
subject of the indictment, primarily through the Institute of Military
Scientific Research which was established by order of Himmler dated 7
July 1942 and was administratively attached to the Ahnenerbe.
On 1 January 1942 Himmler ordered the establishment of an entomological
institute; in March 1942 the Institute Dr. Rascher in Dachau; and in the
first month of the year 1942, the Institute Dr. Hirt, at Strasbourg.
These subsequently became part of the Institute for Military Scientific
Research.
Sievers was, for all practical purposes, the acting head of the
Ahnenerbe. In this capacity he was subordinated to Himmler and regularly
reported to him on the affairs of this Society. The top secret
correspondence of Himmler concerning the Ahnenerbe was sent to Sievers.
The charter of the Ahnenerbe defines Sievers’ duties as follows:
“The Reich Business Manager handles the business affairs of the
community; he is in charge of the business organization and
administration. He is responsible for the drawing up of the
budget and for the administration of the treasury.”
Sievers was responsible for the entire administrative problems of the
secretary’s office, bookkeeping and treasury. Besides that he also had
to manage the Ahnenerbe publishing house. In June 1943 Professor Dr.
Mentzel, who among other things was Chief of the Business Managing
Advisory Council of the Reich Research Council, appointed Sievers as his
deputy. By this act Sievers did not become a member of the Reich
Research Council but held only an honorary position.
In a letter to the defendant Rudolf Brandt, dated 28 January 1943,
Sievers defines his position as Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe
as follows:
“My duty merely consists in smoothing the way for the research
men and seeing that the tasks ordered by the Reichsfuehrer SS
are carried out in the quickest possible way. On one thing I
certainly can form an opinion; that is, on who is doing the
quickest job.”
Sievers received orders directly from Himmler on matters of research
assignments for the Ahnenerbe and he reported directly to Himmler on
such experiments. Sievers devoted his efforts to obtaining the funds,
materials, and equipment needed by the research workers. The materials
obtained by Sievers included concentration camp inmates to be used as
experimental subjects. When the experiments were under way, Sievers made
certain that they were being performed in a satisfactory manner. In this
connection, Sievers necessarily exercised his own independent judgment
and had to familiarize himself with the details of such assignments.
HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS
The details of these experiments are discussed in other portions of this
judgment. Sievers’ activities in the high-altitude experiments are
revealed clearly by the evidence. Rascher, in a letter to Himmler dated
5 April 1942, states as follows:
“SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Sievers took a whole day off to watch
some of the interesting standard experiments and may have given
you a brief report * * * I am very much indebted to
Obersturmbannfuehrer Sievers as he has shown a very active
interest in my work in every respect.”
Sievers admitted that he reported to Himmler about his visit to Dachau.
On the basis of the reports of Sievers and Rascher, Himmler authorized
Rascher to continue the high-altitude experiments in Dachau, in the
course of which the evidence shows that 180 to 200 inmates were
experimented upon; that 70 to 80 of them died. Rascher became associated
with the Ahnenerbe in March 1942, and during the entire time covered by
the period of the high-altitude experiments, Rascher was attached to the
Ahnenerbe and performed the high-altitude experiments with its
assistance. On 20 July 1942, when the final report on high-altitude
experiments was submitted to Himmler, Rascher’s name appeared on the
letterhead of the Ahnenerbe Institute for Military Scientific Research
as shown by the cover letter, and the inclosed report bore the statement
that the experiments had been carried out in conjunction with the
research and instruction association “Das Ahnenerbe”. Sievers had actual
knowledge of the criminal aspects of the Rascher experiments. He was
notified that Dachau inmates were to be used. He himself inspected the
experiments. Sievers admitted that Rascher told him that several died as
a result of the high-altitude experiments.
Under these facts Sievers is specially chargeable with the criminal
aspects of these experiments.
FREEZING EXPERIMENTS
Before the high-altitude experiments had actually been completed,
freezing experiments were ordered to be performed at Dachau. They were
conducted from August 1942 to the early part of 1943 by Holzloehner,
Finke and Rascher, all of whom were officers in the Medical Services of
the Luftwaffe. Details of the freezing experiments have been given
elsewhere in this judgment.
In May 1943 Rascher was transferred to the Waffen SS and then proceeded
alone to conduct freezing experiments in Dachau until May 1945. Rascher
advised the defendant Rudolf Brandt that Poles and Russians had been
used as subjects.
The witness Neff testified that the defendant Sievers visited the
experimental station quite frequently during the freezing experiments.
He testified further that in September 1942 he received orders to take
the hearts and lungs of 5 experimental subjects killed in the
experiments to Professor Hirt in Strasbourg for further scientific
study; that the travel warrant for the trip was made out by Sievers; and
that the Ahnenerbe Society paid the expenses for the transfer of the
bodies. One of the 5 experimental subjects killed was a Dutch citizen.
Neff’s testimony is corroborated in large part by the affidavits of the
defendants Rudolf Brandt and Becker-Freyseng, by the testimony of the
witnesses Lutz, Michalowsky and Vieweg, and by the documentary evidence
in the record. In the Sievers’ diary, there are numerous instances of
Sievers’ activities in the aid of Rascher. On 1 February 1943 Sievers
noted efforts in obtaining apparatus, implements and chemicals for
Rascher’s experiments. On 6 and 21 January 1944 Sievers noted the
problem of location. Rascher reported to Sievers periodically concerning
the status and details of the freezing experiments.
It is plain from the record that the relationship of Sievers and Rascher
in the performance of freezing experiments required Sievers to make the
preliminary arrangements for the performance of the experiments to
familiarize himself with the progress of the experiments by personal
inspection, to furnish necessary equipment and material, including human
beings used during the freezing experiments, to receive and make
progress reports concerning Rascher, and to handle the matter of
evaluation and publication of such reports. Basically, such activities
constituted a performance of his duties as defined by Sievers in his
letter of 28 January 1943 to Rudolf Brandt, in which he stated that he
smoothed the way for research workers and saw to it that Himmler’s
orders were carried out.
Under these facts Sievers is chargeable with the criminal activities in
these experiments.
MALARIA EXPERIMENTS
Details of these experiments are given elsewhere in this judgment. These
experiments were performed at Dachau by Schilling and Ploetner. The
evidence shows that Sievers had knowledge of the nature and purpose of
these criminal enterprises and supported them in his official position.
LOST GAS EXPERIMENTS
These experiments were conducted in the Natzweiler concentration camp
under the supervision of Professor Hirt of the University of Strasbourg.
The Ahnenerbe Society and the defendant Sievers supported this research
on behalf of the SS. The arrangement for the payment of the research
subsidies of the Ahnenerbe was made by Sievers. The defendant Sievers
participated in these experiments by actively collaborating with the
defendants Karl Brandt and Rudolf Brandt and with Hirt and his principal
assistant, Dr. Wimmer. The record shows that Sievers was in
correspondence with Hirt at least as early as January 1942, and that he
established contact between Himmler and Hirt.
In a letter of 11 September 1942 to Gluecks, Sievers wrote that the
necessary conditions existed in Natzweiler “for carrying out our
military scientific research work”. He requested that Gluecks issue the
necessary authorization for Hirt, Wimmer, and Kieselbach to enter
Natzweiler, and that provision be made for their board and
accommodations. The letter also stated:
“The experiments which are to be performed on prisoners are to
be carried out in four rooms of an already existing medical
barrack. Only slight changes in the construction of the building
are required, in particular the installation of the hood which
can be produced with very little material. In accordance with
attached plan of the construction management at Natzweiler, I
request that necessary orders be issued to same to carry out the
reconstruction. All the expenses arising out of our activity at
Natzweiler will be covered by this office.”
In a memorandum of 3 November 1942 to the defendant Rudolf Brandt,
Sievers complained about certain difficulties which had arisen in
Natzweiler because of the lack of cooperation from the camp officials.
He seemed particularly outraged by the fact that the camp officials were
asking that the experimental prisoners be paid for. A portion of the
memorandum follows:
“When I think of our military research work conducted at the
concentration camp Dachau, I must praise and call special
attention to the generous and understanding way in which our
work was furthered there and to the cooperation we were given.
Payment of prisoners was never discussed. It seems as if at
Natzweiler they are trying to make as much money as possible out
of this matter. We are not conducting these experiments, as a
matter of fact, for the sake of some fixed scientific idea, but
to be of practical help to the armed forces and beyond that, to
the German people in a possible emergency.”
Brandt was requested to give his help in a comradely fashion in setting
up the necessary conditions at Natzweiler. The defendant Rudolf Brandt
replied to this memorandum on 3 December 1942 and told Sievers that he
had had occasion to speak to Pohl concerning these difficulties, and
that they would be remedied.
The testimony of the witness Holl was that approximately 220 inmates of
Russian, Polish, Czech, and German nationality were experimented upon by
Hirt and his collaborators, and that approximately 50 died. None of the
experimental subjects volunteered. During the entire period of these
experiments, Hirt was associated with the Ahnenerbe Society.
In early 1944 Hirt and Wimmer summarized their findings from the Lost
experiments in a report entitled “Proposed Treatment of Poisoning Caused
by Lost.” The report was described as from the Institute for Military
Scientific Research, Department H of the Ahnenerbe, located at the
Strasbourg Anatomical Institute. Light, medium, and heavy injuries due
to Lost gas are mentioned. Sievers received several copies of this
report. On 31 March 1944, after Karl Brandt had received a Fuehrer
Decree giving him broad powers in the field of chemical-warfare, Sievers
informed Brandt about Hirt’s work and gave him a copy of the report.
This is proved by Sievers’ letter to Rudolf Brandt on 11 April 1944.
Karl Brandt admitted that the wording of the report made it clear that
experiments had been conducted on human beings.
Sievers testified that on 25 January 1943, he went to Natzweiler
concentration camp and consulted with the camp authorities concerning
the arrangements to be made for Hirt’s Lost experiments. These
arrangements included the obtaining of laboratories and experimental
subjects. Sievers testified that the Lost experiments were harmful. On
the visit of 25 January 1943, Sievers saw ten persons who had been
subjected to Lost experiments and watched Hirt change the bandages on
one of the persons. Sievers testified that in March 1943 he asked Hirt
whether any of the experimental subjects had suffered harm from the
experiments and was told by Hirt that two of the experimental subjects
had died due to other causes.
It is evident that Sievers was criminally connected with these
experiments.
SEA-WATER EXPERIMENTS
These experiments were conducted at Dachau from July through September
1944. Details of these experiments are explained elsewhere in the
judgment.
The function of the Ahnenerbe in the performance of sea-water
experiments conducted at Dachau from July through September 1944 was
chiefly in connection with the furnishing of space and equipment for the
experiments. Sievers made these necessary arrangements on behalf of the
Ahnenerbe. As a result of Schroeder’s request to Himmler through Grawitz
for permission to perform the sea-water experiments on inmates in
Dachau, Himmler directed on 8 July 1944 that the experiments be made on
gypsies and three other persons with other racial qualities as control
subjects. Sievers was advised by Himmler’s office of the above
authorization for experiments at the Rascher station at Dachau.
On 27 June 1944, Rascher was replaced by Ploetner as head of the
Ahnenerbe Institute for Military Scientific Research at Dachau. Sievers,
on 20 July, went to Dachau and conferred with Ploetner of the Ahnenerbe
Institute and the defendant Beiglboeck, who was to perform the
experiments, concerning the execution of the sea-water experiments and
the availability of working space for them. Sievers agreed to supply
working space in Ploetner’s department and at the Ahnenerbe
Entomological Institute.
On 26 July 1944, Sievers made a written report to Grawitz concerning
details of his conference at Dachau. Sievers wrote that 40 experimental
persons could be accommodated at “our” research station, that the
Ahnenerbe would supply a laboratory, and that Dr. Ploetner would give
his assistance, help, and advice to the Luftwaffe physicians performing
the experiments. Sievers also stated the number and assignment of the
personnel to be employed, estimating that the work would cover a period
of three weeks and designated 23 July 1944 as the date of commencement,
provided that experimental persons were available and the camp commander
had received the necessary order from Himmler. In conclusion, Sievers
expressed his hope that the arrangements which he had made would permit
a successful conduct of the experiments and requested that
acknowledgment be made to Himmler as a participant in the experiments.
In his testimony Sievers admitted that he had written the above letter
and had conferred with Beiglboeck at Dachau. As the letter indicates,
Sievers knew that concentration camp inmates were to be used.
Sievers had knowledge of and criminally participated in sea-water
experiments.
TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS
Detailed description of these experiments is contained elsewhere in this
judgment. Sievers participated in the criminal typhus experiments
conducted by Haagen on concentration camp inmates at Natzweiler by
making the necessary arrangements in connection with securing
experimental subjects, handling administrative problems incident to the
experiments, and by furnishing the Ahnenerbe station with its equipment
in Natzweiler for their performance.
On 16 August 1943, when Haagen was preparing to transfer his typhus
experiments from Schirmeck to Natzweiler, he requested Sievers to make
available a hundred concentration camp inmates for his research. This is
seen from a letter of 30 September 1943 from Sievers to Haagen in which
he states that he will be glad to assist, and that he is accordingly
contacting the proper source to have the “desired personnel” placed at
Haagen’s disposal. As a result of Sievers’ efforts, a hundred inmates
were shipped from Auschwitz to Natzweiler for Haagen’s experiments.
These were found to be unfit for experimentation because of their
pitiful physical condition. A second group of one hundred was then made
available. Some of these were used by Haagen as experimental subjects.
That the experiments were carried out in the Ahnenerbe experimental
station in Natzweiler is proved by excerpts from monthly reports of the
camp doctor in Natzweiler. A number of deaths occurred among non-German
experimental subjects as a direct result of the treatment to which they
were subjected.
POLYGAL EXPERIMENTS
Evidence has been introduced during the course of the trial to show that
experiments to test the efficacy of a blood coagulant “polygal” were
conducted on Dachau inmates by Rascher. The Sievers’ diary shows that
the defendant had knowledge of activities concerning the production of
polygal, and that he lent his support to the conduct of the experiments.
JEWISH SKELETON COLLECTION
Sievers is charged under the indictment with participation in the
killing of 112 Jews who were selected to complete a skeleton collection
for the Reich University of Strasbourg.
Responding to a request by the defendant Rudolf Brandt, Sievers
submitted to him on 9 February 1942 a report by Dr. Hirt of the
University of Strasbourg on the desirability of securing a Jewish
skeleton collection. In this report, Hirt advocated outright murder of
“Jewish Bolshevik Commissars” for the procurement of such a collection.
On 27 February 1942, Rudolf Brandt informed Sievers that Himmler would
support Hirt’s work and would place everything necessary at his
disposal. Brandt asked Sievers to inform Hirt accordingly and to report
again on the subject. On 2 November 1942 Sievers requested Brandt to
make the necessary arrangements with the Reich Main Security Office for
providing 150 Jewish inmates from Auschwitz to carry out this plan. On 6
November, Brandt informed Adolf Eichmann, the Chief of Office IV B/4
(Jewish Affairs) of the Reich Main Security Office to put everything at
Hirt’s disposal which was necessary for the completion of the skeleton
collection.
From Sievers’ letter to Eichmann of 21 June 1943, it is apparent that SS
Hauptsturmfuehrer Beger, a collaborator of the Ahnenerbe Society,
carried out the preliminary work for the assembling of the skeleton
collection in the Auschwitz concentration camp on 79 Jews, 30 Jewesses,
2 Poles, and 4 Asiatics. The corpses of the victims were sent in three
shipments to the Anatomical Institute of Hirt in the Strasbourg
University.
When the Allied Armies were threatening to overrun Strasbourg early in
September 1944, Sievers dispatched to Rudolf Brandt the following
teletype message:
“Subject: Collection of Jewish Skeletons.
“In conformity with the proposal of 9 February 1942 and with the
consent of 23 February 1942 * * * SS Sturmbannfuehrer Professor
Hirt planned the hitherto missing collection of skeletons. Due
to the extent of the scientific work connected herewith, the
preparation of the skeletons is not yet concluded. Hirt asks
with respect to the time needed for 80 specimens, and in case
the endangering of Strasbourg has to be reckoned with, how to
proceed with the collection situated in the dissecting room of
the anatomical institute. He is able to carry out the maceration
and thus render them irrecognizable. Then, however, part of the
entire work would have been partly done in vain, and it would be
a great scientific loss for this unique collection, because
hominit casts could not be made afterwards. The skeleton
collection as such is not conspicuous. Viscera could be declared
as remnants of corpses, apparently left in the anatomical
institute by the French and ordered to be cremated. Decision on
the following proposals is requested:
“1. Collection can be preserved.
“2. Collection is to be partly dissolved.
“3. Entire collection is to be dissolved.
“Sievers”
The pictures of the corpses and the dissecting rooms of the Institute,
taken by the French authorities after the liberation of Strasbourg,
point up the grim story of these deliberate murders to which Sievers was
a party.
Sievers knew from the first moment he received Hirt’s report of 9
February 1942 that mass murder was planned for the procurement of the
skeleton collection. Nevertheless he actively collaborated in the
project, sent an employee of the Ahnenerbe to make the preparatory
selections in the concentration camp at Auschwitz, and provided for the
transfer of the victims from Auschwitz to Natzweiler. He made
arrangements that the collection be destroyed.
Sievers’ guilt under this specification is shown without question.
Sievers offers two purported defenses to the charges against him (1)
that he acted pursuant to superior orders; (2) that he was a member of a
resistance movement.
The first defense is wholly without merit. There is nothing to show that
in the commission of these ghastly crimes, Sievers acted entirely
pursuant to orders. True, the basic policies or projects which he
carried through were decided upon by his superiors, but in the execution
of the details Sievers had an unlimited power of discretion. The
defendant says that in his position he could not have refused an
assignment. The fact remains that the record shows the case of several
men who did, and who have lived to tell about it.
Sievers’ second matter of defense is equally untenable. In support of
the defense, Sievers offered evidence by which he hoped to prove that as
early as 1933 he became a member of a secret resistance movement which
plotted to overthrow the Nazi Government and to assassinate Hitler and
Himmler; that as a leading member of the group, Sievers obtained the
appointment as Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe so that he could
be close to Himmler and observe his movements; that in this position he
became enmeshed in the revolting crimes, the subject matter of this
indictment; that he remained as business manager upon advice of his
resistance leader to gain vital information which would hasten the day
of the overthrow of the Nazi Government and the liberation of the
helpless peoples coming under its domination.
Assuming all these things to be true, we cannot see how they may be used
as a defense for Sievers. The fact remains that murders were committed
with cooperation of the Ahnenerbe upon countless thousands of wretched
concentration camp inmates who had not the slightest means of
resistance. Sievers directed the program by which these murders were
committed.
It certainly is not the law that a resistance worker can commit no
crime, and least of all, against the very people he is supposed to be
protecting.
MEMBERSHIP IN A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
Under count four of the indictment, Wolfram Sievers is charged with
being a member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of
the International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows
that Wolfram Sievers became a member of the SS in 1935 and remained a
member of that organization to the end of the war. As a member of the SS
he was criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the
indictment.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Wolfram Sievers
guilty under counts two, three and four of the indictment.
ROSE
The defendant Rose is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with special responsibility for, and participation in Typhus
and Epidemic Jaundice Experiments.
The latter charge has been abandoned by the prosecution.
Evidence was offered concerning Rose’s criminal participation in malaria
experiments at Dachau, although he was not named in the indictment as
one of the defendants particularly charged with criminal responsibility
in connection with malaria experiments. Questions presented by this
situation will be discussed later.
The defendant Rose is a physician of large experience, for many years
recognized as an expert in tropical diseases. He studied medicine at the
Universities of Berlin and Breslau and was admitted to practice in the
fall of 1921. After serving as interne in several medical institutes, he
received an appointment on the staff of the Robert Koch Institute in
Berlin. Later he served on the staff of Heidelberg University and for
three years engaged in the private practice of medicine in Heidelberg.
In 1929 he went to China, where he remained until 1936, occupying
important positions as medical adviser to the Chinese Government. In
1936 he returned to Germany and became head of the Department for
Tropical Medicine at the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin. Late in August
1939 he joined the Luftwaffe with the rank of first lieutenant in the
Medical Corps. In that service he was commissioned brigadier general in
the reserve and continued on active duty until the end of the war. He
was consultant on hygiene and tropical medicine to the Chief of the
Medical Service of the Luftwaffe. From 1944 he was also consultant on
the staff of defendant Handloser and was medical adviser to Dr. Conti in
matters pertaining to tropical diseases. During the war Rose devoted
practically all of his time to his duties as consultant to the Chief of
the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe, Hippke, and after 1 January 1944,
the defendant Schroeder.
MALARIA EXPERIMENTS
Medical experiments in connection with malaria were carried on at Dachau
concentration camp from February 1942 until the end of the war. These
experiments were conducted under Dr. Klaus Schilling for the purpose of
discovering a method of establishing immunity against malaria. During
the course of the experiments probably as many as 1,000 inmates of the
concentration camp were used as subjects of the experiments. Very many
of these persons were nationals of countries other than Germany who did
not volunteer for the experiments. By credible evidence it is
established that approximately 30 of the experimental subjects died as a
direct result of the experiments and that many more succumbed from
causes directly following the experiments, including non-German
nationals.
With reference to Rose’s participation in these experiments, the record
shows the following: The defendant Rose had been acquainted with
Schilling for a number of years, having been his successor in a position
once held by Schilling in the Robert Koch Institute. Under date 3
February 1941, Rose, writing to Schilling, then in Italy, referred to a
letter received from Schilling, in which the latter requested “malaria
spleens” (spleens taken from the bodies of persons who had died from
malaria). Rose in reply asked for information concerning the exact
nature of the material desired. Schilling wrote 4 April 1942 from Dachau
to Rose at Berlin, stating that he had inoculated a person
intracutaneously with sporocoides from the salivary glands of a female
anopheles which Rose had sent him. The letter continues:
“For the second inoculation I miss the sporocoides material
because I do not possess the ‘Strain Rose’ in the anopheles yet.
If you could find it possible to send me in the next days a few
anopheles infected with ‘Strain Rose’ (with the last consignment
two out of ten mosquitoes were infected) I would have the
possibility to continue this experiment and I would naturally be
very thankful to you for this new support of my work.
“The mosquito breeding and the experiments proceed
satisfactorily and I am working now on six tertiary strains.”
The letter bears the handwritten endorsement “finished 17 April 1942. L.
g. RO 17/4,” which evidence clearly reveals that Rose had complied with
Schilling’s request for material.
Schilling again wrote Rose from Dachau malaria station 5 July 1943,
thanking Rose for his letter and “the consignment of atroparvus eggs.”
The letter continues:
“Five percent of them brought on water went down and were
therefore unfit for development; the rest of them hatched almost
100 percent.
“Thanks to your solicitude, achieved again the completion of my
breed.
“Despite this fact I accept with great pleasure your offer to
send me your excess of eggs. How did you dispatch this
consignment? The result could not have been any better!
“Please tell Fraeulein Lange, who apparently takes care of her
breed with greater skill and better success than the prisoner
August, my best thanks for her trouble.
“Again my sincere thanks to you!”
The “prisoner August” mentioned in the letter was doubtless the witness
August Vieweg, who testified before this Tribunal concerning the malaria
experiments.
Rose wrote Schilling 27 July 1943 in answer to the latter’s letter of 5
July 1943, stating he was glad the shipment of eggs had arrived in good
order and had proved useful. He also gave the information that another
shipment of anopheles eggs would follow.
In the fall of 1942 Rose was present at the “Cold Conference” held at
Nuernberg and heard Holzloehner deliver his lecture on the freezing
experiments which had taken place at Dachau. Rose testified that after
the conference he talked with Holzloehner, who told him that the
carrying out of physiological experiments on human beings imposed upon
him a tremendous mental burden, adding that he hoped he never would
receive another order to conduct such experiments.
It is impossible to believe that during the years 1942 and 1943 Rose was
unaware of malaria experiments on human beings which were progressing at
Dachau under Schilling, or to credit Rose with innocence of knowledge
that the malaria research was not confined solely to vaccinations
designed for the purpose of immunizing the persons vaccinated. On the
contrary, it is clear that Rose well knew that human beings were being
used in the concentration camp as subjects for medical experimentation.
However, no adjudication either of guilt or innocence will be entered
against Rose for criminal participation in these experiments for the
following reason: In preparing counts two and three of its indictment
the prosecution elected to frame its pleading in such a manner as to
charge all defendants with the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, generally, and at the same time to name in each
sub-paragraph dealing with medical experiments only those defendants
particularly charged with responsibility for each particular item.
In our view this constituted, in effect, a bill of particulars and was,
in essence, a declaration to the defendants upon which they were
entitled to rely in preparing their defenses, that only such persons as
were actually named in the designated experiments would be called upon
to defend against the specific items. Included in the list of names of
those defendants specifically charged with responsibility for the
malaria experiments the name of Rose does not appear. We think it would
be manifestly unfair to the defendant to find him guilty of an offense
with which the indictment affirmatively indicated he was not charged.
This does not mean that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was
inadmissible against the charges actually preferred against Rose. We
think it had probative value as proof of the fact of Rose’s knowledge of
human experimentation upon concentration camp inmates.
TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS
These experiments were carried out at Buchenwald and Natzweiler
concentration camps, over a period extending from 1942 to 1945, in an
attempt to procure a protective typhus vaccine.
In the experimental block at Buchenwald, with Dr. Ding in charge,
inmates of the camp were infected with typhus for the purpose of
procuring a continuing supply of fresh blood taken from persons
suffering from typhus. Other inmates, some previously immunized and some
not, were infected with typhus to demonstrate the efficacy of the
vaccines. Full particulars of these experiments have been given
elsewhere in the judgment.
Rose visited Buchenwald in company with Gildemeister of the Robert Koch
Institute in the spring of 1942. At this time Dr. Ding was absent,
suffering from typhus as the result of an accidental infection received
while infecting his experimental subjects. Rose inspected the
experimental block where he saw many persons suffering from typhus. He
passed through the wards and looked at the clinical records “of * * *
persons with severe cases in the control cases and * * * lighter cases
among those vaccinated.”
The Ding diary, under dates 19 August-4 September 1942, referring to use
of vaccines for immunization, states that 20 persons were inoculated
with vaccine from Bucharest, with a note “this vaccine was made
available by Professor Rose, who received it from Navy Doctor Professor
Ruegge from Bucharest.” Rose denied that he had ever sent vaccine to
Mrugowsky or Ding for use at Buchenwald. Mrugowsky, from Berlin, under
date 16 May 1942, wrote Rose as follows:
“Dear Professor:
“The Reich Physician SS and Police has consented to the
execution of experiments to test typhus vaccines. May I
therefore ask you to let me have the vaccines.
“The other question which you raised, as to whether the louse
can be infected by a vaccinated typhus patient, will also be
dealt with. In principle, this also has been approved. There
are, however, still some difficulties at the moment about the
practical execution, since we have at present no facilities for
breeding lice.
“Your suggestion to use Olzscha has been passed on to the
personnel department of the SS medical office. It will be given
consideration in due course.”
From a note on the letter, it appears that Rose was absent from Berlin
and was not expected to return until June. The letter, however, refers
to previous contact with Rose and to some suggestions made by him which
evidently concern medical experiments on human beings. Rose in effect
admitted that he had forwarded the Bucharest vaccine to be tested at
Buchenwald.
At a meeting of consulting physicians of the Wehrmacht held in May 1943,
Ding made a report in which he described the typhus experiments he had
been performing at Buchenwald. Rose heard the report at the meeting and
then and there objected strongly to the methods used by Ding in
conducting the experiments. As may well be imagined, this protest
created considerable discussion among those present.
The Ding diary shows that, subsequent to this meeting, experiments were
conducted at Buchenwald at the instigation of the defendant Rose. The
entry under date of 8 March 1944, which refers to “typhus vaccine
experimental series VIII”, appears as follows:
“Suggested by Colonel M. C. of the Air Corps, Professor Rose
(Oberstarzt), the vaccine ‘Kopenhagen’ (Ipsen-Murine-vaccine)
produced from mouse liver by the National Serum Institute in
Copenhagen was tested for its compatibility on humans. 20
persons were vaccinated for immunization by intramuscular
injection * * *. 10 persons were contemplated for control and
comparison. 4 of the 30 persons were eliminated before the start
of the artificial injection because of intermittent sickness * *
*. The remaining experimental persons were infected on 16 April
44 by subcutaneous injection of 1/20 cc. typhus sick fresh blood
* * *. The following fell sick: 17 persons immunized: 9 medium,
8 seriously; 9 persons control: 2 medium, 7 seriously * * *. 2
June 44: The experimental series was concluded 13 June 44: Chart
and case history completed and sent to Berlin. 6 deaths (3
Copenhagen) (3 control). Dr. Ding.”
When on the witness stand Rose vigorously challenged the correctness of
this entry in the Ding diary and flatly denied that he had sent a
Copenhagen vaccine to Mrugowsky or Ding for use at Buchenwald. The
prosecution met this challenge by offering in evidence a letter from
Rose to Mrugowsky dated 2 December 1943, in which Rose stated that he
had at his disposal a number of samples of a new murine virus typhus
vaccine prepared from mice livers, which in animal experiments had been
much more effective than the vaccine prepared from the lungs of mice.
The letter continued:
“To decide whether this first-rate murine vaccine should be used
for protective vaccination of human beings against lice typhus,
it would be desirable to know if this vaccine showed in your and
Ding’s experimental arrangement at Buchenwald an effect similar
to that of the classic virus vaccines.
“Would you be able to have such an experimental series carried
out? Unfortunately I could not reach you over the phone.
Considering the slowness of postal communications I would be
grateful for an answer by telephone * * *.”
The letter shows on its face that it was forwarded by Mrugowsky to Ding,
who noted its receipt by him 21 February 1944.
On cross-examination, when Rose was confronted with the letter he
admitted its authorship, and that he had asked that experiments be
carried out by Mrugowsky and Ding at Buchenwald.
The fact that Rose contributed actively and materially to the
Mrugowsky-Ding experiments at Buchenwald clearly appears from the
evidence.
The evidence also shows that Rose actively collaborated in the typhus
experiments carried out by Haagen at the Natzweiler concentration camp
for the benefit of the Luftwaffe.
From the exhibits in the record, it appears that Rose and Haagen
corresponded during the month of June 1943 concerning the production of
a vaccine for typhus. Under date 5 June 1943 Haagen wrote to Rose
amplifying a telephone conversation between the two and referring to a
letter from a certain Giroud with reference to a vaccine which had been
used on rabbits. A few days later Rose replied, thanking him for his
letters of 4 and 5 June and for “the prompt execution of my request.”
The record makes it plain that by use of the phrase “the prompt
execution of my request” was meant a request made by Rose to the Chief
of the Medical Service of the Wehrmacht for an order to produce typhus
vaccine to be used by the armed forces in the eastern area.
Under date 4 October 1943 Haagen again wrote Rose concerning his plans
for vaccine production, making reference in the letter to a report made
by Rose on the Ipsen vaccine. Haagen stated that he had already reported
to Rose on the results of experiments with human beings and expressed
his regret that, up to the date of the letter, he had been unable to
“perform infection experiments on the vaccinated persons.” He also
stated that he had requested the Ahnenerbe to provide suitable persons
for vaccination but had received no answer; that he was then vaccinating
other human beings and would report results later. He concluded by
expressing the wish and need for experimental subjects upon whom to test
vaccinations, and suggested that when subjects were procured, parallel
tests should be made between the vaccine referred to in the letter and
the Ipsen tests.
We think the only reasonable inference which can be drawn from this
letter is that Haagen was proposing to test the efficacy of the
vaccinations which he had completed, which could only be accomplished by
infecting the vaccinated subjects with a virulent pathogenic virus.
In a letter written by Rose and dated “in the field, 29 September 1943”,
directed to the Behring Works at Marburg/Lahn, Rose states that he is
enclosing a memorandum regarding reports by Dr. Ipsen on his experience
in the production of typhus vaccine. Copy of the report which Rose
enclosed is in evidence, Rose stating therein that he had proposed, and
Ipsen had promised, that a number of Ipsen’s liver vaccine samples
should be sent to Rose with the object of testing its protective
efficacy on human beings whose lives were in special danger. Copies of
this report were forwarded by Rose to several institutions, including
that presided over by Haagen.
In November 1943, 100 prisoners were transported to Natzweiler, of whom
18 had died during the journey. The remainder were in such poor health
that Haagen found them worthless for his experiments and requested
additional healthy prisoners through Dr. Hirt, who was a member of the
Ahnenerbe.
Rose wrote to Haagen 13 December 1943, saying among other things “I
request that in procuring persons for vaccination in your experiment,
you request a corresponding number of persons for vaccination with
Copenhagen vaccine. This has the advantage, as also appeared in the
Buchenwald experiments, that the test of various vaccines simultaneously
gives a clearer idea of their value than the test of one vaccine alone.”
There is much other evidence connecting Rose with the series of
experiments conducted by Haagen but we shall not burden the judgment
further. It will be sufficient to say that the evidence proves
conclusively that Rose was directly connected with the criminal
experiments conducted by Haagen.
Doubtless at the outset of the experimental program launched in the
concentration camps, Rose may have voiced some vigorous opposition. In
the end, however, he overcame what scruples he had and knowingly took an
active and consenting part in the program. He attempts to justify his
actions on the ground that a state may validly order experiments to be
carried out on persons condemned to death without regard to the fact
that such persons may refuse to consent to submit themselves as
experimental subjects. This defense entirely misses the point of the
dominant issue. As we have pointed out in the case of Gebhardt, whatever
may be the condition of the law with reference to medical experiments
conducted by or through a state upon its own citizens, such a thing will
not be sanctioned in international law when practiced upon citizens or
subjects of an occupied territory.
We have indulged every presumption in favor of the defendant, but his
position lacks substance in the face of the overwhelming evidence
against him. His own consciousness of turpitude is clearly disclosed by
the statement made by him at the close of a vigorous cross-examination
in the following language:
“It was known to me that such experiments had earlier been
carried out, although I basically objected to these experiments.
This institution had been set up in Germany and was approved by
the state and covered by the state. At that moment I was in a
position which perhaps corresponds to a lawyer who is, perhaps,
a basic opponent of execution or death sentence. On occasion
when he is dealing with leading members of the government, or
with lawyers during public congresses or meetings, he will do
everything in his power to maintain his opinion on the subject
and have it put into effect. If, however, he does not succeed,
he stays in his profession and in his environment in spite of
this. Under circumstances he may perhaps even be forced to
pronounce such a death sentence himself, although he is
basically an opponent of that set-up.”
The Tribunal finds that the defendant Rose was a principal in, accessory
to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with
plans and enterprises involving medical experiments on non-German
nationals without their consent, in the course of which murders,
brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhuman acts
were committed. To the extent that these crimes were not war crimes they
were crimes against humanity.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Gerhard Rose guilty
under counts two and three of the indictment.
RUFF, ROMBERG, AND WELTZ
The defendants Ruff, Romberg, and Weltz are charged under counts two and
three of the indictment with special responsibility for, and
participation in, High-Altitude Experiments.
The defendant Weltz is also charged under counts two and three with
special responsibility for, and participation in, Freezing Experiments.
To the extent that the evidence in the record relates to the
high-altitude experiments, the cases of the three defendants will be
considered together.
Defendant Ruff specialized in the field of aviation medicine from the
completion of his medical education at Berlin and Bonn in 1932. In
January 1934 he was assigned to the German Experimental Institute for
Aviation, a civilian agency, in order to establish a department for
aviation medicine. Later he became chief of the department.
Defendant Romberg joined the NSDAP in May 1933. From April 1936 until
1938 he interned as an assistant physician at a Berlin hospital. On 1
January 1938 he joined the staff of the German Experimental Institution
for Aviation as an associate assistant to the defendant Ruff. He
remained as a subordinate to Ruff until the end of the war.
Defendant Weltz for many years was a specialist in X-ray work. In the
year 1935 he received an assignment as lecturer in the field of aviation
medicine at the University of Munich. At the same time he instituted a
small experimental department at the Physiological Institute of the
University of Munich. Weltz lectured at the University until 1945; at
the same time he did research work at the Institute.
In the summer of 1941 the experimental department at the Physiological
Institute, University of Munich, was taken over by the Luftwaffe and
renamed the “Institute for Aviation Medicine in Munich.” Weltz was
commissioned director of this Institute by Hippke, then Chief of the
Medical Inspectorate of the Luftwaffe. In his capacity as director of
this Institute, Weltz was subordinated to Luftgau No. VII in Munich for
disciplinary purposes. In scientific matters he was subordinated
directly to Anthony, Chief of the Department for Aviation Medicine in
the Office of the Medical Inspectorate of the Luftwaffe.
HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS
The evidence is overwhelming and not contradicted that experiments
involving the effect of low air pressure on living human beings were
conducted at Dachau from the latter part of February through May 1942.
In some of these experiments great numbers of human subjects were killed
under the most brutal and senseless conditions. A certain Dr. Sigmund
Rascher, Luftwaffe officer, was the prime mover in the experiments which
resulted in the deaths of the subjects. The prosecution maintains that
Ruff, Romberg, and Weltz were criminally implicated in these
experiments.
The guilt of the defendant Weltz is said to arise by reason of the fact
that, according to the prosecution’s theory, Weltz, as the dominant
figure proposed the experiments, arranged for their conduct at Dachau,
and brought the parties Ruff, Romberg, and Rascher together. The guilt
of Ruff and Romberg is charged by reason of the fact that they are said
to have collaborated with Rascher in the conduct of the experiments. The
evidence on the details of the matter appears to be as follows:
In the late summer of 1941 soon after the Institute Weltz at Munich was
taken over by the Luftwaffe, Hippke, Chief of the Medical Service of the
Luftwaffe, approved, in principle, a research assignment for Weltz in
connection with the problem of rescue of aviators at high altitudes.
This required the use of human experimental subjects. Weltz endeavored
to secure volunteer subjects for the research from various sources;
however, he was unsuccessful in his efforts.
Rascher, one of Himmler’s minor satellites, was at the time an assistant
at the Institute. He, Rascher, suggested the possibility of securing
Himmler’s consent to conducting the experiments at Dachau. Weltz seized
upon the suggestion, and thereafter arrangements to that end were
completed, Himmler giving his consent for experiments to be conducted on
concentration camp inmates condemned to death, but only upon express
condition that Rascher be included as one of the collaborators in the
research.
Rascher was not an expert in aviation medicine. Ruff was the leading
German scientist in this field, and Romberg was his principal assistant.
Weltz felt that before he could proceed with his research these men
should be persuaded to come into the undertaking. He visited Ruff in
Berlin and explained the proposition. Thereafter Ruff and Romberg came
to Munich, where a conference was held with Weltz and Rascher to discuss
the technical nature of the proposed experiments.
According to the testimony of Weltz, Ruff, and Romberg, the basic
consideration which impelled them to agree to the use of concentration
camp inmates as subjects was the fact that the inmates were to be
criminals condemned to death who were to receive some form of clemency
in the event they survived the experiments. Rascher, who was active in
the conference, assured the defendants that this also was one of the
conditions under which Himmler had authorized the use of camp inmates as
experimental subjects.
The decisions reached at the conference were then made known to Hippke,
who gave his approval to the institution of experiments at Dachau and
issued an order that a mobile low-pressure chamber which was then in the
possession of Ruff at the Department for Aviation Medicine, Berlin,
should be transferred to Dachau for use in the project.
A second meeting was held at Dachau, attended by Ruff, Romberg, Weltz,
Rascher, and the camp commander, to make the necessary arrangements for
the conduct of the experiments. The mobile low-pressure chamber was then
brought to Dachau, and on 22 February 1942 the first series of
experiments was instituted.
Weltz was Rascher’s superior; Romberg was subordinate to Ruff. Rascher
and Romberg were in personal charge of the conduct of the experiments.
There is no evidence to show that Weltz was ever present at any of these
experiments. Ruff visited Dachau one day during the early part of the
experiments, but thereafter remained in Berlin and received information
concerning the progress of the experiments only through his subordinate,
Romberg.
There is evidence from which it may reasonably be found that at the
outset of the program personal friction developed between Weltz and his
subordinate Rascher. The testimony of Weltz is that on several occasions
he asked Rascher for reports on the progress of the experiments and each
time Rascher told Weltz that nothing had been started with reference to
the research. Finally Weltz ordered Rascher to make a report; whereupon
Rascher showed his superior a telegram from Himmler which stated, in
substance, that the experiments to be conducted by Rascher were to be
treated as top secret matter and that reports were to be given to none
other than Himmler. Because of this situation Weltz had Rascher
transferred out of his command to the DVL branch at Dachau. Defendant
Romberg stated that these experiments had been stopped soon after their
inception by the adjutant of the Reich War Ministry, because of friction
between Weltz and Rascher, and that the experiments were resumed only
after Rascher had been transferred out of Weltz Institute.
While the evidence is convincingly plain that Weltz participated in the
initial arrangements for the experiments and brought all parties
together, it is not so clear that illegal experiments were planned or
carried out while Rascher was under Weltz command, or that he knew that
experiments which Rascher might conduct in the future would be illegal
and criminal.
There appear to have been two distinct groups of prisoners used in the
experimental series. One was a group of 10 to 15 inmates known in the
camp as “exhibition patients” or “permanent experimental subjects”.
Most, if not all, of these were German nationals who were confined in
the camp as criminal prisoners. These men were housed together and were
well-fed and reasonably contented. None of them suffered death or injury
as a result of the experiments. The other group consisted of 150 to 200
subjects picked at random from the camp and used in the experiments
without their permission. Some 70 or 80 of these were killed during the
course of the experiments.
The defendants Ruff and Romberg maintain that two separate and distinct
experimental series were carried on at Dachau; one conducted by them
with the use of the “exhibition subjects”, relating to the problems of
rescue at high altitudes, in which no injuries occurred; the other
conducted by Rascher on the large group of nonvolunteers picked from the
camp at random, to test the limits of human endurance at extremely high
altitudes, in which experimental subjects in large numbers were killed.
The prosecution submits that no such fine distinction may be drawn
between the experiments said to have been conducted by Ruff and Romberg,
on the one hand, and Rascher on the other, or in the prisoners who were
used as the subjects of these experiments; that Romberg—and Ruff as his
superior—share equal guilt with Rascher for all experiments in which
deaths to the human subjects resulted.
In support of this submission the members of the prosecution cite the
fact that Rascher was always present when Romberg was engaged in work at
the altitude chamber; that on at least three occasions Romberg was at
the chamber when deaths occurred to the so-called Rascher subjects, yet
elected to continue the experiments. They point likewise to the fact
that, in a secret preliminary report made by Rascher to Himmler which
tells of deaths, Rascher mentions the name of Romberg as being a
collaborator in the research. Finally they point to the fact that, after
the experiments were concluded, Romberg was recommended by Rascher and
Sievers for the War Merit Cross, because of the work done by him at
Dachau.
The issue on the question of the guilt or innocence of these defendants
is close; we would be less than fair were we not to concede this fact.
It cannot be denied that there is much in the record to create at least
a grave suspicion that the defendants Ruff and Romberg were implicated
in criminal experiments at Dachau. However, virtually all of the
evidence which points in this direction is circumstantial in its nature.
On the other hand, it cannot be gainsaid that there is a certain
consistency, a certain logic, in the story told by the defendants. And
some of the story is corroborated in significant particulars by evidence
offered by the prosecution.
The value of circumstantial evidence depends upon the conclusive nature
and tendency of the circumstances relied on to establish any
controverted fact. The circumstances must not only be consistent with
guilt, but they must be inconsistent with innocence. Such evidence is
insufficient when, assuming all to be true which the evidence tends to
prove, some other reasonable hypothesis of innocence may still be true;
for it is the actual exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis but
that of guilt which invests mere circumstances with the force of proof.
Therefore, before a court will be warranted in finding a defendant
guilty on circumstantial evidence alone, the evidence must show such a
well-connected and unbroken chain of circumstances as to exclude all
other reasonable hypotheses but that of the guilt of the defendant. What
circumstances can amount to proof can never be a matter of general
definition. In the final analysis the legal test is whether the evidence
is sufficient to satisfy beyond a reasonable doubt the understanding and
conscience of those who, under their solemn oaths as officers, must
assume the responsibility for finding the facts.
On this particular specification, it is the conviction of the Tribunal
that the defendants Ruff, Romberg, and Weltz must be found not guilty.
FREEZING EXPERIMENTS
In addition to the high-altitude experiments, the defendant Weltz is
charged with freezing experiments, likewise conducted at Dachau for the
benefit of the German Luftwaffe. These began at the camp at the
conclusion of the high-altitude experiments and were performed by
Holzloehner, Finke, and Rascher, all of whom were officers in the
medical services of the Luftwaffe. Non-German nationals were killed in
these experiments.
We think it quite probable that Weltz had knowledge of these
experiments, but the evidence is not sufficient to prove that he
participated in them.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Siegfried Ruff
is not guilty under either counts two or three of the indictment, and
directs that he be released from custody under the indictment when this
Tribunal presently adjourns; and
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Hans Wolfgang
Romberg is not guilty under either counts two or three of the
indictment, and directs that he be released from custody under the
indictment when this Tribunal presently adjourns; and
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Georg August
Weltz is not guilty under either counts two or three of the indictment;
and directs that he be released from custody under the indictment when
this Tribunal presently adjourns.
BRACK
The defendant Brack is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with personal responsibility for, and participation in,
Sterilization Experiments and the Euthanasia Program of the German
Reich. Under count four the defendant is charged with membership in an
organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal, namely, the SS.
The defendant Brack enlisted in an artillery unit of an SA regiment in
1923, and became a member of the NSDAP and the SS in 1929. Throughout
his career in the Party he was quite active in high official circles. He
entered upon full-time service in the Braune Haus, the Nazi headquarters
at Munich, in the summer of 1932. The following year he was appointed to
the Staff of Bouhler, business manager of the NSDAP in Munich. When in
1934 Bouhler became Chief of the Chancellery of the Fuehrer of the
NSDAP, Brack was transferred from the Braune Haus to Bouhler’s Berlin
office. In 1936 Brack was placed in charge of office 2 (Amt 2) in the
Chancellery of the Fuehrer in Berlin, that office being charged with the
examinations of complaints received by the Fuehrer from all parts of
Germany. Later, he became Bouhler’s deputy in office 2. As such he
frequently journeyed to the different Gaue for the purpose of gaining
first-hand information concerning matters in which Bouhler was
interested.
Brack was promoted to the rank of Sturmbannfuehrer in the SS in 1935,
and in April 1936 to the rank of Obersturmbannfuehrer. The following
September he became a Standartenfuehrer in the SS, and was transferred
to the staff of the Main Office of the SS in November. In November 1940
he was promoted to the grade of Oberfuehrer.
In 1942 Brack joined the Waffen SS, and during the late summer of that
year was ordered to active duty with a Waffen SS division. He apparently
remained on active duty until the close of the war.
STERILIZATION EXPERIMENTS
The persecution of the Jews had become a fixed Nazi policy very soon
after the outbreak of World War II. By 1941 that persecution had reached
the stage of the extermination of Jews, both in Germany and in the
occupied territories. This fact is confirmed by Brack himself, who
testified that he had been told by Himmler that he, Himmler, had
received a personal order to that effect from Hitler.
The record shows that the agencies organized for the so-called
euthanasia of incurables were used for this bloody pogrom. Later,
because of the urgent need for laborers in Germany, it was decided not
to kill Jews who were able to work but, as an alternative, to sterilize
them.
With this end in view Himmler instructed Brack to inquire of physicians
who were engaged in the Euthanasia Program about the possibility of a
method of sterilizing persons without the victim’s knowledge. Brack
worked on the assignment, with the result that in March 1941 he
forwarded to Himmler his signed report on the results of experiments
concerning the sterilization of human beings by means of X-rays. In the
report a method was suggested by which sterilization with X-ray could be
effected on groups of persons without their being aware of the
operation.
On 23 June 1942 Brack wrote the following letter to Himmler:
“Dear Reichsfuehrer:
“* * * Among 10 millions of Jews in Europe, there are, I figure,
at least 2-3 millions of men and women who are fit enough to
work. Considering the extraordinary difficulties the labor
problem presents us with I hold the view that those 2-3 millions
should be specially selected and preserved. This can however
only be done if at the same time they are rendered incapable to
propagate. About a year ago I reported to you that agents of
mine have completed the experiments necessary for this purpose.
I would like to recall these facts once more. Sterilization, as
normally performed on persons with hereditary diseases is here
out of the question, because it takes too long and is too
expensive. Castration by X-ray however is not only relatively
cheap, but can also be performed on many thousands in the
shortest time. I think, that at this time it is already
irrelevant whether the people in question become aware of having
been castrated after some weeks or months, once they feel the
effects.
“Should you, Reichsfuehrer, decide to choose this way in the
interest of the preservation of labor, then Reichsleiter Bouhler
would be prepared to place all physicians and other personnel
needed for this work at your disposal. Likewise he requested me
to inform you that then I would have to order the apparatus so
urgently needed with the greatest speed.
“Heil Hitler!
“Yours
“VIKTOR BRACK.”
Brack testified from the witness stand that at the time he wrote this
letter he had every confidence that Germany would win the war.
Brack’s letter was answered by Himmler on 11 August 1942. In the reply
Himmler directed that sterilization by means of X-rays be tried in at
least one concentration camp in a series of experiments, and that Brack
place at his disposal expert physicians to conduct the operation.
Blankenburg, Brack’s deputy, replied to Himmler’s letter and stated that
Brack had been transferred to an SS division, but that he, Blankenburg,
as Brack’s permanent deputy would “immediately take the necessary
measures and get in touch with the chiefs of the main offices of the
concentration camps.”
A Polish Jew testified before the Tribunal that while confined in
Auschwitz concentration camp he was marched to Birkenau and forcibly
subjected to severe X-ray exposure and was castrated later in order that
the effects of the X-ray could be studied.
A French physician of Jewish descent who was confined at Auschwitz from
September 1943 to January 1945, testified that near Auschwitz was
Birkenau camp where people were sterilized by SS doctors. About 100 male
Poles who had been sterilized at Birkenau were attended by the witness
after the operation. Later this group was castrated by the camp
physicians.
The record contains other evidence from which it is manifestly plain
that sterilization by means of X-rays was attempted on groups of persons
who were painfully injured thereby; and that castration followed the
X-ray procedures.
Brack’s part in the organization of the sterilization program with full
knowledge that it would be put into execution, is conclusively shown by
the record.
EUTHANASIA PROGRAM
The Euthanasia Program, which was put into effect by a secret decree of
Hitler on the day that Germany invaded Poland, has been discussed at
length in the judgment in the case against Karl Brandt.
Brack contends that he was basically opposed to this program and that,
on occasion, he assisted certain of his Jewish friends to escape from
its consequences. But be that as it may, the evidence is that whatever
sentiments Brack may have entertained toward individual members of the
race, he was perfectly willing to and did act as an important
administrator in furthering the Euthanasia Program. After it had gotten
under way, he wrote letters to various public officials, explaining to
them how to keep the matter secret and to allay the public sentiment
against the program.
This much is shown by Brack’s own statements. As a witness on the stand
he testified that while at first he did not understand the full import
of the program, he decided, after a talk with Bouhler, to collaborate in
carrying out the assignment and to execute Bouhler’s orders.
He participated in the initial meetings called for the purpose of
placing the project in operation. He was present at meetings of the
experts, as well as the administrative discussions. He often acted as
Bouhler’s representative, frequently making decisions which called for
the exercise of personal judgment and a wide latitude of discretion.
Brack admitted that such were his activities in the program, that one
might well have come to the conclusion that he was the influential man
in euthanasia.
As Bouhler’s deputy he addressed a meeting at Munich, where he explained
the purpose of Hitler’s decree and mentioned the draft of a law which
was being prepared to give complete legislative sanctify to
euthanasia—a law, incidentally, which was never in fact enacted. He
represented Bouhler in April of 1941 at a meeting attended by Nazi
judges and prosecutors. He testified that the Ministry of Justice had
become considerably embarrassed because of the Euthanasia Program, and
that he was present at the meeting for the purpose of imparting
information concerning the salutary features of euthanasia to those who
were present.
Brack gave the Tribunal considerable information concerning the method
of extermination by euthanasia, stating that the program was so designed
as to render the process inconspicuous and painless. In December 1939,
or January 1940, Brack, Bouhler, Conti, and some other doctors were
present at the administration of euthanasia to four experimental
subjects. The victims were led into a gas chamber which had been built
to resemble a shower room. The patients were seated on benches and
poisonous gas was let into the chamber. A few moments later the patients
became drowsy and finally lapsed into a death sleep without even knowing
they were being executed. On the basis of this execution “Hitler decided
that only carbon monoxide was to be used for killing the patients.”
According to Brack these persons were not Jews, because, as Bouhler had
explained to him, “the philanthropic action of euthanasia should be
extended only to Germans.”
The evidence is plain that the euthanasia program explained by the
defendant, gradually merged into the “Action 14 f 13,” which, briefly
stated, amounted to an extermination of concentration camp inmates by
methods and agencies used in euthanasia. One of the prime motives behind
the program was to eliminate “useless eaters” from the scene, in order
to conserve food, hospital facilities, doctors and nurses for the more
important use of the German Armed Forces. Many nationals of countries
other than Germany were killed.
Brack’s direct connection with and participation in the execution of
euthanasia is conclusively proved by the evidence in the record.
MEMBERSHIP IN A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
Under count four of the indictment the defendant Brack is charged with
being a member of the organization declared criminal by the judgment of
the International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows
that Brack became a member of the SS in 1929, and voluntarily remained
in that organization until the end of the war. As a member of the SS he
was criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the
indictment.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Viktor Brack guilty
under counts two, three and four of the indictment.
BECKER-FREYSENG
The defendant Becker-Freyseng is charged under counts two and three of
the indictment with personal responsibility for, and participation in,
High-Altitude, Freezing, Sulfanilamide, Sea-Water, Epidemic Jaundice,
and Typhus Experiments.
The prosecution has abandoned all charges except as to high-altitude,
freezing, sea-water and typhus experiments, and hence only these will be
considered.
The defendant Becker-Freyseng joined the Nazi Party in 1933. In 1940 he
was drafted into the Luftwaffe. In 1943 he was promoted to the rank of
Stabsarzt in the Luftwaffe.
From August 1941 until May 1944 the defendant was an assistant
consultant to Anthony, Chief of the Referat for Aviation Medicine,
Berlin. This department dealt with all questions concerning aviation
medicine and reported to the Chief of the Medical Service of the
Luftwaffe. When Schroeder became Chief of the Medical Service of the
Luftwaffe on 1 January 1944, the defendant became the consultant for
aviation medicine in Schroeder’s office.
HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS
As shown elsewhere in the judgment, high-altitude experiments for the
benefit of the Luftwaffe were conducted at Dachau concentration camp on
non-German nationals, beginning in February or March 1942. These
experiments had been approved, in principle at least, by Hippke, Chief
of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe. A mobile low-pressure chamber
which had been in the possession of the department of aviation medicine,
Berlin, was transferred to Dachau for use in the experiments.
Concentration camp inmates were killed while being subjected to
experiments conducted in the chamber.
During the time the experiments were conducted, defendant
Becker-Freyseng was an assistant consultant to Anthony, Chief of the
Referat for Aviation Medicine, Berlin. All low-pressure chambers owned
by the Luftwaffe were under the general control of that office.
It is submitted by the prosecution that the record shows that
Becker-Freyseng was a principal in, accessory to, aided, abetted, took a
consenting part in, and was connected with plans and enterprises
involving the commission of these experiments.
The evidence upon this charge is not deemed sufficient to preponderate
against a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilty participation in
the experiments here involved.
FREEZING EXPERIMENTS
It is claimed that in June 1942 Becker-Freyseng was informed from
certain of his official files that a meeting to consider experiments to
investigate the treatment of persons who had been severely chilled or
frozen would be held in Nuernberg the following October (referred to as
the “Cold Congress”). It is contended that the directive which set the
experiment into motion was issued from the office of the department for
aviation medicine, that the funds and equipment were supplied by that
office, and that Becker-Freyseng had knowledge of the experiments, and
that he admitted such knowledge.
As to all this, the proof is clear that Becker-Freyseng was actively
employed in organizing and was present at the so-called “Cold Congress.”
But more than the evidence discloses is needed to establish that he had
any later part in or connection with the experiments themselves, or that
he had any controlling relationship to their initial establishment.
TYPHUS EXPERIMENTS
The evidence is insufficient to disclose any criminal responsibility of
the defendant Becker-Freyseng in connection with the typhus experiments.
SEA-WATER EXPERIMENTS
We have discussed the sea-water experiments in that portion of our
judgment which deals with the case of the defendant Schroeder. As was
pointed out there, two methods of making sea water drinkable were
available to the Luftwaffe. One, the so-called Schaefer method, had been
chemically tested and apparently produced potable sea water; the other,
the so-called Berka process, which changed the taste of the sea water
but did not reduce the salt content.
Becker-Freyseng, as chief consultant for aviation medicine in the office
of Schroeder, arranged for a conference to be held in May 1944 to
discuss the testing of these two methods. At the conference the
defendant reported on various clinical experiments which had been
conducted by a certain von Sirany to test the Berka process. He came to
the conclusion that the experiments had not been conducted under
sufficiently realistic conditions of sea distress to make the findings
conclusive.
As a result of the conference it was decided that new experiments should
be conducted.
We learn from the report of the meeting, which is in evidence, that two
series of experiments were to be conducted. The first, a maximum period
of six days, during which one group of subjects would receive sea water
processed with the Berka method; a second group, ordinary drinking
water; a third group no water at all; and the fourth group, such water
as would be available in the emergency sea distress kits then used.
During the duration of the experiment all persons were to receive only
an emergency sea diet, such as provided for persons in distress at sea.
In addition to the 6-day experiment it was determined that a 12-day
experiment should be run. The plan for this series reads as follows:
“Persons nourished with sea water and Berkatit, and as diet also
the emergency sea rations.
“Duration of experiments: 12 days.
“Since in the opinion of the Chief of the Medical Service
permanent injuries to health, that is the death of the
experimental subjects, has to be expected, as experimental
subjects such persons should be used as will be put at the
disposal by [the] Reichsfuehrer SS.”
By letter dated 7 June 1944 Schroeder requested the Reichsfuehrer SS to
allow him to use concentration camp inmates for the sea-water
experiments. The letter stated among other things the following:
“As the experiments on human beings could thus far only be
carried out for a period of four days, and as practical demands
require a remedy for those who are in distress at sea up to 12
days, appropriate experiments are necessary.
“Required are 40 healthy test subjects, who must be available
for 4 whole weeks. As it is known from previous experiments that
necessary laboratories exist in the concentration camp Dachau,
this camp would be very suitable * * *.”
When on the stand as a witness, the defendant Becker-Freyseng admitted
that he prepared the substance of the letter for Schroeder’s dictation
and signature.
Thus with actual knowledge of the nature of the Berka process, and the
fact that if used over prolonged periods it would cause suffering and
death, Becker-Freyseng counselled and conferred with his chief
concerning the necessity for experiments wherein the process would be
used. He gave advice upon the exact procedure to be used in the 6-day
and 12-day experimental series. He framed the letter to Himmler
requesting the use of concentration camp inmates at Dachau for
experimental subjects. He called the defendant Beiglboeck to Berlin to
explain to him the details and purpose of the experiments. He issued the
order under which Beiglboeck went to Dachau to begin the experiments. He
received Beiglboeck’s report after the experimental series had been
concluded.
Throughout all stages of the affair, from its inception to its
conclusion, the defendant knew of the dangerous nature of the
experiments. He knew that deaths were reasonably to be expected. He knew
that concentration camp inmates were to be used as experimental
subjects. It is impossible to believe that he supposed that the inmates
of the camps, who were to be furnished by Himmler, were to be
volunteers. The entire language of the letter, which was written to
Himmler asking for experimental subjects, entirely refutes such
implication.
The evidence shows conclusively that gypsies of various nationalities
were used as experimental subjects. They were former inmates of
Auschwitz who had been tricked into coming to Dachau under the promise
that they were to be used in a special labor battalion. When they
arrived at Dachau they were detailed to the sea-water experiments
without their voluntary consent being asked or given.
During the course of the experiment many of the experimental subjects
were treated brutally and endured much pain and suffering.
It is apparent from the evidence that Becker-Freyseng was criminally
connected with the experiments, and that the experiments were
essentially criminal in their nature. To the extent that the crimes
committed by him or under his authority were not war crimes, they were
crimes against humanity.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Hermann
Becker-Freyseng guilty under counts two and three of the indictment.
SCHAEFER
The defendant Schaefer is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with personal responsibility for and participation in
Sea-Water Experiments.
Konrad Schaefer was a scientist whose special field of research was
chemical therapy. In November 1941 he was drafted into the Luftwaffe. In
spring of the following year he was transferred to the Luftwaffe
Replacement Depot in Salow, and from there to the Luftwaffe base at
Frankfurt on the Oder. In summer of 1942 he was transferred to Berlin
and assigned to the staff of the Research Institute for Aviation
Medicine. His chief assignment at the Institute was to do research on
the problem of sea emergency for the Luftwaffe. This included research
work on various methods to render sea water potable. Schaefer remained
in his position at the Institute without ever having attained officer
rank.
In May of 1944 the defendant was ordered to be present at a meeting to
be held at the German Air Ministry in Berlin, called to consider further
research on making sea water potable. Some months previous to the
meeting Schaefer had developed a process which actually precipitated the
salts from sea water, but it was thought by the Chief of the Luftwaffe
Medical Service to be too bulky and expensive for military use by the
Luftwaffe.
Present at the meeting were Schaefer; Becker-Freyseng, research advisor
to Schroeder; Christensen, of the Technical Bureau of the Reich Ministry
of Aviation; and others. The subject of discussion was the feasibility
of using the Schaefer process, or of turning to another process known as
the Berka Method. The latter method, while cheap, did not precipitate
salts from sea water and was dangerous to health when used for a period
of time—as Schaefer, previous to the meeting, had already reported to
Schroeder. Nevertheless, those in command of the meeting agreed that
experiments should be conducted on concentration camp inmates to
determine the extent to which the Berka method might be usable.
The experiments later conducted have been described at length in dealing
with the case of Schroeder. Due to his attendance at this meeting,
Schaefer is sought to be held criminally responsible in connection with
the sea-water experiments.
The record has received careful attention from the Tribunal.
Nowhere have we been able to find that Schaefer was a principal in, or
accessory to, or was otherwise criminally involved in or connected with
the experiments mentioned. In fact, the record fails to show that the
defendant had anything to do with these experiments, except such as
might be implied from his attendance at several meetings of the parties
who were actively interested therein. Nowhere in the testimony or
elsewhere is it revealed that Schaefer voted for commencement or
prosecution of the experiments or in any other manner aided in their
execution.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Konrad Schaefer not
guilty of the charges contained in the indictment, and directs that he
be released from custody under the indictment when the Tribunal
presently adjourns.
HOVEN
The defendant Hoven is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with special responsibility for and participation in Typhus
and other Vaccine Experiments, Gas Oedema Experiments, and the
Euthanasia Program. In count four he is charged with being a member,
after 1 September 1939, of an organization declared criminal by the
International Military Tribunal.
Hoven joined the SS in 1934 and the Nazi Party in 1937. Soon after the
outbreak of the war he joined the Waffen SS. In October 1939 he became
assistant medical officer in the SS hospital at Buchenwald concentration
camp. In 1941 he was appointed medical officer in charge of the SS
troops stationed in the camp. He became assistant medical officer at the
camp inmate hospital, and in July 1942 he became chief camp physician.
He remained in the latter position until September 1943. At that time he
was arrested on the order of the SS police court in Kassel for having
allegedly murdered an SS noncommissioned officer who was a dangerous
witness against Koch, the camp commander.
TYPHUS AND OTHER VACCINE EXPERIMENTS
The vaccine experiments with which Hoven is charged were conducted at
Buchenwald under the supervision of SS Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Ding, alias
Ding-Schuler. They have already been described at length in other
portions of this judgment.
The prosecution has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Hoven was a
criminal participant in these experiments. In collaboration with the SS
camp administration he helped select the concentration camp inmates who
became the experimental subjects. During the course of selection he
exercised the right to include some prisoners and to reject others.
While perhaps not empowered to initiate new series of experiments on his
own responsibility—that apparently being a power which only Ding could
exercise—the defendant worked with Ding on experiments then in
progress. He supervised the preparation of diary notes, fever charts,
and report sheets of the experiments. Occasionally he injected some of
the subjects with the vaccines. He acted as Ding’s deputy in the conduct
of the experiments. He was in command of experimental Block 46 in Ding’s
absence. During the period of Hoven’s activity in the experimental
station no less than 100 inmates were killed as a result of the typhus
experiments. Many of these victims were non-German nationals who had not
given their consent to be used as experimental subjects.
GAS OEDEMA EXPERIMENTS
It is asserted in an affidavit made by Dr. Ding-Schuler, who was in
charge of Blocks 46 and 50, Buchenwald, that toward the end of 1942 a
conference was held in the Military Medical Academy, Berlin, for the
purpose of discussing the fatal effects of gas oedema serum on wounded
persons. During the conference, Killian, of the Army Medical
Inspectorate, and the defendant Mrugowsky reported several cases in
which wounded soldiers who had received gas oedema serum injections in
high quantities died suddenly without apparent reason. Mrugowsky
suspected that the fatalities were due to the phenol content of the
serum. To help solve the problem Mrugowsky ordered Ding to take part in
a euthanasia killing with phenol and to report on the results in detail.
A few days later Hoven, in the presence of Ding, gave phenol injections
to several of the concentration camp inmates with the result that they
died instantly. In accordance with instructions, Ding made a report of
the killings to his superior officer.
The fact that Hoven engaged in phenol killings is substantiated by an
affidavit voluntarily made by Hoven himself prior to the trial, which
was received in evidence as a part of the case of the prosecution. In
the affidavit Hoven makes the following statement:
“There were many prisoners who were jealous of the positions
held by a few political prisoners and tried to discredit them.
These traitors were immediately killed, and I was later notified
in order to make out statements that they had died of natural
causes.
“In some instances I supervised the killings of these unworthy
inmates by injections of phenol, at the request of the inmates,
in the hospital assisted by several inmates. Dr. Ding came once
and said I was not doing it correctly, and performed some of the
injections himself, killing three inmates who died within a
minute.
“The total number of traitors killed was about 150, of whom 60
were killed by phenol injections, either by myself or under my
supervision, and the rest were killed by beatings, etc., by the
inmates.”
EUTHANASIA PROGRAM
The details of the Euthanasia Program have been discussed by us at
length in dealing with the charges against certain other defendants;
consequently they will not be repeated here.
In the Hoven pre-trial affidavit, portions of which were quoted while
discussing gas oedema serum experimentation, the defendant gives us a
partial picture of the Euthanasia Program, in the following statement:
“In 1941 Koch, the camp commander, called all the important SS
officials of the camp together and informed them that he had
received a secret order from Himmler that all mentally and
physically deficient inmates should be killed, including Jews.
300 to 400 Jewish prisoners of different nationalities were sent
to the ‘euthanasia station’ at Bernburg for extermination. I was
ordered to issue falsified statements of the death of these
Jews, and obeyed the order. This action was known as ‘14 f 13’.”
When the defendant Hoven took the stand in his own defense, he attempted
to discredit the effects of the statements contained in his affidavit by
testifying that the affidavit was taken as a result of interrogations
propounded to him by the prosecution in English, and that he was not
sufficiently familiar with the language to be fully aware of the
inculpatory nature of the statements he was making.
The Tribunal is not impressed with these assertions. The evidence shows
that prior to the war the defendant had lived for several years in the
United States, where he had acquired at least an average understanding
and comprehension of the English language. When he was on the witness
stand, the Tribunal questioned him at length in order to ascertain the
extent of his knowledge of English, and in particular, of his
understanding of the meaning of the words used by him in his affidavit.
As a result of this questioning the Tribunal is convinced that no undue
or improper advantage was taken of the defendant in procuring the
affidavit, and that at the time of his interrogation by the prosecution,
Hoven knew and understood perfectly well the nature of the statements he
was making.
The facts contained in the Hoven affidavit were convincingly
substantiated by other evidence in the record, the only real difference
being that the evidence shows the defendant to have been guilty of even
many hundreds more murders than are admitted by him in his affidavit. As
stated, in essence, by one of the prosecution witnesses in connection
with the subject, Hoven personally killed inmates in the hospital
barracks by injection. These people were mostly suffering from
malnutrition and exhaustion. Hoven must have killed 1,000 of every
nationality. These inmates were killed on the initiative of Hoven with
no requests from the illegal camp administration or the political
prisoners.
It is obvious from the evidence that throughout his entire service at
Buchenwald, Hoven attempted to serve three masters: the SS camp
administration, the criminal prisoners, and the political prisoners of
the camp. As a result he became criminally implicated in murders
committed by all three groups involving the deaths of non-German
nationals, some of whom were prisoners of war and others of whom were
civilians. In addition to these, he committed murders on his own
individual responsibility. There can be nothing said in mitigation of
such conduct. To the extent that the crimes committed by Hoven were not
war crimes, they were crimes against humanity.
MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
Under count four of the indictment the defendant is charged with being a
member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows that
Hoven became a member of the SS in 1934, and remained in this
organization throughout the war. As a member of the SS he was criminally
implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity,
as charged under counts two and three of the indictment.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Waldemar Hoven
guilty, under counts two, three and four of the indictment.
BEIGLBOECK
The defendant Beiglboeck is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with personal responsibility for, and participation in
Sea-Water Experiments.
The defendant Beiglboeck, an Austrian citizen, was a captain in the
medical department of the German Air Force from May 1941 until the end
of the war. In June 1944, while stationed at the hospital for
paratroopers at Tarvis [Tarvisio], Italy, he received orders from his
military and medical superior, defendant Becker-Freyseng, to carry out
sea-water experiments at Dachau.
The sea-water experiments have been described in detail in those
portions of the judgment dealing with defendants Schroeder and
Becker-Freyseng.
The defendant Beiglboeck testified that he reported to Berlin at the end
of June 1944, where Becker-Freyseng told him the nature and purpose of
the experiments. Upon that trip he also reported to and talked with the
defendant Schroeder. From these conversations he learned that the prime
purpose of the experiments was to test the process developed by Berka
for making sea water potable and also to ascertain whether it would be
better for a shipwrecked person in distress at sea to go completely
without sea water or to drink small quantities thereof.
It appears from the record that the persons used in the experiments were
40 gypsies of various nationalities who had been formerly at Auschwitz
but who had been brought to Dachau under the pretext that they were to
be assigned to various work details. These persons had been imprisoned
in the concentration camps on the basis that they were “asocial
persons.” Nothing was said to them about being used as human subjects in
medical experiments. When they reached Dachau some of them were told
that they were being assigned to the sea-water experiment detail.
Beiglboeck testified that before beginning the experiments he called the
subjects together and told them the purpose of the experiments and asked
them if they wanted to participate. He did not tell them the duration of
the experiments, or that they could withdraw if ever they reached the
physical or mental state that continuation of the experiment should seem
to them to be impossible. The evidence is that none of the experimental
subjects felt that they dared refuse becoming experimental subjects for
fear of unpleasant consequences if they voiced any objections.
The defendant testified that pursuant to the order that had been given
him, it was necessary that the subjects thirst for a continuous period;
and that the question of when, if ever, they should be relieved during
the course of the experiment was a matter which he reserved for his own
decision.
During the course of the experiments the subjects were locked in a room.
As to this phase of the program the defendant testified that “They
should have been locked in a lot better than they were, because then
they would have had no opportunity at all to get fresh water on the
side.”
At the trial the defendant produced clinical charts which he said were
made during the course of the experiments and which, according to the
defendant, showed that the subjects did not suffer injury. On
cross-examination the defendant admitted that some of the charts had
been altered by him since he reached Nuernberg in order to present a
more favorable picture of the experiments.
We do not think it necessary to discuss in detail what is shown by the
charts either before or after the fraudulent alterations. We think it
only necessary to say that a man who intends to rely on written evidence
at a trial does not fraudulently alter such evidence from any honest or
worthy motive.
The defendant claims that he was at all times extremely reluctant to
perform the experiments with which he is charged, and did so only out of
his sense of obedience as a soldier to superior authority. Under Control
Council Law No. 10 such fact does not constitute a defense, but will be
considered, if at all, only in mitigation of sentence.
In our view the experimental subjects were treated brutally. Many of
them endured much pain and suffering, although from the evidence we
cannot find that any deaths occurred among the experimental subjects.
It is apparent from the evidence that the experiments were essentially
criminal in their nature, and that non-German nationals were used
without their consent as experimental subjects. To the extent that the
crimes committed by defendant Beiglboeck were not war crimes they were
crimes against humanity.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges the defendant Wilhelm Beiglboeck
guilty under counts two and three of the indictment.
POKORNY
The defendant Pokorny is charged with special responsibility for, and
participation in, criminal Sterilization Experiments, as set forth in
counts two and three of the indictment.
It is conceded by the prosecution that, in contradistinction to all
other defendants, the defendant Pokorny never held any position of
responsibility in the Party or State Hierarchy of Nazi Germany. Neither
was he a member of the Nazi Party or of the SS. Formerly a
Czechoslovakian citizen, he became a citizen of the Greater German Reich
under the Munich Agreement of October 1938. During the war he served as
a medical officer in the German Army and attained the rank of captain.
The only direct evidence bearing on the guilt of the defendant is a
letter written by Pokorny to Himmler in October 1941, suggesting the use
of a drug, caladium seguinum, as a possible means of medical
sterilization of peoples of the occupied territories. The letter
follows:
“To the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German
Folkdom,
SS Himmler, Chief of Police,
Berlin.
“I beg you to turn your attention to the following arguments. I
have requested Professor Hoehn to forward this letter to you. I
have chosen this direct way to you in order to avoid the slower
process through channels and the possibility of an indiscretion
in regard to the eventually enormous importance of the ideas
presented.
“Led by the idea that the enemy must not only be conquered but
destroyed, I feel obliged to present to you, as the Reich
Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Folkdom the
following:
“Dr. Madaus published the result of his research on a _medicinal
sterilization_ (both articles are enclosed). Reading these
articles, the immense importance of this drug in the present
fight of our people occurred to me. _If, on the basis of this
research, it were possible to produce a drug which, after a
relatively short time, effects an imperceptible sterilization on
human beings, then we would have a new powerful weapon at our
disposal._ The thought alone that the 3 million Bolsheviks, at
present German prisoners, could be sterilized so that they could
be used as laborers but be prevented from reproduction, opens
the most far-reaching perspectives.
“Madaus found that the sap of the Schweigrohr (caladium
seguinum) when taken by mouth or given as injection to male but
also to female animals, after a certain time produces permanent
sterility. The illustrations accompanying the scientific article
are convincing.
If my ideas meet your approval the following course should be
taken:
1. Dr. Madaus must not publish any more such articles. (The
enemy listens!)
2. Multiplying the plant (easily cultivated in greenhouses!)
3. Immediate research on human beings (criminals!) in order to
determine the dose and length of the treatment.
4. Quick research of the constitutional formula of the effective
chemical substance in order to
5. Produce it synthetically if possible.
“As German physician and Chief Physician of the Reserves of the
German Wehrmacht, retired (d.R.a.D.), I undertake to keep secret
the purpose as suggested by me in this letter.
“Heil Hitler!
[Signed] “Dr. Pokorny
“Specialist for skin and venereal diseases.
“Komotau, October 1941.”
The defendant has attempted to explain his motives for sending the
letter by asserting that for some time prior to its transmittal he had
known of Himmler’s intentions to sterilize all Jews and inhabitants of
the eastern territories, and had hoped to find some means of preventing
the execution of this dreadful program. He knew, because of his special
experience as a specialist in skin and venereal diseases, that
sterilization of human beings could not be effected by the
administration of caladium seguinum. He thought, however, that if the
articles written by Madaus could be brought to the attention of Himmler,
the latter might turn his attentions to the unobtrusive method for
sterilization which had been suggested by the articles and thus be
diverted, at least temporarily, from continuing his program of
castration and sterilization by well-known, tried and tested methods.
Therefore the letter was written—so explained the defendant—not for
the purpose of furthering, but of sabotaging the program.
We are not impressed with the defense which has been tendered by the
defendant and have great difficulty in believing that he was motivated
by the high purposes which he asserted impelled him to write the letter.
Rather are we inclined to the view that the letter was written by
Pokorny for very different and more personal reasons.
Be that however as it may, every defendant is presumed to be innocent
until he has been proved guilty. In the case of Pokorny the prosecution
has failed to sustain the burden. As monstrous and base as the
suggestions in the letter are, there is not the slightest evidence that
any steps were ever taken to put them into execution by human
experimentation. We find, therefore, that the defendant must be
acquitted—not because of the defense tendered, but in spite of it.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Adolf Pokorny
is not guilty of the charge contained in the indictment, and directs
that he be discharged from custody under the indictment when the
Tribunal presently adjourns.
OBERHEUSER
The defendant Oberheuser is charged under counts two and three of the
indictment with Sulfanilamide, Bone, Muscle and Nerve Regeneration and
Bone Transplantation, and Sterilization Experiments.
The charge of participation in the sterilization experiments has been
abandoned by the prosecution and will not be considered further.
The defendant Oberheuser joined the league of German Girls (BDM) in 1935
and held the rank of “block leader.” In August 1937 she became a member
of the Nazi Party. She was also a member of the Association of National
Socialist Physicians. She volunteered for the position of a camp doctor
in the women’s department of the Ravensbrueck concentration camp in 1940
and remained there until June 1943. She was then given a position as
assistant physician in the Hohenlychen Hospital under the defendant
Gebhardt.
Regarding her connection with both the sulfanilamide and the bone,
muscle, and nerve regeneration and bone transplantation experiments, the
same facts are applicable as were presented in the cases of the
defendants Fischer and Gebhardt. Fischer and Oberheuser were Gebhardt’s
active agents in carrying out these experiments. They did a great deal
of the actual work. They personally committed atrocities involved in the
experiments.
A few facts produced in evidence regarding the special work of defendant
Oberheuser in these experiments are entitled to comment.
Oberheuser was thoroughly aware of the nature and purpose of the
experiments. She aided in the selection of the subjects, gave them
physical examinations, and otherwise prepared them for the operation
table. She was present in the operating room at the time of the
operations and assisted in the operational procedures. She faithfully
cooperated with Gebhardt and Fischer at the conclusion of each operation
by deliberately neglecting the patients so that the wounds which had
been given the subjects would reach the maximum degree of infection.
Testimony of the witness Sofia Maczka, an X-ray technician in the camp
at Ravensbrueck, is that deaths occurred among the experimental
subjects. Most of these deaths could have been averted by proper
post-operative care, proper treatment, or by the amputation of badly
infected members.
In one instance—the case of a Krystina Dabska—small pieces of bone
were cut from both legs of the subject. Witness Maczka testified that
she read on the cast of the patient that on one leg periosteum had been
left and on the other leg periosteum had been removed together with
bone. Because she was of the opinion that the purpose of the experiment
had been to check regeneration, the witness asked the defendant
Oberheuser, “How do you expect to get regeneration of bone if the bones
are removed with periosteum?” To this the defendant replied, “That is
just what we want to check.”
Nonconsenting non-German nationals were used in at least some of the
experiments. Many of them died as a result of the experiments. To the
extent that the crimes committed were not war crimes, they were crimes
against humanity.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Herta
Oberheuser is guilty under counts two and three of the indictment.
FISCHER
The defendant Fischer is charged under counts two and three with
Sulfanilamide and Bone, Muscle and Nerve Regeneration and Bone
Transplantation Experiments.
Fritz Fischer joined the Allgemeine SS in February 1934 and the NSDAP in
1939. In the latter year he joined the Waffen SS and was assigned to the
SS unit in the Hohenlychen Hospital as a physician subordinated to the
defendant Gebhardt. In June 1940 he was transferred to the SS regiment
Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler”, and returned the same year to Hohenlychen
as assistant physician to Gebhardt, where he remained until May 1943. He
then served as a surgeon on both the eastern and western fronts and,
after having been wounded in August 1944, came back to Hohenlychen as a
patient. In December 1944 he was assigned to the Charity Hospital in
Berlin, but returned again to Hohenlychen as Gebhardt’s assistant in
April 1945. In the Waffen SS he attained the rank of Sturmbannfuehrer
(major).
SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS
Gebhardt, as shown elsewhere in this judgment, was in personal charge of
the work being done in this field by his assistant Fritz Fischer. That
the latter performed most of the sulfanilamide experimental work is not
denied by him; on the contrary, he freely admits it. The defense offered
in his behalf is twofold; that the experimental subjects were to have
alleged death sentences, then impending, commuted to something less
severe in the event they survived the experiments; and that defendant
Fischer was acting under military orders from his superior officer,
Gebhardt. These defenses have been considered and separately rejected in
other parts of this judgment.
It is true, however, that paragraph 4 (_b_) of Article II of Control
Council Law No. 10 reads:
“The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his
government, or of a superior, does not free him from
responsibility for crime, but may be considered in mitigation.”
It is unnecessary to take up and answer all the arguments that might be
presented upon whether or not Fischer is entitled to a mitigation of
sentence due to the circumstances claimed as the basis of such
mitigation. He acted with most complete knowledge that what he was doing
was fundamentally criminal, even though directed by a superior. Under
the circumstances his defense must be rejected, and he must be held to
be guilty as charged.
BONE, MUSCLE AND NERVE REGENERATION AND BONE
TRANSPLANTATION
These experiments have been discussed in connection with the case of the
defendant Gebhardt, who was assisted therein by the defendant Fischer.
Testimony and exhibits now constituting parts of the record in this case
reveal that Fischer has offered no substantial defense to the charge.
Indeed, criminal connection with these experiments is admitted, and the
admission includes the defendant’s own testimony that he personally
performed at least some of the operations. It only remains for the
Tribunal to hold that on the specification above-mentioned the defendant
Fischer is guilty.
To the extent that the crimes committed by defendant Fischer were not
war crimes they were crimes against humanity.
MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
Under count four of the indictment Fritz Fischer is charged with being a
member of an organization declared criminal by the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal, namely, the SS. The evidence shows that
Fritz Fischer became a member of the SS in 1934 and remained in this
organization until the end of the war. As a member of the SS he was
criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, as charged under counts two and three of the indictment.
CONCLUSION
Military Tribunal I finds and adjudges that the defendant Fritz Fischer
is guilty under counts two, three, and four of the indictment.
[signed] WALTER B. BEALS
PRESIDING JUDGE.
HAROLD L. SEBRING
JUDGE.
JOHNSON T. CRAWFORD
JUDGE.
SENTENCES
PRESIDING JUDGE BEALS: Military Tribunal I has convened this
morning for the purpose of imposing sentences upon the
defendants who have been on trial before this Tribunal and who
have been adjudged guilty by the Tribunal.
“KARL BRANDT, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization
declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you.
For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted
Military Tribunal I sentences you, Karl Brandt, to death by hanging.
“SIEGFRIED HANDLOSER, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you
guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the
indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which
you have been and now stand convicted, Military Tribunal I sentences
you, Siegfried Handloser, to imprisonment for the full term and period
of your natural life, to be served at such prison or prisons, or other
appropriate place of confinement, as shall be determined by competent
authority.
“OSKAR SCHROEDER, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty
of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the
indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which
you have been and now stand convicted Military Tribunal I sentences you,
Oskar Schroeder, to imprisonment for the full term and period of your
natural life, to be served at such prison or prisons, or other
appropriate place of confinement, as shall be determined by competent
authority.
“KARL GENZKEN, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization
declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you.
For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted,
Military Tribunal I sentences you, Karl Genzken, to imprisonment for the
full term and period of your natural life, to be served at such prison
or prisons, or other appropriate place of confinement, as shall be
determined by competent authority.
“KARL GEBHARDT, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization
declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you.
For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted,
Military Tribunal I sentences you, Karl Gebhardt, to death by hanging.
“RUDOLF BRANDT, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization
declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you.
For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted,
Military Tribunal I sentences you, Rudolf Brandt, to death by hanging.
“JOACHIM MRUGOWSKY, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you
guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an
organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed
against you. For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand
convicted Military Tribunal I sentences you, Joachim Mrugowsky, to death
by hanging.
“HELMUT POPPENDICK, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you
guilty of membership in an organization declared criminal by the
judgment of the International Military Tribunal, as charged under the
indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which
you have been and now stand convicted, Military Tribunal I sentences
you, Helmut Poppendick, to imprisonment for a term of ten years, to be
served at such prison or prisons, or other appropriate place of
confinement, as shall be determined by competent authority.
“WOLFRAM SIEVERS, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty
of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an
organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed
against you. For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand
convicted, Military Tribunal I sentences you, Wolfram Sievers, to death
by hanging.
“GERHARD ROSE, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of
war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the indictment
heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which you have
been and now stand convicted Military Tribunal I sentences you, Gerhard
Rose, to imprisonment for the full term and period of your natural life,
to be served at such prison or prisons, or other appropriate place of
confinement, as shall be determined by competent authority.
“VIKTOR BRACK, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization
declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you.
For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted,
Military Tribunal I sentences you, Viktor Brack, to death by hanging.
“HERMANN BECKER-FREYSENG, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you
guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the
indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which
you have been and now stand convicted, Military Tribunal I sentences
you, Hermann Becker-Freyseng, to imprisonment for a term of twenty
years, to be served at such prison or prisons, or other appropriate
place of confinement, as shall be determined by competent authority.
“WALDEMAR HOVEN, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty
of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an
organization declared criminal by the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed
against you. For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand
convicted, Military Tribunal I sentences you, Waldemar Hoven, to death
by hanging.
“WILHELM BEIGLBOECK, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you
guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the
indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which
you have been and now stand convicted Military Tribunal I sentences you,
Wilhelm Beiglboeck, to imprisonment for a term of fifteen years, to be
served at such prison or prisons, or other appropriate place of
confinement, as shall be determined by competent authority.
“HERTA OBERHEUSER, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty
of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as charged under the
indictment heretofore filed against you. For your said crimes on which
you have been and now stand convicted Military Tribunal I sentences you,
Herta Oberheuser, to imprisonment for a term of twenty years, to be
served at such prison or prisons, or other appropriate place of
confinement, as shall be determined by competent authority.
“FRITZ FISCHER, Military Tribunal I has found and adjudged you guilty of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in an organization
declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal, as charged under the indictment heretofore filed against you.
For your said crimes on which you have been and now stand convicted
Military Tribunal I sentences you, Fritz Fischer, to imprisonment for
the full term and period of your natural life, to be served at such
prison or prisons, or other appropriate place of confinement, as shall
be determined by competent authority.”
-----
[56] A more correct translation is typhus, see vol. I, p. 13.
[57] Indictment originally read “January 1943” but was amended by a
motion filed with the Secretary General. See Arraignment, vol. I, p. 22.
[58] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 269, Nuernberg, 1947.
XIII. PETITIONS
a. Introduction
Article XV of Ordinance No. 7 of Military Government for Germany (US)
provides that the judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or innocence
of any defendant shall be final and not subject to review. However,
Article XVII provides that the Military Governor has the power to
mitigate, reduce, or otherwise alter the sentence imposed by the
Tribunal, but may not increase the severity thereof. The petitions on
behalf of defendants seeking a revision of the sentences have ordinarily
been called clemency pleas.
All 16 defendants found guilty by the Tribunal in case No. I petitioned
for clemency to the Military Governor of the United States Zone of
Occupation in accordance with Article XVII of Ordinance No. 7. Each of
the condemned defendants, with the exception of the defendant
Poppendick, also petitioned to the Supreme Court of the United States
for a writ of habeas corpus and for a writ of prohibition against the
proceeding or an order nullifying the trial and setting the defendants
at liberty. Moreover, all defendants, with the exception of the
defendant Becker-Freyseng, filed appeals of some kind with the Secretary
of War. From these various types of petitions, six are set forth below
in whole or in part as follows: petition of appeal to the Secretary of
War for the defendant Karl Brandt, page 302; petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and a writ of prohibition to the Supreme Court of the
United States by the defendant Rose, pp. 303 to 306; extracts from the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of prohibition to the
Supreme Court of the United States by the defendant Schroeder, pp. 307
to 308; petition for review to the Military Governor of the United
States Zone of Occupation for the defendant Genzken, pp. 309 to 318;
clemency plea to the Military Governor of the United States Zone of
Occupation for the defendant Rudolf Brandt, pp. 319 to 321; and clemency
plea to the Military Governor of the United States Zone of Occupation
for the defendant Poppendick, pp. 322 to 326.
b. Selections from the Petitions to the Military Governor, the
Supreme Court of the United States, and to the
Judge Advocate General
_FOR THE DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT_
Nuernberg, 4 September 1947.
The
Secretary of War,
Judge Advocate General,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.,
United States of America.
Professor Dr. Karl BRANDT, Petitioner,
Defense Counsel Dr. R. Servatius, attorney-at-law, Cologne
_vs._
United States of America
Petition of Appeal
No.——
As defense counsel of the defendant Professor Dr. med. Karl Brandt, I
herewith lodge an appeal against the verdict of the Military Tribunal
No. I at Nuernberg in Case I, of 19 and 20 August 1947, by which the
defendant was sentenced to death. For justification of my appeal against
the indictment on which the verdict is based, as well as the verdict
itself, I refer to the following documents, copies of which are
attached:
(_a_) Application for review, dated 28 August 1947, addressed to
the Chief of Military Government for the American Zone of
Occupation in Germany.
(_b_) Application for writ of habeas corpus, dated 28 August
1947, addressed to the Supreme Court of the United States of
America.
It follows from these attached documents that the defendant Karl Brandt
was unlawfully deprived of the possibility to lodge an appeal before a
Military Tribunal consisting of medical experts.
A re-trial before a court of higher order is necessary in order to
re-examine the errors committed by the Tribunal in ascertaining the
facts of the case and applying the law.
I request:
(_a_) that the verdict of the Military Tribunal, dated 20 August
1947, be annulled.
(_b_) that a court of appeal be formed for a new trial of the
case.
[Signature] DR. R. SERVATIUS
_Attorney-at-law_.
_FOR THE DEFENDANT ROSE_
Prof. Dr. med. Gerhard Rose Nuernberg, 4 September 1947
POW A/938984
Palace of Justice,
Nuernberg, Germany
Defense Counsel: Dr. Heinz [Hans] Fritz
Attorney-at-law,
Bavariaring 14,
Munich, Germany
To the
Supreme Court of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
Prof. Dr. med. Gerhard Rose, Petitioner
_vs._
United States of America
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and
Petition for Writ of Prohibition
No.——
I, the undersigned Prof. Dr. Gerhard Rose, was sentenced, in the verdict
of the American Military Tribunal I in Nuernberg, Germany, that was
announced on 19 and 20 August 1947, of Case I, United States of America
_vs._ Karl Brandt and others, for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, as defined in Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 Dec 1945, to
life imprisonment.
I pray:
(1) that a writ of habeas corpus be issued by this Court,
directed to Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay, Commanding
General, United States Army Forces, Germany, commanding him to
produce the body of the petitioner before your Court or some
member thereof at a time and place therein to be specified, then
and there to receive and to do what your honorable Court shall
order concerning his confinement and trial as an accused war
criminal and that he be ordered returned to the status of, and
internment as a prisoner of war in conformity with the
provisions of Article 9 of the Geneva Convention of July 27,
1929, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and of
paragraph 82 of the Rules of Land Warfare [U. S. Field Manual
27-10], and
(2) that a writ of prohibition be issued by this Court
prohibiting the respondent from proceeding with the trial and
that the petitioner be discharged from the offenses and
confinement aforesaid,
(3) that the costs of the court shall not be levied, because I
am a prisoner of war and my property has been confiscated by the
Control Council for Germany.
As reasons for the above requests I offer the following:
The sentence imposed on me not only violates valid international
law, but also legal principles whose observance by all the
courts of the United States is guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States of America.
The basic principle that has been violated is that no one may be
deprived of the judge [justice] provided for by law and that
each defendant must be granted a regular trial.
The following violations are charged in particular:
The sentence was passed in violation of Article 63 of the Geneva
Convention of 1929. I am a medical officer and was Generalarzt
in the Reserve, which is equivalent to a brigadier general in
the Medical Corps in the American Army. In May 1941 I was in the
Luftwaffe hospital at Kitzbuehl in Austria and became a prisoner
of war. Shortly afterwards I was flown to England and taken to
Camp Latimer (Bucks), known as POW Camp 7. There I was
registered as a prisoner of war in the middle of June 1945 and
received the POW number A 938984. I was informed that I was a
British prisoner of war. I am still a prisoner of war today,
because I was neither discharged _de facto_ nor was I ever given
discharge papers or shown discharge papers that had been filled
out. As a prisoner of war I have a right to have my case tried
by a court martial, as would be correct in case an Allied
medical officer of equal rank were to be indicted on the same
charges. This Court must not only be an officers’ court composed
of judges holding corresponding rank, but it must also be a
professional court, because it must be composed of medical
officers. Since the American Military Tribunal I is not such a
court, it was, for example, not in a position to correctly judge
my activity as scientific consultant medical officer in
relationship to that of a commanding officer.
Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 purposely makes no
differentiation between crimes that a prisoner of war commits
during his prisoner of war captivity and those which he
committed before he became a prisoner of war. In accordance with
the purpose and spirit of the Geneva Convention of 1929, the
prisoners of war are to be protected by this provision from
being brought up before a special court or from any limitation
of their legal rights.
(2) There is a violation of Article 64 of the Geneva Convention
because the legal remedies that would be available to an Allied
medical officer in a corresponding case cannot be used in the
case of the sentence that has been imposed upon me, because
Article 15 of Ordinance No. 7 of the American Military
Government in Germany provides that the verdicts of the Military
Tribunals are final and incontestable.
(3) There is a violation of Article 60 of the Geneva Convention,
because Switzerland was not informed, as the protecting power
for prisoners of war, of the criminal proceedings pending
against me.
(4) The sentence imposed on me violates generally recognized
legal principles. It is based on the Control Council Law No. 10,
dated 20 December 1945, and the _ex post facto_ definitions
contained therein. The sentence has inflicted punishment on me
for crimes against humanity, that is, on the basis of an act
which was for the first time declared punishable by Control
Council Law No. 10.
The suspension of this universally recognized legal principle by
a new law cannot change justice itself. The validity of this
special law must be tested by the court.
(5) The sentence violates the basic principle _nulla poena sine
culpa_, because it punished me according to Article II, 2_c_ and
_d_ of the Control Council Law. These parts of the Control
Council Laws allow punishment for mere consent to an act and for
a merely objective “connection” with the planning or execution
of such act. These provisions represent new substantive law that
has been created _ex post facto_.
(6) During the trial I was limited in my defense in an
inadmissible way. My defense counsel, Attorney Dr. Fritz, twice
requested, in the prescribed manner, that Prof. Dr. Blanc, a
French citizen and director of the Pasteur Institute in
Casablanca, Morocco, be summoned as an expert witness in the
examination of the research work of Prof. Haagen. The medical
research work of Prof. Haagen concerns such difficult medical
problems that it cannot, in my opinion, be judged by judges who
lack medical training, without the expert testimony of a capable
specialist. However, the Court did not approve the requests.
This is in my opinion the only reason that I was found guilty in
connection with the research work of Haagen.
(7) It is further asserted that the principle of oral
proceedings was violated. In the final stages of the trial the
Court ordered a partly written procedure. Although the main
trial had lasted many months and there was an extremely abundant
amount of material to discuss, from a factual as well as a legal
standpoint, my defense counsel was only allowed one hour for his
closing speech. As for the remaining arguments he was advised to
present a closing brief. In this way the protection of publicity
was denied and the guarantee removed that the Court would really
take cognizance of these written statements.
It was not possible for me to receive information concerning
these written statements of my co-defendants in time to take
action thereon.
The contents of the closing brief which my defense counsel
submitted, and the contents of his rebuttal to the closing brief
submitted by the prosecutor against me have obviously not been
considered in the findings of the Court, although the Court
described the closing brief which it demanded as the most
important part of the defense. The English translations of the
closing brief and rebuttal to the closing brief of the
prosecution arrived so late that it seems impossible that the
Court could have taken note of the contents before writing the
verdict.
Several closing briefs which had been submitted by the defense
counsels of my co-defendants were not even available at the time
when the verdict was read.
I assume that the Court could not peruse the rebuttal of my
defense counsels to the closing brief of the prosecution before
writing the verdict, because the verdict, insofar as it pertains
to my case, contains several obviously false statements of facts
and furthermore does not even analyze these statements.
(8) The verdict does not have, according to the provisions of
Military Government Ordinance No. 7, sufficient reasons to back
it up. For instance, it is impossible to determine whether the
Court investigated the possibility of duress that would preclude
punishment.
Insofar as incompetency of the American Military Tribunal No. I is
asserted in my case, I point to the fact that it was not possible for me
to object earlier on account of Article II _e_ of Ordinance No. 7.
I reserve the right to submit further statements and evidence later.
[Signature] DR. GERHARD ROSE.
_FOR THE DEFENDANT SCHROEDER_
To the
Supreme Court
of the United States of America
Washington
through the office of the General Secretary of the
U. S. Military Tribunal I
Nuernberg.
Oskar Schroeder, Petitioner
_vs._
The United States of America
Oskar Schroeder, former Generaloberstabsarzt (Lieutenant
General) of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) at present in the
prison of the Court in Nuernberg, Germany.
Counsel for the defendant: Dr. Hanns Marx at present at the
Military Tribunal I Nuernberg, Roonstrasse 15.
_Writ of Habeas Corpus and_
_Writ of Prohibition_
* * * * *
Here too, the Court found that I am guilty merely because of the fact
that contrary to duty I did not supervise my subordinates.
Finally the judgment found me guilty with regard to the responsibility
for gas experiments. Here the judgment states:
“A certain Oberarzt Wimmer, a staff physician of the Luftwaffe
worked with Hirt on the gas experiments throughout the period.
“We discussed the duty which rests upon a commanding officer to
take appropriate measures to control his subordinates, in
dealing with the case of Handloser. We shall not repeat what we
said there. Had Schroeder adopted the measures which the law of
war imposes upon one in position of command to prevent the
actions of his subordinates amounting to violations of the law
of war, the deaths of the non-German nationals involved in the
gas experiments might well have been prevented.”
* * * * *
III
A further infringement against the habeas corpus is the fact that while
I have been found guilty as being responsible for the Lost experiments,
although I have never been indicted on this count.
The verdict of the Military Tribunal I states on page 11 the names of
those defendants who have been accused of having borne special
responsibility for the Lost (mustard) gas experiments. My name does not
appear on that list.
On page 187 of the verdict, the Court describes the importance that this
enumeration of defendants has in relation to the various individual
counts of the indictment. It says:
“In preparing counts II and III of the indictment, the
prosecution elected to frame its pleadings in such a manner
[page 7 of the original] as to charge all defendants with the
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, generally,
and at the same time to name in each subparagraph dealing with
medical experiments only those defendants particularly charged
with responsibility for each particular item.”
The Court goes on to say:
“In our view this constituted in effect, a bill of particulars
and was, in essence, a declaration to the defendants upon which
they were entitled to rely in preparing their defenses, that
only such persons as were actually named in the designated
experiments would be called upon to defend against the specific
items.”
As the Court repeatedly gave evidence during the course of the
proceedings that it adhered to this view I did not defend myself, did
not need to defend myself and could not defend myself against the
accusation that I had participated in the Lost experiments.
Although the Court finds on page 187 of the verdict:
“We think it would be manifestly unfair to the defendant to find
him guilty of an offense with which the indictment affirmatively
indicated he was not charged,”
it has still found me guilty because of responsibility for the Lost
experiment, so that in view of the Court’s own statements as contained
in the verdict, my sentence constitutes, insofar as it concerns this
matter, a gross injustice.
I believe that the sentence of the Military Tribunal I violates a
principle insofar as each defendant must be told clearly what crime he
has been charged with, and that he must have opportunity to defend
himself against these accusations.
It is this principle that is being violated in the findings of the Court
against me. In my opinion, it infringes thus the principle of legal
heading laid down in the habeas corpus. It is therefore obviously
unjust, according to the wording of the verdict itself.
* * * * *
_FOR THE DEFENDANT GENZKEN_
Dr. R. Merkel
Defense Counsel of Defendant Dr. Karl Genzken
Nuernberg, 2 September 1947.
To the
American Military Governor for Germany
General Lucius D. Clay
_via_
the Secretary General of the
Military Tribunal I
Nuernberg.
_Concerning_: Confirmation of the sentence of Military Tribunal I,
Nuernberg, of 19 August 1947.
Karl Genzken, defendant in Case I, defended by Attorney-at-Law Dr. R.
Merkel, Nuernberg, by verdict of Military Tribunal I of 19 August 1947
was found guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership
in the SS—counts two, three, and four of the indictment—and was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
I request that the sentence may not be confirmed, since the defendant is
innocent of the punishable participation in the typhus experiments in
Buchenwald with which he is charged.
The verdict of Military Tribunal I, Nuernberg of 19-20 August 1947
decided that Genzken in his official position was responsible for,
cooperated in, and promoted the typhus experiments which were carried
out on non-Germans against their will, and in the course of which, and
as a result of which, cases of death occurred.
On the basis of the verdict it is certain that the defendant himself did
not actively participate in the typhus experiments; he never entered the
Buchenwald concentration camp during the war and never saw the typhus
experimental station in Block 46.
The verdict is based on the presupposition—
(1) that Genzken before 1 September 1943—as superior of Mrugowsky, the
Chief of the Hygiene Institute, and of Ding in his capacity as an
assistant in this Institute—has had the command and thus the official
supervision over the experiments in the typhus experimental station in
Block 46 of the Buchenwald concentration camp,
(2) that Genzken before 1 September 1943 was acquainted with the kind
and scope of the activity of Mrugowsky and Ding, who were supposedly
subordinated to him in the field of typhus research, and
(3) that he nevertheless failed to make sure that this research work was
carried out within legally permissible limits.
These statements of the verdict are not correct, since they do not take
into account in any way the actual facts which emerged on the basis of
the extensive evidence submitted by the prosecution and defense.
I
_Genzken had no command and no official supervision over the
typhus experiments in Block 46_
The research for a new typhus vaccine for the Waffen SS was purely
scientific research in the medical field. In contrast to the Chiefs of
the Medical Services of the three Wehrmacht branches (Army, Air Corps,
Navy) scientific research and planning did not belong to the tasks
delegated to the Chief of the Medical Service of the Waffen SS. The
official agency in charge of scientific research and planning for all
the organizations of the SS and the police was rather exclusively Reich
Physician SS and Police Professor Dr. Grawitz (pages 4-6 of closing
brief of the defense).
Exhibit No. 39 of the prosecution proves that Grawitz in 1942 without
success requested funds for the intended establishment of several
research institutes. However, in view of the imminent pressing danger of
typhus, Grawitz, at the order of Himmler, gave the command to establish
a typhus experimental station in connection with and sharing the funds
appropriated for Block 46 of the Buchenwald concentration camp and in
December 1941 he appointed Dr. Ding of the Hygiene Institute of the
Waffen SS head of Block 46. In reference to this Mrugowsky states:
“Himmler did not order me to take charge of these experiments, but at
the suggestion of Grawitz assigned these duties to Dr. Ding.” (_p. 5067
of the English transcript._) In the affidavit of S. Dumont, we read:
“Mrugowsky told me that Grawitz will transmit Himmler’s order direct to
Ding” (_Document Mrugowsky 38, Exhibit 13, p. 50 Document book Mrugowsky
I_). Finally Blumenreuther declares in his affidavit of 3 February 1947
(_Document Mrugowsky No. 26, Exhibit 6, p. 170 Document Book Mrugowsky
I_) as follows: “In 1942 Grawitz brought about Himmler’s order to
establish in the Buchenwald concentration camp an experimental station
for typhus research and appointed Dr. Ding to take charge of this
experimental station.” Thus Ding left the Hygiene Institute, when his
research work began, and from this time on he was no longer a
subordinate of Genzken, but as chief of the research department in Block
46 was directly, immediately, and exclusively subordinate to Grawitz. As
oldest hygienic expert, Grawitz consulted his consulting hygienist
Mrugowsky in the course of his researches concerned with typhus. This
latter called himself “Reich Physician SS and Leading Police Hygienist”
in his report of 5 May 1942 which was mentioned in the verdict
(_Mrugowsky, Exhibit 20, p._ _86, Doc. Book Mrug. I_). As a result of
the shortage of hygienists, Mrugowsky, in his capacity as head of the
only Hygiene Institute on the home front, was available also to the
Reich Physician for his medical duties concerned with all the branches
of the SS and for his scientific research tasks. As head of the Hygiene
Institute and as head of Office XVI concerned with questions of group
hygiene of the Waffen SS, Mrugowsky was subordinate to Genzken, not
however in his capacity as hygienic consultant to the Reich Physician.
In connection with these problems, to which belonged also the typhus
vaccine research, Mrugowsky was subordinate only to Reich Physician SS
Grawitz and not to Genzken. If, as the verdict presupposes, the
relationship of giving orders had really been the following:
Himmler-Grawitz-Genzken-Mrugowsky-Ding, then Genzken would have had to
take orders from Grawitz and would have been called for conferences with
Grawitz. This has not been established by the prosecution.
Through the examination of witnesses by prosecution and defense, it was
established that there were two separate institutions in Buchenwald: the
typhus research institute from December 1941 in Block 46 and the typhus
vaccine manufacturing station from the fall of 1943 in Block 50 (_see
page 35, Closing Brief of the Defense and Exhibit Genzken Exh. No. 5_).
The manufacturing station in Block 50, and Ding as its head, would have
been subordinate to Dr. Genzken as such if the manufacture of the new SS
typhus vaccine had been started before 1 September 1943. However, this
was definitely not the case; it was still in a preparatory state (_see
page 46, closing brief of the defense_). If on page 96 (German text) of
the verdict it is furthermore stated that the official channels were
arranged in this manner: _Himmler-Grawitz-Genzken-Mrugowsky-Ding_, then
this statement also is in obvious contradiction to the facts established
in a clear and conclusive manner by the examination of witnesses.
Because, as far as the channels of command for the typhus experimental
station are concerned, the following points prove that these channels of
command ran _Himmler-Grawitz-Ding_ for Block 46:
(1) Dr. Morgen states in his affidavit Mrugowsky Exh. 107 (_Doc. Mrug.
114, Doc. Book Mrug. Supplement II, p. 54_), that Grawitz gave written
and direct order to Ding to carry out the typhus research without
Genzken’s participation. Ding showed Morgen the written order from
Grawitz.
(2) The letterhead which Ding used before spring 1943, as head of the
experimental station for typhus and virus research, read as follows:
“Reich Fuehrer SS—Typhus-Experimental Station, Buchenwald” (_see Doc.
Genzken No. 2, Genzken Exh. 8_).
(3) The prosecution witness Kogon confirms the fact that all reports
went through Mrugowsky directly to Grawitz and not by way of Genzken.
(4) Genzken and Mrugowsky both testify under oath that Himmler and
Grawitz gave the order for the establishment of the experimental station
to Ding directly.
(5) In Exhibit 283 of the prosecution, Ding states “that Grawitz, in
agreement with the leading physician of the concentration camp Dr.
Lolling appointed Dr. Hoven as Ding’s deputy in Buchenwald”. The
appointment, therefore, did not take place by way of Genzken.
The order channel, Himmler-Grawitz-Genzken-Mrugowsky-Ding, as stated in
the verdict, is based exclusively on the affidavit of Dr. Hoven dated 24
October 1946, Prosecution Exh. No. 281. When he was interrogated, Hoven
stated under oath that this channel of command was correct only for the
manufacturing station in Block 50 and not for the research institute in
Block 46 (_see p. 9913 of the English record_). When Mrugowsky was
interrogated, he also stated under oath “that this command relationship
referred solely to the vaccine _manufacture_ in Block 50. This chain of
command did not refer to Block 46, and insofar as it is touched by it,
this channel of giving orders is not correct” (_see p. 46 closing brief
of the defense_).
From all this evidence it follows conclusively that Hoven’s statement
cannot be used as supporting evidence for a conviction against Genzken.
For he was not a station on this channel of giving orders and had never
had anything to do about giving orders concerning the carrying out of
the typhus experiments in Block 46 until 1 September 1943.
If, therefore, the verdict states that Genzken was responsible for the
carrying out of the typhus experiments, then the verdict does not take
into consideration the proven fact that not Genzken, but Grawitz was the
one who gave the order to carry out research experiments in the
concentration camp Buchenwald on concentration camp inmates. Only he who
gives the order to carry out an action and who was a party to it in some
other ways can be responsible for the act. Nothing of the sort has been
proved against Genzken. If, as established by Document Mrug. Exh. No.
107, Grawitz gave the order to carry out typhus experiments to Ding,
then it is impossible that Genzken too could have given such an order,
if for no other reason, because he was never the competent authority for
scientific research and projects. Furthermore on the basis of his
testimony as a witness, it has been established that he never received
an order to this effect by Grawitz, and that Grawitz purposely excluded
him from exerting any influence on the research projects in Block 46.
In Genzken Exhibit No. 3, Mrugowsky confirms “that Grawitz, in
conversations with him, frequently emphasized that he—Grawitz—was the
only one responsible for research and planning assignments within the
SS, and that Genzken had nothing to do with them.”
The assumption in the verdict is, therefore, not correct that Ding
undertook typhus research “for” the Hygiene Institute (_page 97, German
text of the verdict_). As already mentioned above and as proved beyond
doubt during the trial, Ding did not undertake these typhus experiments
for the Hygiene Institute of the Waffen SS, but exclusively for his
employer and commander, Grawitz.
Genzken, therefore, was not responsible for the carrying out of the
typhus experiments, since he neither commanded nor ordered those
experiments.
If furthermore the Tribunal is trying to construe incriminating evidence
against Genzken by claiming that Genzken provided the funds for Ding’s
expenses (_see page 97 and 99 of the German text_), this too is a
mistake. Genzken expressly said under oath that he never provided any
money for Ding’s experiments, but that only for Ding’s personal needs
had funds been transferred to the Waffen SS through the medical office.
In the Genzken Document No. 17, Genzken Exhibit No. 15, Rudolf Tonndorf
says “that he never paid or ordered payment for the upkeep or provided
other funds for scientific experiments or for institutions which served
such purposes, because such scientific research work was not the concern
of the medical office of the Waffen SS, but exclusively that of the
office of the Reich Physician of the SS and Police, Dr. Grawitz.”
In Genzken Exhibit No. 8, Barnewald states under oath “that the entire
administrative care for Block 46 was the concern of the Buchenwald camp
administration through the official channels via the patients’ building
of the concentration camp. The administration of the medical office of
the Waffen SS had officially nothing to do with administrative matters
concerning Block 46.”
On page 6 of the Ding diary—Prosecution Exhibit No. 287—it says that
Pohl, the Chief of the Main Administrative and Economic Office, gave the
order for the enlargement of a block of stone buildings. On page 9 of
that same document a conference between Ding and two representatives of
the Main Administrative and Economic Office is mentioned (Barnewald and
Schlesinger), who occupied themselves with the breeding of experimental
animals for the experimental department.
Not Genzken, but the authorities competent for the economic supply of
the concentration camps, namely, the Main Administrative and Economic
Office therefore carried through the financing of the typhus experiments
via the camp administration of the concentration camp Buchenwald.
II
_Genzken had no knowledge of the character and of the extent of
the experiments carried out in the field of typhus research
in Block 46_
The statement in the verdict (_page 105_) “that Genzken knew that the
prisoners were subjected to cruel medical experiments, in the course of
which deaths were occurring,” is not proved in any way.
The verdict itself (_page 98_) states that Genzken said “that he was
aware of the fact that concentration camp inmates were subjected to
experiments, and that he stated that he was not advised as to the
_methods_ of experimentation.” In the cross-examination, Genzken
emphasized that the number of the experimental persons, of the series of
experiments, the number of dead, the cultures for infections, and the
passages had only become clear to him through the trial, and that the
names “Block 46” and “Block 50” had been entirely unknown to him up to
the trial. As proved by the evidence it is clear, beyond doubt, that
Genzken was not informed either by Grawitz, nor by Ding, nor by
Mrugowsky about the details of the experiments. Grawitz who distrusted
Genzken, consciously never informed Genzken about a single case of his
many secret experiments upon human beings in which, according to the
documentary evidence he participated. The defense has given sufficient
evidence for this fact. Grawitz even prevented Mrugowsky from informing
Genzken (_Document Genzken, Exhibit No. 3_): “This is none of Genzken’s
business.”
It has also been made very clear by the defense that Ding had never
given any oral or written information about the details of the
experiments. The prosecution could not produce any evidence for such
information.
The verdict speaks about a “warm personal friendship between Genzken and
Ding” (_page 97_). Their relationship never was more than one of
official comradeship. They did not use the intimate “Du” in addressing
each other. Ding was never a guest at Genzken’s house. Once Ding was
presented to Frau Genzken. The two women did not know each other at all.
Ding’s scientific reports concerning his research went directly to
Grawitz via Mrugowsky. To the question whether it was not true that
reports concerning the typhus experiments in Block 46 went to the office
of the Reich Physician of the SS and of the Police Grawitz, the
prosecution witness Kogon answered by saying: “This is correct” (_see p.
1290 of the English Transcript_). Mrugowsky said in this connection:
“The reports were never presented to Genzken through me but in a new
envelope went directly to Grawitz” (_see p. 5366 of the English
Transcript_). Finally the witness Dumont in figure 7 of her affidavit
(_Document Mrugowsky, Exhibit 13, page 51, Document Book Mrug. I_)
declared: “The reports which Ding made concerning his experiments with
prisoners were directed to Grawitz via the Hygiene Institute.”
The verdict tries furthermore to base the fact that Genzken knew about
the typhus experiments via stating that once a report by Mrugowsky of 5
May 1942 went to him and that besides this, he had been personally
informed about everything by Mrugowsky. Both conclusions are also wrong
and are in direct contradiction to the evidence.
The only document of the prosecution which, according to the distributor
mentions the name of Genzken at all, is the report by Mrugowsky of 5 May
1942, mentioned in the verdict (_page 99 and following_). The
conclusions which the Tribunal feels compelled to have to draw from this
report to the prejudice of Genzken do not apply if only for the reason
that this report was _never_ made available to Dr. Genzken. Mrugowsky
said in this respect: “This report was not presented to Genzken himself
but was even later on, until the end, in the files of Amt XVI.” (_See
reply of the defense to the closing brief of the prosecution, p. 5_).
Genzken cannot be made responsible for something he, as has been proved,
never knew. If he never saw that report of Mrugowsky and if he never
knew of its existence, it cannot serve as an incriminating evidence
against him.
It is not correct, that before 1 September 1943 Mrugowsky gave
regularly, on the average once a week, oral or written reports
concerning the typhus experiments to Genzken. Mrugowsky only said that
about once a week he reported to Genzken on the hygiene of the troops at
the meeting of the Referenten[59] of the medical office. Mrugowsky did
this in his capacity as leading hygienist of the medical office
(Sanitaets-Amt). Mrugowsky never reported to Genzken about the typhus
experiments, on the occasion of these weekly reports and meetings of
Referenten (Heads of Referate, Departments in a Ministry), if only
because of the fact that these experiments did not fall within the scope
of the work of the medical office of the Waffen SS, and because, upon
Grawitz order, they were to be kept strictly secret. Written reports
were never made at all. The established fact that in the medical office
there was not the slightest information about, nor was there ever any
discussion of, typhus experiments or any other experiments upon human
beings in concentration camps, in itself shows that on Mrugowsky’s part,
no oral or written reports were submitted to the medical office of the
Waffen SS. Four participants in such meetings of the Referenten of the
medical office have borne witness to this fact (_see p. 52 of the
closing brief for the defense_).
The sole report of the spring of 1943 has been described in detail by
Mrugowsky. His explanations were incorporated into the verdict word for
word. The Tribunal thus considers them to be true and accurate.
Mrugowsky and Genzken both stated under oath that Genzken had not seen
that infection dates and incidents of death had been marked in the
charts which were submitted to him. Mrugowsky stated literally as
follows: “I had no cause to call his attention to these things expressly
because actually I made no report to him concerning Ding’s experimental
series, but merely wanted to give him factual information concerning the
protective effect of certain vaccines, which he as head of the medical
office had to know.”
On pages 25-26, the verdict states: “In Anglo-Saxon law, every defendant
in a criminal proceedings for a crime of which he is accused is
considered innocent until the prosecution has brought sound credible
proof of his guilt, excluding all reasonable doubt. This assumption
applies to the defendant throughout all the stages of the trial, until
such proof has been brought. ‘Reasonable doubt’ is, as the name implies,
doubt that is in keeping with reason, a doubt that a reasonable person
would entertain.”
These statements must be completely and entirely agreed to. But, when
applied to this very case of defendant Genzken and especially to his
alleged knowledge of the experiments, it can under no circumstances be
said that the evidence brought by the prosecution is sufficient to
provide the judge with a lasting conviction giving him the moral
certainty the accusation is true. For Genzken did not see Mrugowsky’s
report, and the single report made by Mrugowsky presents, according to
the latter’s statement, no sound and conclusive proof of Genzken’s
knowledge.
The verdict holds Genzken responsible (_p. 103_) “for having
nevertheless neglected to reassure himself that his experimental work
was being carried out within permissible legitimate limits.”
III
_Genzken had no official supervisory power and no chance
to intervene by giving orders and also no reason
at all to reassure himself_
As witness, Genzken himself stated that he had merely known that a new
typhus vaccine was to be produced in an institute at Buchenwald. Genzken
had no knowledge whatsoever in this specialized field of hygiene, as
well as no bacteriological training at all, and had never conducted
scientific research work. He had no reason at all to assume that, in
connection with this research, prisoners would be used in a criminal
manner. He was merely of the opinion that the prisoners were brought in
for purposes of checking the efficacy of the vaccine, in the form of
experimental series which were generally customary in medical research.
It was only during the course of the trial that he for the first time
learned of deliberate infections and that there had been many deaths
during the experimental series. He could not know anything about these
facts, especially because the assignment of the prisoners was, as a
concentration camp matter, completely outside of his sphere of duties.
When, on page 103 (German text), the verdict implies that Genzken had
undertaken no steps to reassure himself about the condition of the
experimental subjects or of the circumstances under which they had been
taken to the experimental block, this implication of the verdict is also
incorrect, because the prisoners were not assigned by the medical office
of the Waffen SS, but by the office in charge of the administration of
the concentration camp in collaboration with the Reich Criminal Police
Office. Until the trial, he had not even known that non-Germans were
called in as experimental subjects. This and the fact that all
experiments were kept strictly secret made it impossible for Genzken to
institute investigations or to undertake steps to reassure himself about
the condition of the experimental subjects. If, finally, on page 98 of
the verdict, reference is made to Ding’s diary in order to support the
judgment, it must above all be stated that there are grave doubts as to
the probative value of this document (_see p. 27 and the following of
the closing brief for the defense_). The verdict asserts that Kogon kept
the original diary. That is not in keeping with the facts; in any case
it would have been impossible for the period from December 1941 to June
1943, because Kogon only became Ding’s secretary on the latter date
(_see p. 1259 of the English Transcript_). On page 99 of the verdict,
the Tribunal itself makes the following statement in connection with the
entry for 9 January 1943 referred to in order to incriminate Genzken:
“if Ding’s proven attempts at self-glorification are taken into account,
one should not credulously accept this entry in its existing form.” Thus
in this connection the statements on page 25 and 26 of the verdict
regarding the Tribunal’s conviction apply in particular. If even the
Tribunal, and quite rightly so, feels considerable doubts as to the
correctness and significance of this entry, it is not permissible to use
it in order to the prejudice of the defendant. Besides, Genzken
expressly declared as also confirmed by Kogon (_see p. 1228 of English
Tr._) that he never expressed his approval with regard to the department
for typhus research, but that this entry would have to be interpreted as
his consent to the change of name of the vaccine _production_
laboratory. This intended change of name was not effected until after 1
September 1943, thus at a time when Genzken was no longer responsible.
(_See p. 32 and following of the closing brief for the defense._)
The verdict states at the end of the opinion for Genzken’s sentence that
he was responsible for the typhus experiments and that he assisted in
them and furthered them.
In the face of all this, the result of the case in chief is once again
to be summarized as follows:
Genzken had no responsibility, no authority to give orders, and
no official supervisory power regarding the Typhus Experimental
Station in Block 46 of the Buchenwald concentration camp. All
these were in the hands of Grawitz. The latter gave direct
orders for the experiments to be carried out to Ding who was his
immediate subordinate. Ding’s reports went directly through
Mrugowsky to Grawitz and never to Genzken. The latter had no
knowledge whatsoever of the criminal methods of the experiments.
Genzken had no responsibility, no official supervisory power,
and no possibility to interfere by an order; owing to his
ignorance of the facts, he had no cause to reassure himself of
the conditions under which the experiments took place. Therefore
a sentence in connection with counts two and three of the
indictment ought not to follow. I, therefore, ask that the
verdict should not be confirmed on these points, as Genzken is
not guilty of a war crime or of a crime against humanity as is
clearly proved by the evidence.
With regard to his membership in the SS, this fact alone is not
sufficient to bring about his conviction before the American
Military Tribunal. In addition, it would be necessary that his
knowledge of _criminal_ experiments should have been proved as
in the Poppendick case. However, in accordance with the above
statements this is not the case.
Only the competent German Denazification Board could convict the
defendant for his SS membership. I therefore propose that the
case be referred to the Denazification Board competent for his
home town Preetz/Holstein.
[Signature] DR. R. MERKEL,
_Attorney-at-Law_.
_FOR THE DEFENDANT RUDOLF BRANDT_
Dr. Kurt Kauffmann
Counsel for the Defense of the Defendant Rudolf Brandt
Nuernberg, 2 September 1947
To the Military Governor of the American Zone of Occupation in Germany.
Through the Secretary General at Military Tribunal No. I, Nuernberg.
As counsel for the defense of Rudolf Brandt, who has been sentenced to
death, I herewith petition that the judgment of the American Military
Tribunal No. I, dated 19-20 August 1947, not be confirmed.
It is perhaps the grandest task of a human being and counsel for the
defense to intercede on behalf of another person and to commend him to
the clemency of the mighty.
Clemency appeals to the understanding of the great for human weakness.
Clemency is the opposite of pure criticism and spiteful anger.
For this reason I remain quiet in the face of the sentence pronounced; I
do not raise any complaint because, in one point or another, the
decision of the Tribunal does not perhaps entirely agree with my opinion
of the course of events, of the position of the defendant at that time,
and of his character.
This petition for clemency wants once more to go into the depths of the
thoughts which basically were already the subject of my final plea.
One may well believe that at the beginning of the trial, after I had
studied the case of Rudolf Brandt, I recognized that this task was
hardly to be rewarded with success; nevertheless it seemed to me that it
was worth my efforts to take over the defense, since I believed—then as
well as now—that Rudolf Brandt is guilty to receive any kind of
punishment but not the death sentence.
Not a few of the statements made in my final plea serve this idea. I
must admit, however, that even I, as the counsel for his defense,
arrived at this conviction only on the strength of the characterization
of the personality of the defendant contained in my document book, as
well as on the strength of my own judgment of him, which sees in Brandt
a beast of burden which dragged on day and night without really
recognizing the contents of its burden; for the burden which it carried,
together with the weights, which make this trial such a terrible one,
were only a small fraction of the gigantic burden under which the bearer
himself was not visible any more.
This comparison can be drawn without difficulty from the evidence
presented by the defense.
I take the liberty—because it seems characteristic in this respect—to
refer to some pieces of evidence which have already been submitted to
the Tribunal, namely:
(1) the affidavit of Medizinalrat Felix Kersten of Stockholm
(_Document Book Rudolf Brandt, page 8_).
(2) two affidavits from Schellenberg and Dr. Stuckart (_Document
Book Rudolf Brandt, pp. 16-17 and pp. 23-24_).
(3) I once more refer to the final plea of Rudolf Brandt
(_English transcript, pages 11330-35_).
(4) I attached two letters of the World Jewish Congress in Paris
and Stockholm, addressed to the above-mentioned Felix Kersten,
which had been rejected by the Tribunal as unessential pieces of
evidence, which, however, throw a distinct light on the
personality of Felix Kersten, who, on his part, defends so
warmly Rudolf Brandt.
The fact that Rudolf Brandt did not make his own decisions but was under
the command of Himmler can be found a mitigating consideration according
to Law No. 10 of the Control Council, Article II 4 _b_.
I appeal to the generosity of the great to make use of this possibility
to mitigate the sentence.
A sentence of imprisonment is also a heavy expiation.
The counsel for the defense again and again feels tempted to regret that
these trials are too drawn out and through their long duration have a
negative effect on the broad masses of the German people. If it is to be
the goal of these trials to punish the main war criminals, these
procedures should be shortened. The people are not interested any more
in the course of these trials, apart from the trial against Goering and
others during its first stages; one reason for this is, of course, the
general plight; because the hunger of the people, the great mortality,
the problem of the prisoners of war who are not returned to their
families, the conditions in the East push everything else aside.
Furthermore, the long duration of the trials causes even the most lively
interest to slacken. But it also seems wrong to pronounce death
sentences after such a long duration of proceedings. In the case of the
trial of the International Military Tribunal, the people were still able
to connect the long duration of the proceedings with the sentences
pronounced, because each proceeding was an individual event. The
following trials, however, among them, therefore, the doctors’ trial,
are much too much drawn out with regard to German legal opinion. If such
a drawn-out procedure closes with a death sentence, that death
punishment seems hardly justified anymore. German trial procedure does
not know such long drawn-out proceedings, the final result of which is a
death sentence. The special peculiarities of the Anglo-American trial
procedures are the cause for such trials that last for months and
months. It has also to be remembered that the defendants in each case
have been in custody for almost or more than two years when the trial
finally began. Procedures ending with death sentences will have to be
carried through much faster. It is in contradiction to one’s reactions
that death sentences are pronounced against defendants with whom not
only counsel for the defense has worked together for many months, but
who also for many months appeared daily in court and were respected by
the court, since they are rightly considered innocent until their guilt
is finally established.
Neither should one forget that the defendants themselves, after having
been held in custody for inquiry for such a long time and having gone
through such long drawn-out procedures, have already atoned more for
their crimes than if there had been a quick procedure started
immediately after the collapse of Germany.
If I may impose on the instance for clemency I beg to read some parts of
my final plea; then, I don’t have to repeat myself here. (_Cf.
statements on page 14 V, 1_; _furthermore pages 18-20, 27, 43 C_).
[Signature] DR. KAUFFMANN.
_FOR THE DEFENDANT POPPENDICK_
Nuernberg, 1 September 1947
Georg Boehm, Attorney
Defense Counsel
Military Tribunal I
Nuernberg, 115 Zerzabelshofstrasse
The
Military Commander
of the U.S. Occupation Zone
Germany
Petition
of Attorney Georg Boehm, Defense Counsel at
Military Tribunal I, Nuernberg
for the defendant
Helmut Poppendick, at present in the courthouse prison at
Nuernberg, _concerning alteration of the sentence passed_
_by Military Tribunal I, Nuernberg_
The defendant Helmut Poppendick was acquitted of the charges of having
committed war crimes and crimes against humanity (counts two and three)
in the sentence of the Military Tribunal I at Nuernberg in Case I,
United States of America against Karl Brandt _et al._, on 19 August
1947, and found guilty only, as an SS member, of membership in an
organization declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal
(count four). On 20 August 1947, the defendant Helmut Poppendick was
sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment merely on account of membership in
the SS.
I. _The sentence exceeds the maximum penalty_
According to the recommendations of the International Military Tribunal
(_The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military
Tribunal, Vol. I, p. 288_), inserted into the sentence of the Medical
Case, a maximum penalty is provided for the punishment of members of
organizations declared criminal. The IMT recommendation provides in
detail that “in no case is the penalty, imposed on the basis of Law No.
10 upon a member of an organization or group declared criminal by the
Tribunal, to be more severe than the one provided in the Denazification
Law”. The Denazification Law, dated 5 March 1946, valid for the U.S.
Occupation Zone of Germany, referred to as a standard for comparison,
provides the maximum penalty of 10 years in a labor camp. According to
present penal regulations, 10 years’ imprisonment is, however, a more
severe penalty than being sent to a labor camp for the same period. _10
years’ imprisonment_ _exceeds, therefore, the penalty provided in the
recommendation of the IMT._ The sentence against Poppendick does not
give any special reason for exceeding the maximum penalty.
II. _More lenient evaluation of the group of persons within the
SS who only knew about crimes without, however,
being involved in them_
The sentence of the International Military Tribunal declares punishable
in the sense of the statute “the group composed of those persons who
were officially admitted as members * * * in the SS, became or remained
members of the organization knowing that use was made of them for
committing acts declared punishable by Article 6 of the Statute, _or_
who were involved in committing such crimes as members of the
organization.” According to a reasonable interpretation of this
provision, if mere membership is punished, one has to differentiate
between those persons involved in committing such crimes and those
persons only knowing about the commission of such crimes within the SS.
According to a sound sense of justice, the provided maximum penalty for
membership in the SS cannot possibly be valid for both groups of
persons. On the contrary, the group having only knowledge has to be
punished more lightly than the group involved in crimes. A penalty
_inferior_ to the provided maximum penalty has, therefore, to be imposed
on the first mentioned persons among the SS members called to account.
The Tribunal clearly stated that the defendant Helmut Poppendick was not
involved in the crimes of the SS and, in this way, made it clear that
not even on account of his rank or official position was he able to
prevent crimes. The Tribunal only tried to impute knowledge on the part
of the defendant Poppendick of definite experiments specified in the
indictment. _For this reason the maximum penalty should not be imposed
in the case of the defendant Poppendick._
III. _Knowledge of the defendant Poppendick_
The Tribunal imputed to the defendant Poppendick, who was Oberfuehrer of
the Waffen SS and Obersturmbannfuehrer of the General SS: (1) knowledge
of freezing experiments; (2) sulfanilamide experiments; (3)
sterilization experiments; (4) incendiary bomb experiments; (5) phlegmon
experiments, without, however, being criminally involved in them.
(1) Knowledge of freezing experiments is imputed to the defendant
Poppendick because he was subsequently invited to participate in a
conference between Grawitz and Dr. Rascher in January 1943. As Rascher
was at that time an officer in the Luftwaffe and all his collaborators
were not members of the SS, this series of experiments (at least in
January 1943) cannot be interpreted as a series of experiments within
the SS and consequently as crimes of the SS. There is no proof of
knowledge of such experiments after January 1943.
(2) The defendant Poppendick knew as much about Professor Gebhardt’s
sulfanilamide experiments as Professor Rostock who was acquitted by the
same Tribunal, i.e., that prisoners sentenced to death were used for
these experiments.
(3) Knowledge of sterilization experiments is imputed to the defendant
Poppendick by means of a simple assumption, although the Tribunal
pointed out in several passages of the judgment that a mere assumption
of guilt, in our case of knowledge, is insufficient. Poppendick only
worked in the Race and Settlement Office as a doctor dealing with
hereditary questions for members of the SS and their families; as
medical superintendent he had to supervise this activity and the social
welfare doctors. These matters were purely internal SS affairs. If the
Race and Settlement Office occasionally dealt, amongst other measures,
with one of racial policy through its field offices, the doctors were
not involved in any case, and there is not the least indication that
Poppendick knew or ought to have known about such measures. Even the
judgment itself reveals to what extent the real sterilization
experiments were kept secret.
(4) On page 112 (German), the Tribunal points out, that in conferences
concerning sterilization experiments (Poppendick never took part in such
conferences) each participant had to undertake to maintain absolute
secrecy. Neither the defendant Poppendick’s statement nor the evidence
submitted reveal that Poppendick had any knowledge of sterilization
experiments, let alone of extermination measures.
(5) In the case of the phlegmon experiments it has not been proved that
Poppendick had any knowledge of them. Here, too, the assertion that he
had such knowledge is based on a mere assumption.
It has, however, nowhere been proved that defendant Helmut Poppendick
knew about the experiments in such a way as to necessitate his realizing
that non-Germans were being used for such experiments. In its verdict
the Tribunal has consistently followed the principle that it must be
proved that crimes were committed on non-German nationals (_see pp. 50,
51, 70, 91, 103, 131, 160, German text_). In contrast to this the
Tribunal left open the question as to how far the state is entitled to
carry out experiments on its own citizens; it stated when dealing with
the question of guilt: “* * * whatever right a state may have concerning
its own citizens” (_see pp. 114, 195, German_). The Tribunal, therefore,
in all essentials confined itself to the question of to what extent
crimes were committed on non-Germans. _No conclusive evidence has been
brought against defendant Helmut Poppendick in each single case to prove
his knowledge of experiments carried out on non-Germans._ In reality,
nothing is more suitable to explain under whatever point of view we have
to look at defendant Poppendick’s knowledge of experiments, than his
words at the end of the trial: “As to medical experiments on prisoners,
human experiments were nothing striking and nothing new to me. I knew
that experiments were being conducted in hospitals. I knew that the
triumphs of modern medicine had not been achieved without sacrifices. I
admit I cannot remember that in experiments in hospitals, the voluntary
participation of the experimental subjects had to be such an
indispensable and obvious prerequisite, as it appears to be according to
the argumentation heard in this trial. Furthermore, I know that some
scientific questions can only be solved by serial experiments in an
unchanging environment, and that, therefore, in all countries,
experiments are often conducted, particularly on soldiers in camps.
Under these circumstances I was not at all surprised that during the war
serial examinations and experiments were also carried out by scientists
in concentration camps. I had not the slightest reason to assume that
these scientists in the camps went beyond what was usual everywhere else
in the world of science. As far as I was concerned, what I knew about
medical experiments in the SS had just as little to do with criminal
acts as the experiments about which I knew from my internship before
1933.”
IV. _Consequences for future jurisdiction arising from the
penalties imposed by the sentence on Poppendick_
The sentence imposed on Helmut Poppendick for his membership in the SS
is altogether the first sentence in the American Zone against an SS
member of this kind. Therefore, it has to be regarded as a precedent for
all military tribunals and possibly, later on, for German courts, whose
task it will be to punish members of criminal organizations. To sum up
its consequences, the sentence creates a precedent, that—
1. Every SS leader with a rank higher than Poppendick’s, who
knew of SS crimes committed on Germans and non-Germans, can, on
principle, only be sentenced to the maximum penalty.
2. Every member of the SS involved in crimes can be sentenced up
to this maximum penalty again only on account of his SS
membership. What penalty can, for example, be inflicted on an SS
Obergruppenfuehrer who saw how the gas chambers were run at
Auschwitz, without, however, being otherwise involved in the
extermination of the Jews; a man thus having, so to speak, the
highest degree of knowledge derived from SS membership? _It is
obvious that such a sentence as the one passed on Poppendick
deprives future tribunals of all latitude of discretion,
transforms the maximum penalty into the average penalty, and in
this way renders the recommendation of the IMT absurd._
V. _Prevention of further possibilities of appeal_
The defendant Poppendick, whose domicile is in the British Zone, would
consequently under normal circumstances have to be tried by a tribunal
(Spruchgericht) set up in the meantime in consequence of the British
Ordinance No. 69. Because he has been sentenced by a Nuernberg Military
Tribunal as a member of an organization declared criminal _he loses the
two further appeals_ provided for by Ordinance No. 69 and its
implementation regulations for the British Zone. _Therefore this is the
only legal way still open to him to state his case._
VI. _Personal Conditions_
I make the following application for reduction of penalty with even
greater emphasis, because the defendant has already been amply punished
for his SS membership. His family has lost all its property and has not
a pfennig left. His wife must support her four little children aged 3 to
7 by the labor of her hands under the most primitive conditions, without
having a chance during her husband’s entire term of imprisonment to
obtain the slightest financial assistance for herself and her children.
The defendant used his considerable abilities as a physician to help
many people, both Germans and foreigners, during the long years of his
medical practice, without ever even mentioning this during the trial,
because it is a physician’s duty to help suffering humanity. The
defendant, who is not involved in the crimes dealt with by this
Tribunal, suffers sufficiently under his outward discrimination as an SS
member.
In view of all these circumstances and with the request for careful
examination of the case, I make in conclusion the
_Application_
1. _For the sentence of imprisonment for ten years inflicted on
defendant Helmut Poppendick to be reduced to a tolerable term of
imprisonment, perhaps to be commuted into a shorter term of confinement
in a labor camp, and at the same time_
2. _For the 2¼ years’ detention already served by the defendant to be
included in the then newly-determined term of imprisonment._
[Signature] G. BOEHM,
_Attorney-at-Law_.
-----
[59] According to German terminology a “Referent” (plural: “Referenten”)
is an official with expert knowledge of a specialized subject in a
government or private organization.
XIV. AFFIRMATION OF SENTENCES BY THE
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE UNITED
STATES ZONE OF OCCUPATION
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
FOR GERMANY (U. S.)
Office of the Military Governor
APO 742
Berlin, Germany
22 November 1947
AG 013. 3 (LD)
SUBJECT: Petitions for Review and for Habeas Corpus in the case of the
_United States of America_ v. _Karl Brandt et al._, Case 1,
Military Tribunal I, Nuernberg, Germany (Medical Case)
TO: Secretary General
Military Tribunals
APO 696-A, U.S. Army
1. Inclosed herewith you will find original orders denying petitions for
clemency submitted by the following persons convicted in Case Number 1
before Military Tribunal I:
Karl Brandt Siegfried Handloser
Oskar Schroeder Karl Genzken
Karl Gebhardt Rudolf Brandt
Joachim Mrugowsky Helmut Poppendick
Wolfram Sievers Gerhard Rose
Viktor Brack Hermann Becker-Freyseng
Waldemar Hoven Wilhelm Beiglboeck
Herta Oberheuser Fritz Fischer
2. Please formally advise the petitioners through their respective
attorneys of the action taken by the Military Governor upon these
petitions.
FOR THE MILITARY GOVERNOR:
[Signed] G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lieutenant Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General
Incls: a/s
Telephone BERLIN 42361
HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Commander-in-Chief
APO 742
Berlin, Germany
In the Case of Military Tribunal I
The United States of America Case No. 1
_vs._
Karl Brandt, et alii
_Order with Respect to Sentence of Karl Brandt_
In the case of the United States of America against Karl Brandt et alii,
tried by United States Military Tribunal I, Case No. 1, Nuernberg,
Germany, the defendant, Karl Brandt, on 20 August 1947, was sentenced by
the Tribunal to death by hanging. A petition to modify the sentence,
filed on behalf of the defendant by Dr. R. Servatius, his defense
counsel, has been referred to me pursuant to the provision of Military
Government Ordinance No. 7. I have duly considered the petition and the
record of the trial and in accordance with Article XVII of said
Ordinance it is hereby ordered that:
1. The sentence imposed by Military Tribunal I upon Karl Brandt
be, and hereby is, in all respects, confirmed.
2. Pending action on petitions filed by the defendant with
authorities other than the Office of Military Government for
Germany, (U.S.), the execution of the death sentence be stayed
until further order by me.
3. The defendant be confined until further order in War Crimes
Prison No. 1, Landsberg, Bavaria, Germany.
[Signed] Lucius D. Clay
LUCIUS D. CLAY
General, U.S. Army
Commander-in-Chief, European Command
and Military Governor
HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Commander-in-Chief
APO 742
In the Case of The
United States of America
_vs._
Karl Brandt, et alii
Military Tribunal I
Case No. 1
_Order with respect to sentence of Siegfried Handloser_[60]
In the case of the United States of America against Karl Brandt, et
alii, tried by United States Military Tribunal I, Case No. 1, Nuernberg,
Germany, the defendant Siegfried Handloser, on 20 August 1947, was
sentenced by the Tribunal to life imprisonment. A petition to modify the
sentence, filed on behalf of the defendant by Dr. Otto Nelte, his
defense counsel, has been referred to me pursuant to the provisions of
Military Government Ordinance No. 7. I have duly considered the petition
and the record of the trial and in accordance with Article XVII of said
Ordinance, it is hereby ordered that:
_a._ the sentence imposed by Military Tribunal I, on Siegfried
Handloser be, and hereby is, in all respects confirmed;
_b._ the defendant be confined in War Crimes Prison No. 1,
Landsberg, Bavaria, Germany.
[Signed] Lucius D. Clay
LUCIUS D. CLAY
General, U.S.A.
Commander-in-Chief, European Command
and Military Governor
-----
[60] The sentences imposed upon the remaining 14 defendants were
confirmed in all respects by the Military Commander of the United States
Zone of Occupation by identical orders.
XV. ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT DENYING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Monday, 16 February 1948
No. 286, Misc. Karl Brandt, petitioner, _v._ The United States
of America;
No. 287, Misc. Viktor Brack, petitioner, _v._ The United States
of America;
No. 288, Misc. Rudolf Brandt, petitioner, _v._ The United States
of America;
No. 299, Misc. Wilhelm Bieglboeck, petitioner, _v._ The United States of
America. The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas
corpus and prohibition are denied. Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice
Murphy, and Mr. Justice Rutledge are of the opinion that the petitions
should be set for hearing on the question of the jurisdiction of this
Court. Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision
of these applications.[61]
[The execution of death sentences imposed on Karl Brandt, Rudolf Brandt,
Karl Gebhardt, Joachim Mrugowsky, Viktor Brack, Wolfram Sievers, and
Waldemar Hoven were ordered on 14 May 1948 by the Military Governor.
Executions were carried out at Landsberg prison on 2 June 1948.]
-----
[61] The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus
and prohibition in the case of the other defendants were also denied.
APPENDIX
Table of Comparative Ranks
U. S. German U. S. Navy German Med. SS SA
Army Army Navy Svcs.(A)
2d Leutnant Ensign Leutnant Assistenza Untersturm Sturmfuehr
Lieuten zur See rzt fuehrer er.
ant
1st Oberleutn Lieutenant Oberleutna Oberarzt Obersturmf Obersturmf
Lieuten ant (junior nt zur uehrer uehrer.
ant grade) See
Captain Hauptmann Lieutenant Kapitaenle Stabsarzt Hauptsturm Hauptsturm
(senior utnant fuehrer fuehrer.
grade)
Major Major Lieutenant Korvettenk Oberstabsa Sturmbannf Sturmbannf
Commande apitaen rzt uehrer uehrer.
r
Lieutenan Oberstleu Commander Fregattenk Oberfeldar Obersturmb Obersturmb
t tnant apitaen zt annfuehrer annfuehrer
Colonel .
Colonel Oberst Captain Kapitaen Oberstarzt Standarten Standarten
zur See fuehrer fuehrer
Oberfuehre Oberfuehre
r (B) r (C).
Brigadier Generalma Commodore Konteradmi Generalarz Brigadefue Brigadefue
General jor ral t hrer hrer.
Major Generalle Rear Vizeadmira Generalsta Gruppenfue Gruppenfue
General utnant Admiral l bsarzt hrer hrer.
Lieutenan General Vice Admiral Generalobe Obergruppe Obergruppe
t der Admiral rstabsarzt nfuehrer nfuehrer.
General Infante
rie,
der
Artille
rie,
etc.
General Generalob Admiral Generaladm Oberstgrup
erst iral penfuehrer
.
General Generalfe Admiral of Grossadmir Reichsfueh Stabschef.
of the ldmarscha the al rer
Army ll Fleet
(A) Ranks for the Medical Service of the German Army and the German Air
Force are identical. Ranks for the Medical Service of the German Navy
differ somewhat but are for the most part immaterial here. Dr.
Fikentacher held the rank of Admiraloberstabsarzt which is equivalent to
that of Generaloberstabsarzt.
(B) Equivalent to a senior Colonel.
(C) Same as B above.
List of Witnesses in Case I
[Note.—All witnesses in this case appeared before the Tribunal.
Prosecution witnesses are designated by the letter “P”, defense
witnesses by the letter “D”, and the Tribunal witness by the
letter “T”. The names not preceded by any designation represent
defendants testifying in their own behalf. Extracts from
testimony in this case are listed in the index of documents and
testimony.]
│ │ │
│ │ │ Pages
│ Name │ Dates of testimony │ (mimeographed
│ │ │ transcript)
│ │ │
P│ALEXANDER, Dr. Leo │20 Dec 46 │805-814; 832-838;
│ │ │848-855; 864-869
│ │ │
D│AUGUSTINICK, Dr. │27, 28 Feb 47 │3701-3737
│ Herbert │ │
│ │ │
│BECKER-FREYSENG, │19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27,│7774-8243; 8255-8292
│ Hermann │28, 29 May 46 │
│ │ │
│BEIGLBOECK, Wilhelm │6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 │8666-9028; 9326-9328
│ │Jun 46 │
│ │ │
D│BLOCK, Maria Lotte │16, 17 Apr 47 │6002-6031
│ │ │
│BLOME, Kurt │13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20,│4450-4811
│ │21 Mar 47 │
│ │ │
D│BORKENAU, Franz │14, 15 Apr 47 │5890-5908
│ │ │
│BRACK, Viktor Hermann │12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19 │7413-7772
│ │May 47 │
│ │ │
│BRANDT, Karl │3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Feb 47 │2301-2661
│ │ │
│BRANDT, Rudolf │24, 25, 26 Mar 47 │4869-4994
│ │ │
P│BROEL-PLATER, Maria │19, 20 Dec 46 │785-804
│ │ │
P│BROERS, Constantyn │30 Jun 47 │10386-10406
│ Johan │ │
│ │ │
D│CHRISTENSEN, Heinz │24 Feb 47 │3430-3454
│ │ │
D│DORN, Paul Friedrich │5, 6 Jun 47 │8574-8665
│ │ │
P│DZIDO, Jadwiga │20 Dec 46 │838-848
│ │ │
P│EYER, Olga │15 Jan 47 │1755-1779
│ │ │
│FISCHER, Fritz │10, 11, 12 Mar 47 │4266-4384
│ │ │
│GEBHARDT, Karl │4, 5, 6, 7, 10 Mar 47 │3931-4256
│ │ │
│GENZKEN, Karl │28 Feb; 3 Mar 47 │3773-3891
│ │ │
P│GRANDJEAN, Henri-Jean │6 Jan 47 │1099-1105; 1119-1120
D│GUTZEIT, Kurt │7, 10 Feb 47 │2692-2764
│ │ │
D│HAAGEN, Eugen │17, 18, 19, 20 Jun 47 │9408-9712
│ │ │
P│HALL, Ferdinand │3 Jan 47 │1048-1073
│ │ │
│HANDLOSER, Siegfried │11, 12, 13, 18 Feb 47 │2815-3104
│ │ │
D│HARTLENBEN, Hans │19 Feb 47 │3189-3231
│ │ │
D│HEDERICH, Karl Heinz │8, 9 May 47 │7262-7291
│ │ │
P│HENRI PIERRE, Henri │18 Dec 46 │708-722
│ │ │
D│HIELSCHER, Friedrich │15, 16 Apr 47 │5926-5994
│ │ │
P│HIRTZ, Georg │8 Jan 47 │1291-1300
│ │ │
P│HOELLENRAINER, Karl │27 Jun 47; 1 Jul 47 │10229-10234; 10508-10544
│ │ │
D│HOERING, Felix │17 Apr 47 │6031-6078
│ │ │
D│HORN, Videslaw │31 Mar, 1 Apr 47 │5245-5333
│ │ │
│HOVEN, Waldemar │21, 23, 24 Jun 47 │9761-10004
│ │ │
P│IVY, Dr. Andrew Conway │12, 13, 14, 16 Jun 47 │9029-9324
│ │ │
D│JAEGER, Rolf │28 May 47 │8244-8255
│ │ │
D│JENTSCH, Werner │26 Feb 47 │3582-3602
│ │ │
D│JUNG, Friedrich │26 Jun 47 │10148-10154
│ │ │
D│KARLSTETTER, Maria │25 Feb 47 │3455-3461
│ │ │
P│KAROLEWSKA, Vladislava │20 Dec 46 │815-832
│ │ │
P│KIRCHHEIMER, Fritz │8, 9 Jan 47 │1321-1348
│ │ │
D│KOCH, Ernst │26 Jun 47 │10120-10144
│ │ │
P│KOGON, Dr. Eugen │6, 7, 8 Jan 47 │1150-1290
│ │ │
D│KOSMEHL, Dr. Herbert │12 Mar 47 │4387-4446
│ │ │
P│KUSMIERCZUK, Maria │20 Dec 46 │856-864
│ │ │
D│LAMMERS, Hans Heinrich │7 Feb 47 │2661-2692
P│LAUBINGER, Josef │27 Jun 47 │10198-10229
│ │ │
P│LEIBBRANDT, Werner │27 Jan 47 │1961-2028
│ │ │
P│LEVY, Robert │17 Dec 46 │550-561
│ │ │
P│LUTZ, Wolfgang │12 Dec 46 │266-308
│ │ │
P│MACZKA, Sofia │10 Jan 47 │1430-1462
│ │ │
D│MAY, Eduard │14 Apr 47 │5869-5889
│ │ │
D│MEINE, August │21, 24 Mar 47 │4831-4867
│ │ │
D│METTBACH, Ernst │21 Jun 47 │9714-9757
│ │ │
P│MENNECKE, Fritz │16, 17 Jan 47 │1866-1946
│ │ │
P│MICHALOWSKI, Father Leo│21 Dec 46 │871-886
│ │ │
│MRUGOWSKY, Joachim │26, 27, 28, 31 Mar 47; │5000-5244; 5334-5464
│ │1, 2, 3 Apr 47 │
│ │ │
P│NALES, Gerrid Hendrick │30 Jun 47 │10409-10471
│ │ │
T│NEFF, Walter │17, 18 Dec 46 │595-695
│ │ │
│OBERHEUSER, Herta │3, 8 Apr 47 │5478-5528
│ │ │
D│PFANNMUELLER, Hermann │9, 12 May 47 │7291-7412
│ │ │
D│PIECK, Henry │20 Mar 47 │4722-4755
│ │ │
│POKORNY, Adolf │25, 26 Jun 47 │10007-10109
│ │ │
│POPPENDICK, Helmut │8, 9 Apr 47 │5530-5651
│ │ │
P│ROEMHILD, Ferdinand │14 Jan 47 │1627-1664
│ │ │
│ROMBERG, Hans Wolfgang │1, 2, 5, 6 May 47 │6764-7032A
│ │ │
│ROSE, Gerhard │18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 │6081-6484
│ │Apr 47 │
│ │ │
│ROSTOCK, Paul │20, 21, 24 Feb 47 │3258-3430
│ │ │
│RUFF, Siegfried │25, 28, 29, 30 Apr 47 │6490-6739
│ │ │
│SIEVERS, Wolfram │9, 10, 11, 14 Apr 47 │5656-5869
│SCHAEFER, Konrad │2, 4 Jun 47 │8349-8399; 8494-8571
│ │ │
D│SCHMIDT, Bernhard │19 Feb 47 │3144-3188
│ │ │
P│SCHMIDT, Edith │9 Jan 47 │1364-1383
│ │ │
P│SCHMIDT, Walter Eugen │16 Jan 47 │1816-1863
│ │ │
│SCHROEDER, Oskar │25, 26, 27 Feb 47 │3469-3582; 3602-3700
│ │ │
P│STOEHR, Heinrich │17 Dec 46 │574-594
│ Wilhelm │ │
│ │ │
D│TOPF, Erwin │15 Apr 47 │5908-5924
│ │ │
D│TRUX, Rudolf │26 Jun 47 │10110-10120
│ │ │
P│TSCHOFENIG, Joseph │17 Jun 47 │9329-9363
│ │ │
P│VIEWEG, August Heinrich│13, 16 Dec 46 │418-468
│ │ │
D│VOLLHARDT, Franz │3 Jun 47 │8400-8490
│ │ │
P│VORLICEK, Joseph │17 Jun 47 │9383-9407
│ │ │
│WELTZ, Georg August │6, 7, 8 May 47 │7035-7254
│ │ │
D│WITT, Fritz │28 Feb 47 │3740-3753
│ │ │
D│WUERFLER, Paul │18, 19 Feb 47 │3104-3144
INDEX OF DOCUMENTS AND TESTIMONY
Document No. Exhibit No. Description Vol-Page
NO-005 Pros. Ex. 279 Letter from Grawitz to I-344
Himmler, 22 November 1944,
requesting prisoners for
experiments.
NO-011 Pros. Ex. 188 Note from Himmler to Grawitz, I-504
16 June 1943, concerning
epidemic jaundice
experiments at
concentration camp
Sachsenhausen.
NO-018 Pros. Ex. 404 Letter from Himmler to Brack, I-856
19 December 1940,
requesting that euthanasia
station Grafeneck be
discontinued and that
motion pictures be shown to
dispel rumors.
NO-035 Pros. Ex. 142 Letter from Pokorny to I-713
Himmler, October 1941,
concerning a sterilization
drug to be used against
Germany’s enemies.
NO-036 Pros. Ex. 143 Letter from Himmler, 10 March I-714
1942, to Pohl (initialed by
Rudolf Brandt) concerning a
sterilization drug and
suggesting further research
on criminals.
NO-038 Pros. Ex. 147 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-715
Pohl, June 1942,
transmitting an inquiry by
Himmler as to the progress
made with experiments for
medical sterilization.
NO-039 Pros. Ex. 153 Letter from Gund to Himmler, I-717
24 August 1942, concerning
research in medical
sterilization and
development of
sterilization drugs.
NO-046a Pros. Ex. 148 Letter from Pohl to Himmler, I-716
3 June 1942, concerning the
development of a
sterilization drug by the
firm of Dr. Madaus and Co.
NO-046b Pros. Ex. 149 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-717
Pohl, 11 June 1942, asking
him on behalf of Himmler to
set up a large hothouse for
the development of a
sterilization drug.
NO-080 Pros. Ex. 5 Fuehrer Decree, 28 July 1942, I-81
concerning the Medical and
Health Services.
NO-081 Pros. Ex. 6 Second Fuehrer Decree, 5 I-83
September 1943, concerning
the Medical and Health
Services, 1943.
NO-082 Pros. Ex. 7 Fuehrer Decree, 25 August I-83
1944, concerning the
appointment of a Reich
Commissioner for Medical
and Health Services, 1944.
NO-085 Pros. Ex. 175 Letter from Sievers to Rudolf I-784
Brandt, 9 February 1942,
and report by Hirt
concerning the acquisition
of skulls of
Jewish-Bolshevik
Commissars.
NO-086 Pros. Ex. 177 Letter from Sievers to Rudolf I-750
Brandt, 2 November 1942,
requesting with Himmler’s
approval, 150 skeletons.
NO-087 Pros. Ex. 181 Letter from Sievers to I-751
Eichmann, (copy to Rudolf
Brandt), 21 June 1943,
concerning selection of
subjects for a skeleton
collection.
NO-098 Pros. Ex. 263 Memorandum from Sievers to I-337
Rudolf Brandt, 3 November
1942, concerning research
in the Natzweiler
concentration camp.
NO-099 Pros. Ex. 268 Report by Hirt and Wimmer on I-341
the proposed treatment of
poisoning caused by Lost
gas.
NO-121 Pros. Ex. 293 Letter from Haagen to Hirt, I-578
15 November 1943,
concerning prisoners to be
used as experimental
subjects for tests with
typhus vaccine.
NO-122 Pros. Ex. 298 Letter dictated by Rose, I-579
addressed to Haagen, 13
December 1943, concerning
experimental subjects for
vaccine experiments.
NO-123 Pros. Ex. 303 Letter from Haagen to Hirt, 9 I-580
March 1944, concerning
experiments conducted with
typhus vaccine and
requesting experimental
subjects.
NO-125 Pros. Ex. 194 Letter from Haagen to I-506
Gutzeit, 27 June 1944,
concerning epidemic
jaundice experiments on
human beings.
NO-139 Pros. Ex. 317 Letter from Dr. Grunske to I-581
Haagen, 7 March 1944,
concerning reports on
yellow fever virus
experiments requested by a
Japanese medical officer.
NO-158 Pros. Ex. 410 Letter from Hirche, I-858
administrator of the Mental
Institution Bernburg, to
camp commandant of the
Gross-Rosen concentration
camp, 19 March 1942, with
list of inmates transferred
from the concentration camp
to Bernburg.
NO-177 Pros. Ex. 133 Minutes of conference at the I-448
Reich Ministry of Aviation,
20 May 1944, concerning
methods for making sea
water potable.
NO-182 Pros. Ex. 137 Letter from Sievers to I-454
Grawitz, 24 July 1944,
concerning experiments of
the potability of sea
water.
NO-183 Pros. Ex. 136 Teletype from Rudolf Brandt I-453
to Grawitz, undated,
concerning experimental
subjects.
NO-184 Pros. Ex. 132 Letter from the Technical I-447
Office of the Reich
Minister of Aviation
(Goering) to Himmler’s
office, 15 May 1944,
concerning methods to
render sea water potable.
NO-185 Pros. Ex. 134 Letter from Schroeder to I-452
Himmler and Grawitz, 7 June
1944, requesting subjects
for sea-water experiments.
NO-193 Pros. Ex. 264 Letter from Sievers to Rudolf I-340
Brandt, 22 April 1943,
regarding prevention of Dr.
Wimmer’s transfer to active
duty with the air force.
NO-201 Pros. Ex. 290 Report from Mrugowsky to the I-635
Criminological Institute,
12 September 1944,
concerning experiments with
aconitine nitrate
projectiles.
NO-203 Pros. Ex. 161 Covering letter from Brack to I-719
Himmler, 28 March 1941,
with report on experiments
concerning sterilization
and castration by X-rays.
NO-205 Pros. Ex. 163 Letter from Brack to Himmler, I-721
23 June 1942, proposing
sterilization of two to
three million Jews.
NO-206 Pros. Ex. 164 Letter from Himmler I-722
(counter-signed by Rudolf
Brandt), 11 August 1942,
addressed to Brack,
concerning Himmler’s
interest in sterilization
experiments.
NO-208 Pros. Ex. 166 Letter from Blankenburg to I-723
Himmler, 29 April 1944,
regarding employment of Dr.
Horst Schumann on
experiments concerning the
influence of X-rays on
human genital glands in
connection with similar
experiments conducted at
concentration camp
Auschwitz.
NO-211 Pros. Ex. 169 Letter from Professor I-724
Clauberg to Himmler, 30 May
1942 (referring to a letter
from Rudolf Brandt),
concerning the urgency of
research into biological
propagation and
sterilization without
operation, and draft of a
“Research Institute for
Biological Propagation”.
NO-212 Pros. Ex. 173 Letter from Professor I-730
Clauberg to Himmler, 7 June
1943, reporting on research
in connection with the
sterilization of women.
NO-213 Pros. Ex. 171 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-729
Clauberg, 10 July 1942,
transmitting instructions
of Himmler to perform
sterilizations on Jewesses
at concentration camp
Ravensbrueck.
NO-216 Pros. Ex. 170 Memorandum of Rudolf Brandt, I-728
July 1942, on a discussion
between Himmler, Gebhardt,
Gluecks, and Clauberg
concerning sterilization
experiments conducted on
Jewesses.
NO-218 Pros. Ex. 56 Letter from Rascher to I-150
Himmler, 16 April 1942,
reporting on high-altitude
experiments with fatal
results and on experiments
conducted together with
Romberg.
NO-220 Pros. Ex. 61 Letter from Rascher to I-152
Himmler, 11 May 1942, and
secret report concerning
high-altitude experiments.
NO-224 Pros. Ex. 76 Note by Romberg on showing of I-174
film in office of State
Secretary Milch, and
proposed report to Milch,
11 September 1942.
NO-227 Pros. Ex. 11 Fuehrer Decree of 7 August I-84
1944 concerning the
reorganization of the
Medical Services of the
Wehrmacht.
NO-228 Pros. Ex. 206 Affidavit of defendant I-371
Fischer, 19 November 1946,
concerning sulfanilamide
experiments conducted in
the concentration camp
Ravensbrueck.
NO-231 Pros. Ex. 116 Letter from Rascher to I-255
Sievers, 17 May 1943,
concerning a conference
with Gebhardt on freezing
experiments.
NO-234 Pros. Ex. 83 Letter from Rascher to I-219
Himmler, 10 September 1942,
transmitting intermediate
report on freezing
experiments (_1618-PS_).
NO-244 Pros. Ex. 201 Letter from Himmler (signed I-770
by Rudolf Brandt) to
Greiser, 27 June 1942,
concerning the
extermination of tubercular
Poles.
NO-246 Pros. Ex. 196 Letter from Greiser to I-776
Himmler 1 May 1942,
concerning the plan for
mass extermination of
tubercular Poles.
NO-247 Pros. Ex. 197 Letter from Koppe to Rudolf I-769
Brandt, 3 May 1942,
concerning the killing of
tubercular Poles.
NO-250 Pros. Ex. 203 Letter from Blome to Greiser, I-771
18 November 1942,
concerning the mass
extermination of tubercular
Poles.
NO-257 Pros. Ex. 283 Extract from the affidavit of I-572
Dr. Erwin Schuler, 20 July
1945, concerning typhus
experiments.
NO-257 Pros. Ex. 283 Extract from a sworn I-686
statement by Dr. Erwin
Schuler (Ding), 20 July
1945, concerning euthanasia
with phenol injection.
NO-264 Pros. Ex. 60 File note for SS I-151
Obersturmfuehrer
Schnitzler, 28 April 1942.
NO-265 Pros. Ex. 287 Diary of the Division for I-557
Typhus and Virus Research
at the Institute of Hygiene
of the Waffen SS (Ding
diary) 1941 to 1945.
NO-268 Pros. Ex. 106 Letter from Hippke to I-252
Himmler, 19 February 1943,
on freezing experiments in
Dachau.
NO-285 Pros. Ex. 86 Letter from Rascher to Rudolf I-221
Brandt, 3 October 1942,
stating that Sievers would
obtain four gypsy women for
rewarming through body
warmth.
NO-286 Pros. Ex. 88 Letter from Goering’s office I-223
to Himmler, 8 October 1942,
with attached invitation to
the conference on “Medical
Problems Arising from
Hardships of Sea and
Winter.”
NO-289 Pros. Ex. 72 Letter from Hippke to I-173
Himmler, 8 October 1942,
thanking the latter for his
assistance in high-altitude
experiments in Dachau.
NO-292 Pros. Ex. 111 Letter from Rascher to Rudolf I-253
Brandt, 4 April 1943,
reporting on dry-freezing
experiments in Dachau.
NO-299 Pros. Ex. 190 Letter from Haagen to I-505
Schreiber, 12 June 1944,
concerning epidemic
jaundice experiments.
NO-303 Pros. Ex. 32 Table of organization of the I-88
“Ahnenerbe” from the files
of the Ahnenerbe Society.
NO-320 Pros. Ex. 103 Letter from Sievers to I-246
Brandt, 28 January 1943,
and Rascher’s report on his
discussions with Grawitz
and Poppendick.
NO-322 Pros. Ex. 114 Letter from Rascher to I-254
Keindl, 28 April 1943,
about previous freezing
experiments conducted at
Sachsenhausen.
NO-323 Pros. Ex. 94 Memorandum of Rascher on I-245
women used for rewarming in
freezing experiments, 5
November 1942.
NO-365 Pros. Ex. 507 Unsigned draft letter from I-870
Dr. Wetzel to Rosenberg, 25
October 1941, dealing with
Brack’s collaboration in
the construction of gas
chambers for the
extermination of Jews.
NO-371 Pros. Ex. 186 Affidavit of defendant Rudolf I-503
Brandt, 14 October 1946,
concerning experiments to
determine the cause of
epidemic jaundice.
NO-402 Pros. Ex. 66 Letter, 29 September 1942, I-155
and report, 28 July 1942,
from Romberg and Ruff to
Himmler concerning
experiments on rescue from
high altitudes.
NO-409 Pros. Ex. 249 Report from Grawitz to I-657
Himmler, 29 August 1942,
concerning experiments with
biochemical remedies
conducted at the Dachau and
Auschwitz concentration
camps.
NO-422 Pros. Ex. 33 Letter from Himmler to I-89
Sievers, 7 July 1942,
concerning the
establishment of an
“Institute for Military
Scientific Research” within
the Ahnenerbe Society.
NO-426 Pros. Ex. 160 Extract from the affidavit of I-842
defendant Brack, 14 October
1946, describing
administrative details and
procedure of the Euthanasia
Program.
NO-428 Pros. Ex. 91 Report of 10 October 1942, on I-226
cooling experiments on
human beings.
NO-429 Pros. Ex. 281 Extract from the affidavit of I-555
defendant Hoven, 24 October
1946, concerning typhus and
virus experiments.
NO-429 Pros. Ex. 281 Extracts from the affidavit I-685
of Waldemar Hoven, 24
October 1946, concerning
the killing of inmates by
phenol and other means.
NO-429 Pros. Ex. 281 Extract from the affidavit of I-847
defendant Hoven, 24 October
1946, concerning the
transfer of concentration
camp inmates to euthanasia
stations for extermination.
NO-432 Pros. Ex. 119 Letter from Rascher to Neff, I-258
21 October 1943, concerning
dry-freezing experiments.
NO-438 Pros. Ex. 240 Report from the Institute for I-678
Military Scientific
Research, (Department Dr.
Rascher) on “Polygal 10”.
NO-441 Pros. Ex. 205 Affidavit of defendant Rudolf I-775
Brandt, 24 October 1946,
concerning the plan to
exterminate tubercular
Polish Nationals.
NO-472 Pros. Ex. 234 Affidavit of the defendant I-376
Fischer, 21 October 1946,
supplementing his affidavit
concerning sulfanilamide
experiments.
NO-520 Pros. Ex. 374 Letter from the chief of the I-854
Institution for
feeble-minded in Stetten to
Dr. Frank, 6 September
1940, requesting that
euthanasia be carried out
only after legal basis was
created.
NO-571 Pros. Ex. 285 1943 Work Report for I-573
Department for Typhus and
Virus Research.
NO-579 Pros. Ex. 288 Extract from a report on the I-644
Findings of 2 January 1944,
on a skin ointment—R 17—for
phosphorus burns.
NO-610 Pros. Ex. 41 Inmates of the Dachau I-898-900
concentration camp in
different stages of
simulated altitude in the
low-pressure chamber;
postmortem dissections of
high altitude experimental
subjects showing air
bubbles in blood vessels in
subarachnoid space of brain
and under pleura of
anterior chest wall. (_See_
selections from
photographic evidence of
the prosecution.)
NO-645 Pros. Ex. 3 Table of organization of the I-91
Reich Commissioner for
Health and Medical
Services, drawn by the
defendant Karl Brandt.
NO-656 Pros. Ex. 247 Memorandum by SS I-680
Obersturmbannfuerer Wolff,
8 May 1944; letters from
Dr. Kahr to Rascher, 10 and
16 December 1943.
NO-660 Pros. Ex. 377 Note by Sellmer, 6 December I-855
1940, describing the method
of selection for
euthanasia.
NO-690 Pros. Ex. 120 List of research projects I-259
from the files of the Reich
Research Council.
NO-794 Pros. Ex. 259 Letter from Sievers to Rudolf I-336
Brandt, 27 June 1942,
concerning mustard gas and
its effect on human beings.
NO-807 Pros. Ex. 185 Tank containing formaldehyde I-905-908
for the preservation of
corpses; corpses assembled
in tanks prior to
dissection; corpse showing
incisions in preparation
for dissection. (_See_
selections from
photographic evidence of
the prosecution.)
NO-842 Pros. Ex. 405 Letter from Brack to Dr. I-857
Schlegelberger, 18 April
1941, forwarding forms for
euthanasia and suggesting
that death notifications
should not follow a
stereotyped form.
NO-856 Pros. Ex. 125 Extracts from the review of I-289
the proceedings of the
general military court in
the case of the United
States _vs._ Weiss,
Ruppert, _et al._, held at
Dachau, Germany.
NO-861 Pros. Ex. 232 Affidavit of Sofia Maczka, 16 I-402
April 1946, concerning
experimental operations on
inmates of the Ravensbrueck
concentration camp.
NO-875 Pros. Ex. 230 Affidavit of Mrs. Zdenka I-400
Nedvedova-Nejedla, M.D., of
Prague, concerning
experimental operations
conducted on fellow inmates
in Ravensbrueck
concentration camp.
NO-891 Pros. Ex. 414 Directive of the Reich I-863
Minister of the Interior, 6
September 1944, ordering
euthanasia extended to
insane Eastern workers.
NO-894 Pros. Ex. 38 Fuehrer Decree, 9 June 1942, I-90
concerning the Reich
Research Council.
NO-907 Pros. Ex. 412 Extract from letter from Dr. I-861
Fritz Mennecke to his wife,
25 November 1941,
concerning his activities
as physician selecting
inmates of concentration
camp Buchenwald for
euthanasia.
NO-978 Pros. Ex. 480 Letter from Sievers to I-349
Gluecks, 11 September 1942,
concerning military
scientific research work to
be conducted at Natzweiler
concentration camp.
NO-1007 Pros. Ex. 413 Circular from Gluecks to I-862
concentration camp
commandants, 27 April 1943,
stating that in the future
only insane prisoners
should be used for Action
“14 f 13” (euthanasia).
NO-1080 A, E, F Pros. Ex. 219 Exposures of the witness I-901-902
A, E, F Maria Kusmierczuk who
underwent sulfanilamide and
bone experiments while an
inmate of the Ravensbrueck
concentration camp. (_See_
selections from
photographic evidence of
the prosecution.)
NO-1082 A, C Pros. Ex. 214 Exposures of the witness I-903
A, C Jadwiga Dzido who underwent
sulfanilamide and bone
experiments while an inmate
of the Ravensbrueck
concentration camp. (_See_
selections from
photographic evidence of
the prosecution.)
NO-1135 Pros. Ex. 334 Confirmation, 30 August 1940, I-848
of the transfer of mental
patients with list of
transferred patients
attached.
NO-1424 Pros. Ex. 462 Affidavit of Fritz Friedrich I-676
Karl Rascher, M.D., 31
December 1946, concerning
the life and activities of
Dr. Sigmund Rascher.
NO-1852 Pros. Ex. 456 Extract from report on I-345
medical experiments
addressed to Karl Brandt.
NO-2734 Pros. Ex. 473 Extracts of letter from I-660
Grawitz to Himmler, 7
September 1942, and report
on gas gangrene
experiments.
NO-3963 Pros. Ex. 528 Extracts from affidavit of I-710
Karl Wilhelm Friedrich
Tauboeck, 18 June 1947,
concerning the development
of, and experiments with
sterilization drugs.
343-A-PS Pros. Ex. 62 Letter from Milch to Wolff, I-172
20 May 1942, regarding
continuation of
experiments.
343-B-PS Pros. Ex. 70 Letter from Milch to Himmler, I-172
31 August 1942,
acknowledging receipt of
reports by Rascher and
Romberg on high-altitude
experiments.
615-PS Pros. Ex. 246 Letter from Dr. Hilfrich, I-845
Bishop of Limburg, to the
Reich Minister of Justice,
13 August 1941, protesting
against the killing of
mentally ill people.
630-PS Pros. Ex. 330 Letter from Hitler to Karl I-848
Brandt and Bouhler, 1
September 1939, charging
them with the execution of
euthanasia.
1553-PS Pros. Ex. 428 Extract from the field I-865
interrogation of Kurt
Gerstein, 26 April 1945,
describing the mass gassing
of Jews and other
“undesirables”.
1580-PS Pros. Ex. 107 Letter from Himmler to I-253
Rascher, 26 February 1943,
on freezing experiments in
the concentration camps
Auschwitz and Lublin.
1581-A-PS Pros. Ex. 48 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-144
Sievers, 21 March 1942,
concerning Rascher’s
participation in
high-altitude experiments.
1582-PS Pros. Ex. 45 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-143
Rascher, undated, informing
him that prisoners would be
made available for
high-altitude research.
1602-PS Pros. Ex. 44 Letter from Rascher to I-141
Himmler, 15 May 1941,
concerning high-altitude
experiments on human
beings.
1609-PS Pros. Ex. 92 Letter from Himmler to I-244
Rascher, 24 October 1942,
and note by Rudolf Brandt.
1611-PS Pros. Ex. 85 Letter from Himmler to I-221
Rascher and Sievers, 22
September 1942, ordering
rewarming in freezing
experiments through
physical warmth.
1612-PS Pros. Ex. 79 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-176
Rascher, 13 December 1942,
and Himmler’s order
assigning Rascher to
high-altitude experiments.
1613-PS Pros. Ex. 90 Letter from Rascher to I-225
Himmler, 16 October 1942,
transmitting report on
cooling experiments on
human beings (_NO-428_).
1616-PS Pros. Ex. 105 Letter from Rascher to I-249
Himmler, 17 February 1943,
and summary of experiments
for rewarming of chilled
human beings by animal
warmth, 12 February 1943.
1618-PS Pros. Ex. 84 Intermediate report, 10 I-220
September 1942, on intense
chilling experiments in the
Dachau concentration camp.
1619-PS Pros. Ex. 87 Teletype from commandant of I-223
Dachau concentration camp
to Rudolf Brandt, 7 October
1942, stating that four
women would be available
from Ravensbrueck
concentration camp for
Rascher’s experiments.
1696-PS Pros. Ex. 357 Letter from Dr. Conti to the I-849
Mental Hospital in
Kaufbeuren, 16 November
1939, requesting that
questionnaires (attached)
be filled out for
individual patients; letter
from the General Sick
Transport Company to the
Mental Hospital in
Kaufbeuren, 12 May 1941,
stating that the company
would remove mental
patients; report from the
Provincial Association for
Social Welfare in Swabia, 6
May 1941, that all
transferred patients had
died; letter from Gaum, 24
November 1942, to Dr.
Leinisch stating that
epileptics would be made
available for research.
1971-A-PS Pros. Ex. 49 Letter from Rascher to I-144
Himmler, 5 April 1942, and
report, undated, on
high-altitude experiments.
1971-B-PS Pros. Ex. 51 Letter from Himmler to I-148
Rascher, 13 April 1942,
requesting a repetition of
high-altitude experiments
on prisoners condemned to
death.
1971-C-PS Pros. Ex. 50 Letter from Rudolf Brandt to I-147
Rascher, 13 April 1942,
regarding his success with
high-altitude experiments.
1971-D-PS Pros. Ex. 52 Teletype from Rascher to I-149
Rudolf Brandt, 20 October
1942, requesting
clarification on the pardon
granted by Himmler.
1971-E-PS Pros. Ex. 53 Teletype from Rudolf Brandt I-149
to Schnitzler, 21 October
1942, concerning the pardon
granted by Himmler.
3896-PS Pros. Ex. 372 Extract from the affidavit of I-853
Dr. Ludwig Sprauer, 23
April 1946, concerning the
organization of the
Euthanasia Program.
Becker-Freyseng 31 Becker-Freysen Extracts from Harper’s II-65
g Ex. 18 Magazine entitled “Secrets
by the Thousand” by C.
Lester Walker.
Becker-Freyseng 42 Becker-Freysen Affidavit of Dr. Ludwig I-455
g Ex. 29 Harriehausen, 9 January
1947, regarding use of
patients in sea-water
experiments.
Becker-Freyseng 60 Becker-Freysen Statement of Professor Dr. II-95
g Ex. 58 Hans Luxenburger and Dr.
Hans Halbach concerning the
report on experiments on
human beings in world
literature (Becker-Freyseng
60a, Becker-Freyseng Ex.
59).
Becker-Freyseng Becker-Freysen Extracts from report on II-96
60a g Ex. 59 experiments on human beings
in world literature;
excerpts from various
newspapers and medical
weeklies.
Karl Brandt 1 Karl Brandt Extract from “Life” magazine II-95
Ex. 1 concerning malaria
experiments on convicts in
U.S. penitentiaries.
Karl Brandt 12 Karl Brandt Affidavit of Dr. Walther I-350
Ex. 11 Scheiber on his efforts to
purchase experimental
animals in Spain and bring
them to Germany.
Karl Brandt 18 Karl Brandt Extracts from the affidavit I-871
Ex. 15 of Dr. Werner Kirchert, 29
January 1947, stating that
Karl Brandt was not
involved in the Euthanasia
Program.
Karl Brandt 19 Karl Brandt Affidavit of Alfred I-872
Ex. 16 Rueggeberg, 23 January
1947, concerning radio
discussions on euthanasia.
Karl Brandt 23 Karl Brandt Affidavit of Eduard Woermann, I-873
Ex. 19 18 January 1947, concerning
discussion of Karl Brandt
and Pastor Bodelschwingh on
euthanasia.
Karl Brandt 101 Karl Brandt Affidavit of Dr. Otto Ambros, I-351
Ex. 41 21 April 1947, concerning
the urgency of experiments
in the field of
chemical-warfare agents and
their countermeasures.
Karl Brandt 103 Karl Brandt Affidavit of Dr. Walter I-352
Ex. 42 Mielenz, 21 April 1947,
concerning the assignment
of Karl Brandt in
connection with chemical
warfare.
Karl Brandt 117 Karl Brandt Excerpts from the II-103
Ex. 103 dissertation “Infection
Experiments on Human
Beings” by Alfred Heilbrunn
of the Hygiene Institute of
the Wuerzburg University,
1937, concerning
experiments on human beings
in other countries.
Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from report on the I-377
Oberheuser 1 Fischer, First Conference East of
Oberheuser Ex. Consulting Specialists on
6 18 and 19 May 1942 at the
Military Medical Academy,
Berlin.
Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from report on the I-378
Oberheuser 3 Fischer, Third Conference East of
Oberheuser Ex. Consulting Specialists on
10 24 to 26 May 1943 at the
Military Medical Academy,
Berlin.
Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from “Clinic and I-405
Oberheuser 6 Fischer, Practice”, weekly journal
Oberheuser Ex. for the Practicing
9 Physician, regarding bone
transplantation.
Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from affidavit of Dr. I-377
Oberheuser 21 Fischer, Karl Friedrich Brunner, 14
Oberheuser Ex. March 1947.
20
Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from affidavit of Dr. I-407
Oberheuser 21 Fischer, Karl Friedrich Brunner, 14
Oberheuser Ex. March 1945, concerning
20 scientific experiments
conducted at the clinic of
Hohenlychen.
Gebhardt, Fischer, Gebhardt, Extract from affidavit of Dr. I-408
Oberheuser 22 Fischer, Josef Koestler concerning
Oberheuser Ex. Dr. Gebhardt’s activities,
21 27 February 1947.
Rose 11 Rose Ex. 27 Extract from report of I-298
Professor Dr. E.
Gildemeister concerning the
activities of the Robert
Koch Institute—Reich
Institute for the fight
against infectious
diseases.
Rose 16 Rose Ex. 12 Extracts from the affidavit I-581
of Professor Otto Lenz,
director of the Robert Koch
Institute in Berlin.
Rose 46 Rose Ex. 20 Extract from a certified I-582
statement, 4 March 1947, of
J. Oerskov, M.D., director
of the State Serum
Institute in Copenhagen.
Rose 47 Rose Ex. 35 Affidavit of Professor Dr. I-300
Hans Luxenburger, 24 March
1947, concerning Rose’s
interest in therapeutical
malaria treatments.
Rose 50 Rose Ex. 49 Extract from the affidavit of I-302
Professor Dr. Ernst Georg
Nauck, M.D., Hamburg 4,
Bernhard-Nocht-Institute
for nautical and tropical
diseases.
Mrugowsky 115 Mrugowsky Ex. Extracts from the affidavit I-647
108 of Udo Von Woyrsch, 3 May
1947, concerning
experiments on combating
injuries due to phosphorus
incendiary bombs.
Sievers 45 Sievers Ex. 46 Extract from the affidavit of I-752
Dr. Gisela Schmitz, 27
March 1947, on Siever’s
position in the Ahnenerbe
Society and his connection
with the skeleton
collection.
Sievers 54 Sievers Ex. 50 Regulations for the Commandos I-754
(Einsatzkommandos) of the
Security Police and the
Security Service to be
activated in Stalags.
Blome 1 Blome Ex. 8 Extracts from the affidavit I-778
of Dr. Oskar Gundermann, 28
December 1946, stating that
Blome opposed the plan to
exterminate tubercular
Poles and that the plan was
never carried out.
Blome 14 Blome Ex. 6 Extracts from a report on the I-777
German Tuberculosis
Conference of 18 to 20
March 1937, at Wiesbaden.
Pokorny 19 Pokorny Ex. 27 Affidavit of Dr. Helmuth I-874
Weese, 19 March 1947,
concerning use of caladium
seguinum for sterilization.
TESTIMONIES
Vol-
Page
Dr. Leo Alexander I-386, 417
Beiglboeck I-468
Blome I-780
Brack I-732, 876
Karl Brandt I-506, 892, 900;
II-29
Rudolf Brandt I-183, 757
Jadwiga Dzido I-381
Gebhardt I-388, 667
Dr. Eugen Haagen I-606
Handloser I-265
Dr. Friedrich Hielscher II-30
Karl Hoellenrainer I-456
Dr. Andrew C. Ivy I-994;
II-42, 60, 82,
110
Miss Karolewska I-409
Eugen Kogon I-583, 637, 648, 993
Werner Leibbrandt II-80
Dr. Mennecke I-875
Mrugowsky I-595, 651, 688;
II-56, 66
Walter Neff I-177, 260
Romberg I-186
Rose I-308, 586, 973;
II-69, 77, 118
Schmidt I-890
Schroeder I-269
Sievers I-274, 682
Stoehr I-664
Vieweg I-303
Vollhardt I-474
“_The Milch Case_”
_CASE NO. 2_
MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. II
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
—_against_—
ERHARD MILCH
INTRODUCTION
The trial of Erhard Milch, formerly a Field Marshal in the German Air
Force, is officially designated _United States of America vs. Erhard
Milch_ (Case No. 2), and was heard by Military Tribunal II in the Palace
of Justice at Nuernberg. The proceedings lasted from 13 November 1946 to
17 April 1947, in the course of which period the Court convened 39
times. The prosecution consumed 8 and the defense 28 trial days. A
chronological table of the trial follows:
Indictment filed 13 November 1946
Indictment served 14 November 1946
Arraignment 20 December 1946
Prosecution opening statement 2 January 1947
Defense opening statement 27 January 1947
Prosecution and defense closing 25 March 1947
statements
Judgment 16 April 1947
Sentence 17 April 1947
Affirmation of sentence by Military 17 June 1947
Governor, U.S. Zone of Occupation
Order of the U.S. Supreme Court 20 October 1947
denying writ of habeas corpus
The prosecution introduced into evidence 161 written exhibits, some of
which contained several documents. The defense introduced 51 written
exhibits. The Tribunal heard the oral testimony of 3 witnesses who were
called by the prosecution; 27 witnesses called by the defense were heard
by the full court, and 3 before a commissioner. One witness was called
by the Tribunal on its own motion. The defendant Milch testified at
length in his own behalf.
The members of the Tribunal, and prosecution and defense counsel, are
listed on the ensuing pages. Prosecution counsel were assisted in
preparing the case by Walter Rapp, Chief of the Evidence Division,
Norbert Barr and Bevenuto Selcke, interrogators, and Robert Blakeslie,
Nancy Fenstermacher, and Tempa Altman Watson, research and documentary
analysts.
The material selected for this volume was principally compiled by Mr.
Paul H. Gantt as case editor, working under the general supervision of
Mr. Drexel A. Sprecher, Deputy Chief Counsel and Director of
Publications, Office, United States Chief of Counsel for War Crimes.
Catherine W. Bedford, Henry Buxbaum, Emilie Evand, Gertrude Ferencz,
Helga Lund, Gwendoline Niebergall, and Johanna K. Reischer assisted in
selecting, compiling, editing and indexing the numerous papers.
John H. E. Fried, Special Legal Consultant to the Tribunals, reviewed
and approved the selection and arrangement of the material as the
designated representative of the Nuernberg Military Tribunals.
Final compilation and editing of the manuscript for printing was
administered by the War Crimes Division, Office of the Judge Advocate
General, under the direct supervision of Richard A. Olbeter, Chief,
Special Projects Branch, with Alma Soller as editor, Amelia Rivers as
assistant editor and John W. Mosenthal as research analyst.
ORDER CONSTITUTING TRIBUNAL II
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
APO 742
16 DECEMBER 1946
GENERAL ORDERS }
No. 85 }
PURSUANT TO MILITARY GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE NO. 7
1. Effective as of 14 December 1946, pursuant to Military Government
Ordinance No. 7, 24 October 1946, entitled “Organization and Powers of
Certain Military Tribunals”, there is hereby constituted, Military
Tribunal II.
2. The following are designated as members of Military Tribunal II:
ROBERT M. TOMS Presiding Judge
FITZROI D. PHILLIPS^{*} Judge
MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO Judge
JOHN J. SPEIGHT Alternate Judge
^{*} OMGUS General Orders No. 5, 21 January 1947, corrected spelling to
Fitzroy D. Phillips.
3. The Tribunal shall convene at Nurenberg, Germany, to hear such cases
as may be filed by the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes or by his duly
designated representative.
BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLAY:
C. K. GAILEY
_Brigadier General, GSC_
_Chief of Staff_
OFFICIAL: SEAL:
G. H. GARDE Office of Military Government
_Lieutenant Colonel, AGD_ for Germany (U. S.)
_Adjutant General_
DISTRIBUTION: “B” plus
2—AG MRU USFET
[Illustration: TRIBUNAL II—CASE TWO
L. to R.: _F. Donald Phillips_; _Robert M. Toms, presiding_;
_Michael A. Musmanno_; _John J. Speight, alternate_.]
[Illustration: _Former Luftwaffe Field Marshal Milch,
seated in the defense counsel section of courtroom one,
listens with his lawyer Dr. Bergold and his brother Werner
as Tribunal II announces its verdict in his case._]
[Illustration: _Defendant Erhard Milch with_
_his counsel, Dr. Friedrich Bergold._]
[Illustration: _Mr. Clark Denny, Chief
Trial Counsel of Case II._]
MEMBERS OF MILITARY TRIBUNAL II
ROBERT M. TOMS, Presiding
Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Detroit, Michigan
FITZROY DONALD PHILLIPS, Member,
Judge of the Superior Court for the 13th Judicial District of the
State of North Carolina
MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO, Member,
United States Naval Reserve, on military leave from Court of Common
Pleas, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
JOHN JOSHUA SPEIGHT, Alternate,
Prominent member of the Bar of the State of Alabama
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES GENERAL
Judge RICHARD D. DIXON From 20 December 1946 to 25 March 1947
Major MILLS C. HATFIELD From 16 April 1947 to 17 April 1947
PROSECUTION COUNSEL
CHIEF OF COUNSEL:
Brigadier General TELFORD TAYLOR
CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL:
Mr. CLARK DENNEY
ASSISTANT TRIAL COUNSEL:
Mr. JAMES S. CONWAY
Miss DOROTHY M. HUNT
Mr. HENRY T. KING, JR.
Mr. RAYMOND J. MCMAHON, JR.
Mr. MAURICE C. MYERS
DEFENSE COUNSEL
Dr. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD
Main Counsel
Dr. WERNER MILCH^{*}
Assistant Counsel
^{*} Brother of the defendant Milch.
I. INDICTMENT
The United States of America, by the undersigned Telford Taylor, Chief
of Counsel for War Crimes, duly appointed to represent said Government
in the prosecution of war criminals, charges the defendant Erhard Milch
with the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined
in Control Council Law No. 10,[62] duly enacted by the Allied Control
Council on 20 December 1945. The defendant Milch between 1939 and 1945
was State Secretary in the [Reich] Air Ministry (Staatssekretaer im
Reichsluftfahrt ministerium), Inspector General of the Air Force
(Generalinspekteur der Luftwaffe), Deputy to the Commander in Chief of
the Air Force (Stellvertreter des Oberbefehlshabers der Luftwaffe), and
Member of the Nazi Party (Mitglied der NSDAP). The defendant Milch was
also Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe (Generalfeldmarschall in der
Luftwaffe) 1940-45, Aircraft Master General (Generalluftzeugmeister)
1941-44, Member of the Central Planning Board (Mitglied der “Zentralen
Planung”) 1942-1945, and Chief of the Jaegerstab 1944-1945. The war
crimes and crimes against humanity charged herein against the defendant
Milch include deportation, enslavement and mistreatment of millions of
persons, participation in criminal medical experiments upon human
beings, and murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and
other inhumane acts.
COUNT ONE
1. Between September 1939 and May 1945 the defendant Milch unlawfully,
wilfully, and knowingly committed war crimes as defined by Article II of
Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to,
ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with
plans and enterprises involving slave labor and deportation to slave
labor of the civilian populations of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy,
Hungary, and other countries and territories occupied by the German
Armed Forces, in the course of which millions of persons were enslaved,
deported, ill-treated, terrorized, tortured, and murdered.
2. Between September 1939 and May 1945 the defendant Milch unlawfully,
wilfully, and knowingly committed war crimes as defined by Article II of
Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to,
ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with
plans and enterprises involving the use of prisoners of war in war
operations and work having a direct relation with war operations,
including the manufacture and transportation of arms and munitions, in
the course of which murders, cruelties, ill-treatment, and other
inhumane acts were committed against members of the armed forces of
nations then at war with the German Reich and who were in custody of the
German Reich in the exercise of belligerent control.
3. In the execution of the plans and enterprises charged in paragraphs 1
and 2 of this count, millions of persons were unlawfully subjected to
forced labor under cruel and inhumane conditions which resulted in
widespread suffering. At least 5,000,000 workers were deported to
Germany. The conscription of labor was accomplished in many cases by
drastic and violent methods. Workers destined for the Reich were sent
under guard to Germany, often packed in trains without adequate heat,
food, clothing, or sanitary facilities; other inhabitants of occupied
countries were conscripted and compelled to work in their own countries
to assist the German war economy and on fortifications and military
installations. The resources and needs of the occupied countries were
completely disregarded in the execution of the said plans and
enterprises. Prisoners of war were assigned to work directly related to
war operations, including work in munitions factories, loading bombers,
carrying ammunition, and manning antiaircraft guns. The treatment of
slave laborers and prisoners of war was based on the principle that they
should be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way as to exploit them
to the greatest possible extent at the lowest expenditure.
4. The defendant Milch from 1942 to 1945 was a member of the Central
Planning Board which had supreme authority for the scheduling of
production and the allocation and development of raw materials in the
German war economy. The Central Planning Board determined the labor
requirements of industry, agriculture, and all other phases of German
war economy, and made requisitions for and allocations of such labor.
The defendant Milch had full knowledge of the illegal manner in which
foreign laborers were conscripted and prisoners of war utilized to meet
such requisitions, and of the unlawful and inhumane conditions under
which they were exploited. He attended the meetings of the Central
Planning Board, participated in its decisions and in the formulation of
basic policies with reference to the exploitation of such labor,
advocated the increased use of forced labor and prisoners of war to
expand war production, and urged that cruel and repressive measures be
utilized to procure and exploit such labor.
5. During the years 1939-1945 the defendant Milch, as State Secretary in
the Air Ministry, Inspector General of the Air Force, Deputy to the
Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe,
Aircraft Master General, and Chief of the Jaegerstab, had responsibility
for the development and production of arms and munitions for the German
Air Force. The defendant Milch exploited foreign laborers and prisoners
of war in the arms, aircraft, and munitions factories under his control,
made requisitions for and allocations of such labor within the aircraft
industry, and personally directed that cruel and repressive measures be
adopted towards such labor.
6. Pursuant to the order of the defendant Milch, prisoners of war who
had attempted escape were murdered on or about 15 February 1944.
7. The said war crimes constitute violations of international
conventions, particularly of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 46, and 52 of the
Hague Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, and 31 of the
Prisoner-of-War Convention (Geneva, 1929), the laws and customs of war,
the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws
of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in
which such crimes were committed, and Article II of Control Council Law
No. 10.
COUNT TWO
8. Between March 1942 and May 1943 the defendant Milch unlawfully,
wilfully, and knowingly committed war crimes as defined in Article II of
Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to,
ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with
plans and enterprises involving medical experiments without the
subjects’ consent, upon members of the armed forces and civilians of
nations then at war with the German Reich and who were in the custody of
the German Reich in the exercise of belligerent control, in the course
of which experiments the defendant Milch, together with divers other
persons, committed murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, and other
inhumane acts. Such experiments included, but were not limited to, the
following:
(_A_) _HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS._ From about March 1942 to
about August 1942 experiments were conducted at the Dachau
concentration camp for the benefit of the German Air Force to
investigate the limits of human endurance and existence at
extremely high altitudes. The experiments were carried out in a
low-pressure chamber in which the atmospheric conditions and
pressure prevailing at high altitudes (up to 68,000 feet) could
be duplicated. The experimental subjects were placed in the
low-pressure chamber and thereafter the simulated altitude
therein was raised. Many victims died as a result of these
experiments and others suffered grave injury, torture, and
ill-treatment.
(_B_) _FREEZING EXPERIMENTS._ From about August 1942 to about
May 1943 experiments were conducted at the Dachau concentration
camp primarily for the benefit of the German Air Force to
investigate the most effective means of treating persons who had
been severely chilled or frozen. In one series of experiments
the subjects were forced to remain in a tank of ice water for
periods up to 3 hours. Extreme rigor developed in a short time.
Numerous victims died in the course of these experiments. After
the survivors were severely chilled, rewarming was attempted by
various means. In another series of experiments, the subjects
were kept naked outdoors for many hours at temperatures below
freezing. The victims screamed with pain as parts of their
bodies froze.
9. The said war crimes constitute violations of international
conventions, particularly of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, and 46 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Prisoner-of-War
Convention (Geneva, 1929), the laws and customs of war, the general
principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all
civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which
such crimes were committed, and of Article II, of Control Council Law
No. 10.
COUNT THREE
10. Between September 1939 and May 1945 the defendant Milch unlawfully,
wilfully, and knowingly committed crimes against humanity, as defined by
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in,
accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was
connected with plans and enterprises involving slave labor and
deportation to slave labor of German nationals and nationals of other
countries in the course of which millions of persons were enslaved,
deported, ill-treated, terrorized, tortured, and murdered. The
particulars of these crimes are set forth in count one of this
indictment and are incorporated herein by reference.
11. Between March 1942 and May 1943 the defendant Milch unlawfully,
wilfully, and knowingly committed crimes against humanity as defined in
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 in that he was principal in,
accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was
connected with plans and enterprises involving medical experiments,
without the subjects’ consent, upon German nationals and nationals of
other countries, in the course of which experiments the defendant Milch,
together with divers other persons, committed murders, brutalities,
cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts. The
particulars of such experiments are set forth in count two of this
indictment and are incorporated herein by reference.
12. The said crimes against humanity constitute violations of
international conventions, the laws and customs of war, the general
principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all
civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which
such crimes were committed, and Article II of Control Council Law No.
10.
WHEREFORE, this indictment is filed with the Secretary General of the
Military Tribunals and the charges herein made against the above-named
defendant are hereby presented to the Military Tribunals.
TELFORD TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Counsel for War Crimes
Acting on Behalf of the United States of America
Nuernberg, 13 November 1946
-----
[62] See vol. I, this series, pref. pp. III thru XXVIII for basic
papers.
II. ARRAIGNMENT[63]
THE MARSHAL: Military Tribunal No. 2 is now in session. God save the
United States of America and this honorable Tribunal.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Marshal will ascertain whether the defendant,
Erhard Milch, is present in Court.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, the defendant is present in the
Court.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Is counsel for the defendant, Dr. Bergold, also
present?
THE MARSHAL: Dr. Bergold is also present in the courtroom.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Prosecution may proceed with the arraignment by
reading the indictment.
[At this point Mr. Clark Denney read the indictment. See p.
360.]
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The defendant will stand. You have heard the
indictment just read?
ERHARD MILCH: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: And it has been translated into the German
language which you understand?
ERHARD MILCH: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: For more than 30 days you have had in your
possession a copy of this indictment translated into the German
language?
ERHARD MILCH: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: You have also had the benefit of Dr. Bergold’s
counsel for at least 30 days?
ERHARD MILCH: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Now then to this indictment how do you plead,
guilty or not guilty?
ERHARD MILCH: Not guilty.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Secretary General will enter upon the records
of the Court the defendant’s plea of not guilty. You may be seated.
The Tribunal has set Thursday, the second day of January 1947 for the
commencement of the trial of this action. Will the United States be
ready on that date?
MR. DENNEY: The Government will be ready at that time, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Dr. Bergold, will you be ready to proceed with the
trial on the second of January?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes.
* * * * *
-----
[63] Tr. p. 7.
III. OPENING STATEMENTS
A. Opening Statement for the Prosecution[64]
MR. DENNEY: May it please your Honors, this defendant is Erhard Milch,
Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe, Inspector General of the Luftwaffe,
State Secretary in the Air Ministry, Generalluftzeugmeister, sole
representative of the Wehrmacht on the Central Planning Board, Chief of
the Jaegerstab,[65] and member of the Nazi Party.
This man is accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity in that he
took part in the program for the enslavement and ill-treatment of the
civilian population of vast territories conquered by the armed forces of
Germany and in the employment of prisoners of war in tasks forbidden by
the laws and customs of war. He is also accused of the torture and
murder of concentration camp inmates and prisoners of war who were made
the unwilling subjects of savage and fatal medical experiments.
The life of Erhard Milch is a story of personal and professional
betrayal. A man of high intelligence, of great executive ability, he
misused these talents to dedicate them to a scheme for conquest and a
plan for the enslavement of the world. The 10 years of military service
of the defendant from the age of 18 to 28 which took him through the
First World War were a perfect preparation for the tasks to come. From
1915 to 1919, Milch was a scout, observer, adjutant and squadron leader
in the German Air Force. At the very infancy of military aviation, the
defendant began an association which was to last through his entire
public career. It was at this time that he learned the needs and the
problems of flying men, a knowledge which was to stand him in such good
stead in his work as the founder of the Luftwaffe.
The defendant never dissociated himself from the aims and ideals of
German militarism. He became one of the silent army of men who
remembered, hated, and hoped; but unlike many others, this man did not
sit idly by. He did not wait passively for Germany to rise again, he
devoted his best efforts towards that end. In 1921, only 1 year after
his discharge from the army, we find him working as chief of air
operations [flights] in the new business of commercial aviation.
There is no necessity to fill out in detail the successive steps in the
defendant’s rise in civilian air transportation—a few broad strokes
suffice. The next significant event in his career came in 1925 when he
joined the state-sponsored Lufthansa which within 3 years he was to form
into the nucleus of a new air force. It is no euphemism that he was
called the Father of German Air Transportation.
When Hitler came into power in 1933, Milch acceded to the requests of
both Goering and Hitler and assumed the additional duty of State
Secretary in the Air Ministry. It was understood from the start, and it
was confirmed in 1937, that Milch would succeed Goering as Chief of the
German Air Force in the event of the latter’s death or withdrawal. By
the time the new Luftwaffe had publicly emerged from such embryos as the
Air Sport League, the Air Defense League, and the Flying [Flieger]
Hitler Youth, the defendant had become a Generalleutnant (the equivalent
of the American major general). The honors which followed: field marshal
in the Luftwaffe in 1940, which was gained from 2 months’ participation
in the invasion of Norway; Generalluft-Zeugmeister in 1941; member of
the Central Planning Board in 1942; Chief of the Jaegerstab in 1944,
were proof alike of the evil genius of Erhard Milch and of his complete
compatibility with the Nazi ambitions and methods.
This defendant became a member of the Nazi Party in May 1933. His work
in the Party was important. He was indeed one of the little group of
specialists of whom Mr. Justice Jackson, in his closing address before
the International Military Tribunal, aptly said:
“It is doubtful whether the Nazi master plan could have
succeeded without their specialized intelligence which they so
willingly put at its command. They (speaking of Goering, Keitel,
Jodl, and the rest) did so with knowledge of its announced aims
and methods and continued their services after practice had
confirmed the direction in which they were tending. Their
superiority to the average run of Nazi mediocrity is not their
excuse. It is their condemnation.”[66]
Various Germans allowed themselves to be absorbed into the Nazi Party
for a variety of reasons. Depression, financial and business betterment,
ambition, discouragement with the previous political situation, and
human weakness in the face of terrorism, all played their part in the
recruitment of the Nazi machine. There were few cases in which a man
made as clear, as deliberate, and as discreditable a choice of Nazism as
did Milch.
The high esteem in which the defendant was held by Hitler and his
position within the inner circle of Nazi militarists can be seen from
the fact that he was one of a party of fourteen of Hitler’s highest and
most trusted officers who attended a conference in the new Reich
Chancellory on 23 May 1939, at which Hitler made known to his military
chiefs his plans and objectives. (_L-79._)
All in all, two points stand out in even a quick survey of Milch’s
career: First, he never accepted the defeat of Germany in the First
World War; his life between the wars was devoted to the work of placing
Germany in a position to challenge the world in the matter of air
supremacy; and second, he was a man who was unlikely to allow either
difficulty or honor to stand in the way of the accomplishment of his
purpose—the objectives of the Nazi Party. If these characteristics are
borne in mind, much of the defendant’s fanaticism and the unbelievable
savagery with which he adhered to the Nazi plan for conquest at the
expense of all values of human decency may be seen as the natural
consequences of the acts of a man with his criminal philosophy.
We have then, at the outbreak of the war this man, already within the
inner circle, already devoted to the Nazi scheme of things and quite
essential to their fulfillment, with a record of organization and with
the work of preparation behind him—poised with his companions for the
kill. We see the air armadas, which were the labor of his love, helping
to shatter Poland within 18 days, helping to reduce the Lowlands to
smoking ruins within a few days’ time, assisting in the subjugation of
the French military machine and in driving the British from the
continent in a period of a few weeks. We see the hordes of the
Fatherland racing on and on with the air arm always overhead, preparing
the way, until Germany had overrun a territory from the Normandy Coast
to Moscow, and from the North Sea to El Alamein.
Then began the occupation, the next step in the plan of the Third
Reich—an empire which was to last a thousand years. Over an entire
continent there spread the deadly rigor of a “Pax Germanica” in which
there was to be one citizen class, one race of supermen, and the
balance, one class of slaves. At first the occupation overlords
maintained the appearance of legality. They gave receipts for the
property they plundered, they offered inducements to the laborers they
shanghaied, they went through the mockery of signing contracts which
were both illusory and fraudulent. But even this sham disappeared as the
war went on, and as early as 1942, the German occupation appeared in
public as the ugly thing it was, complete with armed recruiters,
military escorts on deportation trains and prison camps for the workers
brought into Germany. Mr. Justice Jackson, in his opening address on
behalf of the United States of America before the International Military
Tribunal,[67] vividly described the character and extent of the
slave-labor program in the following words:
“Perhaps the deportation to slave labor was the most horrible
and extensive slaving operation in history. On few other
subjects is our evidence so abundant and so damaging. In a
speech made on 25 January 1944 the defendant Frank, Governor
General of Poland, boasted, ‘I have sent 1,300,000 Polish
workers into the Reich.’ (_059-PS, p. 2._) The defendant Sauckel
reported that ‘out of the 5 million foreign workers who arrived
in Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily.’ * * * Children of
10 to 14 years were impressed into service * * *.
“When enough labor was not forthcoming, prisoners of war were
forced into war work in flagrant violation of international
conventions (_016-PS_). Slave labor came from France, Belgium,
Holland, Italy, and the East. Methods of recruitment were
violent (_R-124_, _018-PS_, _204-PS_). The treatment of these
slave laborers was stated in general terms, not difficult to
translate into concrete deprivations, in a letter to the
defendant Rosenberg from the defendant Sauckel, which stated:
* * * * *
“‘All the men’ (prisoners of war and foreign civilian
workers) ‘must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a
way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at
the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure * * *’
(_016-PS_)”.
Working as we do every day with crimes of unbelievable enormity, we are
apt to become quite deadened to the hideous nature of specific crimes.
It is, therefore, well to stop and consider the particular offenses with
which this man stands charged.
Crimes are best evaluated in terms of the rights they violate. The evil,
slavery, which is the deprivation of another’s liberty, is best judged
through a consideration of its opposite good, freedom. Freedom is, to an
extent, properly regarded as the symbol of human progress, the measure
of civilization. Much of man’s history can be expressed in terms of his
fight for freedom. Man’s personal freedom is his most precious
prerogative, the exercise of his free will is his distinctive function.
The building of a legal structure to protect the freedom of the
individual is the basic purpose of good government. Men have lived for
freedom, worked for it, fought for it, and died for it.
It is precisely because of their destructive effects on the freedom of
the individual that governments such as the Nazi German State are so
hatefully and essentially evil. The Nazi rise to power is a story of
duress which ripened into slavery, first for the people within Germany
and then for those in the lands she conquered. The enforced labor
program was no expedient forced upon Germany by the exigencies of war.
It was a basic concept of the Nazi scheme and the permanent destiny of
those who would come under the German yoke.
It is most natural, therefore, that Control Council Law No. 10, which
was enacted for the guidance of this and other tribunals which are set
up for the trial of the principals in the crime of Nazi Germany, should
deal in very severe terms with that most Nazi of all crimes—slavery.
Article II, paragraph 1 (sec. _b_) specifically names among the
enumerated war crimes the ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor of
civilian populations from occupied territory and the murder or
ill-treatment of prisoners of war. Paragraph 1 (sec. _c_) specifies as a
crime against humanity, deportation of civilian populations. Article II,
paragraphs 2 and 3 proclaim that anyone taking a principal or consenting
part in these crimes, or belonging to a plan or enterprise for the
commission of these crimes, is guilty of an offense for which the death
penalty may be prescribed.
The prosecution will prove that Milch was a principal in the deportation
into slave labor of civilian populations from occupied territories. It
will show that he was involved in the murder and ill-treatment of
prisoners of war. Evidence will be presented which will prove that he
was engaged in plans and enterprises which directly involved the use of
slave labor. We will show that this man was as much concerned with the
employment of slave labor as was any man in Germany. In his positions as
a member of the Central Planning Board, as Generalluftzeugmeister, and
as Chief of the Jaegerstab, he had full opportunity to hear all the grim
details of the exploitation of slave labor. He participated in decisions
and formulated basic policies with reference to its use, and over and
above all this he showed his personal animosity and his gratuitous
fanaticism in constantly urging the most repressive and cruel measures
in the procurement and exploitation of foreign workers.
During the course of this trial, an attempt will be made to distinguish
among that which this defendant did as Generalluftzeugmeister, as Chief
of the Jaegerstab, as State Secretary for Air, and as a member of the
Central Planning Board. At times it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to state in just which capacity he was acting at a
particular time. We must emphasize now that it is not essential to the
proof of this case that we should be able always to specify the exact
capacity in which the defendant acted. The multiplicity of his
connection with the slave-labor program is his greatest condemnation,
and it is because he knew so much and did so much that there can be no
excuse for him.
Erhard Milch operated at a policy level high in the chain of command
above the work boss and the concentration camp guard. We need not show
him driving the workers to their tasks or crowding them into the hovels
in which they lived. We are not primarily concerned with the minute
details of the slave-labor program which were carried out by minions who
obeyed men like the defendant. We were dealing with a planner of a great
crime, and it has not been difficult for the law to seek out and punish
those who plan as well as those who obey. The law would indeed be
derelict if only those were punished who pulled the trigger to kill, or,
comparably speaking, ran a slave camp in which people worked an 84-hour
week and dragged out a miserable existence under conditions from which
death was welcome relief.
This defendant cannot plead in truth that he did not know that the use
of slave labor was wrong. He cannot use even the technical excuse, so
common among the Nazis, that this was not illegal because the Nazi law
authorized it. Official sanction of slavery would have been a law so
evil that even the Nazi masters dared not proclaim it. A search through
the mass of decrees and pronouncements which passed for law during the
regime of Adolf Hitler fails to reveal sanction for slavery of foreign
laborers. On the other hand, certain prohibitory laws survived from a
more respectable day.
Paragraph 234 of the German Criminal Law (published in 1942 in Munich
and Berlin, pp. 364-365) provides that “whoever seizes another by ruse,
threat or force in order to expose him in a state of helplessness, or to
deliver him into slavery, bondage, or a foreign military or naval
service shall be punished for kidnapping by confinement in a
penitentiary.” This law was in force during the Nazi regime and was
published in the most recent edition of German Criminal Law which we
have been able to find.
That maltreatment was commonplace in the course of the enforced labor
program in Germany is well known; that starvation, murder, and all types
of personal abuses took place is notorious. All of this was found as a
fact in the decision of the International Military Tribunal. There can
be no question of the responsibility of the defendant for the murders
and privations which were the inevitable byproduct of the slave-labor
program.
But we need not follow the crime of slave labor down to its last detail
in order to show the defendant as the murderer he was. We can and will
prove that he directly participated in crimes of which murder was often
the intended and on numerous occasions the inevitable result.
The prosecution charges, and will prove, that he took an important,
responsible, and essential part in the practice of experiments upon
human beings carried out against their wills and in callous disregard of
the lives of its victims.
Cut then to bare essentials the charges set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9
of count two of the indictment and in paragraph 11 of count three can be
summarized by the statement that the defendant was officially connected
with and took a consenting part in enterprises in which criminal medical
experiments were performed upon involuntary subjects.
The nature and extent of these experiments and the fact that they were
conducted for the specific benefit of the Luftwaffe will be shown in
some detail. We will prove that the defendant was the responsible
Luftwaffe officer with ultimate supervisory authority over the
experiments. The Court will see that throughout the duration of these
experiments, the defendant was constantly treated by all concerned as
the ultimate authority within the Luftwaffe in control of the
experimental equipment and in charge of certain personnel who were
actively engaged in them.
Evidence will be presented which will prove that the defendant was
thoroughly informed of the criminal activities of Dr. Rascher, the
experimenter, and his associates. We will prove that a conference was
held at the defendant’s office, that films were shown there, that
communications were sent to him from highest Nazi sources which
specifically referred to opposition on the part of “narrow-minded
doctors” to the experiments. A web of evidence will be adduced to
portray the defendant, as he really was, an active partner in crime. We
will show that the defendant authorized the initiation of freezing
experiments and that he ordered an extension of the high-altitude
experiments for a period of 2 months, during which extended period a
number of experimental subjects died.
At the conclusion of the evidence with respect to the medical
experiments upon human beings there will remain no doubt that Erhard
Milch was a knowing, willing, and active participant in murder.
Throughout the trial the prosecution will place before the Court a
number of statements which will portray him as a man who believed no
tears should be shed for the victims of total war when German soldiers
every day were making the ultimate sacrifice for the Fatherland. This
man was not a hard-headed, single-minded production chief whose only
problem was to get things done and whose rash statements were the
impetuous remarks of an over-worked executive. Milch will be shown as a
man who boasted of his responsibility in the hanging of prisoners of
war, who urged that any effort on the part of foreign workers to strike
during enemy action should be met with rifle fire, who offered
protection to slave supervisors who should mistreat their subjects. We
will show that he was not too busy to inform himself fully of everything
with which he was officially connected and that over and above this he
went out of his way to learn the most minute details of matters with
which he was very remotely connected.
And now a brief word about the type of evidence with which the
prosecution will prove its case. It must be borne in mind that we are
not concerned with a single localized incident or with a series of such
incidents. The proof which we must show cannot be brought forth from the
daily events of ordered society. It must be drawn from the cold ashes of
a broken nation. The documents which will be brought into Court have
been taken from all corners of a continent. They have one common feature
which elevates them in the hierarchy of evidence to a place above the
story of sincere but fallible eyewitnesses. These documents are official
German records, some of them records of the defendant’s own
organizations. In some cases they bear the defendant’s signature or his
handwritten initials. In every case they are authentic records compiled
by Germans, accurate because there was no reason for falsification or
exaggeration, thorough because of a national fetish for attention to
detail, reliable because they were made at times when the German
fortunes of war were high and their scriveners had no reason to fear
that one day they would be confronted with their hand-made records of
criminality.
It would seem that at this point there should be some discussion of the
various organizations with which the defendant was connected.
We are concerned principally with that part of the OKW (Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht), Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, known as the OKL
(Oberkommando der Luftwaffe), the High Command of the German Air Force.
The Chief of the OKL was Reich Marshal Hermann Goering. His Inspector
General and State Secretary in the Air Ministry was the defendant Erhard
Milch. As such, from July 1940, he held the rank of field marshal
(comparable to the American rank of general of the armies).[68]
The other two branches of the OKW with which we are incidentally
concerned were the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres), High Command of the
Army, and the OKM (Oberkommando der Marine), High Command of the Navy.
The army was commanded by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch until December
1941, at which time it was taken over by Hitler. The navy was commanded
by Grand Admiral [Admiral of the Fleet] Raeder until 1943, thereafter by
Grand Admiral Doenitz.
The Luftwaffe Medical Service came under this defendant in his capacity
as Inspector General of the Luftwaffe. The Medical Service was headed by
Dr. Erich Hippke until January 1944; thereafter it was headed by Dr.
Oskar Schroeder.
There was an experimental institute in Berlin called the DVL which was a
technical research institution for aero-research. This was subordinate
to the defendant in his position as Generalluftzeugmeister.
We now turn to the Central Planning Board. This was established by a
Goering decree, pursuant to a Hitler order of 22 April, 1942. The Board
consisted of Albert Speer, Erhard Milch, and Paul Koerner. Later, by a
supplementary Goering decree, in September 1943, Walter Funk was added
to the Board. Speer and Milch were the dominant members, and Koerner and
Funk played comparatively minor roles. The Central Planning Board was,
in effect, a consolidation of all controls over German war production.
The Board was found by the International Military Tribunal to have “had
supreme authority for the scheduling of German production and the
allocation and development of raw materials. * * *”[69] Hand in hand
with this goes the corollary of the procurement and allocation of labor.
Reich Marshal Goering, in his decree of 22 April, 1942, stated in
part——“It (the Central Planning Board) encompasses that which is
fundamental and vital. It makes unequivocal decisions and supervises the
execution of its directives”. The Central Planning Board requisitioned
labor from Sauckel with full knowledge that the demands would be
supplied by foreign forced labor, and the Board determined the basic
allocation of this labor within the German war economy. Sauckel was the
servant of the Central Planning Board in the procurement of slave labor.
There are records of some 50-odd meetings of the Board between the time
of its establishment in 1942, and 1945. The defendant was present at all
but a few of these meetings and on occasion his was the dominant voice.
The International Military Tribunal found that the Central Planning
Board determined the total number of laborers needed for German
industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually by deportation
from occupied territories.
It is worthy of note that Speer was appointed Reich Minister for
Armaments and Munitions on 2 February 1942, Sauckel was appointed
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation on 21 March 1942, and the
Central Planning Board was created on 22 April 1942.
Turning now to the defendant’s position as Chief of the Jaegerstab. The
Jaegerstab was formed pursuant to a Speer decree of 1 March 1944, for
the purpose of increasing the production of German fighter aircraft,
which, because of effective and heavy raids by strategic air forces of
Great Britain and America, had suffered a production decrease to a
figure below 1,000 planes a month.
Because of this reduced production of fighter planes, Milch had
requested Speer to establish a commission to deal with this most vital
problem. The commission was created and Speer and Milch were joint
chiefs. The Jaegerstab was actually a group of experts, drawn from the
various phases of German industry and supplemented by representatives of
the various Ministries concerned, such as Labor, Supply, Transportation,
Power and Energy, Raw Materials, Health, Repairs, and so forth.
Meetings were held almost daily, in the beginning at the Air Ministry in
Berlin and later at Tempelhof airfield in the same city. The Jaegerstab
functions were these: the quick repair of plants damaged in bombing or
strafing operations, the dispersal of German aircraft plants, and the
construction of underground factories for aircraft production.
As it was with the Central Planning Board, so it was with the
Jaegerstab, a major problem was the procurement of slave labor. The
workers for the Jaegerstab were procured from the Sauckel Ministry, from
occupied countries, and from the SS, who supplied concentration camp
inmates and Hungarian Jews.
So successful was the work of the Jaegerstab that Speer decided to
enlarge its functions to include other phases of armament and munitions
production. Accordingly, on 1 August 1944, he issued a decree expanding
the functions of the Jaegerstab and changing its name to Ruestungsstab.
The position of Generalluftzeugmeister was taken over by the defendant
in 1941, following the death of Colonel General Ernst Udet. In this post
the defendant was in charge of all technical research in the Luftwaffe
and his was the over-all responsibility for all aircraft production. As
such he spoke for the Luftwaffe in the meetings of the Central Planning
Board and in conferences with Hitler. It is obvious that here again the
procurement of labor was a primary consideration for one who had the
complete responsibility for keeping the Luftwaffe in the air.
In the trial before the International Military Tribunal, it was
determined that 5,000,000 laborers were deported to Germany. Of these,
4,800,000 did not come voluntarily.
The evidence will show that the defendant’s responsibility was as great,
if not greater, than was Sauckel’s. Erhard Milch raised his voice in
demanding that foreign labor be procured by any methods and in
advocating that cruel and repressive measures be taken by those in
charge of these laborers. There is no record of any utterance by him,
which can be offered as a mitigating circumstance to his complete
complicity in the criminality of the slave-labor program.
The evidence on the altitude and freezing experiments will reveal him as
a man completely without concern for the welfare and lives of the
wretched, unwilling victims of the criminal tortures conducted for the
benefit of the Luftwaffe.
The series of trials, of which this is one, if it is to serve its
purpose in exposing and punishing the abuses of Nazidom, must strike
hard at the cores of savage German militarism and its technical
counterpart, industry for war. Erhard Milch is the foremost example of
the union between German militarism and German heavy industry. What
useful purpose is served by condemning these two and allowing their
sponsors, men like Milch, to go unpunished?
We take it as a fundamental proposition that man is not the helpless
product of his environment. Civilization is a lengthy chronicle of men
who triumphed over difficulty. Its survival depends on the moral fibre
of individuals who can use circumstance, not be determined by it. If
society must answer for the actions of men, and not men for the course
of society, then, indeed, governments are our masters and not our
servants; then, indeed, law dictates but does not express justice.
Erhard Milch lived during years of violence and in an evil environment
but he was a man well able to overcome these factors and become a force
for good. It was by his own free choice that he followed the line of
least resistance and became one of the evil spirits who cast a dark
shadow of war and crime over Germany and the world. He had a choice
between the easy wrong and the hard right—he chose the former. Peace,
order, and progress depend on men of sufficient courage to choose at
times a hard, just path. Ours indeed is an exacting standard, but the
rewards are great, and the alternative is chaos.
-----
[64] Opening statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript.
[65] See section IV A3, p. 524 ff.
[66] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. XIX, pp. 417-18, Nuremberg,
1947.
[67] Ibid., vol. II, pp. 139-140.
[68] See Table of comparative ranks, p. 331.
[69] Trial of Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 331.
B. Opening Statement for the Defense[70]
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, I undertake now to present the
evidence for the defense. The prosecution has painted the blackest
possible picture of the man I am here to defend. It has pronounced a
moral judgment on him, even for the period of his life, which, according
to the indictment, is not to be judged by this Tribunal.
Because of the great difference between the American and the German
people I have no knowledge of whether such a method of prosecution is
customary in the United States of America. The good principles of law
which were practiced in Germany before 1933 provided that even counsel
for the prosecution should not reproach the defendant for anything that
is not subject to examination by the Tribunal. The meaning of this is
that defense counsel also should be in a position to express his views
with regard to these charges. This, according to my opinion, seems to be
a fair principle.
Therefore, if it please the Tribunal, it shall be my aim in the course
of my submission of evidence to prove by witnesses who have been
approved and by the defendant himself that the charges made by the
prosecution are incorrect, and I shall aim to prove that also for the
charges which are not contained in the indictment.
Erhard Milch has never in his life been a traitor, as a person or in his
profession, not even at the end of the National Socialist rule when he
himself was threatened as to his life and his honor. As a man of high
intelligence and great talent for organization, he always tried to do
his best for his people and for the world.
To say of him that he misused his talent and devoted his life to a plan
for conquest and enslavement of the world is to have a completely wrong
conception of reality. He was never a militarist in the bad sense of the
word. Never did he arm secretly before 1933 nor make use of the peaceful
instrument of the commercial air fleet for any sinister purposes. He,
the man who wanted to devote himself only to the tasks of peace, the man
who in his capacity as director of the German Lufthansa collaborated
with many European air transport companies and who conceived this
collaboration as almost a forerunner of a unified Europe; he, the man
who in 1937 devoted all his efforts, together with a few wise and
courageous statesmen, to the attempt to bring about a full understanding
and a large scale collaboration between France, Belgium, and Germany
(unfortunately, the high Tribunal has not given me permission to furnish
complete proof for this fact); he, Erhard Milch, truly never tried to
enslave the world. If he had succeeded in his plans in 1937, then there
would have been no 1938. And, all the more, there would not have been
the horrible period of 1939 to 1945, the period in which the battle
against intolerance became so hard and so complicated that we might
think today that, as in an Arabian tale, this spirit of intolerance
freed itself from the bottle and spread itself over so wide an area
that, even today, it causes actions which one day must also be condemned
by the just and the wise.
I shall prove that from the moment when this man tried, in 1937, to
achieve his plans for peace he lost the confidence of his superiors. He
never belonged to the intimate circle in which his superiors confided,
even less so after 1937. They employed him unwillingly and only because
they believed that they could not spare him because of his ability. It
is cheap and easy to say now that this man should have denied his
superiors the benefit of his talents. We shall prove that he tried to do
so. But who can dare to judge with certainty what went on in the heart
of such a man who was terribly aware of what dangers threatened his
people, once the fateful step of starting the war had been taken?
Neither did he want this step nor could he prevent it.
Should he really have chosen the path of revolt, this man who was
brought up in a world in which, for all ages, military obedience had
been an inviolate law, this man who had a passionate love for his
people? How many human beings in any country are capable of breaking the
chains of their education, and turn against the laws which have been
inviolate for them ever since their childhood?
There is no punishable guilt, perhaps even no moral guilt in the fact
that a man cannot free himself from the world of his education. Because
it is the very essence of all education to give the man unbreakable laws
and to create around him what philosophers call “the environment proper
to his own nature.” Therefore, he has not made himself guilty by doing
what his education and the conceptions of his environment made him call
his duty, in a war which he did not want, which he tried to prevent; and
the stopping of which he advised again and again after it had started.
This duty, he felt, was to do his work and to prevent the worst which he
anticipated, namely, the terrible devastation of his fatherland and its
complete and helpless collapse.
I shall prove that he always, even after the war had broken out,
concerned himself with questions of defense only; that he wanted to
strengthen the fighter force, a defensive weapon with which he wanted to
prevent the doom of the German cities. Perhaps, one day, the necessity
for this doom will be judged differently. I shall prove that he
condemned the attack against Soviet Russia as folly, and that he tried
to prevent it. I shall show that in the spring of 1943 he submitted to
Hitler detailed proposals for an immediate termination of the war and
that he told him without reserve that the war was lost.
If it is true that from that moment onward he made efforts again and
again to strengthen the fighter force, and that he took part in the
creation of the Jaegerstab, who can reproach him with the intention to
prolong the war if it will be proved that he knew that the enemy air
forces would make a desert of Germany? Was it inhuman that he tried to
prevent this total destruction even if the war was lost? He alone could
not end the war. But he could try to prevent the inferno in Germany from
becoming full reality. What true lover of his own country in any part of
the world would not make the same attempt? Never can he be considered
guilty on account of that, and even less so because of the fact that in
other countries also voices have arisen and still arise which say that
during the destruction of Germany many a thing happened which was not
always compatible with military necessity.
Despite the pains he took, his superiors mistrusted him so much that
both Goering and Hitler contemplated to have him put out of the way.
I shall show that he never endorsed the theory of the superman and of
the master race; that he always remained humane and that he intervened
on behalf of friends with disregard for his own security. He never was
cruel. It may be that some of the minutes carry wild speeches about him
which must strike your Honors who come from a different world and are
used to different customs as terrible and incomprehensible. I shall
prove to you that in the barracks yards, which made the first impress on
the sensitive mind of young Milch, wild expressions were quite common
and that in German barracks yards bombastic expressions were considered
normal and truly militaristic style. Nobody in Germany did at any time
take these expressions at face value. For this human element in
particular, the old saying holds true that dogs which bark do not bite.
This man, however, was all the more inclined to use these shocking
expressions due to the fact that in a number of accidents he had
suffered severe concussions of the brain as a result of which he was
more susceptible to fits of anger than other people; all the more so
since he was overburdened with work and always frantic because time was
too short. But witnesses will appear before this Tribunal who will
confirm that no one in his surroundings took these fits of wrath, these
crazy words, seriously; that these expressions never went further than
the circle of his intimates, and that they in no way had any effect. His
raving and yelling would make so little impression that when people
around him noticed he was about to have another fit of rage, one would
hear the familiar quotation: “In a moment somebody will be hanged again
and then nothing happens.”
I shall show that this man knew nothing at all of the many abominable
happenings which occurred out in the country, sometimes committed by
persons who were under his command, and that, for example, the
connection with the experiments at Dachau were so remote and incidental
that he could not even surmise what the men there undertook to do. The
sphere of his duties was so terrific, the burden of his work so great
that he truly would have needed to be a superman if he were expected to
have known all that the prosecution finds out today from records and
from the examination of the offenders. It is appropriate to use a Latin
quotation here with a little change: “_Quod est in actis, non semper est
in munde._” Not everything that the investigating mind uncovers at a
later date and interconnects was so in actual fact. The poet says “Easy
for him to speak who speaks last.” This man is charged with letting
prisoners be abused and killed. I shall prove that this was not so. I
shall even prove that, for example, he did everything possible to
protect so-called terror fliers from being lynched. He was a man who
tried to attenuate verdicts pronounced by competent courts of justice
and who never favored death sentences.
The prosecution charges him with the enslavement of the peoples of
Europe. I shall prove that he never aspired to enslavement; that
information on deportations and shanghaiing never reached him; and that,
on the contrary, information reached him which was bound to confuse his
judgment and which permitted him to engage in deeds which now are
considered as wrong. Up to this day the opinion still prevails that
everybody in Germany knew everything about all the cruelties. Slowly,
however, the recognition comes through that this is not correct. In the
“Neue Zeitung”, the official organ of the military government, a German
anti-Fascist by the name of Arnold Weiss Reuthel, whose book on the
concentration camps is considered noteworthy by the newspapers,
published an article “On the Psychological Causes.” There he states
literally:
“One would have termed anybody who informed the public of such
happenings a scoundrel or a lunatic. This also explains why
people who did not see these things with their own eyes and did
not suffer from them day after day, even today still refuse to
believe that they actually happened. Yes, to me too it seems
today often a dream and impossible when I think back and try to
persuade myself that they really happened, the fearful excesses
to which I was a witness during my 5 years in the concentration
camp.”
Thus writes, be it noted, a man who suffered for years in a
concentration camp himself. It has been proved again and again that the
most painstaking secrecy was maintained regarding the atrocities. This
is no hollow talk. This is the truth. The actual perpetrators
dissembled, denied, lied, in a way that could not have been surpassed in
cunning. The documents show you, Honorable Judges, that it was forbidden
for Rascher to make reports without Himmler’s authorization. Himmler
wanted to draw the veil of secrecy over everything. But even with a
Hitler, Sauckel, for example, soft-pedalled all his doings in the
procuring of the foreign workers. Regarding this, I will submit
evidence.
I shall also show that the assignment of these workers was not a point
in any program existing from the outset; that it was exclusively an
emergency device which the exigencies of the war forced upon Germany. So
at least all this had to appear to him, the man who did not belong to
the innermost circle. That he could not think otherwise will be
demonstrated to the Court, to the Tribunal.
It is misleading when the honorable representative of the prosecution in
his opening speech points out that this man had more to do with the use
of forced labor than any other man in Germany. The International
Military Tribunal, in its judgment on Speer, whose position, as no one
in this courtroom can doubt, was far more powerful and significant than
that of this man here, has stated:[71] “Speer’s position was such that
he did not have to deal directly with the atrocities and the carrying
out of the forced labor program.” On Sauckel, the International Military
Tribunal says:[72] “It is nevertheless established beyond all doubt that
Sauckel had the over-all responsibility for the slave-labor program.” I
shall offer evidence that Sauckel actually also had the sole power over
the manner in which the people were recruited and brought to Germany,
and over the urgent work for which they were required.
The prosecution submitted much evidence in Document Books No. IA and IB
which contain the speeches and decrees of all kinds of persons and
offices in Germany and in the territories formerly occupied. In my
opinion, however, it never proved that the defendant knew of all these
things, much less that he had anything to do with them. I shall prove
that he knew nothing of all this and that it was all so far remote from
his sphere of action that, logically speaking and considering his
numerous tasks, he could know nothing about it.
I ask permission to remark here that in cases of this kind it is perhaps
after all not in keeping with the rules of true justice to charge one
person with everything that happened somewhere and was committed by
someone among a people of eighty million. In my opinion the concept of
conspiracy is in such a case inflated to the point of monstrosity. It
was created for conditions of a narrower and smaller scope where it was
within the framework of a man’s possibilities to keep an over-all view
of his associates and their deeds. But to extend the concept of
conspiracy over an entire nation and, simultaneously, over numerous
organizations with millions of members, that no longer can be
commensurate with true justice. This would result in the creation of a
conspirator to whom would be ascribed a Godlike stature. That, however,
would be a distortion of an intelligent legal thought.
It must, therefore, be demanded that in the case of each document, of
each act, with due consideration of the extent of the defendant’s
working sphere and, consequently, with due consideration for his working
capacity, one should examine whether he could obtain knowledge thereof,
whether he could humanly anticipate, examine any of them, and by reason
of his authority, could somehow prevent them.
Finally, I shall prove to you that the documents submitted to you as
official documents are not exact, not reliable; that they never were
examined by the defendant and his associates, and that they contain
inaccuracies, distortions, and wilful deceptions.
Regarding the powers and position held by the defendant, a number of
witnesses and the defendant himself will attest that his powers were not
so great nor so permanent as the prosecution assumes.
We will show that while the Medical Inspector of the Luftwaffe was
subordinate to him in his capacity of Inspector General of the
Luftwaffe, this subordination was more a formal than a practical one,
that the staff of the Medical Service was not at all subordinate to him
and that especially he did not have under his direction the DVL (German
Experimental Institute for Aviation).
We shall further prove that even the Central Planning Board did not have
the significance that the prosecution assumes, that this agency was much
more an advisory and information agency, that it was chiefly occupied
with the allocation of raw materials and that only those decisions of
the meetings were binding which were summarized in the so-called
“Results.”
Finally, we shall show that although, it is true, the defendant was one
of the founders of the Jaegerstab, he was not its chief and that his
importance in this connection was far less than it would appear on first
consideration. The work of the Jaegerstab and of the defendant was aimed
solely at the protection of Germany against bombing attacks, and Milch
very soon lost all influence in this Jaegerstab.
In the presentation of all this evidence, I would ask the high Tribunal
to have in mind one difficulty which, particularly in this case, is
nearly insurmountable.
The documents submitted by the prosecution are only parts of a body of
material the extent of which can be termed gigantic. When one considers
that the Jaegerstab, for instance, from the time of its establishment
held daily meetings and that from those meetings only these few
stenographic records of a few sessions have been submitted that appear
in the document books of the prosecution, then one realizes that not
even five percent of the material pertaining to the Jaegerstab has been
submitted.
Similar, although perhaps not equally striking, is the situation with
reference to the minutes of the Central Planning Board. All these
documents which were not submitted are not accessible to me at all. Does
not, however, justice demand that the material in its entirety should be
available to the defense counsel for examination? Already it has been
possible for me to discover in the incriminating documents numerous
passages which throw a different light on the indictment. Is it not
highly probable, then, that numerous other passages may be found in all
of the other material likely to extenuate to a high degree the guilt of
the defendant, or which, in any case, might show many things in a better
light?
In an ordinary trial with a considerably narrower scope it is much
easier for a defendant to conduct his defense than here where material
of such volume is at hand that even if he had the best of memories, it
would be impossible for him to point out to me, his counsel, where and
what kind of exonerating material can be found. That simply surpasses
the capacity of the human memory, of the human ability to think.
In passing, I would say that probably in all of the armies which fought
in this war the responsible men used strong language during meetings and
discussions which, had they all gone down in records, would today cause
the milder ones to shake their heads. Wrath, impatience, worry, and
anguish because of damages sustained frequently lead responsible persons
to wild utterances. What counts is not whether such words are uttered
but the deeds which come after such excitement dies away.
The prosecution had many long months to prepare its case. We, the
defendant and I, received the real documents on the indictment only in
January. It is beyond human capacity to examine everything within such a
short period of time with the thoroughness which is necessary to
assemble the required counter-evidence. The presentation of argument on
the part of the defendant must therefore, be full of gaps. It is
particularly difficult in this case because within the short time
available for preparation it is impossible to study all the problems
which are brought to light as a result of the Dachau experiments. This
calls for special technical knowledge which a man such as the defendant,
who never studied medicine, simply cannot possess. However, as this
trial is held simultaneously with the trial on the Dachau
experiments,[73] the danger exists that the important and exonerating
facts brought to light there, through the defendant experts and their
well informed counsel, cannot be properly appraised in the present case,
and in this way the cause of justice is endangered.
All of this I merely say in order to ask your Honors not to lose sight
of these angles in judging this present case. Honorable Judges, please
bear that in mind also when examining the documents which I shall submit
and, giving ear to that extent to the voice of humanity and of justice,
lend your assistance to a man who, cut off for so long and bitter a time
from all his information and other aids to support his memory, has been
called upon to defend himself before you. If at any time the fundamental
principle of penal justice, which exists since the days of the wise
Romans, should find application, “_In dubio pro reo_” (In case of doubt
favor the accused), it should find strict application in this case. That
is what I wanted to tell you as an introduction.
-----
[70] Opening statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript 27 January
1947. Tr. pp. 494-504.
[71] IMT mimeographed German transcript p. 16614. See also Trial of
Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 332, Nuremberg, 1947.
[72] Ibid., p. 16598. See also Trial of Major War Criminals, vol I, p.
321.
[73] United States _vs._ Karl Brandt, et al. See vol. I.
IV. SELECTIONS FROM THE DOCUMENTS AND
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES OF PROSECUTION
AND DEFENSE
A. Slave Labor
I. GENERAL SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM IN GERMANY
_Prosecution Documents_
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
L-79 3 Extract from minutes of Fuehrer 387
conference, 23 May 1939.
EC-68 6 Letter from the Ministry of 389
Finance and Economics of
Baden, 6 March 1941,
containing directives
regarding the treatment of
Polish farm workers.
3005-PS 7 Extracts from letter from the 392
Reich Labor Ministry to
presidents of regional labor
offices, 26 August 1941,
concerning the use of French
and Russian PW’s.
EC-194 8 Memorandum of Keitel, 31 393
October 1941, concerning the
use of PW’s in the armament
industry.
1206-PS 9 Outlines of directives of 395
Goering regarding the
employment of PW’s in the
armament industry, 7 November
1941.
3040-PS 10 Extracts from secret order of 399
Himmler, 20 February 1942,
concerning the commitment and
treatment of manpower from
the East.
016-PS 13 Letter from Sauckel to 405
Rosenberg, 24 April 1942, and
extracts from report on
Sauckel’s labor mobilization
program, 20 April 1942.
084-PS 16-A Extracts from interdepartmental 408
report of the Ministry for
Occupied Eastern Territories,
30 September 1942, concerning
the status of eastern
laborers.
294-PS 19-A Extracts from top secret 411
memorandum, signed by
Braeutigam, 25 October 1942,
concerning effects of slave
labor program.
L-61 20 Letter from Sauckel to the 413
presidents of labor offices,
26 November 1942, concerning
deportation and employment of
Poles and Jews.
1063-D-PS 21 Extract from order of Mueller, 415
17 December 1942, concerning
prisoners qualified for work
to be sent to concentration
camps.
1526-PS 25 Extracts from letter from 416
German-appointed Ukrainian
main committee to Frank,
February 1943.
407-V-PS 30 Extracts from letter from 418
Sauckel to Hitler, 14 April
1943, concerning labor
questions.
407-IX-PS 33 Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 420
3 June 1943, concerning
foreign labor situation.
3000-PS 34 Extracts from report rendered 422
to Riecke,
Ministerialdirektor in the
Ministry of Agriculture, 28
June 1943, on experiences in
political and economic
problems in the East.
265-PS 35 Extracts from report by Leyser 423
to Rosenberg, 30 June 1943,
on conditions in the district
Zhitomir.
204-PS 39 Extracts from memorandum of a 424
conference, 18 February 1944,
concerning the release of
indigenous labor for purposes
of the Reich.
R-103 40 Extracts from a letter from the 426
(German-appointed) Polish
main committee to the General
Government of Poland on the
conditions of Polish workers
in Germany, 17 May 1944.
208-PS 55 Report by Sauckel, 7 July 1944, 428
on the accomplishments of
labor mobilization in the
first half of 1944.
3819-PS 56 Minutes of a conference on 11 430
July 1944 attended by Milch,
concerning the labor problem.
_Defense Documents_
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
R-124 1 Extract from report on Fuehrer 438
conference attended by Milch
on 19 February 1942.
R-124 32 Extract from the Fuehrer 438
conference minutes, 21 and 22
April 1942.
R-124 2 Extract from the Fuehrer 439
conference minutes of 3, 4, 5
January 1943.
407-II-PS 3 Report from Sauckel to Hitler, 439
10 March 1943, concerning
difficulties originating from
the draft of manpower in
former Soviet territories.
R-124 33 Extract from report on Fuehrer 441
conference of 30 May 1943.
R-124 4 Extract from report of Fuehrer 442
conference of 11-12 September
1943.
R-124 34 Extract from Fuehrer conference 443
of 1-4 January 1944,
concerning Speer’s report on
the French labor situation.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-79[74]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3
EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF FUEHRER CONFERENCE, 23 MAY 1939
Top Secret
To be transmitted by officer only
Minutes of a Conference on 23 May 39
Place: The Fuehrer’s Study, New Reich Chancellery.
Adjutant on duty: Lt.-Col. (GSC) Schmundt.
Present: The Fuehrer, Field Marshal Goering, Grand Admiral [Admiral of the
Fleet] Raeder. Col. Gen. [General] von Brauchitsch, Col. Gen.
Keitel, Col. Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) [Lt. General]
Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewind, Col. (GSC)
Jeschonnek, Col. (GSC) Warlimont, Lt.-Col. (GSC) Schmundt, Capt.
[Army] Engel, Lt. Comdr. Albrecht, Capt. [Army] v. Below.
Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.
The Fuehrer defined as _the purpose of the conference_:
1. Analysis of the situation.
2. Definition of the tasks for the armed forces arising from the
situation.
3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from
these consequences.
Secrecy is the first essential for success. The Fuehrer’s observations
are given in systematized form below.
Our present situation must be considered from two points of view: (1)
the actual development of events between 1933 and 1939; (2) the
permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.
In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military
situation improved enormously.
Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the
same.
Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of
power had been effected without the participation of Germany.
This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the necessities
of life make themselves felt, and Germany reemerges as a Great Power.
All demands are regarded as “Encroachments”. The English are more afraid
of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.
A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So,
too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the
creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of
the problems demands courage. The principle by which one evades solving
the problems by adapting oneself to circumstances is inadmissible.
Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without
invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.
Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis
of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally
it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or
decline. In 15 or 20 years’ time we shall be compelled to find a
solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.
We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor, which is shared by two
other nations—Italy and Japan.
The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All
measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our
aims.
After 6 years the situation is today as follows:
The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart
from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the
shedding of blood.
The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.
The Pole is no supplementary enemy. Poland will always be on the side of
our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always
had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.
Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of
expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food
supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be
expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural
fertility, thorough German exploitation will enormously increase the
surplus.
There is no other possibility for Europe.
Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the
food problem. [Remember]—blockade!
If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of
extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvest we
shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.
The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and
will be available as a source of labor.
The problem “Polish” is inseparable from conflict with the West.
Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus
Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.
It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved
by a quick decision; questionable too is the attitude of Poland.
The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees
danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of
the victory.
There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with
the _decision_:
_To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity._
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-68
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 6[75]
LETTER FROM THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS OF
BADEN, 6 MARCH 1941, CONTAINING DIRECTIVES REGARDING
THE TREATMENT OF POLISH FARM WORKERS
49-7
Copy
III B 5 C (in pencil)
Karlsruhe, 6 March 1941
Minister of Finance and Economics of Baden
Provincial [Land] Food Office Dept. A.
(Provincial Farmers Association)
Confidential Only for Official Business
To all District Farmers Associations [Kreis]
Subject: Directives regarding the treatment of foreign farm workers of
Polish nationality.
The agencies of the Reich Food Estate, Provincial Farmers Association of
Baden, have received the results of the negotiations with the Higher SS
and Police Leader in Stuttgart on 14 February 1941, with great
satisfaction. Appropriate memoranda have already been turned over to the
District Farmers Associations. Below, I promulgate the individual
regulations, as they have been laid down during the conference and how
they are not to be applied accordingly:
1. Fundamentally, farm workers of Polish nationality no longer
have the right to complain, and thus no complaints may be
accepted any more by any official agency.
2. The farm workers of Polish nationality may not leave the
localities in which they are employed, and have a curfew from 1
October to 31 March from 2000 hours to 0600 hours, and from 1
April to 30 September from 2100 hours to 0500 hours.
3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are
possible, for riding to the place of work in the field, if a
relative of the employer or the employer himself is present.
4. The visit of churches, regardless of faith, is strictly
prohibited, even when there is no service in progress.
Individual spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is
permitted.
5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures or other cultural
entertainment are strictly prohibited for farm workers of Polish
nationality.
6. The visit of restaurants is strictly prohibited to farm
workers of Polish nationality except for one restaurant in the
village, which will be selected by the Rural Councillor’s
Office, and then only one day per week. The day, which is
determined as the day to visit the restaurant, will also be
determined by the Rural Councillor’s Office. This regulation
does not change the curfew regulation, mentioned above under No.
2.
7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly
prohibited, and wherever it is established, it must be reported.
8. Gatherings of farm workers of Polish nationality after work
is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or
in the living quarters of the Poles.
9. The use of railroads, buses, or other public conveyances by
farm workers of Polish nationality is prohibited.
10. Permits to leave the village may only be granted in very
exceptional cases, by the local police authority (mayor’s
office). However, in no case may it be granted if he wants to
visit a public agency on his own, whether it is a labor office
or the District Farmers Association, or whether he wants to
change his place of employment.
11. Arbitrary change of employment is strictly prohibited. The
farm workers of Polish nationality have to work daily so long as
the interests of the enterprise demand it, and as it is demanded
by the employer. There are no time limits to the working time.
12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment to
farm workers of Polish nationality, if instructions and good
words fail. The employer may not be held accountable in any such
case by an official agency.
13. Farm workers of Polish nationality should if possible be
removed from the community of the home, and they can be
quartered in stables, etc. No remorse whatever should restrict
such action.
14. Report to the authorities is compulsory in all cases when
crimes have been committed by farm workers of Polish nationality
which are to sabotage the enterprise or slow down work, for
instance, unwillingness to work, impertinent behavior; it is
compulsory even in minor cases. An employer who loses his Pole
who must serve a longer prison sentence because of such a
compulsory report will receive another Pole from the competent
labor office on request with preference.
15. In all other cases, only the state police is still
competent.
For the employer himself, severe punishment is contemplated if it is
established that the necessary distance from farm workers of Polish
nationality has not been kept. The same applies to women and girls.
Extra rations are strictly prohibited. Noncompliance of the Reich
tariffs for farm workers of Polish nationality will be punished by the
competent labor office by the taking away of the worker.
In any case of doubt, the Provincial Farmers Association—IB—will give
information.
Forwarding in writing of the above agreement to the farm workers of
Polish nationality is strictly prohibited.
These regulations do not apply to Poles who are still prisoners of war
and are thus subordinated to the armed forces. In this case, the
regulations published by the armed forces apply.
Heil Hitler!
BY ORDER:
[Signed] DR. KLOTZ
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3005-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 7
EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM THE REICH LABOR MINISTRY TO
PRESIDENTS OF REGIONAL LABOR OFFICES, 26 AUGUST 1941,
CONCERNING THE USE OF FRENCH AND RUSSIAN PW’S
Vol. 78-L
Annex 1 to the Decree of the Reich Minister of Armament
and Munitions
THE REICH MINISTER OF LABOR
_Va 5135/1277_
Nr. 371-4770/41 secret 216/985
Berlin, SW 11, 26 August 1941
Special Delivery
To the Presidents of Regional Labor Offices
(including Nuernberg Branch Office)
Subject: Use of Russian PW’s.
Reference: Circular of 14 August 1941—Va 5135/1189—.
Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal [Goering], 100,000 men are to
be taken from among the French PW’s not yet employed in armament
industry, and are to be assigned to the armament industry (airplane
industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting therefrom will be filled by
Soviet PW’s. The transfer of the above-named French PW’s is to be
accomplished by 1 October. Russian PW’s can be utilized only in larger
concentrated groups under the well-known, tougher employment conditions.
In the civilian field the regional labor offices will have to determine
immediately those work projects where French prisoners of war can be
withdrawn and replaced by Soviet groups. For the time being, no
additional assignment of Soviet prisoners of war can be considered.
Initially all replacement possibilities must be completely exhausted.
Similarly, all French PW’s no longer needed are not to be channeled into
agriculture and forestry any more, but exclusively into armament
industry (aircraft industry).
All branches of economic life employing French PW’s, with the exception
of armament industry and mining, are to be encompassed in determining
those work projects where exchanges are feasible. The absolute necessity
that Soviet PW replacements be employed in larger concentrated groups,
requires, among other things, special checking of all larger
construction projects of any kind (including construction of the Reich
railroads, navigational and cultivation projects). Reich Minister Dr.
Todt has already consented to the exchange of French PW’s employed by
the Reich super highways. In agriculture the exchange can naturally be
effected only in the case of large estates (especially estates with
outlying farms).
Exchange of PW’s will frequently encounter resistance. The factories
concerned will be reluctant to exchange the trained and proven French
PW’s for Soviet PW’s. In such cases the labor offices have to draw the
factories’ attention to the necessities of state, and to the directive
of the Reich Marshal.
As soon as the regional labor offices have determined the work projects
affected by the exchange, they will inform the Service Commands
Headquarters, indicating how many French PW’s are being made available
and how many Soviet PW’s will be needed to replace the French PW’s.
Without my express consent not more than 120 Soviet PW’s may be
requested for each 100 French PW’s made available. Since the determining
factors in the allocation of Soviet PW’s are military and
counter-intelligence considerations, final decision about the exchange
rests with the Service Commands [Military Districts] Headquarters.
* * * * *
The first 100,000 French prisoners of war shall be channeled into the
aircraft industry. * * *
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-194
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 8
MEMORANDUM OF KEITEL, 31 OCTOBER 1941, CONCERNING THE
USE OF PW’S IN THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY
Copy
Fuehrer Headquarters, 31 October 1941
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Secret
WFSt/Abt. L (II Org/IV Qu [sic]
No. 0 2588/41 Secret
Subject: Use of prisoners of war in the war industry.
The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous hindrance for
the future German war and armament industry. The expected relief through
discharges from the armed forces is uncertain as to extent and date. Its
possible extent will by no means correspond to expectations and
requirements in view of the great demand.
The Fuehrer has now ordered that also the working power of the Russian
prisoners of war should be utilized to a great extent by large scale
assignment for the requirements of the war industry. The prerequisite
for production is adequate nourishment. Also very small wages are to be
planned for the most modest supply with a few consumers’ goods for every
day life, and perhaps rewards for production.
For labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz], the following may be considered
as examples:
I. _Armed Forces._
_a._ Clearing and construction units of all kinds in the occupied
eastern territories.
_b._ Work and construction battalions in the other occupied territories
and in Germany.
_c._ Large scale employment in units to relieve soldiers in labor
service.
II. _Construction and Armament Industry._
_a._ Work units for construction of all kind, particularly for the
fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, unloading units for
essential war plants).
_b._ Suitable armament factories which have to be selected in such a way
that their personnel should consist in the majority of prisoners of war
under guidance and supervision (perhaps after withdrawal and transfer to
other employment of the German workers).
III. _Other War Industries._
_a._ Mining as under II _b_.
_b._ Railroad construction units for building tracks, etc.
_c._ Agriculture and forestry in closed units.
The utilization of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the
basis of above examples by:
To I. The armed forces.
To II. The Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions and the Inspector
General for the German road system, in agreement with the Reich Minister
of Labor and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Economic Armament
Office).
Commissioners of the Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions are to be
admitted to the prisoner of war camps to assist in the selection of
skilled workers.
To III. The Reich Minister of Labor. Limitations are—
1. The securing of guards to protect the German people from
dangers.
2. Housing in closed camps.
3. Securing adequate nourishment.
The observance of the counter-intelligence regulations which apply for
the use of prisoners of war will be supervised by military
counter-intelligence agencies as until now.
OKW (AWA)[76] will furnish the Reich Minister of Labor with blueprints
based on professional selection for the appropriate use of labor and
will also permanently provide workers for assignment to the labor
utilization [Arbeitseinsatz].
Furthermore, the Commander in Chief of the Army is asked to take the
necessary measures for the recruiting of voluntary labor in the eastern
operational zone in cooperation with the Reich Minister of Labor.
[Signed] KEITEL
Distribution:
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1206-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 9
OUTLINES OF DIRECTIVES OF GOERING REGARDING THE
EMPLOYMENT OF PW’S IN THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY,
7 NOVEMBER 1941
Draft
Rue(IV)
Berlin, 11 November 1941
Top Secret
6 Copies—6th Copy
_NOTES ON OUTLINES LAID DOWN BY THE REICH MARSHAL
[GOERING] AT THE MEETING OF 7 NOVEMBER
1941 IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY [RLM]_
Subject: Employment of laborers in war industries
The Fuehrer’s point of view as to employment of prisoners of war in war
industries has changed basically. So far, a total of 5 million prisoners
of war—employed so far 2 million.
Directives for employment:
Frenchmen: Individual employment, transposition into the armament
industry. [Rue-Wirtschaft.]
Belgians: Individual employment, transposition into the armament
industry. [Rue-Wirtschaft.]
Serbs: Preferably agriculture.
Poles: If feasible, no individual employment.
Output of Russian armament industry surpasses the German one. Assembly
line work, a great many mechanical devices with relatively few skilled
workers.
Readiness of Russians to work in the operational area is strong. In the
Ukraine and other areas discharged prisoners of war already work as free
labor. In Krivoi Rog, large numbers of workers are available due to the
destruction of the factories.
_Employment of Russian PW’s_
As a rule, employment in groups [geschlossener Arbeitseinsatz]; no
individual employment, not even in agriculture. Guard personnel, not
only soldiers but also foremen, at least during the working time proper.
As a rule soldiers in the camp.
One has to distinguish between _employment in_:
1. Operational area,
2. Reich Commissariats (occupied territories in the East),
3. General Government, and
4. Interior and Protectorate.
To 1: In the _operational area_ take preferably into consideration:
_a._ Railroads.
_b._ Highway construction.
Very important that in the Ukraine some roads be built with
increased speed, not by German skilled labor but by Russian PW’s.
_c._ Clearing work.
_d._ Agriculture.
The Ukraine being conquered, we now finally have to secure the
feeding of the German people. If necessary Frenchmen and Belgians
are to be used for directing the work of the Russian farm workers
in the eastern area. If farm machinery is lacking, employ masses of
workers. Transfer of German farmers only where actual success can
be expected.
_e._ Railroad-repair-factories, etc.
Best supervision: “Field kitchen”. Quick evacuation from operational
area necessary. Losses during transport very heavy (escaping and joining
with partisan and robber bands).
Barbed wire hard to get. (Discarding of barbed wire fences in East
Prussia desirable.)
Leave Asiatic people in operational area if possible.
From construction battalions 69,000 workers have been transferred to the
armament industry: replacement by prisoner-of-war battalions.
Again and again skilled workers are being found in the construction
battalions (machine [wood or metal] operators). Investigation by army
desirable. Express will of the Fuehrer, that every skilled worker is
used in the proper place. If necessary, repeated checking should be
instituted.
To 2: The same applies to employment in _Reich Commissariats_.
To 3: The above is also applicable to the _General Government_.
Attention is to be paid to avoiding of unnecessary transport of
machinery, as thereby often the available manpower in the General
Government is not fully utilized and, on the other hand, the machinery
cannot be made use of for a long time in other places.
To 4: In the _Interior and the Protectorate_ it would be ideal if entire
factories could be manned by Russian PW’s except the employees necessary
for direction. For employment in the Interior and the Protectorate the
following are to have priority:
_a._ At the top, _coal mining industry_.
Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to
suitability for employment of Russians. At times manning
the entire plant with Russian laborers.
_b._ _Transportation_ (construction of locomotives and cars,
repair shops).
Railroad repair and industry workers are to be sought
out from the PW’s. Railroad is most important means of
transportation in the East.
_c._ _Armament industries._
Above all factories producing tanks and guns. Possibly
also construction of parts for airplane engines.
Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned
exclusively by Russians. For the remainder, employment
in columns. Use in factories of tool machinery,
production of farm tractors, generators, etc. In
emergency, erect in individual places barracks for
occasional workers which are used as unloading details
and similar purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior
through communal authorities.)
The General Armed Forces Office of the Supreme Command Armed Forces
[OKW/AWA] is competent for _transporting_ Russian PW’s, employment
through “_Planning Board for Employment of all PW’s_.” If necessary,
offices of Reich Commissariats.
No employment where _danger to people_ [_fuer Menschen_] or their supply
exists, i.e., factories sensitive to explosions, waterworks, powerworks,
etc. No contact with German population, especially no “solidarity”.
German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians.
_Food_ is a matter of the Four Year Plan. Supply their own food (cats,
horses, etc.).
_Clothing_, _billeting_, _messing_ somewhat better than at home where
part of the people live in caverns.
_Supply of shoes_ for Russians, as a rule wooden shoes; if necessary
install Russian shoe repair shops.
Examination of _physical fitness_, in order to avoid importation of
diseases.
_Clearing of mines_ as a rule by Russians, if possible by selected
Russian engineers.
Employment offices for _civilian workers_ to be kept separate from those
for PW’s. In this respect the wage problem is to be considered.
Furthermore, families in Russia have to share the support. As a rule
employment in groups [geschlossener Einsatz].
_Some aspects for labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz] in general._
Rather employ PW’s than _unsuitable foreign workers_. Draft Poles,
Dutchmen, etc., if necessary as PW’s, and employ them as such, if work
through free contract cannot be obtained. Strong action.
General employment of all _German women_ repudiated by the Fuehrer.
Where Russians can be employed, _labor service_ is not to be used. Labor
service to be used where greatest effect is produced, even if the
principle of education through labor service is curtailed thereby. War
situation to be taken into consideration.
_As a matter of principle, central interests precede local interests_,
therefore no resistance from Reich Commissioners and other local
authorities against labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz] in the homeland.
_Savings in wages_ are to be offset by compensatory contributions [to
the Reich] by the respective management.
_Express order by the Fuehrer._ Under no circumstances may the _wage
level in the East_ be raised or assimilated to the wages in western
Germany. Strong action is imperative against recruiting agents who offer
high wages.
It is intended to issue a basically new regulation of _wages for foreign
workers_.
_Foreigners not to be treated like German workers_, on the other hand do
not provoke inferiority complex in foreigners by posters.
The _welfare installations_ of the German Labor Front [DAF] are _under
no circumstances_ to be used by PW’s or eastern workers.
All agencies are to promote maximum _utilization of Russian manpower_.
Employment of Russians not to be improvised, but first to be thoroughly
organized in the operational area. _Speed_ is necessary, as the mass of
manpower is decreasing daily by losses (lack of food and billets).
Make provisions to decrease the excessive number of _escaping
prisoners_. Especially in and around Berlin, strictest guarding is
essential.
[illegible initials]
Distribution:
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3040-PS[77]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 10
EXTRACTS FROM SECRET ORDER OF HIMMLER, 20 FEBRUARY 1942,
CONCERNING THE COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF
MANPOWER FROM THE EAST
_GENERAL COLLECTION OF DECREES [ALLGEMEINE_
_ERLASSAMMLUNG (AES)]_
Part 2
Secret
_Printed by RSHA (Reich Security Main Office) I Org_
Section 2 A III f
Commitment of Manpower from the East. Circular Decree of the Reich
Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the
Interior dated 20 February 1942—S IV No. 208/42 (foreign workers).
Enclosed I am sending you general regulations concerning the recruiting
and the committing of manpower from the East for your information and
careful attention.
I have the following additional directives for the Security Police and
the SD [Security Service]:
_A. MANPOWER FROM THE ORIGINAL SOVIET RUSSIAN
TERRITORY_
_I. General security measures._
1. The commitment of manpower in the Reich from the original Soviet
Russian territory results in greater dangers than any other employment
of foreigners in spite of the special standards of their way of living,
since a complete separation from the German and other foreign laborers
and a strict supervision will frequently, in practice and especially at
the place of work, scarcely be effected. The Security Police is charged
with the responsibility for preventing the danger and it must do
everything to accomplish its tasks; that is, to diminish the
possibilities of danger to a minimum. Since enforcements cannot be
counted on, it is the special task of the inspectors and state police
administrative offices to urge the other administrative offices, charged
with the commitment of the manpower, to take over the affairs of the
Security Police within the sphere of their jurisdiction.
* * * * *
_III. Combatting violations against discipline._
1. According to the equal status of the manpower from the original
Soviet Russian territory with prisoners of war, a strict discipline must
be exercised in the quarters and at the working place. Violations
against discipline, including work refusal and loafing at work, will be
fought exclusively by the Secret State Police [Gestapo]. The smaller
cases will be settled by the leader of the guard according to
instruction of the state police administration offices with measures as
provided for in the enclosure. To break acute resistance, the guards
shall be permitted to use also physical power against the manpower. But
this may be done only for a cogent cause. The manpower should always be
informed about the fact that they will be treated decently when
conducting themselves with discipline and accomplishing good work.
2. In severe cases, that is in such cases where the measures at the
disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the state police
office has to act with its means. Accordingly, they will be treated, as
a rule only with strict measures, that is, with transfer to a
concentration camp or with special treatment.
3. The transfer to a concentration camp is done in the usual manner.
4. In especially severe cases special treatment is to be requested at
the Reich Security Main Office, stating personal data and the exact
history of the act.
5. Special treatment consists of hanging. It should not take place in
the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of the manpower
from the original Soviet Russian territory should attend the special
treatment; at that time they are warned about the circumstances which
led to this special treatment.
6. Should special treatment be required within the camp for exceptional
reasons of camp discipline, this is also to be requested.
* * * * *
_IV. Subversive activities against the Reich._
Anti-Reich activities, especially dissemination of communist ideology,
propaganda of disunity, sabotage acts, are to be fought against with the
strictest measures. The care in obtaining information shall not suffer
through quick arrests, in order to catch the whole group of
perpetrators. Anti-Reich conduct is, as a rule, to be punished by
special treatment, in slighter cases a transfer to a concentration camp
may be considered.
_V. Criminal violations [Kriminelle Verfehlungen]._
1. As a matter of principle, criminal violations—regardless of whether
committed inside or outside the camp—shall be punished by state police
measures. * * *
2. Criminal offenses [Kriminelle Delikte] are generally to be punished
as violations against discipline, that is, the state police measures
provided for, shall take place in cases of smaller violations, and
special treatment shall take place in cases of crimes—such as, murder,
homicide, and robbery.
3. Concerning capital crimes against German persons, punishment by
criminal court procedure may, however, in an individual case appear
suitable. If the (superior) state police agency considers this
opportune, it can transfer the case to the prosecuting attorney, under
the provision that pursuant to the criminal laws, one can safely count
on the death penalty for the perpetrator.
_VI. Sexual Intercourse._
Sexual intercourse is forbidden to the manpower of the original Soviet
Russian territory. Because of their closely confined quarters they have
no opportunity for it. Should sexual intercourse occur
nevertheless—especially by the individually employed manpower on the
farms—the following is directed:
1. For every case of sexual intercourse with our German countrymen or
women [deutschen Volksgenossen oder Volksgenossinnen] special treatment
is to be requested for male manpower from the original Soviet Russian
territory, transfer to a concentration camp for female manpower.
2. When exercising sexual intercourse with other foreign workers, the
conduct of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory is to
be punished as severe violation of discipline with transfer to a
concentration camp.
_VII. Measures against fraternization with manpower from the original
Soviet Russian territory._
1. Special attention is to be paid to the fundamental segregation of
manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory from the German
population. It is important to prevent a penetration of communistic
ideology into the German population by cutting off every contact not
directly pertaining to the work and, if possible, to avoid every
solidarity between German people and the manpower from the original
Soviet Russian territory. Against Germans who act to the contrary, steps
are to be taken by the state police according to the situation of the
individual case.
2. If German countrymen or women should exercise sexual intercourse or
commit indecent acts with manpower from the original Soviet Russian
territory, transfer to a concentration camp is to be requested.
3. The intercourse between other foreign workers employed in the Reich
and the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory also brings
great dangers to be dealt with by the Security Police; therefore, it
should also be fought with measures against the foreign workers. As a
rule, the transfer to a correction camp (deportation for Italians) will
be proper; this also applies to cases of sexual intercourse.
_VIII. Search._
* * * * *
2. When caught, the fugitive must receive special treatment.
* * * * *
_B. MANPOWER FROM THE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND
FOREIGN MANPOWER, NOT OF POLISH ORIGIN,
FROM THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT AND FROM
THE ANNEXED EASTERN TERRITORIES_
_I. General._
1. This manpower is to be treated uniformly in the Reich by the state
police. In view of the political attitude of these nations, or ethnic
groups [Volksstaemme] toward the Reich on the one hand and their
position in the East on the other hand, they are to be governed by the
regulations valid for foreign manpower in general, but are subject to
special limitations in their way of living.
2. These limitations consist essentially in a conspicuous separation of
this manpower from the German people. Since the employment and housing
of this manpower is not closely confined and guarded, it is the task of
the Secret State Police to be especially watchful about the observation
of the mentioned principle. The Secret State Police has to inform the
offices charged with the employment of foreigners through constant
communication, that this principle will be considered in all measures of
work employment. Settlement of these persons in the Reich, individual
billeting in spite of existing collective quarters, position superior to
that of a German worker, etc., must not be tolerated. As far as these
people themselves violate the established principle, and act unlawfully
against Germans by insubordination and acts of violence, such a conduct
will be met with state police measures.
3. This manpower must, however, by no means be put on the same level as
the Poles or the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, on
account of their nations’ fundamental antagonism toward the Polish
people and Bolshevism. Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to
them—especially by the establishment of an active intelligence service
among this manpower—since their rather receptive attitude toward the
German nation might change into the opposite, but at least could
stiffen, because too high political expectations are not fulfilled.
* * * * *
_III. Fighting against breach of labor contract._
1. The fight against breach of labor contract of this manpower is
principally the duty of the Secret State Police.
2. This does not mean, of course, an interference with the activity of
the Reich trustee of labor, with the means at his disposal in the
regulation and settlement of industrial difficulties as long as no
active intervention is necessary. If more stringent measures are
necessary, the Reich trustee of labor will transfer the proceedings to
the Secret State Police.
3. In every case, however, it is the task of the (superior) state police
agency to check whether the violation of the working duty by this
manpower is not caused by the plant through breach of contract as well
as general bad treatment. If the conduct of the concerned manpower
appears justified through the fault on the part of this plant, the state
police is not to interfere, since this is free manpower.
4. In any other case, however, immediate action is necessary and, in
case of a breach of contract on part of this manpower, the transfer to a
correction camp is to be ordered, as a rule. In cases of severe
repetition the transfer to a concentration camp can also be requested.
In the cases of breach of contracts handled by the state police, the
Reich trustee of labor has to be informed each time about the decision.
_IV. Criminal violations._
* * * * *
3. * * *. Crimes against decency, acts of violence, and acts of sabotage
are to be punished, as a matter of principle, by state police measures
(special treatment); however, I have no objection against a transfer of
the inquiry proceedings to the competent public prosecutor if, pursuant
to the criminal laws, one can safely count on the death penalty for the
perpetrator. In these cases it is to be ascertained what the outcome of
the trial is; should, against expectations, a death sentence not be
passed, a report has to be made to me, attaching copy of the judgment.
Inquiry proceedings concerning other offenses are, as a rule, to be
transferred to the competent public prosecutor. If a strong increase of
crimes is noted in certain spheres, then there are no objections at all
against punishing purely criminal acts, as a deterrent example, by state
police measures.
* * * * *
_VI. Sexual intercourse with Germans._
1. The sexual intercourse of the manpower from the Baltic states as well
as of the foreign manpower of non-Polish origin from the General
Government and from the annexed eastern territories with Germans is
punishable by severest penalties. (Changed by Circular Decree dated 23
October 1943.) The workers will be thoroughly instructed through the
attached orientation sheet (enclo. 3) [not reproduced] in the foreign
languages when they report upon their arrival at the local police
offices. An instruction of the German population will be effected
through the Party administration offices.
2. The district [Kreis] police offices have received instructions to
arrest without delay workers who violate this regulation and to report
them to the competent (superior) state police agency.
3. For male manpower who had sexual intercourse with Germans, special
treatment is to be requested, for female manpower, transfer into a
concentration camp. The directives issued for the special treatment of
Polish civil workers are valid correspondingly; this is also applicable
for the treatment of the involved German persons.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 016-PS[78]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 13
LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO ROSENBERG, 24 APRIL 1942, AND
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON SAUCKEL’S LABOR
MOBILIZATION PROGRAM, 20 APRIL 1942
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
GBA
Berlin W. 8, 24 April 1942
Mohrenstrasse 65
(Thuringia House)
Phone: 126571
[Stamp]
Bureau of Ministry [Ministerbuero]
received 27 April 1942, No. 0887 Min. 28/v
Dr. K.P. has been informed
Very esteemed and dear Party Member Rosenberg:
Enclosed please find my program for the mobilization of labor. Please
excuse the fact that this copy still contains a few corrections.
Heil Hitler!
Yours,
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
5 copies
copy for Mr. Wittenbacher.
[Signed] WACHS
Chancellory 1 May 1942
[Kanzlei]
[Stamp] MISCHKE
read: ILFL/KS 4.5.42
filed: 1-5, 5/5 42 Pg
To The Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories,
Party Member Rosenberg
Berlin
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation
20 April 1942
Sckl./We.
_The Labor Mobilization Program_
* * * * *
The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all the rich
and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by our fighting
armed forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, for the armament of
the armed forces and also for the nutrition of the homeland. The raw
material as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and their
human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the
profit of Germany and their allies.
* * * * *
VII. * * * Should we succeed with the help of the Party to convince all
the German intellectual and manual workers of the great importance of
the labor mobilization for the outcome of the war, and succeed to take
good care of and keep up the morale of all the men, women, and the
German youths who work within the labor mobilization program under
extraordinarily strenuous circumstances, as far as their physical and
mental capabilities of endurance are concerned and should we furthermore
be able, also with the help of the Party, to use the prisoners of war as
well as civilian workmen and women of foreign blood not only without
harm to our own people but to the greatest advantage to our war and
nutrition industries, then we will have accomplished the most difficult
part of the labor mobilization program.
_The Task and its Solution_
(No figures are mentioned because of security reasons. I can assure you,
nevertheless, that we are concerned with the greatest labor problem of
all times, especially with regard to figures.)
* * * * *
B. _The Solution_:
* * * * *
3. The armament and nutrition tasks make it vitally necessary, not only
to include the entire German labor power but also to call on foreign
labor.
Consequently, I immediately tripled the transport program which I found
when I took charge of my mission.
The main effort of that transport has been advanced into the months of
May-June in order to assure in time and under any circumstances the
availability of foreign labor power from the occupied territories for an
increased production, in view of coming operations of the army, as well
as of agricultural labor in the sector of the German food economy.
All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well as of the
East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorporated into the
German armament and nutrition industries. Their production must be
brought to the highest possible level.
It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous number of
foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The greatest pool for that
purpose is the occupied territories of the East.
Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human reserves of
the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest extent. Should we not
succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary basis,
we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor.
* * * * *
_Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers_
The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the use of a
gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women, has
become an indisputable necessity for the solution of the mobilization of
labor program in this war.
All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way as to
exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable
degree of expenditure.
It has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from cruelty and
mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if he has proved himself
the most bestial and most implacable adversary, and to treat him
correctly and humanely, even when we expect useful work of him.
As long as the German armaments industry did not make it absolutely
necessary, we refrained under any circumstances from the use of Soviet
prisoners of war as well as of civilian workers, men or women, from the
Soviet territories. This has now become impossible and the working
capacity of these people must now be exploited to the greatest extent.
* * * * *
Therefore, I want to impress most cordially but also most emphatically
upon all the men and women who participate decisively in this war in the
labor mobilization program, the necessity to comply with all these
necessities, decisions and measures, according to the old National
Socialist principle:
Nothing for us, everything for the Fuehrer and his work,
that is, for the future of our Nation!
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
[Stamp]
(The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 084-PS[79]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 16-A
EXTRACTS FROM INTERDEPARTMENTAL REPORT OF THE MINISTRY
FOR OCCUPIED EASTERN TERRITORIES, 30 SEPTEMBER 1942,
CONCERNING THE STATUS OF EASTERN LABORERS
Berlin NW 7, Hegelplatz 2, 30 September 1942
Central Office for Members of Eastern Nations
Ih (ZO)
Subject: Present situation of the Eastern Labor Problem
* * * The manner and method by which the problems created through the
importation of millions of members of the eastern peoples into the Reich
are being solved is relevant with respect to two big tasks:
1. the development of the _war situation_,
2. the enforcement of the German _claim for leadership in the East_
after the end of the war.
* * * * *
* * * The facts which, by the fall of 1942, have been changed only
partially or incompletely, are, among other, as follows:
1. The _definition_ of workers from the occupied territories of the USSR
was narrowed down to the legal labor and social labor concept of
“Eastern workers”; thereby, a particular “employment relationship of a
special type” was created among “foreigners”—something which had to be
looked upon, by those affected, as degrading.
2. The _drafting_ of eastern male and female workers often occurred
without the necessary examination of the capabilities of those
concerned, so that 5 to 10 percent sick and children were transported
along. On the other hand, in those places where no volunteers were
obtained, instead of recruiting them pursuant to labor conscription law,
coercive measures were used by the police (imprisonment, penal
expeditions, and the like).
3. The _allocation_ to enterprises was not undertaken by considering the
occupation and previous training but according to the chance assignment
of the individual to the respective transports or transient camps.
4. The _billeting_ did not follow the policies for other foreigners, but
was done like for civilian prisoners, in camps which were fenced in with
barbed wire and were heavily guarded and which they were not permitted
to leave.
5. The _treatment_ by the guards was, on the average, without
intelligence and cruel so that the Russian and Ukrainian workers, in
enterprises with foreign laborers of different nationalities, were
exposed to the ridicule of the Poles and Czechs, among other things.
6. The _food_ was so bad and insufficient in the camps for the eastern
laborers employed in industry and mining that, on the average, the good
capability of the camp members dropped quickly and many sicknesses and
deaths occurred.
7. _Payment_ was carried out in the form of a ruling in which the
industrial worker would be left on the average with 2 or 3 RM each week,
and the farm laborers with even less, so that the wage transfer to their
homes became illusory, not to mention the fact that no procedure was as
yet developed for such transfer.
8. The _postal service_ with their families was not feasible for months
because of the lack of preparatory measures, so that instead of factual
reports, wild rumors arrived in their countries—among others, by way of
emigrants.
9. The _promises_ which had been made time and time again in the areas
of enlistment were in gross contradiction with the facts mentioned under
3 to 8.
Apart from the natural impairment of morale and working capacity
resulting from these measures and conditions, the result was that the
_Soviet propaganda_ seized upon this matter and exploited it carefully;
for this, an ample basis was provided not only by the actual conditions
and the letters which reached the home country [of the workers] in spite
of the initial blockade, as well as by stories of fugitives and such,
but also by the clumsy publications in the German press about the
respective legal regulations. As early as April 1942, Commissar of
Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in his _note_ to the enemy powers referred to
this, especially in section III of that note in which among other things
it is stated:
“The German administration is stamping under its feet the long
recognized laws and customs of warfare by ordering its troops to
take into captivity the male civilian population, in many places
even the women, and to apply to them the kind of regime, which
the Hitlerites have introduced for the prisoners of war. This
does not only mean _slave labor_ for the captured peaceful
inhabitants but in most cases also inescapable death by
starvation or death through sickness, corporal punishment, and
organized mass murders.
“The deportation of peaceful inhabitants to the rear which has
been very widely practiced by the German-Fascist Army at the
time of its advance is taking on a mass character; it is carried
out at direct orders of the Supreme Command of the German Armed
Forces (OKW) and its effects are especially cruel in the
immediate rear areas during the retreat of the German Army. In a
series of documents which have been found by units of the Red
Army at the staffs of destroyed German units, there is a
reference to the Order of the High Command under No. 2974/41 of
6 December 1941 which orders the deportation of all grown men
from the occupied places to prisoner of war camps. * * *
“Sometimes, all the inhabitants were deported, sometimes the men
were torn away from their families, or mothers were separated
from their children. Only the smallest number of these deported
people have been able to return to their homes. _These returnees
report about unheard-of degradations, heaviest forced labor,
enormous numbers of deaths among inhabitants because of
starvation and tortures, about the murder by the Fascists of all
the weak, wounded, and sick._”
* * * * *
The effects of this large-scale radio, press, and leaflet propaganda
which is based on documentary evidence, a propaganda operating even into
German-administered territories, must be considered as one of the main
reasons for this year’s stiffening of the Soviet resistance as well as
the threatening increase of guerilla bands up to the borders of the
General Government.
In the meantime, after a _betterment of the condition of the eastern
laborers_ had been insisted upon, not only by the Main Office for
Politics in the Reich Ministry for the occupied eastern territories,
which has been able to find support in the repeated requests by the High
Command of the Armed Forces, but also by the gentleman charged with the
responsibility for all labor employment as well as the Department of
Labor Employment in the German Labor Movement, which has the supervision
of the eastern laborers—those previously existing legal and police
rulings have been mitigated and the conditions in the 8-10,000 camps in
the Reich have, on the whole, been improved. * * *
In spite of the improvements mentioned as well as others, which in many
cases can be traced back to the personal intervention of the
Plenipotentiary General of Labor Allocation, the _total situation_ of
the eastern laborers (sampling date: 1 October 1942) must still be
considered _unsatisfactory_, * * *.
There remains such a _quantity of grievances and problems_ that it would
be impossible to relate now.
* * * * *
[Signed] GUTKELCH
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 294-PS[80]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 19-A
EXTRACTS FROM TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM, SIGNED BY
BRAEUTIGAM,[81] 25 OCTOBER 1942, CONCERNING
EFFECTS OF SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM
Copy
Top Secret Matter of State [Geheime Reichssache]
[handwritten:] II 1 1161/44 g Rs.
Memorandum
In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for the
destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the Greater
Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of colonial
territory for colonizing purposes and economic exploitation.
* * * With the instinct characteristic of the eastern peoples, even the
primitive person has soon found out that for Germany, the slogan
“liberation from Bolshevism” was merely a pretext, in order to enslave
the Slavic peoples of the East in her own manner. But lest any doubts at
all exist as to this German war aim, the German public is, to an ever
increasing extent, unabashedly pointing at this intention. Not only for
Germany is the conquered territory publicly being claimed as
colonization area, but even for Germany’s bitter enemies, the Dutch and
Norwegians. * * *
* * * * *
Of primary importance, the treatment of prisoners of war should be
named. It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of
thousands of them literally have died of hunger or cold in our camps.
Allegedly there were not enough food supplies on hand for them. It is
especially peculiar that the food supplies are deficient only for
prisoners of war from the Soviet Union, while complaints about the
treatment of other prisoners of war, Polish, Serbian, French and
English, have not been heard of. It is obvious that nothing was so
suitable for strengthening the resistance of the Red Army as the
knowledge that in German captivity a slow miserable death is to be met.
To be sure, the Main Department for Politics has succeeded here by
unceasing efforts in bringing about a material improvement of the fate
of the prisoners of war. However, this improvement is not to be ascribed
to political insight, but to the sudden realization that our labor
market must be supplied with laborers at once. We now experienced the
grotesque picture of having to recruit millions of laborers from the
occupied eastern territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger
like flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within Germany.
Now the food question suddenly no longer existed. With the usual
unlimited abuse of the Slavic humanity, “recruiting” methods were used
which probably have their model only in the blackest periods of the
slave trade.
A regular manhunt was inaugurated. Without consideration of health or
age, the people were shipped to Germany, where it turned out immediately
that many more than 100,000 had to be sent back because of serious
illnesses and other incapabilities for work. It need not be emphasized
that these methods would of necessity have their effect on the
resistance of the Red Army; of course, these methods were used only in
the Soviet Union, and in no way remotely resembled this form in enemy
countries like Holland or Norway. Actually we have made it quite easy
for Soviet propaganda to augment the hate for Germany and the National
Socialist system. The Soviet soldier fights more and more bravely in
spite of the efforts of our politicians to find another name for this
bravery. Valuable German blood must flow more and more, in order to
break the resistance of the Red Army. Obviously, the Main Department for
Politics has struggled unceasingly to place the methods of acquiring
workers and their treatment within Germany on a rational foundation.
Originally it was thought in all earnestness to demand the utmost
efforts with a minimum of food. Here, as well, not political insight,
but merely the most primitive biological knowledge has led to an
improvement. Now 400,000 female household workers from the Ukraine are
to come to Germany, and already the German press announces publicly that
these people have no right to free time and may not visit theaters,
movies, restaurants, etc., and may leave the house at the most three
hours a week, except for duty purposes.
In addition, there is the treatment of the Ukrainians in the Reich
Commissariat itself. With an unequalled arrogance, we put aside all
political knowledge and, to the happy surprise of all the colored world,
treat the peoples of the Occupied Eastern Territories as whites of class
2, who apparently have only the task of serving as slaves for Germany
and Europe. Only the most limited education is suitable for them, no
social services must be given them. Their sustenance interests us only
insofar as they are still capable of labor, and, in every respect, they
are given to understand that we regard them as of minute value.
* * * * *
Berlin, 25 October 1942
[Signed] BRAEUTIGAM
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-61
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 20
LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO THE PRESIDENTS OF LABOR OFFICES,
26 NOVEMBER 1942, CONCERNING DEPORTATION AND
EMPLOYMENT OF POLES AND JEWS
Copy
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
Berlin S.W. 11, Saarlandstr. 96
26 November 1942
Va 5431/7468/42 g
To the Presidents of the Landes
Labor Offices (excl. Labor
Office Brandenburg)
Special-delivery letter
Secret
Subject: Employment of Jews. _Specif_: Replacement of Jews in
war-essential jobs by Polish labor.
In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the Security
Service, Jews still employed will now be evacuated from the territory of
the Reich and replaced by Poles, who are being deported from the General
Government.
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service has informed
me on 26 October 1942, that it is anticipated that during the month of
November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district will begin, in
order to make room there for the resettlement of Germans.
Poles slated for evacuation, as a result of this measure, will be
committed to concentration camps and put to work insofar as they are
criminal or asocial elements. The remaining Poles, if fit for labor,
will be transported without their families to the Reich, particularly to
Berlin; there they will be put at the disposal of the labor allocation
offices to serve as replacements for Jews to be eliminated from armament
factories.
The Jews who will become available as a result of the employment of
Polish labor will be deported _at once_. This will apply first to Jews
engaged in unskilled labor since they can be exchanged most easily. The
remaining so-called “qualified” Jewish laborers will be left in the
industries until their Polish replacements have been made sufficiently
familiar with the work processes by a period of apprenticeship to be
determined for each case individually. Loss of production in individual
industries will thus be reduced to the absolute minimum.
I reserve the right to issue further instructions. Please inform the
labor offices concerned accordingly.
To the President of the Landes Labor Office Brandenburg, Berlin W. 62
I transmit the foregoing copy for your information. Insofar as the
removal of Jews allocated for work concerns your district, too, I
request that you take the necessary measures in cooperation with the
competent offices of the Chief of the Security Police and of the
Security Service.
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-D-PS[82]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 21
EXTRACT FROM ORDER OF MUELLER, 17 DECEMBER 1942,
CONCERNING PRISONERS QUALIFIED FOR WORK
TO BE SENT TO CONCENTRATION CAMPS
Berlin, 17 December 1942
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service
B. Nr. IV 656/42 Secret
Secret
Distribution—Secret:
All Commanders of the Security Police and the Security Service
All Inspectors of the Security Police and the Security Service
All Commandants of the Security Police and the Security Service
All Chiefs of State Police Headquarters
For information:
The Chief of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer [Lt. Gen.] Pohl
All Higher SS and Police Chiefs
The Inspector of Concentration Camps
For reasons of war necessity, which need not be specified here, the
Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered on 14
December 1942 that at least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be
committed to the concentration camps before the end of January 1943.
In order to reach this number, the following measures are required:
1. As of now (and for the time being, until 1 February 1943) eastern
workers or such foreign workers, who have been fugitives, or who have
broken contracts, insofar as they do not belong to allied, friendly, or
neutral states, are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest
concentration camps under observance of the simplest formalities listed
under No. 3. In order to eliminate or forestall complaints by outside
public offices, explanations will be furnished, if required, stating
that the measures are essential for reasons of public security on the
basis of the facts in the individual cases.
2. The commanders and the commandants of the Security Police and the
Security Service, and the Chiefs of the State Police Headquarters will
make immediate checks, applying especially rigorous and strict
standards, on (a) prisons, and (b) labor correction camps. All prisoners
fit for work, if at all possible physically and from a humanitarian
aspect, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration camp,
according to the following instructions, even if criminal procedures
have already been or will be instituted in the near future. Only such
prisoners who are to remain in solitary confinement, for investigation
purposes, may be left.
* * * * *
By order:
[Signed] MUELLER
Certified correct.
[Signed] HELLMUTH
[Seal of Secret State Police] Chief Secretary of Police
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1526-PS[83]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 25
EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM GERMAN-APPOINTED UKRAINIAN
MAIN COMMITTEE TO FRANK, FEBRUARY 1943
Copy
Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytch,
Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee
Krakow, February 1943
To the Governor General,
Reich Minister Dr. Frank.
Your Excellency:
Complying with your request I am sending you this letter, in which I
should like to state briefly the critical conditions and the distressing
incidents which are creating an especially grave situation for the
Ukrainian population in the General Government. * * *
* * * * *
_II. Measures of labor procurement._
The general nervousness is enhanced yet by the wrong methods to obtain
labor, which have been used increasingly in recent months.
The wild and ruthless manhunt carried on everywhere in towns and
country, in streets, public squares, railway stations, even in churches,
as well as in homes at night, has badly shaken the sense of security of
the population. Everybody is exposed to the danger of being seized
anywhere and at any time by the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and
being taken into an assembly camp. The family does not know what has
happened to him, until weeks or months later one or the other gives news
of his fate by a postcard.
I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs:
_a._ During such a drive a schoolboy in Sokal lost his life and
another was wounded (App. 2).
_b._ 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with
identity cards, were assigned in Krakow to a transport of
“Russian prisoners of war” and delivered into a punishment camp
in Graz (App. 3).
_c._ 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany
by the labor office in the middle of January, were sent via East
Prussia to Pskov in Russia, where most of them died as a result
of the very severe conditions (App. 4).
_d._ Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment
(Zalesczyki); kidnapping schoolboys from classes (Biala
Podlaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieszow) (App. 5).
* * * * *
_III. Question of Personal Security._
Of a much worse character are the mass executions of absolutely innocent
persons * * *.
* * * * *
_Appendix 12_
* * * * *
As this holiday is celebrated by the Ukrainians with great piety, the
shootings of these innocent people on this holy day caused great
indignance and embitterment. These events depress the Ukrainian
population. The view is current that now the shootings of the Jews are
coming to an end those of the Ukrainians begin. The case of Ustrzyki is
commented upon as follows: The Germans do not care about any non-German
sanctity and holidays, they even shoot Ukrainians on the Ukrainian
“Schtschedryj Wetschir” (the case in Ustrzyki).
The Ukrainian population is suspicious of all orders given by the German
authorities and even keep away from the communal kitchens, for fear that
those in need may be considered as beggars and shot.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-V-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 30
EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 14 APRIL 1943, CONCERNING
LABOR QUESTIONS
G.B.A.
April 14th, [1943]
Sckl./We.
Forwarded We.
[in ink] April 15th
To the Fuehrer
Obersalzberg
My Fuehrer,
As Gruppenfuehrer Bormann has already informed you, I am going to the
eastern areas on the 15th April in order to secure 1 million workers
from the east for the German war economy in the coming months.
The result of my last trip to France is that, after exact fulfilment of
the last program, another 450,000 workers from the western areas, too,
will come into the Reich by the beginning of the summer.
With the addition of about 150,000 workers who furthermore may be
obtained from Poland and from the other territories, it will then be
possible by summer again to put 5-600,000 workers at the disposal of
German agriculture and 1,000,000 workers at the disposal of the armament
and other war industries.
I ask for your approval to have the new French workers come into the
Reich under conditions similar to those of the last group. I have taken
contact with the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW).
Since the largest part of the Belgian civilian workers and prisoners of
war perform very satisfactorily, I ask you to agree that a similar
statute to that which was granted to the French be made for some 20,000
Belgian prisoners of war. This very great concession by you has made a
very deep impression upon Laval and the French Ministers. Laval has
repeatedly asked me to transmit his sincerest thanks for this to you, my
Fuehrer.
1. After one year’s activity as Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of
Labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers have been added
to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 March this
year.
As a whole, these forces have produced satisfactory performances. Their
feeding and housing is secured, their treatment so indisputably
regulated that, in this respect too, our National Socialist Reich
presents a shining example compared to the methods of the capitalist and
bolshevist world. However, it is naturally inevitable that mistakes and
blunders still occur here and there. I will continue to endeavor with
the greatest energy to reduce them to a minimum.
In addition to the foreign civilian workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war
are also employed in the German economy.
2. The 3,638,056 workers are distributed amongst the following branches
of the German war economy:
Armament 1,568,801
Mining industry 163,632
Building 218,707
Transportation 199,074
Agriculture and forestry 1,007,544
Other branches of the economy 480,298
In addition to the foreign workers, 5 million male and female German
workers were channelled into the German war economy proper through
transfer from enterprises unimportant to the war effort, to
war-essential industries, etc.
* * * * *
Yours faithfully and obediently,
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
The following persons received a copy of the above version:
Reich Marshal Goering
Reichsleiter Bormann
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers
Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels
Additional text on the original letter to the Fuehrer.
Since I will be in the eastern territories on April 20th, I ask you, my
Fuehrer, to accept in advance my most sincere congratulations along with
those of my district [Gau] and my family.
Let me assure you that the district [Gau] of Thuringia and I will serve
you and our dear people with all our strength.
It is the most fervent wish that you, my Fuehrer, may always enjoy the
best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to your complete
satisfaction.
Faithfully and obediently yours
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-IX-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 33
LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 3 JUNE 1943, CONCERNING
FOREIGN LABOR SITUATION
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
1751/43 [pencilled]
forwarded on 6 June 1943
Berlin W 8, 3 June 1943
To the Fuehrer of Greater Germany
The Fuehrer’s Headquarters.
My Fuehrer,
I beg to be permitted to read to you [a report] on the situation of the
labor allocation for the first 5 months of 1943.
The following number of new foreigners and prisoners of war was for the
first time put at the disposal of the German war industry:
January 1943 120,085
February 1943 138,354
March 1943 257,382
April 1943 160,535
May 1943 170,155
————
TOTAL 846,511
I may remark that it was possible to reach this figure of 850,000 only
under great difficulties which had not existed during the previous year
and only because all labor allocation agencies, particularly also in the
occupied territories, approached their task with the greatest devotion.
Unfortunately, quite a number of our officials and employees became
victims of assassination, attack, and the like, by partisans.
In addition to the labor forces put at the disposal of the economy
within the Reich, several hundred thousand laborers were made available
within the occupied territories by the agencies of the Labor Allocation
Administration to the Organization Todt as well as to the enterprises
working for the German war economy in the East and the West.
Furthermore, it was possible to assign to the Wehrmacht, in addition to
a large number of laborers, some considerable numbers of labor
volunteers.
Moreover, by virtue of the order concerning compulsory registration,
dated 27 January 1943, the following number of men and women are made
available.
│ Men │ Women │ Total
February │ 14,594 │ 163,012 │ 177,606
March │ 45,606 │ 494,931 │ 540,537
April │ 19,315 │ 269,374 │ 288,689
May │ 11,485 │ 186,683 │ 198,168
│ ———— │ ———— │ ————
TOTAL │ 91,000 │ 1,114,000 │ 1,205,000
However, approximately 600,000 of these persons are available only for
less than 48 hours of work per week.
Altogether German war industry recruited 2,000,000 laborers during 5
months of 1943.
Furthermore, as regards wage control and increase of the output of the
laborers in the various European territories, especially in France,
negotiations were conducted as well as arrangements made and regulations
issued, which enabled us to keep the wage system in the occupied
European territories in order to secure, as far as possible, the living
conditions of laborers working for German interests, in spite of the
difficult conditions created by the war, and to increase production by
means of wage regulations also in these territories. The coordination of
these measures was achieved through agreements with the respective
armament and agricultural agencies, as well as with the Reich
Commissioner for Price Control.
Heil!
Yours faithfully and obediently,
[Signed] SAUCKEL
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3000-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 34
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT RENDERED TO RIECKE,
MINISTERIALDIREKTOR IN THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE,
28 JUNE 1943, ON EXPERIENCES IN POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE EAST
Freitag, Chief of Main Office III
with the Commissariat General in Minsk
Minsk, 28 June 1943
Secret!
[stamp]
Main Group Food and Agriculture
Rec’d. 14 July 1943; no encl.
III E 733/43 Secret
To Ministerialdirektor Riecke
in Berlin
Subject: Report on experiences in political and economic problems in the
East, particularly the Commissariat General White Ruthenia.
* * * * *
* * * The task of the military agencies and, subsequently, of the German
administration, is: “Exploitation of the region for the German war
economy,” and the motto: “Everything you do for Germany is right,
everything else is wrong!”
* * * * *
* * * The recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had
disastrous effects. The recruitment measures in the last months and
weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable political and
economic effect * * * From * * * White Ruthenia, approximately 50,000
people have been obtained for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to
be obtained. Considering the total population of 2.4 million, these
figures are impossible * * *.
* * * * *
* * * Due to the sweeping drives [Grossaktionen] of the SS and police in
November 1942, about 250,000 acres of farmland are left unused, as the
population has gone and the villages have been razed.
* * * * *
[Signed] FREITAG
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 265-PS[84]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 35
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT BY LEYSER TO ROSENBERG, 30 JUNE 1943, ON CONDITIONS
IN THE DISTRICT ZHITOMIR
The Commissioner General
Zhitomir, 30 June 1943
Secret
Oral report on the situation in the general district [Generalbezirk]
Zhitomir, by Commissioner General Leyser, delivered at a conference with
Reich Minister Rosenberg, in Vinnitsa, on 17 June 1943.
Mr. Reich Minister,
* * * * *
The symptoms created by the _recruiting of workers_ are, no doubt, well
known to the Reich Minister through reports and his own observations.
Therefore, I shall not report them. It is certain that a recruitment of
labor, in the sense of the word, can hardly be spoken of. _In most
cases, it is nowadays a matter of actual conscription by force._ The
population has been stirred up to a large extent and views the
transports to the Reich as a measure which does in no way differ from
the former exile to Siberia, during the Czarist and Bolshevist systems.
* * * * *
To date, almost 170,000 male and female workers have been sent to the
Reich from the general district Zhitomir. It can be taken for granted
that, during the month of June, this number is going to rise to
approximately 200,000.
* * * * *
The struggle which has to be carried on is hard and full of sacrifices.
But it will and must be carried through. Enormous moral forces have been
mobilized in the personnel of the civil administration in their daily
efforts. The successes which they were able to achieve so far are
impressive, particularly with regard to the resistance encountered. May
I, therefore, be permitted at the conclusion of this report to thank all
my co-workers for their excellent work. They know that they are
practically on the front. I can promise your Excellency, that we all
shall do our duty now, and in the future, as our Fuehrer has ordered.
[Signed] LEYSER
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 204-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 39
EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM OF A CONFERENCE, 18 FEBRUARY 1944, CONCERNING
THE RELEASE OF INDIGENOUS LABOR FOR PURPOSES OF THE REICH
The City Commissioner in Kaunas.
Kaunas, 18 February 1944.
_PROCUREMENT OF INDIGENOUS WORKERS FOR
PURPOSES OF THE REICH_
Numerous drives for the purpose of recruiting indigenous workers for the
Reich have taken place since the entry of German armed forces into the
general district [Generalbezirk] Lithuania in June 1941. A few weeks
after the entry of the German troops, thousands of Lithuanian male and
female farm workers were recruited at the instigation of the military
administration, to work for 6 months on large estates in the Gau East
Prussia. _Unfortunately, the promises made then were not kept._ These
farm workers were not released after 6 months nor after 12 months; their
families remaining behind were left without any support for months; they
were for a long time refused a short vacation in Lithuania, and now it
is even considered to transfer these farm workers, recruited in 1941 for
6 months, to the armament industry in the Reich.
The second major drive was started by the armed forces in the spring of
1942 and concerned the _collecting of approximately 7,000 male workers
as so-called transport helpers_. The action, which was rushed into
without sufficient propaganda preparation, was greatly handicapped by
unwise measures on the part of the nervous armed forces command. Thus
for instance, the Lithuanians, ordered to the official agencies “only
for registration”, were not allowed to return home and were taken away
under military escort to the local barracks, leaving them no way of
either saying good-by to their families or putting in order their most
important personal affairs. No wonder that the enemy propaganda
exploited this “blemish” with avidity comparing the procedure with the
deportation methods used barely a year ago by the Soviets.
Until most recent times, numerous additional drives have been undertaken
for the purpose of obtaining volunteers for the armed forces, the police
and the Reich Labor Service, or for obtaining workers for the armament
industry in the Reich. * * *
* * * * *
Finally it must be recalled that the indigenous administration in its
present form and since its inception _has completely failed_ in the
question of procuring workers for the Reich. * * *
* * * * *
3. Gauleiter Sauckel requested that _30,000 indigenous workers for the
Reich_ be recruited at short order and be shipped to Germany. At a
conference between the Commissioner General and the First Councillor
General [Ersten Generalrat] on 7 September 1943, the latter offered to
assume the entire responsibility for the execution of this drive for the
native administration and to recruit and ship the specified number of
30,000 workers by 7 November 1943.
* * * * *
4. In the meantime, Gauleiter Sauckel made an _additional demand_ to the
effect that the general district Lithuania had to furnish _100,000
native workers_ (instead of the 30,000 demanded up until now) _for the
Reich_. At a conference with all the general councillors on 24 January
1944, the commissioner general did not leave any doubts as to the fact
that this number would have to be furnished regardless of any
consideration, even at the risk of leaving many work projects in the
general district unfinished and permanently removing workers needed on
jobs in the country. The responsibility for the execution of this new
drive lies again in the hands of the local administration, and, with the
consent of the commissioner general, indigenous conscription commissions
have been formed with all district chiefs and all chiefs of judicial and
local districts. The total number to be made available has been divided
up into contingents, and the quota to be furnished by every mayor or
district chief was exactly determined. This is the way the matter looks
in the district of the City of Kaunas:
New quota, to be supplied 7,000 workers
20 percent addition 1,400 workers
———————
TOTAL 8,400 workers
In the district of the City of Kaunas, according to the records of my
labor office on 1 February 1944, there were 7,000 unfilled jobs in
industry and the agencies of the armed forces, police, etc., so that to
all intents and purposes 15,400 workers would have to be found in the
city of Kaunas alone, in order to comply fully with the demands of the
Reich and the local economy. _And all that with a total indigenous
population of only a little over 130,000._
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-103[85]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 40
EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM THE (GERMAN-APPOINTED) POLISH MAIN COMMITTEE
TO THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF POLAND ON THE CONDITIONS OF POLISH WORKERS
IN GERMANY, 17 MAY 1944
Polish Main Committee
5 Vischer Street, Krakow
Krakow, 17 May 1944
To the Administration of the General Government,
Main Department Internal Administration,
Dept. Population and Welfare,
13 University Street, Krakow
No. Pa 1/724
————
6699/44
Subject: Situation of the Polish Workers in the Reich.
The living conditions of about 2 million Polish male and female workers
in the Reich have given rise to shortcomings which are largely lowering
the will and the capacity to work of many workers, endanger their health
and even their lives, and also have a strong influence on the situation
of their families within the General Government, thus directly affecting
the sphere of our own work.
These bad conditions are felt with particular intensity by those groups
of workers who have been assigned for work in factories and have been
lodged in large camps [Massenlagern]. With regard to workers on the
land, they occur as individual cases and are more easily dealt with. * *
*
* * * * *
Food relief allotments—We receive letters from the camps for eastern
workers and their large families, beseeching us for food. The quantity
and quality of camp rations mentioned therein—the so-called fourth
category of rations—is absolutely insufficient to maintain the energies
spent in heavy work. 3.5 kg. bread weekly and a thin soup at lunch time,
cooked with swedes or other vegetables without any meat or fat, with a
meager addition of potatoes now and then, is a hunger ration for a heavy
worker.
Sometimes punishment consists of starvation, which is inflicted e.g.,
for refusal to wear the badge “East”. Such punishment has the result
that workers faint at work (Klosterteich Camp, Gruenheim, Saxony). The
consequence is complete exhaustion, an ailing state of health, and
tuberculosis. The spread of tuberculosis among the Polish factory
workers is a result of the deficient food rations meted out in the
community camps, because energy spent in the heavy work assigned to them
cannot be replaced.
* * * * *
The quantities of bread and [other] food fixed for Polish children in
the camps is thoroughly insufficient for building up substance for
growing and developing their bodies. In some cases children up to the
age of 10 and even more are allotted 200 grams of bread daily, 200 grams
of butter or margarine and 250 grams of sugar monthly, and nothing else
(factory in Zeititz, near Wurzen, Saxony). * * *
* * * * *
_Care of Children_—* * * An indication of the awful conditions this may
lead to is given by the fact that in the camps for eastern workers (camp
for eastern workers “Waldlust”, Post Office Lauf, Pegnitz) there are
cases of 8-year-old, weak and undernourished children put to forced
labor and perishing from such treatment. * * *
_Health Care_—The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the
state of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by many cases
of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from the Reich to
the General Government unfit for work. Their state of health is usually
deteriorated past hope of recovery.
The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting from overwork and
malnutrition is not recognized as a disease condition until the illness
manifests itself in high fever and fainting spells.
* * * * *
_Protection of the Family_—Grave depression is caused among the eastern
workers by the order forbidding marriage among them within the borders
of the Reich. * * * No less suffering is caused by the separation of
families when wives and mothers of small children are torn away from
their families and sent to the Reich for forced labor.
* * * * *
_Religious Care_—If under these bad conditions there is no moral
support such as is normally provided by regular family life, then at
least such moral support which the religious feeling of the Polish
population require should be maintained and increased. The elimination
of religious services, worship, and religious care from the life of the
Polish workers, the prohibition of church attendance at a time when
there is a religious service for other people, and other measures show a
certain contempt for the influence of religion on the feelings and
outlook of the workers. * * *
* * * * *
[Stamp] THE POLISH CENTRAL COMMITTEE
[Signed] [name illegible]
President
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 208-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 55
REPORT BY SAUCKEL, 7 JULY 1944, ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS
OF LABOR MOBILIZATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1944
Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
Berlin W8, 7 July 1944
65 Mohren Street
Thuring House
Secret
NR 520/44/g Dr. ST/Ka
_Special Delivery Letter_
To: All Top Reich Authorities
The Reich Leader of the NSDAP
All Top Army Agencies
All Gauleiters
Subject: Accomplishments of the Labor Mobilization in the first half of
1944.
Enclosed I am submitting the total figures on additional manpower placed
at the disposal of the German war effort by the German Labor Offices in
the first half-year of 1944. They represent only such manpower that was
not previously employed in the German war effort.
According to the quota of 4,050,000 laborers set for this year,
2,000,000 new workers would have had to be secured in the first half of
the year. Because of increased difficulties in Italy and in the occupied
Western countries, regrettably one-half million less than that were
found. If despite the known difficult situation it was possible to
mobilize 1,500,000 people in the first half of the year, it is solely
due to the exertion of all available energy.
Since the Proclamation of 17 February 1944, around 62,000 women have
reported for “Voluntary Honorary Service,” and 52,000 of them have
already been assigned to work.
Heil Hitler!
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
Berlin, 7 July 1944
_New Manpower Placed at the Disposal of the Economy
between 1 January and 30 June 1944_
A. Entire Economy:
Total 1,482,000
Of these were: Germans 848,000
Foreigners 537,400
War prisoners 96,600
B. Breakdown of allocation of [the persons listed under] A:
Agriculture and Forestry 231,000
Of them, foreigners 156,000
Mining 46,000
Of them, foreigners 34,000
Metal industry 415,000
Of them, foreigners 250,000
All other [branches of] economy 790,000
Of them, foreigners 194,000
C. Origin of foreign labor:
Occupied Eastern Territories 284,000
General Government 52,000
Protectorate 23,000
France, excluding Northern France 33,000
Belgium, including Northern France 16,000
Netherlands 15,000
Italy 37,000
Rest of Europe 77,400
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3819-PS[86]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 56
MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE ON 11 JULY 1944 ATTENDED BY MILCH, CONCERNING
THE LABOR PROBLEM
_LIST OF ATTENDANCE FOR THE CONFERENCE IN THE
REICH CHANCELLERY ON 11 JULY 1944 1600 HOURS_
Name Official capacity Agency
Dr. Kuehne Chief of Mil. Adm. [illegible]
(1) Warlimont General of Artillery [Lt. OKW
Gen.]
Dr. Kohlhaase Director of Labor Section of the Supreme
Commissioner, Adriatic Coast,
Trieste
Dr. Landfried State Secretary, Chief of Italy
Mil. Adm.
(2) Walter Funk and Albert Speer
Milch [illegible]
(3) Krosigk
(3) Steengracht State Secretary Foreign Office
Abetz Ambassador German Embassy in Paris
Hanel [?] Major General Armaments Commissioner Staff,
France
von Linstow Colonel, GSC Military Commander, France
Sass Colonel, GSC General [Plenipotentiary] for
Italy
Franssen Major General Armaments Inspector, Belgium
Waeger Major General Armaments Office
Sarnow Ministerialdirektor Gen. Staff of Army, QM Section
Koegel Lieut. Col., GSC Gen. Staff of Army, QM Section
Reeder Chief of Mil. Adm. Brussels
Heider Chief of General Staff Brussels
(4) Ley
(5) Sauckel Labor Plenipotentiary Berlin
H. Backe Minister Reich Food Ministry
Marrenbach Chief [of Dept.] German Labor Front
Leyers Armaments Plenipotentiary Italy
Also present:
Ministerial Direktor Klopfer (Party Chancellery)
Ministerialrat Froehling
Ambassador Rahn
Dr. Huber
(6) Chief of Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner
General Labor Fuehrer Kretschmann
Colonel Meixner (OKW)
(1) United States _vs._ Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. See vols. X and XI.
(2) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of Major War
Criminals, vols. I-XIII, Nuremberg, 1947.
(3) United States _vs._ Ernst von Welzsaecker et al. See vols. XII, XIII
and XIV.
(4) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of the Major
War Criminals, vols. I-XLII, Nuremberg, 1947.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
Berlin, 12 July 1944
_To Rk. 5815 C_
Subject: Stepped-up Procuring of Foreign Manpower
Executive Conference, 11 July 1944
_Note_
Participating in the executive conference were the departmental chiefs
and representatives indicated in the attached list of those present. No
guarantee can be given for the completeness of the list, as not all
participants signed the register.
_Reich Minister Dr. Lammers_[87] reported by way of introduction on the
various proposals on hand by the Plenipotentiary General for Labor
Allocation calculated to bring about the increase in labor in Germany
which is absolutely essential for winning the final victory. He limited
the theme of the discussion by saying that all possibilities were to be
examined by which the present deficit of foreign manpower could be
offset, for example, the question of the reestablishment of an
acceptable price and wage differential between the Reich and non-German
territories. But the primary consideration will have to remain the
solution of the question whether and in what form greater compulsion
could be exerted to accept work in Germany. In this connection it must
be examined how the police agencies, regarding the inadequacy of which
the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation has serious complaints,
could be strengthened, on the one hand, through bringing influence to
bear on the foreign governments and, on the other, through reorganizing
the indigenous police forces by an increased use of the Wehrmacht, the
police or other German agencies. Reich Minister Dr. Lammers then gave
the floor to the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation, Gauleiter
Sauckel.
_Gauleiter Sauckel_ stated that the present deficit of the half-year
program for 2,025,000 foreign workers, to be filled by 30 June of the
current year, totals 500,000. Of the total of 1,500,000 workers procured
up to now, no less than 865,000 were Germans, of whom half were
apprentices and women, two categories which cannot be regarded as
full-fledged workers. Of the 560,000 foreigners put to work,
three-fourths came from the East alone. This result was a scandal
considering that the German people now are mobilized for work to the
fullest extent and it represents the complete bankruptcy of German
authorities in Italy and France, where hundreds of thousands of workers
were still idling. In mobilizing the manpower we did not exert the
necessary severity and, in particular, we were unable to achieve the
necessary unity of the German authorities. It was quite improper for
German authorities to interfere irresponsibly in the tasks of the GBA
[Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation]. He had to have much greater
freedom of action, just as was the case in 1942. With the present
methods of recruitment for voluntary employment we would not make any
progress, for one thing because any volunteers still available exposed
themselves to danger to life and limb from reprisals by their own fellow
countrymen. If, on the other hand, they were forcibly hired and decently
treated at their jobs, they would do completely satisfactory work.
Attention to the wage and price questions connected with the subject was
desirable, but in the present situation no longer so important. If no
effective action were taken now, our manpower mobilization program would
fail, with the consequence that the combat troops would no longer
receive the weapons they need.
_State Secretary von Steengracht_, Foreign Office, stressed that the
Reich Foreign Minister from the beginning had favored the same
standpoint as the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. The
Foreign Office, however, could do nothing except press the foreign
governments more or less urgently to meet German demands, and this has
been done consistently up to the present. The police power was handled
by others who, therefore, would now have to voice their opinion on the
subject of the conference.
_The Deputy for the Chief of the OKW, General Warlimont_, referred to a
recently issued Fuehrer order, according to which all German forces had
to put themselves at the disposal of the task to secure manpower.
Wherever the Wehrmacht was not employed exclusively in essential
military duties (as, for example, in the construction of the coastal
defenses), it would be available, but it could not actually be
_assigned_ for the purposes of the GBA [Sauckel]. General Warlimont made
the following practical suggestions:
_a._ The troops employed in fighting partisans are to take over
the additional task of securing manpower in the partisan areas.
Everyone who cannot fully show cause for his presence in these
areas is to be seized for labor;
_b._ When large cities, due to the difficulty of providing food,
are wholly or partly evacuated, the population suitable for
labor commitment is to be put to work with the assistance of the
Wehrmacht;
_c._ The seizing of labor recruits among the refugees from the
areas near the front is to receive special attention with the
assistance of the Wehrmacht.
_Gauleiter Sauckel_ accepted these suggestions with thanks and said that
he expected that a certain measure of success would no doubt be achieved
by these means.
On behalf of the _Military Commander of Belgium and Northern France_,
the _Chief of the Military Administration, Reeder_, put up for
discussion the possibility of expanding the Military Police, now
totaling only 70, and of the Civilian Searching Service
[Fahndungsdienst] consisting of Flemings and Walloons (1,100 strong). If
the Military Police were increased to 200, appreciable results could be
achieved. Upon inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, General Warlimont
promised on behalf of the OKW that the searching service would be
reinforced.
On further inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, as to whether the
population suitable for work could not be taken along as the troops
withdrew from an area, _Colonel Saas_ ([_Plenipotentiary_] _General for
Italy_) stated that Field Marshal Kesselring had already directed that
the population in a zone of 30 kilometers’ depth behind the front was to
be “captured”. This measure, however, could not be extended to areas
extending farther behind the lines, because of the most severe shock
that would be inflicted on the whole structure of these areas,
especially in regard to the industry still in full production.
_Gauleiter Sauckel_ was of the opinion that widest circles of the
Wehrmacht saw something disreputable in the labor recruiting program.
There had been actual instances where German soldiers had endeavored to
protect the population from being taken away by German labor recruiting
agencies. Therefore it was essential to explain to the front troops the
extraordinary importance of labor recruiting. In contrast to the much
too mild German method, it was part of the Bolshevist conception of war
for the fighting troops, on occupying a new territory, to put the entire
population to work at once. The question for the administration thus was
not one of mass recruiting, but of being consistent. It would be
necessary to establish a few object lessons, and the passive resistance
would quickly change into active cooperation. Nor ought one to shrink
from proceeding drastically against the administrative heads
[Behoerdenleiter] themselves who sabotage the labor recruitment. Not the
small refractory offenders should be punished, but the responsible
administrative heads. In addition to these compulsory measures, other
means too must be applied. Thus it would be advisable to remove a large
part of the exceptional Italian crops in order to improve the rations of
the German and foreign workers. A special problem was presented by the
entirely insufficient rations for the Italian military internees who
were almost starving. The Fuehrer should be asked to have the statute
for these military internees gradually altered. This would release a not
inconsiderable labor potential.
_Reich Leader Dr. Ley_ underscored these statements and suggested the
establishment of a searching service made up by all German forces in the
non-German territories, that would carry out the ruthless recruiting in
large areas.
These proposals were countered by the following objections:
_Reich Minister Funk_ holds that ruthless raids would entail
considerable disturbances in the industries of the non-German
territories. The same opinion is held by the _Chief of the Military
Administration of Italy, State Secretary Dr. Landfried_, who believes
that the German forces making up the executive body are too weak, and
fears that the Italian population would escape seizure in great numbers
and flee to uncontrollable areas.
_Reich Minister Speer_ states that he had an interest in both promoting
increased labor recruiting for the Reich and maintaining the production
in the non-German territories. Up to the present, 25 to 30 percent of
the German war production was furnished by the occupied Western
territories and Italy, with Italy alone supplying 12½ percent. The
Fuehrer had recently decided that this production must be maintained as
long as possible, in spite of the difficulties already existing,
especially in the field of transportation. The Military Administration,
in the opinion of Reich Minister Speer, was easily capable to seize
sufficient foreign workers at its present strength, as only a relatively
small police force was needed for that purpose. The chief need was for
stricter orders, but violent measures or large-scale round-ups were not
to be carried out. Rather it would be advisable to proceed gradually
with clean methods.
On behalf of the _Military Commander in France, Chief of Military
Administration Dr. Michel_, referred to the statements of State
Secretary Dr. Landfried and stated that the situation in France was
similar. The calling up of entire age groups was being prepared in
France, but had not yet begun as the German military authorities had not
yet been able to give their consent. The good will of the highest French
authorities could not be doubted, but it was lacking partly at the lower
and middle levels. The friendly administrators and individuals willing
to work and showing cooperativeness toward the German authorities,
exposed themselves to reprisals by the French population.
_Ambassador Abetz_ confirmed these statements. The application of severe
measures, such as the shooting of French functionaries, was of no avail.
Such a policy only served to drive the population into the Maquis. In
these territories, where there were large German armed forces, it would
no doubt be possible to obtain a few more ten-thousands of workers. Then
these same German forces could be employed in police duty, which would
also turn up large numbers of workers. In Paris, the evacuation of which
was being considered, 100,000 to 200,000 workers could be seized. In
this connection it might be possible to transfer the manpower of entire
industries in a body.
The _Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner_, declared himself
willing, if asked by the GBA, to place the Security Police at his
disposal for this purpose, but pointed out their numerical weakness. For
all of France he had only 2,400 men available. It was questionable
whether entire age groups could be seized with these feeble forces. In
his opinion, the Foreign Office must exercise a stronger influence on
the foreign governments.
_State Secretary von Steengracht_, Foreign Office, commented to the
effect that the agreements made with the foreign governments were
entirely sufficient. The governments had always been willing, upon
requests of the Foreign Office, to issue the necessary orders. If these
orders were not carried out, this was due to the inadequate police power
of the foreign governments themselves. In France, it had been reduced to
a minimum for political reasons. In Italy an executive power was no
longer extant. The Foreign Office was willing at any time, he said, to
exercise stronger pressure on the foreign governments, but did not
expect too much from that. State Secretary von Steengracht asked
Ambassador Rahn to comment on this for Italy.
_Ambassador Rahn_ believes that there is still a sufficient number of
workers in Italy, so that in theory 1 million could still be taken out,
although 2/3 of the Italian territory and population had been lost. He
had always been in favor of the system of drafting age classes. This was
generally successful until the fall of Rome, as could be seen from the
fact that it was possible to seize 200,000 Italians for military
service. Since that time the situation in Italy had become extremely
difficult, however, as the fall of Rome was an enormous shock to the
Italian people. The German authorities had done what they could to
neutralize these effects and to that end had merged all executive power
in the person of Marshal Graziani. At present, however, the use of
violent methods on a large scale was impracticable because it would
cause complete disorder and disrupt production. The best example for
this is the retaliatory action ordered by the Fuehrer because of the
strikes in Turin, when 10 percent of all factory labor forces were to be
conscripted because they were shirkers. A force of 4,000 Germans was
brought together for that purpose. The result was that the food and
power supply of Turin was cut off by the resistance movement so that
250,000 workers had to stop working. This could not be tolerated in view
of the substantial contribution of the Italian armament industry to the
war effort. Field Marshal Kesselring declared that continuation of
forced recruitment would cause not only the loss of the armament
production in the upper Italian area, but the loss of the entire theater
of war. In the face of this statement the hardiest political will must
keep silent. The only thing which could be done was the execution of the
forced recruitment in the rebellious area proper. Ambassador Rahn
believes the following practical suggestions could be carried out:
_a._ The recruitment of volunteers is to be continued.
_b._ To a limited extent, plants are to be transferred to the Reich with
machinery and workers.
_c._ The transfer of wage savings of the Italian workers in Germany to
their homeland, which is not functioning well, is to be ensured. For
this purpose an automatic procedure is to be introduced which Ambassador
Rahn had already proposed in another connection.
_d._ The system of the induction of age classes will be resumed when the
German military authorities consider the time ripe.
In answer to the reported remark of Field Marshal Kesselring, _General
Warlimont_ (OKW) commented that this remark was unknown to the OKW. The
OKW’s approval of this standpoint could therefore not yet be assumed.
_Gauleiter Sauckel_ declared that all these proposals were inadequate
since they were not suited to mobilize the masses of manpower which he
needed. The execution of all these proposals had already been tried in
practice since the labor mobilization authorities had at no time limited
themselves to any single method. He still had to name as seriously
damaging to the execution of the labor mobilization plan the fact that
his far-reaching jurisdiction and powers had been made the subject of
discussion. What he needed, as already said, was “elbow room”.
At the suggestion of Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, Gauleiter Sauckel
declared himself willing to set up several programmatic demands on which
he would consult with the interested parties and which then would be
submitted to the Fuehrer with a request for endorsement and translation
into law. A written formulation will follow. For the time being the
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation presents his demands as
follows:
_a._ The proposals of General Warlimont will be discussed directly among
the interested parties and will be carried out jointly.
_b._ The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation receives
permission to establish local security and recruiting machineries for
labor recruitment, which will operate on the basis of his orders and
directives without interference by other offices.
_c._ The regulations on recruitment of labor for Germany promulgated by
French and Italian authorities are to be given solid foundations by
concrete implementation orders which guarantee the most active
collaboration of foreign authorities in the acquisition of manpower.
After these statements were made Reich Minister Dr. Lammers closed the
meeting, pointing out that he would leave the further handling of the
problem to those concerned, as proposed.
[Initialed] L. [LAMMERS]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 1
EXTRACT FROM REPORT ON FUEHRER CONFERENCE ATTENDED
BY MILCH ON 19 FEBRUARY 1942
_POINTS OF DISCUSSION ON VISIT TO FUEHRER HEADQUARTERS
ON 19 FEBRUARY 1942_
* * * * *
16. Upon recommendation of Field Marshal Milch, the Fuehrer decides that
the 6-month contracts for foreign workers should be dropped and that tax
regulations, which stand in the way against this measure, are to be
rescinded. Rather, contracts are to be introduced which would provide,
in the event of employment of longer duration (exceeding six months), a
single lump sum compensation of some kind—also in view of the fact that
there would be a corresponding saving of the cost of travel back and
forth.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 32
EXTRACT FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE MINUTES,
21 AND 22 APRIL 1942
_POINTS OF DISCUSSION FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE
OF 21 AND 22 APRIL 1942_
* * * * *
SPEER:
20. The Fuehrer explains clearly in an elaborate form that he does not
approve the bad food dispensed to the Russians. The Russians must
absolutely be given sufficient food, and Sauckel has to see to it that
this food will now be guaranteed by Backe.
21. The Fuehrer is surprised that the civilian Russians are kept like
prisoners of war behind a barbed wire fence. I told him that this was
due to a decree issued by him. The Fuehrer knows nothing of such a
decree. I request the documents pertaining thereto to be included in the
forthcoming Fuehrer file and at the same time to see to it that Sauckel
will arrange to have the civilian Russians no longer treated like
prisoners of war.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 2
EXTRACT FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE MINUTES
OF 3, 4, 5 JANUARY 1943
Berlin, 8 January 1943
_POINTS OF DISCUSSION AT THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE
OF 3, 4, 5 JANUARY 1943_
* * * * *
SPEER:
55. The Fuehrer demands unequivocally that in no case must it be
permitted that France be less burdened than Germany. Germany must
sacrifice her blood for this war. We must insist that France intensify
her economic contribution. Any French workers on that job showing signs
of resistance will be deported, if necessary, as civilian internees. At
the slightest attempt of sabotage the most rigorous measures must be
taken. Any maudlin humanitarianism is out of place.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-II-PS[88]
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 3
REPORT FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 10 MARCH 1943, CONCERNING
DIFFICULTIES ORIGINATING FROM THE DRAFT OF
MANPOWER IN FORMER SOVIET TERRITORIES
_Teletype_
10 March 1943
To the Fuehrer
Fuehrer Headquarters
_With the urgent request to be submitted to the Fuehrer in person
immediately for decision_
Subject: Difficulties originating from draft of manpower in former Soviet
territories.
My Fuehrer,
You may be assured that the labor assignment is being pushed by me with
fanatical will but also with circumspection and with due consideration
for economic and technical as well as human necessities and conditions.
Replacement for soldiers who will be relieved and the stockpiling of
additional labor needed for the armament programs can and will be
carried through, notwithstanding the fact that especially during the
last two winter months the greatest difficulties had to be overcome. Yet
it was possible to make 258,000 foreign workers available to the war
economy for January and February alone despite the fact that in the East
transports practically ceased. The employment of German men and women is
in full progress.
Inasmuch as the difficulties of the winter months will now gradually
disappear, and as preparations were made by me, also the transports from
the East can again be resumed in full measure. Although the yield of the
registration and employment of German men and women is excellent, the
employment of the strongest and most efficient foreigners who are used
to work cannot be neglected.
Unfortunately, some of the commanding generals [Oberbefehlshaber] in the
East have prohibited the compulsory enrollment of men and women in the
conquered Soviet territories for—as Gauleiter Koch[89] informs
me—political reasons.
My Fuehrer, in order to enable me to carry out my assignment, I ask that
these orders be rescinded. I consider it entirely impossible that the
population of former Soviet nationality could be accorded a greater
measure of consideration than our German people on whom I have been
forced to place very drastic measures. Should it no longer be possible
to enforce the compulsion to work in the East, nor to draft labor, then
the German war economy and agriculture will likewise no longer be able
to fulfil their tasks in full measure.
I myself am of the opinion that under no circumstances should the
commanders of our armies give credence to the Bolshevist propaganda of
atrocities and defamation. After all, it is to the interest of the
generals themselves that replacements for the troops be made in
opportune time.
I take permission to point out that—without wishing to discredit their
best will—it is impossible to put German women—entirely inexperienced
in work—into the place of hundreds of thousands of excellent workers
who now have to go to the front as soldiers. It must be possible for me
to replace them with people from the Eastern territories.
I myself report to you that all foreign nationals who are working with
us are being treated satisfactorily according to humane standards; that
they are being treated correctly and fairly; they are being fed, housed,
yes, even clothed. Because of my own experience in the service of
foreign nations, I am even bold enough to claim that never before have
foreign workers been so decently treated anywhere in the world as is
being done by the German people during this the hardest of all wars.
I therefore ask you, my Fuehrer, to cancel orders which prevent the
enrollment of foreign male and female workers and to kindly advise me
whether my concept of the assignment as laid down herein still is
correct.
I ask your permission to report to you in person on several important
points of the labor recruitment early next week, possibly on Tuesday.
In lasting gratitude, loyalty and obedience, yours,
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 33
EXTRACT FROM REPORT ON FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 30 MAY 1943
Obersalzberg, 1 June 1943
_Fuehrer Conference on 30 May 1943_
* * * * *
SPEER:
[Marginal Note] Schieber, Pleiger, Sauckel, Backe, Keitel, Waeger.
19. The coal situation causes the Fuehrer to call a meeting with
Pleiger, Sauckel, Backe, and Keitel.
At this meeting will be discussed the allocation of sufficient labor for
the coal district, the removal of Russian prisoners of war from farming
and small war industries (insofar as they are employed as unskilled
labor) and their replacement by other workers from the Ukraine, Poland,
etc.
Furthermore it is intended, if possible, to raise the food rations of
the German miners, even above present levels. The Russians are to get
plentiful additional rations, which will be individually allotted by
plant managers on the basis of efficiency.
Additionally the German workers—and particularly also the Russian
prisoners of war—will receive bonuses for higher production in the form
of tobacco and similar items.
The details are to be discussed in a preliminary conference so as to
establish uniform data as regards quantities, etc., for submission to
the Fuehrer.
On no account must we capitulate to existing conditions on the coal
question. Coal is _the_ critical basis for maintaining our production
and the entire domestic economy.
[Marginal Note] Saur, Kippung, Milch, Dornberger.
20. The Fuehrer desires that in areas which are certainly recurrent
targets of enemy air attacks (Ruhr District, Krupp-Essen) about 100 to
200 rocket projector batteries be installed, which experimentally are to
fire a steady stream of rockets set for the computed altitude of the
enemy formations.
Some of these rockets will, on detonating, loose wire coils. The Fuehrer
expects, after all, significant and not only psychological effects from
massed, unaimed fire against concentrated air attacks on these targets.
Milch and Dornberger are to state their views on the subject.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 4
EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF
11-12 SEPTEMBER 1943
14 September 1943
_FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 11-12 SEPTEMBER 1943_
* * * * *
DETHLEFFSEN:
16. The Fuehrer brings up the question of air force matériel production
and the discussion with Messerschmitt, and asks for my personal
intervention with the Reich Marshal [Goering] and Field Marshal Milch to
cut down appreciably on the number of aircraft types.
17. The Fuehrer approves Messerschmitt’s recommendation that a monthly
conference be held on questions pertaining to developments and
productions for the Luftwaffe, on the introduction of new types and
modifications with the participation of construction designers and
production experts. This is to be discussed with Field Marshal Milch.
MILCH:
18. The Fuehrer is displeased that the long-range Messerschmitt plane
had not yet been taken up by the Luftwaffe. M. is said to have been
unable to obtain the support of the Luftwaffe for it.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 34
EXTRACT FROM FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 1-4 JANUARY 1944,
CONCERNING SPEER’S REPORT ON THE FRENCH
LABOR SITUATION
6 January 1944
_FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 1-4 JANUARY 1944_
* * * * *
[Marginal Note] Kehrl, Waeger.
The Fuehrer has been informed of the differences of opinion with the
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. According to my arguments,
the principal thing is to exploit the industry of France for Germany to
a larger extent, in order to be able to locate there about 1 million
additional workers. However, Sauckel is of the opinion that first of all
workers have to be brought to Germany.
The Fuehrer explains that in his view the transfer to France is of
extreme importance, be it only on account of the possibility to increase
the production of iron connected therewith. In spite of this, in his
opinion, one cannot do without bringing additional French labor to
Germany. It must, therefore, be attempted to find a happy union of both
things. In this connection he proposes to designate protected works in
France, in order to induce the French to work in these plants just
through the pressure of allocation of labor for Germany. Upon my
statement that the protected plants have already been established, he
affirms again the importance of this institution and the necessity to
create here a basis of long-range confidence. He thinks that it is my
affair whether I will be able to do without French labor or not; Sauckel
could be only happy if I would do without them.
Upon my reply that this is not the only problem, but that also the
question of the _executive power_ is involved, since otherwise a loss of
prestige for Germany and a disorder in the allocation of French labor
would be inevitable, the Fuehrer declares that this is, of course, one
of the most important bases for further discussions. I then told him
that on 3 January there will be a meeting between Himmler, Keitel,
Sauckel, and myself (Kehrl) (is the Foreign Office to be included?), at
which these problems will be discussed. Subsequently there shall be a
meeting with him, at which the possibility of executive power in France,
as far as the allocation, and the transport of French workers to Germany
is concerned, will be laid before him. (Kehrl to do advance work, that
we also make a claim for executive power for the protection of the
factories in France against terror bands.)
-----
[74] The basic importance of this Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 was
emphasized by the IMT Judgment. See Trial of Major War Criminals, vol.
I, pp. 188 and 200, Nuremberg, 1947.
For translation of entire document see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,
vol. VII, pp. 847-854, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
1946.
[75] When the prosecution introduced this document in evidence, the
following colloquy ensued (Tr. p. 49):
JUDGE SPEIGHT: Do you establish a chain between all of these documents
which you read and the defendant?
MR. DENNEY: If your Honor please, the prosecution, in presenting these
documents, has in mind to give an over-all picture of the way slave
labor was treated in Germany, going back to the early days showing that
this defendant knew because of attendance at the May 1939, conference
that slave labor was going to be employed. Then as Air Ordnance Master
General, later as Chief of the Jaegerstab, and later as a member of the
Central Planning Board, we will connect him with enterprises involving
slave labor.
JUDGE SPEIGHT: Very well.
[76] Allgemeines Wehrmachtamt of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. See
case of United States _vs._ Wilhelm von Leeb, et al., vols. X, XI.
[77] For more complete translation of document see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. V, pp. 744-754, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[78] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. III, pp. 46-59, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[79] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. III, pp. 130-146, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[80] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. III, pp. 242-251, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[81] Otto Braeutigam, member of the Economic Political Department of the
Foreign Office. As of May 1941 detached by the German Foreign Office to
Rosenberg’s Agency, the Eastern Ministry (Ost-Ministerium).
[82] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. III, pp. 778-9, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[83] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. IV, pp. 79-93, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[84] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. III, pp. 234-238, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[85] For more complete translation, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,
vol. VIII, pp. 104-107, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
1946.
[86] For more complete translation, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,
vol. VI pp. 760-772, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[87] United States _vs._ Ernst von Welzsaecker, et al. See Vols. XII,
XIII, XIV.
[88] After Dr. Bergold read this document into the record he made the
following statement (Tr. pp. 520-521):
“Which proves that until March 1943, the commanders in the
conquered territories were opposed to the labor conscription,
and that it was Sauckel who demanded that this opposition be
removed, because he was of the opinion that foreign people had
to produce the same as the German people. It is further
important that he didn’t declare that to the Fuehrer alone but
also to the defendant [witness] Speer and the defendant Milch.
Accordingly, the defendant [witness] Speer later on will attest
that never before have foreigners been treated so fairly. In
other words, he lied to the men who were to work with him.”
[89] 1130-PS. See Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 797-799,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
2. THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
_EXCERPT FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTION
REGARDING MILCH’S ACTIVITY IN THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 6 JANUARY 1947_[90]
MR. DENNEY: We come now to the part of the proof which places the
defendant in the very center of the Slave Labor Program.
We have shown that from the outset of the war and prior thereto, he was
thoroughly informed of the Nazi plan for total war, which contemplated
the full use of all human material resources within the homeland. We
will show he was active in the formation and announcement of decisions
of the Central Planning Board. We will show the Board exercised
jurisdiction in the matter of procurement, allocation, and use. He
carried out the master plan for requisition, allocation, and use of
human raw material for the war machine. There are words we will have by
necessity to repeat as we introduce the documents—requisition,
allocation, and use.
Our evidence will show that Milch, a member of the Central Planning
Board, belonged to an organization—and here again we have another
important word “belong”. He was one of two most essential men in the
Planning Board that guided the decisions of that organization.
We will present to the Court excerpts from the minutes of some 12
conferences at every one of which Milch was present, starting with the
first held in April 1942 and ending with the fifty-eighth held in May
1944. Actually, he was at all but eight conferences, and we use the
figure “eight” advisably. We are not sure, he may have been in some of
those. There is no question that he was in every one of those meetings
which we introduce here. On occasions when Speer was not present Milch
presided. We will show he actively participated when the Central
Planning Board arrived at decisions with respect to the request,
allocation, and use of this labor.
We will show he was active in the formation of the announcement of
decisions of the Central Planning Board. We will show the Board
exercised jurisdiction in the matter of procurement, allocation, and use
of labor. And all of them were prisoners of war and were allocated to
the German war effort. Requisition, allocation, and use were the
dominating voice. Decisive influence, active participation, forced
labor, illegal occupation—these are the words with which we are
concerned, and these are the things with which he concerned himself.
Evidence
_Prosecution Documents_
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
R-124 48-B Stenographic record of the 447
first conference of the
Central Planning Board on 27
April 1942.
R-124 48-B Letter of 20 October 1942 448
transmitting the statutes of
the Central Planning Board.
1510-PS 58 Extracts from decree of 16 450
September 1943, defining the
duties of the Planning Office
of the Central Planning
Board.
3721-PS 41-A Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 22 452
September 1945, regarding the
jurisdiction of the Central
Planning Board.
NI-1098 63 Extracts from affidavit of 456
Fritz Sauckel, 22 September
1946, regarding the
jurisdiction of the Central
Planning Board.
R-124 48-A Extracts from report on the 457
eleventh conference of the
Central Planning Board, 22
July 1942.
R-124 48-A Extracts from report on the 459
seventeenth conference of the
Central Planning Board, 28
October 1942.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 461
minutes of twenty-first
conference of Central
Planning Board, 30 October
1942.
R-124 48-B Extracts from stenographic 465
minutes of the twenty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 3 November
1942.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 467
minutes of the thirty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1943.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 471
minutes of the thirty-sixth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 22 April
1943.
R-124 48-A Report of the forty-second 475
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 23 June 1943.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 478
minutes of the fifty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1944.
R-124 48-B Report on the fifty-third 479
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1944.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 484
minutes of the fifty-fourth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 1 March 1944.
R-124 48-D Extracts from the report on the 498
fifty-sixth conference of the
Central Planning Board, 4
April 1944.
NOKW-287 49 Letter from Milch to Sauckel, 8 499
April 1943, concerning the
protection of industry.
R-124 48-A Speer’s minutes of a conference 501
with Hitler on 8 July 1943.
R-124 48-A Extract from the report by Saur 502
of the conference with the
Fuehrer, 5 March 1944.
_Defense Documents_
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
R-124 5 Extract from the stenographic 509
report of the eleventh
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 22 July 1942.
R-124 6 Extract from the stenographic 510
minutes of the twenty-second
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 2 November
1942.
R-124 7 Extract from the stenographic 510
minutes of the thirty-second
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 12 February
1943.
R-124 8 Extract from the stenographic 511
minutes of the thirty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1943.
R-124 9 Extract from stenographic 516
minutes of the thirty-ninth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 23 April
1943.
R-124 31 Extracts from the stenographic 517
minutes of the fifty-fourth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 1 March 1944.
_Testimony_
Excerpts from the testimony given by defense witness Albert 502
Speer before commission on 19 February 1947
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
STENOGRAPHIC RECORD OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE
CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD ON 27 APRIL 1942
Berlin, 27 April 1942
Secret
_“THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD” IN THE FOUR YEAR PLAN_
_1ST CONFERENCE_
Present:
The three members:
Reich Minister Speer,
Field Marshal Milch,
State Secretary Koerner.
Furthermore:
State Secretary Dr. Schulze-Fielitz, Ministry of Munitions,
Ministerialrat von Normann, Four Year Plan.
Result:
I. The _Central Planning_ in the Four Year Plan (Decree of the Reich
Marshal of Greater Germany of 22 April 1942—VP 6707 g) is a task for
leaders. It encompasses only principles and executive matters. It makes
unequivocal decisions and supervises the execution of its directives.
The Central Planning does not rely on anonymous institutions difficult
to control, but always on individuals and fully responsible persons who
are free in the selection of their work methods and their collaboration
as far as there are no directives issued by the Central Planning.
II. _Discussion of the situation in iron._
A. The objective is to reach a production of 2,2 million tons per month.
In the first place it has to be established whether, after taking into
account the excessive requests which were certainly made and of the
difficulties confronting an increase of production (coal, transport) the
present figures are sufficient (2 million tons). For the distribution in
the third quarter these 2 million tons have to serve in any case as a
basis.
B. The principles of distribution and the new quotas will be discussed
in a subsequent conference with a wider circle of participants (see
special protocol).
C. The _iron-producing industry_ will be organized into a Reich
association. It is to be established and made to operate as soon as
possible. The creation of an interimistic liaison organization (Planning
Group Iron) has, therefore, been abandoned. The task of the Reich
Association ends with the production of iron and before the distribution
of the iron.
D. For the position of president of the Reich Association Iron,
Generaldirektor Voegler and Geheimrat Roechling[91] are suggested.
Roechling was chosen, the appointment of whom would be approved by the
Fuehrer, according to Reich Minister Speer. State Secretary Koerner will
submit the proposal to the Reich Marshal [Goering].
III. The reorganization of the Upper Silesian Territory with the object
of the highest and best utilization for war economy in mind is urgent.
The selection of locations and the determining of capacities in this
territory has to be expedited with regard to raw material, transport,
and labor.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
LETTER OF 20 OCTOBER 1942 TRANSMITTING THE STATUTES
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan.
Central Planning Board.
_Z. P. 1_
Berlin, October 20, 1942
Enclosed I send you, for your information, the statutes of the Central
Planning Board with the request to support the office of the “Central
Planning Board” in every possible way in its work, and to direct, more
particularly, your section chiefs and reporters to forward all
information requested orally or by writing, in the shortest possible
time. By this collaboration of your section chiefs and reporters, the
building up of a larger apparatus in the framework of the “Central
Planning Board” is to be avoided.
BY ORDER:
[Typewritten] WALTHER SCHIEBER
Certified: SCHWINGE
Ministerialregistrator
[Stamp of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan.]
Distribution to—
_a._ The highest Reich authorities.
_b._ The Reich Protector.
_c._ The Governor General.
_d._ The executive authorities in the occupied territories.
_STATUTES OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
1. The Central Planning Board, created by the Fuehrer and the Reich
Marshal in order to unify armament and war economy, deals only with the
decision of basic questions. Professional questions remain the task of
the competent departments, which in their fields remain responsible
within the framework of the decisions made by the Central Planning
Board.
2. In order to have the conferences properly prepared and to have the
execution of the decisions supervised, the Central Planning Board
appoints an office. This office consists of the deputies appointed by
each of three members of the Central Planning Board; one of these three
deputies shall be appointed chief of the office.
[Handwritten marginal note on left side of the document: “To be
forwarded”.]
3. In accordance with the attached Table of Organization [not
reproduced], the office appoints reporters. These reporters are at the
disposal of all members of the Central Planning Board. The office
appoints one reporter to keep the record.
4. Office and reporters have to see to it, above all, and to draw the
attention of the Central Planning Board, if necessary, to the required
measures, that—
_a._ All decisive tasks of war economy are achieved quickly,
without red tape, and ruthlessly, by mutual adapting of all
composing branches.
_b._ All such work as is obviously without importance for
winning the war, be discontinued.
5. _Tasks of the office_
_a._ The office prepares the meetings of the Central Planning
Board in such a manner that the members of the Central Planning
Board have the agenda and the material of discussion 24 hours in
advance. For this purpose the office conducts preliminary talks
with the competent departments, etc.
_b._ On the strength of the record made by the reporter, the
office sees to the execution of the decisions of the Central
Planning Board by the competent agencies, and sees to it that
the deadlines fixed are complied with.
_c._ The members of the office keep the members of the Central
Planning Board informed between the sessions.
6. The distribution of work, dealing with incoming mail, etc., is
arranged by the office itself. The members of the office sign: “By
order” of the Central Planning Board.
7. _Tasks of the reporters_
Reporters have to keep in constant touch with the departments, with
regard to the sectors of work they are in charge of. In the regular
sittings of the office they report on the progress made and on the
measures which are required for the carrying on of the war economy,
especially for the increase in production, for other improvements in the
supply with raw materials, and for necessary changes in distribution.
They do the preliminary work for the meetings of the board (see also 5
_a_) and in their working sector they are primarily responsible for the
execution, within the established time limits, of the decisions of the
Central Planning Board.
Berlin, 20 October 1942.
[Typewritten] MILCH
[Typewritten] SPEER
[Typewritten] KOERNER
[Stamp]
Berlin 6-11-1942
No. L 16-501
Copy to the State Secretary for his information.
[Typewritten] DR. SCHATTENMANN
Certified: Schulz, Reg. Sekr.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1510-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 58
EXTRACTS FROM DECREE OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1943, DEFINING THE
DUTIES OF THE PLANNING OFFICE OF THE
CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
Berlin, 16 September 1943
_DECREE OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1948 OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY GENERAL FOR ARMAMENT
TASKS WITHIN THE FOUR YEAR PLAN AND OF THE REICH MINISTER FOR ARMAMENT
AND WAR PRODUCTION CONCERNING THE TASK OF THE PLANNING OFFICE_
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich has established a Planning
Office in my department by decree of 4 September 1943 for the purpose of
concentrated handling of all fundamental questions of war economical
planning.
In this connection I order:
I
1. The Planning Office prepares the decisions of the Central Planning
Board and supervises their execution.
2. In this connection it will especially prepare the distribution to
consumers of basic materials (for instance, iron, metals, coal, mineral
oil, nitrogen, and other important raw materials).
3. As a working basis for Central Planning Board, the Planning Office
has to draw up plans for production and distribution for the entire war
economy, the demand schedules being based on the demands of the entire
German sphere of power. In this connection imports and exports are to be
considered. The entire planning is to be synchronized in advance with
the participating departments and specialist offices, taking into
account production requisites. The Planning Office will constantly have
to summarize and to evaluate the necessary statistical material.
4. The Planning Office will have to submit to the Central Planning Board
for decision the proposed assignment of manpower to the individual big
sectors of employment (trade industry for war effort [gewerbliche
Kriegswirtschaft], traffic, foodstuffs, etc.). It also has to evaluate
statistically the carrying through of the assignments.
* * * * *
6. The Planning Office will have to advocate towards the Reich Ministry
of Economics the requirements of war industry in connection with the
establishment of import and export quotas.
It has to report constantly to the Central Planning Board about the
state of imports essential for war economy.
* * * * *
II
* * * * *
4. The Planning Office has to evaluate statistically the industrial and
war production existing within the power sphere of Greater Germany or of
the states allied with the Reich; it has to develop out of that
evaluation proposals for a common exchange of production in order to
increase the initial war production.
* * * * *
[Signed] SPEER
The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production
Plenipotentiary General for
Armament Tasks within the Four Year Plan
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3721-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT NO. 41-A[92]
TESTIMONY OF FRITZ SAUCKEL, 22 SEPTEMBER 1945, REGARDING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
TESTIMONY OF FRITZ SAUCKEL TAKEN AT NUERNBERG, GERMANY, 1030 HOURS TO
1210 HOURS ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1945, BY JOHN J. MONIGAN JR., MAJ., CAC,
OUSCC
MAJOR MONIGAN: Principally, what I am interested in are the functions
and responsibilities of the Central Planning Board in their relationship
to your office and their relationship to industry.
SAUCKEL: I believe that this Central Planning Board was founded about
three months after my taking over my office. The Board was founded in
accord with a law by the Fuehrer or just upon an agreement between the
Fuehrer and Speer and Goering, I don’t know which. The leader and
chairman of this Central Planning Board was Speer himself. It was
founded to transfer the work from the Four Year Plan to Speer, I think,
because Goering was already ill at that time, and there also were
difficulties about which I am not informed. Speer always took on the job
of making great changes in production and put it under his own
direction. Constant members of this Central Planning Board were the
State Secretary and Field Marshal Milch, and State Secretary Koerner.
These three were responsible for the decisions of the Central Planning
Board and for internal matters and they went through this office if they
were worked out by other people inside the office. I was only called to
this Central Planning Board when my task was discussed, and the demands
were put before me and my agencies by Speer, the Four Year Plan
[Office], as well as by Milch. The Fuehrer himself told me to fulfil
these demands without question. In other words, if Speer asked me for a
certain amount of workers, for instance, several thousand, I could not
refuse him. The particular minister had to give the number to the
Central Planning Board and that was the only place where the number of
workers could be discussed. In the Central Planning Board it was decided
how many workers I was able to supply to these various sections like
Milch and Speer, agriculture, and so on. If it came to an argument,
these discussions were brought before the Fuehrer and he then decided
himself.
Q. Would the Central Planning Board, in their outline of workers to be
provided for agriculture and for Speer and for Milch’s industries, etc.,
just give you the numbers of workers which they required, or would you
get the final destination of the workers too, say panzers [tanks] and
machine guns, and so on, from the Central Planning Board?
A. In general, I always got the numbers for the sections in large,
except for Speer who always demanded individual allocations of workers
to agriculture or mining; in other words, Speer always demanded a
certain number of workers for a certain kind of work.
Q. Except for Speer, they would give the requirements in general for the
broad field, but in Speer’s work you would get them allocated by
industry, and so on. Is that right?
A. The others only received whatever was left over, because Speer told
me once in the presence of the Fuehrer that I am here to work for Speer
and that I mainly am his man, he mentioned it very often, without
reference to the countries involved. It was very unnatural, that process
of doing these things. These smaller plants, instead of ordering their
workers from the next higher echelons, gave their orders to the very
highest, to Speer, who in turn handed them down to the lower ones and to
me, and this was the reason for the Rotzettel (red slip) system which
had to be fulfilled by me without question. In practice it came to this
that if a factory actually didn’t need any workers but Speer demanded
them for that factory I had to supply these workers without being able
to discuss or to tell him that it would be a waste of manpower; I just
had to do it because Speer had complete domination.
Q. When it was determined in the Central Planning Board that say a
thousand workers would be required by Speer, how did these workers find
their way from all over Germany and Europe into the Krupp factory, for
instance?
A. The orders were given from higher echelons down to lower echelons;
for instance, the transports were either turned over from one office to
another or the lower echelons in Berlin, for instance, got orders to
transfer certain men from one factory which happened to be in Berlin to
another factory which was also in Berlin. This happened also through the
cooperation among the various offices who were headed by Hildebrand. The
orders were discussed in a so-called daily schedule of trains which was
decided upon in all these meetings.
Q. Well, as I understand it, you would get a requirement for say a
thousand workers for panzers, say; now, in Germany certain factories
would be making tread, some would be making turrets, and some would be
making other things. Now, of that thousand workers needed for tank
production some would be working on treads and some would be working on
other things. How did they get into the particular factories which were
making the specific products?
A. This was accomplished by giving orders recklessly through the various
offices. A factory, for instance, got an order to send 20 or 30 men to
another place, and they were just ordered to go there. This was the
reason for the Notdienstverordnung [Emergency Service Decree] where the
workers were forced by a decree to obey any order which was given to
them.
Q. After the workers were conscripted inside the Reich and outside, they
would be worked according to certain skills and technical specialties,
would they not?
A. As far as possible, they were used according to the profession they
had been trained in.
Q. And the local Gau labor offices, etc., would have a list of all the
workers according to their skills, would they not?
A. Yes, there were detailed files about this. This was the basic
principle: There were various offices which only were concerned about a
certain kind of trade or skill.
Q. So, when you got the request from the Central Planning Board for a
hundred thousand men for tank production, would you, through your
ministry, tell the various offices that you needed so many welders and
so many machine tool people, etc., and then tell them how many of each
specialty you wanted?
A. When I got these orders my assistants were always present and they in
turn took down the individual numbers required for this kind of work. I
also received rosters which pointed out in detail how many people were
needed for certain productions and how many were needed in a certain
place. There was also, besides the red-slip system, another one, which
was a system used after the red-slip system. We called this the
Dringlichkeitsstufen—that means the priority system for workers. These
Dringlichkeitsstufen, which were divided according to place and kind of
work, were given to me in the presence of my assistants and they in turn
worked out these plans. The influence of Speer was so great that
sometimes he specifically asked for certain specialists from a certain
factory to be turned over to another place. It also happened that we
were not even told about these things. If we were not able to supply him
with workers from inside Germany, we had to take them from the other
departments or from foreign countries. There was always a reserve of
something like 500,000 people who went to schools where they were
trained for the armament production.
Q. That was 500,000 German and foreign workers?
A. Yes.
Q. When a requirement was fixed for Speer or for Milch in the Central
Planning Board and they called you in and said we need 500,000, or some
number of workers, would they give at that time the breakdown of what
kind of workers they wanted, or would they give a blanket request for
500,000 without the listing of specialties?
A. Naturally, they gave a detailed breakdown. For instance, they only
asked for miners, but they also asked for specialists in that kind of
work.
Q. The requirements would be stated in detail for the kind of work, not
only whether it should be a mine worker, but, for instance, a locomotive
engineer in a mine, or something like that, would they not?
A. Naturally, since there are many kinds of professions; I, for
instance, put in charge of the mining President Dr. Gaertner who was
always oriented about the different jobs which were required in that
field of work.
Q. Then after you got the detailed specification of the qualifications
of the workers desired, would you also get a statement as to what places
they would work in, and so on?
A. This was just the remarkable thing about it, especially from Speer;
factories were always mentioned and they were also mentioned by
priority; for instance, the ones that always were working on the
so-called Fuehrer orders had priority over the others. Speer actually
controlled the small places, not step by step, but directly from the
highest echelon.
Q. So that you would be informed at the Central Planning Board, at least
for Speer’s factories, about the specialists and the place to which they
were supposed to be sent, is that right?
A. The Central Planning Board determined only the numbers for a certain
time, three months or so. These orders were then forwarded to the
individual offices, who were working for me, from all kinds of
industries; the Central Planning Board met only every two weeks or so.
Q. The Central Planning Board would decide that Speer would get so many
hundred thousand and Milch would get so many hundred thousand, and that
the agricultural program would get so many hundred thousand. Then, that
was agreed upon, if they all agreed upon it among themselves in the
Central Planning Board, and had no disputes regarding the number. But if
there were disputes, then the Fuehrer would decide?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, after they decided a hundred thousand for Speer, then the
section chiefs (in the rings for tank treads, and machine guns, etc.)
would meet with your section later and say we need so many hundred
thousand, we need 10,000 who are welders and 10,000 who are metal
workers, etc., is that right?
A. Yes. A daily conference was held among the different offices where it
was decided how many workers were needed for the individual industries.
It did not occur that when a factory asked for a certain amount of men,
it was like that: Speer said this factory has to be supplied with so and
so many workers. In peacetime it was different.
Q. And the requirements of Speer were met as a matter of priority among
all the other industries; first Speer and then the others?
A. Yes.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NI-1098
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 63
EXTRACTS FROM AFFIDAVIT OF FRITZ SAUCKEL, 22 SEPTEMBER 1946, REGARDING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
A. 1. I, Fritz Sauckel, born in Hassfurt-Unterfranken on 27 October 1894
was honorary Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS and SA, Reich Governor
[Reichsstatthalter], Commissioner for Reich Defense and Gauleiter of
Thuringia. Since 1942 I was Plenipotentiary General for Manpower and
from 1933 on I was a member of the Reichstag. I state upon oath the
following facts which are known to me personally:
* * * * *
L. 1. The Central Planning Board intervened in the problem of foreign
workers to the extent of determining priorities and in representing and
demanding the requirements of the economics branches consolidated in the
Central Planning Board. It also transmitted these demands to the
Fuehrer. The competent gentlemen of the Central Planning Board at the
same time of course represented their ministries as heads. Thus I am not
in a position today to say whether Speer, for instance, spoke in one or
the other capacity in connection with any special matter. At any rate
the Central Planning Board determined the total labor requirements. In
practice I only obtained labor for them.
2. I attended sessions of the Central Planning Board only when questions
concerning the mobilization of labor were involved. Sometimes only my
representatives, Dr. Timm, Landrat Berk, Stothfang, or Dr. Hildebrand,
attended.
3. The competent gentlemen from Speer’s Ministry also attended. Speer
had a labor mobilization department where the requirements of industry
were collected and confirmed.
4. Milch produced the figures for aviation. The same was done by Speer
in his sphere of activity. Speer and Milch, however, also exerted
influence on the allocation of workers. How far this came within their
capacity as members of the Central Planning Board I cannot say; in any
case they did this in their ministerial capacity.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON THE ELEVENTH CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 22 JULY 1942
Berlin 24 July 1942
Dr. Goe/W
Reich Minister Speer
Minister’s Office
Secret
_REPORT ON THE 11TH CONFERENCE OF THE “CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD” ON 22 JULY 1942_
Present:
Reich Minister Speer
Field Marshal Milch
State Secretary Koerner
Kommerzialrat Roechling Reich Association Iron
Dr. Rohland Reich Association Iron
Von Bohlen und Halbach Reich Association Iron
Dr. Langen Reich Association Iron
Bergassessor Sohl Reich Association Iron
Gauleiter Sauckel Plenipotentiary General for Labor
Mobilization
State Secretary Backe Reich Food Ministry
General Director Pleiger Reich Association Coal
Dr. Fischer Reich Association Coal
Major General Gablenz Reich Air Ministry
Colonel Sellschopp Reich Air Ministry
Ministerial Director Gramsch 4 Year Plan
Ministerial Advisor Normann 4 Year Plan
Dr. Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Dr. Stellwaag Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Major Wagner Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Brigadier General Becht Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Lieutenant Colonel Nicolai Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Ministerial Advisor Dr. Wissmann Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Schlieker Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Dr. Goerner Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
* * * * *
Securing of food. A net influx of 1 million foreign workers is counted
on. This number was not reached in the past months. Even with an influx
of more than 1 million in the coming months, the 1-million peak will
actually not be surpassed in view of current departures of workers. Food
for this 1 million is secured.[93]
To what extent an improvement of the food situation, through a sharper
hold on the production outside of Germany, could be accomplished.
* * * * *
Every day a train load of the forces recruited in the East will be
directed to the coal mines until the figure of 6,000 is achieved.
Prisoners of war are being obtained, at present, from camps in the
General Government. 51,000 prisoners of war in the Senne Camp. In the
district east of the General Government there are 74,000 prisoners of
war available. Up till now an elimination quota of 50 percent of
unemployable people has been reckoned with in the allocations to coal
mining. It is considered necessary that not too high demands should be
placed on the choice of prisoners of war. The Miner’s Union doctors
[Knappschaftsaerzte] are to be informed that a different standard is to
be established for the prisoners of war than for German miners.
For the consecutive order in which the prisoners of war are to be put to
work, it will be laid down, that before the metal workers are chosen,
the coal mining in the first place and requirements for the loading and
unloading commands in the second place are to be considered.
Field Marshal Milch undertakes to accelerate the procuring of the
Russian prisoners of war from the camps.
[Typewritten] DR. ING. GOERNER
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON THE SEVENTEENTH CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 28 OCTOBER 1942
Berlin, 30 October 1942
The Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan
Central Planning Board
_REPORT ON THE 17TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD ON 28 OCTOBER 1942, 0930 HOURS_
Increase of Coal Production
_Allocation of Labor_
Coal production in the Ruhr district has increased to 390,000 tons per
day. Any further increase depends on whether the requirements for labor
are being met. About 104,000 men are required. Furthermore 7,800
men—originally 16-17,000 requirements having been brought down by
rationalization—are needed for the supplying industry, 6,800 of these
for the machine industry. 5,000 more unskilled workers are furthermore
required to secure the transport of mine-timber which is essential for
reason of variety [Sortimentsgruenden].
The intake capacity of the mining industry for the month of November is
44,000 prisoners of war, of whom 25,000 are for the Ruhr district, and
12,600 eastern workers, 7,500 of whom are for the Ruhr district. Total
requirements so far amount to 191,000 laborers of whom 90,700 were
wanted by the Ruhr District. Up to 24 October a total of 123,000 was
allocated. These numbers are still to be checked up by the Reich
Association Coal (RVK) and Mr. Sauckel.
According to the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation, the following
number of prisoners of war is at present at hand.
Within the Reich (on the way and in camp) 30,000
Remainder of prisoners of war (outstanding from a total of 60,000
150,000 and promised up to the beginning of December)
At camps in the General Government 15,000
Of these the following can be regarded as available up to 1 December:
Within the Reich 15,000
Of the remaining prisoners of war 10,000
From the General Government 7,500
———
Total about 32,000
Therefore, as compared to the required 44,000, there is a deficit of
about 12,000. Moreover, 10,000 civilian laborers from the East can be
put up by exchanges from the agricultural sector which is 2,000 less
than required so that the November deficit amounts to 14,000 and, in
comparison with the total requirements of the mining industry of
104,000, there is a deficit of 62,000. The deficit increases by the
smaller number of prisoners of war the size of which is still to be
ascertained by the Commissioner of Labor.
The mining industry is in a position to use any amount of eastern labor
instead of prisoners of war. Therefore, it is to get preference at the
combing-out of the agricultural sector. There is no objection to a
temporary accommodation of eastern labor at prisoner-of-war camps
(without barbed wire, etc.).
The requirements of the supply industry are to be met by the Red Label
method [Rotzettelverfahren]. Constructors are to be provided by
canvassing at the French prisoner-of-war camps for officers.
[Typewritten] DR. STEFFLER
* * * * *
Present:
Reich Minister Speer
Field Marshal Milch
State Secretary Koerner Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Staatsrat Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Brig. Gen. Becht Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Lt. Col. v. Nicolai Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Herr Schlieker Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Oberberghauptmann Gabel Reich Economic Ministry
Colonel Dr. Krull Reich Economic Ministry
Oberbergrat Otto Reich Economic Ministry
State Secretary Ganzenmueller Reich Traffic Ministry
Staatsrat Heinberg Reich Traffic Ministry
Min. Dir. Gramsch Four Year Plan
Min. Rat Steffler Four Year Plan
Min. Dirig. Timm Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation
Oberreg. Rat Hildebrand Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation
Gen. Dir. Pleiger Reich Association Coal
Dr. Sogemeier Reich Association Coal
Dr. Fischer Reich Association Coal
Dir. Winkaus Plenipotentiary for Mining Requirements
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF TWENTY-FIRST
CONFERENCE OF CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 30 OCTOBER 1942
_EXCERPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 21ST
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Re: Labor supply and direction of labor held on 30 October 1942,
afternoon, at the Reich Ministry of Armament and Munitions.
Berlin, Pariser Platz 3
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: There is but one possibility, and that is, that the moment the
Wehrmacht takes prisoners in operational territory, they are to be
immediately turned over to us. We will move them away much faster than
the Wehrmacht.
MILCH: The correct thing to do would be to have all Stalags transferred
to you by order of the Fuehrer. The Wehrmacht takes prisoners and as
soon at it relinquishes them, the first delivery goes to your
organization. Then everything will be in order.
SAUCKEL: Yes, but we do not have sufficient personnel for guarding the
prisoners.
(MILCH: The Wehrmacht should have to provide you with that!)
SAUCKEL: As soon as prisoners of war are taken, they should be placed at
our disposal and we would then allocate them in a fair manner. However,
with the present method we get nothing or only a fraction of what the
Wehrmacht had promised us, although the prisoners had been taken by the
Wehrmacht.
TIMM: We can hardly hope to achieve that, since this might have
something to do with the convention concerning the treatment of
prisoners of war.
MILCH: The man who acts there for you can wear a uniform all right and
be a soldier. Only his superior will not be Herr Reinecke but Herr
Sauckel.
For psychological reasons emphasis should be placed on first of all
covering the requirements of the Wehrmacht branches, without other
considerations. The feeling, we don’t get it anyway, has gradually
permeated our whole air force industry—and I heard the same about the
army. I will admit that these gigantic allocations are completely
misjudged. For example, in the Luftwaffe where from an original
allocation of 480,000, a balance of 150,000 was left over [per Saldo
uebrig]. The plants always look only at the balance [Saldo]. However,
there are many plants also who have suffered an actual decrease in
manpower, especially in a young industry like ours, which is occupied
with the manufacture of very special products. This industry has many
young people, of whom many again have been drafted into the Wehrmacht.
This drafting is done in such an idiotic way that one actually has to
feel ashamed. All three experimenting engineers working on a development
which may have an important bearing on the outcome of the war are simply
drafted. They are not sent to the front or into training but sit around
in the back somewhere and are guarding some camp. No consideration
whatsoever is given to individual cases. Of course the plants then call
for replacements. The masses cannot fill these breaches, and qualified
replacements we cannot supply at all. Herr Dr. Werner, for example,
writes a letter to Herr Schieber of which he forwards a copy to me and
which states that production figures established in the delivery
schedules can no longer be met, owing to the fact that for weeks
partially even for months, no manpower has been allocated, and that even
current withdrawals cannot be replaced by the labor offices
[Arbeitsaemter]. The fact, that we can no longer meet the demands of the
rising production, that backlogs are increasing more and more, fills him
with rising apprehension. He then goes into details, but always reverts
to the same conclusion: everything might be accomplished, we could even
get the necessary material; in the final analysis we fail, however, in
one important aspect in connection with our whole armament program—the
allocation of manpower. If only we had, if only we had—thus it goes all
day and in every conference.
I am convinced that many people are beginning to put in fake requests
and exaggerate their requirements. There is only one way to straighten
out this affair. In my department, I do it this way: if for months a
spare part cannot be found, the entire front begins to hoard this
article; so, for instance, the tail skid of a Ju 52. Then we proceeded
to manufacture triple the amount of the expected requirements, yet no
tail skids were available. Ordnance stock piles were filled with it; but
they did not issue any. I then said: We will now manufacture nothing but
tail skids until we hear shouts not to send any more. Thus, an affair
like that gets finally straightened out. And here likewise we must say
for once: We will supply the required laborers to the industry, if
necessary by depriving other fields. Agriculture, at the moment can
spare laborers; it does not need them from 15 November to 15 March of
next year. It is just a waste to have to feed them. Only a small number
will be needed for the procurement of wood. Thus we are able to
generously help industry and later on again replenish agriculture. At
the same time we have the advantage of getting fairly well-fed people.
As Herr Timm recently explained, prisoners of war from the Ukraine would
not serve our purpose; they could not regain their physical strength on
what they get to eat in the industry. Even supplying them with better
food than we give to our own people would not be sufficient to get them
beyond a still weakened condition. In agriculture they get additional
food. Don’t muzzle the mouth of a beast when food lies all around it.
This is also of advantage to prisoners of war and workers from the East.
However, we have to finally do away with the general feeling: we have
nothing and we want yet anything; we have been forsaken by God and the
Fuehrer; constantly more and more is demanded of us; how can we still
believe in this great program? We can only carry it out if we have such
faith in it, as is spoken of in the Bible. In January we started with a
monthly production of 2,000 engines; today we have reached 4,000, and in
a year and a half I must reach 14,000. That of course is a gigantic
achievement for a month. Every engine has at least 1,200 h.p. If in
measurements of horsepower I compare the present with the former World
War, then the present achievement is 40 times as great. What an immense
amount of manpower was available at that time for an industry so totally
different from ours! Yet today we must come up to more than three times
that, which we have already done. That means, that in airplane engines
alone we have to achieve 135 to 140 times as much as we did in the World
War. Dr. Werner who is responsible for the engine industry proposed how
this can be done. He said: We must apply a mass production scale
everywhere, or else we will not accomplish it. He has very progressive
ideas in this field. With the airplane engine, it can be done for sure.
Crankshafts and connecting rods, etc., we can produce on a mass
production scale. Today we manufacture 40,000 connecting rods. However,
we still have no machines today that assemble these products
individually on the assembly line. The Americans have such machines. We
are lacking about 10 construction engineers and 5 mechanics; they just
simply cannot be procured. One must for once satisfy the needs of the
people again. I have always put them off until November and told them
that Sauckel would produce the necessary labor from agriculture.
* * * * *
SPEER: We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the
sick list decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in factories where
doctors are on the staff who are examining the sick men. There is
nothing to be said against SS and police taking drastic steps and
putting those known as slackers into concentration camps. There is no
alternative. Let it happen several times and the news will soon go
around.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: We talked of taking the waiters out of the restaurants in
Germany. But in this respect we have absolutely an abundance in France,
the General Government and the Protectorate. As long as we have not
skimmed that off, we could not take the responsibility towards the
German people for such a measure. Again a cable of the Foreign Minister
has burst into my recent negotiations in France stating that under no
circumstances should the Ministry Laval be put into peril. The Fuehrer
has said: If the French show no good will, then I shall retake the
800,000 French PW’s. If they show good will, then the French wives can
follow their husbands to Germany and work there. Of course, he said, I
have an interest that Laval remains in power. The Ministry Laval will
remain, it depends only on us. And Laval cannot go back after he has
reproduced in his speech and spoken before the French passages which he
has taken verbally out of my appeal. Only Pétain could bring him to
fall. I wish to draw your attention to the fact, however, that in France
there is a surplus of young men all of whom we could use in Germany. If
we expect our people to accept severest restrictions then we cannot
admit such luxuries in Paris as, e.g., small restaurants with bands of
25 musicians and two waiters per table. I am firmly convinced, if we are
brutal also against the others then we can extract quite a considerable
number of men out of the General Government—I sent an efficient man,
President Struwe, over there—and of the Protectorate. This need not
interfere with the armament industry over there. There is, therefore, no
fear that the demand could not be met.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE TWENTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE
CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 3 NOVEMBER 1942
Secret
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 23D CONFERENCE OF
CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
_Concerning the fixing of iron quotas, on 3 November 1942, 1600_
_hours in the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions,_
_Berlin, Pariser Platz 3_
* * * * *
PLEIGER: * * * For the physical strain on the miners, who practically
work two Sunday shifts each month, is such that they could not stand it
for another six months. In other words—this is the important point—the
quota of approximately 95,600 men is still lacking and must be assigned
to work now at last; it was promised to me at one time. The gentlemen of
the Ruhr tell me: We have our huts ready. Some of them are not
completely furnished, and I reproached the people for it. They answered,
however: But you promised us workers for about half a year. We have
always been ahead with our huts. How can you reproach us now, our huts
were not ready. The workers assigned to us will be taken care of. I
would be very thankful if Sauckel would be induced to assign to us the
quota of workers.
SPEER: He received the instruction in the last conference of the Central
Planning Board to assign workers first of all to the coal-mining
industry as well as to the iron-producing industry, for you the amount
of 44,000 plus 12,000, plus 7,500 for the feeder industry, plus 5,000
for pit props. The same holds true for Mr. Rohland.
PLEIGER: In our conferences it must always be taken as a basis that the
Reichsbahn, with regard to the allocation of cars, is at least in the
same position as they were last year.
(SPEER: That’s pretty bad.)
—No, it allocated over 80,000 cars in December.
* * * * *
SPEER: Can you give me by name any smelters or other people which could
be taken out?
(ROHLAND: Yes.)
This would still be another 50 or 100, I guess.
ROHLAND: I figure about 40 men per Martin furnace. If we take away 20 or
15—let’s say 20—as trained Martin furnace smelters, we would have 300
men. 300 smelters could help us a lot. But when will they come?
SPEER: Then we could deceive the French about the industry in such a
way, as if we would release among the prisoners of war the rollers and
smelters—they have—if they give us their names.
ROHLAND: We opened our own office in Paris. In other words, you mean the
French should report the smelters who are prisoners of war in Germany?
MILCH: I would simply say: You will get two people for one of this kind.
SPEER: The French firms know exactly who is a smelter among the
prisoners of war. There you should make it appear, as if they would be
released. They give us the names and then we take them out. Try it.
ROHLAND: That’s an idea.
MILCH: We in the Luftwaffe and airplane industry will also try to find
out: Who is a roller, smelter, or furnace mason.
ROHLAND: But by the time the people arrive, the quarter of the year will
be over.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-THIRD
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD,
16 FEBRUARY 1943
Secret!
Top Secret State Matter
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 33D CONFERENCE[94]
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
_Concerning Labor Supply on 16 February 1943 at 1600 hrs. at the_
_Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions 3,_
_Pariser Platz, Berlin_
* * * * *
TIMM: I should like to say something about the labor supply
possibilities. Perhaps you will permit me to emphasize the negative side
a little. The greatest difficulties result from the fact that the supply
of labor outstanding could not be fully dispatched from the East, but
came in in ever diminishing numbers. One may say that they have almost
become completely exhausted. Eastern laborers during the last six weeks
arrived only in smaller numbers than in former times, so that they can
hardly be included to an appreciable amount on the credit side of the
supply account. In any case their numbers are small. The foremost reason
is that in former months most transports were dispatched from the
Ukraine while the main recruitment areas were those which in the
meantime have become operational areas, or even are no longer in our
hands. The forecasts we made applied to a large extent to the transport
of people from the Caucasus district, the Kuban, from areas like
Stalingrad. We prepared measures which should enable us to draw more
eastern workers again during the following months. I venture to think
that we should be able, on a conservative calculation, to transfer
during the month of March between 150,000 and 200,000 laborers from the
East to the West.
(SPEER: Including or excluding those needed for agriculture?)
Including those needed for agriculture. But in my opinion it will be
necessary to apply much pressure, since just those districts are
concerned which have been pacified to a certain extent, and for the same
reason will not be very much inclined to release labor. This is
calculated on the assumption that some labor has to be released also
from the eastern and northern parts of the East.
The second area, capable of releasing a considerable amount of labor is
the General Government and that for the January estimate which has been
drawn up with particular caution as I again wish to emphasize. We expect
that the figures will be surpassed rather than not reached. I think we
can expect a number of 40,000, of which, it is true, a part will have to
be given to agriculture, if we intend no more than to cover the losses
which we had to inflict last autumn.
Beyond this it ought to be possible in my opinion to employ within the
Reich, and especially for the mining industry, part of the Polish
Building Service. I venture to think one ought to enlarge this
organization in such a way that more age groups than so far are called
up for it, since this procedure is functioning. The younger age groups
which in fact are especially suited for mining could be dispatched to
the Reich. In this case the supervisors who are provided for the
greatest part by the Building Service, will be needed only in very small
numbers in the Reich.
The next area would be the Protectorate on which I cannot make a final
statement today. We have been promised for the month of March about
10,000 laborers. But I am of the opinion that some loosening-up is
possible. The Plenipotentiary will soon in a personal visit take in hand
the possibility of this loosening-up.
France is included in the account with 100,000 laborers for March.
Messages which I received permit us to hope that this number will be
increased in the middle of March. Belgium is included with 40,000,
Holland with 30,000, Slovakia with 20,000, who, it is true, are
exclusively suited for agriculture, since their share of individual
workers has been completely delivered. This item consists exclusively of
agricultural laborers, owing to a state treaty. For the remaining part
of the foreign areas I included another 10,000. This amounts altogether
to 400,000 laborers who should arrive in March. One might be entitled to
add for the last month altogether 10,000 prisoners of war. These are men
to be drawn from the East. It can be expected that this number might
under certain conditions be surpassed, since the High Command intends
especially for operational reasons, to take the prisoners of war back to
the Reich, particularly from the areas threatened by the enemy.
A former item concerns the fluctuation of labor which certainly amounts
to about 100,000 laborers. Then there are items which at the moment
cannot be estimated—the yield from the threatened areas and from the
“Stoppage-action”. Here I cannot venture to name final figures, but I
hope to be able to do so next month.
SAUCKEL: Of course, we regret very much that last autumn we were unable
to recruit as much as we would have liked in the areas which now are
again in enemy hands. This is partly due to the fact that we were not
assisted in the degree we had expected. Moreover we were not able to
effect the removal of the civil population which had been planned. These
events are an urgent reminder of the fact that it is necessary to employ
foreign laborers at once and in great numbers in Germany proper and in
the actual armaments industry. You may be certain that we wish to
achieve this. We have not the slightest interest in creating
difficulties for an armaments office, even for those working for German
interest abroad, by taking labor away from them to an unreasonable
extent. But on this occasion I should like to ask you to try and
understand our procedure. We Germans surely have sent to the front
between 50 and 75 percent of our skilled workers. A part of them has
been killed while the nations subjugated by us need no longer shed their
blood. Thus they can preserve their entire capacity with regard to
skilled workers, inasmuch as they have not been transferred to Germany
which is the case only for a much smaller percentage than all of us
supposed, and in fact they do use them partly for manufacturing things
which are not in the least important for the German war economy. If we
proceed energetically against this abuse, I ask you to give me credit
for so much reason that I do not intend to damage the foreign interests
of the German armaments industry. The quality of the foreign worker is
such that it cannot be compared with that of the German worker. But even
then I intend to create a similar proportion between skilled and workers
trained for their job, as it exists in Germany by force of tradition,
since it has come about that we had to send men to the front in much
larger numbers than we requested France or any other country to do.
Moreover we shall endeavor increasingly to bring about on a generous
scale the adaptation of the French, Polish, and Czech workers. I do not
see for the moment any necessity for limiting the use of foreign labor.
The only thing I ask for is that we understand each other, so that the
immense difficulties and friction between the respective authorities
disappear and the program drawn up by us will by no means be frustrated
by such things.
There are without a doubt still enough men in France, Holland, Belgium,
the Protectorate, and the General Government to meet our labor demands
for the next months. I confess that I expect more success from such a
procedure with respect to heavier work or for work where shifts of 10 or
more hours are customary, than from relying on the use of German women
and men exclusively. We shall have better success by proceeding this way
provided the foreign workers still obey, which remains a risk we always
run, than by using weaker German women and girls as labor in places of
very important armament work, where foreigners may be used for security
reasons. * * *
* * * The situation in France is this; after I and my assistants had
succeeded after difficult discussions in inducing Laval to introduce the
Service Act this act has now been enlarged, owing to our pressure so
that already yesterday three French age groups have been called up. We
are now, therefore, legally and with the assistance of the French
Government entitled to recruit laborers in France from three age groups,
whom we can use in French factories in the future, but of whom we may
choose some for our use in Germany and send them to Germany. I think in
France the ice is now broken. According to reports received they now
have begun to think about a possible break-through by the Bolshevists
and the dangers which thereby threaten Europe. The resistance which the
French Government has hitherto shown is diminishing. Within the next
days I shall go to France in order to set the whole thing into motion,
so that the losses in the East may be somewhat balanced by increasing
recruitment and calling-up in France.
If we receive comprehensive lists in time, we shall, I think, be able to
cover all demands by dispatching in March 800,000 laborers.
SPEER: Recruitment abroad as such is supported by us. We only fear very
much that the skilled workers extracted from the occupied countries do
not always reach the appropriate factories in Germany. It might
certainly be better if we acted in such a way that the parent firms of
Germany which work with the French and Czech factories would comb out
the foreign workers more than before for their own use.
SAUCKEL: We made an agreement with Field Marshal Milch. You will get the
factories which are urgently needed for your airplane motors, etc.;
these will be completely safeguarded. In the same way I promised Admiral
of the Fleet Doenitz[95] today that the U-boat repair firms proper are
absolutely safeguarded. We shall even be able to provide our own
armament factories on French soil with labor extracted from French
factories, in the main from the unoccupied territory where there still
are metal works which have their full complement of skilled workers
without even having been touched so far.
HILDEBRAND: May I point out at this point that we have to figure that we
shall be deprived of the Italian workers this year. This according to
present discussions, concerns 300,000 men altogether, or 15 to 20,000 a
month. If we deduct the first installment, the remaining ones to a great
part are just highly skilled metal workers.
SAUCKEL: This is a request of the Fuehrer, but he has not yet finally
decided.
HILDEBRAND: But we have been told to be prepared to lose these men.
SPEER: We ourselves quite support the combing-out abroad. On the other
hand we must be entitled—and this was agreed—to exclude or prefer
particular kinds of work, e.g., the armor factories. In France we are
more and more turning towards giving up finishing processes and
stressing the subcontracting. It is the foundries and similar works,
e.g., for the use of the aluminum industry, which we wish to use to
capacity. We could force the production of Opel, so that in this case
Peugeot who manufacture the forged parts for Opel, the parent firm,
might demand more labor for this while the rest of their workers would
be taken over by Opel.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD,
22 APRIL 1943
Dr. Jaenicke
Secret
Top Secret State Matter
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 36TH CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
_Concerning 1943-44 coal economy plan. Held on Thursday, 22 April 1943,
1550 hours at the Festival Hall at the Zoo, Jebenstr._
* * * * *
SPEER: Throughout the winter we have seen that in the last instance it
is coal which provides the basis for all plans we wish to execute in
other respects, and most of you are also aware of our intention to
increase the manufacture of iron. Here also it will again be coal which
in the last instance will tip the scales, whether or not we shall be
able to accomplish this increase of iron production. Seen from the
Central Planning Board, we are of the opinion that the demand for coal
as well as the demand for iron ought to be coordinated in a separate
plan, and that this plan ought to receive about the same degree of
urgency as the Krauch plan, and that with regard to labor, the
conditions required for the execution of that plan must be established.
Perhaps Mr. Timm will be able to state how he expects the question of
the miners to be developed; unfortunately the miners cannot be taken
from the German reservoir, in their place we shall have to use very
strong foreigners.
TIMM: At the moment, 69,000 men are needed for hauling that coal. We
want to cover this by finding within the Reich 23,000 men, viz., healthy
prisoners of war, etc., who are especially suitable for mining—and by
dispatching 50,000 Poles from the General Government. Out of these about
30,000 men have been supplied up to 24 April, so that about 39,000 men
are still outstanding for January to April. The demand for May has been
reported to us at 35,700. The difficulties existed especially with
regard to recruitment in the General Government, since in every district
surrounding Germany there is an extraordinary resistance to recruitment.
In all countries we have to change over more or less to registering the
men by age groups and to conscripting them in age groups. They do appear
for registration as such, but as soon as transport is available, they do
not come back so that the dispatch of the men has become more or less a
question for the police.
Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is extraordinarily
serious. It is well known that vehement battles occurred just because of
these actions. The resistance against the administration established by
us is very strong. Quite a number of our men have been exposed to
increased dangers, and it was just in the last two or three weeks that
some of them were shot dead, e.g., the head of the labor office in
Warsaw who was shot in his office, and yesterday another man again. This
is how matters stand presently, and the recruiting itself even if done
with the best will remain extremely difficult unless police
reinforcements are at hand.
* * * * *
SPEER: These [women] we can use in the Reich. There are a great number
of Russian PW’s and laborers who are employed at places where they need
not be employed. There can be an exchange. The only thing is to do this
with unskilled workers, and not to take the workers from the industry
where they were trained with difficulty.
KEHRL: Where we are late in completion of a task, or where we lose an
opportunity, we can make up for it. But any coal which we cannot haul at
once is definitely lost for use in this war. This is why we cannot do
enough to force the allotment to the pits.
SPEER: But not by forcible actions in smashing what we toilsomely built.
(KEHRL: We need not do that!)
You ought to add the conscripted labor.
TIMM: We must endeavor to get German men for working at the coal-face.
KEHRL: We subsist on foreigners who live in Germany.
TIMM: These men are concentrated within a very small area. Otherwise
there might be trouble in this sector.
SPEER: There is a specified statement showing in what sectors the
Russian PW’s have been distributed, and this statement is quite
interesting. It shows that the armaments industry only received 30
percent. I always complained about this.
TIMM: The highest percentage of PW’s are Frenchmen, and one ought not to
forget that it is difficult to employ them at the coal-face. The number
of Russians living within the Reich is small.
ROHLAND: In the mines one should exclusively use eastern people, not
western ones.
SPEER: The western men collapse!
* * * * *
SPEER: In any case we ought to force the coal production with all our
power. I now have here a statement on the distribution of the Soviet
prisoners. There are 368,000 altogether. Of these are: 101,000 in
agriculture; 94,000 in the mining industry—who are not available in any
case; 15,000 in the building materials industry; 26,000 in iron and
metal production where they cannot be extracted either; 29,000 in the
manufacture of iron, steel, and metal goods; 63,000 in the manufacture
of machines, boilers, and cars, and similar appliances, which means in
armaments industry; and 10,000 in the chemical industry. Agriculture has
received by far the most of them, and the men employed there could in
the course of time be exchanged for women. The 90,000 Russian PW’s
employed in the whole of the armaments industry are for the greatest
part skilled men. If you can extract 8-10,000 men from there, it would
already be the limit.
KEHRL: Would it not be possible to add Serbians, etc.?
SOGEMEIER: We ought not to mix too much.
ROHLAND: For God’s sake, no Serbians! We had very bad experiences with
mixing.
* * * * *
SPEER: Everything depends on the amount of the influx from abroad.
SCHIEBER: If anyway nothing arrives, the mines certainly will get
nothing.
TIMM: Gauleiter Sauckel is perfectly convinced that the transports will
be on their way within a short time. Now the front has been consolidated
at last.
SCHIEBER: We ought to be grateful that the weather has allowed the
farmer to keep things going in some way despite the little labor being
available to him. For the farmer, the coal supply is just as important
as for the whole of the armaments industry. When we discuss tomorrow the
nitrogen problem we shall see the same; our first need is coal.
KOERNER: On 1 April we had in agriculture a deficit of about 600,000
laborers. It had been planned to cover it by supplying labor from the
East, mainly women. These laborers will first have to be supplied until
other laborers are released from agriculture. We are just entering the
season where the heaviest work in the fields has to be done, for which
many laborers are necessary. Much labor is needed for the hoeing of the
fruits, and it is to be hoped that this year the harvest can be started
early which would be rendered much more difficult if an exchange of
labor would have to take place.
* * * * *
MILCH: We ought to except certain areas of the Protectorate to which the
orders are being directed, and extract nothing there until a surplus is
found out subsequently. For the time being it cannot be ascertained.
There are enough other areas of the Protectorate which are not affected
by the industry plan and some labor could be extracted from them at
once. We ought to name the places which are excepted from our action.
TIMM: In this the authorities on the other side ought to participate;
they are in the best position to tell the places from where nothing must
be extracted.
MILCH: If one proceeds as I proposed, and Timm agreed to it, no damage
can be done. This ought to be done in any case. For the rest I
completely agree; we must now supply the mines with labor. The greatest
part of labor which we can supply from the East will indeed be women.
But the eastern women are quite accustomed to agricultural work, and
especially to the type of work which has to be done these coming weeks,
the hoeing and transplanting of turnips, etc. The women are quite
suitable for this. One thing has to be considered: first you must supply
agriculture with the women, then you can extract the men, laborer for
laborer. It is not the right thing if first the men are taken away and
the farmers are left without labor for 4 to 6 weeks. If the women arrive
after such time they arrive too late.
SPEER: Beyond this we are prepared to release from all parts of the war
economy, in exchange for women, any Russian PW’s or other Russian who is
employed as auxiliary laborer.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
REPORT OF THE FORTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 23 JUNE 1943
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
Central Planning Board
Z.P. 148
Berlin W 8, 24 June 1943
Leipziger Strasse 3
24 copies, 17th copy
Top Secret State Matter
_REPORT ON THE 42D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD ON 23 JUNE 1943, 1600 HOURS_
_Coal situation_
The manpower situation in the coal mining industry, particularly in the
hard coal mining industry, is still unsatisfactory, and necessitates an
extension of the measures decided upon at the 36th Conference of the
Central Planning Board, held on 22 April 1943.
The intensive discussion yielded as the most expedient solution the use
of Russian prisoners of war to fill the existing vacancies. The more
homogeneous character of the shifts will bring about the necessary
higher output resulting both from an increased capacity of such shifts
and particularly from a restriction of fluctuations.
1. The present drive, which is to be carried out throughout the German
economy proper, aims both at freeing Russian labor, fit for work in the
mining industry and actually not employed as semi-skilled workmen, and
at replacing it by additionally imported labor consisting of eastern
workers, Poles, etc. Thus, about 50,000 workmen are expected to be made
available up to the end of July 1943. This drive is to be accelerated.
Furthermore as an immediate measure it should be suggested to the
Fuehrer—RVK [Reich Association Coal] and GBA [Plenipotentiary General
for Labor Allocation] submitting the necessary figures for the statement
to the Fuehrer—that 200,000 Russian prisoners fit for the heaviest work
be made available from the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS through the chiefs of
the army groups [Heeresgruppenchefs]. The prisoners will be selected on
the spot by medical officers of the mining industry and officials of the
office of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation will take
charge of them there and then. Provisions are to be made for an
extension of this program in order to satisfy any demand for manpower,
which will have accumulated up to the end of the year 1943.
The manpower needed by the mining transport industry
[Bergbau-Zubringer-Industrie] and by the iron-producing industry may be
supplied from that same source provided that the necessities of the coal
mining industry have previously been adjusted.
The performance of the Soviet Russians so employed is to be raised by a
premium system. For this purpose, the present pay restrictions are to be
lifted and the manager [Betriebsfuehrer] be allowed to distribute
amongst the workers, according to his discretion, one Reichmark per head
per day as premium for particular services rendered.
Furthermore, care will be taken that workmen can exchange these
premiums, which will be paid out in camp money [Lagergeld] for goods. It
is intended to put at their disposal various provisions (e.g., sunflower
seeds, etc.) beer, tobacco, cigarettes and cigars, small items for daily
use, etc.
The Reich Food Ministry in conjunction with the Reich Association Coal
and the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs will clarify the question
whether, beyond that, something else can be changed as far as rations
are concerned.
2. Equally, in occupied countries, labor is to be tied more securely to
the various factories by means of the distribution of additional ration
cards as premium for good services. This refers in particular to the
General Government and the occupied territories in the East. The output
demanded of the General Government is to be fixed at the proposed
amount, and the additional rations for armament workers may then be
rated accordingly.
[Typewritten signature] DR. GRAMSCH
Present:
Reich Minister Speer
Field Marshal Milch
Staatstrat Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Oberbuergermeister Liebel Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Major General Waeger Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Dr. Ing. Groener Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
President Kehrl Reich Economic Ministry
Min. Dir. Gramsch Four Year Plan
Min. Dirig. Timm Plenipotentiary General for Labor
Allocation (GBA)
Staatsrat Pleiger Reich Association Coal (RVK)
Dr. Sogemeier Reich Association Coal (RVK)
Dr. Rosenkranz Reich Association Coal (RVK)
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE FIFTY-THIRD
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD,
16 FEBRUARY 1944
Secret!
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 53D CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
_Concerning Supply of Labor held on 16 February 1944, 10 o’clock,_
_in the Reich Air Ministry_
Present: Milch (for Central Planning Board), Kehrl, Backe, etc.
MILCH: The armament industry employs foreign workers to a large extent,
according to the latest figures—40 percent. The new allocations of the
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation consist mostly of
foreigners and we lost a lot of German personnel which was called up.
Specially the air industry being a young industry employs a great many
young people who should be called up. This will be very difficult as is
easily seen if one deducts those working for experimental stations. In
mass production the foreign workers by far prevail. It is about 95
percent and higher. Our best new engine is made 88 percent by Russian
prisoners of war and the other 12 percent by German men and women. 50-60
Ju 52’s which we now regard only as transport planes are made per month.
Only 6-8 German men are working on this machine, the rest are Ukrainian
women who have beaten all the records of trained workers.
* * * * *
The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler’s trustworthy
hands who will make them work, all right. This is very important for
educating people and has also a deterrent effect on such others who
would likewise feel inclined to shirk.
* * * * *
* * * It is, therefore, not possible to exploit fully all the foreigners
unless we compel them by piece work or have the possibility of taking
measures against foreigners who are not doing their bit. But if the
foreman lays hands on a prisoner of war or smacks him, at once there is
a terrible uproar, the man is put into prison, etc. There are sufficient
officials in Germany who think it their most important duty to stand up
for human rights instead of war production. I, too, am all for human
rights. But if a Frenchman says, “You fellows will all be hanged and the
chief of the factory will be beheaded first”, and if then the chief
says, “I am going to hit him”, then he is in a mess. He is not
protected, but the “poor fellow” who said that to him is protected. I
have told my engineers, “I am going to punish you if you don’t hit such
a man; the more you do in this respect the more I shall praise you. I
shall see to it that nothing happens to you.” This is not yet
sufficiently known. I cannot talk to all plant leaders. I should like to
see the man who stays my arm because I can take care of anybody who does
so. If the little plant leader does that he is put into a concentration
camp and runs the risk of losing the prisoners of war. In one case two
Russian officers took off with an airplane but crashed. I ordered that
these two men be hanged at once. They were hanged or shot yesterday. I
left that to the SS. I expressed the wish to have them hanged in the
factory for the others to see. * * *
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
REPORT ON THE FIFTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 16 FEBRUARY 1944
[Marginal notes] St. 10-44 VII Top Secret
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
Central Planning Board
Z.P. 7 g. Rs.
Pl. 030053
Berlin, 18 February 1944
W 8, Leipziger Strasse 3
Secret
31 copies, 3d copy
[Milch’s initial]
M
_REPORT ON THE 53D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD ON 16 FEBRUARY 1944,
ON LABOR ALLOCATION 1944_
The purpose of this conference is to determine the labor needs and
resources for the 1st quarter and the whole year of 1944. The session is
opened by the discussion of the data submitted by the planning office
(see enclosures 1-9). On the basis of the planning office’s estimate of
the requirements (enclosure 9) these turn out, after discussion with the
individual allottees, to be the following:
First Second-Fourth
Quarter-44 Quarter-44 Total
in 1000’s
Agriculture 70 (1) 70 (2) 140
Forestry and Timber Industry 40 (3) . . (4) 40
Armament and War Production 544 (5) 3,000 (6) 3,544
Air Raid Damages 100 50 150 (7)
Communications 85 (8) 265 350
Distribution . . . . . .
Public Administration 62 (9) . . 62
Wehrmacht Administration 130 . . 130
——— ——— ———
1,031 3,385 4,416
(1) Not including the 200,000 of whom 100,000 each will flow back from
industry and forestry.
(2) Not including the demand for seasonal workers amounting usually to
62,000.
(3) 25,000 for forestry and 15,000, including 8,000 women for the timber
industry, as against a peacetime requirement of 150,000 male and 40,000
female seasonal workers, although now considerably increased production
(1943:70 million cubic meters; 1944:80 million cubic meters) and
particularly heavy combing-out through draft.
(4) Starting autumn 1944, the usual necessary transfer from agriculture.
(5) Found to be a priority requirement for February with the
Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation.
(6) Starting March, 200,000 monthly as compensation for fluctuations—2
million for period March to December 1944. Plus compensation for return
to agriculture 100,000 (cp. note 1) including 30,000 retrained workers
who perhaps will have to be covered by an over-all exchange system and
about 900,000 as replacement for draftees, as reserves for increased
programs, etc., making about 3 million men all told for the period from
March to December 1944.
(7) 150,000 is the minimum requirement in addition to the hitherto
assigned 70,000 OT, 100,000 GB construction and 118,000 workmen to the
local and district assignments and 42,000 workers centrally assigned.
The mobile formations are to be increased and sometimes to be reinforced
by local help, particularly by people unemployed through bombings.
(8) Including 75,000 for the Reichsbahn, 1,000 for inland navigation,
7,000 for motor traffic, 2,000 for minor railways.
(9) Including 27,000 for the Reichspost and 35,000 for the Red Cross.
In this estimate, real fluctuation (departure from work) as well as
fictitious fluctuation (change of work location) are taken into account.
Fictitious fluctuation is still to be variously estimated in the various
branches. For the armament section it is estimated at 50 percent of the
total fluctuation (cp. note 6). The total requirements of approximately
4.4 million would thus decrease by up to 1 million. The above estimate
of requirements ought, therefore, in no case to exceed the requirements
determined at the Fuehrer’s conference on 4 January 1944, comprising
only the real fluctuation and amounting to 4,05 million namely:
1. Maintenance of the status of activity in the whole of 2,5 million
the war economy including agriculture, taking into
account the replacement of deficiencies due to drafts
into the Wehrmacht, deaths, illness, expiration of
contract, etc. (real fluctuation)
2. For additional armament tasks and removal of bottleneck 1,30 million
situations in armament plants
3. Air raid defense constructions, etc. 0,25 million
—————
Total 4,05 million
Kehrl is charged with the task of ascertaining the magnitude of real and
fictitious fluctuation, and as a basis thereto, on behalf of the Central
Planning Board, together with the competent offices, to determine the
concepts, “real and fictitious fluctuation,” furthermore the concepts,
assignment, reserves [Aufstockung], etc., in a uniform terminology which
will be binding for all agencies concerned.
The following resources are the GBA’s [Sauckel’s] estimated coverage of
the requirements:
1. With the utmost efforts, other workers can be mobilized 500,000
from German domestic reserves (getting hold of labor
unemployed as result of enemy air raids, compulsory
registration, shutting down, combing out measures)
2. Recruitment of Italian labor numbering at the rate of 1,500,000
250,000 a month from January to April—1,000,000 and
500,000 from May to December
3. Recruitment of French labor at equal monthly rates, 1,000,000
from 1 February to 31 December 1944 (approx. 91,000 per
month)
4. Recruitment of labor from Belgium 250,000
5. Recruitment of labor from the Netherlands 250,000
6. Recruitment of labor from the eastern territories, 600,000
occupied former Soviet territories, Baltic states, and
General Government
7. Recruitment of workers from other European countries 100,000
—————
Approximately 4,2 million
In addition, the following possibilities are seen for the mobilization
of more reserves: Intensification of employment of women (in England, 61
percent of women between 14 and 65 are conscripted for the war economy,
in Germany only 46 percent) especially in agriculture (more stringent
application of the Goering ordinance), reduction in number of domestic
assistants, reduction of the idle classes (Sauckel-Kehrl-Himmler, in
this respect regional round-ups are to be carried out separately for
foreigners, men and women) improvement of the sanitary system (saving up
to 3 percent), working out of equitable contractual wages with incentive
wage premiums. The planning office undertakes in common with the GBA
[Sauckel] the examination of these possibilities for an intensified
mobilization. Kehrl is moreover commissioned to make a general
examination of the question of an improvement of industrial labor
assignment. Everyone concerned will transmit their data on faulty
assignment of workers to the planning office. If necessary, this
question will be handled at a special session of the Central Planning
Board.
For the 1st quarter of 1944 the following resources (including a
fictitious fluctuation of about 50,000 per month) are given by the
estimate of the GBA [Sauckel]:
Assignments in January 145,000
Assignments February-March 500,000
————
Approximately 650,000
The adjustment of requirements and coverage will be effected at another
session of the Central Planning Board.
[Signed] STEFFLER
Present:
Field Marshal Milch
State Secretary Koerner
President Kehrl
Ministerial Councillor Steffler
Maj. Gen. Waeger Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Teuscher Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
KVV Chief Bosch Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Ministerial Councillor Wissmann Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Lt. Col. Schaede Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Provincial Counsellor Berk Plenipotentiary for Labor
Allocation
State Secretary Hayler Reich Economic Ministry
General of Engineers Sellschopp Reich Air Ministry
Staff Engineer Kaufmann Reich Air Ministry
Staff Secretary Ganzenmueller Reich Transport Ministry
Ministerial Director Hassenpflug Reich Transport Ministry
Ministerial Councillor Hennig Reich Transport Ministry
State Secretary Backe Reich Food Ministry
State Secretary Alpers Reich Office for Forestry
Prof. Abetz Reich Office for Forestry
State Secretary Gutterer Propaganda Ministry
Mayor Ellgering Propaganda Ministry
Gen. Weidemann OKW
Major Koch OKW
Distribution:
Reich Minister Speer 1st copy
Reich Minister Funk 2d copy
Field Marshal Milch 3d copy
State Secretary Koerner 4th copy
President Kehrl 5th copy & 6th
Engineer Goerner 7th copy
Ministerial Councillor Steffler 8th & 9th copies
Maj. Gen. Waeger 10th copy
KVV Chief Bosch 11th copy
Ministerial Councillor Wissmann 12th copy
Provincial Councillor Berk 13th copy
State Secretary Hayler 14th copy
General Engineer Sellschopp 15th copy
State Secretary Ganzenmueller 16th copy
State Secretary Backe 17th copy
State Secretary Alpers 18th copy
State Secretary Gutterer 19th copy
Gen. Weidemann 20th copy
Major Koch 21st copy
Planning Office 22d & 23d copies
Registry V.P. 24th & 31st copies
Pla. 160/ 11.2.
List of persons invited to the Conference of the Central
Planning Board on 16 February 1944:
Chairman: Field Marshal Milch
Participants:
Reich Minister of Economy Funk
State Secretary Koerner
State Secretary Dr. Backe
General Forester Dr. Alpers
State Secretary Dr. Ganzenmueller
State Secretary Dr. Gutterer
President Kehrl
Maj. Gen. Waeger
Ministerial Manager Dr. Timm (crossed out and replaced by Provincial
Councillor Berk)
Military Government vice-regent Dr. Bosch
Ministerial Councillor Dr. Steffler
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING
BOARD, 1 MARCH 1944
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 54TH CONFERENCE_[96]
_OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Re: Labor Supply on Wednesday, 1 March 1944, 10 o’clock, at the
Ministry for Air Transport
SAUCKEL: Field Marshal [Milch], Gentlemen, it goes without saying that
we shall satisfy as far as possible the demands agreed upon by the
Central Planning Board. In this connection I wish to state that I call
such deliveries as can be made by the Plenipotentiary for Labor
Allocation “possible” by stressing every nerve of his organization.
Already on 4 January I had to report to the Fuehrer with the greatest
regret that for the first time I was not in a position to guarantee
delivery of the grand total of 4,050,000 men then calculated in the
Fuehrer’s Headquarters for the year 1944. In the presence of the Fuehrer
I emphasized this several times. In the previous years I was able to
satisfy the demands, at least with regard to the number of laborers, but
this year I am no longer able to guarantee them in advance. In case I
can deliver only a small number, I should be glad if those arriving
would be distributed by percentage within the framework of your program.
Of course, I shall readily agree if I am now told by the board: Now we
have to change the program; now this or that is more urgent. It goes
without saying that we will satisfy the demands whatever they may be, to
the best of our ability, with due regard to the war situation. So much
about figures!
We have no reason to contest the figures as such, for we ask nothing for
ourselves. We are not even able to do anything with the laborers we
collect; we only put them at the disposal of industry. I only wish to
make some general statements and ask for your indulgence.
In the autumn of last year the supply program, inasmuch as it concerns
supply from abroad was frustrated to a very great extent; I need not
give the reasons in this circle; we have talked enough about them, but I
have to state: the program has been smashed. People in France, Belgium,
and Holland thought that labor was no longer to be directed from these
countries to Germany because the work now had to be done within these
countries themselves. For months—sometimes I visited these countries
twice within a month—I have been called a fool who against all reason
travelled around in these countries in order to extract labor. This went
so far, I assure you, that all prefectures in France had general orders
not to satisfy my demands since even the German authorities quarreled
over whether or not Sauckel was a fool. If one’s work is smashed in such
a way, repair is very, very difficult. * * *
* * * * *
* * * Today I am able to report that we stopped that decrease. According
to most accurate statistics, which I had ordered, we have today again
including foreign workers and prisoners of war, the same number of 29.1
million which we had in September. But we have added nothing since that
time. Thus we dispatched to the Reich in those two months no more than
4,500 Frenchmen which amounts to nothing. From Italy only 7,000
civilians arrived. This, although from 1 December until today, I have
had no hour, no Sunday, and no night for myself. I have visited all
these countries and travelled through the whole Reich. My work was
terribly difficult, but not for the reason that no more workers are to
be found. I wish to state expressly, in France and in Italy there are
still men galore. The situation in Italy is nothing but a European
scandal, the same applies to a certain extent to France. Gentlemen, the
French work badly and support themselves at the expense of the work done
by the German soldier and laborer, even at the expense of the German
food supply, and the same applies to Italy. I found out during my last
stay that the food supply of the northern Italians cannot suffer any
comparison with that of the southern Italians. The northern Italians,
viz., as far to the south as Rome are so well nourished that they need
not work; they are nourished quite differently from the German nation by
their Father in Heaven without having to work for their bread. The labor
reserves exist but the means of touching them have been smashed.
The most abominable point made by my adversaries is their claim that no
executive had been provided within these areas in order to recruit in a
sensible manner the Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch
them to work. Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole
batch of French male and female agents who for good pay, just as was
done in olden times for “shanghaiing”, went hunting for men and made
them drunk by using liquor as well as words in order to dispatch them to
Germany. Moreover I charged some able men with founding a special labor
supply executive of our own, and this they did by training and arming,
with the help of the Higher SS and Police Leader, a number of natives,
but I still have to ask the Munitions Ministry for arms for the use of
these men. * * *
* * * * *
* * * Especially the protected factories in the occupied countries make
my work more difficult. According to reports received within the last
days these protected factories are to a great part filled to capacity,
and still labor is sucked up into these areas. This strong suction very
much obstructs our desire to dispatch labor to the Reich. I wish to
emphasize that I never opposed the use of French labor in factories
which had been transferred from Germany to France. I am still sound of
mind, and as recently as last summer I charged Mr. Hildebrand with an
inquiry in France which had the following result: It would be easy to
extract from French medium and small factories—80 percent of all French
factories are small enterprises with only 36-40 working hours—1 million
laborers for use in the transferred factories, and 1 million more for
dispatch to Germany. To use 1 million within France should be quite
possible unless the protected factories in France artificially suck up
the labor completely and unless their number is continually increased,
as happens according to my reports especially in Belgium, and unless new
categories of works are continually declared protected, so that finally
no labor is left which I may use in Germany. I wish here and now to
repeat my thesis: A French workman, if treated in the right way, does
double the amount of work in Germany that he would do in France, and he
has here twice the value he has in France. I want to state clearly and
fearlessly—the exaggerated use of the idea of protected factories in
connection with the labor supply from France in my submission implies a
grave danger for the German labor supply. If we cannot come to the
decision that my assistants, together with the armament authorities, are
to comb out every factory, this fountain of labor too in the future will
remain blocked for the use of Germany, and in this case the program
prescribed to me by the Fuehrer may well be frustrated. The same applies
to Italy. In either country there are enough laborers, even enough
skilled workers; only we must have enough courage to step into the
French plants. What really happens in France, I do not know. That a
smaller amount of work is done during enemy operations in France, like
in every occupied country, than is done in Germany seems to me evident.
If I am to fulfill the demands which you present to me, you must be
prepared to agree with me and my assistants, that the term “protected
factory” is to be restricted in France to what is really necessary and
feasible by reasonable men, and the protected factories are not, as the
Frenchmen think, protected against any extraction of labor from them for
use in Germany. It is indeed very difficult for me to be presented to
French eyes as a German of whom they may say, Sauckel is here stopped
from acting for German armament! * * * On the other hand, I have grounds
for hoping that I shall be just able to wiggle through, first by using
my old corps of agents and my labor executive, and secondly by relying
upon the measures which I was lucky enough to succeed in obtaining from
the French Government. In a discussion lasting 5-6 hours I have exerted
from M. Laval the concession that the death penalty will be threatened
for officials endeavoring to sabotage the flow of labor supply and
certain other measures. Believe me, this was very difficult. It required
a hard struggle to get this through. But I succeeded and now in France,
Germans ought to take really severe measures, in case the French
Government does not do so. Don’t take it amiss, I and my assistants in
fact have sometimes seen things happen in France that I was forced to
ask, is there no respect any more in France for the German lieutenant
with his 10 men. For months every word I spoke was countered by the
answer: But what do you mean, Mr. Gauleiter, you know there is no
executive at our disposal; we are not able to take action in France!
This I have been answered over and over again. How then, am I to
regulate the labor supply with regard to France. There is only one
solution—the German authorities have to co-operate with each other, and
if the Frenchmen despite all their promises do not act, then we Germans
must make an example of one case, and, by reason of this law, if
necessary put prefect or burgomaster against the wall, if he does not
comply with the rules; otherwise no Frenchman at all will be dispatched
to Germany. During the latter quarter the belief in a German victory and
in all propaganda statements which we were still able to make has sunk
below zero, and today it is still the same. I rather expect the new
French ministers, especially Henriot [French (Vichy) Minister of
Propaganda] will act ruthlessly; they are very willing and I have a good
impression of them. The question is only how far they will be able to
impress their will on the subordinated authorities. Such is the
situation in France.
In Italy the situation is exactly the same, perhaps rather worse. * * *
Moreover, I am offended, and this grieves me most, by the statement that
I was responsible for the European partisan nuisance. Even German
authorities reproached me thus, although they were the last ones who
have the right to make such statements. I wish to protest against this
slander, and I can prove that it is not I who is responsible. * * *
* * * Numerous German authorities, even such as had no connections with
economics and labor supply, inquired of me, why do you fetch these
people to Germany at all? You make trouble for this area and render our
existence there more difficult. To which I can only reply: It is my duty
to insist on it that labor supply comes from abroad. There is no longer
a German labor supply. That the latter is exhausted I already proved by
my ill-famed manifesto of April of last year. But I am not able to
transfer the German soil to France. Nor can I transfer the German
traffic to France nor the German mines. Nor can I transfer the German
armament works which still have to release part of their workers, if fit
for war service, nor their machines. Here alone 2,500,000 men are in
question as has been calculated in the Fuehrer conference. It is the
flower of German workers who go to the front and must go there. I have
always been one of those who says: If only energetic measures are
applied in fetching labor from abroad, then we want to release in God’s
name everybody from armaments work whom we can, in order to strengthen
our companies. The 1st and 7th Armored Divisions from Thuringia are
frequently mentioned in the armed forces report, I can only tell you
that the number of soldiers killed in battle in some Thuringian villages
has surpassed for some time already the number of soldiers killed in the
World War [I] by twice that amount. This I mention in my capacity as
Gauleiter. It is for this reason that we have to do our duty. The best
kind of German men, and men in the prime of life, have to go to the
front, and German women of more than 50 years of age cannot replace
them. Therefore I have to continue to go to France, Belgium, Holland,
and Italy, and there will be a time again when I shall go to Poland and
extract workers there as fit and as many of them as I can get. In this
circle I only wish to urge that you spread it around that I am not quite
the insane fellow I have been said to be during the last quarter of a
year. Even the Fuehrer has been told so. It goes without saying that
just this slander has had the effect that I was unable to deliver in the
last quarter at least 1½ million workers whom I would have been able to
deliver as long ago as last year, had the atmospheric conditions been
better. It was due to that “artificial atmospheric screen”, that they
did not arrive. I am aware that they simply have to arrive this year. My
duty to the Fuehrer, the Reich Marshal, Minister Speer, and towards you,
Gentlemen, and to agriculture is apparent, and I shall fulfill it. A
start has been made, and as many as 262,000 new workers have arrived,
and I hope and am convinced to be able to deliver the bulk of the order.
How the labor is to be distributed will then have to be decided
according to the needs of the whole of German industry, and I shall
always be prepared to keep the closest contact with you, Gentlemen, and
to charge the labor exchanges and the district labor exchanges with
intimately collaborating with you. Everything is functioning if such
collaboration exists. * * *
* * * * *
MILCH: * * * I now proceed to the important question, where are we still
able to get greater amounts of laborers from you, and without a doubt
the answer is, from abroad. I have asked Mr. Schieber to make a short
appearance here in order to give his opinion on Italy. I agree with your
statement, Gauleiter, that it is only the bad organization of our work
abroad which is responsible for the fact that you can’t do your job. Too
many people meddle in your work. If someone tells you, there is no
executive in France and Italy, I consider it an impudence, a foolish and
stupid lie uttered by people who either are unable to think or
consciously state an untruth. This kind of person is not interested in
giving a clear lead in this respect and in analyzing the situation,
probably because they are not smart enough. In this way, however, your
work is rendered more difficult or frustrated, and all armament work at
the same time. For we have it before our eyes what close relations exist
between the situation in the occupied countries and that in the
armaments industry. A more foolish policy can hardly be conceived. In
case the invasion of France begins and succeeds only to a certain
degree, then we shall experience a rising by partisans such as we have
never experienced either in the Balkans or in the East, not because this
would have happened in any case, but only because we made it possible by
not dealing with them in the right manner. Four whole age groups have
grown up in France, men between 18 and 23 years of age, who are,
therefore, at that age when young people moved by patriotism or seduced
by other people are ready to do anything which satisfies their personal
hatred against us—and of course they hate us. These men ought to have
been called up in age groups and dispatched to Germany; for they present
the greatest danger which threatens us in case of invasion. I am firmly
convinced and have said several times, if invasion starts, sabotage of
all railways, works, and supply bases will be a daily occurrence, and
then it will be really the case that our forces are no longer available
to survey the execution of our orders within the country, but they will
have to fight at the front, thereby leaving in their rear the much more
dangerous enemy who destroys their communications, etc. If one had shown
the nailed fist and a clear executive intention, a churchyard peace
would reign in the rear of the front at the moment the uproar starts.
This I have emphasized so frequently, but still nothing is happening, I
am afraid. For if one intends to start to shoot at that moment, it will
be too late for it; then we have no longer the men at our disposal to
kill off the partisans. In the same way, we are aware of the fact that
their supply of arms in the West is rather ample since the English are
dropping them from planes. I consider it an idiotic statement if you,
Gauleiter, are accused of having made these men into partisans. As soon
as you arrive the men run away to protect themselves from being sent to
Germany. Then they are away, and since they do not know how to exist,
they automatically fall into the hands of the partisan leaders; but this
is not the consequence of the fact that you wish to fetch them, but of
the fact that your opposite number, the executive is not able to prevent
their escape. You simply cannot act differently. The main crux of the
problem is the fact that your work is made so extremely difficult, and
this is why you cannot deliver the 4,050,000 workers. As long as it is
feasible for these men to get away and not be caught by the executive,
as long as the men are able not to return from leave and not to be found
out on the other side, I do not think, Party Comrade Sauckel, that you
will have a decisive success through employing your special corps. The
men even then will be whisked away unless quite another authority and
power is on the watch, and this can only be the army itself. The army
alone can exercise effective executive. If some say they cannot do this
kind of work, this is incorrect for within France there are training
forces stationed in every hole and corner town and every place which
could all be used for this work. If this would be done in time, the
partisan nuisance would not emerge, just as it would not have done in
the East if one had only acted in time. Once I had this task at
Stalingrad. At Taganrog there were then 65,000 men of the army, and at
the front one lieutenant and 6 men were actually available for each km.
and they would have been only too glad if they had 20-30 for their
assistance. In the rear there were great masses of men who had retreated
in time and squatted down in the villages, and who now were available
neither for fighting at the front nor for fighting the partisans. I am
aware that I am placing myself in opposition to my own side, but I have
seen such things happen everywhere, and can find no remedy but that the
army should assert itself ruthlessly. You, Gauleiter Sauckel, the Reich
Marshal, and the Central Planning Board ought to report on this question
to the Fuehrer, and then he ought to decide at the same time on the
duties of the military commanders. There ought to be orders of such
lucidity that they could not be misunderstood, and it is then that
things will be in order. It never can be too late to do so, but these
duties and this work will be more difficult to perform with every
passing day. The same applies to Italy as well.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: I wish to insist on combing out the protected factories in the
future also for the protected factories are working like a suction pump;
and since it is known everywhere in Italy and France that every worker
if he works in a protected factory is protected against any attempt of
mine to extract him, it is only too natural that the men are pouring
into these factories. How difficult my task becomes thereby is proved by
the following fact. I intended to extract from Italy a million workers
within the quarter ending 30 May. Hardly 7,000 arrived in the two months
which expired so far. This is indeed the difficulty. The bulk enters the
protected factories, and only the chaff remains for my purpose to send
them to Germany. At least I hope to accomplish that with regard to
larger enterprises as the number of protected factories is restricted in
Italy, i.e., the number of protected factories, will not be further
increased.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: This indeed is the decisive question, the one we are dealing
with now. If half of the program for 4 million workers to be brought to
Germany—in other words 2 million—cannot be fulfilled, the employment
of labor in Germany will fall off this year. The more useful workers,
however, are in France, and of course in Italy too, employed in the
protected factories. Therefore if I am not to touch the protected
factories which are situated in these countries, this will have the
effect that the less valuable workers instead of the more valuable type
will arrive in Germany. And here we have to ponder about what is in fact
more important and expedient. If we give up using these people in
Germany, where we effectively rule the factories, where moreover we keep
to a different labor discipline and reach better labor results than in
France proper, then we give up the valuable kind, and then I shall only
be able to transport to Germany the less valuable kind of people who
still can be found on the streets of France or Italy, or people like
waiters, hairdressers, small folk from tailor shops, etc.
MILCH: What is the percentage of protected factories in Italy compared
with the whole of Italian labor?
SCHIEBER: I think 14 percent, but I don’t have the figures here.
MILCH: Would not the following method be better: We could take under
German administration the entire food supply for the Italians and tell
them: Only he gets any food who either works in a protected factory or
goes to Germany.
SAUCKEL: True, the French worker in France is better nourished than the
German worker is in Germany, and the Italian worker too, even if he does
not work at all, is better nourished in the part of Italy occupied by us
than if he works in Germany. This is why I asked the German food
authorities over and over again to improve also the food of the German
worker introducing the “factory sandwich”. When I am in Paris, of
course, I go to Maxim’s. There one can experience miracles of
nourishment. The Fuehrer still thinks that in these countries only very
rich men who can go to Maxim’s are well provided with food. Thereupon I
sent my assistants to the Paris suburbs, to the estaminets and lunch
restaurants and was told that the Frenchmen who eat there did not feel
the shortage caused by the war to any degree comparable with what our
nation has to experience. The average French citizen too can still buy
everything he wishes.
(Interruption: This is still more so in small places!)
Yes. Moreover, the Frenchman can pay for what he can get. Therefore he
has no reason for wishing to go to Germany in order to get better food.
This unfortunately is the case.
MILCH: Is there nothing we can do? True, we might not be able to control
the distribution to the customer, but we ought to be able to intervene
at an earlier stage of distribution.
KOERNER: We have requested from France really immense amounts of food;
these requests have always been fulfilled; often after some pressure,
but they have been fulfilled.
MILCH: But there is a simple remedy, let us cease supplying the troops
from Germany, but tell them to provide the food for themselves from
France. Then in a few weeks they will have everything eaten up, and then
we can start distributing the food to the Frenchmen.
KOERNER: In France there still is for the time being a rationing system.
The Frenchmen had his ration card on which he receives the minimum. The
rest he provides in other ways, partly by receiving food parcels which
we cannot touch at all. Every year we increase our food demands to the
French Government who always satisfied them, though very frequently
yielding to pressure, and in proportion to the harvest results, were
they good or bad. In Italy the situation is that food is not rationed at
all. The Italian can buy and eat what he wants, and since an Italian
always has money and deals in the black market, he is in a much better
situation than our German worker who practically has nothing but what he
gets on his card.
MILCH: But don’t we even send food to Italy?
KOERNER: We are exchanging certain goods.
SAUCKEL: Moreover we are now at the point that the families of French
and Italian workers are no longer in a better position owing to the
money transfer if their bread-winning members are working in Germany
than if they remain abroad; now nothing remains to induce them to go to
Germany.
* * * * *
MILCH: Unfortunately, Reich Minister Speer is not present today. He
certainly must have had an opinion about the whole system. His agreement
with Bichelonne was to activate an additional labor supply in France
itself for our armament with the aid of existing French capacities. We
cannot compute the result here of what was achieved by that action.
Whether the result he dreamed of has been achieved cannot be decided
just yet; that is, have the S-plants given us an increase of armaments
which is greater than what we would have achieved if the people had
worked in Germany? I would propose that Minister Speer himself one day
clarify this problem again. Because if only a negative result had been
achieved, he would automatically change his point of view too.
The first question is: Is the percentage of trained people in the
S-plants so great that all the others are to be regarded as rubbish? And
the second question is: Is it possible at all, with the lack of
so-called executive power and differing opinions on this question, to
seize and transfer to Germany the remaining 80 percent who are not in
the S-plants? So, in view of the general political and organizational
conditions in France, would you be able to transfer some 10-15 percent
of the best of these 80 percent?
SAUCKEL: I’ll have to get them.
MILCH: Can you do it at all?
SAUCKEL: Today I cannot promise anything. Today I can only do my work.
MILCH: I mean, in reference to the other 80 percent, if your hands are
not tied by different circumstances, that first, there is nothing to
attract these people to Germany; that second, they reckon with Germany’s
defeat in a short time; that third, they are attached to their families
and to their country; and that fourth, they shun work because they can
still exist, and without it they look on the whole period as a period of
transition. On the other hand you have the fact that the army does not
assist you and that the German authorities are hostile to each other, a
fact which is very cleverly utilized by the French.
SAUCKEL: That has changed since my last visit. All German authorities,
the Military Commander, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, Field Marshal
Sperrle, have supported me considerably in these affairs.
(MILCH: I refer to the smaller authorities, the executive ones.)
That has been spoiled—pardon me if I have to bring this up—because all
departments, even armaments over there, were of the opinion up to 4
January, that my claims and, especially, my figures, were crazy.
(MILCH: But only people who could not understand such figures.)
Up to 4 January it was the same everywhere, from the military commander
to the German Ambassador and the German armament departments. Up to then
all the agencies in France had in general held the opinion: it has not
been decided yet by any means, Sauckel’s figures are not correct, so we
have to take it easy here. And that penetrated naturally down to the
lower ranks of French authorities too.
MILCH: That is just what I mean about the differences of opinion between
you and Minister Speer. You say: The best thing for me is to approach
the protected industries; Speer says: Leave those people alone, take 80
percent away from the others. And if one is neutral, one has to say,
always with the provision that these 20 percent in the S-plants really
achieve something for us, Speer is right when he says: Please do not
touch my 20 percent; there are enough among the 80 percent for your use.
And now I say: Why do you not take the others? Is it so difficult to
approach them?
SAUCKEL: No. I need the people as well. The fact is that Speer’s plants
are filling up nowadays. For instance, I received the information the
day before yesterday that the urge to work for the protected industries
is especially strong in France just now and so the supply of skilled
workers to Germany is practically cut off. Skilled workers can only be
found in these plants.
KEHRL: May I explain briefly the opinion of my Minister? Otherwise the
impression might be created that the measures taken by Minister Speer
had been unclear or unreasonable, and I want to prevent this. Seen from
our viewpoint, the situation is as follows: Up to the beginning of 1943
manufacturing for Germany was done in France only to a relatively modest
extent, since generally only such work was transferred for which German
capacity did not suffice; these were some few individual products, and
moreover some basic industries. During all this time a great number of
Frenchmen were recruited and voluntarily went to Germany.
(SAUCKEL: Some were recruited forcibly.)
The drafting started after the recruiting no longer yielded adequate
results.
SAUCKEL: Out of the five million foreign workers who arrived in Germany,
not even 200,000 came voluntarily.
KEHRL: Let us forget for the moment whether or not some slight pressure
was used. Formally, at least, they were volunteers. After this
recruitment no longer yielded satisfactory results, we started drafting
according to age groups, and with regard to the first age group the
success was rather good. Up to eighty percent of the age group were
registered and sent to Germany. This started about June of last year.
Following developments in the Russian war and the hopes raised thereby
in the western nations, the results of this calling-up of age groups
became considerably worse, as can be proved by the figures noted; viz.,
the men tried to dodge this call-up for transport to Germany, partly by
simply not registering at all, partly by not arriving for the transport
or by leaving the transport en route. When they found out through these
first attempts during the months of July and August that the German
executive either was not able or was not willing to catch these shirkers
and either to imprison them or take them forcibly to Germany, the
readiness to obey the call-ups sank to a minimum. Therefore, relatively
small percentages were caught in individual countries. On the other
hand, these men, moved by the fear the German executive might after all
be able to catch them, did not enter French, Belgian, or Dutch
factories, but took to the mountains where they found company and
assistance from the small partisan groups there.
* * * * *
MILCH: Another question. Since now through the transfer of various
industries so much is covered by French labor, as in the textile
industry, etc., a corresponding number of German workers would
necessarily become free as a result of that.
KEHRL: Then they will not be requisitioned here, though they would have
been formerly.
TIMM: Nobody is going to be released. Probably other requests will be
sent to the same factories.
SAUCKEL: In this respect I must also draw attention to the fact that the
German factories which were shut down were much more up to date and
probably worked with less personnel than the French factories.
MILCH: But we want all the factories to work for armaments.
KEHRL: That would also result in spreading the risk in case of air
warfare.
MILCH: I believe the system to be good, as a still more severe
commitment of workers for Germany would have the effect of making a
considerable part of them remain over there for good. I wish you had
something to back you up so you can have enough power to get it done. I
do not think that anyone in France will enforce it.
SAUCKEL: But they will all right, if Germany goes at this thing the
right way. It is not the insignificant French workman who should be
punished, but the French policeman, who, instead of supplying people to
Germany, goes to them beforehand and says: I’m coming tomorrow; you’d
better get out. The French subordinate and intermediary authorities have
to be punished.
MILCH: Even if Bichelonne and Laval have the best intention there will
be resistance from the mayors, the gendarmes, and the prefects, just
because these people are afraid that, first, they will be called to
account afterwards for it, and, second, because of their patriotism,
which makes them say: We must not work for the enemy of our country.
Therefore, I would like to have an authority in our administration which
would force these people to do it, because then the French could say: If
you force us, we will do it, but voluntarily we will not do it. The same
applies to Italy. There they say: Who knows who will win, whether it
will be Mussolini or Badoglio or the King; only, if you force us, we are
ready to do it. Therefore, we have to have something on our side which
will exercise this pressure. I don’t see at all why big divisions should
be necessary for this. The existing forces should be sufficient to
accomplish it.
TIMM: I have the feeling that we are sticking too closely to the figures
and are neglecting the qualitative side of the question. The present
development may permit us to fulfill our programs with regard to
figures, but in the demands made by the factories the important thing
for them is to have so many metal workers, etc. Then we practically have
to say: You will only get unskilled workers.
KEHRL: We realize that. The plants are getting unskilled workers, at the
utmost it may be possible to obtain skilled workers by transferring
plants from Italy to Germany.
SAUCKEL: Then in the course of the year the factories will declare: We
cannot use these workers. And over against this you have the fact that
in France we have a reservoir of unused skilled workers.
MILCH: I am not worrying about that. Naturally our plants will say: We
want skilled workers. But they also need a certain number of unskilled
workers.
TIMM: Will it not happen that the officers making the demands say one
day: But we know that in the French plants there is an excess of skilled
workers which cannot be justified?
MILCH: That should be discussed again later with Speer himself. First,
Speer must have the proper perspective to see what has happened as the
result of all his agreements.
I can imagine that first the _numerus clausus_ is introduced at once, so
that the extent of the output in the S-plants is fixed, and that
secondly it is decided later on that if a part of the S-plants has not
worked properly after a certain period, they lose their protection again
and the people from these plants can be transferred as a unit. I can
foresee already now that in air armaments, part of the plants will turn
out such bad production that I shall not be interested in keeping them
up. So, protection for certain plants will simply be discontinued. And
this will have a positive effect on the other plants, too, because they
will say: If we don’t do our work properly, we shall be transferred. Now
during the transfer it is necessary to see that people really do arrive
and do not run away before or during the transfer. If a transport has
left a town and has not arrived, 500 to 600 persons from this place must
be arrested and sent to Germany as prisoners of war. Such a thing is
then talked about everywhere. If actions like this and other similar
ones are carried out often, they would exert a certain pressure. The
whole thing would be made easier if we had control of food. The stuff
offered by the black market has to come from a certain depot, and there
we ought to cut in.
KEHRL: That is difficult. The transport of food by parcel post has taken
on extraordinary proportions in France.
MILCH: If I were military commander, I would simply confiscate the whole
of the parcel post!
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-D
EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT ON THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 4 APRIL 1944
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
Central Planning Board
Z.P. 18 Secr. St. Papers Pl. 030056
Berlin, 8 April 1944
[Signed] DR. GOERNER
Top Secret State Matter
_REPORT ON THE 56TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD ON 4 APRIL 1944_
_Building Allocation 1944_
* * * * *
The _Jaegerstab_ is to get a quota of 550 million including 150 million
definitely pledged from the reserve and the _air administration_ is to
have a quota of 200 million; both are to be checked against each other.
Regarding the air administration quota, precise details (as to specific
amounts, number of workers required, quantities of material, etc.) are
to be submitted, building projects for the supplying industry (optical
glass) are to be transferred to the office of armament supplies, trial
projects are to be discussed between the commissioner of building and
air H.C., the remaining demands are to be cleared between air chief
administration and the Chief of the General Staff.
* * * * *
The quota recipients will be informed of their respective quotas as of
guiding figures within the limits of which the commissioner of building
may give assignments. The quota recipients themselves are, on the basis
of these guiding figures, to re-plan their projects by concentrating on
priority issues and to report which of their building projects will have
to fall out including the resulting figures. Field Marshal Milch will
report to the Fuehrer on the total situation of building. Reports on the
quotas Air Ministry, Navy, Army, and Reichsbahn are to be sent to Field
Marshal Milch forthwith.
Demands of labor, building materials, etc., as resulting from the quota
allocations are to be discussed with the planning office by the quota
recipients taking into account such amounts of the quota as were already
used up for building purposes since 1 January 1944.
[Typed signature] STEFFLER.
Present:
Field Marshal Milch
Reich Minister Funk
State Secretary Koerner[97]
President Kehrl[98]
Dr. Ing. Goerner
Min. Rat Steffler
[follow names of 27 others who attended, including Under Secretary
Ohlendorf,[99] Lt. Gen. (Artillery) Von Leeb,[100] and Professor
Krauch.[101]]
[Signed] STAATSRAT SCHIEBER
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-287
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 49
LETTER FROM MILCH TO SAUCKEL, 8 APRIL 1943, CONCERNING
THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRY
Copy
The Reich Air Minister and Supreme Commander of the Air Force
St/GL
Secret
File note: 16m 10 No. 220/43 secret (GL/A-W Wi 3 II)
Berlin W 8, 8 April 1943
7 Leipziger Street
Tel. 12 0047, Ext. 5530
To the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
Berlin SW 11
96 Saarland Street
Subject: Protection of Industry.
The continuously increasing drafting of German workers from the
production as well as from the security teams (plant protection and
plant fireguards) make it necessary to assign more and more foreign
labor to the factories of the armament industry. This assignment of
foreign labor faces the plants of the armament industry with special
tasks of security, which cannot be guaranteed with the forces at present
at the disposal of the industry. According to what I have found out the
statistics of 31 December 1942 have already shown an unfulfilled demand
of 15 percent in plant protection personnel. Moreover, the extension of
the air force industry brings about a further increase in the
requirements for plant protection personnel, an increase which up to now
has not been covered by the labor offices.
An investigation I made in a number of plants of the air force industry
a short while ago has shown that even after the introduction of the
compulsory labor law most of the labor offices could not make the
necessary forces available for protection and fireguard tasks, while
other labor agencies could not entirely satisfy the needs. The labor
office of Halberstadt has even refused to deal with this requirement
because these men were required for organizations without productive
value.
In the field of the air force industry I already ordered, at the
beginning of the war, the 84-hour week for these sectors. So that no
further increase can be made with these working hours, for otherwise,
there would be an increase of illness which would bring about a further
unwarranted weakening in the numbers of the personnel. Even the decree
for the securing of the necessary forces of protectory guards, issued by
you on 29 December 1942, (File note: Va 5550.917) has not yet shown any
results up to now in the field of the armament industry.
Therefore, you are urgently requested to direct the labor offices to
place at the disposal of the armament plants, upon their request as
quickly as possible the competent forces for plant protection and
fireguards, because otherwise normal security in the plants does not
seem to be guaranteed any longer.
In the field of air force industry, this would involve approximately
2,500 to 3,000 men.
We ask you to kindly inform us about the steps taken.
Copy, for information, to:
OKW W Stb [Economic Staff of the Armed Forces]
BY ORDER:
MILCH [Typewritten]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
SPEER’S MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE WITH HITLER ON 8 JULY 1943
Top Secret State Matter
Berlin, 10 July 1943
_CONFERENCE WITH THE FUEHRER, 8 JULY 1943_
* * * * *
17. The Fuehrer laid down in the coal discussion that 70,000 Russian
prisoners of war fit for mining work should be sent each month to the
mines. He also pointed out that an approximate minimum of
150,000-200,000 fit Russian prisoners of war must be earmarked for the
mines in order to obtain the required number of men suitable for this
work.
If the Russian prisoners of war cannot be released by the army, the male
population in the partisan infested areas should without distinction be
proclaimed prisoners of war and sent off to the mines.
At the same time the Fuehrer ordered that prisoners of war not fit for
the mines should immediately be placed in the iron industry, in
manufacturing and supply industries, and in the armament industry.
The Fuehrer further ordered that he should receive a monthly report
giving (_a_) the total number of Russian prisoners of war, and (_b_) the
number of Russian prisoners of war fit for mining, made available for
the mines and a report addressed to Field Marshal Keitel as to why the
remainder could not be used.
The joint report of Sauckel and Pleiger is also to be sent to me.
[Signed] SPEER
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT BY SAUR OF THE CONFERENCE
WITH THE FUEHRER, 5 MARCH 1944
Top Secret State Matter
Berlin, 6 March 1944
_POINTS FROM THE CONFERENCE (SAUR) WITH THE
FUEHRER ON 5 MARCH 1944_
_Jointly with Field Marshal Milch, Lt. Gen. of the Air Force_
_Bodenschatz, Colonel von Below_
* * * * *
18. Told the Fuehrer of the Reich Marshal’s wish for the future
utilization of the productive capacity of prisoners of war by giving the
direction of the Stalag to the SS, with the exception of the British and
Americans. The Fuehrer considers the proposal a good one and has asked
Colonel von Below to arrange matters accordingly.
* * * * *
(Prepared by Saur)
(Seen by Speer)
EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY DEFENSE WITNESS
ALBERT SPEER[102] BEFORE COMMISSION ON 19 FEBRUARY 1947
* * * * *
_EXAMINATION_
* * * * *
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Herr Speer, I would like to understand the machinery by
which labor was brought into Germany beginning with the request by any
particular department for any particular number of workers. Let us
suppose that someone appeared before the Central Planning Board and
said, “I will need fifty thousand men for a factory that I am about to
construct.” Now please tell us just what happened. Would you issue an
order to somebody? Would he then in turn order someone else and how did
these workers finally then arrive in Germany?
WITNESS SPEER: If somebody on the Central Planning Board requested
labor, the Central Planning Board did not issue an order that these
workers must be supplied, but the Central Planning Board agreed that
those workers can be supplied. An order by the Central Planning Board,
Sauckel would not have accepted. That is a definite fact.
It is quite clear that the requests for labor did not occur in these
long intervals between the meetings of the Central Planning Board, but
this had to happen in much shorter intervals and in a constant
collaboration with the people concerned, for the enemy air raids and
changes in programs which became necessary because of the military
situation made these changes very often necessary. Therefore, for the
whole of our armament industry and also for certain branches of
production outside armament that were in my ministry, we decided on
so-called framework contingents, and priority lists were drawn up. I do
not know whether you are interested in that part.
Q. Well, not particularly. I want very succinctly a statement as to the
steps which ensue after the declaration of someone before the Central
Planning Board that he needed a certain number of workers. Who was
informed of this request? Who authorized the call for the workers? Who
submitted the demand? Who then at the other end gathered the workers?
Not in detail—I just want the steps in movement from the Central
Planning Board until the men actually arrived.
A. The Central Planning Board did not deal with that matter anymore
afterwards. Let us say the request of labor, say, of the coal mining
industry——
Q. Yes.
A. ——was reported to Sauckel by the coal mining industry itself.
Therefore, one could call a meeting of the Central Planning Board as a
statement for Sauckel that such labor is very important for the coal
mining industry, and that as far as possible he has to supply them. That
is necessary within the framework of economic planning, but beyond that
the Central Planning Board did not pursue the matter any further or was
not even in a position to do so.
Q. Well, did you know there at the fountainhead of labor—because if you
made the request originally, that is what started the machinery in
motion—did you not know that bringing in workers forcibly from occupied
territories to work in the war operation constituted a violation of
international convention? Weren’t you aware of that right at the very
source?
A. What I say now is not meant to be an excuse. I really did not know
it. Up to the beginning of my trial here, the regulations of
international law were unknown to me, and nobody ever drew my attention
to the fact that such regulations exist; but I want to say once more, I
don’t say this in order to excuse myself, here, but it is a fact that it
was like this.
Q. Well, you were certainly quite aware from the decision of the
International Military Tribunal just how illegal and improper that was.
A. I took note of it there, and, after all, I received my punishment for
it now.
Q. Well, could you not have followed the same line of reasoning adopted
by the Tribunal, which, after all, was based upon international
convention? You were a man of education, a man of great cultural
attainments and of great technical ability, and it was because of these
attributes that you were chosen by Hitler to become the Minister of
Armaments. Could you not have reasoned that out by yourself? Wasn’t it
very clear and obvious?
A. I believe that the general knowledge of the principles of
international law can only be brought to the knowledge of a wider circle
of legal laymen if after a war legal offenses committed during the war
will be revealed by a public trial, and thereby a more general knowledge
of offenses against international law becomes known. You know that I was
an architect and that such knowledge as I had in the field of law I
merely received from newspapers, and I knew, for instance, all about
various legal commitments of architects which are fairly extensive as
far as construction of buildings goes.
I would say that a great mistake has been committed here by omitting
after the First World War to establish international legal conditions by
trials, and at the same time to adjust it to the developments of
technical warfare instead of which, after the First World War, the whole
question of the deportation of labor, for instance, was decided by the
highest German courts, and as far as I know, the decision of that court
was not particularly lucid. This is how the basis of ignorance is laid
in the field of international law, and I believe that many a mistake and
many a violation in this war could have been avoided or at least
mitigated if a general knowledge of international law had been
prevalent.
Q. Would you say that had there been, following the First World War,
trials such as those we are now conducting, that you then would have
been aware of the illegality of the practices in which you were engaged;
or rather, you would have been aware of the illegality of such practices
and you then would not have participated in them?
A. I am of the opinion that trials against the responsible men for the
First World War after its conclusion would have enlightened the public
and myself on the tenets of international law. I do not wish to go as
far as to say that I would not have committed these breaches of law, for
it is very difficult to excuse one’s self after the event by saying one
committed the act only through ignorance of international law.
Nevertheless, I should say that the observance of international law
would have been possible without losing much momentum in my armament
drive. Of course only that part of international law is meant here which
deals with the recruiting of labor, whereas the other factor, the
so-called legal looting of occupied territories as it is called, there
is no doubt that that would have been necessary for an increased output
of armaments. Violations of international law as far as the assignment
of labor was concerned were in my opinion not only unnecessary, but
unreasonable. We would have achieved more if we had observed
international law. This is a very complicated topic; I do not know
whether you are interested why this should be so.
Q. Well, I merely want you to enlighten me, if you care to, on this
specific angle. You are considered a specialist. Now, had there been an
international trial following the First World War, and the decision in
that trial had been very clear and specific—as was the decision in this
trial—you would have then known the limitations very specifically on
the conduct of war; and having then known that you couldn’t do certain
things, would you then have refused to participate as you did in this
World War as a specialist? Having been put on notice that you cannot
take labor from other countries forcibly and throw them into the
armament industries—knowing all that, would you then have refused to
give your services to Hitler in the prosecution of this war?
A. As to the first part of the question I wish to say if a trial and a
clear decision had been handed down after the First World War, then
certainly somebody would have put the international laws and regulations
on my desk; that is to say, he would have informed me of it. The second
question—it is not possible to give a simple answer to the second part
of the question for when I started my office in 1942 the war in all its
aspects had already departed from all existing international
regulations. Please don’t misunderstand me if I point out here that
economic warfare was waged by the British and Americans with extreme
concentration on bombing warfare, which was not a matter of national
reprisal because it hit industries in occupied territories. On the other
hand the war with Russia had gone beyond the normal limits, if I can
call it that. It is difficult for me to say who was the guilty party.
Q. I do not refer to the time after the war had reached such a state
that there were no restrictions. I am speaking of the period before the
war started. I would like to know whether a man of your education could
have been enlisted in a practice which you knew and would then have
known was entirely illegal and contrary to international law as well as
the precepts and dictates of humanity.
A. I would not have participated if I had known the whole documentary
material which became known in our first big trial. If I had known that
Hitler since 1938 had prepared for war and had tied the fate of his
people to his own to such an extent that his end was the end of his own
nation——
Q. I didn’t intend to enter into such a long discussion on this. All I
had in mind was that if those in your classification, as specialists,
would have observed international law, and would have known clearly what
international law was—the restrictions, the limitations and so on—and
if we assumed that these specialists were men of character, then, even
though Germany had at the helm a navigator who had become mad, he could
not have run the ship on to the rocks for the simple reason that you and
the other specialists who assisted in the present shipwreck, would have
refused to ship on a venture which was so obviously bound for the rocks,
internationally speaking. Is that true or not?
A. That is so without a doubt.
Q. And would you go so far as to say that had there been an
international trial of the proportions of the one we have just had, and
these which are now following, after the First World War, and the
knowledge resulting from decisions handed down would have become
well-known because of the punishments which would have been inflicted,
would you say that that might have served as a bar against a Second
World War?
A. I do not wish to say that it could have stopped and Hitler——
Q. If Hitler had not had specialists, Hitler could not have wrecked the
world himself. Hitler had to have a Speer and had to have the others who
were condemned in the first International Military Tribunal. He could
not have done it alone.
A. That’s quite clear, but these specialists were taken into their part
of the war without realizing what the connections were and an
international trial is not a wholly certain method to prevent a new war;
but I think it’s a very essential contribution toward that aim. I am
unable to answer your question by saying that Hitler would have been
unable to find collaborators if, after the First World War, these trials
had been held, but I do wish to say it would have been much more
difficult for him, also because our specialists were not very intimately
connected with the Party circles.
Q. Well, I think that’s a point I wanted to find out; that, if the
specialists had refused to collaborate, knowing that the contribution of
their service meant a completely illegal undertaking, then Hitler could
not have conducted a war by himself and therefore there could not have
been a war?
A. In technical warfare the specialists are decisive factors for the
conduct of war, but the specialists are not to be regarded as being the
parties principally responsible. They do not have the necessary
knowledge of the background, the political background—essential in view
of Hitler’s untruthfulness—to see where he is taking the ship.
Q. The ship could go nowhere without you specialists. That’s all.
A. I thank you.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Do you have any questions, Dr. Bergold?
_DIRECT EXAMINATION_
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, sir, I have. Witness, his Honor has asked you how it
would be if a factory, for instance, would need and would request 50,000
workers, which way and in which channel would take this request up to
the point in foreign territories where 50,000 foreigners would have been
gathered and taken to Germany for that purpose. Isn’t it correct that
such a proposal of bringing 50,000 workers to this factory did not mean
that 50,000 foreign workers would be brought but meant only that 50,000
workers altogether were brought? That meant German workers as well as
foreign workers which were actually already in Germany and employed
there and also new recruits? That included all that, did it not?
SPEER: I was deflected from my answer in that particular case and I did
not really give an answer to the question. If 50,000 workers were
requested for a certain branch in our industry the request gave a figure
which did not show how many of them were Germans and how many of them
were foreign workers. The bigger part of the workers which were supplied
came from what was called fluctuation. Fluctuation meant the transfer of
workers from one plant to another. It’s quite clear that production is
in a constant development. One always follows the other and in some
cases one orders particular workers and then it loses that importance
for military reasons. The plan is that some workers available are
constantly released and sent on to different plants or industries. A
second source was the newly mobilized German workers, I mean the women
workers, and a third source was the sending of foreign workers already
in Germany, and a fourth source the prisoners of war who were also sent
on from one branch to the next, and the fifth source consisted of some
that came in from foreign countries. How these various workers from
these various sources were distributed among branches, neither my
offices nor the factories who had requested workers could find out. That
was a matter which had to be decided by the labor exchanges because it
took an enormous amount of work to find the proper workers for the
proper branches. * * *
Q. Thank you. Witness, do you know that when the French Government,
which at that time existed in Paris, had issued an order for the calling
up of labor did that mean compulsory labor?
A. These details became known to me during the trial. My tasks were
enormous and at that time I did not bother much about details. I cannot
say anything about this from my knowledge.
Q. Witness, you must know this; at the time when you had discussions
with Mr. Bichelonne, French Minister, I should think that the existence
of compulsory labor service in France should have been discussed at that
time.
A. Perhaps I misunderstood you. I said quite clearly last time that I
knew about the fact that in occupied territories workers were taken to
Germany against their free will. The various districts, etc., are not
known to me.
Q. No. I mean if such a decree had been issued at all. That’s what I am
speaking of.
A. I had to assume that but I wasn’t actually informed about it.
Q. Did you consider the French Government, which at that time was in
Paris, France—did you consider it a regular government?
A. This is the same sort of question which his Honor put to me too. I
had no basis to find out whether the French Government was legal or not,
because these are problems of international law which are beyond me as a
layman.
Q. Witness, do you not know that the Government of Pétain had been
recognized and was recognized by the American Government, and that the
American Government had an ambassador, if I recall correctly—and I am
not sure I can pronounce his name—at that time, Mr. Leahy, Admiral
Leahy?
A. I know that, but I must say frankly that I did not spend my time
thinking about whether the French Government was legal or not.
Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Herr Speer, what I was endeavoring to elucidate, or have
you elucidate for us, was not whether you knew if a government was legal
or not, if it was recognized internationally or not. I wanted to draw
your attention to something quite more fundamental, and that was the
employment against its will of population in a war activity, all of
which was prohibited by international law. And if you and all the
specialists in the Hitler regime knew of the limitation and were
thoroughly aware, and the knowledge was so widespread that you couldn’t
help but know that it was illegal and that you would be punished if you
did it, that is, to bring in workers from another country and put them
into war operations—if that were a matter of such general knowledge
that every college man and every person that was well read would know of
it, would Hitler not have had difficulty in obtaining such a crew to run
a ship, regardless of what he may have had in mind as to the illegal
port which he hoped to attain by that voyage?
SPEER: I can only speak about the time in which I worked, that is to
say, from 1942 onwards. In that time, I am sure that if these legal
matters had been made quite clear a large number of technicians or
industrial leaders would not have collaborated to the extent they did if
they had realized the illegality and the possible punishment.
I would like to stress this particularly for the period from 1943
onwards. From that time onwards, many intelligent people realized that
the war had been lost, and from that time onwards it would have made a
great impression if in former trials heavy punishment was meted out. Not
everybody would have been impressed; certain people would have followed
the old line, but the majority of so-called specialists, certainly—
Q.—would have recognized the illegality of what they were asked to do.
I understand you to say that the majority of the specialists would have
recognized the illegality of what they were asked to do and would have
refused. That is what I understand you to say.
A. Yes, that is what I wanted to say.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Very well. Thank you very much.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 5
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE ELEVENTH
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD,
22 JULY 1942
_REPORT OF THE 11TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL_
_PLANNING BOARD ON 22 JULY 1942_[103]
[page 2 of original]
_Safeguarding of Food Supplies_
A net increase of one million foreign workers is anticipated. This
figure has not been reached during the past months. Even if more than
one million workers are brought here during the months to come, the
limit of one million will actually never be exceeded due to continued
losses. Food for this number of workers is guaranteed.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 6[104]
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
TWENTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 2 NOVEMBER 1942
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 22D CONFERENCE_
_OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD CONCERNING_
_ASSIGNMENT OF LABOR, MONDAY, 2 NOVEMBER_
_1942, 12:00 O’CLOCK IN THE REICH MINISTRY_
_FOR AVIATION_
* * * * *
MILCH: In my opinion agriculture has to be provided with its labor. If,
theoretically, agriculture could have been given 100,000 more men, there
would be 100,000 fairly well-fed men, while those we get now,
particularly the prisoners of war, are not exactly fit for work. If
agriculture will get them in time, they will again be able to feed these
people up again. However, it will not be very happy about it. * * *
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 7
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
THIRTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 12 FEBRUARY 1943
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 32D CONFERENCE_
_OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD—THE FOUR_
_YEAR PLAN ON 12 FEBRUARY 1943_
* * * * *
MILCH: Everybody sticks to his old methods until he is literally beaten
away from them. However, one must not only beat, one must give advice,
too. They must be good experts who will tell people: You will do that
this way or that; it is not necessary that you use just this sum. Who
does such a thing will never give in and say, I can do with less. Mining
has been partly beaten[105] into iron by saying we cannot give you
anything but iron on account of the shortage of lumber.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 8[106]
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 16 FEBRUARY 1943
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 33D CONFERENCE_[107]
_OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Subject: Assignment of Labor, 16 February 1943, 16 o’clock, in the Reich
Ministry for Armament and Munitions, Berlin.
* * * * *
SPEER: We are in complete agreement. You will not receive any list from
us for this action but the whole armament industry including the
anticipated deliveries will be devoted to this action. The
administrations too must be served at the same time. But the authorities
including army, air and navy shall not get a single person from the
action. This must be adhered to. You know what the Reich Minister Dr.
Lammers said: That he must therefore have some new women typists at the
Reich Chancellory at once. That makes no sense.
MILCH: Where France is concerned, there exists in France an industry
which makes aircraft motors and parts, all complete. We have transferred
there all the things which can be made there without endangering secrecy
in any way. These are training aircraft, transport aircraft, etc.
However, since we want to make the most of the production in other ways,
we have moved away part of it to a large extent. As a whole these things
must be kept secret from the French but in every part subject to secrecy
there are only a few parts which are real secret. The bulk consists of
other parts. These have also gone there to a great extent just as we
engaged aircraft builders in France to a great extent. We now currently
have work waiting in France for several thousand aircraft builders. At
the moment the industry working for us there needs, according to its
claims, some 20,000 men, who are asked of us, in order to be able to
keep to the program. The production is still far behind that which was
agreed upon with you in the program. Whereas we in Germany fully carry
out our program, only 30 percent of it is carried out in France. In fact
it has only begun to function in the last weeks and months after we have
been more active there. In principle, we have excluded the State from
this whole cooperation with industry and set the German firms to work
with the French firms.
Sponsor firms have been appointed so as to make the affair operate. This
system is not yet fully completed but has been favorably initiated
everywhere and indeed brings quite other returns to some extent. The
reproach is always made to us that nearly all Europe is at our disposal.
The production we draw from France, with the exception of motor cars, is
minute as regards the army. The whole French production potential is not
yet fully exploited by us or only to a quite small proportion. If it
were necessary for us to produce in France, because in Germany the
capacity, space machine tools, etc., which are not convenient for
removal are lacking, if the accommodation of the people were not so
difficult, etc., we would in fact be reduced to the point of taking
everything to Germany and have the work done here. But this would entail
too great a decrease in the production in our own country, not to
mention the reluctance of the people.
We came to an agreement yesterday. I am very thankful that this matter
is now, thanks to yourself, Gauleiter Sauckel, together with Gen. v. d.
Heyde and Col. Brueckner, to be settled on the spot. It is difficult to
induce Frenchmen to come over here. An official agency alone cannot
either appreciate or realize this, only a sponsoring firm can realize
it. I therefore suggest that sponsor firms be called upon to cooperate,
precisely because in France the sub-contract system is very widespread.
Behind the factory which actually organizes the thing, there are other
factories which belong to the semi-finished goods and preparatory
industry. This industry, however, can be supervised by our sponsor
industries. We should have to assign to our people the task of
investigating the individual firms and find out which people are working
for our program. All others we annex ourselves. When we have got hold of
them and annex them in German industry, that is, only those people who
are really necessary to us, it will be possible to utilize them in the
right way.
The proportion of specialist workers there is higher than in this
country. We have indeed drained a certain number of them into our
factories last year because they were the easiest to get. The Frenchmen
must work with more specialists than we. We must work with more
specialists than the Russian, and the Russian must have still more
specialists than the American. In America they can place any simpleton
before any machine, he will put it right in a flash. Only the
installation requires a specialist. The man need only have arms; a head
is a superfluous luxury.
In France the system is quite different. The Frenchman has adapted
himself to it and has always indeed had unemployment. A labor
organization as we conceive it does not exist. With the same number of
Frenchmen and all other installations, facilities, etc., being the same,
one will only obtain, as compared with German personnel, half at the
most or only one-third of the production, even if the personnel have all
good will and zeal. It is a matter of system. This system we cannot
simply alter, neither can the sponsor firms, but we must try in this way
to obtain from them to a certain extent the additional resources which
we need for our industry and armament. By proceeding thus, we can put
things right. I believe the sponsor firms have an obvious interest in
this. If industry has too many specialist workers there working for us,
let us draw upon them ourselves, because we are suffering a great
shortage of them. This resource should be left to our firms after this
extensive drain on specialist workers has been suffered. We want to
raise our armament.
Now to another point. I have today ordered in my jurisdiction that an
extensive action should take place; today, when we are counting upon
obtaining a great number of women in virtue of the obligatory service
whose age limit we hope to see extended to 55. The British have extended
obligatory service to the age of 65. The additional 10 years are a
trifle exaggerated. Women are not able to go to the machines immediately
and perform heavy work. The few days that are necessary for them to
instruct the personnel are immaterial. We can still spare that much time
if it were not that it would convey to the population an impression to
the following effect: Now that we have reported for work, it is months
before we are called up. I have ordered, within my jurisdiction, that
the women should as much as possible be employed in offices where men
are now to be found, for instance in the wage offices, etc. In these,
women and elderly men can be easily trained, as they will be able to do
without further difficulty. In this way, men in the commercial offices,
etc., should be released for the accountancy offices and similar
offices. This involves, in the case of industry, over 20,000 individuals
and there are other branches besides.
It amounts to quite a considerable number consisting solely of people
who, in view of the war economy, are unfortunately necessary now. These
men must now be placed at our machines insofar as they are not drafted,
that is to say, are not soldiers. These people are more likely to be
able to render better service at the machines or in the factories than
the women now assigned, insofar as women are disposed to go to the
machines. Of course, there will be women who have done such work before
and who are now willing to turn to this work but who have not reported
for work so far because they have not found it necessary to work for a
living on account of the dole.
Where the assignment of women is concerned, I should suggest that, in
the process of the action, only those women be assigned for whom work at
the machine is not involved if a man is thereby released.
TIMM: The danger lies in this that the draftees were partly to be
released without replacement having actually been forthcoming.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: That is quite another matter. When female
auxiliaries of the Signal Corps are assigned, it is not additionally but
only in the proportion that soldiers are released thereby. There are
indeed several 100,000 men in the signal corps of the army and air
force. In our department, 250 to 300,000 have been such. Whether there
are so many now, I do not know. They are all young men fit for combat. I
have always campaigned against this and said: one ought to assign women
preferably so as to release soldiers. If that is done now, it will
really release a large number, it does not matter whether for the
workshop or for the front. Of course, there is a front somewhere in the
East too. This front will be maintained for a certain time. The only
useful thing the Russian will inherit from the territories evacuated by
us will be the people. It might be better in principle to withdraw the
population in time as far as 100 km. behind the front. The whole
civilian population will move back to 100 km. behind the front. Nobody
will now be assigned to trench [digging] work.
TIMM: We tried to withdraw the population of Kharkov. 90 to 120,000
people were required by the fortress commandant of Kharkov for trench
work alone so that in some cases we had to organize whole convoys.
WEGER: Actual demolitions were even carried out.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: But that is done by the engineer corps. There is
definitely no more hope that more prisoners of war will come from the
East.
SAUCKEL: The prisoners taken are used there.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: We have made the request that there should be a
certain percentage of Russians with us in the antiaircraft artillery.
50,000 altogether are expected. 30,000 are already there as gunners. It
is a funny thing that Russians must operate the guns. The other 20,000
are still missing. I received a letter from the High Command of the Army
yesterday saying: We can no longer turn over a single one, we have too
few ourselves. So this thing will not turn out so successfully for us.
SPEER: It would be advisable to make the draft of women somewhat clearer
in the press.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: That would primarily have to be placed in the
foreground. In this respect the question is whether I will receive the
accounts from our industry in time. The matter is bound to be settled
some time. There will be no deception. People who want to deceive also
deceive now, whether they have this personnel or not, whether their
accounts are up to date or not. The other people are honest. The mass
has not engaged in deception. Whether we are a little backward in
checking prices will not be very important. The most important thing is
to work. We know what is produced abroad, having now received the
figures. The Russian actually makes 2,000 aircraft a month in the way of
front-line aircraft. This figure is far higher than ours. This must not
be forgotten. We must get to the assembly line and produce quite other
figures.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 9
EXTRACT FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-NINTH
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD,
23 APRIL 1943
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 39TH CONFERENCE_
_OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Subject: Food Situation and Armament Industry.
_Held on Friday 23 April 1943, 9:30 A.M. in the Festival Barrack_
_near the Zoo, Jebenstrasse_
* * * * *
MILCH: I am convinced that there are more Russian prisoners of war. At
that time 4,000,000 were captured. A large part of them died, however
the number of those who are still living is higher than we are told now.
We reckon here with hundred thousand Russian prisoners of war in the
agriculture. Altogether, we have 300,000 of them in the Reich. During
the First World War I had 200 Italian prisoners of war with me. These
prisoners were to be turned over, however, we kept ours by reporting
them dead in order to keep them. And these people also wanted to stay in
spite of the fact that we told them that they would be reported dead
even to their families. We dragged these prisoners around with us till
the end of the war.
KEHRL: If the food supplies of the labor brought in from abroad are
taken from the German rations then, while we think that we are very rich
for having these people, the German rations are in reality reduced, and
the decrease in the working capacity of our own workers does more harm
than the good done by the new people.
SPEER: But from the figures of this incoming labor we have to deduct
those who leave the country because of expired foreign agreements, and
the others which we lose because of cases of death or illness. On the
whole the increase of labor in our total war economy is not at all so
very important. (Interpolation: the more labor we fetch from the East,
the more this total figure will increase.)
BACKE: But there is a limit, too, in the number of men we can absorb. At
that time we were told that one million was to be taken into the
country, from the East. Now we have already got several millions.
MILCH: You cannot count that way. Before all these measures in the
second year of the war, the air force had 1.8 million men and today it
has less than two million. The whole air armament which is a
considerable part of the total war armament, in the course of the war or
in the last 2½ years of the war has not even increased by 10 percent. In
reality the total increase in this field amounts to about 125,000 to
150,000 men. We are always looking for those people. That is our main
problem.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 31
EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING
BOARD, 1 MARCH 1944
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 54TH CONFERENCE[108]
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Re: Labor Allocation on Wednesday, 1 March 1944, 1000 hours, at the
Reich Air Ministry.
SAUCKEL: * * * I have a Gau armament supervisor in Thuringia and I have
just been inspecting the plants in Thuringia. At the railroad car
factory in Gotha I have set things going so that within a few days it
will be turning out 20 percent of its production again. Everything has
been done. But one thing you must bear in mind: Labor allocation as an
institution must be independent and must remain so. Furthermore I must
ask you not to support constantly the opinion of the armament
inspectors: Sauckel must be put under the control of the Ministry then
everything will be better. Gentlemen, please see to it that that does
not happen this year. As a National Socialist of long standing I am
determined to cooperate unreservedly with you, the Minister for Armament
and Production, indeed with all those gentlemen, but, in consideration
of the difficulty in this sphere of work I must be given the amount of
freedom to make decisions of my own which was guaranteed me by the
Fuehrer’s decrees and those of the Reich Marshal. I would never have
taken on the task without these decrees, because I know it cannot be
accomplished without them. I beg you therefore, to create such an
atmosphere as is necessary among the lower ranks too so that the Gau
labor offices in the first place may be recognized as organizations
which are entrusted to me and put at my disposal for keeping the labor
commitment in order on the lower levels. * * *
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: I would like to insist on the fact that, in the future also,
the S-plants be checked; for the S-plants form a suction pump, and,
since it is known all over Italy and France, that whoever works in the
S-plants is protected from any interference on my part is proved by the
following fact. During the first three months I wanted to take out of
Italy 1 million people before 30 May. In these two months hardly 7,000
men have come. That is just the difficulty. The bulk goes to the
S-plants, and only the dregs are left for employment in Germany. I would
like to achieve yet, that for the important plants in Italy, at least
the number of S-plants be restricted, that is that the number of
S-plants be not increased.
SCHIEBER: In Italy for every protected plant there is an agreement made.
Over, beyond the situation on 15 February or 10 February, S-plants are
established only with the approval of the services under me. We have
them registered, and only when we aim at an agreement are they declared
protected plants.
SAUCKEL: Now the question arises: If in such a protected plant there are
more hands than are needed according to German standards, could they be
handed over?
SCHIEBER: They are to be combed through but the people combed through
are to be put only in other protected plants. Down there in Italy in
your services there is a demand for 7,000 hands and more. The gentlemen
are right to laugh at us saying: What does that mean, you want people,
but at the same time our great task must be the transfer of people! I
spoke with Leyers on Sunday and told him that I wished to have a
conversation with the Gauleiter about this matter: If the labor offices
state that there is still a certain surplus of hands employed, a
commissioner appointed by General Leyers must then visit the respective
plant together with a commissioner of Gauleiter Sauckel’s; they must
examine the situation, and these two gentlemen must then come to an
agreement, as to the people they remove from plants. * * * Besides these
promises concerning nutrition have not been kept to the extent we
wished. The extra food, as we had planned it has not yet appeared at all
so that there is no incentive felt; apart from this certain inner
evolutions are influencing industry at present in Italy, with the result
that especially the leading workmen who are so valuable for us partly
fail to come to the factory any more. They wait patiently until, during
the next three or four weeks, the elections and convocations in the
factories concerning socialization and the introduction of commissars,
etc., are over. * * *
SAUCKEL: In Italy, it seems, things are going on smoothly in general,
but not yet in France.
MILCH: When workmen are transferred how are their families ensured?
SAUCKEL: Automatically.
SCHIEBER: That is quite easy. If it is possible in any way, we shall
have the whole personnel transferred to another factory. * * *
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: Years ago we made an investigation like this in France and saw
that in German armament production, corresponding to districts A and B,
some 600,000 workers were occupied out of the total of some 2½ to 3
million metal workers we had anticipated. Therefore there must still be
some more metal workers hidden in France, people who were formerly in
metal trades.
MILCH: So 75 percent are still free, and 25 percent are tied up in the
S-industries.
SAUCKEL: We have to deduct the prisoners of war who are now in Germany.
But there are hundreds of thousands of skilled workers who, according to
the agreements made, have returned to France and Belgium month after
month.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: In reply to that I must ask you the following: What do you want
to do now in Germany? In Germany you now have plane construction, the
manufacture of highly expensive apparatus, complicated engine
construction, you have here in general the most complicated manufactures
in the world. If I brought the scum of French manpower to Germany for
you what would you get as regards production? We of the Labor Allocation
were always of the opinion in the French industries we must under all
circumstances maintain a certain level of the trained workers and a
certain degree of production. And we wanted to compel these French
industries to lower their level of a hundred percent skilled personnel
for the benefit of the German industries which have been bled of their
skilled hands.
As Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor I considered my
task to be not the transfer to Germany of the scum of Europe, but the
bringing of efficient manpower. But a part of your gentlemen in France,
and in your Ministry too, had no understanding for this. That I must say
quite plainly. It would be mere child’s play for me to bring you the
refuse of Europe if you would be satisfied with it. I would simply grab
all the whores and gigolos in Paris and put them at your disposal, then
I would not have to touch your armament industries. But if I have to
provide you with real workers who will prove efficient in Germany, then
in France—and that was just my program—we must do the same as we did
in every German plant and in every German enterprise: when a German
company is split in two, some of the good workers and some of the bad
ones had to be given up and not just the bad workers. And French
armaments never were harmed thereby. It is a fact, is it not, that a
French worker of quality produces the double amount if he is put in a
German factory under German discipline, with German supervision and
German welfare?
If we agree to re-examine all S-plants—and that is all I ask—and if we
take out all superfluous expert workers and assistant workers, then we
put them at the disposal of the other French enterprises which need
them, to the extent that they need them, and when they are satisfied, I
have to request that if I am to carry out my program, then from these
plants too, workers must be transferred to Germany. If that is not
approved of and it is insisted that the severe formula be observed:
S-plants are out of question for labor commitments to Germany, then,
according to my experience, this program of January 4 can hardly be
achieved. Then you are responsible for the decision of what was better
at the end of this year, to have these people in France or in Germany.
That is the responsibility you have to bear and which I shift from my
shoulders. I was told: Why did you not take the Russian workers away in
time, now they are in the Russian regiments. Exactly the same would
happen here. My opinion is that the introducing of S-plants was
altogether a great mistake which is damaging to the general interests of
Germany. The French government jumped to that with the greatest
cleverness. * * * That is the way we did it the first year, and up to
700,000 Frenchmen came to the Reich according to the program. These were
all decent French workers. From the fall of this year on this came to an
end. No more skilled French workers came, nor any others either. It was
the entire collapse of the labor allocation built up on the slogan: From
now on no worker needs to go from France to Germany.
* * * * *
KEHRL: The consideration which originated at that time with Minister
Speer and which led to the arrangement with Bichelonne was the
following: If I cannot transfer the people by force from France to
Germany to the extent necessary, which is shown, by developments now,
and if at the same time I run the danger of having the people leave the
plants in which they are now working for fear of being taken by force,
then it is a lesser evil for me to try and put these people to work in
France and Belgium, in which case I do not have to use German force to
get them across the frontier. Then at least I am sure that the people
are not running away from the plants in the first place and secondly
that additional employment will be brought there.
He sent an invitation to Minister Bichelonne. The conferences took place
between the 16th and 18th September. The question was put to Bichelonne
to what extent the shifting of industries would be possible, and what
additional productions he could place, etc. This caused a change in the
policy of production. So far Minister Speer had chiefly shifted to
France all the urgent armament productions in those fields in which the
German capacity was insufficient. Now he said: I will not only shift
this to France, but I will also shift really important war production,
which is carried out at present in Germany with German labor, so that I
can release German labor in Germany and have this production carried out
in France, Belgium, and Holland. There is sufficient capacity in this
field in France and labor is also available in sufficient numbers.
Therefore a large part of the work can be accomplished there and I can
release the people in Germany. Thereby I am serving two ends: in the
first place I am setting free German labor and secondly I am utilizing
the French workers who are not working at all now because industry is at
standstill. And there is still a third factor, that Frenchmen will be
ready of their own accord to carry out such production as serves the
welfare of the civilian population, because with such work they are no
longer in danger of air raids and they are not working directly for the
war. So that they will not be considered as traitors to their country,
but are working for the advantage of their own country.
This development has been encouraged in the meantime. The time is still
too short to make any definite statement as to the results. In some
fields the results are already quite exceptional. In some instances we
have transferred up to 50 percent and more of the total German
requirements to the West and the manufacturing is done there. The
transfer figures are rising rapidly from month to month. The coal and
power questions are of course great obstacles. We hope, however, to
overcome them in the course of this year, because by the middle of the
year we shall have increased 25 percent of the power supply in France by
water power, the necessary constructions for which will be finished by
them, and by the end of 1944 hydroelectric stations will be ready and
they will be equal to 50 percent of the present French power production.
The idea in fact is this: to carry out there the work which up to now
has been done here and to release thereby German labor. There is yet
another reason for this. It has been pointed out by you time after time,
Gauleiter, that in these sections of industry, it is not easy to change
the workers. According to the Field Marshal’s description of the
situation, there is especially a lack of managers and supervising
personnel in the works and only German workmen can be considered for
such, and every worker, even if technically he is not so suitable, will
serve for purposes of management supervision and will lend some backbone
to the plant.
As regards the question of the S-plants, Minister Speer put the
following question to Minister Bichelonne: Are you in a position to
provide the labor for such an extensive shifting program, which involves
a certain risk? To which Bichelonne, from his standpoint quite rightly
replied: If the people are not running away into the woods for fear of
being deported to Germany I shall get them to work in French plants.
From this discussion there resulted the idea of protected plants which,
as you said, were supposed to represent a protection against Sauckel.
Whoever is there is working for Germany and may not be deported to
Germany. You said that these plants worked like a suction pump. That is
just what they were meant to do. Labor was to be drawn in with a suction
process so that the plants were full to capacity and could work for us.
The existence of the S-plants cannot and may not be undermined. It is
backed by the German promise which was given in all solemnity and which
was supported by the signature of my Minister.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: May I again draw attention to the matter of volunteers and to
the entire process of the allocation of French labor. There was never
any program carried out in France on a voluntary basis, but the programs
have been carried out for the Todt Organization the building of
fortresses in France, on the one hand, and for the assignment in France
to the plants working for Germany and also to the plants working for
transferred industries according to concrete agreements which I made
with the French government, on the other hand. The French government
fulfilled these conditions last year. It appointed people for the
western fortifications and for the Atlantic fortifications, it appointed
people for the plants and it appointed people for Germany. In the fall
of last year, towards the end of summer, Laval declared for the first
time that he was not going to send any more people to Germany and from
then on only very few Frenchmen arrived in Germany.
* * * * *
TIMM: Will it not happen that the offices making the demands say one
day: But we know that in the French plants there is an excess of skilled
workers which cannot be justified?
MILCH: That should be discussed again later with Speer himself. First
Speer must have a survey of what has happened as the result of all his
agreements.
* * * * *
-----
[90] Tr. pp. 161-162.
[91] Defendant in case of Government of France _vs._ Hermann Roechling.
See Vol. XIV.
[92] DR. BERGOLD, Milch’s defense counsel, objected as follows (_Tr. p.
134_): “May it please the Tribunal, I would like to make a final
objection against the introduction of the exhibit just submitted by
prosecution, namely 41-A, for the following reason: this is an
interrogation of Sauckel, who, in conformance with the sentence passed
upon him, was executed. I am of the opinion that such an interrogation
cannot be used as evidence here, for, since Sauckel was executed, I have
no possibility whatsoever to ask him to appear here before the Tribunal
as a witness and to cross-examine him concerning his statements. In this
statement there are certain things which are not correct, and, due to
the fact that the person who made them is dead, they cannot be
corrected. The International Military Tribunal frequently ruled that
statements made by witnesses and affidavits can only be introduced when
it is possible for the defense counsel to bear these persons as
witnesses, and to ask prosecution to produce these people for
cross-examination. This is absolutely impossible in the case of Sauckel,
and I should like to ask the Tribunal to issue a ruling on whether or
not these statements can be used as evidence here.
The Court ruled as follows (_Tr. p. 194_):
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Court has determined that under the Charter
and the Ordinance this exhibit is admissible. Its weight, however, in
view of the peculiar circumstances attending it, is, of course, still
for the Tribunal to determine. This ruling is made after conference with
the judges of Tribunal I, who had a similar problem presented, and who
made the same ruling as this Tribunal now makes.
MR. DENNEY: If your Honors please, that question will come up again,
because we have interrogations and affidavits from other defendants in
the first trial, who have since either been executed or have taken their
own lives.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Tribunal feels that the very broad scope of
the section of the Charter and the Ordinance dealing with the admission
of evidence justifies the admission of this exhibit.
[93] Defense introduced this paragraph as Defense Exhibit 5. See pp.
509-10.
[94] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by
the defense as Defense Exhibit 8. See pp. 511-15.
[95] Defendant before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of the
Major War Criminals, vols. I-XLII, Nuremberg, 1947.
[96] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by
the defense as Defense Exhibit 31. See pp. 517 to 523.
[97] Defendants in case of United States _vs._ Ernst von Weizsaecker, et
al. See Vols. XII, XIII, XIV.
[98] Same as note above.
[99] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Otto Ohlendorf, et al. See
Vol. IV.
[100] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Wilhelm von Leeb, et al.
See Vols. X, XI.
[101] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Carl Krauch, et al. See
Vols. VII, VIII.
[102] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 17 Feb.
and 4 Mar. 47, pp. 1136-1186, 1445-1457.
[103] Prosecution introduced other portions of this report as
Prosecution Exhibit 48-A. See pp. 457-59.
[104] Prosecution also introduced this document.
[105] Defense counsel, Dr. Bergold, explained (_Tr. p. 523_):
“This document shows that the defendant liked to use strong
language. It refers merely to the allocation. He speaks of
‘beating’, yet he does not mean this literally but figuratively.
The high Tribunal will remember at one time he spoke of whips
being used to force certain people to use suggested methods.
That is not what he meant.”
[106] Dr. Bergold stated (_Tr. p. 530_): “This document is submitted to
show that Field Marshal Milch was very much endeavouring to leave the
French workers in France with their own firms and only to transfer
orders over there. The International Military Tribunal has accounted as
exonerating circumstances in the case of Speer that he established in
France the protected plant system (Speer Betriebe); so far as Milch is
concerned, we wish to point out that he did the very same thing for the
airplane industry and that he tried to act in a reasonable way. I also
wish to say that the man always had in mind reasonable economic
propositions. Finally the document proves that individual remarks made
were of no consequence whatsoever, that they were only verbal flourish
which did not lead to any results. For instance, in the case of
antiaircraft batteries, the conference passes that point over, which is
shown by the last words of Speer and Milch. It is simply a marginal
remark. I will also prove that he did not say that on this occasion and
that the minutes were changed, because he had difficulties with Goering.
I shall show that this passage, criticizing Goering, was taken out of
the report because at that time serious difficulties arose between him
and Goering.”
[107] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by
the prosecution as Prosecution Exhibit 48-A. See pp. 467-71.
[108] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by
the prosecution as Exhibit 48-A, See pp. 484 to 498.
3. THE JAEGERSTAB[109]
_EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTION
REGARDING MILCH’S ACTIVITY IN THE
JAEGERSTAB, 13 JANUARY 1947_[110]
MR. KING: If your Honors please, the prosecution begins now the
presentation of that phase of its case dealing with the defendant
Milch’s participation in the Jaegerstab. I might add that that has to do
with the slave labor phase of the Milch case.
First, I wish to say a few words about the background of the Jaegerstab.
The Jaegerstab was formed on 1 March 1944 by decree of Albert Speer
issued pursuant to an order of Adolf Hitler. Our evidence will show,
however, that it was the defendant Milch who conceived and instigated
the formation of the Jaegerstab.
The purpose of the Jaegerstab was increased production of fighter
aircraft. Fighter plane production had suffered severe set-backs due to
British and American air attacks. Defendant Milch and his Luftwaffe had
also suffered in the battle for new raw materials.
Fighter aircraft were Germany’s principal defense against bombing raids.
Early in 1944 the defendant Milch had concluded that without adequate
fighter protection the entire German armament industry would soon be
destroyed. After repeated urgings, Milch was finally successful in his
efforts to create a special commission of top officials from various
ministries to undertake a special effort in the field of fighter
production.
The Jaegerstab, therefore, was actually a concentration of experts drawn
from various ministries. Our evidence will show that the defendant Milch
and Speer were designated as the joint chiefs of the Jaegerstab with
Karl Adolf Saur acting as Chief of Staff.
The methods adopted by the Jaegerstab in the execution of its tasks were
(1) transfer of German aircraft industry underground, (2) the
decentralization of German aircraft industry, (3) quick repair of
bombed-out plants.
Our proof will show that the labor for this program, which was the
decisive consideration in the discussions of the Jaegerstab, was
obtained from three sources: (1) Sauckel Ministry, (2) concentration
camps, (3) direct recruitment from occupied countries.
Evidence
_Prosecution Documents_
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
NOKW-017 54 Extracts from the minutes of 527
the conference with air force
engineers and chief
quartermasters under
chairmanship of Milch, 25
March 1944.
NOKW-261 70 Chart of the organization of 535
the Jaegerstab drawn by Saur
with letter of transmittal to
prosecution staff, 14
November 1946.
1584-III-PS 71 Correspondence between Himmler 537
and Goering, 9 March 1944,
concerning the use of
concentration camp prisoners
in the aircraft industry.
R-124 48-E Extracts from the minutes of 539
discussions between Saur and
the Fuehrer, 6 and 7 April
1944.
NOKW-247 61 Appointment of Field Marshal 540
Milch as Goering’s
plenipotentiary for the
intensification of air force
armament.
F-824 57 Order of Field Marshal von 542
Kluge regarding compulsory
recruitment of labor in the
West, 25 July 1944.
NOKW-337 75 Extracts from transcript of 544
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference of 6
March 1944.
NOKW-338 75 Extracts from transcript of 545
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference on
Friday, 17 March 1944.
NOKW-346 75 Extracts from transcript of 546
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference under
chairmanship of Field Marshal
Milch on Monday, 20 March
1944.
NOKW-388 75 Extracts from transcript of 547
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference of 28
March 1944.
NOKW-334 75 Extract from transcript of 550
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference of 25
April 1944.
NOKW-362 75 Extracts from transcript of 552
stenographic minutes of
Jaegerstab Conference on the
occasion of the 5th trip of
the “Hubertus Undertaking”, 2
and 3 May 1944.
NOKW-390 75 Extract from transcript of 553
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference of 4
May 1944.
NOKW-442 75 Extract from transcript of 554
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference on 5
May 1944.
NOKW-361 75 Extract from transcript of 554
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference during
the 6th journey of the
“Hubertus Undertaking” from
8-10 May 1944.
NOKW-336 75 Extracts from transcript of 555
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference on 26
May 1944.
NOKW-359 75 Extracts from transcript of 557
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference on 27
June 1944.
NOKW-320 73 Extract from interrogation of 558
Karl Otto Saur on 13 November
1946, concerning the use of
concentration camp prisoners
in Jaegerstab construction.
NOKW-266 76 Affidavit of Fritz Schmelter, 559
19 November 1946, concerning
the organization of the
Jaegerstab.
_Defense Documents_
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
Speer Ex. 34 17 Order of Hitler, 21 April 1944, 560
delegating to Dorsch
authority for Jaegerstab
constructions.
NOKW-337 12 Excerpts from the stenographic 561
minutes of the Jaegerstab
Conference on 6 March 1944 in
the Reich Air Ministry.
NOKW-338 13 Excerpts from the stenographic 562
minutes of the Jaegerstab
Conference presided over by
Field Marshal Milch on
Friday, 17 March 1944, 1100
hours, in the Reich Air
Ministry.
NOKW-365 15 Extract from the stenographic 563
minutes of the Jaegerstab
Conference, 12 April 1944.
NOKW-334 16 Extracts from stenographic 564
minutes of the Jaegerstab
Conference, 25 April 1944.
NOKW-442 21 Extract from the stenographic 565
minutes of the Jaegerstab
Conference, 5 May 1944.
NOKW-336 23 Excerpts from the stenographic 566
minutes of the Jaegerstab
Conference on Friday, 26 May
1944, at 10:00 o’clock.
_Testimony_
Extracts of testimony of defense witness Fritz Schmelter 567
Extracts of testimony of defense witness Xaver Dorsch 583
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-017
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 54
EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF THE CONFERENCE WITH AIR
FORCE ENGINEERS AND CHIEF QUARTERMASTERS UNDER
CHAIRMANSHIP OF MILCH, 25 MARCH 1944
[Handwritten note] To my files
Mi.
_Secret_
_MINUTES OF THE CONFERENCE WITH AIR FORCE ENGINEERS
AND CHIEF QUARTERMASTERS UNDER
THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF FIELD MARSHAL
MILCH ON SATURDAY, 25 MARCH 1944,
AT 10 O’CLOCK_
Dr. Koppert/Lm.
25 March 1944
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: Gentlemen! I welcome you. I have called you
together here in order to discuss with you questions of importance for
our German defense.
Beginning with the year 1942, the Luftwaffe put special emphasis upon a
considerable increase in the number of fighter planes produced each
month which at that time amounted to 200 to 220. It was possible, by
July of last year, to exceed the figure of one thousand as the norm, in
accordance with our program. Then the heavy raids, especially against
our armament industry, began first against the preliminary industry
[Vorindustrie] in the Ruhr, then against our fighter and airplane
industry itself. The enemy enumerated 65 completely destroyed fighter
factories and factories producing parts for fighters in his lists.
Beginning in the middle of 1942 we undertook extensive evacuations, and
did so to small localities above ground, smaller places, and the like.
In so doing, about 4½ million square meters of factory space, productive
space, were evacuated. That was the maximum that could be accomplished
with the means at our disposal. We were lacking in transport space, we
were lacking in machine tools, and primarily we were lacking in skilled
workers and managerial forces, more of whom are of course needed in a
dispersed system of manufacture than in a centralized system. The
extraordinary drafting into the Wehrmacht and just at the end also the
SE 3-drive deprived the Luftwaffe armament industry of its key
personnel. We have in our employ today approximately 60 percent
foreigners and 40 percent Germans, whereby one has to take into
consideration that the women work in the factories only half a day.
Therefore, the ratio of Germans to foreigners becomes considerably more
unfavorable. The ratio is gradually approaching 90 percent foreign with
10 percent German supervising them. The rest of the Germans are
concentrated in development factories and the like.
The enemy has now adopted a definite plan—as you as soldiers know
yourselves and learn constantly from foreign news—of destroying
aircraft production first, and mainly the production of fighter planes
and night fighters, in order to be able to deal with Germany as he
pleases. The enemy believes that this stage has almost been reached now.
There is, however, still some confusion in his news reports. One day he
expresses his amazement that the German fighter planes did not appear.
Then again the newspapers receive a secret directive: “Unpleasant
surprises do occur, so do not emphasize so strongly that the enemy has
already disappeared from the air.” On the whole, however, the enemy
hopes that it has come to the point where Germany’s backbone has been
broken or that at least that stage has almost been reached where the
enemy has been granted the possibility of dealing with Germany as he
pleases.
Another plan our Western enemies have concerns the questions surrounding
the concept of the invasion. The invasion and its success would of
course also be favorably influenced by a destruction of German anti-air
raid defenses.
We of the Luftwaffe armaments have been asking for over a year already
that a strong home defense in the air be set up. We have made efforts to
establish the prerequisites necessary for this, namely, the providing of
sufficient planes to serve as day and night fighters. * * * Being fully
aware that the strength of the Luftwaffe alone is insufficient both as
regards quotas and with respect to the workers, etc., in order to bring
about an extensive change in the field of air armaments, we applied to
Minister Speer and his colleagues to undertake a common special effort
in this field. The establishment of a Ruhr staff served as an example
for us; it was established at the time when the industry in the Ruhr
area seemed to be entirely put out of commission by the continuous
raids. At that time the Ruhr staff was set up and the necessary quotas,
buildings, etc., were put at its disposal. Thereby the entire situation
was changed. Minister Speer and his colleagues, fully aware that without
air armaments and without air defense the rest of the armament industry
would very soon be destroyed and become useless, agreed to this plan
enthusiastically and with initiative. Thus it came about that a definite
proposal was made to the Reich Marshal and the Fuehrer: the Jaegerstab
was created. The order of the Fuehrer provides clearly that the fighter
plane program which the Jaegerstab is starting has priority over all
other fields of armament, which means, to be sure, that other important
armaments are not to be infringed upon by it. * * *
* * * * *
The Jaegerstab is made up as follows: the direction is in the hands of
Reich Minister Speer and myself. Deputy for both of us, and at the same
time our chief of staff, is Hauptdienstleiter Dipl. Ing. Saur, who is
sitting on my left. Saur is the man who carried out the large-scale
armament program for the army and the navy in the Speer Ministry in
recent years in an exemplary manner. Saur again and again during the
past year and a half succeeded in raising the production figures in all
important fields and sometimes even in multiplying them.
Further, I name only the leaders of the Jaegerstab. We have put the
question of over-all planning in the hands of Dr. Wegener. Construction
matters will be directed by Dipl. Ing. Schlempp. The evacuation
underground will be in the hands of SS Gruppenfuehrer Kammler. The
supply, one of the most essential factors, and everything in the way of
semi-manufactured material that comes to our factories for completion,
will be taken care of by Director Schaaf, deputy to Staatsrat Dr.
Schieber, the chief of the armament supply office
[Ruestungslieferungsamt] in Speer’s Ministry. Dr. Schmelter will take
care of labor commitment. Sites suitable for dispersal, confiscations,
etc., will be in the hands of Ministerialrat Speh of the armaments
supply office. Gruppenfuehrer Nagel of the Organization Speer will be in
charge of transportation. The supply of power will be in the hands of
General Director Fischer. Engineer Lange will be in charge of machinery,
Mr. Nobel of repairs. Reich railroad questions will be in the hands of
the President of the Reich railroad, Pueckler. Post Office: Oberpostrat
Dr. Zerbel. Health matters: Dr. Poschmann. Social welfare: Dr.
Birkenholz. Special problems for Me 262 and steel power units: Captain
Dr. Krome. Raw materials and quota system: Dr. Stoffregen. Questions of
technical simplification, etc.: Oberstabsing. Klinker. Office manager:
Petri.
* * * On the spot the individual gentlemen are then told, supported by
the combined authority of the state, the Wehrmacht, and the Party, that
is, Saur and me—Speer is unfortunately still on sick leave, otherwise
he would also be present—what it is all about. That takes ten minutes.
After ten minutes the individual members of the Jaegerstab disappear and
get together with the men from the factory who are competent for their
sphere of activity. Thus, all pertinent questions are dealt with in the
conferences about the commitment of labor, and all competent men, who
have anything to do with the commitment of labor meet, especially the
president of the competent Provincial Labor Office. Thus it is
determined on the spot, in the individual spheres, what the factory
lacks. If the circumstances require it, it is immediately demonstrated
to the factory that their requests are nonsense. Unreasonable demands
and excessive claims are revised. Well-founded demands are immediately
filled. While the discussions are still going on, telegrams are sent to
the different offices, and the people are already set to work. In
general, the people arrive in 24 hours. Unfortunately there are
exceptions, for which the Wehrmacht sector is responsible. The Wehrmacht
does not work as smoothly and beautifully as civilian offices. It is an
error to believe that civilian offices are more bureaucratic than
military offices. On the basis of my continuous and extensive experience
I can assure you exactly the opposite is true.
* * * * *
* * * Our entire German ball-bearing industry, and that outside Germany,
was eliminated one hundred percent by the enemy in a, I must say,
brilliant attacking operation: Erfurt, Schweinfurt, Frankfurt on the
Main, Stuttgart, Italy. We were faced with the question whether without
ball bearings we could produce new planes at all, new tanks, or whether
we had to capitulate as an armament industry. For ball bearings are an
indispensable factor in modern armament industry. One finds and needs
them everywhere, even in places where one does not think of them at
first. Now it became apparent, thank God, that the branches of the
Wehrmacht had hoarded ball bearings and roller bearings in such large
masses that we got along for three months with the hoarded material
alone. In this case it was lucky that we still had so much, that so many
ball bearings had been hoarded. I have to admit that. But that is not
the normal way. It is certain that in the whole period up to now too
many spare parts have been requested just in order to gather such
hoards. And this in spite of the fact that not everything has been
attained by far, but only very large stocks. I should like to say that
with the material you have, 20 to 30,000 planes could be newly built or
newly equipped without further ado. That is how much material you have!
And this does not concern large parts; for in that field I was always
strict—it concerns rather all the accessories and apparatus. In
considering these figures one has to know that about 52 percent of the
total man-hours are spent in equipping a plane and only 48 percent in
building the aircraft frame and the engine. Only then does one realize
fully the importance for us of all that small junk that is lying around
all over. It is not necessary that the troops always take along all
their spare parts. * * *
Gentlemen, in this connection I may call your attention to another
important point. If I visit an office and find out that something is
being hidden there, then I ask for the death penalty for such a crime
today! That is fraud! That is sabotage of the German armament industry!
* * * * *
Then there is still the human factor. We often had considerable
difficulty with the human factor. The fluctuation there is very
considerable. The quota of the Luftwaffe in the distribution of manpower
is constantly lowered. The foreigners run away. They do not keep to any
contract. There are difficulties with Frenchmen, Italians, Dutch. The
prisoners of war are partly unruly and fresh. These people are also
supposed to be carrying on sabotage. These elements cannot be made more
efficient _by small means. They are just not handled strictly enough._
If a decent foreman would sock one of those unruly guys because the
fellow won’t work, then the situation would soon change. _International
law cannot be observed here._ I have asserted myself very strongly, and
with the help of Saur I have very strongly represented the point of view
that the prisoners, with the exception of the English and the Americans,
_should be taken away from the military authorities_. Soldiers are not
in a position, as experience has shown, to cope with these fellows who
know all the answers. I shall take very strict measures here and shall
put such a prisoner of war before my court martial. If he has committed
sabotage or refused to work, I will have him hanged, right in his own
factory. I am convinced that that will not be without effect.
Anyhow, the strangest things occur in the treatment of the workers. It
is said that the people collapse, and then one has to find out that they
have a furlough of three or four days every eight weeks. That is dirty
business of the first order and treason to the country! Then perhaps a
construction battalion arrives and is supposed to be put to work. The
commanding officer, perhaps some overfed grade-school teacher, declares
that the men must drill and must take part in sports! Damn it, the
fellows are there to work so that the maximum amount of work will
result. One has to act very strictly here. A construction battalion was
ordered to Regensburg. The commanding officer was one of those scholars
who said he could not billet the men in peacetime conditions and,
therefore, he refused to start work. Such a guy should be convicted by a
court martial and hanged. I would be grateful if the gentlemen would
proceed in that manner. As with me in industry, so every stupidity is
possible everywhere else also. As chief, one has to take up these
matters. I know what kind of obstacles become apparent. There is
bureaucracy. It is not easy to go against bureaucracy. But we have to
cut through that also, and if you, Gentlemen, proceed with the right
attitude here, then we are already assured of success.
* * * * *
* * * In saying this I do not even consider the fact that the workshops
have first-class personnel, whereas we in the Luftwaffe armament
industry have Russians, French prisoners of war, Dutch, and members of
32 other nations. Obtaining interpreters alone presents a big difficulty
there. * * *
A further question concerns the efforts for housing the machines. That
is very important, and I would be very grateful if you would think this
matter over also. In this manner you would not only facilitate the
question of spare parts but also the scarce supply of materials. Each
fighter plane contains about one ton of aluminum. Every small bomber
contains four tons of aluminum; and a larger bomber, seven to eight
tons. The captured bombers contain eleven to twelve tons of aluminum.
There are in any case tremendous amounts of material involved here. Let
us take twelve tons as normal for an American heavy bomber, or let us
say only ten tons, and let us assume that we actually shoot down 500
such American bombers a month and that we can salvage them over our own
territory; that alone means 5,000 tons of aluminum, 5,000 tons: that is
25 percent of the aluminum quota at the disposal of the Luftwaffe. You
can see how important these questions are, too. We can certainly count
on more Americans being shot down in the future because we will have
more fighter planes.
* * * * *
I further ask for support by the Luftwaffe physicians. With all the
rabble that we have among the foreign workers there is of course a lot
of shirking. At the moment the Russians—that is, the Russian prisoners
of war—are feigning a lot of fatigue and illness. The incidence of
sickness of one-and-a-half to two percent which we have had up to now
has at least doubled and in some factories it has been increased to
eight, nine, and ten percent. That is, of course, done by previous
agreement. There the official physicians must undertake an examination
and if the physicians, who have to be very strict, find out that it is
not true, then we return the fellows to work by means of the whip. Then
the whip serves as cure.
A further request which is very important from the point of view of
leadership! Sometimes we do not know in case of an alert what orders we
want to give for our factories. If a factory knows that it is about to
be attacked, and it has a few trench shelters but does not have a
bomb-proof shelter or the like, then the people simply run away from the
factory, automatically at each raid, after the first one, and they
usually cannot be caught the next day, either. That applies particularly
to the foreigners. We have, therefore, now issued the following order,
and have equipped the superiors accordingly with weapons and pistols: as
soon as a factory which has already been attacked a few times can count
on the raids being aimed at that particular factory again, then the
personnel leave the factory; but in closed groups by shops, under the
leadership of the man in charge of the shop, and, to the extent that
they are German personnel, they leave singing military songs. The people
are led away from the factory to a distance of 1,000 or 1,500 meters.
There they have to lie down in slit trenches and watch their factory
from there, so that they can immediately rush to it after the raid in
order to help and to save what can be saved. That is the only correct
way to do it. * * *
* * * * *
Gentlemen, you come from the fronts, and some of you were perhaps
surprised to see how Berlin looks. I recommend to you, if you still have
time today, to drive around in a bus and see Berlin. The center still
looks quite nice. But have a look at other districts of Berlin too, or
look at Frankfurt or Duesseldorf or whatever all of these places are
called, in their present condition; then you will admit to me that the
population will not be able to endure this condition permanently; not
that there is any danger of a revolution or any such thing as we know it
from 1918. But at a certain point a human being just cannot endure any
more. It is quite surprising how the population has endured this thing
so far or how it always gets on its feet again, when it is led in the
proper way by true leaders (Fuehrer) who, thank God, are present among
the people through the Party and the rest of the leadership. But you
must not forget, Gentlemen, the war of nerves has reached a point which
causes us in the leadership group worry. The people cannot endure that
forever.
One does not have to see only how the people are working—I have told
you that—but also how they live, where they are living today, how they
are sleeping today. There are hundreds of thousands of Berliners who
have not known any heating for months, who have not been able to take a
bath for months, who have not been able to shave with warm water for
months, and the like. They are happy if they can still put their warm
coffee [Plirsch] in their stomachs in the morning and at noon their
soup. And with that they work seventy-two hours. It is a damned
difficult affair. Whoever does not understand that and whoever does not
say on this occasion: From now on our work will be done quite
differently than was the case so far, is a miserable wretch in my
opinion. And everyone of us and everyone you appoint has to be trained
to accomplish in this sphere what the others have been accomplishing for
a long time. We have to do that, we have to increase our production so
that we can push the enemy back in the next few weeks and months in the
same way as he has advanced to Berlin and farther, step by step.
* * * * *
Please go wherever you are going and knock everybody down who blocks
your way! We cover up everything here. We do not ask whether he is
allowed to or whether he is not allowed to. For us, there is nothing but
this one task. We are fanatics in this sphere. We do not even consider
letting anything at all distract us from that task. No order exists
which could prevent me from fulfilling this task. Nor shall I ever be
given such an order. Now, do not let anything deter you, and get your
people to the point that no one deters them. If there is a little
hindrance from below, this is not due to ill will but to stupidity.
Gentlemen! In the fifth year of war stupidity is a crime!
* * * * *
Gentlemen, I know, not every subordinate can say: For me, the law no
longer exists, but he has to have someone who covers up for him, not out
of cowardice; but if you act according to the spirit of the old field
service regulation, “Abstaining from doing something hurts us more than
erring in the choice of the means,” and if, moreover, you keep in touch
and immediately clarify difficult points so that something can be done,
then we are willing to accept the responsibility, whether this is the
law or not. I see only two possibilities for me and for Germany: Either
we succeed and thereby save Germany, or we continue these slipshod
methods and then get the fate that we deserve. I prefer to fall while I
am doing something that is against the rules but that is right and
sensible and be called to account for it and, if you like, hanged,
rather than be hanged because Papa Stalin is here in Berlin, or the
Englishman. I have no desire for that. I would rather die in a different
way. But I think we can accomplish this task, too. We are in the fifth
year of war. I repeat: The decision will come within the next six weeks!
Heil Hitler!
(End: 12:20 hours)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-261
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 70
CHART OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JAEGERSTAB DRAWN
BY SAUR WITH LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO PROSECUTION
STAFF, 14 NOVEMBER 1946
Nuernberg, 14 November 1946
K. O. Saur
TO: Mr. King, via Prison Office.
In accordance with your request enclosed please find the organization
chart of the Jaegerstab which was founded by decree of Reich Minister
Speer on 1 March 1944. The chart was drawn up from memory.
The working methods of the Jaegerstab are disclosed in their essence by
the following paragraph from the Armament Staff Charter issued by Reich
Minister Speer on 1 August 1944.
“Also in the future in order to prevent the Armament Staff from
developing gradually into an extensive agency, the regulation
concerning the purely personal membership will be maintained, as
was the case for the Jaegerstab. The technical work will be
done, therefore, in the office and agencies to which the
personal members belong, under the responsibility of the
competent office chiefs or agency directors.”
The ministries and their offices or agencies responsible for the
different tasks are mentioned individually in the organization chart.
For reasons of clarity, the Jaegerstab, as liaison office, has been
framed in red; the technological office, which then was under my own
responsibility has been framed in blue. [See legend on chart.]
[Signed] SAUR
[Illustration: Chart: Responsible Groups and/or Main Departments.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1584-III-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 71
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HIMMLER AND GOERING, 9 MARCH
1944, CONCERNING THE USE OF CONCENTRATION CAMP
PRISONERS IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
1879/44 Secret 9 March 1944
Field-command office
Subject: Employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.
Reference: Teletype of 14 February 1944.
5 copies, 5th copy
Top Secret State Matter
Most honored Reich Marshal,
Following my teletype letter of 18 February 1944, I herewith transmit a
survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.[111]
This survey indicates that at the present time about _36,000 prisoners_
are employed for the purposes of the air force. An increase to a total
of _90,000 prisoners_ is contemplated.
The production is being discussed, established, and executed between the
Reich Ministry of Aviation and the Chief of my Economic Administrative
Main Office, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS
Pohl.[112]
We shall render assistance with all forces at our disposal.
The task of my Economic Administrative Main Office, however, is not
solely fulfilled with the delivery of the prisoners to the aviation
industry, as SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl and his assistants take care of
the required working speed through constant control and supervision of
the work-groups [Kommandos] and therefore have some influence on the
results of production. In this respect I may suggest consideration of
the fact that in enlarging our responsibility through a speeding up of
the total work better results can definitely be expected.
We also have for some time adjusted our own stone quarries to production
for the air force. For instance, in Flossenbuerg near Weiden the
prisoners employed previously in the quarry are working now in the
fighter plane program for the Messerschmitt corporation, Regensburg,
which saw in the availability of our stonemason shops and labor forces
after the attack on Regensburg at that time a favorable opportunity for
the immediate partial transfer of their production. Altogether 4,000
prisoners will work there after the expansion. We produce now with 2,000
men 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers as well as 120,000
single parts of various kinds for the fighter Me 109.
In Oranienburg we are now employing 6,000 prisoners at the Heinkel works
for construction of the He 177. With these we are supplying 60 percent
of the total crew of the plant.
The prisoners are working without fault. Up till now 200 suggestions
regarding the improvement of work have been handed in at Heinkel from
the ranks of the prisoners, which were used and were rewarded with
premiums. We are increasing this employment to 8,000 prisoners.
We also have employed female prisoners in the aviation industry. For
instance at the mechanical workshops in Neubrandenburg 2,500 women are
working now in the manufacture of devices for dropping bombs and rudder
control. The plant has adjusted the total aerial production to employ
prisoners. In the month of January 30,000 devices as well as 500 rudder
controls and altitude regulators have been manufactured. We are
increasing employment to 4,000 women. The performance of the women is
excellent.
In our own plant in Butschowitz near Bruenn (Brno) we produce also for
the air force, there however with civilian workers. This plant supplies
14,000 wooden-built rear control apparatus for Me 109 to the
Messerschmitt Corporation, Augsburg.
The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry to
subterranean locations requires _further_ employment of about 100,000
prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of your letter of
14 February 1944 are already under way.
I shall keep you, most honored Reich Marshal, currently informed on this
subject.
Heil Hitler!
[Initialed] H.H.
[HEINRICH HIMMLER]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-E
EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SAUR
AND THE FUEHRER, 6 AND 7 APRIL 1944
Top Secret State Matter
The Chief of the Technical Office
TA Ch S/Kr
Berlin, 9 April 1944
_MINUTES OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FUEHRER
ON 6 AND 7 APRIL 1944_
* * * * *
16. Reports made to the Fuehrer by myself [Saur] and Field Marshal
Milch, based on tables and drawings, as to the achievements of the
Jaegerstab stressing the satisfactory cooperation of the new
organization with all offices and plants. Reported in detail that plans
have been made for the best part of transfers, and that, as a first
installment, the decentralization above ground will be completed by
August, and, as the second installment, that the most vulnerable plants
will be underground by the end of the year.
17. Field Marshal Milch reported on the result of a construction staff
meeting of the Central Planning Board according to which the most
important building projects only could materialize due to a great
tension in general conditions. In spite of this, the Fuehrer demands
that the two huge buildings of 600,000 square meters each should be
erected with all speed. He agrees that one of these buildings is not to
be made from concrete but—according to our suggestion—will be set up
as an extension of, and close to, the Middle Plant [Mittelwerk] as a
so-called “Middle-Building” [Mittelbau], and that this plant will be
placed under the direction of the Junkers Works. Plans have to be made
without delay to secure production in bottleneck items of the Junkers
Works, production of Me 262 at 1,000 per month, and fighters at 2,000
per month.
Suggested to the Fuehrer that, due to lack of builders and equipment,
the second big building project should not be set up in German territory
but in close vicinity to the border on suitable soil (preferably on
gravel base and with transport facilities) on French, Belgian, or Dutch
territory. The Fuehrer agrees to this suggestion if the works could be
set up behind a fortified zone. For the suggestion of setting this plant
up in French territory speaks mainly the fact that it would be much
easier to procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless, the Fuehrer asks
that an attempt be made to set up the second works in a safer area,
namely in the Protectorate. If it should prove impossible there, too, to
get hold of the necessary workers, the Fuehrer himself will contact the
Reich Leader SS and will give an order that the required 100,000 men are
to be made available by bringing in Jews from Hungary. Stressing the
fact that the building organization of the Industry Association Silesia
[Industriegemeinschaft Schlesien] was a failure, the Fuehrer demands
that these works must be built by the O.T. [Organization Todt]
exclusively and that the workers should be made available by the Reich
Leader SS. He wants to hold a meeting shortly in order to discuss
details with all the men concerned.
* * * * *
The Fuehrer agrees that these items may be used as a basis for future
conferences.
[signed] SAUR
[typed] (SAUR)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-247
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 61
APPOINTMENT OF FIELD MARSHAL MILCH AS GOERING’S
PLENIPOTENTIARY FOR THE INTENSIFICATION OF
AIR FORCE ARMAMENT
_Copy_
The Reich Marshal of Greater Germany
Chairman of the Reich Defense Council
Berlin, June [sic]
_AUTHORIZATION_
The war situation calls for the utmost intensification of the armament
capacity of the German Air Force within the shortest time. The goal of
the measures to be taken has to be the fourfold increase of the present
production in all branches of air force armament. I commission the State
Secretary of the Ministry of Aviation, Field Marshal Milch, with the
speediest execution of this intensification of armament ordered by the
Fuehrer. To secure the attainment of the end at which we aim I confer
herewith the most extensive power of authority on Field Marshal Milch
within the sphere defined as follows:
1. Shutting-down and seizure of factories, decisions about
expropriations and forced leases, seizure and expropriation of
construction material in agreement with the Plenipotentiary General for
Construction, erection of auxiliary buildings exempted from restricting
provisions of the building police, of the office for the supervision of
industry, of air-raid protection, social institutions, etc., as far as
these provisions are incompatible with the fast completion of the
building projects.
2. Confiscation, expropriation, and renting of machinery of all kinds
and its distribution to the armament factories of the Luftwaffe. Forced
transfer of workers who are unemployed or employed in industry of any
kind whatsoever, this not only for the erection of the buildings but
also for allocation to Luftwaffe armament factories.
3. Confiscation of raw materials absolutely essential for the Luftwaffe
program; only superfluous raw materials may then be distributed in the
manner as now. This refers especially to light metals and gasoline.
4. Removal and transfer of key personnel of the entire armament industry
irrespective of existing contracts under private law; cancellations of
or changes in existing powers of authorization, and issue of new powers;
creation of industrial associations, patent associations, merger of
companies; creation of new companies, and separation of uneconomically
working firms and their coordination or subordination to better managed
firms.
5. Deviation from existing regulations about the financing of the war
and premiums in cases where the utmost intensification of output cannot
be achieved otherwise. In this connection due consideration has to be
given to the economical situation and to the financial capacity of the
firms involved.
6. All decisions of and all measures taken by my plenipotentiary on the
basis of this authorization have to be regarded as if they were ordered
by me. These decrees and measures have priority in respect to all other
official directions and decrees as far as these are not compatible with
the speediest execution of the intensification of the production
capacity.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT F-824
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 57
ORDER OF FIELD MARSHAL VON KLUGE REGARDING
COMPULSORY RECRUITMENT OF LABOR IN THE WEST,
25 JULY 1944
Secret [Stamp]
2_a_ [Handwritten]
Headquarters, 25 July 1944
546 [Handwritten]
Commander in Chief West Section
IaT No. 1731/44 secret
Reference: 1. OKW/WFST/Qu. (Adm.1) Qu.2 (West) No. 05201/44 secret of 8
July 1944 (_distributed only to Commander in Chief West and
the Military Commanders._)
2. OKW/WFST/Qu. (Adm.1) Qu.2 (West) No. 05431/44 secret of 19
July 1944.
(File Notes)
Subject: Procurement of Labor in the West.
With Ref. to 2, Chief OKW has ordered:
“The communication of Field Marshal Von Kluge of 8 July, addressed to
the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production, crossed with my
order of the same day.” (OKW/WFST/Qu. (Adm. 1) Qu. 2 (West) No. 05201/44
secret).
From this it is evident that, by order of the Fuehrer, under suspension
of orders to the contrary, the wishes of the Plenipotentiary for Labor
[Sauckel] and of Reich Minister Speer must, in principle, be carried
out. Further, to my teletype, the following additional general
directions apply in future, as a result of the conference of ministers
in the Reich Chancellery on 11 July, about which the Commander in Chief
West will have been informed by the military commander:
Rejecting justified misgivings with regard to peace and security in the
interior of the country, seizures must be carried out wherever the
opportunities referred to in my above-mentioned teletype offer
themselves. As the only limitation, the Fuehrer has ordered that no
forcible means shall be employed against the population in the actual
combat area as long as it [the population] shows itself prepared to
assist the German Armed Forces. However, recruiting of volunteers from
among refugees from the combat zone is to be carried out vigorously.
Moreover, every means is justified to seize as much labor as possible
otherwise, apart from [using] the powers granted to the armed forces.
In order to render as effective as possible the measures which have been
introduced, the troops are furthermore to be instructed in general as to
the necessity of the organization for conscription of labor in order to
put an end to the open and covert resistance which has arisen in many
instances. The field commandants and the offices of the military
administration must give wide support to the representatives of the
Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation and refrain from encroaching on
their sphere of activity.
I now direct that the necessary orders in this sense be given and that I
be constantly informed about the measures taken and their execution.
_Indorsement of Commander in Chief West_:
In accordance with this, Commander in Chief West has reported the
following to the Chief of the OKW on 23 July 1944:
1. I have authorized the execution of the Sauekel-Laval agreement
of 12 May in spite of misgivings because of interior security.
2. I will issue more detailed directives for the execution of the
measures in the combat zone in accordance with OKW/WFST/Qu.
(Adm.1)/2 (West) No. 05201/44 secret of 8 July 1944.
The Commander in Chief West
[Typewritten] VON KLUGE
Field Marshal
Additional orders will follow.
For the Commander in Chief West
The Chief of Staff
BY ORDER
(illegible signature)
Colonel, GSC
Distribution:
High Command Army Group B
High Command Army Group G
Armored Group Command West
_Mil. Cmdr. in France_
Armed Forces Commander in Belgium and northern France
For Information:
Commander in Chief West/Ic [Intelligence]
IaT (Draft)
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-337[113]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF
THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 6 MARCH 1944
SS MAJOR: [unidentified] I have already discussed with Lt. Col. Diesing
our requirements according to our construction plan in the immediate
program. From tomorrow 5,000 prisoners will be in readiness to carry out
this measure. For that we need 750 guard personnel.
* * * * *
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: We must distribute our German people as key
personnel. That is, out of three construction companies we can probably
make ten complete ones by introducing 70 percent foreigners.
SS MAJOR: They must be skilled workers. In handling the prisoners, it
appears best that we should give 5 to 10 of them to one man who knows
his job.
SAUR: The construction companies will be dissolved to provide key
personnel for teams 10 times or even 100 times their size. That is a
question which must be clarified by 10 a.m. tomorrow between the
Plenipotentiary General for Construction and the air force construction
units on one side and Kammler’s construction staff on the other. That
will be clarified by tomorrow and he then must say what he needs. The
Todt Organization must take part in the discussion, but I cannot consent
to the inclusion of the Todt Organization in the matter as a third
leading organization, as we would get confused. The Todt Organization
must bleed with the rest. It is the same as your construction companies.
It is the donor but he is the organizer and usufructuary. He is by all
means the usufructuary. For besides being organizer, he is the
usufructuary for the construction sites of the Plenipotentiary General
for Construction.
SS MAJOR: Therefore it is important that these construction companies
should be under military leadership!
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: * * * We further appealed to the Fuehrer that we
should get the 64 miners who are in Berchtesgaden, as the work there
will probably soon be finished. He made the suggestion that we, like the
SS, should also train miners in the greater degree and mentioned the
figure of 10,000 who would have to be trained one after another because
they could not all be trained at once.
SAUR: The SS should be told that the training of miners should rest
entirely with them because the SS runs the best mining school.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: We must also ask the SS to get more miners from
Italy and Slovakia.
SAUR: * * * We must bring more order into the PW base camps [Stalags].
We have made a proposal that the PW base camps should be transferred to
the SS. The Italians and eastern peoples should be treated more roughly.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-338[114]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF
THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY, 17 MARCH 1944
* * * * *
STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN: * * * We already count on 100,000 men for the tasks
of the Jaegerstab. To transfer them would mean breaking into the rest of
the armament economy to an unheard-of degree.
(SAUR: 100,000 without Kammler!)
Including the labor we give Kammler but not including the concentration
camp people.
SAUR: Right from the beginning we realized that 200,000 men would be
transferred.
STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN: I have just spoken to Prinzel about it. It is
absolutely necessary that the few German key personnel at our disposal
should be taken with the concentration camp inmates or with the other
subjugated people in such a proportion as will guarantee the best use of
this valuable German strength * * *.
* * * * *
STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN: I am always getting demands for German labor. For
example: Here are 5,000 concentration camp inmates, give me 1,000 German
workers. I do not fulfill these requests in this proportion; otherwise
my German labor would soon come to an end. We have filled only a
fraction of the positions. I distribute German workers only in the ratio
of 1:10.
* * * * *
MILCH: The air force stresses the importance of getting the whole cave
for the purposes of manufacture. * * *
PORSCHE: * * * I shall talk to Weiss again about our getting more
concentration camp people for finishing off the work.
(DIESING: We probably shall not get them.)
I’ll get them from the Reich Leader. I already have 3,500. Two of
Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl’s men are going to France to prepare everything
locally with regard to housing and feeding.
* * * * *
NOBEL: Can one be responsible for foreigners working as airfield control
personnel? The repair works say: yes!
(MILCH: Not as pilots!)
I do not think that is intended. The repair works said yesterday that it
would be a help to them if foreigners could be used as airfield control
personnel. * * *
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-346
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF
THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP OF
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH ON MONDAY, 20 MARCH 1944
* * * * *
SAUR: * * * As far as Hungary is concerned, I should be grateful if the
Field Marshal would call up Mr. Sauckel and tell him that the whole
group mobilized in Hungary should be primarily at the disposal of the
Jaegerstab. Large construction [of entrenchments] columns [Schanz
Kolonnen] must be formed. The people have to be treated like prisoners.
Otherwise it won’t work.
* * * * *
SAUR: Where are the 54,000 Czechs?
MAHNKE: Of the 58,000 Czechs, 17,000 have been earmarked for
Czechoslovakia. 31,000 are intended for the Reich, and after that 26,000
have been divided among the special commissions [Sonderausschusse].
31,000 were for power units.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-388
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF
THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 28 MARCH 1944
* * * * *
NOBEL: The labor situation in the repair sector is very unsatisfactory.
Of the 2,000 people promised me before from the Action Sauckel, not one
has yet arrived. There is no point in saying that people should apply to
the armament department [Ruestungskommando]. The armament departments
and inspectorates [Ruestungskommandos and Inspektionen] have not got
anybody. If these men are not roped in by higher authority, the repair
workshops cannot get any labor. My people are not in a position to stop
production because we have not received any men since 11 March.
MEMBER OF THE JAEGERSTAB: I brought this matter up yesterday with
Ministerialdirigent Dr. Timm of the office of the Plenipotentiary
General for Labor Allocation, and told him that we handed in our request
on 17 March, but had not yet received any laborers. He could not tell me
anything but will let us know today. I will ask Schmelter, who is coming
to this meeting later, to follow up the matter.
MILCH: Tell Schmelter, that if I can help in any way by calling Sauckel,
etc., he should let me know.
* * * * *
SCHMELTER: I have received such high demands, for instance today over
3,000, tomorrow over 5,000, and the day after, again over 4,000, that it
cannot possibly be that the labor is really needed, or else the firms do
not understand the program. What has been received from you, Mr. Lange,
has been passed on. It is also to be expected that these laborers will
come within the next 10-14 days. I have arranged with Sauckel that I
shall give out red tickets for the most urgent demands, first of all a
consignment of 10,000. That will do to begin with. These red tickets
will have priority, even over other red tickets. Of course, that will
cause difficulties over skilled workers. When we have a picture of the
number of skilled workers we need, we must decide from which branch of
manufacture we can remove them, for Sauckel does not have so many
skilled workers. Those who have already arrived are, for the most part,
from the East. That is still the most prolific source. Very few come
from the West and they are slowly starting to come from Italy. There are
comparatively few skilled workers among them. So we must decide what
factories are to be closed or restricted and where we shall take away
the skilled workers. I can only let you have details in a few days when
I have a complete picture of requirements.
NOBEL: If I must speed up repair work in a limited time, I need the
labor at once. Since 16 March not one of the 2,000 people that Sauckel
was going to send has arrived. That is already two weeks ago. They tell
me that if they have to deliver 50 machines they must have 60 people
today or tomorrow. But that won’t work because I have not got the
people. I have always said—you will not get skilled workers. They
answer—then give us others. If we do not fulfill these demands, their
confidence in the Jaegerstab will be undermined. This morning I shall
get material from Hansen & Company in Muenster. The labor office there
is not yet clear about the set-up of the Jaegerstab and the priority of
the fighter program. It is the result of the bureaucracy of the
authorities. My men have to argue with the authorities and thereby lose
valuable time.
SCHMELTER: It is now customary, if one fails to produce something to put
the blame on the labor office. I remind you of the Messerschmitt affair.
(MILCH: That is not so in all cases.)
Assuredly! The gentlemen were with me on Saturday. They had got back 50
tool makers from the army into the bargain, which they had had in the
meantime, and said nothing about. First, they could not employ them,
secondly, they did not need them, and thirdly, they got them elsewhere.
Furthermore Sauckel puts the people at the disposal of the repair
department. It was immediately reported that the labor offices worked
too slowly.
MILCH: You will make things easier for yourselves if you build up
gradually a small reserve of a few hundred people, at first 500 which
you can later raise to 2,000 so that you can cover immediately any need
that arises. Then our work will gain the respect of others. At the
moment it is like this—either we must transfer people and leave a gap
where it is less vital, or wait until the people are brought in by
Sauckel. When one sees the figures that Sauckel has produced and
ascertains what the armament industry has received, the comparison is
ridiculous.
SCHMELTER: A letter is on the way from the minister to Mr. Sauckel.
During the first three months Sauckel has brought in between 300,000 and
400,000 people, but not even a miserable 66,000 red tickets could be
honored.
MILCH: I personally cannot get over it! Take the help away from the
housewives! In the past year 800,000 domestic servants have been
negotiated and we are fighting for 2,000 men!
SCHMELTER: In one year the demand for female domestic servants in
Germany has risen by 200,000, the demands of the armament industry
during the same period by 600. I have arranged that transports that come
from abroad are directed straight to the points of greatest need.
MILCH: Every week 2,000 people come from the East.
(SCHMELTER: Most of them go into agriculture.)
The Jaegerstab has priority over agriculture. Can you not intercept
them?
SCHMELTER: I have arranged that. The 2,000 are disposed of; some of them
are already at work. But it does not always happen that the reports of
the firms are 100 percent correct. We have often checked that up. It
often happens that firms take the people and put them into another
branch of production but still shout for people for the high priority
processes.
(NOBEL: That is not the case in my repair industry!)
FRYDAG: Yesterday, I was in Wiener-Neustadt. The works have a
considerable assignment and a hefty increase. Merely in order to get out
of the room unscathed I gave them 200 men from the airframes industry.
SCHMELTER: In Wiener Neustadt there was a demand for 1,000 or 1,500. A
thousand were supposed to come from Air Fleet 2 in Italy. An engineer
official, Weidinger, was going to produce them. On Sunday I received a
phone call to the effect that the engineer official could not produce
them.
FRYDAG: That is quite right. But you must put yourself in the firm’s
place. The firm must have these people.
SCHMELTER: Then I must see to it that I take them from somewhere else.
MILCH: You know our position. We are convinced that you do everything
you can. But we must now commit a robbery. We can no longer operate
along legal lines.
(SCHMELTER: That is the only possibility.)
There will be abuse but we must accept that.
SCHMELTER: I shall go tomorrow to Mr. Sauckel and tell him that he must
give the fighter industry the next transport of workers from the East.
The proposal that the fighter industry should not give back the laborers
it received who originally worked in agriculture has been turned down by
Sauckel. I am commissioned to inform you of this.
MILCH: That is out of the question. Nothing shall go out of the fighter
industry!
SCHMELTER: I am commissioned to say that he must have this labor back
again.
MILCH: Later, not now! One more thing. We must protect all the factories
working for the fighter program. We must say to them: You must not give
up people for anything whatsoever except on command of the Jaegerstab.
None can touch you, not even the local labor offices and the ministerial
authorities; requests for personnel must all be directed to the
Jaegerstab. We must put that out clearly as an order.
(PETRI: That is already in previous minutes.)
SCHMELTER: May I request that this order should be extended to the
management and repair personnel of the electricity and gas works.
MILCH: I can only do it for the Jaegerstab. I am not doing it for the
bomber and other branches either as we have only that special authority.
SCHMELTER: I should like to ask that it should only be done for
manufacture and not construction.
MILCH: Agreed! We must write a letter to Keitel of the OKW and a letter
to Sauckel saying: Requests are to be made only directly to the
Jaegerstab.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-334[115]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF
THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 25 APRIL 1944
* * * * *
[page 27]
WEGENER: I have a question for Schmelter: Has the question of the
_transfer of western Europeans_ been clarified?
WERNER: On this subject I can say that it is especially difficult for
BMW [Bavarian Motor Works], because we can only transfer Russians and
concentration camp inmates, and the guards for these are mainly Belgians
and French.
* * * * *
WEGENER: As far as I can remember, 200 key personnel are needed for
Markirch.
MILCH: Perhaps that must be brought before the Fuehrer again.
SCHAAF: Saur came back and said there was no more to be said on this
subject to the Fuehrer.
MILCH: That is out of date now. I have discussed with Saur the fact that
we cannot keep up this state of affairs. Saur is of my opinion. It must
be discussed once more with the Fuehrer. I can discuss it again with the
Reich Marshal. We shall do what we can, but we cannot throw everything
into confusion without due consideration. How should we then manage to
produce! I am convinced that the Fuehrer will agree as soon as we can
put these people reasonably into barracks so that they do not come into
contact with the population.
* * * * *
SCHAEDE: Whenever French key personnel are brought to Lorraine, they run
away without fail in a short time. This one must tell the firm. Already
they do not come back from leave.
MILCH: It will only work if we put these workers into barracks. We
cannot exactly treat them as prisoners. It must appear otherwise, but it
must be so in practice.
* * * * *
MILCH: I am personally convinced after talking to the Fuehrer that he
will agree as soon as it is made reasonable. The people should not be
able to mingle with the population and to conspire. Nor should they be
allowed to run around free, so that they can cross the frontier every
day. Both practices must be stopped.
* * * * *
HEYNE: I have two short points. Yesterday Maehrisch-Truebau was removed
from the program because the Quartermaster General told me the previous
night that it was possible to move in on the morning of 28 April. The
matter is already progressing. Last night I was called up again because
the Chief of Prisoners of War Affairs did not quite agree with the new
accommodation in Brunswick of the prisoners from Maehrisch-Truebau for
some reasons of security.
I should like to ask Major Kleber, who was also yesterday announced as
Mr. Saur’s liaison officer with the OKW, to exert some pressure here.
Apart from that, General Schmidt said that there were also some fighter
units and suchlike in the barracks; that he could not move out as
quickly as that; he would not take orders; otherwise he would go to the
Reich Marshal.
MILCH: I am of the opinion that that must be done at once. It’s all the
same to me if individual people do object. Protest does not interest me
at all, whether from the Chief of Prisoners of War Affairs or from our
side.
Kleber, would you be so good as to take care of this?
KLEBER: As far as prisoners of war are concerned I can take care of it,
but not where it concerns the air force. That must be handled
separately.
MILCH: Naturally. This matter must be handled by us. There was in fact,
another proposal but we do not want it. Otherwise someone else will come
complaining.
KLEBER: I should like to transfer the prisoners further off to
Brunswick.
MILCH: I think it is an excellent idea for the prisoners to go there if
Brunswick continues to be attacked.
* * * * *
SAUR: I must come back again to the question of _western European
workers_. Make an energetic attempt to make a _compromise within the
factories_. I think it will work out. I do not think the Fuehrer will
give in even if we put the French into barracks. He has spoken so firmly
and for reasons which I cannot but recognize. I am all the more thankful
that permission has been given for the Protectorate. I am going to see
State Minister Frank on Friday and I shall discuss with him the whole
question of dispersal in the Protectorate. I shall like Schmelter to
accompany me to Prague on Friday to discuss the question of transfer of
workers.
MILCH: I said before that we wanted to carry out the transfer within the
factories. Then if something is left over, we should have to approach
the Fuehrer again, but only on condition that they are in barracks and
that there are replacements for them.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-362
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF
JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON THE OCCASION OF THE 5TH
TRIP OF THE “HUBERTUS UNDERTAKING”, 2 AND 3 MAY 1944
* * * * *
[Page 65]
MILCH: * * * I also ask that every time the civilian population is
attacked [Translator’s note: by low-flying aircraft], in private cars,
on [rail] roads, etc., the local offices make reports accordingly. The
Fuehrer has ordered extremely severe measures against these enemy crews
who harass the civilian population. There is not the slightest military
necessity for this and the Fuehrer intends absolutely to act according
to the Japanese pattern. (Enthusiastic applause!) We must only take
cases individually so that we have the necessary material and can
produce it. We owe that to our boys who are prisoners over there, who
will be held as hostages unless we have proper proof.
* * * * *
[Page 110]
SCHNAUDER: * * *
1. At the Heinkel factory at Barth there are 3,300 workers, consisting
of 300 Germans and 3,000 concentration camp inmates. Of the 3,000
concentration camp inmates, 1,500 are men. In order to maintain their
working capacity it is necessary to evacuate these men too during
daylight air attacks. However, there are not enough guards and sometimes
there is a deficit of as many as 20. As guards cannot be drawn from any
other source, it has been decided that the factory is to arm as guards
certain men from its own ranks to guard the concentration camp inmates.
* * *
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-390
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF
THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 4 MAY 1944
* * * * *
SAUR: 12. Can the arrival of the reported 50,000 Italians be relied on?
By what date will the first transport arrive? This wording is, frankly,
unintelligible. It was quite clear that the 50,000 Italians were coming
so that the transport facilities were guaranteed long ago. How did such
a report get into the minutes of 14 April?
(Comment: The camps into which these people are to go don’t even
exist yet!)
We shan’t get any further like this! Inform Mr. Schmelter.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: Are they coming via Sauckel?
SAUR: No. This is our own undertaking. Pueckel has clarified various
doubtful points with Nagel and got ready a large number of vehicles and
now all that comes to nothing. Schmelter must report on it tomorrow, not
in the sense of whether it can be done, but that this and that must be
done, and by such and such means.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-442[116]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF
THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 5 MAY 1944
* * * * *
SCHMELTER: Then the transport of the Italians. 50,000 Italians have not
yet been transported. It was due to the fact that the escort for the
transport has not yet been appointed. The conversation yesterday with
the Plenipotentiary in Milan proved that the transport should leave
today for this place Woerl (?) [sic] where further distribution will be
undertaken. I booked another call this morning but did not get through.
I hope to be able to give more details tomorrow.
MILCH: Has a proper reception center been set up in Woerl?
(SCHMELTER: Yes.)
Is it assured that the number of those leaving is in reasonable
proportion to those arriving? * * *: [sic] That shall be. A man has been
appointed by Schmelter to travel down there especially and control
directly the conscription of civilians.
MILCH: Is there someone at the Escort Detachment Headquarters in Italy
responsible for seeing that people do not get out and run away during
the journey?
* * * [sic] That is what the escorting personnel is there for.
(MILCH: Someone of standing?)
Dr. Wendt is responsible for the whole undertaking.
MILCH: I am of the opinion that, if anyone jumps out, he should be shot;
otherwise a thousand will get on and only twenty will arrive there. The
Gendarmerie and all military posts must look out for those who abscond
on the journey. They will be arrested at once and will appear before a
court martial.
(End of meeting 1225 hours).
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-361
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF
THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE DURING THE 6TH JOURNEY
OF THE “HUBERTUS UNDERTAKING” FROM 8-10 MAY 1944
* * * * *
GABEL: We must have 1,000 underground workers at once.
SAUR: Definitely.
BORNITZ: The Erzberg [ore mine] has, furthermore, a loss of from 1,400
to 1,500 men per annum due to climatic conditions. It goes up as high as
1,500 meters.
SAUR: Do you give the men up systematically, and to whom?
BORNITZ: Not systematically. They collapse, report sick, and the
foreigners do not come back. Some escape too, as in the mountain country
it is not possible to seal everything hermetically.
(Comment: A year ago the labor potential of a large concentration camp
was thoroughly gone into. That possibility must not be entirely
disregarded).
GABEL: Careful! Concentration camp internees are not strong enough to be
able to work underground.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-336[117]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF
THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 26 MAY 1944
* * * * *
[Page 31-32]
REICH MINISTER SPEER: With regard to construction it is important that
we should not start more building than we can supply labor and equipment
for. Equipment is of secondary importance. We must not continue with the
mistakes we found in the air force armament industry when we took over,
i.e., the beginning of no end of buildings for which, at that time, only
20 to 30 percent of the necessary labor was available.
SAUR: That is the case now unfortunately. We have at least 3 times as
many buildings under construction as we have labor available.
REICH MINISTER SPEER: What is the news about the Hungarian Jews?
KAMMLER: They are on the way. At the end of the month the first
transports will arrive for surface work on the surface bunkers.
* * * * *
[Page 33]
SCHLEMPP: * * * Dorsch said yesterday that he wanted to bring 100,000
Jews from Hungary, 50,000 Italians, 10,000 men from bomb damage repair,
also 1,000 from Waldbroehl (?) [sic]; then he wanted to get something
from Greiser’s zone by negotiation, then 4,000 Italian officers, 10,000
men from South Russia and 20,000 from North Russia. That would be
220,000 altogether.
REICH MINISTER SPEER: We have often made such calculations; but the
people never came.
* * * * *
[Page 34]
KAMMLER: For all these measures [Translator’s note: A and B construction
measures which were the responsibility of the SS], I must take in 50,000
more people in protective custody [Schutzhaeftlinge].
* * * * *
[Page 43]
REICH MINISTER SPEER: We shall carry out a special operation
[Sondereinsatz] of our own in order to build up reserves of manpower
[Schwerpunkte]. It will bring in 90,000 men in three installments of
30,000.
* * * * *
It will be experts who are called up. And it would be a good thing if
one linked up with it the conscription of tool makers within the firms
so that one would have a body of tool makers in the armament industry.
These people would get leave from this group and would function as armed
forces employees. If we make them armed forces employees we have the
advantage of being independent of Sauckel’s offices.
* * * * *
[Page 80]
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: How long do the Italian PW’s actually work here?
SCHMELTER: As long as the factory works. There is a regulation that PW’s
must work so long.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: Could you not look into this? You can see people on
the streets about 4 or 5 o’clock and nobody after that.
(SCHMELTER: I can look into it!)
I do not believe that any Italian prisoner of war works 72 hours.
* * * * *
[Page 81]
SCHMELTER: * * * Dorsch will accompany me to Greiser to try and get 20
to 30 thousand men out of him.
REICH MINISTER SPEER: Kammler had his doubts about that before.
REPRESENTATIVE OF KAMMLER: He didn’t think the 100,000 Jews would come.
SCHMELTER: To that I can add the following. Till now two transports have
arrived at the SS camp Auschwitz. For fighter construction we were
offered only children, women, and old men with whom very little can be
done. * * * Unless the next transports bring men of an age fit for work
the whole action will not have much success.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-359
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF
THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 27 JUNE 1944
* * * * *
[Page 27]
SCHMELTER: I have another small point to bring up. I said once before
that we had fairly large numbers of English and American “Terror Flyers”
in air force camps, who cannot be used. It is a matter, in all, of about
17,000 people, approximately half officers and NCO’s who do not need to
work. That means that there are 6 to 9 thousand men in camps who just
sit about doing nothing. The suggestion that they should be put to work
has now been turned down on the grounds that it concerns especially
intelligent people trained in collecting information and, apart from
that, inclined to acts of sabotage.
SAUR: Can we put them into the manufacture of component parts?
LANGE: Perhaps we can employ them in underground factories.
SAUR: We could employ them in the manufacture of component parts. Who is
responsible for this matter?
KRAUSE: The Commission for Prisoners of War; it comes under the
Quartermaster General.
SAUR: Will you undertake to put this matter in order? These people must
be put at the disposal of the component parts industry. That would be an
unbelievable help to us.
SCHMELTER: It must be laid down that these people _all_ go into fighter
production or into the component parts industry. Otherwise a part will
be sent off elsewhere. The people in question are excellent people, good
material.
* * * * *
[Page 31]
SCHMELTER: I have a few more points. Up till now 12,000 female
concentration camp internees, Jewesses, have been demanded. The matter
is now in order. The SS has agreed to deliver these Hungarian Jewesses
in batches of 500. Thus the smaller firms, too, will be in a position to
employ these concentration camp Jewesses better. I request that these
people should be ordered in batches of 500.
MAHNKE: How many are still there?
SCHMELTER: There are still enough there.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-320
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 73
EXTRACT FROM INTERROGATION OF KARL OTTO SAUR ON
13 NOVEMBER 1946, CONCERNING THE USE OF CONCENTRATION
CAMP PRISONERS IN JAEGERSTAB CONSTRUCTION
Q. Were special factories built after the creation of the Jaegerstab?
A. All building of factories above the ground was stopped, and
subterranean factories were built. We divided approximately 30 factories
into 700 individual workshops to avoid offering targets for attacks.
Q. What kind of workers were used for this construction?
A. The construction was divided into three parts: the two Kammler parts,
(_a_) new construction underground, and (_b_) expansion underground, and
the Todt Organization part.
Q. This expansion program was directed by Kammler,[118] then?
A. Parts (_a_) and (_b_) were directed quite independently by Kammler.
He had full authority from Goering as of 4 March 1944 and was then made
a member of the Jaegerstab. * * * The whole affair was carried out by
Kammler alone.
Q. And the workers who were used for this purpose were concentration
camp prisoners?
A. To my knowledge, they must have been concentration camp prisoners.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-266
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 76
AFFIDAVIT OF FRITZ SCHMELTER, 19 NOVEMBER 1946,
CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JAEGERSTAB
I, Fritz Schmelter, swear, testify, and state:
1. That, since about January 1944 until April 1945, I held, in
the end, the office of Ministerialdirigent in the Ministry for
Armament and War Production (Ministry Speer); that as
Ministerialdirigent I was in charge of the Division for Labor
Assignment, and from December 1944 until April 1945 of the
Central Department for Labor Assignment and Labor Output, and
that, as a holder of these positions I was also a member of the
Jaegerstab.
2. That Milch and Speer together were in charge of the
Jaegerstab; that Saur was the Chief of Staff and was, in this
capacity, the immediate subordinate of Milch and Speer.
3. That during its existence the Jaegerstab met almost every day
and that these meetings were presided over in most cases by
Milch, in the beginning, and later on by Saur; that Speer was
very rarely present and only on special occasions; that these
meetings took place, first, in the Reich Air Ministry and after
this was destroyed in the barrack at Tempelhof.
4. That in the meetings of the Jaegerstab the supply of labor
for the Luftwaffe was discussed; that, for the Jaegerstab, the
labor requirements necessary to the industry of the Luftwaffe
were discussed with the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation
(Ministry Sauckel); that Sauckel satisfied these requirements as
far as possible; that the Chief of Staff, in the Jaegerstab,
Saur occasionally also distributed the available labor to the
different Luftwaffe plants.
5. That in the year of 1944 the air raids made it necessary to
decentralize many of the plants of the Luftwaffe; that this
decentralization was ordered by the Jaegerstab; that many
factories of the Luftwaffe were transferred into subterranean
buildings and that for the completion of these subterranean
buildings concentration camp inmates and Jews were also used;
that the whole building program of the Jaegerstab was
established and controlled by this Jaegerstab itself.
6. That the above facts are personally known to me; that these
facts are known to me on account of the position I held and the
responsibility it gave me in the Jaegerstab and in the Ministry
Speer.
I have read the above statement which consists of two pages in German,
and I state that this is the full truth, to the best of my knowledge and
belief. I have had the opportunity to make changes and corrections in
the above statements. I have given this testimony voluntarily, without
any promise of reward and without being, in any way, forced or
threatened.
Nuernberg, 19 November 1946.
[Signed] DR. FRITZ SCHMELTER
TRANSLATION OF SPEER EXHIBIT 34[119]
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 17
ORDER OF HITLER, 21 APRIL 1944, DELEGATING TO DORSCH
AUTHORITY FOR JAEGERSTAB CONSTRUCTIONS[120]
Copy
The Fuehrer
Fuehrer’s Headquarters
21 April 1944
To the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production and
Head of the Todt Organization, Reich Minister Speer
Berlin W 8
I delegate Ministerialdirektor Dorsch, Chief of the Todt Central Office,
to carry out the erection of the six fighter production buildings
ordered by me, while retaining his other functions in your sphere of
work.
You are to be responsible for taking care of all the prerequisites
necessary for the speedy erection of these buildings. You are
particularly to effect the best possible coordination with the other
war-essential buildings, if necessary referring to me for a decision.
[Signed] ADOLF HITLER
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-337[121]
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 12
EXCERPTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 6 MARCH 1944
IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY[122]
* * * * *
SAUR: I see a great many unknown faces and I do not know what business
all these gentlemen have here. I suggest that a check be made at the
door and that the showing of passes be mandatory. Otherwise there is
danger that other people may sneak in here. I demand therefore a
stricter control under all circumstances. Furthermore I would ask that
gentlemen remain at meetings only as long and no longer as their
business makes it necessary. I would therefore request that each
gentleman report his presence and state whether he has any matters of
general interest. These things could then be taken up first and that
would settle that and the man could leave. We only want one gentleman
for one subject, not a whole bunch of them.
* * * * *
SAUR: Does the term “construction company”[123] exist at all? I think it
does not exist.
DIESING: We have construction companies with the Luftwaffe, among them
masons, slaters, window fitters, etc. That is how we arrived at the term
“construction company”. We cannot again withdraw the six construction
companies which we have taken from Berlin. For each building site we
need approximately 100 skilled people, this on the basis of a fixed
distribution key and we do not know where to get them.
* * * * *
MILCH: Now we come to the question of foreign exchange. Here the Fuehrer
has announced his consent that the requests of the Slovaks to purchase
antiaircraft guns, etc., be complied with. Saur has reported orally how
many antiaircraft guns have actually been finished and how far we have
exceeded the program. This is a good and acceptable method for us.
We have furthermore approached the Fuehrer in order to obtain the 64
miners, at present employed at Berchtesgaden, since the work there
should soon be finished. He said that we, like the SS, should train
miners on a larger scale too, and named the figure of 10,000 to be
trained in successive shifts because one cannot train them all at the
same time.
SAUR: The gentlemen of the SS should be told of this, that the entire
training of miners is supposed to be done by the SS because the SS has
the best school for that.
MILCH: Furthermore we must ask the SS to get hold of further miners from
Italy and Slovakia.
SAUR: Barowski (?) [sic] must know that! This question must be cleared
up at once, today, in order to agree on the selection with the SS.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-338[124]
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 13
EXCERPTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD MARSHAL
MILCH ON FRIDAY, 17 MARCH 1944, 1100 HOURS,
IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY[125]
* * * * *
[Page 13]
STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN:[126] Probably you have not understood me quite
correctly. When I asked this question, I did not have in mind the
projects of 600,000 and 800,000 square meters,
(SAUR: But I did!)
but the original 60,000 square meter works. I now ask: shall these
60,000 square meter works now be simply cancelled in consideration of
the big works, and are they no longer to be taken into consideration?
This seems hazardous to me because we must make the following
distinction. The construction capacity of underground works in mountains
and caves is entirely different from the one to be reckoned with at such
concrete works. It is available for concrete works and consequently it
should be used. It was not as if we had to go into caves or worm
ourselves into the mountain. The question of the big works is a very
difficult one for us from the point of view of capacity. It alone
requires another 25,000 workers. We reckon already now 100,000 men for
the tasks of the Jaegerstab. To switch to some other work would
constitute an inroad of unheard of proportions into the remaining
armament economy.[127]
(SAUR: 100,000 without Kammler!)
Including the manpower we give Kammler, but without the people from
concentration camps!
* * * * *
MILCH: We have been ordered to carry out these two construction projects
by the Fuehrer. If I now take a higher compression ratio and thus attain
much higher figures, even this higher figure would not prevent us from
having to deal with further shifting afterwards, besides concrete works
and cave works, smaller caves, tunnels, etc. It is now doubtless correct
to ascertain: (1) What has to be constructed, (2) for whom it has to be
constructed, (3) where it has to be constructed. We have to distribute
it in such a way that we can efficiently cope with manpower and all the
other questions, power, transportation, etc.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-365
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 15
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE, 12 APRIL 1944
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE_
_PRESIDED OVER BY HAUPTDIENSTLEITER_
_SAUR, LATER ON PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD_
_MARSHAL MILCH, ON WEDNESDAY, 12 APRIL_
_1944, 10 O’CLOCK IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_
* * * * *
SAUR: Please tell this to Schmelter. We are in an incredible situation
as a result of lack of manpower. Here we are in the middle of the month
already, and the 10,000 people allocated to us according to red slips
have not arrived yet. A way must be found to assure priority for
red-slip matters over all other allocations. Tell Herr Schmelter to
contact Gauleiter Sauckel today. Going further than that, the
discontinuation, transfer, or concentration of every other type of
production must be brought about by us at once.
SCHAAF: The 4,000 people from Kahla!
LANGE: Schmelter’s people complain particularly because they have no
means of making pressure demands to Sauckel which will also be complied
with.
SAUR: Field Marshal, the best thing would be for you to approach Sauckel
yourself since he is the man in charge of labor allocation.
MILCH: I shall tell him that the 10,000 red slips were not honored.
BALCKE: On that I can report that the requests were sent out on the 5th
and that on the 11th they had not yet reached the labor offices. The way
is long, it is true. Therefore it is not yet possible for the people to
be employed.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-334[128]
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 16
EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE, 25 APRIL 1944
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE_
_OF 25 APRIL 1944, 10 O’CLOCK IN THE_
_REICH AIR MINISTRY_
_PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD MARSHAL MILCH_
Herr Saur does not appear until towards the end of the meeting.
* * * * *
WEGENER: I have a question for Schmelter: Has the question of the
_transfer of west European workers_ been settled?
WERNER: On this I can say that especially for the Bavarian Motor Works
matters are particularly difficult because we can transfer only Russians
and concentration camp inmates, and the staff used for supervision
consists mostly of Belgians and Frenchmen.
* * * * *
KREUTZ: Mueller declared at one time—and he believed he could do
it—that he would try and shift a part of the head personnel within the
concern.
SCHAEDE: If you bring the French key personnel to Lorraine, I can
guarantee you that they would run away within the shortest possible
time. That must be told to the firm. Even now they do not return from
their vacation.
MILCH: It will work only if we place these people into barracks. It is
true we cannot treat them as prisoners of war; the outward appearance
must be different, but in actual practice that is just what it must be.
SCHAEDE: I merely wanted to suggest to the firms to take along as few
French people as possible so that they would not lose them altogether,
and rather follow the system of Mueller.
MILCH: Exactly. And if then there are still some left one can say that
this will be limited in terms of time, perhaps to several months, and
that in return certain advantages will be granted to them because they
will be subject to certain deprivation of their freedom.
* * * * *
MILCH: As early as today at noon, we may face the situation that
Bavarian Motor Works at Allach is completely destroyed and that we have
to get out. Then we cannot deal with things such as 200 or 300 French
people who cannot come to Lorraine. That must be explained to the
Fuehrer once more. Otherwise, I see no possibility for carrying through
our assignment.
Personally, I am firmly convinced—after the conversations with the
Fuehrer—that he will then consent provided it is done in a sensible
way. The people must not sit together with the population and they must
not be able to conspire. Nor should they have sufficient freedom of
movement to be able to pass the green border line. Both of these things
must be prevented.
In compensation for these restrictions we can, on the other hand, give
these people something and make them happy—be it even only cigarettes.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-442[129]
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 21
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE, 5 MAY 1944
_THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB_
_CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY, 5 MAY 1944, 10 O’CLOCK_
_IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_
* * * * *
SCHMELTER: I was supposed to report on the employment of labor in the
penal institutions.[130] The Minister of Justice has not yet forwarded
the complete list of workers available in the penal institutions. I have
made another inquiry. Dr. Schmelter (?) [sic] has appointed Attorney
Karl as special official in charge. He is the liaison to the Reich
Ministry of Justice. * * *
HEYNE: Such conversations have taken place. They do not get us anywhere.
The thing we need is a listing of all localities showing how large a
number of prisoners are yet available there. Then we must see whether
they are required there. Herr Schmelter planned to concentrate the
skilled workers in those spots. There are only 2-3 percent skilled
workers in all among all prisoners. That is too little.
MILCH: I suggest you are going to submit to me today a letter to
Thierack, to wit: Taking into consideration the extraordinary urgency of
the work in connection with the Jaegerstab we need this assistance. We
have failed for a long time unfortunately to obtain the compilation from
the authorities concerned. We need such and such data. I ask him to
concern himself personally with the matter and to let us have the
material in the very near future.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-336[131]
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 23
EXCERPTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY, 26 MAY 1944,
AT 10 O’CLOCK
* * * * *
(Minister Speer and Field Marshal Milch entering.)
MILCH: I welcome our Minister Speer for the first time in the circle of
the Jaegerstab, and would like to express my special happiness and at
the same time yours, that you, dear Speer, are again with us, well,
cheerful, and in the old creative spirit.
This machinery, created by your orders, accomplished excellent things in
the three months of its existence. It has made special efforts to bring
the production of fighters and all that goes with them to a high level.
* * * * *
SCHMELTER: The reports of the board of examiners show that a larger
number could be deducted from the plants belonging to the Luftwaffe if
one succeeds in establishing joint direction for the department of plane
construction, the technical plant groups and companies. Up to now they
exist separately under three different commands and leaderships, and
that would make it possible to deduct more workers. The board of
examiners thinks that hundreds of laborers could be deducted if a single
command would be established. This must be done by Field Marshal Milch.
MILCH: The Quartermaster General to whom all are subordinate! No one is
subordinate to me.
* * * * *
(SCHMELTER: Probably they will work in plants where people do
not work for 72 hours.)
Isn’t it possible—to avoid injustice toward our workers—to have our
other plants work too, not all of them for 72 hours, but perhaps up to
64 hours? That should suffice if all would do it.
SCHMELTER: I prepared already for the conference of the chiefs of the
various offices the suggestion that working hours in civilian production
should be increased. There are still many production plants working only
48 hours.
MILCH: Then one can equalize and we need not work all the time for 72
hours.
* * * * *
EXTRACTS OF TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS FRITZ SCHMELTER[132]
_DIRECT EXAMINATION_
[Tr. pp. 717-734]
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, will you give us your first name and your last
name?
WITNESS SCHMELTER: Fritz Schmelter.
Q. When were you born?
A. On the first of March 1904.
Q. What was your position at the end of the war?
A. At the end of the war, I was Central Department Manager at the
Ministry of Armament.
* * * * *
Q. Thank you. Witness, when and in what position did you have to do
official business with the defendant?
A. I had some dealings with him on official business after 1944 when I
became Chief of the Amtsgruppeneinsatz in the Ministry of Armament. I
saw him again after the Jaegerstab was formed, that is, after March
1944.
Q. In your position in the Ministry of Armament, did you have anything
to do with the Central Planning Board?
A. I had something to do with them insofar as the chief of staff of the
armament office was concerned. He was my chief. I had to write down the
necessary figures concerning labor assignments when I accompanied him to
certain sessions of the Central Planning Board as assistant.
Q. What month was that, approximately?
A. As far as I can remember the first session in which I participated
was in February or March 1944. I did not always participate in these
sessions, only in a few of them when I accompanied the man I mentioned
before.
Q. Did the sessions of February and March 1944 deal with labor
assignments?
A. Yes.
Q. During these conferences, were they trying to clear the numbers or
the figures which were announced by Sauckel?
A. In one of the conferences I remember they wanted to make Sauckel a
proposal concerning the distribution of labor he wanted to provide. I
remember that the Central Planning Board had a written proposal
submitted to him concerning requests about labor assignments. Sauckel
said that he would acknowledge this proposal but would take care of the
distribution personally.
Q. Did they, during these sessions, try to find out whether the numbers
and figures Sauckel reported were correct? If he mentioned figures which
were too high, did they speak about those matters in this conference?
A. I do not remember that day. But I know that in various conferences
the question of reliability of the figures played a great part. There
was always a difference between the figures Sauckel reported and those
Speer reported.
Q. Did this apply to figures which Sauckel mentioned as having already
been brought in or did it apply to figures on labor still to come?
A. That applied particularly to the numbers of laborers who had already
been brought. It was not possible to try to control the number of
laborers wanted because it was only something that was being planned,
nothing else.
Q. That is correct, but from previous experiences, weren’t they in a
position to find out that Sauckel’s promises were not being kept?
A. At the time they doubted that the figures which Sauckel reported
could ever be brought in.
* * * * *
Q. Is it correct that in your position, as a member of the Speer
ministry, or in your capacity as a member of the Todt Organization, you
very often participated in the staff meetings of Sauckel?
A. Every month Sauckel would call such a staff meeting where
representatives of the most important labor assignment ministries took
part. I almost always participated in those meetings.
Q. What other ministries apart from the Ministry of Armaments
participated in those conferences?
A. The Air Ministry, the OKW, the Ministry of Economics, the
Agricultural Ministry, and I do not think I can remember anything
further.
* * * * *
Q. Did the defendant Milch ever participate in those sessions?
A. No. Those were conferences in which the experts of the ministries
took part; not the leaders and not their representatives, either.
Q. Who was the chief of the Air Ministry?
A. Goering.
Q. At these staff conferences, did Sauckel ever make any statements
saying he brought the laborers voluntarily to the Reich?
A. I remember that Sauckel repeatedly said approximately the following:
“They say that I am forcing laborers to come to Germany. Once
somebody said I went to foreign countries with a lasso and
caught people and brought them over to Germany. They said I
forced them to come to Germany.”
Furthermore, he said:
“I declare all those things are not true. The laborers are
brought to Germany by me on the basis of contracts with other
governments, as far as there are governments in those occupied
territories, or on the orders of the local military commanders
or other local German agencies.”
He asked us to tell our superiors his opinion on that question.
* * * * *
Q. Is it known to you that there was an agreement with the French
Government according to which one prisoner of war would be released to
France for two laborers.
A. Yes.
Q. Is it known to you that the French workers during their activity in
Germany got leave once in a while?
A. Yes.
Q. A leave to France?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they ever return from their leave or did they just stay there?
A. The greater part came back from their leave; quite a number did not
come back. Part of the laborers who went on leave did not come back.
Some of them came back.
Q. Was that the larger part that came back or the smaller part?
A. I did not hear any figures concerning that. As far as I know the
greatest of them came back. According to the factory manager, the larger
part always came back, but of course I have no exact figures.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, you then joined the Jaegerstab. Do you know anything about
the creation of the Jaegerstab?
A. Approximately on the first of March, I do not remember the exact
date, I was asked by my chief of staff to go to the Air Ministry where
Milch and Mr. Saur were present. He said the air armament was so badly
damaged by the air raids that there had to be a fighter program. For
that purpose a staff needed to be developed to hold daily conferences
which would be necessary in order to increase the fighter production or
at least bring it to the same level that it used to be. A number of
gentlemen from air as well as from the armament industry were designated
to participate in these sessions and to report to their offices what had
taken place and put orders into effect.
As a representative of the Armament Ministry, I was assigned to labor
assignment. Later on I heard that this Jaegerstab was under the
management of Speer and Milch and that Saur was the manager of the
Jaegerstab. Later on there were conferences almost daily, first at the
Air Ministry and later on at a barracks at the Tempelhof, near Berlin.
They dealt, first of all, with the production of the fighters and with
all the questions in connection with the fighters and also with labor
assignment.
Q. Who directed these conferences?
A. At the beginning Milch participated almost regularly in those
sessions and he was the one that actually led or presided over the
conferences; formally, that is, Mr. Saur was the speaker most of the
time. Mr. Speer very seldom, according to my recollection perhaps three
of four times, participated in those sessions, which on those particular
days were transferred to the Armament Ministry.
Q. You just said that Milch at the beginning had the formal leadership.
From what time on did that cease?
A. After the transfer into the Armament Ministry, or rather, into the
Caserne at Tempelhof—I don’t remember the date—Milch did not
participate as regularly as he did before. At those conferences, after
the transfer of the fighter staff into the Armament Ministry, he only
participated once or never.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, concerning the conferences of the staff, there were always
verbatim records taken. Is that known to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Apart from those minutes, were any other minutes taken?
A. Yes. An extract of the verbatim record—I want to call it a “result
record”—was compiled and these records were sent to all of the offices
which were interested in those conferences. Those verbatim records which
were taken down by stenographers during the session, according to my
knowledge, were sent only to Mr. Speer, and of course they remained with
both Saur and Milch. In other words, very few copies were made.
Q. Were these verbatim records ever controlled?
A. No, I don’t think so. I don’t believe that the large records were
read or checked by someone else.
Q. Can one say then that the decisions of the Jaegerstab were contained
in the records?
A. Not only the decisions but also the more important deliberations that
took place. However, when decisions were made, then they were included
in the result records.
Q. During these conferences did it ever occur that the participants were
not always present?
A. That happened very often because the sessions lasted for a long time
and it happened many times that I, for instance, was called out and
ordered to take care of my business, at least by telephone, and the
members of the Jaegerstab themselves did not always participate in the
conferences, but later on—that is, from May on—they had
representatives or deputies replace them.
Q. Did those sessions often result in individual discussions?
A. That happened once in a while, particularly when technical questions
were discussed where very few experts could say something.
Q. I shall now proceed to the labor assignment within the Jaegerstab.
How did the Jaegerstab deal with questions of labor assignment?
A. Along with all the production discussions of other programs, labor
assignment questions were discussed at the sessions of the Jaegerstab. I
had the task, concerning these labor assignment questions, to pass them
through my office chief and so far as the tasks I had with the
Jaegerstab overlapped my other duties and tasks with other
organizations; in other words, if you want to know exactly or if you
want to have a detailed description of what my tasks were in general—
Q. I want to know what you had to do with the labor assignment of the
Jaegerstab and what was your main task there; otherwise, we will be here
about an hour or so.
A. Among other things, we had the task, on the basis of the reports of
the various factories which came over the Armament Inspectorates to me,
to write up a proposal how those red slips were to be distributed on
each individual production. In the Jaegerstab, I also had the task to
distribute those red slips in such a way that the most important
factories would get the necessary number of red slips. The red slips
were orders to the labor assignment offices or agencies of Speer; in
other words, to the Armament Inspectorates and to the armament
commandos, and were given from Sauckel to his labor assignment agencies
which were to provide preferentially the necessary amount of workers on
the basis of those red slips. I furthermore had the task to take care of
transfers of laborers who already were in the armament industry by
giving respective orders to my agency and requesting Sauckel to carry
out the transfer. Since in the fighter production, the question, in the
first place, concerned skilled workers only; transfers of this kind were
carried out. Skilled workers were no longer assigned to us by Sauckel in
1944. My main activity, therefore, concerned transfers from one of the
industries to the other, and as regards the Jaegerstab, in transfers
from the destroyed bomber factories or from other aircraft types to the
fighter factories which were working full time.
I finally had the task to deal with deliveries of armament to the
Wehrmacht soldiers and I had to take care of those. In 1944, through
several actions, many laborers were withdrawn from the armament industry
and delivered to the army. That concerned particularly skilled workers.
It was my task then, together with those responsible for the production,
to take care of the distribution in such a manner that the armament
industry be hampered as little as possible in their production.
Q. Is it known to you that Milch tried to see to it that no one from the
fighter factories had to go to the Wehrmacht?
A. Yes, from all the factories, and particularly from the fighter
factories, they tried to send as few laborers as possible to the army.
At the beginning, in the early days of the Jaegerstab—in other words,
in the months of March and April, approximately—we tried to relieve the
fighter program from delivering laborers to the Wehrmacht. Later on,
this was very difficult. I know, however, that Milch tried his very best
to give as few people as possible to the Wehrmacht from Jaegerstab
production, that is, of the Jaegerstab factories.
Q. Witness, you just said that, concerning the request for assignment of
workers, you made suggestions to Sauckel. In these meetings there is a
statement by Saur that says, “We take care of the labor assignment.”
What is correct now? Did you just request them or did the Jaegerstab
actually take care of the assignment?
A. The Jaegerstab was not able to give orders to offices which did not
belong to the Speer Ministry or to the Air Ministry. In Jaegerstab, very
often Saur and perhaps Milch—I can’t remember, concerning Milch—used
such words. In reality, however, it was quite different. I appeared at
Sauckel’s and I was ordered to tell him about the creation of the
Jaegerstab and its importance concerning the fighter production, with
the request that when labor was distributed, the Jaegerstab production
should be considered in first place. An order to Sauckel was never given
by me and I am sure that Sauckel would certainly not have followed my
request, particularly as he always and repeatedly stressed the point
that he was independent and was responsible only to the leader of the
Four Year Plan and Hitler.
Q. When Saur made such a statement, “We take care of the labor
assignment,” why do you think he said that?
A. Well, once in a while such strong words were used. I never took this
statement very seriously and I didn’t react to it because I knew exactly
that nothing would happen afterwards, and nothing really happened. I was
sure that the labor assignment should have been taken care of by the
Jaegerstab, but it was impossible to take care of that for one single
production. Everyone who had something to do with labor assignment could
understand that.
Q. Witness, you just spoke concerning boasting remarks. Is it known to
you that Milch often used such strongly exaggerated boasting remarks
during these meetings?
A. I don’t remember single statements made by Milch but I am sure that
they occurred. What I wanted to say now is that it appeared to me that
Milch very often, particularly concerning the industry and his own
generals, wanted to boast in order to play the strong man. I believe,
however, that these statements did not always make the impression he
wished to create.
Q. Do you mean to say that they were not taken seriously?
A. Well, not quite seriously, anyway.
Q. Were you present during the conference of the Jaegerstab where Milch
made a long speech to the air force engineers and the quartermaster
chiefs?
A. I was there part of the time. I remember now. That was the session
which took place in the Air Ministry—there were 100 people there at the
time, and I have to remind you of the fact that I wasn’t present during
all those conferences.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, the prosecution introduced a document during the trial where
Goering gives Himmler a fighter group in exchange for the use of
concentration camp inmates which were put at the disposal of the air
force armament. Do you know anything about that?
A. What fighter group do you mean?
Q. I mean a squadron—a whole squadron was placed at the disposal of the
SS, and Goering wanted to have concentration camp inmates from the SS.
Do you remember anything about that? It was on the 15th of February
1944.
A. I can’t remember that exactly. Goering, that is the Luftwaffe, put a
great number of soldiers at his disposal for immediate production. They
got their leave. But if there ever was such an exchange of concentration
camp inmates, I do not know today anymore. It could be possible;
however, I can’t tell for sure.
Q. Witness, is it known to you that in the Jaegerstab they were often
transferred from the construction sector of the Plenipotentiary for
chemistry?
A. No. In any case, I don’t know that this was done to a considerable
extent. It is possible that it also was said during my presence that the
Plenipotentiary for chemical industry had too many workers in the
construction sector and a few of them had to be transferred; lots of
complaints were made. However, I can’t remember anything concrete.
Q. Witness, can you remember that Milch tried to be able to free certain
engineers from Hitler who were working in Berchtesgaden?
A. I believe I can remember that. The question of engineers was
discussed very often because this was a big bottleneck in the
construction sector. I remember also that, concerning the construction
works in Berchtesgaden, it was discussed in this connection and that one
hoped to be able to get not only engineers but other skilled workers
from the construction works carried out in Berchtesgaden for Hitler.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, is it known to you that the use of concentration camp
inmates was carried out in closed groups?
A. Yes, as far as the SS used concentration camp inmates, outside of
their own factories, this was obviously only done in larger groups of
about 500 to 1,000.
Q. Is it possible that during constructions a few miners or engineers
were concentration camp inmates?
A. When the rest of the workers were not concentration camp inmates,
then, according to the regulations of the SS, personally, I don’t
believe that there were certain concentration camp inmates in there, and
I don’t know of any such cases. I know that the SS always required that
the concentration camp inmates be taken in large numbers and that they
should be assigned in groups and billeted in groups.
Q. In other words, is it possible that the SS also used people of their
own as miners, apart from those concentration camp inmates?
A. I couldn’t tell you, because I did not know the situation with the
SS. However, that is possible.
* * * * *
Q. The question was: If the SS ever used miners from their own ranks and
if they trained them?
A. No. I don’t know anything about that either.
Q. Do you know if the SS had a miners’ school?
A. No. I don’t know that either. I never heard of any miners’ school.
The miners learned by experience.
* * * * *
[Tr. pp. 743-759]
Q. What do you know about labor utilization of English and American
prisoners of war? That is to say, Americans and British who were
captured in Germany?
A. In 1944, that is to say, in my time, no new prisoners of war were
used because we didn’t capture any more. So far as I know, British and
American prisoners of war were not used in armament factories.
Repeatedly, proposals in this direction were made also in the case of
noncoms and officers. In the case of officers—it was Polish officers,
if I recall, no change in the regulations was made, so far as I recall.
Instructions were transmitted to the OKW, but I do not know if anything
came of them.
Q. I come now to your two sworn affidavits of 19 November 1946;
Prosecution Exhibit 76 is a sworn affidavit of yours of that date.
NOKW-266, dated 19 November, * * *.
* * * * *
Q. Did you know that in 1944, in order to protect the aircraft industry,
underground and protected factories were built?
A. Yes.
Q. You know who gave the original order for this?
A. So far as I know, the order for this relocation of industries in
subterranean plants was given by the Jaegerstab itself. I was not
competent in this matter, but naturally I took part in the discussion of
the Jaegerstab and heard it there. I heard that it was decided that a
bombed-out factory should be relocated to a different place which the
Jaegerstab would determine.
Q. That’s no answer to my question. Witness, I asked: Who gave the
original order for the construction of these subterranean factories? Do
you know that?
A. If I may repeat; you want to know who ordered in the first place that
these plants should be transferred to subterranean factories? That I do
not know.
Q. Do you know Herr Kammler?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know from whom he received the order to construct these
special subterranean factories?
A. Here again I do not know precisely who gave him the original order.
In any event, at the first beginning of the Jaegerstab, Kammler became a
member and was commissioned to undertake the construction of
subterranean buildings for Jaegerstab protection. The Jaegerstab pointed
out to him individual objectives and he reported from time to time how
many square meters were now ready. But who first originally gave these
orders to Kammler, whether it was Himmler or Hitler or some agreement or
something like that, I don’t know.
Q. Was Kammler commissioned into the Jaegerstab because of an order of
Himmler or because of some special order elsewhere?
A. I am not able to say. I assume that Himmler also gave him an order.
The individual orders, what he was to build, he received from the
Jaegerstab.
* * * * *
Q. Did Kammler, within the Jaegerstab, represent Himmler?
A. I do not know his powers or his functions and I cannot say. He was in
the construction sector. That I know, but Himmler had charge of more
things than construction.
* * * * *
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Will you try to answer these questions as simply
and briefly as you can? Were Russian prisoners of war used in the
armament industry?
WITNESS SCHMELTER: In the armaments plant Russian prisoners of war were
also employed. At what they were employed, I do not know, since they
were already there when I came and I did not myself inspect the plants.
Q. Did you ever see Russian prisoners of war either manufacturing or
transporting munitions of war?
A. In plants and in transports? No. Neither in plants nor in transports
did I see Russian prisoners of war.
Q. That question is perfectly clear and you understand it?
A. I shall repeat it. I was asked whether these prisoners of war
worked—whether I saw them in plants or in transport.
Q. That’s right.
A. And I answered in the negative.
Q. Were Russian prisoners of war used in the decentralization of the
Luftwaffe after the heavy bombings?
A. Not that I know of. So far as I know, after the heavy bombings
Russian prisoners of war were no longer available. They had already been
assigned elsewhere. I do know that after the heavy bombings, that is, in
the year 1944, new Russian prisoners of war were not used in armaments
or in the bombed out factories. It is, of course, possible that the
local labor offices used Russian prisoners of war for this purpose, but
we in the central offices knew nothing of this.
Q. Will you answer the same questions as to Polish prisoners of war?
A. So far as I know, Polish prisoners of war consisted solely of
officers. Only officers were available. The others had been freed. The
officers, however, in contradiction to many wishes that were expressed,
were not used. At least if they were, I know nothing of it.
Q. Will you answer the same questions as to Hungarian Jews?
A. Hungarian Jews, among other things, were used in the construction of
fighters—fighter planes. Female Hungarian Jews were also used in the
actual construction of fighter planes.
Q. Were they voluntary workers?
A. No. Those were inmates of concentration camps, prisoners at the
disposal of the SS.
Q. So the Hungarian Jews who were employed in the manufacture of fighter
planes were forced to work in that connection?
A. The Hungarian Jews, so far as I recall, were offered by the SS to be
employed in armament production. At first there were 1,000 of them or
500 who were employed. Then a number of plants said that they wanted
such workers and they were then allotted by the SS to these plants and
there they were obliged to work.
Q. Then the SS, which was one branch of the German military
establishment simply dealt out the Hungarian Jews to anybody who needed
them?
A. No. The Hungarian Jews, like all concentration camp inmates, were
housed in camps that were either in or near the plants and which were
constructed by the SS. They were then taken to work every day, and after
the work they were again brought back by the SS to the camps. Also, the
supervision of the work, for security reasons, was carried out by the
SS. So far as the technical side of it was concerned, it was carried out
by the representatives of the plant.
Q. Of course you don’t claim they were paid for their work?
A. That I do not know. I only know the general regulations concerning
concentration camp prisoners, and I know them in part. I know that these
prisoners, at least toward the end, also received some sort of wages.
What the payment was, I do not know. I do know that the plant had to
give the SS a certain amount for each prisoner, but what the prisoner
himself received, I do not know.
Q. Do you know whether these Hungarian Jews worked through any contract
with a foreign government, as was the case in France?
A. Let me repeat the question whether Hungarian Jews worked on the basis
of an agreement with a foreign power—foreign government. Was that the
question?
Q. Yes.
A. Not that I know of.
Q. I have no other questions. One more question please. You said that
you know that Russian prisoners of war were working in the armament
factories but you didn’t know what kind of work they were doing.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever see them in any of the factories?
A. No.
Q. What do you think they were doing?
A. I guess some of them were engaged in construction. So far as skilled
workers were concerned they were certainly working at tasks that they
were qualified to do. So far as they were unskilled workers they might
have been doing almost anything.
Q. If they were working in munitions factories they were doing something
to manufacture munitions, were they not?
A. If they worked in munitions factories then they must, of course, have
had something to do with manufacturing munitions. Even if they only
worked in the courtyard, or something like that, they still had
something to do with the manufacture of munitions.
* * * * *
JUDGE PHILLIPS: Witness, did you ever know of any prisoners of war,
especially Russians, being used to man antiaircraft guns?
A. In the construction or in the use of the antiaircraft?
Q. In the use of antiaircraft.
A. Yes, I have heard of that. I heard that Russian prisoners of war were
used to man antiaircraft guns of that sort.
Q. Do you have any idea how many were used for that purpose?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. Did you ever see them being used for that purpose?
A. No.
Q. On what fronts were they used?
A. I believe they were used on the home front, not on the actual battle
front, but that is simply my opinion.
Q. Against American planes, British planes, and Russian planes?
A. They shot at whatever planes were over Germany.
* * * * *
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, you spoke of female Jews. When were these female
Jews employed?
A. I do not know the precise date. It was the summer of 1944. In my
estimation, it must have been May.
Q. Let me show you Document NOKW-359, Prosecution Exhibit 75. It is the
next to the last document of the prosecution, Stenographic Minutes of
the Jaegerstab Meeting of 27 June 1944. You said: “I have a few more
points. Up until now 12,000 female concentration camp internees,
Jewesses, have been demanded. The matter is now in order. The SS has
agreed to deliver these Hungarian Jewesses in batches of 500. Thus the
smaller firms, too, will be in a better position to employ these
concentration camp Jewesses. I request that these people should be
ordered in batches of 500.”
Is this the point from when onward these females were used?
A. Yes. It must have been about this time. The difficulty was the
following: The SS demanded that the females should be delivered in
batches of thousands only. Most factories could not use such a large
number of females. Consequently, the SS was asked if it could not
deliver them in smaller groups. That is the reason.
Q. Witness, is there a difference between the concept of
“Ruestungsfabrik”, which means armament factory, and “Munitionsfabrik”,
which means a munitions factory? Is there a difference in Germany?
A. “Ruestungsfabrik” took care of all sorts of armament production,
materials, finishing up the deliveries and so on and so forth.
“Munitionsfabrik” is the narrower concept and contents itself with the
manufacture of munitions only.
Q. Did the “Munitionsfabrik” belong inside the concept of
“Luftruestung”, air armament?
A. So far as the “Luftruestung” is concerned, they did, yes. The
limitation of these concepts was not, however, uniform. Unfortunately,
we had very few uniform concepts. They were often misused.
Q. Were factories that made sheet metal and so on, armament factories?
Did they fall under the concept of armaments?
A. They did, yes.
DR. BERGOLD: Thank you.
* * * * *
_CROSS-EXAMINATION_
MR. DENNEY: In one of these interrogations, on 30 December 1946, you
were asked what the Jaegerstab did to bring workers from Hungary into
Germany; do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recall that you made reference to certain trips of the
Jaegerstab to Hungary?
A. Yes.
Q. You made this statement: “The Jaegerstab, during its existence, made
at least a total of 10 to 12 trips”?
A. Yes.
* * * * *
Q. All right. You were asked this question: “Who was in charge of these
trips?” And your answer was: “So far as I remember, it was Milch. Milch
participated in most trips of the Jaegerstab.”
A. In most of them, yes.
Q. In the same interrogation on 30 December, the record indicates that
you made this statement: “I know about 100,000 workers from Hungary;
however, these were Jews who were allocated to construction. I know
nothing about 8,000 workers who evidently were skilled workers, intended
for the fighter production program.”
A. Yes.
Q. You were then asked: “Is it known to you that these 100,000 Jews were
used by Todt in the interests of the Jaegerstab?” and you made the
following answer: “Yes, that is known to me.”
A. Yes.
Q. You were interrogated on 24 January and asked this question: “Do you
know whether the Luftwaffe, in the Luftwaffe industry, used
concentration camp prisoners, not in the building program, but for
production?” and your answer was: “I don’t know. I don’t think so,
except for women. The SS once offered us a lot of women. The difficulty
was that, at first, at least 1,000 and later 500 were to be employed.
Various firms got women after that, and I think that Heinkel, in
Oranienburg, used concentration camp prisoners, not only women, but all
the inmates.”
A. Yes.
Q. The answer was yes, if your Honor please. And Heinkel was an airplane
factory, was it not, producing the Heinkel plane?
A. Yes.
Q. On November 15, of last year, you were asked if you knew that Himmler
used concentration camp inmates for the underground buildings of the
Jaegerstab, and your answer: “Yes. You mean the finished buildings, do
you not?” And then you were asked: “The underground ones, the completion
of the existing caverns or tunnels, or the like, where concentration
camp inmates were employed?” and your answer: “Yes.”
A. Yes.
Q. And you were also asked: “Were these constructions built in the
interest of the Luftwaffe?” Your answer: “These new constructions? Yes.”
A. Yes.
Q. The next question: “Exclusively in the interest of the Luftwaffe? And
did the orders for the new constructions come from the Jaegerstab?”
Answer: “Whether other constructions were also built there? Probably,
yes.” Question: “I am only interested in the Luftwaffe.” Answer: “Also
for the Luftwaffe. I do not know whether for others. I would not like to
pin myself down.”
A. Yes.
Q. Later you were asked: “Do you know that prisoners of war were at all
employed in air armament?” and you stated: “Yes, I should like to say,
the armament plants. The air armament also employed prisoners of war in
its plants.”
A. Yes.
* * * * *
Q. In reply to a question: “What was Field Marshal Milch’s position in
the Jaegerstab?” you stated, “There were two chairmen in the Jaegerstab,
Speer and Milch. In the first session, or rather in most of the
sessions, Milch participated personally; Speer did not. Speer was
present only in exceptional cases. In his position, Saur, who was at the
same time manager, initiated the contact with the rest of the armament
industry. Milch was Chief of the Jaegerstab, besides Speer.”
A. Yes.
Q. In the same interrogation of 15 November you made the following
statement: “Assignment of labor was involved in every question including
every question of production.”
A. Yes.
Q. On 26 November you made the following statement when you were
interrogated: “Mobilization of manpower as a matter which is closely
connected with production was very much discussed. Everybody had a word
to say, had a request for something and they suggested or said I could
do better, etc.”
A. Yes.
* * * * *
_REDIRECT EXAMINATION_
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, as to the trip to Hungary, were you present when
the committee went to Hungary?
A. No, I traveled only as far as Prague and returned.
Q. Do you know the purpose of this trip to Hungary?
A. Not precisely. I know that there was a question of production to take
place in Hungary, but precise information I do not have.
Q. Do you know that there was a definite contract with Hungary?
A. I heard about that subsequently.
Q. Did you then hear that this trip had the purpose of bringing
Hungarian Jews to Germany?
A. No.
Q. Thank you. The prosecutor spoke to you of 100,000 Jews. Did you know
that these were to be used by Mr. Dorsch?
A. Yes.
Q. And, as far as the tasks that he had, mainly for the construction of
bombproof factories?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whether the Jaegerstab ordered these 100,000 Jews or
whether somebody else did?
A. The employment of these 100,000 Jews in this construction
organization took place on Hitler’s orders. I, myself, was not present
at this discussion. Dorsch, however, was present and told me that Hitler
had ordered—had said Himmler had 100,000 Jews for bombproof factories
and was to make them available.
Q. Do you know whether and in what number and when these Jews arrived to
carry out this construction work?
A. I do not know precisely the dates. It was in the summer of 1944. Nor
do I know whether all of them arrived. Once I concerned myself with the
question regarding the guarding of these people. At that time the SS did
not have enough guard personnel and Hitler ordered Keitel to provide
10,000 soldiers which were to be withdrawn from the eastern front and to
make them available to the SS so that they, the SS, would have the
necessary guard personnel. Thereafter, I heard nothing further about the
matter and assumed that the Jews for the most part were employed. I
deduced this from the fact that I otherwise should have heard of it
probably.
Q. I discussed just yesterday with you whether these buildings were
ordered by the Jaegerstab. I do not need to return to that question.
Were these constructions used exclusively by the Jaegerstab or for other
advantages, such as armored cars?
A. Originally they were exclusively planned for fighter construction but
I do recall that, as time went on, there were also discussions of using
them for other manufacture, for instance, tanks, and this construction
was to take place in these buildings. Since, however, I had nothing to
do with this professionally, I can only report on this from hearsay. In
other words, I know nothing precisely.
Q. The prosecutor quoted to you a statement of yours from an
interrogation; I shall ask you now did you make the statement in the
interrogation that Milch was responsible in air armament to seek out
workers individually?
A. I don’t know how I should understand the word “seek out”; if you mean
that he went to foreign countries and searched for them personally, then
of course that is wrong. I did state in that interrogation that during
my activity in the Jaegerstab in March 1944 no individual actions in
foreign countries were carried out by Milch or the Jaegerstab. The
manpower was provided by Sauckel exclusively, or to the extent that they
were prisoners by the SS, or prisoners of war by the Wehrmacht.
Q. And then they were transferred, as you said yesterday, to other
sectors?
A. Yes.
Q. You also said in this interrogation that in most of the meetings
Milch was present.
A. At the beginning, I said.
DR. BERGOLD: I have no further questions.
EXTRACTS OF TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS XAVER DORSCH[133]
_DIRECT EXAMINATION_
[Tr. p. 1361-1379]
DR. BERGOLD: Please state to the Court your first and last name?
WITNESS DORSCH: Xaver Dorsch.
Q. When were you born?
A. 28 December 1899.
Q. What was your last position in the German Reich?
A. I was Deputy Chief of the Todt Organization, in the Speer Ministry.
Q. On the 28th of December 1946 you signed an affidavit?
A. Yes, sir.
DR. BERGOLD: Your Honor, this is Document NOKW-447, Prosecution Exhibit
74.
Q. Witness, you made the following statement:
“As deputy of Minister Speer in his capacity as Chief of the Todt
Organization, I received from Hitler, at the end of April 1944, an order
to construct with the Todt Organization six bombproof fighter factories,
of which two should have priority.” Can you tell me about the history of
this construction?
A. Yes, but I must go into detail.
Q. Proceed.
A. Approximately eight months before this date, I made a suggestion to
Minister Speer about how bombproof fighter factories above ground could
be built, in this way, not only to secure manufacture, but also so that
they would be more secure against bomb damage while being built.
The source was that the Todt Organization in France was doing a similar
construction job as a launching site for V-2 bombs. Speer told me that I
should take the plans with me on my next visit to the Fuehrer’s
Headquarters, and two weeks later I was with Speer, visiting Hitler, and
after other matters had been discussed, and before going, Speer
mentioned this matter and Hitler said: “We must absolutely achieve
bombproof aircraft factories because there is danger that transportation
might be attacked, and then we cannot make up the time we have lost.”
Hitler wanted large-size, big scale units, in which planes and fighters
could be protected from the beginning to the end, because he saw a
danger in the fact that transportation could be attacked and
interrupted, and then the different parts, if they were made in various
factories, could not be assembled.
He said that he imagined the matter roughly as follows: In narrow
mountain valleys in Saxonian Switzerland, for example, caves could be
dug which would provide these bombproof factory installations. Then
Speer said, “Dorsch or the Todt Organization has another suggestion.”
Speer said that, and I then submitted to him my plans for the special
Todt Organization construction, which, as I said, had already been built
in France, and I also pointed out to him that such factories, even as
they were being built, were relatively safe against bomb attack.
This was roughly eight months before this date in April on which this
commission of which I spoke in my affidavit was given to me. Hitler said
to me that it was a matter of indifference to him according to what
system these things were built, but that it was important to him that
something really serious should be done.
On the next day there was a discussion on the same theme with Goering.
Speer’s representative Dethleffsen, as Plenipotentiary for construction
matters, and the leader of the main committee for construction,
Gaertner, were present. I had to explain again the thought behind this
special construction which I was proposing. Goering was enthusiastic and
said that that was the solution and that the Todt Organization should
begin immediately with that construction. Thereupon Speer said, “The
Todt Organization cannot build these factories because it builds only
outside the Reich, with the exception of the Ruhr district, and in the
Reich itself the Main Committee for Construction should carry out the
construction,” and for that reason, he had called the two gentlemen I
mentioned above. Goering also said that it was indifferent to him who
built the factories, that the important thing was that they should be
built soon.
In April of 1944, I was visiting Speer near Meran when a call came that
I should immediately go to Hitler. Speer asked me if I had any idea what
was afoot, but I did not. I immediately went to Berchtesgaden. There
Hitler asked me, “What has become of your fighter production?” I told
him that I did not know precisely, because in the Reich the Todt
Organization did not do the constructing but another organization. He
was greatly excited and said roughly, that he had heard enough about
this other organization, that he did not want it, and he demanded that
the Todt Organization should take over that construction immediately.
Then the plans were fetched overnight from Berlin. I explained the whole
system to him once more. I told him that I could only carry out this
construction if it were given priority above all other construction as
far as workers, machines, building materials, trucks, and so
on—whatever is needed in construction—were concerned. I was given
assurances that that priority would be given me, and I then took over
this construction project.
I was able to assure myself that the Hauptausschuss Bau—the Main
Committee for Construction—which had been in charge before I took over
had begun constructions at three locations. On one of these we
immediately stopped work, because both architecturally and, as the
Jaegerstab told me, technically the factory was no good.
Q. Witness, you then said that the wish to build these bombproof fighter
factories by the Todt Organization was communicated to you by the
Jaegerstab. What do you know about that personally?
A. I know the following: The Jaegerstab, as far as the entire work of
the Plenipotentiary for construction was concerned, was not satisfied
with the work. Saur complained continuously about how work dragged on
and asked me repeatedly to step in and do something. He called me to his
meetings in the Jaegerstab and asked me to develop further plans. I was
called up continuously by other gentlemen. I remember Major Dr. Krohmer,
who also asked me to step in, and again and again I had to say that that
would not do because, I said the Todt Organization did not carry out
construction in the Reich. I was pressed continuously by the Jaegerstab,
because it was the organization that would benefit from these
constructions.
Q. Do you know whether Milch went in that direction too, or only Saur?
A. That I cannot say. I did not speak about that to him myself. I did
speak with Saur and a few other gentlemen—I believe with Schlempp who
was later representative of the Todt Organization in the Jaegerstab.
Q. When was that first pressure on the part of Saur? Was that before
March of 1944?
A. Yes. That was even earlier, but I cannot say precisely. It might have
been in February even.
Q. Do you know whether Saur visited the Fuehrer on this matter?
A. I was not present, but I assumed that it must have been so. I cannot
prove it, however.
Q. So. This afternoon you told me what you thought Milch’s function was
in the Jaegerstab. You used a rather striking expression. Would you like
to repeat it here?
A. I called him “the breakfast director”. I ask the defendant to pardon
the expression. He shouldn’t hold it against me.
Q. What do you mean by this “breakfast director”?
A. Well, it is sort of difficult for me to tell that.
Q. Milch won’t be angry.
A. Well, I only saw him at a Jaegerstab meeting once, when he invited me
and when he asked for the support of the Todt Organization. He explained
to me the general situation. He told me what his worries and troubles
were, but the real work, the whole functioning of the thing, I don’t
believe he concerned himself with. That is why I used the expression
“breakfast director,” but perhaps that was a little exaggerated.
Q. I quite understand. After the end of April 1944, when you were
commissioned with these construction matters, what did you do?
A. As I told Hitler very exactly, I took Todt Organization units from
France and from the Atlantic Wall.
Q. How many were there?
A. 2,000 or 3,000—I cannot remember.
Q. Your affidavit says 10,000.
A. No, that is incorrect. That cannot have been the number in France.
The second time that I went to the Plenipotentiary General for
chemistry, Prof. Krauch, and told him of the serious situation, and I
finally brought him to the point of giving me 15,000 workers from his
department.
Q. What workers were those?
A. First of all, in the Baltic States—that was a Todt Organization
itself—I took away most of the German workers, and took some elsewhere
as additional workers, engineers, experts of one sort or another,
machinists. Then came the attack on Leuna on the 10th or 12th of May
1944. That was on the occasion of the first attack on Leuna. I had a
talk with Hitler at that time. He said, “This cannot be tolerated—that,
at the very moment when we are so in need of oil, workers are taken away
from Leuna”.
I then answered him that, first of all, I had undertaken this measure
before the air attack, and secondly, it was not a question of cutting
down on oil production, but of oil capacity. Hitler took over and said,
“No, that cannot be”. Then Speer said, “If we don’t get the workers, we
can’t do the building”. Hitler said, “Quiet down, you will get 50,000
Italians,” and then I said, “I don’t believe that”, and I said that for
the following reasons: We, the Todt Organization, had such workers from
Italy for the construction program Riese in Silesia, but we did not do
this via Sauckel but by applying to Italian firms to take over
construction commissions in Germany, and then they automatically brought
their workers, their directors and architects, and so on, with them
particularly after we had assured them that we with our
organization—that is to say, with the Todt Organization in Italy—would
take care of paying wages, paying for the hospitalization fees,
insurance, and so on, but at the moment when workers were fetched by
Sauckel, I understood clearly that workers such as we needed would not
be provided in any considerable numbers. At any rate, I told Hitler, “I
do not believe in these Italian workers, and I won’t believe in them
until they have crossed the Brenner Pass.” He then said to me, “You can
believe in them because tomorrow Mussolini is signing an agreement that
1,000,000 workers will come to Germany.”
* * * If I may mention it, it is also worthy of mention, that in
January, the beginning of January, I was at a conference with Hitler, or
rather, I did not take part in it, but I knew of it. There, a new worker
contingent was demanded, and in this conference Hitler himself named the
number of 250,000 workers for the construction; for aircraft
construction. In other words, it wasn’t Speer but Hitler who demanded
those workers, especially, and it is possible—that, at any rate, is the
way I construe it now—that he was thinking of these fighter plants.
Then I asked Hitler to permit me to use 10,000 Todt Organization workers
from Southern Russia. I must mention that here, because I did that as
Speer’s representative with Hitler. I could not have said to Speer that
he should give me these 10,000 workers. I had to do that through Hitler,
because the commanders in chief, in this case the commander in chief of
the army group in Southern Russia, were in charge of these people and
they had to be released by them. Thereupon these 10,000 workers got
under way toward Germany. However, they unfortunately arrived very
slowly and some of them never got to the fighter plant, but were taken
over by Speer to make ball bearings in Wellen, in Thuringia, and then,
when no workers came, the plants were to be built by Hungarian Jews. I
do not know precisely when it was, but I do remember an armaments
conference in Linz—I guess it was about the middle of June or maybe
later, but I can’t say for sure—and it was then that the first ones
began to arrive.
Q. Were they approved by Hitler?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, when you of the Todt Organization fetched Italians on your
own initiative, were they volunteers or were they more or less forced
labor?
A. Precisely in Italy, we had a remarkable achievement because as a
matter of principle we turned to Italian firms, gave them commissions
and they provided the workers. I believe I can say that the Todt
Organization was known for taking model care of its workers. For
instance, in Norway and Holland, the Dutch or Norwegian Todt worker
received higher wages than the German Todt worker who was working right
beside him. I could make extensive statements on that if I wanted to, or
if I were given the opportunity.
Q. But that is not an answer to my question, whether they were
volunteers or forced labor?
A. They were not forced. They were brought by their firms.
Q. Through the Italian firms?
A. Yes, that was the intention from the very beginning, so that the
Italian firms could provide their trained and expert personnel to us,
and, in this way, they were simply volunteers; they did much better work
than if they were forced.
DR. BERGOLD: No further questions.
_CROSS-EXAMINATION_
MR. KING: Witness, you stated that Milch was only present at a few of
the early meetings of the Jaegerstab. May I ask you—
A. What I said refers only to those meetings of the Jaegerstab at which
I was present and that was perhaps four or five.
Q. Now, you said, in your affidavit, which has been submitted as a
prosecution exhibit referred to by Dr. Bergold, that you received an
order for the construction of fighter factories at the end of April
1944?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall being present at a conference at Berchtesgaden with
Goering, among others, on the 19th of April 1944?
A. I cannot say whether that was the precise date, but I did take part
in some such conference.
Q. Do you recall who was present at that conference?
A. Yes. Goering was there, Milch was there, the others I’m not sure
about. Saur—I’m not sure he was there. I knew for sure that Milch and
Goering were present, but as to the others I no longer recall.
Q. Do you recall what was discussed at this conference?
A. The construction of fighter plants was discussed then, and, if I
remember, Goering pointed out that the Todt Organization was to receive
all sorts of support but I do not remember the details at the moment.
Q. And a few days later, on 21 April 1944, you received the order from
Hitler to build the six fighter plants?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall that possible sources of labor were discussed at this
meeting? That is, labor for the construction of the fighter factories?
A. I should like to assume that, but I do not remember precisely.
Probably all sorts of conditions and possibilities were discussed, but I
cannot answer this precisely.
Q. You were discussing a large-scale construction; you must have known
where this labor was to come from. Can you tell me what possible sources
were discussed at that meeting?
A. I do not know whether or not that question was discussed at this
conference. I assume that it was, but that was such a long time ago that
it is impossible for me to recall these details. But I was clear in my
own mind about that fact. That we needed so and so many workers was of
course obvious. I did make the demand that this construction program
should receive top priority and I stated previously that I wanted
primarily German workers, which was then done, and in the sector of the
Plenipotentiary General for chemistry I wanted to take some workers;
that was the way in Germany that you got workers. Later, when we of the
Todt Organization took over the construction program in Germany, we saw
that a large number of construction offices had so little manpower that
they had to stop production and there again we found workers. The whole
situation was somewhat unclear because when we took over building these
fighter factories, the entire construction was turned over to the Todt
Organization, and no one could take the responsibility for such
important constructions unless he could control the direction of the
whole construction program, but, with the best will in the world, I
can’t recall the details. There were so many conferences, one followed
the other so rapidly, I do not any longer recall.
Q. Who was your representative at meetings of the Jaegerstab?
A. Schlempp, first of all; even before I was commissioned with this
task, he was the technical adviser or expert on construction. Saur asked
me at that time to regard him as the liaison man between the Todt
Organization and the Jaegerstab. Then, about the middle of June,
Schlempp became group leader of the unit in Prague, for which reason I
provided one of my best men, namely, Knipping and I used him in what had
previously been Schlempp’s capacity.
Q. Do you recall that Schlempp, and later Knipping, reported on the
progress of it to the Jaegerstab?
A. I am convinced that they did, because that was their job.
* * * * *
Q. Now can you give me percentagewise the breakdown of this labor by
groups, that is, prisoners of war labor, foreign labor, concentration
camp labor, German labor?
A. That I could only do with the most general estimate, with vagueness.
In the case of Kaufering, there were perhaps sixty percent from the
concentration camps; however, prisoners of war, as far as I know, were
not there at all. The rest must have been Germans. In Muehldorf, where
the second factory was, the breakdown was roughly the same, but I really
cannot say. I visited each one of these factories only twice. Because of
the transportation situation of the Rhine bridges and the hydrogenation
plant situation, I did not have the time to visit them.
Q. Now did you obtain any of this labor for the construction project? Do
you recall obtaining any of this from Schmelter?
A. I take it that Hitler himself had approved these workers. Our request
went to Schmelter, and he was working his own men in that Todt
Organization, and in the Jaegerstab, and it was his job to settle the
details when they should come, and what they should be paid, and such
matters. That was Schmelter’s job, and Schmelter was told that this is a
technical staff, and he knew that Hitler had approved the workers, and
so it was his job to take care of the details, and to inform the
Einsatzgruppe what it should do. I did not carry much of these things in
detail after that.
Q. Now do you recall how large a construction was at Kaufering? I am
speaking both at Kaufering I and Kaufering II?
A. You mean the technical construction?
Q. Yes.
A. There was one main hall in Kaufering I, three hundred meters long,
ninety meters wide, with six stories. Kaufering II conducted production
later, but everything was concentrated in Kaufering I.
Q. Do you recall how much of this construction was completed?
A. I should think three-fourths. At the last time I visited this
construction shortly before the collapse, the machines were being set in
on one side of the building, and that is as far as it went.
Q. And to whom was this plant allocated?
A. That I cannot say. In my opinion the Messerschmitt, but I must be
careful in what I say here, because in the last week before the collapse
there were negotiations with the armament staff. I cannot remember what
that situation was in Kaufering, but in Muehldorf there was constant
talk of putting Buna in there. That changed continuously, dependent on
the war situation. Once Speer wanted to set up a steel foundry in the
fighter factory in the Rhineland, which was later changed.
Q. Please answer the question. Now in these inspections at Kaufering, do
you recall any Luftwaffe representatives who inspected these
construction sites?
A. That I don’t know. I cannot say. A colonel of the Luftwaffe was there
but in his capacity as representative of the armament commando or of an
armament office.
Q. Now getting back to this meeting of 19 April 1944, do you recall that
Speer was present there?
A. No.
Q. How were your relations with Speer at that time?
A. They were tense. Speer did not regard the Todt Organization as a sort
of construction organization. To make a statement, I should have to go
into great detail on this subject.
Q. I think that suffices. Now with regard to the recruitment of these
fifty thousand Italians, which you discussed with Dr. Bergold, do you
recall who was to handle the recruitment of those Italians for work in
the Reich?
A. To be sure that I do not make any false statement, is it your concern
who recruited the fifty thousand Italians that Hitler approved of?
Q. My concern is through what channel were these Italians that were
promised Hitler by Mussolini, through what channels were they recruited?
A. That was to be taken care of by Sauckel, but through the Todt
Organization, who had their office in Italy apply to Italian firms
ultimately, and that was done through the Todt Organization office in
Italy.
Q. Now with regard to these Italians, do you know what provision was
made for the guarding of those that were to arrive, that is, en route?
A. Of that I know nothing, because they did not arrive. They were not
watched, or guarded at all. They were free workers, there was no reason
to guard them.
Q. Now, Witness, outside of Kaufering, can you tell me where and under
what names these other fighter factories were to be located?
A. In Muehldorf, and then there was a factory in Vaihingen.
Q. Just a minute. Now with regard to Muehldorf, can you tell me what
that was to be used for, who was it to be used by?
A. First it was thought of as a fighter factory, and then, a few weeks
before the collapse, there was a conference of the armament gentlemen in
Munich, at which it was agreed that it could be used for the manufacture
of Buna; in other words, they changed their minds.
Q. What time did that conference at Munich take place?
A. That must have been about the end of March 1945.
Q. Now, with regard to Muehldorf, can you tell me where, primarily this
labor was coming from?
A. These were Hungarian Jews. There were Germans there. Where they came
from, that I don’t know.
Q. Well, now, with regard to these Hungarian Jews, can you tell me
whether that was a result of a special action in Hungary?
A. I don’t believe so, but I don’t know. We were only told that we were
going to receive Hungarian Jews. They were already in Germany, if I
remember, but where they came from I don’t know because I didn’t concern
myself with it.
Q. But you do recall that Hungarian Jews were used on that site?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, with regard to these other factories, we have covered Kaufering
and Muehldorf, can you tell me the location of the others?
A. Vaihingen—that was a factory that was already under construction
before the Todt Organization stepped in.
Q. Witness, where was that located?
A. V-a-i-h-i-n-g-e-n, and it is in Wuerttemberg.
Q. And how large was that construction?
A. It was a building about 100 meters by 60, four, five stories high.
Q. And do you recall what type of workers was used in that construction?
A. Concentration camp inmates, but I don’t know the number.
Q. And that was in Thuringia?
A. No, in Wuerttemberg.
Q. Now do you recall that any of these factories was to be located in
the Protectorate?
A. One was to be erected there, yes, in the neighborhood of Prague but
so far as I know they never got around to it. Perhaps the ground work
was carried out and the machines were shipped there, but the factory
itself was not actually built. Then there was to be another one in the
Rhineland. I have already mentioned that.
Q. Witness, with regard to this factory in the Protectorate, can you
give me the code name for that factory?
A. No, I don’t know it. It was about 50 kilometers north of Prague.
Q. And that was to be used by what company?
A. I can’t say, I don’t know.
Q. Can you give me any indication of the size of that factory?
A. The one north of Prague? Yes. That would have been about the same
size as Kaufering, roughly, but, as I say, I really don’t know whether
they got construction under way there.
Q. But you were to construct it?
A. Yes, it would have been done under my supervision, or under my
direction. I was Speer’s representative and chief of the Todt
Organization.
Q. But you don’t know how far along or whether construction was
initiated there?
A. I cannot say for sure. I suppose that they started the construction,
but so far as I know they really did not actually get this factory
built.
Q. Now, with regard to this factory in the Rhineland, can you tell me
where that was to be located?
A. I can’t remember the name any more. I was there once, and I can
perhaps locate it on the map. It was west of the Rhine, 70 or 80
kilometers, but I can’t remember the name any longer. It was under
construction, and then the construction was interrupted by military
events, that is, about the time when the Americans entered the Rhineland
on the Ruhr. Nor do I know whether concentration camp inmates were used
there.
Q. Do you recall whether foreign labor was used?
A. In this factory? That I cannot say.
Q. You don’t recall constructing any factories for Wiener-Neustadt?
A. No.
Q. Or for the automobile works at Steyr, in Austria?
A. No.
Q. Focke-Wulf, in Bremen?
A. No, in Bremen we only built a U-boat factory.
Q. Do you recall constructing any factories for Heinkel?
A. That I don’t know. I wasn’t really interested in such questions,
because I received the data from the Jaegerstab, and the Jaegerstab did
the actual construction. The engineer of the Todt Organization built the
house, and then the Jaegerstab took care of the rest. There were no
discussions on my part with construction firms. Moreover, I didn’t even
have time to carry out such things.
Q. But you got your labor through Schmelter, who was a member of the
Jaegerstab?
A. Yes, he was a member of the Jaegerstab, and I have already said that
he was also the leader of labor allocation in the Todt Organization. He
was in charge. At first he was entirely within the Todt Organization,
and then later he was what you might call the leader for the allocation
of labor in Speer’s Ministry, and was in charge later of the allocation
of labor in the Todt Organization. At the same time, he performed the
same function in the Jaegerstab, so that automatically there was a
connection between the Todt Organization and the Jaegerstab.
MR. KING: I have no further questions, your Honor.
_REDIRECT EXAMINATION_
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, I have one more question. When did these Hungarian
Jews arrive at Muehldorf?
A. I do not know about Muehldorf, but I can recall that at Kaufering the
first ones came—and here I must guess—at the end or the beginning of
June 1944.
DR. BERGOLD: Thank you, I have no further questions.
MR. KING: I have one further question, if your Honor pleases.
DR. BERGOLD: I have just heard that the interpreter was inaccurate. The
witness spoke of the end and the middle of June, and the interpreter
said “the beginning of June”.
THE INTERPRETER: “The middle or the end of June” is what the witness
said, but he is not sure about it.
_RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION_
MR. KING: Now, Witness, with respect to this construction at Kaufering,
can you tell me when that was initiated?
A. In May of 1944 it must have begun, the beginning of May.
Q. And that was also true of the other fighter factories that you were
to construct under the Hitler order?
A. Perhaps two weeks later the construction in Muehldorf began; the
construction in Vaihingen that I mentioned before was already under way,
and I took it over. The construction in the Rhineland started
considerably later, it could have been perhaps at the end of June;
Prague came along much later.
Q. Now, you say that you were at Kaufering on two separate occasions.
Did you have any opportunity to—
A. (Interposing) I was in Kaufering three times. Do you want to know
when? In May 1944; at the beginning of January 1945; and then once more
just before the capitulation, perhaps two or three weeks before the
capitulation.
Q. Do you recall anything about the conditions at Kaufering; that is,
the conditions of labor?
A. I only saw the construction site. When I was in Munich, Niebermann,
who was responsible for construction, told me that the Hungarian Jews
were poorly clothed and poorly fed in part. I then told the competent SS
man, whose name I no longer recall—but he was there in Munich, in
Niebermann’s office—and I pointed out to him that this was the
responsibility of the SS and he should see to it that these men were
decently clothed.
Q. Witness, do you recall any reports of deaths of Hungarian Jews on the
project?
A. Roughly, in October, our physicians told us that the fatalities in
Kaufering were higher than normal. I then commissioned that physician to
take up negotiations with the SS to improve conditions.
I should like to say explicitly that the Todt Organization was forbidden
to enter the camps. The physician tried to send medicines to the camp,
and was successful. I can remember a date, namely, one on which I was
operated on—that is why I remember it—in November, at which time the
physician told me that he had succeeded in bringing these bad hygienic
conditions to an end after considerable effort. I remember the date
because it coincided with a sickness of my own.
-----
[109] A group of experts, drawn from various phases of German industry
and supplemented by representatives of the various ministries.
[110] Tr. pp. 300-1.
[111] Survey is published as part of document in Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. IV, pp. 120-126, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[112] Defendant in case of U.S. _vs._ Oswald Pohl, et al. See Vol. V.
[113] Portions of this document were introduced by the defense as
Defense Exhibit 12. See pp. 561-62.
[114] Other portions of this document were introduced by the defense as
Defense Exhibit 13. See pp. 562-63.
[115] Portions of this document were introduced by the defense as Defend
Exhibit 16. See pp. 564-65.
[116] Another portion of this document was introduced by the defense as
Defense Exhibit 21. See pp. 565-66.
[117] Other portions of this document were introduced by the defense as
Defense Exhibit 23. See pp. 566-67.
[118] Kammler was one of the leading officials of the Economic
Administrative Main Office of the SS
[Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt—WVHA]. See case of _United States_ vs.
_Oswald Pohl, et al._, (_Vol. V_), concerning the WVHA which
administered the utilization of concentration camp labor.
[119] Document was Speer Exhibit 34 in Trial before International
Military Tribunal. See Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. XVI, p.
589, Nuremberg, 1947.
[120] Defense Counsel, Dr. Bergold, explained (_Tr. p. 580_): “This
proves that the Fuehrer himself ordered these large construction works,
the execution of which is charged to the defendant.
Although I mentioned before that the Jaegerstab was of the opinion that
it could only build one factory, the order was given by Hitler to build
six. That was an impossible number. He delegated this duty to Mr.
Dorsch. That man had his orders from the Fuehrer and not from the
Jaegerstab, which, of course, was no longer responsible for his
activities.”
[121] Portions of this document were introduced by the prosecution as
Prosecution Exhibit 75. See pp. 544-45.
[122] DR. BERGOLD stated (_Tr. p. 567_): “I introduce this in order to
show that the Jaegerstab meetings not always prove who was there at a
certain given time and those meetings changed so that as far as the
defendant Milch is mentioned, this does not prove he was there all of
the time.”
[123] DR. BERGOLD explained (_Tr. p. 568_): “There was introduced by the
prosecution and also presented an exhibit from this Jaegerstab
conference where the term ‘construction company’ was mentioned in such a
way. Those were companies of concentration camp inmates. This explains
the term ‘construction company’ clearly.”
[124] Other portions of this document were introduced by the prosecution
as Prosecution Exhibit 75. See pp. 545-46.
[125] Chief of the Construction Department in the Speer Ministry.
[126] Ibid.
[127] DR. BERGOLD stated (_Tr. p. 751_): “The prosecution has alleged
that these great plants were made by slave labor, and I want to show
that this plant in which, according to the allegations of the
prosecution, Hungarian Jews were used, was not built by the Jaegerstab
and that therefore the prosecution has not proved altogether that the
Jaegerstab used Hungarian Jews.
The passage will show in a very short time that concentration camp
inmates were not used. * * *”
[128] Portions of this document were introduced by the prosecution as
Prosecution Exhibit 75. See pp. 550-52.
[129] Another portion of this document was introduced by the prosecution
as Prosecution Exhibit 75. See pp. 554-55.
[130] DR. BERGOLD stated (_Tr. p. 584_): “Your Honors, in all civilized
countries, also in Germany, penal prisoners have to work. If
concentration camp inmates were put to work in Germany, this was done
within the frame of the law which existed in Germany for the employment
of criminal prisoners. This was nothing special. This work of
concentration camp inmates cannot be considered slave work.”
[131] Other portions of this document were introduced by the prosecution
as Prosecution Exhibit 75. See pp. 555-57.
[132] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 6, 7
Feb. 47, pp. 717-759.
[133] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 24 Feb.
47, pp. 1361-1379.
4. GENERALLUFTZEUGMEISTER[134]
Evidence
_Prosecution Documents_
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
NOKW-311 62 Extract from interrogation of 597
Hermann Goering on 6
September 1946, regarding
Milch’s position as
Generalluftzeugmeister (GL).
NOKW-418 136 Extracts from stenographic 598
minutes of GL-Conference, 5
May 1942.
NOKW-407 137 Extracts from stenographic 599
minutes of GL-Conference, 27
May 1942.
NOKW-406 138 Extracts from stenographic 599
minutes of the GL-Conference,
7 July 1942.
NOKW-408 139 Extracts from stenographic 600
minutes of GL-Conference, 28
July 1942.
NOKW-409 140 Extracts from stenographic 601
minutes of GL-Conference, 4
August 1942.
NOKW-412 141 Extracts from stenographic 602
minutes of GL-Conference, 18
August 1942.
NOKW-416 142 Extracts from stenographic 602
minutes of GL-Conference, 26
August 1942.
NOKW-286 144 Extracts from stenographic 605
minutes of GL-Conference, 1
September 1942.
NOKW-245 157 Extracts from stenographic 606
minutes of conference with
Goering, 22 February 1943,
regarding plans for airplane
construction.
NOKW-449 148 Extracts from stenographic 607
minutes of GL-Conference, 2
March 1943.
NOKW-195 143 Extracts from stenographic 608
minutes of conference with
Goering, 28 October 1943.
NOKW-180 155 Extracts from stenographic 613
notes on the conference at
the Reich Marshal’s on
Thursday, 4 November 1943, 11
o’clock at the Junkers Plant
in Dessau.
_Testimony_
Extracts from testimony of defense witness Max Koenig 615
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-311
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 62
EXTRACT FROM INTERROGATION OF HERMANN GOERING ON 6
SEPTEMBER 1946, REGARDING MILCH’S POSITION AS
GENERALLUFTZEUGMEISTER (GL)
* * * * *
INTERROGATOR: Now to the Milch case: Who was commissioned after 1941
with the labor allocation in the Ministry for Air?
GOERING: What am I to understand by “labor allocation”?
Q. Labor allocation consisted of the drawing in of foreign workers or
German workers, especially of concentration camp inmates, in order to
free them for air force production.
A. This matter went through Udet, the Chief of Supply for the Air Force,
until Udet’s death, and then it went through Milch.
Q. In what manner did the Reich Air Ministry submit its requests to
Sauckel and the approximate figure for its requirements, the number of
workers, etc.? And if Sauckel received such a request from the Reich Air
Ministry, how did he undertake the distribution?
A. The requests were made by Milch, it was he who said how many workers
the air force needed, and these were forwarded to Speer. Speer then
asked Sauckel for the workers for the entire armaments branch, almost
for the entire industrial branch, and he then made the distribution. It
was he in the end who made the final decision as to how many workers
went to the air force for instance, how many to the army, etc. As far as
I know, Sauckel had actually nothing to do with the distribution of
labor. The contingent was put at the disposal of the authorities.
Terrific pressure was continually brought to bear on Sauckel. If the
requested number was not brought, he was given hell. I personally
presided over a meeting where there were differences between Sauckel and
Speer. He wanted to have more, etc. There was a mix-up and that’s how I
know it; but the needs of the air force were put forward by Milch, that
is the Chief of Supply for the Air Force. When difficulties arose and
they did not get the people, and the program threatened to break down,
then they came to me and I supported their demands.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-418
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 136
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE,
5 MAY 1942
[Two handwritten marginal notes at top of document:] Mi. 10.
Secret
_SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT ON THE GL-CONFERENCE_
_PRESIDED OVER BY THE STATE SECRETARY, FIELD_
_MARSHAL MILCH, ON TUESDAY, 5 MAY 1942,_
_10 A.M. IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_
* * * * *
ALPERS: The reason given is shortage of labor. And in fact there are
2,000 men lacking at Heinkel-Oranienburg.
MILCH: As far as the French are concerned, 60,000 of the ones that we
had been promised are still missing.
(Comment: 40,000 are missing.)
If we get those men I would assign 2,000 to Heinkel-Oranienburg.
FRYDAG: The French become worse and worse; I threw out 80 of them who
will be sent to concentration camps in Russia. They refused to work. The
French say at 4 o’clock: “I won’t work another hour,” and you cannot
make them work another hour. This happened four weeks ago all of a
sudden, when the first bombing attack on Paris took place, while before
that the French were the best people.
MILCH: We were told in Oranienburg that they were good as long as they
didn’t get spoiled by our German people.
FRYDAG: It happened here after we got the French from Messerschmitt;
according to the French they got a warm meal twice a day there and had
their laundry done. We cannot do either. We don’t have a warm meal twice
a day either. At Messerschmitt the living conditions were better.
MILCH: Gablenz, I want you to get in touch with Reinecke concerning
these French. I demand that if the people refuse to work they
immediately be placed against the wall and shot before all the other
workers. I ask you to get in touch with the Reich Leader SS and to ask
him to discuss the matter with the Fuehrer. Now is the right time;
unless we do something effective now, the others will become bothersome.
I ask that their being sent to concentration camps be taken into
consideration too. I’ll tell you afterwards how you should act in such a
matter.
So I do not agree. You should make another proposal. At the beginning
you cannot expect more.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-407
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 137
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE, 27 MAY 1942
[Three handwritten marginal notes at top of document:] To my
files Mi. 14
Vossen/Dr. Reynitz/Ca.
Secret
_SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT OF THE GL-CONFERENCE_
_PRESIDED OVER BY THE STATE SECRETARY, FIELD_
_MARSHAL MILCH ON WEDNESDAY, 27 MAY 1942,_
_9 A.M. IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_
* * * * *
VON GABLENZ: Yesterday, the first[135] has exploded in France, at the
Arade plant, an explosive, a float, but no damage has been done.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: What measures have been taken in consequence?—I
want to have a report on what has been done. How many people have been
shot and how many hanged? If that guy cannot be found today, fifty men
should be selected and if I were you I would hang three or four of them
whether they are guilty or not. It is the only way!
(Mahnke hands another letter to the Field Marshal.)
What do you think of that man?
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-406
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 138
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE GL-CONFERENCE,
7 JULY 1942
[Two handwritten marginal notes at top of document:] St/R 21
Secret
_SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT OF THE GL-CONFERENCE_
_PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD MARSHAL MILCH ON_
_7 JULY 1942, 10 A.M. IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_
* * * * *
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: I do not like the engine. I have inspected it and
for the time being anyhow, I shall not take the 177 plane as a traveling
plane.
With regard to the output of Prague I want to say this: Of course, one
must recognize good output, even of a foreigner. On the other hand, as
far as the French are concerned, something must be done now. Gablenz,
ring up Toennes and tell him that this is a crazy situation [tolle
Schweinerei]. However, we would still try first to arrange it in a
friendly way through Toennes. If that does not succeed, then I intend to
fill the new Heinkel plant in the east entirely with Frenchmen brought
down there by force. If they don’t work in France, they may work as
prisoners in Poland. After all we have to remember that it is we, and
not the French, who have won the war.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-408
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 139
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE,
28 JULY 1942
[Two handwritten marginal notes at top of document:] St/R 24
Vossen/Dr. Jonuschat/C
Secret
_SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT ON THE GL-CONFERENCE_
_PRESIDED OVER BY STATE SECRETARY FIELD_
_MARSHAL MILCH ON TUESDAY, 28 JULY 1942,_
_10 A.M. IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_
* * * * *
ALPERS: We have discussed whether a stronger pressure should not be put
upon French firms by both our liaison office and by us here. I have
talked with the French works managers myself. Actually they are all of
the same mind; they are willing to exert pressure, but then the workers
will leave them. In France there is no law that binds a worker to his
place of employment.
MILCH: As far as we are concerned, that is very difficult. But at the
very moment when the deadline is passed for me, I shall say: Now there
is no more French production. The workers are sent on leave or taken
away immediately for other work. The French always want the proportion
1:5, but they only reach 1:2.3. In reality they have very much more, as
we have received only old French junk. If we consider the actual output
that we have received, then the proportion is not even 1:0.2, but
exactly the contrary: 5:1 in favor of the French! At the present time we
receive 8 to 9 planes from the French. I could well imagine that they
get out 45 for themselves. I shall shut the shop with a single stroke
and have the workers and the machines come to Germany. If it does not
work on a voluntary basis, then we do it by compulsory contracts.
Perhaps I shall first give them a week to think it over.
(ALPERS: Amio himself is behind. For him the surfaces and tail
unit factories are situated just right.)
—It is a fact that, on the whole, these people work in silent
opposition. One cannot blame them for it either, it is true, but they
should not have started the war.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-409
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 140
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE,
4 AUGUST 1942
[Handwritten marginal notes] To my files, personally St/R 25
Secret
_SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT ON THE GL-CONFERENCE_
_PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD MARSHAL MILCH_
_TUESDAY, 4 AUGUST 1942, 10 A.M. IN THE_
_REICH AIR MINISTRY_
* * * * *
GEYER: In the west there is a danger of the French going on strike in
the event of a British attack. In that case, the whole of the engine
supply would be severely handicapped.
MILCH: In such a case I would ask to be appointed military commander
myself. I would band the workers together and have 50 percent of them
shot; I would then publish this fact and compel the other 50 percent to
work, by beatings if necessary. If they don’t work, then they too will
be shot. I would get the necessary replacement somehow. But I hope the
military commander will do his duty. I’m not worried about it. The word
“strike” must never be used. For us there is only “living or dying”, but
not “striking”. That goes for the educated man as well as for the
worker, for the German [Inlaender] as well as for the foreigner. The
word “strike” means death for the man who uses it.
* * * * *
GABLENZ: Sauckel also made an effort but he does not have a completely
free hand. Lt. Col. Nickolai and Stending are still standing in between.
MILCH: In spite of all, he has brought in quite a tidy number. Sauckel
has brought over 1.6 million people to Germany, 1.3 million from the
east and the rest from other countries.
GABLENZ: We should not be sorry if Sauckel not only took care of getting
the workers, but also of distributing them. That way we would fare
better.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-412
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 141
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE,
18 AUGUST 1942
[page 1874 of original]
[Handwritten marginal notes on attendance list] St/R 27
* * * * *
[page 1932 of original]
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: As soon as the figures for August are ready I
request an exact account for my report to the Reich Marshal and also for
the conferences which I want to hold with Sauckel and Speer beforehand.
This account is to show how the labor question has developed, how great
the fluctuation is and which nationalities it involves, what real
requests we now have to make in the different sectors in order to cover
the needs for specialists and for skilled and unskilled labor, how many
of them can be foreigners, etc.? What happens to those who leave the
industry? Are they being compelled to work elsewhere? Are they, as I
proposed, under control in the camps supervised by the SS and considered
as being in mild concentration camps, or are these gentlemen allowed to
remain outside and do as they please?
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-416
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 142
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE,
26 AUGUST 1942
[Handwritten marginal notes] St/R 29
Secret
_SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONFERENCE OF_
_THE DIRECTOR OF SUPPLIES PRESIDED OVER BY_
_FIELD MARSHAL MILCH ON WEDNESDAY, 26_
_AUGUST 1942, 11 A.M. IN THE REICH_
_AIR MINISTRY_
* * * * *
MILCH: Is Quartermaster General 6 here?
(Comment: Yes!)
Do you know anything about it?
(Comment: No!)
Ask about it and inform Colonel Brueckner!
FRYDAG: Another important consideration is the letter, which you
yourself have signed, Field Marshal, dealing with the expiration of the
labor contracts of the foreign workers. * * *
MILCH: The Reich Marshal [Goering] wanted to bind these people by law at
one time, that was one idea. The Fuehrer’s plan would be more favorable.
He wishes that the workers be gradually all replaced by Russians for
whom there is no longer such a thing as expiration of contracts.
(Comment: But there is a certain transition period!)
BRUECKNER: You, Field Marshal, have yourself put your signature to this
matter. The contracts are to be extended till 1 October 1943. I hope
that it will be done.
* * * * *
MILCH: On the other hand, a number of these people have been drafted
into the armed forces. But if I consider the others, I arrive all the
same at a monthly total of about 30,000 who loaf around and fluctuate
from job to job. According to the suggestions of the Reich Marshal,
these people are to come under the care of Himmler and are to be handled
severely there. What has been done, so far, in this regard? Brueckner,
you know about this matter, don’t you?
(BRUECKNER: Yes!)
You do not seem to be informed quite correctly. Sometime ago we were
quite irritated about the fact that so many workers move about from one
factory to another, most of them antisocial elements who do not like to
work and whom the firms are possibly glad to get rid of because they do
nothing but complain and grumble, do no proper work, are constantly
late, shirk work where they can, pretend to be sick, etc. These people
were supposed to be handled more severely, and about a year ago the
Reich Marshal issued an order and gave the Ministry of Labor the job of
dealing with this matter firmly. Then the Ministry of Labor issued an
explanatory order which was nothing but a sabotage of the order and the
desire expressed by the Reich Marshal. I reported to the Reich
Marshal—in the very words which I have just used—that in this case his
will was clearly being sabotaged by some lawyers or other poor fellows
and that I asked him to take measures against it. He told me that he
would talk the matter over with Himmler. That is, I had suggested to him
that this matter could only be settled with the help of Himmler’s
organization. The armed forces are not in a position to do it. The
suggestion had been made that the armed forces should take care of these
people in camps but these workers are not ready for that. They have not
been condemned and in no way violate the existing laws, but act only
against their country which certainly does not yet come within the
sphere of the old legal nonsense. That is why Himmler should get these
people into his clutches because he can treat them outside the law. My
suggestion was that the people should be put into camps or, in part,
just get numbers. The person involved would have a passport in which it
is entered that he is a German of this or that category, and that his
number is so and so. Then there are subsequent entries: At this or that
time he did not work, at this or that time he was late, etc. If he
“loses” this passport—because he doesn’t want to have it anymore—off
he goes to the concentration camp immediately; the same thing happens if
he does not show it when ordered to do so. Once every month the pass is
checked by the local SD. If it shows that the man has been ill, or late
thirty times in one month, then the SD takes him along and gives him a
job in which he has to work 14 hours a day and where he is treated in
the way he deserves if he is not willing. The Reich Marshal has approved
this suggestion. Nevertheless I have not yet seen anything of the kind
being carried out.
BRUECKNER: I know that such labor camps have been established.
MILCH: In that case I want you to tell me exactly during the next
conference, where these camps have been established, who is in charge of
them, and how do we get these honorable gentlemen who do not want to
work into them? * * * It is a simple matter to have these people taken
care of somehow by the SD. It has only got to be taken in hand. I want
to have a report on it as soon as possible. Otherwise I will talk to
Himmler about it myself and see that this matter is taken very firmly in
hand. I see in these people the greatest danger for the home front.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-286
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 144
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE,
1 SEPTEMBER 1942
[Handwritten marginal notes] St/R 31 To my files
Secret
_SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT OF THE GL-CONFERENCE_
_PRESIDED OVER BY STATE SECRETARY FIELD_
_MARSHAL MILCH ON WEDNESDAY, 9 SEPTEMBER_
_1942, 10 A.M. IN THE REICH_
_AIR MINISTRY_
* * * * *
DEUTSCHMANN: Reports have come in from front repair workshops that up to
40 percent of the people simply do not come to work. Because of the
difficulties in the food supply they simply go out into the country in
order to have something to eat. At the plant Mechanical Workshops
[Mechanische Werkstaetten] I have found out that the Poles have not come
because Russian pilots had dropped propaganda material. In one case, I
have seen that about 50 percent of the workers failed to come.
MILCH: What do you do against that?
(DEUTSCHMANN: For the time being, I did not do anything.)
And where was that?—In Warsaw? In such a case, orders have to be given
that these workers get a good beating. And Russian prisoners of war are
used to give it to them.
DEUTSCHMANN: Just at the time when the Russians attacked I was planning
to have 200 Poles transported to western Germany in order to fill a gap
in the hoop production there. The conditions of procurement in Warsaw
were such that I could afford it; therefore, I had no special reason to
take measures.
MILCH: If those workers stay away from work just as they please then
they need a good beating and this punishment is to be administered by
Russians. Contact the SD; tell them that these workers had failed to
come to work and that I demand that they be punished and not by having
their food taken away from them but by the slightly milder punishment of
50 strokes each on their behind.
DEUTSCHMANN: Various unfortunate occurrences have happened together.
MILCH: I don’t care, these occurrences are none of my business. The
unfortunate occurrence for the person involved is when he gets his good
beating. And he should not fail to get it.
(DEUTSCHMANN: We have already drawn the attention of the Reich
Leader SS to it; something is going to be done about it.)
Such occurrences must not remain unpunished, they must not happen. If
those people mutiny and do not work, then I demand that some shooting is
done at those occasions. We do the same in Poland as the British do in
India, with the only difference that the British deal with their own
subjects, whereas we deal with the enemy. I want none of our people ever
to show lack of action. I make every section chief responsible to take
measures to that effect immediately. He is not to administer the
beatings himself but to go to the SD and demand that this or that is
done. What kind of measures they take we will leave to the SD, but I
want to have a report on what has been done in such cases! What do you
think would happen to a worker in Germany if he went on strike?
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-245
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 157
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF CONFERENCE
WITH GOERING, 22 FEBRUARY 1943, REGARDING PLANS
FOR AIRPLANE CONSTRUCTION
* * * * *
MILCH: * * * Just now things are not going well. Sauckel has agreed with
Speer and myself that von der Heyde is to go to Paris to ascertain on
the very spot what may be taken away. If we want to maintain the program
we require an additional 80,000 workmen over there. Sauckel said he
recognized that and promised to deliver them. If the promise is kept all
will be all right.
REICH MARSHAL: What sense does it make to leave the workers there?
MILCH: There is no good will in France, and you can really not expect it
from these fellows. But we will force them to work by not feeding them.
REICH MARSHAL: I can do this here much better.
MILCH: That’ll get us nowhere. We shall then have to shut down the
plants in France.
REICH MARSHAL: The fault is this: Sauckel should have said: Milch, there
are too many skilled workers in that plant; take so-and-so many out for
your German plants; I am going to replace those skilled workers from our
French workers pool. Otherwise there is no sense in his taking them
away.
MILCH: Until six months ago we piloted the whole French industry by way
of the government, but since then we changed and took sponsor-firms. * *
*
REICH MARSHAL: I’ll tell Sauckel not to touch our industry at all. But
we must do it ourselves.
MILCH: I told Sauckel that we will cooperate on all matters on the very
spot, that we will get the thing done but not smash up anything that is
producing for us or is going to produce. He admitted that his men had
acted wrongly. * * * Speer and myself are of the opinion that he must be
incorporated somehow in the Central Planning in order to secure manpower
for us as well as the material. Now we got the first workers in
November; prior to that date none at all. Of course, by taking into
account the many fluctuations he arrives at fantastic figures. We try to
diminish the fluctuations with the aid of Himmler and Ley. The military
physicians are put in to examine the men. I have proposed that a man who
leaves his working place more than three times a year, should be put
into a detention camp and be released only when he stays on the very
spot. * * *
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-449
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 148
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF GL-CONFERENCE,
2 MARCH 1943
[Handwritten marginal notes] To my files Mi
Secret
_SHORTHAND TRANSCRIPT OF THE GL-CONFERENCE_
_PRESIDED OVER BY THE STATE SECRETARY FIELD_
_MARSHAL MILCH ON TUESDAY, 2 MARCH 1943,_
_10 A.M. IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY_
* * * * *
MILCH: Another question! All the reports from France show that the
French have got their heads full of political thoughts and ideas. On the
basis of the news they tell themselves: They are retreating on the
eastern front and the English and Americans are gradually getting afraid
that the Russians alone will be victorious. The French go on to say: If
the promises made to us by the Americans are really kept, our fortunes
are made. That has already led to our foreign workers slowly becoming
hostile. On principle I have to be informed of every case of
swinishness. I do not understand at all why Germany should put up with
it when Poles and Frenchmen explain to the people: Today indeed you are
still sitting in this work, but later we shall be the owners and if you
treat us properly we shall see to it then that you are shot dead
immediately and not tortured first. In all these matters energetic
interference must be made. I am of the opinion that there should be only
two types of punishment in such cases: firstly, a concentration camp for
foreigners, and secondly, capital punishment. If a certain number of
such hostile elements are removed and the others are informed, they will
then work better. Their love for us certainly won’t become any greater,
but neither will their hate, for it is already strong enough. In this
respect, too, energetic interference must be made and in no case must
the workers put up with it. The best method is to give the person
concerned one with a sledge-hammer and I shall treat with distinction
every man who does something like that whenever he hears such stupid
nonsense. We are living in a total war and the workers must be told that
they don’t have to put up with anything. Now the question is whether or
not the gentlemen believe on the whole that we achieve something worth
mentioning with our production in France. For then we must consider that
the establishments there will be besieged. Then the French would have to
be forced to come to Germany. There I must reflect on whether the
available means of compulsion are sufficient. That does not depend on
me. But, in the abstract, I see no difficulties in the way of getting
100,000 or 200,000 French workers to Germany, nor do I see any
difficulties in the way of keeping them in order. If a case of sabotage
occurs in one area, every tenth man in that area will be shot. Then such
acts of sabotage would cease of themselves. The western peoples are very
much afraid of death, while it is a quite different matter with the
Russians.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-195
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 143
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF CONFERENCE WITH GOERING, 28
OCTOBER 1943
[Handwritten] Notes for Discussion No 116/43/KD st. 4th copy
[Signature] MILCH
_STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF THE DISCUSSION WITH_
_THE REICH MARSHAL ON 28 OCTOBER 1943,_
_12 O’CLOCK AT KARINHALL_
Subject: Allocation of Labor.
Effects of the Drafting of Laborers.
Participants:
Reich Marshal
Reich Minister Speer
Field Marshal Milch
Gauleiter Sauckel
General von der Heyde
Staatsrat Gritzbach
Ministerialrat Dr. Groennert
Ministerialdirektor Hildebrand
Landrat Berg
Lt. Colonel Biesing, GSC
Lt. Colonel von Brauchitsch, GSC
Director Frydag
Dr. Janicke/Dr. Eggeling/Bs
25 October 1943
* * * * *
MILCH: Interesting are the figures on the decrease of prisoners of war
where one had believed they would remain stable. Between January and
August the figure went down for the Russians from 22,000 to 19,000; for
the others, from 48,000 to 28,000. In the summer the prisoners of war
decreased from 70,000 to 48,000.
* * * * *
REICH MARSHAL: But here you report to me and to the Fuehrer: From 1
January to 30 September a total of 2,200,000 in manpower could be made
available for armament production,
(Comment by SAUCKEL: But not for the first time.)
among whom there are 770,000 prisoners of war. Through allocation
300,000 of these who had been drafted for armament and the armed
services, and those who left for other reasons, were replaced, and labor
for the most important armament industries was increased by 650,000,
from 5.3 million to 5.9 million.
(Reading continued.)
FRYDAG: Those are the total allocations.
(REICH MARSHAL: I took that to be net allocation.)
No, gross.
MILCH: The Luftwaffe has increased by 150,000 men; the army by 240,000;
the navy by 50,000; military administration has remained stable. For the
Wehrmacht armament alone, there has been an increase of 400,000 men.
Then other industries, including state railway [Reichsbahn], postal
service, experts basic materials industry, make a total increase of 5.29
million, i.e., an actual addition of 500,000 men in this whole area
within half a year.
* * * * *
REICH MARSHAL: Then there is one more question which again belongs here
and which in all seriousness must be discussed. Suppose that, in the
central sector of Holland, between Arnhem, Utrecht, and Dortrecht, I
place at your disposal for three days 15,000 young German
soldiers—recruits who have been there eight days, together with their
respective officers’ corps for handling the executive—to catch the
young Dutchmen (this would have to be carefully prepared, of
course)—would you expect good results? It goes without saying that
everything must be well organized in advance, transport to move them
out, camps to receive them here, far away from the Dutch frontier.
SAUCKEL: Considering the Dutch population figure that amounts to
something. However, the same should be done in Poland and France.
REICH MARSHAL: Naturally, after that has been done once, one has to
modify the system for the second blow. Then the Dutch people will no
longer be out in the streets on Sundays for pleasure promenades.
SPEER: Care should be taken though, not to affect the protected
industries which we have established there. Their workers are also out
for walks on Sundays.
REICH MARSHAL: First, all of the people must be brought together in a
pen [Pferch]; then they will be asked individually who works where, and
then the men will be selected accordingly.
SAUCKEL: We should like to set an example. However, I do not like to
rely on this alone for the next year; but I should like to ask that one
have the confidence in us that, reasonably speaking we are doing things
in the right way. The factories which Speer barred to us * * *.
REICH MARSHAL: Really I am not imposing. But when I constantly hear: I
could do very much if I only had the executive power, then I am ready to
assist you, not permanently, but then, for five days or one week, by
putting my men at your disposal. In France also we have training
regiments, and the army, too, could arrange to make certain units
available so as to make a big push.
SAUCKEL: If I may be permitted to speak quite frankly, the conditions
are as follows: All of our Military Commanders, and also our
Commissioners General—with the exception of Koch—also the general
governors, take the stand that in all of their regions the supreme law
is tranquility and order. Also during the present era of war these
German people still feel—after all that is typically German—the
inherent obligation of maintaining order in their country and of somehow
protecting the local population.
(REICH MARSHAL: They do not see Germany, but Seyss-Inquart sees
Holland only.)
That is the greatest difficulty which we face, and in spite of the
obduracy which is there I am of the opinion that we really have more
friends in these countries than we imagine. I shall place my reports at
your disposal, among them a detailed report of a Flemish man, an
economist who lives with his wife in Weimar, works there, and who at the
same time looks after the Flemish people in my district. The matter is
as follows: Our highest political authorities in these countries
cultivate to some extent social contacts with the local high society;
thus in Belgium, bluntly stated, with elite circles, the high financial
circles, and leaders of industry. They show to the German commanders in
chief a certain demeanor of courteousness and of conventionality and
thereby satisfy our gentlemen to a great extent. Under this mask,
however, they permit their nearest subordinate organizations to
persecute and harass everybody who is in any way friendly to Germany.
Unwillingly and without being suspected by our gentlemen [Herren] we
have in this manner placed the Germans who were there under pressure.
They all have become fearful, and they bar their minds against Germany,
and those who really did something for Germany resign.
* * * * *
REICH MARSHAL: * * * Our method of procedure in the expansion of the
large air fields, Sauckel, would then be that, we try, first of all, to
get a hold of the available labor in the vicinity of the harbors in
France, Belgium, and Holland which so far has not been recruited in any
manner by Speer or by the Luftwaffe, or by you—just as the Russians do,
and as the British now also are doing in Southern Italy and Sicily.
There is a scarcity of water there and he who loafs is not permitted to
come near the water tap. They are very strict on this point. Now, in the
fifth year of the war, we too must be just as strict. And over and above
this I still need workers who will be fetched from regions farther away
if those from the immediate vicinity are not sufficient. And then come
specialists, whom Speer makes available from his organization, the
engine operators and so forth. If I am to rearm the Luftwaffe with
everything that is conceivable now, I do need a considerable reserve
stock of laborers. Technical workers must be included. This is in
addition to the number necessary for fulfilling needs arising from
actual fluctuation and departure of workers. Now that would have to be
considered in detail.
SAUCKEL: May I call attention to the following: That which makes things
very difficult for me at the moment is the question of our currency. It
is a fact that prices in France, and in the entire west, are very much
out of proportion. If we bring the workers to Germany and, according to
German standards, we pay them just as well as the German workers, that
does not help them at all because their families living in the occupied
territories cannot buy anything with the money that the people transfer.
I should like to ask you, Herr Reich Marshal, to talk with Reich
Minister Funk and the other competent officials so that under all
circumstances and with all possible means the German mark will preserve
its purchasing power against the French franc, just as it was done on
the other side, during the World War.
REICH MARSHAL: All we need to do is to fix the rate of exchange, just as
was done at that time with the dollar, i.e., today the German mark
equals 20 francs, tomorrow 23, then 27, then 40, etc., etc., up to one
million, or one billion. We have had all that. The same holds true for
the guilder. One cigarette now costs in Holland 1.50 guilders; formerly
it cost 10 cents. I merely have to say: 1.50 guilders equal to 10
pfennigs, or one mark equals 15 guilders.
SAUCKEL: That would solve a big problem in the wage question.
REICH MARSHAL: The same is done in Belgium. I shall schedule a
discussion on that with Mr. Funk. With friendly nations it is more
difficult; nevertheless, there, too, we have to do it.
SAUCKEL: There is still something I should like to say. If this
large-scale recruiting is carried into effect, even with coercion, it is
nothing but compliance with laws which were promulgated there by their
own governments, except that the governments declare they lack the
executive power.
REICH MARSHAL: That is always the excuse; I simply shall give them the
executive power.
Well, let me summarize it once more. We undoubtedly are agreed on the
fact that what Sauckel brings to us here, and that which to us appears
as stocking up, has been subject to a natural compromise and actually a
greater number of people was necessary, to make up for the losses. If it
had been impossible to obtain more labor there would, of necessity, have
been a decrease, merely by reason of the draft, the increased rate of
disease during the war, deaths, etc. The decrease in prisoners of war
should really be insignificant unless there are modifications; on the
contrary, I should like to see that the prisoners of war who had been
released, Norwegians, and so forth, be taken again. Insofar as officers
are concerned this has been done to a certain extent. It was the
greatest nonsense ever committed by us and for which nobody thanks us.
We have made prisoners of entire armies and we let them go again. We do
not get anything from Norway?
SAUCKEL: No. Even Russians are being taken there, also French
specialists.
(REICH MARSHAL: Why?)
The tasks there are much bigger than the population could cope with.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-180
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 155
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC NOTES ON THE CONFERENCE AT
THE REICH MARSHAL’S ON THURSDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 1943,
11 O’CLOCK AT THE JUNKERS PLANT IN DESSAU
* * * * *
THE REICH MARSHAL: Give the prisoner-of-war camp [Stalag] commander my
greetings and tell him I said the Stalag is the biggest racket in
Germany and merely a camp where get-aways are being organized wholesale.
The men do not even have to bother to dig a tunnel, since they can walk
out freely in broad daylight. The Italians get beaten up when they do
not work. * * * It is absolutely useless to take the Italians as
soldiers, for they report for duty, it is true, but then they bolt
again. We need them here, however, as workers for the 100,000 men
operation. In the second place, why do we not get the machines? If I
want to have them, I just have to occupy a factory by surprise.
MILCH: There are no transportation facilities to make this possible. We
have to let certain plants go on working in Italy, such as ball
bearings, steel castings, and others, and we cannot take the people from
there. The same applies to the technical sphere. The people there are
working for us. All depends on our policy toward the Italians. I have
ordered that they can be beaten up if they do not work. I have also
given permission that Italians caught sabotaging be sentenced to death.
If this measure is not desired by the higher authorities, which seems to
be the case, we are powerless; then the Italians in the Reich will not
be of any use to us, and they will not do anything down there either.
Now the Italian has found the way out, he goes into the militia and,
once he is over there, he bolts. There is one other way to make him
work; if we do not provide the Italian with food and tell him: only
those who fight and work for us will get food.
(THE REICH MARSHAL: That is what the Americans do!)
Why do we not do it? In my opinion we should try to get the machines by
force. We can manufacture 1,000 pursuit planes in Italy and the engines
for them. The engines will go only through Junkers, the other parts only
through Messerschmitt. I should like to have the 109 and the 605 in
Italy while they are still working, so that we can modernize our
factories. We have the further advantage that the enemy drops his bombs
not only on Germany, but also on Italy. We can disperse industry there
in small valleys and we need not use the big Milan plants. The situation
there is rather favorable.
THE REICH MARSHAL: Above all, this question must be discussed at once
with the Fuehrer.
(End of the conference at 11:45 p.m.)
* * * * *
St
149-43 III gK [Stamp]
Top Secret
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich
Adjutant’s office
Adj. 2019-43 top secret
[Pencil note] For my files
Berlin W 8 Leipziger Str. #3
Telephone: 120044
Headquarters, 12 Nov. 1943
2 copies, 1st copy
[initialed] Mi 15 Nov.
To the State Secretary for Aviation and Inspector General of the Air
Force, Field Marshal Milch.
Reich Air Ministry
Forwarded herewith for your attention and further handling are the
uncorrected stenographic notes on the conference at the Reich Marshal’s
[Office] on 28 October 1943.
Inclosure:
Notes on conference No. 116-13
Top Secret—4th copy.
[signature] BRAUCHITSCH
Lieutenant Colonel, GSC and Chief Adjutant
EXTRACTS FROM TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS MAX KOENIG[136]
_DIRECT EXAMINATION_
DR. BERGOLD: Will you please give the Court your first name and second
name?
WITNESS KOENIG: Max Koenig.
Q. When were you born?
A. 19 August 1897.
Q. What was your last position in the war with the Wehrmacht?
A. Lieutenant colonel in the reserve.
Q. And where were you?
A. With the commander of the Luftwaffe in Rechlin in charge of the
testing station.
Q. Is it known to you, Witness, whether and what sort of orders, if at
all, Milch gave with reference to the treatment of so-called terror
pilots?
A. My department was subordinate to the GL, and therefore received
orders from that office concerning the treatment of pilots who had made
emergency landings, and such orders were to the effect to inform the
Buergermeister [mayors] and the councillors that the prisoners who had
made emergency landings should be sent to Oberursel at once.
Q. Then were these orders given or were they repeated in certain cases?
A. I myself went there in 1942 to that office and I remember very well
that the first orders in this respect were given in 1943 and then in
1944.
Q. Have these orders provided for the taking of prisoners of all pilots
by the Luftwaffe and taking them to Oberursel?
A. The GL ordered, followed by the threatening of heavy punishment if
the orders were not followed, that all pilots who bailed out or made
emergency landings should be taken at once in the quickest way possible
to Oberursel.
Q. Did you transmit these orders to the mayors and councillors of your
district?
A. These orders were passed on by the commander of the testing station
to the ground organization of the base, passed on to all Buergermeister
and the city councillors.
Q. Can you confirm that these orders came from Milch?
A. They came from the GL. It was even ordered how we should proceed. As
far as I can recall we were ordered, among other things, that the
contents of their pockets should be taken away from the pilots and sent
to Oberursel with an accompanying letter.
Q. Did you know at that time that the Party wanted the pilots to be
treated in a different manner?
A. I did not know that for we in Rechlin had hardly any contact with the
Party.
Q. Therefore, you never corrected orders from the Party? Or would you
have done this?
A. No. We were subordinate to the GL, and, therefore, we could only take
orders from that superior office.
Q. Witness, what do you know within your office as to how concentration
camp inmates were treated?
A. I should say this: When labor was requested for the building of a
pillbox, we were given a detachment from Oranienburg. These prisoners
were housed by the evacuating of our testing station, that means our
German soldiers, in Laerz, and prisoners from the concentration camp at
Oranienburg were moved into the billets of the German soldiers. There
were about a thousand of these.
Q. Were the barracks in good condition?
A. They were not barracks in the bad sense of the word. They were the
best billets which we had at our disposal in Laerz. They were new
buildings and contained, apart from the living rooms, a theater room,
and a big kitchen with, I believe, four stoves. I know the camp because
I visited it repeatedly.
Q. Witness, what orders did you receive for treating of those people by
the GL?
A. I remember two orders that were to the effect that all those who
actually worked, whether foreigners or concentration camp inmates,
should be treated well in order to save their good health and in order
to increase their production.
Q. What has been done for that purpose?
A. As far as their health was concerned, under this order, I repeatedly
saw to it that I obtained medical supplies from the hospital [Revier] of
Rechlin.
Q. What you call the Revier is the hospital ward?
A. “Revier” is the sickroom which, considering the bigness of the
agency, is approximately the equivalent to a hospital * * *.
Q. Let us go back to concentration camp inmates. What has been done in
health matters?
A. Near Rechlin, there was an estate called Boek. This estate consisted
of several thousand acres and apart from potatoes and turnips also
produced wheat. On orders from the GL we received from that estate for
the commando in Laerz and for the concentration camp and for the foreign
workers large quantities of goods produced there.
Q. These concentration camp inmates; were they exploited unfairly?
A. I can say this—I myself was in the hall east from there up to the
building of the commander, which was about a kilometer and a half. The
foreign workers and concentration camp inmates lived in smaller and
bigger groups and worked in such groups, but I could always observe them
when I walked along the lanes. It seemed that when the civilian and
other employees there were still working, the concentration camp groups
had already stopped working because they had to be in their camp at a
certain time. The time they needed to march to and fro was part of their
working hours.
Q. Were they told to work particularly fast, or particularly heavy?
A. I can say this that I could really judge them because after all I saw
them almost daily. Their work was not particularly slow, it wasn’t
particularly fast. And one couldn’t say they were driven on.
Q. Were these people happy or did you hear complaints?
A. Should complaints have occurred I would have been the first to hear
about them for it would have been my job to hear them, because I headed
the particular office for food and treatment which was the liaison
office between ourselves and the Stalags. I even listened at times to
outbursts of joy. And from the liaison office we bought everything,
beginning from cigarettes and other small gifts, foodstuffs, etc. This
was used both in the camps and foreign workers, and the foreign workers
were always running about freely there.
Q. Did your office ask for concentration camp inmates or were they sent
to you by labor exchange on the basis of assignment of labor?
A. We had to use two ways, we had to use two channels here—one through
labor exchanges and the other through the GL who ordered labor for us
and on the basis of our application with the labor exchanges and the GL,
this special commando and attachment came, whether on the basis of our
application I really don’t know.
Q. Did you request concentration camp inmates or simply workers?
A. I may say quite frankly here I asked for German workers and I
expected they would turn up but as we were under orders to maintain
secrecy, neither did I think of foreign workers nor concentration camp
inmates.
* * * * *
_CROSS-EXAMINATION_
MR. DENNEY: Just what was your job in Rechlin?
A. I was I B or I Bertha—that means an organization, and my job was
looking after the army.
* * * * *
Q. Well, in your position having to do with figures you possibly were
concerned with labor in Rechlin?
A. From Rechlin we were ordered to build a shelter in Laerz, and to
carry this out we had to ask for labor.
Q. Didn’t they consolidate requests for labor and give them to you and
you would send them up?
A. Requests were sent on to the labor offices on the one hand, and on
the other hand to the GL.
Q. And they were sent by you?
A. They were sent by the commanding officer of the testing station, that
is, to say, my superior officer.
Q. But you got them up and gave them to him to send them on?
A. I worked on them and passed them on to my commanding officer.
Q. You said that you had concentration camp workers—you also had
foreign workers didn’t you?
A. There were about 1,000 concentration inmates and a certain number of
foreign workers—Russians, French, and Italians.
Q. Did you have any prisoners of war?
A. Yes. We had some prisoners of war.
Q. How many people were employed there altogether?
A. In Rechlin, prisoners of war and foreign workers, Germans, altogether
there were 4 to 5 thousand.
Q. Well, now we have got 1,000 concentration camp workers. So that
leaves 3 to 4 thousand. How were those broken down among prisoners of
war, foreign workers, and Germans?
A. Prisoners of war, roughly 500. There were about 300 foreigners, and
the rest were German civilians and German military personnel.
Q. Now, these concentration camp workers, were they guarded?
A. They were guarded in their own camps and in some cases on trucks were
taken to their places of work on the east Boek airstrip.
Q. And the foreigners, were they guarded?
A. I think they were at first a little guarded or, let us say, not at
all.
Q. How about the prisoners of war?
A. The prisoners of war were under a similar condition as there were not
very many guards at our disposal—guards were very few.
Q. You talked about the concentration camp people marching back and
forth. Were they marching under guard?
A. Yes. They marched under guard.
Q. In the stockade?
A. They were in large camps or huts under stockade and under guard.
Q. Was there barbed wire around it?
A. Yes. There was barbed wire.
Q. And guards walking around?
A. And guards, yes.
A. Armed guards?
A. Yes. They were armed.
Q. Now, you told about passing on these orders about the terror fliers
to the Buergermeister [mayor]. The order that you spoke of that you got
from the defendant?
A. From the GL.
Q. The GL was Field Marshal Milch?
A. That was Herr Milch.
Q. And you gave those orders on to the Buergermeister about the
so-called “terror fliers”?
A. The Buergermeister and county councillors.
Q. And then one day you heard about four fliers who had parachuted or
made a forced landing—anyway they came down—and you sent your soldiers
over there and you were told that they were not available?
A. No. The officer came back and said that the police had arrested the
four pilots who had made a forced landing, contrary to our order and
contrary to the regulations where the telephone number of our airfield
had to be passed on to the Buergermeister. The report to the
Buergermeister had the purpose to inform the airfield as quickly as
possible so that from there a truck could pick up the pilots.
Q. Which police had taken these four fliers?
A. Unfortunately, I do not know. The officer of the airfield came back
and reported that the police had fetched them. He didn’t see the police.
He merely was informed by the Buergermeister of this.
Q. And then what did you do? Did you call the Buergermeister up?
A. No. We passed this on to the airfield and the airfield reported this
to the Luftgau. The Luftgau is the next superior office above the
airfield.
Q. Did they ever get these four fliers back?
A. No.
Q. They never got them back?
A. I do not know where they were taken to.
Q. You were the second man at Rechlin. You know that these orders were
passed on to the Buergermeister that you received through your immediate
superior from the Generalluftzeugmeister?
A. I was not the second man. I was E commander—commander of that
office. I was purely an expert in I B. I was concerned in this because
Colonel Petersen of the SD commando ordered the airfield should make
investigations because of the Milch order to the effect that every pilot
should be at once taken to Oberursel.
Q. At any rate, you didn’t do anything about this after you heard it?
A. Oh, yes. The report was immediately sent to the Luftgau that the
pilots had been taken away.
Q. Did you send the report?
A. No. The report had to be sent by the competent office of the ground
organization—namely, the airfield.
Q. You never made any effort to find out what happened to these four
Allied fliers?
A. Oh, yes, that was passed on at once and the airfield having received
it sent it on to the Luftgau and continued to work on this matter. What
happened at the end I could not possibly find out because the Luftgau,
the next highest office, had to report on it through those channels of
command.
Q. You never tried to find out, did you? Did you ever call up anybody
over at the Luftgau and ask them what happened to these four fliers?
A. No. I could hardly do that because I belonged to the testing station
and there was a certain amount of dualism. It was rather like air
activity on the one hand and the ground organization on the other.
Q. You knew what the Hitler order was about terror fliers, didn’t you?
A. Yes. I learned about this much, much later after this emergency
landing in 1944. I heard about this in 1945 when I was interrogated in
Munich by the Reich Marshal Special Court.
Q. What nationality were these pilots?
A. I could not say that. I assumed they were Americans, but I could not
say that with certainty because we never saw the insignia of the
aircraft nor even the pilots themselves as we did not take them
prisoners.
Q. Were there any SD units around where you were?
A. In Rechlin itself, no, but my chief, Petersen, and I myself learned
later on that we were supervised by the SD service.
Q. You say that in your position you would have heard complaints from
any of the workers, of whom you had four to five thousand of whom
approximately two-thousand were made up of concentration camp workers,
prisoners of war, and foreign workers. You never got a single complaint
from any of those people, is that right?
A. No. I can only confirm that repeatedly the foreign workers gave
expressions of their gratitude for having this liaison office, which
consisted of a sergeant, and for the additional supplies which they thus
got from the Stalag. Strictly speaking, we would have been forbidden to
enter the concentration camp compound because it was part of
Oranienburg, and Oranienburg was an SS agency.
Q. So you never were inside, were you, in the concentration camp?
A. I went repeatedly there. I myself attended the hospital hours. That
is to say, I looked at the ill people before they saw the doctor and I
asked the doctor afterwards if he needed anything, and thereupon I got
the medical supplies from the airfield and for that purpose I was able
to do this because I was supported by the order of the GL.
Q. The Generalluftzeugmeister was able to arrange it so you could go
into the camp and look around?
A. On the basis of the order where it was my duty to look after the
people that they should be well-treated and well-looked after and,
therefore, I was admitted into their compound.
Q. And the compound was under the jurisdiction of the SS who had
jurisdiction over * * *.
A. (Interrupting) Yes. That was under the jurisdiction of the SS.
Q. And they had jurisdiction over all of the concentration camps?
A. I didn’t know that but all I know is that they came from Oranienburg
and that the regulations concerning that compound came from Oranienburg.
Q. You knew that Himmler was head of the SS?
A. I heard about that in 1945.
Q. In 1945 you found out that Himmler was the Reich Leader SS?
A. Yes.
Q. I have no more questions.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Witness, you mean you did not know, before 1945, of the
power Himmler had in the SS?
A. No, your Honor. Particularly in the testing station we did not
discuss that nor did we receive many reports there. The attitude of my
chief—I may perhaps say here, of the GL himself—it was known what
their attitude was towards the Party. We ourselves were under the
Gauleiter of Mecklenburg who supervised us. Therefore, we went to no
trouble to look into other matters.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: This testing station was in Germany, wasn’t it?
A. Yes. Rechlin is roughly 120 kilometers northeast of Berlin on the
Muelef Lake [northwest of Berlin on Lake Mueritz].
Q. And an officer of the German army, 120 kilometers from Berlin, didn’t
know who Himmler was until 1945?
A. Of course, I knew that Himmler was a Party member but that Himmler
had all the concentration camps under him I really didn’t know until
very much later.
Q. But you knew he was head of the SS?
A. I knew that he was an SS commander. I did not know until then that he
was the head of the SS.
JUDGE PHILLIPS: How many concentration camp victims did you hear were
killed up to 1945, starved to death and killed?
A. I did not know that and I only learned it from press notices which
came out in connection with the Nuernberg trials.
Q. How many concentration camp workers were killed in your camp?
A. Nobody was tortured or killed in our camp; not even one man.
Q. Did any of them die a natural death while you were there?
A. Nobody died; I can confirm to the Court that both the health and the
individuals’ happiness was such that there was neither case of death nor
complaint.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The name of this concentration camp I must know.
What was it?
A. The camp was near Rechlin and was an agency attached to Oranienburg.
Q. That was Oranienburg you were talking about?
A. It must have been a branch of Oranienburg. Up to my resignation on 31
January 1945, neither a torture nor a fatality occurred there. I said
that before, your Honor, and I should like to repeat it.
Q. Don’t repeat it.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: How many inmates were there in this camp; what was the
population of this camp?
A. The camp was roughly about 1,000 people strong.
Q. And how long were you there?
A. From October 1942 until 31 January 1945.
Q. And you say that in approximately three years’ time there was not one
death in this camp?
A. Your Honor, the camp was not founded in 1942; as far as I can
remember, it only came at the end of 1943 or early in 1944. I cannot
give you the exact figure of the arrivals. I think it must have been at
the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944.
Q. And in all that time there was not one single death in the entire
camp?
A. Your Honor, I had not heard of one single case of death. Should one
case of death have occurred, it is possible that the SS in Oranienburg
would have been told. We ourselves had not heard of one case of death in
that camp, but during the day we assigned SS men in various groups.
Q. Do you mean this camp was functioning as a health resort?
A. On that, I can say, your Honor, that after the end of the war, I
heard that before the end of the war when people left, they left very
reluctantly, because there they were given food just as much as was
corresponding to their performance and, in turn, they were actually able
to work there.
-----
[134] Generalluftzeugmeister was translated as: Aircraft Master General,
Air Ordnance Master General, Chief of Supply for the Air Forces, Chief
of Air Forces Special Supply and Procurement Service, Director of
Supplies, and Director General of Air Force Equipment.
[135] Word is missing in German original document.
[136] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 17 Feb.
47, pp. 1189-1204.
B. Medical Experiments
a. Introduction
The defendant Milch was charged with participation in criminal medical
experiments. On this charge he was acquitted. Both the judgment and the
concurring opinions deal extensively with this topic; also Volume I of
this series, and the first part of the present volume, contains
considerable documentation from Case I (the Medical Case) on the same
medical experiments for participation in which the defendant Milch was
indicted. Hence, only a small portion of the evidence on medical
experiments offered in the Milch Case has been included in the present
volume. Some of the prosecution documents which were directly related to
the defendant Milch have been included here as well as the testimony of
the defense witness SS General Wolff. Documents NO-285, NO-289, NO-224,
343-A-PS, and 343-B-PS, published as part of the Medical Case, were also
introduced in the Milch Case. Further defense testimony on this topic
may be found by consulting the official record.
The following defendants in Case I (the Medical Case) testified as
witnesses for the defendant Milch: Hans Wolfgang Romberg, Wolfram
Sievers, Hermann Becker-Freyseng, Georg August Weltz, and Rudolf Brandt.
In addition, six other defense witnesses testified regarding the medical
experiments: Erich Hippke, Walter Neff, Dr. Leo Alexander, Siegfried
Ruff, Karl Wolff, and Gerhard Engel. See list of witnesses for dates and
transcript page references on pages 889-90.
b. Evidence
PROSECUTION DOCUMENTS
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
NOKW-041 113 Sworn statement by Hermann 626
Goering, 27 September 1946,
concerning Milch’s position
as Inspector General of the
Luftwaffe.
NO-219 83 Letter from Dr. Rudolf Brandt 626
to Dr. Rascher, 27 April
1942, concerning medical
experiment report for Himmler
and Milch.
NO-261 89 Letter from Milch to Dr. 626
Hippke, 4 June 1942,
concerning availability of
low-pressure air chamber for
experiments.
1607-B-PS 115 Letter from Dr. Rascher to Dr. 627
Brandt, 20 July 1942,
concerning report on
high-altitude experiments.
1607-A-PS 115 Letter from Himmler to Milch, 628
25 August 1942, concerning
Dr. Rascher’s report on
high-altitude experiments.
1617-PS 111 Letter from Himmler to Milch, 629
13 November 1942, concerning
Rascher’s transfer to the
Waffen SS.
NO-262 119 Letter from Dr. Hippke to SS 631
Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff, 6
March 1943, concerning
Rascher’s transfer to the
Waffen SS.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-041
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 113
SWORN STATEMENT BY HERMANN GOERING, 27 SEPTEMBER 1946,
CONCERNING MILCH’S POSITION AS INSPECTOR GENERAL
OF THE LUFTWAFFE
I, Hermann Goering, swear, depose, and state:
That I am the former Reich Marshal of the German Reich and the former
Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, that I have personal knowledge of
all the facts stated here, and that I know these facts because of the
position and responsibility which I had in the German Reich.
That in approximately 1939 the former Field Marshal Erhard Milch was
appointed Inspector General [Generalinspekteur] of the Luftwaffe and
that as such he was directly responsible to me for the performance of
his duties.
That the Inspector General of the Luftwaffe was in charge of all tasks
and responsibilities, with the exception of those which were concerned
with tactical operations (the latter were handled by my Chief of Staff).
The supervision of the inspections, as well as the affairs of the health
and medical inspections, was included in the tasks of the Office of the
Inspector General. Special questions, however, such as the number of
hospitals to be put at the disposal of the individual air fleets, fell
within the province of my Chief of Staff.
That Generaloberstabsarzt [Lt. Gen., Medical Service] Dr. Erich Hippke
was Chief of the Medical Service [Sanitaetswesen] of the Luftwaffe
during the years 1941 till 1944 inclusive; that the Office of the Chief
of the Medical Service was directly responsible for the execution of all
medical research and experiments; that the Office of the Chief of the
Medical Service, i.e., Hippke’s office, was directly subordinated to the
Inspector General, the former Field Marshal Milch.
I have read the foregoing deposition consisting of two pages, in the
German language, and declare that it is the full truth to the best of my
knowledge and belief. I have had the opportunity to make changes and
corrections in the above statement. I made this declaration voluntarily
without any promise of reward, and I was not subjected to any duress or
threat whatsoever. Nuernberg, 27 September 1946.
[Signed] HERMANN GOERING
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-219
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 83
LETTER FROM DR. RUDOLF BRANDT TO DR. RASCHER, 27 APRIL 1942, CONCERNING
MEDICAL EXPERIMENT REPORT FOR HIMMLER AND MILCH
Top Secret
XI a-59
Fuehrer Headquarters, 27 April 1942
1198/42
Bra-N
To SS Untersturmfuehrer Dr. Sigmund Rascher
Munich
56 Troger Street
Dear Comrade Dr. Rascher:
The Reich Leader [Himmler] has seen your letter of 16 April 1942. He has
shown the same interest in this report as in the one you sent recently.
He would like you to make up for him an over-all report on the
experiments carried out to date, which he would like to present
personally to Field Marshal Milch.
Kind regards to your wife and yourself,
Heil Hitler!
Yours
[initialed] R. Br.
SS Obersturmbannfuehrer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-261
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 89
LETTER FROM MILCH TO DR. HIPPKE, 4 JUNE 1942, CONCERNING
AVAILABILITY OF LOW-PRESSURE AIR CHAMBER FOR EXPERIMENTS
The State Secretary for Aviation and Inspector General of the
Luftwaffe
Berlin W 8, Leipziger Street 7, 4 June 1942
Telephone 12 00 47
Dear Herr Hippke!
According to the agreement with the Reich Leader SS the low-pressure air
chamber for experiments in the neighborhood of Munich is still to be
available for two further months.
Moreover, Stabsarzt Dr. Rascher is, in addition to his tests in the
Luftwaffe, to be on duty for the present for the purposes of the Reich
Leader SS.
Heil Hitler!
Yours
Generaloberstabsarzt Professor Dr. Hippke
Berlin-Tempelhof.
Copy
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS Wolff
Berlin SW 11.
Heil Hitler!
and kind regards,
Yours,
[signature] MILCH
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1607-B-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 115
LETTER FROM DR. RASCHER TO DR. BRANDT, 20 JULY 1942, CONCERNING REPORT
ON HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS
Stabsarzt Dr. Rascher
Ahnenerbe RF-SS
Munich, 20 July 1942
Top Secret
SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. R. Brandt
Berlin, RF-SS.
Very esteemed Dr. Brandt,
Enclosed please find a copy of the work of myself and Romberg,
“Experiments for Rescue from High Altitudes”.
On 14 July 1942, I was ordered by the Reich Leader SS to send you the
above-mentioned report. The Reich Leader wants that report to be
forwarded to Field Marshal Milch, accompanied by a letter from him,
asking Milch to receive Romberg and me for a lecture. I believe to have
understood correctly that the Reich Leader thought you would submit to
him a letter to that effect for his signature.
I was very glad to hear that the Reich Leader was satisfied with the
result of the work at Dachau and with the film, and that he ordered an
intensive continuation of the work in that field.
I recommended Romberg for the War Merit Cross 2d Class
[“Kriegsverdienstkreuz II. Klasse”] on the request of SS
Obersturmbannfuehrer Sievers. SS Standartenfuehrer Dr. Wuest ordered me
to notify you hereof.
The Reich Leader furthermore decided on 14 July 1942 that the prisoner
Sobota and the two prisoners who work in the dissection room in Dachau
should be released and transferred to the group “Dirlewanger.” The exact
names are in possession of SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Sievers. The Reich
Leader has also issued an order to that effect to Major Suchaneck.
I thank you cordially for everything and remain
Heil Hitler!
[handwritten] Very faithfully yours,
[Signed] DR. S. RASCHER
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1607-A-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 115[137]
LETTER FROM HIMMLER TO MILCH, 25 AUGUST 1942, CONCERNING
DR. RASCHER’S REPORT ON HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS
Field Headquarters, 25 August 1942
Field Marshal Milch
Secret
Dear Milch:
Enclosed please find a report about experiments for rescue from high
altitudes, which have been carried out by Stabsarzt Dr. S. Rascher and
Dr. med. H. W. Romberg. I saw a film[138] produced by Dr. Rascher.
I consider the results of those experiments as so important for the air
force, that I beg you to receive Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg
I consider the results of those experiments as so important for the air
force, that I beg you to receive Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg that, after
having seen the film, you will also refer the matter to the Reich
Marshal because of its importance.
I would be obliged if you could let me know your opinion in time.
Friendly greetings and
Heil Hitler!
H. H. [initials of Himmler]
27 August 1942
[initial illegible]
1 Enclosure
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1617-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 111
LETTER FROM HIMMLER TO MILCH, 13 NOVEMBER 1942, CONCERNING RASCHER’S
TRANSFER TO THE WAFFEN SS
The Reich Leader SS
Berlin, SW 11, 8 Prinz Albrecht Street
Field Command Post
13 November 1942
Secret
Dear Comrade Milch:
You will recall that through General Wolff I particularly recommended
for your consideration the work of a certain SS Fuehrer Dr. Rascher, who
is a medical officer of the air force reserve [Arzt des
Beurlaubtenstandes der Luftwaffe].
These researches which deal with the behavior of the human organism at
great heights, as well as with manifestations caused by prolonged
cooling of the human body in cold water and similar problems which are
of vital importance to the air force in particular, can be performed by
us with particular efficiency because I personally assumed the
responsibility for supplying asocial individuals and criminals, who
deserve only to die [todeswuerdig], from concentration camps for these
experiments.
Unfortunately, you had no time recently when Dr. Rascher wanted to
report on the experiments at the Ministry of Aviation. I had put great
hopes in that report, because I believed that in this way the
difficulties, based mainly on religious objections to Dr. Rascher’s
experiments—for which I assumed responsibility—could be eliminated.
The difficulties are still the same now as before. In these Christian
medical circles the standpoint is being taken that it goes without
saying that a young German aviator should be allowed to risk his life
but that the life of a criminal—who is not drafted into military
service—is too sacred for this purpose and one should not stain oneself
with this guilt; at the same time it is interesting to note that credit
is taken for the results of the experiments while excluding the
scientist who performed them.
I personally have inspected the experiments, and have—I can say this
without exaggeration—participated in every phase of this scientific
work in a helpful and inspiring manner.
We two should not get angry about these difficulties. It will take at
least another ten years until we can get such narrow-mindedness out of
our people. But this should not affect the research work which is
necessary for our young, splendid soldiers and aviators.
I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt of the reserve, from the air
force and to transfer him to the Waffen SS. I would then assume the sole
responsibility for having these experiments made in this field and would
put the results, of which we in the SS need only a part for the frost
injuries in the East, entirely at the disposal of the air force.
However, in this connection I suggest that with the liaison between you
and Wolff, a “non-Christian” doctor should be entrusted who ought to be
not only a fully qualified scientist but also a man not prone to
intellectual theft and who could be informed of the results. This doctor
should also have good contacts with the administrative authorities so
that the results would really obtain a hearing.
I believe that this solution—to transfer Dr. Rascher to the SS, so that
he could carry out the experiments under my responsibility and on my
orders—is the best way. The experiments should not be stopped; we owe
that to our men. If Dr. Rascher remained with the air force, there would
certainly be much annoyance; because then I would have to submit to you
a number of unpleasant details caused by the arrogance and
presumptousness which Professor Dr. Holzloehner displayed in the Dachau
military post—which is under my command—during conversations with SS
Standartenfuehrer Sievers about my person. In order to save both of us
this trouble, I suggest again that Dr. Rascher should be transferred to
the Waffen SS as quickly as possible.
I would be grateful if you ordered the low-pressure chamber being put at
our disposal again, together with the differential pumps
[Stufenaggregatpumpen], as the experiments should be extended to even
greater altitudes.
Cordial greetings and
Heil Hitler!
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-262
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 119
LETTER FROM DR. HIPPKE TO SS OBERGRUPPENFUEHRER WOLFF,
6 MARCH 1943, CONCERNING RASCHER’S TRANSFER
TO THE WAFFEN SS
The Inspector of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe
Berlin W 8, Leipziger Street 7, 6 March 1943
File No. 2299-43 secret Inspectorate
Dear Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff!
State Secretary Milch has given me your letter of 21 November last
year—Diary No. 1426/42 top secret—regarding the release of Stabsarzt
of the Luftwaffe Dr. Rascher to the Waffen SS.
I am prepared to release Stabsarzt Dr. Rascher from the Luftwaffe, even
after the Reich Physician of the SS, SS Gruppenfuehrer Dr. Grawitz
explained to me that he was unable to give me a replacement; I shall put
him at the disposal of the Waffen SS if Rascher himself desires this
release. I shall ask him about that.
Your conception that I, as the responsible director of all
medical-scientific research work, would have been opposed to the
chilling experiments on human beings and so retarded their development
is erroneous. I immediately agreed to the experiments, because our own
previous experiments on large animals were concluded and supplementary
work was necessary. It is also highly improbable that I, who is
responsible for the development of all possibilities for rescuing our
airmen, would not do everything possible to further such work. When
Rascher explained his wishes to me, I agreed with him immediately. The
difficulties, Mr. Wolff, lie in an entirely different sphere: it is a
question of vanity on the part of individual scientists, every one of
whom _personally_ wants to bring out new research results, and very
often it is only with great effort that they can be led to work
unselfishly for the common good. None of them is without guilt in this
respect; Rascher is not either.
If Rascher wants to build up his own research institute within the
framework of the Waffen SS, I have no objection. All research work
within the field of aviation medicine—that is, altitude—moreover, is
under my scientific supervision in my capacity as director of German
aviation medicine. This institute would then be under the supervision of
the Reich Physician of the SS, SS Gruppenfuehrer Dr. Grawitz.
Momentarily, however, this work _cannot_ be carried on because its
continuation would require a low-pressure chamber in which not only the
_altitude_ of the stratosphere, but also the stratospheric _temperature_
can be established. But there is no such chamber available in Germany as
yet; a large chamber is being built in the new Berlin Research Institute
for Aviation Medicine, and I hope I shall be able to have it completed
in the course of this year.
If Rascher, on the other hand, wishes to conduct other experiments not
concerned with altitude and chilling problems, these would not be under
_my_ supervision (_aviation_ medicine) but under the supervision of the
Medical Inspector of the Army (_military_ medicine), whom he would have
to contact.
I am going to talk over all these problems with Rascher in old
comradeship, and I shall again notify you.
With respectful compliments and
Heil Hitler!
[Signed] HIPPKE
-----
[137] When this document was introduced, Dr. Bergold made the following
statement (_Tr. p. 457_): “Please let me have the photostatic copy of
the original, so that I can make a statement.
“I merely wanted to find out on the copy, whether there was any
‘receiving’ mark. Later on, in the course of the introduction of
evidence, I shall prove that all letters which are not signed with a red
pencil and do not carry the initials ‘Mi’ were never seen by the
defendant Milch but were forwarded directly. This letter does not show
the initials ‘Mi’.
(Stepping forward and showing the Tribunal the document) “May it please
the Tribunal: Milch, whenever he received the letter, added his initials
‘Mi’; at all times, when Milch received a document, he indicated the
receipt with a date; he initialed with a date. These letters, which do
not show the initials, were received by his office but were not shown to
him. At a later date, I can prove this. I just wanted, at this time, to
call the Court’s attention to it.”
[138] When this document was read, Presiding Judge Toms asked (_Tr. p.
458_): “Mr. McMahon, do you know whether the film referred to in this
letter is available?”
MR. MCMAHON: As far as we know, your Honor, it is not available. In
regard to the one [letter] just referred to, I would like your Honor to
understand that the copies which we have come from the secret files of
Mr. Himmler, therefore, cannot show the initials of Milch, and so, in
fact, would not show that Milch had seen that. This letter was received
from the files of Himmler and would not have the initials of Milch,
saying that he had received this particular letter.
C. Curriculum Vitae and Excerpts from the Testimony
of the Defendant Milch
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-269
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 59
_A SHORT CURRICULUM VITAE OF FIELD MARSHAL
ERHARD MILCH_
Date Position Activity
30.3.92 Date of birth.
24.2.10 Officer candidate First Foot Artillery Regt.
18.8.11 Lieutenant Recruit training.
1.8.14 Lieutenant Adjutant, 2d Bn., Reserve,
First Foot Artillery Regt.
2.7.15 Lieutenant Air Force, Reconnaissance
Observer.
18.8.15 First Lieutenant Air Force, Reconnaissance
Observer.
Winter 16-17 First Lieutenant Air Force, Adjutant of a unit.
1917 First Lieutenant Chief of the Fifth Air
Squadron.
1918 First Lieutenant Detached service, commander of
an Inf. Company; Detached
service, commander of a
Field Artillery Battery.
18.8.18 Captain Air Force, commander of 204th
Air Squadron, commander of
Sixth Fighter Group.
1919 Captain Commander of 412th Border
Guard Squadron.
1920 Captain Detached service, commander of
Police Air Squadron.
End of 1920 Captain Resigned from military
service.
1921 Lloyd-Ostflug, later Civilian air transport
Danziger Luftpost company, Operation chief;
Civilian air transport
company, Manager.
1922 Junkers-Luftverkehr & Head of Traffic
Danziger Luftpost Department—Organizer of air
lines with Switzerland,
Austria, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland.
1923 Junkers-Luftverkehr & Id.
Danziger Luftpost
1924 Junkers-Luftverkehr & Head of air expedition to
Danziger Luftpost South America. Business
travel to the U.S.A.
1925 Junkers-Luftverkehr Head of General
Administration.
Nov. 1925 Deutsche Lufthansa Member of Technical Board.
Summer 1928 Deutsche Lufthansa Id. and Business Director.
30.1.33 Id. and Deputy Reich Id. concurrently with
Commissioner for direction of aviation under
Aviation supervision of Goering.
March 33 Deutsche Lufthansa and Id. in the Reich Ministry of
State Secretary Aviation.
May 1933 Join NSDAP Party member without
assignment of tasks for
Party.
Sept. 1933 Activated as Colonel Party membership suspended.
1934 Brigadier General Reich Air Ministry and
Deutsche Lufthansa.
1935 Major General Reich Air Ministry and
Deutsche Lufthansa.
1936 Lieutenant General Reich Air Ministry and
(Air Force) Deutsche Lufthansa.
Inspector General of the Air
Force
1938 General
1.9.39 General To operational Air Force.
11.4.-5.5.40 General Commander of Fifth Air Fleet.
Since 10.5.40 General Inspector General.
19.7.40 Field Marshal Inspector General.
Nov. 41 Field Marshal Id. and Chief of Air Force
Material (Development,
testing, procurement of Air
Force material).
April 42 Field Marshal Central Planning Board;
Allocation of raw materials.
March 44 Field Marshal Establishment of “Jaegerstab”.
Raising output of fighter
craft.
20.6.44 Field Marshal Resign posts of State
Secretary and Chief of Air
Force Material.
Jan. 45 Resign post of Inspector
General.
March 45 Field Marshal Hitler declines my
reinstatement.
4.5.45 Field Marshal Taken into British custody in
Holstein.
1 November 1946. [Signed] ERHARD MILCH
EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT MILCH[139]
[March 11]
Erhard Milch, the defendant, took the stand and testified as follows:
JUDGE MUSMANNO: The defendant will raise his right hand and repeat after
me: I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the
pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The defendant repeated the oath.)
JUDGE MUSMANNO: You may be seated.
_DIRECT EXAMINATION_
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, I do not have to tell you the same thing I tell
all the other witnesses; namely, that you should speak slowly and all
that. You have heard that several times.
Give your full name.
DEFENDANT MILCH: Erhard Milch.
Q. When and where were you born?
A. On 30 March 1892, in Wilhelmshaven.
Q. Who were your parents?
A. My father was a clerk with the Kriegsmarine [navy], and my mother was
born Vetter.
Q. What education did you have?
A. I attended the Gymnasium in Wilhelmshaven, and then from 1905 on I
went to the Joachimsthalsche Gymnasium in Berlin.
Q. When did you matriculate?
A. In February 1910.
Q. What did you study then?
A. I didn’t study, but four days later I went to the First Foot
Artillery Regiment in Koenigsberg in East Prussia, and I joined that
regiment as a cadet.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, what was your position in the Third Reich in 1933?
A. I was State Secretary at that time; at first, it was not called a
ministry. It was called the Reich Commissar’s Office, because formal
measures for the formation of a ministry had to be considered both with
the Reich President as well as the Reichstag. At first, Goering was
Reich Commissar and I was Deputy Reich Commissar for Aviation. I think
it was in March that the Reich Ministry was formed; and at that moment I
became State Secretary.
* * * * *
[March 12]
Q. * * * Witness, is it correct to say that in your capacity as
Inspector General you had to make trips abroad too, that is, you had to
take care of the comradely relationship with the air forces of other
countries?
A. * * * Perhaps I can look up some notes to check the dates of my
trips. The visits which I made were only, some of them, in my capacity
as Inspector General. Some of them were made for purely personal
reasons, relations with people. For instance, the first visit which I
made at the request of Van Zeeland, the Belgian Prime Minister, that
must have been about 1936. I visited Belgium. The Belgian Ambassador in
Berlin, Count Kerkhove [Kerchove de Deuterghem], was a personal friend
of mine. One day he asked me to go to Belgium with him; the Prime
Minister Van Zeeland would like to see me. I was very astonished at this
idea and I asked him what the matter was. I then told him that I had to
have the permission of my superior officers. I received it. This was an
entirely private journey. The purpose of the trip, as I realized in
Belgium, was that Van Zeeland wished to come to terms with Germany, not
only formally but full-heartedly. Belgium, since the First World War,
had a treaty with France and was under an obligation to come to France’s
aid militarily by agreement with France. Van Zeeland wished to renounce
that treaty, and he wished to have similar terms with France as with
Germany. Belgium was also prepared in economic matters, which was a very
urgent point for Germany at the time, to make concessions, far-reaching
concessions. The visit started with a brief call on the King, who did
not refer to the purpose of the visit. This was purely a courtesy call,
but this call gave support to my trip. I saw that the Prime Minister
acted in accordance with his King. The plan as such—although as I
emphasized several times I am not a politician and it was not my
intention to interfere in foreign office matters, but here von Neurath
entirely agreed with my visit. He had not the bureaucratic mind—the
plan impressed me. Rather, I saw the possibility to create friendly
relations between Germany and Belgium, and via Belgium to France, and
later on via France to England itself.
I was convinced that the over-privileged policy of balance of power no
longer applied since the First World War. The powers in Europe had been
dislodged too much and joint friendship between France and Britain was
definitely a British interest in that sense.
When I returned I reported orally to von Neurath who entirely agreed
with that point of view. I also reported to Field Marshal von Blomberg,
who, apart from Goering, was my military superior. He took the same
line. I reported to Hitler and Goering. Both received my report but did
not express their own opinion. To my question whether and what I could
tell the Belgian Ambassador, I was told that would have to be done
through other channels, not through me. My orders had come to an end by
giving this report. This was my first visit and it was entirely
unofficial.
Then I went to Belgium in May 1987. At that time, as a Luftwaffe man, I
was officially received by the Commander in Chief of the Belgian Air
Force, General Duvivier; also by the Minister of War and other
officials. That was a very friendly visit which also led to very good
personal relations between ourselves and their pilots.
I was particularly interested in Belgium because in the First World War
Germany had marched through Belgium, had violated Belgian neutrality,
and had to make up for this now. I believed that the views as expressed
by Belgium on both occasions were aimed at finally burying the hatchet.
I assumed that there was a direct connection between my Belgian visit
and a visit by the French Ambassador Poncet who came to call on me in my
office and extended an invitation by the French Government on the
occasion of the International Exhibition. That visit took place from 4
to 9 October 1937 in Paris with the full approval of Goering and Hitler.
The visit was most impressive since I believe it was the first time
since 1867 that a German officer was able to pay an official friendly
visit to France. The French told me with the greatest satisfaction that
that was the first time the French Company of Honor had presented its
arms since the Prussian Crown Prince had visited Paris in 1867.
The French made great efforts to make the visit a success and I must say
they succeeded all along the line. The main point was joint military
inspections. Very cordial words were exchanged with the generals of the
French Air Force. I was accompanied by Udet and Count Kerkhove [Kerchove
de Deuterghem] who also had very good relations with France from other
times. The central point perhaps of the visit and its real purpose
occurred after a lunch given by Pierre Cot, the Minister of Aviation. On
my other side the Foreign Minister was sitting, and also the Minister of
the Navy was there. After lunch the three French Ministers, Wilmer, the
Commander in Chief of the French Air Force, Udet, and myself remained in
a special room and the French Foreign Minister asked me to take home
with me some propositions made by his office.
I should add that our German Ambassador in France was also there, also
in the smaller circle. When I said that I didn’t want to interfere in
his business, he himself did not take any notice of it. He said that the
most important thing was to report to Hitler on my impressions. He
himself could not approach Hitler. The Ambassador was then Count
Welczeck. I was extremely surprised; I had no idea. I couldn’t imagine
that the Head of State should not see his own Ambassador. On that basis
I said I would only act as a postman, and as such would transmit what I
would be told. I would give my very best own will.
The contents of the conversation were to have a far-reaching agreement
between the two countries, the main purpose being to establish a really
permanent and lasting peace between the two countries. I was able to
take over this assignment with the best conscience in the world. After
all, I said yesterday what I thought of military events in Europe in the
last thousand years. My impression was that the Foreign Minister was
very serious in this business, nor did I have any suspicions that this
might be a political trap and the Air Minister Cot who was always
described as communist in Germany, gave me a very good impression
indeed, and our conversations were very intimate and very frank.
The French Foreign Minister at that time was called Delbos. The farewell
on the Le Bourget Airfield led to fraternization between all of us, and
between ourselves and five or six of the highest French generals. I must
not forget that one of the oldest French generals, General Keller,
expressed with tears in his eyes that he was convinced that the thousand
years war between France and Germany was now a matter of the past. We
also were deeply moved.
On 9 October I flew from Paris to Berchtesgaden and reported to Hitler
at once. He ordered me to report to him as soon as I had returned. I may
perhaps say quite generally I could only see Hitler if Goering gave me
permission or ordered me to do so, or, of course, if Hitler himself
ordered me to come and see him. I myself could not go and see him as I
was merely a subordinate.
In the presence of Udet I gave a report to Hitler lasting over two hours
on the evening of the 9th of October, when my impression was still very
fresh. Hitler listened very attentively, asked a number of detailed
questions. I could tell him all about the various details which we saw
and heard, not so much the military ones, but the political details. I
could never talk enough about these things. After all, it was a fairly
long conversation with the Head of State. I recommended all these things
very warmly and I asked him to take this extended hand and he would
represent the greatest glory if he would succeed in coming to a lasting
agreement with France based on the very far-reaching economic community
between the two countries.
I compared this with the time of the German Customs League prior to 1870
when the German states were linked together only through this Customs
League. I recalled to his memory that both countries, France and
Germany, had been a unit and a community for centuries at one time, and
what was greatness at that time today merely meant a normal state. I
want to express in particular that nobody pleaded that the two countries
should be politically linked together but that political collaboration
was a necessity.
On 11 October, two days later, the Italian Ambassador called on me—
Q. Just a minute. I have to ask another question. Is it correct that
during this conversation you also offered to go as a special envoy to
France and to complete this task?
A. Oh yes, I told him that Count Welczeck should be called to Hitler in
order to give a report. Hitler said no, that is not necessary. I then
said that he must have somebody, if he wished to pursue this matter, who
enjoyed his confidence and also the confidence of the government to
which he was sent. I told him that I was prepared at all times to serve
under Welczeck as a special envoy only for that one task. I explained to
him that I regarded Welczeck as a man who enjoyed the confidence of the
French Government, and that it would be a pity if Hitler would not see
that man more frequently.
Q. Witness, did Hitler take a position on this question or did he keep
silent again as he did before?
A. Apart from putting questions to me he didn’t say anything decisive at
all. After all, I was not a Foreign Office official, and I could hardly
expect him to do so. Perhaps later on I can describe what I did as far
as Neurath is concerned.
Q. But before that I would ask you one more question. In Belgium and in
France were you told why you of all persons were approached by these
foreign countries and had the confidence of these countries?
A. The Belgians were explicit on that point. When I told Count Welczeck
that, after all, the Foreign Office was concerned here; that it would
not serve any useful purpose, he replied, “That will not be read higher
up. If you are the soldier coming to Hitler, he will listen to you, for,
after all, soldiers are your trump cards at the moment. Also we have
confidence in you, confidence that you will at least be able to see
Hitler; and he also has the confidence that you personally will do your
best in this respect.”
Q. Witness, at that time did others also approach you, other diplomatic
representatives, and lend you their confidence?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have the confidence of Mr. Messersmith?
A. Oh, yes, Mr. Messersmith; but that was before all this. I think that
really took place in 1933, ’34 or perhaps in ’35. He visited me three
times. When he was the Consul General of the United States, he had some
difficulties with some American subsidiary companies in Germany. One was
Standard Oil, as far as I recall. I asked him why he wanted to see me
since that was not my business. Then he said that he had full confidence
that I would look after his interests. He had been told by other
diplomatic representatives that I was able to help him.
Q. All right. Now, Witness, we come to the steps you took after your
report to Hitler, the steps you took later on. I ask you to tell about
that briefly.
A. Perhaps I’ll do that. It was after my visit to England.
Q. Very well, go ahead.
A. On 11 October 1937, the Italian Ambassador came to see me. That was
Professor Attolico. He told me that the Italians had got very excited at
my Paris visit. It was believed that I had gone to make arrangements
there which were in contradiction to German-Italian agreements. I calmed
him down at once without giving him too many details; but he asked me to
pay a brief visit to Italy before going to England. We had been asked to
go to England on the 17th of October. An air force exhibition in Milan
was the occasion; and I was asked to open that exhibition on the 12th of
May. That, of course, was headlined by the Italian papers. Attolico came
and saw me after this and expressed his gratitude. He said that Delbos
had put a trap in front of me.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The witness gives the date as the 12th of May. Is
that what he meant for the exhibition in Milan?
A. 12 October.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: What year?
A. In October 1937. I went to Italy and then to England. The visit had
been arranged by the Royal Air Force as a reply to the visit paid to us
by the Royal Air Force in January 1937. At that time figures were
exchanged between us on planned armaments, that is to say the figures
concerning bombers, fighters, and so forth, by agreement with Goering
and Hitler. Here again the intention existed to know exactly what the
other was doing. The other point was the intention to come to terms on
all these questions.
The visit to England lasted until 25 October. England had quite a lot to
show. The air force was very well organized and had first-rate
personnel. The visits were very cordial. Political conversations of an
official nature were not held; but unofficially we spent an evening in a
club, in a very small circle of ten people, perhaps less than ten. Lord
Swinton, who was then Minister of Aviation, took part, as well as the
leader of the opposition, Mr. Churchill, and Lord [Rt. Hon.] Amery,
Secretary of State for India, and from the British Air Force, Lord
Trenchard.
We had brought General Stumpff and of course General Udet. This was more
in the nature of a personal contact and political questions were not
touched upon. The other hosts had told me before, “Today you meet your
first and second best enemy. Don’t be confused by this; but if there is
an attack, hit back.” That is what happened; but it was a very jolly
evening.
Before we took off again, that is to say on 24 October, Mr. Eden, the
Foreign Secretary, rang me up. He said that he had been busy all the
time before, but could I see him now. I said that I should be delighted
but that a program had been arranged for us by the RAF to visit an
airfield tomorrow. I asked that if the program could be changed, would
he please contact the RAF. He told me that perhaps that would be a bit
too complicated and asked if perhaps I could see him later on. I could
be with him in two hours and thirty minutes since that was how long my
aircraft took from Berlin to London at that time. Unfortunately I never
saw Mr. Eden.
I reported about that trip to England on 2 November. The report took
over two hours. Hitler was much more accessible than when I talked to
him about France. I reported particularly my talk with Mr. Churchill and
drew his attention to the seriousness which was expressed. Hitler
immediately interrupted me. He said, “Please do not worry at all; never
in my life will I do anything against Britain. The basis of my whole
policy is collaboration with Britain.” These words calmed me
considerably. I immediately explained to him once more that the way to
come to terms with England would be by Brussels and Paris, and I
explained why.
I saw von Neurath on 11 October on the trip to France; and on 28 October
I reported to him on my trip to England in great detail. All I could
tell him at the time was what Hitler had said or had failed to say about
France. Neurath again was very impressed with me for having worked for
him in this sense. I was in agreement with him that without any further
invitations by him or Hitler I must not take any further steps.
Then on 1 November 1937 I went and saw Field Marshal von Blomberg who at
that time was Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, that is to say,
Goering’s military superior. I reported to him. Blomberg in all things
entirely agreed with me, as had Neurath. Goering at that time did not
have enough time to see me. I asked on several occasions to be allowed
to report to him on these very important matters; but this did not
happen because he simply declined.
Q. Witness, I think we can leave this field now. Will you only explain
briefly to the Tribunal whether you received foreign delegations, and of
which nations, and what happened at those occasions?
A. I said before that the British had visited us in January 1937. After
that I had perhaps five or six visits from Englishmen. The French paid a
return visit in 1938. On that occasion again we returned the very
cordial welcome which the French had given to us. We showed the French
our troops and factories. Yesterday, reference was made by the witness
Vorwald[140] to this, who said that we only showed what the troops had
at their disposal at the time and what expressly had been permitted to
be shown by Goering, after a request had been made by the competent
department of the General Staff. I know that somebody has alleged that
Hitler at the end of the war said I had shown secret methods to foreign
visitors and damaged Germany thereby. That is a slanderous statement. It
was alleged that I had shown radar instruments, and at that time we
didn’t have any radar at all.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, were you ever Goering’s deputy in this capacity, and how
long?
A. Until 1937 I was his deputy, and all offices in the Luftwaffe which
were subordinate to him were also subordinate to me. This applied to the
execution of orders. From 1937 onwards I was his deputy only in my own
sector, and this automatically as Chief of the General Staff in his
field, which applies also to the Generalluftzeugmeister. In any case it
was within my capacity to deputize for Goering in all matters as I was
the second senior officer of the Luftwaffe, and this was done only by
way of rank. But Goering reserved the right to appoint a deputy in
general, that is, especially always only for the Luftwaffe. This
authority he did not confer upon me. Even when he was on leave he kept
this right, he retained his command. I agreed with this arrangement
personally.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, what was the position at the beginning when you took over
the duties of GL? What measures did you take, and what was your aim?
A. I can be brief in this connection, at least in regard to the first
point. General Vorwald yesterday spoke at length about it. No useful
developments for the immediate future were available. No bomber aircraft
of a new type was in existence, and as to mass production we stood very
poorly, as I previously described to you. Painstakingly we had
reorganized on 1 September, and it was only because of the extreme
devotion of industry and because of the faithful service rendered by our
German workers and those who helped them that it was possible to, shall
we say, bring about a miracle.
The production figure in bombers was reached once more in the shortest
of time, in the spring of 1942. There was not a single individual
instance where our program as we had set it for ourselves was not
reached. This was something extraordinary. In the case of fighters,
there was a good type of fighter aircraft, or even two; namely, the
Focke-Wulf and the Messerschmitt, but there were no engines for those
fighters. We had to use incomplete engines to equip these aircraft, and
on the strength of my experience collected in my capacity as director of
the Lufthansa, I had to have tests carried out. My testing department in
Rechlin was excellently staffed, the commander being an excellent pilot
and technician, and it was due to their devotion that in a few months we
managed to get even these new engines ready although, according to human
estimate, we could not expect it. It was more through luck than
intelligence that we got that.
Now that was the situation as I found it. The new organization, of
course, had not been started up, and I had to collect a few new,
extremely good experts. The men who were working there independently
were rather downhearted for a long time. As experts they had lost any
doubt in the outcome of the war, and they did not believe that it would
be possible once again to start up our armament program.
The total number of aircraft in production was something in the
neighborhood of 800. That included trainer aircraft, transports, liaison
aircraft, such as the Storch; it even included towing aircraft which
were to be used for parachutists. As far as fighters were concerned,
production of those, when it was removed from under my care, had
increased by only about ten percent, although ’37, ’38, ’39, ’40,
’41—four years—five years—had elapsed. The saddest fact was that
among those 800 there were only 200 fighter aircraft, although both on
the British front and in the East, fighter planes were necessary. The
Russians had at their disposal a very large number of bombers, and even
if they were an elderly type, after all, we did have to have fighters to
keep them in check, and since the transport extended from the North to
the South over 2,000 kilometers, a large number of fighter units had to
be used in that campaign. This arm could not be supported with 200
fighters. We needed more.
The demand which I found from the General Staff, which of course made
all demands and had them confirmed by Goering, amounted to a total of
360 fighters which were to be obtained in 1942. It was said yesterday
that immediately I ordered a considerable increase. Several figures have
been mentioned by various witnesses. Actually, these increases were not
decided upon in one day. To begin with, it was to be doubled and a few
days later I said, “Let’s make it 1,000; that’s a round number,” and
later, in fact, there were 3,000 and later even we planned 5,000. We
knew at about that time just what we had to expect from our enemies. We
knew the types they had.
America, in the initial period, still published their production figures
correctly subdivided according to types, and we also had an excellent
intelligence, and from analyzing aircraft that had been shot down and
from the numbers which were coded, and which could be deciphered by an
expert right away, we could discover right to the very last number what
they had produced. That was production that had been actually carried
out, and the figures found in the United States were not fictitious.
Industry, although with a certain amount of reticence and difficulty,
but certainly afterwards quite clearly fulfilled these figures. I still
know exactly that the plan ran to about 8,000 aircraft, and was
achieved, and that figure included four-engine bombers. Production under
Britain’s rearmament, too, was learned in detail, and I remember at the
time Great Britain was either already producing 800 four-engine bombers
a month or was just about to produce that number.
You could calculate from that the number, the quantity of bombs which
could be brought to Germany, and regarding the function and size of the
bombs, of course we knew about that too. This was, of course, the reason
that previously as Inspector General I demanded that the entire force
should be built to defend our home country, this being the fundamental
principle of warfare, since without armaments and life at home, battles
at the front were unthinkable. I shall later have to come to this
question in more detail because I am probably the man who remembers this
most accurately, and as long as I am still about I would like to state
this clearly once again, because this is one of the most important
questions which probably existed in every war. This was the biggest
struggle that went on, and as I look back on it today I am surprised
that I did not despair over that struggle myself.
Q. Witness, those measures which you planned, were they dictated by the
thought that with the campaign against Russia the situation of Germany
would become desperate?
A. As I said earlier, the war on two fronts was the stab in the back of
this war as far as I was concerned, that I thought excluded victory once
and for all, and the only remaining question now was just how badly
fleeced we might escape from this whole affair. It was no longer
possible in my opinion to end this war by force of arms. It was only
possible by means of arms to attain a somewhat satisfactory final
position on the strength of which political and diplomatic steps would
have to take place. In order to achieve such a final position it was
necessary in the first place that Germany should be protected against
destruction, because once the war potential was destroyed it was
immaterial whether the fronts collapsed a little earlier or a little
later. They could not be held any longer. This thought, unfortunately,
was not understood by our leaders, or rather they did not agree with it
and turned it down and just did not come to it. The end did not come
until there was hardly one stone left intact.
Q. Witness, in this connection I should like to ask you to show the
correctness of your present report and to prove that from the very start
you had these thoughts, and to submit to the Tribunal the remark you had
made in your diary when the Russian campaign started.
A. I wrote in it, “The attack against Russia: the first day 1,800
aircraft destroyed, mostly on the ground. The Russians left them there.
They didn’t expect that we would attack. They overestimated our
intelligence.”
Q. What did you want to say by these words, “They overestimated our
intelligence?”
A. Well, the Russians might have thought that no opponent would be so
foolish and so stupid to attack them now and create a war on two fronts.
* * * * *
[March 13]
Q. Witness, do you know at what point the Central Planning Board was
ordered and how did the creation of this institute come about?
A. Its creation must have taken place during the last days of March
1942. It originated from a discussion which Speer had with Hitler in the
latter’s headquarters. At the time when Speer had taken over armament
there was no higher authority which was acting according to clear-cut
points of view when distributing raw material. Until then we had been
receiving raw material through a certain department of the OKW. This
department in turn had been getting it from the Four Year Plan. The OKW
was distributing to the army, navy and air force but this department had
no expert knowledge. Consequently the continuity of armament suffered
under this. Speer quickly recognized the state of affairs and without my
having previous knowledge of it he tackled this question when talking to
Hitler. As a result Hitler appointed Speer as the central planner for
this subject. Subsequently Speer made the request that I should take on
this task together with him, since Speer had been in the armament
business rather briefly and since he said I would be able to help
him—at least this was the way Speer discussed the matter with me
shortly afterwards; I, myself, hadn’t been at that conference. Following
this, on 2 April 1942, Speer and I together went to see Goering since
Speer considered that this task, which, after all, was connected with
the Four Year Plan, should be discussed with Goering. Goering expressed
agreement but he demanded that a representative of State Secretary
Koerner, who was in official contact with the Four Year Plan should
enter the Central Planning Board. I know that Speer said at this point:
“It seems to me three are rather too many for this job”, and I said
“Well, I am only too willing to drop out. I have enough work as it is,”
and Speer interfered and said that was out of the question. Goering
said: “No, it is my view that there can be three.” That is how the
composition of the Central Planning Board was realized. I can anticipate
at this point that very much later Minister Funk joined the Central
Planning Board as a force which was done at the instance when the
so-called “War Production”—and in this case we are not talking about
the armament business but civilian requirements and the like—was
transferred from Funk’s Ministry to Speer’s Ministry.
Q. Witness, did you, within the framework of the Central Planning Board
become the armed forces’ or air forces’ representative?
A. No, right at the very beginning that had been decided upon by Hitler
that, namely, that in no way was I to look after my own interest there,
that is to say, the interest of the air force, that I should be above
the Party. Later on there were demands from the navy, which had not
known about this arrangement. They, too, wanted to have a representative
in the Central Planning Board. * * *
Q. Witness, what were the actual tasks of this Central Planning Board?
A. The tasks had been communicated to me by Speer and had been confirmed
through Goering. There was only distribution of raw materials to all
holders of priority permits.
Q. Witness, what is what you call the “holder of a priority”?
A. Well, the armed forces are such priority holders, and within the
armed forces the navy, army, and air force are holders of these
priorities. The coal industry holds these priorities; the steel
industry; the textile industry; the German cities and municipalities,
for their municipal requirements; the power supplying industry.
Q. What about agriculture?
A. Most certainly agriculture, for agricultural machinery requires
steel, requires coal, requires all sorts of things. Altogether, the
forms according to which we used to distribute, and which contained the
word “armament” on the left, contained on the right all the civilian
purchasers, all the buyers. There were approximately 40 to 45 civilian
holders of these priorities.
Q. But then what did the Central Planning Board have to do with the Four
Year Plan, to which there seemed to be some sort of formal connection
through Speer?
A. The Central Planning Board as such had nothing to do with the Four
Year Plan; only Speer, in his capacity as Armament Minister.
Q. Did you ever report to Goering about the Central Planning Board?
A. No, with the exception of that first meeting on 2 April 1942, when
the matter was reported to him. Apart from that meeting, I have never
talked to him or with him about the Central Planning Board. * * *
* * * * *
Q. From whom did the Central Planning Board have instructions?
A. Directly from Hitler.
Q. Through which channels were they given?
A. Speer was with Hitler practically every week, for the reason of army
supplies, or other questions, sometimes staying with Hitler for several
days. On such occasions Hitler would mention his most important
problems. For instance, he would mention the sequence of priorities of
the various armament branches, which I explained to you yesterday. Quite
automatically, through this, the approximate priority ratings were laid
down. However, within the individual spheres, because of the events of
the war, there were current changes: At one moment one type of tank, and
then at another moment, another type of tank; or first one type of gun,
and then another type of gun, would be more important. That, of course,
necessitated considerable rapid changes in the allotment of raw
materials. That was the case, and to an even stronger degree, in the
case of munitions, so that currently, probably during every such
conference which took place in his office, Hitler used to express
special wishes, which of course meant orders for us.
I personally took part in such conferences on nine occasions.
Occasionally Speer would take me along to have me appear on the stage
there, as he would put it. However, that ceased almost completely during
the last years. Anyway, I know for certain, according to my documents,
that I was there nine times.
Let me add at this point that State Secretary Koerner[141] was never
there. Speer did not think that it was necessary for him to be taken
along, and Koerner would not impose his presence either.
Q. So that during such a meeting for the receiving of orders of the
Central Planning Board, Koerner was never there?
A. No, he was not there, and he did not know about it either. He didn’t
know, therefore, how strongly Hitler interfered in this sphere by giving
orders.
Q. But didn’t you always report to him, either you or Speer, in the case
of the meetings of Central Planning Board?
A. It might have come as an aside during the meetings; one of us might
have said, usually Speer, “Hitler has given this or that order,” but
that wasn’t anything very noticeable to Koerner.
Q. Was it only because of the Central Planning Board that Speer went to
see Hitler?
A. No, that was one very small portion of all the other discussions,
because Hitler was interested, to an extraordinary degree, in army
armament, and even right down to the most minute detail. He himself
decided, on his own initiative, the thickness of armor on armored
fighting vehicles; he decided upon the caliber and type of gun which
should be fitted to tanks; he decided the thickness and the caliber of
antitank defensive armor; he himself laid down, personally, the supply
rate of ammunition for every type of gun. I had an awful lot of
difficulty with him over antiaircraft ammunition in that connection,
since Hitler would never depart during that time, from anything which he
had once laid down. He had changed a great deal from his prewar days.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, it is your opinion that even this first record of the
Central Planning Board meeting is inexact and does not correspond with
the true discussions which took place?
A. May I state quite basically in connection with this that I hardly
ever had my deputy with me when I went to the meetings; he had a lot of
other assignments and their meetings went on for several hours.
Koerner’s deputy, the representative whom he brought along, always kept
the minutes in the sense of observing Koerner’s meaning. Sometimes I did
read through these brief minutes, and I might say that I pointed out to
Koerner and Speer that facts always seemed altered considerably, but all
three of us used to laugh about it, and with a flick of the wrist we
used to consider it quite unimportant to have these minutes altered
afterwards because all of these minutes appeared of no importance
whatsoever. What was important were decisions of the Central Planning
Board, and they were taken down most exactly, and they contained to my
knowledge only contingencies of raw materials such as we had
distributed. * * *
Q. Witness, on this occasion we might touch upon the value or lack of
value of the so-called verbatim minutes, now that we have come to this
subject, don’t you think? These verbatim minutes, which are very
comprehensive, very voluminous, even with reference to one meeting,
there was a whole volume it seems. Were they examined?
A. No. That wasn’t possible. I might have examined one or the other
minutes at the beginning, and I did on one occasion try to make
improvements, but I found that it contained so many mistakes that the
time of reading and improving them would have amounted to fifty percent
more time than the actual meeting. These meetings often went on for four
or more hours or so, and I really did not have the time to sit down for
something like six hours afterwards in order to put the minutes right. I
know that there wasn’t any one who read through them, and I didn’t
really know why these records, these verbatim records, were prepared. I
thought perhaps it was a question of supervision for us, and I had no
cause to state that I would not allow myself to be supervised. If you
went to the pains of having one stenographer who would do nothing but
write, but who was stumped by the fact that we sometimes spoke too
quickly or not too clearly; a stenographer who often sat far away from
the man who was speaking, or who didn’t know the name of the man who was
speaking, there was bound to be a lot of muddle in that respect. He
didn’t know whether the man who was sitting on the left was talking or
his neighbor on the right, and one mistake after another occurred. I
gave it up pretty quickly after looking through these minutes. I once
asked the others whether they read through the minutes and they just
laughed at me, and said that they had more and better jobs on hand, and
I said so had I.
Q. Witness, you have just said that these stenographers who sat on the
side could quite often not even distinguish between the speaker, whether
it was he or his neighbor. What was the custom; did you remain seated
while you were speaking, or did one always rise?
A. No, no, we all stayed seated; we all remained seated and the
stenographer couldn’t always see who was speaking because on certain
occasions a lot of people were there. If you invited one man to a
meeting in Germany, then possibly he always brought his entire staff
along so that he could answer all the questions; and if you invited one,
sometimes fifteen or twenty showed up. I sometimes asked whether these
men didn’t have anything else to do because we were not really concerned
with details, only with the basic, larger points, and they used to say,
well, everybody is invited.
Q. Witness, did it happen that specific orders were given to
stenographers to alter certain points or omit them? So that apart from
accidental mistakes, deliberate mistakes were being made?
A. I have recollections of many occasions that Speer, who used to sit
next to me, would shout to the stenographer across the room and say,
“Leave that out, what the Field Marshal just said.” Unfortunately,
notorious before this Tribunal are the expressions and words I used,
which were not always too carefully chosen. I have always said during my
entire life what came to my mind at the moment, and I, as a soldier, was
never taught to hide my opinion. But sometimes, in order to refreshen
sometimes boring meetings, I used rather forceful language to shake up
the others a bit so that they would at last come out with their true
opinions, because many of the people were only there as experts on
individual points. Quite often ministers were there; even in Germany a
minister and a field marshal have a fairly high-ranking position; and
the German is rather more inclined to speak too much than too little.
Now, if they found that I too would use strong expressions on one
occasion, or another, then they would loosen up a bit and they would
start talking, since they felt that I had let go too. I was keen to have
clarity, and that the cat wouldn’t always run around the hot porridge,
because, after all, we had to know the truth and the real background.
Since Speer was much more cautious and much more courteous, never having
been a soldier, I could allow myself the exhibition of freedom, and
unfortunately I did.
Q. Yes, unfortunately. So that statements of that kind of yours were
either stricken or they were altered?
A. That warning of Speer’s only came into force if I stated my criticism
of the higher leaders too severely. If, for instance, somewhere Hitler
had given assignments or orders which, to my view, were wrong, or even
as to orders coming from Goering or other people, the Minister of the
Interior or the Minister of the Police or some other person, then I even
here would state my frank criticism amongst these people. Usually I
didn’t have any other possibility to state my deviating opinion, and I
had the inner urge to say it out aloud. Speer, in my interest, would
have it struck out, and he told me a few times afterward, “For heaven’s
sake, do be careful. They will hang you one day.” But of course he meant
by the German side. Sometimes when I myself became aware of the fact
that in my criticism of these high-ranking gentlemen I had gone too far,
I would say to the stenographer, “Leave that out.” And on one or two or
three occasions I said, “Change it. Put someone else in there as having
been referred to,” because I myself discovered—mind you, I wasn’t
always aware that I criticized too severely, but since Speer told me so
a few times, I controlled myself a little more—that I had said too much
and that it was a mistake, and so I intervened myself.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, after our discussion concerning labor questions, in
connection with the decree concerning the Central Planning Board, I want
you to answer my question now, whether and what powers the Central
Planning Board had with reference to the Plenipotentiary General for
Labor, Sauckel?
A. The Central Planning Board had no power to issue orders to Sauckel.
Q. Who was it that gave Sauckel’s orders?
A. Sauckel’s office had been formed by Hitler’s Decree. However, after
that it was taken into the Four Year Plan, so that formally Sauckel was
under Goering immediately. However, he received his orders from Hitler
himself.
Q. As you said, the Central Planning Board had no powers toward Sauckel?
A. None whatsoever.
Q. However, don’t you know that Speer tried to win influence over
Sauckel? Did that occur in his capacity as a member of the Central
Planning Board, or did that occur in his capacity as Armament Minister?
A. It only occurred in his capacity as Armament Minister.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, on this occasion I would like to ask you, what then do you
know about these concentration camps during the war?
A. I only knew of two concentration camps, namely, Dachau and
Oranienburg. I visited Dachau personally in 1935; in other words, before
the war. That was the only time that I visited a concentration camp,
except for now as a prisoner of war. What there was inside the
concentration camps I do not know. In 1935 there were only Germans in
there; and I was very much surprised to learn after the collapse of
Germany that there were also foreigners in the concentration camps. I
did not know that. I am quite convinced that none of my collaborators
knew about these things in the concentration camps. We had been told at
the time that in these concentration camps criminals of various
categories were being detained. What I saw in 1935 were habitual
criminals. I thought it a very good idea that these people be not
allowed to walk around freely. When we were there these people had to
tell us their sentences; and there were several barriers full of people,
and there the average criminal record was twenty to thirty times rape of
small children. Therefore, I, being a father, believed that it was best
for these people to be locked up.
However, I know that there were political people there; and I saw them,
too. There my opinion differed. But I was told that those people were
there on a temporary basis and would only be kept in there for a longer
period of time if they actually committed active sabotage against the
state. At Dachau most of the political people who were being detained
there as prisoners in 1935 were members of the SA, on account of the
Roehm Putsch in 1934, and that was the basis and reason for their being
there.
I should like to add that I asked to be allowed to visit that
concentration camp at the time, together with other officers of my
branch, in other words, of the Luftwaffe, because during my meetings and
conversations with foreigners, I repeatedly heard the statement,
particularly from the British, “We understand your Hitler’s system very
well. There was no other way for you to go. However, we do not
understand your concentration camps.” That is why I decided to get some
sort of a picture for myself by seeing the camp. It took a little while,
but finally I got the permission to visit the concentration camp. That
at the time was my only contact with the question.
Q. What was your impression of the camp? Was it clean?
A. In 1935, well, yes, at that time it looked very well. There were good
barracks, absolutely waterproof, with two cots, one above the other. Our
barracks always had the same system anyway; and I was the only one to
get that principle in the Luftwaffe, so that there was quite a
revolution among the soldiers in the army. I witnessed one of their
meals. There was a good portion of food, meat, vegetables, potatoes,
quite a lot of soup. The people were thus well-fed. Of course, they had
to work. The work they did was not an easy task. Cleanness was
noticeable. The beds had sheets with a special design on them. The
entertainment of the people was taken care of. There was recreation.
They had a special room where they could hold speeches. They had
facilities for writing and reading. There was an excellent library there
which even according to its size and contents was very interesting. I
looked through the index one time. The man in charge of the library was
a Gruppenfuehrer of the SA and also a concentration camp inmate. I saw
the bakery, saw the butcher shop.
At that time I am sure that there were no cruelties and no inhumane
equipment of any kind. Of course, I could not speak to these same
individuals and ask them how they like it in there. We were allowed to
talk to these people; but each of them was allowed only to say what his
sentence was.
Q. Did you see what kind of work these inmates had to do?
A. That was very hard. They worked on their own equipment, I believe,
not only for the camp but for all sorts of purposes and for the SS. In
other words, they made furniture for themselves and for the Waffen SS
for instance, cupboards, chairs, stools, tables. They also had a
locksmith shop there. As far as I know they did work outside the camp as
well.
I believe there were special commands for cutting down trees; there were
special commands for splitting stones. However, I cannot go into detail
because I inserted this visit into one day—it was in the afternoon
after I had an inspection of the troops in Munich, which inspection I
finished about 9:30 in the morning, and at four o’clock in the afternoon
I had another inspection to carry out of the Luftwaffe, and in between I
saw the camp. I myself ate or tasted the food which the German inmates
had, and I thought it was very tasty, good, and sufficient.
Q. Witness, at a time following that, did you ever hear, even if only
rumors, that inhumane acts were being committed in the concentration
camps?
A. I cannot remember that anything had been mentioned in that
connection—anything that had anything to do with the truth or that
seemed like the truth. I can confirm the fact that there were quite a
few rumors during the war. However, all our efforts to find where these
rumors originated were not successful. We were not able to find out
anything at all. I had very few connections with the SS itself.
Q. I shall come back to the SS later on. Now, Witness, as witnesses have
said, you yourself saw to it that persons in concentration camps were
freed, or were not committed to the concentration camps. Can one not
draw the conclusion from that that you were of the opinion that it was
not very good in the concentration camps; that bad things were happening
there, because in general one who has committed a criminal offense is
not protected from imprisonment?
A. At the beginning I was quite convinced that these concentration camps
were just a temporary measure. I knew from the press that they had done
the same thing in Italy under the Mussolini regime, and that then, after
a few years, these institutions had been dissolved—at least that’s what
I heard at the time—and, since many things were being imitated here in
Germany which Mussolini’s Italy had done, I saw at that concentration
camp nothing but such an imitation. That certain abuses would occur
there, I could understand, because, after all, the National Socialist
movement itself, in its early beginnings, was a revolutionary group.
Even if it weren’t so, at least that’s what people said. I thought that
these things were only the childish diseases of the new regime. However,
if I ever heard anything, if anything was brought to my own personal
attention, then I thought it my human duty to help. That the parents of
anybody who is sent to a concentration camp or something are always
convinced of his innocence, can be understood and every one of us today
knows how unpleasant that is. However, certain other reasons prevailed
at the time, when a family wrote: that is probably the case with one of
the cases which was submitted here in an affidavit. The main reason was
not that the man was a Social Democrat leader. No. He was blamed for
other things, and they had to be cleared up. That is why my help took a
little bit longer here, and I believe that the man was vindicated. The
reproaches which they made to him, and which came from those greatest
pests whom we had at the time, the informers, had to be refuted by
bringing counter-evidence.
Q. That’s enough, Witness. Now such people were taken out of the camp by
you. Then I’m sure that they came to see you and thanked you for it?
A. No. They didn’t do that and I did not pay too much attention to that.
I told their parents and their relatives to restrain them from doing
that. Maybe they wrote a letter though, sometime, but I did not do it in
order to get their thanks and appreciation.
Q. Witness, didn’t you ever speak to anybody who had been released from
a concentration camp and who then would have given you more details
about the concentration camp?
A. I never spoke with anybody who had been released from a concentration
camp—at least, not that I know of. I never spoke with anybody about his
experience in a concentration camp. However, during my captivity, I
heard through other people that no one else ever heard about such things
either, because these people were not only prohibited from speaking, but
they were also so scared that they followed that order to the very
letter.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, you also visited factories, didn’t you, and you saw eastern
male or female workers there, didn’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. What was your opinion about these people. Didn’t they complain to you
or anything?
A. I regarded it as absolutely natural that whenever I visited a factory
it was natural for me to talk to these workers, even if, in my official
capacity, I had nothing to do with that question. However, as a soldier
I was accustomed to act in that way. On each occasion I asked them how
they were, how the food was; I looked at the people and I saw how they
were clad and what kind of an impression they gave, generally speaking,
whether they looked healthy, whether they looked satisfied or not. I saw
Russians, and also Russian prisoners of war. Then I saw Russian female
civilian workers, namely, Ukrainians. I saw Frenchmen, namely French
civilian workers. There could have been prisoners of war among them, but
they were wearing protective overalls over their clothes. There could
have been workers from Slovakia, who considered themselves our allies,
but they were very, very few. Then there were quite a few Italian
workers there, those who had come on a voluntary basis at the time;
those so-called “Imis” (Italians who revolted against Mussolini and were
sent as prisoners of war to work in Germany) I did not see.
Q. Did eastern workers, male or female, ever complain to you concerning
their work?
A. No, they did not. On the contrary, the general impression of these
female Ukrainians who worked on the Junker 52’s was a very pleasing one.
The girls were singing; they were well fed; they were well dressed; and
they answered my questions in a nice, cheerful way. I spent about 20
minutes with these girls. There were quite a few pretty ones among them,
and towards the end they flirted with me, and the girls were laughing
all the time.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, I will now enter into the question of what the Central
Planning Board has to do with labor questions at all?
A. The Central Planning Board had considerable difficulties connected
with the question of getting raw materials. The acquisition of raw
materials was originally the tasks of the Ministry of Economics and then
of Speer in the Armament Ministry. On such raw materials depended the
armament program.
The pacemaker among all these raw materials for the armament program was
steel, but the pacemaker in turn for steel was coal or coke production.
That was the biggest bottleneck, since, unfortunately, during the first
years of the war the youngest and strongest age groups of miners had
been called up for military service. Hitler had given us the order to
develop a steel production program amounting to 3.2 million tons per
month. This was to be done by Speer, and Speer had succeeded in reaching
the figure of 2.6 million tons, but that was the maximum. Hitler’s
armament program, however, had been based on the figure of 3.2 millions.
Hitler had demanded these armament programs and the experts had
calculated the amount of steel they needed for those programs.
We in the Central Planning Board discussed the possibilities of getting
up to 3.2 million tons of steel, and Speer being the man for that part
of the production, ordered the men from the steel manufacturers’ union
to come and see him in a conference in which all steel problems, through
the self-administration of the industry, were dealt with. Speer was in
agreement with me, this is an aside which I must add, to the effect it
was a mistake to direct industry through the state, but that industry
ought to govern itself through committees of their own, coming from
their own ranks, and in this sense of course, these main committees and
rings which we have talked about must be understood.
These gentlemen from the Reich Association Iron stated that the
possibilities existed that 3.2 million tons of steel could be
manufactured, subject to certain conditions. In that connection the main
prerequisite was a very much larger allocation of coke. Apart from that
they wanted certain additional matters for their own production, some
labor too. I remember the question of smelters which was submitted at
the time. I am not an expert, but at that time I did gather that we were
concerned with specialists with very considerable ability and knowledge,
since otherwise a few handful of men wouldn’t have been brought into our
conversation. At any rate, the main problem was coal.
Speer, anyhow, during one of our conferences, sent for the men
representing the coal industry. Such a Reich Association Coal had
existed for some considerable time. These people stated that there was
enough coal in the mines but that human manpower was lacking to bring it
up. Speer in his capacity as Armament Minister now asked them to tell
him in writing what was needed. Now, these men apparently reported the
figures regarding workers they had, and during those conferences with
the coal representatives, always, of course with reference to the
question of steel, it was stated that all efforts on the part of the
Armament Ministry would have to fall down because of the labor shortage.
Speer, as he told me, mentioned this to Hitler dozens of times. It was
here for the first time that various controversies arose between Speer
and Sauckel.
* * * * *
The first difficulties between Speer as Armament Minister and Sauckel
came to Hitler for decision. Speer said, “I’m short of workers”. Sauckel
said, “I have fulfilled all your demands”, and as proof he submitted his
figures. Between the figures which Speer had and those which Sauckel
had, no comparison was ever possible. They were based on different
suppositions. Speer was unable to obtain the basis for the figures which
were at Sauckel’s disposal. In their conflict Hitler took the side of
Sauckel. He wished thereby to exercise pressure on Speer to increase
armament. Speer was unable to do so because he did not have the workers
who had to produce coal.
This struggle went on through the years. At first Speer still hoped that
Sauckel would still bring the workers into his factories until in the
summer of 1943 he gave up this hope. In the Central Planning Board this,
of course, was discussed, and it was also discussed how much steel we
could obtain for the next three months and how we could distribute it.
Always there was this contrast between the figures—Hitler wishes to
have 3.2 million tons of steel; we can only distribute 2.6 millions
because Speer is quite unable to produce more. The consequence was again
that Hitler reproached Speer for not producing more steel although
Sauckel had supplied the workers. The Central Planning Board was not
responsible for the quantity of raw materials at his disposal. Speer
asked me to give him my support in this question. I did so quite
frequently in the meetings and also when I reported to Goering because
we wished to convince Goering that we did not have the workers so that
Goering would intervene with Hitler in that sense.
But I was unable to obtain Goering’s support. Goering took Hitler’s
side, and he said, “The workers are there”. All that was left now was
for Speer in the first line and we ourselves who wished to help him in
the second line to attack Sauckel. Sauckel escaped all meetings for a
long time. Sometimes he sent a representative, and in some cases he
himself appeared, but he and his representative pursued the same policy
by giving us a lot of figures and alleging they had fulfilled
everything. Our doubts in these figures increased. Hitler became more
and more impatient and the reproaches for Speer towards the end of 1943
became insufferable. Whereas Hitler supported Speer until roughly the
middle of 1943 and regarded him as one of the first collaborators, the
relations became much more cool later on, and I explain that mainly
through this conflict. I myself had the same annoyance both with Goering
and with Hitler, who maintained in opposition to me that I had been
given all of the workers.
Our mood wasn’t very nice about this, obviously because although we had
no personal ambition we did not wish to be blamed for something that we
were not responsible for, bad armament, and to have stated that because
of bad armament the war had been lost. That reproach, of course, we
could foresee, and it was obvious that we fought against it with every
means within our disposal. We felt ourselves to be quite innocent in
this field, but in order to prove our innocence, we were missing one
link in the chain, and that was to show beyond doubt that Sauckel’s
figures were untrue. They were not wrong by accident; they were
deliberately forged, in our opinion, because Sauckel wished to impress
Hitler with his own efficiency in his ability to fulfill all the demands
of Hitler in the sphere of labor.
Sauckel pursued that policy up to 4 January 1944. Only when there was a
conference with Hitler on 4 January 1944, of which I was a participant,
did he there say for the first time to Hitler, “Up to now I always
fulfilled all your demands, my Fuehrer. Whether that will still be
possible with the new demands of four million workers, I can no longer
guarantee.”
Q. Witness, we will come later to this conference. Now, I ask you to go
back to answer one question. Did the Central Planning Board have
authority to request labor and to distribute it?
A. A clear “no” to both parts of the question. The question of labor was
discussed in the Central Planning Board only in the interest of Speer
because Speer needed help and knew I would always give him my support. *
* *
* * * I may claim, for example, that throughout my activities, anyway
shortly after the beginning of the war, that is to say, on 9 November,
there were about sixty production managers of factories—no, not
managers but so-called men of trust [Vertrauensmaenner], elected by
workers—these men came to me and I found out they wanted to ask me to
get their rations increased. At that time the whole nutrition was based
upon lower rations; these people in our high industries were not
entitled to the supplementary rations for heavy workers, and these
people explained to me that now that there was a war, and they were
forced to work in different factories from peacetime, their housing was
much further away from their places of work, and in the morning and at
night they had to travel longer; and, therefore, their food was
insufficient. That gave me the idea to apply for a new supplementary
ration and as we became very set in this question, it became possible to
achieve that supplementary ration which was now for the benefit of all
workers. And I have now gotten hold of documentary evidence that
supplementary rations were also given to foreign workers; that was a
supplementary ration for foreign workers working long hours. As this
documentary evidence shows it is an affidavit actually the food of
German and foreign workers was the same. But I also wanted to say that
it is quite possible that there are cases where this principle was not
observed, but that was against the will of the German Government if it
happened.
Q. Witness, that means that neither the labor office nor the Armament
Inspectorate were under your supervision, as the GL.
A. Yes that is quite correct.
Q. But Speer has testified that until the very end you did not renounce
the command of the air industry. What could you say to this effect?
A. If Speer should mean that my personnel official, in the way I
described before, talked with his, Speer’s armament office, once a
month, then it is quite correct; but my officials might have used these
occasions, and how far he worked with my name on these occasions I do
not know. I hope he did so in order to get his point through. I was
never present. I never heard how these negotiations went on. Should
Speer mean, however, that my work in that field was the same as his in
his field, then he makes a mistake, for I did not have that organization
nor did I have the task. My field was only a very specialized one
compared to Speer’s field. * * * I might add perhaps, that Speer did not
know my organization; of course we never discussed it. He knew, of
course, that I had a technical office; he knew that I had a planning
office, and he also knew that I had an economic department for the
contracts of industry. After all, he fought a battle to take the whole
economic department into his sphere, and when I said he couldn’t
possibly do it, he waited until the whole armament industry came under
his charge. We two always settled everything in a friendly manner after
that up to the last moment. Even if there were a certain amount of
conflicting interests, which sometimes were quite considerable,
particularly between our subordinate officers—there were quite severe
battles between those subordinate officers at times—but we always
poured oil on the troubled waters, Mr. Speer and I.
Q. Witness, but couldn’t it be, that in the sphere of the Central
Planning Board in presenting the labor demands of your industry, you
spoke for your own interests?
A. I cannot recall, and I have read some of the records, but in not one
of them, there is not one word said that I had any special demands for
the Luftwaffe. Apart from the fact that once or twice I remarked that I
was equally badly off, that I didn’t get anything, but that doesn’t mean
that I was looking after my interests in the GL. If I talked about
workers at the Central Planning Board, I did so at Speer’s request, to
give him in the armament industry all the support. Speer was
particularly pleased when I played the wild man and became a little
strong. He once told me, “you are much better at this than I am; I am
only a civilian; I can’t do it as well as you can”. And sometimes he
pepped me up and said “Speak a little more fiercely, please”, which I
was only too delighted to do for him. That was meant to achieve
something which you may wish to ask me about a little later on: How we
could get Sauckel to speak clearly. How we could get rid of the
suspicion that we through our inefficiency cannot bring German industry
up to the high level, to the right level.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, during these conferences of the Central Planning Board did
it happen that the bulk of the workers was discussed, or was it rather a
question of bringing new workers into Germany?
A. No, it was only the labor question as such, only inasmuch as it was
important for the increase of raw materials in accordance with Hitler’s
order, and indeed always as an attack on Sauckel in order to get him to
give us the people or to say he cannot do it. As we knew he could not
supply them, our main demand which we wished to achieve was an open
statement by Sauckel, “I haven’t got the workers whom you need”.
Q. Witness, but if your air force industry, for instance, either the
labor offices or the Armament Inspectorates had made requests to Speer,
and when your planning office had checked these demands in order to find
out what was really necessary and what was unnecessary, was it a matter
of proposing what kind of workers you wanted to have and what kind of
workers should be distributed into these different production programs?
Was it a question of deciding whether you needed German workers or
rather more foreigners?
A. We did that in one sense, that for certain factories we simply had to
have skilled workers, which we asked for, but never did we ask, “Give us
foreigners; give us prisoners of war”, and so forth. Our wishes were to
the effect to have Germans, but it was quite clear to us that there
weren’t enough German workers to fulfill the demands. Had they been
available, one needn’t have used prisoners of war or recruited foreign
workers or sent the prisoners of war to work unless they volunteered for
it.
* * * * *
[March 14]
JUDGE PHILLIPS: The Tribunal understands you to say that Polish
prisoners of war were changed into civilian workers and that you no
longer considered them to be prisoners of war. How were they changed
into civilian workers from prisoners of war?
A. Personally I cannot give you many details about this because that
happened as early as 1939, and at that time I was not connected with the
armament question. How it was worked I do not know. All I can imagine is
that there was no longer a Polish Government and that the Governor
General gave the order; whether any Polish office was asked, I don’t
know; it is only in the files here that I found something about some
Polish regional authority. I cannot give you any more clear details.
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, perhaps I can clarify the
matter.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Let’s let the witness clarify it. Witness, you are
an old soldier. You have been a soldier for many years. How do you
transfer a prisoner of war into a civilian, by discharging him?
A. Yes, he must be released from being a prisoner of war, and then there
are various possibilities. One possibility would be—and this was
resorted to by Germany—to make him a free worker and tell him that “You
are being released, but you must do some work. That is the conditions
which we put to you. You are being paid properly, and otherwise you live
as a free man.”
There is also another possibility, which was the way chosen by the
Americans, by which a prisoner of war is released and then regarded as
an internee. I think that that procedure is not quite so favorable for
the man concerned.
Q. You just transposed them from prisoners of war to civilian prisoners,
then?
A. No, they were no longer prisoners. They were properly released, but
they signed a document which obliged them to do some work for Germany.
Q. You imprisoned them by a document instead of in a stockade?
A. They were no longer locked up, Sir. The Polish workers—I saw them in
the country, for instance—live quite freely.
Q. Could they go where they liked?
A. They could not change their places of work without permission. For
instance, if they were allocated to a farmer, they had to stay with that
farmer. Only if there were special reasons could they change their place
of work. Then they were transferred.
Q. That is what you call freeing them?
A. It was not complete freedom, but it was a better status than
previously when they were prisoners of war.
Q. What would happen to one of these free workers if he walked away from
his place of employment?
A. Sir, that is what I do not know myself. But may I say something else?
A German worker was not allowed to change his place of work either.
Freedom for a German was not any bigger than freedom for a Pole, as long
as the war lasted.
Q. The German went home to his family every night, did he not?
A. These Polish soldiers—I cannot speak comprehensively because I am
not particularly well informed here—but those I saw were young people,
and they lived with the farmer’s family.
Q. Witness, you don’t mean to tell this Tribunal seriously that the
Polish worker, the former prisoner of war, had the same freedom of
movement that the German civilian had?
A. I cannot speak on all fields of life because I do not know. All I do
know was that he was under the obligation to remain with his employer,
but, as I said before, the German worker had to remain with his
employer.
Q. Oh, well, we had that in the United States, for that matter. I still
don’t remember your answering my question: What would happen to a Polish
worker who chose to walk away from his place of employment?
A. I am unable to answer that. I know of no such cases, nor was I told
about one.
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, the defendant cannot know,
because he was a soldier, what the Polish worker had to do. Like the
German worker, the Polish worker would have been punished and brought
before a tribunal because he broke his contract, and he would have
received a small punishment. Thousands of German workers have been
punished for the same reason, and I have defended many a German worker
for the same charge. That would have happened—nothing else.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Let me ask you, Dr. Bergold. Did you ever defend a
Polish worker for walking away from his employment?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, I did.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: I have no inclination to dispute you.
DR. BERGOLD: I defended quite a few foreign workers in wartime, not only
Poles, but Frenchmen, Belgians, and Dutchmen.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Oh, maybe Belgians, Dutchmen, but Poles—?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, definitely. I am prepared to make that statement on
oath, Sir.
DEFENDANT MILCH: May I supply an observation of my own on the Polish
question? Shortly before I was taken prisoner, I was in the country in
Schleswig-Holstein. In that region the only foreigners there were Poles.
Those Poles on the estate where I was, perhaps 30 or 40 of them, said
that they did not wish to return home, that they would ask to be allowed
to remain on the estate just as did their colleagues in the
neighborhood. These people were dressed very neatly on Sundays. They
looked very clean and healthy. They could not be told from any German in
the neighborhood there except for certain racial distinctions. All of
them had bicycles. On that bicycle they went on Sundays to the nearest
pub and met their girl friends and danced, and they told me themselves
that never before had they been so happy as they were in Germany. That
was at a time when the British were 50 kilometers away from their
village.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Perhaps that is why they were so happy.
A. No. They said that they did not want to leave there now. They wished
to remain.
Q. I think you misunderstood my point. Perhaps their happiness arose
from the fact that the British were only 50 kilometers away.
A. No. I understood what you were trying to say, Sir, but I also talked
to the German employers there. I was there in a totally private
capacity, and I knew these people quite well. They were friends of mine,
and they told me that they were quite satisfied with their Poles, and
they also said that the Poles had done very good work and that the Poles
had asked to be allowed to remain after the collapse, because in those
days they did not wish to return to Poland and they were quite well
looked after here.
May I ask the Court to believe me that we in Germany were not all of us
hangmen and people who delighted in other people’s misery. I may say
here that I think that the majority of the German people are
good-hearted and that they treat other people well and that these people
did not know that in some isolated places there were isolated criminals
who polluted our good name for a long time to come. The people are
suffering from that now, and they will suffer in the future. That is
what depresses all of us the most. Otherwise, one has to take the point
of view that all Germans are criminals and then it might be justified to
hang the lot. Then, please start on me.
* * * * *
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, after this question was discussed, you received
information that this employment of foreign workers was admissible.
Could you tell me now what you knew before, prior to that moment,
concerning this question?
A. I know that after the First War, the question of deportation of
Belgium workers had been examined by a committee of the German
Reichstag. I know that this parliamentary committee examined people like
Hindenburg, Ludendorff, I think also Mackensen and others; and that many
questions were discussed, including that of Belgian civilian workers. As
far as I can recall, that committee was presided over by a man who had
been given the Nobel Prize, Professor Schuecking; I think that was his
name. However, I was very interested in it, and closely followed it
because Hindenburg whom I worshipped, was put before a court; and as far
as I can recall, no sentence was passed upon that score; and nobody was
reproached that international law had been violated. At that time the
Hague Convention existed and the first Geneva Conference had taken
place. I am not very well informed, but I think that was so.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, I shall now come to the 54th meeting, concerning two points
there. Witness, during that meeting[142] Sauckel mentioned that only a
very small percentage of those sent to Germany came on a voluntary
basis. This statement has been mentioned repeatedly in this trial and I
want you to say something about that.
A. I might say that I do not remember having heard these words from
Sauckel. It is possible that I was not there at the moment when he said
that. However, it is possible that I overheard that remark, because
during those long meetings, we had discussions among each other. We were
also interested in other questions. During those long meetings there was
at least one meeting, probably more, during which our concentration was
not quite what it should have been. Had I heard it, I would have
believed Sauckel just as little as I believed all the figures he gave
us, because Sauckel had stated the contrary not long before. I know
exactly it was not so long before that he had declared how well his
system functioned and how he brought all these laborers on a voluntary
basis.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, I shall now leave the meetings of the Central Planning Board
and come to single questions in that connection. What do you know about
the use of British and American prisoners of war?
A. According to my opinion and as far as I know, they went into the
respective camps and they were not used for labor. I never saw such a
prisoner of war any place.
Q. * * * What orders did you have toward the middle of January 1943?
What orders did you receive from Hitler?
A. On 15 January 1943, in the evening I was called up and summoned to go
to Hitler’s Headquarters the next day for a special mission. As far as I
know, I believe that it was General Bodenschatz who called me to the
Fuehrer’s Headquarters. The following morning I reported to Goering, who
happened to be in Berlin at that time. Goering knew that the question of
food for Stalingrad was involved. Stalingrad had been encircled for
months, and the whole Sixth German Army was in it. On the 16th, in the
morning, I flew to Hitler’s Headquarters in East Prussia; and then
Hitler either in the afternoon or in the evening gave me the information
that I should proceed to Czechoslovakia immediately by air in order to
supervise Stalingrad’s food supplies from there.
Q. Witness, make it a little more brief, please.
A. Yes. I tried to carry out this mission. When I received the mission,
the last airfield had been lost. The Russians had taken them. We looked
for smaller places which were rather difficult to find there in those
mountainous areas; and within the next few days we succeeded in carrying
out a considerable air lift of supplies. However, it was too late. The
resisting force of the defenders had broken down; the people were
starving; they had hardly any vehicles or horses. They could not get the
food from the landing places for the planes because they were too weak
to do so. They could not carry the containers so that the air lift of
supplies in the case of Stalingrad could not be kept up after the end of
January or the beginning of February.
Q. Did you have a serious accident then?
A. Yes. At that moment when I wanted to fly into Stalingrad, before I
hit the airfield, I was hit by a railroad engine, and I was seriously
injured.
Q. Then you went back to Hitler?
A. I carried out the mission first. Then when Stalingrad had fallen, I
withdrew and went to see Hitler and told him that I could not complete
my mission. He told me, however, that it was not I who had not carried
out the mission but that it was his fault. He said he gave me the orders
too late; he had wanted to give the orders to me much earlier but had
been talked out of it.
Q. Witness, during that occasion, did you tell Hitler your opinion about
the war and the general situation of the war?
A. It was on 4 February when I reported back to Hitler. Hitler on that
particular day was very crushed due to the loss of Stalingrad. It was
not possible to have a quiet talk with him. He did not receive me at
first, or my chief of staff, namely, General of the Tank Corps Model,
who had a corps within that fortress. We both were under the impression
that day that we would not be able to speak to him. However, he told me
in a few words, “Now, go right ahead to your GL task, manufacturing. Now
we will have transport planes in the first line, transport planes, and
more transport planes.” He was talking about Stalingrad. He thought that
had he had more transport planes he would have been able to keep
Stalingrad.
With respect to Stalingrad, I had a long discussion with him on 5 March.
That was the last time I saw him. That was about a month later. I was
ordered to see him because he wanted to give me the mission to build
high-altitude and fast bombers and put them in the first line of
production. Those now were more important than transport planes. I
availed myself of that opportunity on that day and had prepared myself
in order to tell him my opinion about the general situation. That
discussion took place in the evening. I had dinner with him alone. That
was shortly before 9:00 o’clock; and it lasted until 3:15 a.m. Then in
contrast to all other discussions I had with him, I was the one who was
speaking all the time.
* * * * *
I told him first of all the truth about Stalingrad; and I told him that
the question of leaving an army was a military mistake, when according
to military and strategical points of view it should have withdrawn,
something which had been suggested both by myself and by the army. It
was a mistake; and it did end with the loss of 350,000 men on the German
side. However, a withdrawal in time would have saved the greatest part
of these soldiers. I told him that, after all, the Russians were not as
anxious to attack as that; that in the winter they themselves were in a
difficult position for attacking a German army and they would not have
dared. I told him then that that point was the last turning point in the
fate of the war. I told him that I had tried to reach him before the
Russian campaign. However, I had been unable to do so because it had
been forbidden. I said that the time was now five minutes past twelve.
We use that expression in Germany when something is completed; when it
is finished. I told him that by that I meant that the war was lost. I
apologized for not considering his nervous condition. There was no time
for that any more. I thought it my duty to tell him my sincere opinion;
as a field marshal I thought myself entitled to do so.
I knew that he did not want to hear this. However, I wished that he
would hear me in spite of that. He could do with me whatever he wanted
to afterwards. I remembered, however, that he himself before the war had
used strong words against the bad advisers of Wilhelm II, who out of
cowardice, had not told him the truth. In no case did I wish to stand
before my own conscience with such a reproach on myself. He told me
then, “Yes, you can say today whatever you wish to say.”
I told him then that he was no more in a position to attack in the East.
That those attacks which had already been developed, he should stop.
That he could only defend himself, and I was of the direct opinion that
instead of building great fortification works in France and Norway, that
during the whole of the spring, summer, and autumn, he should
concentrate on fortifying the Dnieper position, which lay about 800
kilometers behind the Russian front, with all the means at his disposal,
with fortifications of concrete, etc., in a great width, between
two-hundred and three-hundred kilometers depth, and in that way there
would be strong fortifications and good shelter for soldiers, with good
equipment and food and ammunition, and that then he should take the
troops back to that position for the winter, and that he should give up
the whole territory in front of that fortification, out of which he
would not get anything at all, neither oil, coal, nor ore. By doing that
he would shorten the length of the Russian front, and in such a way that
the maintenance of those soldiers on the line would be much easier.
Apart from that he should take more care of the eastern forces, and I am
quite sure that on the whole eastern front of two-thousand kilometers,
of about ten million German soldiers, not one million of them were
fighting and he should take measures to change that. That was the only
point he carried out later on, and unfortunately only towards the end of
November of that year and the result was that the fighting infantry
units on the whole eastern front amounts to 265,000 men of the army. It
was impossible to hold that front with such a small number.
I furthermore suggested to him that a great personnel change should be
made, namely, he himself should give up command over the army, that he
should place a simple general in that position. As it was, he held
before the German people a responsibility, which he could not bear. He
was no soldier in that sense, since he was not trained for that. I
suggested to him to dissolve my own branch as an independent Wehrmacht
unit and to put the Luftwaffe entirely under the Wehrmacht, since there
was no strategic air force any longer.
Now what I had to say was special for the army, and this was certainly
of a personal nature, namely, to remove Reich Marshal Goering from the
Luftwaffe, and give him a different task. I said also that it was now
the opportune moment for the Reich Foreign Minister also to be removed
from his position.
Q. Would you give the name?
A. Von Ribbentrop. I suggested to him that the Field Marshal be put in
charge of the units at the front, and I gave as a reason that Keitel was
too lenient in reference to Hitler, and did not know how to get his
ideas across to Hitler; that he should have somebody who would force him
to observe correct military measures. I told him then that the most
important task in my opinion was the home defense of Germany; the air
home defense of Germany, and to consider as having the highest priority;
and also the fighter production should be placed in the first place, and
armaments. I showed him the figures of the English, the American and the
Russian armaments explicitly, and I showed him how these armaments would
have their effect over Germany, and also at what point, or at what time
this would happen. I reported to him that many false reports were made
to him, and I gave him an exact instance. I told him that he
overestimated himself, and his allies, and that he also underestimated
the Russians, and the attitude of Stalin personally, and that that had
led to the Stalingrad collapse, and he should be quite clear as to the
facts if the attack was continued in the East; that he could hold the
Dnieper position, and that if he held that position, the air defense
would be able to prepare a military preparation for peace if the enemy
would see that this crushing of Germany from the air was no longer
possible and if the Russians would see that they would not be able to
cross the Dnieper without being crushed; that I am sure with that
preparedness which should be started at once, we ought to be coming to a
peace. It might be possible to get away with bearable peace terms if
they would act immediately.
Then I also discussed the peace question, and I told him he might make a
real peace with France without taking territory, and I was sure that
France would still consider that. The same applied to Belgium, and also
Holland, as well as Norway. A peace with these countries would then
induce the greater powers of the Western countries to be able to
conclude peace with Germany which would be endurable.
Those were the main points of my opinion. I do not wish to recite
details. He listened to and interrupted me only once, and that was on
the question whether he could or could not attack in 1943, and I
remember exactly that I said to him more than twenty times, “You cannot
attack” and first he said in a quiet way, then got more excited and more
excited until he was very cross, and knocked on the table, “I must
attack.” I told him at the end, “I know I am very impolite, I don’t want
to discuss this question of attacking anymore. But be convinced I shall
not change my opinion.”
Then he waited for a short while, and I began to speak of something
else, and then suddenly he said, “What would you say, Milch, if I would
only make a short attack in order to be able to push through the Russian
preparations before they can start developing.” I answered, “Wait a
minute, it is a defensive measure, because a soldier carries out his
defense by attacking in turn,” and he said, “Then we agree on that
point.” I said, “No, I don’t think we do. If you are successful you will
continue. I would say all the troops should go back after forty-eight
hours that no matter what. Think of Verdun in 1916 when the same mistake
was made; when they did not succeed in getting through on a surprise
attempt, they went doggedly on.”
* * * * *
Q. Witness, what was the development after Stalingrad of your
relationship to Hitler and Goering?
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Before you go on, will you ask for the date of
this conference of Hitler’s again?
A. It was on 5 March 1943.
* * * * *
On the question of how my relationship to Hitler and Goering developed
later on I have to say the following: It became worse and worse from
time to time. It was due to a struggle which I had about the German air
defense which contradicted Hitler’s idea of waging war, for this was the
specific field of the Luftwaffe and I as Inspector General of the
Luftwaffe was forced to make suggestions. I did not let this matter
drop, and I repeatedly brought it to the front, in contrast with
political proposals or proposals in the field of the army and navy,
which were outside of my field of tasks and which I could not bring to
anyone’s attention unless Hitler gave me his permission or if he wished
me to.
Q. With respect to this conference, did you inform him of the fact that
you wanted to have Goering gone?
A. Yes. I did. I told Goering about that. I did not want to stab him in
the back.
Q. Then, what happened to your relationship with Goering?
A. I do not believe that this single incident had any influence on our
relationship, which was bad anyway. Goering was not the kind of a man
who would hold it against me. He had a certain understanding of the
circumstances. There were other things that he did not like about me.
* * * * *
[March 17]
Q. Witness, the last time you were giving us a description of the
suggestions you made with Hitler with regard to achieving a change. What
was the impression you had afterwards as to whether he was going to
follow your suggestions or not?
A. At that time I first of all hoped that he would somehow react to my
suggestion, because in the case of the Stalingrad assignment which had
been given to me although too late, I saw indications that at that time
he still had confidence in me, and also in my military ability. During
the following weeks and months I waited for something to happen, but
nothing did. In the spring of 1943, after my conference, new attacks
were ordered by him on the eastern front. He was not making an attack
for the purposes of defense, he was going to try to reestablish the
front along the Volga River. He was also going to try again to advance
towards the Caucasus. It was only in November 1943 that he followed one
of my suggestions, namely, to ascertain how many men were fighting in
the East, as I said last Friday, and I need not repeat it. The attack
was catastrophic, but in spite of that, no basic changes were made after
that. All the other suggestions, political, military, and those
regarding the personnel, were not followed. Through that I lost my last
hope, namely, that a final basis favorable to Germany could be
established to bring an end to this war through political means, in
other words, peace negotiations, which might have had certain prospects
of success.
Q. Witness, now I shall have to put to you this question. Why, after you
recognized that fact did you continue your activity at all. What were
the reasons which made you place your service at their disposal at all?
A. The main reason was that I was responsible to my people, and even if
all the plans failed to materialize, I, nevertheless, still had one last
hope at least, that a proper air defense could be arranged for Germany
in order to protect our home country and the people from the worst, and
the destruction of their homes and places of culture. That was my main
reason.
Q. What then are the steps that you took in order to achieve your last
final aim for the German people?
A. After 1941 I had a constant struggle, I would like to say, with
Goering and with Hitler in order to achieve an air defense which I
considered necessary. My last effort then was the foundation of the
Jaegerstab.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, you have just testified that you had founded the Jaegerstab
in order gradually to leave your post. Did that further have any other
purpose, for instance, the removal of existing difficulties outside your
own department?
A. Yes. Air armament within the entire armament program had very small,
very negligible powers. As Hitler especially demanded army and naval
rearmament, Speer’s Ministry for years had encroached on a large scale
in all matters which were important for my industry. As a result experts
and other workers had been simply taken away from us. The armament
inspectors and district military administrative authorities, both of
whom were under Speer, were able to carry this through. It was merely by
accident that I learned of this in individual cases, when, for instance,
one of the industrialists happened to come to see me. We raised
objections but we could not alter the situation, I mentioned this the
other day. I wanted to use the Jaegerstab in order to transfer part of
this responsibility for air armament to Speer and his ministry so that
such encroachment, which was particularly noticeable where materials
were concerned, should no longer happen.
The man who had approximately the same task as my own in Speer’s
Ministry was Mr. Saur. Saur was a very clever man, very able, very
energetic, and since he was always sent to report to Hitler personally,
he knew Hitler and his intentions very well, and he knew therefore that
Hitler was not so keen on air armament, and from that he drew the
conclusion which led to these encroachments into our sphere. I was very
anxious to have him join the Jaegerstab so that there too he would share
in the responsibility. There was a struggle about this with Speer until
it finally came about that Saur joined the Jaegerstab. I did not want to
found the Jaegerstab without him, and it turned out that Saur now
tackled this new task very energetically and he did in fact succeed to
some extent in bringing Hitler at least to a standstill. But Hitler’s
views and Hitler’s orders he could not change. Apart from that it was
necessary, if I wanted to transfer armament work to Speer, for the final
armament would have to go through Saur’s hands eventually, so it was
essential that Saur should be included right from the start.
Q. Thank you. Did you give him responsibility to a small or a large
extent within the Jaegerstab?
A. Let me answer that like this: I gave him as much freedom of action as
possible, since he was going to take it over later, and it was his
nature that when any matter was placed in his hands he took it up very
energetically, and I was happy to see that he was going ahead so
vigorously.
Q. Witness, you have made notes about everything you did during the war.
Can you tell this high Tribunal whether you gradually withdrew from the
Jaegerstab and how many meetings you participated in each month?
A. In March, I participated in 15 meetings—they took place daily—and
two trips. In April, I participated in eight meetings, and one journey.
In May, I attended five meetings and took part in two journeys. In June
I attended two meetings only, and had also two journeys. In July, I
didn’t attend any meetings at all, neither did I participate in any
journey. I took more active interest in the journeys, totaling seven, in
order to go into the provinces and show that the handing over of my task
to Saur was taking place with my agreement. These are the figures: March
15, then eight, then five, then two.
Q. You mean the meetings?
A. Yes; that applies to meetings. In other words, I participated in a
total of 30 meetings.
Q. But there was one more on 1 August 1944, wasn’t there?
A. That was after my retirement. It was a meeting when Speer was in the
chair, in which the Jaegerstab was now finally discontinuing its work,
as the tasks of the Jaegerstab were now being incorporated with ordinary
armament under Speer in the armament staff. It was a purely formal
meeting of handing over, and I deliberately took part, so as not to
create the impression that I was leaving reluctantly or that I was angry
about anything, for, of course, the exact opposite was the case.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, did the Jaegerstab have anything to do with workers?
A. Do you mean building workers?
Q. I mean generally speaking, for the moment.
A. I see. Well, you have to draw a clear dividing line. There were two
completely different conceptions for us, armament workers and building
workers. Armament workers came through the existing channels; in other
words, requests were made to Sauckel by the industries, and Sauckel
fulfilled, or did not fulfill such requests. Information about this
first of all went to Speer’s Ministry through the Armament
Inspectorates, and secondly, there were statistical reports monthly from
industry to air force. Building workers, on the other hand, did not
concern any of us at all, not even statistically speaking; that is,
insofar as the GL was concerned and his representatives on the
Jaegerstab. This was entirely a problem for Todt’s Organization. We knew
absolutely nothing about this problem as far as we were concerned.
Q. Witness, did the Jaegerstab include a representative of the GBA, the
Plenipotentiary General for Labor, Sauckel, on its board?
A. I cannot at this moment recollect that accurately, but I believe not.
As far as I know, for these questions there was only a representative
from Speer’s Ministry. That was Mr. Schmelter, who has been a witness in
this trial, and who on his part used to hear our requests and take our
requests to his ministry to help as far as he could.
Q. In order to help in labor problems did Schmelter have to go to
Sauckel on his part?
A. Yes, quite decidedly. He, on his own initiative, could not distribute
workers because he did not have any workers reserves of any kind.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, the construction work which Hitler stated had to be
constructed either by Kammler or Dorsch, was that all for the purpose of
the Jaegerstab or also for other armament purposes?
A. I know that these constructions were meant for many other purposes
because if these questions were discussed in the Jaegerstab I repeatedly
heard Saur or some of his representatives saying, “We wish to change
this; we want to use this for making tanks; or here, for instance, we
will have V-2 rockets.” That is how it fluctuated. In any case, I know
that the subterranean constructions or tunnels were meant for other
armament purposes.
Q. Witness, did you ever hear about the fact that for the construction
of the surface concrete factories concentration camp inmates were to be
used?
A. I heard about that in the Jaegerstab, I believe; and that is how we
can explain Kammler’s task.
Q. Witness, in your capacities as GL, as member of the Central Planning
Board, or member of the Jaegerstab, what did you have to do with the
concentration camp inmates? Did you apply for those?
A. No, we had nothing whatsoever to do with it. But they were
requisitioned for industry through channels which I did not know at the
time. At that time I knew from a conference that in Oranienburg, at
Heinkel’s, people were being used from the concentration camps which
were near there. I heard one of my men say that the work that was being
done over there was good work, I myself did not see these inmates
working. However, at that time I was convinced of the fact, through my
visit to the concentration camp of Dachau in 1935, that these were, in
the main, only German criminals.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, did you hear in connection with labor for concrete
construction work, that Hitler gave orders for the use of one hundred
thousand Jews, or did the Jaegerstab request this?
A. I am sure that the Jaegerstab did not do that. I cannot say for sure
if before the collapse I knew anything at all about this matter. I know
from the record that Hitler is said to have had a conference on 4
January 1944 about this question. However, I know that that conference
lasted for quite a few days, I believe, from 1 to 4 January. I
participated for a very short time in that conference on 4 January. I do
not know, or I cannot recall, if during the time I was there they
discussed that point.
Q. Did you later on find out that Jewish concentration camp inmates were
used in this construction?
A. I never found out for sure.
Q. However, in the sessions of the Jaegerstab they had discussed that
point?
A. I cannot remember anything about it. Many things were discussed there
every day, so that it is not quite possible to remember every detail
that they discussed.
Q. During those conferences or meetings, the number of which you had
mentioned, did you always participate in these conferences?
A. No. I was called out very often. I left on my own initiative
sometimes in order to make certain arrangements in connection with my
other fields of work; otherwise, I should not have been able to do any
work whatsoever in my other spheres. At that time I had the whole set-up
of General Foerster under my orders, and also the entire training of the
Luftwaffe; on top of that were the questions of the Inspectorate General
and his problems.
Q. Witness, I shall come now to your speech of 25 March 1944, which has
been repeatedly mentioned here, Document NOKW-017, Prosecution Exhibit
54. It is your speech to the chief engineers of the Luftwaffe and the
chief quartermasters. It says here at one point that for construction a
few hundred thousand laborers were being used who had been withdrawn
from other places. By that don’t you mean those 100,000 Jews we just
mentioned?
A. No. Under no circumstances. At that time workers had been transferred
for these purposes from many other constructions which were already
under way.
Q. Witness—
A. May I add to that, this: I could not possibly imagine why Jews should
be used as construction workers. Therefore, I am sure that it would have
struck me if I had heard that, for Jews are not used as carpenters and
bricklayers. They are mostly people who work in offices, and one could
hardly expect construction work from them. I don’t believe that I
myself, as a man who has never done that kind of work, would be of any
use for it.
Q. Witness, explain to us now the purpose of this speech of yours, which
uses rather strong language.
A. During the severe air raids we had lost many stocks of material,
mainly of parts. The new output of these parts could not possibly keep
pace with the destruction. There was only one way left, namely, to take
these parts from troops’ stocks. The troops had large stocks over which
the GL himself had no power of disposal whatsoever. He just gave the
orders for the manufacture of them. The requests of the troops, in my
opinion, were always too high—4.2 billion marks’ worth of parts were
being ordered at that time, that is proof of it. If we wanted to have
these planes, which were half ready, in time, it was possible only if
the troops would give us some of their parts. Prior to this conference
many attempts to that effect had been made, but the Quartermaster
General, because of the veto of his chief quartermasters and chief
engineers, had refused my wishes. I was very annoyed about that. Saur
came to see me and stressed once more that the completion of the planes
was impossible. He thought that in the army that would have been taken
care of long ago, but in the Luftwaffe there did not seem to be any
definite power to give orders, and he would take this matter up with the
higher authorities. That, for the second time, made me very cross, and
when this conference took place immediately after these things, I spoke
in very strong terms in order that the Quartermaster General with his
staff should give me the parts that were needed. That was the purpose
and the aim of the whole thing, and contrary to what had happened
before, when they had refused me those parts, the harsh military speech
I made was crowned with success.
Q. Witness, in this speech there are certain passages which in
themselves have nothing to do with those aims you just mentioned. I
would like to show you these passages. At one spot you come to the
question concerning labor, and you say that the portion assigned to the
Luftwaffe in the allocation of labor had been constantly diminished,
that the foreigners were running away and not keeping their contracts,
and that if a foreman reprimanded or beat one of these young laborers
who was engaged in sabotage, he, the foreman, got into trouble; and that
the international law could not be applied here and that you would see
to it yourself that the prisoners, with the exception of the Americans
and British, were removed from the power of the military
organization—then, if a man committed sabotage, he should be hanged in
his own factory or workshop. What does that have to do with this speech
and these aims that you mentioned?
A. As far as prisoners of war were working with the Luftwaffe itself,
the Quartermaster General and the Chief Quartermaster had something to
do with it. This was to be a threat to that department, namely, that
certain rights would be withdrawn from them. Of course, I could not do
that. I don’t believe that Goering would have followed such a suggestion
of mine either.
I have no excuse whatsoever for these words which I used. I have now had
the time to read this passage in peace, and I cannot understand it
myself. I can only repeat that I myself was in an impossible position. I
could see what was coming, and I could no longer help my people. At that
time—I do not wish to say this as an excuse, but just in order to
explain—I was still suffering very badly from my accident, and I could
not quite get over the concussion, because at that time I could not
possibly be absent for one minute. I knew that because my doctor was
worried about me and he tried to help me with all sorts of drugs and
medicines.
Q. Witness, a number of witnesses who were here have stated that very
often you had outbursts of rage. At the time when you made that
statement did you have the sincere wish to carry through these measures?
A. No. I can say that with a good conscience. Never, never in my life
did I do such a thing, and I believe that he who really knows me knows
exactly that, on the contrary, I was different. However, at that time I
simply had to give vent to my feelings, and I could not use strong words
to the people I really wanted to use them on. That was not consistent
with the discipline you have in an army. I also have to say that
immediately after such a discussion I myself no longer knew what I had
said during one of those outbursts of rage. Even today I could not say
for sure that I said that. However, I cannot deny it.
Q. Witness, did you at that time use such wild expressions with
reference to these Luftwaffe gentlemen, and did you threaten them as
well?
A. Yes. I did. I read now that I did so. I am very sorry even today that
I used such strong words against my comrades.
Q. Later on in another place you said that people who acted as if they
were sick ought to be whipped to work and that the whip should be used
as a medicine. That is a similar statement?
A. That was just silly talk, so to speak, and I also used strong words
about myself and called myself an idiot once in a while.
Q. Did you ever issue orders to drive people to work with the whip?
A. Never, and I am sure that I myself would have intervened in such a
case.
Q. Did you ever have anybody hanged because of sabotage at any time.
A. No. First, I did not do it. Second, I could not do it. I never had
anybody punished for sabotage in any way because that was not within my
competency, not even in the few instances where sabotage had actually
taken place.
Q. Witness, weren’t you afraid, however, that if you spoke like that
before this circle of men, that those people would actually act
according to your words?
A. In this circle there was nobody who could possibly have the power to
carry out such things, and second, I believe that everybody knew me,
because my friends even at that time had told me that I had lost my
control over myself. It was a very good thing that nobody took me
seriously at such a time. I also always promised myself that I would not
burst into rage again. However, at that time I did not have full control
over myself because the situation was becoming more serious every day.
Moreover, I knew that all this could have been avoided, that it had
never been necessary to go to war, but if so, that the war could have
been terminated long ago, and apart from all this, if nothing else, the
destruction of Germany could have been avoided. That thought did not
leave me alone day or night, and that actually contributed to these
explosions. When everything was over, from that day I became more quiet.
Q. Witness, those people you spoke to were soldiers, were they not?
A. Yes.
Q. Could those soldiers, according to your knowledge, have possibly been
led to carry out these orders which were against international law?
A. No, never. They quite rightly thought, as people often told me, that
I was crazy during such outbursts. I myself was in no position to judge
that, however.
Q. Witness, however, a certain number of measures in contradiction to
international law were carried out in Germany. Did you know anything
about that, could you have thought then that maybe you were also causing
such measures against international law?
A. No. I did not know about that, with the very few exceptions that were
discussed here. However, I never connected them with myself. There never
was any connection at any time.
* * * * *
[March 18]
Q. Witness, after you received the Knight’s Cross in 1940, did you
receive any distinctions from Hitler, any decorations?
A. Yes, I did, in 1940 I received the promotion to a field marshal, and
that was also in 1940. After 1940 I did not receive anything which I
considered a distinction as a soldier, because the bonus I received in
1942—yes, I will refer to that later—I couldn’t see any distinction in
that as a soldier.
Q. Will you now talk of this bonus which you received? Give us some
details about it.
A. Hitler sent his adjutant on my 50th birthday, with a picture of
Hitler, that is, a photograph, with a dedication, and a letter in which
he congratulated me, and there was a check inside to the amount of
250,000 marks. Hitler wrote in his letter that he knew I was leading a
very modest life and he would like to give me in this way the
possibility of making it a little pleasanter.
I thanked Hitler, and I told him that I gladly accepted the money,
because after all I could not refuse it, as a compensation for the fact
that I had earned a little less by this amount than I would have earned
if I had remained with the Lufthansa, because my salary in the Lufthansa
was twice as high, and even later on, three times as high as the money I
received from the State. Consequently, I did not consider that as a gift
exceeding my merits.
Q. Witness, did the Air Ministry not offer you a bonus, also?
A. That was not a bonus but the President of the Air Ministry told me
that the industry wanted to give me a present to the value of 50,000
marks. I told him that I rejected this present; it looked to me like
bribery. He immediately withdrew the offer, especially as he knew that
never in my life had I accepted a present from industry while I was in
government service.
* * * * *
Q. Was it possible for you to remove directors of industry, or to
appoint them?
A. No. Either there were limited companies [G.m.b.H.], or shareholder
companies, and they had their own organizations, their own
administrations. The shareholders appointed the board of directors and
the board of directors decided who was to be the general manager, and we
never interfered with that.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, will you explain to the Tribunal how overburdened you were
with work during all these years?
A. May I refer to my field of tasks which is shown in one exhibit?
DR. BERGOLD: May I ask this Tribunal now to see the charts which are in
the document book—the first document?
* * * * *
A. Until the end of 1941 my main task was that of Inspector General of
the Luftwaffe. From that point onward, the work as GL took the first
place, while in my capacity as Inspector General I was continuously
travelling by plane. But as Inspector General I was tied more closely to
the Berlin ministry. Oh, I beg your pardon, I mean to say as GL. There
we had meetings every day; and in my capacity as GL I took over a
technical staff in the Ministry of over four thousand. I reduced this
staff to about half; but in spite of that the number of conferences and
meetings could not be reduced. Therefore, I had to go through the
incredible amount of papers which were to be read and also the papers
which had to be signed; and I had to take them home in the evening. I
think that always amounted to two large suitcases and sometimes even
three of them. On the average I would work at home until 2:00 o’clock,
a.m. The reading was the main task because in all technical matters I
had to be up to the mark myself; and that was not very easy for me
because, after all, I had not studied technique but rather was a
self-taught man as a soldier who had been a pilot. In the morning I
would start my duties at 9:00 o’clock or at 9:15. Generally I would eat
my lunch at my desk, and often I even ate my dinner at my desk, so that
I had the impression that I was overburdened with work. Even apart from
these two functions, as GL and Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, the
direction of the different other offices in the Ministry made quite a
lot of work for me, though in my last position the excellent General
Foerster took most of the work off me.
Q. Witness, are the offices correct as they are shown on this chart
which I have submitted to the Tribunal, and can you confirm them as
such?
[Illustration: _CHART OF MILCH’S POSITION SUBMITTED BY DEFENSE_]
A. Yes.
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, this concludes my
interrogation; and I make room now for the prosecution.
_CROSS-EXAMINATION_
MR. DENNEY: You testified as a witness before the International Military
Tribunal on behalf of the defendant Goering, did you not?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And in the course of your testimony before the Tribunal you stated
that you were the second highest officer in the air force?
A. Yes, that was my rank.
Q. So that the only one who ranked higher than you was Goering?
A. Yes.
Q. And that continued up until the time when you told us this morning
that you completely withdrew, which, I believe was some time in January
of 1945?
A. Yes. May I remark here that from 1937 several officers were in the
second place. That is to say, the chief of the general staff, the chief
of the personnel office, and also the GL. We were all of the same rank,
as it were, but I was the most senior officer among them.
Q. And under Goering there were really four echelons; that is, the chief
of staff, the inspector general, the GL, and the director of the
personnel office?
A. Yes. They were all equal to each other.
Q. Goering was on top, and then came these four in a parallel line below
him; is that right?
A. Yes, under Goering.
Q. And you, from 1941, November, following Udet’s death until sometime
in the middle of 1944, held both the office of GL and inspector general?
A. That is correct.
* * * * *
MR. DENNEY: If your Honor pleases, I ask that this be marked Prosecution
Exhibit 133 for identification. This is a letter, dated 1 April 1943.
The writer of the letter is Sauckel, and the letter is addressed to the
defendant.
“Most honored Field Marshal,
“I take the liberty of enclosing in confidence three copies of
the speech I gave in Poznan on 5 and 6 February 1943, on the
occasion of the Reich and Gauleiters meeting and beg you kindly
to peruse it. The figures contained in this speech refer to the
end of the year 1942. Of course, the figures given concerning
utilization of labor have again increased in the meantime. I
would ask for your continued sympathetic understanding of the
interests of manpower utilization, and your understanding and
assistance in my task as far as possible. On my side, I can
assure you that I always have asked the offices of the labor
allocation administration subordinate to me for close and
successful cooperation with all departments, and that I will do
so for the future too.
“Heil Hitler,
“Yours respectfully,
[Signed] “Sauckel”
And, on the 7th, the last page, the defendant acknowledges receipt of
this letter:
“Most esteemed Gauleiter,
“I thank you most cordially for kindly transmitting to me the
speech you made in Poznan on 5 and 6 February 1943 on the
occasion of the Reich and Gauleiters meeting.
“Heil Hitler! Yours.”
* * * * *
Q. Do you recall receiving it from Sauckel on 1 April 1943?
A. No. At the beginning of April I wasn’t there the first few days. I
see a remark, by somebody else, on this document. It probably says—I
can’t read it very well—“for the files of the Central Planning Board”.
Perhaps this letter may have been submitted to me later on—I do not
know whether I replied myself. I certainly did not read the report
because otherwise I would be able to recall the figures.
Q. But you did initial the letter, didn’t you?
A. I do not know. I do not recall it at all.
* * * * *
MR. DENNEY: On the copy that your Honors have, I believe it’s apparent
in the upper left-hand corner of the first page, the defendant’s
initials appear there, as well as on the original letter.
* * * * *
Q. Now, do you ever recall saying that you would put the German workers
into concentration camps, the ones who did not work well?
A. When I talked about slackers, I referred to education by Himmler, but
not to sending them into concentration camps. Himmler had other training
places for workers where such people who were disinclined to work were
being trained by making their supplementary rations dependent on their
production.
Q. Don’t you recall that you asked that certain camps be set up
especially to take care of these German workers who weren’t doing well?
A. I did not say that we should make a special camp, but that they
should go to the training camps which already existed and we could get
them back from there. I do wish to emphasize here these were people,
Germans, who did not do their duty towards their Fatherland. I thought
it justified that such people should be trained.
* * * * *
MR. DENNEY: Witness, I believe you said you kept a diary?
A. A diary? You could not call it exactly a diary, I only took some
short notes concerning my stay, and I jotted down a few key words which
conveyed generally the most important matters.
Q. That was lost, was it, or destroyed, when you were captured?
A. It has not been lost. I still have it here.
Q. That is what you are referring to?
A. If I look up where I was at a particular day or what personalities I
met, I refer only to the most important questions, not to everything, I
can see whom I was with. Sometimes there is a table of contents, too,
which is more detailed, according to the interest I had in those
questions. For instance, for 28 October, which you referred to a while
ago, I only have the following: My dispute with Goering he had reported
to Hitler; he had not obtained anything, and now he started to vent his
bad humor on me. Then comes a short note again that there was a
conference afterwards with Goering. That was in Karinhall. It went on
for the whole day. It was one hour from Berlin by car. I noted down that
Speer was there, that Sauckel was there, Grawitz, von der Heyde, and
some others. There is no mention what subjects were discussed, but the
attendance of Sauckel clarifies the matter for me. That is an example of
how I would enter these notes in this book.
Q. Insofar as you recall, you were at that meeting on 28 October?
A. Yes, indeed. I have found it here in my book.
* * * * *
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Mr. Denney, let’s get an unequivocal answer to
this. Did you put the initials on the letter from Sauckel?
MILCH: The “Mi”, yes, indeed.
Q. You wrote that?
A. Yes, I did. I wrote it. Somebody else wrote “to the files—”
Q. Never mind what somebody else wrote. Now, on the first page of the
pamphlet, the printed speech, there are some initials. Did you write
those?
A. On the cover, yes; I did, “Mi, 6/4”, that is what I wrote.
Q. All right.
MR. DENNEY: Do you recall saying that Americans were never assigned to
work in any of the airplane factories?
MILCH: Yes, I said that.
Q. This is Document NOKW-364, which is a partial translation of the
minutes of the Jaegerstab, held on 19 June 1944. The cover page, which
is photostated here in the German, which will be given to the Secretary
General, bears the initials of the defendant.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Is this a new exhibit?
MR. DENNEY: Yes, your Honor. This will bear Prosecution Exhibit Number
135 for identification, if your Honor pleases. Document NOKW-364, a
partial translation of the minutes of the Jaegerstab of a meeting held
19 June 1944. On the covering page there appear the initials of the
defendant. Perhaps the Secretary General would be good enough to let Mr.
Blakeslee have the original so the cover page can be shown to the
defendant. Just show it to him, Mr. Blakeslee.
(The document was handed to the defendant.)
* * * * *
MR. DENNEY: Do your records show that you attended a conference of the
GL on 4 August 1942?
A. Yes, indeed. These discussions were twice a week. (_NOKW-409, Pros.
Ex. 140._)
* * * * *
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Curiosity consumes me as to what would happen if an
officer inferior in rank to yourself took you at your word and actually
executed a number of these workers or prisoners of war. Would that
officer then be punished?
A. No one was there who would have been in a position to do that. Apart
from that, all those who were under my orders knew me and my way of
handling things. They knew that I didn’t mean it, and apart from that
they always laughed about my remarks when I let myself go, as they said.
Q. In other words the comment of the Field Marshal in a matter of this
seriousness was really of no value?
A. Because the people knew that I got excited very easily about certain
things, and these incidents here have been selected and produced. From
every one of these meetings which took place twice a month, there was a
long report and owing to one or other of these reports, maybe once or
twice, there would be a certain outburst or explosion, and then, as we
soldiers were accustomed to do, we would just get mad, that is all.
However, I didn’t intend to do anything about it and I spoke to those
under my orders when the opportunity offered. They pointed the matter
out to me. They knew exactly from my words that this was not meant
seriously. They knew exactly that no such order had been given and that
I myself would never cause anybody to be punished, not even then when it
might have been justified, for the very simple reason that I did not
have the power to administer punishments.
JUDGE PHILLIPS: Mr. Denney read this paragraph to you, Document
NOKW-409, Prosecution Exhibit 140. I understood you to say this, that
the paragraph did not contain your attitude there, that you never gave
such an order, that when you were worried you sometimes used strong
language as a soldier would. Didn’t you say that?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, now whether you meant it or not, you would say these things,
and by so doing you counseled and advised others under you at a meeting
over which you presided to do such things. Whether you meant it or not
you did that, didn’t you?
A. No, I never gave an order by using these words, because my people
spoke with me, and they knew afterwards from my words that I never meant
it earnestly.
Q. Didn’t you say, “I would band the workers together and have fifty
percent of them shot. I would then publish this fact and compel the
other fifty percent to work by beating if necessary.” Did you say that
or not?
A. I do not remember having said that. However, three days ago I believe
I said that, when I had such a rush of blood to my head, due to that
injury I had, and I couldn’t remember what I had said at that particular
moment. I just burst out with rage.
Q. Well, if you did say that, you were advising and counseling others to
do that, were you not?
A. No, that was not a counsel or an advice to anybody else. On the
contrary, it was known that if someone had done such a thing I would
have intervened myself.
* * * * *
[March 20]
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Since we are on the subject of Jews, I would like to
refer to something which occurred at the first trial. Now you are not
compelled to discuss this matter if for any reason you prefer not to,
but you will recall that you were cross-examined by Justice Jackson on
the subject of your being Aryanized. Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I recall it.
Q. Now you gave an explanation at the trial which, however, was not
definite, it seems to have left something in mid-air, and since you have
given us quite a long autobiographical sketch of yourself, if you would
care to enlighten us on this point, you are free to do so.
A. My point of view is as I stated at the time.
Q. Yes.
A. That point of view I still adhere to.
Q. Let us see. You were asked certain questions and gave certain answers
as follows:
“Question: At that time” (Goering had referred to 1933) “Goering
had you—we will have no misunderstanding about this—Goering
made you what you call a full Aryan; was that right?
“Answer: I do not think he made me one; I was one.
“Question: Well, he had it established, let us say.
“Answer: He had helped me in clearing up this question, which
was not clear.
“Question: That is, your mother’s husband was a Jew; is that
correct?
“Answer: It was not said so.
“Question: You had to demonstrate that none of your ancestry was
Jewish; is that correct?
“Answer: Yes, everybody had to do that.
“Question: And in your case that involved your father, your
alleged father, is that correct?
“Answer: Yes.” [There the inquiry rested.]
A. Yes.
Q. Just what had to be done to demonstrate that you were a full Aryan,
and why did the question arise?
A. The first time that question arose was in 1933, and the occasion was
the following: The president of the German Aero Club was reported as
being adverse to the Hitler regime, and I protected that man. Following
that, a man who was a member of the SA sent a letter to Goering, and I
may add that this was a man who was trying to become a state secretary
in the Air Ministry, and he had been deeply hurt when he, an old Party
member, had to take second place to me. In this letter he said that
State Secretary Milch was not a full Aryan. This happened in the summer
of 1933. Goering forwarded this letter to me, and I went to Goering.
Following that I was asked to submit my family tree. That is how this
matter arose.
Q. In other words, you had to establish that no Jewish blood flowed in
your veins, is that correct?
A. Yes, that is what I was supposed to do.
Q. And you established that to their satisfaction?
A. That was established.
* * * * *
Q. * * * Now, I understand you to say that the first time you learned of
the proposed war against Poland was on 21 August, and even then it was
not very clearly indicated that a war could actually be unleashed, and
that further it was not until the very end of the day, that is to say,
at five o’clock in the afternoon of 31 August that you were directed to
put the Luftwaffe, or all your forces, in readiness for the attack. Is
that correct? Is that what you said?
A. On 31 August, not to get ready, but I received the order: “The attack
starts tomorrow,” that was the order for an attack, whereas, over-all
preparations had been made previously at the meeting which took place
with Hitler on 22 August, only then there was still the possibility of
negotiations which were still going on. These negotiations came to an
end on 31 August at 1700 hours.
Q. Did you not tell this Tribunal that after the meeting of 23 May 1939
you were convinced that war was not intended?
A. 23d of May?
Q. Yes, 23 May 1939?
A. Yes.
Q. That you had no intimation that Hitler intended an aggressive war on
Poland?
A. Yes, because at that time, according to my recollection, Hitler
stated again and again that he was certainly going to settle the Polish
problem, but that he would not allow war to break out.
Q. And that you had called to his attention the necessity of
manufacturing bombs, because you believed that hostilities might break
out?
A. That was before that date, before the 23d, and also after the 23d,
because I myself did not share Hitler’s optimism. Although he may not
have intended to wage war, his policy might nevertheless have led to
war, for he alone was not the deciding factor, the others would have
something to say as well.
Q. And that assumption lulled you into the conviction that there would
be no war, since he refused you authority to manufacture bombs?
A. Today I must assume that, at that time I was not aware of it.
* * * * *
Q. When did you first learn that an attack on Russia was intended?
A. At the beginning of January 1941—I beg your pardon—yes, that is
right, 1941, on 13 January actually. It was then that Goering, during a
conference with a large circle of commanding officers, informed us that
one’s attention should be turned to the East, as Hitler was fearing an
attack by the Russians.
Q. Yes, and you finally came to the conclusion that the declaration of
war, or rather, the undeclared war against Russia was a crime against
Germany.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you think it was a crime against Russia?
A. Yes, against Russia also.
Q. Also?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you endeavored to see Hitler to persuade him not to enter this
war.
A. Yes.
Q. And your immediate circle, your military friends, realized that it
was foolhardy to provoke a war with Russia and thereby establish two
fronts?
A. Exactly the way I saw it, yes. My immediate circle were of the same
opinion as I was.
Q. And all the generals were of the same impression—that it was
hopeless for Germany, and that further it was tragic and suicidal to
Germany to allow Hitler to take over the control of the armed forces?
You were practically unanimous in that belief, were you not?
A. This was never discussed in any larger circles.
Q. But you have testified—it is in the record—that you were all of
that belief.
A. It transpired at a later stage, when it was discussed, that they were
all of the same opinion.
Q. When was that?
A. Later on in the course of the war.
Q. When did you realize that it was a mistake to have Hitler as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces?
A. I, personally?
Q. When was it thoroughly recognized, even though not expressed at a
public meeting among the generals, that it was suicidal, a great
mistake, to have Hitler as Commander in Chief?
A. That was the general point of view after Stalingrad. That is when it
became general.
Q. And when was that?
A. That was the end of January 1943.
Q. Yes. You still had two and a half years of war ahead of you?
A. Yes.
Q. Why didn’t you do something about having Hitler removed?
A. It was my duty toward my people to keep allegiance to him. I had
sworn an oath of allegiance to Hitler. I am only a human being who can
see this world subjectively and I cannot presume to be an impartial
judge on such questions. Moreover, I believe that in the whole of
Germany’s history there is not one instance of soldiers rising against
their military commander. I certainly do not know of one.
Q. Even though you realized that Hitler was leading Germany into stark
annihilation and unspeakable hardship, and even though all the generals
were of that same belief, yet you upheld this fetish of an allegiance
which was destined, and very clearly so, to bring unparalleled misery to
the people that you professed to be faithful to?
A. Your Honor, I personally did not presume to say that my judgment was
right, and that Hitler’s judgment, and the judgment of all those around
him, was wrong.
Q. Then, you modify your statement that Hitler was wrong? You say that
he might have been right?
A. No, no, I am not saying that. What I am trying to say is that it was
my point of view that the question whether the head of the state was to
be overthrown or not was a matter for the constitution, and that for
this eventuality the constitution and the state must surely have powers,
means through which in such cases there could be intervention; but then
it could not be the task of any individual general to take steps in such
questions, which were, after all, unlawful.
* * * * *
-----
[139] The defendant Milch testified in his own behalf on eight full
trial days (March 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1947). His
testimony is recorded in 581 mimeographed pages (_Tr. pp. 1696-2276_).
[140] Wolfgang Vorwald, former Commander of Luftgau (Air Force
Administrative Command) VII, Munich.
[141] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Ernst von Weizsaecker, et
al. See Vols. XII, XIII, XIV.
[142] Doc. R-124, Pros. Ex. 48-A, Conference of 1 March 1944, pp.
484-498.
V. CLOSING STATEMENTS
A. Closing Statement of the Prosecution[143]
MR. CLARK DENNY: We close today the trial of a major war criminal—a
leader in a slaving operation, the enormity of which is without
historical parallel; a principal in a crime of murder in the ironic
masquerade of scientific progress which has shocked alike the world of
medicine and the world of laymen. The evidence set forth before the
Tribunal has shown that Erhard Milch was primarily implicated as a
leader in a program to bring laborers into Germany by force, of
allocating them to the various segments of the German war economy, and
of munitions.
We deal here with a top military and economic planner who at all times
was fully informed as to the aims and objectives of the Nazi plan.
Unlike his colleagues Speer and Sauckel, Milch entered the conspiracy
early. The defendant was one of a small group of men who constituted the
leadership of the Reich.
Before dealing directly with the responsibility of the defendant for the
crimes charged in the indictment, as shown by the evidence, we should
like to review, briefly, the law applicable to these crimes.
_THE LAW_
The indictment charges and the evidence has connected the defendant with
a wide variety of crimes incident to the enforced labor program of the
Nazi regime. In themselves, these crimes are not new except in their
enormity. In domestic law they have, from ancient times, borne such
familiar titles as assault, battery, murder, kidnapping and pillage. In
international law the principles which protect the individual from undue
interference with his person and his personal freedom have given rise to
a series of kindred precepts governing the conduct of a nation which has
gained factual control over the citizens of another state. We shall
consider briefly some salient precepts and prohibitions of international
law up to, and including the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10.
Much of the labor which supplied Germany with the tools of total war was
exacted from people who had been uprooted from their homes in occupied
territories and imported to Germany. Displacement of groups of persons
from one country to another is the proper concern of international law
insofar as it affects the community of nations.
The law has recognized that some conditions may justify the transfer of
people from one country to another. Correspondingly, and with much more
relevance to the present case, international law has enunciated certain
conditions under which the fact of deportation becomes a crime.
If the transfer is carried out without a legal title, as is the case
where people are deported from a country occupied by an invader while
the occupied enemy still has an army in the field, the deportation is
contrary to international law. The rationale of this rule lies in the
supposition that the occupying power has prevented temporarily the
rightful sovereign from exercising power over its citizens.
Articles 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, and 56 of the Hague Regulations, which
limit the rights of the belligerent occupant, do not _expressly_ specify
as a crime the deportation of civilians from an occupied territory.
However, Article 52 states the following conditions under which services
may be demanded from the inhabitants of occupied countries:
1. They must be for the needs of the army of occupation;
2. They must be in proportion to the resources of the country; and
3. They must be of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in
the obligation to take part in military operations against their
own country.
Insofar as this section limits the conscription of labor to that
required for the needs of the army of occupation, it is clear that the
use of labor from occupied territories outside of the area of occupation
is forbidden by the Hague Regulations.
The illegality of the deportation of civilians in territories under
belligerent occupation was demonstrated in the First World War when the
Germans attempted a deportation program of Belgian workers into Germany.
This measure met with world-wide protest and was abandoned after about
four months.
Among the voices raised in protest against the deportation of Belgians
by Germany in 1916-1917 was that of Lansing, Secretary of State. He
wrote:
“The Government of the United States has learned with the
greatest concern and regret of the policy of the German
Government to deport from Belgium a portion of the civilian
population for the purposes of forcing them to labor in Germany,
and is constrained to protest in a friendly spirit but most
solemnly against this policy which is in contravention of all
precedent and all principles of international practice which
have long been accepted and followed by civilized nations in
their treatment of noncombatants in conquered territory.”
Other protests were lodged with the German Government by Spain,
Switzerland, Netherlands, and Brazil, all neutral countries.
International lawyers all over the world condemned Germany’s action in
the strongest terms.
The opposition in the German Reichstag accused the government of
violating the Hague Convention and refused to vote for the war budget.
It is worthy of note, in passing, that the defendant has testified at
this trial that he knew of this effort at deportation of labor on the
part of Germany in the First War and that he was much interested in the
investigation conducted by a Reichstag Committee concerning this matter.
He could not have followed this investigation, as he admits he did,
without learning that the deportation in question was a violation of
international law.
The second condition under which deportation becomes a crime occurs when
the purpose of the displacement is illegal. A conspicuous example of
illegality of purpose is found when the deportation is for the purpose
of compelling the deportees to manufacture weapons for use against their
homeland or to be assimilated in the working economy of the occupying
country.
An attempt has been made by the defense in this trial to show that
persons were deported from France into Germany legally and for a legal
purpose, by pointing out that such deportations were authorized by
agreements between Nazi and Vichy French authorities. This defense is
both technically and substantially deficient. Many of the Vichy
Government’s highest officials, who held office by reason of and under
the protection of Nazi power, have been punished for treason by the
present legitimate government. And, too, the agreements themselves were
illegal—because they were exacted under duress, and because they were
void _ab initio_ because of their immoral content. It is common
knowledge that even the puppets of Vichy did not of their own accord
agree to the Nazi deportation measures. It is equally clear that these
agreements were _contra bonos mores_. Then, too, it was illegal for any
French Government to conclude agreements which provided for the
compulsory mass deportation of French workers to aid the enemy’s war
effort. At the time of the agreement between Germany and Vichy there was
merely a state of suspension of hostilities. French resistance had not
ceased, and the outcome of the war continued to be uncertain. Lastly,
the deportation agreements were invalid because their manifest purpose
was to aid Germany in the commission of the crime of aggressive war.
That an agreement in furtherance of an act which is illegal in
international law is invalid has been stated by various authorities. For
example, Professor Charles Cheney Hyde, of Columbia University, defines
as internationally illegal “agreements which are concluded for the
purpose of, and with a view to, causing the performance of acts which it
(international law) proscribes.”
Professor Hall, page 382 of the 8th Edition of International Law (1924),
declares:
“The requirement that contracts shall be in conformity with law
invalidates, or at least renders voidable, all agreements which
are at variance with the fundamental principles of international
law and their undisputed applications * * *.”
Lauterpacht on International Law by L. Oppenheim, in volume I, page 706,
states:
“It is a unanimously recognized customary rule of international
law that obligations which are at variance with universally
recognized principles of international law cannot be the object
of a treaty.”
The final condition under which deportation becomes illegal occurs
whenever generally recognized standards of decency and humanity are
disregarded. This flows from the established principle of law that an
otherwise permissible act becomes a crime when carried out in a criminal
manner.
A study of the pertinent parts of Control Council Law No. 10 strengthens
the conclusions of the foregoing statements, that deportation of the
population is criminal whenever there is no title in the deporting
authority or whenever the purpose of the displacement is illegal, or
whenever the deportation is characterized by inhumane or illegal
methods.
Article II (1) (_b_) lists under war crimes “ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian
population from occupied territory.” It is clear that Law No. 10
establishes the following separate and distinct crimes: ill-treatment of
civilians from occupied territories; deportation to slave labor of such
civilians; and deportation for any other purposes of such civilians.
The prohibition of deportation of civilians from occupied territories
irrespective of the purpose, as stated in Control Council Law No. 10, is
a recognition of the principle of international law that a power in
belligerent occupation has no right or authority (title) to deport the
citizens of the occupied territories. The separate specification as a
war crime in Law No. 10 of ill-treatment of civilians from occupied
territories is a recognition of the rule of international law, as
heretofore discussed, that even an otherwise lawful deportation (by an
authority having title and for a legitimate purpose) is rendered illegal
where the deportees are ill-treated.
Without entering into a detailed discussion of the evidence, it should
be pointed out at this point, that all these conditions for criminal
deportation were abundantly present in the enforced labor program of
Germany during the 2d World War, and that the _knowing connection_ of
the defendant with all phases of illegal deportation has been
established.
Article II (1) (_c_) of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies certain
crimes against humanity. Among these is listed the “deportation * * *
(of) any civilian population * * *”. The general language of this
sub-section, as applied to deportation, indicates that Control Council
Law No. 10 has indeed unconditionally condemned, as a crime against
humanity, every instance of the deportation of civilians. Under this
sub-section, there would seem to be no room for argument as to the
legality of any agreement on the part of any government, legitimate or
illegitimate, which allows deportation of its subjects in time of war.
We come now to a consideration of the crime of enslavement. Whereas
Article II (_b_) names deportation to slave labor as a war crime,
Article II (1) (_c_) states that the “enslavement * * * (of) any
civilian population” is a crime against humanity. Thus, Law No. 10
treats as separate crimes, and different types of crime, “deportation to
slave labor” and “enslavement.”
Article II (_b_) does not specify as a crime the detention (as
distinguished from the deportation) of civilians for use as slave labor
or for any other purpose. However, the section does stipulate that any
atrocities or offenses against persons which constitute violations of
the laws or customs of war, _including but not limited to_ deportation
to slave labor, are war crimes. Use or detention of persons from
occupied territories for slave labor or for any other purpose, in and of
themselves, _do_ constitute violations of the laws and customs of war.
Ergo, such use or detention is a _war crime_ within II (1) (_b_) of Law
No. 10.
The _crime against humanity_ which is termed “enslavement” in Article II
(1) (_c_) of Law No. 10 is susceptible of two meanings. It can be
understood to embrace the initial act of deprivation of the freedom of
another, and an act whereby such deprivation is continued, or either of
them, or it may be interpreted as referring only to the initial measures
whereby a person is deprived of his freedom.
It is the contention of the prosecution in this case that all phases of
the slave labor program, the taking, the transportation, the detention,
the use and the inhuman treatment of foreign workers as practiced by the
Nazi state and participated in by the defendant, constitute enslavement
within the meaning of Article II (1) (_c_). No sufficient reason appears
for the limitation of the crime to the mere initial act. In every true
and complete sense a person is enslaved from the moment when his liberty
is taken from him until the time when it is restored to him. It is more
than probable that if Law No. 10 is intended to limit the crime of
enslavement to the initial measures under which a person was deprived of
his liberty, there would have been some definite indication, either in
the language or in the context of the statute.
Even if we were to concede the narrowest possible meaning for the term
“enslavement” in Article II (1) (_c_), so as to understand by it only
the first acts of deprivation of liberty, all acts under which such
people were kept in an enslaved status would be crimes against humanity,
because the same section defines as such any atrocities and offenses
committed against the civilian population. By express proviso
“enslavement” and “deportation” are only illustratively mentioned, and
“other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population”
constitute crimes against humanity.
The result is that whether we adopt the broad interpretation of the term
“enslavement” or the narrower one, the deportation, the transportation,
the retention, the use and the inhuman treatment of civilian populations
are crimes against humanity. The prosecution charges that the defendant
was criminally connected with all the phases of the slave labor program,
whether these divisions be comprehended within the technical term
“enslavement” or be divided between the crime of “enslavement” and that
of “other inhuman acts.”
We shall now make brief comment on the subject of the treatment and use
of prisoners of war. The Hague and Geneva Conventions merely codify the
precepts of the laws and usages of all civilized nations. Article 31 of
the Geneva Convention provides that “labor furnished by prisoners of war
shall have no direct relation to war operations.” Thus the Convention
forbids:
1. The use of prisoners of war in manufacture or transportation
of arms or munitions of any kind, and
2. The use of prisoners of war for transporting material
intended for combat units.
The Hague Regulations contain comparable provisions.
The essence of the crime of the misuse of prisoners of war derives from
the kind of work to which they are assigned—in other words, to work
directly connected with the war effort. The prosecution would like to
recall to the court the evidence which connects the defendant with both
the _illegal employment_ of prisoners of war and with their abusive
treatment. The Tribunal will recall that the defendant ordered the
murder of prisoners of war who attempted to escape. We will discuss this
crime more fully later. It will be remembered that there never has been
a substantial denial of the fact that prisoners of war were used to man
German antiaircraft batteries. Nor is it subject to doubt that prisoners
were used in air armament industries over which the defendant exercised
supervisory control.
We now come to the consideration of the basic charges and the law
governing the defendant’s complicity in, and responsibility for, the
Medical Experiments Program. The fundamental crime with which the
defendant is charged in this connection is murder. Also involved are
various atrocities, tortures, offenses against the person, and other
inhuman acts.
The applicable provisions of Control Council Law No. 10, Article II, are
(_b_) war crimes, (_c_) crimes against humanity. In connection with the
criminal Medical Experiments Program, the prosecution submits that the
defendant is guilty of—
(_a_) War crimes, namely violations of the laws and customs of
war, as the medical experiments performed upon involuntary
persons, some of them nationals of countries at war with the
German Reich, involved the commission of murders, tortures, and
other inhuman acts.
(_b_) Crimes against humanity, namely medical experiments
performed upon involuntary German nationals and nationals of
other countries, in the course of which, brutalities, murders,
and other inhuman acts were committed.
Before we pass from the law involved in this case to a consideration of
the evidence, we wish to mention the legal basis for the prosecution’s
contention that the defendant must share the guilt which attaches to the
slave labor program and the conduct of medical experiments upon
unconsenting human beings. Control Council Law No. 10 defines for us the
theory upon which this trial proceeds in Article II, paragraph 2, when
it says:
“Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in
which he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined
in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (_a_) a principal or
(_b_) an accessory to the commission of any such crime, or
ordered or abetted the same or (_c_) took a consenting part
therein or (_d_) _was connected with plans or enterprises
involving its commission or_ (_e_) _was a member of any
organization or group connected with the commission of any such
crime_. * * *” [Emphasis added.]
Without wishing to limit the scope of the testimony in this case, the
Tribunal’s attention is directed to the evidence which has established
that the defendant, as a member of the Central Planning Board, and the
Jaegerstab, and as Generalluftzeugmeister, and in every one of his
capacities, was connected with “plans and enterprises” for the
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and was a “member
of organizations and groups”, within the meaning of subdivisions (_d_)
and (_e_) of paragraph 2, “connected with the commission of such
crimes”.
Count One, paragraph 6, of the indictment charges the defendant Milch
with guilt in the murder of prisoners of war who had attempted to escape
from enforced labor in German war industry. The gist of this crime is
murder, which is, and always has been, prohibited by every country which
laid any claim to civilization. It was specified as a war crime under
the Hague and Geneva Conventions and under the provisions of Article II
of Control Council Law No. 10. The evidence which connects the defendant
with this crime will be discussed in another part of this summation.
Law Number 10, Article II, paragraph 3 provides that the death penalty
or lesser sentences may be prescribed for the commission of war crimes
and crimes against humanity as defined in the statute.
We turn now from the law to the evidence. In the presentation of its
case in chief, the prosecution first offered evidence to describe the
slave labor program in Germany in all its stark terror. It then turned
to a presentation of the proof which connected the defendant with the
slave labor program in two of his principal capacities, as member of the
Central Planning Board and as member of the Jaegerstab. Next there was
put in evidence the documents which established the defendant’s
connection with the medical experiments, and finally, after the defense
had put in its case, the defendant was confronted with the evidence of
additional documents which connected him with the detention and
mistreatment of slave labor in his capacity as Generalluftzeugmeister.
In summing up the evidence the prosecution wants to keep roughly the
same order. It will deal in turn with the evidence of the defendant’s
activities as member of the Central Planning Board and as member of the
Jaegerstab. The documents relating to the defendant as
Generalluftzeugmeister will then be dealt with and, in conclusion, the
defendant’s implication in the criminal medical experiments will be
discussed.
When, in the course of presenting the evidence, we first turned our
attention from the general documents which established the body of the
crime of slave labor to the documents which were to prove the
defendant’s connection with that crime, we asked the Court’s attention
to certain key words which we said would run like small threads through
our proof. These words were cited to be “procurement, allocation and
use”. It was stated that we would often use them. We offered many
documents to prove Milch’s connection with each of the functions
described by these key words. Once again, we ask the Tribunal to keep
these words in mind.
The Central Planning Board, which was established in April 1942, served
as a means of consolidating in a single agency all controls over German
war production. The minutes of the Central Planning Board which have
been submitted to the Tribunal reflect the dominant role played by the
defendant at meetings of the Board.
The best evidence of the scope and authority of the Central Planning
Board is contained in the Board’s own minutes. The first conference of
the Central Planning Board was held on 27 April 1942. The duties and
responsibilities of the Board were announced in these words:
“The Central Planning in the Four Year Plan (decree of the Reich
Marshal of Greater Germany [Goering] of 22 April 1942) is a task
for leaders. It encompasses only principles and executive
matters. It makes unequivocal decisions and supervises the
execution of its directives. The Central Planning does not rely
on anonymous institutions difficult to control but always on
individuals and fully responsible persons who are free in the
selection of their working methods and their collaborations, as
far as there are no directives issued by the Central Planning.”
Then, six months later, on 20 October 1942, the statutes of the Central
Planning Board were published and distributed. A portion of these
states:
“The Central Planning Board created by the Fuehrer and Reich
Marshal in order to unify armament and war economy deals only
with the decision of basic questions. Professional questions
remain the task of the competent departments which in their
field remain responsible within the framework of the decisions
made by the Central Planning Board.”
It is addressed to: “The highest Reich authorities, the Reich Protector,
the Governor General and the executive authorities in the occupied
countries.” The letter of transmittal stated in part:
“Enclosed I send you for your information the statutes of the
Central Planning Board with the request to support the office of
the Central Planning Board in every possible way in its work,
and to direct, more particularly, your section chiefs and
reporters to forward all information requested orally, or by
writing, in the shortest possible time. By this collaboration by
your section chiefs and reporters, the building up of larger
machinery in the framework of the Central Planning Board is to
be avoided.”
The International Military Tribunal found that the Central Planning
Board “had supreme authority for the scheduling of German production and
the allocation and development of raw material”.
It needs no emphasis that the effective performance of these functions
necessarily involved the Board in the requisitioning and distribution of
labor, and the records of the Board, which have been submitted, leave no
doubt that the Board exercised the authority conferred upon it in the
field of labor. The International Military Tribunal in its opinion found
that the Board requisitioned labor from Sauckel with full knowledge that
the demands could be supplied only by foreign forced labor, and that the
Board determined the basic allocation of this labor within the German
war economy.
In assessing the guilt of the defendant Funk, the Court said:[144]
“In the fall of 1943, Funk was a member of the Central Planning
Board which determined the total number of laborers needed for
German industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually
by deportation from occupied territories. Funk did not appear to
be particularly interested in this aspect of the forced labor
program, and usually sent a deputy to attend the meetings, often
SS General Ohlendorf, the former Chief of the SD inside of
Germany and the former Commander of Einsatzgruppe D. But Funk
was aware that the Board of which he was a member was demanding
the importation of slave laborers, and allocating them to the
various industries under its control.”
Bearing in mind the fact that Funk was a minor member of the Board, how
much greater is the responsibility of the defendant who was a dominant
figure on the Board throughout its existence.
There is no need to review in historical detail the defendant’s personal
participation in the criminal activities of the Board. A few references
to the pattern for 1944 will suffice. The Tribunal will recall that
Albert Speer, the other dominant member of the Board, was ill during
most of this period.
On 4 January 1944, demands were made at a Hitler conference that Sauckel
produce four million new workers from the occupied countries. The
defendant was present at the conference, and at this meeting, Sauckel,
in pledging himself to perform his recruitment tasks, indicated that the
demands could be met only by Himmler, and the promise of assistance was
forthcoming from the Reich Leader SS.
The allocation of this labor to the various sectors of the German
economy was determined by the Board at its 53d meeting. The defendant
was the presiding officer at this meeting. The chart compiled by Milch
and found in his files shows his personal knowledge of the sources of
the labor being allocated.
Sauckel was, however, unable to satisfy completely these demands. He
reported this inability at its 54th meeting. This meeting of the Board
was presided over by the defendant, and the minutes which we have
submitted show the subordinate position occupied by Sauckel with respect
to the Board. The Tribunal will recall Sauckel’s opening statement:
“Field Marshal, gentlemen, it goes without saying that we shall
satisfy as far as possible the demands agreed upon by the
Central Planning Board.”
And then later on in the meeting:
“If I am to fulfill the demands which you present to me * * *.”
We shall not review in detail the minutes of this meeting, but the
Tribunal’s attention is again directed to the fact that Sauckel was
questioned closely by the defendant who suggested that the Wehrmacht be
assigned to the task of assisting in the recruitment drive. The
defendant suggested that French workers be coerced by a system of
premeditated starvation. In dealing with the problem of Italian
laborers, the defendant suggested that only those who went to Germany or
worked in protected factories be given food.
As a further means of meeting the manpower shortage, consideration was
given to possible measures for increasing the productive power of
prisoners of war. Accordingly, on 5 March 1944, a conference was held at
the Fuehrer Headquarters. It is evident from the minutes which have been
submitted to the Tribunal that the defendant was in attendance. The
Tribunal will recall that the decision was made to give the direction of
the Stalags to the SS, in order to increase the production power of the
prisoners. This was not to apply to the Americans or the English. The
Tribunal will take judicial notice of the methods of the SS.
On 7 July 1944, Sauckel issued a report showing new manpower placed at
the disposal of German war industry during the first half of 1944. We
shall not review in detail this report, but merely state that it is
proof of the Board’s directive to Sauckel.
This report, however, showed a deficit, and on 11 July 1944 a further
conference was held to solve the question of how greater compulsion
could be exerted on persons to work in Germany. The defendant has
testified that he was in virtual retirement from production matters
since late June 1944. Yet the record of this conference shows that he
was present. The result of this conference was the greater utilization
of the Wehrmacht in the recruitment of forced labor. The directive of
Field Marshal von Kluge, which has been submitted in evidence, makes
specific reference to the results of this conference.
Here, in brief, we have the picture. The defendant and the Board, of
which he was a dominant member, requisitioning forced labor from
Sauckel, allocating this labor to the various sectors of the German war
economy, and later improvising new and more brutal techniques of force
and terror for the recruitment of new labor.
The defense, besides denying the power and authority of the Central
Planning Board, has challenged the authenticity and accuracy of its
transcripts. The prosecution has been compelled to rely upon these
minutes for much of its proof.
In this connection, it might be said that these same transcripts
constituted the basis for findings of fact by the International Military
Tribunal. They are quoted in the decision of that Court.
The statutes of the Central Planning Board, mentioned a few minutes ago,
show the extreme care taken to insure the accuracy of reporting these
meetings, as well as action taken or ordered to be taken. The statutes
of the Board provide in part:
“In order to have the conferences properly prepared and to have
the execution of the decisions supervised, the Central Planning
Board appoints an office. This office consists of the deputies
appointed by each of three members of the Central Planning
Board; one of these three deputies shall be appointed chief of
the office.”
Then follows a handwritten marginal note which I shall omit.
“In accordance with the attached distribution of work the office
appoints reporters. These reporters are at the disposal of all
members of the Central Planning Board. The office appoints one
reporter to keep the record.”
And then, tasks of the office:
“The office prepares the meetings of the Central Planning Board
in such a manner that the members of the Central Planning Board
have the agenda and the material of discussion 24 hours in
advance. For this purpose the office conducts preliminary talks
with the competent departments, etc.
“On the strength of the record made by the reporter, the office
sees to the execution of the decisions of the Central Planning
Board by the competent agencies, and sees to it that the
deadlines fixed are complied with.
“The members of the office keep the members of the Central
Planning Board informed between the sessions.”
The minutes of these meetings which have been submitted to this Tribunal
show that these proceedings were recorded and transcribed with
characteristic German detail and accuracy. We need only refer to the
charts and tables, and the remarks quoted in the transcripts. Of the 59
meetings fully covered by these official reports, 41 were prepared and
signed by Ministerialrat Steffler, who was personally responsible for
the accuracy and completeness of these reports.
Without the Central Planning Board the slave labor program could not
have functioned.
_THE JAEGERSTAB._
Here we have the defendant in immediate contact with the slave labor
program at its peak. By the testimony of the defendant, it was he who
conceived and instigated the formation of the Jaegerstab. Speer and the
defendant constituted its leadership. Speer’s participation was nominal
and it was the defendant who directed its activities and acted as its
chairman. Speer was ill during part of the Jaegerstab’s existence and
has stated to the Court that he did not preside at a meeting.
The Jaegerstab assumed control over fighter production when the
exploitation of foreign forced labor in air armament had already reached
unparalleled heights. On 16 February 1944, the defendant had told his
colleagues in the Central Planning Board that “our best new engine is
made 88 percent by Russian prisoners of war.” On 25 March, he told his
engineers that soon the percentage of foreign personnel in the aircraft
industry would reach 90 percent. Reich Leader SS Himmler, reporting to
Goering on 9 March 1944 on the employment of concentration camp
personnel in the aircraft industry, stated that nearly 36,000 prisoners
were employed and that an increase to 90,000 was expected. The formation
of the Jaegerstab is partly explainable in terms of the battle to
increase the manpower resources available for fighter production.
The Jaegerstab was assigned top priority. Projects for the recruitment
and commitment of manpower were discussed by the Jaegerstab. The
evidence presented before the Tribunal has shown that questions of
manpower were time and time again referred to the defendant. We have
seen him agreeing to use his prestige and influence upon Sauckel in
efforts to obtain new workers for aircraft production. When manpower in
sufficient numbers was not forthcoming through normal channels, the
Jaegerstab did not shrink from other methods of obtaining its labor.
When necessary the Jaegerstab recruited its own labor, either directly
or by engineering “snatching” expeditions for the seizure of manpower
arriving on transports from the East.
The defendant’s frank admission to his subordinates that “international
law cannot be observed here” characterizes best his own participation in
the activities of the Jaegerstab. Where, as was the case with France,
transfers of production facilities were concerned, the defendant
advocated the stripping of the country and the deportation of its people
as prisoners of war. When the discussion turned to PW’s, the defendant
was quick to suggest their transfer to places under air attack. When the
transportation of Italian civilian conscripts directly recruited by the
Jaegerstab for service in Germany was in question, it was the defendant
who advocated the shooting of those who attempted to escape.
The Jaegerstab was no mere discussion group. As an agency with absolute
authority over fighter production, the Jaegerstab acted by orders and
directives. The Jaegerstab fixed hours of labor and conditions of work.
It was the Jaegerstab, for example, which established the 72-hour work
week in the aircraft industry.
In addition to its jurisdiction over fighter production, the Jaegerstab
was charged with the program for the decentralization of the German
aircraft industry, both to above ground bombproof installations and to
subterranean locations. Much of the labor employed in both phases of the
project was concentration camp labor. The defendant must have known this
fact.
One phase, the transfer to new installations underground, was under the
immediate supervision of SS Gruppenfuehrer Heinz Kammler. Kammler was a
member of the Jaegerstab. Where, as was the case in some instances,
labor was not forthcoming in sufficient quantity, Kammler informed the
Jaegerstab of his intention to take large numbers of persons into
protective custody for use on his projects. Members of the Jaegerstab
knew that manpower shortages on the construction projects were at least
in part due to the high death rate. The conditions of employment on the
projects have not been substantially disputed. The Jaegerstab was well
informed of these conditions. While on trips with the Jaegerstab,
Kammler visited these projects and his fellow members of the Jaegerstab
were well advised as to the manner in which workers employed on them
were treated. Where it was necessary to hang thirty people merely as an
example to others, Kammler reported this fact to the Jaegerstab.
A second phase of the program, the transfer of fighter production to
bombproof factories above ground, was carried out for the Jaegerstab by
Stobbe-Dethleffsen and later Xaver Dorsch. While Stobbe-Dethleffsen and
Dorsch were immediately in charge, it was the Jaegerstab which received
the funds and raw materials necessary for the carrying out of this
project. When sufficient progress had not been made under
Stobbe-Dethleffsen, the Jaegerstab demanded that Dorsch carry out this
program. The defendant was a leader in the planning which preceded
Dorsch’s appointment.
By the testimony of Dorsch, Milch was one of a small group which worked
out with Goering the details of the project, including the question of
manpower. Dorsch was represented on the Jaegerstab by Schlempp, and
later Knipping, deputies designated for this particular purpose.
Schlempp informed the Jaegerstab on the progress of the work, both
orally and in writing. Dorsch received manpower from the Jaegerstab.
This was the immediate concern of Schmelter.
Early in April 1944 the defendant represented the Jaegerstab at
conferences with Hitler where the decision was first taken to carry out
deportations. Shortly thereafter, the defendant received written
confirmation of the results of this conference, as did Himmler, who was
to procure the workers. Progress reports were made and delivery dates
agreed upon. Then came the disappointing news that the first transports
arriving at Auschwitz consisted primarily of old men, women, and
children. Later on there were reports as to the successful allocation of
this personnel. The testimony of Dorsch shows that these Jews were used
on the construction projects, that the conditions under which they lived
were intolerable, and that the death rate on the project was excessive.
In closing this phase of the case, it is submitted that the defendant
never resigned from the Jaegerstab. While it is true that the defendant
at Goering’s behest was removed from certain offices in the Air Ministry
in the summer of 1944, he retained his membership in the Jaegerstab
until its dissolution, the prosecution contends.
As Generalluftzeugmeister the defendant had complete control over
aircraft production. In this field his authority was unlimited. In
particular it has been shown that the defendant requisitioned labor for
the aircraft industry with knowledge of the brutal and inhumane
techniques employed in recruiting these laborers, and that he gave
directives for the criminal treatment of these laborers at the centers
of production.
There is evidence that the defendant presented the labor demands of the
aircraft industry to Sauckel. The Tribunal will recall that in his
affidavit Sauckel stated that it was the defendant who produced the
manpower figures for aviation. In view of the position occupied by
Sauckel in the slave labor program, this statement is of special
importance.
The statement of Sauckel is in agreement with the statements of Hermann
Goering, the defendant’s superior in the Luftwaffe. In his interrogation
the former Reich Marshal stated that the defendant was in charge of the
division for labor employment in the Air Ministry and that the industry
demands for labor in air armament were made by the defendant.
Even the defendant’s collaborator Albert Speer testified to the same
effect when he stated:
“The requests of the air armament industry for laborers were
presented by Milch and he did not permit anyone to take this
right away from him until March 1944.”
The defendant as Generalluftzeugmeister was acquainted with the methods
employed in recruiting this manpower. In fact, many of the practices
indulged in by Sauckel were formulated at conferences at which the
defendant was in attendance. The Tribunal will recall that the defendant
was present at a conference in which Goering announced his plan to use
the Luftwaffe in the recruitment drive to capture laborers in Holland.
The Tribunal’s attention is also drawn to the Generalluftzeugmeister
meeting of 25 January 1944 in which methods for the more expeditious
deportation of young Czechs for work in the Luftwaffe were discussed.
The defendant also knew that prisoners of war and concentration camp
personnel were included in the manpower he was requisitioning and
distributing to the aircraft industry. We have seen him trying to
increase their numbers in the industry under his control, and we have
seen him ordering and abetting the inhumane treatment of this labor.
As chief of aircraft production, the defendant regulated the treatment
of foreign forced labor in the German aircraft industry. The defendant
fixed hours of labor and conditions of work and by directives to his
subordinates set basic policies for the handling of this labor within
the industry.
Where foreign workers refused to work, the defendant ordered that they
be shot. When these wretched slaves attempted to revolt, the defendant
directed that some of their numbers be killed, regardless of personal
guilt or innocence. In the case of prisoners of war who attempted to
escape, the defendant ordered that they be shot.
When the “contracts” of workers under his control expired, the defendant
ordered their compulsory extension, and when workers attempted to change
jobs, he advocated that they be put in concentration camps.
In the case of Italians who refused to work, the defendant ordered that
they be beaten and so informed his chief, Goering. And where Frenchmen
refused to work in French factories under his control, the defendant
stated that he would deport them by force and bring them to Germany or
to the East. Similar policies were applied by the defendant in the case
of Polish workers.
No more need be said about the Generalluftzeugmeister. The Tribunal has
seen the documents containing the minutes of the meetings. The documents
dealing with this phase of the case are particularly revealing in
showing the fanaticism of the defendant and the enthusiasm with which he
recommended ruthless treatment of the hapless victims of German
occupation policies.
We will now restate the pattern originally presented in terms of the
proof brought forward at the trial in order to ascertain to what extent
the defendant’s culpability has been established with reference to the
medical phase.
First, the body of the crime. The prosecution contends that in violation
of the laws of war and all the laws of humanity criminal high-altitude
and freezing experiments were carried on by Luftwaffe physicians.
The testimony of Dr. Erich Hippke, the Medical Inspector of the
Luftwaffe, is of interest on this subject. Hippke stated that Dr.
Rascher, a Luftwaffe physician at the time, came to Hippke with a
proposal to use prisoners as high-altitude experimental subjects in May
1941.
Hippke was in a receptive frame of mind, for it was essential that the
scope of these experiments be widened and new human subjects were
needed. The researchers working on the tests had developed a certain
immunity so that results of self-experimentation did not give a true
picture of the reactions.
With the aid of Himmler and the SS, the Luftwaffe was able to proceed
with the experiments which were allegedly necessary in the interests of
German military aviation medical knowledge. But lest one be inclined to
believe that these pressure experiments were considered as minor
nuisances to the subjects concerned, with no real dangers, note the
words of Dr. Hippke:
“I asked him,” speaking of Rascher, “how he would be able to
obtain such persons for experimentation, and he justified
himself by saying that he had connections with the SS who had
charge of such penal prisoners. There were such penal prisoners
in Dachau and he would be in a position to obtain them for these
purposes. I myself, because of my inner personal feelings on the
matter, was very much against these experiments and could not
make up my mind whether I should approve such experimentation.”
From the very beginning of the plan to conduct these experiments, Dr.
Hippke had strong mental reservations concerning the moral principles
involved in the task which the Luftwaffe doctors were about to
undertake. During the coming year Hippke weighed the problem, and it was
with some misgiving that he finally allowed his doctors to begin the
experiments, saying to them: “Please, children, go carefully.”
But, tragically enough, his “children” did not go carefully. Instead,
they ran amuck with their scientific apparatus and tests. The pressure
experiments which were supposed to have been helpful to fliers of the
Luftwaffe degenerated into so-called “X-experiments”, which meant
“execution” experiments.
Seventy to eighty persons were murdered during the spring and summer of
1942 when the pressure experiments were carried on at Dachau.
During the subsequent freezing experiments a comparable number of
concentration camp inmates forfeited their lives to the sadistic Dr.
Rascher and his Luftwaffe associates.
Dr. Romberg himself admits having seen three persons die in the
low-pressure chamber and concedes that at least nine other deaths may
well have occurred when he was absent from his post at Dachau.
Wolfram Sievers,[145] the manager of the Ahnenerbe, the SS Research
Institute, witnessed the death of an experimental subject in the
freezing tank.
There is adequate evidence that the low-pressure and freezing
experiments were carried out by Luftwaffe physicians for the benefit of
the Luftwaffe. There has been no valid denial of the fact that the
defendant was the Luftwaffe official responsible for the deaths and
cruelties suffered in these twin torture chambers, the pressure chamber
and the freezing tank.
Now, let us examine in more detail the second basic charge of the
prosecution, namely, that the defendant was officially connected with
these experiments which violated the laws of war and humanity.
We have the “Wolffy” letter of 20 May 1942 in which the defendant tells
Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff of the SS that “the altitude experiments
carried out by the SS and the Luftwaffe at Dachau have been finished.”
In this same letter Milch announces that experiments in connection with
perils on the high seas would be important; that the necessary
arrangements have been made and, since the low-pressure chamber is no
longer needed, it must be moved from Dachau. Thus the defendant has
entered the picture and established his official connection with the
high-altitude experiments and the low-temperature experiments, which
proved to be considerably more than mere harmless chilling tests.
If, as the defendant contends, he was not officially responsible for
these Luftwaffe medical experiments, then it should follow that other
persons connected with them would not take cognizance of the defendant
in this matter. The contention is ridiculous.
The witness Wolff had the following to say regarding a meeting he had
with Milch in August or September 1942:
“Thereafter, we had discussed our official questions. I inquired
about how he was, and if everything between the Luftwaffe and
the SS was all right. During that occasion we also spoke about
these experiments very shortly, if at all, and we spoke of the
invaluable help which the SS was giving us by providing these
voluntary inmates, which was helping us with our medical
material which could be used at the front.”
It is to be noted that they talked about the experiments and Wolff asked
how the Luftwaffe SS relations were. It is submitted that this
demonstrates that Wolff regarded the defendant as the top man in the
Luftwaffe Medical Experiments Program, as indeed he was.
Then there are the two letters addressed to Milch by Himmler and Wolff,
substantially alike in content; Himmler’s, dated November 1942, in which
he cites the opposition that exists among “Christian medical circles” to
conducting experiments on helpless, involuntary concentration camp
inmates. He refers to the narrow-mindedness of such medical men, which
“will take at least another ten years” to remove. But this
narrow-mindedness did not trouble the consciences of Himmler or the
defendant Milch. Decidedly not. In the words of the Reich Leader SS: “We
two should not get angry about these difficulties.”
The prosecution submits that Himmler would not have written a letter in
this tenor unless he was certain that his good friend Milch would be in
complete agreement with his views.
And how did Himmler regard Milch in connection with the experiments? As
a casual onlooker, with a purely academic interest in the results
obtained? No, Himmler knew that Milch possessed the over-all command,
the ultimate authority in the Luftwaffe; that the Inspector General of
the Luftwaffe was the man to refer to whenever a question arose as to
the disposition of the pressure chamber or the status of Dr. Rascher.
Witness Himmler’s request in his letter:
“I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt in the reserve,
from the air force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen SS. I
would then assume the sole responsibility for having these
experiments made in this field and would put the results, which
we in the SS need only for the frost injuries in the East,
entirely at the disposal of the air force.”
The logical corollary to this statement is inescapable. _If_ Rascher was
not transferred to the SS and remained with the air force, the
responsibility would not be Himmler’s alone. And we must remember that
Rascher did not leave his Luftwaffe post until the year 1943 _after_ the
experimental atrocities had been largely completed. Then where did this
responsibility rest? Himmler had no doubts; it was on the shoulders of
the defendant.
Nor did Karl Wolff, Himmler’s right-hand man, have any doubts as to the
responsible person in the Luftwaffe, with reference to the medical
experiments. He, too, wrote to Milch requesting that Rascher be released
from the Luftwaffe and transferred to the SS. Here was a man, who, by
his own testimony, “had a good comradely relationship” with the
defendant. On the direct examination, Wolff testified regarding his
connection with Milch:
“Q. In your position during the war did you have any official
dealings with Milch?
“A. Yes.
“Q. In what connection?
“A. During peacetime—that is, from 1933 on, until 1939—there
was a personal cooperation between Milch and me. _All
difficulties between the Luftwaffe and the SS were handled at
personal conferences in a very comradely way. This usage also
took place during the war._”
It is because of the situation above described, that the prosecution has
called Wolff the liaison man between Himmler and the SS on the one hand,
and the defendant and the Luftwaffe, on the other.
The testimony and affidavit of Walter Neff, the Dachau prisoner who
later became a block leader in Dachau, is of interest. This man saw
Rascher often. Was Milch’s name mentioned by Rascher in connection with
the medical experiments? It was. In his affidavit, which he did not
repudiate when testifying before this Court, Neff said:
“The name of Field Marshal _Milch_ was frequently mentioned in
Dachau. Every time I asked Dr. Romberg how long the cars and the
low-pressure chambers would remain in Dachau, he assured me that
_Milch_ would attend to everything. Dr. Rascher said to me that
he had communicated with Milch personally and that the cars
would remain in Dachau as long as he specified.”
Dr. Siegfried Ruff,[146] an important figure in the medical experiments
program, head of the research section of the DVL, recognized the
defendant Milch as the supreme authority in the experimental program. In
his affidavit Ruff said:
“The entire medical research for aviation was under General Dr.
Erich Hippke, in his capacity as Chief of the Medical Service,
until 1944, and subsequently under Professor Dr. Schroeder. As
Chief of the Medical Service, General Hippke was immediately
subordinate to Field Marshal Milch * * *. The chain of command
for these experiments was Milch—Hippke—Ruff—Romberg.”
Again there is the chart drawn up by Dr. Oskar Schroeder,[147] outlining
the official Luftwaffe channels through which orders flowed from Milch
to Hippke, and from Hippke to the various doctors engaged in the actual
process of experimentation. Schroeder thus knew definitely that Milch
was the Luftwaffe Chief in the medical experiments program. He later
succeeded Hippke as Medical Inspector. Consequently, his chart is
entitled to material weight in the proof offered by the prosecution.
Rudolf Brandt,[148] adjutant to Himmler, often had occasion to deal with
correspondence between the Luftwaffe and the SS, regarding the
experiments. In referring to Himmler’s request that Milch order Dr.
Rascher to be transferred to the SS, Brandt wrote a letter to Wolfram
Sievers, of the Ahnenerbe Society, stating—
“I assume that the _Field Marshal will of himself give the
necessary orders_, and then confine himself to sending a brief
answer to the Reich Leader SS.”
And Sievers writing to Brandt about the use of the low-pressure chamber
says—
“The putting at our disposal of the low-pressure chamber,
however, will be possible then _only if the Reich Leader SS
writes in person to Field Marshal Milch concerning this_.”
These two men, Sievers and Brandt, were not uninformed of the course of
the medical experiments nor of the competent personnel in the Luftwaffe
and SS in this matter. On the contrary, Sievers admitted witnessing the
death of an experimental subject in the freezing tank, and the
subsequent autopsy, while Rudolf Brandt stated in his affidavit—
“Field Marshal E. Milch and Professor Hippke, Inspector of the
Medical Service of the Luftwaffe, were fully informed about the
low-pressure experiments. Actually these experiments could not
have been conducted without the knowledge and approval of these
men, as they were conducted for the benefit of the Luftwaffe and
the experimenting persons were mostly Luftwaffe physicians.”
In the eyes of other persons, the defendant was the dominant force
behind the Luftwaffe participation in the Medical Experiments Program.
The defense has brought forward no adequate proof to show that they were
mistaken. It is the conviction of the prosecution that no such proof
exists.
The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, Reich Marshal Hermann Goering,
was thoroughly familiar with the organization which was his brain child,
the Luftwaffe, and the way it functioned. What importance did Milch’s
position have in Goering’s mind?
His affidavit reads—
“Included among the responsibilities of the Office of the
Inspector General was the conduct of all research and
experiments and of all matters pertaining to health and
sanitation inspection * * *.
* * * * *
“That Generaloberstabsarzt Erich Hippke was the Sanitation
Inspector of the Luftwaffe during the period from 1941 through
1944; that the Office of the Sanitation Inspector was directly
responsible for the conduct of all research and medical
experiments; that the Office of the Sanitation Inspector, of
which Generaloberstabsarzt Erich Hippke was the head, was
directly subordinate to the Inspector General, former Field
Marshal Milch, and that former Field Marshal Milch was
responsible for all action taken by Generaloberstabsarzt Hippke,
or by the Office of the Sanitation Inspector or its
subordinates.”
It has been established that criminal experiments, high-altitude and
freezing, were carried on at Dachau by Luftwaffe physicians, working
under the orders and supervision of competent Luftwaffe authorities.
We have shown that all Luftwaffe personnel connected with, or knowing
about these experiments, from those closest to the place where the
experiments were conducted—Dr. Rascher, and Walter Neff—to those high
up in the positions of command—Goering and Schroeder—looked to Milch
as the ultimate authority in the Medical Experiments Program. An
investigation of the attitudes and convictions of the SS officials
concerned in this program discloses the same picture.
Could all these men have been mistaken? Were they writing to and
referring to the wrong man when they contacted the defendant? To put
forward such a proposition is to deny the facts. There was no error, the
facts are indisputable.
The defendant was and is officially responsible for the Medical
Experiments Program of the Luftwaffe.
Lastly, we come to the question of the defendant’s knowledge of the
experiments which were being carried out at Dachau for the Luftwaffe.
Throughout direct examination by his defense counsel, the defendant has
consistently denied receiving reports authored by Rascher or in any
other way being informed of the criminal nature of those experiments,
until the time of this trial.
However, he was very much interested in altitude experiments as such.
The following excerpt is from his testimony under questioning by Dr.
Bergold:
“Q. Witness, how far were you interested in these high-altitude
experiments in question as GL?
“A. We were interested in the real altitude tests as I know it
exactly, because I want to state this figure as 13,500 meters,
and we added 500 meters in order to get a square figure.
However, we knew that this last 500 meters, which I have
mentioned, we were not too interested in that. We were only
interested in the first place in cabin planes, too, after a
certain test had been carried out on 388-cabin suits, whether it
did not succeed or fail, because a person could not move
properly the way those suits were, due to low pressure up there
in the air is felt much more than here on the ground.”
The Tribunal’s attention is directed to this figure of 14,000 meters,
which is approximately ten miles. Milch wanted that altitude simulated
in the pressure chamber and the human reactions studied.
It was on 20 May 1942 that Milch wrote his letter to Wolff. Here he said
that Hippke had reported to him that the altitude experiments carried
out by the SS and Luftwaffe at Dachau were finished. Mention was made of
Rascher’s availability for the forthcoming experiments dealing with sea
perils. And Milch stated that the low-pressure chamber could no longer
remain at Dachau. In this one letter, the defendant demonstrates his
knowledge that the SS and the Luftwaffe were conducting, and had
completed, altitude experiments at Dachau and that Dr. Rascher was
involved.
There is the letter of 4 June 1942 to Hippke, wherein the defendant
exhibits his authority in regard to the low-pressure chamber and the
tasks of Dr. Rascher.
On 25 August 1942, Himmler wrote to the defendant enclosing the report
on the high-altitude experiments. Moreover, he asked Milch to receive
Drs. Rascher and Romberg for a lecture and presentation of the film on
the experiments. Himmler suggested that Milch refer the matter to the
Reich Marshal “because of its importance”.
This last statement should dispel any possible doubts as to the
attention accorded these experiments by official German military
circles. In fact, the defendant himself admitted discussing the
experiments with Goering on 13 September 1942. The defendant spoke of
Himmler’s interest in the program, and the apprehension felt by the
Medical Inspector Hippke, although “he did tell me that everything was
all right.” The disposal of the pressure chamber was settled in this
talk with Goering.
The defendant has said that the experiments, reports, and other aspects
of the matter were not known to him, partly because he had no time for
this, and partly because he had no technical knowledge of the subject.
He would have this Court believe that the experimental program was a
minor matter—one that the Inspector General of the Luftwaffe would not
pay close attention to. Yet we have seen that it was important enough so
that Himmler was frequently corresponding with the defendant or others
on the subject. It was important enough for the defendant to bring the
matter to Goering’s attention, even to the details of the disposition of
the low-pressure chamber.
On 31 August 1942, the defendant wrote to Himmler, acknowledging receipt
of the report on altitude experiments, and telling Himmler that he was
“informed about the current experiments”.
While on the stand the defendant attempted to explain this letter by
referring to the usage of German Ministries, where the form “I” means
the Ministry as such. But he admitted that he had written the closing
sentences of this letter “I remain yours, as ever, etc.” Here he did not
deny that “I” was used in its ordinary sense. It is neither logical nor
capable of belief that in the same letter to Himmler, defendant would
use the word “I” in two different senses.
It was also on 31 August 1942 that Hippke discussed the experiments with
the defendant, expressing _doubts_ and _misgivings_. In reply to Milch’s
question, Hippke told him that these doubts had not been substantiated.
Thus it can be seen, from Milch’s testimony itself, that a cloud of
suspicion and evil hovered over the entire Medical Experiments Program.
It is useless, indeed futile, to punish the perpetrators of criminal
acts on the one hand, and to ignore those in high positions who have
made possible the commission of the crimes. The defendant has belabored
the term “duty” in the course of his testimony. He has spoken of his
solemn oath to Hitler and to the German people. It would seem that it
was incumbent upon the defendant to acquaint himself with the activities
of his subordinates, at least to the extent that he should have known
that people were being murdered in experiments, which from the evidence,
were useless as far as the advancement of the knowledge of aviation
medicine is concerned.
The present case is not without judicial precedent. A close analogy can
be drawn between it and a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States, _in re Yamashita_ [U. S. Reports, Vol. 327, October
term 1945, Nos. 61 and 672]. The procedural and jurisdictional questions
therein decided are of no moment to us now, but the facts of the
Yamashita case are similar to those of the Milch case, and the opinion
rendered by the Court is particularly in point in the matter of
responsibility for senior officers.
General Yamashita was the Commanding General of the 14th Army Group of
the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines.
Upon surrendering to United States Forces, he was indicted and tried as
a war criminal before a Military Tribunal on the following
charge—“while commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United
States of America and its Allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to
discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members
of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against people of the United States and of its Allies and
dependencies, particularly the Philippines, and he * * * thereby
violated the laws of war.”
The Court summed up the issue as follows:
“The question then is whether the law of war imposes on an army
commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are within
his power to control the troops under his command for the
prevention of the specified acts which are violations of the law
of war and which are likely to attend the occupation of hostile
territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and whether he may be
charged with personal responsibility for his failure to take
such measures when violations result.”
The Court cited Articles 1 and 43 of the Fourth Hague Convention of
1907, Article 19 of the Tenth Hague Convention, and Article 26 of the
Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929. It then stated—
“These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner, who at the time
specified was Military Governor of the Philippines, as well as
commander of the Japanese forces, an affirmative duty to take
such measures as were within his power, and appropriate in the
circumstances, to protect prisoners of war and the civilian
population. This duty of a commanding officer has heretofore
been recognized and its breach penalized by our own military
tribunals.”
The Court thereupon denied the petition for certiorari and leave to file
petitions, for writs of habeas corpus, and prohibition.
In the case of the medical experiments, we have a much less complex
situation. There is no question of a senior officer in an occupied
country, rather we are faced with a simple direct chain of command
problem: Milch—Foerster—Hippke. Had Milch given the order, the
experiments would have been terminated, but no order of termination was
given—people were murdered and Rascher remained in the Luftwaffe until
he was transferred to the SS in March 1943. The defendant had an
affirmative duty to know what was going on, and an affirmative duty to
act so as to stop the experiments. That he was ignorant of the true
state of affairs is unbelievable in view of the letters and the
testimony of those who were below him. Field marshals are not made as
are noncommissioned officers. The road is a long one in any army from
the position of private to the lofty peak of a field marshal. The
defendant would have you believe that his powers were similar to those
of a private first class. Yet we have seen him, high in the councils, a
confidant of Hitler, one who could disagree with Goering, whose deputy
he was on occasion, a man who was so thoroughly skilled a soldier that
he seriously requested an assignment as a division commander, although
his service had been in the air force for a decade prior to the request.
If the defendant was not the responsible officer in connection with the
medical experiments, then the scourge of the Wehrmacht has not touched
the continent of Europe. There is no one who knows better than the
defendant the principle of responsibility in any army. By holding the
office which he held, he had the duty to control the activities of those
who were his subordinates, to insure that they conducted themselves as
soldiers and not as murderers. He has failed woefully in the task.
We have concluded now our remarks regarding the criminal activities of
the defendant in his various capacities with respect to the slave labor
program and the medical experiments. It remains only for us to deal
briefly with the defendant’s participation in the murder of two Russian
escapees, to discuss his defense of irresponsibility because of a bad
temper, to discuss the use of PW’s, and to touch upon the testimony of
some of the witnesses who appeared in his behalf, and the record of the
meeting of 23 May 1939.
The defendant has maintained that he knew nothing about the shooting of
the two Russian officers who attempted to escape in February 1944. We
have his own statement, made at a time when the general situation, from
the Wehrmacht’s point of view, was acute but not forlorn. The
International Military Tribunal has stated in its judgment concerning
Fritz Sauckel,[149] speaking of a statement made by Sauckel at a Central
Planning Board meeting, “Although he now claims that the statement is
not true, the circumstances under which it was made, as well as the
evidence presented before the Tribunal, leave no doubt that it was
substantially accurate.” The word “circumstances” as there used refers
to a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944. Milch made
his statement at the prior meeting held on 16 February 1944 (53d). The
letters submitted by the defense in connection with this episode are
interesting. The first and second from Schmidtke on 10 January, and from
Gangolf on 13 January, refer to a similar incident other than that with
which we are here concerned. The third letter from Winterstein on 12
January says nothing about the deaths. The affidavit of Prell, other
than stating that the deaths occurred on a Saturday, is of no value. The
witness Barthelmess, who made an affidavit though a resident of
Nuernberg, was not called. The affidavits of Klein and Popp were
offered; each is in a prison camp in the American Zone, yet neither was
called. The letter of Janko recites the facts in a context suggestive of
the words used by the defendant when he described the incident in the
53d meeting of the Central Planning Board on 16 February 1944. Here,
too, it is submitted that the circumstances under which the statement
was made leave no doubt that it was substantially accurate. The
defendant boasted of his prowess as a commander who ordered executions
when he would impress those who curried his favor at the Central
Planning Board meetings, but now he says he had no authority to give
orders and if he had given them, they would not have been obeyed.
The defendant has offered, as a plausible reason for the employment of
Russian, French, and Italian prisoners of war, the fact that various
historical events made it unnecessary to abide by the terms of the
convention concerning prisoners of war. The witness von Neurath
testified that Russia had renounced the conventions in question, and
hence Germany could renounce them as to Russia. As for France, it is
contended that the alleged government headed by Pierre Laval had
concluded an arrangement with the Reich which made it legal to employ
prisoners of war in tasks forbidden by the Conventions. A similar reason
is advanced for the use of Italian prisoners, the concluding of an
arrangement between the Reich and Mussolini. The International Military
Tribunal made a finding with respect to this matter.[150]
“The argument in defense of the charge with regard to the murder
and ill-treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, that the U.S.S.R.
was not a party to the Geneva Convention, is quite without
foundation. On 15 September 1941 Admiral Canaris protested
against the regulations for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of
war, signed by General Reinecke on 8 September 1941.”
I might add that Admiral Canaris was a member of the German Navy.
Resuming the quotation—
“He”—Canaris—“then stated, ‘The Geneva Convention for the
treatment of prisoners of war is not binding in the relationship
between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Therefore only the principles
of general international law on the treatment of prisoners of
war apply. Since the 18th century these have gradually been
established along the lines that war captivity is neither
revenge nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only
purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further
participation in the war. This principle was developed in
accordance with the view held by all armies that it is contrary
to military tradition to kill or injure helpless people * * *.
The decrees for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war
enclosed are based on a fundamentally different viewpoint.’
“This protest, which correctly stated the legal position, was
ignored”.
The defendant was a soldier of some experience, he knew it was improper,
even criminal, to have the Russian prisoners work in the Luftwaffe
factories, but he paid no attention to the breach of this duty of the
soldier. The manner in which the Reich bludgeoned a treaty from the
French is too well known to warrant discussion. It cannot be contended
with any seriousness that the French prisoners of war, who were
negotiated into slavery by a puppet government, were voluntary employees
of the Germans. Indeed the witness Le Friec has testified that when he
was taken to work in the airplane factory, he was told that he would
“work on baby carriages”. The position of the defendant with reference
to Italian prisoners of war and their illegal employment is still more
absurd, if that is possible. The Wehrmacht had moved into Italy early in
the war, and in 1943, when the Badoglio government concluded an
armistice with the Allies, the Wehrmacht continued to occupy the
northern part of Italy as an occupying power. They allegedly made a
treaty with the by then tottering shadow of the former sawdust Cæsar and
proceeded to bring the Italian prisoners of war to the Reich to work.
Here again the soldiery had been sold into bondage by their former
chief. The record shows that the Russian, French, and Italian prisoners
of war were used to work in airplane factories. Whether they made the
fighter plane, Me 109, or the jet fighter, Me 262, or the transport
plane, Ju 52, is of little moment. In the total warfare in which the
Reich was engaged, there is one certainty, that nothing was being
constructed which was not part of the war armament program.
The International Military Tribunal stated in this connection—[151]
“Many of the prisoners of war were assigned to work directly
related to military operations, in violation of Article 31 of
the Geneva Convention. They were put to work in munitions
factories and even made to load bombers, to carry ammunition and
to dig trenches, often under the most hazardous conditions. This
condition applied particularly to Soviet prisoners of war. On 16
February 1943, at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, * * *
Milch said: ‘We have made a request for an order that a certain
percentage of men in the Ack-Ack artillery must be Russians;
50,000 will be taken altogether. Thirty thousand are already
employed as gunners. This is an amusing thing, that the Russians
must work the guns’”.
That every aircraft factory in the Reich had antiaircraft batteries to
protect it goes without saying. Who would know better than the defendant
that such use was made of the Soviet prisoners of war? Further, this
type of artillery was a part of the Luftwaffe and not a separate branch
in the ground forces, as it is in the U.S. Army. The witness Foerster
has testified that Soviet prisoners of war worked at the gun positions.
If the number two man in the German air force could not have done
anything toward arranging that the prisoners of war did not work in the
factories, or work the guns, then no one in the Wehrmacht could have
done anything about the situation.
We have heard much of the defendant’s violent temper and the resulting
statements which, witnesses assert, were never taken seriously by those
who heard them. The explanations offered by the defense are as frivolous
as the alleged outbursts were frequent. It would have been difficult, if
not impossible, for one who occupied the positions held by the
defendant, to accomplish anything if his subordinates had to sift all of
the strong statements he made, in an effort to determine which of them
were seriously said. Further, his strong statements about the
procurement and treatment of laborers are closely aligned with the grim
reality as we have seen it. We submit that this man of violent temper
believed in, and consciously advocated, the ruthless measures he
recommended, and that his subordinates, to the best of their ability,
complied with his recommendations. It is not reasonable to assume that
one with his power could have made statements, of the kind of which we
have heard here, and that he would then rely on the good offices of
those who were around him to insure that nothing was done as a result of
these statements. The Reich was not a country of innocent victims of one
tyrant, but rather it was composed of a series of tyrants, each like the
master tyrant, each with his own group of subordinates, who carried out
the wishes and whims of their respective chiefs. If all men who held
positions of authority in the Reich are to be believed when they say
that they were personally opposed to criminal excesses, then we have the
fantastic conclusion that these crimes were committed in the face of
influential and unanimous opposition.
The witnesses produced by the defense left a little to be desired.
Without indulging in exhaustive detail, a few statements made by some
are worth comment.
The witness Koenig said that he didn’t know Himmler was head of the SS
until 1945.
The witness von Brauchitsch did not know families were broken up and
sent to concentration camps. It was this man, the aid to Goering, who
passed on the Terboven letter of May 1942 to the defendant. The Court
will recall that the letter told of the attempted escape and the
resulting concentration camp detention of the Norwegians. It was the
defendant who said that an attempt to escape by a prisoner of war is an
honorable thing. Would not a similar effort on the part of some
Norwegians merit something less than a concentration camp? Brauchitsch
had said a little earlier that he did not know that foreigners were in
concentration camps.
The witness Felmy has stated that some Yugoslav partisans were sent to
Germany as laborers.
The witness Schniewind, who was present at the conference of 23 May
1939, did not under any circumstances gain the impression that
aggression was announced.
The witness Vorwald, a subordinate of the defendant and hence his
concern for these proceedings, may be assumed as being something short
of disinterested, was thoroughly glib and exceptionally agreeable. He
even agreed with the statement, on cross-examination, that the forces of
the Reich were no longer in Africa in 1943. It is a matter of historical
record that the invasion of that Continent began in November 1942 and
that the campaign was concluded in the spring of the following year.
The witness Koerner, still laboring under the spell of the former
leaders, stated that he believed Goering to be the last great man of the
Renaissance.
The last witness of whom we shall speak is Karl Wolff. In his affidavit
he spoke of meetings between Himmler and Milch over coffee and cigars.
He spoke of the great cultural works of the SS. Was he speaking of
Dachau and Mauthausen? With some vehemence, he insisted that he had
deported only 1,050 Jews from all of Italy. He knew nothing of Dachau
that led him to believe that anything unusual was happening there;
although he did say that, in his visit there in 1942, the place was so
clean that one could have eaten from the floor.
These represent a fair cross section of the witnesses, all of whom had
roles of varying importance in the tragedy with which we are here
concerned. Even as the defendant contends that he knew nothing of what
went on, so do they echo the same refrain.
Much time has been spent in attempting to discredit the Schmundt record
of the 23 May 1939 meeting. The Court is familiar with the findings
which have been made by the International Military Tribunal on this
subject. There has been no additional light thrown on the matter by the
evidence here presented to indicate that the Schmundt record is anything
other than a correct record of the events which transpired at the
meeting.
We wish to discuss now in conclusion one document offered by the
prosecution. This we have saved until the last because we believe that
of all the evidence presented by the prosecution it is most typical of
the defendant as a man and as a Nazi. We refer to the minutes of the
conference of air force engineers and others which was presided over and
was addressed by the defendant on 25 March 1944. This document, like so
many others in this case, was initialed by the defendant.
The defendant stated that, as of the date of the conference, “We have in
our employ today approximately 60 percent foreigners * * *.”
He continued, “The ratio is gradually approaching 90 percent foreigners,
with 10 percent German managers.”
These are statements by a man who said he did not know about the extent
to which foreign labor was used in his own industry, let alone in
Germany. He stated that—
“The Fuehrer order provides clearly that the fighter plane
program, which the Jaegerstab is starting, has priority over all
other fields of armament * * *.”
He showed knowledge of the production of tanks and infantry munitions.
He spoke of having the air force production “to an extent safely
underground” in four months’ time. It is here that he stated that he was
head of the Jaegerstab and that Saur was his deputy and Chief of Staff.
Touching on his conferences with the various plant officials, he
stated—
“On the spot the individual gentlemen are then told—supported
by the combined authority of the State, the Wehrmacht, and the
Party, that is Saur and me, Speer is unfortunately still on sick
leave, otherwise he would also be present—what it is all
about.”
He commented on labor—
“Thus, all pertinent questions are dealt with in the conferences
about the commitment of labor and all competent men, who have
anything to do with the commitment of labor, meet, especially
the president of the competent provincial labor office. Thus it
is determined on the spot, in the individual spheres, what the
factory lacks.”
This is the man who has constantly maintained that he had nothing to do
with labor. One can readily imagine a session between the Luftwaffe
field marshal and a labor office chief.
We have heard the defendant deny and re-deny any knowledge of the slave
labor program as such, let alone the extent to which it went. It is our
contention that anybody who walked the streets of Germany could not have
failed to have become aware of the activities which were being carried
on by Sauckel and his henchmen.
He makes an interesting reference to bureaucracy:
“It is an error to believe that civilian offices are more
bureaucratic than military offices. On the basis of my
continuous and extensive experience, I can assure you exactly
the opposite is true.”
This from one who would have the Tribunal believe that his staff and
officers were one big happy family who ran things in a rather casual
catch-as-catch-can fashion.
Speaking of the arrival of laborers, he said—
“In brief, the people arrive there and are put to work there. If
any doubts exist as to whether a request is justified—for the
people are not requested by numbers, but as electricians,
blacksmiths, fitters, turners, as unskilled laborers, as
foreigners—then this is settled. If the result shows that the
request for people is not justified, then the matter is referred
to a commission and this commission examines the facts within 48
hours. If it becomes apparent that dirty dealings are going on,
my special court martial is called into play, and it hands down
a quick decision.”
This from a man who has stated that he had no power to give orders. He
stated further, “the normal work week in our industry is 72 hours.” The
witness Krysiak testified that they worked 84 hours at the factory where
the Mauthausen inmates were employed.
Speaking of the difficulties that resulted from the hoarding of spare
parts by the various foremen, he said—
“Now it is your task to teach these people some sense and to put
the entire system of hoarding on a sensible basis. I therefore
ask you, as the senior authorities in the field: teach that to
these people by force. There is no sense in writing letters.
Such letters are not read. They would not understand them
anyhow.”
The wish of a field marshal is as an order, and he advocated the use of
force on his own people. The extent to which he urged that they go was
expressed a few lines further on when he stated—
“Whoever hoards supplies must be punished immediately. By
punishment I also mean shooting. For if these people are told
what is at issue here, and they still try to hide parts of their
supplies or to cover them up, that is dirty dealing and a crime
against Germany. I want to say that very clearly and I want to
say it in very sincere words, so that you yourselves will
realize that we are dealing here with a question which is of
decisive importance for Germany’s well-being, that we are not
dealing with an ordinary point of discussion but with a question
which decides about the life and death of Germany.”
He advocated killing Germans, not slackers but hoarders. He consciously
used strong language, yet he would have it believed that he never spoke
harshly except in a rage and that nothing ever came from his outbursts.
He indicated knowledge of the overall figures on the breakdown of
working hours.
“In considering the figures one has to know that 52 percent of
the total man-hours are spent in equipping a plane and only 48
percent in building the aircraft frame and engine.”
He has said that he was powerless to do anything about requests from
industry, yet he stated—
“If I want something from industry, then industry comes and
says, ‘Yes, I have those and those requests.’ Only then can I do
what you want.”
He again speaks of the death penalty when he says—
“Gentlemen, in this connection I may call your attention to
another important point. If I visit an office and find out that
something is being hidden there, then I ask for the death
penalty for such a crime today. That is fraud. That is sabotage
of the German armament industry.”
Can it be seriously contended that these words were regarded by the
listeners as mere outbursts?
Next we have another illuminating passage on his attitude toward
prisoners of war.
“Then there is still the human factor. We often had considerable
difficulty with the human factor. The fluctuation there is very
considerable. The quota of the Luftwaffe in the distribution of
manpower was considerably lowered. The foreigners run away. They
do not keep any contract. There are difficulties with Frenchmen,
Italians, Dutch. The prisoners of war are partly unruly and
fresh. The people are also supposed to be carrying on sabotage.
These elements cannot be made more efficient by small means.
They are just not handled strictly enough. If a decent foreman
would sock one of those unruly guys because the fellow won’t
work, the situation would soon change. International law cannot
be observed here. I have asserted myself very strongly and, with
the help of Saur, I have represented the point of view very
strongly that the prisoners, with the exception of the English
and the Americans, should be taken away from the military
authorities. The soldiers are not in a position, as experience
has shown, to cope with these fellows who know all the answers.
I shall take very strict measures here and shall put such a
prisoner of war before my court martial. If he has committed
sabotage or refused to work, I will have him hanged right in his
own factory. I am convinced that that will not be without
effect.”
These words are strangely reminiscent of his speech at the 53d meeting
of the Central Planning Board. He knew he had advocated and participated
in flagrant violations of international law and here he went on record
on this subject.
We see the defendant making a “big request” of the Quartermaster General
and calling for “energetic action” by the chief of supply. This was a
meeting of considerable moment and these statements did not go unheeded.
He spoke of the laborers.
“* * * We in the Luftwaffe armament industry have Russians,
French prisoners of war, Dutch, and members of 32 other nations.
The obtaining of interpreters alone presents a big difficulty
there.”
Then he adds—
“We, the Quartermaster General and Generalluftzeugmeister, have
already agreed that we are to balance the personnel also. Above
all it is necessary that the member of the troops be treated in
exactly the same way as the industrial worker.”
We have a strong statement concerning the feelings of the German worker.
He said—
“By unjust treatment the German worker means that the treatment
is not the same for all. That is what makes the German worker
indignant. He wants everyone to be treated the same way. He
wants justice and does not want to be ill-treated in words or
any other way. He cannot stand it and he is right in not being
able to stand it.”
The defendant advocated that the German worker be carefully handled. The
Tribunal has heard from the witnesses Ferrier, Le Friec, and Krysiak how
the foreign workers were handled.
He outlined the working program for the Easter week end—
“Finally I ask that the troops receive the fundamental order to
work on Good Friday, the Saturday before Easter, and on Easter
Monday in the same way as the people in the factories. The
soldiers just do not have to go on furlough either. They must be
told why.”
Are these the words of a man who is without authority to issue orders
concerning the troops?
He acknowledged his employment of Russian prisoners of war and advocated
that shirkers among the factory laborers be whipped back to their jobs.
He said—
“I further ask for support by the Luftwaffe physicians. With all
the rabble that we have among the foreign workers there is of
course a lot of shirking. At the moment the Russians—that is,
the Russian prisoners of war—are feigning a lot of fatigue and
illness. The incidence of sickness of one and a half to two
percent which we have had up to now has at least doubled, and in
some factories it has been increased to eight, nine, and ten
percent. That is, of course, done by previous agreement. There
the official physicians must undertake an examination and if the
physicians, who have to be very strict, find out that it is not
true, then we return the fellows to work by means of the whip.
Then the whip serves as cure.”
He again spoke of orders that have been given.
“If the factory knows: Now we are going to be attacked, and it
has a few trench shelters but does not have a bombproof shelter
or the like, then the people simply ran away from the factory
automatically at each raid after the first one, and they could
usually not be caught the next day either. That applies
particularly to the foreigners. We have therefore now issued the
following order, and have equipped the superiors accordingly
with weapons and pistols: As soon as a factory which has already
been attacked a few times can count on the raid’s being aimed at
that particular factory again, then the personnel leave the
factory, but in closed groups by shops, under the leadership of
the man in charge of the shop, and, to the extent that they are
German personnel, they leave singing military songs.”
Are superiors armed with weapons and pistols to lead contented German
workers away from a factory in case of an air-raid? Little wonder that
the foreigners who had been brought in like chattels ran away when the
opportunity presented itself. Were these workers who were fleeing,
voluntary workers?
Commenting on the gravity of the task of fighter production, and the
importance of the months of April and May 1944, he said—
“That will be decided in six to eight weeks. If we succeed in
this, then we will once again have time to carry out all the
other tasks and jobs of this war and can also achieve greater
successes in other fields.”
Were the “other fields” tasks to be accomplished in the sowing of seeds
of the Reich’s culture?
The defendant has said that he knew nothing about the living conditions
of the foreigners. It is obvious that he knew something, for he said—
“I also ask you to be of considerable assistance in the question
of lodging in connection with the question of the relationship
between our military personnel at the airfields and the workers.
If we bring the people over to work, we also have to provide
them with places to live. As far as foreigners are concerned,
this has to be done in some suitable way. They cannot be put
together with our people, just like that. But they should not be
so far away from the airfield that one cannot get them to work
at all.”
No, don’t let them live with the native workers, but be sure that they
live close enough to the factory so that they can put in their 72 hours
a week!
The importance of the fighter program is emphasized when he said—
“There are no laws of bureaucracy, there are no regulations,
there is nothing at all as important as the task of winning the
war.”
The defendant could not agree with anything that Hitler stood for after
March 1943. He was trying to get out, but here he speaks of Hitler and
his henchmen—men who, he said, were leading Germany to certain
catastrophe:
“It is quite surprising how the population has endured this
thing so far and how it always gets on its feet again when it is
led in the proper way by true leaders who, thank God, are
present among the people through the Party and the rest of the
leadership. But you must not forget, gentlemen, war nerves have
reached a point which cause us in the leadership group worry.”
He has said that he was not a wholehearted Nazi, but here he referred to
himself as one of the true leaders and this at a time when the hands on
the clock tolling the hours of the Reich were approaching twelve. Yet he
would have you believe that he was a minor man.
He did not confine his speaking efforts solely to the Luftwaffe; he was
one of the leaders, and as such it was natural that he should address
the armament feeder industry. On that subject he said—
“What I am telling you today was told the other day to the
entire armament feeder industry—that includes the blacksmiths,
foundries, crankshaft workers of the iron producing industry,
etc. They were likewise exhorted to produce the maximum. In the
same way the Gauleitungen, all of the provincial offices,
wherever we were, were addressed by us to that effect. But
everyone considers that if he does not do his duty, we do not
ask whether there is a law, we ask only that he is the
responsible one, and that we will seize him no matter who he
is.”
His first peroration is indicative of his attitude.
“Please go wherever you are going and knock everybody down who
blocks your way! We cover up everything here. We do not ask
whether he is allowed to or whether he is not allowed to. For
us, there is nothing but this one task. We are fanatics in this
sphere. We do not even consider letting anything at all distract
us from that task. No order exists which could prevent me from
fulfilling this task. Nor shall I ever be given such an order.”
Yes, the defendant was a fanatic. Too, he was one who could cover up. It
was a willful man who could say that.
There is an interesting statement concerning the number of employees of
the Luftwaffe. The defendant set it at 1.8 million. This is somewhat in
excess of the .5 million figure that one witness mentioned.
It has been insisted that he had nothing to do with labor, it has been
insisted that he could give no orders, yet in his second peroration to
the same speech, he said—
“We have given orders that will make you laugh. Some labor
control office or other suddenly declared that the Jaegerstab
was not entitled, according to paragraph so-and-so, to establish
a 72-hour workweek; it was not valid. I said: The gentleman is
herewith informed, if he should say such a thing once more, he
will be picked up; I have excellent cellars in this house. Then
the opposition disappears immediately. But you have to count on
such things, and the difficulty for you is that, in order to get
through all the junk, one should clean out, first of all, a
whole lot of little pigsties. Something will come out of this
whole affair with us, yet. Whoever of my technical people from
the Ministry does not earn his keep with the Jaegerstab now, and
does not cooperate, I guarantee that he will never appear again
in this Ministry, in the machine where I give the orders.”
Is this the man who said he could not have people sent to concentration
camps? The witness Krysiak was “picked up” for having said in 1940 that
Germany would lose the war. He was arrested by the Gestapo as the result
of a private conversation. It is unbelievable that a field marshal could
not, and did not, exercise the same power.
Today is the third anniversary of the speech of 25 March 1944 made by
the defendant. His closing remarks on that day detail decisively the
philosophy of the then field marshal of the Luftwaffe. Those assembled
had been listening to their chief since midmorning. The hour was late.
The hands of the clock were past twelve. Germany was in the fifth year
of war. The defendant was concluding his speech. He said—
“Gentlemen, I know, not every subordinate can say: for me the
law no longer exists, but he has to have someone who covers up
for him. Not out of cowardice, but if you act according to the
spirit of the old field service regulation, ‘Abstaining from
doing something hurts us more than erring in the choice of the
means’, and if, moreover, you keep in touch and immediately
clarify difficult points so that something can be done, then we
are willing to accept the responsibility, whether this is the
law or not. I see only two possibilities for me and for Germany;
either we succeed and thereby save Germany, or we continue these
slipshod methods and then get the fate that we deserve. I prefer
to fall, while I am doing something that is against the rules
but that is right and sensible, and be called to account for it,
and, if you like, hanged, rather than be hanged because Papa
Stalin is here in Berlin or the Englishmen. I have no desire for
that. I would rather die in a different way. But I think we can
accomplish this task, too. We are in the fifth year of war—I
repeat: The decision will come during the next six weeks. Heil
Hitler!”
The time is at hand for another decision, a decision which will follow
the dictates of sound reason. The record which will be made by this
Tribunal and its judgment will be one that shall give courage to
peaceful free men everywhere. Indeed, the defendant is fortunate that
the decision in the present case is in the hands of those who do believe
that the law exists and will continue to exist. There is no place for
passion or for prejudice in the ceaseless tasks, the seeking of truth
and the establishing of justice.
-----
[143] Mr. Clark Denney delivered the closing statement before the
Tribunal on 25 March 1947, Tr. pp. 2436-2488.
[144] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 306, Nuremberg, 1947.
[145] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Karl Brandt, et al. See
Vol. I.
[146] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Karl Brandt, et al. See
Vol. I.
[147] Same as preceeding footnote.
[148] Same as preceeding footnote.
[149] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 321, Nuremberg, 1947.
[150] Ibid., p. 232.
[151] Ibid., p. 246.
B. Closing Statement of the Defense[152]
DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal. In my opening
statement I drew a picture of the defendant Milch which differs
considerably from the description given by the prosecution. It is my
hope that in the long course of producing evidence I have given proof
that my conception is the full truth.
According to the testimony of the witness Richter, the affidavit of the
witness von Mueller and according to the defendant Milch’s own
testimony, nobody can doubt that Milch has never been a good National
Socialist. His love for peace and his longing for a final understanding
between the nations of Europe, especially between Belgium, France,
England, and Germany, became completely obvious. No one who believes in
justice would refuse to believe him if he states that he regarded the
war as a misfortune. He was also one of the few intelligent men to admit
Germany’s defeat in the First World War. There was no proof supplied
that in any way prior to 1933 he supported any armaments. His testimony
and military affidavit from von Mueller have shown that under his
management the Luftwaffe was always a peaceful instrument of
communication among the nations. It is to be regretted that the
examination of foreign politicians, such as Van Zeeland, Pierre Cot, and
Delbos, were not permitted, because only then the personality of Milch
would have been shown in its true light. He must have been a peaceful
and just man; otherwise, all these statesmen would not have had
confidence in him. Even the witness delegate Messersmith, whose
affidavit, Document 1760-PS, was introduced in the International
Military Tribunal proceedings, affirmed that Milch condemned the
coercive methods of the Nazis. He was different from the other Party
members, so that after 1937 he lost Goering’s confidence. At that time
he asked to be allowed to retire but in spite of his threat of suicide,
he did not obtain that permission.
Such a man of such a past must be believed when he testified that even
in 1939 he had no knowledge of Hitler’s aggressive intentions. Milch had
misgivings about Hitler because he regarded the measures taken against
Czechoslovakia as a breach of peace, and he was sufficiently intelligent
to see that Britain would no longer tolerate such violations. Hitler was
dishonest with him and always put before him his intentions for peace,
even forbidding him the manufacture of bombs. The defendant never
requested the manufacture of bombs because he intended to lead a war of
offense, but only because, understanding the international situation, he
was convinced that England would fight against the Nazi regime.
Up to that time, your Honor, nobody can find any inconsistency in the
defendant’s outlook. It was no offense if he requested a Wehrmacht for
his country in view of the world situation, and therefore he favored a
reasonable rearmament. As long as all nations were peace-minded and
maintained armies, Germany had the right to maintain armed forces as
well. I beg you to remember that the defendant demanded from his
superiors that rearmament should be effected in a slow and reasonable
manner and that he had differences with them on account of this.
It was not for nothing, your Honor, I repeat that. Only for one to keep
all these things in mind will it be possible to judge whether or not the
defendant’s statement regarding the conference of 23 May 1939 is
correct. A man who loves peace and works for peace was present at that
conference and states today, or testified that the speech in question
did not contain any mention of aggressive war against Poland or any
other country. He even testified in this courtroom that this speech did
not have the contents as it is laid down in the Schmundt protocol.
I realize that the International Military Tribunal came to the
conclusion that the Schmundt protocol is correct. All defendants and
witnesses who were heard at that time declared that the contents of the
speech were not of so aggressive a nature as it is laid down in the
minutes. The defense counsel made a mistake at that time of not calling
all the witnesses which I requested. Nobody went to the trouble of
critically examining the text of the record. I can understand why the
IMT reached a different conclusion, having heard only the defendants’
general objection, which remained unsubstantiated in detail. Nowhere is
it yet permissible in law to maintain the verdict of a previous court
when new and better evidence has been submitted.
The witnesses Warlimont, Schniewind, Engel, and Raeder stated that
several passages of the Schmundt record contained a number of false
assertions regarding Hitler’s words. Warlimont testified that he was not
present, although he is listed as among those present. Milch’s testimony
made it absolutely definite that Goering was not present. If there were
only so few persons present and there were mistakes made concerning the
presence of persons, the record must have been made up a long time after
the event, otherwise no faults of that kind would have been possible.
Schniewind testified that a number of points contained in the Schmundt
record were never discussed at that time at all. He had the opinion that
many ideas laid down in the record were borne out at a later period,
that is to say, 1940. These ideas concerned, for example, the use which
could be made of war production after the defeat of France, the
importance of aircraft carriers for convoys, the collaboration of Italy,
and the break-through of the Maginot Line by this force, about Japan,
and last but not least, the so-called Fuehrer Decree. By the statement
of Felmy it is proved forever that the so-called Fuehrer order was given
only on 12 December 1940. Even Raeder stated that the principles of the
Fuehrer order were laid down at another occasion and that they were
accordingly carried out afterwards. This other occasion was given by the
statement of Felmy. Also Raeder did not hear anything about Japan; he
considered it impossible that Italy and the break-through of the Maginot
Line were discussed and he also states that nobody mentioned a better
production of cruisers. He also testified that in that meeting a
two-front war was not mentioned because he, as an officer, would have
noticed that. Furthermore, he testified that Belgium and Holland were
not referred to and that after the speech Goering did not open a debate.
Even though the witness was not present at all times, it is rather
strange that he should not have heard mention of any of the very points
not heard by the other witnesses. The defendant Milch gave you the
precise details of those points of the speech which were not mentioned
at the time, and he was even in a position to tell you when these
various points were first conceived.
Who, assuming responsibility for justice, can still seriously maintain
the findings of the IMT now that these precise statements have shown us
the errors of the Schmundt record? A record containing so many grave
mistakes is no longer of probative value and can never be made the basis
for any judgment. I am convinced that after this trial the historians of
the whole world will regard the Schmundt record as the product of a
later period, i.e., between the fall of 1940 and the spring of 1941 and
that they will regard it as the result of time, drawn up to make Hitler,
then regarded as the victor, seem possessed of a prophetic gift which in
reality he never had.
The conference did take place on 23 May 1939; that is true. Its real
topics, however, can no longer be stated on the basis of the Schmundt
record. Thus, the statements made in the first Nuernberg trial gain a
different and greater significance. Never again, therefore, will it be
possible for anyone to say that on that occasion Hitler preached war and
the enslavement of Europeans.
There is yet another argument possible against this record, which, it is
alleged, also contains the plan for slave labor. Document EC-194,
Exhibit 8, and 016-PS, Exhibit 13, submitted by the prosecution, show in
all clarity that the use of European peoples in German armament works
was a measure forced by the emergencies of the war and that the idea was
born and realized only by the military difficulties resulting from the
war with Russia.
With clean hands and a pure heart, Milch entered the war in August 1939
having previously advised Goering to fly to Britain to prevent the war.
He himself became the victim of Hitler’s deception, and he himself
believed that the war had been forced upon Hitler. Who can disregard
justice to such an extent as to reproach Milch with having held that
belief? It is his misfortune, but not his guilt, to have been deflected
from the truth by misleading propaganda. Who would so misinterpret
patriotism, heretofore regarded as one of man’s noblest instincts, as to
reproach Milch for having done in 1939 his duty as a soldier?
He never prepared any aggressive wars. In every case he was informed
shortly before the event, and nothing is more typical of the opinion his
superiors held of him than the fact that he chanced to hear about the
preparations for the war against Russia through a subordinate, who had
been told of Hitler’s plan before the field marshal was told. The first
Nuernberg trial has already shown that Milch saw Goering at once in an
effort to prevent that war. Goering himself admitted this. Milch’s good
intentions were of no avail because Goering turned him down. As Milch’s
superior officer, he even went so far as to forbid Milch to see Hitler
and to tell him that he, Goering, would prevent Milch from being
admitted to Hitler’s presence.
One of your Honors, in putting questions to the defendant, aimed to show
that it might be regarded as incriminating to the defendant that he did
not resign in 1941 or at least in 1943. Your Honors, only if one has
lived in Germany these last years is it possible truly to judge that
problem. As I said in my opening speech, one can judge the man only
against his background, through his upbringing, from which usually
nobody can escape no matter in what country he lives. Milch was brought
up as a soldier. He absorbed ideas which for centuries were regarded as
true and inviolate laws. It is no guilt for him not to have freed
himself from them. I have said this once before.
At that time nobody in Germany was in a position to protest against
certain events, against certain aims of the Party. All that one could do
was to criticize things within one’s own immediate circle and tell one’s
intimate collaborators how to improve matters. If in Germany anybody had
attempted at any time to express criticism publicly, either by word or
by publicly resigning, nobody would have been the wiser for it. This
system was so ruthless and its stranglehold over public opinion so great
that it would and could suppress anything.
You need only remember that during the first IMT trial it was shown that
von Papen’s criticism in his Marburg speech was completely withheld from
the German public. Had Milch done anything, nobody would have heard
about it, and his action would have been useless, perhaps senseless, as
nothing would have been changed for the better. Your Honors may not know
that six to eight generals, including General von Falkenhausen, once
Commander in Chief in Belgium, and Colonel General Halder, one of
Germany’s highest and best leaders, were thrown into concentration camps
because they had deviated from Hitler’s line. This is not connected with
20 July 1944. Nobody in Germany knew about this. Pictures of General
Count Sponeck were sold as of a hero two years after this man had
vanished into a concentration camp. Such were the lies and the
deceptions of Goebbels’ propaganda. We have learned since the end of the
war that prior to 20 July 1944, there were 50 to 60 generals in Moabit
prison, without anyone in Germany knowing anything about that. You will
understand the full falsehood of propaganda when you recall the base
distortions by which the dismissals of Generals von Blomberg and von
Fritsch were announced to the German public.
Believe me, your Honors, protests in Germany were not possible at that
time. The only result would have been the futile death of the protesting
person. If Milch had attempted to fly abroad, his whole family—such
were the detestable methods of those in power—would have been put to
death on the basis of what was known as family responsibility.
Milch cannot be reproached with not having refused service and
allegiance. No soldier could do this. Should a member of the
Anglo-American Air Forces suddenly have refused to go out on an
operation which would bring death to innocent women and children, he
would not have been regarded as a hero. He would have been put before a
court martial.
That Milch did not participate in an attempt on Hitler’s life, who would
accuse him of that? Although he was an energetic man, the defendant was,
because of several concussions of the brain which he suffered, inclined
to terrifying fits of rage, or ranting speeches, but the evidence has
shown that in his heart of hearts he was kind and soft. He would
ameliorate sentences already passed, and as the witness Richter
testified, he compensated for a fine, which he inflicted himself, by
secretly passing into the family of the punished man a very large sum of
money, larger than the fine itself. The witness Vorwald expressly stated
that basically Milch was a man soft of heart, who conducted himself
*self soft, who only in a rage caused by disease and worry utters harsh
words never followed by action, is not capable of murder. Thus, no just
man will charge him with not liquidating Hitler, and Milch did what in
his conscience he felt to be possible and necessary. He had the courage
of telling the dictator to his face what he thought of the situation. He
demanded that Hitler desist from his plans, dismiss the most important
men, such as Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, give up the supreme
command, and establish a cabinet of equal powers, and he finally desired
that peace should be brought about.
Your Honors, it would be easy to say that as a field marshal he did not
thereby endanger himself. The statement of the next witness Krysiak, the
fate of the generals which I mentioned to you, show what was done in
Germany to men who did such things, but the defendant went one step
further. He succeeded in inducing Goering also to demand the end of the
dictatorship and the instituting of a Reich cabinet. Your Honors, this
means that this defendant thereby risked his life. He could not foresee
that nothing would happen to him. That nothing did happen to him was not
due to his rank, but to Hitler’s opinion that this man was not yet
dispensable. Everybody can only be sentenced according to his
potentialities. Your Honors must not compare conditions in your free and
noble country to those in Germany. Only the German world as it was
should be the basis of your judgment here. It is not true to say that
Milch gave his continued support to the objectionable aims of the Party.
He continued to do his duty because, as he testified, he wished to
prevent the worst from happening to his people, the total destruction of
the cities and of Germany’s culture. It was his constant hope to
organize the defense in such manner as to prevent bombing warfare from
taking its full effect, that same bombing warfare which is the scourge
of mankind, whatever one may think of its military value. Would it be
for us to judge him on the fact that he did not obtain his aim because
of the stupidity and failings of his superiors? Milch furthermore
testified before you that by an improved defense he hoped to achieve
better peace terms for his people. I can assure your Honors that since
1941 Goebbels’ propaganda told the German people time and again of the
horrible terms the enemy would impose on them in the event of peace.
That included an item to the effect that the whole of the German male
population would be castrated should Germany lose the war so that the
German people would perish. Who has the courage to say it is despicable
for a man of battle to organize a defensive system under the news impact
of such items in order to obtain better peace terms?
It would be a distortion to say that Milch thus believed Hitler’s aim of
destroying Europe, for he knew that the war was lost. He was intelligent
enough to see that with the lost war the end of Hitler’s ideology would
come. It was not the Party he wanted to serve when he hoped for less
severe peace terms with a better defense, but a lost war that would not
mean the loss of the legal rights of a whole nation as is the case
unhappily today. Only he who comprehends and understands all these
things can appreciate Milch’s actions and judge them fairly. And later,
when he saw that his objective of saving the German people from the
worst would fail, Milch withdrew from the regime. He could not resign on
his own. That, for a soldier in Germany, was an impossibility. He did
not choose to act dishonorably, which no one can expect from a decent
man. In Germany soldiers are removed from their offices only by their
superiors. Thus, as he put it himself, Milch could only organize his own
elimination from office by gradually transferring his tasks to Speer’s
Ministry. As his superiors thereupon regarded him as superfluous and
were glad to be rid of this man, Milch was finally free. Then began the
scheme on the part of his superiors to liquidate him. Such was the
position of Milch, the man, and such by and large were his motives. For
him to have acted in this and no other way is not dishonorable, and only
he can cast the first stone who never in his born days gave in to public
opinion in defiance of his better judgment, who has never considered his
superiors, and who proved himself to be above his upbringing, and had
the courage of fighting for his convictions even with the most brutal
methods.
Before dealing with the details of the indictment I should like to make
these basic points. The prosecution created the impression that under
the conspiracy count it would hold Milch responsible for everything in
totality that was done in connection with labor assignments and
experiments within the confines of the Luftwaffe, nay, within the
confines of the German government departments. This is not admissible.
The indictment may be referred to Control Council Law No. 10. Nothing is
mentioned there that conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity or war
crimes constitutes a punishable offense. Only conspiracy against peace
is punishable. The way the law is formulated, particularly count 2 of
Article 2, makes it clear beyond doubt that activities listed therein
only concern participation but no independent types of crime. Where
there is an independent crime then also in the case of war crimes and
crimes against humanity there would have to be a provision similar in
count 1-A, Article 2 of the Control Council law where a crime is defined
as “participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the purpose of
committing one of the crimes above set forth.” In this connection the
verdict of the IMT must also be considered. At the end of the sixth part
of the verdict it states:[153] “Count one, however, charges not only the
conspiracy to commit aggressive war, but also to commit war crimes and
crimes against humanity,” but the Charter does not define as a separate
crime any conspiracy except the one to commit acts of aggressive war.
Article 6 of the Charter provides: “Leaders, organizers, instigators,
and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such
plan.” In the opinion of the Tribunal these words do not add a new and
separate crime to those already listed. The words are designed to
establish the responsibility of persons participating in a common plan.
The Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges in count 1, that the
defendants conspired to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity,
and will consider only the common plan to prepare, initiate, and wage
aggressive war. And under figure 8, the IMT states further:[154] “As
heretofore stated, the Charter does not define as a separate crime any
conspiracy except the one set out in Article 6(a) dealing with crimes
against peace.” The verdict was so formulated because the Charter was
unclear at this point. As above stated, the Control Council law contains
no such provisions, so much the less because in this case conspiracy
does not constitute a separate crime. The provision set forth in Article
2, paragraph 2, No. 6, “whoever was connected with this planning or
execution”, is only a form of individual defense and cannot be put on a
par with the concept of the common plan or conspiracy. Article 2 defines
clearly the type of crime referred to in paragraph 1, namely (1) the
individual crime of violation of peace; (2) conspiracy against peace;
(3) individual war crimes; (4) individual crimes against humanity; and
finally, the form of participation in paragraph 2. Therefore, it is
rendered that a so-called conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes
against humanity is not a punishable offense.
It has to be examined therefore whether Milch made himself guilty of any
individual type of participation. It would have to be shown that either
as a principal or accessory he participated in a crime or that he
especially ordered or initiated it. It would have to be proved that he
gave his approval for a definite crime. That approval, however, cannot
refer to a general approbation but can only be considered as
participation in crime if, by his approval, he strengthened and
stiffened the criminal will of the perpetrators. It must therefore be
made clear that he knew of the individual crimes and that he intended to
put them into action by means of his approval. Even in that case his
subsequent approval would not suffice; since still nowhere in the world
is anyone punished because of an inner or moral attitude. Finally, it
must be examined whether Milch was connected with the planning or
commission of such crimes. Here again it must be understood, of course,
that this connection must be capable of causing the crime, and that
Milch knew about the connection and therefore the crime. The question of
membership in any organization or association which was connected with
the execution of crimes requires special examination. It is clear that
mere membership, as such, in any organization wherein any member may at
one time have committed a punishable act cannot make every other member
of that organization punishable. Otherwise a monstrous situation would
arise where the commander in chief of a large army was punishable if any
member of that army committed a war crime. Where in this world in all
time has it happened that in such a huge organization as wartime armies’
soldiers did not at one time or another commit punishable acts? This is
inevitable and it occurs in all armies. It can therefore only be a
question here whether the organization or the association of which the
defendant was a member had as its particular purpose the commission of
war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Letter (_f_) of Article 2, paragraph 2, must be considered here. Since
Milch is not charged with a crime against peace, it would also have to
be especially proved that he participated in the common plan of
conspiracy for the commission of crimes against the peace. That he held
high office cannot of its own make him punishable. This is also evident
from the Tribunal of the IMT who acquitted three persons who held
equally high office in Germany.
Bearing in mind these points of view, one has to examine the individual
counts of the indictment. In answer to the prosecution’s charge that
Milch in February 1944 had ordered two Russian officers to be shot,
Exhibits Milch 40 to 44, and the testimony of the witness Vorwald have
proven that the said officers were shot on the basis of an expressed
order by Hitler who received, through political channels, the report of
the incident earlier than Milch. Exhibits Milch 40 to 44 and the
testimony of Vorwald have made it clear that Milch, first of all, had no
possibility of issuing such an order, and secondly, that he did not
cause its being ordered, and thirdly, that he only gained knowledge of
the incident after the officers had been shot.
The witness Vorwald was in a position to testify that Milch even angrily
protested against such an order.
The passage in the record of the 53d meeting of the Central Planning
Board of 16 February 1944 contained in Defense Exhibit 11, can therefore
not be made the basis for a judgment. Whoever, knowing the German
language, reads the text critically must realize that the utterances of
Milch recorded therein are contradictory in themselves and, therefore,
cannot possibly contain the real statements made by Milch. They are
contradictory to the true course of events; they are contradictory to
Milch’s real authority, and finally, they are contradictory to the inner
attitude of the defendant who himself angrily described this act as a
crime.
It is significant for the question of the probative value of all
verbatim records submitted to consider that such recording of the true
events is found here. Such records containing such mistakes cannot be
made the basis for a judgment. If we assume, however, that Milch really
made these utterances which are so wrong, then this passage would remove
all doubt that Milch during moments of excitement was no longer master
of his thoughts and words and, therefore, cannot be held responsible for
them. It would be a serious offense against justice, however, if
judgment was to be pronounced on the basis of such stenographic notes
taken by an unknown person who may have been in error.
Milch is furthermore accused of having abetted, participated in, and
been connected with cruel and inhuman experiments carried out on
concentration camp inmates at Dachau. I believe that here, too, evidence
has shown that Milch is innocent. It has been proved by the clear,
although long-winded, deposition of the witness Hippke that the
defendant had heard for the first time on 31 August 1942 that human
experiments were being carried out on others than the volunteering
members of the Luftwaffe; that is, at a moment when the high-altitude
experiments were already completed and when the freezing experiments
were about to be completed.
In this connection I recall that the final report on freezing
experiments was available in print already on 10 October 1942, so that
these experiments too must have been completed by a considerably earlier
date. On 31 August 1942, the defendant learned merely from Hippke that
human experiments had been carried out on criminals who had been
sentenced to death and who had volunteered to obtain a pardon. He was
told expressly that nothing had happened so far during these
experiments. It is obvious that experiments as such do not in themselves
constitute an offense against humanity, whether or not they are in use
in some foreign countries. At any rate much evidence has already been
submitted by the defense in the medical trial, proving that, also in
democratic states of the world, experiments have been carried out and
are being carried out on volunteering criminals, experiments which
constitute a danger to the life and health of the experimental subject.
The prosecutor has submitted in evidence his last exhibit, Document
1971-PS, Prosecution Exhibit 161, showing irrefutably that Himmler too
had ordered that only men sentenced to death are to be used for these
experiments. Hippke did not even misinform Milch. That, besides the
experiments which were of importance to the Luftwaffe, Himmler had also
started secret experiments is shown from this very Exhibit 161 because
therein Himmler directs Rascher to continue these special experiments on
which he had reported to him and even to carry out revival experiments.
Both witnesses Ruff and Romberg have testified unanimously that nothing
has happened during these experiments. Death casualties had occurred
during Rascher’s own experiments which he carried out on Himmler’s
behalf. Only the aim of these experiments remained unclear to the
witness, which is now being clarified by Exhibit 161, but Milch had no
knowledge of all this. He fully believed what Hippke told him, nor did
he ever have any cause to distrust Hippke and he could not distrust him
more as he knew that high-altitude experiments had already previously
been carried out on Luftwaffe personnel of his own air force without any
danger being involved. Not even Hippke has had any knowledge of
cruelties and death casualties. How much the less can be proved that the
defendant could have had any knowledge. It does not say anything against
the defendant that he had signed already before 31 August 1942 some
letters which had been submitted to him by his offices. Nobody has been
able to state that Milch had dictated these letters at all. It could not
even be proved that he had seen or read the letters from the SS to which
these letters refer. It is impossible for a man who has such a burden of
work and such a large sphere of tasks as the defendant to take care of
every trifling matter in his office, that these letters—which to
anybody who has no knowledge of the underlying facts appear harmless and
unimportant—could also not arouse the defendant’s suspicion. Should he
be charged with responsibility for them then, this would be a
responsibility which could not be borne by anybody. This would mean to
overestimate human working capacity. It is the very idea of any great
organization to relieve the chiefs or the heads of attentions to details
in order to make them free for the main tasks. If such a man were to be
asked to take care of everything, then the organization would be
unsuccessful and no man in the world could form a great work comprising
many people, and no man in the world would be willing to head such an
organization if the chief of the organization should be held responsible
for everything that his subordinate agencies commit. Everybody has the
right generally to trust his subordinates as long as he has no reason to
distrust them.
Hippke’s descriptions were unimpeachable and gave no reason for
misgivings. His tenure of office at that time was irreproachable so that
Milch had not to distrust Hippke’s activities and all the less so
because already at an earlier date human experiments had been carried
out by the Luftwaffe in a manner above reproach. Milch has testified to
the effect that he had not read the report on high-altitude experiments.
Evidence has shown that he has not seen the film nor could he have cause
for this film to be shown, only if he would have stayed in Berlin, but
he was not even in Berlin on that day; therefore, he could not become
suspicious from what occurred. Likewise Milch never received the report
on freezing experiments nor did he ever get a final report on this
matter.
Finally, Milch had no reason to distrust the fact that the SS
participated in the experiments. He knew that Hippke was part of it and
was therefore entitled to believe that everything was in order.
Therefore, Milch was neither a principal in nor an accessory to, nor has
he ordered or instigated these experiments. He has never given his
consent to the crimes committed because he had no knowledge whatsoever
of them nor was he connected with their planning or their execution, nor
was he a member of any organization aiming at the commission of such
crimes. It is not the aim of the Luftwaffe to carry out such criminal
experiments, and with the DVL he had nothing to do at all. It is
irrelevant that at that time Rascher was a member of the Luftwaffe.
Exhibit 161 proves that Rascher received the orders to execute the
crimes as a member of the SS from Himmler himself and also carried them
out in that capacity. Finally, it must be said that the Wolff letter of
November 1942 was only written after the crimes were committed. It has
not been proved that Milch ever saw this letter. He was not in Berlin
when the letter arrived. That he has testified. The letter was sent to
the Medical Inspectorate which only answered it in 1943 as Hippke has
testified. Also, the fact that Rascher was transferred to the SS had
nothing to do with the defendant. That was a matter settled outside of
his competency. The personnel chief of the Luftwaffe was at no time
subordinated to him, and it must also be taken into consideration that,
according to the evidence, Milch had no knowledge of Rascher’s having
committed any crimes. One cannot charge Milch with the fact that Rascher
referred to him. The testimony of Neff and Defense Exhibit 56, the
affidavit of Punzengruber, have shown to this Tribunal that Rascher was
a confirmed liar whose statements have no probative value and,
therefore, I believe that Milch in this matter too has shown to this
Tribunal his complete innocence.
Before I go into the charges against Milch for his participation in the
so-called slave labor program, I must make a few fundamental statements.
I shall begin by examining the question as to what extent the Hague
Convention on land warfare and the Geneva Convention of 1929 were valid
for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war. By the statements of
witness von Neurath, it has been confirmed that the U.S.S.R. in 1919
specifically withdrew from the Hague Convention on land warfare as well
as the former Geneva Convention. Jurists will not dispute the fact that
a formal withdrawal from agreements is of greater importance in the
relations between states than the act of joining such a convention. Even
if one were of the opinion that the Hague Convention on land warfare and
the Geneva Convention represented merely the codification of already
existing international law, so that the state that did not join the
conventions would also be bound to this already existing international
law in all details, even in such a case the expressly stated withdrawal
from such a convention must mean also a withdrawal from the natural
international law. If this were not the case, the withdrawal from such
conventions would be an act without meaning which such intelligent
politicians as those found in the U.S.S.R. would never undertake. Nor is
this conception of mine contradicted by the expert opinion offered in
the first Nuernberg trial (_Canaris Doc. No. EC-338_)[155] because this
expert opinion is only concerned with the order of Hitler and Keitel
regarding the killing and cruel treatment of prisoners. It is, of
course, clear that inhumane acts do not become permissible because of
withdrawal from conventions. What we must examine here, however, is
purely the question whether or not, and for what activities, such
prisoners of war may be used. Detailed regulations of international law,
which in themselves do not contain atrocities, can in my opinion be
nullified by expressly withdrawing from a convention codifying existing
international law. Finally, we wish to draw attention to Article 82,
paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention of 1929 which contains the
following regulation: “If in wartime one of the belligerents is not a
member of the convention, the regulations of this convention remain
valid, nevertheless, for the belligerents who have signed the
convention.” This does not mean that the signatories are bound to the
Geneva Convention also with regard to the treatment of soldiers of a
nonsignatory power, but only with regard to soldiers of the signatories
who are at war. Article 82, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention,
therefore, states that with regard to the relations of nonsignatories
the convention is not valid. The regulation was made so that it should
not be thought that if a nonsignatory participated in the war the Geneva
Convention would not apply to that war.
That my opinion was shared by the U.S.S.R. becomes clear beyond doubt
from Defense Exhibit 49 presented by me, which contains the decision of
the Council of the Peoples Commissioners of the U.S.S.R. of 1 July 1941.
This decision does not mention any limitation with regard to the use of
prisoners of war for labor except for the regulations under number 25.
According to this, prisoners of war may not be used as workers in the
battle zone nor for the personal needs of the administrations, or by
other prisoners of war (orderly services). Defense Exhibit 51,
concerning employment of German women prisoners of war in Russia, also
reveals the same conception of the U.S.S.R.
The objections that not Russia’s conception but that of the United
States of America matters here is not justified. Existing regulations
between two states can only be judged on the legal relations valid for
those two states. If both states regulate a given question in agreement
with conclusive acts in the same way, that regulation becomes
international law valid for the relations of those two states and must
be taken into consideration by all other states. It is the right of
sovereign states to regulate their relations as they wish. Other states
have no right to interfere in the right of sovereignty and they must
acquiesce in the legal conception existing between those two states
regarding any issue concerning their citizens. Therefore, legal opinions
of another state must not be taken as a basis for the judging of actions
which occurred between the nationals of these two states.
As in Milch’s sphere of competency Russian prisoners of war were used
neither at the front nor as orderlies, he cannot be found guilty so far
as the treatment of Russian prisoners of war is concerned.
All this also applies to the treatment of the Russian civilian
population whose rights could have been cared for by the Hague
Convention for land warfare alone. Here, too, Russia’s express
withdrawal from the convention is of great importance.
In my opinion it cannot be argued that Germany attacked Russia and that,
for the reason, employment of the civilian population would be illegal
even if this were not illegal in itself. That alone would mean that
Germany would be bound to the regulations and that Russia was not. From
the point of view of international law, this is an impossible situation.
For two belligerent states, there cannot be a different international
law.
Moreover, the validity of the regulations laid down in the Hague
Convention for land warfare can be cancelled by a special factor which
precludes lawlessness. In all codes of law of the civilized world, the
law of so-called emergency situations exists. This conception of law
must also be applied to international law. That Germany was in an
emergency situation in the sense that the use of the civilian population
for labor in the occupied territories was only caused by the emergency
situation, I showed in detail a little while ago. Modern war means total
war and as such has suspended, in several points, international law as
it existed up to now. It is uncontested that according to the Hague
Convention for land warfare actions of combat against the civilian
population are forbidden. Modern air warfare, having as its aim total
annihilation of armament and production of the enemy, brought with it to
a great extent warfare against the civilian population without any of
the belligerents regarding such combat actions as forbidden according to
the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. This also applies to the total
blockade of a country which aims at starving the population of that
country. These comprehensive ways of waging war which hit all classes of
the population permit, in my opinion, to a state which is at war,
especially on account of the fact that its civilian population is
brought into the strife, to use for its purposes labor from occupied
countries so as to maintain its production and armament.
Concerning the relations of the other nations involved in the war, there
is no doubt that for the above the Hague Convention on Land Warfare and
the Geneva Convention of 1929 are valid. But it is just as clear that it
is left to the nations to change and abolish these regulations by
special agreements between one another. A good example here is the
Armistice Treaty signed in 1944 between the Russian and Romanian
governments according to which Romania had to pledge itself to put at
the disposal of Russia a large number of people for reconstruction
purposes. Complying with this agreement, in January 1945 many thousand
members of the Romanian state were deported to Russia by compulsion and
against their will. This case shows what, in such matters, may be legal
and valid. Moreover, that agreement was made under some force of
bayonets, as in all history is usually the case with every treaty
between a conquered and conquering state. The Defense Exhibit 47 proves
that in the case of Germany the Control Council (_see sec. VI, number 19
of the Proclamation No._ _2_) imposed on the German authorities even
without a treaty, but simply on unilateral orders, the same obligation,
i.e., to put at disposal labor for personal services inside and outside
Germany. That such orders could naturally only be fulfilled by the
German authorities by means of a labor service law will not be contested
by anybody.
These one-sided orders given by the victor to the vanquished, whether
they be issued on the basis of an armistice brought about by force of
arms or on the basis of command or law following the unconditional
surrender of a state, are not contrary to law.
It should, therefore, be stated that the rules of the Hague Land Warfare
regulations can be suspended between two states. I have given proof for
the fact that there were between Germany and France agreements whereby
the French population had to make themselves available for work in
Germany, first, by volunteering, and later, on the basis of a law for
compulsory labor issued by the French Government. No restrictions were
laid down to what extent and for what purpose these people were to be
employed.
The objection has been raised that the Vichy Government was a government
of traitors, but it was that government which concluded the armistice
with Germany, and throughout the war all Frenchmen, including those in
de Gaulle’s camp, would raise passionate protests when they thought that
one of its articles had been violated. Thus, they all acknowledged that
an armistice could be concluded and was concluded. Once you acknowledge
the existence of an armistice agreement, you cannot, logically or
legally, deny the legality of the government which has concluded the
armistice. You must eat your cake as it is and you must not pick out the
plums alone.
As for the situation in Holland and Belgium, both those countries
surrendered unconditionally. According to international law Germany was,
therefore, in a position in its dealings with the authorities of these
countries to regulate the labor commitments of the civilian population
unilaterally in the same manner as this has now been handled in regard
to the German population by the Control Council.
As far as Poland is concerned, that country, on the basis of the
partitioning agreement between Russia and Germany, had lost its
sovereignty. That such partitioning agreements can abrogate the
existence of a state has already been historically proved by the former
partitioning agreements of the bordering countries in regard to the
Polish state. Moreover, the agreements concluded between the victorious
nations after this war have abrogated the sovereignty of the German
state over very large areas in the East and thus have created new
sovereignty for the population of these territories. Germany released
the Polish prisoners of war and could at any time issue legal labor
directives as regards the Polish civilian population since the latter
were under German sovereignty.
So far as the Italian prisoners of war are concerned, the evidence has
shown that the Mussolini Government, which at the time was the covenant
government in that part of Italy not occupied by the allied forces, made
them available for work in the armament industry, especially after
Germany had to manufacture armaments for Mussolini’s Italy. Here it
should also be mentioned that Milch’s opinion that Italian prisoners of
war who fled from a transport should be shot does not mean a cruelty.
All countries of the world have prisoners shot who attempt to escape as
proved by me in Defense Exhibit 26. So far as the civilian population of
other southeastern states are concerned, they were only recruited and
employed as free workers based on approval by the legally existing
governments of these countries.
In addition, it is interesting to point out that the agreement between
France and Germany, according to which France was supposed to allocate
French civilians for the labor commitment in exchange for the release of
prisoners of war, had a parallel in the discussion of the question
regarding the fate of German prisoners of war still in allied countries.
In France, in particular, the request has been made to make possible the
release of German prisoners of war by making available German civilians
as workers in place of the prisoners of war. This, too, is evidence to
the effect that such an agreement is not contrary to international law.
That, your Honors, is the legal position as I must present it.
In regard to the question of guilt, a special point has still to be
considered. All legal theories consider that the defendant is not liable
for punishment if after careful consideration and careful inquiries he
has gained the conviction that his action was permissible. It has been
shown that in Germany prisoners of war and foreign civilians were being
employed within the war production even at the time when Milch had not
yet taken over the office of the GL (Generalluftzeugmeister—Air
Ordnance Master General). In other words, he was already confronted with
the situation, the exploitation of which he is being reproached for
today.
The testimony of the witness Vorwald and that of the defendant himself
showed that Milch made inquiries from the competent authority as to
whether the employment of prisoners of war and foreign civilians which
he planned to use was admissible under the existing regulations. He has
testified here that he received an affirmative answer. Furthermore, he
testified that the admissibility of the utilization of foreign civilian
workers was discussed soon after the First World War in a large staff
committee of the German Reichstag. The chairman of that staff committee
was Prof. Dr. Schuecking, a legal authority of repute, who had become
known throughout the world as a passionate champion of pacifism and
democracy. This committee, as the defendant gathered from the
discussions held at the time, could not and did not find that employment
of foreign civilian workers in armament industry was inadmissible.
Impressed by his earlier experience, the defendant had the right to
believe the information given to him by his superior office that
employment of foreign manpower and of prisoners of war was admissible.
Moreover, this information was not issued without reason. The reasons
given for it were rather in accordance with the reasons which I have
described in detail above. How should Milch, who is not a legal expert,
who as a layman did not understand anything about applicable
international law, how could he form a different opinion? It is the
right of every citizen to believe the legal information supplied by his
superior and the concomitant authorities, for no one can impose upon a
citizen the duty to undertake on his own independently an examination of
the legal questions involved. In a modern state this would result in an
untenable situation whereby every one of the citizens would acquire his
own conception of law. Differing opinions abroad Milch was not in a
position to hear since he was not allowed to read foreign newspapers nor
listen to foreign broadcasts, nor did he do so.
He acted in good faith, and that has to be considered in his favor
today, the more since he knew and may well have assumed that these
measures were only temporary and were forced by the necessities of war.
[At this point the following discussion took place:]
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Is it a principle of the German law that ignorance
of the law is an excuse for violating it?
DR. BERGOLD: It is a principle inasmuch as if somebody has been misled
by his superiors on the significance of the law. Everybody must inquire
what the law is, but if his superior authorities give him certain
information, he can rely on that.
Q. Suppose a person is advised by his own counsel as to the law, and
counsel is wrong, does that excuse the client?
A. The client’s lawyer is not sufficient. The authority must be a
government official.
Q. Well, suppose a high government official, a man in high authority who
was not a lawyer, advised his subordinate as to his legal rights and
duties, and that advice was wrong?
A. That would mean that there would be an excusable error, an excusable
legal error.
Q. If, for example, Goering, who was a person in high authority, advised
Milch that he had the legal right to go out and shoot a person, would
that be justification for Milch’s doing so, legally?
A. No. Because as to the question of whether you can commit murder or
not everybody knows about that; but the point as to whether the
employment of foreigners was admissible under international law is a
very tricky legal point, and there, of course, there is a difference.
Q. You mean that every one is supposed to know that he cannot shoot a
man.
A. Yes. Everybody knows that.
Q. But everyone is not supposed to know that he can force a man to
unwilling labor?
A, No. He is not obliged to know that. That is why Milch applied to
receive this information about international law.
Q. You make a distinction between homicide and slavery?
A. Yes. I make a difference not, perhaps, as in this exact example, but
I make a difference between the natural knowledge of law, which
everybody has, and special questions and special knowledge not shared by
everybody in the state. The point whether you can kill or steal is
common knowledge, but the question whether international law permits the
employment is not something which everybody knows. This question is one
which only specialists and legal experts can decide, and if any man
concerned tries to obtain information as to whether it is permissible,
and obtains that information from a specialist of a governmental
department who says, yes, then it does not become permissible in itself,
but we have what is known as an excusable legal error.
Q. Would you take the same position as to enforced civilian labor?
A. Yes, on the whole question whether anyone can employ foreign workers
or prisoners of war.
Q. I would like to get this straightened out.
A. There are a number of other difficult legal points which I need not
go into here. This is certainly an example of what occupies us here.
Q. That is true. I want to get your position perfectly clear. I think it
is—
A. Let’s take, for example, the question whether, in any foreign country
which is occupied, the occupier may issue occupation money; let’s assume
that this is punishable according to some international regulation which
is difficult to interpret and which a layman is not in a position to
know. Now, if the Reich Bank, as expert, told the governor of the
occupied country that it was permissible, then the chief of this
occupied country, the military authority, would have an erroneous
opinion for which he could not be held guilty.
Q. Now, that theory of law becomes a very uncertain guide, does it not?
It depends upon interpretation of not the lawyers, nor the professors,
but of high government officials; they make the law.
A. No. My client inquired of the competent offices, not of Goering, but
of the competent offices, namely the legal departments. In all the
ministries there were legal departments, also in the Reich Air Ministry
and in the Wehrmacht itself. They employed specially trained experts. I
draw your attention to—
Q. Just a minute. Then the head legal experts make the law as far as the
defendant is concerned?
A. No, no, he does not make the law but he tries to, and that is, of
course, the legal error that—
Q. He makes the law by which the defendant may govern himself?
A. Yes, for this special case, as long as he does not hear an opinion to
the contrary, let’s assume.
Q. Oh, what happens after he does hear the opinion to the contrary, then
which law does he abide by?
A. In that case he can act no longer at all. If he acts, he acts on what
is known from the Roman law as “eventual dolus”, an evil intention, in
case he comes up against the law. I assume that the term “eventual
dolus” is known to your country, too.
Q. Supposing that he gets two conflicting opinions from the legal
ministry, or one of the legal advisers in a high place tells him he may
do a thing, and another in an equally high place says he may not, how
does that solve the dilemma?
A. In that case he must not commit the act, because his attention has
been drawn to the difference in the legal opinions, and that is where we
have the “eventual dolus”. If he does not depend on it, and does it on
his own risk, then in that risk he committed a wrong.
Q. I am frank to say that this is a new and startling legal theory. Did
you understand that?
A. Yes. I understood.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Well, we have your position.
[Dr. Bergold continues.]
His good faith, however, was reinforced by the fact that all the
measures against English and American prisoners of war, which are being
objected to, were not carried out. That the reasons expressly stated for
this were that no agreement except a change in the regulations had been
conveyed normally to the British and American prisoners of war. Whoever
has the least psychological insight will understand that the observing
of the Geneva Convention principles towards those two countries must
have made the deviation from them in respect to other countries appear
to the defendant as authorized, all the more as this deviation had been
based on presence of other agreements, or the lack of other protective
measures.
As far as the question of actual recruiting and using of manpower is
concerned, a differentiation must be made between recruiting, bringing
foreign laborers to the country, and their treatment on the whole on the
one hand, and on the other hand their use within Germany in the labor
assignment.
May it please the Tribunal, the case in chief, and the submitted
documents of the prosecution, especially the Exhibits No. 13, 14, 14-A,
15, 15-A, and 17 eliminated any doubt as to the fact that Sauckel alone
was competent for the recruiting of foreign laborers and their transport
to Germany and for the treatment of the foreign workers, and that Hitler
over and over again confirmed against the attacks of Speer that he was
the only competent man. Not one single document has been submitted which
would show that Milch participated in the recruiting, transfer to
Germany, and treatment of the workers. The witnesses Speer, Koerner,
Richter, Hertel, Eschenauer, Pendele, Vorwald, as well as Milch himself,
have testified under oath that neither they nor the defendant knew
anything about all the abuses which have become evident in the sphere of
Sauckel’s work.
I call your attention to Document 407-II-PS, Defense Exhibit 3, which
reveals how Sauckel always and everywhere emphasized that he took care
of the foreign workers to the best of his ability. In this exhibit he
makes the assertion that foreign workers have never in the history of
the world been treated as well as they were treated by him in this most
severe of all wars. The testimony of the witness Schmelter and of Milch
has shown that Sauckel had made the same declarations and told the same
lies to them also. There is no need for any further statement to the
effect that the recruitment and even the forced transport of the workers
into the Reich on the basis of an order could have been carried out in
an absolutely humane manner and that all these atrocities, murders, and
tortures which took place need not have occurred. Such actions are not
of necessity connected with such events. The fact that in the East and
in France, parts of the population were called up and drafted by classes
by means of labor service decrees could not and did not have to make
Milch suspicious. Forced drafting of people occurs in all countries
which have a compulsory military service or labor service. Examples of
the latter are Germany and Bulgaria. The latter state had ordered
service according to each group before the Hitler regime existed, and
how could Milch, after all, have found out about the inhuman acts in the
recruitment and transport into the Reich and the treatment within the
Reich? Obviously, only if he had observed such incidents himself or if
complaints reached him through his subordinates or through these foreign
workers themselves.
Milch testifies here in a creditable manner that during the entire
course of the war he had never observed such conditions. During all
these years he made his trips by plane and, in some exceptional cases,
by special train; that in this way he could naturally not observe such
facts is quite clear. The witnesses have confirmed that they never
reported abuses to him. The only things he heard were isolated
complaints that the food was inadequate at times or that there was a
lack of clothing and shoes. In themselves, these were conditions which
resulted at the time from the wartime emergency and applied also to the
German civilian population. All of the above-mentioned witnesses and
Milch have, however, confirmed that Milch on his own part immediately
ordered that the conditions should be remedied.
These incidents, however, cannot be called inhuman acts or atrocities,
cannot be called crimes. The witnesses Pendele, Hertel, and Vorwald, as
well as the defendant himself, have testified that the foreign workers
never brought any complaints to the defendant. They all expressed their
happiness. It may be that they shied away from complaining to Milch.
That, however, was not Milch’s fault. He had the right to believe the
assurances of the persons he questioned, the more so because his
conversations with them were carried out in the friendliest, even the
most cheerful manner.
Now, how could Milch have found out about these incidents? I have
already mentioned that he could not obtain knowledge about that from
foreign reports, because he did not receive such reports. Thus, it
should be established that Milch was not responsible, first, for the
directive for the so-called slave labor; secondly, the recruitment of
manpower; third, the inhuman acts perpetrated in connection with this,
the transport to Germany, and the crimes connected therewith, and
finally, fifth, the treatment of foreign workers in Germany and the
atrocities committed in connection therewith.
He knew nothing at all about them. He did not commit these crimes;
neither as a principal nor as an accomplice. He neither ordered such
crimes nor instigated them. He did not take a consenting part in them
either. On the contrary, he always eliminated minor abuses and
constantly saw to it that the conditions of the foreign workers were
ameliorated by special gifts. He was in no way connected in a causative
manner with the planning or execution of these crimes, and here I refer
you to my earlier legal statement, for he would have had to know about
them, that such atrocities, murders, and other inhuman acts occurred in
connection with the recruitment, transfer to Germany, and treatment
within Germany if he is to be held responsible for them. Neither did he
belong to the organization which was connected with the recruiting,
transport, and treatment, namely, the Organization Sauckel. If at all,
he could be charged only with the utilization of foreign workers.
No just man who values that name can, by virtue of knowledge
subsequently acquired, condemn the actions which a defendant committed
at an earlier time in ignorance of what later became known. Today the
whole world is full of the horrors which have been brought to light. It
is not true, however, that these horrors were desired by the supreme
leadership. That Sauckel acted independently here and that he alone
bears the guilt is shown by Defense Exhibit 3, in which Sauckel lied to
Hitler, saying that workers had never been treated so well as by him.
I do not wish to defend Hitler. As a German, I myself have every reason
to raise the most bitter and serious charges against the man whose
account of guilt can never be paid up, but here it must be said that
Hitler could hardly have included the commission of atrocities and
murders in his plan for the foreign workers, for if that had been the
case, Sauckel would not have had to lie as he did. Then he would not
have had to pretend to his lord and master that he was treating the
foreign workers so well. Such lies, such deceit, are practiced only by
the subordinate who is aware that he has violated instructions and that
he can be punished by his superior.
Document R-124, Defense Exhibit 32 shows clearly that in two cases
Sauckel acted against Hitler’s instructions in committing his crimes.
Therefore, even Sauckel’s labor organization was not created for the
purpose of committing atrocities, murders, and other inhumane acts.
Sauckel and a number of his subordinates made themselves guilty on their
own accounts, and as guilty persons they strove to keep secret and to
cover up their crimes. That the defendant cannot be responsible for
these secret acts is hardly to be doubted.
I realize that in answer the prosecution will remind me of all the
documents with severe statements by Milch which have been submitted to
the Tribunal. This is a serious count of the indictment, but one can
achieve clarity on the complex of questions thus brought up only if one
considers whether Milch made these severe statements only against
foreign workers and prisoners of war or whether they were simply a part
of his nature.
The witnesses Richter, Foerster, Hertel, Eschenauer, Pendele, and
Vorwald have confirmed that Milch in his tantrums threatened even his
German subordinates, his best workers, with hanging and shooting, and
here in this room several men have appeared on the witness stand whom
the defendant shot or hanged in words. This clearly shows that the
defendant was not one-sidedly filled with hatred of the members of
foreign nations; besides, this was hardly to be expected in the
character of a man who for years energetically worked for peaceful
collaboration with other peoples and who despised the racial doctrine
and the idea of the “master race”. Rather, it makes it clear that he
threw out such wild expressions only when he was excited, so that his
subordinates acquired the habit of laying bets on the number of people
who would be shot, when they knew that exciting matters were up for
discussion. I read a number of passages to you from the notorious speech
before the quartermasters and fleet engineers, in which he raged against
those present and against himself in the same terms as he used against
the foreigners. And in other documents submitted by the prosecution, one
can find such expressions used against Germans, against members of the
leading class of the German people, and against German workers. All this
proves that an unfortunate inclination of Milch is here expressed for
which, like a sick person, he cannot be held responsible, especially
since he never carried out the punishments which he threatened. All the
witnesses whom I have called to the stand from Milch’s entourage have
testified that he used such terms only in tantrums. These tantrums
occurred frequently, and always when he had met with major difficulties
in the way of his work to save Germany from complete destruction. He was
a sick man. He suffered several very serious accidents, all with severe
brain concussions. It is an old experience of medicine that such people
are easily excitable, and you must not forget how much this man had on
his mind. He was a clairvoyant. He knew that the war was lost for
Germany. He realized what horrors Germany was doomed to through the
increasingly violent air war. He knew what help was possible in the
distress of his people, and he had to stand helplessly by while his
short-sighted and perhaps malevolent superiors frustrated, hampered, and
prohibited all his precautions. In such severe physical distress, even a
healthy man would become so irritable that he would be subjected to
violent outbursts of anger. How much more violent would these outbursts
be in the case of the sick defendant. His distressed soul housed in a
suffering body, helplessly exposed to its worries, reacted in this way
to relieve the tension.
Many witnesses, in particular the witness Vorwald, have told you that
when such excitement occurred the defendant even changed physically,
that the back of his neck became red and swollen and that afterwards he
no longer knew what he said while he was in such a state. That this
testimony, especially that of the witness Vorwald is true, is shown with
actual certainty by the incidents between the defendant and Goering on
the occasion of the report on the crimes committed by Terboven in Norway
on the civilian population, and Document R-134, Exhibit 159 of the
prosecution. The prosecution without justification bitterly reproached
the defendant for failure to protest against this monstrosity. The
defendant in his defense was not able to answer that he had done so.
Vorwald has testified that this process took place in connection with an
outburst of anger about precisely that incident, and because the
testimony of Vorwald that the defendant did not remember afterwards what
had happened during his period of excitement is true, the defendant was
not able to carry out a full answer in his own defense because of his
excitement. He did not remember. Your Honors, it is clear you have
achieved deep insight into the souls of men. Therefore, surely you are
able to judge that this incident has revealed the truth of what the
defendant and his witnesses have told you. Otherwise he would be able to
cite his protest as a defense against the charge of the prosecution.
Now, I assume that the prosecution will object that these fits of rage
occurred much too frequently and that they are therefore not a
pathological symptom but a normal expression of his character. Your
Honors, this can be disputed by a very simple consideration. The
so-called GL (Generalluftzeugmeister—Air Ordnance Master General)
meetings took place twice a week. That means that from the time when the
defendant took office there were a total of about 160 meetings. In
addition, there were 60 meetings of the Central Planning Board. Finally
there were about 30 Jaegerstab meetings, altogether about 250 meetings
in which the defendant participated. The meetings lasted many hours.
According to my concept the average number of pages of verbatim
transcript of the GL was about 200 for a single meeting, or about
30,000-32,000 pages for the GL alone. If one includes the transcripts of
other meetings then one comes to figure approximately at least of about
35,000 pages for all the transcripts at a conservative estimate. This is
an enormous figure from all these many meetings. From all these many,
many pages of transcript, the prosecutor has been able to submit only a
very few pages with only very occasional extravagant statements.
Therefore, the question is asked whether this was the normal tone of the
defendant. It is also significant that in the meetings of the GL, such
outbursts occur much more frequently than in the transcripts of the
Jaegerstab or the transcripts of the Central Planning Board. In the GL
meetings the defendant was in his own realm among us “parson’s
daughters”, as the witness Vorwald said. Such outbursts naturally
occurred there more often because according to experience a human being
can let himself go more easily among his most intimate friends than
among his subordinates. Nevertheless the outbursts remained isolated.
How curious is it that the emotional disturbances of the defendant
occurred repeatedly in connection with the same subjects of discussion,
for example, in the question of the work done by the French industry,
the French people, the question of so-called slackers, or the discussion
of threatening and inciting remarks made by foreigners. Sometimes
several outbursts occurred at brief intervals, one after the other. Why,
your Honors? Because the matters that excited the defendant were not
settled. But this leads us to the question of whether the defendant
followed up these wild words with deeds. He never did. Just consider,
for example, the question of slackers or the question of the work done
by the French industry, the French people. These apparently so
malevolent orders issued in anger were not carried out. These stones
were repeatedly laid in the path of the defendant. Here, your Honors, I
ask you to penetrate into the depth of the circumstances with the
understanding that characterizes a legal person. The defendant
repeatedly became excited, for example, over the so-called slackers,
Germans unwilling to work whom he considered to be traitors. Each time
he issued strict orders, expressed wild threats, but would it not have
been the most natural thing for this excitable man on all these
occasions, which followed one on the heels of the other, to shout at his
subordinates and to reproach them, to ask them why the orders which he
had given and supported before in anger and which he had advanced
repeatedly had not long since been carried out? Would that not have been
the most natural and the first thing that he would have done in his
anger if he had really expected and wanted his wild orders carried out?
Your Honors, look at it from the human point of view. Revive all the
experiences of your long and no doubt rich lives and examine with me
whether I am not right in what I say.
I challenge my learned opponent to show me in all these instances, which
are really appalling, one single expression indicating that the
defendant objected to the failure to carry out his earlier threatening
orders. Not a single word can be found and here, your Honors, the truth
becomes so obvious that no intelligent man can ignore it. It sounded
incredible in the mouth of the witnesses when they said again and again
that no such orders were carried out. It has been put to the defendant
that it is improbable that a field marshal did not expect his orders to
be carried out and that all his subordinates did not immediately rush to
carry out his orders, but the man who is sitting before you told the
truth in spite of all appearances to the contrary, for if he as a field
marshal had expected his orders issued in anger to be carried out then
he would surely at one time or another have expressed dissatisfaction
because they had not been carried out. But he did nothing except to get
angry from his sickness and his anxiety about his people. It is clear
not only from the Terboven case that he actually knew nothing about what
he had screamed out and that he never seriously pressed home his
demands. The Court has questioned him repeatedly about these
expressions. He always supplied that he did not remember them and he did
not believe that he had said so. He has often had to tell you that what
he shouted was wrong if he had actually said it. That too seemed
incredible at first, but as this man afterwards no longer knew what he
said in these attacks then he cannot testify about them. It is also
clear that a man in such a fit speaks many untruths and one cannot
assert that he lied deliberately. The man, as I say today, has told you
the truth as far as he can know it to the best of his knowledge and
belief. These transcripts cannot convict him of untrustworthiness.
Moreover, in many cases the transcripts are no doubt full of mistakes,
distortions, and errors. I have shown you a number of passages which
must be wrong. I have shown you transcripts such as NOKW-359, Exhibit
75, which speak of Milch’s presence and statements although on that day
he could not have been present in the Jaegerstab. This is also true of
some records of ostensible GL meetings. I have also proved that other
transcripts make no logical sense in German and that several statements
must have been run together there. Today, of course, no one can say
whether these various statements were all made by the defendant. Many
witnesses which I have examined on this matter, for example, to name but
a few, Richter, Pendele, Hertel, Speer, and Vorwald, have testified that
the transcripts contained many errors and that they were never
corrected, that they were sometimes even intentionally distorted when
the defendant attacked his superiors. Such passages were either left out
or changed in such a way that the attacks on the person in question were
no longer recognizable. But who would seriously consider it permissible
to use such faulty transcripts as evidence?
All the witnesses from the entourage of the defendant have told you
finally that in these Central Planning Board, as well as in the
Jaegerstab and GL meetings, that in addition to transcripts reproducing
the individual speeches and opinions so-called records of results were
drawn up which contained only the really important decisions, orders,
and regulations. They alone were valid for the subordinates. Those
concerned acted according to them alone. It is noteworthy that the
prosecution has not submitted a single one of those records of results
containing any inhuman orders issued by the defendant. I beg of you,
your Honors, not only to give severe consideration to the weaknesses of
the defense, I beg you to draw your severe conclusions from the
weaknesses of the prosecution as well. The fact that no incriminating
records of results have been submitted proves once more that these
threats were never carried out.
Your Honors, in disturbed times other men, too, sometimes say things
which cannot be taken seriously. Men can be charged only according to
their deeds, not according to their chatter. If you have access to
Churchill’s speech made in his first excitement after Dunkirk, you can
see what violations of international law he recommended to the civilian
population of England when he called upon them to prevent a German
airborne landing. But he never actually issued any such orders, and so
no one will try him for that. When the late General Patton said at one
time that he intended to continue to collaborate with such of the German
Nazis as were specialists, some excited American newspaper ran this
headline: “Patton Should Be Shot.” Who would be so stupid as to call
these newspapers inhuman? No one in the world; no one takes such excited
words seriously. No one can say that these outbursts of anger meant that
Milch approved the atrocities which occurred elsewhere in Germany.
The affidavits of Kruedener, Defense Exhibit 37, Lotte Mueller, Defense
Exhibit 38, the testimony of witnesses Koenig, Vorwald, Pendele, have
all shown that this man always and everywhere tried to help people in
distress. He, who ostensibly wanted to force the foreign workers and
concentration camp inmates to work by means of starving them, had the
concentration camp inmates supplied with food from his estate near
Rechlin in order to improve their diet. Thus, in his actions, he did the
opposite of what he shouted in his anger. But one could raise a very
serious charge to the effect that Milch by his thoughtless manner of
speaking incited the elements throughout the country which committed
such misdeeds. But this again, your Honors, is untrue. You have not
heard one single example here of anyone having acted according to
Milch’s words and having referred to having done so. These displays of
fury only occurred among people who knew Milch and knew that he could
not be taken seriously in such moments. All witnesses have stated for
you that these fits only became known to the circle of intimates.
I lived in Germany throughout the war. Although the sins of the
high-ranking leaders of the Reich were eagerly discussed among the
people, I never heard one word about Milch’s fits of rage. In reply to
my question the witness Vorwald stated convincingly that nobody spoke
about these incidents to other persons because they did not wish to
expose their superior to whom they were attached. His loyal followers
surrounding him with a cordon of silence. Nothing could be more
understandable, and every decent person who respects his superior will
and must act in the same manner, for, in spite of his occasional
fierceness, Milch was popular with his subordinates. The witnesses
Richter, Hertel, Pendele and Vorwald, among others, testified before you
that Milch was highly esteemed. Richter actually called him the best and
fairest superior whom he had ever met in all his life. Here, your
Honors, in this praise Milch’s true nature appears before our eyes.
I believe, therefore, to be justified in saying that one cannot and must
not judge Milch by his wild talk. To infer guilt from that would mean to
pass a judgment which could never be upheld before justice. Nobody may
be judged by empty phrases. I would like to tell you a true story here
which occurred in Germany during the discussions about a new, more
stringent National Socialist penal code. At that time the Party took the
point of view that criminal intent in itself was punishable, and thus,
during a meeting of the Penal Law Commission in connection with the
question of the meaning of murder, a long debate developed as to whether
a person who intended to bring about the death of an enemy by prayer was
to be punished by death for murder. The majority of Party members
concurred with this mad opinion on the punishment of criminal intent.
The sensible ones protested against it for a long time. When the debate
was nearing its end, Dr. Guertner, the Reich Minister of Justice at the
time, a clear-sighted man, rose and with one single sentence made reason
prevail. These were his words: “Gentlemen, I do not understand you. All
my life a corpse has been part of a murder.” The narrow-minded Party
doctrinaires had to give in to the scornful laughter that followed these
words. And in that way I should like here to think of Milch’s wild talk
and exclaim, “Where is the corpse?”
In my opinion the only remaining question which needs serious discussion
is merely that of the employment of foreign workers, of PW’s, and of
concentration camp inmates. To begin with, it must be mentioned that the
prosecution in its opening speech maintained that Milch more than
anybody else in Germany was occupied with the employment of forced labor
in Germany. That statement, however, is in no way correct. That, at
least, has been clarified by the evidence beyond all doubt, it seems to
me. There can be no doubt that Sauckel and Speer had considerably more
to do with so-called forced labor than Milch, quite apart from Hitler
and Goering themselves.
It is necessary to visualize clearly the scope of Milch’s sphere of
activities and of his authority. Your Honors, even if you were only to
check the three part Defense Exhibit 55 which I submitted, even to a
superficial scrutiny only, you would realize immediately that Speer
alone had a great deal more to do with this work than Milch. Speer was
in charge of all armaments for the army and navy which, measured in
human beings, by far exceeded the Luftwaffe, and alone exceeded the
volume of the Luftwaffe armament many times, in particular as Milch only
dealt with the construction of airplanes and as all equipment for the
crews, in fact were part of the army equipment. Furthermore, Speer was
in charge of all other productions in the German Reich. Finally, after
the establishment of the Jaegerstab, Speer was also placed in charge of
all armaments for the Luftwaffe. This Defense Exhibit 55, to which the
defendant has sworn and which is based on the prosecution’s own Exhibit
58, reveals a much greater and more comprehensive scope of Speer’s
organization. It was he, who as the central authority, not only
controlled an apparatus with considerably more tasks, he alone also had
at his disposal the executive authorities in the country, who dealt with
all matters which had to be taken, whereas Milch had no executive organs
at his disposal. He had, therefore, no executive powers whatsoever.
Speer alone was in charge of the powerful main committees, the main
industrial rings, in which the captains of industry exerted their
influence and power.
He was also in charge of the armament commissions and armament officials
of the armament inspectorates and armament detachments in the defense
districts. And lastly, the Gau plenipotentiaries and provincial economic
offices in the whole country listened to him. He was with Hitler almost
every week, and therefore, he possessed much more influence to which
Sauckel’s power—
[At this point, the following discussion took place:]
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: May I ask you what was Koerner’s special interest?
DR. BERGOLD: I am not speaking about Central Planning Board here. I am
only speaking about the GL.
Q. I know, but in the Central Planning Board what particular field was
Koerner interested in—the navy?
A. Koerner? No. He was mainly in charge of agriculture. He testified to
that effect.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Very well.
[Dr. Bergold continues.]
Speer was with Hitler almost once a week and had therefore much more
influence to which Sauckel’s power set the only limit. The man, Milch,
never possessed such a machine. The GL was nothing but a technical
agency in the Reich Air Ministry which generally, as the witnesses
Vorwald and Hertel confirmed, was told by the General Staff of the
Luftwaffe what was to be constructed. If Milch had really been the
powerful man as the prosecution describes him, it would have been
possible for him to carry out his plan for Germany’s air defense. But
the achievement of this goal for which this man worked with unbelievable
effort and with all energy was denied to him simply because he was only
in charge of a technical office which could not make any decisions
whatsoever. Hitler, Goering, and the General Staff of the Luftwaffe
decided what this man had to construct and what plans he was to carry
out. He carried them out within the framework of the task with which he
was entrusted, always being suspended in the middle, without ground
under his feet, without the direct authority to give orders to industry,
without influence on the supply of manpower and materials; he could only
get influence through the Central Planning Board, and there too the
fundamental decisions were made by Hitler, by the latter himself, on the
advice of Speer. It is not necessary for me to name all the witnesses.
All his collaborators have testified to that effect.
May it please the Tribunal, if you examine the statements made by Hertel
and Vorwald, you will gather from them beyond any doubt that the GL had
nothing to do at all with the question of labor, with the recruiting,
transportation, and assignment of workers. The GL, and this cannot
possibly be doubted by anyone after hearing all these witnesses and
especially after Milch’s testimony, had merely to make the blueprints
for airplanes and the construction necessary for this purpose, and then
to place the orders with the completely independent industry, following
in all this the instructions of the General Staff and the orders given
by Hitler and Goering. All witnesses from the GL have confirmed before
you that the GL had nothing to do at all with the labor question; that
he did not request one single worker or exert any influence on Sauckel.
It is true that requests for labor passed, for statistical reasons as
well as for control purposes, through the GL office. But it is important
to remember and never to forget that industry submitted its real labor
requests throughout the country to the labor exchange offices which were
Sauckel’s agencies and to the armament inspectorates and armament
detachments which were Speer’s agencies.
Vorwald and the defendant himself have shown you with unmistakable
clearness that the only thing which the GL had to do with these requests
was merely that he examined these requests of industry concerning the
material point as well as the labor point, and that he then reported to
the Speer Ministry whether and in how far the requests of industry were
exaggerated and false and if the GL considered fewer material and less
manpower to be adequate.
Now, what does such an activity actually mean? Surely not, as the
prosecution submits, the enslavement of new workers, but exactly the
contrary; namely their reduction. If the GL had not exercised this
activity, Sauckel would have got much larger requests from industry and
he would have procured this labor by means of more forceful methods than
he actually did. That industry had to request workers in order to carry
out its tasks assigned by Hitler, Goering, and the General Staff of the
Luftwaffe, who were the authorities who decided on the extent of the
construction program of air armaments, was however not caused by the GL.
He was nothing else but an executive organ in the chain of command from
Hitler, Goering, and the General Staff. He was merely the technical
agency which had to make the blueprints and constructions, and then,
after approval by higher authorities, had to submit them to industry for
the undertaking of the orders.
This, your Honors, is the recital of the evidence produced on the
activity of the GL, and the only thing which the GL did in the framework
of this activity was to reduce to the lowest level the requests for
labor made by industry, for the many reasons that he was sufficiently
expert to look through the exaggerated requests of industry which could
never get enough workers. It is significant that the GL minutes which
have been submitted nowhere reveal a discussion of real manpower
guidance, but, at the utmost, that once a few questions were discussed
for information purposes. It is furthermore highly significant that
among the entire organizations of the GL there were no offices for labor
assignment and labor research as was the case in the Armament Ministry
of Speer (_see Defense Exhibit 55_), but merely for statistics of the
personnel. There is nothing to clarify the real situation better than
this fact.
Has the fact that industry, which had to carry out Hitler’s construction
program, employed foreign workers, prisoners of war, concentration camp
inmates, been caused by the defendant? Industry had employed these
people before the beginning of Milch’s tenure; it employed them because
Hitler had ordered through Sauckel that industry had to employ these
people—not in order to obtain slave labor for slave labor’s sake—but
only for the reason to be able to throw still more Germans into the
greedy jaws of the fiendish war and thus surely causing disaster for
Germans as well as for other peoples.
As far as the GL is concerned—the least reproach can be cast upon
Milch, of all the reproaches that can be cast upon him. It only consists
in that he passed orders on to the air armament industry (and where did
this not occur during the war?), and that he saw to it that no
exaggerated requests for material and manpower were made.
The prosecution has proved nothing which could contradict these
statements. But Milch has—and this, too, has been proved—not only
curtailed exaggerated labor requests of industry by means of his
statistics, thus preventing the increase of foreign labor, but in
addition to that, as was stated by the witnesses Brauchitsch, Pendele,
Hertel, Vorwald, and others, he always endeavored seriously and
successfully to maintain the German workers in the factories; and in
doing so he even saved German workers who should have been drafted, at
least to the amount of 70,000 for the air armament factories, keeping
thus on a lower level further requests for foreign workers and their
assignment. A man who, as the prosecution means, is keen on slave labor
does not act in that way.
Finally, there is another point to be mentioned in this connection. The
International Military Tribunal—which, by the way, states expressly in
its verdict against Sauckel that there is no doubt of Sauckel having had
the over-all responsibility for the slave labor program—that Tribunal
stated in its verdict against Speer that it has to be considered as a
mitigating circumstance in his favor, that by setting up protected
factories Speer had kept many workers in their homelands. Your Honors
will remember the depositions of Hertel, Vorwald, and Milch, of which it
results that as early as 1941 Milch, first together with Udet and later
on alone, had factories working in France on the basis of a free
agreement with the French plants in order to employ French workers in
their home country. These agreements were, as has been testified to by
Foerster, completely free, because in 1941 the industry of that part of
France which at that time had not yet been occupied had concluded them.
Therefore, Milch was the inventor of the idea to have labor employed on
the spot in foreign countries. It was not only in France that he, being
the first, carried that out. You have heard that this occurred also in
Holland and in Hungary. Now, if the International Military Tribunal
counted this circumstance as a mitigating one for Speer, it must all the
more be credited to the defendant who acted that way not merely from
1943 onward, as did Speer according to his own statement in this trial,
but already as early as 1941, and was the first to do so. In this
instance again the defendant proved to be a man who endeavored to
mitigate as much as possible the difficulties which had arisen from the
prevailing emergency. That much as far as the defendant’s activity as GL
is concerned.
When I come to consider in how far Milch’s activity on the Central
Planning Board could be charged against him, I am aware that some of the
minutes of the Central Planning Board could, in themselves, be
interpreted as a charge against Milch. But if your Honors consider that
out of sixty meetings of the Central Planning Board the prosecution
could only list fifteen meetings in which labor questions were
discussed—this being done in some instances in a perfunctory and casual
way—it results from this fact already that the Central Planning Board,
as to its aim, was not charged with the guiding of manpower, which at
that time was the focal point of many schemes in all countries and,
above all, in Germany.
In this trial there was much argument between the prosecution and the
defense as to the significance and the essence of the Central Planning
Board until, eventually, with the help of the key Document NOKW-245,
Prosecution Exhibit 157, the argument was decided. There it says
literally, “Speer and I (that is, Milch) are of the opinion that he
(Sauckel) has to be incorporated somehow in the Central Planning Board
in order to get the labor assignment, as well as the material, into our
hands. At the present time we have no possibility to steer it.” These
words were voiced on 23 February 1943 after the Central Planning Board
had been in existence for already one year. These words were not voiced
at that time for the purpose of _ex post facto_ whitewashing, but they
expressed the complete truth and have characterized the situation in
quite simple and clear words for always and unmistakably. No decree has
been submitted, nor order of Hitler has been proved, to show that this
situation was changed. At no time, indeed at no time, was Sauckel a
member of the Central Planning Board. If the prosecution wants to
consider the wish Milch uttered at that occasion as incriminating, they
are at liberty to do so. However, this is not a punishable deed, and
nobody can tell what amount of good Milch could have done if he had
factually been in charge of the labor assignment. His other deeds
account for the assumption that he would certainly have stopped abuses
and would have mitigated all that was necessary as far as possible. The
members of this trial would not believe, at first, in the depositions of
all the witnesses who have been heard here, including Koerner, stating
that the Central Planning Board dealt with labor questions merely for
reasons of information. The wording of the speeches seemed to contradict
it. But, your Honors, the witnesses have also testified before you that
the speeches could only be understood if they are read. Prosecution
Exhibit 157 has put an end to all such doubts. Whoever wants to
pronounce here the verdict with all the necessary seriousness cannot
bypass this document. Nobody can contend any longer that the defendant
has not told you the full truth. Therefore, his statement under oath is
to be believed, which agrees with Speer’s statement in that the
so-called labor assignment meetings were held with Sauckel always with
the sole aim to obtain from Sauckel, who had reported so many false
figures and was not scrupulous about telling the truth, eventually and
for once, clear figures. Likewise, Document NOKW-195, Prosecution
Exhibit 143, the report on the meeting of 28 October 1943, held at
Goering’s place, shows a constant struggle with Sauckel in order to
obtain true figures because Hitler would not believe that Sauckel’s
figures were completely false. It has been proved that factually both
Speer and Milch have been reproached because they did not fulfill the
program made by Hitler, although many millions of workers had allegedly
been at their disposal. Alone for air armament, according to Goering’s
calculation based on Sauckel’s figures, five million workers should have
been available—whereas the entire air armament employed a much lower
total of people. As Hitler was a dangerous man and his reproaches could
have disagreeable consequences, Speer and Milch cannot be blamed for
wanting to get this subject clear; consequently, if they discussed this
problem in detail—especially during the 53d and 54th meetings of the
Central Planning Board—this has nothing to do at all with labor
procurement. That these meetings have not been summoned by Milch—that
they have been summoned by Speer and his ministry—has been proved.
Milch presided over these meetings only because Speer was ill. But he
only carried through the order of his friend Speer. But even these
discussions do not alter the fact that the Central Planning Board as
such had nothing to do with labor procurement. These very discussions
were of a purely informative nature. By them the Central Planning Board
did not obtain any influence on the carrying out of labor procurement
nor on its distribution. How characteristic it is, however, for the
personality of Milch that he used even this discussion about Sauckel’s
figures in order to reduce the millions of new workers whom Hitler had
ordered in January 1944 to quite a considerable extent.
In all the discussions submitted there is nowhere a word to be found,
either to the effect that Milch had requested workers for his air
armament. If the need for workers was under discussion, then always
only, as the defendant himself confirmed, in regard to the basic
industries—that is, mining and the iron industry and in regard to
agriculture. It was always a question, as the records show, of the
commitment of prisoners of war. But even according to the Geneva
Convention prisoners of war may be employed in mining, in the production
of iron, and in agriculture. These places of work are not actual
armament industries.
That Milch did not have anything to do with the commitment of Russians
in antiaircraft defense, which was not under him at all; that, on the
contrary, he even opposed it, and that that part of the minutes of the
33d meeting of the Central Planning Board must be incorrect here, too,
has been stated by the witnesses Hertel, Koenig, as well as others
equally incontestably. It has now been proved that this order was issued
by the OKW directly via Goering.
Thus Milch, in his capacity as member of the Central Planning Board, was
neither perpetrator of, nor accomplice in, crimes; nor did the Central
Planning Board have as its purpose the commission of such crimes. Its
sole purpose was the distribution of raw materials—an activity which is
not prohibited under any conditions.
The third activity of Milch which could bring him in connection with the
so-called slave labor was the activity on the Jaegerstab. Were one to
view this membership in the Jaegerstab from the point of view of the
prosecution, one could perhaps maintain the previously formed opinion
that this activity was limited to the increased use of slave labor. The
testimony of Speer, Vorwald, and Milch, however, have shown that the
Jaegerstab had two main aims, namely, first, to raise the production of
fighter planes and, secondly, to facilitate Milch’s resignation from his
office by transferring the entire air armament industry to the ministry
of Speer.
Formerly, to be sure, Milch was one of the chairmen of this Jaegerstab,
but the witnesses—among them Schmelter, Hertel, Eschenauer and
Vorwald—have testified that the actual chairman of this Jaegerstab was
Saur. Milch very soon withdrew from the Jaegerstab; in March 1944 he
still participated in fifteen meetings, in April only eight, in May only
five, and in June only two. Nothing proves the veracity of the testimony
of the defendant more than the quite obvious decrease in his
participation. If one considers the fact that the Jaegerstab held its
meetings daily one realizes how rapidly the decrease in the activity of
the defendant was. If one considers furthermore that he was not always
present at the meetings at all, that he did not hear most of the details
of the discussions at these meetings, one can say with certainty that he
was really not the man who had the biggest influence in the Jaegerstab,
and who performed the practical work there. The expression “breakfast
director”, which the witness Dorsch applied to the defendant,
characterizes the situation excellently. The Jaegerstab was concerned
with labor questions only insofar as it guided the so-called transfer of
workers who were already working in industry, in the event changes in
production occurred, especially effecting, as far as possible, their
transfer from closed down bomber factories to fighter plane factories.
However, in this connection it is almost exclusively a question of
so-called skilled workers, as the witness Schmelter, a specialist in
this field, has confirmed. In this process no new workers of any kind
were introduced into industry. The witness Schmelter, however, finally
expressly confirmed that no real influence was exerted on Sauckel and
his offices. Wishes regarding the transfer were merely referred to the
Organization Sauckel. This fact in particular was emphasized in the
statement of Schmelter with all the clarity desirable.
Thus, it has been proved in regard to this committee, too, that it had
nothing to do with the bringing of workers into Germany from abroad, nor
dealt with their redistribution. Thus, it was also not the purpose of
the Jaegerstab to decide labor questions. Finally, it has thus been
clarified that the ministry of Speer was the office which handled labor
questions, insofar as it was necessary in the framework of the
transfers. On the basis of the submitted documents, it seems at first as
though the Jaegerstab had initiated and carried out the building of
underground factories or of concrete protected factories above ground.
The witnesses Speer, Hertel, Eschenauer, Koenig, Pendele, as well as
Milch, himself, however, all clearly and decisively confirmed that these
constructions were ordered directly by Hitler and Goering, and that the
defendant had opposed these orders because he considered them senseless.
It has furthermore been declared that Hitler himself, handled the needs
of workers for these undesirable constructions. The Jaegerstab was
connected with these constructions, according to all the testimony, only
to the extent that it had to examine which ones of the fighter plane
factories had to be installed in them. In this connection it must be
remembered that a number of these constructions were also allocated for
armament factories of the Wehrmacht. Thus, Milch also cannot be charged
with any responsibility in this count. He was neither formally nor
actually in a position to prevent Hitler’s and Goering’s orders.
Nor had Milch anything to do with the allocation of Hungarian Jews to
these factories, quite apart from the fact that it has been made clear
that these Jews were allocated only in the summer of 1944, which was
stated by the last prosecution witness, Krysiak, that is, at a time when
Milch had withdrawn from his office for some time. It has been proved
that Hitler issued relevant orders here and that the Jaegerstab trip to
Hungary was entirely unconnected with this matter because it was
undertaken solely for the purpose of a conference with the legal
Hungarian government. These consultations were merely concerned with
agreements regarding aircraft production by the Hungarian industry in
the large caves near the Danube. Not one single document has shown that
Milch either agreed to or welcomed the employment of Hungarian Jews.
To sum up, I may say then that even within the Jaegerstab Milch was
neither a principal nor an abetter in the crimes listed in the
indictment. I might add that it was not the purpose of the Jaegerstab to
carry out such crimes. In any case he was by no means the leading man on
that board. It has been found with certainty beyond all doubt that the
Jaegerstab served the purpose of helping the defendant to withdraw from
office.
Mention must also be made of the question of concentration camp inmates
working. Before going into details, I should like to make a few basic
remarks. From all the trials in which I acted as counsel, from the
questions asked in this courtroom, from various discussions I have had
with citizens of your country, I have, your Honors, attained the
certainty that in your circles no one believes in the truthfulness of
the defendants’ and all other witnesses’ statements, namely that the
average German knew nothing about the happenings in the concentration
camps and that the defendant did not know of the existence of such
camps, with the exception of Dachau and Oranienburg. As most Germans
certify to this and as all witnesses swear to this under oath, it is
first of all difficult to understand why such statements are not
believed. It can only be explained by the fact that the citizens of your
country have been so much influenced by press propaganda and the newly
discovered facts that they put more trust in the reports of their
newspapers than in the assurances of the citizens of a country which is
now known throughout the world as the place of origin of many
atrocities.
But should such prejudice which does not originate from [one’s] own and
actual experience influence the judgment? I believe and always have
believed that it is one of the essential laws of justice to base one’s
judgment strictly on facts which have become evident during a trial. It
is a proven fact that in Germany no one was allowed to write about
concentration camps; that the rules of secrecy which had been imposed by
the dictatorial regime had to be kept very strictly; and that even the
German authorities in case of their violating these rules of secrecy,
were threatened with death, as I have proved by the submission of
Defense Exhibit 36.
From the statement of the witness Roeder, who, incidentally, explained
that the defendant had neither the power of passing a death sentence nor
of sending people to concentration camps, you have learned that the
concentration camp inmates spoke to nobody about their condition. Even
the prosecution witness Krysiak has told you that the prisoners did not
dare to lodge complaints to anybody. How could the Germans generally
learn about conditions in concentration camps? Milch, too, could not and
did not learn about them, as he has told you, for the secrecy was kept
even among the highest authorities. May the propaganda of your country
insist on the contrary as much as it likes, what I have stated here
still remains true, and I can certify it myself.
I myself who during the time of the so-called Third Reich often enough
defended men who were accused because of their political views, I, who
was watched by the Gestapo, who was attacked in the public newspapers of
Nuernberg and especially was mentioned with name in the notorious
“Stuermer” on account of my defense of unhappy Jews, I, too, didn’t
learn anything about these camps, although clients came to me after
their release from the concentration camp Dachau. I always asked them
and I always received the answer that they had nothing special to
report. It was, of course, no pleasant life, but they reported that it
was not so bad.
I would ask you, your Honors, to consider how we could have learned of
these conditions.
May I remind you in this connection that deeds have been committed in
the east of the former German territory, in the Sudeten-German border
territories of Czechoslovakia, and other countries, deeds which, even if
one imagines them at their worst, remain far behind the truth. About
these atrocities the international press has kept silent although one
day history will speak and one will learn about them with horror. I have
refused to give proof of the events which were brought about by your
armies after the collapse. I could have mentioned many deeds which can
be called nothing but grave infringements against the Geneva Convention.
I could have given you a picture of how in the prisoners’ camps in the
early days hundreds of German prisoners died of starvation. I am not
accusing anyone. Shortcomings of organization and of human nature but
not express orders and rules account for it.
I only mention this, your Honors, in order to point out that you did not
learn about this and that it is only our unhappy and wretched people who
know about it. But we who have had the bitter experience of the power of
propaganda and of the force of secrecy know that ignorance of such
matters can be excused and believed. Therefore, no one may say from the
outset that all the unanimous statements by witnesses and the
declarations of Milch are to be disbelieved. They have been sworn to;
and the verdict must take them into consideration.
According to these it is certain that Milch only knew of the employment
of concentration camp inmates in the Heinkel plant in Oranienburg and
that he was of the opinion that these were German criminals and German
political prisoners, of whose mistreatment, however, he had no
knowledge. The use of prisoners and convicts is not a crime against
humanity. This, however, should not have to be mentioned. In all
countries in the world it is customary for prisoners to be obliged to
work. In Germany this was even regulated by law to such an extent that
the prisoners who were condemned to prison, that is, not to the
penitentiary, also had to work. For a prisoner to have to work is not an
atrocity. An atrocity can be seen only if the prisoner has to do this
work under conditions which injure his health or which are inhuman.
But Milch did not know that the food, the housing, and the treatment of
the prisoners were inhuman. One would have to prove such knowledge
before one could punish him for it. You have heard, on the contrary,
that he always did everything possible when he heard of individual cases
of abuse. He even tried to help, as the Kruedener affidavit, Defense
Exhibit 37, proves, in a case where he was not competent. As the
testimony of Kruedener revealed this was a case of inadequate
accommodations. Moreover, as the witness Koenig has testified, he
instituted an improvement in the food given the prisoners at Rechlin on
his own initiative, and he generally saw to it that workers got better
rations.
But that does not mean that he knew that those prisoners were starving.
It was unfortunately so that because of the total blockade of Germany by
the Allied forces the food available to the civilian population of
Germany was very poor. I myself had only had the minimum ration card;
and I could tell you a long story about how difficult it was to work on
such rations. Milch, however, obtained better food for everyone working
under him for armament. It was he who was the first to obtain extra
rations for his air armament industry because the workers worked
overtime. As a number of records of the Central Planning Board and the
Jaegerstab show, he obtained additional rations for the prisoners of war
and, for example, sent the Russians into agriculture so that they might
get better food there and be padded a little. He had an office set up in
the Jaegerstab in order to obtain additional food and clothing for the
workers, as the witness Schmelter has testified.
The improvement in the food of the inmates of Rechlin concentration camp
was part of these measures. If he did this through his estate, it was
because he had no influence with the administration of the concentration
camps in respect of the issue of additional ration cards.
It would not correspond with justice if he was pronounced punishable for
the employment of concentration camp inmates under these conditions. The
compulsory labor of prisoners has always been lawful in Germany even
before the Third Reich. He knew nothing of cruelties and atrocities or
inhuman treatment. Therefore, his consent to these cannot be proved.
If I may summarize then, I believe that my opening statement for the
defense had correctly revealed that Milch was not a slave holder,
moreover that he never aspired to be one, that he was of the opinion
that the employment of such workers was permitted, and finally that he
had done everything to keep down the employment of foreign workers as
much as possible and to make it as humane as possible. At any rate the
prosecution’s description of him is in no way accurate, and could only
originate from a misunderstanding of the man, his speeches, and of his
background. Sauckel and Speer had far greater responsibility in this
connection. It was they who had real influence, and not Milch, but even
in the case of Speer who was higher than Milch in his position, the
International Military Tribunal has granted extenuating circumstances in
connection with the manpower issue. I am convinced that Milch thought
employing such labor was permissible, and that he did everything in his
power to keep such employment to the lowest level and as human as
possible.
I am conscious of the fact that the verdict of the International
Military Tribunal is a great obstacle for me, and nevertheless the
Tribunal was merely composed of human beings, and it had passed judgment
under particularly difficult circumstances, and in composition it opened
the door to politics into the courtroom. I do not need to remind you
that in the English speaking countries, several verdicts of the Tribunal
were subjected to very serious criticism. I myself here attacked one
point of this verdict with better witnesses and better evidence, that
with regard to slave labor, for example, the International Military
Tribunal based itself upon a wrong assumption. Nobody stated there that
the U.S.S.R. had called off the Hague Convention of Land Warfare. I
checked up on those features of defense, and I found that all the time
it was only talk that the U.S.S.R. had not become a partner of the
convention. The statement of von Neurath revealed that notice of
withdrawal was expressly given.
Here we not only pronounce penalty verdicts or judgment, but also
political judgments, whether we want to or not. Especially in politics
there is always some fluctuation. Every day new facts turn up, which
throw different light upon things. The distance of time which always
grows greater and greater and separates us from the irritating events of
the past allows an ever clearer judgment. The man who returns from
battle is always confused. The more he becomes calm the more he admits
justice towards his enemy.
Honorable Judges of this Tribunal, when you judge please don’t forget
the whole personality of Milch. He always concerned himself as a good
and noble man, and I am not only convinced of that as his counsel but
also as a human being. The world would have a different outlook if his
superiors had listened to his advice, which was intended to serve the
people of this world, and the common will of the people, and peace. In
his heart he always took the side of the fighter who fought for united
Europe, which now has been joined also by his former enemy number one,
Churchill. May this statement of Milch which has thrown new light upon
things serve this aim. Poor and tortured Europe needs an enduring peace.
May his statements also open the eyes of those among the German people
who still cannot give up their misconceptions of many years, and show
them what crime has been committed against them.
But you, Honorable Judges, must recognize from the attitude of the
defendant Milch that he never became unfaithful to himself, and even if
he had been perhaps under the spell of erroneous conception, he has
always wanted the best for his and other people.
I have profound confidence in you, Honorable Judges, that you, equally
detached from your own people, will find an independent, true and
righteous judgment that corresponds to the truth. I shall consider it as
an honor for my person if I have contributed to this through my
painstaking labor.
-----
[152] Defense Counsel Dr. Friedrich Bergold delivered the closing
statement before the Tribunal on 25 March 1947, Tr. pp. 2377-2435.
[153] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 226.
[154] Ibid., p. 253.
[155] Memorandum of 15 September 1941 from Canaris to Keitel concerning
an OKW order regulating the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war,
contained in _Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression_, vol. VII, p. 411, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
VI. FINAL STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT,
25 MARCH 1947[156]
DEFENDANT ERHARD MILCH: Since I became a soldier in 1910 my work has
been devoted to my German people. In the First World War I was at the
front from the first to the last day. Then with others I built up the
German air lines, and when in 1933 the government asked me to enter the
Air Ministry, despite many misgivings, I could not refuse to take up
that task because it was pointed out to me that I could not turn a deaf
ear to this call of the German people.
I have remained faithful to the idea which I conceived at the time of
the air lines, that all nations must collaborate, particularly the
European nations. Pressed together in a small area, and whenever
possible, mostly outside my actual sphere of work, I dedicated myself to
that task. I was opposed to war because my experiences from the First
World War showed me that the living standard of any people would not be
improved by war, and on the contrary everybody would be grievously
harmed.
It was for me a matter of course, even in the late great war, the
planning of which was unknown to me, to do my duty in my post. My full
effort was dedicated to the air defense of the German homeland. This I
conceived to be the only possibility to obtain bearable peace terms.
Even though I had nothing to do with the employment of workers,
including foreign workers, I considered it to be my duty to make precise
investigations into the admissibility of work by foreigners,
investigations which were answered in the affirmative; I also made
efforts to keep the numbers as low as possible and to see to it they
would work in protected factories in foreign countries.
I always made efforts to improve the living conditions of all types of
workers.
My statements made to the best of my knowledge and conscience to this
Tribunal were directed to the world at large, and above all to the
German people, in order to show that only by peaceful understanding of
the nations among each other could life and civilization be secured in
future and that understanding was not only necessary but also possible
if good will prevails. But I also wanted to show my fellow Germans quite
clearly that an autocratic government which is not controlled must end
in disaster.
My personal fate is of no consequence in this connection. I am
interested only in one thing—that the German people should, as soon as
possible, be relieved of their untold suffering and should join the
community of nations as an equal partner.
-----
[156] Tr. pp. 2489-90.
VII. JUDGMENT
A. Opinion and Judgment of the United States
Military Tribunal II[157]
The indictment in this case contains three counts, which may be
summarized as follows:
_Count One_: War crimes, involving murder, slave labor,
deportation of civilian population for slave labor, cruel and
inhuman treatment of foreign laborers, and the use of prisoners
of war in war operations by force and compulsion.
_Count Two_: War crimes, involving murder, subjecting
involuntary victims to low-pressure and freezing experiments
resulting in torture and death.
_Count Three_: Crimes against humanity, involving murder and the
same unlawful acts specified in counts one and two against
German nationals and nationals of other countries.
For reasons of its own, the Tribunal will first consider counts two and
one, in that order, followed by consideration of count three.
COUNT TWO
More in detail, this count alleges that the defendant was a principal
in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in and was
connected with, plans and enterprises involving medical experiments
without the subjects’ consent, in the course of which experiments, the
defendant, with others, perpetrated murders, brutalities, cruelties,
tortures, and other inhuman acts. The so-called medical experiments
consisted of placing the subject in an airtight chamber in which the air
pressure is mechanically reduced so that it is comparable with the
pressure to which an aviator is subjected at high altitudes, and in
experimenting upon the effect of extreme dry and wet cold upon the human
body. For these experiments inmates of the concentration camp at Dachau
were selected. These inmates presented a motley group of prisoners of
war, dissenters from the philosophy of the National Socialist Party,
Jews, both from Germany and the eastern countries, rebellious or
indifferent factory workers, displaced civilians from eastern occupied
countries, and an undefined group known as “asocial or undesirable
persons.”
In approaching a judicial solution of the questions involved in this
phase of the case, it may be well to set down seriatim the controlling
legal questions to be answered by an analysis of the proof.
(1) Were low-pressure and freezing experiments carried on at
Dachau?
(2) Were they of a character to inflict torture and death on the
subjects? (The answer to these two questions may be said to
involve the establishment of the _corpus delicti_.)
(3) Did the defendant personally participate in them?
(4) Were they conducted under his direction or command?
(5) Were they conducted with prior knowledge on his part that
they might be excessive or inhuman?
(6) Did he have the power of opportunity to prevent or stop
them?
(7) If so, did he fail to act, thereby becoming _particeps
criminis_ and accessory to them?
The periods during which these experiments were conducted become
extremely significant in determining the responsibility of the
defendant. The evidence is uncontradicted that the low-pressure
experiments were inaugurated in March 1942, and were concluded by the
end of June 1942. The cold water experiments extended from August to
October 1942, and the freezing experiments from February to April 1943.
During all of these periods the defendant was Under State Secretary of
the Reich Air Ministry, Inspector General and Second in Command under
Goering of the Luftwaffe, to which post he was appointed 19 November
1941. In these various capacities, certain military duties devolved upon
him, especially as Inspector General. For example, he was ordered by
Hitler to take an air squadron to Norway on a purely military
expedition, and during the siege of Stalingrad, early in 1943, he was
ordered by Hitler to attempt to transport into Stalingrad by air food
and supplies for the beleaguered German Army. His high military standing
is indicated by the fact that he was one of the twelve field marshals of
the German armed forces. The major part of his duties, however, revolved
around the production of aircraft for the Luftwaffe. He was primarily a
production man, charged with the duty of keeping military airplanes
supplied in sufficient quantity to the air arm of Germany’s military
machine. This naturally involved the procurement in large quantities of
the two essential ingredients of production—labor and raw material—and
an over-all supervision of any efforts having to do with that arm. One
of the defendant’s immediate subordinates was Professor Hippke, who held
the post of Inspector of the Medical Services of the Luftwaffe. Hippke
was a physician, and had supervision of all matters involving the health
and physical welfare of the personnel of the Luftwaffe.
The low-pressure experiments at Dachau were conducted by three
physicians, Dr. Romberg, Dr. Ruff, and Dr. Rascher. It is quite apparent
from the evidence that Dr. Rascher, who was attached to the Luftwaffe
but made frantic efforts to have himself transferred to the SS, was
principally responsible for the nature of the experiments. Dr. Ruff and
Dr. Romberg were also attached to the Luftwaffe and were, therefore,
remotely under the command and control of the defendant, but the
evidence is persuasive that, although they were interested in and helped
conduct the experiments up to a certain point, the excesses which
resulted in torture and death are attributable to Dr. Rascher. It is
quite apparent that the actual activities of these three physicians were
far removed from the immediate scrutiny of the defendant even though
their activities were conducted within the orbit of the Luftwaffe, over
which the defendant had command.
Approaching now the determinative questions listed above, some progress
can quickly be made in arriving at judicially satisfactory answers.
(1) As to the first question, the evidence is overwhelming and
not contradicted that experiments involving the effect of low
air pressure and freezing on live human beings were conducted at
Dachau from March through June 1942.
(2) Approaching the second question, it is claimed by the
defendant that only legitimate scientific experiments were
conducted which did not involve pain or torture and could not
ordinarily be expected to result in death. It is remotely
possible that so long as the experiments were under the guidance
of Dr. Ruff and Dr. Romberg some consideration was given to the
possible effect upon the subjects of the experiments. But it is
indisputable that the experiments conducted by Dr. Rascher
involved torture and suffering in the extreme and in many cases
resulted in death. Under the specific guidance of Dr. Rascher,
the air pressure was reduced to a point which no flier would
ever be required to undergo (14,000 meters). The photographs of
the subjects undergoing these experiments indicate extreme agony
and leave no doubt that any victim who was fortunate enough to
survive had undergone a harrowing experience. The Tribunal does
not hesitate to find that these experiments, performed under the
specious guise of science, were barbarous and inhuman. It has
been urged by the defendant that the only persons used as
subjects of these experiments were habitual criminals who had
been sentenced to death and who were given the dubious option of
offering themselves for the experiments and receiving as a
reward, if they survived, a commutation of the death sentence to
life imprisonment. This claim scarcely merits serious
consideration. A number of witnesses stated that they had a
vague understanding that this was the case, but the record is
entirely barren of any credible testimony which could possibly
justify such a finding of fact.
(3) The prosecution does not claim (and there is no evidence)
that the defendant personally participated in the conduct of
these experiments.
(4) There is no evidence that the defendant instituted the
experiments or that they were conducted or continued under his
specific direction or command. It may perhaps be claimed that
the low-pressure chamber, which was the property of the
Luftwaffe, was sent to Dachau at the direction of the defendant,
but even if this were true it could not be inferred from that
fact alone that he thereby promulgated the inhuman and criminal
experiments which followed. The low-pressure chamber was
susceptible of legitimate use and, perhaps, had Dr. Rascher not
injected himself into the proceedings, it would have been
confined to that use.
(5) Assuming that the defendant was aware that experiments of
some character were to be launched, it cannot be said that the
evidence shows any knowledge on his part that unwilling subjects
would be forced to submit to them or that the experiments would
be painful and dangerous to human life. It is quite apparent
from an over-all survey of the proof that the defendant
concerned himself very little with the details of these
experiments. It was quite natural that this should be so. His
most pressing problems involved the procurement of labor and
materials for the manufacture of airplanes. His position
involved vast responsibilities covering a wide industrial field,
and there were certainly countless subordinate fields within the
Luftwaffe of which he had only cursory knowledge. The Tribunal
is convinced that these experiments, which fell naturally and
almost exclusively within one of his subordinate departments,
engaged the attention of the defendant only perfunctorily, if at
all.
(6) Did the defendant have the power or opportunity to prevent
or stop the experiments? It cannot be gainsaid that he had the
authority to either prevent or stop them insofar as they were
being conducted under the auspices of the Luftwaffe. It seems
extremely probable, however, that, in spite of him, they would
have continued under Himmler and the SS. But certainly he had no
opportunity to prevent or stop them, unless it can be found that
he had guilty knowledge of them, a fact which has already been
determined in the negative. As early as 20 May 1942, the
defendant wrote to Wolff, Himmler’s Adjutant, stating:
“* * * our medical inspector [Dr. Hippke] reports to me that the
altitude experiments carried out by the SS and Luftwaffe at
Dachau have been finished. Any continuation of these experiments
seems essentially unreasonable * * *
“The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these
low-temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at another
place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau.”
Certainly the defendant did not have the opportunity to prevent
or stop the experiments if he had been told and was convinced
that they had terminated on 20 May 1942, and there is no reason
to believe that he did not rely upon Dr. Hippke’s report as to
their termination. Considerable emphasis is laid upon the
testimony that a motion picture of the experiments was brought
to Berlin and exhibited in the Air Ministry Building, where the
defendant had his office. It may even be said that the picture
was brought to Berlin for the defendant’s edification. But it
appears that he was not present when it was shown and that, in
any event, the showing was long after the experiments were
concluded, at which time the defendant certainly could do
nothing toward preventing them or stopping them.
(7) In view of the above findings, it is obvious that the
defendant never became _particeps criminis_ and accessory in the
low-pressure experiments set forth in the second count of the
indictment.
As to the other experiments, involving subjecting human beings
to extreme low temperatures both in the open air and in water,
the responsibility of the defendant is even less apparent than
in the case of the low-pressure experiments. The same letter of
20 May 1942 to Wolff does indicate that the defendant was aware
of the proposed sea-water experiments. In it he says—
“* * * the carrying out of experiments of some other kind, in
regard to perils at high seas, would be important. These have
been prepared in immediate agreement with the proper offices;
Oberstabsarzt Weltz will be charged with the execution and
Stabsarzt Rascher will be made available until further order in
addition to his duties within the medical corps of the
Luftwaffe. A change of these measures does not appear necessary,
and an enlargement of the task is not considered pressing at
this time.”
It is true that Rascher wrote interminable reports as to the results of
these experiments, but there is no proof that they ever reached the
defendant. On the contrary, they were addressed to Himmler and to Rudolf
Brandt, his adjutant. At the Nuernberg conference in November 1943,
which was held after all experiments had been finished, reports were
made which even to a mildly curious lay person might have indicated that
the experiments had been tinged with excesses and fatalities. But two
facts are striking. First, the defendant was not present at the
conference and only received a report of it later; and, second, the
experiments were at that time all over.
It must be constantly borne in mind that this is an American court of
justice, applying the ancient and fundamental concepts of Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence which have sunk their roots into the English common law
and have been stoutly defended in the United States since its birth. One
of the principal purposes of these trials is to inculcate into the
thinking of the German people an appreciation of, and respect for, the
principles of law which have become the backbone of the democratic
process. We must bend every effort toward suggesting to the people of
every nation that laws must be used for the protection of people and
that every citizen shall forever have the right to a fair hearing before
an impartial tribunal, before which all men stand equal. We must never
falter in maintaining, by practice as well as by preachment, the
sanctity of what we have come to know as due process of law, civil and
criminal, municipal and international. If the level of civilization is
to be raised throughout the world, this must be the first step. Any
other road leads but to tyranny and chaos. This Tribunal, before all
others, must act in recognition of these self-evident principles. If it
fails, its whole purpose is frustrated and this trial becomes a mockery.
At the very foundation of these juridical concepts lie two important
postulates (1) every person accused of crime is presumed to be innocent,
and (2) that presumption abides with him until guilt has been
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Unless the court which hears the proof is convinced of guilt to the
point of moral certainty, the presumption of innocence must continue to
protect the accused. If the facts as drawn from the evidence are equally
consistent with guilt and innocence, they must be resolved on the side
of innocence. Under American law neither life nor liberty is to be
lightly taken away, and, unless at the conclusion of the proof there is
an abiding conviction of guilt in the mind of the court which sits in
judgment, the accused may not be damnified.
Paying reverent attention to these sacred principles, it is the judgment
of the Tribunal that the defendant is not guilty of the charges embraced
in count two of the indictment.
COUNT ONE
Count one of the indictment charges the defendant with the commission of
specified war crimes, as defined by Article II of Control Council Law
No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted,
took a consenting part in and was connected with, plans and enterprises
involving slave labor and deportation to slave labor, resulting in the
enslavement, torture and murder of civilians of foreign countries. The
indictment further charges that he similarly participated in the use of
prisoners of war in war operations and work having a direct relation to
war operations, resulting in inhuman treatment and death to captured
members of the armed forces opposed to Germany. The indictment alleges
that these acts were in violation of international law and the
recognized principles of civilized warfare and in specific violation of
numerous treaties and conventions to which Germany was a party.
It is claimed by the prosecution that the defendant’s responsibility for
these alleged crimes arises from his activities in three capacities (1)
as Aircraft Master General (Generalluftzeugmeister); (2) member of the
Central Planning Board; and (3) chief of the Jaegerstab. The Central
Planning Board was established by a decree of the Fuehrer, dated 29
October 1943. That decree fitted the task of production of material
goods of every kind into the framework of the Four Year Plan and charged
the Central Planning Board with the procurement and distribution of
material of every description. The Board consisted of Reich Minister
Speer, Under Secretary Koerner, and the defendant. On 1 March 1944, the
Jaegerstab was established, consisting of Speer, Saur (a subordinate of
Speer), and the defendant. The Jaegerstab concerned itself exclusively
with the material needs of the Luftwaffe, and was headed, naturally, by
the defendant. It became apparent that neither of these two bodies could
adequately deal with the problems of production without constantly
dealing with the question of labor supply. Meetings of the Central
Planning Board were held at least weekly and the minutes of those
meetings which were offered in evidence show a constant and unremitting
concern with the problem of labor. Fritz Sauckel was in supreme command
of the procurement of labor for the entire war effort, and his conduct
in carrying out his task has been vividly portrayed in the judgment of
the International Military Tribunal:[158]
“* * * As local supplies of raw materials and local industrial
capacity became inadequate to meet the German requirements, the
system of deporting laborers to Germany was put into force. By
the middle of April 1940 compulsory deportation of laborers to
Germany had been ordered in the General Government; and a
similar procedure was followed in other eastern territories as
they were occupied. A description of this compulsory deportation
from Poland was given by Himmler. In an address to SS officers
he recalled how in weather 40 degrees below zero they had to
‘haul away thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands.’
On a later occasion Himmler stated:
“‘Whether ten thousand Russian females fall down from exhaustion
while digging an antitank ditch interests me only insofar as the
antitank ditch for Germany is finished * * *. We must realize
that we have 6-7 million foreigners in Germany * * *. They are
none of them dangerous so long as we take severe measures at the
merest trifles.’
“During the first two years of the German occupation of France,
Belgium, Holland, and Norway, however, an attempt was made to
obtain the necessary workers on a voluntary basis. How
unsuccessful this was may be seen from the report of the meeting
of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944. The
representative of the defendant Speer, one Koehrl [Kehrl],
speaking of the situation in France said: ‘During all this time
a great number of Frenchmen were recruited, and voluntarily went
to Germany.’
“He was interrupted by the defendant Sauckel: ‘Not only
voluntary, some were recruited forcibly.’
“To which Koehrl [Kehrl] replied: ‘The calling up started after
the recruitment no longer yielded enough results.’
“To which the defendant Sauckel replied: ‘Out of the five
million workers who arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came
voluntarily.’ And Koehrl [Kehrl] rejoined: ‘Let us forget for
the moment whether or not some slight pressure was used.
Formally, at least, they were volunteers.’
“Committees were set up to encourage recruiting, and a vigorous
propaganda campaign was begun to induce workers to volunteer for
service in Germany. This propaganda campaign included, for
example, the promise that a prisoner of war would be returned
for every laborer who volunteered to go to Germany. In some
cases it was supplemented by withdrawing the ration cards of
laborers who refused to go to Germany, or by discharging them
from their jobs and denying them unemployment benefit or an
opportunity to work elsewhere. In some cases workers and their
families were threatened with reprisals by the police if they
refused to go to Germany. It was on 21 March 1942 that the
defendant Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary-General for the
Utilization of Labor, with authority over ‘all available
manpower, including that of workers recruited abroad, and of
prisoners of war’.
“The defendant Sauckel was directly under the defendant Goering
as Commissioner of the Four Year Plan, and a Goering decree of
27 March 1942 transferred all his authority over manpower to
Sauckel. Sauckel’s instructions, too, were that foreign labor
should be recruited on a voluntary basis, but also provided that
‘where, however, in the occupied territories, the appeal for
volunteers does not suffice, obligatory service and drafting
must under all circumstances be resorted to.’ Rules requiring
labor service in Germany were published in all the occupied
territories. The number of laborers to be supplied was fixed by
Sauckel, and the local authorities were instructed to meet these
requirements by conscription if necessary * * *.
“* * * the evidence before the Tribunal establishes the fact
that the conscription of labor was accomplished in many cases by
drastic and violent methods. The ‘mistakes and blunders’ were on
a very great scale. Manhunts took place in the streets, at
motion picture houses, even at churches and at night in private
houses. Houses were sometimes burnt down, and the families taken
as hostages, practices which were described by the defendant
Rosenberg as having their origin ‘in the blackest periods of the
slave trade.’ The methods used in obtaining forced labor from
the Ukraine appear from an order issued to SD officers which
stated:
“‘It will not be possible always to refrain from using force * *
*. When searching villages, especially when it has been
necessary to burn down a village, the whole population will be
put at the disposal of the commissioner by force * * *. As a
rule no more children will be shot * * *. If we limit harsh
measures through the above orders for the time being it is only
done for the following reason * * *. The most important thing is
the recruitment of workers.’
“The resources and needs of the occupied countries were
completely disregarded in carrying out this policy. The
treatment of the laborers was governed by Sauckel’s instructions
of 20 April 1942 to the effect that—
‘All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as
to exploit them to the highest possible extent, at the lowest
conceivable degree of expenditure.’
“The evidence showed that workers destined for the Reich were
sent under guard to Germany, often packed in trains without
adequate heat, food, clothing, or sanitary facilities. The
evidence further showed that the treatment of the laborers in
Germany in many cases was brutal and degrading * * *. They were
subject to constant supervision by the Gestapo and the SS, and
if they attempted to leave their jobs they were sent to
correction camps or concentration camps. The concentration camps
were also used to increase the supply of labor. Concentration
camp commanders were ordered to work their prisoners to the
limits of their physical power. During the latter stages of the
war the concentration camps were so productive in certain types
of work that the Gestapo was actually instructed to arrest
certain classes of laborers so that they could be used in this
way. Allied prisoners of war were also regarded as a possible
source of labor. Pressure was exercised on noncommissioned
officers to force them to consent to work, by transferring to
disciplinary camps those who did not consent. Many of the
prisoners of war were assigned to work directly related to
military operations, in violation of Article 31 of the Geneva
Convention. They were put to work in munition factories and even
made to load bombers, to carry ammunition and to dig trenches,
often under the most hazardous conditions. This condition
applied particularly to the Soviet prisoners of war. On 16
February 1943, at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, at
which the defendants Sauckel and Speer were present, Milch said:
“‘We have made a request for an order that a certain percentage
of men in the ack-ack artillery must be Russians; 50,000 will be
taken altogether, 30,000 are already employed as gunners. This
is an amusing thing, that Russians must work the guns.’”
And on 4 October 1943, at Poznan, Himmler, speaking of the Russian
prisoners, captured in the early days of the war, said:
“‘At that time we did not value the mass of humanity as we value
it today, as raw material, as labor. What, after all, thinking
in terms of generations, is not to be regretted, but is now
deplorable by reason of the loss of labor, is that the prisoners
died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and
hunger.’
“The general policy underlying the mobilization of slave labor
was stated by Sauckel on 20 April 1942. He said:
“‘The aim of this new gigantic labor mobilization is to use all
the rich and tremendous sources conquered and secured for us by
our fighting armed forces, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler,
for the armament of the armed forces, and also for the nutrition
of the homeland. The raw materials, as well as the fertility of
the conquered territories and their human labor power, are to be
used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and
her allies * * *. All prisoners of war from the territories of
the West, as well as the East, actually in Germany, must be
completely incorporated into the German armament and nutrition
industries * * *. Consequently it is an immediate necessity to
use the human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the
fullest extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary
amount of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately
institute conscription or forced labor * * *. The complete
employment of all prisoners of war, as well as the use of a
gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women,
has become an indisputable necessity for the solution of the
mobilization of the labor program in this war.’”
Continuing with the quotation from the IMT decision:[159]
“* * * As the dominant member of the Central Planning Board,
which had supreme authority for the scheduling of German
production and the allocation and development of raw materials,
Speer took the position that the Board had authority to instruct
Sauckel to provide laborers for industries under its control and
succeeded in sustaining this position over the objection of
Sauckel. The practice was developed under which Speer
transmitted to Sauckel an estimate of the total number of
workers needed. Sauckel obtained the labor and allocated it to
the various industries in accordance with instructions supplied
by Speer.
“Speer knew when he made his demands on Sauckel that they would
be supplied by foreign laborers serving under compulsion. He
participated in conferences involving the extension of the slave
labor program for the purpose of satisfying his demands. He was
present at a conference held during 10-12 August 1942 with
Hitler and Sauckel at which it was agreed that Sauckel should
bring laborers by force from occupied territories where this was
necessary to satisfy the labor needs of the industries under
Speer’s control. Speer also attended a conference in Hitler’s
headquarters on 4 January 1944, at which the decision was made
that Sauckel should obtain ‘at least 4 million new workers from
occupied territories’ in order to satisfy the demands for labor
made by Speer, although Sauckel indicated that he could do this
only with help from Himmler.
“Sauckel continually informed Speer and his representatives that
foreign laborers were being obtained by force. At a meeting of 1
March 1944, Speer’s deputy questioned Sauckel very closely about
his failure to live up to the obligation to supply four million
workers from occupied territories. In some cases Speer demanded
laborers from specific foreign countries. Thus, at the
conference 10-12 August 1942, Sauckel was instructed to supply
Speer with ‘a further million Russian laborers for the German
armament industry up to and including October 1942.’ At a
meeting of the Central Planning Board on 22 April 1943, Speer
discussed plans to obtain Russian laborers for use in the coal
mines, and flatly vetoed the suggestion that this labor deficit
should be made up by German labor.
“Speer has argued that he advocated the reorganization of the
labor program to place a greater emphasis on utilization of
German labor in war production in Germany and on the use of
labor in occupied countries in local production of consumer
goods formerly produced in Germany. Speer took steps in this
direction by establishing the so-called ‘blocked industries’ in
the occupied territories which were used to produce goods to be
shipped to Germany. Employees of these industries were immune
from deportation to Germany as slave laborers and any worker who
had been ordered to go to Germany could avoid deportation if he
went to work for a blocked industry. This system, although,
somewhat less inhumane than deportation to Germany, was still
illegal. The system of blocked industries played only a small
part in the over-all slave labor program, although Speer urged
its cooperation with the slave labor program, knowing the way in
which it was actually being administered. In an official sense,
he was its principal beneficiary and he constantly urged its
extension.
“Speer was also directly involved in the utilization of forced
labor as Chief of the Organization Todt. The Organization Todt
functioned principally in the occupied areas on such projects as
the Atlantic Wall and the construction of military highways, and
Speer has admitted that he relied on compulsory service to keep
it adequately staffed. He also used concentration camp labor in
the industries under his control. He originally arranged to tap
this source of labor for use in small out-of-the-way factories;
and later, fearful of Himmler’s jurisdictional ambitions,
attempted to use as few concentration camp workers as possible.
“Speer was also involved in the use of prisoners of war in
armament industries but contends that he utilized Soviet
prisoners of war only in industries covered by the Geneva
Convention.
“Speer’s position was such that he was not directly concerned
with the cruelty in the administration of the slave labor
program, although he was aware of its existence. For example, at
meetings of the Central Planning Board he was informed that his
demands for labor were so large as to necessitate violent
methods in recruiting. At a meeting of the Central Planning
Board on 30 October 1942, Speer voiced his opinion that many
slave laborers who claimed to be sick were malingerers and
stated: ‘There is nothing to be said against SS and police
taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into
concentration camps.’”
Under the provisions of Article X of Ordinance No. 7, these
determinations of fact by the International Military Tribunal are
binding upon this Tribunal “in the absence of substantial new evidence
to the contrary.” Any new evidence which was presented was in no way
contradictory of the findings of the International Military Tribunal,
but, on the contrary, ratified and affirmed them.
The next question to be answered is whether or not the defendant Milch
in this case knew that foreign slave labor and prisoners of war were
being procured by Sauckel and used in the aircraft industry, which the
defendant controlled. The defendant’s own words, as gleaned from the
minutes of the Central Planning Board and from his own testimony,
conclusively answer this question in the affirmative. He testified that
he knew that prisoners of war were employed in the airplane factory at
Regensburg and that some twenty thousand Russian prisoners of war were
used to man antiaircraft guns protecting the various plants. He stated
further that he saw this type of war prisoners manning 8.8 and 10.5
[centimeter] antiaircraft guns at airplane factories in Luftgau 7 near
Munich. Sauckel, the Plenipotentiary for Labor, sat in on at least
fifteen meetings of the Central Planning Board, over which the defendant
presided, and discussed at great length and in elaborate detail the
problems involved in procuring sufficient foreign laborers for the
German war effort. He frankly disclosed the cruel and barbarous methods
used in forcing civilians of the eastern countries into the Reich for
war work. He related the difficulties and resistance which confronted
him and the methods which he used and proposed to use in forcibly
rounding up and transporting foreign workers. The advisability of using
prisoners of war and inmates of concentration camps in the Luftwaffe was
frankly discussed, with the defendant offering advice and suggestions as
to the most effective methods to be used. In the face of this
overwhelming evidence, disclosing page after page of discussion between
Speer, Sauckel, and the defendant in which the defendant urged more
severe and coercive methods of procuring foreign labor from the East, it
would violate all reason to conclude that he had no knowledge of the
source of this labor or of the methods used in procuring it. His voice
is constantly heard, pleading for more laborers from this source and
clamoring for a larger share in Sauckel’s labor pool. Hildebrand and
Sagemeier for the coal mines, Rohland for the foundries, Kehrl for the
coal and iron industries, Bruch and Becht for the rubber industry, Speer
for the armament industry, and Milch for the aircraft industry—all
these and others joined in a pagan chorus, in which the harmony was
frequently strained, but all singing the same song, “We need laborers,
men and women. We don’t care where you get them, but give us more.”
At the 54th meeting of the Central Planning Board, Sauckel stated in the
defendant’s presence:
“* * * Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole
batch of French male and female agents who for good pay, just as
was done in olden times for ‘shanghaiing’, went hunting for men
and made them drunk by using liquor as well as words, in order
to dispatch them to Germany. Moreover I charged some able men
with founding a special labor supply executive of our own, and
this they did by training and arming, with the help of the
Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, a number of natives, but I still
have to ask the Munitions Ministry for arms for the use of these
men. * * *.
“* * * I and my assistants in fact have sometimes seen things
happen in France that I was forced to ask, is there no respect
any more in France for the German lieutenant with his 10 men? *
* * We Germans must make an example of one case, and, by reason
of this law, if necessary put Prefect or Burgomaster against the
wall, if he does not comply with the rules; otherwise no
Frenchman at all will be dispatched to Germany.”
The defendant contributed to the discussion by saying:
“* * * As soon as you arrive the men run away to protect
themselves from being sent to Germany * * *. The men even then
will be whisked away unless quite another authority and power is
on the watch, and this can only be the army itself. * * * I can
find no remedy but that the army should assert itself
ruthlessly.”
As indicating that the defendant was not indifferent to the problem, at
the same meeting, in referring to procuring labor from Italy, he offered
the following suggestion:
“We could take under German administration the entire food
supply for the Italians and tell them: only he gets any food who
either works in a protected factory (that is, a factory in Italy
manufacturing German war material) or goes to Germany.”
Later in the same conference, the defendant made another contribution to
the solution of the problem of foreign labor, saying:
“Now during the transfer it is necessary to see that the people
really do arrive and do not run away before or during the
transfer. If a transport has left a town and has not arrived,
500 to 600 persons from this place must be arrested and sent to
Germany as prisoners of war. Such a thing is then talked about
everywhere. If actions like this and other similar ones are
carried out often, they would exert a certain pressure. The
whole thing would be made easier, if we had control of food.”
At the 53d meeting of the Central Planning Board (16 February 1944), the
defendant stated:
“Our best new engine is made 88 percent by Russian prisoners of
war and the other 12 percent by German men and women.”
Instances could be multiplied in which the defendant not only listened
to stories of enforced labor from eastern civilians and other prisoners
of war and thereby became aware of the methods used in procuring such
labor, but in which he himself urged more stringent and coercive means
to supplement the dwindling supply of labor in the Luftwaffe. As
Germany’s plight became more desperate, her loss of military personnel
presented an alarming dilemma, resulting in the defection of thousands
of workmen to the armed forces. This resulted in a shifting of the
dilemma to industry, and spurs were put to the labor procurement
officers to fill the widening gap in the industrial labor ranks. Every
branch of war industry constantly clamored for replacements and each
vied with the others for a greater quota from the labor pool. Confronted
by the desperate situation, the labor procurement officers, headed by
the implacable Sauckel, cast aside all restraint and set out
systematically to herd into the Reich any human being who could
contribute to Germany’s war effort. Under Sauckel’s whip, no means
however harsh were overlooked, and no person however exempt was spared.
The defense on this count is ingenious but unconvincing. As to the use
of prisoners of war, the defendant testified that he had been advised by
some unidentified person high in the National Socialist Councils that it
was not unlawful to employ prisoners of war in war industries. The
defendant was an old and experienced soldier, and his testimony revealed
that he was well acquainted with the provisions of the Geneva and Hague
Treaties on this subject, which are plain and unequivocal. In the face
of this knowledge, the advice which he claims to have received should
have raised grave suspicions in his mind. Presenting an entirely
different aspect to his defense, he testifies that many of the Russian
prisoners of war volunteered to serve in the war industries and
apparently enjoyed the opportunity of manufacturing munitions to be used
against their fellow countrymen and their allies. Other Russian
prisoners of war, he states, were discharged as such and immediately
enrolled as civilian workers. The photographs introduced in evidence,
however, show that they still retained their Russian army uniforms,
which makes their status as civilians suspect. Be that as it may, it
does not adequately answer the charge that hundreds of thousands of
Polish prisoners of war were cast into concentration camps and parceled
out to the various war factories, nor the further fact that thousands of
French prisoners of war were compelled to labor under the most harrowing
conditions for the Luftwaffe.
As to the French civilian workers who were employed at war work in
Germany after the conquest of France, it is the contention of the
defendant that these workers were supplied by the French Government
under a solemn agreement with the Reich. It is claimed with a straight
face that the Vichy Government, headed by Laval, entered into an
international compact with the German Government to supply French
laborers for work in Germany. This contention entirely overlooks the
fact that the Vichy Government was a mere puppet set up under German
domination, which, in full collaboration with Germany, took its orders
from Berlin. The position of the defendant seems to be that, if any
force or coercion was used on French citizens, it was exerted by their
own government, but this position entirely overlooks the fact that the
transports which brought Frenchmen to Germany were manned by German
armed guards and that upon their arrival they were kept under military
guard provided by the Wehrmacht or the SS.
It was sought to disguise the harsh realities of the German foreign
labor policy by the use of specious legal and economic terms, and to
make such policy appear as the exercise of conventional labor relations
and labor law. The fiction of a “labor contract” was frequently resorted
to, especially in the operations of the Todt Organization, which implied
that foreign workers were given a free choice to work or not to work for
Germany military industry. This, of course, was purely fictitious, as is
shown by the fact that thousands of these “contract workers” jumped from
the trains transporting them to Germany and fled into the woods. Does
anyone believe that the vast hordes of Slavic Jews who labored in
Germany’s war industries were accorded the rights of contracting
parties? They were slaves, nothing less—kidnapped, regimented, herded
under armed guards, and worked until they died from disease, hunger, and
exhaustion. The idea of any Jew being a party to a contract with Germans
was unthinkable to the National Socialists. Jews were considered as
outcasts and were completely at the mercy of their oppressors.
Exploitation was merely a convenient and profitable means of
extermination, to the end that, “when this war ends, there will be no
more Jews in Europe”. As to non-Jewish foreign labor, with few
exceptions they were deprived of the basic civil rights of free men;
they were deprived of the right to move freely or to choose their place
of residence; to live in a household with their families; to rear and
educate their children; to marry; to visit public places of their own
choosing; to negotiate, either individually or through representatives
of their own choice, the conditions of their own employment; to organize
in trade unions; to exercise free speech or other free expression of
opinion; to gather in peaceful assembly; and they were frequently
deprived of the right to worship according to their own conscience. All
these are the sign-marks of slavery, not free employment under contract.
The German nation, before the ascendancy of the NSDAP, had repeatedly
recognized the rights of civilians in occupied countries. At the Hague
Peace Conference of 1907, an amendment was submitted by the German
delegate, Major General von Guendell, which read:
“A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of
the adverse party to take part in the operations of war directed
against their country, even when they have been in his service
before the commencement of the war.”
The German manual for war on land (Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, Edition
1902) stated:
“The inhabitants of an invaded territory are persons endowed
with rights * * * subject to certain restrictions * * * but who
otherwise may live free from vexations and, as in time of peace,
under the protection of the laws.”
During the First World War, an order of the German Supreme Command (3
October 1916) provided for the deportation of Belgian vagrants and
idlers to Germany for work, but specified that such labor was not to be
used in connection with operations of war. The order resulted in such a
storm of protest that it was at once abandoned by the German
authorities.
It cannot be contended, of course, that foreign workers were entitled to
comforts or luxuries which were not accorded German workers. It is also
recognized that, especially during the latter part of the war there was
a universal shortage of food and fuel throughout the Reich and in the
discomforts arising therefrom foreign workers were bound to share. But
it is an undoubted fact that the foreign workers were subjected to
cruelties and torture and the deprivation of decent human rights merely
because they were aliens. This was not true in isolated instances, but
was universal and was the working out of the German attitude toward
those whom it considered inferior peoples. If any decent human
consideration was shown these workers, it was merely to maintain their
productivity and did not stem from any humanitarian considerations.
The Tribunal therefore finds the defendant guilty of the war crimes
charged in count one of the indictment, to wit, that he was a principal
in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in and was
connected with, plans and enterprises involving slave labor and
deportation to slave labor of the civilian populations of countries and
territories occupied by the German armed forces, and in the enslavement,
deportation, ill-treatment and terrorization of such persons; and
further that the defendant was a principal in, accessory to, ordered,
abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with, plans and
enterprises involving the use of prisoners of war in war operations and
work having a direct relation to war operations.
COUNT THREE
Count three of the indictment charges the defendant with crimes against
humanity committed against “German nationals and nationals of other
countries.” Sufficient proof was not adduced as to such offenses against
German nationals to justify an adjudication of guilt on that ground. As
to such crimes against nationals of other countries, the evidence shows
that a large number of Hungarian Jews and other nationals of Hungary and
Romania, which countries were occupied by Germany but were not
belligerents, were subjected to the same tortures and deportations as
were the nationals of Poland and Russia. In count one of the indictment
these acts are charged as war crimes and have heretofore been considered
by the Tribunal under that count in this judgment. In the judgment of
the International Military Tribunal (_Vol. I, Trial of the Major War
Criminals, p. 254_), the court stated—
“From the beginning of the war in 1939, war crimes were
committed on a vast scale which were also crimes against
humanity.”
This is a finding of law and an interpretation of Control Council Law
No. 10, with which this Tribunal is in full accord.
Our conclusion is that the same unlawful acts of violence which
constituted war crimes under count one of the indictment also constitute
crimes against humanity as alleged in count three of the indictment.
Having determined the defendant to be guilty of war crimes under count
one, it follows, of necessity, that he is also guilty of the separate
offense of crime against humanity, as alleged in count three, and this
Tribunal so determines.
In exculpation, the defendant states that he was a German soldier and
that whatever was done by him or with his knowledge or consent was done
in pursuance of a national military policy promulgated by Hitler and in
obedience to military orders. He protests that, no matter how violently
he disagreed with the methods used by the German Reich in the furthering
of its policy of aggressive war, he was helpless to extricate himself
and had no alternative except to stay with the venture to the bitter
end. It is true that withdrawal may involve risks and dangers, but these
are incidental to the original affiliation with the unlawful scheme. He
who elects to participate in a venture which may result in failure must
make his election to abandon the enterprise if it is not to his liking
or to stay as a participant, and win or lose according to the outcome.
Much significance must be attached to the meeting of 23 May 1939, at
which the defendant was admittedly present and in which Hitler spoke at
great length as to his plans for the subjugation of friendly minor
nations and the ultimate conquest of Europe. A purported record of the
events at this meeting has been introduced in evidence and has been
found to be reliable and accurate by the International Military
Tribunal. The defendant has throughout insisted that this record is
spurious and was made by Schmundt long after the occasion which it
records. Of course, it was never anticipated that this record, which was
marked “Top Secret, To be Transmitted by Officer Only,” would ever be
captured and its contents become known. It is not surprising that those
who sat and listened to the astounding program of the Fuehrer now wish
that they had been absent. It cannot be denied that there was a meeting
of some kind which the defendant attended and at which the Fuehrer
spoke, and further that it was held a few short months before the actual
invasion of Poland, as forecast in the report of the meeting. The
Schmundt paper does not pretend to be a verbatim report of Hitler’s
exact words, but certainly all of the diabolical plans which it reveals
were not manufactured by Schmundt out of thin air, attributed to Hitler,
and then marked “Top Secret”. Even if Hitler said only a small part of
what is attributed to him by Schmundt, there was enough said to advise
and warn a man of the defendant’s intelligence and experience that
mischief was afoot. Every sentence shrieks of war. The record hints at
nothing else, and, if all references to conquest and war and world
domination are eliminated, Hitler did not speak at all. At this early
date, the defendant must be charged with knowledge that a war of
aggression, to be ruthlessly pursued, was planned. This, then, was the
time for him to have made his decision—the decision which confronts
every man daily—to be honorable or dishonorable. Life consists quite
generally in making such decisions. As an old soldier, schooled in the
code of war and well aware of the principles to which an honorable
soldier must adhere, he sat complacently and listened to a proposed
program which violated national honor, personal integrity and the moral
code of an honest soldier. He made his choice and elected to ride with
the tyrant.
When the defendant joined the National Socialist Party in 1933, Germany
was in the throes of dire economic and political distress and was
burdened by a myriad of political parties, each with its separate
program and all functioning at cross-purposes. The defendant elected to
affiliate with the NSDAP because, he testified, he believed it offered
the most likely agency for bringing order out of chaos. But very soon he
must have realized that he had joined a band of villains whose program
contemplated every crime in the calendar. The Nazi code was not a
secret. It was published and proclaimed by the Party leaders in long
harangues to the people; decrees and directives were broadcast; the
infamous Streicher was spreading anti-Jewish obscenities throughout the
Reich in “Der Stuermer”; Roehm and a large number of the SA were
murdered by Hitler’s orders; hundreds of German citizens were cast into
concentration camps for “political re-education,” without hearing or
opportunity for defense; the iniquitous Gestapo stormed through the
land, with power over life and liberty which could not be questioned; in
public view Jews were beaten and killed, their synagogues burned and
their stores destroyed. The Party proclaimed its objectives from the
house-tops and verified them by open public conduct throughout the
Reich. The significant fact which must not be overlooked is that all
these things happened _before_ the war was launched, at a time when
there was no claim upon the loyalty of the defendant as a soldier to
protect his homeland at war. He protests that he never subscribed to the
master race philosophy, but 18 years before he joined the Party in 1933,
its precepts and demands had been proclaimed, among which was Point 4—
“Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the
race can only be one who is of German blood, without
consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member of
the race.”
The humblest citizens of Germany knew that the iniquitous doctrines of
the Party were being implemented by ruthless acts of persecution and
terrorism which occurred in public view. Thousands of obscure German
citizens were only too well aware that they were living under the
scrutiny of an army of spies and saw their friends and relatives
summarily dispatched to concentration camps for the slightest suspicion
of dissidence. The defendant did not live in a vacuum. He was not blind
nor deaf. Long before 1939, long before his military loyalty was called
into play, long before the door of withdrawal was closed, he could have
seen the bloody handwriting on the wall, for murder and enslavement of
his own countrymen was there written in blazing symbols. But he had
taken on the crimson mantle of the Party, with all its ghastly
implication, and he wore it with glory and profit to himself to the end.
Others with more courage and higher principles and with more loyalty to
the ancient German ideals rebelled and withdrew from the brutal
crew—von Clausewitz, Yorck von Wartenburg, Schlegelberger, Schmitt,
Eltz von Ruebenach, Tesmer. These men in high positions had the
character to repudiate great evil, and if in so doing they took risks
and made sacrifices, nevertheless, they made their choice to stand with
decency and justice and honor. The defendant had his opportunity to join
those who refused to do the evil bidding of an evil master, but he cast
it aside and his professed repentance now comes too late.
What a sordid picture of a civilized nation—the nation of Goethe and
Heine, of Beethoven and Schubert, even of Bismarck and von
Hindenburg—fawning and cringing at the feet of a small man with
delusions of grandeur. Even when madness crept in to intensify his
frenzy and fear of defeat put spurs to his ferocity, they still said,
“We are his people. He is our immaculate leader.” Men of large
capacities, even of genius, prostituted their talents before a puny
renegade who used them impiously and paid off his puppets with medals
and pelf. But the strutting menials stayed with him. So long as success
was on the horizon, they bowed and scraped and sought to outdo each
other in supine adulation. They tell us now, “Hitler was wrong.” But
they never told him that. Right or wrong, their only concern was, “Can
he win the war? And what will it mean for me?” They heard him proclaim
as early as November 1937, “The question for Germany is where the
greatest possible conquest could be made at the lowest possible cost,”
and they nodded and shouted, “Heil Hitler,” and maneuvered to get closer
to him. Before the invasion of Poland, they heard this bloodthirsty
tyrant say, “In starting and making a war, not the right is what
matters, but victory.” And this defendant, as part of the unholy array,
rolled up his sleeves and said, “Let me help. Give me men and more men,
no matter where you get them.”
In a civilized state which recognizes the sanctity of human lives and
human rights, no man—no group of men—should be endowed with
omnipotence. The history of human relations, from Herod to Hitler, has
repeatedly demonstrated this to be true. Omnipotence is only for God. Be
a man ever so wise, ever so benevolent, ever so trustworthy, there still
exists in him the frailty, the fallibility, the susceptibility to
temptation that is inherent in every man. If the only protection against
the tyranny of an autocrat is his own self-restraint, that is not
enough, for power feeds on power, and the temptation to stretch
authority to its limit is irresistible.
What, then, of the responsibility of those who bask in the reflected
radiance of omnipotence, who get their sustenance from it and who
arrogantly carry out its mandates and crush any resistance to it? Are
they not the hands and limbs of the monster, carrying out the orders of
the head? Surely, they cannot be allowed to detach themselves from the
corpus by saying, “These arms and legs are innocent—only the head is
guilty?”
In an authoritarian state, the head becomes the supreme authority for
woe as well as weal. Those who subscribe to such a state submit to that
principle. If they abjectly place all the power in the hands of one man,
with no right reserved to check or limit or repudiate, they must accept
the bitter with the sweet. This is especially true of those in high
places in the state—those who choose to enjoy the honor, the emoluments
and the power of such high stations. By accepting such attractive and
lucrative posts under a head whose power they know to be unlimited, they
ratify in advance his every act, good or bad. They cannot say at the
beginning, “The Fuehrer’s decisions are final; we will have no voice in
them; it is not for us to reason why; his will is law,” and then, when
the Fuehrer decrees aggressive war or barbarous inhumanities or broken
covenants, to attempt to exculpate themselves by saying, “Oh, we were
never in favor of _those_ things.”
One cannot escape the conviction that, had the war terminated in victory
for Germany, all of the acts of Hitler, including those related to the
charges in this indictment, would have been hailed as strokes of genius,
and that this defendant would now be elbowing his way into the front row
of those claiming to have successfully and victoriously carried out
Hitler’s orders and policies—in fact, claiming co-authorship in many.
But with Germany defeated and Hitler dead, it becomes naively convenient
to take refuge in the flimsy claim that no one except Hitler was in
favor of the invasion of Poland and Russia and France and the rape of
Holland and Belgium and Norway and Denmark.
The defendant insists that he knew nothing of the atrocities and
violence which were cumulating day by day throughout Europe. Being a
good German, he says, he supinely obeyed the decree which forbade
listening to foreign broadcasts or reading foreign periodicals. He
surrendered to a political philosophy which outlawed the ordinary means
of knowledge and which prevented the formation of rationalized opinion
or judgment. No one might read or listen or talk except in predetermined
channels. Ignorance was prescribed by law. The first weapon of tyranny
is to keep its victims in darkness. The Germans were an intelligent,
cultured people; they were not ignorant serfs. What a travesty to say
that a people which has produced some of the greatest intellects in
human history is not fit to be told the truth.
Desperate and discouraged peoples, distraught with the crushing problems
of hunger and insecurity, have always cried out for a miracle worker to
lead them out of the wilderness. Then is the golden opportunity for the
mountebank with bland promises and soothing phrases to provide a
poisonous panacea for their distress. In their desperation they fail to
realize that despotism has a way of beginning with benevolence and ends
by being merely despotic. Masquerading in the mantle of a messiah, the
wily opportunist lulls them into subscribing to some glib Fuehrerprinzip
which means, “Ask no questions; leave everything to me.” And when the
debacle comes, they realize that they _have_ left everything to
him—honor, dignity, self-respect, liberty, even life itself—and they
end up degraded, ashamed, impoverished, and hopeless. But have they
ended up wiser? The universal fear today is that in their desperation
they will repeat the vicious process by saying, “Last time we picked the
wrong man. Let us seek a new messiah. He will save us.” The lessons of
one generation are quickly forgotten by the next, but the inexorable
laws of nature are immutable. The tragic fruits of tyranny and
intolerance will always be the moral decay of peoples and the
degradation of human dignity.
Over the heavy gates which shut in the hapless victims at Dachau is a
legend reading, “Work will set you free.” The toil of slaves cannot set
them free; it only serves to further enslave them. Some day an
enlightened German people will storm those gates and all others like
them and recast them into an image of Truth—an imperishable figure with
eyes open and unbandaged. So long as Truth stands free and untarnished,
no future Hitler will ever arise to deceive and degrade the German
nation. Then there will never be another Dachau.
[Signed] ROBERT M. TOMS
PRESIDING JUDGE
FITZROY D. PHILLIPS
JUDGE
MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO
JUDGE
SENTENCE
This Tribunal takes no pleasures in performing the duty which confronts
it, but the deliberate enslavement of millions must not go unexpiated.
The barbarous acts which have been revealed here originated in the lust
and ambition of comparatively few men, but all Germans are paying and
will pay for the degradation of their souls and the debasement of the
German honor, caused by following the false prophets who led them to
disaster.
It would be a travesty on justice to permit those false leaders,
including this defendant, to escape responsibility for the deception and
betrayal of their people. It would be even a greater injustice to view
with complacence the mass graves of millions of men, women, and children
whose only crime was that they stood in Hitler’s way. Retribution for
such crimes against humanity must be swift and certain. Future would-be
dictators and their subservient satellites must know what follows their
defilement of international law and of every type of decency and fair
dealing with their fellow men. Civilization will be satisfied with
nothing less.
It is the sentence of this Tribunal that the defendant Erhard Milch be
confined to the Rebdorf Prison for the remainder of his natural life.
-----
[157] Concurring opinions were filed by Judge Musmanno, see pp. 797-859,
and by Judge Phillips, see pp. 860-878.
[158] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, pp. 243-47, Nuremberg,
1947.
[159] Ibid., pp. 381-83.
B. Concurring Opinion by Judge Michael A. Musmanno
The defendant is Erhard Milch, Field Marshal in the German Luftwaffe,
Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, State Secretary in the Air Ministry,
Generalluftzeugmeister, representative of the Wehrmacht on the Central
Planning Board, Chief of the Jaegerstab and member of the Nazi Party. He
stands indicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in
Control Council Law No. 10, enacted by Allied Control Council on 20
December 1945.
The indictment contains three counts which may be briefly summarized as
follows:
COUNT ONE
Erhard Milch is charged with having knowingly committed war crimes as
principal and accessory in enterprises involving slave labor and having
also willingly and knowingly participated in enterprises involving the
use of prisoners of war in war operations contrary to international
convention and the laws and customs of war.
COUNT TWO
The defendant is accused of having knowingly and willfully participated
in enterprises involving fatal medical experiments upon subjects without
their consent.
COUNT THREE
In the third count the defendant is charged with responsibility for
slave labor and fatal medical experiments, in the same manner as
indicated in the first two counts, except that here the alleged victims
are declared to be German nationals and nationals of other countries.
The defendant has entered a general denial of Not Guilty to all counts.
To the charges of slave labor he has answered in effect—
1. That the term slave labor is a misnomer and that all foreign
workmen in Germany during the war were there of their own free
will.
2. That if they did not come voluntarily they were treated
humanely, considerately, and were not subjected to any
ill-treatment either in transportation or while actively
employed for the Reich.
3. That if ill-treatment, fatal or otherwise, of foreign workmen
occurred, the defendant was in no way responsible for such
ill-treatment.
To the charges of responsibility for fatal medical experiments inflicted
on involuntary subjects, the defendant replies substantially—
1. That the high-altitude and freezing experiments were not
painful to the subjects, nor did any illegal deaths result
therefrom.
2. That if fatalities did occur, they were suffered by those
already condemned to death, or were caused by persons over whom
the defendant had no control.
3. That in any event, Milch was in no way officially connected
with the illegal and fatal experiments.
I. SLAVE LABOR
(a) Methods of Recruitment
The defense has affirmatively asserted that there was no slave labor in
Germany during the war, or that if it did exist, its scope was
negligible. The Tribunal finds that this assertion is not supported by
the testimony in the case. It concludes, on the contrary, from the
evidence presented at this trial that the German Reich during World War
II did actively and plenarily employ slave labor. It further is of the
opinion that the Third Reich used and abused slave labor to an extent
and in a manner hitherto unknown in either modern or ancient history.
The exploitation of human beings by Germany during the years of the war
must take its place, in point of cruelty and inhumaneness, with the most
iniquitous slave practices of the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians,
Assyrians, and Persians. The building of the Pyramids, the Hanging
Gardens of Babylon, and other ancient landmarks under whip and lash have
their modern counterpart in the German building of the Western Wall, the
Gothic Line, military fortifications, concentration camps, and munitions
factories. The guilt of the German Reich is greater than that of the
ancient empires because in that area of antiquity the immorality of
human bondage was not universally accepted, whereas in 1939 no country
in the sisterhood of civilized nations had failed to condemn and outlaw
involuntary servitude in its every form.
It is submitted in behalf of the defendant that foreign workers came to
Germany of their own will. It is true that in the early stages of the
European conflict, Germany offered such inducements in foreign countries
as to persuade numbers of their subjects voluntarily to proceed to that
country for remunerative employment. In those first days of Blitzkrieg
when nation after nation fell helplessly under the invincible Nazi war
machine, workers accepted employment in Germany not only because of
promises made, but because exterior evidence to their bewildered minds
seemed to portend that soon the frontiers of Germany would be
coterminous with the boundaries of Europe itself. Thus, but small choice
remained to them; whether they worked at home or in Germany the master
was destined to be the same.
However, when the subjugated peoples perceived at Stalingrad that the
unbeatable German army could be beaten, when they heard the roar of
American propellers in the sky and the clank of British tanks returned
once more to the battle, a light of hope gleamed that it might not be
true, as Hitler had said, that his rule and order were to endure a
thousand years, and then these people refused the coin and currency of
the German Reich. From then on the feet of foreign workers were not
turned willingly toward Germany. And in the face of this defiance,
Sauckel, German Plenipotentiary for Labor, declared, “Should we not
succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary basis,
we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor.”
(_T-58._)[160]
There is no adding machine tape to which one can turn to determine the
exact total number of foreign workers impressed into German industry,
but Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary General for Labor, declared, “Out of
5,000,000 workers who arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came
voluntarily.” (_T-149._) Heinrich Himmler placed the number of foreign
workers at from 6,000,000 to 7,000,000. (_IMT 243_)[161].
On 9 November 1941, Hitler declared in a speech—
“The territory which now works for us contains more than
250,000,000 men, but the territory which works indirectly for us
includes now more than 350,000,000. In the measure in which it
concerns German territory, the domain which we have taken under
our administration, it is not doubtful that we shall succeed in
harnessing the very last man to this work.”
Hitler was never quite able to achieve the fullness of this ambitious
program, but it was not due to any relinquishment of efforts in that
direction by himself or his criminal coadjutors. Of course, this program
was in direct violation of Article 52 of the Hague Convention which
declares—
“Requisition in kind and services shall not be demanded from
municipalities or inhabitants, except for the needs of the army
of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of
the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the
inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military
operations against their own country.”
In the very initial stages of the German invasions, the officiating
agents phrased their demands for labor in language which gave the
recruitment an aspect of voluntary action on the part of the workers.
Thus, when the German forces entered Lithuania, male and female farm
workers were called upon by the military administration to sign up for
six months’ employment on large estates, but after the signatures were
obtained the promises were not kept. (_T-97._) And it was not long until
all pretense at voluntary recruitment was abandoned and then
Lithuanians, ordered to official agencies “only for registration”, were
held there and taken away under military guards to the local barracks
where they had neither the opportunity to bid their families good-by nor
to put their most personal affairs in order. (_T-97-98._)
There were other pacific methods to “persuade” foreign workers into
employment for the Reich. Thus, Governor General Frank of Poland
recommended that one way to force Polish workers into Germany was to
withhold their unemployment insurance. (_T-112._)
However, these genteel methods in Poland soon gave way to means more
direct. Recruitment now degenerated into a fierce manhunt with
unsuspecting victims being seized on the streets, in railroad stations,
from their homes, even in churches. (_T-83._)
“Everybody is exposed to the danger of being seized anywhere and
at any time by members of the police, suddenly and unexpectedly,
and being brought into an assembly camp. None of his relatives
knows what has happened to him; only weeks or months later, one
or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard.” (_T-83._)
In Ukrainia skilled workers whose names had been furnished to the police
by corrupted village elders were “dragged from their beds at night to be
locked up in cellars until shipped.” (_T-67._) As neither the male nor
the female workers were given time to gather up their belongings they
often arrived at the collecting center without shoes or other adequate
clothing for the long and torturing journey ahead. (_T-67._)
A directive applying to recruitment in White Ruthenia declared—
“All permissible means shall be used to obtain manpower from
White Ruthenia. Do not hesitate to apply extraordinary
measures.” (_T-91._)
In the same directive “the recruiters” are told, “Everything you do for
Germany is right, everything else is wrong.” (_T-93._) So wide-sweeping
was this recruitment drive waged by the SS and police in one area of
White Ruthenia that 115,000 hectares of farm land became useless because
the whole population had been removed. (_T-93._)
Goering bluntly declared in a speech at the Reich Ministry of Air on 7
November 1941, in connection with the Four Year Plan that Poles,
Dutchmen, etc., were to be taken, “if necessary as prisoners of war and
employ them as such, if work through free contract cannot be obtained.
Strong action.” * * * “Foreigners not to be treated like German
workers.” (_T-53._)
One Leyser in making a report to Rosenberg on the situation in his
district of Zhitomir gives the answer to the assertion of voluntary
labor when he says—
“It is certain that a recruitment of labor, in the sense of the
word, can hardly be spoken of. In most cases, it is nowadays a
matter of actual conscription by force. The population has been
stirred up to a large extent and views the transports to the
Reich as a measure which does in no way differ from the former
exile to Siberia during the Czarist and Bolshevist system.”
(_T-94._)
A report on recruitment measures taken in Holland reveals—
“All Jewish Netherlanders, whom the Germans could lay their
hands on, with the exception of a small group of exempted
persons, were brought together here; hospitals, old age homes,
institutions for the blind and other disabled persons were
emptied in order to concentrate the inmates in Westerbork for
deportation. Even the inmates of lunatic asylums did not escape
deportation.” (_T-125._)
On the subject of workers from the Netherlands, Goering said on 28
October 1943, in the presence of the defendant—
“After that has been done once, one has to modify the system for
the second blow. Then the Dutch people will be no longer out in
the streets on Sunday for pleasure promenades * * *. First, all
the people must be brought together in a pen. Then they will be
asked individually who works where. Then the men will be
selected accordingly.” (_T-2094._)
And on the subject of foreign exchange at that same meeting, Goering
contributed this bit of wisdom in finance—
“All we need to do is to fix the rate of exchange * * * today
the German mark equals 20 francs, tomorrow 23, then 27, then 40,
and so forth, up to one million, or one billion. We have had all
that. The same holds true for the guilder. One cigarette now
costs in Holland 1.50 guilders; formerly it cost 10 cents. I
merely have to say, 1.50 guilders equal 10 pfennigs or one mark
equals 15 guilders.” (_T-2095._)
It may be well to note at once that all quotations from the transcript
represent excerpts from records and documents located in the official
files of the German Reich. The evidence advanced by the prosecution in
this case was almost exclusively documentary. Thus, if any observation
in this opinion seems overly emphatic and appears to go beyond the
restraint usually found in judicial pronouncements, it will still fall
short of the force of language employed in some of the original reports
made by German officials to their own superiors at the time of the
events described. A top secret memorandum on conditions in occupied
Russian territory declared—
“It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of
thousands of them literally have died of hunger or cold in our
camps * * *. We now experience the grotesque picture of having
to recruit millions of laborers from the occupied eastern
territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger like
flies, in order to fill the gaps that are formed within Germany.
Now the food question no longer existed. In the prevailing
limitless abuse of the Slavic humanity, _recruiting methods were
used which probably had their origin only in the blackest
periods of the slave trade_.” (_T-121._)
Even Rosenberg acknowledged the severity and harshness of the
recruitment program and protested, not, to be sure, on humanitarian
grounds, but because “endangered persons prefer to escape their fate” by
going over to guerilla bands. (_T-78._)
The fury with which the manhunt for workers was prosecuted reached such
extremes that in many instances villages were burned down as
“retribution for failure to comply with the demand for the appropriation
of labor forces directed to the communities.” (_T-80._)
And it was not only where large numbers were demanded that savage
reprisals occurred. In a little village where 25 workers had been
ordered but none reported, the German militia set fire to the houses of
those who had fled. Then—
“The people who had hurried to the scene were forbidden to
extinguish the flames, beaten and arrested, so that seven
homesteads burned down. The policemen meanwhile ignited other
houses. The people fell on their knees and kissed their hands,
but the policemen beat them with rubber truncheons.”
(_T-80-81._)
All because the mighty Reich needed 25 men to throw into its vast
workshop of millions turning out the steel teeth of war.
In the same instance the German militia continued into other villages
and where they did not find the workers they seized the parents. “The
workers who had not appeared until then were shot.” Then, in the report
we are quoting from, appears the damning phrase which shows more than
anything else to what a low ebb the dignity of man had been reduced and
degraded by the German Reich. “_They are now catching humans like the
dog catchers used to catch dogs._” (_T-81._) The report closes on a
statement which must needs bring a blush of shame to the cheek of every
member of the civilized human race—
“People from many villages went on a certain day to a pilgrimage
to the monastery Potschaew. They were all arrested, locked in,
and will be sent to work. Among them there are lame, blind, and
aged people.” (_T-81._)
It has been asserted that the defendant and others holding high office
cannot and should not be held responsible for the acts of subordinate
officers in far away places, and of whose activities they could have no
knowledge. But these smaller officers were only putting into effect the
policies publicly declared over and over by the chieftains. Thus, when a
certain Koch spoke in Kiev and declared—
“I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not come
to spread bliss. I have come to help the Fuehrer. The population
must work, work, and work again * * * for some people are
getting excited that the population may not get enough to eat.
The population cannot demand that. One has only to remember what
our heroes were deprived of in Stalingrad * * *. We definitely
did not come here to give out manna; we have come here to create
the basis for Victory.” (_T-86._)
He was only repeating what had been said by Hitler, Himmler, Goering,
and Milch, in varying forms. The defendant claims that he did not
literally mean the blood and thunder declarations admittedly authored by
him, and that phase of the case will be discussed in detail later. But
underlings who heard these wild, inflammatory utterances did not know
that Milch was only barking, if in fact we are to assume that his
ferocious words were only purposeless growlings. The men in the field
did not stop at words, because they were in a position to act and did
act—directly on the people. Koch was not voicing a concept original
with him when he said in that same speech—
“We are a master race which must remember that the lowliest
German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more
valuable than the population here.” (_T-86._)
Unfortunately, however, his utterances were not confined to rhetoric,
but being in a position to put them into flesh and blood effect, he did
so.
Quotations from documents furnishing further proof of involuntary
foreign labor in Germany are too numerous to repeat in the judgment.
Reference, however, will be made to but one more before proceeding to
the next item for discussion. In the recruitment of 1 million workers
demanded in the Ukraine, SS Major Christensen, in charge of operations,
declared that whatever harsh treatment was required should be
controlled. He thus orders that in arresting communist functionaries it
is no longer necessary to arrest all the close relatives of a member of
the communist party. He decrees further that in searching for workers
“when it becomes necessary to burn down a village, the whole population
will be put at the disposal of the commissioner by force.” (_T-129._)
This is regarded as a concession, and then comes what must be classified
as the most heart-rending utterance which has come out of this war—
“_As a rule, no more children will be shot._”
Not an out-and-out prohibition against shooting children; not that more
care should be exercised in the handling of children; but only a
general, vague suggestion that this SS battalion of murderers must not
fire at children on sight just as one might mow down sparrows or
rabbits. However, if the situation requires, then of course, children
will be shot with everybody else, for the order goes on to say, “Slavs
will interpret all soft treatment on our part as weakness.” “The most
important thing,” the directive concludes, “is the recruitment of
workers.” (_T-129-130._)
(b) Treatment of Workers
On 20 April 1942, Fritz Sauckel announced his labor mobilization program
which contained the one supremely cruel proposition regarding treatment
of foreign workers—
“All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way
as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest
conceivable degree of expenditure.” (_T-58._)
After the announcement of this inhuman decree of maximum work with
minimum sustenance, Sauckel followed with—
“It has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from
cruelty and mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if
he has proved himself the most bestial and most implacable
adversary, and to treat him correctly and humanly, even when we
expect useful work of him.” (_T-58-59._)
It can be imagined with what kindness an underling of Sauckel’s would
treat a worker whom Sauckel has already characterized as a “bestial and
most implacable adversary”.
As a result of the minimum sustenance directive it is not difficult to
understand the report of a Dr. Hupe who stated—
“During the last few days we have established that the food for
the Russians employed here is so miserable that the people are
getting weaker from day to day. Investigations showed that
single Russians are not able to place a piece of metal for
turning into position, for instance, because of lack of physical
strength. The same conditions exist at all places of work where
Russians are employed.” (_T-55._)
Wilhelm Jager, senior camp director at the Krupp Works, reported that
diet prescribed for eastern workers was 1,000 calories less per day than
the minimum prescribed for any Germans. Further, that while German heavy
workers received 5,000 calories a day, eastern workers in comparable
jobs received only 2,000 calories. Such meat as was allowed the foreign
workers was that which had been “rejected by the veterinary, such as
horse meat or tuberculin infested”. (_T-103._) The clothing allowed the
eastern workers was likewise entirely inadequate. They had no overcoats
and, because of the shortage of shoes, many were forced to go to work
barefoot even in winter. In the work camps tuberculosis was widespread
among the eastern workers, caused by bad housing, insufficient and poor
food, overwork and insufficient rest—
“These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever. Lice,
the carrier of this disease, together with countless fleas,
bugs, and other vermin tortured the inhabitants of these camps.
As a result of the filthy conditions of the camps nearly all
eastern workers were afflicted with skin disease. The shortage
of food also caused many cases of Hunher-Oedem, Nephritis, and
Shighakruse.” (_T-103._)
These conditions became infinitely worse, of course, during the time of
air raids—
“The French prisoner-of-war camp in Nogerratstrasse had been
destroyed in an air raid attack and its inhabitants were kept
for nearly half a year in dog kennels, urinals, and in old
baking houses. The dog kennels were three feet high, nine feet
long, and six feet wide. Five men slept in each of them. The
prisoners had to crawl into these kennels on all fours.”
(_T-105._)
A Dr. Stinnesbeck reports on 12 June 1944—
“The PW camp at Nogerratstrasse was in most deplorable
condition. The people live in ashcans, doghouses, old baking
stoves, and self-made huts.” (_T-106._)
Visiting camp Humboldtstrasse, Dr. Stinnesbeck found 600 Jewish women
who worked at the Krupp factory. They suffered from festering wounds and
other diseases. They had no shoes and went about in their bare feet!
“The sole clothing of each consisted of a sack with holes for
their arms and head. Their hair was shorn. The camp was
surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded by SS guards.”
(_T-106._)
Concentration camp inmates were made to work, to which there can be no
objection on the grounds of inhumanity. In fact, some useful toil is
preferable to idleness in prison. But camp commanders were instructed
that the “employment must be, in the true meaning of the word,
exhaustive, in order to obtain the greatest measure of performance.”
(_T-61._)
“There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends on
the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind of
work to be done. They are fixed by the camp commanders alone.”
(_T-62._)
Certain “antisocial elements” were by special order “to be worked to
death”. In the literal Gestapo language “death” was never used
rhetorically or figuratively. Those who were to be killed through work
were listed as “under protective arrest”. This included Jews, gypsies,
Russians, and Ukrainians; Poles with more than three-year sentences;
Czechs and Germans with more than eight-year sentences. (_T-63._)
In these work camps frequently children of tender age were forced to
toil.
“An indication of the awful conditions this may lead to is given
by the fact that in the camps for eastern workers, camp for
eastern workers ‘Waldlust’, Post Office Lauf, Pegnitz, there are
cases of eight-year old, delicate and undernourished children
put to forced labor and perishing from such treatment.”
(_T-99._)
Those who were imported for farm work fared no better than their factory
brothers. A directive issued by the Ministry of Finance and Economy at
Baden on the control of Polish farm workers in Stuttgart and Baden
directed that farm workers were to be quartered in stables, and the
employer was urged that “no remorse should restrict such action.”
(_T-47._) “Fundamentally”, this extraordinary document proclaims, “farm
workers of Polish nationality no longer have the right to complain, and
thus no complaints may be accepted any more by any official agency.”
(_T-46._)
To deprive a human being of the right to complain is in effect to
classify him lower than an animal because even a beast of burden is
privileged to announce his objections to harsh and cruel treatment. Nor
were the Polish workers permitted the consolation and comfort in
adversity which religion affords. “The visiting of churches, regardless
of faith, is strictly prohibited.” The edict of the Ministry of Finance
said further that this prohibition against attendance at churches even
excluded the visiting of churches when no service was in progress. The
visiting of theatres, motion picture shows, or other cultural
entertainment also was prohibited. (_T-46._)
“Gathering of farm workers of Polish nationality after work is
prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or in
the living quarters of the Poles. The use of railroads, buses,
or other public conveyances by farm workers of Polish
nationality is prohibited.” (_T-47._)
The difference between slave labor of this type and outright slavery is
a margin faint and indistinguishable. There was no limit to the hours of
work, and the employer was invested with the right, bestially inherent
in the proprietorship of slave owners, to inflict corporal punishment on
the worker “_if_ instruction and good words failed”. Nor was there any
one to determine whether good words had failed because the “employer may
not be held accountable in any such cases by an official agency.”
(_T-47._)
Heinrich Himmler took a very active part in the slave labor program.
Concerning commitment of manpower from the East, he laid down strict
rules which, if violated, brought severe punishment. He decreed that—
“In severe cases, that is in such cases where the measures at
the disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the
state police office has to act with its means. Accordingly, they
will be treated, as a rule, only with strict measure, that is
with transfer to a concentration camp or with special
treatment.” (_T-53._)
We learn further on in the directive that the “special treatment” so
casually referred to as if it were some slight deprivation of comfort or
convenience means nothing less than hanging!
“Special treatment is hanging. Hanging should not take place in
the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of the
manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory should
attend the special treatment; at that time they are to be warned
about the circumstances which led to this special treatment.”
(_T-53._)
If workers sought to escape, search measures were to be decreed locally,
and when caught the fugitive must receive special treatment. (_T-54._)
Heinrich Himmler was one of the most relentless pursuers of slave labor,
as, of course, he was the most notorious executant of all that was
inhuman, indecent, cruel, and vulgar in the entire Nazi program. Himmler
does not defy description, he invites it. He stands out in the whole
hideous camp of Hitler barbarians as the most savage of them all. A
fiend in human shape, a monster in the clothing of man; there is no wild
beast, bound only by jungle code, which, in point of honor, was not his
superior; there is no slimy, maggoty larva, wriggling in the stagnancy
and stench of the foulest cesspool which could be regarded his inferior.
His creed was murder, his religion massacre, his belief kidnapping, his
faith treachery, and his dogma oppression in every form. Only one thing
mattered and that was German blood—
“What happens to a Russian, to a Czech, does not interest me in
the slightest. What the nation can offer in the way of good
blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping
their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations
live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only insofar
as we need them as slaves for our Kultur; otherwise, it is of no
interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down from
exhaustion while digging an antitank ditch interests me only
insofar as the antitank ditch for Germany is finished * * *.
When somebody comes to me and says, ‘I cannot dig the antitank
ditch with women and children, it is inhuman, for it would kill
them,’ then I have to say, ‘You are a murderer of your own blood
because if the antitank ditch is not dug, German soldiers will
die, and they are sons of German mothers. They are our own
blood.’ That is what I want to instill into this SS and what I
believe I have instilled into them as one of the most sacred
laws of the future. Our concern, our duty, is our people and our
blood. It is for them that we must provide and plan, work and
fight, nothing else. We can be indifferent to everything else.”
(_T-145._)
When hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners of war died from
exhaustion and hunger, his regret was not that they died, but that it
was deplorable “by reason of the loss of labor.” (_T-144._)
The defense in this case denied that foreign workers and prisoners of
war were maltreated, and produced some evidence to dispute the
prosecution’s contentions in this regard, we quote from the affidavit of
one Albin Schirmer, a resident of Nuernberg—
“From the year 1929 onwards, I was employed by the Hercules
Works, Ltd. at Nuernberg (Nuernberger Herkuleswerke G.m.b.H.),
and worked there in the capacity of foreman throughout the war.
The necessary workers were requested by the firm from the Labor
Office. The Labor Office allocated French prisoners of war, free
French, and Czech workers to the firm. The free foreign workers,
who also cooperated in executing the commissions of the
Luftwaffe, were treated in every respect in exactly the same way
as the German workers. Some lived in furnished rooms. Some lived
in a camp as it was cheaper there. Working hours, wages, ration
cards, and the supplementary ration cards for workers, whose
hours were long, were the same as for any German. Equally,
freedom of movement during leisure hours, permission to attend
theaters, churches, and cinemas, the protection of the Labor
Front and of strength-through-joy, permission to visit public
houses and German families were available to free foreign
workers as well as to German workers. Intercourse with German
girls was also permitted to free foreign workers. This, however,
did not apply to prisoners of war. The sanitary installations of
the firm were good, and were available for the use of foreign
workers, as well as of the German workers. The prisoners of war
had fixed times for taking showers whereas the free foreign
workers had their showers at the same time as the Germans. The
free French workers were allowed free postal communication with
France, and they also went there on leave. I know of only two
cases in which free French workers did not return from their
leave in France.
Many French prisoners of war volunteered as free workers, in
order to be eligible for the resultant advantages. Even the
prisoners of war had beer sent to them every day.
During air raids, the free foreign workers played their part
with devotion, a thing which they would certainly not have done
if they had not considered that they were well-treated.
After the arrival of the American troops most of the French
workers said good-by to me in a friendly fashion, shaking hands
with me, and wishing me luck. The female workers from the
Ukraine too liked it here according to their statements.”
Why should one doubt that in the vast German workshop which employed a
score of millions, here and there some foreign workers were not abused
but in the long run fared well? It would need to be someone wearing
spectacles of pitch and groping in a Cimmerian night of prejudice and
pique to assert that the German people are incapable of hospitality and
generosity. The very fact that there were concentration camps in the
land attests to the fact that not everybody accepted Hitler’s and
Himmler’s crackpot master race ideology. However, even accepting Albin
Schirmer’s affidavit at face value, it is but one little flower in a
jungle of evidence establishing that only a very few foreign workers
were so fortunate as to be showered with the care and comforts and
allowed to revel and luxuriate in the liberties vouchsafed those who
were so lucky as to be employed in the Hercules Works, Limited, at
Nuernberg.
As against this idyllic picture of happiness in a powder plant or
strength-through-joy in Nuernberg, there is recalled the image of the
last witness at this trial. He also was a German, Joseph Krysiak, and he
too worked in a war factory. In December 1940, he remarked in a
conversation to some friends that if America entered the European
conflict, Germany could not win. The ubiquitous Gestapo learned of his
observation and he was committed to a concentration camp, from which he
went daily to work at the Me [ssersmitt] 109 plant at Gusen I. His
living conditions were a trifle less felicitous than those described by
Schirmer. Krysiak worked twelve hours a day, he had coffee for
breakfast, watery soup for lunch, and at night seven men shared a loaf
of bread. If he did not reach the quota of work assigned him for the
day, he was beaten. Later he was sent to another factory, and of working
conditions there he said—
“We were working at Saint George, Gusen II, for twelve hours.
Also, the transport to and from work and back to this camp
occupied two to three hours as well, so that these people
altogether had only four to five hours sleep under the worst
imaginable conditions. Four people had to sleep in one bed.
“Q. Did you work seven days a week?
“A. Yes, and the day and night shift, and Sundays, too.”
(_T-2366._)
When asked what effect these conditions had on the health of the
workers, he replied—
“The most dreadful effect, the majority died in Mauthausen and
Gusen II. It was a rule no one was released, but transports
which were filled were where detainees would die.”
And as to his own particular condition, he stated—
“All I can say now is that I suffer from TB and I am medically
being treated, and this is what those five years did to me.
“Q. What was your condition before going to the concentration
camp?
“A. I was active in sports, and I was a long distance runner. I
can say my lungs were not blemished at all.”
The shattering of this man’s health is perhaps only a small part of the
disaster which has befallen him. From the witness stand he gave the
impression of one who had been spiritually crushed by his five years’
ordeal. His voice faltered, his shoulders drooped, his eyes looked out
into distance. He was alive, but something within him had perished.
Perhaps he reflected on the tragedy that this awful thing which had
happened to him had been inflicted by his own countrymen, not for
opposing his country but for speaking a truth which, if listened to,
could have averted not only his own ruin but the misery of millions of
his brethren.
II. PRISONERS OF WAR
Article 31 of the Geneva Convention provides—
“Work done by prisoners of war shall have no direct connection
with the operations of the war. In particular it is forbidden to
employ prisoners in the manufacture or transport of arms or
munitions of any kind, or on the transport of material destined
for the combatant units.”
The Hague Convention of 1907, Article 6 provides—
“The State may utilize the labor of prisoners of war according
to their rank and aptitude, officers excepted. The tasks shall
not be excessive and shall have no connection with the
operations of the war.” (_T-155._)
These prohibitions on the use of prisoners of war were flagrantly
violated by the Germans in World War II. On 7 November 1941, Hermann
Goering, speaking at the meeting in the Reich Ministry of Air, already
referred to, declared that “it would be ideal if entire factories could
be manned by Russian prisoners of war.” (_T-52._) Then, insofar as
feeding these prisoners was concerned the notes of the speech report:
“Food is a matter of the Four Year Plan. Supply their own food (cats,
horses, etc.).” (_T-52._)
On 20 April 1942, Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary General for Labor
Mobilization, proclaimed that—
“All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well
as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely
incorporated into the German armament and nutrition industries.”
(_T-58._)
On 26 August 1941, the Reich Labor Ministry directed the presidents of
the Regional Labor Offices as follows:
“Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are to be
taken from among the French prisoners of war not yet employed in
armament industry, and are to be assigned to the armament
industry (airplane industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting
therefrom will be filled by Soviet prisoners of war. The
transfer of the above-named French prisoners of war can be
utilized only in quite large concentrated groups under the
well-known tougher employment conditions.” (_T-49-50._)
In a discussion with Sauckel, the defendant, and others on the subject
of manpower available for the armament industry, Goering stated on 28
October 1943, that out of 2,200,000 in armament production, 770,000 were
prisoners of war. (_T-2093._)
On 14 April 1943, Sauckel reported to Hitler that “1,622,829 prisoners
of war are employed in the German economy.” (_T-90._)
Noting that the utilization of prisoners of war in the war program was a
very profitable enterprise for the Reich, Goering regretted that any had
ever been released. However, it was a mistake easily rectified.
“I should like to see that the prisoners of war who have been
released, Norwegians and so forth, be taken again. Insofar as
officers are concerned, this has been done to a certain extent.
It was the greatest nonsense ever committed by us and for which
nobody thanks us. We have made prisoners of entire armies and we
let them go again. We do not get anything from Norway.”
(_T-2096._)
At a Jaegerstab meeting on 19 June 1944, it developed that 300 American
prisoners of war were assigned to work at the Dornier airplane factory
at Oberpfaffenhofen, but with good Yankee obstinacy, knowing their
rights, they refused to work. Lange, of the Speer Ministry, complaining
about this said—
“They simply sat down, drank coffee, and ate corned beef, and
could not be persuaded to work in spite of threats of shooting.
Now, the question has been asked if we should not start a
shooting action.” (_T-2102._)
And the only reason they were not shot is that the Fuehrer feared
reprisals.
III. PARTICIPATION OF MILCH IN THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM
It was not contended by the prosecution at the trial that the defendant
was aware, nor would it have been physically possible for him to have
had knowledge, of all the excesses, inhumanities, and illegalities
encompassed in the far-flung slave labor program which spread its
cruelties into practically every part of Europe. However, its very
bigness and the great production power which it generated in every
department of the German war plant negates the defendant’s position that
he was utterly ignorant of its existence. This opinion has gone to some
length in pointing out the numbers involved in the compulsory work
program, and the heinousness of some of its operations, and has quoted
from official decrees promulgated in its unfoldment, not only for the
purpose of demonstrating the basis for condemning the whole illegal
enterprise, but also for the purpose of laying the foundation for
consideration of Milch’s responsibility in this phase of German war
guilt.
On 23 May 1939, Hitler outlined his plans for war to his fourteen most
trusted and important military chieftains. Milch attended that then
secret, and now notorious, conference. Hitler there said, “The
population of non-German areas will perform no military service and will
be available as source of labor.” (_T-37._) This statement is taken from
the memorandum made by adjutant Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt, who was
present and preserved a drastically condensed record of the speech for
the Reich files. The accuracy of the Schmundt record was attacked in the
IMT trial and came under fire here. The defendant goes so far as to
conjecture that the Schmundt statement was prepared months, perhaps even
a year, after Hitler’s speech, and was intended to demonstrate Hitler’s
uncanny and possibly supernatural powers of prophecy by the undeniably
sure method of writing up the prophecy subsequent to the happening of
the event predicted. The memorandum obviously is not definitely precise
because it consists of only ten pages whereas the speech lasted four and
one-half hours. As the memorandum manifestly cannot be complete, neither
can human recollection (unaided by notes) be infallible. Milch, who made
no notes at all, testified that labor was not mentioned in the speech,
but Admiral Schniewind, also present, and who testified in court, stated
that he did not exclude the possibility that labor was discussed.
(_T-1326._)
In any event, whether Hitler did or did not mention labor in his
utterances of that day is not so important as it is that Milch was
present when Hitler made crystal clear his intentions to attack Poland,
and, if it became necessary or expedient, to fight other countries as
well, with the inevitable subjugation of the conquered peoples. Slave
labor was an inescapable concomitant of the type of total war Hitler
intended to wage, and the character of which Milch could not fail to
appreciate.
As a field marshal in the German Reich, Milch could not ignore the
existence of Sauckel’s proclamation on 20 April 1942 that “the raw
materials as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and
their human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to
the profit of Germany and her allies.” (_T-57._)
But in the evaluation of Milch’s criminal responsibility for Germany’s
use of slave labor something more is needed in a court of law than
presumptions of his assumed general knowledge of what was taking place.
It must be established that he, himself, participated in the slave labor
enterprises, or knowing that such illegal practices were being
committed, he, having the power to do so, made no effort to curb or halt
them. The prosecution contends that the defendant, as a member of the
Central Planning Board and of the Jaegerstab, and as
Generalluftzeugmeister (Aircraft Master General), was thoroughly
cognizant of Sauckel’s program and that he, Milch, actively participated
in slave labor practices.
(a) Central Planning Board
The Central Planning Board was made up of three members, Speer, Milch,
and Koerner, each having equal authority, although, as it developed,
Speer and Milch dominated the proceedings. The function of the Central
Planning Board in the main was the distribution and allocation of raw
materials necessary for the entire conduct of the German war economy,
the planning of intended construction or enlargement, and the
systematization of transportation industry independent of the shortage
of raw materials. During the war this Board had 60 meetings and much
time was given to consideration of the manpower problem confronting the
various departments in the huge German war workshop. Sauckel often
appeared before the Central Planning Board to report on the foreign
labor situation. Various other officials came before the Board to
express their needs in connection with foreign workers. Milch often
presided at these meetings. He was absent on several occasions but all
quotations from the minutes of the Central Planning Board meetings,
cited in this opinion, are from meetings where he was present, and he is
therefore chargeable with knowledge of their contents.
Wehrmacht representatives were often in attendance at the Central
Planning Board meetings, and on 25 July 1944, Field Marshal von Kluge,
Commander in Chief West, issued an order on labor recruitment—
“As the only limitation, the Fuehrer has ordered that no
forcible means shall be employed against the population in the
actual combat area as long as it shows itself prepared to assist
the German Armed Forces. However, recruiting of volunteers from
among refugees from the combat zone is to be carried out
vigorously. Moreover, every means is justified to seize as much
labor as possible, apart from the powers granted to the armed
forces.” (_T-271._)
It will be noted that the Fuehrer orders that forcible means shall not
be used if the population assists. This is comparable to saying that the
armed robber is thoroughly peaceful in his intentions because he will
not shoot if the victim surrenders his valuables voluntarily.
The proof in this case that foreign workers were brought into Germany
against their will generally does not come from them, but almost
exclusively from their abductors. At one of the meetings of the Central
Planning Board, Mr. Timm, representing the Plenipotentiary General for
Labor, reports that they are encountering resistance to recruitment—
“In all countries we have to change over more or less to
registering the men by age groups and to conscripting them in
age groups. They do appear for registering as such, but as soon
as transport is available, they do not come back so that the
dispatch of the men has become more or less a question for the
police. Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is
extraordinarily serious. It is well known that vehement battles
occurred just because of these actions.” (_T-197-198._)
The word “recruitment” will be used in this opinion not in its literal
sense of voluntary enlistment, but in the broad sense of both voluntary
and involuntary gathering up of workers.
It is the contention of the defense that Milch had nothing to do with
the actual recruitment. It is, of course, true that he did not go into
France, Italy, Hungary, Russia, and other countries, to physically rope
the workers and drag them into Germany, but is the guilt any less if one
sits back in his office and signs the order which casts the uncoiling
rope for the far-reaching lasso?
Goering, in an interrogation conducted 6 September 1946, stated that
after the death of Udet it was Milch, as Chief of Supply for the air
forces, who put forward the needs of the Luftwaffe for workers. The
requests were forwarded to Speer, and Speer would ask Sauckel for the
workers for the entire armament branch. Sauckel, on 24 September 1946,
made a very important declaration in an affidavit on the part Milch
played in the matter of obtaining workers—
“Milch produced the figures for aviation. The same was done by
Speer in his sphere of activity. Speer and Milch, however, also
exerted influence on the allocation of workers. How far this
came within their capacity as members of the Central Planning
Board I cannot say; in any case they did this in their
ministerial capacity.” (_T-281._)
Thus, if Milch knew how workers were actually being recruited, how they
were being transported, and to what they were being transported, he
cannot claim exoneration in the assertion that he did not take them in
hand personally. And, if this knowledge is established, then he, when he
asked for workers, was, in effect, consigning foreign workers to the
suffering and torture of which he had cognizance. Behind each
requisition for foreign labor there shone the inevitable backdrop of the
lurid scenes of labor camps with their “special treatment,” disease,
vermin, starvation, whipping, illness, and death.
On 8 April 1943, Milch wrote Sauckel and Goering, announcing that in
certain sections he had proclaimed an 84-hour week in the air force
industry. (_T-196._) The defendant has explained that this applied only
to those engaged in guard work. Witness Krysiak testified that he worked
84 hours a week.
At the 1 March 1944 meeting of the Central Planning Board, Sauckel
particularly addressed himself to Milch who was presiding, and said—
“Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole batch of
French male and female agents who for good pay, just as was done
in olden times for ‘shanghaiing’, went hunting men and made them
drunk by using liquor as well as words, in order to dispatch
them to Germany.” (_T-228._)
As evidence that he was encountering difficulty in obtaining foreign
workers, Sauckel pointed out that several dozen of his very able labor
executive officers were shot. (_T-228._) In France he wrung from Laval
the concession “that the death penalty be threatened for officials who
tried to sabotage the labor supply.” And then he adds that “if the
Frenchmen despite all their promises do not act, then we Germans must
make an example of one case, and by reason of this law, if necessary put
Prefect or Burgomaster against the wall.” (_T-232._)
It is a long speech which Sauckel makes, and then Milch replies,
analyzing in his turn the foreign labor question. He complains bitterly
that more men have not been called up from France—
“Four whole age groups have grown up in France; men between 18
and 23 years of age, who are therefore at that age when young
people moved by patriotism or seduced by other people are ready
to do anything which satisfies their personal hatred against
us—and of course they hate us. These men ought to have been
called up in age groups and dispatched to Germany; for they
present the greatest danger which threatens us in case of
invasion.” (_T-236._)
“If one had shown the mailed fist and a clear executive
intention, a churchyard peace would reign in the rear of the
front at the moment the uproar starts. This I have emphasized so
frequently, but still nothing is happening, I am afraid.”
(_T-237._)
When Sauckel complains about the trouble he is having in getting workers
from Italy, Milch recommends—
“We could take under German administration the entire food
supply for the Italians and tell them, only he gets any food who
either works in a protected factory or goes to Germany.”
(_T-240-241._)
When on another occasion one Kehrl declared that it would be difficult
to control the food situation in France because food was delivered by
parcel post, Milch made the extraordinary pronouncement, “I personally
as military commander would confiscate all goods sent by parcel post.”
(_T-295._)
The Tribunal has not been shown any statement wherein the defendant
advocated that foreign workers be induced to come to Germany by offering
them good wages, good working conditions, pensions, security, and the
usual attractions held out to prospective employees. When he speaks on
the importation of foreign workers it is invariably in an aggressive and
domineering manner. At the 54th meeting of the Central Planning Board,
held on 1 March 1944, he explained that force had to be exercised
because there was nothing to attract the workers to Germany since they
believed that Germany would soon be defeated, and furthermore they were
attached to their families and their own countries. A very cogent
observation indeed.
Speaking on the French situation, he said—
“Even if Bichelonne and Laval have the best intentions there
will be resistance from the mayors, the gendarmes, and the
prefects, just because these people are afraid that firstly,
they will be called to account afterwards for this affair, and
secondly, because of their national point of view, which makes
them say, ‘We must not work for the enemy of our country.’
Therefore I would like to have an authority in our
administration which would force these people to do it, because
then the French could say, ‘If you force us, we will do it, but
voluntarily we will not do it.’ The same applies to Italy.”
(_T-292-293._)
Once the transportation of workers got under way it was not always
certain that they would all arrive. Aside from the unsanitary conditions
under which they travelled, frequently without food and in the
wintertime without heat, many in desperation escaped. To offset these
defections en route, Milch recommended—
“If a transport has left a town and has not arrived, 500 to 600
persons from this place must be arrested and sent to Germany as
prisoners of war.” (_T-294._)
The defense has asserted many times that the foreign workers were not
all treated as badly as the prosecution’s evidence might indicate. It is
unquestionably true that not all foreign workers were starved and
tortured, because if this were so they could not have worked at all, and
the German war machine would have ground to a stop long before the
spring of 1945. Thus, there is no reason to disbelieve the statement
made at one of the Central Planning Board meetings—
“The performance of the Soviet Russians so employed is to be
raised by a premium system. For this purpose, the ban on pay
restrictions is to be lifted and the manager be allowed to
distribute among the workmen, according to his duty and
discretion, RM 1 per head per day as premium for particular
services rendered. Furthermore, care will be taken, that workmen
can exchange these premiums, which will be paid out in camp
money for goods. It is intended to put at their disposal various
provisions—beer, tobacco, cigarettes and cigars, small items
for daily use, etc.” (_T-219._)
If the defendant has much to explain in this case it is principally
because of declarations made by himself. On 16 February 1944 at a
meeting of the Central Planning Board, he announced that the armament
industry employed foreign workmen to the extent of 40 percent, and that
in maximum production the foreign workers prevailed to the extent of 95
percent and higher. He said further that the Germans’ best new engine
was made 88 percent by Russian prisoners of war and the other 12 percent
by German men and women. “Only 6 to 8 German men are working on this
machine. The rest are Ukrainian women who have beaten all the records of
trained workers.” And yet, despite this apparently creditable
performance on the part of foreign workers, he complains bitterly—
“The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler’s
trustworthy hands who will make them work all right. This is
very important for educating people and has also a deterrent
effect on such others who would likewise feel inclined to
shirk.” (_T-223._)
When Milch recommends entrusting anyone to Himmler’s “trustworthy
hands”, the world well knows how bloody and homicidal those hands were.
The charges of maltreatment of foreign workers leveled against Milch
could be taken almost literally from his own words—
“It is, therefore, not possible to exploit fully all the
foreigners unless we compel them by piece work or we have the
possibility of taking measures against foreigners who are not
doing their bit. But, if the foreman lays hands on a prisoner of
war or smacks him there is at once a terrible row, the man is
put into prison, etc. There are sufficient officials in Germany
who think it their most important duty to stand up for human
rights instead of war production. I am also for human rights.
But if a Frenchman says, ‘You fellows will all be hanged and the
chief of the factory will be beheaded first,’ and if then the
chief says, ‘I am going to hit him’, then he is in a mess. He is
not protected. I have told my engineers, ‘I am going to punish
you if you don’t hit such a man; the more you do in this respect
the more I shall praise you. I shall see to it that nothing
happens to you.’ This is not yet sufficiently known. I cannot
talk to all factory leaders. I should like to see the man who
stays my arm because I can settle accounts with everybody who
stays my arm. If the little factory leader does that he is put
into a concentration camp and runs the risk of losing the
prisoners of war. In one case two Russian officers took off with
an airplane but crashed. I ordered that these two men be hanged
at once. They were hanged or shot yesterday. I left that to the
SS. I expressed the wish to leave them hanged in the factory for
the others to see.” (_T-223-224._)
On the stand Milch denied that he had anything to do with the fate of
the two Russian prisoners of war mentioned above. He further claimed
that his reference to this episode was made at another meeting (a GL
meeting), and that possibly the two stenographers got their notes
confused. The defense also introduced affidavits to the effect that
Milch was in no way implicated in this happening and that if the two
Russians were executed, the execution was performed by shooting and not
by hanging. It is probably true that Milch did not order the hanging of
these men, but did author the remarks attributed to him because they are
in keeping with his many other admitted and proved statements.
Did Milch know that prisoners of war were being used in violation of
international convention, and the laws and customs of war?
On 6 March 1944, Milch, Speer, General Bodenschatz, and Colonel von
Below conferred with Hitler. Hitler was informed of the Reich Marshal’s
wishes for the further utilization of the production power of prisoners
of war, by giving the direction of the Stalags to the SS. The Fuehrer
considered the proposal good, and asked Colonel von Below to arrange
matters accordingly. (_R-124, p. 168._)
At the 42d meeting of the Central Planning Board, held on 23 June 1943,
the intensive discussion on labor needs seemed to settle on the use of
Russian prisoners of war as the solution to the problem. It was
recommended that the Fuehrer be advised that 200,000 Russian prisoners
of war, fit for the heaviest work, should be made available from the
Wehrmacht and Waffen SS through the intermediary of the Chiefs of the
Army Groups (_T-218._)
However, Milch’s participation in the illegal use of prisoners of war is
not confined to his knowledge that it was being done. At the meeting on
30 October 1942, Sauckel suggested that as soon as the army took
prisoners in operational territories they should be immediately turned
over to him as Plenipotentiary for Labor. Instead of objecting to this
procedure as contrary to international law, Milch added—
“The correct thing to do would be to have all Stalags
transferred to you by order of the Fuehrer. The Wehrmacht takes
prisoners and as soon as it relinquishes them, the first
delivery goes to your organization. Then everything will be in
order.” (_T-176._)
Nothing can be more precise and definitive in international law than
that prisoners of war may not be compelled to fight against their own
country. But Milch treats this matter rather lightly at one of the
meetings of the Central Planning Board—
“We have made a request for an order that a certain percentage
of men in the antiaircraft artillery must be Russians. Fifty
thousand will be taken altogether; 30,000 are already employed
as gunners. This is an amusing thing that Russians must work the
guns.” (_T-192._)
On this statement the defendant has various explanations. One, that the
German word which has been translated into “amusing”, should really have
been rendered “mad”. Thus, it is a mad thing to make Russian prisoners
work guns against their own allies. In support of this interpretation
Milch argues that since he needed these prisoners in his armament
program, he could not have approved their use as gunners. He then also
denies that they were in fact used as gunners, and if they were, he was
not responsible for the deed. But other witnesses called by the defense
clearly established that the Russian prisoners were stationed at the
guns, either for servicing the pieces, hauling ammunition to them, or
actually firing them. It is clear that the Russian prisoners were
utilized at the guns and that this type of use of prisoners of war
represents an extreme violation of the laws and customs of war.
It has been argued by the defense that since Russia had denounced
adherence to the Geneva Convention, Germany was not compelled to treat
Russian prisoners with the limitations laid down in that convention.
German Admiral Canaris on 15 September 1941, in a memorandum of counsel
to the German High Command, declared that despite Russia’s attitude on
the Geneva Convention her prisoners were yet entitled to immunities
guaranteed under the rules and customs of war—
“The Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war is
not binding in the relationship between Germany and the U.S.S.R.
Therefore, only the principles of general international law on
the treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since the 18th century
these have gradually been established along the lines that war
captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but solely
protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent the
prisoners of war from further participation in the war. This
principle was developed in accordance with the view held by all
armies that it is contrary to military tradition to kill or
injure helpless people * * *. The decrees for the treatment of
Soviet prisoners of war enclosed are based on a fundamentally
different viewpoint.” (_IMT 222._)
Admiral Canaris’ position was entirely correct and in accordance with
accepted international law. In the episode of the Russian gunners
adverted to by Milch, he could not help but know the physical facts and
could not escape being aware that such use of prisoners of war violated
international law. His responsibility here is unequivocal.
On 25 March 1944, the defendant complained that prisoners of war were
not being treated with sufficient severity—
“If a decent foreman would sock one of those unruly guys because
the fellow won’t work, then the situation would soon change.
_International law cannot be observed here._ I have asserted
myself very strongly, and with the help of Saur I have
represented the point of view very strongly that the prisoners,
with the exception of the English and the Americans, should be
taken away from the military authorities. The soldiers are not
in a position, as experience has shown, to cope with these
fellows who know all the answers. I shall take very strict
measures here and shall put such a prisoner of war before my
court martial. If he has committed sabotage or refused to work,
I will have him hanged, right in his own factory. I am convinced
that that will not be without effect.” (_T-249._)
When a German field marshal, speaking to men subordinate in rank,
declares that “international law cannot be observed here”, it can only
mean to those under his command that in the execution of their duties,
international law should go overboard and, thus being unlimited in their
treatment of prisoners of war, the rights of the prisoners of war must
sink also.
Defense counsel insists that Milch had, as a matter of fact, a mild and
lenient disposition. Testimony was introduced to show that on several
occasions when he sat on courts martial, his judgments were tempered
with mercy. Note will be taken of this occasional yielding of an
apparently implacable and unyielding spirit, but one must also remark
the incongruity that one who, in his references to foreign workers and
prisoners of war, had constant harshness on his lips, could have
possessed in his make-up no harshness at all. In one of his speeches he
complains because the workers collapsed, and that they receive a
furlough of three or four days every eight weeks. This he calls “dirty
business of the first order, and treason to the country!” (_T-249._)
Then he adds—
“I further ask for support by the Luftwaffe physicians. With all
the rabble that we have among the foreign workers, there is of
course a lot of shirking. At the moment the Russians—that is,
the Russian prisoners of war—are feigning a lot of fatigue and
illness. The incidence of sickness of one and a half to two
percent which we have had up to now has at least doubled and in
some factories it has been increased to eight, nine, and ten
percent. That is, of course, done by previous agreement. There
the official physicians, who have to be very strict, find out
that it is not true, and then we return the fellows to work by
means of the whip. Then the whip serves as a cure.” (_T-250._)
Recommending the employment of so merciless an instrument as a whip can
hardly be regarded as evidence of a mild disposition. Then he says—
“Let everyone consider that if he does not do his duty, we do
not ask whether there is a law; we ask only whether he is the
responsible one and then we will seize him no matter who he is *
* *. Please go wherever you are going and knock everybody down
who blocks your way! We cover up everything here. We do not ask
whether he is allowed to or whether he is not allowed to. For
us, there is nothing but this one task. We are fanatics in this
sphere. We do not even consider letting anything at all distract
us from that task. No order exists which could prevent me from
fulfilling this task.” (_T-251._)
Then comes the outburst which is an out and out defiance of all law—
“Gentlemen, I know that not every subordinate can say, ‘For me,
the law no longer exists,’ but he has to have someone who covers
up for him, not out of cowardice. But if you act according to
the spirit of the old field service regulation, ‘Abstaining from
doing something hurts us more than erring in the choice of the
means,’ and if, moreover, you keep in touch and immediately
clarify difficult points, so that something can be done, then we
are willing to accept the responsibility, whether this is the
law or not. I see only two possibilities for me and for Germany.
Either we succeed and thereby save Germany, or we continue these
slipshod methods and then get the fate that we deserve. I prefer
to fall while I am doing something that is against the rules but
that is right and sensible, and be called to account for it, and
if you like, hanged, rather than be hanged because Papa Stalin
is here in Berlin, or the Englishmen. I have no desire for that.
I would rather die in a different way. But I think we can
accomplish this task, too. We are in the fifth year of war. I
repeat, the decision will come during the next six weeks!”
(_T-251-252._)
(b) Jaegerstab
We now come to a consideration of the Jaegerstab, formed on 1 March
1944, for the purpose of increasing production of fighter aircraft to
meet the incessant and ever increasingly effective bomber attacks of the
Americans and British which had seriously damaged the entire airplane
industry in Germany. Every airplane factory with the accessory workshops
had been hit at least three times. The Jaegerstab became essentially a
concentration of experts drawn from various ministries. Its programs
envisaged a decentralization of plane factories by transferring them in
part to above-surface localities and in part to subterranean localities.
Milch and Speer were joint chiefs of the Jaegerstab, and Karl Adolph
[Otto] Saur functioned as Chief of Staff. SS Obergruppenfuehrer Kammler
had supervision of the construction program. So far as this trial is
concerned, we are interested in the work of the Jaegerstab only to the
extent that it involves employment of foreign labor and prisoners of
war. Did the Jaegerstab employ labor prohibited under international law,
and if so, can Milch be held responsible for such illegal use?
In order to resolve this question we must review the documents submitted
in evidence.
On 6-7 April 1944, Milch and Saur reported to Hitler on the
achievements, up to that time, of the Jaegerstab and discussed with him
the plans for further construction on a second work project. Hitler
declared that he desired this project be set up in the Protectorate and,
at this point, the minutes read, “If it should prove impossible there
too to get hold of the necessary workers, the Fuehrer, himself, will
contact the Reichsfuehrer SS and will give an order that the required
100,000 men are to be made available by bringing in Jews from Hungary.”
(_T-318._) Here Milch is put directly on notice that forced labor is
being contemplated.
Fritz Schmelter, director of the Central Department for Employment and
Distribution of Labor, and because of that a member of the Jaegerstab,
declared in an affidavit on 9 December 1946, that Kammler utilized
concentration camp prisoners placed at his disposal by the SS in order
to carry out his share of the Jaegerstab construction program. Also,
that Xaver Dorsch of the Todt Organization used foreign workers, part of
whom were Hungarian Jews, to accomplish his part of the Jaegerstab
construction program. Then Schmelter states, “Milch, as one of the two
responsible chiefs of the Jaegerstab, personally directed, ordered or
approved decisions made in the interests of Jaegerstab undertakings.”
(_T-322._)
On 13 November 1946, Saur, Chief of Staff of the Jaegerstab, declared in
an interrogation that in the decentralization program Kammler divided 30
factories into 700 individual workshops, and that the workers used in
the project were concentration camp prisoners. (_T-323._)
Speer, in an interrogation made shortly after his capture, declared that
Hungarian Jews were used in the building program. (_T-325._)
At one of the Jaegerstab meetings, presided over by Milch,
Stobbe-Dethleffsen, in discussing the matter of labor needed for the
Jaegerstab program, requests a few German key personnel to supervise the
concentration camp inmates “with the other _subjugated people_.”
(_T-328._)
At a Jaegerstab meeting on 6 March 1944, a Sturmbannfuehrer of the SS
declared he had 5,000 prisoners in readiness for work, but needed 750
guard personnel. To this statement Milch commented, “We must distribute
our German people as key personnel. That is, out of three construction
companies we can probably make ten complete ones by introducing 70
percent foreigners.” (_T-331._)
At a meeting on 2 May 1944, Kammler, in Milch’s presence declares he had
30 men hanged—
“As usual it is because the people have noticed that they are no
longer treated severely enough. I had 30 people hanged as a
special measure. Since they were hanged, everything has been to
some extent in order again. It is the same old story, whenever
people notice that they are not being treated so severely as
before, they take all sorts of liberties. It is not surprising
that a normal soldier, standing guard on people who were
previously always harmless, does not suspect anything of the
kind. They are not, however, harmless people.” (_T-333-34._)
The minutes of the meeting do not indicate that Milch in any way
protested Kammler’s deeds and utterance, although at the trial he
doubted that Kammler had actually hanged 30 people as he had stated.
Although Milch was not present at the meeting on 25 May 1944 of the
Jaegerstab, he approved the minutes of that meeting which revealed a
discussion among Schmelter (labor expert for Jaegerstab), Schlempp
(deputy of Jaegerstab) and Lange, in charge of machinery for Jaegerstab.
Schmelter said—
“The Hungarian Jews are expected now, and they will require some
kind of key personnel. Altogether I need about 250,000
construction workers for the large bunkers and for Schlett’s
installations.” (_T-334._)
To this Lange remarked—
“You can get them all in Hungary. There are still Jews running
about Budapest.” (_T-334._)
It is to be noted that Lange uses phraseology that one would employ in
speaking of dogs or other animals. There are still dogs running around
Budapest. There are still Jews running about Budapest.
At the meeting on 26 May 1944, Schmelter reported that two transports of
Hungarian Jews had arrived at the SS in Auschwitz, but that they
consisted primarily of children, women, and old men. Kammler then
declared that he had conscripted his own men by taking 50,000 people
into protective custody.
Schlempp, in outlining Dorsch’s needs for labor, states—
“Dorsch said yesterday that he wanted to bring 100,000 Jews from
Hungary, 500,000 Italians,[162] 10,000 men from bomb damage
repair, also 1,000 from Waldbrohl; then he wanted to get
something from Greiser’s zone by negotiation, then 4,000 Italian
officers, 10,000 men from south Russia, and 20,000 from north
Russia. That would be 220,000 altogether.” (_T-335-36._)
As early as 20 March 1944, we find Chief of Staff Saur asking Milch to
inform Sauckel that the group mobilization in Hungary must be placed
primarily at the disposal of the Jaegerstab. “Large, heavy labor
companies must be formed. The people have to be treated like the
prisoners. Otherwise it won’t work.” (_T-342._)
In the face of all these uncontradicted documents and stenographic
records of meetings, it would be fatuous for anyone to say that Milch
was unaware that forced labor and prisoners of war were being used in
the Jaegerstab construction program.
However, there is more than this passive evidence. Milch, himself,
contributes the positive evidence of his full knowledge of and
unrestrained participation in the Jaegerstab slave labor activities.
On 25 April 1944, he said—
“It will only work if we put these workers into barracks. We
cannot exactly treat them as prisoners. It must appear
otherwise, but it must be so in practice. * * * I am personally
convinced after talking to the Fuehrer that he will agree as
soon as it is made reasonable. The people should not be able to
mingle with the population and to conspire. Nor should they be
allowed to run around free, so that they can cross the frontier
every day. Both practices must be stopped. * * * I am of the
opinion that that must be done at once. It’s all the same to me
if individual people do object. Protest does not interest me at
all, whether from the Chief of Prisoners of War Affairs or from
our side. Kleber, would you be so good as to take care of this?”
KLEBER: “As far as prisoners of war are concerned I can take
care of it, but not where it concerns the air force. That must
be handled separately.”
MILCH: “Naturally. This must be handled by us. There was, in
fact, another proposal but we do not want it. Otherwise someone
else will come complaining.”
KLEBER: “I should like to transfer the prisoners further off to
Brunswick.”
MILCH: “I think it is an excellent idea for the prisoners to go
there if Brunswick continues to be attacked.” (_T-356-57._)
Article 9 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 provides—
“No prisoner of war may be sent to an area where he would be
exposed to the fire of the fighting zone.”
At the 4 May 1944 meeting, Saur reported that the Jaegerstab itself,
independent of Sauckel, had organized an expedition for the procuring of
workers in Italy. On 5 May 1944, Schmelter reported that the Jaegerstab
transport from Italy had been delayed because of the lack of guards,
whereupon the defendant said—
“Is there someone at the escort detachment headquarters in Italy
responsible for seeing that people do not get out and run away
during the journey? That is what the escorting personnel is
there for. Someone of standing? Dr. Wendt is responsible for the
whole undertaking. I am of the opinion that, if anyone jumps
out, he should be shot; otherwise a thousand will get on and
only twenty will arrive there. The gendarmerie and all military
posts must look out for those who abscond on the journey. They
will be arrested at once and will appear before a court
martial.” (_T-349-50._)
At a conference held on 22 February 1944, one Rautenbach says—
“That refers to Wernigerode. In Solingen we had the best results
with Frenchmen and the worst with Italians, meaning the Italian
workers and not the prisoners of war. For that reason we do not
employ any Italians here in Wernigerode. They are only 50 to 60
percent efficient.” (_T-2180._)
And the defendant then remarks—
“Could not the following be done; give the Italians in principle
only half of their food rations, letting them earn the other
half when they do their work well?” (_T-2181._)
It is obvious that, as one of the chiefs of the Jaegerstab, the
defendant actively, willingly, and knowingly countenanced, ordered, and
participated in slave labor practices and the use of prisoners of war in
activities prohibited by international law. Aside from his other
statements, the one made on 13 June 1944, where he advocates the
exportation from France of machinery and men would, in itself, be enough
to convict him of such participation.
“We must write off these areas in France completely, and above
all the factories which are situated further into the country
towards the south and west. For when the invasion begins, the
guarding neither of a stretch of land, nor of a line will be
possible, nor will anything function because of sabotage * * *.
No Frenchman will work when the invasion begins. I am of the
opinion that the French should be brought over again by force,
as prisoners.”
SAUR: “I should prefer to do it sooner.”
LANGE: “We have machines there too, in particular the presses.”
MILCH: “Everything must come out; machines and men.” (_T-358._)
The Jaegerstab functioned from 1 March 1944 to 1 August 1944 and then it
expanded into the Ruestungsstab. When the Jaegerstab concluded its
efforts a report was made to the Fuehrer, which declared that Jaegerstab
had, in spite of air attacks, doubled its aircraft production.
(_T-360._)
(c) Generalluftzeugmeister
In his capacity as Generalluftzeugmeister, Milch held periodical
meetings and conferences in connection with the Luftwaffe armament
production. Labor, its procurement, disposition, and treatment, was
inevitably a subject for frequent discussion, and in these discussions
Milch portrayed himself an intransigent, implacable taskmaster,
uninhibited neither by law nor custom, and unrestrained by moderation or
regard for the helpless vanquished.
At one of these meetings on 5 May 1942, presided over by the defendant,
one Fridag reported—
“The French become worse and worse. I threw out 80 of them who
will be sent to concentration camps in Russia. They refused to
work. The French say at 4 o’clock: ‘I won’t work another hour’,
and you cannot make them work another hour. This happened four
weeks ago all of a sudden when the first bombing attack on Paris
took place, while before that the French were the best people.”
(_T-2106._)
The fact that the bombardment of the beloved Paris of these Frenchmen
would naturally emotionally disturb them was not weighed or considered
by the defendant in spite of the fact that Frydag had reported that
prior to the bombardment they had been excellent workers. Implacable and
unyielding as some story book pagan god, the defendant turns to von
Gablenz, Chief of the Planning Office, and declares—
“I demand if the people refuse to work they immediately be
placed against the wall and shot before all the other workers.”
(_T-2107._)
Further—
“I ask you to get in touch with the Reich Fuehrer SS [Himmler]
and to ask him to discuss the matter with the Fuehrer. Now is
the right time; unless we do something effective now, the others
will become bothersome. I ask that their being sent to
concentration camps be taken into consideration too. I will tell
you afterwards how you should act in such a matter.” (_T-2107._)
Later, on 7 July 1942, he indicated a willingness to try more peaceable
methods, but if they did not succeed, then—
“I intend to fill the new Heinkel Plant in the East entirely
with Frenchmen brought down there by force. If they don’t work
in France, they may work as prisoners in Poland. After all, we
have to remember that it is we and not the French who have won
the war.” (_T-2116._)
On 28 July 1942 we find him again complaining about French production—
“At the present time we receive six to nine planes from the
French. I could well imagine that they would get out 45 for
themselves. I shall close up the shop with a single stroke and
have the workers and the machines come to Germany. If it does
not work on a voluntary basis, then we do it by compulsory
contracts. Perhaps I shall first give them a week to think it
over. It is a fact that, on the whole, these people work in
silent opposition. One cannot blame them for it either, it is
true, but they should not have started the war.” (_T-2117._)
In this outburst we discover two strange utterances. One, “compulsory
contracts”, and the other the statement that the French started the war.
Since the word “contract” means a willing agreement between two or more
people, a “compulsory contract” is, of course, meaningless because one
cannot be forced into a contract. If there is any compulsion, then the
operation becomes a matter of outright coercion. With regard to the
French starting the war, the defendant had the grace to state during the
trial that he now knows that France did not initiate hostilities,
although he believed to the contrary at the time.
The defendant has declared repeatedly that he had no connection with, or
even knowledge of, concentration camps. He only visited one of them
(Dachau) in 1935. At the end of the war he was aware of the existence of
but two concentration camps, although 200 were flourishing in all their
ghastliness at the time. Yet despite this blissful ignorance of
concentration camps the phrase rippled easily from his tongue. At the
same meeting above-mentioned he stated that if two certain individuals,
Schneider and Bergen, “make difficulties” he would put them into a
concentration camp for the duration of the war (_T-2118._)
When one Petersen, on 30 November 1942, spoke of obtaining 500 men from
a concentration camp, Milch said, “For this purpose we should come to an
agreement with Himmler.” (_T-2148._)
On 27 April 1943, when one Stahms indicated that concentration camp
inmates are almost 3,000 strong, Milch declares that against a
withdrawal of 3,000 foreign workers from the Luftwaffe industry, he
attached importance to the assignment of these 3,000 concentration camp
inmates to the Luftwaffe. (_NOKW-413._)
At the GL meeting of 4 August 1942, someone reported that the French
might strike in the event of a British attack. This provoked Milch into
the thunderous outburst—
“In such a case I would ask to be appointed military commander
myself. I would band the workers together and have fifty percent
of them shot; I would then publish this fact and compel the
other fifty percent to work by beating if necessary. If they
don’t work, then they, too, will be shot. I would get the
necessary replacement somehow. But I hope the military commander
will do his duty. I’m not worried about it. The word ‘strike’
must never be used. For us there is only ‘living or dying’ but
not ‘striking’. That goes for the educated man as well as for
the worker, for the German as well as for the foreigner. The
word ‘strike’ means death for the man who uses it.”
(_T-2121-2122._)
On this quotation in court the following colloquy occurred between a
member of the Tribunal and the witness [Milch]:
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Curiosity consumes me as to what would happen if
an officer inferior in rank to yourself took you at your word
and actually executed a number of these workers or prisoners of
war. Would that officer then be punished?
THE WITNESS: No one was there who would have been in a position
to do so. Apart from that, all those who were under my orders
knew me and my way of handling things. They knew exactly that I
didn’t mean it the way I said it, and apart from that they
always laughed about my remarks when I used such strong words.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: In other words, the comment of a field marshal
in a matter of this seriousness was really of no value?
THE WITNESS: Because the people knew that I got excited very
easily about certain things, and these incidents here have been
selected and submitted of course. From every one of these
meetings, which took place twice a month, there was a
report—about this thick—and perhaps, at some time or another,
sometimes once, sometimes twice, due to the many reports which I
received, there was a certain outburst, and then I would lose my
temper as we soldiers used to. However, I didn’t intend to do
anything about it and I spoke to those under my orders once in a
while. They pointed out to me that I used such strong words, and
they knew exactly that this was not meant seriously. They knew
exactly that no such order had been given and that I myself
would never cause anybody to be punished, not even when it would
have been justified, for the very simple reason that I did not
have the power to give punishments. (_T-2124-2125._)
Then Judge Phillips inquired—
JUDGE PHILLIPS: Well, now, whether you meant it or not, you
would say these things, and by so doing you counselled and
advised others under you at a meeting which you presided over to
do such things. Whether you meant it or not, you did that,
didn’t you?
THE WITNESS: No. I never gave the order by using these words,
because my people spoke with me, and after all they knew from my
words that I never meant it earnestly.
JUDGE PHILLIPS: Didn’t you say, ‘I would band the workers
together and have fifty percent of them shot? I would then
publish this fact and compel the other fifty percent to work by
beating if necessary.’ Did you say that or not?
THE WITNESS: I do not remember to have said that. However, three
days ago I believe I said that I never knew afterwards when I
had such outbursts of rage because I had that rush of blood to
my skull due to that injury I had, and I couldn’t remember what
I said at that particular moment. I just burst out in rage.
(_T-2125-2126._)
The defendant has constantly denied that he was a moving factor in the
foreign workers program. But at the GL meeting on 18 August 1942, we
find him asking for a complete report on the labor question, how it has
developed, what nationalities are involved, how great is the
fluctuation—
“What real requests we now have to make in the different sectors
in order to cover the needs for specialists and for skilled and
unskilled labor, how many of them are foreigners, etc. What
happens to those who leave the industry? Are they compelled to
work elsewhere? Are they, _as I proposed, under control in the
camps supervised by the SS_ and considered as being in mild
concentration camps or are these gentlemen allowed to remain
outside and do as they please?” (_T-2127._)
When questioned as to the significance of “mild” concentration camps, he
explained that these were camps to which people were sent for a short
time for “education”.
Complaining about “antisocial elements” who “moved from one factory to
another,” Milch rejected the suggestion that the armed forces should
take care of these people in camps. This could not be done because “they
have not been condemned and in no way violated the existing laws.”
“That is why Himmler should get these people into his clutches
because he can treat them _outside the law_.” (_T-2134._)
At the GL meeting on 19 October 1943, the defendant spoke on the subject
of a possible foreign workers’ uprising. He said that he had discussed
this eventuality with Himmler, and that he, Milch, had already given
orders to the Chief AW[163] and to the training stations to get military
training in this field.
“If for instance in the locality X, an uprising is started, then
a sergeant with a few men, or else a lieutenant with 30 men is
to turn up in the plant, and first of all shoot into the crowd
with a machine gun. What he should do after is to shoot down as
many people as possible in cases of revolt. I have given orders
to that effect even if our foreign workers are involved. But
first of all he must succeed in getting them all laid out flat
on the ground. And then every tenth man is to be singled out and
shot, while the others are lined up and see it. If our machines
are being wrecked, etc., then such measures have to be applied.
I said to Himmler: ‘I’ll go along with you in your efforts.’”
(_T-2153._)
Milch denied at the trial that he had talked to Himmler about this
matter and endeavored to argue incorrectness in the minutes. But the
weakness of his attempted exculpation here lies in the fact that he
could well have argued the necessity for drastic action in such an
emergency, without excesses of course. In fact, he had explained, “If
our planes are destroyed in the workshops, an energetic measure should
be taken.” But in the desire to extricate himself completely from the
situation, he challenges the record, he refutes the Himmler conference,
and then adds the usual explanation that he was excited at the time.
At a GL conference on 2 March 1943, the defendant was commenting on the
fact that foreign workers were becoming hostile.
“On principle I have to be informed of every case of
swinishness. I do not understand at all why Germany should put
up with it when Poles and Frenchmen explain to the
people—today, indeed, you are still sitting in this work; but
later we shall be the owners; and if you treat us properly we
shall see to it then that you are shot dead immediately and not
tortured first. In all these matters energetic interference must
be made. I am of the opinion that there should be only two types
of punishment in such cases; firstly, concentration camps for
foreigners, and secondly, capital punishment. If a certain
number of such hostile elements are removed and the others are
informed, they will then work better. Their love for us
certainly won’t become any greater; but neither will their hate,
for it is already strong enough. In this respect, too, energetic
interference must be made and in no case must the works put up
with it. The best method is to give one blow with a sledge
hammer to the person concerned; and I shall treat with
distinction every man who does something like that whenever he
hears such stupid nonsense. We are living in total war; and the
workers must be told that they don’t have to put up with
anything.” (_T-2169._)
When the above was read to the defendant in court, he stated that he did
not recall the utterance and explained, “that once again it is my
well-known rage. I simply let go.” However, upon further
cross-examination he seemed to recall what it was all about and said,
“Yes, and I was enraged here through the report which had been submitted
to me as to the fact that our people were being threatened with death.
That enraged me considerably; and I blew up.” This is an interesting
observation. This man, from whose lips death threats fell like acorns
from an oak, asks that all his fulminations be ignored. Although he sat
on the victors’ bench at the time, yet because a worker who had been
dragged from his home hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of miles away,
blurted from the depth of his misery, that if he got the opportunity he
would kill his captor, the captor felt morally justified in recommending
the use of a sledge hammer on the head of the defenseless captive. The
sledge hammer blow was to be delivered not for a deed committed, but
merely for the use of words. To fortify this point, defense introduced
an affidavit which declared that the servant girl in the Milch household
repeated certain statements as to what her people (she was a Ukrainian)
would do in the event they became victorious. On this subject they were
so sensitive that even the gossip and chatter of a maid servant threw
fear into their hearts, but it is solemnly averred in court that the
imprecations of a field marshal were always ignored.
At the same meeting above indicated the defendant said—
“But in the abstract, I see no difficulties in the way of
getting 100,000 or 200,000 French workers to Germany, nor do I
see any difficulties in the way of keeping them in order. If a
case of sabotage occurs in one area, every tenth man in the area
will be shot. Then such acts of sabotage would cease of
themselves. The western peoples are very much afraid of death,
while it is quite different matter with the Russians.”
(_T-2172._)
In explanation of this remark the defendant said that he did not recall
making it. “That was still part of my madness.”
On 4 November 1943, Milch conferred with Goering at the Junkers Works at
Dessau. Discussing the Italian workers, the defendant said—
“We have to let certain plants go on working in Italy, such as
ball bearings, steel castings, and others, and we cannot take
the people from there. The same applies to the technical sphere.
The people there are working for us. All depends on our policy
toward the Italians. I have ordered that they can be beaten up
if they do not work. I have also given permission that Italians
caught sabotaging be sentenced to death. If this measure is not
desired by the higher authorities, which seems to be the case,
we are powerless. Then the Italians in the Reich will not be of
any use to us.” Further, “We could count on millions all
together, if we let them starve if they do not work!”
(_T-2193-2194._)
The defendant denies that he ever gave the order specifically mentioned
here, and since he was talking to Goering, he places himself in the
position of having lied to his superior officer, something of which,
considering his vehement professions of soldier’s loyalty to military
hierarchy, it would never be expected he could be guilty.
On the subject of French prisoners of war, the defendant said—
“Don’t forget that not even 1,000,000 Frenchmen are here as PW’s
while we have 7 to 8 million soldiers. Therefore, the French are
still in a very favorable position. But they must realize that
they will be brought to Germany all together if they don’t work
hard enough at home.” (_T-2198._)
As Vichy was working hand in glove with Berlin at the time, the
defendant contends that coercion was not involved since it was the
French Government who had issued the orders for this movement.
Addressing himself on another occasion to the subject of French workers,
the defendant stated, “There is no good will in France, and you can
really not expect it from these fellows. But we will force them to work
by not feeding them.” Goering then said, “I can do this here much
better.” And Milch replied, “That will get us nowhere. We shall then
have to shut down the plants in France.” (_NOKW-245._)
At the GL meeting of 27 May 1942, von Gablenz reported, “Yesterday, the
first[164] has exploded in France, at the Arado plant, an explosive, a
float, but no damage has been done.” Milch commented, “What measures
have been taken in consequence? I want to have a report on what has been
done—How many people have been shot and how many hanged. If that guy
cannot be found today, fifty men should be selected and if I were you I
would hang three or four of them whether they are guilty or not. It is
the only way!” (_NOKW-407._)
IV. MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS
(a) High-Altitude Tests
On 15 May 1941, Dr. Rascher, medical officer in the Luftwaffe and member
of the SS stationed at Munich, wrote Heinrich Himmler asking that
Himmler furnish to him two or three professional criminals to be used as
subjects in high-altitude experiments. He stated that tests had been
made with monkeys, but since their reactions differed from those of
human beings, he preferred to work with live men, it being understood
that these individuals could, of course, die in the experiment. Himmler
replied through his adjutant, Rudolf Brandt, that he would gladly make
prisoners available for such high-altitude research, and authorized that
the experiments be carried out by Dr. Rascher, a Dr. Kottenhoff, and Dr.
G. A. Weltz, who was Chief of the Institute for Aviation Medicine in
Munich.
In March 1942, with a low-pressure chamber furnished by the Luftwaffe,
the experiments began at Dachau. The apparatus used for these tests was
simply a wood and metal cabinet in which air pressure could be increased
and decreased, the purpose of the tests being to ascertain the subject’s
capacity and ability to take large amounts of pure oxygen, and to
observe his reaction to a gradual decrease of oxygen approaching
infinity. In this manner high-altitude atmospheric pressure would be
simulated, and from the results the experimenters were to be able to
determine methods and means of maintaining and saving lives among
aviators compelled to rise to extreme altitudes, and at times because of
war hazards obliged to parachute to the earth. The subjects for these
experiments were to be individuals already sentenced to death.
Stated in strictly academic fashion, one could without too much
difficulty be persuaded that these experiments were not entirely
irrational or inhuman. The subjects were to die anyway, and if in dying
they could furnish scientific data not obtainable otherwise, data which
would save the lives of others, the project would not seem as criminally
homicidal as it might appear when stated bluntly that experimenters
would kill experimentees.
Whether the project was criminal and inhumane depends upon answers to
the inevitable questions:
1. Were the prisoners actually condemned to death previously?
2. If so, for what reasons were they condemned to capital punishment?
3. Were the experiments painful to the subjects?
4. What scientific benefits resulted from the experiments?
If any prisoner used in the experiments was condemned to death merely
for opposing the Nazi Regime without actually having committed any
physical crime, it does not answer the criminal charge to say that the
subject was already doomed to die, because by using that argument the
experimenter or his SS superior could easily take any concentration camp
inmate and, by merely pointing a finger at him, condemn him to death.
Obviously in such a case the slayer could not, after the death, plead
innocence on the grounds that the victim was to die anyway. Exculpation
from the charge of criminal homicide can possibly be based only upon
bona fide proof that the subject had committed murder or any other
legally recognized capital offense; and, not even then, unless the
sentencing Tribunal with authority granted by the State in the
constitution of the Court, declared that the execution would be
accomplished by means of a low-pressure chamber.
It has been asserted by the defense in this case that pardons were
promised the subjects of these experiments in the event they survived.
But the whole record reveals but one such shadowy case. It was also
stated by one of the witnesses for the defense (General Wolff of the SS)
that the subjects of these experiments were men who, because of their
criminal records, had been denied the honor of fighting for the
Fatherland, but that by submitting to these experiments they would be
allowed, if they survived, to join combat forces at the front. General
Wolff furnished no names or specific instances in this connection, nor
does it appear that he, at any time, was in attendance upon the
experiments at Dachau.
Dr. Romberg, under indictment for these same and kindred offenses, said
on 1 November 1946, that he personally witnessed the death of three of
Dr. Rascher’s subjects, and that he knows that other experimental
subjects were killed while he was not present. He estimated that the
fatalities totaled between five and ten. He was silent on the character
of the victims.
Rudolf Brandt, who is currently on trial in Tribunal I, declared in an
affidavit dated 30 August 1946, that Rascher wrote Himmler asking for
concentration camp subjects for his high-altitude experiments.
“Volunteers could not very well be expected, as the experiments could be
fatal under the circumstances.” (_T-475._) Also “many experiments ended
with the death of the experimental subject.” (_T-477._)
Brandt declared further that after Rascher submitted a report on his
first experiments, Himmler ordered him to continue the experiments and
authorized the commutation to life imprisonment of those subjects,
previously condemned to death, who survived the experiments. However,
Poles and Russians were excluded from this declared clemency. For
Himmler, to be a Russian or a Pole or a Jew was an offense that could be
expiated only with death. Both Romberg and Brandt are interested
witnesses since they are defendants in another trial on similar charges.
The testimony of one Anton Pacheleff, however, is not burdened with this
possible defect as he is not answering to any charges. An Austrian
patent lawyer, he was an inmate of Dachau, and while his testimony must
still be carefully scrutinized, it does not need to be evaluated on the
basis that the affiant has something to gain in exaggerating the nature,
extent, and effect of the medical experiments. He declared under oath
that Dr. Rascher chose the victims for his researches from the
punishment company at Dachau, a group made up of political prisoners
marked for extermination. “A few convicts were among the political
prisoners, having been placed there merely to depress the morale of the
political prisoners, and so a few convicts were killed along with the
others.” (_T-408._)
The most complete account of this entire operation was contributed by
Walter Neff, an Austrian who had been committed to Dachau because, prior
to the Anschluss, he had testified in an Austrian court against certain
Nazi terrorists. Only by coincidence were the experiments enacted in a
ward to which he had been assigned as an untrained nurse, and thus he
became an unofficial observer. He testified that from 180 to 200
concentration camp inmates were subjected to the high-altitude
experiments, and of these, 10 were volunteers. Of all these subjects
only one man was ever released, and that was an individual called
Zopota.
It was Neff’s conclusion that over a period of three months from 70 to
80 persons were killed in the high-altitude experiments. He declared
further that approximately 40 of the persons killed were persons not
previously condemned to death. One man, according to Neff, was
deliberately killed in the low-pressure chamber by Dr. Rascher so that
he could perform an autopsy on him after his death at the atmospheric
pressure of 10,000 meters altitude. During one autopsy it was discovered
after the breast had been opened that the heart was still beating. “This
experiment,” Neff said, “caused many cases of death because many more
experiments were made in order to see how long the heart of a man could
beat thus autopsied.” (_T-419._)
In this connection, reference must be made to one of the most cruel and
fiendish decrees scratched by the claw of Himmler on the horror-filled
parchment of his diabolic ingenuity. On 13 April 1942 he wrote Dr.
Rascher, “these experiments should above all be evaluated for the
purpose of seeing whether it is not possible, through this long
functioning of the heart, to bring such people back to life. Should such
an experiment of bringing back to life succeed, then it is understood
that the person condemned to death will be commuted to lifelong
imprisonment in a concentration camp.” (_1971-B-PS._) Thus, if the
lifeless and mutilated body of one of these tortured victims of
cold-blooded homicide should be made to function again, its owner would
receive from the benevolent Heinrich Himmler the assurance of the
luxuries of a lifelong imprisonment in an SS concentration camp!
But this is not the end of the hilarious game of these two death-head
players, as they toss human life back and forth. On 20 October 1942,
Rascher queries Himmler’s adjutant on this subject. He desires to know
if, amongst the mythical survivors of his lethal experiments, there
should be any Poles or Russians, whether they were also to receive the
boon of lifelong imprisonment in a concentration camp. Incidentally,
Rascher adds, the only ones he has experimented with have been Poles and
Russians. And the reply comes back from Himmler’s adjutant that Dr.
Rascher, “please,” is to be informed that “the decree of the
Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler concerning pardoning (they called it
pardoning!) of experimental subjects does not apply to Poles and
Russians.” (!!!)
The manner in which some of the victims were selected is material fit
for an Edgar Allen Poe story or a horror magazine. One day after 16
Russian prisoners had been used as experiments, two Jews were scheduled
to be killed. Curious as to the identity of the two scheduled for
extermination, Neff watched the first victim being placed in the
experimental chamber. Something in the man’s features forcibly brought
to his mind the image of the prison tailor. Hurrying to the tailor shop
he learned that indeed it was the tailor, and that he had not been
condemned to death, but that an SS-man, one Endres, had placed him among
the list of those scheduled to be killed because this tailor had refused
to make a civilian suit for Endres!
Neff further testified that at one time the chamber became damaged, but
after being repaired more deaths occurred, and on the last day Rascher
killed five persons. (_T-421._)
On 16 April 1942, Rascher wrote Himmler describing an experiment which
he repeated four times “with the same results.”
“When Wagner, the last VP (experimental subject) had stopped
breathing, I let him come back to life by increasing pressure.
Since the VP was assigned for a terminal (‘Terminal’ meaning
‘death-resulting’ in this case) experiment, since a repeated
experiment held no prospect for new results, and since I had not
been in possession of your letter at that time, I subsequently
started another experiment through which VP Wagner did not live.
Also in this case the results obtained by electrocardiographic
registration (Herzstromabschreibung) were extraordinary.”
(_T-431-32._)
Here Rascher, in a macabre demonstration worthy of his record, repeated
an experiment four times knowing what the result would be, and then
finally killed the subject because he had been marked for extermination
anyway.
(b) Were the Experiments Painful to the Subjects
The defense contends that the experiments, even though often fatal, were
not accompanied with actual pain to the subjects, and therefore the
experiments could not be characterized cruel or inhuman. Anton Pacheleff
often stood by the apparatus during the experiments and looked through
the observation window of the chamber. He testified—
“I have personally seen through the observation window of the
chamber when a prisoner inside would stand a vacuum until his
lungs ruptured. Some experiments gave men such pressure in their
heads that they would go mad, and pull out their hair in an
effort to relieve the pressure. They would tear their heads and
face with their fingers and fingernails in an attempt to maim
themselves in their madness. They would beat the walls with
their hands and head, and scream in an effort to relieve
pressure on their eardrums. These cases of extreme vacuums
generally ended in the death of the subject. An extreme
experiment was so certain to result in death that in many
instances the chamber was used for routine execution purposes
rather than an experiment.” (_T-409._)
One report made up by Doctors Ruff, Romberg, and Rascher graphically
described the reactions of the subject as he fell from a height of
47,000 feet. Some of the more unusual reactions are noted:
47,200 ft. Lets the mask fall, severe altitude sickness, spasmodic
(klonische) convulsions.
45,580 ft. Opisthotonus.
44,950 ft. Suspended in opisthotonus.
44,920 ft. Arms stretched stiffly forward; sits up like a dog,
legs spread stiffly apart.
43,310 ft. Agonal convulsive breathing.
40,030 ft. Dyspnea, hangs limp.
23,620 ft. Uncoordinated movements with the extremities.
19,690 ft. Clonic convulsions, groaning.
18,080 ft. Yells aloud.
9,520 ft. Still yells, convulses arms and legs, head sinks
forward.
6,560 ft. Yells spasmodically, grimaces, bites his tongue, does
not respond to speech, gives the impression of
someone who is completely out of his mind.
5 minutes (after reaching ground level) Reacts for the first time
to vocal stimulation.
11 minutes Holds his head turned convulsively to the right; tries
repeatedly to answer the first question concerning
his birth date.
28 minutes Sees nothing; runs against open window sash upon which
the sun is shining, so that large lump is formed on
his forehead; says “Excuse me, please.” No expression
of pain.
37 minutes Reacts to pain stimuli.
75 minutes Still disoriented in time; retrogressive amnesia over
three days.
24 hours Normal condition again attained; has no recollection of
the experiment itself. (_T-455-56._)
(c) Results Achieved
On 11 May 1942, Rascher made his first report to Himmler on the
high-altitude experiments—
“As practical result of the more than 200 experiments conducted
at Dachau the following can be assumed. Flying in altitudes
higher than 12 kilometers without pressure-cabin or
pressure-suit is impossible even while breathing pure oxygen. If
the airplane pressure machine is damaged at altitudes of 13
kilometers and higher the crew will not be able to bail out of
the damaged plane themselves since at that height the bends
appear rather suddenly. It must be requested that the crew
should be removed automatically from the plane, for instance, by
catapulting the seats by means of compressed air. Descending
with opened parachute without oxygen would cause severe injuries
due to the lack of oxygen besides causing severe freezing;
consciousness would not be regained until the ground was
reached. Therefore, the following is to be requested: (1) A
parachute with barometrically controlled opening. (2) A portable
oxygen apparatus for the jump. For the following experiments
Jewish professional criminals who had committed ‘Rassenschande’
(race pollution) were used; the question of the formation of
embolism was investigated in ten cases. Some of the VP’s died
during a continued high-altitude experiment; for instance, after
one-half hour at a height of 12 kilometers. * * * To find out
whether the severe psychical and physical effects, as mentioned
under No. 3, are due to the formation of embolism, the following
was done: After relative recuperation from such a parachute
descending test had taken place, however before regaining of
consciousness, some VP’s were kept under water until they died.
* * * One VP was made to breathe pure oxygen for two and
one-half hours before the experiment started. After six minutes
at a height of 20 kilometers he died and at dissection also
showed ample air embolism as was the case in all other
experiments.” (_T-384-385._)
Dr. Romberg declared in an interrogation conducted on 29 October 1946,
that he and other doctors had conducted experiments on themselves
reaching altitudes of 17,000 meters (17 kilometers). Beyond that, he
said, death was probable. This seems to contradict the report made by
Rascher, above referred to, in which he speaks of the impossibility of
flight at 12 kilometers (12,000 meters).
But the whole fallacy of the experiments and their sheer futility are
revealed in a letter which Dr. Hippke, Chief of the Medical Section of
the Luftwaffe, wrote to Himmler under date of 8 October 1942—
“It is true that no conclusions as to the practice of
parachuting can be drawn for the time being, as a very important
factor, viz., cold, has so far not yet been taken into
consideration; it places an extraordinary excess burden on the
entire body and its vital movements, so that the results in
actual practice will very likely prove to be far more
unfavorable than in the present experiments.” (_T-404._)
If it was impossible perfectly to simulate flying conditions in the
low-pressure chamber—and this, if they were scientists at all worthy of
the name, they should have known and must have known—then the tests
were only the wildest kind of experimenting. And if the experimenting
was done with human lives, as it was, the recklessness and the wanton
handling of these human lives, resulting from 60 to 70 times in death,
can only be characterized by what it was,—murder.
(d) Freezing Experiments
On 20 May 1942, [Field] Marshal Milch wrote General Wolff recommending
experiments “in regard to perils at high seas.” (_T-393._) As German
aviators from time to time were being forced to parachute into the North
Seas, and consequently being subject to extreme cold for extended
periods of time, the purpose of the freezing experiments was to
ascertain the most effective way of rewarming such aviators and thereby
saving their lives. (_T-480._)
The cold water experiments were performed between August and October
1942; the dry-cold experiments from February to April 1943. Walter Neff,
already identified, described the experimental basin as being made of
wood, two meters long, two meters high, and 50 centimeters above the
floor. He stated that 280 to 300 prisoners were used in the tests, many
of them undergoing as high as three experiments, and that out of the
number indicated 80 to 90 died. The selection of the subjects was left
to the political department of the camp after Rascher had made requests
for a certain number. The eventual victims were made up of political
prisoners, foreigners, prisoners of war, and inmates condemned to death.
According to Neff, none of the subjects were volunteers. (_T-423._)
The experiment was conducted in the following manner. The basin was
filled with water and then ice was added until the temperature measured
3° [centigrade]. Now the subject, either naked or dressed in a flying
suit, was forced into the freezing liquid. When two certain doctors,
Holzloehner and Finke, were performing the experiment, the subjects had
narcotics administered to them, but when Rascher took over he refused
narcotics because he maintained that “you cannot find the exact
condition of the blood, and that you would exclude the willpower of the
subject if he was under an anaesthetic.” When the subject was
experimented on in a conscious state, a much longer time elapsed before
the so-called freezing narcosis set in. (_T-424._)
Neff, describing the operation, declared that the “sinking down of the
temperature until 32° [centigrade] was a terrible plight for the
experimental subject.” At 32° the subject lost consciousness, but these
persons “were frozen down to 25° body temperature.” When Rascher was
handling the experiments “a large number of the persons involved were
kept in the water so long a time until they were dead.” (_T-425._)
Many others died during the reviving or during the re-warming procedure.
The utterly heartless and fiendish manner in which some of the
experiments were conducted can be gathered from the graphic description
by Neff of the episode of the two Russians—
“It was the worst experiment which was ever carried out. From
the bunker two Russian officers were carried out. We were
forbidden to speak to them. They arrived in the afternoon at
approximately 4 o’clock. Rascher had them undressed and they had
to go into the basin in a naked state. Hour after hour passed
and when usually after a short time, 60 minutes, the freezing
would have set in, these two Russians were still conscious even
after two hours. All of our appeals to Rascher, asking him to
give them an injection was without purpose. Approximately in the
third hour one Russian said to the other: ‘Comrade, tell that
officer that he may shoot us.’ Then the other one replied,
‘Don’t expect any mercy from this Fascist dog.’ And how can one
imagine that we inmates also had to be witnesses of such a death
and could do nothing against it, then you can really estimate
how terrible it is to be condemned to work in such an
experimental station. After these words, which were translated
to the Germans by a young Pole in a somewhat different form,
Rascher went back into his office. The young Pole immediately
tried to give them an anaesthetic with chloroform, but Rascher
returned immediately. He threatened us with a pistol, and he
said, ‘Don’t dare interfere and approach these victims.’ The
experiment lasted at least five hours until death set in. Both
corpses were sent to Munich for autopsy in the Schwabisches
Hospital there. Q. Witness, how long did it normally take to
kill a person in these freezing experiments? A. The length of
the experiment varied according to the individual case. It
always varied according to whether the subject was clothed or
unclothed. If his physical construction was weak and if in
addition to that he was naked, death often set in already after
80 minutes. But there were a number of cases where the
experimental subject lived up to three hours and remained that
way in the water until finally death set in.” (_T-426._)
On 20 September 1942, Rascher made an intermediary report on these
experiments—
“The experimental subjects (VP’s) were placed in the water
dressed in complete flying uniform, winter or summer
combination, and with an aviator’s helmet. A life jacket made of
rubber or kapok was to prevent submerging. The experiments were
carried out at water temperatures varying from 2.5° to 12°
[centigrade]. In one experimental series, the occiput, the brain
stem, protruded above the water, while in another series, the
brain stem and back of the head were submerged in water * * *.
Fatalities occurred only when the brain stem and back of the
head were also chilled. Autopsies of such fatal cases always
revealed large amounts of free blood, up to one-half liter, in
the cranial cavity. The heart invariably showed extreme dilation
of the right chamber. As soon as the temperature in these
experiments reached 28° the experimental subjects died
invariably, despite all attempts at resuscitation. The
above-discussed autopsy findings conclusively proved the
importance of a warming protective device for the occiput when
designing the planned protective clothing of foam type.”
(_T-398-399._)
The sheer monstrousness of this type of experiment reveals itself in the
last sentence of the report which states with the flourish of a great
scientific discovery that if the back of the head, the occiput is to be
submerged in freezing water, there should be a warm, protective device
to cover the occiput. If one is to have his feet in icy water, he should
wear warm, waterproof boots. If he is to dip his head in the icy water,
then his head should also be protected! This, then, is the weighty
conclusion of so-called scientists sacrificing human lives for an
observation that is obvious to a ten-year-old child.
“During attempts to save severely chilled persons (Unterkuehlte)
it was shown that rapid re-warming was in all cases preferable
to slow re-warming, because after removed from the cold water,
the body temperature continued to sink rapidly. I think that for
this reason, we can dispense with the attempt to save intensely
chilled subjects by means of animal heat. Rewarming by animal
warmth, animal bodies or women’s bodies, would be too slow. As
auxiliary measures for the prevention of intense chilling,
improvements in the clothing of aviators come alone into
consideration. The foam suit with suitable neck protector which
is being prepared by the German Institution for Textile Research
(Deutsches Textilforschungsinstitut), Muenchen-Gladbach,
deserves first priority in this connection. The experiments have
shown that pharmaceutical measures are probably necessary if the
flier _is still alive_ at the time of rescue.” (_T-399-400._)
Here other amazing, fantastic discoveries were made.
1. That something should be done at once to re-warm a body that
has been floating about in icy water.
2. That aviator suits be made up with suitable neck protectors.
3. And that if the flier is still alive when rescued, medicine
should be prescribed for him. If dead, no pharmaceutical
measures are recommended!
In the year 1942, in the name of science, in the name of progress, men
trained in medicine calmly and deliberately froze the blood in the
arteries and veins of human beings to the point of death to proclaim
warm clothing for low temperatures and re-warming and medicine for those
who have succumbed to coldness.
Dr. Becker-Freyseng, who participated in some of the experiments,
declared that as a result of the freezing experiments conducted at
Dachau, they gave orders to flight surgeons that the warm bath method
was to be used in reviving aviators who had been chilled. And thus
another milestone was reached in science; namely, that warmth revived
and comforted these who had been chilled. (_T-470._)
On 22 September 1942, Himmler acknowledged Rascher’s report, but Himmler
who was carrion and obscenity incarnate, ordered that further subjects
be frozen, and that re-warming and revival be attempted by the use of
naked women. For this purpose Rascher obtained four gypsy women, and the
experiments began. The subjects were, in accordance with usual
procedure, forced into water in which ice cakes floated and were
retained in the freezing compound until unconscious. Then each frozen
victim was put to bed with two naked women, and the three were covered
with blankets. In still other experiments the unconscious subject was
placed in bed with only one woman. From all this revolting and macabre
performance, the scientific deduction was reached that the re-warming
process was better achieved by one woman than two because with one
single partner “personal inhibitions are removed and the woman nestles
up to the chilled victim more intimately.” This was the great scientific
revelation achieved from an obscene spectacle which could have seemed
more like the superstitious drum-beating rites of barbarians on some
forgotten savage, jungle-infested isle, than the work of educated
doctors in the year 1942. Nor was this type of experiment without its
fatalities. Of one subject, the report stated, “This person died with
symptoms suggesting cerebral hemorrhage as was confirmed by the
subsequent autopsy.” The Nazi scientists, after this experiment, did
however, achieve greatness in stating that this type of re-warming was
recommended only when women were available and other types of re-warming
facilities were not available, except in the “case of small children who
are best re-warmed by their mothers with the aid of hot-water bottles.”
(!)
In a final report to Himmler on the super-cooling experiments at Dachau,
the ghastly experimenters, after having killed scores of subjects, came
to the conclusion that they did not know whether rescued persons should
be re-warmed quickly or slowly—
“It was not clear, for example, whether those who had been
rescued should be warmed quickly or slowly. According to the
current instructions for treating frozen people, a slow
warming-up seemed to be indicated. Certain theoretical
considerations could be adduced for a slow warming. Well-founded
suggestions were missing for a promising medicinal therapy.”
The uncertainty is blamed on the “absence of well-founded suggestions
concerning the cause of death by cold in human beings.” (_T-433._)
And now, in order to clarify this question, they decided to go back to
animal experiments which would suggest that after all their
experimenting and killing of human beings, they are no closer to any
scientific discovery than when they started. (_T-433._)
However, they still continued the experiments with human beings in
another manner. This was the dry-cold process, an operation carried out
during the period January-March 1943. The _modus operandi_ of this
experiment was to place the subject outdoors at night in a nude state,
cover him with a linen sheet, and then pour cold water over him hourly.
After several operations of this character, Rascher complained that it
was a mistake to cover the subjects even with a linen sheet. He must be
utterly naked, otherwise “the air cannot get at the person.” And from
then on the subjects suffered their torture without covering of any
kind. Even if it could be assumed that the test could have the slightest
modicum of value, it is not understood why the subject had to be utterly
naked. As the purpose of the experiment, it is presumed, was to
ascertain the reaction of a soldier’s body to a frozen state, there is
no reason why the subject could not wear some clothes, if only the
merest undergarment, because it is scarcely conceivable that a soldier
or aviator would be without some clothing on his back. On this subject,
Neff testified—
“The next experiment was a mass experiment when the prisoners
were also put outside naked at night. The temperature of one of
them was measured with a galvanometer, the others with a
thermometer. Rascher was present during approximately eighteen
to twenty experiments of that type, but I can not remember
exactly how many deaths occurred and if deaths occurred in
connection with these experiments. I would like to say with
certain reservations that approximately three deaths occurred
during that period.” (_T-429._)
On the character of the subjects Neff stated—
“Of the experimental subjects subjected to air-cooling
experiments, none were people who were sentenced to death. They
were prisoners of various nationalities. There were also German
political prisoners and ‘green’ prisoners.
“Q. And these prisoners had not volunteered, had they?
“A. No.” (_T-429._)
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
(a) Responsibility of Milch as to Count One of Indictment
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, promulgated by the Allied
Control Council, representing the nations of the United States, Great
Britain, France, and Russia, proclaims the ill-treatment or deportation
to slave labor of civilian populations of occupied territories, or the
ill-treatment of prisoners of war, to be war crimes, punishable by
death, imprisonment, or other penalties.
It is sufficient for this Tribunal to cite Control Council Law No. 10 as
authority for its action in this case. Since, however, the Control
Council came into being after the ending of the war, and since the laws
which it published necessarily also followed the termination of
hostilities, it has been argued by defense counsel that it does not
comport with justice and reason that a defendant should be condemned for
an act which, prior to its commission, was not accepted in international
law as a crime. From the day of surrender Germany has been without a
government of its own, and as the Allied powers are exercising
quasi-sovereign jurisdiction in practically all phases of German
relations, both internal and external, the very circumstances of
Germany’s present political situation not only justifies but demands
that the Control Council establish government in its three fundamental
phases; namely, the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative.
Otherwise chaos would fling Germany into even a more precipitous abyss
than the one into which she has fallen, and the supreme and perhaps
irreparable disaster, arrested by Allied intervention, would be upon
her.
Yet it can be argued and it has been argued that despite the imperative
need of an occupational force with its almost unlimited jurisdiction,
such an occupying force simply represents the authority of victor over
vanquished. In the discharge of its duties under the law which created
it, this Tribunal is not called upon to answer the arguments just
indicated, but a respect for the opinion of mankind invites a listing of
the reasons which establish the justice of the procedure here invoked
and the reasons which must invest its judgment with the solemnity and
solidity of accepted international law.
In the first place, it is not Control Council Law No. 10 which makes
abuse of civilian populations an international crime, nor even the
decision of the International Military Tribunal, which in turn derived
its power from the London Charter which had as its antecedent the Moscow
Declaration of 1943. International law is not a body of codes and
statutes, but the gradual expression, case by case, of the moral
judgments of the civilized world, and no international law textbook of
the last century ever sanctioned the deportation of a civilian
population for labor. Although under Article 52 of the Hague
Regulations, the inhabitants of occupied countries may be used for the
needs of the occupying army, such civilians may be utilized only in
proportion to the resources of the country, and they may not under any
circumstances be required to take part in military operations against
their own country. L. Oppenheim’s Treatise on International Law (Vol.
II, Sixth Edition, page 345) states flatly that there is no right to
deport inhabitants to the country of the occupant for the purpose of
compelling them to work there.
It is submitted, however, that though this is the law and so recognized,
total warfare, as it raged in World War II, suspended, if it did not
outrightly abrogate, all these rules heretofore respected and esteemed
as binding on civilized nations. In this respect defense counsel argues
that “modern warfare, having as its aim total annihilation of the armed
production of the enemy, brought with it to a great extent warfare
against the civilian population,” and he cites total blockade as an
illustration of his thesis. It is true that total blockade affects the
entire blockaded population, as indeed air raids strike at the most
helpless and harmless of the enemy’s civilians. The writer of this
opinion was witness many times to the death and mutilation of
inhabitants, including women, children, and old men, in Luftwaffe air
raids aimed at legitimate war targets. German civilians also paid with
their lives for living in their own country. And thus, it would seem in
principle, that if civilians may legitimately be killed through military
action, though noncombatant, they may certainly be made to work. But it
does not follow that because military necessity unintentionally
victimizes a civilian population, political domination may strip them of
their civil rights and subject them to intentional torture and possible
death. With all its horror modern war still “is not a condition of
anarchy and lawlessness between the belligerents, but a contention in
many respects regulated, restricted, and modified by law.” (Oppenheim,
ibid., 421.)
Though the adversaries descend into the pit of bloody combat, there is
always open to them the means of re-ascending to the level of nonhostile
negotiations. The matter of temporary truces for recovering the dead and
succoring the wounded, the making of arrangements through international
relief organizations for the treatment of prisoners, the granting of
safe passage through the lines of persons mutually agreed upon by the
parties, all are instances which refute the logical development of
defense counsel’s argument that total warfare justifies the abandonment
of every restriction and authorizes the combatants to use all manners
and means to win the conflict.
And no one was in a better position to understand this than the
defendant. He had participated as a soldier in the First World War; he
had, following the war, entered distinguished private enterprise; he had
travelled extensively and was induced by none other than Hitler himself
to enter the Air Ministry long before the outbreak of World War II
because of his talents and abilities. It is idle for defense counsel to
say that Milch “was never a good National Socialist.” If joining a
political party, accepting its benefits and preferments, rising to
supreme heights in grade and distinction, offering never-flagging
loyalty to the Fuehrer, even in the face of a declared acknowledgment
that the Fuehrer was leading Germany to disaster, if this does not make
one a full-fledged National Socialist, then nothing does.
Milch did not simply passively ignore international law, he actively
expressed a knowledgeable contempt for it. We have seen how he declared
at one of the Central Planning Board meetings that “International law
cannot be observed here.”
Defense counsel made much of the point that the German people did not
want war, and the defendant himself described how when the first tanks
moved through the streets of Berlin, the inhabitants of that city were
silent and worried. But it is not clear how this observation advances
the innocence of the defendant. If anything it adds to his moral guilt
because the evidence reveals only too well that to the fullest extent of
his energies he prosecuted a war which he states was against the will
and interests of his people. The indictment has not charged him with
waging aggressive war, but in view of his participation in the 23 May
1939 conference when Hitler outlined quite clearly his aggressive
intentions, and in view of his (Milch’s) never tiring efforts in the
war’s various phases—at the front, in the air, in production, in
inspection—it cannot be said that to his trained mind the war had the
aspects of a defensive and not an aggressive conflict. Although Milch
has here repudiated belief in the master race theory, yet we know that
he went through a formal procedure to establish the absence of Jewish
blood in his veins. This procedure even took the embarrassing turn of
statements concerning his parentage. In doing this, Milch could not help
but know that the Jews were being persecuted by the political party to
which he voluntarily belonged. Nor will the Tribunal believe his
declaration that he knew of only two concentration camps in all of
occupied Europe. For the Tribunal to acknowledge this statement would be
to declare Milch weak-minded if not _non compos mentis_. Milch, was
constantly threatening workers with the concentration camp. These
threats he attributes to excessive anger as he does all his outbursts,
to which we have already called attention.
Milch would have the Tribunal believe that his violent language was
never intended to produce results. He explained that his declaration
that Italian prisoners of war attempting to escape should be shot does
not constitute cruelty because, in the words of his counsel, “all
countries have prisoners shot who attempt to escape.” This contradicts
another statement made in court wherein he lauded prisoners who sought
to regain their freedom. When confronted with inconsistencies of this
character, the defendant invariably sought refuge in the statement that
he was never taken seriously in his threats to shoot, hang, or whip. He
informs us that he never used a whip, that everybody knew he
exaggerated, that nobody took him seriously, and that he did not have
full control of himself. But Erhard Milch was not the village idiot. He
carried a field marshal’s baton, and the lifting of that baton compelled
obedience no matter how idiotic might be the demand. Further, Milch’s
imprecations were not simple interjections; they frequently carried the
appearance of orders already given or about to be issued. He may never
have actually penned a death warrant or called out the SD with its
murder squads, but is it so certain that underlings beyond his
cognizance did not carry into effect his sometimes very clear directions
on punishments to be inflicted?
Violent language is not as innocuous as Milch would have the present
world believe. Even if it should be true that his immediate circle
laughed at his fulminations, as was testified, there is no assurance
that others laughed. A field marshal’s fraternizations are necessarily
limited. There were not many who had the privilege to stand beside him,
as did General Vorwald, and philosophically muse; “Now his neck is
getting red again.” There were necessarily hundreds in the course of six
years of war who, attending his various meetings, were not informed that
his fire and brimstone were froth. Vorwald can laugh at a field marshal
and a field marshal can laugh at a Hitler, but the comedy ceases there.
Milch has ridiculed Hitler’s speeches and pointed out that certain
portions of the Fuehrer’s orations were known as the “Adam and Eve”
section. He indicated further that many of Hitler’s thunderings were
mere bluff, but who can say today that he was bluffing?
Hitler’s most potent force for evil was language. With all that he has
to answer for at the bar of history, it can be doubted that there exists
proof that he with his own hands killed any man or even the proverbial
fly. Hitler’s armory was language. It was Hitler’s language which
mesmerized the German nation. Every one has said so. He had no other
abilities. He was no soldier. All the generals were agreed on that. He
could not ride a horse, he could not drive a car, he could not build a
fence. He could hang paper and he could talk, and the German people
regarded that talk as substance. And on the phosphorescent sea of his
wildly undulating phrases they launched the ship of their well-being
with the tragic result that fragments and splinters of that ship now
piteously stare at one from every nook and corner of this once
prosperous and happy land.
The greatest individual force of destruction in Germany for nearly 20
years was _Mein Kampf_. And yet _Mein Kampf_ was simply language. To the
knowledge of the writer of this opinion, _Mein Kampf_ was never used as
a missile or fired as a projectile, but is there a German sincerely
interested in the welfare of his country today who doubts that its words
were bullets, its phrases bombs, and its pages poison which, falling
into the wells of the nation, corroded the thinking of the innocent and
goaded into action the ambitions of the wicked?
As the record shows, Milch incessantly threatened the wildest excesses,
he orally directed them, and he reported to his chief on one occasion
that he had put certain ones into effect. In spite of his present
disavowal, there is nothing in the transcript to indicate that he
repudiated his threats at the time of utterance. The defense has
repeatedly attacked the accuracy of the minutes of the Central Planning
Board, the GL, and the Jaegerstab. All these documents were taken from
the official files of the Reich Air Ministry. Furthermore, the
defendant’s constant efforts on the stand to modify the far-reaching
implications of his speeches concede the general correctness of the
remarks attributed to him. Thus, making due allowance for stenographic
errors, the defendant stands out through the pages of these reports as a
resolute, persevering, determined worker, unyielding and loyal to his
cause, which was the cause of the Fuehrer.
It can be believed that Erhard Milch was not seeking personal enrichment
and a luxurious living, which was so obviously the nefarious and
principal goal of his chief, the super-pilferer Hermann Goering. Milch
was seeking victory for Germany, for which he held an understandable
affection, but his intelligence, training, and experience in the affairs
of the world told him inescapably that Germany was waging an aggressive
and culpable war. Milch gave of his talents and energies to the winning
of a war criminally begun and lawlessly prosecuted, which, had it ended
in victory for the aggressors would have resulted in the heartless
subjugation of countless millions of innocent and helpless people. The
defendant has recounted his worries and anguish and has explained that
this mental torment provoked many of his unbridled utterances, but what
was the cause of this bitterness and mortification? Not that Europe had
become a slaughterhouse, not that blood ran like water, not that the
four Horsemen of the Apocalypse were galloping over the continent
hurling famine, pestilence, and death into every city, village, and
hamlet. Milch’s torment and soul-sickness were not that the human race
and human dignity were being debased and degraded as they had never been
before since man knew shame. It was not for all this that Milch’s heart
was breaking. His consternation, his panic was that Germany was losing
the war!
He said, “I had to walk into defeat with open eyes.” (_T-1948._) Also,
“I could see what was coming and I could not help my people.” And in his
bitterness he increased the fury of his verbal lashes over the backs of
the foreign workers, he redoubled his efforts for more importations and
screamed for more production. He knew, as far back as November 1941,
that the war was lost; this knowledge was confirmed after Stalingrad,
and every vestige of doubt as to the eventual result was shattered by
the clouds of bombers over Germany every day. He knew that Hitler was
leading Germany over the brink to ruin, and yet he called for more and
more production to make the disaster all the more noteworthy. He was
having difficulties with Goering, Hitler did not want him any more, and
yet he stoked the fires of his wrath to an even higher degree of
vengeance against the workers because they would not turn out more
production for the war, every continuing day of which brought only
greater misery to his people. The argument does not ring true. Milch may
have believed Germany might lose the war but he certainly made every
effort to have it end victoriously. This in itself is honorable for a
soldier, but he allowed himself to use means and methods which the code
of a soldier does not authorize or countenance, and therein he fell.
He has related several accidents which may have affected his health. He
cracked-up two or three times with his plane and he suffered an
automobile mishap as well. It is suggested, although not vigorously
pressed, that all this may explain his towering wraths and lightning
fury. But the plea in this case is not “Not Guilty because of Insanity.”
Nowhere is it advanced that the defendant is not now, nor that at any
time throughout the war was not, in the fullest possession of his mental
faculties. If a temporary aberration is being suggested, it is
remarkable that these deviations from the norm occurred only when he was
urging the maximum and severest employment of forced labor and menacing
with the direst punishment those who did not fulfill to the extreme the
commitments of this illegal enterprise. If Milch was at any time
deprived of his reasoning faculties, his temporary unbalance had method
in it.
The Tribunal finds Erhard Milch guilty on count one of the indictment.
(b) Count Two
In considering Milch’s responsibility under count two, we will need to
enumerate and weigh each reference to him in the testimony in this
connection. The high-altitude experiments began in March and lasted
until June 1942. Cold-water experiments were conducted during the period
from the middle of August until October 1942. The dry-cold experiments
lasted from February through April 1943. During this time Milch was
Inspector General of the Air Forces, State Secretary in the Air
Ministry, and Generalluftzeugmeister. As Inspector General he was in
charge of the office which authorized research and medical experiments
conducted in behalf of the Air Forces. General Hippke, physician in
charge of the Luftwaffe Medical Department, was directly subordinate to
the defendant. As Generalluftzeugmeister, Milch was head of air
ordnance. Milch had charge of the development of technical experiments
for the Luftwaffe.
All medical institutes and Luftwaffe medical men were subordinate to the
Medical Inspectorate Chief, Dr. Hippke. The DVL[165] was subordinate to
Hippke’s office in technical matters. Dr. Rascher conducted his
experiments at Dachau. He was temporarily assigned to the SS, but
retained his status as a Luftwaffe physician, rising from a second
lieutenant to a captain in the Luftwaffe. During the period of the
experimentations, Rascher was under the command of the Luftwaffe.
On 20 May 1942, Milch wrote a letter to General Wolff, stating that his
medical inspector had reported to him that the high-altitude experiments
conducted by the SS and the Luftwaffe had been finished, and he did not
recommend that they should be continued. He did, however, authorize
experiments “of some other kind in regard to perils at high seas.” On 4
June 1942, Milch authorized Hippke the continued use of the low-pressure
chamber. On 20 July 1942, Rascher sent Brandt a report on the
high-altitude experiments and the accompanying letter stated that it is
Himmler’s desire that the report should be sent to Milch. On 25 August
1942, Himmler sent Milch a copy of the report and asked that he receive
Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg for a lecture and a showing of the film made
of the experiment.
On 31 August 1942, Milch wrote Himmler acknowledging the report and
promising to receive the two gentlemen for the lecture and showing of
the film. On 23 August 1942, Sievers wrote Brandt discussing a revival
of the high-altitude experiments and stating that a report was to have
been made to Milch, but that the report was not made. On 3 October 1942,
Rascher wrote Brandt that the report to Milch, planned for September,
could not be made because Milch was not present. On 27 November 1942,
Wolff wrote Milch a long letter pointing out the need and the great
value of the experiments with human beings, stating that Himmler “has
accepted the responsibility for supplying death-deserving, asocial
persons, and criminals from the concentration camps for these
experiments.” He asks Milch to assign Rascher to the SS so that he can
continue with the experiments directly under Himmler’s orders. “In any
case, these experiments must not be stopped. We owe that to our men.”
Dr. Romberg stated in an affidavit that Milch “was familiar with these
experiments.” Neff testified that “Milch’s name was mentioned in
connection with the high-altitude experiments.” Sievers, Director of the
Research and Teaching Association, stated that “Milch must have known
about the experiments of Dr. Rascher.” Dr. Ruff stated that to his
knowledge Milch was informed of these tests either by Hippke or by the
SS. Dr. Becker-Freyseng said that Dr. Kalk told him he had seen Rascher
in Milch’s office.
When the film was shown in Milch’s office on 11 September 1942, Milch
was not present. Wolfgang Lutz testified that Milch had negotiated
directly with Himmler regarding the execution of such experiments
without consulting the Medical Inspectorate. Rudolf Brandt stated that
Milch was fully informed about the low-pressure experiments. As late as
January 1943, Milch had not replied to the letter sent him by Wolff,
asking for the assignment of Rascher to the SS.
This, in brief, constitutes the case against Erhard Milch in connection
with the medical experiments. In order to find Milch guilty on this
count of the indictment, it must be established that—
1. Milch had knowledge of the experiments.
2. That, having knowledge, he knew they were criminal in scope and
execution.
3. That he had this knowledge in time to act to prevent the
experiments.
4. That he had the power to prevent them.
In pressing this count against the defendant, the prosecution has the
burden, as it has the burden in every count, to prove the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. We begin our deliberations with the
cardinal rule that the defendant is presumed to be innocent. Glancing at
the evidence as a whole, it is a facile matter to say that the defendant
must have known of the experiments; that, with so much smoke, there must
be fire. But in addition to smoke, there must be light.
The proof against Milch on this count is entirely circumstantial, and
before we can find him guilty we must conclude that every hypothesis
resulting from the circumstances is consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence. One can easily reach the hypothesis of
guilt from the documents and testimony but that hypothesis in many of
its phases is also consistent with innocence. Thus, applying the rule of
evidence just cited, the test of guilt fails.
So far as chronology is concerned, Milch does not come into the picture
of the experiments until 20 May 1942 with a letter in which he states
that his medical inspector informed him that the high-altitude
experiments had been completed. Obviously if they were completed there
was nothing he could do to prevent them. Nor did the medical inspector
or anyone else testify that Milch was informed of the precise nature of
the experiments. Further, there is no evidence that Milch ever received
any reports at all on the freezing experiments.
No one ever suggested that Milch attended the operations at Dachau or
that he ever gave an order that human beings were to be used to the
point of death.
If we can imagine the pieces of evidence on this count as irregularly
shaped blocks of wood floating on water, we find these blocks
occasionally coming together and dovetailing into a pattern of guilt,
but then we find them separating and just as often forming the pattern
of innocence. No man should be convicted on evidence that does not
remain fixed and immovable in granitic solidity. Guilt cannot be founded
on a set of facts from which arguments are equally convincing as to
guilt and as to innocence. Remarks such as “the defendant must have
known,” or “to the best of my knowledge he knew,” and other similar
inconclusive conjectures frequently used in this part of the case are
not the kind of links which are imperatively needed to make up a chain
strong enough to sustain the weight of a conviction.
The defendant is found not guilty on the second count of the indictment.
Though Milch is acquitted of complicity and participation in the medical
experiments, we have nonetheless commented on those experiments at
length. We have done this because otherwise the reference to Milch’s
acquittal standing alone might convey impression that the experiments
themselves were not criminal. The Tribunal holds that the _corpus
delicti_ was established and a crime was committed, even though Milch is
not guilty of it.
(c) Count Three
The third count of the indictment charges the defendant with crimes
against humanity (slave labor and fatal medical experiments) committed
on German nationals and nationals of other countries. As we have found
him not guilty on count two, we necessarily also find him not guilty of
the crime of fatal medical experiments in count three. We have, however,
adjudicated him guilty on count one, and since the evidence establishes
that nationals of other countries were also victims of slave labor under
his control, we thus find Erhard Milch guilty on that part of the third
count which covers the nationals of other countries. Sufficient proof
was not submitted as to slave labor offenses against German nationals to
justify an adjudication of guilt on that ground.
Thus, in recapitulation, we find the defendant guilty on count one, not
guilty on count two, not guilty on count three insofar as it appertains
to German nationals and guilty wherein it refers to “nationals of other
countries.” In reaching these conclusions, we inescapably ascertain that
Erhard Milch was a full-fledged member of the National Socialist Party
of Germany. Further, that he adhered to the doctrines of this Party
which, with the almost cataclysmic force of planetary violence, achieved
more destruction than has been known since man stood upright on the
shores of history. The conclusion is also unavoidable that it was
individuals like Milch that made the Hitler plan of war and subjugation
possible. Hitler was but one man and it was only because he had
brilliant and able coadjutors that he could develop a war machine which
achieved the incredible and fantastic record of smashing Poland in 18
days, striking France to her knees in 2 months, driving England from the
continent in 6 weeks, overrunning Holland and Belgium in a few days,
vanquishing Norway in several weeks, and Denmark overnight.
In those days of spectacular triumph, Milch had no complaint against
Hitler. But it was precisely then that Hitler was working his greatest
harm to Germany because it was inevitable that the people he had
temporarily crushed would rise again and not rest until the evil power
responsible for their suffering was destroyed. If Milch had entertained
the loyalty to his people which he now professes, then was the time to
withdraw from a program which was wreaking a devastation so universal
that no country, including Germany, could escape.
The defendant stated from the witness stand he could not withdraw
because he owed fealty to Hitler and to the German people. His loyalty
to Hitler was loyalty to a man who he now states had marked him for
liquidation, and so far as allegiance to the German people is concerned,
they can feel no gratitude for an allegiance which increased their ruin,
magnified their misery, and pushed them only deeper into the pit of
despair. The Germans could do without a devotion of that kind.
The defendant apparently gained the impression in our questioning of him
that some heroic sacrifice was expected on his part. We never intended,
nor was it suggested, that he should take any action which could result
in the forfeiture of his life. But he did himself volunteer from the
witness stand that on two occasions he was ready to tell Hitler the
truth even if it should mean his execution. If he was prepared to
sacrifice his life on so futile a gesture, he could have taken some
action which involved less hazard. He could thus, at least to that
extent, have contributed to honesty and justice by refraining from
threatening with death and whipping those who did not give of their last
ounce of energy in the production of ordnance whose muzzles would
eventually be turned on Germany itself.
In his last statement in court Milch declared that he was indifferent to
his fate but he was interested in seeing Germany relieved of her
suffering and re-admitted to the community of nations as an equal
partner. We do not believe that any intelligent person can be
indifferent to his fate, although one can summon sufficient spiritual
fortitude to rise above an immediate regret. With regard to Milch’s wish
for the German people, he has definitely performed one service in
pulling aside the curtain to disclose to them the stupidities, the
vanities, and the arrogances of their leaders which brought about their
present state. The record of this case will particularly, of course,
expose Milch’s own errors and his transgressions against international
law, the laws and customs of war, the moral code of humanity and even
commandments 4 and 7 of the 10 commandments of the German soldier.
The purpose of these postwar trials obviously is not vengeance. The
object aimed at (as in the criminal jurisprudence of all civilized
nations) is the ascertainment of truth. When guilt is established, the
penalty imposed is to serve as a deterrent to all others who might be
similarly minded. Albert Speer, convicted in the first trial, stated
here in this courtroom that had trials such as these followed the First
World War, the Second World War might have been averted. Erhard Milch
may obtain some comfort from the realization that by the publication of
the evidence of this trial he is definitely contributing to the
education and well-being of Germany’s future, as indeed a precise
contribution is being made to the cause of world justice itself.
Over 155,000 Americans made the supreme sacrifice in Germany in this
war. These lads gave their lives for this ideal of world justice and
world peace. America sought no territorial aggrandizement or material
advantage. The American flag in this courtroom ensured to the defendant
all the guarantees of the United States Constitution as to a fair trial.
No person within the continental limits of the United States itself
could have wished for a fuller opportunity to demonstrate his innocence
of the charges brought against him.
America and her Allies bestowed upon Germany what no desire can achieve
and what no money can buy. The Allied nations gave the blood of their
youth to water the roots of the tree of liberty and tolerance which had
withered in the twelve-year drought of National Socialism. It is to
reveal who were responsible and what was responsible for the desiccation
of that tree and to proclaim to the world the inevitable consequences to
others who degrade the soil with the pollution and prussic acid of
oppression that these trials have been established. The present trial is
one chapter in the book which will forever condemn _Mein Kampf_ and
offer to the new German nation a volume of proved fact, whose every page
will tell of the sorrow awaiting any people which permit any man or men
to hoist deceit above truth, power above justice, oppression above
tolerance, war above peace and man above God.
[Signed] MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO
JUDGE MILITARY TRIBUNAL II
-----
[160] The reference “T” is to the page of the mimeographed transcript.
[161] “IMT” refers to Trial of the Major War Criminals before the
International Military Tribunal, Vol. I, Nuremberg, Germany, 1947.
[162] Original German document read 50,000 but, due to clerical error,
translation of document which was submitted in Court read 500,000.
Incorrectness is obvious by total figure of 220,000 in last sentence.
[163] Chef Ansbildungawesen (Chief of Training).
[164] A word is missing here in the German original.
[165] Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fuer Luftfahrt (German Institute for
Aviation Research). In this case, the reference is to the Medical
Section of the Institute.
C. Concurring Opinion by Judge Fitzroy D. Phillips
This Tribunal has been duly organized and is now existing under the
authority of Ordnance No. 7 pursuant to the powers of the Military
Governor of the United States Zone of Occupation within Germany
expressly conferred therein and further pursuant to the powers conferred
upon the zone commander by Control Council Law No. 10 and Articles 10
and 11 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to
the London agreement of 8 August 1945, and by authority of Executive
Order No. 9819 signed and issued by Harry S. Truman, President of the
United States of America, the pertinent parts of said order as follows:
“By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and
the statutes, and as President of the United States and
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it
is ordered as follows:
“1. I hereby designate Fitzroy Donald Phillips, Judge of a
Superior Court in the State of North Carolina; Robert Morrell
Toms, Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Detroit,
Michigan; and Captain Michael A. Musmanno (S), USNR, 086622, as
the members, and John Joshua Speight as the alternate member of
one of the several military tribunals established by the
Military Governor for the United States Zone of Occupation
within Germany pursuant to the quadripartite agreement of the
Control Council for Germany, enacted December 20, 1945, as
Control Council Law No. 10, and pursuant to Articles 10 and 11
of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which
Tribunal was established by the Government of the United States
of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic,
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, for the trial and punishment of major war
criminals of the European Axis. Such members and alternate
member may, at the direction of the Military Governor of the
United States Zone of Occupation, serve on any of the several
military tribunals above mentioned.”
and as such Tribunal, has jurisdiction to try and determine this case.
Subsequent to the organization of said Tribunal, Telford Taylor,
Brigadier General, United States Army, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
prepared and caused to be prepared a bill of indictment charging the
defendant, Erhard Milch, with certain war crimes and crimes against
humanity as will appear more specifically hereinafter in this judgment
and on 14 November 1946 caused said bill of indictment to be duly served
upon the defendant, Erhard Milch, by the Marshal for the United States
Military Tribunals according to the provisions of law.
Thereafter said bill of indictment was made returnable and said cause
set for trial before United States Military Tribunal No. II. Whereupon,
Dr. I. Friedrich Bergold of the Nuernberg, Germany, bar was duly
appointed as counsel for the defendant and accepted such appointment.
On 20 December 1946, at 9:30 a.m. in the Palace of Justice, Nuernberg,
Germany, the defendant, Erhard Milch, being present in court and
represented by his counsel, Dr. I. Friedrich Bergold, and the United
States of America being represented by Telford Taylor, Brigadier
General, United States Army, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, and
Honorable Clark Denney of counsel, the Tribunal duly arraigned the
defendant upon the charges contained in the bill of indictment against
him, and the defendant when called upon to plead to the bill of
indictment entered a plea of Not Guilty. Whereupon the Tribunal set the
date of 2 January 1947, for the trial of said case and adjourned until
said time.
On 2 January 1947, United States Military Tribunal No. II met in the
Palace of Justice, Nuernberg, Germany, and commenced the trial of this
case.
The bill of indictment charging the defendant, Erhard Milch, with
certain and specific war crimes and crimes against humanity is
summarized as follows:
_Count One_: War crimes involving murder, slave labor, deportation of
civilian populations for slave labor, cruel and inhuman treatment of
foreign laborers, and the use of prisoners of war in war operations by
force and compulsion.
_Count Two_: War crimes involving murder, subjecting involuntary victims
to low-pressure and freezing experiments, resulting in torture and
death.
_Count Three_: Crimes against humanity, involving murder and the same
unlawful acts specified in counts one and two against German nationals
and nationals of other countries.
The trial was conducted in two languages in the main, English and
German, and in English, German, and French when French witnesses were
testifying.
The hearing of evidence and the arguments of counsel concluded on 25
March 1947.
The prosecution offered three witnesses who gave evidence orally and 161
written exhibits, several exhibits containing many documents. The
defense offered 27 witnesses who gave evidence orally and the defendant
also testified in his own behalf, and in addition to oral evidence the
defendant offered 51 written exhibits. The exhibits as offered by both
the prosecution and defense contained documents, photographs,
affidavits, interrogatories, letters, maps, charts, and other written
evidence.
A complete stenographic record of everything said and done in court has
been made as well as an electrical recording of all the proceedings.
Copies of all the documents and written evidence offered by the
prosecution have been supplied to the defense in the German language.
The applications made by the defendant for the production of witnesses
and documents were passed upon by the Tribunal and orders made in
pursuance thereof. The Tribunal, after examination, granted all of the
defense applications which in their opinion were relevant to the defense
of the defendant and denied a few that the Tribunal found not to be
relevant. Facilities were provided for obtaining those witnesses and
documents granted through the Office of the Secretary General of the
Tribunal.
Much of the evidence presented to the Tribunal on behalf of the
prosecution was documentary evidence captured by the Allied armies in
German army headquarters, government buildings, and elsewhere, and some
of said documents were captured in the private files of the defendant
himself. The case therefore against the defendant rests in a large
measure on the documents thus obtained. The documents offered against
the defendant on the part of the prosecution were in a large measure of
his own making or those that were made in the organizations of which he
was a member and largely under his control, and the authenticity of
which has not been challenged except in a few cases and in those he
challenged them mainly on the correctness of the transcript and not upon
the subject matter as a whole. The evidence, oral and written, together
with exhibits and documents contain approximately 3,000 pages which
constitutes the record in this case.
The trial was conducted generally along the lines as are usually
followed in trial courts of the United States except as to the rules of
evidence, and as to those the Tribunal was not bound by technical rules
of evidence and admitted any and all evidence which it deemed to have
probative value and in strict compliance with the provisions of Article
VII of Ordnance No. 7.
The Tribunal has kept in mind throughout the entire trial that this was
a Tribunal established for the purpose of trying major war criminals and
in this particular case a fallen military field marshal of a conquered
nation, and that he was entitled to the Anglo-Saxon and English common
law presumption that he was innocent until his guilt was established
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Article II of Control Council No. 10 is as follows:
“ARTICLE II
“1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:
“(_a_) _Crimes against Peace._ Initiation of invasions of other
countries and wars of aggression in violation of international
laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning,
preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war
in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
“(_b_) _War Crimes._ Atrocities or offenses against persons or
property constituting violations of the laws or customs of war,
including but not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian
population from occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity.
“(_c_) _Crimes against Humanity._ Atrocities and offenses,
including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in
violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.
“(_d_) Membership in categories of a criminal group or
organization declared criminal by the International Military
Tribunal.
“2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in
which he acted is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in
paragraph 1 of this Article, if he (_a_) was a principal or
(_b_) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or
ordered or abetted the same or (_c_) took a consenting part
therein or (_d_) was connected with plans or enterprises
involving its commission or (_e_) was a member of any
organization or group connected with the commission of any such
crime or (_f_) with reference to paragraph 1 (_a_), if he held a
high political, civil or military (including General Staff)
position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or
satellites or held high position in the financial, industrial or
economic life of any such country.
“3. Any person found guilty of any of the crimes above-mentioned
may upon conviction be punished as shall be determined by the
Tribunal to be just. Such punishment may consist of one or more
of the following:
“(_a_) Death.
“(_b_) Imprisonment for life or a term of years, with or without
hard labor.
“(_c_) Fine, and imprisonment with or without hard labor, in
lieu thereof.
“(_d_) Forfeiture of property.
“(_e_) Restitution of property wrongfully acquired.
“(_f_) Deprivation of some or all civil rights.
“Any property declared to be forfeited or the restitution of
which is ordered by the Tribunal shall be delivered to the
Control Council for Germany, which shall decide on its disposal.
“4. (_a_) The official position of any person, whether as Head
of State or as a responsible official in a Government
Department, does not free him from responsibility for a crime or
entitle him to mitigation of punishment.
“(_b_) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of
his Government or of a superior does not free him from
responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation.
“5. In any trial or prosecution for a crime herein referred to,
the accused shall not be entitled to the benefits of any statute
of limitation in respect of the period from 30 January 1933 to 1
July 1945, nor shall any immunity, pardon, or amnesty granted
under the Nazi regime be admitted as a bar to trial or
punishment.”
The defendant stands indicted for the violation particularly of the
provisions of section _b_, which defines war crimes, and for the
violation of the provisions of section _c_, which defines crimes against
humanity, and for the violations of certain provisions of international
conventions, particularly of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 46, and 52 of the
Hague Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, and 31 of the
Prisoner-of-War Convention, Geneva, 1929, the laws and customs of war,
the general provisions of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws
of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in
which such crimes were committed, and further as particularly defined in
Article II of the Control Council Law No. 10.
The first count in the bill of indictment has been designated by the
prosecution as “Slave Labor,” the second count as “Medical Experiments”
and the third count as “Slave Labor and Medical Experiments upon German
Nationals.” The pertinent rules of law that are applicable in this case
will now be considered, and we shall consider briefly some salient
precepts and prohibitions of international law up to and including the
provisions of Control Council Law No. 10.
The prosecution has offered evidence which tended to show that much of
the labor which supplied Germany with the tools of absolute and total
war was extracted from people who had been uprooted from their homes in
occupied territories and imported to Germany against their will and
often under the most trying and difficult circumstances. Displacement of
groups of persons from one country to another is the proper concern of
international law in as far as it affects the community of nations.
International law has enunciated certain conditions under which the fact
of deportation of civilians from one nation to another during times of
war becomes a crime. If the transfer is carried out without a legal
title, as in the case where people are deported from a country occupied
by an invader while the occupied enemy still has an army in the field
and is still resisting, the deportation is contrary to international
law. The rationale of this rule lies in the supposition that the
occupying power has temporarily prevented the rightful sovereign from
exercising its power over its citizens. Articles 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, and
56, Hague Regulations, which limit the rights of the belligerent
occupant, do not expressly specify as crime the deportation of civilians
from an occupied territory. Article 52 states the following provisions
and conditions under which services may be demanded from the inhabitants
of occupied countries:
1. They must be for the needs of the army of occupation.
2. They must be in proportion to the resources of the country.
3. They must be of such a nature as not to involve the
inhabitants in the obligation to take part in military
operations against their own country.
Insofar as this section limits the conscription of labor to that
required for the needs of the army of occupation, it is manifestly clear
that the use of labor from occupied territories outside of the area of
occupation is forbidden by the Hague Regulations.
The second condition under which deportation becomes a crime occurs when
the purpose of the displacement is illegal, such as deportation for the
purpose of compelling the deportees to manufacture weapons for use
against their homeland or to be assimilated in the working economy of
the occupying country. The defense as contained in this case is that
persons were deported from France into Germany legally and for a lawful
purpose by contending that such deportations were authorized by
agreements and contracts between Nazi and Vichy French authorities. The
Tribunal holds that this defense is both technically and substantially
deficient. The Tribunal takes judicial notice of the fact that after the
capitulation of France and the subsequent occupation of French territory
by the German army, a puppet government was established in France and
located at Vichy. This government was established at the instance of the
German Army and was controlled by its officials according to the
dictates and demands of the occupying army and a contract made by the
German Reich with such a government as was established in France
amounted to in truth and in fact a contract that on its face was null
and void. The Vichy Government, until the Allies regained control of the
French Republic, amounted to no more than a tool of the German Reich. It
will be borne in mind that at no time during the Vichy regime a peace
treaty had been signed between the French Republic and the German Reich
but merely a cessation of hostilities and an armistice prevailed, and
that French resistance had at no time ceased and that France at all
times still had an army in the field resisting the German Reich.
The third and final condition, under which deportation becomes illegal,
occurs whenever generally recognized standards of decency and humanity
are disregarded. This flows from the established principle of law that
an otherwise permissible act becomes a crime when carried out in a
criminal manner. A close study of the pertinent parts of Control Council
Law No. 10 strengthens the conclusions of the foregoing statements that
deportation of the population is criminal whenever there is no title in
the deporting authority or whenever the purpose of the displacement is
illegal or whenever the deportation is characterized by inhumane or
illegal methods.
Article II (1) (_c_) of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies certain
crimes against humanity. Among those is listed the deportation of any
civilian population. The general language of this sub-section as applied
to deportation indicates that Control Council Law No. 10 has
unconditionally contended as a crime against humanity every instance of
the deportation of civilians. Article II (1) (_b_) names deportation to
slave labor as a war crime. Article II (1) (_c_) states that the
enslavement of any civilian population is a crime against humanity. Thus
Law No. 10 treats as separate crimes and different types of crime
“deportation to slave labor” and “enslavement.” The Tribunal holds that
the deportation, the transportation, the retention, the unlawful use,
and the inhumane treatment of civilian populations by an occupying power
are crimes against humanity.
The Hague and Geneva Conventions codify the precepts of the law and
usages of all civilized nations. Article 31 of the Geneva Convention
provides that labor furnished by prisoners of war shall have no direct
relation to war operations. Thus the convention forbids (1) the use of
prisoners of war in manufacture or transportation of arms or ammunitions
of any kind; and (2) the use for transporting of matériel intended for
combat units. The Hague Regulations contain comparable provisions. The
essence of the crime is the misuse of prisoners of war derived from the
kind of work to which they are assigned, in other words, to work
directly connected with the war effort. The Tribunal holds as a matter
of law that it is illegal to use prisoners of war in armament factories
and factories engaged in the manufacture of airplanes for use in the war
effort.
Now, considering the basic charges and the law governing the charge
against the defendant in which it alleges his responsibility for and
participation in the medical experiment program, the fundamental crime
with which the defendant is charged in this connection is murder. Also
involved are various atrocities, tortures, offenses against the person,
and other inhumane acts. The provisions of Control Council Law No. 10,
which are applicable to this charge, to wit, Article II, are “_b._ War
crimes” and “_c._ Crimes against humanity.” The bill of indictment
charges:
“A. War crimes, namely violations of the laws and customs of war
as to medical experiments performed involuntarily upon persons,
some of whom were prisoners of war and citizens of countries who
were at war with the German Reich, and other deported citizens
from other countries who were at war with the German Reich
involving the commission of murders, tortures, and other
inhumane acts.
“B. Crimes against humanity, namely medical experiments
performed upon involuntary German nationals and nationals of
other countries in the course of which brutalities, murders, and
other inhumane acts were committed.”
The prosecution contends that the defendant Milch did not personally
participate in or personally direct, counsel, or initiate such medical
experiments but that the same was done by members of his command and
that he was personally responsible for their conduct by virtue of the
authority that he held over his subordinates.
In this connection in the recent case before the United States Supreme
Court in re Yamashita, the opinion of which was handed down by the
Supreme Court of the United States at the October term, 1945, of said
Court, some of the pertinent holdings in this case are as follows:
“It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops
whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders or efforts of
their commander would almost certainly result in violations
which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its
purpose to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war
from brutality would largely be defeated if the commander of an
invading army could with impunity neglect to take reasonable
measures for their protection. Hence the law of war presupposes
that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the
operations of war by commanders who are to some extent
responsible for their subordinates.
“This is recognized by the annex to Fourth Hague Convention of
1907, respecting the laws and customs of war on land. Article I
lays down the condition which an armed force must fulfill in
order to be accorded the rights of lawful belligerents, that it
must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.
“These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner, who at the time
specified, was Military Governor of the Philippines, as well as
commander of the Japanese forces, an affirmative duty to take
such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the
circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian
population. This duty of a commanding officer has heretofore
been recognized, and its breach is penalized by our own military
tribunals.
“* * * It is plain that the charge on which petitioner was tried
charged him with a breach of his duty to control the operations
of the members of his command, by permitting them to commit the
specified atrocities. This was enough to require the commission
to hear evidence tending to establish the culpable failure of
the petitioner to perform the duty imposed on him by the law of
war and to pass upon its sufficiency to establish guilt.”
I am of the opinion and find as a fact from the evidence in this case
that the defendant Milch between the years 1939 and 1945 was State
Secretary in the Air Ministry, Inspector General of the Air Force,
Deputy to the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, a member of the Nazi
Party. The defendant Milch was also Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe, 1940
to 1945; Air Quartermaster General, 1941 to 1944; member of the Central
Planning Board, 1942 to 1945; and Chief of the Jaegerstab, 1944 to 1945.
After hearing the evidence of both the prosecution and defense, and
after having heard the arguments of counsel, and after having fully
considered all of the evidence, the following facts are concluded:
COUNT NO. I
_SLAVE LABOR_
That the defendant, Erhard Milch, was born in Germany on 30 March 1892,
that he was a member of the Air Force of the German Army in World War I
and was a contemporary in said air force with Goering, Udet, and others;
that after the termination of World War I he returned to Germany, had a
business and later was connected with the manufacture of civilian
airplanes.
Prior to the outbreak of World War II he became a member of the Nazi
Party and materially aided in the rebuilding of the air force of the
German Reich. Shortly prior to the outbreak of World War II he visited
various countries as a personal emissary of the Fuehrer, Hitler; to
France, England, Holland, Italy and other countries in an effort to
establish so-called permanent peace between the German Reich and these
nations. That on 23 May 1939, the defendant attended a conference for
the purpose of planning World War II with the following present: Hitler,
Goering, Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col. Gen. Keitel, Gen. Halder, Gen.
Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewind, Col. (GSC.) Jeschonnek, Col.
Warlimont, Lieut. Col. Schmundt, Captain Engel, Lieut. Commander
Albrecht, and Captain v. Below. At the time of this meeting the
defendant held a high position in the German Army, to wit, the rank of
colonel general.[166]
At this meeting the Fuehrer, Hitler, gave his plan of aggressive war,
and in this plan was included the attack of Poland at the first suitable
opportunity; what the struggle would be like; the question of a short or
long war; England’s weakness; the consequences of such a war; the
unrestricted use of all resources available; the plan of attack; and the
working principles of an entire and complete program. Aggressive war was
planned and initiated at this meeting, and the defendant was one of the
high-ranking officers who counseled and approved of the plan.
After the outbreak of the war and the subsequent attack on Poland, the
defendant actively participated in the prosecution of aggressive war
until after the capitulation and fall of France. From that time on he
did not participate as a combat officer but was used in the general
economy for the prosecution of war in Germany, and particularly as to
the building and maintenance of the Luftwaffe. Later he was elevated to
the rank of field marshal in the Luftwaffe and was second in command
only to Goering.
The defendant was a member of the Central Planning Board which was
established and organized in April 1942, and said organization served as
a means of consolidating in a single agency all controls over German war
production. The Central Planning Board held regular meetings, and the
defendant presided over and was present at a majority of such meetings.
The Central Planning Board at each meeting kept full minutes, and a
great number of said minutes have been submitted to the Tribunal and
reflect the fact that the defendant had a dominant role in the meetings
of said board. The scope and authority of the Central Planning Board is
contained in the minutes of a meeting held on 27 April 1942, and the
duties and responsibilities of the board, according to said minutes,
were announced as follows:
“The Central Planning in the Four Year Plan (Decree of the Reich
Marshal of Greater Germany of 22 April 1942) is a task for
leaders. It encompasses only principles and executive matters.
It makes unequivocal decisions and supervises the execution of
its directives. The Central Planning does not rely on anonymous
institutions difficult to control but always on individuals and
fully responsible persons who are free in the selection of their
work methods and their collaboration as far as there are no
directives issued by the Central Planning.”
On 20 October 1942, the statutes of the Central Planning Board were
published and distributed, a portion of which are as follows:
“The Central Planning Board, created by the Fuehrer and the
Reich Marshal in order to unify armament and war economy, deals
only with the decision of basic questions. Professional
questions remain the task of the competent departments, which in
their field remain responsible within the framework of the
decisions made by the Central Planning Board.”
The Central Planning Board was superior to “the highest Reich authority,
the Reich protector, the Governor General, and the executive authorities
in the occupied countries.”
The International Military Tribunal found that the Central Planning
Board “had supreme authority for the scheduling of German production and
the allocation and development of raw materials.” The International
Tribunal found further in its opinion, in the case of United States vs.
Goering and others, “that the Central Planning Board requisitioned labor
from Sauckel with full knowledge that the demands could be supplied only
by foreign forced labor and that the board determined the basic
allocation of this labor within the German war economy.” The
International Military Tribunal found further in its opinion the
following:
“In the fall of 1943 Funk (who was then indicted before said
Tribunal in regard to deportation and the use of foreign forced
labor in the German Reich) was a member of the Central Planning
Board which determined the total number of laborers needed for
German industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually
by deportation from occupied territories * * * but Funk was
aware that the board of which he was a member was demanding the
importation of slave laborers, and allocating them to the
various industries under his control.”
The prosecution offered evidence which tended to show that Albert Speer
was the Plenipotentiary for Armament and was the nominal head of the
Central Planning Board and that the defendant was a member of said board
and was, by the order of Hitler, assigned to assist Speer as the head of
said board. During much of the time of the existence of said board Speer
was ill and unable to attend the meetings and look after the duties of
the board and during this time the defendant was the acting head of said
board and presided over its meetings as chairman.
Fritz Sauckel was Plenipotentiary for Labor and was directly responsible
for the procurement and allocation of labor to the various war
industries. However, the Tribunal finds as a fact that although Sauckel
had the primary duty of procuring and allocating labor, the Central
Planning Board on many occasions, as the minutes of the meetings of said
board show, called Milch into conference with the members of the Central
Planning Board and in such conferences labor was assigned and allocated
by the Central Planning Board and Sauckel. The minutes of the Central
Planning Board, as introduced by the prosecution, show that the members
of the Central Planning Board knew and discussed the fact that labor was
being deported from occupied countries against their will and were being
used in various factories manufacturing armaments, airplanes, and other
articles essential and necessary to the war effort, that such foreign
workers were being forcibly taken from their homes without knowledge of
their destination, and by force and against their will, crowded into box
cars without food or water or toilet facilities, transported great
distances, and forced to work in factories manufacturing war materials
and other necessary items for the prosecution of the war as slave
laborers.
I find as a fact that the defendant Milch had knowledge of the way and
manner in which such labor was procured and the work that they were
forced to do, and that he aided, abetted, counseled, advised, and
assisted in the deportation, allocation, and work of said slave
laborers.
The documents and reports of the meetings as offered by the prosecution
are too voluminous to incorporate herein, but said records clearly show
that the defendant was one of the authorized agents who dealt with the
procurement, deportation, and work of thousands and thousands of slave
laborers from occupied countries.
_JAEGERSTAB_
I find as a fact that it was the defendant who conceived and instigated
the formation of the Jaegerstab, and that the defendant directed its
activities and acted as its chairman. The Jaegerstab assumed control
over fighter production and exploited foreign forced labor in the
armament industry and directed the use of the same. The Jaegerstab was
assigned top priority for their projects, for the recruitment and
commitment of manpower in the air armament industry. From the meetings
of said board as offered in evidence by the prosecution, the question of
manpower was time and time again referred to by the defendant. When
other methods of obtaining its labor was not forthcoming, the Jaegerstab
recruited its own labor either directly or by engineering snatching
expeditions for the seizure of manpower arriving on transports from the
East.
At one of the meetings of the Jaegerstab, Prosecution Exhibit 54, page
28, the defendant made this statement to his subordinates, that
“international law cannot be observed here.” When the question of
Italian civilian labor was being discussed at a meeting of the
Jaegerstab, the defendant made the statement and advocated the shooting
of those who attempted to escape in transit.
I find as a fact that the Jaegerstab was not a mere discussion group but
was an agency with absolute authority over fighter production and acted
by orders and directives, fixed hours of labor and conditions of work,
and on one occasion fixed the established hours of work per week in the
aircraft industry at seventy-two hours.
Much of the labor employed by the Jaegerstab in aircraft production and
in the air armament industry was from concentration camp inmates and
foreign forced labor. The defendant was well acquainted with the
procurement and allocation of this labor.
I find as a fact, from the evidence offered in the case, that after the
arrival of forced slave labor from occupied countries they were poorly
fed, poorly clothed, were forced to work an excessive amount of hours
each week, and that their general condition and treatment as a result of
such forced labor resulted in the death of a great many and the
permanent disability of others, both in body and in mind.
_GENERALLUFTZEUGMEISTER_
I find as a fact from the evidence offered in the case, that the
defendant, as Generalluftzeugmeister, had complete control of aircraft
production and that he requisitioned labor for the aircraft industry
with knowledge of the brutal and inhuman techniques in recruiting these
laborers; and that he gave directives for the criminal treatment of the
same in the centers of production. Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary for
Labor, stated that it was “Milch who produced manpower figures for
aviation.” Albert Speer testified as follows: “The requests of the air
armament industry for laborers were presented by Milch, and he did not
permit anyone to take this right away from him until March 1944.”
I find as a fact from the evidence offered on the part of the
prosecution, that prisoners of war were included in the manpower that
the defendant was requisitioning and distributing to the aircraft
industry with full knowledge that they were prisoners of war. As chief
of aircraft production, the defendant regulated the treatment of foreign
forced labor in the German aircraft industry, fixed hours of labor and
conditions of work, and by directives to his subordinates formulated the
basic policy for the handling of such labor within the industry.
The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to show that the
defendant advocated the most extreme measures in dealing with foreign
forced labor, inhuman measures which violated every recognized principle
of decency. When foreign forced laborers refused to work, the defendant
ordered that they be shot. When they attempted to revolt the defendant
directed that some of their numbers be killed, regardless of their
personal guilt or innocence. In the case of prisoners of war who
attempted to escape, the defendant ordered that these prisoners be shot
and later hanged in the factory for all to see. On one occasion the
defendant made the following statement, Prosecution Exhibit 145:
“The other day I talked to Himmler about it, and I told him that
his main task should be to see to the production of German
industry in case of internal uprisings of the foreign workers. I
said that consequently a well established method should exist,
and I have already given orders to the Chief A. W.[167] and to
the training stations to get military training in this field.
If, for instance, in the Locality X an uprising is started, then
a sergeant with a few men, or else a lieutenant with thirty men
has to turn up in the plant, and first of all shoot into the
crowd with a machine gun. What he should do after is to shoot
down as many people as possible in case of revolt. I have given
orders to that effect, and even if our own foreign workers are
involved—and then every tenth man is to be singled out and shot
while the others are lined up and see him.”
On another occasion, Prosecution Exhibit 148, when the defendant was
speaking of the treatment of foreign workers, he made the following
statement.
“In all these matters energetic interference must be made. I am
of the opinion that there should be only two types of punishment
in such cases; firstly, a concentration camp for foreigners, and
secondly, capital punishment.”
The prosecution offered a great number of documents containing
statements made by the defendant in regard to orders and threats of
violence, for mistreatment and punishment, tortures, killings, and
hangings of foreign workers. Space is too short to quote in this
judgment all of such pertinent documents.
Although the defendant denied making a number of these statements
appearing in the documents, he admitted the authenticity and utterances
of many, with the excuse that he was a man of very violent temper, who,
when worried from overwork, was not wholly responsible for many
utterances made by him. He protested further that he did not actually
mean nor intend for orders given in such fits of temper to be carried
out, but they were simply the result of uncontrolled anger, and
understood by his associates and subordinates to have been uttered in
such vein. In further extenuation he declared that head injuries
resulting from two serious accidents were largely responsible for such
uncontrollable temper.
I have given due consideration to the explanation given by the defendant
and am compelled to reject it. If but only a few of such remarks could
be attributed to the defendant, his protestations might be given some
credence; but when statements such as appear in the documents have been
persistently made over long periods of time, at many places and under
such varying conditions, the only logical conclusion that can be reached
is that they reflect the true and considered attitude of the defendant
toward the Nazi foreign labor policy and its victims and are not mere
aberrations brought on by fits of uncontrollable anger. I find as a
fact, therefore, that the true attitude of the defendant toward foreign
laborers and prisoners of war is that reflected in the documents of the
prosecution and was not the result of uncontrollable fits of temper. I
find, further, that the defendant ordered, advised, counselled, and
procured inhumane and illegal treatment of foreign workers resulting in
permanent injury and death to many.
COUNT NO. 2
_MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS_
The prosecution contends that in violation of the laws of war and of
crimes against humanity, high-altitude and freezing experiments were
carried out by the Luftwaffe physicians at Dachau, and that said
physicians who conducted such experiments were under the command of and
subordinate to the defendant Milch.
I am of the opinion from the evidence offered on the part of the
prosecution that illegal and inhuman medical experiments were conducted
at Dachau by Luftwaffe physicians who were under the command and
subordinate to the defendant Milch and from which a great number of
deaths ensued to concentration camp inmates and that great pain and
suffering and permanent disability resulted to many others. I find as a
fact from the evidence offered on the part of the prosecution that Dr.
Erich Hippke was the Medical Inspector of the Luftwaffe and was the
direct subordinate of the defendant Milch; that Hippke gave authority
and ordered Dr. Rascher, a Luftwaffe physician, in the early spring of
1941 to use concentration camp inmates and prisoners of war as
high-altitude experimental subjects for the benefit of the Luftwaffe. I
further find, as a fact, that the witness Hippke at no time communicated
this information to the defendant Milch, nor has the prosecution offered
any direct evidence to the effect that the defendant Milch knew that
such experiments had been conducted until after their completion. All of
the testimony and the evidence, both for the prosecution and the
defense, is to the effect that the defendant Milch did not have such
knowledge of the high-altitude or low-pressure experiments which were
carried out and completed by Luftwaffe physicians at Dachau until after
the completion of such experiments. The evidence offered as to the
knowledge or responsibility of the defendant Milch was not of such a
nature as to show guilty knowledge on his part of said experiments.
As to the cooling or freezing experiments performed at concentration
camp, Dachau, for which the defendant is charged with responsibility, I
find as a fact that the defendant ordered experiments to be conducted at
the camp for the benefit of the Luftwaffe. In a letter from Milch to
Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff of the SS, dated 20 May 1942, the following is
stated:
“In reference to your telegram of 12 May our medical inspector
reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the
SS and Luftwaffe at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation
of these experiments seems essentially unreasonable. However,
the carrying out of experiments of some other kind in regard to
perils at high sea would be important. These have been prepared
in immediate agreement with the proper offices. Oberstabsarzt
Weltz will be charged with the execution and Stabsarzt Rascher
will be made available until further order in addition to his
duties with the medical corps of the Luftwaffe. A change of
these measures does not appear necessary and an enlargement of
the task is not considered pressing at this time.”
Further evidence makes it manifestly plain that subsequent to the
receipt of the letter of Wolff, officers of the Luftwaffe, under the
command and subordinate to the defendant, conducted medical experiments
on concentration camp inmates at Dachau, against their will, by placing
such experimental subjects in tanks of water of freezing temperatures,
and requiring them to remain there for long periods of time while
certain medical data concerning such subjects was gathered; and that as
a result of such experiments, many of the human subjects died or were
gravely injured.
The defendant admits giving orders for the conduct of experiments within
the scope of the authority conferred by the letter, but contends that he
did not know of, or contemplate, that the experiments would be conducted
in an illegal manner or would result in the injury or death of any
person. The defendant further asserts that he did not know or have any
reason to believe that the experiments were conducted in such manner
until after they had been completed. He therefore insists that he was
and is not responsible for the unlawful manner in which the experiments
were actually conducted by the Luftwaffe officers, and that he is not
guilty of any crime as a result thereof.
The Tribunal, in its majority opinion, has fully considered the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in the judgment in re Yamashita, and
has found that said decision is not controlling in the case at bar. In
weighing the evidence, the Tribunal was mindful of the fact that the
defendant gave the order and directed his subordinates to carry on such
experiments, and that thereafter he failed and neglected to take such
measures as were reasonably within his power to protect such subjects
from inhumane treatment and deaths as a result of such experiments.
Notwithstanding these facts, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the
evidence fails to disclose beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
had any knowledge that the experiments would be conducted in an unlawful
manner and that permanent injury, inhumane treatment or deaths would
result therefrom.
Therefore, the Tribunal found that the defendant did not have such
knowledge as would amount to participation or responsibility on his part
and therefore found the defendant not guilty on charges contained in
count 2.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) I concur in the opinion of the Tribunal that war crimes and crimes
against humanity were committed by the defendant, including deportation,
enslavement, and mistreatment of millions of persons; and that as a
result thereof and in furtherance of such treatment, murders,
brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts
were committed in a large scale measure upon citizens of occupied
countries, prisoners of war, Jews, and other nationals. I agree further
that the defendant was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted,
and took a consenting part therein. I also agree that for such acts and
conduct on the part of the defendant, he is guilty of charges contained
in count number one of the indictment.
The evidence produced during the trial upon the charges contained in
this count showed conclusively that countless millions of persons were
unlawfully deported, enslaved, and murdered. Especially were the Jews
mistreated, tortured and murdered merely because they were Jews and
their extermination desired. History discloses the fact that as early as
the year 1349 in the city of Nuernberg, and within sight of where this
opinion is being written, the citizens of Nuernberg drove the Jews from
their city, confiscated their property, and erected a market place on
the site of the Ghetto and the Liebfrauenkirche in place of the
Synagogue. The hatred of the Aryan German for the Jew seems to have been
constant during the many intervening years. History will record such
conduct as a blot upon the name of the present German generation for
many years to come.
(2) The Tribunal found the defendant not guilty of the charges contained
in count number two, and I concur in such finding.
Under the American concept of liberty, as brought to us by our
Anglo-Saxon heritage and the English Common Law, every person accused of
crime is presumed to be innocent until proof of his guilt is established
by the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption follows
him throughout the trial and until he is found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. In applying this God-given principle of liberty, one
eminent American jurist uttered the following words:
“After considering and weighing all of the evidence you then
find that your minds are disturbed, your convictions
tempest-tossed, and your judgment, like the dove of the deluge,
finds no place to rest; the law says you must acquit.”
The defendant was given the full benefit of these great and lasting
rules of law and has received at the hands of the Tribunal a fair and
impartial trial in full accord with the American concepts of justice
under the law.
(3) Count three of the indictment charges the defendant with crimes
against “German nationals and nationals of other countries.” I am of the
opinion that sufficient evidence was not produced by the prosecution to
justify an adjudication by the Tribunal of guilt as to German nationals
alone. However, as to such crimes against nationals of other countries,
the Tribunal has heretofore considered such charges and has made an
adjudication concerning the same in count number one of the indictment.
The conclusion of the Tribunal is that the same unlawful acts of
violence which constituted war crimes under count one of the indictment
also constitute crimes against humanity as alleged in count three of the
indictment. Therefore, the Tribunal found the defendant guilty of crimes
against humanity under count three, with which finding I concur.
In weighing the evidence, the Tribunal simulated the ancient customs of
using the seed of the oriental carob tree to balance the scales of
justice. The defendant should not now complain.
Therefore, for the reasons stated, I am in full agreement with the
judgment of the Tribunal and concur therein.
Respectfully submitted this the 15th day of April, 1947
[Signed] FITZROY D. PHILLIPS
Fitzroy D. Phillips
Judge, Military Tribunal No. II
-----
[166] See Table of Comparative Ranks, p. 331.
[167] Chef Ausbildungswesen (Chief of Training).
VIII. PETITIONS
A. Extract from Petition for Clemency to Military
Governor of United States Zone of Occupation
Nuernberg, 2 May 1947
To the Military Governor
PETITION
of
Attorney-at-law Dr. Friedrich Bergold,
Nuernberg, Prinzregenten-Ufer 7/III,
Defense Counsel, Military Court II
Nuernberg
in Case II against the defendant
Erhard Milch, General Field Marshal,
at present in the Court Prison, Nuernberg,
to modify the sentence of the Military Court II
Nuernberg
on 16/17 April 1947.
* * * * *
A
The sentence passed on counts I and III contains actual inaccuracies,
which are inconsistent with the recorded evidence. Obviously, these
errors have had an influence on the sentence as far as the award of
punishment is concerned. A correction of these errors would necessarily
lead to a less severe sentence.
1. The statements on page 3 of the judgment that Milch since 19 November
1941 was the second highest commander of the Luftwaffe is not in
agreement with the evidence. The witnesses have testified that from
1938-1941 Milch held only one of the four highest commanding posts under
Goering, and since 1941 two of the four highest Luftwaffe commanding
posts. Only in regard to seniority he was the oldest officer of these
four highest commands. This is important because evidence has been given
for the fact that the general staff of the Luftwaffe had the
responsibility for the armament program of the Luftwaffe.
2. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the Central Planning
Board had been created by a decree of the Fuehrer of 29 October 1943. It
has been proved by the statement of Speer that the decree of 29 October
1943 was a decree issued by Speer a long time after the creation of the
Central Planning Board and without authorization of the defendant Milch.
Since this decree was issued by Speer for his sphere of administration
only, no conclusion can be drawn therefrom against the defendant.
3. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the Court finds that
the Central Planning Board handled the labor problem as such. Exhibit
151 of the prosecution proved the opposite. The witnesses who have been
heard have confirmed that the Central Planning Board handled the labor
problem only for information purposes for the distribution and
production of raw materials and in order to clarify the untrue
statements of Sauckel. This Exhibit 151 constitutes essential new
evidence which is of greatest importance in regard to the verdict of the
International Military Tribunal.
4. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the defendant had
admitted having seen Russian prisoners of war at service at 8.8 and 10.5
cm. antiaircraft guns in aircraft factories in Luftgau 7. The witness
Vorwald made this statement on the basis of his own observation.
It has been proved that Milch had nothing to do with the allocation of
Russians to the antiaircraft artillery (flak), and that he declared
himself against it.
5. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Milch said that
Russian prisoners of war had volunteered for work in war plants. What he
did state—and this was in agreement with the witnesses Vorwald and
Foerster—was that Russian prisoners of war had volunteered for service
at the antiaircraft artillery (flak), with the reservation that they
would not be used for combatting Russian airplanes. This condition was
fulfilled. Thus, there is no question of an inadmissible use of
prisoners of war for war service.
6. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Sauckel, the
Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, participated in at least 15
sessions of the Central Planning Board. Only 15 minutes concerning the
sessions [minutes of 15 sessions] of the Central Planning Board have
been submitted. These minutes prove that Sauckel was not present at most
of these sessions.
7. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the defendant was
informed about the methods employed and the cruelties on the occasion of
the recruiting and utilization of foreign workers. All witnesses who
have been heard have stated the opposite. It is therefore not
permissible to assume without the basis of exact proof that Milch was
informed about these matters. The Court concludes from the fact that
foreign workers and prisoners of war had been used that Milch must
necessarily have recognized that the methods must have been cruel. Speer
has stated explicitly that the cruel methods were not necessary and
that, therefore, they were an error. But if they were not necessary then
the conclusion drawn from them without any explicit proof was not
permissible.
8. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that 100,000 Polish
prisoners of war were deported to concentration camps. The opposite has
been proved, viz., that Polish prisoners of war, in accordance with the
agreement between Russia and Germany were released from captivity and
employed as civilians.
9. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Romanian nationals
were subjected to deportation. Not one single piece of evidence for that
has been submitted. Romania was mentioned by the defense only in
connection with the armistice agreement between Russia and Romania.
10. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Milch used
Hungarian Jews. It is proved by the evidence that this did not happen
before the summer of 1944 when Milch had resigned from his positions.
11. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the Schmundt
minutes must be correct, for the reason that if any allusion to a war
had been omitted, Hitler would not have spoken at all. It has been
proven that Hitler spoke merely theoretically about the world situation
in case there should be a war at some time. He did not mention that he
wanted to foment aggressive wars.
B
The judgment states that the defendant recommended more drastic and more
cruel measures in regard to the recruiting and utilization of workers.
(Page 18 of the judgment.)
This is in discrepancy with the recorded evidence.
Here the defense does not argue about the separate reasons given by
Judge Michael A. Musmanno, since these reasons do not constitute the
official judgment. These reasons also contain factual errors and even
use material which has not been discussed during the trial.
These separate reasons, however, make it possible to draw a conclusion
in regard to the sentence of the judgment which states that the
defendant recommended more drastic and more cruel measures.
It has been proved through the evidence that utterances to that effect
were made by the defendant only in smaller circles and while he was in a
state of excitement. It has been proved that no action was ever taken in
conformity with these utterances. It has been proved that the defendant
never asked for action pursuant to such utterances. It has been proved
that he did not have any executive power in regard to any measures
whatsoever. It has finally been proved that the record concerning such
utterances must in part be incorrect.
Therefore, it has not been proved that the defendant approved such
cruelties or demanded them in earnest.
C
The objection must be raised that the Military Tribunal did not clarify
at all the legal questions which were raised by the defense in
connection with the fact that the Russian Government has explicitly
renounced the Hague Convention concerning Land Warfare and the previous
Geneva Conventions. Since the Decree Number 7 of the Military Government
for Germany provides, in Article XV, that reasons have to be given for
the sentence, the Tribunal would have had to state its position in
regard to these questions. This also constitutes a defectiveness of the
verdict and this defect may possibly have had an influence on the award
of the punishment.
D
The Military Tribunal has extensively referred on page 14 and 15 to the
verdict of the International Military Tribunal against Speer. The
Tribunal has therefore made the reasons of the International Military
Tribunal its own to a large extent.
But consequently the Military Tribunal would have had to examine the
problem of extenuating circumstances. The defense has already pointed
out that the fact that he organized protected factories constituted for
Speer an extenuating circumstance. During the trial it has been clearly
proved that Milch was the first who already in 1941 organized protected
factories, and that he was, therefore, the inventor of this kind of
employment.
The problem of extenuating circumstances involves further the
examination of the question, whether Milch had more to do with the
utilization of foreign workers and prisoners of war than Speer. This
examination was omitted. Exhibit Milch 55 and also all the evidence
proved that Speer’s participation in the utilization of foreign workers
and prisoners of war was considerably more extensive.
If the Tribunal had examined the extenuating circumstances, then the
result would undoubtedly have been that the defendant would have been
allowed extenuating circumstances on a large scale. Due to the fact that
the responsibility of Speer was greater than that of Milch, Milch should
not have received a more severe sentence than Speer.
Consideration should also have been given to the fact that it was proved
that Milch continually advocated restrictions in the employment of
foreign workers and of prisoners of war, and that he did indeed succeed
in achieving such restrictions.
Finally, consideration should also have been given to the fact that
Milch withdrew from his positions as early as spring and summer 1944,
and that he had nothing to do with the extraordinary aggravation of all
conditions which took place toward the end of the war.
This weighs more than what Speer did—the nonexecution of some insane
orders which Hitler issued at the end of the war in 1945.
This consideration too should have led the Tribunal to a much less
severe sentence. The fact that this was not taken into consideration is
therefore made a part of this petition.
(Signed) DR. BERGOLD
B. Petition to the Supreme Court of the United States
for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Erhard Milch,
Petitioner _vs._ United States of America
Nuernberg, 2 May 1947
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Application for Leave to File Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
I, the undersigned Erhard Milch, have been charged in Case No. II before
the Military Court No. II Nuernberg of illegally, deliberately, and
intentionally having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity,
as defined in Control Council Law No. 10 Article II, viz. the following:
_Count One of the Indictment._ War crimes, including murder, slave
labor, deportation of the civilian population for slave labor, cruel and
inhuman treatment of foreign workers, and the employment of prisoners of
war by force and duress in actions connected with warfare.
_Count Two of the Indictment._ War crimes, including murder, whereby
involuntary victims were exposed to sub-pressure and cold, experiments
resulting in torture and death.
_Count Three of the Indictment._ Crimes against humanity, including
murder and the unlawful acts listed in counts one and two of the
indictment, committed against Germans and foreigners.
(page 2 of original)
I have been acquitted on count II of the indictment and found guilty by
the sentence passed by the Military Court II on 16/17 April 1947 in
respect of counts I and III of the indictment, and am condemned
therefore to lifelong imprisonment.
I hereby make application for the sentence of the Military Court II
passed on 16/17 April 1947 to be completely quashed, as being
inadmissible according to Articles 63 and 64 of the Geneva Convention of
1929.
_Substantiation_
Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany concerning the
constitution and competency of certain military courts, constitutes a
violation of Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929, insofar as
Decree No. 7 is applied to prisoners of war as well, and in its Article
II appoints special courts for passing sentences on prisoners of war.
Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 lays down, “Sentence against
a prisoner of war may only be passed by the same courts and according to
the same procedure as a sentence against persons belonging to the
fighting forces of the country where he is a prisoner”. A field marshal
is equal to a five-star general of the United States of America. The
present Court consisted of three judges, of which not one has the
military rank which I have. It therefore does not correspond to the
court which, according to the laws of the United States of America,
could pass sentence on a five-star general. The authority of the present
Court is, however, expressly recognized by me.
Furthermore, Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany
constitutes a violation in Article XV of Article 64 of the Geneva
Convention of 1929, because Article XV declares the sentence of the
court in finding the defendant guilty, to be final and incontestable.
Article 64 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 stipulates that prisoners of
war must be allowed to employ the same legal means against a verdict as
are granted to members of the fighting forces
(page 3 of original)
of the country where they are detained.
The rules laid down by the Geneva Convention of 1929 represent
compulsory international law of a universal character and cannot be
altered either by a signatory power alone or by an agreement between
several signatory powers, but only by the consent of all signatory
powers. In no case may they be altered by a decree of Military
Government, not even by a decree of the Control Council. The rights of a
prisoner of war, which are based upon the regulations of the Geneva
Convention of 1929, can neither be waived nor cancelled.
The violation of the regulations of the Geneva Convention has now come
about with the passing of sentence and the now existing restrictions
placed in the way of contesting the verdict, not already by the trial as
such.
I am still a prisoner of war. I have not been released from captivity. I
am therefore still under the protection of the Geneva Convention, the
same as before.
The violation of the Geneva Convention is all the more serious, in that
I am still a prisoner of war of the British. True, the defense counsel
was told at the beginning of the trial in reply to an express question,
that my transfer to the jurisdiction of the United States of America was
already effected, but it was not proved until the conclusion of the
passing of sentence. That should have been absolutely necessary.
After the serving of the indictment and the beginning of the actual
trial, an attempt was made on 4 January 1947 to gain my veiled consent
to my release without saying anything, whereby I was asked to accept
release money. On the receipt, however, I expressly noted, “Without
recognizing my release”. I declared that release by American officers
was not
(page 4 of original)
permissible at that moment and moreover a German field marshal could not
be released in any case under existing German law.
After this explanation on my part, the American major conducting the
proceedings revealed to me that another separate release proceeding
would have to be carried out against me then.
Thereby it is clear that I am still a prisoner of war today. At any
rate, I was when the trial begun and therefore in accordance with
Article 60 of the Geneva Convention the protecting power for German
prisoners of war, viz., Switzerland, should have been informed of the
proceedings. This too constitutes a violation of the Geneva Convention
of 1929. If the public prosecution authorities, however, were to refer
to the fact that I was released after the trial had begun, then they
should be confronted with the assertion that such a release is invalid.
It would represent nothing but an evasion of the regulations of the
Geneva Convention of 1929. I was not set at large for a single day. But
that is demanded by a release from captivity as a prisoner of war. A
release from captivity as a prisoner of war while maintaining captivity
would be a release in fraudem legis.
Therefore the sentence constitutes a violation of international law. At
the same time this violation is also a violation of the Habeas Corpus
Act. None, under whatever pretext, may be deprived of the rights of
legal proceedings and of a legal judge.
I therefore request the Supreme Court in Washington to examine whether
the Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany may be applied in
my case, and whether, with due regard to the regulations of Article
60-65 of the Geneva Convention, the present Military Court II
(page 5 of original)
Nuernberg was in a position to pass sentence on me.
Furthermore I enclose a copy of my petition to the Governor-General
[Military Governor of U. S. Zone of Occupation].
[Signed] ERHARD MILCH
[Note: Another petition with the same text was submitted to the
United States Supreme Court by Dr. Bergold, Defense Counsel.]
IX. AFFIRMATION OF SENTENCE BY THE
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE UNITED
STATES ZONE OF OCCUPATION
Military Tribunal II, Case No. 2
In the Case of
The United States of America
_vs._
Erhard Milch, Defendant
_Order with Respect to Sentence_
In the case of the United States of America against Erhard Milch, tried
by United States Military Tribunal II, Case 2, Nuernberg, Germany, the
defendant on 17 April 1947 was sentenced by the Tribunal to be
transported to the Rebdorf Prison and there confined for the remainder
of his natural life. A petition to modify the sentence, filed on behalf
of the defendant by Dr. Friedrich Bergold, his defense counsel, has been
referred to me pursuant to delegation by the Military Governor under the
provisions of Article XXIII of Military Government Ordinance No. 7 and
paragraph 6_b_ of Regulation No. 1 under said Ordinance. I have duly
considered the petition and the record of the trial, and in accordance
with Article XVII of said Ordinance and paragraph 6_b_ of said
Regulation it is hereby ordered that—
The sentence imposed by Military Tribunal II, upon Erhard Milch be, and
hereby is, in all respects affirmed.
[Signed] FRANK A. KEATING
FRANK A. KEATING
Major General USA
Deputy Military Governor
17 June 1947
X. ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, 20 OCTOBER 1947, DENYING
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Present: Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Reed,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Murphy, Mr.
Justice Jackson, Mr. Justice Rutledge, and Mr. Justice Burton.
No. 50, Misc. Erhard Milch, petitioner, _vs._ The United States of
America. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus
is denied. Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Murphy,
and Mr. Justice Rutledge are of the opinion that the petition should be
set for hearing on the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. Mr.
Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this
application.
APPENDIX
List of Witnesses in Case 2
[NOTE.—With the exception of Constantin von Neurath, Erich
Raeder, and Albert Speer, all witnesses in this case appeared
before the Tribunal. Prosecution witnesses are designated by the
letter “P,” defense witnesses by the letter “D”, Tribunal
witness by the letter “T”. The name not preceded by any
designation represents the defendant testifying in his own
behalf. Extracts from testimony in this Case are listed in the
index of documents and testimonies.]
Name │ Date of Testimony │ Pages
│ │ (mimeographed
│ │ transcript)
D ALEXANDER, Dr. Leo │14 Feb 47 │1074-1092
D BECKER-FREYSENG, Hermann │14 Feb 47 │1061-1066
D BRANDT, Rudolf │24 Feb 47 │1330-1354
D BRAUCHITSCH, Berndt von │20 Feb 47 │1271-1289
D DORSCH, Xaver │24 Feb 47 │1361-1379
D ENGEL, Gerhard │24 Feb 47 │1355-1361
D ESCHENAUER, Artur │13 Feb 47 │980-996
D FELMY, Helmut │20 Feb 47 │1290-1296
P FERRIER, Roland │5, 6 Mar 47 │1481-1548
D FOERSTER, Helmut │12 Feb 47 │915-938
D HERTEL, Walter │12 Feb 47 │944-979
D HIPPKE, Erich │7, 11 Feb 47 │759-870
D KOENIG, Max │17 Feb 47 │1189-1204
D KOERNER, Paul │5 Feb 47 │652-710
P KRYSIAK, Joseph │21 Mar 47 │2362-2376
P LE FRIEC, Paul │6 Mar 47 │1550-1584
T LICHTENSTEIN, Walter │3 Mar 47 │1428-1432
MILCH, Erhard │11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18,│1696-2276
│ 19, 20 Mar 47 │
D NEFF, Walter │12 Feb 47 │939-943
D NEURATH, Constantin von │19 Feb 47 │1440-1443
D PENDELE, Max │18 Feb 47 │1205-1227
D RAEDER, Erich │4 Mar 47 │1434-1439
D REINECKE, Hermann │20 Mar 47 │2277-2287
D RICHTER, Karl Eitel │11 Feb 47 │871-900
D ROEDER, Manfred │3 Mar 47 │1381-1403
D ROMBERG, Hans Wolfgang │14 Feb 47 │1021A-1050
D RUFF, Siegfried │14, 17 Feb 47 │1092-1122
D SCHMELTER, Fritz │6, 7 Feb 47 │717-759
D SCHNIEWIND, Otto │24 Feb 47 │1307-1329
D SCHROEDER, Oskar │ │(withdrawn)
D SIEVERS, Wolfram │14 Feb 47 │1050-1057
D SPEER, Albert │17, 19 Feb 47 │1136-1186; 1445-1457
D VORWALD, Wolfgang │10, 11, 20, 21 Mar 47 │1586-1696; 2287-2340
D WARLIMONT, Walter │20 Feb 47 │1296-1299
D WELTZ, Georg August │14 Feb 47 │1066-1072
D WOLFF, Karl │18 Feb 47 │1228-1268
INDEX OF DOCUMENTS AND TESTIMONY
Document No. Exhibit No. Description Page
EC-68 Pros. Ex. 6 Letter from the Ministry of Finance 389
and Economics of Baden, 6 March
1941, containing directives
regarding the treatment of Polish
farm workers.
EC-194 Pros. Ex. 8 Memorandum of Keitel, 31 October 1941, 393
concerning the use of PW’s in the
armament industry.
F-824 Pros. Ex. 57 Order of Field Marshal von Kluge 542
regarding compulsory recruitment of
labor in the West, 25 July 1944.
L-61 Pros. Ex. 20 Letter from Sauckel to the presidents 413
of Labor Offices, 26 November 1942,
concerning deportation and
employment of Poles and Jews.
L-79 Pros. Ex. 3 Extract from minutes of Fuehrer 387
conference, 23 May 1939.
NI-1098 Pros. Ex. 63 Extracts from affidavit of Fritz 456
Sauckel, 22 September 1946,
regarding the jurisdiction of the
Central Planning Board.
NO-219 Pros. Ex. 83 Letter from Dr. Rudolf Brandt to Dr. 626
Rascher, 27 April 1942, concerning
medical experiment report for
Himmler and Milch.
NO-261 Pros. Ex. 89 Letter from Milch to Dr. Hippke, 4 626
June 1942, concerning availability
of low pressure air chamber for
experiments.
NO-262 Pros. Ex. 119 Letter from Dr. Hippke to SS 631
Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff, 6 March
1943, concerning Rascher’s transfer
to the Waffen SS.
NOKW-017 Pros. Ex. 54 Extracts from the minutes of the 527
conference with Air Force Engineers
and Chief Quartermasters under
chairmanship of Milch, 25 March
1944.
NOKW-041 Pros. Ex. 113 Sworn statement by Hermann Goering, 27 625
September 1946, concerning Milch’s
position as Inspector General of the
Luftwaffe.
NOKW-180 Pros. Ex. 155 Extracts from stenographic notes on 613
the conference at the Reich
Marshal’s on Thursday, 4 November
1943, 11 o’clock at the Junkers
Plant in Dessau.
NOKW-195 Pros. Ex. 143 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 608
conference with Goering, 28 October
1943.
NOKW-245 Pros. Ex. 157 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 606
conference with Goering, 22 February
1943, regarding plans for airplane
construction.
NOKW-247 Pros. Ex. 61 Appointment of Field Marshal Milch as 540
Goering’s plenipotentiary for the
intensification of air force
armament in June 1944.
NOKW-261 Pros. Ex. 70 Chart of the organization of the 535
Jaegerstab drawn by Saur with letter
of transmittal to prosecution staff,
14 November 1946.
NOKW-266 Pros. Ex. 76 Affidavit of Fritz Schmelter, 19 559
November 1946, concerning the
organization of the Jaegerstab.
NOKW-269 Pros. Ex. 59 A short curriculum vitae of Field 633
Marshal Erhard Milch.
NOKW-286 Pros. Ex. 144 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 605
GL-Conference, 1 September 1942.
NOKW-287 Pros. Ex. 49 Letter from Milch to Sauckel, 8 April 499
1943, concerning the protection of
industry.
NOKW-311 Pros. Ex. 62 Extract from interrogation of Hermann 597
Goering on 6 September 1946,
regarding Milch’s position as
Generalluftzeugmeister (GL).
NOKW-320 Pros. Ex. 73 Extract from interrogation of Karl 558
Otto Saur on 13 November 1946,
concerning the use of concentration
camp prisoners in Jaegerstab
construction.
NOKW-334 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 550
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference of 25 April
1944.
NOKW-334 Def. Ex. 16 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 564
the Jaegerstab Conference, 25 April
1944.
NOKW-336 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 555
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference on 26 May
1944.
NOKW-336 Def. Ex. 23 Excerpts from the stenographic minutes 566
of the Jaegerstab Conference on
Friday, 26 May 1944, at 10:00
o’clock.
NOKW-337 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 544
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference of 6 March
1944.
NOKW-337 Def. Ex. 12 Excerpts from the stenographic minutes 561
of the Jaegerstab Conference on 6
March 1944 in the Reich Air
Ministry.
NOKW-338 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 545
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference on Friday, 17
March 1944.
NOKW-338 Def. Ex. 13 Excerpts from the stenographic minutes 562
of the Jaegerstab Conference
presided over by Field Marshal Milch
on Friday, 17 March 1944, 1100
hours, in the Reich Air Ministry.
NOKW-346 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 546
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference under
chairmanship of Field Marshal Milch
on Monday, 20 March 1944.
NOKW-359 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 557
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference on 27 June
1944.
NOKW-361 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 554
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference during the 6th
journey of the “Hubertus
Undertaking” from 8-10 May 1944.
NOKW-362 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 552
stenographic minutes of Jaegerstab
Conference on the occasion of the
5th trip of the “Hubertus
Undertaking”, 2 and 3 May 1944.
NOKW-365 Def. Ex. 15 Extract from the stenographic minutes 563
of the Jaegerstab Conference, 12
April 1944.
NOKW-388 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 547
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference of 28 March
1944.
NOKW-390 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 553
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference of 4 May 1944.
NOKW-406 Pros. Ex. 138 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 599
the GL-Conference, 7 July 1942.
NOKW-407 Pros. Ex. 137 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 599
GL-Conference, 27 May 1942.
NOKW-408 Pros. Ex. 139 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 600
GL-Conference, 28 July 1942.
NOKW-409 Pros. Ex. 140 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 601
GL-Conference, 4 August 1942.
NOKW-412 Pros. Ex. 141 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 602
GL-Conference, 18 August 1942.
NOKW-416 Pros. Ex. 142 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 602
GL-Conference, 26 August 1942.
NOKW-418 Pros. Ex. 136 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 598
GL-Conference, 5 May 1942.
NOKW-442 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 554
stenographic minutes of the
Jaegerstab Conference on 5 May 1944.
NOKW-442 Def. Ex. 21 Extract from the stenographic minutes 565
of the Jaegerstab Conference, 5 May
1944.
NOKW-449 Pros. Ex. 148 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 607
GL-Conference, 2 March 1943.
016-PS Pros. Ex. 13 Letter from Sauckel to Rosenberg, 24 405
April 1942, and extracts from report
on Sauckel’s labor mobilization
program, 20 April 1942.
084-PS Pros. Ex. 16-A Extracts from interdepartmental report 408
of the Ministry for Occupied Eastern
Territories, 30 September 1942,
concerning the status of Eastern
laborers.
204-PS Pros. Ex. 39 Extracts from memorandum of a 424
conference, 18 February 1944,
concerning the release of indigenous
labor for purposes of the Reich.
208-PS Pros. Ex. 55 Report by Sauckel, 7 July 1944, on the 428
accomplishments of labor
mobilization in the first half of
1944.
265-PS Pros. Ex. 35 Extracts from report by Leyser to 423
Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, on
conditions in the district Zhitomir.
294-PS Pros. Ex. 19-A Extracts from top secret memorandum, 411
signed by Braeutigam, 25 October
1942, concerning effects of slave
labor program.
407-II-PS Def. Ex. 3 Report from Sauckel to Hitler, 10 439
March 1943, concerning difficulties
originating from the draft of
manpower in former Soviet
territories.
407-V-PS Pros. Ex. 30 Extracts from letter from Sauckel to 418
Hitler, 14 April 1943, concerning
labor questions.
407-IX-PS Pros. Ex. 33 Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 3 June 420
1943, concerning foreign labor
situation.
1063-D-PS Pros. Ex. 21 Extract from order of Mueller, 17 415
December 1942, concerning prisoners
qualified for work to be sent to
concentration camps.
1206-PS Pros. Ex. 9 Outlines of directives of Goering 395
regarding the employment of PW’s in
the armament industry, 7 November
1941.
1510-PS Pros. Ex. 58 Extracts from decree of 16 September 450
1943, defining the duties of the
Planning Office of the Central
Planning Board.
1526-PS Pros. Ex. 25 Extracts from letter from 416
German-appointed Ukrainian main
committee to Frank, February 1943.
1584-III-PS Pros. Ex. 71 Correspondence between Himmler and 537
Goering, 9 March 1944, concerning
the use of concentration camp
prisoners in the aircraft industry.
1607-A-PS Pros. Ex. 115 Letter from Himmler to Milch, 25 628
August 1942, concerning Dr.
Rascher’s report on high-altitude
experiments.
1607-B-PS Pros. Ex. 115 Letter from Dr. Rascher to Dr. Brandt, 627
20 July 1942, concerning report on
high-altitude experiments.
1617-PS Pros. Ex. 111 Letter from Himmler to Milch, 13 629
November 1942, concerning Rascher’s
transfer to the Waffen SS.
3000-PS Pros. Ex. 34 Extracts from report rendered to 422
Riecke, Ministerialdirektor in the
Ministry of Agriculture, 28 June
1943, on experiences in political
and economic problems in the East.
3005-PS Pros. Ex. 7 Extracts from letter from the Reich 392
Labor Ministry to presidents of
Regional Labor Offices, 26 August
1941, concerning the use of French
and Russian PW’s.
3040-PS Pros. Ex. 10 Extracts from secret order of Himmler, 399
20 February 1942, concerning the
commitment and treatment of manpower
from the East.
3721-PS Pros. Ex. 41-A Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 22 452
September 1945, regarding the
jurisdiction of the Central Planning
Board.
3819-PS Pros. Ex. 56 Minutes of a conference on 11 July 430
1944 attended by Milch, concerning
the labor problem.
R-103 Pros. Ex. 40 Extracts from a letter from the 426
(German-appointed) Polish main
committee to the General Government
of Poland on the conditions of
Polish workers in Germany, 17 May
1944.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Stenographic record of the first 447
conference of the Central Planning
Board on 27 April 1942.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from report on the eleventh 457
conference of the Central Planning
Board, 22 July 1942.
R-124 Def. Ex. 5 Extract from the stenographic report 509
of the eleventh conference of the
Central Planning Board, 22 July
1942.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from report on the 459
seventeenth conference of the
Central Planning Board, 28 October
1942.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 461
twenty-first conference of Central
Planning Board, 30 October 1942.
R-124 Def. Ex. 6 Extract from the stenographic minutes 510
of the twenty-second conference of
the Central Planning Board, 2
November 1942.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Extracts from stenographic minutes of 465
the twenty-third conference of the
Central Planning Board, 3 November
1942.
R-124 Def. Ex. 7 Extract from the stenographic minutes 510
of the thirty-second conference of
the Central Planning Board, 12
February 1943.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 467
the thirty-third conference of the
Central Planning Board, 16 February
1943.
R-124 Def. Ex. 8 Extract from the stenographic minutes 511
of the thirty-third conference of
the Central Planning Board, 16
February 1943.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 471
the thirty-sixth conference of the
Central Planning Board, 22 April
1943.
R-124 Def. Ex. 9 Extract from stenographic minutes of 516
the thirty-ninth conference of the
Central Planning Board, 23 April
1943.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Report of the forty-second conference 475
of the Central Planning Board, 23
June 1943.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 478
the fifty-third conference of the
Central Planning Board, 16 February
1944.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Report on the fifty-third conference 479
of the Central Planning Board, 16
February 1944.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from the stenographic minutes 484
of the fifty-fourth conference of
the Central Planning Board, 1 March
1944.
R-124 Def. Ex. 31 Extracts from the stenographic minutes 517
of the fifty-fourth conference of
the Central Planning Board, 1 March
1944.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-D Extracts from the report on the 498
fifty-sixth conference of the
Central Planning Board, 4 April
1944.
R-124 Def. Ex. 1 Extract from report on Fuehrer 438
conference attended by Milch on 19
February 1942.
R-124 Def. Ex. 32 Extract from the Fuehrer conference 438
minutes, 21 and 22 April 1942.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Letter of 20 October 1942 transmitting 448
the statutes of the Central Planning
Board.
R-124 Def. Ex. 2 Extract from the Fuehrer conference 439
minutes of 3, 4, 5 January 1943.
R-124 Def. Ex. 33 Extract from report on Fuehrer 441
conference of 30 May 1943.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 124 Speer’s minutes of a conference with 501
Hitler on 8 July 1943.
R-124 Def. Ex. 4 Extract from report of Fuehrer 442
conference of 11-12 September 1943.
R-124 Def. Ex. 34 Extract from Fuehrer conference of 1-4 443
January 1944, concerning Speer’s
report on the French labor
situation.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extract from the report by Saur of the 502
conference with the Fuehrer, 5 March
1944.
R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-E Extracts from the minutes of 539
discussions between Saur and the
Fuehrer, 6 and 7 April 1944.
Speer Ex. 34 Def. Ex. 17 Order of Hitler, 21 April 1944, 560
delegating to Dorsch authority for
Jaegerstab constructions.
TESTIMONIES
Excerpts from the testimony of defendant _Milch_ 635
Extracts of testimony of defense witness Fritz _Schmelter_ 567
Extracts of testimony of defense witness Xaver _Dorsch_ 583
Extracts from testimony of defense witness Max _Koenig_ 615
Excerpts from the testimony given by defense witness Albert _Speer_ 502
before Commission on 19 February 1947
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. American spelling occurs throughout the document. Multiple
occurrences of the following spellings which differ and are found
throughout this volume are as follows:
border line borderline
front line front-line
Jewish Bolshevik Jewish-Bolshevik
Fraeulein Frau
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in
the trial(s). This volume had no German, Polish, Russian or other
eastern European diacritics, only French diacritics. As a result,
Goering and Fuehrer are spelled without umlauts throughout.
An attempt has been made to produce this ebook in a format as close as
possible to the original document's presentation and layout.
Some illustrations were moved to facilitate page layout.
[The end of _Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (Oct 1946-Apr 1949) (Vol.
2)_, by Anonymous.]
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