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Title: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Vol. II)
Author: Various
Language: English
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                          [Cover Illustration]

                            NAZI  CONSPIRACY
                            AND  AGGRESSION

                              _VOLUME  II_

                       _Office of United States_
                   _Chief of Counsel For Prosecution_
                         _of Axis Criminality_


                          WASHINGTON  •  1946

                         Sold in Complete Sets
                                 by the
                      Superintendent of Documents
                       U. S. Government Printing
                          Washington 25, D. C.

American and British Prosecuting Staffs for Presentation before the
International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany, in the case of



    FRITZSCHE, Individually and as Members of Any of the Following
    Groups or Organizations to which They Respectively Belonged,
    ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the “SS”) and including DIE
    SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME
    STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the
    as the “SA”) and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of the
    GERMAN ARMED FORCES all as defined in Appendix B of the


                            C O N T E N T S

     Chapter XV. Criminality of Groups and Organizations               1
                  1. The Law Under Which Nazi Organizations are
                     Accused of Being Criminal                         1
                  2. The Nazi Party Leadership Corps                  23
                  3. The Reich Cabinet                                91
                  4. The Sturmabteilung (SA)                         133
                  5. The Schutzstaffeln (SS)                         173
                  6. The Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) and
                     Sicherheitsdienst (SD)                          248
                  7. The General Staff and High Command of the
                     Armed Forces                                    316
            XVI. Individual Responsibility of Defendants             416
                  1. Hermann Wilhelm Goering                         417
                  2. Rudolf Hess                                     466
                  3. Joachim von Ribbentrop                          489
                  4. Wilhelm Keitel                                  528
                  5. Alfred Jodl                                     565
                  6. Ernst Kaltenbrunner                             575
                  7. Alfred Rosenberg                                593
                  8. Hans Frank                                      624
                  9. Wilhelm Frick                                   653
                 10. Julius Streicher                                689
                 11. Walter Funk                                     715
                 12. Hjalmar Schacht                                 738
                 13. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach             774
                 14. Karl Doenitz                                    815
                 15. Erich Raeder                                    849
                 16. Baldur von Schirach                             877
                 17. Martin Bormann                                  896
                 18. Franz von Papen                                 915
                 19. Artur Seyss-Inquart                             956
                 20. Constantin von Neurath                         1014
                 21. Hans Fritzsche                                 1035
 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA                                                  1055
                  1. Principal Officials of the Reich Government    1055
                  2. Principal Officials of the Nazi Party          1062
                  3. Heads of the Armed Forces                      1063
                  4. Index of Individuals                           1064
   OPERATIONS AND MEASURES DURING THE WAR                           1078
 DATA CONCERNING CAPTURE OF DEFENDANTS                              1083
   TERMS, WITH THEIR OFFICIAL ABBREVIATIONS                         1084

                               Chapter XV


_The following argument on the law and policy involved in the
prosecution’s charge that certain Nazi groups and organizations should
be declared criminal, was delivered by Justice Jackson before the
Tribunal on 28 February 1946._

May it please the Tribunal:

The unconditional surrender of Germany created, for the victors, novel
and difficult problems of law and administration. Since it is the first
such surrender of an entire and modernly organized society, precedents
and past experiences are of little help in guiding our policy toward the
vanquished. The responsibility implicit in demanding and accepting
capitulation of a whole people must of necessity include a duty to
discriminate justly and intelligently between opposing elements of the
population which bore dissimilar relations to the policies and conduct
which led to the catastrophe. This differentiation is the objective of
those provisions of the Charter which authorize this Tribunal to declare
organizations or groups to be criminal. Understanding of the problem
which the instrument attempts to solve is essential to its
interpretation and application.

              A. _The Problem of the Nazi Organizations._

One of the sinister peculiarities of German society at the time of the
surrender was that the State itself played only a subordinate role in
the exercise of political power, while the really drastic controls over
German society were organized outside its nominal government. This was
accomplished through an elaborate network of closely knit and exclusive
organizations of selected volunteers oath-bound to execute, without
delay and without question, the commands of the Nazi leaders.

These organizations penetrated the whole German life. The country was
subdivided into little Nazi principalities of about 50 households each,
and every such community had its recognized party leaders, party police,
and its undercover party spies. These were combined into larger units
with higher ranking leaders, executioners and spies. The whole formed a
pyramid of power outside the law, with the Fuehrer at its apex, and with
the local party officials as its broad base resting heavily on the
German population. The Nazi despotism, therefore, did not consist of
these individual defendants alone. A thousand little fuehrers dictated,
a thousand imitation Goerings strutted, a thousand Schirachs incited the
youth, a thousand Sauckels worked slaves, a thousand Streichers and
Rosenbergs stirred hate, a thousand Kaltenbrunners and Franks tortured
and killed, a thousand Schachts and Speers and Funks administered,
financed, and supported the movement. The Nazi movement was an
integrated force in city and county and hamlet. The party power
resulting from this system of organizations first rivaled, and then
dominated, the power of the State itself.

The primary vice of this web of organizations was that they were used to
transfer the power of coercing men from the government and the law to
the Nazi leaders. Liberty, self-government, and security of persons and
property do not exist except where the power of coercion is possessed
only by the State and is exercised only in obedience to law. The Nazis,
however, set up a private system of coercion, outside of and immune from
law, with party-controlled concentration camps and firing squads to
administer privately decreed sanctions. Without responsibility to law
and without warrant from any court, they were enabled to seize property,
take away liberty, and even take life itself.

These organizations had a calculated and decisive part in the barbaric
extremes of the Nazi movement. They served cleverly to exploit mob
psychology and to manipulate the mob. Multiplying the numbers of persons
in a common enterprise tends to diminish each individual’s sense of
moral responsibility and to increase his sense of security. The Nazi
leaders were masters of this technique. They manipulated these
organizations to make before the German populace impressive exhibitions
of numbers and of power. These were used to incite a mob spirit and then
riotously to gratify the popular hates they had inflamed and the
Germanic ambition they had inflated.

These organizations indoctrinated and practiced violence and terrorism.
They provided the systematized, aggressive, and disciplined execution
throughout Germany and the occupied countries of the whole catalogue of
crimes we have proven. The flowering of the system is represented in the
fanatical SS General Ohlendorf, who told this Tribunal without shame or
trace of pity how he personally directed the putting to death of 90,000
men, women, and children. No tribunal ever listened to a recital of such
wholesale murder as this Tribunal heard from him and from Wisliceny, a
fellow officer of the SS. Their own testimony shows the responsibility
of the SS for the extermination program which took the lives of five
million Jews, a responsibility the organization welcomed and discharged
methodically, remorselessly, and thoroughly. These crimes are
unprecedented ones because of the shocking numbers of victims. They are
even more shocking and unprecedented because of the large number of
persons who united to perpetrate them. All scruple or conscience of a
very large segment of the German people was committed to Nazi keeping,
and its devotees felt no personal sense of guilt as they went from one
extreme measure to another. On the other hand, they developed a contest
in cruelty and a competition in crime. Ohlendorf from the witness stand
accused other SS commanders, whose killings exceeded his, of
“exaggerating” their figures.

There could be no justice and no wisdom in an occupation policy which
imposed upon passive and unorganized and inarticulate Germans the same
burdens as it placed upon those who voluntarily banded themselves
together in these powerful and notorious gangs. One of the basic
requirements, both of justice and of successful administration of the
occupation responsibility of the victors, is a segregation of these
organized elements from the masses of Germans for separate treatment.

It seems beyond controversy that to punish a few top leaders but to
leave this web of organized bodies unscotched in the midst of German
postwar society, would be to foster the nucleus of a new Nazidom. The
members are accustomed to an established chain of centralized command;
they have formed a habit and developed a technique of both secret and
open cooperation. They still nourish a blind devotion to the suspended,
but not abandoned, Nazi program. They will keep alive the hates and
ambitions which generated the orgy of crime we have proved. They are
carriers, from this generation to the next, of the infection of
aggressive and ruthless war. The Tribunal has seen on the screen how
easily an assemblage that ostensibly is only a common labor force can be
in fact a military training unit drilling with shovels. The next war and
the next pogroms will be hatched in the nests of these organizations as
surely as we leave their membership with its prestige and influence
undiminished by condemnation and punishment.

The menace of these organizations is the more impressive when we
consider the demoralized state of German society. It will be years
before there can be established in the German State any political
authority that is not inexperienced and provisional. It cannot quickly
acquire the stability of a government aided by long habit of obedience
and traditional respect. The intrigue, obstruction, and possible
overthrow, which older and established governments fear from
conspiratorial groups, is a real and present danger to any stable social
order in the Germany of today and of tomorrow.

Insofar as the Charter of this Tribunal contemplates a justice of
retribution, it is obvious that it could not overlook these organized
instruments and instigators of past crimes. In opening this case, I said
that the United States does not seek to convict the whole German people
of crime. But it is equally important that this trial shall not serve to
absolve the whole German people except 22 men in the dock. The wrongs
that have been done to the world by these defendants and their top
confederates was not done by their will or by their strength alone. The
success of their designs was made possible because great numbers of
Germans organized themselves to become the fulcrum and the lever by
which the power of these leaders was extended and magnified. If this
trial fails to condemn these organized confederates for share of
responsibility for this catastrophe, it will be construed as their

But the Charter was not concerned with retributive justice alone. It
manifests a constructive policy influenced by exemplary and preventive
considerations. The primary objective of requiring that the surrender be
unconditional was to clear the way for reconstruction of German society
on such a basis that it will not again threaten the peace of Europe and
of the world. Temporary measures of the occupation authorities may, by
necessity, have been more arbitrary and applied with less discrimination
than befits a permanent policy. Under existing denazification policy, no
member of the Nazi party or its formations may be employed in any
position, other than ordinary labor, or in any business enterprise
unless he is found to have been only a nominal Nazi. Persons in certain
categories, whose standing in the community is one of prominence or
influence, are required to meet this standard, and those who do not may
be denied further participation in their businesses or professions. It
is mandatory to remove or exclude from public office, and from positions
of importance in quasi public and private enterprises, persons falling
within approximately 90 specified categories deemed to consist of either
active Nazis, Nazi supporters, or militarists. The property of such
persons is blocked.

It is recognized by the Control Council, as it was by the framers of the
Charter, that a permanent, long-term program should be based on a more
careful and more individual discrimination than was possible with
sweeping temporary measures. There is a movement now within the Control
Council for reconsideration of its whole denazification policy and
procedure. The action of this Tribunal in declaring, or in failing to
declare, the accused organizations criminal has a vital bearing on
future occupation policy.

It was the intent of the Charter to utilize the hearing processes of
this Tribunal to identify and condemn those Nazi and militaristic forces
that were so organized as to constitute a continuing menace to the
long-term objectives for which our respective countries have spent the
lives of their young men. It is in the light of this great purpose that
we must examine the provisions of the Charter.

            B. _The Procedure for Condemning Organizations._

It was obvious that the conventional litigation procedures could not,
without some modification, be adapted to this task. No system of
jurisprudence has yet evolved any satisfactory technique for handling a
great multiplicity of common charges against a multitude of accused
persons. The number of individual defendants that fairly can be tried in
a single proceeding probably does not greatly exceed the number now in
your dock. Moreover, the number of separate trials in which the same
voluminous evidence as to common plan must be repeated is very limited
as a practical matter. Yet adversary hearing procedures are the best
assurance the law has evolved that decisions will be well considered and
just. The task of the framers of the Charter was to find a way to
overcome these obstacles to practicable and early decision without
sacrificing the fairness implicit in hearings. The solution prescribed
by the Charter is certainly not faultless, but not one of its critics
has ever proposed an alternative that would not either deprive the
individual of any hearing or contemplate such a multitude of long trials
as to be impracticable. In any case, it is the plan adopted by our
respective governments and our duty here is to make it work.

The plan which was adopted in the Charter essentially is a severance of
the general issues which would be common to all individual trials from
the particular issues which would differ in each trial. The plan is
comparable to that employed in certain wartime legislation of the United
States (_Yakus_ v. _United States_, 321 U. S., 414, 64 Sup. Ct. 660).
The general issues are to be determined with finality in one trial
before the International Tribunal. In this trial, every accused
organization must be defended by counsel and must be represented by at
least one leading member, and other individual members may apply to be
heard. Their applications may be granted if the Tribunal thinks justice
requires it. The only issue in this trial concerns the collective
criminality of the organization or group. It is to be adjudicated by
what amounts to be a declaratory judgment. It does not decree any
punishment, either against the organization or against the individual

The only specification as to the effect of this Tribunal’s declaration
that an organization is criminal, is contained in Article 10 of the
Charter, which provides:

    “In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by
    the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory
    shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for
    membership therein before national, military or occupation
    courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group or
    organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned.”

Unquestionably, it would be competent for the Charter to have declared
flatly that membership in any of these named organizations is criminal
and should be punished accordingly. If there had been such an enactment,
it would not have been open to an individual who was being tried for
membership in the organization to contend that the organization was not
in fact criminal. The framers of the Charter, at a time before the
evidence adduced here was available, did not care to find organizations
criminal by fiat. They left that issue to determination after relevant
facts were developed by adversary proceedings. Plainly, the individual
member is better off because of the procedure of the Charter, which
leaves that finding of criminality to this body after hearings at which
the organization must, and the individual may, be represented.

The groups and organizations named in the Indictment are not “on trial”
in the conventional sense of that term. They are more nearly under
investigation as they might be before a grand jury in Anglo-American
practice. Article 9 recognizes a distinction between _the declaration_
of a group or organization as criminal and “_the trial_ of any
individual member thereof.” The power of the Tribunal to try is confined
to “persons,” and the Charter does not expand that term by definition,
as statutes sometimes do, to include other than natural persons. The
groups or organizations named in the Indictment were not as entities
served with process. The Tribunal is not empowered to impose any
sentence upon them as entities, nor to convict any person because of

It is to be observed that the Charter does not _require_ subsequent
proceedings against anyone. It provides only that the competent national
authorities “_shall have the right_ to bring individuals to trial for
membership therein.”

The Charter is silent as to the form these trials should take. It was
not deemed wise, on the information available when the Charter was drawn
up, that the Charter should regulate subsequent proceedings. Nor was it
necessary to do so. There is a continuing legislative authority,
representing all four signatory nations, competent to take over where
the Charter leaves off. Legislative supplementation of the Charter is
necessary to confer jurisdiction on local courts, to define procedures,
and to prescribe different penalties for different forms of activity.

Fear has been expressed, however, that the Charter’s silence as to
future proceedings means that great numbers of members will be rounded
up and automatically punished as a result of a declaration of an
organization to be criminal. It also has been suggested that this is, or
may be, the consequence of Article II, 1(d) of Control Council Act No.
10, which defines as a crime “membership in categories of a criminal
group or organization declared criminal by the International Military
Tribunal.” A purpose to inflict punishments without a right of hearing
cannot be spelled out of the Charter, and would be offensive to both its
letter and its spirit. And I do not find in Control Council Act No. 10
any inconsistency with the Charter. Of course, to reach all individual
members will require numerous hearings. But they will involve only
narrow issues; many accused will have no answers to charges if they are
clearly stated, and the proceedings should be expeditious and

But I think it is clear that before any person is punishable for
membership in a criminal organization, he is entitled to a hearing on
the facts of his case. The Charter does not authorize the national
authorities to punish membership without a hearing—it gives them only
the right to “bring individuals to trial.” That means what it says. A
trial means there is something to try.

As to trials of the individual members, the Charter denies only one of
the possible defenses of an accused: he may not relitigate the question
whether the organization itself was a criminal one. Nothing precludes
him from denying that his participation was voluntary and proving he
acted under duress; he may prove that he was deceived or tricked into
membership; he may show that he had withdrawn; or he may prove that his
name on the rolls is a case of mistaken identity.

The membership which the Charter and the Control Council Act make
criminal, of course, implies a genuine membership involving the volition
of the member. The act of affiliation with the organization must have
been intentional and voluntary. Legal compulsion or illegal duress,
actual fraud or trick of which one is a victim, has never been thought
to be the victim’s crime, and such an unjust result is not to be implied
now. The extent of the member’s knowledge of the criminal character of
the organization is, however, another matter. He may not have known on
the day he joined but may have remained a member after learning the
fact. And he is chargeable not only with what he knew but with all of
which he reasonably was put on notice.

There are safeguards to assure that this program will be carried out in
good faith. Prosecution under the declaration is discretionary, and if
there were purpose to punish without trial, it would have been already
done without waiting for the declaration. We think the Tribunal will
presume that signatory powers which have voluntarily submitted to this
process will carry it out faithfully.

The Control Council Act applies only to “categories of membership
declared criminal.” This language recognizes a power in this Tribunal to
limit the effect of its declaration. I do not think, for reasons I will
later state, that this should be construed or availed of so as to try
here any issues as to sub-groups or sections or individuals, which can
be tried later. It should, I think, be construed to mean, not those
limitations which must be defined by detailed evidence, but limitations
of principle such as those I have outlined as already implied. It does
not require this Tribunal to delve into evidence to condition its
judgment, if it sees fit, to apply only to intentional, voluntary, and
knowing membership. It does not supplant later trials but guides them.

It cannot be said that a plan, such as we have here, for the severance
of general issues common to many cases from particular issues applicable
only to individual defendants and for the litigation of each type of
issue in separate Tribunals specially adapted to their different tasks,
is lacking in reasonableness or fair play. And while it presents unusual
procedural difficulties, I do not think it presents any insurmountable

   C. _Criteria, Principles, and Precedents for Declaring Collective

The substantive law which governs the inquiry into criminality of
organizations is, in its large outline, old and well settled and fairly
uniform in all systems of law. It is true that we are dealing with a
procedure easy to abuse and one often feared as an interference with
liberty of assembly or as an imposition of “guilt by association.” It
also is true that proceedings against organizations are closely akin to
the conspiracy charge, which is the great dragnet of the law, rightly
watched by courts lest it be abused.

The fact is, however, that every form of government has considered it
necessary to treat some organizations as criminal. Not even the most
tolerant of governments can permit the accumulation of power in private
organizations to a point where it rivals, obstructs, or dominates the
government itself. To do so would be to grant designing men a liberty to
destroy liberty. It was the very complacency and tolerance as well as
the impotence of the Weimar Republic towards the growing organization of
Nazi power, which spelled the death of German freedom.

Protection of the citizen’s liberty has required even free governments
to enact laws making criminal those aggregations of power which threaten
to impose their will on unwilling citizens. Every one of the nations
signatory to this Charter has laws making certain types of organizations
criminal. The Ku Klux Klan in the United States flourished at about the
same time as the Nazi movement in Germany. It appealed to the same
hates, practiced the same extra-legal coercions, and likewise terrorized
by weird nighttime ceremonials. Like the Nazi Party it was composed of a
core of fanatics, but enlisted support of some respectable persons who
knew it was wrong, but thought it was winning. It eventually provoked a
variety of legislative acts directed against such organizations.

The Congress of the United States also has enacted legislation outlawing
certain organizations. A recent example is the Act of June 28, 1940 (c.
439, Title I, Section 2, 54 Stat. 671, 18 USCA 10) which provides in
part as follows:

    “(a) It shall be unlawful for any person . . .

        “(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group,
        or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage
        the overthrow or destruction of any government in the
        United States by force or violence; or to be or become a
        member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group,
        or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.”

There is much legislation by States of the American union creating
analogous offenses. An example is to be found in the Act of California
(Statutes 1919, Chapter 188, p. 281) which, after defining “criminal
syndicalism,” provides:

    “Section 2. Any person who . . . (4) organizes or assists in
    organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a member of, any
    organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized
    or assembled to teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism . . .

    “Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment.”

Precedents in English law for outlawing organizations and punishing
membership therein are old and consistent with the Charter. One of the
first is the British India Act No. 30, enacted November 14, 1836.
Section 1 provides:

    “It is hereby enacted that whoever shall be proved to have
    belonged either before or after the passing of this Act to any
    gang of thugs either within or without the territories of the
    East India Company shall be punished with imprisonment for life
    with hard labour.”

Other precedents in English legislation are the Unlawful Societies Act
of 1799 (3 George III, Chapter 79); the Seditious Meetings Act of 1817
(57 George III, Chapter 19); the Seditious Meetings Act of 1846 (9 and
10 Victoria, Chapter 33); the Public Order Act of 1936 and Defense
Regulation 18(b). The last, not without opposition, was intended to
protect the integrity of the British Government against the fifth-column
activities of this same Nazi conspiracy.

Soviet Russia punishes as a crime the formation of and membership in a
criminal gang. Criminologists of the U.S.S.R. call this crime the “crime
of banditry,” a term appropriate to the German organizations.

French criminal law makes membership in subversive organizations a
crime. Membership of the criminal gang is a crime in itself. (Articles
265-268, French Penal Code, “_Association de Malfaiteurs_”; Garaud,
_Précis de Droit Criminel_, 1934 Edition Sirey, p. 1518 and seq. See
also Act of December 18, 1893.)

For German precedents, it is neither seemly nor necessary to go to the
Nazi regime. Under the Empire and the Weimar Republic, however, German
jurisprudence deserved respect and it presents both statutory and
juridical examples of declarations of the criminality of organizations.
Among statutory examples are:

1. The German Criminal Code enacted in 1871. Section 128 was aimed
against secret associations and Section 129 was directed against
organizations inimical to the State.

2. The law of March 22, 1921 against paramilitary organizations.

3. The law of July 21, 1922 against organizations aimed at overthrowing
the constitution of the Reich.

Section 128 of the Criminal Code of 1871 is especially pertinent. It

    “The participation in an organization the existence,
    constitution, or purposes of which are to be kept secret from
    the Government, or in which obedience to unknown superiors or
    unconditional obedience to known superiors is pledged, is
    punishable by imprisonment up to six months for the members and
    from one month to one year for the founders and officers. Public
    officials may be deprived of the right to hold public office for
    a period of from one to five years.”

Under the Empire, various Polish national unions were the subject of
criminal prosecution. Under the Republic, judicial judgments in 1927-28
held criminal the entire Communist Party of Germany. In 1922 and 1928
judgments ran against the political Leadership Corps of the Communist
Party, which included all its so-called “body of functionaries,”
corresponding to the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party which we have
accused. The judgment included every cashier, every employee, every
delivery boy and messenger, and every district leader. In 1930 a
judgment of criminality against the “Union of Red Front Fighters” of the
Communist Party made no discrimination between leaders and ordinary

Most significant of all is the fact that on 30 May, 1924 the German
courts rendered judgment that the whole Nazi Party was a criminal
organization. This decision referred not only to the Leadership Corps,
which we are indicting here, but to all other members as well. The whole
subsequent rise to power of the Nazi Party was in the shadow of this
judgment of illegality.

The German courts in dealing with criminal organizations proceeded on
the theory that all members were held together by a common plan in which
each one participated even though at various levels. Moreover, the
fundamental principles of responsibility of members as stated by the
German Supreme Court are strikingly like the principles that govern our
Anglo-American law of conspiracy. Among them were these:

    1. “It is a matter of indifference whether all the members
    pursued the forbidden aims. It is enough if a part exercised the
    forbidden activity.” (R.G. VIa 97/22 of the 8.5.22.)

    2. “It is a matter of indifference whether the members of the
    group or association agree with the aims, tasks, means of
    working and means of fighting.” (R.G. 58, 401 of the 24.10.24.)

    3. “The real attitude of mind of the participants is a matter of
    indifference. Even if they had the intention of not
    participating in criminal efforts, or hindering them, this can
    not eliminate their responsibility.” (R.G. 58, 401 of the

Organizations with criminal ends are everywhere regarded as in the
nature of criminal conspiracies, and their criminality is judged by the
application of conspiracy principles. The reason why they are offensive
to law-governed people has been succinctly stated as follows:

    “The reason for finding criminal liability in case of a
    combination to effect an unlawful end or to use unlawful means,
    where none would exist, even though the act contemplated were
    actually committed by an individual, is that a combination of
    persons to commit a wrong, either as an end or as a means to an
    end, is so much more dangerous, because of its increased power
    to do wrong, because it is more difficult to guard against and
    prevent the evil designs of a group of persons than of a single
    person, and because of the terror which fear of such a
    combination tends to create in the minds of people.” (_Miller on
    Criminal Law_, 1932, p. 110.)

The Charter, in Article 6, provides that “Leaders, organizers,
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in
execution of such plan.” The individual defendants are arraigned at your
bar on this charge which, if proved, makes them responsible for the acts
of others in execution of the common plan.

The Charter did not define responsibility for the acts of others in
terms of “conspiracy” alone. The crimes were defined in non-technical
but inclusive terms, and embraced formulating and executing a “common
plan” as well as participating in a “conspiracy.” It was feared that to
do otherwise might import into the proceedings technical requirements
and limitations which have grown up around the term “conspiracy.” There
are some divergences between the Anglo-American concept of conspiracy
and that of either Soviet, French, or German jurisprudence. It was
desired that concrete cases be guided by the broader considerations
inherent in the nature of the social problem, rather than controlled by
refinements of any local law.

Now, except for procedural difficulties arising from their multitude,
there is no reason why every member of any Nazi organization accused
here could not have been indicted and convicted as a part of the
conspiracy under Article 6 even if the Charter had never mentioned
organizations at all. Voluntary affiliation constituted a definite act
of adherence to some common plan and purpose. These did not pretend to
be merely social or cultural groups; admittedly they were united for
action. In the case of several of the Nazi organizations, the fact of
confederation was evidenced by formal induction into membership, the
taking of an oath, the wearing of a distinctive uniform, the submission
to a discipline. That all members of each Nazi organization did combine
under a common plan to achieve some end by combined efforts is
abundantly established.

The criteria for determining the collective guilt of those who thus
adhered to a common plan obviously are those which would test the
legality of any combination or conspiracy. Did it contemplate illegal
methods or aim at illegal ends? If so, the liability of each member of
one of these Nazi organizations for the acts of every other member is
not essentially different from the liability for conspiracy enforced in
Courts of the United States against business men who combine in
violation of the anti-trust laws, or of other defendants accused under
narcotic drugs laws, sedition acts, or other federal penal enactments.

Among the principles every day enforced in Courts of Great Britain and
the United States in dealing with conspiracy are these:

1. No meeting or formal agreement is necessary. It is sufficient,
although one performs one part and other persons other parts, if there
be concert of action, and working together understandingly with a common
design to accomplish a common purpose.

2. One may be liable even though he may not have known who his
fellow-conspirators were, or just what part they were to take, or what
acts they committed, and though he did not take personal part in them or
was absent when criminal acts occurred.

3. There may be liability for acts of fellow-conspirators although the
particular acts were not intended or anticipated, if they were done in
execution of the common plan.

4. It is not necessary to liability that one be a member of a conspiracy
at the same time as other actors, or at the time of criminal acts. When
one becomes a party to it, he adopts and ratifies what has gone before
and remains responsible until he abandons the conspiracy with notice to
his fellow-conspirators.

Of course, members of criminal organizations or conspiracies who
personally commit crimes are individually punishable for those crimes
exactly as are those who commit the same offenses without organizational
backing. But the very gist of the crime of conspiracy or membership in a
criminal association is liability for acts one did not personally commit
but which his acts facilitated or abetted. The crime is to combine with
others and to participate in the unlawful common effort, however
innocent the personal acts of the participant when considered by

The very innocent act of mailing a letter is enough to implicate one in
a conspiracy if the purpose of the letter is to advance a criminal plan.
There are countless examples of this doctrine in Anglo-American

The sweep of the law of conspiracy is an important consideration in
determining the criteria of guilt for organizations. Certainly the
vicarious liability imposed in consequence of voluntary membership,
formalized by oath, dedicated to a common organizational purpose and
submission to a discipline and chain of command, can not be less than
that which follows from informal cooperation with a nebulous group to a
common end as is sufficient in conspiracy. This meets the suggestion
that the prosecution is required to prove every member, or every part,
fraction, or division of the membership to be guilty of criminal acts.
The suggestion ignores the conspiratorial nature of the charge. Such an
interpretation also would reduce the Charter to an unworkable absurdity.
To concentrate in one International Tribunal inquiries requiring such
detailed evidence as to each member would set a task not possible of
completion within the lives of living men.

It is easy to toss about such a plausible but superficial cliché as,
“One should be convicted for his activities, not for his membership.”
But this ignores the fact that membership in Nazi bodies was itself an
activity. It was not something passed out to a passive citizen like a
handbill. Even a nominal membership may aid and abet a movement greatly.
Does anyone believe that Hjalmar Schacht sitting in the front row of the
Nazi Party Congress of 1935, wearing the insignia of the Party, was
included in the Nazi propaganda films merely for artistic effect? This
great banker’s mere loan of his name to this shady enterprise gave it a
lift and a respectability in the eyes of every hesitating German. There
may be instances in which membership did not aid and abet the
organizational ends and means, but individual situations of that kind
are for appraisal in the later hearings and not by this Tribunal. By and
large, the use of organization affiliation is a quick and simple, but at
the same time fairly accurate outline of the contours of a conspiracy to
do what the organization actually did. It is the only one workable at
this stage of the trial. It can work no injustice because before any
individual can be punished, he can submit the facts of his own case to
further and more detailed judicial scrutiny.

While the Charter does not so provide, we think that on ordinary legal
principles the burden of proof to justify a declaration of criminality
is upon the prosecution. It is discharged, we think, when we establish
the following:

1. The organization or group in question must be some aggregation of
persons associated in some identifiable relationship with a collective
general purpose.

2. While the Charter does not so declare, we think it implied that
membership in such an organization must be generally voluntary. That
does not require proof that every member was a volunteer. Nor does it
mean that an organization is not to be considered voluntary if the
defense proves that some minor fraction or small percentage of its
membership was compelled to join. The test is a common-sense one: Was
the organization on the whole one which persons were free to join or to
stay out of? Membership is not made involuntary by the fact that it was
good business or good politics to identify one’s self with the movement.
Any compulsion must be of the kind which the law normally recognizes,
and threats of political or economic retaliation would be of no

3. The aims of the organization must be criminal in that it was
designing to perform acts denounced as crimes in Article 6 of the
Charter. No other act would authorize conviction of an individual and
therefore no other act would authorize conviction of an organization in
connection with the conviction of the individual.

4. The criminal aims or methods of the organization must have been of
such character that its membership in general may properly be charged
with knowledge of them. This again is not specifically required by the
Charter. Of course, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to establish
the individual knowledge of every member of the organization or to rebut
the possibility that some may have joined in ignorance of its true

5. Some individual defendant must have been a member of the organization
and must be convicted of some act on the basis of which the organization
is declared to be criminal.

                  D. _Definition of Issues for Trial._

The progress of this trial will be expedited by clear definition of the
issues to be tried. I have indicated what we consider to be the proper
criteria of guilt. There are also subjects which we think are not
relevant before this Tribunal, some of which are mentioned in the
specific questions asked by the Tribunal.

Only a single ultimate issue is before this Tribunal for decision. That
is whether accused organizations properly may be characterized as
criminal ones or as innocent ones. Nothing is relevant here that does
not bear on a question that would be common to the case of every member.
Any matter which would be exculpating for some members but not for all
is irrelevant here.

We think it is not relevant to this proceeding at this stage that one or
many members were conscripted if in general the membership was
voluntary. It may be conceded that conscription is a good defense for an
individual charged with membership in a criminal organization, but an
organization can have criminal purposes and commit criminal acts even if
a portion of its membership consists of persons who were compelled to
join it. The issue of conscription is not pertinent to this proceeding
but it is pertinent to the trials of individuals for membership in
organizations declared criminal by this Tribunal.

We also think it is not relevant to this proceeding that one or more
members of the named organizations were ignorant of its criminal
purposes or methods if its purposes or methods were open and notorious.
An organization may have criminal purposes and commit criminal acts
although one or many of its members were without personal knowledge
thereof. If a person joined what he thought was a social club but what
in fact was a gang of cutthroats and murderers, his lack of knowledge
would not exonerate the gang considered as a group, although it might
possibly be a factor in extenuation of a charge of criminality brought
against him for mere membership in the organization. Even then the test
would be not what the man knew, but what, as a person of common
understanding, he should have known.

It is not relevant to this proceeding that one or more members of the
named organizations were themselves innocent of unlawful acts. This
proposition is basic to the entire theory of the declaration of
organizational criminality. The purpose of declaring criminality of
organizations, as in every conspiracy charge, is punishment for aiding
crimes, although the precise perpetrators may never be found or
identified. We know that the Gestapo and SS, as organizations, were
given principal responsibility for the extermination of the Jewish
people in Europe—but beyond a few isolated instances, we can never
establish which members of the Gestapo or SS actually carried out the
murders. Any member guilty of direct participation in such crimes can be
tried on the charge of having committed specific crimes in addition to
the general charge of membership in a criminal organization. Therefore,
it is wholly immaterial that one or more members of the organizations
were themselves allegedly innocent of specific wrongdoing. The purpose
of this proceeding is not to reach instances of individual criminal
conduct, even in subsequent trials and, therefore, such considerations
are irrelevant here.

Another question raised by the Tribunal is the period of time during
which the groups or organizations named in the Indictment are claimed by
the Prosecution to have been criminal. The Prosecution believes that
each organization should be declared criminal during the period referred
to in the Indictment. We do not contend that the Tribunal is without
power to condition its declaration so as to cover a lesser period of
time than that set forth in the Indictment. The Prosecution feels,
however, that there is in the record at this time adequate evidence to
support the charge of criminality with respect to each of the named
organizations during the full period of time set forth in the

Another question raised by the Tribunal is whether any classes of
persons included within the accused groups or organizations should be
excluded from the declaration of criminality. It is, of course,
necessary that the Tribunal relate its declaration to some identifiable
group or organization. The Tribunal, however, is not expected or
required to be bound by formalities of organization. In framing the
Charter, the use was deliberately avoided of terms or concepts which
would involve this trial in legal technicalities about “juristic
persons” or “entities.” Systems of jurisprudence are not uniform in the
refinements of these fictions. The concept of the Charter, therefore, is
a nontechnical one. “Group” or “organization” should be given no
artificial or sophistical meaning. The word “group” was used in the
Charter as a broader term, implying a looser and less formal structure
or relationship than is implied in the “organization.” The terms mean in
the context of the Charter what they mean in the ordinary speech of
people. The test to identify a group or organization is, we submit, a
natural and common-sense one.

It is important to bear in mind that while the Tribunal no doubt has
power to make its own definition of the groups it will declare criminal,
the precise composition and membership of groups and organizations is
not an issue for trial here. There is no Charter requirement and no
practical need for the Tribunal to define a group or organization with
such particularity that its precise composition or membership is thereby
determined. The creation of a mechanism for later trial of such issues
was a recognition that the declaration of this Tribunal is not decisive
of such questions and is likely to be so general as to comprehend
persons who on more detailed inquiry will prove to be outside of it. An
effort by this Tribunal to try questions of exculpation of individuals,
few or many, would unduly protract the trial, transgress the limitation
of the Charter, and quite likely do some mischief by attempting to
adjudicate precise boundaries on evidence which is not directed to that

The prosecution stands upon the language of the Indictment and contends
that each group or organization should be declared criminal as an entity
and that no inquiry should be entered upon and no evidence entertained
as to the exculpation of any class or classes of persons within such
descriptions. Practical reasons of conserving the Tribunal’s time
combine with practical considerations for the defendants. A single trial
held in one city to deal with questions of excluding thousands of
defendants living all over Germany could not be expected to do justice
to each member unless it was expected to endure indefinitely. Provision
for later, local trial of individual relationships protects the rights
of members better than can possibly be done in proceedings before this

With respect to the Gestapo, the United States consents to exclude
persons employed in purely clerical, stenographic, janitorial or similar
unofficial routine tasks. As to the Nazi Leadership Corps we abide by
the position taken at the time of submission of the evidence, that the
following should be included: the Fuehrer, the _Reichsleitung_ (i.e.,
the _Reichsleiters_, main departments and officeholders), the
_Gauleiters_ and their staff officers, the _Kreisleiters_ and their
staff officers, the _Ortsgruppenleiters_, the _Zellenleiters_, and the
_Blockleiters_, but not members of the staff of the last three
officials. As regards the SA, it is considered advisable that the
Declaration expressly exclude (1) wearers of the SA Sports Badge; (2) SA
controlled Home Guard Units (_SA Wehrmannschaften_) which were not
strictly part of the SA; (3) The _Marchabteilungen_ of the N.S.K.O.V.
(National Socialist League for Disabled Veterans); and (4) the SA
Reserve, so as to include only the active part of the organization, and
that members who were never in any part of that organization other than
the Reserve should be excluded.

The Prosecution does not feel that there is evidence of the severability
of any class or classes of persons within the organizations accused
which would justify any further concessions and feels that no other part
of the named groups should be excluded. In this connection, we would
again stress the principles of conspiracy. The fact that a section of an
organization itself committed no criminal act, or may have been occupied
in technical or administrative functions, does not relieve that section
of criminal responsibility if its activities contributed to the
accomplishment of the criminal enterprise.

                E. _Further Steps Before This Tribunal._

Over 45,000 persons have joined in communications to this Tribunal
asking to be heard in connection with the accusations against
organizations. The volume of these applications has caused apprehension
as to further proceedings. No doubt there are difficulties yet to be
overcome, but my study indicates that the difficulties are greatly

The Tribunal is vested with wide discretion as to whether it will
entertain an application to be heard. The Prosecution would be anxious,
of course, to have every application granted that is necessary, not only
to do justice but to avoid the appearance of doing anything less than
justice. And we do not consider that expediting this trial is so
important as affording a fair opportunity to present all really
pertinent facts.

Analysis of the conditions which have brought about this flood of
applications indicates that their significance is not proportionate to
their numbers. The Tribunal sent out 200,000 printed notices of the
right to appear before it and defend. They were sent to Allied prisoner
of war and internment camps. The notice was published in all German
language papers and was repeatedly broadcast over the radio. The 45,000
persons who responded with applications to be heard came principally
from about 15 prisoner of war and internment camps in British or United
States control. Those received included an approximate 12,000 from
Dachau, 10,000 from Langwasser, 7,500 from Auerbach, 4,000 from
Staumuehle, 2,500 from Garmisch, and several hundred from each of the

We undertook investigation of these applications from Auerbach camp as
probably typical of all. The camp is for prisoners of war, predominantly
SS members, and its prisoners number 16,964 enlisted men and 923
officers. The notice of the International Tribunal was posted in each
barracks and was read to all inmates. The applications to the Tribunal
were forwarded without censorship. Applications to defend were made by
7,509 SS members.

Investigation indicates that these were filed in direct response to the
notice and that no action was directed or inspired from any other source
within the camp. All who were interrogated professed no knowledge of any
SS crimes or of SS criminal purpose, but expressed interest only in
their individual fate. Our investigators report no indication that the
SS members had additional evidence or information to submit on the
general question of the criminality of the SS as an organization. They
seemed to think it necessary to make the application to this Tribunal in
order to protect themselves.

Examination of the applications made to the Tribunal indicates that most
members do not profess to have evidence on the general issue triable
here. They assert that the writer has neither committed, witnessed, nor
known of the crimes charged against the organization. On a proper
definition of the issues such an application is insufficient on its

A careful examination of the Tribunal’s notice to which these
applications respond will indicate that the notice contains no word
which would inform a member, particularly if a layman, of the narrowness
of the issues here, or of the later opportunity of each member, if and
when prosecuted, to present personal defenses. On the other hand, I
think the notice creates the impression that every member may be
convicted and punished by this Tribunal and that his only chance to be
heard is here.

In view of these facts we suggest consideration of the following program
for completion of this trial as to organizations.

1. That the Tribunal formulate and express in an order the scope of the
issues and the limitations on the issues to be heard by it.

2. That a notice adequately informing members as to the limitation on
issues and the opportunity for later, individual trial, be sent to all
applicants and published as was the original notice.

3. That a panel of masters be appointed as authorized in Article 17(e)
of the Charter to examine applications and report those insufficient on
their own statements, and to go to the camps and supervise the taking of
any relevant evidence. Defense counsel and prosecution representatives
should of course attend and be heard before the masters. The masters
should reduce any evidence to deposition form and report the whole to
the Tribunal to be introduced as a part of its record.

4. The representative principle may also be employed to simplify this
task. Members of particular organizations in particular camps might well
be invited to choose one or more to represent them in presenting

It may not be untimely to remind the Tribunal and defense counsel that
the prosecution has omitted from evidence many relevant documents which
show repetition of crimes by these organizations in order to save time
by avoiding cumulative evidence. It is not too much to expect that
cumulative evidence of a negative character will likewise be limited.

Some concern has been expressed as to the number of persons who might be
affected by the declarations of criminality we have asked. Some people
seem more susceptible to the shock of a million punishments than to the
shock of 5 million murders. At most the number of punishments will never
catch up with the number of crimes. However, it is impossible to state
even with approximate accuracy the number of persons who might be
affected. Figures from German sources seriously exaggerate the number,
because they do not take account of heavy casualties in the latter part
of the war, and make no allowances for duplication of membership, which
was large. For example, the evidence is to the effect that 75 percent of
the Gestapo men also were members of the SS. We know that the United
States forces have in detention a roughly estimated 130,000 persons who
appear to be members of accused organizations. I have no figures from
other Allied forces. But how many of these actually would be prosecuted,
instead of being dealt with under the denazification program, no one can
foretell. Whatever the number, of one thing we may be sure: it is so
large that a thorough inquiry by this Tribunal, into each case, would
prolong its session beyond endurance. All questions as to whether
individuals or sub-groups of accused organizations should be excepted
from the Declaration of Criminality, should be left for local courts,
located near the home of the accused and near sources of evidence. These
courts can work in one or at most in two languages, instead of four, and
can hear evidence which both parties direct to the specific issues.

                            F. _Conclusion._

This is not the time to review the evidence against particular
organizations which, we take it, should be reserved for summation after
all the evidence is presented. But it is timely to say that the
selection of the six organizations named in the Indictment was not a
matter of chance. The chief reasons they were chosen are these:
collectively they were the ultimate repositories of all power in the
Nazi regime; they were not only the most powerful, but the most vicious
organizations in the regime; and they were organizations in which
membership was generally voluntary.

The Nazi Leadership Corps consisted of the directors and principal
executors of the Nazi Party, which was the force lying behind and
dominating the whole German state. The Reichs Cabinet was the facade
through which the Nazi Party translated its will into legislative,
administrative, and executive acts. The two pillars on which the
security of the regime rested were the armed forces, directed and
controlled by the General Staff and High Command, and the police
forces—the Gestapo, the SA, the SD, and the SS. These organizations
exemplify all the evil forces of the Nazi regime.

These organizations were also selected because, while representative,
they were not so large or extensive as to make it probable that
innocent, passive, or indifferent Germans might be caught up in the same
net with the guilty. State officialdom is represented, but not all
administrative officials or department heads or civil servants; only the
_Reichsregierung_, the very heart of Nazidom within the Government, is
named. The armed forces are accused, but not the average soldier or
officer, no matter how high ranking. Only the top policy-makers—the
General Staff and High Command—are named. The police forces are
accused, but not every policeman: not the ordinary police, which
performed only normal police functions. Only the most terroristic and
repressive police elements—the Gestapo and SD—are named. The Nazi
Party is accused, but not every Nazi voter, not even every member; only
the leaders, the _Politische Leiter_. (_See Chart No. 14._) And not even
every Party official or worker is included; only “the bearers of
sovereignty,” in the metaphysical jargon of the Party, who were the
actual commanding officers and their staff officers on the highest
levels, are accused. The “formations” or strong arms of the Party are
accused, but not every one of the seven formations, nor any of the
twenty or more supervised or affiliated party groups. Nazi organizations
in which membership was compulsory, either legally or in practice (like
the Hitler Youth and the _Deutsche Studentschaft_); Nazi professional
organizations (like the Civil Servants Organization, the National
Socialist Teachers Organization, and the National Socialist Lawyers
Organization); Nazi organizations having some legitimate purpose (like
the welfare organizations), have not been indicted. Only two formations
are named, the SA and the SS, the oldest of the Nazi organizations,
groups which had no purpose other than carrying out the Nazi schemes and
which actively participated in every crime denounced in the Charter.

In administering preventive justice with a view to forestalling
repetition of these crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes, it would be a greater catastrophe to acquit these
organizations than it would be to acquit the entire 22 individual
defendants in the box. These defendants’ power for harm is spent. That
of these organizations goes on. If they are exonerated here, the German
people will infer that they did no wrong and will easily be regimented
in reconstituted organizations under new names behind the same program.

In administering retributive justice it would be possible to exonerate
these organizations only by concluding that no crimes have been
committed by the Nazi regime. Their sponsorship of every Nazi purpose
and their confederation to execute every measure to attain those ends is
beyond denial. A failure to condemn these organizations under the terms
of the Charter can only mean that such Nazi ends and means cannot be
considered criminal, and that the Charter of the Tribunal is considered
a nullity.


The Nazi Party Leadership Corps—it is proposed to demonstrate—was
responsible for planning, directing, and supervising the criminal
measures carried into execution by the Nazi Party, which was the central
core of the common plan or conspiracy charged in Count I of the
Indictment. Moreover, it will be shown, the members of the Leadership
Corps themselves actively participated in the commission of illegal
measures in aid of the conspiracy. In the light of the evidence to be
discussed, the Leadership Corps may be fairly described as the brain,
the backbone, and the directing arms of the Nazi Party. Its
responsibilities are more massive and comprehensive than those of the
army of followers who blindly and faithfully did its bidding.

    A. _Composition, Functions, Responsibilities, and Powers of the
                           Leadership Corps._

In considering the composition and organizational structure of the
Leadership Corps, preliminary reference is made to the organization
chart of the Nazi Party (_Chart Number 1_) as well as a chart of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party appearing at page 9 of a magazine
published by the Chief Education Office of the Nazi Party entitled “_Das
Gesicht der Partei_” (The Face of the Party). These charts and the
evidence to follow show that the Leadership Corps constituted the sum of
the officials of the Nazi Party: it included the Fuehrer; the
_Reichsleiter_ and Reich office holders; the five categories of leaders
who were area commanders (called _Hoheitstraeger_, or “bearers of
sovereignty”) ranging all the way from the 40-odd _Gauleiter_ in charge
of large districts down through the intermediate political leaders to
the _Blockleiter_, charged with looking after 40 to 60 households; and
what may best be described as the Staff Officers attached to each of the
5 levels of _Hoheitstraeger_.

Organized upon a hierarchical basis, forming a pyramidal structure, the
principal Political Leaders on a scale of descending authority were:


    _Reichsleiter_ (Reich Leaders) and _Main Office_ and _Office

    _Gauleiter_ (District Leaders) and Staff Officers

    _Kreisleiter_ (County Leaders) and Staff Officers

    _Ortsgruppenleiter_ (Local Chapter Leaders) and Staff Officers

    _Zellenleiter_ (Cell Leaders) and Staff Officers

    _Blockleiter_ (Block Leaders) and Staff Officers

A large part of this and other evidence relating to the composition of
the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party is to be found in the 1943
edition of the _Organization Book of the NSDAP_, an authoritative primer
on Nazi organizations which was edited by the defendant, Reich
Organization Leader of the NSDAP, Dr. Robert Ley.

The _Reichsleitung_ of the Leadership Corps consisted of the
_Reichsleiter_ or Reich Leaders of the Party, the _Hauptaemter_ (Main
Offices) and the _Aemter_ (or Offices). The _Reichsleiter_ of the Party
were, next to Hitler, the highest officeholders in the Party hierarchy.
All the _Reichsleiter_ and Main Office and officeholders within the
_Reichsleitung_ were appointed by Hitler and were directly responsible
to him. _The Organization Book of the NSDAP_ puts it as follows:

    “The Fuehrer appoints the following Political Directors:
    “_Reichsleiter_ and all Political Directors, to include the
    Directors of the Womens Leagues within the Reich Directorate or
    _Reichsleitung_.” (_1893-PS_)

The significant fact is that through the _Reichsleitung_ perfect
coordination of Party and State machinery was guaranteed. The Party
Manual describes it this way:

    “In the _Reichsleitung_ the arteries of the organization of the
    German people and of the German State merge.” (_1893-PS_)

To demonstrate that the _Reichsleiter_ of the Leadership Corps included
the most powerful coalition of political overlords in Nazi Germany, it
is necessary only to mention their names. The list of _Reichsleiter_
includes the following defendants on trial: Rosenberg, Von Schirach,
Frick, Bormann, and Ley.

The evidence to be presented will show that Rosenberg was the leader of
an organization named for him, the _Einsatzstab_ Rosenberg, which
carried out a vast program of looting and plunder of art treasures
throughout occupied Europe. The evidence will further show that, as
Representative of the Fuehrer for the Supervision of Nazi Ideology and
Schooling, Rosenberg participated in an aggressive campaign to undermine
the Christian churches and to supersede Christianity by a German
National Church founded upon a combination of irrationality,
pseudo-scientific theories, mysticism, and the cult of the racial state.

It will be shown that the late Defendant Ley, acting as the agent of
Hitler and the Leadership Corps, directed the Nazi assault upon the
independent labor unions of Germany and before destroying himself first
destroyed the free and independent labor movement; and that he replaced
it by a Nazi organization, the German Labor front or DAF, which he
employed as a means of exploiting the German labor force in the
interests of the conspiracy and to instill Nazi ideology among the ranks
of the German workers.

It will be shown that Frick participated in the enactment of many laws
which were designed to promote the conspiracy in its several phases.
Frick shares responsibility for the grave injury done by the officials
of the Leadership Corps to the concept of the rule of law by virtue of
his efforts to give the color of law and formal legality to a large
volume of Nazi legislation violative of the rights of humanity, such as
the legislation designed to stigmatize and eliminate the Jewish people
of Germany and German-occupied Europe. As chief of the Party
Chancellery, immediately under Hitler, Bormann was an extremely
important force in directing the activities of the Leadership Corps. As
will be shown, a decree of 16 January 1942 provided that the
participation of the Party in all important legislation, governmental
appointments, and promotions had to be undertaken exclusively by
Bormann. He took part in the preparation of all laws and decrees issued
by the Reich authorities and gave his assent to those of the subordinate

The list of _Reichsleiter_ of the NSDAP set forth in the _National
Socialist Yearbook_ (1943 Edition) shows that the following 15
_Reichsleiter_ were in office in 1943 (_2473-PS_):

                    “_THE REICHSLEITERS OF THE NSDAP_
   “Max Amann                _Reichsleiter_ for the Press.
   “Martin Bormann           Chief of the Party Chancery.
   “Phillipp Bouhler         Chief of the Chancery of the Fuehrer of
                             the NSDAP. Chairman of the official Party
                             Investigation Commission for the
                             Protection of National Socialist Writings.
   “Walter Darré             On leave.
   “Otto Dietrich            Reich Press Chief of the NSDAP.
   “Franz von Epp            Chief of the _Kolonialpolitischen Amtes_.
   “Karl Fiehler             Chief of the main office for Municipal
   “Wilhelm Frick            Leader of the National Socialist “faction”
                             in the Reichstag.
   “Joseph Goebbels          Reich Propaganda Leader of the NSDAP.
   “Konstantin Hierl         Leader of the Reich Labor.
   “Heinrich Himmler         Reich Leader of the SS. The Deputy of the
                             NSDAP, for all questions of Germandom.
   “Robert Ley               Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP.
                             Leader of the German Labor Front.
   “Victor Lutze             Chief of Staff of the SA.
   “Alfred Rosenberg         Representative of the Fuehrer for the
                             supervision of all mental and ideological
                             training and education of the NSDAP.
   “Baldur von Schirach      Reich Leader for the Education of Youth of
                             the NSDAP.
   “Franz Xaver Schwarz      Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP.”

The principal functions of the _Reichsleiter_ included carrying out the
tasks and missions assigned to them by the Fuehrer or by the Chief of
the Party Chancellery, Martin Bormann. The _Reichsleiter_ were further
charged with insuring that Party policies were being executed in all the
subordinate areas of the Reich. The _Reichsleiter_ were also responsible
for insuring a continual flow of new leadership into the Party. With
respect to the function and responsibilities of the _Reichsleiter_, the
Organization Book of the NSDAP states as follows:

    “The NSDAP represents the political conception, the political
    conscience, and the political will of the German nation.
    Political conception, political conscience, and political will
    are embodied in the person of the Fuehrer. Based on his
    directives and in accordance with the program of the NSDAP the
    organs of the Reich Directorate directionally determine the
    political aims of the German people. It is in the Reich
    Directorate that the arteries of the organization of the German
    people and the State merge. It is the task of the separate
    organs of the Reich Directorate to maintain as close a contact
    as possible with the life of the nation through their
    sub-offices in the Gau * * *

    “The structure of the Reich Directorate is thus that the channel
    from the lowest Party office upwards shows the most minute
    weaknesses and changes in the mood of the people * * *

    “Another essential task of the Reich Directorate is to assure a
    good selection of leaders. It is the duty of the Reich
    Directorate to see that there is leadership in all phases of
    life, a leadership which is firmly tied to National Socialist
    ideology and which promotes its dissemination with all its
    energy * * *

    “* * * It is the supreme task of the Reich Organization Leader
    to preserve the Party as a well-sharpened sword for the
    Fuehrer.” (_1893-PS_)

The domination of the German Government by the top members of the
Leadership Corps was facilitated by a circular decree of the Reich
Minister of Justice, dated 17 February 1934, which established equal
rank for the offices within the _Reichsleitung_ of the Leadership Corps
and the Reich offices of the government. In this decree it was expressly
provided that

    “the supreme offices of the _Reichsleitung_ are equal in rank to
    the supreme Reich Government authorities.”

The Party Manual termed the control exercised over the machinery of
government by the Leadership Corps “the permeation of the State
apparatus with the political will of the Party.”

Domination by the Leadership Corps over the German State and Government
was facilitated by uniting in the same Nazi chieftains both high office
within the _Reichsleitung_ and corresponding offices within the
apparatus of government. For example, Goebbels was a _Reichsleiter_ in
charge of Party propaganda, but he was also a cabinet minister in charge
of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment. Himmler held office within the
_Reichsleitung_ as head of the Main Office for “Volkdom” and as
Reichsfuehrer of the SS. At the same time, Himmler held the governmental
position of Reich Commission for the Consolidation of Germandom and was
the governmental head of the German police system (_Chart Number 1_).
This personal union of high office in the Leadership Corps and high
governmental position in the same Nazi Leaders greatly assisted the plan
of the Leadership Corps to dominate and control the German State and

In addition to the _Reichsleiter_, the _Reichsleitung_ (Reich Party
Directorate) included about eleven _Hauptamter_, or Main Offices, and
about four _Amter_, or Offices. The _Hauptamter_ of the Party included
such main organizations as those for personnel, training, technology
(headed by Speer), “Volkdom,” (headed by Himmler), civil servants,
communal policy, and the like. The _Amter_, or offices, of the Party
within the _Reichsleitung_ included the Office for Foreign Policy under
Rosenberg which actively participated in plans for aggression against
Norway, the Office for Colonial Policy, the Office for Geneology, and
the Office for Racial Policy.

Certain of the main offices and offices within the _Reichsleitung_
appeared again within the _Gauleitung_, or Gau Party Directorate, and
_Kreisleitung_, or County Party Directorate. Thus, the _Reichsleiter_
and main office and office holders within the _Reichsleitung_ exercised,
through functional channels running through subordinate offices on lower
regional levels, total control over the various sectors of the national
life of Germany.

(1) _Gauleiter._ For Party purposes Germany was divided into major
administrative regions, _Gaue_, which, in turn, were subdivided into
_Kreise_ (counties), _Ortsgruppen_ (local chapters), _Zellen_ (cells),
and _Blocke_ (blocks). Each _Gau_ was in charge of a _Gauleiter_ who was
the political leader of the _Gau_ or district. Each _Gauleiter_ was
appointed by and was responsible to Hitler himself. The _Organization
Book of the NSDAP_ states:

    “The _Gau_ represents the concentration of a number of Party
    counties, or _Kreise_. The _Gauleiter_ is directly subordinate
    to the Fuehrer. He is appointed by the Fuehrer. The _Gauleiter_
    bears overall responsibility to the Fuehrer for the sector of
    sovereignty entrusted to him. The rights, duties, and
    jurisdiction of the _Gauleiter_ result primarily from the
    mission assigned by the Fuehrer and, apart from that, from
    detailed directives.” (_1893-PS_)

The responsibility and function of the _Gauleiter_ and his staff
officers or office holders were essentially political, namely, to insure
the authority of the Nazi Party within his area, to coordinate the
activities of the Party and all its affiliated and supervised
organizations, and to enlarge the influence of the Party over people and
life in his _Gau_ generally. Following the outbreak of the war, when it
became imperative to coordinate the various phases of the German war
effort, the _Gauleiter_ were given additional important
responsibilities. The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich,
which was a sort of general staff for civil defense and the mobilization
of the German war economy, by a decree of 1 September 1939 (1939,
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1565), appointed about sixteen
_Gauleiter_ as Reich Defense Commissars. Later, under the impact of
mounting military reverses and an increasingly strained war economy,
more and more important administrative functions were put on a _Gau_
basis; the Party Gaue became the basic defense areas of the Reich and
each _Gauleiter_ became a Reich Defense Commissar (Decree of the
Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich of 16 November 1942,
1942 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 649). In the course of the war,
additional functions were entrusted to the _Gauleiter_ so that at the
end, with the exception of certain special matters, such as police
affairs, almost all phases of the German war economy were coordinated
and supervised by them. For instance, regional authority over price
control was put under the _Gauleiter_ as Reich Defense Commissars, and
housing administration was placed under the _Gauleiter_ as _Gau_ Housing
Commissar. Toward the end of the war, the _Gauleiter_ were charged even
with military and quasi military tasks. They were made commanders of the
_Volkssturm_ in their areas and were entrusted with such important
functions as the evacuation of civilian population in the path of the
advancing Allied armies, as well as measures for the destruction of
vital installations.

The structure and organization of the Party _Gau_ were substantially
repeated in the lower levels of the Party organization such as the
_Kreise_, _Ortsgruppen_, Cells, and Blocks. Each of these was headed by
a political leader who, subject to the Fuehrer principle and the orders
of superior political leaders, was sovereign within his sphere. The
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party was in effect a “hierarchy of
descending caesars.” Each of the subordinate Party levels, such as
_Kreise_, _Ortsgruppen_, and so on, was organized into offices or
_Amter_ dealing with the various specialized functions of the Party. But
the number of such departments and offices diminished as the Party unit
dropped in the hierarchy, so that, while the _Kreise_ office contained
all, or most of the offices in the _Gau_ (such as the deputy, the staff
office leader, an organization leader, school leader, propaganda leader,
press office leader, treasurer, judge of the Party Court, inspector, and
the like), the _Ortsgruppe_ had less and the _Zellen_ and _Blocke_ fewer

(2) _Kreisleiter_ (_County Leaders_). The _Kreisleiter_ was appointed
and dismissed by Hitler upon the nomination of the _Gauleiter_ and
directly subordinate to the _Gauleiter_ in the Party hierarchy. The
_Kreis_ usually comprised a single county. The _Kreisleiter_, within the
_Kreis_, had in general the same position, powers, and prerogatives
granted the _Gauleiter_ in the _Gau_. In cities they constituted the
very core of Party power and organization. According to the
_Organization Book of the NSDAP_:

    “The _Kreisleiter_ carries over-all responsibility towards the
    _Gauleiter_ within his zone of sovereignty for the political and
    ideological training and organization of the Political Leaders,
    the Party members, as well as the population.” (_1893-PS_)

(3) _Ortsgruppenleiter_ (_Local Chapter Leaders_). The area of the
_Ortsgruppenleiter_ comprised one or more communes or, in a town, a
certain district. The _Ortsgruppe_ was composed of a combination of
blocks and cells and, according to local circumstances, contained up to
1500 households. The _Ortsgruppenleiter_ also had a staff of office
leaders to assist him in the various functional activities of the Party.
All other political leaders in his area of responsibility were
subordinate to and under the direction of the _Ortsgruppenleiter_. For
example, the leaders of the various affiliated organizations of the
Party, within his area, such as the German Labor Front, and the Nazi
organizations for lawyers, students, and civil servants, were all
subordinate to the _Ortsgruppenleiter_. In accordance with the Fuehrer
principle, the _Ortsgruppenleiter_ or Local Chapter Leaders were
appointed by the _Gauleiter_ and were directly under and subordinate to
the _Kreisleiter_.

The party Manual provides as follows with respect to the

    “As _Hoheitstraeger_ [Bearer of Sovereignty] all expressions of
    the Party will emanate from the _Ortsgruppenleiter_; he is
    responsible for the political and ideological leadership and
    organization within his zone of sovereignty.

    “The _Ortsgruppenleiter_ carries the over-all responsibility for
    the political results of all measures initiated by the offices,
    organizations, and affiliated associations of the Party. * * *
    The _Ortsgruppenleiter_ has the right to protest to the
    _Kreisleiter_ against any measures contrary to the interests of
    the Party with regard to an outside political appearance in
    public.” (_1893-PS_)

(4) _Zellenleiter_ (_Cell Leaders_). The _Zellenleiter_ was responsible
for four to eight blocks. He was the immediate superior of and had
control and supervision over the _Blockleiter_ (Block Leader). His
mission and duties, according to the Party Manual, corresponded to the
missions of the _Blockleiter_. (_1893-PS_)

(5) _Blockleiter_ (_Block Leaders_). The _Blockleiter_ was the one Party
official who was peculiarly in a position to have continuous contact
with the German people. The _block_ was the lowest unit in the Party
pyramidal organization. The _block_ of the Party comprised 40 to 60
households and was regarded by the Party as the focal point upon which
to press the weight of its propaganda. The _Organization Book of the
NSDAP_ states:

    “The household is the basic community upon which the block and
    cell system is built. The household is the organizational focal
    point of all Germans united in an apartment and includes
    roomers, domestic help, etc. * * * The _Blockleiter_ has
    jurisdiction over all matters within his zone relating to the
    Movement and is fully responsible to the _Zellenleiter_. * * *”

The _Blockleiter_, as in the case of other political leaders, was
charged with planning, disseminating, and developing a receptivity to
the policies of the Nazi Party among the population in his area of
responsibility. It was also the expressed duty of the _Blockleiter_ to
spy on the population. According to the Party Manual:

    “It is the duty of the _Blockleiter_ to find people
    disseminating damaging rumors and to report them to the
    _Ortsgruppe_ so that they may be reported to the respective
    State authorities.

    “The _Blockleiter_ must not only be preacher and defender of the
    National Socialist ideology towards the members of nation and
    Party entrusted to his political care, but he must also strive
    to achieve practical collaboration of the Party members within
    his block zone * * *.”

    “The _Blockleiter_ shall continuously remind the Party members
    of their particular duties towards the people and the State * *
    * The _Blockleiter_ keeps a list (card file) about the
    households * * * In principle, the _Blockleiter_ will settle his
    official business verbally and he will receive messages verbally
    and pass them on in the same way. Correspondence will only be
    used in cases of absolute necessity * * * The _Blockleiter_
    conducts National Socialist propaganda from mouth to mouth. He
    will eventually awaken the understanding of the eternally
    dissatisfied as regards the frequently misunderstood or wrongly
    interpreted measures and laws of the National Socialist
    Government * * * It is not necessary to him to fall in with
    complaints and gripes about possibly obvious shortcomings of any
    kind in order to demonstrate * * * solidarity * * * A condition
    to gain the confidence of all people is to maintain absolute
    secrecy in all matters.” (_1893-PS_)

There were in Germany around a half million of these _Blockleiter_.
Large though this figure may appear, there can be no doubt that these
officials were in and of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. Though
they stood at the broad base of the Party pyramid rather than at its
summit, where rested the _Reichsleiter_, by virtue of this fact they
were stationed at close intervals throughout the German civil
population. It may be doubted that the average German ever looked upon
the face of Heinrich Himmler. But the man in the street in Nazi Germany
could not have avoided an uneasy acquaintance with the _Blockleiter_ in
his neighbourhood. It was the block leaders who represented to the
people of Germany the police-state of Hitler’s Germany. In fact, the
_Blockleiter_ were little fuehrers with real power over the civilians in
their domains. The authority of the _Blockleiter_ to exercise coercion
and the threat of force upon the civil population is shown in an excerpt
from page 7 of the magazine published by the Chief Education Office of
the Party, entitled “The Face of the Party”:

    “Advice and sometimes also the harsher form of education is
    employed if the faulty conduct of an individual harms this
    individual himself and thus also the community.”

(6) _Hoheitstraeger._ Within the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party
certain of the Political Leaders possessed a higher degree of
responsibility than others, were vested with special prerogatives, and
constituted a distinctive and elite group. These were the so-called
“_Hoheitstraeger_” (Bearers of Sovereignty) who represented the Party
within their area of jurisdiction, the so-called _Hoheitsgebiet_. The
Party Manual (_1893-PS_) states as follows:

    “Among the Political Leaders, the _Hoheitstraeger_ assumed a
    special position. Contrary to the other Political Leaders who
    have departmental missions, the _Hoheitstraeger_ themselves are
    in charge of a geographical sector known as the _Hoheitsgebiet_
    [Sectors of Sovereignty].

    “_Hoheitstraeger_ are:
    “The _Fuehrer_
    The _Gauleiter_
    The _Kreisleiter_
    The _Ortsgruppenleiter_
    The _Zellenleiter_
    The _Blockleiter_.
    “_Hoheitsgebiet_ are:
    “The _Reich_
    The _Gau_
    The _Kreis_
    The _Ortsgruppe_
    The _Zelle_
    The _Block_.

    “Within their sector of sovereignty the _Hoheitstraeger_ have
    sovereign political rights. They represent the Party within
    their sector. The _Hoheitstraeger_ supervise all Party Officers
    within their jurisdiction and * * * are responsible for the
    maintenance of discipline. * * * The directors of offices, etc.,
    and of the affiliated organizations are responsible to their
    respective _Hoheitstraeger_ as regards their special missions. *
    * * The _Hoheitstraeger_ are superior to all Political Leaders,
    managers, etc., within their sector. As regards personal
    considerations, _Hoheitstraeger_ * * * are endowed with special

    “The _Hoheitstraeger_ of the Party are not to be administrative
    officials * * * but are to move in a continuous vital contact
    with the Political Leaders of the population within their
    sector. The _Hoheitstraeger_ are responsible for the proper and
    good supervision of all members of the nation within their
    sectors * * *.

    “The Party intends to achieve a state of affairs in which the
    individual German will find his way to the Party * * *.”

The distinctive character of the _Politischer Leiter_ (Political
Leaders) constituting the _Hoheitstraeger_, and their existence and
operation as an identifiable group, are indicated by the publication of
a magazine, entitled _Der Hoheitstraeger_, whose distribution was
limited by regulation of the Reich Organization Leader to the
_Hoheitstraeger_ and certain other designated _Politischer Leiter_. The
inside cover of this exclusive Party magazine reads as follows:

    “_DER HOHEITSTRAEGER_, the contents of which is to be handled
    confidentially, serves only for the orientation of the competent
    leaders. It may not be loaned out to other persons * * *” [then
    follows a list of the Hoheitstraeger and other Political Leaders
    authorized to receive the magazine.] (_2660-PS_)

The magazine states that, in addition, the following were entitled to
receive it:

    “Commandants, Unit Commanders and Candidates of Order Castles;
    the Reich, Shock Troop and _Gaue_ Speakers of the NSDAP; the
    Lieutenant Generals and Major Generals of SA, SS, NSFK, and
    NSKK; Lieutenant Generals and Major Generals of the HJ.”

The fact that this magazine existed, that it derived its name from the
Commanding Officers of the Leadership Corps, that it was distributed to
the elite of the Leadership Corps—that a House Bulletin was circulated
down the command channels of the Leadership Corps—demonstrates that the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party was an identifiable group or
organization within the meaning of Article 9 of the Charter.

An examination of the contents of the magazine _Der Hoheitstrager_
reveals a continuing concern by the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party
in measures and doctrines which were employed throughout the course of
the conspiracy. The plans and policies of the inner elite of the
Leadership Corps gain clarity through a random sampling of articles
published and policies advocated in various issues of the magazine _Der
Hoheitstrager_. From February 1937 to October 1938 these included the
following: anti-Semitic articles, attacks on Catholicism and the
Christian religion and clergy; the need for motorized armament; the
urgent need for expanded _Lebensraum_ and colonies; persistent attacks
on the League of Nations; the use of the Block and Cell in achieving
favorable votes in Party plebiscites; the intimate association between
the _Wehrmacht_ and the Political Leadership; the racial doctrines of
Fascism; the cult of “leadership”; the role of the _Gaue_,
_Ortsgruppen_, and _Zellen_ in the expansion of Germany; and related

(_a_) _Organization of Political Leaders._ The Political Leaders were
organized according to the leadership principle (_1893-PS_):

    “The basis of the Party organization is the Fuehrer thought. The
    public is unable to rule itself either directly or indirectly *
    * * All Political Leaders stand as appointed by the Fuehrer and
    are responsible to him. They possess full authority toward the
    lower echelons * * * Only a man who has absorbed the school of
    subordinate functions within the Party has a claim to the higher
    Fuehrer offices. We can only use Fuehrers who have served from
    the ground up. Any Political Leader who does not conform to
    these principles is to be dismissed or to be sent back to the
    lower offices, as _Blockleiter_, _Zellenleiter_ for further
    training * * *

    “The Political Leader is not an office worker but the Political
    Deputy of the Fuehrer * * * Within the Political Leadership, we
    are building the Political Leadership of the state * * * The
    type of the Political Leader is not characterized by the office
    which he represents. There is no such thing as a Political
    Leader of the NSBO, etc., but there is only the Political Leader
    of the NSDAP.” (_1893-PS_)

Each Political Leader was sworn in yearly. According to the Party Manual
(_1893-PS_), the wording of the oath was as follows:

    “I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge
    unconditional obedience to him and the Fuehrers appointed by
    him.” (_1893-PS_)

The Organization Book of the NSDAP also provides:

    “The Political Leader is inseparably tied to the ideology and
    the organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his death
    or with his expulsion from the National Socialist community.”

(_b_) _Appointment of Political Leaders._ The appointment of the
political leaders constituting the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party
proceeded as follows, according to the Party Manual:

    “The Fuehrer appointed the following Political Leaders:

    “a. All _Reichsleiter_ and all Political Leaders within the
    _Reichsleitung_ [Reich Party Directorate], including women’s

    “b. All _Gauleiter_, including the Political Leaders holding
    offices in the _Gauleitung_ [Gau Party Directorate], including
    _Gau_ women leaders.

    “c. All _Kreisleiter_.

    “The _Gauleiter_ appointed:

    “a. The Political Leaders and women’s leaders within the _Gau_
    Party Directorate.

    “b. The Political Leaders and directors of women’s leagues in
    the _Kreis_ Party Directorate.

    “c. All _Ortsgruppenleiter_.

    “The _Kreisleiter_ appoints the Political Leaders and the
    Directors of the Women’s Leagues of the _Ortsgruppen_ including
    the Block and Cell Leaders.” (_1893-PS_)

_c._ Power _of Hoheitstraeger to Call Upon Party Formations_. The
_Hoheitstraeger_ among the Leadership Corps were entitled to call upon
and utilize the various Party Formations as necessary for the execution
of Nazi Party policies.

The Party Manual makes it clear that the _Hoheitstrager_ has power and
authority to requisition the services of the SA:

    “The _Hoheitstrager_ is responsible for the entire political
    appearance of the Movement within his zone. The SA leader of
    that zone is tied to the directives of the _Hoheitstrager_ in
    that respect.

    “The _Hoheitstrager_ is the ranking representative of the Party
    to include all organizations within his zone. He may requisition
    the SA located within his zone from the respective SA leader if
    they are needed for the execution of a political mission. The
    _Hoheitstrager_ will then assign the mission to the SA * * *

    “Should the _Hoheitstrager_ need more SA for the execution of
    political mission than is locally available, he then applies to
    the next higher office of sovereignty which, in turn, requests
    the SA from the SA office in his sector.” (_1893-PS_)

The _Hoheitstrager_ also had the same authority to call upon the
services of the SS and NSKK (_1893-PS_).

The _Hoheitstrager_ further, had authority to call upon the services of
the Hitler Youth (HJ):

    “The Political Leader has the right to requisition the HJ in the
    same manner as the SA for the execution of a political action.

    “In appointing leaders of the HJ and the DJ, the office of the
    HJ must procure the approval of the _Hoheitstrager_ of his zone.
    This means that the _Hoheitstrager_ can prevent the appointment
    of leaders unsuited for the leadership of youth. If his approval
    has not been procured, an appointment may be cancelled if he so
    requests.” (_1893-PS_)

An example of the use of the Party Formations at the call of the
Leadership Corps of the Party is provided by the action taken by the
_Reichsleiter_ for Party Organization of the NSDAP, Dr. Robert Ley,
leading to the deliberate dissolution of the Free Trade Unions on 2 May
1933. A directive issued by _Reichsleiter_ Ley on 21 April 1933
(_392-PS_) ordered the employment of the SA and the SS in occupying
trade union properties and in taking trade union leaders into protective

    “* * * SA as well as SS are to be employed for the occupation of
    trade union properties and for the taking of personalities who
    come into question into protective custody.

    “The _Gauleiter_ (i.e. Regional Director) is to proceed with his
    measures on a basis of the closest understanding with competent
    Regional Factory Cells Director. * * *

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The following are to be taken into protective custody:

    “All Trade Union Chairmen; the District Secretaries and the
    Branch Directors of the ‘Bank for Workers, Employees and
    Officials, Inc.’” (_392-PS_)

A decree issued by Hess as Deputy of the Fuehrer, dated 25 October 1934,
underwrites the authority of the _Hoheitstrager_ with respect to the
Party Formations:

    “The political leadership within the Party and its political
    representation towards all offices, State or others, which are
    outside of the Party, lie solely and exclusively with the
    _Hoheitstrager_, which is to say with me, the _Gauleiter_,
    _Kreisleiter_, and _Ortsgruppenleiter_ * * *.

    “The departmental workers of the Party organization, as well as
    _Reichsleiter_, office directors, etc., as well as the leaders
    of the SA, SS, HJ and the subordinate affiliations, may not
    enter into binding agreements of a political nature with State
    and other offices except when so authorized by their

    “In places where the territories of the units of the SA, SS, HJ
    and the subordinate affiliations do not coincide with the zones
    of the _Hoheitstrager_, the _Hoheitstrager_ will give his
    political directives to the ranking leader of each unit within
    his zone of sovereignty.” (_2474-PS_)

It was the official policy of the Leadership Corps to establish close
and cooperative relations with the Gestapo. The Head of the German
Police and SS, Himmler, was a _Reichsleiter_ on the top level of the
Leadership Corps. A decree issued by Bormann, as Chief of Staff of the
Deputy of the Fuehrer, dated 26 June 1935, provided the following:

    “In order to effect a closer contact between the offices of the
    Party and its organizations with the Directors of the Secret
    State Police [Gestapo], the Deputy of the Fuehrer requests that
    the Directors of the Gestapo be invited to attend all of the
    larger official rallies of the Party and its organization.”

(_d_) _Meetings of the Political Leaders._ The contention of the
Prosecution that the members of the Leadership Corps constituted a
distinctive and identifiable group or organization is strongly supported
by the fact that the various _Hoheitstraeger_ (such as the _Gauleiter_,
_Kreisleiter_, _Ortsgruppenleiter_, and so on) were under an absolute
obligation to meet and confer periodically, not only with the staff
officers on their own staffs, but with the political leaders and staff
officers immediately subordinate to them. For example, the _Gauleiter_
was bound to confer with his staff officers (such as his deputy, his
staff office leader, his organization leader, school leader, propaganda
leader, press leader, his _Gau_ Party Judge, and so on) every 8 to 14
days. Furthermore, the _Gauleiter_ was obligated to meet with the
various _Gauleiter_ subordinate to him once every 3 months for a 3-day
convention for the purpose of discussing and clarifying Nazi Party
policies and directives, for hearing basic lectures on Party policy, and
for the mutual exchange of information pertinent to the Party’s current
program. The _Gauleiter_ was also obligated to meet at least once a
month with the leaders of the Party formations and affiliated
organizations within his _Gau_ area, such as the leaders of the SA, SS,
Hitler Youth and others. These matters are set forth in the
_Organization Book of the NSDAP_ (_1893-PS_) as follows:

    “Leader conferences in the District:

    “(a) District Leaders (_Gauleiter_) with his staff every 8 to 14

    “(b) It is further absolutely necessary that the directors of
    the _Gau_ offices will meet with the county directors of their
    district once every three months for a three-day convention
    (possibly at a district schooling castle) where they will have
    an opportunity to overcome difficulties of personal and
    professional nature, apart from hearing fundamental lectures, by
    social gatherings in the presence of the bearer of the
    sovereignty, by getting to know each other and by a mutual
    exchange of ideas. Participation in these conferences is
    compulsory and duty would not constitute an excuse under any

    “(c) The arrangement of social meeting in the presence of
    leaders of the organizations of RAD and NSFK of the respective
    zone of sovereignty. In the course of these meetings differences
    of opinion may be straightened out in discussions.

    “(d) The bearer of sovereignty will meet at least once a month
    with the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK, HJ, as well as the RAD and
    the NSFK who are within the zone for the purpose of mutual
    orientation.” (_1893-PS_)

The _Organization Book of the Party_ imposes a similar requirement of
regular and periodical conferences and meetings upon all the other
_Hoheitstraeger_, including the _Kreisleiter_, _Ortsgruppenleiter_,
_Zellenleiter_, and _Blockleiter_.

The clear consequence of such regular and obligatory conferences and
meetings by all the _Hoheitstraeger_, both with their own staff officers
and with the political leaders and staff officers subordinate to them,
was that basic Nazi policies and directives issued by Hitler and the
leader of the Party Chancellery, Bormann, directly through the chain of
command of the _Hoheitstraeger_, and functional policies issued by the
various _Reichsleiter_ and Reich office holders through functional and
technical channels, were certain to be brought to the attention and
understanding of the bulk of the membership of the Leadership Corps.
When this fact is coupled with the further fact that all the members of
the Leadership Corps under the Leadership Principle and their sworn
oaths, were bound to obey blindly and without question orders received
from their competent superiors, it is clear that the general membership
of the Leadership Corps is responsible for measures taken or ordered by
that organization in furtherance of the conspiracy.

(7) _Statistics Relating to the Leadership Corps._ As previously shown,
the Leadership Corps comprised the sum of officials of the Nazi Party,
including, in addition to Hitler and the members of the _Reichsleitung_,
such as the _Reichsleiter_ and the Reich office holders, a hierarchy of
_Hoheitstraeger_ (ranging from the _Gauleiter_ down to the
_Blockleiter_) as well as the staff officers attached to the
_Hoheitstraeger_. According to page 10 of issue No. 8, 1939 of the
authoritative publication of the Leadership Corps, “_Der
Hoheitstrager_,” there were in 1939:

       40 _Gaue_ and 1 Foreign
          Organization _Gau_   each led by a _Gauleiter_.
      808 _Kreise_             each led by a _Kreisleiter_.
   28,376 _Ortsgruppen_        each led by a _Ortsgruppenleiter_.
   89,378 _Zellen_             each led by a _Zellenleiter_.
  463,048 _Blocke_             each led by a _Blockleiter_.

However, as shown by previous evidence, the Leadership Corps was
composed not only of the _Hoheitstraeger_ (such as _Gauleiter_,
_Kreisleiter_, _Ortsgruppenleiter_, _Zellenleiter_, and _Blockleiter_)
but also of the staff officers or office holders attached to these
_Hoheitstraeger_. The _Gauleiter_, for example, was assisted by a deputy
_Gauleiter_, several _Gau_ inspectors, and a staff which was divided
into main offices (_Hauptamter_) and offices (_Amter_), including such
departments as the _Gau_ staff Office, Treasury, Education Office,
Propaganda Office, Press Office, University Teachers, Communal Policy,
etc. As previously shown in evidence, the staff office structure of the
_Gau_ was substantially represented in the lower levels of the
Leadership Corps organization such as the _Kreise_, _Ortsgruppen_, and
so on. The _Kreise_ and the smaller territorial areas of the Party were
also organized into staff offices dealing with the various activities of
the Leadership Corps. But, of course, the importance and the number of
such staff offices diminished as the unit dropped in the hierarchy; so
that, while the _Kreisleiter_ staff contained all or most of the
departments mentioned for the _Gau_, the _Ortsgruppe_ had fewer
departments and the lower ones fewer still.

Firm figures have not been found as to the total number of staff
officers, as distinguished from the _Hoheitstraeger_ or political
commanders themselves included within the Leadership Corps.

It is the view of the prosecution that in defining the scope and
composition of the Leadership Corps, staff officers should be included
only down to and including the _Kreise_. Upon this basis, the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party constituted the Fuehrer, the members of the
_Reichsleitung_, the 5 levels of _Hoheitstraeger_ (ranging from
_Gauleiter_ down through the _Blockleiter_), and the staff officers
attached to the 40-odd _Gauleiter_ and the eight to nine hundred
_Kreisleiter_. Adopting this definition of the Leadership Corps, it will
be seen that the total figure for the membership of that organization,
based upon the statistics cited from the basic handbook for Germany,
amounts to around 700,000.

It is true that this figure is based upon an admittedly limited view of
the size of the membership of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party;
for the evidence has shown that the Leadership Corps in effect embraced
staff officers attached to the subordinate _Hoheitstraeger_, and
inclusion of such staff officers in the estimation of the size of the
Leadership Corps would have very considerably enlarged the final figure
estimated to a total of 2,000,000. The Prosecution, however, proposes to
exclude such subordinate staff officers for the reason that their
participation in and responsibility for the Conspiracy were measurably
less extensive than those of the staff officers and office holders on
the higher levels of the Leadership Corps. The subordinate staff
officers thus excluded were responsible functionally to the higher staff
officers with respect to their particular specialty, such as propaganda,
Party organization, and so on, and to their respective _Hoheitstraeger_
with respect to discipline and policy control. Likewise, such higher
staff officers participated in planning and policy discussions, and also
issued orders through technical channels to lower staff officers.

     B. _Participation of the Leadership Corps in the Conspiracy._

The Program of the Nazi Party, proclaimed by Hitler, the Fuehrer of the
Leadership Corps, on 24 February 1920 (_1708-PS_), contained the chief
elements of the Nazi plan for domination and conquest. The first point
required the incorporation of all Germans into a Greater German Reich.
Point 2 demanded unilateral abolition of the Peace Treaties of
Versailles and St. Germain. Point 3 stated the demand for “land and
soil” (colonies). Point 4 proclaimed the Nazi doctrines of racial
discrimination and anti-Semitism. Point 6 proclaimed the fight against
the democratic-parliamentary system, as follows:

    “* * * We demand that every public office, of any sort,
    whatsover, whether in the Reich, the county or municipality, be
    filled only by citizens. We combat the corrupting parliamentary
    economy, office-holding only according to Party inclinations
    without consideration of character or abilities.” (_1708-PS_)

Point 22 expressed the Nazi plans and policies for rearmament as

    “We demand the abolition of the mercenary troops and formation
    of a National Army.” (_1708-PS_)

The official Party Program declares on its face that:

    “The program is the political foundation of the NSDAP and
    accordingly the primary political law of the State * * *

    “All legal precepts are to be applied in the spirit of the Party

    “Since the taking over of control, the Fuehrer has succeeded in
    the realization of the essential portions of the Party Program
    from the fundamentals to the details.

    “The Party Program of the NSDAP was proclaimed on 24 February
    1920 by Adolf Hitler at the first large Party gathering in
    Munich and since that day has remained unaltered * * * The
    National Socialist philosophy is summarized in 25 points.”

As previously stated, the Party Program was binding upon the Political
Leaders of the Leadership Corps, and they were under a duty to support
and carry out that Program. As the Party Manual puts it:

    “The Commandments of the National Socialists:

    “The Fuehrer is always right * * *.

    “The Program be your dogma.

    “It demands your utter devotion to the Movement * * *.

    “Right is what serves the Movement and thus Germany.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * Leader Corps is responsible for the complete penetration
    of the German Nation with the National Socialist spirit * * *.”

The oath of the Political Leader to Hitler has been previously referred
to. In connection therewith, the Party Manual provides:

    “The Political Leader is inseparably tied to the ideology and
    the organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his death
    or with his expulsion from the National Socialist community.”

While the leadership principle assured the binding nature of Hitler’s
statements, program, and policies upon the entire Party and the
Leadership Corps, the leadership principle also established the full
responsibility of the individual Political Leader within the province
and jurisdiction of his office or position.

The leadership principle applied not only to Hitler as the supreme
leader, but also to the Political Leaders under him, and thus permeated
the entire Leadership Corps:

    “The basis of the Party Organization is the Fuehrer thought * *
    * All Political Leaders stand as appointed by the Fuehrer and
    are responsible to him. They possess full authority toward the
    lower echelons * * *.” (_1893-PS_)

The various _Hoheitstraeger_ of the Leadership Corps were, in their
respective areas of responsibility, themselves _Fuehrer_:

    “Within their sector of sovereignty, the _Hoheitstraeger_
    (_Gauleiter_, _Kreisleiter_, _Ortsgruppenleiter_,
    _Zellenleiter_, _Blockleiter_) have sovereign political rights *
    * * They are responsible for the entire political situation
    within their sector * * *” (_1893-PS_)

As stated in the _Organization Book of the NSDAP_

    “The Party is an order of ‘Fuehrer’.” (_1814-PS_)

The subjection of the entire membership of the Leadership Corps to the
fiat of the Fuehrer Principle is clearly shown in the following passage
from the Party Manual:

    “* * * a solid anchorage for all the organizations within the
    party structure is provided and a firm connection with the
    sovereign leaders of the NSDAP is created in accordance with the
    Fuehrer Principle.” (_1814-PS_)

(1) _Domination and Control of the German State and Government by the
Nazi Party, directed by the Leadership Corps._ On 23 March 1933 the
Reichstag enacted a law conferring power on the Reich Cabinet to
legislate on its own authority (_2001-PS_). Prominent members of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party were members of the Reich Cabinet.
The presence of _Reichsleiter_ and other prominent members of the
Leadership Corps in the Cabinet facilitated the domination of the
Cabinet by the Nazi Party and the Leadership Corps. For example, a
decree of 13 March 1933 established the Ministry of Public Enlightenment
and Propaganda. The head of this ministry was Goebbels, who
simultaneously was _Reichsleiter_ for Propaganda of the NSDAP
(_2029-PS_). Examples of personal union between high officials in the
Leadership and Cabinet membership existed in the case of the Food
Minister, the Chief of the German Police, the Reich Labor Leader, the
Chief of the Party Organization in Foreign Countries, and the Reich
Youth Fuehrer (_2473-PS_). Moreover, the majority of the Reich
Ministries were occupied by leading old Party Members. All Reich
Ministers were accepted by the Party on 30 January 1937 and were
decorated with the Golden Party Insignia. (_1774-PS_)

A law of 14 July 1933 outlawed and forbade the formation of any
political parties other than the Nazi Party and made violation of this
decree a punishable crime. Thereby the one party State was established
and the Leadership Corps was rendered immune from the opposition of
organized political groups. This Law Against the Formation of New
Political Parties reads as follows:

    “The National Socialist German Workers’ Party constitutes the
    only political party in Germany. Whoever undertakes to maintain
    the organizational structure of another political party or to
    form a new political party will be punished with penal servitude
    up to three years or with imprisonment of from six months to
    three years, if the deed is not subject to a greater penalty
    according to other regulations.” (_1388-PS_)

A law was enacted on 20 July 1933 providing for the dismissal of
officials who belonged to the Communist Party or who were otherwise
active in furthering the aims of Communism. The law also provided for
the dismissal of those who were in the future active for Marxism,
Communism, or Social Democracy (Law to Supplement the Law for the
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, 20 July 1933, (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 518)). (_1398-PS_)

On 13 October 1933 a “law to guarantee public peace” was enacted which
provided, _inter alia_, that the death penalty or other severe
punishment should be imposed upon any person who—

    “* * * undertakes to kill a member of the SA or the SS, a
    trustee or agent of the NSDAP * * * out of political motives or
    on account of their official activity.” (_1394-PS_)

On 1 December 1933 a law was enacted “to secure the unity of Party and
State.” This law provided that the Nazi Party was the pillar of the
German State, and was linked to it indissolubly; it also made the Deputy
of the Fuehrer (then Hess) and the Chief of Staff of the SA (then Roehm)
members of the Reich Cabinet (_1395-PS_). The pertinent provisions of
this law read as follows:

    “After the victory of the National Socialist Revolution, the
    National Socialistic German Labor Party is the bearer of the
    concept of the German State and is inseparably the State. It
    will be a part of the public law. Its organization will be
    determined by the Fuehrer * * *.

    “The Deputy of the Fuehrer and the Chief of Staff of the SA will
    become members of the Reich Government in order to insure close
    cooperation of the offices of the Party and SA with the public
    authorities * * *.” (_1395-PS_)

This law was a basic measure in enthroning the Leadership Corps in a
position of supreme political power in Germany. For it laid it down that
the Party, directed by the Leadership Corps, was the embodiment of the
State and, in fact, was the State. Moreover, this law made both the
Fuehrer’s Deputy and the Chief of Staff of the SA, which was a Party
Formation subject to the call of the _Hoheitstraeger_, Cabinet Members.
Thus, the Leadership Corps’ control of the Cabinet was further
solidified. The dominant position of the Leadership Corps is further
revealed by the provision that the Reichs-Chancellor would issue the
regulations carrying out this law in his capacity as Fuehrer of the Nazi
Party. The fact that Hitler, as Fuehrer of the Leadership Corps, could
promulgate rules which would have statutory force and be published in
the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, the proper compilation for State enactments, is
but a further reflection of the reality of the Party’s domination of the
German State.

In a declaration to the 1935 Party Congress at Nurnberg, Hitler stated:

    “It is not the State which gives orders to us, it is we who give
    orders to the State.” (_2775-PS_)

That categorical statement of the Fuehrer of the Leadership Corps
affirms the dominance of Party over State which the evidence makes
undeniably clear.

On 30 June 1934 Hitler, as Head of the Nazi Party, directed the massacre
of hundreds of SA-men and other political opponents. Hitler sought to
justify these mass murders by declaring to the Reichstag that “at that
hour I was responsible for the fate of the German nation and supreme
judge of the German people.” (The evidence relating to these events is
discussed in Section 4, infra.) On 3 July 1934 the Cabinet issued a
decree describing the murders of 30 June 1934, in effect, as legitimate
self-defense by the State. By this law the Reich Cabinet made themselves
accessories after the fact of these murders. The domination of State by
Party, however, makes the Cabinet’s characterization of these criminal
acts by Hitler and his top Party Leaders as state measures consistent
with political reality. The single article of the law of 3 July 1934
reads as follows:

    “The measures taken on 30 June and 1 and 2 July 1934 to
    counteract attempt at treason and high treason shall be
    considered as national emergency defense.” (_2057-PS_)

On 12 July 1934 there was enacted a law defining the function of the
Academy for German law:

    “Closely connected with the agencies competent for legislation,
    it [the Academy] shall further the realization of the National
    Socialist program in the realm of the law.” (_1391-PS_)

On 30 January 1933, Hitler, the Leader of the Nazi Party and Fuehrer of
the Leadership Corps, was appointed Chancellor of the Reich. When
President von Hindenburg died in 1934, the Fuehrer amalgamated in his
person the offices of Chancellor and Reich President. (_2003-PS_)

By a decree of 20 December 1934 Party uniforms and institutions were
granted the same protection as those of the State. This law was entitled
“Law Concerning Treacherous Acts Against the State and Party, and for
the Protection of Party Uniforms.” This law imposed heavy penalties upon
any person making false statements injuring the welfare or prestige of
the Nazi Party or its agencies. It authorized the imprisonment of
persons making or circulating malicious or baiting statements against
leading personalities of the Nazi Party. And it provided punishment by
forced labor for the unauthorized wearing of Party uniforms or symbols.

By a law of 15 September 1934, the Swastika flag of the Party was made
the official flag of the Reich (_2079-PS_). This law, enacted by the
Reichstag, indicates on its face that it issued from Nurnberg on the
Party Day of 15 September 1935. Article 2 of this law reads as follows:

“The Reich and National flag is the swastika flag.” (_2079-PS_) The
Swastika was the flag and symbol of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi
Party. The law making it the flag of the State constituted a recognition
that the Party and its Corps of Political Leaders were the sovereign
powers in Germany.

On 23 April 1936, a law was enacted granting amnesty for crimes which
the offender had committed “in his eagerness to fight for the National
Socialist Ideal.” (_1386-PS_)

In furtherance of the Conspiracy to acquire totalitarian control over
the German people, a law was enacted on 1 December 1936, which
incorporated the entire German youth within the Hitler Youth, thereby
achieving a “total mobilization of German youth” (_1392-PS_). The law
further provided that the task of educating the German youth through the
Hitler Youth was entrusted to the _Reichsleiter_ of German Youth in the
NSDAP. By this law a monopoly control over the entire German youth was
placed in the hands of a top official, a _Reichsleiter_, of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the defendant von Schirach.

On 4 February 1938, the Fuehrer of the Leadership Corps of the NSDAP,
Hitler, issued a decree in which he took over directly the command of
the whole Armed Forces (_1915-PS_). In this decree, Hitler declared, in
part, as follows:

    “From now on, I take over directly the command of the whole
    Armed Forces.” (_1915-PS_)

By the decree of 4 February 1938, Hitler became Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces. He was, at the time of its issuance, Fuehrer of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. By virtue of the earlier law of 1
August 1934, he combined the office of Reich President with that of the
Chancellorship. In the final result, therefore, Hitler was Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, Head of the German State, and Fuehrer of
the Nazi Party.

With respect to the foregoing point, the Party Manual (_1893-PS_) states
as follows:

    “* * * the Fuehrer created the National Socialist German
    Workers’ Party. He filled it with his spirit and his will and
    with it he conquered the power of the State on 30 January 1933.
    The Fuehrer’s will is supreme in the Party.

    “By authority of the law about the Chief of State of the German
    Reich, dated 1 August 1934, the office of the Reich President
    has been combined with that of the Reich Chancellery.
    Consequently, the powers heretofore possessed by the Reich
    President were transferred to the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler. Through
    this law, the conduct of Party and State has been combined in
    one hand. By desire of the Fuehrer, a plebiscite was conducted
    on this law on 19 August 1934. On this day, the German people
    chose Adolf Hitler to be their sole leader. He is responsible
    only to his conscience and to the German nation.” (_1893-PS_)

A decree of 16 January 1942 provided that the Party should participate
in legislation, official appointments, and promotions (_2100-PS_). The
decree further provided that such participation should be undertaken
exclusively by Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancellery and a
_Reichsleiter_ of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. The decree
provided that the Chief of the Party Chancellery was to take part in the
preparation of all laws and decrees issued by Reich authorities,
including those issued by the Ministerial Council for Defense of the
Reich, and to give his assent to those of the Laender and the Reich
governors; all communications between State and Party authorities,
unless within one _Gau_ only, were to pass through his hands. This
decree is of crucial importance in demonstrating the ultimate control
and responsibility imputable to the Leadership Corps for governmental
policy and actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. (_2100-PS_)

On or about 26 April 1942, Hitler declared in a speech that, in his
capacity as Leader of the Nation, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,
Supreme Head of the Government, and as Fuehrer of the Party, his right
must be recognized to compel with all means at his disposal, every
German, whether soldier, judge, State official, or party official, to
fulfill his desire. He demanded that the Reichstag officially recognize
this asserted right. On 26 April 1942, the German Reichstag issued a
decision in which full recognition was given to the rights which the
Fuehrer had asserted (_1961-PS_). The Reichstag decreed as follows:

    “At the proposal of the President of the Reichstag, on its
    session of 26 April 1942, the greater German Reichstag has
    approved of the rights which the Fuehrer has postulated in his
    speech with the following decision:

    “There can be no doubt, that in the present war, in which the
    German people is faced with a struggle for its existence or
    annihilation, the Fuehrer must have all the rights postulated by
    him which serve to further or achieve victory.
    Therefore—without being bound by existing legal regulations—in
    his capacity as Leader of the Nation, Supreme Commander of the
    Armed Forces, Governmental Chief and Supreme Executive Chief, as
    Supreme Justice and Leader of the Party—the Fuehrer must be in
    a position to force with all means at his disposal every German,
    if necessary, whether he be common soldier or officer, low or
    high official or judge, leading or subordinate official of the
    Party, worker or employee—to fulfill his duties. In case of
    violation of these duties, the Fuehrer is entitled, after
    conscientious examination, regardless of so-called well-deserved
    rights, to mete out due punishment and to remove the offender
    from his post, rank and position without introducing prescribed

    “At the order of the Fuehrer, this decision is hereby made
    public. Berlin, 26 April 1942.” (_1961-PS_)

Hitler himself perhaps best summarized the political realities of his
Germany, in showing the domination of the German State and Government by
the Leadership Corps and its following. The core of the matter was
stated by Hitler in his speech to the Reichstag on 20 February 1938,
when he declared in effect that every institution in Germany was under
the direction of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party:

    “National Socialism has given the German people that leadership
    which as Party not only mobilizes the nation but also organizes
    it, so that on the basis of the natural principle of selection,
    the continuance of a stable political leadership is safeguarded
    forever * * * National Socialism * * * possesses Germany
    entirely and completely since the day when, five years ago, I
    left the house in Wilhelmsplatz as Reich Chancellor. There is no
    institution in this state which is not National Socialist. Above
    all, however, the National Socialist Party in these five years
    not only has made the nation National Socialist, but also has
    given itself that perfect organizational structure which
    guarantees its permanence for all future. The greatest guarantee
    of the National Socialist revolution lies in the complete
    domination of the Reich and all its institutions and
    organizations, internally and externally by the National
    Socialist Party. Its protection against the world abroad,
    however, lies in its new National Socialist armed forces. * * *
    In this Reich, anybody who has a responsible position is a
    National Socialist * * * Every institution of this Reich is
    under the orders of the supreme political leadership * * * The
    Party leads the Reich politically, the armed forces defend it
    militarily * * * There is nobody in any responsible position in
    this state who doubts that I am the authorized leader of this
    Reich.” (_2715-PS_)

The supreme power which the Leadership Corps exercised over the German
State and Government is sharply pointed up by an article published in
the February 1939 issue of the authoritative magazine, “_Der
Hoheitstrager_”. In this article, addressed to all _Hoheitstraeger_, the
Leadership Corps is reminded that it has conquered the State and that it
possesses absolute and total power in Germany. The article is
significantly entitled, “Fight and Order—Not Peace and Order.” It
trumpets forth, in the accents of Caesarism, the battle call of the
Leadership Corps of German life:

    “Fight? Why do you always talk of fighting? You have conquered
    the State, and if something does not please you, then just make
    a law and regulate it differently? Why must you always talk of
    fighting? For you have every power! Over what do you fight?
    Outer-politically? You have the Wehrmacht—it will wage the
    fight if it is required. Inner-politically? You have the law and
    the police which can change everything which does not agree with
    you.” (_3230-PS_)

In view of the domination of the German State and Government by the Nazi
Party and the Leadership Corps thereof, as established by the foregoing
evidence, the Leadership Corps is responsible for the measures,
including legislative enactments, taken by the German State and
Government in furtherance of the Conspiracy formulated and carried out
by the co-conspirators and the organizations charged with criminality.

For example, as revealed by the above evidence, Point 4 of the original
Party Program declared that a Jew was not a member of the German race
and, therefore, was not entitled to citizenship. This premise was
incorporated into the law of the Third Reich by numerous anti-Semitic
and discriminatory laws. Consequently, it is submitted that, by virtue
of their control over the German State and Government, the Nazi Party
and the Leadership Corps share responsibility for, among other
enactments and measures furthering the Conspiracy, discriminatory laws
against the Jews.

(2) _Overt Acts and Crimes of the Leadership Corps._ The membership of
the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party actively participated in measures
designed to further the progress of the Conspiracy. The evidence will
show that the participation by the Leadership Corps in the Conspiracy
embraces such measures as anti-Semitic activities, war crimes committed
against members of the Allied forces, the forced labor program, measures
to subvert and undermine the Christian religion and persecute the
Christian clergy, the plundering and spoliation of cultural and other
property in German-occupied territories of Europe, and plans and
measures leading to the initiation and prosecution of aggressive war.

(_a_) _Crimes against Jews._ The _Gauleiter_ and _Kreisleiter_
participated in what were disingenuously described by the Nazis as the
“spontaneous uprising of the people” against the Jews throughout Germany
on 9 and 10 November 1938 in connection with the assassination of an
official of the German Embassy in Paris on 7 November. (The evidence
relating to these programs is discussed in Chapter XI on the
concentration camps, and Chapter XII on the persecution of the Jews.) It
will be recalled that in the teletyped directive from SS-Gruppenfuehrer
Heydrich, issued on 10 November 1938, to all police headquarters and SD
districts, all chiefs of the State Police were ordered to arrange with
the political leaders in the _Gaue_ and _Kreise_ the organization of the
so-called spontaneous demonstrations against the Jews (_3051-PS_).
Pursuant to this directive, a large number of Jewish shops and
businesses were pillaged and wrecked, synagogues were set on fire,
individual Jews were beaten up, and large numbers were taken off to
concentration camps. These events forcefully illustrate the employment
and participation of all the _Kreisleiter_ and _Gauleiter_ in illegal
measures designed to further the anti-Semitic program, which was an
original and continuing objective of the Leadership Corps.

(_b_) _Crimes against Allied Airmen._ The members of the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party participated in the murder, beating, and
ill-treatment of American airmen who landed in German or
German-controlled territory. American airmen who bailed out of disabled
planes over Germany were not treated as prisoners of war, but were
beaten and murdered by German civilians with the active condonence,
indeed at the instigation of the Leadership Corps. Such a course of
conduct by the Leadership Corps represented a deliberate violation by
the German Government of its obligations, under the Geneva Prisoners of
War Convention, to protect prisoners of war against acts of violence and

Heinrich Himmler was a _Reichsleiter_ of the Nazi Party and thus a top
official in the Leadership Corps by virtue of his positions as
Reichsfuehrer of the SS and Delegate for German Folkdom (_2473-PS; Chart
No. 1_). An order signed by Himmler (_R-110_), dated 10 August 1943,
reads as follows:

    “It is not the task of the police to interfere in clashes
    between Germans and English and American terror fliers who have
    bailed out.” (_R-110_)

This order was transmitted in writing to all senior executive SS and
police officers, and orally to their subordinate officers and to all

Joseph Goebbels was a top-flight official in the Leadership Corps of the
Nazi Party by virtue of his position as Propaganda Leader of the Party
(_2473-PS; Chart No. 1_). In the issue of the _Voelkischer Beobachter_
for 26/29 May 1944, there appeared an article written by Goebbels, the
_Reichsleiter_ for Party Propaganda, in which he openly invited the
German civil population to murder Allied fliers shot down over Germany
(_1676-PS_). After alleging that Anglo-American pilots have engaged in
machine gun attacks against civilians, Goebbels continues:

    “It is only possible with the aid of arms to secure the lives of
    enemy pilots who were shot down during such attacks, for they
    would otherwise be killed by the sorely tried population. Who is
    right here? The murderers who, after their cowardly misdeeds,
    await a humane treatment on the part of their victims, or the
    victims who wish to defend themselves according to the
    principle: ‘An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’? This
    question is not hard to answer.” (_1676-PS_)

_Reichsleiter_ Goebbels then proceeds to answer his question in the
following language:

    “It seems to us hardly possible and tolerable to use German
    police and soldiers against the German people when it treats
    murderers of children as they deserve.” (_1676-PS_)

On 30 May 1944, Bormann, _Reichsleiter_ and Chief of the Party
Chancellery, issued a circular letter on the subject which furnishes
indisputable proof that British and American fliers who were shot down
were lynched by the German population (_057-PS_). After alleging that in
recent weeks English and American fliers had repeatedly shot children,
women, peasants, and vehicles on the highway, Bormann then states:

    “Several instances have occurred where members of the crews of
    such aircraft, who have bailed out or who have made forced
    landings, were lynched on the spot immediately after capture by
    the populace, which was incensed to the highest degree. No
    police measures or criminal proceedings were invoked against the
    German civilians who participated in these incidents.”

This letter of Bormann was distributed through the chain of command of
the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. Express mention on the
distribution list is made of _Reichsleiter_, _Gauleiter_, _Kreisleiter_,
and leaders of the incorporated and affiliated organizations of the
Party. Bormann requested that the local group leaders
(_Ortsgruppenleiter_) be informed of the contents of his circular letter
only by oral means. (_057-PS_)

The effect of _Reichsleiter_ Bormann’s circular letter may be seen in an
order dated 25 February 1945 (_L-154_). This is an order from Albert
Hoffman, an important member of the Leadership Corps by virtue of his
position as _Gauleiter_ and National Defense Commissioner of the Gau
Westfalen-South, and it is addressed to all County Councillors, mayors,
and police officials, and to county leaders and county staff chiefs of
the _Volkssturm_. The order reads as follows:

    “Fighter bomber pilots who are shot down are not to be protected
    against the fury of the people. I expect from all police
    officers that they will refuse to lend their protection to these
    gangster types. Authorities acting in contradiction to the
    popular sentiment will have to account to me. All police and
    gendarmerie officials are to be informed immediately of this, my
    attitude.” (_L-154_)

The obligations of belligerents towards prisoners of war are clearly set
forth in the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 27 July 1929, which
was ratified by both Germany and the United States. Article Two of the
Convention provides as follows:

    “Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile power, but not
    of the individuals or corps who have captured them.

    “They must at all times be humanely treated and protected,
    particularly against acts of violence, insults and public

    “Measures of reprisal against them are prohibited.” (_3738-PS_)

The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention clearly imposes upon its
signatories the strict obligation to protect prisoners of war from
violence. The evidence just discussed shows that the German State
flagrantly violated its obligations under that Convention to protect
captured airmen who were shot down in German hands. The evidence also
proves that the entire hierarchy of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi
Party participated in the conspiracy to incite the German civil
population to murder Allied airmen and also ordered police and Party
officials to take no steps to secure the safety of these airmen.

(_c_) _Crimes against Foreign Labor and Civilians in Occupied Areas._
Alfred Rosenberg and Robert Ley were both _Reichsleiter_ of the NSDAP.

An agreement was concluded between the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg, and the Director of the
German Labor Front, _Reichsorganisationleiter_ Ley, relating to the
inspection and care of foreign workers. This agreement was based on an
earlier agreement of 2 June 1943 between the Deputy General for the
_Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter_ Fritz Sauckel, and the Leader of the German
Labor Front, _Reichsleiter_ for the Party Organization, Dr. Ley,
concerning a “central inspection for the care of foreign workers”
(_1913-PS_). The purpose of the two agreements was to coordinate
activities of the organizations concerned with respect to the
administration of plants and camps in which foreign workers were
employed. (_1914-PS_)

On 17 October 1944, _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg sent a letter to
_Reichsleiter_ Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancery, informing the
latter that he had sent a telegram to _Gauleiter_ urging them not to
interfere in the liquidation of certain listed companies and banks under
his supervision. Rosenberg emphasized to Bormann that any “delay of
liquidation or * * * independent confiscation of the property by the
_Gauleiter_ would impair or destroy an organized plan” for the
liquidation of a vast amount of property. (_327-PS_)

On 7 November 1943, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
delivered a lecture at Munich to the _Reichsleiter_ and _Gauleiter_. The
Chief of Staff stated that his object was to give a review of the
strategic position at the outset of the fifth year of war. He stated his
realization that the Political Leaders in the Reich and Gau areas, in
view of their burdensome tasks in supporting the German War Effort, were
in need of information he could give. He stated, in part, as follows:

    “_Reichsleiter_ Bormann has requested me to give you a review
    today of the strategic position in the beginning of the fifth
    year of war.

    “No one—the Fuehrer has ordered—may know more or be told more
    than he needs for his immediate task, but I have no doubt at all
    in my mind, gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order
    to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your _Gau_, after
    all * * * that all the enemy propaganda, and the malicious
    rumors concentrate that try to find themselves a place among our
    people * * * Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice
    you need to know the true situation, and, for this reason, I
    believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and
    uncovered account of the state of affairs * * *.” (_L-172_)

_Reichsleiter_ Bormann distributed to all _Reichsleiter_, _Gauleiter_,
and leaders of Party affiliated organizations, by an undated letter of
transmittal, an order of the Supreme Command of the _Wehrmacht_ relating
to self-defense by German guard personnel and German contractors and
workers against prisoners of war (_656-PS_). The order of the
_Wehrmacht_ states that the question of treatment of prisoners of war is
continually being discussed by _Wehrmacht_ and Party bureaus. The order
states that should prisoners of war refuse to obey orders to work, the
guard has “in the case of the most pressing need and danger, the right
to force obedience with the weapon if he has no other means. He can use
the weapon as much as is necessary to attain his goal * * *.” (_656-PS_)

On 18 April 1944, Reich Commissar Lohse, Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, in a letter to Reich Youth Leader Axmann, proposed
that the Hitler Youth participate in and supervise the military
education of the Estonian and Latvian youth (_347-PS_). Lohse stated in
this letter that “in the military education camps, the young Latvians
are trained under Latvian leaders in the Latvian language not because
this is our ideal, but because absolute military necessity demands
this.” Lohse further stated:

    “* * * in contrast to the Germanic peoples of the West, military
    education is no longer to be carried out through voluntary
    enlistments but through _legal conscription_. The camps in
    Estonia and Latvia * * * will have to be under German Leadership
    and, as military education camps of the Hitler Youth, they must
    be a symbol of our educational mission beyond Germany’s borders
    * * * I consider the execution of the military education of the
    Estonian and Latvian youth not only a military necessity, but
    also a war mission of the Hitler Youth especially. I would be
    thankful to you, Party member Axmann, if the Hitler Youth would
    put itself at our disposal with the same readiness with which
    they have so far supported our work in the Baltic area.”

The _Reichsfuehrer_ of the SS, as shown earlier, was a _Reichsleiter_ of
the NSDAP (_2473-PS_). An order of the Reich Minister of the Interior,
Frick, dated 22 October 1938, provided as follows:

    “The Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police * * *
    can take the administrative measures necessary for the
    maintenance of security and order, even beyond the legal limits
    otherwise set on such measures.” (_1438-PS_)

This order related to the administration of the Sudeten-German

In a letter dated 23 June 1943 (_407-VI-PS_) _Gauleiter_ and
Plenipotentiary for the Direction of Labor, Fritz Sauckel, wrote to
Hitler advising him of the success of the forced labor program as of
that date. Sauckel stated:

    “You can be assured that the District of Thueringen [_Gau_] and
    I will serve you and our dear people with the employment of all
    strength * * *.” (_407-VI-PS_)

On 1 September 1939, Hitler wrote a memorandum stating:

    “_Reichsleiter_ Bouhler and Dr. Brandt, M.D., are charged with
    the responsibility of enlarging the authority of certain
    physicians to be designated by name in such a manner that
    persons who, according to human judgment, are incurable can,
    upon a most careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be
    accorded a mercy death.

    “(Signed) A. Hitler.” (_630-PS_)

A handwritten note on the face of the document states:

    “Given to me by Bouhler on 27 August 1940, [signed] Dr.
    Guertner.” (_630-PS_)

In a memorandum recording an agreement between himself and Himmler, the
Minister of Justice Thierack stated that, on the suggestion of
_Reichsleiter_ Bormann, an agreement had been reached between Himmler
and himself with respect to “special treatment at the hands of the
police in cases where judicial sentences are not severe enough”
(_654-PS_). The agreement related that:

    “The Reich Minister for Justice will decide whether and when
    special treatment at the hands of the police is to be applied.
    The Reich Fuehrer of SS will send the reports, which he sent
    hitherto to Reichsleiter Bormann, to the Reich Minister for
    Justice.” (_654-PS_)

If the views of the Reich Fuehrer of SS and the Reich Minister for
Justice disagreed,

    “the opinion of Reichsleiter Bormann will be brought to bear on
    the case, and he will possibly inform the Fuehrer * * *.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The delivery of antisocial elements from execution of their
    sentence to the Reich Fuehrer of SS to be worked to death.
    Persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies, Russians and
    Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs and
    Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to the
    decision of the Reich Minister of Justice. First of all the
    worst antisocial elements amongst those just mentioned are to be
    handed over. I shall inform the Fuehrer of this through
    Reichsleiter Bormann.” (_654-PS_)

With respect to the “administration of justice by the people,” the
memorandum states:

    “This is to be carried out step by step as soon as possible * *
    * I shall rouse the Party particularly to cooperate in this
    scheme by an article in the _Hoheitstrager_ [NSDAP publication]
    * * *.” (_654-PS_)

At a meeting of the NSDAP in Kiev, the theory of the master race as the
basis of German administrative policy in the East was expressed by Koch,
Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine:

    “We are the master race * * * I will squeeze the last drop out
    of the country . . . the people must work, work and work. We are
    a master race * * * the lowest German worker is racially and
    biologically a thousand times more valuable than the people
    here.” (_1130-PS_)

A letter from RSHA (Reich Security Main Office) to police chiefs, dated
5 November 1942, recites an agreement between the Reich Fuehrer SS and
the Reich Minister of Justice, approved by Hitler, providing that
ordinary criminal procedure was no longer to be applied to Poles and
members of the Eastern populations (_L-316_). The agreement provided
that such people, including Jews and Gypsies, should henceforth be
turned over to the police. The principles applicable to a determination
of the punishment of German offenders, including appraisal of the
motives of the offender, were not to be applied to foreign offenders.
The letter stated:

    “* * * the offense committed by a person of foreign extraction
    is not to be regarded from the view of legal retribution by way
    of justice, but from the point of view of preventing dangers
    through police action. From this it follows that the criminal
    procedure against persons of foreign extraction must be
    transferred from Justice to the Police. The preceding statements
    serve for personal information. There are no objections if the
    _Gauleiter_ are informed in the usual form should the need arise
    * * *.” (_L-316_)

With respect to the evacuation, deportation, and Germanization of the
civilian population of the incorporated eastern territories,
Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the
Consolidation of German Nationhood, issued several decrees requiring the
deportation to Germany of all Germans from such territories who had
renounced their nationality during the existence of the Polish State
(_R-112_). These decrees directed that persons affected by the
provisions thereof who failed to comply were to be sent to concentration
camps. After deportation to Germany, such persons were to be closely
supervised by NSDAP “Counsellors” and secret police to insure their
Germanization. Certain of the decrees directing such deportation are
addressed, _inter alia_, to the “_Gauleiter_” and the “Reich Governors
in the Reich _Gaue_.” (_R-112_)

In a conference with _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg, Hitler emphasized that he
“wished to have the Crimea cleaned out,” and Rosenberg stated that he
had given much consideration to renaming the towns in the Crimea in
order to invest the area with a German character. (_1517-PS_)

In a speech to a gathering of persons intimately concerned with the
Eastern problem on 20 June 1941, _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg stated that
the southern Russian territories and the northern Caucasus would have to
provide food for the German people:

    “We see absolutely no obligation on our part to feed also the
    Russian people with the products of that surplus territory. We
    know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings * *
    *.” (_1058-PS_)

Rosenberg stated that, as a consequence of the above policy, extensive
evacuations of Russians from that Area would have to take place.

_Gauleiter_ Wagner of the German-occupied Areas of Alsace prepared plans
and took measures leading to the expulsion and deportation of certain
groups within the Alsatian civil population. His plans called for the
forcible expulsion of certain categories of so-called undesirable
persons, as a means of punishment and compulsory Germanization. The
_Gauleiter_ supervised deportation measures in Alsace from July to
December 1940, in the course of which 105,000 persons were either
expelled or prevented from returning. A memorandum, dated 4 August 1942,
of a meeting of high SS and police officials, convened to receive the
reports and plans of the _Gauleiter_ relating to the Alsatian
evacuations, states that the persons deported were mainly—

    “Jews, Gypsies and other foreign racial elements, criminals,
    asocial and incurably insane persons, as well as Frenchmen and
    Francophiles.” (_R-114_)

According to the memorandum, the _Gauleiter_ stated that the Fuehrer had
given him permission “to cleanse Alsace of all foreign, sick, or
unreliable elements,” and emphasized the political necessity of further
deportation. The memorandum further records that the SS and police
officials present at the above conference approved the _Gauleiter’s_
proposals for further evacuation. (_R-114_)

A second memorandum, dated 17 August 1942, relating to a conference
called by SS-Gruppenfuehrer Kaul, held at the _Gauleiter_ office at
Karlsruhe for the purpose of considering the deportation of Alsatians
into Germany, states that the _Gauleiter_ had reported to the Fuehrer
with respect to the proposed evacuation of Alsatians. It is further
stated that the Fuehrer verbally declared that “asocial and criminal
persons” were to be expelled. The _Gauleiter_ stated at the above
conference that the action leading to such evacuation had already begun.
The _Gauleiter_ further declared that he intended to offset the loss of
population as far as possible by transplantation of people from Baden,
“thus creating a uniform race mixture.” (_R-114_)

A memorandum by _Reichsleiter_ Bormann of a conference called by Hitler
at his headquarters on 16 July 1941 (_L-221_), states, in part, as
follows with respect to the maintenance of order in the occupied Eastern

    “The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be
    settled by Germans only * * *. We have now to face the task of
    cutting up the giant cake according to our needs in order to be
    able first, to dominate it, second, to administer it, and third,
    to exploit it. The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare
    behind our front. This partisan war * * * has some advantage for
    us; it enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us. * * *
    Our iron principle is and has to remain: we must never permit
    anybody but the Germans to carry arms * * *.” (_L-221_)

According to the above memorandum, the foregoing conference was attended
by _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg, Reich Minister Lammers, Field Marshal
Keitel, Reich Marshal Goering, and Bormann, and lasted about 20 hours.
The memorandum states that discussion occurred with respect to the
annexation by Germany of various parts of conquered Europe. The
memorandum also states that a long discussion took place with respect to
the qualifications of _Gauleiter_ Lohse, who was proposed by Rosenberg
at the conference as governor of the Baltic country. Discussion also
occurred with respect to the qualifications of other _Gauleiter_ and
commissioners for the administration of various areas of occupied
Russia. Goering stated that he intended to appoint _Gauleiter_ Terboven
for the “exploitation of the Kola Peninsula: the Fuehrer agrees.” With
respect to the security of the German administration in the eastern
areas, the memorandum states:

    “This giant area would have to be pacified as quickly as
    possible; the best solution was to shoot anybody who looked
    sideways * * * Field Marshal Keitel emphasizes the inhabitants
    themselves ought to be made responsible for their things because
    it was, of course, impossible to put a sentry in front of every
    shed or railway station. The inhabitants had to understand that
    anybody who did not perform their duties properly would be shot,
    and that they would be held responsible for each offense.”

(_d_) _Subversion of Christian Church and Persecution of the Clergy._
The evidence relating to the systematic effort of the conspirators to
eliminate the Christian churches in Germany is discussed in Section 6 of
Chapter VII. The evidence hereinafter taken up is limited to proving the
responsibility of the Leadership Corps and its members for participation
in illegal activities against the Christian church and clergy.

Bormann, who was a _Reichsleiter_ and Chief of the Nazi Party
Chancellery, issued a secret decree addressed to all _Gauleiter_,
entitled “Relationship of National Socialism and Christianity” (_D-75_).
In this decree _Reichsleiter_ Bormann flatly declared that National
Socialism and Christianity are incompatible and that the influence of
the churches in Germany must be eliminated:

    “National Socialist and Christian concepts are irreconcilable. *
    * * Our National Socialist ideology is far loftier than the
    concepts of Christianity, which, in their essential points, have
    been taken over from Jewry. For this reason also, we do not need
    Christianity. * * * If, therefore, in the future our youth
    learns nothing more of this Christianity, whose doctrines are
    far below ours, Christianity will disappear by itself. * * * It
    follows from the irreconcilability of National Socialist and
    Christian concepts that a strengthening of existing confessions
    and every demand of originating Christian confessions is to be
    rejected by us. A differentiation between the various Christian
    confessions is not to be made here. For this reason, also, the
    thought of an erection of an Evangelical National Church by
    merger of the various Evangelical churches has been definitely
    given up, because the Evangelical Church is just as inimicable
    to us as the Catholic Church. Any strengthening of the
    Evangelical Church would merely react against us. * * *

    “For the first time in German history, the Fuehrer consciously
    and completely has the leadership of the people in his own hand.
    With the Party, its components, and attached units, the Fuehrer
    has created for himself, and thereby the German Reich
    leadership, an instrument which makes him independent of the
    Church. All influences which might impair or damage the
    leadership of the people exercised by the Fuehrer, with the help
    of the NSDAP, must be eliminated. More and more the people must
    be separated from the churches and their organs, the pastors. Of
    course, the churches must and will, seen from their viewpoint,
    defend themselves against this loss of power. But never again
    must an influence on leadership of the people be yielded to the
    churches. This influence must be broken completely and finally.

    “Only the Reich Government and, by its direction, the Party, its
    components and attached units have a right to leadership of the
    people. Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers, seers
    and other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the State, so
    must the possibility of Church influence also be totally
    removed. Not until this has happened, does the State leadership
    have influence on the individual citizens. Not until then are
    people and Reich secure in their existence for all the future.”

On 25 April 1941 a letter was issued from Bormann’s office to Rosenberg,
in his capacity as the Fuehrer’s Representative for the Supervision of
the Entire Mental and Ideological Training and Education of the NSDAP
(_070-PS_). In this letter Bormann’s office stated that measures had
been taken leading to the progressive cancellation of morning prayers
and other religious services and their substitution by Nazi mottos and

    “We are inducing schools more and more to reduce and abolish
    religious morning services. Similarly the confessional and
    general prayers in several parts of the Reich have already been
    replaced by national socialist mottos. I would be grateful, to
    know your opinion on a future national socialist morning service
    instead of the present confessional morning services which are
    usually conducted once per week * * *.” (_070-PS_)

In a letter from _Reichsleiter_ Bormann to _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg,
dated 22 February 1940, Bormann declared to Rosenberg that the Christian
religion and National Socialism are incompatible (_098-PS_). Bormann
cited, as examples of hostile divergence between Naziism and the
churches, the attitude of the latter on the racial question, celibacy of
the priests, monasteries and nunneries, etc. Bormann further declared
that the churches could not be subjugated through compromise, but only
through a new philosophy of life as prophesied in Rosenberg’s writings.
In this letter, Bormann proposed the creation of a National Socialist
Catechism, in order to give that part of the German youth which declines
to practice confessional religion, a moral foundation, and to lay a
moral basis for National Socialist doctrines, which were gradually to
supplant the Christian religions. Bormann suggested that some of the Ten
Commandments could be merged with the National Socialist Catechism and
stated that a few new Commandments should be added, such as: Thou shalt
be courageous; Thou shalt not be cowardly; Thou shalt believe in God’s
presence in the living nature, animals, and plants; Thou shalt keep thy
blood pure; etc. Deputy of the Fuehrer Bormann concluded that he
considered the problem so important that it should be discussed with the
members of the Reich Directorate, comprising the top leaders of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, as soon as possible. (_098-PS_)

At one point in this letter, Bormann stated:

    “Christianity and National Socialism are phenomena which
    originated from entirely different basic causes. Both differ
    fundamentally so strongly, that it will not be possible to
    construct a Christian teaching which would be completely
    compatible with the point of view of the National Socialist
    ideology; just as the communications of Christian faith would
    never be able to stand by the ideology of National Socialism in
    its entirety * * *.” (_098-PS_)

After discussing various proposals for the formulation of a Nazi
religious credo for instruction in the German school system, Bormann

    “The Fuehrer’s deputy finds it necessary that all these
    questions should be thoroughly discussed in the near future in
    the presence of the Reich Leaders [_Reichsleiter_] who are
    especially effected by them * * *.” (_098-PS_)

In a circular letter, dated 17 June 1938, addressed by Bormann as
_Reichsleiter_ and Deputy of the Fuehrer to all _Reichsleiter_ and
_Gauleiter_, there was enclosed a copy of rules prepared by
_Reichsleiter_ Hierl, setting forth certain restrictive regulations with
respect to participation of the Reich Labor Service in religious
celebrations (_107-PS_). Pertinent portions of the directives issued by
_Reichsleiter_ Hierl read as follows:

    “The Reich Labor Service is a training school in which the
    German youth should be educated to national unity in the spirit
    of National Socialism * * *.

    “What religious beliefs a person has is not a decisive factor,
    but it is decisive that he first of all feels himself a German.

    “Every religious practice is forbidden in the Reich Labor
    Service because it disturbs the comradelike harmony of all
    working men and women.

    “On this basis, every participation of the Reich Labor Service
    in churchly, that is religious, arrangements and celebrations is
    not possible.” (_107-PS_)

The position of Bormann as Deputy of the Fuehrer and chief of the Nazi
Party Chancellery, and the position of Rosenberg as the Fuehrer’s
Representative for the Whole Spiritual and Philosophical Education of
the Nazi Party, give to the foregoing views on religion and religious
policy the highest official backing. The anti-Christian utterances and
policies of these two conspirator-defendants reveal a community of mind
and intention amongst the most powerful leaders of the party which was
amply confirmed by the actual treatment of the churches since 1933 and
throughout the course of the conspiracy. An excerpt from page 514 of
“The Myth of the 20th Century,” written by Rosenberg, reads as follows:

    “The idea of honor—national honor—is for us the beginning and
    the end of our entire thinking and doing. It does not admit of
    any equal-valued center of force along side of it, no matter of
    what kind, neither Christian love, nor the Free-Masonic
    humanity, nor the Roman philosophy.” (_2349-PS_)

In addition to promoting beliefs and practices fundamentally
incompatible with Christianity, the Leadership Corps participated in the
persecution of priests, clergy, and members of religious orders. A
Gestapo telegram, dated 24 July 1938, dispatched from Berlin to
Nurnberg, deals with demonstrations and acts of violence against Bishop
Sproll in Rottenburg (_848-PS_). The Gestapo office in Berlin wired its
Nurnberg office the following teletype account received from its
Stuttgart office of disorderly conduct and vandalism carried out by Nazi
Party members against Bishop Sproll:

    “The Party on 23 July 1939 from 2100 on carried out the third
    demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants, about
    2500-3000, were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The
    Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the
    demonstration. This town took rather hostile attitude toward the
    demonstrations. The action got completely out of hand of the
    Party member responsible for it. The demonstrators stormed the
    palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 to 200 people
    forced their way into the palace, searched through the rooms,
    threw files out of the windows and rummaged through the beds in
    the rooms of the palace. One bed was ignited * * * The Bishop
    was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg and the ladies and
    gentlemen of his menage in the chapel at prayer. About 25 to 30
    people pressed into this chapel and molested those present.
    Bishop Groeber was taken for Bishop Sproll. He was grabbed by
    the robe and dragged back and forth * * *.” (_848-PS_)

The Gestapo official in Stuttgart added that Bishop Groeber desired “to
turn to the Fuehrer and Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick,
anew”; and that he had found a full report of the demonstration after
“suppressing counter mass meetings.” (_848-PS_)

On 23 July 1938 the Reich Minister for Church Affairs, Kerrl, sent a
letter to the Minister of State and Chief of the Praesidium Chancellery,
Berlin, stating that Bishop Sproll had angered the population by
abstaining from the plebiscite of 10 April (_849-PS_). In this letter
Kerrl stated that the _Gauleiter_ and Governor of Wuerttemberg had
decided that, in the interest of preserving the State’s authority and in
the interest of quiet and order, Bishop Sproll could no longer remain in
office. The letter reads in part as follows:

    “* * * The Reich Governor had explained to the Ecclesiastical
    Board that he would no longer regard Bishop Sproll as Head of
    the Diocese of Rottenburg on account of his refraining from the
    election in the office and that he desired Bishop Sproll to
    leave the Gau area * * * because he could assume no guarantee
    for his personal safety; that in the case of the return of the
    Bishop of Rottenburg he would see to it that all personal and
    official intercourse with him on the part of State offices as
    well as Party offices and the Armed Forces would be denied.”

Kerrl further stated in the foregoing letter that his Deputy had moved
the Foreign Office, through the German Embassy at the Vatican, to urge
the Holy See to persuade Bishop Sproll to resign his Bishopric. Kerrl
concluded by stating that should the effort to procure the Bishop’s
resignation prove unsuccessful

    “* * * the Bishop would have to be exiled from the land or there
    would have to be a complete boycott of the Bishop by the
    authorities * * *.” (_849-PS_)

On 14 July 1939 Bormann, in his capacity as Deputy of the Fuehrer,
issued a party regulation which required party members entering the
clergy or undertaking the study of theology to leave the party
(_840-PS_). The last paragraph of the regulation reads as follows:

    “I decree that in the future party members who enter the clergy
    or who turn to the study of theology have to leave the party.”

In this directive Bormann also referred to an earlier decree, dated 9
February 1937, in which he had ruled that the admission of members of
the clergy into the party was to be avoided. In that decree also Bormann
referred with approval to a regulation of the Reich Treasurer of the
NSDAP, dated 10 May 1939, providing that—

    “clergymen, as well as other fellow Germans, who are also
    closely connected with the church, cannot be admitted into the
    party.” (_840-PS_)

In the Allocution of His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, to the Sacred College
on 2 June 1945, His Holiness, after declaring that he had acquired an
appreciation of the great qualities of the German people in the course
of 12 years of residence in their midst, expressed the hope that Germany
could rise to new dignity and new life once it had laid the satanic
specter raised by National Socialism, and after the guilty had expiated
the crimes they have committed (_3268-PS_). After referring to repeated
violations by the German government of the Concordat concluded in 1933,
His Holiness declared:

    “The struggle against the Church did, in fact, become ever more
    bitter: there was the dissolution of Catholic organizations; the
    gradual suppression of the flourishing Catholic schools, both
    public and private; the enforced weaning of youth from family
    and Church; the pressure brought to bear on the conscience of
    citizens, and especially of civil servants; the systematic
    defamation, by means of a clever, closely-organized propaganda,
    of the Church, the clergy, the faithful, the Church’s
    institutions, teachings and history; the closing, dissolution,
    confiscation of religious houses and other ecclesiastical
    institutions; the complete suppression of the Catholic press and
    publishing houses * * *.

    “In the meantime the Holy See itself multiplied its
    representations and protests to governing authorities in
    Germany, reminding them, in clear and energetic language, of
    their duty to respect and fulfill the obligations of the natural
    law itself that were confirmed by the Concordat. In those
    critical years, joining the alert vigilance of a Pastor to the
    long-suffering patience of a father, Our great Predecessor Pius
    XI fulfilled his mission as Supreme Pontiff with intrepid

    “But when, after he had tried all means of persuasion in vain,
    he saw himself clearly faced with deliberate violations of a
    solemn pact, with a religious persecution masked or open, but
    always rigorously organized, he proclaimed to the world, on
    Passion Sunday 1937, in his Encyclical _Mit brennender Sorge_,
    what National-Socialism really was; the arrogant apostasy from
    Jesus Christ, the denial of His doctrine and of His work of
    redemption, the cult of violence, the idolatry of race and
    blood, the overthrow of human liberty and dignity * * *.

    “From the prisons, concentration camps and fortresses are now
    pouring out, together with the political prisoners, also the
    crowds of those, whether clergy or laymen, whose only crime was
    their fidelity to Christ and to the faith of their fathers or
    the dauntless fulfillment of their duties as priests * * *.

    “In the forefront, the number and harshness of the treatment
    meted out to them, were the Polish priests. From 1940 to 1945,
    2,800 Polish ecclesiastica and religious were imprisoned in that
    camp; among them was the Auxiliary bishop of Wloclawek, who died
    there of typhus. In April last there were left only 816, all the
    others being dead except for two or three transferred to another
    camp. In the summer of 1942, 480 German-speaking ministers of
    religion were known to be gathered there; of these, 45 were
    Protestants, all the others Catholic priests. In spite of the
    continuous inflow of new internees, especially from some
    dioceses of Bavaria, Rhenania and Westphalia, their number, as a
    result of the high rate of mortality, at the beginning of this
    year, did not surpass 350. Nor should we pass over in silence
    those belonging to occupied territories, Holland, Belgium,
    France (among whom the Bishop of Clermont), Luxembourg,
    Slovenia, Italy. Many of those priests and laymen endured
    indescribable sufferings for their faith and for their vocation.
    In one case the hatred of the impious against Christ reached the
    point of parodying on the person of an interned priest, with
    barbed wire, the scourging and crowning with thorns of our
    Redeemer.” (_3268-PS_)

The Leadership Corps participated in the confiscation of church and
religious property. A letter dated 19 April 1941 from _Reichsleiter_
Bormann to _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg exposes the participation of the
_Gauleiter_ in measures relating to the confiscation of religious
property (_072-PS_). The letter reads in part as follows:

    “The libraries and art objects of the monasteries confiscated in
    the Reich were to remain for the time being in these
    monasteries, insofar as the Gauleiter had not determined
    otherwise.” (_072-PS_)

On 21 February 1940, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Heydrich,
wrote a letter to the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, proposing that certain
listed churches and monasteries be confiscated for the accommodation of
so-called racial Germans. (Himmler was a _Reichsleiter_ in the
Leadership Corps by virtue of his position as Reichsfuehrer of the SS.)
After pointing out that, on political grounds, outright expropriation of
religious property would not be feasible at the time, Heydrich suggested
certain specious interim actions with respect to the church properties
in question, to be followed progressively by outright confiscation
(_R-101-A_). Heydrich’s letter makes the following statements:

    “Enclosed is a list of church possessions which might be
    available for the accommodation of Racial Germans. The list,
    which please return, is supplemented by correspondence and
    illustrated material pertinent to the subject.

    “For political reasons, expropriation without indemnity of the
    entire property of the churches and religious orders will hardly
    be possible at this time.

    “Expropriation with indemnity or in return for assignment of
    other lands and grounds will be even less possible.

    “It is therefore suggested that the respective authorities of
    the Orders be instructed that they make available the
    monasteries concerned for the accommodation of Racial Germans
    and remove their own members to other less populous monasteries.
    [Marginal note in pencil opposite this paragraph: “Very good!”]

    “The final expropriation of these properties thus placed at our
    disposal can then be carried out step by step in course of
    time.” (_R-101-A_)

On 5 April 1940, the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security
Service SS sent a letter to the Reich Commissioner for the consolidation
of Germandom, enclosing a copy of the foregoing letter from Heydrich to
Himmler proposing the confiscation of church properties (_R-101-A_). The
letter of 5 April 1940 stated:

    “The Reich Leader SS has agreed to the proposals made in the
    enclosed letter and has ordered the matter to be dealt with by
    collaboration between the Chief of the Security Police and
    Security Service and your office.” (_R-101-A_)

A letter dated 30 July 1941 (_R-101-C_) written by an
SS-Standartenfuehrer whose signature is illegible, to the Reich Leader
of the SS, supplies further evidence of the participation of the
_Gauleiter_ in the seizure of church property:

    “Further to report of 30 May 1941 this office considers it its
    duty to call the Reich Leader’s attention to the development
    which is currently taking place in the incorporated Eastern
    countries with regard to seizure and confiscation of Church

    “As soon as the Reich Laws on expropriation had been introduced,
    the Reich Governor and _Gauleiter_ in the Wartheland adopted the
    practice of expropriating real estate belonging to churches for
    use as dwellings. He grants compensation to the extent of the
    assessed value and pays the equivalent amount into blocked

    “Moreover the East German Estate Administration Limited reports
    that in the ‘_Warthegau_’ all real estate owned by the churches
    is being claimed by the local _Gau_ administration
    [_Gauselbstverwaltung_].” (_R-101-C_)

Another letter, this one from the Chief of the Staff Main Office to
Himmler, dated 30 March 1942, dealing with the confiscation of church
property, evidences the active participation of the Party Chancellery in
the confiscation of religious property (_R-101-D_). In this letter the
Chief of the Staff Main Office reports to Himmler concerning the policy
of the SS in suspending all payments of rent to monasteries and other
church institutions whose property had been expropriated. The letter
discusses a proposal made by the Reich Minister of the Interior, in
which the Party Chancery prominently participated, to the effect that
the church institutions should be paid amounts corresponding to current
mortgage charges on the premises without realizing any profit. The
writer further suggests that such payments should never be made directly
to the ecclesiastical institutions but rather should be made to the
creditors of such institutions:

    “Such an arrangement would be in line with the basic idea of the
    settlement originally worked out between the Party Chancery and
    the Reich Minister of the Interior.” (_R-101-D_)

The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party participated in the suppression
of religious publications and interfered with free religious education.
In a letter dated 27 September 1940, _Reichsleiter_ and Deputy of the
Fuehrer Bormann transmitted to Rosenberg a photostatic copy of a letter
from _Gauleiter_ Florian to Hess, dated 23 September 1940, which
expresses the _Gauleiter’s_ intense disapproval on Nazi ideological
grounds of a religious pamphlet entitled “The Spirit and Soul of the
Soldiers,” written by a Major General von Rabenau (_064-PS_). The
_Gauleiter_ urges that the religious writings of General von Rabenau be
suppressed. Florian also discusses a conversation he had with General
von Rabenau at the close of a lecture delivered by the General to a
group of younger Army officers at Aachen. This conversation illumines
the hostile attitude of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party toward
the Christian churches:

    “After he had affirmed the necessity of the churches, Rabenau
    said, with emphasized self-assurance, something like the
    following: ‘Dear Gauleiter, the Party is making mistake after
    mistake in the business with the churches. Obtain for me the
    necessary powers from the Fuehrer and I guarantee that I shall
    succeed in a few months in establishing peace with the churches
    for all times.’ After this catastrophic ignorance, I gave up the
    conversation. Dear Party Member Hess: the reading of von
    Rabenau’s pamphlet ‘Spirit and Soul of the Soldier’ has reminded
    me again of this. In this brochure, Rabenau affirms the
    necessity of the Church straight-forward and clearly, even if it
    is prudently careful. He writes on page 28 ‘There could be more
    examples; they would suffice to show that a soldier in this
    world can scarcely get along without thoughts about the next
    one.’ Because von Rabenau is falsely based spiritually, I
    consider his activities as an educator in spiritual affairs as
    dangerous, and I am of the opinion that his educational writings
    are to be dispensed with absolutely and that the publication
    section of the NSDAP can and must renounce these writings * * *
    The churches with their Christianity are this danger against
    which the struggle must always be carried on.” (_064-PS_)

That the Party Chancellery shared the _Gauleiter’s_ hostility to the
Christian churches is further revealed by Bormann’s instruction to
Rosenberg to “take action” on the _Gauleiter’s_ recommendation that the
General’s writings be suppressed. (_064-PS_)

Another letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, dated 8 March 1940, enclosed a
copy of Bormann’s letter of the same date to _Reichsleiter_ Amann
(_089-PS_). Amann was a top member of the Leadership Corps by virtue of
his position as _Reichsleiter_ for the Press and Leader of the Party
Publishing Company. In this letter to Amann, Bormann expressed his
dismay and dissatisfaction that only 10 percent of the 3,000 Protestant
periodicals in Germany had ceased publication for what are described as
“paper saving” reasons. Bormann then advised Amann that “the
distribution of any paper whatsoever for such periodicals” was barred
(_089-PS_). Bormann also instructed Amann to make sharper restrictions
in the distribution of paper against religious writings in favor of
publications more acceptable to the Nazi ideology:

    “I urge you [Bormann is addressing _Reichsleiter_ Amann] to see
    to it in any redistribution of paper to be considered later that
    the confessional writing, which according to experiences so far
    gathered possesses very doubtful value for strengthening the
    power of resistance of the people toward the external foe
    receives still sharper restrictions in favor of literature,
    politically and ideologically more valuable.” (_089-PS_)

A further letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, dated 17 January 1940,
expressed the Party’s opposition to the circulation of religious
literature to the members of the German Armed Forces (_101-PS_).
Pertinent excerpts from Bormann’s letter read as follows:

    “Nearly all the districts [_Gaue_] report to me regularly that
    the churches of both confessions are administering spiritually
    to members of the Armed Forces. This administering finds its
    expression especially in the fact that soldiers are being sent
    religious publications by the spiritual leaders of the home
    congregations. These publications are, in part, very cleverly
    composed. I have repeated reports that these publications are
    being read by the troops and thereby exercise a certain
    influence on the morale.

    “I have, in the past, sought by sounding out the General Field
    Marshal, the High Command of the Armed Forces, and * * * Reich
    Director Amann, to restrict considerably the production and
    shipment of publications of this type. The result of these
    efforts remains unsatisfactory. As _Reichsleiter_ Amann has
    repeatedly informed me, the restriction of these pamphlets by
    means of the * * * paper rationing has not been achieved because
    the paper * * * is being purchased on the open market.

    “If the influencing of the soldiers by the church is to be
    effectively combatted, this will only be accomplished by
    producing many good publications in the shortest possible time
    under the supervision of the Party * * *.

    “Thus at the last meeting of the Deputy _Gauleiters_, comments
    were uttered on this matter to the effect that a considerable
    quantity of such publications are not available.

    “I maintain that it is necessary that in the near future we
    transmit to the Party Service Office down to
    _Ortsgruppenleitern_ a list of additional publications of this
    sort which should be sent to our soldiers by the _Ortsgruppen_.
    * * *” (_101-PS_)

The Leadership Corps also participated in measures leading to the
closing and dissolution of theological schools and other religious
institutions. In a letter dated 17 April 1939 Bormann transmitted to
Rosenberg photostatic copy of a plan suggested by the Reich Minister for
Science, Education, and Training for the combining and closing of
certain specifically listed theological faculties (_122-PS_). In his
letter of transmittal Bormann requested Rosenberg to take “cognizance
and prompt action” with respect to proposed suppression of religious
institutions. The plan to suppress the religious institutions was
summarized as follows:

    “To recapitulate, this plan would include the complete closing
    of the theological faculties at Innsbruck, Salzburg, and Munich,
    the transfer of the faculty of Graz to Vienna, and the vanishing
    of four Catholic faculties; closing of three Catholic
    theological faculties or higher schools, and of four evangelical
    faculties in the Winter semester 1939/1940; closing of one
    further Catholic and of three further evangelical faculties in
    the near future.” (_122-PS_)

A final letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, dated 24 January 1939,
enclosed for Rosenberg’s cognizance a copy of Bormann’s letter to the
Reich Minister for Knowledge and Education (_116-PS_). In the enclosed
letter, Bormann informed the Minister as to the Party’s position in
favor of restricting and suppressing theological faculties. Bormann
stated that, owing to the effects of the introduction of military
service, the consequences of the Four Year Plan, and the extraordinary
lack of replacements, it would become necessary to carry out a
reorganization of the German high schools. In view of these
developments, he requested the Minister to restrict and suppress the
theological faculties:

    “* * * I would appreciate it very much if you would restrict the
    theological faculties in so far as they cannot be wholly
    suppressed in accordance with the above statement. I request in
    this instance the omission of any expressed declaration to the
    Churches or to other places, as well as the avoiding of a public
    announcement of these measures. Complaints and the like must be
    answered (if they are to be replied to) in the fashion that
    these measures are being executed in the course of the economic
    plan of reorganization and that similar things are happening to
    other faculties.

    “I would appreciate it very much if professional chairs thus
    vacated can be then turned over to the newly created fields of
    inquiry of these last years, such as Racial Research,
    Archeological Studies, etc.” (_116-PS_)

From the foregoing evidence it is clear the Leadership Corps of the Nazi
Party shares in the responsibility for the measures taken to subvert the
Christian churches and persecute the Christian clergy, both in Germany
and in German-occupied territories of Europe. The Prosecution stresses
the significance of the appointment of Rosenberg, whose anti-Christian
views are open and notorious, as the Fuehrer’s Representative for the
Whole Spiritual and Philosophical Education of the Nazi Party. It was
precisely this position which gave Rosenberg his seat in the
_Reichsleitung_. But emphasis is placed not merely upon the fact that
anti-Christs such as Bormann and Rosenberg held directive positions
within the Leadership Corps, but upon the further fact that their
directives and orders were passed down the chain of command of the
Leadership Corps and caused the participation of its membership in acts
subversive of the Christian Church.

(_e_) _Destruction of the Free Trade Unions, Imposition of Nazi Control
over the Productive Labor Capacity of Germany._ The evidence relating to
the destruction of the independent trade unions is discussed in Section
5 of Chapter VII. The evidence hereinafter taken up is offered to prove
the responsibility of the Leadership Corps for participation in the
smashing of the unions and the imposition of Nazi Party control over the
productive labor capacity of the German nation.

Soon after the seizure of power (mid-April 1933), _Reichsleiter_ Robert
Ley was directed by Hitler to smash the independent unions.
_Reichsleiter_ Ley, in his speech to the Nurnberg Party Congress of
1936, declared:

    “* * * My Fuehrer! When you, my Fuehrer, ordered me in mid-April
    1933 to take over the trade unions, I could not understand why
    you gave this order to me since I could not see any connection
    between my task as Organizational Leader of the Party and my new
    task. Very soon, however, your decision, my Fuehrer, became
    clear to me and I recognized that the organizational measures of
    the Party could only come to full fruition when supplemented by
    the organization of the people, that is to say, by the
    mobilization of the energies of the people and by their
    concentration and alignment. If the _Party_ represents the
    _concentration of the Political Leaders of the people_—as you,
    my Fuehrer, have told us again and again—then the _people_ is
    the _retinue_ and must be organized and trained according to the
    same principles. _Leader and retinue, elite and community at
    large_—these were the clear directives for my work. These were
    the consequences:

    “(1) _My tasks as Organizational Leader of the Party and as the
    leader of the German Labor Front were a completely homogeneous
    task: in other words, in everything I did I acted as Reich
    Organization Leader of the NSDAP._

    “(2) _The German Labor Front was an institution of the Party and
    was led by it._

    “(3) _The German Labor Front had to be organized regionally and
    professionally according to the same principles as the Party._

    “That is why trade union and employer associations had to be
    smashed unrelentingly, and the basis of construction was formed,
    as in the Party, by the cell and the local section

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_National Socialism has conquered the factory._ Factory troops
    [_Die Werkschar_] are the National Socialist shock troops within
    the factory, and their motto is:

              ‘THE FUEHRER IS ALWAYS RIGHT’.” (_2283-PS_)

In furtherance of the Nazi policy to destroy the independent trade
unions of Germany, Ley issued a Party directive on 21 April 1933
outlining what was termed a “coordination action” scheduled for 2 May
1933 against the General German Trade Union Federation and the General
Independent Employee Federation (_392-PS_). This directive ordered the
SA and the SS to occupy trade union premises, seize trade union funds,
and take into protective custody the higher union leaders.

Pertinent portions of Ley’s order provide:

    “On Tuesday, 2 May 1933, the coordination action of the free
    trade unions begins.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The essential part of the action is to be directed against the
    General German Trade Union Federation and the General
    Independent Employees Federation.

    “Anything beyond that which is dependent upon the free trade
    unions is left to the discretion of the _Gauleiter’s_ judgment.

    “The _Gauleiter_ are responsible for the execution of the
    coordination action in the individual areas. Supporters of the
    action should be members of the National Socialist Factory Cell
    Organizations * * *.

    “SA as well as SS are to be employed for the occupation of trade
    union properties and for taking into protective custody of
    personalities who come into question.

    “The _Gauleiter_ is to proceed with his measures on a basis of
    the closest understanding with competent gau or regional factory
    cells directors.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In the Reich, the following will be occupied:

        The directing offices of the unions;

        The trade union houses and offices of the fur trade

        The Party houses of the Socialist Democratic Party of
        Germany in so far as trade unions are involved there;

        The branches and paying offices of the ‘Bank for
        Workers, Employees and Officials, Inc.’

        The district committees of the General German Trade
        Union Federation and of the General Independent
        Employees Federation.

        The local committees of the General German Trade Union
        Federation and of the General Independent Employees

    “The following are to be taken into protective custody:

        All trade union chairmen;

        The district secretaries and branch directors of the
        Bank for Workers, Employees and Officials, Inc.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Exceptions are granted only with the permission of the

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “It is understood that this action is to proceed in a strongly
    disciplined fashion. The _Gauleiter_ are responsible in this
    respect. They are to hold the direction of the action firmly in

                                                    “Heil Hitler!
                             “(signed)  Dr. Robert Ley.”  (_392-PS_)

Ley’s order for the dissolution of the independent trade unions was
carried out as planned and directed. Trade union premises all over
Germany were occupied by the SA and the unions dissolved. On 2 May 1933,
the official NSDAP Press Service reported that the National Socialist
Factory Cells Organization (NSBO) had “eliminated the old leadership” of
“Free Trade Unions” and taken over their leadership (_2224-PS_):

    “National Socialism, which today has assumed leadership of the
    German working class, can no longer bear the responsibility for
    leaving the men and women of the German working class, the
    members of the largest trade organization in the world, the
    German Trade Union Movement, in the hands of a people who do not
    know a fatherland that is called Germany. Because of that, the
    National Socialist Factory Cell Organization (NSBO) has taken
    over the leadership of the trade unions. The NSBO has eliminated
    the old leadership of the trade unions of the General German
    Trade Unions League and of the General Independent Employees’
    Federation * * *.

    “On 2 May 1933, the National Socialist Factory Cell Organization
    (NSBO) took over the leadership of all trade unions; all trade
    union buildings were occupied and most stringent control has
    been organized over financial and personnel matters of the
    organization.” (_2224-PS_)

This assault on the independent unions directed by Ley in his capacity
as _Reichsleiter_ in charge of Party Organization, assisted by the
_Gauleiter_, and Party Formations, included the seizure of trade union
funds and property. In a speech on 11 September 1937 to the 5th Annual
Session of the German Labor Front (_1678-PS_), Ley admitted the
confiscation of trade union funds.

    “Once I said to the Fuehrer: ‘My Fuehrer, actually I am standing
    with one foot in jail, for today I am still the trustee of the
    comrades “Leipart” and “Imbusch,” and should they some day ask
    me to return their money, then it will be found that I have
    spent it, either by building things, or otherwise. But they
    shall never again find their property in the condition in which
    they handed it over to me. Therefore I would have to be

    “The Fuehrer laughed then and remarked that apparently I felt
    extremely well in this condition.

    “It was very difficult for us all. Today we laugh about it * *
    *.” (_1678-PS_)

The plan of the Nazi conspirators to eliminate the Free Trade Unions was
advanced by the enactment on 19 May 1933 of a law which abolished
collective bargaining between workers and employers and replaced it with
a regulation of working conditions by Labor Trustees appointed by Hitler
(_405-PS_). After providing in Section 1 for the appointment by Hitler
of trustees of labor, this law provides, in Section 2:

    “Until a new revision of the social constitution, the trustees
    are to regulate the conditions for the conclusion of labor
    contracts. This practice is to be legally binding for all
    persons and replaces the system found on combinations of
    workers, of individual employers or of combinations of employers
    * * *.”(_405-PS_)

Having destroyed the independent unions and collective bargaining, the
next step of the Nazi conspirators was to Nazify industrial relations.
The Law of 20 January 1934, entitled “Law Regulating National Labor,”
imposed the Leadership Principle upon industrial enterprisers
(_1861-PS_). Section I, paragraph 1, provided that the enterpriser
should be the leader of the plant and the workers would “constitute his
followers.” Section 1, paragraph 2 reads as follows:

    “The Leader of the plant makes the decisions for the employees
    and laborers in all matters concerning the enterprise, as far as
    they are regulated by this law.

    “He is responsible for the well-being of the employees and
    laborers. The employees and laborers owe him faithfulness
    according to the principles of the factory community.”

The trade unions having been dissolved and the Leadership Principle
superimposed upon the relationship of management and labor, the members
of the Leadership Corps joined in and directed measures designed to
replace the independent unions by the German Labor Front, the DAF, an
affiliated Party organization. On the very day the Nazi conspirators
seized and dissolved the Free Trade Unions, 2 May 1933, they publicly
proclaimed that a “united front of German workers” would be formed with
Hitler as honorary patron at a workers’ congress on 10 May 1933
(_2224-PS_). A release of the Nazi Party Press Agency stated:

    “The National Socialist Party Press Agency is informed that a
    great workers’ congress will take place on Wednesday, 10 May, in
    the Russian House of Lords in Berlin. The United Front of German
    workers will be formed there. Adolf Hitler will be asked to
    assume the position of Honorary Patron.” (_2224-PS_)

The action committee, which supervised the smashing of the unions under
_Reichsleiter_ Ley, met with Hitler and reported that the independent
unions had been effectively dissolved. The Fuehrer then consented to be
Honorary Patron at the Great Workers’ Congress. (_2224-PS_)

The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party was not only employed in measures
taken to dissolve the independent unions, but certain of its members
were given important and directive positions within the German Labor
Front, the Nazi Organization which replaced the free trade unions. On 10
May 1933, Hitler appointed Ley Leader of the German Labor Front (DAF)
(_1940-PS_). By the same edict, Hitler appointed _Gauleiter_ Forster as
Leader of the Employees’ Associations, and Schumann, Leader of the Nazi
Factory Cell Organization (NSBO), as Leader of the Workers’
Associations. The Hitler edict stated:

    “The Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, has issued the following edict:

    “I appoint the Chief of Staff of the Political Organization of
    the NSDAP, Dr. Robert Ley, as leader of the German Labor Front.

    “I appoint _Gauleiter_ Forster, Danzig, as leader of the
    Employees’ Associations.

    “I appoint the leader of the National Socialist Factory Cell
    Organizations (NSBO), Schumann, as leader of the Workers’

                                             “Berlin, 10 May
                                             “Adolf Hitler.” (_1940-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators employed the German Labor Front (DAF) as an
instrument for propagandizing its millions of compulsory members with
Nazi ideology. The control of the Leadership Corps over the German Labor
Front was assured not only by the designation of _Reichsleiter_ Ley as
head of the DAF, but by the employment of a large number of _Politischen
Leiter_ (political leaders) charged with disseminating Nazi ideology to
the large membership of the DAF. These facts are apparent from pages
185-187 of the _Organization Book of the NSDAP_ (_2271-PS_):

    “The National Socialist Factory Cells Organization [NSBO], is a
    union of the political leaders [_Politischen Leiter_] of the
    NSDAP in the German Labor Front.

    “The NSBO is the carrier of the organization of the German Labor

    “The duties and responsibilities of the NSBO have passed over to
    the DAF.

    “The political leaders who have been transferred from the NSBO
    to the German Labor Front guarantee the ideological education of
    the DAF in the spirit of the National Socialistic idea.”

The foregoing evidence fixes upon the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party
responsibility for participation in the measures leading to the
destruction of the independent trade unions and to Nazi Party control
over the productive capacity of the German Labor Movement. Not only were
these actions directed by Ley in his capacity as _Reichsleiter_, but
they were supervised on a regional basis by the _Gauleiter_ as district
representatives of the Leadership Corps. Moreover, the German Labor
Front (DAF) which replaced the dissolved trade unions was an affiliated
organization of the NSDAP and, as such, remained under the control of
the Leadership Corps and was employed by it to nazify the labor
population of Germany.

(_f_) _Plunder of Art Treasures._ The Leadership Corps of the NSDAP is
also responsible for the plundering of art treasures by _Reichsleiter_
Rosenberg’s _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_, the activities of which are
discussed in full in Chapter XIV.

                 *        *        *        *        *

                            LEADERSHIP CORPS

                  │                                      │      │
     Document     │             Description              │ Vol. │  Page
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                  │Charter of the International Military │      │
                  │  Tribunal, Article 9.                │  I   │       6
                  │International Military Tribunal,      │      │
                  │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│      │
                  │  Appendix B.                         │  I   │  29, 69
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                  │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a  │      │
                  │document indicates that the document  │      │
                  │was received in evidence at the       │      │
                  │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│      │
                  │before a document number indicates    │      │
                  │that the document was referred to     │      │
                  │during the trial but was not formally │      │
                  │received in evidence, for the reason  │      │
                  │given in parentheses following the    │      │
                  │description of the document. The USA  │      │
                  │series number, given in parentheses   │      │
                  │following the description of the      │      │
                  │document, is the official exhibit     │      │
                  │number assigned by the court.         │      │
                  │                 ————                 │      │
  *004-PS         │Report submitted by Rosenberg to      │      │
                  │Deputy of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940,  │      │
                  │on the Political Preparation of the   │      │
                  │Norway Action. (GB 140)               │ III  │      19
                  │                                      │      │
  *057-PS         │Circular letter from Bormann to       │      │
                  │Political Leaders, 30 May 1944,       │      │
                  │concerning justice exercised by people│      │
                  │against Anglo-American murderers. (USA│      │
                  │329)                                  │ III  │     102
                  │                                      │      │
  *064-PS         │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 27     │      │
                  │September 1940, enclosing letter from │      │
                  │Gauleiter Florian criticizing churches│      │
                  │and publications for soldiers. (USA   │      │
                  │359)                                  │ III  │     109
                  │                                      │      │
   070-PS         │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,│      │
                  │25 April 1941, on substitution of     │      │
                  │National Socialist mottos for morning │      │
                  │prayers in schools.(USA 349)          │ III  │     118
                  │                                      │      │
  *071-PS         │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April │      │
                  │1941, replying to Bormann’s letter of │      │
                  │19 April 1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA │      │
                  │371)                                  │ III  │     119
                  │                                      │      │
  *072-PS         │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 19 April │      │
                  │1941, concerning confiscation of      │      │
                  │property, especially of art treasures │      │
                  │in the East. (USA 357)                │ III  │     122
                  │                                      │      │
  *089-PS         │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8   │      │
                  │March 1940, instructing Amann not to  │      │
                  │issue further newsprint to            │      │
                  │confessional newspapers. (USA 360)    │ III  │     147
                  │                                      │      │
  *090-PS         │Letter from Rosenberg to Schwarz, 28  │      │
                  │January 1941, concerning registration │      │
                  │and collection of art treasures. (USA │      │
                  │372)                                  │ III  │     148
                  │                                      │      │
  *098-PS         │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22     │      │
                  │February 1940, urging creation of     │      │
                  │National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │      │
                  │provide moral foundation for NS       │      │
                  │religion. (USA 350)                   │ III  │     152
                  │                                      │      │
  *100-PS         │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 18     │      │
                  │January 1940, urging preparation of   │      │
                  │National Socialist reading material to│      │
                  │replace Christian literature for      │      │
                  │soldiers. (USA 691)                   │ III  │     160
                  │                                      │      │
  *101-PS         │Letter from Hess’ office signed       │      │
                  │Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,│      │
                  │concerning undesirability of religious│      │
                  │literature for members of the         │      │
                  │Wehrmacht. (USA 361)                  │ III  │     160
                  │                                      │      │
   107-PS         │Circular letter signed Bormann, 17    │      │
                  │June 1938, enclosing directions       │      │
                  │prohibiting participation of          │      │
                  │Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious      │      │
                  │celebrations. (USA 351)               │ III  │     162
                  │                                      │      │
  *116-PS         │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg,        │      │
                  │enclosing copy of letter, 24 January  │      │
                  │1939, to Minister of Education        │      │
                  │requesting restriction or elimination │      │
                  │of theological faculties. (USA 685)   │ III  │     165
                  │                                      │      │
  *122-PS         │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 17     │      │
                  │April 1939, enclosing copy of Minister│      │
                  │of Education letter, 6 April 1939, on │      │
                  │elimination of theological faculties  │      │
                  │in various universities. (USA 362)    │ III  │     173
                  │                                      │      │
  *136-PS         │Certified copy of Hitler Order, 29    │      │
                  │January 1940, concerning establishment│      │
                  │of “Hohe Schule”. (USA 367)           │ III  │     184
                  │                                      │      │
  *137-PS         │Copy of Order from Keitel to          │      │
                  │Commanding General of Netherlands, 5  │      │
                  │July 1940, to cooperate with the      │      │
                  │Einsatzstab Rosenberg. (USA 379)      │ III  │     185
                  │                                      │      │
  *141-PS         │Goering Order, 5 November 1940,       │      │
                  │concerning seizure of Jewish art      │      │
                  │treasures. (USA 368)                  │ III  │     188
                  │                                      │      │
  *145-PS         │Order signed by Rosenberg, 20 August  │      │
                  │1941, concerning safeguarding the     │      │
                  │cultural goods in the Occupied Eastern│      │
                  │Territories. (USA 373)                │ III  │     189
                  │                                      │      │
  *149-PS         │Hitler Order, 1 March 1942,           │      │
                  │establishing authority of Einsatzstab │      │
                  │Rosenberg. (USA 369)                  │ III  │     190
                  │                                      │      │
  *154-PS         │Letter from Lammers to high State and │      │
                  │Party authorities, 5 July 1942,       │      │
                  │confirming Rosenberg’s powers. (USA   │      │
                  │370)                                  │ III  │     193
                  │                                      │      │
   315-PS         │Note of a meeting held in the Reich   │      │
                  │Ministry for Enlightenment and        │      │
                  │Propaganda, 10 March 1943, concerning │      │
                  │treatment of foreign workers employed │      │
                  │in the Reich.                         │ III  │     251
                  │                                      │      │
  *327-PS         │Letter of Rosenberg to Bormann, 17    │      │
                  │October 1944, concerning liquidation  │      │
                  │of property in Eastern Occupied       │      │
                  │Territories. (USA 338)                │ III  │     257
                  │                                      │      │
  *347-PS         │Letter from Lohse to Reich Youth      │      │
                  │Leader Axmann, 18 April 1944. (USA    │      │
                  │340)                                  │ III  │     267
                  │                                      │      │
  *374-PS         │TWX Series of Orders signed by        │      │
                  │Heydrich and Mueller, issued by       │      │
                  │Gestapo Headquarters Berlin, 9-11     │      │
                  │November 1938, concerning treatment of│      │
                  │Jews. (USA 729)                       │ III  │     277
                  │                                      │      │
  *392-PS         │Official NSDAP circular entitled “The │      │
                  │Social Life of New Germany with       │      │
                  │Special Consideration of the German   │      │
                  │Labor Front”, by Prof. Willy Mueller  │      │
                  │(Berlin, 1938). (USA 326)             │ III  │     380
                  │                                      │      │
   405-PS         │Law Concerning Trustees of Labor, 19  │      │
                  │May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│      │
                  │I, p. 285.                            │ III  │     387
                  │                                      │      │
  *407-V and VI-PS│Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 15     │      │
                  │April 1943, concerning labor          │      │
                  │questions. (USA 209; USA 228)         │ III  │     391
                  │                                      │      │
  *630-PS         │Memorandum of Hitler, 1 September     │      │
                  │1939, concerning authorization of     │      │
                  │mercy killings. (USA 342)             │ III  │     451
                  │                                      │      │
  *654-PS         │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942,  │      │
                  │on discussion with Himmler concerning │      │
                  │delivery of Jews to Himmler for       │      │
                  │extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III  │     467
                  │                                      │      │
   656-PS         │Letter, undated, from Bormann to      │      │
                  │Political leaders, enclosing Order of │      │
                  │Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, 29  │      │
                  │January 1943, relating to self-defense│      │
                  │against prisoners of war. (USA 339)   │ III  │     470
                  │                                      │      │
  *840-PS         │Party Directive, 14 July 1939, making │      │
                  │clergy and theology students          │      │
                  │ineligible for Party membership. (USA │      │
                  │355)                                  │ III  │     606
                  │                                      │      │
  *848-PS         │Gestapo telegram from Berlin to       │      │
                  │Nurnberg, 24 July 1938, dealing with  │      │
                  │demonstrations against Bishop Sproll  │      │
                  │in Rottenburg. (USA 353)              │ III  │     613
                  │                                      │      │
  *849-PS         │Letter from Kerrl to Minister of      │      │
                  │State, 23 July 1938, with enclosures  │      │
                  │dealing with persecution of Bishop    │      │
                  │Sproll. (USA 354)                     │ III  │     614
                  │                                      │      │
 *1058-PS         │Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941,  │      │
                  │by Rosenberg before people most       │      │
                  │intimately concerned with Eastern     │      │
                  │Problem, found in his “Russia File”.  │      │
                  │(USA 147)                             │ III  │     716
                  │                                      │      │
 *1117-PS         │Goering Order, 1 May 1941, concerning │      │
                  │establishment of Einsatzstab Rosenberg│      │
                  │in all Occupied Territories. (USA 384)│ III  │     793
                  │                                      │      │
  1118-PS         │Letter from Rosenberg to Goering, 18  │      │
                  │June 1942, and related correspondence.│ III  │     793
                  │                                      │      │
 *1130-PS         │Note, 11 April 1943, and report of    │      │
                  │speech by Koch in Kiev on 5 March     │      │
                  │1943, concerning treatment of civilian│      │
                  │population in Ukraine. (USA 169)      │ III  │     797
                  │                                      │      │
 *1164-PS         │Secret letter, 21 April 1942, from SS │      │
                  │to all concentration camp commanders  │      │
                  │concerning treatment of priests. (USA │      │
                  │736)                                  │ III  │     820
                  │                                      │      │
  1386-PS         │Law concerning the granting of        │      │
                  │amnesty, 23 April 1936. 1936          │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 378.    │ III  │     960
                  │                                      │      │
  1388-PS         │Law concerning confiscation of        │      │
                  │Property subversive to People and     │      │
                  │State, 14 July 1933. 1933             │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479.    │ III  │     962
                  │                                      │      │
  1389-PS         │Law creating Reich Labor Service, 26  │      │
                  │June 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt,    │      │
                  │Part I, p. 769.                       │ III  │     963
                  │                                      │      │
  1391-PS         │Statute of the Academy for German Law,│      │
                  │2 July 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,  │      │
                  │pp. 605-607.                          │ III  │     970
                  │                                      │      │
  1392-PS         │Law on the Hitler Youth, 1 December   │      │
                  │1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 993.                               │ III  │     972
                  │                                      │      │
  1393-PS         │Law on treacherous attacks against    │      │
                  │State and Party, and for the          │      │
                  │Protection of Party Uniforms, 20      │      │
                  │December 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│      │
                  │Part I, p. 1269.                      │ III  │     973
                  │                                      │      │
  1394-PS         │Law to guarantee Public Peace, 13     │      │
                  │October 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │      │
                  │Part I, p. 723, Art. 1-3.             │ III  │     976
                  │                                      │      │
  1395-PS         │Law to insure the unity of Party and  │      │
                  │State, 1 December 1933. 1933          │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016.   │      │
                  │(GB 252)                              │ III  │     978
                  │                                      │      │
  1397-PS         │Law for the reestablishment of the    │      │
                  │Professional Civil Service, 7 April   │      │
                  │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 175.                               │ III  │     981
                  │                                      │      │
  1398-PS         │Law to supplement the Law for the     │      │
                  │restoration of the Professional Civil │      │
                  │Service, 20 July 1933. 1933           │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 518.    │ III  │     986
                  │                                      │      │
  1402-PS         │The Homestead Law of 29 September     │      │
                  │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 685.                               │ III  │     990
                  │                                      │      │
  1412-PS         │Decree relating to payment of fine by │      │
                  │Jews of German nationality, 12        │      │
                  │November 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│      │
                  │Part I, p. 1579.                      │  IV  │       6
                  │                                      │      │
  1415-PS         │Police regulation concerning          │      │
                  │appearance of Jews in public, 28      │      │
                  │November 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│      │
                  │Part I, p. 1676.                      │  IV  │       6
                  │                                      │      │
  1416-PS         │Reich Citizen Law of 15 September     │      │
                  │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 1146.                              │  IV  │       7
                  │                                      │      │
 *1417-PS         │First regulation to the Reichs        │      │
                  │Citizenship Law, 14 November 1935.    │      │
                  │1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.    │      │
                  │1333. (GB 258)                        │  IV  │       8
                  │                                      │      │
  1419-PS         │Law concerning Jewish tenants, 30     │      │
                  │April 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt,   │      │
                  │Part I, p. 864.                       │  IV  │      10
                  │                                      │      │
  1422-PS         │Thirteenth regulation under Reich     │      │
                  │Citizenship Law, 1 July 1943. 1943    │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 372.    │  IV  │      14
                  │                                      │      │
  1438-PS         │Fuehrer concerning administration of  │      │
                  │Sudeten-German territory, 22 October  │      │
                  │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 1453.                              │  IV  │      17
                  │                                      │      │
 *1481-PS         │Gestapo order, 20 January 1938,       │      │
                  │dissolving and confiscating property  │      │
                  │of Catholic Youth Women’s Organization│      │
                  │in Bavaria. (USA 737)                 │  IV  │      50
                  │                                      │      │
 *1517-PS         │Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning  │      │
                  │discussion with the Fuehrer, 14       │      │
                  │December 1941. (USA 824)              │  IV  │      55
                  │                                      │      │
**1654-PS         │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing    │      │
                  │universal military conscription. 1935 │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369.    │      │
                  │(Referred to but not offered in       │      │
                  │evidence.)                            │  IV  │     163
                  │                                      │      │
  1662-PS         │Order eliminating Jews from German    │      │
                  │economic life, 12 November 1938. 1938 │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1580.   │  IV  │     172
                  │                                      │      │
  1665-PS         │Order concerning treatment of property│      │
                  │of Nationals of the former Polish     │      │
                  │State, 17 September 1940. 1940        │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1270.   │  IV  │     173
                  │                                      │      │
  1674-PS         │Second decree for the execution of the│      │
                  │law regarding the change of surnames  │      │
                  │and forenames, 17 August 1938. 1938   │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1044.   │  IV  │     185
                  │                                      │      │
 *1676-PS         │Speech concerning the enemy air terror│      │
                  │by Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels, 28-29 │      │
                  │March 1944. Voelkischer Beobachter.   │      │
                  │(USA 334)                             │  IV  │     186
                  │                                      │      │
 *1678-PS         │Speech of Dr. Robert Ley. Documents of│      │
                  │German Politics, Vol. V, pp. 373, 376.│      │
                  │(USA 365)                             │  IV  │     190
                  │                                      │      │
 *1708-PS         │The Program of the NSDAP. National    │      │
                  │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153.   │      │
                  │(USA 255; USA 324)                    │  IV  │     208
                  │                                      │      │
 *1774-PS         │Extracts from Organizational Law of   │      │
                  │the Greater German Reich by Ernst     │      │
                  │Rudolf Huber. (GB 246)                │  IV  │     349
                  │                                      │      │
 *1814-PS         │The Organization of the NSDAP and its │      │
                  │affiliated associations, from         │      │
                  │Organization book of the NSDAP,       │      │
                  │editions of 1936, 1938, 1940 and 1943,│      │
                  │pp. 86-88. (USA 328)                  │  IV  │     411
                  │                                      │      │
 *1815-PS         │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning  │      │
                  │the study and treatment of church     │      │
                  │politics. (USA 510)                   │  IV  │     415
                  │                                      │      │
  1817-PS         │Bureau for factory troops, from       │      │
                  │Organization Book of the NSDAP, 1936  │      │
                  │edition, p. 211.                      │  IV  │     457
                  │                                      │      │
  1855-PS         │Extract from Organization Book of the │      │
                  │NSDAP, 1937, p. 418.                  │  IV  │     495
                  │                                      │      │
  1861-PS         │Law on the regulation of National     │      │
                  │labor, 20 January 1934. 1934          │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 45.     │  IV  │     497
                  │                                      │      │
 *1893-PS         │Extracts from Organization Book of the│      │
                  │NSDAP, 1943 edition. (USA 323)        │  IV  │     529
                  │                                      │      │
 *1913-PS         │Agreement between Plenipotentiary     │      │
                  │General for Arbeitseinsatz and German │      │
                  │Labor Front concerning care of        │      │
                  │non-German workers. 1943              │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 588.    │      │
                  │(USA 227)                             │  IV  │     547
                  │                                      │      │
 *1914-PS         │Extracts from Decrees, Regulations,   │      │
                  │Announcements, 1943 Edition, Part I,  │      │
                  │pp. 318-319. (USA 336)                │  IV  │     550
                  │                                      │      │
  1915-PS         │Decree concerning leadership of Armed │      │
                  │Forces, 4 February 1938. 1938         │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111.    │  IV  │     552
                  │                                      │      │
  1939-PS         │Speech by Ley published in Forge of   │      │
                  │the Sword, with an introduction by    │      │
                  │Marshal Goering, pp. 14-17.           │  IV  │     581
                  │                                      │      │
  1940-PS         │Fuehrer edict appointing Ley leader of│      │
                  │German Labor Front. Voelkischer       │      │
                  │Beobachter, Munich (Southern German)  │      │
                  │edition, p. 1.                        │  IV  │     584
                  │                                      │      │
  1961-PS         │Decision of the Greater German        │      │
                  │Reichstag, 26 April 1942. 1942        │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 247.    │  IV  │     600
                  │                                      │      │
  1964-PS         │Decree of the Fuehrer regarding       │      │
                  │special jurisdiction of Reich Minister│      │
                  │of Justice, 20 August 1942. 1942      │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 535.    │  IV  │     601
                  │                                      │      │
  2000-PS         │Law for protection of German blood and│      │
                  │German honor, 15 September 1935. 1935 │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 100, p.│      │
                  │1146.                                 │  IV  │     636
                  │                                      │      │
  2001-PS         │Law to Remove the Distress of People  │      │
                  │and State, 24 March 1933. 1933        │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141.    │  IV  │     638
                  │                                      │      │
  2003-PS         │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of  │      │
                  │the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747.    │  IV  │     639
                  │                                      │      │
  2016-PS         │Order concerning the jurisdiction of  │      │
                  │SS courts and Police courts in the    │      │
                  │Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, 15  │      │
                  │July 1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt,    │      │
                  │Part I, p. 475.                       │  IV  │     649
                  │                                      │      │
  2029-PS         │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry│      │
                  │of Public Enlightenment and           │      │
                  │Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933       │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104.    │  IV  │     652
                  │                                      │      │
  2057-PS         │Law relating to National Emergency    │      │
                  │Defense Measures of 3 July 1934. 1934 │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 529.    │  IV  │     699
                  │                                      │      │
  2079-PS         │Reich Flag Law of 15 September 1935.  │      │
                  │1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.    │      │
                  │1145.                                 │  IV  │     707
                  │                                      │      │
  2100-PS         │Decree on position of leader of Party │      │
                  │Chancellery, 24 January 1942. 1942    │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 35.     │  IV  │     726
                  │                                      │      │
  2118-PS         │Police decree on identification of    │      │
                  │Jews, 1 September 1941. 1941          │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 547.    │  IV  │     750
                  │                                      │      │
  2120-PS         │Law on passports of Jews, 5 October   │      │
                  │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 1342.                              │  IV  │     754
                  │                                      │      │
  2224-PS         │The End of the Marxist Class Struggle,│      │
                  │published in National Socialist Party │      │
                  │Press Agency, 2 May 1933, pp. 1-2.    │      │
                  │(USA 364)                             │  IV  │     864
                  │                                      │      │
  2225-PS         │The Front of German Workers has been  │      │
                  │Erected, published in National        │      │
                  │Socialist Party Press Agency, 3 May   │      │
                  │1933, p. 1.                           │  IV  │     868
                  │                                      │      │
  2230-PS         │Agreement between Ley and Lutze, chief│      │
                  │of staff of SA, published in          │      │
                  │Organization Book of NSDAP, 1938, pp. │      │
                  │484-485b, 486c.                       │  IV  │     871
                  │                                      │      │
  2270-PS         │Coordination of Cooperatives,         │      │
                  │published in National Socialist Party │      │
                  │Press Agency release of 16 May 1933.  │  IV  │     938
                  │                                      │      │
  2271-PS         │The National Socialist Factory Cells  │      │
                  │Organization, published in            │      │
                  │Organization Book of NSDAP, pp.       │      │
                  │185-187.                              │  IV  │     940
                  │                                      │      │
 *2283-PS         │The Fifth Day of the Party Congress,  │      │
                  │from Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich   │      │
                  │(Southern German) Edition, Issue 258, │      │
                  │14 September 1936. (USA 337)          │  IV  │     971
                  │                                      │      │
  2325-PS         │Decree in execution of Article 118 of │      │
                  │German Municipal Order, 26 March 1935.│      │
                  │1935 Reichsgesetzblatt Part I, p. 470.│  IV  │    1034
                  │                                      │      │
  2336-PS         │Special Circular on Securing of       │      │
                  │association of German Labor Front     │      │
                  │against hidden Marxist sabotage, 27   │      │
                  │June 1933.                            │  IV  │    1052
                  │                                      │      │
 *2349-PS         │Extracts from “The Myth of 20th       │      │
                  │Century” by Alfred Rosenberg, 1941.   │      │
                  │(USA 352)                             │  IV  │    1069
                  │                                      │      │
 *2473-PS         │Extracts from National Socialist      │      │
                  │Yearbook, 1943, showing party         │      │
                  │positions of other Cabinet members in │      │
                  │1943. (USA 324)                       │  V   │     226
                  │                                      │      │
  2474-PS         │Directive of 25 October 1934, Decrees │      │
                  │of the Deputy of the Fuehrer, signed  │      │
                  │by Hess. (USA 327)                    │  V   │     227
                  │                                      │      │
 *2660-PS         │Distribution Plan for Gaue, Kreise,   │      │
                  │and Ortsgruppen, from The Bearers of  │      │
                  │Sovereignty, 2nd Issue, 3rd Year,     │      │
                  │February 1939. (USA 325)              │  V   │     365
                  │                                      │      │
 *2715-PS         │Speech by Hitler to the Reichstag on  │      │
                  │20 February 1938, published in The    │      │
                  │Archive, February 1938, Vol. 47, pp.  │      │
                  │1441-1442. (USA 331).                 │  V   │     376
                  │                                      │      │
 *2775-PS         │Hitler’s speech, published in Nurnberg│      │
                  │Party Congress, 1934. (USA 330)       │  V   │     418
                  │                                      │      │
 *2958-PS         │Extract from The Statistics of the    │      │
                  │NSDAP, Issue 8, 1939, p. 10. (USA 325)│  V   │     663
                  │                                      │      │
 *3051-PS         │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│      │
                  │all stations of State Police, 10      │      │
                  │November 1938, on measures against    │      │
                  │Jews, and one order from Heydrich on  │      │
                  │termination of protest actions. (USA  │      │
                  │240)                                  │  V   │     797
                  │                                      │      │
 *3063-PS         │Letters of transmission enclosing     │      │
                  │report about events and judicial      │      │
                  │proceedings in connection with        │      │
                  │anti-semitic demonstrations of 9      │      │
                  │November 1938. (USA 332)              │  V   │     868
                  │                                      │      │
 *3230-PS         │Fight and Order—Not Peace and Order!  │      │
                  │from the Bearer of Sovereignty,       │      │
                  │February 1939, p. 15. (USA 325)       │  V   │     937
                  │                                      │      │
 *3268-PS         │Allocution of His Holiness Pope Pius  │      │
                  │XII, to the Sacred College, 2 June    │      │
                  │1945. (USA 356)                       │  V   │    1038
                  │                                      │      │
  3738-PS         │Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to │      │
                  │treatment of Prisoners of War.        │  VI  │     599
                  │                                      │      │
  *D-75           │SD Inspector Bierkamp’s letter, 12    │      │
                  │December 1941, to RSHA enclosing copy │      │
                  │of secret decree signed by Bormann,   │      │
                  │entitled Relationship of National     │      │
                  │Socialism and Christianity. (USA 348) │  VI  │    1035
                  │                                      │      │
  *D-728          │Circular, 15 March 1945, from NSDAP   │      │
                  │Gauleitung Hessen-Nassau to the       │      │
                  │“Kreis”-Leaders of the Gau, concerning│      │
                  │Action by the Party to keep Germans in│      │
                  │check until end of the War. (GB 282)  │ VII  │     174
                  │                                      │      │
  *L-154          │Letter from Hoffman, 25 February 1945,│      │
                  │concerning action to be taken against │      │
                  │pilots who are shot down. (USA 335)   │ VII  │     904
                  │                                      │      │
  *L-172          │“The Strategic Position at the        │      │
                  │Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a  │      │
                  │lecture delivered by Jodl on 7        │      │
                  │November 1943 at Munich to Reich and  │      │
                  │Gauleiters. (USA 34)                  │ VII  │     920
                  │                                      │      │
  *L-221          │Bormann report on conference of 16    │      │
                  │July 1941, concerning treatment of    │      │
                  │Eastern populations and territories.  │      │
                  │(USA 317)                             │ VII  │    1086
                  │                                      │      │
  *L-316          │RSHA Order of 5 November 1942, signed │      │
                  │by Streckenbach, concerning           │      │
                  │jurisdiction over Poles and Eastern   │      │
                  │Nationals. (USA 346)                  │ VII  │    1104
                  │                                      │      │
  *R-101-A        │Letter from Chief of the Security     │      │
                  │Police and Security Service to the    │      │
                  │Reich Commissioner for the            │      │
                  │Consolidation of German Folkdom, 5    │      │
                  │April 1940, with enclosures concerning│      │
                  │confiscation of church property. (USA │      │
                  │358)                                  │ VIII │      87
                  │                                      │      │
   R-101-C        │Letter to Reich Leader SS, 30 July    │      │
                  │1941, concerning treatment of church  │      │
                  │property in incorporated Eastern      │      │
                  │areas. (USA 358)                      │ VIII │      91
                  │                                      │      │
  *R-101-D        │Letter from Chief of Staff of the     │      │
                  │Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) to  │      │
                  │Reich Leader SS, 30 March 1942,       │      │
                  │concerning confiscation of church     │      │
                  │property. (USA 358)                   │ VIII │      92
                  │                                      │      │
  *R-110          │Himmler order of 10 August 1943 to all│      │
                  │Senior Executive SS and Police        │      │
                  │officers. (USA 333)                   │ VIII │     107
                  │                                      │      │
  *R-112          │Orders issued by Reich Commissioner   │      │
                  │for the Consolidation of German       │      │
                  │nationhood, 16 February 1942, 1 July  │      │
                  │1942, 28 July 1942. (USA 309)         │ VIII │     108
                  │                                      │      │
  *R-114          │Memoranda of conferences, 4 and 18    │      │
                  │August 1942, concerning directions for│      │
                  │treatment of deported Alsatians. (USA │      │
                  │314)                                  │ VIII │     122
                  │                                      │      │
 *Chart No. 1     │National Socialist German Workers’    │      │
                  │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2)               │ VIII │     770

                          3. THE REICH CABINET

The Reich Cabinet, or _Reichsregierung_, unlike most of the other Nazi
organizations, was not especially created by the Nazi Party to carry out
or implement its purposes. The _Reichsregierung_ had, before the Nazis
came to power, a place in the constitutional and political history of
the country. As with other cabinets of duly constituted governments, the
executive power of the realm was concentrated in that body. The Nazi
conspirators well realized this fact. Their aim for totalitarian control
over the State could not be secured, they realized, except by acquiring,
holding, and utilizing the machinery of the State. And this they did.
Under the Nazi regime the _Reichsregierung_ gradually became a primary
agent of the Nazi Party, with functions and policies formulated in
accordance with the objectives and methods of the Party itself. The
_Reichsregierung_ became—at first gradually and then with more
rapidity—polluted by the infusion of the Nazi conspirators sixteen of
whom are accused in the Indictment. Its purpose came to be to clothe
every scheme and purpose of the Party, however vile, with the semblance
of legality.

          A. _Composition and Nature of the Reichsregierung._

The term _Reichsregierung_ literally translated means “Reich
Government”. Actually, it was commonly taken to refer to the ordinary
Reich Cabinet. In the Indictment the term _Reichsregierung_ is defined
to include not only those persons who were members of the ordinary Reich
Cabinet, but also persons who were members of the Council of Ministers
for the Defense of the Reich (_Ministerrat fuer die Reichsverteidigung_)
and the Secret Cabinet Council (_Geheimer Kabinettsrat_). The most
important body, however, was the ordinary cabinet. Between it and the
other two groups there was in reality only an artificial distinction.
There existed, in fact, a unity of personnel, action, function, and
purpose that obliterated any academic separation. As used in the
Indictment, the term “ordinary cabinet” means Reich Ministers, i.e.,
heads of departments of the central government; Reich Ministers without
portfolio; State Ministers acting as Reich Ministers; and other
officials entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings. Altogether, 48
persons held positions in the ordinary cabinet. 17 of them have been
indicted as defendants. Of the remaining 31, eight are believed to be

(1) _The Ordinary Cabinet._ Into the ordinary cabinet were placed the
leading Nazi trusted henchmen. Then, when new governmental agencies or
bodies were created, either by Hitler or by the Cabinet itself, the
constituents of these new bodies were taken from the rolls of the
ordinary cabinet.

When the first Hitler Cabinet was formed on 30 January 1933, there were
10 ministries which could be classified as departments of the central
government. This fact appears from the minutes of the first meeting of
that cabinet, which were found in the files of the Reich Chancellery and
bear the typed signature of one Weinstein, who is described in the
minutes as “Responsible for the Protocol—Counsellor in the Ministry”
(_351-PS_). The ten ministers who attended are set forth:

    “Reichs Minister of Foreign Affairs (von Neurath); Reichs
    Minister of the Interior (Frick); Reichs Minister of Finance
    (Graf Schwerin von Krosigk); Reichs Minister of Economy; Reichs
    Minister for Food and Agriculture (Dr. Hugenberg); Reichs
    Minister of Labor (Seldte); Reichs Minister of Justice [no name
    given; the post was filled two days later by Gurtner]; Reichs
    Defense Minister (von Blomberg); the Reichs Postmaster General;
    and Reichs Minister for Transportation (Freiherr von
    Eltz-Ruebanach).” (_351-PS_)

In addition, Goering attended as Reichs Minister (he held no portfolio
at that time) and Reichs Commissar for Aviation. Dr. Perecke attended as
Reich Commissar for Procurement of Labor. Two state secretaries were
present—Dr. Lammers of the Reichs Chancellery and Dr. Meissner of the
Reich’s Presidential Chancellery. In addition, Funk was present as
Reichs Press Chief, and von Papen was present as Deputy of the Reichs
Chancellor and Reichs Commissar for the State of Prussia. (_351-PS_)

Not long afterwards new ministries or departments were created, into
which leading Nazi figures were placed. On 13 March 1933, the Ministry
of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda was created, and Paul Josef
Goebbels was named as Reich Minister of Popular Enlightenment and
Propaganda (_2029-PS_). On 5 May 1933 the Ministry of Air (_2089-PS_),
on 1 May 1934 the Ministry of Education (_2078-PS_), and on 16 July 1935
the Ministry for Church Affairs (_2090-PS_) were created. Goering was
made Air Minister; Bernhard Rust, Gauleiter of South Hanover, was named
Education Minister; and Hans Kerrl was named Minister for Church
Affairs. Two Ministries were added after the war started. On 17 March
1940 the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions was established
(_2091-PS_). Dr. Fritz Todt, a high party official, was appointed to
this post. Speer succeeded him. The name of this department was changed
to “Armaments and War Production” in 1943 (_2092-PS_). On 17 July 1941,
when the seizure of Eastern territories was in progress, the Ministry
for the Occupied Eastern Territories was created. There was no published
decree for this act. A file found in the Presidential Chancellery
contains a typewritten copy of the decree of Hitler establishing that
post (_1997-PS_). The decree provides:

    “Decree of the Fuehrer concerning the administration of the
    newly-occupied Eastern Territories dated 17 July 1941.”

    “In order to maintain public order and public life in the
    newly-occupied Eastern territories I decree that:

    “As soon as the military operations in the newly-occupied
    territories are over, the administration of these territories
    shall be transferred from the military establishments to the
    civil-administration establishments. I shall from time to time
    determine by special decree, the territories which according to
    this are to be transferred to the civil administration and the
    time when this is to take place.

    “The Civil Administration in the newly occupied Eastern
    territories, where these territories are not included in the
    administration of the territories bordering on the Reich or the
    General government, is subject to the ‘Reich Minister for the
    Occupied Eastern territories.’

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for
    the Occupied Eastern Territories. He will hold office in
    Berlin.” (_1997-PS_)

During the years 1933 to 1945, one ministry was dropped—the Ministry of
Defense (later called War). This took place on 4 February 1938, when
Hitler took over command of the whole Armed Forces. At the same time he
created the office of the “Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces” or Chief of the OKW. This was held by Keitel. The decree
accomplishing this change provides in part as follows:

    “He [the Chief of the supreme command of the armed forces] is
    equal in rank to a Reich Minister. At the same time, the supreme
    command takes the responsibility for the affairs of the Reichs
    Ministry of War, and by my order, the chief of the supreme
    command of the Armed Forces exercises the authority formerly
    belonging to the Reichs Minister.” (_1915-PS_)

Another change in the composition of the cabinet during the years in
question should be noted. The post of vice-chancellor was never refilled
after the departure of von Papen on 30 July 1934.

In addition to the heads of departments mentioned above, the ordinary
cabinet also contained Reich Ministers without portfolio. Among these
were Frank, Seyss-Inquart, Schacht (after he left the Economics
Ministry), and von Neurath (after he was replaced as Ministry of the
Interior). Other positions also formed an integral part of the cabinet.
Those were the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Hess, and later his successor, the
Leader of the Party Chancellery, Bormann; the Chief of Staff of the SA,
Ernst Roehm, for the seven months prior to his assassination; the Chief
of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers; and, as already mentioned, the Chief
of the OKW, Keitel. These men had either the title or rank of Reich

The Cabinet also contained other functionaries, such as State Ministers
acting as Reich Ministers. Only two persons fell within this
category—the Chief of the Presidential Chancellery, Otto Meissner, and
the State Minister of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Karl
Hermann Frank. In addition, as named in the Indictment, the ordinary
cabinet included “others entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings”.
Many governmental agencies were created by the Nazis between the years
1933 and 1945, but the peculiarity of these creations was that in most
instances the new officials were given the right to participate in
cabinet meetings. Among those entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings
were the Commanders in Chief of the Army and the Navy; the Reich Forest
Master; the Inspector General for Water and Power; the Inspector General
of German Roads; the Reich Labor Leader; the Reich Youth Leader; the
Chief of the Foreign Organization in the Foreign Office; the
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of
the Interior; the Prussian Finance Minister; and the Cabinet Press
Chief. These posts and officials comprising the ordinary cabinet all
appear on the chart entitled “Organization of the Reich Government,” and
authenticated by Frick (_Chart Number 18_). The persons who held these
posts in the ordinary cabinet varied between the years 1933 to 1945.
Their names are listed in the chart (_Chart Number 18_), which discloses
that 17 of these officials are defendants in these proceedings.

(2) _The Secret Cabinet Council._ Proof that there was only an
artificial distinction between the ordinary cabinet, the Secret Cabinet
Council, and the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, is
shown by the unity of personnel among the three subdivisions. Thus, on 4
February 1938, Hitler created the Secret Cabinet Council (_2031-PS_):

    “To advise me in conducting the foreign policy I am setting up a
    secret cabinet council.

    “As president of the secret cabinet council, I nominate:
    Reichsminister Freiherr von Neurath

    “As members of the secret cabinet council I nominate:
    Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop

    Prussian Prime Minister, Reichsminister of the Air, Supreme
    Commander of the Air Forces, General Field Marshall Hermann

    The Fuehrer’s Deputy, Reichsminister Rudolf Hess

    Reichsminister for the Enlightenment of the people and of
    Propaganda, Dr. Joseph Goebbels

    Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellery Dr.
    Hans-Heinrich Lammers

    The Supreme Commander of the Army, General Walther von

    The Supreme Commander of the Navy, Grand Admiral Dr. (honorary)
    Erich Raeder

    The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Lt. Gen.
    Wilhelm Keitel.” (_2031-PS_)

It will be noted that every member of this group was either a
Reichsminister or, as, in the case of the Army, Navy, and OKW heads, had
the rank and authority of a Reich Minister.

(3) _The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich._ On 30
August 1939 Hitler established the Council of Ministers for the Defense
of the Reich (better known as the Ministerial Council). This was the
so-called war cabinet. The decree establishing this Council provided

                               “Article I

    “(1) A Ministerial Council for Reich Defense shall be
    established as a standing committee out of the Reich Defense

    “(2) The standing members of the Ministerial Council for Reich
    Defense shall include: General Field Marshall Goering as
    chairman; Fuehrer’s Deputy [Hess]; Commissioner General (or
    Plenipotentiary) for Reich Administration [Frick]; Commissioner
    General (or Plenipotentiary) for Economy [Funk]; Reich Minister
    and Chief of the Reich Chancellery [Dr. Lammers]; Chief of the
    High Command for the Armed Forces [Keitel].

    “(3) The chairman may draw on other members of the Reich Defense
    Council including further personalities for advice.”

Again, all members of this group were also members of the ordinary

The Reich Defense Council, for secret war planning, was created by the
Cabinet on 4 April 1933 (cf. the unpublished Reich Defense Law of 21 May
1935 (_2261-PS_)). The membership of that Council when first created is
shown by the minutes of the second session of the working committee of
the delegates for Reich Defense, dated 22 May 1933 and signed by Keitel

   “_Composition of the Reich Defense Council_:
 _President_: Reichs Chancellor
 _Deputy_: Reichswehr Minister
 _Permanent Members_:      Minister of the:
                           Foreign Affairs
                           Economic Affairs
                           Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
                           Chief of the Army Command Staff
                           Chief of the Navy Command Staff

    “Depending on the case: The remaining ministers, other
    personalities, e.g., leading industrialists, etc.” (_EC-177_)

All but the Chiefs of the Army and Navy Command Staff were at that time
members of the ordinary cabinet.

The composition of this Reich Defense Council was changed by an
unpublished law on 4 September 1938, which provided as follows

    “* * * (2) The leader and Reich Chancellor is chairman in the
    RVR. His permanent deputy is General Field Marshall Goering. He
    has the right to call conferences of the RVR. Permanent members
    of the RVR are

    “The Reich Minister of Air and Supreme Commander of the Air Force,
    The Supreme Commander of the Army,
    The Supreme Commander of the Navy,
    The Chief of the OKW,
    The Deputy of the Fuehrer,
    The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery,
    The President of the Secret Cabinet Council,
    The Chief Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration,
    The Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics,
    The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs,
    The Reich Minister of the Interior,
    The Reich Finance Minister,
    The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda,
    The President of the Reichsbank Directorate.

    “The other Reich Ministers and the Reich offices directly
    subordinate to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor are consulted if
    necessary. Further personalities can be called as the case
    demands.” (_2194-PS_)

On that date all the members also belonged to the ordinary cabinet, for
by that time the supreme commanders of the Army and Navy had been given
ministerial rank and authorized to participate in cabinet meetings
(_2098-PS_). It is also worth noting that two members of the Reich
Defense Council also appear in the Ministerial Council under the same
title—The Plenipotentiary for Administration, and the Plenipotentiary
for Economy. The former post was held by Frick, while the latter was
first held by Schacht and then by Funk. These facts are verified by
Frick on the Nazi governmental organization chart (_Chart Number 18_).
Many other ministries were subordinated to these two posts for
war-planning aims and purposes. These two officials, together with the
Chief of the OKW, formed a powerful triumvirate known as the “Three-Man
College” (Frick, Funk, and Keitel) which figured prominently in war
plans and preparations.

                 B. _Functions of the Reichsregierung._

The utilization of the ordinary cabinet as a manpower reservoir for
other governmental agencies, the chronological development of the
offshoots of the ordinary cabinet, and the cohesion between all of these
groups, is apparent from the Nazi governmental organization chart
(_Chart Number 18_). The chart shows the following offshoots of the
ordinary cabinet: 1933, the Reich Defense Council; 1935, the Three-Man
College; 1936, the Delegate for the Four Year Plan; 1938, the Secret
Cabinet Council; 1939, The Ministerial Defense Council; and 1944, the
Delegate for Total War Effort (Goebbels). In every case these important
Nazi agencies were staffed with personnel taken from the ordinary

(1) _The Ordinary Cabinet._ The unity, cohesion, and interrelationship
of the sub-divisions of the _Reichsregierung_ was not the result of a
co-mixture of personnel alone. It was also realized by the method in
which it operated. The ordinary cabinet consulted together both by
meetings and through the so-called circulation procedure. Under the
latter procedure, which was chiefly used when meetings were not held,
drafts of laws prepared in individual ministries were distributed to
other cabinet members for approval or disapproval.

The man primarily responsible for the circulation of drafts of laws
under this procedure was Dr. Lammers, the Leader and Chief of the Reich
Chancellery. Lammers has described that procedure in an affidavit

    “* * * I was Leader of the Reich Chancellery (_Leiter der
    Reichskanzlei_) from 30 January 1933 until the end of the war.
    In this capacity I circulated drafts of proposed laws and
    decrees submitted to me by the Minister who had drafted the law
    or decree, to all members of the Reich Cabinet. A period of time
    was allowed for objections, after which the law considered as
    being accepted by the various members of the Cabinet. This
    procedure continued throughout the whole war. It was followed
    also in the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich
    (_Ministerrat fuer die Reichsverteidigung_).” (_2999-PS_)

A memorandum dated 9 August 1943, which bears the facsimile signature of
Frick and is addressed to the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
Chancellery, illustrates how the circulation procedure worked
(_1701-PS_). Attached to the memorandum is a draft of the law in
question and a carbon copy of a letter dated 22 December 1943 from
Rosenberg to the Reich Minister of the Interior, containing his comments
on the draft:

    “To the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, in
    _Berlin W8_.

    “For the information of the other Reich ministers.

    “Subj: Law on the treatment of enemies of the society.

    “In addition to my letter of 19 March, 1942.

    “_Enclosures: 55.—_

    “After the draft of the law on the treatment of enemies of the
    society has been completely rewritten, I am sending the enclosed
    new draft with the consent of the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr.
    Thierack, and ask that the law be approved in a circulatory
    manner. The necessary number of prints is attached.” (_1701-PS_)

(2) _Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich._ The same
procedure was followed in the Council of Ministers when that body was
created. And the decrees of the Council of Ministers were also
circulated to the members of the ordinary Cabinet. A memorandum found in
the files of the Reich Chancellery and addressed to the members of the
Council of Ministers, dated 17 September 1939, and bearing the typed
signature of Dr. Lammers, Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
Chancellery, states (_1141-PS_):

    “Matters submitted to the Council of Ministers for the Reich
    Defense have heretofore been distributed only to the members of
    the Council. I have been requested by some of the
    Reichsministers who are not permanent members of the Council to
    inform them of the drafts of decrees which are being submitted
    to the Council, so as to enable them to check these drafts from
    the point of view of their respective offices. I shall follow
    this request so that all the Reichsministers will in future be
    informed of the drafts of decrees which are to be acted upon by
    the Council for the Reich Defense. I therefore request to add
    forty-five additional copies of the drafts, as well as of the
    letters which usually contain the arguments for the drafts, to
    the folders submitted to the Council.” (_1141-PS_)

Von Stutterheim, who was an official of the Reich Chancellery, comments
on this procedure at page 34 of a pamphlet entitled “_Die

    “* * * It must be noted that the peculiarity in this case is
    that the subjects dealt with by the Cabinet Council—(Council of
    Ministers for the Defense of the Reich), are distributed not
    merely among the members of the Cabinet Council, but also among
    all the members of the Cabinet (_Kabinett_) who are thereby
    given the opportunity of guarding the interests of their spheres
    of office by adding their appropriate standpoints in the Cabinet
    Council legislation, even if they do not participate in making
    the decree.” (_2231-PS_)

For a time the Cabinet consulted together through actual meetings. The
Council of Ministers did likewise, but those members of the Cabinet who
were not already members of the Council also attended the meetings of
the Ministerial Council. And where they did not attend in person, they
were usually represented by the state secretaries of their Ministries.
The minutes of six meetings of the Council of Ministers, on 1, 4, 8, and
19 September 1939, on 16 October 1939, and on 15 November 1939,
demonstrate this procedure. (_2852-PS_)

At the meeting held on 1 September 1939, which was probably the first
meeting since the Council was created on 30 August 1939, the following
were in attendance:

    “Present were the permanent members of the Council of Ministers
    for the Reich Defense: The Chairman and Generalfield Marshall,
    Goering; the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Hess [a line appears through
    the name Hess]; the Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration,
    Dr. Frick; the Plenipotentiary for Economy, Funk; the Reich
    Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers; and
    the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel,
    represented by Major General Thomas.” (_2852-PS_)

These were the regular members of the Council. Also present was the
Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, Darré, and seven State
Secretaries: Koerner, Neumann, Stuckart, Posse, Landfried, Backe, and
Syrup (_2852-PS_). These State Secretaries were from the several
Ministries or other supreme Reich authorities. Koerner was the Deputy of
Goering in the Four-Year Plan; Stuckart was in the Ministry of the
Interior; Landfried was in the Ministry of Economics; Syrup was in the
Ministry of Labor.

The minutes dated 8 September 1939 (_2852-PS_) note that in addition to
all members of the Ministerial Council, the following also were present:

    “The Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture * * * Darré; State
    Minister * * * Popitz;”

Then come the names of nine State Secretaries from the several
Ministries, and then:

    “SS Gruppenfuehrer * * * Heydrich;”

The close integration of the Ministerial Council with the ordinary
Cabinet is seen by the following excerpt from the minutes of the same
date (8 September 1939):

    “The Council of Ministers for the Reich Defense ratified the
    decree for the change of the Labor Service Law which had already
    been passed as law by the Reich Cabinet. (_Reichsgesetzblatt_,
    Part I, page 1744.)”

The minutes of the meeting of 19 September 1939 (_2852-PS_) show the
following Reich Ministers to be present in addition to four members of
the Council:

    “Also: The Reich Minister for Finance, Count Schwerin von

    The Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, Darré.

    The Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr.

    State Minister * * * Dr. Popitz.” (_2852-PS_)

Then come the names of eight State Secretaries. Others present included:

    “SS Gruppenfuehrer * * * Heydrich; General of the Police
    (_Ordnungpolizei_) Daluege.” (_2852-PS_)

The minutes dated 15 November 1939 show the same co-mixture of
Ministers, State Secretaries, and similar functionaries. In addition,
the following were also present:

    “Reichsleiter, Dr. Ley; Reichsleiter, Bouhler; Reichsfuehrer SS,
    Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of Interior,
    Himmler; The Reich Labor Service Leader, Hierl * * * Reich
    Commissioner for Price Control, Wagner * * * as well as experts
    (_Sachbearbeiter_) of the German Labor Front and the Reich Labor
    Service.” (_2852-PS_)

Some of the decrees passed and matters discussed at these meetings of
the Ministerial Council are significant. At the first meeting of 1
September 1939 14 decrees were ratified by the Council. Decree No. 6

    “* * * the organization of the administration and about the
    German safety police in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
    (_RGBl_, I, page 1681).” (_2852-PS_)

At the meeting of the Council on 19 September 1939 the following

    “The Chairman of the Council, Generalfieldmarshall Goering, made
    comments regarding the structure of civil administration in the
    occupied Polish territory. He expressed his intentions regarding
    the economic evacuation measures in this territory. Then the
    questions of decreasing wages and the questions of working hours
    and the support of members of families of inducted workers were

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Chairman directed that all members of the Council regularly
    receive the situation reports of the Reichsfuehrer SS. Then the
    question of the population of the future Polish Protectorate was
    discussed and the placement of Jews living in Germany.”

Finally, at the meeting of 15 November 1939 the discussion concerned,
among other things, the “treatment of Polish Prisoners of War”.

The minutes of these meetings (_2852-PS_) not only establish the close
working union between agencies of the state and the party, especially
the SS, but also tends to establish that the _Reichsregierung_ was
responsible for the policies adopted and put into effect by the

                  C. _Powers of The Reichsregierung._

But mere working alliances would be meaningless unless there was power.
And the _Reichsregierung_ had power. Short of Hitler himself, it had
practically all the power a government can exercise.

(1) _The Ordinary Cabinet._ The Nazi conspirators secured the passage by
the Reichstag of the “Law for the Protection of the People and the
Reich,” of 24 March 1933 (_2001-PS_), which vested the Cabinet with
legislative powers even to the extent of deviating from previously
existing constitutional law. These powers were retained even after the
members of the cabinet were changed, and the several states, provinces,
and municipalities, which had formerly exercised semi-autonomous powers,
were transformed into mere administrative organs of the central
government. The ordinary cabinet emerged all-powerful from this rapid
succession of events. Frick waxed eloquent upon that achievement in an
article which he wrote for the 1935 National Socialist Year Book:

    “The relationship between the Reich and the States has been put
    on an entirely new basis, never known in the history of the
    German people. It gives to the Reich cabinet (_Reichsregierung_)
    unlimited power. It even makes it its duty, to build a
    completely unified leadership and administration of the Reich.
    From now on, there is only one national authority: The one of
    the Reich! Thus, the German Reich has become a unified state,
    and the entire administration in the states is only carried out
    by order or in the name of the Reich. The state borders are now
    only administration, technical are boundaries but no longer
    boundaries of sovereignty! In calm determination, the Reich
    Cabinet (_Reichsregierung_) realizes step by step, supported by
    the confidence of the entire German people, the great longing of
    the Nation. The creation of the national socialist German,
    unified state.” (_2380-PS_)

The heightened legislative power of the Cabinet is also emphasized in an
article written by Dr. Franz Medicus, an official in the Reich Ministry
of the Interior, and published in 1939 in Volume 4 of “_Das Dritte Reich
in Aufbau_”:

    “* * * Worked out by the Reich Minister of the Interior, the
    ‘Law for Alleviation of the Distress of People and Reich’, in
    short called ‘Enabling Law’, was issued on 24 March 1933, broke
    with the liberal principle of ‘division of power’ by
    transferring the legislature from the Reichstag to the Reich
    Cabinet, so that legislation by _personally responsible persons_
    took the place of ‘anonymous’ legislation.” (_2849-PS_)

When the Ministerial Council was formed in 1939, it too was given
legislative powers (cf. Article II of the decree of 30 August 1939
(_2018-PS_)). The ordinary cabinet also continued to legislate
throughout the war. Because of the fusion of personnel between the
Ministerial Council and the ordinary cabinet, questions were bound to
arise as to what forum should lend its name to a particular law. Dr.
Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery and a member of both agencies,
wrote a letter on 14 June 1942 to the Plenipotentiary for Reich
Administration about these questions (_352-PS_):

    “To the Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration
    (_Generalbevollmaechtigter die Reich Verwaltung_)

    “Subject: The Jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers for the
    Defense of the Reich (_Ministerat fuer die Reichsverteidigung_)

    “Your letter of 3 June 1942, No. 493/42/2882.—Recently the
    Fuehrer announced in accord with the opinions of the Reich
    Marshal of the Greater German Reich as shown in my letter of 20
    Feb. 1940-RK. 624-B—that he believes it practical to reserve
    certain legislative missions for the Reich Cabinet. With this he
    has not limited the competency of the Council of Ministers for
    the defense of the Reich but given a directive as to how
    legislation should be handled under the point of view of
    practicability. I have no doubt that the Fuehrer, as well as the
    Reich Marshal, have not changed their point of view, in
    particular, regarding the fact, that at the present there should
    be only legislation important in the cause of war, and that they
    will stress the fact that the Fuehrer himself and the Reich
    Cabinet should not be eliminated from the powers of legislation.
    It will have to be tested from time to time what measures will
    be reserved for the Reich Cabinet. My letter of 20 February
    1940, and the opinions of the Fuehrer therein expressed may
    serve as a directive even if the limitations indicated by me are
    no longer applicable in their full meaning. I would therefore
    suggest not basing the discussions with the Reich Minister of
    Finance on the question of competency of the Reich Cabinet or
    the Council of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich, but on
    the question of whether it would be practical to achieve
    settlement through either Reich law or a Decree from the Council
    of Ministers for the defense of the Reich in the sense of the
    opinions voiced by the Fuehrer.

                                 (signed)  Dr. Lammers” (_352-PS_).

Other officials possessed legislative powers. Hitler was of course one.
Goering, as Deputy of the Four Year Plan, could and did issue decrees
with the effect of law. The Cabinet delegated power to issue laws
deviating from existing law to the Plenipotentiaries of Economy and
Administration and the Chief of the OKW, the so-called Three-Man
College. This was done in the Secret Defense Law of 1938 (_2194-PS_).
These three officials—Frick, Funk, and Keitel—however, were also
members of the Council of Ministers and of the ordinary cabinet as well.
It can therefore be said, in the language of the Indictment, that the
_Reichsregierung_ “possessed * * * legislative * * * powers of a very
high order in the system of the German government.”

The executive and administrative powers of the Reich were concentrated
in the central government primarily as the result of two basic Nazi laws
that reduced the separate states (called _Laender_) to mere geographical
divisions. One was the law of 30 January 1934, known as the Law for the
Reconstruction of the Reich (_2006-PS_). By that law the States were
deprived of their independent status as States, their legislative
assemblies were abolished, and their sovereign powers were transferred
to the Reich. The other was the Reich Governor’s Law, enacted by the
Cabinet on 30 January 1935 (_2008-PS_), which made all Reich Governors
(_Statthalters_) permanent delegates of and subject to the order of the
cabinet and, more especially, of the Reich Minister of the Interior. As
a result, the ordinary cabinet was possessed of wide powers, which are
set forth in “Administration Law,” periodical published in 1944 which
was edited by Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart, State Secretary in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, and Dr. Harry V. Rosen-v. Hoewel, an
_Oberregierungsrat_ in the Reich Ministry of the Interior (_2959-PS_).
The description of the powers and functions of all the ministries of the
ordinary cabinet illustrates the extent of control vested in the

                       III. _The Reich Ministers_

    “There are at present twenty-one Reich Ministers, namely:

    “I. 15 Reich Ministers with a definite portfolio.

    The Ministries of the Reich Ministers mentioned under 2, 6, 7,
    8, 9, 10, 11, 12 are united with the corresponding Ministries of

    “1. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (Foreign Office).

    (_a_) He handles all matters touching on the relations of the
    Reich to foreign countries.

    (_b_) Under him are the diplomatic and consular representatives
    as well as the Reich office for Foreign Trade.

    “2. The Reich Minister of the Interior.

    (_a_) To his portfolio belong general administration, local
    administration, police administration, administration of
    officials, public health, welfare, geodetic system, sport system
    and the Reich Labor Service.

    (_b_) Under him are the general and internal administrations,
    for example, the Reich Governors, the state governments
    (_Landesregierung_) the superior Presidents, the governmental
    Presidents, as well as police officials and the Reich Labor

    Furthermore, there are under him numerous central intermediary
    boards, for example, the Reich Health Office, the Reich
    Archives, the Reich Genealogical Office.

    “3. The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.

    (_a_) To his portfolio belong the intellectual influences on the
    nation, recruiting for the state, culture and economics, and the
    instruction of domestic and foreign public opinion.

    (_b_) Under him are, among other things, the Reich Propaganda
    Offices and the film censorship offices. Furthermore, he
    exercises supervision over the Reich Chamber of Culture, the
    Recruiting Council of German Economics, the Reich Radio Company,
    and the Institute of Politics (_Hochschule fuer Politik_).

    “4. The Reich Minister of Aviation and Supreme Commander of the
    Air Force.

    He administers civil and military aviation.

    “5. The Reich Minister of Finances.

    (_a_) To his portfolio belong the budget and financial system of
    the Reich, as well as the administration of taxes; monopolies,
    and tariffs.

    (_b_) Under him are namely: the administration of taxes and
    tariffs, as well as the administration of Reich monopolies.

    “6. The Reich Minister of Justice.

    (_a_) He is in charge of all matters related to the judicial

    (_b_) Under him are all judicial agencies and the Reich Patent

    “7. The Reich Ministry of Economics.

    (_a_) To his portfolio belong the basic economic political
    questions of German economy, the supply of the civilian
    population with goods for consumption and the regulation of
    their distribution, the handling of foreign economic questions
    in the framework of policy on foreign trade of the Reich and the
    supreme supervision over the institutes of credit.

    (_b_) Under him are the Reich administration of mines, the Reich
    office of Statistics, the Supervisory Office for Private
    Insurance, the Gau Chambers of Economy, the State Economic
    Offices, (_Landeswirtschaftsamt_) the Savings Banks, and the
    State Insurance Offices.

    “8. The Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture.

    (_a_) He is in charge of all farmers and of the agriculture, as
    well as the food administration.

    (_b_) Under him are the State Food Offices
    (_Landesernaechrungsamt_) the State Administration of Large
    Estates (_Domaenen verwaltung_) the Administration of Rural
    Affairs and the Agricultural Credit Offices. Furthermore, he
    exercises state supervision over the Reich Food Supply of which
    he is the leader.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “14. Reich Minister for Armament and War Production.

    He has to bring to a level of highest production all offices
    active in producing arms and munitions. Furthermore, he is
    responsible for the field of raw materials and production in
    industry and manual labor.

    “15. The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

    (_a_) He administers the recently occupied (i.e. former
    Soviet-Russian) Eastern territories, insofar as they are under
    civil administration and not subordinated to the Chief of Civil
    Administration for the district of Bialystok (cf. page 70) or
    insofar as they are incorporated in the General Gouvernment (cf.
    page 100).

    (_b_) Under him are the Reich Commissars, the General
    Commissars, Head Commissars, and District Commissars, in the
    recently occupied Eastern territories.” (_2959-PS_)

Other important powers and functions contained in the ordinary cabinet
were not included in the foregoing list. For example, upon the creation
of the People’s Court on 24 April 1934, it was placed within the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice (_2014-PS_). With the
acquisition and occupation of new territories, the integration and
coordination thereof were placed within the Ministry of the Interior.
The Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick, (in some cases in cooperation
with other Reich Ministers) was, by law, given regulatory powers over
such territories. The territory and the applicable law may be listed as

    (1) The Saar (1935, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 66).

    (2) Austria (1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 237).

    (3) Memel (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 54).

    (4) Bohemia and Moravia (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page

    (5) Sudetenland (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 780).

    (6) Danzig (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1547).

    (7) Incorporated Poland (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page

    (8) Occupied Poland (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page

    (9) Eupen, Malmedy and Moresnet (1940, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part
    I, page 803).

    (10) Norway (1941, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 765).

Such were the powers and functions of the ordinary cabinet.

(2) _The Secret Cabinet Council._ Of the other two subdivisions of the
_Reichsregierung_—the Secret Cabinet Council and the Ministerial
Council—the Secret Cabinet Council had no legislative or administrative
powers. It was created by Hitler on 4 February 1938

    “To advise me in conducting the foreign policy * * *.”

Its position in the Nazi regime is described by Ernst Rudolf Huber, a
leading Nazi Constitutional Lawyer, in his book entitled
“_Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches_” (“Constitutional Law of
the Greater German Reich”). In this book, which was an authoritative,
widely used work on Nazi Constitutional Law, Huber states (_1774-PS_):

    “A privy cabinet council, to advise the Fuehrer in the basic
    problems of foreign policy, has been created by the decree of 4
    February 1938 (_RGBl._ I, 112). This privy cabinet council is
    under the direction of Reich Minister v. Neurath, and includes
    the Foreign Minister, the Air Minister, the Deputy Commander for
    the Fuehrer, the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of the Reich
    Chancellery, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Supreme Command of
    the Armed Forces. The privy cabinet council constitutes a select
    staff of collaborators of the Fuehrer which consists exclusively
    of members of the Government of the Reich; thus, it represents a
    select committee of the Reich Government for the deliberation on
    foreign affairs.” (_1774-PS_)

(3) _The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich._ The powers
concentrated in the Ministerial Council, which did possess legislative
and administrative functions, at its creation in 1939, are best
expressed by the lecture which Frick gave before the University of
Freiburg on 7 March 1940. The lecture, published in a pamphlet entitled
“The Administration in Wartime,” contains these statements (_2608-PS_):

    “* * * The composition of the Ministerial Council for the
    defense of the Reich shows the real concentration of power in
    it. General Field Marshal Goering is the chairman and also the
    Supreme Director of the War Economy and Commissioner for the
    Four Year Plan. He is joined by the Plenipotentiary General for
    the Reich Administration, who directs the entire civilian
    administration with the exception of the economic
    administration, and the Plenipotentiary General for Economy. The
    Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces is the liaison man
    to the Armed Forces. It is primarily his duty to coordinate the
    measures for civilian defense in the area of administration and
    economy with the genuine military measures for the defense of
    the Reich. The Deputy of the Fuehrer represents the Party, thus
    guaranteeing the unity between Party and State also within the
    Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich. The Reich
    Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery is in charge of the
    business management of the Ministerial Council for the Defense
    of the Reich.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, the
    highest legislative and executive organ in wartime next to the
    Fuehrer, created a subordinate organ for the purpose of the
    defense of the Reich: The Commissioners for the Reich Defense,
    who have their headquarters at the seat of the individual corps
    area.” (_2608-PS_)

With such power concentrated in the _Reichsregierung_ and to such a high
degree, the Nazi conspirators possessed a formidable weapon to
effectuate their plans.

             D. _Acts and Decrees of the Reichsregierung._

Under the Nazi regime the _Reichsregierung_ became the instrument of the
Nazi party.

(1) _Execution of the Nazi Party Program._ In the original Cabinet of 30
January 1933 only three cabinet members were members of the
Party—Goering, Frick, and Hitler. As new Ministries were added to the
Cabinet, prominent Nazis were placed at their head. On 30 January, 1937,
Hitler accepted into the Party those Cabinet members who were not
already members. This action is reported in the _Voelkischer
Beobachter_, South German Edition, of 1 February 1937 (_2964-PS_):

    “In view of the anticipated lifting of the ban for party
    membership, the Fuehrer, as the first step in this regard,
    personally carried out the enlistment into the party of the
    members of the Cabinet, who so far had not belonged to it and he
    handed them simultaneously the Gold Party Badge, the supreme
    badge of honor of the party. In addition, the Fuehrer awarded
    the Gold Party Badge to Generaloberst Freiherr von Fritsch;
    Generaladmiral Dr. H. C. Raeder; the Prussian Minister of
    Finance, Professor Popitz; and the Secretary of State and Chief
    of the Presidential Chancellery, Dr. Meissner.

    “The Fuehrer also honored with the gold party badge the party
    members State Secretary Dr. Lammers, State Secretary Funk, State
    Secretary Koerner and State Secretary General of the Airforce
    Milch.” (_2964-PS_)

It was possible to refuse the party membership thus conferred. Only one
man, von Eltz-Ruebenach, who was the Minister of Post and Minister of
Transport at the time, did this. His letter from von Eltz-Ruebenach to
Hitler, dated 30 January 1937, reads as follows (_1534-PS_):

    “My Fuehrer:

    “I thank you for the confidence you have placed in me during the
    four years of your leadership and for the honor you do me in
    offering to admit me to the party. My conscience forbids me
    however to accept this offer. I believe in the principles of
    positive Christianity and must remain faithful to my Lord and to
    myself. Party membership however would mean that I should have
    to face without contradiction the steadily aggravating attacks
    by party offices on the Christian confessions and those who want
    to remain faithful to their religious convictions.

    “This decision has been infinitely difficult for me. For never
    in my life have I performed my duty with greater joy and
    satisfaction than under your wise state leadership.

    “I ask to be permitted to resign.

                                          “With German Greetings:
                                           Yours very obediently,
                             “(signed)  Baron v. Eltz” (_1534-PS_).

But the Nazis did not wait until all members of the cabinet were party
members. Shortly after they came to power, they quickly assured
themselves of active participation in the work of the Cabinet. On 1
December 1933, the Cabinet passed a law securing the unity of party and
state (_1395-PS_). In Article 2 of that law the Deputy of the Fuehrer,
Hess, and the Chief of Staff of the SA, Roehm, were made members of the
Cabinet (_1395-PS_). Lest mere membership in the Cabinet would not be
effective, Hitler endowed his deputy with greater powers of
participation. An unpublished decree signed by Hitler, dated 27 July
1934, and addressed to the Reich Ministers, provides (_D-138_):

    “I decree that the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Reich Minister Hess,
    will have the capacity of a participating Reich Minister in
    connection with the preparation of drafts for laws in all Reich
    Administrative spheres. All legislative work is to be sent to
    him when it is received by the other Reich Minister concerned.
    This also applies in cases where no one else participates except
    the Reich Minister making the draft. Reich Minister Hess will be
    given the opportunity to comment on drafts suggested by experts.

    “This order will apply in the same sense to legislative
    ordinances. The Deputy of the Fuehrer in his capacity of Reich
    Minister can send as representative an expert on his staff.
    These experts are entitled to make statements to the Reich
    Ministers on his behalf.

                               “[signed]  Adolph Hitler” (_D-138_).

Hess himself made pertinent comment on his right of participation on
behalf of the party, in a letter dated 9 October 1934, on the stationery
of the NSDAP, addressed to the Reich Minister for Enlightenment of the
People and Propaganda (_D-139_):

    “By a decree of the Fuehrer dated 27 July 1934, I have been
    granted the right to participate in the legislation of the Reich
    as regards both formal laws and legal ordinances. This right
    must not be rendered illusory by the fact that I am sent the
    drafts of laws and decrees so late and am then given a limited
    time, so that it becomes impossible for me to deal with the
    material concerned during the given time. I must point out that
    my participation means the taking into account of the opinion of
    the NSDAP as such, and that in the case of the majority of
    drafts of laws and decrees, consult with the appropriate
    departments of the Party before making my comment. Only by
    proceeding in this manner can I do justice to the wish of the
    Fuehrer as expressed in the decree of the Fuehrer of 27 July

    “I must therefore ask the Reich Ministers to arrange that drafts
    of laws and decrees reach me in sufficient time. Failing this, I
    would be obliged in future to refuse my agreement to such drafts
    from the beginning and without giving the matter detailed
    attention, in all cases where I am not given a sufficiently long
    period for dealing with them.

                                    “[signed]  R. Hess.” (_D-139_).

A handwritten note attached to the letter reads:

    “1. The identical letter seems to have been addressed to all
    Reich Ministers. In our special field the decree of 27 July 1934
    has hardly become applicable so far. A reply does not seem
    called for.

    “2. File in file 7B (?)

                                         “[signed]  “R”  (_D-139_).

The participating powers of Hess were later broadened, according to a
letter dated 12 April 1938 from Doctor Lammers to the Reich Ministers

    “* * * The Deputy of the Fuehrer will also have participation
    where the Reich Ministers give their agreement to the State Laws
    and legislative ordinances of States under paragraph 3 of the
    first decree concerning reconstruction of the Reich of Feb 2nd
    1934 (Reich Law Gazette I 81). Where the Reich Ministers have
    already, at an earlier date been engaged in the preparation of
    such laws or legislative ordinances, or have participated in
    such preparation, the Deputy of the Fuehrer likewise becomes
    participating Reich Minister. Laws and legislative decrees of
    the Austrian State are equally affected hereby.

                                “[signed]  Dr. LAMMERS”  (_D-140_).

After Hess’ flight to England, Bormann, as Leader of the Party
Chancellery, took over the same functions. He was given the authority of
a Reich Minister and made a member of the cabinet. (_2099-PS_)

The Nazi constitutional lawyer, Ernst Rudolf Huber, has this to say
about the unity of party and Cabinet (_1774-PS_):

    “Unity of party and Reich-Cabinet (_Reichsregierung_) is
    furthermore secured by the numerous personal unions i.e.
    association of Central State Offices with corresponding party
    offices. Such personal unions exist in the cases of Food
    Minister and the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of the German
    Police and the Reich Labor Leader, the Chief of the Organization
    in foreign countries, and the Reich Youth Fuehrer. Furthermore,
    the majority of the Reich Ministries is occupied by leading old
    party members. Finally, all Reich Ministers have been accepted
    by the party on 30 January 1937 and have been decorated with
    golden party insignia.” (_1774-PS_)

In 1943, out of 16 Reich Leaders (_Reichsleiters_) of the NSDAP, eight
were members of the Cabinet: Martin Bormann; Walter Darré; Otto
Dietrich; Wilhelm Frick; Paul Josef Goebbels; Constantin Hierl; Heinrich
Himmler; Alfred Rosenberg (_2473-PS_). Through its domination of the
Cabinet the Nazi Party strove to secure the fulfilment of its program
under a facade of legality.

(_a_) _Decrees of the Ordinary Cabinet._ To the Nazi Cabinet, the Nazi
Party program of 25 points (_1708-PS_) was more than a mere political
platform; it was a mandate for action. And the Cabinet acted.

Point 1 of this program declared:

    “We demand the inclusion of all Germans in a greater Germany on
    the grounds of the right of self-determination.” (_1708-PS_)

In implication of this demand the Nazi Cabinet enacted, among others,
the following laws: the law of 3 February 1938 concerning the obligation
of German citizens in foreign countries to register (1938
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 113); the law of 13 March 1938 for the
reunion of Austria with Germany (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
237) (_2307-PS_); the law of November 1938 for the reintegration of the
German Sudetenland with Germany (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
1641); the law of 23 March 1939 for the reintegration of Memel in
Germany (1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 559).

Point 2 of the Party platform stated in part:

    “We demand * * * the cancellation of the treaties of Versailles
    and St. Germain.” (_1708-PS_)

The following acts of the Cabinet supported this part of the program:
The proclamation of 14 October 1933 to the German people concerning
Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament
Conference (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 730); the
proclamation and law of 16 March 1935, for the establishment of the
_Wehrmacht_ and compulsory military service (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, pages 369, 375) (_1654-PS_); and the defense law of 21 May 1935
implementing the last-named law (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page

Point 4 of the Party platform read as follows:

    “Only those who are members of the ‘Volk’ can be citizens. Only
    those who are of German blood, without regard to religion, can
    be members of the ‘Volk’. No Jew, therefore, can be a member of
    the ‘Volk’.” (_1708-PS_)

Among the cabinet laws which implemented this point were these: the law
of 14 July 1933 for the recall of naturalization and the deprivation of
citizenship (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 480); the law of 7
April 1933 permitting persons of non-Aryan descent to be refused
permission to practice law (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 188)
(_1401-PS_); the law of 25 April 1933 restricting the number of
non-Aryans in schools and higher institutions (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 225) (_2022-PS_); the law of 29 September 1933 excluding
persons of Jewish blood from the peasantry (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 685) (_1402-PS_); the law of 26 June 1936, forbidding
people of Jewish blood to hold positions of authority in the army (1936
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 518) (_1398-PS_); the law of 19 March
1937 excluding Jews from the Reich Labor Service (1937
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 325); the law of 28 March 1938 on the
legal status of Jewish religious communities (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 338); and the law of 6 July 1938 prohibiting Jews from
participating in six different types of business (1938
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 823).

Point 23 of the platform proclaimed:

    “We demand legislative action against conscious political lies
    and their broadcasting through the press.” (_1708-PS_)

To carry out this point numerous Cabinet laws were passed, of which the
following are merely examples: the law of 22 September 1933 for the
establishment of the Reich Culture Chamber (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 661) (_2082-PS_); the law of 4 October, 1933 regarding
editors (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 713) (_2083-PS_); and
the law of 15 May 1934 regarding the theater (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 411).

All the laws referred to above and hereafter were enacted specifically
in the name of the Cabinet (_Reichsregierung_). A typical introductory
paragraph reads:

    “The Reich Cabinet (_die Reichsregierung_) has enacted the
    following law which is hereby promulgated. * * *” [Law of 1
    August 1934, 1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 747].

In furtherance of the Nazi plans to acquire totalitarian control of
Germany (cf. Section 1-2 of Chapter VII), the Cabinet passed the
following laws: Law of 26 May 1933, providing for the confiscation of
Communist property (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 293)
(_1396-PS_); Law of 14 July 1933 against the new establishment of
parties (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 479); Law of 14 July
1933 providing for the confiscation of property of Social Democrats and
others (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 479) (_1388-PS_); and Law
of 1 December 1933 securing the unity of party and state (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1016). (_1395-PS_)

In the course of consolidating Nazi control of Germany, (cf. Section 3
of Chapter VII) the following laws were enacted by the Cabinet: Decree
of the Cabinet, 21 March 1933, creating special courts (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 136) (_2076-PS_); Law of 31 March 1933
for the integration of States into the Reich (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 153) (_2004-PS_); Law of 7 April 1933 for the
reestablishment of the Professional Civil Service (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 175) (_1397-PS_); Law of 7 April 1933
for the integration of states into the Reich (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 173) (_2005-PS_); Law of 30 June 1933 eliminating non-Aryan
civil servants or civil servants married to non-Aryans (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 433) (_1400-PS_); Law of 20 July 1933
providing for the discharge of Communist officials (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 518) (_1398-PS_); Law of 24 April 1934
creating the People’s Court (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 341)
(_2014-PS_); Law of 1 August 1934 uniting the office of President and
Chancellor (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 747) (_2003-PS_); Law
of 30 January 1935, Reich Governors Law, further reducing the
independence of the states (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 65);
Law of 30 January 1935 providing for the abolition of representatives or
deliberative bodies in the municipalities (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 49) (_2008-PS_); Law of 26 January 1937, the comprehensive
civil service law (1937 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 39); and Law
of 18 March 1938 providing for the submission of one list of candidates
to the electorate for the entire Reich (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part
I, page 258). (_2355-PS_)

Nazi extermination of political internal resistance in Germany, through
the purge of political opponents and through acts of terror, (cf.
Section 4 of Chapter VII), was facilitated and legalized by the
following Cabinet laws: Law of 14 July 1933 against the new
establishment of parties (containing a penal clause) (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 479) (_1388-PS_); Law of 3 July 1934
concerning measures for emergency defense of the State (legalizing the
Roehm purge) (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 529) (_2057-PS_);
Law of 20 December 1934 on treacherous acts against state and party and
for the protection of party uniforms (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I,
page 1269) (_1393-PS_); Law of 24 April 1934 making the creation of new
or continuance of existing parties an act of treason (1934
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 341) (_2014-PS_); Law of 28 June 1935
changing the Penal Code permitting punishment under analogous law (1935
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 839) (_1962-PS_); Law of 16 September
1939 permitting second prosecution of an acquitted person before a
special court, the members of which were named by Hitler (1939
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1841). (_2550-PS_)

The destruction of the free trade unions in Germany, (cf. Section 5 of
Chapter VII), was made possible by the following Cabinet laws: Law of 4
April 1933 concerning factory representative councils and economic
organizations (controlling employee representation) (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 161) (_1770-PS_); Law of 19 May 1933
concerning Trustees of Labor (abolishing collective bargaining) (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 285) (_405-PS_); Law of 20 January
1934 regulating National Labor (introducing leadership principle into
industrial relations (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 45)
(_1861-PS_); and Law of 26 June 1935 establishing Reich Labor Service
(compulsory labor service) (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 769).

Even the anti-Jewish Nurnberg laws of 15 September 1935, although
technically passed by the Reichstag, were nevertheless worked out by the
Ministry of the Interior. Dr. Franz A. Medicus, who served as
_Ministerialdirigent_ in the Ministry of the Interior, made this
statement in a book published in 1940 (_2960-PS_):

    “* * * The work of the Reich Ministry of Interior forms the
    basis for the three Nurnberg Laws passed by a resolution of the
    Reichstag on the occasion of the Reich party meeting of Freedom.

    “The ‘Reich Citizenship Law’ as well as the ‘Law for the
    protection of German blood and German honor’ (Blood Protection
    Law) opened extensive tasks for the Ministry of Interior not
    only in the field of administration. The same applies to the
    ‘Reich Flag Law’ that gives the foundation for the complete
    re-organization of the use of the flag * * *” (_2960-PS_).

(_b_) _Decrees of The Council of Ministers._ Decrees of the Council of
Ministers similarly supplied the “legal” basis for other criminal
actions of the Nazi conspirators. Among these laws are the following:
Decree of 5 August 1940 imposing a discriminatory tax on Polish workers
in Germany (1940 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1077); Decree of 4
December 1941 regarding penal measures against Jews and Poles in the
occupied Eastern Territories (1941 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
759) (_2746-PS_); and Decree of 30 June 1942 concerning the employment
of Eastern Workers (1942 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 419).

Almost immediately upon Hitler’s coming to power, the Cabinet
participated in the Nazi conspiracy to wage aggressive war. This fact
appears clearly from the minutes of the second session of the working
committee of the Delegates for Reich Defense, dated 22 May 1933 and
signed by Keitel (_EC-177_); from a letter dated 24 June 1935 and signed
by von Blomberg, the Reichs Minister of War, which transmits a copy of
the secret, unpublished Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and also a copy
of the decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 in the Council for
the Defense of the Reich (_2261-PS_); and from a letter dated 5
September 1939 transmitting a copy of the secret, unpublished Reich
Defense Law of 4 September 1938 (a note dated 4 September 1938 attached
to this law states that the Reich Defense law of 21 May 1935 and the
decisions of the Cabinet previously mentioned are repeated) (_2194-PS_).
These three documents, important in the conspiracy to wage aggressive
war emphasize the participation of the Reich Cabinet and Reich
Ministers, through legislative enactments, in the conspiracy.

The Reich Defense Council was a creation of the Cabinet. On 4 April 1933
the Cabinet decided to form that agency (_2261-PS_). The circumstances
of its creation were discussed at the meeting of 22 May 1933 (_EC-177_):

    “_Thoughts about a Reich Defense Council_

    “All great European powers which are at freedom to arm, have a
    RVR. One does not have to refer to history to prove the
    necessity of this institution. The war has shown conclusively
    that the cooperation with the various ministries has not been
    close enough. The consequences did not fail to materialize. The
    soldier is not in a position to have a say in all matters. The
    disadvantages of the past system were caused by parallel efforts
    of the various ministries in matters of the Reich defense. To
    avoid these mistakes a _central agency_ has been created which
    occupies itself already in peacetime in the widest sense with
    the problems of Reich Defense. This working staff will continue
    its existence in time of war.

    “In accordance with the cabinet decision of the 4 April 1933 the
    Reich Defense Council, which until now had been prepared for war
    emergency, will go into immediate action.

    “In time of peace its task will be to decide about all measures
    for the preparation of the defense of the Reich, while surveying
    and utilizing all powers and means of the nation.” (_EC-177_)

The composition of the Reich Defense Council is thereupon set out.
Hitler was President; the Minister of Defense was his deputy; and he,
plus six more ministers (there were only ten at that time) and the
Chiefs of the Army and Navy Command Staffs were permanent members. The
remaining ministers, as well as “leading industrialists”, were subject
to call. Of the defendants who were then members of the Council, there
was von Neurath as Foreign Affairs Minister; Frick as Interior Minister,
Goering as Air Minister; and Raeder as Chief of the Navy Command Staff.

The presence of Cabinet ministers was indispensable. The cabinet by that
time could legislate for the Reich. It had a definite role to play in
this planning, as Keitel pointed out (_EC-177_):

    “_Col. Keitel_:—Points out once more the urgency of the tasks,
    since it had been possible to do only very little in this
    connection during the last years. He asks the delegates to
    consider the Reich Defense at all times and represent it
    accordingly at the drafting of new laws. Experiences of the wars
    are available and are at the disposal of the various ministries;
    (e.g. Reich Archives, Memorandum of an administrative official
    about gasoline supply). All these sources must be taken
    advantage of for the future. The task of the full time delegates
    is also to bring about a close cooperation of the ministries
    with each other.” (_EC-177_)

Each separate ministry, moreover, was scheduled for a definite task.

    “* * * In the work plans the questions and ideas are laid down,
    which have come up in the _Reichswehr_ Ministry and must be
    considered in case of mobilization. Up to the present time the
    support on the part of other Ministries was frequently based
    only on personal helpfulness since any authority from above was
    lacking. The following work plans are finished.

    “_a._ Work Plan for the Reich Ministry of Economics.
    Work Plan for the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
    Work Plan for the Reich Ministry of Labor.

    “These three are composed in one work plan for the preparation
    of a war economy.

    “_b._ Work Plan for the Reich Postal Ministry.

    “_c._ Work Plan for the Reich Traffic Ministry.

    “Request the plans to be worked through carefully by the
    competent Ministries. The plans will be discussed beginning of
    June, when proposals for improvements may be made. The other
    Ministries which have no work plans yet will receive them later
    on. The Office of Air Raid Protection will work out a work plan
    in conjunction with the Reich Commissariat for Aviation.”

The secrecy of all undertakings was stressed:

                       “_Security and Secrecy._”

    “Question has been brought up by the Reich Ministries.

    “The secrecy of all Reich Defense work has to be maintained very
    carefully. Communications with the outside by _messenger
    service_ only, has been settled already with the Post Office,
    Finance Ministry, Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the
    Reichswehr Ministry. _Main Principle of security_: No document
    must be lost since, otherwise, the enemy propaganda would make
    use of it. Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they
    can be denied by us in Geneva. Therefore, the _Reichswehr_
    Ministry has worked out security directives for the Reich
    Ministries and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior.”

As time went on and greater concentration of power was needed, the
Cabinet made changes and additions to this secret war planning body.
Article 6 of the Secret Defense Law of 1935 (_2261-PS_) provided:

    “(1) The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will appoint a
    plenipotentiary-general for war economy to direct the entire war

    “(2) It is the task of the plenipotentiary-general for war
    economy to put all economic forces in the service of carrying on
    the war and to secure the life of the German people

    “(3) Subordinate to him are:

    The Reichsminister for Economy.
    The Reichsminister for Food and Agriculture.
    The Reichs Labor Minister.

    The Reichs Forest Master, and all Reichs’ agencies immediately
    subordinate to the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor. Furthermore the
    financing of the war effort (in the province of the Reichs
    Finance Ministry and of the Reichsbank) will be carried on under
    his responsibility.

    “(4) The Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy is authorized,
    within his realm of responsibility to issue legal regulations,
    which may deviate from the existing laws.” (_2261-PS_)

Schacht was named as Plenipotentiary for War Economy. It will be noted
that the Reich Ministers for Food and Agriculture and for Labor, and the
Reichs Forest Master (who by this time had Cabinet rank) had not been
included in the original membership of the Reichs Defense Council. Darré
was Minister for Food and Agriculture, Seldte for Labor, and Goering was
Reich Forest Master.

On the same day the Law was passed, the Cabinet made these decisions
covering the newly-created Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy

    “1. The Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy appointed by the
    Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will begin his work already in
    peacetime * * *.

    “2. The Reichsminister of War and the Plenipotentiary for War
    Economy will effect the preparations for mobilization in closest
    cooperation on both sides.

    “3. The Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy will be a
    permanent member of the Reich Defense Council
    (_Reichsverteidigungsrat_). Within the working committee he
    represents through his leadership staff the interests of war
    economy.” (_EC-177_)

The complete reorganization of this Reich Defense Council took place in
1938, under the Secret Defense Law of 4th September of that year. By
that time, there had been a reorganization of the Armed Forces: the
chief of the OKW had been created and the War Ministry had been
abolished (_2194-PS_). The Reich Defense Council in 1938 was composed of
Goering, as permanent deputy and Minister of Air and Supreme Commander
of the Air Force; Raeder as Supreme Commander of the Navy; Hess as
Deputy of the Fuehrer; von Neurath as President of the Secret Cabinet
Council; Frick as Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration; Keitel
as Chief of the OKW; Funk as Plenipotentiary for Economics; Ribbentrop
as Minister of Foreign Affairs; Schacht as President of the Reichsbank
directorate (_2261-PS_). An important part of the Reich Defense Council
was the Working Committee. The minutes of the twelfth meeting of the
Reich Defense Working Committee, on 14 May 1936, read (_EC-407_):

    “1. _The National Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the
    Armed Forces_, General Field Marshal von Blomberg, opened the
    12th meeting of the Reichs Defense Committee by expressing
    thanks for the work accomplished and pointing out in principle
    the necessity of a preparation for a total mobilization with
    emphasis on the most important measures to be taken at this
    time. (Among others; mobilization schedule, legal basis,
    preparations in the demilitarized zone.) He further indicates
    the assignment of the national resources (_Reichsressort_) to
    finance its measures for preparation of the Reichs defense out
    of its budget.

    “2. The _chairman_ of the _Reichs Defense_ Committee, Lieutenant
    General Keitel, states:

    “In today’s and future meetings of the Reichs Defense Committee
    a cross section of the general situation concerning all matters
    of the national defense is presented. The picture of the
    situation does not appear in the reports of the meetings.

    “The open discussion of State secrets before our large committee
    gives the special obligation to the chairman of the Reichs
    Defense Committee of pointing out its _secrecy_.

    “Today’s sessions takes place under the auspices of the
    restoration of the State authority in the demilitarized zone.

    “The difficulties of the economic situation, which are presented
    today, must be mastered.” (_EC-407_)

This Working Committee was still functioning in 1939. The Mobilization
Book for Civil Administration of 1939 states, in part (_1639-A-PS_):

    “D. _Terms for Mobilization Preparations by the Civil

    “The acceptance of all new measures in the Mobilization Book for
    Civil Administration must be requested from the Chief of the
    Reich Defense Committee (Department of State Defense in the
    Armed Forces High Command).” (_1639-A-PS_)

The composition of the Working Committee was redefined by the Secret Law
of 1938 as follows (_2194-PS_):

    “_The Reich Defense Committee_ [_Reichsverteidigungsausschuss_]

    “(1) The Reich Defense Committee is the working Committee of the
    RVR. It prepares the decisions of the RVR, sees to their
    execution, and secures collaboration between armed forces, chief
    Reich offices, and party.

    “(2) Presiding is the chief of the OKW. He regulates the
    activity of the committee and gives the directions to the GBV
    and GBW and to the Reich ministries not subordinated to them and
    to the chief Reich offices according to the decisions of the
    RVR, which directions are necessary for securing their uniform

    “(3) The RVA is composed of the OKW, deputy of the commissioner
    for the four year plan, the leader staffs of the GBV and GBW,
    and the Reich Defense officials.

    “(4) Chief office officials for the Reich defense
    (_RV-Referenten_) and their deputies are commissioned by the
    deputy of the leader, by the Reich Chancellery, by each Reich
    Ministry, by the Reich Leader of the SS and chief of the German
    police, by the Reich work leaders, by the Reich Forest Master,
    by the Chief Inspector for the German Road Net, by the Reich
    Office for Regional Order, by the Reichsbank directorate, and in
    the Prussian state ministry. RV-Referent and his deputy are
    immediately subordinate to the minister or the state secretary,
    and to the chief of the Reich office, resp.” (_2194-PS_)

The GBV and the GBW mentioned in the portion quoted above are,
respectively, the Plenipotentiaries for Administration and for Economy.
Under them were grouped other ministries, some of which were already
permanent members of the Council. By paragraph 3 of the Secret Law the
following were made subordinate to the Plenipotentiary for
Administration: the Ministers of the Interior, Justice, Science and
Education, Churches; the Reich Authority for Spatial Planning; and, for
limited purposes, the Minister of Finance. Subordinate to and under the
direction of the Plenipotentiary for Economy (a position formerly held
by Schacht under the title “War Economy” and later held by Funk) were
the ministers of Economics, Food, Agriculture, Labor, and for limited
purposes, the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank; the Reich
Forest Master; and the Commissioner for Price Control from the 4-Year

Paragraph 5 of the law (_2194-PS_) shows that subordinated to the Chief
of the OKW were the Reich Postal Minister, the Reich Transportation
Minister, and the General Inspector for German Highways.

This concentration of power by the Cabinet was for one purpose only: to
plan secretly with the strongest means at hand for the waging of
aggressive war. Further evidence of this objective is contained in an
affidavit by Frick covering the place, activities, and scope of the
Reich Defense Council, including the Three-Man College (_2986-PS_):

    “I, Wilhelm Frick, being first duly sworn, depose and say:

    “I was Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration
    (_Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer die Reichsverwaltung_) from the
    time when this office was created, until 20 August 1943.
    Heinrich Himmler was my deputy in this capacity. Before the
    outbreak of the war my task as Plenipotentiary for Reich
    Administration was the preparation of organization in the event
    of war, such as, for instance, the appointment of liaison men in
    the different ministries who would keep in touch with me. As
    Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration, I, together with the
    Plenipotentiary for Economy and OKW formed what was called a
    ‘3-Man College’ (_Dreierkollegium_). We also were members of the
    Reich defense Council (_Reichsverteidigungsrat_), which was
    supposed to plan preparations and decrees in case of war which
    later on were published by the Ministerial Council for the
    Defense of the Reich. Since, as soon as the war started,
    everything had to be done speedily and there would have been no
    time for planning, such measures and decrees were prepared in
    advance in case of war. All one then still had to do was to pull
    out of the drawer the war orders that had been prepared. Later
    on, after the outbreak of the war, these decrees were enacted by
    the Ministerial Council for the defense of the Reich.

                    “(_Signed_)  _Dr. Wilhelm Frick_”  (_2986-PS_).

                 *        *        *        *        *


                  │                                      │      │
     Document     │             Description              │ Vol. │  Page
                  │                                      │      │
                  │Charter of the International Military │      │
                  │  Tribunal, Article 9.                │  I   │       6
                  │International Military Tribunal,      │      │
                  │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│      │
                  │  Appendix B.                         │  I   │  29, 68
                  │                 ————                 │      │
                  │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a  │      │
                  │document indicates that the document  │      │
                  │was received in evidence at the       │      │
                  │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│      │
                  │before a document number indicates    │      │
                  │that the document was referred to     │      │
                  │during the trial but was not formally │      │
                  │received in evidence, for the reason  │      │
                  │given in parentheses following the    │      │
                  │description of the document. The USA  │      │
                  │series number, given in parentheses   │      │
                  │following the description of the      │      │
                  │document, is the official exhibit     │      │
                  │number assigned by the court.         │      │
                  │                 ————                 │      │
   351-PS         │Minutes of First Meeting of Cabinet of│      │
                  │Hitler, 30 January 1933. (USA 389)    │ III  │     270
                  │                                      │      │
  *352-PS         │Letter from Dr. Lammers to the        │      │
                  │Plenipotentiary of Administration, 14 │      │
                  │June 1942, concerning the jurisdiction│      │
                  │of the Council of Ministers for the   │      │
                  │Defense of the Reich. (USA 398)       │ III  │     276
                  │                                      │      │
   405-PS         │Law Concerning Trustees of Labor, 19  │      │
                  │May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│      │
                  │I, p. 285.                            │ III  │     387
                  │                                      │      │
 *1141-PS         │Letter from Dr. Lammers to Members of │      │
                  │the Council of Ministers for Defense  │      │
                  │of the Reich, 17 September 1939. (USA │      │
                  │393)                                  │ III  │     805
                  │                                      │      │
  1388-PS         │Law concerning confiscation of        │      │
                  │Property subversive to People and     │      │
                  │State, 14 July 1933. 1933             │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479.    │ III  │     962
                  │                                      │      │
  1389-PS         │Law creating Reich Labor Service, 26  │      │
                  │June 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt,    │      │
                  │Part I, p. 769.                       │ III  │     963
                  │                                      │      │
  1393-PS         │Law on treacherous attacks against    │      │
                  │State and Party, and for the          │      │
                  │Protection of Party Uniforms, 20      │      │
                  │December 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│      │
                  │Part I, p. 1269.                      │ III  │     973
                  │                                      │      │
  1395-PS         │Law to insure the unity of Party and  │      │
                  │State, 1 December 1933. 1933          │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016.   │      │
                  │(GB 252)                              │ III  │     978
                  │                                      │      │
  1396-PS         │Law concerning the confiscation of    │      │
                  │Communist property, 26 May 1933. 1933 │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 293.    │ III  │     979
                  │                                      │      │
  1397-PS         │Law for the reestablishment of the    │      │
                  │Professional Civil Service, 7 April   │      │
                  │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 175.                               │ III  │     981
                  │                                      │      │
  1398-PS         │Law to supplement the Law for the     │      │
                  │restoration of the Professional Civil │      │
                  │Service, 20 July 1933. 1933           │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 518.    │ III  │     986
                  │                                      │      │
  1400-PS         │Law changing the regulations in regard│      │
                  │to public officer, 30 June 1933. 1933 │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 433.    │ III  │     987
                  │                                      │      │
  1401-PS         │Law regarding admission to the Bar, 7 │      │
                  │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,   │      │
                  │Part I, p. 188.                       │ III  │     989
                  │                                      │      │
  1402-PS         │The Homestead Law of 29 September     │      │
                  │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 685.                               │ III  │     990
                  │                                      │      │
 *1534-PS         │Eltz letter of resignation, 30 January│      │
                  │1937. (USA 402)                       │  IV  │      95
                  │                                      │      │
 *1639-A-PS       │Mobilization book for the Civil       │      │
                  │Administration, 1939 Edition, issued  │      │
                  │over signature of Keitel. (USA 777)   │  IV  │     143
                  │                                      │      │
**1654-PS         │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing    │      │
                  │universal military conscription. 1935 │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369.    │      │
                  │(Referred to but not offered in       │      │
                  │evidence.)                            │  IV  │     163
                  │                                      │      │
 *1701-PS         │Memorandum from Frick to the Reich    │      │
                  │Minister and Chief of the Reich       │      │
                  │Chancellery, 9 August 1943, enclosing │      │
                  │draft law and memorandum of comment   │      │
                  │thereon by Rosenberg, 22 December     │      │
                  │1943. (USA 392)                       │  IV  │     203
                  │                                      │      │
  1708-PS         │The Program of the NSDAP. National    │      │
                  │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153.   │      │
                  │(USA 255; USA 324)                    │  IV  │     208
                  │                                      │      │
  1770-PS         │Law concerning factory representative │      │
                  │councils and economic organizations, 4│      │
                  │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,   │      │
                  │Part I, p. 161.                       │  IV  │     343
                  │                                      │      │
 *1774-PS         │Extracts from Organizational Law of   │      │
                  │the Greater German Reich by Ernst     │      │
                  │Rudolf Huber. (GB 246)                │  IV  │     349
                  │                                      │      │
  1861-PS         │Law on the regulation of National     │      │
                  │labor, 20 January 1934. 1934          │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 45.     │  IV  │     497
                  │                                      │      │
  1862-PS         │Ordinance for execution of Four Year  │      │
                  │Plan, 18 October 1936. 1936           │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 887.    │  IV  │     499
                  │                                      │      │
  1915-PS         │Decree concerning leadership of Armed │      │
                  │Forces, 4 February 1938. 1938         │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111.    │  IV  │     552
                  │                                      │      │
  1942-PS         │Hess’ participation in legislative    │      │
                  │process, published in Legal           │      │
                  │Regulations and Legal Problems of the │      │
                  │Movement, by Dr. O. Gauweiler, p. 20. │  IV  │     584
                  │                                      │      │
  1962-PS         │Law to change the Penal Code of 28    │      │
                  │June 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt,    │      │
                  │Part I, p. 839.                       │  IV  │     600
                  │                                      │      │
 *1997-PS         │Decree of the Fuehrer, 17 July 1941,  │      │
                  │concerning administration of Newly    │      │
                  │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA    │      │
                  │319)                                  │  IV  │     634
                  │                                      │      │
  2001-PS         │Law to remove the Distress of People  │      │
                  │and State, 24 March 1933. 1933        │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141.    │  IV  │     638
                  │                                      │      │
  2003-PS         │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of  │      │
                  │the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747.    │  IV  │     639
                  │                                      │      │
  2004-PS         │Preliminary law for the coordination  │      │
                  │of Federal States under the Reich, 31 │      │
                  │March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,   │      │
                  │Part I, p. 153.                       │  IV  │     640
                  │                                      │      │
  2005-PS         │Second law integrating the “Laender”  │      │
                  │with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933    │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173.    │  IV  │     641
                  │                                      │      │
  2006-PS         │Law for the reconstruction of the     │      │
                  │Reich, 30 January 1934. 1934          │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 75.     │  IV  │     642
                  │                                      │      │
  2008-PS         │German Communal Ordinance, 30 January │      │
                  │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 49.                                │  IV  │     643
                  │                                      │      │
  2014-PS         │Law amending regulations of criminal  │      │
                  │law and criminal procedure, 24 April  │      │
                  │1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 341.                               │  IV  │     648
                  │                                      │      │
 *2018-PS         │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a       │      │
                  │Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│      │
                  │30 August 1939. 1939                  │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539.   │      │
                  │(GB 250)                              │  IV  │     650
                  │                                      │      │
  2022-PS         │Law against overcrowding of German    │      │
                  │schools and Higher Institutions, 25   │      │
                  │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,   │      │
                  │Part I, p. 225.                       │  IV  │     651
                  │                                      │      │
  2029-PS         │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry│      │
                  │of Public Enlightenment and           │      │
                  │Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933       │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104.    │  IV  │     652
                  │                                      │      │
  2030-PS         │Decree concerning the Duties of the   │      │
                  │Reich Ministry for Public             │      │
                  │Enlightenment and Propaganda, 30 June │      │
                  │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 449.                               │  IV  │     653
                  │                                      │      │
  2031-PS         │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet  │      │
                  │Council, 4 February 1938. 1938        │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB│      │
                  │217)                                  │  IV  │     654
                  │                                      │      │
  2039-PS         │Decree concerning the conditions of   │      │
                  │employment of Eastern workers, 30 June│      │
                  │1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 419.                               │  IV  │     655
                  │                                      │      │
  2047-PS         │Law for the extension of the law      │      │
                  │concerning the removal of the distress│      │
                  │of People and Reich, 30 January 1937. │      │
                  │1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.    │      │
                  │105.                                  │  IV  │     660
                  │                                      │      │
  2048-PS         │Law for the extension of the law      │      │
                  │concerning the removal of the distress│      │
                  │of People and Reich, 30 January 1939. │      │
                  │1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 95.│  IV  │     660
                  │                                      │      │
  2057-PS         │Law relating to National Emergency    │      │
                  │Defense Measures of 3 July 1934. 1934 │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 529.    │  IV  │     699
                  │                                      │      │
  2073-PS         │Decree concerning the appointment of a│      │
                  │Chief of German Police in the Ministry│      │
                  │of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936   │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487.    │  IV  │     703
                  │                                      │      │
  2075-PS         │Decree for appointment of a chief of  │      │
                  │organization of Germans abroad within │      │
                  │the Foreign Office, 30 January 1937.  │      │
                  │1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.    │      │
                  │187.                                  │  IV  │     704
                  │                                      │      │
  2076-PS         │Decree of the Government concerning   │      │
                  │formation of Special Courts, 21 March │      │
                  │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │pp. 136-137.                          │  IV  │     705
                  │                                      │      │
  2078-PS         │Decree concerning establishment of    │      │
                  │Ministry for Science, Education and   │      │
                  │Popular Culture, 1 May 1934. 1934     │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 365.    │  IV  │     706
                  │                                      │      │
  2082-PS         │Law relating to the Reich Chamber of  │      │
                  │Culture of 22 September 1933. 1933    │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 661.    │  IV  │     708
                  │                                      │      │
  2083-PS         │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933.│      │
                  │1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.    │      │
                  │713.                                  │  IV  │     709
                  │                                      │      │
  2089-PS         │Decree relating to Reich Air Ministry,│      │
                  │5 May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,   │      │
                  │Part I, p. 241.                       │  IV  │     719
                  │                                      │      │
  2090-PS         │Decree relating to coordination of    │      │
                  │Jurisdiction of Reich and Prussia in  │      │
                  │relation to church affairs, 16 July   │      │
                  │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 1029.                              │  IV  │     720
                  │                                      │      │
  2091-PS         │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich       │      │
                  │Chancellor appointing a Reich Minister│      │
                  │for Armaments and Munitions, 17 April │      │
                  │1940. 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 513.                               │  IV  │     720
                  │                                      │      │
  2092-PS         │Decree of the Fuehrer for             │      │
                  │concentration of war economy, 2       │      │
                  │September 1943. 1943                  │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 529.    │  IV  │     721
                  │                                      │      │
  2093-PS         │First Executive Order relating to     │      │
                  │transfer of forestry and hunting      │      │
                  │matters to the Reich, 12 July 1934.   │      │
                  │1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.    │      │
                  │617.                                  │  IV  │     723
                  │                                      │      │
  2094-PS         │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│      │
                  │concerning Reich Labor Leader in Reich│      │
                  │Ministry ofInterior, 30 January 1937. │      │
                  │1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 95.│  IV  │     723
                  │                                      │      │
  2095-PS         │Decree of Fuehrer on Establishment of │      │
                  │Supreme Reich Authority—“The Reich    │      │
                  │Labor Leader”, 20 August 1943. 1943   │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 495.    │  IV  │     724
                  │                                      │      │
  2097-PS         │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│      │
                  │relating to designation of Chief of   │      │
                  │Praesidialkanzlei, 1 December 1937.   │      │
                  │1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.    │      │
                  │1317.                                 │  IV  │     724
                  │                                      │      │
 *2098-PS         │Decree relating to Status of Supreme  │      │
                  │Commanders of Army and Navy, 25       │      │
                  │February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│      │
                  │Part I, p. 215. (GB 206)              │  IV  │     725
                  │                                      │      │
  2099-PS         │Fuehrer decree relating to Chief of   │      │
                  │Party Chancellery of 29 May 1941. 1941│      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 295.    │  IV  │     725
                  │                                      │      │
  2100-PS         │Decree on position of leader of Party │      │
                  │Chancellery, 24 January 1942. 1942    │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 35.     │  IV  │     726
                  │                                      │      │
  2101-PS         │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│      │
                  │concerning Inspector General of German│      │
                  │Highways administration of 3 April    │      │
                  │1941. 1941 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 192.                               │  IV  │     727
                  │                                      │      │
  2102-PS         │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│      │
                  │concerning Inspector General for Water│      │
                  │and Power, 29 July 1941. 1941         │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 467.    │  IV  │     727
                  │                                      │      │
  2103-PS         │Decree of Fuehrer on Cabinet          │      │
                  │Legislation, 10 May 1943. 1943        │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 295.    │  IV  │     729
                  │                                      │      │
 *2194-PS         │Top secret letter from Ministry for   │      │
                  │Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich   │      │
                  │Protector in Bohemia and Moravia,     │      │
                  │enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │      │
                  │Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36)     │  IV  │     843
                  │                                      │      │
  2231-PS         │Excerpt from von Stutterheim, “Die    │      │
                  │Reichskanzlei” (1940), pp. 19-34.     │  IV  │     873
                  │                                      │      │
 *2261-PS         │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme    │      │
                  │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air      │      │
                  │Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by  │      │
                  │copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May   │      │
                  │1935 and copy of Decision of Reich    │      │
                  │Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │      │
                  │for defense of the Reich. (USA 24)    │  IV  │     934
                  │                                      │      │
 *2307-PS         │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│      │
                  │German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938     │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│      │
                  │133)                                  │  IV  │     997
                  │                                      │      │
  2355-PS         │Second Law relating to right to vote  │      │
                  │for Reichstag, 18 March 1938. 1938    │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 258.    │  IV  │    1098
                  │                                      │      │
 *2380-PS         │Articles from National Socialist      │      │
                  │Yearbook, 1935. (USA 396).            │  V   │       6
                  │                                      │      │
 *2473-PS         │Extracts from National Socialist      │      │
                  │Yearbook, 1943, showing party         │      │
                  │positions of other Cabinet members in │      │
                  │1943. (USA 324)                       │  V   │     226
                  │                                      │      │
  2550-PS         │Law on modification of rules of       │      │
                  │general criminal procedure, 16        │      │
                  │September 1939. 1939                  │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1841.   │  V   │     293
                  │                                      │      │
 *2608-PS         │Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The│      │
                  │Administration in Wartime”. (USA 714) │  V   │     327
                  │                                      │      │
  2746-PS         │Decree concerning organization of     │      │
                  │Criminal Jurisdiction against Poles   │      │
                  │and Jews in Incorporated Territories, │      │
                  │4 December 1941. 1941                 │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp.        │      │
                  │759-761.                              │  V   │     386
                  │                                      │      │
  2847-PS         │Extracts from Reichs Ministerialblatt,│      │
                  │1933, regarding Cabinet change in the │      │
                  │Common Business Order of Reich        │      │
                  │Ministries, para. 57c, the Circulation│      │
                  │of Drafts.                            │  V   │     509
                  │                                      │      │
  2848-PS         │File memorandum from files of Council │      │
                  │of Ministers, initialled L.           │  V   │     510
                  │                                      │      │
  2849-PS         │Extract from The Third Reich, Vol. 4, │      │
                  │p. 81.                                │  V   │     511
                  │                                      │      │
 *2852-PS         │Minutes of meetings of Council of     │      │
                  │Ministers for Reich Defense. (USA 395)│  V   │     512
                  │                                      │      │
  2957-PS         │Extract from German Civil Servants    │      │
                  │Calendar, 1940, p. 111.               │  V   │     663
                  │                                      │      │
 *2959-PS         │The Reich Minister, published in New  │      │
                  │Formation of Justice and Economy, p.  │      │
                  │66. (USA 399)                         │  V   │     664
                  │                                      │      │
 *2960-PS         │The Reich Ministry of Interior,       │      │
                  │published in Publications on the State│      │
                  │Structure. (USA 406)                  │  V   │     668
                  │                                      │      │
  2961-PS         │Regulations for the leadership of the │      │
                  │German People, 1940, p. 62.           │  V   │     668
                  │                                      │      │
 *2964-PS         │Memorial meeting of the Reich Cabinet,│      │
                  │published in Voelkischer Beobachter,  │      │
                  │Munich edition, 1 February 1937. (USA │      │
                  │401)                                  │  V   │     672
                  │                                      │      │
  2970-PS         │Extracts concerning The New           │      │
                  │Construction of the State from New    │      │
                  │Formation of Law and Economy.         │  V   │     677
                  │                                      │      │
 *2986-PS         │Affidavit of the defendant, Wilhelm   │      │
                  │Frick, 19 November 1945. (USA 409)    │  V   │     688
                  │                                      │      │
 *2999-PS         │Affidavit of Hans Heinrich Lammers, 22│      │
                  │November 1945. (USA 391)              │  V   │     725
                  │                                      │      │
  3787-PS         │Report of the Second Meeting of the   │      │
                  │Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939.  │      │
                  │(USA 782)                             │  VI  │     718
                  │                                      │      │
 *3863-PS         │Extracts from Operations in the Third │      │
                  │Reich by Lammers. (GB 320)            │  VI  │     786
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-138           │Decree of 27 July 1934, providing for │      │
                  │participation of Fuehrer’s deputy in  │      │
                  │the drafting of all legislation. (USA │      │
                  │403)                                  │  VI  │    1055
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-139           │Letter from Hess to Goebbels, 9       │      │
                  │October 1934, concerning participation│      │
                  │in legislation of the Reich. (USA 404)│  VI  │    1056
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-140           │Letter from Lammers to Reich          │      │
                  │Ministers, 12 April 1938. (USA 405)   │  VI  │    1057
                  │                                      │      │
 *EC-177          │Minutes of second session of Working  │      │
                  │Committee of the Reich Defense held on│      │
                  │26 April 1933. (USA 390)              │ VII  │     328
                  │                                      │      │
 *EC-407          │Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of Reichs  │      │
                  │Defense Council, 14 May 1936. (GB 247)│ VII  │     462
                  │                                      │      │
**Chart No. 6     │Reich Cabinet and Subsidiaries.       │      │
                  │(Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.)  │ VIII │     775
                  │                                      │      │
 *Chart No. 18    │Organization of the Reich Government. │
                  │(2905-PS; USA 3)                      │  End of VIII

                       4. THE STURMABTEILUNG (SA)

The _Sturmabteilung_, or SA, is the organization which the world
remembers as the “Brown Shirts” or Storm Troops—the gangsters of the
early days of Nazi terrorism. Since it was the first of the
organizations created by the Nazis as instruments to effectuate their
illegal objectives, the SA occupied a place of peculiar importance in
the scheme of the conspirators. Unlike some of the other organizations,
the functions of the SA were not fixed or static. The SA was an agency
adapted to many designs and purposes, and its role in the conspiracy
changed from time to time various phases toward the final
objective—abrogation of the Versailles Treaty and acquisition of the
territory of other peoples and nations. If the conspiracy is likened to
a pattern, with its various parts fitting together like the pieces of a
jig-saw puzzle, the piece representing the SA would be found to
constitute the essential link in the pattern.

The SA participated in the conspiracy as a distinct and separate unit,
having a legal character of its own. An ordinance passed in March, 1935,
provided that the SA and certain other agencies were thereafter to be
considered “components” of the Nazi Party (_1725-PS_). This ordinance
further provided, in Article 5, that:

    “* * * The affiliated organizations can possess their own legal
    character.” (_1725-PS_)

Similarly, the 1943 Organization Book of the Nazi Party which
characterizes the SA as an “entity,” declares:

    “The Fuehrer prescribes the law of conduct; he commands its use.
    The Chief of Staff represents the SA as a complete entity on the
    mandate of the Fuehrer.” (_3220-PS_)

While the SA was composed of many individual members, they acted as a
unit. They were closely bound together by many common factors, including
uniform membership standards and disciplinary regulations; a common and
distinctive uniform; common aims and objectives; common activities,
duties, and responsibilities; and a fanatical adherence to the
ideologies conceived by the Nazis. Although membership in the SA was
voluntary, the SA man was expected to withdraw if

    “he can no longer agree with SA views or if he is not in a
    position to fulfill completely the duties imposed upon him as a
    member of the SA.” (_2354-PS_)

The SA man was well schooled in the philosophies and activities which he
was required to adopt in his daily life. Uniformity of action and
thought in such matters was in part obtained by the publication and
distribution of a weekly periodical entitled “_Der SA-Mann_.” This
publication was principally devoted to fostering various aspects of Nazi
ideology. In addition, “_Der SA-Mann_” reported upon the activities of
the SA and its constituent groups.

The SA developed from scattered bands of street ruffians into a cohesive
unit organized on a military basis, with military training and military
functions, and with an aggressive spirit and philosophy. The
organization extended throughout the entire Reich and was organized
vertically into local subdivisions. Horizontally, there were special
units including military, cavalry, communications, engineer, and medical
units. These various groups and branches were coordinated by the SA
Headquarters and operational offices, located in Munich.

        A. _The Relationship Between The SA and The Nazi Party._

The affiliation between the SA and the Nazi leaders was closely
maintained, for the purpose of enabling the conspirators to employ the
SA for any activity necessary in effectuating the objectives of the
conspiracy. The SA was conceived and created by Hitler, in 1921, at the
very inception of the conspiracy. Hitler retained the direction of the
SA throughout the conspiracy, delegating responsibility for its
leadership to a Chief of Staff. Goering was an early leader of the SA,
and maintained close connection with it throughout the conspiracy. Hess
participated in many of the early battles of the SA and was leader of an
SA group in Munich. Frank, Streicher, von Schirach, and Sauckel each
held the position of _Obergruppenfuehrer_ in the SA, a position
corresponding to the rank of Lieutenant General; and Bormann was a
member of the Staff of the SA High Command.

The close relationship between the SA and leaders of the Nazi Party is
demonstrated by the fact that the _Hoheitstraeger_ (Bearers of
Sovereignty) of the Nazi Leadership Corps were authorized to call upon
the SA for assistance in carrying out particular phases of the Party
program. For example, at page 71 of the Organization Book of the Nazi
Party (1943 edition) the following statement is made (_1893-PS_):

    “The _Hoheitstraeger_ is responsible for the entire political
    appearance of the Movement within this zone. The SA leader of
    that zone is tied to the directives of the _Hoheitstraeger_ in
    that respect.

    “The _Hoheitstraeger_ is the ranking representative of the Party
    to include all organizations within his zone. He may requisition
    the SA located within his zone for the respective SA leader if
    they are needed for the execution of a political mission. The
    _Hoheitstraeger_ will then assign the mission to the SA * * *.

    “Should the _Hoheitstraeger_ need more SA for the execution of
    political mission than is locally available, he then applies to
    the next higher office of sovereignty which, in turn, requests
    the SA from the SA office in his sector.” (_1893-PS_)

This close relationship is further shown by an ordinance for the
execution of a Hitler decree (_2383-PS_):

    “The leader of affiliated organizations, as well as the leaders
    of the party women’s organization, are subordinate to the
    sovereign bearer (_Hoheitstraeger_) politically, functionally,
    disciplinarily, and personally.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The formations of the NSDAP, with exception of the SS, for whom
    special provisions apply, are subordinated to the sovereign
    bearer (_Hoheitstraeger_) politically and in respect to
    commitment. Responsibility for the leadership of the units rests
    in the hands of the unit leader.” (_2383-PS_)

It was in compliance with the authority of the Leadership Corps that the
SA was used in the seizure of trade union properties.

In addition, the SA demonstrated its close affiliation to the Nazi Party
by participating in various ways in election proceedings. A pamphlet
entitled “The SA,” depicting the history and general activities of the
SA, written by an SA Sturmfuehrer upon orders from SA Headquarters,
declares that the SA stood—

    “at the foremost front of election fights.” (_2168-PS_)

Further evidence of the close relationship between the SA and Nazi
leaders is found in the distribution list of the confidential
publication of the Nazi Leadership Corps, which shows that this strictly
confidential magazine was distributed to Lieutenant-Generals and
Major-Generals of the SA. (_2660-PS_)

The interest and participation of Nazi leaders in the activities of the
SA is clearly shown in the issues of “_Der SA-Mann_” for the period from
1934 to March 1939 (_3050-A-E-PS_). Throughout these volumes there
appear photographs of Nazi leaders participating in SA activities. The
following are descriptions of a few of these photographs, together with
the page numbers upon which they appear:

        Photograph of Himmler, Huhnlein (Fuehrer of NSKK) and
        Lutze, bearing caption: “They lead the soldiers of
        National Socialism,” 15 June, 1935, p. 1.

        Photograph of Hitler at SA Ceremony, carrying SA Battle
        Flag. The picture bears the caption: “As in the fighting
        years the Fuehrer, on Party Day of Freedom, dedicates
        the new regiments with the Blood Banner,” 21 September,
        1935, p. 4.

        Photograph of Lutze and Hitler, 19 September, 1936, p.

        Photograph of Hitler and SA officers, 1 January, 1938,
        p. 3.

        Photograph of Streicher with SA men, and reviewing SA
        Troops, 25 November, 1938, p. 1.

        Photograph of Goering in SA uniform reviewing SA
        marching troops under the caption: “Honor Day of the
        SA,” 21 September, 1935, p. 3.

        Photographs of Goering, Hess, and Hitler in SA uniform
        at the ceremonies dedicated to SA men killed in the
        Munich Putsch, 16 November, 1935, p. 3.

        Photograph of Goering marching in SA uniform, 19
        September, 1936, p. 3.

        Photographs of Goering at ceremonies held upon occasion
        of his being made Obergruppenfuehrer of the
        Feldherrnhalle Regiment of the SA, 23 January, 1937, p.

        Photograph of Goering leading Feldherrnhalle Regiment of
        SA in parade, 18 September, 1937, p. 3.

The work of the SA did not end with the seizure of the German government
by the Nazis, but affiliation between the SA and Nazi leaders continued
thereafter. The importance of the SA in connection with the Nazi
Government and control of Germany is shown by the law of 1 December 1933
entitled, “The Law on Securing the Unity of Party and State”

    “* * * The Deputy of the Fuehrer and the Chief of Staff of SA
    become members of the Reich Government in order to insure close
    cooperation of the offices of the Party and SA with the public
    authorities.” (_1395-PS_)

Similarly, a decree promulgated by Hitler providing for supervision of
premilitary training by the SA declares:

    “The offices of the Party and State are to support the SA in
    this training program and to value the possession of the
    certificate for the SA military insignia.” (_2383-PS_)

The complete control of the SA by the Nazis at all times is shown by the
so-called “Roehm Purge” of June 1934 (see _2407-PS_). Roehm had been
Chief of Staff of the SA for several years, and was responsible for the
development of SA into a powerful, organization. SA members were
required to take a personal oath of fidelity to Roehm. But when his
policies conflicted with those of the Nazi leaders, he was removed,
murdered, and replaced by Victor Lutze. This drastic action was
accomplished without revolt or dissension in the ranks of the SA, and
with no change in its objectives or program. The SA remained “a reliable
and strong part of the National Socialist Movement * * * full of
obedience and blind discipline,” whose function was to “create and form
the new German citizens.” (_2407-PS_)

The importance of the SA in the Nazi plan for the utilization of the
people of Germany is shown in Hitler’s pronouncement “The Course for the
German Person,” which appears in the issue of “_Der SA-Mann_” for 5
September 1936, at page 22. Hitler’s statement reads as follows:

    “The boy, he will enter the Young Volk, and the lad, he will
    enter the Hitler Youth, the young man will go into the SA, in
    the SS, and in other units, and the SA and SS men will one day
    enter into the labor service and from there to the Army, and the
    soldier of the Volk will return again into the Organization of
    the Movement, the Party, in the SA and SS and never again will
    our Volk decay as it once was decayed”.

Thus the SA was constantly available to the conspirators as an
instrument to further their aims. It was natural that Victor Lutze, the
former Chief of Staff of the SA, in a pamphlet entitled “The Nature and
Tasks of the SA,” declared:

    “The SA cannot be independent of the National Socialist Movement
    but can only exist as a part of it.” (_2471-PS_)

            B. _Participation by the SA in the Conspiracy._

The principal functions performed by the SA in furtherance of the
objectives of the conspiracy may be classified into four distinct
phases, each of which corresponds with a particular phase in the
progression of the conspiracy.

The first phase consists of the use of the SA and its members as the
instrument for the dissemination of Nazi ideology throughout Germany.
The employment of SA for this purpose continued throughout the entire
period of the conspiracy. In the second phase, the period prior to the
Nazi seizure of power, the SA was a militant group of fighters whose
function was to combat all opponents of the Party. In the third phase,
the period of several years following the Nazi seizure of power, the SA
participated in various measures designed to consolidate the control of
the Nazis, including the dissolution of the trade unions, the
persecution of the church, and Jewish persecutions. During this period
the SA continued to serve as a force of political soldiers whose purpose
was to combat members of political parties considered hostile to the
Nazi Party. The fourth aspect of SA activities consisted of its
employment as an agency for the building up of an armed force in Germany
in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, and for the preparation of the
youth of Germany for the waging of an aggressive war.

(1) _The Propagation of Nazi Doctrine._ From the very start the Nazi
leaders emphasized the importance of the SA’s mission to disseminate
Nazi doctrines. The responsibility of propagating National Socialist
ideology remained constant throughout. This is shown in an excerpt from
_Mein Kampf_ in which Hitler declared:

    “* * * As the directing idea for the inner training of the
    _Sturmabteilung_, the intention was always dominant, aside from
    all physical education, to teach it to be the unshakeable
    convinced defender of the National Socialist idea.” (_2760-PS_)

Hitler’s pronouncement as to the function of SA in this respect became
the guiding principle of SA members, for _Mein Kampf_ was taken to
express the basic philosophy of the SA. The Organization Book of the
Nazi Party declares that the training of SA members should consist of—

    “The training and rearing upon the basis of the teachings and
    aims of the Fuehrer as they are put down in ‘Mein Kampf’ and in
    the Party program, for all spheres of our life and our National
    Socialist ideology.” (_2354-PS_)

The Party Organization Book also declares that the SA is the

    “training and rearing instrument of the Party.” (_2354-PS_)

Similarly, in an article which appeared in “_Der SA-Mann_”, at page 1 of
the issue of January 1934, the functions of the SA were set forth as

    “First, to be the guaranty of the power of the National
    Socialist State against all attacks from without as well as from

    “Second, to be the high institute of education of the people for
    the living National Socialism.”

The function of the SA as propagandist of the Party was more than a
responsibility which SA took unto itself. It was a responsibility
recognized by the law of Germany. The law for “Securing the Unity of
Party and State,” promulgated by the Reich Cabinet in 1933, provided:

    “The members of the National Socialistic German Labor Party and
    the SA (including their subordinate organizations) as the
    leading and driving force of the National Socialist State will
    bear greater responsibility toward Fuehrer, people and State.”

As the principal ideology bearers of the Nazi Party SA members were “the
soldiers of an idea,” to use the expression employed by Nazi writers.
Examples of the use of the SA as Nazi propagandist will be seen in the
description of the other functions performed by the SA. For in each case
the SA combined its propagandist responsibility instrument with the
other functions which it performed in furtherance of the conspiracy.

(2) _Strong-Arm Terrorization of Political Opponents._ In the early
stages of the Nazi Movement the SA combined propaganda with violence
along the lines expressed by Hitler in _Mein Kampf_:

    “The Young Movement from the first day, espoused the standpoint
    that its idea must be put forward spiritually but that the
    defense of this spiritual platform must, if necessary, be
    secured by strong-arm means.” (_2760-PS_)

So that the Nazis might better spread their philosophies, the SA was
employed to gain possession and control of the streets for the Nazis.
Its function was to beat up and terrorize all political opponents. The
importance of this function is explained in a pamphlet written by SA
Sturmfuehrer Bayer, upon orders from SA Headquarters (_2168-PS_):

    “Possession of the streets is the key to power in the State—for
    this reason the SA marched and fought. The public would have
    never received knowledge from the agitative speeches of the
    little Reichstag faction and its propaganda or from the desires
    and aims of the Party if the martial tread and battle song of
    the SA Companies had not beat the measure for the truth of a
    relentless criticism of the state of affairs in the governmental
    system. They wanted the young Movement to keep silent. Nothing
    was to be read in the press about the labor of the National
    Socialists, not to mention the basic aims of its platform. They
    simply did not want to awake any interest in it. However, the
    martial tread of the SA took care that even the drowsiest
    citizens had to see at least the existence of a fighting troop.”

And in _Mein Kampf_ Hitler defined the task of the SA as follows:

    “We have to teach the Marxists that the master of the streets in
    the future is National Socialism, exactly as it will once be the
    Master of the State.” (_2760-PS_)

The importance of the work of SA in the early days of the Movement was
indicated by Goebbels in a speech which appeared in _Das Archiv_ in
October 1935:

    “* * * The inner-political opponents did not disappear due to
    mysterious unknown reasons but because the Movement possessed a
    strong-arm within its organization and the strongest strong-arm
    of the Movement is the SA * * *.” (_3211-PS_)

Specific evidence of the activities of the SA during the early period of
the Nazi Movement (1922-31) is to be found in a series of articles
appearing in “_Der SA-Mann_” entitled, “SA Battle Experiences Which We
Will Never Forget.” Each of these articles is an account of a street or
meeting-hall battle waged by the SA against a group of political
opponents in the early days of the Nazi struggle for power. These
articles demonstrate that during this period it was the function of SA
to employ physical violence in order to destroy all forms of thought and
expression which might be considered hostile to Nazi aims or philosophy.

The titles of these articles are sufficiently descriptive to constitute
evidence of SA activities. Some of these titles, together with the page
and reference of “_Der SA-Mann_” upon which they appear, follow:

 Article entitled:    “We subdue the Red Terror,” 24 February, 1934: p.
 Article entitled:    “Nightly Street Battles on the Czech Border,” 8
                        September, 1934: p. 12.
 Article entitled:    “Street Battle in Chemnitz,” 6 October, 1934: p.
 Article entitled:    “Victorious SA,” 20 October, 1934: p. 7.
 Article entitled:    “SA Against Sub-Humanity,” 20 October, 1934: p. 7.
 Article entitled:    “For the Superiority of the Street,” 10 November,
                        1934: p. 10.
 Article entitled:    “The SA Conquers Rastenburg,” 26 January,
                        1936[_sic_]: p. 7.
 Article entitled:    “Company 88 Receives its Baptism of Fire,” 23
                        February, 1935: p. 5.
 Article entitled:    “Street Battles at Pforghein,” 23 February, 1935:
                        p. 5.
 Article entitled:    “The SA Breaks the Red Terror,” 1 June, 1935: p.
 Article entitled:    “The Blood Sunday of Berlin,” 10 August, 1935: p.
 Article entitled:    “West Prussian SA Breaks the Red Terror in
                        Christburg,” 24 August, 1935: p. 15.
 Portrait symbolizing the SA Man as the “Master of the Streets,”
   entitled, “Attention: Free the Streets,” 11 September, 1937: p. 1.
 Article entitled:    “9 November, 1923, in Nurnberg,” 30 October, 1937.

As an example of the nature of these articles, the article appearing in
the Franken Edition of “_Der SA-Mann_” for 30 October 1937, at page 3,
is typical. It is entitled: “9 November 1923 in Nurnberg,” and reads in
part as follows:

    “We stayed overnight in the Coliseum. Then in the morning we
    found out what had happened in Munich. ‘Now a revolution will
    also be made in Nurnberg,’ we said. All of a sudden the Police
    came from the Maxtor Guard and told us that we should go home,
    that the Putsch in Munich failed. We did not believe that and we
    did not go home. Then came the State Police with fixed bayonets
    and drove us out of the hall. One of us then shouted ‘Let’s go
    to the Cafe Habsburg!’ By the time we arrived, however, the
    Police again had everything surrounded. Some shouted then: ‘The
    Jewish place will be stormed * * * Out with the Jews!’ Then the
    Police started to beat us up. Then we divided into small groups
    and roamed through town and wherever we caught a Red or a Jew we
    knew, a fist fight ensued.

    “Then in the evening we marched, although the Police had
    forbidden it, to a meeting in Furth. During the promenade again
    the police attempted to stop us. It was all the same to us.
    Already in the next moment we attacked the police in our anger
    so that they were forced to flee. We marched on to the Geissmann
    Hall. There again they tried to stop us. But the Landsturm,
    which was also there, attacked the protection forces like
    persons possessed, and drove them from the streets. After the
    meeting we dissolved and went to the edge of town. From there we
    marched in close column back to Nurnberg. In the Wall Street
    near the Plaerrer the Police came again. We simply shoved them
    aside. They did not trust themselves to attack, for what would a
    blood bath have meant? We decided beforehand not to take
    anything from anyone. Also in Furth they had already noticed
    that we were up to no good. A large mass of people accompanied
    us on the march. We marched with unrolled flags and sang so that
    the streets resounded: Comrade reach me your hand; we want to
    stand together, even though they have false impressions, the
    spirit must not die, Swastika on the steel helmet,
    black—white—red armband, we are known as Storm Troop (SA)

Through such means the SA was chiefly responsible for destroying all
political elements hostile to the Nazis, including liberalism and
capitalism. This is shown by an article which appeared on 6 January,
1934, at page 1 of “_Der SA-Mann_,” entitled “The SA Man in the New

    “The New Germany would not have been without the SA man and the
    new Germany would not exist if the SA man would now, with the
    feeling of having fulfilled his duty, quietly and unselfishly
    and modestly step aside or if the new State would send him home
    much like the Moors who had done his obligations.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “What has been accomplished up until now, the taking over of the
    power in the State and the ejection of those elements which are
    responsible for the pernicious developments of the post war
    years as bearers of Marxist liberalism, and capitalism are only
    the preliminaries, the spring-board for the real aims of
    National Socialism.

    “Being conscious of the fact that the real National Socialist
    construction work would be building in an empty space without
    the usurpation of power by Adolf Hitler, the movement and the SA
    man as the aggressive bearer of its will primarily have directed
    all their efforts thereupon, to achieve the platform of
    continued striving and to obtain the fundamental for the
    realization of our desires in the State by force * * *

    “* * * Out of this comes the further missions of the SA for the
    completion of the German revolution. First: To be the guaranty
    of the power of the National Socialist State against all attacks
    from without as well as within. Second: To be the high institute
    of education of the people for the living National Socialism.
    Third: to build a bridge over which the present day German youth
    can march free and unhampered as first generation into the
    formed Third Reich.”

(3) _Consolidation of Nazi Control of Germany._ The Third function of
the SA was to carry out various programs designed to consolidate Nazi
control of the German State, including particularly the dissolution of
the trade unions and the Jewish persecutions. In the words of an SA
officer, it was the function of the SA to be the “tool for strengthening
the structure of the new State,” and “to clean up” all that was “worth
cleaning up.” It was generally employed, says the SA man, “where
communism and elements hostile to the State still insolently dared to
rebel.” (_2168-PS_)

SA groups were employed to destroy political opposition by force and
brutality where necessary. As an example, an affidavit of William F.
Sollman reads as follows:

    “* * * From 1919 until 1933 I was a Social Democrat and a member
    of the German Reichstag. Prior to March 11, 1933, I was the
    editor-in-chief of a chain of daily newspapers, with my office
    in Cologne, Germany, which led the fight against the Nazi Party.

    “On March 9, 1933, members of the SS and SA came to my home in
    Cologne and destroyed the furniture and my personal records. At
    that time I was taken to the Brown House in Cologne where I was
    tortured, being beaten and kicked for several hours. I was then
    taken to the regular government prison in Cologne where I was
    treated by two medical doctors * * * and released the next day.
    On March 11, 1933, I left Germany.” (_3221-PS_)

Prior to the organization of the Gestapo on a national scale local SA
meeting places were designated as arrest points, and SA members took
into custody Communists and other persons who were actually or
supposedly hostile to the Nazi Party. This activity is described in an
affidavit of Raymond H. Geist, former U. S. Consul in Berlin:

    “* * * At the beginning of the Hitler regime, the only
    organization which had meeting places throughout the country was
    the SA (Storm Troopers). Until the Gestapo could be organized on
    a national scale the thousands of local SA meeting places became
    ‘arrest points.’ There were at least fifty of these in Berlin.
    Communists, Jews, and other known enemies of the Nazis party
    were taken to these points, and, if they were enemies of
    sufficient importance, they were immediately transferred to the
    Gestapo headquarters.” (_1759-PS_)

In addition, SA members served as guards at concentration camps during
this consolidation period and participated in mistreatment of the
persons there imprisoned. A report to Hitler by the public prosecutor of
Dresden concerning the _Knollprosse_ of one Vogel, who was accused of
mistreatment of the persons imprisoned in a concentration camp, reads as
follows (_787-PS_):

    “The prosecuting authority in Dresden has indicted
    Oberregierungsrat Erich Vogel in Dresden (case designation 16
    STA 4 107/34) on account of bodily injury while in office. The
    following subject matter is the basis of the process:

    “Vogel belongs to the Gestapo office of the province of Saxony
    since its foundation and is chief of Main section II, which
    formerly bore the title ZUB (_Zentralstelle fuer
    Umsturzbekaempfung_) (Central office for combatting overthrow).
    In the process of combatting efforts inimical to the State Vogel
    carried out several so called borderland actions in the year
    1933 in which a large number of politically unreliable persons
    and persons who had become political prisoners in the border
    territories were taken into protective custody (_Schutzhaft_)
    and brought to the Hohnstein protective custody camp. In the
    camp serious mistreatment of the prisoners has been going on at
    least since summer of 1933. The prisoners were not only, as in
    protective custody camp Bredow near Stettin, beaten into a state
    of unconsciousness for no reason with whips and other tools but
    were also tortured in other ways, as for instance with a
    drip-apparatus especially constructed for the purpose, under
    which the prisoners had to stand so long that they came away
    with serious purulent wounds of the scalp. The guilty SA-leaders
    and SA-men were sentenced to punishment of six years to nine
    months of imprisonment by the main criminal court of the
    provincial court in Dresden of 15 May 1935 (16 STA. 3431.34).
    Vogel, whose duties frequently brought him to the camp, took
    part in this mistreatment, insofar as it happened in the
    reception room of the camp during completion of the reception
    formalities, and in the supply room, during issuing of the
    blankets. In this respect it should be pointed out that Vogel
    was generally known to the personnel of the camp—exactly
    because of his function as head of the ZUB—and his conduct
    became at least partly a standard for the above-named conduct of
    the SA-leaders and men.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In his presence, for instance, the SA-men Mutze dealt such
    blows to one man, without provocation, that he turned around on
    himself. As already stated, Vogel not only took no steps against
    this treatment of the prisoners, but he even made jokes about it
    and stated that it amused him the way things were popping here.

    “In the supply room Vogel himself took a hand in the beating
    amid the general severe mistreatment. The SA-men there employed
    whips and other articles and beat the prisoners in such a manner
    that serious injuries were produced; the prisoners partly became
    unconscious and had to lie in the dispensary a long time. Vogel
    was often present in the supply room during the mistreatment. At
    least in the following cases he personally laid violent hands
    upon prisoners.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * the prisoner was laid across the counter in the usual
    manner, held fast by the head and arms, and then beaten for a
    considerable time by the SA men with whips and other articles.
    Along with this Vogel himself took part in the beating for a
    time, and after this mistreatment slapped him again, so that the
    prisoner appeared green and blue in the face. The prisoner is
    the tinsmith Hans Kuehitz, who bore the nickname Johnny. Upon
    his departure Vogel gave the head of the supply room,
    Truppenfuehrer Meier from 6 to 8 reichsmarks with the stated
    reason that the SA men ‘had sweated so.’ The money was then
    distributed by Meier to those SA-comrades who had taken part in
    the mistreatment.” (_787-PS_)

Similarly, the SA participated in the seizure and dissolution of the
German trade unions in 1933, a measure taken by the Nazis under the
direction of Robert Ley. An official Nazi Party circular containing an
order promulgated by Robert Ley concerning the program for the seizure
of the union properties read as follows:

    “SA, as well as SS, are to be employed for the occupation of
    trade union properties and for the taking into protective
    custody all personalities who come into the question.”

The SA also participated extensively in the Jewish persecutions
conducted by the Nazis. The affidavit of Mr. Geist, former U. S. Consul
in Berlin (_1759-PS_) sets forth numerous instances of attacks upon
Jewish-American citizens. Mr. Geist also declares that on the morning
after the Nazis’ acquisition of power, SA groups roamed the streets of
Berlin seizing and beating Jewish persons and other political opponents
of the Nazi Party. Thereafter SA men participated in many attacks of
physical violence upon Jews, including Jewish-American citizens. In
addition, uniformed SA men were employed as a display of threatening
force in order to coerce Jewish persons to dispose of their property at
greatly reduced values. (_1759-PS_)

SA participation in the Jewish program of 10 to 11 November, 1938, is
disclosed in a confidential report of an SA Brigade Fuehrer to his Group
Commander, dated 29 November, 1938 (_1721-PS_):

  “TO:     SA Group Electrical Palatinate (Kurpfalz)

    “The following order reached me at 3 o’clock on 10 November

    ‘On the order of the Gruppenfuehrer, all the Jewish synagogues
    within the 50th Brigade are to be blown up or set fire

    ‘Neighboring houses occupied by Aryans are not to be damaged.
    The action is to be carried out in civilian clothes. Rioting and
    plundering are to be prevented. Report of execution of orders to
    reach Brigade Fuehrer or office by 8:30.’

    “I immediately alerted the Standartenfuehrer and gave them the
    most exact instructions; the execution of the order began at

    “I hereby report that the following were destroyed in the area
    of * * *

    “_Standarte 115_

 1. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Bleichstrasse      Destroyed by fire
 2. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Fuchsstrasse       Destroyed by fire
 3. Synagogue at Ober/Ramstadt                 Interior and furnishings
 4. Synagogue at Graefenhausen                 Interior and furnishings
 5. Synagogue at Griesheim                     Interior and furnishings
 6. Synagogue at Pfungstadt                    Interior and furnishings
 7. Synagogue at Eberstadt                     Destroyed by fire”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Standarte 145_

 1. Synagogue at Bensheim                      Destroyed by fire
 2. Synagogue at Lorch in Hessen               Destroyed by fire
 3. Synagogue at Heppenheim                    Destroyed by fire
 4. Prayer House Alsbach                       Destroyed by fire
 5. Meeting room Alsbach                       Destroyed by fire
 6. Synagogue at Rimbach                       Furnishings completely

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Standarte 168_

 1. Synagogue in Seligenstadt                  Destroyed by fire
 2. Synagogue in Offenbach                     Destroyed by fire
 3. Synagogue in Klein-Krotzenburg             Destroyed by fire
 4. Synagogue in Steinheim on the Main         Destroyed by fire
 5. Synagogue in Muehlheim on the Main         Destroyed by fire
 6. Synagogue in Sprendlingen                  Destroyed by fire
 7. Synagogue in Langen                        Destroyed by fire
 8. Synagogue in Egelsbach                     Destroyed by fire”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Standarte 186_

 1. Synagogue in Beerfelden                    Blown up
 2. Synagogue in Michelstadt                   Furnishings wrecked
 3. Synagogue in Koenig                        Furnishings wrecked
 4. Synagogue in Hoechst i/Odenwald            Furnishings wrecked
 5. Synagogue in Gross-Umstadt                 Furnishings wrecked
 6. Synagogue in Dieburg                       Furnishings wrecked
 7. Synagogue in Babenhausen                   Furnishings wrecked
 8. Synagogue in Gross-Bieberau                Destroyed by fire
 9. Synagogue in Fraenk. Crumbach              Furnishings destroyed
 10. Synagogue in Reichelsheim                 Furnishings destroyed”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Standarte 221_

 1. Synagogue and Chapel in Gross-Gerau        Destroyed by fire
 2. Synagogue in Ruesselsheim                  Torn down and furnishings
 3. Synagogue in Dornheim                      Furnishings destroyed
 4. Synagogue in Wolfskehlen                   Furnishings destroyed”

                          “The Fuehrer of Brigade 50 (STARKENBURG)
                                       “Brigadefuehrer” (_1721-PS_)

In connection with the persecutions of the Jews, the SA again performed
its propaganda function. It was the function of the SA to create and
foster among the people an anti-Jewish spirit. Evidence of this function
is to be found in the issues of “_Der SA-Mann_”. Article after article
in this publication was devoted to propaganda designed to engender
hatred toward the Jewish race. The nature of these articles is apparent
from some of the titles:

        Article entitled: “Finish up with the Jew”, with
        subtitle: “We want no women to buy from Jews, and no
        Jewish girl friends,” 27 July, 1935, p. 4.

        Article entitled: “The Jewish World Danger,” 2 February,
        1935, p. 5.

        Article entitled: “Jewish Worries,” (defending the
        practices of excluding Jews from certain resorts). 20
        July, 1935, p. 4.

        Article entitled: “Jews aren’t wanted Here,” with
        pictures posted on outskirts of villages showing signs
        bearing the same message. (1 June, 1935, p. 1.) The last
        portion of this article reads as follows:

“Since the day when National Socialism unrolled its flag and the march
began for the Germany for Germans, our battle also included the Jewry *
* * Let the Jew continue with his methods against New Germany. We know
that at the end we will remain the victor for

       Snake remains a snake, and
       Jew remains a Jew! * * *

* * * “German women, if you buy from Jews and German girl, if you carry
on with Jews, then both of you betray your German Volk and your Fuehrer,
Adolf Hitler, and commit a sin against your German Volk and its future!
Then, also, outside of the last German village, the sign will stand
‘Jews are not wanted here!’ and then, finally, no German citizen will
again cross the threshold of a Jewish store. To achieve this goal is the
mission of the SA man as political soldier of the Fuehrer. Next to his
word and his explanations stands his example”.

        Article entitled: “God Save the Jew,” 17 August, 1935,
        p. 1.

        Photograph showing SA men gathered around trucks upon
        which are posted signs reading: “Read _The Stuermer_ and
        you will know the Jew.” 24 August, 1935, p. 3.

        Photograph apparently representing public SA rally
        showing large sign which reads: “He who knows a Jew
        knows a devil,” 24 August, 1935, p. 3.

        Article entitled: “The Face of the Jew” (with portrait
        of a Jew holding the hammer and sickle), 5 Oct., 1935,
        p. 6.

        Article entitled: “Jews, Blacks and Reactionaries,” 2
        November, 1935, p. 2.

        Article entitled: “The Camouflaged Benjamin—Jewish
        Cultural Bolshevism in German music,” 23 November, 1935,
        p. 2.

        Article entitled: “The Jewish Assassination,” 15
        February, 1936, p. 1.

        Article entitled: “Murder—The Jewish Slogan,” 4 April,
        1936, p. 11.

        Series of articles entitled: “The Jewish Mirror.” Eight
        weekly installments beginning 22 May 1936, p. 17.

        Series of articles entitled: “Gravediggers of World
        Culture,” beginning 5 December, 1936, p. 6 and
        continuing weekly to 13 March 1937.

        Article entitled: “Rumania to the Jews?” 2 January,
        1937, p. 6.

        Article entitled: “Bismarck’s Position on Jews,” 2
        January, 1937, p. 7.

        Article entitled: “Jewry is a Birth Error,” 13 February
        1937, p. 5.

        Article entitled: “The Protection of the German Blood,”
        24 April, 1937, p. 1.

        Article entitled: “Crooked Ways to Money and Power,” 24
        April, 1937, p. 1.

        Article entitled: “The Camouflage of Jewry—Beginning or
        End?” 22 May, 1937, p. 14.

        Article entitled: “How come still German Jews?” 18 June,
        1938, p. 2.

        Article entitled: “Westheimer Jew Servants,” 22 January,
        1938, p. 2.

        Article entitled: “The Poor Jew—Well, Well!!” 19 March,
        1938, p. 15.

        Article entitled: “Jewish Methods, Churchly Parallel,” 9
        September, 1938, p. 4.

        Article entitled: “Jews and Free Masons,” 13 January,
        1939, p. 15.

        Article entitled: “Friends of the World Jewry—Roosevelt
        and Ickes,” 3 February, 1939, p. 14.

The circulation of these articles was not intended to be confined to
members of the SA. On the contrary, the plan was to educate the members
of the SA with this philosophy, and for the SA in turn to disseminate it
into the minds of the German people. This fact is demonstrated in the
introduction to a series of anti-Jewish articles entitled “Gravediggers
of World Culture,” which began in the issue of 5 December, 1936, at page
6. This introduction stated in part as follows:

    “We suggest that the comrades especially take notice of this
    series of articles and see that they are further circulated.”

In addition, intensive campaigns were conducted to persuade the public
to purchase and read “_Der SA-Mann_,” and various issues were posted in
public places so that the general public might read them. “_Der
SA-Mann_” itself contained several photographs showing particular issues
posted upon street bulletin boards. There are also several photographs
showing advertising displays, one of which reads as follows “_Der
SA-Mann_ belongs in every house, every hotel, every inn, every waiting
room, and every store” (page 3 of the issue of 31 October, 1936).

In view of such widespread publicity for the objectives and methods of
the SA, it is inconceivable that volunteers for membership did not know
of the criminal character of this organization.

(4) _Fostering of Militarism._ In the final phase of the SA in the
conspiracy—its participation in the preparation for aggressive
warfare—the SA was again employed to inculcate a particular Nazi
ideology into the minds of the German people. It was the function of the
SA to prepare Germany mentally for the waging of an aggressive war.

At all times, and especially during the period from 1933-39, SA leaders
emphasized to SA members the duty and responsibility of creating and
fostering a militaristic spirit throughout Germany. In 1933, Hitler
established the so-called SA sports program and at that time, according
to Sturmfuehrer Bayer in his pamphlet “The SA,”

    “the SA was “commissioned to obtain an increase of and
    preservation of a warlike power and a warlike spirit as the
    expression of an aggressive attitude”. (_2168-PS_)

In 1937, Hitler renewed the so-called sports program and then declared
the program to be a means “for the fostering of a military spirit” among
the German people. (_3050-A-E-PS_)

The Organization Book of the Party is to the same effect. The function
of the SA is characterized as follows:

    “While the political organization of the NSDAP has carried out
    the political leadership, the SA is the training and education
    instrument of the Party for the realization of the
    world-philosophical soldier-like attitude.

    “Consequently, the young German in the SA is being inculcated in
    the first instance from the standpoint of world philosophy and
    character, and trained as the bearer of National Socialist armed
    will.” (_3220-PS_)

The contents of a number of articles designed to serve as war propaganda
material may be gained from their titles, which are very graphic. A
number of articles relate to the Nazi _Lebensraum_ philosophy:

        Article entitled: “The German Living Space,” 5 January,
        1935, p. 13.

        Article entitled: “Folk and Space—A Geopolitical View,”
        27 April, 1935, p. 13.

        Article entitled: “The Enlargement of our Living Space,”
        25 April, 1936, p. 10.

        Article entitled: “Our Right, Our Colonies,” 10 October,
        1936, p. 15.

        Article entitled: “Our Right for Colonies,” 18 December,
        1937, p. 7.

        Article entitled: “Space and Folk,” 14 October, 1938, p.

        Article entitled: “Colonies for Germany,” 2 January,
        1937, p. 4. This article reads in part as follows:

    “The German Ambassador in London, Herr von Ribbentrop, recently,
    on occasion of a reception in the Anglo-German Fellowship * * *
    has renewed, in a speech which aroused great interest, the
    unretractable claim of Germany for the restitution of its
    colonies which had been snatched away.

    “Shortly thereafter the Reichsbank president and Reich Minister
    of Economics, Dr. Schacht, published in the English magazine,
    ‘Foreign Affairs,’ a detailed article on the German colonial
    problem. * * *

    “For the rest Dr. Schacht laid out the categorical demand that
    Germany must, in order to solve its raw materials problem, get
    colonies, which must be administered by Germany, and in which
    the German standard currency must be in circulation.”

The next group consists of articles condemning the Versailles Treaty:

        Article entitled: “What is the Situation regarding our
        battle for Equal Rights?” 7 April 1934, p. 4.

        Article entitled: “The Dictate of Versailles,” 30 June,
        1934, p. 15. This article reads in part as follows:

            “* * * The dictate of Versailles established the
            political, economical and financial destruction
            of Germany in 440 artfully—one could also
            say—devilishly devised paragraphs; this work of
            ignominy is a sample of endless and partly
            contradictory repetitions in constantly new
            forms. Not too many have occupied themselves
            with this thick book to a great extent, for one
            could only do it with abomination * * *”

        Article entitled: “The Unbearable Limitations of our
        Fleet,” 7 July, 1934, p. 15.

        Article entitled: “Versailles after 15 years,” 19
        January, 1935, p. 13. This article reads in part as

            “This terrible word ‘Versailles,’ since a blind
            nation ratified it, has become a word of
            profanity for all those who are infatuated in
            the spirit of this enormous production of
            hatred. The Versailles dictate is German fate in
            the fullest sense of the word. Every German
            stood up under the operation of this fate during
            the past 15 years. Therefore, every last German
            must also grasp the contents of this dictate so
            that one single desire of its absolute
            destruction fills the whole German Volk.”

        Article entitled: “How about Germany’s fight for Equal
        Rights?” 16 March, 1935, p. 1.

        Article entitled: “Through Adolf Hitler’s Acts: Free
        from Versailles,” 30 January, 1937, pp. 12-13.

        Article entitled: “Versailles will be Liquidated,” 13
        February, 1937. This article reads in part as follows,
        p. 4:

            “The National Socialist Movement has again
            achieved a victory, for upon its flag since the
            beginning of the fight stands: The liquidation
            of the Versailles Treaty. For this fight the SA
            marched year after year * * *.”

A third group consists of articles describing preparations for war
allegedly being carried on by other nations:

        Article entitled: “Military Training of the English
        Youth” (showing pictures of Eton students wearing
        traditional Eton dress—tall hats and frock
        coats—marching with rifles), 26 January, 1935, p. 14.

        Article entitled: “The Army of the Soviet Union” (with
        pictures of self-propelled artillery and tanks. One
        picture bears the quotation “The Artillery of the Red
        Army is already extensively motorized”), 16 March, 1935,
        p. 14.

        Photograph of Russian Artillery bearing the notation
        “Soviet Russian Heavy artillery on maneuver,” 16 March,
        1935, p. 1.

        Article entitled: “Armies of Tomorrow” (discussion of
        anticipated developments in motorized and mechanized
        warfare. One section of the article is devoted to “plans
        of foreign countries with respect to motorized armies”),
        30 March, 1935, p. 14.

        Article entitled: “The Red Danger in the East,” 4 April,
        1936, p. 13.

        Article entitled: “The Red Army Today,” 4 April, 1936,
        p. 13.

        Article entitled: “Russia prepares for World War,” 29
        August, 1936, p. 10.

        Article entitled: “Red Terrorism Nailed Down,” 19 June,
        1937, p. 7.

        Cartoon bearing title “Stalin Wants World Revolution,”
        26 February, 1938, p. 13.

These lists of articles are not exhaustive. These articles are merely
typical of many in similar vein which appear throughout the issues of
“_Der SA-Mann_.”

(5) _The Training of German Youth for Aggressive Warfare._

The important responsibility of training the youth of Germany in the
technique of war, and of preparing them physically and spiritually for
the waging of aggressive warfare, was delegated to the SA. Hitler
characterized this task of the SA in these words:

    “Give the German Nation six million perfectly trained bodies in
    sport, all fanatically inspired with the love for the Fatherland
    and trained to the highest offensive spirit and a National
    Socialist State will, if necessary, have created an Army out of
    them in less than two years.” (_3215-PS_)

The military character of the SA is demonstrated by its organizational
structure (_2168-PS)_. As appears from the SA organizational chart,
(_Chart Number 8_) it was organized into units closely corresponding to
those of the German army. The organizational scheme consisted of
divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads. In
addition, there were special units and branches, including cavalry,
signal corps, engineer corps, and medical corps. There were also three
officer training schools (_2168-PS_). SA members wore distinctive
uniforms adapted to military functions, bore arms, and engaged in
training, forced marches, and other military exercises. These facts are
disclosed in photographs and articles in “_Der SA-Mann_”.

SA members, moreover, were governed by general regulations which closely
resemble service regulations of an armed force (_2820-PS_). According to
these regulations, “discipline and obedience are the foundations as
strong as steel for each military unit.” These regulations further
provide for punishment for disobedience. The punishments provided
demonstrate the militaristic character of the SA. They include the

 Reprimand in private;
 Reprimand in presence of superiors and announcement
 thereof at formations;
 Prohibition of right to wear the service uniform;
 House arrest;
 Arrest and confinement in jail;
 Demotion in rank;
 Prohibition of right to carry weapon. (_2820-PS_)

Preparation for war through the SA training program was commenced in
Germany as early as 1933, but the scope of this program was not made
public because it constituted a violation of the Treaty of Versailles.
The strict secrecy with which the program was surrounded is shown by an
order from the Chief of Staff of the SA dated 25 July, 1933 (_D-44_):

    “Further to my instruction Z II 1351/33 dated 11 July 33, I find
    cause to ask all SA authorities to exercise the greatest caution
    with regard to any publicity given to the SA service not only in
    the press, but also in the information and news sheets of the
    individual SA units.

    “Only during the last few days, the Reich Ministry of the
    Interior, at the request of the Foreign Office, has given strict
    instructions to all Reich authorities according to which the
    most severe control is to be exercised on all publications which
    might give other countries an opening to construe German
    infringements of the terms of the Versailles Treaty. “As is
    known from the Geneva negotiations, our opponents have piled up
    material collected in Germany and submitted to them, which they
    use against us on every occasion during the conferences.

    “From this point of view, the information sheets circulating
    among the subordinate SA units cause the liveliest concern. I
    hold all higher SA leaders responsible that any such internal
    information sheets appearing in the district of their command
    are submitted to the most stringent control _before they go into
    print_, and I feel compelled to draw attention to the threat of
    a prosecution for treason, pronounced by official instructions
    issued in the last few days, in cases where such reports,
    printed no doubt in good faith, are publicized and therefore
    exposed to the danger of falling into the wrong hands.

    “On principle, pictures of the technical specialized units of
    the SA and SS, in particular of the signals, motorized and
    possibly also of the air wings which now exist outside these
    formations, are forbidden, such pictures enabling other
    countries to prove the alleged formation of technical troop
    units.” (_D-44_)

Secrecy was also required in the order assigning a _Wehrmacht_ officer
to the SA in January, 1934, to assist in the SA Training Program
(_2823-PS_). A memorandum from SA Headquarters dated 20 January, 1934
designates an officer of the _Wehrmacht_ to assist in the military
training of SA members and goes on to provide:

    “For the purpose of disguise, Lt. Col. Auleb will wear SA
    uniform with insignia of rank according to more detailed
    regulations of the Supreme SA leaders”. (_2823-PS_)

The military training program of the SA was for many years conducted
under the guise of a sports program. This plan was created by Hitler as
early as 1920 in founding what he called the National Socialist Sport
Troop (SA). Hitler’s declaration at the time of the creation of this
sports organization was as follows:

    “The Sport Troop * * * is but the bearer of the military thought
    of a free people.” (_3215-PS_)

The fact that the so-called Sports Program was in reality closely
associated with and in fact a means of providing military training for
German youth, is shown by the following characterization of the program
by Lutze, the Chief of Staff of the SA, in an article written in 1939

    “* * * This goal setting also served for the decrees of the
    Fuehrer to the SA of 1935 regarding the renewing of, in 1936
    regarding the evaluation of, in 1937 regarding the yearly
    repetitive exercises of the SA sport badge. Parallel to this
    decree of the Fuehrer for the physical betterment and military
    training the organizational and development missions within the
    SA were met. Out of the conception that the preservation and
    intensification of the military power of our people must
    especially be requested by military and physical exercises, the
    training was especially carried out systematically in these
    fields. In 25 schools of the troop and in 3 Reichsfuehrer
    schools of the SA yearly 22,000 to 25,000 officers and non-coms
    were trained since 1934 in special educational courses until
    they possessed the education and examination certificates. In
    clearly outlined training directives the training goals which
    had to be achieved yearly were given and at the same time the
    yearly Reich competitive contests were established. Hand in hand
    the training of the Fuehrer Corps and corresponding
    organizational measures and the training at the front proceeded
    on the broadest basis.” (_3215-PS_)

The military nature of the Sports Program is likewise demonstrated by
the tests and standards required to obtain the sports award. The
Organization Book of the Party lists these tests as follows (_2354-PS_):

    “The performance test includes three groups of exercises:

        Body exercises,
        Military sports,
        Topographical (naval) services.

    “Group I: Body exercises;

        100-meter race,
        Broad jump,
        Throwing of hand grenades,
        3000-meter race.

    “Group II: Military sports;

        25-Kilometer march with pack,
        Firing of small-caliber arms,
        Aimed throwing of hand grenades,
        200-meter cross-country race with gas masks over 4 obstacles,
        Swimming or bicycle riding,
        Basic knowledge of first aid in case of accidents.

    “Group III: Terrain service;

        Terrain observation,
        Estimate of terrain,
        Estimate of distance,
        Observing and reporting,
        Utilization of terrain and general behavior in terrain
        service.” (_2354-PS_)

In 1939, the SA Sports Program was formally recognized, in a decree
issued by Hitler, as a military training program. At the same time the
SA was openly declared to be an agency for pre- and post-military
training, that is, military training prior to and following military
service in the _Wehrmacht_ (_2383-PS_).

The decree provided in part as follows:

    “Der Fuehrer. In amplification of my decree of the 15th
    February, 1935, and 18th March, 1937, regarding the acquisition
    of the SA sport insignia and the yearly repetitive exercises, I
    lift the SA sport insignia to the SA military insignia and make
    it as a basis for pre-imposed military training.

    “I designate the SA as standard bearer of this training.

    “These soldiers who honourably were discharged out of the active
    military service and who were serviceable soldiers are to be
    placed into the Army ranks for the retaining of their spiritual
    and physical energy and to be attached to the SA insofar as no
    other organization of the Party (the SS, NSKK, and SFK) have
    received them for special training.” (_2383-PS_)

The SA military training program was not confined to its members, but
extended to the entire youth of Germany. Thus the Chief of Staff of the
SA, in re-establishing the sports program in 1935, declared (_2354-PS_):

    “In order to give conscious expression to the fostering of a
    valiant spirit in all parts of the German people, I further
    decide that this SA Sport Insignia can also be earned and worn
    by persons who are not members of the movement, inasfar as they
    comply racially and ideologically with the National Socialist
    requirements”. (_2354-PS_)

The pamphlet entitled “The SA”, shows that responsibility for conducting
this nation-wide program was lodged in the operational main office of
the SA (_2168-PS_). According to the pamphlet it was the duty of this
office to—

    “Prepare the fighting training of the bodies of all Germans
    capable of bearing arms (_Wehrfahig_) and as preparation
    therefore must organize the execution of corporal exercises
    (basic physical training) and sports achievements, so that the
    widest stratum of the population is laid hold upon and will be
    kept in condition to bear arms (_Wehrtuchtig_) both physically
    and spiritually, as well as ideologically in character up to
    greatest old age.” (_2168-PS_)

The extent to which the SA carried the military training program into
the lives of the German people may be seen from the following excerpt
from “Das Archiv” (_3215-PS_):

    “Next to the companies of the SA were the sport badge
    associations (SAG) in which all the militaristic nationals
    entered who were prepared to voluntarily answer the call of the
    SA for the preservation of military proficiency. Up until now
    around 800,000 nationals outside of the SA could successfully
    undergo the physical betterment as well as the political
    military training of the SA on the basis of the SA sport badge.

    “As pronounced proof heretofore it may be shown that alone
    13,400 officers and around 30,000 non-coms in the Reserve Corps
    of the Wehrmacht from its (SA) own ranks stand at the disposal
    of the SA and can be employed at any time for the direction of
    SA military forces * * *”. (_3215-PS_)

In 1939, the extension of the SA military program to non-SA members was
officially recognized by Hitler. This occurred in the ordinance for the
execution of the Hitler decree of 16 January, 1942:

    “Every German man who has completed his seventeenth year and who
    shows preliminary requirements for honorary service with the
    weapon, has the _customary_ duty to win the SA military insignia
    in preparation for military service.

    “During the years in the Hitler Youth following his sixteenth
    year, he is to prepare himself for the winning of the SA
    military insignia.” (_2383-PS_)

The SA, in its military training program, was no mere marching and
drilling society. It embraced every phase of the technique of modern
warfare. This appears clearly from the articles on military training
which appear throughout the issues of “_Der SA-Mann”. The titles of
these articles indicate their substance. The foll_owing are a few

        Article entitled: “Defense Platoon and the Company in
        Battle” (with diagrams), 27 January, 1934, p. 10.

        Article entitled: “_Die Luftwaffe_” (with diagrams on
        Aircraft Gunnery), 3 February 1934, p. 7.

        Article entitled: “Pistol Shooting,” 17 February, 1934,
        p. 7.

        Article entitled: “Orientation in Terrain,” 10 March,
        1934, p. 7.

        Article entitled: “First Aid—ABC,” 17 March, 1934, p.

        Article entitled: “We go into the Terrain” (relating to
        map study and map symbols), 24 March, 1934, p. 7.

        Article entitled: “What every SA Man must know about
        Aviation,” 21 April, 1934, p. 13.

        Article entitled: “Expert firing in German National
        Sport” (relating to small caliber firing), 12 May, 1934,
        p. 7.

        Article entitled: “Chemical Warfare,” 19 May, 1934, p.

        Article entitled: “What every SA Man should know about
        Aviation,” 19 May, 1934, p. 12.

        Article entitled: “Flame Throwers on the Front,” 26 May,
        1934, p. 14.

        Article entitled: “Modern Battle Methods in the View of
        the SA Man,” 2 June, 1934, p. 14.

        Article entitled: “The Significance of Tanks and Motors
        in Modern War,” 4 August, 1934, p. 13.

        Article entitled: “The Rifle 98,” 8 September, 1934, p.

        Article entitled: “The Combat Battalion” (with
        description of tactical missions and maneuvers of the
        battalion), 15 September, 1934, p. 7.

        Article entitled: “Air Strategy and Air Tactics,” 29
        September, 1934, p. 7.

        Article entitled: “Gas Protection and the Gas Mask,” 6
        October, 1934, p. 7.

        Article entitled: “The Pistol 08” (with diagram of the
        pistol, its nomenclature and field stripping), 6
        October, 1934, p. 7.

        Article entitled: “Training the SA in Map and Terrain
        Study,” 24 November, 1934, p. 4.

        Article entitled: “The Defense,” with subheading “What
        does the War of Tomorrow look like?” 1 December, 1934,
        p. 13.

        Series of articles by a Wehrmacht officer entitled:
        “Training in the Army of the Third Reich,” beginning on
        12 January, 1935, p. 13.

        Series of articles entitled: “Construction and
        Composition of various units of the Modern Army,”
        written by a Brigadier General in the
        _Wehrmacht_—beginning 26 January, 1935, p. 15, and
        ending 20 April, 1935, p. 16.

        Article entitled: “Small caliber firing” (with sketches
        of ammunition, rifles, targets, and aiming technique),
        26 January, 1935, p. 19.

        Article entitled: “Armies of Tomorrow” (discussion of
        anticipated developments in motorized and mechanized
        warfare. One section of the article is devoted to “Plans
        of foreign countries with respect to motorized armies”),
        30 March, 1935, p. 14.

The issues of “_Der SA-Mann_” also contain many photographs and articles
demonstrating SA participation in military exercise, including forced
marching, battle maneuvers, obstacle runs, small calibre firing, and the
like. Among these photographs and articles are the following:

        Each issue of “_Der SA-Mann_” contains advertisements
        for the sale of various items of military equipment,
        including uniforms, steel helmets, rifles, boots,
        grenades, field glasses, ammunition, etc. (See, for
        example, 20 January, 1934, p. 16; and 9 March, 1935, p.

        Picture of SA men marching in military formation
        executing “goose step,” 14 April, 1934, p. 8.

        Group of pictures showing SA Troops marching in military
        formations and in full pack and bearing flags being
        reviewed by Hitler. Title of page is “SA Marches into
        the New Year,” 12 January, 1935, p. 3.

        Photographs of uniformed SA Troops marching in streets
        of Saarbrucken with caption: “In the streets of free
        Saarbrucken thuds the marching steps of the SA,” 9
        March, 1935, p. 3.

        Group of photographs entitled: “SA Brigade 6 marches for
        the German Danzig,” 4 May, 1935, p. 3.

        Article entitled: “Who fights against us we will defeat,
        who provokes us we shall attack” (with picture of SA men
        in military formation bearing caption: “We are a
        political ideological troop”), 13 July, 1935, p. 1.

        Article entitled: “The SA is and remains the Shock Troop
        of the Third Reich” (with picture of _Gruppenfuehrer_
        reviewing SA men marching in uniform and in full pack,
        in military formation), 24 August, 1935, p. 2.

        Article entitled: “SA Men at the heavy machine gun,” 3
        July, 1936, p. 14.

        Photograph of SA men in uniform and full pack on
        obstacle run, 29 August, 1936, p. 7.

        Article entitled: “Fight, Fight, Fight” with subtitles:

        “Preparation of Francken Division for the NS War Games”
        (with picture of SA men bearing arms), 26 June, 1937, p.

        Photograph of SA men bearing weapons, bearing caption:

        “Austria’s SA: through battle, distress and persecution,
        to victory.”

        Photograph bearing caption: “German-Austrian SA was
        armed in the hour of decision,” 2 April, 1938, p. 1.

        Photograph of SA men bearing arms on battle maneuvers,
        19 August, 1938, p. 8., bearing the caption: “The way to

        Article entitled: “SA and the _Wehrmacht_” (with
        pictures of SA men on field maneuvers throwing hand
        grenades), 2 September, 1938, p. 1.

        Photograph of SA men on field maneuvers, 9 September,
        1938, p. 18.

        Photograph of SA men bearing arms in trenches,
        apparently on field maneuvers, 16 September, 1938, p. 1.

        Photographs of SA men marching under arms, and on the
        rifle range, 30 September, 1938, p. 4. (Frankens-SA).

        Photograph of SA Regiment _Feldherrnhalle_ marching in
        goose-step with rifles and steel helmets and with the
        Luftwaffe insignia of sovereignty on their uniform and
        helmets, 11 November, 1938, p. 4.

        Photograph entitled “Regiment _Feldherrnhalle_ was
        there”, (referring to the incorporation of the
        Sudetenland), 14 October, 1938, p. 6.

        Photograph bearing the caption: “Training with the KK
        Rifle. Something entirely new for the Sudeten German.
        Every SA man must be outstanding in marksmanship,” 6
        January, 1939, p. 3.

        Article entitled: “The SA—the forger of military
        power,” with the subheading: “The SA as Bearer of the
        Pre-military Training,” 27 January, 1939, p. 1.

        Photograph of Von Brauchitsch (_Wehrmacht_) and Lutze
        reviewing the SA, 3 February, 1939, p. 3.

        Photograph of SA on march with full pack and rifles.
        (Frankens-SA), 3 February, 1939, p. 1.

   C. _Cooperation with the Wehrmacht in Preparation for Aggression._

Evidence of the SA’s participation in the conspiracy is found in the
care which was taken at all times to coordinate the military training
program of the SA with the requirements of the _Wehrmacht_. As early as
1934, an SA memorandum provided that the SA chief of training and his
subordinates should remain—

    “* * * in direct touch with the respective offices and sections
    of the Reich Defense Ministry.” (_2823-PS_)

The same memorandum recites that a Lieutenant-Colonel of the _Wehrmacht_
was assigned to the SA with the duty of participating—

    “* * * in all questions regarding training and organization * *
    *.” (_2823-PS_)

Another SA memorandum declared that:

    “* * * permanent liaison between the Reich Defense Ministry and
    the Supreme Commander of the SA * * * has been assured.”

Hitler’s words regarding cooperation between _Wehrmacht_ and SA were as

    “The requirements of the _Wehrmacht_ are to be taken into
    consideration in organization and training.

    “The Chief of Staff of the SA releases the required executionary
    directives in agreement with the Commander in Chief of the
    _Wehrmacht_ units. He alone is responsible for the fulfillment.”

A speech by the Chief of Staff of the SA relating to the technical and
specialized branches of the SA revealed that this opportunity for
collaboration with the _Wehrmacht_ in specialized military training was
utilized to the utmost:

    “In the course of this development also special missions for
    military betterment (program) were placed on the SA. The Fuehrer
    gave the SA the cavalry and motor training and called SA
    Obergruppenfuehrer Littmann as Reich Inspector with the mission
    to secure the * * * recruits and requirements for the German
    Wehrmacht through the SA. In close cooperation with parts of the
    Wehrmacht special certificates were created for the
    communication, engineer and medical units which, like the
    cavalry certificate of the SA, are valued as statement of
    preference for employment in said units.” (_3215-PS_)

The specialized training given SA members, in accordance with the
requirements of technical branches of the _Wehrmacht_, is described by
SA Sturmfuehrer Bayer as follows (_2168-PS_):

    “* * * On one side the young SA man who enters the armed forces
    (_Wehrmacht_) from his branch, comes prepared with a multitude
    of prerequisites which facilitate and speed up training in
    technical respects; while on the other side those very soldiers,
    having served, who return out of the armed forces into the SA
    keep themselves, by constant practice, in a trained condition
    physically and mentally and impart their knowledge to their

    “Thus they contribute a considerable portion to the enhancement
    of armed strength (_Wehrkraft_) and armed spirit (_Wehrgeist_)
    of the German people.” (_2168-PS_)

And, with respect to the mounted or cavalry SA—

    “* * * the SA each year is able to furnish many thousands of
    young trained cavalrymen to our _Wehrmacht_. * * * At present
    the SA cavalry has at its disposal 101 cavalry units in whose
    schools, year in and year out, young Germans who are obligated
    for military service receive the training which fits him for
    entrance into a section of troops which is of their own
    choosing.” (_2168-PS_)

The close relationship between the SA and the _Wehrmacht_ is shown
throughout the issues of “_Der SA-Mann_”, which contain a number of
articles on military training written by _Wehrmacht_ officers. The same
relationship is shown in many photographs. For example, in the issue of
1 May, 1937, at page 4, there is a picture of a _Wehrmacht_ formation
drawn up in front of an SA building with SA officers and men in the
background. The picture is entitled—

    “Day after day the closed formations of the _Wehrmacht_ march in
    Wurzburg to the subscription places of the SA for thanksgiving
    to the nation in order to announce its close relation with the
    SA, and to express thanks to the Fuehrer for making the Reich
    capable of defense.”

Page 2 of the issue of 27 January, 1939, contains a photograph of the SA
Chief of Staff, Lutze, addressing a group of SA men. The photograph
bears the caption, “We will be the bridge between the Party and the
_Wehrmacht_.” Page 3 of the issue of 3 February, 1939, reproduces a
photograph of General von Brauchitsch and Chief of Staff Lutze reviewing
an SA unit.

The close cooperation between the _Wehrmacht_ and the SA, and the
significance of the SA military training program is shown by the fact
that service in the SA was considered as military service under the
Conscription Law of 1935. The Organization Book of the Party declared

    “Equally significant is a suitable education and training which
    the SA has accomplished within the yearly classes, and which
    have satisfied their arms obligation.” (_3220-PS_)

And an article in “Das Archiv” declared—

    “It was announced that conscripted SA men and Hitler Youths can
    fulfill their military conscription in the SA Regiment
    _Feldherrnhalle_ whose Commander is General Field Marshall SA
    Obergruppenfuehrer Goering. The Regiment for the first time was
    employed as Regiment of the Luftwaffe in the occupation of the
    Sudetenland under its Fuehrer and Regimental Commander SA
    Gruppenfuehrer Reimann.” (_3214-PS_)

There was never any misunderstanding among SA men as to the reasons
which lay behind their military training program. They were preparing
for war and knew it. The purpose of the so-called “Sports Program” was
announced time after time in articles in “_Der SA-Mann_.” For example,
the introduction to an article entitled, “The War of Tomorrow,” which
appeared in the issue of 6 July, 1937, at page 12, declared:

    “By decree of the Fuehrer of 18th March, 1937, the SA Sport
    Badge was declared as a means for the aggressive training of the
    body, for the fostering of a military spirit, for the retaining
    of military efficiency and thereby as a basis for German
    military power. * * *

    “* * * In the following article an attempt is made to occupy
    every SA Fuehrer, who does not have the opportunity due to their
    profession or many-sided SA services, with questions concerning
    military policy and modern war direction, to give him an overall
    view of facts, teachings, opinions and beliefs which today are
    not without decisive influence upon the military policy, upon
    the character of the coming war and upon the modern national

                D. _Participation of the SA in Warfare._

It would be natural in view of the above quotation, to expect the SA to
have been used as a striking force in the first steps of the aggressive
warfare launched by Germany, and as a basis for so-called Commando
Groups. Such was the case. SA units were among the first of the Nazi
military machine to invade Austria in the spring of 1938. This fact was
proudly announced in an article appearing in “_Der SA-Mann_” for 19
March, 1938, at p. 10, entitled, “We were the First!” Similarly, the SA
participated in the occupation of the Sudetenland (_3214-PS_). It was
announced that conscripted SA men and Hitler Youths could fulfill their
military conscription duty in the SA Regiment _Feldherrnhalle_,
commanded by General Field Marshall SA Obergruppenfuehrer Goering. The
regiment was employed for the first time as Regiment of the Luftwaffe in
the occupation of the Sudetenland, under its Fuehrer and Regimental
commander SA Gruppenfuehrer Reimann.

SA participation in the occupation of the Sudetenland is also shown by
an affidavit of Gottlob Berger, a former officer in the SS who was
assigned to the Sudeten-German Free Corps (_3036-PS_). Berger declares—

    “* * * 1. In the fall of 1938 I held the rank and title of
    Oberfuehrer in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned as SS
    Liaison Officer with Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Free Corps
    at their headquarters in the castle at Dondorf outside Bayreuth.
    In this position I was responsible for all liaison between the
    Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and Henlein and, in particular, I was
    delegated to select from the Sudeten Germans those who appeared
    to be eligible for membership in the SS or VT (_Verfuegungs
    Truppe_). In addition to myself, Liaison Officers stationed with
    Henlein included an Obergruppenfuehrer from the NSKK, whose name
    I have forgotten, and Obergruppenfuehrer Max Juettner, from the
    SA. In addition, Admiral Canaris, who was head of the OKW
    Abwehr, appeared at Dondorf nearly every two days and conferred
    with Henlein.

    “2. In the course of my official duties at Henlein’s
    Headquarters I became familiar with the composition and
    activities of the Free Corps. Three groups were being formed
    under Henlein’s direction: One in the Eisenstein area, Bavaria,
    one in the Bayreuth area; one in the Dresden area, and possibly
    a fourth group in Silesia. These groups were supposedly composed
    of refugees from the Sudetenland who had crossed the border into
    Germany, but they actually contained Germans with previous
    service in the SA and NSKK [Nazi Motor Corps] as well. These
    Germans formed the skeleton of the Free Corps. On paper the Free
    Corps had a strength of 40,000 men. Part of the equipment
    furnished to Henlein, mostly haversacks, cooking utensils and
    blankets, were supplied by the SA.” (_3036-PS_)

The adaptability of the SA to whatever purpose was required of it is
demonstrated by its activities subsequent to the outbreak of the war.
During the war the SA continued to carry out its military training
program, but it also engaged in various other functions:

    “The General of the SA, Wilhelm Schepmann, gave further orders
    to increase the employment of the SA in the homeland war
    territories because of the requirements of total war employment.
    This was done in numerous business conferences with Fuehrers of
    the SA-Divisions.

    “As a result of these conferences, as well as of measures
    already carried out earlier for the totalization of the war
    employment, the SA now has placed 86 per cent of its main
    professional Fuehrer Corps at disposal at the Front even though
    the war missions of the SA have increased in the fields of
    pre-military training, the SA penetration into new territorial
    parts of the Reich, the air war employment, the State and
    national guard etc., during war time.

    “The SA as a whole has given at present an even 70% of its
    nearly million members to the Wehrmacht.” (_3219-PS_)

The SA even extended its activities into Poland:

    “By command of the General of the SA, the ‘SA-Unit General
    Government’ was established, the command of which was taken over
    by Governor-General SA Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Frank.”

An affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, bureau chief in the RSHA, reads as

    “* * * From the beginning of 1944 on the SA also participated in
    many of the functions which had previously been entrusted only
    to the SS, SIPO and Army, for instance the guarding of
    concentration camps, the guarding of prisoner of war camps, the
    supervision over forced laborers in Germany and occupied areas.
    This cooperation of the SA was planned and arranged for by high
    officials in Berlin as early as the middle of 1943 * * *.”

       E. _Special Responsibility of Goering for the SA Program._

Hermann Goering participated in the conspiracy in his capacity as an SA
member and leader. In 1923, Goering became Commander of the entire SA. A
few months later Goering participated in the so-called Munich Putsch. SA
troops participated with him in this action.

Goering’s intention to employ the SA as a terroristic force to destroy
political opponents is shown by a speech made by him on 3 March, 1933,
at a Nazi demonstration in Frankfurt Am Main (_1856-PS_). Goering spoke
as follows:

    “Certainly, I shall use the power of the State and the police to
    the utmost, my dear Communists! So you won’t draw any false
    conclusions by the struggle to the death in which my fist will
    grasp your necks, I shall lead with those down there. Those are
    the Brown Shirts.” (_1856-PS_)

The importance of the SA under Goering in the early stages of the Nazi
movement is shown by a letter written to Goering by Hitler (_3259-PS_):

    “My dear Goering:

        “When in November 1923 the Party tried for the first time to
    conquer the power of the State, you as Commander of the SA
    created within an extraordinarily short time that instrument
    with which I could bear that struggle. Highest necessity had
    forced us to act, but a wise providence at that time denied the
    success. After receiving a grave wound you again entered the
    ranks as soon as circumstances permitted as my most loyal
    comrade in the battle for power. You contributed essentially to
    creating the basis for the 30th of January. Therefore, at the
    end of a year of the National Socialist Revolution, I desire to
    thank you wholeheartedly, my dear Party Comrade Goering, for the
    great values which you have for the National Socialist
    Revolution and consequently for the German people.

        “In cordial friendship and grateful appreciation.

                                 “(s)  Adolf Hitler!” (_3259-PS_)

Although Goering did not retain command of the SA, he at all times
maintained a close affiliation with the organization. This is shown by
the photographs of Goering participating in SA activities which have
been mentioned previously. In 1937, Goering became Commander of the
_Feldherrnhalle_ Regiment of the SA. This was the Regiment which was
employed in the occupation of the Sudetenland. (_3214-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *


                  │                                      │      │
     Document     │             Description              │ Vol. │  Page
                  │                                      │      │
                  │Charter of the International Military │      │
                  │  Tribunal, Article 9.                │  I   │       6
                  │International Military Tribunal,      │      │
                  │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│      │
                  │  Appendix B.                         │  I   │  29, 72
                  │                 ————                 │      │
                  │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a  │      │
                  │document indicates that the document  │      │
                  │was received in evidence at the       │      │
                  │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│      │
                  │before a document number indicates    │      │
                  │that the document was referred to     │      │
                  │during the trial but was not formally │      │
                  │received in evidence, for the reason  │      │
                  │given in parentheses following the    │      │
                  │description of the document. The USA  │      │
                  │series number, given in parentheses   │      │
                  │following the description of the      │      │
                  │document, is the official exhibit     │      │
                  │number assigned by the court.         │      │
                  │                 ————                 │      │
   392-PS         │Official NSDAP circular entitled “The │      │
                  │Social Life of New Germany with       │      │
                  │Special Consideration of the German   │      │
                  │Labor Front”, by Prof. Willy Mueller  │      │
                  │(Berlin, 1938). (USA 326)             │ III  │     380
                  │                                      │      │
  *787-PS         │Memorandum to Hitler from Public      │      │
                  │Prosecutor of Dresden, 18 June 1935,  │      │
                  │concerning criminal procedure against │      │
                  │Vogel on account of bodily injury     │      │
                  │while in office. (USA 421)            │ III  │     568
                  │                                      │      │
 *1395-PS         │Law to insure the unity of Party and  │      │
                  │State, 1 December 1933. 1933          │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016.   │      │
                  │(GB 252)                              │ III  │     978
                  │                                      │      │
 *1721-PS         │Confidential report of SA             │      │
                  │Brigadefuehrer, November 1938,        │      │
                  │concerning destruction of Jewish      │      │
                  │property. (USA 425)                   │  IV  │     214
                  │                                      │      │
  1725-PS         │Decree enforcing law for securing the │      │
                  │unity of Party and State, 29 March    │      │
                  │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 502.                               │  IV  │     224
                  │                                      │      │
 *1759-PS         │Affidavit of Raymond H. Geist. (USA   │      │
                  │420)                                  │  IV  │     288
                  │                                      │      │
 *1856-PS         │Extract from book entitled “Hermann   │      │
                  │Goering—Speeches and Essays”, 3rd     │      │
                  │edition 1939, p. 27. (USA 437)        │  IV  │     496
                  │                                      │      │
 *1893-PS         │Extracts from Organization Book of the│      │
                  │NSDAP, 1943 edition. (USA 323)        │  IV  │     529
                  │                                      │      │
 *2168-PS         │Book by SA Sturmfuehrer Dr. Ernst     │      │
                  │Bayer, entitled “The SA”, depicting   │      │
                  │the history, work, aim and            │      │
                  │organization of the SA. (USA 411)     │  IV  │     772
                  │                                      │      │
  2260-PS         │Settlement of Relationship between    │      │
                  │NSDAP and Stahlhelm (Steel Helmets)   │      │
                  │published in National Socialist Party │      │
                  │Press Service release, 21 June 1933.  │  IV  │     933
                  │                                      │      │
 *2354-PS         │Extracts from Organization Book of    │      │
                  │NSDAP, 5th, 6th and 7th editions,     │      │
                  │concerning SA. (USA 430) (See Chart   │      │
                  │No. 17.)                              │  IV  │    1091
                  │                                      │      │
 *2383-PS         │Ordinance for execution of decree of  │      │
                  │Fuehrer concerning position of the    │      │
                  │Head of Party Chancellery of 16       │      │
                  │January 1942, published in Decrees,   │      │
                  │Regulations, Announcements. (USA 410) │  V   │       9
                  │                                      │      │
 *2407-PS         │Order concerning the Roehm purge and  │      │
                  │appointment of Lutze as Chief of      │      │
                  │Staff, published in Voelkischer       │      │
                  │Beobachter, 1934. (USA 412)           │  V   │      82
                  │                                      │      │
 *2471-PS         │Pamphlet No. 12 in a series entitled  │      │
                  │“Here Speaks the New German”. Speech  │      │
                  │made in January 1936 by Victor Lutze, │      │
                  │Chief of Staff of SA, subject: “The   │      │
                  │Affairs and Tasks of SA”. (USA 413)   │  V   │     211
                  │                                      │      │
  2532-PS         │Extract from The Third Reich, by Gerd │      │
                  │Ruehle.                               │  V   │     268
                  │                                      │      │
 *2660-PS         │Distribution Plan for Gaue, Kreise,   │      │
                  │and Ortsgruppen, from The Bearers of  │      │
                  │Sovereignty, 2nd Issue, 3rd Year,     │      │
                  │February 1939. (USA 325)              │  V   │     365
                  │                                      │      │
 *2760-PS         │Extract from Mein Kampf by Adolf      │      │
                  │Hitler, 1933 edition. (USA 256)       │  V   │     396
                  │                                      │      │
 *2820-PS         │General Service Regulations for the SA│      │
                  │of the NSDAP, published in Munich, 12 │      │
                  │December 1933. (USA 427)              │  V   │     456
                  │                                      │      │
  2821-PS         │Memorandum from Supreme SA            │      │
                  │Headquarters, 19 March 1934,          │      │
                  │concerning organization of the SA and │      │
                  │collaboration between Wehrmacht and   │      │
                  │SA. (USA 431)                         │  V   │     458
                  │                                      │      │
  2822-PS         │Letter from the Reich Military        │      │
                  │Ministry, 26 May 1933, suggesting that│      │
                  │an SA branch and Reich Defense Council│      │
                  │be united.                            │  V   │     459
                  │                                      │      │
 *2823-PS         │Memorandum of SA Headquarters, January│      │
                  │1934, concerning assignment of        │      │
                  │Wehrmacht officer to Training Division│      │
                  │of SA. (USA 429)                      │  V   │     459
                  │                                      │      │
 *2824-PS         │Extract from book entitled            │      │
                  │“Concentration Camp Oranienburg”. (USA│      │
                  │423)                                  │  V   │     461
                  │                                      │      │
**3036-PS         │Affidavit of Gottlob Berger on the    │      │
                  │composition and activity of the       │      │
                  │Henlein Free Corps in September 1938. │      │
                  │(Objection to admission in evidence   │      │
                  │upheld.) (USA 102)                    │  V   │     742
                  │                                      │      │
**3050-A-E-PS     │Excerpts from The SA Man. (USA 414;   │      │
                  │USA 415; USA 416; USA 417; USA 418)   │      │
                  │(Referred to but not offered in       │      │
                  │evidence.)                            │  V   │     777
                  │                                      │      │
 *3054-PS         │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion   │      │
                  │picture composed of captured German   │      │
                  │film. (USA 167)                       │  V   │     801
                  │                                      │      │
 *3211-PS         │Goebbels to the SA, 17 October 1935,  │      │
                  │from The Archive, Vol. 19, October    │      │
                  │1935, p. 939. (USA 419)               │  V   │     928
                  │                                      │      │
  3212-PS         │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 34,    │      │
                  │January 1937, p. 1452.                │  V   │     929
                  │                                      │      │
  3213-PS         │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 50, May│      │
                  │1938, pp. 156-157.                    │  V   │     929
                  │                                      │      │
  3214-PS         │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 55,    │      │
                  │October 1938, p. 1069. (USA 432)      │  V   │     930
                  │                                      │      │
 *3215-PS         │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 60,    │      │
                  │March 1939, p. 1834. (USA 426)        │  V   │     930
                  │                                      │      │
 *3216-PS         │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 97,    │      │
                  │April 1942, p. 54. (USA 434)          │  V   │     933
                  │                                      │      │
  3217-PS         │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 97,    │      │
                  │April 1942, p. 54.                    │  V   │     933
                  │                                      │      │
  3218-PS         │Excerpt from The Archive, October     │      │
                  │1933, pp. 482-485.                    │  V   │     934
                  │                                      │      │
 *3219-PS         │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 125,   │      │
                  │August 1944, p. 367. (USA 433)        │  V   │     934
                  │                                      │      │
 *3220-PS         │Excerpt from Organization Book of     │      │
                  │NSDAP, 1943 edition, p. 358. (USA 323)│  V   │     935
                  │                                      │      │
 *3221-PS         │Affidavit of William F. Sollman, 26   │      │
                  │October 1945. (USA 422)               │  V   │     936
                  │                                      │      │
 *3232-PS         │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 26  │      │
                  │November 1945. (USA 435)              │  V   │     937
                  │                                      │      │
 *3252-PS         │Extract from book Hermann Goering, The│      │
                  │Man and His Work, by Eric Gritzbach,  │      │
                  │1937. (USA 424)                       │  V   │     957
                  │                                      │      │
 *3259-PS         │Extract from book Hermann Goering, The│      │
                  │Man and His Work, by Eric Gritzbach,  │      │
                  │p. 69. (USA 424)                      │  V   │    1007
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-44            │Circular, 25 July 1933, referring to  │      │
                  │publications of SA activities. (USA   │      │
                  │428)                                  │  VI  │    1024
                  │                                      │      │
Affidavit F       │Affidavit of Josef Dietrich, 20-21    │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │ VIII │     631
                  │                                      │      │
  L-198           │State Department Dispatch by Consul   │      │
                  │General Messersmith, 14 March 1933,   │      │
                  │concerning molesting of American      │      │
                  │citizens in Berlin.                   │ VII  │    1026
                  │                                      │      │
  L-199           │Newspaper clippings from Berliner     │      │
                  │Tageblatt, 29 March 1933, regarding   │      │
                  │boycott action.                       │ VII  │    1034
                  │                                      │      │
Statement IX      │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│      │
                  │the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow,   │      │
                  │fall 1945.                            │ VIII │     707
                  │                                      │      │
Statement XIII    │Outline of Defense of Dr. Robert Ley, │      │
                  │written in Nurnberg prison, 24 October│      │
                  │1945.                                 │ VIII │     749
                  │                                      │      │
**Chart No. 8     │Organization of the SA. (Enlargement  │
                  │displayed to Tribunal.)               │  End of VIII
                  │                                      │      │
 *Chart No. 17    │Foreign Organization of the NSDAP.    │
                  │(2354-PS; USA 430)                    │  End of VIII

                       5. THE SCHUTZSTAFFELN (SS)

In the early weeks of the trial, there appeared in a newspaper
circulated in Nurnberg an account of a correspondent’s visit to a camp
in which SS prisoners of war were confined. The thing which particularly
struck the correspondent was the one question asked by the SS prisoners:
Why are we charged as war criminals? What have we done except our normal

The evidence which follows will answer that question. It will show that
just as the Nazi Party was the core of the conspiracy, so the SS was the
very essence of Nazism. For the SS was the elite group of the Party,
composed of the most thorough-going adherents of the Nazi cause, pledged
to blind devotion to Nazi principles, and prepared to carry them out
without any question and at any cost. It was a group in which every
ordinary value was so subverted that today its members can ask, what is
there unlawful about the things we have done?

In the evidence of the conspirators’ program for aggressive war, for
concentration camps, for the extermination of the Jews, for enslavement
of foreign labor and illegal use of prisoners of war and for the
deportation and Germanization of inhabitants of conquered territories,
in all this evidence the name of the SS runs like a thread. Again and
again that organization and its components are referred to. It performed
a responsible role in each of these criminal activities, because it was
and indeed had to be a criminal organization.

The creation and development of such an organization was essential for
the execution of the conspirators’ plans. Their sweeping program and the
measures they were prepared to use and did use, could be fully
accomplished neither through the machinery of the government nor of the
Party. Things had to be done for which no agency of government and no
political party even the Nazi Party, would openly take full
responsibility. A specialized type of apparatus was needed—an apparatus
which was to some extent connected with the government and given
official support, but which, at the same time, could maintain a
quasi-independent status so that all its acts could be attributed
neither to the government nor to the Party as a whole. The SS was that

Like the SA, it was one of the seven components or formations of the
Nazi Party referred to in the Decree on Enforcement of the Law for
Securing the Unity of Party and State of 29 March 1935 (_1725-PS_). But
its status was above that of the other formations. As the plans of the
conspirators progressed, it acquired new functions, new
responsibilities, and an increasingly more important place in the
regime. It developed during the course of the conspiracy into a highly
complex machine, the most powerful in the Nazi State, spreading its
tentacles into every field of Nazi activity.

The evidence which follows will be directed toward showing first, the
origin and early development of the SS; second, how it was
organized—that is, its structure and its component parts; third, the
basic principles governing the selection of its members and the
obligations they undertook; and finally, its aims and the means used to
accomplish them.

The history, organization, and publicly announced functions of the SS
are not controversial matters. They are not matters to be learned only
from secret files and captured documents. They were recounted in many
publications, circulated widely throughout Germany and the world—in
official books of the Nazi Party itself, and in books, pamphlets, and
speeches by SS and State officials published with SS and Party approval.
Throughout this section there will be frequent reference to and
quotation from a few such publications.

              A. _Origin and General Functions of the SS._

(1) _Origin._ The first aim of the conspirators was to gain a foothold
in politically hostile territory, to acquire mastery of the street, and
to combat any and all opponents with force. For that purpose they needed
their own private, personal police organization. The SA was created to
fill such a role. But the SA was outlawed in 1923. When Nazi Party
activity was again resumed in 1925, the SA remained outlawed. To fill
its place and to play the part of Hitler’s own personal police, small
mobile groups known as protective squadrons—_Schutzstaffel_—were
created. This was the origin of the SS in 1925. With the reinstatement
of the SA in 1926, the SS for the next few years ceased to play a major
role. But it continued to exist as an organization within the SA—under
its own leader, however—the Reichsfuehrer SS.

This early history of the SS is related in two authoritative
publications. The first is a book by SS Standartenfuehrer Gunter
d’Alquen entitled “The SS” (_2284-PS_). This pamphlet of some 30 pages,
published in 1939, is an authoritative account of the history, mission,
and organization of the SS. As indicated on its fly leaf, it was written
at the direction of the Reichsfuehrer SS, Heinrich Himmler. Its author
was the editor of the official SS publication “_Das Schwarze Korps_”.
The second publication is an article by Himmler, entitled “Organization
and Obligations of the SS and the Police.” It was published in 1937 in a
booklet containing a series of speeches or essays by important officials
of the Party and the State, and known as “National Political Course for
the Armed Forces from 15 to 23 January 1937”. (_1992-A-PS_)

As early as 1929, the conspirators recognized that their plans required
an organization in which the main principles of the Nazi system,
specifically the racial principles, would not only be jealously guarded
but would be carried to such extremes as to inspire or intimidate the
rest of the population. Such an organization would also have to be
assured complete freedom on the part of the leaders and blind obedience
on the part of the members. The SS was built up to meet this need. The
following statement appears on page 7 of d’Alquen’s book, “_Die SS_”

    “On the 16th of January, 1929, Adolf Hitler appointed his tested
    comrade of long standing, Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsfuehrer SS.
    Heinrich Himmler assumed charge therewith of the entire
    _Schutzstaffel_ totaling at the time 280 men, with the express
    and particular commission of the Fuehrer to form of this
    organization an elite troop of the Party, a troop dependable in
    every circumstance. With this day the real history of the SS
    begins as it stands before us today in all its deeper essential
    features, firmly anchored into the national Socialist movement.
    For the SS and its Reichsfuehrer, Heinrich Himmler, its first SS
    man, have become inseparable in the course of these
    battle-filled years.” (_2284-PS_)

Carrying out Hitler’s directive, Himmler proceeded to build up out of
this small force of men an elite organization which, to use d’Alquen’s
words, was “composed of the best physically, the most dependable, and
the most faithful men in the Nazi movement.” As d’Alquen further states,
at page 12 of his book:

    “When the day of seizure of power had finally come, there were
    52,000 SS men, who in this spirit bore the revolution in the
    van, marched into the new State which they began to help form
    everywhere, in their stations and positions, in profession and
    in science, and in all their essential tasks.” (_2284-PS_)

(2) _General Functions._ The conspirators now had the machinery of
government in their hands. The initial function of the SS—that of
acting as their private army and personal police force—was thus
completed. But its mission had in fact really just begun. That mission
is described in the Organizations book of the NSDAP for 1943 as follows:


    “The most original and most eminent duty of the SS is to serve
    as the protector of the Fuehrer.

    “By order of the Fuehrer its sphere of duties has been amplified
    to include the internal security of the Reich.” (_2640-PS_)

This new mission—protecting the internal security of the regime—was
somewhat more colorfully described by Himmler in his pamphlet, “The SS
as an Anti-bolshevist Fighting Organization,” published in 1936

    “We shall unremittingly fulfill our task, the guaranty of the
    security of Germany from the interior, just as the _Wehrmacht_
    guarantees the safety, the honor, the greatness, and the peace
    of the Reich from the exterior. We shall take care that never
    again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the
    Jewish-Bolshevistic revolution of subhumans be able to be
    kindled either from within or through emissaries from without.
    Without pity we shall be a merciless sword of justice for all
    those forces whose existence and activity we know, on the day of
    the slightest attempt, may it be today, may it be in decades or
    may it be in centuries.” (_1851-PS_)

This conception necessarily required an extension of the duties of the
SS into many fields. It involved, of course, the performance of police
functions. But it involved more. It required participation in the
suppression and extermination of all internal opponents of the regime.
It meant participation in extending the regime beyond the borders of
Germany, and eventually, participation in every type of activity
designed to secure a hold over those territories and populations which,
through military conquest, had come under German domination.

               B. _Organization and Branches of the SS._

The expansion of SS duties and activities resulted in the creation of
several branches and numerous departments and the development of a
highly complex machinery. Although those various branches and
departments cannot be adequately described out of the context of their
history, a few words about the structure of the SS may be useful.

For this purpose reference is made to the chart depicting the
organization of the SS as it appeared in 1945. This chart was examined
by Gottlob Berger, formerly Chief of the SS Main Office, who stated in
an attached affidavit that it correctly represents the organization of
the SS (_Chart Number 3_).

(1) _Supreme Command of the SS._ At the very top of the chart is
Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer SS, who commanded the entire organization.
Immediately below, running across the chart and down the right hand
side, embraced within the heavy line, are the twelve main departments
constituting the Supreme Command of the SS. Some of these departments
have been broken down into the several offices of which they were
composed, as indicated by the boxes beneath them. Other departments have
not been so broken down. It is not intended to indicate that there were
not subdivisions of these latter departments as well. The breakdown is
shown only in those cases where the constituent offices of some
department may have a particular significance in this case.

These departments and their functions are described in two official Nazi
publications: The first is the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943,
at pages 419-422 (_2640-PS_). The second is an SS manual, which bears
the title: “The Soldier Friend—Pocket Diary for the German Armed
Forces—Edition D: Waffen SS” (_2825-PS_). It was prepared at the
direction of the Reichsfuehrer SS and issued by the SS Main Office for
the year ending 1942. In addition, the departments are listed in a
directory of the SS published by one of the Main Departments of the SS
(_2769-PS_). This document was found in the files of the Personal Staff
of the Reichsfuehrer SS. It is entitled “Directory for the
_Schutzstaffel_ of the NSDAP, 1 November 1944”, marked “Restricted”, and
bears the notation “Published by SS Fuerhungshauptamt, Kommandant of the
General SS. Berlin—Wilmersdorf.”

Returning to the chart, following down the central spine from the
Reichsfuehrer SS to the regional level, the Higher SS and Police
Leaders, the supreme SS commanders in each region are reached.
Immediately below these officials is the breakdown of the organization
of the Allgemeine or General SS. To the left are indicated two other
branches of the SS—the Death Head Units (_Totenkopf Verbaende_) and the
Waffen SS. To the right under the HSS Pf is the SD. All of which,
together with the SS Police Regiments, are specifically named in the
Indictment (Appendix B) as being included in the SS.

(2) _Principal Branches of the SS._ Up to 1933 there were no such
specially designated branches. The SS was a single group, made up of
“volunteer political soldiers.” It was out of this original nucleus that
new units developed.

(_a_) _The Allgemeine SS._ The Allgemeine (General) SS was the main stem
from which the various branches grew. It was composed of all members of
the SS who did not belong to any of the special branches. It was the
backbone of the entire organization. The personnel and officers of the
Main Departments of the SS Supreme Command were members of this branch.
Except for high ranking officers and those remaining in staff
capacities, as in the Main Offices of the SS Supreme Command, its
members were part-time volunteers. Its members were utilized in about
every phase of SS activity. They were called upon in anti-Jewish pogroms
of 1938; they took over the task of guarding concentration camps during
the war; they participated in the colonization and resettlement program.
In short, the term “SS” normally meant the General SS.

It was organized on military lines as will be seen from the chart
(_Chart Number 3_), ranging from district and subdistrict down through
the regiment, battalion, and company, to the platoon. Until after the
beginning of the war it constituted numerically the largest branch of
the SS. In 1939 d’Alquen, the official SS spokesmen, said, in his book,
“The SS” (_2284-PS_):

    “The strength of the General SS, 240,000 men, is subdivided
    today into 14 corps, 38 divisions, 140 infantry regiments, 19
    mounted regiments, 14 communication battalions and 19 engineer
    battalions as well as motorized and medical units. This General
    SS stands fully and wholly on call as in the fighting years,
    except for one small part of the chief leaders and men. The
    corps, which are presently led by a Lt. General or Major
    General, are subdivided into divisions, regiments, battalions
    and companies.” (_2284-PS_)

Similar reference to the military organization of the General SS will be
found in Himmler’s speech, “Organization and Obligations of the SS and
the Police” (_1992-A-PS_), and in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP
for 1943 (_2640-PS_). Members of this branch, however,—with the
exception of certain staff personnel—were subject to compulsory
military service. As a result of the draft of members of the General SS
of military age into the Army, the numerical strength of presently
active members considerably declined during the war. Older SS men and
those working in or holding high positions in the Main Departments of
the Supreme Command of the SS remained. Its entire strength during the
war was probably not in excess of 40,000 men.

(_b_) _The SD._ The second component to be mentioned is the Security
Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS, almost always referred to as the SD.
Himmler described the SD in these words (_1992-A-PS_):

    “I now come to the Security Service (SD); it is the great
    ideological intelligence service of the Party and, in the long
    run, also that of the State. During the time of struggle for
    power it was only the intelligence service of the SS. At that
    time we had, for quite natural reasons, an intelligence service
    with the regiments, battalions and companies. We had to know
    what was going on on the opponents side, whether the Communists
    intended to hold a meeting today or not, whether our people were
    to be suddenly attacked or not, and similar things. I separated
    this service already in 1931 from the troops, from the units of
    the General SS, because I considered it to be wrong. For one
    thing, the secrecy is endangered, then the individual men, or
    even the companies, are too likely to discuss everyday
    problems.” (_1992-A-PS_)

Although, as Himmler put it, the SD was only the intelligence service of
the SS during the years preceding the accession of the Nazis to power,
it became a much more important organization promptly thereafter. It had
been developed into such a powerful and scientific espionage system
under its chief, Reinhard Heydrich, that on 9 June 1934, just a few
weeks before the bloody purge of the SA, it was made, by decree of Hess,
the sole intelligence and counter-intelligence agency of the entire Nazi
Party (_2284-PS_). Its organization and numbers, as they stood in 1937,
were thus described by Himmler (_1992-A-PS_):

    “The Security Service was already separated from the troop in
    1931 and separately organized. Its higher headquarters, coincide
    today with the _Oberabschnitte_ and _Abschnitte_—[that is, the
    districts and subdistricts of the General SS]—and it has also
    field offices, its own organization of officials with a great
    many Command Posts, approximately three to four thousand men
    strong, at least when it is built up.” (_1992-A-PS_)

Up to 1939 its headquarters was the SS Main Security Office
(_Sicherheitshauptamt_), which became amalgamated in 1939 into the Reich
Main Security Office (or RSHA), one of the SS main departments shown on
the chart (_Chart Number 3_).

The closer and closer collaboration of the SD with the Gestapo and
Criminal Police (Kripo), which eventually resulted in the creation of
the RSHA, as well as the activities in which the SD engaged in
partnership with the Gestapo are discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.
The SD was, of course, at all times an integral and important component
of the SS. But it is more practicable to deal with it in connection with
the activities of the whole repressive police system with which it

(_c_) _The Waffen SS._ The third component is the Waffen SS, the combat
arm of the SS, which was created, trained, and finally utilized for the
purposes of aggressive war. The reason underlying the creation of this
combat branch was described in the Organizations Book of the Nazi Party
for 1943:

    “The Waffen SS originated out of the thought: to create for the
    Fuehrer a selected long service troop for the fulfillment of
    special missions. It was to render it possible for members of
    the General SS, as well as for volunteers who fulfill the
    special requirements of the SS, to fight in the battle for the
    evolution of the National Socialist idea, with weapon in hand,
    in unified groups, partly within the framework of the Army.”

The term “Waffen SS” did not come into use until after the beginning of
the war. Up to that time there were two branches of the SS composed of
fulltime, professional, well-trained soldiers: the so-called _SS
Verfuegungstruppe_, translatable perhaps as “SS Emergency Troops”; and
the _SS Totenkopf Verbaende_, the “Death Head Units.” After the
beginning of the war, the units of the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ were
brought up to division strength, and new divisions were added to them.
Moreover, parts of the SS Death Head Units were formed into a division,
the _SS Totenkopf Division_. All these divisions then came to be known
collectively as the “Waffen SS”.

This development is traced in the Organization Book of the Nazi Party
for 1943:

    “The origin of the Waffen SS goes back to the decree of 17 March
    1933, establishing the “Stabswache” with an original strength of
    120 men. Out of this small group developed the later-called SS
    Verfuegungstruppe (SS Emergency Force).” (_2640-PS_)

The function and status of the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ are described in a
Top Secret Hitler order, 17 August 1938 (_647-PS_). That order provides,
in part:

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “II. The Armed Units of the SS.

    “A. (The _SS Verfuegungstruppe_)

    “1. The _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ is neither a part of the
    Wehrmacht nor a part of the police. It is a standing armed unit
    exclusively at my disposal. As such and as a unit of the NSDAP
    its members are to be selected by the Reichsfuehrer SS according
    to the philosophical and political standards which I have
    ordered for the NSDAP and for the _Schutzstaffel_. Its members
    are to be trained and its ranks filled with volunteers from
    those who are subject to serve in the army who have finished
    their duties in the obligatory labor service. The service period
    for volunteers is for 4 years. It may be prolonged for _SS
    Unterfuehrer_. Such regulations are in force for SS leaders. The
    regular compulsory military service (par. 8 of the law relating
    to military service) is fulfilled by service of the same amount
    of time in the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “III. Orders for the Case of Mobilization.

    “A. The employment of the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ in case of
    mobilization is a double one.

    “1. By the Supreme Commander of the Army within the wartime
    army. In that case it comes completely under military laws and
    regulations, but remains a unit of the NSDAP politically.

    “2. In case of necessity in the interior according to my orders,
    in that case it is under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the
    German Police.

    “In case of mobilization I myself will make the decision about
    the time, strength and manner of the incorporation of the _SS
    Verfuegungstruppe_ into the wartime army, these things will
    depend on the inner-political situation at that time.”

Immediately after the issuance of this decree, this militarized force
was employed with the Army for aggressive purposes—the taking over of
the Sudetenland. Following this action, feverish preparations to
motorize the force and to organize new units, such as antitank, machine
gun, and reconnaissance battalions, were undertaken pursuant to further
directives of the Fuehrer. By September 1939, the force was fully
motorized, its units had been increased to division strength, and it was
prepared for combat. These steps are described in the National Socialist
Yearbook for the years 1940 (_2164-PS_) and 1941 (_2163-PS_). The
Yearbook was an official publication of the Nazi Party, edited by
Reichsleiter Robert Ley and published by the Nazi Party publishing

After the launching of the Polish invasion, and as the war progressed,
still further divisions were added. The Organizations Book of the Nazi
Party for 1943 (_2640-PS_) lists some eight divisions and two infantry
brigades as existing at the end of 1942. This was no longer a mere
emergency force. It was an SS army and hence came to be designated as
the “Waffen SS” that is, “Armed” or “Combat” SS. Himmler referred to the
spectacular development of this SS combat branch in his speech at Posen
on 4 October 1943 to SS Gruppenfuehrers, in these terms:

    “* * * Now I come to our own development, to that of the SS in
    the past months. Looking back on the whole war, this development
    was fantastic. It took place at an absolutely terrific speed.
    Let us look back a little to 1939. At that time we were a few
    regiments, guard units (_Wachverbande_) 8 to 9,000 strong,—that
    is, not even a division, all in all 25 to 28,000 men at the
    outside. True, we were armed, but really only got our artillery
    regiment as our heavy arm two months before the war began.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In the hard battles of this year, the Waffen-SS has been welded
    together in the bitterest hours from the most varied divisions
    and sections, and from these it formed: bodyguard units
    (_Leibstandarte_), military SS (_Verfuegungstruppe_), Death’s
    Head Units, and then the Germanic SS. Now when our ‘Reich’,
    Death’s Head Cavalry Divisions and ‘Viking’ Divisions were
    there, everyone knew in these last weeks: ‘Viking’ is at my
    side, ‘Reich’ is at my side, ‘Death’s Head’ is at my
    side,—‘Thank God’ now nothing can happen to us.” (_1919-PS_)

The transformation of a small emergency force into a vast combat Army
did not result in any separation of this branch from the SS. Although
tactically under the command of the _Wehrmacht_ while in the field, it
remained as much a part of the SS as any other branch of that
organization. Throughout the war it was recruited, trained, administered
and supplied by the main offices of the SS Supreme Command.
Ideologically and racially its members were selected in conformity with
SS standards, as shown by the recruiting standards of the Waffen SS
published in the SS manual, “The Soldier Friend” (_2825-PS_). A section
of that manual entitled “The Way to the Waffen SS,” reads:

    “Today at last is the longed-for day of the entrance examination
    where the examiners and physicians decide whether or not the
    candidate is ideologically and physically qualified to do
    service in the Armed Forces SS.

    “Everyone has acquainted himself with the comprehensive Manual
    for the Waffen SS; the principal points are as follows:

    “1. Service in the Armed Forces SS counts as military service.
    Only volunteers are accepted.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “3. Every pure-blooded German in good health between the ages of
    17 and 45 can become a member of the armed forces SS. He must
    meet all the requirements of the SS, must be of excellent
    character, have no criminal record, and be an ardent adherent to
    all Nazi socialist doctrines. Members of the _Streifendienst_
    and of the _Landdienst_ of the Hitler Youth will be given
    preference because their aptitudes, qualities and schooling are
    indicative that they have become acquainted very early with the
    ideology of the SS.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In all cases of doubt or difficulty the recruiting offices of
    the Waffen SS will advise and aid volunteers. They have branches
    over the entire Reich, always at the seat of the Service Command
    Headquarters, and work closely with the recruiting of the Waffen
    SS in the Main Office (SS Hauptamt) of the Reichsfuehrer SS.”

The recruiting activities of the SS Main Office are illustrated by its
recruiting pamphlet, “The SS Calls You,” an elaborate illustrated
booklet containing full information covering the Waffen SS:

    “If you answer the call of the Waffen SS and volunteer to join
    the ranks of the great Front of SS Divisions, you will belong to
    a corps which has from the very beginning been directed toward
    outstanding achievements, and, because of this fact, has
    developed an especially deep feeling of comradeship. You will be
    bearing arms with a corps that embraces the most valuable
    elements of the young German generation. Over and above that you
    will be especially bound to the National Socialist ideology.”

The SS Main Office, through which these recruiting activities were
conducted, was one of the principal departments of the SS Supreme
Command. It is shown on the chart (the second box from the left) (_Chart
Number 3_). In the breakdown of that department, shown by the boxes
underneath, will be found the central recruiting office.

Other departments of the Supreme Command performed other functions in
connection with the Waffen SS. The SS Operational Headquarters (_SS
Fuehrungshauptamt_)—the fifth box from the left—contains the Command
Headquarters of the Waffen SS (_Chart Number 3_). The functions of this
department are thus defined in the SS Manual, “The Soldier Friend”:

    “In the _Fuehrungshauptamt_ the command office of the Waffen SS
    handles tasks of military leadership: Training and organization
    of the units of the Waffen SS, supply of the troops with arms,
    equipment and ammunition, procurement of motor vehicles for the
    Waffen SS and General SS, personnel and disciplinary affairs.”

The SS Legal Main Office (_Hauptamt SS Gericht_) (indicated on the chart
by the second box from the top on the right hand side within the heavy
embracing line—(_Chart Number 3_)) controlled the administration of
courts-martial and discipline within the Waffen SS. The secret Hitler
order of 17 August 1938 (_647-PS_) had, it is true, provided that in the
event of mobilization the SS militarized forces should come completely
under military laws and regulations. That provision was modified by
subsequent enactments: The decree of 17 October 1939 relating to special
jurisdiction in penal matters for members of the SS and for members of
police groups on special tasks (_2946-PS_); and the decree of 17 April
1940, entitled “Second Decree for the Implementation of the Decree
Relating to a Special Jurisdiction in Penal Matters for Members of the
SS” (_2947-PS_). These two decrees established a special jurisdiction in
penal matters for various classes of SS members, including members of
the SS militarized units, in cases which would ordinarily fall under the
jurisdiction of the _Wehrmacht_; and created special SS courts to handle
such cases under the direction of the SS Legal Main Office. Thus, in the
vital question of discipline, as well as in recruiting, administration,
and supply, the Waffen SS was subject to the SS Supreme Command.

The place of the Waffen SS as an integral part of the entire SS
organization was strongly emphasized by Himmler in his address to
officers of the _SS Leibstandarte_ “Adolf Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:

    “You must also consider the following: I cannot concentrate my
    mind solely on—now, please don’t become conceited—the most
    splendid part of the SS because it _is_ the most positive part
    and because the trade you are following _is_ the most positive
    and most manly. I cannot do that. I must always have the
    _entire_ SS in my mind.

    “If I did not see this part, I would deny life to this most
    positive and most manly part of our activity; i.e., the Armed
    SS. I would deny your life. Because this armed SS will live only
    if the entire SS is alive. If the entire corps is actually an
    order which lives according to these laws and realizes that one
    part cannot exist without the other—you are unimaginable
    without the General SS, and the latter is not imaginable without
    you. The police is not imaginable without the SS, nor are we
    imaginable without this executive branch of the state which is
    in our hands.” (_1918-PS_)

(_d_) _The Totenkopf Verbaende._

The fourth component to be mentioned is the SS Death Head Units (_SS
Totenkopf Verbaende_). Their origin and purpose are succinctly described
by d’Alquen on page 20 of his book, “_Die SS_”:

    “The SS Death Head Units form one part of the garrisoned SS.
    They arose from volunteers of the General SS who were recruited
    for the guarding of concentration camps in 1933.

    “Their mission, aside from the indoctrination of the armed
    political soldier, is guarding enemies of the State who are held
    in concentration camps.

    “The SS Death Head Units obligate their members to 12 years
    service. It is composed mainly of men who have already fulfilled
    their duty to serve in the _Wehrmacht_. This time of service is
    counted completely.” (_2284-PS_)

Since the Death Head Units, like the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_, were
composed of well trained professional soldiers, they were also a
valuable nucleus for the Waffen SS. The secret Hitler order of 17 August
1938 (_647-PS_) provided for this task in the event of mobilization. The
_Totenkopf Verbaende_ were to be relieved from the duty of guarding
concentration camps and transferred as a skeleton corps to the _SS
Verfuegungstruppe_. Section II C, subparagraph 5, of that order
provides: “5. _Regulations for the case of the Mobilization_.

    “The _SS-Totenkopf Verbaende_ form the skeleton corps for the
    reinforcement of the _SS-Totenkopf Verbaende_ (police
    reinforcement), and will be replaced in the guarding of the
    concentration camps by members of the General SS who are over 45
    years of age and had military training.

    “The skeleton corps—which up to now were units of the two
    replacement units for the short time training of the
    reinforcement of the _SS-Totenkopf Verbaende_—will be
    transferred to the _SS-Verfuegungstruppe_ as skeleton crews of
    the replacement units for that unit.” (_647-PS_)

(_e_) _The SS Polizei Regimente._

The final component specifically referred to in the Indictment is the SS
Police Regiments. The SS eventually succeeded in assuming controls over
the entire Reich Police. Out of the police, special militarized forces
were formed, originally SS Police Battalions, and later expanded to SS
Police Regiments. Himmler, in his Posen speech, declared:

    “Now to deal briefly with the tasks of the regular uniformed
    police and the Sipo [the Security Police] they still cover the
    same field. I can see that great things have been achieved. We
    have formed roughly 30 police regiments from police reservists
    and former members of the police—police officials, as they used
    to be called. The average age in our police battalions is not
    lower than that of the security battalions of the Armed Forces.
    Their achievements are beyond all praise. In addition, we have
    formed Police Rifle Regiments by merging the police battalions
    of the ‘savage peoples.’ Thus we did not leave these police
    battalions untouched but blended them in the ratio of about 1 to
    3.” (_1919-PS_)

The results of this blend of militarized SS police and “savage peoples”
will be seen in the evidence, subsequently referred to, of the
extermination actions conducted by them in the Eastern territories.
These exterminations which were so successful and so ruthless that even
Himmler could find no words adequate for their eulogy.

(3) _Unity of the Organization._

Each of the various components described above played its part in
carrying out one or more functions of the SS. The personnel composing
each differed. Some were part-time volunteers; others were professionals
enlisted for different periods of time. But every branch, every
department, every member was an integral part of the whole organization.
Each performed his assigned role in the manifold tasks for which the
organization had been created. No better witness to this fact could be
called upon than the Reichsfuehrer SS, whose every endeavor was to
insure the complete unity of the organization. The following words are
taken from his Posen speech:

    “It would be an evil day if the SS and police fell out. It would
    be an evil day if the Main Offices, performing their tasks well
    meaningly but mistakenly made themselves independent by each
    having a downward chain of command. I really think that the day
    of my overthrow would be the end of the SS. It must be, and so
    come about, that this SS organization with all its branches—the
    General SS which is the common basis of all of them, the
    Waffen-SS, the regular uniformed police (_Ordnungspolizei_), the
    SIPO (with the whole economic administration, schooling,
    ideological training, the whole question of kindred), is, even
    under the tenth Reichsfuehrer-SS _one_ bloc, _one_ body, _one_

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The regular uniformed police and SIPO, General-SS and Waffen-SS
    must now gradually amalgamate too, just as this is and must be
    the case within the Waffen-SS. This applies to matters
    concerning filling of posts, recruiting, schooling, economic
    organization, and medical services. I am always doing something
    towards this end, a bond is constantly being cast around these
    sections of the whole to cause them to grow together. Alas, if
    these bonds should ever be loosened—then everything—you may be
    sure of this—would sink back into its old insignificance in one
    generation, and in a short space of time.” (_1919-PS_)

         C. _Selection, Training, and Obligations of Members._

To understand this organization, the theories upon which it was based
must be kept clearly in mind. The underlying philosophy of the SS, the
principles by which its members were selected, and the obligations
imposed upon them furnish the key to all its activities. It is
necessary, therefore, to consider them in some detail.

(1) _The Racial Basis of the SS._

(_a_) _The SS as a racial and biological elite._

The fundamental principle of selection was what Himmler called that of
Blood and Elite. The SS was to be the living embodiment of the Nazi
doctrine of the superiority of Nordic blood, and of the Nazi conception
of a master race. In Himmler’s own words, the SS was to be a “National
Socialist Soldierly Order of Nordic Men” (_1992-A-PS_). In describing to
the _Wehrmacht_ the reasons behind his emphasis on racial standards of
selection and the manner in which they were carried out, he said:

    “* * * Accordingly, only good blood, blood which history has
    proved to be leading and creative and the foundation of every
    state and of all military activities, only Nordic blood, can be
    considered. I said to myself that should I succeed in selecting
    from the German people for this organization as many people as
    possible a majority of whom possess this desired blood, in
    teaching them military discipline and, in time, the
    understanding of the value of blood and the entire ideology
    which results from it, then it will be possible actually to
    create such an elite organization which would successfully hold
    its own in all cases of emergency.” (_1992-A-PS_)

Further on in the same speech, Himmler described the selection of
candidates for his organization:

    “* * * They are extremely thoroughly examined and checked. Of
    100 men we can use on the average of 10 or 15, no more. We ask
    for the political reputation record of his parents, brothers and
    sisters, the record of his ancestry as far back as 1750 and
    naturally the physical examination and his records from the
    Hitler Youth. Further, we ask for a record of hereditary health
    showing that no hereditary disease exists in his parents and in
    his family. Last, but perhaps most important, is a certification
    of the race commission. This examining commission is composed of
    SS leaders, anthropologists and physicians.” (_1992-A-PS_)

This same strict selection process for the SS was somewhat similarly
described in the Organizations Book of the Nazi Party for 1943:

    “_Selection of Members_

    “For the fulfillment of these missions a homogeneous firmly
    welded fighting force has been created bound by ideological
    oaths, whose fighters are selected out of the best Aryan

    “The conception of the value of the blood and soil serves as
    directive for the selection into the SS. Every SS man must be
    deeply imbued with the sense and essence of the National
    Socialist Movement. He will be ideologically and physically
    trained so that he can be employed individually or in groups in
    the decisive battle for the National Socialist ideology.

    “Only the best and thoroughbred Germans are suited for
    commitment, in this battle. Therefore it is necessary that an
    uninterrupted selection is retained within the ranks of the SS,
    first superficially, then constantly more thoroughly.”

The creation of a racial and biological elite had some very practical
reasons behind it. The conspirators’ plans for conquest and exploitation
of the conquered territories required the development of a Nazi
aristocracy which would dominate Germany and Europe for centuries to
come. That purpose was explicitly stated by Himmler in his Posen speech:

    “One thing must be clear, one thing I would like to say to you
    today: the moment the war is over, we will really begin to weld
    together our organization, this organization which we have built
    up for 10 years, which we imbued and indoctrinated with the
    first most important principles during the 10 years before the
    war. We must continue to do this—we,—if I may say so, we older
    men—for twenty years full of toil and work, so that a tradition
    30, 35, 40 years, a generation, may be created. Then this
    organization will march forward into the future young and
    strong, revolutionary and efficient to fulfill the task of
    giving the German people, the Germanic people, the superstratum
    of society which will combine and hold together this Germanic
    people and this Europe, and from which the brains which the
    people need for industry, farming, politics, and as soldiers,
    statesmen and technicians, will emerge. In addition this
    superstratum must be so strong and vital that every generation
    can unreservedly sacrifice two or three sons from every family
    on the battle-field, and that never-the-less the continued
    flowing of the bloodstream is assured.” (_1919-PS_)

He forcibly made the same point in his address to officers of the _SS
Leibstandarte_ “Adolph Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:

    “The ultimate aim for these 11 years during which I have been
    the Reichsfuehrer SS has been invariably the same: To create an
    order of good blood which is able to serve Germany. Which
    unfailingly and without sparing itself can be made use of
    because the greatest losses can do no harm to the vitality of
    this order, the vitality of these men, because they will always
    be replaced. To create an order which will spread the idea of
    nordic blood so far that we will attract all nordic blood in the
    world, take away the blood from our adversaries, absorb it so
    that never again, looking at it from the viewpoint of grand
    policy, nordic blood in great quantities and to an extent worth
    mentioning will fight against us. We must get it and the others
    cannot have it. We never gave up the ideas and the aim conceived
    so many years ago. Everything we did has taken us some distance
    further on the way. Everything we are going to do will lead us
    further on the way.” (_1918-PS_)

Since the SS was to be made a Nazi aristocracy which would dominate not
only Germany but the world for centuries to come, it was essential that
the SS stock be perpetuated. To insure the continuance of this good
blood, the first step was to limit marriages of SS men to women meeting
the same requirements as to health, descent, and ideological background
as the SS man himself. This was accomplished by an order of the
Reichsfuehrer SS issued on 31 December 1931. This SS marriage law is set
out in full in d’Alquen’s Book, “The SS,” (_2284-PS_). But proper
marriages were not enough without children. A series of orders took care
of that. On 13 September 1936, Himmler issued an order entitled
“Foundation of the Organization ‘_Lebensborn e.V._’”, published in the
SS manual, “The Soldier Friend”:

    “As early as December 13, 1934, I wrote to all SS leaders and
    declared that we have fought in vain if political victory was
    not to be followed by victory of birth of good blood. The
    question of multiplicity of children is not a private affair of
    the individual but his duty towards his ancestors and our

    “The SS has taken the first step in this direction long ago with
    the engagement and marriage decree of December 1931. However,
    the existence of sound marriage is futile if it does not result
    in the creation of numerous descendants.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The minimum amount of children for a good sound marriage is
    four. Should unfortunate circumstances deny a married couple
    their own children, then every SS leader should adopt racially
    and hereditarily valuable children, educate them in the spirit
    of National Socialism, let them have an education corresponding
    to their ability.” (_2825-PS_)

The drive for perpetuation of SS stock was continued. A further order of
Himmler, issued on 28 October 1939, directed to the entire SS and the
Police, is also published in the SS manual, “The Soldier Friend”:

    “The old saying that only those who have children can die in
    peace must again become acknowledged truth in this war,
    especially for the SS.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Though in other times it may perhaps be considered an
    infraction of necessary social standards and conventions, German
    women and girls of good blood can fulfill a high obligation by
    bearing children out of wedlock to soldiers going to the front,
    whose eventual return or death for Germany lies entirely in the
    hands of fate—not out of promiscuity but out of a deep sense of

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Let us never forget that the victory of the sword and of the
    spilled blood of our soldiers remains fruitless, if it is not
    succeeded by the victory of the child and the colonizing of
    conquered soil.” (_2825-PS_)

A final order designed to assure continuance of good SS blood was issued
on 15 August 1942, entitled “SS Orders to the Last Sons”, also published
in “The Soldier Friend”:

    “You SS men have been withdrawn from the front lines by order of
    the Fuehrer because you are the last sons. This measure has been
    taken because the people and the State have an interest in
    seeing that your families do not die out.

    “It has never been the nature of SS men to submit to a fate
    without attempting to effect a change. It is your duty to see to
    it that you are no longer the last sons by producing as many
    children of good blood as possible.” (_2825-PS_)

These orders were not the product of some benevolent theorist in
eugenics who was interested in large and happy SS families for their own
sake. They stemmed from a basic idea of the conspiracy, the plan to
insure Germany’s continued capacity to wage war for generations. Himmler
put this theory very bluntly in his speech to officers of the _SS
Leibstandarte_ “Adolf Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:

    “* * * If we once had not enough sons, those who will come after
    us will have to become cowards. A nation which has an average of
    four sons per family can venture a war; if two of them die, two
    transmit the name. The leadership of a nation having one son or
    two sons per family will have to be faint-hearted at any
    decision on account of their own experience, because they will
    have to tell themselves: We cannot afford it. Look at France,
    which is the best example. France had to accept from us a
    dictate.” (_1918-PS_)

(_b_) _The SS as an exterminator of “inferior” races._

Domination of Europe through a Nazi Elite required more, however, than
the positive side of racism—that is, the building up of a numerous
“biologically superior” group. It necessarily meant also the destruction
of other races. The SS had to be, and was, taught not merely to breed,
but to exterminate. In a speech delivered at Kharkov in April 1943,
Himmler declared:

    “We have—I would say, as very consistent National
    Socialists—taken the question of blood as our starting point.
    We were the first really to solve the problem of blood by
    action, and in this connection by problem of blood, we of course
    do not mean anti-semitism. Antisemitism is exactly the same as
    delousing. Getting rid of lice is not a question of ideology. It
    is a matter of cleanliness. In just the same way, anti-semitism
    for us, will soon have been dealt with. We shall soon be
    deloused. We have only 20,000 lice left, and then the matter is
    finished within the whole of Germany.” (_1919-PS_)

But it was not merely against Jews that SS efforts were directed. All
non-Nordic races were similarly condemned. In his Posen speech, Himmler
stated this basic principle of the SS:

    “One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS men:
    We must be honest, decent, loyal and comradely to members of our
    own blood and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian, to a
    Czech, does not interest me in the slightest. What other nations
    can offer in the way of good blood of our type, we will take, if
    necessary, by kidnapping their children and raising them here
    with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death
    interests me only so far as we need them as slaves for our
    culture; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000
    Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an
    antitank ditch interests me only insofar as the antitank ditch
    for Germany is finished.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “That is what I want to instill into this SS and what I believe
    I have instilled in them as one of the most sacred laws of the
    future.” (_1919-PS_)

(_c_) _Indoctrination of members in SS racial theories._ These were the
principles which were publicly reiterated, over and over again, so that
the newest recruit was thoroughly steeped in them. In his Kharkov speech
to the commanding officers of three Waffen SS divisions, Himmler
strongly insisted on indoctrinating all SS members in his theories of
the racial struggle.

    “This is what is important for us as SS men, for our province of
    duty and our mission (it is a task additional to those of the
    whole German armed forces and the whole German people): That is
    what I would like to impress upon you. This is what I beg you as
    commanding officers, as chiefs and as leaders, to teach the
    young men again and again in their ideological instruction. That
    is what I demand and exact of you—that you really concern
    yourself with the man, the young fellow of 17 or 18 who comes to
    us, and with many who are in our ranks not as volunteers but as
    conscripts. I ask you to look after them, and guide them, and
    not let them go before they are really saturated with our spirit
    and are fighting as the old guard fought before us—that is what
    I request and demand of you.

    “We have only one task—to stand firm and carry on the racial
    struggle without mercy.” (_1919-PS_)

This function of the SS men in the racial struggle was publicly
proclaimed in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943:

    “He openly and relentlessly fights against the most dangerous
    enemies of the State: Jews, Freemasons, Jesuits and political
    clergymen.” (_2640-PS_)

(2) _The Obligation of Obedience._ Indoctrination of the organization in
principles of racial hatred was not enough. The members had to be ready
and willing tools, prepared to carry out tasks of any nature, however
distasteful, illegal or inhuman. Absolute obedience was the necessary
second foundation stone of the SS. The Organizations Book of the NSDAP
for 1943 thus describes this fundamental requirement:

    “Obedience must be unconditional. It corresponds to the
    conviction that the National Socialist ideology must reign
    supreme. He who is possessed by it and fights for it
    passionately subjects himself voluntarily to the obligation to
    obey. Every SS man is prepared, therefore, to carry out blindly
    every order which is issued by the Fuehrer or which is given by
    his superior, irrespective of the heaviest sacrifices involved.”

The same point was emphasized by Himmler in the Posen speech:

    “I would like here to state something clearly and unequivocally.
    It is a matter of course that the little man must obey. It is
    even more a matter of course that all the senior leaders of the
    SS, that is the whole corps of Gruppenfuehrers, are a model of
    blind obedience.” (_1919-PS_)

(3) _The SS as a Terroristic Agency._ A necessary corollary of these two
fundamental principles of race and of blind obedience was ruthlessness.
Subsequent evidence of SS activities will prove how successfully the SS
learned the lesson it was taught. The SS had to and did develop a
reputation for terror which was carefully cultivated. Himmler himself
attested to it as early as 1936 in a speech publicly delivered at the
Peasant’s Day Rally and subsequently published and circulated in
pamphlet form under the title “The SS as an Anti-bolshevist Fighting

    “I know that there are some people in Germany who become sick
    when they see their black coats. We understand the reason for
    this and do not expect that we shall be loved by too many.”

(4) _Continuance of the Elite and Voluntary Character of the SS._ The
role which the SS was to play required that it remain constantly the
essence of Naziism, and that its elite Nazi quality never be diluted.
For this reason the SS was for a time temporarily closed to new members,
and those who had proved unfit were weeded out. Himmler described this
process in his article “Organization and Obligations of the SS and the
Police” (_1992-A-PS_). Referring to the influx of new adherents to the
Party and its organizations in 1933, he said:

    “A very difficult question confronted us at that time. It was a
    question of deciding whether to close the Party and its
    organizations to further membership and thus remain pure in
    quality but small in volume, or of opening them to further
    membership to increase their volume.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The SS too was endangered by this menace. Therefore I closed it
    while some of the other organizations accepted as great a number
    of people as possible. This way I had the SS again under my
    control in April and said: We shall accept no more people. From
    the end of 1933 to the end of 1935 we expelled all those of the
    newly accepted members who proved unsuitable.” (_1992-A-PS_)

These standards were not abandoned later. Indeed, in 1943 the
Organizations Book of the Nazi Party stated that:

    “The demands with respect to racial purity of the SS are being
    increased every year.”

And in the same year, 1943, Himmler emphasized this point in a letter
written to Kaltenbrunner (_2768-PS_).

This letter from the Reichsfuehrer SS, which bears the date 24 April
1943, states in part as follows:

    “Referring again to the matter which I discussed some time ago,
    i.e., the admission of SIPO officials into the SS. I wish to
    clarify again: I want an admission only if the following
    conditions are fulfilled:

        “1. If the man applies freely and voluntarily;

        “2. If, by applying strict and peacetime standards, the
        applicant fits racially and ideologically into the SS,
        guarantees according to the number of his children a
        really healthy SS stock, and is neither ill, degenerate
        nor worthless.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I beg you not only to act accordingly in the future, but
    especially also that numerous admissions into ranks of the SS in
    the past be reexamined and revised according to these
    instructions.” (_2768-PS_)

(5) _Method of Acquiring Membership in the SS._ The normal method by
which membership in the SS was attained was discussed by Himmler in his
article, “Organization and Obligations of the SS and Police”:

    “The age groups in the SS are as follows: With 18 years the
    young man enters the SS. He is first an applicant, after three
    months he takes the oath on the Fuehrer and thus becomes a
    candidate (_Anwaerter_). As a candidate during the first year he
    takes examinations for his SA sport insignia and his bronze
    sport insignia. At the age of 19 or 19½, according to the time
    of his acceptance, he is conscripted for the labor service and
    subsequently for the _Wehrmacht_. After two more years he comes
    back from the _Wehrmacht_ unless he remains there as a
    prospective noncommissioned officer or reenlists. If he returns
    to us, he is still candidate. In these weeks he is especially
    thoroughly instructed in ideology. The first year is for him a
    period of elementary ideological indoctrination. In these weeks
    following his return from the _Wehrmacht_ he receives special
    instruction about the marriage law and all other laws pertaining
    to the family, and the honor laws. On the 9th of November,
    following his return from the _Wehrmacht_, he becomes an SS man
    in the true sense. The Reichsfuehrer of the SS is just as much
    an SS man in the sense of the SS organization as the common man
    at the front. On this 9th of November he is awarded the dagger,
    and at this occasion he promises to abide by the marriage law
    and the disciplinary laws of the SS, since the family is also
    subject to these laws. From this day on he has the right and the
    duty to defend his honor with a weapon as laid down by the honor
    laws of the SS. The applicants and candidates do not yet have
    this right. The SS man remains in the so-called active General
    SS until his 35th year. From his 35th to his 45th year he is in
    the SS reserve, and after his 45th year in the _Stammabteilung_
    of the SS, identified by the grey color patch.” (_1992-A-PS_)

The oath to the Fuehrer, referred to by Himmler in the passage just
quoted, appears in the SS recruiting pamphlet, “The SS Calls You”:

    “The Oath of the SS Man:

    “I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, as Fuehrer and Reichschancellor,
    loyalty and bravery. I vow to you, and to those you have named
    to command me, obedience unto death, so help me God.”

              D. _Criminal Aims and Activities of the SS._

(1) _The Purge of 20[_sic_] June 1934._ Proof of the elite Nazi quality
and thorough reliability of the SS, the test by which it won its spurs,
occurred on 30 June 1934, when it participated in the purge of the SA
and other opponents or potential opponents of the Nazi regime. That was
the first real occasion for use of this specialized organization which
could operate with the blessing of the Nazi State but outside the law.
In an affidavit signed and sworn to in Nurnberg on 19 November 1945,
Wilhelm Frick says, referring to the victims of that purge:

    “They were just killed on the spot. Many people were killed—I
    don’t know how many—who actually did not have anything to do
    with the putsch. People who just weren’t liked very well, as for
    instance, Schleicher, the former Reich Chancellor, were killed *
    * * The SS was used by Himmler for the execution of these orders
    to suppress the putsch.” (_2950-PS_)

Himmler referred to this same event in his Posen speech:

    “Just as we did not hesitate on June 20,[_sic_] 1934, to do the
    duty we were bidden, and stand comrades who had lapsed, up
    against the wall and shoot them, so we have never spoken about
    it and will never speak about it.” (_1919-PS_)

It was in recognition of its services in this respect that the SS was
elevated to the status of a component of the Party equal in rank to the
SA and other similar branches. The following announcement appeared on
page 1 of the _Voelkischer Beobachter_ of 26 July 1934:

    “The Reich press office announces the following order of the

    “In consideration of the greatly meritorious service of the SS,
    especially in connection with the events of 30 June 1934, I
    elevate it to the standing of an independent organization within
    the NSDAP.

    “Munch 20 July 1934.” (_1857-PS_)

(2) _Functions as a Repressive Police Organization._

One of the first steps essential to the security of any regime is
control of the police. The SS was the type of organization which the
conspirators needed for this purpose. Their aim was to fuse the SS and
police, and to merge them into a single, unified repressive force.

Shortly after the seizure of power the conspirators began to develop as
part of the state machinery, secret political police forces. These
originated in Prussia with the Gestapo, established by decree of Goering
in April 1933, and were duplicated in the other German States. (This
development is discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.) By 1934 Himmler,
the Reichsfuehrer SS, had become the chief of these secret political
police forces in each of the German states except Prussia, and deputy
chief of the Prussian Gestapo. In that capacity he infiltrated these
forces with members of the SS until a virtual identity of membership was

On 17 June 1936, by Decree on the Establishment of a Chief of the German
Police (_2073-PS_), the new post of Chief of the German Police was
created in the Ministry of the Interior. Under the terms of the decree,
Himmler was appointed to this post with the title of “Reichsfuehrer SS
and Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior.” The
combination of these two positions, that of leadership of the SS and
head of all the police forces in the Reich, was no accident but was
intended to establish a permanent relation between the two bodies and
not a mere “transitory fusion of personnel.” The significance of the
combination of these two positions was referred to by Hitler in the
preamble to his secret order of 17 August 1938:

    “By means of the nomination of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of
    the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior on June 17th,
    1936 (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ I, page 487), I have created the basis
    for the unification and reorganization of the German Police.

    “With this step, the _Schutzstaffeln_ of the NSDAP, which were
    under the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police even
    up to now, have entered into close connection with the duties of
    the German Police.” (_647-PS_)

Upon his appointment, Himmler immediately proceeded to reorganize the
entire Reich Police Force, designating two separate branches: (1) the
regular uniformed police force (_Ordnungspolizei_, or Orpo), and (2) the
Security Police (_Sicherheitspolizei_, or Sipo). The Sipo was composed
of all criminal police organizations in the Reich and all the secret
political police forces, or Gestapo. This reorganization was achieved by
the Decree Assigning Functions in the Office of the Chief of the German
Police (_1551-PS_). To be head of the Sipo, that is the criminal police
and Gestapo, Himmler appointed Reinhard Heydrich, who was at that time
the Chief of the SD. Thus, through Himmler’s dual capacity as leader of
the SS and as Chief of the Police, and through Heydrich’s dual capacity
as head of the Sipo and as chief of the SD, a unified personal command
of the SS and Security Police Forces was achieved. But further steps
toward unification were later taken. In 1939, the Security Police and
the SD were combined in a single department, the Reich Security Main
Office, commonly referred to as the RSHA. (The details of the
organization of the RSHA are discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.) The
important point to be observed is this: The newly created Reich Security
Main Office was not a mere department of the Government. It was a dual
body: an agency of the government, organizationally placed in the
Department of the Interior, and at the same time one of the principal
departments of the SS, organizationally placed in the Supreme Command of
the SS. (cf. the chart of the SS organization (_Chart Number 3_)). The
following description of the RSHA appears in the Organizations Book of
the NSDAP for 1943:

    “The RSHA handles all the organizational, personnel, management
    and technical affairs of the Security Police and the SD. In
    addition, it is the central office of the State Police and
    criminal police executive, as well as the central directorate of
    the intelligence net of the SD.” (_2640-PS_)

The position of the RSHA in the Supreme Command of the SS is also
similarly described in the SS manual, “The Soldier Friend”. (_2825-PS_)

But it was not merely the Gestapo and the Criminal Police which came
under the sway of the SS. The regular uniformed police as well were
affected. For, like the RSHA, the Department of the Regular Police
(_Ordnungspolizei_, or Orpo), was not merely a department in the
Ministry of the Interior, but also simultaneously in the Supreme Command
of the SS. Its position in the SS is indicated by the seventh box on the
chart of the SS organization (_Chart Number 3_). The following
description of the Department of the Regular Police appears in the
Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943:

    “The sphere of duties of the Main Office of the
    _Ordnungspolizei_ includes police administration as well as the
    management and direction of the protective police
    (_Schutzpolizei_) of the Reich, the Gendarmes, the protective
    police of the community, the water protection police, the air
    protection police, the fire protection police, the protective
    groups in the occupied territories, the colonial police, the
    volunteer fire department, the compulsatory and youth fire
    departments, the technical aid and the technical SS and police
    academy.” (_2640-PS_)

The position of this Department in the SS Supreme Command is also
similarly described in the SS Manual, “The Soldier Friend”. (_2825-PS_)

This unity of the Command was not a mere matter of the highest
headquarters. It extended down to the operating level. As the chart
shows, the Higher SS and Police Leader in each region, who was directly
subordinate to Himmler, had under his command both the Security Police
and the regular, uniformed police (_Chart Number 3_). These forces were
subject to his orders as well as to those of the RSHA and the Department
of the Regular Police respectively. This position of the Higher SS and
Police Leader is described in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for
1943. (_2640-PS_)

SS control of the police was, however, not only a matter of organization
and of unified command. Unity of personnel was also in large measure
achieved. Vacancies occurring in the police forces were filled by SS
members; police officials retained in the force were urged to join the
SS; and schools operated by the SS were the required training centers
for police as well as SS officials. These measures are described in
Himmler’s article, “Organization and Obligations of the SS and the
Police” (_1992-A-PS_). They are also described in an authoritative book
on the police and on the SS, entitled “The German Police,” written by
Dr. Werner Best, a Ministerial Director in the Ministry of the Interior
and a department head in the Security Police and published in 1940. It
bears on its flyleaf the imprimatur of the Nazi Party and is listed in
the official list of National Socialist Party bibliography. Chapter 7
from that book is reproduced in document (_1852-PS_). Reference is also
made to the order of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police
of 23 June 1938, entitled “Acceptance of Members of the Security Police
into the SS” (_1637-PS_). In that order provision was made for admitting
members of the Security Police into the SS upon certain conditions. The
preamble of the order states that it was issued “with the aim of fusing
members of the German Police with the ‘_Schutzstaffel_’ of the National
Socialist German Workers Party into one uniformly turned out State
Protective Corps of the National Socialist Reich” (_1637-PS_).
Parenthetically, it should be observed that even this aim was not
sufficient to cause a relaxation of SS admission standards since the
order provided that, to be admitted as an SS member, personnel of the
Security Police were obliged to fulfill the general requirements of the
SS (its racial and ideological standards).

Through this unity of organization and personnel, the SS and the police
became identified in structure and in activity. The resulting situation
was described by Best as follows:

    “Thus the SS and the Police form a unit, both in their structure
    and in their activity, although their individual organizations
    have not lost their true individuality and their position in the
    larger units of the Party and State administration * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In the relationship between the Police and the SS, the
    principle of the ‘orderly’ penetration of an organization of the
    National order has been realized for the first time to the final
    outcome through the supporters of the National Socialist
    movement”. (_1852-PS_)

As Himmler stated in his address to the officers of _SS-Leibstandarte_
“Adolph Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:

    “I want to tell you: In the entire Waffen-SS we must begin to
    view the other great activity of the entire SS (_Gesamt-SS_) and
    entire Police. We must see to it that you consider the activity
    of the man in the green uniform as just as valuable as the
    activity you yourself are engaged in. You have to consider the
    work of the SD man or the man of the Security Police as a vital
    part of our whole work just like the fact that you can carry
    arms”. (_1918-PS_)

Through the police the SS was in a position to carry out a large part of
the functions assigned to it. The working partnership between Gestapo,
the criminal police, and the SD, under the direction of the
Reichsfuehrer SS, resulted in the ultimate in repressive and
unrestrained police activity. (cf. the discussion in Section 6 on the
Gestapo.) It must be remembered that the Gestapo activities were but one
aspect of SS functions—one part of the whole criminal SS scheme.

(3) _Functions and Activities with Respect to Concentration Camps._
Control over the police, however, was not enough. Potential sources of
opposition could be tracked down by the SD. Suspects could be seized by
the criminal police and Gestapo. But those means alone would not assure
the complete suppression of all opponents and potential opponents of the
regime. For this purpose concentration camps were invented, and the SS
was given large responsibility in that system.

(_a_) _Criminal activities of SS guards and camp personnel._ The first
requirement of the camps was for guard and administrative personnel.
Part-time volunteer members of the _Allgemeine SS_ were originally
utilized as guards. But part-time volunteers could not adequately serve
the need of the extensive and long-range program that was planned.
Hence, beginning in 1933 full-time professional guard units (the _SS
Totenkopf Verbaende_) were organized. Their very name (“Death Head
Units”) and their distinguishing insignia, the skull and cross bones,
appropriately marked the type of activity in which they engaged.

During the war, members of the _Allgemeine SS_ resumed the function of
guarding the camps which they had undertaken when the camps were
created. This was provided for in the Hitler order of 17 August 1938
(_647-PS_) directing the substitution of _Allgemeine SS_ members for the
Death Head Units in the event of mobilization. That substitution took
place. In reviewing the events of the period between 1938 and 1940,
significant for the SS, the National Socialist Yearbook of 1940
congratulated the _Allgemeine SS_ on the performance of its new mission:

    “However, not only the garrisoned parts of the SS were employed.
    Also the General SS were brought forth for special missions.
    Thousands of younger and older SS comrades were employed for the
    strengthening of the police and for the guarding of
    concentration camps and have faithfully fulfilled their duty
    throughout the weeks.” (_2164-PS_)

It is unnecessary to repeat the evidence of wholesale brutalities,
tortures, and murders committed by SS guards. These were not sporadic
crimes committed by irresponsible individuals. They were a part of a
definite and calculated policy, which necessarily resulted from SS
philosophy, and which was carried out from the initial creation of the

Himmler bluntly explained to the _Wehrmacht_ in 1937 the prevailing view
of the SS as to the inmates of concentration camps:

    “It would be extremely instructive for everyone, some members of
    the _Wehrmacht_ were already able to do so, to inspect such a
    concentration camp. Once they have seen it, they are convinced
    of the fact that no one had been sent there unjustly; that it is
    the offal of criminals and freaks. No better demonstration of
    the laws of inheritance and race, as set forth by Doctor Guett,
    exists than such a concentration camp. There you can find people
    with hydrocephalus, people who are cross-eyed, deformed,
    half-Jewish, and a number of racially inferior products. All
    that is assembled there. Of course, we distinguish between those
    inmates who are only there for a few months for the purpose of
    education, and those who are to stay for a very long time. On
    the whole, education consists of discipline, never of any kind
    of instruction on an ideological basis, for the prisoners have,
    for the most part, slave-like souls; and only very few people of
    real character can be found there.” (_1992-A-PS_)

Even these “slave-like souls,” however, might be redeemed by SS hygienic
measures. For, as Himmler continued:

    “The discipline thus means order. The order begins with these
    people living in clean barracks. Such a thing can really only be
    accomplished by us Germans, hardly another nation would be as
    humane as we are. The laundry is frequently changed. The people
    are taught to wash themselves twice daily, and the use of a
    toothbrush with which most of them have been unfamiliar.”

Despite this callous jest to the _Wehrmacht_, all pretense was swept
away in Himmler’s speech to his own Gruppenfuehrers at Posen:

    “I don’t believe the Communists could attempt any action, for
    their leading elements, like most criminals, are in our
    concentration camps. And here I must say this—that we shall be
    able to see after the war what a blessing it was for Germany
    that, in spite of all the silly talk about humanitarianism, we
    imprisoned all this criminal substratum of the German people in
    concentration camps: I’ll answer for that.” (_1919-PS_).

Certainly there was no “silly humanitarianism” in the manner in which SS
men performed their task. An illustration of their conduct, not in 1944
or 1945 but in 1933, is shown in four reports relating to the deaths of
four different inmates of the Concentration Camp Dachau between May 16
and 27, 1933. Each report is signed by Winterberger, the Public
Prosecutor of the District Court in Munich, and addressed to the Public
Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Munich. The first (_641-PS_) 1 June
1933, relates to the death of Dr. Alfred Strauss, a prisoner in
protective custody in Dachau. That report states:

    “On May 24, 1933 the 30 year old, single, attorney at law, Dr.
    Alfred Strauss from Munich who was in the concentration camp
    Dachau as a prisoner under protective custody was killed by 2
    pistol shots from SS man Johann Kantschuster who escorted him on
    a walk outside of the fenced part of the camp prescribed to him
    by the camp doctor.

    “Kantschuster gives the following report: He himself had to
    urinate; Strauss proceeded on his way. Suddenly Strauss broke
    away towards the shrub located at a distance of about 6 m from
    the line. When he noticed it, he fired 2 shots at the fugitive
    from a distance of about 8 m, whereupon Strauss collapsed dead.

    “On the same day, May 24, 1933, a judicial inspection of the
    locality took place. The corpse of Strauss was lying at the edge
    of the wood. Leather slippers were on his feet. He wore a sock
    on one foot, while the other foot was bare, obviously because of
    an injury to this foot. Subsequently an autopsy was performed.
    Two bullets had entered the back of his head. Besides, the body
    showed several black and blue spots (_Blutunterlaufung_) and
    also open wounds.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I have charged Kantschuster today with murder and have made
    application for opening and execution of the judicial
    preliminary investigation as well as for a warrant of arrest
    against him.” (_641-PS_)

The second (_642-PS_) also 1 June 1933, relates to the death of Leonhard
Hausmann, another prisoner in Dachau. That letter states:

    “On 17 May 1933, Leonhard Hausmann from Augsburg, 31 years old,
    married, relief worker, who was kept in protective custody in
    the Dachau concentration camp, was shot by SS Staff Sergeant
    Karl Ehmann. According to the account of the latter, Hausmann
    was to dig out young fir trees in the woods in the vicinity of
    the camp and pile them up on a certain spot. He was supervised
    by Ehmann. Suddenly the latter did not see him anymore.
    Therefore Ehmann looked after the prisoners and saw him running
    away in a stooped position, Ehmann ran after him, called ‘Halt’
    several times, once also ‘Stop,’ but in vain. Whereupon Ehmann
    raised his pistol at the prisoner and fired without aiming;
    Hausmann dropped dead. Ehmann asserts that he fired from a
    distance of 10 to 12 meters.

    “The corpse was inspected already on 17 May 1933 with the
    assistance of the State court physician. It was found that death
    was due to a shot through the left side of the chest. According
    to the autopsy protocol, the shot was fired from a distance less
    than 1 meter. Meanwhile the legal-medical institute ascertained
    that the distance was less than 30 cm.” (_642-PS_)

The third (_644-PS_) 22 May 1933, relates to the death of Louis Schloss,
an inmate of Dachau. Attached to the letter is a copy of a report of the
autopsy conducted in the Schloss case, signed by the examining
physicians. The letter of 22 May 1933, begins:

    “In the afternoon of 16 May 1933 the police station Dachau
    informed the State Prosecution that an inmate of the
    concentration camp Dachau, the merchant Louis Schloss, from
    Nurnberg, widowed, born on 21 June 1889, has hanged himself in
    solitary confinement. At the request of the state prosecution,
    on the same day the legal inspection was performed with the
    assistance of the state court physician with the State Court
    Munich II. As it was proven that the corpse exhibited numerous
    whip marks and as the cause of death appeared doubtful, an
    autopsy was carried out on 17 May 1933. According to a
    preliminary certificate of the participating physicians, the
    autopsy did not prove death by hanging”. (_644-PS_)

The preliminary opinion of the examining physician states:

    “Preliminary opinion:

    “I. The death through hanging could not be proven by autopsy.

    “II. Extensive blood suffusions and whipmarks were found,
    particularly on the back, on the buttocks and on both arms, as
    well as on both legs, abdomen and thorax to a minor extent. In
    the region of the buttocks and shoulders extensive destruction
    of adipose tissue was found together with the blood suffusions.
    This is adequate to explain death through autointoxication and
    fat embolism.” (_644-PS_)

The fourth (_645-PS_) 1 June 1933, relates to the death of Sebastian
Nefzger, another Dachau prisoner. The letter reads:

    “On May 27, 1933, the following report was received by the Lower
    Court Dachau:

    “Concentration Camp Dachau, Political Division, May 27, 1933, to
    the Lower Court Dachau. An inquest on the dead body of the
    prisoner Nefzger Sebastian merchant in Munich, Schommerstrasse
    17/0, born: 1/10/1900 in Munich, religion: Catholic, marital
    status: married—showed that death through the action of third
    persons must be excluded. Death was indubitably caused by
    excessive bleeding resulting from an opened artery of the left
    hand. Signed Dr. Nuernbergk, Camp Physician.

    “Neither the Lower Court Dachau nor the State Attorney Munich II
    had up to that time been informed of Nefzger’s death reported in
    the letter in spite of the fact that Nefzger had already died in
    the night of the 25 to the 26th of May 1933. The Lower Court
    Dachau informed the State Attorney, Munich II of this letter. A
    coroner’s inquest was ordered, which took place as late as May
    27, 1933. Since the physician appointed by the Superior Court,
    doubted that death had occurred to excessive bleeding and in
    identified marks of strings on the victim’s neck, a judicial
    autopsy was arranged by the State Attorney on May 29, 1933. The
    resulting opinion of the expert is so far: I) The autopsy
    discloses that excessive bleeding due to a cut on the left arm
    must be excluded as a cause of death: II) The cut on the left
    wrist reveals three incisions of the bone. Trial cuts are
    lacking. These findings are contrary to the assumption that the
    wound has been self-inflicted: III) It must be assumed that the
    cause of death was suffocation. As a cause for suffocation,
    strangulation and throttling must be considered. The
    characteristics of the marks left by the strings do not agree
    with those otherwise observed in cases of death caused by
    hanging.” (_645-PS_)

These four murders, committed within the short space of two weeks in the
Spring of 1933, each by different SS guards, are but a few examples of
SS activities in the camps even as early as 1933. Many similar examples
from that period and later periods could be produced.

Indeed, that sort of thing was officially encouraged. Disciplinary
Regulations for the Dachau Concentration Camp were issued on 1 October
1933 by SS Fuehrer Eicke, who later became commander of all the Death
Head Units (_778-PS_). The fourth paragraph of the introduction of those
rules provides:

    “Tolerance means weakness. In the light of this conception,
    punishment will be mercilessly handed out whenever the interests
    of the Fatherland warrant it. The fellow countryman who is
    decent but misled will never be affected by these regulations.
    But let it be a warning to the agitating politicians and
    intellectual provocators—regardless of which kind—; be on
    guard not to be caught, for otherwise it will be your neck and
    you will be shut up according to your own methods.” (_778-PS_)

So many inmates were killed “while trying to escape,” to use the pat
official phrase, that by 1936 the Minister of Justice was moved to
appeal to Himmler to regulate the use of firearms by the Death Head
Units. A memorandum 9 March 1936, prepared by Minister of Justice
Guertner, reads as follows:

    “On the 2d of this month, using the Hoppe case as an
    illustration, I discussed the question of use of arms by the
    guard-personnel of the concentration camp with the Reichsfuehrer
    SS. I suggested to Himmler that he issue an order on the use of
    arms for the officials subordinated to him. I referred in this
    respect to the example of the decree on the use of arms by the
    armed forces of 17 January of this year. Himmler has promised me
    that such a decree will be issued and will grant us
    participation in the preliminary work.” (_781-PS_)

The memorandum bears the pencil notation, “Initiative with Himmler”.
Subsequent events showed how Himmler carried out this initiative.

(_b_) _Administration of concentration camps through SS agencies._
Furnishing guard personnel was not the only function of the SS with
relation to the camps. The entire internal management of the camps,
including the use of prisoners, their housing, clothing, sanitary
conditions, the determination of their right to live and the disposal of
their remains, was controlled by the SS. Such management was first
vested in the leader of the SS Death Head Units, who also had the title
of Inspector of the Concentration Camps. This official was originally a
part of the SS Main Office (_SS Hauptamt_), represented on the chart by
the second box from the left (_Chart Number 3_).

During the course of the war, in March 1942, control of concentration
camps was transferred to another of the departments of the SS Supreme
Command, the SS Economic and Administration Main Office (commonly known
as WVHA). That department is indicated on the chart by the third box
from the left (_Chart Number 3_).

That change was announced in a letter to Himmler 30 April 1942 from SS
Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS Pohl, the Chief of WVHA
(_R-129_). In that letter Pohl reported on the measures he had taken to
carry out Himmler’s order of 3 March 1942 to transform the camps into
large scale economic enterprises, and inclosed an order to all
concentration camp commanders which provided that no longer was there to
be any limit on working hours in the camps. (_R-129_)

(_c_) _SS control of concentration camps and the slave labor program._
This shift of control to WVHA coincided with the change in the basic
purposes of the concentration camps. Political and security reasons,
which previously had been the grounds for confinement, were abandoned
and the camps were made to serve the Nazi slave labor program.

To satisfy the increased demands for manpower it was not enough to work
the inmates of the camp harder. More inmates had to be obtained. Through
its police arm, the SS was prepared to satisfy this demand. On 17
December 1942 an order was issued to all commanders of the Security
Police and SD directing that at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for
work be sent immediately to the concentration camps (_1063-D-PS_).
Thirty-five thousand prisoners was, of course, merely the beginning. The
SS dragnet was capable of catching many more slaves. A directive to all
the departments of the SS Supreme Command signed by Himmler at his field
headquarters on 5 August 1943, ordered the collection of men, women, and
children for work in coal mines (_744-PS_). This directive implements an
order signed by Keitel directing the use of all males captured in
guerilla fighting in the East for forced labor (_744-PS_). The Himmler
directive, it will be noted, is addressed to every main office in the SS
Supreme Command:

    “_Subject_: Manpower for coal mining industry. _Reference_:
    Letter of the command staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS—journal No.
    Ia/1909/43 secret.


    1. Chief of the personal staff of Reichsfuehrer SS.

    2. SS Main Office.

    3. Reich security main office (RSHA).

    4. Race and resettlement main office—SS.

    5. Main office, ordinary police.

    6. SS economic administrative main office.

    7. SS personal main office.

    8. Main office SS court.

    9. SS Supreme Command—Headquarters of the Waffen SS.

    10. Staff Headquarters of the Reichscommissar for the
    consolidation of Germanism.

    11. Main office center for Racial Germans (_Volksdeutsche

    12. Office of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Heissmeyer.

    13. Chief of the guerilla-fighting units.

    14. Higher SS and Police Leader Ostland.

    15. Higher SS and Police Leader Russia-Center.

    16. Higher SS and Police Leader Russia-South.

    17. Higher SS and Police Leader Northeast.

    18. Higher SS and Police Leader East.

    19. Higher SS and Police Leader Alpine territory.

    20. Higher SS and Police Leader Serbia.

    21. Commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer SS for Croatia.

    “To figure 4 of the above-mentioned order, I order, that all
    young female prisoners, capable of work, are to be sent to
    Germany for work, through the agency of Reich Commissioner

    “Children, old women, and men are to be collected and employed
    in the women’s and children’s camps, established by me, on
    estates as well as on the border of the evacuated area.”

In April 1944 the SS was called on to produce even more laborers, this
time 100,000 to be drawn from Hungarian Jews, as shown by the minutes of
Speer’s discussion with Himmler on 6 and 7 April 1944. (_R-124_)

The last source of manpower had not been tapped. To Jews, deportees,
women and children, there was added the productive power of prisoners of
war. Naturally enough it was through the SS that the conspirators
squeezed the last drop of labor from such prisoners. Speer’s minutes of
his conference with the Fuehrer on 5 March 1944, state:

    “Told the Fuehrer of the Reichs Marshal’s wish for further
    utilization of the production power of prisoners of war by
    giving the direction of the Stalag to the SS with the exception
    of the English and Americans. The Fuehrer considers the proposal
    good and has asked Colonel von Below to arrange matters
    accordingly.” (_R-124_)

That matters were soon arranged is shown by Speer’s statement made at
the 58th discussion of the Central Planning Board on 25 May 1944

    “Speer: We have come to an arrangement with the Reichsfuehrer SS
    as soon as possible so that PW’s he picks up are made available
    for our purposes. The Reichsfuehrer SS gets from 30 to 40
    thousand men per month.” (_R-124_)

Finally, in order to insure SS control over the labor of prisoners of
war, the Reichsfuehrer SS was appointed by Hitler as head of all
prisoner of war camps on 25 September 1944. A circular letter from the
Director of the Party Chancellery, 30 September 1944 and signed by M.
Bormann, states:

    “1. The Fuehrer has ordered under the date 25 Sept 1944: The
    custody of all prisoners of war and interned persons, as well as
    prisoner of war camps, and institutions with guards are
    transferred to the commander of the Reserve Army from October 1,

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “2. The Reichsfuehrer SS has commanded:

    “_a._ In my capacity as Commander of the Reserve Army, I
    transfer the affairs of prisoners of war to Gottleb Berger,
    SS-Lieut. General (_SS-Obergruppenfuehrer und General der
    Waffen-SS_) Chief of Staff of the _Volkstums_.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_c._ The mobilization of labor of the prisoners of war will be
    organized with the present labor mobilization office in joint
    action between SS-Lieut. General Berger (SS-Obergruppenfuehrer)
    and SS-Lieut. General Pohl.

    “The strengthening of security in the field of prisoner of war
    affairs is to be accomplished between SS-Lieut. General Berger
    and the Chief of the Security Police, SS-Lieut. Gen. Dr.
    Kaltenbrunner.” (_058-PS_)

So impressive were the results obtained from SS concentration camp labor
that Goering on 14 February 1944 called on Himmler for more inmates for
use in the aircraft industry (_1584-I-PS_). Himmler’s reply to that
request reads, in part, as follows:

    “Most Honored Reichsmarshal:

    “Following my teletype letter of the 18 Feb. 44 I herewith
    transmit a survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation

    “This survey indicates that at the present time about _36,000
    prisoners_ are employed for the purposes of the air force. An
    increase to a total of _90,000 prisoners is_ contemplated.

    “The production is being discussed, established, and executed
    between the Reich Ministry of aviation and the chief of my
    economic-administrative main office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
    General of the Waffen-SS, Pohl respectively.

    “We assist with all forces at our disposal.

    “The task of my economic-administrative main office, however, is
    not solely fulfilled with the delivery of the prisoners to the
    aviation industry as SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl and his
    assistants take care of the required working speed thru constant
    and supervision of the work-groups [Kommandos] and therefore
    have some influence on the results of production. In this
    respect I may suggest consideration of the fact that in
    enlarging our responsibility thru a speeding up of the total
    work, better results can definitely be expected.

    “We also have for some time adjusted our own stone-quarries to
    production for the airforce. For instance in Flossenbuerg near
    Weiden the prisoners employed previously in the quarry are
    working now in the fighter plane program for the Messerschmitt
    corporation Regensburg, which saw in the availability of our
    stone-mason shops and labor forces after the attack on
    Regensburg at that time a favorable opportunity for the
    immediate partial transfer of their production. Altogether 4,000
    prisoners will work there after the expansion. We produce now
    with 2,000 men 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers
    as well as 120,000 single parts of various kinds for the fighter
    ME 109.

    “In Oranienburg we are employing 6,000 prisoners at the Heinkel
    works now for construction of the HE 177. With that we have
    supplied 60% of the total crew of the plant.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry
    to subterranean locations requires _further_ employment of about
    100,000 prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of
    your letter of 14 Feb. 1944 are already under way.

    “I shall keep you, most honored Reichsmarshal, currently
    informed on this subject.

                                     “Heil Hitler
                                     “[initialled]  HH”  (_1584-III-PS_)

Inclosed with that letter was a report in tabular form of the number of
prisoners being used in each of the concentration camps, the total
man-hours for the month of January 1944, and the type of production in
which such prisoners were engaged. That report is signed by Pohl, the
Chief of WVHA (_1584-III-PS_). The total appearing under the column
“Number of prisoners planned” is 90,785; under the column “Number of
prisoners used,” 35,839; and under the column “Man-hours—January,”
8,733,495. (_1584-III-PS_)

The extent to which the number of prisoners was increased through SS
efforts is illustrated by a report from Office Group D of WVHA, 15
August 1944:

“_Subject_:   Report of the number of prisoners and Survey of prisoners
                clothing type G and Z and the supply of G available.
“Reference:   Telephone call by SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Waschkau on 15.8.44.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “With reference to the above-mentioned telephone call, I am
    sending herewith a report on the actual number of prisoners for
    1.8.1944 and of the new arrivals already announced, as well as
    the clothing report for 15.8.44.

“(1).  The actual number on 1.8.44, consisted of:
       _a._ Male prisoners                                         379,167
       _b._ Female prisoners                                       145,119

        “In addition, there are the following new arrivals:

 1. From the Hungary program (anti-Jewish action)                   90,000
 2. From Litzmannstadt (Police prison and Ghetto)                   60,000
 3. Poles from the General Government                               15,000
 4. Convicts from the Eastern Territories                           10,000
 5. Former Polish officers                                          17,000
 6. From Warsaw (Poles)                                            400,000
 7. Continued arrivals from France approx.                   15,000-20,000

    “Most of the prisoners are already on the way and will be
    received into the Concentration Camps within the next few days.”

(_d_) _SS control of concentration camps and the ill treatment and
murder of inmates._ The intensive drive for manpower to some extent
interfered with the program already undertaken by WVHA to exterminate
certain classes of individuals in the camps. This is shown by a letter
from WVHA, Department D Concentration Camps, 28 March 1942, addressed to
a number of concentration camp commandants and signed Liebehenschel, SS

    “It became known through a report of a Camp Commandant that 42
    prisoners out of 51 which were mustered out for the special
    treatment 14 f 13 again became capable of work after a period of
    time and therefore do not have to be directed to the special
    treatment. From this it appears that the selection of the
    prisoners is not being handled according to given directives.
    Only those prisoners are allowed to be directed to the
    examination commission who fulfill the given stipulations and
    who above all are no longer capable of work.

    “In order to be able to fulfill the designated missions of the
    concentration camps, the working capabilities of every prisoner
    must be retained for the camp. The camp commandants of the
    concentration camps are requested to especially make this their
    aim.” (_1151-P-PS_)

Another letter from WVHA, Department D Concentration Camps, 27 April
1943, addressed to a number of concentration camp commanders, signed by
Gluecks, SS Brigade Fuehrer and Major General of the Waffen SS, deals
with the same point:

    “The Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police has decided,
    after consultation, that in the future only mentally sick
    (_geisteskranke_) prisoners may be selected for action 14 F 13
    by the medical commissions appointed for this purpose.

    “All other prisoners incapable of working (tubercular cases,
    bedridden cripples, etc.) are to be basically excepted from this
    action. Bedridden prisoners are to be drafted for suitable work
    which they can perform in bed.

    “The order of the Reich Fuehrer SS is to be obeyed strictly in
    the future.

    “Requests for fuel for this purpose, therefore, do not take
    place.” (_1933-PS_)

The SS, however, was to some degree enabled to achieve both goals—that
of increased production and of elimination of undesirable individuals,
as shown by the agreement between Minister of Justice Thierack and
Himmler on 18 September 1942 (_654-PS_). That agreement provided for the
delivery of antisocial elements after the execution of their sentences
to the Reichsfuehrer SS “to be worked to death.”

The conditions under which such persons worked in the camps were well
calculated to lead to their deaths. Those conditions were regulated by
the WVHA. An illustration of WVHA management is to be found in an order
directed to commandants of concentration camps, 11 August 1942, and
issued by SS Brigade Fuehrer and General of the Waffen SS Gluecks, Chief
of Office Group D of WVHA (_2189-PS_):

    “The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police has
    ordered, that punishment by beating will be executed in
    concentration camps for women by _prisoners_—under the ordered

    “In order to coordinate this order the main office chief of the
    main SS economic administration office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer
    and General of the Waffen-SS Pohl, has ordered, effective
    immediately, that punishment by beating will also be executed by
    prisoners in concentration camps for men.” (_2189-PS_)

Even after their deaths, the prisoners did not escape the management of
WVHA. A directive to the commanders of concentration camps, 12 September
1942, signed by the Chief of the Central Office of Office Group D of
WVHA, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Liebehenschel, provided:

    “According to a communication of the Chief of the Security
    Police and the SD and conforming to a report of the Chief of
    Security Police and SD in Prague, urns of deceased Czechs and
    Jews were sent for burial to the home-cemeteries within the

    “Based on different events (Demonstrations, erecting of posters
    inimical to the Reich on urns of deceased inmates in halls of
    cemeteries in the home-communities, pilgrimages to the graves of
    deceased inmates, etc.) within the Protectorate, the delivery of
    urns with the ash remnants of deceased Nationals of the
    Protectorate and of Jews is henceforth prohibited. The urns
    shall be preserved within the Concentration Camps. In case of
    doubt about the preservation of the urns oral instructions shall
    be available at this agency.” (_2199-PS_)

(_e_) _SS use of concentration camp labor for pecuniary profit._ The SS
regarded the inmates of concentration camps as its own personal property
to be used for its own economic advantage. The suggestion in Himmler’s
letter to Goering, will be recalled, that the SS be given a larger
responsibility in the armament program conducted in the camps
(_1584-III-PS_). As early as 1942 Speer recognized that the SS was
motivated by the desire for further profits when he suggested to Hitler
in a conference on 20, 21, and 22 September that the SS receive a share
of the war equipment produced by concentration camp labor in ratio to
the working hours of the prisoners (_R-124_). The Fuehrer agreed that a
3 to 5 percent share would satisfy SS commanders (_R-124_). Himmler
himself frankly admitted his intention to derive profits for SS purposes
from the camps in his speech to the officers of the SS Leibstandarte
“Adolf Hitler” (_1918-PS_):

    “* * * The apartment-building program which is the prerequisite
    for a healthy and social basis of the entire SS as well as of
    the entire Fuehrerkorps can be carried out only when I get the
    money for it from somewhere; nobody is going to give me the
    money, it must be earned, and it will be earned by forcing the
    scum of mankind, the prisoners, the professional criminals to do
    positive work. The man, guarding these prisoners, serves just as
    hard as the one on close-order drill. The one who does this and
    stands near these utterly negative people will learn within 3 to
    4 months * * * and we shall see: In peacetime I shall form
    guard-battalions and put them on duty for 3 months only—to
    fight the inferior being (_Untermenschentum_), and this will not
    be a boring guard duty, but if the officers handle it right, it
    will be the best indoctrination on inferior beings and the
    inferior races. This activity is necessary, as I said; 1. to
    eliminate those negative people from the German people; 2. to
    exploit them once more for the great folk community by having
    them break stones and bake bricks so that the Fuehrer can again
    erect his grand buildings; and 3. to in turn invest the money,
    earned soberly this way, in houses, in ground, in settlements so
    that our men can have houses in which to raise large families
    and lots of children. This in turn is necessary because we stand
    or die with this leading blood of Germany and if the good blood
    is not reproduced we will not be able to rule the world.”

(4) _Functions and activities with respect to human experiments._ One
aspect of SS control over concentration camps remains to be
mentioned—its direction of the program of biological experiments on
human beings which was carried on in the camps. An American military
tribunal has passed judgment on some of the SS members who participated
in these experiments at Dachau. The purpose of this discussion is to
show only that those experiments were the result of SS direction and
that the SS played a vital part in their successful execution.

The program seems to have originated in a request by Dr. Sigmund Rascher
to Himmler for permission to utilize persons in concentration camps as
material for experiments with human beings, in connection with research
he was conducting on behalf of the Luftwaffe. A letter dated 15 May
1941, addressed to the Reichsfuehrer SS and signed by S. Rascher reads
in part as follows:

    “For the time being I have been assigned to the
    _Luftgaukommando_ VLL, Munich for a medical course. During this
    course, where researches on high-altitude flights play a
    prominent part (determined by the somewhat higher ceiling of the
    English fighter planes) considerable regret was expressed at the
    fact that no tests with human material had yet been possible for
    us, as such experiments are very dangerous and nobody volunteers
    for them. I put, therefore, the serious question: can you make
    available two or three professional criminals for these
    experiments? The experiments are made at _Bodenstaendige
    Bruefstells fuer Hoehenforschung der Luftwaffe_, Munich. The
    experiments, by which the subjects can, of course, die, would
    take place with my cooperation. They are essential for
    researches on high-altitude flight and cannot be carried out, as
    has been tried, with monkeys, who offer entirely different
    test-conditions. I have had a very confidential talk with a
    representative of the air forces surgeon who makes these
    experiments. He is also of the opinion that the problem in
    question could only be solved by experiments on human persons.
    (Feeble-minded could also be used as that material.)”

Dr. Rascher promptly received assurance that he would be allowed to
utilize concentration camp inmates for his experiments.

A letter dated 22 May 1941, addressed to Dr. Rascher and bearing the
signature of SS Sturmbannfuehrer Karl Brandt, reads in part:

    “Shortly before flying to Oslo, the Reichsfuehrer SS gave me
    your letter of 15 May 1941, for partial reply.

    “I can inform you that prisoners will of course be gladly made
    available for the high-flight researches. I have informed the
    Chief of the Security Police of this agreement of the
    Reichsfuehrer SS, and requested that the competent official be
    instructed to get in touch with you.” (_1582-PS_)

The altitude experiments were conducted by Rascher. In May 1942 General
Field Marshal Milch on behalf of the Luftwaffe expressed his thanks to
the SS for the assistance it furnished in connection with the
experiments. This letter, dated 20 May 1942, addressed to SS
Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff reads in part:

    “In reference to your telegram of 12 May our sanitary inspector
    reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the
    SS and Air Force at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation
    of these experiments seems essentially unreasonable. However the
    carrying out of experiments of some other kind, in regard to
    perils at high seas, would be important. These have been
    prepared in immediate agreement with the proper offices; Major
    (M.C.) Weltz will be charged with the execution and Capt. (M.C.)
    Rascher will be made available until further orders in addition
    to his duties within the Medical Corps of the Air Corps. A
    change of these measures does not appear necessary, and an
    enlargement of the task is not considered pressing at this time.

    “The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these
    low-temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at another
    place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau.

    “I convey the special thanks from the supreme commander of the
    Air Corps to the SS for their extensive cooperation.

    “I remain with best wishes for you in good comradeship and with

                                             “Heil Hitler!
                                             “Always yours
                                             “s/s  E. Milch”  (_343-PS_)

Having finished his high-altitude experiments, Dr. Rascher proceeded to
experiment with methods of rewarming persons who had been subjected to
extreme cold. On 10 September 1942 he rendered an intermediate report on
intense chilling experiments which had been started in Dachau on 15
August (_1618-PS_). That report states:

    “The experimental subjects (VP) were placed in the water,
    dressed in complete flying uniform, winter or summer
    combination, and with an aviator’s helmet. A life jacket made of
    rubber or kapok was to prevent submerging. The experiments were
    carried out at water temperatures varying from 2.5° to 12°.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Electrical measurements gave low temperature readings of 26.4°
    in the stomach and 26.5° in the rectum. Fatalities occurred only
    when the brain stem and the back of the head were also chilled.
    Autopsies of such fatal cases always revealed large amounts of
    free blood, up to ½ liter, in the cranial cavity. The heart
    invariably showed extreme dilation of the right chamber. As soon
    as the temperature in these experiments reached 28°, the
    experimental subjects (VP) died invariably, despite all attempts
    at resuscitation.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “During attempts to save severely chilled persons
    (_Unterkuehlte_), it was shown that rapid rewarming was in all
    cases preferable to slow rewarming, because after removal from
    the cold water, the body temperature continued to sink rapidly.
    I think that for this reason we can dispense with the attempt to
    save intensely chilled subjects by means of animal heat.

    “Rewarming by animal warmth—animal bodies or women’s
    bodies—would be too slow.” (_1618-PS_)

Although Rascher was of the preliminary opinion that rewarming by
women’s bodies would be too slow, means for conducting such experiments
were nevertheless placed at his disposal. A letter from the
Reichsfuehrer SS, signed Himmler, 16 November 1942, and addressed to Lt.
General Pohl, the head of WVHA, read as follows:

    “The following struck me during my visit to Dachau on the 13 Nov
    1942 regarding the experiments conducted there for the saving of
    people whose lives are endangered through exposure
    (_Unterkuehlung_) in ice, snow, or water and who are to be saved
    by the employment of every method or means:

    “I had ordered that suitable women are to be set aside from the
    Concentration Camp for these experiments for the warming of
    these who were exposed. Four girls were set aside who were in
    the Concentration Camp due to loose living, and being
    prostitutes, they formulate a danger of contagion. * * *”

To insure the continuance of Rascher’s experiments, Himmler arranged for
his transfer to the Waffen SS. A letter dated November 1942 from the
Reichsfuehrer SS addressed to “Dear Comrade Milch,” stated:

    “You will recall that through General Wolff I particularly
    recommended to you for your consideration the work of a certain
    SS Fuehrer, Dr. Rascher, who is a physician of the air force on
    leave (_Arzt des Beurlaubtenstandes der Luftwaffe_).

    “These researches which deal with the behavior of the human
    organism at great heights, as well as with manifestations caused
    by prolonged cooling of the human body in cold water, and
    similar problems which are of vital importance to the air force
    in particular, can be performed by us with particular efficiency
    because I personally assumed the responsibility for supplying
    asocial individuals and criminals who deserve only to die
    (_todeswuerdig_) from concentration camps for these

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt in reserve, from
    the air force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen-SS. I
    would then assume the sole responsibility for having these
    experiments made in this field, and would put the results, of
    which we in the SS need only a part for the frost injuries in
    the East, entirely at the disposal of the air force. However, in
    this connection I suggest that with the liaison between you and
    Wolff a “non-Christian” physician should be charged, who should
    be at the same time honorable as a scientist and not prone to
    intellectual theft and who could be informed of the results.
    This physician should also have good contacts with the
    adminstrative[administrative?] authorities, so that the results
    would really obtain a hearing.

    “I believe that this solution—to transfer Dr. Rascher to the
    SS, so that he could carry out the experiments under my
    responsibility and under my orders—is the best way. The
    experiments should not be stopped; we owe that to our men. If
    Dr. Rascher remained with the air force, there would certainly
    be much annoyance; because then I would have to bring a series
    of unpleasant details to you, because of the arrogance and
    assumption which Professor Dr. Holzloehner has displayed in the
    post of Dachau—who is under my command—about me in utterances
    delivered to SS Colonel Sievers. In order to save both of us
    this trouble, I suggest again that Dr. Rascher should be
    transferred to the Waffen SS as quickly as possible.”

Rascher’s experiments were by no means the only experiments in which the
SS was interested. Without attempting even to outline the whole extent
of the experimental program, one further illustration of this type of SS
activity may be mentioned. That is a report prepared by the Chief
Hygienist in the office of the Reich Surgeon of the SS and Police, SS
Oberfuehrer Dr. Mrugowsky, 12 September 1944, relating to experiments
with poisoned bullets.

    “On 11 September 1944, in the presence of SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
    Dr. Ding, Dr. Widman and the undersigned, experiments with
    Akonotinnitrate bullets were carried out on five persons who had
    been sentenced to death. The caliber of the bullets used was
    7.65 cm and they were filled with the poison in crystal form.
    Each subject of the experiments received one shot in the upper
    part of the left thigh, while in a horizontal position. In the
    case of 2 persons, the bullets passed clean through the upper
    part of the thigh. Even later no effect from the poison could be
    seen. These two subjects were therefore rejected * * *.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The symptoms shown by the three condemned persons were
    surprisingly the same. At first, nothing special was noticeable.
    After 20 to 25 minutes, a disturbance of the motor nerves and a
    light flow of saliva began, but both stopped again. After 40 to
    44 minutes a strong flow of saliva appeared. The poisoned
    persons swallowed frequently, later the flow of saliva is so
    strong that it can no longer be controlled by swallowing. Foamy
    saliva flows from the mouth. Then, a sensation of choking, and
    vomiting start.” (_L-103_)

The next three paragraphs describe in coldly scientific fashion the
reactions of the dying persons. That description then concludes:

    “At the same time there was pronounced nausea. One of the
    poisoned persons tried in vain to vomit. In order to succeed he
    put 4 fingers of his hand, up to the main joint, right into his
    mouth. In spite of this, no vomiting occurred. His face became
    quite red.

    “The faces of the other two subjects were already pale at an
    early stage. Other symptoms were the same. Later on the
    disturbance of the motor nerves increased so much that the
    persons threw themselves up and down rolled their eyes and made
    aimless movements with their hands and arms. At last, the
    disturbance subsided, the pupils were enlarged to the maximum,
    the condemned lay still. Massetercramp and loss of urine was
    observed in one of them. Death occurred 121, and 129 minutes
    after they were shot.” (_L-103_)

The fact that SS doctors engaged in such experiments was no accident. It
was consistent with an ideology and racial philosophy which, to use
Himmler’s own words, regarded human beings as lice and offal. But the
most important factor was the fact that only the SS was in a position to
supply necessary human material. And it did supply such material through
WVHA. A letter from the Department Chief of Office Group D of WVHA, 12
May 1944, addressed to the commandants of all concentration camps dealt
with the assignment of prisoners for the experimental purposes:

    “There is cause to call attention to the fact that in every case
    permission for assignment has to be requested here _before_
    assignment of prisoners is made for experimental purposes.

    “To be included in this request are number, kind of custody, and
    in case of aryan prisoners, exact personal data, file number in
    the Main Reich’s Security Office and reason for detainment into
    the concentration camp.

    “Herewith, I explicitly forbid assignment of prisoners for
    experimental purposes without permission.” (_1751-PS_)

It was on the basis of its ability to supply such material that the
Ministry of Finance was prepared to subsidize the SS experimental
program. This matter was discussed in a series of letters between the
Ministry of Finance, the Reichs Research Department, and the Reich
Surgeon of the SS and police (_002-PS_). The first is from the office of
the Executive Council of the Reichs Research Department, addressed to
the Reichs Surgeon SS and Police, 19 February 1943, and signed by
Mentzel, Chief of Bureau, SS Brigade Leader:

    “The Reichs Minister of Finance told me that you requested 53
    leading positions (BES. GR C3-C8) for your office, partly for a
    new research institute.

    “After the Reichsmarschall of the Great German Reich had, as
    President of the Reichs Research Dept., entrusted himself with
    all German research, issued directives among other things, that
    in the execution of military important scientific tasks, the
    available institutions including equipment and personnel should
    be utilized to the utmost for reasons of necessary economization
    (of effort).

    “The foundation of new institutes comes therefore only in
    question in as far as there are no outstanding institutes
    available for the furtherance of important war research tasks.”

To this letter the Reich Surgeon of SS and Police replied on 26 February

    “In acknowledgment of your correspondence of the 19th Feb. 1943,
    I am able to reply the following to it today:

    “The appropriation for the 53 key positions for my office which
    you made the basis of your memorandum was a veritable peace

    “The special institutes of the SS which are to be partly staffed
    through this appropriation are to serve the purpose to establish
    and make accessible for the entire realm of scientific research,
    the particular possibilities of research only possessed by the

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I will gladly be at your disposal at any time to discuss the
    particular research aims in connection with the SS, which I
    would like to bring up upon the direction of the Reichs Director
    SS.” (_002-PS_)

An interview between the Reich Surgeon and Mentzel took place, and on 25
March 1943 Mentzel wrote the following letter to the Reich Minister of

    “In regard to your correspondence of the 19th Dec (J 4761—174 I
    g III. Ang) to which I gave you a preliminary communication on
    the 19th Feb, I finally take the following position:

    “The Surgeon General-SS and Police, in a personal discussion,
    told me that the budget claim which he looks after is used
    primarily in the pure military sector of the Waffen SS. Since it
    is established on a smaller scale for the enlarging of
    scientific research possibilities, they pertain therefore
    exclusively to such affairs that are carried out with the
    material (Prisoners—‘_Haflinge_’) which is only accessible to
    the Waffen SS and are therefore not to be undertaken for any
    other experimental purposes.

    “I cannot object therefore on the part of the Reichs
    Experimental Counsel against the budget claims of the Surgeon
    General, SS and Police.” (_002-PS_)

(5) _Functions and Activities with respect to Jewish Persecution._
Through its activities with respect to concentration camps the SS
performed part of its mission to safeguard the security of the Nazi
regime. But another specialized aspect of that mission must not be
forgotten. Himmler had defined that task as the prevention of a
“_Jewish_ Bolshevist revolution of subhumans.” In plain words this meant
participation in the Nazi program of Jewish persecution and
extermination. That program involved every branch and component of the

The racial philosophy of the SS made that organization a natural agency
for the execution of all types of anti-semitic measures. The SS position
on the Jewish question was publicly stated in the SS newspaper “_Das
Schwarze Korps_,” in the issue of 8 August 1940, by its editor, Gunter
d’Alquen (_2668-PS_). “_Das Schwarze Korps_” was the official propaganda
agency of the SS which every SS man was required to read and to induce
others to read. This was the SS position on the Jews:

    “Just as the Jewish question will be solved for Germany only
    when the last Jew has been deported, so the rest of Europe
    should realize that the German peace which awaits it must be a
    peace without Jews.” (_2668-PS_)

The attempted “solution” of the Jewish question through pogroms and
“spontaneous” demonstrations occurred following the murder of von Rath
in November 1938. In these demonstrations all branches of the SS were
called on to play a part. The teletype message from SS Gruppenfuehrer
Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued on 10 November
1938 concerning “Measures against Jews tonight,” provided:

    “* * * The direction of the measures of the Security Police
    concerning the demonstrations against Jews is vested with the
    organs of the State Police—inasmuch as the inspectors of the
    Security Police are not issuing their own orders. In order to
    carry out the measures of the Security Police, officials of the
    Criminal Police, as well as members of the SD, of the
    _Verfuegungstruppe_ and the _Allgemeine SS_ may be used.”

With the outbreak of the war and the march of Nazi armies over the
Continent, the SS participated in “solving” the Jewish question in all
the countries of Europe. The solution was nothing short of
extermination. To a large degree these wholesale murders were disguised
under the name of “anti-partisan” or “anti-guerilla” actions, and as
such included as victims not merely Jews but Soviets, Poles, and other
Eastern peoples. One example of an action confined essentially to Jews
was the mass annihilation of Jews in gas vans (_501-PS_). Those vans
were operated by the Security Police and SD under the direction of RSHA.
Another example is found in the report entitled “Solution of the Jewish
Question in Galicia,” prepared by SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lt. General of
the Police Katzman and rendered to SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of
the Police Krueger (_L-18_). The “solution,” which consisted in
evacuation and extermination of all the Jews in Galicia and confiscation
of their property, was carried out under the energetic direction of the
SS and Police Leaders, with the assistance of SS police units, as the
report proudly boasts. Three additional items in that report dealing
specifically with the SS should be noted. The first is the text under a
photograph in the original report:

    “Great was the joy of the SS men when the Reichsfuehrer SS in
    person in 1942 visited some camps along the Rollbahn.” (_L-18_)

The second is a balance sheet, showing the income from forced Jewish
labor and expenditures therefrom. Item 3 on the balance sheet reads as

“3. Amount paid over to the SS cashier:
    _a._ Camps                                            6,876,251,00 Zl
    _b._ W&R Factories                                    6,556,513,69 Zl
                                                         13,432,764,69 Zl

    Further payments to the SS-cashier are effected every month.”

The third is the last two paragraphs of the report:

    “Despite the extraordinary burden heaped upon every single SS
    Police Officer during these actions, mood and spirit of the men
    were extraordinarily good and praiseworthy to the last day.

    “Only thanks to the sense of duty of every single leader and man
    have we succeeded to get rid of this PLAGUE in so short a time.”

One final example of SS participation in Jewish extermination is the
report by SS Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Police, Stroop, of
the destruction of the Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw during April and May 1943
(_1061-PS_). Two sections of that report dealing with the constitution
of the participating forces should be noted. A table of the units used
indicates the average number of officers and men from each unit employed
per day. It will be observed that among the units involved were the
staff of the SS and Police Leader, two battalions of the Waffen SS, two
battalions of the 22d SS Police Regiment and members of the Security
Police. The part played by the Waffen SS particularly came in for high
praise from the writer of the report. Tribute is paid to the toughness
of the men of the Waffen SS, Police, and _Wehrmacht_. In the next
paragraph the writer says:

    “Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen SS
    had been trained for only three or four weeks before being
    assigned to this action, high credit should be given for the
    pluck, courage and devotion to duty which they showed.”

The selection methods and ideological education of Waffen SS men
furnished such good grounding that a few weeks of practice was all that
was required to turn them into excellent exterminators. Himmler’s proud
boast of the part that the SS played in the extermination of the Jews
occurs in his Posen Speech:

    “Most of _you_ must know what it means when 100 corpses are
    lying side by side, or 500 or 1,000. To have stuck it out and at
    the same time—apart from the exceptions caused by human
    weakness—to have remained decent fellows, that is what has made
    us hard. This is a page of glory in our history which has never
    been written and is never to be written * * *.” (_1919-PS_)

(6) _Functions and activities with respect to preparing for and waging
aggressive war._ From the very beginning the SS made prime contributions
to the conspirators’ aggressive aims. First, it served as one of the
para-military organizations under which the conspirators disguised their
building up of an Army in violation of the Versailles Treaty. Second,
through affiliated SS organizations in other countries and through some
of the departments in its own Supreme Command, it fostered Fifth Column
movements outside Germany and prepared the way for aggression. Third,
through its militarized units, it participated in the aggressive actions
which were eventually carried out.

(_a_) _The SS as a para-military organization._ The para-military
character of the General SS is apparent from the military character of
its structure, the military discipline required of its members, and the
steps it took to enlist in its ranks young men of military age. In
addition to this volunteer Army the SS created, as early as 1933, fully
armed professional soldiers who complied with the requirement for
compulsory military service by performing duties in the SS. These were
the _SS Vorfuegungstruppe_ and the Death Head Units.

(_b_) _The SS as a fifth column agency._ While building up the SS as a
military force within Germany, the conspirators also utilized it in
other countries to lay the groundwork for aggression. During the seizure
of Austria, the _SS Standarte 89_ was directly involved in the murder of
Chancellor Dolfuss, and a memorial placque was erected in Vienna as a
tribute to the SS men who participated in that murder (_L-273_;
_2968-PS_). Subsequently, on the night of 11 March 1938, the SS with the
SA marched into Vienna and occupied all government buildings and
important posts in the city. (See the report of Gauleiter Rainer to
Reich Commissioner Buerckel (_812-PS_); and the record of the telephone
conversations between Goering and Dambrowski (_2949-PS_)).

The same pattern was repeated in Czechoslovakia. Henlein’s Free Corps
played in that country the part of fifth column which the SS had played
in Austria and was rewarded, in September 1938, by being placed under
the jurisdiction of the Reichsfuehrer SS (_388-PS, Items 37, 38_).
Moreover, a Most Secret OKW order of 28 September 1938, reveals that the
SS had its own armed units, four battalions of _Totenkopf Verbaende_,
actually operating in Czechoslovakian territory before the Munich Pact
was signed (_388-PS, Item 36_).

But SS preparations for aggression were not confined to military forces.
One of the departments of the SS Supreme Command, the _Volksdeutsche
Mittelstelle_, was a center for fifth column activity. At the secret
meeting between Ribbentrop and Henlein in March 1938, at which the line
to be followed by the Sudeten German Party was determined, the
_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_ was represented by Professor Haushofer and
SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz (_2788-PS_). And when the Foreign Office in
August 1938 awarded further subsidies to Henlein’s Sudeten Party, the
memorandum of that recommendation (_3059-PS_) contained the significant

    “Volksdeutsche Mittlestelle will be informed.” (_3059-PS_)

(_c_) _SS participation in aggressive war._ When at last the time came
to strike, the SS was ready. In the words of the National Socialist
Yearbook for 1940 (_2164-PS_):

    “When the march into the liberated provinces of the Sudetenland
    began on that memorable October 1, 1938, _Verfuegungstruppe_ as
    well as the Death Head Units were along with those in the lead.
    * * *”

    “The 15th of March 1939 brought a similar utilization of the SS
    when it served to establish order in collapsing Czechoslovakia.
    This action ended with the founding of the protectorate

    “Only a week later, on the 29th of March 1939, Memel also
    returned to the Reich upon basis of an agreement with Lithuania.
    Again it was the SS, here above all the Eastern Prussian SS,
    which played a prominent part in the liberation of this
    province.” (_2164-PS_)

In the final act which set off the war, the attack on Poland in
September 1939, the SS acted as stage manager. In his affidavit
(_Affidavit A_), Maj. Gen. Erwin Lahousen describes the simulated attack
on the radio station Gleiwitz by Germans dressed in Polish uniforms, as
one of the most mysterious actions which took place in the _Abwehr_

    “This was an incident which had been deliberately engineered and
    directed by the SD and it was executed by prisoners from
    Concentration Camps dressed up in Polish uniforms, and using
    Polish weapons and equipment. Those prisoners were later
    murdered by the SD in order to eliminate any possibility of
    their giving testimony of the incident.” (_Affidavit A_)

The war erupted and the Waffen SS again took its place in the van of the
attacking forces.

(7) _Functions and activities with respect to commission of war crimes._
During the war great use was made of the peculiar qualities possessed by
the SS—qualities not only of its combat force, but of its other
components as well—in executing tasks embracing the commission of war
crimes and crimes against humanity.

(_a_) _“Antipartisan” operations._ A directive issued by Keitel on 13
March 1941, making preparations 3 months in advance for the attack on
Russia, provided that in the area of operations the Reichsfuehrer SS was
entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political
administration—tasks which would result from the struggle about to
commence between two opposing political systems. (_447-PS_)

One of the steps taken by the Reichsfuehrer SS to carry out those
“special tasks” was the formation and use of so-called “anti-partisan”
units. They were discussed by Himmler in his Posen speech:

    “In the meantime I have also set up the Chief of the
    anti-partisan units. Our comrade SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem
    Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it
    necessary for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative
    command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are
    best in position to take action against this enemy struggle,
    which is decidedly a political one. Except where units which had
    been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were
    taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very

    “It is notable that by setting up this department, we have
    gained for the SS in turn, a division, a corps, an army, and the
    next step—which is the High Command of an army or area of a
    group—if you wish to call it that.” (_1919-PS_)

What the SS did with its division, corps, and army, out of which the
anti-partisan units were formed, is illustrated in the “Activity and
Situation Report No. 6 of the Task Forces of the Security Police and SD
in the U.S.S.R.,” covering the period from 1 to 31 October 1941
(_R-102_). The report shows that so-called “anti-partisan” activity was
actually nothing but a name for extermination of Jews and persons
believed politically undesirable. The report is a carefully organized
and detailed description of such extermination. Section I describes the
stations of the various Task Forces involved, and section II their
activities. The latter section is divided into parts, each dealing with
a different geographical region—the Baltic area, White Ruthenia, and
the Ukraine. Under each area the report of activities is classified
under three headings: (_a_) Partisan activity and counteraction; (_b_)
arrests and executions of communists and officials; and (_c_) Jews. The
following units were involved (_R-102_):

    “The present stations are:

        “Task Force A: since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk.
        “Task Force B: continues in Smolensk.
        “Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew.
        “Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.

    “The Action and Special Commandos (_Einsatz und Sonder
    Commandos_) which are attached to the Task Force continue on the
    march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been
    assigned to them.” (_R-102_)

The section headed “Baltic area” and subsection labeled “Jews” read as
follows (_R-102_):

    “Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on
    the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not
    been recorded on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination.

    “However, the Estonian Protective Corps (_Selbstschutz_), formed
    at the time of the entry of the Wehrmacht, immediately started a
    comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action was under
    the direction of the task force of the Security Police and the

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of
    doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still
    in progress. After completion of this action there will remain
    only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern Territory.”

In the section headed “White Ruthenia,” the subsection labeled “Partisan
activity and counteraction,” the following appear:

    “In Wultschina 8 juveniles were arrested as partisans and shot.
    They were inmates of a children’s home. They had collected
    weapons which they hid in the woods. Upon search the following
    were found: 3 heavy machine guns, 15 rifles, several thousand
    rounds of ammunition, several hand grenades, and several
    packages of poison gas Ebrit.

    “_b. Arrests and executions of communists, officials, and

    “A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was
    devoted to the combatting of Communists and criminals. A special
    Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63
    officials, NKVD agents and agitators.” (_R-102_)

The preceding subsection ends with the following statement:

    “The liquidations for the period covered by this report have
    reached a total of 37,180 persons.” (_R-102_)

And under the section headed “Ukraine,” the subsection “Jews,” this
statement occurs:


    In Shitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience
    they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propaganda and
    saboteurs.” (_R-102_)

The foregoing report deals with the activities of four Task Forces—A,
B, C, and D. The more detailed report of Task Force A up to 15 October
1941 shows great variety of SS components in such a task force:

    “This description of the over-all situation showed and shows
    that the members of the Stapo [The Secret State Police], Kripo
    and SD [Security Service] who are attached to the Action-Group,
    are active mainly in Lithouania, Latvia, Esthonia,
    White-Ruthenia and to a smaller part in front of Leningrad. It
    shows further that the forces of the uniformed police and the
    Armed SS are active mainly in front of Leningrad, in order to
    take measures against the returning population and under their
    own officers. This is so much easier because the Action
    detachments in Lithouania, Latvia and Esthonia have at their
    disposal native police units, as described in encl. 1, and
    because so far 150 Latvian reinforcements have been sent to

    “The distribution of the leaders of Security Police and SD
    during the individual phases can be gathered from encl. 2, the
    advance and the activities of the Action-Group and the
    Action-detachments from encl. 3. It should be mentioned that the
    leaders of the Armed-SS and of the uniformed police who are
    reserves have declared their wish to stay on with the Security
    Police and the SD.” (_L-180_)

Inclosure 1_a_ to this report shows the constitution of the Force:

“_Total Strength of Action Group A_:
“Total:                                       990
 Waffen-SS                                    340       34.4
 Motor Bicycle-Riders                         172       17.4
 Administration                                18        1.8
 Security Service [SD]                         35        3.5
 Criminal Police [Kripo]                       41        4.1
 State Police [Gestapo]                        89        9.0
 Auxiliary Police                              87        8.8
 Order Police                                 133       13.4
 Female Employees                              13        1.3
 Interpreters                                  51        5.1
 Teleprinter-Operators                          3        0.3
 Wireless-Operators                             8        0.8 ” (_L-180_)

Another report on the anti-partisan activity, from the General Commissar
for White Ruthenia to the Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern
Territories, 5 June 1943, deals with the results of the police operation

    “* * * SS Brigadefuehrer, Major General of Police von Gottberg,
    reports that the operation ‘Cottbus’ had the following result
    during the period mentioned:

Enemy dead                                                           4,500
Dead suspected of belonging to bands                                 5,000
German dead                                                             59

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy
    destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492
    rifles are taken from 4,500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows
    that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from the
    country. The battalion Dirlewanger especially has a reputation
    for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000 people
    suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and

    “By order of the Chief of Band-Combatting, SS Obergruppenfuehrer
    von dem Bach, units of the armed forces have also participated
    in the operation * * *” (_R-135_)

SS Obergruppenfuehrer vom dem Bach was referred to by Himmler as “our
comrade” when he placed him in charge of anti-partisan activity.

(_b_) _Execution of civilians._ The activities so far dealt with were
joint activities in which the Gestapo, Order Police, the SD, Waffen SS,
and SS Police Regiments were all involved. But these units were, of
course, also used individually to carry out tasks of such a
nature—tasks for which any component of the SS was well trained. A
letter from the Chief of the Command Office of the Waffen SS to the
Reichsfuehrer SS, 14 October 1941, contains an intermediate report on
civilian state of emergency:

    “* * * I deliver the following report regarding the commitment
    of the Waffen SS in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia during
    the civilian state of emergency:

    “In the mutual changes, all Battalions of the Waffen SS in the
    Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia will be brought forth for
    shootings, and relatively for the supervision at hangings.

    “Up until now there occurred:

“in Prague:                             99 shootings
                                        21 hangings
“in Bruenn:                             54 shootings
                                        17 hangings
“Total:                                191 executions (including 16 Jews)

    “A complete report regarding other measures and on the conduct
    of the officers, noncoms and men will be made following the
    termination of the civilian state of emergency.” (_1972-PS_)

(_c_) _Murder of prisoners of war._ It is not surprising that units of
the Waffen SS, a branch which had thus been employed for extermination
actions and the execution of civilians, also violated the laws of
warfare when carrying on ordinary combat activities. Proof of these
violations is contained in a supplementary report of the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Court of Inquiry concerning the
shooting of allied prisoners of war by the 12th SS Panzer Division
(Hitler Jugend) in Normandy, France, on 7-21 June 1944 (_2997-PS_). The
Court of Inquiry concluded that there occurred in Normandy, between 7
and 17 June 1944, seven cases of violations of the law of war, involving
the shooting of 64 unarmed allied prisoners of war in uniform, many of
whom had been previously wounded, and none of whom had resisted or
endeavored to escape; that the perpetrators were members of the 12th SS
Panzer Division, the so-called Hitler Jugend Division; that enlisted men
of the 15th Company of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of that
Division were given secret orders to the effect that SS troops should
take no prisoners and that prisoners were to be executed after having
been interrogated; that similar orders were given to men of the 3d
Battalion of the 26th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and to the 12th SS
Engineering and Reconnaissance Battalions; and that the conclusion was
irresistible that it was understood throughout the Division that a
policy of denying quarter or executing prisoners after interrogation was
openly approved. (_2997-PS_)

Other combatants met a similar fate at the hands of other components of
the SS. (The execution of allied fliers, of commandos, and paratroopers,
and of escaped prisoners of war who were turned over to the SD to be
destroyed, is discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.)

Combatants who were taken prisoner of war encountered the SS in another
form. (Section 6 on the Gestapo discusses the selection, by SS groups
stationed in prisoner of war camps, of prisoners for what the Nazis
euphemistically called “special treatment.”) Finally, the entire control
of prisoners of war was turned over to the Reichsfuehrer SS, pursuant to
the circular letter from the Nazi Party Chancellery placing Himmler in
charge of all prisoner of war camps. (_058-PS_)

(8) _Functions and activities with respect to Germanization of conquered
lands._ The final phase of the conspiracy in which the SS played a
leading role comprehended the colonization of conquered territories, the
destruction of their national existence, and the permanent extension of
the German frontier. These objectives were carried out through the
forcible evacuation and resettlement of inhabitants of conquered
regions, confiscation of their properties, “denationalization” and
“reeducation” of persons of German blood, and the colonization of
conquered territories by Germans. (See Chapter X on the Slave Labor
Program and Chapter XIII on Germanization and Spoliation.)

The SS was the logical agency to formulate and carry out the execution
of this program. The numerous statements made by Himmler as to SS
training for its role as the aristocracy in the “new Europe” leave that
beyond doubt. Himmler immediately proceeded to put these theories into
practice upon his appointment on 7 October 1939 as Reich Commissioner
for the Consolidation of German Folkdom. (_686-PS_)

To make and carry out plans for the program of evacuation and
resettlement, a new department of the SS Supreme Command, the Staff
Headquarters of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German
Folkdom, was created. The functions of this office are thus described in
the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943:

    “The Main Office of the Staff of the Reichs Commissar for the
    Consolidation of German Nationality is entrusted with the whole
    settlement and constructive planning and with its execution in
    the Reich and all those territories within the authority of the
    Reich, including all administrative and economic questions in
    connection with settlement, especially the deployment of
    manpower for this purpose.” (_2640-PS_)

The colonization program had two principal objectives: the first phase
was the destruction of the conquered peoples, by exterminating them,
deporting them, and confiscating their property; the second phase was
the bringing back of racial Germans to settle in the newly acquired land
and to live from the wealth of those who had been eliminated.

(_a_) _Elimination and deportation of conquered people._ The
extermination actions contributed in part to clearing the conquered
territories of persons deemed dangerous to the Nazi plan. But not every
undesirable could be liquidated. Moreover, manpower was needed for the
Nazi war effort. Mass deportation thus accomplished the twin purpose of
providing labor and of freeing the land for German colonists. The
participation of SS agencies in deporting persons from the conquered
territories to meet the increased demands of the Nazi war machine for
manpower has already been shown. The evacuation and resettlement
program, however, required the use of additional SS agencies to deport
persons occupying the desired living space. For this purpose immigration
centers were set up under the direction of RSHA, as is stated in the
National Socialist Yearbook for 1941:

    “For some time now the Reichsfuehrer-SS has had at his disposal
    an office under the management of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz,
    the _Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_. This office has the task of
    dealing with National German questions and the raising of
    required support.

    “In addition to the VM the Immigration Center Offices with the
    Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service of the SS
    (under the management of SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. Sandberger)
    and the Settlement Staff of the Reich-Commissioner were created,
    which, in cooperation with the NSV [National Socialist Welfare
    Organization] and the Reich Railroad Agency, took charge of the
    Migration of National Germans.” (_2163-PS_)

Further evidence is contained in the affidavit of Otto Hoffman, SS
Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS and Police, who was
chief in the Main Office for Race and Settlement in the SS Supreme
Command until 1943. This affidavit, taken at Freising, Germany, on 4
August 1945 reads as follows:

    “* * * 2. The executive power, in other words the carrying out
    of all so-called resettlement actions, that is to say, sending
    away of Polish and Jewish settlers and those of non-German blood
    from a territory in Poland destined for Germanization, was in
    the hands of the Chief of the RSHA (Heydrich and later
    Kaltenbrunner, since the end of 1942). The Chief of the RSHA
    also supervised and issued orders to the so-called immigration
    center (EWZ) which classified the Germans, living abroad who
    returned to Germany and directed them to the individual farms,
    already freed. The latter was done in agreement with the chief
    office of the Reichsfuehrer SS.” (_L-49_)

Other SS agencies also were included. The report, dated 22 May 1940,
relating to confiscation of Polish agricultural enterprises and
deportation of the Polish owners to Germany, shows that the following SS
agencies were involved in this action:

    “Means of transportation to the railroad can be provided (1)—by
    the enterprise of the East German Corporation of Agricultural
    Development, (2)—by the SS NCO School in Lublinitz and the
    concentration camp of Auschwitz.

    “These two latter places will also detail the necessary SS men
    for the day of the confiscation, etc.” (_1352-PS_)

The extent to which departments of the Supreme Command of the SS were
concerned with the evacuation program is shown by the minutes of a
meeting on 4 August 1942 dealing with the treatment of deported
Alsatians (_R-114_). The minutes list those present at the meeting as

“SS.- ‘Hauptsturmfuehrer’ Dr. Stier  }
 SS.- ‘Hauptsturmfuehrer’ Petri      }
‘RR’  Hoffmann                       }  Staff Headquarters
 Dr.  Scherler                       }
 SS.- ‘Untersturmfuehrer’ Foerster   }
 SS.- ‘Obersturmfuehrer’ Dr. Hinrichs, Chief of Estate Office and
        Settlement Staff, Strasbourg [_Leiter des Bodenamtes und
        Ansiedlungsstabes Strasburg_]
 SS.- ‘Sturmbannfuehrer’ Bruckner, Intermediate Office for Racial Germans
        (_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_)
 SS.- ‘Hauptsturmfuehrer’ Hummisch, Main Office Reich Security
 SS.- ‘Untersturmfuehrer’ Dr. Sieder, Main office for race and settling
 Dr. Labes, D. U. T.” (_R-114_)

The minutes read in part as follows:

    “1. _State of deportation in Alsace._

    “The starting point of the conference was a report on the
    deportation effected so far and further plans for resettlement
    in Alsace.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *


    “The representatives of the SS Main Offices present were united
    in this opinion:

    “II. 1. The Gauleiter’s plans for evacuation can be approved in
    principle, since they confine themselves in fact to a class of
    persons, whose presence in the Reich would be insupportable for
    racial and political reasons.” (_R-114_)

(_b_) _Resettlement of conquered territories by Germans._ The SS not
only destroyed or deported conquered peoples and confiscated their
property, but it also repopulated the conquered regions with so-called
racial Germans. Thousands upon thousands of these Germans were
transported from all parts of Europe to join the greater Reich. Not all
Germans were deemed reliable colonists, however. Those who were not,
were returned to Germany proper for “re-Germanization” and “reeducation”
along Nazi lines. A typical instance of the fate of such Germans is
found in the decree of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of
German Folkdom of 16 February 1942, dealing with the treatment to be
accorded so-called “Polonized” Germans (_R-112_). By the terms of that
decree two other SS functionaries were charged with the responsibility
for the re-Germanization program, the Higher SS and Police Leaders and
the Gestapo. Paragraph III of the decree provides:

    “III. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer will further the
    re-Germanization actions with every means at their disposal and
    continuously take stock of their success. In case they find that
    obstacles are put in the way of a re-Germanization action, they
    will report on their findings to the competent State Police
    (Superior) Office for appropriate measures. Where it proves to
    be impossible to attain re-Germanization even by forcible
    measures taken by the State Police, they will apply for a
    revocation of the naturalization through the Reich Fuehrer SS,
    Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood
    and give notice to the competent State Police (Superior)
    Office.” (_R-112_)

Paragraph IV of the decree provides:

    “IV. In the course of fulfilling their duties imposed on them by
    this Decree the competent State Police (Superior) Offices will
    take in particular the following measures:”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “4. They will assist the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in their
    task of re-Germanization, particularly in removing obstacles by
    forcible measures whenever there is opposition to
    re-Germanization. Before ordering forcible measures by the State
    Police they will give the Counsellor of the person in question
    an opportunity to state his opinion.

    “5. They will take into protective custody all persons, with
    regard to whom the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer has applied for
    revocation of their naturalization and will order their
    imprisonment in a Concentration Camp.” (_R-112_)

In the final stage of the process, the resettlement of the conquered
lands by racially and politically desirable Germans, still other SS
agencies participated. The National Socialist Yearbook for 1941 states

    “Numerous SS-leaders and SS-men helped with untiring effort in
    bringing about this systematic migration of peoples, which has
    no parallel in history.

    “There were many authoritative and administrative difficulties
    which, however, were immediately overcome due to the
    unbureaucratic working procedure. This was especially guaranteed
    above all by the employment of SS leaders.

    “The procedure called ‘_Durchschleusung_’ (literally, ‘passing
    through the lock’) takes 3 to 4 hours as a rule. The resettler
    is passed through 8 to 9 offices, following each other in
    organic order: registration office, card-index office,
    certificate and photo-office, property office, and biological
    hereditary and sanitary test office. The latter was entrusted to
    doctors and medical personnel of the SS and of the Armed Forces.
    The SS-Corps Areas [_Oberabschnitte_] Alpenland, North-West,
    Baltic Sea, Fulda-Werra, South and South East, the SS-Main
    Office [_SS-Hauptamt_], the NPEA (National Political Education
    Institution) Vienna, and the SS-Cavalry-School in Hamburg
    provided most of the SS-Officer and SS-Non-Coms who worked at
    this job of resettlement.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The settlement, establishment and care of the newly won
    peasantry in the liberated Eastern territory will be one of the
    most cherished tasks of the SS in the whole future.” (_2163-PS_)

                 E. _Defendant’s Membership in the SS._

In the course of its development from a group of strong armed
bodyguards, some 200 in number, to a complex organization participating
in every field of Nazi endeavor, the SS found room for its members in
high places. Persons in high places moreover, found for themselves a
position in the SS. Of the defendants charged in the indictment at least
7 were high ranking officers in the SS. They are the defendants
Ribbentrop, Hess, Kaltenbrunner, Bormann, Sauckel, Neurath, and
Seyss-Inquart. The vital part that Kaltenbrunner played in the SS, the
SD, and the entire Security Police system is discussed in Section 6 on
the Gestapo.

With respect to the other six defendants, the facts as to their
membership in the SS are to be found in two official publications. The
first is the membership list of the SS as of 1 December 1936. On line 2,
page 8, of that publication, there appears the name “Hess, Rudolf,”
followed by the notation, “By authority of the Fuehrer the right to wear
the uniform of an SS Obergruppenfuehrer.” In the 1937 edition of the
same membership list, line 50, page 10, there appears the name “Bormann,
Martin,” and in line with his name on the opposite page, under the
heading “Gruppenfuehrer,” appears the following date “20.4.37.” In the
same edition, line 56, page 12, is the name “von Neurath, Konstantin”
and on the opposite page, under the column headed “Gruppenfuehrer,” the
date “18.9.37.”

The second publication is “_Der Grossdeutsche Reichstag_” for the Fourth
Voting Period, edited by E. Kienast, Ministerial Director of the German
Reichstag, an official handbook containing biographical data as to
members of the Reichstag. On page 349 the following appears: “von
Ribbentrop, Joachim, _Reichsminister des Auswaertigen_, SS
Obergruppenfuehrer”; and on page 360 the following: “Sauckel, Fritz,
_Gauleiter_ and _Reichsstatthalter_ in Thuringen, SS
Obergruppenfuehrer”; and on page 389 the following: “Seyss-Inquart,
Arthur, Dr. Jur., Reichsminister, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.”

                            F. _Conclusion._

It is the prosecution’s contention that the SS, as defined in Appendix B
of the Indictment, was unlawful. Its participation in every phase of the
conspiracy alleged in Count One is clear. As an organization founded on
the principle that persons of “German blood” were a “master race,” it
exemplified a basic Nazi doctrine. It served as one of the means through
which the conspirators acquired control of the German government. The
operations of the SD, and of the _SS Totenkopf Verbaende_ in
concentration camps, were means used by the conspirators to secure their
regime and terrorize their opponents as alleged in Count One. All
components of the SS were involved from the very beginning in the Nazi
program of Jewish extermination. Through the _Allgemeine SS_ as a
para-military organization, the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ and _SS Totenkopf
Verbaende_ as professional combat forces, and the _Volksdeutsche
Mittelstelle_ as a fifth column agency, it participated in preparations
for aggressive war, and, through its militarized units, in the seizure
of Austria, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the attack on Poland, and
the waging of aggressive war in the West and in the East, as set forth
in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. In the course of such war, all
components of the SS had a part in the war crimes and crimes against
humanity, set forth in Counts Three and Four,—the murder and ill
treatment of civilian populations in occupied territory, the murder and
ill treatment of prisoners of war, and the Germanization of occupied

The evidence has shown that the SS was a single enterprise—a unified
organization. Some of its functions were, of course, performed by one
branch, or department or office, some by another. No single branch or
department participated in every phase of its activity. But every branch
and department and office was necessary to the functioning of the whole.
The situation is much the same as in the case of the individual
defendants at the bar. Not all participated in every act of the
conspiracy; but all performed a contributing part in the whole criminal

The evidence has shown, not only that the SS was an organization of
volunteers but that applicants had to meet the strictest standards of
selection. It was not easy to become an SS member. That was true of all
branches of the SS. During the course of the war, as the demands for
manpower increased and the losses of the Waffen SS grew heavier and
heavier, there were occasions when men drafted for compulsory military
service were assigned to units of the _Waffen SS_ rather than to the
_Wehrmacht_. Those instances were relatively few. Evidence of recruiting
standards of the Waffen SS in 1943 has shown that membership in that
branch was as essentially voluntary and highly selective as in other
branches. The fact that some individuals may have been arbitrarily
assigned to some Waffen SS unit has no bearing on the issue before the
tribunal, which is this, whether the SS was or was not an unlawful
organization. Doubtless some of the members of the SS, or of other of
the organizations alleged to be unlawful, might desire to show that
their participation in the organization was small or innocuous, that
compelling reasons drove them to apply for membership, that they were
not fully conscious of its aims, or that they were mentally
irresponsible when they became members. Such facts might or might not be
relevant if they were on trial. But in any event this is not the forum
to try out such matters.

The question before this Tribunal is simply this, whether the SS was or
was not an unlawful organization. The evidence has fully shown what the
aims and activities of the SS were. Some of these aims were stated in
publications. The activities were so widespread and so notorious,
covering so many fields of unlawful endeavor, that the illegality of the
organization could not have been concealed. It was a notorious fact, and
Himmler himself admitted that in 1936, when he said:

    “I know that there are people in Germany now who become sick
    when they see these black coats. We know the reason and we don’t
    expect to be loved by too many.”

It was at all times the exclusive function and purpose of the SS to
carry out the common objectives of the conspirators. Its activities in
carrying out those functions involved the commission of the crimes
defined in Article 6 of the Charter. By reason of its aims and the means
used for the accomplishment thereof, the SS should be declared a
criminal organization in accordance with Article 9 of the Charter.

                 *        *        *        *        *


                  │                                      │      │
     Document     │             Description              │ Vol. │  Page
                  │                                      │      │
                  │Charter of the International Military │      │
                  │  Tribunal, Article 9.                │  I   │       6
                  │International Military Tribunal,      │      │
                  │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│      │
                  │  Appendix B.                         │  I   │  29, 70
                  │                 ————                 │      │
                  │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a  │      │
                  │document indicates that the document  │      │
                  │was received in evidence at the       │      │
                  │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│      │
                  │before a document number indicates    │      │
                  │that the document was referred to     │      │
                  │during the trial but was not formally │      │
                  │received in evidence, for the reason  │      │
                  │given in parentheses following the    │      │
                  │description of the document. The USA  │      │
                  │series number, given in parentheses   │      │
                  │following the description of the      │      │
                  │document, is the official exhibit     │      │
                  │number assigned by the court.         │      │
                  │                 ————                 │      │
 *002-PS          │Letters of Reichs Research Department │      │
                  │regarding the budget of the SS. (USA  │      │
                  │469)                                  │ III  │       5
                  │                                      │      │
 *058-PS          │Hitler Order of 30 September 1944     │      │
                  │concerning reorganization of the      │      │
                  │concerns of prisoners of war. (USA    │      │
                  │456)                                  │ III  │     103
                  │                                      │      │
 *343-PS          │Letter from Milch, Chief of the       │      │
                  │Personal Staff, to Himmler, 31 August │      │
                  │1942, and letter from Milch to Wolff, │      │
                  │20 May 1942. (USA 463)                │ III  │     266
                  │                                      │      │
 *388-PS          │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│      │
                  │for the attack on Czechoslovakia),    │      │
                  │kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant,  │      │
                  │April-October 1938. (USA 26)          │ III  │     305
                  │                                      │      │
  447-PS          │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │      │
                  │No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March    │      │
                  │1941, concerning Directives for       │      │
                  │special areas. (USA 135)              │ III  │     409
                  │                                      │      │
 *501-PS          │Collection of four documents on       │      │
                  │execution by gas, June 1942, one      │      │
                  │signed by Dr. Becker, SS              │      │
                  │Untersturmfuehrer at Kiev, 16 May     │      │
                  │1942. (USA 288)                       │ III  │     418
                  │                                      │      │
 *641-PS          │Report of Public Prosecutor General in│      │
                  │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│      │
                  │of Dr. Strauss in Dachau by an SS     │      │
                  │guard. (USA 450)                      │ III  │     453
                  │                                      │      │
 *642-PS          │Report to Public Prosecutor General in│      │
                  │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│      │
                  │of Hausmann in Dachau by an SS guard. │      │
                  │(USA 451)                             │ III  │     454
                  │                                      │      │
 *644-PS          │Report to Public Prosecutor General in│      │
                  │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│      │
                  │of Schloss in Dachau by an SS guard.  │      │
                  │(USA 452)                             │ III  │     455
                  │                                      │      │
 *645-PS          │Report to Public Prosecutor General in│      │
                  │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│      │
                  │of Nefzger in Dachau by an SS guard.  │      │
                  │(USA 453)                             │ III  │     457
                  │                                      │      │
 *647-PS          │Secret Hitler Order, 17 August 1938,  │      │
                  │concerning organization and           │      │
                  │mobilization of SS. (USA 443)         │ III  │     459
                  │                                      │      │
 *654-PS          │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942,  │      │
                  │on discussion with Himmler concerning │      │
                  │delivery of Jews to Himmler for       │      │
                  │extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III  │     467
                  │                                      │      │
  686-PS          │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich       │      │
                  │Chancellor to strengthen German       │      │
                  │Folkdom, 7 October 1939, signed by    │      │
                  │Hitler, Goering, Lammers and Keitel.  │      │
                  │(USA 305)                             │ III  │     496
                  │                                      │      │
 *744-PS          │Secret letter of Keitel, 8 July 1943, │      │
                  │concerning manpower for coal mining.  │      │
                  │(USA 455)                             │ III  │     540
                  │                                      │      │
 *778-PS          │Disciplinary and Penal Measures for   │      │
                  │Concentration Camp Dachau and Service │      │
                  │Regulations for the Camp Personnel,   │      │
                  │signed Eicke, 1 October 1933. (USA    │      │
                  │247)                                  │ III  │     550
                  │                                      │      │
  781-PS          │Memorandum by Minister of Justice,    │      │
                  │Guertner, of conference with Himmler, │      │
                  │9 March 1936, concerning issuance of  │      │
                  │decree on use of arms by concentration│      │
                  │camp officials.                       │ III  │     557
                  │                                      │      │
 *812-PS          │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart,  │      │
                  │22 August 1939 and report from        │      │
                  │Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar   │      │
                  │Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on    │      │
                  │events in the NSDAP of Austria from   │      │
                  │1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61)       │ III  │     586
                  │                                      │      │
*1061-PS          │Official report of Stroop, SS and     │      │
                  │Police Leader of Warsaw, on           │      │
                  │destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943.   │      │
                  │(USA 275)                             │ III  │     718
                  │                                      │      │
*1063-D-PS        │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942,    │      │
                  │concerning prisoners qualified for    │      │
                  │work to be sent to concentration      │      │
                  │camps. (USA 219)                      │ III  │     778
                  │                                      │      │
 1151-P-PS        │Letter from WVHA, 28 March 1942,      │      │
                  │concerning “Action 14 F 13” from files│      │
                  │of Gross Rosen Concentration camp.    │ III  │     808
                  │                                      │      │
 1166-PS          │Interoffice memorandum of WVHA, 15    │      │
                  │August 1944, concerning number of     │      │
                  │prisoners and survey of prisoners     │      │
                  │clothing. (USA 458)                   │ III  │     824
                  │                                      │      │
*1352-PS          │Reports concerning the confiscation of│      │
                  │Polish agricultural properties, 16 and│      │
                  │29 May 1940, signed Kusche. (USA 176) │ III  │     916
                  │                                      │      │
 1551-PS          │Decree assigning functions in Office  │      │
                  │of Chief of German Police, 26 June    │      │
                  │1936. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt,   │      │
                  │pp. 946-948.                          │  IV  │     106
                  │                                      │      │
*1582-PS          │Letter from SS Sturmbannfuehrer Brandt│      │
                  │to Dr. Rascher, 22 May 1941,          │      │
                  │concerning use of prisoners for       │      │
                  │high-flight research. (USA 462)       │  IV  │     114
                  │                                      │      │
*1583-PS          │Letter from Himmler, 16 November 1942,│      │
                  │concerning feminine prisoners in      │      │
                  │concentration camps. (USA 465)        │  IV  │     115
                  │                                      │      │
*1584-I-PS        │Teletype from Goering to Himmler, 14  │      │
                  │February 1944, concerning formation of│      │
                  │7th Airforce Group squadron for       │      │
                  │special purposes. (USA 221)           │  IV  │     117
                  │                                      │      │
*1584-III-PS      │Correspondence between Himmler and    │      │
                  │Goering, 9 March 1944, concerning use │      │
                  │of concentration camp inmates in      │      │
                  │aircraft industry. (USA 457)          │  IV  │     118
                  │                                      │      │
*1602-PS          │Letter from Dr. Rascher to Himmler, 15│      │
                  │May 1941, asking for use of prisoners │      │
                  │for experiments in high-altitude      │      │
                  │flights. (USA 454)                    │  IV  │     132
                  │                                      │      │
 1616-PS          │Letter from Dr. Rascher to Himmler, 17│      │
                  │February 1943, concerning freezing    │      │
                  │experiments.                          │  IV  │     133
                  │                                      │      │
 1617-PS          │Letter from Himmler to General Field  │      │
                  │Marshal Milch, 13 November 1942,      │      │
                  │concerning transfer of Dr. Rascher to │      │
                  │Waffen-SS. (USA 466)                  │  IV  │     133
                  │                                      │      │
*1618-PS          │Report of Freezing experiments in     │      │
                  │Dachau, 15 August 1942, signed by Dr. │      │
                  │Rascher. (USA 464)                    │  IV  │     135
                  │                                      │      │
 1637-PS          │Order of Himmler, 23 June 1938,       │      │
                  │concerning acceptance of members of   │      │
                  │Security Police into the SS. 1938     │      │
                  │Reichs Ministerialblatt, pp.          │      │
                  │1089-1091.                            │  IV  │     138
                  │                                      │      │
*1680-PS          │“Ten Years Security Police and SD”    │      │
                  │published in The German Police, 1     │      │
                  │February 1943. (USA 477)              │  IV  │     191
                  │                                      │      │
 1725-PS          │Decree enforcing law for securing the │      │
                  │unity of Party and State, 29 March    │      │
                  │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 502.                               │  IV  │     224
                  │                                      │      │
*1751-PS          │Letter to all concentration camp      │      │
                  │commanders, from Gluecks, 12 May 1944,│      │
                  │concerning assignment of prisoners for│      │
                  │experimental purposes. (USA 468)      │  IV  │     279
                  │                                      │      │
*1851-PS          │The Security Squadron as an           │      │
                  │Anti-Bolshevist Battle Organization   │      │
                  │1936 by Himmler from The New Germany  │      │
                  │Speaks Here, book 11. (USA 440)       │  IV  │     488
                  │                                      │      │
*1852-PS          │“Law” from The German Police, 1941, by│      │
                  │Dr. Werner Best. (USA 449) (See Chart │      │
                  │No. 16.)                              │  IV  │     490
                  │                                      │      │
*1857-PS          │Announcement of creation of SS as     │      │
                  │independent formation of NSDAP.       │      │
                  │Voelkischer Beobachter, 26 July 1934, │      │
                  │p. 1. (USA 412)                       │  IV  │     496
                  │                                      │      │
 1918-PS          │Speech by Himmler to SS officers on   │      │
                  │day of Metz. (USA 304)                │  IV  │     553
                  │                                      │      │
*1919-PS          │Himmler’s speech to SS                │      │
                  │Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA │      │
                  │170)                                  │  IV  │     558
                  │                                      │      │
 1932-PS          │Letter from Office of Chief of        │      │
                  │Department D of WVHA, 7 June 1943,    │      │
                  │concerning handling of prisoners who  │      │
                  │fall under Night and Fog decree.      │  IV  │     579
                  │                                      │      │
*1933-PS          │Letter to Commandant of Gross Rosen   │      │
                  │Camp from Department 10 of WVHA, 27   │      │
                  │April 1943, providing that “Action 14 │      │
                  │F 13” be applied only to insane. (USA │      │
                  │459)                                  │  IV  │     581
                  │                                      │      │
*1972-PS          │Letter from Chief of SS Operations    │      │
                  │Headquarters to Himmler, 14 October   │      │
                  │1941, reporting on executions of      │      │
                  │Czechs by Waffen SS. (USA 471)        │  IV  │     604
                  │                                      │      │
*1992-A-PS        │Organization and Obligations of the SS│      │
                  │and the Police from “National         │      │
                  │Political Education of the Army,      │      │
                  │January 1937”. (USA 439)              │  IV  │     616
                  │                                      │      │
 2073-PS          │Decree concerning the appointment of a│      │
                  │Chief of German Police in the Ministry│      │
                  │of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936   │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487.    │  IV  │     703
                  │                                      │      │
*2163-PS          │The SS during the War-Year 1939-40,   │      │
                  │published in National Socialist       │      │
                  │Yearbook, 1941. (USA 444)             │  IV  │     762
                  │                                      │      │
*2164-PS          │The SS since the Reichparteitag 1938, │      │
                  │published in National Socialist       │      │
                  │Yearbook, 1940. (USA 255)             │  IV  │     768
                  │                                      │      │
*2189-PS          │Orders from Department D of Economic  │      │
                  │and Administrative Main Office, 11    │      │
                  │August 1942, concerning punishment by │      │
                  │beating. (USA 460)                    │  IV  │     842
                  │                                      │      │
 2199-PS          │Letter to Commanders of concentration │      │
                  │camps, 12 September 1942, concerning  │      │
                  │return of urns of inmates deceased in │      │
                  │concentration camps. (USA 461)        │  IV  │     853
                  │                                      │      │
*2284-PS          │The Organizational Structure of the   │      │
                  │Third Reich—The SS—from Writings of   │      │
                  │the Hochschule for Politics. (USA 438)│  IV  │     973
                  │                                      │      │
*2640-PS          │Extracts from Organization Book of    │      │
                  │NSDAP, 1943. (USA 323)                │  V   │     346
                  │                                      │      │
*2668-PS          │“And Don’t Forget the Jews”, from the │      │
                  │Black Corps, 8 August 1940, No. 32, p.│      │
                  │2. (USA 269)                          │  V   │     367
                  │                                      │      │
*2768-PS          │Letter from Himmler to Kaltenbrunner, │      │
                  │24 April 1943. (USA 447)              │  V   │     412
                  │                                      │      │
*2769-PS          │Order of Battle of the SS, 1 November │      │
                  │1944. (USA 442)                       │  V   │     413
                  │                                      │      │
*2788-PS          │Notes of conference in the Foreign    │      │
                  │Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad     │      │
                  │Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on    │      │
                  │program for Sudeten agitation, 29     │      │
                  │March 1938. (USA 95)                  │  V   │     422
                  │                                      │      │
*2825-PS          │Soldier’s Friend—pocket diary for     │      │
                  │German Armed Forces with calendar for │      │
                  │1943. (USA 441)                       │  V   │     462
                  │                                      │      │
 2946-PS          │Decree relating to Special            │      │
                  │Jurisdiction in Penal Matters for     │      │
                  │members of SS and for members of      │      │
                  │Police Groups on Special Tasks of 17  │      │
                  │October 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, │      │
                  │Part I, p. 2107.                      │  V   │     625
                  │                                      │      │
 2947-PS          │Second decree for implementation of   │      │
                  │decrees relating to Special           │      │
                  │Jurisdiction in Penal Matters for     │      │
                  │members of SS and members of Police   │      │
                  │Groups on special tasks of 17 April   │      │
                  │1940. 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 659.                               │  V   │     627
                  │                                      │      │
 2949-PS          │Transcripts of telephone calls from   │      │
                  │Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA  │      │
                  │76)                                   │  V   │     628
                  │                                      │      │
*2950-PS          │Affidavit of Frick, 19 November 1945. │      │
                  │(USA 448)                             │  V   │     654
                  │                                      │      │
*2968-PS          │Memorandum from U. S. Army officer    │      │
                  │concerning plaque erected in Austrian │      │
                  │Chancellery in memoriam to killers of │      │
                  │Dollfuss. (USA 60)                    │  V   │     677
                  │                                      │      │
*2997-PS          │Supplementary report of Supreme       │      │
                  │Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary    │      │
                  │Force, Court of Inquiry, concerning   │      │
                  │shooting of Allied Prisoners of War in│      │
                  │Normandy, France. (USA 472)           │  V   │     716
                  │                                      │      │
*3051-PS          │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│      │
                  │all stations of State Police, 10      │      │
                  │November 1938, on measures against    │      │
                  │Jews, and one order from Heydrich on  │      │
                  │termination of protest actions. (USA  │      │
                  │240)                                  │  V   │     797
                  │                                      │      │
*3059-PS          │German Foreign Office memorandum, 19  │      │
                  │August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s │      │
                  │Sudeten German Party between 1935 and │      │
                  │1938. (USA 96)                        │  V   │     855
                  │                                      │      │
*3429-PS          │Extract from The SS Calls You. (USA   │      │
                  │446)                                  │  VI  │     133
                  │                                      │      │
 3815-PS          │Report of the SS, 25 April 1942,      │      │
                  │concerning the activities of Hans     │      │
                  │Frank in Poland.                      │  VI  │     745
                  │                                      │      │
*3839-PS          │Statement of Josef Spacil, 9 November │      │
                  │1945, concerning the meaning of       │      │
                  │“resettlement” and “special           │      │
                  │treatment”. (USA 799)                 │  VI  │     774
                  │                                      │      │
*3840-PS          │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February│      │
                  │1946, concerning the elimination of   │      │
                  │the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803)          │  VI  │     775
                  │                                      │      │
 3841-PS          │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer    │      │
                  │Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946,     │      │
                  │concerning elimination of the Warsaw  │      │
                  │Ghetto. (USA 804)                     │  VI  │     776
                  │                                      │      │
*3842-PS          │Statement of Fritz Mundhenke, 7 March │      │
                  │1946, concerning the activities of    │      │
                  │Kaltenbrunner and SS in preparation   │      │
                  │for occupation of Czechoslovakia. (USA│      │
                  │805)                                  │  VI  │     778
                  │                                      │      │
*3868-PS          │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand   │      │
                  │Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning       │      │
                  │execution of 3,000,000 people at      │      │
                  │Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA  │      │
                  │819)                                  │  VI  │     787
                  │                                      │      │
*3870-PS          │Affidavit of Hans Marsalek, 8 April   │      │
                  │1946, concerning Mauthausen           │      │
                  │Concentration Camp and dying statement│      │
                  │of Franz Ziereis, the Commandant. (USA│      │
                  │797)                                  │  VI  │     790
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-569           │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer  │      │
                  │SS, the OKW, Inspector of             │      │
                  │Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│      │
                  │Police and SD, dating from 29 October │      │
                  │1941 through 22 February 1944,        │      │
                  │relative to procedure in cases of     │      │
                  │unnatural death of Soviet PW,         │      │
                  │execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII  │      74
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-665           │Hitler’s license for the SS. (GB 280) │ VII  │     170
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-745-A         │Deposition of Anton Kaindl, 8 March   │      │
                  │1946, concerning SS personnel         │      │
                  │supervising concentration camps. (USA │      │
                  │811)                                  │ VII  │     208
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-745-B         │Deposition of Anton Kaindl, 19 March  │      │
                  │1946, concerning SS personnel         │      │
                  │supervising concentration camps. (USA │      │
                  │812)                                  │ VII  │     209
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-746-A         │Deposition of Fritz Suhren, 8 March   │      │
                  │1946, concerning SS personnel         │      │
                  │supervising concentration camps. (USA │      │
                  │813)                                  │ VII  │     209
                  │                                      │      │
  D-746-B         │Deposition of Fritz Suhren, 19 March  │      │
                  │1946, concerning SS personnel         │      │
                  │supervising concentration camps. (USA │      │
                  │814)                                  │ VII  │     210
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-748           │Affidavit of Karl Totzauer, 15 March  │      │
                  │1946, concerning SS personnel         │      │
                  │supervising concentration camps. (USA │      │
                  │816)                                  │ VII  │     211
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-749-B         │Statement of Rudolf Hoess, 20 March   │      │
                  │1946, concerning SS personnel         │      │
                  │supervising concentration camps. (USA │      │
                  │817)                                  │ VII  │     212
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-750           │Deposition of August Harbaum, 19 March│      │
                  │1946, concerning SS personnel         │      │
                  │supervising concentration camps. (USA │      │
                  │818)                                  │ VII  │     213
                  │                                      │      │
 *L-18            │Official report, Katzmann to General  │      │
                  │of Police Krueger, 30 June 1943,      │      │
                  │concerning “Solution of Jewish        │      │
                  │Question in Galicia”. (USA 277)       │ VII  │     755
                  │                                      │      │
 *L-49            │Affidavit of Otto Hoffman, Chief of SS│      │
                  │Main Office for Race and Settlement, 4│      │
                  │August 1945. (USA 473)                │ VII  │     795
                  │                                      │      │
 *L-103           │Letter, 12 September 1944, concerning │      │
                  │experiments with                      │      │
                  │Akonitin-nitrate-bullets. (USA 467)   │ VII  │     877
                  │                                      │      │
  L-156           │Circular letter from Office of        │      │
                  │Commissioner for Four-Year Plan, 26   │      │
                  │March 1943, concerning removal of Jews│      │
                  │to labor camps.                       │ VII  │     905
                  │                                      │      │
 *L-180           │Report by SS Brigade Commander        │      │
                  │Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group  │      │
                  │A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276)        │ VII  │     978
                  │                                      │      │
  L-198           │State Department Dispatch by Consul   │      │
                  │General Messersmith, 14 March 1933,   │      │
                  │concerning molesting of American      │      │
                  │citizens in Berlin.                   │ VII  │    1026
                  │                                      │      │
  L-201           │Excerpts from Berlin newspapers, April│      │
                  │1933, concerning violence against Jews│      │
                  │and discrimination against politically│      │
                  │undesirable professors.               │ VII  │    1035
                  │                                      │      │
  L-273           │Report of American Consul General in  │      │
                  │Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July │      │
                  │1938, concerning anniversary of       │      │
                  │assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. │      │
                  │(USA 59)                              │ VII  │    1094
                  │                                      │      │
 *L-361           │Three documents concerning the        │      │
                  │formation of the RSHA, Himmler, 27    │      │
                  │September 1939; Heydrich, 23 and 27   │      │
                  │September 1939. (USA 478)             │ VII  │    1109
                  │                                      │      │
 *R-102           │Report on activities of The Task      │      │
                  │Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31   │      │
                  │October 1941. (USA 470)               │ VIII │      96
                  │                                      │      │
 *R-112           │Orders issued by Reich Commissioner   │      │
                  │for the Consolidation of German       │      │
                  │nationhood, 16 February 1942, 1 July  │      │
                  │1942, 28 July 1942. (USA 309)         │ VIII │     108
                  │                                      │      │
 *R-114           │Memoranda of conferences, 4 and 18    │      │
                  │August 1942, concerning directions for│      │
                  │treatment of deported Alsatians. (USA │      │
                  │314)                                  │ VIII │     122
                  │                                      │      │
 *R-124           │Speer’s conference minutes of Central │      │
                  │Planning Board, 1942-44, concerning   │      │
                  │labor supply. (USA 179)               │ VIII │     146
                  │                                      │      │
 *R-129           │Letter and enclosure from Pohl to     │      │
                  │Himmler, 30 April 1942, concerning    │      │
                  │concentration camps. (USA 217)        │ VIII │     198
                  │                                      │      │
 *R-135           │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret  │      │
                  │reports from Kube on German atrocities│      │
                  │in the East, 18 June 1943, found in   │      │
                  │Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289)   │ VIII │     205
                  │                                      │      │
  R-143           │Himmler decree, 1 December 1939,      │      │
                  │concerning procedure for confiscation │      │
                  │of works of art, archives, and        │      │
                  │documents.                            │ VIII │     246
                  │                                      │      │
Affidavit A       │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21       │      │
                  │January 1946, substantially the same  │      │
                  │as his testimony on direct examination│      │
                  │before the International Military     │      │
                  │Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│      │
                  │December 1945.                        │ VIII │     587
                  │                                      │      │
Affidavit B       │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20       │      │
                  │November 1945, substantially the same │      │
                  │as his testimony on direct examination│      │
                  │before the International Military     │      │
                  │Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946.  │ VIII │     596
                  │                                      │      │
Affidavit F       │Affidavit of Josef Dietrich, 20-21    │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │ VIII │     631
                  │                                      │      │
Affidavit G       │Affidavit of Fritz Ernst Fischer, 21  │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │ VIII │     635
                  │                                      │      │
Statement IX      │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│      │
                  │the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow,   │      │
                  │fall 1945.                            │ VIII │     707
                  │                                      │      │
*Chart No. 1      │National Socialist German Workers’    │      │
                  │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2)               │ VIII │     770
                  │                                      │      │
*Chart No. 3      │Organization of the SS. (USA 445)     │ VIII │     772
                  │                                      │      │
*Chart No. 5      │Position of Kaltenbrunner and the     │      │
                  │Gestapo and SD in the German Police   │      │
                  │System. (USA 493)                     │ VIII │     774
                  │                                      │      │
*Chart No. 16     │The Structure of the German Police.   │
                  │(1852-PS; USA 449)                    │  End of VIII
                  │                                      │      │
*Chart No. 19     │Organization of the Security Police   │
                  │(Gestapo and Kripo) and the SD        │
                  │1943-1945. (2346-PS; USA 480)         │  End of VIII


This section on the _Geheime Staatspolizei_ (GESTAPO) includes evidence
on the criminality of the _Sicherheitsdienst_ (SD) of the
_Schutzstaffel_ (SS). In the Indictment the SD is included by special
references as a part of the SS, since it originated as a part of the SS
and always retained its character as a party organization, as
distinguished from the GESTAPO, which was a State organization. As will
be shown in this section, however, the GESTAPO and the SD were brought
into close working relationship, the SD serving primarily as the
information-gathering agency and the GESTAPO as the executive agency of
the police system established by the Nazis for the purpose of combatting
the political and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime. This close
working relationship between the GESTAPO and the SD was accomplished by
the appointment of Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, to the position
of Chief of the German Police. What is proved in this section with
respect to the criminality of the SD applies directly to the case
against the SS. The relationship between the SS and the GESTAPO is
considered in section 5 on the SS.

              A. _Development of the Gestapo and the SD._

(1) _Development of the GESTAPO._ The _Geheime Staatspolizei_, or
GESTAPO, was first established in Prussia on 26 April 1933 by Goering,
with the mission of carrying out the duties of political police with or
in place of the ordinary police authorities. The GESTAPO chief was given
the rank of a higher police authority and was subordinated only to the
Minister of the Interior, to whom was delegated the responsibility of
determining its functional and territorial jurisdiction (_2104-PS_).
Pursuant to this law, and on the same date, the Minister of the Interior
issued a decree on the reorganization of the police which established a
State Police Bureau in each government district of Prussia subordinate
to the Secret State Police Bureau in Berlin. (_2371-PS_)

On 30 November 1933 Goering issued a decree for the Prussian State
Ministry and for the Reichs Chancellor which acknowledged the valuable
services which the GESTAPO was able to render to the State and which
placed the GESTAPO under his direct supervision as Chief. The GESTAPO
was thereby established as an independent branch of the Administration
of the Interior, responsible directly to Goering as Prussian Prime
Minister. This decree gave the GESTAPO jurisdiction over the political
police matters of the general and interior administration and provided
that the district, county, and local police authorities were subject to
the directives of the GESTAPO (_2105-PS_). By a decree of 8 March 1934
the regional State Police offices were separated from their
organizational connection with the district government and established
as independent authorities of the GESTAPO. (_2113-PS_)

Parallel to the development of the GESTAPO in Prussia, the Reichsfuehrer
SS, Heinrich Himmler, created in Bavaria the Bavarian Political Police
and also directed the formation of political police forces in the other
federal states outside of Prussia. The unification of the political
police of the various states took place in the spring of 1934 when
Hermann Goering appointed Himmler the Deputy Chief of the Prussian
GESTAPO in place of the former Deputy Chief, Diels. Himmler thereby
obtained unified control over the political police forces throughout the
Reich. (_1680-PS_)

On 10 February 1936 the basic law for the GESTAPO was promulgated by
Goering as Prussian Prime Minister. This law provided that the Secret
State Police had the duty to investigate and to combat in the entire
territory of the State all tendencies inimical to the State, and
declared that orders in matters of the Secret State Police were not
subject to the review of the administrative courts (_2107-PS_). On the
same date, 10 February 1936, a decree for the execution of said law was
issued by Goering as Prussian Prime Minister and by Frick as Minister of
the Interior. This decree provided that the GESTAPO had authority to
enact measures valid in the entire area of the State and measures
affecting that area, that it was the centralized agency for collecting
political intelligence in the field of political police, and that it
administered the concentration camps. The GESTAPO was given authority to
make police investigations in cases of criminal attacks upon Party as
well as upon State. (_2108-PS_)

On 28 August 1936 a circular of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the
German Police provided that as of 1 October 1936 the political police
forces of the German provinces were to be called the “_Geheime
Staatspolizei_” (Secret State Police). The regional offices were still
to be described as State Police (_2372-PS_). On 20 September 1936 a
circular of the Minister of the Interior commissioned the GESTAPO Bureau
in Berlin with the supervision of the duties of the political police
commanders in all the States of Germany. (_L-297_)

The law relating to financial measures in connection with the police of
19 March 1937 provided that officials of the GESTAPO were to be
considered direct officials of the Reich and their salaries, in addition
to the operational expenses of the whole State Police, were to be borne
from 1 April 1937 on by the Reich. (_2243-PS_)

Through the above laws and decrees the GESTAPO was established as a
uniform political police system operating throughout the Reich and
serving Party, State, and the Nazi leadership.

(2) _Development of the SD._ In 1932 the Reichsfuehrer of the SS,
Heinrich Himmler, created the _Sicherheitsdienst_, or SD, as an
intelligence service of the SS under the then SS-Standartenfuehrer
Reinhard Heydrich. (_1680-PS_)

On 9 June 1934, the NSDAP issued an ordinance which merged all
information facilities then existing within the Party organization into
the SD, and the SD was established as the sole Party information
service. (_1680-PS_)

In the course of its development, the SD came into increasingly closer
cooperation with the GESTAPO and also with the _Reich Kriminalpolizei_,
the Criminal Police, or KRIPO. The GESTAPO and the KRIPO considered
together were called the _Sicherheitspolizei_, the Security Police, or
SIPO. The SD was also called upon to furnish information to various
State authorities. On 11 November 1938 a decree of the Reich Minister of
the Interior declared that the SD was to be the intelligence
organization for the State as well as for the Party, that it had the
particular duty of supporting the Secret State Police, and that it
thereby became active on a national mission. These duties necessitated a
close cooperation between the SD and the authorities for the General and
Interior Administration. (_1680-PS_; _1638-PS_)

Through the above laws and decrees the SD was established as a uniform
political information service operating throughout the Reich and serving
Party, State, and the Nazi leadership.

(3) _Consolidation of the GESTAPO and the SD._ The first step in the
consolidation of the political police system of the State (the GESTAPO)
and the information service of the Nazi Party (the SD) took place in the
spring of 1934 when Goering appointed Himmler Deputy Chief of the
GESTAPO. Heydrich was the head of the SD under Himmler, and when Himmler
took over the actual direction of the GESTAPO, these two agencies were
in effect united under one command. (_1956-PS_; _2460-PS_)

On 17 June 1936, “for the uniformity of police duties in the Reich,” the
position of Chief of the German Police was established in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, to which was assigned the direction and
protection of all police affairs within the jurisdiction of the Reich.
By this law Himmler was appointed Chief of the German Police under
Frick, the Reich Minister of the Interior, and was given the right to
participate in the sessions of the Reich Cabinet as Chief of the German
Police. (_2073-PS_)

On 26 June 1936 Himmler issued a decree providing for the appointment of
a chief of the uniformed police and of a chief of the Security Police.
This decree divided the German police system into two principal

    (_a_) _Ordnungspolizei_ (ORPO or Regular Police).

    (_b_) _Sicherheitspolizei_ (SIPO or Security Police).

The _Ordnungspolizei_ was composed of the _Schutzpolizei_ (Safety
Police), the _Gendarmerie_ (Rural Police), and the _Gemeindepolizei_
(Local Police). The _Sicherheitspolizei_ was composed of the _Reich
Kriminalpolizei_ (KRIPO) and the _Geheime Staatspolizei_ (GESTAPO).
Daluege was named head of the _Ordnungspolizei_ and Heydrich was named
head of the _Sicherheitspolizei_. Since Heydrich was also head of the
SD, he took the new title of Chief of the Security Police and SD.

On 27 September 1939 by order of Himmler, in his capacity as
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, the central offices of
the GESTAPO and the SD, together with the Criminal Police, were
centralized in the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD
under the name of the _Reichssicherheitshauptamt_, Reich Security Main
Office, or RSHA. Under this order the personnel and administrative
sections of each agency were coordinated in _Amt_ I and _Amt_ II of the
RSHA; the operational sections of the SD became _Amt_ III (except for
foreign intelligence which was placed in _Amt_ VI); the operational
sections of the GESTAPO became _Amt_ IV and the operational sections of
the KRIPO became _Amt_ V. Ohlendorf was named the Chief of _Amt_ III,
the SD within Germany; Mueller was named the Chief of _Amt_ IV, the
GESTAPO; and Nebe was named the Chief of _Amt_ V, the KRIPO. (_L-361_)

On 27 September 1939 Heydrich, as Chief of the Security Police and SD,
issued a directive pursuant to the foregoing order of Himmler, in which
he ordered the designation and heading “_Reichssicherheitshauptamt_” to
be used exclusively in internal relations of the Reich Ministry of the
Interior, and the heading “The Chief of the Security Police and SD” in
transactions with outside persons and offices. The directive provided
that the GESTAPO would continue to use the designation and heading
“_Geheime Staatspolizeiamt_” according to particular instructions.

In 1944 most of the sections of the _Abwehr_ (military intelligence)
were incorporated into the various sections of the RSHA and into a new
section connected with _Amt_ VI, called the _Militaerisches Amt_.

Heydrich was Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) until his death
on 4 June 1942, after which Himmler directed the organization until the
appointment of the defendant Ernst Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the
Security Police and SD. Kaltenbrunner took office on 30 January 1943 and
remained Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) until the end of the
war. (_2644-PS_)

              B. _Organization of the Gestapo and the SD._

(1) _Organization of the Gestapo_ (_Amt_ IV of the RSHA). The
headquarters organization of the GESTAPO (_Amt_ IV of the RSHA) was set
up on a functional basis. In 1943 it contained five sub-sections.

Section A dealt with opponents, sabotage, and protective service and was
subdivided as follows:

 A 1   Communism, Marxism and associated organizations, war crimes,
       illegal and enemy propaganda.
 A 2   Defense against sabotage, combatting of sabotage, political
 A 3   Reaction, opposition, legitimism, liberalism, matters of malicious
 A 4   Protective service, reports of attempted assassinations, guarding,
       special jobs, pursuit troops.

Section B dealt with political churches, sects and Jews, and was
subdivided as follows:

 B 1   Political Catholicism.
 B 2   Political Protestantism Sects.
 B 3   Other churches, Freemasonry.
 B 4   Jewish affairs, matters of evacuation, means of suppressing
       enemies of the people and State, dispossession of rights of German
       citizenship. (Eichmann was head of this office).

Section C dealt with card files, protective custody, and matters of
press and Party, and was subdivided as follows:

 C 1   Evaluation, main card index, administration of individual files,
       information office, supervision of foreigners.
 C 2   Matters of protective custody.
 C 3   Matters of the press and literature.
 C 4   Matters of the Party and its formations, special cases.

Section D dealt with regions under greater German influence, and was
subdivided as follows:

 D (_aus. arb._)  Foreign Workers.
 D 1   Matters of the Protectorate, Czechs in the Reich, Slovakia,
       Serbia, Croatia, and the remaining regions of the former
       Jugoslavia, Greece.
 D 2   Matters of the General Government, Poles in the Reich.
 D 3   Confidential office, foreigners hostile to the State, emigrants.
 D 4   Occupied territories, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark.
 D 5   Occupied Eastern territories.

Section E dealt with security and was subdivided as follows:

 E 1   General security matters, supply of legal opinions in matters of
       high and State treason, and other security matters.
 E 2   General economic matters, defense against economic espionage,
       protection of works and those engaged in guarding.
 E 3   Security West.
 E 4   Security North.
 E 5   Security East.
 E 6   Security South.

Section F dealt with passport matters and alien police and was
subdivided as follows:

   F 1 Frontier police.
   F 2 Passport matters.
   F 3 Identification and identity cards.
   F 4 Alien police and basic questions concerning frontiers.
   F 5 Central visa office. (_L-219_)

Subordinate offices of the GESTAPO were established throughout the Reich
and designated as _Staats Polizeileitstellen_ or _Staats
Polizeistellen_, depending upon the size of the office. These offices
reported directly to the RSHA in Berlin but were subject to the
supervision of _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police in the various
provinces. The inspectors were expected to foster cooperation between
the Security Police and the central offices of the general and interior
administration. (_2245-PS_)

In the occupied territories the regional offices of the GESTAPO were
coordinated with the Criminal Police and the SD under _Kommandeurs_ of
the Security Police and SD, who were subject to _Befehlshabers_ of the
Security Police and SD who reported to the Chief of the Security Police
and SD (RSHA) in Berlin. (_1285-PS_)

(2) _Organization of the SD (Amt III of the RSHA)._ The headquarters
organization of the SD (including only _Amt_ III of the RSHA and not
_Amt_ VI, the Foreign Intelligence Branch) was set up on a functional
basis. In 1943 it contained four sections.

Section A dealt with questions of legal order and structure of the Reich
and was subdivided as follows:

 A 1   General questions of work on spheres of German life.
 A 2   Law.
 A 3   Constitution and administration.
 A 4   National life in general.
 A 5   General questions of police law, and technical questions of

Section B dealt with nationality, and was subdivided as follows:

 B 1   Nationality questions.
 B 2   Minorities.
 B 3   Race and health of the people.
 B 4   Citizenship and naturalization.
 B 5   Occupied territories.

Section C dealt with culture, and was subdivided as follows:

 C 1   Science.
 C 2   Educational religious life.
 C 3   Folk culture and art.
 C 4   Press, literature, radio, office for evaluation of material.

Section D dealt with economics, and was subdivided as follows:

 D a   Reading office, economics, press, magazines, literature.
 D b   Colonial economics.
 D S   Special questions and review of material.
 D West  Western occupied regions.
 D Ost    Eastern occupied regions.
 D 1   Food economy.
 D 2   Commerce, handcraft, and transport.
 D 3   Finance, currency, banks and exchanges, insurance.
 D 4   Industry and Power.
 D 5   Labor and Social Questions.   (_L-219_)

Within Germany the original regional offices of the SD were called
_SD-Oberabschnitte_ and _SD-Unterabschnitte_. In 1939 these designations
were changed to _SD-Abschnitte_ and _SD-Leitabschnitte_. Offices of the
_SD-Abschnitte_ were located in the same place as the
_Staatspolizeistellen_. _SD-Abschnitte_ located where there were _Staats
Polizeileitstellen_ were called “_SD Leitabschnitte_.” Direct orders
came from the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Berlin (RSHA) to
these regional offices, but they were also subject to the supervision of
the _Inspekteurs_ of the SIPO and SD. In the occupied territories the
regional offices of the SD were coordinated with the GESTAPO and
Criminal Police under _Kommandeurs_ of the SIPO and SD who were subject
to _Befehlshabers_ of the Security Police and SD who reported to the
Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) in Berlin. (_1680-PS_,

(3) _Combined Organization of the GESTAPO and SD._ The central offices
of the GESTAPO and SD were coordinated in 1936 with the appointment of
Heydrich, the head of the SD, as chief of the Security Police. The
office of Heydrich was called “Chief of the Security Police and SD.”

When the central offices of the GESTAPO and SD, together with the
Criminal Police, were centralized in one main office (RSHA) in 1939, the
functions were somewhat redistributed.

_Amt_ I of the RSHA handled personnel for the three agencies. Subsection
A 2 handled personnel matters of the GESTAPO, A 3 handled personnel
matters of the KRIPO, and A 4 handled personnel matters of the SD.

_Amt_ II handled organization, administration, and law for the three
agencies. Subsection C handled domestic arrangements and pay accounts,
and was divided into two sections, one to take care of pay accounts of
the Security Police and the other to take care of pay accounts of the
SD, since personnel of the former were paid by the State and personnel
of the latter were paid by the Party. Subsection D, under
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff handled technical matters, including the
motor vehicles of the SIPO and SD.

_Amt_ III was the SD and was charged with investigation into spheres of
German life. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.

_Amt_ IV was the GESTAPO and was charged with combatting political
opposition. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.

_Amt_ V was the KRIPO and was charged with combatting criminals.
Subsection V D was the criminalogical institute for the SIPO handling
matters of identification, chemical and biological investigations, and
technical research.

_Amt_ VI was concerned with foreign political intelligence and contained
subsections dealing with western Europe, Russia and Japan,
Anglo-American sphere, and central Europe. It contained a special
section dealing with sabotage.

_Amt_ VII handled ideological research against enemies, such as
Freemasonry, Judaism, political churches, Marxism, and liberalism.
(_L-185_; _L-219_)

The centralization of the main offices of the GESTAPO and SD was not
fully carried out in the regional organization. Within Germany the
regional offices of the GESTAPO and SD maintained their separate
identity and reported directly to the section of the RSHA which had the
jurisdiction of the subject matter. They were, however, coordinated by
the _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police and SD. The _Inspekteurs_ were
also under the supervision of the Higher SS and Police leaders appointed
for each _Wehrkreis_.

The Higher SS and Police leaders reported to the Reichsfuehrer SS and
Chief of the German Police in each _Wehrkreis_ and supervised not only
the _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police and SD but also the
_Inspekteurs_ of the Order Police and various subdivisions of the SS.

In the occupied territories the organization developed as the German
armies advanced. Combined operational units of the Security Police and
SD, known as _Einsatz_ Groups, operated with and in the rear of the
Army. These groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the
KRIPO, and the SD, and the enlisted men were composed of Order Police
and Waffen SS. They functioned with various army groups. The _Einsatz_
Groups were subdivided into _Einsatzkommandos_, _Sonderkommandos_, and
_Teilkommandos_, all of which performed the functions of the Security
Police and SD with or closely behind the army. After the occupied
territories had been consolidated, the _Einsatz_ Groups and their
subordinate parts were formed into permanent combined offices of the
Security Police and SD within prescribed geographical locations. These
combined forces were placed under the _Kommandeurs_ of the Security
Police and SD, and the offices were organized in sections similar to the
RSHA headquarters. The _Kommandeurs_ of the Security Police and SD
reported directly to _Befehlshabers_ of the Security Police and SD, who
in turn reported directly to the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In
the occupied territories, the Higher SS and Police leaders exercised
more direct control over the _Befehlshabers_ and the _Kommandeurs_ of
the Security Police and SD than within the Reich. They had authority to
issue direct orders so long as they did not conflict with the Chief of
the Security Police and SD who exercised controlling authority.
(_1285-PS, Chart Number 19._)

          C. _Place of the GESTAPO and SD in the Conspiracy._

(1) _Tasks and Methods of the GESTAPO._ In the basic law of 10 February
1936, the GESTAPO was declared to have “the duty to investigate and to
combat in the entire territory of the State, all tendencies dangerous to
the State.” The decree issued for the execution of said law gave the
GESTAPO the authority to make police investigations in treason,
espionage, and sabotage cases, “and in other cases of criminal attacks
on Party and State.” (_2107-PS_; _2108-PS_)

In referring to the above law, the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best,
commented as follows:

    “Not the State in its outward organic appearance but the tasks
    of the leadership in the sense of the National-Socialist idea is
    the object of protection.” (_2232-PS_)

The duties of the GESTAPO were described in 1938 as follows, in an order
published by the Party Chancery:

    “To the GESTAPO has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer to
    watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the
    National Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of
    all kinds directed against both.” (_1723-PS_)

In _Das Archiv_, January 1936, the duties of the GESTAPO were described
in part as follows:

    “Since the National Socialist revolution, all open struggle and
    all open opposition to the State and to the leadership of the
    State is forbidden, and a Secret State Police as a preventive
    instrument in the struggle against all dangers threatening the
    State is indissolubly bound up with the National Socialist
    Fuehrer-State.” (_1956-PS_)

The successful accomplishment of this mission to strike down the
political and ideological opponents of the Nazi conspiracy was stated in
the official magazine of the SIPO and SD on 1 February 1943 in the
following words:

    “The Secret State Police by carrying out these tasks,
    contributed decisively to the fact that the National Socialist
    constructive work could be executed in the past ten years
    without any serious attempts of interference by the political
    enemies of the nation.” (_1680-PS_)

The methods used by the GESTAPO were limited only by the results to be

    “The duties of the political police and the necessary means for
    their performance are not chosen freely but are prescribed by
    the foe. Just like the operations of an army against the outward
    enemy and the means to fight this enemy cannot be prescribed, so
    the political police also must have a free hand in the choice of
    the means necessary at times to fight the attempts dangerous to
    the State.” (_2232-PS_)

The GESTAPO was not restricted to the limitations of written law. The
Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:

    “As long as the ‘police’ carries out the will of the leadership,
    it is acting legally.” (_1852-PS_)

The GESTAPO was given the express power to take action outside the law
in the occupied territories. The laws pertaining to the administration
of Austria and the Sudetenland provided that the Reichsfuehrer SS and
Chief of the German Police will take measures for the maintenance of
security and order “even beyond the legal limitation otherwise laid down
for this purpose.” (_1437-PS_; _1438-PS_)

The actions and orders of the GESTAPO were not subject to judicial
review. The decision of the Prussian High Court of Administration on 2
May 1935 held that the status of the GESTAPO as a special police
authority removed its orders from the jurisdiction of the Administrative
Tribunals. The court said that under the law of 30 November 1933 the
only redress available was by appeal to the next higher authority within
the GESTAPO itself. (_2347-PS_)

The basic law of 10 February 1936 on the powers of the GESTAPO provided
specifically in Section VII:

    “Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to
    the review of the administrative courts.” (_2107-PS_)

Concerning the power of the GESTAPO to act outside the law, the Nazi
jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:

    “It is no longer a question of law but a question of fate
    whether the will of the leadership lays down the ‘right’ rules,
    i.e., rules feasible and necessary for police action—the
    ‘police’ law suitable for and beneficial to the people. Actual
    misuse of the legislative power by a people’s leadership—be it
    a harmful severity or weakness—will, because of the violations
    of the ‘laws of life,’ be punished in history more surely by
    fate itself through misfortune, overthrow and ruin, than by a
    State Court of Justice.” (_1852-PS_)

The great power of the GESTAPO was “_Schutzhaft_”—the power to imprison
people without judicial proceedings on the theory of “protective
custody.” This power was based upon the law of 28 February 1933 which
suspended the clauses of the Weimar Constitution guaranteeing civil
liberties to the German people, including Article 114 thereof, which
provided that an abridgement of personal liberty was permissible only by
authority of law. (_2499-PS_)

In April 1934 the Reich Minister of the Interior issued a decree (which
was not made public) stating that in view of the stabilizing of the
national situation it had become feasible to place restrictions upon the
exercise of protective custody and providing for limitations upon its
exercise. (_L-301_; _779-PS_)

The GESTAPO did not observe such limitations, and the practice of taking
people into protective custody increased greatly in 1934. The GESTAPO
did not permit lawyers to represent persons taken into protective
custody and, in one instance, counsel were themselves placed in
protective custody for trying to represent clients. Civil employees were
investigated and taken into protective custody by the GESTAPO without
knowledge of their superiors. (_775-PS_)

As of 1 February 1938, the Reich Minister of the Interior rescinded
previous decrees relating to protective custody, including the decree of
12 April 1934, and issued new regulations. These regulations provided
that protective custody could be ordered:

    “* * * as a coercive measure of the Secret State Police against
    persons who endangered the security of the people and the State
    through their attitude, in order to counter all aspirations of
    enemies of the people and State”;

that the GESTAPO had the exclusive right to order protective custody;
that protective custody was to be executed in the State concentration
camps; and that the GESTAPO, which authorized release from protective
custody, would review individual cases once every three months. The
Chief of the Secret Police was given authority to issue the necessary
regulations. (_1723-PS_)

The importance of this power of protective custody was set forth in _Das
Archiv_, 1936, in the following language:

    “The most effective preventive measure is without doubt the
    withdrawal of freedom, which is covered in the form of
    protective custody, if it is to be feared that the free activity
    of the persons in question might endanger the security of the
    State in any way. While protective arrest of short duration is
    carried out in police and court prisons, the concentration camps
    under the Secret State Police admit those taken into protective
    custody who have to be withdrawn from public life for a longer
    time.” (_1956-PS_)

The authority of the GESTAPO to administer the concentration camps was
set forth in the decree to the basic law of 10 February 1936.

Other methods used by the GESTAPO consisted of the dissolution of
associations, prohibition and dissolution of assemblies and
congregations, prohibition of publications of various kinds and so
forth. (_1956-PS_)

(2) _Tasks and Methods of the SD._ The task of the SD, after it became
the intelligence service for State and Party, was to obtain secret
information concerning the actual and potential enemies of the Nazi
leadership so that appropriate action could be taken to destroy or
neutralize opposition. (_1956-PS_)

The duties of the SD were stated by the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, as

    “As the intelligence service of the German National Socialist
    Labor Party, the Security Service has first of all the task of
    investigating and keeping a watch over all forces, events and
    facts which are of importance for the domination of the National
    Socialist idea and movement in German territory. With this task
    follows that duty laid down by the Reich Minister of the
    Interior—the duty of supporting the Security Police—which is
    fulfilled, so far as it goes, under State orders. In support of
    the tasks of the Security Police in securing the ranks of the
    German people against interference and destruction of any kind,
    the Security Service has to watch over every sphere of life of
    the German people with regard to the activities of inimical
    forces and the result of state and political measures, and to
    inform continually the competent State authorities and offices
    about the facts which have come to light. Finally, it has to
    investigate politically and explore fundamentally the activities
    and connections of the great, ideological, arch-enemy of
    National Socialism and the German people, in order thereby to
    render possible a purposeful and effective fight against it.”

To accomplish this task, the SD created an organization of agents and
informants operating out of various SD regional offices established
throughout the Reich, and later in conjunction with the GESTAPO and
Criminal Police throughout the occupied territories. The organization
consisted of several hundred full-time agents whose work was
supplemented by several thousand part-time informants. Informants were
located in schools, shops, churches, and all other spheres of German
life, operating under cover, and reporting any utterances or actions
against the Nazi Party, State or leadership. (_2614-PS_)

The SD had direct and powerful influence in the selection of Nazi
leaders. It investigated the loyalty and reliability of State officials,
evaluating them by their complete devotion to Nazi ideology and the
Hitler leadership. It secretly marked ballots and thereby discovered the
identity of persons who cast “No” votes and “invalid” votes in the
referenda. (_2614-PS_; _R-142_)

The SD worked closely with the GESTAPO. An article in the “_Voelkischer
Beobachter_” published in _Das Archiv_, January 1936, stated:

    “As the Secret State Police can not carry out, in addition to
    its primary executive tasks, this observation of the enemies of
    the state, to the extent necessary, there steps alongside to
    supplement it the Security Service of the Reichsleader of the
    SS, set up by the Deputy Fuehrer as the political intelligence
    service of the movement, which puts a large part of the forces
    of the movement mobilized by it into the service of the security
    of the state.” (_1956-PS_)

(3) _The Place of the GESTAPO and the SD in the Conspiracy._ The GESTAPO
was founded in April 1933 by Goering to serve as a political police
force in Prussia. Goering instructed Diels, the first Deputy Chief of
the GESTAPO, that his main task would be the elimination of political
opponents of National Socialism and the fight against Communism.

In “_Aufbau Einer Nation_,” published in 1934, Goering said:

    “For weeks I had been working personally on the reorganization
    and at last I alone and upon my own decision and my own
    reflection created the office of the Secret State Police. This
    instrument which is so feared by the enemies of the State, has
    contributed most to the fact that today there can no longer be
    talk of a Communist and Marxist danger in Germany and Prussia.”

So effective had the GESTAPO proven itself in combatting the political
opposition to National Socialism by the fall of 1933 that Goering took
over direct control of the GESTAPO (_2105-PS_). Goering’s position as
Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia was recognized by Himmler even after he
became Chief of the German Police in 1936 (_2372-PS_). Even as late as
December 1938 Goering continued to exercise his direct control over the
Prussian GESTAPO. (_D-183_)

Himmler was named Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia in 1934. He
used the GESTAPO, infused with new personnel recruited in large part
from the SS, to carry out the Roehm purge of 30 June 1934. (_2460-PS_)

The GESTAPO, through its great power of arrest and confinement to
concentration camps without recourse to law, was the principal means for
eliminating enemies of the Nazi regime. Diels, the former Deputy Chief
of the GESTAPO under Goering, declared:

    “* * * From (1934) on the GESTAPO is responsible for all
    deprivations of freedom and breaches of law and killings in the
    political field which took place without court verdict. Of
    primary importance among these was the shooting of numerous
    persons who had been committed to jails by the courts and then
    shot supposedly because of resistance. Many such cases were at
    that time published in the papers. For people guilty of
    immorality such illegal shootings became the rule. As for
    deprivation of freedom, there was no legal reason any more for
    protective custody orders after 1934, which had still been the
    case before that date, since from 1934 on the power of the
    totalitarian state was so stabilized that the arrest of a person
    for his own protection was only an excuse for arbitrary
    arrest—without court verdict and without legal measures for
    him. The terroristic measures, which led to the development of
    the pure force system and punished to an increasing degree each
    critical remark and each impulse of freedom with the
    concentration camp, took on more and more arbitrary and cruel
    forms. The GESTAPO became the symbol of the regime of force.”

          D. _Criminal Responsibility of the Gestapo and SD._

In the remainder of this section the criminal responsibility of the
GESTAPO and the SD will be considered with respect to certain crimes
against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity which were in
principal part committed by the centralized political police system the
development and organization of which has previously been considered. In
some instances the crimes were committed in cooperation or conjunction
with other groups and organizations.

Frequent reference will be made to the phrase, “SIPO and SD.” The SIPO
and SD was composed of the following organizations,—the GESTAPO, the
KRIPO and the SD.

The GESTAPO was the largest of these, having a membership of about
40,000 or 50,000 in 1943-45. It was the political police force of the
Reich. Much of its personnel consisted of transferees from former
political police forces of the States. Membership in the GESTAPO was

The KRIPO was second largest, having a membership of about 15,000 in
1943-45. It was the criminal police force of the Reich.

The SD was the smallest, having a membership of about 3,000 in 1943-45.
It was the intelligence service of the SS. Membership in the SD was
voluntary. (_3033-PS_)

In common usage, and even in orders and decrees, the term “SD” was used
as an abbreviation in the term “SIPO and SD.” Since the GESTAPO was the
primary executive agency of the SIPO and SD, and by far the largest, in
most such cases the actual executive action was carried out by personnel
of the GESTAPO rather than of the SD or of the KRIPO. In occupied
territories members of the GESTAPO frequently wore SS uniforms.

The term “Chief of the Security Police and SD” describes the person who
is the head of the GESTAPO, KRIPO and the SD, and of their headquarters
office called the RSHA. The “Chief of the Security Police and SD” and
the “head of the RSHA” are always one and the same person. The RSHA was
a department in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and in the SS.
Sometimes organizational responsibility can be established by the fact
that the orders in question were issued by or submitted to _Amt_ III of
the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the SD), to _Amt_ IV of the
RSHA (in which case the action concerned the GESTAPO), or to _Amt_ V of
the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the KRIPO).

Although the GESTAPO was the chief executive agency in the political
police system, all three organizations contributed to the accomplishment
of most of the criminal activities discussed hereinafter.

          E. _Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD against the Peace._

Prior to the invasion of Poland by Germany, “border incidents” were
fabricated by the GESTAPO and SD for the purpose of furnishing Hitler
with an excuse to wage war. (_2751-PS_)

Early in August, 1939, the plan was conceived by the Chief of the
Security Police and SD, Heydrich, to stage simulated border raids by
personnel of the GESTAPO and SD dressed as Poles. To add authenticity,
it was planned to take certain prisoners from concentration camps, kill
them by use of hypodermic injections, and leave their bodies, clad in
Polish uniforms, at the various places where the incidents were planned
to occur. The Chief of the GESTAPO, Mueller, took a directing hand in
these actions, which were staged on 31 August 1939 in Beuthen,
Hindenburg, Gleiwitz, and elsewhere.

The leader of the SD agents who made the pretended attack on the
Gleiwitz radio station on 31 August, said:

    “* * * In my presence, Mueller discussed with a man named
    Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should
    be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German
    troops. Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to
    be used. Mueller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals
    who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the
    ground of the scene of the incident, to show that they had been
    killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given
    fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they
    were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the incident members
    of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of
    the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared.

    “4. Mueller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make
    one of those criminals available to me for the action at
    Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals
    was ‘Canned Goods.’

    “5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried
    out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I
    recall, war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon of
    the 31st August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code
    word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o’clock that
    evening. Heydrich said, ‘In order to carry out this attack
    report to Mueller for Canned Goods.’ I did this and gave Mueller
    instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I
    received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the
    station. He was alive but he was completely unconscious. I tried
    to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was
    alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds but
    a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian

    “6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech
    of three to four minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired
    some pistol shots and left.” (_2751-PS_; _2479-PS_)

These were the “frontier incidents” to which Hitler referred in his
speech to the Reichstag on 1 September 1939. (Adolf Hitler, “My New
Order,” Reynal and Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 687.)

                 F. _War Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD._

(1) _The GESTAPO and SD carried out mass murders of hundreds of
thousands of civilians of occupied countries as a part of the Nazi
program to exterminate political and racial undesirables (“Einsatz
Groups”)._ About four weeks before the attack on Russia, special task
forces of the SIPO and SD, called _Einsatzgruppen_ or Special Task
Groups, were formed on order of Himmler for the purpose of following the
German armies into Russia, combatting partisans and members of
resistance groups and exterminating the Jews and Communist leaders. In
the beginning four _Einsatz_ Groups were formed. _Einsatz_ Group A,
operating in the Baltic States, was placed under the command of
Stahlecker, former Inspector of the SIPO and SD. _Einsatz_ Group B,
operating toward Moscow, was placed under the command of Nebe, the Chief
of _Amt_ V (KRIPO) of the RSHA. _Einsatz_ Group C, operating toward
Kiev, was placed under the command of Rasch and later of Thomas, former
Chief of the SIPO and SD in Paris. _Einsatz_ Group D, operating in the
south of Russia, was placed under the command of Ohlendorf, the Chief of
_Amt_ III (SD) of the RSHA.

The _Einsatz_ Groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the SD
and the KRIPO. The men were drawn from the Order Police and the Waffen
SS. The groups had complements of 400 to 500 men, and had their own
vehicles and equipment. By agreement with the OKW and OKH, the
_Einsatzkommandos_ were attached to certain Army corps or divisions. The
Army assigned the area in which the _Einsatzkommandos_ were to operate,
but all operational directives and orders for the carrying out of
executions were given through the RSHA in Berlin. Regular courier
service and radio communications existed between the _Einsatz_ Groups
and the RSHA.

The affidavit of Ohlendorf, Chief of the SD, who led _Einsatz_ Group D,
reads in part as follows:

    “When the German Army invaded Russia, I was leader of
    _Einsatzgruppe_ D in the southern sector, and in the course of
    the year during which I was leader of the _Einsatzgruppe_ D, it
    liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women and children. The
    majority of those liquidated were Jews, but there were also
    among them some Communist functionaries.

    “In the execution of this extermination program the
    _Einsatzgruppen_ were subdivided into _Einsatzkommandos_, and
    the _Einsatzkommandos_ into still smaller units, the so-called
    _Sonderkommando_ and _Teilkommandos_. Usually the smaller units
    were led by a member of the SD, the GESTAPO or the KRIPO. The
    unit selected for this task would enter a village or city and
    order the prominent Jewish citizens to call together all Jews
    for the purpose of resettlement. They were asked to hand over
    their personal belongings to the leaders of the unit, and
    shortly before the execution, to surrender their outer clothing.
    The men, women and children were led to a place of execution
    which usually was located beside a deepened antitank ditch. Then
    they were shot, kneeling or standing, and the corpses were
    thrown into the ditch. I never permitted the shooting by
    individuals in Group D, but ordered that several of the men
    should shoot at the same time in order to avoid direct personal
    responsibility. The leaders of the unit, or especially
    designated persons, however, had to fire the last shot against
    those victims who were not dead immediately. I learned from
    conversations with other group leaders that some of them asked
    the victims to lie down flat on the ground to be shot through
    the neck. I did not approve of these methods.” (_2620-PS_)

The contention that these murders were carried out by subterfuge and
without force and terror is belied by the eyewitness account of two such
mass murders witnessed by Hermann Graebe, who was manager and engineer
in charge of the branch office of the Solingen firm of Josef Jung in
Sdolbunow, Ukraine, from September 1941 until January 1944. Graebe’s
interest in the mass executions derived from the fact that in addition
to Poles, Germans, and Ukrainians, he employed Jews on the various
construction projects under his supervision. He was personally
acquainted with the leader of the SIPO and SD who carried out the
actions hereinafter described with the aid of SS-men (most of whom wore
the SD arm-band) and Ukrainian militia. Graebe negotiated with SS-major
Putz, the leader of the SIPO and SD, for the release of about 100 Jewish
workers from the action which took place in Rowno on 13 July 1942. The
original letter which exempted these Jewish workers from the action is
attached to Graebe’s affidavit, which states in part as follows:

    “In the evening of this day I drove to Rowno and posted myself
    with Fritz Einsporn in front of the house in the Bahnhofstrasse
    in which the Jewish workers of my firm slept. Shortly after
    22.00 the ghetto was encircled by a large SS detachment and
    again about three times as many members of the Ukrainian
    militia. Then the electric floodlights which had been erected
    all around the ghetto were switched on. SS and militia details
    of 4 to 6 members entered or at least tried to enter the houses.
    Where the doors and windows were closed and the inhabitants did
    not open upon the knocking, the SS men and militia broke the
    windows, forced the doors and beams with crowbars and entered
    the dwellings. The owners were driven onto the street just as
    they were, regardless of whether they were dressed or whether
    they had been in bed. Since the Jews in most cases refused to
    leave their dwellings and resisted, the SS and militia both
    applied force. With the help of whippings, kicks and hits with
    the rifle butts they finally succeeded in having the dwellings
    evacuated. The people were chased out of their houses in such
    haste that the small children who had been in bed had been left
    behind in several instances. In the street women cried out for
    their children and children for their parents. That did not
    prevent the SS from chasing the people along the road, at double
    time, and hitting them until they reached a waiting freight
    train. Car after car was filled, over it hung the screaming of
    women and children, the cracking of whips and rifle shots. Since
    several families and groups had barricaded themselves in
    especially strong buildings, and the doors could not be forced
    with crowbars or beams, these houses were now blown open with
    hand grenades. Since the ghetto was near the railroad tracks in
    Rowno, the younger people tried to get across the tracks and to
    a small river to be outside of the ghetto. This sector being
    outside of the floodlights was lighted by signal ammunition. All
    through the night these beaten, chased and wounded people
    dragged themselves across the lighted streets. Women carried
    their dead children in their arms, children hugged and dragged
    by their arms and feet their dead parents down the road toward
    the train. Again and again the calls ‘Open the door,’ ‘Open the
    door’ echoed through the ghetto.” (_2992-PS_)

The leader of _Einsatz_ Group D, Ohlendorf, stated in his affidavit that
other _Einsatz_ Group leaders required the victims to lie down flat on
the ground to be shot through the neck. Graebe describes a mass
execution of this kind which he observed carried out under the direction
of a man in SD uniform on 5 October 1943 at Dubno, Ukraine, as follows:

    “Thereupon in the company of Moennikes I drove to the
    construction area and saw in its vicinity a heap of earth, about
    30 meters long and 2 meters high. Several trucks stood in front
    of the heap. Armed Ukrainian militia chased the people off the
    trucks under the supervision of an SS man. The militia men were
    guards on the trucks and drove them to and from the excavation.
    All these people had the prescribed yellow badges on the front
    and back of their clothes, and thus were recognized as Jews.

    “Moennikes and I went directly to the excavation. Nobody
    bothered us. Now we heard shots in quick succession from behind
    one of the earth mounds. The people who had gotten off the
    trucks—men, women, and children of all ages—had to undress
    upon the orders of an SS man who carried a riding or dog whip.
    They had to put down their clothes in fixed places, sorted
    according to shoes, over and underclothing, I saw a pile of
    shoes of about 800 to 1,000 pairs, great piles of laundry and
    clothing. Without screaming or crying these people undressed,
    stood around by families, kissed each other, said farewells and
    waited for the nod of another SS man, who stood near the
    excavation, also with a whip in his hand. During the 15 minutes
    that I stood near the excavation I have heard no complaint and
    no request for mercy. I watched a family of about 8 persons, a
    man and a woman, both about 50 with their children of about 1, 8
    and 10, and two grown-up daughters of about 20 to 24. An old
    woman with snow-white hair held the one-year-old child in her
    arms and sang for it, and tickled it. The child was squeaking
    from joy. The couple looked on with tears in their eyes. The
    father held the hand of a boy about 10 years old and spoke to
    him softly; the boy was fighting his tears. The father pointed
    toward the sky, fondled his hand, and seemed to explain
    something to him. At that moment the SS-man at the excavation
    called something to his comrades. The latter counted off about
    20 persons and instructed them to walk behind the earth mound.
    Among them was the family which I had mentioned. I remember very
    well a girl, blackhaired and slender, passing near me; she
    pointed at herself and said, ‘23 years.’ I walked around the
    mound, and stood in front of a tremendous grave. Closely pressed
    together the people were lying on top of each other so that only
    their heads were visible. Several of the people shot still
    moved. Some lifted their arms and turned their heads to show
    that they were still alive. The excavation was already
    two-thirds full. I estimated that it contained about 1,000
    people. I looked for the man who did the shooting. I saw an
    SS-man who sat at the rim of the narrow end of the excavation,
    his feet dangling into the excavation. On his knees he had a
    machine pistol and he was smoking a cigarette. The completely
    naked people descended a stairway which was dug into the clay of
    the excavation and slipped over the heads of the people lying
    there already to the place to which the SS-man directed them.
    They laid themselves in front of the dead or injured people,
    some touched tenderly those who were still alive and spoke to
    them in a low voice. Then I heard a number of shots. I looked
    into the excavation and saw how the bodies jerked or the heads
    rested already motionless on top of the bodies that lay before
    them. Blood was running from their necks. I was surprised that I
    was not chased away, but I saw there were two or three postal
    officers in uniform nearby. Now already the next group
    approached, descended into the excavation, lined themselves up
    against the previous victims and was shot. When I walked back,
    around the mound, I noticed again a transport which had just
    arrived. This time it included sick and frail persons. An old,
    very thin woman with terribly thin legs was undressed by others
    who were already naked, while two persons held her up.
    Apparently the woman was paralyzed. The naked people carried the
    woman around the mound. I left with Moennikes and drove with my
    car back to Dubno.” (_2992-PS_)

There are two reports by Stahlecker, the Chief of _Einsatz_ Group B,
available. The first report, found in Himmler’s personal files, states
that during the first four months of the Russian campaign _Einsatz_
Group A murdered 135,000 Communists and Jews, and carried out widespread
destruction of homes and villages and other vast crimes. Enclosure 8 to
this Stahlecker report is a careful survey of the number of persons
murdered, classified as to country, and whether Jew or Communist, with
totals given in each instance. This report discloses that the _Einsatz_
Groups frequently enlisted the aid of the local populations in the
extermination program. It states:

    “In view of the extension of the area of operations and the
    great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security
    Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the
    cooperation of the reliable population for the fight against
    vermin—that is, mainly the Jews and Communists.” (_L-180_)

With respect to extermination of Jews the report stated:

    “From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish
    problem could not be solved by pogroms alone. In accordance with
    the basic orders received, however, the cleansing activities of
    the Security Police had to aim at a complete annihilation of the
    Jews. Special detachments reinforced by selected units—in
    Lithuania partisan detachments, in Latvia units of the Latvian
    auxiliary police—therefore performed extensive executions both
    in towns and in rural areas. The actions of the execution
    detachments were performed smoothly. * * *”

Enclosure 8, “Survey of the number of executed persons” is quoted
directly from the report:

        “_Enclosure 8—Survey of the number of executed persons_

                  Area                  │   Jews   │Communists│  Total
“Lithuania:                             │          │          │
Kowono town and surroundings            │          │          │
    (land)                              │    31,914│        80│    31,994
    Schaulen                            │    41,382│       763│    42,145
    Wilna                               │     7,015│        17│     7,032
                                        │     —————│     —————│     —————
                                        │    80,311│       860│    81,171
“Latvia:                                │          │          │
    Riga town and surroundings          │          │          │
    (land)                              │          │          │     6,378
    Mitau                               │          │          │     3,576
    Libau                               │          │          │    11,860
    Wolmar                              │          │          │       209
    Dueanaburg                          │     9,256│       589│     9,845
                                        │     —————│     —————│     —————
                                        │    30,025│     1,843│    31,868
“Esthonia                               │       474│       684│     1,158
“White Ruthenia                         │     7,620│          │     7,620
“Total:                                 │          │          │
    Lithuania                           │    80,311│       860│    81,171
    Latvia                              │    30,025│     1,843│    31,868
    Esthonia                            │       474│       684│     1,158
    White Ruthenia                      │     7,620│          │     7,620
                                        │     —————│     —————│     —————
                                        │   118,430│     3,387│   121,817

“to be added to these figures:
In Lithuania and Latvia Jews annihilated by pogroms                  5,500
Jews, Communists and partisans executed in old-Russian area          2,000
Lunatics executed                                                      748
Communists and Jews liquidated by State Police and Security
  Service Tilsit during search actions                               5,502

The second report from _Einsatz_ Group A (_L-180_) reports the
extermination of nearly 230,000 persons. With respect to Esthonia, it
states in part:

    “Only by the SIPO and SD were the Jews gradually executed as
    they became no longer required for work. Today there are no
    longer any Jews in Esthonia.”

With respect to Latvia, the report states in part:

    “Up to October 1941 approximately 30,000 Jews had been executed
    by these _Sonderkommandos_. The remaining Jews who were still
    indispensable from the economic point of view were collected in
    Ghettos, which were established in Riga, Duenaburg and Libau.”

With respect to Lithuania, the report states in part:

    “Therefore by means of selected units—mostly in the proportion
    of 1:8—first of all the prisons, and then systematically,
    district by district, the Lithuanian sector was cleansed of Jews
    of both sexes. Altogether 136,421 people were liquidated in a
    great number of single actions. As the complete liquidation of
    the Jews was not feasible, as they were needed for labor,
    Ghettos were formed which at the moment are occupied as follows:
    Kauen approximately 15,000 Jews; Wilna approximately 15,000
    Jews; Schaulen approximately 4,500 Jews. These Jews are used
    primarily for work of military importance. For example, up to
    5,000 Jews are employed in 3 shifts on the aerodrome near Kauen
    on earthworks and work of that sort.”

With respect to White Russia, the report states in part:

    “In view of the enormous distances, the bad condition of the
    roads, the shortage of vehicles and petrol, and the small forces
    of Security Police and SD, it needs the utmost effort to be able
    to carry out shootings in the country. Nevertheless 41,000 Jews
    have been shot up to now.”

With respect to Jews from the Reich, the report states in part

    “Since December 1940 transports containing Jews have arrived at
    short intervals from the Reich. Of these, 20,000 Jews were
    directed to Riga and 7,000 Jews to Minsk. Only a small section
    of the Jews from the Reich is capable of working. About 70-80
    percent are women and children or old people unfit for work. The
    death rate is rising continually also as a result of the
    extraordinarily bad winter. In isolated instances sick Jews with
    contagious disease were selected under the pretext of putting
    them into a home for the aged or a hospital, and executed.”

Attached as an enclosure to this report is a map entitled “Jewish
Executions Carried out by _Einsatzgruppe_ A,” on which, by the use of
coffins as symbols, the number of Jews murdered in each area covered by
_Einsatz_ Group A is shown (_Chart Number 4_). The map shows thousands
of Jews in ghettos, and an estimated 128,000 Jews “still on hand” in the
Minsk area. Number of murdered, according to figures beside the coffins,
during the period covered by this report, was 228,050.

On 30 October 1941 the Commissioner of the territory of Sluzk wrote a
report to the Commissioner General, Minsk, in which he severely
criticized the actions of the _Einsatzkommandos_ operating in his area
for the murder of all the Jews of Sluzk:

    “On 27 October in the morning at about 8 o’clock a first
    lieutenant of the police battalion No. 11 from Kauen (Lithuania)
    appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion
    commander of the security police. The first lieutenant explained
    that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect
    the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within
    two days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength
    of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian
    partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to
    begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to
    discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About
    half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk.
    Immediately after the arrival the conference with the battalion
    commander took place according to my request. I first explained
    to the commander that it would not very well be possible to
    effect the action without previous preparation, because
    everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead to
    terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to
    inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone
    the action one day. However, he rejected this with the remark
    that he had to carry out this action everywhere and in all towns
    and that only two days were allotted for Sluzk. Within these two
    days, the town of Sluzk had to be cleared of Jews by all means.
    For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must
    point out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered already
    on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of horror during
    the action. With indescribable brutality on the part of both the
    German police officers and particularly the Lithuanian
    partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them White
    Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded
    together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in
    different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The
    White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves
    from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish
    people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a
    terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian
    people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over
    with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an
    action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a
    revolution. In conclusion I find myself obliged to point out
    that the police battalion has looted in an unheard of manner
    during the action, and that not only in Jewish houses but just
    the same in those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use such
    as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, has been
    taken away. On the basis of statements of members of the armed
    forces, watches were torn off the arms of Jews in public, on the
    streets, and rings were pulled off the fingers in the most
    brutal manner. A major of the finance department reported that a
    Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000
    rubles to have her father released. This girl is said to have
    actually gone everywhere in order to obtain the money.”

This report was submitted by the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia
to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories on 1 November 1941
with the following comment:

    “I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may
    be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be
    maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To bury
    seriously wounded people alive who worked their way out of their
    graves again is such a base and filthy act that the incidents as
    such should be reported to the Fuehrer and Reichs Marshal.”

On the same date by separate letter the Commissioner General of White
Ruthenia reported to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories
that he had received money, valuables, and other objects taken by the
police in the action at Sluzk and other regions, all of which had been
deposited with the Reich Credit institute for the disposal of the Reich
Commissioner. (_1104-PS_)

On 21 November 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent to the
personal reviewer of the permanent deputy of the Minister of the Reich
with a copy to Heydrich, the Chief of the Security Police and SD.

On 6 November 1942 a secret report submitted to the Reich Commissar for
the East concerning the struggle against partisans in the East discloses
that destruction of villages continued, and reports the execution of
1,274 partisan suspects and 8,350 Jews, and the deportation of 1,217
people. This report was forwarded on 10 December 1942 to the Reich
Minister for the occupied Eastern territories. (_1113-PS_)

The report from the prison administrator at Minsk as of 31 May 1943 to
the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia states:

    “The German, former dentist Ernst Israel Tichauer and his wife
    Elisa Sara Tichauer, born Rosenthal, were delivered to the
    Court-Prison by the SD (_Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube) on 13 April
    1943. Since that date, the golden bridgework, crowns and
    fillings of the received German and Russian Jews were pulled
    out, respectively broken out by force. This always happened 1-2
    hours before the actions in question.

    “Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews were
    liquidated. After careful investigation it was ascertained that
    gold objects were only taken away during 2 actions, namely on 14
    April 43 from 172 and on 27 April 43 from 164 Jews. About 50
    percent of the Jews had gold teeth, bridges or fillings.
    _Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube of the SD was always present in person,
    and also took the gold objects with him.

    “This has not been done before 13 April 1943.”

This report was forwarded to the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern
territories on 1 June 1943. (_R-135_)

Death vans were used by the _Einsatz_ Groups to murder victims by gas.
These vans were built by the Saurer Works in Berlin and other firms. The
vans were built for the technical section of _Amt_ II of the RSHA, which
sent them to the _Einsatz_ Groups in the field. They were first used in
the spring of 1942 and continued to be used throughout the war
(_2348-PS_). The method of using the vans is described by Ohlendorf in
the following words:

    “We received orders to use the car for the killing of women and
    children. Whenever a unit had collected a sufficient number of
    victims, a car was sent for their liquidation. We also stationed
    these cars in the neighborhood of the transit camps to which the
    victims had been brought. They were told that they would be
    resettled and had to climb into the cars for that purpose. Then
    the doors were closed and as soon as the cars started moving the
    gas would enter. The victims died within ten to fifteen minutes.
    The cars were driven to the burial place where the corpses were
    taken out and buried.” (_2620-PS_)

A letter from Becker, the operator of several death vans, written to
Rauff, the head of the technical section of _Amt_ II of the RSHA, on 16
May 1942, states:

    “The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While
    the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the
    weather is not too bad the vans of the second series (Saurer)
    stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance
    for only one-half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply
    skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is
    only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at
    the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that
    place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of
    execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is
    difficult of access because of its location; in damp or wet
    weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be
    executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize
    immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be
    avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load
    them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.

    “I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as
    house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each
    side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans,
    such as one often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans
    became so well-known, that not only the authorities but also the
    civilian population called the van “death van”, as soon as one
    of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion that the van cannot
    be kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.

    “* * * I should like to take this opportunity to bring the
    following to your attention: several commands have had the
    unloading after the application of gas done by their own men. I
    brought to the attention of the commanders of those SK concerned
    the immense psychological injuries and damages to their health
    which that work can have for those men, even if not immediately,
    at least later on. The men complained to me about headaches
    which appeared after each unloading.

    “* * * The application of gas usually is not undertaken
    correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the
    driver presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing
    that the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation
    and not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now
    have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death comes
    faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces
    and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer
    noticed.” (_501-PS_)

The death vans were not always satisfactory. A telegram from the
commandant of the SIPO and SD “Ostland” to the RSHA, _Amt_ II D, on 15
June 1942, states:

    “A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way,
    arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security
    Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.

    “The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that
    purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the
    same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three
    S-vans on hand (2 Diamond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are
    leaky already.” (_501-PS_)

The reports of the various _Einsatz_ Groups were summarized at RSHA, and
the summaries were then distributed to the various sections interested,
particularly _Amt_ III (the SD), _Amt_ IV (the GESTAPO), and _Amt_ V
(the KRIPO) (_2752-PS_). One such report covering the period 1-31
October 1941 is entitled “Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the
_Einsatz_ Groups of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR”
(_R-102_). This report describes in summary form the activities of the
various _Einsatz_ Groups during the month of October 1941. The report
first discusses the stations and in that regard states:

    “During the period covered by this report the stations of the
    Task Forces of the Security Police and the SD have changed only
    in the Northern Sector.

    “The present stations are:

    “Task Force A: since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk.

    “Task Force B: continues in Smolensk.

    “Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew.

    “Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.

    “The Action and Special Commandos (_Einsatz und Sonder_
    Commandos) which are attached to the Task Force continue on the
    march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been
    assigned to them.” (_R-102_)

The report next discusses the activities of each _Einsatz_ Group. There
is included first a discussion of the Baltic area, next of White
Ruthenia, and last of the Ukraine. Under each section the work of the
_Einsatz_ Groups in connection with the action taken against partisans,
Jews, and communist officials is considered. With respect to the
treatment of Jews in the Baltic area the report states in part:

    “* * * However, the Estonian Protective Corps (_Selbstschutz_),
    formed at the time of the entry of the _Wehrmacht_, immediately
    started a comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action
    was under the direction of the task force of the Security Police
    and the SD.

    “The measures taken were:

        1. Arrest of all male Jews over 16.

        2. Arrest of all Jewesses from 16-20 years, who lived in
        Reval and environs and were fit for work; these were
        employed in peat cutting.

        3. Comprehensive detention in the synagogue of all
        Jewesses living in Dorport and its environs.

        4. Arrest of the Jews and Jewesses fit for work in
        Pernau and environs.

        5. Registration of all Jews according to age, sex, and
        capacity for work for the purpose of their detention in
        a camp that is being prepared.

    “The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of
    doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still
    in progress. After completion of this action there will remain
    only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern territory. * * *”

With respect to partisan activity in White Ruthenia, the report states
in part:

    “* * * In the village Michalowo, after careful reconnaissance
    through civilian agents, 8 partisans were surprised in a house
    by the same Commando of the Security Police and the SD, they
    were arrested and hanged the next day in this particularly
    partisan infested village.

    “The president of the District Region Soviets in Tarenitsch and
    his secretary were shot because of their connections with

    “During an action approximately 70 kilometers south of Mogilow,
    25 Armenians, Kirghize and Mongols were apprehended with false
    identification papers with which they tried to conceal the fact
    that they belong to a partisan group. They were liquidated. * *
    *” (_R-102_)

With respect to arrests and executions of communists in White Ruthenia,
the report states in part:

    “A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was
    devoted to the combating of Communists and criminals. A special
    Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63
    officials, NKVD agents and agitators. * * *” (_R-102_)

With respect to the action taken against the Jews in White Ruthenia the
report states in part:

    “* * * All the more vigorous are the actions of the task forces
    of the Security Police and the SD against the Jews who make it
    necessary that steps be taken against them in different spheres.

    “In Gorodnia 165 Jewish terrorists and in Tschernigow 19 Jewish
    Communists were liquidated. 8 more Jewish communists were shot
    at Beresna.

    “It was experienced repeatedly that the Jewish women showed an
    especially obstinate behaviour. For this reason 28 Jewesses had
    to be shot in Krugoje and 337 at Mogilev.

    “In Borissov 321 Jewish saboteurs and 118 Jewish looters were

    “In Bobruisk 380 Jews were shot who had engaged to the last in
    incitement and horror propaganda [_Hetz-und Greuelpropaganda_]
    against the German army of occupation.

    “In Tatarsk the Jews had left the Ghetto of their own accord and
    returned to their old home quarters, attempting to expel the
    Russians who had been quartered there in the meantime. All male
    Jews as well as 3 Jewesses were shot.

    “In Sadrudubs the Jews offered some resistance against the
    establishment of a Ghetto so that 272 Jews and Jewesses had to
    be shot. Among them was a political Commissar.


    “In Mogilev too, the Jews attempted to sabotage their removal to
    the Ghetto; 113 Jews were liquidated.


    “Moreover four Jews were shot on account of refusal to work and
    2 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged orders issued by the
    German occupation authorities.

    “In Talka 222 Jews were shot for anti-German propaganda and in
    Marina Gorka 996 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged
    orders issued by the German occupation authorities.

    “At Schklow 627 more Jews were shot because they had
    participated in acts of sabotage.


    “On account of the extreme danger of an epidemic, a beginning
    was made to liquidate the Jews in the ghetto at Witebsk. This
    involved approximately 3000 Jews. * * *” (_R-102_)

With respect to partisan activity in the Ukraine the report states in

    “Although partisan activity in the south sector is very strong
    too, there is nevertheless the impression that spreading and
    effective partisan activity are strongly affected by the flight
    of higher partisan leaders and by the lack of initiative of the
    subordinate leaders who have remained behind. Only in one case a
    commando of the Security Police and the SD succeeded in a fight
    with partisans in shooting the Secretary of the Communist Party
    for the administration district of Nikolajew-Cherson, who was at
    the time Commissar of a partisan group for the district
    Nikolajew-Cherson-Krim. * * *” (_R-102_)

With respect to treatment of Jews in the Ukraine the report states in

    “The embitterment of the Ukrainian population against the Jews
    is extremely great because they are thought responsible for the
    explosions in Kiew. They are also regarded as informers and
    agents of the NKVD who started the terror against the Ukrainian
    people. As a measure of retaliation for the arson at Kiew, all
    Jews were arrested and altogether 33,771 Jews were executed on
    the 29th and 30th September. Money, valuables and clothing were
    secured and put at the disposal of the National-Socialist League
    for Public Welfare (NSV) for the equipment of the National
    Germans [_Volksdeutschen_] and partly put at the disposal of the
    provisional city administration for distribution to the needy


    “In Shitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience
    they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propaganda and


    “In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of retaliation
    for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area east of the Dnjepr
    the solution of the Jewish question has been taken up
    energetically by the task forces of the Security Police and the
    SD. The areas newly occupied by the Commandos were purged of
    Jews. In the course of this action 4,891 Jews were liquidated.
    At other places the Jews were marked and registered. This
    rendered it possible to put at the disposal of the _Wehrmacht_
    for urgent labor, Jewish worker groups up to 1,000 persons.”

These reports, circulated among the various offices of the RSHA, brought
general knowledge to the entire organization of the program of mass
murder conducted by these special task forces of the SIPO and SD.

The activities of the _Einsatz_ Groups continued throughout 1943 and
1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the SIPO and SD. New groups were
formed and sent into action in the West (_2890-PS_). Under adverse war
conditions, however, the program of extermination was to a large extent
changed to one of rounding up slave labor for Germany. A letter written
on 19 March 1943 from the headquarters of a _Sonderkommando_ (section of
_Einsatz_ Group C) states as follows:

    “It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security
    Service (SD) to discover all enemies of the Reich and fight
    against them in the interest of security, and in the zone of
    operations especially to guarantee the security of the army.
    Besides the annihilation of active opponents all other elements
    who, by virtue of their opinions or their past, may appear
    active as enemies under favorable conditions, are to be
    eliminated [_sind * * * auszumerzen_] through preventive
    measures. The Security Police carries out this task according to
    the general directives of the Fuehrer with all the required
    toughness. Energetic measures are especially necessary in
    territories endangered by the activity of hostile gangs. The
    competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations
    is based on the Barbarossa decrees. I deem the measures of the
    Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during
    recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:

    “1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so
    serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and
    Italians, who streamed back in chaotic condition, took openly
    position against us.

    “2. The strong expeditions of hostile gangs, who came especially
    from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that,
    other revolutionary groups, formed by the population, appeared
    suddenly in all districts. The providing of arms evidently
    provided no difficulties at all. It would have been
    irresponsible, if we had observed this whole activity without
    acting against it. It is obvious that all such measures bring
    about some harshness. I want to take up the significant points
    of harsh measures:

        “1. The shooting of Hungarian Jews.

        “2. The shooting of directors of collective farms.

        “3. The shooting of children.

        “4. The total burning down of villages.

        “5. The “shooting, while trying to escape” of Security
        Service (SD) prisoners.

    “Chief of _Einsatz_ Group C confirmed once more the correctness
    of the measures taken, and expressed his recognition for the
    energetic actions.

    “With regard to the current political situation, especially in
    the armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the
    Security Police have to be subordinated to the greatest extent
    to the recruiting of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible
    time, the Ukraine has to put at the disposal of the armament
    industry 1 million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our
    territory daily.

    “The work of the field groups has therefore to be changed as of
    now. The following orders are given:

    “1. Special treatment is to be limited to a minimum.

    “2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists and so on,
    is to take place by roster only for the time being, without
    arresting anybody. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to
    arrest all the close relatives of a member of the communist
    party. Although, members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested
    only if they were active in a leading position.

    “3. The activity of the labor offices, respective of recruiting
    commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible.
    It will not be possible always to refrain from using force.
    During a conference with the Chief of the Labor Commitment
    Staffs, an agreement was reached stating that wherever prisoners
    can be released, they should be put at the disposal of the
    Commissioner of the Labor Office. When searching [_Uberholung_]
    villages, resp., when it has become necessary to burn down a
    village, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the
    Commissioner by force.

    “4. As a rule, no more children will be shot.

    “5. The reporting of hostile gangs as well as drives against
    them is not affected hereby. All drives against these hostile
    gangs can only take place after my approval has been obtained.

    “6. The prisons have to be kept empty, as a rule. We have to be
    aware of the fact that the Slavs will interpret all soft
    treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act
    accordingly right away. If we limit our harsh measures of
    security police through above orders for the time being, that is
    only done for the following reason. The most important thing is
    the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into
    the Reich will be made. No written certificates of political
    reliability check or similar things will be issued.

                                           “(signed) Christiansen.”

The head of the Jewish section in the GESTAPO, and the man directly
responsible for carrying out the mass extermination program against the
Jews by the GESTAPO, _Obersturmbannfuehrer_ Eichmann, estimated in his
report to Himmler on the matter, that 2,000,000 Jews had been killed by
shootings, mainly by the _Einsatz_ Groups of the SIPO and SD during the
campaign in the East. This did not include the estimated 4,000,000 sent
by the GESTAPO for extermination in annihilation camps. (_2615-PS_)

(2) _The GESTAPO and SD stationed special units in prisoner of war camps
for the purpose of screening out racial and political undesirables and
executing them._ The program of mass murder of political and racial
undesirables carried on against civilians was also applied to prisoners
of war captured on the Eastern front. Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Staff
of the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab_, states:

    “* * * Shortly before the beginning of this campaign [with
    U.S.S.R.] I was present in a group composed of the Commanders in
    Chief (with their Chiefs of Staff) of the three Armed Forces, of
    the Army groups, of Armies, and of the corresponding groups in
    the Air Forces and Navy. Hitler made an announcement to this
    group that special measures would have to be taken against
    political functionaries and commissars of the Soviet army. He
    said that this would not be an ordinary campaign but would be
    the clash of conflicting ideologies. He further said that the
    political functionaries and commissars were not to be considered
    as prisoners of war but were to be segregated from other
    prisoners immediately after their capture and were to be turned
    over to special detachments of the SD which were to accompany
    the German troops to Russia. He further said that when it was
    not possible to turn over the political functionaries and
    commissars to the SD, they were to be eliminated by the German
    troops.” (_2884-PS_)

The Chief of the SD, Otto Ohlendorf, describes this action in the
following words:

    “In 1941, shortly after the start of the campaign against
    Russia, an agreement was entered into between the Chief of the
    Security Police and SD and the OKW and OKH to the effect that
    the prisoner of war camps on the Eastern front should be opened
    to _Einsatzkommandos_ of the SIPO and SD so that the prisoners
    could be screened. All Jews and Communist functionaries were to
    be taken from the prisoner of war camps by the
    _Einsatzkommandos_ and executed outside the camps. To my
    knowledge, this action was carried on throughout the entire
    Russian campaign. In the other occupied territories and within
    the Reich—to my knowledge—the GESTAPO had been made
    responsible for this program in the Russian prisoner of war
    camps. It was, to my knowledge, carried on throughout the
    greater part of the war.” (_2622-PS_)

Lahousen, chief of a division in the office of foreign intelligence in
the _Wehrmacht_, states:

    “* * * From the start of the campaign against the U.S.S.R. the
    higher German political and military leadership followed the
    policy of eliminating Russian commissars and various other types
    of Russian prisoners of war captured by the _Wehrmacht_. In June
    and July 1941 I participated in a conference which concerned
    itself with the treatment of Russian commissars. * * *
    Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller was present as representative of the
    RSHA, and he participated in this matter because, as Chief of
    Section IV, he was responsible for the carrying out of these
    measures. Jointly with the SD and the GESTAPO he had the task of
    instituting the necessary measures for the execution of
    commissars. * * * In the discussion that followed, Mueller
    promised in a peculiarly cynical manner that these executions
    would take place in the future outside the camp, so that the
    troops would not be obliged to watch them. He promised further a
    certain limitation in the concept of ‘Bolshevistically
    infected.’ This concept and its interpretation had been hitherto
    left to the discretion of the SD _Sonderkommandos_. * * * An
    agreement was concluded between the OKW, the GESTAPO and the SD.
    Pursuant to this agreement Russian prisoners of war under the
    control of the OKW were delivered to the GESTAPO and SD for
    execution. The term ‘_Sonderbehandlung_’ in the official
    documents and way of speaking of the SD was equivalent to
    ‘condemned to death’.” (_2846-PS_)

On 17 July 1941 instructions were issued by the GESTAPO to Commandos of
the SIPO and SD stationed in Stalags, providing in part as follows:

    “The activation of commandos will take place in accordance with
    the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security
    Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16
    July 1941 (see enclosure 1). The commandos will work
    independently according to special authorization and in
    consequence of the general regulations given to them, in the
    limit of the camp organizations. Naturally, the commandos will
    keep close contact with the camp-commander and the
    defense-officers assigned to him.

    “The mission of the commandos is the political investigating of
    all camp-inmates, the elimination and further ‘treatment’

    “_a._ of all political, criminal or in some other way unbearable
    elements among them.

    “_b._ of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction
    of the occupied territories.

    “The commandos must use for their work as far as possible, at
    present and even later, the experiences of the camp-commanders
    which the latter have collected meanwhile from observation of
    the prisoners and examinations of camp inmates.

    “Further, the commandos must make efforts from the beginning to
    seek out among the prisoners elements which appear reliable,
    regardless if there are communists concerned or not, in order to
    use them for intelligence purposes inside of the camp and, if
    advisable, later in the occupied territories also.

    “By use of such informers and by use of all other existing
    possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated
    among the prisoners, must proceed step by step at once. * * *

    “Above all, the following must be discovered: All important
    functionaries of state and party, especially

        Professional revolutionaries

        Functionaries of the Komintern

        All policy forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and
        its fellow organizations in the central committees, in
        the regional and district committees.

        All peoples-commissars and their deputies

        All former political commissars in the Red-Army

        Leading personalities of the state-authorities of
        central and middle regions.

        The leading personalities of the business world.

        Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence

        All Jews

        All persons who are found to be agitators or fanatical
        communists. * * *

    “Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate
    vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the general-government are
    in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are
    to be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former
    Soviet-Russian territory. * * *

    “In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible
    removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for
    the _Einsatz_-group in the occupied territories, the leader of
    the _Einsatz-Kommando_ [?] must make an agreement with the
    nearest State-Police-Office, as well as with the commandant of
    the Security Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these
    with the Chief of the _Einsatz_-group concerned in the occupied
    territories. * * *” (_502-PS_)

On 23 October 1941 the Camp Commander of the concentration camp Gross
Rosen reported to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, a list of Russian PWs
who had been executed the preceding day. (_1165-PS_)

On 9 November 1941 Mueller issued a directive to all GESTAPO offices in
which he ordered that diseased PWs should be excluded from the transport
into the concentration camps for execution. The letter began:

    “The commandant of the concentration camps are complaining that
    5 to 10 percent of the Soviet Russians destined for execution
    are arriving in the camps dead or half dead. Therefore the
    impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such
    prisoners in this way. * * *” (_1165-PS_)

The affidavit of Kurt Lindow, former GESTAPO official, states:

    “* * * 2. From 1941 until the middle of 1943 there was attached
    to subsection IVA1 a special department that was headed by the
    _Regierungsoberinspektor_, later _Regierungsamtmann_, and
    _SS-Hauptsturmbannfuehrer_ Franz Koenigshaus. In this department
    were handled matters concerning prisoners of war. I learned from
    this department that instructions and orders by Reichsfuehrer
    Himmler, dating from 1941 and 1942, existed according to which
    captured Soviet Russian political Commissars and Jewish soldiers
    were to be executed. As far as I know proposals for execution of
    such PWs were received from the various PW camps. Koenigshaus
    had to prepare the orders for execution and submitted them to
    the chief of section IV, Mueller, for signature. These orders
    were made out so that one order was to be sent to the agency
    making the request and a second one to the concentration camp
    designated to carry out the execution. The PWs in question were
    at first formally released from PW status, then transferred to a
    concentration camp for execution. * * *

    “* * * 4. There existed in the PW camps on the Eastern front
    small screening teams (_Einsatzkommandos_) headed by lower
    ranking members of the Secret Police (GESTAPO). These teams were
    assigned to the camp commanders and had the job to segregate the
    PWs who were candidates for execution, according to the orders
    that had been given, and to report them to the Office of the
    Secret Police (_Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt_). * * *” (_2542-PS_)

(3) _The GESTAPO and SD sent recaptured prisoners of war to
concentration camps where they were executed (“Bullet Decree”)._ In
March 1944 the Chief of the Security Police and SD forwarded an OKW
order to regional SIPO and SD offices in which the OKW ordered that, on
recapture, every escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoner of war,
with the exception of British and American prisoners of war, were to be
handed over to the SIPO and SD, with the words “_Stufe III_”. Whether
escaped British and American officers and nonworking NCOs, upon
recapture, should be handed over to the SIPO and SD was to be decided by
the High Command of the Army. In connection with this order, the Chief
of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) issued instructions that the
GESTAPO _Leitstellen_ should take over the escaped officers from the
camp commandants and transport them in accordance with a procedure
theretofore in force to the Mauthausen concentration camp. The camp
commandant was to be informed that the prisoners were being handed over
under the operation “_Kugel_”. On the journey the prisoners of war were
to be placed in irons. The GESTAPO _Leitstellen_ were to make
half-yearly reports, giving numbers only, of the handing over of
prisoners of war. Escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoners of war,
with the exception of British and Americans, recaptured by police
stations were not to be handed back to the Stalag command. The Stalag
was to be informed of the recapture and asked to surrender them with the
words “_Stufe III_”. (_1650-PS_)

On 27 July 1944 an order from the 6th Corps Area Command was issued on
the treatment of prisoners of war, which provided that prisoners of war
were to be discharged from prisoner-of-war status and transferred to the
GESTAPO if they were guilty of crimes, had escaped and been recaptured,
or refused to work or encouraged other prisoners not to work, or were
screened out by _Einsatzkommandos_ of the SIPO and SD, or were guilty of
sabotage. No reports on transfers were required (_1514-PS_). This decree
was known as the “_Kugel Erlass_” (“Bullet Decree”). Prisoners of war
sent to Mauthausen concentration camp under it were regarded as dead to
the outside world and were executed. (_2478-PS_; _2285-PS_.)

(4) _The GESTAPO and SD were responsible for establishing and
classifying concentration camps, and for committing racial and political
undesirables to concentration and annihilation camps for slave labor and
mass murder._ The first concentration camps were established in 1933 at
Dachau in Bavaria and at Oranienburg in Prussia. The GESTAPO was given
by law the responsibility of administering the concentration camps.

The GESTAPO had the sole authority to take persons into protective
custody, and orders for protective custody were carried out in the State
concentration camps. (_1723-PS_)

The GESTAPO issued the orders establishing concentration camps,
transforming prisoner of war camps into concentration camps, designating
concentration camps as internment camps, changing labor camps into
concentration camps, setting up special sections for female prisoners,
and so forth. (_D-50_; _D-46_.)

The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the classification of
concentration camps according to the seriousness of the accusation and
the chances for reforming the prisoners from the Nazi viewpoint. The
concentration camps were classified as Classes I, II, or III. Class I
was for the least serious prisoners, and Class III for the most serious
prisoners. (_1063-A-PS_)

Regional offices of the GESTAPO had the authority to commit persons to
concentration camps for short periods, at first 21 days and later 56
days, but all other orders for protective custody had to be approved by
the GESTAPO headquarters in Berlin. Orders for protective custody issued
by GESTAPO headquarters had to be signed by or on behalf of the Chief of
the Security Police and SD, at first Heydrich, later Kaltenbrunner.

The Chief of the Security Police and SD had authority to fix the length
of the period of custody. During the war it was the policy not to permit
the prisoners to know the period of custody and merely to announce the
term as “until further notice”. (_1531-PS_)

The local GESTAPO offices which made the arrests maintained a register
called the “_Haftbuch_.” In this register the names of all persons
arrested were listed, together with personal data, grounds for the
arrest, and disposition. When orders were received from the GESTAPO
headquarters in Berlin to commit persons who had been arrested to
concentration camps, an entry was made in the _Haftbuch_ to that effect.
The reason assigned for the arrest and commitment of persons to
concentration camps usually was that, according to the GESTAPO, the
person endangered by his attitude the existence and security of the
people and the State. Further specifications of grounds included such
offenses as that of “working against the Greater German Reich with an
illegal resistance organization,” “being a Jew,” “suspected of working
for the detriment of the Reich,” “being strongly suspected of aiding
desertion,” “because as a relative of a deserter he is expected to take
advantage of every occasion to harm the German Reich,” “refusal to
work,” “sexual intercourse with a Pole,” “religious propaganda,”
“working against the Reich,” “loafing on the job,” or “defeatist
statements.” Sometimes specification of the grounds simply referred to
an “action,” under which a large number of persons would be arrested and
sent to concentration camps. (_L-358_; _L-215_.)

On 16 December 1942, Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, reported that, in
connection with an increase in slave labor required by concentration
camps by 30 January 1943 the GESTAPO could round up 45,000 Jews,
including invalids, aged, and children. The telegram stated:

    “In accordance with the increased recruitment of manpower into
    the concentration camps, which was ordered by 30 January 1943,
    the following may be applied in the Jewish sector:

    “1. Total amount: 45,000 Jews.

    “2. Start of transportation 11 January 1943.

    “3. Completion of transportation 31 January 1943.” (_1472-PS_)

On 17 December 1942, Mueller issued an order to the _Kommandeurs_ and
_Inspekteurs_ of the SIPO and SD and to the directors of the GESTAPO
regional offices, in which he stated that Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS and
Chief of the German Police, had given orders on 14 December 1942 that at
least 35,000 persons who were fit for work had to be put into
concentration camps not later than at the end of January. The order
further provided that Eastern or foreign workers who had escaped or
broken the labor contracts were to be sent to the nearest concentration
camps as quickly as possible, and that inmates of detention rooms and
educational work camps who were fit for work should be delivered to the
nearest concentration camps. (_1063-D-PS_)

On 23 March 1943, Mueller issued another directive referring to said
directive of 17 December 1942, in which he stated that measures are to
be carried out until 30 April ‘43. More explicit instructions were given
as to which concentration camps the slave laborers were to be sent. He

    “Care has to be taken that only prisoners who are fit for work
    are sent to concentration camps, and adolescents only in
    accordance with the provisions issued; otherwise, contrary to
    the purpose, the concentration camps become overburdened.”

On 25 June 1943, Mueller issued an order stating that the decrees of 17
December 1942 and of 23 March 1943 had achieved the intended goal.

On 21 April 1943, the Minister of Justice declared in a letter that the
RSHA had ordered on 11 March 1943 that all Jews who were released from
prison were to be handed over to the GESTAPO for lifelong detainment in
the concentration camps at Auschwitz and Lublin. Poles released after an
imprisonment of over six months were to be transferred to the GESTAPO
for internment in a concentration camp for the duration of the war.

The arrest of Jews and their shipment to annihilation camps was carried
out under the direction of Eichmann, head of the section handling Jews
in the Gestapo. Eichmann’s staff was composed of members of the SIPO,
especially the GESTAPO. The Jews were shipped on order of the SIPO and
SD to annihilation camps in the East. Eichmann estimated, and so
reported to Himmler, that 4,000,000 Jews were killed in the annihilation
camps in the East, in addition to the 2,000,000 Jews shot by the
_Einsatz_ Groups. The extermination of Jews in the annihilation camps
was accomplished mainly after the beginning of 1943, during the time
Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the Security Police and SD. (_2615-PS_)

(5) _The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the deportation of citizens
of occupied countries for forced labor and handled the disciplining of
forced labor._ On 26 November 1942, Fritz Sauckel transmitted a letter
to the president of provincial employment offices in which he stated
that he had been advised by the Chief of the Security Police and SD
(RSHA) under date of 26 October 1942 that during the month of November
the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district would begin in order to
make room for the settlement of persons of the German race. The Poles
who were evacuated as a result of this measure were to be put into
concentration camps for labor so far as they were criminal or asocial.
The remaining Poles who were suitable for labor were to be transported
without their families into the Reich, there to be put at the disposal
of the Labor Allocation Offices to serve as replacements for Jews
eliminated from the armament factories. (_L-61_)

During 1943 the program of mass murder carried out by the _Einsatz_
Groups in the East was modified, and orders were issued to round up
hundreds of thousands of persons for the armament industry.

    “In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has to put at the
    disposal of the armament industry one million workers, 500 of
    whom have to be sent from our territory daily. * * * The
    activity of the labor offices * * * is to be supported to the
    greatest extent possible. * * * When searching villages, esp.
    when it has become necessary to burn down a village, the whole
    population will be put at the disposal of the Commissions by
    force. * * * The most important thing is the recruiting of
    workers.” (_3012-PS_)

On 18 June 1941 secret orders were issued from the Chief of the Security
Police and SD, signed by Mueller, to prevent the return of Eastern
emigrants and civilian workers from the Reich to the East, and to keep
them in German war production. Any attempts at refusal to work were to
be countered by the GESTAPO with the severest measures, arrest and
confinement in concentration camps (_1573-PS_). The Chief of the
Security Police and SD had exclusive jurisdiction over labor reformatory
camps established under control of the GESTAPO for disciplining foreign
workers. (_1063-B-PS_)

(6) _The GESTAPO and SD executed captured commandos and paratroopers,
and protected civilians who lynched Allied flyers._ On 4 August 1942
Keitel issued an order which provided that the GESTAPO and SD were
responsible for taking counter-measures against single parachutists or
small groups of them with special missions. Even if such paratroopers
were captured by the _Wehrmacht_, they were to be handed over to the
GESTAPO and the SD. (_553-PS_)

On 18 October 1942, Hitler ordered that all members of Commando units,
even when in uniform, or members of sabotage groups, armed or not, were
to be exterminated to the last man by fighting or by pursuing them. Even
if they wished to surrender, they were not to be spared. Members of such
Commandos, acting as agents, saboteurs, etc., handed over to the
_Wehrmacht_ through other channels, were to be turned over immediately
to the SD. (_498-PS_)

On 17 June 1944, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, in a Top
Secret letter to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, stated that he
had instructed the Commander of the SIPO and SD in Paris to treat
parachutists in English uniform as members of Commando operations in
accordance with Hitler’s order of 18 October 1942. (_1276-PS_)

On 26 June 1944, WFSt issued an order in which it was stated that enemy
paratroopers landing in Brittany were to be treated as commandos, and
that it was immaterial whether the paratroopers were in uniform or
civilian clothes. The order provided that in cases of doubt enemy
soldiers who were captured alive were to be handed over to the SD for
examination as to whether the Fuehrer Order of 18 October 1942 was to be
applied or not. (_532-PS_)

Commandos turned over to the SIPO and SD under these orders were
executed. (_526-PS_; _2374-PS_.)

The affidavit of Adolf Zutter, former adjutant of Mauthausen
concentration camp, states in part:

    “* * * Concerning the American Military Mission which landed
    behind the German front in the Slovakian or Hungarian area in
    January, 1945, I remember, when these officers were brought to
    Camp Mauthausen; I suppose the number of the arrivals were about
    12 to 15 men. They wore a uniform which was American or
    Canadian; brown-green color, shirt, and cloth cap. Eight or ten
    days after their arrival the execution order came in by
    telegraph or teletype. _Standartenfuehrer_ Ziereis came to me
    into my office and told me now Kaltenbrunner has given the
    permission for the execution. This letter was secret and had the
    signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. Then, these people were shot
    according to martial law and their belongings were given to me
    by 1st Sgt. [_Oberscharfuehrer_] Niedermeyer. * * *” (_L-51_)

On 10 August 1943, Himmler issued an order to the Security Police
stating that it was not the task of the Police to interfere in clashes
between Germans and English and American terror flyers who had bailed
out. (_R-110_)

In 1944 at a conference of _Amt_ Chiefs Kaltenbrunner said:

    “All offices of the SD and the security police are to be
    informed that pogroms of the populace against English and
    American terror-flyers are not to be interfered with; on the
    contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered.” (_2990-PS_)

On 12 June 1944 the Chief of the SD-_Abschnitte_ Koblenz stated that the
Army had issued a similar order, namely, that German soldiers were not
to protect enemy flyers from the populace and that the Army no longer
attached value to enemy flyers taken prisoner. (_745-PS_)

(7) _The GESTAPO and SD took civilians of occupied countries to Germany
for secret trial and punishment (“Nacht und Nebel Erlass”)._ On 7
December 1941 Hitler issued the directive, since called the “_Nacht und
Nebel Erlass_” (Night and Fog Decree), under which persons who committed
offenses against the Reich or occupation forces in occupied territories,
except where death sentence was certain, were to be taken secretly to
Germany and surrendered to the Security Police and SD for trial or
punishment in Germany. An executive ordinance was issued by Keitel the
same date, and on 4 February 1942 the directive and ordinance were
published to the police and the SS. (_L-90_)

In compliance with the above directive, the military intelligence turned
over cases, other than those in which the death sentence was probable,
to the GESTAPO and the Secret Field Police for secret deporting to
Germany. (_833-PS_)

After the civilians arrived in Germany, no word of the disposition of
their cases was permitted to reach the country from which they came, or
their relatives. Even when they died awaiting trial, the SIPO and SD
refused to notify the families, so that anxiety would be created in the
minds of the family of the arrested person. (_668-PS_)

(8) _The GESTAPO and SD arrested, tried, and punished citizens of
occupied territories under special criminal procedure and by summary
methods._ The GESTAPO arrested, placed in protective custody, and
executed civilians of occupied territories under certain circumstances.
Even where there were courts capable of handling emergency cases, the
GESTAPO conducted its own executions without regard to normal judicial
processes. (_674-PS_)

On 18 September 1942, Thierack, the Reich Minister of Justice, and
Himmler came to an understanding by which antisocial elements were to be
turned over to Himmler to be worked to death, and a special criminal
procedure was to be applied by the police to the Jews, Poles, gypsies,
Russians, and Ukrainians who were not to be tried in ordinary criminal
courts. (_654-PS_)

On 5 September 1942 an order was issued by the RSHA to the offices of
the GESTAPO and SD covering this understanding. This order provided that
ordinary criminal procedure would not be applied against Poles, Jews,
gypsies, and other Eastern people, but that instead they would be turned
over to the police. Such persons of foreign extraction were to be
treated on a basis entirely different from that applied to Germans.

    “* * * Such considerations which may be right for adjudicating a
    punishable offense committed by a German are, however, wrong for
    adjudicating a punishable offense committed by a person of alien
    race. In the case of punishable offenses committed by a person
    of alien race the personal motives actuating the offender must
    be completely eliminated. The only standard may be that German
    civil order is endangered by his action, and that consequently
    preventive measures must be taken to prevent the recurrence of
    such risks. In other words, the action of a person of alien race
    is not to be viewed from the angle of judicial expiation, but
    from the angle of the police guard against danger.

    “As a result of this, the administration of penal law for
    persons of alien race must be transferred from the hands of the
    administrators of justice into the hands of the police. * * *”

(9) _The GESTAPO and SD executed or confined persons in concentration
camps for crimes allegedly committed by their relatives._ On 19 July
1944, the Commander of the SIPO and SD for the District Radom published
an order transmitted through the Higher SS and Police Leaders to the
effect that in all cases of assassination or attempted assassination of
Germans, or where saboteurs had destroyed vital installations, not only
the guilty person but also all his (or her) male relatives should be
shot and the female relatives over 16 years of age put into a
concentration camp. (_L-37_)

In the summer of 1944, the _Einsatzkommando_ of the SIPO and SD at
Luxembourg caused persons to be confined at Sachsenhausen concentration
camp because they were relatives of deserters and were, therefore,
“expected to endanger the interest of the German Reich if allowed to go
free.” (_L-215_)

(10) _The GESTAPO and SD were instructed to murder prisoners in the SIPO
and SD prisons to prevent their release by the Allied armies._ On 21
July 1944, the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD for the District Radom
forwarded an order of the _Befehlshaber_ of the SIPO and SD to the
effect that it was essential that the number of inmates of the SIPO and
SD prisons be kept as low as possible. Inmates were to be subjected only
to short formal interrogations and then to be sent by the quickest route
to concentration camps. Preparations were to be made for total clearance
of the prisons should the situation at the front necessitate such
action. In the case of sudden emergency precluding the evacuation of the
prisoners, they were to be shot and their bodies buried or otherwise
disposed of, the buildings to be dynamited, and so forth. In similar
circumstances, the Jews who were still employed in the armament
industries or in other work were to be dealt with in the same way. The
liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy was to be avoided at all
costs. (_L-53_)

(11) _The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the seizure and spoliation
of public and private property._ In connection with the program for the
mass extermination of Jews and Communist functionaries, the GESTAPO and
the SD seized all personal effects of the persons executed or murdered.
On the eastern front the victims were required not only to give up all
their personal possessions, but even to remove their outer garments
prior to being murdered. (_2620-PS_)

In connection with the program of confiscation of scientific, religious,
and art archives and objects, an agreement was entered into between
Rosenberg and Heydrich, under which the SD and Rosenberg were to
cooperate closely in the confiscation of public and private collections.

(12) _The GESTAPO and SD conducted third degree interrogations._ On 26
October 1939 an order to all GESTAPO offices from the RSHA signed
Mueller, “by order,” in referring to execution of protective custody
during the war, stated in part:

    “In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German
    Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a
    concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in the future,
    also be transmitted to the State Police District Office
    concerned. In this case, too, there is no objection to spreading
    the rumour of this increased punishment. * * *” (_1531-PS_)

On 12 June 1942 the Chief of the Security Police and SD, through
Mueller, published an order authorizing the use of third degree methods
in interrogating where preliminary investigation indicates that the
prisoner could give information on important facts such as subversive
activities, but not to extort confessions of the prisoner’s own crimes.
The order stated in part:

    “* * * 2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only be
    employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses,
    saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements,
    parachute agents, antisocial elements, Polish or Soviet-Russian
    loafers or tramps. In all other cases, my permission must first
    be obtained.

    “* * * 4. Third degree can, according to the circumstances,
    consist amongst other methods, of:

        very simple diet (bread and water)

        hard bunk

        dark cell

        deprivation of sleep

        exhaustive drilling

        also in flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must
        be consulted).”  (_1531-PS_)

On 24 February 1944 the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD for the district
Radom, “in view of the variety of methods used to date in third-degree
interrogations and in order to avoid excesses,” published an order
issued by the BdS Cracow based on regulations in force for the Reich
which followed closely the limitations laid down in the above decree of
12 June 1942. (_L-89_)

          G. _Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD Against Humanity._

(1) _The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the persecution of
the Jews._ The persecution of the Jews under the Nazi regime is a story
of increasingly severe treatment, beginning with restrictions, then
seizure and spoliation of property, commitment to concentration camps,
deportation, slave labor, and finally mass murder. The responsibility of
the GESTAPO and the SD for the mass extermination program carried out by
the Einsatz Groups of the SIPO and SD and in the annihilation camps to
which Jews were sent by the SIPO and SD has already been considered. In
this subdivision, the place of the GESTAPO and SD in the development of
this persecution will be treated.

Section B of the SD dealt with problems of nationality, including
minorities, race and national health, immigration, and resettlement.
Section B4 of the GESTAPO, headed by Eichmann, dealt with Jewish
affairs, including matters of evacuation, means of suppressing enemies
of the people and State, and dispossession of rights of German
citizenship. One of the functions of the SD was to furnish information
concerning the Jews to the GESTAPO. One of the functions of the GESTAPO
was to carry out the Nazi program of persecution of the Jews. (_L-185_;

The GESTAPO was charged with the enforcement of discriminatory laws,
such as those preventing Jews from engaging in business, restricting
their right to travel, and prohibiting them from associating with
gentiles. Violations of such restrictions resulted in protective custody
and confinement in concentration camps by the GESTAPO. (_L-217_;
_L-152_; _L-167_.)

The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the GESTAPO and the SD
to supervise the anti-Jewish pogrom staged in November 1938 following
the von Rath incident in Paris. As many Jews were to be arrested in all
districts as the available jail space would hold. Well-to-do Jews were
to be singled out for arrest, and primarily only healthy male adults of
not too advanced age. Immediately after completion of the arrests, the
competent concentration camp was to be notified in order to provide for
speediest transfer of Jews to the camps. (_3051-PS_)

On 11 November 1938 Heydrich reported to Goering by secret express
letter on the results of the action as reported by the GESTAPO. The
report stated in part:

    “* * * The extent of the destruction of Jewish shops and houses
    cannot yet be verified by figures. The figures given in the
    reports: 815 shops destroyed, 171 dwelling houses set on fire or
    destroyed, only indicate a fraction of the actual damage caused,
    as far as arson is concerned. Due to the urgency of the
    reporting, the reports received to date are entirely limited to
    general statements such as ‘numerous’ or ‘most shops destroyed.’
    Therefore the figures given must have been exceeded

    “191 synagogues were set on fire, and another 76 completely
    destroyed. In addition 11 parish halls, [_Gemeindehauser_]
    cemetery chapels and similar buildings were set on fire and 3
    more completely destroyed.

    “20,000 Jews were arrested, also 7 Aryans and 3 foreigners. The
    latter were arrested for their own safety.

    “36 deaths were reported and those seriously injured were also
    numbered at 36. Those killed and injured are Jews. One Jew is
    still missing. The Jews killed include one Polish national, and
    those injured include 2 Poles.” (_3058-PS_)

On 31 July 1941 Goering sent the following order to the Chief of the
Security Police and SD, Heydrich:

    “Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January
    1939, which dealt with arriving at a solution of the Jewish
    problem through furtherance of emigration and evacuation as
    advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you with making all
    necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial
    matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish
    question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.”

In February or March 1943, according to Gottfried Boley,
_Ministerialrat_ in the Reich Chancery, a conference on the solution of
the Jewish problem, attended by representatives of the ministries, was
called by Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD. Boley

    “The meeting was presided over by Eichmann who had charge of
    Jewish problems in the GESTAPO. In his opening remarks Eichmann
    referred to former conferences that had taken place in the
    office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, and that on
    this occasion he wished to discuss the matter in a more basic
    manner. He stated that the Jewish question had to be solved in a
    quick and proper way. Representatives of the Chief of the
    Security Police and SD who attended the conference made it clear
    to those present that the remaining Jews had to be sent forcibly
    to concentration camps or be sterilized. Those present at the
    conference must have carried away the impression that the
    objectives were the extermination of the Jewish people.”

The deportation of Jews into concentration camps was part of the program
for slave labor. Jews not fit for work were screened out at
extermination centers, such as Auschwitz, and the remainder were taken
into concentration and work camps. The orders were issued by Himmler and
passed through the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Kaltenbrunner
(formerly Heydrich) to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, and then to
Eichmann for execution. (_2376-PS_; _1472-PS_.)

In Galicia, the deportation of Jews was carried out during the period
from April 1942 to June 1943. At the end of that time Galicia had been
entirely cleared of Jews. In all, 434,392 Jews were deported from
Galicia alone. In connection with the deportations, Jewish property was
confiscated, including furniture, clothing, money, dental fillings, gold
teeth, wedding rings, and other personal property of all kinds. The
Security Police participated in this action along with other police and
SS detachments. (_L-18_)

In Warsaw the Security Police played a responsible role in the
segregation of the Jews and placing them in the Ghetto, in the
subsequent removal of the Jews to concentration camps, and in the final
clearance of the Ghetto. The Ghetto was established in November of 1940.
Over 300,000 Jews were deported from it between July and October 1942,
and 6,500 more were deported in January 1943. In April and May 1943 the
final clearance of the Ghetto was accomplished under the direction of
the SS and Police Leader of the Warsaw area, and with units of the SIPO,
Waffen SS, Order Police, and some military and Polish police units.
Thousands of Jews were killed in the action. About 7,000 were
transported to “T. II” where they were exterminated. The remaining
40,000 to 45,000 were placed in concentration camps. (_1061-PS_)

In Denmark the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD was ordered in September
of 1943 to arrest all Danish citizens of Jewish belief and send them to
Stettin by ship and from there to the concentration camp at
Theresienstadt. In spite of the protests of the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO
and SD, Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD gave direct
orders to carry out the anti-Jewish action. Eichmann, head of the Jewish
section in the GESTAPO, had direct charge of the clearance program.

In Hungary the deportation of Jews was again carried out by Eichmann.
This action took place under direction of the GESTAPO after the German
occupation of Hungary in March 1944. About 450,000 Jews were deported
from Hungary due to the pressure and direction of the GESTAPO.

(2) _The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the persecution of
the churches._ The fight against the churches was never brought out into
the open by the GESTAPO and the SD as in the case of the persecution of
the Jews. The struggle was designed to weaken the churches and to lay a
foundation for the ultimate destruction of the confessional churches
after the end of the war. (_1815-PS_)

Section C2 of the SD dealt with education and religious life. Section B1
of the GESTAPO dealt with political Catholicism. Section B2 with
political Protestantism sects, and Section B3 with other churches and
Freemasonry. (_L-185_)

As early as 1934 the GESTAPO enforced restrictions against the churches.
An order by the State Police of Dusseldorf prohibited the churches from
engaging in public activities, especially public appearances in groups,
sports, hikes, and the establishment of holiday or outdoor camps.

In 1934 the Bavarian Political Police placed three ministers in
protective custody for refusing to carry out the order of the Government
to ring church bells on the occasion of the death of Hindenburg.

The GESTAPO dissolved those church organizations which it considered to
have political objectives. In 1938 the GESTAPO at Munich dissolved by
order the Guild of the Virgin Mary of the Bavarian dioceses. (_1481-PS_)

An insight into the hidden objectives and secret methods of the GESTAPO
and the SD in the fight against the churches is disclosed in the file of
the GESTAPO regional office at Aachen (_1815-PS_). On 12 May 1941 the
Chief of the GESTAPO issued a directive in which he reported that the
Chief of the Security Police and SD had issued an order under which the
treatment of church politics which had theretofore been divided between
the SD and the GESTAPO was to be taken over entirely by the GESTAPO. The
SD “church specialists” were to be temporarily transferred to the same
posts in the GESTAPO and operate an intelligence service in the church
political sphere there. SD files concerning church political opposition
were to be handed over to the GESTAPO, but the SD was to retain material
concerning the confessional influence on the lives of the people.

On 22 and 23 September 1941 a conference of church specialists attached
to GESTAPO regional offices was held in the lecture hall of the RSHA in
Berlin. The notes on the speeches delivered at this conference indicate
that the GESTAPO considered the church as an enemy to be attacked with
determination and “true fanaticism.” The immediate objective of the
GESTAPO was stated to be to insure that the Church did not win back any
lost ground. The ultimate objective was stated to be the destruction of
the confessional churches. This was to be brought about by the
collection of material through the GESTAPO church intelligence system to
be produced at a proper time as evidence for the charge of treasonable
activities during the German fight for existence.

The executive measures to be applied by the GESTAPO were discussed. It
was stated to be impractical to deal with political offenses under
normal legal procedure owing to lack of political perception which
prevailed among the legal authorities. The so-called “agitator-Priests,”
therefore, had to be handled by GESTAPO measures, and when necessary
removed to a concentration camp. The following punishments were to be
applied to priests according to individual circumstances: warning, fine,
forbidden to preach, forbidden to remain in parish, forbidden all
activity as a priest, short-term arrest, protective custody. Retreats,
youth and recreational camps, evening services, processions and
pilgrimages were all to be forbidden on grounds of interfering with the
war effort, blackouts, overburdened transportation, etc.

In executing this program close cooperation was required between the
GESTAPO and the SD. The study and treatment of the Church in its
opposition to the Nazi state was the responsibility of the GESTAPO. The
result of this treatment of the Church in the sphere of “religious life”
remained the province of the SD. By these means the GESTAPO and the SD
carried on the struggle of the Nazi conspirators against the Church.

                            H. _Conclusion._

The evidence shows that the GESTAPO was created by Goering in Prussia in
April 1933 for the specific purpose of serving as a police agency to
strike down the actual and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime, and
that henceforward the GESTAPO in Prussia and in the other States of the
Reich carried out a program of terror against all who were thought to be
dangerous to the domination of the conspirators over the people of
Germany. Its methods were utterly ruthless. It operated outside the law
and sent its victims to the concentration camps. The term “GESTAPO”
became the symbol of the Nazi regime of force and terror.

Behind the scenes, operating secretly, the SD, through its vast network
of informants, spied upon the German people in their daily lives, on the
streets, in the shops, and even within the sanctity of the churches.

The most casual remark of a German citizen might bring him before the
GESTAPO, where his fate and freedom were decided without recourse to
law. In this government, in which the rule of law was replaced by a
tyrannical rule of men, the GESTAPO was the primary instrumentality of

The GESTAPO and the SD played an important part in almost every criminal
act of the conspiracy. The categories of these crimes, apart from the
thousands of specific instances of torture and cruelty in policing
Germany for the benefit of the conspirators, indicate the extent of
GESTAPO and SD complicity.

The GESTAPO and SD fabricated the border incidents which Hitler used as
an excuse for attacking Poland.

Through the _Einsatz_ Groups they murdered approximately 2,000,000
defenseless men, women, and children.

They removed Jews, political leaders, and scientists from prisoner of
war camps and murdered them.

They took recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps and
murdered some of them.

The GESTAPO established and classified concentration camps and sent
millions of people into them for extermination and slave labor.

The GESTAPO cleared Europe of the Jews and was responsible for sending
4,000,000 Jews to their deaths in annihilation camps.

The GESTAPO and SD rounded up hundreds of thousands of citizens of
occupied countries and shipped them to Germany for forced labor, and
sent slave laborers to labor reformatory camps and concentration camps
for disciplining.

They executed captured commandos and paratroopers and protected
civilians who lynched Allied flyers.

They took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial
and punishment.

They arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied territories
under special criminal procedures which did not accord them fair trials,
and by summary methods.

They murdered or sent to concentration camps the relatives of persons
who had allegedly committed crimes.

They ordered the murder of prisoners in SIPO and SD prisons to prevent
their release by the Allied armies.

They participated in the seizure and spoliation of public and private

They were primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews and of the

In carrying out these crimes the GESTAPO operated as an organization,
closely centralized and controlled from Berlin headquarters. Reports
were submitted to Berlin, and all important decisions emanated from
Berlin. The regional offices had only limited power to commit persons to
concentration camps. All cases, other than those of short duration, had
to be submitted to Berlin for approval. From 1943 to the end of the war
the defendant Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the Security Police and SD
in Berlin. The GESTAPO was organized on a functional basis. Its
principal divisions dealt with the groups and institutions against which
it committed the worst crimes—Jews, churches, communists, and political
liberals. Thus, in perpetrating these crimes, the GESTAPO acted as an
entity, each section performing its part in the general criminal
enterprises ordered by Berlin. It must be held responsible as an entity.

The SD was at all times a department of the SS. Its criminality directly
concerns and contributes to the criminality of the SS.

As to the GESTAPO, it is submitted that:

        1. The GESTAPO is an organization, in the sense in which
        that term is used in Article 9 of the Charter.

        2. The defendants Goering and Kaltenbrunner committed
        the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter in their
        capacity as members and leaders of the GESTAPO.

        3. The GESTAPO, as an organization, participated in and
        aided the conspiracy which contemplated and involved the
        commission of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the

In 1941, on German Police Day, Heydrich, the former Chief of the
Security Police and the SD, said:

    “Secret State Police, Criminal Police, and SD are still adorned
    with the furtive and whispered secrecy of a political detective
    story. In a mixture of fear and shuddering—and yet at home with
    a certain feeling of security because of their
    presence,—brutality, inhumanity bordering on the sadistic, and
    ruthlessness are attributed abroad to the men of this
    profession.” (Extract from a brochure on Reinhard Heydrich,
    published in December 1943.)

The evidence as it is submitted, shows that brutality, inhumanity,
sadism, and ruthlessness were characteristic of the GESTAPO and that it
was and should be declared, a criminal organization, in accordance with
article 9 of the Charter.

                 *        *        *        *        *


                  │                                      │      │
     Document     │             Description              │ Vol. │  Page
                  │                                      │      │
                  │Charter of the International Military │      │
                  │  Tribunal, Article 9.                │  I   │       6
                  │International Military Tribunal,      │      │
                  │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│      │ 29, 70,
                  │  Appendix B.                         │  I   │      71
                  │                 ————                 │      │
                  │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a  │      │
                  │document indicates that the document  │      │
                  │was received in evidence at the       │      │
                  │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│      │
                  │before a document number indicates    │      │
                  │that the document was referred to     │      │
                  │during the trial but was not formally │      │
                  │received in evidence, for the reason  │      │
                  │given in parentheses following the    │      │
                  │description of the document. The USA  │      │
                  │series number, given in parentheses   │      │
                  │following the description of the      │      │
                  │document, is the official exhibit     │      │
                  │number assigned by the court.         │      │
                  │                 ————                 │      │
  071-PS          │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April │      │
                  │1941, replying to Bormann’s letter of │      │
                  │19 April 1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA │      │
                  │371)                                  │ III  │     119
                  │                                      │      │
 *498-PS          │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing  │      │
                  │of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA   │      │
                  │501)                                  │ III  │     416
                  │                                      │      │
 *501-PS          │Collection of four documents on       │      │
                  │execution by gas, June 1942, one      │      │
                  │signed by Dr. Becker, SS              │      │
                  │Untersturmfuehrer at Kiev, 16 May     │      │
                  │1942. (USA 288)                       │ III  │     418
                  │                                      │      │
 *502-PS          │Order, 17 July 1941, entitled         │      │
                  │“Regulations for the Commandos of the │      │
                  │Chief of the SIPO and SD which are to │      │
                  │be activated in Stalags”. (USA 486)   │ III  │     422
                  │                                      │      │
 *526-PS          │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943,       │      │
                  │concerning saboteurs captured and shot│      │
                  │in Norway. (USA 502)                  │ III  │     434
                  │                                      │      │
  532-PS          │Telegram of WFSt, 24 June 1944,       │      │
                  │concerning treatment of Commandos.    │ III  │     437
                  │                                      │      │
 *553-PS          │Order signed by Keitel, 4 August 1942,│      │
                  │regulating treatment of paratroops.   │      │
                  │(USA 500)                             │ III  │     441
                  │                                      │      │
  654-PS          │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942,  │      │
                  │on discussion with Himmler concerning │      │
                  │delivery of Jews to Himmler for       │      │
                  │extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III  │     467
                  │                                      │      │
 *668-PS          │Letter from Chief of the SIPO and SD  │      │
                  │and OKW letter, 24 June 1942,         │      │
                  │concerning prosecution of punishable  │      │
                  │offenses against the Reich or         │      │
                  │occupation forces in occupied         │      │
                  │territories. (USA 504)                │ III  │     476
                  │                                      │      │
 *674-PS          │Secret letter from President of High  │      │
                  │District Court of Kattowitz re        │      │
                  │executions being carried out by       │      │
                  │Gestapo without judicial processes, 3 │      │
                  │December 1941. (USA 505)              │ III  │     478
                  │                                      │      │
 *701-PS          │Letter from Minister of Justice to    │      │
                  │Prosecutors, 1 April 1943, concerning │      │
                  │Poles and Jews who are released from  │      │
                  │Penal institutions of Department of   │      │
                  │Justice. (USA 497)                    │ III  │     510
                  │                                      │      │
 *710-PS          │Letter from Goering to Heydrich, 31   │      │
                  │July 1941, concerning solution of     │      │
                  │Jewish question. (USA 509)            │ III  │     525
                  │                                      │      │
  745-PS          │Letter from Chief of SD, Koblenz, 12  │      │
                  │June 1944, concerning enemy aviators  │      │
                  │who have been shot down.              │ III  │     543
                  │                                      │      │
  775-PS          │Memorandum of Minister of the Interior│      │
                  │concerning clarification of police    │      │
                  │matters, 1935.                        │ III  │     547
                  │                                      │      │
  779-PS          │Directive by Frick, regulating        │      │
                  │“protective custody”, 12 April 1934.  │ III  │     555
                  │                                      │      │
  833-PS          │Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head │      │
                  │of the Abwehr, 2 February 1942,       │      │
                  │concerning prosecution of crimes      │      │
                  │against the Reich or occupying forces │      │
                  │in the occupied territories.          │ III  │     600
                  │                                      │      │
 1061-PS          │Official report of Stroop, SS and     │      │
                  │Police Leader of Warsaw, on           │      │
                  │destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943.   │      │
                  │(USA 275)                             │ III  │     718
                  │                                      │      │
*1063-A-PS        │Order of Chief of SIPO and SD, 2      │      │
                  │January 1941, concerning              │      │
                  │classification of concentration camps.│      │
                  │(USA 492)                             │ III  │     775
                  │                                      │      │
*1063-B-PS        │Letter signed by Kaltenbrunner, 26    │      │
                  │July 1943, concerning establishment of│      │
                  │Labor Reformatory camps. (USA 492)    │ III  │     777
                  │                                      │      │
*1063-D-PS        │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942,    │      │
                  │concerning prisoners qualified for    │      │
                  │work to be sent to concentration      │      │
                  │camps. (USA 219)                      │ III  │     778
                  │                                      │      │
 1063-E-PS        │Copy of Mueller’s order, 25 June 1942,│      │
                  │concerning increased shipments to     │      │
                  │concentration camps.                  │ III  │     780
                  │                                      │      │
*1104-PS          │Memorandum, 21 November 1941,         │      │
                  │enclosing copies of report concerning │      │
                  │anti-Jewish action in Minsk. (USA 483)│ III  │     783
                  │                                      │      │
 1113-PS          │Report of 6 November 1942 concerning  │      │
                  │action “Marshfever”.                  │ III  │     792
                  │                                      │      │
*1165-PS          │Letter from Commandant of             │      │
                  │concentration Camp Gross Rosen, 23    │      │
                  │October 1941, and letter of Mueller to│      │
                  │all Gestapo offices, 9 November 1941, │      │
                  │concerning execution of Russian PW’s. │      │
                  │(USA 244)                             │ III  │     821
                  │                                      │      │
*1276-PS          │Top secret letter from Chief of SIPO  │      │
                  │and SD to OKW/WFSt, 17 June 1944,     │      │
                  │concerning Commando operations. (USA  │      │
                  │525).                                 │ III  │     855
                  │                                      │      │
 1285-PS          │Extract from The German Police, 1943, │      │
                  │pp. 81-82.                            │ III  │     863
                  │                                      │      │
 1437-PS          │Law concerning reuniting of Austria   │      │
                  │with German Reich, 18 March 1938. 1938│      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 262.    │  IV  │      17
                  │                                      │      │
 1438-PS          │Fuehrer concerning administration of  │      │
                  │Sudeten-German territory, 22 October  │      │
                  │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 1453.                              │  IV  │      17
                  │                                      │      │
*1472-PS          │Copy of telegram from Mueller to      │      │
                  │Himmler, 16 December 1942, concerning │      │
                  │recruiting Jewish labor. (USA 279)    │  IV  │      49
                  │                                      │      │
*1481-PS          │Gestapo order, 20 January 1938,       │      │
                  │dissolving and confiscating property  │      │
                  │of Catholic Youth Womens Organization │      │
                  │in Bavaria. (USA 737).                │  IV  │      50
                  │                                      │      │
*1514-PS          │Order, 27 July 1944, from 6th Corps   │      │
                  │Area Command concerning delivery of   │      │
                  │prisoners of war to secret state      │      │
                  │police. (USA 491)                     │  IV  │      53
                  │                                      │      │
*1521-PS          │Report from the Bavarian Political    │      │
                  │Police to the Gestapo, Berlin, 24     │      │
                  │August 1934, concerning National      │      │
                  │mourning on occasion of death of von  │      │
                  │Hindenburg. (USA 740)                 │  IV  │      75
                  │                                      │      │
*1531-PS          │Directive from RSHA, 26 October 1939, │      │
                  │concerning execution of protective    │      │
                  │custody, and directive, 12 June 1942, │      │
                  │concerning third degree. (USA 248)    │  IV  │      93
                  │                                      │      │
 1551-PS          │Decree assigning functions in Office  │      │
                  │of Chief of German Police, 26 June    │      │
                  │1936. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt,   │      │
                  │pp. 946-948.                          │  IV  │     106
                  │                                      │      │
*1573-PS          │Order signed Mueller, 18 June 1941,   │      │
                  │concerning measures to be taken       │      │
                  │against Emigrants and civilian workers│      │
                  │from Russian areas and against Foreign│      │
                  │workers. (USA 498)                    │  IV  │     112
                  │                                      │      │
 1638-PS          │Circular of Minister of Interior, 11  │      │
                  │November 1938, on cooperation of SD   │      │
                  │and other authorities. 1938 Reichs    │      │
                  │Ministerialblatt, p. 1906.            │  IV  │     142
                  │                                      │      │
*1650-PS          │Directive to State Police Directorates│      │
                  │from Chief of SIPO and SD by Mueller, │      │
                  │4 March 1944, concerning captured     │      │
                  │escaped PWs except British and        │      │
                  │American PWs. (USA 246)               │  IV  │     158
                  │                                      │      │
*1680-PS          │“Ten Years Security Police and SD”    │      │
                  │published in The German Police, 1     │      │
                  │February 1943. (USA 477)              │  IV  │     191
                  │                                      │      │
*1723-PS          │Order concerning cooperation of Party │      │
                  │offices with the Secret State Police, │      │
                  │25 January 1938, published in Decrees,│      │
                  │Regulations, Announcements, 1937, Vol.│      │
                  │II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206)            │  IV  │     219
                  │                                      │      │
*1815-PS          │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning  │      │
                  │the study and treatment of church     │      │
                  │politics. (USA 510)                   │  IV  │     415
                  │                                      │      │
*1852-PS          │“Law” from The German Police, 1941, by│      │
                  │Dr. Werner Best. (USA 449) (See Chart │      │
                  │No. 16.)                              │  IV  │     490
                  │                                      │      │
 1956-PS          │Meaning and Tasks of the Secret State │      │
                  │Police, published in The Archives,    │      │
                  │January 1936, Vol. 22-24, p. 1342.    │  IV  │     598
                  │                                      │      │
 2073-PS          │Decree concerning the appointment of a│      │
                  │Chief of German Police in the Ministry│      │
                  │of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936   │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487.    │  IV  │     703
                  │                                      │      │
 2104-PS          │Law on organization of Secret State   │      │
                  │Police office, 26 April 1933. 1933    │      │
                  │Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 122.   │  IV  │     730
                  │                                      │      │
 2105-PS          │Law on Secret State Police of 30      │      │
                  │November 1933. 1933 Preussische       │      │
                  │Gesetzsammlung, p. 413.               │  IV  │     731
                  │                                      │      │
 2107-PS          │Law on Secret State Police of 10      │      │
                  │February 1936. 1936 Preussische       │      │
                  │Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22.            │  IV  │     732
                  │                                      │      │
 2108-PS          │Decree for execution of Law on Secret │      │
                  │State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936│      │
                  │Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 22-24.│  IV  │     732
                  │                                      │      │
 2113-PS          │Decree for application of law of 30   │      │
                  │November 1933, concerning Secret State│      │
                  │Police of 8 March 1934. 1934          │      │
                  │Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 143.   │  IV  │     743
                  │                                      │      │
 2232-PS          │Tasks and Means of a Political Police,│      │
                  │from German Administrative Law by Hans│      │
                  │Frank, pp. 420-430.                   │  IV  │     881
                  │                                      │      │
 2243-PS          │Law relating to finance measures in   │      │
                  │connection with the police, 19 March  │      │
                  │1937. 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 325.                               │  IV  │     924
                  │                                      │      │
 2245-PS          │Frick decree of 20 September 1936     │      │
                  │concerning employment of Security     │      │
                  │Police Inspectors. 1936 Reichs        │      │
                  │Ministerialblatt, pp. 1343-1344.      │  IV  │     928
                  │                                      │      │
*2273-PS          │Extract from a top secret report of   │      │
                  │Einsatz Group A. (USA 487) (See Chart │      │
                  │No. 4.)                               │  IV  │     944
                  │                                      │      │
*2285-PS          │Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French │      │
                  │officers, about shooting of prisoners │      │
                  │at Mauthausen. (USA 490)              │  IV  │     991
                  │                                      │      │
 2344-PS          │Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering,│      │
                  │1934, p. 89.                          │  IV  │    1065
                  │                                      │      │
 2347-PS          │Court decisions from 1935             │      │
                  │Reichsverwaltungsblatt, Vol. 56, pp.  │      │
                  │577-578, 20 July 1935.                │  IV  │    1066
                  │                                      │      │
 2348-PS          │Affidavit of Rauff, Head of Amt II D, │      │
                  │RSHA, 19 October 1945. (USA 485)      │  IV  │    1068
                  │                                      │      │
 2371-PS          │Execution of ordinance for Security of│      │
                  │people and state, 28 February 1933.   │      │
                  │1933 Reichs Ministerialblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │p. 543.                               │  IV  │    1102
                  │                                      │      │
 2372-PS          │Unified Designation of offices of     │      │
                  │Secret State Police in Reich. 1936    │      │
                  │Reichs Ministerial Gazette, Part V,   │      │
                  │pp. 1344-5.                           │  IV  │    1105
                  │                                      │      │
 2374-PS          │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 27 June  │      │
                  │1945, concerning treatment of         │      │
                  │English-American commando groups.     │  V   │       1
                  │                                      │      │
 2375-PS          │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16       │      │
                  │November 1945, concerning activities  │      │
                  │of SIPO and SD.                       │  V   │       2
                  │                                      │      │
 2376-PS          │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16       │      │
                  │November 1945, concerning treatment of│      │
                  │Jews.                                 │  V   │       3
                  │                                      │      │
*2460-PS          │Affidavit of Rudolf Diels. (USA 751)  │  V   │     205
                  │                                      │      │
*2477-PS          │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4      │      │
                  │November 1945. (USA 518)              │  V   │     229
                  │                                      │      │
 2478-PS          │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4      │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │  V   │     230
                  │                                      │      │
 2479-PS          │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Mildner, 4    │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │  V   │     230
                  │                                      │      │
*2499-PS          │Original Protective Custody Order     │      │
                  │served on Dr. R. Kempner, 15 March    │      │
                  │1935. (USA 232)                       │  V   │     236
                  │                                      │      │
*2542-PS          │Affidavit of Kurt Lindow, 30 September│      │
                  │1945. (USA 489)                       │  V   │     286
                  │                                      │      │
*2605-PS          │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner,      │      │
                  │former President of the Hungarian     │      │
                  │Zionist Organization, 13 September    │      │
                  │1945. (USA 242)                       │  V   │     313
                  │                                      │      │
 2614-PS          │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5    │      │
                  │November 1945. (USA 918)              │  V   │     337
                  │                                      │      │
 2615-PS          │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5    │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │  V   │     338
                  │                                      │      │
*2620-PS          │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5        │      │
                  │November 1945. (USA 919)              │  V   │     341
                  │                                      │      │
 2622-PS          │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5        │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │  V   │     343
                  │                                      │      │
 2644-PS          │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5        │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │  V   │     357
                  │                                      │      │
 2645-PS          │Affidavit of Gottfried Boley, 14      │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │  V   │     357
                  │                                      │      │
*2751-PS          │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20      │      │
                  │November 1945. (USA 482)              │  V   │     390
                  │                                      │      │
 2752-PS          │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 8      │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │  V   │     392
                  │                                      │      │
 2846-PS          │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 13       │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │  V   │     507
                  │                                      │      │
 2884-PS          │Affidavit of Walter Warlimont, 14     │      │
                  │November 1945.                        │  V   │     550
                  │                                      │      │
 2890-PS          │Extracts from Befehlsblatt of the SIPO│      │
                  │and SD.                               │  V   │     557
                  │                                      │      │
*2990-PS          │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 18  │      │
                  │November 1945. (USA 526)              │  V   │     694
                  │                                      │      │
*2992-PS          │Affidavits of Hermann Graebe. (USA    │      │
                  │494)                                  │  V   │     696
                  │                                      │      │
*3012-PS          │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March   │      │
                  │1943, to all group leaders of Security│      │
                  │Service, and record of telephone      │      │
                  │conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│      │
                  │1943. (USA 190)                       │  V   │     731
                  │                                      │      │
*3033-PS          │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 21  │      │
                  │November 1945. (USA 488)              │  V   │     741
                  │                                      │      │
*3051-PS          │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│      │
                  │all stations of State Police, 10      │      │
                  │November 1938, on measures against    │      │
                  │Jews, and one order from Heydrich on  │      │
                  │termination of protest actions. (USA  │      │
                  │240)                                  │  V   │     797
                  │                                      │      │
 3058-PS          │Letter from Heydrich to Goering, 11   │      │
                  │November 1938, reporting action       │      │
                  │against the Jews. (USA 508)           │  V   │     854
                  │                                      │      │
 3343-PS          │Speech delivered at labor-meeting of  │      │
                  │Prussian State Council on 18 June     │      │
                  │1934, from Speeches and Essays of     │      │
                  │Hermann Goering.                      │  VI  │      78
                  │                                      │      │
 3344-PS          │Extract from Befehlsblatt of the Chief│      │
                  │of Security Police and SD, Berlin, 7  │      │
                  │September 1942, No. 39, p. 249.       │  VI  │      78
                  │                                      │      │
*3360-PS          │Teletype, 12 February 1944, relating  │      │
                  │to recaptured escaped Eastern         │      │
                  │laborers. (USA 499)                   │  VI  │      95
                  │                                      │      │
 3363-PS          │Special delivery letter, 21 September │      │
                  │1939, from Chief of Security Police to│      │
                  │Chiefs of all detail groups concerning│      │
                  │Jewish problem in Occupied zone.      │  VI  │      97
                  │                                      │      │
*3840-PS          │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February│      │
                  │1946, concerning the elimination of   │      │
                  │the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803)          │  VI  │     775
                  │                                      │      │
*3841-PS          │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer    │      │
                  │Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946,     │      │
                  │concerning elimination of the Warsaw  │      │
                  │Ghetto. (USA 804)                     │  VI  │     776
                  │                                      │      │
*3868-PS          │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand   │      │
                  │Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning       │      │
                  │execution of 3,000,000 people at      │      │
                  │Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA  │      │
                  │819)                                  │  VI  │     787
                  │                                      │      │
 D-46             │Order designating Herzogenbosch as    │      │
                  │concentration camp, 18 January 1943.  │  VI  │    1025
                  │                                      │      │
 D-50             │Order establishing concentration camps│      │
                  │at Lublin, 9 April 1943.              │  VI  │    1027
                  │                                      │      │
 D-183            │Order of Gestapo Office, Darmstadt, 7 │      │
                  │December 1938, concerning treatment of│      │
                  │articles secured during protest action│      │
                  │against Jews.                         │  VI  │    1075
                  │                                      │      │
*D-569            │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer  │      │
                  │SS, the OKW, Inspector of             │      │
                  │Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│      │
                  │Police and SD, dating from 29 October │      │
                  │1941 through 22 February 1944,        │      │
                  │relative to procedure in cases of     │      │
                  │unnatural death of Soviet PW,         │      │
                  │execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII  │      74
                  │                                      │      │
*D-762            │Order of Hitler, 30 July 1944,        │      │
                  │concerning combatting of “terrorists” │      │
                  │and “saboteurs” in Occupied           │      │
                  │Territories. (GB 298)                 │ VII  │     221
                  │                                      │      │
*D-763            │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944,      │      │
                  │regarding penal jurisdiction of       │      │
                  │non-German civilians in Occupied      │      │
                  │Territories. (GB 300)                 │ VII  │     222
                  │                                      │      │
*L-18             │Official report, Katzmann to General  │      │
                  │of Police Krueger, 30 June 1943,      │      │
                  │concerning “Solution of Jewish        │      │
                  │Question in Galicia”. (USA 277)       │ VII  │     755
                  │                                      │      │
*L-37             │Letter from Illmer, Chief of the SIPO │      │
                  │and SD of Radom, to subordinates, 19  │      │
                  │July 1944, concerning collective      │      │
                  │responsibility of members of families │      │
                  │of assassins and saboteurs. (USA 506) │ VII  │     782
                  │                                      │      │
*L-41             │Orders of Mueller, Chief of the       │      │
                  │Gestapo, 17 December 1942 and 23 March│      │
                  │1943, concerning transfer of workers  │      │
                  │to concentration camps. (USA 496)     │ VII  │     784
                  │                                      │      │
*L-51             │Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August   │      │
                  │1945. (USA 521)                       │ VII  │     798
                  │                                      │      │
 L-53             │Order from Commandant of the SIPO and │      │
                  │SD for the Radom District to Branch   │      │
                  │Office in Tomaschow, 21 July 1944, on │      │
                  │clearance of prisons. (USA 291)       │ VII  │     814
                  │                                      │      │
*L-61             │Express letter from Sauckel to        │      │
                  │Presidents of Landes Employment       │      │
                  │Office, 26 November 1942, concerning  │      │
                  │employment of Jews and exchange of    │      │
                  │Jews in essential employment against  │      │
                  │Polish labor. (USA 177)               │ VII  │     816
                  │                                      │      │
*L-89             │Top secret letter issued by the       │      │
                  │Commandant of the SIPO and SD,        │      │
                  │District Radom, 24 February 1944,     │      │
                  │concerning intensified interrogations.│      │
                  │(USA 507)                             │ VII  │     868
                  │                                      │      │
*L-90             │Fuehrer decree, February 1942,        │      │
                  │concerning prosecution of offenses in │      │
                  │Occupied Territory; “First Ordinance” │      │
                  │signed by Keitel for execution of the │      │
                  │directive; memorandum of 12 December  │      │
                  │1941, signed by Keitel. (USA 503)     │ VII  │     871
                  │                                      │      │
 L-152            │RSHA Order concerning fraternization  │      │
                  │of Jews and Aryans, 3 November 1941.  │ VII  │     903
                  │                                      │      │
 L-167            │Orders of the Reichsminister of the   │      │
                  │Interior, 24 March 1942, concerning   │      │
                  │use of public transportation by Jews, │      │
                  │and covering letters.                 │ VII  │     917
                  │                                      │      │
*L-180            │Report by SS Brigade Commander        │      │
                  │Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group  │      │
                  │A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276)        │ VII  │     978
                  │                                      │      │
*L-185            │Organization plan of the RSHA, 1      │      │
                  │January 1941. (USA 484)               │ VII  │     996
                  │                                      │      │
*L-215            │File of orders and dossiers of 25     │      │
                  │Luxembourgers committed to            │      │
                  │concentration camps at various times  │      │
                  │in 1944. (USA 243)                    │ VII  │    1045
                  │                                      │      │
 L-217            │Order of Secret State Police          │      │
                  │concerning camouflage of Jewish       │      │
                  │businesses, 20 November 1936.         │ VII  │    1052
                  │                                      │      │
*L-219            │Organization plan of the RSHA as of 1 │      │
                  │October 1943. (USA 479)               │ VII  │    1053
                  │                                      │      │
 L-297            │Law commissioning Secret State Police │      │
                  │Bureau with supervision of duties of  │      │
                  │Political Police commanders in        │      │
                  │provinces, 20 September 1936. 1936    │      │
                  │Reichs Ministerialblatt, p. 1343.     │ VII  │    1099
                  │                                      │      │
 L-301            │New ruling on protective custody, from│      │
                  │The Archive, April 1934, p. 31.       │ VII  │    1099
                  │                                      │      │
*L-316            │RSHA Order of 5 November 1942, signed │      │
                  │by Streckenbach, concerning           │      │
                  │jurisdiction over Poles and Eastern   │      │
                  │Nationals. (USA 346)                  │ VII  │    1104
                  │                                      │      │
*L-358            │Extract from register of arrests by   │      │
                  │Gestapo in Poland, 1943. (USA 495)    │ VII  │    1107
                  │                                      │      │
*L-361            │Three documents concerning the        │      │
                  │formation of the RSHA, Himmler, 27    │      │
                  │September 1939; Heydrich, 23 and 27   │      │
                  │September 1939. (USA 478)             │ VII  │    1109
                  │                                      │      │
*R-102            │Report on activities of The Task      │      │
                  │Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31   │      │
                  │October 1941. (USA 470)               │ VIII │      96
                  │                                      │      │
*R-110            │Himmler order of 10 August 1943 to all│      │
                  │Senior Executive SS and Police        │      │
                  │officers. (USA 333)                   │ VIII │     107
                  │                                      │      │
*R-135            │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret  │      │
                  │reports from Kube on German atrocities│      │
                  │in the East, 18 June 1943, found in   │      │
                  │Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289)   │ VIII │     205
                  │                                      │      │
*R-142            │Memoranda to Koblenz District         │      │
                  │Headquarters, 22 April 1938 and 7 May │      │
                  │1938, relating to the plebiscite of 10│      │
                  │April 1938. (USA 481)                 │ VIII │     243
                  │                                      │      │
 R-145            │State Police Order, 28 May 1934, at   │      │
                  │Duesseldorf, signed Schmid, concerning│      │
                  │sanction of denominational youth and  │      │
                  │professional associations and         │      │
                  │distribution of publications in       │      │
                  │churches. (USA 745)                   │ VIII │     248
                  │                                      │      │
Affidavit A       │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21       │      │
                  │January 1946, substantially the same  │      │
                  │as his testimony on direct examination│      │
                  │before the International Military     │      │
                  │Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│      │
                  │December 1945.                        │ VIII │     587
                  │                                      │      │
Affidavit B       │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20       │      │
                  │November 1945, substantially the same │      │
                  │as his testimony on direct examination│      │
                  │before the International Military     │      │
                  │Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946.  │ VIII │     596
                  │                                      │      │
Affidavit C       │Affidavit of Dieter Wisliceny, 29     │      │
                  │November 1945, substantially the same │      │
                  │as his testimony on direct examination│      │
                  │before the International Military     │      │
                  │Tribunal at Nurnberg, 3 January 1946. │ VIII │     606
                  │                                      │      │
Affidavit D       │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23  │      │
                  │January 1946, substantially the same  │      │
                  │as his testimony on direct examination│      │
                  │before the International Military     │      │
                  │Tribunal at Nurnberg, 4 January 1946. │ VIII │     622
                  │                                      │      │
Statement IX      │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│      │
                  │the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow,   │      │
                  │fall 1945.                            │ VIII │     707
                  │                                      │      │
*Chart No. 1      │National Socialist German Workers’    │      │
                  │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2)               │ VIII │     770
                  │                                      │      │
 Chart No. 3      │Organization of the SS. (USA 445)     │ VIII │     772
                  │                                      │      │
*Chart No. 4      │Report of Special Purpose Group “A”   │      │
                  │regarding Jews killed in the Baltic   │      │
                  │Countries, White Russia and Lithuania.│      │
                  │(2273-PS; USA 487)                    │ VIII │     773
                  │                                      │      │
*Chart No. 5      │Position of Kaltenbrunner and the     │      │
                  │Gestapo and SD in the German Police   │      │
                  │System. (USA 493)                     │ VIII │     774
                  │                                      │      │
*Chart No. 16     │The Structure of the German Police.   │
                  │(1852-PS; USA 449)                    │  End of VIII
                  │                                      │      │
*Chart No. 19     │Organization of the Security Police   │
                  │(Gestapo and Kripo) and the SD        │
                  │1943-1945. (USA 480)                  │  End of VIII


In one respect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed
Forces is to be distinguished from the other groups and organizations
against which the prosecution seeks declaration of criminality. The
Leadership Corps of the NSDAP, for example, was the instrument by which
Hitlerism rose to full power in Germany. The SA and the SS were
branches—large branches to be sure—of the Nazi Party. The German
police had certain roots and antecedents which antedated Hitlerism, but
was almost entirely a creature of the party and the SS. The Reichs
Cabinet was, in essence, merely a committee or set of committees of
Reichs Ministers, and when the Nazis came to power these ministerial
positions were filled for the most part by Nazis. All those groups and
organizations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to
Naziism, or automatically became nazified when Hitler came to full

That is not true of this group, the General Staff and High Command of
the German Armed Forces. It is common knowledge that German armed might
and the German military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many decades.
The war of 1914-18, the Kaiser, and the “scrap of paper” are modern
witnesses to this fact.

As a result of the German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles,
the size and activities of the German armed forces were severely
restricted. The last few years have made it abundantly apparent that
these restrictions did not destroy or even seriously undermine German
militarism. The full flowering of German military strength came about
through collaboration between the Nazis and the career leaders of the
German Armed Forces—the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen.
When Hitler came to power in 1933, he did not find a vacuum in the field
of military affairs; he found a small _Reichswehr_ and a body of
professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German
military history.

The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in
the Indictment—the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed
Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men. Needless to
say, it is not the prosecution’s position that it is a crime to be a
soldier or sailor, or to serve one’s country as a soldier or sailor in
time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one, and can be
honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man who
commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in

It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the prosecution’s
position, that all members of this group were wicked men, or that they
were all equally culpable. But this group not only collaborated with
Hitler and supported many Nazi objectives. They furnished one thing
which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program for
Germany—skill and experience in the development and use of armed might.

Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? The answer is simple.
The answer is that they agreed with the basic objectives of Naziism, and
that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a major part in
achieving those objectives. The generals, like Hitler, wanted Germany to
aggrandize at the expense of neighboring countries, and to do so if
necessary by force or threat of force. Force—armed might—was the
keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would have
been possible.

As they came to power and when they had attained power, the Nazis had
two alternatives: to collaborate with and expand the _Reichswehr_, or to
ignore the Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The
generals feared that the Nazis might do the latter. So they were the
more ready to play along with the Nazis. Moreover, the Nazis offered the
generals the chance of achieving much that the generals wished to
achieve in the expansion of German armies and frontiers. And so the
generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon. They saw it was going in their
direction for the present. No doubt they hoped later to take over the
direction themselves. In fact, it was ultimately they who were taken
over by the Nazis. Hitler attracted the generals to him with the glitter
of conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically. As the
war proceeded they became his tools.

But if the leaders of the Armed Forces became the tools of Naziism, it
is not to be supposed that they were unwitting, or that they did not
participate fully in many of the actions which are charged as criminal.
The willingness, indeed eagerness, of German officers to become partners
of the Nazis will be fully developed.

  A. _Composition and Functions of The General Staff and High Command

During the first World War there was an organization in the German Armed
Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name persists in the
public mind, but the _Grosse Generalstab_ no longer exists in fact.
There has been no such single organization, no single German General
Staff, since 1918. But there has of course been a group of men
responsible for the policy and acts of the Armed Forces. The fact that
these men have no collective name does not prevent us from collecting
them together. Men cannot escape the consequences of their collective
acts by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a
general staff or a high command lies not in name but in function. And
the men comprised within this group do constitute a functional group,
welded together by common responsibility, of those officers who had the
principal authority and responsibility under Hitler, for the plans and
operations of the German armed forces.

(1) _Structure and Organization of the German Armed Forces._ When the
Nazis came to power in 1933 the German Armed Forces were controlled by a
Reich Defense Minister, at that time Field Marshall von Blomberg.
Subordinate to von Blomberg were the chiefs of the army staff (at that
time von Fritsch), and of the naval staff, the defendant Raeder. Owing
to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the
German Air Force at that time had no official existence whatsoever.

In May 1935, at the time that military conscription was introduced in
Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices but the
structure remained basically the same. Field Marshall von Blomberg
remained in supreme command of the armed forces, with the title of Reich
Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch
became Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy. The army and naval staffs were renamed “High
Commands”—_Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine_,
from which are derived the initials by which they are usually known (OKH
and OKM).

The German Air Force came into official and open existence at about this
same time, but it was not put under von Blomberg. It was an independent
institution under the personal command of Goering, who had the double
title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

In February 1938 a rather fundamental reorganization took place, both in
terms of personnel and organizational structure. Although Raeder
survived the reshuffle, von Blomberg and von Fritsch were both retired
from their positions, and Blomberg’s ministry, the War Ministry, was
wound up. This ministry had contained a division or department called
the _Wehrmachtamt_ or “Armed Forces Department,” the function of which
was to coordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From
this Armed Forces Department was formed a new over-all Armed Forces
authority, known as the High Command of the Armed Forces—_Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht_—usually known by the initials OKW. As the Air Force as
well as the Army and the Navy was subordinated to OKW, coordination of
all Armed Forces matters was vested in the OKW, which was in effect
Hitler’s personal staff for these matters. It combined staff and
ministerial functions. Keitel was appointed chief of the OKW. The most
important department of OKW was the operations staff, of which Jodl
became the chief. Jodl’s immediate subordinate was Warlimont, with the
title of Deputy Chief of The Armed Forces Operations Staff from 1941.
(The genesis of this department is explained in _L-79_.)

This reorganization and establishment of OKW were embodied in a decree
issued by Hitler on 4 February 1938 (1938 RGBl., Part I, page 111):


    “Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from now on
    exercised directly by me personally.

    “The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry with its
    functions becomes ‘The High Command of the Armed Forces’ and
    comes directly under my command as my military staff.

    “The head of the Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces
    is the Chief of the former Armed Forces Department, with the
    title of Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. His
    status is equal to that of Reich Minister.

    “The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the
    affairs of the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the High Command
    of the Armed Forces as my representative exercises the functions
    hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister.

    “The High Command of the Armed Forces is responsible in peace
    time for the unified preparation of the defense of the Reich in
    all areas according to my directives.

    “Berlin, 4 February 1938.

                                  “The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
                                               “(S)  Adolf Hitler
             “The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
                                                “(S)  Dr. Lammers
                     “Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
                                                    “(S)  Keitel”

Under OKW were the supreme commands of the three branches of the Armed
Forces: OKH, OKM, and the Air Force, which did not receive the official
designation of _Oberkommando der Luftwaffe_ (OKL) until 1944. Raeder
remained after 1938 as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and von Fritsch
was replaced by von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Goering continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. In 1941 von
Brauchitsch was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Army by Hitler
himself, and Raeder was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy by
Doenitz early in 1943. Goering continued as Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force until the last month of the war, when he was replaced by von

OKW, OKH, OKM and the Air Force each had its own staff. These four
staffs did not have uniform designations; in the case of OKH, the staff
was known as the _Generalstab_ (General Staff); in the case of OKW, it
was known as the _Fuehrungstab_ (Operations Staff); but in all cases the
functions were those of a General Staff in military parlance. It will be
seen, therefore, that there was in this war no single German General
Staff, but rather four, one for each branch of the service plus one for
the OKW as the over-all interservice supreme command.

Under OKH, OKL, and OKM were the various fighting formations of the
Army, Air Force and Navy respectively. The largest army field formation
was known to the Germans, as it is among the nations generally, as an
“army group”. An Army group was a headquarters controlling two or more
“armies.” In some cases, e.g. in the campaigns in Norway and Greece
where only one army was used, “armies” were directly subordinated to
OKH, rather than to an “army group.” Under the armies come the lower
field formations such as corps, divisions, regiments, etc.

In the case of the German Air Force (OKL), the largest formation was
known as an “air fleet” (_Luftflotte_) and the lower units under the air
fleet were called “corps” (_Fliegerkorps_ or _Jagdkorps_) or “divisions”
(_Fliegerdivisionen_ or _Jagddivisionen_).

Under OKM were the various “naval group commands,” which controlled all
naval operations in a given area, with the exception of the operation of
the high seas fleet and the submarines, which by their nature, were too
mobile to be restricted to an area command. The Commanders of the fleet
and submarines, and certain other specialized units, were directly
subordinate to the German Admiralty.

(2) _Composition of the Group Charged as Criminal._ The group charged in
the Indictment (Appendix B) as criminal comprises, first, German
officers who held the top positions in the four supreme commands
described above; and second, the officers who held the top field

The holders of nine of the principal positions in the supreme commands
are included in the group. Four of these are positions of supreme
authority: the chief of the OKW, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force. Four other positions are those of the Chiefs of Staff to the four
Commanders-in-Chief: the Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW, the Chief
of the General Staff of the Army, the Chief of the General Staff of the
Air Force, and the Chief of the Naval War Staff. The ninth position is
that of Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW. The particular
responsibility of the holder of this office was planning, and for this
reason his office has been included in the group.

The group named in the Indictment comprises all individuals who held any
of these nine staff positions between February 1938 and the end of the
war in May 1945. February 1938 was selected as the opening date because
it was in that month that the top organization of the German Armed
Forces was reorganized and assumed substantially the form in which it
persisted up to the end of the war. Twenty-two different individuals
occupied these nine positions during that period, of whom eighteen are
still living.

With regard to the officers who held the principal field commands, the
Indictment includes as members of the group all Commanders-in-Chief in
the field who had the status of _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the Army, Navy, or
Air Force. The term _Oberbefehlshaber_ defies literal translation into
English: literally the components of the word mean
“over-command-holder,” and it is perhaps best translated as
Commander-in-Chief. In the case of the Army, commanders of army groups
and armies always had the status and title of _Oberbefehlshaber_. In the
Air Force, the Commander-in-Chief of air fleets always had the status of
_Oberbefehlshaber_, although they were not formally so designated until
1944. In the Navy, officers holding the senior regional commands, and
therefore in control of all naval operations (other than of the high
seas fleet itself) in a given sector, had the status of
_Oberbefehlshaber_. Roughly 110 individual officers had the status of
_Oberbefehlshaber_ in the Army, Navy, or Air Force during the period in
question, and all but approximately a dozen of them are still alive.

The entire General Staff and High Command group as defined in the
Indictment comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed still
to be living. These figures are the cumulative total of all officers who
at any time belonged to the group during the seven years and three
months from February 1938 to May 1945. The number of active members of
the group at any one time is, of course, much smaller; it rose from
about 20 at the outbreak of the war to 50 in 1944 and 1945.

The structure and functioning of the German General Staff and High
Command group have been described in a series of affidavits by some of
the principal German field marshalls and generals. A brief description
of how these statements were obtained may be helpful. In the first place
two American officers, selected for ability and experience in
interrogating high-ranking German prisoners of war, were briefed by an
Intelligence officer and a trial counsel on the particular problems
presented by this part of the case. These interrogators were already
well versed in military intelligence and were able to converse fluently
in German. The officer who briefed these interrogators emphasized that
their function was objectively to inquire into and to establish facts on
which the prosecution wishes to be accurately and surely informed; the
interrogators were not to regard themselves as cross-examiners. The
German officers to be interrogated were selected on the basis of the
special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of
positions held by them during the past generation. After each interview
the interrogator prepared a report. From this report such facts as
appeared relevant to the issues now before the Tribunal were extracted
and a statement embodying these facts was prepared. This statement was
then presented to the officer at a later interview. It was presented in
the form of a draft and the officer was asked whether it truly
reproduced what he said at the previous interview. He was also invited
to alter it in any way he thought fit. This careful and laborious, but
necessary, process had as its object the procuring of the best possible
testimony in the form of carefully considered statements.

These affidavits fully support the prosecution’s description of the
group, and conclusively establish that this group of officers was in
fact the group which had the major responsibility for planning and
directing the operations of the German Armed Forces.

The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Halder (_3702-PS_), who
held the rank of _Generaloberst_ (Colonel General), the equivalent of a
four-star general in the American Army. Halder was chief of the General
Staff of OKH from September 1938 to September 1942 and is, accordingly,
a member of the group. His statement reads:

    “Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in
    Germany was vested in the Head of State who prior to 2 August
    1934 was Field Marshall von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945
    was Adolf Hitler.

    “Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the
    three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the
    Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of
    State), that is to say the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In
    practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a
    relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers
    exercised such supervision in their official capacity and by
    virtue of their training, their positions and their mutual
    contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed
    Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the
    instructions of the OKW in the name of their respective
    Commanding Officers and were presented by them to the
    Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of

    “The members of this group were charged with the responsibility
    of preparing for military operations within their competent
    fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as
    were to be undertaken by troops in the field.

    “Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled
    and given appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples
    of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the
    Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish
    campaign and the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14
    June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign. The composition
    of this group and the relationship of its members to each other
    were as shown in the attached chart. This was in effect the
    General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.”

                                         “(S)  Halder”  (_3702-PS_)

A substantially identical statement (_3703-PS_) was made by von
Brauchitsch, who held the rank of Field Marshall, and who was
Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941. Von Brauchitsch was
also, therefore, a member of the group. The only difference between the
two statements is worth noting occurs in the last sentence of each.
Halder states that the group described in the Indictment “was in effect
the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces,”
(_3702-PS_), whereas von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently,
saying “in the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the
chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.” (_3703-PS_)

Both von Brauchitsch and Halder have stated under oath that the General
Staff chart (_Chart Number 7_) accurately portrays the top organization
of the German Armed Forces. The statements by von Brauchitsch and Halder
also fully support the prosecution’s statement that the holders of the
positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major
responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces

Another affidavit by Halder (_3707-PS_) sets forth certain less
important matters of detail:

    “The most important department in the OKW was the Operations
    Staff—in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army
    and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel
    there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in
    status with Jodl, but in the planning and conduct of military
    affairs they and their departments were less important and less
    influential than Jodl and Jodl’s staff.

    “The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of
    these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was
    chief. It was called the ‘National Defense’ Section and was
    primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions.
    From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same
    duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.

    “There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as
    the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.

    “Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out
    by the group of high-ranking officers described in my Statement
    of 7 November (in the Army: ‘General Staff of the Army’; in the
    Air Force ‘General Staff of the Air Force’).

    “Operational matters in the Navy were even in World War I not
    worked out by the ‘Great General Staff’ but by the Naval Staff.”

                              “(Signed)  Franz Halder”  (_3707-PS_)

This affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General
Staffs of the four Commanders of OKW, OKL, OKM, and OKH and fully
supports the inclusion of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services in
the indicted group, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy
Chief of the OKW Operations Staff, with his strategic planning

An affidavit (_3708-PS_) by the son of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch,
who had the rank of _Oberst_ (Colonel) in the German Air Force, and who
was personal aide to Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the German Air
Force, furnishes a few details on the _Luftwaffe_:

    “_Luftflottenchefs_ have the same status as the
    _Oberbefehlshaber_ of an army. During the war they had no
    territorial authority and accordingly exercised no territorial

    “They were the highest troop commanders of the air force units
    subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the
    Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

    “Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation
    ‘_Befehlshaber_’ and from then on that of ‘_Oberbefehlshaber_.’
    This change of designation carried with it no change in the
    functions and responsibilities which they previously had.”

                               “(Signed)  Brauchitsch”  (_3708-PS_)

(3) _Functioning of the General Staff and High Command Group._ In many
respects, the German military leaders functioned in the same general
manner as obtains in the military establishments of other large nations.
General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants
at OKW, OKH, OKL, and OKM, in collaboration with the field generals or
admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision
to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the
highest level, and the making of such a decision would involve political
and diplomatic questions as well as purely military considerations. When
the decision was made, to attack Poland, for example, the top staff
officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military
plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the
Commanders of the Army groups and Armies who were to be in charge of the
campaign. Consultation would follow between the top field commanders and
the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, and the plans would be revised,
perfected, and refined in detail.

The manner in which the group worked, involving as it did the
interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers
at OKW and OKH and the principal field commanders, is graphically
described in two affidavits by Field Marshall von Brauchitsch

                     “STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945

    “In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military
    preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was
    immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan.
    This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him as amended
    by a change which he desired.

    “After the operational and deployment orders had been given to
    the two Commanders of the army groups and the five Commanders of
    the armies, conferences took place with them about details in
    order to hear their desires and recommendations.

    “After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of
    keeping in close and constant touch with the Commanders-in-Chief
    of army groups and of armies by personal visits to their
    headquarters as well as by telephone, teletype or wireless. In
    this way I was able to obtain their advice and their
    recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In
    fact it was the accepted policy and common practice for the
    Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate
    Commanders-in-Chief and to maintain a constant exchange of ideas
    with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of
    Staff communicated with army groups and, thru them as well as
    directly, with armies; thru army groups on strategical and
    tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and the
    administration of conquered territory occupied by these armies.
    An army group had no territorial jurisdiction. It had a
    relatively small staff which was concerned only with military
    operations. In all territorial matters it was the
    Commander-in-Chief of the army and not of the army group who
    exercised jurisdiction.

                           “(Signed)  von Brauchitsch”  (_3705-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *


    “When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of
    his political objectives through military pressure or through
    the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the
    Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an
    appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.

    “Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the
    OKM. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally
    by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a
    written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed
    Forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the
    operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies
    involved. Details of the operational and deployment plans were
    discussed by the OKH with the Commanders of the army groups and
    armies and with the Chiefs of Staff of these Commanders.

    “During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of
    ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio and
    courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every
    opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the
    Commanders of army groups, armies and lower echelons by means of
    personal visits to them. In the war against Russia the
    Commanders of army groups and of armies were individually and
    repeatedly called in by Hitler for consultation.

    “Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army
    groups and for all matters concerning supply and territorial
    jurisdiction from the OKH directly to the armies.”

                           “(Signed)  von Brauchitsch”  (_3705-PS_)

The _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the field, therefore—and in the case of the
army that means the Commander-in-Chief of army groups and
armies—participated in planning, and directed the execution of the
plans. The _Oberbefehlshaber_ were also the repositories of general
executive power in the areas in which their army groups and armies were
operating. This fact appears from a directive of 13 March 1941 signed by
Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (_447-PS_).
This directive sets out various regulations for the impending operations
against the Soviet Union (which were actually begun on 22 June 1941).
Under paragraph I, is entitled “Area of operations and executive power
(_Vollziehende Gewalt_)”, subparagraph 1 and 2(a) provide:

    “It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the
    General-Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in
    accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21
    October 1939, the Commander in Chief of the Army shall be
    authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of
    his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may
    transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief
    [_Oberbefehlshaber_] of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of
    that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The area of operations created through the advance of the Army
    beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries
    is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The
    Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right to exercise the
    executive power [_Vollziehende Gewalt_] in this area, and may
    transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief
    [_Oberbefehlshaber_] of the Army Groups and Armies.” (_447-PS_)

The official command invitation to participate in consultations at the
Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941, eight days prior to the German attack
on the Soviet Union, also shows the group at work (_C-78_). This meeting
is referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavits by Halder
(_3702-PS_) and von Brauchitsch (_3703-PS_) mentioned above. This
document, signed by Colonel Schmundt, Chief _Wehrmacht_ Adjutant to
Hitler, and is dated at Berchtesgaden, 9 June 1941, begins:

    “_Re: Conference ‘Barbarossa’_

    “The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
    ordered reports on Barbarossa [the code name for the invasion of
    the U.S.S.R.] by the Commanders of Army Groups and Armies and
    Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.”

This document likewise includes a list of the participants in this
conference which closely parallels the structure of the group as set
forth in the Indictment. The list includes General Field Marshal von
Brauchitsch, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and a member
of the group; and General Halder, who was chief of the Army Staff, and a
member of the group. Then there are three subordinates who were not
members of the group: Paulus, Heusinger, and Gyldenfeldt. Next is navy
Captain Wagner, who was chief of the Operations Staff, Operations
Division of the Naval War Staff, not a member of the group. On the air
side there were General Milch, State Secretary and Inspector of the Air
Force, again not a member of the group; General Joschonnek, chief of the
General Staff of the Air Force and a member of the group; and two of his
assistants. Passing to the OKW, High Command of the Armed Forces, we
find that Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, all members of the group, were
present, with an assistant from the General Staff. Then there were four
officers from the office of the adjutant, who were not members of the
group. Present from the Field Commanders were General von Falkenhorst,
Army High Command, Norway, member of the group; General Stumpff, Air
Fleet 5, member of the group; Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stuelpnagel,
Schobert, Kleist, all from the Army, all members of the group. Of the
Air Force officers present, General Loehr, Air Fleet 4, was a member of
the group; General Fromm and General Udet were not members. One was
director of the Home Forces, commander of the Home Forces, and the other
the Director General of Equipment and Supply. Turning to the Navy, those
present were Raeder, a member of the group; Fricke, chief of the Naval
War Staff, and a member of the group; and an assistant who was not a
member, Carls, Navy Group North, member of the group, and likewise
Schmundt were present. Then from the Army, Leeb, Busch, Kuechler, all
members of the group as _Oberbefehlshaber_, and Keller, a member of the
group, were present. Also Bock, Kluge, Strauss, Guderian, Hoth,
Kesselring, all members of the group, were present. It will be seen
that, except for a few assisting officers of relatively junior rank, all
the participants in these consultations were members of the group, and
that in fact the participants in these consultations included the
members of the group who were concerned in the impending operations
against the Soviet Union.

 B. _Criminal Activities of the General Staff and High Command Group._

The General Staff and High Command group is well represented among the
individual defendants in this case. It must be kept in mind that this
group may be declared criminal in connection with any act of which an
individual defendant who is a member of the group may be convicted
(Charter, Article 9). Five of the individual defendants, or one-quarter
of the total number accused, are members of this group.

In the order of listing in the indictments, the first is Goering.
Goering is a defendant in this case in numerous capacities. He is a
member of the General Staff and High Command group by reason of having
been the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force from the time when the Air
Force first came into the open, and was officially established, until
about a month prior to the end of the war. During the last month of the
war he was replaced in this capacity by von Greim, who committed suicide
shortly after his capture at the end of the war. Goering is charged with
crimes under all counts of the Indictment.

The next listed defendant who is a member of the group is Keitel. He and
the remaining three defendants who are members of the group are all four
in this case primarily or solely in their military capacities, and all
four of them were professional soldiers or sailors. Keitel was made the
chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) when the OKW
was first set up in 1938, and remained in that capacity throughout the
period in question. He held the rank of Field Marshall throughout most
of this period, and in addition to being the Chief of OKW, he was a
member of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the Council of Ministers for
the Defense of the Reich. Keitel is charged with crimes under all four
counts of the Indictment.

The defendant Jodl was a career soldier; he was an _Oberstleutnant_
(Lieutenant Colonel) when the Nazis came to power, and ultimately
attained the rank of _Generaloberst_ (Colonel General). He became the
Chief of the Operations Staff of the _Wehrmacht_, and continued in that
capacity throughout the war. He also is charged with crimes under all
four counts of the Indictment.

The defendant Raeder is in a sense the senior member of the entire
group, having been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy as early as
1928. He attained the highest rank in the German Navy, _Grossadmiral_,
and in addition to being Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he was a member
of the Secret Cabinet Council. He retired from Supreme Command of the
Navy in January 1943, and was replaced by Doenitz. Raeder is charged
with crimes under counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Indictment.

The last of these five defendants, Doenitz, was a relatively junior
officer when the Nazis came to power. During the early years of the Nazi
regime he specialized in submarine activities and was in command of the
U-boat arm when the war broke out. He rose steadily in the Navy and was
chosen to succeed Raeder when the latter retired in 1943. Doenitz then
became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and attained the rank of
_Grossadmiral_. When the German Armed Forces collapsed near the end of
the war, Doenitz succeeded Hitler as head of the German government. He
is charged with crimes under counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Indictment.

Four of these five defendants are reasonably typical of the group as a
whole. Goering is an exception: he is primarily a Nazi party politician
nourishing a hobby for aviation as a result of his career in 1914-18.
But the others made soldiering or sailoring their life work. They
collaborated with and joined in the most important adventures of the
Nazis, but they were not among the early party members. They differ in
no essential respect from the other 125 odd members of the group. They
are, no doubt, abler men in certain respects than some of the other
members, as they rose to the highest positions in the German Armed
Forces, and all but Jodl attained the highest rank. But they are
generally representative of the group, and their expressed ideas and
actions are fairly characteristic of those of the other group members.

It is not, of course, the prosecution’s position, and it is not
essential to its case, that all 130 members of this group, (or all the
members of any other organization or group named in the Indictment),
actually committed crimes, under Article 6 of the Charter. It is the
prosecution’s position that the leadership of the group and the purposes
to which the group was committed by the leaders were criminal under
Article 6. The individual defendants were among the leaders of the
General Staff and High Command group, and, acting in the official
capacities which made them members of the group, they performed and
participated in acts which are criminal under Article 6 of the Charter.
Other members of the group performed such acts. The German Armed Forces
were so completely under the group’s control as to make the group
responsible for their activities under the last sentence of Article 6 of
the Charter.

(1) _The Planning and Launching of Wars of Aggression._ It is, of
course, the normal function of a military staff to prepare military
plans. In peacetime, military staffs customarily concern themselves with
the preparation of plans of attack or defense based on hypothetical
contingencies. There is nothing criminal about carrying on such
exercises or preparing such plans. That is not what these defendants and
this group are charged with.

This group agreed with the Nazi objective of aggrandizing Germany by
force or threat of force. They joined knowingly and enthusiastically in
developing German armed might for this criminal purpose. They joined
knowingly and willfully in initiating and waging aggressive wars. They
were advised in advance of the Nazi plans to launch aggressive wars.
They laid the military plans and directed the initiation and carrying on
of the wars. These things are criminal under article 6 of the Charter.

Aggressive war cannot be prepared and waged without intense activity on
the part of all branches of the Armed Forces and particularly by the
high-ranking officers who control such forces. To the extent, therefore,
that German preparations for and waging of aggressive war are historical
facts of common knowledge, or are proved, it necessarily follows that
the General Staff and High Command group, and the German Armed Forces,
participated therein.

This is so notwithstanding the effort on the part of certain military
leaders of Germany, after defeat, to insist that until the troops
marched they lived in an ivory tower of military technicalities, unable
or unwilling to observe the end to which their work led. The documentary
evidence which follows fully refutes any such contentions.

The purposes and objectives of the German General Staff and High Command
group during the period prior to the absorption of Austria may be
summarized as follows:

    (i) Secret rearmament, including the training of military
    personnel, the production of war munitions, and the building of
    an air force;

    (ii) The creation of a military air force, announced by Goering
    on 10 March 1935;

    (iii) The law for compulsory military service, of 16 March 1935,
    fixing the peace-time strength of the German Army at 500,000;

    (iv) The reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 and the
    refortification of that area.

These events are historical facts not requiring proof. Likewise, the
impossibility of the Nazis’ achieving these ends without cooperation by
the Armed Forces is indisputable from the very nature of things.

Events and circumstances during the period 1933-36 are discussed in
Section 2 of Chapter IX. Chief among these were the secret expansion of
the German Navy in violation of treaty limitations, under the guidance
of Raeder; the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, adopted the same
day that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament provision of the
Versailles Treaty (_2261-PS_); von Blomberg’s plan, 2 May 1935, for the
reoccupation of the Rhineland (_C-139_); and von Blomberg’s orders of 2
March 1936 under which the reoccupation was actually carried out
(_C-159_). All these events clearly required the closest collaboration
between the military leaders and the Nazis.

The state of mind and objectives of the German military leaders during
this early period are significant. The viewpoint of the German Navy on
the opportunities which Naziism offered for rearmament so that Germany
could achieve its objectives by force or threat of force, is reflected
in a memorandum published by the High Command of the German Navy in 1937
entitled “The Fight of the Navy against Versailles, 1919-35” (_C-156_).
This memorandum was compiled by a naval captain named Schuessler in the
German Admiralty. The preface contains the following statements:

    “The object and aim of this memorandum is to draw a technically
    reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence
    of those who took part, of the fight of the Navy against the
    unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “This compilation makes it clearer however, that even such ideal
    and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if
    the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not
    behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the
    Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition
    for an effective rearmament, in the coordination of the whole
    nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and
    spiritual powers, could the work of the soldier find its

    “The framework of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in
    world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united
    will.” (_C-156_)

Thus, the German Navy and the Nazis were in comradely agreement and full
collaboration. Hitler was giving the military leaders the chance they
wanted. Jodl stated the situation clearly in his speech to the
Gauleiters on 7 November 1943 (_L-172_):

    “1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its
    struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the
    outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is
    not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like
    however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful
    regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played
    by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to
    fight [_Wehrwillen_] in nurturing fighting strength
    [_Wehrkraft_] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all
    the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small _Reichswehr_
    would never have been able to cope with this task, if only
    because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the
    Fuehrer aimed at—and has so happily been successful in bringing
    about—was the fusion of these two forces.

    “2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first
    place restoration of fighting sovereignty [_Wehrhoheit_]
    (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and rearmament with
    special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured
    and air arm.” (_L-172_)

Nor were the high-ranking German officers unaware that the policies and
objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the direction of war.
Notes made by Admiral Carls of the German Navy in September 1938 by way
of comment on a “Draft study of Naval Warfare against England,” read as

    “A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.

    “1. If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to acquire
    a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient
    colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and
    secure access to the ocean.

    “2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to
    Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world
    powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful
    means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore
    forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding
    preparations for war.

    “3. War against England means at the same time war against the
    Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a
    large number of countries overseas, in fact against one-half to
    one-third of the whole world.

    “It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is
    prepared _economically_ as well as _politically_ and
    _militarily_ and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an
    outlet to the ocean.” (_C-23_)

The German Air Force, during this prewar period, was developing even
more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement of the Reich. A
study prepared by the chief, Kammhuber, of a branch of the General Staff
of the Air Force called the “Organization Staff”, contained
recommendations for the organization of the German Air Force in future
years up to 1950 (_L-43_). The recommendations are based on certain
assumptions, one of which was that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany
would be as shown on the map which is attached as an inclosure to this
study (_Chart Number 10_). On this map Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included
within the borders of the Reich. Kammhuber also envisaged the future
peacetime organization of the German Air Force as comprising seven
“Group Commands.” Four of these were to lie within the borders of
Germany proper, at Berlin, Brunswick, Munich, and Koenigsberg, but the
three others are proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw.

The basic agreement and harmony between the Nazis and the German
military leaders cannot be overemphasized. Without this agreement on
objectives there might never have been a war. In this connection, an
affidavit (_3704-PS_) by von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshall, Reich
War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces until
February 1938, is significant:

    “From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical
    territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were
    the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr and Memel.

    “I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers,
    believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was
    the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled
    some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety percent of
    the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the
    Polish question. A war to wipe out the desecration involved in
    the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to
    separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was
    regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity. This was one
    of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament
    which began about ten years before Hitler came to power and was
    accentuated under Nazi rule.

    “Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to
    Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler since he produced
    the results which they desired. After this time some generals
    began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of
    his judgment. However they failed as a group to take any
    definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do
    so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their

    “Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief
    of the Armed Forces in January 1938, Hitler asked me to
    recommend a successor. I suggested Goering, who was the ranking
    officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and
    diligence. I was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
    Forces by no officer, but Hitler personally took over my
    function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a Chef de
    bureau. As far as I know he was never named Commander of the
    Armed Forces but was always merely a ‘Chief of Staff’ under
    Hitler and in effect conducted the administrative functions of
    the Ministry of War. At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler
    and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding
    between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself
    desired and had furthered as _Reichswehrminister_ and
    _Reichskriegsminister_. To do the opposite would have led to a
    civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people
    supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But
    it is the truth.

    “As I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler’s measures. He
    became a willing tool in Hitler’s hands for every one of his

    “He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him.”

This statement by von Blomberg is paralleled closely in some respects by
an affidavit by Colonel General Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_). Blaskowitz
commanded an army in the campaign against Poland and the campaign
against France. He subsequently took command of Army Group G in southern
France, and held command of Army Group H, which retreated beyond the
Rhine at the end of the war. His statement is as follows:

    “* * * After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the
    Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through
    diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and
    England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter
    of fact we felt that, if political negotiations came to naught,
    the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not
    only with Poland herself, but also with the Western Powers.

    “When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to
    prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war
    came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion
    was only strengthened by the Fuehrer’s speech on 22 August 1939
    on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality.
    Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members
    of my staff who were engaged in preparations, participated in
    various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army
    group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical,
    strategic and general nature were discussed as had to do with my
    future position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army during
    the planned Polish campaign.

    “During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno
    operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the
    Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he, as well as the Fuehrer,
    visited my headquarters. In fact it was common practice for
    commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked
    from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their
    recommendations by telephone, teletype or wireless, as well as
    by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually
    became advisers to the OKH in their own field so that the
    positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which
    was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the
    German Armed Forces.” (_3706-PS_)

It should be noted that General Blaskowitz, like Colonel General Halder
and Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the
structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group
as described by the prosecution.

It is, accordingly, clear beyond dispute that the military leaders of
Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the
expansion of the Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties. The
objectives they had in mind are obvious from the affidavits and
documents to which reference has been made. In these documents and
affidavits we see the Nazis and the Generals in agreement upon the basic
objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force, and
collaborating to build up the armed might of Germany in order to make
possible the subsequent acts of aggression.

(_a_) _Austria._ Notes taken by Colonel Hossbach of a conference held in
the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937 show that this
conference, at which Hitler presided, was small and highly secret
(_386-PS_). The only other participants were the four principal military
leaders, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (von Neurath), and Hossbach
acting as Secretary. The four chief leaders of the Armed
Forces—Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister for War, and the
Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces, von
Fritsch for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Goering for the Air
Force—were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of
Germany’s diplomatic and military policy, and stated that the conquest
of Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential preliminary “for the
improvement of our military position” and “in order to remove any threat
from the flanks”. (_386-PS_)

The military and political advantages envisaged included the acquisition
of a new source of food, shorter and better frontiers, the release of
troops for other tasks, and the possibility of forming new divisions
from the population of the conquered territories. Von Blomberg and von
Fritsch joined in the discussion and von Fritsch stated:

    “That it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for
    this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out
    operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of
    the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications”

In the following Spring, March 1938, the German plans with respect to
Austria came to fruition. Entries in the diary kept by Jodl show the
participation of the German military leaders in the absorption of
Austria (_1780-PS_). As is shown by Jodl’s diary entry for 11 February
1938, Keitel and other generals were present at the Obersalzberg meeting
between Schuschnigg and Hitler:

    “_11 February_

    “In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V.
    Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together
    with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and
    military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol”.

Two days later Keitel and others were preparing proposals to be
submitted to Hitler which would give the Austrian government the
impression that Germany would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg
agreement was ratified in Vienna:

    “_13 February_

    “In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come
    to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer order is to the
    effect that military pressure by shamming military action should
    be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive
    maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone
    for approval”. (_1780-PS_)

These proposals are embodied in a document 14 February 1938 and signed
by Keitel (_1775-PS_). Portions of Keitel’s proposals to the Fuehrer are
as follows:

    “1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or
    Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

    “2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the
    conclusion of military preparations against Austria,

        “_a._ through V-men (_V-Maenner_) in Austria,
        “_b._ through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier,
        “_c._ through travelling agents.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “4. Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in
    _Wehrkreis VII_ and between Berlin and Munich.

    “5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of
    the Mountain Troops near the frontier.

    “6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th
    in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out
    measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.” (_1775-PS_)

As Jodl’s diary entry for 14 February shows, these deceptive maneuvers
and threats of force were very effective in Austria:

    “The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
    created that Germany is undertaking serious military
    preparations.” (_1780-PS_)

About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg’s
decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in
accordance with the preexisting plans for the invasion of Austria (these
plans were known as “Case Otto”) in order to absorb Austria and stop the
plebiscite. Jodl’s diary entry for 10 March 1938 states:

    “By surprise and without consulting the ministers, Schuschnigg
    ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring
    strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or

    “Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March
    9 to 10, he calls for Goering, General V. Reichenau is called
    back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General V. Schobert is
    ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is
    with the District Leader [_Gauleiter_] Burckel in the
    Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He
    drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15,
    according to the wish of General V. Viebahn, to give him the old

    ‘Prepare case Otto’.” (_1780-PS_)

In an order 11 March, initialed by Keitel and Jodl, Hitler laid down the
general instructions for the invasion, and directed that the Army and
Air Force be ready for action by 12 March (_C-102_). On the same evening
Hitler ordered the invasion of Austria to commence at daybreak on 12
March. The order was initialed by Jodl. (_C-182_)

The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of aggression
in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance.
This was so simple because the invasion was precipitated by an outside
event, Schuschnigg’s order for the plebiscite. But although for this
reason the element of deliberately timed planning was lacking, the
foregoing documents make abundantly clear the participation of the
military leaders at all stages. At the small policy meeting in November
1937, when Hitler’s general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was
outlined, the only others present were the four principal military
leaders and the Foreign Secretary (_386-PS_). In February, Keitel,
Reichenau, and Sperrle were present at Obersalzberg to help subject
Schuschnigg to “the heaviest military pressure” (_1780-PS_). Keitel and
others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of
military threat and deception for frightening the Austrian Government
into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol (_1775-PS_). When the actual
invasion took place it was, of course, directed by the military leaders
and executed by the German Armed Forces. Jodl has given a clear
statement of why the German military leaders were delighted to join with
the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence. In his
lecture to the Gauleiters in November 1943 (_L-172_) Jodl explained:

    “The Austrian ‘Anschluss’, in its turn, brought with it not only
    fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both
    of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving
    our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of
    Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into
    Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base
    for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself
    was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now
    become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any
    attack pressed home with vigour before effective aid from the
    West could be expected to arrive”. (_L-172_)

(_b_) _Czechoslovakia._

The steps in the planning for the invasion of Czechoslovakia (“Case
Green” or Fall Gruen) bear the evidence of knowing and wilful
participation by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the General Staff
and High Command Group.

The Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and the four
principal German military leaders on 5 November 1937 show, that Austria
and Czechoslovakia were then listed as the first intended victims of
German aggression (_386-PS_). After the absorption of Austria in March
1938, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the armed
forces lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. In the
Hitler-Keitel discussions on 21 April 1938 a nice balance of political
and military factors was worked out (_388-PS_):

                         “A. _Political Aspect_

1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or
possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be:
hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a
measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on
the mainland.

2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a
crisis and lead to war.

3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g.
assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German

                       B. _Military Conclusions_

1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2 and
3. Case 2 is the undesired one since “Gruen” will have taken security

*            *            *            *            *            *

4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive
ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis
will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of
foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of
spoils!) and demoralize “Gruen”.

Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and
employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless
thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pi past Pr) [Pilsen, Prague].

From this point on, nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt
file (_388-PS_) and in Jodl’s diary (_1780-PS_). These two sources of
information demolish in advance what will, no doubt, be urged in defense
of the military defendants and the General Staff and High Command Group.
They will seek to create the impression that the German generals were
pure military technicians; that they were uninterested and uninformed
about political and diplomatic considerations and events; that they
passed their days mounting mock battles at the _Kriegsakadamie_; that
they prepared plans for military attack or defense, on a purely
hypothetical basis. They will say all this in order to suggest that they
did not share and could not estimate Hitler’s aggressive intentions, and
that they carried out politically conceived orders like military
automatons, with no idea whether the wars they launched and waged were
aggressive or not.

If these arguments are made, the Schmundt file (_388-PS_) and Jodl’s
diary (_1780-PS_) make it abundantly apparent that aggressive designs
were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals; that the
military leaders were fully posted on the aggressive intentions of the
Nazis; that they were fully informed of political and diplomatic
developments; that indeed German generals had a habit of turning up at
diplomatic gatherings.

If the documents did not show these things so clearly, a moment’s
thought must show them to be true. A highly successful program of
conquest depends on armed might, and cannot be executed with an
unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of
course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to
soldiers alone. It is equally true that aggressive diplomacy is far too
dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and
military support.

No doubt some of the German generals had qualms about Hitler’s timing
and the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather
amusingly reflected in an entry in Jodl’s diary for 10 August 1938:

    “The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt.
    Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After
    dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three
    hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The
    subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer’s attention to the
    defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few
    generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies
    especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top
    it off he claims to quote from General Adams [_die er noch dazu
    dem General Adams in den Mund legt_] that the western
    fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer
    becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark
    that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for
    anything. ‘I assure you, General, the position will not only be
    held for three weeks, but for three years.’ The cause of this
    despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very
    widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various
    reasons. First of all, it [the General Staff] is restrained by
    old memories; political considerations play a part as well,
    instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is
    certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the
    soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the
    genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with
    Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may
    not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the
    opposition between the General’s opinion and that of the Fuehrer
    is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale
    of the troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be
    able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when
    the right moment comes.” (_1780-PS_)

But if this entry shows that some of the German generals at that time
were cautious with respect to Germany’s ability to take on Poland and
the Western Powers simultaneously, nonetheless the entry shows no lack
of sympathy with the Nazi aims for conquest. And there is no evidence in
Jodl’s diary or elsewhere that any substantial number of German generals
lacked sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Furthermore, the top military
leaders always joined with and supported his decisions, with formidable
success in the years from 1938 to 1942.

If it is said that German military leaders did not know that German
general policy toward Czechoslovakia was aggressive, or based on force
and threat of force, it may be noted that on 30 May 1938 Hitler signed a
Most Secret directive to Keitel (_388-PS Item 11_) in which he said:

    “It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
    military action in the near future. It is the job of the
    political leaders to await or bring about the politically and
    militarily suitable moment.

    “An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia
    or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly
    favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may
    cause me to take early action.

    “The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a
    favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly
    the preparations are to be made at once.” (_388-PS Item 11_)

Jodl was in no doubt what this meant. He noted in his diary that same

    “The Fuehrer signs directive ‘Green’, where he states his final
    decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates
    military preparation all along the line”. (_1780-PS_)

The succeeding evidence in the Schmundt file (_388-PS Items 14, 16, 17_)
and in the Jodl diary (_1780-PS_) shows how those military preparations
went forward “all along the line.” Numerous examples of discussions,
planning, and preparation during the last few weeks before the Munich
Pact, including discussions with Hungary and the Hungarian General Staff
in which General Halder participated, are contained in the Jodl diary
(_1780-PS_) and the later items in the Schmundt file (_388-PS Items 18
to 22, 24, 26 to 28, 31 to 34, 36 to 54_). The day the Munich Pact was
signed, Jodl noted in his diary:

    “The Munich Pact is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out.
    Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th
    of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will
    be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer
    and his determination not to shun even a World War have again
    won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that
    the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been
    converted and will remain that way.” (_1780-PS_)

Plans for the “liquidation” of the remainder of Czechoslovakia were made
soon after Munich (_388-PS Item 40_; _C-136_; _C-138_). Ultimately the
absorption was accomplished by diplomatic bullying in which Keitel
participated for the usual purposes of demonstrating that German armed
might was ready to enforce the threats (_2802-PS_). Once again, Jodl in
his 1943 lecture (_L-172_) explained clearly why the objective of
eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of the German
military leaders as to the hearts of the Nazis:

    “The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of
    1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded
    off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it then
    became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of
    more or less favorable strategic premises.” (_L-172_)

This serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg (_3704-PS_) and
Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_) already quoted:

    “The whole group of German staff and front officers believed
    that the question of the Polish Corridor would have to be
    settled some day, if necessary by force of arms.”

    “A war to wipe out the political and economic losses resulting
    from the creation of the Polish Corridor was regarded as a
    sacred duty though a sad necessity.”

    “Before 1938-39, the German generals were not opposed to

    “Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired.”

(_c_) _Poland._ The story of the German attack on Poland furnishes an
excellent case study of the functioning of the General Staff and High
Command Group.

Reference is made to the series of directives from Hitler and Keitel
involving “Fall Weiss” (_C-120_). The series starts with a re-issuance
of the “Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed
Forces”. This periodically re-issued directive was encountered
previously in the case of Czechoslovakia.

In essence these directives are (_a_) statements of what the Armed
Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political and
diplomatic policies and developments, and (_b_) indications of what
should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the military
tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They constitute, in
fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and strongly
demonstrate the mutual inter-dependence of aggressive diplomacy and
military planning. The distribution of these documents early in April
1939, in which the preparations of plans for the Polish war is ordered,
was limited. Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: one to
Brauchitsch (OKH), one to Raeder (OKM), one to Goering (OKL), and two to
Warlimont in the Planning Branch of OKW. Hitler lays down that the plan
must be susceptible of execution by 1 September 1939, and that target
date was adhered to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is
clearly brought out by the following part of one of those documents:

    “1. _Political Requirements and Aims._ German relations with
    Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any
    quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards
    Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and
    adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement
    might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with

    “The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and
    create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements
    of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed
    a part of the Reich-territory at the outbreak of the conflict,
    at the latest.

    “The political leadership considers it its task in this case to
    isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to
    Poland only.

    “The development of increasing internal crises in France and the
    resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in
    the not too distant future.

    “Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this
    cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this
    would imply Poland’s destruction by Bolshevism.

    “The attitudes of the _Baltic States_ will be determined wholly
    by German military exigencies.

    “On the German side, Hungary cannot be considered a certain
    German ally. Italy’s attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome

    “2. _Military Conclusions._ The great objectives in the building
    up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by
    the antagonism of the ‘Western Democracies’. ‘Fall Weiss’
    constitutes only a precautionary complement to these
    preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however,
    as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the
    Western opponents.

    “The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even
    after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the
    war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.

    “The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be
    taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea
    coast, as well as the air over them.” (_C-120_)

It cannot be suggested that these are hypothetical plans, or that the
General Staff and High Command Group did not know what was in prospect.
The plans show on their face that they are in earnest and no war game.
The point is reinforced by Schmundt’s notes on the conference in
Hitler’s study at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939
(_L-79_). At this conference Hitler announced:

    “There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are
    left with the decision: _to attack Poland at the first suitable
    opportunity_”. (_L-79_)

Besides Hitler and a few military aides and adjutants, the following
were present: Goering (C-in-C _Luftwaffe_); Raeder (C-in-C Navy); Keitel
(Chief, OKW); von Brauchitsch (C-in-C Army); Col. General Milch
(Inspector General of the _Luftwaffe_); Gen. Bodenschatz (Goering’s
personal assistant); Rear Admiral Schnievindt (Chief of the Naval War
Staff); Col. Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff); Col. Warlimont
(Planning Staff of OKW). All except Milch, Bodenschatz, and the
adjutants are members of the Group as defined in the Indictment.

The initial and general planning of the attack on Poland, however, had
to be examined, checked, corrected, and perfected by the field
commanders who were to carry out the attack. In a document issued in the
middle of June 1939 (_C-142_), von Brauchitsch as C-in-C of the Army
passed on the general outlines of the plan to the field
commanders-in-chief (the _Oberbefehlshaber_ of Army Groups and Armies)
so that they could work out the actual preparation and deployments in
accordance with the general plan:

    “The object of the operation is to _destroy the Polish Armed
    Forces_. High policy demands that the war should be begun by
    heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. _The
    intention of the Army High Command_ is to prevent a regular
    mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise
    invasion of Polish territory and to destroy the mass of the
    Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the
    Vistula-Narve line. This is to be achieved by a concentric
    attack from Silesia on one side and Pomerania-East Prussia on
    the other side. The possible influence from Galicia against this
    operation must be eliminated. The main idea of the destruction
    of the Polish Army west of the Vistula-Narve Line with the
    elimination of the possible influence from Galicia remains
    unchanged even if advanced preparedness for defense on the part
    of the Polish Army, caused by previous political tension, should
    have to be taken into consideration. In such a case it may be a
    question of not making the first attack mainly with mechanized
    and motorized forces but of waiting for the arrival of stronger,
    non-motorized units. The Army High Command will then give the
    correspondingly later time for the crossing of the frontier. The
    endeavour to obtain a quick success will be maintained.

    “The Army Group Commands and the Army Commands (A.O.K.) will
    make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy.
    There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to
    be abandoned: these will have to be developed simply and quickly
    on the same basis: they are to be prepared mentally to such an
    extent, that in case of an order from the Army High Command they
    can be carried out quickly.” (_C-142_)

A document of approximately the same date reveals an _Oberbefehlshaber_
at work in the field planning the attack (_2327-PS_). This document,
signed by Blaskowitz, at the time the commander-in-chief of the Third
Army Area Command and commander-in-chief of the 8th Army during the
Polish campaign, states in part:

    “The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out
    of a _plan of deployment against Poland_ which takes in account
    the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war
    by surprise and for quick success.

    “The order of deployment by the High Command, ‘_Fall Weiss_’
    authorizes the Third Army Group [in _Fall Weiss_, 8th Army
    Headquarters] to give necessary directions and orders to all
    commands subordinated to it for ‘_Fall Weiss_’.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The whole correspondence on ‘_Fall Weiss_’ has to be conducted
    under the classification Top Secret [_Chefsache_]. This is to be
    disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgment
    of the chief of the responsible command is harmless in every
    way—even in connection with other documents.

    “For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on
    the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered
    later on. Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army
    Group before 10 July.

    “I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the
    divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as
    possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to
    limit the extent of the information and ask that all suitable
    measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting

    “The Commander-in-Chief of Army Area Command

                       “(signed)  F. Blaskowitz.”

    “_Aims of Operation ‘Fall Weiss’_

    “1. a. The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish
    mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with
    forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed
    on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial
    superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that
    can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly
    bringing up other parts of the army as well to counteract the
    marching up of the Polish Army.

    “Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the
    foe by quick action and ruthless attacks.” (_2327-PS_)

Finally, a week before the actual onslaught, when all the military plans
have been laid, The General Staff and High Command Group all gathered in
one place, in fact all in one room. On 23 August 1939 the
_Oberbefehlshaber_ assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler’s
explanation of the timing of the attack, and to receive political and
diplomatic orientation from the head of the State (_798-PS_). This
speech, the second of the two examples referred to in the initial
affidavits by Halder (_3702-PS_) and Brauchitsch (_3703-PS_), was
addressed to the very group defined in the indictment as the General
Staff and High Command Group.

(_d_) _The War Period, September 1939-June 1941: Norway, Denmark,
Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece._ On 1 September 1939
Germany launched the war. Within a few weeks, and before any important
action on the western front, Poland was overrun and conquered. German
losses were insignificant.

The “three principal territorial questions” mentioned in the Blomberg
(_3704-PS_) and Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_) affidavits had all been solved.
The Rhineland had been reoccupied and fortified, Memel annexed, and the
Polish Corridor annexed. And much more too. Austria had become a part of
the Reich, and Czechoslovakia was occupied and a Protectorate of
Germany. All of western Poland was in German hands. Germany was superior
in arms, and in experience in their use, to her western enemies, France
and England.

Then came the three years of the war—1939, 1940, 1941—when German
armed might swung like a great scythe from north to south to east.
Italy, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria had become German allies. Norway
and Denmark; the Low Countries; France; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia
and Greece; the western part of the Soviet Union—all this territory was
invaded and overrun.

In the period from the fall of Poland in October 1939 to the attack
against the Soviet Union in June 1941, occurred the aggressive wars, in
violation of treaties, against Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece. But one thing is certain: neither
the Nazis nor the generals thought during this period in terms of a
series of violations of neutrality and treaties. They thought in terms
of a war, a war for the conquest of Europe.

Six weeks after the outbreak of war, and upon the successful termination
of the Polish campaign, on 9 October 1939, there was issued a
“Memorandum and Directive for the Conduct of the War in the West.”
(_L-52_). It is unsigned, was distributed only to the four service
chiefs (Keitel, Brauchitsch, Goering, and Raeder) and gives every
indication of having been issued by Hitler. The following are pertinent

    “The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or
    disintegrate the 80 million state again so that in this manner
    the European equilibrium, in other words the balance of power,
    which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle therefore
    will have to be fought out by the German people one way or
    another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first
    month of war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing
    of peace to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially
    to such an extent that from the German viewpoint there would be
    no objection to ending the war immediately, insofar as the
    present achievement with arms is not jeopardized by the

    “It is not the object of this memorandum to study the
    possibilities in this direction or even to take them into
    consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively
    to the other case; the necessity to continue the fight, the
    object of which, as already stressed, consists so far as the
    enemy is concerned in the dissolution or destruction of the
    German Reich. In opposition to this, the German war aim is the
    final military dispatch of the West, i.e. destruction of the
    power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to
    oppose the state consolidation and further development of the
    German people in Europe.

    “As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this
    internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda
    adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This
    does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of
    our Western enemies.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first
    of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without
    any hope of realization, that is to say, Germany is able to
    enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a
    few covering troops.

    “The remaining European states are neutral either because they
    fear for their own fates, or lack interest in the conflict as
    such, or are interested in a certain outcome of the war, which
    prevents them from taking part at all or at any rate too soon.

    “The following is to be firmly borne in mind * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Belgium and Holland_—Both countries are interested in
    preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding
    prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of
    their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the
    securing of their interior economy, even of their very life,
    depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore, in
    their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions, both
    countries are dependent upon the West, in the highest degree. If
    England and France promise themselves a successful result at the
    price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position
    to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without
    covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality,
    they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality.
    Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch
    neutrality time is not a factor which might promise a favorable
    development for Germany.

    “_The Nordic States_—Provided no completely unforeseen factors
    appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed.
    The continuation of German trade with these countries appears
    possible even in a war of long duration.” (_L-52_)

Six weeks later, on 23 November 1939, the group of _Oberbefehlshaber_
again assembled and heard from Hitler much of what he had said
previously to the four service chiefs (_789-PS_):

    “For the first time in history we have to fight on only one
    front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know
    how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time
    whether I should strike in the east and then in the west.
    Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to
    strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or
    later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was
    decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish
    war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our
    armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history.
    Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material. Now the
    eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation
    which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is
    as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his
    fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with
    him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is
    favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so anymore.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves.
    The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring
    England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have
    occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me.
    None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no
    importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great
    height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this
    work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or
    destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be
    compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the
    first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one
    man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to
    capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even
    the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great.
    My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England
    at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the
    neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will
    question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the
    breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do
    not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without
    attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as
    possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question
    as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer.
    Everything depends upon the favorable instant”. (_789-PS_)

Thereafter the winter of 1939-40 passed quietly—the winter of “phony
war”. The General Staff and High Command Group all knew what the plan
was; they had all been told. It was to attack ruthlessly at the first
opportunity, to smash the French and English forces, to pay no heed to
treaties with, or the neutrality of, the Low Countries.

    “Breaking of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is
    meaningless. No one will question that when we have won.”

That is what Hitler told the _Oberbefehlshaber_. The generals and
admirals agreed and went forward with their plans.

The military leaders may contend that all the steps in this march of
conquest were conceived by Hitler, and that the military leaders
embarked on them with reluctance and misgivings. Or they may be
restrained by pride from taking so undignified and degrading a position
as to suggest that German military leadership, the bearers of the
tradition of Schlieffen, Moltke, Spee and Hindenburg, was cowed and
coerced into war and plans of which they did not approve by a gang of
political adventurers. But whether they make the argument or not, it is
utterly without foundation.

Hitler’s utterances in October (_L-79_) and November (_789-PS_) 1939 are
full of plans against France, England, and the Low Countries but contain
no suggestion of an attack on Scandinavia. Indeed, Hitler’s memorandum
of 9 October 1939 (_L-52_) to the four service chiefs affirmatively
indicates that he saw no reason to disturb the situation to the North:

    “_The Northern States_—Providing no completely unforeseen
    factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be
    assumed. The continuance of trade with these countries appears
    possible even in a war of long duration.” (_L-52_)

But a week previous, on 3 October 1939, Raeder had caused a
questionnaire to be circulated within the Naval War Staff, seeking
comments on the advantages which might be gained from a naval standpoint
by securing bases in Norway and Denmark (_C-122_). Raeder was stimulated
to circulate this questionnaire by a letter from another Admiral named
Carls, who pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian
coast by Germany (_C-66_). (Rolf Carls later attained the rank of
Admiral of the Fleet, and commanded Naval Group North from January 1940
to February 1943. In that capacity he is a member of the General Staff
and High Command Group as defined in the Indictment.)

Doenitz, at that time Flag Officer Submarines, on 9 October 1939,
replied to the questionnaire that from his standpoint Trondheim and
Narvik met his requirements, that Trondheim was preferable, and proposed
the establishment of a U-boat base there (_C-5_). Raeder’s visit to
Hitler the next day and certain subsequent events are described as
follows (_L-323_):

    “_Entry in the War Diary of the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War
    Staff) on ‘Weseruebung’._ 1. 10 October 1939. First reference of
    the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff), when visiting the
    Fuehrer, to the significance of Norway for sea and air warfare.
    The Fuehrer intends to give the matter consideration.

    “12 December 1939. Fuehrer received Q & H.

    “Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed
    Forces to make mental preparations. The C-in-C of the Navy is
    having an essay prepared, which will be ready in January. With
    reference to this essay, _Kapitan zur see_ Krancke is working on
    ‘_Weseruebung_’, and OKW.

    “During the time which followed, H maintained contact with the
    Chief of Staff of the C-in-C of the Navy. His aim was to develop
    the Party Q with a view to making it capable of making a coup,
    and to give the Supreme Command of the Navy information on
    political developments in Norway and military questions. In
    general he pressed for a speeding-up of preparations, but
    considered that it was first necessary to expand the
    organization. The support which had been promised him in the
    form of money and coal was set in motion only very slowly and
    came in small quantities, and he repeatedly complained about
    this. It was not until the end of March that Q considered the
    coup [_Aktion_] so urgent that the expansion of his organization
    could not wait. The military advice of H was passed on to the
    OKW.” (_L-323_)

On 12 December the Naval War Staff discussed the Norwegian project with
Hitler at a meeting which Keitel and Jodl also attended (_C-64_). In the
meantime, illustrating the close link between the service chiefs and the
Nazi politicians, Raeder was in touch with Rosenberg on the
possibilities of using Quisling (_C-65_). As result of all this, on
Hitler’s instructions Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27 January 1940.
The directive related that Hitler had commissioned Keitel to take charge
of preparation for the Norway operation, to which he then gave the code
name “_Weseruebung_.” On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive
setting forth the general plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark
(_C-174_). The invasion itself took place on 9 April 1940. The directive
was initialled by Admiral Kurt Fricke who at that time was head of the
Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, and who at the end of 1941
became Chief of the Naval War Staff. In that capacity he too is a member
of the Group as defined in the Indictment.

So, as these documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark
was not conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military
leaders. On the contrary it was conceived in the naval part of the
General Staff and High Command Group, and Hitler was persuaded to take
up the idea. Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General
Staff and High Command Group as to the Nazis. Launching aggressive war
against inoffensive neighboring states gave the generals and admirals no

As for the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders were
disturbed about Treaty considerations. At the conferences between Hitler
and the principal military leaders in May 1939 (_L-79_), when the
intention to attack Poland was announced, Hitler in discussing the
possibility of war with England said:

    “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
    force. Declarations of neutrality will be ignored”. (_L-79_)

And in the speech to the _Oberbefehlshaber_ in November 1939 (_789-PS_),
after the Polish victory, Hitler made clear his intention to attack
France and England by first invading the Low Countries. “No one will
question that when we have won,” he said.

Accordingly, the winter of 1939-40 and the early spring of 1940 was a
period of intensive planning in German military circles. The major
attack in the West through the Low Countries, and the attack on Norway
and Denmark had to be planned. Jodl’s diary for the period 1 February to
26 May 1940 (_1809-PS_) contains many entries reflecting the course of
this planning. These entries show that during February and early March
there was considerable doubt in German military circles as to whether
the attack on Norway and Denmark should precede or follow the attack on
the Low Countries; and that at some points there even was doubt as to
whether all these attacks were necessary from a military standpoint. But
there is not a single entry which reflects any hesitancy, from a moral
angle, on the part of Jodl or any of the people he mentions to overrun
these neutral countries.

On 1 February 1940, General Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff and a
member of the Group as defined in the Indictment) visited Jodl and
suggested that it might be wise to attack only Holland, on the ground
that Holland alone would “be a tremendous improvement in conducting
aerial warfare”. On 6 February, Jodl conferred with Jeschonnek,
Warlimont, and Col. von Waldau, and what Jodl calls a “new idea” was
proposed at this meeting: that the Germans should “carry out actions H
(Holland) and Weser exercise (Norway and Denmark) only and guarantee
Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war” (_1809-PS_). The
German Air Force may have felt that occupation of Holland alone would
give them sufficient scope for air bases for attacks on England, and
that if Belgium’s neutrality were preserved the bases in Holland would
be immune from attack by the French and the British armies in France.
If, to meet this situation, the French and British attacked through
Belgium, the violation of neutrality would be on the other foot. But
whether or not the “new idea” made sense from a military angle, it
appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a diplomatic angle. It
was a proposal to violate, without any substantial excuse, the
neutrality of three neighboring small countries, and simultaneously to
guarantee the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have
attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such circumstances
it is difficult to imagine and in fact the “new idea” projected at this
meeting of military leaders is an extraordinary combination of cynicism
and naivete.

In the meantime, as Jodl’s diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the “special
staff” for the Norway invasion met for the first time and got its
instructions from Keitel (_1809-PS_). On 21 February Hitler put General
von Falkenhorst (who subsequently became an _Oberbefehlshaber_ and a
member of the Group) in command of the Norway undertaking; and Jodl’s
diary records that “Falkenhorst accepts gladly” (_1809-PS_). On 26
February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first into Norway or
the Low Countries, but on 3 March, he decided to do Norway first and the
Low Countries a short time thereafter. This decision proved final.
Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the
venture was certain by the first of May; the invasion of the Low
Countries took place 10 days thereafter.

France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on the side of
Germany, and the African campaign began. In the meantime, Goering’s Air
Force hammered at England unsuccessfully, and the planned invasion of
Britain (“Operation _Seeloewe_”) never came to pass. In October 1940
Italy attacked Greece and was fought to better than a standstill. The
Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of Yugoslavia were
embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the attack on the Soviet
Union was being planned in the winter of 1940-41, and Germany felt she
could not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans.

Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to
Italy’s aid, and the Yugoslavian coup d’etat of 26 March 1940 brought
about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also. The aggressive
nature of the German attacks on Greece and Yugoslavia are demonstrated
in _444-PS_; _1541-PS_; _C-167_; _1746-PS_. The decisions were made, and
the Armed Forces drew up the plans and executed the attacks. The
onslaught was particularly ruthless against Yugoslavia for the special
purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final deployment
instructions were issued by Brauchitsch (_R-95_):

    “1. The political situation in the Balkans having changed by
    reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be
    considered as an enemy even should it make declarations of
    loyalty at first.

    “_The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to
    destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible_ * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “5. _Timetable for the operations._ a. On 5th April as soon as
    sufficient forces of the Air Forces are available and weather
    permitting, the Air Forces shall attack continuously by day and
    night the Yugoslav ground organization and Belgrade.” (_R-95_)

(_e_) _The Soviet Union._ It is quite possible that some members of the
General Staff and High Command Group opposed “Barbarossa,” the German
attack on the Soviet Union, as unnecessary and unwise from a military
standpoint. Raeder so indicated in a memorandum he wrote on 10 January
1944 (_C-66_):

    “1. At this time the Fuehrer had made known his ‘unalterable
    decision’ to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all
    remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situation
    had arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of
    Naval War Staff, I was never convinced of the ‘compelling
    necessity’ for Barbarossa.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling
    accounts with Russia, doubtless his general ideological attitude
    played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that
    he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they
    would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian
    Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic
    States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this

    “The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the autumn
    of 1940 could no longer be attained—a realization which the
    Fuehrer, no doubt, gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who
    were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on
    England (our own losses)—surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back
    as August and September, to consider whether—even prior to
    victory in the West—an Eastern campaign would be feasible with
    the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the
    Continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear,
    however, until well into September.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “7. As no other course is possible, I have submitted to
    compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises
    between 1 SKL and myself, it is perhaps because the arguments
    the Fuehrer used on such occasion (dinner speech in the middle
    of July to the Officers in Command) to justify a step he had
    planned, usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to
    the ‘inner circle,’ than on those who often heard this type of

    “Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on
    the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941,
    whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very
    skeptical.” (_C-66_)

But the passage last quoted indicates that the other members of the
General Staff favored “Barbarossa”. Raeder’s memorandum actually says
substantially what Blomberg’s affidavit (_3704-PS_) says; that some of
the generals lost confidence in the power of Hitler’s judgment, but that
the generals failed as a group to take any definite stand against him
although a few tried and suffered thereby. Certainly the High Command
Group took no stand against Hitler on “Barbarossa” and the events of
1941 and 1942 do not suggest that the High Command embarked on the
Soviet war tentatively or with reservations, but rather with ruthless
determination backed by careful planning. The plans themselves have
already been cited. (_446-PS_; _C-35_; _872-PS_; _C-78_; _447-PS_)

(_f_) _Nature of the General Staff and High Command Group Responsibility
for Aggression._ The nature of the accusation against this Group for
plotting and launching wars of aggression must be clearly understood.
They are not accused on the ground that they are soldiers. They are not
accused because they did the usual things a soldier is expected to do,
such as make military plans and command troops.

It is among the normal duties of a diplomat to engage in negotiations
and conferences; to write notes and side memoires to the government to
which he is accredited; and to cultivate good will toward the country he
represents. Ribbentrop is not indicted for doing these things. It is the
usual function of a politician to weigh and determine matters of
national policy and to draft regulations and decrees and make speeches.
Hess, Frick, and the other politician-defendants are not indicted for
doing these things. It is an innocent and respectable business to be a
locksmith but it is none the less a crime if the locksmith turns his
talents to picking the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And
that is the nature of the charge against all the defendants, and against
the General Staff and High Command Group as well. The charge is that in
performing the functions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers, sailors,
or whatever they happened to be, they conspired to and did plan,
prepare, initiate, and wage wars of aggression and in violation of

The Charter (Article 6(a)) declares that wars of aggression and wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances are
crimes against peace. It is no defense for those who commit such crimes
to plead that they practice a particular profession, whether it is arms
or the law. It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military
plans to meet national contingencies, to carry out such plans and engage
in war if in so doing they do not knowingly plan and wage illegal wars.

There might well be individual cases where drawing the line between
legal and illegal conduct would involve some difficulties. That is not
an uncommon situation in the legal field. But there can be no doubt as
to the criminality of the General Staff and High Command Group, nor as
to the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the Group. The
evidence is clear that these defendants, and the leaders of the Group,
and most of the members of the Group, were fully advised in advance of
the aggressive and illegal war plans, and carried them out with full
knowledge that the wars were aggressive and in violation of treaties.

In the case of defendants Goering, Keitel, and Jodl, the evidence is
voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and wars is
constant. The same is true of the defendant Raeder, and his individual
responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway and
Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against Doenitz
is less voluminous, for the reason that he was younger and not one of
the top group until later in the war, but his knowing participation in
and advocacy of the Norwegian venture is clear.

Numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command Group,
including its other leaders, participated knowingly and willfully in
these illegal plans and wars. Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, and his Chief of Staff, Halder; Warlimont the deputy to Jodl and
chief repository of plans—in the nature of things these men knew all
that was going on, and participated fully, as the evidence has shown.
Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau and von
Schobert, together with Goering, were immediately sent for by Hitler
when Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. At later date, Blaskowitz as an
_Oberbefehlshaber_ in the field knowingly prepared for the attack on
Poland; Field Marshal List educated the Bulgarians for their role during
the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; von Falkenhorst “gladly” accepted
the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and Denmark. On the air
side, Jeschonnek had proposed that Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and
Holland, and simultaneously assured Belgium that there was nothing to
fear. On the naval side, Admiral Carls foresaw at an early date that
German policy was leading to a general European war, and at a later date
the attack on Norway and Denmark was his brainchild; Krancke was one of
the chief planners of this attack; Schniewindt was in the inner circle
for the attack on Poland; Fricke certified the final orders for
“_Weseruebung_” and a few months later proposed that Germany annex
Belgium and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia
to vassalage. Most of these 19 officers were at the time members of the
Group, and the few who were not subsequently became members. At the
final planning and reporting conference for “_Barbarossa_,” 17
additional members were present. At the two meetings with Hitler, at
which the aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were fully
disclosed, the entire group was present.

The military defendants may perhaps argue that military men are pure
technicians, bound to do whatever the political leaders order them to
do. Such a suggestion must fail, on any test of reason or logic. It
amounts to saying that military men are a race apart from and different
from the ordinary run of human beings—men above and beyond the moral
and legal requirements that apply to others; men incapable of exercising
moral judgment on their own behalf.

It stands to reason that the crime of planning and waging aggressive
warfare is committed most consciously, deliberately, and culpably by a
nation’s leaders—the leaders in all the major fields of activity
necessary to and closely involved in the waging of war. It is committed
by the principal propagandists and publicists who whip up the necessary
beliefs and enthusiasms among the people as a whole, so that the people
will acquiesce and join in attacking and slaughtering the peoples of
other nations. It is committed by the political leaders who purport to
represent and execute the national will. It is committed by the
diplomats who handle the nation’s foreign policy and endeavor to create
a favorable diplomatic setting for successful warfare, and by the chief
ministers who adapt the machinery of government to the needs of a nation
at war. It is committed by the principal industrial and financial
leaders who shape the national economy and marshall the productive
resources for the needs of an aggressive war program. It is no less
committed by the military leaders who knowingly plan aggressive war,
mobilize the men and equipment of the attacking forces, and execute the
actual onslaught.

In the nature of things, planning and executing aggressive war is
accomplished by agreement and consultation among all these types of
leaders. If the leaders in any notably important field of activity stand
aside, resist, or fail to cooperate in launching and executing an
aggressive war program, the program will at the very least be seriously
obstructed, and probably its successful accomplishment will be
impossible. That is why the principal leaders in all these fields of
activity share responsibility for the crime, and the military leaders no
less than the others. Leadership in the military field, as in any other
field, calls for moral wisdom as well as technical astuteness.

The responsible military leaders of any nation can hardly be heard to
say that their role is that of a mere janitor, custodian, or pilot of
the war machine which is under their command, and that they bear no
responsibility whatsoever for the use to which that machine is put. Such
a view would degrade and render ignoble the profession of arms. The
prevalence of such a view would be particularly unfortunate today, when
the military leaders control forces infinitely more powerful and
destructive than ever before. Should the military leaders be declared
exempt from the declaration in the Charter that planning and waging
aggressive war is a crime, it would be a crippling if not fatal blow to
the efficacy of that declaration.

The American prosecution here representing the United Nations believes
that the profession of arms is a distinguished and noble profession. It
believes that the practice of that profession by its leaders calls for
the highest degree of integrity and moral wisdom no less than for
technical skill. It believes that in consulting and planning with
leaders in other national fields of activity, the military leaders will
act and counsel in accordance with International Law and the dictates of
the public conscience. Otherwise, the military resources of the nation
will be used, not in accordance with the laws of modern civilization,
but with the law of the jungle. The military leaders share
responsibility with other leaders of a nation.

Obviously the military leaders are not the final and exclusive arbiters,
and the German military leaders do not bear exclusive responsibility for
the aggressive wars which were waged. If the leading German diplomats
and industrialists and other leaders had not been infected with similar
criminal purposes, the German military leaders might not have had their
way. But the German military leaders conspired with others to undermine
and destroy the conscience of the German nation. The German military
leaders wanted to aggrandize Germany and if necessary to resort to war
for that purpose. As the Chief Prosecutor for the United States said in
his opening statement, “the German military leaders are here before you
because they, along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war.”

(2) _War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity._ It is proposed to show
that members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the
five defendants who are members of the Group, ordered and directed the
commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the
Indictment. It is also proposed to show, in certain instances, the
actual commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces,
as a result of these orders, or as a result of other orders or
arrangements made by members of the General Staff and High Command
Group, which controlled the German Armed Forces and bears responsibility
for war crimes committed by them.

It is not proposed, however, to make a full showing of war crimes
committed by the German Armed Forces. The full presentation of this
evidence is to be made, pursuant to agreement among the Chief
Prosecutors, by the French and Soviet delegations.

It will be shown that the General Staff and High Command became wedded
to a policy of terror. In some cases, where the evidence of this policy
is in documentary form, the activating papers which were signed by,
initialed by, and circulated among the members of the Group will be
presented. In other instances, where the actual crimes were committed by
others than members of the German Armed Forces (where, for example
prisoners of war or civilians were handed over to and mistreated or
murdered by the SS or SD), it will be shown that members of the Group
were well aware that they were assisting in the commission of war
crimes. It will be shown that many crimes committed by the SS or SD were
committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General Staff
and High Command, and that frequently members of the German Armed Forces
acted in conjunction with the SS and SD in carrying out tasks then known
by such respectable-sounding terms as “pacification,” “cleansing,” and
“elimination of insecure elements.”

(_a_) _Murder of Commandos, Paratroopers, and Members of Military
Missions._ This story starts with an order issued by Hitler on 18
October 1942 (_498-PS_). The order began with a recital that allied
commandos were using methods of warfare alleged to be outside the scope
of the Geneva Conventions, and thereafter proceeded to specify the
methods of warfare which German troops should use against allied
commandos, and the disposition which should be made of captured
commandos. This order reads as follows:

    “1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare
    methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions.
    Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the
    so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially
    recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From
    captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only
    to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on
    the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as
    prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their
    purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have
    been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded
    in principle.

    “2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to
    the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future,
    Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and
    their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that
    they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in
    combat, wherever they may appear.

    “3. I therefore order:
    From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe
    or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all
    appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether
    armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered
    to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they
    are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or
    whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these
    individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give
    themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In
    each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW
    for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.

    “4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents,
    saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by
    some other means, through the police in occupied territories for
    instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any
    imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades for instance,
    etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for
    a short time.

    “5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy
    soldiers who in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale
    offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations),
    are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this
    order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after
    battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by
    parachute after battles.

    “6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to
    carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either
    have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this
    order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.

                                   “(S)  Adolf Hitler”  (_498-PS_).

This order was issued by the OKW in twelve copies, and the distribution
included the three supreme commands and the principal field commands.

On the same day Hitler issued a supplementary order (_503-PS_) for the
purpose of explaining the reasons for the issuance of the basic order.
In this explanation, Hitler pointed out that allied commando operations
had been extraordinarily successful in the destruction of rear
communications, intimidation of laborers, and destruction of important
war plants in occupied areas. Among other things Hitler stated in this

    “Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and
    sabotage troops (_OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18
    October 1942_) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.

    “_This order is intended for commanders only and must not under
    any circumstances fall into enemy hands._

    “_The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the
    receiving bureaus._

    “The bureaus named in the distribution list are held
    responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed
    pieces of the order and copies made thereof.

        “The Chief of the High Command of
        the Armed Forces

                                                            “By order of

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the
    destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare
    noncompliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it
    necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and
    commanders the reasons for this decree.

    “As in no previous war, a method of destruction of
    communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace
    working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important
    industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been
    developed in this war.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary
    weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is
    cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single
    electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the _Luftwaffe_
    of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the
    construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the
    fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the
    Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.

    “Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the
    adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at
    the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can,
    according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they
    themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers
    or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of
    suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at
    the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender
    and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the
    provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however,
    that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva
    agreements, especially since part of these elements are even
    criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate
    themselves through these activities.

    “England and America will therefore always be able to find
    volunteers for this kind of warfare as long as they can
    truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life
    for them. At worse, all they have to do is to successfully
    commit their attack on people, traffic installations, or other
    installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to

    “If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage
    through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary
    that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without
    exception, to the last man.

    “This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is
    nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that
    a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to
    be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the
    Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly

    “The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces
    communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage,
    terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and
    exterminated to the last man.

    “I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies
    subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only
    to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry
    out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned
    officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported
    without fail, or under circumstances when there is danger in
    delay to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as
    well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to
    expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as
    well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition
    remains secure.

    “These are the reasons for the issuance of this decree.

    “If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to
    initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot
    immediately after interrogation.

                                 “(signed)  A. Hitler”  (_503-PS_).

Ten days later, on 28 October 1942, while Raeder was Commander-in-Chief
of the Germany Navy, the Naval War Staff in Berlin transmitted its copy
of the basic order of 18 October to the lower Naval commands. The copy
distributed by the Navy and the covering memorandum from the Naval War
Staff (_C-179_) shows clearly the secrecy which surrounded the
dissemination of this order:

    “Enclosed pleased find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of
    terror and sabotage units.

    “This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla
    leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.

    “After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above
    authorities must hand this order over to the next highest
    section which is responsible for its confiscation and

                                          “(s)  Wagner”  (_C-179_).

                 *        *        *        *        *

    “_Note for Distribution_:

    “These instructions are not to be distributed over and above the
    battalions and corresponding staffs of the other services. After
    notification, those copies distributed over and above the
    Regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must
    be withdrawn and destroyed.” (_C-179_)

On 11 February 1943, just twelve days after Doenitz had become
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, the Naval War Staff promulgated a
further memorandum on this subject in order to clear up certain
misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic order of 18 October 1942
(_C-178_). It was stated in this subsequent memorandum that all
commanders and officers who neglected their duty in failing to instruct
their units concerning the order would run the risk of serious court
martial penalties:

    “From the notice given by 3/SKL [Naval War Staff] on February
    1st 43, it has been discovered that the competent departments of
    the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force
    Operations Staff have a wrong conception regarding the treatment
    of saboteurs. A telephone inquiry at 3/SKL proved that this
    Naval authority was not correctly informed either. In view of
    this situation, reference is made to figure _6_ of the Fuehrer
    order of October 18, 42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 26
    367/42 Top Secret of October 28, 42) according to which all
    commanders and officers, who have neglected their duty in
    instructing their units about the order referring to treatment
    of saboteurs, are threatened with punishment by court martial.

    “The first Fuehrer order concerning this matter of October 18,
    42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 2108/42 Top Secret of
    October 27, 42) was given the protection of Top Secret merely
    because it is stated therein:

    “1. That, according to the Fuehrer’s views the spreading of
    military sabotage organizations in the East _and_ West may have
    portentous consequences for our whole conduct of the war and

    “2. That the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military
    orders must be carried out even _after_ they have surrendered
    voluntarily and asked for pardon.

    “On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle
    is not at all to be kept secret but on the contrary to be
    currently published in the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed
    Forces) reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a
    deterrent, will not be achieved, if those taking part in enemy
    ‘Commando Operations’ would not learn that certain death and not
    safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be
    annihilated immediately, unless their statements are first
    needed for military reasons, it is necessary that not only all
    members of the Armed Forces must receive instructions that these
    types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be
    annihilated, but also all departments of the home staff, dealing
    with this kind of question, must be informed of the course of
    action which has been ordered.” (_C-178_)

The Hitler order of October 1942 was actually carried out in a number of
instances. During the night of the 19-20 November 1942, a British
freight glider crashed near Egersund in Norway. The glider carried a
British commando unit of 17 men, of whom 3 were apparently killed in the
crash. All were in English uniform. The 14 survivors were executed in
accordance with the Hitler order in the evening of 20 November 1942. The
proof is contained in the following document (_508-PS_):

    “1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a
    British freight glider at Hegers and in the night of November

    “a. No firing on the part of German defense.

    “b. The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed the ground, 7 man
    crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the
    17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer
    order has been carried out.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “On November 20, 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 Km NE
    of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of
    wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are
    severely, the others slightly wounded.

    “All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia.
    Furthermore following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skis
    and radio sender, exact number is unknown. The glider carried
    rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number unknown.
    At present the prisoners are with the Bn. in Egersund.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Beside the 17 member crew extensive sabotage material and work
    equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was
    absolutely proved. The 280th Inf. Div. (J.D.) ordered the
    execution of the action according to the Fuehrer’s order. The
    execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of
    the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms
    which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short
    interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their
    names, ranks and serial numbers.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew,
    the Armed Forces Commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order
    to the district commanders, according to which the interrogation
    by G-2 (Ic) and by BDS are important before the execution of the
    Fuehrer order; in case of No. 4 of the Fuehrer order the
    prisoners are to be handed over to the BDS.” (_508-PS_)

In three specific instances the Hitler order was carried out in Norway
(_512-PS_). The procedure was to take individual commandos prisoner and
interrogate them to extract military intelligence before executing them.
This procedure was in accordance with the last sentence of Hitler’s
supplementary order (_503-PS_), and is obviously in flat contradiction
of the requirements of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The reason for
this procedure is explained as follows:

    “_TOP SECRET_—According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer
    order of 18th October (_CHEFS_), individual saboteurs can be
    spared for the time being in order to keep them for
    interrogation. The importance of this measure was proven in the
    cases of Glomfjord, Twoman torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane
    Stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge
    of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur
    was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore,
    Armed Forces Commander (WB) referred to above mentioned (OA)
    last sentence of the Fuehrer order (Liquidation only after short
    interrogation).” (_512-PS_)

Another instance from the Norwegian theater of war (_526-PS_): On 30
March 1943, 10 Norwegian navy personnel were taken prisoner from a
Norwegian cutter at Toftefjord. The 10 prisoners were executed by the SD
in accordance with the Hitler order, but the published report announced
only that the unit was destroyed:

    “On the 30.3 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) an enemy cutter was
    sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10

    “Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Purpose_: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of
    strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and

    “_Assigner of Mission in London_: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.

    “Fuehrer order executed by S.D. (security service).

    “_Wehrmacht Report_ of 6.4 announces the following about it:

    “In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and
    destroyed on approaching the coast.” (_526-PS_)

Similar action took place in the Italian theater. A telegram (_509-PS_)
from the Supreme Commander in Italy to OKW, dated 7 November 1943, shows
that on 2 November 1943 three British commandos captured at Pascara,
Italy, were given “special treatment” (_Sonderbehandelt_), which, as
previous evidence has shown, (_3040-PS_) means death. What happened to
the remaining nine prisoners of war who were wounded and in the hospital
is not known. (_509-PS_)

An affidavit (_2610-PS_) dated 7 November 1945, by Frederick W. Roche, a
Major in the Army of the United States, furnishes other evidence of the
carrying out of the Hitler order. Major Roche was the Judge Advocate of
an American Military Commission which tried General Anton Dostler,
formerly Commander of the 75th German Army Corps, for the unlawful
execution of 15 members of the United States Armed Forces. His affidavit

    “FREDERICK W. ROCHE being duly sworn deposes and says:

    “I am a Major in the Army of the United States.

    “I was the Judge Advocate of the Military Commission which tried
    Anton Dostler for ordering the execution of the group of fifteen
    United States Army personnel who comprised the ‘Ginny Mission.’
    This Military Commission consisting of five officers was
    appointed by command of General McNarney, by Special Orders No.
    269, dated 26 September 1945, Headquarters, Mediterranean
    Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 512.

    “The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945
    and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States v.
    Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed four days and the
    findings and sentence were announced on the morning of 12
    October 1945. The charge and specification in this case are as

    “‘Charge: Violation of the law of war.’

    “‘Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then General, commanding
    military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation,
    to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in
    the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war,
    order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army
    personnel, consisting of two officers and thirteen enlisted men
    who had then recently been captured by forces under General
    Dostler, which order was carried into execution on or about 26
    March 1944, resulting in the death of the said fifteen members
    of the Army of the United States identified as follows * * *’.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I was present throughout the entire proceeding. I heard all the
    testimony, and I am familiar with the record in this case. The
    facts developed in this proceeding are as follows: On the night
    of 22 March 1944, two officers and thirteen enlisted men of the
    2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the
    United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and
    landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All
    fifteen men were members of the Army of the United States and
    were in the military service of the United States. When they
    landed on the Italian coast they were all properly dressed in
    the field uniform of the United States Army and they carried no
    civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad
    tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail
    line was being used by the German Forces to supply their
    fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead fronts. The
    entire group was captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a
    patrol consisting of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of
    the German Army. All fifteen men were placed under interrogation
    in La Spezia and they were held in custody until the morning of
    26 March 1944 when they were all executed by a firing squad.
    These men were never tried nor were they brought before any
    court or given any hearing; they were shot by order of Anton
    Dostler, then General Commanding the 75th German Army Corps.

    “Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified by way
    of defense that he ordered the fifteen American soldiers to be
    shot pursuant to the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 on commando
    operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and
    not taken prisoners of war, even after they had been
    interrogated. He also testified that he would have been subject
    to court martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler

    “The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in
    the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler, as these
    findings and sentence appear in the original record of the trial
    and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy on 12
    October 1945:

   “‘_FINDINGS_: General Dostler, as president of this commission it is
                 my duty to inform you that the commission in closed
                 session and upon secret written ballot, at least
                 two-thirds of all the members of the commission
                 concurring in each finding of guilty, finds you of the
                 specification and of the charge:
     “‘SENTENCE: And again in closed session and upon secret written
                 ballot, at least two-thirds of all of the members of
                 the commission concurring, sentences you:
                 “‘TO BE SHOT TO DEATH BY MUSKETRY’.”  (_2610-PS_)

The order of 18 October 1942 remained in force, so far as the evidence
shows, until the end of the war. On 22 June 1944 in a document initialed
by Warlimont (_506-PS_) the OKW made it clear that the Hitler order was
to be applied even in cases where the commando operation was undertaken
by only one person:

    “WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the army group
    judge [_Heeresgruppenrichter_] with the Supreme Commander
    Southwest of 20 May 44 (Br. B. Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order
    is to be applied even if the enemy employs only _one_ person for
    a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several
    persons or a single person take part in a commando operation.
    The reason for the special treatment of participants in a
    commando operation is that such operations do not correspond to
    the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.”

The allied landing in Normandy early in June 1944, in the course of
which large scale air-borne operations took place, raised among the
Germans the question as to how far the Hitler order would be applied to
Normandy, and in France behind the German lines. A memorandum (_531-PS_)
dated 23 June 1944 and signed by Warlimont, starts by quoting a teletype
from the Supreme Command in the West inquiring what should be done about
applying the Hitler order to air-borne troops and commandos:

    “Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No. 1750/44
    Top Secret of 23 June 44:

    “The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried
    out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale
    landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred
    to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken
    prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal
    combat operations (large-scale landing operations and
    undertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and
    4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the
    troops how far the concept ‘within the limits of normal combat
    operations, etc.’ is to be extended.

    “The application of number 5 for all enemy _soldiers in uniform_
    penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is
    held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest
    solution.” (_531-PS_)

Warlimont’s memorandum (_531-PS_) continues by reciting the position
taken with reference to the request by the OKW Operations Staff, of
which Warlimont was the Deputy Chief:

    “_Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff_:

    “1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after
    the enemy landing in the west.

    “2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that
    the order is not valid for _those_ enemy soldiers in uniform,
    who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of
    the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender.
    Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the
    divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to
    and including corps headquarters.

    “3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have
    fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD,
    upon whom it is encumbent to determine whether the Commando
    order is to be applied or not.

    “4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units
    committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner
    with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando
    undertakings of 18 Oct. 42 along with the above explanation.”

On 25 June 1944 the OKW replied to this inquiry in a teletype message
(_551-PS_) signed by Keitel and initialed by Warlimont and Jodl:

    “_Subject_: Treatment of Commando Participants.

    “1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the
    order of the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage
    units of 18 Oct. 1942 remains fully in force.

    “Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the
    bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in
    the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the
    Corps Commands, according to No. 5 of the basic order of 18 Oct.
    1942, remain exempted.

    “2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the
    immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all
    parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they
    are to be turned over to the SD.

    “3. All troops, committed outside the combat area of Normandy,
    are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and
    sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the
    directives, issued for it.

    “4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily, how
    many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies
    especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The
    number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces Communique
    to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done
    toward previous commando undertakings in the same manners.”

                                       “[Initial]  W  [Warlimont]
                                       “[signature]  Keitel  (_551-PS_).

In July 1944, the question was raised within the German High Command as
to whether the order of October 1942 should be applied to members of
foreign military missions, with special regard to the British, American,
and Soviet military missions which were cooperating with allied forces
in Southeastern Europe, notably in Yugoslavia. A long document signed by
Warlimont (_1279-PS_) embodies the discussions which were had at that
time at OKW. It discloses that the Armed Forces Operational Staff
recommended that the order should be applied to these military missions
and drew up a draft order to this effect. The order which actually
resulted from these discussions (_537-PS_), dated 30 July 1944 and
signed by Keitel, provides:

    “_Re: Treatment of members of foreign ‘Military Missions,’
    captured together with partisans._

    “In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest
    members of foreign so-called ‘Military Missions’ (Anglo-American
    as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the
    struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as
    speculated in the Special Orders regarding the treatment of
    captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs
    but in conformity with the Fuehrer’s order re the elimination of
    terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW/WFSt.
    003830/42 g. Kdos).

    “This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the Armed
    forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be
    destroyed after being made record.

    “The Chief of the High Command of the _Wehrmacht_

                                               “Keitel”  (_537-PS_)

Pursuant to this order, approximately 15 members of an allied military
mission to Slovakia were executed in January 1945. An affidavit (_L-51_)
signed by one Adolf Zutter, who was the adjutant at the camp where the
executions took place, reads in part:

    “Concerning the American Military Mission which had landed
    behind the German main line of resistance in Slovakian or
    Hungarian territory in January 1945, I remember when in January
    1945 it was brought to the concentration camp at Mauthausen. I
    suppose there were about 12 to 15 newcomers. They wore an
    American or Canadian uniform, of brown-green color, blouse, and
    cap made of cloth. Eight or ten days after their arrival the
    order for execution came in by radiogram or teletype. Colonel
    Ziereis came to me in the office and said: now Kaltenbrunner has
    authorized the execution. The letter was secret and had the
    signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. These people were then shot
    according to martial law and T/Sgt [_Oberscharfuehrer_]
    Niedermeyer handed their belongings over to me. In spring 1945,
    a written order based on an Army manual to destroy all files was
    received by the security officer in Mauthausen, 1st Lt.
    [_Obersturmfuehrer_] Reimer; this order had been sent by Lt.
    [_Untersturmfuehrer_] Meinhardt, security officer of Section D
    in Oranienburg. Reimer forwarded this order personally in
    written form to the various sections and supervised the
    compliance with it. Among the files were also all the execution
    orders.” (_L-51_)

The foregoing documents with respect to the order of 18 October 1942,
and its subsequent enforcement and application, clearly demonstrate that
members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the
defendants Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raeder, ordered and directed the
commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces, and that
these orders were carried out in numerous instances.

(_b_) _War Crimes on the Eastern Front._ The order of October 1942 with
respect to the murdering of captured commandos operated chiefly in the
Western theater of war, against British and American commando troops.
This was natural since Germany occupied almost the entire Western coast
of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that
period land fighting in Western Europe was largely limited to commando
operations. The Mediterranean Theater likewise lent itself to this type
of warfare.

On the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale land fighting in
Poland and the Soviet Union from 1941 on, the German forces were
fighting amongst a hostile population and had to face extensive partisan
activities behind their lines. It will be shown that the activities of
the German Armed Forces against partisans and other elements of the
population became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial
policies, and a cloak for the ruthless and barbaric massacre of Jews and
of numerous segments of the Slavic population which were regarded by the
Nazis as undesirable. It was the policy of the German Armed Forces to
behave with the utmost severity to the civilian population of the
occupied territories, and to conduct its military operations,
particularly against partisans, so as to further these Nazi policies. It
will be shown that the German Armed Forces supported, assisted, and
acted in cooperation with the SS Groups which were especially charged
with anti-partisan activities. Members of the General Staff and High
Command Group ordered, directed, encouraged, and were fully aware of
these criminal policies and activities.

It is not proposed to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes
committed by the Nazis on the Eastern Front; evidence of those crimes
are to be presented by the Soviet delegation. Evidence concerning the
activities of the SS, SD, and Gestapo will be discussed only to the
extent necessary to clarify the relations between these organizations
and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration
in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe.

These policies of ruthless severity to the civilian population of the
occupied Eastern territories were determined upon and made official for
the German Armed Forces even before the invasion of the Soviet Union
took place. An order by Hitler, dated 13 May 1941, and signed by Keitel
as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (_C-50_) provided:


    “_Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and PROCEDURE
    IN THE AREA ‘Barbarossa’ and special military measures._

    “The application of martial law aims in the first place at
    _maintaining discipline_.

    “The fact that the operational areas in the East are so
    farflung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the
    peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial
    with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve
    while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of
    pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless
    jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main

    “This is possible only if _the troops_ take ruthless action
    themselves against any threat from the enemy population.

    “For these reasons I herewith issue the following order
    effective for the area ‘Barbarossa’ (area of operations, army
    rear area, and area of political administration).

    “I. _Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians._

    “1. Until further notice the military courts and the
    courts-martial will not be competent for _crimes committed by
    enemy civilians_.

    “2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military,
    whether they are fighting or in flight.

    “3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed
    Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once
    by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the
    assailants are destroyed.

    “4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first
    possible, _persons suspected of criminal action will be brought
    at once before an officer_. _This officer will decide whether
    they are to be shot._

    “On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a
    Battalion Commander, _collective despotic measures_ will be
    taken without delay against _localities_ from which cunning or
    malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances
    do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.

    “5. It is _expressly forbidden_ to _keep_ suspects _in custody_
    in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement
    of civil courts.

    “6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the
    competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce _military
    jurisdiction for civilians_, in areas which are sufficiently

    “For the _area of the_ ‘_Political Administration_’ this order
    will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed

    “II. _Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants by
    members of the Armed Forces and its employees._

    “1. With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by
    members of the Wehrmacht and its employees _prosecution is not
    obligatory_ even where the deed is at the same time a military
    crime or offence.

    “2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind,
    whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in
    1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the
    fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of
    innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by
    Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.

    “3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases
    whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether _legal
    measures_ are necessary. In the case of offences against
    inhabitants it will order a _court martial_ only if _maintenance
    of discipline_ or _security of the Forces_ call for such a
    measure. This applies for instance to serious offences
    originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a
    criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the
    troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have
    resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores or other
    captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a
    rule be judged no less severely.

    “_The order to institute proceedings_ requires in every single
    case the signature of the Judicial Authority.

    “4. _Extreme caution_ is indicated in assessing the credibility
    of statements made by enemy civilians.

    “III. _Responsibility of the Military Commanders._

    “Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are
    _personally_ responsible for seeing that:

    “1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command
    is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on
    principles set out under I above.

    “2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these
    instructions and of _verbal information in which the political
    intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs_.

    “3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in
    accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.

    “IV. _Security._

    Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as
    “Most Secret”:

                               “By order
                     “Chief of the Supreme Command
                          of the Armed Forces
                                        “(signed) Keitel”  (_C-50_)

Less than three months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, these
instructions were amplified and made even more drastic. An order dated
16 September 1941 and signed by Keitel, was widely distributed
(_C-148_). This order was of general application in all theaters of war,
but was clearly of primary importance for the Eastern Front:

    “_Subject_: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories.

    “1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia,
    Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in
    the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is
    growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual
    members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread
    guerilla warfare.

    “It can be seen that this is a _mass movement centrally directed
    by Moscow_, who is also responsible for the apparently trivial
    isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise

    “In view of the many political and economic crises in the
    occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that
    _nationalist and other circles_ will make full use of this
    opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying
    forces by associating themselves with the Communist

    “This creates an increasing _danger to the German war effort_,
    which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the
    occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of
    forces to the main centers of disturbance.

    “2. _The measures taken up to now_ to deal with general
    insurrection movement _have proved inadequate_. The Fuehrer has
    now given orders that we take action _everywhere with the most
    drastic means_ in order to crush the movement in the shortest
    possible time.

    “Only this course, which has always been followed successfully
    throughout the history of the extension of influence of great
    peoples, can restore order.

    “3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the
    following _general directions_:

    “_a._ It should be inferred, in _every case_ of resistance to
    the German occupying Forces, no matter what the individual
    circumstances, that it is of _Communist origin_.

    “_b._ In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most
    drastic measures should be taken immediately on _the first
    indication_, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may
    be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this
    connection it should be remembered that a human life in
    unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a
    deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The
    death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded
    in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier’s
    life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still
    further increase the deterrent effect.

    “The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively
    lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of
    deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not
    accord with these principles and should therefore not be

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “4. _The Commanding Officers in the occupied territories_ are
    seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay
    to all military establishments concerned in dealing with
    Communist measures of insurrection.”

                                          “[Indecipherable initial]
                                                “Keitel”  (_C-148_)

The German military leaders took up, sponsored, and instructed their
troops to practice the racial policies of the Nazis. On 10 October 1941
a directive was issued by Field Marshal von Reichenau, the
Commander-in-Chief (_Oberbefehlshaber_) of the German 8th Army, then
operating on the Eastern Front (_UK-81_). Reichenau (who died in 1942)
was therefore a member of the group, and here is what he had to say:

    “Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.

    “Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic
    system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most
    essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a
    complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination
    of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this
    connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the
    one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern
    territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of
    the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology
    and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon
    German and racially related nations.

    “Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the
    necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The
    Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e., the annihilation of
    revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always
    been caused by Jews.

    “The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not
    being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and
    unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and
    guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes
    and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and
    sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian
    officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly
    about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens.
    Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete
    thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to
    clarify the meaning of the present struggle.

    “The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not
    working for the Armed Forces from Army kitchens is an equally
    misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes
    and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great
    sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to
    the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the
    enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It
    is an important part of our supply.

    “When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire.
    The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only
    as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of
    billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former
    bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the
    struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic
    considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories.
    The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of
    raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The
    complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the
    fighting troops is imperative considering the long and
    vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured
    weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this
    be impossible because of the situation of the battle so the
    weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated
    partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army
    drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be
    extended to that part of the male population who were in a
    position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of
    numerous apparently anti-Soviet elements which originates from a
    ‘wait and see’ attitude, must give way to a clear decision for
    active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being
    judges and treated a member of the Soviet System.

    “The fear of the German countermeasures must be stronger than
    the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far
    from all political considerations of the future the soldier has
    to fulfill two tasks:

    “1. _Complete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of
    the Soviet State and its armed forces._

    “2. _The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty
    and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in

    “This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate
    the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.

                                             “(Signed) von Reichenau
                                             “Field Marshal.”  (_UK-81_)

Immediately preceding Reichenau’s order is a memorandum, dated 28
October 1941, which shows that Reichenau’s order met with Hitler’s
approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the
Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. It is also clear that Reichenau’s
order was thereafter circulated down to divisional level, and was
received by the 12th Infantry Division on 27 November 1941. (_UK-81_)

These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German
military leaders, it is no wonder that the _Wehrmacht_ joined in the
monstrous behavior of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front. Units (known
as _Einsatzgruppen_) were formed by the SIPO and SD and sent out to
operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in
order to combat partisans and to “cleanse” and “pacify” the civilian

In a directive dated 19 March 1943, the Commanding Officer of one of
these units praised and justified such activities as the shooting of
Hungarian Jews, the shooting of children, and the total burning down of
villages (_3012-PS_). The officer directed that in order not to obstruct
the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry,

    “as a rule no more children will be shot” (_3012-PS_).

A report covering the work of the _Einsatzgruppen_ in the German
occupied territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October
1941 disregards every vestige of decency (_R-102_). It states cynically
that, in the Baltic areas,

    “spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on
    the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not
    been recorded, on account of the lack of adequate
    indoctrination” (_R-102_).

This report shows clearly that “pacification” and “anti-partisan
activity” are mere code words for “extermination of Jews and Slavs” just
as much as “_Weserubung_” was a code word for the invasion and
subjugation of Norway and Denmark.

Documents quoted earlier show that the German Army was operating under
similar policies and directives. It only remains to show that, in these
practices, the Army and the SS worked hand in glove. The report
describing the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto (_1061-PS_) stresses the
close cooperation between the SS and the Army:

    “The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the
    _Waffen SS_, Police and _Wehrmacht_ became; they fulfilled their
    duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as
    models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted
    from early morning until late at night. At night, search patrols
    with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the
    Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and
    killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their
    stores from abandoned dugouts and for contacting neighboring
    groups or exchanging news with them.” (1061-PS)

To the same general effect is a report dated 5 June 1943 by the German
General Commissioner for Minsk (_R-135_). This report describes an
anti-partisan operation in which 4,500 “enemies” were killed, 5,000
suspected partisans were killed, and 59 Germans were killed. The
cooperation in this adventure by the German Army is shown in the
following excerpt:

    “The above mentioned figures show, that we have to count with a
    strong annihilation of the population. The fact that only 492
    rifles were found on the 4,500 enemy dead, demonstrates that the
    numerous peasants from the country were also among the enemy
    dead. The battalion _Direwanger_ is particularly known to have
    destroyed numerous human lives. Among the 5,000 partisan
    suspects who were shot, are numerous women and children.

    “Units of the troops [_Wehrmannschaften_] also took part in the
    action, by order of SS Lt. General [_Obergruppenfuehrer_] von
    dem Bach. SA Colonel [_Standartenfuehrer_] Kunze led the troops
    [Wehrmannschaften], who included also 90 members of my authority
    and of the district-commissarate Minsk-Stadt. Our men returned
    yesterday from the action without any losses. I refuse the use
    of officials and Reich-Employees of the General Commissarate in
    the rear areas. The men who work for me have not been classified
    as essential, after all in order to fight the partisans actively
    in the place of the Armed Forces and the Police.

    “Of the troops [_Wehrmannschaften_], one railroad employee had
    been wounded (shot through the lung). The political effect of
    this large scale action on the peaceful population had been
    disastrous, because of the numerous executions of women and
    children. The town BEGOMIE was cleared by the Armed Forces and
    the Police in December. The population of Begomie was
    predominantly favorable to us. Begomie, which has been fortified
    as a strong point by the partisans, has been destroyed by German
    Air Attacks during the fighting.” (_R-135_)