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Title: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Vol. II)
Author: Various
Language: English
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NAZI CONSPIRACY
AND AGGRESSION
_VOLUME II_
_Office of United States_
_Chief of Counsel For Prosecution_
_of Axis Criminality_
[Illustration]
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON • 1946
Sold in Complete Sets
by the
Superintendent of Documents
U. S. Government Printing
Office
Washington 25, D. C.
American and British Prosecuting Staffs for Presentation before the
International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany, in the case of
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
—against—
HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP,
ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED
ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER
FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH, KARL
DOENITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR von SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL,
ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ von PAPEN, ARTUR
SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN von NEURATH, and HANS
FRITZSCHE, Individually and as Members of Any of the Following
Groups or Organizations to which They Respectively Belonged,
Namely: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER
POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN
ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE
SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN
ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the “SS”) and including DIE
SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME
STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the
“GESTAPO”); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known
as the “SA”) and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of the
GERMAN ARMED FORCES all as defined in Appendix B of the
Indictment,
Defendants.
C O N T E N T S
Page
Chapter XV. Criminality of Groups and Organizations 1
1. The Law Under Which Nazi Organizations are
Accused of Being Criminal 1
2. The Nazi Party Leadership Corps 23
3. The Reich Cabinet 91
4. The Sturmabteilung (SA) 133
5. The Schutzstaffeln (SS) 173
6. The Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) and
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) 248
7. The General Staff and High Command of the
Armed Forces 316
XVI. Individual Responsibility of Defendants 416
1. Hermann Wilhelm Goering 417
2. Rudolf Hess 466
3. Joachim von Ribbentrop 489
4. Wilhelm Keitel 528
5. Alfred Jodl 565
6. Ernst Kaltenbrunner 575
7. Alfred Rosenberg 593
8. Hans Frank 624
9. Wilhelm Frick 653
10. Julius Streicher 689
11. Walter Funk 715
12. Hjalmar Schacht 738
13. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach 774
14. Karl Doenitz 815
15. Erich Raeder 849
16. Baldur von Schirach 877
17. Martin Bormann 896
18. Franz von Papen 915
19. Artur Seyss-Inquart 956
20. Constantin von Neurath 1014
21. Hans Fritzsche 1035
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 1055
1. Principal Officials of the Reich Government 1055
2. Principal Officials of the Nazi Party 1062
3. Heads of the Armed Forces 1063
4. Index of Individuals 1064
CODE NAMES AND WORDS USED BY THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND FOR
OPERATIONS AND MEASURES DURING THE WAR 1078
DATA CONCERNING CAPTURE OF DEFENDANTS 1083
GLOSSARY OF COMMON GERMAN AND NAZI TITLES, DESIGNATIONS, AND
TERMS, WITH THEIR OFFICIAL ABBREVIATIONS 1084
TABLE OF COMMISSIONED RANKS IN THE GERMAN ARMY, NAVY, AND SS WITH
THEIR EQUIVALENTS IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES 1099
Chapter XV
CRIMINALITY OF GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS
1. THE LAW UNDER WHICH NAZI ORGANIZATIONS ARE ACCUSED OF BEING CRIMINAL
_The following argument on the law and policy involved in the
prosecution’s charge that certain Nazi groups and organizations should
be declared criminal, was delivered by Justice Jackson before the
Tribunal on 28 February 1946._
May it please the Tribunal:
The unconditional surrender of Germany created, for the victors, novel
and difficult problems of law and administration. Since it is the first
such surrender of an entire and modernly organized society, precedents
and past experiences are of little help in guiding our policy toward the
vanquished. The responsibility implicit in demanding and accepting
capitulation of a whole people must of necessity include a duty to
discriminate justly and intelligently between opposing elements of the
population which bore dissimilar relations to the policies and conduct
which led to the catastrophe. This differentiation is the objective of
those provisions of the Charter which authorize this Tribunal to declare
organizations or groups to be criminal. Understanding of the problem
which the instrument attempts to solve is essential to its
interpretation and application.
A. _The Problem of the Nazi Organizations._
One of the sinister peculiarities of German society at the time of the
surrender was that the State itself played only a subordinate role in
the exercise of political power, while the really drastic controls over
German society were organized outside its nominal government. This was
accomplished through an elaborate network of closely knit and exclusive
organizations of selected volunteers oath-bound to execute, without
delay and without question, the commands of the Nazi leaders.
These organizations penetrated the whole German life. The country was
subdivided into little Nazi principalities of about 50 households each,
and every such community had its recognized party leaders, party police,
and its undercover party spies. These were combined into larger units
with higher ranking leaders, executioners and spies. The whole formed a
pyramid of power outside the law, with the Fuehrer at its apex, and with
the local party officials as its broad base resting heavily on the
German population. The Nazi despotism, therefore, did not consist of
these individual defendants alone. A thousand little fuehrers dictated,
a thousand imitation Goerings strutted, a thousand Schirachs incited the
youth, a thousand Sauckels worked slaves, a thousand Streichers and
Rosenbergs stirred hate, a thousand Kaltenbrunners and Franks tortured
and killed, a thousand Schachts and Speers and Funks administered,
financed, and supported the movement. The Nazi movement was an
integrated force in city and county and hamlet. The party power
resulting from this system of organizations first rivaled, and then
dominated, the power of the State itself.
The primary vice of this web of organizations was that they were used to
transfer the power of coercing men from the government and the law to
the Nazi leaders. Liberty, self-government, and security of persons and
property do not exist except where the power of coercion is possessed
only by the State and is exercised only in obedience to law. The Nazis,
however, set up a private system of coercion, outside of and immune from
law, with party-controlled concentration camps and firing squads to
administer privately decreed sanctions. Without responsibility to law
and without warrant from any court, they were enabled to seize property,
take away liberty, and even take life itself.
These organizations had a calculated and decisive part in the barbaric
extremes of the Nazi movement. They served cleverly to exploit mob
psychology and to manipulate the mob. Multiplying the numbers of persons
in a common enterprise tends to diminish each individual’s sense of
moral responsibility and to increase his sense of security. The Nazi
leaders were masters of this technique. They manipulated these
organizations to make before the German populace impressive exhibitions
of numbers and of power. These were used to incite a mob spirit and then
riotously to gratify the popular hates they had inflamed and the
Germanic ambition they had inflated.
These organizations indoctrinated and practiced violence and terrorism.
They provided the systematized, aggressive, and disciplined execution
throughout Germany and the occupied countries of the whole catalogue of
crimes we have proven. The flowering of the system is represented in the
fanatical SS General Ohlendorf, who told this Tribunal without shame or
trace of pity how he personally directed the putting to death of 90,000
men, women, and children. No tribunal ever listened to a recital of such
wholesale murder as this Tribunal heard from him and from Wisliceny, a
fellow officer of the SS. Their own testimony shows the responsibility
of the SS for the extermination program which took the lives of five
million Jews, a responsibility the organization welcomed and discharged
methodically, remorselessly, and thoroughly. These crimes are
unprecedented ones because of the shocking numbers of victims. They are
even more shocking and unprecedented because of the large number of
persons who united to perpetrate them. All scruple or conscience of a
very large segment of the German people was committed to Nazi keeping,
and its devotees felt no personal sense of guilt as they went from one
extreme measure to another. On the other hand, they developed a contest
in cruelty and a competition in crime. Ohlendorf from the witness stand
accused other SS commanders, whose killings exceeded his, of
“exaggerating” their figures.
There could be no justice and no wisdom in an occupation policy which
imposed upon passive and unorganized and inarticulate Germans the same
burdens as it placed upon those who voluntarily banded themselves
together in these powerful and notorious gangs. One of the basic
requirements, both of justice and of successful administration of the
occupation responsibility of the victors, is a segregation of these
organized elements from the masses of Germans for separate treatment.
It seems beyond controversy that to punish a few top leaders but to
leave this web of organized bodies unscotched in the midst of German
postwar society, would be to foster the nucleus of a new Nazidom. The
members are accustomed to an established chain of centralized command;
they have formed a habit and developed a technique of both secret and
open cooperation. They still nourish a blind devotion to the suspended,
but not abandoned, Nazi program. They will keep alive the hates and
ambitions which generated the orgy of crime we have proved. They are
carriers, from this generation to the next, of the infection of
aggressive and ruthless war. The Tribunal has seen on the screen how
easily an assemblage that ostensibly is only a common labor force can be
in fact a military training unit drilling with shovels. The next war and
the next pogroms will be hatched in the nests of these organizations as
surely as we leave their membership with its prestige and influence
undiminished by condemnation and punishment.
The menace of these organizations is the more impressive when we
consider the demoralized state of German society. It will be years
before there can be established in the German State any political
authority that is not inexperienced and provisional. It cannot quickly
acquire the stability of a government aided by long habit of obedience
and traditional respect. The intrigue, obstruction, and possible
overthrow, which older and established governments fear from
conspiratorial groups, is a real and present danger to any stable social
order in the Germany of today and of tomorrow.
Insofar as the Charter of this Tribunal contemplates a justice of
retribution, it is obvious that it could not overlook these organized
instruments and instigators of past crimes. In opening this case, I said
that the United States does not seek to convict the whole German people
of crime. But it is equally important that this trial shall not serve to
absolve the whole German people except 22 men in the dock. The wrongs
that have been done to the world by these defendants and their top
confederates was not done by their will or by their strength alone. The
success of their designs was made possible because great numbers of
Germans organized themselves to become the fulcrum and the lever by
which the power of these leaders was extended and magnified. If this
trial fails to condemn these organized confederates for share of
responsibility for this catastrophe, it will be construed as their
exoneration.
But the Charter was not concerned with retributive justice alone. It
manifests a constructive policy influenced by exemplary and preventive
considerations. The primary objective of requiring that the surrender be
unconditional was to clear the way for reconstruction of German society
on such a basis that it will not again threaten the peace of Europe and
of the world. Temporary measures of the occupation authorities may, by
necessity, have been more arbitrary and applied with less discrimination
than befits a permanent policy. Under existing denazification policy, no
member of the Nazi party or its formations may be employed in any
position, other than ordinary labor, or in any business enterprise
unless he is found to have been only a nominal Nazi. Persons in certain
categories, whose standing in the community is one of prominence or
influence, are required to meet this standard, and those who do not may
be denied further participation in their businesses or professions. It
is mandatory to remove or exclude from public office, and from positions
of importance in quasi public and private enterprises, persons falling
within approximately 90 specified categories deemed to consist of either
active Nazis, Nazi supporters, or militarists. The property of such
persons is blocked.
It is recognized by the Control Council, as it was by the framers of the
Charter, that a permanent, long-term program should be based on a more
careful and more individual discrimination than was possible with
sweeping temporary measures. There is a movement now within the Control
Council for reconsideration of its whole denazification policy and
procedure. The action of this Tribunal in declaring, or in failing to
declare, the accused organizations criminal has a vital bearing on
future occupation policy.
It was the intent of the Charter to utilize the hearing processes of
this Tribunal to identify and condemn those Nazi and militaristic forces
that were so organized as to constitute a continuing menace to the
long-term objectives for which our respective countries have spent the
lives of their young men. It is in the light of this great purpose that
we must examine the provisions of the Charter.
B. _The Procedure for Condemning Organizations._
It was obvious that the conventional litigation procedures could not,
without some modification, be adapted to this task. No system of
jurisprudence has yet evolved any satisfactory technique for handling a
great multiplicity of common charges against a multitude of accused
persons. The number of individual defendants that fairly can be tried in
a single proceeding probably does not greatly exceed the number now in
your dock. Moreover, the number of separate trials in which the same
voluminous evidence as to common plan must be repeated is very limited
as a practical matter. Yet adversary hearing procedures are the best
assurance the law has evolved that decisions will be well considered and
just. The task of the framers of the Charter was to find a way to
overcome these obstacles to practicable and early decision without
sacrificing the fairness implicit in hearings. The solution prescribed
by the Charter is certainly not faultless, but not one of its critics
has ever proposed an alternative that would not either deprive the
individual of any hearing or contemplate such a multitude of long trials
as to be impracticable. In any case, it is the plan adopted by our
respective governments and our duty here is to make it work.
The plan which was adopted in the Charter essentially is a severance of
the general issues which would be common to all individual trials from
the particular issues which would differ in each trial. The plan is
comparable to that employed in certain wartime legislation of the United
States (_Yakus_ v. _United States_, 321 U. S., 414, 64 Sup. Ct. 660).
The general issues are to be determined with finality in one trial
before the International Tribunal. In this trial, every accused
organization must be defended by counsel and must be represented by at
least one leading member, and other individual members may apply to be
heard. Their applications may be granted if the Tribunal thinks justice
requires it. The only issue in this trial concerns the collective
criminality of the organization or group. It is to be adjudicated by
what amounts to be a declaratory judgment. It does not decree any
punishment, either against the organization or against the individual
members.
The only specification as to the effect of this Tribunal’s declaration
that an organization is criminal, is contained in Article 10 of the
Charter, which provides:
“In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by
the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory
shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for
membership therein before national, military or occupation
courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group or
organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned.”
Unquestionably, it would be competent for the Charter to have declared
flatly that membership in any of these named organizations is criminal
and should be punished accordingly. If there had been such an enactment,
it would not have been open to an individual who was being tried for
membership in the organization to contend that the organization was not
in fact criminal. The framers of the Charter, at a time before the
evidence adduced here was available, did not care to find organizations
criminal by fiat. They left that issue to determination after relevant
facts were developed by adversary proceedings. Plainly, the individual
member is better off because of the procedure of the Charter, which
leaves that finding of criminality to this body after hearings at which
the organization must, and the individual may, be represented.
The groups and organizations named in the Indictment are not “on trial”
in the conventional sense of that term. They are more nearly under
investigation as they might be before a grand jury in Anglo-American
practice. Article 9 recognizes a distinction between _the declaration_
of a group or organization as criminal and “_the trial_ of any
individual member thereof.” The power of the Tribunal to try is confined
to “persons,” and the Charter does not expand that term by definition,
as statutes sometimes do, to include other than natural persons. The
groups or organizations named in the Indictment were not as entities
served with process. The Tribunal is not empowered to impose any
sentence upon them as entities, nor to convict any person because of
membership.
It is to be observed that the Charter does not _require_ subsequent
proceedings against anyone. It provides only that the competent national
authorities “_shall have the right_ to bring individuals to trial for
membership therein.”
The Charter is silent as to the form these trials should take. It was
not deemed wise, on the information available when the Charter was drawn
up, that the Charter should regulate subsequent proceedings. Nor was it
necessary to do so. There is a continuing legislative authority,
representing all four signatory nations, competent to take over where
the Charter leaves off. Legislative supplementation of the Charter is
necessary to confer jurisdiction on local courts, to define procedures,
and to prescribe different penalties for different forms of activity.
Fear has been expressed, however, that the Charter’s silence as to
future proceedings means that great numbers of members will be rounded
up and automatically punished as a result of a declaration of an
organization to be criminal. It also has been suggested that this is, or
may be, the consequence of Article II, 1(d) of Control Council Act No.
10, which defines as a crime “membership in categories of a criminal
group or organization declared criminal by the International Military
Tribunal.” A purpose to inflict punishments without a right of hearing
cannot be spelled out of the Charter, and would be offensive to both its
letter and its spirit. And I do not find in Control Council Act No. 10
any inconsistency with the Charter. Of course, to reach all individual
members will require numerous hearings. But they will involve only
narrow issues; many accused will have no answers to charges if they are
clearly stated, and the proceedings should be expeditious and
nontechnical.
But I think it is clear that before any person is punishable for
membership in a criminal organization, he is entitled to a hearing on
the facts of his case. The Charter does not authorize the national
authorities to punish membership without a hearing—it gives them only
the right to “bring individuals to trial.” That means what it says. A
trial means there is something to try.
As to trials of the individual members, the Charter denies only one of
the possible defenses of an accused: he may not relitigate the question
whether the organization itself was a criminal one. Nothing precludes
him from denying that his participation was voluntary and proving he
acted under duress; he may prove that he was deceived or tricked into
membership; he may show that he had withdrawn; or he may prove that his
name on the rolls is a case of mistaken identity.
The membership which the Charter and the Control Council Act make
criminal, of course, implies a genuine membership involving the volition
of the member. The act of affiliation with the organization must have
been intentional and voluntary. Legal compulsion or illegal duress,
actual fraud or trick of which one is a victim, has never been thought
to be the victim’s crime, and such an unjust result is not to be implied
now. The extent of the member’s knowledge of the criminal character of
the organization is, however, another matter. He may not have known on
the day he joined but may have remained a member after learning the
fact. And he is chargeable not only with what he knew but with all of
which he reasonably was put on notice.
There are safeguards to assure that this program will be carried out in
good faith. Prosecution under the declaration is discretionary, and if
there were purpose to punish without trial, it would have been already
done without waiting for the declaration. We think the Tribunal will
presume that signatory powers which have voluntarily submitted to this
process will carry it out faithfully.
The Control Council Act applies only to “categories of membership
declared criminal.” This language recognizes a power in this Tribunal to
limit the effect of its declaration. I do not think, for reasons I will
later state, that this should be construed or availed of so as to try
here any issues as to sub-groups or sections or individuals, which can
be tried later. It should, I think, be construed to mean, not those
limitations which must be defined by detailed evidence, but limitations
of principle such as those I have outlined as already implied. It does
not require this Tribunal to delve into evidence to condition its
judgment, if it sees fit, to apply only to intentional, voluntary, and
knowing membership. It does not supplant later trials but guides them.
It cannot be said that a plan, such as we have here, for the severance
of general issues common to many cases from particular issues applicable
only to individual defendants and for the litigation of each type of
issue in separate Tribunals specially adapted to their different tasks,
is lacking in reasonableness or fair play. And while it presents unusual
procedural difficulties, I do not think it presents any insurmountable
ones.
C. _Criteria, Principles, and Precedents for Declaring Collective
Criminality._
The substantive law which governs the inquiry into criminality of
organizations is, in its large outline, old and well settled and fairly
uniform in all systems of law. It is true that we are dealing with a
procedure easy to abuse and one often feared as an interference with
liberty of assembly or as an imposition of “guilt by association.” It
also is true that proceedings against organizations are closely akin to
the conspiracy charge, which is the great dragnet of the law, rightly
watched by courts lest it be abused.
The fact is, however, that every form of government has considered it
necessary to treat some organizations as criminal. Not even the most
tolerant of governments can permit the accumulation of power in private
organizations to a point where it rivals, obstructs, or dominates the
government itself. To do so would be to grant designing men a liberty to
destroy liberty. It was the very complacency and tolerance as well as
the impotence of the Weimar Republic towards the growing organization of
Nazi power, which spelled the death of German freedom.
Protection of the citizen’s liberty has required even free governments
to enact laws making criminal those aggregations of power which threaten
to impose their will on unwilling citizens. Every one of the nations
signatory to this Charter has laws making certain types of organizations
criminal. The Ku Klux Klan in the United States flourished at about the
same time as the Nazi movement in Germany. It appealed to the same
hates, practiced the same extra-legal coercions, and likewise terrorized
by weird nighttime ceremonials. Like the Nazi Party it was composed of a
core of fanatics, but enlisted support of some respectable persons who
knew it was wrong, but thought it was winning. It eventually provoked a
variety of legislative acts directed against such organizations.
The Congress of the United States also has enacted legislation outlawing
certain organizations. A recent example is the Act of June 28, 1940 (c.
439, Title I, Section 2, 54 Stat. 671, 18 USCA 10) which provides in
part as follows:
“(a) It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
“(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group,
or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage
the overthrow or destruction of any government in the
United States by force or violence; or to be or become a
member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group,
or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.”
There is much legislation by States of the American union creating
analogous offenses. An example is to be found in the Act of California
(Statutes 1919, Chapter 188, p. 281) which, after defining “criminal
syndicalism,” provides:
“Section 2. Any person who . . . (4) organizes or assists in
organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a member of, any
organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized
or assembled to teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism . . .
“Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment.”
Precedents in English law for outlawing organizations and punishing
membership therein are old and consistent with the Charter. One of the
first is the British India Act No. 30, enacted November 14, 1836.
Section 1 provides:
“It is hereby enacted that whoever shall be proved to have
belonged either before or after the passing of this Act to any
gang of thugs either within or without the territories of the
East India Company shall be punished with imprisonment for life
with hard labour.”
Other precedents in English legislation are the Unlawful Societies Act
of 1799 (3 George III, Chapter 79); the Seditious Meetings Act of 1817
(57 George III, Chapter 19); the Seditious Meetings Act of 1846 (9 and
10 Victoria, Chapter 33); the Public Order Act of 1936 and Defense
Regulation 18(b). The last, not without opposition, was intended to
protect the integrity of the British Government against the fifth-column
activities of this same Nazi conspiracy.
Soviet Russia punishes as a crime the formation of and membership in a
criminal gang. Criminologists of the U.S.S.R. call this crime the “crime
of banditry,” a term appropriate to the German organizations.
French criminal law makes membership in subversive organizations a
crime. Membership of the criminal gang is a crime in itself. (Articles
265-268, French Penal Code, “_Association de Malfaiteurs_”; Garaud,
_Précis de Droit Criminel_, 1934 Edition Sirey, p. 1518 and seq. See
also Act of December 18, 1893.)
For German precedents, it is neither seemly nor necessary to go to the
Nazi regime. Under the Empire and the Weimar Republic, however, German
jurisprudence deserved respect and it presents both statutory and
juridical examples of declarations of the criminality of organizations.
Among statutory examples are:
1. The German Criminal Code enacted in 1871. Section 128 was aimed
against secret associations and Section 129 was directed against
organizations inimical to the State.
2. The law of March 22, 1921 against paramilitary organizations.
3. The law of July 21, 1922 against organizations aimed at overthrowing
the constitution of the Reich.
Section 128 of the Criminal Code of 1871 is especially pertinent. It
reads:
“The participation in an organization the existence,
constitution, or purposes of which are to be kept secret from
the Government, or in which obedience to unknown superiors or
unconditional obedience to known superiors is pledged, is
punishable by imprisonment up to six months for the members and
from one month to one year for the founders and officers. Public
officials may be deprived of the right to hold public office for
a period of from one to five years.”
Under the Empire, various Polish national unions were the subject of
criminal prosecution. Under the Republic, judicial judgments in 1927-28
held criminal the entire Communist Party of Germany. In 1922 and 1928
judgments ran against the political Leadership Corps of the Communist
Party, which included all its so-called “body of functionaries,”
corresponding to the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party which we have
accused. The judgment included every cashier, every employee, every
delivery boy and messenger, and every district leader. In 1930 a
judgment of criminality against the “Union of Red Front Fighters” of the
Communist Party made no discrimination between leaders and ordinary
members.
Most significant of all is the fact that on 30 May, 1924 the German
courts rendered judgment that the whole Nazi Party was a criminal
organization. This decision referred not only to the Leadership Corps,
which we are indicting here, but to all other members as well. The whole
subsequent rise to power of the Nazi Party was in the shadow of this
judgment of illegality.
The German courts in dealing with criminal organizations proceeded on
the theory that all members were held together by a common plan in which
each one participated even though at various levels. Moreover, the
fundamental principles of responsibility of members as stated by the
German Supreme Court are strikingly like the principles that govern our
Anglo-American law of conspiracy. Among them were these:
1. “It is a matter of indifference whether all the members
pursued the forbidden aims. It is enough if a part exercised the
forbidden activity.” (R.G. VIa 97/22 of the 8.5.22.)
2. “It is a matter of indifference whether the members of the
group or association agree with the aims, tasks, means of
working and means of fighting.” (R.G. 58, 401 of the 24.10.24.)
3. “The real attitude of mind of the participants is a matter of
indifference. Even if they had the intention of not
participating in criminal efforts, or hindering them, this can
not eliminate their responsibility.” (R.G. 58, 401 of the
24.10.24.)
Organizations with criminal ends are everywhere regarded as in the
nature of criminal conspiracies, and their criminality is judged by the
application of conspiracy principles. The reason why they are offensive
to law-governed people has been succinctly stated as follows:
“The reason for finding criminal liability in case of a
combination to effect an unlawful end or to use unlawful means,
where none would exist, even though the act contemplated were
actually committed by an individual, is that a combination of
persons to commit a wrong, either as an end or as a means to an
end, is so much more dangerous, because of its increased power
to do wrong, because it is more difficult to guard against and
prevent the evil designs of a group of persons than of a single
person, and because of the terror which fear of such a
combination tends to create in the minds of people.” (_Miller on
Criminal Law_, 1932, p. 110.)
The Charter, in Article 6, provides that “Leaders, organizers,
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in
execution of such plan.” The individual defendants are arraigned at your
bar on this charge which, if proved, makes them responsible for the acts
of others in execution of the common plan.
The Charter did not define responsibility for the acts of others in
terms of “conspiracy” alone. The crimes were defined in non-technical
but inclusive terms, and embraced formulating and executing a “common
plan” as well as participating in a “conspiracy.” It was feared that to
do otherwise might import into the proceedings technical requirements
and limitations which have grown up around the term “conspiracy.” There
are some divergences between the Anglo-American concept of conspiracy
and that of either Soviet, French, or German jurisprudence. It was
desired that concrete cases be guided by the broader considerations
inherent in the nature of the social problem, rather than controlled by
refinements of any local law.
Now, except for procedural difficulties arising from their multitude,
there is no reason why every member of any Nazi organization accused
here could not have been indicted and convicted as a part of the
conspiracy under Article 6 even if the Charter had never mentioned
organizations at all. Voluntary affiliation constituted a definite act
of adherence to some common plan and purpose. These did not pretend to
be merely social or cultural groups; admittedly they were united for
action. In the case of several of the Nazi organizations, the fact of
confederation was evidenced by formal induction into membership, the
taking of an oath, the wearing of a distinctive uniform, the submission
to a discipline. That all members of each Nazi organization did combine
under a common plan to achieve some end by combined efforts is
abundantly established.
The criteria for determining the collective guilt of those who thus
adhered to a common plan obviously are those which would test the
legality of any combination or conspiracy. Did it contemplate illegal
methods or aim at illegal ends? If so, the liability of each member of
one of these Nazi organizations for the acts of every other member is
not essentially different from the liability for conspiracy enforced in
Courts of the United States against business men who combine in
violation of the anti-trust laws, or of other defendants accused under
narcotic drugs laws, sedition acts, or other federal penal enactments.
Among the principles every day enforced in Courts of Great Britain and
the United States in dealing with conspiracy are these:
1. No meeting or formal agreement is necessary. It is sufficient,
although one performs one part and other persons other parts, if there
be concert of action, and working together understandingly with a common
design to accomplish a common purpose.
2. One may be liable even though he may not have known who his
fellow-conspirators were, or just what part they were to take, or what
acts they committed, and though he did not take personal part in them or
was absent when criminal acts occurred.
3. There may be liability for acts of fellow-conspirators although the
particular acts were not intended or anticipated, if they were done in
execution of the common plan.
4. It is not necessary to liability that one be a member of a conspiracy
at the same time as other actors, or at the time of criminal acts. When
one becomes a party to it, he adopts and ratifies what has gone before
and remains responsible until he abandons the conspiracy with notice to
his fellow-conspirators.
Of course, members of criminal organizations or conspiracies who
personally commit crimes are individually punishable for those crimes
exactly as are those who commit the same offenses without organizational
backing. But the very gist of the crime of conspiracy or membership in a
criminal association is liability for acts one did not personally commit
but which his acts facilitated or abetted. The crime is to combine with
others and to participate in the unlawful common effort, however
innocent the personal acts of the participant when considered by
themselves.
The very innocent act of mailing a letter is enough to implicate one in
a conspiracy if the purpose of the letter is to advance a criminal plan.
There are countless examples of this doctrine in Anglo-American
jurisprudence.
The sweep of the law of conspiracy is an important consideration in
determining the criteria of guilt for organizations. Certainly the
vicarious liability imposed in consequence of voluntary membership,
formalized by oath, dedicated to a common organizational purpose and
submission to a discipline and chain of command, can not be less than
that which follows from informal cooperation with a nebulous group to a
common end as is sufficient in conspiracy. This meets the suggestion
that the prosecution is required to prove every member, or every part,
fraction, or division of the membership to be guilty of criminal acts.
The suggestion ignores the conspiratorial nature of the charge. Such an
interpretation also would reduce the Charter to an unworkable absurdity.
To concentrate in one International Tribunal inquiries requiring such
detailed evidence as to each member would set a task not possible of
completion within the lives of living men.
It is easy to toss about such a plausible but superficial cliché as,
“One should be convicted for his activities, not for his membership.”
But this ignores the fact that membership in Nazi bodies was itself an
activity. It was not something passed out to a passive citizen like a
handbill. Even a nominal membership may aid and abet a movement greatly.
Does anyone believe that Hjalmar Schacht sitting in the front row of the
Nazi Party Congress of 1935, wearing the insignia of the Party, was
included in the Nazi propaganda films merely for artistic effect? This
great banker’s mere loan of his name to this shady enterprise gave it a
lift and a respectability in the eyes of every hesitating German. There
may be instances in which membership did not aid and abet the
organizational ends and means, but individual situations of that kind
are for appraisal in the later hearings and not by this Tribunal. By and
large, the use of organization affiliation is a quick and simple, but at
the same time fairly accurate outline of the contours of a conspiracy to
do what the organization actually did. It is the only one workable at
this stage of the trial. It can work no injustice because before any
individual can be punished, he can submit the facts of his own case to
further and more detailed judicial scrutiny.
While the Charter does not so provide, we think that on ordinary legal
principles the burden of proof to justify a declaration of criminality
is upon the prosecution. It is discharged, we think, when we establish
the following:
1. The organization or group in question must be some aggregation of
persons associated in some identifiable relationship with a collective
general purpose.
2. While the Charter does not so declare, we think it implied that
membership in such an organization must be generally voluntary. That
does not require proof that every member was a volunteer. Nor does it
mean that an organization is not to be considered voluntary if the
defense proves that some minor fraction or small percentage of its
membership was compelled to join. The test is a common-sense one: Was
the organization on the whole one which persons were free to join or to
stay out of? Membership is not made involuntary by the fact that it was
good business or good politics to identify one’s self with the movement.
Any compulsion must be of the kind which the law normally recognizes,
and threats of political or economic retaliation would be of no
consequence.
3. The aims of the organization must be criminal in that it was
designing to perform acts denounced as crimes in Article 6 of the
Charter. No other act would authorize conviction of an individual and
therefore no other act would authorize conviction of an organization in
connection with the conviction of the individual.
4. The criminal aims or methods of the organization must have been of
such character that its membership in general may properly be charged
with knowledge of them. This again is not specifically required by the
Charter. Of course, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to establish
the individual knowledge of every member of the organization or to rebut
the possibility that some may have joined in ignorance of its true
character.
5. Some individual defendant must have been a member of the organization
and must be convicted of some act on the basis of which the organization
is declared to be criminal.
D. _Definition of Issues for Trial._
The progress of this trial will be expedited by clear definition of the
issues to be tried. I have indicated what we consider to be the proper
criteria of guilt. There are also subjects which we think are not
relevant before this Tribunal, some of which are mentioned in the
specific questions asked by the Tribunal.
Only a single ultimate issue is before this Tribunal for decision. That
is whether accused organizations properly may be characterized as
criminal ones or as innocent ones. Nothing is relevant here that does
not bear on a question that would be common to the case of every member.
Any matter which would be exculpating for some members but not for all
is irrelevant here.
We think it is not relevant to this proceeding at this stage that one or
many members were conscripted if in general the membership was
voluntary. It may be conceded that conscription is a good defense for an
individual charged with membership in a criminal organization, but an
organization can have criminal purposes and commit criminal acts even if
a portion of its membership consists of persons who were compelled to
join it. The issue of conscription is not pertinent to this proceeding
but it is pertinent to the trials of individuals for membership in
organizations declared criminal by this Tribunal.
We also think it is not relevant to this proceeding that one or more
members of the named organizations were ignorant of its criminal
purposes or methods if its purposes or methods were open and notorious.
An organization may have criminal purposes and commit criminal acts
although one or many of its members were without personal knowledge
thereof. If a person joined what he thought was a social club but what
in fact was a gang of cutthroats and murderers, his lack of knowledge
would not exonerate the gang considered as a group, although it might
possibly be a factor in extenuation of a charge of criminality brought
against him for mere membership in the organization. Even then the test
would be not what the man knew, but what, as a person of common
understanding, he should have known.
It is not relevant to this proceeding that one or more members of the
named organizations were themselves innocent of unlawful acts. This
proposition is basic to the entire theory of the declaration of
organizational criminality. The purpose of declaring criminality of
organizations, as in every conspiracy charge, is punishment for aiding
crimes, although the precise perpetrators may never be found or
identified. We know that the Gestapo and SS, as organizations, were
given principal responsibility for the extermination of the Jewish
people in Europe—but beyond a few isolated instances, we can never
establish which members of the Gestapo or SS actually carried out the
murders. Any member guilty of direct participation in such crimes can be
tried on the charge of having committed specific crimes in addition to
the general charge of membership in a criminal organization. Therefore,
it is wholly immaterial that one or more members of the organizations
were themselves allegedly innocent of specific wrongdoing. The purpose
of this proceeding is not to reach instances of individual criminal
conduct, even in subsequent trials and, therefore, such considerations
are irrelevant here.
Another question raised by the Tribunal is the period of time during
which the groups or organizations named in the Indictment are claimed by
the Prosecution to have been criminal. The Prosecution believes that
each organization should be declared criminal during the period referred
to in the Indictment. We do not contend that the Tribunal is without
power to condition its declaration so as to cover a lesser period of
time than that set forth in the Indictment. The Prosecution feels,
however, that there is in the record at this time adequate evidence to
support the charge of criminality with respect to each of the named
organizations during the full period of time set forth in the
Indictment.
Another question raised by the Tribunal is whether any classes of
persons included within the accused groups or organizations should be
excluded from the declaration of criminality. It is, of course,
necessary that the Tribunal relate its declaration to some identifiable
group or organization. The Tribunal, however, is not expected or
required to be bound by formalities of organization. In framing the
Charter, the use was deliberately avoided of terms or concepts which
would involve this trial in legal technicalities about “juristic
persons” or “entities.” Systems of jurisprudence are not uniform in the
refinements of these fictions. The concept of the Charter, therefore, is
a nontechnical one. “Group” or “organization” should be given no
artificial or sophistical meaning. The word “group” was used in the
Charter as a broader term, implying a looser and less formal structure
or relationship than is implied in the “organization.” The terms mean in
the context of the Charter what they mean in the ordinary speech of
people. The test to identify a group or organization is, we submit, a
natural and common-sense one.
It is important to bear in mind that while the Tribunal no doubt has
power to make its own definition of the groups it will declare criminal,
the precise composition and membership of groups and organizations is
not an issue for trial here. There is no Charter requirement and no
practical need for the Tribunal to define a group or organization with
such particularity that its precise composition or membership is thereby
determined. The creation of a mechanism for later trial of such issues
was a recognition that the declaration of this Tribunal is not decisive
of such questions and is likely to be so general as to comprehend
persons who on more detailed inquiry will prove to be outside of it. An
effort by this Tribunal to try questions of exculpation of individuals,
few or many, would unduly protract the trial, transgress the limitation
of the Charter, and quite likely do some mischief by attempting to
adjudicate precise boundaries on evidence which is not directed to that
purpose.
The prosecution stands upon the language of the Indictment and contends
that each group or organization should be declared criminal as an entity
and that no inquiry should be entered upon and no evidence entertained
as to the exculpation of any class or classes of persons within such
descriptions. Practical reasons of conserving the Tribunal’s time
combine with practical considerations for the defendants. A single trial
held in one city to deal with questions of excluding thousands of
defendants living all over Germany could not be expected to do justice
to each member unless it was expected to endure indefinitely. Provision
for later, local trial of individual relationships protects the rights
of members better than can possibly be done in proceedings before this
Tribunal.
With respect to the Gestapo, the United States consents to exclude
persons employed in purely clerical, stenographic, janitorial or similar
unofficial routine tasks. As to the Nazi Leadership Corps we abide by
the position taken at the time of submission of the evidence, that the
following should be included: the Fuehrer, the _Reichsleitung_ (i.e.,
the _Reichsleiters_, main departments and officeholders), the
_Gauleiters_ and their staff officers, the _Kreisleiters_ and their
staff officers, the _Ortsgruppenleiters_, the _Zellenleiters_, and the
_Blockleiters_, but not members of the staff of the last three
officials. As regards the SA, it is considered advisable that the
Declaration expressly exclude (1) wearers of the SA Sports Badge; (2) SA
controlled Home Guard Units (_SA Wehrmannschaften_) which were not
strictly part of the SA; (3) The _Marchabteilungen_ of the N.S.K.O.V.
(National Socialist League for Disabled Veterans); and (4) the SA
Reserve, so as to include only the active part of the organization, and
that members who were never in any part of that organization other than
the Reserve should be excluded.
The Prosecution does not feel that there is evidence of the severability
of any class or classes of persons within the organizations accused
which would justify any further concessions and feels that no other part
of the named groups should be excluded. In this connection, we would
again stress the principles of conspiracy. The fact that a section of an
organization itself committed no criminal act, or may have been occupied
in technical or administrative functions, does not relieve that section
of criminal responsibility if its activities contributed to the
accomplishment of the criminal enterprise.
E. _Further Steps Before This Tribunal._
Over 45,000 persons have joined in communications to this Tribunal
asking to be heard in connection with the accusations against
organizations. The volume of these applications has caused apprehension
as to further proceedings. No doubt there are difficulties yet to be
overcome, but my study indicates that the difficulties are greatly
exaggerated.
The Tribunal is vested with wide discretion as to whether it will
entertain an application to be heard. The Prosecution would be anxious,
of course, to have every application granted that is necessary, not only
to do justice but to avoid the appearance of doing anything less than
justice. And we do not consider that expediting this trial is so
important as affording a fair opportunity to present all really
pertinent facts.
Analysis of the conditions which have brought about this flood of
applications indicates that their significance is not proportionate to
their numbers. The Tribunal sent out 200,000 printed notices of the
right to appear before it and defend. They were sent to Allied prisoner
of war and internment camps. The notice was published in all German
language papers and was repeatedly broadcast over the radio. The 45,000
persons who responded with applications to be heard came principally
from about 15 prisoner of war and internment camps in British or United
States control. Those received included an approximate 12,000 from
Dachau, 10,000 from Langwasser, 7,500 from Auerbach, 4,000 from
Staumuehle, 2,500 from Garmisch, and several hundred from each of the
others.
We undertook investigation of these applications from Auerbach camp as
probably typical of all. The camp is for prisoners of war, predominantly
SS members, and its prisoners number 16,964 enlisted men and 923
officers. The notice of the International Tribunal was posted in each
barracks and was read to all inmates. The applications to the Tribunal
were forwarded without censorship. Applications to defend were made by
7,509 SS members.
Investigation indicates that these were filed in direct response to the
notice and that no action was directed or inspired from any other source
within the camp. All who were interrogated professed no knowledge of any
SS crimes or of SS criminal purpose, but expressed interest only in
their individual fate. Our investigators report no indication that the
SS members had additional evidence or information to submit on the
general question of the criminality of the SS as an organization. They
seemed to think it necessary to make the application to this Tribunal in
order to protect themselves.
Examination of the applications made to the Tribunal indicates that most
members do not profess to have evidence on the general issue triable
here. They assert that the writer has neither committed, witnessed, nor
known of the crimes charged against the organization. On a proper
definition of the issues such an application is insufficient on its
face.
A careful examination of the Tribunal’s notice to which these
applications respond will indicate that the notice contains no word
which would inform a member, particularly if a layman, of the narrowness
of the issues here, or of the later opportunity of each member, if and
when prosecuted, to present personal defenses. On the other hand, I
think the notice creates the impression that every member may be
convicted and punished by this Tribunal and that his only chance to be
heard is here.
In view of these facts we suggest consideration of the following program
for completion of this trial as to organizations.
1. That the Tribunal formulate and express in an order the scope of the
issues and the limitations on the issues to be heard by it.
2. That a notice adequately informing members as to the limitation on
issues and the opportunity for later, individual trial, be sent to all
applicants and published as was the original notice.
3. That a panel of masters be appointed as authorized in Article 17(e)
of the Charter to examine applications and report those insufficient on
their own statements, and to go to the camps and supervise the taking of
any relevant evidence. Defense counsel and prosecution representatives
should of course attend and be heard before the masters. The masters
should reduce any evidence to deposition form and report the whole to
the Tribunal to be introduced as a part of its record.
4. The representative principle may also be employed to simplify this
task. Members of particular organizations in particular camps might well
be invited to choose one or more to represent them in presenting
evidence.
It may not be untimely to remind the Tribunal and defense counsel that
the prosecution has omitted from evidence many relevant documents which
show repetition of crimes by these organizations in order to save time
by avoiding cumulative evidence. It is not too much to expect that
cumulative evidence of a negative character will likewise be limited.
Some concern has been expressed as to the number of persons who might be
affected by the declarations of criminality we have asked. Some people
seem more susceptible to the shock of a million punishments than to the
shock of 5 million murders. At most the number of punishments will never
catch up with the number of crimes. However, it is impossible to state
even with approximate accuracy the number of persons who might be
affected. Figures from German sources seriously exaggerate the number,
because they do not take account of heavy casualties in the latter part
of the war, and make no allowances for duplication of membership, which
was large. For example, the evidence is to the effect that 75 percent of
the Gestapo men also were members of the SS. We know that the United
States forces have in detention a roughly estimated 130,000 persons who
appear to be members of accused organizations. I have no figures from
other Allied forces. But how many of these actually would be prosecuted,
instead of being dealt with under the denazification program, no one can
foretell. Whatever the number, of one thing we may be sure: it is so
large that a thorough inquiry by this Tribunal, into each case, would
prolong its session beyond endurance. All questions as to whether
individuals or sub-groups of accused organizations should be excepted
from the Declaration of Criminality, should be left for local courts,
located near the home of the accused and near sources of evidence. These
courts can work in one or at most in two languages, instead of four, and
can hear evidence which both parties direct to the specific issues.
F. _Conclusion._
This is not the time to review the evidence against particular
organizations which, we take it, should be reserved for summation after
all the evidence is presented. But it is timely to say that the
selection of the six organizations named in the Indictment was not a
matter of chance. The chief reasons they were chosen are these:
collectively they were the ultimate repositories of all power in the
Nazi regime; they were not only the most powerful, but the most vicious
organizations in the regime; and they were organizations in which
membership was generally voluntary.
The Nazi Leadership Corps consisted of the directors and principal
executors of the Nazi Party, which was the force lying behind and
dominating the whole German state. The Reichs Cabinet was the facade
through which the Nazi Party translated its will into legislative,
administrative, and executive acts. The two pillars on which the
security of the regime rested were the armed forces, directed and
controlled by the General Staff and High Command, and the police
forces—the Gestapo, the SA, the SD, and the SS. These organizations
exemplify all the evil forces of the Nazi regime.
These organizations were also selected because, while representative,
they were not so large or extensive as to make it probable that
innocent, passive, or indifferent Germans might be caught up in the same
net with the guilty. State officialdom is represented, but not all
administrative officials or department heads or civil servants; only the
_Reichsregierung_, the very heart of Nazidom within the Government, is
named. The armed forces are accused, but not the average soldier or
officer, no matter how high ranking. Only the top policy-makers—the
General Staff and High Command—are named. The police forces are
accused, but not every policeman: not the ordinary police, which
performed only normal police functions. Only the most terroristic and
repressive police elements—the Gestapo and SD—are named. The Nazi
Party is accused, but not every Nazi voter, not even every member; only
the leaders, the _Politische Leiter_. (_See Chart No. 14._) And not even
every Party official or worker is included; only “the bearers of
sovereignty,” in the metaphysical jargon of the Party, who were the
actual commanding officers and their staff officers on the highest
levels, are accused. The “formations” or strong arms of the Party are
accused, but not every one of the seven formations, nor any of the
twenty or more supervised or affiliated party groups. Nazi organizations
in which membership was compulsory, either legally or in practice (like
the Hitler Youth and the _Deutsche Studentschaft_); Nazi professional
organizations (like the Civil Servants Organization, the National
Socialist Teachers Organization, and the National Socialist Lawyers
Organization); Nazi organizations having some legitimate purpose (like
the welfare organizations), have not been indicted. Only two formations
are named, the SA and the SS, the oldest of the Nazi organizations,
groups which had no purpose other than carrying out the Nazi schemes and
which actively participated in every crime denounced in the Charter.
In administering preventive justice with a view to forestalling
repetition of these crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes, it would be a greater catastrophe to acquit these
organizations than it would be to acquit the entire 22 individual
defendants in the box. These defendants’ power for harm is spent. That
of these organizations goes on. If they are exonerated here, the German
people will infer that they did no wrong and will easily be regimented
in reconstituted organizations under new names behind the same program.
In administering retributive justice it would be possible to exonerate
these organizations only by concluding that no crimes have been
committed by the Nazi regime. Their sponsorship of every Nazi purpose
and their confederation to execute every measure to attain those ends is
beyond denial. A failure to condemn these organizations under the terms
of the Charter can only mean that such Nazi ends and means cannot be
considered criminal, and that the Charter of the Tribunal is considered
a nullity.
2. THE NAZI PARTY LEADERSHIP CORPS
The Nazi Party Leadership Corps—it is proposed to demonstrate—was
responsible for planning, directing, and supervising the criminal
measures carried into execution by the Nazi Party, which was the central
core of the common plan or conspiracy charged in Count I of the
Indictment. Moreover, it will be shown, the members of the Leadership
Corps themselves actively participated in the commission of illegal
measures in aid of the conspiracy. In the light of the evidence to be
discussed, the Leadership Corps may be fairly described as the brain,
the backbone, and the directing arms of the Nazi Party. Its
responsibilities are more massive and comprehensive than those of the
army of followers who blindly and faithfully did its bidding.
A. _Composition, Functions, Responsibilities, and Powers of the
Leadership Corps._
In considering the composition and organizational structure of the
Leadership Corps, preliminary reference is made to the organization
chart of the Nazi Party (_Chart Number 1_) as well as a chart of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party appearing at page 9 of a magazine
published by the Chief Education Office of the Nazi Party entitled “_Das
Gesicht der Partei_” (The Face of the Party). These charts and the
evidence to follow show that the Leadership Corps constituted the sum of
the officials of the Nazi Party: it included the Fuehrer; the
_Reichsleiter_ and Reich office holders; the five categories of leaders
who were area commanders (called _Hoheitstraeger_, or “bearers of
sovereignty”) ranging all the way from the 40-odd _Gauleiter_ in charge
of large districts down through the intermediate political leaders to
the _Blockleiter_, charged with looking after 40 to 60 households; and
what may best be described as the Staff Officers attached to each of the
5 levels of _Hoheitstraeger_.
Organized upon a hierarchical basis, forming a pyramidal structure, the
principal Political Leaders on a scale of descending authority were:
_Fuehrer_
_Reichsleiter_ (Reich Leaders) and _Main Office_ and _Office
Holders_
_Gauleiter_ (District Leaders) and Staff Officers
_Kreisleiter_ (County Leaders) and Staff Officers
_Ortsgruppenleiter_ (Local Chapter Leaders) and Staff Officers
_Zellenleiter_ (Cell Leaders) and Staff Officers
_Blockleiter_ (Block Leaders) and Staff Officers
A large part of this and other evidence relating to the composition of
the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party is to be found in the 1943
edition of the _Organization Book of the NSDAP_, an authoritative primer
on Nazi organizations which was edited by the defendant, Reich
Organization Leader of the NSDAP, Dr. Robert Ley.
The _Reichsleitung_ of the Leadership Corps consisted of the
_Reichsleiter_ or Reich Leaders of the Party, the _Hauptaemter_ (Main
Offices) and the _Aemter_ (or Offices). The _Reichsleiter_ of the Party
were, next to Hitler, the highest officeholders in the Party hierarchy.
All the _Reichsleiter_ and Main Office and officeholders within the
_Reichsleitung_ were appointed by Hitler and were directly responsible
to him. _The Organization Book of the NSDAP_ puts it as follows:
“The Fuehrer appoints the following Political Directors:
“_Reichsleiter_ and all Political Directors, to include the
Directors of the Womens Leagues within the Reich Directorate or
_Reichsleitung_.” (_1893-PS_)
The significant fact is that through the _Reichsleitung_ perfect
coordination of Party and State machinery was guaranteed. The Party
Manual describes it this way:
“In the _Reichsleitung_ the arteries of the organization of the
German people and of the German State merge.” (_1893-PS_)
To demonstrate that the _Reichsleiter_ of the Leadership Corps included
the most powerful coalition of political overlords in Nazi Germany, it
is necessary only to mention their names. The list of _Reichsleiter_
includes the following defendants on trial: Rosenberg, Von Schirach,
Frick, Bormann, and Ley.
The evidence to be presented will show that Rosenberg was the leader of
an organization named for him, the _Einsatzstab_ Rosenberg, which
carried out a vast program of looting and plunder of art treasures
throughout occupied Europe. The evidence will further show that, as
Representative of the Fuehrer for the Supervision of Nazi Ideology and
Schooling, Rosenberg participated in an aggressive campaign to undermine
the Christian churches and to supersede Christianity by a German
National Church founded upon a combination of irrationality,
pseudo-scientific theories, mysticism, and the cult of the racial state.
It will be shown that the late Defendant Ley, acting as the agent of
Hitler and the Leadership Corps, directed the Nazi assault upon the
independent labor unions of Germany and before destroying himself first
destroyed the free and independent labor movement; and that he replaced
it by a Nazi organization, the German Labor front or DAF, which he
employed as a means of exploiting the German labor force in the
interests of the conspiracy and to instill Nazi ideology among the ranks
of the German workers.
It will be shown that Frick participated in the enactment of many laws
which were designed to promote the conspiracy in its several phases.
Frick shares responsibility for the grave injury done by the officials
of the Leadership Corps to the concept of the rule of law by virtue of
his efforts to give the color of law and formal legality to a large
volume of Nazi legislation violative of the rights of humanity, such as
the legislation designed to stigmatize and eliminate the Jewish people
of Germany and German-occupied Europe. As chief of the Party
Chancellery, immediately under Hitler, Bormann was an extremely
important force in directing the activities of the Leadership Corps. As
will be shown, a decree of 16 January 1942 provided that the
participation of the Party in all important legislation, governmental
appointments, and promotions had to be undertaken exclusively by
Bormann. He took part in the preparation of all laws and decrees issued
by the Reich authorities and gave his assent to those of the subordinate
governments.
The list of _Reichsleiter_ of the NSDAP set forth in the _National
Socialist Yearbook_ (1943 Edition) shows that the following 15
_Reichsleiter_ were in office in 1943 (_2473-PS_):
“_THE REICHSLEITERS OF THE NSDAP_
“Max Amann _Reichsleiter_ for the Press.
“Martin Bormann Chief of the Party Chancery.
“Phillipp Bouhler Chief of the Chancery of the Fuehrer of
the NSDAP. Chairman of the official Party
Investigation Commission for the
Protection of National Socialist Writings.
“Walter Darré On leave.
“Otto Dietrich Reich Press Chief of the NSDAP.
“Franz von Epp Chief of the _Kolonialpolitischen Amtes_.
“Karl Fiehler Chief of the main office for Municipal
Politics.
“Wilhelm Frick Leader of the National Socialist “faction”
in the Reichstag.
“Joseph Goebbels Reich Propaganda Leader of the NSDAP.
“Konstantin Hierl Leader of the Reich Labor.
“Heinrich Himmler Reich Leader of the SS. The Deputy of the
NSDAP, for all questions of Germandom.
“Robert Ley Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP.
Leader of the German Labor Front.
“Victor Lutze Chief of Staff of the SA.
“Alfred Rosenberg Representative of the Fuehrer for the
supervision of all mental and ideological
training and education of the NSDAP.
“Baldur von Schirach Reich Leader for the Education of Youth of
the NSDAP.
“Franz Xaver Schwarz Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP.”
(_2473-PS_)
The principal functions of the _Reichsleiter_ included carrying out the
tasks and missions assigned to them by the Fuehrer or by the Chief of
the Party Chancellery, Martin Bormann. The _Reichsleiter_ were further
charged with insuring that Party policies were being executed in all the
subordinate areas of the Reich. The _Reichsleiter_ were also responsible
for insuring a continual flow of new leadership into the Party. With
respect to the function and responsibilities of the _Reichsleiter_, the
Organization Book of the NSDAP states as follows:
“The NSDAP represents the political conception, the political
conscience, and the political will of the German nation.
Political conception, political conscience, and political will
are embodied in the person of the Fuehrer. Based on his
directives and in accordance with the program of the NSDAP the
organs of the Reich Directorate directionally determine the
political aims of the German people. It is in the Reich
Directorate that the arteries of the organization of the German
people and the State merge. It is the task of the separate
organs of the Reich Directorate to maintain as close a contact
as possible with the life of the nation through their
sub-offices in the Gau * * *
“The structure of the Reich Directorate is thus that the channel
from the lowest Party office upwards shows the most minute
weaknesses and changes in the mood of the people * * *
“Another essential task of the Reich Directorate is to assure a
good selection of leaders. It is the duty of the Reich
Directorate to see that there is leadership in all phases of
life, a leadership which is firmly tied to National Socialist
ideology and which promotes its dissemination with all its
energy * * *
“* * * It is the supreme task of the Reich Organization Leader
to preserve the Party as a well-sharpened sword for the
Fuehrer.” (_1893-PS_)
The domination of the German Government by the top members of the
Leadership Corps was facilitated by a circular decree of the Reich
Minister of Justice, dated 17 February 1934, which established equal
rank for the offices within the _Reichsleitung_ of the Leadership Corps
and the Reich offices of the government. In this decree it was expressly
provided that
“the supreme offices of the _Reichsleitung_ are equal in rank to
the supreme Reich Government authorities.”
The Party Manual termed the control exercised over the machinery of
government by the Leadership Corps “the permeation of the State
apparatus with the political will of the Party.”
Domination by the Leadership Corps over the German State and Government
was facilitated by uniting in the same Nazi chieftains both high office
within the _Reichsleitung_ and corresponding offices within the
apparatus of government. For example, Goebbels was a _Reichsleiter_ in
charge of Party propaganda, but he was also a cabinet minister in charge
of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment. Himmler held office within the
_Reichsleitung_ as head of the Main Office for “Volkdom” and as
Reichsfuehrer of the SS. At the same time, Himmler held the governmental
position of Reich Commission for the Consolidation of Germandom and was
the governmental head of the German police system (_Chart Number 1_).
This personal union of high office in the Leadership Corps and high
governmental position in the same Nazi Leaders greatly assisted the plan
of the Leadership Corps to dominate and control the German State and
Government.
In addition to the _Reichsleiter_, the _Reichsleitung_ (Reich Party
Directorate) included about eleven _Hauptamter_, or Main Offices, and
about four _Amter_, or Offices. The _Hauptamter_ of the Party included
such main organizations as those for personnel, training, technology
(headed by Speer), “Volkdom,” (headed by Himmler), civil servants,
communal policy, and the like. The _Amter_, or offices, of the Party
within the _Reichsleitung_ included the Office for Foreign Policy under
Rosenberg which actively participated in plans for aggression against
Norway, the Office for Colonial Policy, the Office for Geneology, and
the Office for Racial Policy.
Certain of the main offices and offices within the _Reichsleitung_
appeared again within the _Gauleitung_, or Gau Party Directorate, and
_Kreisleitung_, or County Party Directorate. Thus, the _Reichsleiter_
and main office and office holders within the _Reichsleitung_ exercised,
through functional channels running through subordinate offices on lower
regional levels, total control over the various sectors of the national
life of Germany.
(1) _Gauleiter._ For Party purposes Germany was divided into major
administrative regions, _Gaue_, which, in turn, were subdivided into
_Kreise_ (counties), _Ortsgruppen_ (local chapters), _Zellen_ (cells),
and _Blocke_ (blocks). Each _Gau_ was in charge of a _Gauleiter_ who was
the political leader of the _Gau_ or district. Each _Gauleiter_ was
appointed by and was responsible to Hitler himself. The _Organization
Book of the NSDAP_ states:
“The _Gau_ represents the concentration of a number of Party
counties, or _Kreise_. The _Gauleiter_ is directly subordinate
to the Fuehrer. He is appointed by the Fuehrer. The _Gauleiter_
bears overall responsibility to the Fuehrer for the sector of
sovereignty entrusted to him. The rights, duties, and
jurisdiction of the _Gauleiter_ result primarily from the
mission assigned by the Fuehrer and, apart from that, from
detailed directives.” (_1893-PS_)
The responsibility and function of the _Gauleiter_ and his staff
officers or office holders were essentially political, namely, to insure
the authority of the Nazi Party within his area, to coordinate the
activities of the Party and all its affiliated and supervised
organizations, and to enlarge the influence of the Party over people and
life in his _Gau_ generally. Following the outbreak of the war, when it
became imperative to coordinate the various phases of the German war
effort, the _Gauleiter_ were given additional important
responsibilities. The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich,
which was a sort of general staff for civil defense and the mobilization
of the German war economy, by a decree of 1 September 1939 (1939,
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1565), appointed about sixteen
_Gauleiter_ as Reich Defense Commissars. Later, under the impact of
mounting military reverses and an increasingly strained war economy,
more and more important administrative functions were put on a _Gau_
basis; the Party Gaue became the basic defense areas of the Reich and
each _Gauleiter_ became a Reich Defense Commissar (Decree of the
Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich of 16 November 1942,
1942 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 649). In the course of the war,
additional functions were entrusted to the _Gauleiter_ so that at the
end, with the exception of certain special matters, such as police
affairs, almost all phases of the German war economy were coordinated
and supervised by them. For instance, regional authority over price
control was put under the _Gauleiter_ as Reich Defense Commissars, and
housing administration was placed under the _Gauleiter_ as _Gau_ Housing
Commissar. Toward the end of the war, the _Gauleiter_ were charged even
with military and quasi military tasks. They were made commanders of the
_Volkssturm_ in their areas and were entrusted with such important
functions as the evacuation of civilian population in the path of the
advancing Allied armies, as well as measures for the destruction of
vital installations.
The structure and organization of the Party _Gau_ were substantially
repeated in the lower levels of the Party organization such as the
_Kreise_, _Ortsgruppen_, Cells, and Blocks. Each of these was headed by
a political leader who, subject to the Fuehrer principle and the orders
of superior political leaders, was sovereign within his sphere. The
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party was in effect a “hierarchy of
descending caesars.” Each of the subordinate Party levels, such as
_Kreise_, _Ortsgruppen_, and so on, was organized into offices or
_Amter_ dealing with the various specialized functions of the Party. But
the number of such departments and offices diminished as the Party unit
dropped in the hierarchy, so that, while the _Kreise_ office contained
all, or most of the offices in the _Gau_ (such as the deputy, the staff
office leader, an organization leader, school leader, propaganda leader,
press office leader, treasurer, judge of the Party Court, inspector, and
the like), the _Ortsgruppe_ had less and the _Zellen_ and _Blocke_ fewer
still.
(2) _Kreisleiter_ (_County Leaders_). The _Kreisleiter_ was appointed
and dismissed by Hitler upon the nomination of the _Gauleiter_ and
directly subordinate to the _Gauleiter_ in the Party hierarchy. The
_Kreis_ usually comprised a single county. The _Kreisleiter_, within the
_Kreis_, had in general the same position, powers, and prerogatives
granted the _Gauleiter_ in the _Gau_. In cities they constituted the
very core of Party power and organization. According to the
_Organization Book of the NSDAP_:
“The _Kreisleiter_ carries over-all responsibility towards the
_Gauleiter_ within his zone of sovereignty for the political and
ideological training and organization of the Political Leaders,
the Party members, as well as the population.” (_1893-PS_)
(3) _Ortsgruppenleiter_ (_Local Chapter Leaders_). The area of the
_Ortsgruppenleiter_ comprised one or more communes or, in a town, a
certain district. The _Ortsgruppe_ was composed of a combination of
blocks and cells and, according to local circumstances, contained up to
1500 households. The _Ortsgruppenleiter_ also had a staff of office
leaders to assist him in the various functional activities of the Party.
All other political leaders in his area of responsibility were
subordinate to and under the direction of the _Ortsgruppenleiter_. For
example, the leaders of the various affiliated organizations of the
Party, within his area, such as the German Labor Front, and the Nazi
organizations for lawyers, students, and civil servants, were all
subordinate to the _Ortsgruppenleiter_. In accordance with the Fuehrer
principle, the _Ortsgruppenleiter_ or Local Chapter Leaders were
appointed by the _Gauleiter_ and were directly under and subordinate to
the _Kreisleiter_.
The party Manual provides as follows with respect to the
_Ortsgruppenleiter_:
“As _Hoheitstraeger_ [Bearer of Sovereignty] all expressions of
the Party will emanate from the _Ortsgruppenleiter_; he is
responsible for the political and ideological leadership and
organization within his zone of sovereignty.
“The _Ortsgruppenleiter_ carries the over-all responsibility for
the political results of all measures initiated by the offices,
organizations, and affiliated associations of the Party. * * *
The _Ortsgruppenleiter_ has the right to protest to the
_Kreisleiter_ against any measures contrary to the interests of
the Party with regard to an outside political appearance in
public.” (_1893-PS_)
(4) _Zellenleiter_ (_Cell Leaders_). The _Zellenleiter_ was responsible
for four to eight blocks. He was the immediate superior of and had
control and supervision over the _Blockleiter_ (Block Leader). His
mission and duties, according to the Party Manual, corresponded to the
missions of the _Blockleiter_. (_1893-PS_)
(5) _Blockleiter_ (_Block Leaders_). The _Blockleiter_ was the one Party
official who was peculiarly in a position to have continuous contact
with the German people. The _block_ was the lowest unit in the Party
pyramidal organization. The _block_ of the Party comprised 40 to 60
households and was regarded by the Party as the focal point upon which
to press the weight of its propaganda. The _Organization Book of the
NSDAP_ states:
“The household is the basic community upon which the block and
cell system is built. The household is the organizational focal
point of all Germans united in an apartment and includes
roomers, domestic help, etc. * * * The _Blockleiter_ has
jurisdiction over all matters within his zone relating to the
Movement and is fully responsible to the _Zellenleiter_. * * *”
(_1893-PS_)
The _Blockleiter_, as in the case of other political leaders, was
charged with planning, disseminating, and developing a receptivity to
the policies of the Nazi Party among the population in his area of
responsibility. It was also the expressed duty of the _Blockleiter_ to
spy on the population. According to the Party Manual:
“It is the duty of the _Blockleiter_ to find people
disseminating damaging rumors and to report them to the
_Ortsgruppe_ so that they may be reported to the respective
State authorities.
“The _Blockleiter_ must not only be preacher and defender of the
National Socialist ideology towards the members of nation and
Party entrusted to his political care, but he must also strive
to achieve practical collaboration of the Party members within
his block zone * * *.”
“The _Blockleiter_ shall continuously remind the Party members
of their particular duties towards the people and the State * *
* The _Blockleiter_ keeps a list (card file) about the
households * * * In principle, the _Blockleiter_ will settle his
official business verbally and he will receive messages verbally
and pass them on in the same way. Correspondence will only be
used in cases of absolute necessity * * * The _Blockleiter_
conducts National Socialist propaganda from mouth to mouth. He
will eventually awaken the understanding of the eternally
dissatisfied as regards the frequently misunderstood or wrongly
interpreted measures and laws of the National Socialist
Government * * * It is not necessary to him to fall in with
complaints and gripes about possibly obvious shortcomings of any
kind in order to demonstrate * * * solidarity * * * A condition
to gain the confidence of all people is to maintain absolute
secrecy in all matters.” (_1893-PS_)
There were in Germany around a half million of these _Blockleiter_.
Large though this figure may appear, there can be no doubt that these
officials were in and of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. Though
they stood at the broad base of the Party pyramid rather than at its
summit, where rested the _Reichsleiter_, by virtue of this fact they
were stationed at close intervals throughout the German civil
population. It may be doubted that the average German ever looked upon
the face of Heinrich Himmler. But the man in the street in Nazi Germany
could not have avoided an uneasy acquaintance with the _Blockleiter_ in
his neighbourhood. It was the block leaders who represented to the
people of Germany the police-state of Hitler’s Germany. In fact, the
_Blockleiter_ were little fuehrers with real power over the civilians in
their domains. The authority of the _Blockleiter_ to exercise coercion
and the threat of force upon the civil population is shown in an excerpt
from page 7 of the magazine published by the Chief Education Office of
the Party, entitled “The Face of the Party”:
“Advice and sometimes also the harsher form of education is
employed if the faulty conduct of an individual harms this
individual himself and thus also the community.”
(6) _Hoheitstraeger._ Within the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party
certain of the Political Leaders possessed a higher degree of
responsibility than others, were vested with special prerogatives, and
constituted a distinctive and elite group. These were the so-called
“_Hoheitstraeger_” (Bearers of Sovereignty) who represented the Party
within their area of jurisdiction, the so-called _Hoheitsgebiet_. The
Party Manual (_1893-PS_) states as follows:
“Among the Political Leaders, the _Hoheitstraeger_ assumed a
special position. Contrary to the other Political Leaders who
have departmental missions, the _Hoheitstraeger_ themselves are
in charge of a geographical sector known as the _Hoheitsgebiet_
[Sectors of Sovereignty].
“_Hoheitstraeger_ are:
“The _Fuehrer_
The _Gauleiter_
The _Kreisleiter_
The _Ortsgruppenleiter_
The _Zellenleiter_
The _Blockleiter_.
“_Hoheitsgebiet_ are:
“The _Reich_
The _Gau_
The _Kreis_
The _Ortsgruppe_
The _Zelle_
The _Block_.
“Within their sector of sovereignty the _Hoheitstraeger_ have
sovereign political rights. They represent the Party within
their sector. The _Hoheitstraeger_ supervise all Party Officers
within their jurisdiction and * * * are responsible for the
maintenance of discipline. * * * The directors of offices, etc.,
and of the affiliated organizations are responsible to their
respective _Hoheitstraeger_ as regards their special missions. *
* * The _Hoheitstraeger_ are superior to all Political Leaders,
managers, etc., within their sector. As regards personal
considerations, _Hoheitstraeger_ * * * are endowed with special
rights.
“The _Hoheitstraeger_ of the Party are not to be administrative
officials * * * but are to move in a continuous vital contact
with the Political Leaders of the population within their
sector. The _Hoheitstraeger_ are responsible for the proper and
good supervision of all members of the nation within their
sectors * * *.
“The Party intends to achieve a state of affairs in which the
individual German will find his way to the Party * * *.”
(_1893-PS_)
The distinctive character of the _Politischer Leiter_ (Political
Leaders) constituting the _Hoheitstraeger_, and their existence and
operation as an identifiable group, are indicated by the publication of
a magazine, entitled _Der Hoheitstraeger_, whose distribution was
limited by regulation of the Reich Organization Leader to the
_Hoheitstraeger_ and certain other designated _Politischer Leiter_. The
inside cover of this exclusive Party magazine reads as follows:
“_DER HOHEITSTRAEGER_, the contents of which is to be handled
confidentially, serves only for the orientation of the competent
leaders. It may not be loaned out to other persons * * *” [then
follows a list of the Hoheitstraeger and other Political Leaders
authorized to receive the magazine.] (_2660-PS_)
The magazine states that, in addition, the following were entitled to
receive it:
“Commandants, Unit Commanders and Candidates of Order Castles;
the Reich, Shock Troop and _Gaue_ Speakers of the NSDAP; the
Lieutenant Generals and Major Generals of SA, SS, NSFK, and
NSKK; Lieutenant Generals and Major Generals of the HJ.”
(_2660-PS_)
The fact that this magazine existed, that it derived its name from the
Commanding Officers of the Leadership Corps, that it was distributed to
the elite of the Leadership Corps—that a House Bulletin was circulated
down the command channels of the Leadership Corps—demonstrates that the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party was an identifiable group or
organization within the meaning of Article 9 of the Charter.
An examination of the contents of the magazine _Der Hoheitstrager_
reveals a continuing concern by the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party
in measures and doctrines which were employed throughout the course of
the conspiracy. The plans and policies of the inner elite of the
Leadership Corps gain clarity through a random sampling of articles
published and policies advocated in various issues of the magazine _Der
Hoheitstrager_. From February 1937 to October 1938 these included the
following: anti-Semitic articles, attacks on Catholicism and the
Christian religion and clergy; the need for motorized armament; the
urgent need for expanded _Lebensraum_ and colonies; persistent attacks
on the League of Nations; the use of the Block and Cell in achieving
favorable votes in Party plebiscites; the intimate association between
the _Wehrmacht_ and the Political Leadership; the racial doctrines of
Fascism; the cult of “leadership”; the role of the _Gaue_,
_Ortsgruppen_, and _Zellen_ in the expansion of Germany; and related
matters.
(_a_) _Organization of Political Leaders._ The Political Leaders were
organized according to the leadership principle (_1893-PS_):
“The basis of the Party organization is the Fuehrer thought. The
public is unable to rule itself either directly or indirectly *
* * All Political Leaders stand as appointed by the Fuehrer and
are responsible to him. They possess full authority toward the
lower echelons * * * Only a man who has absorbed the school of
subordinate functions within the Party has a claim to the higher
Fuehrer offices. We can only use Fuehrers who have served from
the ground up. Any Political Leader who does not conform to
these principles is to be dismissed or to be sent back to the
lower offices, as _Blockleiter_, _Zellenleiter_ for further
training * * *
“The Political Leader is not an office worker but the Political
Deputy of the Fuehrer * * * Within the Political Leadership, we
are building the Political Leadership of the state * * * The
type of the Political Leader is not characterized by the office
which he represents. There is no such thing as a Political
Leader of the NSBO, etc., but there is only the Political Leader
of the NSDAP.” (_1893-PS_)
Each Political Leader was sworn in yearly. According to the Party Manual
(_1893-PS_), the wording of the oath was as follows:
“I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge
unconditional obedience to him and the Fuehrers appointed by
him.” (_1893-PS_)
The Organization Book of the NSDAP also provides:
“The Political Leader is inseparably tied to the ideology and
the organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his death
or with his expulsion from the National Socialist community.”
(_1893-PS_)
(_b_) _Appointment of Political Leaders._ The appointment of the
political leaders constituting the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party
proceeded as follows, according to the Party Manual:
“The Fuehrer appointed the following Political Leaders:
“a. All _Reichsleiter_ and all Political Leaders within the
_Reichsleitung_ [Reich Party Directorate], including women’s
leaders.
“b. All _Gauleiter_, including the Political Leaders holding
offices in the _Gauleitung_ [Gau Party Directorate], including
_Gau_ women leaders.
“c. All _Kreisleiter_.
“The _Gauleiter_ appointed:
“a. The Political Leaders and women’s leaders within the _Gau_
Party Directorate.
“b. The Political Leaders and directors of women’s leagues in
the _Kreis_ Party Directorate.
“c. All _Ortsgruppenleiter_.
“The _Kreisleiter_ appoints the Political Leaders and the
Directors of the Women’s Leagues of the _Ortsgruppen_ including
the Block and Cell Leaders.” (_1893-PS_)
_c._ Power _of Hoheitstraeger to Call Upon Party Formations_. The
_Hoheitstraeger_ among the Leadership Corps were entitled to call upon
and utilize the various Party Formations as necessary for the execution
of Nazi Party policies.
The Party Manual makes it clear that the _Hoheitstrager_ has power and
authority to requisition the services of the SA:
“The _Hoheitstrager_ is responsible for the entire political
appearance of the Movement within his zone. The SA leader of
that zone is tied to the directives of the _Hoheitstrager_ in
that respect.
“The _Hoheitstrager_ is the ranking representative of the Party
to include all organizations within his zone. He may requisition
the SA located within his zone from the respective SA leader if
they are needed for the execution of a political mission. The
_Hoheitstrager_ will then assign the mission to the SA * * *
“Should the _Hoheitstrager_ need more SA for the execution of
political mission than is locally available, he then applies to
the next higher office of sovereignty which, in turn, requests
the SA from the SA office in his sector.” (_1893-PS_)
The _Hoheitstrager_ also had the same authority to call upon the
services of the SS and NSKK (_1893-PS_).
The _Hoheitstrager_ further, had authority to call upon the services of
the Hitler Youth (HJ):
“The Political Leader has the right to requisition the HJ in the
same manner as the SA for the execution of a political action.
“In appointing leaders of the HJ and the DJ, the office of the
HJ must procure the approval of the _Hoheitstrager_ of his zone.
This means that the _Hoheitstrager_ can prevent the appointment
of leaders unsuited for the leadership of youth. If his approval
has not been procured, an appointment may be cancelled if he so
requests.” (_1893-PS_)
An example of the use of the Party Formations at the call of the
Leadership Corps of the Party is provided by the action taken by the
_Reichsleiter_ for Party Organization of the NSDAP, Dr. Robert Ley,
leading to the deliberate dissolution of the Free Trade Unions on 2 May
1933. A directive issued by _Reichsleiter_ Ley on 21 April 1933
(_392-PS_) ordered the employment of the SA and the SS in occupying
trade union properties and in taking trade union leaders into protective
custody:
“* * * SA as well as SS are to be employed for the occupation of
trade union properties and for the taking of personalities who
come into question into protective custody.
“The _Gauleiter_ (i.e. Regional Director) is to proceed with his
measures on a basis of the closest understanding with competent
Regional Factory Cells Director. * * *
* * * * * *
“The following are to be taken into protective custody:
“All Trade Union Chairmen; the District Secretaries and the
Branch Directors of the ‘Bank for Workers, Employees and
Officials, Inc.’” (_392-PS_)
A decree issued by Hess as Deputy of the Fuehrer, dated 25 October 1934,
underwrites the authority of the _Hoheitstrager_ with respect to the
Party Formations:
“The political leadership within the Party and its political
representation towards all offices, State or others, which are
outside of the Party, lie solely and exclusively with the
_Hoheitstrager_, which is to say with me, the _Gauleiter_,
_Kreisleiter_, and _Ortsgruppenleiter_ * * *.
“The departmental workers of the Party organization, as well as
_Reichsleiter_, office directors, etc., as well as the leaders
of the SA, SS, HJ and the subordinate affiliations, may not
enter into binding agreements of a political nature with State
and other offices except when so authorized by their
_Hoheitstrager_.
“In places where the territories of the units of the SA, SS, HJ
and the subordinate affiliations do not coincide with the zones
of the _Hoheitstrager_, the _Hoheitstrager_ will give his
political directives to the ranking leader of each unit within
his zone of sovereignty.” (_2474-PS_)
It was the official policy of the Leadership Corps to establish close
and cooperative relations with the Gestapo. The Head of the German
Police and SS, Himmler, was a _Reichsleiter_ on the top level of the
Leadership Corps. A decree issued by Bormann, as Chief of Staff of the
Deputy of the Fuehrer, dated 26 June 1935, provided the following:
“In order to effect a closer contact between the offices of the
Party and its organizations with the Directors of the Secret
State Police [Gestapo], the Deputy of the Fuehrer requests that
the Directors of the Gestapo be invited to attend all of the
larger official rallies of the Party and its organization.”
(_d_) _Meetings of the Political Leaders._ The contention of the
Prosecution that the members of the Leadership Corps constituted a
distinctive and identifiable group or organization is strongly supported
by the fact that the various _Hoheitstraeger_ (such as the _Gauleiter_,
_Kreisleiter_, _Ortsgruppenleiter_, and so on) were under an absolute
obligation to meet and confer periodically, not only with the staff
officers on their own staffs, but with the political leaders and staff
officers immediately subordinate to them. For example, the _Gauleiter_
was bound to confer with his staff officers (such as his deputy, his
staff office leader, his organization leader, school leader, propaganda
leader, press leader, his _Gau_ Party Judge, and so on) every 8 to 14
days. Furthermore, the _Gauleiter_ was obligated to meet with the
various _Gauleiter_ subordinate to him once every 3 months for a 3-day
convention for the purpose of discussing and clarifying Nazi Party
policies and directives, for hearing basic lectures on Party policy, and
for the mutual exchange of information pertinent to the Party’s current
program. The _Gauleiter_ was also obligated to meet at least once a
month with the leaders of the Party formations and affiliated
organizations within his _Gau_ area, such as the leaders of the SA, SS,
Hitler Youth and others. These matters are set forth in the
_Organization Book of the NSDAP_ (_1893-PS_) as follows:
“Leader conferences in the District:
“(a) District Leaders (_Gauleiter_) with his staff every 8 to 14
days.
“(b) It is further absolutely necessary that the directors of
the _Gau_ offices will meet with the county directors of their
district once every three months for a three-day convention
(possibly at a district schooling castle) where they will have
an opportunity to overcome difficulties of personal and
professional nature, apart from hearing fundamental lectures, by
social gatherings in the presence of the bearer of the
sovereignty, by getting to know each other and by a mutual
exchange of ideas. Participation in these conferences is
compulsory and duty would not constitute an excuse under any
circumstances.
“(c) The arrangement of social meeting in the presence of
leaders of the organizations of RAD and NSFK of the respective
zone of sovereignty. In the course of these meetings differences
of opinion may be straightened out in discussions.
“(d) The bearer of sovereignty will meet at least once a month
with the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK, HJ, as well as the RAD and
the NSFK who are within the zone for the purpose of mutual
orientation.” (_1893-PS_)
The _Organization Book of the Party_ imposes a similar requirement of
regular and periodical conferences and meetings upon all the other
_Hoheitstraeger_, including the _Kreisleiter_, _Ortsgruppenleiter_,
_Zellenleiter_, and _Blockleiter_.
The clear consequence of such regular and obligatory conferences and
meetings by all the _Hoheitstraeger_, both with their own staff officers
and with the political leaders and staff officers subordinate to them,
was that basic Nazi policies and directives issued by Hitler and the
leader of the Party Chancellery, Bormann, directly through the chain of
command of the _Hoheitstraeger_, and functional policies issued by the
various _Reichsleiter_ and Reich office holders through functional and
technical channels, were certain to be brought to the attention and
understanding of the bulk of the membership of the Leadership Corps.
When this fact is coupled with the further fact that all the members of
the Leadership Corps under the Leadership Principle and their sworn
oaths, were bound to obey blindly and without question orders received
from their competent superiors, it is clear that the general membership
of the Leadership Corps is responsible for measures taken or ordered by
that organization in furtherance of the conspiracy.
(7) _Statistics Relating to the Leadership Corps._ As previously shown,
the Leadership Corps comprised the sum of officials of the Nazi Party,
including, in addition to Hitler and the members of the _Reichsleitung_,
such as the _Reichsleiter_ and the Reich office holders, a hierarchy of
_Hoheitstraeger_ (ranging from the _Gauleiter_ down to the
_Blockleiter_) as well as the staff officers attached to the
_Hoheitstraeger_. According to page 10 of issue No. 8, 1939 of the
authoritative publication of the Leadership Corps, “_Der
Hoheitstrager_,” there were in 1939:
40 _Gaue_ and 1 Foreign
Organization _Gau_ each led by a _Gauleiter_.
808 _Kreise_ each led by a _Kreisleiter_.
28,376 _Ortsgruppen_ each led by a _Ortsgruppenleiter_.
89,378 _Zellen_ each led by a _Zellenleiter_.
463,048 _Blocke_ each led by a _Blockleiter_.
(_2958-PS_)
However, as shown by previous evidence, the Leadership Corps was
composed not only of the _Hoheitstraeger_ (such as _Gauleiter_,
_Kreisleiter_, _Ortsgruppenleiter_, _Zellenleiter_, and _Blockleiter_)
but also of the staff officers or office holders attached to these
_Hoheitstraeger_. The _Gauleiter_, for example, was assisted by a deputy
_Gauleiter_, several _Gau_ inspectors, and a staff which was divided
into main offices (_Hauptamter_) and offices (_Amter_), including such
departments as the _Gau_ staff Office, Treasury, Education Office,
Propaganda Office, Press Office, University Teachers, Communal Policy,
etc. As previously shown in evidence, the staff office structure of the
_Gau_ was substantially represented in the lower levels of the
Leadership Corps organization such as the _Kreise_, _Ortsgruppen_, and
so on. The _Kreise_ and the smaller territorial areas of the Party were
also organized into staff offices dealing with the various activities of
the Leadership Corps. But, of course, the importance and the number of
such staff offices diminished as the unit dropped in the hierarchy; so
that, while the _Kreisleiter_ staff contained all or most of the
departments mentioned for the _Gau_, the _Ortsgruppe_ had fewer
departments and the lower ones fewer still.
Firm figures have not been found as to the total number of staff
officers, as distinguished from the _Hoheitstraeger_ or political
commanders themselves included within the Leadership Corps.
It is the view of the prosecution that in defining the scope and
composition of the Leadership Corps, staff officers should be included
only down to and including the _Kreise_. Upon this basis, the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party constituted the Fuehrer, the members of the
_Reichsleitung_, the 5 levels of _Hoheitstraeger_ (ranging from
_Gauleiter_ down through the _Blockleiter_), and the staff officers
attached to the 40-odd _Gauleiter_ and the eight to nine hundred
_Kreisleiter_. Adopting this definition of the Leadership Corps, it will
be seen that the total figure for the membership of that organization,
based upon the statistics cited from the basic handbook for Germany,
amounts to around 700,000.
It is true that this figure is based upon an admittedly limited view of
the size of the membership of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party;
for the evidence has shown that the Leadership Corps in effect embraced
staff officers attached to the subordinate _Hoheitstraeger_, and
inclusion of such staff officers in the estimation of the size of the
Leadership Corps would have very considerably enlarged the final figure
estimated to a total of 2,000,000. The Prosecution, however, proposes to
exclude such subordinate staff officers for the reason that their
participation in and responsibility for the Conspiracy were measurably
less extensive than those of the staff officers and office holders on
the higher levels of the Leadership Corps. The subordinate staff
officers thus excluded were responsible functionally to the higher staff
officers with respect to their particular specialty, such as propaganda,
Party organization, and so on, and to their respective _Hoheitstraeger_
with respect to discipline and policy control. Likewise, such higher
staff officers participated in planning and policy discussions, and also
issued orders through technical channels to lower staff officers.
B. _Participation of the Leadership Corps in the Conspiracy._
The Program of the Nazi Party, proclaimed by Hitler, the Fuehrer of the
Leadership Corps, on 24 February 1920 (_1708-PS_), contained the chief
elements of the Nazi plan for domination and conquest. The first point
required the incorporation of all Germans into a Greater German Reich.
Point 2 demanded unilateral abolition of the Peace Treaties of
Versailles and St. Germain. Point 3 stated the demand for “land and
soil” (colonies). Point 4 proclaimed the Nazi doctrines of racial
discrimination and anti-Semitism. Point 6 proclaimed the fight against
the democratic-parliamentary system, as follows:
“* * * We demand that every public office, of any sort,
whatsover, whether in the Reich, the county or municipality, be
filled only by citizens. We combat the corrupting parliamentary
economy, office-holding only according to Party inclinations
without consideration of character or abilities.” (_1708-PS_)
Point 22 expressed the Nazi plans and policies for rearmament as
follows:
“We demand the abolition of the mercenary troops and formation
of a National Army.” (_1708-PS_)
The official Party Program declares on its face that:
“The program is the political foundation of the NSDAP and
accordingly the primary political law of the State * * *
“All legal precepts are to be applied in the spirit of the Party
Program.
“Since the taking over of control, the Fuehrer has succeeded in
the realization of the essential portions of the Party Program
from the fundamentals to the details.
“The Party Program of the NSDAP was proclaimed on 24 February
1920 by Adolf Hitler at the first large Party gathering in
Munich and since that day has remained unaltered * * * The
National Socialist philosophy is summarized in 25 points.”
(_1708-PS_)
As previously stated, the Party Program was binding upon the Political
Leaders of the Leadership Corps, and they were under a duty to support
and carry out that Program. As the Party Manual puts it:
“The Commandments of the National Socialists:
“The Fuehrer is always right * * *.
“The Program be your dogma.
“It demands your utter devotion to the Movement * * *.
“Right is what serves the Movement and thus Germany.
* * * * * *
“* * * Leader Corps is responsible for the complete penetration
of the German Nation with the National Socialist spirit * * *.”
(_1893-PS_)
The oath of the Political Leader to Hitler has been previously referred
to. In connection therewith, the Party Manual provides:
“The Political Leader is inseparably tied to the ideology and
the organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his death
or with his expulsion from the National Socialist community.”
(_1893-PS_)
While the leadership principle assured the binding nature of Hitler’s
statements, program, and policies upon the entire Party and the
Leadership Corps, the leadership principle also established the full
responsibility of the individual Political Leader within the province
and jurisdiction of his office or position.
The leadership principle applied not only to Hitler as the supreme
leader, but also to the Political Leaders under him, and thus permeated
the entire Leadership Corps:
“The basis of the Party Organization is the Fuehrer thought * *
* All Political Leaders stand as appointed by the Fuehrer and
are responsible to him. They possess full authority toward the
lower echelons * * *.” (_1893-PS_)
The various _Hoheitstraeger_ of the Leadership Corps were, in their
respective areas of responsibility, themselves _Fuehrer_:
“Within their sector of sovereignty, the _Hoheitstraeger_
(_Gauleiter_, _Kreisleiter_, _Ortsgruppenleiter_,
_Zellenleiter_, _Blockleiter_) have sovereign political rights *
* * They are responsible for the entire political situation
within their sector * * *” (_1893-PS_)
As stated in the _Organization Book of the NSDAP_
“The Party is an order of ‘Fuehrer’.” (_1814-PS_)
The subjection of the entire membership of the Leadership Corps to the
fiat of the Fuehrer Principle is clearly shown in the following passage
from the Party Manual:
“* * * a solid anchorage for all the organizations within the
party structure is provided and a firm connection with the
sovereign leaders of the NSDAP is created in accordance with the
Fuehrer Principle.” (_1814-PS_)
(1) _Domination and Control of the German State and Government by the
Nazi Party, directed by the Leadership Corps._ On 23 March 1933 the
Reichstag enacted a law conferring power on the Reich Cabinet to
legislate on its own authority (_2001-PS_). Prominent members of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party were members of the Reich Cabinet.
The presence of _Reichsleiter_ and other prominent members of the
Leadership Corps in the Cabinet facilitated the domination of the
Cabinet by the Nazi Party and the Leadership Corps. For example, a
decree of 13 March 1933 established the Ministry of Public Enlightenment
and Propaganda. The head of this ministry was Goebbels, who
simultaneously was _Reichsleiter_ for Propaganda of the NSDAP
(_2029-PS_). Examples of personal union between high officials in the
Leadership and Cabinet membership existed in the case of the Food
Minister, the Chief of the German Police, the Reich Labor Leader, the
Chief of the Party Organization in Foreign Countries, and the Reich
Youth Fuehrer (_2473-PS_). Moreover, the majority of the Reich
Ministries were occupied by leading old Party Members. All Reich
Ministers were accepted by the Party on 30 January 1937 and were
decorated with the Golden Party Insignia. (_1774-PS_)
A law of 14 July 1933 outlawed and forbade the formation of any
political parties other than the Nazi Party and made violation of this
decree a punishable crime. Thereby the one party State was established
and the Leadership Corps was rendered immune from the opposition of
organized political groups. This Law Against the Formation of New
Political Parties reads as follows:
“The National Socialist German Workers’ Party constitutes the
only political party in Germany. Whoever undertakes to maintain
the organizational structure of another political party or to
form a new political party will be punished with penal servitude
up to three years or with imprisonment of from six months to
three years, if the deed is not subject to a greater penalty
according to other regulations.” (_1388-PS_)
A law was enacted on 20 July 1933 providing for the dismissal of
officials who belonged to the Communist Party or who were otherwise
active in furthering the aims of Communism. The law also provided for
the dismissal of those who were in the future active for Marxism,
Communism, or Social Democracy (Law to Supplement the Law for the
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, 20 July 1933, (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 518)). (_1398-PS_)
On 13 October 1933 a “law to guarantee public peace” was enacted which
provided, _inter alia_, that the death penalty or other severe
punishment should be imposed upon any person who—
“* * * undertakes to kill a member of the SA or the SS, a
trustee or agent of the NSDAP * * * out of political motives or
on account of their official activity.” (_1394-PS_)
On 1 December 1933 a law was enacted “to secure the unity of Party and
State.” This law provided that the Nazi Party was the pillar of the
German State, and was linked to it indissolubly; it also made the Deputy
of the Fuehrer (then Hess) and the Chief of Staff of the SA (then Roehm)
members of the Reich Cabinet (_1395-PS_). The pertinent provisions of
this law read as follows:
“After the victory of the National Socialist Revolution, the
National Socialistic German Labor Party is the bearer of the
concept of the German State and is inseparably the State. It
will be a part of the public law. Its organization will be
determined by the Fuehrer * * *.
“The Deputy of the Fuehrer and the Chief of Staff of the SA will
become members of the Reich Government in order to insure close
cooperation of the offices of the Party and SA with the public
authorities * * *.” (_1395-PS_)
This law was a basic measure in enthroning the Leadership Corps in a
position of supreme political power in Germany. For it laid it down that
the Party, directed by the Leadership Corps, was the embodiment of the
State and, in fact, was the State. Moreover, this law made both the
Fuehrer’s Deputy and the Chief of Staff of the SA, which was a Party
Formation subject to the call of the _Hoheitstraeger_, Cabinet Members.
Thus, the Leadership Corps’ control of the Cabinet was further
solidified. The dominant position of the Leadership Corps is further
revealed by the provision that the Reichs-Chancellor would issue the
regulations carrying out this law in his capacity as Fuehrer of the Nazi
Party. The fact that Hitler, as Fuehrer of the Leadership Corps, could
promulgate rules which would have statutory force and be published in
the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, the proper compilation for State enactments, is
but a further reflection of the reality of the Party’s domination of the
German State.
In a declaration to the 1935 Party Congress at Nurnberg, Hitler stated:
“It is not the State which gives orders to us, it is we who give
orders to the State.” (_2775-PS_)
That categorical statement of the Fuehrer of the Leadership Corps
affirms the dominance of Party over State which the evidence makes
undeniably clear.
On 30 June 1934 Hitler, as Head of the Nazi Party, directed the massacre
of hundreds of SA-men and other political opponents. Hitler sought to
justify these mass murders by declaring to the Reichstag that “at that
hour I was responsible for the fate of the German nation and supreme
judge of the German people.” (The evidence relating to these events is
discussed in Section 4, infra.) On 3 July 1934 the Cabinet issued a
decree describing the murders of 30 June 1934, in effect, as legitimate
self-defense by the State. By this law the Reich Cabinet made themselves
accessories after the fact of these murders. The domination of State by
Party, however, makes the Cabinet’s characterization of these criminal
acts by Hitler and his top Party Leaders as state measures consistent
with political reality. The single article of the law of 3 July 1934
reads as follows:
“The measures taken on 30 June and 1 and 2 July 1934 to
counteract attempt at treason and high treason shall be
considered as national emergency defense.” (_2057-PS_)
On 12 July 1934 there was enacted a law defining the function of the
Academy for German law:
“Closely connected with the agencies competent for legislation,
it [the Academy] shall further the realization of the National
Socialist program in the realm of the law.” (_1391-PS_)
On 30 January 1933, Hitler, the Leader of the Nazi Party and Fuehrer of
the Leadership Corps, was appointed Chancellor of the Reich. When
President von Hindenburg died in 1934, the Fuehrer amalgamated in his
person the offices of Chancellor and Reich President. (_2003-PS_)
By a decree of 20 December 1934 Party uniforms and institutions were
granted the same protection as those of the State. This law was entitled
“Law Concerning Treacherous Acts Against the State and Party, and for
the Protection of Party Uniforms.” This law imposed heavy penalties upon
any person making false statements injuring the welfare or prestige of
the Nazi Party or its agencies. It authorized the imprisonment of
persons making or circulating malicious or baiting statements against
leading personalities of the Nazi Party. And it provided punishment by
forced labor for the unauthorized wearing of Party uniforms or symbols.
(_1393-PS_)
By a law of 15 September 1934, the Swastika flag of the Party was made
the official flag of the Reich (_2079-PS_). This law, enacted by the
Reichstag, indicates on its face that it issued from Nurnberg on the
Party Day of 15 September 1935. Article 2 of this law reads as follows:
“The Reich and National flag is the swastika flag.” (_2079-PS_) The
Swastika was the flag and symbol of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi
Party. The law making it the flag of the State constituted a recognition
that the Party and its Corps of Political Leaders were the sovereign
powers in Germany.
On 23 April 1936, a law was enacted granting amnesty for crimes which
the offender had committed “in his eagerness to fight for the National
Socialist Ideal.” (_1386-PS_)
In furtherance of the Conspiracy to acquire totalitarian control over
the German people, a law was enacted on 1 December 1936, which
incorporated the entire German youth within the Hitler Youth, thereby
achieving a “total mobilization of German youth” (_1392-PS_). The law
further provided that the task of educating the German youth through the
Hitler Youth was entrusted to the _Reichsleiter_ of German Youth in the
NSDAP. By this law a monopoly control over the entire German youth was
placed in the hands of a top official, a _Reichsleiter_, of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the defendant von Schirach.
On 4 February 1938, the Fuehrer of the Leadership Corps of the NSDAP,
Hitler, issued a decree in which he took over directly the command of
the whole Armed Forces (_1915-PS_). In this decree, Hitler declared, in
part, as follows:
“From now on, I take over directly the command of the whole
Armed Forces.” (_1915-PS_)
By the decree of 4 February 1938, Hitler became Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces. He was, at the time of its issuance, Fuehrer of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. By virtue of the earlier law of 1
August 1934, he combined the office of Reich President with that of the
Chancellorship. In the final result, therefore, Hitler was Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, Head of the German State, and Fuehrer of
the Nazi Party.
With respect to the foregoing point, the Party Manual (_1893-PS_) states
as follows:
“* * * the Fuehrer created the National Socialist German
Workers’ Party. He filled it with his spirit and his will and
with it he conquered the power of the State on 30 January 1933.
The Fuehrer’s will is supreme in the Party.
“By authority of the law about the Chief of State of the German
Reich, dated 1 August 1934, the office of the Reich President
has been combined with that of the Reich Chancellery.
Consequently, the powers heretofore possessed by the Reich
President were transferred to the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler. Through
this law, the conduct of Party and State has been combined in
one hand. By desire of the Fuehrer, a plebiscite was conducted
on this law on 19 August 1934. On this day, the German people
chose Adolf Hitler to be their sole leader. He is responsible
only to his conscience and to the German nation.” (_1893-PS_)
A decree of 16 January 1942 provided that the Party should participate
in legislation, official appointments, and promotions (_2100-PS_). The
decree further provided that such participation should be undertaken
exclusively by Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancellery and a
_Reichsleiter_ of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. The decree
provided that the Chief of the Party Chancellery was to take part in the
preparation of all laws and decrees issued by Reich authorities,
including those issued by the Ministerial Council for Defense of the
Reich, and to give his assent to those of the Laender and the Reich
governors; all communications between State and Party authorities,
unless within one _Gau_ only, were to pass through his hands. This
decree is of crucial importance in demonstrating the ultimate control
and responsibility imputable to the Leadership Corps for governmental
policy and actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. (_2100-PS_)
On or about 26 April 1942, Hitler declared in a speech that, in his
capacity as Leader of the Nation, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,
Supreme Head of the Government, and as Fuehrer of the Party, his right
must be recognized to compel with all means at his disposal, every
German, whether soldier, judge, State official, or party official, to
fulfill his desire. He demanded that the Reichstag officially recognize
this asserted right. On 26 April 1942, the German Reichstag issued a
decision in which full recognition was given to the rights which the
Fuehrer had asserted (_1961-PS_). The Reichstag decreed as follows:
“At the proposal of the President of the Reichstag, on its
session of 26 April 1942, the greater German Reichstag has
approved of the rights which the Fuehrer has postulated in his
speech with the following decision:
“There can be no doubt, that in the present war, in which the
German people is faced with a struggle for its existence or
annihilation, the Fuehrer must have all the rights postulated by
him which serve to further or achieve victory.
Therefore—without being bound by existing legal regulations—in
his capacity as Leader of the Nation, Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces, Governmental Chief and Supreme Executive Chief, as
Supreme Justice and Leader of the Party—the Fuehrer must be in
a position to force with all means at his disposal every German,
if necessary, whether he be common soldier or officer, low or
high official or judge, leading or subordinate official of the
Party, worker or employee—to fulfill his duties. In case of
violation of these duties, the Fuehrer is entitled, after
conscientious examination, regardless of so-called well-deserved
rights, to mete out due punishment and to remove the offender
from his post, rank and position without introducing prescribed
procedures.
“At the order of the Fuehrer, this decision is hereby made
public. Berlin, 26 April 1942.” (_1961-PS_)
Hitler himself perhaps best summarized the political realities of his
Germany, in showing the domination of the German State and Government by
the Leadership Corps and its following. The core of the matter was
stated by Hitler in his speech to the Reichstag on 20 February 1938,
when he declared in effect that every institution in Germany was under
the direction of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party:
“National Socialism has given the German people that leadership
which as Party not only mobilizes the nation but also organizes
it, so that on the basis of the natural principle of selection,
the continuance of a stable political leadership is safeguarded
forever * * * National Socialism * * * possesses Germany
entirely and completely since the day when, five years ago, I
left the house in Wilhelmsplatz as Reich Chancellor. There is no
institution in this state which is not National Socialist. Above
all, however, the National Socialist Party in these five years
not only has made the nation National Socialist, but also has
given itself that perfect organizational structure which
guarantees its permanence for all future. The greatest guarantee
of the National Socialist revolution lies in the complete
domination of the Reich and all its institutions and
organizations, internally and externally by the National
Socialist Party. Its protection against the world abroad,
however, lies in its new National Socialist armed forces. * * *
In this Reich, anybody who has a responsible position is a
National Socialist * * * Every institution of this Reich is
under the orders of the supreme political leadership * * * The
Party leads the Reich politically, the armed forces defend it
militarily * * * There is nobody in any responsible position in
this state who doubts that I am the authorized leader of this
Reich.” (_2715-PS_)
The supreme power which the Leadership Corps exercised over the German
State and Government is sharply pointed up by an article published in
the February 1939 issue of the authoritative magazine, “_Der
Hoheitstrager_”. In this article, addressed to all _Hoheitstraeger_, the
Leadership Corps is reminded that it has conquered the State and that it
possesses absolute and total power in Germany. The article is
significantly entitled, “Fight and Order—Not Peace and Order.” It
trumpets forth, in the accents of Caesarism, the battle call of the
Leadership Corps of German life:
“Fight? Why do you always talk of fighting? You have conquered
the State, and if something does not please you, then just make
a law and regulate it differently? Why must you always talk of
fighting? For you have every power! Over what do you fight?
Outer-politically? You have the Wehrmacht—it will wage the
fight if it is required. Inner-politically? You have the law and
the police which can change everything which does not agree with
you.” (_3230-PS_)
In view of the domination of the German State and Government by the Nazi
Party and the Leadership Corps thereof, as established by the foregoing
evidence, the Leadership Corps is responsible for the measures,
including legislative enactments, taken by the German State and
Government in furtherance of the Conspiracy formulated and carried out
by the co-conspirators and the organizations charged with criminality.
For example, as revealed by the above evidence, Point 4 of the original
Party Program declared that a Jew was not a member of the German race
and, therefore, was not entitled to citizenship. This premise was
incorporated into the law of the Third Reich by numerous anti-Semitic
and discriminatory laws. Consequently, it is submitted that, by virtue
of their control over the German State and Government, the Nazi Party
and the Leadership Corps share responsibility for, among other
enactments and measures furthering the Conspiracy, discriminatory laws
against the Jews.
(2) _Overt Acts and Crimes of the Leadership Corps._ The membership of
the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party actively participated in measures
designed to further the progress of the Conspiracy. The evidence will
show that the participation by the Leadership Corps in the Conspiracy
embraces such measures as anti-Semitic activities, war crimes committed
against members of the Allied forces, the forced labor program, measures
to subvert and undermine the Christian religion and persecute the
Christian clergy, the plundering and spoliation of cultural and other
property in German-occupied territories of Europe, and plans and
measures leading to the initiation and prosecution of aggressive war.
(_a_) _Crimes against Jews._ The _Gauleiter_ and _Kreisleiter_
participated in what were disingenuously described by the Nazis as the
“spontaneous uprising of the people” against the Jews throughout Germany
on 9 and 10 November 1938 in connection with the assassination of an
official of the German Embassy in Paris on 7 November. (The evidence
relating to these programs is discussed in Chapter XI on the
concentration camps, and Chapter XII on the persecution of the Jews.) It
will be recalled that in the teletyped directive from SS-Gruppenfuehrer
Heydrich, issued on 10 November 1938, to all police headquarters and SD
districts, all chiefs of the State Police were ordered to arrange with
the political leaders in the _Gaue_ and _Kreise_ the organization of the
so-called spontaneous demonstrations against the Jews (_3051-PS_).
Pursuant to this directive, a large number of Jewish shops and
businesses were pillaged and wrecked, synagogues were set on fire,
individual Jews were beaten up, and large numbers were taken off to
concentration camps. These events forcefully illustrate the employment
and participation of all the _Kreisleiter_ and _Gauleiter_ in illegal
measures designed to further the anti-Semitic program, which was an
original and continuing objective of the Leadership Corps.
(_b_) _Crimes against Allied Airmen._ The members of the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party participated in the murder, beating, and
ill-treatment of American airmen who landed in German or
German-controlled territory. American airmen who bailed out of disabled
planes over Germany were not treated as prisoners of war, but were
beaten and murdered by German civilians with the active condonence,
indeed at the instigation of the Leadership Corps. Such a course of
conduct by the Leadership Corps represented a deliberate violation by
the German Government of its obligations, under the Geneva Prisoners of
War Convention, to protect prisoners of war against acts of violence and
ill-treatment.
Heinrich Himmler was a _Reichsleiter_ of the Nazi Party and thus a top
official in the Leadership Corps by virtue of his positions as
Reichsfuehrer of the SS and Delegate for German Folkdom (_2473-PS; Chart
No. 1_). An order signed by Himmler (_R-110_), dated 10 August 1943,
reads as follows:
“It is not the task of the police to interfere in clashes
between Germans and English and American terror fliers who have
bailed out.” (_R-110_)
This order was transmitted in writing to all senior executive SS and
police officers, and orally to their subordinate officers and to all
_Gauleiter_.
Joseph Goebbels was a top-flight official in the Leadership Corps of the
Nazi Party by virtue of his position as Propaganda Leader of the Party
(_2473-PS; Chart No. 1_). In the issue of the _Voelkischer Beobachter_
for 26/29 May 1944, there appeared an article written by Goebbels, the
_Reichsleiter_ for Party Propaganda, in which he openly invited the
German civil population to murder Allied fliers shot down over Germany
(_1676-PS_). After alleging that Anglo-American pilots have engaged in
machine gun attacks against civilians, Goebbels continues:
“It is only possible with the aid of arms to secure the lives of
enemy pilots who were shot down during such attacks, for they
would otherwise be killed by the sorely tried population. Who is
right here? The murderers who, after their cowardly misdeeds,
await a humane treatment on the part of their victims, or the
victims who wish to defend themselves according to the
principle: ‘An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’? This
question is not hard to answer.” (_1676-PS_)
_Reichsleiter_ Goebbels then proceeds to answer his question in the
following language:
“It seems to us hardly possible and tolerable to use German
police and soldiers against the German people when it treats
murderers of children as they deserve.” (_1676-PS_)
On 30 May 1944, Bormann, _Reichsleiter_ and Chief of the Party
Chancellery, issued a circular letter on the subject which furnishes
indisputable proof that British and American fliers who were shot down
were lynched by the German population (_057-PS_). After alleging that in
recent weeks English and American fliers had repeatedly shot children,
women, peasants, and vehicles on the highway, Bormann then states:
“Several instances have occurred where members of the crews of
such aircraft, who have bailed out or who have made forced
landings, were lynched on the spot immediately after capture by
the populace, which was incensed to the highest degree. No
police measures or criminal proceedings were invoked against the
German civilians who participated in these incidents.”
(_057-PS_)
This letter of Bormann was distributed through the chain of command of
the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. Express mention on the
distribution list is made of _Reichsleiter_, _Gauleiter_, _Kreisleiter_,
and leaders of the incorporated and affiliated organizations of the
Party. Bormann requested that the local group leaders
(_Ortsgruppenleiter_) be informed of the contents of his circular letter
only by oral means. (_057-PS_)
The effect of _Reichsleiter_ Bormann’s circular letter may be seen in an
order dated 25 February 1945 (_L-154_). This is an order from Albert
Hoffman, an important member of the Leadership Corps by virtue of his
position as _Gauleiter_ and National Defense Commissioner of the Gau
Westfalen-South, and it is addressed to all County Councillors, mayors,
and police officials, and to county leaders and county staff chiefs of
the _Volkssturm_. The order reads as follows:
“Fighter bomber pilots who are shot down are not to be protected
against the fury of the people. I expect from all police
officers that they will refuse to lend their protection to these
gangster types. Authorities acting in contradiction to the
popular sentiment will have to account to me. All police and
gendarmerie officials are to be informed immediately of this, my
attitude.” (_L-154_)
The obligations of belligerents towards prisoners of war are clearly set
forth in the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 27 July 1929, which
was ratified by both Germany and the United States. Article Two of the
Convention provides as follows:
“Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile power, but not
of the individuals or corps who have captured them.
“They must at all times be humanely treated and protected,
particularly against acts of violence, insults and public
curiosity.
“Measures of reprisal against them are prohibited.” (_3738-PS_)
The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention clearly imposes upon its
signatories the strict obligation to protect prisoners of war from
violence. The evidence just discussed shows that the German State
flagrantly violated its obligations under that Convention to protect
captured airmen who were shot down in German hands. The evidence also
proves that the entire hierarchy of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi
Party participated in the conspiracy to incite the German civil
population to murder Allied airmen and also ordered police and Party
officials to take no steps to secure the safety of these airmen.
(_c_) _Crimes against Foreign Labor and Civilians in Occupied Areas._
Alfred Rosenberg and Robert Ley were both _Reichsleiter_ of the NSDAP.
(_2473-PS_)
An agreement was concluded between the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg, and the Director of the
German Labor Front, _Reichsorganisationleiter_ Ley, relating to the
inspection and care of foreign workers. This agreement was based on an
earlier agreement of 2 June 1943 between the Deputy General for the
_Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter_ Fritz Sauckel, and the Leader of the German
Labor Front, _Reichsleiter_ for the Party Organization, Dr. Ley,
concerning a “central inspection for the care of foreign workers”
(_1913-PS_). The purpose of the two agreements was to coordinate
activities of the organizations concerned with respect to the
administration of plants and camps in which foreign workers were
employed. (_1914-PS_)
On 17 October 1944, _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg sent a letter to
_Reichsleiter_ Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancery, informing the
latter that he had sent a telegram to _Gauleiter_ urging them not to
interfere in the liquidation of certain listed companies and banks under
his supervision. Rosenberg emphasized to Bormann that any “delay of
liquidation or * * * independent confiscation of the property by the
_Gauleiter_ would impair or destroy an organized plan” for the
liquidation of a vast amount of property. (_327-PS_)
On 7 November 1943, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
delivered a lecture at Munich to the _Reichsleiter_ and _Gauleiter_. The
Chief of Staff stated that his object was to give a review of the
strategic position at the outset of the fifth year of war. He stated his
realization that the Political Leaders in the Reich and Gau areas, in
view of their burdensome tasks in supporting the German War Effort, were
in need of information he could give. He stated, in part, as follows:
“_Reichsleiter_ Bormann has requested me to give you a review
today of the strategic position in the beginning of the fifth
year of war.
“No one—the Fuehrer has ordered—may know more or be told more
than he needs for his immediate task, but I have no doubt at all
in my mind, gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order
to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your _Gau_, after
all * * * that all the enemy propaganda, and the malicious
rumors concentrate that try to find themselves a place among our
people * * * Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice
you need to know the true situation, and, for this reason, I
believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and
uncovered account of the state of affairs * * *.” (_L-172_)
_Reichsleiter_ Bormann distributed to all _Reichsleiter_, _Gauleiter_,
and leaders of Party affiliated organizations, by an undated letter of
transmittal, an order of the Supreme Command of the _Wehrmacht_ relating
to self-defense by German guard personnel and German contractors and
workers against prisoners of war (_656-PS_). The order of the
_Wehrmacht_ states that the question of treatment of prisoners of war is
continually being discussed by _Wehrmacht_ and Party bureaus. The order
states that should prisoners of war refuse to obey orders to work, the
guard has “in the case of the most pressing need and danger, the right
to force obedience with the weapon if he has no other means. He can use
the weapon as much as is necessary to attain his goal * * *.” (_656-PS_)
On 18 April 1944, Reich Commissar Lohse, Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, in a letter to Reich Youth Leader Axmann, proposed
that the Hitler Youth participate in and supervise the military
education of the Estonian and Latvian youth (_347-PS_). Lohse stated in
this letter that “in the military education camps, the young Latvians
are trained under Latvian leaders in the Latvian language not because
this is our ideal, but because absolute military necessity demands
this.” Lohse further stated:
“* * * in contrast to the Germanic peoples of the West, military
education is no longer to be carried out through voluntary
enlistments but through _legal conscription_. The camps in
Estonia and Latvia * * * will have to be under German Leadership
and, as military education camps of the Hitler Youth, they must
be a symbol of our educational mission beyond Germany’s borders
* * * I consider the execution of the military education of the
Estonian and Latvian youth not only a military necessity, but
also a war mission of the Hitler Youth especially. I would be
thankful to you, Party member Axmann, if the Hitler Youth would
put itself at our disposal with the same readiness with which
they have so far supported our work in the Baltic area.”
(_347-PS_)
The _Reichsfuehrer_ of the SS, as shown earlier, was a _Reichsleiter_ of
the NSDAP (_2473-PS_). An order of the Reich Minister of the Interior,
Frick, dated 22 October 1938, provided as follows:
“The Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police * * *
can take the administrative measures necessary for the
maintenance of security and order, even beyond the legal limits
otherwise set on such measures.” (_1438-PS_)
This order related to the administration of the Sudeten-German
territory.
In a letter dated 23 June 1943 (_407-VI-PS_) _Gauleiter_ and
Plenipotentiary for the Direction of Labor, Fritz Sauckel, wrote to
Hitler advising him of the success of the forced labor program as of
that date. Sauckel stated:
“You can be assured that the District of Thueringen [_Gau_] and
I will serve you and our dear people with the employment of all
strength * * *.” (_407-VI-PS_)
On 1 September 1939, Hitler wrote a memorandum stating:
“_Reichsleiter_ Bouhler and Dr. Brandt, M.D., are charged with
the responsibility of enlarging the authority of certain
physicians to be designated by name in such a manner that
persons who, according to human judgment, are incurable can,
upon a most careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be
accorded a mercy death.
“(Signed) A. Hitler.” (_630-PS_)
A handwritten note on the face of the document states:
“Given to me by Bouhler on 27 August 1940, [signed] Dr.
Guertner.” (_630-PS_)
In a memorandum recording an agreement between himself and Himmler, the
Minister of Justice Thierack stated that, on the suggestion of
_Reichsleiter_ Bormann, an agreement had been reached between Himmler
and himself with respect to “special treatment at the hands of the
police in cases where judicial sentences are not severe enough”
(_654-PS_). The agreement related that:
“The Reich Minister for Justice will decide whether and when
special treatment at the hands of the police is to be applied.
The Reich Fuehrer of SS will send the reports, which he sent
hitherto to Reichsleiter Bormann, to the Reich Minister for
Justice.” (_654-PS_)
If the views of the Reich Fuehrer of SS and the Reich Minister for
Justice disagreed,
“the opinion of Reichsleiter Bormann will be brought to bear on
the case, and he will possibly inform the Fuehrer * * *.
* * * * * *
“The delivery of antisocial elements from execution of their
sentence to the Reich Fuehrer of SS to be worked to death.
Persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies, Russians and
Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs and
Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to the
decision of the Reich Minister of Justice. First of all the
worst antisocial elements amongst those just mentioned are to be
handed over. I shall inform the Fuehrer of this through
Reichsleiter Bormann.” (_654-PS_)
With respect to the “administration of justice by the people,” the
memorandum states:
“This is to be carried out step by step as soon as possible * *
* I shall rouse the Party particularly to cooperate in this
scheme by an article in the _Hoheitstrager_ [NSDAP publication]
* * *.” (_654-PS_)
At a meeting of the NSDAP in Kiev, the theory of the master race as the
basis of German administrative policy in the East was expressed by Koch,
Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine:
“We are the master race * * * I will squeeze the last drop out
of the country . . . the people must work, work and work. We are
a master race * * * the lowest German worker is racially and
biologically a thousand times more valuable than the people
here.” (_1130-PS_)
A letter from RSHA (Reich Security Main Office) to police chiefs, dated
5 November 1942, recites an agreement between the Reich Fuehrer SS and
the Reich Minister of Justice, approved by Hitler, providing that
ordinary criminal procedure was no longer to be applied to Poles and
members of the Eastern populations (_L-316_). The agreement provided
that such people, including Jews and Gypsies, should henceforth be
turned over to the police. The principles applicable to a determination
of the punishment of German offenders, including appraisal of the
motives of the offender, were not to be applied to foreign offenders.
The letter stated:
“* * * the offense committed by a person of foreign extraction
is not to be regarded from the view of legal retribution by way
of justice, but from the point of view of preventing dangers
through police action. From this it follows that the criminal
procedure against persons of foreign extraction must be
transferred from Justice to the Police. The preceding statements
serve for personal information. There are no objections if the
_Gauleiter_ are informed in the usual form should the need arise
* * *.” (_L-316_)
With respect to the evacuation, deportation, and Germanization of the
civilian population of the incorporated eastern territories,
Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the
Consolidation of German Nationhood, issued several decrees requiring the
deportation to Germany of all Germans from such territories who had
renounced their nationality during the existence of the Polish State
(_R-112_). These decrees directed that persons affected by the
provisions thereof who failed to comply were to be sent to concentration
camps. After deportation to Germany, such persons were to be closely
supervised by NSDAP “Counsellors” and secret police to insure their
Germanization. Certain of the decrees directing such deportation are
addressed, _inter alia_, to the “_Gauleiter_” and the “Reich Governors
in the Reich _Gaue_.” (_R-112_)
In a conference with _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg, Hitler emphasized that he
“wished to have the Crimea cleaned out,” and Rosenberg stated that he
had given much consideration to renaming the towns in the Crimea in
order to invest the area with a German character. (_1517-PS_)
In a speech to a gathering of persons intimately concerned with the
Eastern problem on 20 June 1941, _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg stated that
the southern Russian territories and the northern Caucasus would have to
provide food for the German people:
“We see absolutely no obligation on our part to feed also the
Russian people with the products of that surplus territory. We
know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings * *
*.” (_1058-PS_)
Rosenberg stated that, as a consequence of the above policy, extensive
evacuations of Russians from that Area would have to take place.
(_1058-PS_)
_Gauleiter_ Wagner of the German-occupied Areas of Alsace prepared plans
and took measures leading to the expulsion and deportation of certain
groups within the Alsatian civil population. His plans called for the
forcible expulsion of certain categories of so-called undesirable
persons, as a means of punishment and compulsory Germanization. The
_Gauleiter_ supervised deportation measures in Alsace from July to
December 1940, in the course of which 105,000 persons were either
expelled or prevented from returning. A memorandum, dated 4 August 1942,
of a meeting of high SS and police officials, convened to receive the
reports and plans of the _Gauleiter_ relating to the Alsatian
evacuations, states that the persons deported were mainly—
“Jews, Gypsies and other foreign racial elements, criminals,
asocial and incurably insane persons, as well as Frenchmen and
Francophiles.” (_R-114_)
According to the memorandum, the _Gauleiter_ stated that the Fuehrer had
given him permission “to cleanse Alsace of all foreign, sick, or
unreliable elements,” and emphasized the political necessity of further
deportation. The memorandum further records that the SS and police
officials present at the above conference approved the _Gauleiter’s_
proposals for further evacuation. (_R-114_)
A second memorandum, dated 17 August 1942, relating to a conference
called by SS-Gruppenfuehrer Kaul, held at the _Gauleiter_ office at
Karlsruhe for the purpose of considering the deportation of Alsatians
into Germany, states that the _Gauleiter_ had reported to the Fuehrer
with respect to the proposed evacuation of Alsatians. It is further
stated that the Fuehrer verbally declared that “asocial and criminal
persons” were to be expelled. The _Gauleiter_ stated at the above
conference that the action leading to such evacuation had already begun.
The _Gauleiter_ further declared that he intended to offset the loss of
population as far as possible by transplantation of people from Baden,
“thus creating a uniform race mixture.” (_R-114_)
A memorandum by _Reichsleiter_ Bormann of a conference called by Hitler
at his headquarters on 16 July 1941 (_L-221_), states, in part, as
follows with respect to the maintenance of order in the occupied Eastern
areas:
“The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be
settled by Germans only * * *. We have now to face the task of
cutting up the giant cake according to our needs in order to be
able first, to dominate it, second, to administer it, and third,
to exploit it. The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare
behind our front. This partisan war * * * has some advantage for
us; it enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us. * * *
Our iron principle is and has to remain: we must never permit
anybody but the Germans to carry arms * * *.” (_L-221_)
According to the above memorandum, the foregoing conference was attended
by _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg, Reich Minister Lammers, Field Marshal
Keitel, Reich Marshal Goering, and Bormann, and lasted about 20 hours.
The memorandum states that discussion occurred with respect to the
annexation by Germany of various parts of conquered Europe. The
memorandum also states that a long discussion took place with respect to
the qualifications of _Gauleiter_ Lohse, who was proposed by Rosenberg
at the conference as governor of the Baltic country. Discussion also
occurred with respect to the qualifications of other _Gauleiter_ and
commissioners for the administration of various areas of occupied
Russia. Goering stated that he intended to appoint _Gauleiter_ Terboven
for the “exploitation of the Kola Peninsula: the Fuehrer agrees.” With
respect to the security of the German administration in the eastern
areas, the memorandum states:
“This giant area would have to be pacified as quickly as
possible; the best solution was to shoot anybody who looked
sideways * * * Field Marshal Keitel emphasizes the inhabitants
themselves ought to be made responsible for their things because
it was, of course, impossible to put a sentry in front of every
shed or railway station. The inhabitants had to understand that
anybody who did not perform their duties properly would be shot,
and that they would be held responsible for each offense.”
(_L-221_)
(_d_) _Subversion of Christian Church and Persecution of the Clergy._
The evidence relating to the systematic effort of the conspirators to
eliminate the Christian churches in Germany is discussed in Section 6 of
Chapter VII. The evidence hereinafter taken up is limited to proving the
responsibility of the Leadership Corps and its members for participation
in illegal activities against the Christian church and clergy.
Bormann, who was a _Reichsleiter_ and Chief of the Nazi Party
Chancellery, issued a secret decree addressed to all _Gauleiter_,
entitled “Relationship of National Socialism and Christianity” (_D-75_).
In this decree _Reichsleiter_ Bormann flatly declared that National
Socialism and Christianity are incompatible and that the influence of
the churches in Germany must be eliminated:
“National Socialist and Christian concepts are irreconcilable. *
* * Our National Socialist ideology is far loftier than the
concepts of Christianity, which, in their essential points, have
been taken over from Jewry. For this reason also, we do not need
Christianity. * * * If, therefore, in the future our youth
learns nothing more of this Christianity, whose doctrines are
far below ours, Christianity will disappear by itself. * * * It
follows from the irreconcilability of National Socialist and
Christian concepts that a strengthening of existing confessions
and every demand of originating Christian confessions is to be
rejected by us. A differentiation between the various Christian
confessions is not to be made here. For this reason, also, the
thought of an erection of an Evangelical National Church by
merger of the various Evangelical churches has been definitely
given up, because the Evangelical Church is just as inimicable
to us as the Catholic Church. Any strengthening of the
Evangelical Church would merely react against us. * * *
“For the first time in German history, the Fuehrer consciously
and completely has the leadership of the people in his own hand.
With the Party, its components, and attached units, the Fuehrer
has created for himself, and thereby the German Reich
leadership, an instrument which makes him independent of the
Church. All influences which might impair or damage the
leadership of the people exercised by the Fuehrer, with the help
of the NSDAP, must be eliminated. More and more the people must
be separated from the churches and their organs, the pastors. Of
course, the churches must and will, seen from their viewpoint,
defend themselves against this loss of power. But never again
must an influence on leadership of the people be yielded to the
churches. This influence must be broken completely and finally.
“Only the Reich Government and, by its direction, the Party, its
components and attached units have a right to leadership of the
people. Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers, seers
and other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the State, so
must the possibility of Church influence also be totally
removed. Not until this has happened, does the State leadership
have influence on the individual citizens. Not until then are
people and Reich secure in their existence for all the future.”
(_D-75_)
On 25 April 1941 a letter was issued from Bormann’s office to Rosenberg,
in his capacity as the Fuehrer’s Representative for the Supervision of
the Entire Mental and Ideological Training and Education of the NSDAP
(_070-PS_). In this letter Bormann’s office stated that measures had
been taken leading to the progressive cancellation of morning prayers
and other religious services and their substitution by Nazi mottos and
slogans:
“We are inducing schools more and more to reduce and abolish
religious morning services. Similarly the confessional and
general prayers in several parts of the Reich have already been
replaced by national socialist mottos. I would be grateful, to
know your opinion on a future national socialist morning service
instead of the present confessional morning services which are
usually conducted once per week * * *.” (_070-PS_)
In a letter from _Reichsleiter_ Bormann to _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg,
dated 22 February 1940, Bormann declared to Rosenberg that the Christian
religion and National Socialism are incompatible (_098-PS_). Bormann
cited, as examples of hostile divergence between Naziism and the
churches, the attitude of the latter on the racial question, celibacy of
the priests, monasteries and nunneries, etc. Bormann further declared
that the churches could not be subjugated through compromise, but only
through a new philosophy of life as prophesied in Rosenberg’s writings.
In this letter, Bormann proposed the creation of a National Socialist
Catechism, in order to give that part of the German youth which declines
to practice confessional religion, a moral foundation, and to lay a
moral basis for National Socialist doctrines, which were gradually to
supplant the Christian religions. Bormann suggested that some of the Ten
Commandments could be merged with the National Socialist Catechism and
stated that a few new Commandments should be added, such as: Thou shalt
be courageous; Thou shalt not be cowardly; Thou shalt believe in God’s
presence in the living nature, animals, and plants; Thou shalt keep thy
blood pure; etc. Deputy of the Fuehrer Bormann concluded that he
considered the problem so important that it should be discussed with the
members of the Reich Directorate, comprising the top leaders of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, as soon as possible. (_098-PS_)
At one point in this letter, Bormann stated:
“Christianity and National Socialism are phenomena which
originated from entirely different basic causes. Both differ
fundamentally so strongly, that it will not be possible to
construct a Christian teaching which would be completely
compatible with the point of view of the National Socialist
ideology; just as the communications of Christian faith would
never be able to stand by the ideology of National Socialism in
its entirety * * *.” (_098-PS_)
After discussing various proposals for the formulation of a Nazi
religious credo for instruction in the German school system, Bormann
stated:
“The Fuehrer’s deputy finds it necessary that all these
questions should be thoroughly discussed in the near future in
the presence of the Reich Leaders [_Reichsleiter_] who are
especially effected by them * * *.” (_098-PS_)
In a circular letter, dated 17 June 1938, addressed by Bormann as
_Reichsleiter_ and Deputy of the Fuehrer to all _Reichsleiter_ and
_Gauleiter_, there was enclosed a copy of rules prepared by
_Reichsleiter_ Hierl, setting forth certain restrictive regulations with
respect to participation of the Reich Labor Service in religious
celebrations (_107-PS_). Pertinent portions of the directives issued by
_Reichsleiter_ Hierl read as follows:
“The Reich Labor Service is a training school in which the
German youth should be educated to national unity in the spirit
of National Socialism * * *.
“What religious beliefs a person has is not a decisive factor,
but it is decisive that he first of all feels himself a German.
“Every religious practice is forbidden in the Reich Labor
Service because it disturbs the comradelike harmony of all
working men and women.
“On this basis, every participation of the Reich Labor Service
in churchly, that is religious, arrangements and celebrations is
not possible.” (_107-PS_)
The position of Bormann as Deputy of the Fuehrer and chief of the Nazi
Party Chancellery, and the position of Rosenberg as the Fuehrer’s
Representative for the Whole Spiritual and Philosophical Education of
the Nazi Party, give to the foregoing views on religion and religious
policy the highest official backing. The anti-Christian utterances and
policies of these two conspirator-defendants reveal a community of mind
and intention amongst the most powerful leaders of the party which was
amply confirmed by the actual treatment of the churches since 1933 and
throughout the course of the conspiracy. An excerpt from page 514 of
“The Myth of the 20th Century,” written by Rosenberg, reads as follows:
“The idea of honor—national honor—is for us the beginning and
the end of our entire thinking and doing. It does not admit of
any equal-valued center of force along side of it, no matter of
what kind, neither Christian love, nor the Free-Masonic
humanity, nor the Roman philosophy.” (_2349-PS_)
In addition to promoting beliefs and practices fundamentally
incompatible with Christianity, the Leadership Corps participated in the
persecution of priests, clergy, and members of religious orders. A
Gestapo telegram, dated 24 July 1938, dispatched from Berlin to
Nurnberg, deals with demonstrations and acts of violence against Bishop
Sproll in Rottenburg (_848-PS_). The Gestapo office in Berlin wired its
Nurnberg office the following teletype account received from its
Stuttgart office of disorderly conduct and vandalism carried out by Nazi
Party members against Bishop Sproll:
“The Party on 23 July 1939 from 2100 on carried out the third
demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants, about
2500-3000, were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The
Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the
demonstration. This town took rather hostile attitude toward the
demonstrations. The action got completely out of hand of the
Party member responsible for it. The demonstrators stormed the
palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 to 200 people
forced their way into the palace, searched through the rooms,
threw files out of the windows and rummaged through the beds in
the rooms of the palace. One bed was ignited * * * The Bishop
was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg and the ladies and
gentlemen of his menage in the chapel at prayer. About 25 to 30
people pressed into this chapel and molested those present.
Bishop Groeber was taken for Bishop Sproll. He was grabbed by
the robe and dragged back and forth * * *.” (_848-PS_)
The Gestapo official in Stuttgart added that Bishop Groeber desired “to
turn to the Fuehrer and Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick,
anew”; and that he had found a full report of the demonstration after
“suppressing counter mass meetings.” (_848-PS_)
On 23 July 1938 the Reich Minister for Church Affairs, Kerrl, sent a
letter to the Minister of State and Chief of the Praesidium Chancellery,
Berlin, stating that Bishop Sproll had angered the population by
abstaining from the plebiscite of 10 April (_849-PS_). In this letter
Kerrl stated that the _Gauleiter_ and Governor of Wuerttemberg had
decided that, in the interest of preserving the State’s authority and in
the interest of quiet and order, Bishop Sproll could no longer remain in
office. The letter reads in part as follows:
“* * * The Reich Governor had explained to the Ecclesiastical
Board that he would no longer regard Bishop Sproll as Head of
the Diocese of Rottenburg on account of his refraining from the
election in the office and that he desired Bishop Sproll to
leave the Gau area * * * because he could assume no guarantee
for his personal safety; that in the case of the return of the
Bishop of Rottenburg he would see to it that all personal and
official intercourse with him on the part of State offices as
well as Party offices and the Armed Forces would be denied.”
(_849-PS_)
Kerrl further stated in the foregoing letter that his Deputy had moved
the Foreign Office, through the German Embassy at the Vatican, to urge
the Holy See to persuade Bishop Sproll to resign his Bishopric. Kerrl
concluded by stating that should the effort to procure the Bishop’s
resignation prove unsuccessful
“* * * the Bishop would have to be exiled from the land or there
would have to be a complete boycott of the Bishop by the
authorities * * *.” (_849-PS_)
On 14 July 1939 Bormann, in his capacity as Deputy of the Fuehrer,
issued a party regulation which required party members entering the
clergy or undertaking the study of theology to leave the party
(_840-PS_). The last paragraph of the regulation reads as follows:
“I decree that in the future party members who enter the clergy
or who turn to the study of theology have to leave the party.”
(_840-PS_)
In this directive Bormann also referred to an earlier decree, dated 9
February 1937, in which he had ruled that the admission of members of
the clergy into the party was to be avoided. In that decree also Bormann
referred with approval to a regulation of the Reich Treasurer of the
NSDAP, dated 10 May 1939, providing that—
“clergymen, as well as other fellow Germans, who are also
closely connected with the church, cannot be admitted into the
party.” (_840-PS_)
In the Allocution of His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, to the Sacred College
on 2 June 1945, His Holiness, after declaring that he had acquired an
appreciation of the great qualities of the German people in the course
of 12 years of residence in their midst, expressed the hope that Germany
could rise to new dignity and new life once it had laid the satanic
specter raised by National Socialism, and after the guilty had expiated
the crimes they have committed (_3268-PS_). After referring to repeated
violations by the German government of the Concordat concluded in 1933,
His Holiness declared:
“The struggle against the Church did, in fact, become ever more
bitter: there was the dissolution of Catholic organizations; the
gradual suppression of the flourishing Catholic schools, both
public and private; the enforced weaning of youth from family
and Church; the pressure brought to bear on the conscience of
citizens, and especially of civil servants; the systematic
defamation, by means of a clever, closely-organized propaganda,
of the Church, the clergy, the faithful, the Church’s
institutions, teachings and history; the closing, dissolution,
confiscation of religious houses and other ecclesiastical
institutions; the complete suppression of the Catholic press and
publishing houses * * *.
“In the meantime the Holy See itself multiplied its
representations and protests to governing authorities in
Germany, reminding them, in clear and energetic language, of
their duty to respect and fulfill the obligations of the natural
law itself that were confirmed by the Concordat. In those
critical years, joining the alert vigilance of a Pastor to the
long-suffering patience of a father, Our great Predecessor Pius
XI fulfilled his mission as Supreme Pontiff with intrepid
courage.
“But when, after he had tried all means of persuasion in vain,
he saw himself clearly faced with deliberate violations of a
solemn pact, with a religious persecution masked or open, but
always rigorously organized, he proclaimed to the world, on
Passion Sunday 1937, in his Encyclical _Mit brennender Sorge_,
what National-Socialism really was; the arrogant apostasy from
Jesus Christ, the denial of His doctrine and of His work of
redemption, the cult of violence, the idolatry of race and
blood, the overthrow of human liberty and dignity * * *.
“From the prisons, concentration camps and fortresses are now
pouring out, together with the political prisoners, also the
crowds of those, whether clergy or laymen, whose only crime was
their fidelity to Christ and to the faith of their fathers or
the dauntless fulfillment of their duties as priests * * *.
“In the forefront, the number and harshness of the treatment
meted out to them, were the Polish priests. From 1940 to 1945,
2,800 Polish ecclesiastica and religious were imprisoned in that
camp; among them was the Auxiliary bishop of Wloclawek, who died
there of typhus. In April last there were left only 816, all the
others being dead except for two or three transferred to another
camp. In the summer of 1942, 480 German-speaking ministers of
religion were known to be gathered there; of these, 45 were
Protestants, all the others Catholic priests. In spite of the
continuous inflow of new internees, especially from some
dioceses of Bavaria, Rhenania and Westphalia, their number, as a
result of the high rate of mortality, at the beginning of this
year, did not surpass 350. Nor should we pass over in silence
those belonging to occupied territories, Holland, Belgium,
France (among whom the Bishop of Clermont), Luxembourg,
Slovenia, Italy. Many of those priests and laymen endured
indescribable sufferings for their faith and for their vocation.
In one case the hatred of the impious against Christ reached the
point of parodying on the person of an interned priest, with
barbed wire, the scourging and crowning with thorns of our
Redeemer.” (_3268-PS_)
The Leadership Corps participated in the confiscation of church and
religious property. A letter dated 19 April 1941 from _Reichsleiter_
Bormann to _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg exposes the participation of the
_Gauleiter_ in measures relating to the confiscation of religious
property (_072-PS_). The letter reads in part as follows:
“The libraries and art objects of the monasteries confiscated in
the Reich were to remain for the time being in these
monasteries, insofar as the Gauleiter had not determined
otherwise.” (_072-PS_)
On 21 February 1940, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Heydrich,
wrote a letter to the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, proposing that certain
listed churches and monasteries be confiscated for the accommodation of
so-called racial Germans. (Himmler was a _Reichsleiter_ in the
Leadership Corps by virtue of his position as Reichsfuehrer of the SS.)
After pointing out that, on political grounds, outright expropriation of
religious property would not be feasible at the time, Heydrich suggested
certain specious interim actions with respect to the church properties
in question, to be followed progressively by outright confiscation
(_R-101-A_). Heydrich’s letter makes the following statements:
“Enclosed is a list of church possessions which might be
available for the accommodation of Racial Germans. The list,
which please return, is supplemented by correspondence and
illustrated material pertinent to the subject.
“For political reasons, expropriation without indemnity of the
entire property of the churches and religious orders will hardly
be possible at this time.
“Expropriation with indemnity or in return for assignment of
other lands and grounds will be even less possible.
“It is therefore suggested that the respective authorities of
the Orders be instructed that they make available the
monasteries concerned for the accommodation of Racial Germans
and remove their own members to other less populous monasteries.
[Marginal note in pencil opposite this paragraph: “Very good!”]
“The final expropriation of these properties thus placed at our
disposal can then be carried out step by step in course of
time.” (_R-101-A_)
On 5 April 1940, the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security
Service SS sent a letter to the Reich Commissioner for the consolidation
of Germandom, enclosing a copy of the foregoing letter from Heydrich to
Himmler proposing the confiscation of church properties (_R-101-A_). The
letter of 5 April 1940 stated:
“The Reich Leader SS has agreed to the proposals made in the
enclosed letter and has ordered the matter to be dealt with by
collaboration between the Chief of the Security Police and
Security Service and your office.” (_R-101-A_)
A letter dated 30 July 1941 (_R-101-C_) written by an
SS-Standartenfuehrer whose signature is illegible, to the Reich Leader
of the SS, supplies further evidence of the participation of the
_Gauleiter_ in the seizure of church property:
“Further to report of 30 May 1941 this office considers it its
duty to call the Reich Leader’s attention to the development
which is currently taking place in the incorporated Eastern
countries with regard to seizure and confiscation of Church
property.
“As soon as the Reich Laws on expropriation had been introduced,
the Reich Governor and _Gauleiter_ in the Wartheland adopted the
practice of expropriating real estate belonging to churches for
use as dwellings. He grants compensation to the extent of the
assessed value and pays the equivalent amount into blocked
accounts.
“Moreover the East German Estate Administration Limited reports
that in the ‘_Warthegau_’ all real estate owned by the churches
is being claimed by the local _Gau_ administration
[_Gauselbstverwaltung_].” (_R-101-C_)
Another letter, this one from the Chief of the Staff Main Office to
Himmler, dated 30 March 1942, dealing with the confiscation of church
property, evidences the active participation of the Party Chancellery in
the confiscation of religious property (_R-101-D_). In this letter the
Chief of the Staff Main Office reports to Himmler concerning the policy
of the SS in suspending all payments of rent to monasteries and other
church institutions whose property had been expropriated. The letter
discusses a proposal made by the Reich Minister of the Interior, in
which the Party Chancery prominently participated, to the effect that
the church institutions should be paid amounts corresponding to current
mortgage charges on the premises without realizing any profit. The
writer further suggests that such payments should never be made directly
to the ecclesiastical institutions but rather should be made to the
creditors of such institutions:
“Such an arrangement would be in line with the basic idea of the
settlement originally worked out between the Party Chancery and
the Reich Minister of the Interior.” (_R-101-D_)
The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party participated in the suppression
of religious publications and interfered with free religious education.
In a letter dated 27 September 1940, _Reichsleiter_ and Deputy of the
Fuehrer Bormann transmitted to Rosenberg a photostatic copy of a letter
from _Gauleiter_ Florian to Hess, dated 23 September 1940, which
expresses the _Gauleiter’s_ intense disapproval on Nazi ideological
grounds of a religious pamphlet entitled “The Spirit and Soul of the
Soldiers,” written by a Major General von Rabenau (_064-PS_). The
_Gauleiter_ urges that the religious writings of General von Rabenau be
suppressed. Florian also discusses a conversation he had with General
von Rabenau at the close of a lecture delivered by the General to a
group of younger Army officers at Aachen. This conversation illumines
the hostile attitude of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party toward
the Christian churches:
“After he had affirmed the necessity of the churches, Rabenau
said, with emphasized self-assurance, something like the
following: ‘Dear Gauleiter, the Party is making mistake after
mistake in the business with the churches. Obtain for me the
necessary powers from the Fuehrer and I guarantee that I shall
succeed in a few months in establishing peace with the churches
for all times.’ After this catastrophic ignorance, I gave up the
conversation. Dear Party Member Hess: the reading of von
Rabenau’s pamphlet ‘Spirit and Soul of the Soldier’ has reminded
me again of this. In this brochure, Rabenau affirms the
necessity of the Church straight-forward and clearly, even if it
is prudently careful. He writes on page 28 ‘There could be more
examples; they would suffice to show that a soldier in this
world can scarcely get along without thoughts about the next
one.’ Because von Rabenau is falsely based spiritually, I
consider his activities as an educator in spiritual affairs as
dangerous, and I am of the opinion that his educational writings
are to be dispensed with absolutely and that the publication
section of the NSDAP can and must renounce these writings * * *
The churches with their Christianity are this danger against
which the struggle must always be carried on.” (_064-PS_)
That the Party Chancellery shared the _Gauleiter’s_ hostility to the
Christian churches is further revealed by Bormann’s instruction to
Rosenberg to “take action” on the _Gauleiter’s_ recommendation that the
General’s writings be suppressed. (_064-PS_)
Another letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, dated 8 March 1940, enclosed a
copy of Bormann’s letter of the same date to _Reichsleiter_ Amann
(_089-PS_). Amann was a top member of the Leadership Corps by virtue of
his position as _Reichsleiter_ for the Press and Leader of the Party
Publishing Company. In this letter to Amann, Bormann expressed his
dismay and dissatisfaction that only 10 percent of the 3,000 Protestant
periodicals in Germany had ceased publication for what are described as
“paper saving” reasons. Bormann then advised Amann that “the
distribution of any paper whatsoever for such periodicals” was barred
(_089-PS_). Bormann also instructed Amann to make sharper restrictions
in the distribution of paper against religious writings in favor of
publications more acceptable to the Nazi ideology:
“I urge you [Bormann is addressing _Reichsleiter_ Amann] to see
to it in any redistribution of paper to be considered later that
the confessional writing, which according to experiences so far
gathered possesses very doubtful value for strengthening the
power of resistance of the people toward the external foe
receives still sharper restrictions in favor of literature,
politically and ideologically more valuable.” (_089-PS_)
A further letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, dated 17 January 1940,
expressed the Party’s opposition to the circulation of religious
literature to the members of the German Armed Forces (_101-PS_).
Pertinent excerpts from Bormann’s letter read as follows:
“Nearly all the districts [_Gaue_] report to me regularly that
the churches of both confessions are administering spiritually
to members of the Armed Forces. This administering finds its
expression especially in the fact that soldiers are being sent
religious publications by the spiritual leaders of the home
congregations. These publications are, in part, very cleverly
composed. I have repeated reports that these publications are
being read by the troops and thereby exercise a certain
influence on the morale.
“I have, in the past, sought by sounding out the General Field
Marshal, the High Command of the Armed Forces, and * * * Reich
Director Amann, to restrict considerably the production and
shipment of publications of this type. The result of these
efforts remains unsatisfactory. As _Reichsleiter_ Amann has
repeatedly informed me, the restriction of these pamphlets by
means of the * * * paper rationing has not been achieved because
the paper * * * is being purchased on the open market.
“If the influencing of the soldiers by the church is to be
effectively combatted, this will only be accomplished by
producing many good publications in the shortest possible time
under the supervision of the Party * * *.
“Thus at the last meeting of the Deputy _Gauleiters_, comments
were uttered on this matter to the effect that a considerable
quantity of such publications are not available.
“I maintain that it is necessary that in the near future we
transmit to the Party Service Office down to
_Ortsgruppenleitern_ a list of additional publications of this
sort which should be sent to our soldiers by the _Ortsgruppen_.
* * *” (_101-PS_)
The Leadership Corps also participated in measures leading to the
closing and dissolution of theological schools and other religious
institutions. In a letter dated 17 April 1939 Bormann transmitted to
Rosenberg photostatic copy of a plan suggested by the Reich Minister for
Science, Education, and Training for the combining and closing of
certain specifically listed theological faculties (_122-PS_). In his
letter of transmittal Bormann requested Rosenberg to take “cognizance
and prompt action” with respect to proposed suppression of religious
institutions. The plan to suppress the religious institutions was
summarized as follows:
“To recapitulate, this plan would include the complete closing
of the theological faculties at Innsbruck, Salzburg, and Munich,
the transfer of the faculty of Graz to Vienna, and the vanishing
of four Catholic faculties; closing of three Catholic
theological faculties or higher schools, and of four evangelical
faculties in the Winter semester 1939/1940; closing of one
further Catholic and of three further evangelical faculties in
the near future.” (_122-PS_)
A final letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, dated 24 January 1939,
enclosed for Rosenberg’s cognizance a copy of Bormann’s letter to the
Reich Minister for Knowledge and Education (_116-PS_). In the enclosed
letter, Bormann informed the Minister as to the Party’s position in
favor of restricting and suppressing theological faculties. Bormann
stated that, owing to the effects of the introduction of military
service, the consequences of the Four Year Plan, and the extraordinary
lack of replacements, it would become necessary to carry out a
reorganization of the German high schools. In view of these
developments, he requested the Minister to restrict and suppress the
theological faculties:
“* * * I would appreciate it very much if you would restrict the
theological faculties in so far as they cannot be wholly
suppressed in accordance with the above statement. I request in
this instance the omission of any expressed declaration to the
Churches or to other places, as well as the avoiding of a public
announcement of these measures. Complaints and the like must be
answered (if they are to be replied to) in the fashion that
these measures are being executed in the course of the economic
plan of reorganization and that similar things are happening to
other faculties.
“I would appreciate it very much if professional chairs thus
vacated can be then turned over to the newly created fields of
inquiry of these last years, such as Racial Research,
Archeological Studies, etc.” (_116-PS_)
From the foregoing evidence it is clear the Leadership Corps of the Nazi
Party shares in the responsibility for the measures taken to subvert the
Christian churches and persecute the Christian clergy, both in Germany
and in German-occupied territories of Europe. The Prosecution stresses
the significance of the appointment of Rosenberg, whose anti-Christian
views are open and notorious, as the Fuehrer’s Representative for the
Whole Spiritual and Philosophical Education of the Nazi Party. It was
precisely this position which gave Rosenberg his seat in the
_Reichsleitung_. But emphasis is placed not merely upon the fact that
anti-Christs such as Bormann and Rosenberg held directive positions
within the Leadership Corps, but upon the further fact that their
directives and orders were passed down the chain of command of the
Leadership Corps and caused the participation of its membership in acts
subversive of the Christian Church.
(_e_) _Destruction of the Free Trade Unions, Imposition of Nazi Control
over the Productive Labor Capacity of Germany._ The evidence relating to
the destruction of the independent trade unions is discussed in Section
5 of Chapter VII. The evidence hereinafter taken up is offered to prove
the responsibility of the Leadership Corps for participation in the
smashing of the unions and the imposition of Nazi Party control over the
productive labor capacity of the German nation.
Soon after the seizure of power (mid-April 1933), _Reichsleiter_ Robert
Ley was directed by Hitler to smash the independent unions.
_Reichsleiter_ Ley, in his speech to the Nurnberg Party Congress of
1936, declared:
“* * * My Fuehrer! When you, my Fuehrer, ordered me in mid-April
1933 to take over the trade unions, I could not understand why
you gave this order to me since I could not see any connection
between my task as Organizational Leader of the Party and my new
task. Very soon, however, your decision, my Fuehrer, became
clear to me and I recognized that the organizational measures of
the Party could only come to full fruition when supplemented by
the organization of the people, that is to say, by the
mobilization of the energies of the people and by their
concentration and alignment. If the _Party_ represents the
_concentration of the Political Leaders of the people_—as you,
my Fuehrer, have told us again and again—then the _people_ is
the _retinue_ and must be organized and trained according to the
same principles. _Leader and retinue, elite and community at
large_—these were the clear directives for my work. These were
the consequences:
“(1) _My tasks as Organizational Leader of the Party and as the
leader of the German Labor Front were a completely homogeneous
task: in other words, in everything I did I acted as Reich
Organization Leader of the NSDAP._
“(2) _The German Labor Front was an institution of the Party and
was led by it._
“(3) _The German Labor Front had to be organized regionally and
professionally according to the same principles as the Party._
“That is why trade union and employer associations had to be
smashed unrelentingly, and the basis of construction was formed,
as in the Party, by the cell and the local section
[_Ortsgruppe_].
* * * * * *
“_National Socialism has conquered the factory._ Factory troops
[_Die Werkschar_] are the National Socialist shock troops within
the factory, and their motto is:
‘THE FUEHRER IS ALWAYS RIGHT’.” (_2283-PS_)
In furtherance of the Nazi policy to destroy the independent trade
unions of Germany, Ley issued a Party directive on 21 April 1933
outlining what was termed a “coordination action” scheduled for 2 May
1933 against the General German Trade Union Federation and the General
Independent Employee Federation (_392-PS_). This directive ordered the
SA and the SS to occupy trade union premises, seize trade union funds,
and take into protective custody the higher union leaders.
Pertinent portions of Ley’s order provide:
“On Tuesday, 2 May 1933, the coordination action of the free
trade unions begins.
* * * * * *
“The essential part of the action is to be directed against the
General German Trade Union Federation and the General
Independent Employees Federation.
“Anything beyond that which is dependent upon the free trade
unions is left to the discretion of the _Gauleiter’s_ judgment.
“The _Gauleiter_ are responsible for the execution of the
coordination action in the individual areas. Supporters of the
action should be members of the National Socialist Factory Cell
Organizations * * *.
“SA as well as SS are to be employed for the occupation of trade
union properties and for taking into protective custody of
personalities who come into question.
“The _Gauleiter_ is to proceed with his measures on a basis of
the closest understanding with competent gau or regional factory
cells directors.
* * * * * *
“In the Reich, the following will be occupied:
The directing offices of the unions;
The trade union houses and offices of the fur trade
unions;
The Party houses of the Socialist Democratic Party of
Germany in so far as trade unions are involved there;
The branches and paying offices of the ‘Bank for
Workers, Employees and Officials, Inc.’
The district committees of the General German Trade
Union Federation and of the General Independent
Employees Federation.
The local committees of the General German Trade Union
Federation and of the General Independent Employees
Federation.
“The following are to be taken into protective custody:
All trade union chairmen;
The district secretaries and branch directors of the
Bank for Workers, Employees and Officials, Inc.
* * * * * *
“Exceptions are granted only with the permission of the
_Gauleiter_.
* * * * * *
“It is understood that this action is to proceed in a strongly
disciplined fashion. The _Gauleiter_ are responsible in this
respect. They are to hold the direction of the action firmly in
hand.
“Heil Hitler!
“(signed) Dr. Robert Ley.” (_392-PS_)
Ley’s order for the dissolution of the independent trade unions was
carried out as planned and directed. Trade union premises all over
Germany were occupied by the SA and the unions dissolved. On 2 May 1933,
the official NSDAP Press Service reported that the National Socialist
Factory Cells Organization (NSBO) had “eliminated the old leadership” of
“Free Trade Unions” and taken over their leadership (_2224-PS_):
“National Socialism, which today has assumed leadership of the
German working class, can no longer bear the responsibility for
leaving the men and women of the German working class, the
members of the largest trade organization in the world, the
German Trade Union Movement, in the hands of a people who do not
know a fatherland that is called Germany. Because of that, the
National Socialist Factory Cell Organization (NSBO) has taken
over the leadership of the trade unions. The NSBO has eliminated
the old leadership of the trade unions of the General German
Trade Unions League and of the General Independent Employees’
Federation * * *.
“On 2 May 1933, the National Socialist Factory Cell Organization
(NSBO) took over the leadership of all trade unions; all trade
union buildings were occupied and most stringent control has
been organized over financial and personnel matters of the
organization.” (_2224-PS_)
This assault on the independent unions directed by Ley in his capacity
as _Reichsleiter_ in charge of Party Organization, assisted by the
_Gauleiter_, and Party Formations, included the seizure of trade union
funds and property. In a speech on 11 September 1937 to the 5th Annual
Session of the German Labor Front (_1678-PS_), Ley admitted the
confiscation of trade union funds.
“Once I said to the Fuehrer: ‘My Fuehrer, actually I am standing
with one foot in jail, for today I am still the trustee of the
comrades “Leipart” and “Imbusch,” and should they some day ask
me to return their money, then it will be found that I have
spent it, either by building things, or otherwise. But they
shall never again find their property in the condition in which
they handed it over to me. Therefore I would have to be
convicted.’
“The Fuehrer laughed then and remarked that apparently I felt
extremely well in this condition.
“It was very difficult for us all. Today we laugh about it * *
*.” (_1678-PS_)
The plan of the Nazi conspirators to eliminate the Free Trade Unions was
advanced by the enactment on 19 May 1933 of a law which abolished
collective bargaining between workers and employers and replaced it with
a regulation of working conditions by Labor Trustees appointed by Hitler
(_405-PS_). After providing in Section 1 for the appointment by Hitler
of trustees of labor, this law provides, in Section 2:
“Until a new revision of the social constitution, the trustees
are to regulate the conditions for the conclusion of labor
contracts. This practice is to be legally binding for all
persons and replaces the system found on combinations of
workers, of individual employers or of combinations of employers
* * *.”(_405-PS_)
Having destroyed the independent unions and collective bargaining, the
next step of the Nazi conspirators was to Nazify industrial relations.
The Law of 20 January 1934, entitled “Law Regulating National Labor,”
imposed the Leadership Principle upon industrial enterprisers
(_1861-PS_). Section I, paragraph 1, provided that the enterpriser
should be the leader of the plant and the workers would “constitute his
followers.” Section 1, paragraph 2 reads as follows:
“The Leader of the plant makes the decisions for the employees
and laborers in all matters concerning the enterprise, as far as
they are regulated by this law.
“He is responsible for the well-being of the employees and
laborers. The employees and laborers owe him faithfulness
according to the principles of the factory community.”
(_1861-PS_)
The trade unions having been dissolved and the Leadership Principle
superimposed upon the relationship of management and labor, the members
of the Leadership Corps joined in and directed measures designed to
replace the independent unions by the German Labor Front, the DAF, an
affiliated Party organization. On the very day the Nazi conspirators
seized and dissolved the Free Trade Unions, 2 May 1933, they publicly
proclaimed that a “united front of German workers” would be formed with
Hitler as honorary patron at a workers’ congress on 10 May 1933
(_2224-PS_). A release of the Nazi Party Press Agency stated:
“The National Socialist Party Press Agency is informed that a
great workers’ congress will take place on Wednesday, 10 May, in
the Russian House of Lords in Berlin. The United Front of German
workers will be formed there. Adolf Hitler will be asked to
assume the position of Honorary Patron.” (_2224-PS_)
The action committee, which supervised the smashing of the unions under
_Reichsleiter_ Ley, met with Hitler and reported that the independent
unions had been effectively dissolved. The Fuehrer then consented to be
Honorary Patron at the Great Workers’ Congress. (_2224-PS_)
The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party was not only employed in measures
taken to dissolve the independent unions, but certain of its members
were given important and directive positions within the German Labor
Front, the Nazi Organization which replaced the free trade unions. On 10
May 1933, Hitler appointed Ley Leader of the German Labor Front (DAF)
(_1940-PS_). By the same edict, Hitler appointed _Gauleiter_ Forster as
Leader of the Employees’ Associations, and Schumann, Leader of the Nazi
Factory Cell Organization (NSBO), as Leader of the Workers’
Associations. The Hitler edict stated:
“The Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, has issued the following edict:
“I appoint the Chief of Staff of the Political Organization of
the NSDAP, Dr. Robert Ley, as leader of the German Labor Front.
“I appoint _Gauleiter_ Forster, Danzig, as leader of the
Employees’ Associations.
“I appoint the leader of the National Socialist Factory Cell
Organizations (NSBO), Schumann, as leader of the Workers’
Associations.
“Berlin, 10 May
“Adolf Hitler.” (_1940-PS_)
The Nazi conspirators employed the German Labor Front (DAF) as an
instrument for propagandizing its millions of compulsory members with
Nazi ideology. The control of the Leadership Corps over the German Labor
Front was assured not only by the designation of _Reichsleiter_ Ley as
head of the DAF, but by the employment of a large number of _Politischen
Leiter_ (political leaders) charged with disseminating Nazi ideology to
the large membership of the DAF. These facts are apparent from pages
185-187 of the _Organization Book of the NSDAP_ (_2271-PS_):
“The National Socialist Factory Cells Organization [NSBO], is a
union of the political leaders [_Politischen Leiter_] of the
NSDAP in the German Labor Front.
“The NSBO is the carrier of the organization of the German Labor
Front.
“The duties and responsibilities of the NSBO have passed over to
the DAF.
“The political leaders who have been transferred from the NSBO
to the German Labor Front guarantee the ideological education of
the DAF in the spirit of the National Socialistic idea.”
(_2271-PS_)
The foregoing evidence fixes upon the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party
responsibility for participation in the measures leading to the
destruction of the independent trade unions and to Nazi Party control
over the productive capacity of the German Labor Movement. Not only were
these actions directed by Ley in his capacity as _Reichsleiter_, but
they were supervised on a regional basis by the _Gauleiter_ as district
representatives of the Leadership Corps. Moreover, the German Labor
Front (DAF) which replaced the dissolved trade unions was an affiliated
organization of the NSDAP and, as such, remained under the control of
the Leadership Corps and was employed by it to nazify the labor
population of Germany.
(_f_) _Plunder of Art Treasures._ The Leadership Corps of the NSDAP is
also responsible for the plundering of art treasures by _Reichsleiter_
Rosenberg’s _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_, the activities of which are
discussed in full in Chapter XIV.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE NAZI PARTY
LEADERSHIP CORPS
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix B. │ I │ 29, 69
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*004-PS │Report submitted by Rosenberg to │ │
│Deputy of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, │ │
│on the Political Preparation of the │ │
│Norway Action. (GB 140) │ III │ 19
│ │ │
*057-PS │Circular letter from Bormann to │ │
│Political Leaders, 30 May 1944, │ │
│concerning justice exercised by people│ │
│against Anglo-American murderers. (USA│ │
│329) │ III │ 102
│ │ │
*064-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 27 │ │
│September 1940, enclosing letter from │ │
│Gauleiter Florian criticizing churches│ │
│and publications for soldiers. (USA │ │
│359) │ III │ 109
│ │ │
070-PS │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,│ │
│25 April 1941, on substitution of │ │
│National Socialist mottos for morning │ │
│prayers in schools.(USA 349) │ III │ 118
│ │ │
*071-PS │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April │ │
│1941, replying to Bormann’s letter of │ │
│19 April 1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA │ │
│371) │ III │ 119
│ │ │
*072-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 19 April │ │
│1941, concerning confiscation of │ │
│property, especially of art treasures │ │
│in the East. (USA 357) │ III │ 122
│ │ │
*089-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8 │ │
│March 1940, instructing Amann not to │ │
│issue further newsprint to │ │
│confessional newspapers. (USA 360) │ III │ 147
│ │ │
*090-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Schwarz, 28 │ │
│January 1941, concerning registration │ │
│and collection of art treasures. (USA │ │
│372) │ III │ 148
│ │ │
*098-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22 │ │
│February 1940, urging creation of │ │
│National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │ │
│provide moral foundation for NS │ │
│religion. (USA 350) │ III │ 152
│ │ │
*100-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 18 │ │
│January 1940, urging preparation of │ │
│National Socialist reading material to│ │
│replace Christian literature for │ │
│soldiers. (USA 691) │ III │ 160
│ │ │
*101-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,│ │
│concerning undesirability of religious│ │
│literature for members of the │ │
│Wehrmacht. (USA 361) │ III │ 160
│ │ │
107-PS │Circular letter signed Bormann, 17 │ │
│June 1938, enclosing directions │ │
│prohibiting participation of │ │
│Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious │ │
│celebrations. (USA 351) │ III │ 162
│ │ │
*116-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, │ │
│enclosing copy of letter, 24 January │ │
│1939, to Minister of Education │ │
│requesting restriction or elimination │ │
│of theological faculties. (USA 685) │ III │ 165
│ │ │
*122-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 17 │ │
│April 1939, enclosing copy of Minister│ │
│of Education letter, 6 April 1939, on │ │
│elimination of theological faculties │ │
│in various universities. (USA 362) │ III │ 173
│ │ │
*136-PS │Certified copy of Hitler Order, 29 │ │
│January 1940, concerning establishment│ │
│of “Hohe Schule”. (USA 367) │ III │ 184
│ │ │
*137-PS │Copy of Order from Keitel to │ │
│Commanding General of Netherlands, 5 │ │
│July 1940, to cooperate with the │ │
│Einsatzstab Rosenberg. (USA 379) │ III │ 185
│ │ │
*141-PS │Goering Order, 5 November 1940, │ │
│concerning seizure of Jewish art │ │
│treasures. (USA 368) │ III │ 188
│ │ │
*145-PS │Order signed by Rosenberg, 20 August │ │
│1941, concerning safeguarding the │ │
│cultural goods in the Occupied Eastern│ │
│Territories. (USA 373) │ III │ 189
│ │ │
*149-PS │Hitler Order, 1 March 1942, │ │
│establishing authority of Einsatzstab │ │
│Rosenberg. (USA 369) │ III │ 190
│ │ │
*154-PS │Letter from Lammers to high State and │ │
│Party authorities, 5 July 1942, │ │
│confirming Rosenberg’s powers. (USA │ │
│370) │ III │ 193
│ │ │
315-PS │Note of a meeting held in the Reich │ │
│Ministry for Enlightenment and │ │
│Propaganda, 10 March 1943, concerning │ │
│treatment of foreign workers employed │ │
│in the Reich. │ III │ 251
│ │ │
*327-PS │Letter of Rosenberg to Bormann, 17 │ │
│October 1944, concerning liquidation │ │
│of property in Eastern Occupied │ │
│Territories. (USA 338) │ III │ 257
│ │ │
*347-PS │Letter from Lohse to Reich Youth │ │
│Leader Axmann, 18 April 1944. (USA │ │
│340) │ III │ 267
│ │ │
*374-PS │TWX Series of Orders signed by │ │
│Heydrich and Mueller, issued by │ │
│Gestapo Headquarters Berlin, 9-11 │ │
│November 1938, concerning treatment of│ │
│Jews. (USA 729) │ III │ 277
│ │ │
*392-PS │Official NSDAP circular entitled “The │ │
│Social Life of New Germany with │ │
│Special Consideration of the German │ │
│Labor Front”, by Prof. Willy Mueller │ │
│(Berlin, 1938). (USA 326) │ III │ 380
│ │ │
405-PS │Law Concerning Trustees of Labor, 19 │ │
│May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│ │
│I, p. 285. │ III │ 387
│ │ │
*407-V and VI-PS│Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 15 │ │
│April 1943, concerning labor │ │
│questions. (USA 209; USA 228) │ III │ 391
│ │ │
*630-PS │Memorandum of Hitler, 1 September │ │
│1939, concerning authorization of │ │
│mercy killings. (USA 342) │ III │ 451
│ │ │
*654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, │ │
│on discussion with Himmler concerning │ │
│delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │
│extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467
│ │ │
656-PS │Letter, undated, from Bormann to │ │
│Political leaders, enclosing Order of │ │
│Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, 29 │ │
│January 1943, relating to self-defense│ │
│against prisoners of war. (USA 339) │ III │ 470
│ │ │
*840-PS │Party Directive, 14 July 1939, making │ │
│clergy and theology students │ │
│ineligible for Party membership. (USA │ │
│355) │ III │ 606
│ │ │
*848-PS │Gestapo telegram from Berlin to │ │
│Nurnberg, 24 July 1938, dealing with │ │
│demonstrations against Bishop Sproll │ │
│in Rottenburg. (USA 353) │ III │ 613
│ │ │
*849-PS │Letter from Kerrl to Minister of │ │
│State, 23 July 1938, with enclosures │ │
│dealing with persecution of Bishop │ │
│Sproll. (USA 354) │ III │ 614
│ │ │
*1058-PS │Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, │ │
│by Rosenberg before people most │ │
│intimately concerned with Eastern │ │
│Problem, found in his “Russia File”. │ │
│(USA 147) │ III │ 716
│ │ │
*1117-PS │Goering Order, 1 May 1941, concerning │ │
│establishment of Einsatzstab Rosenberg│ │
│in all Occupied Territories. (USA 384)│ III │ 793
│ │ │
1118-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Goering, 18 │ │
│June 1942, and related correspondence.│ III │ 793
│ │ │
*1130-PS │Note, 11 April 1943, and report of │ │
│speech by Koch in Kiev on 5 March │ │
│1943, concerning treatment of civilian│ │
│population in Ukraine. (USA 169) │ III │ 797
│ │ │
*1164-PS │Secret letter, 21 April 1942, from SS │ │
│to all concentration camp commanders │ │
│concerning treatment of priests. (USA │ │
│736) │ III │ 820
│ │ │
1386-PS │Law concerning the granting of │ │
│amnesty, 23 April 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 378. │ III │ 960
│ │ │
1388-PS │Law concerning confiscation of │ │
│Property subversive to People and │ │
│State, 14 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962
│ │ │
1389-PS │Law creating Reich Labor Service, 26 │ │
│June 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 769. │ III │ 963
│ │ │
1391-PS │Statute of the Academy for German Law,│ │
│2 July 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│pp. 605-607. │ III │ 970
│ │ │
1392-PS │Law on the Hitler Youth, 1 December │ │
│1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 993. │ III │ 972
│ │ │
1393-PS │Law on treacherous attacks against │ │
│State and Party, and for the │ │
│Protection of Party Uniforms, 20 │ │
│December 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 1269. │ III │ 973
│ │ │
1394-PS │Law to guarantee Public Peace, 13 │ │
│October 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 723, Art. 1-3. │ III │ 976
│ │ │
1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
1397-PS │Law for the reestablishment of the │ │
│Professional Civil Service, 7 April │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 175. │ III │ 981
│ │ │
1398-PS │Law to supplement the Law for the │ │
│restoration of the Professional Civil │ │
│Service, 20 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 518. │ III │ 986
│ │ │
1402-PS │The Homestead Law of 29 September │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 685. │ III │ 990
│ │ │
1412-PS │Decree relating to payment of fine by │ │
│Jews of German nationality, 12 │ │
│November 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 1579. │ IV │ 6
│ │ │
1415-PS │Police regulation concerning │ │
│appearance of Jews in public, 28 │ │
│November 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 1676. │ IV │ 6
│ │ │
1416-PS │Reich Citizen Law of 15 September │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 1146. │ IV │ 7
│ │ │
*1417-PS │First regulation to the Reichs │ │
│Citizenship Law, 14 November 1935. │ │
│1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│1333. (GB 258) │ IV │ 8
│ │ │
1419-PS │Law concerning Jewish tenants, 30 │ │
│April 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 864. │ IV │ 10
│ │ │
1422-PS │Thirteenth regulation under Reich │ │
│Citizenship Law, 1 July 1943. 1943 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 372. │ IV │ 14
│ │ │
1438-PS │Fuehrer concerning administration of │ │
│Sudeten-German territory, 22 October │ │
│1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 1453. │ IV │ 17
│ │ │
*1481-PS │Gestapo order, 20 January 1938, │ │
│dissolving and confiscating property │ │
│of Catholic Youth Women’s Organization│ │
│in Bavaria. (USA 737) │ IV │ 50
│ │ │
*1517-PS │Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning │ │
│discussion with the Fuehrer, 14 │ │
│December 1941. (USA 824) │ IV │ 55
│ │ │
**1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │
│universal military conscription. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ IV │ 163
│ │ │
1662-PS │Order eliminating Jews from German │ │
│economic life, 12 November 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1580. │ IV │ 172
│ │ │
1665-PS │Order concerning treatment of property│ │
│of Nationals of the former Polish │ │
│State, 17 September 1940. 1940 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1270. │ IV │ 173
│ │ │
1674-PS │Second decree for the execution of the│ │
│law regarding the change of surnames │ │
│and forenames, 17 August 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1044. │ IV │ 185
│ │ │
*1676-PS │Speech concerning the enemy air terror│ │
│by Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels, 28-29 │ │
│March 1944. Voelkischer Beobachter. │ │
│(USA 334) │ IV │ 186
│ │ │
*1678-PS │Speech of Dr. Robert Ley. Documents of│ │
│German Politics, Vol. V, pp. 373, 376.│ │
│(USA 365) │ IV │ 190
│ │ │
*1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │
│Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. │ │
│(USA 255; USA 324) │ IV │ 208
│ │ │
*1774-PS │Extracts from Organizational Law of │ │
│the Greater German Reich by Ernst │ │
│Rudolf Huber. (GB 246) │ IV │ 349
│ │ │
*1814-PS │The Organization of the NSDAP and its │ │
│affiliated associations, from │ │
│Organization book of the NSDAP, │ │
│editions of 1936, 1938, 1940 and 1943,│ │
│pp. 86-88. (USA 328) │ IV │ 411
│ │ │
*1815-PS │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning │ │
│the study and treatment of church │ │
│politics. (USA 510) │ IV │ 415
│ │ │
1817-PS │Bureau for factory troops, from │ │
│Organization Book of the NSDAP, 1936 │ │
│edition, p. 211. │ IV │ 457
│ │ │
1855-PS │Extract from Organization Book of the │ │
│NSDAP, 1937, p. 418. │ IV │ 495
│ │ │
1861-PS │Law on the regulation of National │ │
│labor, 20 January 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 45. │ IV │ 497
│ │ │
*1893-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of the│ │
│NSDAP, 1943 edition. (USA 323) │ IV │ 529
│ │ │
*1913-PS │Agreement between Plenipotentiary │ │
│General for Arbeitseinsatz and German │ │
│Labor Front concerning care of │ │
│non-German workers. 1943 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 588. │ │
│(USA 227) │ IV │ 547
│ │ │
*1914-PS │Extracts from Decrees, Regulations, │ │
│Announcements, 1943 Edition, Part I, │ │
│pp. 318-319. (USA 336) │ IV │ 550
│ │ │
1915-PS │Decree concerning leadership of Armed │ │
│Forces, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111. │ IV │ 552
│ │ │
1939-PS │Speech by Ley published in Forge of │ │
│the Sword, with an introduction by │ │
│Marshal Goering, pp. 14-17. │ IV │ 581
│ │ │
1940-PS │Fuehrer edict appointing Ley leader of│ │
│German Labor Front. Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, Munich (Southern German) │ │
│edition, p. 1. │ IV │ 584
│ │ │
1961-PS │Decision of the Greater German │ │
│Reichstag, 26 April 1942. 1942 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 247. │ IV │ 600
│ │ │
1964-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer regarding │ │
│special jurisdiction of Reich Minister│ │
│of Justice, 20 August 1942. 1942 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 535. │ IV │ 601
│ │ │
2000-PS │Law for protection of German blood and│ │
│German honor, 15 September 1935. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 100, p.│ │
│1146. │ IV │ 636
│ │ │
2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │
│and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638
│ │ │
2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │
│the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639
│ │ │
2016-PS │Order concerning the jurisdiction of │ │
│SS courts and Police courts in the │ │
│Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, 15 │ │
│July 1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 475. │ IV │ 649
│ │ │
2029-PS │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry│ │
│of Public Enlightenment and │ │
│Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104. │ IV │ 652
│ │ │
2057-PS │Law relating to National Emergency │ │
│Defense Measures of 3 July 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 529. │ IV │ 699
│ │ │
2079-PS │Reich Flag Law of 15 September 1935. │ │
│1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│1145. │ IV │ 707
│ │ │
2100-PS │Decree on position of leader of Party │ │
│Chancellery, 24 January 1942. 1942 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 35. │ IV │ 726
│ │ │
2118-PS │Police decree on identification of │ │
│Jews, 1 September 1941. 1941 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 547. │ IV │ 750
│ │ │
2120-PS │Law on passports of Jews, 5 October │ │
│1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 1342. │ IV │ 754
│ │ │
2224-PS │The End of the Marxist Class Struggle,│ │
│published in National Socialist Party │ │
│Press Agency, 2 May 1933, pp. 1-2. │ │
│(USA 364) │ IV │ 864
│ │ │
2225-PS │The Front of German Workers has been │ │
│Erected, published in National │ │
│Socialist Party Press Agency, 3 May │ │
│1933, p. 1. │ IV │ 868
│ │ │
2230-PS │Agreement between Ley and Lutze, chief│ │
│of staff of SA, published in │ │
│Organization Book of NSDAP, 1938, pp. │ │
│484-485b, 486c. │ IV │ 871
│ │ │
2270-PS │Coordination of Cooperatives, │ │
│published in National Socialist Party │ │
│Press Agency release of 16 May 1933. │ IV │ 938
│ │ │
2271-PS │The National Socialist Factory Cells │ │
│Organization, published in │ │
│Organization Book of NSDAP, pp. │ │
│185-187. │ IV │ 940
│ │ │
*2283-PS │The Fifth Day of the Party Congress, │ │
│from Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich │ │
│(Southern German) Edition, Issue 258, │ │
│14 September 1936. (USA 337) │ IV │ 971
│ │ │
2325-PS │Decree in execution of Article 118 of │ │
│German Municipal Order, 26 March 1935.│ │
│1935 Reichsgesetzblatt Part I, p. 470.│ IV │ 1034
│ │ │
2336-PS │Special Circular on Securing of │ │
│association of German Labor Front │ │
│against hidden Marxist sabotage, 27 │ │
│June 1933. │ IV │ 1052
│ │ │
*2349-PS │Extracts from “The Myth of 20th │ │
│Century” by Alfred Rosenberg, 1941. │ │
│(USA 352) │ IV │ 1069
│ │ │
*2473-PS │Extracts from National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1943, showing party │ │
│positions of other Cabinet members in │ │
│1943. (USA 324) │ V │ 226
│ │ │
2474-PS │Directive of 25 October 1934, Decrees │ │
│of the Deputy of the Fuehrer, signed │ │
│by Hess. (USA 327) │ V │ 227
│ │ │
*2660-PS │Distribution Plan for Gaue, Kreise, │ │
│and Ortsgruppen, from The Bearers of │ │
│Sovereignty, 2nd Issue, 3rd Year, │ │
│February 1939. (USA 325) │ V │ 365
│ │ │
*2715-PS │Speech by Hitler to the Reichstag on │ │
│20 February 1938, published in The │ │
│Archive, February 1938, Vol. 47, pp. │ │
│1441-1442. (USA 331). │ V │ 376
│ │ │
*2775-PS │Hitler’s speech, published in Nurnberg│ │
│Party Congress, 1934. (USA 330) │ V │ 418
│ │ │
*2958-PS │Extract from The Statistics of the │ │
│NSDAP, Issue 8, 1939, p. 10. (USA 325)│ V │ 663
│ │ │
*3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│ │
│all stations of State Police, 10 │ │
│November 1938, on measures against │ │
│Jews, and one order from Heydrich on │ │
│termination of protest actions. (USA │ │
│240) │ V │ 797
│ │ │
*3063-PS │Letters of transmission enclosing │ │
│report about events and judicial │ │
│proceedings in connection with │ │
│anti-semitic demonstrations of 9 │ │
│November 1938. (USA 332) │ V │ 868
│ │ │
*3230-PS │Fight and Order—Not Peace and Order! │ │
│from the Bearer of Sovereignty, │ │
│February 1939, p. 15. (USA 325) │ V │ 937
│ │ │
*3268-PS │Allocution of His Holiness Pope Pius │ │
│XII, to the Sacred College, 2 June │ │
│1945. (USA 356) │ V │ 1038
│ │ │
3738-PS │Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to │ │
│treatment of Prisoners of War. │ VI │ 599
│ │ │
*D-75 │SD Inspector Bierkamp’s letter, 12 │ │
│December 1941, to RSHA enclosing copy │ │
│of secret decree signed by Bormann, │ │
│entitled Relationship of National │ │
│Socialism and Christianity. (USA 348) │ VI │ 1035
│ │ │
*D-728 │Circular, 15 March 1945, from NSDAP │ │
│Gauleitung Hessen-Nassau to the │ │
│“Kreis”-Leaders of the Gau, concerning│ │
│Action by the Party to keep Germans in│ │
│check until end of the War. (GB 282) │ VII │ 174
│ │ │
*L-154 │Letter from Hoffman, 25 February 1945,│ │
│concerning action to be taken against │ │
│pilots who are shot down. (USA 335) │ VII │ 904
│ │ │
*L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the │ │
│Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a │ │
│lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 │ │
│November 1943 at Munich to Reich and │ │
│Gauleiters. (USA 34) │ VII │ 920
│ │ │
*L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 │ │
│July 1941, concerning treatment of │ │
│Eastern populations and territories. │ │
│(USA 317) │ VII │ 1086
│ │ │
*L-316 │RSHA Order of 5 November 1942, signed │ │
│by Streckenbach, concerning │ │
│jurisdiction over Poles and Eastern │ │
│Nationals. (USA 346) │ VII │ 1104
│ │ │
*R-101-A │Letter from Chief of the Security │ │
│Police and Security Service to the │ │
│Reich Commissioner for the │ │
│Consolidation of German Folkdom, 5 │ │
│April 1940, with enclosures concerning│ │
│confiscation of church property. (USA │ │
│358) │ VIII │ 87
│ │ │
R-101-C │Letter to Reich Leader SS, 30 July │ │
│1941, concerning treatment of church │ │
│property in incorporated Eastern │ │
│areas. (USA 358) │ VIII │ 91
│ │ │
*R-101-D │Letter from Chief of Staff of the │ │
│Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) to │ │
│Reich Leader SS, 30 March 1942, │ │
│concerning confiscation of church │ │
│property. (USA 358) │ VIII │ 92
│ │ │
*R-110 │Himmler order of 10 August 1943 to all│ │
│Senior Executive SS and Police │ │
│officers. (USA 333) │ VIII │ 107
│ │ │
*R-112 │Orders issued by Reich Commissioner │ │
│for the Consolidation of German │ │
│nationhood, 16 February 1942, 1 July │ │
│1942, 28 July 1942. (USA 309) │ VIII │ 108
│ │ │
*R-114 │Memoranda of conferences, 4 and 18 │ │
│August 1942, concerning directions for│ │
│treatment of deported Alsatians. (USA │ │
│314) │ VIII │ 122
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
3. THE REICH CABINET
The Reich Cabinet, or _Reichsregierung_, unlike most of the other Nazi
organizations, was not especially created by the Nazi Party to carry out
or implement its purposes. The _Reichsregierung_ had, before the Nazis
came to power, a place in the constitutional and political history of
the country. As with other cabinets of duly constituted governments, the
executive power of the realm was concentrated in that body. The Nazi
conspirators well realized this fact. Their aim for totalitarian control
over the State could not be secured, they realized, except by acquiring,
holding, and utilizing the machinery of the State. And this they did.
Under the Nazi regime the _Reichsregierung_ gradually became a primary
agent of the Nazi Party, with functions and policies formulated in
accordance with the objectives and methods of the Party itself. The
_Reichsregierung_ became—at first gradually and then with more
rapidity—polluted by the infusion of the Nazi conspirators sixteen of
whom are accused in the Indictment. Its purpose came to be to clothe
every scheme and purpose of the Party, however vile, with the semblance
of legality.
A. _Composition and Nature of the Reichsregierung._
The term _Reichsregierung_ literally translated means “Reich
Government”. Actually, it was commonly taken to refer to the ordinary
Reich Cabinet. In the Indictment the term _Reichsregierung_ is defined
to include not only those persons who were members of the ordinary Reich
Cabinet, but also persons who were members of the Council of Ministers
for the Defense of the Reich (_Ministerrat fuer die Reichsverteidigung_)
and the Secret Cabinet Council (_Geheimer Kabinettsrat_). The most
important body, however, was the ordinary cabinet. Between it and the
other two groups there was in reality only an artificial distinction.
There existed, in fact, a unity of personnel, action, function, and
purpose that obliterated any academic separation. As used in the
Indictment, the term “ordinary cabinet” means Reich Ministers, i.e.,
heads of departments of the central government; Reich Ministers without
portfolio; State Ministers acting as Reich Ministers; and other
officials entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings. Altogether, 48
persons held positions in the ordinary cabinet. 17 of them have been
indicted as defendants. Of the remaining 31, eight are believed to be
dead.
(1) _The Ordinary Cabinet._ Into the ordinary cabinet were placed the
leading Nazi trusted henchmen. Then, when new governmental agencies or
bodies were created, either by Hitler or by the Cabinet itself, the
constituents of these new bodies were taken from the rolls of the
ordinary cabinet.
When the first Hitler Cabinet was formed on 30 January 1933, there were
10 ministries which could be classified as departments of the central
government. This fact appears from the minutes of the first meeting of
that cabinet, which were found in the files of the Reich Chancellery and
bear the typed signature of one Weinstein, who is described in the
minutes as “Responsible for the Protocol—Counsellor in the Ministry”
(_351-PS_). The ten ministers who attended are set forth:
“Reichs Minister of Foreign Affairs (von Neurath); Reichs
Minister of the Interior (Frick); Reichs Minister of Finance
(Graf Schwerin von Krosigk); Reichs Minister of Economy; Reichs
Minister for Food and Agriculture (Dr. Hugenberg); Reichs
Minister of Labor (Seldte); Reichs Minister of Justice [no name
given; the post was filled two days later by Gurtner]; Reichs
Defense Minister (von Blomberg); the Reichs Postmaster General;
and Reichs Minister for Transportation (Freiherr von
Eltz-Ruebanach).” (_351-PS_)
In addition, Goering attended as Reichs Minister (he held no portfolio
at that time) and Reichs Commissar for Aviation. Dr. Perecke attended as
Reich Commissar for Procurement of Labor. Two state secretaries were
present—Dr. Lammers of the Reichs Chancellery and Dr. Meissner of the
Reich’s Presidential Chancellery. In addition, Funk was present as
Reichs Press Chief, and von Papen was present as Deputy of the Reichs
Chancellor and Reichs Commissar for the State of Prussia. (_351-PS_)
Not long afterwards new ministries or departments were created, into
which leading Nazi figures were placed. On 13 March 1933, the Ministry
of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda was created, and Paul Josef
Goebbels was named as Reich Minister of Popular Enlightenment and
Propaganda (_2029-PS_). On 5 May 1933 the Ministry of Air (_2089-PS_),
on 1 May 1934 the Ministry of Education (_2078-PS_), and on 16 July 1935
the Ministry for Church Affairs (_2090-PS_) were created. Goering was
made Air Minister; Bernhard Rust, Gauleiter of South Hanover, was named
Education Minister; and Hans Kerrl was named Minister for Church
Affairs. Two Ministries were added after the war started. On 17 March
1940 the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions was established
(_2091-PS_). Dr. Fritz Todt, a high party official, was appointed to
this post. Speer succeeded him. The name of this department was changed
to “Armaments and War Production” in 1943 (_2092-PS_). On 17 July 1941,
when the seizure of Eastern territories was in progress, the Ministry
for the Occupied Eastern Territories was created. There was no published
decree for this act. A file found in the Presidential Chancellery
contains a typewritten copy of the decree of Hitler establishing that
post (_1997-PS_). The decree provides:
“Decree of the Fuehrer concerning the administration of the
newly-occupied Eastern Territories dated 17 July 1941.”
“In order to maintain public order and public life in the
newly-occupied Eastern territories I decree that:
“As soon as the military operations in the newly-occupied
territories are over, the administration of these territories
shall be transferred from the military establishments to the
civil-administration establishments. I shall from time to time
determine by special decree, the territories which according to
this are to be transferred to the civil administration and the
time when this is to take place.
“The Civil Administration in the newly occupied Eastern
territories, where these territories are not included in the
administration of the territories bordering on the Reich or the
General government, is subject to the ‘Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern territories.’
* * * * * *
“I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories. He will hold office in
Berlin.” (_1997-PS_)
During the years 1933 to 1945, one ministry was dropped—the Ministry of
Defense (later called War). This took place on 4 February 1938, when
Hitler took over command of the whole Armed Forces. At the same time he
created the office of the “Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces” or Chief of the OKW. This was held by Keitel. The decree
accomplishing this change provides in part as follows:
“He [the Chief of the supreme command of the armed forces] is
equal in rank to a Reich Minister. At the same time, the supreme
command takes the responsibility for the affairs of the Reichs
Ministry of War, and by my order, the chief of the supreme
command of the Armed Forces exercises the authority formerly
belonging to the Reichs Minister.” (_1915-PS_)
Another change in the composition of the cabinet during the years in
question should be noted. The post of vice-chancellor was never refilled
after the departure of von Papen on 30 July 1934.
In addition to the heads of departments mentioned above, the ordinary
cabinet also contained Reich Ministers without portfolio. Among these
were Frank, Seyss-Inquart, Schacht (after he left the Economics
Ministry), and von Neurath (after he was replaced as Ministry of the
Interior). Other positions also formed an integral part of the cabinet.
Those were the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Hess, and later his successor, the
Leader of the Party Chancellery, Bormann; the Chief of Staff of the SA,
Ernst Roehm, for the seven months prior to his assassination; the Chief
of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers; and, as already mentioned, the Chief
of the OKW, Keitel. These men had either the title or rank of Reich
Minister.
The Cabinet also contained other functionaries, such as State Ministers
acting as Reich Ministers. Only two persons fell within this
category—the Chief of the Presidential Chancellery, Otto Meissner, and
the State Minister of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Karl
Hermann Frank. In addition, as named in the Indictment, the ordinary
cabinet included “others entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings”.
Many governmental agencies were created by the Nazis between the years
1933 and 1945, but the peculiarity of these creations was that in most
instances the new officials were given the right to participate in
cabinet meetings. Among those entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings
were the Commanders in Chief of the Army and the Navy; the Reich Forest
Master; the Inspector General for Water and Power; the Inspector General
of German Roads; the Reich Labor Leader; the Reich Youth Leader; the
Chief of the Foreign Organization in the Foreign Office; the
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of
the Interior; the Prussian Finance Minister; and the Cabinet Press
Chief. These posts and officials comprising the ordinary cabinet all
appear on the chart entitled “Organization of the Reich Government,” and
authenticated by Frick (_Chart Number 18_). The persons who held these
posts in the ordinary cabinet varied between the years 1933 to 1945.
Their names are listed in the chart (_Chart Number 18_), which discloses
that 17 of these officials are defendants in these proceedings.
(2) _The Secret Cabinet Council._ Proof that there was only an
artificial distinction between the ordinary cabinet, the Secret Cabinet
Council, and the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, is
shown by the unity of personnel among the three subdivisions. Thus, on 4
February 1938, Hitler created the Secret Cabinet Council (_2031-PS_):
“To advise me in conducting the foreign policy I am setting up a
secret cabinet council.
“As president of the secret cabinet council, I nominate:
Reichsminister Freiherr von Neurath
“As members of the secret cabinet council I nominate:
Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop
Prussian Prime Minister, Reichsminister of the Air, Supreme
Commander of the Air Forces, General Field Marshall Hermann
Goering
The Fuehrer’s Deputy, Reichsminister Rudolf Hess
Reichsminister for the Enlightenment of the people and of
Propaganda, Dr. Joseph Goebbels
Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellery Dr.
Hans-Heinrich Lammers
The Supreme Commander of the Army, General Walther von
Brauchitsch
The Supreme Commander of the Navy, Grand Admiral Dr. (honorary)
Erich Raeder
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Lt. Gen.
Wilhelm Keitel.” (_2031-PS_)
It will be noted that every member of this group was either a
Reichsminister or, as, in the case of the Army, Navy, and OKW heads, had
the rank and authority of a Reich Minister.
(3) _The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich._ On 30
August 1939 Hitler established the Council of Ministers for the Defense
of the Reich (better known as the Ministerial Council). This was the
so-called war cabinet. The decree establishing this Council provided
(_2018-PS_):
“Article I
“(1) A Ministerial Council for Reich Defense shall be
established as a standing committee out of the Reich Defense
Council.
“(2) The standing members of the Ministerial Council for Reich
Defense shall include: General Field Marshall Goering as
chairman; Fuehrer’s Deputy [Hess]; Commissioner General (or
Plenipotentiary) for Reich Administration [Frick]; Commissioner
General (or Plenipotentiary) for Economy [Funk]; Reich Minister
and Chief of the Reich Chancellery [Dr. Lammers]; Chief of the
High Command for the Armed Forces [Keitel].
“(3) The chairman may draw on other members of the Reich Defense
Council including further personalities for advice.”
(_2018-PS_).
Again, all members of this group were also members of the ordinary
Cabinet.
The Reich Defense Council, for secret war planning, was created by the
Cabinet on 4 April 1933 (cf. the unpublished Reich Defense Law of 21 May
1935 (_2261-PS_)). The membership of that Council when first created is
shown by the minutes of the second session of the working committee of
the delegates for Reich Defense, dated 22 May 1933 and signed by Keitel
(_EC-177_):
“_Composition of the Reich Defense Council_:
_President_: Reichs Chancellor
_Deputy_: Reichswehr Minister
_Permanent Members_: Minister of the:
Reichswehr
Foreign Affairs
Interior
Finance
Economic Affairs
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
Air
Chief of the Army Command Staff
Chief of the Navy Command Staff
“Depending on the case: The remaining ministers, other
personalities, e.g., leading industrialists, etc.” (_EC-177_)
All but the Chiefs of the Army and Navy Command Staff were at that time
members of the ordinary cabinet.
The composition of this Reich Defense Council was changed by an
unpublished law on 4 September 1938, which provided as follows
(_2194-PS_):
“* * * (2) The leader and Reich Chancellor is chairman in the
RVR. His permanent deputy is General Field Marshall Goering. He
has the right to call conferences of the RVR. Permanent members
of the RVR are
“The Reich Minister of Air and Supreme Commander of the Air Force,
The Supreme Commander of the Army,
The Supreme Commander of the Navy,
The Chief of the OKW,
The Deputy of the Fuehrer,
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery,
The President of the Secret Cabinet Council,
The Chief Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration,
The Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics,
The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs,
The Reich Minister of the Interior,
The Reich Finance Minister,
The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda,
The President of the Reichsbank Directorate.
“The other Reich Ministers and the Reich offices directly
subordinate to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor are consulted if
necessary. Further personalities can be called as the case
demands.” (_2194-PS_)
On that date all the members also belonged to the ordinary cabinet, for
by that time the supreme commanders of the Army and Navy had been given
ministerial rank and authorized to participate in cabinet meetings
(_2098-PS_). It is also worth noting that two members of the Reich
Defense Council also appear in the Ministerial Council under the same
title—The Plenipotentiary for Administration, and the Plenipotentiary
for Economy. The former post was held by Frick, while the latter was
first held by Schacht and then by Funk. These facts are verified by
Frick on the Nazi governmental organization chart (_Chart Number 18_).
Many other ministries were subordinated to these two posts for
war-planning aims and purposes. These two officials, together with the
Chief of the OKW, formed a powerful triumvirate known as the “Three-Man
College” (Frick, Funk, and Keitel) which figured prominently in war
plans and preparations.
B. _Functions of the Reichsregierung._
The utilization of the ordinary cabinet as a manpower reservoir for
other governmental agencies, the chronological development of the
offshoots of the ordinary cabinet, and the cohesion between all of these
groups, is apparent from the Nazi governmental organization chart
(_Chart Number 18_). The chart shows the following offshoots of the
ordinary cabinet: 1933, the Reich Defense Council; 1935, the Three-Man
College; 1936, the Delegate for the Four Year Plan; 1938, the Secret
Cabinet Council; 1939, The Ministerial Defense Council; and 1944, the
Delegate for Total War Effort (Goebbels). In every case these important
Nazi agencies were staffed with personnel taken from the ordinary
cabinet.
(1) _The Ordinary Cabinet._ The unity, cohesion, and interrelationship
of the sub-divisions of the _Reichsregierung_ was not the result of a
co-mixture of personnel alone. It was also realized by the method in
which it operated. The ordinary cabinet consulted together both by
meetings and through the so-called circulation procedure. Under the
latter procedure, which was chiefly used when meetings were not held,
drafts of laws prepared in individual ministries were distributed to
other cabinet members for approval or disapproval.
The man primarily responsible for the circulation of drafts of laws
under this procedure was Dr. Lammers, the Leader and Chief of the Reich
Chancellery. Lammers has described that procedure in an affidavit
(_2999-PS_):
“* * * I was Leader of the Reich Chancellery (_Leiter der
Reichskanzlei_) from 30 January 1933 until the end of the war.
In this capacity I circulated drafts of proposed laws and
decrees submitted to me by the Minister who had drafted the law
or decree, to all members of the Reich Cabinet. A period of time
was allowed for objections, after which the law considered as
being accepted by the various members of the Cabinet. This
procedure continued throughout the whole war. It was followed
also in the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich
(_Ministerrat fuer die Reichsverteidigung_).” (_2999-PS_)
A memorandum dated 9 August 1943, which bears the facsimile signature of
Frick and is addressed to the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
Chancellery, illustrates how the circulation procedure worked
(_1701-PS_). Attached to the memorandum is a draft of the law in
question and a carbon copy of a letter dated 22 December 1943 from
Rosenberg to the Reich Minister of the Interior, containing his comments
on the draft:
“To the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, in
_Berlin W8_.
“For the information of the other Reich ministers.
“Subj: Law on the treatment of enemies of the society.
“In addition to my letter of 19 March, 1942.
“_Enclosures: 55.—_
“After the draft of the law on the treatment of enemies of the
society has been completely rewritten, I am sending the enclosed
new draft with the consent of the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr.
Thierack, and ask that the law be approved in a circulatory
manner. The necessary number of prints is attached.” (_1701-PS_)
(2) _Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich._ The same
procedure was followed in the Council of Ministers when that body was
created. And the decrees of the Council of Ministers were also
circulated to the members of the ordinary Cabinet. A memorandum found in
the files of the Reich Chancellery and addressed to the members of the
Council of Ministers, dated 17 September 1939, and bearing the typed
signature of Dr. Lammers, Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
Chancellery, states (_1141-PS_):
“Matters submitted to the Council of Ministers for the Reich
Defense have heretofore been distributed only to the members of
the Council. I have been requested by some of the
Reichsministers who are not permanent members of the Council to
inform them of the drafts of decrees which are being submitted
to the Council, so as to enable them to check these drafts from
the point of view of their respective offices. I shall follow
this request so that all the Reichsministers will in future be
informed of the drafts of decrees which are to be acted upon by
the Council for the Reich Defense. I therefore request to add
forty-five additional copies of the drafts, as well as of the
letters which usually contain the arguments for the drafts, to
the folders submitted to the Council.” (_1141-PS_)
Von Stutterheim, who was an official of the Reich Chancellery, comments
on this procedure at page 34 of a pamphlet entitled “_Die
Reichskanzlei_”:
“* * * It must be noted that the peculiarity in this case is
that the subjects dealt with by the Cabinet Council—(Council of
Ministers for the Defense of the Reich), are distributed not
merely among the members of the Cabinet Council, but also among
all the members of the Cabinet (_Kabinett_) who are thereby
given the opportunity of guarding the interests of their spheres
of office by adding their appropriate standpoints in the Cabinet
Council legislation, even if they do not participate in making
the decree.” (_2231-PS_)
For a time the Cabinet consulted together through actual meetings. The
Council of Ministers did likewise, but those members of the Cabinet who
were not already members of the Council also attended the meetings of
the Ministerial Council. And where they did not attend in person, they
were usually represented by the state secretaries of their Ministries.
The minutes of six meetings of the Council of Ministers, on 1, 4, 8, and
19 September 1939, on 16 October 1939, and on 15 November 1939,
demonstrate this procedure. (_2852-PS_)
At the meeting held on 1 September 1939, which was probably the first
meeting since the Council was created on 30 August 1939, the following
were in attendance:
“Present were the permanent members of the Council of Ministers
for the Reich Defense: The Chairman and Generalfield Marshall,
Goering; the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Hess [a line appears through
the name Hess]; the Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration,
Dr. Frick; the Plenipotentiary for Economy, Funk; the Reich
Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers; and
the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel,
represented by Major General Thomas.” (_2852-PS_)
These were the regular members of the Council. Also present was the
Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, Darré, and seven State
Secretaries: Koerner, Neumann, Stuckart, Posse, Landfried, Backe, and
Syrup (_2852-PS_). These State Secretaries were from the several
Ministries or other supreme Reich authorities. Koerner was the Deputy of
Goering in the Four-Year Plan; Stuckart was in the Ministry of the
Interior; Landfried was in the Ministry of Economics; Syrup was in the
Ministry of Labor.
The minutes dated 8 September 1939 (_2852-PS_) note that in addition to
all members of the Ministerial Council, the following also were present:
“The Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture * * * Darré; State
Minister * * * Popitz;”
Then come the names of nine State Secretaries from the several
Ministries, and then:
“SS Gruppenfuehrer * * * Heydrich;”
The close integration of the Ministerial Council with the ordinary
Cabinet is seen by the following excerpt from the minutes of the same
date (8 September 1939):
“The Council of Ministers for the Reich Defense ratified the
decree for the change of the Labor Service Law which had already
been passed as law by the Reich Cabinet. (_Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 1744.)”
The minutes of the meeting of 19 September 1939 (_2852-PS_) show the
following Reich Ministers to be present in addition to four members of
the Council:
“Also: The Reich Minister for Finance, Count Schwerin von
Krosigk.
The Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, Darré.
The Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr.
Goebbels.
State Minister * * * Dr. Popitz.” (_2852-PS_)
Then come the names of eight State Secretaries. Others present included:
“SS Gruppenfuehrer * * * Heydrich; General of the Police
(_Ordnungpolizei_) Daluege.” (_2852-PS_)
The minutes dated 15 November 1939 show the same co-mixture of
Ministers, State Secretaries, and similar functionaries. In addition,
the following were also present:
“Reichsleiter, Dr. Ley; Reichsleiter, Bouhler; Reichsfuehrer SS,
Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of Interior,
Himmler; The Reich Labor Service Leader, Hierl * * * Reich
Commissioner for Price Control, Wagner * * * as well as experts
(_Sachbearbeiter_) of the German Labor Front and the Reich Labor
Service.” (_2852-PS_)
Some of the decrees passed and matters discussed at these meetings of
the Ministerial Council are significant. At the first meeting of 1
September 1939 14 decrees were ratified by the Council. Decree No. 6
concerned
“* * * the organization of the administration and about the
German safety police in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
(_RGBl_, I, page 1681).” (_2852-PS_)
At the meeting of the Council on 19 September 1939 the following
occurred;
“The Chairman of the Council, Generalfieldmarshall Goering, made
comments regarding the structure of civil administration in the
occupied Polish territory. He expressed his intentions regarding
the economic evacuation measures in this territory. Then the
questions of decreasing wages and the questions of working hours
and the support of members of families of inducted workers were
discussed.”
* * * * * *
“The Chairman directed that all members of the Council regularly
receive the situation reports of the Reichsfuehrer SS. Then the
question of the population of the future Polish Protectorate was
discussed and the placement of Jews living in Germany.”
(_2852-PS_)
Finally, at the meeting of 15 November 1939 the discussion concerned,
among other things, the “treatment of Polish Prisoners of War”.
(_2852-PS_)
The minutes of these meetings (_2852-PS_) not only establish the close
working union between agencies of the state and the party, especially
the SS, but also tends to establish that the _Reichsregierung_ was
responsible for the policies adopted and put into effect by the
government.
C. _Powers of The Reichsregierung._
But mere working alliances would be meaningless unless there was power.
And the _Reichsregierung_ had power. Short of Hitler himself, it had
practically all the power a government can exercise.
(1) _The Ordinary Cabinet._ The Nazi conspirators secured the passage by
the Reichstag of the “Law for the Protection of the People and the
Reich,” of 24 March 1933 (_2001-PS_), which vested the Cabinet with
legislative powers even to the extent of deviating from previously
existing constitutional law. These powers were retained even after the
members of the cabinet were changed, and the several states, provinces,
and municipalities, which had formerly exercised semi-autonomous powers,
were transformed into mere administrative organs of the central
government. The ordinary cabinet emerged all-powerful from this rapid
succession of events. Frick waxed eloquent upon that achievement in an
article which he wrote for the 1935 National Socialist Year Book:
“The relationship between the Reich and the States has been put
on an entirely new basis, never known in the history of the
German people. It gives to the Reich cabinet (_Reichsregierung_)
unlimited power. It even makes it its duty, to build a
completely unified leadership and administration of the Reich.
From now on, there is only one national authority: The one of
the Reich! Thus, the German Reich has become a unified state,
and the entire administration in the states is only carried out
by order or in the name of the Reich. The state borders are now
only administration, technical are boundaries but no longer
boundaries of sovereignty! In calm determination, the Reich
Cabinet (_Reichsregierung_) realizes step by step, supported by
the confidence of the entire German people, the great longing of
the Nation. The creation of the national socialist German,
unified state.” (_2380-PS_)
The heightened legislative power of the Cabinet is also emphasized in an
article written by Dr. Franz Medicus, an official in the Reich Ministry
of the Interior, and published in 1939 in Volume 4 of “_Das Dritte Reich
in Aufbau_”:
“* * * Worked out by the Reich Minister of the Interior, the
‘Law for Alleviation of the Distress of People and Reich’, in
short called ‘Enabling Law’, was issued on 24 March 1933, broke
with the liberal principle of ‘division of power’ by
transferring the legislature from the Reichstag to the Reich
Cabinet, so that legislation by _personally responsible persons_
took the place of ‘anonymous’ legislation.” (_2849-PS_)
When the Ministerial Council was formed in 1939, it too was given
legislative powers (cf. Article II of the decree of 30 August 1939
(_2018-PS_)). The ordinary cabinet also continued to legislate
throughout the war. Because of the fusion of personnel between the
Ministerial Council and the ordinary cabinet, questions were bound to
arise as to what forum should lend its name to a particular law. Dr.
Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery and a member of both agencies,
wrote a letter on 14 June 1942 to the Plenipotentiary for Reich
Administration about these questions (_352-PS_):
“To the Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration
(_Generalbevollmaechtigter die Reich Verwaltung_)
“Subject: The Jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers for the
Defense of the Reich (_Ministerat fuer die Reichsverteidigung_)
“Your letter of 3 June 1942, No. 493/42/2882.—Recently the
Fuehrer announced in accord with the opinions of the Reich
Marshal of the Greater German Reich as shown in my letter of 20
Feb. 1940-RK. 624-B—that he believes it practical to reserve
certain legislative missions for the Reich Cabinet. With this he
has not limited the competency of the Council of Ministers for
the defense of the Reich but given a directive as to how
legislation should be handled under the point of view of
practicability. I have no doubt that the Fuehrer, as well as the
Reich Marshal, have not changed their point of view, in
particular, regarding the fact, that at the present there should
be only legislation important in the cause of war, and that they
will stress the fact that the Fuehrer himself and the Reich
Cabinet should not be eliminated from the powers of legislation.
It will have to be tested from time to time what measures will
be reserved for the Reich Cabinet. My letter of 20 February
1940, and the opinions of the Fuehrer therein expressed may
serve as a directive even if the limitations indicated by me are
no longer applicable in their full meaning. I would therefore
suggest not basing the discussions with the Reich Minister of
Finance on the question of competency of the Reich Cabinet or
the Council of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich, but on
the question of whether it would be practical to achieve
settlement through either Reich law or a Decree from the Council
of Ministers for the defense of the Reich in the sense of the
opinions voiced by the Fuehrer.
(signed) Dr. Lammers” (_352-PS_).
Other officials possessed legislative powers. Hitler was of course one.
Goering, as Deputy of the Four Year Plan, could and did issue decrees
with the effect of law. The Cabinet delegated power to issue laws
deviating from existing law to the Plenipotentiaries of Economy and
Administration and the Chief of the OKW, the so-called Three-Man
College. This was done in the Secret Defense Law of 1938 (_2194-PS_).
These three officials—Frick, Funk, and Keitel—however, were also
members of the Council of Ministers and of the ordinary cabinet as well.
It can therefore be said, in the language of the Indictment, that the
_Reichsregierung_ “possessed * * * legislative * * * powers of a very
high order in the system of the German government.”
The executive and administrative powers of the Reich were concentrated
in the central government primarily as the result of two basic Nazi laws
that reduced the separate states (called _Laender_) to mere geographical
divisions. One was the law of 30 January 1934, known as the Law for the
Reconstruction of the Reich (_2006-PS_). By that law the States were
deprived of their independent status as States, their legislative
assemblies were abolished, and their sovereign powers were transferred
to the Reich. The other was the Reich Governor’s Law, enacted by the
Cabinet on 30 January 1935 (_2008-PS_), which made all Reich Governors
(_Statthalters_) permanent delegates of and subject to the order of the
cabinet and, more especially, of the Reich Minister of the Interior. As
a result, the ordinary cabinet was possessed of wide powers, which are
set forth in “Administration Law,” periodical published in 1944 which
was edited by Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart, State Secretary in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, and Dr. Harry V. Rosen-v. Hoewel, an
_Oberregierungsrat_ in the Reich Ministry of the Interior (_2959-PS_).
The description of the powers and functions of all the ministries of the
ordinary cabinet illustrates the extent of control vested in the
_Reichsregierung_:
III. _The Reich Ministers_
“There are at present twenty-one Reich Ministers, namely:
“I. 15 Reich Ministers with a definite portfolio.
The Ministries of the Reich Ministers mentioned under 2, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12 are united with the corresponding Ministries of
Prussia.
“1. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (Foreign Office).
(_a_) He handles all matters touching on the relations of the
Reich to foreign countries.
(_b_) Under him are the diplomatic and consular representatives
as well as the Reich office for Foreign Trade.
“2. The Reich Minister of the Interior.
(_a_) To his portfolio belong general administration, local
administration, police administration, administration of
officials, public health, welfare, geodetic system, sport system
and the Reich Labor Service.
(_b_) Under him are the general and internal administrations,
for example, the Reich Governors, the state governments
(_Landesregierung_) the superior Presidents, the governmental
Presidents, as well as police officials and the Reich Labor
Service.
Furthermore, there are under him numerous central intermediary
boards, for example, the Reich Health Office, the Reich
Archives, the Reich Genealogical Office.
“3. The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.
(_a_) To his portfolio belong the intellectual influences on the
nation, recruiting for the state, culture and economics, and the
instruction of domestic and foreign public opinion.
(_b_) Under him are, among other things, the Reich Propaganda
Offices and the film censorship offices. Furthermore, he
exercises supervision over the Reich Chamber of Culture, the
Recruiting Council of German Economics, the Reich Radio Company,
and the Institute of Politics (_Hochschule fuer Politik_).
“4. The Reich Minister of Aviation and Supreme Commander of the
Air Force.
He administers civil and military aviation.
“5. The Reich Minister of Finances.
(_a_) To his portfolio belong the budget and financial system of
the Reich, as well as the administration of taxes; monopolies,
and tariffs.
(_b_) Under him are namely: the administration of taxes and
tariffs, as well as the administration of Reich monopolies.
“6. The Reich Minister of Justice.
(_a_) He is in charge of all matters related to the judicial
system.
(_b_) Under him are all judicial agencies and the Reich Patent
Office.
“7. The Reich Ministry of Economics.
(_a_) To his portfolio belong the basic economic political
questions of German economy, the supply of the civilian
population with goods for consumption and the regulation of
their distribution, the handling of foreign economic questions
in the framework of policy on foreign trade of the Reich and the
supreme supervision over the institutes of credit.
(_b_) Under him are the Reich administration of mines, the Reich
office of Statistics, the Supervisory Office for Private
Insurance, the Gau Chambers of Economy, the State Economic
Offices, (_Landeswirtschaftsamt_) the Savings Banks, and the
State Insurance Offices.
“8. The Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture.
(_a_) He is in charge of all farmers and of the agriculture, as
well as the food administration.
(_b_) Under him are the State Food Offices
(_Landesernaechrungsamt_) the State Administration of Large
Estates (_Domaenen verwaltung_) the Administration of Rural
Affairs and the Agricultural Credit Offices. Furthermore, he
exercises state supervision over the Reich Food Supply of which
he is the leader.”
* * * * * *
“14. Reich Minister for Armament and War Production.
He has to bring to a level of highest production all offices
active in producing arms and munitions. Furthermore, he is
responsible for the field of raw materials and production in
industry and manual labor.
“15. The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
(_a_) He administers the recently occupied (i.e. former
Soviet-Russian) Eastern territories, insofar as they are under
civil administration and not subordinated to the Chief of Civil
Administration for the district of Bialystok (cf. page 70) or
insofar as they are incorporated in the General Gouvernment (cf.
page 100).
(_b_) Under him are the Reich Commissars, the General
Commissars, Head Commissars, and District Commissars, in the
recently occupied Eastern territories.” (_2959-PS_)
Other important powers and functions contained in the ordinary cabinet
were not included in the foregoing list. For example, upon the creation
of the People’s Court on 24 April 1934, it was placed within the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice (_2014-PS_). With the
acquisition and occupation of new territories, the integration and
coordination thereof were placed within the Ministry of the Interior.
The Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick, (in some cases in cooperation
with other Reich Ministers) was, by law, given regulatory powers over
such territories. The territory and the applicable law may be listed as
follows:
(1) The Saar (1935, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 66).
(2) Austria (1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 237).
(3) Memel (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 54).
(4) Bohemia and Moravia (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
485).
(5) Sudetenland (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 780).
(6) Danzig (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1547).
(7) Incorporated Poland (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
2042).
(8) Occupied Poland (1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
2077).
(9) Eupen, Malmedy and Moresnet (1940, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part
I, page 803).
(10) Norway (1941, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 765).
Such were the powers and functions of the ordinary cabinet.
(2) _The Secret Cabinet Council._ Of the other two subdivisions of the
_Reichsregierung_—the Secret Cabinet Council and the Ministerial
Council—the Secret Cabinet Council had no legislative or administrative
powers. It was created by Hitler on 4 February 1938
“To advise me in conducting the foreign policy * * *.”
(_2031-PS_)
Its position in the Nazi regime is described by Ernst Rudolf Huber, a
leading Nazi Constitutional Lawyer, in his book entitled
“_Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches_” (“Constitutional Law of
the Greater German Reich”). In this book, which was an authoritative,
widely used work on Nazi Constitutional Law, Huber states (_1774-PS_):
“A privy cabinet council, to advise the Fuehrer in the basic
problems of foreign policy, has been created by the decree of 4
February 1938 (_RGBl._ I, 112). This privy cabinet council is
under the direction of Reich Minister v. Neurath, and includes
the Foreign Minister, the Air Minister, the Deputy Commander for
the Fuehrer, the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of the Reich
Chancellery, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces. The privy cabinet council constitutes a select
staff of collaborators of the Fuehrer which consists exclusively
of members of the Government of the Reich; thus, it represents a
select committee of the Reich Government for the deliberation on
foreign affairs.” (_1774-PS_)
(3) _The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich._ The powers
concentrated in the Ministerial Council, which did possess legislative
and administrative functions, at its creation in 1939, are best
expressed by the lecture which Frick gave before the University of
Freiburg on 7 March 1940. The lecture, published in a pamphlet entitled
“The Administration in Wartime,” contains these statements (_2608-PS_):
“* * * The composition of the Ministerial Council for the
defense of the Reich shows the real concentration of power in
it. General Field Marshal Goering is the chairman and also the
Supreme Director of the War Economy and Commissioner for the
Four Year Plan. He is joined by the Plenipotentiary General for
the Reich Administration, who directs the entire civilian
administration with the exception of the economic
administration, and the Plenipotentiary General for Economy. The
Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces is the liaison man
to the Armed Forces. It is primarily his duty to coordinate the
measures for civilian defense in the area of administration and
economy with the genuine military measures for the defense of
the Reich. The Deputy of the Fuehrer represents the Party, thus
guaranteeing the unity between Party and State also within the
Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich. The Reich
Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery is in charge of the
business management of the Ministerial Council for the Defense
of the Reich.”
* * * * * *
“The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, the
highest legislative and executive organ in wartime next to the
Fuehrer, created a subordinate organ for the purpose of the
defense of the Reich: The Commissioners for the Reich Defense,
who have their headquarters at the seat of the individual corps
area.” (_2608-PS_)
With such power concentrated in the _Reichsregierung_ and to such a high
degree, the Nazi conspirators possessed a formidable weapon to
effectuate their plans.
D. _Acts and Decrees of the Reichsregierung._
Under the Nazi regime the _Reichsregierung_ became the instrument of the
Nazi party.
(1) _Execution of the Nazi Party Program._ In the original Cabinet of 30
January 1933 only three cabinet members were members of the
Party—Goering, Frick, and Hitler. As new Ministries were added to the
Cabinet, prominent Nazis were placed at their head. On 30 January, 1937,
Hitler accepted into the Party those Cabinet members who were not
already members. This action is reported in the _Voelkischer
Beobachter_, South German Edition, of 1 February 1937 (_2964-PS_):
“In view of the anticipated lifting of the ban for party
membership, the Fuehrer, as the first step in this regard,
personally carried out the enlistment into the party of the
members of the Cabinet, who so far had not belonged to it and he
handed them simultaneously the Gold Party Badge, the supreme
badge of honor of the party. In addition, the Fuehrer awarded
the Gold Party Badge to Generaloberst Freiherr von Fritsch;
Generaladmiral Dr. H. C. Raeder; the Prussian Minister of
Finance, Professor Popitz; and the Secretary of State and Chief
of the Presidential Chancellery, Dr. Meissner.
“The Fuehrer also honored with the gold party badge the party
members State Secretary Dr. Lammers, State Secretary Funk, State
Secretary Koerner and State Secretary General of the Airforce
Milch.” (_2964-PS_)
It was possible to refuse the party membership thus conferred. Only one
man, von Eltz-Ruebenach, who was the Minister of Post and Minister of
Transport at the time, did this. His letter from von Eltz-Ruebenach to
Hitler, dated 30 January 1937, reads as follows (_1534-PS_):
“My Fuehrer:
“I thank you for the confidence you have placed in me during the
four years of your leadership and for the honor you do me in
offering to admit me to the party. My conscience forbids me
however to accept this offer. I believe in the principles of
positive Christianity and must remain faithful to my Lord and to
myself. Party membership however would mean that I should have
to face without contradiction the steadily aggravating attacks
by party offices on the Christian confessions and those who want
to remain faithful to their religious convictions.
“This decision has been infinitely difficult for me. For never
in my life have I performed my duty with greater joy and
satisfaction than under your wise state leadership.
“I ask to be permitted to resign.
“With German Greetings:
Yours very obediently,
“(signed) Baron v. Eltz” (_1534-PS_).
But the Nazis did not wait until all members of the cabinet were party
members. Shortly after they came to power, they quickly assured
themselves of active participation in the work of the Cabinet. On 1
December 1933, the Cabinet passed a law securing the unity of party and
state (_1395-PS_). In Article 2 of that law the Deputy of the Fuehrer,
Hess, and the Chief of Staff of the SA, Roehm, were made members of the
Cabinet (_1395-PS_). Lest mere membership in the Cabinet would not be
effective, Hitler endowed his deputy with greater powers of
participation. An unpublished decree signed by Hitler, dated 27 July
1934, and addressed to the Reich Ministers, provides (_D-138_):
“I decree that the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Reich Minister Hess,
will have the capacity of a participating Reich Minister in
connection with the preparation of drafts for laws in all Reich
Administrative spheres. All legislative work is to be sent to
him when it is received by the other Reich Minister concerned.
This also applies in cases where no one else participates except
the Reich Minister making the draft. Reich Minister Hess will be
given the opportunity to comment on drafts suggested by experts.
“This order will apply in the same sense to legislative
ordinances. The Deputy of the Fuehrer in his capacity of Reich
Minister can send as representative an expert on his staff.
These experts are entitled to make statements to the Reich
Ministers on his behalf.
“[signed] Adolph Hitler” (_D-138_).
Hess himself made pertinent comment on his right of participation on
behalf of the party, in a letter dated 9 October 1934, on the stationery
of the NSDAP, addressed to the Reich Minister for Enlightenment of the
People and Propaganda (_D-139_):
“By a decree of the Fuehrer dated 27 July 1934, I have been
granted the right to participate in the legislation of the Reich
as regards both formal laws and legal ordinances. This right
must not be rendered illusory by the fact that I am sent the
drafts of laws and decrees so late and am then given a limited
time, so that it becomes impossible for me to deal with the
material concerned during the given time. I must point out that
my participation means the taking into account of the opinion of
the NSDAP as such, and that in the case of the majority of
drafts of laws and decrees, consult with the appropriate
departments of the Party before making my comment. Only by
proceeding in this manner can I do justice to the wish of the
Fuehrer as expressed in the decree of the Fuehrer of 27 July
1934.
“I must therefore ask the Reich Ministers to arrange that drafts
of laws and decrees reach me in sufficient time. Failing this, I
would be obliged in future to refuse my agreement to such drafts
from the beginning and without giving the matter detailed
attention, in all cases where I am not given a sufficiently long
period for dealing with them.
“Heil,
“[signed] R. Hess.” (_D-139_).
A handwritten note attached to the letter reads:
“1. The identical letter seems to have been addressed to all
Reich Ministers. In our special field the decree of 27 July 1934
has hardly become applicable so far. A reply does not seem
called for.
“2. File in file 7B (?)
“[signed] “R” (_D-139_).
The participating powers of Hess were later broadened, according to a
letter dated 12 April 1938 from Doctor Lammers to the Reich Ministers
(_D-140_):
“* * * The Deputy of the Fuehrer will also have participation
where the Reich Ministers give their agreement to the State Laws
and legislative ordinances of States under paragraph 3 of the
first decree concerning reconstruction of the Reich of Feb 2nd
1934 (Reich Law Gazette I 81). Where the Reich Ministers have
already, at an earlier date been engaged in the preparation of
such laws or legislative ordinances, or have participated in
such preparation, the Deputy of the Fuehrer likewise becomes
participating Reich Minister. Laws and legislative decrees of
the Austrian State are equally affected hereby.
“[signed] Dr. LAMMERS” (_D-140_).
After Hess’ flight to England, Bormann, as Leader of the Party
Chancellery, took over the same functions. He was given the authority of
a Reich Minister and made a member of the cabinet. (_2099-PS_)
The Nazi constitutional lawyer, Ernst Rudolf Huber, has this to say
about the unity of party and Cabinet (_1774-PS_):
“Unity of party and Reich-Cabinet (_Reichsregierung_) is
furthermore secured by the numerous personal unions i.e.
association of Central State Offices with corresponding party
offices. Such personal unions exist in the cases of Food
Minister and the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of the German
Police and the Reich Labor Leader, the Chief of the Organization
in foreign countries, and the Reich Youth Fuehrer. Furthermore,
the majority of the Reich Ministries is occupied by leading old
party members. Finally, all Reich Ministers have been accepted
by the party on 30 January 1937 and have been decorated with
golden party insignia.” (_1774-PS_)
In 1943, out of 16 Reich Leaders (_Reichsleiters_) of the NSDAP, eight
were members of the Cabinet: Martin Bormann; Walter Darré; Otto
Dietrich; Wilhelm Frick; Paul Josef Goebbels; Constantin Hierl; Heinrich
Himmler; Alfred Rosenberg (_2473-PS_). Through its domination of the
Cabinet the Nazi Party strove to secure the fulfilment of its program
under a facade of legality.
(_a_) _Decrees of the Ordinary Cabinet._ To the Nazi Cabinet, the Nazi
Party program of 25 points (_1708-PS_) was more than a mere political
platform; it was a mandate for action. And the Cabinet acted.
Point 1 of this program declared:
“We demand the inclusion of all Germans in a greater Germany on
the grounds of the right of self-determination.” (_1708-PS_)
In implication of this demand the Nazi Cabinet enacted, among others,
the following laws: the law of 3 February 1938 concerning the obligation
of German citizens in foreign countries to register (1938
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 113); the law of 13 March 1938 for the
reunion of Austria with Germany (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
237) (_2307-PS_); the law of November 1938 for the reintegration of the
German Sudetenland with Germany (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
1641); the law of 23 March 1939 for the reintegration of Memel in
Germany (1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 559).
Point 2 of the Party platform stated in part:
“We demand * * * the cancellation of the treaties of Versailles
and St. Germain.” (_1708-PS_)
The following acts of the Cabinet supported this part of the program:
The proclamation of 14 October 1933 to the German people concerning
Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament
Conference (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 730); the
proclamation and law of 16 March 1935, for the establishment of the
_Wehrmacht_ and compulsory military service (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, pages 369, 375) (_1654-PS_); and the defense law of 21 May 1935
implementing the last-named law (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
609).
Point 4 of the Party platform read as follows:
“Only those who are members of the ‘Volk’ can be citizens. Only
those who are of German blood, without regard to religion, can
be members of the ‘Volk’. No Jew, therefore, can be a member of
the ‘Volk’.” (_1708-PS_)
Among the cabinet laws which implemented this point were these: the law
of 14 July 1933 for the recall of naturalization and the deprivation of
citizenship (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 480); the law of 7
April 1933 permitting persons of non-Aryan descent to be refused
permission to practice law (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 188)
(_1401-PS_); the law of 25 April 1933 restricting the number of
non-Aryans in schools and higher institutions (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 225) (_2022-PS_); the law of 29 September 1933 excluding
persons of Jewish blood from the peasantry (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 685) (_1402-PS_); the law of 26 June 1936, forbidding
people of Jewish blood to hold positions of authority in the army (1936
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 518) (_1398-PS_); the law of 19 March
1937 excluding Jews from the Reich Labor Service (1937
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 325); the law of 28 March 1938 on the
legal status of Jewish religious communities (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 338); and the law of 6 July 1938 prohibiting Jews from
participating in six different types of business (1938
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 823).
Point 23 of the platform proclaimed:
“We demand legislative action against conscious political lies
and their broadcasting through the press.” (_1708-PS_)
To carry out this point numerous Cabinet laws were passed, of which the
following are merely examples: the law of 22 September 1933 for the
establishment of the Reich Culture Chamber (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 661) (_2082-PS_); the law of 4 October, 1933 regarding
editors (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 713) (_2083-PS_); and
the law of 15 May 1934 regarding the theater (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 411).
All the laws referred to above and hereafter were enacted specifically
in the name of the Cabinet (_Reichsregierung_). A typical introductory
paragraph reads:
“The Reich Cabinet (_die Reichsregierung_) has enacted the
following law which is hereby promulgated. * * *” [Law of 1
August 1934, 1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 747].
(_2003-PS_)
In furtherance of the Nazi plans to acquire totalitarian control of
Germany (cf. Section 1-2 of Chapter VII), the Cabinet passed the
following laws: Law of 26 May 1933, providing for the confiscation of
Communist property (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 293)
(_1396-PS_); Law of 14 July 1933 against the new establishment of
parties (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 479); Law of 14 July
1933 providing for the confiscation of property of Social Democrats and
others (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 479) (_1388-PS_); and Law
of 1 December 1933 securing the unity of party and state (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1016). (_1395-PS_)
In the course of consolidating Nazi control of Germany, (cf. Section 3
of Chapter VII) the following laws were enacted by the Cabinet: Decree
of the Cabinet, 21 March 1933, creating special courts (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 136) (_2076-PS_); Law of 31 March 1933
for the integration of States into the Reich (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 153) (_2004-PS_); Law of 7 April 1933 for the
reestablishment of the Professional Civil Service (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 175) (_1397-PS_); Law of 7 April 1933
for the integration of states into the Reich (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 173) (_2005-PS_); Law of 30 June 1933 eliminating non-Aryan
civil servants or civil servants married to non-Aryans (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 433) (_1400-PS_); Law of 20 July 1933
providing for the discharge of Communist officials (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 518) (_1398-PS_); Law of 24 April 1934
creating the People’s Court (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 341)
(_2014-PS_); Law of 1 August 1934 uniting the office of President and
Chancellor (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 747) (_2003-PS_); Law
of 30 January 1935, Reich Governors Law, further reducing the
independence of the states (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 65);
Law of 30 January 1935 providing for the abolition of representatives or
deliberative bodies in the municipalities (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 49) (_2008-PS_); Law of 26 January 1937, the comprehensive
civil service law (1937 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 39); and Law
of 18 March 1938 providing for the submission of one list of candidates
to the electorate for the entire Reich (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part
I, page 258). (_2355-PS_)
Nazi extermination of political internal resistance in Germany, through
the purge of political opponents and through acts of terror, (cf.
Section 4 of Chapter VII), was facilitated and legalized by the
following Cabinet laws: Law of 14 July 1933 against the new
establishment of parties (containing a penal clause) (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 479) (_1388-PS_); Law of 3 July 1934
concerning measures for emergency defense of the State (legalizing the
Roehm purge) (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 529) (_2057-PS_);
Law of 20 December 1934 on treacherous acts against state and party and
for the protection of party uniforms (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I,
page 1269) (_1393-PS_); Law of 24 April 1934 making the creation of new
or continuance of existing parties an act of treason (1934
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 341) (_2014-PS_); Law of 28 June 1935
changing the Penal Code permitting punishment under analogous law (1935
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 839) (_1962-PS_); Law of 16 September
1939 permitting second prosecution of an acquitted person before a
special court, the members of which were named by Hitler (1939
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1841). (_2550-PS_)
The destruction of the free trade unions in Germany, (cf. Section 5 of
Chapter VII), was made possible by the following Cabinet laws: Law of 4
April 1933 concerning factory representative councils and economic
organizations (controlling employee representation) (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 161) (_1770-PS_); Law of 19 May 1933
concerning Trustees of Labor (abolishing collective bargaining) (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 285) (_405-PS_); Law of 20 January
1934 regulating National Labor (introducing leadership principle into
industrial relations (1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 45)
(_1861-PS_); and Law of 26 June 1935 establishing Reich Labor Service
(compulsory labor service) (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 769).
(_1389-PS_)
Even the anti-Jewish Nurnberg laws of 15 September 1935, although
technically passed by the Reichstag, were nevertheless worked out by the
Ministry of the Interior. Dr. Franz A. Medicus, who served as
_Ministerialdirigent_ in the Ministry of the Interior, made this
statement in a book published in 1940 (_2960-PS_):
“* * * The work of the Reich Ministry of Interior forms the
basis for the three Nurnberg Laws passed by a resolution of the
Reichstag on the occasion of the Reich party meeting of Freedom.
“The ‘Reich Citizenship Law’ as well as the ‘Law for the
protection of German blood and German honor’ (Blood Protection
Law) opened extensive tasks for the Ministry of Interior not
only in the field of administration. The same applies to the
‘Reich Flag Law’ that gives the foundation for the complete
re-organization of the use of the flag * * *” (_2960-PS_).
(_b_) _Decrees of The Council of Ministers._ Decrees of the Council of
Ministers similarly supplied the “legal” basis for other criminal
actions of the Nazi conspirators. Among these laws are the following:
Decree of 5 August 1940 imposing a discriminatory tax on Polish workers
in Germany (1940 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1077); Decree of 4
December 1941 regarding penal measures against Jews and Poles in the
occupied Eastern Territories (1941 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
759) (_2746-PS_); and Decree of 30 June 1942 concerning the employment
of Eastern Workers (1942 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 419).
(_2039-PS_)
Almost immediately upon Hitler’s coming to power, the Cabinet
participated in the Nazi conspiracy to wage aggressive war. This fact
appears clearly from the minutes of the second session of the working
committee of the Delegates for Reich Defense, dated 22 May 1933 and
signed by Keitel (_EC-177_); from a letter dated 24 June 1935 and signed
by von Blomberg, the Reichs Minister of War, which transmits a copy of
the secret, unpublished Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and also a copy
of the decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 in the Council for
the Defense of the Reich (_2261-PS_); and from a letter dated 5
September 1939 transmitting a copy of the secret, unpublished Reich
Defense Law of 4 September 1938 (a note dated 4 September 1938 attached
to this law states that the Reich Defense law of 21 May 1935 and the
decisions of the Cabinet previously mentioned are repeated) (_2194-PS_).
These three documents, important in the conspiracy to wage aggressive
war emphasize the participation of the Reich Cabinet and Reich
Ministers, through legislative enactments, in the conspiracy.
The Reich Defense Council was a creation of the Cabinet. On 4 April 1933
the Cabinet decided to form that agency (_2261-PS_). The circumstances
of its creation were discussed at the meeting of 22 May 1933 (_EC-177_):
“_Thoughts about a Reich Defense Council_
“All great European powers which are at freedom to arm, have a
RVR. One does not have to refer to history to prove the
necessity of this institution. The war has shown conclusively
that the cooperation with the various ministries has not been
close enough. The consequences did not fail to materialize. The
soldier is not in a position to have a say in all matters. The
disadvantages of the past system were caused by parallel efforts
of the various ministries in matters of the Reich defense. To
avoid these mistakes a _central agency_ has been created which
occupies itself already in peacetime in the widest sense with
the problems of Reich Defense. This working staff will continue
its existence in time of war.
“In accordance with the cabinet decision of the 4 April 1933 the
Reich Defense Council, which until now had been prepared for war
emergency, will go into immediate action.
“In time of peace its task will be to decide about all measures
for the preparation of the defense of the Reich, while surveying
and utilizing all powers and means of the nation.” (_EC-177_)
The composition of the Reich Defense Council is thereupon set out.
Hitler was President; the Minister of Defense was his deputy; and he,
plus six more ministers (there were only ten at that time) and the
Chiefs of the Army and Navy Command Staffs were permanent members. The
remaining ministers, as well as “leading industrialists”, were subject
to call. Of the defendants who were then members of the Council, there
was von Neurath as Foreign Affairs Minister; Frick as Interior Minister,
Goering as Air Minister; and Raeder as Chief of the Navy Command Staff.
(_EC-177_)
The presence of Cabinet ministers was indispensable. The cabinet by that
time could legislate for the Reich. It had a definite role to play in
this planning, as Keitel pointed out (_EC-177_):
“_Col. Keitel_:—Points out once more the urgency of the tasks,
since it had been possible to do only very little in this
connection during the last years. He asks the delegates to
consider the Reich Defense at all times and represent it
accordingly at the drafting of new laws. Experiences of the wars
are available and are at the disposal of the various ministries;
(e.g. Reich Archives, Memorandum of an administrative official
about gasoline supply). All these sources must be taken
advantage of for the future. The task of the full time delegates
is also to bring about a close cooperation of the ministries
with each other.” (_EC-177_)
Each separate ministry, moreover, was scheduled for a definite task.
“* * * In the work plans the questions and ideas are laid down,
which have come up in the _Reichswehr_ Ministry and must be
considered in case of mobilization. Up to the present time the
support on the part of other Ministries was frequently based
only on personal helpfulness since any authority from above was
lacking. The following work plans are finished.
“_a._ Work Plan for the Reich Ministry of Economics.
Work Plan for the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
Work Plan for the Reich Ministry of Labor.
“These three are composed in one work plan for the preparation
of a war economy.
“_b._ Work Plan for the Reich Postal Ministry.
“_c._ Work Plan for the Reich Traffic Ministry.
“Request the plans to be worked through carefully by the
competent Ministries. The plans will be discussed beginning of
June, when proposals for improvements may be made. The other
Ministries which have no work plans yet will receive them later
on. The Office of Air Raid Protection will work out a work plan
in conjunction with the Reich Commissariat for Aviation.”
(_EC-177_)
The secrecy of all undertakings was stressed:
“_Security and Secrecy._”
“Question has been brought up by the Reich Ministries.
“The secrecy of all Reich Defense work has to be maintained very
carefully. Communications with the outside by _messenger
service_ only, has been settled already with the Post Office,
Finance Ministry, Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the
Reichswehr Ministry. _Main Principle of security_: No document
must be lost since, otherwise, the enemy propaganda would make
use of it. Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they
can be denied by us in Geneva. Therefore, the _Reichswehr_
Ministry has worked out security directives for the Reich
Ministries and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior.”
(_EC-177_)
As time went on and greater concentration of power was needed, the
Cabinet made changes and additions to this secret war planning body.
Article 6 of the Secret Defense Law of 1935 (_2261-PS_) provided:
“(1) The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will appoint a
plenipotentiary-general for war economy to direct the entire war
economy.
“(2) It is the task of the plenipotentiary-general for war
economy to put all economic forces in the service of carrying on
the war and to secure the life of the German people
economically.
“(3) Subordinate to him are:
The Reichsminister for Economy.
The Reichsminister for Food and Agriculture.
The Reichs Labor Minister.
The Reichs Forest Master, and all Reichs’ agencies immediately
subordinate to the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor. Furthermore the
financing of the war effort (in the province of the Reichs
Finance Ministry and of the Reichsbank) will be carried on under
his responsibility.
“(4) The Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy is authorized,
within his realm of responsibility to issue legal regulations,
which may deviate from the existing laws.” (_2261-PS_)
Schacht was named as Plenipotentiary for War Economy. It will be noted
that the Reich Ministers for Food and Agriculture and for Labor, and the
Reichs Forest Master (who by this time had Cabinet rank) had not been
included in the original membership of the Reichs Defense Council. Darré
was Minister for Food and Agriculture, Seldte for Labor, and Goering was
Reich Forest Master.
On the same day the Law was passed, the Cabinet made these decisions
covering the newly-created Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy
(_EC-177_):
“1. The Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy appointed by the
Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will begin his work already in
peacetime * * *.
“2. The Reichsminister of War and the Plenipotentiary for War
Economy will effect the preparations for mobilization in closest
cooperation on both sides.
“3. The Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy will be a
permanent member of the Reich Defense Council
(_Reichsverteidigungsrat_). Within the working committee he
represents through his leadership staff the interests of war
economy.” (_EC-177_)
The complete reorganization of this Reich Defense Council took place in
1938, under the Secret Defense Law of 4th September of that year. By
that time, there had been a reorganization of the Armed Forces: the
chief of the OKW had been created and the War Ministry had been
abolished (_2194-PS_). The Reich Defense Council in 1938 was composed of
Goering, as permanent deputy and Minister of Air and Supreme Commander
of the Air Force; Raeder as Supreme Commander of the Navy; Hess as
Deputy of the Fuehrer; von Neurath as President of the Secret Cabinet
Council; Frick as Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration; Keitel
as Chief of the OKW; Funk as Plenipotentiary for Economics; Ribbentrop
as Minister of Foreign Affairs; Schacht as President of the Reichsbank
directorate (_2261-PS_). An important part of the Reich Defense Council
was the Working Committee. The minutes of the twelfth meeting of the
Reich Defense Working Committee, on 14 May 1936, read (_EC-407_):
“1. _The National Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces_, General Field Marshal von Blomberg, opened the
12th meeting of the Reichs Defense Committee by expressing
thanks for the work accomplished and pointing out in principle
the necessity of a preparation for a total mobilization with
emphasis on the most important measures to be taken at this
time. (Among others; mobilization schedule, legal basis,
preparations in the demilitarized zone.) He further indicates
the assignment of the national resources (_Reichsressort_) to
finance its measures for preparation of the Reichs defense out
of its budget.
“2. The _chairman_ of the _Reichs Defense_ Committee, Lieutenant
General Keitel, states:
“In today’s and future meetings of the Reichs Defense Committee
a cross section of the general situation concerning all matters
of the national defense is presented. The picture of the
situation does not appear in the reports of the meetings.
“The open discussion of State secrets before our large committee
gives the special obligation to the chairman of the Reichs
Defense Committee of pointing out its _secrecy_.
“Today’s sessions takes place under the auspices of the
restoration of the State authority in the demilitarized zone.
“The difficulties of the economic situation, which are presented
today, must be mastered.” (_EC-407_)
This Working Committee was still functioning in 1939. The Mobilization
Book for Civil Administration of 1939 states, in part (_1639-A-PS_):
“D. _Terms for Mobilization Preparations by the Civil
Administration._
“The acceptance of all new measures in the Mobilization Book for
Civil Administration must be requested from the Chief of the
Reich Defense Committee (Department of State Defense in the
Armed Forces High Command).” (_1639-A-PS_)
The composition of the Working Committee was redefined by the Secret Law
of 1938 as follows (_2194-PS_):
“_The Reich Defense Committee_ [_Reichsverteidigungsausschuss_]
(RVA):
“(1) The Reich Defense Committee is the working Committee of the
RVR. It prepares the decisions of the RVR, sees to their
execution, and secures collaboration between armed forces, chief
Reich offices, and party.
“(2) Presiding is the chief of the OKW. He regulates the
activity of the committee and gives the directions to the GBV
and GBW and to the Reich ministries not subordinated to them and
to the chief Reich offices according to the decisions of the
RVR, which directions are necessary for securing their uniform
execution.
“(3) The RVA is composed of the OKW, deputy of the commissioner
for the four year plan, the leader staffs of the GBV and GBW,
and the Reich Defense officials.
“(4) Chief office officials for the Reich defense
(_RV-Referenten_) and their deputies are commissioned by the
deputy of the leader, by the Reich Chancellery, by each Reich
Ministry, by the Reich Leader of the SS and chief of the German
police, by the Reich work leaders, by the Reich Forest Master,
by the Chief Inspector for the German Road Net, by the Reich
Office for Regional Order, by the Reichsbank directorate, and in
the Prussian state ministry. RV-Referent and his deputy are
immediately subordinate to the minister or the state secretary,
and to the chief of the Reich office, resp.” (_2194-PS_)
The GBV and the GBW mentioned in the portion quoted above are,
respectively, the Plenipotentiaries for Administration and for Economy.
Under them were grouped other ministries, some of which were already
permanent members of the Council. By paragraph 3 of the Secret Law the
following were made subordinate to the Plenipotentiary for
Administration: the Ministers of the Interior, Justice, Science and
Education, Churches; the Reich Authority for Spatial Planning; and, for
limited purposes, the Minister of Finance. Subordinate to and under the
direction of the Plenipotentiary for Economy (a position formerly held
by Schacht under the title “War Economy” and later held by Funk) were
the ministers of Economics, Food, Agriculture, Labor, and for limited
purposes, the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank; the Reich
Forest Master; and the Commissioner for Price Control from the 4-Year
Plan.
Paragraph 5 of the law (_2194-PS_) shows that subordinated to the Chief
of the OKW were the Reich Postal Minister, the Reich Transportation
Minister, and the General Inspector for German Highways.
This concentration of power by the Cabinet was for one purpose only: to
plan secretly with the strongest means at hand for the waging of
aggressive war. Further evidence of this objective is contained in an
affidavit by Frick covering the place, activities, and scope of the
Reich Defense Council, including the Three-Man College (_2986-PS_):
“I, Wilhelm Frick, being first duly sworn, depose and say:
“I was Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration
(_Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer die Reichsverwaltung_) from the
time when this office was created, until 20 August 1943.
Heinrich Himmler was my deputy in this capacity. Before the
outbreak of the war my task as Plenipotentiary for Reich
Administration was the preparation of organization in the event
of war, such as, for instance, the appointment of liaison men in
the different ministries who would keep in touch with me. As
Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration, I, together with the
Plenipotentiary for Economy and OKW formed what was called a
‘3-Man College’ (_Dreierkollegium_). We also were members of the
Reich defense Council (_Reichsverteidigungsrat_), which was
supposed to plan preparations and decrees in case of war which
later on were published by the Ministerial Council for the
Defense of the Reich. Since, as soon as the war started,
everything had to be done speedily and there would have been no
time for planning, such measures and decrees were prepared in
advance in case of war. All one then still had to do was to pull
out of the drawer the war orders that had been prepared. Later
on, after the outbreak of the war, these decrees were enacted by
the Ministerial Council for the defense of the Reich.
“(_Signed_) _Dr. Wilhelm Frick_” (_2986-PS_).
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE REICH CABINET
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix B. │ I │ 29, 68
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
351-PS │Minutes of First Meeting of Cabinet of│ │
│Hitler, 30 January 1933. (USA 389) │ III │ 270
│ │ │
*352-PS │Letter from Dr. Lammers to the │ │
│Plenipotentiary of Administration, 14 │ │
│June 1942, concerning the jurisdiction│ │
│of the Council of Ministers for the │ │
│Defense of the Reich. (USA 398) │ III │ 276
│ │ │
405-PS │Law Concerning Trustees of Labor, 19 │ │
│May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│ │
│I, p. 285. │ III │ 387
│ │ │
*1141-PS │Letter from Dr. Lammers to Members of │ │
│the Council of Ministers for Defense │ │
│of the Reich, 17 September 1939. (USA │ │
│393) │ III │ 805
│ │ │
1388-PS │Law concerning confiscation of │ │
│Property subversive to People and │ │
│State, 14 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962
│ │ │
1389-PS │Law creating Reich Labor Service, 26 │ │
│June 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 769. │ III │ 963
│ │ │
1393-PS │Law on treacherous attacks against │ │
│State and Party, and for the │ │
│Protection of Party Uniforms, 20 │ │
│December 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 1269. │ III │ 973
│ │ │
1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
1396-PS │Law concerning the confiscation of │ │
│Communist property, 26 May 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 293. │ III │ 979
│ │ │
1397-PS │Law for the reestablishment of the │ │
│Professional Civil Service, 7 April │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 175. │ III │ 981
│ │ │
1398-PS │Law to supplement the Law for the │ │
│restoration of the Professional Civil │ │
│Service, 20 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 518. │ III │ 986
│ │ │
1400-PS │Law changing the regulations in regard│ │
│to public officer, 30 June 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 433. │ III │ 987
│ │ │
1401-PS │Law regarding admission to the Bar, 7 │ │
│April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 188. │ III │ 989
│ │ │
1402-PS │The Homestead Law of 29 September │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 685. │ III │ 990
│ │ │
*1534-PS │Eltz letter of resignation, 30 January│ │
│1937. (USA 402) │ IV │ 95
│ │ │
*1639-A-PS │Mobilization book for the Civil │ │
│Administration, 1939 Edition, issued │ │
│over signature of Keitel. (USA 777) │ IV │ 143
│ │ │
**1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │
│universal military conscription. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ IV │ 163
│ │ │
*1701-PS │Memorandum from Frick to the Reich │ │
│Minister and Chief of the Reich │ │
│Chancellery, 9 August 1943, enclosing │ │
│draft law and memorandum of comment │ │
│thereon by Rosenberg, 22 December │ │
│1943. (USA 392) │ IV │ 203
│ │ │
1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │
│Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. │ │
│(USA 255; USA 324) │ IV │ 208
│ │ │
1770-PS │Law concerning factory representative │ │
│councils and economic organizations, 4│ │
│April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 161. │ IV │ 343
│ │ │
*1774-PS │Extracts from Organizational Law of │ │
│the Greater German Reich by Ernst │ │
│Rudolf Huber. (GB 246) │ IV │ 349
│ │ │
1861-PS │Law on the regulation of National │ │
│labor, 20 January 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 45. │ IV │ 497
│ │ │
1862-PS │Ordinance for execution of Four Year │ │
│Plan, 18 October 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 887. │ IV │ 499
│ │ │
1915-PS │Decree concerning leadership of Armed │ │
│Forces, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111. │ IV │ 552
│ │ │
1942-PS │Hess’ participation in legislative │ │
│process, published in Legal │ │
│Regulations and Legal Problems of the │ │
│Movement, by Dr. O. Gauweiler, p. 20. │ IV │ 584
│ │ │
1962-PS │Law to change the Penal Code of 28 │ │
│June 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 839. │ IV │ 600
│ │ │
*1997-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer, 17 July 1941, │ │
│concerning administration of Newly │ │
│Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA │ │
│319) │ IV │ 634
│ │ │
2001-PS │Law to remove the Distress of People │ │
│and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638
│ │ │
2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │
│the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639
│ │ │
2004-PS │Preliminary law for the coordination │ │
│of Federal States under the Reich, 31 │ │
│March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 153. │ IV │ 640
│ │ │
2005-PS │Second law integrating the “Laender” │ │
│with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173. │ IV │ 641
│ │ │
2006-PS │Law for the reconstruction of the │ │
│Reich, 30 January 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 75. │ IV │ 642
│ │ │
2008-PS │German Communal Ordinance, 30 January │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 49. │ IV │ 643
│ │ │
2014-PS │Law amending regulations of criminal │ │
│law and criminal procedure, 24 April │ │
│1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 341. │ IV │ 648
│ │ │
*2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │
│Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │
│30 August 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. │ │
│(GB 250) │ IV │ 650
│ │ │
2022-PS │Law against overcrowding of German │ │
│schools and Higher Institutions, 25 │ │
│April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 225. │ IV │ 651
│ │ │
2029-PS │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry│ │
│of Public Enlightenment and │ │
│Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104. │ IV │ 652
│ │ │
2030-PS │Decree concerning the Duties of the │ │
│Reich Ministry for Public │ │
│Enlightenment and Propaganda, 30 June │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 449. │ IV │ 653
│ │ │
2031-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │
│Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB│ │
│217) │ IV │ 654
│ │ │
2039-PS │Decree concerning the conditions of │ │
│employment of Eastern workers, 30 June│ │
│1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 419. │ IV │ 655
│ │ │
2047-PS │Law for the extension of the law │ │
│concerning the removal of the distress│ │
│of People and Reich, 30 January 1937. │ │
│1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│105. │ IV │ 660
│ │ │
2048-PS │Law for the extension of the law │ │
│concerning the removal of the distress│ │
│of People and Reich, 30 January 1939. │ │
│1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 95.│ IV │ 660
│ │ │
2057-PS │Law relating to National Emergency │ │
│Defense Measures of 3 July 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 529. │ IV │ 699
│ │ │
2073-PS │Decree concerning the appointment of a│ │
│Chief of German Police in the Ministry│ │
│of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487. │ IV │ 703
│ │ │
2075-PS │Decree for appointment of a chief of │ │
│organization of Germans abroad within │ │
│the Foreign Office, 30 January 1937. │ │
│1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│187. │ IV │ 704
│ │ │
2076-PS │Decree of the Government concerning │ │
│formation of Special Courts, 21 March │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│pp. 136-137. │ IV │ 705
│ │ │
2078-PS │Decree concerning establishment of │ │
│Ministry for Science, Education and │ │
│Popular Culture, 1 May 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 365. │ IV │ 706
│ │ │
2082-PS │Law relating to the Reich Chamber of │ │
│Culture of 22 September 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 661. │ IV │ 708
│ │ │
2083-PS │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933.│ │
│1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│713. │ IV │ 709
│ │ │
2089-PS │Decree relating to Reich Air Ministry,│ │
│5 May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 241. │ IV │ 719
│ │ │
2090-PS │Decree relating to coordination of │ │
│Jurisdiction of Reich and Prussia in │ │
│relation to church affairs, 16 July │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 1029. │ IV │ 720
│ │ │
2091-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │
│Chancellor appointing a Reich Minister│ │
│for Armaments and Munitions, 17 April │ │
│1940. 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 513. │ IV │ 720
│ │ │
2092-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer for │ │
│concentration of war economy, 2 │ │
│September 1943. 1943 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 529. │ IV │ 721
│ │ │
2093-PS │First Executive Order relating to │ │
│transfer of forestry and hunting │ │
│matters to the Reich, 12 July 1934. │ │
│1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│617. │ IV │ 723
│ │ │
2094-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│ │
│concerning Reich Labor Leader in Reich│ │
│Ministry ofInterior, 30 January 1937. │ │
│1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 95.│ IV │ 723
│ │ │
2095-PS │Decree of Fuehrer on Establishment of │ │
│Supreme Reich Authority—“The Reich │ │
│Labor Leader”, 20 August 1943. 1943 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 495. │ IV │ 724
│ │ │
2097-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│ │
│relating to designation of Chief of │ │
│Praesidialkanzlei, 1 December 1937. │ │
│1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│1317. │ IV │ 724
│ │ │
*2098-PS │Decree relating to Status of Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army and Navy, 25 │ │
│February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 215. (GB 206) │ IV │ 725
│ │ │
2099-PS │Fuehrer decree relating to Chief of │ │
│Party Chancellery of 29 May 1941. 1941│ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 295. │ IV │ 725
│ │ │
2100-PS │Decree on position of leader of Party │ │
│Chancellery, 24 January 1942. 1942 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 35. │ IV │ 726
│ │ │
2101-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│ │
│concerning Inspector General of German│ │
│Highways administration of 3 April │ │
│1941. 1941 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 192. │ IV │ 727
│ │ │
2102-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│ │
│concerning Inspector General for Water│ │
│and Power, 29 July 1941. 1941 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 467. │ IV │ 727
│ │ │
2103-PS │Decree of Fuehrer on Cabinet │ │
│Legislation, 10 May 1943. 1943 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 295. │ IV │ 729
│ │ │
*2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │
│Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │
│Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │
│enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │
│Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843
│ │ │
2231-PS │Excerpt from von Stutterheim, “Die │ │
│Reichskanzlei” (1940), pp. 19-34. │ IV │ 873
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │
│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │
│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │
│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │
│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │
│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
2355-PS │Second Law relating to right to vote │ │
│for Reichstag, 18 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 258. │ IV │ 1098
│ │ │
*2380-PS │Articles from National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1935. (USA 396). │ V │ 6
│ │ │
*2473-PS │Extracts from National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1943, showing party │ │
│positions of other Cabinet members in │ │
│1943. (USA 324) │ V │ 226
│ │ │
2550-PS │Law on modification of rules of │ │
│general criminal procedure, 16 │ │
│September 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1841. │ V │ 293
│ │ │
*2608-PS │Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The│ │
│Administration in Wartime”. (USA 714) │ V │ 327
│ │ │
2746-PS │Decree concerning organization of │ │
│Criminal Jurisdiction against Poles │ │
│and Jews in Incorporated Territories, │ │
│4 December 1941. 1941 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp. │ │
│759-761. │ V │ 386
│ │ │
2847-PS │Extracts from Reichs Ministerialblatt,│ │
│1933, regarding Cabinet change in the │ │
│Common Business Order of Reich │ │
│Ministries, para. 57c, the Circulation│ │
│of Drafts. │ V │ 509
│ │ │
2848-PS │File memorandum from files of Council │ │
│of Ministers, initialled L. │ V │ 510
│ │ │
2849-PS │Extract from The Third Reich, Vol. 4, │ │
│p. 81. │ V │ 511
│ │ │
*2852-PS │Minutes of meetings of Council of │ │
│Ministers for Reich Defense. (USA 395)│ V │ 512
│ │ │
2957-PS │Extract from German Civil Servants │ │
│Calendar, 1940, p. 111. │ V │ 663
│ │ │
*2959-PS │The Reich Minister, published in New │ │
│Formation of Justice and Economy, p. │ │
│66. (USA 399) │ V │ 664
│ │ │
*2960-PS │The Reich Ministry of Interior, │ │
│published in Publications on the State│ │
│Structure. (USA 406) │ V │ 668
│ │ │
2961-PS │Regulations for the leadership of the │ │
│German People, 1940, p. 62. │ V │ 668
│ │ │
*2964-PS │Memorial meeting of the Reich Cabinet,│ │
│published in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │
│Munich edition, 1 February 1937. (USA │ │
│401) │ V │ 672
│ │ │
2970-PS │Extracts concerning The New │ │
│Construction of the State from New │ │
│Formation of Law and Economy. │ V │ 677
│ │ │
*2986-PS │Affidavit of the defendant, Wilhelm │ │
│Frick, 19 November 1945. (USA 409) │ V │ 688
│ │ │
*2999-PS │Affidavit of Hans Heinrich Lammers, 22│ │
│November 1945. (USA 391) │ V │ 725
│ │ │
3787-PS │Report of the Second Meeting of the │ │
│Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939. │ │
│(USA 782) │ VI │ 718
│ │ │
*3863-PS │Extracts from Operations in the Third │ │
│Reich by Lammers. (GB 320) │ VI │ 786
│ │ │
*D-138 │Decree of 27 July 1934, providing for │ │
│participation of Fuehrer’s deputy in │ │
│the drafting of all legislation. (USA │ │
│403) │ VI │ 1055
│ │ │
*D-139 │Letter from Hess to Goebbels, 9 │ │
│October 1934, concerning participation│ │
│in legislation of the Reich. (USA 404)│ VI │ 1056
│ │ │
*D-140 │Letter from Lammers to Reich │ │
│Ministers, 12 April 1938. (USA 405) │ VI │ 1057
│ │ │
*EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │
│Committee of the Reich Defense held on│ │
│26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328
│ │ │
*EC-407 │Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of Reichs │ │
│Defense Council, 14 May 1936. (GB 247)│ VII │ 462
│ │ │
**Chart No. 6 │Reich Cabinet and Subsidiaries. │ │
│(Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 775
│ │ │
*Chart No. 18 │Organization of the Reich Government. │
│(2905-PS; USA 3) │ End of VIII
4. THE STURMABTEILUNG (SA)
The _Sturmabteilung_, or SA, is the organization which the world
remembers as the “Brown Shirts” or Storm Troops—the gangsters of the
early days of Nazi terrorism. Since it was the first of the
organizations created by the Nazis as instruments to effectuate their
illegal objectives, the SA occupied a place of peculiar importance in
the scheme of the conspirators. Unlike some of the other organizations,
the functions of the SA were not fixed or static. The SA was an agency
adapted to many designs and purposes, and its role in the conspiracy
changed from time to time various phases toward the final
objective—abrogation of the Versailles Treaty and acquisition of the
territory of other peoples and nations. If the conspiracy is likened to
a pattern, with its various parts fitting together like the pieces of a
jig-saw puzzle, the piece representing the SA would be found to
constitute the essential link in the pattern.
The SA participated in the conspiracy as a distinct and separate unit,
having a legal character of its own. An ordinance passed in March, 1935,
provided that the SA and certain other agencies were thereafter to be
considered “components” of the Nazi Party (_1725-PS_). This ordinance
further provided, in Article 5, that:
“* * * The affiliated organizations can possess their own legal
character.” (_1725-PS_)
Similarly, the 1943 Organization Book of the Nazi Party which
characterizes the SA as an “entity,” declares:
“The Fuehrer prescribes the law of conduct; he commands its use.
The Chief of Staff represents the SA as a complete entity on the
mandate of the Fuehrer.” (_3220-PS_)
While the SA was composed of many individual members, they acted as a
unit. They were closely bound together by many common factors, including
uniform membership standards and disciplinary regulations; a common and
distinctive uniform; common aims and objectives; common activities,
duties, and responsibilities; and a fanatical adherence to the
ideologies conceived by the Nazis. Although membership in the SA was
voluntary, the SA man was expected to withdraw if
“he can no longer agree with SA views or if he is not in a
position to fulfill completely the duties imposed upon him as a
member of the SA.” (_2354-PS_)
The SA man was well schooled in the philosophies and activities which he
was required to adopt in his daily life. Uniformity of action and
thought in such matters was in part obtained by the publication and
distribution of a weekly periodical entitled “_Der SA-Mann_.” This
publication was principally devoted to fostering various aspects of Nazi
ideology. In addition, “_Der SA-Mann_” reported upon the activities of
the SA and its constituent groups.
The SA developed from scattered bands of street ruffians into a cohesive
unit organized on a military basis, with military training and military
functions, and with an aggressive spirit and philosophy. The
organization extended throughout the entire Reich and was organized
vertically into local subdivisions. Horizontally, there were special
units including military, cavalry, communications, engineer, and medical
units. These various groups and branches were coordinated by the SA
Headquarters and operational offices, located in Munich.
A. _The Relationship Between The SA and The Nazi Party._
The affiliation between the SA and the Nazi leaders was closely
maintained, for the purpose of enabling the conspirators to employ the
SA for any activity necessary in effectuating the objectives of the
conspiracy. The SA was conceived and created by Hitler, in 1921, at the
very inception of the conspiracy. Hitler retained the direction of the
SA throughout the conspiracy, delegating responsibility for its
leadership to a Chief of Staff. Goering was an early leader of the SA,
and maintained close connection with it throughout the conspiracy. Hess
participated in many of the early battles of the SA and was leader of an
SA group in Munich. Frank, Streicher, von Schirach, and Sauckel each
held the position of _Obergruppenfuehrer_ in the SA, a position
corresponding to the rank of Lieutenant General; and Bormann was a
member of the Staff of the SA High Command.
The close relationship between the SA and leaders of the Nazi Party is
demonstrated by the fact that the _Hoheitstraeger_ (Bearers of
Sovereignty) of the Nazi Leadership Corps were authorized to call upon
the SA for assistance in carrying out particular phases of the Party
program. For example, at page 71 of the Organization Book of the Nazi
Party (1943 edition) the following statement is made (_1893-PS_):
“The _Hoheitstraeger_ is responsible for the entire political
appearance of the Movement within this zone. The SA leader of
that zone is tied to the directives of the _Hoheitstraeger_ in
that respect.
“The _Hoheitstraeger_ is the ranking representative of the Party
to include all organizations within his zone. He may requisition
the SA located within his zone for the respective SA leader if
they are needed for the execution of a political mission. The
_Hoheitstraeger_ will then assign the mission to the SA * * *.
“Should the _Hoheitstraeger_ need more SA for the execution of
political mission than is locally available, he then applies to
the next higher office of sovereignty which, in turn, requests
the SA from the SA office in his sector.” (_1893-PS_)
This close relationship is further shown by an ordinance for the
execution of a Hitler decree (_2383-PS_):
“The leader of affiliated organizations, as well as the leaders
of the party women’s organization, are subordinate to the
sovereign bearer (_Hoheitstraeger_) politically, functionally,
disciplinarily, and personally.”
* * * * * *
“The formations of the NSDAP, with exception of the SS, for whom
special provisions apply, are subordinated to the sovereign
bearer (_Hoheitstraeger_) politically and in respect to
commitment. Responsibility for the leadership of the units rests
in the hands of the unit leader.” (_2383-PS_)
It was in compliance with the authority of the Leadership Corps that the
SA was used in the seizure of trade union properties.
In addition, the SA demonstrated its close affiliation to the Nazi Party
by participating in various ways in election proceedings. A pamphlet
entitled “The SA,” depicting the history and general activities of the
SA, written by an SA Sturmfuehrer upon orders from SA Headquarters,
declares that the SA stood—
“at the foremost front of election fights.” (_2168-PS_)
Further evidence of the close relationship between the SA and Nazi
leaders is found in the distribution list of the confidential
publication of the Nazi Leadership Corps, which shows that this strictly
confidential magazine was distributed to Lieutenant-Generals and
Major-Generals of the SA. (_2660-PS_)
The interest and participation of Nazi leaders in the activities of the
SA is clearly shown in the issues of “_Der SA-Mann_” for the period from
1934 to March 1939 (_3050-A-E-PS_). Throughout these volumes there
appear photographs of Nazi leaders participating in SA activities. The
following are descriptions of a few of these photographs, together with
the page numbers upon which they appear:
Photograph of Himmler, Huhnlein (Fuehrer of NSKK) and
Lutze, bearing caption: “They lead the soldiers of
National Socialism,” 15 June, 1935, p. 1.
Photograph of Hitler at SA Ceremony, carrying SA Battle
Flag. The picture bears the caption: “As in the fighting
years the Fuehrer, on Party Day of Freedom, dedicates
the new regiments with the Blood Banner,” 21 September,
1935, p. 4.
Photograph of Lutze and Hitler, 19 September, 1936, p.
4.
Photograph of Hitler and SA officers, 1 January, 1938,
p. 3.
Photograph of Streicher with SA men, and reviewing SA
Troops, 25 November, 1938, p. 1.
Photograph of Goering in SA uniform reviewing SA
marching troops under the caption: “Honor Day of the
SA,” 21 September, 1935, p. 3.
Photographs of Goering, Hess, and Hitler in SA uniform
at the ceremonies dedicated to SA men killed in the
Munich Putsch, 16 November, 1935, p. 3.
Photograph of Goering marching in SA uniform, 19
September, 1936, p. 3.
Photographs of Goering at ceremonies held upon occasion
of his being made Obergruppenfuehrer of the
Feldherrnhalle Regiment of the SA, 23 January, 1937, p.
3.
Photograph of Goering leading Feldherrnhalle Regiment of
SA in parade, 18 September, 1937, p. 3.
The work of the SA did not end with the seizure of the German government
by the Nazis, but affiliation between the SA and Nazi leaders continued
thereafter. The importance of the SA in connection with the Nazi
Government and control of Germany is shown by the law of 1 December 1933
entitled, “The Law on Securing the Unity of Party and State”
(_1395-PS_):
“* * * The Deputy of the Fuehrer and the Chief of Staff of SA
become members of the Reich Government in order to insure close
cooperation of the offices of the Party and SA with the public
authorities.” (_1395-PS_)
Similarly, a decree promulgated by Hitler providing for supervision of
premilitary training by the SA declares:
“The offices of the Party and State are to support the SA in
this training program and to value the possession of the
certificate for the SA military insignia.” (_2383-PS_)
The complete control of the SA by the Nazis at all times is shown by the
so-called “Roehm Purge” of June 1934 (see _2407-PS_). Roehm had been
Chief of Staff of the SA for several years, and was responsible for the
development of SA into a powerful, organization. SA members were
required to take a personal oath of fidelity to Roehm. But when his
policies conflicted with those of the Nazi leaders, he was removed,
murdered, and replaced by Victor Lutze. This drastic action was
accomplished without revolt or dissension in the ranks of the SA, and
with no change in its objectives or program. The SA remained “a reliable
and strong part of the National Socialist Movement * * * full of
obedience and blind discipline,” whose function was to “create and form
the new German citizens.” (_2407-PS_)
The importance of the SA in the Nazi plan for the utilization of the
people of Germany is shown in Hitler’s pronouncement “The Course for the
German Person,” which appears in the issue of “_Der SA-Mann_” for 5
September 1936, at page 22. Hitler’s statement reads as follows:
“The boy, he will enter the Young Volk, and the lad, he will
enter the Hitler Youth, the young man will go into the SA, in
the SS, and in other units, and the SA and SS men will one day
enter into the labor service and from there to the Army, and the
soldier of the Volk will return again into the Organization of
the Movement, the Party, in the SA and SS and never again will
our Volk decay as it once was decayed”.
Thus the SA was constantly available to the conspirators as an
instrument to further their aims. It was natural that Victor Lutze, the
former Chief of Staff of the SA, in a pamphlet entitled “The Nature and
Tasks of the SA,” declared:
“The SA cannot be independent of the National Socialist Movement
but can only exist as a part of it.” (_2471-PS_)
B. _Participation by the SA in the Conspiracy._
The principal functions performed by the SA in furtherance of the
objectives of the conspiracy may be classified into four distinct
phases, each of which corresponds with a particular phase in the
progression of the conspiracy.
The first phase consists of the use of the SA and its members as the
instrument for the dissemination of Nazi ideology throughout Germany.
The employment of SA for this purpose continued throughout the entire
period of the conspiracy. In the second phase, the period prior to the
Nazi seizure of power, the SA was a militant group of fighters whose
function was to combat all opponents of the Party. In the third phase,
the period of several years following the Nazi seizure of power, the SA
participated in various measures designed to consolidate the control of
the Nazis, including the dissolution of the trade unions, the
persecution of the church, and Jewish persecutions. During this period
the SA continued to serve as a force of political soldiers whose purpose
was to combat members of political parties considered hostile to the
Nazi Party. The fourth aspect of SA activities consisted of its
employment as an agency for the building up of an armed force in Germany
in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, and for the preparation of the
youth of Germany for the waging of an aggressive war.
(1) _The Propagation of Nazi Doctrine._ From the very start the Nazi
leaders emphasized the importance of the SA’s mission to disseminate
Nazi doctrines. The responsibility of propagating National Socialist
ideology remained constant throughout. This is shown in an excerpt from
_Mein Kampf_ in which Hitler declared:
“* * * As the directing idea for the inner training of the
_Sturmabteilung_, the intention was always dominant, aside from
all physical education, to teach it to be the unshakeable
convinced defender of the National Socialist idea.” (_2760-PS_)
Hitler’s pronouncement as to the function of SA in this respect became
the guiding principle of SA members, for _Mein Kampf_ was taken to
express the basic philosophy of the SA. The Organization Book of the
Nazi Party declares that the training of SA members should consist of—
“The training and rearing upon the basis of the teachings and
aims of the Fuehrer as they are put down in ‘Mein Kampf’ and in
the Party program, for all spheres of our life and our National
Socialist ideology.” (_2354-PS_)
The Party Organization Book also declares that the SA is the
“training and rearing instrument of the Party.” (_2354-PS_)
Similarly, in an article which appeared in “_Der SA-Mann_”, at page 1 of
the issue of January 1934, the functions of the SA were set forth as
follows:
“First, to be the guaranty of the power of the National
Socialist State against all attacks from without as well as from
within.
“Second, to be the high institute of education of the people for
the living National Socialism.”
The function of the SA as propagandist of the Party was more than a
responsibility which SA took unto itself. It was a responsibility
recognized by the law of Germany. The law for “Securing the Unity of
Party and State,” promulgated by the Reich Cabinet in 1933, provided:
“The members of the National Socialistic German Labor Party and
the SA (including their subordinate organizations) as the
leading and driving force of the National Socialist State will
bear greater responsibility toward Fuehrer, people and State.”
(_1395-PS_)
As the principal ideology bearers of the Nazi Party SA members were “the
soldiers of an idea,” to use the expression employed by Nazi writers.
Examples of the use of the SA as Nazi propagandist will be seen in the
description of the other functions performed by the SA. For in each case
the SA combined its propagandist responsibility instrument with the
other functions which it performed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
(2) _Strong-Arm Terrorization of Political Opponents._ In the early
stages of the Nazi Movement the SA combined propaganda with violence
along the lines expressed by Hitler in _Mein Kampf_:
“The Young Movement from the first day, espoused the standpoint
that its idea must be put forward spiritually but that the
defense of this spiritual platform must, if necessary, be
secured by strong-arm means.” (_2760-PS_)
So that the Nazis might better spread their philosophies, the SA was
employed to gain possession and control of the streets for the Nazis.
Its function was to beat up and terrorize all political opponents. The
importance of this function is explained in a pamphlet written by SA
Sturmfuehrer Bayer, upon orders from SA Headquarters (_2168-PS_):
“Possession of the streets is the key to power in the State—for
this reason the SA marched and fought. The public would have
never received knowledge from the agitative speeches of the
little Reichstag faction and its propaganda or from the desires
and aims of the Party if the martial tread and battle song of
the SA Companies had not beat the measure for the truth of a
relentless criticism of the state of affairs in the governmental
system. They wanted the young Movement to keep silent. Nothing
was to be read in the press about the labor of the National
Socialists, not to mention the basic aims of its platform. They
simply did not want to awake any interest in it. However, the
martial tread of the SA took care that even the drowsiest
citizens had to see at least the existence of a fighting troop.”
(_2168-PS_)
And in _Mein Kampf_ Hitler defined the task of the SA as follows:
“We have to teach the Marxists that the master of the streets in
the future is National Socialism, exactly as it will once be the
Master of the State.” (_2760-PS_)
The importance of the work of SA in the early days of the Movement was
indicated by Goebbels in a speech which appeared in _Das Archiv_ in
October 1935:
“* * * The inner-political opponents did not disappear due to
mysterious unknown reasons but because the Movement possessed a
strong-arm within its organization and the strongest strong-arm
of the Movement is the SA * * *.” (_3211-PS_)
Specific evidence of the activities of the SA during the early period of
the Nazi Movement (1922-31) is to be found in a series of articles
appearing in “_Der SA-Mann_” entitled, “SA Battle Experiences Which We
Will Never Forget.” Each of these articles is an account of a street or
meeting-hall battle waged by the SA against a group of political
opponents in the early days of the Nazi struggle for power. These
articles demonstrate that during this period it was the function of SA
to employ physical violence in order to destroy all forms of thought and
expression which might be considered hostile to Nazi aims or philosophy.
The titles of these articles are sufficiently descriptive to constitute
evidence of SA activities. Some of these titles, together with the page
and reference of “_Der SA-Mann_” upon which they appear, follow:
Article entitled: “We subdue the Red Terror,” 24 February, 1934: p.
4.
Article entitled: “Nightly Street Battles on the Czech Border,” 8
September, 1934: p. 12.
Article entitled: “Street Battle in Chemnitz,” 6 October, 1934: p.
5.
Article entitled: “Victorious SA,” 20 October, 1934: p. 7.
Article entitled: “SA Against Sub-Humanity,” 20 October, 1934: p. 7.
Article entitled: “For the Superiority of the Street,” 10 November,
1934: p. 10.
Article entitled: “The SA Conquers Rastenburg,” 26 January,
1936[_sic_]: p. 7.
Article entitled: “Company 88 Receives its Baptism of Fire,” 23
February, 1935: p. 5.
Article entitled: “Street Battles at Pforghein,” 23 February, 1935:
p. 5.
Article entitled: “The SA Breaks the Red Terror,” 1 June, 1935: p.
7.
Article entitled: “The Blood Sunday of Berlin,” 10 August, 1935: p.
10.
Article entitled: “West Prussian SA Breaks the Red Terror in
Christburg,” 24 August, 1935: p. 15.
Portrait symbolizing the SA Man as the “Master of the Streets,”
entitled, “Attention: Free the Streets,” 11 September, 1937: p. 1.
Article entitled: “9 November, 1923, in Nurnberg,” 30 October, 1937.
As an example of the nature of these articles, the article appearing in
the Franken Edition of “_Der SA-Mann_” for 30 October 1937, at page 3,
is typical. It is entitled: “9 November 1923 in Nurnberg,” and reads in
part as follows:
“We stayed overnight in the Coliseum. Then in the morning we
found out what had happened in Munich. ‘Now a revolution will
also be made in Nurnberg,’ we said. All of a sudden the Police
came from the Maxtor Guard and told us that we should go home,
that the Putsch in Munich failed. We did not believe that and we
did not go home. Then came the State Police with fixed bayonets
and drove us out of the hall. One of us then shouted ‘Let’s go
to the Cafe Habsburg!’ By the time we arrived, however, the
Police again had everything surrounded. Some shouted then: ‘The
Jewish place will be stormed * * * Out with the Jews!’ Then the
Police started to beat us up. Then we divided into small groups
and roamed through town and wherever we caught a Red or a Jew we
knew, a fist fight ensued.
“Then in the evening we marched, although the Police had
forbidden it, to a meeting in Furth. During the promenade again
the police attempted to stop us. It was all the same to us.
Already in the next moment we attacked the police in our anger
so that they were forced to flee. We marched on to the Geissmann
Hall. There again they tried to stop us. But the Landsturm,
which was also there, attacked the protection forces like
persons possessed, and drove them from the streets. After the
meeting we dissolved and went to the edge of town. From there we
marched in close column back to Nurnberg. In the Wall Street
near the Plaerrer the Police came again. We simply shoved them
aside. They did not trust themselves to attack, for what would a
blood bath have meant? We decided beforehand not to take
anything from anyone. Also in Furth they had already noticed
that we were up to no good. A large mass of people accompanied
us on the march. We marched with unrolled flags and sang so that
the streets resounded: Comrade reach me your hand; we want to
stand together, even though they have false impressions, the
spirit must not die, Swastika on the steel helmet,
black—white—red armband, we are known as Storm Troop (SA)
Hitler!”
Through such means the SA was chiefly responsible for destroying all
political elements hostile to the Nazis, including liberalism and
capitalism. This is shown by an article which appeared on 6 January,
1934, at page 1 of “_Der SA-Mann_,” entitled “The SA Man in the New
State!”
“The New Germany would not have been without the SA man and the
new Germany would not exist if the SA man would now, with the
feeling of having fulfilled his duty, quietly and unselfishly
and modestly step aside or if the new State would send him home
much like the Moors who had done his obligations.
* * * * * *
“What has been accomplished up until now, the taking over of the
power in the State and the ejection of those elements which are
responsible for the pernicious developments of the post war
years as bearers of Marxist liberalism, and capitalism are only
the preliminaries, the spring-board for the real aims of
National Socialism.
“Being conscious of the fact that the real National Socialist
construction work would be building in an empty space without
the usurpation of power by Adolf Hitler, the movement and the SA
man as the aggressive bearer of its will primarily have directed
all their efforts thereupon, to achieve the platform of
continued striving and to obtain the fundamental for the
realization of our desires in the State by force * * *
“* * * Out of this comes the further missions of the SA for the
completion of the German revolution. First: To be the guaranty
of the power of the National Socialist State against all attacks
from without as well as within. Second: To be the high institute
of education of the people for the living National Socialism.
Third: to build a bridge over which the present day German youth
can march free and unhampered as first generation into the
formed Third Reich.”
(3) _Consolidation of Nazi Control of Germany._ The Third function of
the SA was to carry out various programs designed to consolidate Nazi
control of the German State, including particularly the dissolution of
the trade unions and the Jewish persecutions. In the words of an SA
officer, it was the function of the SA to be the “tool for strengthening
the structure of the new State,” and “to clean up” all that was “worth
cleaning up.” It was generally employed, says the SA man, “where
communism and elements hostile to the State still insolently dared to
rebel.” (_2168-PS_)
SA groups were employed to destroy political opposition by force and
brutality where necessary. As an example, an affidavit of William F.
Sollman reads as follows:
“* * * From 1919 until 1933 I was a Social Democrat and a member
of the German Reichstag. Prior to March 11, 1933, I was the
editor-in-chief of a chain of daily newspapers, with my office
in Cologne, Germany, which led the fight against the Nazi Party.
“On March 9, 1933, members of the SS and SA came to my home in
Cologne and destroyed the furniture and my personal records. At
that time I was taken to the Brown House in Cologne where I was
tortured, being beaten and kicked for several hours. I was then
taken to the regular government prison in Cologne where I was
treated by two medical doctors * * * and released the next day.
On March 11, 1933, I left Germany.” (_3221-PS_)
Prior to the organization of the Gestapo on a national scale local SA
meeting places were designated as arrest points, and SA members took
into custody Communists and other persons who were actually or
supposedly hostile to the Nazi Party. This activity is described in an
affidavit of Raymond H. Geist, former U. S. Consul in Berlin:
“* * * At the beginning of the Hitler regime, the only
organization which had meeting places throughout the country was
the SA (Storm Troopers). Until the Gestapo could be organized on
a national scale the thousands of local SA meeting places became
‘arrest points.’ There were at least fifty of these in Berlin.
Communists, Jews, and other known enemies of the Nazis party
were taken to these points, and, if they were enemies of
sufficient importance, they were immediately transferred to the
Gestapo headquarters.” (_1759-PS_)
In addition, SA members served as guards at concentration camps during
this consolidation period and participated in mistreatment of the
persons there imprisoned. A report to Hitler by the public prosecutor of
Dresden concerning the _Knollprosse_ of one Vogel, who was accused of
mistreatment of the persons imprisoned in a concentration camp, reads as
follows (_787-PS_):
“The prosecuting authority in Dresden has indicted
Oberregierungsrat Erich Vogel in Dresden (case designation 16
STA 4 107/34) on account of bodily injury while in office. The
following subject matter is the basis of the process:
“Vogel belongs to the Gestapo office of the province of Saxony
since its foundation and is chief of Main section II, which
formerly bore the title ZUB (_Zentralstelle fuer
Umsturzbekaempfung_) (Central office for combatting overthrow).
In the process of combatting efforts inimical to the State Vogel
carried out several so called borderland actions in the year
1933 in which a large number of politically unreliable persons
and persons who had become political prisoners in the border
territories were taken into protective custody (_Schutzhaft_)
and brought to the Hohnstein protective custody camp. In the
camp serious mistreatment of the prisoners has been going on at
least since summer of 1933. The prisoners were not only, as in
protective custody camp Bredow near Stettin, beaten into a state
of unconsciousness for no reason with whips and other tools but
were also tortured in other ways, as for instance with a
drip-apparatus especially constructed for the purpose, under
which the prisoners had to stand so long that they came away
with serious purulent wounds of the scalp. The guilty SA-leaders
and SA-men were sentenced to punishment of six years to nine
months of imprisonment by the main criminal court of the
provincial court in Dresden of 15 May 1935 (16 STA. 3431.34).
Vogel, whose duties frequently brought him to the camp, took
part in this mistreatment, insofar as it happened in the
reception room of the camp during completion of the reception
formalities, and in the supply room, during issuing of the
blankets. In this respect it should be pointed out that Vogel
was generally known to the personnel of the camp—exactly
because of his function as head of the ZUB—and his conduct
became at least partly a standard for the above-named conduct of
the SA-leaders and men.”
* * * * * *
“In his presence, for instance, the SA-men Mutze dealt such
blows to one man, without provocation, that he turned around on
himself. As already stated, Vogel not only took no steps against
this treatment of the prisoners, but he even made jokes about it
and stated that it amused him the way things were popping here.
“In the supply room Vogel himself took a hand in the beating
amid the general severe mistreatment. The SA-men there employed
whips and other articles and beat the prisoners in such a manner
that serious injuries were produced; the prisoners partly became
unconscious and had to lie in the dispensary a long time. Vogel
was often present in the supply room during the mistreatment. At
least in the following cases he personally laid violent hands
upon prisoners.”
* * * * * *
“* * * the prisoner was laid across the counter in the usual
manner, held fast by the head and arms, and then beaten for a
considerable time by the SA men with whips and other articles.
Along with this Vogel himself took part in the beating for a
time, and after this mistreatment slapped him again, so that the
prisoner appeared green and blue in the face. The prisoner is
the tinsmith Hans Kuehitz, who bore the nickname Johnny. Upon
his departure Vogel gave the head of the supply room,
Truppenfuehrer Meier from 6 to 8 reichsmarks with the stated
reason that the SA men ‘had sweated so.’ The money was then
distributed by Meier to those SA-comrades who had taken part in
the mistreatment.” (_787-PS_)
Similarly, the SA participated in the seizure and dissolution of the
German trade unions in 1933, a measure taken by the Nazis under the
direction of Robert Ley. An official Nazi Party circular containing an
order promulgated by Robert Ley concerning the program for the seizure
of the union properties read as follows:
“SA, as well as SS, are to be employed for the occupation of
trade union properties and for the taking into protective
custody all personalities who come into the question.”
(_392-PS_)
The SA also participated extensively in the Jewish persecutions
conducted by the Nazis. The affidavit of Mr. Geist, former U. S. Consul
in Berlin (_1759-PS_) sets forth numerous instances of attacks upon
Jewish-American citizens. Mr. Geist also declares that on the morning
after the Nazis’ acquisition of power, SA groups roamed the streets of
Berlin seizing and beating Jewish persons and other political opponents
of the Nazi Party. Thereafter SA men participated in many attacks of
physical violence upon Jews, including Jewish-American citizens. In
addition, uniformed SA men were employed as a display of threatening
force in order to coerce Jewish persons to dispose of their property at
greatly reduced values. (_1759-PS_)
SA participation in the Jewish program of 10 to 11 November, 1938, is
disclosed in a confidential report of an SA Brigade Fuehrer to his Group
Commander, dated 29 November, 1938 (_1721-PS_):
“TO: SA Group Electrical Palatinate (Kurpfalz)
_MANNHEIM_
“The following order reached me at 3 o’clock on 10 November
1938.
‘On the order of the Gruppenfuehrer, all the Jewish synagogues
within the 50th Brigade are to be blown up or set fire
immediately.
‘Neighboring houses occupied by Aryans are not to be damaged.
The action is to be carried out in civilian clothes. Rioting and
plundering are to be prevented. Report of execution of orders to
reach Brigade Fuehrer or office by 8:30.’
“I immediately alerted the Standartenfuehrer and gave them the
most exact instructions; the execution of the order began at
once.
“I hereby report that the following were destroyed in the area
of * * *
“_Standarte 115_
1. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Bleichstrasse Destroyed by fire
2. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Fuchsstrasse Destroyed by fire
3. Synagogue at Ober/Ramstadt Interior and furnishings
wrecked
4. Synagogue at Graefenhausen Interior and furnishings
wrecked
5. Synagogue at Griesheim Interior and furnishings
wrecked
6. Synagogue at Pfungstadt Interior and furnishings
wrecked
7. Synagogue at Eberstadt Destroyed by fire”
* * * * * *
“_Standarte 145_
1. Synagogue at Bensheim Destroyed by fire
2. Synagogue at Lorch in Hessen Destroyed by fire
3. Synagogue at Heppenheim Destroyed by fire
4. Prayer House Alsbach Destroyed by fire
5. Meeting room Alsbach Destroyed by fire
6. Synagogue at Rimbach Furnishings completely
destroyed”
* * * * * *
“_Standarte 168_
1. Synagogue in Seligenstadt Destroyed by fire
2. Synagogue in Offenbach Destroyed by fire
3. Synagogue in Klein-Krotzenburg Destroyed by fire
4. Synagogue in Steinheim on the Main Destroyed by fire
5. Synagogue in Muehlheim on the Main Destroyed by fire
6. Synagogue in Sprendlingen Destroyed by fire
7. Synagogue in Langen Destroyed by fire
8. Synagogue in Egelsbach Destroyed by fire”
* * * * * *
“_Standarte 186_
1. Synagogue in Beerfelden Blown up
2. Synagogue in Michelstadt Furnishings wrecked
3. Synagogue in Koenig Furnishings wrecked
4. Synagogue in Hoechst i/Odenwald Furnishings wrecked
5. Synagogue in Gross-Umstadt Furnishings wrecked
6. Synagogue in Dieburg Furnishings wrecked
7. Synagogue in Babenhausen Furnishings wrecked
8. Synagogue in Gross-Bieberau Destroyed by fire
9. Synagogue in Fraenk. Crumbach Furnishings destroyed
10. Synagogue in Reichelsheim Furnishings destroyed”
* * * * * *
“_Standarte 221_
1. Synagogue and Chapel in Gross-Gerau Destroyed by fire
2. Synagogue in Ruesselsheim Torn down and furnishings
destroyed
3. Synagogue in Dornheim Furnishings destroyed
4. Synagogue in Wolfskehlen Furnishings destroyed”
“The Fuehrer of Brigade 50 (STARKENBURG)
“/s/[Illegible]
“Brigadefuehrer” (_1721-PS_)
In connection with the persecutions of the Jews, the SA again performed
its propaganda function. It was the function of the SA to create and
foster among the people an anti-Jewish spirit. Evidence of this function
is to be found in the issues of “_Der SA-Mann_”. Article after article
in this publication was devoted to propaganda designed to engender
hatred toward the Jewish race. The nature of these articles is apparent
from some of the titles:
Article entitled: “Finish up with the Jew”, with
subtitle: “We want no women to buy from Jews, and no
Jewish girl friends,” 27 July, 1935, p. 4.
Article entitled: “The Jewish World Danger,” 2 February,
1935, p. 5.
Article entitled: “Jewish Worries,” (defending the
practices of excluding Jews from certain resorts). 20
July, 1935, p. 4.
Article entitled: “Jews aren’t wanted Here,” with
pictures posted on outskirts of villages showing signs
bearing the same message. (1 June, 1935, p. 1.) The last
portion of this article reads as follows:
“Since the day when National Socialism unrolled its flag and the march
began for the Germany for Germans, our battle also included the Jewry *
* * Let the Jew continue with his methods against New Germany. We know
that at the end we will remain the victor for
Snake remains a snake, and
Jew remains a Jew! * * *
* * * “German women, if you buy from Jews and German girl, if you carry
on with Jews, then both of you betray your German Volk and your Fuehrer,
Adolf Hitler, and commit a sin against your German Volk and its future!
Then, also, outside of the last German village, the sign will stand
‘Jews are not wanted here!’ and then, finally, no German citizen will
again cross the threshold of a Jewish store. To achieve this goal is the
mission of the SA man as political soldier of the Fuehrer. Next to his
word and his explanations stands his example”.
Article entitled: “God Save the Jew,” 17 August, 1935,
p. 1.
Photograph showing SA men gathered around trucks upon
which are posted signs reading: “Read _The Stuermer_ and
you will know the Jew.” 24 August, 1935, p. 3.
Photograph apparently representing public SA rally
showing large sign which reads: “He who knows a Jew
knows a devil,” 24 August, 1935, p. 3.
Article entitled: “The Face of the Jew” (with portrait
of a Jew holding the hammer and sickle), 5 Oct., 1935,
p. 6.
Article entitled: “Jews, Blacks and Reactionaries,” 2
November, 1935, p. 2.
Article entitled: “The Camouflaged Benjamin—Jewish
Cultural Bolshevism in German music,” 23 November, 1935,
p. 2.
Article entitled: “The Jewish Assassination,” 15
February, 1936, p. 1.
Article entitled: “Murder—The Jewish Slogan,” 4 April,
1936, p. 11.
Series of articles entitled: “The Jewish Mirror.” Eight
weekly installments beginning 22 May 1936, p. 17.
Series of articles entitled: “Gravediggers of World
Culture,” beginning 5 December, 1936, p. 6 and
continuing weekly to 13 March 1937.
Article entitled: “Rumania to the Jews?” 2 January,
1937, p. 6.
Article entitled: “Bismarck’s Position on Jews,” 2
January, 1937, p. 7.
Article entitled: “Jewry is a Birth Error,” 13 February
1937, p. 5.
Article entitled: “The Protection of the German Blood,”
24 April, 1937, p. 1.
Article entitled: “Crooked Ways to Money and Power,” 24
April, 1937, p. 1.
Article entitled: “The Camouflage of Jewry—Beginning or
End?” 22 May, 1937, p. 14.
Article entitled: “How come still German Jews?” 18 June,
1938, p. 2.
Article entitled: “Westheimer Jew Servants,” 22 January,
1938, p. 2.
Article entitled: “The Poor Jew—Well, Well!!” 19 March,
1938, p. 15.
Article entitled: “Jewish Methods, Churchly Parallel,” 9
September, 1938, p. 4.
Article entitled: “Jews and Free Masons,” 13 January,
1939, p. 15.
Article entitled: “Friends of the World Jewry—Roosevelt
and Ickes,” 3 February, 1939, p. 14.
The circulation of these articles was not intended to be confined to
members of the SA. On the contrary, the plan was to educate the members
of the SA with this philosophy, and for the SA in turn to disseminate it
into the minds of the German people. This fact is demonstrated in the
introduction to a series of anti-Jewish articles entitled “Gravediggers
of World Culture,” which began in the issue of 5 December, 1936, at page
6. This introduction stated in part as follows:
“We suggest that the comrades especially take notice of this
series of articles and see that they are further circulated.”
(_3050-A-E-PS_)
In addition, intensive campaigns were conducted to persuade the public
to purchase and read “_Der SA-Mann_,” and various issues were posted in
public places so that the general public might read them. “_Der
SA-Mann_” itself contained several photographs showing particular issues
posted upon street bulletin boards. There are also several photographs
showing advertising displays, one of which reads as follows “_Der
SA-Mann_ belongs in every house, every hotel, every inn, every waiting
room, and every store” (page 3 of the issue of 31 October, 1936).
(_3050-A-E-PS_)
In view of such widespread publicity for the objectives and methods of
the SA, it is inconceivable that volunteers for membership did not know
of the criminal character of this organization.
(4) _Fostering of Militarism._ In the final phase of the SA in the
conspiracy—its participation in the preparation for aggressive
warfare—the SA was again employed to inculcate a particular Nazi
ideology into the minds of the German people. It was the function of the
SA to prepare Germany mentally for the waging of an aggressive war.
At all times, and especially during the period from 1933-39, SA leaders
emphasized to SA members the duty and responsibility of creating and
fostering a militaristic spirit throughout Germany. In 1933, Hitler
established the so-called SA sports program and at that time, according
to Sturmfuehrer Bayer in his pamphlet “The SA,”
“the SA was “commissioned to obtain an increase of and
preservation of a warlike power and a warlike spirit as the
expression of an aggressive attitude”. (_2168-PS_)
In 1937, Hitler renewed the so-called sports program and then declared
the program to be a means “for the fostering of a military spirit” among
the German people. (_3050-A-E-PS_)
The Organization Book of the Party is to the same effect. The function
of the SA is characterized as follows:
“While the political organization of the NSDAP has carried out
the political leadership, the SA is the training and education
instrument of the Party for the realization of the
world-philosophical soldier-like attitude.
“Consequently, the young German in the SA is being inculcated in
the first instance from the standpoint of world philosophy and
character, and trained as the bearer of National Socialist armed
will.” (_3220-PS_)
The contents of a number of articles designed to serve as war propaganda
material may be gained from their titles, which are very graphic. A
number of articles relate to the Nazi _Lebensraum_ philosophy:
Article entitled: “The German Living Space,” 5 January,
1935, p. 13.
Article entitled: “Folk and Space—A Geopolitical View,”
27 April, 1935, p. 13.
Article entitled: “The Enlargement of our Living Space,”
25 April, 1936, p. 10.
Article entitled: “Our Right, Our Colonies,” 10 October,
1936, p. 15.
Article entitled: “Our Right for Colonies,” 18 December,
1937, p. 7.
Article entitled: “Space and Folk,” 14 October, 1938, p.
3.
Article entitled: “Colonies for Germany,” 2 January,
1937, p. 4. This article reads in part as follows:
“The German Ambassador in London, Herr von Ribbentrop, recently,
on occasion of a reception in the Anglo-German Fellowship * * *
has renewed, in a speech which aroused great interest, the
unretractable claim of Germany for the restitution of its
colonies which had been snatched away.
“Shortly thereafter the Reichsbank president and Reich Minister
of Economics, Dr. Schacht, published in the English magazine,
‘Foreign Affairs,’ a detailed article on the German colonial
problem. * * *
“For the rest Dr. Schacht laid out the categorical demand that
Germany must, in order to solve its raw materials problem, get
colonies, which must be administered by Germany, and in which
the German standard currency must be in circulation.”
The next group consists of articles condemning the Versailles Treaty:
Article entitled: “What is the Situation regarding our
battle for Equal Rights?” 7 April 1934, p. 4.
Article entitled: “The Dictate of Versailles,” 30 June,
1934, p. 15. This article reads in part as follows:
“* * * The dictate of Versailles established the
political, economical and financial destruction
of Germany in 440 artfully—one could also
say—devilishly devised paragraphs; this work of
ignominy is a sample of endless and partly
contradictory repetitions in constantly new
forms. Not too many have occupied themselves
with this thick book to a great extent, for one
could only do it with abomination * * *”
Article entitled: “The Unbearable Limitations of our
Fleet,” 7 July, 1934, p. 15.
Article entitled: “Versailles after 15 years,” 19
January, 1935, p. 13. This article reads in part as
follows:
“This terrible word ‘Versailles,’ since a blind
nation ratified it, has become a word of
profanity for all those who are infatuated in
the spirit of this enormous production of
hatred. The Versailles dictate is German fate in
the fullest sense of the word. Every German
stood up under the operation of this fate during
the past 15 years. Therefore, every last German
must also grasp the contents of this dictate so
that one single desire of its absolute
destruction fills the whole German Volk.”
Article entitled: “How about Germany’s fight for Equal
Rights?” 16 March, 1935, p. 1.
Article entitled: “Through Adolf Hitler’s Acts: Free
from Versailles,” 30 January, 1937, pp. 12-13.
Article entitled: “Versailles will be Liquidated,” 13
February, 1937. This article reads in part as follows,
p. 4:
“The National Socialist Movement has again
achieved a victory, for upon its flag since the
beginning of the fight stands: The liquidation
of the Versailles Treaty. For this fight the SA
marched year after year * * *.”
A third group consists of articles describing preparations for war
allegedly being carried on by other nations:
Article entitled: “Military Training of the English
Youth” (showing pictures of Eton students wearing
traditional Eton dress—tall hats and frock
coats—marching with rifles), 26 January, 1935, p. 14.
Article entitled: “The Army of the Soviet Union” (with
pictures of self-propelled artillery and tanks. One
picture bears the quotation “The Artillery of the Red
Army is already extensively motorized”), 16 March, 1935,
p. 14.
Photograph of Russian Artillery bearing the notation
“Soviet Russian Heavy artillery on maneuver,” 16 March,
1935, p. 1.
Article entitled: “Armies of Tomorrow” (discussion of
anticipated developments in motorized and mechanized
warfare. One section of the article is devoted to “plans
of foreign countries with respect to motorized armies”),
30 March, 1935, p. 14.
Article entitled: “The Red Danger in the East,” 4 April,
1936, p. 13.
Article entitled: “The Red Army Today,” 4 April, 1936,
p. 13.
Article entitled: “Russia prepares for World War,” 29
August, 1936, p. 10.
Article entitled: “Red Terrorism Nailed Down,” 19 June,
1937, p. 7.
Cartoon bearing title “Stalin Wants World Revolution,”
26 February, 1938, p. 13.
These lists of articles are not exhaustive. These articles are merely
typical of many in similar vein which appear throughout the issues of
“_Der SA-Mann_.”
(5) _The Training of German Youth for Aggressive Warfare._
The important responsibility of training the youth of Germany in the
technique of war, and of preparing them physically and spiritually for
the waging of aggressive warfare, was delegated to the SA. Hitler
characterized this task of the SA in these words:
“Give the German Nation six million perfectly trained bodies in
sport, all fanatically inspired with the love for the Fatherland
and trained to the highest offensive spirit and a National
Socialist State will, if necessary, have created an Army out of
them in less than two years.” (_3215-PS_)
The military character of the SA is demonstrated by its organizational
structure (_2168-PS)_. As appears from the SA organizational chart,
(_Chart Number 8_) it was organized into units closely corresponding to
those of the German army. The organizational scheme consisted of
divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads. In
addition, there were special units and branches, including cavalry,
signal corps, engineer corps, and medical corps. There were also three
officer training schools (_2168-PS_). SA members wore distinctive
uniforms adapted to military functions, bore arms, and engaged in
training, forced marches, and other military exercises. These facts are
disclosed in photographs and articles in “_Der SA-Mann_”.
SA members, moreover, were governed by general regulations which closely
resemble service regulations of an armed force (_2820-PS_). According to
these regulations, “discipline and obedience are the foundations as
strong as steel for each military unit.” These regulations further
provide for punishment for disobedience. The punishments provided
demonstrate the militaristic character of the SA. They include the
following:
Reprimand in private;
Reprimand in presence of superiors and announcement
thereof at formations;
Prohibition of right to wear the service uniform;
House arrest;
Arrest and confinement in jail;
Demotion in rank;
Prohibition of right to carry weapon. (_2820-PS_)
Preparation for war through the SA training program was commenced in
Germany as early as 1933, but the scope of this program was not made
public because it constituted a violation of the Treaty of Versailles.
The strict secrecy with which the program was surrounded is shown by an
order from the Chief of Staff of the SA dated 25 July, 1933 (_D-44_):
“Further to my instruction Z II 1351/33 dated 11 July 33, I find
cause to ask all SA authorities to exercise the greatest caution
with regard to any publicity given to the SA service not only in
the press, but also in the information and news sheets of the
individual SA units.
“Only during the last few days, the Reich Ministry of the
Interior, at the request of the Foreign Office, has given strict
instructions to all Reich authorities according to which the
most severe control is to be exercised on all publications which
might give other countries an opening to construe German
infringements of the terms of the Versailles Treaty. “As is
known from the Geneva negotiations, our opponents have piled up
material collected in Germany and submitted to them, which they
use against us on every occasion during the conferences.
“From this point of view, the information sheets circulating
among the subordinate SA units cause the liveliest concern. I
hold all higher SA leaders responsible that any such internal
information sheets appearing in the district of their command
are submitted to the most stringent control _before they go into
print_, and I feel compelled to draw attention to the threat of
a prosecution for treason, pronounced by official instructions
issued in the last few days, in cases where such reports,
printed no doubt in good faith, are publicized and therefore
exposed to the danger of falling into the wrong hands.
“On principle, pictures of the technical specialized units of
the SA and SS, in particular of the signals, motorized and
possibly also of the air wings which now exist outside these
formations, are forbidden, such pictures enabling other
countries to prove the alleged formation of technical troop
units.” (_D-44_)
Secrecy was also required in the order assigning a _Wehrmacht_ officer
to the SA in January, 1934, to assist in the SA Training Program
(_2823-PS_). A memorandum from SA Headquarters dated 20 January, 1934
designates an officer of the _Wehrmacht_ to assist in the military
training of SA members and goes on to provide:
“For the purpose of disguise, Lt. Col. Auleb will wear SA
uniform with insignia of rank according to more detailed
regulations of the Supreme SA leaders”. (_2823-PS_)
The military training program of the SA was for many years conducted
under the guise of a sports program. This plan was created by Hitler as
early as 1920 in founding what he called the National Socialist Sport
Troop (SA). Hitler’s declaration at the time of the creation of this
sports organization was as follows:
“The Sport Troop * * * is but the bearer of the military thought
of a free people.” (_3215-PS_)
The fact that the so-called Sports Program was in reality closely
associated with and in fact a means of providing military training for
German youth, is shown by the following characterization of the program
by Lutze, the Chief of Staff of the SA, in an article written in 1939
(_3215-PS_):
“* * * This goal setting also served for the decrees of the
Fuehrer to the SA of 1935 regarding the renewing of, in 1936
regarding the evaluation of, in 1937 regarding the yearly
repetitive exercises of the SA sport badge. Parallel to this
decree of the Fuehrer for the physical betterment and military
training the organizational and development missions within the
SA were met. Out of the conception that the preservation and
intensification of the military power of our people must
especially be requested by military and physical exercises, the
training was especially carried out systematically in these
fields. In 25 schools of the troop and in 3 Reichsfuehrer
schools of the SA yearly 22,000 to 25,000 officers and non-coms
were trained since 1934 in special educational courses until
they possessed the education and examination certificates. In
clearly outlined training directives the training goals which
had to be achieved yearly were given and at the same time the
yearly Reich competitive contests were established. Hand in hand
the training of the Fuehrer Corps and corresponding
organizational measures and the training at the front proceeded
on the broadest basis.” (_3215-PS_)
The military nature of the Sports Program is likewise demonstrated by
the tests and standards required to obtain the sports award. The
Organization Book of the Party lists these tests as follows (_2354-PS_):
“The performance test includes three groups of exercises:
Body exercises,
Military sports,
Topographical (naval) services.
“Group I: Body exercises;
100-meter race,
Broad jump,
Shot-put,
Throwing of hand grenades,
3000-meter race.
“Group II: Military sports;
25-Kilometer march with pack,
Firing of small-caliber arms,
Aimed throwing of hand grenades,
200-meter cross-country race with gas masks over 4 obstacles,
Swimming or bicycle riding,
Basic knowledge of first aid in case of accidents.
“Group III: Terrain service;
Orientation,
Terrain observation,
Estimate of terrain,
Estimate of distance,
Camouflage,
Observing and reporting,
Utilization of terrain and general behavior in terrain
service.” (_2354-PS_)
In 1939, the SA Sports Program was formally recognized, in a decree
issued by Hitler, as a military training program. At the same time the
SA was openly declared to be an agency for pre- and post-military
training, that is, military training prior to and following military
service in the _Wehrmacht_ (_2383-PS_).
The decree provided in part as follows:
“Der Fuehrer. In amplification of my decree of the 15th
February, 1935, and 18th March, 1937, regarding the acquisition
of the SA sport insignia and the yearly repetitive exercises, I
lift the SA sport insignia to the SA military insignia and make
it as a basis for pre-imposed military training.
“I designate the SA as standard bearer of this training.
“These soldiers who honourably were discharged out of the active
military service and who were serviceable soldiers are to be
placed into the Army ranks for the retaining of their spiritual
and physical energy and to be attached to the SA insofar as no
other organization of the Party (the SS, NSKK, and SFK) have
received them for special training.” (_2383-PS_)
The SA military training program was not confined to its members, but
extended to the entire youth of Germany. Thus the Chief of Staff of the
SA, in re-establishing the sports program in 1935, declared (_2354-PS_):
“In order to give conscious expression to the fostering of a
valiant spirit in all parts of the German people, I further
decide that this SA Sport Insignia can also be earned and worn
by persons who are not members of the movement, inasfar as they
comply racially and ideologically with the National Socialist
requirements”. (_2354-PS_)
The pamphlet entitled “The SA”, shows that responsibility for conducting
this nation-wide program was lodged in the operational main office of
the SA (_2168-PS_). According to the pamphlet it was the duty of this
office to—
“Prepare the fighting training of the bodies of all Germans
capable of bearing arms (_Wehrfahig_) and as preparation
therefore must organize the execution of corporal exercises
(basic physical training) and sports achievements, so that the
widest stratum of the population is laid hold upon and will be
kept in condition to bear arms (_Wehrtuchtig_) both physically
and spiritually, as well as ideologically in character up to
greatest old age.” (_2168-PS_)
The extent to which the SA carried the military training program into
the lives of the German people may be seen from the following excerpt
from “Das Archiv” (_3215-PS_):
“Next to the companies of the SA were the sport badge
associations (SAG) in which all the militaristic nationals
entered who were prepared to voluntarily answer the call of the
SA for the preservation of military proficiency. Up until now
around 800,000 nationals outside of the SA could successfully
undergo the physical betterment as well as the political
military training of the SA on the basis of the SA sport badge.
“As pronounced proof heretofore it may be shown that alone
13,400 officers and around 30,000 non-coms in the Reserve Corps
of the Wehrmacht from its (SA) own ranks stand at the disposal
of the SA and can be employed at any time for the direction of
SA military forces * * *”. (_3215-PS_)
In 1939, the extension of the SA military program to non-SA members was
officially recognized by Hitler. This occurred in the ordinance for the
execution of the Hitler decree of 16 January, 1942:
“Every German man who has completed his seventeenth year and who
shows preliminary requirements for honorary service with the
weapon, has the _customary_ duty to win the SA military insignia
in preparation for military service.
“During the years in the Hitler Youth following his sixteenth
year, he is to prepare himself for the winning of the SA
military insignia.” (_2383-PS_)
The SA, in its military training program, was no mere marching and
drilling society. It embraced every phase of the technique of modern
warfare. This appears clearly from the articles on military training
which appear throughout the issues of “_Der SA-Mann”. The titles of
these articles indicate their substance. The foll_owing are a few
examples:
Article entitled: “Defense Platoon and the Company in
Battle” (with diagrams), 27 January, 1934, p. 10.
Article entitled: “_Die Luftwaffe_” (with diagrams on
Aircraft Gunnery), 3 February 1934, p. 7.
Article entitled: “Pistol Shooting,” 17 February, 1934,
p. 7.
Article entitled: “Orientation in Terrain,” 10 March,
1934, p. 7.
Article entitled: “First Aid—ABC,” 17 March, 1934, p.
7.
Article entitled: “We go into the Terrain” (relating to
map study and map symbols), 24 March, 1934, p. 7.
Article entitled: “What every SA Man must know about
Aviation,” 21 April, 1934, p. 13.
Article entitled: “Expert firing in German National
Sport” (relating to small caliber firing), 12 May, 1934,
p. 7.
Article entitled: “Chemical Warfare,” 19 May, 1934, p.
13.
Article entitled: “What every SA Man should know about
Aviation,” 19 May, 1934, p. 12.
Article entitled: “Flame Throwers on the Front,” 26 May,
1934, p. 14.
Article entitled: “Modern Battle Methods in the View of
the SA Man,” 2 June, 1934, p. 14.
Article entitled: “The Significance of Tanks and Motors
in Modern War,” 4 August, 1934, p. 13.
Article entitled: “The Rifle 98,” 8 September, 1934, p.
7.
Article entitled: “The Combat Battalion” (with
description of tactical missions and maneuvers of the
battalion), 15 September, 1934, p. 7.
Article entitled: “Air Strategy and Air Tactics,” 29
September, 1934, p. 7.
Article entitled: “Gas Protection and the Gas Mask,” 6
October, 1934, p. 7.
Article entitled: “The Pistol 08” (with diagram of the
pistol, its nomenclature and field stripping), 6
October, 1934, p. 7.
Article entitled: “Training the SA in Map and Terrain
Study,” 24 November, 1934, p. 4.
Article entitled: “The Defense,” with subheading “What
does the War of Tomorrow look like?” 1 December, 1934,
p. 13.
Series of articles by a Wehrmacht officer entitled:
“Training in the Army of the Third Reich,” beginning on
12 January, 1935, p. 13.
Series of articles entitled: “Construction and
Composition of various units of the Modern Army,”
written by a Brigadier General in the
_Wehrmacht_—beginning 26 January, 1935, p. 15, and
ending 20 April, 1935, p. 16.
Article entitled: “Small caliber firing” (with sketches
of ammunition, rifles, targets, and aiming technique),
26 January, 1935, p. 19.
Article entitled: “Armies of Tomorrow” (discussion of
anticipated developments in motorized and mechanized
warfare. One section of the article is devoted to “Plans
of foreign countries with respect to motorized armies”),
30 March, 1935, p. 14.
The issues of “_Der SA-Mann_” also contain many photographs and articles
demonstrating SA participation in military exercise, including forced
marching, battle maneuvers, obstacle runs, small calibre firing, and the
like. Among these photographs and articles are the following:
Each issue of “_Der SA-Mann_” contains advertisements
for the sale of various items of military equipment,
including uniforms, steel helmets, rifles, boots,
grenades, field glasses, ammunition, etc. (See, for
example, 20 January, 1934, p. 16; and 9 March, 1935, p.
16.)
Picture of SA men marching in military formation
executing “goose step,” 14 April, 1934, p. 8.
Group of pictures showing SA Troops marching in military
formations and in full pack and bearing flags being
reviewed by Hitler. Title of page is “SA Marches into
the New Year,” 12 January, 1935, p. 3.
Photographs of uniformed SA Troops marching in streets
of Saarbrucken with caption: “In the streets of free
Saarbrucken thuds the marching steps of the SA,” 9
March, 1935, p. 3.
Group of photographs entitled: “SA Brigade 6 marches for
the German Danzig,” 4 May, 1935, p. 3.
Article entitled: “Who fights against us we will defeat,
who provokes us we shall attack” (with picture of SA men
in military formation bearing caption: “We are a
political ideological troop”), 13 July, 1935, p. 1.
Article entitled: “The SA is and remains the Shock Troop
of the Third Reich” (with picture of _Gruppenfuehrer_
reviewing SA men marching in uniform and in full pack,
in military formation), 24 August, 1935, p. 2.
Article entitled: “SA Men at the heavy machine gun,” 3
July, 1936, p. 14.
Photograph of SA men in uniform and full pack on
obstacle run, 29 August, 1936, p. 7.
Article entitled: “Fight, Fight, Fight” with subtitles:
“Preparation of Francken Division for the NS War Games”
(with picture of SA men bearing arms), 26 June, 1937, p.
4.
Photograph of SA men bearing weapons, bearing caption:
“Austria’s SA: through battle, distress and persecution,
to victory.”
Photograph bearing caption: “German-Austrian SA was
armed in the hour of decision,” 2 April, 1938, p. 1.
Photograph of SA men bearing arms on battle maneuvers,
19 August, 1938, p. 8., bearing the caption: “The way to
victory.”
Article entitled: “SA and the _Wehrmacht_” (with
pictures of SA men on field maneuvers throwing hand
grenades), 2 September, 1938, p. 1.
Photograph of SA men on field maneuvers, 9 September,
1938, p. 18.
Photograph of SA men bearing arms in trenches,
apparently on field maneuvers, 16 September, 1938, p. 1.
(Frankens-SA).
Photographs of SA men marching under arms, and on the
rifle range, 30 September, 1938, p. 4. (Frankens-SA).
Photograph of SA Regiment _Feldherrnhalle_ marching in
goose-step with rifles and steel helmets and with the
Luftwaffe insignia of sovereignty on their uniform and
helmets, 11 November, 1938, p. 4.
Photograph entitled “Regiment _Feldherrnhalle_ was
there”, (referring to the incorporation of the
Sudetenland), 14 October, 1938, p. 6.
Photograph bearing the caption: “Training with the KK
Rifle. Something entirely new for the Sudeten German.
Every SA man must be outstanding in marksmanship,” 6
January, 1939, p. 3.
Article entitled: “The SA—the forger of military
power,” with the subheading: “The SA as Bearer of the
Pre-military Training,” 27 January, 1939, p. 1.
Photograph of Von Brauchitsch (_Wehrmacht_) and Lutze
reviewing the SA, 3 February, 1939, p. 3.
Photograph of SA on march with full pack and rifles.
(Frankens-SA), 3 February, 1939, p. 1.
C. _Cooperation with the Wehrmacht in Preparation for Aggression._
Evidence of the SA’s participation in the conspiracy is found in the
care which was taken at all times to coordinate the military training
program of the SA with the requirements of the _Wehrmacht_. As early as
1934, an SA memorandum provided that the SA chief of training and his
subordinates should remain—
“* * * in direct touch with the respective offices and sections
of the Reich Defense Ministry.” (_2823-PS_)
The same memorandum recites that a Lieutenant-Colonel of the _Wehrmacht_
was assigned to the SA with the duty of participating—
“* * * in all questions regarding training and organization * *
*.” (_2823-PS_)
Another SA memorandum declared that:
“* * * permanent liaison between the Reich Defense Ministry and
the Supreme Commander of the SA * * * has been assured.”
(_2821-PS_)
Hitler’s words regarding cooperation between _Wehrmacht_ and SA were as
follows:
“The requirements of the _Wehrmacht_ are to be taken into
consideration in organization and training.
“The Chief of Staff of the SA releases the required executionary
directives in agreement with the Commander in Chief of the
_Wehrmacht_ units. He alone is responsible for the fulfillment.”
(_2383-PS_)
A speech by the Chief of Staff of the SA relating to the technical and
specialized branches of the SA revealed that this opportunity for
collaboration with the _Wehrmacht_ in specialized military training was
utilized to the utmost:
“In the course of this development also special missions for
military betterment (program) were placed on the SA. The Fuehrer
gave the SA the cavalry and motor training and called SA
Obergruppenfuehrer Littmann as Reich Inspector with the mission
to secure the * * * recruits and requirements for the German
Wehrmacht through the SA. In close cooperation with parts of the
Wehrmacht special certificates were created for the
communication, engineer and medical units which, like the
cavalry certificate of the SA, are valued as statement of
preference for employment in said units.” (_3215-PS_)
The specialized training given SA members, in accordance with the
requirements of technical branches of the _Wehrmacht_, is described by
SA Sturmfuehrer Bayer as follows (_2168-PS_):
“* * * On one side the young SA man who enters the armed forces
(_Wehrmacht_) from his branch, comes prepared with a multitude
of prerequisites which facilitate and speed up training in
technical respects; while on the other side those very soldiers,
having served, who return out of the armed forces into the SA
keep themselves, by constant practice, in a trained condition
physically and mentally and impart their knowledge to their
fellows.
“Thus they contribute a considerable portion to the enhancement
of armed strength (_Wehrkraft_) and armed spirit (_Wehrgeist_)
of the German people.” (_2168-PS_)
And, with respect to the mounted or cavalry SA—
“* * * the SA each year is able to furnish many thousands of
young trained cavalrymen to our _Wehrmacht_. * * * At present
the SA cavalry has at its disposal 101 cavalry units in whose
schools, year in and year out, young Germans who are obligated
for military service receive the training which fits him for
entrance into a section of troops which is of their own
choosing.” (_2168-PS_)
The close relationship between the SA and the _Wehrmacht_ is shown
throughout the issues of “_Der SA-Mann_”, which contain a number of
articles on military training written by _Wehrmacht_ officers. The same
relationship is shown in many photographs. For example, in the issue of
1 May, 1937, at page 4, there is a picture of a _Wehrmacht_ formation
drawn up in front of an SA building with SA officers and men in the
background. The picture is entitled—
“Day after day the closed formations of the _Wehrmacht_ march in
Wurzburg to the subscription places of the SA for thanksgiving
to the nation in order to announce its close relation with the
SA, and to express thanks to the Fuehrer for making the Reich
capable of defense.”
Page 2 of the issue of 27 January, 1939, contains a photograph of the SA
Chief of Staff, Lutze, addressing a group of SA men. The photograph
bears the caption, “We will be the bridge between the Party and the
_Wehrmacht_.” Page 3 of the issue of 3 February, 1939, reproduces a
photograph of General von Brauchitsch and Chief of Staff Lutze reviewing
an SA unit.
The close cooperation between the _Wehrmacht_ and the SA, and the
significance of the SA military training program is shown by the fact
that service in the SA was considered as military service under the
Conscription Law of 1935. The Organization Book of the Party declared
that—
“Equally significant is a suitable education and training which
the SA has accomplished within the yearly classes, and which
have satisfied their arms obligation.” (_3220-PS_)
And an article in “Das Archiv” declared—
“It was announced that conscripted SA men and Hitler Youths can
fulfill their military conscription in the SA Regiment
_Feldherrnhalle_ whose Commander is General Field Marshall SA
Obergruppenfuehrer Goering. The Regiment for the first time was
employed as Regiment of the Luftwaffe in the occupation of the
Sudetenland under its Fuehrer and Regimental Commander SA
Gruppenfuehrer Reimann.” (_3214-PS_)
There was never any misunderstanding among SA men as to the reasons
which lay behind their military training program. They were preparing
for war and knew it. The purpose of the so-called “Sports Program” was
announced time after time in articles in “_Der SA-Mann_.” For example,
the introduction to an article entitled, “The War of Tomorrow,” which
appeared in the issue of 6 July, 1937, at page 12, declared:
“By decree of the Fuehrer of 18th March, 1937, the SA Sport
Badge was declared as a means for the aggressive training of the
body, for the fostering of a military spirit, for the retaining
of military efficiency and thereby as a basis for German
military power. * * *
“* * * In the following article an attempt is made to occupy
every SA Fuehrer, who does not have the opportunity due to their
profession or many-sided SA services, with questions concerning
military policy and modern war direction, to give him an overall
view of facts, teachings, opinions and beliefs which today are
not without decisive influence upon the military policy, upon
the character of the coming war and upon the modern national
defense.”
D. _Participation of the SA in Warfare._
It would be natural in view of the above quotation, to expect the SA to
have been used as a striking force in the first steps of the aggressive
warfare launched by Germany, and as a basis for so-called Commando
Groups. Such was the case. SA units were among the first of the Nazi
military machine to invade Austria in the spring of 1938. This fact was
proudly announced in an article appearing in “_Der SA-Mann_” for 19
March, 1938, at p. 10, entitled, “We were the First!” Similarly, the SA
participated in the occupation of the Sudetenland (_3214-PS_). It was
announced that conscripted SA men and Hitler Youths could fulfill their
military conscription duty in the SA Regiment _Feldherrnhalle_,
commanded by General Field Marshall SA Obergruppenfuehrer Goering. The
regiment was employed for the first time as Regiment of the Luftwaffe in
the occupation of the Sudetenland, under its Fuehrer and Regimental
commander SA Gruppenfuehrer Reimann.
SA participation in the occupation of the Sudetenland is also shown by
an affidavit of Gottlob Berger, a former officer in the SS who was
assigned to the Sudeten-German Free Corps (_3036-PS_). Berger declares—
“* * * 1. In the fall of 1938 I held the rank and title of
Oberfuehrer in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned as SS
Liaison Officer with Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Free Corps
at their headquarters in the castle at Dondorf outside Bayreuth.
In this position I was responsible for all liaison between the
Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and Henlein and, in particular, I was
delegated to select from the Sudeten Germans those who appeared
to be eligible for membership in the SS or VT (_Verfuegungs
Truppe_). In addition to myself, Liaison Officers stationed with
Henlein included an Obergruppenfuehrer from the NSKK, whose name
I have forgotten, and Obergruppenfuehrer Max Juettner, from the
SA. In addition, Admiral Canaris, who was head of the OKW
Abwehr, appeared at Dondorf nearly every two days and conferred
with Henlein.
“2. In the course of my official duties at Henlein’s
Headquarters I became familiar with the composition and
activities of the Free Corps. Three groups were being formed
under Henlein’s direction: One in the Eisenstein area, Bavaria,
one in the Bayreuth area; one in the Dresden area, and possibly
a fourth group in Silesia. These groups were supposedly composed
of refugees from the Sudetenland who had crossed the border into
Germany, but they actually contained Germans with previous
service in the SA and NSKK [Nazi Motor Corps] as well. These
Germans formed the skeleton of the Free Corps. On paper the Free
Corps had a strength of 40,000 men. Part of the equipment
furnished to Henlein, mostly haversacks, cooking utensils and
blankets, were supplied by the SA.” (_3036-PS_)
The adaptability of the SA to whatever purpose was required of it is
demonstrated by its activities subsequent to the outbreak of the war.
During the war the SA continued to carry out its military training
program, but it also engaged in various other functions:
“The General of the SA, Wilhelm Schepmann, gave further orders
to increase the employment of the SA in the homeland war
territories because of the requirements of total war employment.
This was done in numerous business conferences with Fuehrers of
the SA-Divisions.
“As a result of these conferences, as well as of measures
already carried out earlier for the totalization of the war
employment, the SA now has placed 86 per cent of its main
professional Fuehrer Corps at disposal at the Front even though
the war missions of the SA have increased in the fields of
pre-military training, the SA penetration into new territorial
parts of the Reich, the air war employment, the State and
national guard etc., during war time.
“The SA as a whole has given at present an even 70% of its
nearly million members to the Wehrmacht.” (_3219-PS_)
The SA even extended its activities into Poland:
“By command of the General of the SA, the ‘SA-Unit General
Government’ was established, the command of which was taken over
by Governor-General SA Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Frank.”
(_3216-PS_)
An affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, bureau chief in the RSHA, reads as
follows:
“* * * From the beginning of 1944 on the SA also participated in
many of the functions which had previously been entrusted only
to the SS, SIPO and Army, for instance the guarding of
concentration camps, the guarding of prisoner of war camps, the
supervision over forced laborers in Germany and occupied areas.
This cooperation of the SA was planned and arranged for by high
officials in Berlin as early as the middle of 1943 * * *.”
(_3232-PS_)
E. _Special Responsibility of Goering for the SA Program._
Hermann Goering participated in the conspiracy in his capacity as an SA
member and leader. In 1923, Goering became Commander of the entire SA. A
few months later Goering participated in the so-called Munich Putsch. SA
troops participated with him in this action.
Goering’s intention to employ the SA as a terroristic force to destroy
political opponents is shown by a speech made by him on 3 March, 1933,
at a Nazi demonstration in Frankfurt Am Main (_1856-PS_). Goering spoke
as follows:
“Certainly, I shall use the power of the State and the police to
the utmost, my dear Communists! So you won’t draw any false
conclusions by the struggle to the death in which my fist will
grasp your necks, I shall lead with those down there. Those are
the Brown Shirts.” (_1856-PS_)
The importance of the SA under Goering in the early stages of the Nazi
movement is shown by a letter written to Goering by Hitler (_3259-PS_):
“My dear Goering:
“When in November 1923 the Party tried for the first time to
conquer the power of the State, you as Commander of the SA
created within an extraordinarily short time that instrument
with which I could bear that struggle. Highest necessity had
forced us to act, but a wise providence at that time denied the
success. After receiving a grave wound you again entered the
ranks as soon as circumstances permitted as my most loyal
comrade in the battle for power. You contributed essentially to
creating the basis for the 30th of January. Therefore, at the
end of a year of the National Socialist Revolution, I desire to
thank you wholeheartedly, my dear Party Comrade Goering, for the
great values which you have for the National Socialist
Revolution and consequently for the German people.
“In cordial friendship and grateful appreciation.
“Yours,
“(s) Adolf Hitler!” (_3259-PS_)
Although Goering did not retain command of the SA, he at all times
maintained a close affiliation with the organization. This is shown by
the photographs of Goering participating in SA activities which have
been mentioned previously. In 1937, Goering became Commander of the
_Feldherrnhalle_ Regiment of the SA. This was the Regiment which was
employed in the occupation of the Sudetenland. (_3214-PS_)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE STURMABTEILUNG
(SA)
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix B. │ I │ 29, 72
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
392-PS │Official NSDAP circular entitled “The │ │
│Social Life of New Germany with │ │
│Special Consideration of the German │ │
│Labor Front”, by Prof. Willy Mueller │ │
│(Berlin, 1938). (USA 326) │ III │ 380
│ │ │
*787-PS │Memorandum to Hitler from Public │ │
│Prosecutor of Dresden, 18 June 1935, │ │
│concerning criminal procedure against │ │
│Vogel on account of bodily injury │ │
│while in office. (USA 421) │ III │ 568
│ │ │
*1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
*1721-PS │Confidential report of SA │ │
│Brigadefuehrer, November 1938, │ │
│concerning destruction of Jewish │ │
│property. (USA 425) │ IV │ 214
│ │ │
1725-PS │Decree enforcing law for securing the │ │
│unity of Party and State, 29 March │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 502. │ IV │ 224
│ │ │
*1759-PS │Affidavit of Raymond H. Geist. (USA │ │
│420) │ IV │ 288
│ │ │
*1856-PS │Extract from book entitled “Hermann │ │
│Goering—Speeches and Essays”, 3rd │ │
│edition 1939, p. 27. (USA 437) │ IV │ 496
│ │ │
*1893-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of the│ │
│NSDAP, 1943 edition. (USA 323) │ IV │ 529
│ │ │
*2168-PS │Book by SA Sturmfuehrer Dr. Ernst │ │
│Bayer, entitled “The SA”, depicting │ │
│the history, work, aim and │ │
│organization of the SA. (USA 411) │ IV │ 772
│ │ │
2260-PS │Settlement of Relationship between │ │
│NSDAP and Stahlhelm (Steel Helmets) │ │
│published in National Socialist Party │ │
│Press Service release, 21 June 1933. │ IV │ 933
│ │ │
*2354-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of │ │
│NSDAP, 5th, 6th and 7th editions, │ │
│concerning SA. (USA 430) (See Chart │ │
│No. 17.) │ IV │ 1091
│ │ │
*2383-PS │Ordinance for execution of decree of │ │
│Fuehrer concerning position of the │ │
│Head of Party Chancellery of 16 │ │
│January 1942, published in Decrees, │ │
│Regulations, Announcements. (USA 410) │ V │ 9
│ │ │
*2407-PS │Order concerning the Roehm purge and │ │
│appointment of Lutze as Chief of │ │
│Staff, published in Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, 1934. (USA 412) │ V │ 82
│ │ │
*2471-PS │Pamphlet No. 12 in a series entitled │ │
│“Here Speaks the New German”. Speech │ │
│made in January 1936 by Victor Lutze, │ │
│Chief of Staff of SA, subject: “The │ │
│Affairs and Tasks of SA”. (USA 413) │ V │ 211
│ │ │
2532-PS │Extract from The Third Reich, by Gerd │ │
│Ruehle. │ V │ 268
│ │ │
*2660-PS │Distribution Plan for Gaue, Kreise, │ │
│and Ortsgruppen, from The Bearers of │ │
│Sovereignty, 2nd Issue, 3rd Year, │ │
│February 1939. (USA 325) │ V │ 365
│ │ │
*2760-PS │Extract from Mein Kampf by Adolf │ │
│Hitler, 1933 edition. (USA 256) │ V │ 396
│ │ │
*2820-PS │General Service Regulations for the SA│ │
│of the NSDAP, published in Munich, 12 │ │
│December 1933. (USA 427) │ V │ 456
│ │ │
2821-PS │Memorandum from Supreme SA │ │
│Headquarters, 19 March 1934, │ │
│concerning organization of the SA and │ │
│collaboration between Wehrmacht and │ │
│SA. (USA 431) │ V │ 458
│ │ │
2822-PS │Letter from the Reich Military │ │
│Ministry, 26 May 1933, suggesting that│ │
│an SA branch and Reich Defense Council│ │
│be united. │ V │ 459
│ │ │
*2823-PS │Memorandum of SA Headquarters, January│ │
│1934, concerning assignment of │ │
│Wehrmacht officer to Training Division│ │
│of SA. (USA 429) │ V │ 459
│ │ │
*2824-PS │Extract from book entitled │ │
│“Concentration Camp Oranienburg”. (USA│ │
│423) │ V │ 461
│ │ │
**3036-PS │Affidavit of Gottlob Berger on the │ │
│composition and activity of the │ │
│Henlein Free Corps in September 1938. │ │
│(Objection to admission in evidence │ │
│upheld.) (USA 102) │ V │ 742
│ │ │
**3050-A-E-PS │Excerpts from The SA Man. (USA 414; │ │
│USA 415; USA 416; USA 417; USA 418) │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 777
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*3211-PS │Goebbels to the SA, 17 October 1935, │ │
│from The Archive, Vol. 19, October │ │
│1935, p. 939. (USA 419) │ V │ 928
│ │ │
3212-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 34, │ │
│January 1937, p. 1452. │ V │ 929
│ │ │
3213-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 50, May│ │
│1938, pp. 156-157. │ V │ 929
│ │ │
3214-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 55, │ │
│October 1938, p. 1069. (USA 432) │ V │ 930
│ │ │
*3215-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 60, │ │
│March 1939, p. 1834. (USA 426) │ V │ 930
│ │ │
*3216-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 97, │ │
│April 1942, p. 54. (USA 434) │ V │ 933
│ │ │
3217-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 97, │ │
│April 1942, p. 54. │ V │ 933
│ │ │
3218-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, October │ │
│1933, pp. 482-485. │ V │ 934
│ │ │
*3219-PS │Excerpt from The Archive, Vol. 125, │ │
│August 1944, p. 367. (USA 433) │ V │ 934
│ │ │
*3220-PS │Excerpt from Organization Book of │ │
│NSDAP, 1943 edition, p. 358. (USA 323)│ V │ 935
│ │ │
*3221-PS │Affidavit of William F. Sollman, 26 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 422) │ V │ 936
│ │ │
*3232-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 26 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 435) │ V │ 937
│ │ │
*3252-PS │Extract from book Hermann Goering, The│ │
│Man and His Work, by Eric Gritzbach, │ │
│1937. (USA 424) │ V │ 957
│ │ │
*3259-PS │Extract from book Hermann Goering, The│ │
│Man and His Work, by Eric Gritzbach, │ │
│p. 69. (USA 424) │ V │ 1007
│ │ │
*D-44 │Circular, 25 July 1933, referring to │ │
│publications of SA activities. (USA │ │
│428) │ VI │ 1024
│ │ │
Affidavit F │Affidavit of Josef Dietrich, 20-21 │ │
│November 1945. │ VIII │ 631
│ │ │
L-198 │State Department Dispatch by Consul │ │
│General Messersmith, 14 March 1933, │ │
│concerning molesting of American │ │
│citizens in Berlin. │ VII │ 1026
│ │ │
L-199 │Newspaper clippings from Berliner │ │
│Tageblatt, 29 March 1933, regarding │ │
│boycott action. │ VII │ 1034
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707
│ │ │
Statement XIII │Outline of Defense of Dr. Robert Ley, │ │
│written in Nurnberg prison, 24 October│ │
│1945. │ VIII │ 749
│ │ │
**Chart No. 8 │Organization of the SA. (Enlargement │
│displayed to Tribunal.) │ End of VIII
│ │ │
*Chart No. 17 │Foreign Organization of the NSDAP. │
│(2354-PS; USA 430) │ End of VIII
5. THE SCHUTZSTAFFELN (SS)
In the early weeks of the trial, there appeared in a newspaper
circulated in Nurnberg an account of a correspondent’s visit to a camp
in which SS prisoners of war were confined. The thing which particularly
struck the correspondent was the one question asked by the SS prisoners:
Why are we charged as war criminals? What have we done except our normal
duty?
The evidence which follows will answer that question. It will show that
just as the Nazi Party was the core of the conspiracy, so the SS was the
very essence of Nazism. For the SS was the elite group of the Party,
composed of the most thorough-going adherents of the Nazi cause, pledged
to blind devotion to Nazi principles, and prepared to carry them out
without any question and at any cost. It was a group in which every
ordinary value was so subverted that today its members can ask, what is
there unlawful about the things we have done?
In the evidence of the conspirators’ program for aggressive war, for
concentration camps, for the extermination of the Jews, for enslavement
of foreign labor and illegal use of prisoners of war and for the
deportation and Germanization of inhabitants of conquered territories,
in all this evidence the name of the SS runs like a thread. Again and
again that organization and its components are referred to. It performed
a responsible role in each of these criminal activities, because it was
and indeed had to be a criminal organization.
The creation and development of such an organization was essential for
the execution of the conspirators’ plans. Their sweeping program and the
measures they were prepared to use and did use, could be fully
accomplished neither through the machinery of the government nor of the
Party. Things had to be done for which no agency of government and no
political party even the Nazi Party, would openly take full
responsibility. A specialized type of apparatus was needed—an apparatus
which was to some extent connected with the government and given
official support, but which, at the same time, could maintain a
quasi-independent status so that all its acts could be attributed
neither to the government nor to the Party as a whole. The SS was that
apparatus.
Like the SA, it was one of the seven components or formations of the
Nazi Party referred to in the Decree on Enforcement of the Law for
Securing the Unity of Party and State of 29 March 1935 (_1725-PS_). But
its status was above that of the other formations. As the plans of the
conspirators progressed, it acquired new functions, new
responsibilities, and an increasingly more important place in the
regime. It developed during the course of the conspiracy into a highly
complex machine, the most powerful in the Nazi State, spreading its
tentacles into every field of Nazi activity.
The evidence which follows will be directed toward showing first, the
origin and early development of the SS; second, how it was
organized—that is, its structure and its component parts; third, the
basic principles governing the selection of its members and the
obligations they undertook; and finally, its aims and the means used to
accomplish them.
The history, organization, and publicly announced functions of the SS
are not controversial matters. They are not matters to be learned only
from secret files and captured documents. They were recounted in many
publications, circulated widely throughout Germany and the world—in
official books of the Nazi Party itself, and in books, pamphlets, and
speeches by SS and State officials published with SS and Party approval.
Throughout this section there will be frequent reference to and
quotation from a few such publications.
A. _Origin and General Functions of the SS._
(1) _Origin._ The first aim of the conspirators was to gain a foothold
in politically hostile territory, to acquire mastery of the street, and
to combat any and all opponents with force. For that purpose they needed
their own private, personal police organization. The SA was created to
fill such a role. But the SA was outlawed in 1923. When Nazi Party
activity was again resumed in 1925, the SA remained outlawed. To fill
its place and to play the part of Hitler’s own personal police, small
mobile groups known as protective squadrons—_Schutzstaffel_—were
created. This was the origin of the SS in 1925. With the reinstatement
of the SA in 1926, the SS for the next few years ceased to play a major
role. But it continued to exist as an organization within the SA—under
its own leader, however—the Reichsfuehrer SS.
This early history of the SS is related in two authoritative
publications. The first is a book by SS Standartenfuehrer Gunter
d’Alquen entitled “The SS” (_2284-PS_). This pamphlet of some 30 pages,
published in 1939, is an authoritative account of the history, mission,
and organization of the SS. As indicated on its fly leaf, it was written
at the direction of the Reichsfuehrer SS, Heinrich Himmler. Its author
was the editor of the official SS publication “_Das Schwarze Korps_”.
The second publication is an article by Himmler, entitled “Organization
and Obligations of the SS and the Police.” It was published in 1937 in a
booklet containing a series of speeches or essays by important officials
of the Party and the State, and known as “National Political Course for
the Armed Forces from 15 to 23 January 1937”. (_1992-A-PS_)
As early as 1929, the conspirators recognized that their plans required
an organization in which the main principles of the Nazi system,
specifically the racial principles, would not only be jealously guarded
but would be carried to such extremes as to inspire or intimidate the
rest of the population. Such an organization would also have to be
assured complete freedom on the part of the leaders and blind obedience
on the part of the members. The SS was built up to meet this need. The
following statement appears on page 7 of d’Alquen’s book, “_Die SS_”
(_2284-PS_):
“On the 16th of January, 1929, Adolf Hitler appointed his tested
comrade of long standing, Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsfuehrer SS.
Heinrich Himmler assumed charge therewith of the entire
_Schutzstaffel_ totaling at the time 280 men, with the express
and particular commission of the Fuehrer to form of this
organization an elite troop of the Party, a troop dependable in
every circumstance. With this day the real history of the SS
begins as it stands before us today in all its deeper essential
features, firmly anchored into the national Socialist movement.
For the SS and its Reichsfuehrer, Heinrich Himmler, its first SS
man, have become inseparable in the course of these
battle-filled years.” (_2284-PS_)
Carrying out Hitler’s directive, Himmler proceeded to build up out of
this small force of men an elite organization which, to use d’Alquen’s
words, was “composed of the best physically, the most dependable, and
the most faithful men in the Nazi movement.” As d’Alquen further states,
at page 12 of his book:
“When the day of seizure of power had finally come, there were
52,000 SS men, who in this spirit bore the revolution in the
van, marched into the new State which they began to help form
everywhere, in their stations and positions, in profession and
in science, and in all their essential tasks.” (_2284-PS_)
(2) _General Functions._ The conspirators now had the machinery of
government in their hands. The initial function of the SS—that of
acting as their private army and personal police force—was thus
completed. But its mission had in fact really just begun. That mission
is described in the Organizations book of the NSDAP for 1943 as follows:
“_Missions_
“The most original and most eminent duty of the SS is to serve
as the protector of the Fuehrer.
“By order of the Fuehrer its sphere of duties has been amplified
to include the internal security of the Reich.” (_2640-PS_)
This new mission—protecting the internal security of the regime—was
somewhat more colorfully described by Himmler in his pamphlet, “The SS
as an Anti-bolshevist Fighting Organization,” published in 1936
(_1851-PS_):
“We shall unremittingly fulfill our task, the guaranty of the
security of Germany from the interior, just as the _Wehrmacht_
guarantees the safety, the honor, the greatness, and the peace
of the Reich from the exterior. We shall take care that never
again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the
Jewish-Bolshevistic revolution of subhumans be able to be
kindled either from within or through emissaries from without.
Without pity we shall be a merciless sword of justice for all
those forces whose existence and activity we know, on the day of
the slightest attempt, may it be today, may it be in decades or
may it be in centuries.” (_1851-PS_)
This conception necessarily required an extension of the duties of the
SS into many fields. It involved, of course, the performance of police
functions. But it involved more. It required participation in the
suppression and extermination of all internal opponents of the regime.
It meant participation in extending the regime beyond the borders of
Germany, and eventually, participation in every type of activity
designed to secure a hold over those territories and populations which,
through military conquest, had come under German domination.
B. _Organization and Branches of the SS._
The expansion of SS duties and activities resulted in the creation of
several branches and numerous departments and the development of a
highly complex machinery. Although those various branches and
departments cannot be adequately described out of the context of their
history, a few words about the structure of the SS may be useful.
For this purpose reference is made to the chart depicting the
organization of the SS as it appeared in 1945. This chart was examined
by Gottlob Berger, formerly Chief of the SS Main Office, who stated in
an attached affidavit that it correctly represents the organization of
the SS (_Chart Number 3_).
(1) _Supreme Command of the SS._ At the very top of the chart is
Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer SS, who commanded the entire organization.
Immediately below, running across the chart and down the right hand
side, embraced within the heavy line, are the twelve main departments
constituting the Supreme Command of the SS. Some of these departments
have been broken down into the several offices of which they were
composed, as indicated by the boxes beneath them. Other departments have
not been so broken down. It is not intended to indicate that there were
not subdivisions of these latter departments as well. The breakdown is
shown only in those cases where the constituent offices of some
department may have a particular significance in this case.
These departments and their functions are described in two official Nazi
publications: The first is the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943,
at pages 419-422 (_2640-PS_). The second is an SS manual, which bears
the title: “The Soldier Friend—Pocket Diary for the German Armed
Forces—Edition D: Waffen SS” (_2825-PS_). It was prepared at the
direction of the Reichsfuehrer SS and issued by the SS Main Office for
the year ending 1942. In addition, the departments are listed in a
directory of the SS published by one of the Main Departments of the SS
(_2769-PS_). This document was found in the files of the Personal Staff
of the Reichsfuehrer SS. It is entitled “Directory for the
_Schutzstaffel_ of the NSDAP, 1 November 1944”, marked “Restricted”, and
bears the notation “Published by SS Fuerhungshauptamt, Kommandant of the
General SS. Berlin—Wilmersdorf.”
Returning to the chart, following down the central spine from the
Reichsfuehrer SS to the regional level, the Higher SS and Police
Leaders, the supreme SS commanders in each region are reached.
Immediately below these officials is the breakdown of the organization
of the Allgemeine or General SS. To the left are indicated two other
branches of the SS—the Death Head Units (_Totenkopf Verbaende_) and the
Waffen SS. To the right under the HSS Pf is the SD. All of which,
together with the SS Police Regiments, are specifically named in the
Indictment (Appendix B) as being included in the SS.
(2) _Principal Branches of the SS._ Up to 1933 there were no such
specially designated branches. The SS was a single group, made up of
“volunteer political soldiers.” It was out of this original nucleus that
new units developed.
(_a_) _The Allgemeine SS._ The Allgemeine (General) SS was the main stem
from which the various branches grew. It was composed of all members of
the SS who did not belong to any of the special branches. It was the
backbone of the entire organization. The personnel and officers of the
Main Departments of the SS Supreme Command were members of this branch.
Except for high ranking officers and those remaining in staff
capacities, as in the Main Offices of the SS Supreme Command, its
members were part-time volunteers. Its members were utilized in about
every phase of SS activity. They were called upon in anti-Jewish pogroms
of 1938; they took over the task of guarding concentration camps during
the war; they participated in the colonization and resettlement program.
In short, the term “SS” normally meant the General SS.
It was organized on military lines as will be seen from the chart
(_Chart Number 3_), ranging from district and subdistrict down through
the regiment, battalion, and company, to the platoon. Until after the
beginning of the war it constituted numerically the largest branch of
the SS. In 1939 d’Alquen, the official SS spokesmen, said, in his book,
“The SS” (_2284-PS_):
“The strength of the General SS, 240,000 men, is subdivided
today into 14 corps, 38 divisions, 140 infantry regiments, 19
mounted regiments, 14 communication battalions and 19 engineer
battalions as well as motorized and medical units. This General
SS stands fully and wholly on call as in the fighting years,
except for one small part of the chief leaders and men. The
corps, which are presently led by a Lt. General or Major
General, are subdivided into divisions, regiments, battalions
and companies.” (_2284-PS_)
Similar reference to the military organization of the General SS will be
found in Himmler’s speech, “Organization and Obligations of the SS and
the Police” (_1992-A-PS_), and in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP
for 1943 (_2640-PS_). Members of this branch, however,—with the
exception of certain staff personnel—were subject to compulsory
military service. As a result of the draft of members of the General SS
of military age into the Army, the numerical strength of presently
active members considerably declined during the war. Older SS men and
those working in or holding high positions in the Main Departments of
the Supreme Command of the SS remained. Its entire strength during the
war was probably not in excess of 40,000 men.
(_b_) _The SD._ The second component to be mentioned is the Security
Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS, almost always referred to as the SD.
Himmler described the SD in these words (_1992-A-PS_):
“I now come to the Security Service (SD); it is the great
ideological intelligence service of the Party and, in the long
run, also that of the State. During the time of struggle for
power it was only the intelligence service of the SS. At that
time we had, for quite natural reasons, an intelligence service
with the regiments, battalions and companies. We had to know
what was going on on the opponents side, whether the Communists
intended to hold a meeting today or not, whether our people were
to be suddenly attacked or not, and similar things. I separated
this service already in 1931 from the troops, from the units of
the General SS, because I considered it to be wrong. For one
thing, the secrecy is endangered, then the individual men, or
even the companies, are too likely to discuss everyday
problems.” (_1992-A-PS_)
Although, as Himmler put it, the SD was only the intelligence service of
the SS during the years preceding the accession of the Nazis to power,
it became a much more important organization promptly thereafter. It had
been developed into such a powerful and scientific espionage system
under its chief, Reinhard Heydrich, that on 9 June 1934, just a few
weeks before the bloody purge of the SA, it was made, by decree of Hess,
the sole intelligence and counter-intelligence agency of the entire Nazi
Party (_2284-PS_). Its organization and numbers, as they stood in 1937,
were thus described by Himmler (_1992-A-PS_):
“The Security Service was already separated from the troop in
1931 and separately organized. Its higher headquarters, coincide
today with the _Oberabschnitte_ and _Abschnitte_—[that is, the
districts and subdistricts of the General SS]—and it has also
field offices, its own organization of officials with a great
many Command Posts, approximately three to four thousand men
strong, at least when it is built up.” (_1992-A-PS_)
Up to 1939 its headquarters was the SS Main Security Office
(_Sicherheitshauptamt_), which became amalgamated in 1939 into the Reich
Main Security Office (or RSHA), one of the SS main departments shown on
the chart (_Chart Number 3_).
The closer and closer collaboration of the SD with the Gestapo and
Criminal Police (Kripo), which eventually resulted in the creation of
the RSHA, as well as the activities in which the SD engaged in
partnership with the Gestapo are discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.
The SD was, of course, at all times an integral and important component
of the SS. But it is more practicable to deal with it in connection with
the activities of the whole repressive police system with which it
functioned.
(_c_) _The Waffen SS._ The third component is the Waffen SS, the combat
arm of the SS, which was created, trained, and finally utilized for the
purposes of aggressive war. The reason underlying the creation of this
combat branch was described in the Organizations Book of the Nazi Party
for 1943:
“The Waffen SS originated out of the thought: to create for the
Fuehrer a selected long service troop for the fulfillment of
special missions. It was to render it possible for members of
the General SS, as well as for volunteers who fulfill the
special requirements of the SS, to fight in the battle for the
evolution of the National Socialist idea, with weapon in hand,
in unified groups, partly within the framework of the Army.”
(_2640-PS_)
The term “Waffen SS” did not come into use until after the beginning of
the war. Up to that time there were two branches of the SS composed of
fulltime, professional, well-trained soldiers: the so-called _SS
Verfuegungstruppe_, translatable perhaps as “SS Emergency Troops”; and
the _SS Totenkopf Verbaende_, the “Death Head Units.” After the
beginning of the war, the units of the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ were
brought up to division strength, and new divisions were added to them.
Moreover, parts of the SS Death Head Units were formed into a division,
the _SS Totenkopf Division_. All these divisions then came to be known
collectively as the “Waffen SS”.
This development is traced in the Organization Book of the Nazi Party
for 1943:
“The origin of the Waffen SS goes back to the decree of 17 March
1933, establishing the “Stabswache” with an original strength of
120 men. Out of this small group developed the later-called SS
Verfuegungstruppe (SS Emergency Force).” (_2640-PS_)
The function and status of the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ are described in a
Top Secret Hitler order, 17 August 1938 (_647-PS_). That order provides,
in part:
* * * * * *
“II. The Armed Units of the SS.
“A. (The _SS Verfuegungstruppe_)
“1. The _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ is neither a part of the
Wehrmacht nor a part of the police. It is a standing armed unit
exclusively at my disposal. As such and as a unit of the NSDAP
its members are to be selected by the Reichsfuehrer SS according
to the philosophical and political standards which I have
ordered for the NSDAP and for the _Schutzstaffel_. Its members
are to be trained and its ranks filled with volunteers from
those who are subject to serve in the army who have finished
their duties in the obligatory labor service. The service period
for volunteers is for 4 years. It may be prolonged for _SS
Unterfuehrer_. Such regulations are in force for SS leaders. The
regular compulsory military service (par. 8 of the law relating
to military service) is fulfilled by service of the same amount
of time in the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_.”
* * * * * *
“III. Orders for the Case of Mobilization.
“A. The employment of the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ in case of
mobilization is a double one.
“1. By the Supreme Commander of the Army within the wartime
army. In that case it comes completely under military laws and
regulations, but remains a unit of the NSDAP politically.
“2. In case of necessity in the interior according to my orders,
in that case it is under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the
German Police.
“In case of mobilization I myself will make the decision about
the time, strength and manner of the incorporation of the _SS
Verfuegungstruppe_ into the wartime army, these things will
depend on the inner-political situation at that time.”
(_647-PS_)
Immediately after the issuance of this decree, this militarized force
was employed with the Army for aggressive purposes—the taking over of
the Sudetenland. Following this action, feverish preparations to
motorize the force and to organize new units, such as antitank, machine
gun, and reconnaissance battalions, were undertaken pursuant to further
directives of the Fuehrer. By September 1939, the force was fully
motorized, its units had been increased to division strength, and it was
prepared for combat. These steps are described in the National Socialist
Yearbook for the years 1940 (_2164-PS_) and 1941 (_2163-PS_). The
Yearbook was an official publication of the Nazi Party, edited by
Reichsleiter Robert Ley and published by the Nazi Party publishing
company.
After the launching of the Polish invasion, and as the war progressed,
still further divisions were added. The Organizations Book of the Nazi
Party for 1943 (_2640-PS_) lists some eight divisions and two infantry
brigades as existing at the end of 1942. This was no longer a mere
emergency force. It was an SS army and hence came to be designated as
the “Waffen SS” that is, “Armed” or “Combat” SS. Himmler referred to the
spectacular development of this SS combat branch in his speech at Posen
on 4 October 1943 to SS Gruppenfuehrers, in these terms:
“* * * Now I come to our own development, to that of the SS in
the past months. Looking back on the whole war, this development
was fantastic. It took place at an absolutely terrific speed.
Let us look back a little to 1939. At that time we were a few
regiments, guard units (_Wachverbande_) 8 to 9,000 strong,—that
is, not even a division, all in all 25 to 28,000 men at the
outside. True, we were armed, but really only got our artillery
regiment as our heavy arm two months before the war began.”
* * * * * *
“In the hard battles of this year, the Waffen-SS has been welded
together in the bitterest hours from the most varied divisions
and sections, and from these it formed: bodyguard units
(_Leibstandarte_), military SS (_Verfuegungstruppe_), Death’s
Head Units, and then the Germanic SS. Now when our ‘Reich’,
Death’s Head Cavalry Divisions and ‘Viking’ Divisions were
there, everyone knew in these last weeks: ‘Viking’ is at my
side, ‘Reich’ is at my side, ‘Death’s Head’ is at my
side,—‘Thank God’ now nothing can happen to us.” (_1919-PS_)
The transformation of a small emergency force into a vast combat Army
did not result in any separation of this branch from the SS. Although
tactically under the command of the _Wehrmacht_ while in the field, it
remained as much a part of the SS as any other branch of that
organization. Throughout the war it was recruited, trained, administered
and supplied by the main offices of the SS Supreme Command.
Ideologically and racially its members were selected in conformity with
SS standards, as shown by the recruiting standards of the Waffen SS
published in the SS manual, “The Soldier Friend” (_2825-PS_). A section
of that manual entitled “The Way to the Waffen SS,” reads:
“Today at last is the longed-for day of the entrance examination
where the examiners and physicians decide whether or not the
candidate is ideologically and physically qualified to do
service in the Armed Forces SS.
“Everyone has acquainted himself with the comprehensive Manual
for the Waffen SS; the principal points are as follows:
“1. Service in the Armed Forces SS counts as military service.
Only volunteers are accepted.”
* * * * * *
“3. Every pure-blooded German in good health between the ages of
17 and 45 can become a member of the armed forces SS. He must
meet all the requirements of the SS, must be of excellent
character, have no criminal record, and be an ardent adherent to
all Nazi socialist doctrines. Members of the _Streifendienst_
and of the _Landdienst_ of the Hitler Youth will be given
preference because their aptitudes, qualities and schooling are
indicative that they have become acquainted very early with the
ideology of the SS.”
* * * * * *
“In all cases of doubt or difficulty the recruiting offices of
the Waffen SS will advise and aid volunteers. They have branches
over the entire Reich, always at the seat of the Service Command
Headquarters, and work closely with the recruiting of the Waffen
SS in the Main Office (SS Hauptamt) of the Reichsfuehrer SS.”
(_2825-PS_)
The recruiting activities of the SS Main Office are illustrated by its
recruiting pamphlet, “The SS Calls You,” an elaborate illustrated
booklet containing full information covering the Waffen SS:
“If you answer the call of the Waffen SS and volunteer to join
the ranks of the great Front of SS Divisions, you will belong to
a corps which has from the very beginning been directed toward
outstanding achievements, and, because of this fact, has
developed an especially deep feeling of comradeship. You will be
bearing arms with a corps that embraces the most valuable
elements of the young German generation. Over and above that you
will be especially bound to the National Socialist ideology.”
(_3429-PS_)
The SS Main Office, through which these recruiting activities were
conducted, was one of the principal departments of the SS Supreme
Command. It is shown on the chart (the second box from the left) (_Chart
Number 3_). In the breakdown of that department, shown by the boxes
underneath, will be found the central recruiting office.
Other departments of the Supreme Command performed other functions in
connection with the Waffen SS. The SS Operational Headquarters (_SS
Fuehrungshauptamt_)—the fifth box from the left—contains the Command
Headquarters of the Waffen SS (_Chart Number 3_). The functions of this
department are thus defined in the SS Manual, “The Soldier Friend”:
“In the _Fuehrungshauptamt_ the command office of the Waffen SS
handles tasks of military leadership: Training and organization
of the units of the Waffen SS, supply of the troops with arms,
equipment and ammunition, procurement of motor vehicles for the
Waffen SS and General SS, personnel and disciplinary affairs.”
(_2825-PS_)
The SS Legal Main Office (_Hauptamt SS Gericht_) (indicated on the chart
by the second box from the top on the right hand side within the heavy
embracing line—(_Chart Number 3_)) controlled the administration of
courts-martial and discipline within the Waffen SS. The secret Hitler
order of 17 August 1938 (_647-PS_) had, it is true, provided that in the
event of mobilization the SS militarized forces should come completely
under military laws and regulations. That provision was modified by
subsequent enactments: The decree of 17 October 1939 relating to special
jurisdiction in penal matters for members of the SS and for members of
police groups on special tasks (_2946-PS_); and the decree of 17 April
1940, entitled “Second Decree for the Implementation of the Decree
Relating to a Special Jurisdiction in Penal Matters for Members of the
SS” (_2947-PS_). These two decrees established a special jurisdiction in
penal matters for various classes of SS members, including members of
the SS militarized units, in cases which would ordinarily fall under the
jurisdiction of the _Wehrmacht_; and created special SS courts to handle
such cases under the direction of the SS Legal Main Office. Thus, in the
vital question of discipline, as well as in recruiting, administration,
and supply, the Waffen SS was subject to the SS Supreme Command.
The place of the Waffen SS as an integral part of the entire SS
organization was strongly emphasized by Himmler in his address to
officers of the _SS Leibstandarte_ “Adolf Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:
“You must also consider the following: I cannot concentrate my
mind solely on—now, please don’t become conceited—the most
splendid part of the SS because it _is_ the most positive part
and because the trade you are following _is_ the most positive
and most manly. I cannot do that. I must always have the
_entire_ SS in my mind.
“If I did not see this part, I would deny life to this most
positive and most manly part of our activity; i.e., the Armed
SS. I would deny your life. Because this armed SS will live only
if the entire SS is alive. If the entire corps is actually an
order which lives according to these laws and realizes that one
part cannot exist without the other—you are unimaginable
without the General SS, and the latter is not imaginable without
you. The police is not imaginable without the SS, nor are we
imaginable without this executive branch of the state which is
in our hands.” (_1918-PS_)
(_d_) _The Totenkopf Verbaende._
The fourth component to be mentioned is the SS Death Head Units (_SS
Totenkopf Verbaende_). Their origin and purpose are succinctly described
by d’Alquen on page 20 of his book, “_Die SS_”:
“The SS Death Head Units form one part of the garrisoned SS.
They arose from volunteers of the General SS who were recruited
for the guarding of concentration camps in 1933.
“Their mission, aside from the indoctrination of the armed
political soldier, is guarding enemies of the State who are held
in concentration camps.
“The SS Death Head Units obligate their members to 12 years
service. It is composed mainly of men who have already fulfilled
their duty to serve in the _Wehrmacht_. This time of service is
counted completely.” (_2284-PS_)
Since the Death Head Units, like the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_, were
composed of well trained professional soldiers, they were also a
valuable nucleus for the Waffen SS. The secret Hitler order of 17 August
1938 (_647-PS_) provided for this task in the event of mobilization. The
_Totenkopf Verbaende_ were to be relieved from the duty of guarding
concentration camps and transferred as a skeleton corps to the _SS
Verfuegungstruppe_. Section II C, subparagraph 5, of that order
provides: “5. _Regulations for the case of the Mobilization_.
“The _SS-Totenkopf Verbaende_ form the skeleton corps for the
reinforcement of the _SS-Totenkopf Verbaende_ (police
reinforcement), and will be replaced in the guarding of the
concentration camps by members of the General SS who are over 45
years of age and had military training.
“The skeleton corps—which up to now were units of the two
replacement units for the short time training of the
reinforcement of the _SS-Totenkopf Verbaende_—will be
transferred to the _SS-Verfuegungstruppe_ as skeleton crews of
the replacement units for that unit.” (_647-PS_)
(_e_) _The SS Polizei Regimente._
The final component specifically referred to in the Indictment is the SS
Police Regiments. The SS eventually succeeded in assuming controls over
the entire Reich Police. Out of the police, special militarized forces
were formed, originally SS Police Battalions, and later expanded to SS
Police Regiments. Himmler, in his Posen speech, declared:
“Now to deal briefly with the tasks of the regular uniformed
police and the Sipo [the Security Police] they still cover the
same field. I can see that great things have been achieved. We
have formed roughly 30 police regiments from police reservists
and former members of the police—police officials, as they used
to be called. The average age in our police battalions is not
lower than that of the security battalions of the Armed Forces.
Their achievements are beyond all praise. In addition, we have
formed Police Rifle Regiments by merging the police battalions
of the ‘savage peoples.’ Thus we did not leave these police
battalions untouched but blended them in the ratio of about 1 to
3.” (_1919-PS_)
The results of this blend of militarized SS police and “savage peoples”
will be seen in the evidence, subsequently referred to, of the
extermination actions conducted by them in the Eastern territories.
These exterminations which were so successful and so ruthless that even
Himmler could find no words adequate for their eulogy.
(3) _Unity of the Organization._
Each of the various components described above played its part in
carrying out one or more functions of the SS. The personnel composing
each differed. Some were part-time volunteers; others were professionals
enlisted for different periods of time. But every branch, every
department, every member was an integral part of the whole organization.
Each performed his assigned role in the manifold tasks for which the
organization had been created. No better witness to this fact could be
called upon than the Reichsfuehrer SS, whose every endeavor was to
insure the complete unity of the organization. The following words are
taken from his Posen speech:
“It would be an evil day if the SS and police fell out. It would
be an evil day if the Main Offices, performing their tasks well
meaningly but mistakenly made themselves independent by each
having a downward chain of command. I really think that the day
of my overthrow would be the end of the SS. It must be, and so
come about, that this SS organization with all its branches—the
General SS which is the common basis of all of them, the
Waffen-SS, the regular uniformed police (_Ordnungspolizei_), the
SIPO (with the whole economic administration, schooling,
ideological training, the whole question of kindred), is, even
under the tenth Reichsfuehrer-SS _one_ bloc, _one_ body, _one_
organization.
* * * * * *
“The regular uniformed police and SIPO, General-SS and Waffen-SS
must now gradually amalgamate too, just as this is and must be
the case within the Waffen-SS. This applies to matters
concerning filling of posts, recruiting, schooling, economic
organization, and medical services. I am always doing something
towards this end, a bond is constantly being cast around these
sections of the whole to cause them to grow together. Alas, if
these bonds should ever be loosened—then everything—you may be
sure of this—would sink back into its old insignificance in one
generation, and in a short space of time.” (_1919-PS_)
C. _Selection, Training, and Obligations of Members._
To understand this organization, the theories upon which it was based
must be kept clearly in mind. The underlying philosophy of the SS, the
principles by which its members were selected, and the obligations
imposed upon them furnish the key to all its activities. It is
necessary, therefore, to consider them in some detail.
(1) _The Racial Basis of the SS._
(_a_) _The SS as a racial and biological elite._
The fundamental principle of selection was what Himmler called that of
Blood and Elite. The SS was to be the living embodiment of the Nazi
doctrine of the superiority of Nordic blood, and of the Nazi conception
of a master race. In Himmler’s own words, the SS was to be a “National
Socialist Soldierly Order of Nordic Men” (_1992-A-PS_). In describing to
the _Wehrmacht_ the reasons behind his emphasis on racial standards of
selection and the manner in which they were carried out, he said:
“* * * Accordingly, only good blood, blood which history has
proved to be leading and creative and the foundation of every
state and of all military activities, only Nordic blood, can be
considered. I said to myself that should I succeed in selecting
from the German people for this organization as many people as
possible a majority of whom possess this desired blood, in
teaching them military discipline and, in time, the
understanding of the value of blood and the entire ideology
which results from it, then it will be possible actually to
create such an elite organization which would successfully hold
its own in all cases of emergency.” (_1992-A-PS_)
Further on in the same speech, Himmler described the selection of
candidates for his organization:
“* * * They are extremely thoroughly examined and checked. Of
100 men we can use on the average of 10 or 15, no more. We ask
for the political reputation record of his parents, brothers and
sisters, the record of his ancestry as far back as 1750 and
naturally the physical examination and his records from the
Hitler Youth. Further, we ask for a record of hereditary health
showing that no hereditary disease exists in his parents and in
his family. Last, but perhaps most important, is a certification
of the race commission. This examining commission is composed of
SS leaders, anthropologists and physicians.” (_1992-A-PS_)
This same strict selection process for the SS was somewhat similarly
described in the Organizations Book of the Nazi Party for 1943:
“_Selection of Members_
“For the fulfillment of these missions a homogeneous firmly
welded fighting force has been created bound by ideological
oaths, whose fighters are selected out of the best Aryan
humanity.
“The conception of the value of the blood and soil serves as
directive for the selection into the SS. Every SS man must be
deeply imbued with the sense and essence of the National
Socialist Movement. He will be ideologically and physically
trained so that he can be employed individually or in groups in
the decisive battle for the National Socialist ideology.
“Only the best and thoroughbred Germans are suited for
commitment, in this battle. Therefore it is necessary that an
uninterrupted selection is retained within the ranks of the SS,
first superficially, then constantly more thoroughly.”
(_2640-PS_)
The creation of a racial and biological elite had some very practical
reasons behind it. The conspirators’ plans for conquest and exploitation
of the conquered territories required the development of a Nazi
aristocracy which would dominate Germany and Europe for centuries to
come. That purpose was explicitly stated by Himmler in his Posen speech:
“One thing must be clear, one thing I would like to say to you
today: the moment the war is over, we will really begin to weld
together our organization, this organization which we have built
up for 10 years, which we imbued and indoctrinated with the
first most important principles during the 10 years before the
war. We must continue to do this—we,—if I may say so, we older
men—for twenty years full of toil and work, so that a tradition
30, 35, 40 years, a generation, may be created. Then this
organization will march forward into the future young and
strong, revolutionary and efficient to fulfill the task of
giving the German people, the Germanic people, the superstratum
of society which will combine and hold together this Germanic
people and this Europe, and from which the brains which the
people need for industry, farming, politics, and as soldiers,
statesmen and technicians, will emerge. In addition this
superstratum must be so strong and vital that every generation
can unreservedly sacrifice two or three sons from every family
on the battle-field, and that never-the-less the continued
flowing of the bloodstream is assured.” (_1919-PS_)
He forcibly made the same point in his address to officers of the _SS
Leibstandarte_ “Adolph Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:
“The ultimate aim for these 11 years during which I have been
the Reichsfuehrer SS has been invariably the same: To create an
order of good blood which is able to serve Germany. Which
unfailingly and without sparing itself can be made use of
because the greatest losses can do no harm to the vitality of
this order, the vitality of these men, because they will always
be replaced. To create an order which will spread the idea of
nordic blood so far that we will attract all nordic blood in the
world, take away the blood from our adversaries, absorb it so
that never again, looking at it from the viewpoint of grand
policy, nordic blood in great quantities and to an extent worth
mentioning will fight against us. We must get it and the others
cannot have it. We never gave up the ideas and the aim conceived
so many years ago. Everything we did has taken us some distance
further on the way. Everything we are going to do will lead us
further on the way.” (_1918-PS_)
Since the SS was to be made a Nazi aristocracy which would dominate not
only Germany but the world for centuries to come, it was essential that
the SS stock be perpetuated. To insure the continuance of this good
blood, the first step was to limit marriages of SS men to women meeting
the same requirements as to health, descent, and ideological background
as the SS man himself. This was accomplished by an order of the
Reichsfuehrer SS issued on 31 December 1931. This SS marriage law is set
out in full in d’Alquen’s Book, “The SS,” (_2284-PS_). But proper
marriages were not enough without children. A series of orders took care
of that. On 13 September 1936, Himmler issued an order entitled
“Foundation of the Organization ‘_Lebensborn e.V._’”, published in the
SS manual, “The Soldier Friend”:
“As early as December 13, 1934, I wrote to all SS leaders and
declared that we have fought in vain if political victory was
not to be followed by victory of birth of good blood. The
question of multiplicity of children is not a private affair of
the individual but his duty towards his ancestors and our
people.
“The SS has taken the first step in this direction long ago with
the engagement and marriage decree of December 1931. However,
the existence of sound marriage is futile if it does not result
in the creation of numerous descendants.”
* * * * * *
“The minimum amount of children for a good sound marriage is
four. Should unfortunate circumstances deny a married couple
their own children, then every SS leader should adopt racially
and hereditarily valuable children, educate them in the spirit
of National Socialism, let them have an education corresponding
to their ability.” (_2825-PS_)
The drive for perpetuation of SS stock was continued. A further order of
Himmler, issued on 28 October 1939, directed to the entire SS and the
Police, is also published in the SS manual, “The Soldier Friend”:
“The old saying that only those who have children can die in
peace must again become acknowledged truth in this war,
especially for the SS.
* * * * * *
“Though in other times it may perhaps be considered an
infraction of necessary social standards and conventions, German
women and girls of good blood can fulfill a high obligation by
bearing children out of wedlock to soldiers going to the front,
whose eventual return or death for Germany lies entirely in the
hands of fate—not out of promiscuity but out of a deep sense of
ethics.”
* * * * * *
“Let us never forget that the victory of the sword and of the
spilled blood of our soldiers remains fruitless, if it is not
succeeded by the victory of the child and the colonizing of
conquered soil.” (_2825-PS_)
A final order designed to assure continuance of good SS blood was issued
on 15 August 1942, entitled “SS Orders to the Last Sons”, also published
in “The Soldier Friend”:
“You SS men have been withdrawn from the front lines by order of
the Fuehrer because you are the last sons. This measure has been
taken because the people and the State have an interest in
seeing that your families do not die out.
“It has never been the nature of SS men to submit to a fate
without attempting to effect a change. It is your duty to see to
it that you are no longer the last sons by producing as many
children of good blood as possible.” (_2825-PS_)
These orders were not the product of some benevolent theorist in
eugenics who was interested in large and happy SS families for their own
sake. They stemmed from a basic idea of the conspiracy, the plan to
insure Germany’s continued capacity to wage war for generations. Himmler
put this theory very bluntly in his speech to officers of the _SS
Leibstandarte_ “Adolf Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:
“* * * If we once had not enough sons, those who will come after
us will have to become cowards. A nation which has an average of
four sons per family can venture a war; if two of them die, two
transmit the name. The leadership of a nation having one son or
two sons per family will have to be faint-hearted at any
decision on account of their own experience, because they will
have to tell themselves: We cannot afford it. Look at France,
which is the best example. France had to accept from us a
dictate.” (_1918-PS_)
(_b_) _The SS as an exterminator of “inferior” races._
Domination of Europe through a Nazi Elite required more, however, than
the positive side of racism—that is, the building up of a numerous
“biologically superior” group. It necessarily meant also the destruction
of other races. The SS had to be, and was, taught not merely to breed,
but to exterminate. In a speech delivered at Kharkov in April 1943,
Himmler declared:
“We have—I would say, as very consistent National
Socialists—taken the question of blood as our starting point.
We were the first really to solve the problem of blood by
action, and in this connection by problem of blood, we of course
do not mean anti-semitism. Antisemitism is exactly the same as
delousing. Getting rid of lice is not a question of ideology. It
is a matter of cleanliness. In just the same way, anti-semitism
for us, will soon have been dealt with. We shall soon be
deloused. We have only 20,000 lice left, and then the matter is
finished within the whole of Germany.” (_1919-PS_)
But it was not merely against Jews that SS efforts were directed. All
non-Nordic races were similarly condemned. In his Posen speech, Himmler
stated this basic principle of the SS:
“One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS men:
We must be honest, decent, loyal and comradely to members of our
own blood and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian, to a
Czech, does not interest me in the slightest. What other nations
can offer in the way of good blood of our type, we will take, if
necessary, by kidnapping their children and raising them here
with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death
interests me only so far as we need them as slaves for our
culture; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000
Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an
antitank ditch interests me only insofar as the antitank ditch
for Germany is finished.”
* * * * * *
“That is what I want to instill into this SS and what I believe
I have instilled in them as one of the most sacred laws of the
future.” (_1919-PS_)
(_c_) _Indoctrination of members in SS racial theories._ These were the
principles which were publicly reiterated, over and over again, so that
the newest recruit was thoroughly steeped in them. In his Kharkov speech
to the commanding officers of three Waffen SS divisions, Himmler
strongly insisted on indoctrinating all SS members in his theories of
the racial struggle.
“This is what is important for us as SS men, for our province of
duty and our mission (it is a task additional to those of the
whole German armed forces and the whole German people): That is
what I would like to impress upon you. This is what I beg you as
commanding officers, as chiefs and as leaders, to teach the
young men again and again in their ideological instruction. That
is what I demand and exact of you—that you really concern
yourself with the man, the young fellow of 17 or 18 who comes to
us, and with many who are in our ranks not as volunteers but as
conscripts. I ask you to look after them, and guide them, and
not let them go before they are really saturated with our spirit
and are fighting as the old guard fought before us—that is what
I request and demand of you.
“We have only one task—to stand firm and carry on the racial
struggle without mercy.” (_1919-PS_)
This function of the SS men in the racial struggle was publicly
proclaimed in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943:
“He openly and relentlessly fights against the most dangerous
enemies of the State: Jews, Freemasons, Jesuits and political
clergymen.” (_2640-PS_)
(2) _The Obligation of Obedience._ Indoctrination of the organization in
principles of racial hatred was not enough. The members had to be ready
and willing tools, prepared to carry out tasks of any nature, however
distasteful, illegal or inhuman. Absolute obedience was the necessary
second foundation stone of the SS. The Organizations Book of the NSDAP
for 1943 thus describes this fundamental requirement:
“Obedience must be unconditional. It corresponds to the
conviction that the National Socialist ideology must reign
supreme. He who is possessed by it and fights for it
passionately subjects himself voluntarily to the obligation to
obey. Every SS man is prepared, therefore, to carry out blindly
every order which is issued by the Fuehrer or which is given by
his superior, irrespective of the heaviest sacrifices involved.”
(_2640-PS_)
The same point was emphasized by Himmler in the Posen speech:
“I would like here to state something clearly and unequivocally.
It is a matter of course that the little man must obey. It is
even more a matter of course that all the senior leaders of the
SS, that is the whole corps of Gruppenfuehrers, are a model of
blind obedience.” (_1919-PS_)
(3) _The SS as a Terroristic Agency._ A necessary corollary of these two
fundamental principles of race and of blind obedience was ruthlessness.
Subsequent evidence of SS activities will prove how successfully the SS
learned the lesson it was taught. The SS had to and did develop a
reputation for terror which was carefully cultivated. Himmler himself
attested to it as early as 1936 in a speech publicly delivered at the
Peasant’s Day Rally and subsequently published and circulated in
pamphlet form under the title “The SS as an Anti-bolshevist Fighting
Organization”:
“I know that there are some people in Germany who become sick
when they see their black coats. We understand the reason for
this and do not expect that we shall be loved by too many.”
(_1851-PS_)
(4) _Continuance of the Elite and Voluntary Character of the SS._ The
role which the SS was to play required that it remain constantly the
essence of Naziism, and that its elite Nazi quality never be diluted.
For this reason the SS was for a time temporarily closed to new members,
and those who had proved unfit were weeded out. Himmler described this
process in his article “Organization and Obligations of the SS and the
Police” (_1992-A-PS_). Referring to the influx of new adherents to the
Party and its organizations in 1933, he said:
“A very difficult question confronted us at that time. It was a
question of deciding whether to close the Party and its
organizations to further membership and thus remain pure in
quality but small in volume, or of opening them to further
membership to increase their volume.”
* * * * * *
“The SS too was endangered by this menace. Therefore I closed it
while some of the other organizations accepted as great a number
of people as possible. This way I had the SS again under my
control in April and said: We shall accept no more people. From
the end of 1933 to the end of 1935 we expelled all those of the
newly accepted members who proved unsuitable.” (_1992-A-PS_)
These standards were not abandoned later. Indeed, in 1943 the
Organizations Book of the Nazi Party stated that:
“The demands with respect to racial purity of the SS are being
increased every year.”
And in the same year, 1943, Himmler emphasized this point in a letter
written to Kaltenbrunner (_2768-PS_).
This letter from the Reichsfuehrer SS, which bears the date 24 April
1943, states in part as follows:
“Referring again to the matter which I discussed some time ago,
i.e., the admission of SIPO officials into the SS. I wish to
clarify again: I want an admission only if the following
conditions are fulfilled:
“1. If the man applies freely and voluntarily;
“2. If, by applying strict and peacetime standards, the
applicant fits racially and ideologically into the SS,
guarantees according to the number of his children a
really healthy SS stock, and is neither ill, degenerate
nor worthless.”
* * * * * *
“I beg you not only to act accordingly in the future, but
especially also that numerous admissions into ranks of the SS in
the past be reexamined and revised according to these
instructions.” (_2768-PS_)
(5) _Method of Acquiring Membership in the SS._ The normal method by
which membership in the SS was attained was discussed by Himmler in his
article, “Organization and Obligations of the SS and Police”:
“The age groups in the SS are as follows: With 18 years the
young man enters the SS. He is first an applicant, after three
months he takes the oath on the Fuehrer and thus becomes a
candidate (_Anwaerter_). As a candidate during the first year he
takes examinations for his SA sport insignia and his bronze
sport insignia. At the age of 19 or 19½, according to the time
of his acceptance, he is conscripted for the labor service and
subsequently for the _Wehrmacht_. After two more years he comes
back from the _Wehrmacht_ unless he remains there as a
prospective noncommissioned officer or reenlists. If he returns
to us, he is still candidate. In these weeks he is especially
thoroughly instructed in ideology. The first year is for him a
period of elementary ideological indoctrination. In these weeks
following his return from the _Wehrmacht_ he receives special
instruction about the marriage law and all other laws pertaining
to the family, and the honor laws. On the 9th of November,
following his return from the _Wehrmacht_, he becomes an SS man
in the true sense. The Reichsfuehrer of the SS is just as much
an SS man in the sense of the SS organization as the common man
at the front. On this 9th of November he is awarded the dagger,
and at this occasion he promises to abide by the marriage law
and the disciplinary laws of the SS, since the family is also
subject to these laws. From this day on he has the right and the
duty to defend his honor with a weapon as laid down by the honor
laws of the SS. The applicants and candidates do not yet have
this right. The SS man remains in the so-called active General
SS until his 35th year. From his 35th to his 45th year he is in
the SS reserve, and after his 45th year in the _Stammabteilung_
of the SS, identified by the grey color patch.” (_1992-A-PS_)
The oath to the Fuehrer, referred to by Himmler in the passage just
quoted, appears in the SS recruiting pamphlet, “The SS Calls You”:
“The Oath of the SS Man:
“I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, as Fuehrer and Reichschancellor,
loyalty and bravery. I vow to you, and to those you have named
to command me, obedience unto death, so help me God.”
(_3429-PS_)
D. _Criminal Aims and Activities of the SS._
(1) _The Purge of 20[_sic_] June 1934._ Proof of the elite Nazi quality
and thorough reliability of the SS, the test by which it won its spurs,
occurred on 30 June 1934, when it participated in the purge of the SA
and other opponents or potential opponents of the Nazi regime. That was
the first real occasion for use of this specialized organization which
could operate with the blessing of the Nazi State but outside the law.
In an affidavit signed and sworn to in Nurnberg on 19 November 1945,
Wilhelm Frick says, referring to the victims of that purge:
“They were just killed on the spot. Many people were killed—I
don’t know how many—who actually did not have anything to do
with the putsch. People who just weren’t liked very well, as for
instance, Schleicher, the former Reich Chancellor, were killed *
* * The SS was used by Himmler for the execution of these orders
to suppress the putsch.” (_2950-PS_)
Himmler referred to this same event in his Posen speech:
“Just as we did not hesitate on June 20,[_sic_] 1934, to do the
duty we were bidden, and stand comrades who had lapsed, up
against the wall and shoot them, so we have never spoken about
it and will never speak about it.” (_1919-PS_)
It was in recognition of its services in this respect that the SS was
elevated to the status of a component of the Party equal in rank to the
SA and other similar branches. The following announcement appeared on
page 1 of the _Voelkischer Beobachter_ of 26 July 1934:
“The Reich press office announces the following order of the
Fuehrer.
“In consideration of the greatly meritorious service of the SS,
especially in connection with the events of 30 June 1934, I
elevate it to the standing of an independent organization within
the NSDAP.
“Munch 20 July 1934.” (_1857-PS_)
(2) _Functions as a Repressive Police Organization._
One of the first steps essential to the security of any regime is
control of the police. The SS was the type of organization which the
conspirators needed for this purpose. Their aim was to fuse the SS and
police, and to merge them into a single, unified repressive force.
Shortly after the seizure of power the conspirators began to develop as
part of the state machinery, secret political police forces. These
originated in Prussia with the Gestapo, established by decree of Goering
in April 1933, and were duplicated in the other German States. (This
development is discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.) By 1934 Himmler,
the Reichsfuehrer SS, had become the chief of these secret political
police forces in each of the German states except Prussia, and deputy
chief of the Prussian Gestapo. In that capacity he infiltrated these
forces with members of the SS until a virtual identity of membership was
assured.
On 17 June 1936, by Decree on the Establishment of a Chief of the German
Police (_2073-PS_), the new post of Chief of the German Police was
created in the Ministry of the Interior. Under the terms of the decree,
Himmler was appointed to this post with the title of “Reichsfuehrer SS
and Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior.” The
combination of these two positions, that of leadership of the SS and
head of all the police forces in the Reich, was no accident but was
intended to establish a permanent relation between the two bodies and
not a mere “transitory fusion of personnel.” The significance of the
combination of these two positions was referred to by Hitler in the
preamble to his secret order of 17 August 1938:
“By means of the nomination of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of
the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior on June 17th,
1936 (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ I, page 487), I have created the basis
for the unification and reorganization of the German Police.
“With this step, the _Schutzstaffeln_ of the NSDAP, which were
under the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police even
up to now, have entered into close connection with the duties of
the German Police.” (_647-PS_)
Upon his appointment, Himmler immediately proceeded to reorganize the
entire Reich Police Force, designating two separate branches: (1) the
regular uniformed police force (_Ordnungspolizei_, or Orpo), and (2) the
Security Police (_Sicherheitspolizei_, or Sipo). The Sipo was composed
of all criminal police organizations in the Reich and all the secret
political police forces, or Gestapo. This reorganization was achieved by
the Decree Assigning Functions in the Office of the Chief of the German
Police (_1551-PS_). To be head of the Sipo, that is the criminal police
and Gestapo, Himmler appointed Reinhard Heydrich, who was at that time
the Chief of the SD. Thus, through Himmler’s dual capacity as leader of
the SS and as Chief of the Police, and through Heydrich’s dual capacity
as head of the Sipo and as chief of the SD, a unified personal command
of the SS and Security Police Forces was achieved. But further steps
toward unification were later taken. In 1939, the Security Police and
the SD were combined in a single department, the Reich Security Main
Office, commonly referred to as the RSHA. (The details of the
organization of the RSHA are discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.) The
important point to be observed is this: The newly created Reich Security
Main Office was not a mere department of the Government. It was a dual
body: an agency of the government, organizationally placed in the
Department of the Interior, and at the same time one of the principal
departments of the SS, organizationally placed in the Supreme Command of
the SS. (cf. the chart of the SS organization (_Chart Number 3_)). The
following description of the RSHA appears in the Organizations Book of
the NSDAP for 1943:
“The RSHA handles all the organizational, personnel, management
and technical affairs of the Security Police and the SD. In
addition, it is the central office of the State Police and
criminal police executive, as well as the central directorate of
the intelligence net of the SD.” (_2640-PS_)
The position of the RSHA in the Supreme Command of the SS is also
similarly described in the SS manual, “The Soldier Friend”. (_2825-PS_)
But it was not merely the Gestapo and the Criminal Police which came
under the sway of the SS. The regular uniformed police as well were
affected. For, like the RSHA, the Department of the Regular Police
(_Ordnungspolizei_, or Orpo), was not merely a department in the
Ministry of the Interior, but also simultaneously in the Supreme Command
of the SS. Its position in the SS is indicated by the seventh box on the
chart of the SS organization (_Chart Number 3_). The following
description of the Department of the Regular Police appears in the
Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943:
“The sphere of duties of the Main Office of the
_Ordnungspolizei_ includes police administration as well as the
management and direction of the protective police
(_Schutzpolizei_) of the Reich, the Gendarmes, the protective
police of the community, the water protection police, the air
protection police, the fire protection police, the protective
groups in the occupied territories, the colonial police, the
volunteer fire department, the compulsatory and youth fire
departments, the technical aid and the technical SS and police
academy.” (_2640-PS_)
The position of this Department in the SS Supreme Command is also
similarly described in the SS Manual, “The Soldier Friend”. (_2825-PS_)
This unity of the Command was not a mere matter of the highest
headquarters. It extended down to the operating level. As the chart
shows, the Higher SS and Police Leader in each region, who was directly
subordinate to Himmler, had under his command both the Security Police
and the regular, uniformed police (_Chart Number 3_). These forces were
subject to his orders as well as to those of the RSHA and the Department
of the Regular Police respectively. This position of the Higher SS and
Police Leader is described in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for
1943. (_2640-PS_)
SS control of the police was, however, not only a matter of organization
and of unified command. Unity of personnel was also in large measure
achieved. Vacancies occurring in the police forces were filled by SS
members; police officials retained in the force were urged to join the
SS; and schools operated by the SS were the required training centers
for police as well as SS officials. These measures are described in
Himmler’s article, “Organization and Obligations of the SS and the
Police” (_1992-A-PS_). They are also described in an authoritative book
on the police and on the SS, entitled “The German Police,” written by
Dr. Werner Best, a Ministerial Director in the Ministry of the Interior
and a department head in the Security Police and published in 1940. It
bears on its flyleaf the imprimatur of the Nazi Party and is listed in
the official list of National Socialist Party bibliography. Chapter 7
from that book is reproduced in document (_1852-PS_). Reference is also
made to the order of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police
of 23 June 1938, entitled “Acceptance of Members of the Security Police
into the SS” (_1637-PS_). In that order provision was made for admitting
members of the Security Police into the SS upon certain conditions. The
preamble of the order states that it was issued “with the aim of fusing
members of the German Police with the ‘_Schutzstaffel_’ of the National
Socialist German Workers Party into one uniformly turned out State
Protective Corps of the National Socialist Reich” (_1637-PS_).
Parenthetically, it should be observed that even this aim was not
sufficient to cause a relaxation of SS admission standards since the
order provided that, to be admitted as an SS member, personnel of the
Security Police were obliged to fulfill the general requirements of the
SS (its racial and ideological standards).
Through this unity of organization and personnel, the SS and the police
became identified in structure and in activity. The resulting situation
was described by Best as follows:
“Thus the SS and the Police form a unit, both in their structure
and in their activity, although their individual organizations
have not lost their true individuality and their position in the
larger units of the Party and State administration * * *”
* * * * * *
“In the relationship between the Police and the SS, the
principle of the ‘orderly’ penetration of an organization of the
National order has been realized for the first time to the final
outcome through the supporters of the National Socialist
movement”. (_1852-PS_)
As Himmler stated in his address to the officers of _SS-Leibstandarte_
“Adolph Hitler” on the “Day of Metz”:
“I want to tell you: In the entire Waffen-SS we must begin to
view the other great activity of the entire SS (_Gesamt-SS_) and
entire Police. We must see to it that you consider the activity
of the man in the green uniform as just as valuable as the
activity you yourself are engaged in. You have to consider the
work of the SD man or the man of the Security Police as a vital
part of our whole work just like the fact that you can carry
arms”. (_1918-PS_)
Through the police the SS was in a position to carry out a large part of
the functions assigned to it. The working partnership between Gestapo,
the criminal police, and the SD, under the direction of the
Reichsfuehrer SS, resulted in the ultimate in repressive and
unrestrained police activity. (cf. the discussion in Section 6 on the
Gestapo.) It must be remembered that the Gestapo activities were but one
aspect of SS functions—one part of the whole criminal SS scheme.
(3) _Functions and Activities with Respect to Concentration Camps._
Control over the police, however, was not enough. Potential sources of
opposition could be tracked down by the SD. Suspects could be seized by
the criminal police and Gestapo. But those means alone would not assure
the complete suppression of all opponents and potential opponents of the
regime. For this purpose concentration camps were invented, and the SS
was given large responsibility in that system.
(_a_) _Criminal activities of SS guards and camp personnel._ The first
requirement of the camps was for guard and administrative personnel.
Part-time volunteer members of the _Allgemeine SS_ were originally
utilized as guards. But part-time volunteers could not adequately serve
the need of the extensive and long-range program that was planned.
Hence, beginning in 1933 full-time professional guard units (the _SS
Totenkopf Verbaende_) were organized. Their very name (“Death Head
Units”) and their distinguishing insignia, the skull and cross bones,
appropriately marked the type of activity in which they engaged.
During the war, members of the _Allgemeine SS_ resumed the function of
guarding the camps which they had undertaken when the camps were
created. This was provided for in the Hitler order of 17 August 1938
(_647-PS_) directing the substitution of _Allgemeine SS_ members for the
Death Head Units in the event of mobilization. That substitution took
place. In reviewing the events of the period between 1938 and 1940,
significant for the SS, the National Socialist Yearbook of 1940
congratulated the _Allgemeine SS_ on the performance of its new mission:
“However, not only the garrisoned parts of the SS were employed.
Also the General SS were brought forth for special missions.
Thousands of younger and older SS comrades were employed for the
strengthening of the police and for the guarding of
concentration camps and have faithfully fulfilled their duty
throughout the weeks.” (_2164-PS_)
It is unnecessary to repeat the evidence of wholesale brutalities,
tortures, and murders committed by SS guards. These were not sporadic
crimes committed by irresponsible individuals. They were a part of a
definite and calculated policy, which necessarily resulted from SS
philosophy, and which was carried out from the initial creation of the
camps.
Himmler bluntly explained to the _Wehrmacht_ in 1937 the prevailing view
of the SS as to the inmates of concentration camps:
“It would be extremely instructive for everyone, some members of
the _Wehrmacht_ were already able to do so, to inspect such a
concentration camp. Once they have seen it, they are convinced
of the fact that no one had been sent there unjustly; that it is
the offal of criminals and freaks. No better demonstration of
the laws of inheritance and race, as set forth by Doctor Guett,
exists than such a concentration camp. There you can find people
with hydrocephalus, people who are cross-eyed, deformed,
half-Jewish, and a number of racially inferior products. All
that is assembled there. Of course, we distinguish between those
inmates who are only there for a few months for the purpose of
education, and those who are to stay for a very long time. On
the whole, education consists of discipline, never of any kind
of instruction on an ideological basis, for the prisoners have,
for the most part, slave-like souls; and only very few people of
real character can be found there.” (_1992-A-PS_)
Even these “slave-like souls,” however, might be redeemed by SS hygienic
measures. For, as Himmler continued:
“The discipline thus means order. The order begins with these
people living in clean barracks. Such a thing can really only be
accomplished by us Germans, hardly another nation would be as
humane as we are. The laundry is frequently changed. The people
are taught to wash themselves twice daily, and the use of a
toothbrush with which most of them have been unfamiliar.”
(_1992-A-PS_)
Despite this callous jest to the _Wehrmacht_, all pretense was swept
away in Himmler’s speech to his own Gruppenfuehrers at Posen:
“I don’t believe the Communists could attempt any action, for
their leading elements, like most criminals, are in our
concentration camps. And here I must say this—that we shall be
able to see after the war what a blessing it was for Germany
that, in spite of all the silly talk about humanitarianism, we
imprisoned all this criminal substratum of the German people in
concentration camps: I’ll answer for that.” (_1919-PS_).
Certainly there was no “silly humanitarianism” in the manner in which SS
men performed their task. An illustration of their conduct, not in 1944
or 1945 but in 1933, is shown in four reports relating to the deaths of
four different inmates of the Concentration Camp Dachau between May 16
and 27, 1933. Each report is signed by Winterberger, the Public
Prosecutor of the District Court in Munich, and addressed to the Public
Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Munich. The first (_641-PS_) 1 June
1933, relates to the death of Dr. Alfred Strauss, a prisoner in
protective custody in Dachau. That report states:
“On May 24, 1933 the 30 year old, single, attorney at law, Dr.
Alfred Strauss from Munich who was in the concentration camp
Dachau as a prisoner under protective custody was killed by 2
pistol shots from SS man Johann Kantschuster who escorted him on
a walk outside of the fenced part of the camp prescribed to him
by the camp doctor.
“Kantschuster gives the following report: He himself had to
urinate; Strauss proceeded on his way. Suddenly Strauss broke
away towards the shrub located at a distance of about 6 m from
the line. When he noticed it, he fired 2 shots at the fugitive
from a distance of about 8 m, whereupon Strauss collapsed dead.
“On the same day, May 24, 1933, a judicial inspection of the
locality took place. The corpse of Strauss was lying at the edge
of the wood. Leather slippers were on his feet. He wore a sock
on one foot, while the other foot was bare, obviously because of
an injury to this foot. Subsequently an autopsy was performed.
Two bullets had entered the back of his head. Besides, the body
showed several black and blue spots (_Blutunterlaufung_) and
also open wounds.”
* * * * * *
“I have charged Kantschuster today with murder and have made
application for opening and execution of the judicial
preliminary investigation as well as for a warrant of arrest
against him.” (_641-PS_)
The second (_642-PS_) also 1 June 1933, relates to the death of Leonhard
Hausmann, another prisoner in Dachau. That letter states:
“On 17 May 1933, Leonhard Hausmann from Augsburg, 31 years old,
married, relief worker, who was kept in protective custody in
the Dachau concentration camp, was shot by SS Staff Sergeant
Karl Ehmann. According to the account of the latter, Hausmann
was to dig out young fir trees in the woods in the vicinity of
the camp and pile them up on a certain spot. He was supervised
by Ehmann. Suddenly the latter did not see him anymore.
Therefore Ehmann looked after the prisoners and saw him running
away in a stooped position, Ehmann ran after him, called ‘Halt’
several times, once also ‘Stop,’ but in vain. Whereupon Ehmann
raised his pistol at the prisoner and fired without aiming;
Hausmann dropped dead. Ehmann asserts that he fired from a
distance of 10 to 12 meters.
“The corpse was inspected already on 17 May 1933 with the
assistance of the State court physician. It was found that death
was due to a shot through the left side of the chest. According
to the autopsy protocol, the shot was fired from a distance less
than 1 meter. Meanwhile the legal-medical institute ascertained
that the distance was less than 30 cm.” (_642-PS_)
The third (_644-PS_) 22 May 1933, relates to the death of Louis Schloss,
an inmate of Dachau. Attached to the letter is a copy of a report of the
autopsy conducted in the Schloss case, signed by the examining
physicians. The letter of 22 May 1933, begins:
“In the afternoon of 16 May 1933 the police station Dachau
informed the State Prosecution that an inmate of the
concentration camp Dachau, the merchant Louis Schloss, from
Nurnberg, widowed, born on 21 June 1889, has hanged himself in
solitary confinement. At the request of the state prosecution,
on the same day the legal inspection was performed with the
assistance of the state court physician with the State Court
Munich II. As it was proven that the corpse exhibited numerous
whip marks and as the cause of death appeared doubtful, an
autopsy was carried out on 17 May 1933. According to a
preliminary certificate of the participating physicians, the
autopsy did not prove death by hanging”. (_644-PS_)
The preliminary opinion of the examining physician states:
“Preliminary opinion:
“I. The death through hanging could not be proven by autopsy.
“II. Extensive blood suffusions and whipmarks were found,
particularly on the back, on the buttocks and on both arms, as
well as on both legs, abdomen and thorax to a minor extent. In
the region of the buttocks and shoulders extensive destruction
of adipose tissue was found together with the blood suffusions.
This is adequate to explain death through autointoxication and
fat embolism.” (_644-PS_)
The fourth (_645-PS_) 1 June 1933, relates to the death of Sebastian
Nefzger, another Dachau prisoner. The letter reads:
“On May 27, 1933, the following report was received by the Lower
Court Dachau:
“Concentration Camp Dachau, Political Division, May 27, 1933, to
the Lower Court Dachau. An inquest on the dead body of the
prisoner Nefzger Sebastian merchant in Munich, Schommerstrasse
17/0, born: 1/10/1900 in Munich, religion: Catholic, marital
status: married—showed that death through the action of third
persons must be excluded. Death was indubitably caused by
excessive bleeding resulting from an opened artery of the left
hand. Signed Dr. Nuernbergk, Camp Physician.
“Neither the Lower Court Dachau nor the State Attorney Munich II
had up to that time been informed of Nefzger’s death reported in
the letter in spite of the fact that Nefzger had already died in
the night of the 25 to the 26th of May 1933. The Lower Court
Dachau informed the State Attorney, Munich II of this letter. A
coroner’s inquest was ordered, which took place as late as May
27, 1933. Since the physician appointed by the Superior Court,
doubted that death had occurred to excessive bleeding and in
identified marks of strings on the victim’s neck, a judicial
autopsy was arranged by the State Attorney on May 29, 1933. The
resulting opinion of the expert is so far: I) The autopsy
discloses that excessive bleeding due to a cut on the left arm
must be excluded as a cause of death: II) The cut on the left
wrist reveals three incisions of the bone. Trial cuts are
lacking. These findings are contrary to the assumption that the
wound has been self-inflicted: III) It must be assumed that the
cause of death was suffocation. As a cause for suffocation,
strangulation and throttling must be considered. The
characteristics of the marks left by the strings do not agree
with those otherwise observed in cases of death caused by
hanging.” (_645-PS_)
These four murders, committed within the short space of two weeks in the
Spring of 1933, each by different SS guards, are but a few examples of
SS activities in the camps even as early as 1933. Many similar examples
from that period and later periods could be produced.
Indeed, that sort of thing was officially encouraged. Disciplinary
Regulations for the Dachau Concentration Camp were issued on 1 October
1933 by SS Fuehrer Eicke, who later became commander of all the Death
Head Units (_778-PS_). The fourth paragraph of the introduction of those
rules provides:
“Tolerance means weakness. In the light of this conception,
punishment will be mercilessly handed out whenever the interests
of the Fatherland warrant it. The fellow countryman who is
decent but misled will never be affected by these regulations.
But let it be a warning to the agitating politicians and
intellectual provocators—regardless of which kind—; be on
guard not to be caught, for otherwise it will be your neck and
you will be shut up according to your own methods.” (_778-PS_)
So many inmates were killed “while trying to escape,” to use the pat
official phrase, that by 1936 the Minister of Justice was moved to
appeal to Himmler to regulate the use of firearms by the Death Head
Units. A memorandum 9 March 1936, prepared by Minister of Justice
Guertner, reads as follows:
“On the 2d of this month, using the Hoppe case as an
illustration, I discussed the question of use of arms by the
guard-personnel of the concentration camp with the Reichsfuehrer
SS. I suggested to Himmler that he issue an order on the use of
arms for the officials subordinated to him. I referred in this
respect to the example of the decree on the use of arms by the
armed forces of 17 January of this year. Himmler has promised me
that such a decree will be issued and will grant us
participation in the preliminary work.” (_781-PS_)
The memorandum bears the pencil notation, “Initiative with Himmler”.
Subsequent events showed how Himmler carried out this initiative.
(_b_) _Administration of concentration camps through SS agencies._
Furnishing guard personnel was not the only function of the SS with
relation to the camps. The entire internal management of the camps,
including the use of prisoners, their housing, clothing, sanitary
conditions, the determination of their right to live and the disposal of
their remains, was controlled by the SS. Such management was first
vested in the leader of the SS Death Head Units, who also had the title
of Inspector of the Concentration Camps. This official was originally a
part of the SS Main Office (_SS Hauptamt_), represented on the chart by
the second box from the left (_Chart Number 3_).
During the course of the war, in March 1942, control of concentration
camps was transferred to another of the departments of the SS Supreme
Command, the SS Economic and Administration Main Office (commonly known
as WVHA). That department is indicated on the chart by the third box
from the left (_Chart Number 3_).
That change was announced in a letter to Himmler 30 April 1942 from SS
Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS Pohl, the Chief of WVHA
(_R-129_). In that letter Pohl reported on the measures he had taken to
carry out Himmler’s order of 3 March 1942 to transform the camps into
large scale economic enterprises, and inclosed an order to all
concentration camp commanders which provided that no longer was there to
be any limit on working hours in the camps. (_R-129_)
(_c_) _SS control of concentration camps and the slave labor program._
This shift of control to WVHA coincided with the change in the basic
purposes of the concentration camps. Political and security reasons,
which previously had been the grounds for confinement, were abandoned
and the camps were made to serve the Nazi slave labor program.
To satisfy the increased demands for manpower it was not enough to work
the inmates of the camp harder. More inmates had to be obtained. Through
its police arm, the SS was prepared to satisfy this demand. On 17
December 1942 an order was issued to all commanders of the Security
Police and SD directing that at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for
work be sent immediately to the concentration camps (_1063-D-PS_).
Thirty-five thousand prisoners was, of course, merely the beginning. The
SS dragnet was capable of catching many more slaves. A directive to all
the departments of the SS Supreme Command signed by Himmler at his field
headquarters on 5 August 1943, ordered the collection of men, women, and
children for work in coal mines (_744-PS_). This directive implements an
order signed by Keitel directing the use of all males captured in
guerilla fighting in the East for forced labor (_744-PS_). The Himmler
directive, it will be noted, is addressed to every main office in the SS
Supreme Command:
“_Subject_: Manpower for coal mining industry. _Reference_:
Letter of the command staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS—journal No.
Ia/1909/43 secret.
Secret
1. Chief of the personal staff of Reichsfuehrer SS.
2. SS Main Office.
3. Reich security main office (RSHA).
4. Race and resettlement main office—SS.
5. Main office, ordinary police.
6. SS economic administrative main office.
7. SS personal main office.
8. Main office SS court.
9. SS Supreme Command—Headquarters of the Waffen SS.
10. Staff Headquarters of the Reichscommissar for the
consolidation of Germanism.
11. Main office center for Racial Germans (_Volksdeutsche
Mittelstelle_).
12. Office of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Heissmeyer.
13. Chief of the guerilla-fighting units.
14. Higher SS and Police Leader Ostland.
15. Higher SS and Police Leader Russia-Center.
16. Higher SS and Police Leader Russia-South.
17. Higher SS and Police Leader Northeast.
18. Higher SS and Police Leader East.
19. Higher SS and Police Leader Alpine territory.
20. Higher SS and Police Leader Serbia.
21. Commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer SS for Croatia.
“To figure 4 of the above-mentioned order, I order, that all
young female prisoners, capable of work, are to be sent to
Germany for work, through the agency of Reich Commissioner
Sauckel.
“Children, old women, and men are to be collected and employed
in the women’s and children’s camps, established by me, on
estates as well as on the border of the evacuated area.”
(_744-PS_)
In April 1944 the SS was called on to produce even more laborers, this
time 100,000 to be drawn from Hungarian Jews, as shown by the minutes of
Speer’s discussion with Himmler on 6 and 7 April 1944. (_R-124_)
The last source of manpower had not been tapped. To Jews, deportees,
women and children, there was added the productive power of prisoners of
war. Naturally enough it was through the SS that the conspirators
squeezed the last drop of labor from such prisoners. Speer’s minutes of
his conference with the Fuehrer on 5 March 1944, state:
“Told the Fuehrer of the Reichs Marshal’s wish for further
utilization of the production power of prisoners of war by
giving the direction of the Stalag to the SS with the exception
of the English and Americans. The Fuehrer considers the proposal
good and has asked Colonel von Below to arrange matters
accordingly.” (_R-124_)
That matters were soon arranged is shown by Speer’s statement made at
the 58th discussion of the Central Planning Board on 25 May 1944
(_R-124_):
“Speer: We have come to an arrangement with the Reichsfuehrer SS
as soon as possible so that PW’s he picks up are made available
for our purposes. The Reichsfuehrer SS gets from 30 to 40
thousand men per month.” (_R-124_)
Finally, in order to insure SS control over the labor of prisoners of
war, the Reichsfuehrer SS was appointed by Hitler as head of all
prisoner of war camps on 25 September 1944. A circular letter from the
Director of the Party Chancellery, 30 September 1944 and signed by M.
Bormann, states:
“1. The Fuehrer has ordered under the date 25 Sept 1944: The
custody of all prisoners of war and interned persons, as well as
prisoner of war camps, and institutions with guards are
transferred to the commander of the Reserve Army from October 1,
1944.
* * * * * *
“2. The Reichsfuehrer SS has commanded:
“_a._ In my capacity as Commander of the Reserve Army, I
transfer the affairs of prisoners of war to Gottleb Berger,
SS-Lieut. General (_SS-Obergruppenfuehrer und General der
Waffen-SS_) Chief of Staff of the _Volkstums_.”
* * * * * *
“_c._ The mobilization of labor of the prisoners of war will be
organized with the present labor mobilization office in joint
action between SS-Lieut. General Berger (SS-Obergruppenfuehrer)
and SS-Lieut. General Pohl.
“The strengthening of security in the field of prisoner of war
affairs is to be accomplished between SS-Lieut. General Berger
and the Chief of the Security Police, SS-Lieut. Gen. Dr.
Kaltenbrunner.” (_058-PS_)
So impressive were the results obtained from SS concentration camp labor
that Goering on 14 February 1944 called on Himmler for more inmates for
use in the aircraft industry (_1584-I-PS_). Himmler’s reply to that
request reads, in part, as follows:
“Most Honored Reichsmarshal:
“Following my teletype letter of the 18 Feb. 44 I herewith
transmit a survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation
industry.
“This survey indicates that at the present time about _36,000
prisoners_ are employed for the purposes of the air force. An
increase to a total of _90,000 prisoners is_ contemplated.
“The production is being discussed, established, and executed
between the Reich Ministry of aviation and the chief of my
economic-administrative main office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of the Waffen-SS, Pohl respectively.
“We assist with all forces at our disposal.
“The task of my economic-administrative main office, however, is
not solely fulfilled with the delivery of the prisoners to the
aviation industry as SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl and his
assistants take care of the required working speed thru constant
and supervision of the work-groups [Kommandos] and therefore
have some influence on the results of production. In this
respect I may suggest consideration of the fact that in
enlarging our responsibility thru a speeding up of the total
work, better results can definitely be expected.
“We also have for some time adjusted our own stone-quarries to
production for the airforce. For instance in Flossenbuerg near
Weiden the prisoners employed previously in the quarry are
working now in the fighter plane program for the Messerschmitt
corporation Regensburg, which saw in the availability of our
stone-mason shops and labor forces after the attack on
Regensburg at that time a favorable opportunity for the
immediate partial transfer of their production. Altogether 4,000
prisoners will work there after the expansion. We produce now
with 2,000 men 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers
as well as 120,000 single parts of various kinds for the fighter
ME 109.
“In Oranienburg we are employing 6,000 prisoners at the Heinkel
works now for construction of the HE 177. With that we have
supplied 60% of the total crew of the plant.”
* * * * * *
“The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry
to subterranean locations requires _further_ employment of about
100,000 prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of
your letter of 14 Feb. 1944 are already under way.
“I shall keep you, most honored Reichsmarshal, currently
informed on this subject.
“Heil Hitler
“[initialled] HH” (_1584-III-PS_)
Inclosed with that letter was a report in tabular form of the number of
prisoners being used in each of the concentration camps, the total
man-hours for the month of January 1944, and the type of production in
which such prisoners were engaged. That report is signed by Pohl, the
Chief of WVHA (_1584-III-PS_). The total appearing under the column
“Number of prisoners planned” is 90,785; under the column “Number of
prisoners used,” 35,839; and under the column “Man-hours—January,”
8,733,495. (_1584-III-PS_)
The extent to which the number of prisoners was increased through SS
efforts is illustrated by a report from Office Group D of WVHA, 15
August 1944:
“_Subject_: Report of the number of prisoners and Survey of prisoners
clothing type G and Z and the supply of G available.
“Reference: Telephone call by SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Waschkau on 15.8.44.”
* * * * * *
“With reference to the above-mentioned telephone call, I am
sending herewith a report on the actual number of prisoners for
1.8.1944 and of the new arrivals already announced, as well as
the clothing report for 15.8.44.
“(1). The actual number on 1.8.44, consisted of:
_a._ Male prisoners 379,167
_b._ Female prisoners 145,119
“In addition, there are the following new arrivals:
1. From the Hungary program (anti-Jewish action) 90,000
2. From Litzmannstadt (Police prison and Ghetto) 60,000
3. Poles from the General Government 15,000
4. Convicts from the Eastern Territories 10,000
5. Former Polish officers 17,000
6. From Warsaw (Poles) 400,000
7. Continued arrivals from France approx. 15,000-20,000
“Most of the prisoners are already on the way and will be
received into the Concentration Camps within the next few days.”
(_1166-PS_)
(_d_) _SS control of concentration camps and the ill treatment and
murder of inmates._ The intensive drive for manpower to some extent
interfered with the program already undertaken by WVHA to exterminate
certain classes of individuals in the camps. This is shown by a letter
from WVHA, Department D Concentration Camps, 28 March 1942, addressed to
a number of concentration camp commandants and signed Liebehenschel, SS
Obersturmbannfuehrer:
“It became known through a report of a Camp Commandant that 42
prisoners out of 51 which were mustered out for the special
treatment 14 f 13 again became capable of work after a period of
time and therefore do not have to be directed to the special
treatment. From this it appears that the selection of the
prisoners is not being handled according to given directives.
Only those prisoners are allowed to be directed to the
examination commission who fulfill the given stipulations and
who above all are no longer capable of work.
“In order to be able to fulfill the designated missions of the
concentration camps, the working capabilities of every prisoner
must be retained for the camp. The camp commandants of the
concentration camps are requested to especially make this their
aim.” (_1151-P-PS_)
Another letter from WVHA, Department D Concentration Camps, 27 April
1943, addressed to a number of concentration camp commanders, signed by
Gluecks, SS Brigade Fuehrer and Major General of the Waffen SS, deals
with the same point:
“The Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police has decided,
after consultation, that in the future only mentally sick
(_geisteskranke_) prisoners may be selected for action 14 F 13
by the medical commissions appointed for this purpose.
“All other prisoners incapable of working (tubercular cases,
bedridden cripples, etc.) are to be basically excepted from this
action. Bedridden prisoners are to be drafted for suitable work
which they can perform in bed.
“The order of the Reich Fuehrer SS is to be obeyed strictly in
the future.
“Requests for fuel for this purpose, therefore, do not take
place.” (_1933-PS_)
The SS, however, was to some degree enabled to achieve both goals—that
of increased production and of elimination of undesirable individuals,
as shown by the agreement between Minister of Justice Thierack and
Himmler on 18 September 1942 (_654-PS_). That agreement provided for the
delivery of antisocial elements after the execution of their sentences
to the Reichsfuehrer SS “to be worked to death.”
The conditions under which such persons worked in the camps were well
calculated to lead to their deaths. Those conditions were regulated by
the WVHA. An illustration of WVHA management is to be found in an order
directed to commandants of concentration camps, 11 August 1942, and
issued by SS Brigade Fuehrer and General of the Waffen SS Gluecks, Chief
of Office Group D of WVHA (_2189-PS_):
“The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police has
ordered, that punishment by beating will be executed in
concentration camps for women by _prisoners_—under the ordered
supervision.
“In order to coordinate this order the main office chief of the
main SS economic administration office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer
and General of the Waffen-SS Pohl, has ordered, effective
immediately, that punishment by beating will also be executed by
prisoners in concentration camps for men.” (_2189-PS_)
Even after their deaths, the prisoners did not escape the management of
WVHA. A directive to the commanders of concentration camps, 12 September
1942, signed by the Chief of the Central Office of Office Group D of
WVHA, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Liebehenschel, provided:
“According to a communication of the Chief of the Security
Police and the SD and conforming to a report of the Chief of
Security Police and SD in Prague, urns of deceased Czechs and
Jews were sent for burial to the home-cemeteries within the
Protectorate.
“Based on different events (Demonstrations, erecting of posters
inimical to the Reich on urns of deceased inmates in halls of
cemeteries in the home-communities, pilgrimages to the graves of
deceased inmates, etc.) within the Protectorate, the delivery of
urns with the ash remnants of deceased Nationals of the
Protectorate and of Jews is henceforth prohibited. The urns
shall be preserved within the Concentration Camps. In case of
doubt about the preservation of the urns oral instructions shall
be available at this agency.” (_2199-PS_)
(_e_) _SS use of concentration camp labor for pecuniary profit._ The SS
regarded the inmates of concentration camps as its own personal property
to be used for its own economic advantage. The suggestion in Himmler’s
letter to Goering, will be recalled, that the SS be given a larger
responsibility in the armament program conducted in the camps
(_1584-III-PS_). As early as 1942 Speer recognized that the SS was
motivated by the desire for further profits when he suggested to Hitler
in a conference on 20, 21, and 22 September that the SS receive a share
of the war equipment produced by concentration camp labor in ratio to
the working hours of the prisoners (_R-124_). The Fuehrer agreed that a
3 to 5 percent share would satisfy SS commanders (_R-124_). Himmler
himself frankly admitted his intention to derive profits for SS purposes
from the camps in his speech to the officers of the SS Leibstandarte
“Adolf Hitler” (_1918-PS_):
“* * * The apartment-building program which is the prerequisite
for a healthy and social basis of the entire SS as well as of
the entire Fuehrerkorps can be carried out only when I get the
money for it from somewhere; nobody is going to give me the
money, it must be earned, and it will be earned by forcing the
scum of mankind, the prisoners, the professional criminals to do
positive work. The man, guarding these prisoners, serves just as
hard as the one on close-order drill. The one who does this and
stands near these utterly negative people will learn within 3 to
4 months * * * and we shall see: In peacetime I shall form
guard-battalions and put them on duty for 3 months only—to
fight the inferior being (_Untermenschentum_), and this will not
be a boring guard duty, but if the officers handle it right, it
will be the best indoctrination on inferior beings and the
inferior races. This activity is necessary, as I said; 1. to
eliminate those negative people from the German people; 2. to
exploit them once more for the great folk community by having
them break stones and bake bricks so that the Fuehrer can again
erect his grand buildings; and 3. to in turn invest the money,
earned soberly this way, in houses, in ground, in settlements so
that our men can have houses in which to raise large families
and lots of children. This in turn is necessary because we stand
or die with this leading blood of Germany and if the good blood
is not reproduced we will not be able to rule the world.”
(_1918-PS_)
(4) _Functions and activities with respect to human experiments._ One
aspect of SS control over concentration camps remains to be
mentioned—its direction of the program of biological experiments on
human beings which was carried on in the camps. An American military
tribunal has passed judgment on some of the SS members who participated
in these experiments at Dachau. The purpose of this discussion is to
show only that those experiments were the result of SS direction and
that the SS played a vital part in their successful execution.
The program seems to have originated in a request by Dr. Sigmund Rascher
to Himmler for permission to utilize persons in concentration camps as
material for experiments with human beings, in connection with research
he was conducting on behalf of the Luftwaffe. A letter dated 15 May
1941, addressed to the Reichsfuehrer SS and signed by S. Rascher reads
in part as follows:
“For the time being I have been assigned to the
_Luftgaukommando_ VLL, Munich for a medical course. During this
course, where researches on high-altitude flights play a
prominent part (determined by the somewhat higher ceiling of the
English fighter planes) considerable regret was expressed at the
fact that no tests with human material had yet been possible for
us, as such experiments are very dangerous and nobody volunteers
for them. I put, therefore, the serious question: can you make
available two or three professional criminals for these
experiments? The experiments are made at _Bodenstaendige
Bruefstells fuer Hoehenforschung der Luftwaffe_, Munich. The
experiments, by which the subjects can, of course, die, would
take place with my cooperation. They are essential for
researches on high-altitude flight and cannot be carried out, as
has been tried, with monkeys, who offer entirely different
test-conditions. I have had a very confidential talk with a
representative of the air forces surgeon who makes these
experiments. He is also of the opinion that the problem in
question could only be solved by experiments on human persons.
(Feeble-minded could also be used as that material.)”
(_1602-PS_)
Dr. Rascher promptly received assurance that he would be allowed to
utilize concentration camp inmates for his experiments.
A letter dated 22 May 1941, addressed to Dr. Rascher and bearing the
signature of SS Sturmbannfuehrer Karl Brandt, reads in part:
“Shortly before flying to Oslo, the Reichsfuehrer SS gave me
your letter of 15 May 1941, for partial reply.
“I can inform you that prisoners will of course be gladly made
available for the high-flight researches. I have informed the
Chief of the Security Police of this agreement of the
Reichsfuehrer SS, and requested that the competent official be
instructed to get in touch with you.” (_1582-PS_)
The altitude experiments were conducted by Rascher. In May 1942 General
Field Marshal Milch on behalf of the Luftwaffe expressed his thanks to
the SS for the assistance it furnished in connection with the
experiments. This letter, dated 20 May 1942, addressed to SS
Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff reads in part:
“In reference to your telegram of 12 May our sanitary inspector
reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the
SS and Air Force at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation
of these experiments seems essentially unreasonable. However the
carrying out of experiments of some other kind, in regard to
perils at high seas, would be important. These have been
prepared in immediate agreement with the proper offices; Major
(M.C.) Weltz will be charged with the execution and Capt. (M.C.)
Rascher will be made available until further orders in addition
to his duties within the Medical Corps of the Air Corps. A
change of these measures does not appear necessary, and an
enlargement of the task is not considered pressing at this time.
“The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these
low-temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at another
place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau.
“I convey the special thanks from the supreme commander of the
Air Corps to the SS for their extensive cooperation.
“I remain with best wishes for you in good comradeship and with
“Heil Hitler!
“Always yours
“s/s E. Milch” (_343-PS_)
Having finished his high-altitude experiments, Dr. Rascher proceeded to
experiment with methods of rewarming persons who had been subjected to
extreme cold. On 10 September 1942 he rendered an intermediate report on
intense chilling experiments which had been started in Dachau on 15
August (_1618-PS_). That report states:
“The experimental subjects (VP) were placed in the water,
dressed in complete flying uniform, winter or summer
combination, and with an aviator’s helmet. A life jacket made of
rubber or kapok was to prevent submerging. The experiments were
carried out at water temperatures varying from 2.5° to 12°.”
* * * * * *
“Electrical measurements gave low temperature readings of 26.4°
in the stomach and 26.5° in the rectum. Fatalities occurred only
when the brain stem and the back of the head were also chilled.
Autopsies of such fatal cases always revealed large amounts of
free blood, up to ½ liter, in the cranial cavity. The heart
invariably showed extreme dilation of the right chamber. As soon
as the temperature in these experiments reached 28°, the
experimental subjects (VP) died invariably, despite all attempts
at resuscitation.”
* * * * * *
“During attempts to save severely chilled persons
(_Unterkuehlte_), it was shown that rapid rewarming was in all
cases preferable to slow rewarming, because after removal from
the cold water, the body temperature continued to sink rapidly.
I think that for this reason we can dispense with the attempt to
save intensely chilled subjects by means of animal heat.
“Rewarming by animal warmth—animal bodies or women’s
bodies—would be too slow.” (_1618-PS_)
Although Rascher was of the preliminary opinion that rewarming by
women’s bodies would be too slow, means for conducting such experiments
were nevertheless placed at his disposal. A letter from the
Reichsfuehrer SS, signed Himmler, 16 November 1942, and addressed to Lt.
General Pohl, the head of WVHA, read as follows:
“The following struck me during my visit to Dachau on the 13 Nov
1942 regarding the experiments conducted there for the saving of
people whose lives are endangered through exposure
(_Unterkuehlung_) in ice, snow, or water and who are to be saved
by the employment of every method or means:
“I had ordered that suitable women are to be set aside from the
Concentration Camp for these experiments for the warming of
these who were exposed. Four girls were set aside who were in
the Concentration Camp due to loose living, and being
prostitutes, they formulate a danger of contagion. * * *”
(_1583-PS_)
To insure the continuance of Rascher’s experiments, Himmler arranged for
his transfer to the Waffen SS. A letter dated November 1942 from the
Reichsfuehrer SS addressed to “Dear Comrade Milch,” stated:
“You will recall that through General Wolff I particularly
recommended to you for your consideration the work of a certain
SS Fuehrer, Dr. Rascher, who is a physician of the air force on
leave (_Arzt des Beurlaubtenstandes der Luftwaffe_).
“These researches which deal with the behavior of the human
organism at great heights, as well as with manifestations caused
by prolonged cooling of the human body in cold water, and
similar problems which are of vital importance to the air force
in particular, can be performed by us with particular efficiency
because I personally assumed the responsibility for supplying
asocial individuals and criminals who deserve only to die
(_todeswuerdig_) from concentration camps for these
experiments.”
* * * * * *
“I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt in reserve, from
the air force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen-SS. I
would then assume the sole responsibility for having these
experiments made in this field, and would put the results, of
which we in the SS need only a part for the frost injuries in
the East, entirely at the disposal of the air force. However, in
this connection I suggest that with the liaison between you and
Wolff a “non-Christian” physician should be charged, who should
be at the same time honorable as a scientist and not prone to
intellectual theft and who could be informed of the results.
This physician should also have good contacts with the
adminstrative[administrative?] authorities, so that the results
would really obtain a hearing.
“I believe that this solution—to transfer Dr. Rascher to the
SS, so that he could carry out the experiments under my
responsibility and under my orders—is the best way. The
experiments should not be stopped; we owe that to our men. If
Dr. Rascher remained with the air force, there would certainly
be much annoyance; because then I would have to bring a series
of unpleasant details to you, because of the arrogance and
assumption which Professor Dr. Holzloehner has displayed in the
post of Dachau—who is under my command—about me in utterances
delivered to SS Colonel Sievers. In order to save both of us
this trouble, I suggest again that Dr. Rascher should be
transferred to the Waffen SS as quickly as possible.”
(_1617-PS_)
Rascher’s experiments were by no means the only experiments in which the
SS was interested. Without attempting even to outline the whole extent
of the experimental program, one further illustration of this type of SS
activity may be mentioned. That is a report prepared by the Chief
Hygienist in the office of the Reich Surgeon of the SS and Police, SS
Oberfuehrer Dr. Mrugowsky, 12 September 1944, relating to experiments
with poisoned bullets.
“On 11 September 1944, in the presence of SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
Dr. Ding, Dr. Widman and the undersigned, experiments with
Akonotinnitrate bullets were carried out on five persons who had
been sentenced to death. The caliber of the bullets used was
7.65 cm and they were filled with the poison in crystal form.
Each subject of the experiments received one shot in the upper
part of the left thigh, while in a horizontal position. In the
case of 2 persons, the bullets passed clean through the upper
part of the thigh. Even later no effect from the poison could be
seen. These two subjects were therefore rejected * * *.”
* * * * * *
“The symptoms shown by the three condemned persons were
surprisingly the same. At first, nothing special was noticeable.
After 20 to 25 minutes, a disturbance of the motor nerves and a
light flow of saliva began, but both stopped again. After 40 to
44 minutes a strong flow of saliva appeared. The poisoned
persons swallowed frequently, later the flow of saliva is so
strong that it can no longer be controlled by swallowing. Foamy
saliva flows from the mouth. Then, a sensation of choking, and
vomiting start.” (_L-103_)
The next three paragraphs describe in coldly scientific fashion the
reactions of the dying persons. That description then concludes:
“At the same time there was pronounced nausea. One of the
poisoned persons tried in vain to vomit. In order to succeed he
put 4 fingers of his hand, up to the main joint, right into his
mouth. In spite of this, no vomiting occurred. His face became
quite red.
“The faces of the other two subjects were already pale at an
early stage. Other symptoms were the same. Later on the
disturbance of the motor nerves increased so much that the
persons threw themselves up and down rolled their eyes and made
aimless movements with their hands and arms. At last, the
disturbance subsided, the pupils were enlarged to the maximum,
the condemned lay still. Massetercramp and loss of urine was
observed in one of them. Death occurred 121, and 129 minutes
after they were shot.” (_L-103_)
The fact that SS doctors engaged in such experiments was no accident. It
was consistent with an ideology and racial philosophy which, to use
Himmler’s own words, regarded human beings as lice and offal. But the
most important factor was the fact that only the SS was in a position to
supply necessary human material. And it did supply such material through
WVHA. A letter from the Department Chief of Office Group D of WVHA, 12
May 1944, addressed to the commandants of all concentration camps dealt
with the assignment of prisoners for the experimental purposes:
“There is cause to call attention to the fact that in every case
permission for assignment has to be requested here _before_
assignment of prisoners is made for experimental purposes.
“To be included in this request are number, kind of custody, and
in case of aryan prisoners, exact personal data, file number in
the Main Reich’s Security Office and reason for detainment into
the concentration camp.
“Herewith, I explicitly forbid assignment of prisoners for
experimental purposes without permission.” (_1751-PS_)
It was on the basis of its ability to supply such material that the
Ministry of Finance was prepared to subsidize the SS experimental
program. This matter was discussed in a series of letters between the
Ministry of Finance, the Reichs Research Department, and the Reich
Surgeon of the SS and police (_002-PS_). The first is from the office of
the Executive Council of the Reichs Research Department, addressed to
the Reichs Surgeon SS and Police, 19 February 1943, and signed by
Mentzel, Chief of Bureau, SS Brigade Leader:
“The Reichs Minister of Finance told me that you requested 53
leading positions (BES. GR C3-C8) for your office, partly for a
new research institute.
“After the Reichsmarschall of the Great German Reich had, as
President of the Reichs Research Dept., entrusted himself with
all German research, issued directives among other things, that
in the execution of military important scientific tasks, the
available institutions including equipment and personnel should
be utilized to the utmost for reasons of necessary economization
(of effort).
“The foundation of new institutes comes therefore only in
question in as far as there are no outstanding institutes
available for the furtherance of important war research tasks.”
(_002-PS_)
To this letter the Reich Surgeon of SS and Police replied on 26 February
1943:
“In acknowledgment of your correspondence of the 19th Feb. 1943,
I am able to reply the following to it today:
“The appropriation for the 53 key positions for my office which
you made the basis of your memorandum was a veritable peace
plan.
“The special institutes of the SS which are to be partly staffed
through this appropriation are to serve the purpose to establish
and make accessible for the entire realm of scientific research,
the particular possibilities of research only possessed by the
SS.”
* * * * * *
“I will gladly be at your disposal at any time to discuss the
particular research aims in connection with the SS, which I
would like to bring up upon the direction of the Reichs Director
SS.” (_002-PS_)
An interview between the Reich Surgeon and Mentzel took place, and on 25
March 1943 Mentzel wrote the following letter to the Reich Minister of
Finance:
“In regard to your correspondence of the 19th Dec (J 4761—174 I
g III. Ang) to which I gave you a preliminary communication on
the 19th Feb, I finally take the following position:
“The Surgeon General-SS and Police, in a personal discussion,
told me that the budget claim which he looks after is used
primarily in the pure military sector of the Waffen SS. Since it
is established on a smaller scale for the enlarging of
scientific research possibilities, they pertain therefore
exclusively to such affairs that are carried out with the
material (Prisoners—‘_Haflinge_’) which is only accessible to
the Waffen SS and are therefore not to be undertaken for any
other experimental purposes.
“I cannot object therefore on the part of the Reichs
Experimental Counsel against the budget claims of the Surgeon
General, SS and Police.” (_002-PS_)
(5) _Functions and Activities with respect to Jewish Persecution._
Through its activities with respect to concentration camps the SS
performed part of its mission to safeguard the security of the Nazi
regime. But another specialized aspect of that mission must not be
forgotten. Himmler had defined that task as the prevention of a
“_Jewish_ Bolshevist revolution of subhumans.” In plain words this meant
participation in the Nazi program of Jewish persecution and
extermination. That program involved every branch and component of the
SS.
The racial philosophy of the SS made that organization a natural agency
for the execution of all types of anti-semitic measures. The SS position
on the Jewish question was publicly stated in the SS newspaper “_Das
Schwarze Korps_,” in the issue of 8 August 1940, by its editor, Gunter
d’Alquen (_2668-PS_). “_Das Schwarze Korps_” was the official propaganda
agency of the SS which every SS man was required to read and to induce
others to read. This was the SS position on the Jews:
“Just as the Jewish question will be solved for Germany only
when the last Jew has been deported, so the rest of Europe
should realize that the German peace which awaits it must be a
peace without Jews.” (_2668-PS_)
The attempted “solution” of the Jewish question through pogroms and
“spontaneous” demonstrations occurred following the murder of von Rath
in November 1938. In these demonstrations all branches of the SS were
called on to play a part. The teletype message from SS Gruppenfuehrer
Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued on 10 November
1938 concerning “Measures against Jews tonight,” provided:
“* * * The direction of the measures of the Security Police
concerning the demonstrations against Jews is vested with the
organs of the State Police—inasmuch as the inspectors of the
Security Police are not issuing their own orders. In order to
carry out the measures of the Security Police, officials of the
Criminal Police, as well as members of the SD, of the
_Verfuegungstruppe_ and the _Allgemeine SS_ may be used.”
(_3051-PS_)
With the outbreak of the war and the march of Nazi armies over the
Continent, the SS participated in “solving” the Jewish question in all
the countries of Europe. The solution was nothing short of
extermination. To a large degree these wholesale murders were disguised
under the name of “anti-partisan” or “anti-guerilla” actions, and as
such included as victims not merely Jews but Soviets, Poles, and other
Eastern peoples. One example of an action confined essentially to Jews
was the mass annihilation of Jews in gas vans (_501-PS_). Those vans
were operated by the Security Police and SD under the direction of RSHA.
Another example is found in the report entitled “Solution of the Jewish
Question in Galicia,” prepared by SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lt. General of
the Police Katzman and rendered to SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of
the Police Krueger (_L-18_). The “solution,” which consisted in
evacuation and extermination of all the Jews in Galicia and confiscation
of their property, was carried out under the energetic direction of the
SS and Police Leaders, with the assistance of SS police units, as the
report proudly boasts. Three additional items in that report dealing
specifically with the SS should be noted. The first is the text under a
photograph in the original report:
“Great was the joy of the SS men when the Reichsfuehrer SS in
person in 1942 visited some camps along the Rollbahn.” (_L-18_)
The second is a balance sheet, showing the income from forced Jewish
labor and expenditures therefrom. Item 3 on the balance sheet reads as
follows:
“3. Amount paid over to the SS cashier:
_a._ Camps 6,876,251,00 Zl
_b._ W&R Factories 6,556,513,69 Zl
————————
13,432,764,69 Zl
Further payments to the SS-cashier are effected every month.”
(_L-18_)
The third is the last two paragraphs of the report:
“Despite the extraordinary burden heaped upon every single SS
Police Officer during these actions, mood and spirit of the men
were extraordinarily good and praiseworthy to the last day.
“Only thanks to the sense of duty of every single leader and man
have we succeeded to get rid of this PLAGUE in so short a time.”
(_L-18_)
One final example of SS participation in Jewish extermination is the
report by SS Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Police, Stroop, of
the destruction of the Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw during April and May 1943
(_1061-PS_). Two sections of that report dealing with the constitution
of the participating forces should be noted. A table of the units used
indicates the average number of officers and men from each unit employed
per day. It will be observed that among the units involved were the
staff of the SS and Police Leader, two battalions of the Waffen SS, two
battalions of the 22d SS Police Regiment and members of the Security
Police. The part played by the Waffen SS particularly came in for high
praise from the writer of the report. Tribute is paid to the toughness
of the men of the Waffen SS, Police, and _Wehrmacht_. In the next
paragraph the writer says:
“Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen SS
had been trained for only three or four weeks before being
assigned to this action, high credit should be given for the
pluck, courage and devotion to duty which they showed.”
(_1061-PS_)
The selection methods and ideological education of Waffen SS men
furnished such good grounding that a few weeks of practice was all that
was required to turn them into excellent exterminators. Himmler’s proud
boast of the part that the SS played in the extermination of the Jews
occurs in his Posen Speech:
“Most of _you_ must know what it means when 100 corpses are
lying side by side, or 500 or 1,000. To have stuck it out and at
the same time—apart from the exceptions caused by human
weakness—to have remained decent fellows, that is what has made
us hard. This is a page of glory in our history which has never
been written and is never to be written * * *.” (_1919-PS_)
(6) _Functions and activities with respect to preparing for and waging
aggressive war._ From the very beginning the SS made prime contributions
to the conspirators’ aggressive aims. First, it served as one of the
para-military organizations under which the conspirators disguised their
building up of an Army in violation of the Versailles Treaty. Second,
through affiliated SS organizations in other countries and through some
of the departments in its own Supreme Command, it fostered Fifth Column
movements outside Germany and prepared the way for aggression. Third,
through its militarized units, it participated in the aggressive actions
which were eventually carried out.
(_a_) _The SS as a para-military organization._ The para-military
character of the General SS is apparent from the military character of
its structure, the military discipline required of its members, and the
steps it took to enlist in its ranks young men of military age. In
addition to this volunteer Army the SS created, as early as 1933, fully
armed professional soldiers who complied with the requirement for
compulsory military service by performing duties in the SS. These were
the _SS Vorfuegungstruppe_ and the Death Head Units.
(_b_) _The SS as a fifth column agency._ While building up the SS as a
military force within Germany, the conspirators also utilized it in
other countries to lay the groundwork for aggression. During the seizure
of Austria, the _SS Standarte 89_ was directly involved in the murder of
Chancellor Dolfuss, and a memorial placque was erected in Vienna as a
tribute to the SS men who participated in that murder (_L-273_;
_2968-PS_). Subsequently, on the night of 11 March 1938, the SS with the
SA marched into Vienna and occupied all government buildings and
important posts in the city. (See the report of Gauleiter Rainer to
Reich Commissioner Buerckel (_812-PS_); and the record of the telephone
conversations between Goering and Dambrowski (_2949-PS_)).
The same pattern was repeated in Czechoslovakia. Henlein’s Free Corps
played in that country the part of fifth column which the SS had played
in Austria and was rewarded, in September 1938, by being placed under
the jurisdiction of the Reichsfuehrer SS (_388-PS, Items 37, 38_).
Moreover, a Most Secret OKW order of 28 September 1938, reveals that the
SS had its own armed units, four battalions of _Totenkopf Verbaende_,
actually operating in Czechoslovakian territory before the Munich Pact
was signed (_388-PS, Item 36_).
But SS preparations for aggression were not confined to military forces.
One of the departments of the SS Supreme Command, the _Volksdeutsche
Mittelstelle_, was a center for fifth column activity. At the secret
meeting between Ribbentrop and Henlein in March 1938, at which the line
to be followed by the Sudeten German Party was determined, the
_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_ was represented by Professor Haushofer and
SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz (_2788-PS_). And when the Foreign Office in
August 1938 awarded further subsidies to Henlein’s Sudeten Party, the
memorandum of that recommendation (_3059-PS_) contained the significant
footnote:
“Volksdeutsche Mittlestelle will be informed.” (_3059-PS_)
(_c_) _SS participation in aggressive war._ When at last the time came
to strike, the SS was ready. In the words of the National Socialist
Yearbook for 1940 (_2164-PS_):
“When the march into the liberated provinces of the Sudetenland
began on that memorable October 1, 1938, _Verfuegungstruppe_ as
well as the Death Head Units were along with those in the lead.
* * *”
“The 15th of March 1939 brought a similar utilization of the SS
when it served to establish order in collapsing Czechoslovakia.
This action ended with the founding of the protectorate
Bohemia-Moravia.
“Only a week later, on the 29th of March 1939, Memel also
returned to the Reich upon basis of an agreement with Lithuania.
Again it was the SS, here above all the Eastern Prussian SS,
which played a prominent part in the liberation of this
province.” (_2164-PS_)
In the final act which set off the war, the attack on Poland in
September 1939, the SS acted as stage manager. In his affidavit
(_Affidavit A_), Maj. Gen. Erwin Lahousen describes the simulated attack
on the radio station Gleiwitz by Germans dressed in Polish uniforms, as
one of the most mysterious actions which took place in the _Abwehr_
office:
“This was an incident which had been deliberately engineered and
directed by the SD and it was executed by prisoners from
Concentration Camps dressed up in Polish uniforms, and using
Polish weapons and equipment. Those prisoners were later
murdered by the SD in order to eliminate any possibility of
their giving testimony of the incident.” (_Affidavit A_)
The war erupted and the Waffen SS again took its place in the van of the
attacking forces.
(7) _Functions and activities with respect to commission of war crimes._
During the war great use was made of the peculiar qualities possessed by
the SS—qualities not only of its combat force, but of its other
components as well—in executing tasks embracing the commission of war
crimes and crimes against humanity.
(_a_) _“Antipartisan” operations._ A directive issued by Keitel on 13
March 1941, making preparations 3 months in advance for the attack on
Russia, provided that in the area of operations the Reichsfuehrer SS was
entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political
administration—tasks which would result from the struggle about to
commence between two opposing political systems. (_447-PS_)
One of the steps taken by the Reichsfuehrer SS to carry out those
“special tasks” was the formation and use of so-called “anti-partisan”
units. They were discussed by Himmler in his Posen speech:
“In the meantime I have also set up the Chief of the
anti-partisan units. Our comrade SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem
Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it
necessary for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative
command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are
best in position to take action against this enemy struggle,
which is decidedly a political one. Except where units which had
been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were
taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very
successful.
“It is notable that by setting up this department, we have
gained for the SS in turn, a division, a corps, an army, and the
next step—which is the High Command of an army or area of a
group—if you wish to call it that.” (_1919-PS_)
What the SS did with its division, corps, and army, out of which the
anti-partisan units were formed, is illustrated in the “Activity and
Situation Report No. 6 of the Task Forces of the Security Police and SD
in the U.S.S.R.,” covering the period from 1 to 31 October 1941
(_R-102_). The report shows that so-called “anti-partisan” activity was
actually nothing but a name for extermination of Jews and persons
believed politically undesirable. The report is a carefully organized
and detailed description of such extermination. Section I describes the
stations of the various Task Forces involved, and section II their
activities. The latter section is divided into parts, each dealing with
a different geographical region—the Baltic area, White Ruthenia, and
the Ukraine. Under each area the report of activities is classified
under three headings: (_a_) Partisan activity and counteraction; (_b_)
arrests and executions of communists and officials; and (_c_) Jews. The
following units were involved (_R-102_):
“The present stations are:
“Task Force A: since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk.
“Task Force B: continues in Smolensk.
“Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew.
“Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.
“The Action and Special Commandos (_Einsatz und Sonder
Commandos_) which are attached to the Task Force continue on the
march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been
assigned to them.” (_R-102_)
The section headed “Baltic area” and subsection labeled “Jews” read as
follows (_R-102_):
“Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on
the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not
been recorded on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination.
“However, the Estonian Protective Corps (_Selbstschutz_), formed
at the time of the entry of the Wehrmacht, immediately started a
comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action was under
the direction of the task force of the Security Police and the
SD.”
* * * * * *
“The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of
doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still
in progress. After completion of this action there will remain
only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern Territory.”
(_R-102_)
In the section headed “White Ruthenia,” the subsection labeled “Partisan
activity and counteraction,” the following appear:
“In Wultschina 8 juveniles were arrested as partisans and shot.
They were inmates of a children’s home. They had collected
weapons which they hid in the woods. Upon search the following
were found: 3 heavy machine guns, 15 rifles, several thousand
rounds of ammunition, several hand grenades, and several
packages of poison gas Ebrit.
“_b. Arrests and executions of communists, officials, and
criminals._
“A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was
devoted to the combatting of Communists and criminals. A special
Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63
officials, NKVD agents and agitators.” (_R-102_)
The preceding subsection ends with the following statement:
“The liquidations for the period covered by this report have
reached a total of 37,180 persons.” (_R-102_)
And under the section headed “Ukraine,” the subsection “Jews,” this
statement occurs:
“_Shitomir_
In Shitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience
they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propaganda and
saboteurs.” (_R-102_)
The foregoing report deals with the activities of four Task Forces—A,
B, C, and D. The more detailed report of Task Force A up to 15 October
1941 shows great variety of SS components in such a task force:
“This description of the over-all situation showed and shows
that the members of the Stapo [The Secret State Police], Kripo
and SD [Security Service] who are attached to the Action-Group,
are active mainly in Lithouania, Latvia, Esthonia,
White-Ruthenia and to a smaller part in front of Leningrad. It
shows further that the forces of the uniformed police and the
Armed SS are active mainly in front of Leningrad, in order to
take measures against the returning population and under their
own officers. This is so much easier because the Action
detachments in Lithouania, Latvia and Esthonia have at their
disposal native police units, as described in encl. 1, and
because so far 150 Latvian reinforcements have been sent to
White-Ruthenia.
“The distribution of the leaders of Security Police and SD
during the individual phases can be gathered from encl. 2, the
advance and the activities of the Action-Group and the
Action-detachments from encl. 3. It should be mentioned that the
leaders of the Armed-SS and of the uniformed police who are
reserves have declared their wish to stay on with the Security
Police and the SD.” (_L-180_)
Inclosure 1_a_ to this report shows the constitution of the Force:
“_Total Strength of Action Group A_:
_Percent_
“Total: 990
Waffen-SS 340 34.4
Motor Bicycle-Riders 172 17.4
Administration 18 1.8
Security Service [SD] 35 3.5
Criminal Police [Kripo] 41 4.1
State Police [Gestapo] 89 9.0
Auxiliary Police 87 8.8
Order Police 133 13.4
Female Employees 13 1.3
Interpreters 51 5.1
Teleprinter-Operators 3 0.3
Wireless-Operators 8 0.8 ” (_L-180_)
Another report on the anti-partisan activity, from the General Commissar
for White Ruthenia to the Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern
Territories, 5 June 1943, deals with the results of the police operation
“Cottbus”:
“* * * SS Brigadefuehrer, Major General of Police von Gottberg,
reports that the operation ‘Cottbus’ had the following result
during the period mentioned:
Enemy dead 4,500
Dead suspected of belonging to bands 5,000
German dead 59
* * * * * *
“The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy
destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492
rifles are taken from 4,500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows
that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from the
country. The battalion Dirlewanger especially has a reputation
for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000 people
suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and
children.
“By order of the Chief of Band-Combatting, SS Obergruppenfuehrer
von dem Bach, units of the armed forces have also participated
in the operation * * *” (_R-135_)
SS Obergruppenfuehrer vom dem Bach was referred to by Himmler as “our
comrade” when he placed him in charge of anti-partisan activity.
(_b_) _Execution of civilians._ The activities so far dealt with were
joint activities in which the Gestapo, Order Police, the SD, Waffen SS,
and SS Police Regiments were all involved. But these units were, of
course, also used individually to carry out tasks of such a
nature—tasks for which any component of the SS was well trained. A
letter from the Chief of the Command Office of the Waffen SS to the
Reichsfuehrer SS, 14 October 1941, contains an intermediate report on
civilian state of emergency:
“* * * I deliver the following report regarding the commitment
of the Waffen SS in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia during
the civilian state of emergency:
“In the mutual changes, all Battalions of the Waffen SS in the
Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia will be brought forth for
shootings, and relatively for the supervision at hangings.
“Up until now there occurred:
“in Prague: 99 shootings
21 hangings
“in Bruenn: 54 shootings
17 hangings
“Total: 191 executions (including 16 Jews)
“A complete report regarding other measures and on the conduct
of the officers, noncoms and men will be made following the
termination of the civilian state of emergency.” (_1972-PS_)
(_c_) _Murder of prisoners of war._ It is not surprising that units of
the Waffen SS, a branch which had thus been employed for extermination
actions and the execution of civilians, also violated the laws of
warfare when carrying on ordinary combat activities. Proof of these
violations is contained in a supplementary report of the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Court of Inquiry concerning the
shooting of allied prisoners of war by the 12th SS Panzer Division
(Hitler Jugend) in Normandy, France, on 7-21 June 1944 (_2997-PS_). The
Court of Inquiry concluded that there occurred in Normandy, between 7
and 17 June 1944, seven cases of violations of the law of war, involving
the shooting of 64 unarmed allied prisoners of war in uniform, many of
whom had been previously wounded, and none of whom had resisted or
endeavored to escape; that the perpetrators were members of the 12th SS
Panzer Division, the so-called Hitler Jugend Division; that enlisted men
of the 15th Company of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of that
Division were given secret orders to the effect that SS troops should
take no prisoners and that prisoners were to be executed after having
been interrogated; that similar orders were given to men of the 3d
Battalion of the 26th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and to the 12th SS
Engineering and Reconnaissance Battalions; and that the conclusion was
irresistible that it was understood throughout the Division that a
policy of denying quarter or executing prisoners after interrogation was
openly approved. (_2997-PS_)
Other combatants met a similar fate at the hands of other components of
the SS. (The execution of allied fliers, of commandos, and paratroopers,
and of escaped prisoners of war who were turned over to the SD to be
destroyed, is discussed in Section 6 on the Gestapo.)
Combatants who were taken prisoner of war encountered the SS in another
form. (Section 6 on the Gestapo discusses the selection, by SS groups
stationed in prisoner of war camps, of prisoners for what the Nazis
euphemistically called “special treatment.”) Finally, the entire control
of prisoners of war was turned over to the Reichsfuehrer SS, pursuant to
the circular letter from the Nazi Party Chancellery placing Himmler in
charge of all prisoner of war camps. (_058-PS_)
(8) _Functions and activities with respect to Germanization of conquered
lands._ The final phase of the conspiracy in which the SS played a
leading role comprehended the colonization of conquered territories, the
destruction of their national existence, and the permanent extension of
the German frontier. These objectives were carried out through the
forcible evacuation and resettlement of inhabitants of conquered
regions, confiscation of their properties, “denationalization” and
“reeducation” of persons of German blood, and the colonization of
conquered territories by Germans. (See Chapter X on the Slave Labor
Program and Chapter XIII on Germanization and Spoliation.)
The SS was the logical agency to formulate and carry out the execution
of this program. The numerous statements made by Himmler as to SS
training for its role as the aristocracy in the “new Europe” leave that
beyond doubt. Himmler immediately proceeded to put these theories into
practice upon his appointment on 7 October 1939 as Reich Commissioner
for the Consolidation of German Folkdom. (_686-PS_)
To make and carry out plans for the program of evacuation and
resettlement, a new department of the SS Supreme Command, the Staff
Headquarters of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German
Folkdom, was created. The functions of this office are thus described in
the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943:
“The Main Office of the Staff of the Reichs Commissar for the
Consolidation of German Nationality is entrusted with the whole
settlement and constructive planning and with its execution in
the Reich and all those territories within the authority of the
Reich, including all administrative and economic questions in
connection with settlement, especially the deployment of
manpower for this purpose.” (_2640-PS_)
The colonization program had two principal objectives: the first phase
was the destruction of the conquered peoples, by exterminating them,
deporting them, and confiscating their property; the second phase was
the bringing back of racial Germans to settle in the newly acquired land
and to live from the wealth of those who had been eliminated.
(_a_) _Elimination and deportation of conquered people._ The
extermination actions contributed in part to clearing the conquered
territories of persons deemed dangerous to the Nazi plan. But not every
undesirable could be liquidated. Moreover, manpower was needed for the
Nazi war effort. Mass deportation thus accomplished the twin purpose of
providing labor and of freeing the land for German colonists. The
participation of SS agencies in deporting persons from the conquered
territories to meet the increased demands of the Nazi war machine for
manpower has already been shown. The evacuation and resettlement
program, however, required the use of additional SS agencies to deport
persons occupying the desired living space. For this purpose immigration
centers were set up under the direction of RSHA, as is stated in the
National Socialist Yearbook for 1941:
“For some time now the Reichsfuehrer-SS has had at his disposal
an office under the management of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz,
the _Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_. This office has the task of
dealing with National German questions and the raising of
required support.
“In addition to the VM the Immigration Center Offices with the
Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service of the SS
(under the management of SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. Sandberger)
and the Settlement Staff of the Reich-Commissioner were created,
which, in cooperation with the NSV [National Socialist Welfare
Organization] and the Reich Railroad Agency, took charge of the
Migration of National Germans.” (_2163-PS_)
Further evidence is contained in the affidavit of Otto Hoffman, SS
Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS and Police, who was
chief in the Main Office for Race and Settlement in the SS Supreme
Command until 1943. This affidavit, taken at Freising, Germany, on 4
August 1945 reads as follows:
“* * * 2. The executive power, in other words the carrying out
of all so-called resettlement actions, that is to say, sending
away of Polish and Jewish settlers and those of non-German blood
from a territory in Poland destined for Germanization, was in
the hands of the Chief of the RSHA (Heydrich and later
Kaltenbrunner, since the end of 1942). The Chief of the RSHA
also supervised and issued orders to the so-called immigration
center (EWZ) which classified the Germans, living abroad who
returned to Germany and directed them to the individual farms,
already freed. The latter was done in agreement with the chief
office of the Reichsfuehrer SS.” (_L-49_)
Other SS agencies also were included. The report, dated 22 May 1940,
relating to confiscation of Polish agricultural enterprises and
deportation of the Polish owners to Germany, shows that the following SS
agencies were involved in this action:
“Means of transportation to the railroad can be provided (1)—by
the enterprise of the East German Corporation of Agricultural
Development, (2)—by the SS NCO School in Lublinitz and the
concentration camp of Auschwitz.
“These two latter places will also detail the necessary SS men
for the day of the confiscation, etc.” (_1352-PS_)
The extent to which departments of the Supreme Command of the SS were
concerned with the evacuation program is shown by the minutes of a
meeting on 4 August 1942 dealing with the treatment of deported
Alsatians (_R-114_). The minutes list those present at the meeting as
follows:
“Present:
“SS.- ‘Hauptsturmfuehrer’ Dr. Stier }
SS.- ‘Hauptsturmfuehrer’ Petri }
‘RR’ Hoffmann } Staff Headquarters
Dr. Scherler }
SS.- ‘Untersturmfuehrer’ Foerster }
SS.- ‘Obersturmfuehrer’ Dr. Hinrichs, Chief of Estate Office and
Settlement Staff, Strasbourg [_Leiter des Bodenamtes und
Ansiedlungsstabes Strasburg_]
SS.- ‘Sturmbannfuehrer’ Bruckner, Intermediate Office for Racial Germans
(_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_)
SS.- ‘Hauptsturmfuehrer’ Hummisch, Main Office Reich Security
[_Reichssicherheitshauptamt_]
SS.- ‘Untersturmfuehrer’ Dr. Sieder, Main office for race and settling
[_Rus-Hauptamt_]
Dr. Labes, D. U. T.” (_R-114_)
The minutes read in part as follows:
“1. _State of deportation in Alsace._
“The starting point of the conference was a report on the
deportation effected so far and further plans for resettlement
in Alsace.”
* * * * * *
“_B._
“The representatives of the SS Main Offices present were united
in this opinion:
“II. 1. The Gauleiter’s plans for evacuation can be approved in
principle, since they confine themselves in fact to a class of
persons, whose presence in the Reich would be insupportable for
racial and political reasons.” (_R-114_)
(_b_) _Resettlement of conquered territories by Germans._ The SS not
only destroyed or deported conquered peoples and confiscated their
property, but it also repopulated the conquered regions with so-called
racial Germans. Thousands upon thousands of these Germans were
transported from all parts of Europe to join the greater Reich. Not all
Germans were deemed reliable colonists, however. Those who were not,
were returned to Germany proper for “re-Germanization” and “reeducation”
along Nazi lines. A typical instance of the fate of such Germans is
found in the decree of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of
German Folkdom of 16 February 1942, dealing with the treatment to be
accorded so-called “Polonized” Germans (_R-112_). By the terms of that
decree two other SS functionaries were charged with the responsibility
for the re-Germanization program, the Higher SS and Police Leaders and
the Gestapo. Paragraph III of the decree provides:
“III. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer will further the
re-Germanization actions with every means at their disposal and
continuously take stock of their success. In case they find that
obstacles are put in the way of a re-Germanization action, they
will report on their findings to the competent State Police
(Superior) Office for appropriate measures. Where it proves to
be impossible to attain re-Germanization even by forcible
measures taken by the State Police, they will apply for a
revocation of the naturalization through the Reich Fuehrer SS,
Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood
and give notice to the competent State Police (Superior)
Office.” (_R-112_)
Paragraph IV of the decree provides:
“IV. In the course of fulfilling their duties imposed on them by
this Decree the competent State Police (Superior) Offices will
take in particular the following measures:”
* * * * * *
“4. They will assist the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in their
task of re-Germanization, particularly in removing obstacles by
forcible measures whenever there is opposition to
re-Germanization. Before ordering forcible measures by the State
Police they will give the Counsellor of the person in question
an opportunity to state his opinion.
“5. They will take into protective custody all persons, with
regard to whom the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer has applied for
revocation of their naturalization and will order their
imprisonment in a Concentration Camp.” (_R-112_)
In the final stage of the process, the resettlement of the conquered
lands by racially and politically desirable Germans, still other SS
agencies participated. The National Socialist Yearbook for 1941 states
that:
“Numerous SS-leaders and SS-men helped with untiring effort in
bringing about this systematic migration of peoples, which has
no parallel in history.
“There were many authoritative and administrative difficulties
which, however, were immediately overcome due to the
unbureaucratic working procedure. This was especially guaranteed
above all by the employment of SS leaders.
“The procedure called ‘_Durchschleusung_’ (literally, ‘passing
through the lock’) takes 3 to 4 hours as a rule. The resettler
is passed through 8 to 9 offices, following each other in
organic order: registration office, card-index office,
certificate and photo-office, property office, and biological
hereditary and sanitary test office. The latter was entrusted to
doctors and medical personnel of the SS and of the Armed Forces.
The SS-Corps Areas [_Oberabschnitte_] Alpenland, North-West,
Baltic Sea, Fulda-Werra, South and South East, the SS-Main
Office [_SS-Hauptamt_], the NPEA (National Political Education
Institution) Vienna, and the SS-Cavalry-School in Hamburg
provided most of the SS-Officer and SS-Non-Coms who worked at
this job of resettlement.”
* * * * * *
“The settlement, establishment and care of the newly won
peasantry in the liberated Eastern territory will be one of the
most cherished tasks of the SS in the whole future.” (_2163-PS_)
E. _Defendant’s Membership in the SS._
In the course of its development from a group of strong armed
bodyguards, some 200 in number, to a complex organization participating
in every field of Nazi endeavor, the SS found room for its members in
high places. Persons in high places moreover, found for themselves a
position in the SS. Of the defendants charged in the indictment at least
7 were high ranking officers in the SS. They are the defendants
Ribbentrop, Hess, Kaltenbrunner, Bormann, Sauckel, Neurath, and
Seyss-Inquart. The vital part that Kaltenbrunner played in the SS, the
SD, and the entire Security Police system is discussed in Section 6 on
the Gestapo.
With respect to the other six defendants, the facts as to their
membership in the SS are to be found in two official publications. The
first is the membership list of the SS as of 1 December 1936. On line 2,
page 8, of that publication, there appears the name “Hess, Rudolf,”
followed by the notation, “By authority of the Fuehrer the right to wear
the uniform of an SS Obergruppenfuehrer.” In the 1937 edition of the
same membership list, line 50, page 10, there appears the name “Bormann,
Martin,” and in line with his name on the opposite page, under the
heading “Gruppenfuehrer,” appears the following date “20.4.37.” In the
same edition, line 56, page 12, is the name “von Neurath, Konstantin”
and on the opposite page, under the column headed “Gruppenfuehrer,” the
date “18.9.37.”
The second publication is “_Der Grossdeutsche Reichstag_” for the Fourth
Voting Period, edited by E. Kienast, Ministerial Director of the German
Reichstag, an official handbook containing biographical data as to
members of the Reichstag. On page 349 the following appears: “von
Ribbentrop, Joachim, _Reichsminister des Auswaertigen_, SS
Obergruppenfuehrer”; and on page 360 the following: “Sauckel, Fritz,
_Gauleiter_ and _Reichsstatthalter_ in Thuringen, SS
Obergruppenfuehrer”; and on page 389 the following: “Seyss-Inquart,
Arthur, Dr. Jur., Reichsminister, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.”
F. _Conclusion._
It is the prosecution’s contention that the SS, as defined in Appendix B
of the Indictment, was unlawful. Its participation in every phase of the
conspiracy alleged in Count One is clear. As an organization founded on
the principle that persons of “German blood” were a “master race,” it
exemplified a basic Nazi doctrine. It served as one of the means through
which the conspirators acquired control of the German government. The
operations of the SD, and of the _SS Totenkopf Verbaende_ in
concentration camps, were means used by the conspirators to secure their
regime and terrorize their opponents as alleged in Count One. All
components of the SS were involved from the very beginning in the Nazi
program of Jewish extermination. Through the _Allgemeine SS_ as a
para-military organization, the _SS Verfuegungstruppe_ and _SS Totenkopf
Verbaende_ as professional combat forces, and the _Volksdeutsche
Mittelstelle_ as a fifth column agency, it participated in preparations
for aggressive war, and, through its militarized units, in the seizure
of Austria, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the attack on Poland, and
the waging of aggressive war in the West and in the East, as set forth
in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. In the course of such war, all
components of the SS had a part in the war crimes and crimes against
humanity, set forth in Counts Three and Four,—the murder and ill
treatment of civilian populations in occupied territory, the murder and
ill treatment of prisoners of war, and the Germanization of occupied
territories.
The evidence has shown that the SS was a single enterprise—a unified
organization. Some of its functions were, of course, performed by one
branch, or department or office, some by another. No single branch or
department participated in every phase of its activity. But every branch
and department and office was necessary to the functioning of the whole.
The situation is much the same as in the case of the individual
defendants at the bar. Not all participated in every act of the
conspiracy; but all performed a contributing part in the whole criminal
scheme.
The evidence has shown, not only that the SS was an organization of
volunteers but that applicants had to meet the strictest standards of
selection. It was not easy to become an SS member. That was true of all
branches of the SS. During the course of the war, as the demands for
manpower increased and the losses of the Waffen SS grew heavier and
heavier, there were occasions when men drafted for compulsory military
service were assigned to units of the _Waffen SS_ rather than to the
_Wehrmacht_. Those instances were relatively few. Evidence of recruiting
standards of the Waffen SS in 1943 has shown that membership in that
branch was as essentially voluntary and highly selective as in other
branches. The fact that some individuals may have been arbitrarily
assigned to some Waffen SS unit has no bearing on the issue before the
tribunal, which is this, whether the SS was or was not an unlawful
organization. Doubtless some of the members of the SS, or of other of
the organizations alleged to be unlawful, might desire to show that
their participation in the organization was small or innocuous, that
compelling reasons drove them to apply for membership, that they were
not fully conscious of its aims, or that they were mentally
irresponsible when they became members. Such facts might or might not be
relevant if they were on trial. But in any event this is not the forum
to try out such matters.
The question before this Tribunal is simply this, whether the SS was or
was not an unlawful organization. The evidence has fully shown what the
aims and activities of the SS were. Some of these aims were stated in
publications. The activities were so widespread and so notorious,
covering so many fields of unlawful endeavor, that the illegality of the
organization could not have been concealed. It was a notorious fact, and
Himmler himself admitted that in 1936, when he said:
“I know that there are people in Germany now who become sick
when they see these black coats. We know the reason and we don’t
expect to be loved by too many.”
It was at all times the exclusive function and purpose of the SS to
carry out the common objectives of the conspirators. Its activities in
carrying out those functions involved the commission of the crimes
defined in Article 6 of the Charter. By reason of its aims and the means
used for the accomplishment thereof, the SS should be declared a
criminal organization in accordance with Article 9 of the Charter.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE SCHUTZSTAFFELN
(SS)
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix B. │ I │ 29, 70
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*002-PS │Letters of Reichs Research Department │ │
│regarding the budget of the SS. (USA │ │
│469) │ III │ 5
│ │ │
*058-PS │Hitler Order of 30 September 1944 │ │
│concerning reorganization of the │ │
│concerns of prisoners of war. (USA │ │
│456) │ III │ 103
│ │ │
*343-PS │Letter from Milch, Chief of the │ │
│Personal Staff, to Himmler, 31 August │ │
│1942, and letter from Milch to Wolff, │ │
│20 May 1942. (USA 463) │ III │ 266
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │
│No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March │ │
│1941, concerning Directives for │ │
│special areas. (USA 135) │ III │ 409
│ │ │
*501-PS │Collection of four documents on │ │
│execution by gas, June 1942, one │ │
│signed by Dr. Becker, SS │ │
│Untersturmfuehrer at Kiev, 16 May │ │
│1942. (USA 288) │ III │ 418
│ │ │
*641-PS │Report of Public Prosecutor General in│ │
│Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│ │
│of Dr. Strauss in Dachau by an SS │ │
│guard. (USA 450) │ III │ 453
│ │ │
*642-PS │Report to Public Prosecutor General in│ │
│Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│ │
│of Hausmann in Dachau by an SS guard. │ │
│(USA 451) │ III │ 454
│ │ │
*644-PS │Report to Public Prosecutor General in│ │
│Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│ │
│of Schloss in Dachau by an SS guard. │ │
│(USA 452) │ III │ 455
│ │ │
*645-PS │Report to Public Prosecutor General in│ │
│Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder│ │
│of Nefzger in Dachau by an SS guard. │ │
│(USA 453) │ III │ 457
│ │ │
*647-PS │Secret Hitler Order, 17 August 1938, │ │
│concerning organization and │ │
│mobilization of SS. (USA 443) │ III │ 459
│ │ │
*654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, │ │
│on discussion with Himmler concerning │ │
│delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │
│extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467
│ │ │
686-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │
│Chancellor to strengthen German │ │
│Folkdom, 7 October 1939, signed by │ │
│Hitler, Goering, Lammers and Keitel. │ │
│(USA 305) │ III │ 496
│ │ │
*744-PS │Secret letter of Keitel, 8 July 1943, │ │
│concerning manpower for coal mining. │ │
│(USA 455) │ III │ 540
│ │ │
*778-PS │Disciplinary and Penal Measures for │ │
│Concentration Camp Dachau and Service │ │
│Regulations for the Camp Personnel, │ │
│signed Eicke, 1 October 1933. (USA │ │
│247) │ III │ 550
│ │ │
781-PS │Memorandum by Minister of Justice, │ │
│Guertner, of conference with Himmler, │ │
│9 March 1936, concerning issuance of │ │
│decree on use of arms by concentration│ │
│camp officials. │ III │ 557
│ │ │
*812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │
│22 August 1939 and report from │ │
│Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │
│Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │
│events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │
│1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586
│ │ │
*1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and │ │
│Police Leader of Warsaw, on │ │
│destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. │ │
│(USA 275) │ III │ 718
│ │ │
*1063-D-PS │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942, │ │
│concerning prisoners qualified for │ │
│work to be sent to concentration │ │
│camps. (USA 219) │ III │ 778
│ │ │
1151-P-PS │Letter from WVHA, 28 March 1942, │ │
│concerning “Action 14 F 13” from files│ │
│of Gross Rosen Concentration camp. │ III │ 808
│ │ │
1166-PS │Interoffice memorandum of WVHA, 15 │ │
│August 1944, concerning number of │ │
│prisoners and survey of prisoners │ │
│clothing. (USA 458) │ III │ 824
│ │ │
*1352-PS │Reports concerning the confiscation of│ │
│Polish agricultural properties, 16 and│ │
│29 May 1940, signed Kusche. (USA 176) │ III │ 916
│ │ │
1551-PS │Decree assigning functions in Office │ │
│of Chief of German Police, 26 June │ │
│1936. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt, │ │
│pp. 946-948. │ IV │ 106
│ │ │
*1582-PS │Letter from SS Sturmbannfuehrer Brandt│ │
│to Dr. Rascher, 22 May 1941, │ │
│concerning use of prisoners for │ │
│high-flight research. (USA 462) │ IV │ 114
│ │ │
*1583-PS │Letter from Himmler, 16 November 1942,│ │
│concerning feminine prisoners in │ │
│concentration camps. (USA 465) │ IV │ 115
│ │ │
*1584-I-PS │Teletype from Goering to Himmler, 14 │ │
│February 1944, concerning formation of│ │
│7th Airforce Group squadron for │ │
│special purposes. (USA 221) │ IV │ 117
│ │ │
*1584-III-PS │Correspondence between Himmler and │ │
│Goering, 9 March 1944, concerning use │ │
│of concentration camp inmates in │ │
│aircraft industry. (USA 457) │ IV │ 118
│ │ │
*1602-PS │Letter from Dr. Rascher to Himmler, 15│ │
│May 1941, asking for use of prisoners │ │
│for experiments in high-altitude │ │
│flights. (USA 454) │ IV │ 132
│ │ │
1616-PS │Letter from Dr. Rascher to Himmler, 17│ │
│February 1943, concerning freezing │ │
│experiments. │ IV │ 133
│ │ │
1617-PS │Letter from Himmler to General Field │ │
│Marshal Milch, 13 November 1942, │ │
│concerning transfer of Dr. Rascher to │ │
│Waffen-SS. (USA 466) │ IV │ 133
│ │ │
*1618-PS │Report of Freezing experiments in │ │
│Dachau, 15 August 1942, signed by Dr. │ │
│Rascher. (USA 464) │ IV │ 135
│ │ │
1637-PS │Order of Himmler, 23 June 1938, │ │
│concerning acceptance of members of │ │
│Security Police into the SS. 1938 │ │
│Reichs Ministerialblatt, pp. │ │
│1089-1091. │ IV │ 138
│ │ │
*1680-PS │“Ten Years Security Police and SD” │ │
│published in The German Police, 1 │ │
│February 1943. (USA 477) │ IV │ 191
│ │ │
1725-PS │Decree enforcing law for securing the │ │
│unity of Party and State, 29 March │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 502. │ IV │ 224
│ │ │
*1751-PS │Letter to all concentration camp │ │
│commanders, from Gluecks, 12 May 1944,│ │
│concerning assignment of prisoners for│ │
│experimental purposes. (USA 468) │ IV │ 279
│ │ │
*1851-PS │The Security Squadron as an │ │
│Anti-Bolshevist Battle Organization │ │
│1936 by Himmler from The New Germany │ │
│Speaks Here, book 11. (USA 440) │ IV │ 488
│ │ │
*1852-PS │“Law” from The German Police, 1941, by│ │
│Dr. Werner Best. (USA 449) (See Chart │ │
│No. 16.) │ IV │ 490
│ │ │
*1857-PS │Announcement of creation of SS as │ │
│independent formation of NSDAP. │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 26 July 1934, │ │
│p. 1. (USA 412) │ IV │ 496
│ │ │
1918-PS │Speech by Himmler to SS officers on │ │
│day of Metz. (USA 304) │ IV │ 553
│ │ │
*1919-PS │Himmler’s speech to SS │ │
│Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA │ │
│170) │ IV │ 558
│ │ │
1932-PS │Letter from Office of Chief of │ │
│Department D of WVHA, 7 June 1943, │ │
│concerning handling of prisoners who │ │
│fall under Night and Fog decree. │ IV │ 579
│ │ │
*1933-PS │Letter to Commandant of Gross Rosen │ │
│Camp from Department 10 of WVHA, 27 │ │
│April 1943, providing that “Action 14 │ │
│F 13” be applied only to insane. (USA │ │
│459) │ IV │ 581
│ │ │
*1972-PS │Letter from Chief of SS Operations │ │
│Headquarters to Himmler, 14 October │ │
│1941, reporting on executions of │ │
│Czechs by Waffen SS. (USA 471) │ IV │ 604
│ │ │
*1992-A-PS │Organization and Obligations of the SS│ │
│and the Police from “National │ │
│Political Education of the Army, │ │
│January 1937”. (USA 439) │ IV │ 616
│ │ │
2073-PS │Decree concerning the appointment of a│ │
│Chief of German Police in the Ministry│ │
│of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487. │ IV │ 703
│ │ │
*2163-PS │The SS during the War-Year 1939-40, │ │
│published in National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1941. (USA 444) │ IV │ 762
│ │ │
*2164-PS │The SS since the Reichparteitag 1938, │ │
│published in National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1940. (USA 255) │ IV │ 768
│ │ │
*2189-PS │Orders from Department D of Economic │ │
│and Administrative Main Office, 11 │ │
│August 1942, concerning punishment by │ │
│beating. (USA 460) │ IV │ 842
│ │ │
2199-PS │Letter to Commanders of concentration │ │
│camps, 12 September 1942, concerning │ │
│return of urns of inmates deceased in │ │
│concentration camps. (USA 461) │ IV │ 853
│ │ │
*2284-PS │The Organizational Structure of the │ │
│Third Reich—The SS—from Writings of │ │
│the Hochschule for Politics. (USA 438)│ IV │ 973
│ │ │
*2640-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of │ │
│NSDAP, 1943. (USA 323) │ V │ 346
│ │ │
*2668-PS │“And Don’t Forget the Jews”, from the │ │
│Black Corps, 8 August 1940, No. 32, p.│ │
│2. (USA 269) │ V │ 367
│ │ │
*2768-PS │Letter from Himmler to Kaltenbrunner, │ │
│24 April 1943. (USA 447) │ V │ 412
│ │ │
*2769-PS │Order of Battle of the SS, 1 November │ │
│1944. (USA 442) │ V │ 413
│ │ │
*2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │
│Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │
│Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │
│program for Sudeten agitation, 29 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422
│ │ │
*2825-PS │Soldier’s Friend—pocket diary for │ │
│German Armed Forces with calendar for │ │
│1943. (USA 441) │ V │ 462
│ │ │
2946-PS │Decree relating to Special │ │
│Jurisdiction in Penal Matters for │ │
│members of SS and for members of │ │
│Police Groups on Special Tasks of 17 │ │
│October 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 2107. │ V │ 625
│ │ │
2947-PS │Second decree for implementation of │ │
│decrees relating to Special │ │
│Jurisdiction in Penal Matters for │ │
│members of SS and members of Police │ │
│Groups on special tasks of 17 April │ │
│1940. 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 659. │ V │ 627
│ │ │
2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from │ │
│Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA │ │
│76) │ V │ 628
│ │ │
*2950-PS │Affidavit of Frick, 19 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 448) │ V │ 654
│ │ │
*2968-PS │Memorandum from U. S. Army officer │ │
│concerning plaque erected in Austrian │ │
│Chancellery in memoriam to killers of │ │
│Dollfuss. (USA 60) │ V │ 677
│ │ │
*2997-PS │Supplementary report of Supreme │ │
│Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary │ │
│Force, Court of Inquiry, concerning │ │
│shooting of Allied Prisoners of War in│ │
│Normandy, France. (USA 472) │ V │ 716
│ │ │
*3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│ │
│all stations of State Police, 10 │ │
│November 1938, on measures against │ │
│Jews, and one order from Heydrich on │ │
│termination of protest actions. (USA │ │
│240) │ V │ 797
│ │ │
*3059-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum, 19 │ │
│August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s │ │
│Sudeten German Party between 1935 and │ │
│1938. (USA 96) │ V │ 855
│ │ │
*3429-PS │Extract from The SS Calls You. (USA │ │
│446) │ VI │ 133
│ │ │
3815-PS │Report of the SS, 25 April 1942, │ │
│concerning the activities of Hans │ │
│Frank in Poland. │ VI │ 745
│ │ │
*3839-PS │Statement of Josef Spacil, 9 November │ │
│1945, concerning the meaning of │ │
│“resettlement” and “special │ │
│treatment”. (USA 799) │ VI │ 774
│ │ │
*3840-PS │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February│ │
│1946, concerning the elimination of │ │
│the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803) │ VI │ 775
│ │ │
3841-PS │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer │ │
│Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946, │ │
│concerning elimination of the Warsaw │ │
│Ghetto. (USA 804) │ VI │ 776
│ │ │
*3842-PS │Statement of Fritz Mundhenke, 7 March │ │
│1946, concerning the activities of │ │
│Kaltenbrunner and SS in preparation │ │
│for occupation of Czechoslovakia. (USA│ │
│805) │ VI │ 778
│ │ │
*3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │
│Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │
│execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │
│Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │
│819) │ VI │ 787
│ │ │
*3870-PS │Affidavit of Hans Marsalek, 8 April │ │
│1946, concerning Mauthausen │ │
│Concentration Camp and dying statement│ │
│of Franz Ziereis, the Commandant. (USA│ │
│797) │ VI │ 790
│ │ │
*D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │
│SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │
│Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │
│Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │
│1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │
│relative to procedure in cases of │ │
│unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │
│execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74
│ │ │
*D-665 │Hitler’s license for the SS. (GB 280) │ VII │ 170
│ │ │
*D-745-A │Deposition of Anton Kaindl, 8 March │ │
│1946, concerning SS personnel │ │
│supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │
│811) │ VII │ 208
│ │ │
*D-745-B │Deposition of Anton Kaindl, 19 March │ │
│1946, concerning SS personnel │ │
│supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │
│812) │ VII │ 209
│ │ │
*D-746-A │Deposition of Fritz Suhren, 8 March │ │
│1946, concerning SS personnel │ │
│supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │
│813) │ VII │ 209
│ │ │
D-746-B │Deposition of Fritz Suhren, 19 March │ │
│1946, concerning SS personnel │ │
│supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │
│814) │ VII │ 210
│ │ │
*D-748 │Affidavit of Karl Totzauer, 15 March │ │
│1946, concerning SS personnel │ │
│supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │
│816) │ VII │ 211
│ │ │
*D-749-B │Statement of Rudolf Hoess, 20 March │ │
│1946, concerning SS personnel │ │
│supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │
│817) │ VII │ 212
│ │ │
*D-750 │Deposition of August Harbaum, 19 March│ │
│1946, concerning SS personnel │ │
│supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │
│818) │ VII │ 213
│ │ │
*L-18 │Official report, Katzmann to General │ │
│of Police Krueger, 30 June 1943, │ │
│concerning “Solution of Jewish │ │
│Question in Galicia”. (USA 277) │ VII │ 755
│ │ │
*L-49 │Affidavit of Otto Hoffman, Chief of SS│ │
│Main Office for Race and Settlement, 4│ │
│August 1945. (USA 473) │ VII │ 795
│ │ │
*L-103 │Letter, 12 September 1944, concerning │ │
│experiments with │ │
│Akonitin-nitrate-bullets. (USA 467) │ VII │ 877
│ │ │
L-156 │Circular letter from Office of │ │
│Commissioner for Four-Year Plan, 26 │ │
│March 1943, concerning removal of Jews│ │
│to labor camps. │ VII │ 905
│ │ │
*L-180 │Report by SS Brigade Commander │ │
│Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group │ │
│A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276) │ VII │ 978
│ │ │
L-198 │State Department Dispatch by Consul │ │
│General Messersmith, 14 March 1933, │ │
│concerning molesting of American │ │
│citizens in Berlin. │ VII │ 1026
│ │ │
L-201 │Excerpts from Berlin newspapers, April│ │
│1933, concerning violence against Jews│ │
│and discrimination against politically│ │
│undesirable professors. │ VII │ 1035
│ │ │
L-273 │Report of American Consul General in │ │
│Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July │ │
│1938, concerning anniversary of │ │
│assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. │ │
│(USA 59) │ VII │ 1094
│ │ │
*L-361 │Three documents concerning the │ │
│formation of the RSHA, Himmler, 27 │ │
│September 1939; Heydrich, 23 and 27 │ │
│September 1939. (USA 478) │ VII │ 1109
│ │ │
*R-102 │Report on activities of The Task │ │
│Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 │ │
│October 1941. (USA 470) │ VIII │ 96
│ │ │
*R-112 │Orders issued by Reich Commissioner │ │
│for the Consolidation of German │ │
│nationhood, 16 February 1942, 1 July │ │
│1942, 28 July 1942. (USA 309) │ VIII │ 108
│ │ │
*R-114 │Memoranda of conferences, 4 and 18 │ │
│August 1942, concerning directions for│ │
│treatment of deported Alsatians. (USA │ │
│314) │ VIII │ 122
│ │ │
*R-124 │Speer’s conference minutes of Central │ │
│Planning Board, 1942-44, concerning │ │
│labor supply. (USA 179) │ VIII │ 146
│ │ │
*R-129 │Letter and enclosure from Pohl to │ │
│Himmler, 30 April 1942, concerning │ │
│concentration camps. (USA 217) │ VIII │ 198
│ │ │
*R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │
│reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │
│in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │
│Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205
│ │ │
R-143 │Himmler decree, 1 December 1939, │ │
│concerning procedure for confiscation │ │
│of works of art, archives, and │ │
│documents. │ VIII │ 246
│ │ │
Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │
│December 1945. │ VIII │ 587
│ │ │
Affidavit B │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 │ │
│November 1945, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 596
│ │ │
Affidavit F │Affidavit of Josef Dietrich, 20-21 │ │
│November 1945. │ VIII │ 631
│ │ │
Affidavit G │Affidavit of Fritz Ernst Fischer, 21 │ │
│November 1945. │ VIII │ 635
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
│ │ │
*Chart No. 3 │Organization of the SS. (USA 445) │ VIII │ 772
│ │ │
*Chart No. 5 │Position of Kaltenbrunner and the │ │
│Gestapo and SD in the German Police │ │
│System. (USA 493) │ VIII │ 774
│ │ │
*Chart No. 16 │The Structure of the German Police. │
│(1852-PS; USA 449) │ End of VIII
│ │ │
*Chart No. 19 │Organization of the Security Police │
│(Gestapo and Kripo) and the SD │
│1943-1945. (2346-PS; USA 480) │ End of VIII
6. THE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (GESTAPO) AND SICHERHEITSDIENST (SD)
This section on the _Geheime Staatspolizei_ (GESTAPO) includes evidence
on the criminality of the _Sicherheitsdienst_ (SD) of the
_Schutzstaffel_ (SS). In the Indictment the SD is included by special
references as a part of the SS, since it originated as a part of the SS
and always retained its character as a party organization, as
distinguished from the GESTAPO, which was a State organization. As will
be shown in this section, however, the GESTAPO and the SD were brought
into close working relationship, the SD serving primarily as the
information-gathering agency and the GESTAPO as the executive agency of
the police system established by the Nazis for the purpose of combatting
the political and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime. This close
working relationship between the GESTAPO and the SD was accomplished by
the appointment of Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, to the position
of Chief of the German Police. What is proved in this section with
respect to the criminality of the SD applies directly to the case
against the SS. The relationship between the SS and the GESTAPO is
considered in section 5 on the SS.
A. _Development of the Gestapo and the SD._
(1) _Development of the GESTAPO._ The _Geheime Staatspolizei_, or
GESTAPO, was first established in Prussia on 26 April 1933 by Goering,
with the mission of carrying out the duties of political police with or
in place of the ordinary police authorities. The GESTAPO chief was given
the rank of a higher police authority and was subordinated only to the
Minister of the Interior, to whom was delegated the responsibility of
determining its functional and territorial jurisdiction (_2104-PS_).
Pursuant to this law, and on the same date, the Minister of the Interior
issued a decree on the reorganization of the police which established a
State Police Bureau in each government district of Prussia subordinate
to the Secret State Police Bureau in Berlin. (_2371-PS_)
On 30 November 1933 Goering issued a decree for the Prussian State
Ministry and for the Reichs Chancellor which acknowledged the valuable
services which the GESTAPO was able to render to the State and which
placed the GESTAPO under his direct supervision as Chief. The GESTAPO
was thereby established as an independent branch of the Administration
of the Interior, responsible directly to Goering as Prussian Prime
Minister. This decree gave the GESTAPO jurisdiction over the political
police matters of the general and interior administration and provided
that the district, county, and local police authorities were subject to
the directives of the GESTAPO (_2105-PS_). By a decree of 8 March 1934
the regional State Police offices were separated from their
organizational connection with the district government and established
as independent authorities of the GESTAPO. (_2113-PS_)
Parallel to the development of the GESTAPO in Prussia, the Reichsfuehrer
SS, Heinrich Himmler, created in Bavaria the Bavarian Political Police
and also directed the formation of political police forces in the other
federal states outside of Prussia. The unification of the political
police of the various states took place in the spring of 1934 when
Hermann Goering appointed Himmler the Deputy Chief of the Prussian
GESTAPO in place of the former Deputy Chief, Diels. Himmler thereby
obtained unified control over the political police forces throughout the
Reich. (_1680-PS_)
On 10 February 1936 the basic law for the GESTAPO was promulgated by
Goering as Prussian Prime Minister. This law provided that the Secret
State Police had the duty to investigate and to combat in the entire
territory of the State all tendencies inimical to the State, and
declared that orders in matters of the Secret State Police were not
subject to the review of the administrative courts (_2107-PS_). On the
same date, 10 February 1936, a decree for the execution of said law was
issued by Goering as Prussian Prime Minister and by Frick as Minister of
the Interior. This decree provided that the GESTAPO had authority to
enact measures valid in the entire area of the State and measures
affecting that area, that it was the centralized agency for collecting
political intelligence in the field of political police, and that it
administered the concentration camps. The GESTAPO was given authority to
make police investigations in cases of criminal attacks upon Party as
well as upon State. (_2108-PS_)
On 28 August 1936 a circular of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the
German Police provided that as of 1 October 1936 the political police
forces of the German provinces were to be called the “_Geheime
Staatspolizei_” (Secret State Police). The regional offices were still
to be described as State Police (_2372-PS_). On 20 September 1936 a
circular of the Minister of the Interior commissioned the GESTAPO Bureau
in Berlin with the supervision of the duties of the political police
commanders in all the States of Germany. (_L-297_)
The law relating to financial measures in connection with the police of
19 March 1937 provided that officials of the GESTAPO were to be
considered direct officials of the Reich and their salaries, in addition
to the operational expenses of the whole State Police, were to be borne
from 1 April 1937 on by the Reich. (_2243-PS_)
Through the above laws and decrees the GESTAPO was established as a
uniform political police system operating throughout the Reich and
serving Party, State, and the Nazi leadership.
(2) _Development of the SD._ In 1932 the Reichsfuehrer of the SS,
Heinrich Himmler, created the _Sicherheitsdienst_, or SD, as an
intelligence service of the SS under the then SS-Standartenfuehrer
Reinhard Heydrich. (_1680-PS_)
On 9 June 1934, the NSDAP issued an ordinance which merged all
information facilities then existing within the Party organization into
the SD, and the SD was established as the sole Party information
service. (_1680-PS_)
In the course of its development, the SD came into increasingly closer
cooperation with the GESTAPO and also with the _Reich Kriminalpolizei_,
the Criminal Police, or KRIPO. The GESTAPO and the KRIPO considered
together were called the _Sicherheitspolizei_, the Security Police, or
SIPO. The SD was also called upon to furnish information to various
State authorities. On 11 November 1938 a decree of the Reich Minister of
the Interior declared that the SD was to be the intelligence
organization for the State as well as for the Party, that it had the
particular duty of supporting the Secret State Police, and that it
thereby became active on a national mission. These duties necessitated a
close cooperation between the SD and the authorities for the General and
Interior Administration. (_1680-PS_; _1638-PS_)
Through the above laws and decrees the SD was established as a uniform
political information service operating throughout the Reich and serving
Party, State, and the Nazi leadership.
(3) _Consolidation of the GESTAPO and the SD._ The first step in the
consolidation of the political police system of the State (the GESTAPO)
and the information service of the Nazi Party (the SD) took place in the
spring of 1934 when Goering appointed Himmler Deputy Chief of the
GESTAPO. Heydrich was the head of the SD under Himmler, and when Himmler
took over the actual direction of the GESTAPO, these two agencies were
in effect united under one command. (_1956-PS_; _2460-PS_)
On 17 June 1936, “for the uniformity of police duties in the Reich,” the
position of Chief of the German Police was established in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, to which was assigned the direction and
protection of all police affairs within the jurisdiction of the Reich.
By this law Himmler was appointed Chief of the German Police under
Frick, the Reich Minister of the Interior, and was given the right to
participate in the sessions of the Reich Cabinet as Chief of the German
Police. (_2073-PS_)
On 26 June 1936 Himmler issued a decree providing for the appointment of
a chief of the uniformed police and of a chief of the Security Police.
This decree divided the German police system into two principal
branches:
(_a_) _Ordnungspolizei_ (ORPO or Regular Police).
(_b_) _Sicherheitspolizei_ (SIPO or Security Police).
The _Ordnungspolizei_ was composed of the _Schutzpolizei_ (Safety
Police), the _Gendarmerie_ (Rural Police), and the _Gemeindepolizei_
(Local Police). The _Sicherheitspolizei_ was composed of the _Reich
Kriminalpolizei_ (KRIPO) and the _Geheime Staatspolizei_ (GESTAPO).
Daluege was named head of the _Ordnungspolizei_ and Heydrich was named
head of the _Sicherheitspolizei_. Since Heydrich was also head of the
SD, he took the new title of Chief of the Security Police and SD.
(_1551-PS_)
On 27 September 1939 by order of Himmler, in his capacity as
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, the central offices of
the GESTAPO and the SD, together with the Criminal Police, were
centralized in the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD
under the name of the _Reichssicherheitshauptamt_, Reich Security Main
Office, or RSHA. Under this order the personnel and administrative
sections of each agency were coordinated in _Amt_ I and _Amt_ II of the
RSHA; the operational sections of the SD became _Amt_ III (except for
foreign intelligence which was placed in _Amt_ VI); the operational
sections of the GESTAPO became _Amt_ IV and the operational sections of
the KRIPO became _Amt_ V. Ohlendorf was named the Chief of _Amt_ III,
the SD within Germany; Mueller was named the Chief of _Amt_ IV, the
GESTAPO; and Nebe was named the Chief of _Amt_ V, the KRIPO. (_L-361_)
On 27 September 1939 Heydrich, as Chief of the Security Police and SD,
issued a directive pursuant to the foregoing order of Himmler, in which
he ordered the designation and heading “_Reichssicherheitshauptamt_” to
be used exclusively in internal relations of the Reich Ministry of the
Interior, and the heading “The Chief of the Security Police and SD” in
transactions with outside persons and offices. The directive provided
that the GESTAPO would continue to use the designation and heading
“_Geheime Staatspolizeiamt_” according to particular instructions.
(_L-361_)
In 1944 most of the sections of the _Abwehr_ (military intelligence)
were incorporated into the various sections of the RSHA and into a new
section connected with _Amt_ VI, called the _Militaerisches Amt_.
(_2644-PS_)
Heydrich was Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) until his death
on 4 June 1942, after which Himmler directed the organization until the
appointment of the defendant Ernst Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the
Security Police and SD. Kaltenbrunner took office on 30 January 1943 and
remained Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) until the end of the
war. (_2644-PS_)
B. _Organization of the Gestapo and the SD._
(1) _Organization of the Gestapo_ (_Amt_ IV of the RSHA). The
headquarters organization of the GESTAPO (_Amt_ IV of the RSHA) was set
up on a functional basis. In 1943 it contained five sub-sections.
Section A dealt with opponents, sabotage, and protective service and was
subdivided as follows:
A 1 Communism, Marxism and associated organizations, war crimes,
illegal and enemy propaganda.
A 2 Defense against sabotage, combatting of sabotage, political
falsification.
A 3 Reaction, opposition, legitimism, liberalism, matters of malicious
opposition.
A 4 Protective service, reports of attempted assassinations, guarding,
special jobs, pursuit troops.
Section B dealt with political churches, sects and Jews, and was
subdivided as follows:
B 1 Political Catholicism.
B 2 Political Protestantism Sects.
B 3 Other churches, Freemasonry.
B 4 Jewish affairs, matters of evacuation, means of suppressing
enemies of the people and State, dispossession of rights of German
citizenship. (Eichmann was head of this office).
Section C dealt with card files, protective custody, and matters of
press and Party, and was subdivided as follows:
C 1 Evaluation, main card index, administration of individual files,
information office, supervision of foreigners.
C 2 Matters of protective custody.
C 3 Matters of the press and literature.
C 4 Matters of the Party and its formations, special cases.
Section D dealt with regions under greater German influence, and was
subdivided as follows:
D (_aus. arb._) Foreign Workers.
D 1 Matters of the Protectorate, Czechs in the Reich, Slovakia,
Serbia, Croatia, and the remaining regions of the former
Jugoslavia, Greece.
D 2 Matters of the General Government, Poles in the Reich.
D 3 Confidential office, foreigners hostile to the State, emigrants.
D 4 Occupied territories, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark.
D 5 Occupied Eastern territories.
Section E dealt with security and was subdivided as follows:
E 1 General security matters, supply of legal opinions in matters of
high and State treason, and other security matters.
E 2 General economic matters, defense against economic espionage,
protection of works and those engaged in guarding.
E 3 Security West.
E 4 Security North.
E 5 Security East.
E 6 Security South.
Section F dealt with passport matters and alien police and was
subdivided as follows:
F 1 Frontier police.
F 2 Passport matters.
F 3 Identification and identity cards.
F 4 Alien police and basic questions concerning frontiers.
F 5 Central visa office. (_L-219_)
Subordinate offices of the GESTAPO were established throughout the Reich
and designated as _Staats Polizeileitstellen_ or _Staats
Polizeistellen_, depending upon the size of the office. These offices
reported directly to the RSHA in Berlin but were subject to the
supervision of _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police in the various
provinces. The inspectors were expected to foster cooperation between
the Security Police and the central offices of the general and interior
administration. (_2245-PS_)
In the occupied territories the regional offices of the GESTAPO were
coordinated with the Criminal Police and the SD under _Kommandeurs_ of
the Security Police and SD, who were subject to _Befehlshabers_ of the
Security Police and SD who reported to the Chief of the Security Police
and SD (RSHA) in Berlin. (_1285-PS_)
(2) _Organization of the SD (Amt III of the RSHA)._ The headquarters
organization of the SD (including only _Amt_ III of the RSHA and not
_Amt_ VI, the Foreign Intelligence Branch) was set up on a functional
basis. In 1943 it contained four sections.
Section A dealt with questions of legal order and structure of the Reich
and was subdivided as follows:
A 1 General questions of work on spheres of German life.
A 2 Law.
A 3 Constitution and administration.
A 4 National life in general.
A 5 General questions of police law, and technical questions of
legislation.
Section B dealt with nationality, and was subdivided as follows:
B 1 Nationality questions.
B 2 Minorities.
B 3 Race and health of the people.
B 4 Citizenship and naturalization.
B 5 Occupied territories.
Section C dealt with culture, and was subdivided as follows:
C 1 Science.
C 2 Educational religious life.
C 3 Folk culture and art.
C 4 Press, literature, radio, office for evaluation of material.
Section D dealt with economics, and was subdivided as follows:
D a Reading office, economics, press, magazines, literature.
D b Colonial economics.
D S Special questions and review of material.
D West Western occupied regions.
D Ost Eastern occupied regions.
D 1 Food economy.
D 2 Commerce, handcraft, and transport.
D 3 Finance, currency, banks and exchanges, insurance.
D 4 Industry and Power.
D 5 Labor and Social Questions. (_L-219_)
Within Germany the original regional offices of the SD were called
_SD-Oberabschnitte_ and _SD-Unterabschnitte_. In 1939 these designations
were changed to _SD-Abschnitte_ and _SD-Leitabschnitte_. Offices of the
_SD-Abschnitte_ were located in the same place as the
_Staatspolizeistellen_. _SD-Abschnitte_ located where there were _Staats
Polizeileitstellen_ were called “_SD Leitabschnitte_.” Direct orders
came from the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Berlin (RSHA) to
these regional offices, but they were also subject to the supervision of
the _Inspekteurs_ of the SIPO and SD. In the occupied territories the
regional offices of the SD were coordinated with the GESTAPO and
Criminal Police under _Kommandeurs_ of the SIPO and SD who were subject
to _Befehlshabers_ of the Security Police and SD who reported to the
Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) in Berlin. (_1680-PS_,
_L-361_)
(3) _Combined Organization of the GESTAPO and SD._ The central offices
of the GESTAPO and SD were coordinated in 1936 with the appointment of
Heydrich, the head of the SD, as chief of the Security Police. The
office of Heydrich was called “Chief of the Security Police and SD.”
(_1551-PS_)
When the central offices of the GESTAPO and SD, together with the
Criminal Police, were centralized in one main office (RSHA) in 1939, the
functions were somewhat redistributed.
_Amt_ I of the RSHA handled personnel for the three agencies. Subsection
A 2 handled personnel matters of the GESTAPO, A 3 handled personnel
matters of the KRIPO, and A 4 handled personnel matters of the SD.
_Amt_ II handled organization, administration, and law for the three
agencies. Subsection C handled domestic arrangements and pay accounts,
and was divided into two sections, one to take care of pay accounts of
the Security Police and the other to take care of pay accounts of the
SD, since personnel of the former were paid by the State and personnel
of the latter were paid by the Party. Subsection D, under
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff handled technical matters, including the
motor vehicles of the SIPO and SD.
_Amt_ III was the SD and was charged with investigation into spheres of
German life. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.
_Amt_ IV was the GESTAPO and was charged with combatting political
opposition. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.
_Amt_ V was the KRIPO and was charged with combatting criminals.
Subsection V D was the criminalogical institute for the SIPO handling
matters of identification, chemical and biological investigations, and
technical research.
_Amt_ VI was concerned with foreign political intelligence and contained
subsections dealing with western Europe, Russia and Japan,
Anglo-American sphere, and central Europe. It contained a special
section dealing with sabotage.
_Amt_ VII handled ideological research against enemies, such as
Freemasonry, Judaism, political churches, Marxism, and liberalism.
(_L-185_; _L-219_)
The centralization of the main offices of the GESTAPO and SD was not
fully carried out in the regional organization. Within Germany the
regional offices of the GESTAPO and SD maintained their separate
identity and reported directly to the section of the RSHA which had the
jurisdiction of the subject matter. They were, however, coordinated by
the _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police and SD. The _Inspekteurs_ were
also under the supervision of the Higher SS and Police leaders appointed
for each _Wehrkreis_.
The Higher SS and Police leaders reported to the Reichsfuehrer SS and
Chief of the German Police in each _Wehrkreis_ and supervised not only
the _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police and SD but also the
_Inspekteurs_ of the Order Police and various subdivisions of the SS.
(_1285-PS_)
In the occupied territories the organization developed as the German
armies advanced. Combined operational units of the Security Police and
SD, known as _Einsatz_ Groups, operated with and in the rear of the
Army. These groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the
KRIPO, and the SD, and the enlisted men were composed of Order Police
and Waffen SS. They functioned with various army groups. The _Einsatz_
Groups were subdivided into _Einsatzkommandos_, _Sonderkommandos_, and
_Teilkommandos_, all of which performed the functions of the Security
Police and SD with or closely behind the army. After the occupied
territories had been consolidated, the _Einsatz_ Groups and their
subordinate parts were formed into permanent combined offices of the
Security Police and SD within prescribed geographical locations. These
combined forces were placed under the _Kommandeurs_ of the Security
Police and SD, and the offices were organized in sections similar to the
RSHA headquarters. The _Kommandeurs_ of the Security Police and SD
reported directly to _Befehlshabers_ of the Security Police and SD, who
in turn reported directly to the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In
the occupied territories, the Higher SS and Police leaders exercised
more direct control over the _Befehlshabers_ and the _Kommandeurs_ of
the Security Police and SD than within the Reich. They had authority to
issue direct orders so long as they did not conflict with the Chief of
the Security Police and SD who exercised controlling authority.
(_1285-PS, Chart Number 19._)
C. _Place of the GESTAPO and SD in the Conspiracy._
(1) _Tasks and Methods of the GESTAPO._ In the basic law of 10 February
1936, the GESTAPO was declared to have “the duty to investigate and to
combat in the entire territory of the State, all tendencies dangerous to
the State.” The decree issued for the execution of said law gave the
GESTAPO the authority to make police investigations in treason,
espionage, and sabotage cases, “and in other cases of criminal attacks
on Party and State.” (_2107-PS_; _2108-PS_)
In referring to the above law, the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best,
commented as follows:
“Not the State in its outward organic appearance but the tasks
of the leadership in the sense of the National-Socialist idea is
the object of protection.” (_2232-PS_)
The duties of the GESTAPO were described in 1938 as follows, in an order
published by the Party Chancery:
“To the GESTAPO has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer to
watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the
National Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of
all kinds directed against both.” (_1723-PS_)
In _Das Archiv_, January 1936, the duties of the GESTAPO were described
in part as follows:
“Since the National Socialist revolution, all open struggle and
all open opposition to the State and to the leadership of the
State is forbidden, and a Secret State Police as a preventive
instrument in the struggle against all dangers threatening the
State is indissolubly bound up with the National Socialist
Fuehrer-State.” (_1956-PS_)
The successful accomplishment of this mission to strike down the
political and ideological opponents of the Nazi conspiracy was stated in
the official magazine of the SIPO and SD on 1 February 1943 in the
following words:
“The Secret State Police by carrying out these tasks,
contributed decisively to the fact that the National Socialist
constructive work could be executed in the past ten years
without any serious attempts of interference by the political
enemies of the nation.” (_1680-PS_)
The methods used by the GESTAPO were limited only by the results to be
obtained.
“The duties of the political police and the necessary means for
their performance are not chosen freely but are prescribed by
the foe. Just like the operations of an army against the outward
enemy and the means to fight this enemy cannot be prescribed, so
the political police also must have a free hand in the choice of
the means necessary at times to fight the attempts dangerous to
the State.” (_2232-PS_)
The GESTAPO was not restricted to the limitations of written law. The
Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:
“As long as the ‘police’ carries out the will of the leadership,
it is acting legally.” (_1852-PS_)
The GESTAPO was given the express power to take action outside the law
in the occupied territories. The laws pertaining to the administration
of Austria and the Sudetenland provided that the Reichsfuehrer SS and
Chief of the German Police will take measures for the maintenance of
security and order “even beyond the legal limitation otherwise laid down
for this purpose.” (_1437-PS_; _1438-PS_)
The actions and orders of the GESTAPO were not subject to judicial
review. The decision of the Prussian High Court of Administration on 2
May 1935 held that the status of the GESTAPO as a special police
authority removed its orders from the jurisdiction of the Administrative
Tribunals. The court said that under the law of 30 November 1933 the
only redress available was by appeal to the next higher authority within
the GESTAPO itself. (_2347-PS_)
The basic law of 10 February 1936 on the powers of the GESTAPO provided
specifically in Section VII:
“Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to
the review of the administrative courts.” (_2107-PS_)
Concerning the power of the GESTAPO to act outside the law, the Nazi
jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:
“It is no longer a question of law but a question of fate
whether the will of the leadership lays down the ‘right’ rules,
i.e., rules feasible and necessary for police action—the
‘police’ law suitable for and beneficial to the people. Actual
misuse of the legislative power by a people’s leadership—be it
a harmful severity or weakness—will, because of the violations
of the ‘laws of life,’ be punished in history more surely by
fate itself through misfortune, overthrow and ruin, than by a
State Court of Justice.” (_1852-PS_)
The great power of the GESTAPO was “_Schutzhaft_”—the power to imprison
people without judicial proceedings on the theory of “protective
custody.” This power was based upon the law of 28 February 1933 which
suspended the clauses of the Weimar Constitution guaranteeing civil
liberties to the German people, including Article 114 thereof, which
provided that an abridgement of personal liberty was permissible only by
authority of law. (_2499-PS_)
In April 1934 the Reich Minister of the Interior issued a decree (which
was not made public) stating that in view of the stabilizing of the
national situation it had become feasible to place restrictions upon the
exercise of protective custody and providing for limitations upon its
exercise. (_L-301_; _779-PS_)
The GESTAPO did not observe such limitations, and the practice of taking
people into protective custody increased greatly in 1934. The GESTAPO
did not permit lawyers to represent persons taken into protective
custody and, in one instance, counsel were themselves placed in
protective custody for trying to represent clients. Civil employees were
investigated and taken into protective custody by the GESTAPO without
knowledge of their superiors. (_775-PS_)
As of 1 February 1938, the Reich Minister of the Interior rescinded
previous decrees relating to protective custody, including the decree of
12 April 1934, and issued new regulations. These regulations provided
that protective custody could be ordered:
“* * * as a coercive measure of the Secret State Police against
persons who endangered the security of the people and the State
through their attitude, in order to counter all aspirations of
enemies of the people and State”;
that the GESTAPO had the exclusive right to order protective custody;
that protective custody was to be executed in the State concentration
camps; and that the GESTAPO, which authorized release from protective
custody, would review individual cases once every three months. The
Chief of the Secret Police was given authority to issue the necessary
regulations. (_1723-PS_)
The importance of this power of protective custody was set forth in _Das
Archiv_, 1936, in the following language:
“The most effective preventive measure is without doubt the
withdrawal of freedom, which is covered in the form of
protective custody, if it is to be feared that the free activity
of the persons in question might endanger the security of the
State in any way. While protective arrest of short duration is
carried out in police and court prisons, the concentration camps
under the Secret State Police admit those taken into protective
custody who have to be withdrawn from public life for a longer
time.” (_1956-PS_)
The authority of the GESTAPO to administer the concentration camps was
set forth in the decree to the basic law of 10 February 1936.
(_2108-PS_)
Other methods used by the GESTAPO consisted of the dissolution of
associations, prohibition and dissolution of assemblies and
congregations, prohibition of publications of various kinds and so
forth. (_1956-PS_)
(2) _Tasks and Methods of the SD._ The task of the SD, after it became
the intelligence service for State and Party, was to obtain secret
information concerning the actual and potential enemies of the Nazi
leadership so that appropriate action could be taken to destroy or
neutralize opposition. (_1956-PS_)
The duties of the SD were stated by the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, as
follows:
“As the intelligence service of the German National Socialist
Labor Party, the Security Service has first of all the task of
investigating and keeping a watch over all forces, events and
facts which are of importance for the domination of the National
Socialist idea and movement in German territory. With this task
follows that duty laid down by the Reich Minister of the
Interior—the duty of supporting the Security Police—which is
fulfilled, so far as it goes, under State orders. In support of
the tasks of the Security Police in securing the ranks of the
German people against interference and destruction of any kind,
the Security Service has to watch over every sphere of life of
the German people with regard to the activities of inimical
forces and the result of state and political measures, and to
inform continually the competent State authorities and offices
about the facts which have come to light. Finally, it has to
investigate politically and explore fundamentally the activities
and connections of the great, ideological, arch-enemy of
National Socialism and the German people, in order thereby to
render possible a purposeful and effective fight against it.”
(_1852-PS_)
To accomplish this task, the SD created an organization of agents and
informants operating out of various SD regional offices established
throughout the Reich, and later in conjunction with the GESTAPO and
Criminal Police throughout the occupied territories. The organization
consisted of several hundred full-time agents whose work was
supplemented by several thousand part-time informants. Informants were
located in schools, shops, churches, and all other spheres of German
life, operating under cover, and reporting any utterances or actions
against the Nazi Party, State or leadership. (_2614-PS_)
The SD had direct and powerful influence in the selection of Nazi
leaders. It investigated the loyalty and reliability of State officials,
evaluating them by their complete devotion to Nazi ideology and the
Hitler leadership. It secretly marked ballots and thereby discovered the
identity of persons who cast “No” votes and “invalid” votes in the
referenda. (_2614-PS_; _R-142_)
The SD worked closely with the GESTAPO. An article in the “_Voelkischer
Beobachter_” published in _Das Archiv_, January 1936, stated:
“As the Secret State Police can not carry out, in addition to
its primary executive tasks, this observation of the enemies of
the state, to the extent necessary, there steps alongside to
supplement it the Security Service of the Reichsleader of the
SS, set up by the Deputy Fuehrer as the political intelligence
service of the movement, which puts a large part of the forces
of the movement mobilized by it into the service of the security
of the state.” (_1956-PS_)
(3) _The Place of the GESTAPO and the SD in the Conspiracy._ The GESTAPO
was founded in April 1933 by Goering to serve as a political police
force in Prussia. Goering instructed Diels, the first Deputy Chief of
the GESTAPO, that his main task would be the elimination of political
opponents of National Socialism and the fight against Communism.
(_2460-PS_)
In “_Aufbau Einer Nation_,” published in 1934, Goering said:
“For weeks I had been working personally on the reorganization
and at last I alone and upon my own decision and my own
reflection created the office of the Secret State Police. This
instrument which is so feared by the enemies of the State, has
contributed most to the fact that today there can no longer be
talk of a Communist and Marxist danger in Germany and Prussia.”
(_2344-PS_)
So effective had the GESTAPO proven itself in combatting the political
opposition to National Socialism by the fall of 1933 that Goering took
over direct control of the GESTAPO (_2105-PS_). Goering’s position as
Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia was recognized by Himmler even after he
became Chief of the German Police in 1936 (_2372-PS_). Even as late as
December 1938 Goering continued to exercise his direct control over the
Prussian GESTAPO. (_D-183_)
Himmler was named Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia in 1934. He
used the GESTAPO, infused with new personnel recruited in large part
from the SS, to carry out the Roehm purge of 30 June 1934. (_2460-PS_)
The GESTAPO, through its great power of arrest and confinement to
concentration camps without recourse to law, was the principal means for
eliminating enemies of the Nazi regime. Diels, the former Deputy Chief
of the GESTAPO under Goering, declared:
“* * * From (1934) on the GESTAPO is responsible for all
deprivations of freedom and breaches of law and killings in the
political field which took place without court verdict. Of
primary importance among these was the shooting of numerous
persons who had been committed to jails by the courts and then
shot supposedly because of resistance. Many such cases were at
that time published in the papers. For people guilty of
immorality such illegal shootings became the rule. As for
deprivation of freedom, there was no legal reason any more for
protective custody orders after 1934, which had still been the
case before that date, since from 1934 on the power of the
totalitarian state was so stabilized that the arrest of a person
for his own protection was only an excuse for arbitrary
arrest—without court verdict and without legal measures for
him. The terroristic measures, which led to the development of
the pure force system and punished to an increasing degree each
critical remark and each impulse of freedom with the
concentration camp, took on more and more arbitrary and cruel
forms. The GESTAPO became the symbol of the regime of force.”
(_2460-PS_)
D. _Criminal Responsibility of the Gestapo and SD._
In the remainder of this section the criminal responsibility of the
GESTAPO and the SD will be considered with respect to certain crimes
against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity which were in
principal part committed by the centralized political police system the
development and organization of which has previously been considered. In
some instances the crimes were committed in cooperation or conjunction
with other groups and organizations.
Frequent reference will be made to the phrase, “SIPO and SD.” The SIPO
and SD was composed of the following organizations,—the GESTAPO, the
KRIPO and the SD.
The GESTAPO was the largest of these, having a membership of about
40,000 or 50,000 in 1943-45. It was the political police force of the
Reich. Much of its personnel consisted of transferees from former
political police forces of the States. Membership in the GESTAPO was
voluntary.
The KRIPO was second largest, having a membership of about 15,000 in
1943-45. It was the criminal police force of the Reich.
The SD was the smallest, having a membership of about 3,000 in 1943-45.
It was the intelligence service of the SS. Membership in the SD was
voluntary. (_3033-PS_)
In common usage, and even in orders and decrees, the term “SD” was used
as an abbreviation in the term “SIPO and SD.” Since the GESTAPO was the
primary executive agency of the SIPO and SD, and by far the largest, in
most such cases the actual executive action was carried out by personnel
of the GESTAPO rather than of the SD or of the KRIPO. In occupied
territories members of the GESTAPO frequently wore SS uniforms.
(_3033-PS_)
The term “Chief of the Security Police and SD” describes the person who
is the head of the GESTAPO, KRIPO and the SD, and of their headquarters
office called the RSHA. The “Chief of the Security Police and SD” and
the “head of the RSHA” are always one and the same person. The RSHA was
a department in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and in the SS.
Sometimes organizational responsibility can be established by the fact
that the orders in question were issued by or submitted to _Amt_ III of
the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the SD), to _Amt_ IV of the
RSHA (in which case the action concerned the GESTAPO), or to _Amt_ V of
the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the KRIPO).
Although the GESTAPO was the chief executive agency in the political
police system, all three organizations contributed to the accomplishment
of most of the criminal activities discussed hereinafter.
E. _Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD against the Peace._
Prior to the invasion of Poland by Germany, “border incidents” were
fabricated by the GESTAPO and SD for the purpose of furnishing Hitler
with an excuse to wage war. (_2751-PS_)
Early in August, 1939, the plan was conceived by the Chief of the
Security Police and SD, Heydrich, to stage simulated border raids by
personnel of the GESTAPO and SD dressed as Poles. To add authenticity,
it was planned to take certain prisoners from concentration camps, kill
them by use of hypodermic injections, and leave their bodies, clad in
Polish uniforms, at the various places where the incidents were planned
to occur. The Chief of the GESTAPO, Mueller, took a directing hand in
these actions, which were staged on 31 August 1939 in Beuthen,
Hindenburg, Gleiwitz, and elsewhere.
The leader of the SD agents who made the pretended attack on the
Gleiwitz radio station on 31 August, said:
“* * * In my presence, Mueller discussed with a man named
Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should
be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German
troops. Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to
be used. Mueller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals
who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the
ground of the scene of the incident, to show that they had been
killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given
fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they
were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the incident members
of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of
the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared.
“4. Mueller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make
one of those criminals available to me for the action at
Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals
was ‘Canned Goods.’
“5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried
out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I
recall, war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon of
the 31st August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code
word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o’clock that
evening. Heydrich said, ‘In order to carry out this attack
report to Mueller for Canned Goods.’ I did this and gave Mueller
instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I
received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the
station. He was alive but he was completely unconscious. I tried
to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was
alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds but
a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian
clothes.
“6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech
of three to four minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired
some pistol shots and left.” (_2751-PS_; _2479-PS_)
These were the “frontier incidents” to which Hitler referred in his
speech to the Reichstag on 1 September 1939. (Adolf Hitler, “My New
Order,” Reynal and Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 687.)
F. _War Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD._
(1) _The GESTAPO and SD carried out mass murders of hundreds of
thousands of civilians of occupied countries as a part of the Nazi
program to exterminate political and racial undesirables (“Einsatz
Groups”)._ About four weeks before the attack on Russia, special task
forces of the SIPO and SD, called _Einsatzgruppen_ or Special Task
Groups, were formed on order of Himmler for the purpose of following the
German armies into Russia, combatting partisans and members of
resistance groups and exterminating the Jews and Communist leaders. In
the beginning four _Einsatz_ Groups were formed. _Einsatz_ Group A,
operating in the Baltic States, was placed under the command of
Stahlecker, former Inspector of the SIPO and SD. _Einsatz_ Group B,
operating toward Moscow, was placed under the command of Nebe, the Chief
of _Amt_ V (KRIPO) of the RSHA. _Einsatz_ Group C, operating toward
Kiev, was placed under the command of Rasch and later of Thomas, former
Chief of the SIPO and SD in Paris. _Einsatz_ Group D, operating in the
south of Russia, was placed under the command of Ohlendorf, the Chief of
_Amt_ III (SD) of the RSHA.
The _Einsatz_ Groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the SD
and the KRIPO. The men were drawn from the Order Police and the Waffen
SS. The groups had complements of 400 to 500 men, and had their own
vehicles and equipment. By agreement with the OKW and OKH, the
_Einsatzkommandos_ were attached to certain Army corps or divisions. The
Army assigned the area in which the _Einsatzkommandos_ were to operate,
but all operational directives and orders for the carrying out of
executions were given through the RSHA in Berlin. Regular courier
service and radio communications existed between the _Einsatz_ Groups
and the RSHA.
The affidavit of Ohlendorf, Chief of the SD, who led _Einsatz_ Group D,
reads in part as follows:
“When the German Army invaded Russia, I was leader of
_Einsatzgruppe_ D in the southern sector, and in the course of
the year during which I was leader of the _Einsatzgruppe_ D, it
liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women and children. The
majority of those liquidated were Jews, but there were also
among them some Communist functionaries.
“In the execution of this extermination program the
_Einsatzgruppen_ were subdivided into _Einsatzkommandos_, and
the _Einsatzkommandos_ into still smaller units, the so-called
_Sonderkommando_ and _Teilkommandos_. Usually the smaller units
were led by a member of the SD, the GESTAPO or the KRIPO. The
unit selected for this task would enter a village or city and
order the prominent Jewish citizens to call together all Jews
for the purpose of resettlement. They were asked to hand over
their personal belongings to the leaders of the unit, and
shortly before the execution, to surrender their outer clothing.
The men, women and children were led to a place of execution
which usually was located beside a deepened antitank ditch. Then
they were shot, kneeling or standing, and the corpses were
thrown into the ditch. I never permitted the shooting by
individuals in Group D, but ordered that several of the men
should shoot at the same time in order to avoid direct personal
responsibility. The leaders of the unit, or especially
designated persons, however, had to fire the last shot against
those victims who were not dead immediately. I learned from
conversations with other group leaders that some of them asked
the victims to lie down flat on the ground to be shot through
the neck. I did not approve of these methods.” (_2620-PS_)
The contention that these murders were carried out by subterfuge and
without force and terror is belied by the eyewitness account of two such
mass murders witnessed by Hermann Graebe, who was manager and engineer
in charge of the branch office of the Solingen firm of Josef Jung in
Sdolbunow, Ukraine, from September 1941 until January 1944. Graebe’s
interest in the mass executions derived from the fact that in addition
to Poles, Germans, and Ukrainians, he employed Jews on the various
construction projects under his supervision. He was personally
acquainted with the leader of the SIPO and SD who carried out the
actions hereinafter described with the aid of SS-men (most of whom wore
the SD arm-band) and Ukrainian militia. Graebe negotiated with SS-major
Putz, the leader of the SIPO and SD, for the release of about 100 Jewish
workers from the action which took place in Rowno on 13 July 1942. The
original letter which exempted these Jewish workers from the action is
attached to Graebe’s affidavit, which states in part as follows:
“In the evening of this day I drove to Rowno and posted myself
with Fritz Einsporn in front of the house in the Bahnhofstrasse
in which the Jewish workers of my firm slept. Shortly after
22.00 the ghetto was encircled by a large SS detachment and
again about three times as many members of the Ukrainian
militia. Then the electric floodlights which had been erected
all around the ghetto were switched on. SS and militia details
of 4 to 6 members entered or at least tried to enter the houses.
Where the doors and windows were closed and the inhabitants did
not open upon the knocking, the SS men and militia broke the
windows, forced the doors and beams with crowbars and entered
the dwellings. The owners were driven onto the street just as
they were, regardless of whether they were dressed or whether
they had been in bed. Since the Jews in most cases refused to
leave their dwellings and resisted, the SS and militia both
applied force. With the help of whippings, kicks and hits with
the rifle butts they finally succeeded in having the dwellings
evacuated. The people were chased out of their houses in such
haste that the small children who had been in bed had been left
behind in several instances. In the street women cried out for
their children and children for their parents. That did not
prevent the SS from chasing the people along the road, at double
time, and hitting them until they reached a waiting freight
train. Car after car was filled, over it hung the screaming of
women and children, the cracking of whips and rifle shots. Since
several families and groups had barricaded themselves in
especially strong buildings, and the doors could not be forced
with crowbars or beams, these houses were now blown open with
hand grenades. Since the ghetto was near the railroad tracks in
Rowno, the younger people tried to get across the tracks and to
a small river to be outside of the ghetto. This sector being
outside of the floodlights was lighted by signal ammunition. All
through the night these beaten, chased and wounded people
dragged themselves across the lighted streets. Women carried
their dead children in their arms, children hugged and dragged
by their arms and feet their dead parents down the road toward
the train. Again and again the calls ‘Open the door,’ ‘Open the
door’ echoed through the ghetto.” (_2992-PS_)
The leader of _Einsatz_ Group D, Ohlendorf, stated in his affidavit that
other _Einsatz_ Group leaders required the victims to lie down flat on
the ground to be shot through the neck. Graebe describes a mass
execution of this kind which he observed carried out under the direction
of a man in SD uniform on 5 October 1943 at Dubno, Ukraine, as follows:
“Thereupon in the company of Moennikes I drove to the
construction area and saw in its vicinity a heap of earth, about
30 meters long and 2 meters high. Several trucks stood in front
of the heap. Armed Ukrainian militia chased the people off the
trucks under the supervision of an SS man. The militia men were
guards on the trucks and drove them to and from the excavation.
All these people had the prescribed yellow badges on the front
and back of their clothes, and thus were recognized as Jews.
“Moennikes and I went directly to the excavation. Nobody
bothered us. Now we heard shots in quick succession from behind
one of the earth mounds. The people who had gotten off the
trucks—men, women, and children of all ages—had to undress
upon the orders of an SS man who carried a riding or dog whip.
They had to put down their clothes in fixed places, sorted
according to shoes, over and underclothing, I saw a pile of
shoes of about 800 to 1,000 pairs, great piles of laundry and
clothing. Without screaming or crying these people undressed,
stood around by families, kissed each other, said farewells and
waited for the nod of another SS man, who stood near the
excavation, also with a whip in his hand. During the 15 minutes
that I stood near the excavation I have heard no complaint and
no request for mercy. I watched a family of about 8 persons, a
man and a woman, both about 50 with their children of about 1, 8
and 10, and two grown-up daughters of about 20 to 24. An old
woman with snow-white hair held the one-year-old child in her
arms and sang for it, and tickled it. The child was squeaking
from joy. The couple looked on with tears in their eyes. The
father held the hand of a boy about 10 years old and spoke to
him softly; the boy was fighting his tears. The father pointed
toward the sky, fondled his hand, and seemed to explain
something to him. At that moment the SS-man at the excavation
called something to his comrades. The latter counted off about
20 persons and instructed them to walk behind the earth mound.
Among them was the family which I had mentioned. I remember very
well a girl, blackhaired and slender, passing near me; she
pointed at herself and said, ‘23 years.’ I walked around the
mound, and stood in front of a tremendous grave. Closely pressed
together the people were lying on top of each other so that only
their heads were visible. Several of the people shot still
moved. Some lifted their arms and turned their heads to show
that they were still alive. The excavation was already
two-thirds full. I estimated that it contained about 1,000
people. I looked for the man who did the shooting. I saw an
SS-man who sat at the rim of the narrow end of the excavation,
his feet dangling into the excavation. On his knees he had a
machine pistol and he was smoking a cigarette. The completely
naked people descended a stairway which was dug into the clay of
the excavation and slipped over the heads of the people lying
there already to the place to which the SS-man directed them.
They laid themselves in front of the dead or injured people,
some touched tenderly those who were still alive and spoke to
them in a low voice. Then I heard a number of shots. I looked
into the excavation and saw how the bodies jerked or the heads
rested already motionless on top of the bodies that lay before
them. Blood was running from their necks. I was surprised that I
was not chased away, but I saw there were two or three postal
officers in uniform nearby. Now already the next group
approached, descended into the excavation, lined themselves up
against the previous victims and was shot. When I walked back,
around the mound, I noticed again a transport which had just
arrived. This time it included sick and frail persons. An old,
very thin woman with terribly thin legs was undressed by others
who were already naked, while two persons held her up.
Apparently the woman was paralyzed. The naked people carried the
woman around the mound. I left with Moennikes and drove with my
car back to Dubno.” (_2992-PS_)
There are two reports by Stahlecker, the Chief of _Einsatz_ Group B,
available. The first report, found in Himmler’s personal files, states
that during the first four months of the Russian campaign _Einsatz_
Group A murdered 135,000 Communists and Jews, and carried out widespread
destruction of homes and villages and other vast crimes. Enclosure 8 to
this Stahlecker report is a careful survey of the number of persons
murdered, classified as to country, and whether Jew or Communist, with
totals given in each instance. This report discloses that the _Einsatz_
Groups frequently enlisted the aid of the local populations in the
extermination program. It states:
“In view of the extension of the area of operations and the
great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security
Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the
cooperation of the reliable population for the fight against
vermin—that is, mainly the Jews and Communists.” (_L-180_)
With respect to extermination of Jews the report stated:
“From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish
problem could not be solved by pogroms alone. In accordance with
the basic orders received, however, the cleansing activities of
the Security Police had to aim at a complete annihilation of the
Jews. Special detachments reinforced by selected units—in
Lithuania partisan detachments, in Latvia units of the Latvian
auxiliary police—therefore performed extensive executions both
in towns and in rural areas. The actions of the execution
detachments were performed smoothly. * * *”
Enclosure 8, “Survey of the number of executed persons” is quoted
directly from the report:
“_Enclosure 8—Survey of the number of executed persons_
Area │ Jews │Communists│ Total
“Lithuania: │ │ │
Kowono town and surroundings │ │ │
(land) │ 31,914│ 80│ 31,994
Schaulen │ 41,382│ 763│ 42,145
Wilna │ 7,015│ 17│ 7,032
│ —————│ —————│ —————
│ 80,311│ 860│ 81,171
│==========│==========│==========
“Latvia: │ │ │
Riga town and surroundings │ │ │
(land) │ │ │ 6,378
Mitau │ │ │ 3,576
Libau │ │ │ 11,860
Wolmar │ │ │ 209
Dueanaburg │ 9,256│ 589│ 9,845
│ —————│ —————│ —————
│ 30,025│ 1,843│ 31,868
│==========│==========│==========
“Esthonia │ 474│ 684│ 1,158
│==========│==========│==========
“White Ruthenia │ 7,620│ │ 7,620
│==========│==========│==========
“Total: │ │ │
Lithuania │ 80,311│ 860│ 81,171
Latvia │ 30,025│ 1,843│ 31,868
Esthonia │ 474│ 684│ 1,158
White Ruthenia │ 7,620│ │ 7,620
│ —————│ —————│ —————
│ 118,430│ 3,387│ 121,817
“to be added to these figures:
In Lithuania and Latvia Jews annihilated by pogroms 5,500
Jews, Communists and partisans executed in old-Russian area 2,000
Lunatics executed 748
————
122,455
Communists and Jews liquidated by State Police and Security
Service Tilsit during search actions 5,502
————
135,567”
(_L-180_)
The second report from _Einsatz_ Group A (_L-180_) reports the
extermination of nearly 230,000 persons. With respect to Esthonia, it
states in part:
“Only by the SIPO and SD were the Jews gradually executed as
they became no longer required for work. Today there are no
longer any Jews in Esthonia.”
With respect to Latvia, the report states in part:
“Up to October 1941 approximately 30,000 Jews had been executed
by these _Sonderkommandos_. The remaining Jews who were still
indispensable from the economic point of view were collected in
Ghettos, which were established in Riga, Duenaburg and Libau.”
With respect to Lithuania, the report states in part:
“Therefore by means of selected units—mostly in the proportion
of 1:8—first of all the prisons, and then systematically,
district by district, the Lithuanian sector was cleansed of Jews
of both sexes. Altogether 136,421 people were liquidated in a
great number of single actions. As the complete liquidation of
the Jews was not feasible, as they were needed for labor,
Ghettos were formed which at the moment are occupied as follows:
Kauen approximately 15,000 Jews; Wilna approximately 15,000
Jews; Schaulen approximately 4,500 Jews. These Jews are used
primarily for work of military importance. For example, up to
5,000 Jews are employed in 3 shifts on the aerodrome near Kauen
on earthworks and work of that sort.”
With respect to White Russia, the report states in part:
“In view of the enormous distances, the bad condition of the
roads, the shortage of vehicles and petrol, and the small forces
of Security Police and SD, it needs the utmost effort to be able
to carry out shootings in the country. Nevertheless 41,000 Jews
have been shot up to now.”
With respect to Jews from the Reich, the report states in part
“Since December 1940 transports containing Jews have arrived at
short intervals from the Reich. Of these, 20,000 Jews were
directed to Riga and 7,000 Jews to Minsk. Only a small section
of the Jews from the Reich is capable of working. About 70-80
percent are women and children or old people unfit for work. The
death rate is rising continually also as a result of the
extraordinarily bad winter. In isolated instances sick Jews with
contagious disease were selected under the pretext of putting
them into a home for the aged or a hospital, and executed.”
Attached as an enclosure to this report is a map entitled “Jewish
Executions Carried out by _Einsatzgruppe_ A,” on which, by the use of
coffins as symbols, the number of Jews murdered in each area covered by
_Einsatz_ Group A is shown (_Chart Number 4_). The map shows thousands
of Jews in ghettos, and an estimated 128,000 Jews “still on hand” in the
Minsk area. Number of murdered, according to figures beside the coffins,
during the period covered by this report, was 228,050.
On 30 October 1941 the Commissioner of the territory of Sluzk wrote a
report to the Commissioner General, Minsk, in which he severely
criticized the actions of the _Einsatzkommandos_ operating in his area
for the murder of all the Jews of Sluzk:
“On 27 October in the morning at about 8 o’clock a first
lieutenant of the police battalion No. 11 from Kauen (Lithuania)
appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion
commander of the security police. The first lieutenant explained
that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect
the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within
two days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength
of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian
partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to
begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to
discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About
half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk.
Immediately after the arrival the conference with the battalion
commander took place according to my request. I first explained
to the commander that it would not very well be possible to
effect the action without previous preparation, because
everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead to
terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to
inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone
the action one day. However, he rejected this with the remark
that he had to carry out this action everywhere and in all towns
and that only two days were allotted for Sluzk. Within these two
days, the town of Sluzk had to be cleared of Jews by all means.
For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must
point out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered already
on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of horror during
the action. With indescribable brutality on the part of both the
German police officers and particularly the Lithuanian
partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them White
Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded
together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in
different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The
White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves
from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish
people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a
terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian
people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over
with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an
action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a
revolution. In conclusion I find myself obliged to point out
that the police battalion has looted in an unheard of manner
during the action, and that not only in Jewish houses but just
the same in those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use such
as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, has been
taken away. On the basis of statements of members of the armed
forces, watches were torn off the arms of Jews in public, on the
streets, and rings were pulled off the fingers in the most
brutal manner. A major of the finance department reported that a
Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000
rubles to have her father released. This girl is said to have
actually gone everywhere in order to obtain the money.”
(_1104-PS_)
This report was submitted by the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia
to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories on 1 November 1941
with the following comment:
“I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may
be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be
maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To bury
seriously wounded people alive who worked their way out of their
graves again is such a base and filthy act that the incidents as
such should be reported to the Fuehrer and Reichs Marshal.”
(_1104-PS_)
On the same date by separate letter the Commissioner General of White
Ruthenia reported to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories
that he had received money, valuables, and other objects taken by the
police in the action at Sluzk and other regions, all of which had been
deposited with the Reich Credit institute for the disposal of the Reich
Commissioner. (_1104-PS_)
On 21 November 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent to the
personal reviewer of the permanent deputy of the Minister of the Reich
with a copy to Heydrich, the Chief of the Security Police and SD.
(_1104-PS_)
On 6 November 1942 a secret report submitted to the Reich Commissar for
the East concerning the struggle against partisans in the East discloses
that destruction of villages continued, and reports the execution of
1,274 partisan suspects and 8,350 Jews, and the deportation of 1,217
people. This report was forwarded on 10 December 1942 to the Reich
Minister for the occupied Eastern territories. (_1113-PS_)
The report from the prison administrator at Minsk as of 31 May 1943 to
the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia states:
“The German, former dentist Ernst Israel Tichauer and his wife
Elisa Sara Tichauer, born Rosenthal, were delivered to the
Court-Prison by the SD (_Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube) on 13 April
1943. Since that date, the golden bridgework, crowns and
fillings of the received German and Russian Jews were pulled
out, respectively broken out by force. This always happened 1-2
hours before the actions in question.
“Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews were
liquidated. After careful investigation it was ascertained that
gold objects were only taken away during 2 actions, namely on 14
April 43 from 172 and on 27 April 43 from 164 Jews. About 50
percent of the Jews had gold teeth, bridges or fillings.
_Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube of the SD was always present in person,
and also took the gold objects with him.
“This has not been done before 13 April 1943.”
This report was forwarded to the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern
territories on 1 June 1943. (_R-135_)
Death vans were used by the _Einsatz_ Groups to murder victims by gas.
These vans were built by the Saurer Works in Berlin and other firms. The
vans were built for the technical section of _Amt_ II of the RSHA, which
sent them to the _Einsatz_ Groups in the field. They were first used in
the spring of 1942 and continued to be used throughout the war
(_2348-PS_). The method of using the vans is described by Ohlendorf in
the following words:
“We received orders to use the car for the killing of women and
children. Whenever a unit had collected a sufficient number of
victims, a car was sent for their liquidation. We also stationed
these cars in the neighborhood of the transit camps to which the
victims had been brought. They were told that they would be
resettled and had to climb into the cars for that purpose. Then
the doors were closed and as soon as the cars started moving the
gas would enter. The victims died within ten to fifteen minutes.
The cars were driven to the burial place where the corpses were
taken out and buried.” (_2620-PS_)
A letter from Becker, the operator of several death vans, written to
Rauff, the head of the technical section of _Amt_ II of the RSHA, on 16
May 1942, states:
“The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While
the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the
weather is not too bad the vans of the second series (Saurer)
stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance
for only one-half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply
skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is
only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at
the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that
place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of
execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is
difficult of access because of its location; in damp or wet
weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be
executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize
immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be
avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load
them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.
“I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as
house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each
side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans,
such as one often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans
became so well-known, that not only the authorities but also the
civilian population called the van “death van”, as soon as one
of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion that the van cannot
be kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.
“* * * I should like to take this opportunity to bring the
following to your attention: several commands have had the
unloading after the application of gas done by their own men. I
brought to the attention of the commanders of those SK concerned
the immense psychological injuries and damages to their health
which that work can have for those men, even if not immediately,
at least later on. The men complained to me about headaches
which appeared after each unloading.
“* * * The application of gas usually is not undertaken
correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the
driver presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing
that the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation
and not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now
have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death comes
faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces
and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer
noticed.” (_501-PS_)
The death vans were not always satisfactory. A telegram from the
commandant of the SIPO and SD “Ostland” to the RSHA, _Amt_ II D, on 15
June 1942, states:
“A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way,
arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security
Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.
“The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that
purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the
same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three
S-vans on hand (2 Diamond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are
leaky already.” (_501-PS_)
The reports of the various _Einsatz_ Groups were summarized at RSHA, and
the summaries were then distributed to the various sections interested,
particularly _Amt_ III (the SD), _Amt_ IV (the GESTAPO), and _Amt_ V
(the KRIPO) (_2752-PS_). One such report covering the period 1-31
October 1941 is entitled “Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the
_Einsatz_ Groups of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR”
(_R-102_). This report describes in summary form the activities of the
various _Einsatz_ Groups during the month of October 1941. The report
first discusses the stations and in that regard states:
“During the period covered by this report the stations of the
Task Forces of the Security Police and the SD have changed only
in the Northern Sector.
“The present stations are:
“Task Force A: since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk.
“Task Force B: continues in Smolensk.
“Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew.
“Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.
“The Action and Special Commandos (_Einsatz und Sonder_
Commandos) which are attached to the Task Force continue on the
march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been
assigned to them.” (_R-102_)
The report next discusses the activities of each _Einsatz_ Group. There
is included first a discussion of the Baltic area, next of White
Ruthenia, and last of the Ukraine. Under each section the work of the
_Einsatz_ Groups in connection with the action taken against partisans,
Jews, and communist officials is considered. With respect to the
treatment of Jews in the Baltic area the report states in part:
“* * * However, the Estonian Protective Corps (_Selbstschutz_),
formed at the time of the entry of the _Wehrmacht_, immediately
started a comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action
was under the direction of the task force of the Security Police
and the SD.
“The measures taken were:
1. Arrest of all male Jews over 16.
2. Arrest of all Jewesses from 16-20 years, who lived in
Reval and environs and were fit for work; these were
employed in peat cutting.
3. Comprehensive detention in the synagogue of all
Jewesses living in Dorport and its environs.
4. Arrest of the Jews and Jewesses fit for work in
Pernau and environs.
5. Registration of all Jews according to age, sex, and
capacity for work for the purpose of their detention in
a camp that is being prepared.
“The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of
doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still
in progress. After completion of this action there will remain
only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern territory. * * *”
(_R-102_)
With respect to partisan activity in White Ruthenia, the report states
in part:
“* * * In the village Michalowo, after careful reconnaissance
through civilian agents, 8 partisans were surprised in a house
by the same Commando of the Security Police and the SD, they
were arrested and hanged the next day in this particularly
partisan infested village.
“The president of the District Region Soviets in Tarenitsch and
his secretary were shot because of their connections with
partisans.
“During an action approximately 70 kilometers south of Mogilow,
25 Armenians, Kirghize and Mongols were apprehended with false
identification papers with which they tried to conceal the fact
that they belong to a partisan group. They were liquidated. * *
*” (_R-102_)
With respect to arrests and executions of communists in White Ruthenia,
the report states in part:
“A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was
devoted to the combating of Communists and criminals. A special
Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63
officials, NKVD agents and agitators. * * *” (_R-102_)
With respect to the action taken against the Jews in White Ruthenia the
report states in part:
“* * * All the more vigorous are the actions of the task forces
of the Security Police and the SD against the Jews who make it
necessary that steps be taken against them in different spheres.
“In Gorodnia 165 Jewish terrorists and in Tschernigow 19 Jewish
Communists were liquidated. 8 more Jewish communists were shot
at Beresna.
“It was experienced repeatedly that the Jewish women showed an
especially obstinate behaviour. For this reason 28 Jewesses had
to be shot in Krugoje and 337 at Mogilev.
“In Borissov 321 Jewish saboteurs and 118 Jewish looters were
executed.
“In Bobruisk 380 Jews were shot who had engaged to the last in
incitement and horror propaganda [_Hetz-und Greuelpropaganda_]
against the German army of occupation.
“In Tatarsk the Jews had left the Ghetto of their own accord and
returned to their old home quarters, attempting to expel the
Russians who had been quartered there in the meantime. All male
Jews as well as 3 Jewesses were shot.
“In Sadrudubs the Jews offered some resistance against the
establishment of a Ghetto so that 272 Jews and Jewesses had to
be shot. Among them was a political Commissar.
“_MOGILEV_
“In Mogilev too, the Jews attempted to sabotage their removal to
the Ghetto; 113 Jews were liquidated.
“_Wit_
“Moreover four Jews were shot on account of refusal to work and
2 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged orders issued by the
German occupation authorities.
“In Talka 222 Jews were shot for anti-German propaganda and in
Marina Gorka 996 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged
orders issued by the German occupation authorities.
“At Schklow 627 more Jews were shot because they had
participated in acts of sabotage.
“_Witebsk_
“On account of the extreme danger of an epidemic, a beginning
was made to liquidate the Jews in the ghetto at Witebsk. This
involved approximately 3000 Jews. * * *” (_R-102_)
With respect to partisan activity in the Ukraine the report states in
part:
“Although partisan activity in the south sector is very strong
too, there is nevertheless the impression that spreading and
effective partisan activity are strongly affected by the flight
of higher partisan leaders and by the lack of initiative of the
subordinate leaders who have remained behind. Only in one case a
commando of the Security Police and the SD succeeded in a fight
with partisans in shooting the Secretary of the Communist Party
for the administration district of Nikolajew-Cherson, who was at
the time Commissar of a partisan group for the district
Nikolajew-Cherson-Krim. * * *” (_R-102_)
With respect to treatment of Jews in the Ukraine the report states in
part:
“The embitterment of the Ukrainian population against the Jews
is extremely great because they are thought responsible for the
explosions in Kiew. They are also regarded as informers and
agents of the NKVD who started the terror against the Ukrainian
people. As a measure of retaliation for the arson at Kiew, all
Jews were arrested and altogether 33,771 Jews were executed on
the 29th and 30th September. Money, valuables and clothing were
secured and put at the disposal of the National-Socialist League
for Public Welfare (NSV) for the equipment of the National
Germans [_Volksdeutschen_] and partly put at the disposal of the
provisional city administration for distribution to the needy
population.
“_Shitomir_
“In Shitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience
they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propaganda and
saboteurs.
“_Cherson_
“In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of retaliation
for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area east of the Dnjepr
the solution of the Jewish question has been taken up
energetically by the task forces of the Security Police and the
SD. The areas newly occupied by the Commandos were purged of
Jews. In the course of this action 4,891 Jews were liquidated.
At other places the Jews were marked and registered. This
rendered it possible to put at the disposal of the _Wehrmacht_
for urgent labor, Jewish worker groups up to 1,000 persons.”
(_R-102_)
These reports, circulated among the various offices of the RSHA, brought
general knowledge to the entire organization of the program of mass
murder conducted by these special task forces of the SIPO and SD.
(_R-102_)
The activities of the _Einsatz_ Groups continued throughout 1943 and
1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the SIPO and SD. New groups were
formed and sent into action in the West (_2890-PS_). Under adverse war
conditions, however, the program of extermination was to a large extent
changed to one of rounding up slave labor for Germany. A letter written
on 19 March 1943 from the headquarters of a _Sonderkommando_ (section of
_Einsatz_ Group C) states as follows:
“It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security
Service (SD) to discover all enemies of the Reich and fight
against them in the interest of security, and in the zone of
operations especially to guarantee the security of the army.
Besides the annihilation of active opponents all other elements
who, by virtue of their opinions or their past, may appear
active as enemies under favorable conditions, are to be
eliminated [_sind * * * auszumerzen_] through preventive
measures. The Security Police carries out this task according to
the general directives of the Fuehrer with all the required
toughness. Energetic measures are especially necessary in
territories endangered by the activity of hostile gangs. The
competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations
is based on the Barbarossa decrees. I deem the measures of the
Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during
recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:
“1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so
serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and
Italians, who streamed back in chaotic condition, took openly
position against us.
“2. The strong expeditions of hostile gangs, who came especially
from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that,
other revolutionary groups, formed by the population, appeared
suddenly in all districts. The providing of arms evidently
provided no difficulties at all. It would have been
irresponsible, if we had observed this whole activity without
acting against it. It is obvious that all such measures bring
about some harshness. I want to take up the significant points
of harsh measures:
“1. The shooting of Hungarian Jews.
“2. The shooting of directors of collective farms.
“3. The shooting of children.
“4. The total burning down of villages.
“5. The “shooting, while trying to escape” of Security
Service (SD) prisoners.
“Chief of _Einsatz_ Group C confirmed once more the correctness
of the measures taken, and expressed his recognition for the
energetic actions.
“With regard to the current political situation, especially in
the armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the
Security Police have to be subordinated to the greatest extent
to the recruiting of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible
time, the Ukraine has to put at the disposal of the armament
industry 1 million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our
territory daily.
“The work of the field groups has therefore to be changed as of
now. The following orders are given:
“1. Special treatment is to be limited to a minimum.
“2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists and so on,
is to take place by roster only for the time being, without
arresting anybody. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to
arrest all the close relatives of a member of the communist
party. Although, members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested
only if they were active in a leading position.
“3. The activity of the labor offices, respective of recruiting
commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible.
It will not be possible always to refrain from using force.
During a conference with the Chief of the Labor Commitment
Staffs, an agreement was reached stating that wherever prisoners
can be released, they should be put at the disposal of the
Commissioner of the Labor Office. When searching [_Uberholung_]
villages, resp., when it has become necessary to burn down a
village, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the
Commissioner by force.
“4. As a rule, no more children will be shot.
“5. The reporting of hostile gangs as well as drives against
them is not affected hereby. All drives against these hostile
gangs can only take place after my approval has been obtained.
“6. The prisons have to be kept empty, as a rule. We have to be
aware of the fact that the Slavs will interpret all soft
treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act
accordingly right away. If we limit our harsh measures of
security police through above orders for the time being, that is
only done for the following reason. The most important thing is
the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into
the Reich will be made. No written certificates of political
reliability check or similar things will be issued.
“(signed) Christiansen.”
(_3012-PS_)
The head of the Jewish section in the GESTAPO, and the man directly
responsible for carrying out the mass extermination program against the
Jews by the GESTAPO, _Obersturmbannfuehrer_ Eichmann, estimated in his
report to Himmler on the matter, that 2,000,000 Jews had been killed by
shootings, mainly by the _Einsatz_ Groups of the SIPO and SD during the
campaign in the East. This did not include the estimated 4,000,000 sent
by the GESTAPO for extermination in annihilation camps. (_2615-PS_)
(2) _The GESTAPO and SD stationed special units in prisoner of war camps
for the purpose of screening out racial and political undesirables and
executing them._ The program of mass murder of political and racial
undesirables carried on against civilians was also applied to prisoners
of war captured on the Eastern front. Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Staff
of the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab_, states:
“* * * Shortly before the beginning of this campaign [with
U.S.S.R.] I was present in a group composed of the Commanders in
Chief (with their Chiefs of Staff) of the three Armed Forces, of
the Army groups, of Armies, and of the corresponding groups in
the Air Forces and Navy. Hitler made an announcement to this
group that special measures would have to be taken against
political functionaries and commissars of the Soviet army. He
said that this would not be an ordinary campaign but would be
the clash of conflicting ideologies. He further said that the
political functionaries and commissars were not to be considered
as prisoners of war but were to be segregated from other
prisoners immediately after their capture and were to be turned
over to special detachments of the SD which were to accompany
the German troops to Russia. He further said that when it was
not possible to turn over the political functionaries and
commissars to the SD, they were to be eliminated by the German
troops.” (_2884-PS_)
The Chief of the SD, Otto Ohlendorf, describes this action in the
following words:
“In 1941, shortly after the start of the campaign against
Russia, an agreement was entered into between the Chief of the
Security Police and SD and the OKW and OKH to the effect that
the prisoner of war camps on the Eastern front should be opened
to _Einsatzkommandos_ of the SIPO and SD so that the prisoners
could be screened. All Jews and Communist functionaries were to
be taken from the prisoner of war camps by the
_Einsatzkommandos_ and executed outside the camps. To my
knowledge, this action was carried on throughout the entire
Russian campaign. In the other occupied territories and within
the Reich—to my knowledge—the GESTAPO had been made
responsible for this program in the Russian prisoner of war
camps. It was, to my knowledge, carried on throughout the
greater part of the war.” (_2622-PS_)
Lahousen, chief of a division in the office of foreign intelligence in
the _Wehrmacht_, states:
“* * * From the start of the campaign against the U.S.S.R. the
higher German political and military leadership followed the
policy of eliminating Russian commissars and various other types
of Russian prisoners of war captured by the _Wehrmacht_. In June
and July 1941 I participated in a conference which concerned
itself with the treatment of Russian commissars. * * *
Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller was present as representative of the
RSHA, and he participated in this matter because, as Chief of
Section IV, he was responsible for the carrying out of these
measures. Jointly with the SD and the GESTAPO he had the task of
instituting the necessary measures for the execution of
commissars. * * * In the discussion that followed, Mueller
promised in a peculiarly cynical manner that these executions
would take place in the future outside the camp, so that the
troops would not be obliged to watch them. He promised further a
certain limitation in the concept of ‘Bolshevistically
infected.’ This concept and its interpretation had been hitherto
left to the discretion of the SD _Sonderkommandos_. * * * An
agreement was concluded between the OKW, the GESTAPO and the SD.
Pursuant to this agreement Russian prisoners of war under the
control of the OKW were delivered to the GESTAPO and SD for
execution. The term ‘_Sonderbehandlung_’ in the official
documents and way of speaking of the SD was equivalent to
‘condemned to death’.” (_2846-PS_)
On 17 July 1941 instructions were issued by the GESTAPO to Commandos of
the SIPO and SD stationed in Stalags, providing in part as follows:
“The activation of commandos will take place in accordance with
the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security
Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16
July 1941 (see enclosure 1). The commandos will work
independently according to special authorization and in
consequence of the general regulations given to them, in the
limit of the camp organizations. Naturally, the commandos will
keep close contact with the camp-commander and the
defense-officers assigned to him.
“The mission of the commandos is the political investigating of
all camp-inmates, the elimination and further ‘treatment’
“_a._ of all political, criminal or in some other way unbearable
elements among them.
“_b._ of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction
of the occupied territories.
“The commandos must use for their work as far as possible, at
present and even later, the experiences of the camp-commanders
which the latter have collected meanwhile from observation of
the prisoners and examinations of camp inmates.
“Further, the commandos must make efforts from the beginning to
seek out among the prisoners elements which appear reliable,
regardless if there are communists concerned or not, in order to
use them for intelligence purposes inside of the camp and, if
advisable, later in the occupied territories also.
“By use of such informers and by use of all other existing
possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated
among the prisoners, must proceed step by step at once. * * *
“Above all, the following must be discovered: All important
functionaries of state and party, especially
Professional revolutionaries
Functionaries of the Komintern
All policy forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and
its fellow organizations in the central committees, in
the regional and district committees.
All peoples-commissars and their deputies
All former political commissars in the Red-Army
Leading personalities of the state-authorities of
central and middle regions.
The leading personalities of the business world.
Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence
All Jews
All persons who are found to be agitators or fanatical
communists. * * *
“Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate
vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the general-government are
in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are
to be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former
Soviet-Russian territory. * * *
“In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible
removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for
the _Einsatz_-group in the occupied territories, the leader of
the _Einsatz-Kommando_ [?] must make an agreement with the
nearest State-Police-Office, as well as with the commandant of
the Security Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these
with the Chief of the _Einsatz_-group concerned in the occupied
territories. * * *” (_502-PS_)
On 23 October 1941 the Camp Commander of the concentration camp Gross
Rosen reported to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, a list of Russian PWs
who had been executed the preceding day. (_1165-PS_)
On 9 November 1941 Mueller issued a directive to all GESTAPO offices in
which he ordered that diseased PWs should be excluded from the transport
into the concentration camps for execution. The letter began:
“The commandant of the concentration camps are complaining that
5 to 10 percent of the Soviet Russians destined for execution
are arriving in the camps dead or half dead. Therefore the
impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such
prisoners in this way. * * *” (_1165-PS_)
The affidavit of Kurt Lindow, former GESTAPO official, states:
“* * * 2. From 1941 until the middle of 1943 there was attached
to subsection IVA1 a special department that was headed by the
_Regierungsoberinspektor_, later _Regierungsamtmann_, and
_SS-Hauptsturmbannfuehrer_ Franz Koenigshaus. In this department
were handled matters concerning prisoners of war. I learned from
this department that instructions and orders by Reichsfuehrer
Himmler, dating from 1941 and 1942, existed according to which
captured Soviet Russian political Commissars and Jewish soldiers
were to be executed. As far as I know proposals for execution of
such PWs were received from the various PW camps. Koenigshaus
had to prepare the orders for execution and submitted them to
the chief of section IV, Mueller, for signature. These orders
were made out so that one order was to be sent to the agency
making the request and a second one to the concentration camp
designated to carry out the execution. The PWs in question were
at first formally released from PW status, then transferred to a
concentration camp for execution. * * *
“* * * 4. There existed in the PW camps on the Eastern front
small screening teams (_Einsatzkommandos_) headed by lower
ranking members of the Secret Police (GESTAPO). These teams were
assigned to the camp commanders and had the job to segregate the
PWs who were candidates for execution, according to the orders
that had been given, and to report them to the Office of the
Secret Police (_Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt_). * * *” (_2542-PS_)
(3) _The GESTAPO and SD sent recaptured prisoners of war to
concentration camps where they were executed (“Bullet Decree”)._ In
March 1944 the Chief of the Security Police and SD forwarded an OKW
order to regional SIPO and SD offices in which the OKW ordered that, on
recapture, every escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoner of war,
with the exception of British and American prisoners of war, were to be
handed over to the SIPO and SD, with the words “_Stufe III_”. Whether
escaped British and American officers and nonworking NCOs, upon
recapture, should be handed over to the SIPO and SD was to be decided by
the High Command of the Army. In connection with this order, the Chief
of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) issued instructions that the
GESTAPO _Leitstellen_ should take over the escaped officers from the
camp commandants and transport them in accordance with a procedure
theretofore in force to the Mauthausen concentration camp. The camp
commandant was to be informed that the prisoners were being handed over
under the operation “_Kugel_”. On the journey the prisoners of war were
to be placed in irons. The GESTAPO _Leitstellen_ were to make
half-yearly reports, giving numbers only, of the handing over of
prisoners of war. Escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoners of war,
with the exception of British and Americans, recaptured by police
stations were not to be handed back to the Stalag command. The Stalag
was to be informed of the recapture and asked to surrender them with the
words “_Stufe III_”. (_1650-PS_)
On 27 July 1944 an order from the 6th Corps Area Command was issued on
the treatment of prisoners of war, which provided that prisoners of war
were to be discharged from prisoner-of-war status and transferred to the
GESTAPO if they were guilty of crimes, had escaped and been recaptured,
or refused to work or encouraged other prisoners not to work, or were
screened out by _Einsatzkommandos_ of the SIPO and SD, or were guilty of
sabotage. No reports on transfers were required (_1514-PS_). This decree
was known as the “_Kugel Erlass_” (“Bullet Decree”). Prisoners of war
sent to Mauthausen concentration camp under it were regarded as dead to
the outside world and were executed. (_2478-PS_; _2285-PS_.)
(4) _The GESTAPO and SD were responsible for establishing and
classifying concentration camps, and for committing racial and political
undesirables to concentration and annihilation camps for slave labor and
mass murder._ The first concentration camps were established in 1933 at
Dachau in Bavaria and at Oranienburg in Prussia. The GESTAPO was given
by law the responsibility of administering the concentration camps.
(_2108-PS_)
The GESTAPO had the sole authority to take persons into protective
custody, and orders for protective custody were carried out in the State
concentration camps. (_1723-PS_)
The GESTAPO issued the orders establishing concentration camps,
transforming prisoner of war camps into concentration camps, designating
concentration camps as internment camps, changing labor camps into
concentration camps, setting up special sections for female prisoners,
and so forth. (_D-50_; _D-46_.)
The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the classification of
concentration camps according to the seriousness of the accusation and
the chances for reforming the prisoners from the Nazi viewpoint. The
concentration camps were classified as Classes I, II, or III. Class I
was for the least serious prisoners, and Class III for the most serious
prisoners. (_1063-A-PS_)
Regional offices of the GESTAPO had the authority to commit persons to
concentration camps for short periods, at first 21 days and later 56
days, but all other orders for protective custody had to be approved by
the GESTAPO headquarters in Berlin. Orders for protective custody issued
by GESTAPO headquarters had to be signed by or on behalf of the Chief of
the Security Police and SD, at first Heydrich, later Kaltenbrunner.
(_2477-PS_)
The Chief of the Security Police and SD had authority to fix the length
of the period of custody. During the war it was the policy not to permit
the prisoners to know the period of custody and merely to announce the
term as “until further notice”. (_1531-PS_)
The local GESTAPO offices which made the arrests maintained a register
called the “_Haftbuch_.” In this register the names of all persons
arrested were listed, together with personal data, grounds for the
arrest, and disposition. When orders were received from the GESTAPO
headquarters in Berlin to commit persons who had been arrested to
concentration camps, an entry was made in the _Haftbuch_ to that effect.
The reason assigned for the arrest and commitment of persons to
concentration camps usually was that, according to the GESTAPO, the
person endangered by his attitude the existence and security of the
people and the State. Further specifications of grounds included such
offenses as that of “working against the Greater German Reich with an
illegal resistance organization,” “being a Jew,” “suspected of working
for the detriment of the Reich,” “being strongly suspected of aiding
desertion,” “because as a relative of a deserter he is expected to take
advantage of every occasion to harm the German Reich,” “refusal to
work,” “sexual intercourse with a Pole,” “religious propaganda,”
“working against the Reich,” “loafing on the job,” or “defeatist
statements.” Sometimes specification of the grounds simply referred to
an “action,” under which a large number of persons would be arrested and
sent to concentration camps. (_L-358_; _L-215_.)
On 16 December 1942, Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, reported that, in
connection with an increase in slave labor required by concentration
camps by 30 January 1943 the GESTAPO could round up 45,000 Jews,
including invalids, aged, and children. The telegram stated:
“In accordance with the increased recruitment of manpower into
the concentration camps, which was ordered by 30 January 1943,
the following may be applied in the Jewish sector:
“1. Total amount: 45,000 Jews.
“2. Start of transportation 11 January 1943.
“3. Completion of transportation 31 January 1943.” (_1472-PS_)
On 17 December 1942, Mueller issued an order to the _Kommandeurs_ and
_Inspekteurs_ of the SIPO and SD and to the directors of the GESTAPO
regional offices, in which he stated that Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS and
Chief of the German Police, had given orders on 14 December 1942 that at
least 35,000 persons who were fit for work had to be put into
concentration camps not later than at the end of January. The order
further provided that Eastern or foreign workers who had escaped or
broken the labor contracts were to be sent to the nearest concentration
camps as quickly as possible, and that inmates of detention rooms and
educational work camps who were fit for work should be delivered to the
nearest concentration camps. (_1063-D-PS_)
On 23 March 1943, Mueller issued another directive referring to said
directive of 17 December 1942, in which he stated that measures are to
be carried out until 30 April ‘43. More explicit instructions were given
as to which concentration camps the slave laborers were to be sent. He
said:
“Care has to be taken that only prisoners who are fit for work
are sent to concentration camps, and adolescents only in
accordance with the provisions issued; otherwise, contrary to
the purpose, the concentration camps become overburdened.”
(_L-41_)
On 25 June 1943, Mueller issued an order stating that the decrees of 17
December 1942 and of 23 March 1943 had achieved the intended goal.
(_1063-E-PS_)
On 21 April 1943, the Minister of Justice declared in a letter that the
RSHA had ordered on 11 March 1943 that all Jews who were released from
prison were to be handed over to the GESTAPO for lifelong detainment in
the concentration camps at Auschwitz and Lublin. Poles released after an
imprisonment of over six months were to be transferred to the GESTAPO
for internment in a concentration camp for the duration of the war.
(_701-PS_)
The arrest of Jews and their shipment to annihilation camps was carried
out under the direction of Eichmann, head of the section handling Jews
in the Gestapo. Eichmann’s staff was composed of members of the SIPO,
especially the GESTAPO. The Jews were shipped on order of the SIPO and
SD to annihilation camps in the East. Eichmann estimated, and so
reported to Himmler, that 4,000,000 Jews were killed in the annihilation
camps in the East, in addition to the 2,000,000 Jews shot by the
_Einsatz_ Groups. The extermination of Jews in the annihilation camps
was accomplished mainly after the beginning of 1943, during the time
Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the Security Police and SD. (_2615-PS_)
(5) _The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the deportation of citizens
of occupied countries for forced labor and handled the disciplining of
forced labor._ On 26 November 1942, Fritz Sauckel transmitted a letter
to the president of provincial employment offices in which he stated
that he had been advised by the Chief of the Security Police and SD
(RSHA) under date of 26 October 1942 that during the month of November
the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district would begin in order to
make room for the settlement of persons of the German race. The Poles
who were evacuated as a result of this measure were to be put into
concentration camps for labor so far as they were criminal or asocial.
The remaining Poles who were suitable for labor were to be transported
without their families into the Reich, there to be put at the disposal
of the Labor Allocation Offices to serve as replacements for Jews
eliminated from the armament factories. (_L-61_)
During 1943 the program of mass murder carried out by the _Einsatz_
Groups in the East was modified, and orders were issued to round up
hundreds of thousands of persons for the armament industry.
“In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has to put at the
disposal of the armament industry one million workers, 500 of
whom have to be sent from our territory daily. * * * The
activity of the labor offices * * * is to be supported to the
greatest extent possible. * * * When searching villages, esp.
when it has become necessary to burn down a village, the whole
population will be put at the disposal of the Commissions by
force. * * * The most important thing is the recruiting of
workers.” (_3012-PS_)
On 18 June 1941 secret orders were issued from the Chief of the Security
Police and SD, signed by Mueller, to prevent the return of Eastern
emigrants and civilian workers from the Reich to the East, and to keep
them in German war production. Any attempts at refusal to work were to
be countered by the GESTAPO with the severest measures, arrest and
confinement in concentration camps (_1573-PS_). The Chief of the
Security Police and SD had exclusive jurisdiction over labor reformatory
camps established under control of the GESTAPO for disciplining foreign
workers. (_1063-B-PS_)
(6) _The GESTAPO and SD executed captured commandos and paratroopers,
and protected civilians who lynched Allied flyers._ On 4 August 1942
Keitel issued an order which provided that the GESTAPO and SD were
responsible for taking counter-measures against single parachutists or
small groups of them with special missions. Even if such paratroopers
were captured by the _Wehrmacht_, they were to be handed over to the
GESTAPO and the SD. (_553-PS_)
On 18 October 1942, Hitler ordered that all members of Commando units,
even when in uniform, or members of sabotage groups, armed or not, were
to be exterminated to the last man by fighting or by pursuing them. Even
if they wished to surrender, they were not to be spared. Members of such
Commandos, acting as agents, saboteurs, etc., handed over to the
_Wehrmacht_ through other channels, were to be turned over immediately
to the SD. (_498-PS_)
On 17 June 1944, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, in a Top
Secret letter to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, stated that he
had instructed the Commander of the SIPO and SD in Paris to treat
parachutists in English uniform as members of Commando operations in
accordance with Hitler’s order of 18 October 1942. (_1276-PS_)
On 26 June 1944, WFSt issued an order in which it was stated that enemy
paratroopers landing in Brittany were to be treated as commandos, and
that it was immaterial whether the paratroopers were in uniform or
civilian clothes. The order provided that in cases of doubt enemy
soldiers who were captured alive were to be handed over to the SD for
examination as to whether the Fuehrer Order of 18 October 1942 was to be
applied or not. (_532-PS_)
Commandos turned over to the SIPO and SD under these orders were
executed. (_526-PS_; _2374-PS_.)
The affidavit of Adolf Zutter, former adjutant of Mauthausen
concentration camp, states in part:
“* * * Concerning the American Military Mission which landed
behind the German front in the Slovakian or Hungarian area in
January, 1945, I remember, when these officers were brought to
Camp Mauthausen; I suppose the number of the arrivals were about
12 to 15 men. They wore a uniform which was American or
Canadian; brown-green color, shirt, and cloth cap. Eight or ten
days after their arrival the execution order came in by
telegraph or teletype. _Standartenfuehrer_ Ziereis came to me
into my office and told me now Kaltenbrunner has given the
permission for the execution. This letter was secret and had the
signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. Then, these people were shot
according to martial law and their belongings were given to me
by 1st Sgt. [_Oberscharfuehrer_] Niedermeyer. * * *” (_L-51_)
On 10 August 1943, Himmler issued an order to the Security Police
stating that it was not the task of the Police to interfere in clashes
between Germans and English and American terror flyers who had bailed
out. (_R-110_)
In 1944 at a conference of _Amt_ Chiefs Kaltenbrunner said:
“All offices of the SD and the security police are to be
informed that pogroms of the populace against English and
American terror-flyers are not to be interfered with; on the
contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered.” (_2990-PS_)
On 12 June 1944 the Chief of the SD-_Abschnitte_ Koblenz stated that the
Army had issued a similar order, namely, that German soldiers were not
to protect enemy flyers from the populace and that the Army no longer
attached value to enemy flyers taken prisoner. (_745-PS_)
(7) _The GESTAPO and SD took civilians of occupied countries to Germany
for secret trial and punishment (“Nacht und Nebel Erlass”)._ On 7
December 1941 Hitler issued the directive, since called the “_Nacht und
Nebel Erlass_” (Night and Fog Decree), under which persons who committed
offenses against the Reich or occupation forces in occupied territories,
except where death sentence was certain, were to be taken secretly to
Germany and surrendered to the Security Police and SD for trial or
punishment in Germany. An executive ordinance was issued by Keitel the
same date, and on 4 February 1942 the directive and ordinance were
published to the police and the SS. (_L-90_)
In compliance with the above directive, the military intelligence turned
over cases, other than those in which the death sentence was probable,
to the GESTAPO and the Secret Field Police for secret deporting to
Germany. (_833-PS_)
After the civilians arrived in Germany, no word of the disposition of
their cases was permitted to reach the country from which they came, or
their relatives. Even when they died awaiting trial, the SIPO and SD
refused to notify the families, so that anxiety would be created in the
minds of the family of the arrested person. (_668-PS_)
(8) _The GESTAPO and SD arrested, tried, and punished citizens of
occupied territories under special criminal procedure and by summary
methods._ The GESTAPO arrested, placed in protective custody, and
executed civilians of occupied territories under certain circumstances.
Even where there were courts capable of handling emergency cases, the
GESTAPO conducted its own executions without regard to normal judicial
processes. (_674-PS_)
On 18 September 1942, Thierack, the Reich Minister of Justice, and
Himmler came to an understanding by which antisocial elements were to be
turned over to Himmler to be worked to death, and a special criminal
procedure was to be applied by the police to the Jews, Poles, gypsies,
Russians, and Ukrainians who were not to be tried in ordinary criminal
courts. (_654-PS_)
On 5 September 1942 an order was issued by the RSHA to the offices of
the GESTAPO and SD covering this understanding. This order provided that
ordinary criminal procedure would not be applied against Poles, Jews,
gypsies, and other Eastern people, but that instead they would be turned
over to the police. Such persons of foreign extraction were to be
treated on a basis entirely different from that applied to Germans.
“* * * Such considerations which may be right for adjudicating a
punishable offense committed by a German are, however, wrong for
adjudicating a punishable offense committed by a person of alien
race. In the case of punishable offenses committed by a person
of alien race the personal motives actuating the offender must
be completely eliminated. The only standard may be that German
civil order is endangered by his action, and that consequently
preventive measures must be taken to prevent the recurrence of
such risks. In other words, the action of a person of alien race
is not to be viewed from the angle of judicial expiation, but
from the angle of the police guard against danger.
“As a result of this, the administration of penal law for
persons of alien race must be transferred from the hands of the
administrators of justice into the hands of the police. * * *”
(_L-316_)
(9) _The GESTAPO and SD executed or confined persons in concentration
camps for crimes allegedly committed by their relatives._ On 19 July
1944, the Commander of the SIPO and SD for the District Radom published
an order transmitted through the Higher SS and Police Leaders to the
effect that in all cases of assassination or attempted assassination of
Germans, or where saboteurs had destroyed vital installations, not only
the guilty person but also all his (or her) male relatives should be
shot and the female relatives over 16 years of age put into a
concentration camp. (_L-37_)
In the summer of 1944, the _Einsatzkommando_ of the SIPO and SD at
Luxembourg caused persons to be confined at Sachsenhausen concentration
camp because they were relatives of deserters and were, therefore,
“expected to endanger the interest of the German Reich if allowed to go
free.” (_L-215_)
(10) _The GESTAPO and SD were instructed to murder prisoners in the SIPO
and SD prisons to prevent their release by the Allied armies._ On 21
July 1944, the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD for the District Radom
forwarded an order of the _Befehlshaber_ of the SIPO and SD to the
effect that it was essential that the number of inmates of the SIPO and
SD prisons be kept as low as possible. Inmates were to be subjected only
to short formal interrogations and then to be sent by the quickest route
to concentration camps. Preparations were to be made for total clearance
of the prisons should the situation at the front necessitate such
action. In the case of sudden emergency precluding the evacuation of the
prisoners, they were to be shot and their bodies buried or otherwise
disposed of, the buildings to be dynamited, and so forth. In similar
circumstances, the Jews who were still employed in the armament
industries or in other work were to be dealt with in the same way. The
liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy was to be avoided at all
costs. (_L-53_)
(11) _The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the seizure and spoliation
of public and private property._ In connection with the program for the
mass extermination of Jews and Communist functionaries, the GESTAPO and
the SD seized all personal effects of the persons executed or murdered.
On the eastern front the victims were required not only to give up all
their personal possessions, but even to remove their outer garments
prior to being murdered. (_2620-PS_)
In connection with the program of confiscation of scientific, religious,
and art archives and objects, an agreement was entered into between
Rosenberg and Heydrich, under which the SD and Rosenberg were to
cooperate closely in the confiscation of public and private collections.
(_071-PS_)
(12) _The GESTAPO and SD conducted third degree interrogations._ On 26
October 1939 an order to all GESTAPO offices from the RSHA signed
Mueller, “by order,” in referring to execution of protective custody
during the war, stated in part:
“In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German
Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a
concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in the future,
also be transmitted to the State Police District Office
concerned. In this case, too, there is no objection to spreading
the rumour of this increased punishment. * * *” (_1531-PS_)
On 12 June 1942 the Chief of the Security Police and SD, through
Mueller, published an order authorizing the use of third degree methods
in interrogating where preliminary investigation indicates that the
prisoner could give information on important facts such as subversive
activities, but not to extort confessions of the prisoner’s own crimes.
The order stated in part:
“* * * 2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only be
employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses,
saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements,
parachute agents, antisocial elements, Polish or Soviet-Russian
loafers or tramps. In all other cases, my permission must first
be obtained.
“* * * 4. Third degree can, according to the circumstances,
consist amongst other methods, of:
very simple diet (bread and water)
hard bunk
dark cell
deprivation of sleep
exhaustive drilling
also in flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must
be consulted).” (_1531-PS_)
On 24 February 1944 the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD for the district
Radom, “in view of the variety of methods used to date in third-degree
interrogations and in order to avoid excesses,” published an order
issued by the BdS Cracow based on regulations in force for the Reich
which followed closely the limitations laid down in the above decree of
12 June 1942. (_L-89_)
G. _Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD Against Humanity._
(1) _The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the persecution of
the Jews._ The persecution of the Jews under the Nazi regime is a story
of increasingly severe treatment, beginning with restrictions, then
seizure and spoliation of property, commitment to concentration camps,
deportation, slave labor, and finally mass murder. The responsibility of
the GESTAPO and the SD for the mass extermination program carried out by
the Einsatz Groups of the SIPO and SD and in the annihilation camps to
which Jews were sent by the SIPO and SD has already been considered. In
this subdivision, the place of the GESTAPO and SD in the development of
this persecution will be treated.
Section B of the SD dealt with problems of nationality, including
minorities, race and national health, immigration, and resettlement.
Section B4 of the GESTAPO, headed by Eichmann, dealt with Jewish
affairs, including matters of evacuation, means of suppressing enemies
of the people and State, and dispossession of rights of German
citizenship. One of the functions of the SD was to furnish information
concerning the Jews to the GESTAPO. One of the functions of the GESTAPO
was to carry out the Nazi program of persecution of the Jews. (_L-185_;
_L-219_.)
The GESTAPO was charged with the enforcement of discriminatory laws,
such as those preventing Jews from engaging in business, restricting
their right to travel, and prohibiting them from associating with
gentiles. Violations of such restrictions resulted in protective custody
and confinement in concentration camps by the GESTAPO. (_L-217_;
_L-152_; _L-167_.)
The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the GESTAPO and the SD
to supervise the anti-Jewish pogrom staged in November 1938 following
the von Rath incident in Paris. As many Jews were to be arrested in all
districts as the available jail space would hold. Well-to-do Jews were
to be singled out for arrest, and primarily only healthy male adults of
not too advanced age. Immediately after completion of the arrests, the
competent concentration camp was to be notified in order to provide for
speediest transfer of Jews to the camps. (_3051-PS_)
On 11 November 1938 Heydrich reported to Goering by secret express
letter on the results of the action as reported by the GESTAPO. The
report stated in part:
“* * * The extent of the destruction of Jewish shops and houses
cannot yet be verified by figures. The figures given in the
reports: 815 shops destroyed, 171 dwelling houses set on fire or
destroyed, only indicate a fraction of the actual damage caused,
as far as arson is concerned. Due to the urgency of the
reporting, the reports received to date are entirely limited to
general statements such as ‘numerous’ or ‘most shops destroyed.’
Therefore the figures given must have been exceeded
considerably.
“191 synagogues were set on fire, and another 76 completely
destroyed. In addition 11 parish halls, [_Gemeindehauser_]
cemetery chapels and similar buildings were set on fire and 3
more completely destroyed.
“20,000 Jews were arrested, also 7 Aryans and 3 foreigners. The
latter were arrested for their own safety.
“36 deaths were reported and those seriously injured were also
numbered at 36. Those killed and injured are Jews. One Jew is
still missing. The Jews killed include one Polish national, and
those injured include 2 Poles.” (_3058-PS_)
On 31 July 1941 Goering sent the following order to the Chief of the
Security Police and SD, Heydrich:
“Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January
1939, which dealt with arriving at a solution of the Jewish
problem through furtherance of emigration and evacuation as
advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you with making all
necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial
matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish
question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.”
(_710-PS_)
In February or March 1943, according to Gottfried Boley,
_Ministerialrat_ in the Reich Chancery, a conference on the solution of
the Jewish problem, attended by representatives of the ministries, was
called by Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD. Boley
states:
“The meeting was presided over by Eichmann who had charge of
Jewish problems in the GESTAPO. In his opening remarks Eichmann
referred to former conferences that had taken place in the
office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, and that on
this occasion he wished to discuss the matter in a more basic
manner. He stated that the Jewish question had to be solved in a
quick and proper way. Representatives of the Chief of the
Security Police and SD who attended the conference made it clear
to those present that the remaining Jews had to be sent forcibly
to concentration camps or be sterilized. Those present at the
conference must have carried away the impression that the
objectives were the extermination of the Jewish people.”
(_2645-PS_)
The deportation of Jews into concentration camps was part of the program
for slave labor. Jews not fit for work were screened out at
extermination centers, such as Auschwitz, and the remainder were taken
into concentration and work camps. The orders were issued by Himmler and
passed through the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Kaltenbrunner
(formerly Heydrich) to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, and then to
Eichmann for execution. (_2376-PS_; _1472-PS_.)
In Galicia, the deportation of Jews was carried out during the period
from April 1942 to June 1943. At the end of that time Galicia had been
entirely cleared of Jews. In all, 434,392 Jews were deported from
Galicia alone. In connection with the deportations, Jewish property was
confiscated, including furniture, clothing, money, dental fillings, gold
teeth, wedding rings, and other personal property of all kinds. The
Security Police participated in this action along with other police and
SS detachments. (_L-18_)
In Warsaw the Security Police played a responsible role in the
segregation of the Jews and placing them in the Ghetto, in the
subsequent removal of the Jews to concentration camps, and in the final
clearance of the Ghetto. The Ghetto was established in November of 1940.
Over 300,000 Jews were deported from it between July and October 1942,
and 6,500 more were deported in January 1943. In April and May 1943 the
final clearance of the Ghetto was accomplished under the direction of
the SS and Police Leader of the Warsaw area, and with units of the SIPO,
Waffen SS, Order Police, and some military and Polish police units.
Thousands of Jews were killed in the action. About 7,000 were
transported to “T. II” where they were exterminated. The remaining
40,000 to 45,000 were placed in concentration camps. (_1061-PS_)
In Denmark the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD was ordered in September
of 1943 to arrest all Danish citizens of Jewish belief and send them to
Stettin by ship and from there to the concentration camp at
Theresienstadt. In spite of the protests of the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO
and SD, Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD gave direct
orders to carry out the anti-Jewish action. Eichmann, head of the Jewish
section in the GESTAPO, had direct charge of the clearance program.
(_2375-PS_)
In Hungary the deportation of Jews was again carried out by Eichmann.
This action took place under direction of the GESTAPO after the German
occupation of Hungary in March 1944. About 450,000 Jews were deported
from Hungary due to the pressure and direction of the GESTAPO.
(_2605-PS_)
(2) _The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the persecution of
the churches._ The fight against the churches was never brought out into
the open by the GESTAPO and the SD as in the case of the persecution of
the Jews. The struggle was designed to weaken the churches and to lay a
foundation for the ultimate destruction of the confessional churches
after the end of the war. (_1815-PS_)
Section C2 of the SD dealt with education and religious life. Section B1
of the GESTAPO dealt with political Catholicism. Section B2 with
political Protestantism sects, and Section B3 with other churches and
Freemasonry. (_L-185_)
As early as 1934 the GESTAPO enforced restrictions against the churches.
An order by the State Police of Dusseldorf prohibited the churches from
engaging in public activities, especially public appearances in groups,
sports, hikes, and the establishment of holiday or outdoor camps.
(_R-145_)
In 1934 the Bavarian Political Police placed three ministers in
protective custody for refusing to carry out the order of the Government
to ring church bells on the occasion of the death of Hindenburg.
(_1521-PS_)
The GESTAPO dissolved those church organizations which it considered to
have political objectives. In 1938 the GESTAPO at Munich dissolved by
order the Guild of the Virgin Mary of the Bavarian dioceses. (_1481-PS_)
An insight into the hidden objectives and secret methods of the GESTAPO
and the SD in the fight against the churches is disclosed in the file of
the GESTAPO regional office at Aachen (_1815-PS_). On 12 May 1941 the
Chief of the GESTAPO issued a directive in which he reported that the
Chief of the Security Police and SD had issued an order under which the
treatment of church politics which had theretofore been divided between
the SD and the GESTAPO was to be taken over entirely by the GESTAPO. The
SD “church specialists” were to be temporarily transferred to the same
posts in the GESTAPO and operate an intelligence service in the church
political sphere there. SD files concerning church political opposition
were to be handed over to the GESTAPO, but the SD was to retain material
concerning the confessional influence on the lives of the people.
On 22 and 23 September 1941 a conference of church specialists attached
to GESTAPO regional offices was held in the lecture hall of the RSHA in
Berlin. The notes on the speeches delivered at this conference indicate
that the GESTAPO considered the church as an enemy to be attacked with
determination and “true fanaticism.” The immediate objective of the
GESTAPO was stated to be to insure that the Church did not win back any
lost ground. The ultimate objective was stated to be the destruction of
the confessional churches. This was to be brought about by the
collection of material through the GESTAPO church intelligence system to
be produced at a proper time as evidence for the charge of treasonable
activities during the German fight for existence.
The executive measures to be applied by the GESTAPO were discussed. It
was stated to be impractical to deal with political offenses under
normal legal procedure owing to lack of political perception which
prevailed among the legal authorities. The so-called “agitator-Priests,”
therefore, had to be handled by GESTAPO measures, and when necessary
removed to a concentration camp. The following punishments were to be
applied to priests according to individual circumstances: warning, fine,
forbidden to preach, forbidden to remain in parish, forbidden all
activity as a priest, short-term arrest, protective custody. Retreats,
youth and recreational camps, evening services, processions and
pilgrimages were all to be forbidden on grounds of interfering with the
war effort, blackouts, overburdened transportation, etc.
In executing this program close cooperation was required between the
GESTAPO and the SD. The study and treatment of the Church in its
opposition to the Nazi state was the responsibility of the GESTAPO. The
result of this treatment of the Church in the sphere of “religious life”
remained the province of the SD. By these means the GESTAPO and the SD
carried on the struggle of the Nazi conspirators against the Church.
H. _Conclusion._
The evidence shows that the GESTAPO was created by Goering in Prussia in
April 1933 for the specific purpose of serving as a police agency to
strike down the actual and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime, and
that henceforward the GESTAPO in Prussia and in the other States of the
Reich carried out a program of terror against all who were thought to be
dangerous to the domination of the conspirators over the people of
Germany. Its methods were utterly ruthless. It operated outside the law
and sent its victims to the concentration camps. The term “GESTAPO”
became the symbol of the Nazi regime of force and terror.
Behind the scenes, operating secretly, the SD, through its vast network
of informants, spied upon the German people in their daily lives, on the
streets, in the shops, and even within the sanctity of the churches.
The most casual remark of a German citizen might bring him before the
GESTAPO, where his fate and freedom were decided without recourse to
law. In this government, in which the rule of law was replaced by a
tyrannical rule of men, the GESTAPO was the primary instrumentality of
oppression.
The GESTAPO and the SD played an important part in almost every criminal
act of the conspiracy. The categories of these crimes, apart from the
thousands of specific instances of torture and cruelty in policing
Germany for the benefit of the conspirators, indicate the extent of
GESTAPO and SD complicity.
The GESTAPO and SD fabricated the border incidents which Hitler used as
an excuse for attacking Poland.
Through the _Einsatz_ Groups they murdered approximately 2,000,000
defenseless men, women, and children.
They removed Jews, political leaders, and scientists from prisoner of
war camps and murdered them.
They took recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps and
murdered some of them.
The GESTAPO established and classified concentration camps and sent
millions of people into them for extermination and slave labor.
The GESTAPO cleared Europe of the Jews and was responsible for sending
4,000,000 Jews to their deaths in annihilation camps.
The GESTAPO and SD rounded up hundreds of thousands of citizens of
occupied countries and shipped them to Germany for forced labor, and
sent slave laborers to labor reformatory camps and concentration camps
for disciplining.
They executed captured commandos and paratroopers and protected
civilians who lynched Allied flyers.
They took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial
and punishment.
They arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied territories
under special criminal procedures which did not accord them fair trials,
and by summary methods.
They murdered or sent to concentration camps the relatives of persons
who had allegedly committed crimes.
They ordered the murder of prisoners in SIPO and SD prisons to prevent
their release by the Allied armies.
They participated in the seizure and spoliation of public and private
property.
They were primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews and of the
churches.
In carrying out these crimes the GESTAPO operated as an organization,
closely centralized and controlled from Berlin headquarters. Reports
were submitted to Berlin, and all important decisions emanated from
Berlin. The regional offices had only limited power to commit persons to
concentration camps. All cases, other than those of short duration, had
to be submitted to Berlin for approval. From 1943 to the end of the war
the defendant Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the Security Police and SD
in Berlin. The GESTAPO was organized on a functional basis. Its
principal divisions dealt with the groups and institutions against which
it committed the worst crimes—Jews, churches, communists, and political
liberals. Thus, in perpetrating these crimes, the GESTAPO acted as an
entity, each section performing its part in the general criminal
enterprises ordered by Berlin. It must be held responsible as an entity.
The SD was at all times a department of the SS. Its criminality directly
concerns and contributes to the criminality of the SS.
As to the GESTAPO, it is submitted that:
1. The GESTAPO is an organization, in the sense in which
that term is used in Article 9 of the Charter.
2. The defendants Goering and Kaltenbrunner committed
the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter in their
capacity as members and leaders of the GESTAPO.
3. The GESTAPO, as an organization, participated in and
aided the conspiracy which contemplated and involved the
commission of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the
Charter.
In 1941, on German Police Day, Heydrich, the former Chief of the
Security Police and the SD, said:
“Secret State Police, Criminal Police, and SD are still adorned
with the furtive and whispered secrecy of a political detective
story. In a mixture of fear and shuddering—and yet at home with
a certain feeling of security because of their
presence,—brutality, inhumanity bordering on the sadistic, and
ruthlessness are attributed abroad to the men of this
profession.” (Extract from a brochure on Reinhard Heydrich,
published in December 1943.)
The evidence as it is submitted, shows that brutality, inhumanity,
sadism, and ruthlessness were characteristic of the GESTAPO and that it
was and should be declared, a criminal organization, in accordance with
article 9 of the Charter.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE GEHEIME
STAATSPOLIZEI (GESTAPO) AND SICHERHEITSDIENST (SD)
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ 29, 70,
│ Appendix B. │ I │ 71
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
071-PS │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April │ │
│1941, replying to Bormann’s letter of │ │
│19 April 1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA │ │
│371) │ III │ 119
│ │ │
*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │
│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │
│501) │ III │ 416
│ │ │
*501-PS │Collection of four documents on │ │
│execution by gas, June 1942, one │ │
│signed by Dr. Becker, SS │ │
│Untersturmfuehrer at Kiev, 16 May │ │
│1942. (USA 288) │ III │ 418
│ │ │
*502-PS │Order, 17 July 1941, entitled │ │
│“Regulations for the Commandos of the │ │
│Chief of the SIPO and SD which are to │ │
│be activated in Stalags”. (USA 486) │ III │ 422
│ │ │
*526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │
│concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │
│in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434
│ │ │
532-PS │Telegram of WFSt, 24 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Commandos. │ III │ 437
│ │ │
*553-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 4 August 1942,│ │
│regulating treatment of paratroops. │ │
│(USA 500) │ III │ 441
│ │ │
654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, │ │
│on discussion with Himmler concerning │ │
│delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │
│extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467
│ │ │
*668-PS │Letter from Chief of the SIPO and SD │ │
│and OKW letter, 24 June 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of punishable │ │
│offenses against the Reich or │ │
│occupation forces in occupied │ │
│territories. (USA 504) │ III │ 476
│ │ │
*674-PS │Secret letter from President of High │ │
│District Court of Kattowitz re │ │
│executions being carried out by │ │
│Gestapo without judicial processes, 3 │ │
│December 1941. (USA 505) │ III │ 478
│ │ │
*701-PS │Letter from Minister of Justice to │ │
│Prosecutors, 1 April 1943, concerning │ │
│Poles and Jews who are released from │ │
│Penal institutions of Department of │ │
│Justice. (USA 497) │ III │ 510
│ │ │
*710-PS │Letter from Goering to Heydrich, 31 │ │
│July 1941, concerning solution of │ │
│Jewish question. (USA 509) │ III │ 525
│ │ │
745-PS │Letter from Chief of SD, Koblenz, 12 │ │
│June 1944, concerning enemy aviators │ │
│who have been shot down. │ III │ 543
│ │ │
775-PS │Memorandum of Minister of the Interior│ │
│concerning clarification of police │ │
│matters, 1935. │ III │ 547
│ │ │
779-PS │Directive by Frick, regulating │ │
│“protective custody”, 12 April 1934. │ III │ 555
│ │ │
833-PS │Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head │ │
│of the Abwehr, 2 February 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of crimes │ │
│against the Reich or occupying forces │ │
│in the occupied territories. │ III │ 600
│ │ │
1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and │ │
│Police Leader of Warsaw, on │ │
│destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. │ │
│(USA 275) │ III │ 718
│ │ │
*1063-A-PS │Order of Chief of SIPO and SD, 2 │ │
│January 1941, concerning │ │
│classification of concentration camps.│ │
│(USA 492) │ III │ 775
│ │ │
*1063-B-PS │Letter signed by Kaltenbrunner, 26 │ │
│July 1943, concerning establishment of│ │
│Labor Reformatory camps. (USA 492) │ III │ 777
│ │ │
*1063-D-PS │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942, │ │
│concerning prisoners qualified for │ │
│work to be sent to concentration │ │
│camps. (USA 219) │ III │ 778
│ │ │
1063-E-PS │Copy of Mueller’s order, 25 June 1942,│ │
│concerning increased shipments to │ │
│concentration camps. │ III │ 780
│ │ │
*1104-PS │Memorandum, 21 November 1941, │ │
│enclosing copies of report concerning │ │
│anti-Jewish action in Minsk. (USA 483)│ III │ 783
│ │ │
1113-PS │Report of 6 November 1942 concerning │ │
│action “Marshfever”. │ III │ 792
│ │ │
*1165-PS │Letter from Commandant of │ │
│concentration Camp Gross Rosen, 23 │ │
│October 1941, and letter of Mueller to│ │
│all Gestapo offices, 9 November 1941, │ │
│concerning execution of Russian PW’s. │ │
│(USA 244) │ III │ 821
│ │ │
*1276-PS │Top secret letter from Chief of SIPO │ │
│and SD to OKW/WFSt, 17 June 1944, │ │
│concerning Commando operations. (USA │ │
│525). │ III │ 855
│ │ │
1285-PS │Extract from The German Police, 1943, │ │
│pp. 81-82. │ III │ 863
│ │ │
1437-PS │Law concerning reuniting of Austria │ │
│with German Reich, 18 March 1938. 1938│ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 262. │ IV │ 17
│ │ │
1438-PS │Fuehrer concerning administration of │ │
│Sudeten-German territory, 22 October │ │
│1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 1453. │ IV │ 17
│ │ │
*1472-PS │Copy of telegram from Mueller to │ │
│Himmler, 16 December 1942, concerning │ │
│recruiting Jewish labor. (USA 279) │ IV │ 49
│ │ │
*1481-PS │Gestapo order, 20 January 1938, │ │
│dissolving and confiscating property │ │
│of Catholic Youth Womens Organization │ │
│in Bavaria. (USA 737). │ IV │ 50
│ │ │
*1514-PS │Order, 27 July 1944, from 6th Corps │ │
│Area Command concerning delivery of │ │
│prisoners of war to secret state │ │
│police. (USA 491) │ IV │ 53
│ │ │
*1521-PS │Report from the Bavarian Political │ │
│Police to the Gestapo, Berlin, 24 │ │
│August 1934, concerning National │ │
│mourning on occasion of death of von │ │
│Hindenburg. (USA 740) │ IV │ 75
│ │ │
*1531-PS │Directive from RSHA, 26 October 1939, │ │
│concerning execution of protective │ │
│custody, and directive, 12 June 1942, │ │
│concerning third degree. (USA 248) │ IV │ 93
│ │ │
1551-PS │Decree assigning functions in Office │ │
│of Chief of German Police, 26 June │ │
│1936. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt, │ │
│pp. 946-948. │ IV │ 106
│ │ │
*1573-PS │Order signed Mueller, 18 June 1941, │ │
│concerning measures to be taken │ │
│against Emigrants and civilian workers│ │
│from Russian areas and against Foreign│ │
│workers. (USA 498) │ IV │ 112
│ │ │
1638-PS │Circular of Minister of Interior, 11 │ │
│November 1938, on cooperation of SD │ │
│and other authorities. 1938 Reichs │ │
│Ministerialblatt, p. 1906. │ IV │ 142
│ │ │
*1650-PS │Directive to State Police Directorates│ │
│from Chief of SIPO and SD by Mueller, │ │
│4 March 1944, concerning captured │ │
│escaped PWs except British and │ │
│American PWs. (USA 246) │ IV │ 158
│ │ │
*1680-PS │“Ten Years Security Police and SD” │ │
│published in The German Police, 1 │ │
│February 1943. (USA 477) │ IV │ 191
│ │ │
*1723-PS │Order concerning cooperation of Party │ │
│offices with the Secret State Police, │ │
│25 January 1938, published in Decrees,│ │
│Regulations, Announcements, 1937, Vol.│ │
│II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206) │ IV │ 219
│ │ │
*1815-PS │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning │ │
│the study and treatment of church │ │
│politics. (USA 510) │ IV │ 415
│ │ │
*1852-PS │“Law” from The German Police, 1941, by│ │
│Dr. Werner Best. (USA 449) (See Chart │ │
│No. 16.) │ IV │ 490
│ │ │
1956-PS │Meaning and Tasks of the Secret State │ │
│Police, published in The Archives, │ │
│January 1936, Vol. 22-24, p. 1342. │ IV │ 598
│ │ │
2073-PS │Decree concerning the appointment of a│ │
│Chief of German Police in the Ministry│ │
│of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487. │ IV │ 703
│ │ │
2104-PS │Law on organization of Secret State │ │
│Police office, 26 April 1933. 1933 │ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 122. │ IV │ 730
│ │ │
2105-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 30 │ │
│November 1933. 1933 Preussische │ │
│Gesetzsammlung, p. 413. │ IV │ 731
│ │ │
2107-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 10 │ │
│February 1936. 1936 Preussische │ │
│Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22. │ IV │ 732
│ │ │
2108-PS │Decree for execution of Law on Secret │ │
│State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936│ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 22-24.│ IV │ 732
│ │ │
2113-PS │Decree for application of law of 30 │ │
│November 1933, concerning Secret State│ │
│Police of 8 March 1934. 1934 │ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 143. │ IV │ 743
│ │ │
2232-PS │Tasks and Means of a Political Police,│ │
│from German Administrative Law by Hans│ │
│Frank, pp. 420-430. │ IV │ 881
│ │ │
2243-PS │Law relating to finance measures in │ │
│connection with the police, 19 March │ │
│1937. 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 325. │ IV │ 924
│ │ │
2245-PS │Frick decree of 20 September 1936 │ │
│concerning employment of Security │ │
│Police Inspectors. 1936 Reichs │ │
│Ministerialblatt, pp. 1343-1344. │ IV │ 928
│ │ │
*2273-PS │Extract from a top secret report of │ │
│Einsatz Group A. (USA 487) (See Chart │ │
│No. 4.) │ IV │ 944
│ │ │
*2285-PS │Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French │ │
│officers, about shooting of prisoners │ │
│at Mauthausen. (USA 490) │ IV │ 991
│ │ │
2344-PS │Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering,│ │
│1934, p. 89. │ IV │ 1065
│ │ │
2347-PS │Court decisions from 1935 │ │
│Reichsverwaltungsblatt, Vol. 56, pp. │ │
│577-578, 20 July 1935. │ IV │ 1066
│ │ │
2348-PS │Affidavit of Rauff, Head of Amt II D, │ │
│RSHA, 19 October 1945. (USA 485) │ IV │ 1068
│ │ │
2371-PS │Execution of ordinance for Security of│ │
│people and state, 28 February 1933. │ │
│1933 Reichs Ministerialblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 543. │ IV │ 1102
│ │ │
2372-PS │Unified Designation of offices of │ │
│Secret State Police in Reich. 1936 │ │
│Reichs Ministerial Gazette, Part V, │ │
│pp. 1344-5. │ IV │ 1105
│ │ │
2374-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 27 June │ │
│1945, concerning treatment of │ │
│English-American commando groups. │ V │ 1
│ │ │
2375-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 │ │
│November 1945, concerning activities │ │
│of SIPO and SD. │ V │ 2
│ │ │
2376-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 │ │
│November 1945, concerning treatment of│ │
│Jews. │ V │ 3
│ │ │
*2460-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Diels. (USA 751) │ V │ 205
│ │ │
*2477-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 518) │ V │ 229
│ │ │
2478-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 230
│ │ │
2479-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Mildner, 4 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 230
│ │ │
*2499-PS │Original Protective Custody Order │ │
│served on Dr. R. Kempner, 15 March │ │
│1935. (USA 232) │ V │ 236
│ │ │
*2542-PS │Affidavit of Kurt Lindow, 30 September│ │
│1945. (USA 489) │ V │ 286
│ │ │
*2605-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, │ │
│former President of the Hungarian │ │
│Zionist Organization, 13 September │ │
│1945. (USA 242) │ V │ 313
│ │ │
2614-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 918) │ V │ 337
│ │ │
2615-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 338
│ │ │
*2620-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 919) │ V │ 341
│ │ │
2622-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 343
│ │ │
2644-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 357
│ │ │
2645-PS │Affidavit of Gottfried Boley, 14 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 357
│ │ │
*2751-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 482) │ V │ 390
│ │ │
2752-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 8 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 392
│ │ │
2846-PS │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 13 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 507
│ │ │
2884-PS │Affidavit of Walter Warlimont, 14 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 550
│ │ │
2890-PS │Extracts from Befehlsblatt of the SIPO│ │
│and SD. │ V │ 557
│ │ │
*2990-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 18 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 526) │ V │ 694
│ │ │
*2992-PS │Affidavits of Hermann Graebe. (USA │ │
│494) │ V │ 696
│ │ │
*3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │
│1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │
│Service, and record of telephone │ │
│conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │
│1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731
│ │ │
*3033-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 21 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 488) │ V │ 741
│ │ │
*3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│ │
│all stations of State Police, 10 │ │
│November 1938, on measures against │ │
│Jews, and one order from Heydrich on │ │
│termination of protest actions. (USA │ │
│240) │ V │ 797
│ │ │
3058-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Goering, 11 │ │
│November 1938, reporting action │ │
│against the Jews. (USA 508) │ V │ 854
│ │ │
3343-PS │Speech delivered at labor-meeting of │ │
│Prussian State Council on 18 June │ │
│1934, from Speeches and Essays of │ │
│Hermann Goering. │ VI │ 78
│ │ │
3344-PS │Extract from Befehlsblatt of the Chief│ │
│of Security Police and SD, Berlin, 7 │ │
│September 1942, No. 39, p. 249. │ VI │ 78
│ │ │
*3360-PS │Teletype, 12 February 1944, relating │ │
│to recaptured escaped Eastern │ │
│laborers. (USA 499) │ VI │ 95
│ │ │
3363-PS │Special delivery letter, 21 September │ │
│1939, from Chief of Security Police to│ │
│Chiefs of all detail groups concerning│ │
│Jewish problem in Occupied zone. │ VI │ 97
│ │ │
*3840-PS │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February│ │
│1946, concerning the elimination of │ │
│the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803) │ VI │ 775
│ │ │
*3841-PS │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer │ │
│Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946, │ │
│concerning elimination of the Warsaw │ │
│Ghetto. (USA 804) │ VI │ 776
│ │ │
*3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │
│Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │
│execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │
│Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │
│819) │ VI │ 787
│ │ │
D-46 │Order designating Herzogenbosch as │ │
│concentration camp, 18 January 1943. │ VI │ 1025
│ │ │
D-50 │Order establishing concentration camps│ │
│at Lublin, 9 April 1943. │ VI │ 1027
│ │ │
D-183 │Order of Gestapo Office, Darmstadt, 7 │ │
│December 1938, concerning treatment of│ │
│articles secured during protest action│ │
│against Jews. │ VI │ 1075
│ │ │
*D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │
│SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │
│Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │
│Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │
│1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │
│relative to procedure in cases of │ │
│unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │
│execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74
│ │ │
*D-762 │Order of Hitler, 30 July 1944, │ │
│concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │
│and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │
│Territories. (GB 298) │ VII │ 221
│ │ │
*D-763 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │
│regarding penal jurisdiction of │ │
│non-German civilians in Occupied │ │
│Territories. (GB 300) │ VII │ 222
│ │ │
*L-18 │Official report, Katzmann to General │ │
│of Police Krueger, 30 June 1943, │ │
│concerning “Solution of Jewish │ │
│Question in Galicia”. (USA 277) │ VII │ 755
│ │ │
*L-37 │Letter from Illmer, Chief of the SIPO │ │
│and SD of Radom, to subordinates, 19 │ │
│July 1944, concerning collective │ │
│responsibility of members of families │ │
│of assassins and saboteurs. (USA 506) │ VII │ 782
│ │ │
*L-41 │Orders of Mueller, Chief of the │ │
│Gestapo, 17 December 1942 and 23 March│ │
│1943, concerning transfer of workers │ │
│to concentration camps. (USA 496) │ VII │ 784
│ │ │
*L-51 │Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August │ │
│1945. (USA 521) │ VII │ 798
│ │ │
L-53 │Order from Commandant of the SIPO and │ │
│SD for the Radom District to Branch │ │
│Office in Tomaschow, 21 July 1944, on │ │
│clearance of prisons. (USA 291) │ VII │ 814
│ │ │
*L-61 │Express letter from Sauckel to │ │
│Presidents of Landes Employment │ │
│Office, 26 November 1942, concerning │ │
│employment of Jews and exchange of │ │
│Jews in essential employment against │ │
│Polish labor. (USA 177) │ VII │ 816
│ │ │
*L-89 │Top secret letter issued by the │ │
│Commandant of the SIPO and SD, │ │
│District Radom, 24 February 1944, │ │
│concerning intensified interrogations.│ │
│(USA 507) │ VII │ 868
│ │ │
*L-90 │Fuehrer decree, February 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of offenses in │ │
│Occupied Territory; “First Ordinance” │ │
│signed by Keitel for execution of the │ │
│directive; memorandum of 12 December │ │
│1941, signed by Keitel. (USA 503) │ VII │ 871
│ │ │
L-152 │RSHA Order concerning fraternization │ │
│of Jews and Aryans, 3 November 1941. │ VII │ 903
│ │ │
L-167 │Orders of the Reichsminister of the │ │
│Interior, 24 March 1942, concerning │ │
│use of public transportation by Jews, │ │
│and covering letters. │ VII │ 917
│ │ │
*L-180 │Report by SS Brigade Commander │ │
│Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group │ │
│A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276) │ VII │ 978
│ │ │
*L-185 │Organization plan of the RSHA, 1 │ │
│January 1941. (USA 484) │ VII │ 996
│ │ │
*L-215 │File of orders and dossiers of 25 │ │
│Luxembourgers committed to │ │
│concentration camps at various times │ │
│in 1944. (USA 243) │ VII │ 1045
│ │ │
L-217 │Order of Secret State Police │ │
│concerning camouflage of Jewish │ │
│businesses, 20 November 1936. │ VII │ 1052
│ │ │
*L-219 │Organization plan of the RSHA as of 1 │ │
│October 1943. (USA 479) │ VII │ 1053
│ │ │
L-297 │Law commissioning Secret State Police │ │
│Bureau with supervision of duties of │ │
│Political Police commanders in │ │
│provinces, 20 September 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichs Ministerialblatt, p. 1343. │ VII │ 1099
│ │ │
L-301 │New ruling on protective custody, from│ │
│The Archive, April 1934, p. 31. │ VII │ 1099
│ │ │
*L-316 │RSHA Order of 5 November 1942, signed │ │
│by Streckenbach, concerning │ │
│jurisdiction over Poles and Eastern │ │
│Nationals. (USA 346) │ VII │ 1104
│ │ │
*L-358 │Extract from register of arrests by │ │
│Gestapo in Poland, 1943. (USA 495) │ VII │ 1107
│ │ │
*L-361 │Three documents concerning the │ │
│formation of the RSHA, Himmler, 27 │ │
│September 1939; Heydrich, 23 and 27 │ │
│September 1939. (USA 478) │ VII │ 1109
│ │ │
*R-102 │Report on activities of The Task │ │
│Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 │ │
│October 1941. (USA 470) │ VIII │ 96
│ │ │
*R-110 │Himmler order of 10 August 1943 to all│ │
│Senior Executive SS and Police │ │
│officers. (USA 333) │ VIII │ 107
│ │ │
*R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │
│reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │
│in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │
│Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205
│ │ │
*R-142 │Memoranda to Koblenz District │ │
│Headquarters, 22 April 1938 and 7 May │ │
│1938, relating to the plebiscite of 10│ │
│April 1938. (USA 481) │ VIII │ 243
│ │ │
R-145 │State Police Order, 28 May 1934, at │ │
│Duesseldorf, signed Schmid, concerning│ │
│sanction of denominational youth and │ │
│professional associations and │ │
│distribution of publications in │ │
│churches. (USA 745) │ VIII │ 248
│ │ │
Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │
│December 1945. │ VIII │ 587
│ │ │
Affidavit B │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 │ │
│November 1945, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 596
│ │ │
Affidavit C │Affidavit of Dieter Wisliceny, 29 │ │
│November 1945, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg, 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 606
│ │ │
Affidavit D │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg, 4 January 1946. │ VIII │ 622
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
│ │ │
Chart No. 3 │Organization of the SS. (USA 445) │ VIII │ 772
│ │ │
*Chart No. 4 │Report of Special Purpose Group “A” │ │
│regarding Jews killed in the Baltic │ │
│Countries, White Russia and Lithuania.│ │
│(2273-PS; USA 487) │ VIII │ 773
│ │ │
*Chart No. 5 │Position of Kaltenbrunner and the │ │
│Gestapo and SD in the German Police │ │
│System. (USA 493) │ VIII │ 774
│ │ │
*Chart No. 16 │The Structure of the German Police. │
│(1852-PS; USA 449) │ End of VIII
│ │ │
*Chart No. 19 │Organization of the Security Police │
│(Gestapo and Kripo) and the SD │
│1943-1945. (USA 480) │ End of VIII
7. THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES
In one respect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed
Forces is to be distinguished from the other groups and organizations
against which the prosecution seeks declaration of criminality. The
Leadership Corps of the NSDAP, for example, was the instrument by which
Hitlerism rose to full power in Germany. The SA and the SS were
branches—large branches to be sure—of the Nazi Party. The German
police had certain roots and antecedents which antedated Hitlerism, but
was almost entirely a creature of the party and the SS. The Reichs
Cabinet was, in essence, merely a committee or set of committees of
Reichs Ministers, and when the Nazis came to power these ministerial
positions were filled for the most part by Nazis. All those groups and
organizations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to
Naziism, or automatically became nazified when Hitler came to full
power.
That is not true of this group, the General Staff and High Command of
the German Armed Forces. It is common knowledge that German armed might
and the German military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many decades.
The war of 1914-18, the Kaiser, and the “scrap of paper” are modern
witnesses to this fact.
As a result of the German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles,
the size and activities of the German armed forces were severely
restricted. The last few years have made it abundantly apparent that
these restrictions did not destroy or even seriously undermine German
militarism. The full flowering of German military strength came about
through collaboration between the Nazis and the career leaders of the
German Armed Forces—the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen.
When Hitler came to power in 1933, he did not find a vacuum in the field
of military affairs; he found a small _Reichswehr_ and a body of
professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German
military history.
The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in
the Indictment—the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed
Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men. Needless to
say, it is not the prosecution’s position that it is a crime to be a
soldier or sailor, or to serve one’s country as a soldier or sailor in
time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one, and can be
honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man who
commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in
uniform.
It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the prosecution’s
position, that all members of this group were wicked men, or that they
were all equally culpable. But this group not only collaborated with
Hitler and supported many Nazi objectives. They furnished one thing
which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program for
Germany—skill and experience in the development and use of armed might.
Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? The answer is simple.
The answer is that they agreed with the basic objectives of Naziism, and
that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a major part in
achieving those objectives. The generals, like Hitler, wanted Germany to
aggrandize at the expense of neighboring countries, and to do so if
necessary by force or threat of force. Force—armed might—was the
keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would have
been possible.
As they came to power and when they had attained power, the Nazis had
two alternatives: to collaborate with and expand the _Reichswehr_, or to
ignore the Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The
generals feared that the Nazis might do the latter. So they were the
more ready to play along with the Nazis. Moreover, the Nazis offered the
generals the chance of achieving much that the generals wished to
achieve in the expansion of German armies and frontiers. And so the
generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon. They saw it was going in their
direction for the present. No doubt they hoped later to take over the
direction themselves. In fact, it was ultimately they who were taken
over by the Nazis. Hitler attracted the generals to him with the glitter
of conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically. As the
war proceeded they became his tools.
But if the leaders of the Armed Forces became the tools of Naziism, it
is not to be supposed that they were unwitting, or that they did not
participate fully in many of the actions which are charged as criminal.
The willingness, indeed eagerness, of German officers to become partners
of the Nazis will be fully developed.
A. _Composition and Functions of The General Staff and High Command
Group._
During the first World War there was an organization in the German Armed
Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name persists in the
public mind, but the _Grosse Generalstab_ no longer exists in fact.
There has been no such single organization, no single German General
Staff, since 1918. But there has of course been a group of men
responsible for the policy and acts of the Armed Forces. The fact that
these men have no collective name does not prevent us from collecting
them together. Men cannot escape the consequences of their collective
acts by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a
general staff or a high command lies not in name but in function. And
the men comprised within this group do constitute a functional group,
welded together by common responsibility, of those officers who had the
principal authority and responsibility under Hitler, for the plans and
operations of the German armed forces.
(1) _Structure and Organization of the German Armed Forces._ When the
Nazis came to power in 1933 the German Armed Forces were controlled by a
Reich Defense Minister, at that time Field Marshall von Blomberg.
Subordinate to von Blomberg were the chiefs of the army staff (at that
time von Fritsch), and of the naval staff, the defendant Raeder. Owing
to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the
German Air Force at that time had no official existence whatsoever.
In May 1935, at the time that military conscription was introduced in
Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices but the
structure remained basically the same. Field Marshall von Blomberg
remained in supreme command of the armed forces, with the title of Reich
Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch
became Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy. The army and naval staffs were renamed “High
Commands”—_Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine_,
from which are derived the initials by which they are usually known (OKH
and OKM).
The German Air Force came into official and open existence at about this
same time, but it was not put under von Blomberg. It was an independent
institution under the personal command of Goering, who had the double
title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
In February 1938 a rather fundamental reorganization took place, both in
terms of personnel and organizational structure. Although Raeder
survived the reshuffle, von Blomberg and von Fritsch were both retired
from their positions, and Blomberg’s ministry, the War Ministry, was
wound up. This ministry had contained a division or department called
the _Wehrmachtamt_ or “Armed Forces Department,” the function of which
was to coordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From
this Armed Forces Department was formed a new over-all Armed Forces
authority, known as the High Command of the Armed Forces—_Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht_—usually known by the initials OKW. As the Air Force as
well as the Army and the Navy was subordinated to OKW, coordination of
all Armed Forces matters was vested in the OKW, which was in effect
Hitler’s personal staff for these matters. It combined staff and
ministerial functions. Keitel was appointed chief of the OKW. The most
important department of OKW was the operations staff, of which Jodl
became the chief. Jodl’s immediate subordinate was Warlimont, with the
title of Deputy Chief of The Armed Forces Operations Staff from 1941.
(The genesis of this department is explained in _L-79_.)
This reorganization and establishment of OKW were embodied in a decree
issued by Hitler on 4 February 1938 (1938 RGBl., Part I, page 111):
“DECREE ON THE COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES
“Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from now on
exercised directly by me personally.
“The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry with its
functions becomes ‘The High Command of the Armed Forces’ and
comes directly under my command as my military staff.
“The head of the Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces
is the Chief of the former Armed Forces Department, with the
title of Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. His
status is equal to that of Reich Minister.
“The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the
affairs of the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces as my representative exercises the functions
hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister.
“The High Command of the Armed Forces is responsible in peace
time for the unified preparation of the defense of the Reich in
all areas according to my directives.
“Berlin, 4 February 1938.
“The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
“(S) Adolf Hitler
“The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
“(S) Dr. Lammers
“Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
“(S) Keitel”
Under OKW were the supreme commands of the three branches of the Armed
Forces: OKH, OKM, and the Air Force, which did not receive the official
designation of _Oberkommando der Luftwaffe_ (OKL) until 1944. Raeder
remained after 1938 as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and von Fritsch
was replaced by von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Goering continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. In 1941 von
Brauchitsch was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Army by Hitler
himself, and Raeder was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy by
Doenitz early in 1943. Goering continued as Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force until the last month of the war, when he was replaced by von
Greim.
OKW, OKH, OKM and the Air Force each had its own staff. These four
staffs did not have uniform designations; in the case of OKH, the staff
was known as the _Generalstab_ (General Staff); in the case of OKW, it
was known as the _Fuehrungstab_ (Operations Staff); but in all cases the
functions were those of a General Staff in military parlance. It will be
seen, therefore, that there was in this war no single German General
Staff, but rather four, one for each branch of the service plus one for
the OKW as the over-all interservice supreme command.
Under OKH, OKL, and OKM were the various fighting formations of the
Army, Air Force and Navy respectively. The largest army field formation
was known to the Germans, as it is among the nations generally, as an
“army group”. An Army group was a headquarters controlling two or more
“armies.” In some cases, e.g. in the campaigns in Norway and Greece
where only one army was used, “armies” were directly subordinated to
OKH, rather than to an “army group.” Under the armies come the lower
field formations such as corps, divisions, regiments, etc.
In the case of the German Air Force (OKL), the largest formation was
known as an “air fleet” (_Luftflotte_) and the lower units under the air
fleet were called “corps” (_Fliegerkorps_ or _Jagdkorps_) or “divisions”
(_Fliegerdivisionen_ or _Jagddivisionen_).
Under OKM were the various “naval group commands,” which controlled all
naval operations in a given area, with the exception of the operation of
the high seas fleet and the submarines, which by their nature, were too
mobile to be restricted to an area command. The Commanders of the fleet
and submarines, and certain other specialized units, were directly
subordinate to the German Admiralty.
(2) _Composition of the Group Charged as Criminal._ The group charged in
the Indictment (Appendix B) as criminal comprises, first, German
officers who held the top positions in the four supreme commands
described above; and second, the officers who held the top field
commands.
The holders of nine of the principal positions in the supreme commands
are included in the group. Four of these are positions of supreme
authority: the chief of the OKW, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force. Four other positions are those of the Chiefs of Staff to the four
Commanders-in-Chief: the Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW, the Chief
of the General Staff of the Army, the Chief of the General Staff of the
Air Force, and the Chief of the Naval War Staff. The ninth position is
that of Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW. The particular
responsibility of the holder of this office was planning, and for this
reason his office has been included in the group.
The group named in the Indictment comprises all individuals who held any
of these nine staff positions between February 1938 and the end of the
war in May 1945. February 1938 was selected as the opening date because
it was in that month that the top organization of the German Armed
Forces was reorganized and assumed substantially the form in which it
persisted up to the end of the war. Twenty-two different individuals
occupied these nine positions during that period, of whom eighteen are
still living.
With regard to the officers who held the principal field commands, the
Indictment includes as members of the group all Commanders-in-Chief in
the field who had the status of _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the Army, Navy, or
Air Force. The term _Oberbefehlshaber_ defies literal translation into
English: literally the components of the word mean
“over-command-holder,” and it is perhaps best translated as
Commander-in-Chief. In the case of the Army, commanders of army groups
and armies always had the status and title of _Oberbefehlshaber_. In the
Air Force, the Commander-in-Chief of air fleets always had the status of
_Oberbefehlshaber_, although they were not formally so designated until
1944. In the Navy, officers holding the senior regional commands, and
therefore in control of all naval operations (other than of the high
seas fleet itself) in a given sector, had the status of
_Oberbefehlshaber_. Roughly 110 individual officers had the status of
_Oberbefehlshaber_ in the Army, Navy, or Air Force during the period in
question, and all but approximately a dozen of them are still alive.
The entire General Staff and High Command group as defined in the
Indictment comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed still
to be living. These figures are the cumulative total of all officers who
at any time belonged to the group during the seven years and three
months from February 1938 to May 1945. The number of active members of
the group at any one time is, of course, much smaller; it rose from
about 20 at the outbreak of the war to 50 in 1944 and 1945.
The structure and functioning of the German General Staff and High
Command group have been described in a series of affidavits by some of
the principal German field marshalls and generals. A brief description
of how these statements were obtained may be helpful. In the first place
two American officers, selected for ability and experience in
interrogating high-ranking German prisoners of war, were briefed by an
Intelligence officer and a trial counsel on the particular problems
presented by this part of the case. These interrogators were already
well versed in military intelligence and were able to converse fluently
in German. The officer who briefed these interrogators emphasized that
their function was objectively to inquire into and to establish facts on
which the prosecution wishes to be accurately and surely informed; the
interrogators were not to regard themselves as cross-examiners. The
German officers to be interrogated were selected on the basis of the
special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of
positions held by them during the past generation. After each interview
the interrogator prepared a report. From this report such facts as
appeared relevant to the issues now before the Tribunal were extracted
and a statement embodying these facts was prepared. This statement was
then presented to the officer at a later interview. It was presented in
the form of a draft and the officer was asked whether it truly
reproduced what he said at the previous interview. He was also invited
to alter it in any way he thought fit. This careful and laborious, but
necessary, process had as its object the procuring of the best possible
testimony in the form of carefully considered statements.
These affidavits fully support the prosecution’s description of the
group, and conclusively establish that this group of officers was in
fact the group which had the major responsibility for planning and
directing the operations of the German Armed Forces.
The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Halder (_3702-PS_), who
held the rank of _Generaloberst_ (Colonel General), the equivalent of a
four-star general in the American Army. Halder was chief of the General
Staff of OKH from September 1938 to September 1942 and is, accordingly,
a member of the group. His statement reads:
“Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in
Germany was vested in the Head of State who prior to 2 August
1934 was Field Marshall von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945
was Adolf Hitler.
“Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the
three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of
State), that is to say the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In
practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a
relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers
exercised such supervision in their official capacity and by
virtue of their training, their positions and their mutual
contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed
Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the
instructions of the OKW in the name of their respective
Commanding Officers and were presented by them to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of
State).
“The members of this group were charged with the responsibility
of preparing for military operations within their competent
fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as
were to be undertaken by troops in the field.
“Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled
and given appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples
of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the
Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish
campaign and the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14
June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign. The composition
of this group and the relationship of its members to each other
were as shown in the attached chart. This was in effect the
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.”
“(S) Halder” (_3702-PS_)
A substantially identical statement (_3703-PS_) was made by von
Brauchitsch, who held the rank of Field Marshall, and who was
Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941. Von Brauchitsch was
also, therefore, a member of the group. The only difference between the
two statements is worth noting occurs in the last sentence of each.
Halder states that the group described in the Indictment “was in effect
the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces,”
(_3702-PS_), whereas von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently,
saying “in the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the
chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.” (_3703-PS_)
Both von Brauchitsch and Halder have stated under oath that the General
Staff chart (_Chart Number 7_) accurately portrays the top organization
of the German Armed Forces. The statements by von Brauchitsch and Halder
also fully support the prosecution’s statement that the holders of the
positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major
responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces
matters.
Another affidavit by Halder (_3707-PS_) sets forth certain less
important matters of detail:
“The most important department in the OKW was the Operations
Staff—in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army
and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel
there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in
status with Jodl, but in the planning and conduct of military
affairs they and their departments were less important and less
influential than Jodl and Jodl’s staff.
“The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of
these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was
chief. It was called the ‘National Defense’ Section and was
primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions.
From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same
duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.
“There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as
the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.
“Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out
by the group of high-ranking officers described in my Statement
of 7 November (in the Army: ‘General Staff of the Army’; in the
Air Force ‘General Staff of the Air Force’).
“Operational matters in the Navy were even in World War I not
worked out by the ‘Great General Staff’ but by the Naval Staff.”
“(Signed) Franz Halder” (_3707-PS_)
This affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General
Staffs of the four Commanders of OKW, OKL, OKM, and OKH and fully
supports the inclusion of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services in
the indicted group, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy
Chief of the OKW Operations Staff, with his strategic planning
responsibilities.
An affidavit (_3708-PS_) by the son of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch,
who had the rank of _Oberst_ (Colonel) in the German Air Force, and who
was personal aide to Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the German Air
Force, furnishes a few details on the _Luftwaffe_:
“_Luftflottenchefs_ have the same status as the
_Oberbefehlshaber_ of an army. During the war they had no
territorial authority and accordingly exercised no territorial
jurisdiction.
“They were the highest troop commanders of the air force units
subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
“Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation
‘_Befehlshaber_’ and from then on that of ‘_Oberbefehlshaber_.’
This change of designation carried with it no change in the
functions and responsibilities which they previously had.”
“(Signed) Brauchitsch” (_3708-PS_)
(3) _Functioning of the General Staff and High Command Group._ In many
respects, the German military leaders functioned in the same general
manner as obtains in the military establishments of other large nations.
General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants
at OKW, OKH, OKL, and OKM, in collaboration with the field generals or
admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision
to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the
highest level, and the making of such a decision would involve political
and diplomatic questions as well as purely military considerations. When
the decision was made, to attack Poland, for example, the top staff
officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military
plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the
Commanders of the Army groups and Armies who were to be in charge of the
campaign. Consultation would follow between the top field commanders and
the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, and the plans would be revised,
perfected, and refined in detail.
The manner in which the group worked, involving as it did the
interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers
at OKW and OKH and the principal field commanders, is graphically
described in two affidavits by Field Marshall von Brauchitsch
(_3705-PS_):
“STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945
“In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military
preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was
immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan.
This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him as amended
by a change which he desired.
“After the operational and deployment orders had been given to
the two Commanders of the army groups and the five Commanders of
the armies, conferences took place with them about details in
order to hear their desires and recommendations.
“After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of
keeping in close and constant touch with the Commanders-in-Chief
of army groups and of armies by personal visits to their
headquarters as well as by telephone, teletype or wireless. In
this way I was able to obtain their advice and their
recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In
fact it was the accepted policy and common practice for the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate
Commanders-in-Chief and to maintain a constant exchange of ideas
with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of
Staff communicated with army groups and, thru them as well as
directly, with armies; thru army groups on strategical and
tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and the
administration of conquered territory occupied by these armies.
An army group had no territorial jurisdiction. It had a
relatively small staff which was concerned only with military
operations. In all territorial matters it was the
Commander-in-Chief of the army and not of the army group who
exercised jurisdiction.
“(Signed) von Brauchitsch” (_3705-PS_)
* * * * *
“SUPPLEMENT TO MY STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945
“When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of
his political objectives through military pressure or through
the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an
appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.
“Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the
OKM. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally
by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a
written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed
Forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the
operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies
involved. Details of the operational and deployment plans were
discussed by the OKH with the Commanders of the army groups and
armies and with the Chiefs of Staff of these Commanders.
“During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of
ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio and
courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every
opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the
Commanders of army groups, armies and lower echelons by means of
personal visits to them. In the war against Russia the
Commanders of army groups and of armies were individually and
repeatedly called in by Hitler for consultation.
“Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army
groups and for all matters concerning supply and territorial
jurisdiction from the OKH directly to the armies.”
“(Signed) von Brauchitsch” (_3705-PS_)
The _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the field, therefore—and in the case of the
army that means the Commander-in-Chief of army groups and
armies—participated in planning, and directed the execution of the
plans. The _Oberbefehlshaber_ were also the repositories of general
executive power in the areas in which their army groups and armies were
operating. This fact appears from a directive of 13 March 1941 signed by
Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (_447-PS_).
This directive sets out various regulations for the impending operations
against the Soviet Union (which were actually begun on 22 June 1941).
Under paragraph I, is entitled “Area of operations and executive power
(_Vollziehende Gewalt_)”, subparagraph 1 and 2(a) provide:
“It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the
General-Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in
accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21
October 1939, the Commander in Chief of the Army shall be
authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of
his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may
transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief
[_Oberbefehlshaber_] of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of
that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian
agencies.”
* * * * * *
“The area of operations created through the advance of the Army
beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries
is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right to exercise the
executive power [_Vollziehende Gewalt_] in this area, and may
transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief
[_Oberbefehlshaber_] of the Army Groups and Armies.” (_447-PS_)
The official command invitation to participate in consultations at the
Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941, eight days prior to the German attack
on the Soviet Union, also shows the group at work (_C-78_). This meeting
is referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavits by Halder
(_3702-PS_) and von Brauchitsch (_3703-PS_) mentioned above. This
document, signed by Colonel Schmundt, Chief _Wehrmacht_ Adjutant to
Hitler, and is dated at Berchtesgaden, 9 June 1941, begins:
“_Re: Conference ‘Barbarossa’_
“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
ordered reports on Barbarossa [the code name for the invasion of
the U.S.S.R.] by the Commanders of Army Groups and Armies and
Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.”
This document likewise includes a list of the participants in this
conference which closely parallels the structure of the group as set
forth in the Indictment. The list includes General Field Marshal von
Brauchitsch, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and a member
of the group; and General Halder, who was chief of the Army Staff, and a
member of the group. Then there are three subordinates who were not
members of the group: Paulus, Heusinger, and Gyldenfeldt. Next is navy
Captain Wagner, who was chief of the Operations Staff, Operations
Division of the Naval War Staff, not a member of the group. On the air
side there were General Milch, State Secretary and Inspector of the Air
Force, again not a member of the group; General Joschonnek, chief of the
General Staff of the Air Force and a member of the group; and two of his
assistants. Passing to the OKW, High Command of the Armed Forces, we
find that Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, all members of the group, were
present, with an assistant from the General Staff. Then there were four
officers from the office of the adjutant, who were not members of the
group. Present from the Field Commanders were General von Falkenhorst,
Army High Command, Norway, member of the group; General Stumpff, Air
Fleet 5, member of the group; Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stuelpnagel,
Schobert, Kleist, all from the Army, all members of the group. Of the
Air Force officers present, General Loehr, Air Fleet 4, was a member of
the group; General Fromm and General Udet were not members. One was
director of the Home Forces, commander of the Home Forces, and the other
the Director General of Equipment and Supply. Turning to the Navy, those
present were Raeder, a member of the group; Fricke, chief of the Naval
War Staff, and a member of the group; and an assistant who was not a
member, Carls, Navy Group North, member of the group, and likewise
Schmundt were present. Then from the Army, Leeb, Busch, Kuechler, all
members of the group as _Oberbefehlshaber_, and Keller, a member of the
group, were present. Also Bock, Kluge, Strauss, Guderian, Hoth,
Kesselring, all members of the group, were present. It will be seen
that, except for a few assisting officers of relatively junior rank, all
the participants in these consultations were members of the group, and
that in fact the participants in these consultations included the
members of the group who were concerned in the impending operations
against the Soviet Union.
B. _Criminal Activities of the General Staff and High Command Group._
The General Staff and High Command group is well represented among the
individual defendants in this case. It must be kept in mind that this
group may be declared criminal in connection with any act of which an
individual defendant who is a member of the group may be convicted
(Charter, Article 9). Five of the individual defendants, or one-quarter
of the total number accused, are members of this group.
In the order of listing in the indictments, the first is Goering.
Goering is a defendant in this case in numerous capacities. He is a
member of the General Staff and High Command group by reason of having
been the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force from the time when the Air
Force first came into the open, and was officially established, until
about a month prior to the end of the war. During the last month of the
war he was replaced in this capacity by von Greim, who committed suicide
shortly after his capture at the end of the war. Goering is charged with
crimes under all counts of the Indictment.
The next listed defendant who is a member of the group is Keitel. He and
the remaining three defendants who are members of the group are all four
in this case primarily or solely in their military capacities, and all
four of them were professional soldiers or sailors. Keitel was made the
chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) when the OKW
was first set up in 1938, and remained in that capacity throughout the
period in question. He held the rank of Field Marshall throughout most
of this period, and in addition to being the Chief of OKW, he was a
member of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the Council of Ministers for
the Defense of the Reich. Keitel is charged with crimes under all four
counts of the Indictment.
The defendant Jodl was a career soldier; he was an _Oberstleutnant_
(Lieutenant Colonel) when the Nazis came to power, and ultimately
attained the rank of _Generaloberst_ (Colonel General). He became the
Chief of the Operations Staff of the _Wehrmacht_, and continued in that
capacity throughout the war. He also is charged with crimes under all
four counts of the Indictment.
The defendant Raeder is in a sense the senior member of the entire
group, having been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy as early as
1928. He attained the highest rank in the German Navy, _Grossadmiral_,
and in addition to being Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he was a member
of the Secret Cabinet Council. He retired from Supreme Command of the
Navy in January 1943, and was replaced by Doenitz. Raeder is charged
with crimes under counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Indictment.
The last of these five defendants, Doenitz, was a relatively junior
officer when the Nazis came to power. During the early years of the Nazi
regime he specialized in submarine activities and was in command of the
U-boat arm when the war broke out. He rose steadily in the Navy and was
chosen to succeed Raeder when the latter retired in 1943. Doenitz then
became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and attained the rank of
_Grossadmiral_. When the German Armed Forces collapsed near the end of
the war, Doenitz succeeded Hitler as head of the German government. He
is charged with crimes under counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Indictment.
Four of these five defendants are reasonably typical of the group as a
whole. Goering is an exception: he is primarily a Nazi party politician
nourishing a hobby for aviation as a result of his career in 1914-18.
But the others made soldiering or sailoring their life work. They
collaborated with and joined in the most important adventures of the
Nazis, but they were not among the early party members. They differ in
no essential respect from the other 125 odd members of the group. They
are, no doubt, abler men in certain respects than some of the other
members, as they rose to the highest positions in the German Armed
Forces, and all but Jodl attained the highest rank. But they are
generally representative of the group, and their expressed ideas and
actions are fairly characteristic of those of the other group members.
It is not, of course, the prosecution’s position, and it is not
essential to its case, that all 130 members of this group, (or all the
members of any other organization or group named in the Indictment),
actually committed crimes, under Article 6 of the Charter. It is the
prosecution’s position that the leadership of the group and the purposes
to which the group was committed by the leaders were criminal under
Article 6. The individual defendants were among the leaders of the
General Staff and High Command group, and, acting in the official
capacities which made them members of the group, they performed and
participated in acts which are criminal under Article 6 of the Charter.
Other members of the group performed such acts. The German Armed Forces
were so completely under the group’s control as to make the group
responsible for their activities under the last sentence of Article 6 of
the Charter.
(1) _The Planning and Launching of Wars of Aggression._ It is, of
course, the normal function of a military staff to prepare military
plans. In peacetime, military staffs customarily concern themselves with
the preparation of plans of attack or defense based on hypothetical
contingencies. There is nothing criminal about carrying on such
exercises or preparing such plans. That is not what these defendants and
this group are charged with.
This group agreed with the Nazi objective of aggrandizing Germany by
force or threat of force. They joined knowingly and enthusiastically in
developing German armed might for this criminal purpose. They joined
knowingly and willfully in initiating and waging aggressive wars. They
were advised in advance of the Nazi plans to launch aggressive wars.
They laid the military plans and directed the initiation and carrying on
of the wars. These things are criminal under article 6 of the Charter.
Aggressive war cannot be prepared and waged without intense activity on
the part of all branches of the Armed Forces and particularly by the
high-ranking officers who control such forces. To the extent, therefore,
that German preparations for and waging of aggressive war are historical
facts of common knowledge, or are proved, it necessarily follows that
the General Staff and High Command group, and the German Armed Forces,
participated therein.
This is so notwithstanding the effort on the part of certain military
leaders of Germany, after defeat, to insist that until the troops
marched they lived in an ivory tower of military technicalities, unable
or unwilling to observe the end to which their work led. The documentary
evidence which follows fully refutes any such contentions.
The purposes and objectives of the German General Staff and High Command
group during the period prior to the absorption of Austria may be
summarized as follows:
(i) Secret rearmament, including the training of military
personnel, the production of war munitions, and the building of
an air force;
(ii) The creation of a military air force, announced by Goering
on 10 March 1935;
(iii) The law for compulsory military service, of 16 March 1935,
fixing the peace-time strength of the German Army at 500,000;
and
(iv) The reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 and the
refortification of that area.
These events are historical facts not requiring proof. Likewise, the
impossibility of the Nazis’ achieving these ends without cooperation by
the Armed Forces is indisputable from the very nature of things.
Events and circumstances during the period 1933-36 are discussed in
Section 2 of Chapter IX. Chief among these were the secret expansion of
the German Navy in violation of treaty limitations, under the guidance
of Raeder; the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, adopted the same
day that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament provision of the
Versailles Treaty (_2261-PS_); von Blomberg’s plan, 2 May 1935, for the
reoccupation of the Rhineland (_C-139_); and von Blomberg’s orders of 2
March 1936 under which the reoccupation was actually carried out
(_C-159_). All these events clearly required the closest collaboration
between the military leaders and the Nazis.
The state of mind and objectives of the German military leaders during
this early period are significant. The viewpoint of the German Navy on
the opportunities which Naziism offered for rearmament so that Germany
could achieve its objectives by force or threat of force, is reflected
in a memorandum published by the High Command of the German Navy in 1937
entitled “The Fight of the Navy against Versailles, 1919-35” (_C-156_).
This memorandum was compiled by a naval captain named Schuessler in the
German Admiralty. The preface contains the following statements:
“The object and aim of this memorandum is to draw a technically
reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence
of those who took part, of the fight of the Navy against the
unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.”
* * * * * *
“This compilation makes it clearer however, that even such ideal
and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if
the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not
behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the
Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition
for an effective rearmament, in the coordination of the whole
nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and
spiritual powers, could the work of the soldier find its
fulfilment.
“The framework of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in
world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united
will.” (_C-156_)
Thus, the German Navy and the Nazis were in comradely agreement and full
collaboration. Hitler was giving the military leaders the chance they
wanted. Jodl stated the situation clearly in his speech to the
Gauleiters on 7 November 1943 (_L-172_):
“1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its
struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the
outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is
not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like
however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful
regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played
by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to
fight [_Wehrwillen_] in nurturing fighting strength
[_Wehrkraft_] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all
the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small _Reichswehr_
would never have been able to cope with this task, if only
because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the
Fuehrer aimed at—and has so happily been successful in bringing
about—was the fusion of these two forces.
“2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first
place restoration of fighting sovereignty [_Wehrhoheit_]
(conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and rearmament with
special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured
and air arm.” (_L-172_)
Nor were the high-ranking German officers unaware that the policies and
objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the direction of war.
Notes made by Admiral Carls of the German Navy in September 1938 by way
of comment on a “Draft study of Naval Warfare against England,” read as
follows:
“A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.
“1. If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to acquire
a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient
colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and
secure access to the ocean.
“2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to
Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world
powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful
means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore
forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding
preparations for war.
“3. War against England means at the same time war against the
Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a
large number of countries overseas, in fact against one-half to
one-third of the whole world.
“It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is
prepared _economically_ as well as _politically_ and
_militarily_ and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an
outlet to the ocean.” (_C-23_)
The German Air Force, during this prewar period, was developing even
more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement of the Reich. A
study prepared by the chief, Kammhuber, of a branch of the General Staff
of the Air Force called the “Organization Staff”, contained
recommendations for the organization of the German Air Force in future
years up to 1950 (_L-43_). The recommendations are based on certain
assumptions, one of which was that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany
would be as shown on the map which is attached as an inclosure to this
study (_Chart Number 10_). On this map Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included
within the borders of the Reich. Kammhuber also envisaged the future
peacetime organization of the German Air Force as comprising seven
“Group Commands.” Four of these were to lie within the borders of
Germany proper, at Berlin, Brunswick, Munich, and Koenigsberg, but the
three others are proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw.
(_L-43_)
The basic agreement and harmony between the Nazis and the German
military leaders cannot be overemphasized. Without this agreement on
objectives there might never have been a war. In this connection, an
affidavit (_3704-PS_) by von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshall, Reich
War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces until
February 1938, is significant:
“From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical
territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were
the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr and Memel.
“I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers,
believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was
the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled
some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety percent of
the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the
Polish question. A war to wipe out the desecration involved in
the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to
separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was
regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity. This was one
of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament
which began about ten years before Hitler came to power and was
accentuated under Nazi rule.
“Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to
Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler since he produced
the results which they desired. After this time some generals
began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of
his judgment. However they failed as a group to take any
definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do
so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their
positions.
“Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces in January 1938, Hitler asked me to
recommend a successor. I suggested Goering, who was the ranking
officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and
diligence. I was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces by no officer, but Hitler personally took over my
function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a Chef de
bureau. As far as I know he was never named Commander of the
Armed Forces but was always merely a ‘Chief of Staff’ under
Hitler and in effect conducted the administrative functions of
the Ministry of War. At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler
and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding
between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself
desired and had furthered as _Reichswehrminister_ and
_Reichskriegsminister_. To do the opposite would have led to a
civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people
supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But
it is the truth.
“As I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler’s measures. He
became a willing tool in Hitler’s hands for every one of his
decisions.
“He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him.”
(_3704-PS_)
This statement by von Blomberg is paralleled closely in some respects by
an affidavit by Colonel General Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_). Blaskowitz
commanded an army in the campaign against Poland and the campaign
against France. He subsequently took command of Army Group G in southern
France, and held command of Army Group H, which retreated beyond the
Rhine at the end of the war. His statement is as follows:
“* * * After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the
Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through
diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and
England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter
of fact we felt that, if political negotiations came to naught,
the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not
only with Poland herself, but also with the Western Powers.
“When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to
prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war
came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion
was only strengthened by the Fuehrer’s speech on 22 August 1939
on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality.
Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members
of my staff who were engaged in preparations, participated in
various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army
group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical,
strategic and general nature were discussed as had to do with my
future position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army during
the planned Polish campaign.
“During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno
operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he, as well as the Fuehrer,
visited my headquarters. In fact it was common practice for
commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked
from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their
recommendations by telephone, teletype or wireless, as well as
by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually
became advisers to the OKH in their own field so that the
positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which
was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the
German Armed Forces.” (_3706-PS_)
It should be noted that General Blaskowitz, like Colonel General Halder
and Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the
structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group
as described by the prosecution.
It is, accordingly, clear beyond dispute that the military leaders of
Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the
expansion of the Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties. The
objectives they had in mind are obvious from the affidavits and
documents to which reference has been made. In these documents and
affidavits we see the Nazis and the Generals in agreement upon the basic
objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force, and
collaborating to build up the armed might of Germany in order to make
possible the subsequent acts of aggression.
(_a_) _Austria._ Notes taken by Colonel Hossbach of a conference held in
the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937 show that this
conference, at which Hitler presided, was small and highly secret
(_386-PS_). The only other participants were the four principal military
leaders, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (von Neurath), and Hossbach
acting as Secretary. The four chief leaders of the Armed
Forces—Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister for War, and the
Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces, von
Fritsch for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Goering for the Air
Force—were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of
Germany’s diplomatic and military policy, and stated that the conquest
of Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential preliminary “for the
improvement of our military position” and “in order to remove any threat
from the flanks”. (_386-PS_)
The military and political advantages envisaged included the acquisition
of a new source of food, shorter and better frontiers, the release of
troops for other tasks, and the possibility of forming new divisions
from the population of the conquered territories. Von Blomberg and von
Fritsch joined in the discussion and von Fritsch stated:
“That it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for
this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out
operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of
the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications”
(_386-PS_).
In the following Spring, March 1938, the German plans with respect to
Austria came to fruition. Entries in the diary kept by Jodl show the
participation of the German military leaders in the absorption of
Austria (_1780-PS_). As is shown by Jodl’s diary entry for 11 February
1938, Keitel and other generals were present at the Obersalzberg meeting
between Schuschnigg and Hitler:
“_11 February_
“In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V.
Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together
with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and
military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol”.
(_1780-PS_)
Two days later Keitel and others were preparing proposals to be
submitted to Hitler which would give the Austrian government the
impression that Germany would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg
agreement was ratified in Vienna:
“_13 February_
“In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come
to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer order is to the
effect that military pressure by shamming military action should
be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive
maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone
for approval”. (_1780-PS_)
These proposals are embodied in a document 14 February 1938 and signed
by Keitel (_1775-PS_). Portions of Keitel’s proposals to the Fuehrer are
as follows:
“1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or
Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.
“2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the
conclusion of military preparations against Austria,
“_a._ through V-men (_V-Maenner_) in Austria,
“_b._ through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier,
“_c._ through travelling agents.”
* * * * * *
“4. Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in
_Wehrkreis VII_ and between Berlin and Munich.
“5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of
the Mountain Troops near the frontier.
“6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th
in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out
measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.” (_1775-PS_)
As Jodl’s diary entry for 14 February shows, these deceptive maneuvers
and threats of force were very effective in Austria:
“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
created that Germany is undertaking serious military
preparations.” (_1780-PS_)
About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg’s
decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in
accordance with the preexisting plans for the invasion of Austria (these
plans were known as “Case Otto”) in order to absorb Austria and stop the
plebiscite. Jodl’s diary entry for 10 March 1938 states:
“By surprise and without consulting the ministers, Schuschnigg
ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring
strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or
preparation.
“Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March
9 to 10, he calls for Goering, General V. Reichenau is called
back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General V. Schobert is
ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is
with the District Leader [_Gauleiter_] Burckel in the
Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He
drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15,
according to the wish of General V. Viebahn, to give him the old
draft.
‘Prepare case Otto’.” (_1780-PS_)
In an order 11 March, initialed by Keitel and Jodl, Hitler laid down the
general instructions for the invasion, and directed that the Army and
Air Force be ready for action by 12 March (_C-102_). On the same evening
Hitler ordered the invasion of Austria to commence at daybreak on 12
March. The order was initialed by Jodl. (_C-182_)
The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of aggression
in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance.
This was so simple because the invasion was precipitated by an outside
event, Schuschnigg’s order for the plebiscite. But although for this
reason the element of deliberately timed planning was lacking, the
foregoing documents make abundantly clear the participation of the
military leaders at all stages. At the small policy meeting in November
1937, when Hitler’s general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was
outlined, the only others present were the four principal military
leaders and the Foreign Secretary (_386-PS_). In February, Keitel,
Reichenau, and Sperrle were present at Obersalzberg to help subject
Schuschnigg to “the heaviest military pressure” (_1780-PS_). Keitel and
others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of
military threat and deception for frightening the Austrian Government
into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol (_1775-PS_). When the actual
invasion took place it was, of course, directed by the military leaders
and executed by the German Armed Forces. Jodl has given a clear
statement of why the German military leaders were delighted to join with
the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence. In his
lecture to the Gauleiters in November 1943 (_L-172_) Jodl explained:
“The Austrian ‘Anschluss’, in its turn, brought with it not only
fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both
of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving
our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of
Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into
Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base
for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself
was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now
become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any
attack pressed home with vigour before effective aid from the
West could be expected to arrive”. (_L-172_)
(_b_) _Czechoslovakia._
The steps in the planning for the invasion of Czechoslovakia (“Case
Green” or Fall Gruen) bear the evidence of knowing and wilful
participation by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the General Staff
and High Command Group.
The Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and the four
principal German military leaders on 5 November 1937 show, that Austria
and Czechoslovakia were then listed as the first intended victims of
German aggression (_386-PS_). After the absorption of Austria in March
1938, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the armed
forces lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. In the
Hitler-Keitel discussions on 21 April 1938 a nice balance of political
and military factors was worked out (_388-PS_):
“A. _Political Aspect_
1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or
possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be:
hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a
measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on
the mainland.
2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a
crisis and lead to war.
3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g.
assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German
demonstration).
B. _Military Conclusions_
1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2 and
3. Case 2 is the undesired one since “Gruen” will have taken security
measures.
* * * * * *
4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive
ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis
will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of
foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of
spoils!) and demoralize “Gruen”.
Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and
employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless
thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pi past Pr) [Pilsen, Prague].
(_388-PS_)
From this point on, nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt
file (_388-PS_) and in Jodl’s diary (_1780-PS_). These two sources of
information demolish in advance what will, no doubt, be urged in defense
of the military defendants and the General Staff and High Command Group.
They will seek to create the impression that the German generals were
pure military technicians; that they were uninterested and uninformed
about political and diplomatic considerations and events; that they
passed their days mounting mock battles at the _Kriegsakadamie_; that
they prepared plans for military attack or defense, on a purely
hypothetical basis. They will say all this in order to suggest that they
did not share and could not estimate Hitler’s aggressive intentions, and
that they carried out politically conceived orders like military
automatons, with no idea whether the wars they launched and waged were
aggressive or not.
If these arguments are made, the Schmundt file (_388-PS_) and Jodl’s
diary (_1780-PS_) make it abundantly apparent that aggressive designs
were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals; that the
military leaders were fully posted on the aggressive intentions of the
Nazis; that they were fully informed of political and diplomatic
developments; that indeed German generals had a habit of turning up at
diplomatic gatherings.
If the documents did not show these things so clearly, a moment’s
thought must show them to be true. A highly successful program of
conquest depends on armed might, and cannot be executed with an
unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of
course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to
soldiers alone. It is equally true that aggressive diplomacy is far too
dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and
military support.
No doubt some of the German generals had qualms about Hitler’s timing
and the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather
amusingly reflected in an entry in Jodl’s diary for 10 August 1938:
“The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt.
Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After
dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three
hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The
subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer’s attention to the
defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few
generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies
especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top
it off he claims to quote from General Adams [_die er noch dazu
dem General Adams in den Mund legt_] that the western
fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer
becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark
that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for
anything. ‘I assure you, General, the position will not only be
held for three weeks, but for three years.’ The cause of this
despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very
widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various
reasons. First of all, it [the General Staff] is restrained by
old memories; political considerations play a part as well,
instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is
certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the
soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the
genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with
Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may
not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the
opposition between the General’s opinion and that of the Fuehrer
is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale
of the troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be
able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when
the right moment comes.” (_1780-PS_)
But if this entry shows that some of the German generals at that time
were cautious with respect to Germany’s ability to take on Poland and
the Western Powers simultaneously, nonetheless the entry shows no lack
of sympathy with the Nazi aims for conquest. And there is no evidence in
Jodl’s diary or elsewhere that any substantial number of German generals
lacked sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Furthermore, the top military
leaders always joined with and supported his decisions, with formidable
success in the years from 1938 to 1942.
If it is said that German military leaders did not know that German
general policy toward Czechoslovakia was aggressive, or based on force
and threat of force, it may be noted that on 30 May 1938 Hitler signed a
Most Secret directive to Keitel (_388-PS Item 11_) in which he said:
“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
military action in the near future. It is the job of the
political leaders to await or bring about the politically and
militarily suitable moment.
“An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia
or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly
favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may
cause me to take early action.
“The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a
favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly
the preparations are to be made at once.” (_388-PS Item 11_)
Jodl was in no doubt what this meant. He noted in his diary that same
day:
“The Fuehrer signs directive ‘Green’, where he states his final
decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates
military preparation all along the line”. (_1780-PS_)
The succeeding evidence in the Schmundt file (_388-PS Items 14, 16, 17_)
and in the Jodl diary (_1780-PS_) shows how those military preparations
went forward “all along the line.” Numerous examples of discussions,
planning, and preparation during the last few weeks before the Munich
Pact, including discussions with Hungary and the Hungarian General Staff
in which General Halder participated, are contained in the Jodl diary
(_1780-PS_) and the later items in the Schmundt file (_388-PS Items 18
to 22, 24, 26 to 28, 31 to 34, 36 to 54_). The day the Munich Pact was
signed, Jodl noted in his diary:
“The Munich Pact is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out.
Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th
of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will
be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer
and his determination not to shun even a World War have again
won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that
the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been
converted and will remain that way.” (_1780-PS_)
Plans for the “liquidation” of the remainder of Czechoslovakia were made
soon after Munich (_388-PS Item 40_; _C-136_; _C-138_). Ultimately the
absorption was accomplished by diplomatic bullying in which Keitel
participated for the usual purposes of demonstrating that German armed
might was ready to enforce the threats (_2802-PS_). Once again, Jodl in
his 1943 lecture (_L-172_) explained clearly why the objective of
eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of the German
military leaders as to the hearts of the Nazis:
“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of
1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded
off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it then
became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of
more or less favorable strategic premises.” (_L-172_)
This serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg (_3704-PS_) and
Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_) already quoted:
“The whole group of German staff and front officers believed
that the question of the Polish Corridor would have to be
settled some day, if necessary by force of arms.”
“A war to wipe out the political and economic losses resulting
from the creation of the Polish Corridor was regarded as a
sacred duty though a sad necessity.”
“Before 1938-39, the German generals were not opposed to
Hitler.”
“Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired.”
(_c_) _Poland._ The story of the German attack on Poland furnishes an
excellent case study of the functioning of the General Staff and High
Command Group.
Reference is made to the series of directives from Hitler and Keitel
involving “Fall Weiss” (_C-120_). The series starts with a re-issuance
of the “Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed
Forces”. This periodically re-issued directive was encountered
previously in the case of Czechoslovakia.
In essence these directives are (_a_) statements of what the Armed
Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political and
diplomatic policies and developments, and (_b_) indications of what
should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the military
tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They constitute, in
fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and strongly
demonstrate the mutual inter-dependence of aggressive diplomacy and
military planning. The distribution of these documents early in April
1939, in which the preparations of plans for the Polish war is ordered,
was limited. Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: one to
Brauchitsch (OKH), one to Raeder (OKM), one to Goering (OKL), and two to
Warlimont in the Planning Branch of OKW. Hitler lays down that the plan
must be susceptible of execution by 1 September 1939, and that target
date was adhered to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is
clearly brought out by the following part of one of those documents:
“1. _Political Requirements and Aims._ German relations with
Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any
quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards
Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and
adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement
might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with
Poland.
“The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and
create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements
of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed
a part of the Reich-territory at the outbreak of the conflict,
at the latest.
“The political leadership considers it its task in this case to
isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to
Poland only.
“The development of increasing internal crises in France and the
resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in
the not too distant future.
“Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this
cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this
would imply Poland’s destruction by Bolshevism.
“The attitudes of the _Baltic States_ will be determined wholly
by German military exigencies.
“On the German side, Hungary cannot be considered a certain
German ally. Italy’s attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome
Axis.
“2. _Military Conclusions._ The great objectives in the building
up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by
the antagonism of the ‘Western Democracies’. ‘Fall Weiss’
constitutes only a precautionary complement to these
preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however,
as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the
Western opponents.
“The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even
after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the
war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.
“The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be
taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea
coast, as well as the air over them.” (_C-120_)
It cannot be suggested that these are hypothetical plans, or that the
General Staff and High Command Group did not know what was in prospect.
The plans show on their face that they are in earnest and no war game.
The point is reinforced by Schmundt’s notes on the conference in
Hitler’s study at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939
(_L-79_). At this conference Hitler announced:
“There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are
left with the decision: _to attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity_”. (_L-79_)
Besides Hitler and a few military aides and adjutants, the following
were present: Goering (C-in-C _Luftwaffe_); Raeder (C-in-C Navy); Keitel
(Chief, OKW); von Brauchitsch (C-in-C Army); Col. General Milch
(Inspector General of the _Luftwaffe_); Gen. Bodenschatz (Goering’s
personal assistant); Rear Admiral Schnievindt (Chief of the Naval War
Staff); Col. Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff); Col. Warlimont
(Planning Staff of OKW). All except Milch, Bodenschatz, and the
adjutants are members of the Group as defined in the Indictment.
The initial and general planning of the attack on Poland, however, had
to be examined, checked, corrected, and perfected by the field
commanders who were to carry out the attack. In a document issued in the
middle of June 1939 (_C-142_), von Brauchitsch as C-in-C of the Army
passed on the general outlines of the plan to the field
commanders-in-chief (the _Oberbefehlshaber_ of Army Groups and Armies)
so that they could work out the actual preparation and deployments in
accordance with the general plan:
“The object of the operation is to _destroy the Polish Armed
Forces_. High policy demands that the war should be begun by
heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. _The
intention of the Army High Command_ is to prevent a regular
mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise
invasion of Polish territory and to destroy the mass of the
Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the
Vistula-Narve line. This is to be achieved by a concentric
attack from Silesia on one side and Pomerania-East Prussia on
the other side. The possible influence from Galicia against this
operation must be eliminated. The main idea of the destruction
of the Polish Army west of the Vistula-Narve Line with the
elimination of the possible influence from Galicia remains
unchanged even if advanced preparedness for defense on the part
of the Polish Army, caused by previous political tension, should
have to be taken into consideration. In such a case it may be a
question of not making the first attack mainly with mechanized
and motorized forces but of waiting for the arrival of stronger,
non-motorized units. The Army High Command will then give the
correspondingly later time for the crossing of the frontier. The
endeavour to obtain a quick success will be maintained.
“The Army Group Commands and the Army Commands (A.O.K.) will
make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy.
There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to
be abandoned: these will have to be developed simply and quickly
on the same basis: they are to be prepared mentally to such an
extent, that in case of an order from the Army High Command they
can be carried out quickly.” (_C-142_)
A document of approximately the same date reveals an _Oberbefehlshaber_
at work in the field planning the attack (_2327-PS_). This document,
signed by Blaskowitz, at the time the commander-in-chief of the Third
Army Area Command and commander-in-chief of the 8th Army during the
Polish campaign, states in part:
“The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out
of a _plan of deployment against Poland_ which takes in account
the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war
by surprise and for quick success.
“The order of deployment by the High Command, ‘_Fall Weiss_’
authorizes the Third Army Group [in _Fall Weiss_, 8th Army
Headquarters] to give necessary directions and orders to all
commands subordinated to it for ‘_Fall Weiss_’.”
* * * * * *
“The whole correspondence on ‘_Fall Weiss_’ has to be conducted
under the classification Top Secret [_Chefsache_]. This is to be
disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgment
of the chief of the responsible command is harmless in every
way—even in connection with other documents.
“For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on
the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered
later on. Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army
Group before 10 July.
“I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the
divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as
possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to
limit the extent of the information and ask that all suitable
measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting
information.
“The Commander-in-Chief of Army Area Command
“(signed) F. Blaskowitz.”
“_Aims of Operation ‘Fall Weiss’_
“1. a. The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish
mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with
forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed
on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial
superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that
can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly
bringing up other parts of the army as well to counteract the
marching up of the Polish Army.
“Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the
foe by quick action and ruthless attacks.” (_2327-PS_)
Finally, a week before the actual onslaught, when all the military plans
have been laid, The General Staff and High Command Group all gathered in
one place, in fact all in one room. On 23 August 1939 the
_Oberbefehlshaber_ assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler’s
explanation of the timing of the attack, and to receive political and
diplomatic orientation from the head of the State (_798-PS_). This
speech, the second of the two examples referred to in the initial
affidavits by Halder (_3702-PS_) and Brauchitsch (_3703-PS_), was
addressed to the very group defined in the indictment as the General
Staff and High Command Group.
(_d_) _The War Period, September 1939-June 1941: Norway, Denmark,
Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece._ On 1 September 1939
Germany launched the war. Within a few weeks, and before any important
action on the western front, Poland was overrun and conquered. German
losses were insignificant.
The “three principal territorial questions” mentioned in the Blomberg
(_3704-PS_) and Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_) affidavits had all been solved.
The Rhineland had been reoccupied and fortified, Memel annexed, and the
Polish Corridor annexed. And much more too. Austria had become a part of
the Reich, and Czechoslovakia was occupied and a Protectorate of
Germany. All of western Poland was in German hands. Germany was superior
in arms, and in experience in their use, to her western enemies, France
and England.
Then came the three years of the war—1939, 1940, 1941—when German
armed might swung like a great scythe from north to south to east.
Italy, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria had become German allies. Norway
and Denmark; the Low Countries; France; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia
and Greece; the western part of the Soviet Union—all this territory was
invaded and overrun.
In the period from the fall of Poland in October 1939 to the attack
against the Soviet Union in June 1941, occurred the aggressive wars, in
violation of treaties, against Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece. But one thing is certain: neither
the Nazis nor the generals thought during this period in terms of a
series of violations of neutrality and treaties. They thought in terms
of a war, a war for the conquest of Europe.
Six weeks after the outbreak of war, and upon the successful termination
of the Polish campaign, on 9 October 1939, there was issued a
“Memorandum and Directive for the Conduct of the War in the West.”
(_L-52_). It is unsigned, was distributed only to the four service
chiefs (Keitel, Brauchitsch, Goering, and Raeder) and gives every
indication of having been issued by Hitler. The following are pertinent
extracts:
“The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or
disintegrate the 80 million state again so that in this manner
the European equilibrium, in other words the balance of power,
which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle therefore
will have to be fought out by the German people one way or
another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first
month of war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing
of peace to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially
to such an extent that from the German viewpoint there would be
no objection to ending the war immediately, insofar as the
present achievement with arms is not jeopardized by the
peace-treaty.
“It is not the object of this memorandum to study the
possibilities in this direction or even to take them into
consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively
to the other case; the necessity to continue the fight, the
object of which, as already stressed, consists so far as the
enemy is concerned in the dissolution or destruction of the
German Reich. In opposition to this, the German war aim is the
final military dispatch of the West, i.e. destruction of the
power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to
oppose the state consolidation and further development of the
German people in Europe.
“As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this
internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda
adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This
does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of
our Western enemies.”
* * * * * *
“The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first
of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without
any hope of realization, that is to say, Germany is able to
enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a
few covering troops.
“The remaining European states are neutral either because they
fear for their own fates, or lack interest in the conflict as
such, or are interested in a certain outcome of the war, which
prevents them from taking part at all or at any rate too soon.
“The following is to be firmly borne in mind * * *”
* * * * * *
“_Belgium and Holland_—Both countries are interested in
preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding
prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of
their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the
securing of their interior economy, even of their very life,
depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore, in
their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions, both
countries are dependent upon the West, in the highest degree. If
England and France promise themselves a successful result at the
price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position
to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without
covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality,
they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality.
Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch
neutrality time is not a factor which might promise a favorable
development for Germany.
“_The Nordic States_—Provided no completely unforeseen factors
appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed.
The continuation of German trade with these countries appears
possible even in a war of long duration.” (_L-52_)
Six weeks later, on 23 November 1939, the group of _Oberbefehlshaber_
again assembled and heard from Hitler much of what he had said
previously to the four service chiefs (_789-PS_):
“For the first time in history we have to fight on only one
front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know
how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time
whether I should strike in the east and then in the west.
Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to
strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or
later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was
decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish
war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our
armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history.
Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material. Now the
eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation
which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is
as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his
fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with
him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this
situation.”
* * * * * *
“Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is
favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so anymore.”
* * * * * *
“England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves.
The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring
England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have
occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me.
None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no
importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great
height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this
work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or
destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be
compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the
first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one
man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to
capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even
the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great.
My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England
at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the
neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will
question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the
breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do
not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without
attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as
possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question
as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer.
Everything depends upon the favorable instant”. (_789-PS_)
Thereafter the winter of 1939-40 passed quietly—the winter of “phony
war”. The General Staff and High Command Group all knew what the plan
was; they had all been told. It was to attack ruthlessly at the first
opportunity, to smash the French and English forces, to pay no heed to
treaties with, or the neutrality of, the Low Countries.
“Breaking of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is
meaningless. No one will question that when we have won.”
(_789-PS_)
That is what Hitler told the _Oberbefehlshaber_. The generals and
admirals agreed and went forward with their plans.
The military leaders may contend that all the steps in this march of
conquest were conceived by Hitler, and that the military leaders
embarked on them with reluctance and misgivings. Or they may be
restrained by pride from taking so undignified and degrading a position
as to suggest that German military leadership, the bearers of the
tradition of Schlieffen, Moltke, Spee and Hindenburg, was cowed and
coerced into war and plans of which they did not approve by a gang of
political adventurers. But whether they make the argument or not, it is
utterly without foundation.
Hitler’s utterances in October (_L-79_) and November (_789-PS_) 1939 are
full of plans against France, England, and the Low Countries but contain
no suggestion of an attack on Scandinavia. Indeed, Hitler’s memorandum
of 9 October 1939 (_L-52_) to the four service chiefs affirmatively
indicates that he saw no reason to disturb the situation to the North:
“_The Northern States_—Providing no completely unforeseen
factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be
assumed. The continuance of trade with these countries appears
possible even in a war of long duration.” (_L-52_)
But a week previous, on 3 October 1939, Raeder had caused a
questionnaire to be circulated within the Naval War Staff, seeking
comments on the advantages which might be gained from a naval standpoint
by securing bases in Norway and Denmark (_C-122_). Raeder was stimulated
to circulate this questionnaire by a letter from another Admiral named
Carls, who pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian
coast by Germany (_C-66_). (Rolf Carls later attained the rank of
Admiral of the Fleet, and commanded Naval Group North from January 1940
to February 1943. In that capacity he is a member of the General Staff
and High Command Group as defined in the Indictment.)
Doenitz, at that time Flag Officer Submarines, on 9 October 1939,
replied to the questionnaire that from his standpoint Trondheim and
Narvik met his requirements, that Trondheim was preferable, and proposed
the establishment of a U-boat base there (_C-5_). Raeder’s visit to
Hitler the next day and certain subsequent events are described as
follows (_L-323_):
“_Entry in the War Diary of the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War
Staff) on ‘Weseruebung’._ 1. 10 October 1939. First reference of
the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff), when visiting the
Fuehrer, to the significance of Norway for sea and air warfare.
The Fuehrer intends to give the matter consideration.
“12 December 1939. Fuehrer received Q & H.
“Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces to make mental preparations. The C-in-C of the Navy is
having an essay prepared, which will be ready in January. With
reference to this essay, _Kapitan zur see_ Krancke is working on
‘_Weseruebung_’, and OKW.
“During the time which followed, H maintained contact with the
Chief of Staff of the C-in-C of the Navy. His aim was to develop
the Party Q with a view to making it capable of making a coup,
and to give the Supreme Command of the Navy information on
political developments in Norway and military questions. In
general he pressed for a speeding-up of preparations, but
considered that it was first necessary to expand the
organization. The support which had been promised him in the
form of money and coal was set in motion only very slowly and
came in small quantities, and he repeatedly complained about
this. It was not until the end of March that Q considered the
coup [_Aktion_] so urgent that the expansion of his organization
could not wait. The military advice of H was passed on to the
OKW.” (_L-323_)
On 12 December the Naval War Staff discussed the Norwegian project with
Hitler at a meeting which Keitel and Jodl also attended (_C-64_). In the
meantime, illustrating the close link between the service chiefs and the
Nazi politicians, Raeder was in touch with Rosenberg on the
possibilities of using Quisling (_C-65_). As result of all this, on
Hitler’s instructions Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27 January 1940.
The directive related that Hitler had commissioned Keitel to take charge
of preparation for the Norway operation, to which he then gave the code
name “_Weseruebung_.” On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive
setting forth the general plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark
(_C-174_). The invasion itself took place on 9 April 1940. The directive
was initialled by Admiral Kurt Fricke who at that time was head of the
Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, and who at the end of 1941
became Chief of the Naval War Staff. In that capacity he too is a member
of the Group as defined in the Indictment.
So, as these documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark
was not conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military
leaders. On the contrary it was conceived in the naval part of the
General Staff and High Command Group, and Hitler was persuaded to take
up the idea. Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General
Staff and High Command Group as to the Nazis. Launching aggressive war
against inoffensive neighboring states gave the generals and admirals no
qualms.
As for the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders were
disturbed about Treaty considerations. At the conferences between Hitler
and the principal military leaders in May 1939 (_L-79_), when the
intention to attack Poland was announced, Hitler in discussing the
possibility of war with England said:
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
force. Declarations of neutrality will be ignored”. (_L-79_)
And in the speech to the _Oberbefehlshaber_ in November 1939 (_789-PS_),
after the Polish victory, Hitler made clear his intention to attack
France and England by first invading the Low Countries. “No one will
question that when we have won,” he said.
Accordingly, the winter of 1939-40 and the early spring of 1940 was a
period of intensive planning in German military circles. The major
attack in the West through the Low Countries, and the attack on Norway
and Denmark had to be planned. Jodl’s diary for the period 1 February to
26 May 1940 (_1809-PS_) contains many entries reflecting the course of
this planning. These entries show that during February and early March
there was considerable doubt in German military circles as to whether
the attack on Norway and Denmark should precede or follow the attack on
the Low Countries; and that at some points there even was doubt as to
whether all these attacks were necessary from a military standpoint. But
there is not a single entry which reflects any hesitancy, from a moral
angle, on the part of Jodl or any of the people he mentions to overrun
these neutral countries.
On 1 February 1940, General Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff and a
member of the Group as defined in the Indictment) visited Jodl and
suggested that it might be wise to attack only Holland, on the ground
that Holland alone would “be a tremendous improvement in conducting
aerial warfare”. On 6 February, Jodl conferred with Jeschonnek,
Warlimont, and Col. von Waldau, and what Jodl calls a “new idea” was
proposed at this meeting: that the Germans should “carry out actions H
(Holland) and Weser exercise (Norway and Denmark) only and guarantee
Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war” (_1809-PS_). The
German Air Force may have felt that occupation of Holland alone would
give them sufficient scope for air bases for attacks on England, and
that if Belgium’s neutrality were preserved the bases in Holland would
be immune from attack by the French and the British armies in France.
If, to meet this situation, the French and British attacked through
Belgium, the violation of neutrality would be on the other foot. But
whether or not the “new idea” made sense from a military angle, it
appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a diplomatic angle. It
was a proposal to violate, without any substantial excuse, the
neutrality of three neighboring small countries, and simultaneously to
guarantee the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have
attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such circumstances
it is difficult to imagine and in fact the “new idea” projected at this
meeting of military leaders is an extraordinary combination of cynicism
and naivete.
In the meantime, as Jodl’s diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the “special
staff” for the Norway invasion met for the first time and got its
instructions from Keitel (_1809-PS_). On 21 February Hitler put General
von Falkenhorst (who subsequently became an _Oberbefehlshaber_ and a
member of the Group) in command of the Norway undertaking; and Jodl’s
diary records that “Falkenhorst accepts gladly” (_1809-PS_). On 26
February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first into Norway or
the Low Countries, but on 3 March, he decided to do Norway first and the
Low Countries a short time thereafter. This decision proved final.
Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the
venture was certain by the first of May; the invasion of the Low
Countries took place 10 days thereafter.
France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on the side of
Germany, and the African campaign began. In the meantime, Goering’s Air
Force hammered at England unsuccessfully, and the planned invasion of
Britain (“Operation _Seeloewe_”) never came to pass. In October 1940
Italy attacked Greece and was fought to better than a standstill. The
Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of Yugoslavia were
embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the attack on the Soviet
Union was being planned in the winter of 1940-41, and Germany felt she
could not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans.
Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to
Italy’s aid, and the Yugoslavian coup d’etat of 26 March 1940 brought
about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also. The aggressive
nature of the German attacks on Greece and Yugoslavia are demonstrated
in _444-PS_; _1541-PS_; _C-167_; _1746-PS_. The decisions were made, and
the Armed Forces drew up the plans and executed the attacks. The
onslaught was particularly ruthless against Yugoslavia for the special
purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final deployment
instructions were issued by Brauchitsch (_R-95_):
“1. The political situation in the Balkans having changed by
reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be
considered as an enemy even should it make declarations of
loyalty at first.
“_The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to
destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible_ * * *”
* * * * * *
“5. _Timetable for the operations._ a. On 5th April as soon as
sufficient forces of the Air Forces are available and weather
permitting, the Air Forces shall attack continuously by day and
night the Yugoslav ground organization and Belgrade.” (_R-95_)
(_e_) _The Soviet Union._ It is quite possible that some members of the
General Staff and High Command Group opposed “Barbarossa,” the German
attack on the Soviet Union, as unnecessary and unwise from a military
standpoint. Raeder so indicated in a memorandum he wrote on 10 January
1944 (_C-66_):
“1. At this time the Fuehrer had made known his ‘unalterable
decision’ to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all
remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situation
had arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of
Naval War Staff, I was never convinced of the ‘compelling
necessity’ for Barbarossa.”
* * * * * *
“The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling
accounts with Russia, doubtless his general ideological attitude
played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that
he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they
would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian
Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic
States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this
idea.
“The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the autumn
of 1940 could no longer be attained—a realization which the
Fuehrer, no doubt, gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who
were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on
England (our own losses)—surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back
as August and September, to consider whether—even prior to
victory in the West—an Eastern campaign would be feasible with
the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the
Continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear,
however, until well into September.”
* * * * * *
“7. As no other course is possible, I have submitted to
compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises
between 1 SKL and myself, it is perhaps because the arguments
the Fuehrer used on such occasion (dinner speech in the middle
of July to the Officers in Command) to justify a step he had
planned, usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to
the ‘inner circle,’ than on those who often heard this type of
reasoning.
“Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on
the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941,
whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very
skeptical.” (_C-66_)
But the passage last quoted indicates that the other members of the
General Staff favored “Barbarossa”. Raeder’s memorandum actually says
substantially what Blomberg’s affidavit (_3704-PS_) says; that some of
the generals lost confidence in the power of Hitler’s judgment, but that
the generals failed as a group to take any definite stand against him
although a few tried and suffered thereby. Certainly the High Command
Group took no stand against Hitler on “Barbarossa” and the events of
1941 and 1942 do not suggest that the High Command embarked on the
Soviet war tentatively or with reservations, but rather with ruthless
determination backed by careful planning. The plans themselves have
already been cited. (_446-PS_; _C-35_; _872-PS_; _C-78_; _447-PS_)
(_f_) _Nature of the General Staff and High Command Group Responsibility
for Aggression._ The nature of the accusation against this Group for
plotting and launching wars of aggression must be clearly understood.
They are not accused on the ground that they are soldiers. They are not
accused because they did the usual things a soldier is expected to do,
such as make military plans and command troops.
It is among the normal duties of a diplomat to engage in negotiations
and conferences; to write notes and side memoires to the government to
which he is accredited; and to cultivate good will toward the country he
represents. Ribbentrop is not indicted for doing these things. It is the
usual function of a politician to weigh and determine matters of
national policy and to draft regulations and decrees and make speeches.
Hess, Frick, and the other politician-defendants are not indicted for
doing these things. It is an innocent and respectable business to be a
locksmith but it is none the less a crime if the locksmith turns his
talents to picking the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And
that is the nature of the charge against all the defendants, and against
the General Staff and High Command Group as well. The charge is that in
performing the functions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers, sailors,
or whatever they happened to be, they conspired to and did plan,
prepare, initiate, and wage wars of aggression and in violation of
Treaties.
The Charter (Article 6(a)) declares that wars of aggression and wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances are
crimes against peace. It is no defense for those who commit such crimes
to plead that they practice a particular profession, whether it is arms
or the law. It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military
plans to meet national contingencies, to carry out such plans and engage
in war if in so doing they do not knowingly plan and wage illegal wars.
There might well be individual cases where drawing the line between
legal and illegal conduct would involve some difficulties. That is not
an uncommon situation in the legal field. But there can be no doubt as
to the criminality of the General Staff and High Command Group, nor as
to the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the Group. The
evidence is clear that these defendants, and the leaders of the Group,
and most of the members of the Group, were fully advised in advance of
the aggressive and illegal war plans, and carried them out with full
knowledge that the wars were aggressive and in violation of treaties.
In the case of defendants Goering, Keitel, and Jodl, the evidence is
voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and wars is
constant. The same is true of the defendant Raeder, and his individual
responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway and
Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against Doenitz
is less voluminous, for the reason that he was younger and not one of
the top group until later in the war, but his knowing participation in
and advocacy of the Norwegian venture is clear.
Numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command Group,
including its other leaders, participated knowingly and willfully in
these illegal plans and wars. Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, and his Chief of Staff, Halder; Warlimont the deputy to Jodl and
chief repository of plans—in the nature of things these men knew all
that was going on, and participated fully, as the evidence has shown.
Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau and von
Schobert, together with Goering, were immediately sent for by Hitler
when Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. At later date, Blaskowitz as an
_Oberbefehlshaber_ in the field knowingly prepared for the attack on
Poland; Field Marshal List educated the Bulgarians for their role during
the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; von Falkenhorst “gladly” accepted
the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and Denmark. On the air
side, Jeschonnek had proposed that Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and
Holland, and simultaneously assured Belgium that there was nothing to
fear. On the naval side, Admiral Carls foresaw at an early date that
German policy was leading to a general European war, and at a later date
the attack on Norway and Denmark was his brainchild; Krancke was one of
the chief planners of this attack; Schniewindt was in the inner circle
for the attack on Poland; Fricke certified the final orders for
“_Weseruebung_” and a few months later proposed that Germany annex
Belgium and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia
to vassalage. Most of these 19 officers were at the time members of the
Group, and the few who were not subsequently became members. At the
final planning and reporting conference for “_Barbarossa_,” 17
additional members were present. At the two meetings with Hitler, at
which the aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were fully
disclosed, the entire group was present.
The military defendants may perhaps argue that military men are pure
technicians, bound to do whatever the political leaders order them to
do. Such a suggestion must fail, on any test of reason or logic. It
amounts to saying that military men are a race apart from and different
from the ordinary run of human beings—men above and beyond the moral
and legal requirements that apply to others; men incapable of exercising
moral judgment on their own behalf.
It stands to reason that the crime of planning and waging aggressive
warfare is committed most consciously, deliberately, and culpably by a
nation’s leaders—the leaders in all the major fields of activity
necessary to and closely involved in the waging of war. It is committed
by the principal propagandists and publicists who whip up the necessary
beliefs and enthusiasms among the people as a whole, so that the people
will acquiesce and join in attacking and slaughtering the peoples of
other nations. It is committed by the political leaders who purport to
represent and execute the national will. It is committed by the
diplomats who handle the nation’s foreign policy and endeavor to create
a favorable diplomatic setting for successful warfare, and by the chief
ministers who adapt the machinery of government to the needs of a nation
at war. It is committed by the principal industrial and financial
leaders who shape the national economy and marshall the productive
resources for the needs of an aggressive war program. It is no less
committed by the military leaders who knowingly plan aggressive war,
mobilize the men and equipment of the attacking forces, and execute the
actual onslaught.
In the nature of things, planning and executing aggressive war is
accomplished by agreement and consultation among all these types of
leaders. If the leaders in any notably important field of activity stand
aside, resist, or fail to cooperate in launching and executing an
aggressive war program, the program will at the very least be seriously
obstructed, and probably its successful accomplishment will be
impossible. That is why the principal leaders in all these fields of
activity share responsibility for the crime, and the military leaders no
less than the others. Leadership in the military field, as in any other
field, calls for moral wisdom as well as technical astuteness.
The responsible military leaders of any nation can hardly be heard to
say that their role is that of a mere janitor, custodian, or pilot of
the war machine which is under their command, and that they bear no
responsibility whatsoever for the use to which that machine is put. Such
a view would degrade and render ignoble the profession of arms. The
prevalence of such a view would be particularly unfortunate today, when
the military leaders control forces infinitely more powerful and
destructive than ever before. Should the military leaders be declared
exempt from the declaration in the Charter that planning and waging
aggressive war is a crime, it would be a crippling if not fatal blow to
the efficacy of that declaration.
The American prosecution here representing the United Nations believes
that the profession of arms is a distinguished and noble profession. It
believes that the practice of that profession by its leaders calls for
the highest degree of integrity and moral wisdom no less than for
technical skill. It believes that in consulting and planning with
leaders in other national fields of activity, the military leaders will
act and counsel in accordance with International Law and the dictates of
the public conscience. Otherwise, the military resources of the nation
will be used, not in accordance with the laws of modern civilization,
but with the law of the jungle. The military leaders share
responsibility with other leaders of a nation.
Obviously the military leaders are not the final and exclusive arbiters,
and the German military leaders do not bear exclusive responsibility for
the aggressive wars which were waged. If the leading German diplomats
and industrialists and other leaders had not been infected with similar
criminal purposes, the German military leaders might not have had their
way. But the German military leaders conspired with others to undermine
and destroy the conscience of the German nation. The German military
leaders wanted to aggrandize Germany and if necessary to resort to war
for that purpose. As the Chief Prosecutor for the United States said in
his opening statement, “the German military leaders are here before you
because they, along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war.”
(2) _War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity._ It is proposed to show
that members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the
five defendants who are members of the Group, ordered and directed the
commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the
Indictment. It is also proposed to show, in certain instances, the
actual commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces,
as a result of these orders, or as a result of other orders or
arrangements made by members of the General Staff and High Command
Group, which controlled the German Armed Forces and bears responsibility
for war crimes committed by them.
It is not proposed, however, to make a full showing of war crimes
committed by the German Armed Forces. The full presentation of this
evidence is to be made, pursuant to agreement among the Chief
Prosecutors, by the French and Soviet delegations.
It will be shown that the General Staff and High Command became wedded
to a policy of terror. In some cases, where the evidence of this policy
is in documentary form, the activating papers which were signed by,
initialed by, and circulated among the members of the Group will be
presented. In other instances, where the actual crimes were committed by
others than members of the German Armed Forces (where, for example
prisoners of war or civilians were handed over to and mistreated or
murdered by the SS or SD), it will be shown that members of the Group
were well aware that they were assisting in the commission of war
crimes. It will be shown that many crimes committed by the SS or SD were
committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General Staff
and High Command, and that frequently members of the German Armed Forces
acted in conjunction with the SS and SD in carrying out tasks then known
by such respectable-sounding terms as “pacification,” “cleansing,” and
“elimination of insecure elements.”
(_a_) _Murder of Commandos, Paratroopers, and Members of Military
Missions._ This story starts with an order issued by Hitler on 18
October 1942 (_498-PS_). The order began with a recital that allied
commandos were using methods of warfare alleged to be outside the scope
of the Geneva Conventions, and thereafter proceeded to specify the
methods of warfare which German troops should use against allied
commandos, and the disposition which should be made of captured
commandos. This order reads as follows:
“1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare
methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions.
Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the
so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially
recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From
captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only
to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on
the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as
prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their
purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have
been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded
in principle.
“2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to
the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future,
Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and
their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that
they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in
combat, wherever they may appear.
“3. I therefore order:
From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe
or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all
appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether
armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered
to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they
are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or
whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these
individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give
themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In
each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW
for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.
“4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents,
saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by
some other means, through the police in occupied territories for
instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any
imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades for instance,
etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for
a short time.
“5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy
soldiers who in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale
offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations),
are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this
order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after
battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by
parachute after battles.
“6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to
carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either
have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this
order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.
“(S) Adolf Hitler” (_498-PS_).
This order was issued by the OKW in twelve copies, and the distribution
included the three supreme commands and the principal field commands.
(_498-PS_)
On the same day Hitler issued a supplementary order (_503-PS_) for the
purpose of explaining the reasons for the issuance of the basic order.
In this explanation, Hitler pointed out that allied commando operations
had been extraordinarily successful in the destruction of rear
communications, intimidation of laborers, and destruction of important
war plants in occupied areas. Among other things Hitler stated in this
explanation:
“Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and
sabotage troops (_OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18
October 1942_) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.
“_This order is intended for commanders only and must not under
any circumstances fall into enemy hands._
“_The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the
receiving bureaus._
“The bureaus named in the distribution list are held
responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed
pieces of the order and copies made thereof.
“The Chief of the High Command of
the Armed Forces
“By order of
“Jodl”
* * * * * *
“I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the
destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare
noncompliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it
necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and
commanders the reasons for this decree.
“As in no previous war, a method of destruction of
communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace
working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important
industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been
developed in this war.”
* * * * * *
“The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary
weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is
cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single
electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the _Luftwaffe_
of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the
construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the
fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the
Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.
“Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the
adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at
the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can,
according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they
themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers
or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of
suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at
the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender
and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the
provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however,
that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva
agreements, especially since part of these elements are even
criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate
themselves through these activities.
“England and America will therefore always be able to find
volunteers for this kind of warfare as long as they can
truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life
for them. At worse, all they have to do is to successfully
commit their attack on people, traffic installations, or other
installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to
capitulate.
“If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage
through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary
that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without
exception, to the last man.
“This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is
nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that
a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to
be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the
Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly
exterminated.
“The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces
communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage,
terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and
exterminated to the last man.
“I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies
subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only
to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry
out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned
officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported
without fail, or under circumstances when there is danger in
delay to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as
well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to
expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as
well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition
remains secure.
“These are the reasons for the issuance of this decree.
“If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to
initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot
immediately after interrogation.
“(signed) A. Hitler” (_503-PS_).
Ten days later, on 28 October 1942, while Raeder was Commander-in-Chief
of the Germany Navy, the Naval War Staff in Berlin transmitted its copy
of the basic order of 18 October to the lower Naval commands. The copy
distributed by the Navy and the covering memorandum from the Naval War
Staff (_C-179_) shows clearly the secrecy which surrounded the
dissemination of this order:
“Enclosed pleased find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of
terror and sabotage units.
“This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla
leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.
“After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above
authorities must hand this order over to the next highest
section which is responsible for its confiscation and
destruction.
“(s) Wagner” (_C-179_).
* * * * *
“_Note for Distribution_:
“These instructions are not to be distributed over and above the
battalions and corresponding staffs of the other services. After
notification, those copies distributed over and above the
Regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must
be withdrawn and destroyed.” (_C-179_)
On 11 February 1943, just twelve days after Doenitz had become
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, the Naval War Staff promulgated a
further memorandum on this subject in order to clear up certain
misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic order of 18 October 1942
(_C-178_). It was stated in this subsequent memorandum that all
commanders and officers who neglected their duty in failing to instruct
their units concerning the order would run the risk of serious court
martial penalties:
“From the notice given by 3/SKL [Naval War Staff] on February
1st 43, it has been discovered that the competent departments of
the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force
Operations Staff have a wrong conception regarding the treatment
of saboteurs. A telephone inquiry at 3/SKL proved that this
Naval authority was not correctly informed either. In view of
this situation, reference is made to figure _6_ of the Fuehrer
order of October 18, 42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 26
367/42 Top Secret of October 28, 42) according to which all
commanders and officers, who have neglected their duty in
instructing their units about the order referring to treatment
of saboteurs, are threatened with punishment by court martial.
“The first Fuehrer order concerning this matter of October 18,
42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 2108/42 Top Secret of
October 27, 42) was given the protection of Top Secret merely
because it is stated therein:
“1. That, according to the Fuehrer’s views the spreading of
military sabotage organizations in the East _and_ West may have
portentous consequences for our whole conduct of the war and
“2. That the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military
orders must be carried out even _after_ they have surrendered
voluntarily and asked for pardon.
“On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle
is not at all to be kept secret but on the contrary to be
currently published in the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces) reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a
deterrent, will not be achieved, if those taking part in enemy
‘Commando Operations’ would not learn that certain death and not
safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be
annihilated immediately, unless their statements are first
needed for military reasons, it is necessary that not only all
members of the Armed Forces must receive instructions that these
types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be
annihilated, but also all departments of the home staff, dealing
with this kind of question, must be informed of the course of
action which has been ordered.” (_C-178_)
The Hitler order of October 1942 was actually carried out in a number of
instances. During the night of the 19-20 November 1942, a British
freight glider crashed near Egersund in Norway. The glider carried a
British commando unit of 17 men, of whom 3 were apparently killed in the
crash. All were in English uniform. The 14 survivors were executed in
accordance with the Hitler order in the evening of 20 November 1942. The
proof is contained in the following document (_508-PS_):
“1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a
British freight glider at Hegers and in the night of November
20:
“a. No firing on the part of German defense.
“b. The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed the ground, 7 man
crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the
17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer
order has been carried out.”
* * * * * *
“On November 20, 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 Km NE
of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of
wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are
severely, the others slightly wounded.
“All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia.
Furthermore following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skis
and radio sender, exact number is unknown. The glider carried
rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number unknown.
At present the prisoners are with the Bn. in Egersund.”
* * * * * *
“Beside the 17 member crew extensive sabotage material and work
equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was
absolutely proved. The 280th Inf. Div. (J.D.) ordered the
execution of the action according to the Fuehrer’s order. The
execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of
the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms
which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short
interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their
names, ranks and serial numbers.”
* * * * * *
“In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew,
the Armed Forces Commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order
to the district commanders, according to which the interrogation
by G-2 (Ic) and by BDS are important before the execution of the
Fuehrer order; in case of No. 4 of the Fuehrer order the
prisoners are to be handed over to the BDS.” (_508-PS_)
In three specific instances the Hitler order was carried out in Norway
(_512-PS_). The procedure was to take individual commandos prisoner and
interrogate them to extract military intelligence before executing them.
This procedure was in accordance with the last sentence of Hitler’s
supplementary order (_503-PS_), and is obviously in flat contradiction
of the requirements of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The reason for
this procedure is explained as follows:
“_TOP SECRET_—According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer
order of 18th October (_CHEFS_), individual saboteurs can be
spared for the time being in order to keep them for
interrogation. The importance of this measure was proven in the
cases of Glomfjord, Twoman torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane
Stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge
of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur
was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore,
Armed Forces Commander (WB) referred to above mentioned (OA)
last sentence of the Fuehrer order (Liquidation only after short
interrogation).” (_512-PS_)
Another instance from the Norwegian theater of war (_526-PS_): On 30
March 1943, 10 Norwegian navy personnel were taken prisoner from a
Norwegian cutter at Toftefjord. The 10 prisoners were executed by the SD
in accordance with the Hitler order, but the published report announced
only that the unit was destroyed:
“On the 30.3 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) an enemy cutter was
sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10
prisoners.
“Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian
Navy.”
* * * * * *
“_Purpose_: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of
strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and
bridges.
“_Assigner of Mission in London_: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.
“Fuehrer order executed by S.D. (security service).
“_Wehrmacht Report_ of 6.4 announces the following about it:
“In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and
destroyed on approaching the coast.” (_526-PS_)
Similar action took place in the Italian theater. A telegram (_509-PS_)
from the Supreme Commander in Italy to OKW, dated 7 November 1943, shows
that on 2 November 1943 three British commandos captured at Pascara,
Italy, were given “special treatment” (_Sonderbehandelt_), which, as
previous evidence has shown, (_3040-PS_) means death. What happened to
the remaining nine prisoners of war who were wounded and in the hospital
is not known. (_509-PS_)
An affidavit (_2610-PS_) dated 7 November 1945, by Frederick W. Roche, a
Major in the Army of the United States, furnishes other evidence of the
carrying out of the Hitler order. Major Roche was the Judge Advocate of
an American Military Commission which tried General Anton Dostler,
formerly Commander of the 75th German Army Corps, for the unlawful
execution of 15 members of the United States Armed Forces. His affidavit
states:
“FREDERICK W. ROCHE being duly sworn deposes and says:
“I am a Major in the Army of the United States.
“I was the Judge Advocate of the Military Commission which tried
Anton Dostler for ordering the execution of the group of fifteen
United States Army personnel who comprised the ‘Ginny Mission.’
This Military Commission consisting of five officers was
appointed by command of General McNarney, by Special Orders No.
269, dated 26 September 1945, Headquarters, Mediterranean
Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 512.
“The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945
and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States v.
Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed four days and the
findings and sentence were announced on the morning of 12
October 1945. The charge and specification in this case are as
follows:
“‘Charge: Violation of the law of war.’
“‘Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then General, commanding
military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation,
to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in
the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war,
order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army
personnel, consisting of two officers and thirteen enlisted men
who had then recently been captured by forces under General
Dostler, which order was carried into execution on or about 26
March 1944, resulting in the death of the said fifteen members
of the Army of the United States identified as follows * * *’.”
* * * * * *
“I was present throughout the entire proceeding. I heard all the
testimony, and I am familiar with the record in this case. The
facts developed in this proceeding are as follows: On the night
of 22 March 1944, two officers and thirteen enlisted men of the
2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the
United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and
landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All
fifteen men were members of the Army of the United States and
were in the military service of the United States. When they
landed on the Italian coast they were all properly dressed in
the field uniform of the United States Army and they carried no
civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad
tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail
line was being used by the German Forces to supply their
fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead fronts. The
entire group was captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a
patrol consisting of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of
the German Army. All fifteen men were placed under interrogation
in La Spezia and they were held in custody until the morning of
26 March 1944 when they were all executed by a firing squad.
These men were never tried nor were they brought before any
court or given any hearing; they were shot by order of Anton
Dostler, then General Commanding the 75th German Army Corps.
“Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified by way
of defense that he ordered the fifteen American soldiers to be
shot pursuant to the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 on commando
operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and
not taken prisoners of war, even after they had been
interrogated. He also testified that he would have been subject
to court martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler
order.
“The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in
the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler, as these
findings and sentence appear in the original record of the trial
and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy on 12
October 1945:
“‘_FINDINGS_: General Dostler, as president of this commission it is
my duty to inform you that the commission in closed
session and upon secret written ballot, at least
two-thirds of all the members of the commission
concurring in each finding of guilty, finds you of the
specification and of the charge:
“‘GUILTY’.
“‘SENTENCE: And again in closed session and upon secret written
ballot, at least two-thirds of all of the members of
the commission concurring, sentences you:
“‘TO BE SHOT TO DEATH BY MUSKETRY’.” (_2610-PS_)
The order of 18 October 1942 remained in force, so far as the evidence
shows, until the end of the war. On 22 June 1944 in a document initialed
by Warlimont (_506-PS_) the OKW made it clear that the Hitler order was
to be applied even in cases where the commando operation was undertaken
by only one person:
“WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the army group
judge [_Heeresgruppenrichter_] with the Supreme Commander
Southwest of 20 May 44 (Br. B. Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order
is to be applied even if the enemy employs only _one_ person for
a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several
persons or a single person take part in a commando operation.
The reason for the special treatment of participants in a
commando operation is that such operations do not correspond to
the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.”
(_506-PS_)
The allied landing in Normandy early in June 1944, in the course of
which large scale air-borne operations took place, raised among the
Germans the question as to how far the Hitler order would be applied to
Normandy, and in France behind the German lines. A memorandum (_531-PS_)
dated 23 June 1944 and signed by Warlimont, starts by quoting a teletype
from the Supreme Command in the West inquiring what should be done about
applying the Hitler order to air-borne troops and commandos:
“Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No. 1750/44
Top Secret of 23 June 44:
“The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried
out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale
landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred
to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken
prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal
combat operations (large-scale landing operations and
undertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and
4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the
troops how far the concept ‘within the limits of normal combat
operations, etc.’ is to be extended.
“The application of number 5 for all enemy _soldiers in uniform_
penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is
held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest
solution.” (_531-PS_)
Warlimont’s memorandum (_531-PS_) continues by reciting the position
taken with reference to the request by the OKW Operations Staff, of
which Warlimont was the Deputy Chief:
“_Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff_:
“1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after
the enemy landing in the west.
“2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that
the order is not valid for _those_ enemy soldiers in uniform,
who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of
the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender.
Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the
divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to
and including corps headquarters.
“3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have
fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD,
upon whom it is encumbent to determine whether the Commando
order is to be applied or not.
“4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units
committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner
with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando
undertakings of 18 Oct. 42 along with the above explanation.”
(_531-PS_)
On 25 June 1944 the OKW replied to this inquiry in a teletype message
(_551-PS_) signed by Keitel and initialed by Warlimont and Jodl:
“_Subject_: Treatment of Commando Participants.
“1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the
order of the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage
units of 18 Oct. 1942 remains fully in force.
“Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the
bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in
the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the
Corps Commands, according to No. 5 of the basic order of 18 Oct.
1942, remain exempted.
“2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the
immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all
parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they
are to be turned over to the SD.
“3. All troops, committed outside the combat area of Normandy,
are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and
sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the
directives, issued for it.
“4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily, how
many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies
especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The
number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces Communique
to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done
toward previous commando undertakings in the same manners.”
“[Initial] W [Warlimont]
“[signature] Keitel (_551-PS_).
In July 1944, the question was raised within the German High Command as
to whether the order of October 1942 should be applied to members of
foreign military missions, with special regard to the British, American,
and Soviet military missions which were cooperating with allied forces
in Southeastern Europe, notably in Yugoslavia. A long document signed by
Warlimont (_1279-PS_) embodies the discussions which were had at that
time at OKW. It discloses that the Armed Forces Operational Staff
recommended that the order should be applied to these military missions
and drew up a draft order to this effect. The order which actually
resulted from these discussions (_537-PS_), dated 30 July 1944 and
signed by Keitel, provides:
“_Re: Treatment of members of foreign ‘Military Missions,’
captured together with partisans._
“In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest
members of foreign so-called ‘Military Missions’ (Anglo-American
as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the
struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as
speculated in the Special Orders regarding the treatment of
captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs
but in conformity with the Fuehrer’s order re the elimination of
terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW/WFSt.
003830/42 g. Kdos).
“This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the Armed
forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be
destroyed after being made record.
“The Chief of the High Command of the _Wehrmacht_
“Keitel” (_537-PS_)
Pursuant to this order, approximately 15 members of an allied military
mission to Slovakia were executed in January 1945. An affidavit (_L-51_)
signed by one Adolf Zutter, who was the adjutant at the camp where the
executions took place, reads in part:
“Concerning the American Military Mission which had landed
behind the German main line of resistance in Slovakian or
Hungarian territory in January 1945, I remember when in January
1945 it was brought to the concentration camp at Mauthausen. I
suppose there were about 12 to 15 newcomers. They wore an
American or Canadian uniform, of brown-green color, blouse, and
cap made of cloth. Eight or ten days after their arrival the
order for execution came in by radiogram or teletype. Colonel
Ziereis came to me in the office and said: now Kaltenbrunner has
authorized the execution. The letter was secret and had the
signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. These people were then shot
according to martial law and T/Sgt [_Oberscharfuehrer_]
Niedermeyer handed their belongings over to me. In spring 1945,
a written order based on an Army manual to destroy all files was
received by the security officer in Mauthausen, 1st Lt.
[_Obersturmfuehrer_] Reimer; this order had been sent by Lt.
[_Untersturmfuehrer_] Meinhardt, security officer of Section D
in Oranienburg. Reimer forwarded this order personally in
written form to the various sections and supervised the
compliance with it. Among the files were also all the execution
orders.” (_L-51_)
The foregoing documents with respect to the order of 18 October 1942,
and its subsequent enforcement and application, clearly demonstrate that
members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the
defendants Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raeder, ordered and directed the
commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces, and that
these orders were carried out in numerous instances.
(_b_) _War Crimes on the Eastern Front._ The order of October 1942 with
respect to the murdering of captured commandos operated chiefly in the
Western theater of war, against British and American commando troops.
This was natural since Germany occupied almost the entire Western coast
of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that
period land fighting in Western Europe was largely limited to commando
operations. The Mediterranean Theater likewise lent itself to this type
of warfare.
On the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale land fighting in
Poland and the Soviet Union from 1941 on, the German forces were
fighting amongst a hostile population and had to face extensive partisan
activities behind their lines. It will be shown that the activities of
the German Armed Forces against partisans and other elements of the
population became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial
policies, and a cloak for the ruthless and barbaric massacre of Jews and
of numerous segments of the Slavic population which were regarded by the
Nazis as undesirable. It was the policy of the German Armed Forces to
behave with the utmost severity to the civilian population of the
occupied territories, and to conduct its military operations,
particularly against partisans, so as to further these Nazi policies. It
will be shown that the German Armed Forces supported, assisted, and
acted in cooperation with the SS Groups which were especially charged
with anti-partisan activities. Members of the General Staff and High
Command Group ordered, directed, encouraged, and were fully aware of
these criminal policies and activities.
It is not proposed to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes
committed by the Nazis on the Eastern Front; evidence of those crimes
are to be presented by the Soviet delegation. Evidence concerning the
activities of the SS, SD, and Gestapo will be discussed only to the
extent necessary to clarify the relations between these organizations
and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration
in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe.
These policies of ruthless severity to the civilian population of the
occupied Eastern territories were determined upon and made official for
the German Armed Forces even before the invasion of the Soviet Union
took place. An order by Hitler, dated 13 May 1941, and signed by Keitel
as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (_C-50_) provided:
“_Order_
“_Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and PROCEDURE
IN THE AREA ‘Barbarossa’ and special military measures._
“The application of martial law aims in the first place at
_maintaining discipline_.
“The fact that the operational areas in the East are so
farflung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the
peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial
with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve
while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of
pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless
jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main
task.
“This is possible only if _the troops_ take ruthless action
themselves against any threat from the enemy population.
“For these reasons I herewith issue the following order
effective for the area ‘Barbarossa’ (area of operations, army
rear area, and area of political administration).
“I. _Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians._
“1. Until further notice the military courts and the
courts-martial will not be competent for _crimes committed by
enemy civilians_.
“2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military,
whether they are fighting or in flight.
“3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed
Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once
by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the
assailants are destroyed.
“4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first
possible, _persons suspected of criminal action will be brought
at once before an officer_. _This officer will decide whether
they are to be shot._
“On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a
Battalion Commander, _collective despotic measures_ will be
taken without delay against _localities_ from which cunning or
malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances
do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.
“5. It is _expressly forbidden_ to _keep_ suspects _in custody_
in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement
of civil courts.
“6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the
competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce _military
jurisdiction for civilians_, in areas which are sufficiently
settled.
“For the _area of the_ ‘_Political Administration_’ this order
will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces.
“II. _Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants by
members of the Armed Forces and its employees._
“1. With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by
members of the Wehrmacht and its employees _prosecution is not
obligatory_ even where the deed is at the same time a military
crime or offence.
“2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind,
whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in
1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the
fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of
innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by
Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.
“3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases
whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether _legal
measures_ are necessary. In the case of offences against
inhabitants it will order a _court martial_ only if _maintenance
of discipline_ or _security of the Forces_ call for such a
measure. This applies for instance to serious offences
originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a
criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the
troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have
resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores or other
captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a
rule be judged no less severely.
“_The order to institute proceedings_ requires in every single
case the signature of the Judicial Authority.
“4. _Extreme caution_ is indicated in assessing the credibility
of statements made by enemy civilians.
“III. _Responsibility of the Military Commanders._
“Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are
_personally_ responsible for seeing that:
“1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command
is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on
principles set out under I above.
“2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these
instructions and of _verbal information in which the political
intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs_.
“3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in
accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.
“IV. _Security._
Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as
“Most Secret”:
“By order
“Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
“(signed) Keitel” (_C-50_)
Less than three months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, these
instructions were amplified and made even more drastic. An order dated
16 September 1941 and signed by Keitel, was widely distributed
(_C-148_). This order was of general application in all theaters of war,
but was clearly of primary importance for the Eastern Front:
“_Subject_: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories.
“1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia,
Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in
the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is
growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual
members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread
guerilla warfare.
“It can be seen that this is a _mass movement centrally directed
by Moscow_, who is also responsible for the apparently trivial
isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise
quiet.
“In view of the many political and economic crises in the
occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that
_nationalist and other circles_ will make full use of this
opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying
forces by associating themselves with the Communist
insurrection.
“This creates an increasing _danger to the German war effort_,
which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the
occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of
forces to the main centers of disturbance.
“2. _The measures taken up to now_ to deal with general
insurrection movement _have proved inadequate_. The Fuehrer has
now given orders that we take action _everywhere with the most
drastic means_ in order to crush the movement in the shortest
possible time.
“Only this course, which has always been followed successfully
throughout the history of the extension of influence of great
peoples, can restore order.
“3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the
following _general directions_:
“_a._ It should be inferred, in _every case_ of resistance to
the German occupying Forces, no matter what the individual
circumstances, that it is of _Communist origin_.
“_b._ In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most
drastic measures should be taken immediately on _the first
indication_, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may
be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this
connection it should be remembered that a human life in
unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a
deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The
death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded
in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier’s
life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still
further increase the deterrent effect.
“The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively
lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of
deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not
accord with these principles and should therefore not be
followed.”
* * * * * *
“4. _The Commanding Officers in the occupied territories_ are
seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay
to all military establishments concerned in dealing with
Communist measures of insurrection.”
“[Indecipherable initial]
“Keitel” (_C-148_)
The German military leaders took up, sponsored, and instructed their
troops to practice the racial policies of the Nazis. On 10 October 1941
a directive was issued by Field Marshal von Reichenau, the
Commander-in-Chief (_Oberbefehlshaber_) of the German 8th Army, then
operating on the Eastern Front (_UK-81_). Reichenau (who died in 1942)
was therefore a member of the group, and here is what he had to say:
“Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.
“Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic
system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most
essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a
complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination
of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this
connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the
one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern
territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of
the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology
and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon
German and racially related nations.
“Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the
necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The
Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e., the annihilation of
revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always
been caused by Jews.
“The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not
being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and
unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and
guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes
and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and
sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian
officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly
about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens.
Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete
thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to
clarify the meaning of the present struggle.
“The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not
working for the Armed Forces from Army kitchens is an equally
misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes
and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great
sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to
the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the
enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It
is an important part of our supply.
“When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire.
The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only
as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of
billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former
bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the
struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic
considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories.
The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of
raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The
complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the
fighting troops is imperative considering the long and
vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured
weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this
be impossible because of the situation of the battle so the
weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated
partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army
drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be
extended to that part of the male population who were in a
position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of
numerous apparently anti-Soviet elements which originates from a
‘wait and see’ attitude, must give way to a clear decision for
active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being
judges and treated a member of the Soviet System.
“The fear of the German countermeasures must be stronger than
the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far
from all political considerations of the future the soldier has
to fulfill two tasks:
“1. _Complete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of
the Soviet State and its armed forces._
“2. _The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty
and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in
Russia._
“This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate
the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.
“Commander-in-Chief
“(Signed) von Reichenau
“Field Marshal.” (_UK-81_)
Immediately preceding Reichenau’s order is a memorandum, dated 28
October 1941, which shows that Reichenau’s order met with Hitler’s
approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the
Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. It is also clear that Reichenau’s
order was thereafter circulated down to divisional level, and was
received by the 12th Infantry Division on 27 November 1941. (_UK-81_)
These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German
military leaders, it is no wonder that the _Wehrmacht_ joined in the
monstrous behavior of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front. Units (known
as _Einsatzgruppen_) were formed by the SIPO and SD and sent out to
operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in
order to combat partisans and to “cleanse” and “pacify” the civilian
population.
In a directive dated 19 March 1943, the Commanding Officer of one of
these units praised and justified such activities as the shooting of
Hungarian Jews, the shooting of children, and the total burning down of
villages (_3012-PS_). The officer directed that in order not to obstruct
the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry,
“as a rule no more children will be shot” (_3012-PS_).
A report covering the work of the _Einsatzgruppen_ in the German
occupied territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October
1941 disregards every vestige of decency (_R-102_). It states cynically
that, in the Baltic areas,
“spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on
the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not
been recorded, on account of the lack of adequate
indoctrination” (_R-102_).
This report shows clearly that “pacification” and “anti-partisan
activity” are mere code words for “extermination of Jews and Slavs” just
as much as “_Weserubung_” was a code word for the invasion and
subjugation of Norway and Denmark.
Documents quoted earlier show that the German Army was operating under
similar policies and directives. It only remains to show that, in these
practices, the Army and the SS worked hand in glove. The report
describing the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto (_1061-PS_) stresses the
close cooperation between the SS and the Army:
“The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the
_Waffen SS_, Police and _Wehrmacht_ became; they fulfilled their
duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as
models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted
from early morning until late at night. At night, search patrols
with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the
Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and
killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their
stores from abandoned dugouts and for contacting neighboring
groups or exchanging news with them.” (1061-PS)
To the same general effect is a report dated 5 June 1943 by the German
General Commissioner for Minsk (_R-135_). This report describes an
anti-partisan operation in which 4,500 “enemies” were killed, 5,000
suspected partisans were killed, and 59 Germans were killed. The
cooperation in this adventure by the German Army is shown in the
following excerpt:
“The above mentioned figures show, that we have to count with a
strong annihilation of the population. The fact that only 492
rifles were found on the 4,500 enemy dead, demonstrates that the
numerous peasants from the country were also among the enemy
dead. The battalion _Direwanger_ is particularly known to have
destroyed numerous human lives. Among the 5,000 partisan
suspects who were shot, are numerous women and children.
“Units of the troops [_Wehrmannschaften_] also took part in the
action, by order of SS Lt. General [_Obergruppenfuehrer_] von
dem Bach. SA Colonel [_Standartenfuehrer_] Kunze led the troops
[Wehrmannschaften], who included also 90 members of my authority
and of the district-commissarate Minsk-Stadt. Our men returned
yesterday from the action without any losses. I refuse the use
of officials and Reich-Employees of the General Commissarate in
the rear areas. The men who work for me have not been classified
as essential, after all in order to fight the partisans actively
in the place of the Armed Forces and the Police.
“Of the troops [_Wehrmannschaften_], one railroad employee had
been wounded (shot through the lung). The political effect of
this large scale action on the peaceful population had been
disastrous, because of the numerous executions of women and
children. The town BEGOMIE was cleared by the Armed Forces and
the Police in December. The population of Begomie was
predominantly favorable to us. Begomie, which has been fortified
as a strong point by the partisans, has been destroyed by German
Air Attacks during the fighting.” (_R-135_)
The _SS Obergruppenfuehrer_ von dem Bach referred to in this quotation
is mentioned in Himmler’s speech to a gathering of SS generals at Posen
on 4 October 1943 (_1919-PS_). In this speech Himmler announced the
appointment of von dem Bach to be Chief of all anti-partisan units:
“In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of
the Anti-partisan Units” [_Bandenkampf-Verbunde_]. Our comrade
_SS-Obergruppenfuehrer_ von dem Bach is Chief of the
anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the
Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these
battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to
take action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly
political one. Except where the units which had been supplied
and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to
fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful.
“It is notable that, by setting up this department we have
gained (p. 58) for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army,
and the next step, which is the High Command of an army or even
of a group—if you wish to call it that.” _(1919-PS_)
The report of _Einsatzgruppe A_, (_L-180_) covering the period up to 15
October 1941, makes clear beyond doubt the participation of the German
military leaders and Armed Forces in these extermination policies:
“Action-Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action
proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June
1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group
North consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer-Group 4
had left the day before. Our task was to hurriedly establish
personal contact with the commanders of the Armies and with the
commander of the army of the rear area. It must be stressed from
the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was
generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer-Group 4
under Col. Gen. Hoeppner, it was very close, almost cordial.
Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the
first days, were cleared up mainly through personal
discussions.”
* * * * * *
“Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start
pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture,
though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following
out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the
Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But
it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an
immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the
extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German
circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native
population itself took the first action by way of natural
reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades
and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the
preceding period.”
* * * * * *
“After the failure of purely military activities such as the
placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied
territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to
look out for new methods. The Action-Group undertook to search
for new methods. Soon therefore the Armed Forces adopted the
experiences of the Security Police and their methods of
combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous
reports concerning the struggle against the partisans.”
* * * * * *
“1. _Instigation of self-cleansing actions._
“Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had
suffered very heavily under the government of Bolshevism and
Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be
expected that after the liberation from that foreign government,
they (i.e., the population themselves) would render harmless
most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red
Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to set in motion
these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the
correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the
cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less
important in view of the future to establish the unshakable and
provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the
most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy
quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities
could not be found out.
“In Lithouania this was achieved for the first time by partisan
activities in Kowno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to
set in motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. KLIMATIS, the
leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for
this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the
basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment
acting in Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or
German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the
first pogrom in the night from 25. to 26.6 the Lithouanian
partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to
several Synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned
down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses.
During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless
in a similar way. In other parts of Lithouania similar actions
followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to
the Communists who had been left behind.
“These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army
authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this
procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first
days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for
carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the
self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.
“It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar
cleansing actions in _Latvia_. Essentially the reason was that
the whole of the national stratum of leaders had been
assassinated or destroyed by the Soviets, especially in Riga. It
was possible though through similar influences on the Latvian
auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against Jews also in Riga.
During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed and about 400
Jews were killed. As the population of Riga quieted down
quickly, further pogroms were not convenient.”
* * * * * *
“5. _Other jobs of the Security Police._
“1. Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic
asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many
institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their
whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had
fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and became a
danger to the general security; therefore
in Aglona (Lithouania) 544 lunatics
in Mariampol (Lithouania) 109 lunatics and
in Magutowo (near Luga) 95 lunatics
were liquidated.”
* * * * * *
“When it was decided to extend the German operations to
Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Action Group A to
this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941 to parts of Action
Detachments 2 and 3 and to the Staff of the Group to advance to
Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able
to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad
and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Action
Group A which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was
effected in agreement with and on the express wish of
Panzer-Group 4.”
* * * * * *
“Action detachment of Action Group A of the Security Police
participated from the beginning in the fight against the
nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the
Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were
collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a
thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength,
equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on.”
(_L-180_).
Certain affidavits, furnished by responsible officials in both the
_Wehrmacht_ and the SS, fill in much of the background for the documents
quoted above. An affidavit (_3710-PS_) by Walter Schellenberg who, at
the time under discussion, was an important official in the RSHA,
states:
“In the middle of May 1941, as far as I remember, the Chief of
Amt 4 of the RSHA (SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller), in the name of
the Chief of the RSHA (SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich), held
discussions with the Generalquartiermeister of the Army (General
Wagner) about questions connected with the operations of the
SIPO and SD within the bounds of the Field Army during the
imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could come to no
agreement with Mueller and therefore asked Heydrich to send
another representative. I was at that time Chief of Section E in
Amt 4 of the RSHA under Chief of Amt Mueller and was sent by
Heydrich to Wagner because of my experience in matters of
protocol for the purpose of drawing up the final agreement.
According to the instructions given to me, I was supposed to
make sure that this agreement would provide that the responsible
headquarters in the Army would be firmly obligated to give
complete support to all activities of the Combat Groups and
Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD. I discussed the problem of
this mutual relationship in great detail with Wagner. In
accordance with this discussion I then presented him with the
completed draft of an agreement, which met with his full
approval. This draft of an agreement was the basis for a final
discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May
1941.
“The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember, were
substantially as follows. Its basis was the Fuehrer’s command,
mentioned at the very beginning of the agreement, that the SIPO
and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field
Army, with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in
conquered front-line areas as well as in conquered rear supply
zones by every means and as quickly as possible. The various
areas were then set down in which the SIPO and SD were to be
active and operating. The individual Combat Groups were then
assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the
campaign and the individual Combat Commandos to the respective
armies which were to take part in the campaign.
“The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in
detail:
“1. In front-line areas: in complete subordination to the Field
Army, tactically, functionally and administratively;
“2. In rear operational areas: in merely administrative
subordination to the Field Army, but under command and
functional control of the RSHA;
“3. In rear Army areas: arrangement as in 2;
“4. In areas of the civil administration in the East: same as in
the Reich.
“The tactical and functional authority and responsibility of
front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the Combat
Commandos found no limitation in the agreement and therefore
needed no further clarification.
“The agreement made it clear that the administrative
subordination embraced not only disciplinary subordination but
also the obligation for rear headquarters of the Field Army to
support the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos in matters of
supply (gasoline, rations, etc.) as well as in the use of the
communications network.
“This agreement was signed by Heydrich and Wagner in my
presence. Wagner signed it either ‘acting for’ or ‘by order of’
the OKH.
“After Wagner and Heydrich had affixed their signatures, both of
them asked me to leave the room for half an hour. Just while
leaving I heard how they both wanted to discuss in complete
privacy the Fuehrer’s command, which was apparently known in
advance by each of them personally, and its far-reaching
implications. After the half hour was over I was called in once
more just to say goodbye.
“Today I read the ‘Operational and Situational Report No. 6 of
the Combat Groups of the SIPO and SD in the USSR (covering the
period from 1 to 31 October 1941),’ as well as the
‘Comprehensive Report of Combat Group A up to 15 October 1941.’
The whole substance of these reports shows that the prime
mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO
and SD was to undertake and carry out mass executions of Jews,
Communists and other elements of resistance. It is also clear
from the above-cited ‘Comprehensive Report,’ which embraces no
more than the first four months of these operations, that the
cooperation of the respective _Oberbefehlshabers_ with Combat
Group A was ‘in general good and in individual instances, for
instance that of Panzergruppe 4 under Colonel General Hoeppner,
very close, in fact almost cordial’ (page 1). From an inclosure
to this same report, bearing the title ‘Summary of the Number of
Executed Persons,’ particularly from the figures arranged
according to the successively conquered areas, it is evident
that the SIPO and SD operated in front-line areas so as fully to
carry out their prime function of conducting mass executions of
all elements of resistance even from the very beginning of the
advance against Russia. I acknowledge the reliability and
authenticity of both of the above cited reports. Therefore I
must today express my firm conviction that the Oberbefehlshabers
of the army groups and armies which were to take part in the
Russian campaign were accurately informed through the normal OKH
channels of communication about the extensive future mission of
the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD as
including planned mass executions of Jews, Communists and all
other elements of resistance.
“In the beginning of June 1941 all of the Ic
counter-intelligence officers, and, as far as I remember, all of
the Ic officers of all army groups, armies, army corps and some
of the divisions which were to take part in the coming Russian
campaign were called in by Wagner, together with Heydrich and
the Chief of the Amt for Counter-Intelligence Abroad in the OKW
(Admiral Canaris) for a general conference in the OKW Building
at Berlin. The responsible leaders of the Combat Groups and
Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD were for the most part
likewise present. I was also there. The essential substance and
purpose of this meeting was to outline the military strategy
against Russia and to announce the above-mentioned details of
the written agreement reached by Wagner and Heydrich.
“This group of Ic counter-intelligence officers and Ic officers
remained at Berlin a few days longer and was carefully
instructed in several additional conferences, at which I was not
present, about further details of the coming Russian campaign. I
assume that these discussions were concerned with the exact
delineation of the Fuehrer’s command ‘to smash utterly all
resistance in occupied areas by every means and as quickly as
possible,’ including even planned mass executions of all
elements of resistance. Otherwise the cooperation between the
Field Army and the Combat Groups, which in the above-cited
documents is clearly revealed as existing but a few weeks
thereafter, could not in my opinion have been forthcoming. In
any event there is hardly any reason to doubt that these Ic
counter-intelligence officers, immediately upon their return
from Berlin, accurately informed their own superiors, including
all Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were
to march against Russia, about the full extent of the
agreement.”
“(signed) Walter Schellenberg
“26. XI. 45” (_3710-PS_)
Another affidavit which sheds light on the relations between the
_Wehrmacht_ and the SS at the top level with respect to anti-partisan
warfare (_3711-PS_) is sworn to by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of
the German Army who worked in the War History Section of OKW from 1941
to 1945:
“I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the
OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.
“Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I
remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the
Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in
the Fuehrer’s headquarters with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the
Fuehrer’s appointee for the compilation of the history of the
war.
“Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of
Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces to
handle this matter.
“In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan warfare
developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW
had to give it particular attention. In the Army Operations
Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a specific officer
was assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his
special job. It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations
against the partisans with _Wehrmacht_ troops in Russian as well
as Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while
threatened to cut off the lines of communication and transport
routes that were necessary to support the German _Wehrmacht_.
For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the
railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian
area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during
that period, causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to
300 locomotives.
“It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted
with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-known that
reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose
inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting
them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been
known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW
and in the Army’s General Staff. It was further well-known that
Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting
counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as
deterrents.
“I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw,
SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to Generaloberst Guderian
and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS-Brigade
Kaminski, which fought on the German side.”
“(Signed) Wilhelm Scheidt
“Retired Captain of the Reserve” (_3711-PS_)
The foregoing documents show the arrangements which were made between
the OKW, OKH and Himmler’s headquarters with respect to anti-partisan
warfare. They show conclusively that the plans and arrangements were
made jointly, and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only
fully aware of but an active participant in these plans. The same is
true of the field commanders. General Roettiger, who attained the rank
of General of Panzer Troops (the equivalent of a Lt. General in the
American Army), has made three statements (_3713-PS_; _3714-PS_).
Roettiger was Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army
Group Center, on the Eastern Front during the period of which he speaks:
“As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943,
to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had
occasion to concern myself officially with anti-partisan
warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from
the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the
harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of
the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security
battalions.
“At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued
through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In
accordance with orders, Jews, political commissars and agents
were delivered up to the SD.
“The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very
high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which
have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order
from highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the
anti-partisan war can have been intended to make possible a
ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by
using for this purpose the military struggle of the army against
the partisans.” (_3713-PS_)
Roettiger’s second statement reads:
“Supplementary to my above declaration I declare:
“As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commander-in-Chief
of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many times not to wage
war against the partisans more severely than was required at the
time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the
annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a
surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily
had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them
could very well be used as members of native volunteer units
against the partisans.
“Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans there
was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the
population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them
to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the
women too were continually urged to get their men back from the
forests or to keep them by other means from joining the
partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring
of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of
partisans. Only on its boundaries and then from time to time
were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the
area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was
obliged on this account on the orders of the Army Group to give
up security forces to the neighboring army to the south.
“(signed) Roettiger” (_3713-PS_)
Roettiger’s third statement reads:
“During my period of service in 1942/3 as chief of staff of the
4th Army of the Central Army Group, SD units were attached in
the beginning, apparently for the purpose of
counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear
that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the
local civilian population with the result that my commanding
officer therefore asked the commander-in-chief of the army
group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear
out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The
reason for this first and foremost was that the excesses of the
SD units by way of execution of Jews and other persons assumed
such proportions as to threaten the security of the Army in its
combat areas because of the aroused civilian populace. Although
in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and
appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest
military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as
possible, because of the danger which existed for our troops.
“(Signed) Roettiger” (_3714-PS_)
An extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces
Operational Staff (Warlimont), dated 14 March 1943, deals with the
problem of shipping off suspected partisans to concentration camps in
Germany (_1786-PS_). It appears clearly from this extract that the Army
was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment
for suspected partisans, without at the same time obstructing the
procurement of labor from the occupied territories:
“The General Quartermaster [_General Quartiermeister_] together
with the Economic Staff (East) [_Wirtschaftsstab Ost_] has
proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison
camps or to ‘training centres in their own area,’ and that
deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees
are on probation and in less serious cases.
“In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff
[_Wehrmachtfuehrungstab_] this proposal does not take sufficient
account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with
the treatment meted out to the ‘peaceful population’ which has
been called upon to work. He recommends therefore transportation
to concentration camps in Germany which have already been
introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he
is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [_Wehrmacht_] in
the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High
Command of the Armed Forces [_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht_]
therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not
to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS
and Police Leader [_Hoehrer SS und Polizeifuehrer_] and orders
that the difference between ‘punitive work’ and ‘work in
Germany’ is to be made clear to the population.” (_1786-PS_)
A final group of four affidavits show that the SD _Einsatzgruppen_ on
the Eastern Front operated under the command and with the necessary
support of the _Wehrmacht_, and that the nature of their activities were
fully known to the _Wehrmacht_. The first of these is a statement
(_3715-PS_) by Ernst Rode, who was an SS Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor
of the Police, and was head of Himmler’s personal command staff from
1943 to 1945:
STATEMENT
“I, Ernst Rode, was formerly chief of the Command Staff of the
Reichsfuehrer-SS, having taken over this position in the spring
of 1943 as successor to former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt
Knoblauch. My last rank was Generalmajor of Police and of the
Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish forces necessary for
anti-partisan warfare to the higher SS and police leaders and to
guarantee the support of army forces. This took place through
personal discussions with the leading officers of the Operations
Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General
von Buttlar, Generaloberst Guderian, Generaloberst Zeitzler,
General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg
and Colonel v. Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was under
the sole command of the respective Army commander-in-chief in
operational areas (for instance in the Central Army Group under
Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch) and since police troops for
the most part could not be spared from the Reichscommissariates,
the direction of this warfare lay practically always entirely in
the hands of the army. In the same way orders were issued not by
Himmler but by the OKH. SS and police troops transferred to
operational areas from the Reichscommissariates to support the
army groups were likewise under the latter’s command. Such
transfers often resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the
Reichscommissariates. According to a specific agreement between
Himmler and the OKH, the direction of individual operations lay
in the hands of the troop leader who commanded the largest troop
contingent. It was therefore possible that an army general could
have SS and police under him, and on the other hand that army
troops could be placed under a general of the SS and police.
Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas could never be
ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the OKH to order it,
until 1944 mostly through the intervention of
Generalquartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary
Ganzenmueller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the
army groups concerned, for compliance.
“The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically
diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had
already resulted in Draconian laws being issued by Hitler for
its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops
through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops
as well as to those of the SS and police. There was absolutely
no difference in the manner in which these two components
carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as
embittered against the enemy as those of the SS and police. As a
result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried out
by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping with
Himmler’s desires or intentions. As proof of this the order of
the OKW and OKH can be adduced, which directed that all captured
partisans, for instance such as Jews, agents and political
commissars, should without delay be handed over by the troops to
the SD for special treatment. This order also contained the
provision that in anti-partisan warfare no prisoners except the
above named be taken. That anti-partisan warfare was carried on
by army troops mercilessly and to every extreme I know as the
result of discussions with army troop leaders, for instance with
General Herzog, Commander of the XXXVIII Army Corps and with his
chief of staff, Colonel Pamberg in the General Staff, both of
whom support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that
anti-partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the
systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.
“(Signed) Ernst Rode” (_3715-PS_)
Another and shorter statement by Rode reads:
“As far as I know, the SD Combat Groups with the individual army
groups were _completely subordinate_ to them, that is to say
tactically as well as in every other way. The
commanders-in-chief were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the
missions and operational methods of these units. They approved
of these missions and operational methods because apparently
they never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews,
agents and commissars, who were handed over to the SD underwent
the same cruel death, as victims of so-called ‘purifications,’
is a proof that the executions had their approval. This also
corresponded with what the highest political and military
authorities wanted. Frequent mention of these methods were
naturally made in my presence at the OKW and OKH, and they were
condemned by most SS and police officers, just as they were
condemned by most army officers. On such occasions I always
pointed out that it would have been quite within the scope of
the authority of the commanders-in-chief of army groups to
oppose such methods. I am of the firm conviction that an
energetic and unified protest by all field marshals would have
resulted in a change of these missions and methods. If they
should ever assert that they would then have been succeeded by
even more ruthless commanders-in-chief, this, in my opinion,
would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.
“(Signed) Ernst Rode” (_3716-PS_)
In an affidavit by Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, who at the beginning of
the Russian campaign was a staff officer with the 17th Panzer Division,
the following statement is made:
“At the beginning of the Russian campaign I was the first
General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had the
mission of driving across the Bug north of Brest-Litovsk.
Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division received
through channels from the OKW a written order of the Fuehrer.
This order directed that Russian commissars be shot upon
capture, without judicial process, immediately and ruthlessly.
This order extended to all units of the Eastern Army. Although
the order was supposed to be relayed to companies, the
Commanding General of the XXXVII Panzer Corps (General of Panzer
Troops Lemelsen) forbade its being passed on to the troops
because it appeared unacceptable to him from military and moral
points of view.
“(Signed) Bogislav v. Bonin
“Colonel” (_3718-PS_)
Finally an affidavit (_3717-PS_) by Heusinger, who was a Generalleutnant
in the German Army, and who from 1940 to 1944 was Chief of the
Operations Section at OKH, states as follows:
“1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940 I
was Ia of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn
1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.
“When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to
the chief of the General Staff of the Army the function of
advising him on all operational matters in the Russian theater.
“This made the chief of the General Staff of the Army
responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the
east, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the
operational areas, for instance, all troops (security units, SS
units, police) stationed in the Reichscommissariates.
“All police and SS units in the Reichscommissariates were also
subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. When it was necessary to
transfer such units into operational areas, this had to be done
by order of the chief of the OKW. On the other hand,
corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered
by the OKW with the concurrence of the chief of the General
Staff of the Army.
“The high SS and police leaders normally had command of
operations against partisans. If stronger army units were
committed together with the SS and police units within
operational areas, a high commander of the army could be
designated commander of the operation.
“During anti-partisan operations _within_ operational areas all
forces committed for these operations were under the command of
the respective commander-in-chief of the army group.
“2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on
counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW (Keitel) to
the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with
Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of
these orders to army groups, for instance such orders as those
concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and
communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts
martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the
population, as well as those establishing the basic principles
governing reprisals against the inhabitants.
“3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the
treatment of the local populace as well as anti-partisan warfare
in operational areas, in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was
the responsibility of the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.
“4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of
the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare
in operational areas presented the highest political and
military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out
their plans, namely the systematic extermination of Slavism and
Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always regarded these
cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to
make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult.
“(Signed) Heusinger
“Generalleutnant.” (_3717-PS_)
(At this point, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was called upon for oral
testimony. His testimony on direct examination was substantially to the
same effect as his affidavit _3712-PS_.)
(_c_) _Responsibility of the Group for War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity: Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment._ The foregoing evidence
against the General Staff and High Command Group is such that no German
soldier can view it with anything but shame. The German High Command
developed and applied a policy of terror against commandos and
paratroopers, in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, on the
Western Front. On the Eastern Front it descended to savagery. In advance
of the attack against the Soviet Union, the High Command ordered the
troops to take “ruthless action”, left it to the discretion of any
officer to decide whether suspected civilians should be immediately
shot, and empowered any officer with the powers of a Battalion Commander
to take “collective despotic measures” against localities. Offenses
committed against civilians by German soldiers, however, were not
required to be prosecuted, and prosecution was suggested only where
desirable in order to maintain discipline and security from a military
standpoint.
Soon after the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were told by
the OKW that “a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for
nothing” and were encouraged to observe a punitive ratio of 50 to 100
Communists for one German soldier. German troops were told that they
were to take “revenge on sub-human Jewry” and that they were not merely
soldiers but “bearers of ruthless national ideology and avengers of
bestialities”. The High Command and the chief lieutenants of Himmler
jointly planned the establishment of the _Einsatzgruppen_, the behavior
of which has been shown in detail. These groups when in operational
areas were under the command of the German Army, and German soldiers
joined in their savagery. The _Einsatzgruppen_ were completely dependent
upon the Armed Forces for supplies with which to carry out their
atrocities. The practices employed against the civilian population and
against partisans were well known to all high ranking German officers on
the Eastern Front. No doubt some of them disapproved of what was going
on. Nonetheless, the full support of the military leaders continued to
be given to these activities.
The record is clear that the General Staff and High Command Group,
including the defendants, who were members of the Group and numerous
other members ordered, directed, and participated in war crimes and
crimes against humanity as specified in counts 3 and 4 of the
Indictment.
C. _Conclusion._
The world must bear in mind that the German High Command is not an
evanescent thing, the creature of a decade of unrest, or a school of
thought or tradition which is shattered or utterly discredited. The
German High Command and military tradition have in the past achieved
victory and survived defeat. They have met with triumph and disaster,
and have survived through a singular durability not unmixed with
stupidity. An eminent American statesman and diplomat, Mr. Sumner
Welles, has written (“The Time for Decision”, 1944, pp. 261-262) that:
“* * * the authority to which the German people have so often
and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German
Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of to-day, but the German
General Staff.
“It will be said that this insistence that the German General
Staff has been the driving force in German policy is a dangerous
oversimplification. I am not disposed to minimize the importance
of other factors in German history. They all have their place.
But I am convinced that each of them has played its part only in
so far as it was permitted to do so by the real master of the
German race, namely, German militarism, personified in, and
channelled through, the German General Staff.”
* * * * * *
“Whether their ostensible ruler is the Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or
Adolf Hitler, the continuing loyalty of the bulk of the
population is given to that military force controlled and guided
by the German General Staff. To the German people, the army
to-day, as in the past, is the instrument by which German
domination will be brought about. Generations of Germans may
pass. The nation may undergo defeat after defeat. But if the
rest of the world permits it, the German General Staff will
continue making its plans for the future.”
The German General Staff and High Command is indicted not now at the bar
of history, but on specific charges of crimes against International Law
and the dictates of the conscience of mankind as embodied in the
Charter. The picture that emerges from the evidence is that of a group
of men with great powers for good or ill who chose the latter; who
deliberately set out to arm Germany to the point where the German will
could be imposed on the rest of the world; and who gladly joined with
the most evil forces at work in Germany. “Hitler produced the results
which all of us warmly desired”, Blomberg and Blaskowitz say, and that
is obviously the truth. The converse is no less clear; the military
leaders furnished Hitler with the means and might which were necessary
to his mere survival, to say nothing of the accomplishment of those
purposes which seem to the world so ludicrously impossible in 1932 and
so fearfully imminent in 1942.
It was said above that the German militarists were inept as well as
persistent. Helpless as Hitler would have been without them, he
succeeded in mastering them. The generals and the Nazis were allies in
1933. But it was not enough for the Nazis that the generals should be
voluntary allies; Hitler wanted them permanently and completely under
his control. Devoid of political skill or principle, the generals lacked
the mentality or morality to resist. On the day of the death of
President Hindenburg in August 1934, the German officers swore a new
oath. Their previous oath had been to the Fatherland; now it was to a
man, Adolf Hitler. It was not until 18 days later that the law requiring
this change was passed. A year later the Nazi emblem became part of
their uniform and the Nazi flag their standard. By a clever process of
infiltration into key positions, Hitler seized control of the entire
military machine.
No doubt these generals will ask what they could have done about it. It
will be said that they were helpless, and that to protect their jobs and
families and their own lives they had to follow Hitler’s decisions. No
doubt this became true. But the generals were a key factor in Hitler’s
rise to complete power and a partner in his criminal aggressive designs.
It is always difficult and dangerous to withdraw from a criminal
conspiracy. Never has it been suggested that a conspirator may claim
mercy on the ground that his fellow-conspirators threatened him with
harm should he withdraw from the plot.
In many respects the spectacle which the German General Staff and High
Command group presents today is the most degrading of all the groups and
organizations charged in the Indictment. The bearers of a tradition not
devoid of valour and honour, they emerge from this war stained both by
criminality and ineptitude. Attracted by the militaristic and aggressive
Nazi policies, the German generals found themselves drawn into
adventures of a scope they had not foreseen. From crimes in which almost
all of them participated willingly and approvingly were born others in
which they participated because they were too ineffective to alter the
governing Nazi policies, and because they had to continue collaboration
to save their own skins.
Having joined the partnership, the General Staff and High Command group
planned and carried through manifold acts of aggression which turned
Europe into a charnel-house, and caused the Armed Forces to be used for
foul practices foully executed of terror, pillage, murder and wholesale
slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that the military uniform shall be
their cloak, or that they may find sanctuary by pleading membership in
the profession to which they are an eternal disgrace.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE GENERAL STAFF AND
HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix B. │ I │ 29, 72
3737-PS │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting │ │
│ the Laws and Customs of War on Land,│ │
│ Annex, Articles 4, 23. │ VI │590, 594
3738-PS │Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to │ │
│ treatment of Prisoners of War, │ │
│ Articles 2,3. │ VI │ 600
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │
│report of Intelligence Division, │ │
│Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August │ │
│1938. (USA 84) │ III │ 280
│ │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in │ │
│the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 │ │
│November 1937, signed by Hitler’s │ │
│adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 │ │
│November 1937. (USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
*444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from │ │
│Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by │ │
│Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 │ │
│November 1940, concerning plans for │ │
│prosecution of war in Mediterranean │ │
│Area and occupation of Greece. (GB │ │
│116) │ III │ 403
│ │ │
*446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed│ │
│by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │
│Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December │ │
│1940, concerning the Invasion of │ │
│Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407
│ │ │
447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │
│No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March │ │
│1941, concerning Directives for │ │
│special areas. (USA 135) │ III │ 409
│ │ │
*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │
│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │
│501) │ III │ 416
│ │ │
*503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │
│1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │
│of his commando order of the day │ │
│before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426
│ │ │
*506-PS │Draft of top secret letter, 22 June │ │
│1944, initialled by Warlimont, │ │
│concerning enemy agents. (USA 549) │ III │ 430
│ │ │
*508-PS │OKW correspondence, November 1942, │ │
│about shooting of British glider │ │
│troops in Norway. (USA 545) │ III │ 430
│ │ │
*509-PS │Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, │ │
│reporting “special treatment” for │ │
│three British commandos. (USA 547) │ III │ 433
│ │ │
*512-PS │Teletype from Army Commander in │ │
│Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning │ │
│interrogation of saboteurs before │ │
│shooting; and memorandum in reply from│ │
│OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546) │ III │ 433
│ │ │
*526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │
│concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │
│in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434
│ │ │
*531-PS │OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing │ │
│inquiry from Supreme Command West │ │
│about treatment of paratroopers. (USA │ │
│550) │ III │ 435
│ │ │
*537-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 30 July 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of members of │ │
│foreign “Military Missions”, captured │ │
│together with partisans. (USA 553) │ III │ 439
│ │ │
551-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Commando │ │
│participants. (USA 551) │ III │ 440
│ │ │
*728-PS │Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of │ │
│Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 │ │
│June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │
│enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) │ III │ 526
│ │ │
729-PS │Handwritten note initialled Keitel, 14│ │
│June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │
│enemy terror aviators. │ III │ 529
│ │ │
730-PS │Draft of letter to Foreign Office, │ │
│attention Ambassador Ritter, 15 June │ │
│1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │
│aviators. │ III │ 530
│ │ │
731-PS │Memorandum initialled by Jodl, 22 May,│ │
│concerning measures to be taken │ │
│against Anglo-American air crews in │ │
│special instances. │ III │ 531
│ │ │
732-PS │Letter from Feske to Keitel, 19 June │ │
│1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │
│terror aviators. │ III │ 532
│ │ │
733-PS │Telephone memorandum, 26 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of terror │ │
│aviators. │ III │ 533
│ │ │
*735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │
│fix the cases in which the application│ │
│of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │
│would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533
│ │ │
737-PS │Conference Notes, 4 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │
│aviators. │ III │ 536
│ │ │
*740-PS │Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │
│aviators. (GB 153) │ III │ 537
│ │ │
741-PS │Secret memorandum, 5 July 1944, │ │
│concerning terror aviators. │ III │ 538
│ │ │
*789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,│ │
│23 November 1939, to which all Supreme│ │
│Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572
│ │ │
*798-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │
│Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, │ │
│22 August 1939. (USA 29) │ III │ 581
│ │ │
*872-PS │Memorandum of Discussion between the │ │
│Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case │ │
│“Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” │ │
│(African operation). (USA 134) │ III │ 626
│ │ │
*1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and │ │
│Police Leader of Warsaw, on │ │
│destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. │ │
│(USA 275) │ III │ 718
│ │ │
*1279-PS │Minutes of meeting concerning │ │
│treatment of members of foreign │ │
│“Military Missions” captured with │ │
│partisan groups and draft of order, 7 │ │
│July 1944 pertaining thereto. (USA │ │
│552) │ III │ 857
│ │ │
*1541-PS │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13│ │
│December 1940. (GB 117) │ IV │ 101
│ │ │
*1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │
│Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │
│speech by Hitler to German High │ │
│Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │
│March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │
│Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272
│ │ │
*1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │
│February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
1786-PS │Excerpt of 14 March 1943 of War Diary │ │
│of the Deputy Chief of the Armed │ │
│Forces Operations Staff. (USA 561) │ IV │ 369
│ │ │
*1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February │ │
│1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377
│ │ │
*1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │
│The Jewish Question, under the │ │
│Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, │ │
│12 November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425
│ │ │
*1919-PS │Himmler’s speech to SS │ │
│Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA │ │
│170) │ IV │ 558
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │
│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │
│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │
│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │
│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │
│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2327-PS │Two top secret memoranda, 14 June │ │
│1939, concerning operation “Fall │ │
│Weiss”. (USA 539) │ IV │ 1035
│ │ │
*2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30│ │
│August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23
│ │ │
*2610-PS │Affidavit of Frederick W. Roche, │ │
│Major, U. S. Army, 7 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 548) │ V │ 330
│ │ │
*2802-PS │German Foreign Office notes of │ │
│conference on 13 March 1939 between │ │
│Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime │ │
│Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) │ V │ 443
│ │ │
*3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │
│1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │
│Service, and record of telephone │ │
│conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │
│1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731
│ │ │
3040-PS │Secret order of Reichsfuehrer SS, 20 │ │
│February 1942, concerning commitment │ │
│of manpower from the East. (USA 207) │ V │ 744
│ │ │
*3702-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │
│Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531) │ VI │ 411
│ │ │
*3703-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │
│Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │
│532) │ VI │ 413
│ │ │
*3704-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Werner von │ │
│Blomberg, 7 November 1945. (USA 536) │ VI │ 414
│ │ │
*3705-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │
│Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │
│535) │ VI │ 415
│ │ │
*3706-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Johannes │ │
│Blaskowitz, 10 November 1945. (USA │ │
│537) │ VI │ 417
│ │ │
*3707-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │
│Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533) │ VI │ 419
│ │ │
*3708-PS │Affidavit of Colonel Bernd von │ │
│Brauchitsch, 20 November 1945. (USA │ │
│534) │ VI │ 419
│ │ │
*3710-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 26 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 557) │ VI │ 420
│ │ │
*3711-PS │Affidavit of Captain Wilhelm Scheidt, │ │
│26 November 1945. (USA 558) │ VI │ 424
│ │ │
3712-PS │Affidavit of General von dem Bach, 27 │ │
│November 1945. │ VI │ 425
│ │ │
*3713-PS │Affidavit of General Roettiger, 8 │ │
│December 1945. (USA 559) │ VI │ 429
│ │ │
3714-PS │Affidavit of General Roettiger, 28 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 560) │ VI │ 430
│ │ │
*3715-PS │Affidavit of Major General Rode, 30 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 562) │ VI │ 431
│ │ │
*3716-PS │Affidavit of Major General Rode, 30 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 563) │ VI │ 433
│ │ │
*3717-PS │Affidavit of General Heusinger, 1 │ │
│December 1945. (USA 564) │ VI │ 434
│ │ │
*3718-PS │Affidavit of Colonel v. Bonin, 1 │ │
│December 1945. (USA 565) │ VI │ 435
│ │ │
*3739-PS │Memo on General Staff and High Command│ │
│and affidavit thereto. (USA 778) │ VI │ 624
│ │ │
*3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │
│Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │
│execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │
│Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │
│819) │ VI │ 787
│ │ │
*C-5 │Memorandum to Supreme Command of the │ │
│Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, │ │
│concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) │ VI │ 815
│ │ │
*C-23 │Unsigned documents found in official │ │
│Navy files containing notes year by │ │
│year from 1927 to 1940 on │ │
│reconstruction of the German Navy, and│ │
│dated 18 February 1938, 8 March 1938, │ │
│September 1938. (USA 49) │ VI │ 827
│ │ │
*C-35 │Entry in Naval War Diary, January │ │
│1941, p. 401. (USA 132) │ VI │ 852
│ │ │
*C-50 │Covering letters and Order of 13 May │ │
│1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless │ │
│treatment of civilians in the USSR for│ │
│offenses committed by them. (USA 554; │ │
│GB 162) │ VI │ 871
│ │ │
*C-63 │Keitel order on preparation for │ │
│“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB │ │
│87) │ VI │ 883
│ │ │
C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │
│meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │
│(GB 86) │ VI │ 884
│ │ │
*C-65 │Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder │ │
│concerning visit of Quisling. (GB 85) │ VI │ 885
│ │ │
*C-66 │Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 │ │
│January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” │ │
│and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81) │ VI │ 887
│ │ │
*C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │
│convening conference on Barbarossa on │ │
│14 June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909
│ │ │
*C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │
│operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │
│74) │ VI │ 911
│ │ │
*C-102 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │
│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │
│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-122 │Extract from Naval War Diary. │ │
│Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 │ │
│October 1939. (GB 82) │ VI │ 928
│ │ │
*C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │
│Weiss” and directions for secret │ │
│mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932
│ │ │
*C-136 │OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 │ │
│October 1938, signed by Hitler and │ │
│initialled by Keitel. (USA 104) │ VI │ 947
│ │ │
*C-138 │Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed│ │
│by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the │ │
│OKW. (USA 105) │ VI │ 950
│ │ │
*C-139 │Directive for operation “Schulung” │ │
│signed by Blomberg, 2 May 1935. (USA │ │
│53) │ VI │ 951
│ │ │
*C-142 │Intention of the Army High Command and│ │
│Orders, signed by Brauchitsch. (USA │ │
│538) │ VI │ 956
│ │ │
*C-148 │Keitel Order, 16 September 1941, │ │
│subject: Communist Insurrection in │ │
│Occupied Territories. (USA 555) │ VI │ 961
│ │ │
C-156 │Concealed Rearmament under Leadership │ │
│of Government of Reich, from “Fight of│ │
│the Navy against Versailles │ │
│1919-1935”. (USA 41) │ VI │ 970
│ │ │
*C-159 │Order for Rhineland occupation signed │ │
│by Blomberg, 2 March 1936. (USA 54) │ VI │ 974
│ │ │
*C-167 │Report of meeting between Raeder and │ │
│Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 977
│ │ │
*C-174 │Hitler Order for operation │ │
│“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89) │ VI │ 1003
│ │ │
*C-178 │Order of Navy concerning treatment of │ │
│saboteurs, 11 February 1943. (USA 544)│ VI │ 1012
│ │ │
*C-179 │Hitler’s second decree, 18 October │ │
│1942, regarding annihilation of terror│ │
│and sabotage units. (USA 543) │ VI │ 1014
│ │ │
*C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander│ │
│Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017
│ │ │
*D-39 │Telegrams relating to activities │ │
│against partisans in Italy. (GB 275) │ VI │ 1023
│ │ │
*D-411 │Letters of 26 and 28 November 1941, │ │
│enclosing orders concerning protection│ │
│of troops against Partisans and │ │
│sabotage. (USA 556) │ VII │ 49
│ │ │
*D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │
│SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │
│Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │
│Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │
│1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │
│relative to procedure in cases of │ │
│unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │
│execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74
│ │ │
D-730 │Statement of PW Walther Grosche, 11 │ │
│December 1945. (GB 279) │ VII │ 177
│ │ │
*D-731 │Statement of PW Ernst Walde, 13 │ │
│December 1945. (GB 278) │ VII │ 183
│ │ │
*D-762 │Order of Hitler, 30 July 1944, │ │
│concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │
│and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │
│Territories. (GB 298) │ VII │ 221
│ │ │
*D-763 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │
│regarding penal jurisdiction of │ │
│non-German civilians in Occupied │ │
│Territories. (GB 300) │ VII │ 222
│ │ │
*D-764 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │
│concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │
│and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │
│Territories and jurisdiction relative │ │
│thereto. (GB 299) │ VII │ 223
│ │ │
*D-765 │Directives of OKW, 2 September 1944, │ │
│regarding offenses by non-German │ │
│civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │
│302) │ VII │ 225
│ │ │
*D-766 │Circular of OKW, 4 September 1944, │ │
│regarding offenses by non-German │ │
│civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │
│301) │ VII │ 226
│ │ │
*D-767 │Memorandum, 13 September 1944, on │ │
│offenses by non-German civilians in │ │
│Occupied Territories. (GB 303) │ VII │ 228
│ │ │
*D-769 │Telegram signed by Gen. Christiansen, │ │
│21 September 1940, relative to │ │
│application of capital punishment in │ │
│connection with Railway strike in │ │
│Holland. (GB 304) │ VII │ 229
│ │ │
D-770 │Circular, 24 September 1944, on │ │
│offenses of non-German civilians in │ │
│Occupied Territories. (GB 305) │ VII │ 229
│ │ │
*D-774 │Directive of Chief of OKW to German │ │
│Foreign Office at Salzburg, on │ │
│treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers, 14 June 1944. (GB │ │
│307) │ VII │ 231
│ │ │
*D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 308) │ VII │ 232
│ │ │
*D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │
│June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │
│Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233
│ │ │
*D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234
│ │ │
*D-778 │Notes, 18 June 1944, concerning │ │
│treatment of Anglo-American │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 311) │ VII │ 235
│ │ │
*D-779 │Letter from Reichsmarschall to Chief │ │
│of OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding │ │
│treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312) │ VII │ 235
│ │ │
*D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │
│Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │
│June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236
│ │ │
*D-781 │Note of OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, 23 June 1944, regarding │ │
│treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 314) │ VII │ 239
│ │ │
D-782 │Note from German Foreign Office, │ │
│Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB │ │
│315) │ VII │ 239
│ │ │
*D-783 │Note of a telephone communication, 26 │ │
│June 1944, with regard to treatment of│ │
│“Terrorist”-aviators. (GB 316) │ VII │ 240
│ │ │
*D-784 │Note from Operation Staff of OKW │ │
│signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 317) │ VII │ 240
│ │ │
*D-785 │Note from OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, 4 July 1944, concerning │ │
│“Terror”-flyers. (GB 318) │ VII │ 241
│ │ │
*D-786 │Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror”-flyers.│ │
│(GB 319) │ VII │ 242
│ │ │
*L-43 │Air Force “Organizational Study 1950”,│ │
│2 May 1938. (GB 29) (See Chart No. │ │
│10.) │ VII │ 788
│ │ │
*L-51 │Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August │ │
│1945. (USA 521) │ VII │ 798
│ │ │
*L-52 │Memorandum and Directives for conduct │ │
│of war in the West, 9 October 1939. │ │
│(USA 540) │ VII │ 800
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
L-166 │Minutes of conference on Fighter │ │
│Aircraft with Reichsmarshal on 15 and │ │
│16 May 1944. │ VII │ 911
│ │ │
*L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the │ │
│Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a │ │
│lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 │ │
│November 1943 at Munich to Reich and │ │
│Gauleiters. (USA 34) │ VII │ 920
│ │ │
L-180 │Report by SS Brigade Commander │ │
│Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group │ │
│A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276) │ VII │ 978
│ │ │
*L-323 │Entry in Naval War Diary concerning │ │
│operation “Weseruebung”. (USA 541) │ VII │ 1106
│ │ │
*R-95 │Army Order signed by von Brauchitsch, │ │
│30 March 1941, concerning deployment │ │
│instructions for “Action 25” and │ │
│supplementary instruction for action │ │
│“Marita”. (GB 127) │ VIII │ 70
│ │ │
*R-102 │Report on activities of The Task │ │
│Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 │ │
│October 1941, (USA 470) │ VIII │ 96
│ │ │
R-118 │Drafts of letters and memoranda of │ │
│General Staff of Armed Forces │ │
│concerning treatment of enemy fliers. │ VIII │ 127
│ │ │
*R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │
│reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │
│in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │
│Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205
│ │ │
*TC-54-B │Von Brauchitsch appeal to the people │ │
│of Danzig, from Documents of German │ │
│Politics, Part VII, p. 596. (GB 73) │ VIII │ 410
│ │ │
*UK-66 │Report of British War Crimes Section │ │
│of Allied Force Headquarters on German│ │
│reprisals for partisan activity in │ │
│Italy. (GB 274) │ VIII │ 572
│ │ │
UK-81 │Letters of 26 November and 28 October │ │
│1941, with enclosed orders on │ │
│protection of troops against Partisans│ │
│and Sabotage and conduct of troops in │ │
│Eastern Territories. │ VIII │ 582
│ │ │
Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │
│December 1945. │ VIII │ 587
│ │ │
Affidavit B │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 │ │
│November 1945, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 596
│ │ │
Affidavit D │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 4 January 1946. │ VIII │ 622
│ │ │
Affidavit H │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November│ │
│1945. │ VIII │ 643
│ │ │
Affidavit I │Affidavit of Leopold Buerkner, 22 │ │
│January 1946. │ VIII │ 647
│ │ │
Affidavit J │Affidavit of Erhard Milch, 23 January │ │
│1946. │ VIII │ 653
│ │ │
Statement III │The Origin of the Directives of the │ │
│Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,│ │
│by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 15 │ │
│September 1945. │ VIII │ 669
│ │ │
Statement IV │The Position and Powers of the Chief │ │
│of the OKW, by Wilhelm Keitel, │ │
│Nurnberg, 9 October 1945. │ VIII │ 672
│ │ │
Statement V │Notes Concerning Actions of German │ │
│Armed Forces During the War and in │ │
│Occupied Territory, by Wilhelm Keitel,│ │
│Nurnberg, 19 October 1945. │ VIII │ 678
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707
│ │ │
Chart No. 7 │Organization of the Wehrmacht │ │
│1938-1945. (Enlargement displayed to │ │
│Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 776
│ │ │
*Chart No. 10 │1938 Proposals for Luftwaffe Expansion│ │
│1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29) │ VIII │ 779
Chapter XVI
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS
The crime of conspiracy is recognized, in various forms, in nearly every
legal system. The Anglo-American doctrine of conspiracy, despite
technical differences, is analogous in purpose to the Soviet notion of a
“criminal gang” and the French _association de malfaiteurs_. German law,
both before and after the Nazi seizure of power, also contained a
similar concept. The fundamentals of the doctrine, common to most
systems of law, are reflected in Article 6 of the Charter, which
declares it a crime to participate in “the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy” to plan or wage aggressive war, to commit War
Crimes, or to commit Crimes against Humanity. Count I of the Indictment
charges the existence of such a conspiracy on the part of the
defendants, acting together with divers other persons.
The essence of conspiracy is the joining together of persons to pursue
unlawful ends, by legal or illegal means, or to pursue lawful ends by
illegal means. A conspiracy may exist even though the ends or means
employed by the conspirators might have been perfectly legal if carried
out by one person acting alone. The gravamen of the crime is association
and acting in concert for the purpose of formulating and executing a
common plan involving criminal ends or means.
Participation in a common plan or conspiracy results in vicarious
liability, in the sense that each member of the conspiracy is liable for
the acts of every other conspirator, even though he may have actually
committed no criminal acts himself. He still may be adjudged criminal
for mere participation in a common plan to pursue a common criminal
purpose, regardless of disparities in the functions performed by
individual conspirators.
Nevertheless, in order to prove the participation of a certain person in
a conspiracy, his own acts must be considered. The roles played by the
various members of the Nazi conspiracy are necessarily different. The
following sections sketch in rough outline the parts played by each of
the 22 defendants (excepting Sauckel and Speer who are discussed in
Chapter X) and the former defendant and co-conspirator, Krupp von Bohlen
und Halbach, in the conspiracy to commit Crimes against Peace, War
Crimes against Humanity, as alleged in Count I of the Indictment. These
sections are by no means exhaustive but merely indicate the general
lines of a particular defendant’s participation. Further and more
detailed discussion of the parts played by the conspirators in
particular phases of the conspiracy will be found under the pertinent
subject matter in the preceding chapters.
1. HERMANN WILHELM GOERING
For more than two decades Hermann Goering played one of the foremost
roles amongst the Nazi conspirators. He, who called himself the most
faithful paladin of the Fuehrer, was a key figure within the conspiracy,
participating in nearly all phases of the conspiratorial activities. He
took part in the Munich Beer Hall putsch of 1923; he promoted Hitler’s
rise to power in 1933; he founded the Gestapo in 1933 and the
concentration camps in 1934; and he created the German Luftwaffe, making
it an instrument for aggressive war and using it to destroy other
countries. As Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan and chairman of the
Ministerial Council for Defense, Goering became the Czar of German
economy and administration and eventually the executive manager of the
entire conspiracy.
The following list, the correctness of which has been certified by
Goering and his attorney (_2836-PS_) is a partial statement of positions
and offices held by him from 1922 to 1945:
1. Party member (1922-1945).
2. Supreme Leader of the SA (1923—November 1923).
3. Member of the Reichstag (1928).
4. President of the Reichstag (1932).
5. Prussian Minister of the Interior (1933-34).
6. Prussian Prime Minister (1933-45).
7. Prussian Chief of Secret State Police (1933-36).
8. Prussian Chief of State Council (1933-36).
9. Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan (1936-45).
10. Reichsminister for Air (1933-45).
11. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (1935-45).
12. President of the Cabinet Council for the Defense of the
Reich (1939-45).
13. Member of the Secret Cabinet Council (1938-45).
14. Reichsmarschall (1939-45).
15. Successor Designate to Hitler (1939-45).
16. Head of Reichswerke Hermann Goering (1938-45).
17. Head of Gestapo in Prussia (1933-34).
Goering was a member of and assisted in the Nazi conspiracy to commit
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, in the
following ways:
A. _CRIMES AGAINST PEACE._
(1) _Acquisition and Consolidation of Power in Germany._
(_a_) _Before 1933._ Soon after joining the Party, Goering in 1923 was
placed in command of the entire SA (_2168-PS_). In November 1923, he
took part in the ill-fated attempt at Munich to gain control of the
German State by force. In the encounter with the police, Goering was
wounded and fled from Germany. (_2532-PS_)
After his return, Goering became more than a commander of street
fighters. He was designated Hitler’s first political assistant.
“The movement was conducted by the Fuehrer from Munich. But one
man has to act for him in Berlin, while Gauleiter Goebbels stirs
up the masses and makes them ripe for National Socialism, a man
on whom he could rely unconditionally to the same extent as if
he acted himself. And thus, Hermann Goering became the political
deputy of Adolf Hitler.” (_3252-PS_)
Goering’s official biographer, the Ministerial Dirgent Gritzbach, tells
of his dealings with the Bruening government, his attempts to “break
down the barrier” around the Reich President, von Hindenburg, and of his
“coup” as Reichstag President in September 1932 in procuring a vote of
nonconfidence against the Papen government just before the Reichstag
could be dissolved (_3252-PS_). Goering says in his own book, _Aufbau
einer Nation_:
“The moment was unforgettable for me who have gone back and
forth as representative so often between the Kaiserhof and the
Wilhelmstrasse during the past year, when I hurried out to my
car and could report to the questioning masses as the first one:
‘Hitler has become Reich Chancellor.’” (_3251-PS_)
Goebbels also gave him full measure of credit:
“‘This is surely Goering’s happiest hour’ wrote Dr. Goebbels in
his book Von Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, and, quoting from it,
said: that ‘Goering prepared diplomatically and politically in a
long lasting all hard struggle the basis for Hitler’s rise.”
(_3252-PS_)
In a letter written in 1935, Hitler summarized Goering’s contributions
as follows:
“My dear Goering: When in November 1923 the Party tried for the
first time to conquer the power of the State, you as Commander
of the SA created within an extraordinarily short time that
instrument with which I could bear that struggle. Highest
necessity had forced us to act, but a wise providence at that
time denied that success. After receiving a grave wound you
again entered the ranks as soon as circumstances permitted as my
most loyal comrade in the battle for power. You contributed
essentially to creating the basis for the 30th of January.
Therefore, at the end of a year of the National Socialist
Revolution, I desire to thank you whole-heartedly, my dear Party
Comrade Goering, for the great values which you have for the
National Socialist Revolution and consequently, for the German
people. In cordial friendship and grateful appreciation.
Yours,
Adolf Hitler.”
(_3259-PS_)
Goering himself has boasted:
“Numerous titles and honors have been bestowed on me during the
past months, and still no title and no decoration could make me
so proud, as the designation, given to me by the German people:
‘The most faithful paladin of our Fuehrer.’ In that, my
relationship to the Fuehrer finds expression. I followed him for
over a decade with unreserved faith, and I will follow him with
the same unconditional faith until my end.” (_3251-PS_)
(_b_) _Prussia, 1933-36._ Immediately after the 30th of January 1933,
Goering was awarded the key post of acting Prussian Minister of the
Interior, and shortly thereafter, that of Minister President of Prussia.
In these capacities, he proceeded promptly to establish a regime of
terror in Prussia designed to suppress all opposition to the Nazi
program.
His chief tool was the Prussian police, which remained under his
jurisdiction until 1936. As early as February 1933, he ordered the
entire police forces to render unqualified assistance to the
para-military organizations supporting the new government, such as the
SA and the SS, and to crush all political opponents with firearms, if
necessary, regardless of the consequences. (Directive of 10 February
1933, Ministerialblatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung 1933, p.
148; Directive of 17 February 1933, _id_, p. 169). Goering has
frequently and proudly acknowledged his own personal responsibility for
the crimes committed pursuant to orders of this character:
“I declared at that time before thousands of fellow Germans,
each bullet which leaves the barrel of a police pistol now is my
bullet. If one calls this murder, then I have murdered; I
ordered all this, I back it up. I assume the responsibility, and
I am not afraid to do so.” (_2324-PS; 3252-PS._)
Soon after he became Prussian Minister President, Goering began to
develop the Gestapo, or Secret State Police. To quote from his own book:
“The most important thing for me was first, to get the
instrument of power of the protective police and political
police firmly in my hand. Here I undertook the first sweeping
changes of personnel. Of the 32 available colonels of the
protective police, I dismissed 22. Hundreds of officers and
thousands of sergeants followed them in the course of the next
months. New forces were procured, and everywhere, these forces
were taken out of the large reserve pool of the SA and the SS.
“For weeks, I personally worked on this transformation, and
finally I created alone and from my own conviction and own
thought the ‘Secret State Police Office’. That instrument,
feared so much by the enemies of the state, which above all has
contributed so much, that today a Communist or Marxist danger in
Germany or Prussia is hardly worth talking about anymore.”
(_3251-PS_)
In a public address delivered on 11 December 1934, Goering boasted:
“We were firmly determined after assumption of power to hit the
Communists so that in Germany they would never recover from our
blow. For that we do not require a Reichstag fire. That has been
one of the most important points on our program. In the former
Weimar Constitution the destruction of Communism was
unthinkable. For the execution of these measures we needed the
instrument of a through and through reliable, and of the highest
degree powerful, police force. I have created this instrument
through the reorganization of the field police (_Landespolizei_)
and the formation of a Secret State Police. These organizations
will constitute a means for implanting fear in all enemies of
the State, which a State needs if it wishes to defend itself for
always”. (_3440-PS_)
On 26 April 1933 Goering signed the first law officially establishing
the Secret State Police in Prussia (_2104-PS_). On 30 November 1933,
Goering signed a law naming himself, as Prime Minister, Chief of the
Prussian Secret State Police (_2105-PS_). He continued in this position
until sometime in 1936, when Himmler secured control of all police in
the Reich.
Men and women taken into custody by the Gestapo were thrown, without
judicial or other form of trial, into concentration camps, which had
been established in Prussia as early as the spring of 1933. (_3252-PS_;
_L-83_.)
As explained by Goering in his own book:
“Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly.
It cannot be forgotten, that at the moment of our rise to power,
according to the official election figures of March 1933, six
million people still confess their sympathy for Marxism. * * *
Therefore the concentration camps have been created, where we
have first confined thousands of Communists and Social Democrat
functionaries. * * *” (_2344-PS_)
On 10 February 1936, Goering, as Prussian Minister President, signed a
further basic law on the Prussian Secret State Police. Article 7 of this
law provided:
“Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to
the review of the administrative courts”. (_2107-PS_)
Thus it was made quite clear by Goering’s own law that those imprisoned
in concentration camps without trial of any kind were to have no
recourse to any court. On the same day Goering signed a decree for the
execution of the foregoing law, which further acknowledged his
responsibility for Prussian concentration camps. Its provisions included
the following:
“Art. 2 * * * (4) The Secret State Police Bureau administers the
state concentration camps.” (_2108-PS_)
The range of police terrorism under Goering’s leadership was almost
limitless. A glance at a few of his police directives in these early
days will indicate the extent and thoroughness with which every
dissident voice was silenced:
_Directive of 22 June 1933_ (_Ministerial-Blatt fuer die
Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 731_): Ordered all
officials to watch the statements of employees of the Prussian
civil service and to denounce to Goering those who made critical
remarks (“_Miesmacher_”); failure to do so regarded as proof of
hostile attitude.
_Directive of 23 June 1933_ (_Ministerial-Blatt fuer die
Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 749_): Suppressed all
activities of the Social Democratic Party, including meetings
and press, and ordered confiscation of its property.
_Directive of 30 June 1933_ (_Ministerial-Blatt fuer die
Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 793_): Ordered the
Gestapo authorities to report to the Labor Trustees on political
attitudes of workers, particularly in cases of criticism of the
regime.
_Directive of 15 January 1934_ (_Ministerial-Blatt fuer die
Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 137_): Ordered the
Gestapo and frontier police to keep track of and to watch
emigres, particularly political emigres and Jews, residing in
neighboring countries, and ordered them arrested and put into
concentration camps if they returned to Germany.
After the elimination of the forces of the opposition, the Nazis felt it
necessary to dispose of nonconformists within their own ranks. During
the Roehm purge of 30 June 1934, many people were murdered who had
nothing to do with the internal SA revolt but were just “not liked very
well” (_2950-PS_). Goering’s role in this bloody affair was related less
than two weeks later by Hitler in a speech to the Reichstag:
“Meanwhile Minister President Goering had previously received my
instructions that in case of a purge, he was to take analogous
measures at once in Berlin and in Prussia. With an iron fist he
beat down the attack on the National Socialist State before it
could develop.” (_3442-PS_)
(_c_) _The Reich, 1933-39._ Meanwhile, in the central Reich government,
Goering occupied a series of the highest and most influential positions.
The broad powers which devolved upon him made him, under Hitler, the
Chief Executive of the Nazi State.
With the accession to power, Goering retained the somewhat empty title
of Reichstag President but was also appointed Minister Without Portfolio
and became a cabinet member. When in an early meeting (15 March 1933)
the cabinet discussed the pending Enabling Act (which gave the Cabinet
plenary powers of legislation) he offered the suggestion that the
required two-thirds majority might be obtained simply by refusing
admittance to the Social Democratic delegates (_2962-PS_). He became
Reich Air Minister in May 1933 (_2089-PS_). In his capacity as Air
Minister and Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe, he sat as a member of
and the Fuehrer’s deputy on the Reich Defense Council, which was
established by the secret law of 21 May 1933 and continued by the secret
law of 4 September 1938 (_2261-PS_; _2194-PS_). This Council was a war
planning group whose purpose was “to plan preparations and decrees in
case of war which later on were published by the Ministerial Council for
the Defense of the Reich.” (_2986-PS_)
In 1936, Goering was made Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan and
acquired plenary legislative and administrative powers over all German
economic life. (_1862-PS_)
Goering was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council established in 1938
to act as “an advisory board in the direction of foreign policy”
(_2031-PS_).
The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, created in 1939,
took over, in effect, all the legislative powers of the Cabinet which
had not been reserved to Hitler’s personal control or to Goering as the
Delegate for the Four-Year Plan. Goering became the Chairman of this
Council. (_2018-PS_)
Finally, as the invading Nazi armies marched into Poland, Hitler
announced the designation of Goering as successor designate, the heir
apparent of the “New Order.”
(_d_) _Economic Preparation for War, 1933-1939._
In April 1936, Goering was appointed Coordinator for Raw Materials and
Foreign Exchange and empowered to supervise all State and Party
activities in these fields (_2827-PS_). In this capacity he convened the
War Minister, the Minister of Economics, the Reich Finance Minister, the
President of the Reichsbank, and the Prussian Finance Minister to
discuss inter-agency problems connected with war mobilization. At a
meeting of this group on 12 May 1936, when the question of the
prohibitive cost of synthetic raw material substitutes arose, Goering
said:
“If we have war tomorrow, we must help ourselves by substitutes.
Then money will not play any role at all. If that is the case,
then we must be ready to create the prerequisites for that in
peace.” (_1301-PS_)
At a subsequent meeting of the same men on 27 May 1936, Goering
suggested a program of plant construction for the production of
synthetic substitutes but warned against the financial strain involved
in excessive overexpansion. He opposed any limitations dictated by
orthodox financial policy and stated:
“All measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an
assured waging of war.
“Ready reserves must ordinarily be accumulated already in
On the Nurnberg Party Day in the fall of 1936, Hitler proclaimed the
establishment of the Four-Year Plan, a comprehensive program of national
self-sufficiency, and announced the appointment of Goering as
“Plenipotentiary” in charge. In October, a decree was promulgated which
implemented this announcement and provided for the execution of the
plan. (_1862-PS_)
It is clear from Goering’s own statements in an interrogation on 25 June
1945 that the purpose of the Plan was to place Germany on a war footing
economically:
“Goering: ‘My job was to organize the German economy and my
energy was put to work to get things started and carried through
* * *. My main task was to secure the food supply for Germany
for many years ahead and to make Germany self-sufficient. The
most important items were iron, petroleum and rubber. * * * The
industry only wanted to have very high grade Swedish iron for
business reasons. There was danger that during the war Germany
would not be able to get iron from Sweden and there would be no
iron.’
Interrogator: ‘What war are you talking about? This is 1936
you’re speaking of.’
Goering: ‘Any possibility of war. Perhaps with Russia, or in
case there was war with anyone at any time and anywhere.’”
When asked the reasons why the Four-Year Plan lost importance in 1942,
Goering explained that his preoccupation with the Air Force did not
allow him the necessary concentration on the affairs of the Four-Year
Plan, and stated:
“The main task of the Four-Year Plan had been accomplished. This
task was to get Germany ready.”
These answers confirm the comment Goering made in 1936, that his chief
task as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan was “to put the whole
economy on a war footing within four years.” (_EC-408_) As
Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, Goering was virtually the
economic dictator for Germany with control over all other interested
Reich agencies. He was the “boss of the economy,” and all important
decisions had to be referred to him.
Two important conferences show clearly how Goering inspired and directed
the preparation of the German economy for aggressive war. On 8 July 1938
he addressed a number of leading German aircraft manufacturers,
explained the political situation, and laid the groundwork for a vast
increase in aircraft production. After stating that war with
Czechoslovakia was imminent and boasting that the German air force was
already superior in quality and quantity to the English, he continued:
“If Germany wins the war, she will be the greatest power in the
world, dominating the world market, and Germany will be a rich
nation. For this goal, risks must be taken. The only thing that
matters is increased output regarding quantity and quality. Even
if the manufacturers know that their present policies may mean
their bankruptcy within three years, they will have to do it all
the same * * * I want you to be perfectly resolved, today
already, how you will run your business when war comes. The
earlier the manufacturers make their preparations for
mobilization today, the less danger there will be of work being
held up. It must be determined for every worker whether he is
essential for production upon outbreak of war, and measures must
be taken to secure his deferment in case of mobilization.
(_3441-PS_). An executive will be put in charge to work on
nothing but the complete preparation of each plant for
mobilization day.” (_R-140_)
A few weeks after the Munich agreement, on 14 October 1938, another
conference was held in Goering’s office. He began with the statement
that Hitler had instructed him to organize a gigantic armament program
which would make insignificant all previous achievements. He indicated
that he had been ordered to build as rapidly as possible an air force
five times as large, to increase the speed of Army and Navy armament,
and to concentrate on offensive weapons, principally heavy artillery and
heavy tanks. He then proposed a specific program designed to accomplish
these ends. (_1301-PS_)
(_e_) _Military Mobilization for War._ In his dual role as Reich Air
Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, it was
Goering’s function to develop the Luftwaffe to practical war strength.
As early as March 1935 Goering frankly announced to the world that he
was in the process of building a true military air force:
“After the German government expressed willingness to help, it
became necessary to make a clear demarcation within German
aviation, namely in this respect: which air force will be able
to be made available? This situation brought about the decision
as to those of the German aviation who will in future belong to
the Air Force and those who will in future remain in civil
aviation or in sport aviation. It was necessary to mark this
separation also outwardly, so that the members of the German Air
Force became soldiers according to the law and their leaders
became officers.” (_2292-PS_)
Two months later, in a speech to 1,000 Air Force officers, Goering spoke
in a still bolder vein:
“I repeat: I intend to create a Luftwaffe which, if the hour
should strike, shall burst upon the foe like a chorus of
revenge. The enemy must have a feeling of being lost already
before even having fought. * * *”
In the same year, he signed his name to the Conscription Law which
provided for compulsory military service and constituted an act of
defiance on the part of Nazi Germany in violation of the Versailles
Treaty. (_1654-PS_)
Goering’s statements during this period left no doubt in the minds of
Allied diplomats that Germany was engaged in full mobilization of air
power for an impending war.
“Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence that the
Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the weapon of
terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the
weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in the
shortest time . . . High ranking Nazis with whom I had to
maintain official contact, particularly men such as Goering,
Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darré and others, repeatedly
scoffed at my position as to the binding character of treaties
and openly stated to me that Germany would observe her
international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany’s
interests to do so.” (_2385-PS_)
(2) _The Launching of Aggressive War._ Goering was the central figure in
the preparation of Germany for military aggression. In German economic
development and military growth he held the key positions throughout the
prewar period. Although he held no official position in the field of
foreign affairs, Goering also figured prominently in all of the major
phases of Nazi international aggression between 1937 and 1941. As “No. 2
Nazi” he was a leading participant in every major plan of territorial
aggrandizement or offensive military strategy.
Goering was the prompter and director of the diplomatic tragi-comedy
leading to the Austrian Anschluss. In the middle of November 1937, Mr.
Bullitt, the American Ambassador to France, reported the following
conversation with Goering:
“I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely
determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this
was an absolute determination of the German Government. The
German Government at the present time was not pressing this
matter because of certain momentary political considerations,
especially in their relations with Italy; but Germany would
tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the
consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. He then added a
statement which went further than any I have heard on this
subject: He said, ‘There are schemes being pushed now for a
union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or
without a Hapsburg at the head of the unit. Such a solution is
absolutely inacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such
an agreement would be an immediate _casus belli_’.” (_L-151_)
When the time came, on 11 March 1938, Goering was in complete command.
Throughout the afternoon and evening of that day he directed by
telephone the activities of Seyss-Inquart, also of Keppler, Ullrich, and
the other Nazi operatives in Vienna. (_2949-PS_); (the pertinent
portions of these telephone conversations have already been referred to
in Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)
In the late afternoon Goering gave the following order to Seyss-Inquart:
“Now, remember the following: You go immediately together with
Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the
conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately,
the troops who are already stationed in and advancing to the
frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria
will cease to exist.” (_2949-PS_)
Early the same evening he dictated to Seyss-Inquart the telegram which
the latter was to send to Berlin requesting the Nazi Government to send
German troops to “prevent bloodshed”. Two days later he was able to call
Ribbentrop in London and say:
“Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely
over-shadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to
me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he
saw his homeland again. Now, I merely want to talk about
political things. Well, this story we have given an ultimatum,
that is just foolish gossip.” (_2949-PS_)
Goering played a similarly important role in the attack on
Czechoslovakia. In March of 1938, at the time of the Anschluss with
Austria, he had given a solemn assurance to the Czechoslovakian Minister
in Berlin that the developments in Austria would in no way have a
detrimental influence on the relations between Germany and
Czechoslovakia, and had emphasized the continued earnest endeavor on the
part of Germany to improve these mutual relations. In this connection,
Goering used the expression: “_Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort._ (I give
you my word of honor)” (_TC-27_). On the other hand, in his address to
German airplane manufacturers on 8 July 1938, he made his private views
on this subject clear:
“Beyond this they fear that once we have pocketed
Czechoslovakia, we will attack Hungary, the Rumanian oil wells,
etc. Moreover, since there are democratic countries on the one
hand, and authoritarian ones on the other, there is enough
inflammable matter in the world anyway. When, how and where this
inflammable matter will explode, no one among us can say. It may
happen within some months, but it may also take some years. At
present, the situation is this that Czechoslovakia has promised
the Sudeten Germans to meet them half way. I am convinced that
they will satisfy no more than some of their unimportant
demands. Such action on their part would probably suit our
policy best, since in this case we could put the entire
responsibility on England because she has engaged herself so
deeply in this business.” (_R-140_)
On 14 October 1938, shortly after the Munich agreement, Goering gave his
views on the Czechoslovakian question at a conference in the Air
Ministry:
“The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General
Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial
assimilation of the Slovakia. Czech and Slovakia would become
German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The
Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore
have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary
Keppler.” (_1301-PS_)
Meanwhile, he was deceiving the representatives of the puppet Slovakian
government to the same end:
“The Field Marshal considers that the Slovak negotiations toward
independence are to be supported in a suitable manner.
Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.”
(_2801-PS_)
In the following year, with the rape of Czechoslovakia complete Goering
frankly stated what Germany’s purpose had been throughout the whole
affair:
“In a rather long statement the field marshal explained that the
incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had
taken place, among other reasons to increase the German War
potential by exploitation of the industry there.” (_R-133_)
Goering was also a moving force in the later crimes against the peace.
As the successor designate to Hitler, as Chief of the Air Forces, and as
economic czar of Greater Germany, he was a party to all the planning for
military operations of the Nazi forces in the East and the West. In the
Polish affair, for example, it was Goering who in 1935 gave assurances
to the Polish government that “there should be not the slightest fear in
Poland that on the German side it (the German-Polish alliance) would not
be continued in the future.” Yet, four years later, Goering helped
formulate plans for the invasion of Polish territory.
With regard to the attack upon the Soviet Union, plans for the ruthless
exploitation of Russian territory were made months in advance of the
opening of hostilities. Goering was placed in charge of this army of
spoliation, whose mission was that of “seizing raw materials and taking
over all important concerns.” (_1317-PS_; _1157-PS_.)
These specific instances cover only a small part of Goering’s activities
in the field of aggressive war. There follows a partial list of
additional documents which demonstrate Goering’s knowledge of and
continued participation in the Nazi war program. They deal either with
conferences on the highest war-planning levels which he attended, or
with secret orders communicated to him outlining in advance the official
plans for the execution of the successive acts of aggression.
_Meetings and Conferences Attended:_
Conference in Reichskanzlei, 5 November 1937, to outline the necessity
for expanding German foreign policy; plans discussed for the acquisition
of Austria and Czechoslovakia. (_386-PS_)
Entry in Jodl diary, 10 March 1938, referring to meeting attended by
Goering and others at which the preparation of “Case Otto” and the
mobilization of the army and the air force were ordered. (_1780-PS_)
Top secret conference with Hitler on 23 May 1939, the subject of which
was indoctrination on the political situation and foreign aims. (_L-79_)
Meeting with Hitler, 22 August 1939, attended by commanders of the armed
forces at which immediate plans for Polish invasion were discussed.
(_L-3_; _798-PS_; _1014-PS_)
Hitler’s speech to all military commanders on 23 November 1939,
regarding the invasion of the low countries. (_789-PS_)
Meetings of 8 February 1941 and 27 March 1941, at which Hitler outlined
the prospective operations against Yugoslavia and Greece. (_1746-PS_)
_Orders and Other Directives Received:_
Directive of Blomberg to the armed forces containing plans for military
operations in the event that sanctions were applied against German
withdrawal from League of Nations. (_C-140_)
Top secret directive of Blomberg of 2 May 1935, with plans for operation
“Schulung” (the reoccupation of the Rhineland). (_C-139_)
Top secret letter from Blomberg dated 24 June 1935, enclosing copy of
secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and decision of Reich Cabinet of
the same date. (_2261-PS_)
Order of Blomberg of 2 March 1936, giving the operational basis for the
Rhineland occupation. (_C-159_)
Directives from Hitler and Keitel April to August 1939 on preparation
and invasion of Poland. (_C-120_)
Operational file, “Fall Weiss,” the code name for the Polish operation.
(_C-126_)
Directive from GAF, dated 25 August 1938, regarding the acquisition of
bases in the low countries. (_375-PS_)
Directive No. 6 for the conduct of the war, dated 9 October 1939, signed
by Hitler, and orders of Keitel, dated 15 November 1939, on the plans
for “Fall Gelb”, (operation in the West). (_C-62_)
Orders of the Supreme Command from 7 November 1939 to 9 May 1940,
regarding the opening of the invasion in the West. (_C-72_)
Order of Hitler No. 8, 20 November 1939, for the execution of “Fall
Gelb”. (_440-PS_)
Operational plans signed by Keitel on 28 November 1939, on action near
the French-Belgium borders. (_C-10_)
Entries in Jodl diaries from 1 February to 26 May 1940 confirming plans
for invasion of the West. (_1809-PS_)
OKW orders, 27 January 1940, signed by Keitel on preparation for “Fall
Weseruebung” (Invasion of Norway and Denmark). (_C-63_)
Fuehrer order of 1 March 1940 for the execution of “Fall Weseruebung.”
(_C-174_)
Most secret order from Hitler’s headquarters, dated 19 February 1941, on
plans for the invasion of Greece. (_C-59_)
Top secret operational order on “Case Barbarossa” (invasion of the
Soviet Union), dated 13 March 1941, signed by Keitel. (_447-PS_)
Time table for “Case Barbarossa,” signed by Keitel. (_C-39_)
Top secret memorandum of 29 October 1940, signed by Falkenstein,
Luftwaffe liaison officer with OKW, discussing need for the seizure of
air bases in the event of future war with the United States. (_376-PS_)
Basic order No. 24, dated 5 March 1941, signed by Keitel, regarding
German collaboration with Japan. (_C-75_)
B. _WAR CRIMES._
(1) _Forced Labor, Deportation, and Enslavement of Residents of Occupied
Territories._
The slave labor program of the Nazi conspirators had two criminal
purposes. The first was to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi
war machine by forcing residents of occupied countries to work in
Germany, often directly in the German armament industry, and the second
was to destroy or weaken the peoples of the occupied territories.
Millions of foreign workers were taken to Germany, for the most part
under pressure and generally by physical force. These workers were
forced to labor under conditions of undescribable brutality and
degredation, and often they were used in factories and industries
devoted exclusively to the production of munitions of war. (_See Chapter
X on The Slave Labor Program._)
Goering was at all times implicated in the slave labor program.
Recruitment and allocation of manpower and determination of working
conditions were included in his jurisdiction as Plenipotentiary for the
Four-Year Plan, and from its beginning a part of the Four-Year Plan
Office was devoted to such work. (_1862-PS_; _2827-PS_.)
The defendant Goering was present at a meeting in Hitler’s study on 23
May 1939 at which Hitler, after declaring his intention to attack Poland
at the first suitable opportunity, said:
“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession
of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. * * * The
population of non-German areas will perform no military service
and will be available as a source of labor.” (_L-79_)
Soon after the fall of Poland, Goering as Plenipotentiary for the
Four-Year Plan, began the enslavement of large numbers of Poles. On 25
January 1940, the defendant Frank, then Governor General of Poland,
reported to Goering as follows:
“For the execution of the task of systematically placing the
economic strength of the Generalgouvernement, within the
framework of the Four-Year Plan, in the service of the German
defense industry, I give the following
_DIRECTIVES_
“1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the
defense industry, it is at present fundamentally impossible to
carry on a long-term economic policy in the Generalgouvernement.
Rather, it is necessary so to steer the economy of the
Generalgouvernement that it will, in the shortest possible time,
accomplish results representing the maximum that can be gotten
out of the economic strength of the Generalgouvernement for
immediate strengthening of our capacity for defense. * * *
“2. (g) Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and
female agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich—among
them at least 7500 000 [sic] agricultural workers of which at
least 50% must be women—in order to guarantee agricultural
production in the Reich and as a replacement for industrial
workers lacking in the Reich. * * *” (_1375-PS_)
That orders for this enormous number of workers originated with the
defendant Goering is clear from the following statement in Frank’s Diary
for 10 May 1940:
“Then the Governor General deals with the problem of the
_Compulsory Labor Service_ of the Poles. Upon the demands from
the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion may be
exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower was not
voluntarily available for service inside the German Reich. This
compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and female
Poles. Because of these measures a certain disquietude had
developed which, according to individual reports, was spreading
very much, and which might produce difficulties everywhere.
General Fieldmarshal Goering some time ago pointed out in his
long speech the necessity to deport into the Reich a million
workers. The supply so far was 160,000. However, great
difficulties had to be overcome. Therefore it would be advisable
to consult the district and town chiefs in the execution of the
compulsion, so that one could be sure from the start that this
action would be reasonably successful. The arrest of young Poles
when leaving church service or the cinema would bring about an
increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he had
no objections at all if the rubbish, capable of work yet often
loitering about, would be snatched from the streets. The best
method for this, however, would be the organization of a raid,
and it would be absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole in the
street and to question him what he was doing, where he was
working, etc.” (_2233-A-PS_)
Goering was also responsible for the harsh treatment given these workers
when they reached Germany. On 8 March 1940, as Plenipotentiary of the
Four-Year Plan and as Chairman of the Cabinet Counsel for the Defense of
the Reich, he issued a directive to the Supreme Reich authorities,
entitled: “Treatment of male and female civilian workers of Polish
Nationality in the Reich.” In this directive Goering provided in part:
“The mass employment of male and female civilian workers of
Polish nationality in the Reich necessitates a comprehensive
ruling on treatment of these workers.
“The following orders are to be executed at once:
* * * * * *
“4. The blameless conduct of the Poles is to be assured by
special regulations. The legal and administrative regulations,
necessary for this, will be issued by the Reichsfuehrer-SS and
Chief of the German Police at the Reich Ministry of the
Interior.
“6. Attention is drawn to the explanations enclosed as
appendix.” (_R-148_)
Attached to this directive, and also dated 8 March 1940, were a series
of regulations issued by Himmler, as Reichfuehrer SS and Chief of the
German Police. These regulations provided for stringent measures and
discrimination against Polish workers in the Reich. In a covering
Express Letter addressed to all State Police district-offices and State
Police offices, also dated 8 March 1940, Himmler made clear what was
intended in order to secure “blameless conduct”. He stated:
“The steps to be taken to combat insubordination and
noncompliance with the duty to work, must be decided according
to the severity of the case and to the spirit of resistance of
the offender. It is of most importance that they be taken
immediately after the offense is committed so that they have a
decisive effect. In accordance with my instructions in the
appended decrees, especially severe measures must be taken
during the first eight weeks, in order to bring home to the
workers of Polish nationality from the outset the consequences
of noncompliance with the orders issued. * * *
“In general, in all cases where a warning, by the State Police
or a short imprisonment is not sufficient to induce the worker
to fulfill his duties, application is to be made for his
transfer to a labor training camp, and an opinion given on what
treatment he should receive there. The treatment in the labor
training camps will have to be in accordance with, the severity
of the offense. It is suitable, e.g., to make obstinate shirkers
work in the stone-quarries of the Mauthausen camp. By a special
decree, to the heads of SS-Deathshead Units and concentration
camps, I have ordered that the treatment of these persons under
protective custody be undertaken in a concentration camp.
“Extraordinarily serious cases have to be reported to the Chief
of the Security Police and the SD who, after examination, make
the decision on a special treatment of the workers of Polish
nationality in question.” (_R-148_)
On 29 January 1942 the Division for the Employment of Labor in the
Four-Year Plan Office issued a circular, signed by Dr. Mansfeld, the
General Delegate for Labor Employment in the Four-Year Plan Office, and
addressed to various civilian and military authorities in the occupied
territories, explaining the various means to be used to force workers to
go to Germany. The circular provides in part:
“Subject: Increased mobilization of man-power for the German
Reich from the occupied territories and preparations for
mobilization by force.
“On the one hand, the labor shortage which was rendered more
acute by the draft for the Wehrmacht, and on the other hand, the
increased scope of the armament problem in the German Reich,
render it necessary that manpower for service in the Reich be
recruited from the occupied territories to a much greater extent
than heretofore, in order to relieve the shortage of labor.
Therefore, any and all methods must be adopted which make
possible the transportation, without exception and delay, for
employment in the German Reich, of manpower in the occupied
territories which is unemployed or which can be released for use
in Germany after most careful screening.
“This mobilization shall first of all, as heretofore, be carried
out on a voluntary basis. For this reason, the recruiting effort
for employment in the German Reich must be strengthened
considerably. But if satisfactory results are to be obtained,
the German authorities, who are functioning in the occupied
territories, must be able to exert any pressure necessary to
support the voluntary recruiting of labor for employment in
Germany. Accordingly, to the extent that may be necessary, the
regulations in force in the occupied territories in regard to
shift in employment and withdrawal of support upon refusal to
work, must be tightened. Supplementary regulations concerning
shift in employment must above all insure that older personnel
who are freed must be exchanged for younger personnel to make up
for it, so that the latter may be made available for the Reich.
A far-reaching decrease in the amount of relief granted by
Public Welfare must also be effected in order to induce laborers
to accept employment in the Reich. Unemployment relief must be
set so low that the amount in comparison with the average wages
in the Reich and the possibilities there for sending remittances
home may serve as an inducement to accept employment in the
Reich. When refusal to accept work in the Reich is not
justified, the compensation must be reduced to an amount barely
enough for subsistence, or even be cancelled. In this
connection, partial withdrawal of ration cards and assignment to
particularly heavy obligatory labor may be considered.
“However, all misgivings must give way before the necessity of
supplying the deficit in manpower caused by excessive draft
calls into the Armed Forces, in order to avoid detriment to the
armament industry. For this purpose the forcible mobilization of
workers from the occupied territories cannot be disregarded, in
case the voluntary recruiting is unsuccessful. The mere
possibility of mobilization by force will, in many cases, make
recruiting easier.
“Therefore, I ask you immediately to take any measures in your
district which will promote the employment of workers in the
German Reich on a voluntary basis. I herewith request you to
prepare for publication regulations applying to forced
mobilization of laborers from your territory for Germany, so
that they may be decreed at once, in case recruiting on a
voluntary basis will not have the desired result, that is relief
of the manpower shortage in the Reich. I request you to inform
me of the measures taken by you.” (_1183-PS_)
On 21 March 1942, Hitler promulgated a decree appointing Sauckel
Plenipotentiary General for Man Power. This decree provided in part:
“In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war
industries as a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is
necessary that the utilization of all available manpower,
including that of workers recruited [erwerben] abroad and of
prisoners of war, should be subject to a uniform control,
directed in a manner appropriate to the requirements of war
industry, and further that all still incompletely utilized
manpower in the Greater German Reich, including the
Protectorate, and in the General Government and in the occupied
territories, should be mobilized.
“Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel will carry out
this task within the framework of the Four-Year Plan, as
plenipotentiary general, for the employment of manpower. In that
capacity he will be directly responsible to the Commissioner for
the Four-Year Plan.” (_1666-PS_)
On 27 March 1942, Goering, as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan,
issued a decree in pursuance of the Fuehrer’s decree of 21 March 1942.
This decree provided:
“In pursuance of the Fuehrer’s Decree of 21 March 1942 (RGBl I,
179), I decree as follows:
“1. My manpower sections (_Geschaeftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz_)
are hereby abolished (circular letter of 22 Oct 1936/ St M. Dev.
265). Their duties (recruitment and allocation of manpower,
regulations for labor conditions (_Arbeitsbedingungen_)) are
taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz,
who is directly under me.
“2. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will be
responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy)
employed in the Reich Territory, having regard to the
requirements of Arbeitseinsatz.
“3. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz is part of
the Four-Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required,
or existing laws required to be modified, he will submit
appropriate proposals to me.
“4. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will have at
his disposal for the performance of his task the right delegated
to me by the Fuehrer for issuing instructions to the higher
Reich authorities, their branches and the Party offices, and
their associated organisms and also the Reich Protector, the
General Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, and heads of the civil
administrations. In the case of ordinances and instructions of
fundamental importance a report is to be submitted to me in
advance.” (_1666-PS_)
Since Sauckel was an authority of the Four-Year Plan, it is clear that
Goering remains responsible for the war crimes committed by Sauckel as
Plenipotentiary-General for Manpower. (_See Chapter X on The Slave Labor
Program._)
(2) _Employment of Prisoners of War in War Industry._ The Nazi
conspirators ordered prisoners of war to work under dangerous
conditions, and in the manufacturing and transportation of arms or
munitions, in violation of the Laws of War and of Articles 31 and 32 of
the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 on Prisoners of War. (_See Chapter
X on The Illegal Use of Prisoners of War._)
Goering had a part in these crimes. At a conference on 7 November 1941,
the subject of which was the employment of Russians, including Russian
prisoners of war, it appears from a memorandum signed by Koerner, State
Secretary to the defendant Goering as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year
Plan, that Goering gave the following directives for use of Russians as
laborers:
“I. _The stronger labor reserves in the zone of the interior are
also decisive for the war._
“The Russian workers have proved their productive capacity
during the development of the huge Russian industry. Therefore
it must be made available to the Reich from now on. Objections
against this order of the Fuehrer are of the secondary nature.
The disadvantages which can be created by the Arbeitseinsatz
have to be reduced to a minimum: the task especially of
counter-intelligence and security police.
“II. _The Russian in the zone of operations._
“He is to be employed particularly in building roads and
railroads, in clearing work, clearing of mines and in building
airports. The German construction battalions have to be
dissolved to a great extent (Example: Air Forces!); the German
skilled workers belong to the war industry; it is not their task
to shovel and to break stones, the Russian is there for that.”
* * * * * *
“IV. _The Russian in the Reich territory including the
Protectorate._
“The number of the employed depends on the requirement. By
determining the requirement, it is to be considered that workers
of other states who produce little and eat much are to be
shipped out of the Reich and that in the future the German woman
should come less into the foreground in the labor process.
Beside the Russian prisoners of war, free Russian workers should
also be used.
“A. _The Russian Prisoner of War._
“1. The _selection_ has to take place already in the collecting
camps, beyond the Reich border. The profession and physical
condition are decisive. At the same time screening as to
nationality and according to the requirements of the security
police and counter-intelligence must take place.
“2. The _transportation_ has to be organized just as the
selection and not improvised. The prisoners are to be forwarded
rapidly. Their feeding should be orderly and their guarding
unconditionally secured.
“3. _Officers_ are to be excluded from the work as much as
possible, _commissars_ as a matter of principle.
“4. The Russian belongs in first line to the following _work
places_ (in order of priorities):
Mining.
Railroad maintenance (including repair shops and
construction of vehicles).
War industry (tanks, artillery pieces, airplane parts).
Agriculture.
Building industry.
Large scale workshops (shoe shops!)
Special units for urgent, occasional and emergency work.
* * * * * *
“B. _The Free Russian Worker._
_Employment and treatment_, will not be handled in practice
differently than for Russian prisoners of war. In both
categories, particularly good production can be acknowledged by
a limited distribution of luxury items. Sufficient, adequate
nourishment is also the main thing for the free workers.”
(_1193-PS_)
In a set of top secret notes on what was apparently the same conference,
the following appears:
“NOTES
On outlines layed down by the Reichsmarschall in the meeting of
7 November 1941 in the Reich Ministry for Air (RLM)
“SUBJECT: Employment of laborers in war industries.
“The Fuehrer’s point of view as to employment of prisoners of
war in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5
million prisoners of war—employed so far 2 million.
“Directives for employment:
“Frenchmen: Individual employment, transposition into armament
industry (Rue-wirtschaft)
“Serbs: Preferably agriculture.
“Poles: If feasible no individual employment achievement
of Russian armament industry surpasses the German
one. Assembly linework, a great many mechanical
devices with relatively few skilled workers.
“Readiness of Russians in the operational area to work is
strong. In the Ukraine and other areas discharged prisoners of
war already work as free labor. In Krivoy Rog, large numbers of
workers are available due to the destruction of the factories. *
* *
“_Some points as to general Arbeitseinsatz_
“Rather employ PW’s than _unsuitable foreign workers_. Seize
Poles, Dutchmen, etc. if necessary as PW’s and employ them as
such, if work through free contract cannot be obtained. Strong
action.” (_1206-PS_)
In a secret letter from the Reichsminister of Labor to the Presidents of
the Regional Labor Exchange Offices, the following appears:
“Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are to be
taken from among the French PW’s not yet employed in the
armament industry, and are to be assigned to the armament
industry (airplane industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting
therefrom will be filled by Soviet PW’s. The transfer of the
above-named French PW’s is to be accomplished by 1 October.”
(_3005-PS_)
(3) _Looting and Destruction of Works of Art._ The Nazi conspirators
planned and organized the cultural impoverishment of every country in
Europe: the plunder of works of art by the Government General in
occupied Poland and the activities of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg are
outstanding examples. (_See Chapter XIV on the Plunder of Art
Treasures._)
Goering was continuously connected with these activities. In October
1939 he requested a Dr. Kajetan Muehlmann to undertake immediately the
“securing” of all Polish art treasures. In an affidavit, Dr. Muehlmann
states:
“I was the special deputy of the Governor General of Poland,
Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the General
Government, October 1939 to September 1943.
“Goering, in his function as chairman of the Reich Defense
Council, had commissioned me with this duty.
“I confirm, that it was the official policy of the Governor
General, Hans Frank, to take into custody all important art
treasures, which belonged to Polish public institutions, private
collections and the Church. I confirm, that the art treasures,
mentioned, were actually confiscated, and it is clear to me,
that they would not have remained in Poland in case of a German
victory, but that they would have been used to complement German
artistic property.” (_3042-PS_)
Indicative of the continued interest taken by Goering in these
operations, it appears from Dr. Muehlmann’s report that at one time 31
valuable sketches by the artist Albrecht Durer were taken from a Polish
collection and personally handed to the defendant Goering, who took them
to the Fuehrer’s headquarters. (_1709-PS_)
The part played by Goering in looting of art by the _Einsatzstab
Rosenberg_ has been shown in Chapter XIV. On 5 November 1940 Goering
issued an order under his own signature directed to the Chief of the
Military Administration Paris, and to the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_, as
follows:
“In conveying the measures taken until now, for the securing of
Jewish art property by the Chief of the Military Administration
Paris and the special service staff Rosenberg (the Chief of the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 2 f 28.14. W.Z.Nr 3812/40
g), the art objects brought to the Louvre will be disposed of in
the following way:
“1. Those art objects about which the Fuehrer has reserved for
himself the decision as to their use.
“2. Those art objects which serve to the completion of the Reich
Marshal’s collection.
“3. Those art objects and library stocks the use of which seem
useful to the establishing of the higher institutes of learning
and which come within the jurisdiction of Reichsleiter
Rosenberg.
“4. Those art objects that are suited to be sent to German
museums, of all these art objects a systematic inventory will be
made by the special purpose staff Rosenberg; they will then be
packed and shipped to Germany with the assistance of the
Luftwaffe.” (_141-PS_)
In view of the high priority afforded by the foregoing order to the
completion of Goering’s own collection, it is not surprising to find
that he continued to aid the operations of the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_.
Thus, on 1 May 1941, Goering issued an order to all Party, State, and
Wehrmacht Services, under his own signature, requesting them—
“* * * to give all possible support and assistance to the Chief
of Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s staffs. * * * The
above-mentioned persons are requested to report to us on their
work, particularly on any difficulties that might arise.”
(_1117-PS_)
By 30 May 1942, Goering was able to boast of the assistance which he had
rendered to the work of the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_. In a letter to
Rosenberg, of that date, he stated:
“* * * On the other hand I also support personally the work of
your Einsatzstab wherever I can do so, and a great part of the
seized cultural goods can be accounted for because I was able to
assist the Einsatzstab with my organization.” (_1015-I-PS_)
(4) _Germanization and Spoliation._ With respect to Poland the Nazi
conspirators’ plans for Germanization and spoliation commenced with the
incorporation of the four western provinces of Poland into the German
Reich. In the remaining portions occupied by Germany they set up the
Government General. The Nazis planned to Germanize the so-called
incorporated territories ruthlessly by deporting Polish intelligentsia,
Jews, and dissident elements to the Government General, for eventual
elimination; by confiscating Polish property, particularly farms; by
sending those so deprived of their property to Germany as laborers; and
by importing German settlers. It was specifically planned to exploit the
people and material resources of the territory within the Government
General by taking whatever was needed to strengthen the Nazi war
machine, thus impoverishing this region and reducing it to a vassal
state. (_See Chapter XIII on Germanization and Spoliation._)
Goering, together with Hitler, Lammers, Frick, and Hess, signed the
decree purporting to incorporate certain parts of Polish territory into
the Reich. (Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the
Organization and Administration of the Eastern Territories, 8 October
1939, 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 2042.)
Purporting to act by virtue of section 8 of the foregoing decree,
Goering, as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, signed an order
concerning the introduction of the Four-Year Plan in the Eastern
Territories. (Order concerning the Introduction of the Four-Year Plan in
the Eastern Territories, 30 October 1939, 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part
I, p. 2125.)
Goering in a directive dated 19 October 1939 stated:
“In the meeting of October 13th, I have given detailed
instructions for the economical administration of the occupied
territories. I will repeat them here in short: 1. The task for
the economic treatment of the various administrative regions is
different depending on whether a country is involved which will
be incorporated politically into the German Reich or whether we
deal with the Government General, which, in all probability,
will not be made a part of Germany.
“In the first mentioned territories the reconstruction and
expansion of the economy, the safeguarding of all their
production facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well as
a complete incorporation into the Greater German economic system
at the earliest possible time. On the other hand there must be
removed from the territories of the Government General all raw
materials, scrap materials, machines, etc., which are of use for
the German war economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely
necessary for the meager maintenance of the naked existence of
the population must be transferred to Germany, unless such
transfer would require an unreasonably long period of time and
would make it more practical to exploit those enterprises by
giving them German orders to be executed at their present
location.” (_EC-410_)
Goering acted as chairman of a meeting on 12 February 1940 to discuss
“questions concerning the East,” attended also by Himmler and Frank.
From the minutes of this meeting it appears:
“By way of introduction, the General Field Marshal explained
that the strengthening of the war potential of the Reich must be
the chief aim of all measures to be taken in the East.”
(_EC-305_).
The hand of Goering may also be found in the remainder of the Nazi plans
for Poland. It was he, for example, who signed, with Hitler and Keitel,
the secret decree which entrusted Himmler with the task of executing the
Germanization program (_686-PS_). Similarly, it was Goering who, by
virtue of his powers as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, issued a
decree concerning confiscations in the incorporated eastern territories.
This decree applied to “property of citizens of the former Polish State
within the territory of the Greater German Reich, including the
incorporated Eastern Territories”, and provided in part:
“SECTION 1. (1) The property of citizens of the former Polish
State within the territory of the Greater German Reich,
including the incorporated Eastern territories, shall be subject
to sequestration, trustee administration, and confiscation in
accordance with the following provisions.
“(2) Subsection 1 shall not apply to the property of persons
who, in accordance with Section 6 of the decree of the Fuehrer
and Reich Chancellor relating to the organization and
administration of the Eastern Territories of October 8, 1935
(RGBl, I, p. 2042), have acquired German nationality. The agency
having jurisdiction in accordance with Section 12 may allow
further exemptions.
* * * * * *
“SECTION 2. (2) Sequestration shall be ordered in connection
with the property of:
_a_. Jews.
_b_. Persons who have fled or are not merely temporarily
absent.
“(2) Sequestration may be ordered:
_a_. If the property is required for the public welfare,
particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the
strengthening of Germanism.
_b_. If the owners or other title holders immigrated
into the territory of the German Reich as it was then
delimited, after October 1, 1918.
* * * * * *
SECTION 9. (1) Sequestrated property may be confiscated by the
competent agency (Section 12) for the benefit of the German
Reich if the public welfare, particularly the defense of the
Reich, or the strengthening of Germanism, so requires.”
(_1665-PS_).
The spoliation of Soviet territory and resources and the barbarous
treatment inflicted on Soviet citizens were the result of plans long
made and carefully drawn up by the Nazis before they launched their
aggressive war on the Soviet Union. The Nazis planned to destroy the
industrial potential of the northern regions occupied by their armies
and to administer the production of food in the south and southeast,
which normally produced a surplus of food, in such a way that the
population of the northern region would inevitably be reduced to
starvation because of diversion of such surplus food to the German
Reich. The Nazis also planned to incorporate Galicia and all the Baltic
countries into Germany and to convert the Crimea, an area north of the
Crimea, the Volga territory, and the district around Baku into German
colonies. Their plans were to Germanize or destroy. (_See Chapter XIII
on Germanization and Spoliation._)
By 29 April 1941, seven weeks prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union,
it appears that Hitler had entrusted Goering with the over-all direction
of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the
areas under political administration. It further appears that Goering
had set up an economic staff and subsidiary authorities to carry out
this function. (_1157-PS_)
The form of organization thus created by Goering and the duties of its
various sections appear more clearly in a set of directives “for the
operation of the economy in the newly occupied territories” issued by
Goering, as Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich in July 1941. By
the terms of these directives, it is stated “The Orders of the Reich
Marshal cover all economic fields, including nutrition and agriculture.
They are to be executed by the subordinate economic offices.” An
“Economic Staff, East” was charged with the execution of orders
transmitted to it from higher authority. One subdivision of this staff,
entitled “Group La”, was charged with the following functions:
“Nutrition and Agriculture, the economy of all agricultural products,
provision of supplies for the Army, in cooperation with the Army groups
concerned.” (_EC-472_; _1743-PS_.)
As appears from the foregoing documents, it was a subdivision of the
economic organization set by Goering, the Economic Staff, East,
Agricultural Group, which rendered a top secret report on 23 May 1941,
containing a set of policy directives for the exploitation of Soviet
agriculture. These directives contemplated abandonment of all industry
in the food deficit regions, with certain exceptions, and the diversion
of food from the food surplus regions to German needs, even though
millions of people would inevitably die of starvation as a result.
(_EC-126_)
Minutes of a meeting at Hitler’s Headquarters on 16 July 1941, kept by
Bormann, disclose Hitler’s announcement that the Nazis never intended to
leave the countries then being occupied by their Armies. The Fuehrer
further declared that although the rest of the world was to be deceived
on this point, nevertheless, “this need not prevent us taking all
necessary measures—shooting, desettling, etc.—and we shall take them,”
and he discussed making the Crimea and other parts of Russia into German
colonies. Goering was present and participated in this conference.
(_L-221_)
As a final illustration, it appears from a memorandum dated 16 September
1941 that Goering presided over a meeting of German military officials
concerned with the “better exploitation of the occupied territories for
the German food economy” and that in discussing this topic, Goering
said:
“It is clear that a graduated scale of food allocations is
needed.
“First in line are the _combat troops_, then the remainder of
troops in _enemy territory_, and then those _troops stationed at
home_. The rates are adjusted accordingly. The supply of the
_German_ non-military population follows and only then comes the
_population of the occupied territories_.
“In the occupied territories on principle only those people are
to be supplied with an adequate amount of food who work for us.
Even if one _wanted_ to feed all the other inhabitants, one
_could not_ do it in the newly occupied eastern areas. It is,
therefore, wrong to funnel off food supplies for this purpose,
if it is done at the expense of the Army and necessitates
increased supplies from home.” (_EC-3_)
C. _CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY._
(1) _Murder, Extermination, Enslavement, Deportation, and other Inhumane
Acts Committed against Civilian Populations before and during the War._
In 1936, Himmler became Chief of the German Police. Goering was
thereafter able to devote his attention chiefly to the tasks of creating
the German Air Force and preparing the nation economically for
aggressive war. As was inevitable from his position, however, Goering
continued to be concerned from time to time with the institutions of his
creation, such as the Gestapo and the concentration camps. For example,
on 14 February 1944, he sent the following teletype to Himmler:
“I received your request to form another squadron of air force
group for special purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7) and ordered examination
by the air force operational staff [_Luftwaffenfuerungstab_]. At
the same time I ask you to put at my disposal as great a number
of concentration camp [K Z—] convicts as possible for air
armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be very useful
according to previous experience. The situation of the air war
makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work of
this kind concentration camp [K Z—] convicts can be especially
well concentrated at work and in the camp. Such installations
are necessary in order to secure production of the now fully
developed most modern airplanes. The Fuehrer upon his visit in
Insterburg has attached great value to these airplanes.
Intermediate negotiations have already been held between my and
your departments. I would be especially grateful for your
support in carrying out this task.” (_1584-I-PS_)
On 9 March 1944 Himmler replied to the foregoing teletype as follows:
“Most honored Reichsmarshal:
“Following my teletype letter of the 18 February 1944 I herewith
transmit a survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation
industry.
“This survey indicates that at the present time about _36,000
prisoners_ are employed for the purposes of the air force. An
increase to a total of _90,000 prisoners_ is contemplated.
“The production is being discussed, established and executed
between the Reich Ministry of Aviation and the chief of my
Economic-Administrative Main Office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of the Waffen-SS, Pohl respectively.
“We assist with all forces at our disposal.”
There follows a report on the use of concentration camp prisoners in the
aviation industry. (_1584-III-PS_)
In Chapter XI on Concentration Camps and Chapter XV, section 5, on the
SS, reference is made to medical experiments performed on humans at the
concentration camp in Dachau. On 20 May 1942, Field Marshal Milch,
Secretary of State and Deputy to Goering as Air Minister, wrote to
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff the following letter:
“Dear Wolffy:
“In reference to your telegram of 12 May our sanitary inspector
reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the
SS and Air Force at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation
of these experiments seems essentially unreasonable. However,
the carrying out of experiments of some other kind, in regard to
perils at high seas, would be important. These have been
prepared in immediate agreement with the proper offices; Major
(M.C.) Weltz will be charged with the execution and Capt. (M.C.)
Rascher will be made available until further orders in addition
to his duties within the Medical Corps of the Air Corps. A
change of these measures does not appear necessary, and an
enlargement of the task is not considered pressing at this time.
“The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these
low-temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at another
place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau.
“I convey the special thanks from the supreme commander of the
Air Corps to the SS for their extensive cooperation.
“I remain with best wishes for you and in good comradeship and
with
Heil Hitler!
Always yours
/s/ E. Milch” (_343-PS_).
That Milch kept informed of the progress of the experiments may be seen
from the following letter which he sent to Himmler on 31 August 1942:
“Dear Mr. Himmler:
“I thank you very much for your letter of the 25 Aug. I have
read with great interest the reports of Dr. Rascher and Dr.
Romberg. I am informed about the current experiments. I shall
ask the two gentlemen to give a lecture combined with the
showing of motion pictures to my men in the near future.
“Hoping that it will be possible for me to see you at the
occasion of my next visit to Headquarters I remain with best
regards and
Heil Hitler!
/s/ yours
E. Milch” (_343-PS_).
Thus it is clear that the highest circles in the Air Ministry, of which
Goering was the head, were interested in these experiments.
(2) _Persecution of the Jews._ As was to be expected from his position
as Number 2 Nazi, Goering took an active part in the waging of the Nazi
program of persecution, the ultimate purpose of which was the
extermination of all Jews. To quote from Goering’s own book:
“The solution of the Jewish question has not yet been reached.
Whatever has happened so far has been done in a state of
necessity, in the interest of our own people; it was a reaction
against the ruin which this race has brought upon us.”
(_3461-PS_)
In 1935, Goering, as President of the Reichstag, in a speech urging that
body to pass the Nurnberg race laws, said:
“God has created the races. He did not want equality and
therefore we energetically reject any attempt to falsify the
concept of race purity by making it equivalent with racial
equality. * * * This equality does not exist. We have never
accepted such an idea and therefore we must reject it in our
laws likewise and must accept that purity of race which nature
and providence have destined for us.” (_3458-PS_)
Again, on 26 March 1938, Goering said in a speech in Vienna:
“I must direct a serious word to the City of Vienna. Today
Vienna cannot rightly claim to be a German City. One cannot
speak of a German City in which 300,000 Jews live. This city has
an important German mission in the field of culture as well as
in economics. For neither of these can we make use of the Jews.”
(_3460-PS_)
In the late fall of 1938, using as an excuse the murder of von Rath,
Secretary of the German Legation in Paris, the Nazi conspirators, acting
within the frame-work of economic preparation for aggressive war, began
the complete elimination of Jews from economic life, preparatory to
their physical annihilation. Goering as head of the Four-Year Plan, was
in active charge of this phase of the persecutions. The first step in
his campaign was a law requiring registration of all Jewish-owned
property. In April 1938 Goering and Frick signed such a law (_1406-PS_).
Armed with the information thus secured, the Nazi conspirators were
fully prepared to take the next step. The killing of von Rath in Paris
on 9 November 1938 was made the pretext for widespread “spontaneous”
riots, which included the looting and burning of many Jewish synagogues,
homes, and shops, all of which were carefully organized and supervised
by the Nazi conspirators. Goering was fully informed of measures taken.
(_3051-PS_; _3058-PS_)
Immediately after these riots, on 12 November 1938, Goering acted as
Chairman of a meeting at the Reich Ministry of Air, on the “Jewish
question,” attended by Funk, Goebbels, Heydrich, and others (_1816-PS_).
Goering made the purpose of the meeting clear at the outset. He said:
“Today’s meeting is of a decisive nature. I have received a
letter written on the Fuehrer’s orders by the Stabsleiter of the
Fuehrer’s deputy, Bormann, requesting that the ‘Jewish Question
be now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or
another. And yesterday, once again did the Fuehrer request by
‘phone for me to take coordinated action in the matter’.
“Since the problem is mainly an economic one, it is from an
economic angle that it shall have to be tackled. Naturally a
number of legal measures shall have to be taken which fall into
the sphere of the Minister for Justice and into that of the
Minister of the Interior; and certain propaganda measures shall
have to be taken care of by the office of the Minister for
Propaganda. The Minister for Finance and the Minister for
Economic Affairs shall take care of problems falling into their
respective resorts.” (_1816-PS_)
Goering then said that it was not sufficient to have demonstrations and
to burn down Jewish property. In such cases the real loss usually fell
on German insurance companies. He continued:
“I should not want to leave any doubt, gentlemen, as to the aim
of today’s meeting. We have not come together merely to talk
again but to make decisions, and I implore the competent
agencies to take all measures for elimination of the Jews from
German economy and to submit them to me, as far as it is
necessary.
“The fundamental idea in this program of elimination of the Jew
from German economy, is first, the Jew being ejected from the
economy transfers his property to the State. He will be
compensated. The compensation is to be listed in the debit
ledger and shall bring a certain percentage of interest. The Jew
shall have to live out of this interest. It is a foregone
conclusion, that this aryanizing, if it is to be done quickly,
cannot be made in the Ministry for Economy in Berlin. That way,
we would never finish * * *.
“It is my lot, so that the damage will not be greater than the
profit, which we are striving for.
“It is obvious, gentlemen, that the Jewish stores are for the
people, and not the stores. Therefore, we must begin here,
according to the rules previously laid down.
“The Minister for Economic Affairs shall announce which stores
he’ll want to close altogether. These stores are excluded from
aryanizing at once. Their stocks are to be made available for
sale in other stores; what cannot be sold, shall be processed
through the “Winterhilfe” or taken care of otherwise. However,
the sales values of these articles shall always be considered,
since the State is not to suffer but should profit through this
transformation. For the Chain and Department stores—I speak now
only of that, which can be seen, certain categories have to be
established, according to the importance of the various
branches.
“The trustee of the State will estimate the value of the
property and decide what amount the Jew shall receive.
Naturally, this amount is to be set as low as possible. The
representative of the State shall then turn the establishment
over to the “Arian” proprietor, that is, the property shall be
sold according to its real value.
“There begins the difficulties. It is easily understood that
strong attempt will be made to get all these stores to Party
members and to let them have some kind of compensations. I have
witnessed terrible things in the past; little chauffeurs of
Gauleiters have profited so much by these transactions that they
have now about half a million. You, gentlemen, know it. Is that
correct?” (_1816-PS_)
Specific measures to effect the “Arianization” of Jewish businesses were
then discussed. A representative of German insurance companies was
called in to assist in solving the difficulties created by the fact that
most of the Jewish stores and other property destroyed in the rioting
were in fact insured, in some cases ultimately by foreign insurance
companies. All present were agreed that it would be unfortunate to pass
a law which would have the effect of allowing foreign insurance
companies to escape from liability, and that moreover, so far as the
insurance companies were concerned, they had made a bargain and should
stand by it. The defendant Goering then suggested a solution:
“Goering: No. I don’t even dream of refunding the insurance
companies the money. The companies are liable. No, the money
belongs to the State. That’s quite clear. That would indeed be a
present for the insurance companies. You make a wonderful
Petidum there. You’ll fulfill your obligations, you may count on
that.” (_1816-PS_)
It is impossible here to quote further from the extensive discussion of
all phases of persecution of the Jews which took place at this meeting.
It is sufficient to point out that on the same day Goering, over his own
signature, promulgated three decrees putting into effect the most
important matters decided at the meeting. In the first of these decrees,
a collective fine of 1,000,000,000 RM was placed on all German Jews
(_1412-PS_). The second decree, entitled “A Decree on Elimination of
Jews from German Economic Life”, barred Jews from trades and crafts
(_2875-PS_). The third decree took care of the insurance question raised
in the morning’s meeting, by providing that insurance due to Jews for
various losses sustained by them was to be collected by the State.
For other examples, the energetic manner in which Goering took part in
driving the Jews from economic life at this period, see: _069-PS_;
_1208-PS_.
As the German armies moved into other countries, the anti-Jewish laws
were extended, often in a more stringent form, to the occupied
territories. Many of the decrees were not signed by Goering himself, but
were issued on the basis of decrees signed by Goering and introducing
the Four-Year Plan in the occupied territories. For example, reference
is made to the:
Order Concerning the Introduction of the Four-Year Plan in the
Eastern Territories, 30 October 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 2125.
Nevertheless, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Four-Year Plan, or
as Chairman of the Ministerial Council for National Defense, Goering
himself signed several anti-Jewish decrees for occupied territories,
including the following:
1939 Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1703, Verordnung ueber die
Ammeldung der Vermoegens von Juden in den sudetendeutschen
Gebieten, 2 December 1938 (Order concerning the registration of
the property of Jews in the Sudeten German territories), which
was the preliminary for sequestration of such property,
1939 Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 702, Verordnung ueber die
Einfuehrung der Luftschutzgesetzes in den sudetendeutschen
Gebieten, 31 March 1939 (Order concerning the introduction of
the Air Defense Law in the Sudeten German territories),
discriminating against Jews,
1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, I, p. 1270, Verordnung ueber die
Behandlung von Vermoegen der Angehoerigen des ehemaligen
polnischen Staates, 17 September 1940 (Order concerning
treatment of property of nationals of the former Polish State),
by which the property of Polish Jews was confiscated,
1940 Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1547, Kriegsachschaeden Verordnung
(War Damages Law), 30 November 1940, also discriminating against
Jews, and
1941 Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 759, Decree regarding
Administration of Criminal Law against Poles and Jews in the
Incorporated Eastern Territories, 4 December 1941, which
introduced especially stringent penal laws for Jews.
During the later years of the war, the program of the Nazi conspirators
for the complete physical annihilation of all Jews in Europe achieved
its full fury. While the execution of this program was for the most part
handled by the SS and the Security Police, Goering remains implicated in
the final phases of the Nazi “Solution” of the Jewish problem. On 31
July 1941, he wrote the following letter to the conspirator Heydrich:
“Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January
1939, which dealt with arriving at—through furtherance of
emigration and evacuation, a solution of the Jewish problem, as
advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you with making all
necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial
matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish
question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.
“Wherever other governmental agencies are involved, these are to
cooperate with you.
“I charge you furthermore to send me, before long, an overall
plan concerning the organizational, factual and material
measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired
solution of the Jewish question.” (_710-PS_)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO HERMANN WILHELM
GOERING
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 6
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 57
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
069-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 │ │
│January 1939, enclosing order of 28 │ │
│December 1938, concerning decisions on│ │
│Jewish question. (USA 589) │ III │ 116
│ │ │
*141-PS │Goering Order, 5 November 1940, │ │
│concerning seizure of Jewish art │ │
│treasures. (USA 368) │ III │ 188
│ │ │
*343-PS │Letter from Milch, Chief of the │ │
│Personal Staff, to Himmler, 31 August │ │
│1942, and letter from Milch to Wolff, │ │
│20 May 1942. (USA 463) │ III │ 266
│ │ │
*375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │
│report of Intelligence Division, │ │
│Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August │ │
│1938. (USA 84) │ III │ 280
│ │ │
*376-PS │Top secret memorandum signed by Major │ │
│Falkenstein, 29 October 1940, │ │
│concerning current military questions,│ │
│including question of occupation of │ │
│Atlantic Islands referring to the │ │
│United States. (USA 161) │ III │ 288
│ │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in │ │
│the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 │ │
│November 1937, signed by Hitler’s │ │
│adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 │ │
│November 1937. (USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*440-PS │Directive No. 8 signed by Keitel, 20 │ │
│November 1939, for the conduct of the │ │
│war. (GB 107) │ III │ 397
│ │ │
*447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │
│No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March │ │
│1941, concerning Directives for │ │
│special areas. (USA 135) │ III │ 409
│ │ │
*638-PS │Extract from minutes of Dr. Joel, 6 │ │
│October 1942, concerning Special │ │
│Purpose Group for Commando activities.│ │
│(USA 788) │ III │ 452
│ │ │
686-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │
│Chancellor to strengthen German │ │
│Folkdom, 7 October 1939, signed by │ │
│Hitler, Goering, Lammers and Keitel. │ │
│(USA 305) │ III │ 496
│ │ │
*710-PS │Letter from Goering to Heydrich, 31 │ │
│July 1941, concerning solution of │ │
│Jewish question. (USA 509) │ III │ 525
│ │ │
*789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,│ │
│23 November 1939, to which all Supreme│ │
│Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572
│ │ │
*798-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │
│Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, │ │
│22 August 1939. (USA 29) │ III │ 581
│ │ │
*1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │
│Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. │ │
│(USA 30) │ III │ 665
│ │ │
*1015-I-PS │Letter from Goering to Rosenberg, 30 │ │
│May 1942. (USA 385) │ III │ 670
│ │ │
*1117-PS │Goering Order, 1 May 1941, concerning │ │
│establishment of Einsatzstab Rosenberg│ │
│in all Occupied Territories. (USA 384)│ III │ 793
│ │ │
*1157-PS │Report on conference, 29 April 1941, │ │
│concerning top secret plan for │ │
│Economic exploitation of Soviet Areas │ │
│(Oldenburg Plan). (USA 141) │ III │ 811
│ │ │
*1183-PS │Letter of Commissioner for Four-Year │ │
│Plan, 29 January 1942, concerning │ │
│increased mobilization of manpower │ │
│from Occupied Territories and │ │
│preparation for mobilization by force.│ │
│(USA 585) │ III │ 830
│ │ │
1188-PS │Decree of Fuehrer concerning economy │ │
│in newly Occupied Eastern Territories,│ │
│20 May 1941, and attached comment. │ III │ 832
│ │ │
1193-PS │Letter, 14 November 1941, transmitting│ │
│report of conference of 7 November │ │
│1941 about employment of Soviet │ │
│Russians. (USA 785) │ III │ 834
│ │ │
*1206-PS │Notes of Goering’s remarks at the Air │ │
│Ministry, 7 November 1941, concerning │ │
│employment of laborers in war │ │
│industries. (USA 215) │ III │ 841
│ │ │
*1208-PS │Goering Order, 10 December 1938, │ │
│concerning Jewish question. (USA 590) │ III │ 845
│ │ │
*1301-PS │File relating to financing of armament│ │
│including minutes of conference with │ │
│Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 │ │
│October 1938, concerning acceleration │ │
│of rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868
│ │ │
*1317-PS │Top secret notes taken by Hamann of a │ │
│discussion of the economic │ │
│exploitation of Russia, presided over │ │
│by General Thomas, 28 February 1941. │ │
│(USA 140) │ III │ 911
│ │ │
*1375-PS │Letter from Frank to Goering, 25 │ │
│January 1940. (USA 172) │ III │ 925
│ │ │
1406-PS │Decree for reporting of Jewish-owned │ │
│property, 26 April 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 414. │ III │ 1001
│ │ │
1412-PS │Decree relating to payment of fine by │ │
│Jews of German nationality, 12 │ │
│November 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 1579. │ IV │ 6
│ │ │
*1584-I-PS │Teletype from Goering to Himmler, 14 │ │
│February 1944, concerning formation of│ │
│7th Airforce Group economy in newly │ │
│Occupied Eastern Territories, 20 May │ │
│1941, and attached comment. │ III │ 832
│ │ │
1584-III-PS │Correspondence between Himmler and │ │
│Goering, 9 March 1944, concerning use │ │
│of concentration camp inmates in │ │
│aircraft industry. (USA 457) │ IV │ 118
│ │ │
**1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │
│universal military conscription. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ IV │ 163
│ │ │
1665-PS │Order concerning treatment of property│ │
│of Nationals of the former Polish │ │
│State, 17 September 1940. 1940 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1270. │ IV │ 173
│ │ │
*1666-PS │Decree appointing Sauckel General │ │
│Plenipotentiary for Manpower, 21 March│ │
│1942 and decree of Goering conferring │ │
│certain powers on Sauckel, 27 March │ │
│1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│pp. 179-180. (USA 208) │ IV │ 182
│ │ │
*1709-PS │Report of Special Delegate for art │ │
│seizures, July 1943. (USA 378) │ IV │ 211
│ │ │
*1742-PS │Directives to Army Commands from │ │
│Goering, 26 October 1942, concerning │ │
│combatting of partisan activities. │ │
│(USA 789) │ IV │ 262
│ │ │
*1743-PS │Guiding principles for the economic │ │
│operations in the newly occupied │ │
│Eastern territories, June 1941. (USA │ │
│587) │ IV │ 263
│ │ │
*1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │
│Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │
│speech by Hitler to German High │ │
│Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │
│March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │
│Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272
│ │ │
1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
*1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February │ │
│1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377
│ │ │
*1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │
│The Jewish Question, under the │ │
│Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, │ │
│12 November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425
│ │ │
1862-PS │Ordinance for execution of Four Year │ │
│Plan, 18 October 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 887. │ IV │ 499
│ │ │
*2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │
│Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │
│30 August 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. │ │
│(GB 250) │ IV │ 650
│ │ │
*2031-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │
│Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB│ │
│217) │ IV │ 654
│ │ │
2089-PS │Decree relating to Reich Air Ministry,│ │
│5 May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 241. │ IV │ 719
│ │ │
2104-PS │Law on organization of Secret State │ │
│Police office, 26 April 1933. 1933 │ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 122. │ IV │ 730
│ │ │
2105-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 30 │ │
│November 1933. 1933 Preussische │ │
│Gesetzsammlung, p. 413. │ IV │ 731
│ │ │
2107-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 10 │ │
│February 1936. 1936 Preussische │ │
│Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22. │ IV │ 732
│ │ │
2108-PS │Decree for execution of Law on Secret │ │
│State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936│ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 22-24.│ IV │ 732
│ │ │
2168-PS │Book by SA Sturmfuehrer Dr. Ernst │ │
│Bayer, entitled “The SA”, depicting │ │
│the history, work, aim and │ │
│organization of the SA. (USA 411) │ IV │ 772
│ │ │
*2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │
│Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │
│Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │
│enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │
│Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843
│ │ │
*2233-A-PS │Frank Diary, │ │
│Abteilungsleitersitzungen, 1939-1940. │ │
│Minutes of conferences, December and │ │
│May 1940. (USA 173) │ IV │ 883
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │
│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │
│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │
│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │
│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │
│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2292-PS │Interview of Goering by representative│ │
│of London Daily Mail, concerning the │ │
│German Air Force, from German report │ │
│in The Archive, March 1935, p. 1830. │ │
│(USA 52) │ IV │ 995
│ │ │
*2324-PS │Extracts from Reconstruction of a │ │
│Nation, by Hermann Goering, 1934. (USA│ │
│233) │ IV │ 1033
│ │ │
2344-PS │Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering,│ │
│1934, p. 89. │ IV │ 1065
│ │ │
*2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30│ │
│August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23
│ │ │
2523-PS │Account of conversations between │ │
│Goering and Bunjes. (USA 783) │ V │ 258
│ │ │
2532-PS │Extract from The Third Reich, by Gerd │ │
│Ruehle. │ V │ 268
│ │ │
*2801-PS │Minutes of conversation between │ │
│Goering and Slovak Minister Durkansky │ │
│(probably late fall or early winter │ │
│1938-39). (USA 109) │ V │ 442
│ │ │
*2827-PS │Extract from The Third Reich, │ │
│concerning Four Years Plan, pp. │ │
│250-253. (USA 577) │ V │ 474
│ │ │
*2836-PS │Affidavit of offices and positions │ │
│held by Goering. (USA 4) │ V │ 503
│ │ │
2875-PS │Decree on exclusion of Jews from │ │
│German economic life, 12 November │ │
│1938. │ V │ 536
│ │ │
*2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from │ │
│Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA │ │
│76) │ V │ 628
│ │ │
*2950-PS │Affidavit of Frick, 19 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 448) │ V │ 654
│ │ │
*2962-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │
│15 March 1933. (USA 578) │ V │ 669
│ │ │
*2986-PS │Affidavit of the defendant, Wilhelm │ │
│Frick, 19 November 1945. (USA 409) │ V │ 688
│ │ │
*3005-PS │Letter from Reich Labor Ministry to │ │
│Presidents of Regional Labor Offices, │ │
│26 August 1941, concerning use of │ │
│Russian PWs. (USA 213) │ V │ 727
│ │ │
*3042-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Kajetan Muehlmann, 19│ │
│November 1945. (USA 375) │ V │ 754
│ │ │
**3047-PS │File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s │ │
│train on 12 September 1939; report on │ │
│execution of Jews in Borrisow; and │ │
│entries from diary of Admiral Canaris.│ │
│(USA 80) (Referred to but not offered │ │
│in evidence.) │ V │ 766
│ │ │
3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│ │
│all stations of State Police, 10 │ │
│November 1938, on measures against │ │
│Jews, and one order from Heydrich on │ │
│termination of protest actions. (USA │ │
│240) │ V │ 797
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*3058-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Goering, 11 │ │
│November 1938, reporting action │ │
│against the Jews. (USA 508) │ V │ 854
│ │ │
3251-PS │Extracts from Reconstruction of a │ │
│Nation by Hermann Goering. │ V │ 956
│ │ │
*3252-PS │Extract from book Hermann Goering, The│ │
│Man and His Work, by Eric Gritzbach, │ │
│1937. (USA 424) │ V │ 957
│ │ │
*3259-PS │Extract from book Hermann Goering, The│ │
│Man and His work, by Eric Gritzbach, │ │
│p. 69. (USA 424) │ V │ 1007
│ │ │
3440-PS │Speech of Goering entitled The Victory│ │
│over Communism in Germany, published │ │
│in The Archive, November-December │ │
│1934, pp. 1153-4. │ VI │ 150
│ │ │
*3441-PS │Speech by Goering, published in │ │
│Speeches and Papers, 1939, p. 242. │ │
│(USA 437) │ VI │ 150
│ │ │
*3442-PS │Hitler’s address to the Reichstag, 13 │ │
│July 1934, published in The Archive, │ │
│Vols. 4-6, p. 505. (USA 576) │ VI │ 151
│ │ │
*3458-PS │Speech by Hermann Goering on 15 │ │
│September 1935, from The Third Reich. │ │
│(USA 588) │ VI │ 158
│ │ │
*3460-PS │Speech by Goering, from Hermann │ │
│Goering Speeches and Papers. (USA 437)│ VI │ 160
│ │ │
3461-PS │Excerpt from Hermann Goering: │ │
│Reconstruction of a Nation. │ VI │ 160
│ │ │
*3471-PS │Letter from Keppler to Bodenschatz, 21│ │
│February 1938, with enclosures noting │ │
│activity of Leopold as leader of │ │
│Austrian Nazis and possible │ │
│appointment of Klausner as his │ │
│successor. (USA 583) │ VI │ 195
│ │ │
*3472-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 9 │ │
│February 1938, requesting that Leopold│ │
│be forbidden to negotiate with │ │
│Schuschnigg except with approval of │ │
│Reich authorities. (USA 582) │ VI │ 196
│ │ │
*3473-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 6 │ │
│January 1938, giving details of Nazi │ │
│intrigue in Austria. (USA 581) │ VI │ 197
│ │ │
*3474-PS │Manuscript notes by Bodenschatz on │ │
│conference of German Air Forces │ │
│leaders, 2 December 1936. (USA 580) │ VI │ 199
│ │ │
*3568-PS │Letter from SS Main Office, 25 July │ │
│1942, concerning enrollment into SS of│ │
│Reichsminister Albert Speer. (USA 575)│ VI │ 256
│ │ │
*3740-PS │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 6 March │ │
│1946. (USA 779) │ VI │ 635
│ │ │
3766-PS │Report prepared by the German Army in │ │
│France 1942 concerning removal of │ │
│French art objects through the German │ │
│Embassy and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg │ │
│in France. │ VI │ 646
│ │ │
3775-PS │Letter from Goering to his │ │
│brother-in-law, 21 November 1940, │ │
│concerning bomb destruction in │ │
│England. │ VI │ 652
│ │ │
3786-PS │Stenographic transcript of a meeting │ │
│in the Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 27 │ │
│January 1945. (USA 787) │ VI │ 655
│ │ │
*3787-PS │Report of the Second Meeting of the │ │
│Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939. │ │
│(USA 782) │ VI │ 718
│ │ │
*C-10 │OKW directive, 28 November 1939, │ │
│signed by Keitel, subject: Employment │ │
│of 7th Flieger Division. (GB 108) │ VI │ 817
│ │ │
*C-39 │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by │ │
│Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138)│ VI │ 857
│ │ │
*C-59 │Order signed by Warlimont for │ │
│execution of operation “Marita”, 19 │ │
│February 1941. (GB 121) │ VI │ 879
│ │ │
*C-62 │Directive No. 6 on the conduct of war,│ │
│signed by Hitler, 9 October 1939; │ │
│directive by Keitel, 15 October 1939 │ │
│on Fall “Gelb”. (GB 106) │ VI │ 880
│ │ │
*C-63 │Keitel order on preparation for │ │
│“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB │ │
│87) │ VI │ 883
│ │ │
*C-72 │Orders postponing “A” day in the West,│ │
│November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109) │ VI │ 893
│ │ │
*C-75 │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, │ │
│signed Keitel, 5 March 1941, │ │
│concerning collaboration with Japan. │ │
│(USA 151) │ VI │ 906
│ │ │
*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │
│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │
│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │
│Weiss” and directions for secret │ │
│mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932
│ │ │
*C-139 │Directive for operation “Schulung” │ │
│signed by Blomberg, 2 May 1935. (USA │ │
│53) │ VI │ 951
│ │ │
C-140 │Directive for preparations in event of│ │
│sanctions, 25 October 1935, signed by │ │
│Blomberg. (USA 51) │ VI │ 952
│ │ │
*C-159 │Order for Rhineland occupation signed │ │
│by Blomberg, 2 March 1936. (USA 54) │ VI │ 974
│ │ │
*C-174 │Hitler Order for operation │ │
│“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89) │ VI │ 1003
│ │ │
*D-729 │Notes on conversation between Goering │ │
│and Mussolini on 23 October 1942. (GB │ │
│281) │ VII │ 177
│ │ │
*D-730 │Statement of PW Walther Grosche, 11 │ │
│December 1945. (GB 279) │ VII │ 177
│ │ │
*D-731 │Statement of PW Ernst Walde, 13 │ │
│December 1945. (GB 278) │ VII │ 183
│ │ │
*D-769 │Telegram signed by Gen. Christiansen, │ │
│21 September 1940, relative to │ │
│application of capital punishment in │ │
│connection with Railway strike in │ │
│Holland. (GB 304) │ VII │ 229
│ │ │
*D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers, (GB 308) │ VII │ 232
│ │ │
*D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │
│June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │
│Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233
│ │ │
*D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234
│ │ │
D-779 │Letter from Reichsmarshal to Chief of │ │
│OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding │ │
│treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312) │ VII │ 235
│ │ │
*D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │
│Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │
│June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236
│ │ │
*D-781 │Note of OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, 23 June 1944, regarding │ │
│treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 314) │ VII │ 239
│ │ │
*D-783 │Note of a telephone communication, 26 │ │
│June 1944, with regard to treatment of│ │
│“Terrorist”-aviators. (GB 316) │ VII │ 240
│ │ │
*D-785 │Note from OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, 4 July 1944, concerning │ │
│“Terror”-flyers. (GB 318) │ VII │ 241
│ │ │
*EC-3 │Letter of Liaison Staff at Supreme │ │
│Headquarters, Armament Procurement │ │
│Office directed to General Thomas, │ │
│Chief of Wi Rue Amt, Berlin, 25 │ │
│November 1941. (USA 318) │ VII │ 242
│ │ │
*EC-126 │Economic Policy Directive for Economic│ │
│Organization, East, Agricultural │ │
│Group, 23 May 1941. (USA 316) │ VII │ 295
│ │ │
*EC-286 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │
│Goering, March-April 1937, concerning │ │
│price control. (USA 833) │ VII │ 380
│ │ │
*EC-305 │Minutes of meeting on 12 February │ │
│1940, under Chairmanship of Goering │ │
│concerning labor supply in the East. │ │
│(USA 303) │ VII │ 402
│ │ │
EC-317 │Order of Goering, 7 September 1943, │ │
│concerning evacuation of harvest crops│ │
│and destruction of means of production│ │
│in agricultural and food economy in │ │
│parts of Occupied Eastern Territories.│ │
│(USA 786) │ VII │ 405
│ │ │
*EC-408 │Memorandum report about the Four Year │ │
│Plan and preparation of the war │ │
│economy, 30 December 1936. (USA 579) │ VII │ 465
│ │ │
*EC-410 │Appendix to Goering’s directive of 19 │ │
│October 1939 concerning the economic │ │
│administration of Occupied │ │
│Territories. (USA 298) │ VII │ 466
│ │ │
*EC-472 │Directives of Reich Marshal Goering │ │
│concerning economic organization of │ │
│Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA │ │
│315) │ VII │ 539
│ │ │
**L-3 │Contents of Hitler’s talk to Supreme │ │
│Commander and Commanding Generals, │ │
│Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 28)│ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ VII │ 752
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May │ │
│1939,”Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
*L-83 │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July│ │
│1945. (USA 234) │ VII │ 859
│ │ │
*L-151 │Report from Ambassador Bullitt to │ │
│State Department, 23 November 1937, │ │
│regarding his visit to Warsaw. (USA │ │
│70) │ VII │ 894
│ │ │
*L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 │ │
│July 1941, concerning treatment of │ │
│Eastern populations and territories. │ │
│(USA 317) │ VII │ 1086
│ │ │
R-133 │Notes on conference with Goering in │ │
│Westerland on 25 July 1939, signed │ │
│Mueller, dated Berlin 27 July 1939. │ │
│(USA 124) │ VIII │ 202
│ │ │
*R-140 │Secret letter from Goering’s adjutant,│ │
│Major Conrath, 11 July 1938, enclosing│ │
│transcript of Goering’s speech of 8 │ │
│July to representatives of aircraft │ │
│industry. (USA 160) │ VIII │ 221
│ │ │
R-148 │Letter from Goering to Supreme Reich │ │
│authorities, 8 March 1940, concerning │ │
│treatment of male and female civilian │ │
│workers of Polish nationality; also │ │
│letters, orders, and memoranda │ │
│relating thereto. │ VIII │ 251
│ │ │
*TC-27 │German assurances to Czechoslovakia, │ │
│11 and 12 March 1938, as reported by │ │
│M. Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister │ │
│to London to Viscount Halifax. (GB 21)│ VIII │ 377
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
│ │ │
*Chart No. 10 │1938 Proposals for Luftwaffe Expansion│ │
│1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29) │ VIII │ 779
2. RUDOLF HESS
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY HESS._
(1) _Between 1919 and 1941, Hess held the following positions_:
(_a_) Member of the Nazi Party, 1920-1941 (_3191-PS_).
(_b_) Deputy to the Fuehrer, 21 April 1933 to 10 May 1941 (_3196-PS_).
(_c_) Reich Minister without Portfolio, 1 December 1933—10 May 1941
(_3178-PS_).
(_d_) Member of the Reichstag, 5 March 1933—10 May 1941 (_3192-PS_).
(_e_) Member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich,
30 August 1930—10 May 1941 (_2018-PS_).
(_f_) Member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 4 February 1938—10 May 1941
(_1377-PS_).
(_g_) Successor Designate to the Fuehrer, after Goering, 1 September
1939—10 May 1941 (_3190-PS_).
(_h_) General in the SS (_3198-PS_).
(_i_) Private Secretary and A. d. C. to Hitler, 1925-1932 (_3192-PS_).
(_j_) Head of the Central Political Committee of the N.S.D.A.P.,
appointed 15 December 1932 (_3132-PS_).
(_k_) _Reichsleiter_ of the N.S.D.A.P. (Member of the Party Directorate)
(_3198-PS_).
(_l_) Member of the Reichs Defense Council (_2261-PS_).
B. _PROMOTION OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER._
The Nazi Party was the conspiracy’s main instrument of control. As its
directing head, Hess used this instrument vigorously to advance the
purposes of the conspiracy. He thus played a decisive part in the
preparation and execution of its criminal designs.
Hess began his conspiratorial activities immediately upon the
termination of World War I by joining militaristic and nationalistic
organizations. He became a member of the Thule Society and of the Free
Corps Epp. In June 1920 he joined the Nazi Party, receiving membership
card No. 16 (_3191-PS_; _3347-PS_).
By 1923 Hess was an SA leader and head of the Nazi University
Organization in Munich. He took part in the Nazi Putsch of 8-9 November
1923. As a result he was tried and convicted on a charge of high treason
(_3132-PS_). He spent 7½ months of his 18 months’ sentence with Hitler
at the Landsberg Fortress (_3191-PS_). There Hitler dictated _Mein
Kampf_ to him (_3132-PS_).
After their release, Hess remained extremely close to Hitler. In 1925,
he became officially his private secretary and A. d. C. (_3192-PS_).
During the Party crisis which resulted from the sudden resignation of
Gregor Strasser, head of the Party’s Political Organization, in December
1932, Hitler called on Hess to take charge of the newly formed Central
Political Committee of the Party, in order to restore its strength and
unity (_3132-PS_).
Shortly thereafter, Hess took part in the decisive negotiations which
brought the Nazi conspirators into power on 30 January 1933 (_3132-PS_).
C. _ESTABLISHMENT OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL OVER GERMANY._
Upon the conspirators’ accession to power, Hess was appointed Deputy to
the Fuehrer of the NSDAP (_3196-PS_). His broad powers and
responsibilities in that position were officially described as follows:
“All the threads of the Party work are gathered together by the
Deputy of the Fuehrer. He gives the final word on all
intra-Party plans and all questions vital for the existence of
the German people. The Deputy of the Fuehrer gives the
directives required for all the Party work, in order to maintain
the unity, determination and striking power of the N.S.D.A.P. as
the bearer of the National-Socialist philosophy.” (_3163-PS_;
_Chart Number 15_).
Through Hess the Conspirators established the control of the Party over
the State. As a first step he obtained a seat in the Cabinet, which had
in effect become the sole legislative organ of the Reich (_2001-PS_;
_2426-PS_; _1395-PS_). As a Cabinet Minister, Hess signed the laws which
further strengthened the political power of the Nazi Party. Among these
enactments were the law of 1 August 1944 consolidating the positions of
Chief of State and Leader of the Party (_2003-PS_); and the law of 20
December 1934 against treacherous attacks on Party and State
(_1393-PS_).
Through a long series of decrees Hess obtained control over every aspect
of public and private life in Germany, in order to subvert it to the
aims of the conspiracy, as represented by the Party.
(1) _Hess gained control over all legislation._
A Hitler Decree of 27 July 1934 provided for Hess’s participation in the
drafting of all legislation (_D-138_). In a circular to Cabinet members
on 9 October 1939, Hess stated that he would in the future veto every
bill which reached him too late to allow him enough time for its
thorough study from the Party point of view (_D-139_). A letter from
Chief of the Reich Chancellery Lammers, on 12 April 1938, announced a
supplementary decree extending Hess’s participation, especially with
regard to the drafting of laws affecting individual States (_D-140_; see
_1942-PS_).
(2) _Hess gained control over all government appointments, including
those of the judiciary and university teachers._
A decree of 24 September 1935 provided for the consultation of Hess in
the appointment of Reich and State civil servants (_3180-PS_). A decree
of 10 July 1937 provided for the participation of the Fuehrer’s Deputy
in the appointment of Reich and State civil servants (_3184-PS)_. A
decree of 14 October 1936, signed by Hess, regulated the status of Reich
and State civil servants (_3183-PS_). A further decree of 3 April 1936
provided for Hess’s participation in the appointment of Labor Service
officials (_3182-PS_).
(3) _Hess gained control over Local Government Administration._
This control was effected through the German Municipality Act of 30
January 1935 provided for the participation of Party delegates
(_2008-PS_).
(4) _Hess gained control over the administration of annexed
territories._
Thus, the Ordinance of 10 June 1939 provided for Hess’s participation in
the administration of Austria (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1939, Part I, p. 995)
while another Ordinance of the same date provided for Hess’s
participation in the administration of the Sudetenland
(_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1939, Part I, p. 997).
(5) _Hess, in his capacity as Deputy Leader of the Party, gained control
over the German Youth._
An order of 10 July 1934 set up a University Commission of the NSDAP
under Hess; an Order of 18 July 1934 placed the NS German Student League
directly under Hess; and an Order of 14 November 1934 delegated to the
Student League exclusive jurisdiction over the political and ideological
education of German students (_3132-PS_). A Hess Decree of 3 June 1936
established the NS Aid Fund for the Struggle in the Universities
(_3203-PS_; see also _3132-PS_ and _1392-PS_).
The success of this entire program of legislation was described by
Hitler as follows:
“In this Reich everybody who has a responsible position is a
National Socialist * * * Every institution of this Reich is
under the orders of the supreme political leadership * * * The
Party leads the Reich (_2715-P_S; see _1774-PS_ and _3163-PS_).
In order to enable the conspirators to buttress their power through the
armed terror of the SA and SS, Hess, while not actually in control of
these Party formations, nevertheless gave them active support. Thus, he
was instrumental in establishing the Hitler Grant (a large fund
contributed annually by heavy German industry under the chairmanship of
Krupp) and in directing part thereof to the support of the SA and SS
(_D-151_).
When several SA men were convicted for mistreatment of inmates of the
Hohnstein concentration camp, two members of the jury which had voted
the conviction were expelled from the party (_784-PS_).
Finally, when Himmler, Reich Leader of the SS, organized the SD, Hess
issued an order establishing the SD as the sole political information
service of the Nazi Party, its functions to be exercised through the SS
(_3385-PS_).
Hess also sought to destroy the influence of the independent churches
among the German people, in order to wipe out every opposition to the
aims of the conspirators. Thus, Hess’s Chief of Staff, Bormann, issued
numerous orders and communications from Hess’s office against the
independent churches. Among these were the Secret Order of 27 July 1938
making clergymen ineligible for party offices (_113-PS_); the Party
Directive of 14 July 1939 making the clergy and theology students
ineligible for Party membership (_840-PS_); the letter of 22 February
1940 discussing ways and means of eliminating religious instruction from
the schools (_098-PS_); the report of 25 April on the progressive
substitution of National Socialist mottoes in place of morning prayers
in the schools (_070-PS_); the letter to Rosenberg of 17 January 1940
concerning the undesirability of religious literature for members of the
_Wehrmacht_ (_101-PS_); the instructions of 8 March 1940 against the
further issuance of newsprint to confessional newspapers (_089-PS_); and
the letter to the Minister of the Interior, in May 1938, agreeing to the
invalidation of the Concordat between Austria and the Holy See
(_675-PS_; _838-PS_ and _107-PS_).
D. _PREPARATION FOR WAR._
Hess was one of the members of the conspiracy who professed as early as
1933 the aim of complete world domination (_2385-PS_).
In pursuance of that aim Hess threw the power of the Party which he
directed, behind the war preparations of the conspiracy. Hess himself
described the Party, in this connection, as the mechanism with which to
“organize and direct offensively and defensively the spiritual and
political strength of the people” (_2426-PS_).
Hess’s tasks in the preparations for aggressive wars fell mainly into
the fields of military preparedness, political planning, and
fifth-column activities.
(1) _Rearmament._ Even before 1933 Hess took a personal interest in the
secret military training program of the uniformed Party organizations
(_1143-PS_).
After the conspirators had come to power, Hess was one of those who
echoed the cry of “guns for butter” in his speeches (_2426-PS_).
Hess signed the law which reintroduced universal military conscription
in Germany on 16 March 1935 (_1654-PS_). Hess admitted that signing this
law was no mere formality for him, but rather the realization of one of
his most important aims, when he declared in a speech to Army officers
in 1937:
“When I spoke about conscription after the 16th of March 1935,
in what used to be the most radical industrial plant of Munich *
* * to thousands and thousands of the same workers who but a few
years before had been singing the Internationale, I was
interrupted again and again by such applause and cheers as I
would never have believed possible. That was the most beautiful
and at the same time the most moving demonstration of my life
(_3124-PS_).
When the Nazi conspirators were ready to launch their aggressive wars in
the fall of 1938, Hess and the Party agencies under his control
cooperated with the Army High Command in the mobilization of the German
Army (_388-PS, Item 32_).
(2) _Political Planning for War._ When the Reich Defense Council was
reorganized in September 1938, Hess became one of its members with the
express assignment of assuring “the political direction of the nation”
(_2261-PS_).
Hess was also made a member of the Ministers’ Council for the Defense of
the Reich upon its creation in 1939. Here he continued to exercise an
important war-planning function with the specific task of “guaranteeing
the unity between Party and State” within that body (_2018-PS_;
_2608-PS_).
Hess’s functions in the field of political planning for war were not
limited to the domestic sphere. He was also a member of the Secret
Cabinet Council formed to advise Hitler on foreign policy planning
(_1377-PS_; _3189-PS_).
(3) _Fifth Column Activities._ Hess’ most important contribution to the
conspirators’ preparations for aggressive war lay in his organization of
the German fifth-columns abroad through the Foreign Organization
(_Auslands Organisation_ (AO)) of the Nazi Party and its various
affiliated semi-official organizations. Through these channels Hess
succeeded in building up conspiratorial shock-troops in foreign
countries, composed of citizens of these countries who were of German
“racial stock.” These foreign citizens were incited by Hess to acts of
treason against their country in furtherance of the plans of the
conspiracy. It was the subversive activities of these fifth-column
groups which prepared the way for the conspirators’ destruction of
independence of many countries. Principal among these were Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
As his chief instrument in this conspiratorial campaign Hess created the
Foreign Organization of the Nazi Party on 3 October 1933. This office
was placed directly under Hess, who from then on was known to take the
greatest personal interest in its rapid development and expansion
(_3258-PS_; _3401-PS_; _3254-PS_).
The Foreign Organization extended its activities not only to German
citizens living abroad but to all persons allegedly of German ancestry
regardless of their foreign citizenship. In the early years after the
conspirators’ rise to power and up to 1937 this aim was openly admitted
by the responsible heads of the Foreign Organization (_3258-PS_).
Hess announced that it was the task of the Foreign Organization to
organize all persons of the German race who lived abroad and to turn
them into active Nazi supporters, thus making them subservient to the
purposes of the conspiracy. In his speech at the 1937 Congress of the
Foreign Organization, Hess declared:
“You stand before me as a slice of the great German racial
community, the racial community which extends beyond the borders
of our Reich, for National Socialism has not only at home
created a national community transcending all classes and groups
in a way previously unknown, but it has also included German
racial comrades [_Volks-Genossen_] in foreign countries. It has
made them conscious and proud members of this racial community!
* * *
“Under the leadership of the Foreign Organization, Germandom
abroad is also becoming more and more _filled with the National
Socialist spirit_. The Foreign Organization, of the NSDAP has
brought together the Germans out there, who even long after the
seizure of power were disunited and split by class differences,
and joined them with Adolf Hitler’s Reich. The National
Socialist care for Germandom abroad is maintaining an enormous
number of Germans for the nation, who otherwise would be
absorbed as cultural fertilizer for other nations” (_3258-PS_).
The same principle was expressed bluntly by Gauleiter Ernst Bohle, head
of the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP directly under Hess from 1933
to 1945, who stated in his address at the Nurnberg Party Congress of
1936:
“The Fuehrer had to come in order to hammer into all of us the
fact that the German cannot choose and may not choose whether or
not he will be German but that he was sent into this world by
God as a German, that God thereby had laid upon him as a German
duties of which he cannot divest himself without committing
treason to Providence. _Therefore we believe and we know that
the German everywhere_ is a _German_—whether he lives in the
Reich or in Japan, in France or in China or anywhere else in the
world. _Not countries or continents, not climate or environments
but blood and race determine the world of ideas of the German._”
(_3258-PS_).
Hess was also in control of all other semi-official organizations
associated with the Foreign Organization in fifth-column work among
foreign citizens of German ancestry, for the purpose of gaining foreign
support for the conspiracy. Thus, by a Secret Circular of 3 February
1939, Hess ordered the consolidation of the undercover activities of all
organizations active in the foreign field, subject to the central
direction of SS Gruppenfuehrer Werner Lorenz, head of the
_Volks-deutsche Mittelstelle_ (Central Agency for Racial Germans)
(_837-PS_).
The two most important of these semi-official agencies were the VDA
(League for Germandom Abroad) and the DAI (German Foreign Institute).
The VDA was a vast world-wide organization giving financial support to
various activities of German groups abroad without regard to their
nationality. Its large funds were collected in Germany with the aid of
the Nazi Government (_3258-PS_). The aim of the activities of the VDA
was to establish a great German world empire of 100,000,000 inhabitants,
containing all persons of German “racial stock” everywhere, including
millions of American citizens (_3258-PS_). The DAI was a world-wide
information intelligence and propaganda service (_3258-PS_).
Hess repeatedly stressed the importance of using Germans abroad for
spreading Nazi propaganda (_3124-PS_).
The DAI also based its activities on the proposition that all persons of
German ancestry belonged to the Nazi German Reich, though they held
citizenship in foreign countries. This was stated by Nazi
Minister-President Mergenthaler of Wuerttemberg in his address at the
1933 annual meeting of the DAI:
“The liberalist ideology which has been overcome dealt with the
formal concept of the citizen. We have gotten rid of that. Today
the blood-united German racial comrade stands in the center.
That is the new foundation upon which we must build * * *. Hence
I want to impress on the DAI: Join us therefore in taking care
that the spirit of National Socialism also becomes alive among
the German racial comrades in foreign countries so that streams
of energy may emanate from it.” (_3258-PS_).
At the annual meeting held by the DAI in 1937, Frick restated in his
address the fundamental aim of this organization: to unite every person
of German “racial stock” under the control of the Nazi conspirators.
“* * * the new Germany has recognized that its attention and
devotion to the welfare of the millions of Germans who have not
the fortune to owe political allegiance to Germany, but who are
condemned to live abroad, are not merely a matter of natural
sympathy and solidarity but are in a higher degree dictated by
the strong political and economic interests of the Reich.”
(_3258-PS_).
It is noteworthy that the DAI was closely affiliated with the
German-American Bund, a subversive Nazi organization in the United
States. The DAI’s official periodical, “Germandom Abroad” (_Deutschtum
im Ausland_), was edited during the war by Walter Kappe, former press
chief of the Bund (_3258-PS_). Walter Kappe and Fritz Gissibl, another
former leader in the Bund, established on the premises of the DAI in
Stuttgart an organization called “Comradeship U. S. A.” The purpose of
this “Comradeship U. S. A.” was to maintain during the war an
organization for all Nazi Party members who had been active in the Bund
in the United States (_3258-PS_). Even before the outbreak of the war,
in the spring of 1939, Walter Kappe had undertaken to collect a complete
archive of Nazi activities in the U. S. on behalf of the DAI and the
Nazi Party (_3258-PS_).
The success of this world-wide fifth column directed by Hess is now a
matter of historical record. Hess himself guided the subversive foreign
groups which he had created until the day when the conspirators were
ready to annex the countries which they had undermined.
Thus, the annexation of Austria was principally due to the efforts of
the Nazi Party’s work within that country under the orders of Hess. As
early as 1934 Hess had appointed Reinthaler leader of the Nazi peasants
in Austria, and thus placed him in a position to take over the
leadership of the Nazi Fifth Column in Austria (_812-PS_). Hess took a
major part in the negotiations carried on by Seyss-Inquart and other
members of the conspiracy in preparation of the Anschluss (_3254-PS_;
_3425-PS_). When on 12 March 1938 Germany invaded Austria, Hess,
accompanied by Himmler, was the first member of the conspiracy to arrive
in Vienna at noon on the same day (_L-292_). The next day Hess signed
the decree by which the conspirators destroyed the independence of
Austria (_2307-PS_; _3075-PS_).
Once the conspirators had achieved their aim, Hess did not hesitate to
admit publicly that he had approved of the steps which led to the final
subjection of Austria. On 24 July 1938 he addressed a meeting held on
the fourth anniversary of the assassination of Austrian Chancellor
Dollfuss by members of the 89th SS Regiment. He devoted the larger part
of his speech to a justification of that assassination (_L-273_).
When the conspirators turned their attention to their next victim,
Czechoslovakia, Hess was again in the forefront directing the German
fifth-column in the Sudetenland. In his speech at the annual meeting of
the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP on 28 August 1938, Hess declared
that Nazi Germany was giving full backing to the demands of the Sudeten
German agitators. What such support meant in fact became very clear when
Hess pointed to the success of the Nazi policy in Austria (_3258-PS_).
All through the summer of 1938 Hess was engaged in consultations with
Karl H. Frank and Konrad Henlein, leaders of the Nazi Sudeten German
Party (_3061-PS_).
A few months later Hess could mark up another success for his
fifth-column. When the Munich Agreement forced Czechoslovakia to
surrender the Sudeten territory to Germany, Hess went to Reichenberg,
the capital of that district, as Hitler’s representative in order to
accept the official incorporation of the Sudeten German Party into the
Nazi Party on 5 November 1938. In his address on that occasion he
emphasized repeatedly that the Nazi conspirators had been ready to go to
war for the possession of the Sudetenland (_3204-PS_).
Hess also put his signature to the Act of 14 April 1939 setting up the
government of the Sudetenland as an integral part of the Reich
(_3076-PS_).
Later during the same year, after the conspirators had loosed their
first aggressive war, Hess signed the laws incorporating first Danzig
and then a large portion of Poland into the Reich (_3077-PS_; see also
Decree 8 October 1939 (RGBl 1939, Part I, p. 2042); Decree of 12 October
1939, Part I, p. 2077).
When in July 1941 the Nazi conspirators occupied Greece, the members of
the local Nazi Party were ready to take over as an auxiliary Army
service (_3258-PS_).
Thus, wherever the conspirators sent their invading armies Hess’
fifth-column had prepared the soil.
E. _PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY._
Hess, as Deputy Leader of the Nazi Party, had the task of realizing its
“ideological” program (_3200-PS_).
One of the demands of this conspiratorial program was the destruction of
so-called inferior racial stock. Persons who suffered from hereditary
insanity or other hereditary diseases were considered useless to the
Nazi community. They were therefore to be killed or at least to be
prevented from procreating their kind.
In order to carry out this plan Hess established a special Racial Policy
Division on his Staff under Dr. Walter Gross, by his order of 17
November 1933. This Division was to “participate with the competent
government agencies in all race and population measures” (_3322-PS_;
_3163-PS_). In addition, other agencies of the Nazi Party, under Hess,
actively cooperated in the administration of this criminal program
(_D-181_; _842-PS_; _1969-PS_).
In 1937 Hess publicly claimed credit for having used his Party
organization in order to gain the nation’s approval for compulsory
sterilization (_3124-PS_; _3067-PS_).
More important still in the Nazi program were the persecution and
extermination of religious and racial minorities. Hess vigorously
propagated the doctrine of the superiority of the German race with which
the conspirators sought to justify these persecutions (_3124-PS_).
The Nurnberg Laws, which constituted the legal basis of this campaign,
were the work of the Party. This was solemnly announced by Hitler in the
peroration of the address in which he announced these laws to the
Reichstag in Nurnberg 15 September 1935:
“I now propose to the Reichstag the acceptance of those laws
which Party member Goering will read to you.
“The first and second laws fulfill the program of the National
Socialist Party in one important respect, and thereby pay a debt
of gratitude to the Movement under whose symbol Germany has
regained her freedom.
“The second law constitutes an attempt to solve by legislation a
problem, the final solution of which, if it should again fail,
will then have to be referred by law to the National Socialist
Party. All three laws are backed by the National Socialist Party
and with it and behind it by the German Nation.
“I ask you to accept these laws.” (_3419-PS_).
Hess, along with Frick, was placed in charge of the administration of
the Nurnberg Laws and of the issuance of ordnances and regulations
thereunder (_1416-PS_; _3179-PS_; _1417-PS_; _2124-PS_).
With the launching of their aggressive wars, the Nazi conspirators
embarked on the execution of their plan to exterminate the non-German
populations which fell into their hands. This plan, especially insofar
as it concerned the Jews, had been bluntly revealed by Hitler well in
advance in his address to the Reichstag on 30 January 1939:
“If inter-national finance-Jewry inside and outside Europe
should succeed in throwing the nations into another _World War_,
the result will not be the Bolshevization of the earth and thus
the victory of Jewry, but the _destruction of the Jewish race in
Europe_!” (_3418-PS_).
In support of this campaign, which was continued by his co-conspirators
after his flight to Scotland, Hess issued an order through his Party
Chancery on behalf of the SS, which had been put in charge of the
extermination program. In this order, Hess demanded the support of all
Party members for the recruiting drive of the SS Army Corps (Waffen SS).
Hess added that these SS formations were scheduled for service in the
Eastern occupied areas, where their “special training in race matters”
could be used to best advantage (_3245-PS_).
By a series of further legislative and administrative measures, Hess
participated in the establishment of a special regime in Poland which
deprived the inhabitants of that country of their legal protection, and
thus initiated their wholesale extermination (_R-139_; _R-96_; _R-141_).
In pursuance of the same policy Hess signed the decree which forced
certain groups of Polish citizens to surrender their original national
allegiance and to accept German citizenship (Decree of 24 October 1939,
RGBl 1939, Part I, p. 2077).
Hess also signed the decree establishing the German Racial Register,
under which Allied nationals of German stock were registered and then
compelled to accept German nationality and to remove to German territory
(_2917-PS_).
Hess also used Party channels in order to incite the German people to
violations of the rules of war. Thus, he ordered that the population be
instructed to seize Allied parachutists or to “liquidate them”
(_062-PS_).
Hess also issued instructions to enforce Hitler’s orders prohibiting the
reconstruction of the city of Warsaw or of any of Poland’s destroyed
industries (_EC-411_).
On 10 May 1941, Hess flew to Scotland for the purpose of seeking an end
to the war with England, and support for Germany’s demands against
Russia. Upon his arrival, he was incarcerated and thus forcibly
eliminated from further participation in the crimes of the conspiracy
(_D-614_).
F. _CONCLUSION._
Of all the members of the Nazi conspiracy, Hess was closest to Hitler
from the first. As Hitler’s secretary and A. d. C., as his Deputy, and
finally as his Second Successor Designate, Hess was at all times his
direct representative in all Party matters. Thus, the conspiracy’s most
powerful instrument of political action rested in his hands.
Hess used this power to penetrate and dominate the German government
administration with National Socialist functionaries; to control
legislation and education; and to persecute all independent groups,
especially the churches and the Jews.
Being responsible for the political direction and control of the German
people, through the Party, Hess played a decisive role in preparing the
nation for war. He furthered the secret rearmament of the Party’s
military formations; he signed the Conscription Law of 1935; he sat on
the Reichs Defense Council, the inner Cabinet in which the heads of the
conspiracy blue-printed the administrative, economic, and political
preparation of their aggressive wars.
Hess, above, all, was responsible for the creation and direction of the
Nazi fifth-column, in which foreign citizens of German extraction joined
under the Nazi banner to weaken and undermine those countries which the
Nazi conspirators had determined to subjugate.
All through the years from 1920 to 1941 Hess remained the most faithful
and relentless executor of Hitler’s aims and designs. This complete
devotion to the success of the conspiracy was climaxed by his flight to
Scotland in an attempt to end the war with England and to receive
English support for Germany’s demands against Russia, which he had
helped to prepare.
The share of Hess’ participation in the Nazi conspiracy is as great as
that of the Party which he directed. The Party’s crimes are his.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO RUDOLF HESS
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 58
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*062-PS │Top secret Hess directive of 13 March │ │
│1940, concerning behavior in case of │ │
│landings of enemy planes or │ │
│parachutists. (USA 696) │ III │ 107
│ │ │
070-PS │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,│ │
│25 April 1941, on substitution of │ │
│National Socialist mottos for morning │ │
│prayers in schools. (USA 349) │ III │ 118
│ │ │
*089-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8 │ │
│March 1940, instructing Amann not to │ │
│issue further newsprint to │ │
│confessional newspapers. (USA 360) │ III │ 147
│ │ │
*098-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22 │ │
│February 1940, urging creation of │ │
│National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │ │
│provide moral foundation for NS │ │
│religion. (USA 350) │ III │ 152
│ │ │
*101-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,│ │
│concerning undesirability of religious│ │
│literature for members of the │ │
│Wehrmacht. (USA 361) │ III │ 160
│ │ │
*107-PS │Circular letter signed Bormann, 17 │ │
│June 1938, enclosing directions │ │
│prohibiting participation of │ │
│Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious │ │
│celebrations. (USA 351) │ III │ 162
│ │ │
*113-PS │Secret Order issued by Hess’ Office │ │
│signed Bormann, 27 July 1938, making │ │
│clergymen ineligible for Party │ │
│offices. (USA 683) │ III │ 164
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
675-PS │Letter from Hess’ office to Minister │ │
│of Interior, signed Bormann, 25 August│ │
│1938, agreeing to invalidation of │ │
│Concordat between Austria and Holy │ │
│See. │ III │ 482
│ │ │
784-PS │Letters from Minister of Justice to │ │
│Hess and SA Chief of Staff, 5 June │ │
│1935, concerning penal proceedings │ │
│against merchant and SA leader and 22 │ │
│companions because of inflicting │ │
│bodily injury on duty. (USA 732) │ III │ 559
│ │ │
*812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │
│22 August 1939 and report from │ │
│Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │
│Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │
│events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │
│1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586
│ │ │
*837-PS │Secret circular by Hess, 3 February │ │
│1939, concerning National League of │ │
│Germans abroad and the German Eastern │ │
│League. (GB 265) │ III │ 603
│ │ │
*838-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann, 3 June 1939, referring to │ │
│Hitler’s Decree of 6 March 1939 which │ │
│precluded Christian Scientists from │ │
│joining the Party. (USA 684) │ III │ 605
│ │ │
*840-PS │Party Directive, 14 July 1939, making │ │
│clergy and theology students │ │
│ineligible for Party membership. (USA │ │
│355) │ III │ 606
│ │ │
842-PS │Correspondence between Party │ │
│officials, 30 December 1940, │ │
│concerning killing of the insane. │ III │ 609
│ │ │
*1143-PS │Letter from Schickendanz to Rosenberg,│ │
│20 October 1932, for personal │ │
│transmission to Hess concerning │ │
│organization of Air Force. (USA 40) │ III │ 806
│ │ │
1377-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │
│Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111. │ III │ 931
│ │ │
1392-PS │Law on the Hitler Youth, 1 December │ │
│1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 993. │ III │ 972
│ │ │
1393-PS │Law on treacherous attacks against │ │
│State and Party, and for the │ │
│Protection of Party Uniforms, 20 │ │
│December 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 1269. │ III │ 973
│ │ │
*1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
1416-PS │Reich Citizen Law of 15 September │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 1146. │ IV │ 7
│ │ │
*1417-PS │First regulation to the Reichs │ │
│Citizenship Law, 14 November 1935. │ │
│1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│1333. (GB 258) │ IV │ 8
│ │ │
**1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │
│universal military conscription. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ IV │ 163
│ │ │
*1774-PS │Extracts from Organizational Law of │ │
│the Greater German Reich by Ernst │ │
│Rudolf Huber. (GB 246) │ IV │ 349
│ │ │
*1866-PS │Record of conversation between Reich │ │
│Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May │ │
│1941. (GB 273) │ IV │ 499
│ │ │
1942-PS │Hess’ participation in legislative │ │
│process, published in Legal │ │
│Regulations and Legal Problems of the │ │
│Movement, by Dr. O. Gauweiler, p. 20. │ IV │ 584
│ │ │
1969-PS │Correspondence of party officials, │ │
│concerning killing of insane. │ IV │ 602
│ │ │
2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │
│and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638
│ │ │
2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │
│the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639
│ │ │
2008-PS │German Communal Ordinance, 30 January │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 49. │ IV │ 643
│ │ │
*2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │
│Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │
│30 August 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. │ │
│(GB 250) │ IV │ 650
│ │ │
*2124-PS │Decree introducing the Nurnberg Racial│ │
│Laws into Austria, 20 May 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 594. (GB│ │
│259) │ IV │ 755
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │
│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │
│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │
│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │
│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │
│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
*2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30│ │
│August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23
│ │ │
*2426-PS │Extracts from Speeches, by Hess. (GB │ │
│253) │ V │ 90
│ │ │
*2608-PS │Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The│ │
│Administration in Wartime”. (USA 714) │ V │ 327
│ │ │
2715-PS │Speech by Hitler to the Reichstag on │ │
│20 February 1938, published in The │ │
│Archive, February 1938, Vol. 47, pp. │ │
│1441-1442. (USA 331) │ V │ 376
│ │ │
*2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │
│Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │
│Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │
│program for Sudeten agitation, 29 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422
│ │ │
2917-PS │Decree concerning German people’s list│ │
│and German nationality in the │ │
│incorporated Eastern Territories of 4 │ │
│March 1941. 1941 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 118. │ V │ 587
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*3061-PS │Supplement No. 2 to the Official │ │
│Czechoslovak Report entitled “German │ │
│Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” │ │
│(document 998-PS). (USA 126) │ V │ 857
│ │ │
3067-PS │Law for the prevention of offspring │ │
│with Hereditary diseases, 14 July │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 529. │ V │ 880
│ │ │
3075-PS │Law for the building up of │ │
│administration in Ostmark, 14 April │ │
│1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 777. │ V │ 884
│ │ │
3076-PS │Law for building up of administrations│ │
│in Reich Gau Sudetenland, 14 April │ │
│1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 780. │ V │ 889
│ │ │
3077-PS │Law regarding reunion of Free City of │ │
│Danzig with German Reich of 1 │ │
│September 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1547. │ V │ 891
│ │ │
3124-PS │Extracts from Rudolf Hess—Speeches. │ │
│(GB 253) │ V │ 902
│ │ │
3132-PS │Extracts from Dates of the History of │ │
│the NSDAP, 1939. │ V │ 906
│ │ │
3163-PS │The Deputy of the Fuehrer—Rudolf Hess,│ │
│published in National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1941, pp. 219-22. │ V │ 914
│ │ │
*3178-PS │Law to Secure the Unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 248) │ V │ 916
│ │ │
3179-PS │Law for the Protection of German Blood│ │
│and Honor of 15 September 1935. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1146. │ V │ 916
│ │ │
3180-PS │Decree providing for the participation│ │
│of the Fuehrer’s Deputy in appointment│ │
│of officials, 24 September 1935. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1203. │ V │ 918
│ │ │
3182-PS │Decree concerning participation of │ │
│Deputy Fuehrer in the appointment of │ │
│Labor Service Leaders and Heads of │ │
│departments of Reich, 3 April 1936. │ │
│1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│373. │ V │ 918
│ │ │
3183-PS │Reich Regulations for enlistment, │ │
│employment and promotion of Reich and │ │
│Provincial officials, 14 October 1936.│ │
│1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, p. 893. │ V │ 919
│ │ │
3184-PS │Order of Fuehrer and Reichchancellor │ │
│concerning appointment of Civil │ │
│Servants and termination of employment│ │
│as Civil Servants of 10 July 1937. │ │
│1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│769. │ V │ 921
│ │ │
3189-PS │Greater Germany, published in │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Vol. VI,│ │
│Part 1, pp. 4-5. (GB 249) │ V │ 922
│ │ │
3190-PS │The Development of the Reich, │ │
│published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, Vol. VII, Part 1, p. 264. │ V │ 923
│ │ │
3191-PS │Extracts from German Fuehrer │ │
│Dictionary, 1934-1935, p. 25, │ │
│concerning Hess. │ V │ 923
│ │ │
3192-PS │Extract concerning Hess from The │ │
│German Reichstag, p. 180. │ V │ 924
│ │ │
3196-PS │Hitler decree of 21 April 1933, │ │
│published in National Socialist Party │ │
│Correspondence, 27 April 1933, p. 1. │ V │ 924
│ │ │
3197-PS │First decree for execution of Sudeten │ │
│Gau Law of 10 June 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 997. │ V │ 924
│ │ │
3198-PS │Official Party News, 26 September │ │
│1933, published in National Socialist │ │
│Party Correspondence. │ V │ 927
│ │ │
3200-PS │Extract concerning Hess as Deputy │ │
│Fuehrer from National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1939, pp. 188-189. │ V │ 927
│ │ │
3203-PS │Hess decree of 3 June 1936 │ │
│establishing the NS Aid Fund for the │ │
│Struggle in the Universities, reported│ │
│in The Third Reich, 1937, Vol. IV, p. │ │
│360. │ V │ 927
│ │ │
3204-PS │Ceremonial Initiation of Sudeten │ │
│German Party into NSDAP by Rudolf │ │
│Hess, published in Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, 7 November 1938, p. 5. │ V │ 928
│ │ │
*3245-PS │Order of 21 February 1940, concerning │ │
│recruiting for Waffen SS, published in│ │
│Decrees, Regulations, Announcements, │ │
│Vol. III, p. 354. (GB 267) │ V │ 946
│ │ │
3254-PS │The Austrian Question, 1934-1938, by │ │
│Seyss-Inquart, 9 September 1945. (USA │ │
│704) │ V │ 961
│ │ │
*3258-PS │Extracts from National Socialism Basic│ │
│Principles, Their Application by the │ │
│Nazi Party’s Foreign Organization, and│ │
│the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi │ │
│Aims, by U. S. Government Printing │ │
│Office, Washington, 1943. (GB 262) │ V │ 997
│ │ │
3322-PS │Office for Racial Policies of NSDAP, │ │
│from Organization Book of NSDAP, 1940,│ │
│p. 330. │ VI │ 38
│ │ │
3347-PS │Seniority List of the SS, of NSDAP, as│ │
│of 1 December 1936. │ VI │ 78
│ │ │
*3385-PS │Hess Order of 14 December 1938 │ │
│concerning position of the SD within │ │
│the Party, from Decrees, Regulations, │ │
│Announcements, Vol. IV, Part I, p. │ │
│231. (GB 257) │ VI │ 104
│ │ │
*3401-PS │National Socialism and German │ │
│Nationalism Abroad, from Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, 24 May 1934, p. 2. (GB │ │
│263) │ VI │ 120
│ │ │
3418-PS │Destruction of the Jewish race, from │ │
│The Archive, January 1939, p. 1605. │ VI │ 121
│ │ │
3419-PS │Extract from The Party Congress of │ │
│Freedom, 1936, pp. 258-259. │ VI │ 122
│ │ │
*3425-PS │Voluntary statement made by │ │
│Seyss-Inquart with advice of counsel, │ │
│10 December 1945. (USA 701) │ VI │ 124
│ │ │
*3796-PS │Letter of Canaris enclosing a report, │ │
│25 October 1939, concerning the │ │
│activities of Auslands organization. │ │
│(GB 286) │ VI │ 732
│ │ │
3817-PS │File of correspondence and reports by │ │
│Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. │ │
│(USA 790) │ VI │ 752
│ │ │
*D-138 │Decree of 27 July 1934, providing for │ │
│participation of Fuehrer’s deputy in │ │
│the drafting of all legislation. (USA │ │
│403) │ VI │ 1055
│ │ │
*D-139 │Letter from Hess to Goebbels, 9 │ │
│October 1934, concerning participation│ │
│in legislation of the Reich. (USA 404)│ VI │ 1056
│ │ │
*D-140 │Letter from Lammers to Reich │ │
│Ministers, 12 April 1938. (USA 405) │ VI │ 1057
│ │ │
*D-151 │Krupp, Schacht and Hess correspondence│ │
│in 1933 regarding the Hitler Fund. (GB│ │
│256; USA 831) │ VI │ 1060
│ │ │
*D-181 │Circular from Gauleiter of South │ │
│Westphalia, 21 January 1937, │ │
│concerning Hereditary Health Law. (GB │ │
│528) │ VI │ 1073
│ │ │
D-614 │Statement of British Secretary of │ │
│State for Foreign Affairs in │ │
│Parliament on 22 September 1943. │ VII │ 94
│ │ │
*EC-411 │Order by Hess concerning the │ │
│reconstruction of certain industrial │ │
│enterprises in Poland, 20 November │ │
│1939. (USA 299) │ VII │ 469
│ │ │
*L-273 │Report of American Consul General in │ │
│Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July │ │
│1938, concerning anniversary of │ │
│assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. │ │
│(USA 59) │ VII │ 1094
│ │ │
*L-292 │Telegram of American Consul General in│ │
│Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March│ │
│1938, concerning propaganda dropped │ │
│over Vienna. (USA 78) │ VII │ 1098
│ │ │
M-102 │Extract from National Zeitung, 27 │ │
│April 1942, concerning Hess. (GB 254) │ VIII │ 32
│ │ │
M-103 │Speech by Hess to representatives of │ │
│Foreign Chamber of Commerce, from │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 30 June 1934. │ VIII │ 33
│ │ │
*M-104 │Speech by Hess at inauguration of new │ │
│Adolf Hitler Hall at Hof, from │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 13 October 1936. │ │
│(GB 260) │ VIII │ 33
│ │ │
*M-105 │Speech by Hess at meeting of Reich │ │
│Chamber of Labour at Messerschmitt │ │
│Works, from Voelkischer Beobachter, 2 │ │
│May 1941. (GB 261) │ VIII │ 34
│ │ │
*M-107 │Speech by Hess at 7th Annual Meeting │ │
│of Foreign Organization of NSDAP, from│ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 28 August │ │
│1939. (GB 266) │ VIII │ 35
│ │ │
M-108 │Speech by Hess broadcast on Fuehrer’s │ │
│birthday, 20 April 1941. │ VIII │ 37
│ │ │
*M-116 │Report of interview with Hess by Wing │ │
│Commander the Duke of Hamilton, 11 May│ │
│1941. (GB 269) │ VIII │ 37
│ │ │
*M-117 │Record of interview with Hess, 13 May │ │
│1941. (GB 270) │ VIII │ 40
│ │ │
*M-118 │Record of interview with Hess, 14 May │ │
│1941. (GB 271) │ VIII │ 43
│ │ │
*M-119 │Record of conversation with Hess, 15 │ │
│May 1941. (GB 272) │ VIII │ 45
│ │ │
M-120 │“The VDA and the Nazi Party”, │ │
│extracted from German Basic Handbook, │ │
│Part III, Chap. IV. │ VIII │ 46
│ │ │
M-121 │“German Foreign Institute”, extracted │ │
│from German Basic Handbook, Part III, │ │
│Chap. IV. │ VIII │ 47
│ │ │
*M-122 │“The Problem of German Minorities”, │ │
│from German Basic Handbook, Part III, │ │
│Chap. IV. (GB 264) │ VIII │ 48
│ │ │
R-96 │Correspondence of Minister of Justice │ │
│in preparation of the discriminatory │ │
│decree of 4 December 1941 regarding │ │
│criminal justice against Poles and │ │
│Jews in annexed Eastern Territories. │ │
│(GB 268) │ VIII │ 72
│ │ │
R-139 │Correspondence between Hess’ office │ │
│and the Ministry of Justice concerning│ │
│civil law in Eastern Territories. │ VIII │ 209
│ │ │
R-141 │Minutes of conference directed by │ │
│Hess’ assistants, 20 February 1941, │ │
│concerning racial problems in Armed │ │
│Forces. │ VIII │ 236
│ │ │
Affidavit F │Affidavit of Josef Dietrich, 20-21 │ │
│November 1945. │ VIII │ 631
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
│ │ │
*Chart No. 15 │Staff of the Fuehrer’s Deputy. │
│(3201-PS; GB 251) │ End of VIII
3. JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY RIBBENTROP._
According to Ribbentrop’s own certified statement (_2829-PS_), he became
a member of the Nazi Party in 1932, but according to the semi-official
statement in “_Das Archiv_,” he had gone to work for the Party before
that time by extending his business connections to political circles.
Having joined the service of the Party in 1930 at the time of the final
struggle for power in the Reich, “Ribbentrop played an important if not
strikingly obvious part in the bringing about of the decisive meetings
between the representatives of the President of the Reich and the heads
of the NSDAP, who had prepared the entry of Nazis into power on
30-1-1933. Those meetings as well as those between Hitler and von Papen
took place in Ribbentrop’s house in Berlin Dahlen.” (_D-472_).
Ribbentrop was therefore present and active at the inception of the Nazi
seizure of power. In that first period he was advisor to the Party on
questions of foreign affairs. His title was first, “Collaborator to the
Fuehrer on matters of Foreign Policy.” He later became Representative in
Matters of Foreign Policy on the Staff of the Deputy.
This was followed by membership in the Nazi Reichstag in November 1933.
On 24 April 1934 after Germany had left the disarmament conference, he
was appointed Delegate of the Reich Government in matters of
Disarmament. In this capacity he visited London and other foreign
capitals. He was then given a more important and imposing title, the
German Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, and it was in that capacity
that he negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935.
In March 1936, after the Nazi Government had reoccupied the Rhineland
zone, which had been demilitarized in accordance with the terms of the
Versailles and Locarno Treaties, and the matter was brought before the
Council of the League of Nations, Ribbentrop addressed the Council in
defense of Germany’s action.
On 11 August 1936 he was appointed Ambassador in London, and occupied
that position for a period of some eighteen months. His activities while
holding that position are not highly relevant to the issues, but during
that period, in his capacity which he still had as German Minister
Plenipotentiary at Large, he signed the original Anticomintern Pact with
Japan in November 1936, and also the additional pact by which Italy
joined it in 1937.
Finally, on 24 February 1938, Ribbentrop was appointed Foreign Minister
in place of von Neurath, and simultaneously was made a member of the
Secret Cabinet Council (_Geheimer Kabinettsrat_) established by decree
of Hitler of the same date (_1337-PS_).
Ribbentrop became an _Oberfuehrer_ in the SS, was subsequently promoted
to SS _Gruppenfuehrer_ in 1938, and later became _Obergruppenfuehrer_.
There is no question of any honorary rank. The SS went into his ancestry
in detail in order to deal with the law relating to that subject.
Ribbentrop was also permitted to adopt “von” as a prefix before his last
name (_D-636_).
These activities of Ribbentrop in the earlier part of his career show in
themselves that he assisted willing and deliberately in bringing the
Nazis into power, and in the earlier stage of their obtaining control of
the German State.
B. _RIBBENTROP’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO LAUNCH AND WAGE WARS OF
AGGRESSION._
(1) _The Austrian Anschluss._ Ribbentrop was present at a meeting at
Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, at which Hitler and von Papen met the
Austrian Chancellor von Schuschnigg and his foreign minister, Guido
Schmidt. The official German account of that interview is contained in
_2461-PS_. What appears to be the truthful account of that interview is
contained in Jodl’s diary, the entries for 11 and 12 February 1938
(_1780-PS_).
On 11 February Jodl wrote:
“In the evening, and on 12 February, General Keitel with General
von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzburg. Schuschnigg, together
with R. G. Schmidt, are again being put under the heaviest
political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs
protocol.” (_1780-PS_)
The 13 February entry reads:
“In the afternoon, General Keitel asks Admiral Canaris and
myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s
order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming
military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for
these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the
Fuehrer by telephone for approval.
“14 February:
“At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrived. Canaris
went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII and
initiates the different measures.
“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
created that Germany is undertaking serious military
preparations.” (_1780-PS_)
The next step was the telephone conversation which took place between
Goering and Ribbentrop on 13 March 1938, when Ribbentrop was still in
London. Goering was passing on the false statement that there was no
ultimatum to Austria. The facts of the ultimatum were explained by the
earlier telephone conversations between Goering and Vienna. But Goering
then passed the falsehood on to Ribbentrop in London in order that he
might placate and reassure political circles in London (_2949-PS_).
The third step was taken by Ribbentrop after his return from London.
Although he had been appointed Foreign Minister in February, he had gone
back to London to clear up his business at the embassy. Although he was
still in London until after the Anschluss had actually occurred, his
name appears as a signatory of the law making Austria a province of the
German Reich (_2307-PS_).
(2) _Czechoslovakia._ Czechoslovakia furnishes a typical example of
aggression in its various aspects. To summarize the outstanding features
briefly: First, there was the necessity of stirring up trouble inside
the country against which aggression was planned.
Ribbentrop, as Foreign Minister, helped in the stirring up of the
Sudeten Germans under Henlein, who was in frequent contact with the
German Foreign Office (_3060-PS_; _2789-PS_; _3059-PS_). These documents
demonstrate how the Foreign Office stirred up the Sudeten-German
movement so that it would act in accordance with the Government of the
Reich.
Later on, Ribbentrop was present on 28 May 1938 at the conference at
which Hitler gave instructions to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia
(_388-PS_; _2360-PS_). In a speech in January 1939 Hitler proclaimed
that aggression was to take place against Czechoslovakia (_2360-PS_):
“On the basis of this unbearable provocation, which was still
further emphasized by a truly infamous persecution and
terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve
the Sudeten-German question in a final and radical manner.”
* * * * * *
“On 28 May I gave the order for the preparation of military
steps against this state, to be concluded by 2 October.”
(_2360-PS_)
The important point is that 28 May was the date when the _Fall Gruen_
for Czechoslovakia was the subject of orders, and that it was thereafter
put into effect, to come to fruition at the beginning of October.
That was the second stage: To lay well in advance the plans of
aggression.
The third stage was to see that neighboring states were not likely to
cause trouble. Hence, on 18 July 1938, Ribbentrop had a conversation
with the Italian Ambassador, Attolico, at which the attack on
Czechoslovakia was discussed (_2800-PS_). Further discussions along the
same lines followed (_2791-PS_; _2792-PS_). The effect of these
documents is, that it was made clear to the Italian Government that the
German Government was going to move against Czechoslovakia.
The other interested country was Hungary, for Hungary had certain
territorial desires with regard to parts of the Czechoslovakian
Republic. Accordingly on 23 and 25 August Ribbentrop was present at the
discussions and had discussions himself with the Hungarian politicians
Imredi and Kanya (_2796-PS_; _2797-PS_). These documents indicate that
Ribbentrop endeavored to get assurances of Hungarian help, and that the
Hungarian Government at the time was not too ready to commit itself to
action, although it was ready enough with sympathy.
Contacts had been established with the Sudeten Germans, for theirs was
the long-term grievance that had to be exploited. But the next stage was
to have a short-term grievance and to stir up trouble, preferably at the
fountainhead. Therefore, between 16 and 24 September, the German Foreign
Office, of which Ribbentrop was the head, was engaged in stirring up
trouble in Prague (_2858-PS_; _2855-PS_; _2854-PS_; _2853-PS_; and
_2856-PS_). An example of the type of these activities is the
communication of 19 September from the Foreign Office to the German
Embassy in Prague (_2858-PS_):
“Please inform Deputy Kundt at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get
in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start
_their_ demands _for_ autonomy tomorrow.” (_2858-PS_)
Another of these documents deals with questions of arrest and the action
to be taken against any Czechs in Germany in order to make the position
more difficult (_2855-PS_).
That was the contribution which Ribbentrop made to the pre-Munich
crisis, which culminated in the Munich agreement of 29 September 1938
(_TC-23_).
A significant aspect of Nazi plotting with regard to Czechoslovakia,
which shows the sort of action and advice which the _Wehrmacht_ expected
from the Foreign Office, is contained in a long document putting forward
an almost infinite variety of breaches of International Law, which were
likely to arise or might have arisen from the action in regard to
Czechoslovakia (_C-2_). On all these points the opinion of the Foreign
Office was sought, with a view to explanation and justification. That,
of course, remained a hypothetical question because at that time no war
resulted.
The second stage of the acquisition of Czechoslovakia occurred when,
having obtained the Sudetenland, the Nazis arranged a crisis in
Czechoslovakia which would be an excuse for taking the rest. This action
is important as constituting the first time that the German Government
disregarded its own commitment that its desires did not go beyond the
return of German blood to the Reich. On that point, again, Ribbentrop
was active. On 13 March, as events were moving to a climax, he sent a
telegram to the German Minister in Prague, his subordinate, telling him
to
“make a point of not being available if the Czech Government
wants to get in touch with you in the next few days.”
(_2815-PS_).
At the same time Ribbentrop attended a conference in Berlin with Hitler
and a delegation of pro-Nazi Slovaks. Tiso, one of the heads of the
pro-Nazi Slovaks, was directed to declare an independent Slovak State in
order to assist in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia (_2802-PS_). A
previous meeting along the same lines had been held a month before
(_2790-PS_). Thus, Ribbentrop was assisting in the task, again, of
fomenting internal trouble.
On 14 March 1939, the following day, Hacha, the President of
Czechoslovakia, was called to Berlin. Ribbentrop was at this meeting, at
which pressure and threats were used to obtain the aged President’s
consent to hand over the Czechoslovak State to Hitler (_2798-PS_;
_3061-PS_).
That was the end of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The following week
Ribbentrop signed a treaty with Slovakia, Article II of which granted
the German Government the right to construct military posts and
installations, and to keep them garrisoned within Slovakia (_1439-PS_).
Thus, after swallowing Bohemia and Moravia as an independent state,
Ribbentrop obtained military control over Slovakia.
(3) _Lithuania._ An interesting point concerning the Northern Baltic
shows how difficult it was for Ribbentrop to keep his hands out of the
internal affairs of other countries, even when it did not seem a very
important matter. On 3 April 1939 Germany had occupied the Memeland
(_TC-53-A_). It would have appeared, as far as the Baltic States were
concerned, that the position was satisfactory to the Nazis but in fact
Ribbentrop was acting in close concert with Heydrich, in stirring up
trouble in Lithuania with a group of pro-Nazi people called the
Woldemaras Supporters (_2953-PS_; _2952-PS_). Heydrich was passing to
Ribbentrop a request for financial support for this group:
“Dear Party Comrade v. Ribbentrop,
“Enclosed please find a further report about the ‘Woldemaras
Supporters.’ As already mentioned in the previous report, the
‘_Woldemaras Supporters’ are still asking for help from the
Reich._ I therefore ask you to examine the question of financial
support, brought up again by the ‘Woldemaras Supporters’ set
forth on page 4, para 2 of the enclosed report and to make a
definite decision.
“_The request of the ‘Woldemaras Supporters’ for financial
support could, in my opinion, be granted. Deliveries of arms
should not, however, be made, under any circumstances._”
(_2953-PS_)
At the end of a fuller report on the same matter (2952-PS) there is
added in handwriting,
“I support small regular payments, e.g. 2,000 to 3,000 marks
quarterly.” (_2952-PS_).
It is signed “W”, who was the Secretary of State. Such was the
extraordinary interference, even with comparatively unimportant
countries.
(4) _Poland._ In the aggression against Poland, there were several
periods. The first was what might be called the Munich period, up to the
end of September 1938, and at that time no language the Nazis could use
was too good for Poland. Examples of German assurances and reassurances
to Poland during this period are Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 20
February 1938 (_2357-PS_), the secret Foreign Office memorandum of 26
August 1938 (_TC-76_), and the conversation between M. Lipski, the
Polish ambassador, and Ribbentrop (_TC-73, No. 40_). A final
illustration of this technique is Hitler’s speech at the Sportzpalast on
26 September 1938, in which he said that this was the end of his
territorial problems in Europe and expressed an almost violent affection
for the Poles (_TC-73, No. 42_).
The next stage occupied the period between Munich and the rape of
Prague. With part of the German plan for Czechoslovakia having been
accomplished and parts still remaining to be done, there was a slight
change towards Poland but still a friendly atmosphere. In a conversation
with M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Berlin, on 24 October 1938,
Ribbentrop put forward very peaceful suggestions for the settlement of
the Danzig issue (_TC-73, No. 44_). The Polish reply, of 31 October
1938, stated that it was unacceptable that Danzig should return to the
Reich, but made suggestions of a bilateral agreement (_TC-73, No. 45_).
Between these dates the German Government had made its preparations to
occupy Danzig by surprise (_C-137_).
But although these preparations were made, still some two months later,
on 5 January 1939, Hitler was suggesting to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign
Minister, a new solution (_TC-73, No. 48_).
Ribbentrop saw M. Beck on the next day and said that there was to be no
violent solution of the Danzig issue, but a further building up of
friendly relations (_TC-73, No. 49_). Not content with that, Ribbentrop
went to Warsaw on 25 January to talk of the continued progress and
consolidation of friendly relations (_2530-PS_). That was capped by
Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 30 January 1939, in the same tone (_TC-73,
No. 57_). That was the second stage—the mention of Danzig in honeyed
words, because the rape of Prague had not yet been attained.
Then, in the meeting at the Reichschancellery on 23 May 1939, Hitler
made it quite clear, and so stated, that Danzig had nothing to do with
the real Polish question (_L-79_). “I have to deal with Poland because I
want _lebensraum_ in the East”—that is the effect of Hitler’s words at
that time: that Danzig was merely an excuse.
The extent to which Ribbentrop had adopted this attitude of mind of
Hitler at this time is shown in the introduction to Count Ciano’s Diary
(_2987-PS_):
“In the Summer of 1939 Germany advanced her claim against
Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had
several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any
intentions of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite
these denials I remained in doubt; I wanted to make sure for
myself, and on August 11th I went to Salzburg. It was in his
residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were
waiting to sit down at the table, of the decision to start the
fireworks, just as he might have told me about the most
unimportant and commonplace administrative matter. ‘Well,
Ribbentrop,’ I asked him, while we were walking in the garden,
‘What do you want? The Corridor, or Danzig?’ ‘Not any more’, and
he stared at me through those cold Musee Grevin eyes, ‘We want
war.’” (_2987-PS_).
That extraordinary declaration closely corroborates Hitler’s statement
at his Chancellery conference on 23 May—that it was no longer a
question of Danzig or the Corridor, but a question of war to achieve
_lebensraum_ in the East (_L-79_).
It should be recalled in this connection that “_Fall Weiss_”, the plan
for operations against Poland, is dated 3 and 11 April 1939, thus
showing that preparations were already in hand (_C-120_). Another entry
in Count Ciano’s Diary during the summer of 1939 makes this point quite
clear:
“I have collected in the conference records verbal transcripts
of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. I shall only
note some impressions of a general nature. Ribbentrop is evasive
every time I ask him for particulars of the forthcoming German
action. He has a guilty conscience. He has lied too many times
about German intentions toward Poland not to feel embarrassment
now over what he must tell me and what he is preparing to do.
“The will to fight is unalterable. He rejects any solution which
might satisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am certain
that even if the Germans were given everything they demanded,
they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by
the demon of destruction.
“Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not
hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But this
doesn’t shake him in the least. I realize how little weight this
view carries in German opinion.
“The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is
reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange a
word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a clear
conscience. He has not.” (_2987-PS_)
The next stage in the German plan consisted of sharp pressure over the
claim for Danzig, commencing immediately after Czechoslovakia had been
formally dealt with on 15 March 1939. The first sharp raising of the
claim was on 21 March (_TC-73, No. 61_).
An interesting sidelight during the last days before the war concerns
the return of Herr von Dirksen, the German Ambassador at the Court of
St. James, to Berlin on 18 August 1939. When interrogated (after
capture) regarding the significance of this event, Ribbentrop expressed
a complete absence of recollection of ever having seen the German
Ambassador to England after his return. Ribbentrop thought he would have
remembered him if he had seen him, and therefore he accepted the
probability that he did not see him (_D-490_). Thus when it was well
known that war with Poland would involve England and France, either
Ribbentrop was not sufficiently interested in opinion in London to take
the trouble to see his ambassador, or else, as he rather suggests, he
had appointed so weak and ordinary a career diplomat to London that his
opinion was not taken into account, either by himself or by Hitler. In
either case, Ribbentrop was completely uninterested in anything which
his Ambassador might have to tell him as to opinion in London or the
possibility of war. It is putting the matter with great moderation to
say that in the last days before 1 September 1939, Ribbentrop did
whatever he could to avoid peace with Poland and to avoid anything which
might hinder the encouraging of the war which he and the Nazis wanted.
He did that, well knowing that war with Poland would involve Great
Britain and France. (See also Section 8 of Chapter IX on Aggression
Against Poland.)
M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador at Berlin, summarized all these events
leading up to the war in his report of 10 October 1939 (_TC-73, No.
147_).
(5) _Norway and Denmark._ On 31 May 1939, Ribbentrop, on behalf of
Germany, signed a non-aggression pact with Denmark which provided that:
“The German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark will under no
circumstances go to war or employ force of any other kind
against one another.” (_TC-24_)
And on 7 April 1940 the German armed forces invaded Denmark at the same
time they invaded Norway.
Ribbentrop was fully involved in the earlier preparations for the
aggression against Norway. Along with Rosenberg, Ribbentrop assisted
Quisling in his early activities. A letter from Rosenberg to Ribbentrop
on 24 February states:
“Dear Party Comrade von Ribbentrop:
“Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed
report to Privy Councillor von Gruendherr who will address you
on this subject. We agreed the other day that 2-300,000 RM would
be made immediately available for the said purpose. Now it turns
out that Privy Councillor Gruendherr states that the second
instalment can be made available only after eight days. But as
it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I request
you to make it possible that this second instalment is given to
him at once. With a longer absence of _Reichsamtsleiter_ P. M.
Scheidt also the connection with your representatives would be
broken up, which just now, under certain circumstances, could be
very unfavorable.
“Therefore I trust that it is in everybody’s interest, if P. M.
Scheidt goes back immediately.” (_957-PS_)
In a report to Hitler on the Quisling activities, Rosenberg outlined
Ribbentrop’s part in the preparation of the Norwegian operation:
“* * * Apart from financial support which was forthcoming from
the Reich in currency, Quisling had also been promised a
shipment of material for immediate use in Norway, such as coal
and sugar. Additional help was promised. These shipments were to
be conducted under cover of a new trade company, to be
established in Germany or through especially selected existing
firms, while Hagelin was to act as consignee in Norway. Hagelin
had already conferred with the respective Ministers of the
Nygaardsvold Government, as for instance, the Minister of Supply
and Commerce, and had been assured permission for the import of
coal. At the same time, the coal transports were to serve
possibly to supply the technical means necessary to launch
Quisling’s political action in Oslo with German help. It was
Quisling’s plan to send a number of selected, particularly
reliable men to Germany for a brief military training course in
a completely isolated camp. They were then to be detailed as
area and language specialists to German Special Troops, who were
to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to accomplish a political
action. Thus Quisling planned to get hold of his leading
opponents in Norway, including the King, and to prevent all
military resistance from the very beginning. Immediately
following this political action and upon official request of
Quisling to the Government of the German Reich, the military
occupation of Norway was to take place. All military
preparations were to be completed previously. Though this plan
contained the great advantage of surprise, it also contained a
great number of dangers which could possibly cause its failure.
For this reason it received a quite dilatory treatment, while at
the same time, it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegians
were concerned.
“In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal
Goering, Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Secretary in the
Office of the Four Year Plan, only of the intention to prepare
coal shipments to Norway to the named confidant Hagelin. Further
details were discussed in a conference between Secretary
Wohlthat, Staff Director Schickedanz, and Hagelin. Since
Wohlthat received no further instructions from the General Field
Marshal, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop—after a consultation
with Reichsleiter Rosenberg—consented to expedite these
shipments through his office. Based on a report of Reichsleiter
Rosenberg to the Fuehrer it was also arranged to pay Quisling
ten thousand English pounds per month for three months,
commencing on the 15 of March, to support his work”. (_004-PS_)
This sum was paid through Scheidt.
In a letter to Ribbentrop dated 3 April 1940, Keitel wrote:
“Dear Herr von Ribbentrop:
“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been, by
command of the Fuehrer, long in preparation by the High Command
of the _Wehrmacht_. The High Command of the _Wehrmacht_ has
therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions
connected with the carrying out of this operation. The time at
your disposal for the political preparation of this operation,
is on the contrary, very much shorter. I believe myself
therefore to be acting in accordance with your own ideas in
transmitting to you herewith, not only these wishes of the
_Wehrmacht_ which would have to be fulfilled by the Governments
in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm for purely military reasons,
but also if I include a series of requests which certainly
concern the _Wehrmacht_ only indirectly but which are, however,
of the greatest importance for the fulfillment of its task * *
*.” (_D-629_)
Keitel then proceeds to ask that the Foreign Office get in touch with
certain commanders. The important point is Keitel’s clear admission to
Ribbentrop that the military occupation of Denmark and Norway had been
long in preparation. It is interesting to connect this letter with the
official Biography of Ribbentrop, in the Archives, which makes a point
of mentioning the invasion of Norway and Denmark (_D-472_):
“With the occupation of Denmark and Norway on the 9 of April
1940, only a few hours before the landing of British troops in
these territories, the battle began against the Western Powers.”
(_D-472_)
It is clear that whoever else had knowledge or whoever else was
ignorant, Ribbentrop had been thoroughly involved in the Quisling
plottings and knew at least a week before the invasion started that the
_Wehrmacht_ and Keitel had been long in preparation for this act of
aggression. (See also Section 9 of Chapter IX on Aggression against
Norway and Denmark.)
(6) _The Low Countries: Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg._ The
facts as to the aggression against these countries, during the period
when Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister, are discussed in Section 10 of
Chapter IX. Special attention should be called, however, to the
statement made by Ribbentrop 10 May 1940 to representatives of the
foreign press with regard to the reasons for the German invasion of the
Low Countries. These reasons demonstrated to be false in Section 10 of
Chapter IX on Aggression Against The Low Countries.
(7) _Greece and Yugoslavia._ At a meeting in Salzburg in August 1939, at
which von Ribbentrop participated, Hitler announced that the Axis had
decided to liquidate certain neutrals (_1871-PS_):
“* * * Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the
pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done,
if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, who is just
finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice versa.
Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the
visit of Prince Regent Paul he [the Fuehrer] suggested,
particularly in consideration of Italy, that Prince Paul clarify
his political attitude towards the Axis by a gesture. He had
thought of a closer connection with the Axis and Yugoslavia’s
leaving the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter.
Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reassurance
from the Western Powers. The same thing was repeated that
happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable
during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the
aims of the western democracies. Afterwards it was learned that
he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the
Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely only on Bulgaria,
which is in a sense a natural ally of Italy and Germany. * * *
At the moment when there would be a turn to the worse for
Germany and Italy, however, Yugoslavia would join the other side
openly, hoping thereby to give matters a final turn to the
disadvantage of the Axis.” (_1871-PS_)
That demonstrates the policy with regard to uncertain neutrals.
Then, as early as September 1940 Ribbentrop reviewed the war situation
with Mussolini. Ribbentrop emphasized the heavy revenge bombing raids in
England and the fact that London would soon be in ruins. It was agreed
between the parties that only Italian interests were involved in Greece
and Yugoslavia, and that Italy could count on German support. Ribbentrop
went on further to explain to Mussolini the Spanish plan for the attack
on Gibraltar and Germany’s participation therein. He added that he was
expecting to sign the Protocol with Spain, bringing the latter country
into the war, on his return to Berlin (_1842-PS_). Ribbentrop then gave
Mussolini a free hand with Greece and Yugoslavia:
“With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister
stressed that it was exclusively a question of Italian
interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone,
and in which Italy could be certain of Germany’s sympathetic
assistance.
“But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems
for the time being, but to concentrate on the destruction of
England with all our forces instead. Where Germany was
concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts
(Norway, etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce.”
(_1842-PS_)
Several months later, in January 1941, at the meeting between Hitler and
Mussolini in which Ribbentrop participated, the Greek operation was
discussed. Hitler stated that the German troops in Rumania were for use
in the planned campaign against Greece (_C-134_). Count Ciano, who
attended that meeting as Italian Foreign Minister, recalls his
impression of that meeting in his diary entry for 20/21 January:
“The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am
less pleased, particularly as Ribbentrop, who had always been so
boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him outright how
long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of its
ending before 1942.” (_2987-PS_)
Despite that somewhat pessimistic statement to Count Ciano, three weeks
later, when it was a question of encouraging the Japanese to enter the
war, Ribbentrop took a more optimistic line. On 13 February 1941 he saw
Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador. In the course of their conversation
Ribbentrop gave an optimistic account of the military situation and the
position of Bulgaria and Turkey (_1834-PS_).
In the course of his efforts to get Yugoslavia to join the Axis,
Ribbentrop addressed a note, (_2450-PS_) on 25 March 1941, to Prime
Minister Cvetkovitch, which contained this assurance:
“The Axis-Power Governments during this war will not direct a
demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of
troops through the Yugoslav state or territory.” (_2450-PS_)
Shortly thereafter, there occurred the coup d’etat in Yugoslavia, when
General Simovitch took over the Government. Two days after Ribbentrop’s
assurance (_2450-PS_), at a meeting on 27 March 1941 at which Ribbentrop
was present, Hitler outlined the military campaign against Yugoslavia
and promised the destruction of Yugoslavia and the demolition of
Belgrade by the German Air Force (_1746-PS_).
After the invasion of Yugoslavia Ribbentrop was one of the persons
directed by Hitler with the drawing of the boundaries for the partition
and division of Yugoslavia. The preliminary directive for that action
provided:
“* * * If the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down in
the above Part I, it will be carried out by the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office
[Ribbentrop], the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
[Goering], and the Reich Minister of the Interior [Frick].”
(_1195-PS_)
(8) _The U.S.S.R._ On 23 August 1939 Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet
non-aggression Pact (_TC-25_). The first point at which Ribbentrop seems
to have considered special problems of aggression against the Soviet
Union was just after 20 April 1941, when Rosenberg and Ribbentrop met or
communicated to consider problems expected to arise in the Eastern
occupied territory. Ribbentrop appointed his Counsellor, Grosskopf, to
be his liaison man with Rosenberg and also assigned a Consul General,
Braeutigam, who had many years experience in the USSR, as a collaborator
with Rosenberg (_1039-PS_).
The following month, on 18 May 1941, the German Foreign Office prepared
a declaration setting forth operational zones in the Arctic Ocean and
the Baltic and Black Seas to be used by the German Navy and Air Force in
the coming invasion of the Soviet Union:
“The Foreign Office has prepared for use in _Barbarossa_ the
attached draft of a declaration of operational zones. The
Foreign Office has, however, reserved its decision as to the
date when the declaration will be issued, as well as discussion
of particulars.” (_C-77_)
Thus, it is clear that Ribbentrop was again fully involved in the
preparation for this act of aggression. Finally, on 22 June 1941,
Ribbentrop announced to the world that the German armies were invading
the USSR (_3054-PS_).
How untrue were the reasons given by Ribbentrop is shown by the report
of his own Ambassador in Moscow on 7 June 1941, who said that everything
was being done by the Russians to avoid a conflict.
(9) _Instigation of Japanese Aggression._ On 25 November 1936, as a
result of negotiations of Ribbentrop as Ambassador at Large, Germany and
Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact (_2508-PS_). The recital states the
purpose of the agreement as follows:
“The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese
Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist
Internationale known as the Comintern is to disintegrate and
subdue existing States by all the means at its command;
convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist
Internationale in the internal affairs of the nations not only
endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is
also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of cooperating
in the defense against Communist subversive activities; having
agreed as follows * * *.” (_2508-PS_)
There then follow the effective terms of the agreement under which
Germany and Japan are to act together for five years. It is signed on
behalf of Germany by Ribbentrop (_2508-PS_).
On 27 September 1940 Ribbentrop, as Foreign Minister, signed the
Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy, thereby bringing about a
full-scale military and economic alliance for the creation of a new
order in Europe and East Asia (_2643-PS_).
On 13 February 1941—some four months later—Ribbentrop was urging the
Japanese to attack British possessions in the Far East (_1834-PS_).
Then, in April 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Matsuoka,
representing Japan, at which Ribbentrop was present, Hitler promised
that Germany would declare war on the United States in the event of war
occurring between Japan and the United States as a result of Japanese
aggression in the Pacific (_1881-PS_).
The development of Ribbentrop’s views is indicated by the minutes of
another conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister (_1882-PS_):
“* * * Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in
Germany, referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere
among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works.
He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as
yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the
intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.
“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which
had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of
intellectuals, most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation,
however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give
them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had
already started their pernicious activities when National
Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely be the
cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with
certainty * * *.” (_1882-PS_)
That was on 5 April 1941.
Within a month after the German armies invaded the Soviet Union on 22
June 1941, Ribbentrop was urging Ott, his ambassador in Tokyo, to do his
utmost to cause the Japanese Government to attack the Soviet in Siberia
(_2896-PS_; _2897-PS_).
A message, intercepted, which was sent by the Japanese Ambassador in
Berlin on 29 November 1941, a week before the attack on the United
States at Pearl Harbor, reports the coaxings of Ribbentrop:
“Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had
received any reports regarding the Japanese-United States
negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.
“Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in
East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been
and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under
the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this
time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New
Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States
will be concentrated against Japan.
“‘As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental
differences in the very right to exist between Germany and
Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the
effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-United
States negotiations being concluded successfully because of the
fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.
“‘If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a
decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident
that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan
jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan and
herself.’” (_D-656_).
Then the Japanese Ambassador replied:
“‘I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any
concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that
a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and
the United States?’
“Ribbentrop: ‘Roosevelt’s a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell
what he would do.’” (_D-656_).
The Japanese Ambassador thereupon concludes:
“Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has
said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to
avoid meeting German troops, and from the tone of Hitler’s
recent speech, as well as that of Ribbentrop’s, I feel that
German attitude toward the United States is being considerably
stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would
not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.” (_D-656_).
Part 3 of the Japanese message quotes Ribbentrop as follows:
“In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering
into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all
British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this
war, England will have no influence whatsoever in international
affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her
other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided
three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa,
Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were
formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share
of the African Colonies. Germany desires, above all else, to
control European Russia.” (_D-656_)
In reply the Japanese Ambassador said:
“‘I am fully aware of the fact that Germany’s war campaign is
progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose
that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only
Great Britain as an actual enemy, but also having all of those
areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which
have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such
circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion,
of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under
such an eventuality?’
“Ribbentrop: ‘We would like to end this war during next year
[1942]. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible
that it will have to be continued on to the following year.
‘Should Japan become engaged in war against the United States,
Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is
absolutely no possibility of Germany’s entering into a separate
peace with the United States under such circumstances. The
Fuehrer is determined on that point.’” (_D-656_)
Ribbentrop was thus associated in the closest possible way, with the
aggression by Japan against the United States.
Another intercepted diplomatic message from the Japanese Ambassador in
Berlin states (_D-657_):
“At 1 p. m. today [8 December 1941] I called on Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy
issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop
replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at
general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring
war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the
German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at
once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out
promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of
the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack
American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them.
“It goes without saying that this is only for your secret
information.” (_D-657_)
Thus, Hitler ordered attacks on American ships before the German
declaration of war.
Then on 11 December 1941 Ribbentrop, in the name of the German
Government, announced a state of war between Germany and the United
States.
Ribbentrop also made attempts to get Japan to attack the Soviet Union.
In his conversations with Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, in July 1942
and in March and April 1943, Ribbentrop continued to urge Japanese
participation and aggression against the Soviet Union (_2911-PS_;
_2954-PS_). The report of a discussion between Ribbentrop and Ambassador
Oshima reads:
“Ambassador Oshima declared that he has received a telegram from
Tokyo, and he is to report, by order of his Government to the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following:
“The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was
the object of a common conference between the Japanese
Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the
question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The
result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely
recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia and completely
understands the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part
will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not
possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present
war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the
conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start
the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese
Government would never disregard the Russian question.”
(_2954-PS_)
Whereupon Ribbentrop returned to the attack:
“However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the
Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England
and America, but also Russia, together. It is not good when one
part must fight alone.” (_2954-PS_)
Ribbentrop’s pressure on Japan to attack Russia is shown in another
report of Japanese-German discussions on 18 April 1943 (_2929-PS_):
“The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that
without any doubt this year presented the most favorable
opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had
sufficient antitank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia,
which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the
moment * * *.” (_2929-PS_)
C. _RIBBENTROP’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY._
(The following discussion concerns only the planning of these crimes.
The execution of the crimes was left to the French and Soviet
prosecuting staffs for proof.)
(1) _The Killing of Allied Aviators._ With the increasing air raids on
German cities in 1944 by the Allied Air Forces, the German Government
proposed to undertake a plan to deter Anglo-American fliers from further
raids on Reich cities. In a report of a meeting at which a definite
policy was to be established, there is stated the point of view that
Ribbentrop had been urging (_735-PS_). The meeting took place at the
Fuehrer’s headquarters on 6 June 1944, and proceeded in part as follows:
“_Obergruppenfuehrer_ Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy Chief of
WFSt in Klessheim, on the afternoon of the 6th of June, that a
conference on this question had been held shortly before between
the Reich Marshal [Goering], the Reich Foreign Minister
[Ribbentrop], and the Reichsfuehrer SS [Himmler]. Contrary to
the original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister, who
wished to include every type of terror attack on the German
civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it
was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks
carried out with aircraft armament, aimed directly at the
civilian population and their property, should be taken as the
standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this sense.
Lynch law would have to be the rule. On the contrary, there has
been no question of court martial sentence or handing over to
the police.” (_735-PS_)
That is, Ribbentrop was pressing that even where there was an attack on
a German city, the airmen who crash-landed should be handed over to be
lynched by the crowd.
The minutes of the conference report further as follows:
“Deputy Chief of the WFSt mentioned that apart from lynch law, a
procedure must be worked out for segregating those enemy
aviators who are suspected of criminal action of this kind until
they are received into the reception camp for aviators at
Oberursel; if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed
over to the SD for special treatment.” (_735-PS_)
The sense of this seems to be that if they were not lynched under the
first scheme, by the crowd, then they were to be kept from prisoners of
war, where they would be subject to the protecting power’s intervention.
And if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD
to be killed.
The conference reached a decision on what would be regarded as
justifying lynch law:
“At a conference with Colonel von Brauchitsch, representing the
C-in-C, Air Force, on the 6th of June, it was settled that the
following actions were to be regarded as terror actions
justifying lynch law:
“Low-level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian
population, single persons as well as crowds.
“Shooting our own men in the air who had bailed out.
“Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the
public service.
“Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals,
hospitals, and hospital trains, which are clearly marked with
the Red Cross.” (_735-PS_)
These were to be the subject of lynching and not, as Ribbentrop had
suggested, the case of the bombing of a city.
In the latter part of this report there occurs a somewhat curious
comment from Keitel:
“If one allows the people to carry out lynch law, it is
difficult to enforce rules!
“Minister Director Berndt got out and shot the enemy aviator on
the road. I am against legal procedure. It doesn’t work out.”
(_735-PS_)
That is signed by Keitel.
The remarks of Jodl then appear:
“This conference is insufficient. The following points must be
decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:
“1. What do we consider as murder?
“Is RR in agreement with point 3_b_?
“2. How should the procedure be carried out?
“_a._ By the people?
“_b._ By the authorities?
“3. How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also carried out
against other enemy aviators?
“4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?
“(Signed) Jodl” (_735-PS_).
It is important to note that Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office were
fully involved in these breaches of the laws and usages of war. The
clarity with which the Foreign Office perceived that there were such
violations is indicated by a document from the Foreign Office, approved
of by Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his officials, Ritter
(_728-PS_). The approval of Ribbentrop is specifically stated in a
memorandum of 30 June 1944 (_740-PS_). The Foreign Office document
reads:
“In spite of the obvious objections, founded on international
law and foreign politics, the Foreign Office is basically in
agreement with the proposed measures.
“In the examination of the individual cases, a distinction must
be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special
treatment by the Security Service, SD.
“1. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the
circumstances deserving punishment, according to points 1-4 of
the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the
German authorities are not directly responsible, since death had
occurred before a German official became concerned with the
case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such
that it will not be difficult to depict the case in an
appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of
lynching, it will be of primary importance correctly to handle
the individual case upon publication.
“2. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the S.D.,
including subsequent publication, would be tenable only if
Germany, on this occasion, simultaneously would openly repudiate
the commitment of International Law, presently in force, and
still recognized by Germany. When an enemy aviator is seized by
the Army or by the Police, and is delivered to the Air Forces
(P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel, he has received, by this very
fact, the legal status of a prisoner of war.
“The Prisoner of War Treaty of 27 July 1929 establishes definite
rules on the prosecution and sentencing of the Prisoner of War,
and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in
Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only three months
after the protective power has been notified of the sentence; in
Article 63: a prisoner of war will be tried only by the same
courts and under the same procedure as members of the German
Armed Forces. These rules are so specific, that it would be
futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever
wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the
other hand the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion
a formal repudiation of the Prisoner of War Treaty.
“An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected fliers from
ever attaining a legal Prisoner of War status, that is, that
immediately upon seizure they be told that they are not
considered Prisoners of War but criminals; that they would not
be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over
Prisoners of War; hence not go to a Prisoner of War Camp; but
that they would be delivered to the authorities in charge of the
prosecution of criminal acts and that they would be tried in a
summary proceeding. If the evidence at the trial should reveal
that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular
case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status
of Prisoner of War by transfer to the Air Forces (P.W.)
Reception Camp Oberursel.
“Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility
that Germany will be accused of the violation of existing
treaties, and maybe not even the adoption of reprisals upon
German prisoners of war. At any rate this solution would enable
us clearly to define our attitude, thus relieving us of the
necessity of openly having to renounce the present agreements or
of the need of having to use excuses, which no one would
believe, upon the publication of each individual case.”
* * * * * *
“It follows from the above, that the main weight of the action
will have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be
carried out to such an extent that the purpose, to wit ‘the
deterrence of enemy aviators’, is actually achieved, which goal
is favored by the Foreign Office, then the strafing attacks by
enemy fliers upon the civilian populations must be stressed in a
completely different propagandist manner than heretofore.”
(_728-PS_).
Those words show clearly Ribbentrop’s point of view:
“Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone on 29 June that
the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft.”
(_740-PS_)
Thus, on the treatment of aviators, Ribbentrop furthered the deliberate
adoption of a procedure evading International Law.
(2) _The Destruction of the Peoples in Europe._ With regard to Poland,
the affidavit of Lahousen reports Ribbentrop participation in a
discussion on 12 September 1939 on the Fuehrer’s train concerning the
extermination of Poles and Jews (_Affidavit A_).
With regard to Bohemia and Moravia, on 16 March 1939 there was
promulgated the decree of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, signed by
Ribbentrop, establishing the protectorate (_TC-51_). The effect of that
decree was to place the Reich Protector in a position of supreme power
over Bohemia and Moravia, subordinate only to the Fuehrer. Article 5 of
that decree provides:
“* * * 2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Fuehrer
and Chancellor of the Reich, and as commissioner of the Reich
Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance
of the political principles laid down by the Fuehrer and
Chancellor of the Reich.
“3. The members of the government of the Protectorate shall be
confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be
withdrawn.
“4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all
measures taken by the government of the Protectorate and to give
advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich,
and, in case of danger, issue ordinances required for the common
interest.” (_TC-51_)
It is further provided that the promulgation of laws and the execution
of certain judgments shall be annulled if the Reich Protector enters an
objection (_TC-51_).
In part as a result of the sweeping terms of this law, the two Reich
Protectors of Bohemia and Moravia and their various deputies were able
to commit numerous violations of the laws of war, and crimes against
humanity. (Discussion of these matters was assumed as the responsibility
of the Soviet prosecuting staff.)
Similarly, with regard to the Netherlands, on 18 May 1940 a decree of
the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the
Netherlands was signed by Ribbentrop. Section 1 of that decree provided
(_D-639_):
“The occupied Netherlands territories shall be administered by
the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands territories
* * * the Reich Commissioner is guardian of the interests of the
Reich and vested with supreme civil authority.
“Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is hereby appointed Reich Commissioner
for the Occupied Netherlands Territories.” (_D-639_)
On the basis of this decree, the Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart,
promulgated such orders as that of 4 July 1940, confiscating the
property of those who had, or might have, furthered activities hostile
to the German Reich (_2921-PS_). Tentative arrangements were also made
for the resettlement of the Dutch population (_1520-PS_). (This part of
the proof was assumed as the responsibility of the French prosecuting
staff.)
With regard to Bohemia and the Netherlands, the charge against
Ribbentrop is laying the basis and erecting the governmental structure
under which the war crimes and crimes against humanity were directed and
facilitated.
(3) _Persecution of the Jews._ In December 1938 Ribbentrop, in a
conversation with M. Bonnet, who was then Foreign Minister of France,
expressed his opinion of the Jews. That was reported by the United
States Ambassador, Mr. Kennedy, to the State Department as follows
(_L-205_):
“During the day we had a telephone call from Berenger’s office
in Paris. We were told that the matter of refugees had been
raised by Bonnet in his conversation with von Ribbentrop. The
result was very bad. Ribbentrop, when pressed, had said to
Bonnet that the Jews in Germany without exception were
pickpockets, murderers and thieves. The property they possessed
had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore
decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the
population. The property which they had acquired illegally would
be taken from them. They would be forced to live in districts
frequented by the criminal classes. They would be under police
observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report
to the police as other criminals were obliged to do. The German
Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped
to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was
not, however, willing for them to take the property which had
resulted from their illegal operations with them. There was in
fact nothing that it could or would do.” (_L-205_)
That succinct statement of Ribbentrop’s views on Jews is elaborated in a
long document which he had sent out by the Foreign Office (_3358-PS_).
This document, entitled “The Jewish Question As A Factor In German
Foreign Policy in the year 1938” contains the following:
“It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has
brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question
simultaneously with the realization of the ‘idea of Greater
Germany’, since the Jewish policy was both the basis and
consequence of the events of the year 1938.”
* * * * * *
“The final goal of German Jewish policy is the emigration of all
Jews living in Reich territory.”
* * * * * *
“These examples from reports from authorities abroad can, if
desired, be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the
expectation that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews
from German _lebensraum_, which were misunderstood in many
countries for lack of evidence, would only be temporary and
would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw
with its own eyes and thus learned what the Jewish danger was to
them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant
Jew to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country will
react and the more desirable is this effect in the interest of
German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be the
future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated
not by false compassion for the ‘United Religious Jewish
minority’ but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the
danger which it represents to the racial composition of the
nations.” (_3358-PS_)
This document was widely circulated by Ribbentrop’s ministry, to all
senior Reich authorities and to numerous other people on 25 January
1939, just after the statement to M. Bonnet. Apparently Ribbentrop’s
anti-Semitic incitements grew stronger, for in June 1944 Rosenberg made
arrangements for an international anti-Jewish Congress to be held in
Krakow on 11 July 1944. The honorary members were to be Ribbentrop,
Himmler, Goebbels, and Frank. The Foreign Office was to take over the
mission of inviting prominent foreigners from Italy, France, Hungary,
Holland, Arabia, Iraq, Norway etc. in order to give an international
aspect to the Congress. However, the military events of June 1944
prompted Hitler to call off the Congress, which had lost its
significance by virtue of the Allied landing in Normandy (_1752-PS_).
It is clear that Ribbentrop supported and encouraged the Nazi program
against the Jews, which resulted in their transportation to
concentration camps, where things went on which he, as a minister in
special touch with the head of the government must have known about. As
one who preached this doctrine and was in a position of authority,
Ribbentrop cannot suggest that he was ignorant of how the policy was
carried out.
D. _CONCLUSION_
Hitler summed up Ribbentrop’s contribution to the Nazi conspiracy for
aggression, as follows:
“In the historic year of 1938 the Foreign Minister, von
Ribbentrop, was of great help to me, in view of his accurate and
audacious judgment and the exceptionally clever treatment of all
problems of foreign policy.”
During the course of the war, Ribbentrop was in close liaison with the
other Nazi conspirators. He advised them and made available to them,
through his foreign embassies and legations abroad, information which
was required. He at times participated in the planning of war crimes and
crimes against humanity. His guilt is clear.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JOACHIM VON
RIBBENTROP
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 57
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*004-PS │Report submitted by Rosenberg to │ │
│Deputy of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, │ │
│on the Political Preparation of the │ │
│Norway Action. (GB 140) │ III │ 19
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
*728-PS │Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of │ │
│Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 │ │
│June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │
│enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) │ III │ 526
│ │ │
*735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │
│fix the cases in which the application│ │
│of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │
│would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533
│ │ │
*740-PS │Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │
│aviators. (GB 153) │ III │ 537
│ │ │
*957-PS │Rosenberg’s letter to Ribbentrop, 24 │ │
│February 1940. (GB 139) │ III │ 641
│ │ │
*1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │
│Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. │ │
│(USA 30) │ III │ 665
│ │ │
1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │
│regarding problems in Eastern │ │
│Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695
│ │ │
*1195-PS │Keitel Order, 12 April 1941, for │ │
│provisional directions for partition │ │
│of Yugoslavia. (GB 144) │ III │ 838
│ │ │
*1337-PS │Hitler’s decree electing Ribbentrop │ │
│member of Secret Cabinet Council, 4 │ │
│February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 112. (GB 129) │ III │ 913
│ │ │
*1439-PS │Treaty of Protection between Slovakia │ │
│and the Reich, signed in Vienna 18 │ │
│March and in Berlin 23 March 1939. │ │
│1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│606. (GB 135) │ IV │ 18
│ │ │
*1520-PS │Memorandum of conference, 8 May 1942 │ │
│between Hitler, Rosenberg, Lammers, │ │
│Bormann. (GB 156) │ IV │ 65
│ │ │
*1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │
│Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │
│speech by Hitler to German High │ │
│Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │
│March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │
│Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272
│ │ │
*1752-PS │Preparation for International │ │
│Anti-Jewish Congress, 15 June 1944. │ │
│(GB 159) │ IV │ 280
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
*1834-PS │Report on conference between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 23 February │ │
│1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469
│ │ │
1842-PS │Meeting of Mussolini and Ribbentrop in│ │
│Rome, 19 September 1940. (GB 143) │ IV │ 477
│ │ │
*1866-PS │Record of conversation between Reich │ │
│Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May │ │
│1941. (GB 273) │ IV │ 499
│ │ │
*1871-PS │Report on Hitler and Ciano meeting, 12│ │
│August 1939. (GB 142) │ IV │ 508
│ │ │
*1881-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and│ │
│Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop in │ │
│Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33) │ IV │ 522
│ │ │
*1882-PS │Notes on conference between Ribbentrop│ │
│and Matsuoka in Berlin, 5 April 1941. │ │
│(USA 153) │ IV │ 526
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
*2357-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 20 │ │
│February 1938, published in Documents │ │
│of German Politics, Part VI, 1, pp. │ │
│50-52. (GB 30) │ IV │ 1099
│ │ │
*2360-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 30 │ │
│January 1939, from Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, Munich Edition, 31 January│ │
│1939. (GB 134) │ IV │ 1101
│ │ │
*2450-PS │Two letters from Ribbentrop to Prime │ │
│Minister of Yugoslavia, as published │ │
│in Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich │ │
│Edition, 26 March 1941. (GB 123) │ V │ 186
│ │ │
*2461-PS │Official German communique of meeting │ │
│of Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February│ │
│1938, published in Documents of German│ │
│Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part I. (GB │ │
│132) │ V │ 206
│ │ │
2508-PS │German-Japanese Agreement against the │ │
│Communist International, 25 November │ │
│1936, signed by Ribbentrop. Documents │ │
│of German Politics, Vol. 4. (GB 147) │ V │ 242
│ │ │
*2530-PS │Ribbentrop’s speech in Warsaw, 25 │ │
│January 1939, published in Voelkischer│ │
│Beobachter, 1 February 1939. (GB 36) │ V │ 267
│ │ │
*2643-PS │Announcement concerning Three-Power │ │
│Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan,│ │
│27 September 1940, signed by │ │
│Ribbentrop for Germany. 1940 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 41, p.│ │
│279. (USA 149) │ V │ 355
│ │ │
*2786-PS │Letter from Ribbentrop to Keitel, 4 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 81) │ V │ 419
│ │ │
*2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │
│Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │
│Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │
│program for Sudeten agitation, 29 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422
│ │ │
*2789-PS │Letter from Konrad Henlein to │ │
│Ribbentrop, 17 March 1938. (USA 94) │ V │ 424
│ │ │
*2790-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conference between Hitler, Ribbentrop,│ │
│Tuca and Karmasin, 12 February 1939. │ │
│(USA 110) │ V │ 425
│ │ │
*2791-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conversation between Ribbentrop and │ │
│Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, 23 │ │
│August 1938. (USA 86) │ V │ 426
│ │ │
*2792-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conversations between Ribbentrop and │ │
│Attolico, 27 August 1938 and 2 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 87) │ V │ 426
│ │ │
*2796-PS │German Foreign Office notes on │ │
│conversations between Hitler, │ │
│Ribbentrop and von Weizsacker and the │ │
│Hungarian Ministers Imredy and von │ │
│Kanya, 23 August 1938. (USA 88) │ V │ 430
│ │ │
2797-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum of │ │
│conversation between Ribbentrop and │ │
│von Kanya, 25 August 1938. (USA 89) │ V │ 432
│ │ │
*2798-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of the │ │
│meeting between Hitler and President │ │
│Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March │ │
│1939. (USA 118; GB 5) │ V │ 433
│ │ │
*2800-PS │German Foreign Office notes of a │ │
│conversation with Attolico, the │ │
│Italian Ambassador, 18 July 1938. (USA│ │
│85) │ V │ 442
│ │ │
*2802-PS │German Foreign Office notes of │ │
│conference on 13 March 1939 between │ │
│Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime │ │
│Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) │ V │ 443
│ │ │
*2815-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German│ │
│Minister in Prague, 13 March 1939. │ │
│(USA 116) │ V │ 451
│ │ │
*2829-PS │Affidavit of von Ribbentrop, 9 │ │
│November 1945, concerning positions │ │
│held by him. (USA 5) │ V │ 496
│ │ │
*2853-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 24 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 100) │ V │ 521
│ │ │
*2854-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 17 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 99) │ V │ 521
│ │ │
*2855-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 16 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 98) │ V │ 522
│ │ │
2856-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 24 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 101) │ V │ 522
│ │ │
*2858-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 19 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 97) │ V │ 523
│ │ │
*2896-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to German │ │
│Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, 10 July │ (USA │
│1941. │ 155) │ V
│ │ │
*2897-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador in │ │
│Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July │ │
│1941. (USA 156) │ V │ 566
│ │ │
*2911-PS │Notes on conversation between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 9 July 1942. │ │
│(USA 157) │ V │ 580
│ │ │
*2921-PS │Decree of Reich Commissar for Occupied│ │
│Dutch Territories concerning │ │
│confiscation of property, 4 July 1940.│ │
│(GB 155) │ V │ 590
│ │ │
*2929-PS │Notes on conversation between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 18 April 1943. │ │
│(USA 159) │ V │ 603
│ │ │
*2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from │ │
│Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA │ │
│76) │ V │ 628
│ │ │
*2952-PS │Memorandum, 19 July 1939, signed │ │
│Doertenbach. (GB 137) │ V │ 655
│ │ │
*2953-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Ribbentrop, 29│ │
│June 1939, with enclosure. (GB 136) │ V │ 657
│ │ │
*2954-PS │Minutes of conversation between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 6 March 1943. │ │
│(USA 158; GB 150) │ V │ 658
│ │ │
*2987-PS │Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA │ │
│166) │ V │ 689
│ │ │
3047-PS │File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s │ │
│train on 12 September 1939; report on │ │
│execution of Jews in Borrisow; and │ │
│entries from diary of Admiral Canaris.│ │
│(USA 80) (Referred to but not offered │ │
│in evidence.) │ V │ 766
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*3059-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum, 19 │ │
│August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s │ │
│Sudeten German Party between 1935 and │ │
│1938. (USA 96) │ V │ 855
│ │ │
*3060-PS │Dispatch from German Minister in │ │
│Prague to Foreign Office in Berlin │ │
│about policy arrangements with │ │
│Henlein, 16 March 1938. (USA 93) │ V │ 856
│ │ │
*3061-PS │Supplement No. 2 to the Official │ │
│Czechoslovak Report entitled “German │ │
│Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” │ │
│(document 998-PS). (USA 126) │ V │ 857
│ │ │
*3308-PS │Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt,│ │
│28 November 1945. (GB 288) │ V │ 1100
│ │ │
*3319-PS │Foreign Office Correspondence and │ │
│reports on anti-Jewish action in │ │
│foreign countries. (GB 287) │ VI │ 4
│ │ │
*3358-PS │German Foreign Office circular, 31 │ │
│January 1939, “The Jewish Question as │ │
│a factor in German Foreign Policy in │ │
│the year 1938”. (GB 158) │ VI │ 87
│ │ │
3638-PS │Memorandum of Ribbentrop, 1 October │ │
│1938, concerning his conversation with│ │
│Ciano about the Polish demands made on│ │
│Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 400
│ │ │
3688-PS │Notice from the Foreign Office, 24 │ │
│September 1942, concerning evacuation │ │
│of Jews from Occupied Territories. │ VI │ 403
│ │ │
*3817-PS │File of correspondence and reports by │ │
│Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. │ │
│(USA 790) │ VI │ 752
│ │ │
*C-2 │Examples of violations of │ │
│International Law and proposed counter│ │
│propaganda, issued by OKW, 1 October │ │
│1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799
│ │ │
*C-77 │Memorandum from Chief of High Command │ │
│to Navy High Command, 18 May 1941. (GB│ │
│146) │ VI │ 908
│ │ │
*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │
│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │
│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum │ │
│on conference between German and │ │
│Italian Generals on 19 January and │ │
│subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 │ │
│January 1941. (GB 119) │ VI │ 939
│ │ │
*C-137 │Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 │ │
│to Hitler Order of 21 October 1938. │ │
│(GB 33) │ VI │ 949
│ │ │
*D-472 │Ribbentrop’s actions as Foreign │ │
│Minister, from International │ │
│Biographical Archives, 22 April 1943. │ │
│(GB 130) │ VII │ 59
│ │ │
*D-490 │Interrogation of Ribbentrop, 20 │ │
│September 1945. (GB 138) │ VII │ 66
│ │ │
*D-629 │Letter from Keitel to Ribbentrop, 3 │ │
│April 1940. (GB 141) │ VII │ 99
│ │ │
*D-636 │Extract from “Examination of Descent │ │
│of SS Leaders”, concerning von │ │
│Ribbentrop. (GB 131) │ VII │ 114
│ │ │
D-639 │Decree of the Fuehrer concerning │ │
│exercise of Governmental Authority in │ │
│Netherlands, 18 May 1940. 1940 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 778. (GB│ │
│154) │ VII │ 115
│ │ │
*D-656 │Extract of 29 November 1941 from │ │
│Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent │ │
│by Japanese Government between 1 July │ │
│and 8 December 1941. (GB 148) │ VII │ 160
│ │ │
*D-657 │Extract of 8 December 1941 from │ │
│Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent │ │
│by Japanese Government between 1 July │ │
│and 8 December 1941. (GB 149) │ VII │ 163
│ │ │
D-734 │Note of conversation between Reich │ │
│Foreign Minister and Duce in presence │ │
│of von Mackenson, Alfieri and │ │
│Bastianini, 25 February 1943. │ VII │ 188
│ │ │
*D-735 │Memorandum of conference between │ │
│German Foreign Minister and Count │ │
│Ciano in presence of Keitel and │ │
│Marshal Cavallero, 19 December 1942. │ │
│(GB 295) │ VII │ 190
│ │ │
*D-736 │Notes on discussion between Fuehrer │ │
│and Horthy on 17 April 1943. (GB 283) │ VII │ 190
│ │ │
*D-737 │Memorandum on reception of Hungarian │ │
│Prime Minister and Foreign Minister by│ │
│German Foreign Minister on 29 April │ │
│1939. (GB 289) │ VII │ 192
│ │ │
*D-738 │Memorandum on second conference │ │
│between German Foreign Minister with │ │
│Hungarian Prime and Foreign Minister │ │
│on 1 May 1939. (GB 290) │ VII │ 193
│ │ │
*D-740 │Minutes of conference between German │ │
│Foreign Minister and Secretary of │ │
│State Bastianini on 8 April 1943. (GB │ │
│297) │ VII │ 194
│ │ │
D-741 │Memorandum on conference between │ │
│German Foreign Minister and Ambassador│ │
│Alfieri on 21 February 1943 in Berlin.│ │
│(GB 296) │ VII │ 196
│ │ │
*D-744-A │File of the Reichsfuehrer-SS with │ │
│personal record of SS │ │
│Obergruppenfuehrer Ribbentrop. (GB │ │
│294) │ VII │ 197
│ │ │
*D-744-B │File of the Reichsfuehrer-SS with │ │
│personal record of SS │ │
│Obergruppenfuehrer Ribbentrop. (GB │ │
│294) │ VII │ 204
│ │ │
*D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 308) │ VII │ 232
│ │ │
*D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │
│June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │
│Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233
│ │ │
*D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234
│ │ │
*D-778 │Notes, 18 June 1944, concerning │ │
│treatment of Anglo-American │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 311) │ VII │ 235
│ │ │
*D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │
│Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │
│June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236
│ │ │
*D-782 │Note from German Foreign Office, │ │
│Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB │ │
│315) │ VII │ 239
│ │ │
D-784 │Note from Operation Staff of OKW │ │
│signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 317) │ VII │ 240
│ │ │
*D-786 │Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror”-flyers.│ │
│(GB 319) │ VII │ 242
│ │ │
EC-265 │German Foreign Office telegram, 1 │ │
│October 1940, concerning the Jews in │ │
│Occupied French Territory. │ VII │ 375
│ │ │
L-74 │Letter from Ribbentrop to Churchill │ │
│with covering letter addressed to │ │
│Field Marshal Montgomery. │ VII │ 839
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
L-202 │State Department dispatch from D. H. │ │
│Buffum, American Consul at Leipzig, 21│ │
│November 1938, concerning Anti-Semitic│ │
│Onslaught in Germany as seen from │ │
│Leipzig. │ VII │ 1037
│ │ │
*L-205 │Telegram from Kennedy to Department of│ │
│State, 8 December 1938. (GB 157) │ VII │ 1041
│ │ │
*M-158 │Telegram, 23 October 1939, regarding │ │
│location of Nazi organizations in │ │
│Madrid. (GB 285) │ VIII │ 51
│ │ │
*TC-23 │Agreement between Germany, the United │ │
│Kingdom, France and Italy, 29 │ │
│September 1938. (GB 23) │ VIII │ 370
│ │ │
*TC-24 │Treaty of non-aggression between │ │
│German Reich and Kingdom of Denmark, │ │
│31 May 1939. (GB 77) │ VIII │ 373
│ │ │
*TC-25 │Non-aggression Treaty between Germany │ │
│and USSR and announcement of 25 │ │
│September 1939 relating to it. (GB │ │
│145) │ VIII │ 375
│ │ │
TC-51 │Decree establishing the Protectorate │ │
│of Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939.│ │
│(GB 8) │ VIII │ 404
│ │ │
*TC-53-A │Marginal note to decree of final │ │
│incorporation of Memel with German │ │
│Reich, 23 March 1939, from Documents │ │
│of German Politics, Part VII, p. 552. │ │
│(GB 4) │ VIII │ 408
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 37 Polish White Book. Hitler’s │ │
│Reichstag speech, 20 February 1938. │ VIII │ 481
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 40 Polish White Book. Lipski and │ │
│Ribbentrop, 10 September 1938. │ VIII │ 481
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 42 Polish White Book. Extracts │ │
│from speech by Hitler at Sportz │ │
│Palast, 26 September 1938. │ VIII │ 482
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 44 Polish White Book. Lipski, │ │
│Ribbentrop luncheon, conversation, 24 │ │
│October 1938. (GB 27-A) │ VIII │ 483
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 45 Polish White Book. Beck’s │ │
│instructions to Lipski, 31 October │ │
│1938. (GB 27-B) │ VIII │ 484
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 48 Polish White Book. Beck and │ │
│Hitler conversation, 5 January 1939. │ │
│(GB 34) │ VIII │ 486
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 49 Polish White Book. Beck and │ │
│Ribbentrop conversation, 6 January │ │
│1939. (GB 35) │ VIII │ 488
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 57 Polish White Book. Hitler’s │ │
│Reichstag speech, 30 January 1939. (GB│ │
│37) │ VIII │ 488
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 61 Polish White Book. Ribbentrop │ │
│and Lipski conversation, 21 March │ │
│1939. (GB 38) │ VIII │ 489
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 147 Polish White Book. Final │ │
│report of former Polish Ambassador in │ │
│Berlin, 10 October 1939. │ VIII │ 499
│ │ │
*TC-76 │Note for Reichsminister, 26 August │ │
│1938. (GB 31) │ VIII │ 515
│ │ │
Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │
│December 1945. │ VIII │ 587
│ │ │
Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
4. WILHELM KEITEL
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY KEITEL._
Chief of the Armed Forces Department in the Reichs Ministry of War
(_Wehrmachtsamt in Reichskriegsministerium_), 1 October 1935 to 4
February 1938. (_3019-PS_)
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Chief of OKW), equal
in rank to a Reichs Minister. (_1915-PS_)
Member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 4 February 1938 to 1945.
(_2031-PS_)
Member of Ministerial Council for the defense of the Reich, 30 August
1939 to 1945. (_2018-PS_)
Member of Reichs Defense Council, 4 September 1938 to 1945. (_2194-PS_)
Field Marshal, July 1940 to 1945. (_3020-PS_)
B. _FUNCTIONS OF KEITEL._
As Chief of the _Wehrmachtsamt_ in the Ministry of War, Keitel was Chief
of Staff for von Blomberg, who was both Minister of War and
Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.
On 4 February 1938 Hitler abolished the Ministry of War, assumed direct
command of the Armed Forces himself, and created the OKW (_Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht_). The OKW advised Hitler on the most important military
questions, and prepared and transmitted directives to the Armed Forces.
Thus it exercised great influence on the formation of the German
military policy and the conduct of military affairs.
Keitel was made Chief of the OKW, with rank equal to that of
Reichsminister. He was also given authorities of the former Minister of
War, and continued to perform the administrative duties of that
position. (_1915-PS_; _1954-PS_; _3704-PS_)
In addition to its ministerial functions, the OKW was Hitler’s military
staff. Its most important duty was the development of strategic and
operational plans. Such plans were worked out by the OKW Operations
Staff in broad outline, and then in more detail by the commanders and
chiefs of staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. After Hitler had
approved the plans they were transmitted by the OKW to the respective
military authorities. (_3705-PS_; _3702-PS_; _3707-PS_).
C. _KEITEL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST PEACE._
Keitel’s conspiratorial activities started immediately after the Nazis
came to power. As early as in May 1933, when Germany was still a member
of the League of Nations, Keitel gave directives for deceiving “Geneva”
in rearmament matters.
At the second meeting of the Working Committee of the Councillors for
Reich Defense on 22 May 1933, Colonel Keitel emphasized that the supreme
consideration guiding the work of the committee was to be secrecy. “No
document”, he said, “ought to be lost, since otherwise it may fall into
the hands of the enemy’s intelligence service. Orally transmitted
matters are not provable; they can be denied by us in Geneva.” He
requested that written documents not be sent through the mails, or, if
it was absolutely necessary to do so, that they be addressed, not to a
government agency or office (where they might be opened by the mail
clerks) but to the recipient personally. (_EC-177_)
The fact that Keitel was a member of the Nazi conspiracy in good
standing is apparent from his statement that he held the Golden Party
Badge, and that consequently the Party considered him a member as from
the autumn of 1944, when the law against military personnel being
members of the Party was changed (1944 RGBl. I, 317). His political
convictions were those of National Socialism, and he was a loyal
follower of Hitler. (_1954-PS_)
At the second meeting of the Working Committee of the Councillors for
Reich Defense held on 26 April 1933, the chairman, Colonel Keitel,
pointed out the necessity and desirability for the creation of the Reich
Defense Council which had been determined on by a cabinet decision of 4
April 1933. He said that a general program for the creation of a war
economy had already been completed, but that it would take a long time
to carry out the program. He explained that it was the purpose and
objective of the Working Committee of the new Defense Council to
overcome these difficulties. (_EC-177_)
On 6 December 1935 General Major Keitel, chairman of the eleventh
meeting of the Reich Defense Council, pointed out that the mobilization
year was to begin on 1 April and to end on 31 March of the following
year. For the first time, a “Mobilization Book for Civilian Agencies”
was to be issued on 1 April 1936. Keitel said that this day, to the
extent possible, should find the nation ready and prepared. He declared
that, according to the will of the Fuehrer, the economic management of
the country should put the enhancement of military capacity above all
other national tasks. Keitel emphasized that it was the function of all
members of the Reich Defense Council to use all available resources
economically and to ask for only such funds and raw materials as were
absolutely and exclusively needed for the defense of the Reich.
In the presence of Keitel, Colonel Jodl said that the “Mobilization Book
for the Civilian Agencies” constituted the unified basis for the
carrying out of mobilization outside of the Army. (_EC-406_)
The twelfth meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense
Council, held on 14 May 1936, was opened by Field Marshal von Blomberg,
War Minister and Supreme Army Commander. He stressed the necessity for a
total mobilization, including the drafting of the necessary laws,
preparations in the re-militarized Rhineland zone, financing and
rearmament. Lt. General Keitel, in his capacity as chairman of the
Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council, again stressed the
necessity for secrecy. Ministerial Director Wohlthat pointed out that,
in order to guarantee rearmament and an adequate food supply, an
increase in production and utmost economy were necessary, a postulate
that had led to the special mandate given by the Fuehrer to Minister
President Goering. (_EC-407_)
Keitel participated also in the activities of the conspirators to
re-militarize the Rhineland. At that time he was Chief of the
_Wehrmachtsamt_ under von Blomberg and signed, on the latter’s behalf,
the order for naval participation in the operation. (_C-194_)
Keitel also took part in the war-planning activities of the Reich
Cabinet, of which he was a member. The cabinet consulted by meetings,
and by the circulation of decrees among its members for their approval
or disapproval. (See generally Section 3 of Chapter XV on the Reich
Cabinet.) Keitel was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council, which has
been described as “a select committee” of the cabinet for deliberation
on foreign affairs. (_1774-PS_)
A Reich Defense Council was established by the ordinary cabinet in 1933.
It was a war-planning group, and Keitel took part in the meetings of its
working committee. (_EC-177_; _EC-406_; _EC-407_)
On 4 December 1938 a Secret Defense Law was passed, which defined the
duties of the Reich Defense Council. As Chief of OKW, Keitel was a
member of the council, and he also presided over the Council’s Working
Committee (_Reichsverteidigungsausschuss_). (_2194-PS_)
The Secret Defense Law of 1938 provided for a Plenipotentiary for
Economy, whose task was to “put all economic forces into the service of
the Reich defense, and to safeguard economically the life of the German
nation”, and for a Plenipotentiary for Administration, whose duties were
to take over “the uniform leadership of the non-military administration
with exception of the economic administration” upon the declaration of a
“state of defense”. Certain ministries were, in peace-time, bound by the
directives of the plenipotentiaries. The latter were bound, in turn,
under certain conditions, together with the ministries subordinate to
them, to take directions from the Chief of OKW. Keitel could also, in a
state of defense, issue orders to the Minister of Transport and the
Minister of Posts. In addition, he presided over the Council’s Working
Committee, which prepared the Council’s decisions, saw that they were
executed, and obtained collaboration between the armed forces, the chief
Reich offices, and the Party. Keitel regulated the activities of this
committee and issued directions to the plenipotentiaries and certain
Reich ministries to assure uniform execution of the council’s decisions.
(_2194-PS_)
The two plenipotentiaries and the OKW formed what was known as a “Three
Man College” (_2608-PS_). This system of a three man college functioned
as follows, from a legislative point of view: The Plenipotentiary for
Economy was empowered by paragraph 4 of the Secret Defense Law of 4
September 1938 to issue laws within his sphere, with the consent of the
OKW and the Plenipotentiary for Administration, which differed from
existing laws. Similarly, the Plenipotentiary for Administration was
empowered by paragraph 3 of the same law to issue laws within his
sphere, with the consent of the OKW and the Plenipotentiary for Economy,
which differed from existing laws.
In the spheres of the Reich Minister of Posts, the Reich Minister of
Transport and of the General Inspector for German roads
(_Generalinspektor fuer die Strassenwesen_), the Chief of the OKW had
the right, under paragraph 5 of the same law, to issue laws, in
agreement with the Plenipotentiaries for Administration and Economy,
which differed from existing laws. (_2194-PS_)
The legislative function of the three man college, prior to 9 September
1939 was one of drafting decrees to be used in time of war.
The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich was established by
a decree of Hitler on 30 August 1939. It was formed out of the Reich
Defense Council, and included among its members the two
plenipotentiaries of the council and the Chief of OKW. (_2018-PS_)
The Council had the power to pass decrees with the force of law, and to
legislate for the occupied Eastern Territories (1939 RGBl, I, 2077).
Decrees of the council were circulated, before enactment, among all the
members by written communication from Dr. Lammers, who was also on the
Council. (_2231-PS_)
Frick has referred to the Council of Ministers as “the highest permanent
organ of the Reich with comprehensive jurisdiction, responsible only to
the Fuehrer”. “The composition of the Ministerial Council for the
Defense of the Reich”, he added, “shows the real concentration of power
in it”. He said also that Keitel was liaison between the council and the
armed forces, it being primarily his duty to coordinate the measures for
civilian defense in the area of administration and economy with the
genuine military measures for the defense of the Reich. (_2608-PS_)
Keitel also took an active part in collaborating with and in instigating
the Japanese to enter the war. Nazi policy with regard to Japan was
expressed in an order signed by Keitel on 5 March 1941. This order was
distributed to the OKH, OKM, and OKL, and also to Jodl. It stated that
Japan must be drawn actively into the war, and that the taking of
Singapore would mean a decisive success for the three powers. (_C-75_)
At about the time this order was issued, a meeting was held with Hitler,
in which Raeder urged that Japan be induced to attack Singapore. Keitel
and Jodl were both present at this meeting. (_C-152_)
Keitel may have known of a report from the Military Attache in Tokyo
that preparations were continuing for a sudden attack on Singapore and
Manila. (_1538-PS_)
D. _KEITEL’S PART IN PLANNING AND LAUNCHING WARS OF AGGRESSION._
(_See “F” 1 through 7, infra, where the joint responsibility of Keitel
and Jodl for these activities is discussed._)
E. _KEITEL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY._
(1) _Murder and ill treatment of civilian populations in occupied
territory and on the high seas._ Keitel committed many crimes of this
nature, by ordering such criminal activities.
On 13 May 1941 Keitel, as Chief of OKW, signed an order from the
Fuehrer’s Headquarters providing that Russian civilians suspected of
offenses against German troops should be shot or ruthlessly punished
without a military trial, and that prosecution of German soldiers for
offenses against Russian civilians was not required (_C-50_). On 27 July
1941 he ordered that all copies of this decree should be destroyed, but
without affecting its validity. (_C-51_)
On 23 July 1941 Keitel signed an order concerning the administration of
occupied Russia. This order provided that legal punishments were
inadequate in so great an area, and that troops should use terrorism in
crushing the population’s will to resist. (_C-52_)
Keitel signed one of the so-called _Nacht und Nebel_ decrees on 7
December 1941. It provided that in occupied territories of the west
civilians would be tried for offenses against the German state only if
the death sentence was likely to be carried out within a few days of
arrest. Otherwise the accused would be taken to Germany, and no
information would be given about them in reply to any inquiries.
(_666-PS_)
By a first ordinance of 7 December 1941 Keitel made the provisions of
the foregoing directive applicable to the following offenses; attacks
against life or bodily health, espionage, sabotage, communistic
conspiracy, offenses likely to create disturbances, assistance to the
enemy, and illicit possession of arms. His ordinance also provided that
the offenses mentioned were to be tried in the occupied countries only
if it were likely that the death sentence would be pronounced, and if it
were possible to complete trial and execution within a very short time,
as a rule within a week after arrest. In case of trial in Germany, it
was provided that alien witnesses could be heard only with the consent
of the High Command of the Armed Forces and that the public would not be
admitted to the proceedings. (_L-90_)
In a communication issued by him in his capacity as Chief of the High
Command of the Armed Forces Keitel on 12 December 1941 stated with
respect to the aforementioned directive and ordinance:
“Efficient and enduring terrorization can be achieved only
either by capital punishment or by measures to keep the
relatives of the criminal and the population in the dark as to
the fate of the criminal. This aim is achieved by transferring
the criminal to Germany.” (_L-90_)
In pursuance of Keitel’s _Nacht und Nebel_ decree, Admiral Canaris on 2
February 1942 issued instructions to the _Abwehr_ to punish crimes
against the _Wehrmacht_ accordingly. At first the order was to apply
only to Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France. (_833-PS_)
The Chief of the SIPO and SD reported to OKW on 24 June 1942 that a
Frenchman had died while awaiting trial in Germany, and that, in order
to create anxiety in accordance with the decree, his family had not been
notified. Keitel’s OKW approved of this procedure, which had been
established for such cases by an OKW order of 16 April 1942. (_668-PS_)
When, on 20 April 1941 Hitler appointed Rosenberg “Deputy for a
Centralized Treatment of Problems concerning the Eastern Territories,”
Keitel was asked to designate a representative of OKW to sit with
Rosenberg. Keitel designated Jodl as his representative and Warlimont as
deputy. (_865-PS_)
Thus Keitel and Jodl share the responsibility for crimes committed by
Rosenberg’s administration. In this connection reference is made to
section 7 of this chapter on Rosenberg.
Among the decrees issued by the Council of Ministers, of which Keitel
was a member, are two which connect him with harsh treatment of
inhabitants of the Occupied Eastern Territories. (_2746-PS_; _2039-PS_)
(2) _Deportation of civilian populations in occupied territories for
slave labor and other purposes._ Keitel’s connection with the forced
labor program began at a meeting with Hitler on 23 May 1939, when it was
announced that Poland would be invaded, and also that non-German
populations would be available as a source of labor. (_L-79_)
Keitel directed the execution of Hitler’s order to use Russian prisoners
of war in German war industries, and stated that OKW (AWA) would furnish
to the Secretary of Labor information on the use of such labor, and
provide the labor force. (_EC-194_)
Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary General for Manpower by a decree
of 21 March 1942, signed by Hitler, Lammers, and Keitel. (_1666-PS_)
On 8 September 1942 Keitel initialled a Hitler order requiring citizens
of France, Holland, and Belgium to work on the “Atlantic Wall”. The
order was to be enforced by the withdrawal of food and clothing ration
cards (_556-2-PS_). Keitel was informed of the quotas of foreign
laborers which Sauckel and his agents were to fill. Sauckel requested
the assistance of the Army, and asked that pressure be used to obtain
the quotas, if necessary. (_3012-PS_)
At a conference with Hitler on 4 January 1944, at which Keitel was
present, it was determined that Sauckel should obtain 4,000,000 new
workers from occupied territories. (_1292-PS_)
(3) _Murder and ill treatment of prisoners of war, and of other members
of the armed forces of the countries with which Germany was at war, and
of persons on the high seas._ On 18 October 1942 Hitler ordered that
commando troops, even if in uniform, should be killed, not only in
battle, but in flight or while attempting to surrender (_498-PS_). An
order regulating the treatment of paratroopers had been issued by Keitel
about a month earlier. It provided that captured paratroopers were to be
turned over to the SD. (_553-PS_)
A supplementary explanation of the commando order, signed by Hitler, was
distributed to commanding officers only, with a covering memorandum
dated 19 October 1942, signed by Jodl (_503-PS_). Several cases are
known in which the order was carried out (_508-PS_; _509-PS_). Three
specific instances were mentioned by the G-3 of the C-in-C, Norway,
where captured members of sabotage units were executed after
interrogations which resulted in valuable intelligence. These occurred
at Glomfjord, Drontheim, and Stavanger. (_512-PS_)
On 23 June 1944 the Supreme Command West requested instructions
redefining the scope of the commando order. In view of the extensive
landings in Normandy, it had become difficult to decide which paratroops
should be considered sabotage troops under the terms of the order, and
which should be considered as engaged in normal combat operations. The
question was answered by an order of 25 June 1944, one copy of which was
signed by Keitel, reaffirming the full force of the original order
(_531-PS_; _551-PS_). Keitel extended the application of the commando
order to members of Anglo-American and Russian “military missions” taken
in the fighting against the partisans in the southeast and southwest.
(_537-PS_)
When allied fliers were forced to land in Germany, they were sometimes
killed by the civilian population. The police had orders not to protect
the fliers, nor to punish civilians for lynching them. A proposal was
considered to order the shooting without court-martial of enemy airmen
who had been forced down after engaging in specified “acts of terror”.
Whether or not the order was ever issued is immaterial, for it is
certain that Keitel and Jodl knew of the lynchings, did nothing to
prevent them, and in fact considered giving them official justification.
(_See also “F”, 8, infra, in which the joint responsibility of Keitel
and Jodl for the lynching of Allied airmen is discussed._)
Keitel’s criminal activities against Soviet prisoners of war are shown
by the following. On 8 September 1941 Keitel’s OKW issued a regulation
for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. It stated that Russian
soldiers would fight by any methods for the idea of Bolshevism and that
consequently they had lost any claim to treatment in accordance with the
Geneva Convention. Stern measures were to be employed against them,
including the free use of weapons. The politically undesirable prisoners
were to be segregated from the others and turned over to “special
purpose units” of the Security Police and the Security Service. There
was to be the closest cooperation between the military commanders and
these police units. (_1519-PS_)
Admiral Canaris of the Abwehr considered this order in such direct
violation of the general principles of International Law that he
addressed a memorandum of protest to Keitel on 15 September 1941. He
pointed out that, while the Geneva Convention was not binding between
Germany and the USSR, the usual rules of International Law should be
observed; that such instructions, particularly those concerning the use
of weapons, would result in arbitrary killings; and that the disposition
of politically undesirable prisoners would be decided by the SIPO and
the SD according to principles of which the _Wehrmacht_ was ignorant.
(As to this argument, Keitel wrote in the margin “Very efficient” and
“Not at all.”) Keitel received and considered this memorandum, for on
its first page there is the following comment in his handwriting, dated
23 September and initialled “K”:
“The objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous
warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore I
approve and back the measures.” (_EC-338_)
The regulations which Canaris had protested were restated on 24 March
1942, but their essential provisions were unchanged. (_695-PS_)
An order of Keitel’s OKW dated 29 January 1943, signed by Reinecke,
contains a broad interpretation of the guards’ right of self-defense
against prisoners. For example, self-defense includes not only the
guard’s person, but his honor and property, and third parties, such as
the State. (_656-PS_)
That Keitel knew of the appalling treatment of Russian prisoners of war,
and the high death rate among them, appears from the statements in a
letter sent to him by Rosenberg on 28 February 1942. The letter stressed
the need for better treatment of the Russians, so that they would be
well impressed by the Germans. (_081-PS_)
An order of Keitel’s OKW provided that escaped officers and non-working
non-commissioned officers other than Americans and British were to be
turned over to the SIPO and SD upon recapture. The SIPO and SD, upon
instructions from their chief, would then transport the men to the
Mauthausen concentration camp under operation “Kugel” (_L-158_). Such
prisoners were executed at Mauthausen upon arrival (_2285-PS_).
Americans and British who were recaptured might be turned over to the
SIPO and SD, upon decision of the “W.Kdos” from the OKW/o.i.c. (_L-158_)
(4) _Killing of Hostages._ Keitel’s criminal activities are shown by the
following two documents. On 16 December 1941 he signed an order stating
that uprisings among German troops in occupied territories must be
considered as inspired by a communist conspiracy, and that the death of
one German soldier must mean death for fifty or one hundred communists.
(_829-PS_)
Keitel also signed an order (received by the OKH on 1 October 1941)
specifying that hostages should be well known, and that they should come
from Nationalist, Democrat, or Communist political factions. After each
act of sabotage hostages belonging to the saboteur’s group should be
shot. (_1590-PS_)
(5) _Plunder of public and private property._ The looting of cultural
property was carried on chiefly under Rosenberg by the _Einsatzstab
Rosenberg_, an organization established for that purpose. In the West he
was to act in his capacity as Reichsleiter, and in the East in his
capacity as Reichsminister. Keitel’s OKW cooperated with Rosenberg, and
directions for carrying out the order were to be issued by the Chief of
the OKW in agreement with Rosenberg (_149-PS_). Keitel ordered the
military authorities to cooperate in this program (_137-PS_; _138-PS_).
A memorandum of 17 May 1944 in the Rosenberg Ministry states that the
_Wehrmacht_ was one of the principal agencies engaged in removing
treasures from Russia. (_1107-PS_)
Keitel was also responsible for the removal of machine tools,
foodstuffs, and other materials from occupied territories. (_1161-PS_;
_743-PS_)
(6) _The exaction of collective penalties._ Collective penalties were
exacted from the population for acts of individuals for which it could
not be held responsible. Keitel advocated such measures. This appears
from correspondence on acts of sabotage in the shipbuilding yards.
(_C-48_; _870-PS_; _871-PS_)
(7) _Germanization of Occupied Territories._ On 16 July 1941 Keitel was
present at a meeting with Hitler where the policy was announced of
exploiting occupied Russian territory and making it part of the Reich.
(_L-221_)
In order to promote a racially valuable German heritage an order signed
by Hitler, Lammers, and Keitel provides for payment of subsidies to
Norwegian or Dutch women who had borne children of German soldiers. The
Chief of OKW was authorized to extend its application to other occupied
territories. (_2926-PS_)
(8) _Persecution of minorities._ Keitel’s responsibility for the
persecution of minorities in Germany appears from the fact that, with
Hitler, Goering, and Lammers, he signed a decree on 7 October 1939 which
provided that the harmful influence of foreigners must be eliminated
from Germany; that Germans could be resettled by the Reichsfuehrer SS;
and that the Reichsfuehrer SS could perform “all necessary general and
administrative measures” to discharge this duty. (_686-PS_)
Keitel’s responsibility for the criminal treatment of Jews is apparent
from his own statement that the struggle against Bolshevism necessitated
a ruthless proceeding against the Jews; the _Wehrmacht_ was not to use
them for any service, but they could be placed in labor columns under
German supervision. (_878-PS_)
F. _JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF KEITEL AND JODL FOR PLANNING AND LAUNCHING
WARS OF AGGRESSION, AND FOR THE LYNCHING OF ALLIED AIRMEN._
(1) _Aggression against Austria._ In June of 1937 von Blomberg ordered
preparations for “Case Otto”—armed intervention in Austria in event of
a Hapsburg restoration (_C-175_). New plans were made in 1938 under the
same name. German policy in 1938 was to eliminate Austria and
Czechoslovakia, and there was a campaign to undermine Austria’s will to
resist, by pressure on the government, by propaganda, and by fifth
column activity. (_1780-PS_)
Keitel was present at Berchtesgaden when Schuschnigg visited Hitler
there in February 1938. Schuschnigg was subjected to political and
military pressure, which resulted in such concessions to the Nazis as
the reorganization of the Austrian cabinet (_1780-PS_). Keitel and Jodl
and Canaris were instructed to keep up the military pressure against
Austria by simulating military measures until 15 February. (_1780-PS_)
The OKW submitted proposals to Hitler regarding the Austrian campaign;
these included suggestions of false rumors and broadcasts. A note in
Jodl’s handwriting states that Hitler approved the memorandum by
telephone and that Canaris was informed. (_1775-PS_)
Hitler ordered preparation of “Case Otto”—mobilization of army units
and air forces (_1780-PS_). Hitler’s directive for “Case Otto” was
initialled by Keitel and Jodl. Jodl issued supplementary instructions
(_C-102_; _C-103_). Jodl initialled Hitler’s order for the invasion of
Austria. (_C-182_)
(2) _The Execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia._ On 21 April
1938 Hitler and Keitel met and discussed plans for the taking of
Czechoslovakia. They considered a military attack after a period of
diplomatic friction, or as the result of a created incident, such as the
assassination of the German ambassador at Prague. (_388-PS_)
After the invasion of Austria, _Wehrmacht_ planning was devoted to “Case
Green,” the operation against Czechoslovakia (_1780-PS_). Case Green was
first drafted in 1937, when it was thought that a “probable warlike
eventuality” would be “war on two fronts with the center of gravity in
the southeast.” A surprise attack on Czechoslovakia was considered
possible (_C-175_). Through the late spring and summer of 1938 Case
Green was revised and modified. The memoranda and correspondence are
frequently signed or initialled by Keitel, and it is clear that he knew
of Hitler’s intention to use force against Czechoslovakia and made the
plans to carry out that intention. (_388-PS_; _1780-PS_; _2353-PS_)
There were many meetings on Case Green in September 1938, some with
Hitler, some with Keitel and Jodl. The timing of troop movements was
discussed; the question of advance notice to OKH; preparations of
railroads and fortifications; even propaganda to counteract the
anticipated violations of International Law which the invasion would
entail (_388-PS_; _1780-PS_; _C-2_). Assistance was given by OKH to the
Sudeten German Free Corps, an auxiliary military organization which
operated under Henlein to create disorder in Czechoslovakia. (_1780-PS_;
_388-PS_)
In October 1938 Hitler addressed to the OKW four specific questions
about the time and the forces that would be required to break Czech
resistance in Bohemia and Moravia, and Keitel submitted the answers
prepared by the OKH and Luftwaffe (_388-PS_). On 21 October 1938 Hitler
signed an order (and Keitel initialled it) requiring the _Wehrmacht_ to
make preparations to take the remainder of Czechoslovakia. (_C-136_)
Two months later Keitel issued a supplement to this order, stating that
on the order of the Fuehrer preparations for the liquidation of
Czechoslovakia were to continue, and stressing the importance of having
the attack well camouflaged and unwarlike in appearance. (_C-138_)
Keitel was present at the interview between Hitler and Hacha at the
Reich Chancellery on 15 March 1939, when the Czech representatives
delivered their country to Hitler, after hours of duress, which included
the threat of immediate bombing of Prague. (_2798-PS_; _2943-PS_)
(3) _Aggression against Poland._ On 25 March 1939—four days after
Ribbentrop pressed new demands for Danzig on the Polish
Ambassador—Hitler told von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-chief of the Army,
that he did not intend to solve the Polish question by force for the
time being but requested that plans for that operation be developed.
(_R-100_)
On 3 April 1939 Keitel, as Chief of the High Command of the Armed
Forces, reissued over his signature the directive for the Uniform
Preparation for War by the Armed Forces for 1939/40. The directive,
noting that the basic principles for the sections on “Frontier Defense”
and “Danzig” remained unaltered, stated that Hitler had added the
following directives to “Fall Weiss”:
“1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation
can be carried out at any time from _1.9.39_ onwards.
“2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to
draw up a precise timetable for “Fall Weiss” and to arrange by
conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches
of the Armed Forces.
“3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the
details for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by
1.5.39.” (_C-120_)
It is noteworthy that, even in April of 1939, the tentative timetable
called for the invasion of Poland to be carried out at any time from 1
September 1939 onwards.
About a week later, an order signed by Hitler was circulated to the
highest commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force. This confirmed
Keitel’s directive to prepare for three eventualities: “Frontier
Defense”, “Fall Weiss”, and the Annexation of Danzig. Annex II contained
further instructions for “Fall Weiss”. In the first paragraph, headed
“Political Hypotheses and Aims”, it was stated that should Poland adopt
a threatening attitude toward Germany, a “final settlement” would be
necessary _notwithstanding the pact with Poland_. “The aim is then to
destroy Polish military strength . . .”
It was further stated that the Free State of Danzig would be
incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict, at the
latest. The directive continued: “Policy aims at limiting the war to
Poland, and this is considered possible in view of the internal crisis
in France and British restraint as a result of this.”
The general political background against which the Armed Forces were to
work having thus been set down, the later paragraphs outlined the tasks
and operational objectives of the three branches of the Armed Forces. It
was also decreed that a “camouflaged or open (‘general’ added in ink)
mobilization will not be ordered before D-Day 1 at the latest possible
moment”, and further that the “preparations for the opening of
operations are to be made in such a way that—without waiting for the
planned assembly of mobilized units—positions can be taken up
immediately by the first available troops.” (_C-120_)
On 10 May an order signed by Hitler promulgated his instructions for the
seizure of economic installations in Poland and directed the
commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the armed forces to report
by 1 August 1939 on the measures taken in consequence of these
instructions. (_C-120_)
On 23 May 1939 Hitler called a meeting of his military leaders at the
Reich Chancellery. Keitel was at the meeting; Jodl was not, but
Warlimont (also from the Planning Department of OKW) was. Hitler
announced the necessity of a war against Poland, not over Danzig, but in
order to acquire living space in the East. He recognized the possibility
that this would provoke a war against France and England, but the
_Wehrmacht_ was instructed to prepare detailed plans. (_L-79_)
A directive dated 22 June 1939, signed by Keitel as Chief of the OKW,
indicates an advanced stage of preparation. On the basis of particulars
already available from the Navy, Army, and Air Force, he stated, he had
submitted to Hitler a “preliminary timetable” for “Fall Weiss.” The
Fuehrer was reported to be in substantial agreement with the intentions
submitted by the three branches; he had also made suggestions with
regard to the need to camouflage the scheduled maneuvers “in order not
to disquiet the population,” and had commented on the disposition of an
SS Artillery Regiment. (_C-126_)
Two days later, Keitel issued instructions for further study on two
specific problems: the capture, in undamaged condition, of bridges over
the Vistula; and the possible adverse effect of Navy mining in Danzig
Bay on the element of surprise in the Army’s attack against the bridge
at Dirschau, southeast of Danzig. (_C-120_)
On 22 August 1939, Hitler called together at Obersalzberg the Supreme
Commanders of the three branches of the armed forces, as well as the
lower ranking Commanding Generals (_Oberbefehlshaber_), and announced
his decision to attack Poland near dawn on 26 August. Keitel was at this
meeting. (_L-3_; _798-PS_; _1014-PS_)
Three documents reporting this meeting have been uncovered: the text of
one, _L-3_, overlaps the contents of the other two, _798-PS_ and
_1014-PS_; the latter two appear to be complementary, _798-PS_ being a
record of a morning speech, and _1014-PS_ of an afternoon speech.
Violent and abusive language appears in both _L-3_ and _798-PS_. That
Hitler made, at a minimum, the following points, appears from all of
them:
1. The decision to attack Poland was made last spring. (_L-3_; _798-PS_)
2. The aim of the war in Poland is to destroy the Polish armed forces,
rather than to reach a fixed line. (_L-3_; _1014-PS_)
3. The attack will start early Saturday morning, 26 August (_L-3_;
_1014-PS_)
4. A spurious cause for starting the war will be devised by German
propaganda. It is a matter of indifference whether it is plausible or
not. The world will not question the victor (_L-3_; _1014-PS_). The text
in _L-3_ further describes the pretext to be used to start the war:
“I’ll let a couple of companies, dressed in Polish uniforms, make an
assault in Upper Silesia or in the Protectorate.”
A handwritten entry in the diary of Jodl, at that time Chief of the
Operations Department of the OKW, confirms that the time for the attack
on Poland had been fixed for 0430 on 26 August 1939. (_1780-PS_)
(4) _Aggression against Norway and Denmark._ On or about 12 September
1939 Hitler ordered the OKW to start preparations for the occupation of
Norwegian bases early in 1940. (_1546-PS_)
The possibility of using Quisling was discussed with Hitler on 12
December 1939, in a conference at which Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl were
present. Hitler agreed with Raeder’s suggestion that, if he was
favorably impressed with Quisling, the OKW should be authorized to
prepare for the occupation either with Quisling’s assistance, or by
force. (_C-64_)
In January of 1940 the Navy was ordered to concentrate barges for the
invasion, and further preparations were to be conducted under the code
name “_Weserubung_” (_C-63_). The general directive for the invasion was
issued by Hitler on 1 March 1940. (_C-174_; _1809-PS_)
(5) _Aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg._ At a
conference with Hitler on 23 May 1939 it was determined that the
occupation of the Low Countries was necessary to the successful conduct
of the war against England. A small planning staff was formed at OKW
with responsibility for further planning of the invasion, and complete
secrecy was invoked. Keitel was at this meeting. (_L-79_)
On 9 October 1939 it was stated in a general directive for the conduct
of the war in the West that the invasion should be started soon, in
order to protect the Ruhr and to provide air bases for use against
England. A copy of this directive was distributed to OKW. (_L-52_)
In October and November of 1939 a number of military orders was issued
concerning the invasion of the Low Countries—“Fall Gelb”. Questions of
how far the troops should advance under the plan were clarified (_C-62_;
_440-PS_). Instructions were issued concerning the deployment of troops,
communications systems, crossing of the borders, and the administration
and pacification of the countries to be taken (_2329-PS_). Provisions
were made for special operations by the 7th Flieger Division near the
Belgian-French border. (_C-10_)
Between 7 November 1939 and 9 May 1940 seventeen orders were issued
setting and postponing the day for starting operations. These delays
were caused by the weather. One of the orders, dated 11 January 1940,
shows that all the others were concerned with the action against the Low
Countries, and that the 7th Flieger Division (see _C-10_) was involved.
All these orders were signed either by Keitel or Jodl. (_C-72_)
The development of the plans, and the various questions which came up
for consideration are shown in the entries in Jodl’s diary. At one point
the Foreign Office did not regard the prepared justification for the
attack as satisfactory, but Jodl thought it was sufficient. His diary
shows the existence of the plan against the Low Countries and the steps
taken to put it into execution. (_1809-PS_)
(6) _Aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia._ On 12 November 1940
Hitler issued orders to the Army to prepare for the occupation of the
Greek mainland (_444-PS_). On 13 December 1940 a Hitler order stated
that the invasion of Greece was planned and would start as soon as the
weather became favorable. The composition of combat teams and their
routes of march were given. When the Greek operation was concluded, the
mass of the troops involved were to be employed for a new task. This
order was distributed to the OKW, as well as to the three armed
services. (_1541-PS_)
On 11 January 1941 Hitler ordered preparation for armed intervention in
Albania, to assist the Italians against Greece. The order was initialled
by Keitel and Jodl (_448-PS_). On 20 January 1941 Jodl reported, in
notes of a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, that Hitler stated that
one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in Rumania was for
use in his plan for the operation against Greece. This was four months
prior to the attack. (_C-134_)
On 19 February 1941 an OKW order signed by Warlimont gave decisions for
carrying out the Greek campaign, providing that pontoon building would
commence on 26 February, and that the Danube would be crossed on 2
March. (_C-59_)
On 18 March 1941 Raeder, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, asked for
confirmation that the whole of Greece would have to be occupied even in
the event of a peaceful settlement, and Hitler replied that complete
occupation was a prerequisite to any settlement. (_C-167_)
At a meeting on 27 March 1941, attended by both Keitel and Jodl, Hitler
outlined the proposed operations against Yugoslavia and Greece. The
actual plan for military operations, Directive No. 25, was issued on the
same day. (_1746-PS_)
(7) _Aggression against the U.S.S.R._ On 12 November 1940 Hitler issued
a directive in which, among other things, it was stated that
preparations for the East already verbally ordered should be continued,
regardless of the outcome of current political discussions for the
clarification of Russia’s attitude. The directive was initialled by
Jodl. (_444-PS_)
The original directive for preparation of the attack on Russia—case
“Barbarossa”—was signed by Hitler on 18 December 1940 and initialled by
Keitel and Jodl (_446-PS_). On 3 February 1941 Hitler held a meeting to
discuss the intended invasion. Keitel and Jodl were both present
(_872-PS_). On 1 March 1941 an OKW map was prepared to show the intended
division of occupied Russian territory. The distribution list shows that
Keitel and Jodl received copies. (_1642-PS_)
In March of 1941 Keitel wrote to Reich Minister Todt to give him
detailed instructions about camouflaging the coming invasion. The letter
was initialled by Jodl. (_874-PS_)
On 13 March 1941 Keitel issued an operational supplement to Hitler’s
Barbarossa order (_446-PS_). This order defined the area of operations
and established the relationship between political and military officers
in those areas (_447-PS_). On 1 June 1941 there was issued, with
Hitler’s approval, a timetable for the invasion, showing the disposition
and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This paper was signed by
Keitel (_C-39_). On 14 June 1941 an order was issued for final reports
on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin by Army, Navy, and Air Commanders.
(_C-78_)
While the foregoing preparations were being made, planning for the
production of armaments and supplies was being conducted by one of
Keitel’s subordinates, General Thomas, Chief of the _Wirtschaft
Ruestungsamt_ in OKW. (_2353-PS_)
By a Fuehrer order dated 20 April 1941 Rosenberg was appointed “Deputy
for a Centralized Treatment of Problems concerning the Eastern
Territories”. Jodl and Warlimont were appointed Keitel’s representatives
with the Rosenberg office (_865-PS_). A preliminary report by Rosenberg
on his work up to the time of the invasion mentions Keitel and Jodl as
having consulted and worked with him in those preparations. (_1039-PS_)
A memorandum written by General Thomas on 20 June 1941 states that
Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler’s policy on raw materials—that it
took less manpower to seize territories containing raw materials, than
it did to make synthetic substitutes. (_1456-PS_)
(8) _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity;—Crimes against Military
Personnel—Lynching of Allied Airmen._ On 21 May 1944 Keitel received a
note from WFSt to the effect that Hitler had decided that enemy fliers
who had been forced down should be shot without court-martial, if they
had engaged in “acts of terror”. Keitel wrote on the note “Please
arrange for order to be drafted. K”. (_731-PS_)
By 4 June 1944 Jodl and Warlimont were ready to go ahead with
formulating the plans. Goering was to be asked what actions of enemy
fliers should be punishable by death; the Airmen’s Reception Camp at
Oberursel was to be told which fliers should be delivered to the SD; and
the Foreign Office was to be kept advised. (_737-PS_)
At subsequent conferences Keitel and Jodl raised questions about the
difficulty of establishing general rules in such a matter. The “Acts of
Terror” were:
1. Low level attacks on civilians.
2. Shooting German fliers in parachutes.
3. Attacks on civilian passenger planes.
4. Attacks on Red Cross hospitals or trains. (_735-PS_)
On 17 June 1944 Keitel wrote to the Foreign Office to ask their approval
of the proposed measure and the agreed definition of “Acts of Terror”
(_730-PS_). On the same day Keitel wrote to Goering to ask for his
approval of the definitions of “Acts of Terror”, and also to ask that he
give verbal instructions to the Commandant of the camp at Oberursel to
hand over fliers guilty of such acts to the SD. Both Keitel and Jodl
initialled this letter (_729-PS_). Goering replied that fliers not
guilty of acts of terror must be protected, and suggested that such
matters be handled by the courts. (_732-PS_)
A draft of a Foreign Office letter dated 20 June 1944 expresses
misgivings about the Geneva Convention, and concern about the publicity
that would be involved. (_728-PS_)
On 26 June 1944 Goering’s adjutant telephoned the WFSt to say that
Goering agreed to the procedures suggested. (_733-PS_)
On 29 June Warlimont was informed that Ribbentrop had approved the
Foreign Office draft (_728-PS_), but wished to obtain Hitler’s approval
before communicating his own final written approval to Keitel.
(_740-PS_)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO WILHELM KEITEL
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 66
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
081-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Keitel, 28 │ │
│February 1942, concerning mistreatment│ │
│of Soviet prisoners of war. │ III │ 126
│ │ │
*137-PS │Copy of Order from Keitel to │ │
│Commanding General of Netherlands, 5 │ │
│July 1940, to cooperate with the │ │
│Einsatzstab Rosenberg. (USA 379) │ III │ 185
│ │ │
138-PS │Copy of Order from Keitel to │ │
│Commanding General of France, 17 │ │
│September 1940, to cooperate with the │ │
│Einsatzstab Rosenberg. │ III │ 186
│ │ │
*149-PS │Hitler Order, 1 March 1942, │ │
│establishing authority of Einsatzstab │ │
│Rosenberg. (USA 369) │ III │ 190
│ │ │
*375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │
│report of Intelligence Division, │ │
│Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August │ │
│1938. (USA 84) │ III │ 280
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
440-PS │Directive No. 8 signed by Keitel, 20 │ │
│November 1939, for the conduct of the │ │
│war. (GB 107) │ III │ 397
│ │ │
*444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from │ │
│Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by │ │
│Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 │ │
│November 1940, concerning plans for │ │
│prosecution of war in Mediterranean │ │
│Area and occupation of Greece. (GB │ │
│116) │ III │ 403
│ │ │
*446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed│ │
│by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │
│Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December │ │
│1940, concerning the Invasion of │ │
│Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407
│ │ │
*447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │
│No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March │ │
│1941, concerning Directives for │ │
│special areas. (USA 135) │ III │ 409
│ │ │
*448-PS │Hitler Order No. 22, initialled by │ │
│Keitel and Jodl, 11 January 1941, │ │
│concerning participation of German │ │
│Forces in the Fighting in the │ │
│Mediterranean Theater of Operations. │ │
│(GB 118) │ III │ 413
│ │ │
*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │
│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │
│501) │ III │ 416
│ │ │
*503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │
│1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │
│of his commando order of the day │ │
│before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426
│ │ │
*508-PS │OKW correspondence, November 1942, │ │
│about shooting of British glider │ │
│troops in Norway. (USA 545) │ III │ 430
│ │ │
509-PS │Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, │ │
│reporting “special treatment” for │ │
│three British commandos. (USA 547) │ III │ 433
│ │ │
*512-PS │Teletype from Army Commander in │ │
│Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning │ │
│interrogation of saboteurs before │ │
│shooting; and memorandum in reply from│ │
│OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546) │ III │ 433
│ │ │
*531-PS │OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing │ │
│inquiry from Supreme Command West │ │
│about treatment of paratroopers. (USA │ │
│550) │ III │ 435
│ │ │
*537-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 30 July 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of members of │ │
│foreign “Military Missions”, captured │ │
│together with partisans. (USA 553) │ III │ 439
│ │ │
*551-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Commando │ │
│participants. (USA 551) │ III │ 440
│ │ │
*553-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 4 August 1942,│ │
│regulating treatment of paratroops. │ │
│(USA 500) │ III │ 441
│ │ │
*556-2-PS │Order initialled by Keitel, 8 │ │
│September 1942, for civilians to work │ │
│on “West Wall”. (USA 194) │ III │ 443
│ │ │
*656-PS │Letter, undated, from Bormann to │ │
│Political leaders, enclosing Order of │ │
│Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, 29 │ │
│January 1943, relating to self-defense│ │
│against prisoners of war. (USA 339) │ III │ 470
│ │ │
666-PS │Directives issued by the Fuehrer and │ │
│Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces │ │
│signed by Keitel, 7 December 1941, for│ │
│prosecution of offenses against the │ │
│Reich. │ III │ 474
│ │ │
668-PS │Letter from Chief of the SIPO and SD │ │
│and OKW letter, 24 June 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of punishable │ │
│offenses against the Reich or │ │
│occupation forces in occupied │ │
│territories. (USA 504) │ III │ 476
│ │ │
*686-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │
│Chancellor to strengthen German │ │
│Folkdom, 7 October 1939, signed by │ │
│Hitler, Goering, Lammers and Keitel. │ │
│(USA 305) │ III │ 496
│ │ │
695-PS │OKW Order signed by Reinecke, 24 March│ │
│1942, concerning treatment of Soviet │ │
│prisoners of war. │ III │ 498
│ │ │
*728-PS │Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of │ │
│Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 │ │
│June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │
│enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) │ III │ 526
│ │ │
729-PS │Handwritten note initialled Keitel, 14│ │
│June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │
│enemy terror aviators. │ III │ 529
│ │ │
730-PS │Draft of letter to Foreign Office, │ │
│attention Ambassador Ritter, 15 June │ │
│1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │
│aviators. │ III │ 530
│ │ │
731-PS │Memorandum initialled by Jodl, 22 May,│ │
│concerning measures to be taken │ │
│against Anglo-American air crews in │ │
│special instances. │ III │ 531
│ │ │
732-PS │Letter from Feske to Keitel, 19 June │ │
│1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │
│terror aviators. │ III │ 532
│ │ │
733-PS │Telephone memorandum, 26 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of terror │ │
│aviators. │ III │ 533
│ │ │
735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │
│fix the cases in which the application│ │
│of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │
│would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533
│ │ │
737-PS │Conference Notes, 4 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │
│aviators. │ III │ 536
│ │ │
*740-PS │Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │
│aviators. (GB 153) │ III │ 537
│ │ │
743-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 8 September │ │
│1944, instructing the Armed Forces to │ │
│support Koch in the exploitation and │ │
│evacuation of Baltic territories. │ III │ 539
│ │ │
*795-PS │Keitel’s conference, 17 August 1939, │ │
│concerning giving Polish uniforms to │ │
│Heydrich. (GB 54) │ III │ 580
│ │ │
*798-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │
│Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, │ │
│22 August 1939. (USA 29) │ III │ 581
│ │ │
829-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 16 December │ │
│1941, for ruthless suppression of │ │
│uprisings in occupied territories. │ III │ 597
│ │ │
833-PS │Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head │ │
│of the Abwehr, 2 February 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of crimes │ │
│against the Reich or occupying forces │ │
│in the occupied territories. │ III │ 600
│ │ │
*865-PS │Correspondence between Keitel, │ │
│Rosenberg and Lammers, April 1941, │ │
│concerning appointment of Jodl and │ │
│Warlimont as OKW representatives with │ │
│Rosenberg. (USA 143) │ III │ 621
│ │ │
870-PS │Report of December 1944 from Terboven │ │
│to Hitler concerning sabotage in Oslo,│ │
│with marginal comment by Keitel │ │
│approving suggestion to shoot │ │
│relatives of saboteurs. │ III │ 623
│ │ │
*871-PS │Teletype from Keitel to Lammers, 6 │ │
│December 1944, agreeing that reprisals│ │
│must be ruthless. (GB 322) │ III │ 626
│ │ │
*872-PS │Memorandum of Discussion between the │ │
│Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case │ │
│“Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” │ │
│(African operation). (USA 134) │ III │ 626
│ │ │
874-PS │Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J,│ │
│and W, 9 March 1941, concerning │ │
│Deception measures. │ III │ 634
│ │ │
878-PS │Draft of Order signed by Keitel, 12 │ │
│September 1941, providing that Jews │ │
│may be put in labor-columns. │ III │ 636
│ │ │
*1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │
│Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. │ │
│(USA 30) │ III │ 665
│ │ │
*1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │
│regarding problems in Eastern │ │
│Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695
│ │ │
1107-PS │Office memorandum, 17 May 1944, in │ │
│Rosenberg Ministry concerning the │ │
│Wehrmacht’s function in removing │ │
│treasures from the USSR. │ III │ 789
│ │ │
1161-PS │OKW, 31 May 1940, setting up economic │ │
│reconnaissance teams to procure all │ │
│important stocks of raw materials, │ │
│machinery, etc. in Belgium, Holland │ │
│and Northern France. │ III │ 816
│ │ │
1292-PS │Memorandum of conference with Hitler, │ │
│4 January 1944, concerning allocation │ │
│of labor, 1944. (USA 225) │ III │ 866
│ │ │
*1456-PS │Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel│ │
│consulted about resources of USSR. │ │
│(USA 148) │ IV │ 21
│ │ │
*1519-PS │Circular from Bormann, 30 September │ │
│1941, containing text of OKW of 8 │ │
│September 1941 on treatment of Soviet │ │
│prisoners of war. (GB 525) │ IV │ 58
│ │ │
*1538-PS │Report from German Military Attache in│ │
│Tokyo to Office Foreign Intelligence, │ │
│24 May 1941. (USA 154) │ IV │ 100
│ │ │
*1541-PS │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13│ │
│December 1940. (GB 117) │ IV │ 101
│ │ │
1546-PS │Raeder memorandum, 9 April 1940, │ │
│concerning occupation of Norway. │ IV │ 104
│ │ │
1590-PS │Order received by OKH signed by │ │
│Keitel, 1 October 1941, containing │ │
│regulations for the shooting of │ │
│hostages. │ IV │ 127
│ │ │
1642-PS │Distribution list, 1 March 1941, for │ │
│secret map of Soviet Union. │ IV │ 154
│ │ │
*1666-PS │Decree appointing Sauckel General │ │
│Plenipotentiary for Manpower, 21 March│ │
│1942 and decree of Goering conferring │ │
│certain powers on Sauckel, 27 March │ │
│1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│pp. 179-180. (USA 208) │ IV │ 182
│ │ │
*1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │
│Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │
│speech by Hitler to German High │ │
│Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │
│March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │
│Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272
│ │ │
1774-PS │Extracts from Organizational Law of │ │
│the Greater German Reich by Ernst │ │
│Rudolf Huber. (GB 246) │ IV │ 349
│ │ │
*1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │
│February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
*1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February │ │
│1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377
│ │ │
1915-PS │Decree concerning leadership of Armed │ │
│Forces, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111. │ IV │ 552
│ │ │
1954-PS │Deposition of Keitel, 3 August 1945, │ │
│on his official functions and relation│ │
│to Nazi Party. │ IV │ 592
│ │ │
*2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │
│Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │
│30 August 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. │ │
│(GB 250) │ IV │ 650
│ │ │
*2031-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │
│Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB│ │
│217) │ IV │ 654
│ │ │
2039-PS │Decree concerning the conditions of │ │
│employment of Eastern workers, 30 June│ │
│1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 419. │ IV │ 655
│ │ │
*2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │
│Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │
│Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │
│enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │
│Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843
│ │ │
2231-PS │Excerpt from von Stutterheim, “Die │ │
│Reichskanzlei” (1940), pp. 19-34. │ IV │ 873
│ │ │
*2285-PS │Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French │ │
│officers, about shooting of prisoners │ │
│at Mauthausen, (USA 490) │ IV │ 991
│ │ │
*2329-PS │Order by Commander in Chief of the │ │
│Army, 7 October 1939. (GB 105) │ IV │ 1037
│ │ │
*2353-PS │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic │ │
│Facts for History of German War and │ │
│Armament Economy. (USA 35) │ IV │ 1071
│ │ │
*2608-PS │Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The│ │
│Administration in Wartime”. (USA 714) │ V │ 327
│ │ │
2746-PS │Decree concerning organization of │ │
│Criminal Jurisdiction against Poles │ │
│and Jews in Incorporated Territories, │ │
│4 December 1941. 1941 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp. │ │
│759-761. │ V │ 386
│ │ │
*2798-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of the │ │
│meeting between Hitler and President │ │
│Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March │ │
│1939. (USA 118; GB 5) │ V │ 433
│ │ │
2926-PS │Decree concerning the care of children│ │
│begotten by members of the Wehrmacht │ │
│Personnel in Occupied Territories, 28 │ │
│July 1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 488. │ V │ 592
│ │ │
*2943-PS │Documents Numbers 55, 57, 62, 65, 66, │ │
│73, 77 and 79 in the French Yellow │ │
│Book. Excerpts from eight dispatches │ │
│from M. Coulondre, the French │ │
│Ambassador in Berlin, to the French │ │
│Foreign Office, between 13 and 18 │ │
│March 1939. (USA 114) │ V │ 608
│ │ │
3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │
│1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │
│Service, and record of telephone │ │
│conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │
│1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731
│ │ │
3019-PS │Announcement of Keitel as Chief of │ │
│Wehrmacht, published in The Archives, │ │
│Vol. 18, p. 860. │ V │ 737
│ │ │
3020-PS │Fuehrer’s speech in Reichstag on 19 │ │
│July 1940, published in The Archives, │ │
│Vol. 76, p. 386. │ V │ 737
│ │ │
**3047-PS │File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s │ │
│train on 12 September 1939; report on │ │
│execution of Jews in Borrisow; and │ │
│entries from diary of Admiral Canaris.│ │
│(USA 80) (Referred to but not offered │ │
│in evidence.) │ V │ 766
│ │ │
*3702-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │
│Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531) │ VI │ 411
│ │ │
*3704-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Werner von │ │
│Blomberg, 7 November 1945. (USA 536) │ VI │ 414
│ │ │
*3705-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │
│Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │
│535) │ VI │ 415
│ │ │
*3707-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │
│Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533) │ VI │ 419
│ │ │
*3786-PS │Stenographic transcript of a meeting │ │
│in the Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 27 │ │
│January 1945. (USA 787) │ VI │ 655
│ │ │
*C-2 │Examples of violations of │ │
│International Law and proposed counter│ │
│propaganda, issued by OKW, 1 October │ │
│1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799
│ │ │
C-6 │Order by Keitel for intensified sea │ │
│and air measures in connection with │ │
│Fall “Gelb”, 30 December 1939. │ VI │ 816
│ │ │
*C-10 │OKW directive, 28 November 1939, │ │
│signed by Keitel, subject: Employment │ │
│of 7th Flieger Division. (GB 108) │ VI │ 817
│ │ │
*C-39 │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by │ │
│Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138)│ VI │ 857
│ │ │
C-48 │Order signed by Keitel, 30 November │ │
│1944, concerning sabotage in Norway │ │
│and Denmark. │ VI │ 870
│ │ │
*C-50 │Covering letters and Order of 13 May │ │
│1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless │ │
│treatment of civilians in the USSR for│ │
│offenses committed by them. (USA 554; │ │
│GB 162) │ VI │ 871
│ │ │
C-51 │Order signed by Keitel, 27 July 1941, │ │
│for destruction of all copies of Order│ │
│of 13 May 1941 (document C-50) without│ │
│effecting its validity. │ VI │ 875
│ │ │
*C-52 │Order signed by Keitel, 23 July 1941, │ │
│to abandon legal prosecution and │ │
│punishment in USSR and use terrorism │ │
│instead. (GB 485) │ VI │ 876
│ │ │
*C-59 │Order signed by Warlimont for │ │
│execution of operation “Marita”, 19 │ │
│February 1941. (GB 121) │ VI │ 879
│ │ │
*C-62 │Directive No. 6 on the conduct of war,│ │
│signed by Hitler, 9 October 1939; │ │
│directive by Keitel, 15 October 1939 │ │
│on Fall “Gelb”. (GB 106) │ VI │ 880
│ │ │
*C-63 │Keitel order on preparation for │ │
│“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB │ │
│87) │ VI │ 883
│ │ │
C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │
│meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │
│(GB 86) │ VI │ 884
│ │ │
*C-72 │Orders postponing “A” day in the West,│ │
│November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109) │ VI │ 893
│ │ │
*C-75 │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, │ │
│signed Keitel, 5 March 1941, │ │
│concerning collaboration with Japan. │ │
│(USA 151) │ VI │ 906
│ │ │
*C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │
│convening conference on Barbarossa on │ │
│14 June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909
│ │ │
*C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │
│operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │
│74) │ VI │ 911
│ │ │
*C-103 │Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March │ │
│1938, on conduct towards Czech or │ │
│Italian troops in Austria. (USA 75) │ VI │ 913
│ │ │
*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │
│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │
│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │
│Weiss” and directions for secret │ │
│mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932
│ │ │
*C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum │ │
│on conference between German and │ │
│Italian Generals on 19 January and │ │
│subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 │ │
│January 1941. (GB 119) │ VI │ 939
│ │ │
*C-136 │OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 │ │
│October 1938, signed by Hitler and │ │
│initialled by Keitel. (USA 104) │ VI │ 947
│ │ │
*C-137 │Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 │ │
│to Hitler Order of 21 October 1938. │ │
│(GB 33) │ VI │ 949
│ │ │
C-138 │Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed│ │
│by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the │ │
│OKW. (USA 105) │ VI │ 950
│ │ │
*C-148 │Keitel Order, 16 September 1941, │ │
│subject: Communist Insurrection in │ │
│Occupied Territories. (USA 555) │ VI │ 961
│ │ │
*C-152 │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18│ │
│March 1941, concerning audience of │ │
│C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March│ │
│1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 966
│ │ │
*C-167 │Report of meeting between Raeder and │ │
│Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 977
│ │ │
*C-174 │Hitler Order for operation │ │
│“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89) │ VI │ 1003
│ │ │
*C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │
│for War 1937-1938, with covering │ │
│letter from von Blomberg, 24 June │ │
│1937. (USA 69) │ VI │ 1006
│ │ │
*C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander│ │
│Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017
│ │ │
*C-194 │Orders by Keitel and │ │
│Commander-in-Chief of Navy, 6 March │ │
│1936, for Navy cooperation in │ │
│Rhineland occupation. (USA 55) │ VI │ 1019
│ │ │
*D-39 │Telegrams relating to activities │ │
│against partisans in Italy. (GB 275) │ VI │ 1023
│ │ │
*D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │
│SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │
│Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │
│Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │
│1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │
│relative to procedure in cases of │ │
│unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │
│execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74
│ │ │
D-730 │Statement of PW Walther Grosche, 11 │ │
│December 1945. (GB 279) │ VII │ 177
│ │ │
*D-731 │Statement of PW Ernst Walde, 13 │ │
│December 1945. (GB 278) │ VII │ 183
│ │ │
*D-735 │Memorandum of conference between │ │
│German Foreign Minister and Count │ │
│Ciano in presence of Keitel and │ │
│Marshal Cavallero, 19 December 1942. │ │
│(GB 295) │ VII │ 190
│ │ │
*D-763 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │
│regarding penal jurisdiction of │ │
│non-German civilians in Occupied │ │
│Territories. (GB 300) │ VII │ 222
│ │ │
*D-764 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │
│concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │
│and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │
│Territories and jurisdiction relative │ │
│thereto. (GB 299) │ VII │ 223
│ │ │
*D-765 │Directives of OKW, 2 September 1944, │ │
│regarding offenses by non-German │ │
│civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │
│302) │ VII │ 225
│ │ │
*D-766 │Circular of OKW, 4 September 1944, │ │
│regarding offenses by non-German │ │
│civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │
│301) │ VII │ 226
│ │ │
*D-767 │Memorandum, 13 September 1944, on │ │
│offenses by non-German civilians in │ │
│Occupied Territories. (GB 303) │ VII │ 228
│ │ │
*D-769 │Telegram signed by Gen. Christiansen, │ │
│21 September 1940, relative to │ │
│application of capital punishment in │ │
│connection with Railway strike in │ │
│Holland. (GB 304) │ VII │ 229
│ │ │
D-770 │Circular, 24 September 1944, on │ │
│offenses of non-German civilians in │ │
│Occupied Territories. (GB 305) │ VII │ 229
│ │ │
*D-774 │Directive of Chief of OKW to German │ │
│Foreign Office at Salzburg, on │ │
│treatment of Allied “Terrorist”-flyers│ │
│14 June 1944. (GB 307) │ VII │ 231
│ │ │
*D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 308) │ VII │ 232
│ │ │
*D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │
│June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │
│Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233
│ │ │
*D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234
│ │ │
*D-779 │Letter from Reichsmarshal to Chief of │ │
│OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding │ │
│treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312) │ VII │ 235
│ │ │
*D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │
│Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │
│June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236
│ │ │
*D-781 │Note of OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, 23 June 1944, regarding │ │
│treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 314) │ VII │ 239
│ │ │
*D-782 │Note from German Foreign Office, │ │
│Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB │ │
│315) │ VII │ 239
│ │ │
D-783 │Note of a telephone communication, 26 │ │
│June 1944, with regard to treatment of│ │
│“Terrorist”-aviators. (GB 316) │ VII │ 240
│ │ │
*D-784 │Note from Operation Staff of OKW │ │
│signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 317) │ VII │ 240
│ │ │
*D-785 │Note from OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, 4 July 1944, concerning │ │
│“Terror”-flyers. (GB 318) │ VII │ 241
│ │ │
*D-786 │Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror”-flyers.│ │
│(GB 319) │ VII │ 242
│ │ │
*EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │
│Committee of the Reich Defense held on│ │
│26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328
│ │ │
*EC-194 │Secret memorandum of Keitel concerning│ │
│use of prisoners of war in the war │ │
│industry, 31 October 1941. (USA 214) │ VII │ 336
│ │ │
*EC-286 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │
│Goering, March-April 1937, concerning │ │
│price control. (USA 833) │ VII │ 380
│ │ │
EC-338 │Memorandum of 15 September 1941 from │ │
│Canaris to Keitel concerning an OKW │ │
│Order regulating the treatment of │ │
│Soviet prisoners of war. │ VII │ 411
│ │ │
*EC-406 │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs │ │
│Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA│ │
│772) │ VII │ 455
│ │ │
*EC-407 │Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of Reichs │ │
│Defense Council, 14 May 1936. (GB 247)│ VII │ 462
│ │ │
L-3 │Contents of Hitler’s talk to Supreme │ │
│Commander and Commanding Generals, │ │
│Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 28)│ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ VII │ 752
│ │ │
*L-52 │Memorandum and Directives for conduct │ │
│of war in the West, 9 October 1939. │ │
│(USA 540) │ VII │ 800
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
*L-90 │Fuehrer decree, February 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of offenses in │ │
│Occupied Territory; “First Ordinance” │ │
│signed by Keitel for execution of the │ │
│directive; memorandum of 12 December │ │
│1941, signed by Keitel. (USA 503) │ VII │ 871
│ │ │
*L-158 │Circular letter from SIPO and SD │ │
│Commander of Radom District, 28 March │ │
│1944, concerning measures to be taken │ │
│against escaped officers and │ │
│non-commissioned officer PWs. (USA │ │
│514) │ VII │ 906
│ │ │
L-179 │Letter from RSHA to police officials, │ │
│5 November 1942, concerning criminal │ │
│procedure against Poles and members of│ │
│Eastern people. │ VII │ 976
│ │ │
*L-211 │OKW circular entitled Direction of War│ │
│as Problem of Organization, 19 April │ │
│1938. (GB 161) │ VII │ 1043
│ │ │
*L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 │ │
│July 1941, concerning treatment of │ │
│Eastern populations and territories. │ │
│(USA 317) │ VII │ 1086
│ │ │
*R-100 │Minutes of instructions given by │ │
│Hitler to General von Brauchitsch on │ │
│25 March 1939. (USA 121) │ VIII │ 83
│ │ │
UK-20 │Keitel Order on treatment of │ │
│supporters of De Gaulle who fight for │ │
│Russians, 26 May 1943. (GB 163) │ VIII │ 538
│ │ │
*UK-57 │Keitel directives, 4 January 1944 and │ │
│21 April 1944, concerning │ │
│counteraction to Kharkov show trial. │ │
│(GB 164) │ VIII │ 539
│ │ │
*UK-66 │Report of British War Crimes Section │ │
│of Allied Force Headquarters on German│ │
│reprisals for partisan activity in │ │
│Italy. (GB 274) │ VIII │ 572
│ │ │
Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │
│December 1945. │ VIII │ 587
│ │ │
Affidavit I │Affidavit of Leopold Buerkner, 22 │ │
│January 1946. │ VIII │ 647
│ │ │
Statement III │The Origin of the Directives of the │ │
│Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, │ │
│by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 15 │ │
│September 1945. │ VIII │ 669
│ │ │
Statement IV │The Position and Powers of the Chief │ │
│of the OKW, by Wilhelm Keitel, │ │
│Nurnberg, 9 October 1945. │ VIII │ 672
│ │ │
Statement V │Notes Concerning Actions of German │ │
│Armed Forces During the War and in │ │
│Occupied Territory, by Wilhelm Keitel,│ │
│Nurnberg, 19 October 1945. │ VIII │ 678
│ │ │
Statement VI │The Relationship Between Canaris and │ │
│Keitel, by Erwin Lahousen, Nurnberg, │ │
│23 October 1945. │ VIII │ 682
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707
│ │ │
**Chart No. 7 │Organization of the Wehrmacht │ │
│1938-1945. (Enlargement displayed to │ │
│Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 776
5. ALFRED JODL
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY JODL._
Operations Department of the Army (_Heer_), 1932-35.
Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command of the
Armed Forces (_Abteilung Landesverteidigung im OKW_), 1935-Oct.
1938.
Artillery Commander (“_Artillerie Kommandeur_”) of the 44th
Division. Vienna and Brno, Oct 1938-27 Aug. 1939.
Chief of Operation Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces
(_Chef des Wehrmachtsfuhrungstabes in Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht_), August 1939-1945.
Dates of Promotion:
1932—Major and Oberstleutnant
1936—Oberst
1939—Generalmajor
1940—General der Artillerie
1944—Generaloberst (2865-PS).
B. _FUNCTIONS OF JODL’S POSITIONS._
Jodl’s most important office was that of Chief of the Operations Staff
(_Wehrmachtsfuehrungstab_) in OKW. In this capacity he was directly
subordinate to Keitel and equal in status to other departmental chiefs
in OKW. However, insofar as the planning and conduct of military affairs
are concerned, Jodl and his staff were more influential than the other
departments.
The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the
most important was the “National Defense” section, of which Warlimont
was chief. He was primarily concerned with the development of strategic
questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same
duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.
(_3707-PS_)
Jodl drafted many directives for Hitler to sign, for the preparation of
military operations and plans of deployment, and for the possible
initiation and commencement of military measures relating to matters of
organization, operations, or “war-economics.” While in a theater of
operations, Jodl would report twice daily to Hitler about operations,
and then prepare the Fuehrer directives. There was direct contact
between Hitler and Jodl, though Keitel was kept informed of what passed
between them.
In addition to certain ministerial functions, the OKW was Hitler’s
military staff. Its most important duty was the development of strategic
and operational plans. Such plans were worked out by the OKW Operations
Staff in broad outline, and then in more detail by the Commanders and
Chiefs of Staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. After Hitler had
approved the plans they were transmitted by the OKW to the appropriate
military authorities (_3705-PS_; _3702-PS_; _3707-PS_).
C. _JODL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST PEACE._
Jodl’s loyalty to the Nazi party doctrine is evident in a speech he
delivered on 7 November 1943. He spoke of the National Socialist
Movement and its struggle for internal power as the preparation for
liberation from the Treaty of Versailles. (_L-172) _ He also stated, in
a speech on the occasion of the attempted assassination of Hitler, that
his aims had been in general agreement with the aims of the party.
(_1808-PS_)
At the sixth meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense
Council on 7 February 1934 Jodl pointed out that the practical execution
of the preparations for mobilization, which had been ordered by the Army
and the highest Reich authorities, were making a considerable
enlargement of personnel necessary. He suggested, however, that this
enlargement of personnel ought not to result in “the disquieting of
foreign countries through conspicuous mobilization measures.” (_EC-405_)
In the presence of Jodl, Generalmajor Keitel pointed out at the eleventh
meeting that the mobilization year was to begin on 1 April and to end on
31 March of the following year. A “Mobilization Book for Civilian
Agencies” was to be issued for the first time on 1 April 1936. Keitel
said that this day, to the extent possible, should find the nation ready
and prepared. He declared that, according to the will of the Fuehrer,
the economic management of the country should put the enhancement of
military capacity deliberately above all other national tasks. It was
the function of all members of the Reich Defense Council, he emphasized,
to use all available resources economically and to ask for only such
funds and raw materials that were absolutely and exclusively needed for
the defense of the Reich. Colonel Jodl said that the Mobilization Book
for the Civilian Departments constituted the unified basis for the
carrying out of mobilization outside of the Army (_EC-406_).
D. _JODL’S PART IN PLANNING AND LAUNCHING WARS OF AGGRESSION._
(_See “F,” 1 through 7, in Section 4 of this Chapter on Keitel, where
the joint responsibility of Keitel and Jodl for these activities is
discussed._)
E. _JODL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY._
(1) _Murder and ill treatment of civilian population in occupied,
territories and on the high seas._ Jodl ordered the forcible evacuation
of all persons in a northern district of Norway, and the burning of all
their dwellings. This was to be done so that the inhabitants of that
area could not help the Russians (_754-PS_). Shortly thereafter an
evacuation took place in Finnmark County in northern Norway, in the
course of which 30,000 houses were damaged. (_1800-PS_)
Jodl was aware that in 1942 there were continual arrests in Belgrade,
and that from fifteen to thirty followers of Mihalovic were shot every
day. (_1383-PS_)
Jodl initialled an order signed for Hitler by Keitel, which provided
that enemy civilians guilty of offenses against German troops should be
killed without a military trial, and that punishment could be waived in
the case of German soldiers who committed offenses against enemy
civilians. (_886-PS_)
Rosenberg was appointed by Hitler on 20 April 1941 “Deputy for a
Centralized Treatment of Problems concerning the Eastern Territories.”
The highest Reich authorities were to cooperate fully, and Keitel was
asked to designate a representative of OKW to sit with Rosenberg. Jodl
was appointed as Keitel’s representative with Warlimont as his deputy,
and Keitel wrote to Rosenberg on 25 April 1941 that Jodl and Warlimont
would be the OKW representatives. (_865-PS_)
Responsibility for crimes committed under Rosenberg’s authority thus
attach to Jodl as well. In this connection reference is made to Section
7 of this chapter on Rosenberg.
(2) _Deportation of civilian populations of and in Occupied Territories
for slave labor and for other purposes._ Jodl knew of the deportation of
workers, for he once told Hitler that the military commander of France
had reported that over 220,000 workers had been deported into the Reich
in the past six months. (_1383-PS_)
(3) _Murder and ill treatment of prisoners of war, and of other members
of the Armed Forces of the countries with whom Germany was at war and of
persons on the high seas._ On 18 October 1942 Hitler ordered that
commando troops, even if in uniform, should be killed, not only in
battle, but in flight or while attempting to surrender. This order was
issued by Jodl’s department. (_498-PS_)
A supplementary explanation of the commando order, signed by Hitler, was
distributed to commanding officers only, with a covering memorandum
dated 19 October 1942, signed by Jodl (_503-PS_). Several cases are
known in which the order was carried out. (_508-PS_; _509-PS_)
Three specific instances were mentioned by the G-3 of the C in C,
Norway, where captured members of sabotage units were executed after
interrogations which resulted in valuable intelligence. These occurred
at Gloafjord, Drontheim, and at Stavanger. (_512-PS_)
On 23 June 1944 C in C West requested instructions re-defining the scope
of the commando order. In view of the extensive landings in Normandy, it
had become difficult to decide which paratroops should be considered
sabotage troops under the terms of the order, and which should be
considered as engaged in normal combat operations. The question was
answered by an order of 25 June 1944, one copy of which was signed by
Keitel, reaffirming the full force of the original order. (_531-PS_;
_551-PS_)
When allied fliers were forced to land in Germany, they were sometimes
killed by the civilian population. The police had orders not to protect
the fliers, nor to punish civilians for lynching them. A proposal was
considered to order the shooting without court-martial of enemy airmen
who had been forced down after engaging in specified “acts of terror.”
It is not certain that the order was ever issued, but it is certain that
Keitel and Jodl knew of the lynchings, did nothing to prevent them and
in fact considered giving them official justification.
(_See also “F” at the end of Section 4 of this Chapter on Keitel, where
the joint responsibility of Keitel and Jodl for the lynching of Allied
airmen is discussed._)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ALFRED JODL
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 66
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from │ │
│Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by │ │
│Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 │ │
│November 1940, concerning plans for │ │
│prosecution of war in Mediterranean │ │
│Area and occupation of Greece. (GB │ │
│116) │ III │ 403
│ │ │
*446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed│ │
│by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │
│Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December │ │
│1940, concerning the Invasion of │ │
│Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407
│ │ │
*448-PS │Hitler Order No. 22, initialled by │ │
│Keitel and Jodl, 11 January 1941, │ │
│concerning participation of German │ │
│Forces in the Fighting in the │ │
│Mediterranean Theater of Operations. │ │
│(GB 118) │ III │ 413
│ │ │
*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │
│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │
│501) │ III │ 416
│ │ │
*503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │
│1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │
│of his commando order of the day │ │
│before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426
│ │ │
*508-PS │OKW correspondence, November 1942, │ │
│about shooting of British glider │ │
│troops in Norway. (USA 545) │ III │ 430
│ │ │
*509-PS │Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, │ │
│reporting “special treatment” for │ │
│three British commandos. (USA 547) │ III │ 433
│ │ │
*512-PS │Teletype from Army Commander in │ │
│Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning │ │
│interrogation of saboteurs before │ │
│shooting; and memorandum in reply from│ │
│OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546) │ III │ 433
│ │ │
531-PS │OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing │ │
│inquiry from Supreme Command West │ │
│about treatment of paratroopers. (USA │ │
│550) │ III │ 435
│ │ │
*551-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Commando │ │
│participants. (USA 551) │ III │ 440
│ │ │
*754-PS │Teletype Order signed by Jodl, 28 │ │
│October 1944, for evacuation of │ │
│Norwegians and burning of houses. (GB │ │
│490) │ III │ 544
│ │ │
*789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,│ │
│23 November 1939, to which all Supreme│ │
│Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572
│ │ │
*865-PS │Correspondence between Keitel, │ │
│Rosenberg and Lammers, April 1941, │ │
│concerning appointment of Jodl and │ │
│Warlimont as OKW representatives with │ │
│Rosenberg. (USA 143) │ III │ 621
│ │ │
874-PS │Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J,│ │
│and W, 9 March 1941, concerning │ │
│Deception measures. │ III │ 634
│ │ │
886-PS │Fuehrer decree, 13 May 1941, on │ │
│courts-martial and treatment of enemy │ │
│civilians in the district │ │
│“Barbarossa”, signed by Keitel for │ │
│Hitler, and initialled by Jodl. │ III │ 637
│ │ │
*1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │
│regarding problems in Eastern │ │
│Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695
│ │ │
1229-PS │OKW Directive to the German │ │
│Intelligence Service in the East, │ │
│signed by Jodl, 6 September 1940. (USA│ │
│130) │ III │ 849
│ │ │
*1383-PS │Extract from transcription of │ │
│stenographic report on discussion of │ │
│current military situation, 12 │ │
│December 1942. (GB 489) │ III │ 958
│ │ │
*1541-PS │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13│ │
│December 1940. (GB 117) │ IV │ 101
│ │ │
1642-PS │Distribution list, 1 March 1941, for │ │
│secret map of Soviet Union. │ IV │ 154
│ │ │
*1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │
│Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │
│speech by Hitler to German High │ │
│Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │
│March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │
│Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272
│ │ │
*1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │
│February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
1800-PS │Preliminary report on Germany’s crimes│ │
│against Norway, prepared by the Royal │ │
│Norwegian Government. │ IV │ 375
│ │ │
*1808-PS │Excerpt of speech by Jodl to Officers │ │
│and officials of Armed Forces │ │
│Operations Staff, 24 July 1944. (GB │ │
│493) │ IV │ 377
│ │ │
*1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February │ │
│1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377
│ │ │
*2865-PS │Statement by Jodl, showing positions │ │
│held by him. (USA 16) │ V │ 526
│ │ │
*3702-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │
│Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531) │ VI │ 411
│ │ │
3705-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │
│Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │
│535) │ VI │ 415
│ │ │
*3707-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │
│Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533) │ VI │ 419
│ │ │
*3786-PS │Stenographic transcript of a meeting │ │
│in the Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 27 │ │
│January 1945. (USA 787) │ VI │ 655
│ │ │
*C-2 │Examples of violations of │ │
│International Law and proposed counter│ │
│propaganda, issued by OKW, 1 October │ │
│1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799
│ │ │
*C-39 │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by │ │
│Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138)│ VI │ 857
│ │ │
*C-59 │Order signed by Warlimont for │ │
│execution of operation “Marita”, 19 │ │
│February 1941. (GB 121) │ VI │ 879
│ │ │
*C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │
│meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │
│(GB 86) │ VI │ 884
│ │ │
*C-72 │Orders postponing “A” day in the West,│ │
│November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109) │ VI │ 893
│ │ │
*C-75 │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, │ │
│signed Keitel, 5 March 1941, │ │
│concerning collaboration with Japan. │ │
│(USA 151) │ VI │ 906
│ │ │
*C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │
│convening conference on Barbarossa on │ │
│14 June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909
│ │ │
*C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │
│operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │
│74) │ VI │ 911
│ │ │
*C-103 │Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March │ │
│1938, on conduct towards Czech or │ │
│Italian troops in Austria. (USA 75) │ VI │ 913
│ │ │
C-123 │Jodl Order on capitulation of │ │
│Leningrad, 7 October 1941. │ VI │ 929
│ │ │
*C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum │ │
│on conference between German and │ │
│Italian Generals on 19 January and │ │
│subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 │ │
│January 1941. (GB 119) │ VI │ 939
│ │ │
*C-152 │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18│ │
│March 1941, concerning audience of │ │
│C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March│ │
│1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 966
│ │ │
*C-167 │Report of meeting between Raeder and │ │
│Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 977
│ │ │
*C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander│ │
│Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017
│ │ │
*D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234
│ │ │
*D-779 │Letter from Reichsmarshal to Chief of │ │
│OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding │ │
│treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312) │ VII │ 235
│ │ │
*EC-405 │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working │ │
│Committee of Reichs Defense Council, │ │
│26 June 1935. (GB 160) │ VII │ 450
│ │ │
*EC-406 │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs │ │
│Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA│ │
│772) │ VII │ 455
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the │ │
│Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a │ │
│lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 │ │
│November 1943 at Munich to Reich and │ │
│Gauleiters. (USA 34) │ VII │ 920
│ │ │
Statement II │A Short Historical Consideration of │ │
│German War Guilt, by Alfred Jodl, │ │
│Nurnberg, 6 September 1945. │ VIII │ 662
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707
│ │ │
**Chart No. 7 │Organization of the Wehrmacht │ │
│1938-1945. (Enlargement displayed to │ │
│Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 776
6. ERNST KALTENBRUNNER
A. _KALTENBRUNNER ENTERED THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT IN ITS EARLY
STAGES, AND SUPPORTED IT, AND WAS A LEADER IN IT UNTIL THE END._
Ernst Kaltenbrunner was born on 4 October 1903 at Ried on Inn (near
Braunau) Austria. He spent his youth in Hitler’s native district. Later
he moved to Linz, where he attended the State _Realgymnasium_. He
studied law and obtained a law degree in 1926. He spent the first year
as apprentice lawyer at Linze-on-Danube and then worked as a
lawyer-candidate, first at Salzburg and after 1928 at Linz (_2938-PS_).
Kaltenbrunner joined the Nazi Party and the SS in Austria in 1932. Prior
to 1933 he was the District speaker (_Gauredner_) and legal counsellor
(_Rechtsberater_) of the SS division (_Abschnitt_) VIII. After 1933 he
was the fuehrer of regiment (_Standarte_) 37 and later of the SS
division VIII (_2892-PS_).
In January 1934 Kaltenbrunner was jailed by the Dollfuss government on
account of his Nazi views, and sent with other leading National
Socialists into the concentration camp Kaisersteinbruch. He is said to
have started and led a hunger strike of the prisoners and thereby to
have forced the government to dismiss 490 National Socialist prisoners.
In the following year he was jailed again because of suspicion of High
Treason and committed to the military court at Wels (Upper Danube).
After an investigation of many months the accusation of High Treason was
dropped, but he was condemned to six months’ imprisonment for
conspiracy. His right to practice law was suspended because of his Nazi
activities (_2938-PS_).
After the Spring of 1935 Kaltenbrunner was the leader of the Austrian
SS. In the magazine of the SIPO and SD, issue of 15 May 1943, it is
stated:
“It redounds to his credit that in this important position he
succeeded through energetic leadership in maintaining the unity
of the Austrian SS, which he had built up, in spite of all
persecution, and succeeded in committing it successfully at the
right moment. After the annexation, in which the SS was a
decisive factor, he was appointed State Secretary for Security
Matters on 11 March 1938 in the new National-Socialist cabinet
of Seyss-Inquart. A few hours later he was able to report to
Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler, who had landed at Aspern, the
Vienna airport, on 12 March 1938, 3 a. m., as the first National
Socialist leader, that the Movement had achieved a complete
victory and that ‘The SS is in formation and awaiting further
orders.’” (_2938-PS_)
Hitler promoted Kaltenbrunner on the date of the Anschluss to the rank
of SS Brigadefuehrer and leader of the SS _Oberabschnitt_ Donau. On 11
September 1938 he was promoted to the rank of SS Gruppenfuehrer. During
the liquidation of the Austrian national government and the
reorganization of Austria into Alps and Danube Districts, he was
appointed Higher SS and Police Leader to the governors of Vienna, Lower
Danube, and Upper Danube, in Corps Area (_Wehrkreis_) XVII, and in April
1941 was promoted to Major General of the Police (_2938-PS_).
On 30 January 1943 Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the Security
Police and SD (RSHA), succeeding Heydrich, who had been assassinated in
Prague in June 1942. Kaltenbrunner held this position until the end of
the war (_2644-PS_).
On 4 October 1943 at Pozen, Poland, in a speech delivered to
Gruppenfuehrers of the SS, Himmler made special reference to “our
comrade Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner, who has succeeded our fallen
friend Heydrich” (_1919-PS_).
On 9 December 1944 the decoration known as the Knight’s Cross of the War
Merit, Cross with Swords, was given to SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General
of the Police Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Security Police and
the SD (_2770-PS_).
In addition he held the Golden insignia of Honor and the _Blutorden_. He
was a member of the Reichstag after the 9th election period 1938
(_2892-PS_).
Toward the end of the war, Kaltenbrunner’s power increased greatly,
especially after the attack on Hitler of 20 July 1944. He gained direct
access to Hitler. He was very friendly with Fegelein and his wife, who
was the sister of Eva Braun. So powerful had Kaltenbrunner become toward
the end that even Himmler feared him. On 13 April 1945 the chief of the
German foreign intelligence service, Schellenberg, asked Himmler to
receive the representative of the Jewish World Congress, Mr. Storsch,
from Stockholm, and Himmler said,
“But how am I going to do that in regard to Kaltenbrunner? I
shall then be completely at his mercy!” (_2990-PS_).
B. _DURING KALTENBRUNNER’S TERM IN OFFICE AS CHIEF OF THE SECURITY
POLICE AND SD, NUMEROUS AND VAST CRIMES WERE COMMITTED BY THE SIPO AND
SD IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES._
As Chief of the Security Police after 30 January 1943, Kaltenbrunner was
the head of the RSHA and the regional offices of the Gestapo, SD, and
Kripo. Directly under Kaltenbrunner were the Chiefs of the main offices
of the RSHA, including Amt III (the SD), Amt IV (the Gestapo), Amt V
(the Kripo), and Amt VI (the SD in foreign intelligence) (_L-219_).
Kaltenbrunner had direct responsibility over the offices of the RSHA.
All important matters had to be referred to him or had to be handled
under general or special authority granted by him to office chiefs.
“All decisions of principal character are signed by the Chief of
the Security Police personally. An office chief has only the
authority to sign ‘acting for’ and a chairman ‘by order of’ if
the subjects treated in the respective decrees fit into the
general laid-down principles according to the plan of
distribution of authority. In case of doubt it was the duty to
get the question cleared up by reporting it to the Chief of
Security Police and SD.” (_L-34_)
“To my knowledge no chief of office or any of the officials of
the RSHA, authorized to sign, had the right to sign in any
principal affairs of particular political significance without
consent of the Chief of the Security Police—not even during his
temporary absence. From my own experience I can furthermore
declare that the chief of Amt IV, Mueller, particularly was very
hesitant in signing documents concerning questions of general
nature and in some cases of greater importance, and that he put
aside events of such nature in most cases for the return of the
Chief of the Security Police, whereby often much time was lost.”
(_L-50_).
Schellenberg, the Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA, has stated:
“I know of no limitation placed on Kaltenbrunner’s authority as
Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA). He promptly entered
upon the duties of the office and assumed direct charge of the
office and control over the Amts * * * He made it very clear in
his official relations with all of us who were his _Amt_ Chiefs
that he was the head of the office exercising full executive
powers and deciding all matters of policy. He permitted us to
issue directives within the organization in our own names
pursuant to fixed policies established by him, but all important
matters had to be submitted to him whether he signed them or we
signed them. He was constantly informed of all matters of
importance which went on in the entire organization. (_2939-PS_)
During Kaltenbrunner’s term in office as Chief of the Security Police
and SD, the following crimes were committed by the SIPO and SD pursuant
to policy established by the RSHA or orders issued out of the RSHA for
all of which he was responsible by virtue of his office.
(1) _Mass murders of civilians of occupied countries by Einsatz Groups._
A general discussion of this and the following twelve crimes of the
_Gestapo_ and SD appears in Section 6 of Chapter XV. That this crime
continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents:
_3012-PS_; _2752-PS_; _2890-PS_.
(2) _Screenings of prisoner of war camps and executing racial and
political undesirables._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is
shown by the following document: _2622-PS_.
(3) _The taking of recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps,
where in some cases they were executed._ That this crime continued after
January 1943 is shown by the following documents: _1650-PS_; _L-158_;
_1514-PS_.
(4) _Establishing concentration camps and committing racial and
political undesirables to concentration and annihilation camps for slave
labor and mass murder._ That this crime continued after January of 1943
is shown by the following documents: _D-50_; _D-46_; _L-41_; _701-PS_.
(5) _Deportation of citizens of occupied countries for forced labor and
disciplining of forced labor._ That this crime continued after January
1943 is shown by the following documents: _3012-PS_; _1063-B-PS_.
(6) _The execution of captured commandos and paratroopers and protection
of civilians who lynched Allied fliers._ That this crime continued after
January 1943 is shown by the following documents: _1276-PS_; _532-PS_;
_526-PS_; _R-110_; _745-PS_.
(7) _The taking of civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret
trial and punishment._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is
shown by the following document: _835-PS_.
(8) _Punishment of citizens of occupied territories under special
criminal procedure and by summary methods._ That this crime continued
after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _L-5_.
(9) _The execution and confinement of persons in concentration camps for
crimes allegedly committed by their relatives._ That this crime
continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _L-37_.
(10) _Seizure and spoliation of public and private property._ That this
crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents:
_2620-PS_; _L-18_.
(11) _Murder of prisoners in SIPO and SD prisons._ That this crime
continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _L-53_.
(12) _Persecution of Jews._ That this crime continued after January 1943
is shown by the following documents: _L-18_; _1061-PS_; _2375-PS_;
_2605-PS_.
(13) _Persecution of the churches._ That this crime continued after
January 1943 is shown by the following document: _1815-PS_.
C. _KALTENBRUNNER HAD DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
COMMISSION OF MANY SPECIFIC CRIMES._
(1) _Kaltenbrunner was fully cognizant of conditions in concentration
camps and of the fact that concentration camps were used for slave labor
and mass murder._ Mauthausen concentration camp was established in
Austria while Kaltenbrunner was the Higher SS and Police Leader for
Austria, and was frequently visited by Kaltenbrunner before he was
appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD (_L-51_). On the occasion
of one such visit in 1942, Kaltenbrunner personally observed the gas
chamber in operation (_2753-PS_). After he became Chief of the Security
Police and SD, Kaltenbrunner visited Mauthausen concentration camp but
with less frequency (_L-51_). On one occasion he made an inspection of
the camp grounds with Himmler and had his photograph taken during the
course of the inspection (_2641-PS_). After a visit to Mauthausen in
1944 Kaltenbrunner reported to his _Amt_ Chiefs with pride that he had
helped to build up Mauthausen when he was Higher SS and Police Leader in
Austria and that the camp was engaged in valuable armament work
(_2990-PS_). Mauthausen concentration camp was classified by Heydrich in
January 1941 in category III, a camp for the most heavily accused
prisoners and for asocial prisoners who were considered incapable of
being reformed (_1063-A-PS_).
There were frequent conferences between the RSHA and executives of the
SS _Wirtschaft_ and _Verwaltungshauptamt_ who had charge of the internal
administration of concentration camps. The affidavit of Rudolf Mildner
states with respect to these conferences:
“SS Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner attended personally
conferences with SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl, Chief of the SS
_Wirtschaft_ and _Verwaltungshauptamt_ and Chief of the
concentration camps. Due to these conferences and through talks
with the Chief of Office Gruppenfuehrer Mueller of _Amt_ IV and
Gruppenfuehrer Nebe of _Amt_ V, the Chief of the Security Police
and SD, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner, must have known
the state of affairs in the concentration camps.” (_L-35_)
(2) _With full knowledge of conditions in and the purpose of
concentration camps, Kaltenbrunner ordered or permitted to be ordered in
his name the commitment of persons to concentration camps._ All orders
for protective custody other than short-term confinements were issued in
the name of Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD and
bore the facsimile stamp of his signature (_2477-PS_).
The commandant of Buchenwald concentration camp in his affidavit states:
“With the exception of the mass delivery of prisoners from the
concentration camps of occupied territories, all prisoners were
sent to the concentration camp Buchenwald on orders of the
_Reichssicherheitschauptamt_, Berlin. These preventive arrest
orders (red blanks) were in most cases signed with the name
Kaltenbrunner. The few other preventive arrest orders were
signed with ‘Foerster.’” (_L-38_)
On 7 July 1943 an order for protective custody was issued by the Gestapo
(_Amt_ IV C 2, RSHA) bearing the facsimile signature of Kaltenbrunner,
to be sent in the form of a telegram to the Gestapo office in Koeslin in
the case of a woman whose offense was stated to be failure to work, work
sabotage, and asocial conduct. She was ordered to be confined in the
concentration camp at Ravensbrueck (_2745-PS_).
On 19 January 1944 a warrant for protective custody was issued by the
Gestapo (_Amt_ IV C 2 of the RSHA) certified as signed by Kaltenbrunner,
to a British subject, C. S. James, on the grounds that he had been
proven guilty of activities to the detriment of the German Reich, and
that there was reason to expect that he would, if released, commit acts
prejudicial to the Reich (_1574-PS_).
Other instances of commitments to various concentration camps on orders,
signed by Kaltenbrunner, are contained in the dossiers of 25
Luxembourgers committed to concentration camps by the _Einsatzkommando_
of the Sipo and SD in Luxembourg during the year 1944. The concentration
camps to which the persons were committed included Dachau, Natzweiler,
Sachsenhausen, and Buchenwald. Among the grounds were: “strongly
suspected of working to the detriment of the Reich;” “spiteful
statements inimical to Germany as well as aspersions and threats against
persons active in the National Socialist movement;” “strongly suspected
of aiding desertion;” “as relative of a deserter expected to take
advantage of every occasion to harm the German Reich.” (_L-215_).
Further orders for commitments to concentration camps are contained in
file of 42 telegrams, all issued by the RSHA, _Amt_ IV A 6, Prague, to
the Gestapo Office at Darmstadt, and all signed by Kaltenbrunner, during
the period from 20 September 1944 to 2 February 1945. The concentration
camps to which people were sent included Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrueck,
Buchenwald, Dachau, Bergen-Belsen, Flossenburg, and Theresienstadt.
Nationalities included Czech, German, French, Dutch, Italian, Corsican,
Lithuanian, Greek, and Jew. Grounds included “refusal to work;”
“religious propaganda;” “sex relations with PWs;” “communist
statements;” “loafing on job;” “working against the Reich;” “spreading
of rumors detrimental to morale;” “_Aktion Gitter_;” “breach of work
contracts;” “statements against Germany;” “assault of foreman;”
“defeatist statements;” “theft and escape from jail.” (_2239-PS_).
(3) _Kaltenbrunner authorized executions in concentration camps._ Adolf
Zutter, the adjutant of Mauthausen concentration camp, avers that, until
the assassination of Heydrich, orders for executions at Mauthausen were
signed by Heydrich or his substitute, and that after Kaltenbrunner
became Chief of the Security Police and SD they were signed either by
Kaltenbrunner or by his substitute, Mueller. Zutter mentions a specific
instance in which Kaltenbrunner ordered the execution of a group of 12
to 15 uniformed members of an American military mission (_L-51_).
(4) _Kaltenbrunner had knowledge of the commitment of thousands of
Warsaw Poles to concentration camps and refused to release them._ During
the suppression of the Warsaw uprising of 1944, about 50,000 to 60,000
inhabitants of Warsaw were sent to concentration camps. As a result of
entreaties by Hans Frank to Himmler the deportation was stopped. Frank
and Buehler, his State Secretary, requested Kaltenbrunner to release the
persons who had been committed. Kaltenbrunner refused to release them on
the grounds they were employed in making secret weapons for the Reich
and declared that the number transported into concentration camps in the
Reich was small. Buehler verified the fact that the number of persons so
placed in concentration camps for forced labor was 50,000 to 69,999
(_2476-PS_).
(5) _Kaltenbrunner controlled the deportation of Poles, Jews, and other
non-Germans from Poland._ Otto Hofmann, former Chief of the SS Main
Office for Race and Settlement Matters, stated:
“The execution of all so-called resettlement actions, that is,
the sending away of Polish, Jewish, and people of non-German
blood, inhabitants of a territory in Poland destined for
Germanization was in the hands of the Chief of the RSHA,
Heydrich, and, since the end of 1942, Kaltenbrunner.” (_L-49_).
(6) _Kaltenbrunner ordered the deportation of Jews from Denmark._ In
September 1943 Himmler ordered the Danish Jews arrested and shipped to
Stettin and from there to Theresienstadt concentration camp. Mildner,
the Chief of the Sipo and SD, telegraphed the RSHA to request that the
Jewish persecutions be stopped. In reply he received an order from
Himmler through Kaltenbrunner to carry out the anti-Jewish action.
Shortly thereafter Mildner flew to Berlin to speak to Kaltenbrunner
personally about the matter. In Kaltenbrunner’s absence he spoke to
Mueller. After his return to Copenhagen, Mildner received a direct order
from Himmler through Kaltenbrunner to carry out the anti-Jewish actions
immediately (_2375-PS_).
(7) _Kaltenbrunner personally exercised punitive authority over foreign
workers._ By order of Kaltenbrunner Labor Reformatory Camps were
established under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Police
(_1063-B-PS_).
In addition to sending workers to Labor Reformatory Camps,
Kaltenbrunner, through orders for protective custody signed by him or by
facsimile of his signature, committed workers to concentration camps. On
9 February 1945 a French citizen was sent to Buchenwald by order of
Kaltenbrunner for shirking work and insubordinate behavior. On 18 June
1943 a Pole was sent to Natzweiler “to be used as a skilled worker” by
order of Kaltenbrunner. On 2 December 1944 a citizen of the Netherlands
was taken into protective custody “for work sabotage” by order of
Kaltenbrunner. On 2 December 1944 a French citizen was taken into
protective custody for “work sabotage and insubmissive” (_2582-PS_;
_2580-PS_).
(8) _Kaltenbrunner personally attended to matters against Jews and
political and concentration camp internees in the Protectorate._ A
memorandum found among Kaltenbrunner’s personal effects states in part:
“Radio message to Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein Hq. of the Fuehrer
through Sturmbannfuehrer Sansoni, Berlin.
“Please report to RF SS and to the Fuehrer that all arrangements
against Jews, political and concentration camp internees in the
Protectorate have been taken care of by me personally today”
(_2519-PS_).
(9) _Kaltenbrunner personally ordered the Sipo and SD to encourage the
populace to lynch American and English flyers._ In 1944 at a conference
of _Amt_ Chiefs Kaltenbrunner said:
“All offices of the SD and the security police are to be
informed that pogroms of the populace against English and
American terror-fliers were not to be interfered with; on the
contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered” (_2990-PS_).
(10) _Kaltenbrunner personally worked out the form of justification to
be submitted to cover up the execution of prisoners of war._ In
connection with the shooting of some 50 recaptured prisoners of war who
had escaped from a prisoner of war camp near Breslau, Kaltenbrunner
worked out with Mueller and Nebe the false reasons which were to be
given to the Red Cross, that is, that they had been killed by bomb
attacks, or shot while escaping or resisting arrest (_2990-PS_).
D. _CONCLUSION._
Kaltenbrunner was a life-long fanatical Nazi. He was the leader of the
SS in Austria prior to the Anschluss and played a leading role in the
betrayal of his native country to the Nazi conspirators. As Higher SS
and Police Leader in Austria after the Anschluss he supervised and had
knowledge of the activities of the Gestapo and the SD in Austria. He had
much to do with developing Mauthausen concentration camp and visited it
frequently. On at least one occasion he observed the gas chamber in
action. With this knowledge and background he accepted in January 1943
appointment as chief of the very agencies which sent such victims to
their deaths. He held that office to the end, rising to high prominence
in the conspiracy, receiving honors from Hitler and gaining Hitler’s
personal confidence.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ERNST KALTENBRUNNER
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 59
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │
│concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │
│in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434
│ │ │
532-PS │Telegram of WFSt, 24 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Commandos. │ III │ 437
│ │ │
*701-PS │Letter from Minister of Justice to │ │
│Prosecutors, 1 April 1943, concerning │ │
│Poles and Jews who are released from │ │
│Penal institutions of Department of │ │
│Justice. (USA 497) │ III │ 510
│ │ │
745-PS │Letter from Chief of SD, Koblenz, 12 │ │
│June 1944, concerning enemy aviators │ │
│who have been shot down. │ III │ 543
│ │ │
*835-PS │Letter from OKW to the German │ │
│Armistice Commission, 2 September │ │
│1944, concerning the status of │ │
│political prisoners. (USA 527) │ III │ 602
│ │ │
*1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and │ │
│Police Leader of Warsaw, on │ │
│destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. │ │
│(USA 275) │ III │ 718
│ │ │
*1063-A-PS │Order of Chief of SIPO and SD, 2 │ │
│January 1941, concerning │ │
│classification of concentration camps.│ │
│(USA 492) │ III │ 775
│ │ │
1063-B-PS │Letter signed by Kaltenbrunner, 26 │ │
│July 1943, concerning establishment of│ │
│Labor Reformatory camps. (USA 492) │ III │ 777
│ │ │
*1104-PS │Memorandum, 21 November 1941, │ │
│enclosing copies of report concerning │ │
│anti-Jewish action in Minsk. (USA 483)│ III │ 783
│ │ │
*1276-PS │Top secret letter from Chief of SIPO │ │
│and SD to OKW/WFSt, 17 June 1944, │ │
│concerning Commando operations. (USA │ │
│525) │ III │ 855
│ │ │
*1514-PS │Order, 27 July 1944, from 6th Corps │ │
│Area Command concerning delivery of │ │
│prisoners of war to secret state │ │
│police. (USA 491) │ IV │ 53
│ │ │
1574-PS │Warrant, 19 January 1944, for │ │
│protective custody. │ IV │ 114
│ │ │
*1650-PS │Directive to State Police Directorates│ │
│from Chief of SIPO and SD by Mueller, │ │
│4 March 1944, concerning captured │ │
│escaped PWs except British and │ │
│American PWs. (USA 246) │ IV │ 158
│ │ │
*1815-PS │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning │ │
│the study and treatment of church │ │
│politics. (USA 510) │ IV │ 415
│ │ │
*1919-PS │Himmler’s speech to SS │ │
│Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA │ │
│170) │ IV │ 558
│ │ │
*2239-PS │File of orders sent by AMT IV, RSHA, │ │
│Prague, to Gestapo office Darmstadt, │ │
│signed Kaltenbrunner. (USA 520) │ IV │ 920
│ │ │
2375-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 │ │
│November 1945, concerning activities │ │
│of SIPO and SD. │ V │ 2
│ │ │
2476-PS │Affidavit of Josef Buehler, 4 November│ │
│1945. │ V │ 228
│ │ │
*2477-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 518) │ V │ 229
│ │ │
*2519-PS │Undated memorandum for radio message │ │
│from Kaltenbrunner to Fegelein, │ │
│concerning arrangements against Jews. │ │
│(USA 530) │ V │ 256
│ │ │
*2580-PS │Protective custody decrees signed │ │
│Kaltenbrunner. (USA 524) │ V │ 305
│ │ │
*2582-PS │Telegrams ordering protective custody │ │
│signed by Kaltenbrunner. (USA 523) │ V │ 307
│ │ │
*2605-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, │ │
│former President of the Hungarian │ │
│Zionist Organization, 13 September │ │
│1945. (USA 242) │ V │ 313
│ │ │
*2620-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 919) │ V │ 341
│ │ │
2622-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 343
│ │ │
*2641-PS │Affidavit of Alois Hoellriegl in │ │
│connection with photographs of │ │
│Kaltenbrunner, Himmler, and others at │ │
│Mauthausen concentration camp. (USA │ │
│516) │ V │ 354
│ │ │
2644-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 357
│ │ │
*2745-PS │Order for commitment to concentration │ │
│camp, 7 July 1943, Kaltenbrunner’s │ │
│signature. (USA 519) │ V │ 383
│ │ │
2752-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 8 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 392
│ │ │
*2753-PS │Affidavit of Alois Hoellriegl, 7 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 515) │ V │ 393
│ │ │
2770-PS │War Decorations, published in Order │ │
│Gazette of the Chief of Security │ │
│Police and SD, Edition A, 5th year, 9 │ │
│December 1944, No. 51. │ V │ 417
│ │ │
2890-PS │Extracts from Befehlsblatt of the Sipo│ │
│and SD. │ V │ 557
│ │ │
2892-PS │Biographical information on Ernst │ │
│Kaltenbrunner, published in the │ │
│Greater German Reichstag, 1938. │ V │ 561
│ │ │
*2938-PS │Article in The German Police, Number │ │
│10, Berlin, 15 May 1943, p. 193, │ │
│concerning Kaltenbrunner. (USA 511) │ V │ 605
│ │ │
*2939-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 17 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 513) │ V │ 606
│ │ │
*2990-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 18 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 526) │ V │ 694
│ │ │
*2992-PS │Affidavits of Hermann Graebe. (USA │ │
│494) │ V │ 696
│ │ │
*3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │
│1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │
│Service, and record of telephone │ │
│conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │
│1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731
│ │ │
3361-PS │Message to all Commanders of Security │ │
│Police from Kaltenbrunner regarding │ │
│arrest of Plant Directors. │ VI │ 96
│ │ │
*3427-PS │Announcement of Kaltenbrunner │ │
│appointed Chief of Security Police and│ │
│SD, in German Police, 15 February │ │
│1943. (USA 512) │ VI │ 130
│ │ │
*3462-PS │Interrogation of Bertus Gerdes, 20 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 528) │ VI │ 161
│ │ │
*3723-PS │Testimony of Gottlieb Berger, 20 │ │
│September 1945. (USA 529) │ VI │ 460
│ │ │
*3762-PS │Affidavit of SS Colonel Kurt Becher, 8│ │
│March 1946, concerning the │ │
│responsibility of Kaltenbrunner for │ │
│concentration camp executions. (USA │ │
│798) │ VI │ 645
│ │ │
*3803-PS │Covering letter enclosing a letter │ │
│from Kaltenbrunner dated 30 June 1944,│ │
│concerning forced labor of Jews in │ │
│Vienna. (USA 802) │ VI │ 737
│ │ │
3838-PS │Statement of Martin Sandberger, 19 │ │
│November 1945, concerning │ │
│Kaltenbrunner’s treatment of │ │
│prisoners. (USA 800) │ VI │ 773
│ │ │
*3839-PS │Statement of Josef Spacil, 9 November │ │
│1945, concerning the meaning of │ │
│“resettlement” and “special │ │
│treatment”. (USA 799) │ VI │ 774
│ │ │
*3840-PS │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February│ │
│1946, concerning the elimination of │ │
│the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803) │ VI │ 775
│ │ │
*3841-PS │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer │ │
│Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946, │ │
│concerning elimination of the Warsaw │ │
│Ghetto. (USA 804) │ VI │ 776
│ │ │
*3842-PS │Statement of Fritz Mundhenke, 7 March │ │
│1946, concerning the activities of │ │
│Kaltenbrunner and SS in preparation │ │
│for occupation of Czechoslovakia. (USA│ │
│805) │ VI │ 778
│ │ │
*3844-PS │Statement of Josef Niedermayer, 7 │ │
│March 1946, concerning Kaltenbrunner’s│ │
│part in “bullet” orders at Mauthausen │ │
│concentration camp. (USA 801) │ VI │ 782
│ │ │
*3846-PS │Interrogation of Johann Kanduth, 30 │ │
│November 1945, concerning crematorium │ │
│at Mauthausen and the activities of │ │
│Kaltenbrunner there. (USA 796) │ VI │ 783
│ │ │
*3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │
│Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │
│execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │
│Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │
│819) │ VI │ 787
│ │ │
*3870-PS │Affidavit of Hans Marsalek, 8 April │ │
│1946, concerning Mauthausen │ │
│Concentration Camp and dying statement│ │
│of Franz Ziereis, the Commandant. (USA│ │
│797) │ VI │ 790
│ │ │
D-46 │Order designating Herzogenbosch as │ │
│concentration camp, 18 January 1943. │ VI │ 1025
│ │ │
D-50 │Order establishing concentration camps│ │
│at Lublin, 9 April 1943. │ VI │ 1027
│ │ │
*D-473 │Letter from Kaltenbrunner to Criminal │ │
│Public Offices, 4 December 1944, │ │
│concerning combatting of crime among │ │
│Polish and Soviet-Russian civilian │ │
│laborers. (USA 522) │ VII │ 64
│ │ │
L-5 │Order of Military Commander Southeast,│ │
│3 September 1944. │ VII │ 755
│ │ │
*L-18 │Official report, Katzmann to General │ │
│of Police Krueger, 30 June 1943, │ │
│concerning “Solution of Jewish │ │
│Question in Galicia”. (USA 277) │ VII │ 755
│ │ │
L-31 │Communique of the Polish-Soviet │ │
│Extraordinary Commission for │ │
│Investigating the Crimes committed by │ │
│the Germans in the Majdanek │ │
│Extermination Camp in Lublin. │ VII │ 772
│ │ │
L-34 │Affidavits of Edmund Trinkl, Chairman │ │
│of Amt I A 6 of the RSHA, 2 August │ │
│1945. │ VII │ 774
│ │ │
L-35 │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 1 August │ │
│1945. │ VII │ 780
│ │ │
*L-37 │Letter from Illmer, Chief of the SIPO │ │
│and SD of Radom, to subordinates, 19 │ │
│July 1944, concerning collective │ │
│responsibility of members of families │ │
│of assassins and saboteurs. (USA 506) │ VII │ 782
│ │ │
*L-38 │Affidavit of Hermann Pister, 1 August │ │
│1945. (USA 517) │ VII │ 783
│ │ │
L-41 │Orders of Mueller, Chief of the │ │
│Gestapo, 17 December 1942 and 23 March│ │
│1943, concerning transfer of workers │ │
│to concentration camps. (USA 496) │ VII │ 784
│ │ │
*L-49 │Affidavit of Otto Hoffman, Chief of SS│ │
│Main Office for Race and Settlement, 4│ │
│August 1945. (USA 473) │ VII │ 795
│ │ │
*L-50 │Affidavit of Kurt Lindow, Director of │ │
│Office for Criminal affairs in RSHA, 2│ │
│August 1945. (USA 793) │ VII │ 796
│ │ │
*L-51 │Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August │ │
│1945. (USA 521) │ VII │ 798
│ │ │
*L-53 │Order from Commandant of the SIPO and │ │
│SD for the Radom District to Branch │ │
│Office in Tomaschow, 21 July 1944, on │ │
│clearance of prisons. (USA 291) │ VII │ 814
│ │ │
*L-158 │Circular letter from SIPO and SD │ │
│Commander of Radom District, 28 March │ │
│1944, concerning measures to be taken │ │
│against escaped officers and │ │
│non-commissioned officer PWs. (USA │ │
│514) │ VII │ 906
│ │ │
*L-215 │File of orders and dossiers of 25 │ │
│Luxembourgers committed to │ │
│concentration camps at various times │ │
│in 1944. (USA 243) │ VII │ 1045
│ │ │
*L-219 │Organization plan of the RSHA as of 1 │ │
│October 1943. (USA 479) │ VII │ 1053
│ │ │
*L-358 │Extract from register of arrests by │ │
│Gestapo in Poland, 1943. (USA 495) │ VII │ 1107
│ │ │
*R-110 │Himmler order of 10 August 1943 to all│ │
│Senior Executive SS and Police │ │
│officers. (USA 333) │ VII │ 1107
│ │ │
*R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │
│reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │
│in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │
│Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205
│ │ │
Affidavit B │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 │ │
│November 1945, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 596
│ │ │
Affidavit C │Affidavit of Dieter Wisliceny, 29 │ │
│November 1945, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 606
│ │ │
Affidavit D │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 4 January 1946. │ VIII │ 622
│ │ │
Affidavit E │Affidavit of Alois Hoellriegl, 22 │ │
│November 1945, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 4 January 1946. │ VIII │ 630
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
│ │ │
*Chart No. 3 │Organization of the SS. (USA 445) │ VIII │ 772
│ │ │
*Chart No. 5 │Position of Kaltenbrunner and the │ │
│Gestapo and SD in the German Police │ │
│System. (USA 493) │ VIII │ 774
│ │ │
*Chart No. 19 │Organization of the Security Police │
│(Gestapo and Kripo) and the SD │
│1943-1945. (2346-PS; USA 480) │ End of VIII
7. ALFRED ROSENBERG
A. _THE POLITICAL CAREER OF ROSENBERG._
The political career of Alfred Rosenberg embraced the entire history of
National Socialism and permeated nearly every phase of the conspiracy.
In order to obtain a full conception of his influence upon and
participation in the conspiracy, it is necessary to review his political
history and to consider each of his political activities in their
relation to the thread of the conspiracy, which stretches from the
inception of the party in 1919 to the defeat of Germany in 1945.
It is interesting to note that for Rosenberg the 30th of November 1918
marked the
“Beginning of political activities with a lecture about the
‘Jewish Problem’”. (_2886-PS_)
An official German pamphlet entitled, “Dates in the History of the
NSDAP”, discloses that Rosenberg was a member of the German Labor Party
(afterwards the National Socialist German Workers Party) in January
1919, and that Hitler joined forces with Rosenberg and his colleagues in
October of the same year (_3557-PS_). Thus, Rosenberg was a member of
the National Socialist movement even before Hitler himself.
An extract from “_Das Deutsche Fuehrer Lexikon_”, 1934/35 (_3530-PS_)
completes the biographical data on Rosenberg:
“From 1921 until the present, editor of the _Voelkischer
Beobachter_; editor of the ‘N.S. Monatshefte’; 1930, Reichstag
deputy and representative of the foreign policy of the movement;
since April 1933, leader of the foreign political office of the
NSDAP; then designated as Reichsleiter; January 1934, deputized
by the Fuehrer for the spiritual and philosophical education of
the NSDAP, the German labor front and all related organizations”
(_3530-PS_).
In July 1941 Rosenberg was appointed Reichsminister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories. (_2886-PS_)
B. _ROSENBERG’S PART, AS OFFICIAL NAZI IDEOLOGIST, IN PREPARING FOR THE
SEIZURE OF POWER AND THE LAUNCHING OF AGGRESSIVE WAR._
Rosenberg was the official National Socialist ideologist. Through the
ideological tenets which he expounded he exerted an influence upon the
unification of German thought, a unification which was an essential part
of the conspirator’s program for seizure of power and preparation for
aggressive war.
Rosenberg wrote extensively on, and actively participated in, virtually
every aspect of the National Socialist program. His first publication
was the “Nature, Basic Principles, and Aims of the NSDAP”, which
appeared in 1922. Rosenberg spoke of this book in the following terms:
“During this time (that is, during the early phase of the party)
a short thesis was written, which nevertheless is significant in
the history of the NSDAP. It was always being asked what points
of program the NSDAP had and how they each were to be
interpreted. Therefore, I wrote the principal program and aims
of the NSDAP, and this writing made the first permanent
connection between Munich and local organizations being
organized and friends within the Reich.” (_3054-PS_)
Thus, the original draftsman of and spokesman for the party program was
Rosenberg.
Without attempting to survey the entire ideological program advanced by
Rosenberg in his various writings and speeches, certain of his
statements may be considered as indicating the nature and scope of the
ideological program which he championed. There was not a single basic
tenet of the Nazi philosophy which was not given authoritative
expression by Rosenberg.
(1) _The theory of racism._ Rosenberg wrote the “Myth of the Twentieth
Century”, published in 1930. At page 479 of this work (_3553-PS_),
Rosenberg expressed the following views on the race question:
“The essence of the contemporary world revolution lies in the
awakening of the racial types, not in Europe alone but on the
whole planet. This awakening is the organic counter movement
against the last chaotic remnants of liberal economic
imperialism, whose object of exploitation out of desperation has
fallen into the snare of Bolshevik Marxism, in order to complete
what democracy had begun, the extirpation of the racial and
national consciousness.” (_3553-PS_)
(2) “_Lebensraum_.” Rosenberg expounded the “_Lebensraum_” idea, which
was utilized as the dynamic impulse behind Germany’s waging of
aggressive war. In his journal, the “National Socialist _Monatshefte_”
for May 1932, he wrote:
“The understanding that the German nation, if it is not to
perish in the truest sense of the word, needs ground and soil
for itself and its future generations, and the second sober
perception that this soil can no more be conquered in Africa,
but in Europe and first of all in the East—these organically
determine the German foreign policy for centuries.” (_2777-PS_)
(3) _Persecution of Christian Churches._ Rosenberg expressed his theory
as to the place of religion in the National Socialist State in the “Myth
of the Twentieth Century”, additional excerpts from which are cited in
(_2891-PS_):
“We now realize that the central supreme values of the Roman and
the Protestant Churches, being a negative Christianity, do not
respond to our soul, that they hinder the organic powers of the
peoples determined by their Nordic race, that they must give way
to them, that they will have to be remodeled to conform to a
Germanic Christendom. Therein lies the meaning of the present
religious search.” (_2891-PS_)
In the place of traditional Christianity, Rosenberg sought to implant
the neo-pagan myth of the blood. At page 114 in the “Myth of the
Twentieth Century” (_2891-PS_) he stated:
“Today, a new faith is awakening—the Myth of the Blood, the
belief that the divine being of mankind generally is to be
defended with the blood. The faith embodied by the fullest
realization, that the Nordic blood constitutes that mystery
which has supplanted and overwhelmed the old sacraments.”
Rosenberg’s attitudes on religion were accepted as the only philosophy
compatible with National Socialism. In 1940 Bormann, in writing to
Rosenberg, made this statement:
“The churches cannot be conquered by a compromise between
National Socialism and Christian teachings, but only through a
new ideology whose coming you yourself have announced in your
writings.” (_098-PS_)
Rosenberg actively participated in the program for elimination of church
influence. Bormann frequently wrote Rosenberg in this regard, furnishing
him information as to proposed action to be instituted against the
churches and, where necessary, requesting that action be taken by
Rosenberg’s department. See _070-PS_ dealing with the abolition of
religious services in the schools; _072-PS_ dealing with the
confiscation of religious property; _064-PS_ dealing with the inadequacy
of anti-religious material circulated to the soldiers; _089-PS_ dealing
with the curtailment of the publication of Protestant periodicals; and
_122-PS_ dealing with the closing of theological faculties.
(4) _Persecution of the Jews._ Rosenberg was particularly zealous in his
pursuit of the “Jewish Question”. On 28 March 1941, on the occasion of
the opening of the Institute for the Exploration of the Jewish Question,
he set the keynote for its activities and indicated the direction which
the exploration was to take. He spoke in part as follows:
“For Germany the Jewish Question is only then solved when the
Last Jew has left the Greater German space.
“Since Germany with its blood and its nationalism has now broken
for always this Jewish dictatorship for all Europe and has seen
to it that Europe as a whole will become free from the Jewish
parasitism once more, we may, I believe, also say for all
Europeans: For Europe the Jewish question is only then solved
when the last Jew has left the European continent.” (_2889-PS_)
Rosenberg had called an Anti-Jewish Congress in June 1944, but the
Congress was cancelled due to military events. (_1752-PS_)
Rosenberg did not overlook any opportunity to put these anti-Semitic
beliefs into practice. He recommended for instance that instead of
executing 100 Frenchmen as retaliation for attempts on lives of members
of the _Wehrmacht_, there be executed 100 Jewish bankers, lawyers, etc.
(_001-PS_). The recommendation was made with the avowed purpose of
awakening the anti-Jewish sentiment.
(5) _Abolition of Versailles Treaty._ In the realm of foreign policy, in
addition to demanding “_Lebensraum_,” Rosenberg called for elimination
of the Treaty of Versailles, and cast aside any thought of revision of
that treaty. In his book, “Nature, Principles and Aims of the NSDAP”,
Rosenberg wrote:
“The National Socialists reject the popular phrase of the
‘Revision of the Peace of Versailles’ as such a revision might
perhaps bring a few numerical reductions in the so-called
‘obligations,’ but the entire German people would still be, just
as before, the slave of other nations.”
* * * * * *
“‘We demand equality for the German people with other nations,
the cancellation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St.
Germain.’” (_2433-PS_)
(6) _Foreign Nazi Penetration._ Rosenberg conceived of the spread of
National Socialism throughout the world and, as will be subsequently
shown, took an active part in promoting the infection of other nations
with his creed. In the “Nature, Principles and Aims of the NSDAP”, he
stated:
“But National Socialism still believes that its principles and
ideology though in individually different suitable ways of fight
according to racial-national conditions—will be directives far
beyond the borders of Germany for the inevitable fights for
power in other countries of Europe and America. There too a
decision of ideas must take place, and the racial-nationalistic
fight against the ever similar loan-capitalistic and Marxist
internationalism must be taken up. National Socialism believes
that once the great world battle is concluded, after the defeat
of the present epoch, there will be a time when the swastika
will be woven into the different banners of the Germanic peoples
as the Aryan symbol of rejuvenation.” (_2433-PS_)
Thus, Rosenberg gave authoritative expression to the basic tenets upon
which National Socialism was founded, and through the exploitation of
which the conspiracy was crystallized in action.
(7) _Ideological training and education._ Rosenberg’s value to the
conspiratorial program found official recognition in his appointment in
1934 as the Fuehrer’s Delegate for the Entire Spiritual and
Philosophical Education and Supervision of the NSDAP. His activities in
this capacity were many and varied. The National Socialist Year Book for
the year 1938, at page 180, describes as follows the functions of
Rosenberg’s office as the Fuehrer’s delegate:
“The sphere of activity of the Fuehrer’s Commissioner for all
spiritual and ideological instruction and education of the
movement, its organization, including the ‘Strength through
Joy’, extends to the detailed execution of all the educational
work of the Party and of the affiliated bodies. The office, set
up by _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg, has the task of preparing the
ideological educational material, of carrying out the teaching
programme, and is responsible for the education of those
teachers suited to this educational and instructional work.”
(_3531-PS_)
As the Fuehrer’s delegate, Rosenberg thus supervised all ideological
education and training in the Party.
It was Rosenberg’s belief that upon the performance of his new functions
as ideological delegate depended the future of National Socialism. An
excerpt from an article by Rosenberg appearing on page 9 of the March
1934 issue of “The Educational Letter” states:
“The focus of all our educational work from now on is the
service for this ideology, and it depends on the result of these
efforts, whether National Socialism will be buried with our
fighting ancestors or whether, as we believe, it really
represents the beginning of a new era.” (_3532-PS_)
In his capacity as the Fuehrer’s Delegate for Spiritual and Ideological
Training, Rosenberg assisted in the preparation of the curriculum for
the Adolf Hitler schools. These schools selected the most suitable
candidates from the Hitler Jugend and trained them for leadership within
the Party. They were the elite schools of National Socialism. An excerpt
from “Documents of German Politics” reads as follows:
“_Voelkischer Beobachter_, 19 January 1937.—‘As stated by Dr.
Ley, _Reichsorganisationsleiter_, on 23 November 1937 at
Ordensburg Sonthofen, these Adolf Hitler Schools, as the first
step of the principle of selecting a special elite, form an
important branch in the educational system of the National
Socialist training of future leaders [_Fuehrernachwuchs_]’
“_Voelkischer Beobachter_ dated 24 November 1937.—* * * The
curriculum has been laid down by _Reichsleiter_ Rosenberg,
together with the _Reichsorganisationsleiter_ and the Reich
Youth Leader.” (_3529-PS_)
Rosenberg exercised further influence in the education of Party members
through the establishment of community schools for all organizations of
the Party. The following statement is taken from the 1934 edition of
“_Das Dritte Reich_”:
“We support the request of the Fuehrer’s Commissioner for the
supervision of the whole spiritual and ideological training and
instruction of the NSDAP, Party member Alfred Rosenberg, to
organize _community schools_ of all organizations of the NSDAP
twice a year, in order to show by this common effort the
ideological and political unity of the NSDAP and the
steadfastness of the National Socialist will.” (_3528-PS_)
Rosenberg’s program was endorsed by Schirach as well as by Himmler, Ley,
and others.
Virtually every phase of National Socialist training came under
Rosenberg’s influence, and unified ideological concepts were inculcated
in every echelon of the party due to his influence. The 1936 edition of
“_Das Dritte Reich_”, under the heading “Education in the Ordensburg”
states:
“Those Party members, selected for training in leadership in
accordance with such points of view (who must have completed
their labor service and their military service satisfactorily)
are to be taught in the Ordensburgen by the best teachers in
history and science of race, philosophy and culture, economics
and specialized training, etc. To determine the ideological
direction of this education, to choose suitable teachers and to
train them, is one of the tasks of the Senior School of the
Party [_Hohe Schule der Partei_] which is to be established in
the near future and will be placed under the direction of the
Reich Leader Party member Alfred Rosenberg in his capacity as
Delegate of the Fuehrer for the Supervision of the Entire
Spiritual and Ideological Teaching and Education of the NSDAP.”
(_3552-PS_)
(8) _Plunder of art treasures._ In his capacity as the Fuehrer’s
delegate, Rosenberg established the Institute for the Exploration of the
Jewish Question, in Frankfort on Main. (This institute, commonly known
as the “_Hohe Schule_”, has been referred to in the discussion of the
Plunder of Art Treasures in Chapter XIV.) Into its library there flowed
books, documents, and manuscripts which were looted from virtually every
country of occupied Europe. As Ideological Delegate Rosenberg conducted
the fabulous art looting activities of the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_,
activities which extended to France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, the Occupied Eastern Territories, Hungary,
and Greece. The extent of the plunder is indicated in document
_1015-B-PS_ which contains a detailed account of the seizure of over
21,000 valuable objects of art, and in document _L-188_ in which the
looting of the contents of over 71,000 Jewish homes is described.
The importance of Rosenberg’s activities as official ideologist of the
Nazi party was not overlooked. The Hart biography of Rosenberg,
entitled, “The Man and His Work” (_3559-PS_), states that Rosenberg won
the German National prize in 1937. The creation of this prize was the
Nazis’ petulant reply to the award of the Nobel prize to Carlin
Assietsky, an inmate of a German concentration camp. The citation which
accompanied the award to Rosenberg read as follows:
“Alfred Rosenberg has helped with his publications to lay the
scientific and intuitive foundation and to strengthen the
philosophy of the National Socialist in the most excellent way.
His indefatigable struggle to keep National Socialist philosophy
clean was especially meritorious. Only future times will be able
to fully estimate the depth of the influence of this man on the
philosophical foundation of the National Socialist Reich. The
National Socialist movement, and beyond that, the entire German
people, will be deeply gratified that the Fuehrer has
distinguished Alfred Rosenberg as one of his oldest and most
faithful fighting comrades by awarding him the German National
Prize.” (_3559-PS_)
The contribution which Rosenberg’s book, “The Myth of the Twentieth
Century,” made to Nazi ideological propaganda was appraised in the
November 1942 edition of the official National Socialist book review
publication, “_Bucher Kunde_”, as follows:
“Next to the Fuehrer’s book it has contributed to a unique
extent to the rise and the spiritual and physical development of
this people. Twelve years after Alfred Rosenberg’s ‘Mythus’
first appeared, a million copies of the book have been published
and circulated.”
* * * * * *
“It must therefore be stated that the phrases coined by Alfred
Rosenberg have passed into the consciousness of the whole
people, and it is just today that they are proving pillars of an
ideological building whose completion is the purpose of the
fight being waged not least today.” (_3554-PS_)
The significance of ideological training in promoting the aims of the
conspiracy is emphasized in a brief statement which Hitler made to his
supreme commanders on 23 November 1939. On that occasion, Hitler said:
“The building up of our armed forces was only possible in
connection with the ideological education of the German people
by the Party.” (_789-PS_)
The contribution which Rosenberg made through formulation and
dissemination of National Socialist ideology was fundamental to the
conspiracy. As apostle of neo-paganism, exponent of the drive for
“_Lebensraum_,” glorifier of the myth of nordic superiority, and as one
of the oldest and most energetic Nazi proponents of anti-Semitism, he
contributed materially to unification of the German people behind the
swastika. He provided the impetus and philosophy of National Socialism.
C. _ROSENBERG’S ACTIVITIES ABROAD, THROUGH THE APA, IN PREPARATION FOR
AGGRESSIVE WAR._
Rosenberg also actively contributed toward the preparation for
aggressive war through the international activities of the APA (The
Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP). Rosenberg became a _Reichsleiter_,
the highest level of rank in the Leadership Corps, and was made chief of
the Foreign Political Office of the NSDAP in April 1933 (_3530-PS_). The
Organizational Manual of the NSDAP (_2319-PS_) describes the functions
of the APA as including the influencing of public opinion abroad so as
to convince foreign nations that Nazi Germany desires peace. The
following excerpt indicates the far-flung activities of the APA:
“* * * II. 1. The APA is divided into three main offices:
“A. Office for Foreign Referats with the Main Offices.
_a._ England and Far East
_b._ Near East
_c._ South East
_d._ North
_e._ Old Orient
_f._ Controls, personnel questions, etc.
“B. Office of the German Academic Exchange Service.
“C. Office of Foreign Commerce.
“2. Moreover, there is in the APA a main office for the press
service and an educational office.” (_2319-PS_)
The Press activities of the APA, designed to influence world opinion in
such a manner as to conceal the conspirators’ true purposes and thus
facilitate the preparation for waging aggressive war, were conducted on
an ambitious scale. “A Short Report on the Activities of the APA of the
NSDAP” describes the press activities as follows:
“* * * _The Press_: The Press Division of the APA is comprised
of persons who together master all the languages that are in
use. Daily they examine approximately 300 newspapers and deliver
to the Fuehrer, the deputy Fuehrer, and all other interested
offices the condensations of the important trends of the entire
world press. I know that these press reports are highly praised
by all who constantly follow them. The Press Division
furthermore conducts an exact archives on the attitudes of the
most important papers of the world and an exact archives on the
most important journalists of the world. Many embarrassments
during conferences in Germany could have been avoided had one
consulted these archives (case of Leumas, Nurnberg, 1934; case
of Dorothy Thompson; and others). Further, the Press Division
was able to arrange a host of interviews as well as conducting a
great number of friendly foreign journalists to the various
official representatives of Germany.” (_003-PS_)
The nature and extent of the activities of the APA are amply disclosed
in a “Report on the Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the
Party from 1933 to 1943,” signed by Rosenberg (_007-PS_). This report
contains a recital of widespread activities in foreign countries. These
activities range from the promotion of economic penetration, to
fomentation of anti-Semitism; from cultural and political infiltration
to the instigation of treason. Activities were carried on throughout the
world and extended to such widely separated points as the Middle East
and Brazil. (_007-PS_)
(1) _Activities in Hungary, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg._ Much of
the APA’s achievements were brought about through the subtle
exploitation of personal relationship. Activities in Hungary proceeded
as follows:
“* * * _The first foreign state visit after the seizure of power
took place through the mediation of the Foreign Affairs Bureau._
Julius Gombos, who in former years had himself pursued
anti-Semitic and racial tendencies, had reached the Hungarian
Premier’s chair. The Bureau maintained a personal connection
with him.” (_007-PS_)
The APA endeavored to strengthen the War Economy by shifting the source
of food imports to the Balkans:
“Motivated by reasons of War Economy, the Bureau advocated _the
transfer of raw material purchases from overseas_ to the areas
accessible by overland traffic routes, i.e., primarily _in the
Balkans_, naturally insofar as practicable. At first little heed
was paid to the Bureau in these endeavors, but it later secured
the active support especially of the Food Estate [_Naeurstand_].
Through its cooperation, e.g., on the subject of fruit and
vegetable imports, a very substantial shift in the source of
imports was attained, particularly through the currently
initiated cooperation with Croatian and Hungarian cooperatives
as well as with commercial associations all over the Balkans.”
(_007-PS_)
Activities in Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg were confined to
“observation of existing conditions” and “to the establishment of
relations, especially of a commercial nature.” (_007-PS_)
(2) _Activities in Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq._ In Iran the APA
achieved a high degree of economic penetration, in addition to promoting
cultural relations:
“The Bureau’s initiative in developing, with the help of
commercial circles, entirely new methods for the economic
penetration of Iran found expression, in an extraordinarily
favorable way, in reciprocal trade relations.
“Naturally in Germany, too, this initiative at first encountered
a completely negative attitude and resistance on the part of the
competent state authorities, an attitude that had first to be
overcome.
“In the course of a few years the volume of trade with Iran was
multiplied five-fold, and in 1939 Iran’s trade turnover with
Germany had attained first place. Even Soviet Russia, the
competitor who had been biggest and most dreaded previously, had
been eliminated from the running. Concurrently with activation
of commercial relations, the Bureau had also intensified
cultural relations and had, in conjunction with growing
commercial influence and in closest collaboration with the
Iranian Government, created a series of cultural institutions
headed and directed by Germans.” (_007-PS_)
Rosenberg further reports on APA activities in other parts of the world:
“Afghanistan’s neutral position today is largely due to the
Bureau’s activity.”
* * * * * *
“The _Arab question_, too, became part of the work of the
Bureau. In spite of England’s tutelage of _Iraq_ the Bureau
established a series of connections to a number of leading
personalities of the Arab world, smoothing the way for strong
bonds to Germany. In this connection, the growing influence of
the Reich in Iran and Afghanistan did not fail to have
repercussions in Arabia.” (_007-PS_)
In view of the numerous “personal connections” maintained by the Bureau
in many different countries, it is not difficult to surmise what
Rosenberg meant when he stated at the conclusion of his report:
“The Bureau has carried out the initiating of all politically
feasible projects. With the outbreak of war it [the APA] was
entitled to consider its task as terminated. The exploitation of
the many _personal_ connections in many lands can be resumed
under a different guise.
“(Signed) Rosenberg” (_007-PS_)
(3) _Activities in Rumania._ Annex Two of the report deals with
activities in Rumania. Here the APA’s intrigue was more insidious, its
interference in the internal affairs of a foreign nation more
pronounced. After describing the failure of what Rosenberg terms a
“basically sound anti-Semitic tendency”, due to dynastic squabbles and
party fights, Rosenberg describes the APA’s influence in the unification
of conflicting elements:
“What was lacking was the guiding leadership of a political
personality. After manifold groping trials the Bureau believed
to have found such a personality—the former Minister and poet,
Octavian Goga. It was not difficult to convince this poet,
pervaded by instinctive inspiration, that a Greater Rumania,
though it had to be created in opposition to Vienna, could be
maintained only together with Berlin. Nor was it difficult to
create in him the desire to link the fate of Rumania with the
future of the National-Socialist German Reich in good time. By
bringing continuing influence to bear, the Bureau succeeded in
inducing Octavian Goga as well as Professor Cuza to amalgamate
the parties under their leadership on an Anti-Semitic basis.
Thus they could carry on with united strength the struggle for
Rumania’s renascence internally, and her _Anschluss_ with
Germany externally. Through the Bureau’s initiative both
parties, which had heretofore been known by distinct names, were
merged as the National-Christian Party, under Goga’s leadership
and with Cuza as Honorary President.” (_007-PS, Annex II_)
Rosenberg’s man, Goga, was supported by two “splinter parties” which had
not joined the anti-Semitic trend of these two parties. Rosenberg has
this to say:
“_Through intermediaries_, the Bureau _maintained constant
contact_ with both tendencies, just as it constantly consulted
with Goga, through Staff Director [Stabsleiter] Schickendanz,
about tactics to be followed.” (_007-PS, Annex II_)
Goga was appointed Prime Minister by the King in December 1937. The
influence of Rosenberg’s ideology had achieved a major triumph, for he
states:
“_Thus a second government on racial and anti-Semitic
foundations had appeared in Europe, in a country in which such
an event had been considered completely impossible._” (_007-PS,
Annex II_)
Rosenberg’s intrigues made a significant contribution to Nazi
preparations for aggressive war, and the benefit to Germany’s position
in the Balkans was great. Rosenberg reports that upon Goga’s resignation
he left a personal heir in Marshal Antonescu, who was appointed by Goga
as Minister of War against the wishes of the King. Of Antonescu
Rosenberg says:
“After Goga’s resignation, Antonescu still remained in the
king’s cabinet at Goga’s wish. He also maintained continued
relations with the Iron Guard. Thereby the possibility of
eliminating the king was at hand—and was exploited. Antonescu
today appears in practice as executor of the heritage bequested
to him by Goga, who had led him from political insignificance
into the political arena. Thereby a change to Germany’s liking
had become possible in Rumania.
“(Signed) Rosenberg.” (_007-PS_)
It will be recalled that on 5 September 1940 Antonescu became President
of the Rumanian Council of Ministers and immediately suspended the
Rumanian constitution. King Carol abdicated on the following day, and
Rumania existed as a German satellite throughout the war. Rosenberg’s
aims had been achieved.
The substantial contribution which Rosenberg had thus made to Germany’s
strategic plans for aggressive war is evident from a brief review of the
military action which followed in the wake of his political maneuvers.
Shortly after King Carol’s abdication Antonescu “invited” German troops
to “protect” the Rumanian oil fields. When Hungary subscribed to the
Axis pact a few weeks later, Germany acquired a continuous land bridge
to the Black Sea, through Austria, Hungary, and Rumania. When Bulgaria
subscribed to the Pact in March 1941, a German thrust southward through
Yugoslavia and Greece became feasible, for with Hungary, Rumania, and
Bulgaria secure, the entire German eastern flank was safe from attack. A
month later, Yugoslavia and Greece were invaded. Only when they were
overcome was Germany free to attack the Soviet Union. Seven weeks after
the fall of Crete, Germany launched her war on the U.S.S.R. Thus,
Rosenberg’s intrigue in Rumania provided a vital link in the chain of
the German strategy of aggression.
(4) _Relations with Quisling in Norway._ Rosenberg also played a leading
role in the development of fifth-column activities in Norway. He
fostered the development of close relations between Germany and
Quisling, procured financial backing for Quisling’s activities, and
brought him into contact with Raeder and Hitler. Rosenberg kept the
Reich informed as to internal developments in Norway through his
contacts with Hagelin, Quisling’s deputy, and took an active part in the
development of plans for a Quisling coup in Norway. The record is clear
that Rosenberg provided the inspiration and the means for the betrayal
of Norway by Quisling and Hagelin—treason for which the Norwegian
Government has tried, condemned, and executed them. (_007-PS_; _C-64_;
_C-65_; _C-66_; _004-PS_; _957-PS_)
D. _ROSENBERG’S PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE OCCUPIED EASTERN TERRITORIES._
Rosenberg participated in the conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes
against humanity in the areas of the Occupied East which he administered
for over three years. This area included the Baltic States, White
Ruthenia and the Ukraine, and the Eastern portion of Poland.
(The mass murder and mistreatment of the Eastern peoples, and the
spoliation of their territories is discussed in Chapter X on Forced
Labor, Chapter XIII on Germanization and Spoliation, Chapter XI on
Concentration Camps, Chapter XII on Persecution of the Jews, Section 5
of Chapter XV on the SS, and Section 6 of Chapter XV on the Gestapo and
SD.) Rosenberg bears personal responsibility for these crimes.
Rosenberg may contend that some of these crimes were committed against
his wishes. There is, indeed, some evidence that he protested on
occasion, not out of humanitarian reasons, but on the ground of
political expediency. Rosenberg may also attempt to place the blame for
these crimes on other agencies and other defendants. The documents
prove, however, that he himself formulated the harsh policies in the
execution of which the crimes were committed; that the crimes were
committed for the most part by persons and agencies within his
jurisdiction and control; that the other agencies which participated in
the commission of these crimes were invited by him to cooperate in the
administration of the East, although the brutal methods customarily
employed by them were common knowledge; and that his Ministry lent full
cooperation to their activities despite the criminal methods that were
employed.
(1). _Activities as “Commissioner for the Central Control of Questions
Connected with the East European Region.”_ Rosenberg was actively
participating in the affairs of the East as early as 20 April 1941, two
months prior to the German attack upon the Soviet Union. On that date he
was designated by Hitler as “Commissioner for the Central Control of
Questions connected with the East European Region” (_865-PS_). The
initial preparations undertaken by Rosenberg for fulfillment of his new
task indicate the extent to which he cooperated in promoting the
military plans for aggression. They also show that he understood his
task as requiring the assistance of a multitude of Reich agencies and
that he invited their cooperation.
Shortly after his appointment by Hitler, Rosenberg conducted a series of
conferences with representatives of various Reich agencies (_1039-PS_).
Cooperation of the following agencies in the administration of the
Eastern Territories was contemplated and solicited by Rosenberg:
OKW
OKH
OKM
Ministry of Economy
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Ministry of the Interior
Reich Youth Leadership
German Labor Front
Ministry of Labor
The SS
and the SA—(as well as several others). (_1039-PS_)
These arrangements, it should be noted, were made by Rosenberg in his
capacity as Commissioner on Eastern Questions—before the attack on the
Soviet Union, before Rosenberg was appointed Minister of the Occupied
East, and before there was any Occupied Eastern Territory for Germany to
administer.
(_a_) _“Solution” of the Jewish Problem._ Emphasis must be placed on
Rosenberg’s basic attitudes regarding his new task, and the directives
he knew he would be expected to follow. On 29 April 1941 he stated:
“A general treatment is required for the Jewish problem for
which a temporary solution will have to be determined (forced
labor for the Jews, creation of Ghettos, etc.)” (_1024-PS_)
On 8 May 1941, instructions were prepared for all Reich Commissars in
the Occupied Eastern Territories (_1030-PS_). The last paragraph of
these instructions reads as follows:
“From the point of view of cultural policy, the German Reich is
in a position to promote and direct national culture and science
in many fields. It will be necessary that in some territories an
uprooting and resettlement of various racial stocks
[_Voelkerschaften_] will have to be effected.” (_1030-PS_)
In his “Instructions for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and
White Russia” (officially referred to together as the “Ostland”),
Rosenberg directs that the Ostland be transformed into a part of the
Greater German Reich by Germanizing racially possible elements,
colonizing Germanic races, and banishing undesirable elements.
(_1029-PS_)
In a speech delivered by Rosenberg on 20 June 1941 he stated that the
job of feeding Germans was the top of Germany’s claim on the East; that
there was no obligation to feed also the Russian peoples; that this was
a harsh necessity bare of any feeling; that a very extensive evacuation
would be necessary; and that the future would hold many hard years in
store for the Russians. (_1058-PS_).
On 22 June 1941 the German armies invaded the U.S.S.R.
(_b_) _Deportation of Prisoners of War for Labor in the Reich._ On 4
July 1941 a representative of the Rosenberg Bureau attended a conference
on the subject of mobilization of labor and utilization of Soviet
prisoners of war. A memorandum of this conference (_1199-PS_) states
that among the participants were representatives of the Commissioner for
the Four-Year Plan, of the Reich Labor Ministry, of the Reich Food
Ministry, and of the Rosenberg Bureau. The conference proceeded as
follows:
“After an introduction by Lt. Col. Dr. Krull, Lt. Col. Breyer of
the P.W. department explained that actually there was in effect
a prohibition by the Fuehrer against bringing Russian P.W.’s
into the Reich for mobilization of labor [_Arbeitseinsatz_]; but
that one might count on this prohibition being relaxed a
little.”
* * * * * *
“The chairman summarized the results of the discussion as
indicating that all the interested bureaus unqualifiedly
advocated and supported the demand for utilization of P.W.’s
because of manpower needs [_Arbeitseinsatz_] in the Reich. The
War Economy and Armament office will approach the Commissioner
for the Four-Year Plan with a request for relaxation of the
restrictive regulations and express to the Chief of Operational
Staff of the Armed Forces its point of view, accordingly.”
(_1199-PS_)
(_c_) _Germanization._ On 16 July 1941, the day before Rosenberg’s
appointment as Minister of the Occupied East, he attended a conference
at the Fuehrer’s Headquarters. At that time Hitler stated that
“The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be
settled by Germans alone.” (_L-221_)
Hitler further stated that Germany’s objectives in the East were
three-fold, first, to dominate it; second, to administer it; third, to
exploit it. (_L-221_)
Thus, the character of the administration contemplated for the Occupied
East was well established before Rosenberg took office as Minister of
the Occupied East. He knew of these plans and was in accord with them.
Persecution of the Jews, forced labor of prisoners of war, Germanization
and exploitation were basic points of policy at the time he assumed
office.
(2) _Activities as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories._ On 17
July 1941 Hitler appointed Rosenberg as Reichsminister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, territories which included nearly all the area
seized by Germany from the U. S. S. R. (_1997-PS_)
(_a_) _Rosenberg’s complete control over, knowledge of, and
responsibility for all non-military German activities and policies in
the occupied Eastern Territories._ The organizational structure and
chain of responsibility within the Ministry for the Occupied East
emphasizes Rosenberg’s responsibility.
A treatise entitled “The Organization of the Administration of the
Occupied Eastern Territories” (_1056-PS_) is undated and unsigned, but
further information regarding it may be obtained by reference to
document _EC-347_, Goering’s “Green Folder.” Part II, subsection of
_EC-347_ is entitled,
“Excerpts from the Directives of the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories for the Civilian Administration.
(Brown Folder, Pt. I, pp. 25-30).” (_EC-347_)
The two paragraphs which follow are identical to two paragraphs found in
document _1056-PS_. Thus, _1056-PS_ is identified as being a
reproduction of Part I of the Brown Folder which was mentioned in the
“Green Folder,” and was issued by the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories.
The directives issued by the Rosenberg Ministry itself (_1056-PS_) prove
the extent of Rosenberg’s authority: he was the Supreme civilian
authority in the Eastern Territories. There was a continuous chain of
command from Rosenberg down to regional administrative officials,
extending even to the local prison warden (_1056-PS_). The relationship
which existed between the Rosenberg Ministry and other German agencies
varied from full control by Rosenberg, to close cooperation with them
made mandatory by his directives and by Hitler’s orders. Finally, the
various subdivisions of the Ministry, were required to submit
period-reports of the situation within their jurisdiction—so that the
numerous reports of brutality which Rosenberg received were submitted to
him pursuant to his orders. (_1056-PS_)
The treatise on the organization of Rosenberg’s ministry states as
follows:
“The newly occupied Eastern Territories are subordinated to the
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. By
directions of the Fuehrer he establishes a civil administration
there upon withdrawal of the military administration. He heads
and supervises the entire administration of this area and
represents the sovereignty of the Reich in the occupied Eastern
Territories.”
* * * * * *
“To the Reich Ministry is assigned a deputy of the Reich Leader
SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the
Interior.” (_1056-PS_)
The responsibility of the Reich Commissars is described as follows:
“In the Reich Commissariats, Reich Commissars are responsible
for the entire civil administration under the supreme authority
of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
According to the instructions of the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories the Reich Commissar, as a
functionary of the Reich, heads and supervises, within his
precincts, the entire civil administration. Within the scope of
these instructions he acts on his own responsibility.
“Subordinate offices of the Reich Commissar are:
“General Commissariats,
“Main Commissariats,
“District Commissariats.” (_1056-PS_)
The SS was placed under Rosenberg’s jurisdiction and control:
“The Higher SS- and Police Leader is directly subordinated to
the Reich Commissar. However, the Chief of Staff has the general
right to secure information from him also. His official title
is:
‘The Reich Commissar for the Eastern Territory The Higher
SS- and Police Leader.’
“Great stress is to be placed on close cooperation between him,
the Chief of Staff, and the other Main Department Heads of the
office of the Reich Commissar, particularly with the one for
Policies.” (_1056-PS_)
The scope of Rosenberg’s control over the SS in the Occupied Eastern
Territories is revealed in a decree signed by Rosenberg, dated 17 July
1941, and found in the _Verordnungsblatt_ of the Reich Minister for the
Occupied East, 1942 #2, pages 7 and 8. This decree provides for the
creation of summary courts-martial to punish crimes committed by
non-Germans in the East, as determined by the Reich Commissar. The
courts are to be presided over by a police officer or an SS leader, who
have authority to order the death sentence and confiscation of property,
and whose decisions are not subject to appeal. The General Commissar is
given the right to reject a summary Courts’ decision. Thus, the
determination of the SS is subordinated to the authority of Rosenberg’s
Ministry.
The position of the General Commissar is defined as follows in the
organizational treatise:
“The General Commissar forms the administrative office of
intermediate appeal. Within his jurisdiction he heads the
administration according to the general directives of the Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and the
prescriptions of the Reich Commissar.”
* * * * * *
“The SS- and _Police Leader_ assigned to the General Commissar
is directly subordinated to him; however, the Chief of Staff has
the general right of requiring information from him.”
(_1056-PS_)
Regional Commissars are described as follows:
“The Regional Commissar heads the entire administration of the
lower administrative office in the Circuit District
[_Kreisgebiet_] in accordance with the instructions of the
General Commissar and the superior offices * * *. The leader of
the police unit assigned to him is directly subordinated to
him.” (_1056-PS_)
Main Commissars are described in these terms:
“Upon recommendation by the Reich Commissar the Reich Minister
for the Occupied Eastern Territories appoints Main Commissars
for Main Districts formed by the consolidation of several
Circuit Districts.” (_1056-PS_)
The order of superiority in the service among these various officials is
stated as follows:
“The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories is the
service superior of the Reich Commissar and the officials and
the employees subordinate to them. The Reich Commissar is the
superior of all officials and employees of his office and of the
offices subordinate to him. The General Commissar is the
superior of the officials and employees of his office and of the
officials and employees of the offices of the Main and Regional
Commissars. The Main Commissar and the Regional Commissar are
the superior of the officials and employees of their offices.”
(_1056-PS_)
Thus, there is a continuous chain of command and of accountability from
the Reich Minister, Rosenberg, down through each subdivision of the
Ministry.
Furthermore, Rosenberg had authority to legislate for the entire area,
and the jurisdiction of his Ministry was exclusive, aside from that of
the military. The organizational treatise states:
“The Reich Commissars, General Commissars, Main Commissars and
Regional Commissars (City Commissars) are—aside from the
military agencies—the only Reich authorities
[_Reichsbehoerden_] in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Other
Reich authorities may not be established alongside them. They
handle all questions of administration of the area which is
subordinate to their sovereignty and all affairs which concern
the organization and activity of the administration including
those of the Police in the supervision of the native
[_landeseigenen_] agencies and organizations, and of the
population.
“The Reich Minister governs the occupied Eastern Territories by
order of the Fuehrer. He can make the law for all the
territories.” (_1056-PS_)
The following passage shows that the economic exploitation of the
territory was undertaken in fullest cooperation with the Commissioner of
the Four-Year Plan:
“The Fuehrer has entrusted Reich Marshal Hermann Goering, as
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, with the supervision of the
tasks of the war economy in the Occupied Eastern Territories.
The economic inspectorates and economic commands are active
there as his representatives [_Organe_] [see Green Folio]. These
economic inspectorates and economic commands will be
substantially absorbed in the agencies of the civil
administration after the establishment of the civil
administration.” (_1056-PS_)
Careful provision was made for channeling to Rosenberg complete and
accurate information as to the situation throughout the territory
governed by him:
“The Reich and General Commissars will determine the periods at
which the subordinate agencies are to report regularly about the
general situation without prejudice to the duty to provide
individual reports and special delivery reports (at first, at
short intervals which can be later lengthened). At first the
Reich Commissars will give the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories a comprehensive report on the situation in
brief form twice a month, on the first and fifteenth of each
month. The Reich Minister is to be given a report by the Reich
Commissar immediately about incidents of an especially important
nature. The General Commissars and Regional Commissars must
report directly to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories by the quickest means particularly important
incidents, as, for example, widespread unrest, more important
acts of sabotage and strikes, great natural catastrophes and the
like, and at the same time report them to the next superior
agency.” (_1056-PS_)
The Second Section of this organizational treatise, entitled “Working
directives for the Civil Administration,” contains this statement:
“* * * the Hague Rules of Land Warfare which deal with the
administration of a country occupied by a foreign armed power
are not valid.” (_1056-PS_; _EC-347_)
The document continues as follows:
“The handling of cases of sabotage is the concern of the Senior
SS- and Police Leader, of the SS- and Police Leader and/or the
police leaders of the lower echelon. Insofar, however, as
collective measures against the population of a definite region
appear appropriate, the decision about them rests with the
competent Commissar on the proposal of the Police Leader. The
calling of the population for the tasks of guarding can be
ordered by the Regional Commissar.
“The assessment of fines of money or goods, as well as the
ordering of the seizure of hostages and the shooting of
inhabitants of the territory in which the acts of sabotage have
taken place, can only be by the General Commissar, insofar as
the Reich Commissar himself does not intervene.”
* * * * * *
“The District Commissar is responsible for the supervision of
all prisons, insofar as the Reich Commissar does not decree
otherwise.” (_1056-PS_; _EC-347_)
(_b_) _Rosenberg’s Use of His Authority and Power for Criminal
Purposes._ The manner in which Rosenberg’s authority and power were
wielded is illustrated in other sections of this volume, which show that
in the Eastern Territories millions of Jews were exterminated; that
millions of slave laborers were pressed into service under indescribable
conditions; that the populace was degraded, starved, beaten, and
murdered; and that the country was stripped of its resources. However,
in order to illustrate the manner in which Rosenberg participated in the
criminal activities conducted within his jurisdiction, four examples may
be mentioned.
_1. Seizure of Jewish Property._ The first illustration is
contained in the decree signed by Lohse, Reichscommissar for the
Ostland, which is published in the _Verordnungsblatt_ of the
Reichscommissar for the Ostland, 1942, No. 38, pages 158 and
159. This decree provides for the seizure of the entire property
of the Jewish population in the Ostland, including the claims of
Jews against third parties. The seizure was made retroactive to
the day of the occupation of the territory by the German troops.
This sweeping decree was issued and published by Rosenberg’s
immediate subordinate, and it must be assumed that Rosenberg
knew of it and acquiesced in it. The power to enact such a
decree, as previously outlined, arose by virtue of delegation of
that power by Rosenberg to the Reichscommissar.
_2. Extermination of Jews._ The second illustration is the
report of the prison warden of Minsk that 516 German and Russian
Jews had been killed. The warden called attention to the fact
that valuable gold had been lost due to the failure to knock out
the tooth-fillings of the victims before they were done away
with (_R-135_).
_3. Deportations for Forced Labor._ The third illustration is a
letter which Rosenberg wrote to Sauckel on 21 December 1942 in
the following terms:
“I thank you very much for your report on the execution
of the great task given to you, and I am glad to hear
that in carrying out your mission you have always found
the necessary support, even on the part of the civilian
authorities in the occupied Eastern territories. For
myself and the officials under my command this
collaboration was and is self-evident, especially since
both you and I have, with regard to the solution of the
labor problem in the East, represented the same
view-points from the beginning.” (_018-PS_)
As late as 11 July 1944 the Rosenberg Ministry was actively
concerned with the continuation of the forced labor program in
spite of the retreat from the East. A letter from Alfred Meyer,
Rosenberg’s deputy, addressed to Sauckel, dated 11 July 1944
shows that this time it is Rosenberg’s Ministry that is urging
action:
“1. * * * The war employment command
[_Kriegseinsatzkommando_] formerly stationed in Minsk
must continue under all circumstances the calling in of
your white Ruthenian and Russian manpower for military
employment in the Reich. In addition, the command has
the mission to bring young boys of 10-14 years of age to
the Reich.” (_199-PS_)
_4. Economic Exploitation._ The final illustration of
Rosenberg’s criminal responsibility is contained in a secret
letter from Rosenberg to Bormann dated 17 October 1944
(_327-PS_). It furnishes a graphic account of Rosenberg’s
activities in the economic exploitation of the Occupied East.
The first paragraph reads:
“In order not to delay the liquidation of companies
under my supervision, I beg to point out that the
companies concerned are not private firms but business
enterprises of the Reich, so that also actions with
regard to them, just as with regard to government
offices, are reserved to the highest authorities of the
Reich. I supervise the following companies * * *.”
(_327-PS_)
There follows a list of nine companies—a trading company, an
agricultural development Company, a supply company, a
pharmaceutical company, and five banking concerns. The mission
of the trading company is stated to be:
“Collection of all agricultural products as well as
commercial marketing and transportation thereof.
(Delivery to armed forces and the Reich.)” (_327-PS_)
The letter continues as follows:
“During this period, the Z.O. (Central Trading
Corporation), together with its subsidiaries, has
collected:
“Grain 9,200,000 tons
Meat and meat products 622,000 tons
Linseed 950,000 tons
Butter 208,000 tons
Sugar 400,000 tons
Fodder 2,500,000 tons
Potatoes 3,200,000 tons
Seeds 141,000 tons
Other agricultural products 1,200,000 tons
and 1,075,000,000 eggs
“The following was required for transportation:
“1,418,000 railroad box cars and 472,000 tons of boat
shipping space.” (_327-PS_)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ALFRED ROSENBERG
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 59
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*001-PS │Memorandum for the Fuehrer signed │ │
│Rosenberg, 18 December 1941, │ │
│concerning Jewish possessions in │ │
│France. (USA 282) │ III │ 1
│ │ │
*003-PS │Report of activity of NSDAP Bureau for│ │
│Foreign Affairs, October 1939. (USA │ │
│603) │ III │ 10
│ │ │
*004-PS │Report submitted by Rosenberg to │ │
│Deputy of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, │ │
│on the Political Preparation of the │ │
│Norway Action. (GB 140) │ III │ 19
│ │ │
*007-PS │Report on activities of the Foreign │ │
│Affairs Bureau from 1933 to 1943 │ │
│signed Rosenberg. (GB 84) │ III │ 27
│ │ │
016-PS │Sauckel’s Labor Mobilization Program, │ │
│20 April 1942. (USA 168) │ III │ 46
│ │ │
*017-PS │Letter from Sauckel to │ │
│Reichsministerfor the Occupied Eastern│ │
│Territories, 5 October 1942, │ │
│concerning mobilization of foreign │ │
│labor forces. (USA 180) │ III │ 60
│ │ │
*018-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Sauckel, 21 │ │
│December 1942, concerning labor in the│ │
│East. (USA 186) │ III │ 61
│ │ │
*019-PS │Letter from Sauckel to Rosenberg, 17 │ │
│March 1943, concerning draft of │ │
│workers from the East. (USA 181) │ III │ 65
│ │ │
*031-PS │Memorandum, 12 June 1944, concerning │ │
│evacuation of youths from the │ │
│territory of Army Group “Center”, and │ │
│interoffice memorandum, Ministry for │ │
│Occupied Eastern Territories, 14 June │ │
│1944. (USA 171) │ III │ 71
│ │ │
*054-PS │Report to Reich Ministry for Occupied │ │
│Eastern Territories, 7 October 1942, │ │
│concerning treatment of Ukrainian │ │
│Specialists. (USA 198) │ III │ 90
│ │ │
*064-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 27 │ │
│September 1940, enclosing letter from │ │
│Gauleiter Florian criticizing churches│ │
│and publications for soldiers. (USA │ │
│359) │ III │ 109
│ │ │
*070-PS │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,│ │
│25 April 1941, on substitution of │ │
│National Socialist mottos for morning │ │
│prayers in schools. (USA 349) │ III │ 118
│ │ │
*072-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 19 April │ │
│1941, concerning confiscation of │ │
│property, especially of art treasures │ │
│in the East. (USA 357) │ III │ 122
│ │ │
084-PS │Interdepartmental report of Ministry │ │
│for Occupied Eastern Territories, 30 │ │
│September 1942, concerning status of │ │
│Eastern laborers. (USA 199) │ III │ 130
│ │ │
*089-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8 │ │
│March 1940, instructing Amann not to │ │
│issue further newsprint to │ │
│confessional newspapers. (USA 360) │ III │ 147
│ │ │
*098-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22 │ │
│February 1940, urging creation of │ │
│National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │ │
│provide moral foundation for NS │ │
│religion. (USA 350) │ III │ 152
│ │ │
*101-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,│ │
│concerning undesirability of religious│ │
│literature for members of the │ │
│Wehrmacht. (USA 361) │ III │ 160
│ │ │
*122-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 17 │ │
│April 1939, enclosing copy of Minister│ │
│of Education letter, 6 April 1939, on │ │
│elimination of theological faculties │ │
│in various universities. (USA 362) │ III │ 173
│ │ │
*199-PS │Letter from Alfred Meyer to Sauckel, │ │
│11 July 1944, concerning forced labor │ │
│of children. (USA 606) │ III │ 213
│ │ │
*212-PS │Memorandum from Rosenberg file │ │
│concerning instructions for treatment │ │
│of Jews. (USA 272) │ III │ 222
│ │ │
*254-PS │Letter from Raab to Reichsministerfor │ │
│Occupied Eastern Territories, 7 June │ │
│1944, concerning burning of houses in │ │
│Wassilkow district. (USA 188) │ III │ 231
│ │ │
265-PS │Memorandum of oral report by Lyser to │ │
│Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, on situation │ │
│in district Shitomir. (USA 191) │ III │ 234
│ │ │
*290-PS │Letter from Rosenberg Ministry, 12 │ │
│November 1943, concerning burning of │ │
│houses in Mueller’s district. (USA │ │
│189) │ III │ 240
│ │ │
*294-PS │Top secret memorandum signed by │ │
│Brautigam, 25 October 1942, concerning│ │
│conditions in Russia. (USA 185) │ III │ 242
│ │ │
*327-PS │Letter of Rosenberg to Bormann, 17 │ │
│October 1944, concerning liquidation │ │
│of property in Eastern Occupied │ │
│Territories. (USA 338) │ III │ 257
│ │ │
342-PS │Decree, 13 October 1941, concerning │ │
│confiscation of Jewish property. │ III │ 264
│ │ │
*789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,│ │
│23 November 1939, to which all Supreme│ │
│Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572
│ │ │
*865-PS │Correspondence between Keitel, │ │
│Rosenberg and Lammers, April 1941, │ │
│concerning appointment of Jodl and │ │
│Warlimont as OKW representatives with │ │
│Rosenberg. (USA 143) │ III │ 621
│ │ │
*957-PS │Rosenberg’s letter to Ribbentrop, 24 │ │
│February 1940. (GB 139) │ III │ 641
│ │ │
1015-B-PS │Report on activities of Special Staff │ │
│for Pictorial Art, October 1940 to │ │
│July 1944. │ III │ 666
│ │ │
*1017-PS │Memorandum entitled “Memorial No. 1 │ │
│regarding USSR”, 2 April 1941, found │ │
│in Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA │ │
│142) │ III │ 674
│ │ │
1024-PS │Memorandum, 29 April 1941, concerning │ │
│organization for handling problems in │ │
│the Eastern Territories. (USA 278) │ III │ 685
│ │ │
*1028-PS │Memorandum from Rosenberg file, 7 May │ │
│1941, concerning instructions for a │ │
│Reichskommissar in the Ukraine. (USA │ │
│273) │ III │ 690
│ │ │
*1029-PS │Paper entitled “Instructions for a │ │
│Reich Commissar in the Baltic States”,│ │
│8 May 1941, found in Rosenberg’s │ │
│“Russia File”. (USA 145) │ III │ 690
│ │ │
*1030-PS │General instructions for all Reich │ │
│Commissars in the Occupied Eastern │ │
│Territories, 8 May 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg file. (USA 144) │ III │ 692
│ │ │
*1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │
│regarding problems in Eastern │ │
│Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695
│ │ │
*1056-PS │Directives concerning administration │ │
│of Occupied Eastern Territories (Brown│ │
│Folder). (USA 605) │ III │ 701
│ │ │
*1058-PS │Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, │ │
│by Rosenberg before people most │ │
│intimately concerned with Eastern │ │
│Problem, found in his “Russia File”. │ │
│(USA 147) │ III │ 716
│ │ │
*1104-PS │Memorandum, 21 November 1941, │ │
│enclosing copies of report concerning │ │
│anti-Jewish action in Minsk. (USA 483)│ III │ 783
│ │ │
1188-PS │Decree of Fuehrer concerning economy │ │
│in newly Occupied Eastern Territories,│ │
│20 May 1941, and attached comment. │ III │ 832
│ │ │
1199-PS │Conference memorandum, 4 July 1941, │ │
│concerning utilization of Soviet PW’s │ │
│for forced labor in Reich. (USA 604) │ III │ 840
│ │ │
*1752-PS │Preparation for International │ │
│Anti-Jewish Congress, 15 June 1944. │ │
│(GB 159) │ IV │ 280
│ │ │
*1997-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer, 17 July 1941, │ │
│concerning administration of Newly │ │
│Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA │ │
│319) │ IV │ 634
│ │ │
*2319-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of │ │
│NSDAP, 4th edition, 1937. (USA 602) │ IV │ 1009
│ │ │
*2349-PS │Extracts from “The Myth of 20th │ │
│Century” by Alfred Rosenberg, 1941. │ │
│(USA 352) │ IV │ 1069
│ │ │
*2433-PS │Extracts from “Nature, Foundation and │ │
│Aims of NSDAP” by Rosenberg, 1934. │ │
│(USA 596) │ V │ 93
│ │ │
*2523-PS │Account of conversations between │ │
│Goering and Bunjes. (USA 783) │ V │ 258
│ │ │
*2777-PS │Article: Space Policy by Rosenberg, │ │
│published in National Socialist │ │
│Monthly, May 1932, p. 199. (USA 594) │ V │ 418
│ │ │
*2886-PS │Excerpt from “The Work of Alfred │ │
│Rosenberg”—a bibliography. (USA 591) │ V │ 551
│ │ │
*2889-PS │The Jew Question as World Problem, │ │
│speech by Rosenberg, published in │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich │ │
│edition, 29 March 1941. (USA 595) │ V │ 554
│ │ │
2891-PS │Extracts from Rosenberg’s “Myth of the│ │
│20th Century”. │ V │ 558
│ │ │
*3000-PS │Report, from Chief of Main Office III │ │
│with the High Command in Minsk to │ │
│Reicke, 28 June 1943, on experiences │ │
│in political and economic problems in │ │
│the East, particularly White Ruthenia.│ │
│(USA 192) │ V │ 726
│ │ │
3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*3428-PS │Letter from Kube, 31 July 1942, │ │
│concerning combatting of Partisans and│ │
│action against Jews in White Ruthenia.│ │
│(USA 827) │ VI │ 131
│ │ │
*3528-PS │Extract concerning NSDAP community │ │
│schools, from The Third Reich, 1934. │ │
│(USA 599) │ VI │ 213
│ │ │
*3529-PS │Extract concerning Adolf Hitler │ │
│Schools, from Documents of German │ │
│Politics. (USA 365) │ VI │ 214
│ │ │
*3530-PS │Extract containing biographical data │ │
│of Alfred Rosenberg, from The German │ │
│Leader Lexicon, 1934-35. (USA 593) │ VI │ 214
│ │ │
*3531-PS │Extract from the National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1938, concerning Rosenberg’s│ │
│office for ideological training. (USA │ │
│597) │ VI │ 215
│ │ │
*3532-PS │Extract from The Educational Letter, │ │
│March 1934, concerning importance of │ │
│ideological training. (USA 598) │ VI │ 216
│ │ │
*3552-PS │Education in the Ordensburg, from The │ │
│Third Reich. (USA 577) │ VI │ 240
│ │ │
*3553-PS │Extract from The Myth of the 20th │ │
│Century. (USA 352) │ VI │ 240
│ │ │
*3554-PS │Extracts from The Myth of the 20th │ │
│Century, published in Book News, No. │ │
│11, November 1942. (USA 601) │ VI │ 242
│ │ │
*3557-PS │Extracts from Dates in History of │ │
│NSDAP, 1939, pp. 4-5. (USA 592). │ VI │ 243
│ │ │
3559-PS │Award of German National Prize, from │ │
│Alfred Rosenberg’s The Man and His │ │
│Work. (USA 600) │ VI │ 243
│ │ │
3766-PS │Report prepared by the German Army in │ │
│France 1942 concerning removal of │ │
│French art objects through the German │ │
│Embassy and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg │ │
│in France. │ VI │ 646
│ │ │
*3780-PS │Record of Fuehrer’s conference with │ │
│Oshima, 27 May 1944, concerning │ │
│Japanese treatment of American terror │ │
│pilots. (GB 293) │ VI │ 655
│ │ │
*C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │
│meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │
│(GB 86) │ VI │ 884
│ │ │
*C-65 │Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder │ │
│concerning visit of Quisling. (GB 85) │ VI │ 885
│ │ │
*C-66 │Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 │ │
│January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” │ │
│and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81) │ VI │ 887
│ │ │
*EC-347 │Directives for operation of the │ │
│Economy in Occupied Eastern │ │
│Territories. (USA 320) │ VII │ 421
│ │ │
*L-188 │Report of 8 August 1944, on │ │
│confiscation up to 31 July 1944. (USA │ │
│386) │ VII │ 1022
│ │ │
*L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 │ │
│July 1941, concerning treatment of │ │
│Eastern populations and territories. │ │
│(USA 317) │ VII │ 1086
│ │ │
*M-153 │Year Book of the Ausland (Foreign) │ │
│Organization of the NSDAP for 1942. │ │
│(GB 284) │ VIII │ 48
│ │ │
*M-156 │Year Book of the Ausland (Foreign) │ │
│Organization of the NSDAP for 1942. │ │
│(GB 284) │ VIII │ 49
│ │ │
R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │
│reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │
│in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │
│Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
│ │ │
*Chart No. 17 │Foreign Organization of the NSDAP. │
│(2354-PS; USA 430) │ End of VIII
8. HANS FRANK
A. _FRANK HELD A POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE
DEUTSCHE ARBEITERPARTEI (NSDAP) AND IN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT._
Frank held the following positions in the NSDAP and the German
Government:
(1) Member of NSDAP, 1928-1945.
(2) Member of the Reichstag, 1930-1945.
(3) Reich Minister Without Portfolio, 1934-1945.
(4) Reich Commissar for the Coordination of the State Administration of
Justice and for Reformation of the Law (_Reichskommisar fuer die
Gleichschaltung der Justiz in der Landern und fuer Erneuerung der
Rechtsordnung_), April 1933-December 1934, in the Ministry of Justice.
(5) President, International Chamber of Law, 1941-42.
(6) President, Academy of German Law (_Praesident der Akademie fuer
Deutsches Recht_), 1933-1942.
(7) Governor-General of the Occupied Polish Territories (_General
Gouverneur fuer die besetzten polnischen Gebiete_), October 1939-1945.
(8) Bavarian State Minister of Justice, March 1933-December 1934.
(9) Reichsleiter of NSDAP, 1933-1942.
(10) Leader of the National Socialist Lawyers League (_Bund
Nationalsozialistischer deutscher Juristen_), 1933-1942.
(11) Editor or author of the following between 1930 and 1942:
(_a_) “_Deutsches Recht_” (Magazine of National Socialist Jurist League)
(_b_) Magazine of the Academy of German Law.
(_c_) National Socialist Handbook for Law and Legislation. (_2979-PS_)
B. _FRANK PROMOTED THE SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS. AS THE
LEADING NAZI JURIST, HE FURTHERED THE REALIZATION OF THE CONSPIRATORS’
PROGRAM IN THE FIELD OF LAW._
Frank himself described his role in the Nazi struggle for power in the
following words in August 1942:
“I have since 1920 continually dedicated my work to the NSDAP. *
* * As National Socialist I was a participant in the events of
November 1923, for which I received the _Blutorden_. After the
resurrection of the movement in the year 1925, my real greater
activity in the movement began, which made me, first gradually,
later almost exclusively, the legal advisor of the Fuehrer and
of the Reich leadership of the NSDAP. I thus was the
representative of legal interests of the growing Third Reich in
a legal ideological as well as practical legal way. * * * The
culmination of this work I see in the big Leipzig Army Trial in
which I succeeded in having the Fuehrer admitted to the famous
oath of legality, a circumstance which gave the Movement the
legal grounds to expand generously. The Fuehrer indeed
recognized this achievement and in 1926 made me leader of the
National Socialist Lawyers League; in 1929 Reich Leader of the
Reich Legal Office of the NSDAP; in 1933 Bavarian Minister of
Justice; in the same year Reich Commissioner of Justice; in 1934
President of the Academy of German Law founded by me; in
December 1934 Reich Minister Without Portfolio; and in 1939 I
was finally appointed to Governor General for the occupied
Polish territories.
“So I was, am and will remain the representative jurist of the
struggle period of National Socialism. * * *
“I profess myself now, and always, as a National Socialist and a
faithful follower of the Fuehrer Adolf Hitler, whom I have now
served since 1919.” (_2233-X-PS_)
Frank’s Diary, from which this quotation is taken, to which frequent
reference is made in this section, is the official journal, kept at
Frank’s direction, of his administration in the General Government. It
consists of 38 volumes in which are recorded the official texts of
speeches, transcripts of conferences, minutes of cabinet sessions, etc.
The volumes are divided into several concurrent series (_Tagebuch,
Abteilungsleitersitzungen_ etc.) which cover the several aspects of the
official business of the administration.
As the “representative jurist of the struggle period of National
Socialism” and in the various juridical capacities listed in the
preceding section, Frank was between 1933 and 1939 the most prominent
policy-maker in the field of German legal theory.
In 1934 Frank founded the Academy of German Law, of which he was
president until 1942. The statute defining the functions of the Academy
conferred on it wide power to coordinate juridical policies:
“It is the task of the Academy for German Law to further the
rejuvenation of the Law in Germany. Closely connected with the
agencies competent for legislation, it shall further the
realization of the National Socialist Program in the realm of
Law. This task shall be carried out through well-fixed
scientific methods.
“The Academy’s task shall cover primarily:
“1. The composition, the initiation, judging and preparing of
drafts of law.
“2. The collaboration in rejuvenating and unifying the training
in jurisprudence and political science.
“3. The editing and supporting of scientific publications.
“4. The financial assistance for research and work in specific
fields of Law and Political Economy.
“5. The organization of scientific meetings and the organization
of courses.
“6. The cultivation of connections to similar institutions in
foreign countries”. (_1391-PS_)
What Frank as policy-maker in the field of law conceived as his task he
explained in a radio address on 20 March 1934:
“The first task was that of establishing a unified German State.
It was an outstanding historical and juristic—political
accomplishment on the part of our Fuehrer that he reached boldly
into the development of history and thereby eliminated the
sovereignty of the various German states. . . .
“The second fundamental law of the Hitler Reich is racial
legislation. The National Socialists were the first ones in the
entire history of human law to elevate the concept of race to
the status of a legal term. The German nation, unified racially
and nationally, will in the future be legally protected against
any further disintegration of the German race stock. . . .
“The sixth fundamental law was the legal elimination of those
political organizations which within the state, during the
period of the reconstruction of the people and the Reich, were
once able to place their selfish aims ahead of the common good
of the nation. This elimination has taken place entirely
legally. It is not the coming to the fore of despotic tendencies
but it was the necessary legal consequence of a clear political
result, of the 14 years’ struggle of the NSDAP.
“In accordance with these unified legal aims in all spheres,
particular efforts have for months now been made as regards the
work of the great reform of the entire field of German law. * *
*” (_2536-PS_)
Frank concluded his remarks by pointing out that the outward forms of
legality could be preserved in building the Nazi state:
“As a leader of the German Jurists I am convinced that together
with all strata of the German people, we shall be able to
construct the legal state of Adolf Hitler in every respect and
to such an extent that no one in the world will at any time be
able to attack this legal state as regards its laws”.
(_2536-PS_)
In his speech at the Congress of the Reich Group of University
Professors of the National Socialist Jurists’ League on 3 October 1936,
Frank explained the necessity for excluding Jews from the legal field:
“* * * this topic embraces all that which in our opinion will
contribute to establishing National Socialism in the field of
jurisprudence, thus eliminating any alien racial spirit
therefrom. * * *
“We National Socialists have started with anti-Semitism in our
fight to free the German people, to re-establish a German Reich
and to build our entire German spiritual, cultural and social
life on the indestructible foundation of our race. We started a
gigantic battle in 1919 * * * It took all the self-confidence of
German manhood to withstand and to triumph—in this fight to
substitute the German spirit for Jewish corruption over the
concerted attacks of powerful world groups of which Jewry is a
representative.
“Particularly we National Socialist Jurists have a mission of
our own to accomplish in this battle. We construct German law on
the foundations of old and vital elements of the German people.
* * *
“It is so obvious that it hardly needs mentioning that any
participation whatsoever of the Jew in German law—be it in a
creative, interpretative, educational or critical capacity—is
impossible. The elimination of the Jews from German
jurisprudence is in no way due to hatred or envy but to the
understanding that the influence of the Jew on German life is
essentially a pernicious and harmful one and that in the
interests of the German people and to protect its future an
unequivocal boundary must be drawn between us and the Jews.”
(_2536-PS_)
As the leading Nazi jurist, Frank accepted and promoted the system of
concentration camps and of arrest without warrant. In an article on
“Legislation and Judiciary in the Third Reich” published in the Journal
of the Academy of German Law in 1936, Frank explained:
“To the world we are blamed again and again because of the
concentration camps. We are asked, ‘Why do you arrest without a
warrant of arrest?’ I say, put yourselves into the position of
our nation. Don’t forget that the very great and still untouched
world of Bolshevism cannot forget that we have made final
victory for them impossible in Europe, right here on German
soil.” (_2533-PS_)
Just as the other conspirators mobilized the military, economic, and
diplomatic resources of Germany for war, Frank, in the field of legal
policy, geared the German juridical machine for a war of aggression,
which, as he explained in 1942 to the NSDAP District _Standortsfuehrung_
Galicia at a mass meeting in Lemberg, had for its purpose:
“* * * to expand the living space for our people in a natural
manner”. (_2233-S-PS_)
Frank was proud of this accomplishment. In a speech before the Academy
of German Law in November 1939, he stated:
“Today we are proud to have formulated our legal principles from
the very beginning in such a way that they need not be changed
in the case of war. For the rule, that right is that which is
useful to the nation, and wrong is that which harms it, which
stood at the beginning of our legal work, and which established
this collective term of nation as the only standard of value of
the law—this rule dominates also the law of these times.”
(_3445-PS_)
C. _THROUGH USE OF HIS OFFICE AS GOVERNOR GENERAL, FRANK PARTICIPATED IN
THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE
TERRITORY OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF POLAND._
Certain of the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the
Nazi conspirators, and in particular by Frank in the General Government
of Poland are discussed in Chapter X on the Slave Labor Program, Chapter
XI on Concentration Camps, Chapter XII on Persecution of the Jews, and
Chapter XIII on Germanization and Spoliation. This section will attempt
to trace Frank’s special responsibility, as Governor General, for the
policies underlying the crimes committed in the General Government
during the period of his administration.
Frank was appointed Governor General of the Occupied Polish Territories
by a Hitler decree dated 12 October 1939. The scope of his executive
power was defined as follows:
“Section 1. The territories occupied by German troops shall be
subject to the authority of the Governor General of the occupied
Polish territories, except insofar as they are incorporated
within the German Reich.
“Section 2. (1) I appoint Reich Minister Dr. Frank as Governor
General of the occupied Polish territories. (2) As Deputy
Governor General I appoint Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
“Section 3. (1) The Governor General shall be directly
responsible to me. (2) All branches of the administration shall
be directed by the Governor General * * *.”(_2537-PS_)
The jurisdiction and functions of Frank in the General Government are
described by him in several passages of his diary. For example at a
meeting of Department Heads of the General Government on 8 March 1940 in
the _Bergakademie_, Frank clarified his status as follows:
“One thing is certain. The authority of General Government as
the representative of the Fuehrer and the will of the Reich in
this territory is certainly strong, and I have always emphasized
that I would not tolerate the misuse of this authority. I have
allowed this to be known anew at every office in Berlin,
especially after Herr Field Marshall Goering on 12.2.1940 from
Karin-hall had forbidden all Administrative Offices of the
Reich, including the Police and even the _Wehrmacht_, to
interfere in administrative matters of the General Government *
* *.
“There is no authority here in the General Government which is
higher as to rank, influence, and authority than that of the
Governor General. Even the _Wehrmacht_ has no governmental or
official functions of any kind in this connection; it has only
security functions and general military duties—it has no
political power whatsoever. The same applies here to the Police
and SS. There is here no state within a state but we are the
representatives of the Fuehrer and of the Reich. In final
conclusion, this applies also to the Party which has here no
far-reaching influence except for the fact that very old members
of the National Socialist Party and loyal veterans of the
Fuehrer take care of general matters.” (_2233-M-PS_)
At a conference of the District _Standartenfuehrer_ of the NSDAP in
Cracow on 18 March 1942, Frank explained the relationship between his
administration and Himmler:
“As you know I am a fanatic as to unity in administration. * * *
It is therefore clear that the Higher SS and Police Officer is
subordinated to me, that the Police is a component of the
government, that the SS and Police Officer in the district is
subordinated to the Governor, and that the _Kreis_ [district]
chief has the authority of command over the gendarmerie in his
_Kreis_ [district]. This the Reichsfuehrer SS has recognized; in
the written agreement all these points are mentioned word for
word and signed. It is also self-evident that we cannot set up a
closed shop here which can be treated in the traditional manner
of small states. It would, for instance, be ridiculous if we
would build up here a security policy of our own against our
Poles in the country, while knowing that the Polacks in West
Prussia, in Posen, in Wartheland and in Silesia have one and the
same movement of resistance. The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of
the German Police thus must be able to carry out with the aid of
his agencies his police measures concerning the interests of the
Reich as a whole. This, however, will be done in such a way that
the measures to be adopted will first be submitted to me and
carried out only when I give my consent. In the General
Government, the Police is the Armed Forces. As a result of this,
the leader of the Police system will be called by me into the
government of the General Government; he is subordinate to me,
or to my deputy, as a State Secretary for the Security Systems.”
(_2233-R-PS_)
D. _THE PROTOCOL UNDER WHICH THE PURPOSES OF FRANK’S ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT WERE DEFINED CONSTITUTES IN ITSELF A CRIMINAL
PLAN OR CONSPIRACY._
The protocol of the conversation between Keitel and Hitler, which was
dated 20 October 1939 and initialed by General Warlimont, regarding “The
Future Shape of Polish Relations with Germany” provided in part as
follows:
“(1) The Armed Forces will welcome it if they can dispose of
Administrative questions in Poland.
“On principle there cannot be two administrations.”
* * * * * *
“(3) It is not the task of the Administration to make Poland
into a model province or a model state of the German order or to
put her economically or financially on a sound basis.
“The Polish intelligentsia must be prevented from forming a
ruling class. The standard of living in the country is to remain
low; we only want to draw labor forces from there. Poles are
also to be used for the administration of the country. However
the forming of national political groups may not be allowed.
“(4) The administration has to work on its own responsibility
and must not be dependent on Berlin. We don’t want to do there
what we do in the Reich. The responsibility does not rest with
the Berlin Ministries since there is no German administrative
unit concerned.
“The accomplishment of this task will involve a hard racial
struggle [_Volkstumskampf_] which will not allow any legal
restrictions. The methods will be incompatible with the
principles otherwise adhered to by us.
“The Governor General is to give the Polish nation only bare
living conditions and is to maintain the basis for military
security.”
* * * * * *
“(6) * * * Any tendencies towards the consolidation of
conditions in Poland are to be suppressed. The ‘Polish muddle’
[_polnische Wirtschaft_] must be allowed to develop. The
government of the territory must make it possible for us to
purify the _Reich territory_ from Jews and Polacks, too.
Collaboration with new Reich provinces (Posen and West Prussia)
only for _resettlements_ (Compare Mission Himmler).
“_Purpose_: Shrewdness and severity must be the maxims in this
racial struggle in order to spare us from going to battle on
account of this country again.” (_864-PS_)
Frank’s own statements regarding the purposes of his administration in
Poland should be considered in connection with the foregoing document.
The economic and political responsibilities which had been conferred on
Frank by Hitler, and according to which he “_intended to administer
Poland_”, were explained by Frank as follows in an interview that took
place on 3 October 1939:
“Poland can only be administered by utilizing the country
through means of ruthless exploitation, deportation of all
supplies, raw materials, machines, factory installations, etc.,
which are important for the German war economy, availability of
all workers for work within Germany, reduction of the entire
Polish economy to absolute minimum necessary for bare existence
of the population, closing of all educational institutions,
especially technical schools and colleges in order to prevent
the growth of the new Polish intelligentsia. ‘Poland shall be
treated as a colony; the Poles shall be the slaves of the
Greater German World Empire.’” (_EC-344-16 & 17_)
The Hitler-Keitel protocol should also be construed in the light of
various passages in Frank’s diary relating to German policy in Poland.
Illegality had been made in effect a canon of administration by the
protocol, which provided that Frank’s task involved “a hard racial
struggle which will not allow any legal restrictions.” Frank emphasized
this point to his Department Heads at a conference on 19 December 1940:
“* * * In this country the force of a determined leadership must
rule. The Pole must feel here that we are not building him a
legal state, but that for him there is only one duty, namely, to
work and to behave himself. It is clear that this leads
sometimes to difficulties, but you must, in your own interest,
see that all measures are ruthlessly carried out in order to
become master of the situation. You can rely on me absolutely in
this.” (_2233-O-PS_)
It was the German purpose from the beginning to administer the General
Government as colonial territory in total disregard of the duties
imposed by International Law on an occupying power, and Frank’s
administrative policies were shaped in accordance with this policy. At
the first conference with Department Heads of the General Government on
2 December 1939, Frank stated:
“Decisive in the administrative activities of the General
Government is the will of the Fuehrer that this area shall be
the first colonial territory of the German nation.”
(_2233-K-PS_)
The “hard racial struggle” which Keitel and Hitler agreed could be
solved only if attacked without “legal restrictions,” developed into the
struggle which had as its ultimate purpose the Germanization of the
General Government.
Frank’s adherence to the conspirators’ Germanization policy was clearly
expressed by him at an official meeting of political leaders of the
NSDAP in Cracow on 5 August 1942. Frank explained on that occasion:
“The situation in regard to Poland is unique insofar as on the
one hand—I speak quite openly—we must expand Germanism in such
a manner that the area of the General Government becomes pure
German colonized land at some decades to come; and, on the other
hand under the present war conditions we have to allow foreign
racial groups to perform here the work which must be carried out
in the service of Greater Germany.” (_2233-V-PS_)
Expediency, and expediency only, tempered Frank’s treatment of the
nonGerman population of the General Government in the “hard racial
struggle” he was charged with administering. The General Government was
destined to become “pure German colonized land”, the valley of the
Vistula to be as “German as the valley of the Rhine.” (_2233-H-PS_)
As for the Poles and Ukrainians, Frank’s attitude was clear. They were
to be permitted to work for the German economy as long as the war
emergency continued. Once the war was won, he told the District
_Standortfuehrung_ and Political Leaders at a conference at Cracow on 14
January 1944:
“* * * then, for all I care, mincemeat [_Hackfleisch_] can be
made of the Poles and the Ukrainians and all the others who run
around here—it does not matter what happens.” (_2233-BB-PS_)
E. _FRANK ADVOCATED AND ADMINISTERED A PROGRAM OF EXTERMINATING JEWS OF
POLISH NATIONALITY WITHIN THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT._
Frank’s diary makes it clear that the complete annihilation of Jews, in
accordance with the racial program of the Nazi conspirators, was one of
the objectives of his administration as Governor General. In the fall of
1940 Frank urged German soldiers to reassure their families in Germany
with regard to the hardships of life in the General Government:
“In all these weeks, they [i.e., your families] will be thinking
of you, saying to themselves: My God, there he sits in Poland
where there are so many lice and Jews, perhaps he is hungry and
cold, perhaps he is afraid to write. * * * It would not be a bad
idea then to send our dear ones back home a picture, and tell
them: well now, there are not so many lice and Jews any more,
and conditions here in the Government General have changed and
improved somewhat already. Of course, I could not eliminate all
lice and Jews in only one year’s time (public amused). But in
the course of time, and above all, if you help me, this end will
be attained. After all, it is not necessary for us to accomplish
everything within a year and right away, for what would
otherwise be left for those who follow us to do?” (_2233-C-PS_).
A year later at a Cabinet Session of 16 December 1941 Frank restated the
official policy of his administration with respect to Jews:
“As far as the Jews are concerned, I want to tell you quite
frankly, that they must be done away with in one way or another.
The Fuehrer said once: should united Jewry again succeed in
provoking a world war, the blood of not only the nations which
have been forced into the war by them, will be shed, but the Jew
will have found his end in Europe * * *.
“Gentlemen, I must ask you to rid yourselves of all feeling of
pity. We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and
wherever it is possible, in order to maintain here the structure
of the Reich as a whole. This will, naturally, be achieved by
other methods than those pointed out by Bureau Chief Dr. Hummel.
Nor can the judges of the Special Courts be made responsible for
it, because of the limitations of the framework of the legal
procedure. Such out-dated views cannot be applied to such
gigantic and unique events. We must find at any rate, a way
which leads to the goal, and my thoughts are working in that
direction.
“The Jews represent for us also extraordinarily malignant
gluttons. We have now approximately 2,500,000 of them in the
General Government, perhaps with the Jewish mixtures and
everything that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews. We cannot shoot or
poison those 3,500,000 Jews, but we shall nevertheless be able
to take measures, which will lead, somehow, to their
annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic measures
to be determined in discussions from the Reich. The General
Government must become free of Jews, the same as the Reich.
Where and how this is to be achieved is a matter for the offices
which we must appoint and create here. Their activities will be
brought to your attention in due course.” (_2233-D-PS_)
An earlier passage in the report of this session of the Cabinet explains
the references to Dr. Hummel. Hummel had complained that legal
formalities were obstructing the process of liquidation:
“In Warsaw, in spite of the setting up of a third court chamber,
we have been able to decree only 45 death sentences, only 8 of
which have been carried out, since in each individual case, the
Pardon Commission [_Gnadenkommission_] in Cracow has to make the
final decision. A further 600 sentences were demanded and are
under consideration. An effective isolation of the ghetto is not
possible by way of the Special Court Procedure. The procedure to
be followed up to the liquidation takes too much time; it is
burdened with too many formalities and must be simplified.”
(_2233-Q-PS_)
Frank himself ordered that every Jew seen outside the Ghetto should be
executed:
“Severe measures must and will be adopted against Jews leaving
the Ghettos. Death sentences pending against Jews for this
reason must be carried out as quickly as possible. This order
according to which every Jew found outside the Ghetto is to be
executed, must be carried out without fail.” (_2233-Q-PS_)
When ways and means of meeting the food deficit in the General
Government created by the increase in quotas to be requisitioned for
export to Germany were discussed in August 1942, Frank approved a
program which provided in part as follows:
“The feeding of a Jewish population, estimated heretofore at 1.5
million, drops off to an estimated total of 300,000 Jews, who
still work for German interests as craftsmen or otherwise. For
these the Jewish rations, including certain special allotments
which have proved necessary for the maintenance of working
capacity, will be retained. The other Jews, a total of 1.2
million, will no longer be provided with foodstuffs.”
(_2233-E-PS_)
Frank’s concurrence was expressed in the following terms:
“That we sentence 1.2 million Jews to die of hunger should be
noted only marginally. It is a matter of course that should the
Jews not starve it would, we hope, result in speeding up
anti-Jewish measures.” (_2233-E-PS_)
At an official meeting of the political leaders of the NSDAP on 5 August
1942, Frank made the following progress report:
“What a dirty people made up of Jews swaggered around here
before 1939! And where are the Jews today? You scarcely see
them. If you see them they are working.” (_2233-V-PS_)
In December 1941, Frank had pointed out that his administration could
not shoot or poison all the three and a half million Jews in the General
Government. He had promised, however, that he would be able to devise
measures which would lead to their annihilation. Two years later, at a
special press conference in January 1944, he was able to report that his
mission was almost accomplished.
“At the present time we have still in the General Government
perhaps 100,000 Jews.” (_2233-F-PS_)
F. _FRANK IMPOSED UPON THE POPULATION OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT A REIGN
OF TERROR, OPPRESSION, IMPOVERISHMENT, AND STARVATION._
What had happened in the General Government in the first three and a
half years of Frank’s administration was summarized by Frank in a report
to Hitler on the situation in Poland, dated 19 June 1943:
“In the course of time, a series of measures or of consequences
of the German rule have led to a substantial _deterioration of
the attitude_ of the entire Polish people in the German
Government. These measures have affected either individual
professions or the entire population and frequently also—often
with crushing severity—the fate of individuals.
“Among these are in particular:
“1—The entirely insufficient nourishment of the population,
mainly of the working classes in the cities, whose majority is
working for German interests.
“Until the war of 1939, its food supplies, though not varied,
were sufficient and generally secure, due to the agrarian
surplus of the former Polish state and in spite of the
negligence on the part of their former political leadership.
“2—The confiscation of a great part of the Polish estates and
the expropriation without compensation and resettlement of
Polish peasants from manoeuvre areas and from German
settlements.
“3—Encroachments and confiscations in the industries, in
commerce and trade and in the field of private property.
“4—Mass arrests and mass shootings by the German police who
applied the system of collective responsibility.
“5—The rigorous methods of recruiting workers.
“6—The extensive paralyzation of cultural life.
“7—The closing of high schools, junior colleges, and
universities.
“8—The limitation, indeed the complete elimination of Polish
influence from all spheres of State administration.
“9—Curtailment of the influence of the Catholic Church,
limiting its extensive influence—an undoubtedly necessary
move—and, in addition, until quite recently, the closing and
confiscation of monasteries, schools and charitable
institutions.” (_437-PS_)
In order to illustrate how completely Frank as Governor General is
identified with the criminal policies whose execution is reported in the
foregoing document, and the extent to which they were the official
policies of his administration, it is proposed to annotate several of
the items with passages from Frank’s own diary.
(1) _Undernourishment of Polish population._ The extent of the
undernourishment of the Polish population was reported to Frank in
September 1941 by _Obermedizinalrat_ Dr. Walbaum:
“_Obermedizinalrat_ Dr. Walbaum expresses his opinion of the
_health condition_ of the Polish population. Investigations
which were carried out by his department proved that the
majority of Poles eat only about 600 calories, whereas the
normal requirement for a human being is 2,200 calories. The
Polish population was enfeebled to such an extent that it would
fall an easy prey to _spotted fever_. The number of diseased
Poles amounted today already to 40%. During the last week alone
1000 new spotted fever cases have been officially recorded. * *
* If the food rations were to be diminished again, an enormous
increase of the number of illnesses could be predicted.”
(_2233-P-PS_)
It was clear from this report that starvation was prevalent in the
General Government. Nevertheless, in August 1942, Frank approved a new
plan which called for much larger contributions of foodstuffs to Germany
at the expense of the nonGerman population of the General Government.
Methods of meeting the new quotas out of the already grossly inadequate
rations of the General Government, and the impact of the new quotas on
the economy of the country were discussed at a Cabinet meeting of the
General Government, on 18 August 1942 in terms which leave no doubt that
not only was the proposed requisition far beyond the resources of the
country, but its impact was to be distributed on a discriminatory basis.
Frank’s opening remarks at this meeting defined the scope of the problem
and its solution:
“Before the German people are to experience starvation, the
occupied territories and their people shall be exposed to
starvation. In this moment therefore we here in the General
Government must also have the iron determination to help the
Great German people, our Fatherland. . . . The General
Government therefore must do the following: The General
Government has taken on the obligation to send 500,000 tons
bread grains to the Fatherland in addition to the foodstuffs
already being delivered for the relief of Germany or consumed
here by troops of the armed forces, Police or SS. If you compare
this with our contributions of last year you can see that this
means a six fold increase over that of last year’s contribution
of the General Government. The new demand will be fulfilled
exclusively at _the expense of the foreign population_. It must
be done cold-bloodedly and without pity; * * *” (_2233-E-PS_).
President of the Main Department for Food and Agriculture Naumann
(apparently an official of the General Government) then described how
the reduced quantity of food available for feeding the population of the
General Government should be distributed:
“The feeding of a _Jewish population_, estimated heretofore at
1.5 million, drops off to an estimated total of 300,000 Jews,
who still work for German interests as craftsmen or otherwise.
For these the Jewish rations, including certain special
allotments which have proved necessary for the maintenance of
working capacity, will be retained. The other Jews, a total of
1.2 million, will no longer be provided with foodstuffs.
“_Non-German normal consumers_ will receive, from 1 January 1943
to 1 March 1943, instead of 4.2 kg. bread per month, 2.8 kg;
from 1 March 1943 to 30 July 1943 the total bread ration for
these non-German normal consumers will be cancelled.
“_Those entitled to be supplied_ [_Versorgungsberechtigten_] are
composed as follows. We estimate that 3 million persons come
into consideration as war workers, the A- and B-card holders and
their kin, and that somewhat more than 3 million persons are
non-German normal consumers, who do not work directly or
indirectly in the interests of Germany. The war workers, A- and
B-card holders and their families, about 3 million persons, will
however continue to be supplied, up to the harvest of 1943, at
the prevailing rates.” (_2233-E-PS_)
Naumann goes on to discuss the difficulties that may be encountered in
the process of requisition:
“_The securing of all depots and food processing plants_, as
well as their transport facilities must be assured, as otherwise
irreplaceable losses result which mean a further burdening of
the food budget. I have had maps made of all districts
[_Kreise_] on which the depots have all been drawn in. I request
that the necessary measures be taken on the part of the police
and these depots, which are in the eye of the hungering masses,
above all at times when the restrictions are carried out, should
be strictly guarded, so that the meager supplies which we have
until the new harvest should not be destroyed by sabotage or
arson. . . . Finally it must be determined at the beginning of
November whether the _martial law for the harvest period_, which
has been proclaimed up to 30 November, must be extended to 30
December. Martial law for the harvest period has been extended
to all products which are to be seized. The planned quota
increase and reduction of ration quantities must be kept secret
under all circumstances and may be published only at that time
which the Main Department for Food and Agriculture considers
proper. Should the reduction of ration quantities and the
increase of quotas become known earlier, extremely noticeable
disturbances in the seizure would take place. The mass of the
Polish population would then go to the land and would become a
supplementary competitor of our requisitioning agencies.”
(_2233-E-PS_)
Frank’s concluding remarks summarized the position as follows:
“I must point out that some sectors of the administration will
feel this very keenly. In the first place the _police_ will feel
this, for it will have to deal, if I may say so, with an
increased activity of the black market and a neglect of food
customs. I will gladly give the police extraordinary powers so
that they can overcome these difficulties.
“The economy will feel it. The decrease of work rendered will
become felt in all sectors, branches and regions. I also assume
that our _transport system_ will feel it too. In view of the
worsening living conditions an extraordinary hardship will set
in for railroad workers and other categories; as the previous
quantities of food were already not enough. The monopolies will
feel it through a decrease of their incomes, as the amounts of
potatoes available for the production of vodka will be less.
“The _Germans_ in this area shall not feel it. We wish in spite
of this new plan to see to it that the supplies for Germans will
be maintained. Also the _Wehrmacht_ and other encamped units in
this area shall not feel it. We hope that it will be possible
for us to keep up the whole quotas here.
“To help in this necessity there is a corresponding measure,
namely that the supervision of persons traveling from the
General Government to the Reich, above all of military
personnel, in order to see whether they are _taking food out_ of
the General Government, should be suspended. This means that in
addition to all that which we must now extract from the land
economically, there must take place a complete removal of
control over that which is dragged out of the land by thousands
upon thousands—doubtless illegally and against our government
measures.” (_2233-E-PS_)
The extent of the General Government’s food contribution to the Reich,
and its significance in terms of rations within Germany were described
by Frank at a meeting of political leaders of the NSDAP in December 1942
at Cracow:
“I will endeavor to get out of the reservoir of this territory
everything that is yet to be got out of it. When you consider
that it was possible for me to deliver to the Reich 600,000 tons
of bread grain, and in addition 180,000 tons to the Armed Forces
stationed here; further an abundance amounting to many thousands
of tons of other commodities such as seed, fats, vegetables,
besides the delivery to the Reich of 300 million eggs, etc.—you
can estimate the significance of the consignment from the
General Government of 600,000 tons of bread grain; you are
referred to the fact that the General Government by this
achievement alone covers the raising of the bread ration in the
Greater German Reich by two-thirds during the present rationing
period. This enormous achievement can rightfully be claimed by
us.” (_2233-Z-PS_)
(2) _Resettlement projects._ Although Himmler was given general
authority in connection with the conspirators’ program to resettle
various districts in the conquered Eastern territories with racial
Germans, projects relating to resettling districts in the General
Government were submitted to and approved by Frank. On 4 August 1942,
for example, the plan to resettle Zamosc and Lublin was reported to him
by State Secretary Krueger:
“State Secretary Krueger then continues, saying that the Reichsfuehrer’s
next immediate plan until the end of the following year would be to
settle the following German racial groups in the two districts (Zamosc
and Lublin): 1000 peasant settlements (1 settlement per family of about
6) for Bosnian Germans; 1200 other kinds of settlements; 1000
settlements for Bessarabian Germans; 200 for Serbian Germans; 2000 for
Leningrad Germans; 4000 for Baltic Germans; 500 for Wolhynia Germans;
and 200 settlements for Flemish, Danish and Dutch Germans: in all 10,000
settlements for 50,000 persons” (_2233-T-PS_). Frank directed that:
“* * * the resettlement plan is to be discussed cooperatively by
the competent authorities and declared his willingness to
approve the final plan by the end of September after
satisfactory arrangements had been made concerning all the
questions appertaining thereto (in particular the guaranteeing
of peace and order) so that by the middle of November, as the
most favorable time, the resettlement can begin.” (_2233-T-PS_)
The way in which the resettlement at Zamosc was carried out was
described to Frank at a meeting at Warsaw on 25 January 1943 by State
Secretary Krueger:
“When we settled about the first 4000 in Kreis Zamosc shortly
before Christmas I had an opportunity to speak to these people.
* * * It is understandable that in resettling this area . . . we
did not make friends of the Poles. * * * In colonizing this
territory with racial Germans, we are forced to chase out the
Poles. * * * We are removing those who constitute a burden in
this new colonization territory. Actually, they are the asocial
and inferior elements. They are being deported, first brought to
a concentration camp, and then sent as labor to the Reich. From
a Polish propaganda standpoint this entire first action has had
an unfavorable effect. For the Poles say: After the Jews have
been destroyed then they will employ the same methods to get the
Poles out of this territory and liquidate them just like the
Jews.” (_2233-AA-PS_)
Although the illegality of this dispossession of Poles to make room for
German settlers was clear, and although the fact that the Poles were not
only being dispossessed but taken off to concentration camps was drawn
to Frank’s attention at this time, he merely directed that individual
cases of resettlement should in future be discussed in the same manner
as in the case of Zamosc. (_2233-AA-PS_)
(3) _Encroachments and confiscations in the industries and in the field
of private property._
Frank explained his policy in respect to Polish property to his
Department Heads in the following terms in December 1939:
“Principally it can be said regarding the administration of the
General Government: This territory in its entirety is booty of
the German Reich, and it thus cannot be permitted that this
territory shall be exploited in its individual parts but that
the territory in its entirety shall be economically used and its
entire economic worth redound to the benefit of the German
people.” (_2233-K-PS_)
Whatever encroachments there were on private property rights in the
General Government fell squarely within the policy which Frank in an
interview on 3 October 1939 stated he intended to administer as General
Governor:
“Poland can only be administered by utilizing the country
through means of ruthless exploitation, deportation of all
supplies, raw materials, machines, factory installations etc.
which are important for the German war economy. * * * [It was
Frank’s opinion] that the war would be a short one and that it
was most important now to make available as soon as possible raw
materials, machines and workers to the German industry, which
was short in all of these. Most important, however, in Frank’s
opinion, was the fact that by destroying Polish industry, its
subsequent reconstruction after the war would become more
difficult, if not impossible, so that Poland would be reduced to
its proper position as an agrarian country which would have to
depend upon Germany for importation of industrial products.”
(_EC-344-16 & 17_)
The basic decree under which property in the General Government was
sequestered was promulgated by Frank on 24 January 1940. This decree
authorized sequestration in connection with the “performance of tasks
serving the public interest,” the seizure of “abandoned property,” and
the liquidation of “antisocial or financially unremunerative property.”
It permitted the Higher S.S. and Police Chief to order sequestrations
“with the object of increasing the striking power of the units of the
uniformed police and armed S.S.” No legal recourse was granted for
losses arising from the enforcement of the decree, compensation being
solely in the discretion of an official of the General Government. It is
clear that the undefined criteria of this decree empowered Nazi
officials in the General Government to engage in wholesale seizure of
property. (_2540-PS_)
(4) _Principle of collective responsibility._ It was no part of Frank’s
policy in administering the General Government that reprisals should be
commensurate with the gravity of the offense. Frank was, on the
contrary, an advocate of drastic measures in dealing with the Polish
people. At a conference of Department Heads of the General Government on
19 January 1940, he explained:
“My relationship with the Poles is like the relationship between
ant and plant louse. When I treat the Poles in a helpful way, so
to speak tickle them in a friendly manner, then I do it in the
expectation that their work performance redounds to my benefit.
This is not a political but a purely tactical-technical problem.
* * * In cases where in spite of all these measures the
performance does not increase, or where the slightest act gives
me occasion to step in, I would not even hesitate to take the
most draconic action.” (_2233-L-PS_)
At a subsequent meeting of Department Heads on 8 March 1940 Frank became
even more explicit:
“Whenever there is the least-attempt by the Poles to start
anything, an enormous campaign of destruction will follow. Then
I would not mind starting a regime of terror, or fear its
consequences.” (_2233-M-PS_)
At a conference of District Standartenfuehrer at Cracow on 18 March 1942
Frank reiterated his policy:
“Incidentally, the struggle for the achievement of our aims will
be pursued cold bloodedly. You see how the state agencies work.
You see that we do not hesitate before anything, and stand whole
dozens of people up against the wall. This is necessary because
here simple consideration says that it cannot be our task at
this period when the best German blood is being sacrificed, to
show regard for the blood of another race. For out of this one
of the greatest dangers may arise. One already hears today in
Germany that prisoners-of-war, for instance with us in Bavaria
or in Thuringia, are administering large estates entirely
independently, while all the men in a village fit for service
are at the front. If this state of affairs continues then a
gradual retrogression of Germanism will show itself. One should
not underestimate this danger. Therefore, everything revealing
itself as a Polish power of leadership must be destroyed again
and again with ruthless energy. This does not have to be shouted
abroad, it will happen silently.” (_2233-R-PS_)
And on 15 January 1944 Frank assured the political leaders of the NSDAP
at Cracow:
“I have not been hesitant in declaring that when a German is
shot, up to 100 Poles shall be shot too.” (_2233-BB-PS_)
(5) _Rigorous methods of recruiting workers._ Force, violence, and
economic duress were all advocated by Frank as means for recruiting
laborers for deportation to slave labor in Germany. Deportation of
Polish laborers to Germany was an integral part of the program announced
by Frank for his administration of the General Government (See
_EC-344-16 & 17_), and as Governor General he authorized whatever degree
of force was required for the execution of his program.
Voluntary methods of recruitment soon proved inadequate. In the spring
of 1940 the question of utilizing force came up, and the following
discussion took place in the presence of Seyss-Inquart:
“The Governor-General stated that the fact that all means in
form of proclamations etc. did not bring success, leads to the
conclusion that the Poles out of malevolence, and guided by the
intention of harming Germany by not putting themselves at its
disposal, refuse to enlist for working duty. Therefore, he asks
Dr. Frauendorfer, if there are any other measures, not as yet
employed, to win the Poles on a voluntary basis.
“_Reichshauptamtsleiter_ Dr. Frauendorfer answered this question
negatively.
“The General Governor emphasized the fact that he now will be
asked to take a definite attitude toward this question.
Therefore the question will arise whether any form of _coercive
measures_ should now be employed.
“The question put by the General Governor to SS Lieutenant
General [_Obergruppenfuehrer_] Krueger: does he see
possibilities of calling Polish workers by coercive means, is
answered in the affirmative by SS Lieutenant General _Krueger_.”
(_2233-N-PS_)
At the same conference Frank declared that he was willing to agree to
any practical measures, and decreed that unemployment compensation
should be discontinued on 1 May 1940 as a means of recruiting labor for
Germany.
“The General Governor is willing to agree to any practical
measure; however, he wishes to be informed personally about the
measures to be taken. One measure, which no doubt would be
successful, would be the _discontinuance of unemployment
compensation_ for unemployed workers and their _transfer to
public welfare_. Therefore, he decrees that, beginning _1 May_,
claim for unemployment compensation will cease to exist and only
public welfare may be granted. For the time being only men are
to report and above those men living in cities. There might be a
possibility of combining the moving of the 120,000 Poles from
the Warthe district with this measure.” (_2233-N-PS_)
In March 1940 Frank assured the authorities in Berlin that he was
prepared to have villages surrounded and the people dragged forcibly
out. He reported that, in the course of his negotiations in Berlin
regarding the urgent demand for larger numbers of Polish farm workers,
he had stated:
“* * * if it is demanded from him, [he] could naturally exercise
force in such a manner, that he has the police surround a
village and get the men and women in question out by force, and
then send them to Germany. But one can also work differently,
besides these police measures, by retaining the unemployment
compensation of these workers in question.” (_2233-B-PS_)
At a conference of Department Heads of the General Government on 10 May
1940 Frank laid down the following principles for dealing with the
problem of conscription labor:
“Upon the demands from the Reich it has now been decreed that
compulsion may be exercised in view of the fact that sufficient
manpower was not voluntarily available for service inside the
German Reich. This compulsion means the possibility of arrest of
male and female Poles. . . . The arrest of young Poles when
leaving church services or the cinema would bring about an
ever-increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he
had no objection at all if the rubbish, capable of work yet
often loitering about, would be snatched from the streets. The
best method for this, however, would be the organization of a
raid, and it would be absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole in
the street and to question him what he was doing, where he was
working, etc.” (_2233-A-PS_)
Frank utilized starvation as a method of recruitment. At a conference on
20 November 1942 the following plan was agreed:
“Starting 1 February 1942 the food ration cards should not be
issued to the individual Pole or Ukrainian by the Nutrition
Office [_Ernaehrungsamt_], but to the establishments working for
the German interest. 2,000,000 people would thus be eliminated
from the non-German, normal ration-consuming contingent. Now, if
those ration cards are only distributed by the factories, part
of those people will naturally rush into the factories. Labor
could then be either procured for Germany from them or they
could be used for the most important work in the factories of
the General Government.” (_2233-Y-PS_)
On 18 August 1942 Frank informed Sauckel that the General Government had
already supplied 800,000 laborers to Germany, and that a further 140,000
would be supplied by the end of the year. Regarding the quota for the
next year he promised:
“* * * you can, however, next year reckon upon a higher number
of workers from the General Government, for we shall employ the
Police to conscript them.” (_2233-W-PS_)
Six months after Frank promised Sauckel to resort to police action to
round up labor for deportation to Germany, the Chairman of the Ukrainian
Main Committee reported to Frank that the program was being carried out
as follows:
“The wild and ruthless man-hunt carried on everywhere in towns
and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at
night in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the
inhabitants. Everybody is exposed to the danger of being seized
anywhere and at any time by members of the police, suddenly and
unexpectedly, and being brought into an assembly camp. None of
his relatives knows what has happened to him, only weeks or
months later, one or the other gives news of his fate by a
postcard.” (_1526-PS_)
(6) _Closing of schools._ The program outlined by Frank on 3 October
1939 as the program he intended to administer as Governor General
included:
“closing of all educational institutions, especially technical
schools and colleges in order to prevent the growth of the new
Polish intelligentsia.” (_EC-344-16 & 17_)
This decision was taken by Frank before it was determined what schools,
if any, might be closed because of failure of instructors to refrain
from reference to politics, or refusal to submit to inspection by the
occupying authorities. Moreover, the policy was determined, as
indicated, in furtherance of the purpose of preventing the rise of an
educated class in Poland.
(7) _Other crimes._ There were other grounds for uneasiness in Poland
which Frank does not mention in his report to Hitler. He does not
mention the Concentration Camps—perhaps because, as the “representative
jurist” of National Socialism, Frank had himself defended the system in
Germany. As Governor General Frank is responsible for all concentration
camps within the boundaries of the General Government. As indicated
above, he knew and approved that Poles were taken to concentration camps
in connection with the resettlement projects. He had certain
jurisdiction, as well, in relation to the notorious extermination camp
Auschwitz, to which Poles from the General Government were committed by
his administration, although the camp itself lay outside the boundaries
of the General Government. In February 1944, Ambassador Counsellor Dr.
Schumberg suggested a possible amnesty of Poles who had been taken to
Auschwitz for trivial offenses and kept for several months. The report
of the conference continues:
“The Governor General will take under consideration an amnesty
probably for 1 May of this year. Nevertheless, one must not lose
sight of the fact that the German leadership of the General
Government must not now show any signs of weakness.”
(_2233-BB-PS_)
G. _CONCLUSION._
As legal adviser of Hitler and the leadership corps of the NSDAP, Frank
promoted the conspirators’ rise to power. In his various juridical
capacities, both in the NSDAP and in the German government, Frank
advocated and promoted the political monopoly of the NSDAP, the racial
program of the conspirators, and the terror system of the concentration
camp and of arrest without warrant. His role in the common plan was to
realize “the National Socialist Program in the realm of law”, and to
give the outward form of legality to this program of terror, persecution
and oppression, which had as its ultimate purpose mobilization for
aggressive war.
As a loyal adherent of Hitler and the NSDAP, Frank was appointed
Governor General in October 1939 of that area of Poland known as the
General Government, which became the testing ground for the
conspirators’ program of “_Lebensraum_.” Frank had defined justice in
the field of German law as that which benefited the German nation. His
five year administration of the General Government illustrates the same
principles applied in the field of International Law.
Frank took the office of Governor General under a program which
constituted in itself a criminal plan or conspiracy, as Frank well knew
and approved, to exploit the territory ruthlessly for the benefit of
Nazi Germany, to conscript its nationals for labor in Germany, to close
its schools and colleges to prevent the rise of a Polish intelligentsia,
and to administer the territory as a colonial possession of the Third
Reich in total disregard of the duties of an occupying power toward the
inhabitants of occupied territory. Under Frank’s administration this
criminal plan was consummated. But the execution went even beyond the
plan. Food contributions to Germany increased to the point where the
bare subsistence reserved for the General Government under the plan was
reduced to the level of mass starvation; a savage program of
exterminating Jews was relentlessly executed; resettlement projects were
carried out with reckless disregard of the rights of the local
population; the terror of the concentration camp followed in the wake of
the Nazi invaders.
It has been shown that all of these crimes were committed in accordance
with the official policies established and advocated by Frank.
This summary of evidence has been compiled almost entirely from
statements by Frank himself, from the admissions found in his diaries,
official reports, records of his conferences with his colleagues and
subordinates, and his speeches. It is therefore appropriate that a final
passage from his diary should be quoted in conclusion. In January 1943,
Frank told his colleagues in the General Government that their task
would grow more difficult. Hitler, he said, could only help them as a
kind of “administrative pillbox”. They must depend on themselves.
“We are now duty bound to hold together [he continued] * * * We
must remember that we who are gathered together here figure on
Mr. Roosevelt’s list of war criminals. I have the honor of being
Number One. We have, so to speak, become accomplices in the
world historic sense.” (_2233-AA-PS_)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO HANS FRANK
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 60
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*437-PS │Extract from report, 19 June 1943, by │ │
│Frank to Hitler, concerning situation │ │
│in Poland. (USA 610) │ III │ 396
│ │ │
*864-PS │Top Secret Note, 20 October 1939, on │ │
│conference between Hitler and Chief │ │
│OKW concerning future relations of │ │
│Poland to Germany, 17 October 1939. │ │
│(USA 609) │ III │ 619
│ │ │
1391-PS │Statute of the Academy for German Law,│ │
│2 July 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│pp. 605-607. │ III │ 970
│ │ │
*1526-PS │Letter from Ukrainian Main Committee │ │
│to Frank, February 1943. (USA 178) │ IV │ 79
│ │ │
2233-A-PS │Frank Diary. │ │
│Abteilungsleitersitzungen, 1939-1940. │ │
│Minutes of conferences, December and │ │
│May 1940. (USA 173) │ IV │ 883
│ │ │
*2233-B-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part I. │ │
│January-March. (USA 174) │ IV │ 885
│ │ │
*2233-C-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part IV. │ │
│October-December. (USA 271) │ IV │ 890
│ │ │
*2233-D-PS │Frank Diary. Regierungsitzungen. 1941.│ │
│October-December. Entry of 16 December│ │
│1941 at pp. 76-77. (USA 281) │ IV │ 891
│ │ │
*2233-E-PS │Frank Diary. │ │
│Regierungs-Hauptabteilungsleiter-Sitzu│ │
│ngen. 1942. Entry of 24 August 1942. │ │
│(USA 283) │ IV │ 893
│ │ │
*2233-F-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1 January │ │
│1944-28 February 1944. Entry of 25 │ │
│January 1944 at p. 5. (USA 295) │ IV │ 902
│ │ │
*2233-H-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1941. Part II. │ │
│Entry of 19 April 1941. (USA 311) │ IV │ 904
│ │ │
*2233-K-PS │Frank Diary. │ │
│Abteilungsleitersitzungen. 1939-1940. │ │
│Entry of 2 December 1939. (USA 173) │ IV │ 905
│ │ │
2233-L-PS │Frank Diary. │ │
│Abteilungsleitersitzungen. 1939-1940. │ │
│Entry of 19 January 1940 at pp. 11-12.│ IV │ 906
│ │ │
*2233-M-PS │Frank Diary. │ │
│Abteilungsleitersitzungen. 1939-1940. │ │
│Entry of 8 March 1940. (USA 173) │ IV │ 906
│ │ │
*2233-N-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part II. │ │
│April to June. (USA 614) │ IV │ 907
│ │ │
*2233-O-PS │Frank Diary. │ │
│Abteilungsleitersitzungen. 1939-1940. │ │
│Entry of 19 December 1940 at pp. │ │
│12-13. (USA 173) │ IV │ 909
│ │ │
2233-P-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1941. Part III.│ │
│Entry of 9 September 1941 at p. 830. │ │
│(USA 611) │ IV │ 909
│ │ │
2233-Q-PS │Frank Diary. Regierungssitzungen. │ │
│October-December 1941. Entry of 16 │ │
│December 1941 at pp. 35, 66. │ IV │ 909
│ │ │
*2233-R-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1942. Part I. │ │
│Entry of 18 March 1942 at pp. 185, │ │
│186, 195-196. (USA 608) │ IV │ 910
│ │ │
*2233-S-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1942. Part III.│ │
│Entry of 1 August 1942 at p. 798. (USA│ │
│607) │ IV │ 911
│ │ │
*2233-T-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1942. Part III.│ │
│Entry of 4 August 1942 at pp. 830-832.│ │
│(USA 607) │ IV │ 911
│ │ │
2233-V-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1942. Part III.│ │
│Entry of 5 August 1942 at pp. 866, │ │
│896. │ IV │ 912
│ │ │
*2233-W-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1942. Part III.│ │
│Entry of 18 August 1942 at pp. 918, │ │
│920. (USA 607) │ IV │ 912
│ │ │
*2233-X-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1942. Part III.│ │
│Entry of 28 August 1942 at pp. │ │
│968-969, 983. (USA 607) │ IV │ 913
│ │ │
2233-Y-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1942. Part IV. │ │
│Entry of 20 November 1942 at pp. │ │
│1212-1213. │ IV │ 914
│ │ │
*2233-Z-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1942. Part IV. │ │
│Entry of 14 December 1942 at pp. │ │
│1329-1331. (USA 612) │ IV │ 915
│ │ │
*2233-AA-PS │Frank Diary. Arbeitssitzungen. 1943. │ │
│Entry of 25 January 1943 at pp. 16, │ │
│17, 19, 53. (USA 613) │ IV │ 916
│ │ │
*2233-BB-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1 January │ │
│1944-28 February 1944. Entry of 14 │ │
│January, 15 January, 8 February 1944. │ │
│(USA 295) │ IV │ 917
│ │ │
2533-PS │Extract from article “Legislation and │ │
│Judiciary in Third Reich”, from │ │
│Journal of the Academy for German Law,│ │
│1936, pp. 141-142. │ V │ 277
│ │ │
2536-PS │Speech by Dr. Frank on “The Jews in │ │
│Jurisprudence” and Radio Speech, │ │
│published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, Vol. II. │ V │ 277
│ │ │
2537-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │
│Chancellor concerning Administration │ │
│of Occupied Polish Territories, │ │
│October 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 2077. │ V │ 279
│ │ │
2540-PS │Decree concerning sequestration of │ │
│private property in the General │ │
│Government, 24 January 1940, published│ │
│in Verordnungsblatt fuer das │ │
│Generalgouverneurs, No. 6, 27 January │ │
│1940, p. 23. │ V │ 280
│ │ │
*2979-PS │Affidavit by Hans Frank, 15 November │ │
│1945, concerning positions held. (USA │ │
│7) │ V │ 684
│ │ │
3445-PS │Speech by Hans Frank, reported in │ │
│German Law, 1939, Vol. 2. │ VI │ 153
│ │ │
3814-PS │Correspondence between Hans Frank, │ │
│Lammers and various witnesses to the │ │
│conduct of Frank, February 1945. │ VI │ 739
│ │ │
3815-PS │Report of the SS, 25 April 1942, │ │
│concerning the activities of Hans │ │
│Frank in Poland. │ VI │ 745
│ │ │
*EC-344 16 and 17 │Thomas report, 20 August 1940, │ │
│summarizing experience with German │ │
│Armament Industry in Poland 1939-40 │ │
│and extract from report by Captain Dr.│ │
│Varain on same subject. (USA 297) │ VII │ 419
│ │ │
Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
9. WILHELM FRICK
A. _FRICK’S POLITICAL CAREER._
Frick’s important contribution to the Nazi conspiracy was in the field
of government administration. He was the administrative brain who
organized the German state for Nazism and who geared the machinery of
the state for aggressive war. It was Frick who transformed the plans and
programs of his fellow conspirators into political action. He was the
manager of the Nazi conspiracy. He was entrusted with broad discretion,
exercised great power, and knew the criminal purpose of the acts he
committed.
The conspiratorial activities of Frick cover a period of 25 years,
beginning as early as 1920 (_3086-PS_).
A brief summary of Frick’s activities will show how extensive was his
contribution to the Nazi conspiracy. He took part in Hitler’s Munich
Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923, and was sentenced for his
participation. He helped Hitler become a German citizen. To maintain the
Nazi regime in the first 2 years of its existence and to achieve some of
its most important immediate purposes, Frick signed 235 laws and decrees
during that period, most of which are published in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_.
For the first time in German history a uniform police system for the
whole German Reich was created. Frick was its creator and its supreme
head. He appointed the Gestapo chief, Heinrich Himmler, Chief of the
German Police. Frick was the highest controlling authority over
concentration camps. He personally inspected these camps. His Ministry
of the Interior made the necessary legal arrangements for acquiring land
for the Auschwitz Concentration Camp. Through his Medical Division,
Frick controlled the Nazi asylums and so-called medical institutions in
which forced sterilizations and murders of thousands of Germans and of
foreign laborers were carried out. The racial legislation, including the
Nurnberg Laws, was drafted by Frick and administered under his
jurisdiction. Frick introduced the Yellow Star as a sign of
stigmatization of the Jews.
In the course of his active participation in the Nazi conspiracy, Frick
occupied a number of important positions. Among his Nazi Party positions
are the following: member of the Nazi Party from 1925 to 1945; Reich
Leader of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1945; floor leader of the Nazi
Party in the Reichstag from 1928 to 1945. His governmental positions
were: chief of a division of the Munich Police Department from 1917 to
10 November 1923, 2 days after Hitler’s Putsch; Nazi Minister of the
Interior and of Education in the German State of Thuringia from January
1930 to April 1931; Reichsministerof the Interior from 30 January 1933
to 20 August 1943; member of the Reich Defense Council as General
Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich from 21 May 1935 to
20 August 1943. On 20 August 1943, Frick was appointed Reich Protector
of Bohemia and Moravia, and he held this last position until 1945.
(_2978-PS_)
B. _FRICK’S PARTICIPATION IN PROMOTING THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION
TO POWER._
Frick has admitted that he was one of the men who helped Hitler to power
(_3043-PS_).
(1) _Frick’s activities in early days of conspiracy._ In the very
beginning of the Nazi Party and its conspiracy, Frick misused his
various governmental positions in order to hold a “protecting hand over
the National-Socialist Party and Hitler.” This he stated solemnly in his
speech before the Munich People’s Court during the Putsch trial
(_3119-PS_; see “The Hitler Trial Before the People’s Court in Munich”
(_Der Hitler Prozess vor dem Volksgericht in Muenchen_), published by
Knorr & Hirth, G.M.B.H., Muenchen, 1924.)
When Hitler was arrested during those early revolutionary days, Frick
used his position in the Munich Police Department to release him under
his own authority (_3124-PS_).
Frick participated in the Nazi Beer Hall Putsch of 8-9 November 1923,
and was tried with Hitler on a charge of complicity in treason. He was
convicted and received a suspended sentence of one year and three months
in a fortress (_3132-PS_).
Hitler’s appreciation of Frick’s assistance during those years is
demonstrated by the fact that Hitler honored Frick by mentioning his
name in _Mein Kampf_, the Nazi bible. Only two other defendants in this
proceeding, Hess and Streicher, share that honor. In this reference
Hitler said of Frick:
“He [Munich Police President Poehner] and his coworker Dr. Frick
are in my estimation the only men in government positions, who
have the right to collaborate in the establishment of a Bavarian
Nation.” (_3125-PS_)
(2) _Frick’s activities as member of Reichstag._ Having been elected to
the Reichstag on 4 May 1924, Frick stated that it was his task not to
“support, but to undermine the parliamentary system” (_2742-PS_).
In the Reichstag Frick immediately proposed those discriminatory
measures against the Jews which were enacted after he and the other Nazi
conspirators had come into power in 1933. On 25 August 1924 Frick
demanded in the Reichstag that all Jews be removed from public office
(_3128-PS_). Two days later he returned with a motion calling for
“special legislation for all members of the Jewish race” (_3119-PS_).
In 1930, a significant investigative report was prepared by the Prussian
Ministry of the Interior (_2513-PS_). This official report analyzed the
criminal activities of Hitler, Frick, and other Nazis. It stated that
Frick had to be regarded as the most influential leader of the NSDAP
next to Hitler. This document reported that at the 1927 Party Congress
in Nurnberg, Frick said that the Nazi Party would first infiltrate into
parliament and misuse its privileges, then abolish it and thus open the
way for racial dictatorship. The document also reported that Frick
stated in a speech in 1929 at Pyritz that this fateful struggle would
first be taken up with the ballot, but that this could not continue
indefinitely, for history had taught that in a battle “blood must be
shed and iron broken.” As early as 1929, according to this same report,
Frick announced that a Special Peoples’ Court would be created, in which
the enemies of the Nazi Party would be called to account for their
political acts (_2513-PS_).
(3) _Frick’s activities as Minister of Interior and Education in
Thuringia._ Frick’s prominent role in helping to bring the Nazis to
power was recognized when on 23 January 1930 he was appointed Minister
of the Interior and Education in the German State of Thuringia, the
first ministerial appointment controlled by the National Socialists
(_3119-PS_).
It was in this capacity that Frick began his manipulation to provide
Adolf Hitler with German citizenship, an essential step toward the
realization of the Nazi conspiracy. It must be remembered that Hitler at
that time was not a German citizen and was regarded by the Prussian
police administration as an undesirable alien. This lack of German
citizenship was most damaging to the cause of the Nazi Party because, as
an alien, Hitler could not become a candidate for the Reich Presidency
in Germany.
In the beginning, Frick was unsuccessful when he tried to grant Hitler
German citizenship by appointing Hitler as police officer in Thuringia,
thus conferring German citizenship automatically. Later he succeeded
with a similar maneuver. This was expressly confirmed by Otto Meissner,
former State Secretary and Chief of Hitler’s Presidential Chancellery,
in an affidavit which reads in part as follows:
“Frick also, in collaboration with Klagges, Minister of
Brunswick, succeeded in naturalizing Hitler as a German citizen
in 1932 by having him appointed a Brunswick government official
(Counsellor of Government). This was done in order to make it
possible for Hitler to run as a candidate for the office of
President of the Reich.” (_3564-PS_)
During his tenure as State Minister in Thuringia, Frick again misused
his official authority in order to advance the Nazi conspiracy through
measures designed to establish Nazi control over the police, and over
the administration and curriculum of universities and schools. Three of
his measures are specially noteworthy:
(_a_) Appointment of the Nazi race theoretician, Dr. Guenther, as
Professor at the University of Jena, against the wishes of the faculty.
(_b_) Compulsory introduction in the schools of Nazi prayers whose
nationalistic, militaristic, and blasphemous character was such that
three out of five were declared unconstitutional by the German
Constitutional Court on 11 July 1930.
(_c_) Infiltration of Nazis in the Police, which twice provoked a
rupture in the administrative relations between the State of Thuringia
and the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and resulted in the withdrawal
of the important police subsidy payment of the Reich to the State.
(_3132-PS; 3128-PS_)
C. _FRICK’S PARTICIPATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL
OVER GERMANY._
Frick’s appointment as Reichsministerof the Interior in the first Hitler
Cabinet of 30 January 1933 gave him the task of “strengthening the power
of the government and to secure the New Regime” (_3128-PS_).
(1) _Powers of Frick as Minister of Interior._ To this task his Ministry
was perfectly suited. As Minister of the Interior Frick became
responsible for the realization of a large part of the conspirators’
program, through both legislation and administration. His Ministry was
charged especially with the following tasks:
(_a_) Internal Administration (State and local governments; State and
Local Civil Service).
(_b_) Relations between Nazi Party and State.
(_c_) Elections.
(_d_) Citizenship.
(_e_) Racial Law and Policy (Jewish Question, Eugenics), National
Health.
(_f_) Armed Forces and Reich Defense (Conscription).
(_g_) Establishment of the New Order in occupied and annexed
territories.
(_h_) Legislation, Constitutional Law (civil liberties).
(_i_) Police Forces (including Gestapo, protective custody,
concentration camps). (_3303-PS_; _3475-PS_)
The names of the men who, according to (_3475-PS_), worked under Frick’s
supervision are significant. Among the subordinates of Frick were “Reich
Health Leader, Dr. Conti,” “Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German
Police, Heinrich Himmler,” and “Reich Labor Service Leader, Konstantin
Hierl.” Frick was, therefore, supreme commander of three important
pillars of the Nazi state: The Nazi Public Health Service, the Police
System, and the Labor Service.
The wide variety of the activities of Frick as Reich Minister of the
Interior can be judged from the following catalogue of his functions: He
had final authority on constitutional questions, drafted legislation,
had jurisdiction over governmental administration and civil defense, and
was final arbiter of questions concerning race and citizenship. The
Manual for Administrative Officials also lists sections of his ministry
concerned with administrative problems for the occupied territories,
including annexed territories, the New Order in the South East, the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the New Order in the East
(_3475-PS_).
The Ministry of the Interior also had considerable authority over the
civil service, including such matters as appointment, tenure, promotion,
and discharge. The Manual for Administrative Officials (_3475-PS_)
states that Frick’s functions included supervision of the general law of
civil servants, civil servants’ policies, civil service aspirants,
education and training of civil servants and political and other
officials. Frick’s Ministry also had extensive jurisdiction over the
German civil servants detailed to the administration of the occupied
countries. This fact was admitted by Wilhelm Stuckart, former Under
Secretary of Frick’s Ministry of the Interior, who stated in an
interrogation:
“As far as I know, the officials for the new territories were
selected by the Personnel Office [of the Ministry of the
Interior] according to their qualifications, their physical
condition and maybe also their knowledge of the language.”
(_3570-PS_)
In the full use of these broad powers, Frick made his essential
contribution to the advancement of the conspiracy.
(2) _Nazi seizure of power of German States._ His first act after the
Conspirators’ accession to power was to install Nazi governments and
administrations in all German States where they were not already in
power. The State governments which refused to hand over their
constitutional authority to the Nazi successors designated by Frick were
removed on Frick’s orders. This was the case in Bavaria, Hamburg,
Bremen, Luebeck, Hesse, Baden, Wuerttemberg, and Saxony.
The manner and purpose of this program was clearly stated in the book,
“Dr. Frick and his Ministry,” which was published by his Under-Secretary
Wilhelm Pfundner for Frick’s 60th birthday in order to establish the
full scope of his contribution to the creation of the Nazis’
“Thousand-Year Reich”:
“While Marxism in Prussia was crushed by the hard fist of the
Prussian Prime Minister, Hermann Goering, and a gigantic wave of
propaganda was initiated for the Reichstag elections of 5 March
1933, Dr. Frick prepared the complete seizure of power in all
states of the Reich. All at once the political opposition
disappeared. All at once the Main [River] line was eliminated.
From this time on only one will and one leadership reigned in
the German Reich.” (_3119-PS_; _3132-PS_)
(3) _Abolition of political opposition._ Frick then proceeded to destroy
all opposition parties in order to establish the political monopoly of
the Nazi Party over Germany. Here again he acted by legislative fiat
against all parties which did not dissolve voluntarily. Among the laws
which he initiated for this purpose were the law of 26 May 1933
confiscating Communists’ property (_1396-PS_); the law of 14 July 1933
confiscating property inimical to nation and state (_1388-PS_); the law
of 7 July 1933 voiding the mandates of all Social Democrat candidates
elected to Reich state and local diets (_2058-PS_); and the law of 14
July 1933 outlawing all political parties other than the Nazi Party
(_1388-A-PS_; see _2403-PS_).
Frick drafted and administered the laws which assured the control of the
Nazi Party over the State and “placed the government machinery * * * at
the disposal of the Party.” Chief among these enactments were the Law to
Secure the Unity of Party and State, of 1 December 1933, which provided
that all government agencies should “lend legal and administrative aid
to the Party agencies” (_1395-PS_), and the law of 1 August 1934
consolidating the positions of Chief of State and Leader of the Party
(_2003-PS_; see _3119-PS_).
The success of this series of measures was accurately described by Frick
himself in the following terms:
“In National Socialist Germany, leadership is in the hands of an
organized community, the National Socialist Party; and as the
latter represents the will of the nation, the policy adopted by
it in harmony with the vital interests of the nation is, at the
same time, the policy adopted by the country * * *.” (_3258-PS_)
(4) _Consolidation of power in Reich Cabinet._ Frick’s next task was to
consolidate the executive and legislative control thus achieved. First
he drafted the law of 24 March 1933, which gave the Reich Cabinet the
power to legislate by decree. This law marked the end of parliamentary
government in Germany (_2001-PS_).
As a further step in the same direction, Frick prepared a series of laws
which destroyed all autonomous State and local government. Through these
laws, all governmental power in Germany was consolidated in the Reich
Cabinet. Administration of these laws was placed in the hands of Frick.
These enactments include the Temporary Law for the Coordination of the
States with the Reich, of 31 March 1933 (_2004-PS_); the Law for the
Coordination of the States with the Reich, of 7 April 1933 (_2005-PS_);
the law of 30 January 1934 transferring the sovereignty of the states to
the Reich; the first ordinance under the law of 30 January 1934
subjecting state legislation to Reich approval, 2 February 1934; the
second Reich Governor Law of 30 January 1935; the German Municipality
Act of 30 January 1935 (_2008-PS_); and the law of 14 February 1934
abolishing the Reichsrat. (see _3119-PS_; _2380-PS_).
Frick drafted the laws which abolished the independence of the civil
service, including functionaries of the Reich and the States, judges,
and university teachers. As Reichsminister of the Interior, he was
charged with the administration of these laws. Among these laws was the
Civil Service Act of 7 April 1933, paragraphs 3 and 4 of which provided
for the elimination of civil servants on the basis of religious or
political beliefs (_1397-PS_; see _3119-PS_).
This complete subjection of the civil servants to the Nazi-controlled
Ministry of Interior was well illustrated by an order of Frick demanding
a report on civil servants who had failed to vote in the Reichstag
elections of 29 March 1936 (_D-43_).
(5) _Establishment of the Police State._ Having thus taken possession of
the entire government machinery, Frick organized a huge Reich police in
order to maintain the conspirators’ power against all opposition.
It should be emphasized that before this time there was no unified Reich
police system; each individual German State had a police force of its
own. Even then, Frick had complete control over the police forces,
through the Reich Governor Act which subjected the State governments to
the authority of the Reich government, in the person of the Reich
Minister of the Interior (_2005-PS_; _L-82_).
The decisive change-over to centralized totalitarianism was effected by
the Act of 17 June 1936 (RGBl, 1936, Part I, p. 487), which was signed
by Frick and Hitler (_2073-PS_). Section 1 of this decree reads as
follows:
“For the unification of police duties in the Reich, a Chief of
German Police is instituted in the German Ministry of the
Interior, to whom is assigned the direction and conduct of all
police affairs.” (_2073-PS_)
Section 2 shows that it was Frick and Hitler, the signers of the decree,
who appointed Himmler as Chief of the German Police. Paragraph 2,
section 2 of the decree states that Himmler was “subordinated
individually and directly to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the
Interior” (_2073-PS_). In other words, Frick not only appointed Himmler
but himself became, pursuant to this decree, the supreme commander of
the Reich police system in his capacity as Reich and Prussian Minister
of the Interior.
The official chart of the German police system (_1852-PS_; _see Chart
Number 16_) clearly shows the position of Reichsministerof the Interior
Frick as the head of the entire German police system. This includes the
notorious RSHA, of which Kaltenbrunner became chief under Frick in
January 1943 (_3119-PS_).
Frick used this newly created authority for the promotion of the Nazi
conspiracy. By his decree of 12 February 1936 he established in detail
the jurisdiction of the Secret State Police (Gestapo), especially over
the concentration camps and in the field of political police information
(_2108-PS_).
By his decree of 20 September 1936, published in the Ministerial Gazette
of the Reich (_Ministerialblatt des Reichs-und Preussischen Ministerium
des Innern_), 1936, page 1343, (_2245-PS_), Frick reserved for himself
the authority to appoint inspectors of security police and ordered their
close cooperation with the Party and with the Army. Furthermore, in an
ordinance dated 18 March 1938 (RGBl, 1938, Part I, page 262) (_1437-PS_)
concerning the reunion of Austria with the Reich, Frick authorized
Himmler to take security measures in Austria without regard to previous
legal limitations. Similarly, in his Decree of 11 November 1938 Frick
ordered that all authorities cooperate closely with the SD and RSHA
under Himmler (_1638-PS_).
Frick’s direct control over Himmler’s Reich police can also be shown in
numerous other instances. It is necessary only to mention Himmler’s
order of 26 June 1936 by which he authorized Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of
the SD, and Kurt Daluege, Chief of the regular police, to sign “By order
of the Minister of the Interior” (_1551-PS_; _1680-PS_).
As a result, the Police and part of Himmler’s SS became in fact merged
under Frick’s jurisdiction. An order by Hitler dated 17 August 1938
regulated the functions of the SS, which “have entered into close
connection with the duties of the German police” in the Ministry of
Interior (_647-PS_; see _1637-PS_).
Similarly, Frick gave direct orders to the State Gestapo offices. Thus
on 6 November 1934 Frick issued an order addressed, among others, to the
Prussian Gestapo, prohibiting the publication of Protestant church
announcements (_1498-PS_), and also issued a secret circular addressed,
among others, to the Prussian Gestapo, subjecting Catholic youth
organizations to severe restrictions (_1482-PS_).
It is not necessary here to repeat the evidence concerning the criminal
activities of the German police, over which Frick had supreme authority.
Reference is made to Chapter XI on Concentration Camps, Chapter XII on
Persecution of the Jews, Section 6, Chapter VII on Persecution of the
Church, and Chapter XV on the criminal organizations, such as the SA,
SS, the Gestapo, and SD. Frick’s personal familiarity with these illegal
activities may be illustrated by two striking instances. The first
instance is contained in a synopsis of correspondence between the Reich
Ministry of the Interior and its field offices from November 1942
through August 1943, concerning the legal aspects of the confiscation of
property by the SS for the enlargement of the concentration camp at
Auschwitz (_1643-PS_). This document contains the minutes of a meeting
held on 17 and 18 December 1942 concerning the confiscation of this
property. These minutes indicate that a further discussion was to be
held on this subject on 21 December 1942, between the representatives of
the Reichsminister of the Interior and the Reichsfuehrer SS. There is
also a summary of a teletype letter, 22 January 1943, from Dr. Hoffman,
representing the Reichsministerof the Interior, to the
_Regierungspraesident_ in Kattowitz, a provincial administrator under
the direct jurisdiction of the Reichsministerof the Interior. The
summary begins significantly with the sentence:
“The territory of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp will be
changed into an independent estate.” (_1643-PS_)
A second illustration of Frick’s personal interest in the activities of
Himmler’s police and SS is the fact that in 1943 Frick visited the
concentration camp at Dachau, where he personally acquainted himself
with the forced malaria inoculation of healthy camp inmates and with
other experiments on human beings carried out by Dr. Rascher. This is
borne out by the affidavit of Dr. Franz Blaha, a former inmate of the
concentration camp at Dachau, who has stated that Frick made a special
tour of inspection of the malaria and cooling experimental stations at
Dachau (_3249-PS_).
(6) _Suppression and terrorization of opponents._ Having established
this powerful police organization under his command, Frick used it
especially in order to suppress all internal opposition. That this would
be his aim he had repeatedly announced even in the years before 1933,
when he declared that he was ready to establish the power of the
conspirators with terror and violence (_2513-PS_).
As early as 1932, Frick threatened his opponents in the Reichstag with
these words:
“Don’t worry, when we are in power we shall put all of you guys
in concentration camps.” (_L-83_)
In pursuance of this long-planned campaign of political terrorism, Frick
drafted and signed a series of decrees legalizing all those uses of the
political police which he considered necessary in order to establish the
dictatorial power of the conspirators within Germany.
Five days after the accession of the conspirators to power Frick signed
the first law limiting the freedom of assembly and of the press in
Germany. Then, on 28 February 1933, the day after the Reichstag fire,
civil rights in Germany were abolished altogether by decree signed by
Frick (_1390-PS_).
The preamble of this decree, which was published on the morning after
the Reichstag fire, stated that the suspension of civil rights was
decreed as a defense measure against Communist acts of violence
endangering the State. At the time of publication of this decree, the
Nazi government announced that a thorough investigation had proven that
the Communists had set fire to the Reichstag building. It is not
necessary here to go into the controversial question of who set fire to
the Reichstag, but it should be stressed that the official Nazi
statement that the Communists had set fire to the building, on which
Frick’s law was predicated, was issued without any investigation. Proof
of this fact is contained in an interrogation of Goering on 13 October
1945, which contains the following passage:
“Q. How could you tell your press agent, one hour after the
Reichstag caught fire, that the Communists did it, without
investigation?
A. Did the public relations officer say that I said that?
Q. Yes. He said you said it.
A. It is possible when I came to the Reichstag, the Fuehrer and
his gentlemen were there. I was doubtful at the time but
it was their opinion that the Communists had started the
fire.
Q. But you were the highest law enforcement official in a
certain sense. Daluege was your subordinate. Looking back
at it now, and not in the excitement that was there once,
wasn’t it too early to say without any investigation that
the Communists had started the fire?
A. Yes, that is possible, but the Fuehrer wanted it this way.
Q. Why did the Fuehrer want to issue at once a statement that
the Communists had started the fire?
A. He was convinced of it.
Q. It is right when I say he was convinced without having any
evidence or any proof of that at this moment?
A. That is right, but you must take into account that at that
time the Communist activity was extremely strong, that our
new government as such was not very secure.” (_3593-PS_)
This Act of 28 February 1933 also constituted the basis for the
establishment of the concentration camps. Frick himself established in
detail the handling of so-called “protective custody” under which
inmates were held in concentration camps (_779-PS_; _1723-PS_; _L-302_).
Frick also signed two laws designed specifically to suppress all
criticism and opposition to the Government and the Nazi Party
(_1652-PS_; _1393-PS_).
Frick also signed the laws which brought about the suppression of
independent labor unions as a potential source of opposition inside
Germany to the progress of the Nazi conspiracy (_405-PS_; _1861-PS_;
_1770-PS_). Among these decrees was the law providing for the
confiscation of all labor union property in favor of the German Labor
Front (_1403-PS_).
Furthermore, Frick and his subordinates took an active part in the
persecution of the independent churches. An order of the Reichsminister
of the Interior dated 6 November 1934 prohibited the publication of
Protestant church announcements (_1498-PS_); likewise Frick issued a
circular letter to Reich officials imposing severe restrictions on
Catholic youth organizations (_1482-PS_). Frick further on 5 May 1938
wrote to the heads of government agencies proposing methods for
invalidating the concordat between Austria and the Holy See (_680-PS_).
His Ministry was also in correspondence with the SD from 1940-1942
concerning the confiscation of church property (_R-101-A, through
R-101-D_).
D. _FRICK’S PROMOTION OF RACIAL PERSECUTION AND RACISM._
Frick promoted the program of racial persecution and racism, involving
the wiping out of the Jews, and the killing of the allegedly insane and
others for whom the German war machine had no further use.
In addition to its many other responsibilities, the vast administrative
empire of Frick controlled the enactment and administration of racial
and eugenic legislation. The “Manual for German Administrative
Officials” (_3475-PS_) shows the following additional functions of
Frick’s Ministry: Health Administration, Social Hygiene; Heredity and
Racial Welfare; Reich Plenipotentiary for Sanitaria and Nursing Homes;
Board for the Examination of Physicians, Dentists and Pharmacists; and
Reich Committee for Public Hygiene. Accordingly, Frick was the
administrative guardian and protector of the German race.
(1) _Persecution of Jews._ Frick took charge of the legislative and
administrative program through which the Nazi conspirators sought to
wipe out the “non-Aryan” part of the German population. Here again he
drafted, signed, and administered the basic legislation. Among these
discriminatory enactments were the following: the Reich Citizens Law of
15 September 1935 depriving Jews of their citizenship rights
(_1416-PS_); the law for the protection of German blood and honor, 15
September 1935, prohibiting mixed marriages (_2000-PS_); the first
ordinance under the Reich Citizens Law, 14 November 1935, depriving Jews
of the right to vote (_1417-PS_); the Civil Service Act of 7 April 1933
providing for the elimination of non-Aryan government workers
(_1397-PS_); the decree of 20 May 1938 introducing the Nurnberg laws in
Austria; the decree of 31 May 1941 introducing the Nurnberg laws in the
annexed eastern territories (_see 3119-PS_).
Extending his program of persecution even to the religious practices of
the Jews, Frick signed the decree which outlawed ritual slaughtering.
But the activities of Frick’s Ministry were not restricted to the
commission of such crimes, camouflaged in the form of legislation. The
police field offices, subordinates to Frick, participated in the
organization of such terroristic activities as the pogrom of 9 November
1938. The pogrom was organized through a series of secret teletype
orders issued by Heydrich (_374-PS_; _3051-PS_). Afterward Heydrich
reported on the loss of Jewish life and property resulting from the
pogrom (_3058-PS_).
The pogroms gave the Nazi conspirators occasion to proceed to the
complete elimination of the Jews from economic life and the confiscation
of most of their property (_1662-PS_; _1409-PS_).
Three days after this pogrom of 9 November 1938 Frick, his
undersecretary Stuckart, and his subordinates Heydrich and Daluege,
participated in a conference on the Jewish question under the
chairmanship of Goering. At this meeting various measures were discussed
which the individual governmental departments should initiate against
the Jews. Goering’s concluding remark in that conference was:
“Also the Minister of the Interior and the Police will have to
think over what measures will have to be taken.” (_1816-PS_).
It was, accordingly, Frick’s duty to follow up by administrative action
the pogrom organized by Frick’s own subordinates.
Thereafter, Frick signed the Law of 23 July 1938 ordering a special
registration for all Jews, in order to establish the strictest possible
control over the Jewish population.
After the outbreak of the war Heydrich issued an order in Frick’s name,
compelling all Jews to wear a yellow star in public (_2118-PS_).
Among the Ordinances which Frick issued under the Reich Citizen Law of
15 September 1935, special mention should be made of the 11th Ordinance
of 25 November 1941, which ordered the confiscation of the property of
all deported or emigrated Jews; and the 13th Ordinance, under which the
Jews were deprived of all legal protection and completely handed over to
the jurisdiction of the police (_1422-PS_; _3085-PS_).
Stuckart, Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, characterized
this legislation as the essential preparation for the “final solution of
the Jewish question” (_3131-PS_).
(2) _Measures against “Inferior Racial Stock.”_ The Public Health
Service was administered as a division of Frick’s Ministry. One of its
subdivisions was devoted to race and heredity problems (_3123-PS_). In
his capacity as chief of this service Frick drafted the basic law
controlling sterilization of persons afflicted with “hereditary
diseases” (_3067-PS_). Its administration was in the hands of his
Ministry (_D-181_; _L-305_).
E. _FRICK’S PARTICIPATION IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR._
Frick wholeheartedly supported the conspirators’ preparations for war.
It was his position that:
“Germany would observe her international undertakings only so
long as it suited Germany’s interests to do so.” (_2385-PS_)
Frick, as Reich Minister of the Interior, was
“The ‘civilian’ defense minister and as such cooperated
prominently * * * in the important field of ‘defense
legislation’ and thereby in the development of * * * Germany’s
armed forces.” (_3119-PS_)
Frick’s Ministry had a division entitled “Armed Forces and Reich
Defense” (_3303-PS_).
(1) _Rearmament and reinstitution of military service._ Frick took a
leading part in Germany’s rearmament in violation of the Versailles
Treaty. He drafted the basic laws on military sevice. These include the
law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing universal military conscription
(_1654-PS_); the decree of 6 March 1936 extending military and labor
service to German citizens abroad; the decree of 16 June 1938 extending
the military service law to Austria (_1660-PS_); and the decree of 30
April 1940 extending the Military Service Law to the incorporated
eastern territories (_see 3043-PS_; _1389-PS_; _388-PS, item 20_).
Frick also supported the military training program of the SA, for the
financing of which his Ministry of Interior was called upon to supply
funds (_1850-PS_).
Additional evidence that Frick contributed to Germany’s rearmament for
aggressive war is contained in a secret order, 25 July 1933, from the
Supreme Command of the SA on the subject, “Publications of the SA.” This
order states that several days before 25 July 1933 the Reich Ministry of
the Interior at the request of the Foreign Office gave strict
instructions to all Reich authorities that the most severe control was
to be exercised over all publications which might give other countries
an opportunity to construe German activities as infringements of the
Versailles Treaty (_D-44_).
(2) _Fifth column activities abroad._ In further preparation for the
aggressive wars planned by the conspirators, Frick used his power,
prestige, and funds as Minister of the Interior in order to command
support for the organization of a Fifth Column abroad among foreign
nationals of German ancestry. In a circular of 24 February 1933 issued
less than a month after the conspirators had taken over the government
of Germany, Frick ordered all State governments to support, especially
financially, the organization work of the League for Germandom Abroad
among the
“30 million Germans in foreign countries [_Auslandsdeutschen._]
outside of the present contracted borders of the Reich [who] are
an integral part of the entire German people.” (_3258-PS_)
Frick at a later date stated even more clearly the true purpose of this
German Fifth Column he was helping to organize abroad. In his speech at
the twentieth annual meeting of the official German Foreign Institute
held in Stuttgart, on 11-15 August 1937, Frick stated that—
“the new Germany has recognized that its attention and devotion
to the welfare of the millions of Germans who have not the
fortune to owe political allegiance to Germany, but who are
condemned to live abroad, are not merely a matter of natural
sympathy and solidarity, but are in a higher degree dictated by
the strong political and economic interests of the Reich.”
(_3258-PS_)
(3) _Organization of civilian agencies for war._ Frick’s principal
contribution to the war preparations of the Nazi conspirators lay in his
role as General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich. He
occupied this position as a member of the Reich Defense Council,
beginning on 21 May 1935 (_2978-PS_).
In this capacity, Frick had complete authority over
“the uniform direction of the nonmilitary administration with
the exception of the economic administrations.”
He was given control over the Ministries of Interior, Justice,
Education, Churches, and the Office for Spatial Planning, in order to
direct their entire planning activities in preparation of war
(_2986-PS_; _2194-PS_). This was Frick’s responsibility during the more
than 4 years that elapsed before the actual launching of the
conspirators’ first aggressive war.
As General Plenipotentiary for the Administration, Frick was a member of
the so-called Three-Man Committee, with Schacht, later Funk (Economy),
and Keitel (OKW). This small group, which was empowered to legislate by
decree on all matters relating to war preparedness, represented during
these decisive years, from 1935 to 1939, a compact, powerful body in
which could be concentrated the conspirators’ preparations for war
(_2986-PS_; see also Section 3, chapter XV on the Reich Cabinet).
In a speech made on 7 March 1940 at the University of Freiburg, Frick
admitted the significant part he played in the preparations for war and
as a member of the triumvirate created by the secret Reich Defense Law.
“* * * The organization of the nonmilitary national defense fits
organically into the entire structure of the National Socialist
government and administration. This state of affairs is not
exceptional, but a necessary and planned part of the National
Socialist order. Thus, the conversion of our administration and
economy to wartime conditions has been accomplished very quickly
and without any friction—avoiding the otherwise very dangerous
changes of the entire structure of the State.
“The planned preparation of the administration for the
possibility of a war has already been carried out during the
peace. For this purpose, the Fuehrer appointed a Plenipotentiary
General for the Reich Administration and a Plenipotentiary
General for the Economy. The Plenipotentiary General for the
Administration was placed in charge of the coordination of the
nonmilitary administrations, with the exception of the
Administration of Economics.” (_2608-PS_)
F. _FRICK’S PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES._
Frick, as Minister of the Interior, was charged with the administrative
policy for all occupied and annexed territories. For this purpose, the
Ministry contained a Division for Incorporated Territories, with
Subdivisions entitled Reorganization in the South-East, the
Protectorate, the East, and the West (_3475-PS_).
When the Nazi conspirators embarked on their program of “bloodless”
territorial aggrandizement, Frick was in control of the incorporation
and administration of these territories. Thus, it was Frick’s Ministry
which introduced the German New Order and German law throughout the
territories of Europe occupied by the German Armed Forces. Frick
exercised these powers in the Saar; in Austria (_2307-PS_; _3075-PS_);
in the Sudetenland (_3076-PS_); in Bohemia and Moravia (_2119-PS_); in
Memel; and in Danzig (_3077-PS_).
When the conspirators started their aggressive Wars, Frick was
specifically charged with the organization and integration of the
territories illegally annexed by Germany. Among the territories over
which Frick was given control were the Incorporated Eastern Territories,
the Gouvernment-General of Poland, Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnot, and
Norway.
In the exercise of this over-all administrative control:
(1) Frick provided in detail for the administration of occupied Polish
Territory. It was Frick who was responsible for the installation of an
SS Chief in the Territory in charge of the Police and the forced
resettlement program (_3304-PS_).
(2) Frick provided the administrative personnel for the government of
these occupied territories. Thus, he arranged for the selection and
assignment of hundreds of occupation officials for Russia before the
invasion had even begun (_1039-PS_).
Similarly, Wilhelm Stuckart, former Under-Secretary of the Interior
under Frick, has stated in an interrogation:
“As far as I knew, the officials for the new territories were
selected by the Personnel Office [of the Ministry of the
Interior] according to their qualifications, their physical
condition, and maybe also their knowledge of the language.”
(_3570-PS_)
(3) Frick had complete charge of the program of denationalization, under
which certain groups of citizens in annexed territories were forced
during the progress of the war to abandon their original national
allegiance and to accept German nationality. The decree of 4 March 1941
established a German Racial Registry under which allied nationals of
German stock were required to accept German nationality and to remove to
German territory (_2917-PS_). Among the conquered territories in which
these activities of Frick were felt were Bohemia and Moravia, Upper
Corinthia and Lower Styria, Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnot, and the
Incorporated Eastern Territories (see _3225-PS_).
These measures place upon Frick a full share of responsibility for the
war crimes committed by the conspiracy in the occupied and annexed
territories.
G. _FRICK’S PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY._
Frick actively participated in the execution of the conspirators’
program of atrocities and Crimes against Humanity. Even without such
personal participation, however, Frick has admitted that he could
properly be charged with having for 12 years continued in the Reich
Cabinet, after he had realized the direction the conspiracy was taking
(_3043-PS_).
The scope of Frick’s personal and direct responsibility for Nazi Crimes
against Humanity is so broad that reference need be made only to a few
of the most significant instances.
(1) _Gestapo atrocities and concentration camps._ Frick, as
jurisdictional head of the German Police Administration, is responsible
for the crimes and atrocities perpetrated by the German police,
especially the Gestapo and SD, inside and outside of Germany. (See
_1643-PS_; also Chapter XI on Concentration Camps.)
As already stated, Frick demonstrated particular interest in the
“medical” experiments carried on in the concentration camps under the
personal direction of Himmler. Frick paid a personal visit to Germany’s
oldest concentration camp, Dachau, in 1943, for the purpose of
inspecting the malaria station and Dr. Rascher’s Experimental Station
(_3249-PS_). There he could personally acquaint himself with the forced
subjection of healthy camp inmates to malarial mosquitos and the
air-pressure and freezing experiments on human beings carried on by Dr.
Rascher.
(2) _Oppression of inhabitants of occupied territories._ As
administrative head of the occupied territories, Frick issued decrees
depriving the inhabitants of their rights and subjecting them to a cruel
and discriminatory regime. Among these enactments were the decree of 4
December 1941 establishing a special penal law for the Polish and Jewish
inhabitants of the Gouvernment General (_R-96_), (_1249-PS_); the decree
of 1 July 1943 depriving Jews of rights remaining to them under the
decree of 4 December 1941 (_1422-PS_); and the Himmler ordinance of 3
July 1943 charging the Gestapo with the execution of the decree of 1
July 1943 (published in Frick’s Ministry of Interior Gazette 1943, p.
1085) (_3085-PS_).
Similarly, the Decree on the Utilization of Eastern Workers, which
required that they be paid salaries substantially below those fixed for
German workers holding similar jobs, was signed in Frick’s name by his
Secretary of State.
(3) _Systematic killing of insane, ill, aged, and incapacitated foreign
slave laborers._ Frick’s greatest guilt perhaps rests on his
responsibility, as Reich Minister of the Interior, for the systematic
killing of the insane, the sick, and the aged, including those foreign
forced laborers who were no longer able to work. These killings were
carried out in nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums. Frick, in his
capacity of Reichsminister of the Interior, had full jurisdiction over
all these institutions (_3475-PS_).
Proof that the Reichministry of the Interior under Frick actually
exercised this jurisdiction is to be found in a letter of 2 October 1940
(_621-PS_) from the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, to the
Reichsminister of Justice. The letter informed the Minister of Justice
that the Chief Prosecutors’ reports concerning the death of inmates of
nursing homes had been transmitted to the Reichsminister of the Interior
for further action (_621-PS_). Through other correspondence Frick’s
Ministry of the Interior was informed of the unexplained deaths of
insane persons (_1696-PS_; _1969-PS_).
The most striking example of the continued killings in these
institutions, which were under Frick’s jurisdiction, is the famous
Hadamar case. Systematic killing started at the Hadamar nursing home as
early as 1939. At least as early as 1941 Frick was officially acquainted
with the fact that these killings had become public knowledge. Proof is
found in a letter from the Bishop of Limburg of 13 August 1941 to the
Reichsminister of Justice, copies of which were sent to the
Reichsminister of the Interior and the Reichsministerfor Church Affairs.
The letter reads in part as follows:
“* * * About 8 kilometers from Limburg, in the little town of
Hadamar, on a hill overlooking the town, there is an institution
which had formerly served various purposes and of late had been
used as a nursing home; this institution was renovated and
furnished as a place in which, by consensus of opinion, the
above-mentioned Euthenasia has been systematically practiced for
months—approximately since February 1941. The fact has become
known beyond the administrative district of Wiesbaden, because
death certificates from a Registry Hadamar-Moenchberg are sent
to the home communities. * * *
“Several times a week buses arrive in Hadamar with a
considerable number of such victims. School children of the
vicinity know this vehicle and say: ‘There comes the murder-box
again.’ After the arrival of the vehicle, the citizens of
Hadamar watch the smoke rise out of the chimney and are tortured
with the ever-present thought of the miserable victims,
especially when repulsive odors annoy them, depending on the
direction of the wind.
“The effect of the principles at work here are: Children call
each other names and say, ‘You’re crazy; you’ll be sent to the
baking oven in Hadamar.’ Those who do not want to marry, or find
no opportunity, say ‘Marry, never! Bring children into the world
so they can be put into the bottling machine!’ You hear old
folks say, ‘Don’t send me to a state hospital! After the
feeble-minded have been finished off, the next useless eaters
whose turn will come are the old people.’
“* * * The population cannot grasp that systematic actions are
carried out which in accordance with Par. 211 of the German
criminal code are punishable with death! * * *
“Officials of the Secret State Police, it is said, are trying to
suppress discussion of the Hadamar occurrences by means of
severe threats. In the interest of public peace, this may be
well intended. But the knowledge and the conviction and the
indignation of the population cannot be changed by it; the
conviction will be increased with the bitter realization that
discussion is prohibited with threats but that the actions
themselves are not prosecuted under penal law.
“_Facta loquuntur._
“I beg you most humbly, Herr Reich Minister, in the sense of the
report of the Episcopate of July 16 of this year, to prevent
further transgressions of the Fifth Commandment of God.
“(Signed) Dr. Hilfrich” (_615-PS_).
Nevertheless, the killings in these institutions continued year after
year. This is shown by a certified copy of the charge, specifications,
and findings of the U. S. Military Commission at Wiesbaden, against the
individuals who operated the Hadamar Sanitarium, where many Russians and
Poles were done away with. In this particular proceeding, seven
defendants were charged with the murder in 1944 and 1945 of 400 persons
of Polish and Russian nationality. Three of the defendants were
sentenced to be hanged; the other four were sentenced to confinement at
hard labor (_3592-PS_).
But the murdering in Hadamar was only part of a systematic program. The
official report of the Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission, entitled
“Detailed Statement on the Murdering of Ill and Aged People in Germany,”
shows that Frick was one of the originators of the secret law of 1940,
which authorized the killing of sick and aged persons and under which
the Hadamar “murder mill” was operated until 1945. The first 3
paragraphs of that report read as follows:
“1. The murdering can be traced back to a secret law which was
released some time in the summer of 1940.
“2. Besides the Chief Physician of the Reich, Dr. L. Conti, the
Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, the Reichsminister of the Interior Dr.
Frick, as well as other men, the following participated in the
introduction of this secret law * * *.
“3. As I have already stated, there were—after careful
calculation—at least 200,000 mainly mentally deficient,
imbeciles, besides neurological cases and medically unfit
people—these were not only incurable cases—and at least 75,000
aged people.” (_1556-PS_).
Thus, Frick bears full responsibility for the systematic killing of the
“unproductive eaters,” for whom the Nazi war machine had no use.
(4) _Oppression in Bohemia and Moravia._ The final phase of Frick’s
criminal activities began with his appointment as Protector in Bohemia
and Moravia, on 20 August 1943 (_3086-PS_).
His authority was clearly defined in a Secret Decree issued on 29 August
1943. That Decree provided that the Reich Protector was “the
representative of the Fuehrer in his capacity as Chief of State.” In
addition to this over-all authority, Frick was given jurisdiction “to
confirm the members of the government of the Protectorate, to appoint,
dismiss and retire the German civil servants in the Protectorate.” He
was given full power “to grant pardons and to quash proceedings in all
cases except in cases before the Military and SS Police Courts”
(_1366-PS_).
These broad powers establish the clear responsibility of Frick for the
crimes committed in the Protectorate under his administration during the
last 20 months of the War. As representative of the Fuehrer in the
Protectorate, he covered these criminal acts with Hitler’s name and
absolute power.
As a single example of these crimes, reference may be made to Supplement
6 to the official Czechoslovak Report on German Crimes Against
Czechoslovakia:
“During the tenure of office of defendant Wilhelm Frick as Reich
Protector of Bohemia and Moravia from August 1943 until the
liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945, many thousands of
Czechoslovak Jews were transported from the Terezin ghetto in
Czechoslovakia to the concentration camp at Oswiecziem
(Auschwitz) in Poland and were there killed in the gas
chambers.” (_3589-PS_).
Frick was also fully responsible for the multiple and notorious
miscarriages of justice by which the population of the Protectorate was
systematically persecuted and oppressed. His failure to correct these
miscarriages of justice through the exercise of his right to grant
pardons and to quash legal proceedings is tantamount to a confirmation
of the cruel and illegal sentences imposed upon the inhabitants of the
Protectorate (_1556-PS_; _3589-PS_).
Frick’s specific responsibility on these counts must be added to the
over-all responsibility which he bears because of the fact that he was
in power as Reich Protector while such Crimes against Humanity were
committed against the population of Bohemia and Moravia (_3443-PS_).
H. _CONCLUSION._
Frick, who joined the Nazi conspiracy at its early beginning, played
within the conspiracy the role of expert administrator and coordinator
of State and Party affairs. Misusing his governmental positions in the
pre-Hitler era, he gave aid and protection to the conspirators when they
were still weak. He supported them in their first attempt to come into
power by force, expecting to gain high office from their success. He was
the first to carry their revolutionary program from the Beer Hall to the
Reichstag Rostrum. As their earliest important office-holder (in
Thuringia), he developed for the first time their totalitarian and
terroristic methods of political and intellectual control.
Upon the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators on 30 January 1933,
Frick took over the vital Ministry of Interior. From this position he
directed the realization of the entire domestic program of the
conspiracy. He took complete charge of the successive destruction of the
parliamentary system, of autonomous State and local government, and of
the career civil service. He planned and executed the measures which
subjected the government itself to the domination of the Nazi Party. He
then proceeded to establish a huge Reich Police Force under Himmler,
which became the instrument with which the Nazi conspirators terrorized
and ultimately “liquidated” all opposition inside and outside Germany in
concentration and extermination camps.
In order to give the semblance of law to the criminal acts of the
conspirators, Frick drafted legislation to withdraw constitutional
protection from the rights and liberties which they had determined to
wipe out. He participated in the relentless and violent persecution of
all persons and groups who were considered as actual or potential
opponents of the conspirators’ plans. Among these were the churches, the
free trade unions, and especially the Jews.
Having secured absolute control over Germany for the conspirators, Frick
proceeded to bring the German people and State into readiness for the
wars of aggression planned by the conspirators. He established the
system of military and labor service on which the _Wehrmacht_ was to
rest. He took over the planning of Germany’s civilian wartime
administration, which was to back it up. In this capacity he organized
and supervised the killing of the useless eaters, the insane, crippled,
aged, and such foreign forced laborers who were no longer able to work.
As the Nazi conspirators began to achieve their predatory aims, Frick
was active in the coordination of the administration of the territories
and peoples which fell into Nazi hands. He presided over the annexation
of territories and the denationalization of their inhabitants in
violation of the Hague Conventions. When the conspirators were ready to
proceed to the realization of their ultimate goals, especially the
complete enslavement and annihilation of conquered populations, Frick
devised the basic legislation for their disfranchisement and finally
took personal charge of one of the oppressed nations, Czechoslovakia.
Thus, Frick was one of the principal artisans of the conspiracy
throughout its course. His contribution to its progress was essential in
all its phases, and decisive in many. He nurtured the conspiracy,
directed its followers, terrorized its opponents, and destroyed its
victims.
I. _POSITIONS HELD BY FRICK._
(1) Between 1932 and 1945 Frick held the following positions:
(_a_) Member of the Nazi Party, 1925-1945 (_3127-PS_).
(_b_) _Reichsleiter_ (Member of the Party Directorate) in his capacity
as _Fraktionsfuehrer_ (Floorleader) of NSDAP in the Reichstag.
(_c_) Member of the Reichstag, 7 December 1924-1945.
(_d_) Reich Minister of the Interior, 30 January 1933-20 August 1943
(_2381-PS_; _3086-PS_).
(_e_) Prussian Minister of the Interior, 1 May 1934-20 August 1943
(_3132-PS_; _3086-PS_).
(_f_) Reich Director of Elections, 30 January 1933-20 August 1943
(_3123-PS_; _3086-PS_).
(_g_) General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich, 21
May 1935-20 August 1943 (_2978-PS_; _3086-PS_).
(_h_) Head of the Central Office for the Reunification of Austria and
the German Reich (_2307-PS_; _1060-PS_; _3123-PS_).
(_i_) Director of the Central Office for the Incorporation of
Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig, the Eastern Incorporated Territories, Eupen,
Malmedy, and Moresnot (_3076-PS_; _3077-PS_).
(_j_) Director of the Central Office for the Protectorate of Bohemia,
Moravia, the Government General, Lower Styria, Upper Carinthia, Norway,
Alsace, Lorraine, and all other occupied territories (_2119-PS_;
_3123-PS_).
(_k_) Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, 20 August 1943-1945
(_3086-PS_).
(2) Between 1917 and 1945, Wilhelm Frick held the additional following
positions:
(_a_) Chief of the Criminal (later the Political) Division of the Munich
Police Department, 1917-1923 (_2381-PS_).
(_b_) _Fraktionsfuehrer_ (Floorleader) of the NSDAP in the Reichstag,
1927-1945 (_2381-PS_).
(_c_) Minister of the Interior and of Education of the Free State of
Thuringia, 23 January 1930-1 April 1931 (_2381-PS_).
(_d_) Member of the Reich Defense Council, 21 May 1935-20 August 1943
(_2978-PS_).
(_e_) Member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, 30
August 1939-20 August 1943 (_2018-PS_).
(_f_) Reich Minister without Portfolio, 20 August 1943-1945 (_3086-PS_).
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO WILHELM FRICK
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 60
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*374-PS │TWX Series of Orders signed by │ │
│Heydrich and Mueller, issued by │ │
│Gestapo Headquarters Berlin, 9-11 │ │
│November 1938, concerning treatment of│ │
│Jews. (USA 729) │ III │ 277
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
405-PS │Law Concerning Trustees of Labor, 19 │ │
│May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, part│ │
│I, p. 285. │ III │ 387
│ │ │
615-PS │Letter from Bishop of Limburg, 13 │ │
│August 1941, concerning killings at │ │
│Hadamar Asylum. (USA 717) │ III │ 449
│ │ │
*621-PS │Letter from Dr. Lammers to Minister of│ │
│Justice, 2 October 1940, concerning │ │
│deaths of Nursing Home inmates. (USA │ │
│715) │ III │ 451
│ │ │
*647-PS │Secret Hitler Order, 17 August 1938, │ │
│concerning organization and │ │
│mobilization of SS. (USA 443) │ III │ 459
│ │ │
680-PS │Letter by Frick to heads of Agencies, │ │
│5 May 1938, proposing methods for │ │
│invalidating Concordat between Austria│ │
│and the Holy See. │ III │ 483
│ │ │
779-PS │Directive by Frick, regulating │ │
│“protective custody”, 12 April 1934. │ III │ 555
│ │ │
*1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │
│regarding problems in Eastern │ │
│Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695
│ │ │
**1060-PS │Order pursuant to law concerning │ │
│Reunion of Austria with German Reich, │ │
│16 March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│part I, p. 249. (Referred to, but not │ │
│offered in evidence.) │ III │ 717
│ │ │
1249-PS │Ordinance, 1 June 1942, issued under │ │
│Decree of 4 December 1941 for │ │
│establishment of courts-martial in │ │
│annexed Eastern Territories of Upper │ │
│Silesia. │ III │ 851
│ │ │
1366-PS │Decree of 29 August 1943 on the │ │
│position, duties, and authorities of │ │
│the Reich Protector in Bohemia and │ │
│Moravia; Budget of the Reich │ │
│Protectorate for 1944. │ III │ 925
│ │ │
1388-PS │Law concerning confiscation of │ │
│Property subversive to People and │ │
│State, 14 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962
│ │ │
1388-A-PS │Law against the establishment of │ │
│Parties, 14 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962
│ │ │
1389-PS │Law creating Reich Labor Service, 26 │ │
│June 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│part I, p. 769. │ III │ 963
│ │ │
1390-PS │Decree of the Reich President for the │ │
│Protection of the People and State, 28│ │
│February 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│part I, p. 83. │ III │ 968
│ │ │
1393-PS │Law on treacherous attacks against │ │
│State and Party, and for the │ │
│Protection of Party Uniforms, 20 │ │
│December 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│part I, p. 1269. │ III │ 973
│ │ │
*1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
1396-PS │Law concerning the confiscation of │ │
│Communist property, 26 May 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 293. │ III │ 979
│ │ │
1397-PS │Law for the reestablishment of the │ │
│Professional Civil Service, 7 April │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, │ │
│p. 175. │ III │ 981
│ │ │
1398-PS │Law to supplement the Law for the │ │
│restoration of the Professional Civil │ │
│Service, 20 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 518. │ III │ 986
│ │ │
1403-PS │Law on the granting of indemnities in │ │
│case of confiscation or transfer of │ │
│property, 9 December 1937. 1937 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 1333. │ III │ 991
│ │ │
1409-PS │Order concerning utilization of Jewish│ │
│property, 3 December 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 1709. │ IV │ 1
│ │ │
1416-PS │Reich Citizen Law of 15 September │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, │ │
│p. 1146. │ IV │ 7
│ │ │
*1417-PS │First regulation to the Reichs │ │
│Citizenship Law, 14 November 1935. │ │
│1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. │ │
│1333. (GB 258) │ IV │ 8
│ │ │
1422-PS │Thirteenth regulation under Reich │ │
│Citizenship Law, 1 July 1943. 1943 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 372. │ IV │ 14
│ │ │
1437-PS │Law concerning reuniting of Austria │ │
│with German Reich, 18 March 1938. 1938│ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 262. │ IV │ 17
│ │ │
*1482-PS │Secret letter, 20 July 1935 to │ │
│provincial governments and the │ │
│Prussian Gestapo from Frick, │ │
│concerning Confessional Youth │ │
│Organizations. (USA 738) │ IV │ 51
│ │ │
*1498-PS │Order of Frick, 6 November 1934, │ │
│addressed inter alios to Prussian │ │
│Gestapo prohibiting publication of │ │
│Protestant Church announcements. (USA │ │
│739) │ IV │ 52
│ │ │
1551-PS │Decree assigning functions in Office │ │
│of Chief of German Police, 26 June │ │
│1936. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt, │ │
│pp. 946-948. │ IV │ 106
│ │ │
*1556-PS │Czechoslovakian report, December 1941,│ │
│naming Frick as one of the originators│ │
│of secret law authorizing the killing │ │
│of sick and aged persons. (USA 716) │ IV │ 111
│ │ │
1637-PS │Order of Himmler, 23 June 1938, │ │
│concerning acceptance of members of │ │
│Security Police into the SS. 1938 │ │
│Reichs Ministerialblatt, pp. │ │
│1089-1091. │ IV │ 138
│ │ │
1638-PS │Circular of Minister of Interior, 11 │ │
│November 1938, on cooperation of SD │ │
│and other authorities. 1938 Reichs │ │
│Ministerialblatt, p. 1906. │ IV │ 142
│ │ │
*1643-PS │Documents concerning confiscation of │ │
│land for the establishment of the │ │
│Auschwitz Extermination Camp. (USA │ │
│713) │ IV │ 155
│ │ │
1652-PS │Decree of the Reich President for │ │
│protection against treacherous attacks│ │
│on the government of the Nationalist │ │
│movement, 21 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 135. │ IV │ 160
│ │ │
**1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │
│universal military conscription. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 369. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ IV │ 163
│ │ │
1660-PS │Decree for registration for active │ │
│service in Austria in the year 1938 of│ │
│16 June 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│part I, p. 631. │ IV │ 171
│ │ │
1662-PS │Order eliminating Jews from German │ │
│economic life, 12 November 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 1580. │ IV │ 172
│ │ │
*1680-PS │“Ten Years Security Police and SD” │ │
│published in The German Police, 1 │ │
│February 1943. (USA 477) │ IV │ 191
│ │ │
1696-PS │Correspondence with Ministry of │ │
│Interior showing unexplained deaths of│ │
│insane persons. │ IV │ 199
│ │ │
*1723-PS │Order concerning cooperation of Party │ │
│offices with the Secret State Police, │ │
│25 January 1938, published in Decrees,│ │
│Regulations, Announcements, 1937, vol.│ │
│II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206) │ IV │ 219
│ │ │
1770-PS │Law concerning factory representative │ │
│councils and economic organizations, 4│ │
│April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│part I, p. 161. │ IV │ 343
│ │ │
*1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │
│The Jewish Question, under the │ │
│Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, │ │
│12 November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425
│ │ │
*1850-PS │Conferences, 1933, calling for │ │
│financing of military training of SA │ │
│from Ministry of Interior funds. (USA │ │
│742) │ IV │ 478
│ │ │
*1852-PS │“Law” from The German Police, 1941, by│ │
│Dr. Werner Best. (USA 449) (See Chart │ │
│No. 16.) │ IV │ 490
│ │ │
1861-PS │Law on the regulation of National │ │
│labor, 20 January 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 45. │ IV │ 497
│ │ │
1969-PS │Correspondence of party officials, │ │
│concerning killing of insane. │ IV │ 602
│ │ │
2000-PS │Law for protection of German blood and│ │
│German honor, 15 September 1935. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, No. 100, p.│ │
│1146. │ IV │ 636
│ │ │
2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │
│and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638
│ │ │
2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │
│the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639
│ │ │
2004-PS │Preliminary law for the coordination │ │
│of Federal States under the Reich, 31 │ │
│March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│part I, p. 153. │ IV │ 640
│ │ │
2005-PS │Second law integrating the “Laender” │ │
│with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 173. │ IV │ 641
│ │ │
2008-PS │German Communal Ordinance, 30 January │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, │ │
│p. 49. │ IV │ 643
│ │ │
*2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │
│Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │
│30 August 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 1539. │ │
│(GB 250) │ IV │ 650
│ │ │
2058-PS │Decree for the securing of the State │ │
│Leadership, 7 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 462. │ IV │ 699
│ │ │
2073-PS │Decree concerning the appointment of a│ │
│Chief of German Police in the Ministry│ │
│of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 487. │ IV │ 703
│ │ │
2108-PS │Decree for execution of Law on Secret │ │
│State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936│ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 22-24.│ IV │ 732
│ │ │
2118-PS │Police decree on identification of │ │
│Jews, 1 September 1941. 1941 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 547. │ IV │ 750
│ │ │
2119-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │
│Chancellor concerning the Protectorate│ │
│of Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939.│ IV │ 751
│ │ │
2124-PS │Decree introducing the Nurnberg Racial│ │
│Laws into Austria, 20 May 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 594. (GB│ │
│259) │ IV │ 755
│ │ │
*2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │
│Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │
│Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │
│enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │
│Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843
│ │ │
2245-PS │Frick decree of 20 September 1936 │ │
│concerning employment of Security │ │
│Police Inspectors. 1936 Reichs │ │
│Ministerialblatt, pp. 1343-1344. │ IV │ 928
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
*2380-PS │Articles from National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1935. (USA 396) │ V │ 6
│ │ │
*2381-PS │Extracts from The Greater German Diet,│ │
│1943. (USA 476) │ V │ 7
│ │ │
*2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30│ │
│August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23
│ │ │
2403-PS │The End of the Party State, from │ │
│Documents of German Politics, vol. I, │ │
│pp. 55-56. │ V │ 71
│ │ │
*2513-PS │Extract from The National Socialist │ │
│Workers’ Party as an Association │ │
│Hostile to State and to Republican │ │
│Form of Government and Guilty of │ │
│Treasonable Activity. (USA 235) │ V │ 252
│ │ │
*2608-PS │Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The│ │
│Administration in Wartime”. (USA 714) │ V │ 327
│ │ │
2742-PS │Passage written by Frick in National │ │
│Socialist Yearbook, 1927, p. 124. │ V │ 383
│ │ │
2917-PS │Decree concerning German people’s list│ │
│and German nationality in the │ │
│incorporated Eastern Territories of 4 │ │
│March 1941. 1941 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│part I, p. 118. │ V │ 587
│ │ │
*2978-PS │Frick’s statement of offices and │ │
│positions, 14 November 1945. (USA 8) │ V │ 683
│ │ │
*2986-PS │Affidavit of the defendant, Wilhelm │ │
│Frick, 19 November 1945. (USA 409) │ V │ 688
│ │ │
3043-PS │Affidavit of Frick, November 1945. │ V │ 755
│ │ │
*3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│ │
│all stations of State Police, 10 │ │
│November 1938, on measures against │ │
│Jews, and one order from Heydrich on │ │
│termination of protest actions. (USA │ │
│240) │ V │ 797
│ │ │
*3058-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Goering, 11 │ │
│November 1938, reporting action │ │
│against the Jews. (USA 508) │ V │ 854
│ │ │
3067-PS │Law for the prevention of offspring │ │
│with Hereditary diseases, 14 July │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, │ │
│p. 529. │ V │ 880
│ │ │
3075-PS │Law for the building up of │ │
│administration in Ostmark, 14 April │ │
│1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, │ │
│p. 777. │ V │ 884
│ │ │
3076-PS │Law for building up of administrations│ │
│in Reich Gau Sudetenland, 14 April │ │
│1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, │ │
│p. 780. │ V │ 889
│ │ │
3077-PS │Law regarding reunion of Free City of │ │
│Danzig with German Reich of 1 │ │
│September 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 1547. │ V │ 891
│ │ │
3085-PS │Himmler’s ordinance of 3 July 1943 │ │
│charging Gestapo with execution of │ │
│Thirteenth Ordinance under Reich │ │
│Citizen Law. 1943 Ministerial Gazette │ │
│of Reich and Prussian Ministry of │ │
│Interior, p. 1085. │ V │ 892
│ │ │
3086-PS │Appointment of Frick as Reich │ │
│Protector, published in The Archives, │ │
│August 1943, p. 347. │ V │ 893
│ │ │
*3119-PS │Extract from Dr. Wilhelm Frick and His│ │
│Ministry. (USA 711) │ V │ 893
│ │ │
3123-PS │Extracts from Manual for │ │
│Administrative Officials, 1943. │ V │ 900
│ │ │
*3124-PS │Extracts from Rudolf Hess—Speeches. │ │
│(GB 253) │ V │ 902
│ │ │
3125-PS │Extract of Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler,│ │
│39th edition, 1933, p. 403. │ V │ 904
│ │ │
3127-PS │Announcement of 60th anniversary of │ │
│Dr. Frick in National Socialist │ │
│Monthly, 1937, p. 346. │ V │ 905
│ │ │
3128-PS │Extracts from Our Reich Cabinet, 1936.│ V │ 905
│ │ │
3131-PS │Extract from Racial Eugenics in the │ │
│Reich Legislation, 1943, p. 14. │ V │ 906
│ │ │
3132-PS │Extracts from Dates of the History of │ │
│the NSDAP, 1939. │ V │ 906
│ │ │
3225-PS │Extract from 1942 Reorganization of │ │
│Law and Economy. │ V │ 936
│ │ │
*3249-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Franz Blaha, 24 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 663) │ V │ 949
│ │ │
*3258-PS │Extracts from National Socialism Basic│ │
│Principles, Their Application by the │ │
│Nazi Party’s Foreign Organization, and│ │
│the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi │ │
│Aims, by U. S. Government Printing │ │
│Office, Washington, 1943. (GB 262) │ V │ 997
│ │ │
3303-PS │Extract from Handbook of the German │ │
│Reich, 1936. │ V │ 1099
│ │ │
3304-PS │Second Order for execution of decree │ │
│of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor │ │
│concerning formation and │ │
│administration of Eastern Territories,│ │
│2 November 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, p. 2133. │ V │ 1100
│ │ │
3399-PS │Affidavit of R. M. W. Kempner, 11 │ │
│December 1945. │ VI │ 116
│ │ │
3443-PS │Supplement No. 5 to official │ │
│Czechoslovak report, containing an │ │
│official memorandum on activities of │ │
│defendant Wilhelm Frick. │ VI │ 151
│ │ │
*3475-PS │Manual for Administrative Officials, │ │
│1943. (USA 710) │ VI │ 200
│ │ │
*3564-PS │Affidavit of Otto L. Meissner, 27 │ │
│December 1945, concerning Frick. (USA │ │
│709) │ VI │ 253
│ │ │
3565-PS │Affidavit of Franz Ritter von Epp, 27 │ │
│December 1945, concerning Frick. │ VI │ 253
│ │ │
3570-PS │Interrogation testimony of Wilhelm │ │
│Stuckart, former State Secretary of │ │
│Interior, at Oberursel, 21 September │ │
│1945. │ VI │ 263
│ │ │
*3589-PS │Supplement No. 6 to Official │ │
│Czechoslovak Report called “German │ │
│Crimes against Czechoslovakia”, 7 │ │
│January 1946. (USA 720) │ VI │ 287
│ │ │
*3592-PS │Charges, specifications, findings and │ │
│sentence of Alfons Klein and others │ │
│tried at Wiesbaden, Hadamar Case. (USA│ │
│718) │ VI │ 296
│ │ │
*3593-PS │Interrogation of Hermann Goering, 13 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 712) │ VI │ 298
│ │ │
*3601-PS │Affidavit of Sidney Mendel, 28 │ │
│December 1945, concerning the │ │
│connection of Frick’s Ministry of │ │
│Interior with concentration camps. (GB│ │
│324) │ VI │ 313
│ │ │
D-43 │Official circular, 26 March 1936, │ │
│concerning Reichstag elections on 29 │ │
│March 1936. │ VI │ 1024
│ │ │
D-44 │Circular, 25 July 1933, referring to │ │
│publications of SA activities. (USA │ │
│428) │ VI │ 1024
│ │ │
*D-181 │Circular from Gauleiter of South │ │
│Westphalia, 21 January 1937, │ │
│concerning Hereditary Health Law. (GB │ │
│528) │ VI │ 1073
│ │ │
L-82 │Decrees of 26 April 1933, 30 November │ │
│1933, 10 February 1936, on the │ │
│organization of the Gestapo from 1933 │ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 122. │ VII │ 855
│ │ │
*L-83 │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July│ │
│1945. (USA 234) │ VII │ 859
│ │ │
L-302 │Dr. Werner Spehr: The Law of │ │
│Protective Custody, Berlin, 1937, p. │ │
│11-13. │ VII │ 1100
│ │ │
L-305 │Correspondence concerning compulsory │ │
│sterilization on orders of Ministry of│ │
│Interior of all descendants of colored│ │
│occupation troops. │ VII │ 1102
│ │ │
*R-96 │Correspondence of Minister of Justice │ │
│in preparation of the discriminatory │ │
│decree of 4 December 1941 regarding │ │
│criminal justice against Poles and │ │
│Jews in annexed Eastern Territories. │ │
│(GB 268) │ VIII │ 72
│ │ │
*R-101-A │Letter from Chief of the Security │ │
│Police and Security Service to the │ │
│Reich Commissioner for the │ │
│Consolidation of German Folkdom, 5 │ │
│April 1940, with enclosures concerning│ │
│confiscation of church property. (USA │ │
│358) │ VIII │ 87
│ │ │
R-101-B │Letter from Himmler to Dr. Winkler, 31│ │
│October 1940, concerning treatment of │ │
│church property in incorporated │ │
│Eastern countries. │ VIII │ 89
│ │ │
R-101-C │Letter to Reich Leader SS, 30 July │ │
│1941, concerning treatment of church │ │
│property in incorporated Eastern │ │
│areas. (USA 358) │ VIII │ 91
│ │ │
*R-101-D │Letter from Chief of Staff of the │ │
│Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) to │ │
│Reich Leader SS, 30 March 1942, │ │
│concerning confiscation of church │ │
│property. (USA 358) │ VIII │ 92
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
│ │ │
*Chart No. 16 │The Structure of the German Police. │
│(1852-PS; USA 449) │ End of VIII
10. JULIUS STREICHER
Through his words and his deeds Julius Streicher assumed for himself the
unofficial title of “Jew-baiter Number One” of Nazi Germany. For the
course of some twenty-five years, Streicher educated the German people
in hatred and incited them to the persecution and to the extermination
of the Jewish race. He was an accessory to murder, on a scale perhaps
never attained before.
A. _STREICHER’S CAREER AND POSITIONS._
Streicher was born in 1885. He became a school teacher in Nurnberg and
formed a party of his own, which he called the German Socialist Party.
The chief policy of that party was anti-semitism. In 1922 he handed over
his party to Hitler, who wrote a glowing account of Streicher’s
generosity in _Mein Kampf_ (_M-3_).
The appointments which Streicher held in the Party and state were few.
From 1921 until 1945, he was a member of the Nazi Party. In 1925 he was
appointed Gauleiter of Franconia, and he remained as such until about
February 1940. From the time that the Nazi government came into power in
1933 until 1945 he was a member of the Reichstag. In addition to that,
he held the title of Obergruppenfuehrer in the SA (_2975-PS_).
The propaganda which Streicher carried out throughout those years was
chiefly done through the medium of his newspapers. He was the editor and
publisher of “_Der Stuermer_” from 1922 until 1933, and thereafter the
publisher and owner of the paper. In 1933 he also founded and thereafter
published a daily newspaper called the “_Fraenkische Tageszeitung_.”
In addition, in later years he published several other papers, mostly
local journals, from Nurnberg.
B. _STREICHER’S PART IN THE REMOVAL OF OPPOSITION THROUGH ANTI-JEWISH
PROPAGANDA AND INCITEMENT._
The course of Streicher’s incitement and propaganda may be traced more
or less in chronological order by referring to short extracts from “_Der
Stuermer_.” The extracts which follow were selected at random. They were
selected with a view to showing the various methods which Streicher
employed to incite the German people against the Jewish race, but his
newspapers are crowded with them, week after week, day after day. It is
impossible to pick up any copy without finding the same kind of
invective and incitement in the headlines and in the articles.
In a speech which Streicher made in 1922 in Nurnberg, after abusing the
Jews in the first paragraph, he went on to say:
“We know that Germany will be free when the Jew has been
excluded from the life of the German people.” (_M-11_).
In a speech in 1924 he stated:
“I beg you and particularly those of you who carry the cross
throughout the land to become somewhat more serious when I speak
of the enemy of the German people, namely, the Jew. Not out of
irresponsibility or for fun do I fight against the Jewish enemy,
but because I bear within me the knowledge that the whole
misfortune was brought to Germany by the Jews alone.
“I ask you once more, what is at stake today? The Jew seeks
domination not only among the German people but among all
peoples. The communists pave the way for him. Do you not know
that the God of the Old Testament orders the Jews to consume and
enslave the peoples of the earth?
“The government allows the Jew to do as he pleases. The people
expect action to be taken. You may think about Adolf Hitler as
you please, but one thing you must admit. He possessed the
courage to attempt to free the German people from the Jew by a
national revolution. That was action indeed.” (_M-12_).
In a speech in April 1925 Streicher declared:
“You must realize that the Jew wants our people to perish. That
is why you must join us and leave those who have brought you
nothing but war, inflation, and discord. For thousands of years
the Jew has been destroying the nations. Let us make a new
beginning today so that we can annihilate the Jews.” (_M-13_).
This appears to be the earliest expression of one of the conspirators’
primary objectives—the annihilation of the Jewish race. Fourteen years
later it became the official policy of the Nazi Government.
In April 1932 Streicher made the following statement:
“For 13 years I have fought against Jewry.”
* * * * * *
“We know that the Jew whether he is baptized as a Protestant or
as a Catholic, remains a Jew. Why cannot you realize, you
Protestant clergymen, you Catholic priests, you who have scales
before your eyes and serve the god of the Jews who is not the
God of Love but the God of Hate. Why do you not listen to
Christ, who said to the Jews, ‘You are children of the devil’.”
(_M-14_).
(1) _The Anti-Jewish Boycott of 1933._
When the Nazi Party came to power, they officially started their
campaign against the Jews by the boycott of 1 April 1933. The boycott
was agreed on and approved by the whole government, as appears from
Goebbels’ diary (_2409-PS_).
Streicher was appointed the chairman of the central committee for the
organization of that boycott. He started his work on Wednesday, 29 March
(_2156-PS_).
On that same day the central committee issued a proclamation announcing
that the boycott would start on Saturday at 10:00 AM sharp:
“Jewry will realize whom it has challenged.” (_M-7_).
On 30 March, two days before the boycott was due to start, an article
was published under the title, “Defeat the Enemy of the World!—by
Julius Streicher, official leader of the central committee to combat the
Jewish atrocity and boycott campaign” (_2153-PS_). The article stated,
in part:
“Jewry wanted this battle. It shall have it until it realizes
that the Germany of the brown battalions is not a country of
cowardice and surrender. Jewry will have to fight until we have
won victory.
“National Socialists! Defeat the enemy of the world. Even if the
world is full of devils, we shall succeed in the end.”
(_2153-PS_).
As head of the central committee for that boycott, Streicher outlined in
detail the organization of the boycott in orders which the committee
published on 31 March 1933 (_2154-PS_). The committee stressed that no
violence should be employed against the Jews during the boycott, but not
for humanitarian reasons. The order was issued because, if no violence
were employed, Jewish employers would have no grounds for discharging
their employees without notice, and for refusing to pay them any wages.
The Jews were also reported, apparently, to be transferring businesses
to German figureheads in order to alleviate the results of this
persecution; accordingly the committee declared that any property so
transferred was to be considered as Jewish for the purpose of the
boycott (_2154-PS_).
It is therefore clear that early in 1933 Streicher was taking a leading
part, as appointed by the Government, in the persecution against the
Jews.
Further extracts from Streicher’s newspapers illustrate the form which
his propaganda developed as the years went on. An article in the New
Year’s issue of a new paper founded and edited by Streicher—a
semimedical paper called “The People’s Health Through Blood and
Soil”—is an example of the remarkable lengths to which he went in
propagandizing against the Jews:
“It is established for all eternity; alien albumen is the sperm
of a man of alien race. The male sperm in cohabitation is
partially or completely absorbed by the female, and thus enters
her bloodstream. One single cohabitation of a Jew with an Aryan
woman is sufficient to poison her blood forever. Together with
the alien albumen she has absorbed the alien soul. Never again
will she be able to bear purely Aryan children, even when
married to an Aryan. They will all be bastards, with a dual soul
and a body of a mixed breed. Their children will also be
crossbreeds; that means, ugly people of unsteady character and
with a tendency to illnesses. Now we know why the Jew uses every
artifice of seduction in order to ravish German girls at as
early an age as possible; why the Jewish doctor rapes his
patients while they were under anaesthetic. He wants the German
girl and the German woman to absorb the alien sperm of the Jew.
She is never again to bear German children. But the blood
products of all animals right down to the bacteria like the
serum, lymph, extracts from internal organs etc., are all alien
albumen. They have a poisonous effect if directly introduced
into the blood stream either by vaccination or by injection. By
these products of sick animals the blood is ravished, the Aryan
is impregnated with an alien species. The author and abettor of
such action is the Jew. He has been aware of the secrets of the
race question for centuries, and therefore plans systematically
the annihilation of the nations which are superior to him.
Science and authorities are his instruments for the enforcing of
pseudo-science and the concealment of truth.” (_M-20_).
At the beginning of 1935, the following extract, entitled “The Chosen
People of the Criminals,” appeared in “_Der Stuermer_”:
“* * * and all the same, or, let us say, just because of this,
the history book of the Jews, which is usually called the Holy
Scriptures, impresses us as a horrible criminal romance, which
makes the 150 penny-dreadfuls of the British Jew, Edgar Wallace,
go green with envy. This ‘holy’ book abounds in murder, incest,
fraud, theft, and indecency.” (_2697-PS_).
In a speech on 4 October 1935 (the month following the proclamation of
the Nurnberg Decrees) Streicher made a speech which is reported in the
_Voelkischer Beobachter_ and is entitled in that newspaper “Safeguard of
German Blood and German Honor.” The report in that article reads in
part:
“Gauleiter Streicher speaks at a German Labor Front mass
demonstration for the Nurnberg laws.”
* * * * * *
“We have therefore, to unmask the Jew, and that is what I have
been doing for the past fifteen years.” (_M-34_).
In a leading article in “_Der Stuermer_” Streicher again emphasized the
part which he himself had taken in this campaign:
“_The ‘Stuermer_’s’ 15 years of work of enlightenment has
already led an army of those who know—millions strong—to
National Socialism. The continued work of the ‘_Stuermer_’ will
help to ensure that every German down to the last man will, with
heart and hand, join the ranks of those whose aim it is to crush
the head of the serpent Pan-Juda beneath their heels. He who
helps to bring this about helps to eliminate the devil, and this
devil is the Jew.” (_M-6_).
The extraordinary length to which Streicher went in his propaganda is
illustrated by the publication in “_Der Stuermer_” of a photograph of
the burning hull of the airship “Hindenburg,” which caught fire in June
1937 in America. The caption beneath the picture includes the comment:
“The first radio picture from the United States of America shows
quite clearly that a Jew stands behind the explosion of our
airship Hindenburg. Nature has depicted clearly and quite
correctly that devil in human guise.”
Although it is not clear from that photograph, the meaning of that
comment is apparently that the cloud of smoke in the air is in the shape
of a Jewish face.
In a speech in September 1937 at the opening of the Wilhelm Gustloff
bridge in Nurnberg, Streicher declared:
“The man who murdered Wilhelm Gustloff had to come from the
Jewish people, because the Jewish text books teach that every
Jew has the right to kill a non-Jew, and, indeed, that it is
pleasing to the Jewish God to kill as many non-Jews as possible.
“Look at the way the Jewish people have been following for
thousands of years past; everywhere murder, everywhere mass
murder. Neither must we forget that behind present-day wars
there stands the Jewish financier who pursues his aims and
interests. The Jew always lives on the blood of other nations;
he needs such murder and such victims. For us who know, the
murder of Wilhelm Gustloff is the same as ritual murder.”
* * * * * *
“It is our duty to tell the children at school and the bigger
ones what this memorial means.”
* * * * * *
“The Jew no longer shows himself among us openly as he used to.
But it would be wrong to say that victory is ours. Full and
final victory will have been achieved only when the whole world
has been rid of Jews.” (_M-4_).
Extracts from the correspondence columns of “_Der Stuermer_,” show
another method which Streicher employed in his propaganda (_M-26_;
_M-27_; _M-28_). The correspondence columns of every issue are full of
purported “letters” from Germans protesting that some German has been
buying shoes from a Jewish shop, etc., thus by printing these letters
assisting in the general boycott of the Jews.
(2) _“Ritual Murder” Propaganda._
Another form of propaganda employed by Streicher concerned the “Ritual
Murder.” Sometime in 1934 “_Der Stuermer_” began publishing accounts of
Jewish ritual murder which horrified the whole world to such an extent
that even the Archbishop of Canterbury, together with people from every
country in the world, protested that any government should allow such
matter to be published in their national newspapers.
Streicher based his ritual murder propaganda on a medieval belief that
during their Eastertide celebrations the Jews were in the habit of
murdering Christian children. Streicher misrepresented this medieval
belief to make it appear that not only was this done in the Middle Ages,
but that the Jews are still doing it and still want to do it. A few
passages from “_Der Stuermer_” together with descriptions of photographs
published therein will illustrate the type of propaganda that Streicher
was putting out concerning “ritual murder”:
“This the French front-line soldier should take with him to
France: The German people have taken a new lease of life. They
want peace, but if anyone tries to attack them, if anyone tries
to torture them again, if anyone tries to push them back into
the past, then the world would see another heroic epic; then
heaven will decide where righteousness lies—here, or where the
Jew has the whiphand and where he instigates massacres, one
could almost say the biggest ritual murders of all times. If the
German people are to be slaughtered according to the Jewish
rites, the whole world will be thus slaughtered at the same
time.”
* * * * * *
“As you have drummed morning and evening prayers into your
children’s heads, so now drum this into their heads, so that the
German people may gain the spiritual power to convince the rest
of the world which the Jews desire to lead against us.” (_M-2_).
A photograph published in “_Der Stuermer_” in April 1937 purports to
show three Jews ritually murdering a girl by cutting her throat, with
the blood pouring out into a bucket on the ground. The caption
underneath that photograph is as follows:
“Ritual murder at Polna. Ritual murder of Agnes Hruza by the
Jews Hilsner, Erdmann[_sic_], and Wassermann, taken from a
contemporary postcard.”
Another article in “_Der Stuermer_”, in April 1937, describes what is
alleged to happen when ritual murder takes place, and the blood is mixed
with the bread and drunk by the Jews in their feast. During the feast
the head of the family is supposed to explain:
“May all gentiles perish—as the child whose blood is contained
in the bread and wine.” (_2699-PS_).
An article in “_Der Stuermer_” for July 1938 has these further remarks
to make on “ritual murder”:
“Whoever had the occasion to be an eye-witness during the
slaughtering of animals or to see at least a truthful film on
the slaughtering will never forget this horrible experience. It
is atrocious. And unwillingly, he is reminded of the crimes
which the Jews have committed for centuries on men. He will be
reminded of the ritual murder. History points out hundreds of
cases in which non-Jewish children were tortured to death. They
also were given the same incision through the throat as is found
on slaughtered animals. They also were slowly bled to death
while fully conscious.” (_2700-PS_).
On special occasions, or when Streicher had some particular subject
matter to put before Germany, he was in the habit of issuing special
editions of “_Der Stuermer_.” “Ritual murder” was such a special subject
that he issued one of these special editions dealing solely with it, in
May 1939. One of the photographs published in this issue shows a child
having knives stuck into its side, from which blood is spurting; and
below the pedestal on which the child stands are five presumably dead
children bleeding on the ground. The caption beneath that picture reads
as follows:
“In the year 1476 the Jews in Regensburg murdered six boys. They
drew their blood and tortured them to death in an underground
vault which belongs to the Jew Josfel. The judges found the body
of the murdered boys; and blood stains are on an altar.”
Two other pictures are explained by their captions. One reads:
“For the Jewish New Year celebrations in 1913, World Jewry
published this picture. On the Jewish New Year and on the Day of
Atonement the Jews slaughtered a so-called ‘kapores’ cock; that
is to say, dead cock, whose blood and death is intended to
purify the Jews. In 1913 the ‘kapores’ cock had the head of the
Russian Czar Nicholas II. By publishing this postcard the Jews
intended to say that Nicholas II would be their next purifying
sacrifice. On the 6th of July 1918, the Czar was murdered by the
Jews Jurowsky and Goloschtschekin.”
The other picture shows the Jews holding a similar bird:
“* * * the ‘kapores’ cock which has the head of the Fuehrer. The
Hebrew script says that one day Jews will kill all Hitlerites.
Then the Jews will be delivered from all misfortunes, but in due
course the Jews will realize that they have reckoned without an
Adolf Hitler.”
In addition to reproductions of a number of previous articles on “ritual
murder” beneath a picture of Streicher, another picture bears the
caption:
“At the Passover Meal. The wine and Matzoh, unleavened bread,
contains non-Jewish blood. The Jew prays before the meal. He
prays for death to all non-Jews.”
The fifth page of this same issue reproduces some of the European and
American newspaper articles and letters protesting against this
propaganda on “ritual murder.” Among these is the “_Stuermer_’s” answer
to the letter from the Archbishop of Canterbury, written to the editor
of the London _Times_ in protest (_M-10_).
Page 6 contains another picture of a man having his throat cut; again
the usual spurt of blood falling into a basin on the floor, with the
following caption:
“The ritual murder of the boy Heinrich. In the year 1345 the
Jews in Munich slaughtered a non-Jewish boy. The martyr was
declared holy by the church.”
On page 8 appears another picture entitled:
“The Holy Gabriel. This boy was crucified and tortured to death
by the Jews in the year 1690. The blood was drawn off him.”
Page 11 reproduces a piece of sculpture on the wall of the Wallfahrts
Chapel, representing the ritual murder of a boy named Werner. The
picture shows the boy strung up by his feet and being murdered by two
Jews. Page 12 reproduces another picture taken from the same place. The
caption is:
“The embalmed body of Trient who was tortured to death by the
Jews.”
Page 13 contains another picture; somebody else having a knife stuck
into him; more blood coming out into a basin. On page 14 are two
pictures. One is said to show the ritual murder of the boy Andreas. The
other is the picture of a tombstone, and the caption reads as follows:
“The tombstone of Hilsner. This is the memorial to a Jewish
ritual murderer, Leopold Hilsner. He was found guilty of two
ritual murders and was condemned to death by hanging in two
trials. The emperor was bribed and pardoned him. Masaryk, the
friend of the Jews, liberated him from penal servitude in 1918.
On his tombstone lying Jewry calls this twofold murderer an
innocent victim.”
The next page produces yet another picture of a woman being murdered by
having her throat cut in the same way. Page 17 produces a picture of the
Archbishop of Canterbury together with a picture of an old Jewish man,
with a caption reading:
“Dr. Lang, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the highest dignitary
of the English Church, and his allies, a typical example of the
Jewish Race.”
The last page contains a picture of “Holy Simon, who was tortured to
death.”
This issue of “_Der Stuermer_” is nothing but an incitement to the
people of Germany who read it, an incitement to murder. It is filled
with pictures of murder, murder alleged to be against the German people.
It is an encouragement, to all who read it to avenge themselves in the
same way.
In January 1938 the persecution of the Jews became more and more
severe—another special issue of “_Der Stuermer_” was published. A
passage from the leading article in that issue written by Streicher,
states:
“* * * The supreme aim and highest task of the state is
therefore to conserve people, blood, and race. But if this is
the supreme task, any crime against this law must be punished
with the supreme penalty. ‘_Der Stuermer_’ takes therefore the
view that there are only two punishments for the crime of
polluting the race:
“1. Penal servitude for life for attempted race pollution.
“2. Death for committing race pollution.” (_M-39_).
The following are some of the headlines on the articles contained in
that edition:
“Jewish race polluters at work.”
* * * * * *
“Fifteen year old non-Jewess ravaged.”
* * * * * *
“A dangerous race polluter. He regards German women as fair game
for himself.”
* * * * * *
“The Jewish sanatorium. A Jewish institution for the cultivation
of race pollution.”
* * * * * *
“Rape of a feeble-minded girl.”
* * * * * *
“The Jewish butler. He steals from his Jewish masters and
commits race pollution.” (_M-40_).
Another article appearing in “_Der Stuermer_,” written by Streicher’s
editor, Karl Holz, states:
“The revenge will break loose one day and will exterminate Jewry
from the surface of the earth.” (_M-35_).
Again, in September 1938, “_Der Stuermer_” published an article
describing the Jews as follows:
“A parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator of diseases
who must be destroyed in the interest of mankind.” (_M-36_).
This is no longer propaganda for the persecution of the Jews; this is
propaganda for the extermination of Jews, and for the murder not of one
Jew but of all Jews (see _2698-PS_).
A picture published in “_Der Stuermer_” in December 1938 shows a girl
being strangled by a man whose hands are around her neck. The shadow of
the man’s face, which is shown against the background, has quite obvious
Jewish features. The caption under that picture is as follows:
“Castration for Race Polluters. Only heavy penalties will
preserve our womenfolk from a tighter grip from ghastly Jewish
claws. The Jews are our misfortune.”
(3) _The Anti-Jewish demonstrations of November 1938._
While his anti-Jewish propaganda was becoming constantly fiercer,
Streicher took a leading part in the organized demonstrations against
the Jews which took place on 9 and 10 November 1938. In the autumn of
that year, on the occasion of a meeting of press representatives in
Nurnberg, Streicher organized the breaking-up of the Nurnberg
synagogues. It was announced that Streicher personally would set the
crane in motion with which the Jewish symbols would be torn down from
the synagogues (_1724-PS_). The event was described as follows:
“* * * the synagogue is being demolished! Julius Streicher
himself inaugurates the work by a speech lasting more than an
hour and a half. By his order—so to speak as a prelude of the
demolition—the tremendous Star of David came off the cupola.”
(_2711-PS_).
Streicher took active part in the November demonstrations of that year,
particularly in his _Gau_ of Franconia. The Nurnberg demonstrations were
reported as follows in the “_Fraenkische Tageszeitung_,” which was
Streicher’s paper, on 11 November:
“* * * In Nurnberg and Furth it resulted in demonstrations by
the crowd against the Jewish murders. These lasted until the
early hours of the morning. Far too long had one watched the
activities of the Jews in Germany.”
* * * * * *
“After midnight the excitement of the populace reached its peak
and a large crowd marched to the synagogues in Nurnberg and
Furth and burned these two Jewish buildings, where the murder of
Germans had been preached.
“The fire-brigades, which had been notified immediately, saw to
it that the fire was continued[_sic_] to the original outbreak.
The windows of the Jewish shopkeepers, who still had not given
up hope of selling their junk to the stupid Goims, were smashed.
Thanks to the disciplined behavior of the SA men and the police,
who had rushed to the scene, there was no plundering.” (_M-42_).
On 10 November, the day of the demonstrations, Streicher made a speech
stating in part as follows:
“From the cradle, the Jew is not being taught, like we are, such
texts as, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,’ or ‘If you
are smitten on the left cheek, offer then your right one.’ No,
he is told: ‘With the non-Jew you can do whatever you like.’ He
is even taught that the slaughtering of a non-Jew is an act
pleasing to God. For 20 years we have been writing about this in
‘_Der Stuermer_’; for 20 years we have been preaching it
throughout the world and we have made millions recognize the
truth.”
* * * * * *
“The Jew slaughtered in one night 75,000 people; when he
emigrated to Egypt he killed all the first-born, i.e. a whole
future generation of Egyptians. What would have happened if the
Jew had succeeded in driving the nations into war against us,
and if we had lost the war? The Jew protected by foreign
bayonets, would have fallen on us and would have slaughtered and
murdered us. Never forget what history has taught us.” (_M-41_)
After the November 1938 demonstrations, irregularities occurred in the
Gau of Franconia in connection with the organized Aryanization of Jewish
property. Aryanization of Jewish property was regulated by the Nazi
State, which had decreed that the proceeds of the transfer of Jewish
properties to Aryans were to go to the State. In Streicher’s _Gau_ of
Franconia, however, a good deal of the proceeds never found their way as
far as the State. As a result Goering set up a commission to investigate
what had taken place. The report of that commission (_1757-PS_)
describes what had been taking place in Streicher’s _Gau_:
“* * * Following upon the November demonstrations the Deputy
Gauleiter, Holz, took up the Jewish questions. His reasons can
be given here in detail on the basis of his statement of the
25th of March, 1939:
“The 9th and 10th of November 1938.
“In the night of the 9th and 10th November and on the 10th of
November 1938, events took place throughout Germany which I
[Holz] considered to be the signal for a completely different
treatment of the Jewish question in Germany. Synagogues and
Jewish schools were burnt down and Jewish property was smashed
both in shops and in private houses. Besides this, a large
number of particular Jews were taken to concentration camps by
the police. Toward midday we discussed these events in the
Gauleiter’s house. All of us were of the opinion that we now
faced a completely new state of affairs on the Jewish question.
By the great action against the Jews, carried out in the night
and morning of the 10th of November, all guiding principles and
all laws on the subject had been made illusory. We were of the
opinion (particularly myself) that we should now act on our own
initiative in this respect. I proposed to the Gauleiter that in
view of the great existing lack of housing, the best thing would
be to put the Jews into a kind of internment camp. Then the
houses would become free in a twinkling, and the housing
shortage would be relieved, at least in part. Besides that, we
would have the Jews under control and supervision. I added ‘The
same thing happened to our prisoners of war and war internees.’
The Gauleiter said that this suggestion was for the time being
impossible to carry out. Thereupon I made a new proposal to him.
I said that I considered it unthinkable that, after the Jews had
had their property smashed, they should continue to be able to
own houses and land. I proposed that these houses and this land
ought to be taken away from them, and declared myself ready to
carry through such an action. I declared that by the
Aryanization of Jewish land and houses a large sum could accrue
to the Gau out of the proceeds. I named some million of marks. I
stated that, in my opinion, this Aryanization could be carried
out as legally as the Aryanization of shops. The Gauleiter’s
answer was something to this effect: ‘If you think you can carry
this out, do so. The sum gained will then be used to build a Gau
school.’”
* * * * * *
“The Aryanization was accomplished by the alienation of
properties, the surrender of claims, especially mortgage claims,
and reductions in buying price.
“The payment allowed the Jews was basically 10% of the nominal
value or nominal sum of the claim. As a justification for these
low prices, Holz claimed at the Berlin meeting of the 6th of
February 1939, that the Jews had mostly bought their property
during the inflation period for a tenth of its value. As has
been shown by investigating a large number of individual cases
selected at random, this claim is not true.” (_1757-PS_)
The second part of this report, which contains the findings of the
commission, reads in part as follows:
“* * * Gauleiter Streicher likes to beat people with a riding
whip but only if he is in the company of several persons
assisting him. Usually the beatings are carried out with
sadistic brutality.
“The best known case is that of Steinruck, whom he beat bloodily
in the prison cell, together with Deputy Gauleiter Holz and SA
Brigadier General Koenig. After returning from this scene to the
_Deutscher Hof_ he said: ‘Now I am relieved. I needed that
again!’ Later he also stated several times that he needed
another Steinruck case in order to ‘relieve’ himself.
“In August 1938, he beat Editor Burker at the District House
together with District Office Leader Schoeller and his Adjutant
Koenig.
“On the 2nd of December 1938 he asked to have three youthful
criminals (15 to 17 years old) who had been arrested for robbery
brought to the room of the director of the Criminal Police
Office in Nurnberg-Furth. Streicher, who was accompanied by his
son, Lothar, had the youths brought in singly and question them
about their sex life and in particular, through clear and
detailed questioning, he laid stress on determining whether and
since when they masturbated. * * *
“* * * The last one of these three boys he beat with his riding
whip, with blows on the head and on the rest of the body.”
(_1757-PS_)
A later passage shows the authority and power which Streicher held in
his Gau:
“According to reports of reliable witnesses Gauleiter Streicher
is in the habit of pointing out on the most varied occasions
that he alone gives orders in the district of Franconia. For
instance, at a meeting in the Colosseum in Nurnberg in 1935 he
said that nobody could remove him from office. In a meeting at
Herkules Hall, where he described how he had beaten Professor
Steinruck, he emphasized that he would not let himself be beaten
by anybody, not even by an Adolf Hitler.
“For, this also must be stated here, in Franconia the Gau acts
first and then orders the absolutely powerless authorities to
approve.” (_1757-PS_)
That report shows the kind of treatment and persecution which the Jews
were receiving in the Gau over which Streicher ruled. It further shows
the absolute authority with which Streicher acted in his district.
As a result either of that investigation or of some other matter,
Streicher was relieved of his position as Gauleiter in February 1940,
but he did not cease from propaganda or from control of his newspaper.
In an article written in “_Der Stuermer_,” on 4 November 1943, Streicher
declared:
“It is really the truth that the Jews, so to speak, have
disappeared from Europe and that the Jewish reservoir of the
East, from which the Jewish plague has for centuries beset the
peoples of Europe, has ceased to exist. However, the Fuehrer of
the German people at the beginning of the war prophesied what
has now come to pass.” (_1965-PS_).
That article, signed by Streicher, shows that he had knowledge of the
Jewish exterminations which were going on in the East. Streicher’s
article was written in November 1943. In April 1943 the Warsaw ghetto
was destroyed. Between April 1942 and April 1944 more than 1,700,000
Jews were killed in Auschwitz and Dachau. It seems clear from this
article that Streicher knew what was happening, perhaps not the details,
but the fact that Jews were being exterminated.
(4) _Perversion of Youth._
Streicher paid particular attention to the instruction and perversion of
the children and youth of Germany. He was not content with inciting the
German population. He started to poison the minds of the children at
school at the earliest possible date. He continually emphasized the need
for teaching children anti-semitism. In a speech as early as June 1925
Streicher said:
“I repeat, we demand the transformation of the school into a
national German institution of education. If we let German
children be taught by German teachers, then we shall have laid
the foundations for the national German school. This national
German school must teach racial doctrine.”
* * * * * *
“We demand, therefore, the introduction of racial doctrine into
the school.” (_M-30_)
The “_Fraenkische Tageszeitung_” of 19 March 1934 reports Streicher’s
address at a girls’ school at Preisslerstrasse:
“Then Julius Streicher spoke about his life and told them about
a girl who at one time went to his school and who fell for a Jew
and was finished for the rest of her life.” (_M-43_)
Every summer in Nurnberg a youth celebration was held. At this pagan
rite the youth of Nurnberg were rallied, organized, and incited,
encouraged by Streicher. Streicher’s speech to the Hitler Youth on the
“Holy Mountain” near Nurnberg on 22 June 1935 contained the following
statements:
“Boys and girls, look back to a little more than 10 years ago. A
great war—the World War—had whirled over the peoples of the
earth and had left in the end a heap of ruins. Only one people
remained victorious in this dreadful war, a people of whom
Christ said its father is the devil. That people had ruined the
German nation in body and soul. Then Adolf Hitler, unknown to
anybody, arose from among the people and became the voice which
called to a holy war and battle. He cried to the people for
everybody to take courage again and to rise and get a helping
hand to take the devil from the German people, so that the human
race might be free again from these people that have wandered
about the world for centuries and millenia, marked with the sign
of Cain.
“Boys and girls, even if they say that the Jews were once the
chosen people, do not believe it, but believe us when we say
that the Jews are not a chosen people. Because it cannot be that
a chosen people should act among the peoples as the Jews do
today.” (_M-1_)
A report of Streicher’s address to 2,000 children at Nurnberg at
Christmas-time, 1936, states:
“‘Do you know who the Devil is,’ he asked his breathlessly
listening audience. ‘The Jew, the Jew,’ resounded from a
thousand children’s voices.” (_M-44_)
Streicher was not content with writing and talking. He issued a book for
teachers, written by one Fink and published from the “_Der Stuermer_”
offices, called “The Jewish Question and School Instruction.” This book
emphasizes the necessity of anti-semitic teaching in schools, and
suggests ways in which the subject can be introduced and handled. The
preface, written by Streicher, reads in part as follows:
“The National Socialist state brought fundamental changes into
all spheres of life of the German people.
“It has also presented the German teacher with some new tasks.
The National Socialist state demands that its teachers instruct
German children in social questions. As far as the German people
is concerned the racial question is a Jewish question. Those who
want to teach the child all about the Jew must themselves have a
thorough knowledge of the subject.
“Those who take to heart all that has been written with such
feeling by Fritz Fink, who for many years has been greatly
concerned about the German people, will be grateful for the
creator of this outwardly insignificant publication.” (_M-46_).
The preface is signed by Julius Streicher, City of the Reich
Party Rallies, Nurnberg, in the year 1937.
The introduction to this book reads as follows:
“Racial and Jewish questions are the fundamental problems of the
National Socialist ideology. The solution of these problems will
secure the existence of National Socialism and with this the
existence of our nation for all time. The enormous significance
of the racial question is recognized almost without exception
today by all the German people. In order to attain this
recognition our people had to travel through a long road of
suffering.
“No one should be allowed to grow up in the midst of our people
without this knowledge of the monstrous character and
dangerousness of the Jew.” (_M-46_).
A later passage in the book contains this statement:
“One who has reached this stage of understanding will inevitably
remain an enemy of the Jews all his life and will instill this
hatred into his own children.” (_M-46_).
“_Der Stuermer_” also published some children’s books. Although
Streicher himself did not write the books, they were published from his
publishing business, and they are on the same line of everything else
published and issued from that business. Among these books was one
entitled “Don’t trust the Fox in the green meadow nor the Jew on his
oath.” It is a picture book for children. The pictures all depict Jews
in an offensive light. And opposite each picture there is a little
story. For instance, opposite one picture, which portrays an
unpleasant-looking Jewish butcher cutting up meat, there appears the
following comment:
“The Jewish butcher: he sells half refuse instead of meat. A
piece of meat lies on the floor; the cat claws another. This
doesn’t worry the Jew butcher since the meat increases in
weight. Besides one mustn’t forget he won’t have to eat it
himself.” (_M-32_).
The story opposite another picture reads as follows:
“Jesus Christ says ‘The Jew is a murderer through and through’.
And when Christ had to die the Lord didn’t know any other people
who would have tortured Him to death so he chose the Jews. That
is why the Jews pride themselves on being the chosen people.”
(_M-32_).
Other pictures in this book portray: a girl being led away by an
evil-appearing Jew; Streicher smiling benignly at a children’s party,
greeting the little children; children looking at copies of “_Der
Stuermer_” posted on a wall; Jewish children being taken away from an
Aryan school by an unpleasant-looking father, with all the Aryan
children shouting and dancing and enjoying the fun very much (_M-32_).
Another book, called “The Poisonous Fungus,” is very similar in
character and appearance, and likewise calculated to poison the minds of
readers. One of the pictures in this book shows a girl sitting in a
Jewish doctor’s waiting room. The story that goes with this picture is
not a very pleasant story, but it is only by adverting to these matters
that it becomes possible to believe the kind of education which German
children received from Streicher. The story reads as follows:
“Inge sits in the reception room of the Jew doctor. She has to
wait a long time. She looks through the journals which are on
the table. But she is much too nervous to read even a few
sentences. Again and again she remembers the talk with her
mother. And again and again her mind reflects on the warnings of
her leader of the League of German Girls: ‘A German must not
consult a Jew doctor. And particularly not a German girl. Many a
girl that went to a Jew doctor to be cured, found disease and
disgrace!’
“When Inge had entered the waiting room, she experienced an
extraordinary incident. From the doctor’s consulting room she
could hear the sound of crying. She heard the voice of a young
girl: ‘Doctor, doctor, leave me alone!’
“Then she heard the scornful laughing of a man. And then, all of
a sudden, it became absolutely silent. Inge had listened
breathlessly.
“‘What may be the meaning of all this?’ she asked herself and
her heart was pounding. And again she thought of the warning of
her leader in the League of German Girls.
“Inge was already waiting for an hour. Again she takes the
journals in an endeavor to read. Then the door opens. Inge looks
up. The Jew appears. She screams. In terror she drops the paper.
Horrified she jumps up. Her eyes stare into the face of the
Jewish doctor. And this face is the face of the devil. In the
middle of this devil’s face is a huge crooked nose. Behind the
spectacles two criminal eyes. And the thick lips are grinning, a
grinning that expresses: ‘Now I got you at last, you little
German girl!’
“And then the Jew approaches her. His fleshy fingers stretch out
after her. But now Inge has composed herself. Before the Jew can
grab hold of her, she smacks the fat face of the Jew doctor with
her hand. One jump to the door. Breathlessly Inge runs down the
stairs. Breathlessly she escapes the Jew house.” (_1778-PS_).
Another photograph shows youthful admirers standing around looking at
Streicher’s picture, with the following commentary:
“‘Without a solution of the Jewish question there will be no
salvation for mankind.’ That is what he shouted to us. All of us
could understand him. And when, at the end, he shouted ‘_Sieg
Heil_’ for the Fuehrer, we all acclaimed him with tremendous
enthusiasm. For two hours Streicher spoke at that occasion. To
us it appeared to have been but a few minutes.” (_1778-PS_).
The effect of all this propaganda is evident from the columns of “_Der
Stuermer_” itself. In April 1936 there was published a letter, which is
typical of many others that appear in other copies from children of all
ages. The third paragraph of this letter, signed by the boys and girls
of the National Socialist Youth Hostel at Grossmuellen, reads:
“* * * Today we saw a play on how the devil persuades the Jew to
shoot a conscientious National Socialist. In the course of the
play the Jew did it too. We all heard the shot. We would have
all liked to jump up and arrest the Jew. But then the policeman
came and after a short struggle took the Jew along. You can
imagine, dear _Stuermer_, that we heartily cheered the
policeman. In the whole play not one name was mentioned, but we
all knew that this play represented the murder by the Jew
Frankfurter. We were very sick when we went to bed that night.
None felt like talking to the others. This play made it clear to
us how the Jew sets to work.” (_M-25_).
C. _STREICHER’S USE OF HIS AUTHORITY AS GAULEITER IN THE SERVICE OF THE
CONSPIRACY._
Streicher’s authority as a Gauleiter was extensive. The Organization
Book of the NSDAP for 1938 describes the duties and authority of
Gauleiters as follows:
“The Gauleiter bears over-all responsibility for the Fuehrer for
the sector of sovereignty entrusted to him. The rights, duties
and jurisdiction of the Gauleiter result primarily from the
mission assigned by the Fuehrer and, apart from that, from
detailed direction.” (_1814-PS_).
Streicher’s association with the Fuehrer and other Nazi conspirators may
also be seen from the newspapers. On the occasion of Streicher’s 50th
birthday, Hitler paid a visit to Nurnberg to congratulate him. The
account of that meeting is published in the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_”
of 13 February 1934 as follows:
“Adolf Hitler spoke to his old comrades in battle and to his
followers in words which went straight to their hearts. By way
of introduction he remarked that it was a special pleasure to be
present for a short while in Nurnberg, the town of the National
Socialist community which had been steeled in battle, at this
day of honor of Julius Streicher, and to be within the circle of
the standard bearers of the National Socialist idea during many
years.
“Just as they, all of them, had during the years of oppression
unshakeably believed in the victory of the movement, so his
friend and comrade in the battle, Streicher, had stood
faithfully at his side at all times. It had been this
unshakeable belief that had moved mountains.
“For Streicher it would surely be a solemn thought, that this
50th anniversary meant not only the halfway point of a century,
but also of a thousand years of German history to him. He had in
Streicher a companion of whom he could say that here in Nurnberg
was a man who would never waver for a single second and who
would unflinchingly stand behind him in every situation.”
(_M-8_).
A letter from Himmler, published in “_Der Stuermer_” of April 1937,
declared:
“If in future years the history of the reawakening of the German
people is written, and if already the next generation will be
unable to understand that the German people was once friendly to
the Jews, it will be stated that Julius Streicher and his weekly
paper ‘_Der Stuermer_’ have contributed a great deal towards the
enlightenment regarding the enemy of humanity. “(Signed) For
the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler.” (_M-22_).
Finally, a letter from von Schirach, the Reich Youth Leader, published
in “_Der Stuermer_” of January 1938, had this to say:
“It is the historical merit of ‘_Der Stuermer_’ to have
enlightened the broad masses of our people in a popular way as
to the Jewish world danger. ‘_Der Stuermer_’ is right in
refusing to fulfill its task in the tone of the aesthetic
drawing room. Jewry has shown no regard for the German people.
We have, therefore, no cause to be considerate and to spare our
worst enemy. What we fail to do today our youngsters of tomorrow
will have to suffer for bitterly.” (_M-45_).
D. _CONCLUSION._
It may be that Streicher is less directly involved in the physical
commission of the crimes against Jews than some of his coconspirators.
The submission of the Prosecution is that his crime is no less worse for
that reason. No government in the world, before the Nazis came to power,
could have embarked upon and put into effect a policy of mass Jewish
extermination in the way in which they did, without having a people who
would back them and support them, and without having a large number of
people who were prepared to carry out the murder themselves. (See
Chapter XII on Persecution of the Jews.)
It was to the task of educating and poisoning the people with hate, and
of producing murderers, that Streicher set himself. For 25 years he
continued unrelentingly the perversion of the people and youth of
Germany. He went on and on, as he saw the results of his work bearing
fruit.
In the early days he was preaching persecution. As persecution took
place he preached extermination and annihilation and, as millions of
Jews were exterminated and annihilated, in the Ghettos of the East, he
cried out for more and more.
The crime of Streicher is that he made these crimes possible, which they
would never have been had it not been for him and for those like him.
Without Streicher and his propaganda, the Kaltenbrunners, the Himmlers,
the General Stroops would have had nobody to do their orders.
In its extent Streicher’s crime is probably greater and more
far-reaching than that of any of the other defendants. The misery which
they caused ceased with their capture. The effects of this man’s crime,
of the poison that he has put into the minds of millions of young boys
and girls goes on, for he concentrated upon the youth and childhood of
Germany. He leaves behind him a legacy of almost a whole people poisoned
with hate, sadism, and murder, and perverted by him. That people remain
a problem and perhaps a menace to the rest of civilization for
generations to come.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JULIUS STREICHER
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 66
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*1724-PS │Announcement in Press Conference, 4 │ │
│August 1938, of breaking up of │ │
│synagogue. (USA 266) │ IV │ 224
│ │ │
*1757-PS │Report of Goering’s Commissioners for │ │
│investigation of Aryanisations. (GB │ │
│175) │ IV │ 283
│ │ │
1778-PS │Book “The Poisonous Mushroom”, │ │
│published in Nurnberg 1938, concerning│ │
│Jews. (USA 257) │ IV │ 358
│ │ │
*1814-PS │The Organization of the NSDAP and its │ │
│affiliated associations, from │ │
│Organization book of the NSDAP, │ │
│editions of 1936, 1938, 1940 and 1943,│ │
│pp. 86-88. (USA 328) │ IV │ 411
│ │ │
*1965-PS │Article by Streicher, 4 November 1943,│ │
│published in Der Stuermer. (GB 176) │ IV │ 602
│ │ │
*2153-PS │Defeat the Enemy of the World, │ │
│published in National Socialist Party │ │
│Correspondence No. 358, 30 March 1933.│ │
│(GB 166) │ IV │ 760
│ │ │
*2154-PS │Streicher decrees, published in │ │
│National Socialist Party │ │
│Correspondence, No. 359, 31 March │ │
│1933. (GB 167) │ IV │ 760
│ │ │
*2156-PS │Announcement of Central Committee for │ │
│defense against Jewish horror and │ │
│boycott agitation, 29 March 1933, │ │
│published in National Socialist Party │ │
│Correspondence No. 357. (USA 263) │ IV │ 761
│ │ │
*2409-PS │Extracts from The Imperial House to │ │
│the Reich Chancellery by Dr. Joseph │ │
│Goebbels. (USA 262) │ V │ 83
│ │ │
2583-PS │Quotation from speech made by │ │
│Streicher, 31 October 1939. │ V │ 311
│ │ │
*2697-PS │Article: “The Chosen People of the │ │
│Criminals” from Der Stuermer, No. 2, │ │
│January 1935. (USA 259) │ V │ 372
│ │ │
*2698-PS │Article: “Two little Talmud Jews”, │ │
│from Der Stuermer, No. 50, December │ │
│1938. (USA 260) │ V │ 372
│ │ │
*2699-PS │Article on Ritual Murder, from Der │ │
│Stuermer, No. 14, April 1937. (USA │ │
│258) │ V │ 372
│ │ │
2700-PS │Article: “The Ritual Murder”, from Der│ │
│Stuermer, No. 28, July 1938. │ V │ 373
│ │ │
*2711-PS │Article: “Symbolic Action”, published │ │
│in Fraenkische Tageszeitung-Nurnberg, │ │
│11 August 1938. (USA 267) │ V │ 376
│ │ │
*2975-PS │Streicher’s affidavit, 19 November │ │
│1945, concerning positions held. (USA │ │
│9) │ V │ 681
│ │ │
*M-1 │Speech by Julius Streicher to Hitler │ │
│Youth on “Holy Mountain”, 22 June │ │
│1935. (GB 178) │ VII │ 1115
│ │ │
*M-2 │Speech by Julius Streicher, 10 May │ │
│1935. (GB 172) │ VIII │ 1
│ │ │
M-3 │Extract from Mein Kampf, p. 440. │ VIII │ 2
│ │ │
*M-4 │Streicher’s speech, 5 September 1937, │ │
│commemorating the opening of the │ │
│Wilhelm-Gustloff Bridge in Nurnberg. │ │
│(GB 171) │ VIII │ 3
│ │ │
M-5 │Report of press conference of 4 August│ │
│1938. │ VIII │ 5
│ │ │
*M-6 │Leading article by Julius Streicher │ │
│from Der Stuermer of September 1936. │ │
│(GB 170) │ VIII │ 6
│ │ │
M-7 │NSDAP Proclamation from Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, 29 March 1933, concerning │ │
│the boycott. │ VIII │ 7
│ │ │
*M-8 │Hitler’s visit to Nurnberg on │ │
│Streicher’s 50th birthday, from │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 13 February │ │
│1935. (GB 182) │ VIII │ 8
│ │ │
*M-10 │Streicher’s letter to Archbishop of │ │
│Canterbury, from Special edition of │ │
│The Stuermer in May 1939. (GB 173) │ VIII │ 9
│ │ │
*M-11 │Streicher’s speech in Central Hall of │ │
│Coliseum in Nurnberg, 23 November │ │
│1922. (GB 165) │ VIII │ 10
│ │ │
M-12 │Streicher’s speech, 20 November 1924. │ │
│(GB 165) │ VIII │ 10
│ │ │
*M-13 │Streicher’s speech in Nurnberg, 3 │ │
│April 1925. (GB 165) │ VIII │ 11
│ │ │
*M-14 │Streicher’s speech in the Hercules │ │
│Hall in Nurnberg, 21 April 1932. (GB │ │
│165) │ VIII │ 11
│ │ │
*M-20 │Article from 1935 New Year’s issue of │ │
│“German People’s health from Blood and│ │
│Soil”. (GB 168) │ VIII │ 12
│ │ │
M-21 │Article: “Jewish Blood in a Priest’s │ │
│Robe”, from Der Stuermer, March 1936. │ VIII │ 12
│ │ │
M-22 │Letter from Himmler, 19 January 1937, │ │
│from Der Stuermer, April 1937. │ VIII │ 13
│ │ │
*M-25 │Letter from Der Stuermer, April 1936, │ │
│concerning the teachings to boys and │ │
│girls of Jewish question. (GB 170; USA│ │
│861) │ VIII │ 14
│ │ │
M-26 │Article: “He calls himself a party │ │
│member”, from Der Stuermer, March │ │
│1936. │ VIII │ 15
│ │ │
M-27 │Article: “Friends of the Jews on the │ │
│Moselle”, from Der Stuermer, March │ │
│1936. │ VIII │ 15
│ │ │
M-28 │Article: “She must stick to the Jews”,│ │
│from Der Stuermer, March 1936. │ VIII │ 16
│ │ │
*M-30 │Speech by Julius Streicher in Bavarian│ │
│Diet, 26 June 1925. (GB 165) │ VIII │ 16
│ │ │
M-31 │Editorial “The Approaching finale, The│ │
│Prophecy of the Fuehrer”, by Julius │ │
│Streicher, published in Der Stuermer. │ VIII │ 19
│ │ │
*M-32 │Extracts from book “Don’t trust a Fox │ │
│on a green meadow nor the Jew on his │ │
│oath”. (GB 181) │ VIII │ 20
│ │ │
M-33 │“100,000 demonstrate in Koenigsplatz │ │
│against Jewish incitements to │ │
│cruelty”, from Muenchener Beobachter, │ │
│1-2 April 1933. (GB 329) │ VIII │ 21
│ │ │
*M-34 │“Safeguard of German Blood and German │ │
│Honour”, from Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │
│6 October 1935. (GB 169) │ VIII │ 24
│ │ │
M-35 │Extract from Leading Article in Der │ │
│Stuermer, July 1938. │ VIII │ 24
│ │ │
M-36 │Extract from Leading Article in Der │ │
│Stuermer, September 1938. │ VIII │ 25
│ │ │
M-39 │Extract from Leading Article in Der │ │
│Stuermer, January 1938. │ VIII │ 26
│ │ │
M-40 │Headlines of Articles in Stuermer │ │
│Special Issue No. 8, January 1938. │ VIII │ 26
│ │ │
M-41 │Speech by Streicher, 10 November 1938.│ VIII │ 26
│ │ │
*M-42 │Account of November 1938 │ │
│demonstrations in Nurnberg and Fuerth.│ │
│(GB 174) │ VIII │ 28
│ │ │
*M-43 │Streicher’s address to young girls of │ │
│vocational training centre, 19 March │ │
│1934, from Fraenkische Tageszeitung. │ │
│(GB 177) │ VIII │ 28
│ │ │
*M-44 │Report of Streicher’s address to 2,000│ │
│children at Nurnberg at Christmas │ │
│celebrations, from Fraenkische │ │
│Tageszeitung, 22 December 1936. (GB │ │
│179) │ VIII │ 29
│ │ │
*M-45 │Letter by von Schirach, published in │ │
│Der Stuermer, January 1938. (USA 871) │ VIII │ 30
│ │ │
*M-46 │Extracts from book: “Jewish Question │ │
│and School Instruction”, published in │ │
│Der Stuermer, 1937. (GB 180) │ VIII │ 30
11. WALTER FUNK
A. _FUNK ACTIVELY PROMOTED THE CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER._
A recital of Funk’s positions and activities is set forth in a statement
made by him (_3533-PS_). Although Funk signed this statement, he
inserted several reservations and denials with respect to certain
positions and activities. Funk’s submissions in this connection, which
are indicated in his statement (_3533-PS_) should be evaluated in the
light of the statements set forth in the collection of relevant excerpts
from German publications (_3563-PS_).
An examination of these excerpts will reveal that the German
publications directly contradict every contention which Funk has made
with respect to his holding the positions and carrying on the activities
listed in his statement (_3533-PS_). For example, in his comment
concerning item (_b_) of his statement Funk denies that he was Hitler’s
Personal Economic Adviser during the 1930’s. On the other hand, there
are four German publications, each of which states unequivocally that
Funk _was_ Hitler’s Personal Economic Adviser (_3563-PS_).
As is indicated by these documents, Funk, soon after he joined the Nazi
Party in 1931, began to hold important positions in the Party and soon
qualified as one of the Nazi inner circle. Thus, he promptly became not
only Hitler’s Personal Economic Adviser, but also Chief of the Economic
Division of the Central Nazi Party Directorate and Chairman of the
Party’s Committee on Economic Policy (_3533-PS_). In these capacities,
he advanced the Party’s drive for mass support by drafting its economic
slogans. In 1932, for example, he wrote a pamphlet entitled “Economic
Reconstruction Program of the NSDAP”, which, after its approval by
Hitler, became the Party’s official pronouncement on economic matters
(_3505-PS_).
Funk also served as the liaison man between the Nazi Party and the large
industrialists, from whom he obtained financial and political support on
Hitler’s behalf (_3505-PS_; _2828-PS_). Thus, for example, he was
present at the meeting of approximately 25 leading industrialists held
in Berlin on 20 February 1933 (_2828-PS_). In the course of this
meeting, which was arranged by Goering and attended by Funk, among
others, and which was designed to obtain the industrialists’ financial
and political support for the Nazi program, Hitler and Goering announced
some of the fundamental Nazi objectives: the destruction of the
parliamentary system in Germany; the crushing of all internal opposition
by force, the restoration of the power of the _Wehrmacht_. In addition,
Hitler indicated that force was to be used in solving problems with
other nations (_D-203_). The financial and political support for the
Nazis which Funk secured from industry promoted the campaign of force
and terror by which the Nazis seized and consolidated their control of
Germany.
The importance of Funk’s general contribution to the conspirators’
accession to power has been described in a book published by the Central
Publishing House of the Nazi Party:
“No less important than Funk’s accomplishments in the
programmatic field in the years 1931 and 1932 was his activity
of that time as the Fuehrer’s liaison man to the leading men of
the German economy in industry, trade, commerce and finance. On
the basis of his past work, his personal relations to the German
economic leaders were broad and extensive. He was now able to
enlist them in the service of Adolf Hitler, and not only to
answer their questions authoritatively, but to convince them and
win their backing for the Party. At that time, that was terribly
important work. Every success achieved meant a moral, political,
and economic strengthening of the fighting force of the Party
and contributed toward destroying the prejudice that National
Socialism is merely a party of class hatred and class struggle.”
(_3505-PS_)
After he had helped Hitler become Chancellor, Funk, as Reich Press
Chief, participated in the early cabinet meetings, in the course of
which the conspirators determined upon the means by which they would
secure the passage of the Enabling Act and destroy parliamentary
government in Germany (_2962-PS_; _2963-PS_). This law destroyed civil
liberties in Germany and marked the conspirators’ seizure of political
control over Germany.
B. _FUNK, BY VIRTUE OF HIS ACTIVITIES IN THE MINISTRY OF PROPAGANDA,
ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE CONSPIRATORS’ CONTROL
OVER GERMANY._
The Nazis created a vast propaganda machine which they used to proclaim
the doctrine of the master race, to inveigh against the Jews, to impose
the leadership principle upon the German people, to glorify war as a
noble activity, to create the social cohesion necessary for war, and to
weaken the capacity and willingness of their intended victims to resist
aggression. (See Section 9 of Chapter VII on Propaganda, Censorship and
Supervision of Cultural Activities.)
The operation of this propaganda machine was principally the
responsibility of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.
Funk played a significant role in the operations of that Ministry and in
related agencies of the Nazi State. On 30 January 1933, the day on which
Hitler became Reich Chancellor, Funk was appointed Press Chief of the
Reich Government. In that capacity, and even after the establishment of
the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, he reported
regularly to Hitler and President von Hindenburg (_3505-PS_; _3501-PS_).
On 13 March 1933, the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda was established with Goebbels as its Chief and Funk as its
under-Secretary (_2029-PS_; _Voelkischer Beobachter_ 15 March 1933, p.
2. (South German Edition)). In an interview with a reporter from the
_Voelkischer Beobachter_ on 30 March 1933, Funk made clear the
importance which propaganda was to have in the Nazi State. He stated:
“Propaganda is the most modern instrument of power and fighting
weapon of state policy. The establishing of the Propaganda
Ministry is vital, for the national political policy of the new
State Leadership is to be the general good of the whole people.
Therefore, the total political, artistic, cultural and spiritual
life of the nation, must be brought on to one level and directed
from one central point.” (Voelkischer Beobachter, South German
Edition, 31 March 1933).
In order to achieve this purpose, the Ministry of Enlightenment and
Propaganda was organized so as to reach and control every medium of
expression within Germany. In the language of the decree defining the
duties of the Minister of Propaganda, he was to have
“* * * jurisdiction over the whole field of spiritual
indoctrination of the nation, of propagandizing the State, of
cultural and economic propaganda, of enlightenment of the public
at home and abroad; furthermore, he is in charge of all
institutions serving these purposes.” (_2030-PS_).
Under this decree, the Ministry controlled propaganda abroad, propaganda
within Germany, the press, music, the theater, films, art, literature,
radio and all related institutions.
Funk discharged important responsibilities in the Ministry. As
Undersecretary, he was Goebbels’ chief aide. In this capacity he appears
to have been the primary organizer of the machine from which flowed Nazi
propaganda. This is made clear by the following excerpt from an
affidavit dated 19 December 1945, and signed by Max Amann, who held the
position of Reich Leader of the Press and President of the Reich Press
Chamber.
“* * * In carrying out my duties and responsibilities, I became
familiar with the operations and the organization of the Reich
Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment.
“Walther Funk was the practical Minister of the Ministry of
Propaganda and Enlightenment and managed the Ministry. Funk was
the soul of the Ministry, and without him Goebbels could not
have built it up. Goebbels once stated to me that Funk was his
‘most effective man.’ Funk exercised comprehensive control over
all the media of expression in Germany: over the press, the
theater, radio and music. As Press Chief of the Reich Government
and subsequently as Under Secretary of the Ministry, Funk held
daily meetings with the Fuehrer and a daily press conference in
the course of which he issued the directives governing the
materials to be published by the German press”. (_3501-PS_).
A note for the files prepared by one Sigismund, an SS Scharfuehrer, also
stresses the important role which Funk played in The Ministry of
Propaganda (_3566-PS_). That note records a discussion between Sigismund
and one Weinbrenner, an official of the Ministry of Propaganda, about
the selection of a General Manager for the German Radio. The note
states:
“Weinbrenner made the following statement: * * * it is almost
impossible to determine whom the Minister would name General
Manager, since Dr. Goebbels reaches most of the important
decisions only by agreement with Under Secretary Funk.”
(_3566-PS_).
In addition to his position as Undersecretary, Funk had many other
important responsibilities in subordinate offices of the Ministry for
Propaganda (_3533-PS_). In 1933, for example, he was appointed Vice
President of the Reich Chamber of Culture, whose President was Goebbels
(_3533-PS_; _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1933, I, p. 798).
Funk’s position as Vice President of the Reich Chamber of Culture was
related to his position as Undersecretary of the Ministry, since the
Chamber of Culture and the seven subordinate chambers were by law
subject to the control of the Ministry of Propaganda (_2082-PS_). This
control was insured in practice by placing officers of the Ministry of
Propaganda in the highest positions of the Chambers. Thus, for example,
Goebbels was its President and Funk its Vice President. By virtue of his
dual position, Funk directly promoted two fundamental and related Nazi
policies: (1) the regimentation of all creative activities in the
interest of Nazi political and military objectives; (2) the elimination
of Jews and dissidents from the so-called cultural professions.
The mechanics by which these policies were carried out have been
described in Section 9 of Chapter VII on Propaganda, Censorship and
Supervision of Cultural Activities. That description will be
supplemented here only by reference to the second decree for the
Execution of the Law of Reich Chamber of Culture, dated 9 November 1933
(_2872-PS_). This decree, which was signed by Funk, representing
Goebbels, fixed the effective date for the entire scheme for the
domination and purging of the cultural professions.
The control of the Ministry of Propaganda was based in part on the
requirement that persons engaged in so-called “cultural activities”
belong to the appropriate Chamber (_1933 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 797).
Decrees were then passed which prescribed standards of admission to
these Chambers, which automatically excluded Jews. For example, in the
field of journalism, “only persons who were of Aryan descent and not
married to a person of non-Aryan descent” were permitted to be so-called
_Schriftleiter_, that is, to perform any work relating to the contents
of a newspaper or a political magazine (_2083-PS_).
Similarly, newspaper publishers had to submit proof tracing their Aryan
descent (and that of their spouses) as far back as the year 1800 (Decree
24 April 1935, issued by the President of the Reich Press Chamber,
Article 1, 3 and Article II, 1(f) and 2, reprinted in Karl Friedrich
Schrieber in “_Das Recht der Reichskulturkammer_”, vol. 2, 1935, pp.
109-112; Decrees 15 April and 22 May 1936 issued by the President of
Reich Press Chamber reprinted in Karl Friedrich Schrieber “_Das Recht
der Reichskulturkammer_”, vol. 4, 1936, pp. 101-102, 120-122; see also:
Decree 17 September 1934 reprinted in Karl Friedrich Schrieber’s “_Das
Recht der Reichskulturkammer_”, vol. 2, 1935, p. 79).
In view of Funk’s official positions and the policies which he advanced,
it is natural that Nazi writers have stressed his contribution to the
perversion of German culture. Thus Oestreich’s biography of Funk states:
“Besides, Funk had a special duty from his Ministry received the
task to take care of the cultural life. In this position he
organized quietly a tremendous concern which represented an
investment of many hundreds of millions. In close co-operation
with the Reich Leader of the Press, Max Amann, the economic
fundamentals of the German press were reconstructed according to
the political necessities. The same took place in the film
industry and in other cultural fields.” (_3505-PS_)
The reconstruction of “the economic fundamentals of the German press * *
* and other cultural fields” was a biographer’s euphemism for the
elimination of Jews and dissidents from the field of literature, music,
theater, journalism, broadcasting, and the arts.
The completeness with which the policy of cultural extermination was
carried out is made clear by a pamphlet entitled “The Reich Ministry for
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda”, by Georg Wilhelm Mueller, an
official of the Ministry of Propaganda, which was published by the
German Academy for Politics as part of a series on the organization of
the Nazi Government. That pamphlet states:
“The Department Special Cultural Tasks (a department within the
Ministry of Propaganda) serves mainly the purpose to remove the
Jews from cultural professions. It reviews the political
attitude of all artistic or cultural workers and cultural
economic enterprises that are members of the seven individual
chambers of the Reich Chamber of Culture (except the Reich
Chamber of the Press), it has to supervise the removal of Jews
in the entire field of the seven individual chambers and settles
as highest authority all complaints and appeals of cultural
workers whose membership was rejected by the Chamber because of
lack of proof of Aryan descent. At the same time, it is the task
of this department to supervise the activities of non-Aryans in
the intellectual and entire cultural field, therefore, also the
supervision of the only Jewish organization in the cultural
field in the entire Reich territory, that is, the ‘Jewish
_Kulturbund_’ (Jewish Cultural Association).
“In this way this department also cooperates with all other
professional departments of the Ministry or the Chambers by
consulting the local officials of the party, the State police
offices, etc., and when supervising the Jewish ‘cultural work’
with the political police.
“It is mainly the merit of this department—to 1937 a department
in the Managing Office of the Reich Chamber of Culture—that the
purge of the entire German cultural life from Jewish or other
non-German influences was completely accomplished according to
the assignments of the Minister.” (_Das Reichsministerium fuer
Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda_ (Reich Ministry of Public
Enlightenment and Propaganda) pp. 30-31).
Funk contributed to the achievement of the Nazi propaganda program in
other capacities. Thus, in 1933, Goebbels appointed him Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Reich Broadcasting Company (_3505-PS_). That
company was the coordinating authority for all German radio broadcasting
and supervised all German radio stations, with a view to insuring that
radio serve the political purposes of the Nazi State (_Das Deutsche
Fuehrerlexikon_, 1934-1935, p. 139; _3505-PS_). Moreover, in 1933, Funk
was also appointed Vice-president of the _Filmkreditbank_. The
_Filmkreditbank_ was a government-controlled financing corporation which
influenced film production in the interests of the Nazi program by
granting financial assistance in connection with only those films deemed
desirable from the Nazi point of view (Seager, “_Der Film im
Nationalsocialistischen Staat_” (“The Film in the National-Socialist
State”), in Frank: “_Nationalsozialistisches Handbuch fuer Recht und
Gesetzgebung_” (“National Socialist Handbook for Law and Legislation”),
1935, 2nd edition, p. 512). It is clear from the foregoing that Funk was
from 1933 until the end of 1937 a versatile and key figure in the
propaganda field. His activities ranged from daily conferences with the
Fuehrer and the organization of a new large Ministry vital to the Nazi
program, to depriving the most humble Jewish artist of his power to earn
a livelihood. Funk appears to have been what Goebbels said he was:
Goebbels’ “most effective man” (_3501-PS_).
C. _FUNK, AS MINISTER OF ECONOMICS, CONTINUED TO ADVANCE THE CONSPIRACY
TO PERSECUTE THE JEWS BY ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE PLANNING AND
EXECUTION OF THE MEASURES WHICH ELIMINATED THE JEWS FROM THE GERMAN
ECONOMY._
The systematic anti-Jewish program of the Nazi conspirators is discussed
in Chapter XII. The evidence discussed below shows that Funk, by virtue
of his activities as Minister of Economics, is responsible for the
planning and execution of the program to exclude the Jews from the
German economy.
The first record of Funk’s anti-Jewish activities as Minister of
Economics consists of a series of decrees which he signed and which were
designed to exclude the Jews from various occupations, such as real
estate business, auctioneering, etc. Reference will be made to only a
few of these decrees (Decree amending trade code of 6 July 1938, (_1938
Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 832); decree concerning occupation of
auctioneers, 12 February 1938, _1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 202.
Moreover, on 14 June 1938, Funk signed a decree providing for the
registration of “Jewish enterprises” (_1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p.
627)). This decree was part of a system of economic persecution which
obliterated Jewish ownership in all commercial, financial and industrial
enterprises.
In 1938, the death of von Rath in Paris was exploited by the Nazis as a
pretext for intensifying the persecution of the Jews. Their new
anti-Jewish policy called for the complete elimination of Jews from the
economic life of Germany. Funk took a significant part in both the
formulation and execution of this policy.
Thus, he was present at the meeting of 12 November 1938, where, with
Goering as the leading spirit, the basis for a more drastic policy
against the Jews was established (_1816-PS_). Goering described the
meeting as a decisive one, and demanded “that the Jewish question be
now, once and for all, coordinated and solved, one way or another.”
(_1816-PS_). Funk came to the meeting with a draft law which he had
prepared, and which he submitted with the following explanation:
“I have prepared a law elaborating that, effective 1 January
1939, Jews shall be prohibited to operate retail stores and
wholesale establishments, as well as independent artisan shops.
They shall further be prohibited from keeping employees or
offering any ready products on the market. Wherever a Jewish
shop is operated, the police shall shut it down. From 1 January
1939, a Jew can no longer be employed as an enterpriser, as
stipulated in the law for the Organization of National Labor
from 20 January 1934. If a Jew holds a leading position in an
establishment without being the enterpriser, his contract may be
declared void within 6 weeks by the enterpriser. With the
expiration of the contract, all claims of the employee,
including all claims to maintenance become obliterated. That is
always very disagreeable and a great danger. A Jew cannot be a
member of a corporation; Jewish members of corporations shall
have to be retired by 31 December 1938. A special authorization
is unnecessary. The competent Ministers of the Reich are being
authorized to issue the provision necessary for the execution of
this law.” (_1816-PS_)
The substance of Funk’s draft law promptly found its way into the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_. On 12 November 1938, Goering signed a decree
entitled “For the Elimination of Jews from the German Economic Life”
(_1662-PS_).
An examination of the provisions of the decree will reveal how well it
deserved its title. Thus, Jews were forbidden to operate retail stores
or mail order houses, or to engage independently in any handicraft, to
offer goods or services at markets, or to take orders therefor (Section
I): or to be “leaders” of any industrial enterprise. That decree also
provided that any Jew in an executive position of an industrial
enterprise was subject to notice of dismissal (Section 2), and that Jews
should be excluded from membership in cooperative organizations (Section
3). Funk was expressly authorized in Section 4 of the decree to issue
the regulations necessary for implementing its provisions (_1662-PS_).
Funk was also authorized to issue the regulations in connection with
another anti-Jewish decree, also issued on 12 November 1938. This decree
provided that all damage done to Jewish enterprises and apartments
during the riots of 8, 9, and 10 November, was to be repaired by the
Jewish owners out of their own pockets, and that claims by German Jews
against insurance companies were to be confiscated in favor of the
German Government (_1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1581).
Soon after the passage of the decree of 12 November, Funk, in a speech
which he delivered on the Jewish question, made it clear that the
program of economic persecution was a part of the larger program of
extermination and boasted of the fact that the new program insured the
complete elimination of the Jews from the German economy. In the course
of this speech, Funk stated:
“The state and the economy constitute a unity. They must be
directed according to the same principles. The best proof
thereof has been rendered by the most recent development of the
Jewish problem in Germany. One cannot exclude the Jews from the
political life, but let them live and work in the economic
sphere. The fact that the last violent explosion of the disgust
of the German people, because of a criminal Jewish attack
against the German people, took place at a time when we were
standing just before the termination of the economic measures
for the elimination of the Jews from the German economy—this
fact is a result of the other fact that in the last years we had
not handled this problem sufficiently early and consistently. In
any event, the basis of a complete elimination of the Jews also
from the economy had already been laid by the decrees of the
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, General Field Marshal
Goering, who was the first to undertake the solution of this
problem. In the meantime, by means of Aryanization, performed
under governmental supervision, the Jews had already been
excluded completely from the stock exchanges and the banks and
almost completely from the large businesses and all important
industrial enterprises. According to estimates, of the net
property of approximately 7 billion marks, determined pursuant
to the decree for the registration of Jewish property, 2 billion
marks have already been transferred into German possession.”
(_3545-PS_).
On 3 December 1938, Funk again advanced the policy of economic
extermination by signing a decree which carried out the promise of the
more severe anti-Jewish policy implied in his above speech (_1409-PS_).
This decree imposed additional and drastic economic disabilities upon
Jews and subjected their property to confiscation and forced
liquidation. It provided that: owners of Jewish enterprises could be
ordered to sell or liquidate their enterprises (Section 1); trustees
could be appointed for such enterprises, with the expenses of
trusteeship borne by the owner of the enterprise (Section 2); Jews could
be ordered to sell their property (real estate, etc.) (Section 6); Jews
were prohibited from acquiring any real estate (Section 7); governmental
consent was required for any disposition of real estate (Section 8);
Jews were forced to deposit all stocks, mining shares, bonds, and other
securities with specially designated banks, and accounts had to be
marked “Jewish” (Section 11); Jews were forbidden to acquire, to give as
security, or to sell objects made of gold, platinum, or silver, precious
stones, or pearls, etc. (Section 14); and Jews could be required to make
certain payments to the Reich before receiving the consent necessary for
the transfer of their property (Section 15). (_1409-PS_).
In addition, many other decrees aiming at the economic ruin of the Jews
were promulgated over the signature of the Minister of Economics. For
example:
Decree, 23 November 1938, _1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1642,
signed by Brinkmann acting for Funk and containing detailed
rules for the liquidation of Jewish retail stores, etc.;
Decree, 14 December 1938, _1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1902,
also signed by Brinkmann acting for Funk, and providing detailed
rules for the elimination of Jews from industrial enterprises;
Decree, 8 May 1939, _1939 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 895, signed
by Dr. Landfried acting for Funk, excluding Jews from the
occupation of travel agents;
Decree, 4 May 1940, _1940 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 730, also
signed by Dr. Landfried acting for Funk, concerning registration
of transfers of Jewish property;
Decree, 14 November 1940, _1940 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1520,
also signed by Dr. Landfried acting for Funk, establishing a
procedure for setting aside financial arrangements which Jews,
discharged from executive positions of industrial enterprises
prior to 12 November 1938, had made with their companies.
Extending certain of the above-described decrees to Austria,
see, e.g.:
Decree, 22 August 1942, _1942 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 537,
signed by von Hanneken, acting for Funk;
Decree, 4 December 1940, _1940 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1564,
signed by Dr. Landfried acting for Funk.
Funk had important responsibilities, not only in the formulation of
anti-Jewish policy and in the drafting of anti-Jewish legislation, but
also in the administration of the conspirators’ anti-Jewish measures.
Funk was the person to whom appeals were made concerning action taken by
subordinate officials in the administration of the anti-Jewish economic
program. In fact, he was the paramount authority in this field; his
decisions were final and conclusive. For example, he had the final voice
in the administrative hierarchy set up for deciding whether an
enterprise was a Jewish enterprise within the meaning of the decree
requiring the registration of such enterprises (Decree of 14 June 1938,
section 9, _1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 628; see also decree of 3
December 1938, section 19, _1938 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1711; decree,
14 November 1940, _1940 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1520).
Nazi publications have recognized the significant contribution made by
Funk to the anti-Jewish program. Thus Hans Quecke, an official of the
German Ministry of Economics, in describing the work of the Ministry
during Funk’s incumbency, stated:
“A task of special political significance and economic
importance arose as an absolute necessity out of the National
Socialist conception of state and economy, namely, _the
eradication of Jewish influence from the economy_. In this
connection, a wealth of legislative and administrative work,
though temporary, was created for the Ministry. The steps of the
work were as follows: definitions of the term ‘Jewish
enterprise’, registration of Jewish property, securing the
‘deployment’ of such property in accordance with the interests
of the German economy, exclusion of Jewish employees from
executive positions, and, finally, re-examination of steps taken
in the de-Judaization of enterprises with a view to ordering
payments to the Reich for the unjust profits secured in the
process of de-Judaization. That task can now be considered as
practically completed in the field of the industrial economy.”
(Building of the Third Reich (_Das Dritte Reich in Aufbau_) Vol.
5, pp. 318-319 (1941)).
Moreover, Funk himself, in the course of administering this program,
emphasized the importance of his new role. For example, on 6 February
1939, he issued a circular in connection with the administration of the
decree of 3 December 1938 which, as indicated, he himself signed. In
that circular, which was published in the Ministerial Gazette of the
Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior (“_Ministerialblatt des
Reichs—und Preussischen Ministeriums des Innern_”), for 1939, No. 7, p.
265, Funk stressed (at p. 265) “the great political and economic
importance” of the anti-Jewish program and stated with respect to the
broad powers conferred by the decree of 3 December 1938, that:
“* * * The extent and speed with which they [the powers] will be
utilized, is dependent upon _my_ orders, to be given under the
general direction of Goering.”
In the same circular (at p. 265) Funk also emphasized the importance of
the laws for de-Judaization, stating:
“The execution of the laws for the economic de-Judaization will,
for a time, impose extraordinary burdens upon the administrative
organization. However, it is expected that the officers charged
with the execution, in view of the great political and economic
importance of the tasks assigned to them, will bend all their
efforts to assure a most rapid, efficient, and in every way
faultless execution of the de-Judaization.”
Funk, in an interrogation dated 22 October 1945, admitted and deplored
his responsibility for the economic persecution of the Jews:
“Q. All the decrees excluding the Jews from industry were yours,
were they not?
“A. * * * So far as my participation in this Jewish affair is
concerned, that was my responsibility and I have regretted it
later on that I ever did participate. The Party had always
brought pressure to bear on me previously to make me agree to
the confiscation of Jewish property, and I had refused
repeatedly. But later on, when the anti-Jewish measures and the
force used against the Jews came into force, something legal had
to be done to prevent the looting and confiscation of all Jewish
property.
“Q. You know that the looting and all that was done at the
instigation of the Party, don’t you?
“(_Here witness weeps_)
“A. Yes, most certainly. That is when I should have left in
1938, of that I am guilty, I am guilty. I admit that I am a
guilty party here.” (_3544-PS_)
D. _FUNK WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONSPIRATORS’ PLANS FOR AGGRESSION,
ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN MOBILIZING THE GERMAN ECONOMY FOR AGGRESSIVE
WAR: HE ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE WAGING OF AGGRESSIVE WARS AND WAS A
MEMBER OF WAR PLANNING AGENCIES WHICH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR POLICIES AND
ACTS CONTRARY TO THE LAWS OF WAR._
Funk was vested with, and carried out, major responsibilities in
connection with the planning and execution of the Nazi program of
economic mobilization for aggression. Thus, in 1938 he succeeded Schacht
as Minister of Economics (_3533-PS_).
Immediately before Funk actually took over the Reich Ministry of
Economics there was a major reorganization of its functions, which
integrated the Ministry with the Four Year Plan as the Supreme Command
of the German military economy. The reorganization was accomplished by
Goering, in his capacity as Commissar for the Four Year Plan, by a
decree dated 4 February, 1938 (“The Four Year Plan” (_Der
Vierjahresplan_) official monthly bulletin, issued by Goering, Vol. II,
1938, p. 105). Under this decree, the jurisdiction of the Economics
Ministry was defined as covering the following fields of Germany’s
economy: German raw and working materials, mining, iron industry, power
industry, handicrafts, finance and credit, foreign trade, devisen, and
exports. As a result of this decree, sectors of the German economy which
were strategic in the organization of war and armaments economy were
placed under the immediate control of Funk.
Furthermore, the Reich Office for Economic Development, charged by the
decree, with “research, planning and execution of the Four Year Plan”,
was incorporated into the Reich Ministry of Economics. Similarly, the
Reich Office for Soil Research and the Office of the Reich Commissar for
the exploitation of Scrap Materials were made subject to that Ministry.
Thus, it is clear that the reorganization decree concentrated
significant responsibilities in the hands of Funk and thereby made him
one of the chief agents of economic mobilization during a decisive
period.
Subsequently, Funk was, by a secret law, expressly charged with the task
of mobilizing the German economy for war. On 4 September 1938, while the
conspirators were engaged in intensive planning for aggression against
Czechoslovakia, Hitler signed a revision of the so-called Reich Defense
Law (_2194-PS_). This law conferred upon Funk substantially the same
authority which had been vested in Schacht by the Reich Defense Law of
21 May 1935 (_2261-PS_). The law of 4 September 1938 provided in part:
“It is the task of the GBW [Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics]
to put all economic forces into the service of the Reich
defense, and to safeguard economically the life of the German
nation. To him are subordinate: the Reich Minister of Economics,
the Reich Minister of Nutrition and Agriculture, the Reich
Minister of Work, the Reich Chief of Forestry, the Reich
Commissar for Price Control. He is furthermore responsible for
directing the financing of the Reich defense within the realm of
the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reich Bank.
“The GBW must carry out the demands of the OKW which are of
considerable importance for the armed forces; and he must insure
the economic conditions for the production of the armament
industry directed immediately by the OKW according to its
demands. If the demands of the armed forces cannot be brought
into accord with the affairs of economy, then the Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor decides.
“The GBW has the right within his sphere to issue laws with the
consent of the OKW and GBV which differ from the existing laws.”
(_2194-PS_).
The law of 4 September 1938, which at the specific direction of Hitler
was not made public, was signed by Hitler and by Funk, among others, as
“Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics” (_2194-PS_).
Funk, in a speech which he delivered on 14 October 1939, explained how
he, as Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics, had, for a year and a half
prior to the launching of the aggression against Poland, advanced
Germany’s economic preparation for war. He stated:
“Although all the economic and financial departments were
harnessed in the tasks and work of the Four Year Plan under the
leadership of _Generalfeldmarschall_ Goering, the war economic
preparation of Germany has also been advanced in secret in
another sector for well over a year, namely, by means of the
formation of a national guiding apparatus for the special war
economic tasks, which had to be mastered at that moment, when
the condition of war became a fact. For this work as well all
economic departments were combined into one administrative
authority, namely under the General Plenipotentiary for Economy,
to which position the Fuehrer appointed me one and a half years
ago.” (_3324-PS_)
In his dual capacity of Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics and Minister
of Economics, Funk naturally was advised of the requirements which the
conspirators’ program of aggression imposed on the economy. Thus, during
a conference in the Reich Aviation Ministry on 14 October 1938 under the
chairmanship of Goering, Goering referred to Hitler’s orders for an
abnormal increase of armament, particularly weapons for attack, and
directed the Ministry of Economics to submit suggestions on how to
finance this rearmament by increasing exports. The report of Goering’s
remarks states in part:
“General Field Marshal Goering opened the session by declaring
that he intended to give directives about the work for the next
months. Everybody knows from the press what the world situation
looks like and therefore the Fuehrer has issued an order to him
to carry out a gigantic program compared to which previous
achievements are insignificant. There are difficulties in the
way which he will overcome with utmost energy and ruthlessness.
“The amount of foreign exchange has completely dwindled on
account of the preparation for the Czech Enterprise and this
makes it necessary that it should be strongly increased
immediately. Furthermore, the foreign credits have been greatly
overdrawn and thus the strongest export activity—stronger than
up to now—is in the foreground. For the next weeks an increased
export was first priority in order to improve the foreign
exchange situation. The Reich Ministry for Economy should make a
plan about raising the export activity by pushing aside the
current difficulties which prevent export.
“These gains made through the export are to be used for
increased armament. The armament should not be curtailed by the
export activity. He received the order from the Fuehrer to
increase the armament to an abnormal extent, the air force
having first priority. Within the shortest time the air force is
to be increased five fold, also the navy should get armed more
rapidly and the army should procure large amounts of offensive
weapons at a faster rate, particularly heavy artillery pieces
and heavy tanks. Along with this manufactured armaments must go;
especially fuel, powder and explosives are moved into the
foreground. It should be coupled with the accelerated
construction of highways, canals, and particularly of the
railroads.” (_1301-PS_).
Goering’s words were the words of one already at war. And the emphasis
on quintupling the Air Force and accelerating weapon manufacture for
attack, were the words of a man waging aggressive war.
Funk actively participated in the planning of wartime financial measures
(_1301-PS_). This was natural since Funk, after 1938, occupied three
positions crucial to finance: Minister of Economics, President of the
Reichsbank (to which he was appointed in January 1939), and Chief
Plenipotentiary for Economics. Funk’s role in war financing is
illustrated by a letter, dated 1 June 1939, from the Chief
Plenipotentiary for Economics (Funk), signed on his behalf by Dr. Posse
(_3562-PS_). This letter found in the captured files of the Reich
Ministry of Economics, transmitted the minutes of a meeting concerning
the financing of the war. This meeting had been held under the
chairmanship of Dr. Landfried, Funk’s Undersecretary in the Reich
Ministry of Economics. The document bears a marginal note in the bottom
left hand corner, dated 5 June, stating that the document was “to be
shown to the Minister” [i.e., Funk]. Only eight copies were made of the
Minutes, which were marked “Top Secret”. Four of these copies were sent
to officials directly subordinate to Funk (two in the Reich Ministry of
Economics, one in the Reichsbank, and one in the Office of the Chief
Plenipotentiary for Economics). During the course of the meeting, which
was attended by twelve officials, five of whom were directly responsible
to Funk in his various capacities, the conferees discussed a memorandum
regarding war finance which had been prepared by the Chief
Plenipotentiary for Economics on May 9, 1939. The minutes of this
meeting state:
“* * * Then a report was made of the contents of the ‘Notes on
the Question of Internal Financing of War’, of 9 May of this
year (appendix to GBW 8/2179/39 Top Secret), in which the
figures given to me by the Reichs Minister of Finance are also
discussed. It was pointed out that the General Plenipotentiary
for the Economy is primarily interested to introduce into the
legislation for war finance, the idea of financing war
expenditures by anticipating future revenues, to be expected
after the war. * * *
“Undersecretary Newman, first, submitted for discussion the
question whether the production would be able to meet to the
assumed extent, the demands of the Army, especially if the
demands of the Army, as stated in the above report, would
increase to approximately 14 billions in the first three months
of war. He stated that, if the production potential of the
present Reich territory is taken as a basis, he doubts the
possibility of such a production increase.” (_3562-PS_).
During the course of the meeting one of the representatives of the High
Command stated:
“The demands of the Army would probably be higher in the first
three months of war than during the further course of the war.”
(_3562-PS_).
In the files of the Reich Ministry of Economics there was also found,
attached to the above letter and minutes, a Top Secret memorandum
entitled “Notes Concerning Financing of War.” That memorandum reveals
the plans to use the resources of countries to be occupied in the
interest of the Nazi war machine. It states:
“* * * First, as concerns the scope of the total production, it
is clear that the economic power of the Protectorate and of
other territories, possibly to be acquired, must of course be
completely exhausted for the purposes of the conduct of the war.
It is, however, just as clear that these territories cannot
obtain any compensation from the economy of Greater Germany for
the products which they will have to give us during the war,
because their power must be used fully for the war and for
supplying the civilian home population.” (_3562-PS_).
It is plain that Funk exercised comprehensive authority over large areas
of the German economy whose proper organization and direction were
critical to effective war preparation. The once powerful German military
machine, which rested on the foundation of thorough economic
preparation, reflected the contribution which Funk had made to Nazi
aggression.
Immediately before this machine was directed against Poland, the final
preparatory steps were taken, and the previous appointment of Funk as
Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics was made public. Thus on 27 August
1939, Funk, in this capacity, issued two decrees, one introducing
general rationing of consumers’ goods, the other setting up regional
economic authorities (_1939 Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, pp. 1495 and 1498).
Finally, on 30 August 1939, Hitler, Goering, and Lammers signed a decree
establishing the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense, composed of
Goering, Funk, and Hess, among others, to act as a War Cabinet (_1939
Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, p. 1532).
Funk mobilized the German economy for war with full knowledge of the
plans for military aggression. An irresistible inference of such
knowledge arises from the combination of several factors: from Funk’s
long and intimate association with the Nazi inner circle; from the very
nature of his official functions; from the war-dominated setting of Nazi
Germany; from the fact that force and the threat of force had become the
open and primary instruments of Nazi policy; and finally from the fact
that at the same time that Funk was making economic preparations,
specific plans for aggression—later to be carried out—were being
formulated, plans which could only be effective if they were
synchronized with the complementary economic measures.
The inference of Funk’s knowledge and intent is reinforced beyond
question by considering, in the light of the factors described above,
the more specific evidence of Funk’s knowledge of aggressive plans.
Thus, Funk, at the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, had stated
that the absorption of Austria by Germany was a political and economic
necessity, and that it would be achieved by whatever means were
necessary (_1760-PS_).
Goering had issued instructions to the Ministry of Economics—in the
language of a man waging aggressive war (_1301-PS_). Moreover, Funk and
his subordinates in May 1939 were making detailed plans for financing
the war, that is, a particular war, the war against Poland (_3562-PS_).
In connection with Funk’s economic planning for aggression, reference
should be made to other evidence of the preparatory work which Funk
carried on prior to the aggression against Poland. Shortly before the
attack on Poland, in a letter to Hitler dated 25 August 1939, Funk
expressed his gratification for his role in the “tremendous events” of
these days, and his thanks for Hitler’s approval of his economic war
measures. He concluded by giving Hitler his pledge in that hour
(_699-PS_). The text of the letter is as follows:
“Reich Minister Walther Funk.
Berlin W. 8, August 25, 1939.
Unter Den Linden 13.
“My Fuehrer:
“For the congratulations which you transmitted to me on my
birthday, in such extremely friendly and kind fashion, I want to
thank you from the depths of my heart. How happy and how
grateful we must be to you to be favored to experience these
colossal and world-moving times, and that we can contribute to
the tremendous events of these days.
“General-Field-Marshal Goering informed me, that last night
you—my Fuehrer—have approved in principle the measures
prepared by me for financing the war, for setting up the wage
and price systems and for carrying out the plan for an emergency
contribution [_Notopfer_]. This news has made me deeply happy. I
hereby most obediently report to you that I have succeeded,
through the provisions made already during the last month, to
make the German Reichsbank internally so strong and so safe
against attack from without that even the most serious
disturbances of the international currency and credit systems
would be absolutely unable to affect us.
“In the meantime I have in a wholly inconspicuous manner
converted into gold all assets of the Reichsbank and of the
German economy abroad on which we could possibly lay hands. With
the proposals worked out by me regarding a ruthless choking of
any unessential consumption and any public expenditure and
project not necessary for war we will be able to meet all
financial and economic demands without any serious
reverberations.
“In my capacity as General Plenipotentiary for Economics,
appointed by you, my Fuehrer, I have regarded it as my duty to
give you this report and this pledge in this hour.
“Heil, my Fuehrer
“(signed) Walther Funk”. (_699-PS_).
Funk both personally and through duly designated representatives also
participated in the planning which preceded the aggression against the
USSR. Thus, in April 1941, Rosenberg, after he had been appointed deputy
for centralized treatment of problems concerning the Eastern
Territories, discussed with Funk the economic problems which would be
raised when the plans for aggression in the East were carried out
(_1039-PS_). At that time Funk appointed Dr. Schlotterer as his deputy
to work with Rosenberg in connection with the exploitation of the
Eastern Territories. Funk’s deputy met with Rosenberg almost daily.
E. _FUNK WAS A MEMBER OF WAR-PLANNING AGENCIES WHICH WERE RESPONSIBLE
FOR POLICIES AND ACTS CONTRARY TO THE LAWS OF WAR._
After the launching of the Nazi aggression against Poland, Funk, in his
capacities as Minister of Economics, President of the Reichsbank, and
Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics, and as a member of the Central
Planning Board (to which he was appointed in September 1943), actively
participated in the waging of aggressive war on the economic front.
Moreover, by virtue of his membership in the Central Planning Board,
which formulated and directed the execution of the program for the
enslavement, exploitation, and degradation of millions of foreign
workers, Funk shares special responsibility for the Nazi Slave Labor
Program. (See Chapter X on the Slave Labor Program. This special aspect
of Funk’s responsibility was left for development by the French
prosecuting staff.)
F. _CONCLUSION._
It is clear that Funk was a central figure in the Nazi conspiracy and
that, as a member of the Nazi inner circle, he helped formulate, was
aware of, and promoted the realization of, the conspirators’ program. He
knew, moreover, that this program envisaged the use of terror and force
within and if necessary outside of Germany, and that it contemplated the
use of criminal means. Funk, by promoting the conspirators’ accession to
power and the realization of their program, signified his approval of
such crimes.
The evidence has also established that, after the Nazi seizure of power,
Funk promoted the achievement of the conspirators’ program by virtue of
his activities in the Ministry of Propaganda, activities which fomented
and carried out the persecution of Jews and dissidents; which
psychologically mobilized the German people for aggressive war; and
which reduced the willingness and capacity of the conspirators’ intended
victims to resist aggression. Funk also participated, as Minister of
Economics, in the formulation and execution of the policy for the
complete elimination of the Jews from the German economy.
As Minister of Economics, President of the Reichsbank, and Chief
Plenipotentiary for Economics, Funk mobilized the German economy for
aggressive war, with full knowledge of the conspirators’ plans for
aggression. Moreover, in these capacities, and as a member of the
Ministerial Council for the Defense and the Central Planning Board, he
also actively participated in the waging of aggressive wars. Finally, by
virtue of his membership in the Central Planning Board, which formulated
and directed the execution of the program for the enslavement,
exploitation, and degradation of millions of foreign workers, he bears a
special responsibility for the war crimes committed in the execution of
that program.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO WALTER FUNK
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 62
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
699-PS │Letter from Funk to Hitler, 25 August │ │
│1939, reporting on economic affairs. │ │
│(GB 49) │ III │ 509
│ │ │
*1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │
│regarding problems in Eastern │ │
│Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695
│ │ │
*1301-PS │File relating to financing of armament│ │
│including minutes of conference with │ │
│Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 │ │
│October 1938, concerning acceleration │ │
│of rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868
│ │ │
1409-PS │Order concerning utilization of Jewish│ │
│property, 3 December 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1709. │ IV │ 1
│ │ │
1662-PS │Order eliminating Jews from German │ │
│economic life, 12 November 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1580. │ IV │ 172
│ │ │
*1760-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 28│ │
│August 1945. (USA 57) │ IV │ 305
│ │ │
*1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │
│The Jewish Question, under the │ │
│Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, │ │
│12 November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425
│ │ │
2029-PS │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry│ │
│of Public Enlightenment and │ │
│Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104. │ IV │ 652
│ │ │
2030-PS │Decree concerning the Duties of the │ │
│Reich Ministry for Public │ │
│Enlightenment and Propaganda, 30 June │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 449. │ IV │ 653
│ │ │
2082-PS │Law relating to the Reich Chamber of │ │
│Culture of 22 September 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 661. │ IV │ 708
│ │ │
2083-PS │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933.│ │
│1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│713. │ IV │ 709
│ │ │
*2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │
│Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │
│Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │
│enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │
│Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │
│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │
│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │
│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │
│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │
│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2828-PS │Interrogations of Funk on 4 June 1945 │ │
│and 26 June 1945. (USA 654) │ V │ 478
│ │ │
2872-PS │Fourth decree relative to Reich │ │
│Citizen Law of 25 July 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 969. │ V │ 533
│ │ │
*2962-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │
│15 March 1933. (USA 578) │ V │ 669
│ │ │
*2963-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │
│20 March 1933. (USA 656) │ V │ 670
│ │ │
*2977-PS │Affidavit of Funk, 14 November 1945, │ │
│concerning positions held. (USA 10) │ V │ 683
│ │ │
*3324-PS │Funk on the Organization of War │ │
│Economy, published in Germany in the │ │
│Fight. (USA 661) │ VI │ 42
│ │ │
*3501-PS │Affidavit signed by Max Amann, 19 │ │
│December 1945. (USA 657) │ VI │ 207
│ │ │
*3505-PS │Extract from “Walter Funk—A Life for │ │
│the Economy”, 1941, by Paul Oestreich.│ │
│(USA 653) │ VI │ 208
│ │ │
3533-PS │Statement of Funk concerning positions│ │
│held by him. (USA 651) │ VI │ 216
│ │ │
*3544-PS │Interrogation of Funk, 22 October │ │
│1945. (USA 660) │ VI │ 217
│ │ │
*3545-PS │Speech by Funk, from Frankfurter │ │
│Zeitung, 17 November 1938. (USA 659) │ VI │ 239
│ │ │
*3562-PS │Letter from Chief Plenipotentiary for │ │
│Economy, 1 June 1939, transmitting │ │
│minutes of meeting concerning │ │
│financing of war. (USA 662). │ VI │ 248
│ │ │
*3563-PS │Extracts from German publications │ │
│concerning Funk’s positions and │ │
│activities. (USA 652) │ VI │ 251
│ │ │
3566-PS │Notes for files, prepared by │ │
│SS-Scharfuehrer Sigismund, concerning │ │
│General Manager of German │ │
│Broadcasting, 1 March 1937. │ VI │ 254
│ │ │
*D-203 │Speech of Hitler to leading members of│ │
│industry before the election of March │ │
│1933. (USA 767) │ VI │ 1080
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA) │ VIII │ 770
12. HJALMAR SCHACHT
The prosecution concedes, at the outset, that although Schacht believed
that the Jews of Germany should be stripped of their rights as citizens,
he was not in complete sympathy with that aspect of the Nazi Party’s
program which involved the wholesale extermination of the Jews, and that
he was, for that reason, attacked from time to time by the more extreme
elements of the Nazi Party. It further concedes that Schacht, on
occasion, gave aid and comfort to individual Jews who sought to escape
the indignities generally inflicted upon Jews in Nazi Germany. Schacht’s
attitude towards the Jews is exemplified by his speech at the German
Eastern Fair, Koenigsberg, on 18 August 1935, wherein he said:
“The Jew must realize that their influence is gone for all
times. We desire to keep our people and our culture pure and
distinctive, just as the Jews have always demanded this of
themselves since the time of the prophet Ezra. But the solution
of these problems must be brought about under state leadership,
and cannot be left to unregulated individual actions, which mean
a disturbing influence on the national
The foregoing concessions should render it unnecessary for Schacht to
produce evidence upon these matters.
The prosecution’s case against Schacht is that he planned and prepared
for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties,
agreements and assurances, and that he knowingly and wilfully
participated in the Nazi common plan or conspiracy to plan, prepare,
initiate, and wage such wars. The evidence establishes that Schacht
actively supported Hitler’s accession to power; that he was the chief
architect of the financial plans and devices which made possible the
huge program of rearmament in Germany; that he played a dominant role in
the economic planning of, and preparation for, wars of aggression; and
that he contributed his efforts willingly and with full knowledge of the
fact that the leader of the conspiracy, Adolf Hitler, was determined
upon attaining his objectives by launching aggressive wars.
A. _CHRONOLOGY OF SCHACHT’S OFFICIAL POSITIONS._
The chronology of Schacht’s official positions is as follows:
(1) Schacht was recalled by Hitler to the Presidency of the
Reichsbank on 17 March 1933 (_3021-PS_).
(2) Schacht was appointed acting Minister of Economics by Hitler
in August 1934 (_3021-PS_).
(3) By secret decree, Schacht was appointed General
Plenipotentiary for the War Economy in May 1935 (_2261-PS_).
(4) Schacht was awarded honorary membership in the Nazi Party
and the Golden Swastika on 30 January 1937, “the highest honor
the Third Reich has to offer” (_EC-500_).
(5) Schacht was re-appointed for one year as President of the
Reichsbank on 16 March 1937 (_3021-PS_).
(6) Schacht resigned as Minister of Economics and General
Plenipotentiary for the War Economy in November 1937 (_3021-PS_;
_EC-494_).
(7) Hitler appointed Schacht Minister Without Portfolio at the
same time (_3021-PS_).
(8) Schacht was re-appointed for a four year term as President
of the Reichsbank on 9 March 1938 (_3021-PS_).
(9) Schacht was dismissed as President of the Reichsbank on 20
January 1939. In connection therewith, Hitler expressed his deep
gratitude for Schacht’s past services and his gratification that
Schacht would remain to serve him as Minister Without Portfolio
(_EC-397_).
(10) Schacht remained as Minister Without Portfolio until
January 1943, when he was dismissed by Hitler. During the period
from the time of his dismissal as President of the Reichsbank
until the end of 1942, he continued to receive the full salary
he had been paid as the President of the Reichsbank, and
thereafter received a pension from the Reichsbank. As Minister
Without Portfolio, he received a large salary from the Nazi
Government and other emoluments of the office (_3724-PS_).
B. _PRIOR TO 1933, SCHACHT ACCEPTED THE NAZI PROGRAM AND HELPED HITLER
TO POWER._
Schacht met Goering for the first time in December 1930, and Hitler
early in January 1931, at Goering’s house. He thought that Hitler was
“full of will and spirit” and a man “with whom one could cooperate”.
Thereafter, he actively supported Hitler’s accession to power
(_3725-PS_; _3729-PS_).
Schacht’s belief in the Nazi program and his undivided loyalty to Hitler
are revealed in his letter to Hitler dated 29 August 1932, wherein he
pledged continued support to Hitler after the latter’s poor showing in
the July 1932 elections and proferred advice concerning electioneering
tactics. The letter includes the following statements, _inter alia_:
“But what you could perhaps do with in these days is a word of
most sincere sympathy. Your movement is carried internally by so
strong a truth and necessity that victory in one form or another
cannot elude you for long. * * *”
* * * * * *
“Wherever my work may take me in the near future even if you
should see me one day within the fortress—you can always count
on me as your reliable assistant.” (_EC-457_).
Subsequently, on 12 November 1932, he again wrote to Hitler,
congratulating him upon his firm attitude and stating:
“I have no doubt that the present development of things can only
lead to your becoming chancellor. * * * I am quite confident
that the present system is certainly doomed to disintegration.”
(_EC-456_).
The fact that Schacht was in complete accord with Hitler’s program is
further shown by the following entry of 21 November 1932, in Goebbels’
diary:
“In a conversation with Dr. Schacht, I assured myself that he
absolutely represents our point of view. He is one of the few
who accepts the Fuehrer’s position entirely.” (_2409-PS_).
Schacht has himself confirmed the correctness of Goebbels’ statement
(_3729-PS_).
But Schacht’s contribution to Hitler before his accession to power did
not consist merely of comforting him, giving advice, and expressing
agreement with the Nazi program. He was an active participant in
Hitler’s vigorous campaign to take over the German state. Thus, he
openly lent the prestige of his name, which was widely known in banking,
financial, and business circles, to Hitler’s cause (_3729-PS_). He
actively undertook to induce business leaders to support Hitler. In his
letter to Hitler of 12 November 1932, he wrote that:
“It seems as if our attempt to collect a number of signatures
from business circles for this purpose (your becoming
Chancellor) was not altogether in vain * * *.” (_EC-456_)
He organized the financial means for the decisive March 1933 election,
at a meeting of Hitler with a group of German industrialists in Berlin.
At this meeting, Hitler bluntly announced his plans to destroy the
parliamentary system in Germany, to crush all internal opposition by
force, to restore the power of the Wehrmacht, and to gain his objectives
outside of Germany by the use of force. On this occasion, Schacht
collected a campaign fund of several million Marks for Hitler’s use
(_D-203_; _EC-439_).
In an eulogy of Schacht on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, the
_Voelkischer Beobachter_, Hitler’s official organ, aptly described
Schacht’s activity in the period before the 1933 election as follows:
“In this critical period, Schacht never failed to point at Adolf
Hitler as the only possible leader of the Reich.”
* * * * * *
“The name of Dr. Schacht will remain linked with the transition
of the German economy to the new National Socialist methods”
(_EC-499_).
C. _SCHACHT PLAYED A DOMINANT ROLE IN THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM OF
REARMAMENT AND ECONOMIC PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR WAR._
Germany was virtually prostrate in the early part of 1933; she was faced
with dwindling revenues from taxation and seemingly unable to raise
money either through external or internal loans. Hitler entrusted to
Schacht the task of wringing from the depressed German economy the
tremendous material requirements of armed aggression, and endowed him
with vast powers over every sector of German industry, commerce, and
finance to carry out that task. Some of the devices which Schacht
employed to fulfill his mission will now be examined.
Schacht’s program, as hereinafter outlined, was, by his own admissions,
dedicated to the accomplishment of Hitler’s armament program. In a
memorandum to Hitler dated 3 May 1935 concerning the financing of
armament, Schacht wrote:
“The following comments are based on the assumption that the
accomplishment of the armament program in regard to speed and
extent, is _the_ task of German policy, and that therefore
everything else must be subordinated to this aim, although the
reaching of this main goal must not be imperiled by neglecting
other questions. * * *”
* * * * * *
“* * * all expenditures which are not urgently needed in other
matters, must stop and the entire, in itself small, financial
power of Germany must be concentrated toward the one goal: to
arm.” (_1168-PS_).
In a letter to General Thomas dated 29 December 1937, Schacht stated:
“I have always considered a rearmament of the German people as
_conditio sine qua non_ of the establishment of a new German
nation.” (_EC-257_).
Schacht’s vast achievements in furtherance of the conspirators’ program
may conveniently be considered under four headings: (a) armament
financing; (b) the “New Plan”; (c) control of production; and (d) plans
and preparations for economic controls during war.
(1) _Armament Financing._
(_a_) _Mefo bills._ The financing of the conspirators’ huge rearmament
program presented a twofold problem to Schacht. First, was the need of
obtaining funds over and above the amount which could be obtained
through taxation and public loans. Second, was the conspirators’ desire,
in the early stages of rearmament, to conceal the extent of their
feverish armament activities. Schacht’s answer to the problem was the
“mefo” bills, a scheme which he devised for the exclusive use of
armament financing (_EC-436_).
Transactions in “mefo” bills worked as follows: “mefo” bills were drawn
by armament contractors and accepted by a limited liability company
called the _Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft_, m.b.H.(MEFO). This
company was merely a dummy organization; it had a nominal capital of
only one million Reichsmarks. “Mefo” bills ran for six months, but
provision was made for extensions running consecutively for three months
each. The drawer could present his “mefo” bills to any German bank for
discount at any time, and these banks, in turn, could rediscount the
bills at the Reichsbank at any time within the last three months of
their earliest maturity. The amount of “mefo” bills outstanding was a
guarded state secret (_EC-436_). The “mefo” bill system continued to be
used until 1 April 1938, when 12 billion Reichsmarks of “mefo” bills
were outstanding (_EC-436_). This method of financing enabled the Reich
to obtain credit from the Reichsbank which, under existing statutes, it
could not directly have obtained. Direct lending to the Government by
the Reichsbank had been limited by statute to 100 million Reichsmarks
(_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1924, II, p. 241). Schacht has conceded that his
“mefo” bill device “enabled the Reichsbank to lend by a subterfuge to
the Government what it normally or legally could not do” (_3728-PS_).
In a speech delivered on 29 November 1938, Schacht glowingly described
the credit policy of the Reichsbank of which he was the author as
follows:
“It is possible that no bank of issue in peacetimes carried on
such a daring credit policy at the Reichsbank since the seizure
of power by National Socialism. With the aid of this credit
policy, however, Germany created an armament second to none, and
this armament in turn made possible the results of our policy.”
(_EC-611_).
The “daring credit policy,” which made possible the creation of “an
armament second to none,” obviously embraced the “mefo” bill financing
which he had contrived.
(_b_) _Use of funds of opponents of Nazi regime._ In his efforts to draw
upon every possible source of funds for the conspirators’ rearmament
program, Schacht even used the blocked funds of foreigners’ deposits in
the Reichsbank. In his memorandum to Hitler of 3 May 1935, Schacht
boasted:
“The Reichsbank invested the major part of Reichsbank accounts
owned by foreigners, and which were accessible to the
Reichsbank, in armament drafts. Our armaments are, therefore,
being financed partially with the assets of our political
opponents.” (_1168-PS_).
(_c_) _Taxation and long term indebtedness._ “Mefo” bills and the funds
of political opponents of the conspirators were, of course, not the only
sources from which Schacht drew to finance the armament program. Funds
for rearmament were likewise derived from taxation and an increase in
public debt—channels through which part of national income is
ordinarily diverted to public authorities. But what distinguished the
conspirators’ program of public indebtedness was the fact that the
German capital market was completely harnessed to the expanding needs of
the Nazi war machine. By a series of controls, they reduced to the
minimum consistent with their rearmament program, all private issues
which might have competed with Government issues for the limited funds
in the capital market. Thus, the capital market was, in effect,
pre-empted for Government issues (_EC-497_; _EC-611_).
During the period from 31 December 1932 to 30 June 1938, the funded debt
of the Reich rose from 10.4 billion Marks to 19 billion Marks
(_EC-419_).
This large increase in funded debt was dedicated “as far as possible” to
“the financing of armament and the Four-Year Plan” (_EC-611_).
(2) _The New Plan._ The conspirators’ grandiose armament plans obviously
required huge quantities of raw materials. Schacht was a proponent of
the view that as much of the requisite raw materials as possible should
be produced within Germany. At the same time, however, he recognized
that large imports of raw materials were indispensable to the success of
the conspirators’ gigantic armament program. To that end, he fashioned
an intricate system of controls and devices which he called the “New
Plan” (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, I, pp. 816, 829, 864;
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1935, I, p. 105).
There were three main features of the “New Plan” as devised by Schacht:
(1) restriction of the demand for such foreign exchange as would be used
for purposes unrelated to the conspirators’ rearmament program; (2)
increase of the supply of foreign exchange, as a means of paying for
essential imports which could not otherwise be acquired; and (3)
clearing agreements and other devices obviating the need for foreign
exchange. Under the “New Plan”, economic transactions between Germany
and the outside world were no longer governed by the autonomous price
mechanism; they were determined by a number of Government agencies whose
primary aim was to satisfy the needs of the conspirators’ military
economy (_EC-437_).
Schacht accomplished the negative task of restricting the demand for
foreign exchange
“by various measures suspending the service on Germany’s foreign
indebtedness, by freezing other claims of foreigners on Germany,
by a stringent system of export controls and by eliminating
foreign travel and other unessential foreign expenditures.”
(_EC-437_).
In order to increase the available supply of foreign exchange
“Schacht repeatedly requisitioned all existing foreign exchange
reserves of German residents, required all foreign exchange
arising out of current exports and other transactions to be sold
to the Reichsbank, and by developing new export markets. Exports
were encouraged by direct subsidies and by accepting partial
payment in German foreign bonds or in restricted Marks which
could be acquired by foreign importers at a substantial
discount.” (_EC-437_).
A vast network of organizations was erected to effectuate these various
measures. Suffice it for the present purposes to mention merely one of
these organizations: the supervisory agencies (_Ueberwachungsstellen_).
These agencies, which were under Schacht’s control as Minister of
Economics, decided whether given imports and exports were desirable;
whether the quantities, prices, credit terms, and countries involved
were satisfactory; and, in short, whether any particular transaction
advanced the conspirators’ armament program. The overriding military
purpose of the series of controls instituted under the “New Plan” is
plainly shown in Schacht’s letter of 5 August 1937 to Goering, wherein
he said:
“* * * The very necessity of bringing our armament up to a
certain level as rapidly as possible must place in the
foreground the idea of as large returns as possible in foreign
exchange and therewith the greatest possible assurance of raw
material supplies, through exporting.” (_EC-497_)
There remains for consideration that aspect of the “New Plan” which
involved extensive use of clearing agreements and other arrangements
made by Schacht to obtain materials from abroad without the expenditure
of foreign exchange. The principle of the clearing system is as follows:
The importer makes a deposit of the purchase price in his own currency
at the national clearing agency of his country, which places the same
amount to the credit of the clearing agency of the exporting country.
The latter institution then pays the exporter in his own currency. Thus,
if trade between two countries is unequal, the clearing agency of one
acquires a claim against the agency of the other. That claim, however,
is satisfied only when a shift in the balance of trade gives rise to an
offsetting claim.
This device was used by Schacht as a means of exploiting Germany’s
position as Europe’s largest consumer in order to acquire essential raw
materials from countries which, because of the world wide economic
depression, were dependent upon the German market as an outlet for their
surplus products. Speaking of his system of obtaining materials abroad
without the use of foreign exchange, Schacht has stated:
“It has been shown that, in contrast to everything which
classical national economy has hitherto taught, not the producer
but the consumer is the ruling factor in economic life. And this
thesis is somewhat connected with general social and political
observations, because it establishes the fact that the number of
consumers is considerably larger than the number of producers, a
fact which exercises a not inconsiderable social and political
pressure.” (_EC-611_)
Schacht’s clearing agreements were particularly effective in
Southeastern Europe, where agricultural exports had been considerably
curtailed by competition from the more extensive and efficient overseas
agriculture. The success of Schacht’s ruthless use of Germany’s
bargaining position is indicated by the fact that by August 1937, there
had been imported into Germany approximately one half billion
Reichsmarks of goods in excess of the amount delivered under the
clearing arrangements. In his letter to Goering dated 5 August 1937,
Schacht stated:
“* * * in clearing transactions with countries furnishing raw
materials and food products we have bought in excess of the
goods we were able to deliver to these countries (namely,
Southeastern Europe and Turkey) roughly one half billion RM * *
*.” (_EC-497_)
Thus, through this device, Schacht was able to extract huge loans from
foreign countries which Germany could not have obtained through ordinary
channels. The device as developed by Schacht was subsequently used
during the war as a means of systematically exploiting the occupied
countries of Western Europe.
In addition to the clearing agreements, Schacht devised the system which
came to be known as the “aski” accounts. This scheme likewise obviated
the need for free currency (i.e. Reichsmarks freely convertible into
foreign currency at the official rate—U. S. dollars, pounds sterling,
etc). The system worked as follows: The German foreign exchange control
administration would authorize imports of goods in specified quantities
and categories on the condition that the foreign sellers agreed to
accept payment in the form of Mark credits to accounts of a special type
held in German banks. These accounts were called “aski”, an abbreviation
of _Auslander Sonderkonten fuer Inlandszahlungen_ (foreigners’ special
accounts for inland payments). The so-called “aski” Marks in such an
account could be used to purchase German goods only for export to the
country of the holder of the account; they could not be converted into
foreign currency at the official rates of exchange. Each group of “aski”
accounts formed a separate “island of exchange” in which the German
authorities, under Schacht’s leadership, could apply their control as
the country’s bargaining position in each case seemed to warrant.
Schacht’s ingenious devices were eminently successful. They admirably
served the conspirators’ need of obtaining materials which were
necessary to create and maintain their war machine. On this point,
Schacht has stated:
“The success of the New Plan can be proved by means of a few
figures. Calculated according to quantity, the import of
finished products was throttled by 63 percent between 1934 and
1937. On the other hand, the import of ores was increased by 132
percent, of petroleum by 116, of grain by 102 and of rubber by
71 percent.”
* * * * * *
“These figures show how much the New Plan contributed to the
execution of the armament program as well as to the securing of
our food.” (_EC-611_)
(3) _Production Control._ As an additional means of assuring that the
conspirators’ military needs would be met, Schacht adopted a host of
controls over the productive mechanism of Germany, extending, _inter
alia_, to the allocation of raw materials, regulation of productive
capacity, use of abundant or synthetic substitutes in place of declining
stocks of urgently needed materials, and the erection of new capacity
for the production of essential commodities. The structure of regulation
was built up out of thousands of decrees in which governmental agencies
under Schacht’s control issued permits, prohibitions, and instructions.
These decrees were the outgrowth of carefully laid plans of the Ministry
of Economics, of which Schacht was the head, concerning “economic
preparation for the conduct of war”, and in accordance with its view
that “genuine positive economic mobilization” demanded that “exact
instructions for every individual commercial undertaking are laid down
by a central authority” (_EC-128_).
The plan to allocate raw materials was carried out through myriad
“orders to produce” specifying that certain commodities must or must not
be produced; “orders to process or use” prescribing the type and
quantity of raw material which could or could not be used in the
production of a given commodity; orders specifying that scarce raw
materials could be used only as admixtures with more plentiful but
inferior products; and other like measures. The precise details of these
orders are unimportant for present purposes. Their significance lies in
the fact that they were governed by a central purpose: preparation for
war. In the above mentioned secret report issued in September 1934 by
the Ministry of Economics it was said:
“Rules are to be initiated for the allotment of scarce raw
materials etc.; and their use and processing for other than war,
or otherwise absolutely vital, goods is prohibited.” (_EC-128_)
The military aspects of Schacht’s plans to increase the production of
scarce raw materials within Germany, and thereby reduce Germany’s
dependence upon foreign countries for materials needed in the rearmament
program, are likewise revealed in the aforementioned report of the
Ministry of Economics of September 1934:
“The investigations initiated by the Raw Materials Commission
and the measures introduced for enlarging our raw materials
basis through home production as well as for furthering the
production of substitute materials will directly benefit war
economy preparations.” (_EC-128_)
(4) _Plans and Preparations for Economic Controls During War._ Pursuant
to the unpublished Reich Defense Law secretly enacted on 21 May 1935,
Schacht was appointed General Plenipotentiary for War Economy by Hitler.
Under this law, Schacht was placed in complete charge of economic
planning and preparation for war in peacetime, except for the direct
production of armaments which was entrusted to the Ministry of War; and
upon the outbreak of war, Schacht was to be the virtual economic
dictator of Germany. His task was “to put all economic forces in the
service of carrying on the war and to secure the life of the German
people economically”. In order to facilitate his task, the Ministers of
Economy, Food and Agriculture, Labor, and Forestry were subordinated to
him, and he was authorized “within his realm of responsibility, to issue
legal regulations which may deviate from existing regulations”. The
necessity for absolute secrecy was stressed (_2261-PS_).
Schacht appointed Wohlthat as his deputy General Plenipotentiary for War
Economy and organized a staff to carry out his directives. Schacht has
admitted that he must accept full responsibility for the actions of
these subordinates (_3729-PS_).
Before his resignation in late 1937, Schacht had worked out in amazing
detail his plans and preparations for the German economy in the
forthcoming war. Recognizing that wartime controls, to be effective,
must be based on adequate information, Schacht had directed the
completion of comprehensive surveys of 180,000 industrial plants in
Germany and had compiled statistics concerning
“* * * the composition of the labor force as to sex, age, and
training, the consumption of raw and auxiliary material, fuels,
power, the productive capacity, the domestic and foreign trade
as well as the supply of material and products in the beginning
and at the end of the year.” (_EC-258_)
On the basis of the statistical data thus collected, plans had been
formulated by the end of 1937 wherein
“* * * the needs of the Armed Forces and the civilian minimum
needs in wartime are compared with the covering thereof by
supplies and production.” (_EC-258_)
The supervisory boards, which were briefly described above in connection
with the import and export controls, were charged with “preparing their
orders for the regulation of war contracts and fees”, and were
instructed to coordinate with various Reich manpower authorities to
secure “their indispensable personnel” (_EC-258_).
Special measures were taken under Schacht’s direction, to maintain
“mobilization stocks” of coal and to assure their distribution in
accordance with the wartime needs of armament factories and large
consumers. Large “gasoline storage places” were constructed for use of
the Wehrmacht and “gasoline stations and gasoline stores” were
designated “for the first equipment of the troops in case of
mobilization”. Careful plans were also made for the allocation of power
during war, and practice manoeuvers were held in order to determine
“what measures have to be taken in case places of power generation
should be eliminated” (_EC-258_).
Evacuation plans for the removal of war materials, agricultural
products, skilled workers, and animals from military zones were worked
out by the Office of the Plenipotentiary for War Economy with
characteristic thoroughness. Thus, “the supplies and skilled workers in
the evacuation zones” were “registered, earmarked for transportation
into certain salvage areas and registered with the _Wehrkreiskommandos_
by the field offices of evacuation and salvaging plans” (_EC-258_).
Detailed plans for a system of rationing to become effective immediately
upon mobilization had already been made by the end of 1937:
“The 80 million ration cards necessary for this purpose have
already been printed and deposited with the Landrats, Chief
Mayors, and corresponding authorities. The further distribution
of the ration cards to the individual households is prepared by
these authorities to take place within 24 hours after
mobilization has been ordered.” (_EC-258_).
Trusted persons whose reliability had been attested to by the Secret
State Police were installed in important enterprises and charged with
the execution of “measures which guarantee the maintenance of production
of their enterprises in the event of mobilization”. Their functions
likewise extended, among other matters, to applying “for exemptions from
military service” of “employees who are indispensable to their
enterprise”, and seeking immunity from requisition by the Wehrmacht of
all motor trucks which were needed in the enterprises to which they were
assigned (_EC-258_).
Pursuant to directives issued by Schacht as Plenipotentiary, labor
authorities of the Government ascertained “the available amount of
manpower, the wartime requirements of manpower and measures for the
covering of the wartime needs”. The wartime needs were to be met in part
“by using reserve manpower (manpower theretofore used in non-essential
enterprises, women, etc.)”, and by making “every change of working place
and every hiring of workers dependent upon the consent of the Labor
Office” (_EC-258_).
The foregoing measures, it should be noted, are merely representative;
they are not exhaustive. But enough appears to make it abundantly clear
that Schacht’s contribution, by any standard was an extraordinarily
important one. Enough appears, moreover, to give particular emphasis to
the following observations of the Honorable George S. Messersmith,
United States Consul General in Berlin from 1930 to 1934:
“It was his [Schacht’s] financial ability that enabled the Nazi
regime in the early days to find the financial basis for the
tremendous armament program and which made it possible to carry
it through. If it had not been for his efforts, and this is not
a personal observation of mine only but I believe was shared and
is shared by every observer at the time, the Nazi regime would
have been unable to maintain itself in power and to establish
its control over Germany, much less to create the enormous war
machine which was necessary for its objectives in Europe and
later throughout the world.
“The increased industrial activity in Germany incident to
rearmament made great imports of raw materials necessary while
at the same time exports were decreasing. Yet by Schacht’s
resourcefulness, his complete financial ruthlessness, and his
absolute cynicism, Schacht was able to maintain and to establish
the situation for the Nazis. Unquestionably without this
complete lending of his capacities to the Nazi Government and
all of its ambitions, it would have been impossible for Hitler
and the Nazis to develop an Armed Force sufficient to permit
Germany to launch an aggressive war.” (_EC-451_).
D. _SCHACHT PARTICIPATED IN THE NAZI CONSPIRACY PURPOSELY, WILLINGLY,
AND WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ITS ILLEGAL AIMS AND METHODS._
(1) _He was a faithful adherent of Hitler._ It has already been
demonstrated that even before Hitler’s accession to power, Schacht
aligned himself with Hitler and accepted his program. Schacht’s
utterances after Hitler had entrenched himself in power clearly show
that he remained a faithful servant of Hitler despite the series of
outrages committed under Hitler’s direction.
At the opening of the Leipzig Fair on 4 March 1935, Schacht said:
“My so-called foreign friends don’t render any services to me or
the cause, which they don’t want anyway, of course, but not even
to themselves, if they try to construe a contrast between me and
the allegedly impossible economic theories of National Socialism
and represent me as a sort of guardian of economic reason. I
assure you that all that I am doing and saying enjoys the
absolute approval of the Fuehrer and that I would never do or
say anything that does not have his approval. Not I but the
Fuehrer is the guardian of economic reason.” (_EC-503_)
On the occasion of the unveiling of Hitler’s bust in the vestibule of
the Reichsbank on 31 July 1935, Schacht said:
“Germany stays and falls with the success of the policy of
Hitler.” (_EC-415_)
At a ceremony in connection with the creation of the Economic Chamber
for Pomerania in Stettin on 19 January 1936, Schacht denied that there
was any disagreement between Hitler and his collaborators, and went on
to say:
“In Germany there is fortunately only one policy and one
economic policy, namely that of Adolf Hitler; to work with him
and for his goals is the highest satisfaction for every member
of the people’s community.” (_EC-502_)
In May 1936, Schacht was attacked by some of the more radical elements
of the Nazi Party because he had rejected their “partially irrational
ideas” concerning armament financing. In repelling these attacks,
Schacht emphasized at a secret meeting of the Ministers on 12 May 1936,
that his program of financing armaments had meant “the commitment of the
last reserve from the very beginning”; and he announced that despite the
attacks, he would continue to work because he
“* * * stands with unswerving loyalty to the Fuehrer, because he
fully recognizes the basic idea of National Socialism and
because at the end, the disturbances, compared to the great
task, can be considered irrelevant.” (_1301-PS_).
So far as appears, Schacht did not become a member of the Nazi Party
until January 1937. Franz Reuter, whose biography of Schacht was
officially published in Germany in 1937, has stated that Schacht’s
becoming a regular Party member was only a question of secondary
importance, and even part of a carefully planned policy, for,
“By not doing so—at least until the final assertion, and
victory of the Party—he [Schacht] was able to assist it [the
Party] much better than he would have been able to do had he
become an official Party member.” (_EC-460_)
On 30 January 1937, Hitler bestowed the Golden Party Badge upon Schacht,
in recognition of his “special services to Party and State.” Schacht
accepted this hallmark of approval by the Fuehrer with effusive thanks
and a pledge of continued support. In his speech of acceptance, Schacht
stated:
“The presentation of the Golden Badge of the Movement is the
highest honor the Third Reich has to offer. In honoring me as
the head of the Reichsbank and the Reich and Prussian Ministry
of Economics, it honors at the same time the two agencies which
I am directing as well as the work of all those officials,
employees and workers functioning in these two agencies.”
* * * * * *
“I thank all my colleagues among the ranks of officials,
employees, and workers for their faithfulness in the performance
of their work, and appeal to all of them further to devote, with
all their hearts, their entire strength to the Fuehrer and the
Reich. The German future lies in the hands of our Fuehrer.”
(_EC-500_)
The depths of adulation were reached in a speech which Schacht delivered
on the occasion of Hitler’s 48th birthday in April 1937. Schacht spoke
as one of Hitler’s “closest collaborators,” who had seen at first hand
the difficulties which beset the Fuehrer in the relentless march toward
his goals. In his speech, Schacht stated:
“With the limitless passion of a burning heart and the
infallible instinct of the born statesman, Adolf Hitler has won
for himself the soul of the German people in a battle fought for
14 years with unswerving consequence.”
* * * * * *
“Only the closest collaborators of the Fuehrer know how
difficult is the burden of this responsibility; how sorrowful
are the hours during which decisions must be made which bear
upon the well being and the fate of all of Germany.” (EC-501)
In November 1938, at a time Schacht now asserts he was plotting against
Hitler, he stated in a speech:
“Instead of a weak and vacillating Government, a single,
purposeful, energetic personality is ruling today. That is the
great miracle which has actually happened in Germany and which
has had its effects in all fields of life and not least in that
of economy and finance. There is no German financial miracle.
There is only the miracle of the reawakening of German national
consciousness and German discipline, and we owe this miracle to
our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler.” (_EC-611_)
(2) _Schacht favored the acquisition of additional territory for
Germany—peacefully if possible, but by aggressive war, if necessary._
Schacht had long been a German nationalist and expansionist. As early as
1927, he spoke against the Versailles Treaty:
“The Versailles Dictate cannot be an eternal document, because
not only its economic, but also its spiritual and moral premises
are wrong.” (_EC-415_)
He strongly favored the acquisition by Germany of both colonial
territory and contiguous territory in Europe. At the Paris conference on
16 April 1929, he said:
“Germany can generally only pay if the Corridor and Upper
Silesia will be handed back to Germany from Polish possession,
and if besides somewhere on the earth colonial territory will be
made available to Germany.” (_3726-PS_)
In a speech in Danzig in June 1935, Schacht ascribed the economic
difficulties which confronted Danzig to “historical errors of the
greatest extent which were beyond the control of the German people”. He
sought to comfort his listeners with the assurance that
“We Germans in the Reich today are looking with fullest
confidence upon our comrades in the Danzig Free State, and
maintain our people’s fellowship with the interests, wishes and
hopes of this territory which has unfortunately been separated
from us.” (_EC-498_)
In January 1936, Schacht again publicly spoke against the Versailles
Treaty, and impliedly threatened war unless its terms were revised in
Germany’s favor. At that time, he stated:
“But the memory of war weighs undiminished upon the people’s
minds. That is because deeper than material wounds, moral wounds
are smarting, inflicted by the so-called peace treaties.
Material loss can be made up through renewed labor, but the
moral wrong which has been inflicted upon the conquered peoples,
in the peace dictates, leaves a burning scar on the people’s
conscience. The spirit of the Versailles has perpetuated the
fury of war, and there will not be a true peace, progress or
reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit. The
German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning.”
(_EC-415_)
Later in the same year, Schacht again publicly advocated “_Lebensraum_”
for the German people in terms not unlike those employed by Hitler. In
his speech at Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, Schacht said:
“Germany has too little living space for her population. She has
made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other
nation, to extract from her own existing small space, whatever
is necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in
spite of all these efforts the space does not suffice.”
(_EC-415_)
Schacht had hoped, it is believed, that his desire for additional space
for Germany would be realized without resort to war. In Austria, for
example, he had authorized 200,000 Marks a month to be set aside for the
National Socialists in Austria, hoping thereby to facilitate the
absorption of Austria into Germany without war. But if Germany’s
neighbors would not accede to the conspirators’ demands for additional
space, Schacht was willing to go to war to fulfill those demands.
Thus, on 23 September 1935, Schacht told S. R. Fuller, Jr. at the
American Embassy in Berlin:
“Colonies are necessary to Germany. We shall get them through
negotiation if possible; but if not, we shall take them.”
(_EC-450_)
In January 1937, Schacht, in a conversation with Ambassador Davies,
impliedly threatened a breach of the peace unless Germany’s demands for
colonies were met. The conversation is related as follows in a report
under date of 20 January 1937, by Ambassador Davies to the Secretary of
State:
“He [Schacht] stated the following: that the present condition
of the Germany people was intolerable, desperate and
unendurable; that he had been authorized by his Government to
submit proposals to France and England which would (1) guarantee
European peace; (2) secure present European international
boundaries; (3) reduce armaments; (4) establish a new form of a
workable League of Nations; (5) abolish sanctions with new
machinery for joint administration; all based upon a colonial
cession that would provide for Germany an outlet for population,
source for food stuffs, fats and raw material. * * *” (_L-111_)
The inference was clear: without a colonial cession, peace could not be
guaranteed. Equally clear was the inference that it would be Germany in
its search for “_Lebensraum_” that would disturb the peace.
On 21 December 1937, Schacht indicated to Ambassador Dodd that he
desired the annexation of neighboring countries, without war if
possible, but with war, if necessary. The pertinent portion of
Ambassador Dodd’s notes on this conversation are as follows:
“Schacht meant what the Army chiefs of 1914 meant when they
invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in six weeks; i.e.,
domination and annexation of neighboring little countries,
especially north and east. Much as he dislikes Hitler’s
dictatorship, he, as most other eminent Germans, wishes
annexation—without war if possible, with war, if the United
States will keep hands off.” (_EC-461_)
(3) _Schacht knew of Hitler’s plans to wage aggressive war and wilfully
provided the means whereby such a war might successfully be waged._
Whether or not Schacht personally favored war, it is clear that he at
least knew that Hitler planned military aggression and that he was
providing Hitler with the instrument by which those plans could be
executed. Even before Hitler’s accession to power, Schacht knew from a
reading of _Mein Kampf_ that Hitler was bent upon expansion to the East
by force of arms (_3727-PS_).
In the course of his frequent contacts with Mr. Messersmith, United
States Consul General in Berlin from 1930 to 1934, Schacht emphasized
that the “Nazis were inevitably going to plunge Europe into war”
(_EC-451_).
In September of 1934, Ambassador Dodd recorded in his diary a
conversation with Sir Eric Phipps at the British Embassy in Berlin,
wherein he stated that “Schacht had acknowledged to me the war purposes
of the Nazi Party” (_EC-461_).
Schacht has admitted that in the course of his numerous talks with
Hitler from 1933 to 1937, he formed the impression that “in order to
make his hold on the Government secure, the Fuehrer felt that he must
present the German people with a military victory” (_EC-458_).
These admissions by Schacht are fortified by other evidence which shows
that Schacht knew that Hitler planned military aggression. After his
appointment as Minister of Economics, Schacht became a permanent member
of the secret Reich Defense Council. The function of that Council, as
shown in other connections, was secretly to mobilize all of the human
and material resources of Germany for war (_EC-177_).
Shortly after his appointment as the Plenipotentiary General for the War
Economy in May 1935, Schacht was entrusted by the Reich Defense Council
with the “preparation of economic mobilization” in connection with the
proposed re-occupation of the Rhineland. Schacht and those officials who
were charged with the purely military aspects of the re-occupation were
enjoined to proceed with the utmost secrecy because of assurances given
by Hitler to the French that no military action was contemplated in the
de-militarized zone of the Rhineland (_EC-405_).
At the 11th meeting of the Reich Defense Council, on 6 December 1935,
which was attended by a number of representatives from Schacht’s office
of Plenipotentiary of the War Economy, Keitel pointed out that
“According to the will of the Fuehrer, the economic leadership
puts the increase of our armed might knowingly ahead of other
requirements of the state. It is the task of all members of the
Reich Defense Council to utilize the national property, made
available, primarily for this purpose and economically in the
framework of the entire situation, and request only such funds
and raw materials which serve absolutely and exclusively the
Reich Defense. * * *”
The singleness of purpose with which Schacht and the other conspirators
were gearing the German economy for war is strikingly shown by the Top
Secret minutes of the meeting of ministers dated 30 May 1936. This, it
will be recalled, was little more than 10 weeks after German troops had
occupied the Rhineland. At this meeting, Schacht pointed out that “it
must be attempted to produce those raw materials within Germany which
are economically favorable; for other raw materials ready reserves for
the case of mobilization”; and also that “certain raw materials for war
must be stocked.” Continuing the discussion, Goering emphasized that
“all measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured
waging of war.” Thereafter, Schacht advocated the introduction of price
supervision and agreed that first priority should be given to the
“specially urgent petroleum question” (_1301-PS_).
By Top Secret letter dated 31 August 1936, Schacht was advised by
General von Blomberg that Hitler had ordered that “the setting up of all
air force units has to be completed on 1 April 1937”. This accelerated
program entailed the expenditure of large additional funds which Schacht
and the Minister of Finance were called upon to supply. The sense of
urgency with which Hitler pressed the completion of the German air force
patently signified that the waging of war was a certainty (_1301-PS_).
Shortly after the receipt of this letter, and on 4 September 1936,
Schacht attended a secret cabinet meeting where Goering stated:
“The Fuehrer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the
Col. General and the Reich War Minister which represents a
general instruction for the execution thereof.
“It starts from the basic thought that the showdown with Russia
is inevitable.”
* * * * * *
“The Colonel General reads the memorandum of the Fuehrer.”
* * * * * *
“If war should break out tomorrow we would be forced to take
measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the
present moment. They are, therefore, to be taken.”
* * * * * *
“All measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in
the stage of imminent danger of war.” (_EC-416_).
There was no room for surmise in these utterances; Hitler was definitely
and irrevocably committed to waging aggressive war. If Schacht ever had
any doubts concerning Hitler’s firm resolve to carry out the program of
aggressive war outlined in _Mein Kampf_; if, contrary to his statements
to Mr. Messersmith and Ambassador Dodd, Schacht actually doubted in 1934
that the Nazis, whom he was faithfully serving, would inevitably plunge
Europe into war; and if, despite the pressing sense of immediacy that
had pervaded the Nazi war economy from the very outset, he had
entertained lingering doubts concerning Hitler’s plans for armed
aggression, all such doubts must have been removed by the clear and
unequivocal pronouncements in the above-mentioned eventful meetings of
1936 in which he participated.
Yet, despite his knowledge of Hitler’s plans to wage aggressive war,
despite the fact that he had grave technical doubts about the ability of
the Reichsbank to finance further armaments through additional short
term credits, and despite the fact that some directors of the Reichsbank
had opposed further “mefo” financing, Schacht pledged another 3 billion
Reichsmarks by the “mefo” bill method for further financing of armaments
in March 1937 (_EC-438_).
The Hossbach notes, dated 10 November 1937, on the important conference
of 5 November 1937 in the _Reichskanzlei_, reveal a further
crystallization of Hitler’s program of absorption and conquest in Europe
(_386-PS_). Definite plans were laid for the early acquisition of
Austria and Czechoslovakia, and for their exploitation in preparation
for further military operations. So far as appears, Schacht was not
present at this particular meeting. But his awareness of what occurred
at the meeting is shown by the fact that he told Ambassador Bullitt on
23 November 1937, that
“Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to
Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of
Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned
about the Polish Corridor, and in his [Schacht’s] opinion it
might be possible to maintain the Corridor provided Danzig were
permitted to join East Prussia, and provided some sort of a
bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and
East Prussia with Germany.” (_L-151_).
Although Schacht apparently sought to convey the impression to
Ambassador Bullitt that he desired to stay Hitler’s hand but was
powerless to do so, it is clear that he was actually in complete
sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Despite the mounting tension which
followed his conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, Schacht remained as
President of the Reichsbank, and in that capacity established, in
advance of the invasion of Austria, the rate of exchange between Marks
and Austrian Schillings which was to prevail after the absorption of
Austria (_EC-421_).
Moreover, under his direction, the Austrian National Bank was merged
into the Reichsbank (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, I, 254). His speech of
21 March 1938, to the employees of the former Austrian National Bank on
the occasion of its obliteration as an independent institution, betrayed
his true feelings. After inveighing against “the dictates of Versailles
and St. Germain”, Schacht stated:
“Thank God, these things could after all not hinder the great
German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a
communion of German will and German thought, he bolstered it up
with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht and he then finally gave
the external form to the inner union between Germany and
Austria.”
* * * * * *
“One person says he would have done it maybe in one way, but the
remarkable thing is that they did not do it (hilarity), that IT
WAS ONLY DONE BY OUR ADOLF HITLER (Long continued applause) and
if there is still something left to be improved, then those
grumblers should try to bring about those improvements from the
German Reich and within the German community, but not to disturb
it from without. (Lively agreement)”.
* * * * * *
“I ask you to raise your hands and to repeat after me:
I swear that: I will be faithful, and obedient to the Fuehrer of
the German Reich and the German people, Adolf Hitler, and will
perform my duties conscientiously and selflessly. (The audience
takes the pledge with uplifted hands).
You have taken this pledge. A scoundrel he who breaks it. To our
Fuehrer a triple ‘Sieg heil’.” (_EC-297-A_)
Schacht was likewise enthusiastic about the acquisition of the
Sudetenland, and filled with pride over the contribution his credit
policy as head of the Reichsbank had made thereto (_EC-611_).
In January 1939, when Hitler was ruthlessly exploiting his successes in
Austria and the Sudetenland in preparation for his next aggressive move,
Schacht again referred, with pride, to the fact that the _Wehrmacht_
which he had helped create by his ingenious and risky methods had made
possible Hitler’s successes. Thus, he said:
“From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact
that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the
reconstruction of the German armed forces. It [the Reichsbank]
therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to
_finance_ the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the
currency. The justification thereof was the necessity—which
pushed all other considerations into the background—to carry
through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore
under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy
possible.” (_EC-369_)
The foregoing proof establishes, it seems clear, that Schacht knew of
Hitler’s plans for aggressive war, and wilfully created the means
whereby those plans could be executed. But apart from this direct proof,
it is submitted that to a man in Schacht’s position, the events of the
period clearly bespoke Hitler’s intentions. Schacht was a key figure in
the Nazi Government during the period of the Nazi agitation in Austria,
the introduction of conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the
conquest of Austria, and the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of
force.
During this period, the Reich debt trebled under the stress of mounting
armaments (_EC-419_), and all the resources of Germany were being
strained to the very limit for armament. It was a period in which the
burning European foreign policy issue was the satisfaction of Germany’s
repeated demands for additional territory. Hitler, committed to a policy
of expansion, was laying the greatest stress upon utmost speed in
preparation for war.
Certainly in this setting, Schacht did not proceed in ignorance of the
fact that he was assisting Hitler and Nazi Germany along the road
towards armed aggression.
E. _SCHACHT’S LOSS OF POWER DID NOT IMPLY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE
CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM OF AGGRESSIVE WAR._
(1) _His resignation as Minister of Economics and General
Plenipotentiary for War Economy._ In November 1937, Schacht resigned his
offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for War
Economy. At the same time, he accepted appointment as Minister without
Portfolio, and continued as President of the Reichsbank. It is submitted
that the evidence shows that Schacht’s resignations were merely the
outgrowth of a clash between two power-seeking individuals, Goering and
Schacht, over _methods_ of creating a war economy and over who should
have final authority to direct the completion of the task. So far as
appears, Schacht was in full accord with the other conspirators upon the
_desirability_ of providing Hitler with the means by which he eventually
could carry out his planned aggressions.
The basic differences between Schacht and Goering date from a period
shortly after Goering became head of the Four-Year Plan Office. The
latter office was created by Hitler in September 1936, and in connection
therewith, Goering was “given far reaching powers to issue directives to
all the highest offices of the State and Party”. Goering conceived of
his function as head of the Four-Year Plan Office “within four years to
put the entire economy in a state of readiness for war” (_EC-408_).
Schacht was in agreement with the “aim and idea” of the Four-Year Plan.
He promised Goering his complete support and cooperation, and urged that
Goering draw upon Schacht’s long experience in economic affairs. Thus,
in Schacht’s letter of 5 August 1937, to Goering, he said:
“The aim and the idea of the Four Year Plan were and remain
entirely correct and necessary! It stands, essentially, for the
application of increased energy to the efforts already
undertaken by my ministry since 1934 with the results shown in
the above statistics. As you will remember, I welcomed it when
your energy, my dear Prime Minister, was recruited by the
Fuehrer for these tasks, and from the very beginning I gave you
my most loyal support and cooperation, with the particular plea
that I be given a hearing from time to time, since I believed
that my more than thirty years of experience in economic life,
half of them in public service, could be of value to you.”
(_EC-497_)
Goering, however, failed to avail himself of Schacht’s offer of his
services. “I can only regret,” said Schacht in the aforementioned
letter, “that you have made so little use of my offer” (_EC-497_).
Instead, Goering began to encroach upon powers which had been delegated
to Schacht, and they became embroiled in a bitter jurisdictional
conflict. On 26 November 1936, Goering issued a directive regarding raw
and synthetic material production, whereby he undertook to assume
control over large economic areas previously within Schacht’s province
(_EC-243_).
Schacht did not supinely accept Goering’s intrusions upon his powers.
Goering’s directive was countered by an abrupt order from Schacht to all
supervisory offices to accept orders from him alone (_EC-376_).
The conflict reached such dimensions that it threatened to retard the
pace of the conspirators’ armament program. The military sided with
Schacht, who had provided the means for their rapid rearmament. They
submitted proposals which would have assured to Schacht as
Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy the responsibility for
“unified preparation of the war economy as heretofore” (_EC-408_;
_EC-420_).
In January 1937, the German Military Weekly Gazette published an article
warmly praising Schacht’s achievements in rearmament. The timing of the
article indicates that it was a further attempt by the military to tip
the scales in Schacht’s favor. The article stated:
“The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today as one
of the men who have done imperishable things for it and its
development in accordance with directions from the Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor. The Defense Force owes it to Schacht’s skill
and great ability that, in defiance of all currency
difficulties, it, according to plan, has been able to grow up to
its present strength from an army of 100,000 men.” (_EC-383_)
Shortly thereafter, Schacht attempted to force a showdown with Goering
by temporarily refusing to act in his capacity as Plenipotentiary.
Schacht plainly was using his prime importance in the conspirators’
program of economic planning and preparation for war as a lever. In a
letter to Hitler dated 22 February 1937, General von Blomberg, the
Minister of War, suggested a settlement of the jurisdictional fight
under which Schacht would fully retain his powers as General
Plenipotentiary of War Economy, and concluded by stating:
“If you, my Fuehrer, agree with my view regarding these
jurisdictional questions, it may be possible to induce
Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht, whose cooperation as
Plenipotentiary for preparation of war is of great significance,
to resume his former activity.” (_EC-244_)
As a further demonstration of the community of interest between Schacht
and the top German military authorities, Schacht attended the secret
“War Economy” games at Godesberg in the latter part of May 1937. The
purpose of the games was to demonstrate “how the action of the soldiers
in total war is influenced by economy and how on the other hand, economy
is completely dependent on military operations”. Schacht’s attendance
was acclaimed at the games as
“renewed proof that you are willing to facilitate for us
soldiers the difficult war-economic preparations and to
strengthen the harmonious cooperation with your offices.”
(_EC-174_).
In June 1937, Keitel implored Hitler to accelerate a final agreement
between Schacht and Goering. Speaking of arrangements concerning
cooperation of these two key figures, Keitel said:
“I know that a necessary practical basis for it [the arrangement
for cooperation between Schacht and Goering] has already been
found, and only a formal agreement is needed in order to carry
on the common work.”
* * * * * *
“* * * to waste time in our situation would be the greatest
reproach that history could make upon us.
“May I beg, therefore, once more that the arrangement mentioned
be expedited, and that I be notified accordingly.” (_EC-248_)
Finally, on 7 July 1937, Schacht and Goering signed an agreement of
reconciliation in Berlin, wherein it was said that the tasks of Goering
and Schacht “are being solved in closest mutual cooperation,” and that
“no doubt exists about the fact that the Commissioner General for War
Economy has the position of a supreme authority of the Reich”
(_EC-384_).
Schacht resumed his duties as General Plenipotentiary with renewed
vigor. On the day following his formal agreement with Goering, he wrote
to General von Blomberg on “Measures for the preparation of the conduct
of war,” pledging continued cooperation in their mutual endeavors:
“* * * by the direction of the supreme authority for the conduct
of war, the coordination of the conduct of war will be assured
in its execution through mutual agreement between you and me,
which I look upon as a matter of course in the Central Authority
and without which I cannot envisage any conduct of war. The
direction of the economy by the plenipotentiary would in that
event never ‘take place entirely independent from the rest of
the war mechanism’ but would be aimed at the accomplishment of
the political war purpose with the mustering of all economic
forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this
way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to
the Reich Defense Act [_Reichsverteidigungsgesetz_].” (_EC-252_)
However, Schacht and Goering were soon again in disagreement. After a
sharp exchange of letters in which each sought to justify his particular
economic program as the best means of making possible the attainment of
Hitler’s objectives (_EC-497_; _EC-493_), Schacht suggested to Goering
in a curt letter dated 26 August 1937, that he (Goering) assume sole
charge of economic policies. In this letter, Schacht rationalized his
precipitate action as follows:
“To me it does not seem to be of decisive importance to raise
questions of competence and initiative, but it is of decisive
importance that the Fuehrer’s economic policy should be carried
out in a coherent manner, and with the least amount of
friction.” (_EC-283_)
Despite the uncompromising tenor of the latter communication, Schacht
was still amenable to an arrangement with Goering which would have
permitted him a measure of autonomy in economic planning and preparation
for war. On 1 November 1937, he attended a conference with Goering
“* * * which led in an entirely friendly manner to the working
out of a series of proposals, which * * * Goering promised to
have presented to me [Schacht] in writing on the following day *
* * so that, after having reached an agreement we could present
a mutually approved text to you, my Fuehrer.” (_EC-495_)
But the written agreement was not forthcoming as Goering had promised,
and Schacht repeated his request to be relieved from the Ministry of
Economics, “in the interest of a uniform government management”
(_EC-495_). Hitler finally accepted Schacht’s resignation as Minister of
Economics on 26 November 1937, simultaneously appointing him Minister
Without Portfolio. Schacht’s resignation was also extended to his
position as Plenipotentiary for War Economy (_EC-494_).
In subsequent interrogations, both Schacht and Goering have confirmed
the fact that Schacht’s withdrawal was simply the result of a losing
struggle with Goering to retain personal power (_3730-PS_; _3728-PS_).
There is nothing to indicate that Schacht’s withdrawal from the Ministry
of Economics and the Office of Plenipotentiary for War Economy in any
sense represented a break with Hitler on the ground of contemplated
military aggression. He consented to retain his position as President of
the Reichsbank, where he remained undisputed master, and accepted the
post of Minister of[without] Portfolio, in order to be Hitler’s
“personal adviser.” In the letter accepting Schacht’s resignation as
Minister of Economics, Hitler said:
“If I accede to your wish it is with the expression of deepest
gratitude for your so excellent achievements and in the happy
consciousness that, as President of the Reichsbank Directorium,
you will make available for the German people and me for many
years more your outstanding knowledge and ability and your
untiring working strength. Delighted at the fact that in the
future, also, you are willing to be my personal adviser, I
appoint you as of today a Reich Minister.” (_L-104_).
As President of the Reichsbank, Schacht continued to carry out Hitler’s
policies. As previously shown, he participated in the planning of the
invasion of Austria by fixing the conversion rate of the Austrian
Schilling in advance of the invasion; and under his direction, the
Austrian National Bank was merged into the Reichsbank. He publicly
approved the absorption of Austria and the acquisition of the
Sudetenland. He continued to finance armaments by “mefo” bill credits
until April 1938, and thereafter, until his resignation in January 1939,
authorized an increase of approximately 2.6 billion Reichsmarks in bank
notes in order to discount commercial paper which was used in connection
with the armament program. (_EC-438_)
(2) _Schacht’s dismissal from the Presidency of the Reichsbank._ Schacht
was dismissed from the Presidency of the Reichsbank in January 1939. The
evidence indicates that Schacht engineered his dismissal in order to
escape personal responsibility for what he believed to be an impending
financial crisis; he was not dismissed because of disagreement with the
ultimate objectives of the conspiracy or common plan.
Schacht had always feared an inflation in Germany. As early as May 1936,
he emphatically stated that he would “never be party to an inflation”
(_1301-PS_). In January 1939, Schacht was convinced that ruinous
inflation was, in fact, imminent (_EC-369_). There was, it appears,
ample basis for his fear. The Finance Minister, von Krosigk, had already
recognized the situation in September 1938, and had written to Hitler
warning that
“* * * we are steering towards a serious financial crisis, the
forebodings of which have led already abroad to detailed
discussions of this weak side in our economic preparations and
to an apprehensive loss of confidence domestically.” (_EC-419_)
Schacht was not only afraid of a financial crisis; he was even more
fearful that he personally would be held responsible for it and his
prestige would suffer a crushing blow. One of his associates at the
Reichsbank has stated:
“When Schacht saw that the risky situation which he had
sponsored was becoming insoluble, he was more and more anxious
to get out. This desire to get out of a bad situation was for a
long time the ‘leitmotif’ of Schacht’s conversations with the
directors of the bank.” (_EC-438_)
In the end, Schacht deliberately stimulated his dismissal from the
Presidency of the Reichsbank by arbitrarily refusing an end-of-the-month
loan in a relatively small amount to the Reich, contrary to well
established practice (_3730-PS_; _3731-PS_).
Despite differences of opinion concerning the limits to which the German
economy might be pushed without plunging the country into inflation,
Schacht continued to enjoy Hitler’s confidence. In his letter to Schacht
dated 19 January 1939, Hitler stated:
“On the occasion of your recall from Office as President of the
Reichsbank Directory, I take the opportunity to express to you
my most sincere and warmest gratitude for the services which you
rendered repeatedly to Germany and to me personally in this
capacity during long and difficult years. Your name, above all,
will always be connected with the first epoch of the national
rearmament. I am happy to be able to avail myself of your
services for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich
Minister.” (_EC-397_).
On his side, Schacht evidenced his abiding faith in Hitler and his
continued agreement with his aggressive policies, by remaining as
Minister without Portfolio until January 1943. As such he received a
large salary from the Nazi Government and enjoyed the emoluments of
public office (_3724-PS_).
(3) _Conclusion._ Schacht’s assistance in the earlier phase of the
conspiracy was an important factor in enabling the conspirators to seize
the German state and thus pave the way for their later crimes. His work
was indispensable to the rearmament of Germany and to the economic
planning and preparation required to launch the German wars of
aggression. As long as he remained in power, he worked as eagerly for
the preparation of aggressive war as any of his co-conspirators. He
personally was favorably disposed towards aggression, if “Lebensraum”
for Germany could not otherwise be attained. He knew that Hitler
intended to and would break the peace, and with this knowledge, he
willingly and purposely contributed his efforts. His withdrawal from
three of his four posts reflected no moral feeling against the use of
aggressive warfare as an instrument of national policy; he withdrew for
reasons wholly unrelated to Hitler’s program of illegal aggression. By
the time of his withdrawal from these three positions, he had already
provided his co-conspirators with the physical means and economic
planning necessary to launch and maintain their wars of aggression; and
he continued in his lucrative fourth position (Minister without
Portfolio) until January 1943—until, in short, it became doubtful
whether the conspirators could maintain the successes which they had
gained in the wars they had illegally launched and were waging.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO HJALMAR SCHACHT
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 63
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in │ │
│the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 │ │
│November 1937, signed by Hitler’s │ │
│adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 │ │
│November 1937. (USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*1168-PS │Unsigned Schacht memorandum to Hitler,│ │
│3 May 1935, concerning the financing │ │
│of the armament program. (USA 37) │ III │ 827
│ │ │
*1301-PS │File relating to financing of │ │
│armament, including minutes of │ │
│conference with Goering at the Air │ │
│Ministry, 14 October 1938, concerning │ │
│acceleration of rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │
│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │
│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │
│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │
│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │
│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2409-PS │Extracts from The Imperial House to │ │
│the Reich Chancellery by Dr. Joseph │ │
│Goebbels. (USA 262) │ V │ 83
│ │ │
*3021-PS │Statement of governmental positions │ │
│held by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. (USA 11) │ V │ 737
│ │ │
3700-PS │Letter from Schacht to Reich Marshal, │ │
│11 March, concerning conscription of │ │
│15-year-olds. (USA 780) │ VI │ 404
│ │ │
*3724-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 11 July │ │
│1945. (USA 776) │ VI │ 463
│ │ │
*3725-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 20 July │ │
│1945. (USA 615) │ VI │ 464
│ │ │
*3726-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 24 │ │
│August 1945. (USA 628) │ VI │ 465
│ │ │
*3727-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 13 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 633) │ VI │ 478
│ │ │
*3728-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 16 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 636) │ VI │ 485
│ │ │
*3729-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 17 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 616) │ VI │ 501
│ │ │
*3730-PS │Testimony of Hermann Goering, 17 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 648) │ VI │ 530
│ │ │
*3731-PS │Testimony of von Krosigk, 24 September│ │
│1945. (USA 647) │ VI │ 535
│ │ │
*3901-PS │Letter written November 1932 by │ │
│Schacht, Krupp and others to the Reich│ │
│President. (USA 837) │ VI │ 796
│ │ │
*D-203 │Speech of Hitler to leading members of│ │
│industry before the election of March │ │
│1933. (USA 767) │ VI │ 1080
│ │ │
*EC-128 │Report on state of preparations for │ │
│war economic mobilization as of 30 │ │
│September 1934. (USA 623) │ VII │ 306
│ │ │
*EC-174 │Summary “war economy” trip to │ │
│Godesberg undertaken by General Staff │ │
│between 25 May and 2 June 1937. (USA │ │
│761) │ VII │ 326
│ │ │
*EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │
│Committee of the Reich Defense held on│ │
│26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328
│ │ │
EC-243 │Memorandum, 26 November 1936, │ │
│containing Goering’s Order regarding │ │
│jurisdiction and development of raw │ │
│and synthetic materials. (USA 637) │ VII │ 338
│ │ │
*EC-244 │Letter from Blomberg to Hitler, 22 │ │
│February 1937. (USA 641) │ VII │ 342
│ │ │
EC-248 │Letter from Keitel to Koerner, 14 June│ │
│1937, concerning cooperation of │ │
│Plenipotentiary General and Four Year │ │
│Plan for War Economy. │ VII │ 343
│ │ │
EC-251 │Letter from Wohlthat to various │ │
│officials, 21 July 1937. │ VII │ 344
│ │ │
*EC-252 │Letter from Schacht to Blomberg, 8 │ │
│July 1937. (USA 762) │ VII │ 346
│ │ │
*EC-257 │Personal letter from Schacht to │ │
│Thomas, 29 December 1937. (USA 763) │ VII │ 347
│ │ │
*EC-258 │Report on Preparation of the Economic │ │
│Mobilization by the Plenipotentiary │ │
│for War Economy as of 31 December │ │
│1937. (USA 625) │ VII │ 347
│ │ │
EC-283 │Letter from Schacht to Goering, 26 │ │
│August 1937. │ VII │ 379
│ │ │
*EC-297-A │Address in Vienna of the Reichsbank │ │
│President, Dr. Schacht, 21 March 1938.│ │
│(USA 632) │ VII │ 394
│ │ │
*EC-369 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │
│Hitler, January 1939. (USA 631) │ VII │ 426
│ │ │
*EC-376 │Letter from Schacht to supervisory │ │
│officers, 11 December 1936. (USA 638) │ VII │ 436
│ │ │
*EC-383 │Letter 16 January 1937 with │ │
│enclosure—article about Schacht │ │
│appearing in the Military weekly │ │
│Gazette. (USA 640) │ VII │ 436
│ │ │
EC-384 │Agreement between Schacht and Goering,│ │
│7 July 1937. (USA 771) │ VII │ 438
│ │ │
*EC-397 │Letter from Hitler to Schacht, 19 │ │
│January 1939. (USA 650) │ VII │ 438
│ │ │
*EC-398 │Dismissal of Schacht as President of │ │
│the Reichsbank, 20 January 1939. (USA │ │
│649) │ VII │ 438
│ │ │
*EC-405 │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working │ │
│Committee of Reichs Defense Council, │ │
│26 June 1935. (GB 160) │ VII │ 450
│ │ │
*EC-406 │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs │ │
│Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA│ │
│772) │ VII │ 455
│ │ │
*EC-408 │Memorandum report about the Four Year │ │
│Plan and preparation of the war │ │
│economy, 30 December 1936. (USA 579) │ VII │ 465
│ │ │
*EC-415 │Extracts from “Schacht in His │ │
│Statements”, Berlin, 1937. (USA 627) │ VII │ 469
│ │ │
*EC-416 │Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 4 │ │
│September 1936. (USA 635) │ VII │ 471
│ │ │
*EC-419 │Letter from Schwerin-Krosigk to │ │
│Hitler, 1 September 1938. (USA 621) │ VII │ 474
│ │ │
*EC-420 │Draft of letter prepared by Military │ │
│Economic Staff, 19 December 1936. (USA│ │
│639) │ VII │ 479
│ │ │
*EC-421 │Minutes taken by member of General │ │
│Thomas’ staff of meeting held on 11 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 645) │ VII │ 481
│ │ │
EC-432 │Extracts from Annual Economic Review │ │
│for Germany, 1935, prepared by Douglas│ │
│Miller. │ VII │ 484
│ │ │
*EC-433 │Koenigsberg speech of Schacht at │ │
│German Eastern Fair. (USA 832) │ VII │ 486
│ │ │
*EC-436 │Affidavit of Puhl, 2 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 620) │ VII │ 494
│ │ │
EC-437 │Affidavit of Puhl, 7 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 624) │ VII │ 495
│ │ │
*EC-438 │Affidavit of Puhl, 8 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 646) │ VII │ 499
│ │ │
*EC-439 │Affidavit of Schnitzler, 10 November │ │
│1945. (USA 618) │ VII │ 501
│ │ │
*EC-450 │Affidavit of S. R. Fuller, 18 October │ │
│1945. (USA 629) │ VII │ 502
│ │ │
*EC-451 │Affidavit of Messersmith, 15 November │ │
│1945. (USA 626) │ VII │ 509
│ │ │
*EC-456 │Letter from Schacht to Hitler, 12 │ │
│November 1932. (USA 773) │ VII │ 512
│ │ │
*EC-457 │Letter from Schacht to Hitler, 29 │ │
│August 1932. (USA 619) │ VII │ 513
│ │ │
*EC-458 │Affidavit of Major Tilley, 21 November│ │
│1945. (USA 634) │ VII │ 514
│ │ │
*EC-460 │Franz Reuter “Schacht”, from German │ │
│Publishing Establishment, 1937, pp. │ │
│113-114. (USA 617) │ VII │ 515
│ │ │
*EC-461 │Extracts from Ambassador Dodd’s Diary,│ │
│1933-38. (USA 58) │ VII │ 515
│ │ │
EC-492 │Letter from Schacht to Goering, 17 │ │
│April 1937. │ VII │ 550
│ │ │
*EC-493 │Letter from Goering to Schacht, 22 │ │
│August 1937. (USA 642) │ VII │ 552
│ │ │
*EC-494 │Letter from Lammers to Goering, │ │
│presenting copy of letter from Lammers│ │
│to Schacht, 8 December 1937. (USA 643)│ VII │ 565
│ │ │
*EC-495 │Letter from Schacht to Hitler, 16 │ │
│November 1937, requesting release. │ │
│(USA 774) │ VII │ 566
│ │ │
*EC-497 │Letter from Schacht to Goering, 5 │ │
│August 1937. (USA 775) │ VII │ 567
│ │ │
EC-498 │“Schacht in Danzig”, excerpt of 16 │ │
│June 1935 from Frankfurter Zeitung. │ VII │ 576
│ │ │
EC-499 │Dr. Schacht 60 Years Old, from │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 21 January │ │
│1937. │ VII │ 576
│ │ │
EC-500 │A Proclamation by Dr. Schacht on │ │
│occasion of presentation of Golden │ │
│Party Badge, from Frankfurter Zeitung,│ │
│9 February 1937. │ VII │ 578
│ │ │
EC-501 │The Economic Development, and │ │
│Inaugural speech by Dr. Schacht, from │ │
│Berliner Tageblatt, 21 April 1937. │ VII │ 579
│ │ │
EC-502 │“In Germany There is only One Economic│ │
│Policy”, from Frankfurter Zeitung, 19 │ │
│January 1936. │ VII │ 583
│ │ │
EC-503 │Schacht Speech at Leipzig Fair, from │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 5 March 1935. │ VII │ 583
│ │ │
*EC-611 │Speech by Schacht, 29 November 1938, │ │
│entitled “Miracle of Finance” and “The│ │
│New Plan”. (USA 622) │ VII │ 589
│ │ │
*L-104 │Report Ambassador Dodd to State │ │
│Department, 29 November 1937, │ │
│concerning Hitler’s letter to Schacht │ │
│accepting resignation as Minister of │ │
│Economics and Schacht’s circular │ │
│communication to officials of │ │
│Ministry. (USA 644) │ VII │ 879
│ │ │
*L-111 │Telegraphic report from Ambassador │ │
│Davies to State Department, 20 January│ │
│1937. (USA 630) │ VII │ 881
│ │ │
*L-151 │Report from Ambassador Bullitt to │ │
│State Department, 23 November 1937, │ │
│regarding his visit to Warsaw. (USA │ │
│70) │ VII │ 894
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
13. GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH[1]
A. _IN FURTHERANCE OF THE NAZI CONSPIRACY, KRUPP CIRCUMVENTED THE
RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES ON THE REARMAMENT OF
GERMANY. AS THE RESPONSIBLE HEAD OF THE HUGE ARMAMENTS CONCERN, FRIED.
KRUPP A.G., HE CONCEALED ITS ARMAMENT ACTIVITY IN ORDER TO DECEIVE THE
ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. HE WAS, THEREFORE, IN A POSITION TO PROMOTE THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE CONSPIRACY BY THE RAPID PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS OF WAR
ON A HUGE SCALE AFTER THE CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER._
-----
[1] Since the name of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was severed
from the Nurnberg trial which commenced on 20 November 1945, the trial
brief outlining the case against Krupp, which was prepared before his
severance, was not presented to the Tribunal. Despite his personal
absence from the prisoners’ dock, however, Krupp remained technically
still under indictment and liable to prosecution in subsequent
proceedings. Moreover, Krupp was still regarded by the prosecution as a
member of the Nazi conspiracy. The following summary of evidence,
adapted from the trial brief, is included here in order to show the role
played by Krupp as co-conspirator.
-----
In an article entitled “Manager and Armament Worker” written for the 1
March 1942 issue of the Krupp magazine, Krupp stated:
“* * * I knew German history well, and out of my experiences in
the rest of the world I believed to know the German kind;
therefore I never doubted that, although for the time being all
indications were against it, one day a change would come. How, I
never knew or asked, but I believed in it. But with this
knowledge—and today I may speak about these things and for the
first time I am doing this extensively and publicly—with this,
as responsible head of the Krupp works, consequences of the
greatest importance had to be taken. If Germany should ever be
reborn, if it should shake off the chains of Versailles one day,
the Krupp concern had to be prepared again. * * *”
“* * * I wanted and had to maintain Krupp, in spite of all
opposition, as an armament plant for the later future, even if
in camouflaged form. I could only speak in the smallest, most
intimate circles about the real reasons which made me undertake
the changeover of the plants for certain lines of production for
I had to expect that many people would not understand me. * * *”
“Without arousing any commotion, the necessary measures and
preparations were undertaken. Thus to the surprise of many
people Krupp began to manufacture goods which really appeared to
be far distant from the former work of an armament plant. Even
the Allied snooping commissions were duped. Padlocks, milk cans,
cash registers, track repair machines, trash carts and similar
‘small junk’ appeared really unsuspicious and even locomotives
and automobiles made an entirely ‘civilian’ impression.
“After the accession to power of Adolf Hitler I had the
satisfaction of being able to report to the Fuehrer that Krupps
stood ready, after a short warming-up period, to begin the
rearmament of the German people without any gaps of
experience,—the blood of the comrades of KAR. Saturday 1923 had
not been shed in vain. Since that time I was often permitted to
accompany the Fuehrer through the old and new workshops and to
experience how the workers of Krupp cheered him in gratitude. In
the years after 1933 we worked with an incredible intensity and
when the war did break out the speed and results were again
increased. We are all proud of having thus contributed to the
heretofore magnificent successes of our army.”
* * * * * *
“I have always considered it to be an honour as well as an
obligation to be the head of an arms factory and I know that the
employees of Krupp share these feelings. Thanks to the
educational work of the National Socialist Government this is
the case all over Germany. I know that the things I have said
here about the armament worker in particular hold true for every
German worker. With these men and women who work for the cause
with all their hearts, with cool heads and skilled hands we will
master every fate.” (_D-94_; see _D-64_).
In a memorandum of a conference held on 9 December 1942, concerning the
proposed publication of a book dealing with Krupp’s armament activities,
Von Bulow, confidential secretary to Krupp, wrote:
“For the period of transition from 1919 up to rearmament, A. K.
[Krupp] had undertaken various tasks in order to keep up the
Company’s activity in the field of artillery, in the sense of
observing activities in that field in the rest of the world
(relation: BOFORS) and then also for the production of artillery
material, within and to a certain extent also beyond, the
limitation established by the peace dictate.” (_D-249_).
B. _AFTER THE CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER, KRUPP LENT HIS
INFLUENCE, PRESTIGE, AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR
CONTROL OVER THE GERMAN STATE._
(1) With knowledge of the aims and purposes of the Nazi conspiracy, he
sought to reorganize the Reich Association of German Industry, of which
he was Chairman, so as to bring it into line with the aims of the
conspirators and to make it an effective instrument for the execution of
their policies.
(_a_) Upon the invitation of Goering (_D-201_), Krupp attended a meeting
in Berlin on 20 February 1933, during which Hitler, in a speech to a
select group of industrialists, announced the conspirators’ aims to
seize totalitarian control over Germany, to destroy the parliamentary
system, to crush all opposition by force, and to restore the power of
the _Wehrmacht_. In the course of this speech, Hitler stated:
“Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of
Democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound
idea of authority and personality. * * * Life always tears up
humanity. It is therefore the noblest task of a Leader to find
ideals that are stronger than the factors that pull the people
apart. I recognized even while in the hospital that one had to
search for new ideas conducive to reconstruction. I found them
in Nationalism, in the value of personality, in the denial of
reconciliation between nations, in the strength and power of
individual personality. * * * If one rejects pacifism, one must
put a new idea in its place immediately. Everything must be
pushed aside, must be replaced by something better.”
“* * * We must not forget that all the benefits of culture must
be introduced more or less with an iron fist, just as once upon
a time the farmers were forced to plant potatoes. For all this,
however, courage, and iron will and perseverance are essential.”
“* * * With the very same courage with which we go to work to
make up for what had been sinned during the last 14 years, we
have withstood all attempts to move us off the right way. We
have turned down the favour (benevolence) of the Catholic Centre
Party [_Zentrum_] to tolerate us. Hugemberg has too small a
movement. He has only considerably slowed down our development.
We must first gain complete power if we want to crush the other
side completely. While still gaining power one should not start
the struggle against the opponent. Only when one knows that one
has reached the pinnacle of power, that there is no further
possible upward development, shall one strike. * * *”
“Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the
outcome there will be no retreat, even if the coming election
does not bring about a decision. One way or another, if the
election does not decide, the decision must be brought about
even by other means. I have intervened in order to give the
people once more the chance to decide their fate by themselves.
This determination is a strong asset for whatever must possibly
happen later. Does the election bring no result, well, Germany
won’t go to ruin. Today, as never before, everyone is under the
obligation to pledge himself to success. The necessity to make
sacrifices has never been greater than now. For Economy I have
the one wish that it go parallel with the internal structure to
meet a calm future. The question of restoration of the Wehrmacht
will not be decided at Geneva, but in Germany, when we have
gained internal strength through internal peace. * * * There are
only two possibilities, either to crowd back the opponent on
constitutional grounds, and for this purpose once more this
election or a struggle will be conducted with other weapons,
which may demand greater sacrifices. I would like to see them
avoided. I hope the German people thus recognize the greatness
of the hour. It shall decide over the next 10 or probably even
100 years. It will become a turning point in German history, to
which I pledge myself with glowing energy.” (_D-203_).
At this same meeting, Goering declared that the impending election of 5
March 1933 would certainly be the last one for the next 10 years, and
probably even for the next 100 years (_D-203_).
In a memorandum dated 22 February 1933 describing this meeting, Krupp
wrote that he had expressed to Hitler the gratitude of approximately 25
industrialists present for the clear expression of his views and
emphasized, on behalf of all present, that it was time to clarify the
political situation in Germany (_D-204_).
(_b_) On 25 April 1933, Krupp, as Chairman of the Reich Association of
German Industry (_Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Industrie_) submitted to
Hitler his plan for the reorganization of German industry and in
connection therewith, undertook to bring the Association into line with
the aims of the conspirators and to make it an effective instrument for
the execution of their policies.
_1._ In the letter of transmittal, Krupp stated that his plan of
reorganization was characterized by the desire to coordinate
“economic measures and political necessity, adopting the
Fuehrer’s conception of the New German State” (_D-157_).
_2._ In the plan of reorganization itself Krupp stated:
“The turn of political events is in line with the wishes
which I myself and the Board of Directors have cherished
for a long time. I am convinced that, under the threat
of the impoverishment of our people, the machinery of
government must be simplified to the utmost. For the
same reason I did not fail to recognize a long time ago
the necessity of rationalizing our economic system.
“Convinced that the opportunity of the hour must not be
missed to obtain the best for our economic system, I am
employing the authority bestowed upon me by the
Presiding Council to carry out a double task:—
1. In the negotiations with the Reichschancellor and his
representatives I shall make it my goal to coordinate,
in the field of organization of industrial associations,
the economically reasonable with the politically
necessary.
2. In reorganizing the Reich Association of German
Industry I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the
new organization into agreement with the political aims
of the Reich Government and at the same time to make it
so rational and forceful that it can be an effective
instrument of industrial enterprise, according to the
relative importance of the industry.” (_D-157_)
(_c_) In a speech delivered on 18 October 1933, on the occasion of the
first meeting of the Committee for Industrial and Social policy of the
Reich Association of German Industry, Krupp reaffirmed his aim to bring
the Association into complete accord with the political goals of the
Nazi government and stated, _inter alia_:
“* * * To have united the purposes of an entire Nation, is the
great historical achievement of the man in whose strong hands
our President has placed the fate of our people. When
Reichschancellor and Fuehrer Adolf Hitler called the General
Council of Economy together for the first time on the 20th of
September, I had the honor to thank him for the confidence which
he had put in the men of the practical business world by calling
them to the General Council. I pledged to him unrestrained
support in his Government in its exceedingly difficult task from
all branches and organizations of Economy.
“I may repeat now what I said then: ‘The unshakable faith of our
Reichschancellor and Fuehrer in the future of our people gives
also to the men of business the courage and the strength to put
everything in the reconstruction of a healthy National Economy
in a strong National State under National Socialist leadership’.
“You, too, gentlemen, if I am certain of your confidence, are
bound to this pledge. It holds in itself, for all of us, the
deeply felt obligation to be the guarantors for the
unconditional execution of the Fuehrer’s will in all links and
branches of Industry. May the spirit of devotion to duty which
inspires us always dominate this Committee’s conferences!
“I ask you, gentlemen, to rise and to join me in the toast: To
the venerable President of the German Reich, General
Fieldmarshal Von Hindenburg and the German People’s Chancellor
and Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler: ‘_Sieg Heil_’.” (_D-353_).
(2) Krupp organized, sponsored, and made substantial financial
contributions to the Hitler Fund (_Hitler Spende_), with knowledge that
the funds were to be used to further the objectives of the SA and SS.
(_a_) In a letter to Schacht dated 30 May 1933, Krupp wrote:
“As Dr. Hoettgen and I had the opportunity of mentioning to you
yesterday, it is proposed to initiate a collection in the most
far-reaching circles of German industry, including agriculture
and the banking world, which is to be put at the disposal of the
Fuehrer of the NSDAP in the name of ‘The Hitler Fund’, which
would replace collections in many cases separately organized of
the various NSDAP organizations and the Stahlhelm. It has been
decided to appoint a management council for this central
collection; I have accepted the chairmanship of the management
council at the unanimous request of the principal federations,
inspired by the wish to collaborate with my full strength in
this task which is to be a symbol of gratitude to the Fuehrer of
the nation.” (_D-151_)
(_b_) A circular written by Hess in August 1933, which was found among
Krupp’s files, specifically states that one of the purposes of the
Hitler Fund is “to put at the disposal of the Reich leadership the funds
required for the unified execution of the tasks which fall to the lot of
the SA, SS, ST, HJ, political organizations etc.” (_D-151_).
In a letter dated 15 August 1934, from Lutze, Chief of Staff of the SA,
which was found among Krupp’s papers, authority was granted, with the
approval of the Deputy Fuehrer, to Gauleiter Terboven to use a special
part of the year’s Hitler Fund in the interest of the SA in the Ruhr
district (_D-368_).
(_c_) From the inception of the Hitler Fund until the collapse of
Germany, the Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works in Essen (main company in the
Krupp organization) alone contributed 4,738,446 marks to that fund
(_D-325_; the above figure is the total amount shown on the chart, not
here reproduced[2]). This assistance to the Hitler Fund was supplemented
by large contributions made by the other Krupp companies.
-----
[2] This and subsequent similar charts have been omitted from this
publication because of their length and complexity, and the relative
unimportance of the issue for which they have been cited.
-----
(3) Krupp, both privately and through the Krupp firm, made substantial
contributions to the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations.
(_a_) For contributions by Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works in Essen, see
_D-325_.
(_b_) In June 1935, Krupp contributed 100,000 marks to the Nazi Party
out of his personal account (_D-332_; _D-373_).
(4) In numerous public addresses, Krupp supported the measures adopted
by the conspirators in the execution of their program.
(_a_) In a speech urging every German to approve Germany’s withdrawal
from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations, Krupp said:
“* * * Just as the 5th of March brought about the change from
chaos to order, from disgrace to honor in domestic policy so, on
November 12, the unanimous “Yes” of the German people concerning
the foreign policy of the Reich Government, shall and must give
ample proof to the entire world that every citizen who is worthy
of the German name, stands unconditionally behind the Reich
Government as led by the Reich Chancellor, and its foreign
policy which is dictated by the commandment of self-respect.”
* * * * * *
“* * * When the radio broadcasts the results of the People’s
Election on the evening of November 12, the entire world must
know that: Germany stands in the camp of Adolf Hitler.”
(_D-393_).
(_b_) In a speech delivered on 26 January 1934, Krupp expressed approval
of the leadership principle in industrial relations, under which the
entrepreneur became the leader and the workers became his followers. In
the course of this speech he said:
“National-Socialism has liberated the German worker from the
clutches of a doctrine which was basically hostile both for
employer and employee. Adolf Hitler has returned the worker to
his nation; he has made of him a disciplined soldier of labor
and therefore our comrade. When, on the other hand, the new
State awards to the enterpriser the role of leader in economy
and labor, then we know that: Leadership has obligation!
“The enterpriser and his leading officers are the trustees for
the material welfare of our people.” (_D-392_).
(_c_) In a speech delivered on 10 August 1934, in connection with the
plebiscite to approve Hitler’s dual appointment as president and
chancellor after Hindenburg’s death, Krupp said:
“Let us all follow him now also, our Leader, our Reich—and
People’s Chancellor.
“In an exceptionally short time he has eliminated the quarrel
between parties, has guaranteed unity to the Reich and has
assured to every German pride to work, has brought the
opportunity for work to the near future. On 19 August all our
votes borne of deep trust and proven confidence shall go to the
man acclaimed by those hearts of many thousands and millions who
cannot, because of their age, go to the polls but who daily join
us, who are permitted to vote, in the Cry:
Heil Hitler!” (_D-386_).
(_d_) In a speech dated 27 October 1935, Krupp stated:
“* * * Our thoughts fly therefore by themselves in this festive
hour of our plant community, to the man whom we thank for the
resurrection of our Nation: Adolf Hitler, the patron of German
labour and German art. Unanimously we will confess and pledge
ourselves to stand behind the Fuehrer and his movement today and
forever and thereby to be of service to the idea of eternal
Germany.” (_D-385_)
(_e_) In a speech dated 1 May 1936, after the Nazis had reoccupied and
fortified the Rhineland, Krupp stated:
“No greater recognition, no greater incentive to further common
work accomplishment could have been given us than was done
through the visit of our Fuehrer on March 27th of this year to
our works and through his addresses from here. * * *”
“Never has a statesman fought for the soul of his people and for
its well-being with such faith, such ardor, such endurance. We
shall never forget how deeply we are indebted to him. * * * I
only mention here the abolition of the parties and the
unification of the people, the regaining of the sovereignty in
the Rhineland, the extensive abolition of unemployment, the
accomplishments of the labour service, the magnificent public
buildings, the roads, bridges and canals. * * *”
* * * * * *
“The world will have to get used to the fact that the voice of
the Fuehrer is the voice of the whole German people. * * *”
“Jubileers and co-workers! We shall be thankful to fate that we
were and are permitted to be eye and action witnesses of the
great turning point in our German history, and we shall thank
especially the divine destiny that it has presented us with a
man like Adolf Hitler. Let us then combine all that which moves
our hearts upon mention of this name into the cry: Our people
and fatherland and its great Fuehrer Adolf Hitler
_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-291_).
C. _UNDER KRUPP’S DIRECTION, THE KRUPP FIRM, BY DEVELOPING NEW
INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND PRODUCING HUGE QUANTITIES OF WAR MATERIALS,
FURTHERED THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM TO CREATE A POWERFUL MILITARY
POTENTIAL._
(1) In a speech prepared in January 1944, for delivery at the University
of Berlin, Krupp stated:
“* * * I don’t see why this thought still flutters in many a
head occasionally—that the production of war materials should
be a sinister trade! No: war material is life-saving for one’s
own people and whoever works and performs in these spheres can
be proud of it; here enterprise as a whole finds its highest
justification of existence. This justification—I may inject
this here—crystallized especially during that time of the
‘Interregnum’, between 1919 and 1933, when Germany was
lying-down disarmed. * * * It is the one great merit of the
entire German war economy that it did not remain idle during
those bad years, even though its activity could not be brought
to light for obvious reasons. Through years of secret work,
scientific and basic ground work was laid, in order to be ready
again to work the German Armed Forces at the appointed hour,
without loss of time or experience.”
* * * * * *
“Only through this secret activity of German enterprise,
together with the experience gained meanwhile through production
of peace time goods was it possible after 1933, to fall into
step with the new tasks arrived at restoring Germany’s military
power, (only through all that) could the entirely new and
various problems, brought up by the Fuehrer’s Four Year’s Plan
for German enterprise, be mastered. * * *” (_D-317_)
(2) Krupp played a leading role in the design and production of new
weapons for the German armed forces.
(_a_) In a memorandum concerning a conference held at the Federal
Ministry for National Defense in Vienna on 25 September 1936, Pfirsch, a
Krupp official, wrote:
“* * * in spite of the obstacles put in our way by the Treaty of
Versailles, we had never been inactive throughout the postwar
period, but had drawn upon the experience of the war in the
creation of new types, and that we had won the prizes for almost
every type in the competitions organized by our War Ministry for
the construction of new artillery weapons, so much so that the
guns introduced into the German Army of to-day, such as the 8.8
cm. anti-aircraft, the 10.5 cm. field gun, the heavy field
howitzer and beyond them the larger calibres have been made
according to our pattern.” (_D-152_)
(_b_) In a memorandum dated 21 February 1944, Woelfert, a department
chief in the Krupp concern, wrote:
“First a few facts about the development of tanks by Krupp. We
are manufacturing tanks since 1928, which means before
rearmament. We started studying on heavy tractors. Krupp built
the first mass production tank, the Panzer I, which is also
known as LaS. It was shown in public in 1935, the year when
rearmament started, and made a great impression. We also
originated the Panzer IV, or better the BW, which was especially
at the beginning of the war one of the prime factors in our
rapid advances into enemy country, so that today we are fighting
on the Atlantic coast, in the South, and east and not on German
soil. Even today we use the BW-base for many self-propelled
guns, assault-guns, anti-aircraft guns etc.” (_D-96_).
(_c_) In a letter to Hitler dated 24 July 1942, Krupp wrote:
“My Fuehrer!
“The big weapon, whose manufacturing is to be thanked to your
command, has now proved its effectiveness. * * *”
“True to an example set by Alfred Krupp in 1870, my wife and
myself ask the favour that the Krupp works refrain from charging
for this first finished product.
“To express my thanks to you, my Fuehrer, for the confidence
shown in our plants and in us personally by entrusting such an
order with us, is a pleasant duty for my wife and myself.
_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-375_).
(_d_) Krupp likewise made significant contributions to the production of
Navy weapons and U-Boats (_D-88_; _D-287_).
(3) The rapid and progressive expansion in armament production by Krupp
after the conspirators’ accession to power is plainly shown by a chart
prepared by Krupp officials concerning the production of war materials
at the _Krupp Gustahlfabrik_ in Essen (only one of the many companies in
the Krupp organization). This chart shows that the production of war
materials at that particular factory during the fiscal year, 1 October
1933 to 30 September 1934, was more than twice that of any previous year
since 1929; that such production during the fiscal year, 1 October 1934
to 30 September 1935, was almost twice as great as the previous year;
and that production of war materials continued thereafter at an
accelerated rate with the result that during the fiscal year, 1 October
1938 to 30 September 1939, it was more than 10 times as great as it was
during the period 1 October 1932 to 30 September 1933 (Chart entitled
“Fried. Krupp Gustahlfabrik Essen, Turnover in War Material,” not
reproduced here). It should be noted that this chart shows only direct
sales by the Essen factory of war materials to the German Armed Forces
Ordnance Supply Department and sales to foreign countries of war
materials easily recognizable as such. It does not cover indirect sales,
viz: the sale of products to other concerns which, in turn, used them to
produce materials of war. (The chart entitled “Fried. Krupp and Branch
Establishments, Inland Turnover,” not here reproduced, shows figures
which include “indirect” sales of war materials by certain Krupp
companies.)
D. _KRUPP GOVERNED THE EXPORTS OF HIS FIRM IN THE LIGHT OF THE MILITARY
REQUIREMENTS OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS AND THE ACCEPTED AND DISCHARGED
IMPORTANT ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES IN FURTHERANCE OF THE
CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION FOR WAR._
(1) In a “strictly confidential” memorandum dated 25 March 1941, the
following was reported:
“* * * The liberation of the Reich from the shackles of
Versailles enabled Krupp to recommence the export of armaments.
The German Government had, in fact, pressed for the matter.
Military-political and Military-economic reasons were the cause.
Krupp desired to come into the closest contact with the armament
exports, so as to further the development of arms * * *”
* * * * * *
“* * * By using all the forces at his [Krupp’s] disposal and
regardless of effort, costs and risk, considerable export
contracts were secured, which served to obtain foreign currency
or raw materials, and were, at the same time, politically
desirable. * * *” (_D-191_)
In a memorandum dated 23 June 1937, concerning a Bulgarian order for
armour plating which was discussed with German Army representatives,
Reiff, a Krupp official, wrote:
“Major Olbrich showed himself aware quite evidently of the
deeper reasons existing why Germany was anxious that this order
should be booked. * * *” (_D-154_)
(2) At the request of the Inspector of War Production, Krupp became a
Leader of War Production in 1937, and was charged with the
responsibility of preparing and carrying out the mobilization of the
armament industry and of directing it in time of war.
(_a_) In a “strictly confidential” letter dated 21 January 1937, the
Inspector of War Production wrote to Krupp:
“The Reich Minister for War and the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces has ordered that a Corps of Economic Leaders of War
Production be recruited with immediate effect.
“The Economic Leaders of War Production in collaboration with
the Armed Forces, are to be responsible for the preparing and
carrying out of the mobilization of the armament industry and
for directing it in time of war.”
* * * * * *
“A selected small circle of these persons is to act in an
advisory capacity to the Armed Forces in all important economic
questions both during peace and war.
“Subject to your approval, I intend to propose to the Reich
Minister for War that you should be nominated as Economic Leader
for War Production.” (_D-62_)
(_b_) In connection with his acceptance of the position of Leader of War
Production, Krupp submitted a “secret” document entitled, “Declaration
of Political Attitude,” dated 6 February 1937, in which he stated:
“I herewith declare that I stand by the National Socialist
conception of the State without reserve and that I have not been
active in any way against the interests of the people.”
* * * * * *
“I am aware that should I say or do anything which constitutes
an attack against the National Socialist conception of the
State, I must expect, in addition to legal proceedings, my
dismissal from the post of Economic Leader of War Production.”
(_D-63_).
E. _KRUPP SUPPORTED THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROPAGANDA PROGRAM; LENT HIS
ORGANIZATION TO THE DISSEMINATION OF NAZI PROPAGANDA ABROAD; AND USED
HIS EMPLOYEES IN ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN FURTHERANCE OF THE AIMS AND
PURPOSES OF THE NAZI CONSPIRACY._
(1) In April 1933, Krupp contributed 20,000 marks to Rosenberg for the
purpose of counteracting anti-Nazi propaganda abroad. In a letter to
Krupp dated 26 April 1933, Rosenberg said:
“Once more my most cordial thanks for not having shunned the
inconvenience of the journey in order to participate at
yesterday’s intimate conference. I am glad to determine, on the
basis of our discussion, that you too welcome the organization
of an active counter-action abroad, in the interest of State and
Economy, and express to you the highest thanks for the support
of a monetary kind as well, which you have subscribed to our
work. Very shortly a quantity of material will be sent to you
promptly and will subsequently be distributed throughout the
world in a comprehensive compilation.” (_D-158_; see also
_D-208_ and _D-242_)
(2) In a memorandum dated 12 October 1939, entitled “Distribution of
Official Propaganda Literature Abroad with the Help of our Foreign
Connections,” concerning a visit by a Mr. Lackmann of Ribbentrop’s
private foreign office, Von Raussendorff, a Krupp official, wrote:
“I informed Mr. L. that our Firm had put itself years ago at the
disposal of official Bureaus for purposes of foreign propaganda
and that we had supported all requests addressed to us to the
utmost. * * * Only by personal handling can our connections
abroad be used and kept receptive to effective propaganda. With
the present lively activity of the ‘Secret Service’ it must be
avoided, not only in the interest of our Firm but also in the
interest of Germany as a whole, that our agents in neutral
foreign countries would come through improper handling to the
attention of the ‘Secret Service’ and economically ruined by it
within a short time.
“* * * If additional distributions of propaganda literature were
desired, a propaganda-leaflet should be sent to us, and after
examining it, we would advise the official Bureau what quantity
of such printed matter could be mailed abroad through us, at our
expense, as heretofore.” (_D-206_)
(3) In a memorandum dated 14 October 1937, concerning a visit by Menzel
of the Intelligence Office of the Combined Services Ministry,
Sonnenberg, a Krupp official, wrote:
“* * * Menzel asked for intelligence on foreign armaments (but
not including matters published in newspapers) received by Krupp
from their agents abroad and through other channels to be passed
on to Combined Services Intelligence [Abwehrabteilung des RKM.].
* * *”
“On our part we undertook to supply information to the Combined
Ministry [RKM] as required.” (_D-167_)
The results of a later visit by Menzel, in the company of _Kapitaen zur
See_ Globig, of the Information Department, Naval Armaments Branch, are
reported in a memorandum dated 25 June 1939 by Dr. Conn, a Krupp
official. In the course of this memorandum, which is entitled
“Intelligence and Information,” Dr. Conn stated:
“1. _Kapitaen zur See_ Globig whom I had known for a long time,
spoke to me quite frankly and openly. It is therefore impossible
to embody parts of our discussion in this report.”
* * * * * *
“Similarly to Kapitaen zur See Globig he [Menzel] stressed the
point that in view of the progressive disappearance of public
and easily accessible sources of information, the information
obtained through our representatives abroad was of increasing
value. This method of obtaining intelligence would have to be
followed up much more drastically than in the past.”
* * * * * *
“His [Menzel’s] third point was a request to utilize foreign
visitors for obtaining intelligence. I replied that this was
being done already, but that it was necessary to proceed very
carefully, to avoid arousing suspicion on the part of the
visitors.”
“I gave him to understand that we were slightly disappointed
with the collaboration with Intelligence [_Abwehr Abteilung_]
since we had supplied information, but had received none in
return. Menzel explained that Intelligence was only a collating
centre and that they were merely passing on information, the
value of which they were unable to judge by themselves, to the
departments concerned; any information for us would therefore
have to come from those departments only. Exceptions were only
made in the case of intelligence of universal importance such as
e.g. the long range gun [_Ferngeschuetz_] some time ago.”
“This remark is important concerning the way in which we should
present our information at Berlin. The departments receiving the
information through Intelligence, must be able to see that it
originates from Krupp, so that they might feel themselves under
obligation to let us have some information in return.” (_D-167_)
In a memorandum marked “secret,” relating to foreign anti-aircraft guns,
Sonnenberg wrote on 8 May 1939:
“I have gained the impression that from no other side do the
respective Army departments get such far reaching support in
their investigation of foreign armaments as from Fr. Krupp.”
(_D-170_).
F. _KRUPP PUBLICLY APPROVED THE SUCCESSIVE CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE
PERPETRATED BY THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS._
(1) In a speech dated 6 April 1938, shortly after Schuschnigg had been
compelled to capitulate to the Nazi conspirators’ threat of force, Krupp
stated:
“At our family party, today as well, our first thought, our
first glass, is raised in deep appreciation to our Fuehrer. We
are still under the lasting impression of the mighty happenings
of the last four weeks; so are those of us who until a short
time ago were forced to wait impatiently for these developments
outside our State frontiers. To the fulfillment of century-old
dreams consciously arrived at, to the fulfillment of the
life-long wish of Adolf Hitler—thanks to his faith, thanks to
his determination, thanks to his heart, to him, our Fuehrer, a
threefold, deeply thankful,
_Sieg Heil_.” (_D-391_).
(2) In a speech dated 7 April 1938, Krupp, in urging all Germans in the
impending election of 10 April to approve Hitler’s invasion of Austria,
stated:
“Three more days separate us from the day of the Plebiscite to
which our Fuehrer calls us, from the Plebiscite concerning
Greater Germany, at the same time a Plebiscite in which the
proof of faith in our Fuehrer concerns every individual’s
conscience.
“Full with thanks for what Adolf Hitler has bestowed and secured
for the German people in little more than five years’ leadership
through internal and external peace he is worthy of the deepest
felt ‘Yes’ from everyone of us!
“To him, our Fuehrer and Chancellor a threefold
_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-387_)
(3) In a speech delivered on 13 October 1938, on the occasion of
Hitler’s visit to the Krupp works after the Nazi occupation of the
Sudetenland, Krupp said:
“My Fuehrer,
“To be able to greet you at the Krupp Works, in our home, in the
name of my wife and my own, as well as in the name of those
close to me and also in that of the greater plant family, so
shortly after the world-shaking events of the last weeks, is a
great honour and a heart-felt joy to me.
“Perhaps no plant and no home can feel more deeply and more
gratefully than ours the changes in the last decades; none can
be more proudly conscious to be allowed to participate in the
mighty tasks set by you.
“Before us stands now the basic and undeniable world-encircling
success, in its total extent perhaps not fully grasped, which
your faith and strong will, your nerves and your initiative have
achieved.
“May no German ever forget how deeply gratitude therefore put us
under obligation, how proud we may be to be recognized once more
in the world as a free, equal, great German People.
“With the thanks of my family, of our plants, of our entire Ruhr
District filled with the urge to work, I must express united
gratitude, springing from a full warm heart, from the Sudeten
District which is now a part of the German Reich.”
* * * * * *
“_Heil_ to Thee, my Fuehrer.” (_D-304_)
(4) Shortly after the conspirators launched their aggression against
Poland, Krupp stated to the workers in his plant:
“The Fuehrer has made his decision, not lightheartedly but in
the consciousness of responsibility to his people, to the entire
future of the German Nation—we have all heard that in his
Reichstag speech last Friday.”
* * * * * *
“A hard struggle, perhaps hardly appreciated to its fullest
extent, lies before us. The entire German Nation must face this
test of fire in unshakable unity, young or old, man or woman,
everyone must and will do his duty at his post, do more than
just what his duty demands and devote his entire strength to the
task assigned to him. Therefore let us also, as Krupp Members,
remain determined. May God protect our Fuehrer and our people!”
(_D-363_)
(5) In a speech dated 6 May 1941, commemorating the successes of the
Nazi aggression in the West, Krupp stated:
“The one who, like myself, had the chance to visit and
thoroughly inspect during the last weeks the fields where our
superb troops made the breakthrough in the West—
“who could hear on that occasion the roar of our Airforce
against England—
“who witnessed how our U-boats and speedboats distinguished
themselves against the remains of England’s sea-might—
“such a person is bound to be thankfully proud to be able to
contribute through his labours to assure to our fighters the
weapons which they need for their battle—
“such a person is and remains devotedly and respectfully
conscious that the nicest machines, the most effective
instruments mean little, no, nothing, without the complete
unselfish and trusting share of the individual, whose trust is
assured through his knowledge of, and his faith in, the genius
of his Fuehrer, who embodies the worth of the German people,
their honour and might. To him, our Fuehrer, we direct also in
this hour in the Spring month of May our thoughts, renew our
solemn oath, present our heartiest wishes and give thanks to
him.
“Adolf Hitler—_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-390_)
G. _KRUPP AS HEAD OF THE KRUPP CONCERN, IN FURTHERANCE OF THE COMMON
PLAN TO EXPLOIT THE PEOPLE OF OCCUPIED COUNTRIES AND PRISONERS OF WAR,
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPELLING PERSONS FORCIBLY DEPORTED FROM OCCUPIED
COUNTRIES AND PRISONERS OF WAR TO WORK AGAINST THEIR WILL AND WITHOUT
THEIR CONSENT IN THE MANUFACTURE OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS. THESE ACTS AND
PRACTICES WERE CONTRARY TO ARTICLES 6 AND 52 OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS,
1907, TO ARTICLE 31 OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR CONVENTION (GENEVA 1929),
THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, AND TO ARTICLES 6(b) AND 6(c) OF THE
CHARTER._
(1) Charts marked “secret” have been found which show the number and
nationalities of prisoners of war and foreign workers employed in each
of the workshops in the Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works at Essen, for the
period from December 1940 to 1 February 1945. These charts, when read in
conjunction with an affidavit by a Krupp official concerning the
materials produced in the various Essen workshops, reveal that French
and Russian prisoners of war and slave laborers from virtually every
country occupied by Germany were used in the production of arms and
munitions. Thus, they were compelled to work in departments engaged in
the construction of turrets for tanks and carriages for heavy Army and
Navy guns; the assembling of marine gun turrets, 10.5 cm. marine guns,
and 15 cm. torpedo-boat guns; the manufacture of crankshafts for S-boats
and aeroplanes, etc. (Charts and affidavit relating to production in the
workshops of Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works by prisoners of war and
foreign workers, not here reproduced.) Affidavits of workers in the
Krupp workshops afford added proof that prisoners of war and foreign
laborers were used by Krupp in the manufacture of arms and munitions
(see _D-253_, _D-265_, _D-279_).
(2) The prisoners of war and foreign workers at the Krupp factories did
not voluntarily engage in the manufacture of arms and munitions; they
were forced to do so. This fact is clearly shown by the following:
(_a_) Workers were brought to Essen from Poland and Russia in grossly
overcrowded, unheated, and unsanitary cattle cars and upon debarking,
were beaten, kicked, and otherwise inhumanely treated. An employee of
the Reich Railway at Essen has described these conditions as follows:
“* * * In the middle of 1941 the first workers arrived from
Poland, Galicia and Polish Ukraine. They came to Essen in goods
wagons in which potatoes, building materials and also cattle
have been transported; they were brought to perform work at
Krupp. The cars were jammed full with people. * * * The people
were squashed closely together and they had no room for free
movement. The Krupp overseers laid special value on the speed
the slave workers got in and out of the train. * * * the people
were beaten and kicked and generally maltreated in a brutal
manner. * * * I could see with my own eyes that sick people who
could scarcely walk * * * were taken to work. One could see that
it was sometimes difficult for them to move themselves. The same
can be said for the Eastern workers and PWs who came to Essen in
the middle of 1942.” (_D-321_; _D-367_).
(_b_) Foreign workers were compelled to go to work under guard and were
closely watched. In a memorandum dated 7 April 1942, entitled
“employment of foreign workers”, from the Ignitor workshop of the Krupp
Essen plant, it is stated:
“In the course of last week, due to the fact that the foreign
workers, especially Poles, could not be relied upon to appear at
work, there was an extraordinary decrease in production; loss of
money and fines did not obtain the desired results.
“Especially during short (bank) holidays we were not able to
find a responsible person in the camp Seumannstrasse, to whom we
could have referred. We ourselves are short of guards to fetch
the Poles from their camp, and to guard them overnight.”
(_D-270_; re compulsion exerted by guards in marching foreign
workers to work, see also _D-253_).
(_c_) After working hours, foreign workers were confined in camps under
barbed wire enclosures and were carefully guarded. Dr. Jaeger, senior
camp doctor in Krupp’s workers’ camps, has stated in an affidavit:
“The eastern workers and Poles who laboured in the Krupp works
at Essen were kept at camps at Seumannstrasse, Spenlestrasse,
Grieperstrasse, Heegstrasse, Germaniastrasse,
Kapitan-Lehmannstrasse, Dechenschule, and Kramerplatz. * * * All
these camps were surrounded by barbed wire and were closely
guarded.” (_D-288_)
H. _CONTRARY TO ARTICLES 4, 6, 7, AND 46 OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS, 1907,
ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR CONVENTION (GENEVA 1929), THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, AND ARTICLES 6(b) AND 6(c) OF THE CHARTER,
KRUPP, AS HEAD OF THE KRUPP CONCERN, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DENYING
ADEQUATE FOOD, SHELTER, CLOTHING, AND MEDICAL CARE AND ATTENTION TO
PRISONERS OF WAR AND WORKERS FORCIBLY DEPORTED FROM OCCUPIED COUNTRIES,
FOR FORCING THEM TO WORK UNDER INHUMANE CONDITIONS, AND FOR TORTURING
THEM AND SUBJECTING THEM TO INDIGNITIES._
(1) The prisoners of war and foreign laborers at the Krupp works were
undernourished and forced to work on a virtual starvation diet.
(_a_) In a memorandum upon Krupp stationery to Mr. Hupe, Director of the
Krupp locomotive factory in Essen, dated 14 March 1942 and entitled
“Employment of Russians”, it was said:
“During the last few days we have established that the food for
the Russians employed here is so miserable, that the people are
getting weaker from day to day.
“Investigations showed that single Russians are not able to
place a piece of metal for turning into position for instance,
because of lack of physical strength. The same conditions exist
at all places of work where Russians are employed.” (_D-316_)
(_b_) In a memorandum dated 18 March 1942, the following was reported
from the Krupp armoured car repair shop:
“I got the food this evening after Mr. Balz telephoned, but I
had quite a struggle with the people responsible in the camp
before I got anything at all. They always told me that the
people had already received the day’s rations and there wasn’t
any more. What the gentlemen understand under a day’s ration is
a complete puzzle to me. The food as a whole was a puzzle too,
because they ladled me out the thinnest of any already watery
soup. It was literally water with a handful of turnips and it
looked as if it were washing up water.
“Please tell Mr. Balz again definitely so that the matter is
finally cleared up, that it cannot continue having people perish
here at work.” (_D-310_)
(_c_) In a memorandum dated 20 March 1942 to Mr. Ihn, one of the Krupp
Directors, Dinkelacker, a Krupp official, wrote:
“The Deputy Works Manager Mr. Mustin, who also employs a number
of such Russian workers and who is quite satisfied with their
performance, went to the camp in Kramerplatz on my inducement
and had a talk with Mr. Welberg, the Camp Commandant. Mr. Hassel
from the Works Police who was present at the time, butted in and
declared that one should not believe what the people said. Also
that one was dealing with Bolsheviks and they ought to have
beatings substituted for food.” (_D-318_)
(_d_) In a memorandum dated 26 March 1942, to Mr. Hupe concerning the
use of Russian prisoners of war and civilian workers, it was reported:
“The reason why the Russians are not capable of production is,
in my opinion, that the food which they are given will never
give them the strength for working which you hope for. The food
one day, for instance, consisted of a watery soup with cabbage
leaves and a few pieces of turnip. The punctual appearance of
the food leaves a good deal to be desired too.” (_D-297_)
(_e_) In a memorandum dated 8 December 1942, Haller, a Krupp official,
wrote:
“The complaints from our foreign workers about insufficient food
have increased lately. * * *”
“We experienced a very forcible confirmation of these complaints
the other day when we drew the food for the Eastern workers from
the kitchen in Kramerplatz. On 5.12.42 the midday meal contained
unpeeled, whole potatoes which were not even properly cooked; on
7.12.42, there was soup on which cabbage leaves floated, the
sight of which made me feel sick.” (_D-366_)
(_f_) Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor in the Krupps’ workers’ camps, has
stated under oath that not only did the plan for food distribution to
foreign workers call for a very small quantity of meat every week, but
also that they received only contaminated meats rejected by the health
authorities, such as horse or tuberculin infested meat (_D-288_).
(2) The prisoners of war and foreign workers at the Krupp factories were
forced to live in grossly overcrowded hutted camps and otherwise were
denied adequate shelter.
(_a_) In a sworn statement, Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor of the Krupp
workers’ camps, has stated with respect to the Krupp camps at which the
eastern workers and Poles were kept:
“Conditions in all these camps were extremely bad. The camps
were greatly overcrowded. In some camps there were over twice as
many people in a barrack as health conditions permitted.”
* * * * * *
“Sanitary conditions were exceedingly bad. At Kramerplatz, where
approximately 1,200 eastern workers were crowded into the rooms
of an old school, the sanitary conditions were atrocious in the
extreme. Only 10 children’s toilets were available for the 1,200
inhabitants. At Dechenschule, 15 children’s toilets were
available for the 400-500 eastern workers. Excretion
contaminated the entire floors of these lavatories. There were
also very few facilities for washing.” (_D-288_)
(_b_) Statistics upon the Krupp camps compiled by Krupp officials in
1942 for the Essen health authorities show that in the Krupp
Seumannstrasse camp 1784 beds were compressed into a surface area of
7844 square meters; in the Krupp Bottroperstrasse camp 874 beds were
crowded into a surface area of 3585 square meters; and that in other
Krupp camps the congestion was even greater (_D-143_).
(_c_) In a memorandum dated 12 June 1944, Dr. Stinnesbeck, a doctor
retained by the Krupp works, reported, with respect to the Krupp
prisoner of war camp at Noggerathstrasse that:
“315 prisoners are still accommodated in the camp. 170 of these
are no longer in barracks but in the tunnel in Grunerstrasse
under the Essen-Mulheim railway line. This tunnel is damp and is
not suitable for continued accommodation of human beings. The
rest of the prisoners are accommodated in 10 different factories
in Krupps works.” (_D-335_)
(_d_) In a special medical report marked “strictly confidential”, dated
2 September 1944, concerning the same prisoner of war camp, Dr. Jaeger
wrote:
“The P. O. W. camp in the Noggerathstrasse is in a frightful
condition. The people live in ash bins, dog kennels, old baking
ovens and in self-made huts.” (_D-339_).
(3) The prisoners of war and foreign workers at the Krupp factories were
denied adequate clothing.
(_a_) Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor in Krupps’ workers’ camps, has
stated under oath:
“The clothing of the eastern workers was likewise completely
inadequate. They worked and slept in the same clothing in which
they had arrived from the east. Virtually all of them had no
overcoats and were compelled, therefore, to use their blankets
as coats in cold and rainy weather. In view of the shortage of
shoes, many workers were forced to go to work in their bare
feet, even in the winter. Wooden shoes were given to some of the
workers, but their quality was such as to give the workers sore
feet. Many workers preferred to go to work in their bare feet
rather than endure the suffering caused by the wooden shoes.
Apart from the wooden shoes, no clothing of any kind was issued
to the workers until the latter part of 1943, when a single blue
work suit was issued to some of them. To my knowledge, this
represented the sole issue of clothing to the workers from the
time of their arrival until the American forces entered Essen.”
(_D-288_)
(_b_) In a memorandum to Mr. Ihn, a Krupp director, dated 20 October
1942, Dr. Wiehle, head of the Krupp hospital in Essen, wrote:
“It has already been pointed out several times at conferences
that the clothing for Eastern workers, men and women, is not
sufficient. With regard to the cold weather, the camp physician
today called our attention to the fact that the number of colds
is going up because of the question of insufficient clothing.
“Many of the men and women still have to go barefooted. They
have no underwear and it often happens that people who wear foot
bandages because of injuries walk barefooted on these bandages.”
(_D-271_; see also _D-355_, _D-312_)
(4) Prisoners of war and foreign laborers at the Krupp works were denied
adequate medical care and treatment, and as a consequence, suffered
severely from a multitude of diseases and ailments.
(_a_) In the above mentioned affidavit, Dr. Jaeger has stated:
“The percentage of eastern workers who were ill was twice as
great as among the Germans. Tuberculosis was particularly
widespread among the eastern workers. The T.B. rate among them
was 4 times the normal rate (2% eastern workers, .5% Germans).
At Dechenschule approximately 2½% of the workers suffered from
open T.B. These were all active T.B. cases. The Tartars and
Kirghiz suffered most; as soon as they were overcome by this
disease they collapsed like flies. The cause was bad housing,
the poor quality and insufficient quantity of food, overwork,
and insufficient rest.
“These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever. Lice,
the carrier of this disease, together with countless fleas, bugs
and other vermin, tortured the inhabitants of these camps. As a
result of the filthy conditions of the camps nearly all eastern
workers were afflicted with skin disease. The shortage of food
also caused many cases of Hunger-Odem, Nephritis and
Shighakruse.
“It was the general rule that workers were compelled to go to
work unless a camp doctor had prescribed that they were unfit
for work. At Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germaniastrasse,
Kapitan-Lehmannstrasse, and Dechenschule, there was no daily
sick call. At these camps, the doctors did not appear for two or
three days. As a consequence, workers were forced to go to work
despite illnesses.”
* * * * * *
“At the end of 1943, or the beginning of 1944,—I am not
completely sure of the exact date—I obtained permission for the
first time to visit the prisoner of war camps. My inspection
revealed that conditions at these camps were even worse than
those I had found at the camps of the eastern workers in 1942.
Medical supplies at such camps were virtually non-existent. In
an effort to cure this intolerable situation, I contacted the
_Wehrmacht_ authorities whose duty it was to provide medical
care for the prisoners of war. My persistent efforts came to
nothing. After visiting and pressing them over a period of two
weeks, I was given a total of 100 aspirin tablets for over 3,000
prisoners of war.” (_D-288_)
(_b_) In a memorandum dated 7 May 1943, prepared at the Krupp hospital,
entitled “Deaths of Eastern Workers,” report was made of the death of 54
“eastern workers.” Of this number, 38 died of tuberculosis, 2 of
undernourishment, and 2 of intestinal disease. (_D-283_)
(_c_) In his “strictly confidential” report concerning the prisoner of
war camp at Noggerathstrasse, Dr. Jaeger reported:
“The food is barely sufficient. Krupp is responsible for housing
and feeding. The supply of medicine and bandages is so extremely
bad that proper medical treatment was not possible in many
cases. This fact is detrimental to the P. W. camp. It is
astonishing that the number of sick is not higher than it is and
it moves between 9 and 10 percent.” (_D-339_; also _D-313_).
(_d_) In a special medical report dated 28 July 1944, Dr. Jaeger wrote:
“The sick barrack in Camp Rabenhorst is in such bad condition,
one cannot speak of a sick barrack anymore. The rain leaks
through in every corner. The housing of the ill is therefore
impossible. The necessary labour for production is in danger
because those persons who are ill cannot recover. * * *”
(_D-338_)
(5) Russian juveniles were compelled to work at the Krupp factories, and
prisoners of war and foreign workers were generally forced to work long
hours, to and beyond the point of exhaustion.
(_a_) In a memorandum marked “secret”, dated 14 August 1942, Reiff, a
Krupp official, wrote:
“* * * I am under the impression that the better Russian workers
are first of all chosen for the works in Central and Eastern
Germany. We really get the bad remainders only. Just now 600
Russians, consisting of 450 women and 150 juveniles, 14 years of
age, arrived.” (_D-348_; similar proof is contained in _D-281_).
(_b_) In a memorandum from the Chief of the Krupp Camp Catering
Department, it is stated:
“* * * It is to be considered that foreigners must work 12 hours
on principle out of which, 1 hour counts as a break and
consequently will not be paid.” (_D-233_; for evidence
concerning complete exhaustion of foreign workers and prisoners
of war, see _D-313_).
(6) The prisoners of war and foreign laborers used at the Krupp works
were beaten, tortured, and subjected to inhuman indignities.
(_a_) In a sworn statement, Heinrich Buschhauer has stated:
“* * * I admit that I hit Russians. The Russians were very
willing and attentive. The clothing of the Russians was very bad
and torn. Their feet were wrapped in rags. The appearance of the
people was bad, they were thin and pale. Their cheeks had fallen
in completely. In spite of this, I was forced to ill-treat the
people on the orders of works manager Theile. I have boxed the
people’s ears and beaten them with a ¾ rubber tube and a wooden
stick. * * * The more energetic I went against these people, the
more the Works Manager liked it. I * * * had to drive and beat
the Russians in order to get increased production from them. At
times, I had up to two thousand foreigners under me. The
Russians could not possibly work more than they did, because the
food was too bad and too little. The Works management, however,
wanted to get still higher performance from them. It often
happened that the Russians, so utterly weakened, collapsed. * *
*”
* * * * * *
“The conditions which I have described above continued the whole
of the years I was in the boiler making department. On 20th
February 1943, I was transferred from the boiler making shop to
Nidia.” (_D-305_).
(_b_) Walter Thoene, a Krupp employee, likewise admitted in a sworn
statement that he constantly beat foreign workers. He stated:
“I admit that I punched and beat Hungarian Jewesses who I had to
supervise in No. 3 Steel Moulding Shop. I did not do this of my
own free will but was ordered to do so by my works manager Reif,
who was a Party Member like I was. Almost every day this
unscrupulous man held me to it in no mistakable manner to
driving on these Jewesses and getting better performances from
them. He also always emphasized that I should not be trivial in
the choice of means, and if necessary, hit them like hitting a
piece of cold iron. As soon as I saw that these women were
standing near the ovens, I had to drive them back to their
work.” (_D-355_)
Comparable admission were made by August Kleinschmidt, another Krupp
employee. (_D-306_)
(_c_) Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki, a doctor in the Polish Army, who was
taken a prisoner of war and in that capacity attended some Russian,
Polish and French prisoners of war at the Krupp factories, has stated
under oath:
“* * * Every day, at least 10 people were brought to me whose
bodies were covered with bruises on account of the continual
beatings with rubber tubes, steel switches or sticks. The people
were often writhing with agony and it was impossible for me to
give them even a little medical aid. * * * I could notice people
daily who on account of hunger or ill-treatment, were slowly
dying. Dead people often lay for 2 or 3 days on the pailliases
until their bodies stank so badly that fellow prisoners took
them outside and buried them somewhere. * * * I have seen with
my own eyes the prisoners coming back from Krupps and how they
collapsed on the march and had to be wheeled back on barrows or
carried by their comrades. * * * The work which they had to
perform was very heavy and dangerous and many cases happened
where people had cut their fingers, hands or legs. These
accidents were very serious and the people came to me and asked
me for medical help. But it wasn’t even possible for me to keep
them from work for a day or two, although I had been to the
Krupp directorate and asked for permission to do so. At the end
of 1941, 2 people died daily and in 1942 the deaths increased to
3-4 per day.” (_D-313_)
(_d_) A particular form of torture which was inflicted upon Russian
workers was a steel cabinet specially manufactured by Krupp, into which
workers were thrown after beatings. The cabinets are shown in
photographs attached to a sworn statement wherein it is stated:
“Photograph ‘A’ shows an iron cupboard which was specially
manufactured by the Firm of Krupp to torture Russian civilian
workers to such an extent that it is impossible to describe. Men
and women were often locked in one compartment of the cupboard,
in which a man could scarcely stand, for long periods. The
measurements of this compartment are height 1.52 meters, breadth
and depth 40 to 50 cm. each. In fact, people were often kicked
and pressed into one compartment in pairs. At the top of the
cupboard, there were sieve-like air holes through which cold
water was poured on the unfortunate victims during the ice-cold
winter.” (_D-382_; for further evidence of constant beatings of
foreign workers, see _D-253_, _D-312_, _D-354_, and _D-267_).
(_e_) Records found in the Krupp files plainly indicate that the
practice of beating and torturing prisoners of war and foreign workers
was deliberately prescribed by Krupp officials. Steel switches which
were used to beat the workers were distributed pursuant to the
instructions of Kupke, head of the Krupp camps for foreign workers
(_D-230_). In a memorandum dated 19 March 1942, from the Krupp Works
Catering Department, it was said:
“* * * With regards to the times ahead it seems desirable to us,
to draw attention to the authorities concerned, with the
necessary pressure, to the fact that only severest treatment of
the French prisoners of war will ensure that they maintain their
performance even with the present food position, which is the
same for German workers.” (_D-278_).
As previously shown, Hassel, an official in the Krupp works police,
stated that the Russians “ought to have beatings substituted for food”
(_D-318_).
(7) The Krupp companies specifically requested and actively sought out
the employment of prisoners of war and foreign laborers.
(_a_) In a memorandum dated 13 July 1942 by Weinhold, a Krupp official,
complaint was registered over the fact that “the foreign laborers are
only available two to three months after they have been asked for by
us.” (_D-281_).
(_b_) In a letter to the Krupp firm dated 27 August 1942, Colonel
Zimmerman of the _Oberkommando des Heeres_, said:
“According to our estimate, there ought to be enough workers in
your ignitor workshops to reach the demanded production figure.
This especially, as the 105 Russians, demanded by your firm at
the Conference of the special committee M 111 on the 24.4.42,
were assigned to your works at the beginning of June re-letter
from Wa J Ru (Mun. 2). * * *
“Unfortunately, I found out at the sitting of the special
committee M 111 on the 26.8.42 that the firm of Krupp asks for
another 55 workers, including 25 skilled labourers, without
having a corresponding raise in the production figures. I cannot
judge from here, what the reasons for this are.” (_D-345_)
(_c_) In a memorandum dated 21 December 1942 concerning the possibility
of the Krupp works obtaining additional conscripted French workers, Dr.
Lehmann, a Krupp official, stated:
“* * * We discussed how far it would be possible for complete
shifts of workers conscripted from French factories to be
transferred to Essen. We are to collaborate as far as
practicable in the splitting up of our requirements amongst
individual military government offices and military police
posts. So far as possible one of our representatives is to
assist in the selection from amongst the conscripts.” (_D-196_;
see also _D-280_)
(8) Concentration camp laborers, who were brought to the Krupp works at
the request of Krupp officials, were subjected to persecution,
degradation, despoilment, and torture in a manner similar to that of
prisoners of war and slave laborers.
(_a_) Mr. Ihn, a director of the Krupp firm, has stated in a signed but
unsworn statement, that the Krupp firm first asked for concentration
camp labor on 22 September 1942, and that the first group of them
arrived “in the summer or autumn of 1944” (_D-274_).
(_b_) The fact that concentration camp labor was requested by the Krupp
works; that such persons were to be confined behind barbed wire
enclosures; and that they were to be closely guarded by SS personnel is
further shown in a memorandum entitled “Visit of the Director of
Distribution of Workers of the Weimar-Buchenwald Concentration Camp; SS
Hauptsturmfuehrer Schwarz on 26-7-44”, written by Trockel, a Krupp
official. In the course of this memorandum, Trockel stated:
“Herr Schwarz came on behalf of his Commandant SS
Standartenfuehrer Pister to talk over with us, the question of
employment of K1 detainees. He pointed out that the employment
of men could not be reckoned with for a considerable period. Our
last request was for 700 women.”
* * * * * *
“As not less than 500 women would be assigned, we agreed that
the figure should remain at 500 women in order that the
assignment should not be endangered. * * *”
* * * * * *
“* * * The main things are the erection of a barbed wire fence
in front of the hall which allows a small exit and the erection
of a small barracks for the Commander of the guard and his duty
office and for the German female guard personnel. * * *”
* * * * * *
“The SS are providing a guard consisting of guard commander and
10 men. For 520 women we have to name approx. 45 German women
who will be sworn in to the SS, given 3 weeks training in the
women’s camp at Ravensbrueck and then given full official
supervision duties by the SS. * * *” (_D-238_)
(_c_) Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor in the Krupp camps, has described
conditions at the camp which the Krupp works maintained for
concentration camp labor as follows:
“Camp Humboldtstrasse had been inhabited by Italian prisoners of
war. After it had been destroyed by an air raid, the Italians
were removed and 600 Jewish females from Buchenwald
Concentration Camp were brought in to work at the Krupp
factories. Upon my first visit at Camp Humboldtstrasse, I found
these females suffering from open festering wounds and other
diseases.
“I was the first doctor they had seen for at least a fortnight.
There was no doctor in attendance at the camp. There were no
medical supplies in the camp. They had no shoes and went about
in their bare feet. The sole clothing of each consisted of a
sack with holes for their arms and head. Their hair was shorn.
The camp was surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded by SS
guards.
“The amount of food in the camp was extremely meagre and of very
poor quality. The houses in which they lived consisted of the
ruins of former barracks and they afforded no shelter against
rain and other weather conditions. I reported to my superiors
that the guards lived and slept outside their barracks as one
could not enter them without being attacked by 10, 20 and up to
30 fleas. One camp doctor employed by me refused to enter the
camp again after he had been bitten very badly. I visited this
camp with a Mr. Grono on two occasions and both times we left
the camp badly bitten. We had great difficulty in getting rid of
the fleas and insects which had attacked us. As a result of this
attack by insects of this camp, I got large boils on my arms and
the rest of my body. I asked my superiors at the Krupp works to
undertake the necessary steps to delouse the camp so as to put
an end to this unbearable, vermin-infested condition. Despite
this report, I did not find any improvement in sanitary
conditions at the camp on my second visit a fortnight later.”
(_D-288_)
(_d_) The conditions under which the concentration camp workers existed
at the Krupp camps and factories and the indignities and barbarities to
which they were subjected are vividly described in affidavits by such
workers (_D-256_; _D-277_; _D-272_). In general, the affidavits disclose
that these concentration camp laborers slept on bare floors of damp,
windowless and lightless cellars; that they had no water for drinking or
cleansing purposes; that they were compelled to do work far beyond their
strength; that they were mercilessly beaten; that they were given one
wretched meal a day, consisting of a dirty watery soup with a thin slice
of black bread; and that many of them died from starvation, tuberculosis
and overexertion. A chart entitled “Fried. Krupp _Berthawerk,
Markstaedt_ Breslau, Number of Occupied Foreigners, Prisoners of War and
Concentration Camp Inmates” shows the use of concentration camp labor at
that factory, as well as at the above-mentioned Krupp company in Essen
(_D-298_).
(9) Charts prepared by Krupp officials show that in September 1943, the
Krupp concerns employed 39,245 foreign workers and 11,224 prisoners of
war, and that the number mounted steadily until September 1944, when
54,990 foreign workers and 18,902 prisoners of war were used (Chart
entitled “Foreigners and Prisoners of War of the Krupp Concern”; chart
entitled “Cast Steel Works, Number of Prisoners of War and Foreigners”,
not here reproduced.) The majority of the foreign laborers consisted of
Russians, French, Poles, and Dutch.
I. _AS REWARD FOR HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM,
KRUPP REAPED LARGE PROFITS, WAS PERMITTED TO EXPAND HIS INDUSTRIAL
EMPIRE, AND RECEIVED HIGH HONORS AND SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM THE NAZI
GOVERNMENT._
(1) Although the Krupp companies operated at a substantial loss in the
years immediately preceding Hitler’s accession to power, the huge orders
from the Nazi state enabled them to derive vast profits thereafter. In
the fiscal year 1 October 1934 to 30 September 1935, the net profits of
Fried. Krupp and subsidiaries, after the deduction of taxes, gifts and
reserves recognized by the tax authorities, amounted to 57,216,392
marks. In the fiscal year 1937 to 1938 these net profits rose to
97,071,632 marks, and in the fiscal year 1941 they amounted to
111,555,216 marks (Chart entitled “Income and Loss of the Fried. Krupp
Combine”; Graph entitled “Profits or Losses of Fried. Krupp and
Subsidiaries as Reported to Tax Authorities,” not here reproduced.)
(2) Krupp was permitted, with the approval and at times connivance of
Nazi officials, to extend in great measure his participation in other
companies, both within and without Germany.
(_a_) On 1 October 1933 the participations of Fried. Krupp in other
concerns had a book value of 75,962,000 marks. By 30 September 1942 the
book value of the participations had grown to 132,944,000 marks. On 1
October 1942 the participation account was revalued and carried at a new
figure of 187,924,621 marks. In the following year new acquisitions were
made in the amount of 50,224,707 marks, so that the book value of the
participations as of 1 October 1943 was 237,316,093 marks. Even this
figure contains many going concerns in occupied countries which were
arbitrarily assigned a book value of only 1 mark. Leaving out of account
the revaluation of 1 October 1942, the participation account as of 1
October 1943 would have been 182,952,000 marks. The increment in the
participation account is shown in a chart entitled, “Fried. Krupp
Participations” (_D-341_). The expansion of the Krupp concern under the
Nazi regime is likewise revealed by a comparison of charts showing the
companies in the Krupp concern as of 30 September 1935 and 31 January
1944.
(_b_) Complete records of all acquisitions by Krupp have not been
obtained because, according to Krupp officials, many records were lost
or destroyed in air raids. Enough appears, however, to indicate that the
Krupp firm did in fact call upon the Nazi authorities to facilitate or
make possible the acquisition of property interests in occupied
countries. Thus, when Mr. Erhard, the French custodian of Jewish
property in France, resisted Krupp’s attempts to acquire a lease of a
plant at Liancourt, France, the Krupp concern enlisted the support of
the Army to gain its objective. Under threat of replacement by a German
official, the French custodian of Jewish property acceded to Krupp’s
demands. In a memorandum dated 29 July 1942, found in the Krupp files,
it is stated:
“* * * M. Erhard delayed the negotiations to such an extent that
finally the appropriate military authorities in Paris urged a
settlement. This authority declared that if Mr. Erhard could not
make up his mind to sell, at least he would have to give a three
years’ lease to Krupp.
“The custodianship would be taken away from Mr. Erhard and a
German Commissar would be appointed unless the lease were
granted in a very short time.” (_D-526_).
(3) In recognition of his services to the Nazi State, Krupp was awarded
the “Shield of the Eagle of the German Reich” with the inscription “To
the German leader of Industry” (_D-66_).
(4) Because of his unique service to the military power of the Nazi
State, Krupp was authorized by special decree of Hitler to transform
Fried. Krupp A.G. into a private family concern in order to perpetuate
control of the firm by a single member of the Krupp family.
(_a_) In a letter dated 11 November 1942 to Bormann, Krupp stated:
“* * * You have asked me to make proposals to you which would
secure the future of the unified existence of the Krupp works
more than this is feasible today. * * * On considering this
question we have ascertained that under the present laws the
principal solution of the question cannot be carried out. We had
to find an entirely new way, therefore, which, just as the law
regarding heritage of agricultural property, creates entirely
new legislation.” (_D-99_)
(_b_) In reply to the above letter, Bormann wrote to Krupp that:
“I have reported the contents of your letters of the 11/11 to
the Fuehrer today. He instructed me to inform you that he would
be readily prepared to arrange for any possible safeguarding for
the continued existence of the works as a family enterprise; it
would be the simplest to issue a ‘_Lex Krupp_’ to start with.”
(_D-101_).
(_c_) Krupp’s recognition of the unusual character of his proposal is
indicated in his letter of 24 February 1943 to Lammers, wherein he said:
“Without doubt, the matter, which is without precedent in
economic life, will have to be discussed with the Reichs
Minister of Justice and the Reichs Minister of Finance also. * *
*” (_D-106_).
(_d_) On 12 November 1943 Hitler signed the decree making possible the
preservation of the Krupp firm as a family enterprise in recognition of
the fact that
“for 132 years the firm of Fried. Krupp, as a family enterprise
has achieved outstanding and unique merits for the armed
strength of the German people.” (_D-120_)
In a letter dated 16 November 1943, Lammers wrote to Krupp:
“On 12 November the Fuehrer signed the decree regarding the
family enterprise of the firm Fried. Krupp. * * * May I express
my heartiest congratulations to you, your wife and the firm
Fried. Krupp on the great honor which has been conferred on the
merits of the firm Fried. Krupp with this recognition by the
Fuehrer.” (_D-124_).
(_e_) As the final step in the proceeding, Hitler approved “the statute
of the family enterprise Fried. Krupp” which gave effect to his decree
of 12 November 1943 (_D-131_).
(_f_) In a letter of gratitude to Hitler dated 29 December 1943, Krupp
stated:
“* * * By this, you have made a wish come true, which my wife
and I had had for years, and thus relieved our hearts of great
worry over the future of the Krupp works.”
* * * * * *
“My wife and I, as well as the whole family, are deeply grateful
to you for this proof of your confidence. * * *”
“Our special thanks go to you, Mein Fuehrer, also for the great
honour and recognition which you have awarded, in the
introduction to your decree, to 130 years of the work of Krupps,
the work of Krupps done by many generations of faithful
followers, and steered and directed by 4 generations of the
family Krupp.” (_D-135_)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO GUSTAV KRUPP VON
BOHLEN UND HALBACH
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 64
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
D-62 │Letter from Inspector of War │ │
│Production to Krupp, 21 January 1937. │ VI │ 1028
│ │ │
D-63 │Declaration of political attitude by │ │
│Krupp, 6 February 1937. │ VI │ 1029
│ │ │
D-64 │Letter to Krupp, 3 December 1941, │ │
│enclosing extracts from draft of │ │
│article entitled “Works Leader and │ │
│Armaments Works”, 5 April 1941. │ VI │ 1030
│ │ │
D-66 │Presentation certificate, 7 August │ │
│1940, concerning granting to Krupp of │ │
│Shield of the Eagle of German Reich. │ VI │ 1034
│ │ │
D-88 │Correspondence between Krupp and │ │
│Raeder, 7 and 10 August 1935. │ VI │ 1042
│ │ │
D-94 │Article by Krupp, Manager and Armament│ │
│Worker, from 1 March 1942 issue of │ │
│Krupp magazine. │ VI │ 1043
│ │ │
D-96 │Memorandum on establishment of an │ │
│experimental Tank Factory by the │ │
│Grusonwerk, 21 February 1944. │ VI │ 1047
│ │ │
D-99 │Letter from Krupp to Bormann, 11 │ │
│November 1942. │ VI │ 1048
│ │ │
D-101 │Letter from Bormann to Krupp, 21 │ │
│November 1942. │ VI │ 1050
│ │ │
D-106 │Letter from Krupp to Lammers, 24 │ │
│February 1943. │ VI │ 1050
│ │ │
D-120 │Fuehrer decree on family enterprise of│ │
│the firm Friedrich Krupp. │ VI │ 1051
│ │ │
D-124 │Letter from Lammers to Krupp, 16 │ │
│November 1943. │ VI │ 1053
│ │ │
D-131 │Hitler decree of 21 December 1943, │ │
│approving family enterprise of Krupp. │ VI │ 1054
│ │ │
D-135 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 29 │ │
│December 1943. │ VI │ 1054
│ │ │
D-143 │List of barracks and beds in workers │ │
│Hostels and PW camps of Friedrich │ │
│Krupp A.G., and covering letter of 30 │ │
│June 1942. │ VI │ 1058
│ │ │
*D-151 │Krupp, Schacht and Hess correspondence│ │
│in 1933 regarding the Hitler Fund. (GB│ │
│256; USA 831) │ VI │ 1060
│ │ │
D-152 │Memorandum by Pfirsrch on the │ │
│conference at Federal Ministry for │ │
│National Defense in Vienna, 28 │ │
│September 1936. │ VI │ 1062
│ │ │
D-154 │Memorandum, 23 June 1937, in files of │ │
│Friedrich Krupp A.G. concerning order │ │
│for armor plating from Bulgaria. │ VI │ 1062
│ │ │
*D-157 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 25 April │ │
│1933, with enclosure. (USA 765) │ VI │ 1063
│ │ │
D-158 │Letter from Rosenberg to Krupp, 26 │ │
│April 1933. │ VI │ 1066
│ │ │
*D-167 │Memoranda by Sonnenberg and Dr. Conn │ │
│concerning exchange of intelligence │ │
│involving Krupp works. (USA 766) │ VI │ 1069
│ │ │
D-170 │Notes of 8 May 1939 by Sonnenberg on │ │
│conference in Berlin concerning │ │
│foreign anti-aircraft guns. │ VI │ 1072
│ │ │
D-191 │Memorandum on reconstruction of │ │
│Krupp’s after war 1914-1918 with │ │
│special reference to armaments │ │
│exports, 25 March 1941. │ VI │ 1076
│ │ │
D-196 │Memoranda by Dr. Lehman concerning │ │
│recruiting of French workers. │ VI │ 1078
│ │ │
D-201 │Telegram from Goering to Krupp. │ VI │ 1080
│ │ │
*D-203 │Speech of Hitler to leading members of│ │
│industry before the election of March │ │
│1933. (USA 767) │ VI │ 1080
│ │ │
*D-204 │Statement of Krupp concerning │ │
│political organization of state and │ │
│economy, 22 February 1933. (USA 768) │ VI │ 1085
│ │ │
*D-206 │Memorandum, 12 October 1939, on │ │
│distribution of propaganda abroad │ │
│through foreign connections of Krupp │ │
│firm. (USA 769) │ VI │ 1085
│ │ │
D-208 │Letter from Krupp to Springorum, 26 │ │
│April 1933. │ VI │ 1087
│ │ │
*D-230 │Instruction for issuing steel switches│ │
│to Krupp camps, 3 January 1945. (USA │ │
│898) │ VI │ 1094
│ │ │
D-233 │Memorandum, 17 October 1944, │ │
│concerning working hours for foreign │ │
│workers. │ VI │ 1095
│ │ │
D-238 │Memorandum by Trockel, 28 July 1944, │ │
│concerning assignation of detainees. │ VI │ 1095
│ │ │
D-242 │Letter from Springorum to Krupp │ │
│concerning contribution of 20,000 │ │
│marks to Rosenberg. │ VI │ 1097
│ │ │
D-249 │Von Bulow memorandum on notes of │ │
│conference with Grassmann, Fuss and │ │
│Kraft, held 9 December 1942, │ │
│concerning History of War Economy. │ VI │ 1098
│ │ │
D-253 │Affidavit of Peter Gutersohn, 3 │ │
│October 1945. │ VI │ 1105
│ │ │
D-256 │Affidavit of Rene Koenigsberg and │ │
│Agnes Koenigsberg, 20 September 1945. │ VI │ 1107
│ │ │
D-265 │Affidavit of Heinrich Ruhnau, 3 │ │
│October 1945. │ VI │ 1108
│ │ │
D-267 │Affidavit of Heinrich Tiedtke, Karl │ │
│Hanke, Johann Berek, 27 September │ │
│1945. │ VI │ 1109
│ │ │
D-270 │Memorandum, 7 April 1942, concerning │ │
│employment of foreign workers. │ VI │ 1110
│ │ │
D-271 │Memorandum from Wiele to Ihn, 20 │ │
│October 1942. │ VI │ 1110
│ │ │
D-272 │Affidavit of Elizabeth and Ernestin │ │
│Roth, 21 September 1945. │ VI │ 1111
│ │ │
D-274 │Statement by Ihn, 1 October 1945. │ VI │ 1112
│ │ │
D-277 │Affidavit of Rosa Katz, 21 September │ │
│1945. │ VI │ 1115
│ │ │
D-278 │Memorandum from Works Catering │ │
│Department to Dr. Lehmann, Employment │ │
│Office, 19 March 1942. │ VI │ 1116
│ │ │
D-279 │Affidavit of Alexander Haverkarte, 1 │ │
│October 1945. │ VI │ 1116
│ │ │
D-280 │Secret memorandum, 17 June 1942, │ │
│concerning need for and obtaining of │ │
│workers for cast steel works. │ VI │ 1117
│ │ │
D-281 │Memorandum by Winhold, 13 July 1942, │ │
│concerning urgent production A.Z. 23 │ │
│(Pr). │ VI │ 1119
│ │ │
*D-283 │Report by Krupp hospitals, 7 May 1943,│ │
│concerning deaths of Eastern Workers. │ │
│(USA 899) │ VII │ 1
│ │ │
D-287 │Letter from Krupp to Raeder, 30 │ │
│October 1942. │ VII │ 1
│ │ │
*D-288 │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Jaeger, 15 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 202) │ VII │ 2
│ │ │
D-291 │Speech by Krupp, 1 May 1936. │ VII │ 7
│ │ │
D-297 │Memorandum from Theile to Hupe, 26 │ │
│March 1942, concerning employment of │ │
│Russian PWs and civilians. │ VII │ 9
│ │ │
D-298 │Affidavit by Dr. Georg Wolff and │ │
│chart, “Fried. Krupp Berthawerk, │ │
│Markstaedt Breslau, Number of Occupied│ │
│Foreigners, Prisoners of War and │ │
│Concentration Camp Inmates”. │ VII │ 10
│ │ │
D-304 │Krupp speech, 13 October 1938. │ VII │ 12
│ │ │
D-305 │Affidavit of Heinrich Buschhauer, 5 │ │
│October 1945. │ VII │ 13
│ │ │
D-306 │Affidavit of August Kleinschmidt, 11 │ │
│October 1945. │ VII │ 14
│ │ │
D-310 │Memorandum from Grollius to Kolsch, 18│ │
│March 1942. │ VII │ 15
│ │ │
D-312 │Affidavit of Karl Sehnbruch, 11 │ │
│October 1945. │ VII │ 16
│ │ │
*D-313 │Affidavit by Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki, │ │
│October 1945. (USA 901) │ VII │ 18
│ │ │
D-316 │Memorandum to Mr. Hupe, 14 March 1942,│ │
│concerning employment of Russians. │ │
│(USA 201) │ VII │ 20
│ │ │
*D-317 │Krupp speech, “Thoughts about the │ │
│Industrial Enterpriser”, January 1944.│ │
│(USA 770) │ VII │ 21
│ │ │
D-318 │Memorandum from Diwkelaker to Ihn, 20 │ │
│March 1942. │ VII │ 24
│ │ │
*D-321 │Affidavit of Adam Schmidt, 12 October │ │
│1945. (USA 895) │ VII │ 25
│ │ │
D-325 │Affidavit of 17 October 1945 │ │
│concerning payments of Fried. Krupp │ │
│Cast Steel Works to Party and Party │ │
│Organizations. │ VII │ 26
│ │ │
D-332 │Letter from Janssen to NSDAP, 27 June │ │
│1935. │ VII │ 26
│ │ │
*D-335 │Memorandum from Stinnesbeck to Jaeger,│ │
│12 June 1944. (USA 900) │ VII │ 27
│ │ │
D-338 │Special medical report by Dr. Jaeger, │ │
│28 July 1944. │ VII │ 27
│ │ │
D-339 │Special medical report by Dr. Jaeger, │ │
│2 September 1944. │ VII │ 28
│ │ │
D-341 │Affidavit of Johannes Schroeder │ │
│concerning Fried. Krupp │ │
│Participations. │ VII │ 29
│ │ │
D-345 │Letter from Col. Zimmermann to Krupp │ │
│firm, 27 August 1942. │ VII │ 30
│ │ │
D-348 │Secret memo by Reiff concerning │ │
│conference in Berlin, 14 August 1942. │ VII │ 31
│ │ │
D-353 │Speech by Krupp, 18 October 1933, at │ │
│first meeting of Committee for │ │
│Industrial and Social Policy of Reich │ │
│Association of German Industry. │ VII │ 32
│ │ │
D-354 │Affidavit of Paul Lenz, Wilhelm Sill, │ │
│Hermann Rosskothen, Fritz Schink, Karl│ │
│Fortkamp, Wilhelm Piegeler, 5 October │ │
│1945. │ VII │ 34
│ │ │
D-355 │Affidavit of Walter Thoene, 8 October │ │
│1945. │ VII │ 36
│ │ │
D-363 │Krupp speech, 4 September 1939. │ VII │ 37
│ │ │
D-366 │Memorandum from Haller to Schuermeyer,│ │
│8 December 1942. │ VII │ 37
│ │ │
D-367 │Affidavit of Heinrich Frauenrath, 12 │ │
│October 1945. │ VII │ 38
│ │ │
D-368 │Letter from Lutze, 15 August 1934, │ │
│concerning use of Hitler Fund. │ VII │ 39
│ │ │
D-373 │Letter from Terboven to Krupp, 24 June│ │
│1935, thanking Krupp for │ │
│contributions. │ VII │ 40
│ │ │
D-375 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 24 July │ │
│1942. │ VII │ 40
│ │ │
*D-382 │Affidavit of Raimund Becker, Aloys │ │
│Hoefer, Josef Dahm, 4 October 1945. │ │
│(USA 897) │ VII │ 41
│ │ │
D-385 │Speech by Krupp at first showing of │ │
│Krupp film on 27 October 1935. │ VII │ 42
│ │ │
D-386 │Speech by Krupp on election after │ │
│death of Hindenburg, on 10 August │ │
│1934. │ VII │ 43
│ │ │
D-387 │Speech by Krupp, 7 April 1938. │ VII │ 43
│ │ │
D-390 │Krupp speech to jubilees of plant on 6│ │
│May 1941. │ VII │ 43
│ │ │
D-391 │Speech by Krupp, 6 April 1938. │ VII │ 44
│ │ │
D-392 │Speech by Krupp, 26 January 1934. │ VII │ 45
│ │ │
D-393 │Speech by Krupp, “The Day of Fate of │ │
│the German People”. │ VII │ 47
│ │ │
D-526 │File memorandum, 29 July 1942, │ │
│concerning acquisition of Liancourt │ │
│lease. │ VII │ 71
14. KARL DOENITZ
A. _NAVAL AND POLITICAL CAREER._
After his appointment in 1935 as commander of the Weddigen U-boat
flotilla—the first flotilla to be formed after the World War in
1918—Doenitz, who thus became in effect commander of U-boats, rose
steadily in rank as the U-boat arm expanded until he became an admiral.
On 30 January 1943 he was appointed Grand Admiral and succeeded Raeder
as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, retaining his command of the
U-boat arm. Then, on 1 May 1945, he succeeded Hitler as leader of
Germany (_2887-PS_).
Doenitz was awarded the following decorations: On 18 September 1939 he
received the Cluster of the Iron Cross, first class, for the U-boat
successes in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. This award was
followed on 21 April 1940 by the high award of the Knight’s Cross to the
Iron Cross, while on 7 April 1943 he received personally from Hitler the
Oak Leaf to the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross, as the 223rd
recipient.
Doenitz’s services in building up the German Navy, and in particular the
offensive U-boat arm for the coming war, were outstanding. An extract
from the official publication “_Das Archiv_” on the occasion of
Doenitz’s promotion to vice-admiral, dated 27 September 1940, reads as
follows:
“* * * In four years of untiring and in the fullest sense of the
word uninterrupted work of training, he [Doenitz] succeeds in
developing the young U-boat arm, personnel, and material till it
is a weapon of a striking power unexpected even by the experts.
More than three million gross tons of sunken enemy shipping in
only one year achieved with only few boats speak better than
words of the services of this man.” (_D-436_)
An extract from the diary for the German Navy, 1944 edition (_1463-PS_)
emphasizes Doenitz’s contribution. It describes in detail Doenitz’s work
in building up the U-boat arm; his ceaseless work in training night and
day to close the gap of seventeen years, during which no training had
taken place; his responsibility for new improvements and for devising
the “pack” tactics which were later to become famous. His position is
summarized further as follows:
“* * * In spite of the fact that his duties took on unmeasurable
proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction
program, the chief was what he always was and always will be,
leader and inspiration to all the forces under him. * * * In
spite of all his duties, he never lost touch with his men and he
showed a masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the
changing fortunes of war.” (_1463-PS_)
It was not only, however, his ability as a naval officer which won
Doenitz these high honors: his promotion to succeed Raeder as
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; the personal position he acquired as one
of Hitler’s principal advisers; and finally, earlier candidates such as
Goering having betrayed Hitler’s trust or finding the position less
attractive than they had anticipated, the doubtful honour of becoming
Hitler’s successor. These he owed, to his fanatical adherence to Hitler
and to the Party, to his belief in the Nazi ideology with which he
sought to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people, and to his
“masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of
war” (_1463-PS_), which may be regarded as synonymous with a capacity
for utter ruthlessness.
B. _INDOCTRINATION OF NAVAL PERSONNEL WITH NAZI POLITICAL IDEOLOGY._
Doenitz’s attitude to the Nazi Party and its creed is shown by his
public utterances. In a speech—subsequently circulated by Doenitz as a
Top Secret document for senior officers only and by the hand of officers
only—at a meeting of commanders of the Navy in Weimar on 17 December
1943, Doenitz stated (_D-443_):
“* * * I am a firm adherent of the idea of ideological
education. For what is it in the main? Doing his duty is a
matter of course for the soldier. But the whole importance, the
whole weight of duty done, are only present when the heart and
spiritual conviction have a voice in the matter. The result of
duty done is then quite different to what it would be if I only
carried out my task literally, obediently, and faithfully. It is
therefore necessary for the soldier to support the execution of
his duty with all his mental, all his spiritual energy, and for
this his conviction, his ideology are indispensable. It is
therefore necessary for us to train the soldier uniformly,
comprehensively, that he may be adjusted ideologically to our
Germany. Every dualism, every dissension in this connection, or
every divergence, or unpreparedness, imply a weakness in all
circumstances. He in whom this grows and thrives in unison is
superior to the other. Then indeed the whole importance, the
whole weight of his conviction comes into play. It is also
nonsense to say that the soldier or the officer must have no
politics. The soldier embodies the state in which he lives; he
is the representative, the articulate exponent of this state. He
must therefore stand with his whole weight behind this state.
“We must travel this road from our deepest conviction. The
Russian travels along it. We can only maintain ourselves in this
war if we take part in it with holy zeal, with all our
fanaticism.
“Not I alone can do this, but it can only be done with the aid
of the man who holds the production of Europe in his hand, with
Minister Speer. My ambition is to have as many warships for the
Navy as possible so as to be able to fight and to strike. It
does not matter to me who builds them.” (_D-443_)
In a speech on the same subject by Doenitz as Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy to the Commanders in Chief on 15 February 1944, he had this to say:
“From the very start the whole of the officer corps must be so
indoctrinated that it feels itself co-responsible for the
National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the
exponent of the state; the idle chatter that the officer is
non-political is sheer nonsense.” (_D-640_)
Doenitz’s position was made unmistakably clear in a speech which he made
to the German Navy and the German people on Heroes’ Day, 12 March 1944:
“German men and women!
“* * * What would have become of our country today, if the
Fuehrer had not united us under National-Socialism! Split into
parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable
to it, and lacking, as a defense, our present uncompromising
world outlook, we would long since have succumbed to the burdens
of this war and been subject to the merciless destruction of our
adversaries. * * *” (_2878-PS_) A speech by Doenitz to the Navy
on 21 July 1944 shows his fanaticism:
“Men of the Navy! Holy wrath and unlimited anger fill our hearts
because of the criminal attempt which was intended to have cost
the life of our beloved Fuehrer. Providence wished it
otherwise—watched over and protected our Fuehrer, and did not
abandon our German fatherland in the fight for its destiny.”
(_2878-PS_)
And then he goes on to deal with the fate which should be meted out to
the traitors.
The abolition of the German military salute and the adoption of the Nazi
salute in the German forces was due to Doenitz along with Goering and
Keitel (_2878-PS_).
When Adolf Hitler was reported dead, Doenitz spoke over the German radio
announcing the Fuehrer’s death and his own succession. The German
announcer made this statement:
“It has been reported from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters that our
Fuehrer Adolf Hitler has died this afternoon in his battle
headquarters at the Reichschancellery fighting to the last
breath for Germany against Bolshevism.
“On the 30th April the Fuehrer nominated Grand Admiral Doenitz
to be his successor. The Grand Admiral and Fuehrer’s successor
will speak to the German nation.” (_D-444_)
Whereupon Doenitz spoke as follows:
“German men and women, soldiers of the German Armed Forces. Our
Fuehrer Adolf Hitler is dead. The German people bow in deepest
sorrow and respect. Early he had recognized the terrible danger
of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against
it. His fight having ended, he died a hero’s death in the
capital of the German Reich, after having led an unmistakably
straight and steady life.” (_D-444_)
Doenitz proceeded to issue an order of the day, to the same effect
(_D-444_).
C. _PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AGGRESSIVE WARS._
Apart from his services in building up the U-boat arm, there is ample
evidence that Doenitz, as Officer Commanding U-boats, took part in the
planning and execution of the aggressive wars against Poland, Norway,
and Denmark.
(1) _Poland._ The distribution list on a memorandum by Raeder, dated 16
May 1939, shows that the sixth copy went to the _Fuehrer der
Unterseeboote_, who was Doenitz. This document was a directive for the
invasion of Poland (_Fall Weiss_) (_C-126_). Another memorandum from
Raeder’s headquarters, dated 2 August 1939, is addressed to the fleet,
and The Flag Officer, U-boats—this is, Doenitz (_C-126_). This was
merely a covering letter on operational directions for the precautionary
employment of U-boats in the Atlantic in the event that the intention to
carry out _Fall Weiss_ remained unchanged. The second sentence is
significant:
“Flag Officer, U-boats, is handing in his operational orders to
SKL [_Seekriegsleitung_, the German Admiralty] by 12 August. A
decision on the sailings of U-boats for the Atlantic will
probably be made at the middle of August.” (_C-126_)
Doenitz proceeded to give operational instructions to his U-boats for
the operation _Fall Weiss_. These instructions, signed by him, are not
dated, but it is clear from the subject matter that the date must have
been before 16 July 1939 (_C-172_). These operational instructions gave
effect to Raeder’s directive (_C-126_).
(2) _Norway and Denmark._ An extract from the War Diary of the Naval War
Staff of the German Admiralty, dated 3 October 1939, records the fact
that the Chief of the Naval War Staff has called for views on the
possibility of taking operational bases in Norway (_C-122_). It states
Doenitz’s views as follows:
“* * * Flag Officer U-boats already considers such harbors
extremely useful as equipment—and supply—bases for Atlantic
U-boats to call at temporarily.” (_C-122_)
A communication from Doenitz as Flag Officer U-boats, addressed to the
Supreme Command of the Navy (the Naval War Staff) dated 9 October 1939,
sets out Doenitz’s views on the advantages of Trondheim and Narvik as
bases. Doenitz proposes the establishment of a base at Trondheim with
Narvik as an alternative (_C-5_).
Doenitz then gave operation orders to his U-boats for the occupation of
Denmark and Norway. This Top Secret order, dated 30 March 1940, under
the code name “_Hartmut_,” provided:
“The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British
flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik.”
(_C-151_)
(3) _England._ The preparations for war against England are perhaps best
shown by the disposition of the U-boats under Doenitz’s command on 3
September 1939, when war broke out between Germany and the Western
Allies. The locations of the sinkings in the following week, including
that of the _Athenia_, provide corroboration. These matters are
contained in two charts prepared by the British Admiralty. The first
chart sets out the disposition of German submarines on 3 September 1939.
The certificate attached to this chart reads:
“This chart has been constructed from a study of the orders
issued by Doenitz between 21 August 1939 and 3 September 1939,
and subsequently captured. The chart shows the approximate
disposition of submarines ordered for the 3rd of September 1939,
and cannot be guaranteed accurate in every detail, as the file
of captured orders are clearly not complete and some of the
submarines shown apparently had received orders at sea on or
about September 3 to move to new operational areas. The
documents from which this chart was constructed are held by the
British Admiralty in London.”
It will be apparent that U-boats which were in the positions indicated
on this chart on 3 September 1939 had left Kiel a considerable time
before. The location of the U-boat U-30 is particularly significant.
The second chart sets out the sinkings during the first week of the war.
The attached certificate reads:
“This chart has been constructed from the official records of
the British Admiralty in London. It shows the position and
sinkings of the British merchant vessels lost by enemy action in
the seven days subsequent to 3 September 1939.”
The location of the sinking of the _Athenia_ is significant.
D. _PARTICIPATION IN CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF RULES OF
WARFARE._
The course of the war waged against neutral and allied merchant shipping
by German U-boats followed, under Doenitz’s direction, a course of
consistently increasing ruthlessness.
(1) _Attacks on Merchant Shipping._ Doenitz displayed “his masterly
understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war”
(_1463-PS_). From the very early days, merchant ships, both allied and
neutral, were sunk without warning, and when operational danger zones
had been announced by the German Admiralty, these sinkings continued to
take place both within and without those zones. With some exceptions in
the early days of the war, no regard was taken for the safety of the
crews or passengers of sunken merchant ships, and the announcement
claiming a total blockade of the British Isles merely served to confirm
the established situation under which U-boat warfare was being conducted
without regard to the established rules of international warfare or the
requirements of humanity.
The course of the war at sea during the first eighteen months is
summarized by two official British reports made at a time when those who
compiled them were ignorant of some of the actual orders issued which
have since come to hand. An official report of the British Foreign
Office summarizes German attacks on merchant shipping during the period
3 September 1939 to September 1940, that is to say, the first year of
the war (_D-641-A_). This report, made shortly after September 1940,
states in part as follows:
“* * * During the first twelve months of the war, 2,081,062 tons
of Allied shipping, comprising 508 ships, have been lost by
enemy action. In addition, 769,213 tons of neutral shipping
comprising 253 ships, have also been lost. Nearly all these
merchant ships have been sunk by submarine, mine, aircraft or
surface craft, and the great majority of them sunk while engaged
on their lawful trading occasions. 2,836 Allied merchant seamen
have lost their lives in these ships.
“In the last war the practice of the Central Powers was so
remote from the recognized procedure that it was thought
necessary to set forth once again the rules of warfare in
particular as applied to submarines. This was done in the Treaty
of London 1930, and in 1936 Germany acceded to these rules. The
rules laid down:
“(1) In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must
conform to the rules of International Law to which surface
vessels are subjected.
“(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to
stop on being summoned, or of active resistance to visit and
search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not
sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without
having first placed passengers, crew, and ship’s papers in a
place of safety. For this purpose, the ship’s boats are not
regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the
passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather
conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another
vessel which is in a position to take them on board.
“At the beginning of the present war, Germany issued a Prize
Ordinance for the regulation of sea warfare and the guidance of
her naval officers. Article 74 of this ordinance embodies the
submarine rules of the London Treaty. Article 72, however,
provides that captured enemy vessels may be destroyed if it
seems inexpedient or unsafe to bring them into port, and Article
73 (i) (ii) makes the same provision with regard to neutral
vessels which are captured for sailing under enemy convoy, for
forcible resistance, or for giving assistance to the enemy.
These provisions are certainly not in accordance with the
traditional British view but the important point is that, even
in these cases, the Prize Ordinance envisages the capture of the
merchantman before its destruction. In other words, if the
Germans adhered to the rules set out in their own Prize
Ordinance, we might have argued the rather fine legal point with
them, but we should have no quarrel with them, either on the
broader legal issue or on the humanitarian one. In the event,
however, it is only too clear that almost from the beginning of
the war the Germans abandoned their own principles and waged war
with steadily increasing disregard for International Law, and
for what is, after all, the ultimate sanction of all law, the
protection of human life and property from arbitrary and
ruthless attacks.” (_D-641-A_)
Two instances are then set out:
“On the 30th of September, 1939, came the first sinking of a
neutral ship by a submarine without warning and with loss of
life. This was the Danish ship ‘_Vendia_’ bound for the Clyde in
ballast. The submarine fired two shots and shortly after
torpedoed the ship. The torpedo was fired when the master had
already signalled that he would submit to the submarine’s orders
and before there had been an opportunity to abandon ship. By
November submarines were beginning to sink neutral vessels
without warning as a regular thing. On the 12th November the
Norwegian ‘_Arne Kjode_’ was torpedoed in the North Sea without
any warning at all. This was a tanker bound from one neutral
port to another. The master and four of the crew lost their
lives and the remainder were picked up after many hours in open
boats. Henceforward, in addition to the failure to establish the
nature of the cargo, another element is noticeable, namely an
increasing recklessness as to the fate of the crew.” (_D-641-A_)
And then, dealing with attacks on allied merchant vessels, certain
figures are given:
“Ships sunk 241
“Recorded attacks 221
“Illegal attacks 112
“At least 79 of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning.”
(_D-641-A_)
The report continues:
“By the middle of October submarines were sinking merchant
vessels without any regard to the safety of the crews. Yet four
months later the Germans were still officially claiming that
they were acting in accordance with the Prize Ordinance. Their
own semi-official commentators however, had made the position
clearer. As regards neutrals, Berlin officials had early in
February stated that any neutral ship that is either voluntarily
or under compulsion bound for an enemy port—including
contraband control harbours—thereby loses its neutrality and
must be considered hostile. At the end of February the cat was
let out of the bag by a statement that a neutral ship which
obtained a navicert from a British Consul in order to avoid
putting into a British contraband control base was liable to be
sunk by German submarines, even if it was bound from one neutral
port to another. As regards Allied ships, in the middle of
November 1939 a Berlin warning was issued against the arming of
British vessels. By that date a score of British merchantmen had
been illegally attacked by gunfire or torpedo from submarines,
and after that date some fifteen more unarmed Allied vessels
were torpedoed without warning. It is clear, therefore, that not
only was the arming fully justified as a defensive measure, but
also that neither before nor after this German threat did the
German submarines discriminate between armed and unarmed
vessels.” (_D-641-A_)
A similar report covering the next six months (_D-641-B_) makes these
statements:
“On the 30th January 1941, Hitler proclaimed that ‘every ship,
with or without convoy, which appears before our torpedo tubes
is going to be torpedoed.’ On the face of it, this announcement
appears to be uncompromising; and the only qualification
provided by the context is that the threats immediately
preceding it are specifically addressed to the peoples of the
American Continent. German commentators, however, subsequently
tried to water it down by contending that Hitler was referring
only to ships which attempted to enter the area within which the
German ‘total blockade’ is alleged to be in force.
“From one point of view it probably matters little what exactly
was Hitler’s meaning, since the only conclusion that can be
reached after a study of the facts of enemy warfare on merchant
shipping is that enemy action in this field is never limited by
the principles which are proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but
solely by the opportunities or lack of them which exist at any
given time.”
* * * * * *
“The effect of the German total blockade is to prohibit neutral
ships from entering an enormous stretch of sea round Britain
(the area extends to about 500 miles west of Ireland, and from
the latitude of Bordeaux to that of the Faroe Islands), upon
pain of having their ships sunk without warning and their crews
killed. As a matter of fact, at least thirty-two neutral ships,
exclusive of those sailing in British convoys, have been sunk by
enemy action since the declaration of the ‘total blockade’.”
* * * * * *
“Yet, though information is lacking in very many cases, details
are available to prove that, during the period under review, at
least thirty-eight Allied merchant ships, exclusive of those in
convoys, have been torpedoed without warning in or near the
‘total blockade’ area.
“That the Germans themselves have no exaggerated regard for the
area is proved by the fact that of the thirty-eight ships
referred to at least sixteen were torpedoed outside the limits
of the war-zone.”
* * * * * *
“The sinking of the ‘_City of Benares_’ on the 17th September
1940 is a good example of this. The ‘_City of Benares_’ was an
11,000-ton liner with 191 passengers on board, including nearly
100 children. She was torpedoed without warning just outside the
‘war zone,’ with the loss of 258 lives, including 77 children.
It was blowing a gale, with hail and rain squalls and a very
rough sea when the torpedo struck her at about 10 p. m. In the
darkness and owing to the prevailing weather conditions, at
least four of the twelve boats lowered were capsized. Others
were swamped and many people were washed right out of them. In
one boat alone sixteen people, including 11 children, died from
exposure; in another 22 died, including 15 children; in a third
21 died. The point to be emphasized is not the unusual brutality
of this attack but rather that such results are inevitable when
a belligerent disregards the rules of sea warfare as the Germans
have done and are doing.”
“There are hundreds of similar stories, stories of voyages for
days in open boats in Atlantic gales, of men in the water
clinging for hours to a raft and gradually dropping off one by
one, of crews being machine-gunned as they tried to lower their
boats or as they drifted away in them, of seamen being blown to
pieces by shells and torpedoes and bombs. The enemy must know
that such things are the inevitable result of the type of
warfare he has chosen to employ.” (_D-641-B_)
The total sinkings by U-boats during the war (1939 to 1945) amounted to
2,775 British, Allied, and Neutral ships totalling 14,572,435 gross tons
(_D-641-C_).
Another example of the ruthless nature of the actions conducted by
Doenitz’s U-boat commanders, particularly as both British and German
versions of the sinking are available, is the sinking of “_S. S. Sheaf
Mead_.” The British report, which includes the German account in the
shape of a complete extract from the U-boat’s log, states:
“The British ‘_S. S. Sheaf Mead_’ was torpedoed without warning
on 27 May 1940 with the loss of 31 of the crew. The commander of
the U-boat responsible is reported to have behaved in an
exceptionally callous manner towards the men clinging to
upturned boats and pieces of wood. It was thought that this man
was Kapitaenleutnant Oehrn of U-37. The following extract from
his diary for 27 May 1940 leaves no doubt on the matter and
speaks for itself as to his behaviour.” (_D-644_)
The relevant extract from the log, at 1554 hours, reads:
“Surface. Stern [referring to the ship which has been torpedoed]
is underwater. Bows rise higher. The boats are now on the water.
Lucky for them. A picture of complete order. They lie at some
distance. The bows rear up quite high. Two men appear from
somewhere in the forward part of the ship. They leap and rush
with great bounds along the deck down to the stern. The stern
disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a boiler explosion. Two men
fly through the air, limbs outstretched. Bursting and crashing.
Then all is over. A large heap of wreckage floats up. We
approach it to identify the name. The crew have saved themselves
on wreckage. We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on
the raft. He says, hardly turning his head—‘Nix Name.’ A young
boy in the water calls ‘Help, help, please.’ The others are very
composed. They look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of
cold hatred is on their faces. On to the old course. After
washing the paint off the buoy, the name comes to light:
Greatafield, Glasgow. 5006 gross registered tons.” (_D-644_)
“On to the old course” means merely that the U-boat makes off.
The report of the Chief Engineer of the “_S. S. Sheaf Mead_” contains
this description of the situation:
“When I came to the surface I found myself on the port side,
that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only about five
yards away. The submarine Captain asked the steward the name of
the ship, which he told him, and the enemy picked up one of our
lifebuoys, but this had the name ‘_Gretaston_’ on it, as this
was the name of our ship before it was changed to ‘_Sheaf Mead_’
last January.”
* * * * * *
“She had cutaway bows, but I did not notice a net cutter. Two
men stood at the side with boat hooks to keep us off.
“They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us
in the water. Otherwise they just watched us, but said nothing.
Then she submerged and went off, without offering us any
assistance whatever.” (_D-644_)
The U-boats log at 1444 hours contains a description of the sighting of
the ship, the difficulty in identification, and then the sinking:
“The distance apart is narrowing. The steamship draws in
quickly, but the position is still 40-50. I cannot see the stern
yet. Tube ready. Shall I or not? The gunnery crews are also
prepared. On the ship’s side a yellow cross in a small, square,
dark blue ground. Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope
a little. Hurrah, a gun at the stern, an ack-ack gun or
something similar. Fire! I cannot miss.” (_D-644_)
The actual documents by which Doenitz and his fellow conspirators issued
their orders in disregard of International Law indicate that the
compiler of the above reports understated the case. These orders cover
not only the period referred to in the above reports, but also the
subsequent course of the war. It is interesting to note in them the
steps by which the conspirators progressed. At first they were content
with breaching the rules of International Law to the extent of sinking
merchant ships, including neutral ships, without warning where there was
a reasonable prospect of being able to do so without discovery. The
facts already quoted show that the question of whether ships were
defensively armed or outside the declared operational areas was in
practice immaterial.
A memorandum by the German Naval War Staff, dated 22 September 1939,
(_C-191_) provides:
“Flag Officer U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to
sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights. * * *
In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as
the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way
that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political
situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out,
U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters
where French and English Naval forces or merchant ships may be
situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English
units are to be expected, the measures desired by F. O. U-boats
can be carried out; permission to take this step is not to be
given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken
approval of the Naval War Staff. U-boat commanders would be
informed by word of mouth and the sinking of a merchant ship
must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion
with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser. In the meanwhile,
U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to
attack all vessels sailing without lights.” (_C-191_)
The War Diary of the Naval War Staff of the German Admiralty contains
the following report by Ia (Staff Operations Officer on the Naval War
Staff) on directive of the Armed Forces High Command of 30 December
1939:
“According to this the Fuehrer, on report of the Commander in
Chief, Navy, has decided:
“(_a_) Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels
in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain.
“(_b_) In the Bristol Channel all ships may be attacked without
warning. For external consumption these attacks should be given
out as hits by mines.
“Both measures may be taken with immediate effect.” (_C-21_)
Another report by Ia, refers to intensified measures in naval and air
warfare in connection with “_Fall Gelb_”.
“In consequence of this Directive, the Navy will authorize,
simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, the
sinking by U-boats, without any warning, of all ships in those
waters near the enemy coasts in which _mines can be employed_.
In this case, for external consumption, pretence should be made
that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons
by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.” (_C-21_)
A third extract from the Naval War Diary, dated 6 January 1940, states:
“* * * the Fuehrer has in principle agreed (see minutes of
report of C. in C. Navy of 30 December) to authorize firing
without warning whilst maintaining the pretence of mine hits in
certain parts of the American blockaded zone.” (_C-21_)
Whereupon, the order is given to Flag Officer, Submarines, carrying out
that decision (_C-21_).
The report for 18 January 1940 states:
“The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the following
Directive dated 17th of January, cancelling the previous order
concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen.
“The Navy will authorize, with immediate effect, the sinking
without warning by U-Boats of all ships in those waters near the
enemy coasts in which the use of mines can be pretended. U-Boats
must adapt their behavior and employment of weapons to the
pretence, which is to be maintained in these cases, that the
hits were caused by mines. Ships of the United States, Italy,
Japan and Russia are exempted from these attacks.” (_C-21_)
An extract from the BDU War Diary (Doenitz’s War Diary) dated 18 July
1941, reveals a further extension of the above order so as to cut down
the protected categories:
“Supplementary to the order forbidding, for the time being,
attacks on U. S. warships and merchant vessels in the
operational area of the North Atlantic, the Fuehrer has ordered
the following:
“1. Attack on U. S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U. S.
convoys or independently is authorized in the original
operational area which corresponds in its dimensions to the U.
S. blockade zone and which does not include the sea-route U. S.
to Iceland.” (_C-118_)
As these orders show, at one date the ships of a particular neutral
under certain conditions could be sunk, while those of another could
not. The attitude to be adopted toward ships of particular neutrals
changed at various times, for Doenitz conducted the U-Boat war against
neutrals with cynical opportunism. It all depended on the political
relationship of Germany toward a particular country at a particular time
whether her ships were sunk or not.
(2) _The Orders Concerning Treatment of Survivors._ A series of orders
led up to the issue of an order which enjoined U-Boat commanders not
merely to abstain from rescuing crews and give them no assistance, but
deliberately to annihilate them.
Among these preliminary standing orders of the U-Boat Command is Order
Number 154, signed by Doenitz:
“Paragraph (_e_). Do not pick up survivors and take them with
you. Do not worry about the merchant-ship’s boats. Weather
conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only
for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as
soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began
the war in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters.”
(_D-642_)
In 1942, when the United States entered the war with its enormous
ship-building capacity, the change thus brought about necessitated a
further adjustment in the methods adopted by the U-Boats. Doenitz
accordingly issued an order, which intended not merely the sinking of
merchant ships, not merely the abstention from rescue of the crews, but
their deliberate extermination.
The course of events is shown by the record of a conversation between
Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, (_D-423_) in the presence of
Ribbentrop, on 3 January 1942:
“The Fuehrer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador
the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic,
emphasizing that he considers his most important task is to get
the U-Boat warfare going in full swing. The U-Boats are being
reorganized. Firstly, he had recalled all U-Boats operating in
the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now be posted
outside United States ports. Later, they would be off Freetown
and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown.”
* * * * * *
“After having given further explanations on the map, the Fuehrer
pointed out that, however many ships the United States built,
one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For
that reason, even merchant ships would be sunk without warning
with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible.
Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the
sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in
enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes
a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our
attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason
he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be
taken prisoner, which is not always possible on the sea, U-boats
were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats.
“Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Fuehrer’s comments,
and said that the Japanese too are forced to follow these
methods.” (_D-423_)
An extract from the BDU War Diary of 16 September 1942 is part of the
story in the sense that it was on the following day that the
annihilation order was issued. It records an attack on a U-boat, which
was rescuing survivors, chiefly the Italian survivors of the Allied
liner “_Laconia_,” when it was attacked by an Allied aircraft (_D-446_).
A Top Secret order, sent to all commanding officers of U-boats from
Doenitz’s headquarters, dated 17 September 1942, provided:
“1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of
ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water
and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and
handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the
rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy
ships and crews.
“2. Orders for bringing in Captains and Chief Engineers still
apply.
“3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of
importance for your boat.
“4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of
women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.”
(_D-630_)
The intentions of this carefully worded order are made clear by an
extract from Doenitz’s War Diary which is personally signed by Doenitz.
The War Diary entry for 17 September 1942 reads:
“The attention of all commanding officers is again drawn to the
fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships
which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for
the conduct of warfare by annihilating enemy ships and their
crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the Captains and
Chief Engineers still stand.” (_D-630_).
In this connection, a telegram from the Commander of the U-boat
“_Schacht_” to Doenitz’s headquarters, and the reply, are significant.
“_Schacht_” had been taking part in the rescue of survivors from the
“_Laconia_.” The telegram from “_Schacht_,” dated 18 September 1942,
reads:
“163 Italians handed over to ‘_Annamite_.’ Navigating Officer of
‘_Laconia_’ and another English Officer on board.” (_D-630_)
The telegram goes on to set out the position of English and Polish
survivors in boats.
The reply from Doenitz’s headquarters was sent on the 20th:
“Action as in wireless telegram message of 17th of September was
wrong. Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for
the rescue of English and Poles.” (_D-630_)
Such were Doenitz’s plans before the bombing incident ever occurred.
“Operation Order Atlantic No. 56,” dated 7 October 1943, contains the
sailing orders of a U-boat (_D-663_). Although the date of this order is
7 October 1943, in fact it is only a reproduction of an order issued
earlier, in the autumn of 1942. The following is an extract from this
order:
“Rescue ships: A so-called rescue ship is generally attached to
every convoy, a special ship of up to 3000 gross registered
tons, which is intended for the picking up of survivors after
U-boat attacks. These ships are, for the most part, equipped
with a shipborne aircraft and large motor-boats, are strongly
armed with depth-charge throwers, and very manoeuverable, so
that they are often called U-Boat Traps by the commander. In
view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, their sinking
is of great value.” (_D-663_)
The Prosecution does not complain against attacks on rescue ships. They
are not entitled to protection. But the point of the foregoing order to
U-boats was that priority in attack should be given to rescue ships.
This order, therefore, is closely allied with the order of 17 September
1942 (_D-630_): in view of the Allied shipbuilding program the German
Navy had resolved to take all means to prevent Allied ships from being
manned.
To summarize, it would appear from the War Diary entry of 17 September
that orders on the lines discussed between Hitler and Oshima were, in
fact, issued. They have not, however, been captured. It may be that they
were issued orally, and that Doenitz awaited a suitable opportunity
before confirming them. The incident of the bombing of the U-boats
detailed to rescue the Italian survivors from the “_Laconia_” afforded
the opportunity, and the order to all commanders was issued. Its intent
is clear when it is considered in the light of the War Diary entry. The
wording is, of course, extremely careful, but to any officer of
experience its intention was obvious: he would know that deliberate
action to annihilate survivors would be approved under that order.
It may be contended that this order, although perhaps unfortunately
phrased, was merely intended to stop a commander from jeopardizing his
ship by attempting a rescue, which had become increasingly dangerous as
a result of the extended coverage of the ocean by Allied aircraft; and
that the notorious action of U-Boat Commander Eck in sinking the Greek
steamer “_Peleus_” and then machine-gunning the crew on their rafts in
the water, was an exception; and that, although it may be true that a
copy of the order was on board, this action was taken solely, as Eck
himself swore, on his own initiative.
In reply it may be said that if the intention of this order was to stop
rescue attempts, in the interests of the preservation of the U-boat, it
would have been done by calling attention to Standing Order 154.
Secondly, this very fact would have been prominently stated in the
order. Drastic orders of this nature are not drafted by experienced
staff officers without the greatest care and an eye to their possible
capture by the enemy. Thirdly, if it was necessary to avoid the risks
attendant on surfacing, not only would this have been stated but there
would have been no question of taking any prisoners at all except
possibly in circumstances where virtually no risk in surfacing was to be
apprehended. Fourthly, the final sentence of the first paragraph would
have read very differently. And fifthly, if in fact—and the Prosecution
does not accept it—Doenitz did not mean to enjoin murder, his order was
so worded that he cannot escape the responsibility which attaches to
such a document.
The instructions given by Admiral Doenitz with regard to the murder of
shipwrecked Allied seamen are described in an affidavit by _Oberleutnant
Zur See_ Peter Josef Heisig (_D-566_). (Heisig was called as a
prosecution witness in the case against Doenitz and testified on direct
examination to the same effect, in substance, as the statements in his
affidavit.) In September 1942 Heisig was a Midshipman in a training
course for U-boat officers of the watch. On the last day of the course
Grand Admiral Doenitz, who was then Commander-in-Chief, U-boats, held an
inspection tour and made a speech to the officers in training. Heisig
describes the content of Doenitz’s speech as follows:
“* * * According to news received from America we were bound to
reckon with the possibility that in the Allied countries more
than 1,000,000 net registered tons of new merchant shipping
space would be brought into service monthly. This was more
shipping space than would be sunk even with good U-boat
successes. The bottleneck of the Allies lay only in the problem
of personnel for these newly built ships. The Atlantic route was
too dangerous for seamen so that they even had to be brought
aboard ship under compulsion. This was the point where we, the
U-boat crews, had to take a hand. He therefore demanded that we
should from now on carry on total warfare against ship and crew.
That meant: so far as possible, no seaman from a sunk ship was
to get home any more. Only thus could the supply line of the
British Isles be seriously endangered and only thus in the long
run could we strike a noticeable blow at Allied merchant
shipping traffic. In this way it would be impossible for the
opponent even to make use of his newly built ships, since no
more crews would be available to him. After the sinking of a
ship, every possibility of rescue must be denied to the crew,
through the destruction of every means of saving life.
“I later discussed these remarks of Admiral Doenitz’s with the
others, and all present unanimously and unambiguously took them
to mean that after the sinking of a ship, all possibility of
escape, whether in boats, on rafts, or by any other means, must
be denied to the crew and the destruction of the crew was to be
attempted by every means. This mode of warfare was for me as for
most of my comrades completely new. Owing to Admiral Doenitz’s
authoritative position, it was nevertheless fully and completely
accepted by many of them. He sought to invalidate in advance any
doubts which might arise, by pointing to the air war and the
bombing.” (_D-566_)
Further light on the real meaning of the Top Secret radio message sent
by the Commander in Chief, U-boats, to all U-boat and operational
flotillas in September 1942 (_D-630_) is contained in the statement of
_Korvettenkapitaen_ Karl Heinz Moehle (_382-PS_). (Moehle was called as
a Prosecution witness in the case against Doenitz and testified on
direct examination to the same effect, in substance, as the statements
in his affidavit.) Concerning this order which was couched in terms of a
prohibition against the rescue of survivors, Moehle states as follows:
“This W/T message was without any doubt, sent out at the
instigation of the Commander in Chief U-boats himself, i.e.
Grand Admiral Doenitz. In view of my knowledge of the way in
which the Staff of the Chief Command U-boats worked, I consider
it quite impossible that an order of such importance could have
been given without his knowledge.”
* * * * * *
“So far as concerns the order itself, it undoubtedly states, and
in particular for those who know the manner in which Commander
in Chief U-Boats is wont to give his orders, that the High
Command regard it as desirable that not only ships but also
their crews should be regarded as objects of attack, i.e. that
they should be destroyed; at that time German propaganda was
continually stressing the shortage of crews for enemy merchant
ships and the consequent difficulties. I too understood this
order in that way.
“Had the point of view of the High Command been otherwise the
order would undoubtedly have been expressed in different words.
It would then only have stated that for reasons of security
rescue measures were to cease and this order would have passed
as a normal secret W/T message. It was perhaps even the
intention that this order could be interpreted in two ways and
the reason may be that in the first place, it contravenes
international laws of warfare and secondly, that it was an order
which must give rise to serious conflicts of conscience in
commanding officers.”
* * * * * *
“To conclude, I can only stress that the order of September 1942
appeared to me personally to go too far and I am in total
disagreement with it at heart. As a serving officer I had
however to carry out the command to pass on this order to
commanding officers for their instruction.
“During the long time that I was senior officer of the Flotilla
no single commanding officer mentioned to me that he could not
reconcile obedience to this order with his conscience and that
he was therefore unable to carry it out.” (_382-PS_)
Moehle graphically describes Doenitz’s incitement of his men to the
murder of survivors:
“A type VII boat (500-tonner) reported in her war log that when
outward bound from a base in France she met far out in the Bay
of Biscay a raft with five enemy airmen, but was not able to
take them on board owing to shortage of room (she had a
complement of 54 and carried full provisions for 14 weeks). The
boat therefore proceeded without taking any notice of the
survivors.
“This action of the U-boat was vehemently denounced by the
Commander in Chief U-boats’ staff. It was stated that she would
have acted more correctly in destroying this raft since it was
highly probably that the enemy air crew would be rescued by the
enemy and in the meantime might once more have destroyed a
German U-boat.
“This occurrence made the views of the Commander in Chief
U-boats clear to me.” (_382-PS_)
As senior officer of the Fifth U-boat Flotilla, it was Moehle’s duty to
transmit orders from the Commander in Chief, U-boats, to commanding
officers of U-boats. In this connection, Doenitz’s ambiguous order
against the rescue of survivors caused difficulties.
“I was wont to pass on this controversial and serious order with
more or less the following words:—‘I have now to inform you of
a High Command order concerning conduct towards survivors. It is
a very ticklish matter. Commander in Chief U-boats in September
1942 gave the following order in an ‘officers only’ signal (* *
* the exact words of the order were then read out).’
“Since I am myself in my innermost conscience in disagreement
with this order, I was very glad that in most cases commanding
officers raised no queries and I was therefore relieved of any
further discussion on this point.
“Sometimes however queries were raised and I was wont to answer
somewhat as follows:—
“‘I will explain the viewpoint of the High Command, which gave
this order, by reference to the following event:’ I then
mentioned the example of the Type VII boat in the Bay of Biscay
together with the explanation and viewpoint expressed to me by
Commander in Chief U-boats’ staff. I then went on to say,
‘Gentlemen, you must yourselves decide what is compatible with
your own consciences. The safety of your own boat must always
remain your prime consideration.’”
* * * * * *
“I also remember that many commanding officers after the order
of September 1942 had been read said, ‘That is quite clear and
unequivocal however hard it may be.’ Had this order been given
to me as a commanding officer I would have taken note of it in
silence but in practice would always have been able with a clear
conscience not to carry it out since I consider I would endanger
my own boat by acting in this way, (i.e., by shooting at
lift-boats).” (_382-PS_)
Finally, Moehle describes the orders to omit from U-boat logs the
notation of any actions in violation of International Law:
“There was an order—I do not remember whether it was in the
form of a written or verbal instruction—that no events during a
war patrol which contravened established international
agreements should be entered in the war log. I believe that the
reason for this order was that eight copies were made of war
logs and were available to many authorities; there was always
the danger therefore that events of this nature would become
known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for reasons of
propaganda that this should be so.
“Events of this nature were only to be reported if asked for
when commanding officers made their personal reports; these were
invariably made after every patrol to Commander in Chief U-boats
or later in certain instances to Captain U-boats.” (_382-PS_)
Two cases may be noted in which the order of 17 September 1942 (_D-630_)
was apparently put into effect. The first case is the sinking of a steam
trawler, the “_Noreen Mary_,” which was sunk by U-247 on 5 July 1944.
The log of the U-Boat shows that at 1943 hours two torpedoes were fired,
which missed (_D-645_).
At 2055 hours the log reads:
“Surfaced.
“Fishing Vessels: [Bearings of 3 ships given].
“Engaged the nearest. She stops after three minutes.” (_D-645_)
There follows an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay stopped, and
then, the final entry:
“Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the stern.”
(_D-645_)
The U-Boat Command made this comment on the action:
“Recognized success: Fishing vessel ‘_Noreen Mary_’ sunk by
flak.” (_D-645_)
An affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deck-hand on board the
“_Noreen Mary_” at the time of the sinking, describes the torpedo tracks
which missed the trawler, and continues as follows:
“At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the submarine
surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yards to the northeast
of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the
ship with a machine gun. We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath,
on a north-westerly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine
and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was smooth, with
light airs.”
* * * * * *
“When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the
conning tower. The skipper [of the trawler] thought at first the
submarine was British, but when she opened fire he immediately
slackened the brake to take the weight off gear, and increased
to full speed, which was about 10 knots. The submarine chased
us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds killed two
or three men, including the skipper, who were on deck and had
not had time to take cover. The submarine then started using a
heavier gun from her conning tower, the first shot from which
burst the boiler, enveloping everything in steam and stopping
the ship.
“By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but
four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle round
ahead of the vessel, and passed down her port side with both
guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the
time but did not catch fire.
“The Mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was
aft, but the Mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned the
attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the
water line, for shelter. The ship was listing more and more to
port, until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and
the only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea.
I do not know where the other three men had taken cover during
this time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the
water.
“I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our
lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top
of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately
steamed in my direction and when only 60 to 70 yards away fired
directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their
intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained
there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after
which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat. The submarine
had been firing her guns for a full hour.” (_D-645_)
The affidavit goes on to describe the attempts of the Second Engineer
and others to rescue themselves and to help each other; they were later
picked up by another trawler. The affidavit continues:
“Whilst on board the ‘_Lady Madeleine_’ the Second Engineer and
I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the Second
Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 2½
inches long embedded in his body. * * * I had 14 shrapnel
wounds.”
* * * * * *
“This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the
whalers ‘_Sylvester_’ (mined) and ‘_New Seville_’ (torpedoed),
and the Trawler ‘_Ocean Tide_’, which ran ashore.
“As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six
killed, two missing, two injured.” (_D-645_).
The next case is that of the ship “_Antonico_”, which was torpedoed, set
afire, and sunk on 28 September 1942, off the coast of French Guiana.
The date of the incident is some eleven days after the issue of the
order (_D-630_). A statement given by the Second Officer describes the
attack on the ship, which by then was on fire (_D-647_):
“* * * That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the
‘_Antonico_’ as he and his crew tried to swing out their
lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20
minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to
get away from the side of the ‘_Antonico_’ in order to avoid
being dragged down by the same ‘_Antonico_’ and also because she
was the aggressor’s target; that the night was dark, and it was
thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard
the ‘_Antonico_’ lit up the locality in which she was
submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats
trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machined-gunned
the defenseless sailors in No. 2 lifeboat, in which the witness
found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de
Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave
orders to his company to throw themselves’ overboard to save
themselves from the bullets; in so doing, they were protected
and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled
with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At
that time the witness and his companions were about 20 meters in
distance from the submarine.” (_D-647_)
The U-boat’s log in that case is not available, but it may be surmised,
in view of the order that nothing compromising should be included in
entries in logs, that it would be no more helpful than in the case of
the previous incident.
A broadcast by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave propaganda
service from Friesland, (_D-646-A_) in English, on 11 March 1943,
stated:
“Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for
romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these
waters—dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the
colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a
U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer.
Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of
the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a
decoy ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20 yards,
when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder
of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank.
There remained only wreckage. Lifeboats packed with men, and
sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth
in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for
Britain and America.” (_D-646-A_)
This statement shows that it was the policy of the enemy to seek to
terrorize crews. It is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships
and with the order on the destruction of steamers.
After Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he
presumably also succeeded to the equivalent rank of a Minister of the
Reich, which Raeder had held (_2098-PS_).
An official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty
sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings, and those
present, on the occasion of meetings between Doenitz or his
representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until
the end (_D-648_). The certificate states:
“* * * I have compiled from them [captured documents] the
attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended
conferences at Hitler’s headquarters. The list of other senior
officials who attended the same conferences is added when this
information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I
certify that the list is a true extract from the collective
documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession
of the British Admiralty, London.”
Either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at
each of the numerous meetings listed. Among those who were also
constantly present were Speer, Keitel, Jodl, Ribbentrop, Goering, and
Himmler or his lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. The inference is
clear that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, Doenitz was one of
the rulers of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all major decisions
of policy.
(3) _The Order to Kill Commandos._ An internal memorandum of the Naval
War Staff, written by the division dealing with International Law to
another division, discusses the order of 18 October 1942, with regard to
the shooting of Commandos (_C-178_).
Doubt appears to have arisen in some quarters with regard to the
understanding of this order. Accordingly, in the last sentence of the
memorandum it is suggested:
“As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether
or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference
with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments
concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the
treatment of members of commando units.” (_C-178_)
Whether that conference took place or not is not known. The document is
dated some 11 days after Doenitz had taken over command from Raeder.
But in July 1943, the Navy handed over to the SD Norwegian and British
Navy personnel, whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order,
for shooting. An affidavit by a British Barrister-at-Law who served as
judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the
order states (_D-649_):
“The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that
they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in
violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the
killing of * * *” [there follow the names of six personnel of
the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one telegraphist
of the British Navy, prisoners of war.].
* * * * * *
“There was evidence before the Court, which was not challenged
by the Defense, that Motor Torpedo Boat No. 345 set out from
Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of
making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian
coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The
persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the Torpedo
Boat.
“The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was
wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant
evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that
they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture.
“On 27th July, 1943, the Torpedo Boat reached the island of Aspo
off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day
the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a
German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von
Schrader, the Admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to
the Bergenhus, where they had arrived by 11 p. m. on 28th July.
The crew were there interrogated by Leut. H. P. W. W. Fanger, a
Naval Leutnant of the Reserve, on the orders of
Korvettenkapitaen Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval
Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon
the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the west coast. Leut.
Fanger reported to the Officer in Charge of the Intelligence
Branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew
were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that
officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea
Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west
coast.
“The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was
concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost
immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the
immediate orders of the Sea Commander, Bergen, to
Obersturmbannfuehrer of the SD, Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was
at that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen.
This followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral von
Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuehrer order of the 18th
October 1942 was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the
classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection
of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners
of war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD.
Admiral von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this Torpedo
Boat were to be handed over in accordance with the Fuehrer
order, to the SD.” (_D-649_)
The affidavit goes on to describe the interrogation by officials of the
SD. These officials took the same view as the Naval Intelligence
officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war.
Nevertheless, the crew were taken out and shot by an execution squad
composed of members of the SD. The affidavit concludes as follows:
“It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945, an
order from the Fuehrer Headquarters, signed by Keitel, was
transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The substance
of the order was that members of the crew of commando raids who
fell into German captivity were from that date to be treated as
ordinary prisoners of war. This order referred specifically to
the Fuehrer order referred to above.” (_D-649_)
The date mentioned is important; it was time “in March or April, 1945,”
for these men to put their affairs in order.
(4) _Reasons for Not Renouncing the Geneva Convention._ The minutes of
conferences on 19 and 20 February 1945 between Doenitz and Hitler read
as follows:
“The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should
renounce the Geneva Convention * * *” [the 1929 Prisoners of War
Convention].
* * * * * *
“The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to
consider the pros and cons of their step and to state his
opinion as soon as possible.” (_C-158_)
Doenitz then stated his opinion in the presence of Jodl and a
representative of Ribbentrop:
“* * * On the contrary, the disadvantages [of renouncing the
convention] outweigh the advantages. It would be better to carry
out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at
all costs to save face with the outer world.” (_C-158_)
An extract from the minutes of another meeting between Doenitz and
Hitler, on 1 July 1944,—the extract is signed by Doenitz—states:
“* * * Regarding the General Strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer
says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court
martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names
of such men are on everybody’s lips, whereas there is silence
with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in
similar circumstances without court martial proceedings.”
(_C-171_)
(5) _Use of Concentration Camp Labor in Shipyards._ In a memorandum
signed by Doenitz sometime late in 1944, which was distributed to
Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Speer, and the Supreme Command of the Air Force,
Doenitz reviews German shipping losses, and concludes:
“Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties
by prisoners from the concentration camps and as a special
measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths,
especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert
coppersmiths from the construction of locomotives to
shipbuilding.” (_C-195_)
In dealing with sabotage, Doenitz has this to say:
“Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against
whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have
proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in
France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for
the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration.”
(_C-195_)
Item 2 of the summing-up reads:
“12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the
shipyards as additional labor (security service [SD] agrees to
this)” (_C-195_).
It was not for nothing that at these meetings Himmler and his
Lieutenants, Fegelein and Kaltenbrunner, were present.
They were not there to discuss U-boats or the use of battleships. It is
clear from this document that Doenitz knew all about concentration camps
and concentration camp labor, and as one of the rulers of Germany he
must bear his full share of that responsibility.
(6) _Doenitz’s Incitement of Ruthless Conduct By His Men._ The orders
issued by Doenitz in April 1945 (_D-650_) show his fanatical adherence
to the Nazi creed, and his preparedness even at that stage to continue a
hopeless war at the expense of human life, and with the certainty of
increased destruction and misery to his country:
“I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the Navy: That
they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of military duty,
whatever may happen. I demand of them that they stamp out
ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men which endanger
the following of this path.
“I demand from Senior Commanders that they should take just as
ruthless action against any commander who does not do his
military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral
strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he
must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier
in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not
burdened with any tasks as a leader.” (_D-650_)
In the secret Battle order of the day of 19 April 1945, Doenitz gives an
example of the type of under-officer who should be promoted:
“An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser
‘_Cormorau_’, in Austria, a petty officer acting as camp senior
officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among
the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a
way that the guards did not notice. This petty officer is sure
of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. After
his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown
that he is fitted to be a leader.” (_D-650_)
E. _CONCLUSION._
Doenitz was no plain sailor, playing the part of a service officer,
loyally obedient to the orders of the government of the day. He was an
extreme Nazi who did his utmost to indoctrinate the Navy and the German
people with the Nazi creed. It is no coincidence that it was he—not
Goering, not Ribbentrop, not Goebbels, not Himmler—who was chosen to
succeed Hitler. He played a large part in fashioning the U-boat fleet,
one of the most deadly weapons of aggressive war. He helped to plan and
execute aggressive wars, which he knew well were in deliberate violation
of treaties. He was ready to stoop to any ruse where he thought he would
not be found out: breaches of the Geneva Convention or of neutrality,
where it might be asserted that sinking was due to a mine. He was ready
to order, and did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken
ships, an action only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally.
There can be few countries which do not mourn for men of the merchant
navies whose destruction was due to the callow brutality with which, at
the orders of this man, the German U-boats did their work.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO KARL DOENITZ
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 67
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*382-PS │Affidavit of Korvettenkapitaen Moehle,│ │
│England, 19 July 1945, concerning the │ │
│interpretation of Doenitz’s order of │ │
│September 1942. (GB 202) │ III │ 290
│ │ │
*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │
│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │
│501) │ III │ 416
│ │ │
503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │
│1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │
│of his commando order of the day │ │
│before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426
│ │ │
*526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │
│concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │
│in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434
│ │ │
*1463-PS │Diary of the Navy, 1944, by Admiral │ │
│Doenitz. (GB 184) │ IV │ 45
│ │ │
*2098-PS │Decree relating to Status of Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army and Navy, 25 │ │
│February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 215. (GB 206) │ IV │ 725
│ │ │
*2878-PS │Extracts from The Archive. (GB 187) │ V │ 540
│ │ │
*2887-PS │Certificate of positions held by │ │
│Doenitz, 8 November 1945. (USA 12) │ V │ 552
│ │ │
2988-PS │Affidavit of Gerhard Wagner, Nurnberg,│ │
│19 November 1945, who identified │ │
│document C-158 as expressing opinion │ │
│of Doenitz and initialled by him. │ V │ 693
│ │ │
3150-PS │Interrogation of Doenitz, 3 November │ │
│1945. │ V │ 911
│ │ │
3151-PS │Interrogation of Falkenhorst, 24 │ │
│October 1945. │ V │ 912
│ │ │
*3260-PS │“Churchill Sank the Athenia”, │ │
│published in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │
│23 October 1939. (GB 218) │ V │ 1008
│ │ │
*C-5 │Memorandum to Supreme Command of the │ │
│Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, │ │
│concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) │ VI │ 815
│ │ │
*C-21 │Extracts from file on Intensification │ │
│of U-boat warfare. (GB 194) │ VI │ 825
│ │ │
*C-105 │Extract from German Naval War Diary, │ │
│21 December 1940, p. 252. (GB 455) │ VI │ 913
│ │ │
C-118 │Extract from German Naval file, 18 │ │
│July 1941, concerning authorization of│ │
│attacks on U. S. Merchantmen. (GB 195)│ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │
│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │
│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-122 │Extract from Naval War Diary. │ │
│Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 │ │
│October 1939. (GB 82) │ VI │ 928
│ │ │
*C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │
│Weiss” and directions for secret │ │
│mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932
│ │ │
*C-151 │Details for execution of operation │ │
│“Weseruebung”, 3 March 1940, signed by│ │
│Doenitz. (GB 91) │ VI │ 965
│ │ │
*C-158 │Minutes of conference of C-in-C of │ │
│Navy with Hitler, 19 and 20 February │ │
│1945. (GB 209) │ VI │ 971
│ │ │
*C-171 │Minutes of conference between Hitler │ │
│and C-in-C of Navy regarding │ │
│Copenhagen General Strike, 1 July │ │
│1944. (GB 210) │ VI │ 1002
│ │ │
*C-172 │Order No. 1 for “Fall Weiss” signed by│ │
│Doenitz. (GB 189) │ VI │ 1002
│ │ │
*C-178 │Order of Navy concerning treatment of │ │
│saboteurs, 11 February 1943. (USA 544)│ VI │ 1012
│ │ │
*C-179 │Hitler’s second decree, 18 October │ │
│1942, regarding annihilation of terror│ │
│and sabotage units. (USA 543) │ VI │ 1014
│ │ │
*C-191 │Demands by defendant Doenitz on │ │
│sinking of merchant ships, 22 │ │
│September 1939. (GB 193) │ VI │ 1018
│ │ │
*C-195 │Report signed by Doenitz, 1944, giving│ │
│support to Navy and Merchant Marine. │ │
│(GB 211) │ VI │ 1022
│ │ │
D-423 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │
│Hitler and Oshima, 3 January 1942. (GB│ │
│197) │ VII │ 53
│ │ │
*D-436 │Citation on promotion of Doenitz to │ │
│Vice Admiral, published in The │ │
│Archive, 27 September 1940. p. 550. │ │
│(GB 183) │ VII │ 54
│ │ │
*D-443 │Speech by Doenitz to Naval officers at│ │
│Weimar, 17 December 1943. (GB 185) │ VII │ 54
│ │ │
*D-444 │Order of day and speech of Doenitz on │ │
│death of Hitler, 1 May 1945. (GB 188) │ VII │ 55
│ │ │
*D-446 │Extract from B.d.U. War Diary, 16 │ │
│September 1942. (GB 198) │ VII │ 57
│ │ │
*D-566 │Affidavit by Peter-Joseph Heisig, 27 │ │
│November 1945. (GB 201) │ VII │ 72
│ │ │
*D-630 │Extracts from B.d.U. War Diary and │ │
│Order to all U-boat commanders; │ │
│telegram from Schacht and in reply to │ │
│Schacht. (GB 199) │ VII │ 100
│ │ │
*D-638 │Affidavit of Doenitz concerning │ │
│sinking of Athenia, 17 November 1945. │ │
│(GB 220) │ VII │ 114
│ │ │
*D-640 │Speech by C-in-C of Navy to Commanders│ │
│in Chief, 15 February 1944. (GB 186) │ VII │ 116
│ │ │
*D-641-A │Extracts from official reports │ │
│concerning German attacks on merchant │ │
│shipping, 3 September 1939 to │ │
│September 1940. (GB 191) │ VII │ 116
│ │ │
*D-641-B │Extracts from official reports │ │
│concerning German attacks on merchant │ │
│shipping, 1 September 1940 to 28 │ │
│February 1941. (GB 191) │ VII │ 120
│ │ │
*D-641-C │Sinkings by U-boats during the war, │ │
│1939-1945. (GB 191) │ VII │ 124
│ │ │
*D-642 │Extract from Befehlshaber der │ │
│U-bootes; Secret Standing Order No. │ │
│154 signed by Doenitz. (GB 196) │ VII │ 124
│ │ │
D-644 │Report of sinking of “Sheaf Mead”. (GB│ │
│192) │ VII │ 124
│ │ │
*D-645 │Report on sinking of “Noreen Mary”; │ │
│affidavit by survivor. (GB 203) │ VII │ 128
│ │ │
*D-646-A │Wireless talk by German naval reporter│ │
│concerning Windjammer sunk by U-boat. │ │
│(GB 205) │ VII │ 133
│ │ │
D-646-B │Extract from War Diary of U-105, 12 │ │
│January 1943. │ VII │ 133
│ │ │
*D-647 │Statement on sinking of SS “Antonico”,│ │
│which was torpedoed, set afire and │ │
│sunk, 28 September 1942. (GB 204) │ VII │ 134
│ │ │
*D-648 │List of Hitler-Doenitz meetings. (GB │ │
│207) │ VII │ 136
│ │ │
*D-649 │Affidavit by Judge Advocate, 28 │ │
│December 1945. (GB 208) │ VII │ 145
│ │ │
*D-650 │Orders issued by Doenitz, 11 April │ │
│1945. (GB 212) │ VII │ 148
│ │ │
*D-663 │Operation Order “Atlantic” No. 56 for │ │
│U-boats in Atlantic, 7 October 1943. │ │
│(GB 200) │ VII │ 170
│ │ │
Statement I │The Laconia Case and German Submarine │ │
│Warfare, by Karl Doenitz, Nurnberg, 7 │ │
│and 19 October 1945. │ VIII │ 657
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707
15. ERICH RAEDER
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY RAEDER._
Erich Raeder was born in 1876 and joined the German Navy in 1896. By
1915 he had become commander of the Cruiser _Koeln_. In 1928 he became
an admiral, Chief of Naval Command, and head of the German Navy. In 1935
he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In 1936 he became General
Admiral, a creation of Hitler’s, on his forty-seventh birthday. In 1937
he received the golden badge of honor of the Nazi Party. In 1938 he
became a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. In 1939 he was made Grand
Admiral, a rank created by Hitler, who presented Raeder with a marshal’s
baton. In 1943 he became Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, which was
a kind of retirement into oblivion, since after January 1943 Doenitz was
the effective commander of the German Navy. (_2888-PS_)
B. _RAEDER’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO PLAN AND WAGE WARS OF
AGGRESSION._
During the years of Raeder’s command of the German Navy, from 1928 to
1943, he played a vital role in building up the Navy as an instrument of
war, to implement the Nazis’ general plan of aggression.
(1) _Concealed rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles._ In
successive and secret steps, the small Navy permitted to Germany under
the Treaty of Versailles was enormously expanded under the guidance of
Raeder.
The story of Germany’s secret rearmament in violation of the Treaty of
Versailles is told in a history of the fight of the German Navy against
Versailles, 1919 to 1935, which was published secretly by the German
Admiralty in 1937 (_C-156_). This history shows that before the Nazis
came to power the German Admiralty was deceiving not only the
governments of other countries, but its own legislature and at one stage
its own government, regarding the secret measures of rearmament ranging
from experimental U-Boat and E-Boat building to the creation of secret
intelligence and finance organizations. Raeder’s role in these
developments are described as follows:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, had
received hereby a far-reaching independence in the building and
development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the
previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in
consideration of the Versailles Treaty.” (_C-156_)
An illustration of Raeder’s concealment of rearmament is contained in
his statement that:
“In view of Germany’s treaty obligations and the disarmament
conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first E-boat
Half-Flotilla from appearing openly as a formation of
torpedo-carrying boats, as it was not intended to count these
E-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed
them.” (_C-141_)
It appears that even in 1930 the intention ultimately to attack Poland
was already current in German military circles. An extract from the
History of War Organization and of the Scheme for Mobilization (_C-135_)
which is headed “All 850/38”, suggesting that the document was written
in 1938, reads:
“Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for
mobilization were forbidden, these were at first confined to a
very small body of collaborators and were at first only of a
theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that time an
‘Establishment Order’ and ‘Instructions for Establishment,’ the
forerunners of the present-day scheme for Mobilization.
“An ‘establishment organization’ and ‘adaptable instructions for
establishment’ were drawn up for each A-year, the cover name for
a mobilization year.
“As stated, the ‘Establishment Organizations’ of that time were
to be judged purely theoretically, for they had no positive
basis in the form of men and materials. They provided,
nevertheless, a valuable foundation for the establishment of a
War Organization as our ultimate aim.”
* * * * * *
“The crises between Germany and Poland, which were becoming
increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of making theoretical
preparations for war, to prepare in a practical manner for a
purely German-Polish conflict.
“The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of
Gdynia was made a basis, and the fleet on active service was to
be reinforced by the auxiliary forces which would be
indispensable to attain this strategic end, and the essential
coastal and flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and
Swinemuende were to be taken over. Thus in 1930 the
Reinforcement Plan was evolved.” (_C-135_)
The extract further shows that Hitler had made a clear political request
to build up for him in five years, that is, by April 1938, armed forces
which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power.
(_C-135_)
The Nazi seizure of power in 1933 was a signal to Raeder to go full
speed ahead on rearmament. In June 1934 Raeder told Hitler that the
German fleet must be developed to oppose England, and that therefore
from 1936 on, the big ships must be armed with big guns to match the
British “_King George_” class of battleship. Raeder also went along with
Hitler’s demand that the construction of U-Boats should be kept
completely secret, especially in view of the Saar plebiscite (_C-189_).
In November 1934 Raeder had a further talk with Hitler on the financing
of naval rearmament, and on that occasion Hitler told him that in case
of need he would get Doctor Ley to put 120,000,000 to 150,000,000 RM.
from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. (_C-190_)
Another example of the deceit used by Raeder in building up the German
Navy is the fact that the true displacement of certain German
battleships exceeded by twenty percent the displacement which the Nazis
had reported to the British (_C-23_). In similar vein, it was ordered
that auxiliary cruisers, which were being secretly constructed, should
be referred to as “transport ships O.” (_C-166_)
The support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry
illustrates Raeder’s concern with the broader aspects of Nazi policy and
of the close link between Nazi politicians, German Service Chiefs, and
German armament manufacturers. (_C-29_)
A commentary on post-1939 naval rearmament is contained in a letter from
Raeder to the German Navy, dated 11 June 1940. This letter was given
extensive distribution; in fact there is provision in the distribution
list for 467 copies. This letter of Raeder’s, which is marked with both
self-justification and apology, reads:
“The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in
the Officer Corps are the Torpedo position and the problem
whether the naval building program, up to Autumn 1939, envisaged
the possibility of the outbreak of war as early as 1939, or
whether the emphasis ought not to have been laid, from the
first, on the construction of U-boats.
“If the opinion is voiced in the Officer Corps that the entire
naval building program has been wrongly directed, and that, from
the first, the emphasis should have been on the U-boat weapon
and, after its consolidation, on the large ships, I must
emphasize the following matters:
“The building up of the Fleet was directed according to the
political demands, which were decided by the Fuehrer. The
Fuehrer hoped, until the last moment, to be able to put off the
threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At that time
the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-boat
superiority and a much more favorable ratio as regards strength
in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for
warfare on the high seas.
“The development of events forced the Navy, contrary to the
expectation even of the Fuehrer, into a war, which it had to
accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The
result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis
should have been laid, from the start, on the building of the
U-boat arm, appear to be right. I leave undiscussed, how far
this development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel,
training and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in
any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German
Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and
necessary creation of an effective Air Force slowed down the
desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I
indicate, however, with pride the admirable and, in spite of the
political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic,
far-reaching preparation for U-boat construction, which made the
immensely rapid construction of the U-boat arm, both as regards
equipment and personnel, possible immediately after the
assumption of power.” (_C-155_)
This letter shows no trace of reluctance in cooperating with the Nazi
program. On the contrary, it is evident that Raeder welcomed and became
one of the pillars of the Nazi power.
(2) _Conversion of the Navy into a tool of the Nazi conspiracy._ Raeder,
more than anyone else, was responsible for securing the unquestioned
allegiance of the German Navy to the Nazi movement—an allegiance which
Doenitz was to make even more firm and fanatical.
Raeder’s approval of Hitler was shown particularly clearly on 2 August
1934, the day of Hindenburg’s death, when Raeder and all the men under
him swore a new oath of loyalty with considerable ceremony, this time to
Adolf Hitler and no longer to the Fatherland (_D-481_). The new oath ran
as follows:
“I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the
Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I
will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath.”
(_D-481_)
For his fatherland, Raeder substituted the Fuehrer.
There is no need to elaborate upon the step by which the German Navy was
progressively drawn into the closest alliance with the Nazi Party. The
facts of history—such as the incorporation of the swastika into the
ensign under which the German Fleet sailed, and the wearing of the
swastika on the uniform of naval officers and men—these facts speak for
themselves.
The Nazis, for their part, were not ungrateful for Raeder’s obeisance
and collaboration. His services in rebuilding the German Navy were
widely recognized by Nazi propagandists and by the Nazi press. On his
66th birthday, the Chief Party Organ, the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_,”
published a special article about him, which summed up Raeder’s
contribution to Nazi development:
“It was to Raeder’s credit to have already built up by that time
a powerful striking force from the numerically small fleet,
despite the fetters of Versailles.
“With the assumption of power through National Socialism began,
too, the most fruitful period in the reconstruction of the
German Fleet.
“The Fuehrer openly expressed his recognition of Raeder’s
faithful services and unstinted cooperation, by appointing him
General Admiral on the 20th of April, 1936”.
* * * * * *
“As a soldier and a seaman, the General-Admiral has proved
himself to be the Fuehrer’s first and foremost naval
collaborator.” (_D-448_)
(3) _Raeder’s political activities and responsibilities._ Raeder’s
personal part in the Nazi conspiracy arises from the fact that, from the
time of the Nazi seizure of power, he became increasingly involved in
responsibility for the general policies of the Nazi State.
Long before he was promoted to General-Admiral in 1936, he had become a
member of the secret Reich Defense Council, joining it when it was
founded, on 4 April 1933. Thus, at an early date, he was involved, both
militarily and politically, in the Nazi conspiracy. These facts are
contained in a document which contains the classic Nazi directive:
“Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can be
denied by us in Geneva.” (_EC-177_)
On 4 February 1938, Raeder was appointed to be a member of a newly
formed Secret Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs (_2031-PS_). Three
weeks later, a decree of Hitler’s stated that, as well as being equal in
rank with a Cabinet Minister, Raeder was also to take part in the
sessions of the Cabinet (_2098-PS_). It is thus clear that Raeder’s
responsibility for the political decisions of the Nazi State was
steadily developed from 1933 to 1938, and that in the course of time he
had become a member of all the main political advisory bodies. He was a
member of the inner councils of the conspirators.
As an illustration, Raeder was present at two of the key meetings at
which Hitler openly declared his intention of attacking neighboring
countries. The first of these was Hitler’s conference at the Reichs
Chancellery on 5 November 1937, concerning matters which were said to be
too important to discuss in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet. The
minutes of this meeting establish conclusively that the Nazis
premeditated their crimes against peace (_386-PS_). The second meeting
which Raeder attended was Hitler’s conference on 23 May 1939 (_L-79_).
This was the conference at which Hitler confirmed his intention to make
a deliberate attack upon Poland at the first opportunity, well knowing
that this must cause widespread war in Europe.
In addition to those two key conferences, Raeder was also present at
many others, where he placed his knowledge and professional skill at the
service of the Nazi war machine. Raeder’s promotion of the military
planning and preparation for the Polish campaign is discussed in Section
8 of Chapter IX.
(4) _The “Athenia Case”._ Once the war was underway, Raeder also showed
himself to be a master of one of the conspirators’ favorite
techniques—deceit on the grand scale. His handling of the case of the
“_Athenia_” is a case in point.
The “_Athenia_” was a passenger liner which was sunk in the evening of 3
September 1939, when she was outward bound to America. About one hundred
lives were lost.
On 23 October 1939, the Nazi Party paper, the “_Voelkischer
Beobachter_,” published in screaming headlines the story, “Churchill
sank the Athenia” (_3260-PS_). The scale on which this deliberate lie
was perpetrated is indicated by the rest of the “_Voelkischer
Beobachter_” for that day; on the front page, with large red
underlining, were the words: “Now we indict Churchill” (_3260-PS_). An
extract from the third page of this issue of the “_Voelkischer
Beobachter_” refers to photograph of the ship and reads as follows:
“Churchill sank the ‘_Athenia_’. The above picture shows the
proud ‘_Athenia_’, the ocean giant, which was sunk by
Churchill’s crime. One can clearly see the big radio equipment
on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship.
Why was the ‘_Athenia_’ silent? Because her captain was not
allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained
from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink
the ship, through the explosion of an infernal machine. He knew
it well, but he had to keep silent. Nearly fifteen hundred
people would have lost their lives if Churchill’s original plan
had resulted as the criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped
that the one hundred Americans on board the ship would find
death in the waves so that the anger of the American people, who
were deceived by him, should be directed against Germany as the
presumed author of the deed. It was fortunate that the majority
escaped the fate intended for them by Churchill. Our picture on
the right shows two wounded passengers. They were rescued by the
freighter, ‘_City of Flint_’, and as can be seen here, turned
over to the American coast guard boat ‘_Gibb_’ for further
medical treatment. They are an unspoken accusation against the
criminal Churchill. Both they and the shades of those who lost
their lives call him before the Tribunal of the world and ask
the British people, ‘How long will the office, one of the
richest in tradition known to Britain’s history, be held by a
murderer?’” (_3260-PS_)
Contrary to these Nazi allegations, the “_Athenia_” made repeated
wireless distress signals, which were in fact intercepted and answered
by His Majesty’s ships “_Electra_” and “_Escort_,” as well as by the
Norwegian steamship “_Knute Nelson_” and the Swedish yacht “_Southern
Cross_.” In fact, the “_Athenia_” was sunk by the German U-boat U-30. So
unjustifiable was the torpedoing of the “_Athenia_,” however, that the
German Navy embarked on a course of falsification of their records and
on other dishonest measures, in the hope of hiding the guilty secret.
Meanwhile, the Nazi propagandists sought to shift the responsibility to
the British. The Captain of U-boat 30, _Oberleutnant_ Lemp, was later
killed in action, but some of the original crew of the U-30 have
survived to tell the tale as prisoners of war. An affidavit by a member
of the crew of the U-30 establishes the truth of this episode and
reveals the Nazis’ attempt to conceal the true facts (_D-654_). The
affidavit reads:
“I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 1043-33T,
“Do solemnly declare that:
“I am now confined to Camp No. 133, Lethbridge, Alberta.
“That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939, a ship of
approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the
evening by the U-30.
“That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again,
approximately half an hour after the explosion, the Commandant
called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship.
“That I have seen the ship with my very eyes, but that I do not
think that the ship could see our U-boat at that time on account
of the position of the moon.
“That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go to
the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship.
“That apart from myself, _Oberleutnant_ Hinsch was in the tower
when I saw the steamer after the attack.
“That I observed that the ship was listing.
“That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was launched.
“That I myself observed much commotion on board of the torpedoed
ship.
“That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack.
“That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes were
fired which did not explode but that I myself heard the
explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer.
“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp waited until darkness before
surfacing.
“That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September 1939.
“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp, shortly before my disembarkation in
Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited me in the forenoon in the
Petty Officers quarters where I was lying severely wounded.
“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp then had the Petty Officers’ quarters
cleared in order to be alone with me.
“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp then showed me a declaration under
oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing
concerning the incidents of 3 September 1939 on board the U-30.
“That this declaration under oath had approximately the
following wording: ‘I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I
shall shroud in secrecy all happenings of 3 September 1939 on
board the U-30, regardless whether foe or friend, and that I
shall erase from my memory all happenings of this day.’
“That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was drawn
up by the Commandant in his own handwriting, with my left hand
very illegibly.
“That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of the
‘_Athenia_,’ the idea came into my mind that the U-30 on the 3
September 1939 might have sunk the ‘_Athenia_,’ especially since
the Captain caused me to sign the above-mentioned declaration.
“That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning these
events.
“That due to the termination of the war I consider myself freed
from my oaths.” (_D-654_)
Doenitz’s part in the “_Athenia_” episode is described in an affidavit
which he has sworn, in English (_D-638_). At the end of the affidavit
four words are added in Doenitz’s handwriting, the significance of which
will be adverted to shortly. Doenitz states:
“U-30 returned to harbor about Mid-September. I met the captain,
_Oberleutnant_ Lemp, on the lockside at Wilhelmshaven, as the
boat was entering harbor, and he asked permission to speak to me
in private. I noticed immediately that he was looking very
unhappy and he told me at once that he thought he was
responsible for the sinking of the ‘_Athenia_’ in the North
Channel area. In accordance with my previous instructions, he
had been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed merchant
cruisers in the approaches to the British Isles, and had
torpedoed a ship he afterwards identified as the ‘_Athenia_’
from wireless broadcasts, under the impression that she was an
armed merchant cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my
instructions any particular type of ship as armed merchant
cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships. I despatched Lemp at
once by air to report to the SKL at Berlin; in the meantime, I
ordered complete secrecy as a provisional measure. Later the
same day or early on the following day, I received a verbal
order from _Kapitaen zur See_ Fricke [head of the Operations
Division of the Naval War Staff] that:
“1. The affair was to be kept a total secret.
“2. The OKM considered that a court martial was not necessary as
they were satisfied that the captain had acted in good faith.
“3. Political explanations would be handled by the OKM.
“I had had no part whatsoever in the political events in which
the Fuehrer claimed that no U-boat had sunk the ‘_Athenia_.’
“After Lemp returned to Wilhelmshaven from Berlin, I
interrogated him thoroughly on the sinking and formed the
impression that although he had taken reasonable care, he had
still not taken sufficient precautions to establish fully the
identity of the ship before attacking. I had previously given
very strict orders that all merchant vessels and neutrals were
to be treated according to naval prize law, before the
occurrence of this incident. I accordingly placed him under
cabin arrest, as I felt certain that a court-martial could only
acquit him and would entail unnecessary publicity” [whereat
Doenitz has added the words, “and too much time”]. (_D-638_)
Doenitz’s suggestion that the captain of the U-30 sank the “_Athenia_”
in mistake for a merchant cruiser must be considered in the light of
Doenitz’s order of 22 September 1939, that
“the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War
Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an
auxiliary cruiser.” (_C-191_)
The U-30 returned to Wilhelmshaven on 27 September 1939. On that date
another fraudulent entry was made in the War Diary of the Chief of
U-boats:
“U-30 comes in. She had sunk: ‘S.S. _Blairlogie_’; ‘S.S. _Fanad
Head_’.” (_D-659_)
There is no reference at all to the sinking of the “_Athenia_.”
Perhaps the most elaborate forgery in connection with this episode was
made on the log book of the U-30, which was responsible for sinking the
“_Athenia_” (_D-662_). The Prosecution submits that the first page of
that log book is a forgery which shows a curiously un-German
carelessness about detail. It is clear on the original document that the
first page of the text is a substitute for pages that have been removed:
The dates in the first column of that page are in Arabic numerals. On
the second and more authentic-looking page, and throughout the other
pages of the log book, they are in Roman numerals. (_D-662_)
Furthermore, all reference to the sinking of the “_Athenia_” on 3
September is omitted. The log book shows that at 1400 hours on 3
September 1939 the position of the U-30 is given as AL 0278, which is
one of the few positions quoted at all upon that page, and which was
some 200 miles west of the position where the “_Athenia_” was sunk. The
recorded course (due south) and the recorded speed (10 knots)—those
entries are obviously designed to suggest that the U-30 was well clear
of the “_Athenia’s_” position on 3 September. (_D-662_)
Finally, the original shows Lemp’s own signature upon the page dealing
with 3 September differs from his other signature in the text. The
difference appears in the final letter of his name. The signature in
question shows a Roman “p”, whereas on the other signatures there is a
script “p.” The inference is that either the signature is a forgery or
it was made by Lemp at some other, and probably considerably later,
date. (_D-662_)
The story of the “_Athenia_” establishes that the German Navy under
Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even before receiving Lemp’s
reports, the German Admiralty had repeatedly denied the possibility that
a German U-boat could be in the area concerned. The charts which showed
the disposition of U-boats and the position of sinking of the
“_Athenia_” (discussed in Section 14 on Doenitz) have shown the
dishonesty of these announcements. The conclusion to be drawn is this:
Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew all the facts. Censorship and
information control in Nazi Germany were so complete that Raeder, as
head of the Navy, must have been party to the falsification published in
the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_,” which was an attempt by the Nazi
conspirators to save face with their own people and to uphold the myth
of an infallible Fuehrer backed by an impeccable war machine.
(5) _The Attack on Norway and Denmark._ Truth mattered little in Nazi
propaganda, and Raeder’s camouflage was not confined to painting his
ships or sailing them under the British flag, as he did in attacking
Norway or Denmark. Raeder’s proud comment upon the invasions of Denmark
and Norway, in which he played a leading part, (see Section 9 of Chapter
IX on aggression against Norway and Denmark), is contained in a letter
of Raeder’s to the Navy, which stated in part:
“The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for
all time remain the great contribution of the Navy to this war.”
(_C-155_)
(6) _The Attack on the U.S.S.R._ With the occupation of Norway and much
of Western Europe safely completed, Hitler turned his eyes towards
Russia. Raeder was against the attack on Russia and tried his best to
dissuade Hitler from embarking upon it. Raeder approached the problem
with cynicism. He did not object to the aggressive war on Russia because
of its illegality, its immorality, its inhumanity. His only objection to
it was its untimeliness. He wanted to finish England first before going
further afield.
The story of Raeder’s part in the deliberations upon the war against
Russia is told in extracts from a German compilation of official naval
notes by the German Naval War Staff (_C-170_). The first entry, dated 26
September 1940, shows that Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive
Mediterranean policy, in which the Navy would play a paramount role, as
opposed to a continental land policy. The entry reads:
“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme
Commander presents his opinion about the situation: the Suez
Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez advance
through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The
Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia
is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable
whether action against Russia from the North will then be still
necessary.” (_C-170_)
The entry for 14 November reads:
“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer is still
inclined to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme
Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the
victory over England since there is heavy strain on German
forces and the end of warfare is not in sight. According to the
opinion of the Naval Supreme Commander, Russia will not press
for a conflict within the next year, since she is in the process
of building up her Navy with Germany’s help—38 cm. turrets for
battleships, etc.:—thus, during these years she continues to be
dependent upon German assistance.” (_C-170_)
And again, the entry for 27 December states:
“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme
Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our
entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most
urgent need of the hour. On the one side England has gained
strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the
eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On
the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a
strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking
effect. What is being done for submarine and naval air force
construction is much too little. Our entire war potential must
work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for Navy
and air force every fissure of strength prolongs the war and
endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices
serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of
England.” (_C-170_)
The entry for 18 February 1941 reads as follows:
“Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of
Malta even before ‘_Barbarossa_’.” (_C-170_)
The 23 February entry reads:
“Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that
seizure of Malta is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the
execution of ‘_Barbarossa_’.” (_C-170_)
The entry for 19 March 1941 shows that by March 1941 Raeder had begun to
consider what prospects of naval action the Russian aggression had to
offer. The entry states:
“In case of ‘_Barbarossa_’, Supreme Naval Commander describes
the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute necessity for the
Navy. Chief of the Supreme Command, Armed Forces, considers
compliance very difficult.” (_C-170_).
In the meantime, the entries show that Mussolini was crying out for a
more active Nazi Mediterranean policy. The entry for 30 May reads:
“[Duce] demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall
1941; 12 divisions are needed for that; ‘This stroke would be
more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London’;
Chief Naval Operations agrees completely.” (_C-170_)
Finally, the entry for 6 June indicates the strategic views of Raeder
and the German Navy at that stage:
“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Memorandum of the
Chief, Naval Operations. Observation on the strategic situation
in the Eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the
occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war.”
* * * * * *
“The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive
aims of the war in the Near East. Their advancement has moved
into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area, and
the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the
present favorable situation must take place with the greatest
acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened
her position in the Near East with help from the United States
of America. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that
the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly;
demands, however, that the undertaking ‘_Barbarossa_’, which
because of the magnitude of its aims naturally stands in the
foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces
leadership, must under no circumstances lead to an abandonment,
diminishing delay of the conduct of the war in the Eastern
Mediterranean.” (_C-170_)
Thus Raeder, throughout, was seeking an active role for his Navy in the
Nazi war plans.
Once Hitler had decided to attack Russia, Raeder sought a role for the
Navy in the Russian campaign. The first naval operational plan against
Russia was characteristically Nazi. The entry for 15 June 1941 in the
notes of the German Naval War Staff reads:
“On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations, use of arms against
Russian submarines, south of the northern boundary of the Poland
warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is
to be aimed at.” (_C-170_)
Keitel provides a typically fraudulent pretext for this action in his
letter dated 15 June 1941 (_C-38_):
“Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in the
Baltic Sea.
“To:
“High Command of the Navy—OKM (SKL)
“Offensive action against submarine south of the line
Memel—southern tip of Oeland is authorized if the boats cannot
be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by
German naval forces.
“The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces
believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines.”
(_C-38_).
This order was given on 15 June 1941, although the Nazi attack on Russia
did not take place until 22 June 1941.
(7) _Instigation of Japanese aggression._ In the meantime, Raeder was
urging Hitler, as early as 18 March 1941, to enlarge the scope of the
world war by inducing Japan to seize Singapore. Raeder’s views at his
audience with Hitler on 18 March were as follows:
“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole
English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war
against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-a-vis the
Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action,
but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she
will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.
Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring
Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East
Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby
solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do
so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.”
(_C-152_)
By 20 April 1941 Hitler had agreed with Raeder’s proposition to induce
the Japanese to take offensive action against Singapore. The entry in
the notes of the German Naval War Staff, for 20 April 1941, reads:
“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Navy Supreme
Commander asks about result of Matsuoka’s visit, and evaluation
of Japanese-Russian pact. Fuehrer has informed Matsuoka, ‘that
Russia will not be touched if she behaves friendly according to
the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself.’
Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany,
and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladisvostok, and
to cause her to attack Singapore.” (_C-170_).
The real purpose of Hitler’s words to Matsuoka is revealed in another
description of their conversation:
“* * * At that time the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a
surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian
attitude to Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was
frequently changing. The communication to Matsuoka was designed
entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise.”
(_C-66_)
The Axis partners were not even honest with each other. This is typical
of the jungle diplomacy with which Raeder associated himself.
C. _RAEDER’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES._
(1) _Instigation of the Navy to Violate the Rules of Warfare._ Raeder
throughout his career showed a complete disregard for any international
rule or usage of war which conflicted with his intention of carrying
through the Nazi program of conquest. Raeder has himself summarized his
attitude in a long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German Naval
War Staff and dated 15 October 1939, only a few weeks after the war
started (_UK-65_). The memorandum, which concerns the intensification of
the war at sea, reads in part as follows:
“I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against
Great Britain.
“Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means
at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success
can be most confidently expected if we attack British
sea-communications wherever they are accessible to us with the
greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut
off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to
consider the requirements. It is desirable to base all military
measures taken on existing International Law; however measures
which are considered necessary from a military point of view,
provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have
to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing
International Law. In principle therefore, any means of warfare
which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be used
on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a
new code of naval warfare.
“The supreme War Council will have to decide what measures of
military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been
decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form,
in fulfilment of military requirements, this decision is to be
adhered to under all circumstances and under no circumstances
may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic
warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under
political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in
the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral
powers must be turned down. Even threats of further countries,
including the U. S. coming into the war, which can be expected
with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to
a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon.
The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will
it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The
economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy
must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate
re-orientation of German war economy and the re-drafting of the
respective agreements with neutral states; for this, strong
political and economic pressure must be employed if necessary.”
(_UK-65_)
Those comments of Raeder are revealing and show that as an active member
of the inner councils of the Nazi state up to 1943, Raeder must share
responsibility for the many war crimes committed by his confederates and
underlings in the course of their wars.
(2) _The Navy’s Crimes at Sea._ Apart from this over-all responsibility
of Raeder, certain war crimes were essentially initiated or ordered
through the naval chain of command by Raeder himself.
(_a_) _Attacks on neutral shipping._ The minutes of a meeting between
Hitler and Raeder on 30 December 1939 read in part as follows:
“The Chief of Naval War Staff requests that full power be given
to the Naval War Staff in making any intensification suited to
the situation and to the means of war. The Fuehrer fundamentally
agrees to the sinking without warning of Greek ships in the
American prohibited area in which the fiction of mine danger can
be upheld, e.g., the Bristol Channel.” (_C-27_)
At this time Greek ships also were neutral. This is another
demonstration that Raeder was a man without principle.
This incitement to crime was a typical group effort, since a directive
effectuating those naval views was issued on 30 December 1939 by the
OKW, and signed by Jodl (_C-12_). This directive reads:
“On the 30th of December 1939, according to a report of Ob.d.M.,
the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces decided
that:
“(1) Greek merchant ships in the area around England declared by
U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels.
“(2) In the Bristol Channel, all shipping may be attacked
without warning—where the impression of a mining incident can
be created.
“Both measures are authorized to come into effect immediately.”
(_C-12_)
A pencilled note at the foot of this directive reads:
“Add to (1) Attack must be carried out without being seen. The
denial of the sinking of these steamships in case the expected
protests are made must be possible.” (_C-12_)
Another example of the callous attitude of Raeder’s Navy towards neutral
shipping is found in an entry in Jodl’s diary for 16 June 1942
(_1807-PS_). This extract reads as follows:
“The operational staff of the Navy (SKL) applied on the 29th May
for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The
SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and
merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (a) because defense
measures are still incomplete; (b) because there is the
possibility of achieving surprise; and (c) because Brazil is to
all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea.” (_1807-PS_).
This was a plan for a kind of Brazilian “Pearl Harbor,” although war did
not in fact break out between Germany and Brazil until the 22 August
1942.
Raeder also caused the Navy to participate in war crimes ordered by
other conspirators. A single example will suffice.
(b) _The order to shoot commandos._ On 28 October 1942 the head of the
Operations Division of the Naval War Staff promulgated to naval commands
Hitler’s order of 18 October 1942 requiring the shooting of commandos.
The effect of this order was to deny the protection of the Geneva
Convention to captured commandos. The document dated 28 October 1942
reads:
“Enclosed please find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of
terror and sabotage units.
“This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla
leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.
“After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above
authorities must hand this order over to the next highest
section which is responsible for its confiscation and
destruction.” (_C-179_).
It will be difficult to conceive of clearer evidence than this, that
Raeder appreciated the wrongfulness of Hitler’s commando order.
One example will show that this order was executed by the German Navy
during the period when Raeder was its Commander.
A certain commando operation of December 1942 had as its objective an
attack on shipping in Bordeaux harbor. The _Wehrmacht_ account of this
incident states that six of the ten participants in that commando raid
were arrested, and that all were shot on 23 March 1943 (_UK-57_). On
this particular occasion the Navy under Raeder had implemented Hitler’s
order much more expeditiously. This fact appears in extracts from the
war diary of Admiral Bachmann, who was the German Flag Officer in charge
of Western France (_C-176_). The entry for 10 December 1942 reads:
“About 1015. Telephone call from personal representative of the
Officer-in-charge of the Security Service in Paris, SS
Obersturmfuehrer Dr. Schmidt to Flag Officer-in-charge’s Flag
Lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as
interrogation had not been concluded. After consultation with
the Chief of Operations Staff the Security Service had been
directed to get approval direct from Headquarters.
“1820. Security Service, Bordeaux, requested Security Service
authorities at Fuehrer’s headquarters to postpone the shooting
for three days. Interrogations continued for the time being.”
(_C-176_)
The entry for the next day, 11 December 1942, reads:
“Shooting of the two prisoners was carried out by a unit
(strength 1/16) belonging to the naval officer in charge
Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the Security Service,
Bordeaux, on order of the Fuehrer.” (_C-176_)
A note in green pencil in the margin opposite this entry reads:
“Security Service should have done this. Phone Flag Officer in
Charge in future cases.” (_C-176_)
This provision for “future cases” was in fact an order that commandos
should be handed over to the Security Service to be shot.
It is therefore evident from Admiral Bachmann’s war diary (_C-176_) that
the first two men to be shot from the Bordeaux operation were actually
put to death by a naval firing party on 11 December 1942.
The Naval War Staff had this comment to make upon that shooting:
“The Naval Commander, West France, reports that during the
course of the day explosives with magnets to stick on, mapping
material dealing with the mouth of the Gironde, aerial
photographs of the port installations at Bordeaux, camouflage
material and food and water for several days were found.
Attempts to salvage the canoe were unsuccessful. The Naval
Commander, West France, has ordered that both soldiers be shot
immediately for attempted sabotage, if their interrogation,
which has begun, confirms what has so far been discovered. Their
execution has, however, been postponed in order to obtain more
information.
“According to a _Wehrmacht_ report, both soldiers have meanwhile
been shot. The measure would be in accordance with the Fuehrer’s
special order, but is nevertheless something new in
international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.”
(_D-658_)
That last sentence shows clearly that the Naval High Command under
Raeder accepted allegiance to the Nazi conspiracy as of greater
importance than any question of moral principle or professional honor.
The shooting of commandos was not an act of war, but simple murder.
D. _RAEDER’S ASSISTANCE TO THE CONSPIRACY THROUGH HIS POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES._
Raeder was not just a military puppet carrying out political orders.
Before the Nazis came to power he had worked actively to rebuild the
German Navy behind the back of the Reichstag. When the Nazis seized
power, he unreservedly joined forces with them. He was the prime mover
in transferring the loyalty of the German Navy to the Nazi Party. He
himself was as much a member of the inner councils of the Nazis as any
other defendant. He accepted membership in their main political advisory
bodies.
He was well aware of the designs of the Nazis and assisted in their
realization not only as a military technician, but also as a mendacious
politician. And he furthered brutal methods of warfare. And yet of all
the conspirators Raeder was one of the first to fall from his high
position. It is true that the extension of the war beyond the boundaries
of Poland came as a disappointment to him. His vision of a Nazi Armada
mastering the Atlantic reckoned without Ribbentrop’s diplomacy and
Hitler’s ideas of strategy.
In a memorandum dated 10 January 1943, just before his retirement,
entitled, “The Importance of German Surface Forces for the War by powers
signatory to the Three Power Pact,” Raeder stated:
“It was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist Reich
to give the German Navy by 1944/45 such a strength that it would
be possible to strike at the British vital arteries in the
Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting power and range.
“In 1939, the war having begun five years earlier, the
construction of these forces was still in its initial stages.”
(_C-161_).
This memorandum shows how completely Raeder was cheated in his ambitious
plans by miscalculation as to when his high seas fleet would be
required. Raeder made a great effort to recover some of his lost glory
with his attack on Norway. He made many efforts to liven up the war at
sea, both at the expense of neutrals and also of the customs and laws of
the sea. His further schemes, however, were disregarded by his fellow
conspirators, and in January 1943 he retired, and thereafter was a
leader in name only.
The record, in Raeder’s handwriting, of his interview with Hitler on 6
January 1943, which led to Raeder’s retirement, states in part:
“If the Fuehrer was anxious to demonstrate that the parting was
of the friendliest and wished that the name Raeder should
continue to be associated with the Navy, particularly abroad, it
would perhaps be possible to make an appointment to General
Inspector, giving appropriate publicity in the press, etc. But a
new C. in C. Navy with full responsibility for this office must
be appointed. The position of General Inspector, or whatever it
was decided to call it, must be purely nominal.
“Hitler accepted this suggestion with alacrity. The General
Inspector could perhaps carry out special tasks for him, make
tours of inspection, etc. The name of Raeder was still to be
associated with the Navy. After C. in C. Navy had repeated his
request, the Fuehrer definitely agreed to 30th January as his
release date. He would like to think over the details.”
(_D-655_)
This was Raeder’s twilight, different from the period of his ascendancy
in 1939, when on 12 March he spoke on the occasion of the German Heroes’
Day (_D-653_). In that speech, during the celebration of “freedom to
rearm,” Raeder stated, in the presence of Hitler and representatives of
the Party and Armed Forces:
“* * * National Socialism, which originates from the spirit of
the German fighting soldier, has been chosen by the German
people as its ideology. The German people follow the symbols of
its regeneration with the same great love and fanatical passion.
The German people has had practical experience of National
Socialism and it has not been imposed, as so many outside
critics believe. The Fuehrer has shown his people that in the
National Socialist racial community lies the greatest and
invincible sources of strength, whose dynamic power ensures not
only peace at home, but also enables to make use of all the
Nation’s creative powers.” (_D-653_).
After eulogies of Hitler, Raeder continued as follows:
“This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons to fight
Bolshevism and international Jewry, whose race-destroying
activities we have sufficiently experienced on our own people.
Therefore, the alliance with all similar-minded Nations who,
like Germany, are not willing to allow their strength, dedicated
to construction and peaceful work at home, to be disrupted by
alien ideologies as by parasites of a foreign race. * * * If
later on we instruct in the technical handling of weapons, this
task demands that the young soldier should also be taught
National Socialist ideology and the problems of life. This part
of the task, which becomes for us both a duty of honor and a
demand which cannot be refused, can and will be carried out if
we stand shoulder to shoulder and in sincere comradeship to the
Party and its organization. The armed forces and the Party thus
became more and more united in attitude and spirit.”
* * * * * *
“Germany is the protector of all Germans within and beyond our
frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria are proof of that.”
(_D-653_)
(The reference is to the bombardment of the Spanish town of Almeria,
carried out by a German naval squadron on 31 May 1937 during the course
of the Spanish Civil War.) After further panegyries on the Fuehrer and
his leadership, Raeder hinted of what was to come:
“They all planted into a younger generation the great tradition
of death for a holy cause, knowing that their blood will lead
the way towards the freedom of their dreams.” (_D-653_)
That speech of Raeder’s illustrates his deep personal involvement in the
Nazi conspiracy. There is the mixture of heroics and fatalism that led
millions of Germans to slaughter. There are boasts of the violence used
on the people of Almeria. There is the lip service to peace by a man who
planned conquest. “Armed forces and party have become more and more
united in attitude and spirit”—there is the authentic Nazi voice. There
is the assertion of racialism. Finally, there is the anti-Semitic
gesture, Raeder’s contribution to the outlook that produced Belsen.
Imbued with these ideas, he became an active participant on both the
political and military level in the Nazi conspiracy to wage wars of
aggression and to wage them ruthlessly.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ERICH RAEDER
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 67
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in │ │
│the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 │ │
│November 1937, signed by Hitler’s │ │
│adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 │ │
│November 1937. (USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │
│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │
│501) │ III │ 416
│ │ │
*503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │
│1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │
│of his commando order of the day │ │
│before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426
│ │ │
*798-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │
│Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, │ │
│22 August 1939. (USA 29) │ III │ 581
│ │ │
*1807-PS │Extract from Jodl Diary, 16 June 1942,│ │
│concerning attack on Brazilian sea and│ │
│air forces. (GB 227) │ IV │ 377
│ │ │
*2031-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │
│Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB│ │
│217) │ IV │ 654
│ │ │
2098-PS │Decree relating to Status of Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army and Navy, 25 │ │
│February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 215. (GB 206) │ IV │ 725
│ │ │
*2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │
│Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │
│Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │
│enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │
│Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843
│ │ │
2879-PS │Extracts from The Archives. │ V │ 542
│ │ │
*2888-PS │Certificate of positions held by │ │
│Raeder, 14 November 1945. (USA 13) │ V │ 553
│ │ │
*3260-PS │“Churchill Sank the Athenia”, │ │
│published in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │
│23 October 1939. (GB 218) │ V │ 1008
│ │ │
*C-12 │OKW directive, signed Jodl, 20 │ │
│December 1939, concerning conduct of │ │
│U-Boat warfare on Merchant shipping │ │
│against England. (GB 226) │ VI │ 818
│ │ │
*C-21 │Extracts from file on Intensification │ │
│of U-boat warfare. (GB 194) │ VI │ 825
│ │ │
*C-23 │Unsigned documents found in official │ │
│Navy files containing notes year by │ │
│year from 1927 to 1940 on │ │
│reconstruction of the German Navy, and│ │
│dated 18 February 1938, 8 March 1938, │ │
│September 1938. (USA 49) │ VI │ 827
│ │ │
*C-27 │Minutes of Meeting between C-in-C Navy│ │
│and the Fuehrer. (GB 225) │ VI │ 829
│ │ │
*C-29 │Directive of 31 January 1933 by Raeder│ │
│for German Navy to support the │ │
│armament industry. (USA 46) │ VI │ 830
│ │ │
C-32 │Survey report of German Naval Armament│ │
│after conference with Chief of “A” │ │
│Section, 9 September 1933. (USA 50) │ VI │ 833
│ │ │
*C-38 │Letter, 13 June 1941, requesting │ │
│decision on action against enemy │ │
│submarines and Order to attack Soviet │ │
│submarines, 15 June 1941. (GB 223) │ VI │ 855
│ │ │
*C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │
│meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │
│(GB 86) │ VI │ 884
│ │ │
*C-66 │Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 │ │
│January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” │ │
│and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81) │ VI │ 887
│ │ │
*C-105 │Extract from German Naval War Diary, │ │
│21 December 1940, p. 252. (GB 455) │ VI │ 913
│ │ │
*C-115 │Naval deception and camouflage in │ │
│invasion of Norway taken from file of │ │
│naval operation orders for operation │ │
│“Weseruebung”. (GB 90) │ VI │ 914
│ │ │
C-116 │Extract from German Naval file, 9 │ │
│August 1941, concerning Order to │ │
│blockade Norwegian ships. │ VI │ 915
│ │ │
C-117 │Extract from German Naval file, 13 │ │
│July 1941, concerning preparations for│ │
│laying of minefield near the │ │
│Bosphorus. │ VI │ 915
│ │ │
*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │
│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │
│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-122 │Extract from Naval War Diary. │ │
│Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 │ │
│October 1939. (GB 82) │ VI │ 928
│ │ │
C-124 │Secret letter, 29 September 1941, │ │
│concerning future of St. Petersburg. │ VI │ 931
│ │ │
*C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │
│Weiss” and directions for secret │ │
│mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932
│ │ │
*C-135 │Extract from history of war │ │
│organization and of the scheme for │ │
│mobilization. (GB 213) │ VI │ 946
│ │ │
*C-141 │Order for concealed armament of │ │
│E-boats, 10 February 1932, signed by │ │
│Raeder. (USA 47) │ VI │ 955
│ │ │
*C-152 │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18│ │
│March 1941, concerning audience of │ │
│C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March│ │
│1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 966
│ │ │
*C-155 │Memorandum, 11 June 1940, signed by │ │
│Raeder. (GB 214) │ VI │ 969
│ │ │
*C-156 │Concealed Rearmament under Leadership │ │
│of Government of Reich, from “Fight of│ │
│the Navy against Versailles │ │
│1919-1935”. (USA 41) │ VI │ 970
│ │ │
*C-161 │Memo by Raeder, 10 January 1943, │ │
│entitled: Importance of German Surface│ │
│forces for conducting of war by powers│ │
│signatory to Three Power Pact. (GB │ │
│230) │ VI │ 976
│ │ │
*C-166 │Order from Command Office of Navy, 12 │ │
│March 1934, signed in draft by Groos, │ │
│concerning preparation of auxiliary │ │
│cruisers. (USA 48) │ VI │ 977
│ │ │
*C-170 │File of Russo-German relations found │ │
│in OKM files covering period 25 August│ │
│1939 to 22 June 1941. (USA 136) │ VI │ 977
│ │ │
*C-176 │Extracts from War Diary of Admiral │ │
│Bachmann, concerning shooting of │ │
│commandos in Bordeaux. (GB 228) │ VI │ 1011
│ │ │
C-179 │Hitler’s second decree, 18 October │ │
│1942, regarding annihilation of terror│ │
│and sabotage units. (USA 543) │ VI │ 1014
│ │ │
*C-189 │Conversation with the Fuehrer in June │ │
│1934 on occasion of resignation of │ │
│Commanding Officer of “Karlsruhe”. │ │
│(USA 44) │ VI │ 1017
│ │ │
*C-190 │Memorandum of conversation with Hitler│ │
│on financing Naval rearmament and │ │
│assembling six submarines, 2 November │ │
│1934. (USA 45) │ VI │ 1018
│ │ │
*C-191 │Demands by defendant Doenitz on │ │
│sinking of merchant ships, 22 │ │
│September 1939. (GB 193) │ VI │ 1018
│ │ │
*D-448 │Announcement of birthday celebration │ │
│of Doenitz in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │
│25 April 1942. (GB 216) │ VII │ 58
│ │ │
*D-481 │Law regarding the swearing in of │ │
│officials and soldiers of Armed │ │
│Forces, 20 August 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 785. (GB│ │
│215) │ VII │ 66
│ │ │
*D-638 │Affidavit of Doenitz concerning │ │
│sinking of Athenia, 17 November 1945. │ │
│(GB 220) │ VII │ 114
│ │ │
*D-653 │Raeder speech, 12 March 1939, │ │
│published in The Archive, March 1939, │ │
│pp. 1841-1846. (GB 232) │ VII │ 153
│ │ │
*D-654 │Affidavit of Adolf Schmidt, 9 August │ │
│1945. (GB 219) │ VII │ 156
│ │ │
*D-655 │Raeder interview with Hitler on 6 │ │
│January 1943. (GB 231) │ VII │ 158
│ │ │
*D-658 │Extract from SKL War Diary, 9 December│ │
│1942. (GB 229) │ VII │ 164
│ │ │
D-659 │Extract from War Diary of Chief of │ │
│U-boats, 27 September 1939. (GB 221) │ VII │ 164
│ │ │
*D-662 │War Diary of Commanding Officer of │ │
│U-boat U-30. (GB 222) │ VII │ 169
│ │ │
*D-663 │Operation Order “Atlantic” No. 56 for │ │
│U-boats in Atlantic, 7 October 1943. │ │
│(GB 200) │ VII │ 170
│ │ │
*EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │
│Committee of the Reich Defense held on│ │
│26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
*UK-57 │Keitel directives, 4 January 1944 and │ │
│21 April 1944, concerning │ │
│counteraction to Kharkov show trial. │ │
│(GB 164) │ VIII │ 539
│ │ │
*UK-65 │Report by Raeder to Hitler, 16 October│ │
│1939, and memorandum regarding │ │
│intensified naval war against England,│ │
│15 October 1939. (GB 224) │ VIII │ 545
│ │ │
Statement I │The Laconia Case and German Submarine │ │
│Warfare, by Karl Doenitz, Nurnberg, 7 │ │
│and 19 October 1945. │ VIII │ 657
│ │ │
Statement VII │The Development of German Naval │ │
│Policy—1933-1939, by Erich Raeder, │ │
│Moscow, fall 1945. │ VIII │ 684
│ │ │
Statement VIII │The Breakthrough in the Channel Early │ │
│in 1942, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, 30 │ │
│August 1945. │ VIII │ 701
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707
16. BALDUR VON SCHIRACH
A. _SCHIRACH’S NSDAP MEMBERSHIP, NSDAP POSITIONS, AND GOVERNMENT
POSITIONS._
In an affidavit (_3302-PS_), Schirach has declared that he held the
following positions:
_Positions in the Nazi Party_
(1) NSDAP member, 1925 to 1945.
(2) Leader of the National Socialist Students League, 1929-1931.
(3) Leader of the Hitler Youth organization, 1931-1940.
(4) Reich Youth Leader (_Reichsjugendfuehrer_) on the Staff of
the SA Supreme Command under Ernst Roehm, 1931-1932.
(5) Reich Youth Leader (_Reichsjugendfuehrer_) of the NSDAP,
1931-1940; in 1932 Schirach became an independent Reich Leader
(_Reichsleiter_), and no longer remained on the Staff of the SA
Supreme Command.
(6) Gruppenfuehrer (Lt. General) of the SA, 1931-1941.
(7) Reich Leader (_Reichsleiter_) for Youth Education in the
NSDAP, 1932-1945.
(8) Gau Leader (Gauleiter) of the Reichsgau Vienna, 1940-1945.
(9) Obergruppenfuehrer (General) of the SA, 1941-1945.
_Governmental Positions_
(1) Reich Youth Leader, 1933-1940.
(2) Reich Governor (_Reichsstatthalter_) of the Reichsgau
Vienna, 1940-1945.
(3) Reich Defense Commission of Vienna, 1940-1945.
(4) Deputy to the Fuehrer for the Inspection of the Hitler Youth
(_Beauftragter der Fuehrer fuer die Inspektion der Gesamten
Hitler Jugend_), 1940-1945.
Schirach was also a member of the Reichstag from 1932 to 1945
(_2973-PS_).
B. _SCHIRACH WAS AN INTIMATE AND SLAVISH FOLLOWER OF HITLER SINCE 1925._
As early as 1925 Baldur von Schirach, then 18 years old, joined the Nazi
conspirators. Upon special request of Hitler, he went to Munich in order
to study Party affairs. After having joined the NSDAP in 1925, he became
active in converting students to National Socialism (_3302-PS_). This
was the start of Schirach’s conspiratorial activities, which he
continued for two decades in the spirit of unbending loyalty to Hitler
and to the principles of National Socialism. Schirach shows his slavish
loyalty to Hitler in his principal book, “The Hitler Youth,” published
in 1934:
“We were not yet able to account for our conception in detail,
we simply believed. And when Hitler’s book, _Mein Kampf_, was
published it was our bible which we almost learned by heart in
order to answer the questions of the doubters and superior
critics. Almost everyone today who is leading youth in a
responsible position joined us in those years.”
* * * * * *
“In my apartment on _Koenigin Strasse_, I was lucky enough to be
able to express my apprehensions about Strasser to the Fuehrer,
otherwise I never discussed these things with anybody with the
exception of Julius Streicher.” (_1458-PS_).
C. _SCHIRACH WAS THE LEADING NAZI CONSPIRATOR IN DESTROYING INDEPENDENT
YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS AND IN BUILDING THE NAZI YOUTH MOVEMENT._
(Reference is made at this point to section 8 of Chapter VII on
“Reshaping of Education and Training of Youth”. See also _3054-PS_.)
It was Schirach’s task to perpetuate the Nazi regime through generations
by poisoning the mind of youth, and thereby the mind of the German
people, and to prepare the German nation for aggressive wars.
The basic law concerning the Hitler Youth, which under Schirach’s
tutelage became an instrument of the Nazi State, declares:
“The future of the German Nation depends on its youth, and the
German youth shall have to be prepared for its future duties. *
* *
“All German youth in the Reich is organized within the Hitler
Youth.
“The German youth besides being reared within the family and
school, shall be educated physically, intellectually, and
morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people
and the community, through the Hitler Youth.
“The task of educating the German Youth through the Hitler Youth
is being entrusted to the Reich Leader of German Youth in the
NSDAP. * * *” (_1392-PS_).
For the five years preceding the promulgation of this law Schirach had
been leader of the Hitler Youth and Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP. He
continued in these positions until the Nazis launched their aggressive
wars. As late as 4 December 1945, Schirach declared his own feeling of
responsibility for Nazi policies concerning youth:
“I feel myself responsible for the policy of the youth movement
in the Party and later within the Reich.” (_3302-PS_).
(1) _Schirach actively promoted the NSDAP and its affiliated youth
organizations before the Nazis seized power._ In 1929 Hitler appointed
Schirach leader of the National Socialist German Students League and in
1931 leader of the Hitler Jugend. After 1931, Schirach devoted his full
time to Party work (_3302-PS_). Before 1933, Schirach moved throughout
Germany, leading demonstrations and summoning German youth to the Hitler
Youth. When this organization and the wearing of its uniform were
forbidden by law, Schirach continued by illegal means. Of this period he
writes:
“Whoever came to us during this illegal time, boy or girl,
risked everything. * * * With pistols in our belts we drove
through the Ruhr district while stones came flying after us.”
(_1458-PS_)
Schirach admits that Rosenberg and he were not successful before 1933 in
efforts to reach “an understanding” with other youth organizations.
Schirach states that he thereupon arrived at a conclusion which later
was to spell the doom of independent youth groups:
“I realized at that time that an understanding with the leaders
of the League would never be possible and devoted myself to the
principle of the totality [_Totalitaet_] of the Hitler Youth
which in the year 1933 cost all those leagues their independent
existence.” (_1458-PS_).
(2) _Schirach, on behalf of the Nazi conspirators, destroyed all
independent youth organizations or caused them to be absorbed within the
Hitler Youth (Hitler Jugend)._ After the Nazi conspirators seized
political control of Germany, Schirach was aggressive in bringing the
entire German youth within the Nazi orbit of control and domination.
Referring to the period immediately following 30 January 1933, Schirach
declared:
“Now the problem was to apply the victory of the movement to the
entire youth. Our cabinet ministers were overburdened with their
new tasks and were working day and night. We could not wait
until they could find time to solve the youth question by their
own initiative. Therefore, we had to act ourselves. My
co-workers met in my Munich apartment and advised me to occupy
the Reichs Committee [_Reichsausschuss_] of the German Youth
Leagues [_Jugendverbaende_]. I commissioned General
[_Obergebietsfuehrer_] Nabersberg with 50 members of the Berlin
HJ to make a surprise raid on the Reich Committee in the
Alsenstrasse early the next morning. This was done and at noon
the press had the report that the HJ [Hitler Youth] had taken
over the leadership of the Reich Committee.” (_1458-PS_).
By a second surprise raid, Schirach took over the Youth Hostels. Of this
Schirach writes in the same book:
“In the meantime I gained control over the Reich League for
German Youth Hostels [_Reichsverband fuer deutsche
Jugendherbergen_] in a similar manner to the one employed with
the Reich Committee.” (_1458-PS_)
By using the records of the seized Reich Committee, Schirach states that
he obtained knowledge of the strength and influential personalities of
all the German youth groups.
“From this point I recognized the necessity of coming to grips
with the Greater German Union [_Grossdeutscher Bund_].”
(_1458-PS_)
In June 1933, Schirach was appointed Youth Leader of the German Reich
(_Jugendfuehrer des Deutschen Reiches_) in a solemn ceremony before
Hitler. Concerning the period immediately following, Schirach writes in
the same book:
“The first thing I did was to dissolve the Greater German Union
[_Grossdeutscher Bund_]. Since I headed all German youth
organizations and I had the right to decide on their leadership,
I did not hesitate for a moment to take this step, which was for
the Hitler Youth the elimination of an unbearable state of
affairs.” (_1458-PS_)
The dissolution of this and other youth organizations was accomplished
by orders issued by Schirach as Youth Leader of the German Reich.
(_2229-PS_)
In this position Schirach also appointed deputies to the various German
states (_Landesbeauftragte_) “to carry out my instructions, and I
appointed district leaders [_Gebietsfuehrer_] to these positions in all
of the states in execution of my right” (_1458-PS_). In this book
Schirach also admits directing the further assimilation or destruction
of other youth organizations:
“The Marxist youth as well as all political youth organizations
I prohibited after the occupation of the Reich Committee. The
one million members of the HJ which we had on 30 January 1933
had grown to a round 3,000,000. Only the two large professional
groups, the Protestant and Catholic youth, were opposed to us.”
(_1458-PS_)
Schirach proceeded to hold discussions with the Hitler-appointed Reich
Bishop Ludwig Mueller,
“And in December 1933, the Reich Bishop and myself were able to
inform the Fuehrer that incorporation of the Protestant youth
into the HJ had become a reality.” (_1458-PS_)
When this book was written, Schirach had not yet accomplished the
complete coordination of Catholic youth into the Hitler Youth, though he
argued that:
“No reasonable man in Germany can give a reason for the
necessity of the existence of Catholic youth organizations in
their present form.” (_1458-PS_)
Schirach’s objective of forcing all German youth into the Hitler Youth
was finally accomplished by a decree in December 1936. (_1392-PS_)
(3) _Schirach was mainly responsible for the indoctrination and training
of German youth outside home and school._ The law making compulsory the
organization of all German Youth within the Hitler Youth declared that:
“The task of educating the German Youth through the Hitler Youth
is being entrusted to the Reich Youth Leader in the NSDAP.”
(_1392-PS_)
To make Schirach’s sole competence even clearer, the first executive
order concerning the basic youth law stated:
“The youth leader of the German Reich is solely competent for
all missions of the physical, ideological, and moral education
of the entire German youth outside of the house of the parents
and the school.” (_1462-PS_)
(4) _Schirach was the principal Nazi conspirator in applying the
Leadership principle to German youth._ As a Reich Leader
(_Reichsleiter_) in the NSDAP, Schirach was responsible only to Hitler
or his deputy (_Stellvertreter_), Hess. In youth affairs he was at the
top of the Nazi leadership pyramid, and under him German youth was
directed by and completely subjected to the Leadership Principle. The
Leadership Principle, one of the principal control-techniques of the
Nazis was explained and glorified by Schirach as it applied to German
youth:
“A single will leads the HJ. The power of authority of the HJ
leaders, that of the smallest as well as of the largest unit, is
absolute, i.e., he has the unlimited right to give orders
because he bears the unlimited responsibility. He knows that the
responsibility of the higher one comes before that of the lower
ones. Therefore, he submits silently to the instructions of his
leaders even if they are directed against him personally. To him
as well as to all young Germany the history of the HJ is proof
of the fact that a youth community also can only be successful
if it unconditionally recognizes the authority of leadership.
The success of National Socialism is a success of discipline.
The structure of National Socialist Youth is built on the
foundation of discipline and obedience. The teachings of the
time of persecution apply even more to the period of victory and
power.” (_1458-PS_)
(5) _Schirach indoctrinated youth with the Nazi ideology._ Schirach
states that:
“It was my task to educate the youth in the aims, ideology and
directives of the NSDAP, and beyond this to direct and to shape
them.” (_3302-PS_)
For this purpose the Hitler Youth had an elaborate propaganda apparatus
which published numerous periodicals, ranging from a daily press service
to monthly magazines. Through liaison agents the Hitler Youth Propaganda
Office had permanent contact with Dr. Goebbels’ Propaganda Office of the
NSDAP and with the Ministry of People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda.
(_3349-PS_).
Schirach, together with Dr. Robert Ley, established the Adolf Hitler
Schools in January 1937. These schools, according to the joint statement
of Reich Leaders (_Reichsleiter_) Schirach and Ley, were open to
outstanding and proven members of the Youth Folk (_Jungvolk_), the
junior section of the Hitler Youth organization. The Adolf Hitler
Schools were destined to train youth free of charge for responsible
positions in National Socialist Germany. These schools were units of and
under the jurisdiction of the Hitler Youth. Schirach shared with Reich
Organization Leader (_Reichsorganisationsleiter_) Ley the general
supervision of the contents of the teaching, the curriculum, and the
staff of the Adolf Hitler Schools (_2653-PS_). Schirach encouraged a
close relation between members of the Hitler Youth and the German League
for Germandom abroad _(Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland_, or
“VDA”). An agreement between Schirach and the leaders of the VDA in 1933
states:
“(1) With a complete respect for the important racial-political
task the Hitler Youth recommends to its members membership in
collaboration with the VDA.”
* * * * * *
“(3) The school groups of the VDA (racial-German work cells)
assist the Hitler Youth in their work.” (_L-360-H_)
Schirach thus subscribed to the “racial-political task” of the NSDAP and
extended his jurisdiction even beyond the border of the German Reich.
His encouragement and approval of anti-Jewish terror by youth is
discussed below.
(6) _Through the Hitler Youth, Schirach assisted the Nazi conspirators
in developing leaders and members of the NSDAP and its affiliated
organizations, including the SA and the SS._ Sometime before the
launching of aggressive wars, the Hitler Youth had become the principal
source of zealous members for the NSDAP and its affiliated
organizations. Orders of the Party Chancellery concerned with “successor
problems” of the Party emphasize constant attention to Hitler Youth
members as future Nazi leaders, thus attempting the perpetuation of the
Nazi regime and Nazi ideology for the immediate future and even into
future generations. Only Hitler Youth members who distinguished
themselves were to be admitted to the Party. Nazi leaders were
instructed to use “properly qualified full-time Hitler Youth leaders * *
* for the continuation of their political work in the Party service,” so
that a necessary succession of full-time leaders in the Leader Corps
(_Fuehrerkorps_) of the Party would be secured. (_3348-PS_)
The Party manual also discusses the Hitler Youth as a recruitment agency
for future Nazi leaders and members of affiliated organizations of the
NSDAP:
“To secure for the Party valuable and trained recruits for
leadership, suitable Hitler Jugend boys of over 17 can be
assigned for education and training to leaders from local unit
leaders on upwards.”
* * * * * *
“Besides the above-mentioned conditions for selections in
general, a process of elimination results from the fact that
from youth on the German is cared for, guided, and educated by
the Party. First they are assembled in the Young Folk
[_Jungvolk_] from which the young people are transferred into
the HJ. The boy of the HJ enters the SA, the SS, the NSKK or the
NSFK or participates in the work of the affiliated organizations
of the Party. After labor and army service, he returns for
service to the Party and its affiliates, respectively.”
(_2401-PS_)
Special arrangements existed between Himmler’s SS and Schirach’s Hitler
Youth concerning the recruiting of members of the Hitler Jugend for
later service in the SS. Within the Hitler Youth was a special group
called the _Streifendienst_ (Patrol Service). Concerning this special
group, an official handbook on youth laws states:
“Organization of the _Streifendienst_.
“1. Since the _Streifendienst_ in the HJ has to perform tasks
similar to those of the SS for the whole movement, it is
organized as a special unit for the purpose of securing recruits
for the general SS; however, as much as possible, recruits for
the SS special troops, for the SS Death Head Troops, and for the
officer candidate schools should also be taken from these
formations.”
* * * * * *
“4a. The selection of _Streifendienst_ members is made according
to the principles of racial selection of the _Schutzstaffel_
[SS]; the competent officials of the SS, primarily unit leaders,
race authorities, and SS physicians, will be consulted for the
admission test.”
* * * * * *
“5. To insure from the beginning a good understanding between
Reich youth leadership and Reich SS leadership, a liaison office
will be ordered from the Reich youth leadership to the SS main
office starting 1 October 1938. The appointment of other leaders
to the SS sections is a subject for a future agreement.
“6. After the organization is completed, the SS takes its
replacement primarily from these _Streifendienst_ members.
Admission of youths of German blood who are not members of the
HJ is then possible only after information and advice of the
competent Bann leader.” (_2396-PS_)
Shortly afterwards, on 17 December 1938, Schirach and Himmler entered
into and signed another agreement for recruiting SS members from the
ranks of the Hitler Youth:
“To secure full success for the common effort of the SS and the
Hitler Youth by strict cooperation, to stem the flight from the
land, to build a new peasant class, to bring the best part of
the people into contact with the earth of the homeland, the
following arrangement has been made in connection with the
agreement of 26 August 1938.
“1. The farm service of the Hitler Youth is according to
education and aim, particularly well suited as a recruiting
organization for the _Schutzstaffel_ (general SS and the armed
sections of the SS; SS special troops and SS death head
battalions).
“2. Boys who suit the special demands of the SS according to
physical conditions and moral attitude are preferably admitted
into the farm service of the Hitler Youth.”
* * * * * *
“5. All farm service members who pass the general admission test
of the SS will be taken over into the general SS after leaving
the farm service.” (_2567-PS_)
Thus, by the end of 1938, the Hitler Youth had become the main source
for future SS members. (For the criminal activities of the SS formations
for which Hitler Youth members were recruited, see Section 5 of Chapter
XV of the _Schutzstaffeln_ (SS).)
(7) _Schirach actively engaged in militarizing the Hitler Youth._ In
June 1933, under an agreement between Hitler and Franz Seldte, which was
negotiated in the presence of the Reich Minister of War, the “Steel
Helmet League of Front Line Soldiers” (_Stahlhelm, Bund der
Frontsoldaten_) was incorporated into the Nazi movement. The
_Scharnhorst_, the youth organization of the _Stahlhelm_, was integrated
into the Hitler Youth. (_2260-PS_)
The Hitler Youth was generally set up along military lines with
uniforms, ranks, and titles. It contained divisions called Naval Hitler
Youth, Motorized Hitler Youth, Hitler Youth Flyers, and Signal Hitler
Youth. According to an official document published by the Reich Youth
Leadership under Schirach, the object of these divisions within the
Hitler Youth was to prepare boys, respectively, for the German merchant
marine and Navy, the National Socialist Motorized Corps (NSKK), for
civil and military aviation, and for service with signal troops.
(_2654-PS_)
On or about 11 August 1939, just before the invasion of Poland, an
agreement was entered into between Schirach and Wilhelm Keitel, then
Chief of the High Command of the _Wehrmacht_, which was declared by _Das
Archiv_ to represent “the result of close cooperation” between these two
conspirators. The agreement itself stated:
“While it is exclusively the task of the Hitler Youth to attend
to the training of their units in this direction, it is suitable
in the sense of a uniform training corresponding to the demands
of the _Wehrmacht_ to support the leadership of the Hitler Youth
for their responsible task as trainers and educators in all
fields of training for defense by special courses * * * A great
number of courses are in progress.” (_2398-PS_)
The agreement stated that it “gives the possibility of roughly
redoubling” the same 30,000 leaders in the Hitler Youth schools for
directing shooting practice and field training. Under the agreement,
specific arrangements were made for messing and billeting the Hitler
Youth leaders at _Wehrmacht_ installations. Former Hitler Youth leaders
in the _Wehrmacht_, who were specially selected volunteers, were to be
assigned as liaison officers and deputies for carrying out this military
training. (_2398-PS_)
Hitler, in a speech in February 1938, represented that thousands of
German boys had received specialized training in naval, aviation, and
motorized groups within the Hitler Youth, and that over 1 million Hitler
Youth members had received instructions in rifle shooting from 7,000
instructors. (_2454-PS_)
D. _SCHIRACH PROMOTED THE ACCESSION TO POWER OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS._
This allegation of the Indictment is born out by Schirach’s activities
in converting students to National Socialism and by his Leadership of
the Hitler Youth before the Nazis’ seizure of political power. These
activities are described above.
E. _SCHIRACH PROMOTED THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER OF THE NAZI
CONSPIRATORS._
Schirach’s acts in accomplishing the Nazis’ complete control over German
youth are described above. These acts were of notable assistance to the
Nazi conspirators in acquiring complete control of Germany during the
pre-war years. Schirach’s own words in 1938 leave no doubt as to his own
feeling of personal responsibility in this connection:
“The struggle for the unification of the German youth is
finished. I considered it as my duty to conduct it in a hard and
uncompromising manner. Many might not have realized why we went
through so much trouble for the sake of the youth. And yet: The
National Socialist German Workers’ Party, whose trustee I felt I
always was and always will be, this Party considered the
struggle for the youth as the decisive element for the future of
the German nation.”
* * * * * *
“And I promise the German public that the youth of the German
Reich, the youth of Adolf Hitler, will accomplish its duty in
the spirit of the man to whom alone their lives belong.”
(_2306-PS_)
F. _SCHIRACH PROMOTED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL PREPARATIONS FOR
AGGRESSIVE WAR AND THE MILITARIZATION OF NAZI-DOMINATED ORGANIZATIONS._
A general outline of Schirach’s acts bearing on this allegation of the
Indictment appears above. By his own admission, Schirach was the
principal Nazi responsible for driving the entire Nazi ideology into the
minds of German youths, many of whom grew up to be fanatical Nazis like
Schirach himself. From Hitler, in 1938, came boastings of the
accomplishments of the Hitler Youth in military training. Through the
vast propaganda network of the Reich Youth Leadership, through the Adolf
Hitler Schools, through the minute regimentation of youth and its
subjection to the Leadership Principle, and through the military
training of German youth, Schirach fulfilled the edict of the basic law
concerning the Hitler Youth:
“The future of the German nation depends on its youth, and the
German youth shall have to be prepared for its future duties”.
It has been demonstrated that the future duties of the youth entrusted
to Schirach were participation in aggressive wars.
G. _SCHIRACH’S GENERAL FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS PARTY AND
GOVERNMENT LEADER IN THE REICHSGAU VIENNA._
(1) _Gau Leader_ (_Gauleiter_). Schirach was Gau Leader of the NSDAP for
the Reichsgau Vienna from July 1940 to 1945. In common with all other
Gau Leaders, Schirach was the highest representative of Hitler, the
supreme Party Leader, in his Gau, and he was the bearer of sovereignty
(_Hoheitstraeger_) of the Party for this regional division of the Party.
As such, he possessed “sovereign political rights”; he represented the
Party with his Gau; and he was “responsible for the entire political
situation within” this Gau. (_1893-PS_)
The Party manual makes it mandatory that each Gau Leader meet at least
once a month with leaders of the affiliated organizations of the NSDAP,
including the SA and the SS, “for the purpose of mutual orientation”,
and authorizes the Gau Leader to call upon SA leaders and SS leaders as
“needed for the execution of a political mission.” As a Gau Leader
Schirach was appointed by Hitler and was “directly subordinate” to him.
He was responsible for coordinating activities of the NSDAP with various
state authorities, including the police and the Gestapo. (_1893-PS_)
(2) _Reich Governor_ (_Reichsstatthalter_). Schirach was Reich Governor
of the Reichsgau Vienna from July 1940 to 1945. After the _Anschluss_
the Nazi conspirators abolished the State of Austria as a sovereign
state and divided Austria into seven Reich Gaus, the most important of
which was the Reichsgau Vienna (_Reichsgau Wien_). Schirach, in his
capacity as Reich Governor, was the lieutenant of the head of the German
State, Hitler, in his Gau. As Reich Governor he was authorized to make
decrees and issue orders within the limitations set by the supreme Reich
authorities (_Oberste Reichsbehoerden_). He was especially under the
administrative supervision of Frick, Reich Minister of Interior. The
Reich Governor was also first mayor (_Erster Buergermeister_) of Vienna.
(_3301-PS_)
Schirach was also Reich Defense Commissar of Vienna from 1940 to 1945.
These government positions, along with his leadership of the Party in
Vienna, made Schirach the most important representative of the Nazi
conspirators in the Reichsgau Vienna. Schirach himself states that as
Reich Governor his “field was the direction of the general
administration” in Vienna. (_3302-PS_)
As the highest Party and State leader in the Reichsgau Vienna, Schirach
was responsible for all the crimes of the Nazi conspirators in the
Reichsgau Vienna on the ground that he either initiated, approved,
executed, or abetted them. Specific examples, described below,
demonstrate that in fact he was actively and personally engaged in Nazi
crimes.
H. _SCHIRACH PARTICIPATED IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, PARTICULARLY ANTI-SEMITIC MEASURES._
Schirach bears responsibility for providing many, if not most, of the
Death Head (_Totenkopf_) members of the SS, who, in the main,
administered the concentration camps. As particularized above, the SS,
by agreement between Himmler and Schirach, took “its replacement
primarily” from _Streifendienst_ members of the Hitler Youth and only
upon special permission could a non-Hitler Youth become an SS man. Nor
can Schirach escape responsibility for his assistance in implanting in
youth the Nazi ideology, with its tenets of a master race, “sub-human”
peoples, and world domination. For such notions were the psychological
prerequisites for the instigation and toleration of the atrocities which
zealous Nazis committed throughout Germany and the occupied countries.
(1) _Schirach directed and participated in the Nazi conspirators’ slave
labor program._
(For a full discussion of the slave labor program see Chapter X.)
Vienna was one of the principal cities and an independent Reichsgau of
Greater Germany. Schirach, as Gau Leader and Reich Governor, was
delegated far-reaching responsibilities concerning the slave labor
program and hence shares responsibility for crimes of slave labor.
(_3352-PS_)
This document proves that the Gau Leaders were required to be the
supreme integrating and coordinating agents of the Nazi conspirators in
executing the entire manpower program. A circular of the Party
Chancellery of 22 March 1942 states that Goering, upon the suggestion of
Sauckel, had agreed that the Gau Leaders were to become active as
Sauckel’s special Plenipotentiaries (_Bevollmaechtigte_) in order that—
“By the leadership of the Party in full appreciation of the
competence of the corresponding Reich authorities, the highest
efficiency in the field of manpower shall be guaranteed.”
(_3352-PS_)
Goering gave Sauckel authority to issue orders to “the agencies of the
Party, its member organizations and affiliated organizations” as well as
to governmental authorities. By an order of 6 April 1942 Sauckel
appointed the Gau Leaders as his “plenipotentiaries for manpower within
their respective Gaus,” and charged them with the—
“* * * establishment of a harmonious cooperation of all agencies
of the State, of the Party, of the Armed Forces, and of the
Economy, charged with problems of manpower and thus to create
agreement between the different conceptions and requirements to
obtain the highest efficiency in the field of manpower.”
(_3352-PS_).
To insure that the Gau Leaders could efficiently perform their manpower
tasks, the entire staff of the Provincial Labor Offices were—
“* * * directed to be at the disposal of the Gau Leaders for
information and advice and to fulfill the suggestions and
demands of the Gau Leader for the purpose of improvements or
manpower.” (_3352-PS_)
In this same order Sauckel said:
“By the above mentioned commission of the Gau Leaders of the
NSDAP, I intend to lead manpower utilization to the greatest
success.” (_3352-PS_)
Thus, Sauckel, himself an experienced Gau Leader, bears witness to the
involvement after 1942 of the Gau Leaders, including Schirach, in the
manpower utilization program of the Nazi conspirators.
Furthermore, a circular from the Party Chancellery of 4 August 1942,
shows that “Bearers of Sovereignty” (_Hoheitstrager_) of the NSDAP
(which included the Gau Leaders and hence Schirach) were to familiarize
themselves with the execution of manpower directives on Eastern workers.
One of the purposes of this directive was to prevent “inept Factory
heads” from giving “too much consideration for the care of the Eastern
Workers and thereby causing justified annoyance among the German
workers” (_3352-PS_). What “consideration” was in fact meted out to
Eastern Workers in the conspirators’ manpower utilization program is
discussed in Chapter X.
(2) _Schirach participated in the conspiracy to persecute the Churches._
The activity of Schirach in persecuting churches by dissolving religious
youth organizations or by incorporating them in the Hitler Youth has
been set forth above.
Official letters of Martin Bormann and Hans Lammers, in March 1941, show
that church properties in Austria had been confiscated for various
pretexts after Schirach had become Gau Leader and Reich Governor of the
Reichsgau Vienna. Upon a visit of Hitler to Vienna, Schirach and two
other officials raised with him a complaint that the confiscations
should be made in favor of Gaus rather than of the Reich. Thereafter all
Gauleiters were notified that the decision had been made in favor of the
position Schirach had taken before Hitler, namely in favor of the Gaus.
(_R-146_)
(3) _Schirach participated in the conspiracy to persecute the Jews._
Even before assuming his Governmental functions in the Reichsgau Vienna,
Schirach was responsible for encouraging anti-Jewish terror. Before
1939, at a meeting of Heidelberg students of the National Socialist
German Students Bund (NSDStB), Schirach was chief speaker. After
praising the students for devoting so much of their time to the affairs
of the Party,
“* * * he declared that the most important phase of German
University life in the Third Reich was the program of the
NSDStB. He extolled various activities of the Bund. He reminded
the boys of the service they had rendered during the Jewish
purge. Dramatically he pointed across the river to the old
University town of Heidelberg where several burnt-out synagogues
were mute witnesses of the efficiency of Heidelberg students.
Those skeleton buildings would remain there for centuries, as
inspiration for future students, as warning to enemies of the
State.” (_2441-PS_)
Immediately after becoming Gau Leader and Reich Governor of the
Reichsgau Vienna, Schirach’s anti-Jewish measures assumed more
formidable proportions. As early as 7 November 1940, one Dr. Fischer,
“by order” of the Reich Governor Schirach, stated that—
“investigations are being made at present by the Gestapo, to
find out how many able-bodied Jews are still available in order
to make plans for the contemplated mass projects. It is assumed
that there are not many more Jews available. If some still
should be available, however, the Gestapo has no scruples to use
the Jews even for the removal of the destroyed synagogues. SS
Colonel Huber will report personally to the
‘_Regierungspraesident_’ in this matter.” (_1948-PS_)
The _Regierungspraesident_ was Reich Governor Schirach’s personal
representative “within the governmental administration” (_in der
staatlichen Verwaltung_) of the Reichsgau. (_3301-PS_)
The above letter indicates that Schirach and his immediate subordinates
not only knew of the atrocities which had been committed against the
Jews by the Nazi conspirators in the Reichsgau, but also that they
endorsed further forced labor of Jews and worked intimately with the
Gestapo and the SS in their measures of persecution. Within six months
after Schirach became Gau Leader and Reich Governor of Vienna, Dr. Hans
Lammers informed Schirach that—
“the Fuehrer has decided after receipt of one of the reports
made by you, that the 60,000 Jews still residing in the
Reichsgau Vienna, will be deported most rapidly, that is still
during the war, to the General Government because of the housing
shortage prevalent in Vienna.” (_1950-PS_)
Lammers’ letter, dated 3 December 1940, informed Schirach that the
Governor General of Poland, Hans Frank, and the Reichsfuehrer SS,
Himmler, had been informed of the Fuehrer’s decision. (_1950-PS_)
Schirach’s guilt in this connection, by his own admission, however, runs
even deeper. In a statement to the so-called European Youth League in
Vienna in 1942, Schirach stated:
“Every Jew who exerts influence in Europe is a danger to
European culture. If anyone reproaches me with having driven
from this city, which was once the European metropolis of Jewry,
tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the ghetto
of the East, I feel myself compelled to reply: I see in this an
action contributing to European culture.” (_3048-PS_)
(4) _Conclusion._ Schirach bears responsibility for rendering
significant aid to the Nazi conspirators in each major phase of the
conspiracy; winning Nazi supporters before the seizure of power;
consolidating the Nazis’ control of Germany after the seizure of power;
preparing for aggressive wars; and conducting aggressive wars. From the
beginning he held important policy-making and administrative positions.
From 1931 to the Nazis’ downfall, he was one of the small group of Reich
Leaders (_Reichsleiter_) of the NSDAP who consorted together, directly
subordinate only to Hitler himself, and who provided the innermost
leaven of the Leadership Corps of the Party. For nearly a decade he was
fully in charge of perpetrating the Nazi regime by poisoning the minds
of the young generation. Although his principal assistance to the
conspiracy was given by his commission of German youth to the
conspirators’ objectives, still he also conspired to wage crimes against
humanity as a Party and governmental administrator of high standing
after the conspiracy had reached its inevitable involvement in war of
aggression.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO BALDUR VON SCHIRACH
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 65
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
1392-PS │Law on the Hitler Youth, 1 December │ │
│1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 993. │ III │ 972
│ │ │
*1458-PS │The Hitler Youth by Baldur von │ │
│Schirach, Leipzig, 1934. (USA 667) │ IV │ 22
│ │ │
1462-PS │First Execution Order to the Law of │ │
│the Hitler Youth, 25 March 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 709. │ IV │ 44
│ │ │
*1893-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of the│ │
│NSDAP, 1943 edition. (USA 323) │ IV │ 529
│ │ │
*1948-PS │Letter from Governor in Vienna, 7 │ │
│November 1940, evidencing RSHA │ │
│instructions to recruit Jews from │ │
│forced labor. (USA 680) │ IV │ 586
│ │ │
*1950-PS │Secret letter from Lammers to │ │
│defendant von Schirach, 3 December │ │
│1940, concerning deportation of Jews. │ │
│(USA 681) │ IV │ 592
│ │ │
*2229-PS │The Reich Youth Leader at Work, │ │
│published in National Socialist Party │ │
│Press Service Release, 22 June 1933, │ │
│pp. 2-3. (USA 668) │ IV │ 870
│ │ │
2260-PS │Settlement of Relationship between │ │
│NSDAP and Stahlhelm (Steel Helmets) │ │
│published in National Socialist Party │ │
│Press Service release, 21 June 1933. │ IV │ 933
│ │ │
2306-PS │Revolution of Education, by Baldur von│ │
│Schirach, 1938, pp. 51-52, 63. (USA │ │
│860) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
*2396-PS │Handbook of Collected Youth Laws, Vol.│ │
│I, Group 1, pp. 19a, 19b, 20. (USA │ │
│673) │ V │ 63
│ │ │
*2398-PS │Cooperation of Hitler Jugend with │ │
│Wehrmacht, 11 August 1939, published │ │
│in The Archive, No. 65, August 1939, │ │
│pp. 601-602. (USA 677) │ V │ 66
│ │ │
*2401-PS │The Hitler Youth as recruits for │ │
│future leaders, from Organization Book│ │
│of NSDAP, 1938, pp. 80-81. (USA 430) │ V │ 69
│ │ │
*2441-PS │Affidavit of Gregor Ziemer, 4 October │ │
│1945, from his book “Education for │ │
│Death”. (USA 679) │ V │ 141
│ │ │
*2454-PS │Quotations from speeches of Hitler, │ │
│published in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │
│Munich edition. (USA 676) │ V │ 196
│ │ │
*2567-PS │Decree signed by Himmler and von │ │
│Schirach, concerning cooperation of HJ│ │
│and SS, printed in The Young Germany, │ │
│Berlin, February 1939. (USA 674) │ V │ 301
│ │ │
*2653-PS │The Way of German Youth, from The │ │
│Third Reich, 5th Year, 1937, pp. │ │
│117-118. (USA 669) │ V │ 359
│ │ │
*2654-PS │Organization and Insignia of the │ │
│Hitler Youth, edited by Reich Youth │ │
│Headquarters of NSDAP. (USA 675) │ V │ 361
│ │ │
*2973-PS │Statement by von Schirach concerning │ │
│positions held. (USA 14) │ V │ 679
│ │ │
*3048-PS │Speech by von Schirach before European│ │
│Youth Congress in Vienna, published in│ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 15 September │ │
│1942. (USA 274) │ V │ 776
│ │ │
3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
3301-PS │Law concerning construction of │ │
│Administration in Austria, 14 April │ │
│1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 777. │ V │ 1093
│ │ │
*3302-PS │Affidavit of von Schirach, 4 December │ │
│1945, concerning positions held. (USA │ │
│665) │ V │ 1096
│ │ │
*3348-PS │Young Replacement Problems, published │ │
│in Decrees, Regulations, │ │
│Announcements, Vol. I, pp. 298-9, 303.│ │
│(USA 410) │ VI │ 79
│ │ │
*3349-PS │Press and propaganda Office of Hitler │ │
│Youth, published in Organization Book │ │
│of the NSDAP, 1936, pp. 452-453. (USA │ │
│666) │ VI │ 79
│ │ │
*3352-PS │Manpower, published in Decrees, │ │
│Regulations, Announcements, Vol. II, │ │
│pp. 507-513, 567. (USA 206) │ VI │ 81
│ │ │
*3459-PS │Article on Meeting of Reich Group of │ │
│Young Law Guardians on 19 May 1939, │ │
│from Congress of German Law, 1939. │ │
│(USA 670) │ VI │ 159
│ │ │
*3464-PS │National Socialist Students League │ │
│from Organization Book of NSDAP, 1936 │ │
│and 1937. (USA 666) │ VI │ 166
│ │ │
*3870-PS │Affidavit of Hans Marsalek, 8 April │ │
│1946, concerning Mauthausen │ │
│Concentration Camp and dying statement│ │
│of Franz Ziereis, the Commandant. (USA│ │
│797) │ VI │ 790
│ │ │
*L-360-H │Agreement between the League for │ │
│Germandom in Foreign Countries and the│ │
│Hitler Youth, 6 May 1933. (USA 671) │ VII │ 1108
│ │ │
R-146 │Letter from Bormann to all Gauleiters,│ │
│20 March 1941, enclosing letter of Dr.│ │
│Lammers to the Reich Minister of the │ │
│Interior, 14 March 1941. (USA 678) │ VIII │ 250
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party, (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
17. MARTIN BORMANN
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY BORMANN._
(1) _Between 1925 and 1945 Bormann held the following positions_:
(_a_) Member of the Nazi Party 1925-1945.
(_b_) Member of the Reichstag, November 1933-1945.
(_c_) Member of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the SA, 15 November
1928 to August 1930.
(_d_) Founder and head of _Hilfskasse der NSDAP_, August 1930 to July
1933.
(_e_) Reichsleiter, July 1933-1945.
(_f_) Chief of Staff, Office of the Fuehrer’s Deputy, July 1933 to May
1941.
(_g_) Head of the Party Chancery, 12 May 1941-1945.
(_h_) Secretary of the Fuehrer, 12 April 1943-1945. (_2981-PS_)
(_i_) Member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich,
29 May 1942-1945. (_2099-PS_)
(_j_) Political and organizational head of the Volkssturm. (_3018-PS_)
(_k_) General in the SS. (_3234-PS_)
(2) _During this period Bormann also held the following position_:
Member of the Reich Cabinet, 29 May 1941 to 1945. (_2099-PS_)
B. _PROMOTION OF THE ACCESSION TO POWER OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS,
ESTABLISHMENT OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL OVER GERMANY, AND PREPARATION FOR
WAR._
Within the conspiracy Martin Bormann had the managerial task of
operating the Nazis’ Party as a center of control for the benefit of the
conspirators. First as the executive chief of the Nazi Party under Hess,
and since 1941 himself the head of the Party, subject only to Hitler’s
supreme authority, Bormann was a key member of the Nazi conspiracy. The
Party constituted the most powerful instrument of public control at the
disposal of the conspirators. Through the Party the conspirators were
able to gain and retain power in Germany. Through it they imposed their
will on the German nation and obtained its support for their aggressive
wars. Bormann is thus responsible for the crimes committed by the Party
under the orders of the conspirators.
Bormann began his conspiratorial activities more than 20 years ago. In
1922, when only 22 years old, he joined the Organization Rossbach, one
of the armed illegal groups which developed the aggressive traditions of
the German Army and established a regime of terror against the small
pacifist minority in Germany. While he was District Leader of the
Organization for Mecklenburg, he was arrested and tried for his part in
a political terror assassination. On 15 May 1924 he was found guilty by
the State Tribunal for the Protection of the Republic and sentenced to
one year in prison. (_2981-PS_; _3355-PS_)
Upon his release from jail in 1925, Bormann again took up his subversive
activities. First, he joined the Militarist Organization Frontbann.
Then, in the same year, he became a member of the reconstituted Nazi
Party, and began his rise to one of the most influential positions in
the conspiracy. In 1927 he became Press Chief for the Party Gau of
Thuringia. On 1 April 1928 he was made a District Leader in Thuringia,
and Business Manager for the entire Gau.
From 15 November 1928 to August 1930 he was on the Staff of the Supreme
Command of the SA. Thus he participated decisively in the development of
these uniformed shock troops with which the conspirators terrorized and
destroyed their opposition inside Germany. (See Section 4 of chapter XV
on the SA.)
In August 1930 Bormann organized the Aid Fund (_Hilfskasse_) of the Nazi
Party, of which he became the head. Through this Fund he collected large
sums for the Party Treasury, allegedly for the purpose of aiding
families of Party members who had been killed or imprisoned while
“fighting” for the Party. (_3236-PS_)
On 30 January 1933 the conspirators and their Party took over the
government of Germany. Shortly thereafter, in July 1933, Bormann was
given the number-three post in the Party Organization, that of Chief of
Staff to Rudolf Hess, then Hitler’s Deputy. At the same time he was made
a member of the Party Directorate (_Reichsleiter_). In November 1933, he
was made a member of the Reichstag. (_3236-PS_)
As Hess’ Chief of Staff, Bormann was responsible for channeling to him
the demands of the Party in all the fields of government action. These
demands were then imposed by Hess, through his participation in Cabinet
meetings, on legislation, public administration, and appointments.
(_Chart Number 15_; _1395-PS_; _2001-PS_; _D-138_; _3180-PS_)
Bormann also used the Party in order to strengthen the hold of the
Gestapo and the SD over the German people. On 14 February 1935 Bormann
ordered all Party officers to assist the SD in its work described as
“benefiting principally the Party” (_3237-PS_). On 3 September 1935
Bormann ordered Party agencies to hand persons who criticize the Nazi
Party or institutions over to the Gestapo. (_3239-PS_) An order of the
Party Chancery issued on 14 December 1938, demanded closest cooperation
between Party agencies and Gestapo (_1723-PS_).
After the flight of Hess to Scotland on 10 May 1941, Bormann succeeded
him as head of the Party under Hitler, with the title of Chief of the
Party Chancery. In that position he took over all offices and powers
formerly held by Hess, especially his membership in the Cabinet and on
the Ministers’ Council for the Defense of the Reich (_2099-PS_).
Only 8 months later, Hitler issued another Decree which extended
Bormann’s powers even beyond those which had been granted to Hess. By
that Decree Bormann was given extensive control over the preparation of
all laws and directives of the Cabinet, the Fuehrer, and the Ministers’
Council for the Defense of the Reich, and over the appointment of all
public officials (the latter, in Germany, included Judges and university
teachers) (_2100-PS_). Under this legislation Bormann must be held at
least jointly responsible for every law and order issued after 24
January 1942 by which the conspirators carried out their crimes.
This decisive participation of Bormann and the Party agencies under his
direct control in the day-to-day administration of the German war
program was buttressed by the Order of the Ministers’ Council for the
Defense of the Reich, dated 1 December 1942, under which all Party Gau
Leaders were appointed Reich Defense Commissioners and all Gaus became
Reich Defense Districts (_3235-PS_). Under this Order the Gau leaders,
who were Party functionaries under the orders of Bormann, became the
Chief Administrators of the entire civilian war effort, not only in
Germany proper but also in all incorporated territories.
This development constituted the culmination of the integration of Party
and State which had begun almost ten years earlier. From then on, the
Party, through Bormann, became a decisive factor in the initiation and
execution of all German war policies, after having been charged in the
preceding years with much of the political and pre-military preparation
of the German people for the aggressive wars of the Conspirators.
(_3242-PS_)
C. _DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AND PERSECUTION OF OPPOSITION._
Bormann participated actively in the execution of that part of the
conspirators’ program relating to the persecution and destruction of
independent groups which were opposed to the aims of the Conspiracy.
(1) _Persecution of the Churches._ Bormann was among the most relentless
members of the conspirators in the persecution of the churches. In a
secret order of 6 June 1941 he stated bluntly the aim of the
conspirators—to destroy Christianity altogether:
“National Socialist and Christian concepts are irreconcilable *
* *. No human being would know anything of Christianity if it
had not been drilled into him in his childhood by pastors. The
so-called dear God in no wise gives knowledge of his existence
to young people in advance, but in an astonishing manner in
spite of his omnipotence leaves this to the efforts of the
pastors. If, therefore, in the future our youth learns nothing
more of this Christianity whose doctrines are far below ours,
Christianity will disappear by itself.” (_D-75_; see also
_098-PS_)
In pursuance of this aim, Bormann’s first efforts in the conspiracy’s
fight against religion were directed toward the elimination of churchmen
and church influence from the Party itself. On 3 July 1938 a Bormann
order prohibited clergymen from holding Party offices (_113-PS_). A
Bormann circular of 3 June 1939 excluded Christian Scientists from Party
membership (_838-PS_). Bormann Decrees of 9 February 1937 and 14 July
1939 excluded clergymen and theology students from membership in the
Nazi Party (_840-PS_). And a Bormann directive of 17 June 1938,
prohibited all religious activities by members of the Labor Service.
(_107-PS_)
Bormann also opposed religious instruction in the schools. A letter from
Bormann’s office to Rosenberg on 25 April 1941 reported success in
reducing the holding of religious morning services in schools and
proposed the substitution of National Socialist school services.
(_070-PS_)
In order further to weaken the churches, Bormann enforced the
elimination of numerous Catholic and Protestant Divinity Schools in
Germany and Austria. In a letter to The Minister of Education, dated 24
January 1939, Bormann denied the scientific value of theological
instruction and suggested a legal basis for the suppression and
restriction of Divinity Schools (_116-PS_). This was followed by a
report of The Ministry of Education, dated 6 April 1939, concerning the
suppression and consolidation of Divinity Schools (_122-PS_). A
confidential letter from Bormann to The Minister of Education, dated 23
June 1939, in reply to memorandum of 6 April 1939 (_122-PS_), reported
the Party’s decision to order the suppression of numerous Divinity
Schools (_123-PS_). In a letter to Rosenberg on 12 December 1939 Bormann
agreed with the suggestion that the University Chairs belonging to the
Divinity School in the University of Munich be used for instructors at
the Nazi Academy (_Hohe Schule_). (_131-PS_)
Bormann also used his power and position in order to demand that other
government departments deprive the churches of their property and
subject them to a discriminatory legal regime. A Bormann letter to The
Reich Minister of Finance in January 1940, demanded that church
assessments for special war tax be greatly increased (_099-PS_). In a
letter to Amann on 8 March 1940, Bormann demanded reduction in the paper
allotment of church publications (_089-PS_). A Bormann letter to
Rosenberg on 24 June 1940 submitted the draft of a discriminatory church
law for Danzig and West Prussia (_066-PS_). Throughout 1940-1941 Bormann
corresponded with numerous officials concerning confiscation of
religious art treasures. (_1600-PS_)
Finally, as the war took an increasing part of Germany’s youth into the
Armed Forces, Bormann insisted that soldiers be removed from all
religious influence. In a letter to the Army High Command in January
1939, Bormann opposed the establishment of an Army Corps of Chaplains
(_117-PS_). A Bormann letter to Rosenberg on 17 January 1940 suggested
the publication of special Nazi literature for members of the
_Wehrmacht_ in order to replace religious literature which the writer
had as yet been unable to suppress completely (_101-PS_). In a letter to
Rosenberg the next day (18 January 1940) Bormann stated that the
publication of Nazi literature for Army recruits as a countermeasure to
the circulation of religious writings was “the most essential demand of
the hour.” (_100-PS_)
When the prosecution of this anti-Church program was turned over to the
RSHA under Himmler, the “Church Specialists” of that organization
received clear instructions as to the aims which the Conspirators wanted
them to achieve, at a meeting of the “Church Specialists” called for
that purpose on 26 September 1941:
“The immediate aim: the church must not regain one inch of the
ground it has lost.
“The ultimate aim: destruction of the churches to be brought
about by the collection of all material obtained through
_Nachrichtendienst_ activities, which will, at a given time, be
produced as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities
during the German fight for existence.” (_1815-PS_)
Five years earlier, Bormann had already issued an order to all Party
members demanding that they turn priests who criticized the Party over
to the Gestapo (_3246-PS_). Bormann thus bears responsibility for the
mistreatment of priests in concentration camps throughout these years.
(_3249-PS_)
(2) _Persecution of the Jews._ It was Bormann who was charged by Hitler
with the transmission and implementation of the latter’s instructions
for the “liquidation” of the Jewish population in Germany.
After the pogrom of 8-9 November 1938, Bormann, acting on orders of
Hitler, instructed Goering to proceed to the “final settlement of the
Jewish question” in Germany. (_1816-PS_)
As a result of this conference a series of anti-Jewish decrees were
issued. A Bormann order of 17 January 1939 demanded compliance with new
regulations under which Jews were denied access to housing, travel, and
other facilities. (_069-PS_; see _1409-PS_)
Bormann also acted through other government agencies to wipe out the
economic existence of a large part of the Jewish population. A Bormann
order of 8 January 1937 communicated an order by Frick, issued at his
instigation, that government employees who consult Jewish doctors,
lawyers, etc., will be denied financial assistance. (_3240-PS_)
In addition to these purely economic measures Bormann, again acting on
instructions from Hitler, caused Goering to issue a secret order
severely restricting the living conditions of Jews in Germany.
(_841-PS_)
After the outbreak of the war these anti-Jewish measures increased in
intensity and brutality. Thus, Bormann participated in the issuance of
rulings under which 60,000 Jewish inhabitants of Vienna were deported to
the Government General of Poland, in cooperation with the SS and the
Gestapo. (_1950-PS_)
After Bormann succeeded Hess as the executive head of the Party, he was
one of the prime movers in the campaign of total spoliation, starvation,
and extermination of the Jews living under the rule of the Conspirators.
A Bormann order of 23 October 1942 announced a Ministry of Foods decree,
issued at his instigation, depriving Jews of many essential food items,
and of all special sickness and pregnancy rations, and ordering the
confiscation of food parcels (_3243-PS_). On 9 October 1942 Bormann
ordered that the problem of eliminating forever the millions of Jews
from Greater German territory could no longer be solved by emigration
but only by the application of “ruthless force” in special camps in the
East (_3244-PS_). The Thirteenth Ordinance under The Reich Citizen Law
of 1 July 1943 (RGBl, 1943, Part I, p. 372), signed by Bormann,
completely excluded Jews from the ordinary courts and handed them over
to the exclusive jurisdiction of Himmler’s police. (_1422-PS_; see also
_3085-PS_)
D. _THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES._
Bormann’s broad powers over all political aspects of the war as a member
of the Reich Cabinet and the Ministers’ Council for the Defense of the
Reich, and as executive head of the Party, were buttressed by the
creation of the post of Secretary of the Fuehrer, to which he was
appointed on 12 April 1943 (_2981-PS_). In that position Bormann
participated in all Hitler’s conferences and became involved in the
planning of war crimes by his co-conspirators.
Even before April 1943, however, Bormann took part in planning the basic
war policies of the conspiracy. Thus, on 16 July 1941, just three weeks
after the invasion of USSR Territory, Bormann participated in a
conference at Hitler’s field headquarters with Goering, Rosenberg,
Keitel, and Reich Minister Lammers. This conference resulted in the
adoption of detailed plans for the enslavement, depopulation, and
annexation of extensive territories in Russia and other countries of
Eastern Europe. In his report on this conference, Bormann included
numerous suggestions of his own for the effective execution of these
plans. (_L-221_)
During subsequent years, Bormann took a prominent part in the
implementation of this conspiratorial program. A conference on Eastern
Territories between Hitler, Rosenberg, Lammers, and Bormann on 8 May
1942, concerned _inter alia_ the suppression of religious freedom, the
forceable resettlement of Dutch peasants in Latvia, the extermination
program in Russia, and the economic exploitation of Eastern Territories
(_1520-PS_). Rosenberg and Bormann corresponded concerning the
confiscation of property, especially art treasures, in the East
(_072-PS_; _071-PS_). A secret Bormann letter of 11 January 1944
discussed large-scale organization for the withdrawal of commodities
from occupied territories for the use of the bombed-out population in
Germany. (_061-PS_; see also _327-PS_)
At the same time, Bormann issued a series of orders establishing Party
jurisdiction over the treatment of prisoners of war, especially when
employed as forced labor (_232-PS_). In the exercise of that
jurisdiction, he called for excessively harsh and brutal treatment of
Allied Prisoners of War. Bormann issued instructions on 5 November 1941
prohibiting decent burials with religious ceremonies for Russian
Prisoners of War (_D-163_). A Bormann circular of 25 November 1943
demanded harsher treatment of prisoners of war and the fuller
utilization of their man-power (_228-PS_). In a secret circular
transmitting OKH instructions of 29 January 1943, Bormann provided for
the enforcement of labor demands on Prisoners of War through the use of
fire-arms and corporal punishment. (_656-PS_)
These instructions issued by Bormann culminated in the decree of
September 30 1944, signed by him. This decree took jurisdiction over all
prisoners of war out of the hands of the OKW, handed them over to the
control of Himmler, and provided that all prisoner of war camp
commanders should be under the orders of the local SS Commanders
(_058-PS_). Through this order, Himmler was enabled to proceed with his
program of extermination of Prisoners of War. Bormann also bears part of
the responsibility for the organized lynching of Allied airmen. As early
as March 1940 Hess had ordered all Party leaders to instruct the
civilian population to “arrest or liquidate” all bailed-out allied
fliers (_062-PS_). In order to assure the success of this scheme Bormann
issued a secret circular prohibiting any police measures or criminal
proceedings against civilians who had lynched British or American fliers
(_057-PS_). For the execution of these decrees, regulations were issued
to cover the systematic application of Lynch Law against captured Allied
airmen (_735-PS_). That such lynchings actually took place has since
been fully established in a series of American Military Commission
proceedings, which resulted in the conviction of German civilians for
the murder of Allied fliers. (_2559-PS_; _2560-PS_; _2561-PS_)
E. _THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY._
Bormann played an important role in the administration of the forced
labor program. A Bormann circular of 5 May 1943 contained detailed
directions as to the treatment of foreign workers, stating especially
that they were subject to SS control for all security matters and that
differentiation between them and Germans was all-important (_205-PS_).
At a conference held on 4 September 1942 it was decided that recruiting,
mobilization, and treatment of 500,000 female domestic workers from the
East would be handled exclusively by Sauckel, Himmler, and Bormann.
(_025-PS_; see also _D-226_)
Bormann also imposed his views on the administration of the occupied
areas and insisted on the ruthless exploitation of the subjected
populations in the East. His views were stated in an official memorandum
of the Ministry for the Eastern Territories, headed by Rosenberg, in
which they were described as governing actual administrative practice in
the East:
“The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we don’t need them,
they may die. Therefore compulsory vaccination and German health
services are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is
undesirable. They may use contraceptives or practice abortion,
the more the better. Education is dangerous. It is enough if
they can count up to 100. At best an education which produces
useful stooges for us is admissible. Every educated person is a
future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion.
As for food they won’t get any more than is necessary. We are
the masters, we come first.” (_R-36_)
A secret conference on 12 January 1943 discussed Bormann’s order of 12
August 1942 under which all Party agencies were placed at Himmler’s
disposal for the latter’s program of forced resettlement and
denationalization of occupied populations (_705-PS_). Correspondence
from the Office of the Fuehrer’s Deputy reveals Bormann’s demands that
non-German populations of occupied territories be subjected to a special
discriminatory legal regime (_R-139_). An agreement between Thierack and
Himmler was made at Bormann’s suggestion, under which all Eastern
populations are subjected to brutal police regime, and under which all
disputes between the parties to the agreement are to be settled by
Bormann. (_654-PS_)
In issuing these orders Bormann took a large part in the conspiracy to
exterminate millions of people in the Eastern occupied areas.
F. _CONCLUSION._
Martin Bormann, only 45 years old at the time of Germany’s defeat,
devoted his entire adult life to the Nazi conspiracy. When he joined the
Nazi Party at the age of 25 he had already been active for several years
in conspiratorial and terroristic organizations working secretly to
prepare Germany for war, and had spent one year in jail for his
participation in a political murder.
Bormann’s important contribution to the conspiracy remained throughout
in the sphere of the Nazi Party. First, as Chief of Staff to Hess, the
Fuehrer’s Deputy, then as Head of the Party Chancery, he managed the
entire organization of the Party in the service of the conspiracy. He
was responsible for channelling the Party’s demands concerning
legislation, education, civil service, and all other fields of public
and private life to Hess, who was a member of the Reich Cabinet, which
was then Germany’s legislative, administrative, and judicial organ.
Thus, Bormann advanced the Party’s conspiratorial program through the
control of his co-conspirators over the German government machinery. He
used this power for various criminal purposes, among them the
persecution of the independent churches, demanding their complete
elimination from German life on the ground that Christianity and
National Socialism were irreconcilable.
After having acceded in 1941 to the highest position in the Nazi Party,
directly under Hitler, Bormann exercised the broadest influence in the
direction of Germany’s aggressive wars. Here he acted in two capacities:
(1) As executive head of the Party he commanded the Party Gauleaders
who, as District Defense Commissioners, controlled all civilian and
political war activities in German and the annexed territories. In that
position he became responsible for the multiple war crimes committed by
the German civilian population, especially the lynching of allied flying
personnel, and the cruel mistreatment of forced laborers.
(2) As Secretary to the Fuehrer, Bormann took an active part in the
policy-making conferences and discussions of Hitler and his political
and military staffs. Here, Bormann became jointly responsible for the
illegal annexation of Allied territories, the enslavement and spoliation
of the civilian population in occupied countries, and the planned
persecution and extermination of the populations in Eastern territories
especially the Jews.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO MARTIN BORMANN
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 60
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*025-PS │Conference report of 4 September 1942 │ │
│concerning the importation of domestic│ │
│workers from the East into the Reich. │ │
│(USA 698) │ III │ 67
│ │ │
057-PS │Circular letter from Bormann to │ │
│Political Leaders, 30 May 1944, │ │
│concerning justice exercised by people│ │
│against Anglo-American murderers. (USA│ │
│329) │ III │ 102
│ │ │
*058-PS │Hitler Order of 30 September 1944 │ │
│concerning reorganization of the │ │
│concerns of prisoners of war. (USA │ │
│456) │ III │ 103
│ │ │
*061-PS │Secret Bormann letter, 11 January │ │
│1944, concerning large-scale │ │
│organization for withdrawal of │ │
│commodities from occupied territories │ │
│for use of bombed-out population in │ │
│Germany. (USA 692) │ III │ 105
│ │ │
*062-PS │Top secret Hess directive of 13 March │ │
│1940, concerning behavior in case of │ │
│landings of enemy planes or │ │
│parachutists. (USA 696) │ III │ 107
│ │ │
*066-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 24 June │ │
│1940, submitting draft for │ │
│discriminatory church law for Danzig │ │
│and West Prussia. (USA 689) │ III │ 112
│ │ │
*069-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 │ │
│January 1939, enclosing order of 28 │ │
│December 1938, concerning decisions on│ │
│Jewish question. (USA 589) │ III │ 116
│ │ │
*070-PS │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,│ │
│25 April 1941, on substitution of │ │
│National Socialist mottos for morning │ │
│prayers in schools. (USA 349) │ III │ 118
│ │ │
*071-PS │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April │ │
│1941, replying to Bormann’s letter of │ │
│19 April 1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA │ │
│371) │ III │ 119
│ │ │
*072-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 19 April │ │
│1941, concerning confiscation of │ │
│property, especially of art treasures │ │
│in the East. (USA 357) │ III │ 122
│ │ │
089-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8 │ │
│March 1940, instructing Amann not to │ │
│issue further newsprint to │ │
│confessional newspapers. (USA 360) │ III │ 147
│ │ │
*098-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22 │ │
│February 1940, urging creation of │ │
│National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │ │
│provide moral foundation for NS │ │
│religion. (USA 350) │ III │ 152
│ │ │
*099-PS │Bormann letter to Reich Minister of │ │
│Finance, January 1940, demanding that │ │
│church assessments for the special war│ │
│tax be greatly increased. (USA 688) │ III │ 158
│ │ │
*100-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 18 │ │
│January 1940, urging preparation of │ │
│National Socialist reading material to│ │
│replace Christian literature for │ │
│soldiers. (USA 691) │ III │ 160
│ │ │
*101-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,│ │
│concerning undesirability of religious│ │
│literature for members of the │ │
│Wehrmacht. (USA 361) │ III │ 160
│ │ │
*107-PS │Circular letter signed Bormann, 17 │ │
│June 1938, enclosing directions │ │
│prohibiting participation of │ │
│Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious │ │
│celebrations. (USA 351) │ III │ 162
│ │ │
*113-PS │Secret Order issued by Hess’ Office │ │
│signed Bormann, 27 July 1938, making │ │
│clergymen ineligible for Party │ │
│offices. (USA 683) │ III │ 164
│ │ │
*116-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, │ │
│enclosing copy of letter, 24 January │ │
│1939, to Minister of Education │ │
│requesting restriction or elimination │ │
│of theological faculties. (USA 685) │ III │ 165
│ │ │
117-PS │Bormann letter to Army High Command, │ │
│28 January 1939, opposing the │ │
│establishment of an Army Corps of │ │
│Chaplains. │ III │ 167
│ │ │
*122-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 17 │ │
│April 1939, enclosing copy of Minister│ │
│of Education letter, 6 April 1939, on │ │
│elimination of theological faculties │ │
│in various universities. (USA 362) │ III │ 173
│ │ │
*123-PS │Confidential letter from Bormann to │ │
│Minister of Education, 23 June 1939, │ │
│in reply to memorandum of 6 April 1939│ │
│(122-PS) reporting the Party’s │ │
│decision to order the suppression of │ │
│numerous Divinity Schools. (USA 686) │ III │ 175
│ │ │
*131-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 12 │ │
│December 1939, agreeing with │ │
│suggestion that the University Chairs │ │
│belonging to the Divinity School in │ │
│the University of Munich be used for │ │
│instructors at the Nazi Academy (Hohe │ │
│Schule). (USA 687) │ III │ 184
│ │ │
205-PS │Bormann Circular, 5 May 1943, │ │
│containing detailed directions as to │ │
│the treatment of foreign workers │ │
│employed within the Reich. │ III │ 218
│ │ │
*228-PS │Bormann Circular, 25 November 1943, │ │
│demanding harsher treatment of │ │
│Prisoners of War and the fuller │ │
│utilization of their manpower. (USA │ │
│695) │ III │ 225
│ │ │
*232-PS │Bormann Order of 13 September 1944 │ │
│establishing Party jurisdiction over │ │
│the use of Prisoners of War for forced│ │
│labor. (USA 693) │ III │ 229
│ │ │
327-PS │Letter of Rosenberg to Bormann, 17 │ │
│October 1944, concerning liquidation │ │
│of property in Eastern Occupied │ │
│Territories. (USA 338) │ III │ 257
│ │ │
*654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, │ │
│on discussion with Himmler concerning │ │
│delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │
│extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467
│ │ │
*656-PS │Letter, undated, from Bormann to │ │
│Political leaders, enclosing Order of │ │
│Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, 29 │ │
│January 1943, relating to self-defense│ │
│against prisoners of war. (USA 339) │ III │ 470
│ │ │
705-PS │Secret conference, 12 January 1943, of│ │
│the SS-Committee for General Labor in │ │
│the German Zone. │ III │ 511
│ │ │
*735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │
│fix the cases in which the application│ │
│of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │
│would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533
│ │ │
*838-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann, 3 June 1939, referring to │ │
│Hitler’s Decree of 6 March 1939 which │ │
│precluded Christian Scientists from │ │
│joining the Party. (USA 684) │ III │ 605
│ │ │
*840-PS │Party Directive, 14 July 1939, making │ │
│clergy and theology students │ │
│ineligible for Party membership. (USA │ │
│355) │ III │ 606
│ │ │
841-PS │Secret Order of Goering, 28 December │ │
│1938, concerning Jewish problem. │ III │ 606
│ │ │
1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
1409-PS │Order concerning utilization of Jewish│ │
│property, 3 December 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1709. │ IV │ 1
│ │ │
1422-PS │Thirteenth regulation under Reich │ │
│Citizenship Law, 1 July 1943. 1943 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 372. │ IV │ 14
│ │ │
*1520-PS │Memorandum of conference, 8 May 1942 │ │
│between Hitler, Rosenberg, Lammers, │ │
│Bormann. (GB 156) │ IV │ 65
│ │ │
*1600-PS │Bormann correspondence, 1940-1941, │ │
│concerning confiscation of religious │ │
│art treasures. (USA 690) │ IV │ 128
│ │ │
*1723-PS │Order concerning cooperation of Party │ │
│offices with the Secret State Police, │ │
│25 January 1938, published in Decrees,│ │
│Regulations, Announcements, 1937, Vol.│ │
│II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206) │ IV │ 219
│ │ │
*1815-PS │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning │ │
│the study and treatment of church │ │
│politics. (USA 510) │ IV │ 415
│ │ │
*1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │
│The Jewish Question, under the │ │
│Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, │ │
│12 November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425
│ │ │
*1950-PS │Secret letter from Lammers to │ │
│defendant von Schirach, 3 December │ │
│1940, concerning deportation of Jews. │ │
│(USA 681) │ IV │ 592
│ │ │
2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │
│and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638
│ │ │
2099-PS │Fuehrer decree relating to Chief of │ │
│Party Chancellery of 29 May 1941. 1941│ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 295. │ IV │ 725
│ │ │
2100-PS │Decree on position of leader of Party │ │
│Chancellery, 24 January 1942. 1942 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 35. │ IV │ 726
│ │ │
2559-PS │Military Commission Order No. 2, │ │
│Headquarters Fifteenth U. S. Army, 25 │ │
│June 1945, concerning trial of German │ │
│civilian by U. S. Military Commission.│ V │ 294
│ │ │
2560-PS │Military Commission Order No. 5, │ │
│Headquarters Third U. S. Army and │ │
│Eastern Military District, 18 October │ │
│1945, concerning trial of German │ │
│national by U. S. Military Commission.│ V │ 296
│ │ │
2561-PS │Military Commission Order No. 3, │ │
│Headquarters Third U. S. Army, 4 │ │
│October 1945, concerning trial of four│ │
│German nationals by U. S. Military │ │
│Commission. │ V │ 298
│ │ │
2981-PS │Biographical information on Martin │ │
│Bormann, published in The Greater │ │
│German Reichstag, 1943, p. 167. │ V │ 686
│ │ │
3018-PS │Hitler decree of 18 October 1944 in │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, South German │ │
│Edition, 20 October 1944, p. 1. │ V │ 736
│ │ │
3085-PS │Himmler’s ordinance of 3 July 1943 │ │
│charging Gestapo with execution of │ │
│Thirteenth Ordinance under Reich │ │
│Citizen Law. 1943 Ministerial Gazette │ │
│of Reich and Prussian Ministry of │ │
│Interior, p. 1085. │ V │ 892
│ │ │
3180-PS │Decree providing for the participation│ │
│of the Fuehrer’s Deputy in appointment│ │
│of officials, 24 September 1935. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1203. │ V │ 918
│ │ │
3234-PS │Promotions in the SS, published in The│ │
│Archive, July 1940, p. 399. │ V │ 938
│ │ │
3235-PS │Every Party Region Becomes a Reich │ │
│Defense District, from The Archive, │ │
│December 1942, p. 805. │ V │ 938
│ │ │
3236-PS │Biographical material on Martin │ │
│Bormann, published in The German │ │
│Reichstag, 1936, p. 113. │ V │ 939
│ │ │
3237-PS │Bormann Order of 14 February 1935, │ │
│demanding that all Party officers │ │
│assist the SD in its work, published │ │
│in Decrees of the Deputy of the │ │
│Fuehrer. │ V │ 939
│ │ │
3239-PS │Bormann Order of 3 September 1935 │ │
│calling on Party agencies to hand │ │
│persons who criticize the Nazi Party │ │
│or institutions over to Gestapo, │ │
│published in Decrees of the Deputy of │ │
│the Fuehrer. │ V │ 940
│ │ │
3240-PS │Bormann Order of 8 January 1937 │ │
│concerning refusal of financial │ │
│assistance to patients who consult │ │
│Jewish Doctors, published in Decrees │ │
│of the Fuehrer’s Deputy. │ V │ 941
│ │ │
3242-PS │The Reich Offices of the NSDAP, │ │
│published in National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1944, pp. 181-182. │ V │ 941
│ │ │
3243-PS │Food Supply of the Jews, published in │ │
│Decrees, Orders, Announcements, Vol. │ │
│II, pp. 147-150. │ V │ 944
│ │ │
3244-PS │Preparatory Measures for the Solution │ │
│of the Jewish Problem in Europe, │ │
│published in Decrees, Regulations, │ │
│Announcements, Vol. 2, pp. 131-132. │ V │ 945
│ │ │
3246-PS │Bormann Order of 7 January 1936, │ │
│published in Decrees of the Deputy of │ │
│the Fuehrer. │ V │ 948
│ │ │
*3249-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Franz Blaha, 24 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 663) │ V │ 949
│ │ │
*3355-PS │Affidavit of Robert M. W. Kempner, 8 │ │
│December 1945. (USA 682) │ VI │ 85
│ │ │
3569-PS │Private will and testament and │ │
│political will of Adolf Hitler, 29 │ │
│April 1945. │ VI │ 258
│ │ │
3734-PS │Summary of Interrogation of Hanna │ │
│Reitsch, 8 October 1945. │ VI │ 551
│ │ │
3735-PS │Testimony of Erich Kempka on the last │ │
│days of Hitler. │ VI │ 571
│ │ │
*D-75 │SD Inspector Bierkamp’s letter, 12 │ │
│December 1941, to RSHA enclosing copy │ │
│of secret decree signed by Bormann, │ │
│entitled Relationship of National │ │
│Socialism and Christianity. (USA 348) │ VI │ 1035
│ │ │
*D-138 │Decree of 27 July 1934, providing for │ │
│participation of Fuehrer’s deputy in │ │
│the drafting of all legislation. (USA │ │
│403) │ VI │ 1055
│ │ │
*D-163 │Bormann instructions, 5 November 1941,│ │
│prohibiting burials with religious │ │
│ceremonies for Russian Prisoners of │ │
│War. (USA 694) │ VI │ 1067
│ │ │
*D-226 │Speer circular of 10 November 1944, │ │
│distributing Himmler’s decree for │ │
│ensuring the discipline and output of │ │
│foreign workers. (USA 697) │ VI │ 1088
│ │ │
*D-753-A │Letter from Lammers to Bormann, 1 │ │
│January 1945. (GB 323) │ VII │ 214
│ │ │
D-753-B │Letter from Bormann to Lammers, 5 │ │
│January 1945. (GB 323) │ VII │ 219
│ │ │
*L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the │ │
│Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a │ │
│lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 │ │
│November 1943 at Munich to Reich and │ │
│Gauleiters. (USA 34) │ VII │ 920
│ │ │
*L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 │ │
│July 1941, concerning treatment of │ │
│Eastern populations and territories. │ │
│(USA 317) │ VII │ 1086
│ │ │
*R-36 │Memorandum to Rosenberg, 19 August │ │
│1942, concerning Bormann letter of 23 │ │
│July 1942, prepared by an official in │ │
│the Rosenberg Ministry. (USA 699) │ VIII │ 52
│ │ │
R-139 │Correspondence between Hess’ office │ │
│and the Ministry of Justice concerning│ │
│civil law in Eastern Territories. │ VIII │ 209
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
18. FRANZ VON PAPEN
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY VON PAPEN._
(1) _Awarded the Golden Party Badge by Hitler, thereby becoming member
of NSDAP_ (_2902-PS_; _Das Archiv_ vol. 48, p. 1614).
(2) _Member of Reichstag_, 1933-1945 (_2902-PS_).
(3) _Reich Chancellor, 1 June 1932 to 2 December 1932, acting pro-tem
between 17 November and 2 December_ (_2902-PS_).
(4) _Vice Chancellor, 30 January 1933 to August 1934_ (?) (Papen admits
holding office only to 30 June 1934; he also admits that decrees
published on 1 and 2 August 1934 carry his signature as Vice-Chancellor,
but claims this was either mistake or forgery) (_2902-PS_).
(5) _Special Plenipotentiary for the Saar_ (13 November 1933 to 30 June
1934) (_2902-PS_).
(6) _Negotiator of Concordat with Vatican_ (concluded 20 July 1933)
(_2655-PS_).
(7) _German Ambassador at Vienna (26 July 1934 to 4 February 1938),
continuing thereafter to arrange Berchtesgaden meeting between Hitler
and Schuschnigg and to participate in meeting itself_ (_2902-PS_).
B. _AS EX-REICH CHANCELLOR AND PROMINENT POLITICAL LEADER, VON PAPEN
USED HIS PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO PROMOTE THE ACCESSION OF THE NAZIS TO
POWER._
(1) _When von Papen began these efforts he was well aware of the Nazi
program and Nazi methods._ The official NSDAP program was open and
notorious. For many years it had been published and republished in the
Yearbook of the NSDAP and elsewhere. The Nazis made no secret of their
intention to make it the fundamental law of the State. The first three
points of this program forecast a foreign policy predicated upon the
absorption of “Germanic” populations outside the boundaries of the
Reich, the abrogation of Versailles treaty limitations, and the
acquisition of “_Lebensraum_.” Points 4 to 8 foretold the ruthless
elimination of the Jews, and the 25th point demanded “unlimited
authority” of the central regime over the entire Reich as a means “for
the execution of all this” (_1708-PS_).
Hitler and the other leaders of the Party repeatedly reiterated these
views before 1933. Hitler himself subsequently pointed out that there
was no excuse for misinterpreting Nazi intentions:
“When I came to power in 1933, our path lay unmistakably before
us. Our internal policy had been, exactly defined by our
fifteen-year-old struggle. Our program, repeated a thousand
times, obligated us to the German people. I should be a man
without honor, worthy of being stoned, had I retracted a single
step of the program I then enunciated * * *”
* * * * * *
“My foreign policy had identical aims. My program was to abolish
the Treaty of Versailles. It is futile nonsense for the rest of
the world to pretend today that I did not reveal this program
until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. Instead of listening to the foolish
chatter of emigres, these gentlemen would have been wiser to
read what I have written thousands of times.” (_2541-PS_)
Hitler and other Nazi leaders repeatedly made clear their willingness to
use force if necessary to achieve their purposes. They glorified war.
_Mein Kampf_ is replete with early evidence of such intentions, which
subsequently were reaffirmed from time to time in the years preceding
1933 (_D-660_; _2771-PS_; _2512-PS_).
The Nazi leaders prior to 1933 had openly declared their intentions to
subvert democratic processes as a means to achieve their purposes, and
to this end to harass and embarrass democratic forces at every turn.
Thus Hitler himself had declared that,
“We shall become members of all constitutional bodies, and in
this manner make the Party the decisive factor. Of course, when
we possess all constitutional rights we shall then mould the
State into the form we consider to be the right one.”
(_2512-PS_)
Frick, writing in the National Socialist Yearbook, declared:
“Our participation in the parliament does not indicate a
support, but rather an undermining of the parliamentarian
system. It does not indicate that we renounce our
anti-parliamentarian attitude, but that we are fighting the
enemy with his own weapons and that we are fighting for our
National Socialist goal from the parliamentary platform.”
(_2742-PS_)
The practical application of these purposes was thus subsequently
described by a leading Nazi constitutional authority, Ernst Rudolf
Huber:
“It was necessary above all to make formal use of the
possibilities of the party-state system but to refuse real
cooperation and thereby to render the parliamentary system,
which is by nature dependent upon the responsible cooperation of
the opposition, incapable of action.” (_2633-PS_).
This practical application of Nazi purposes and methods was manifest at
the time von Papen was a member of the Reichstag and Vice Chancellor. By
this time the Nazi members of the Reichstag were engaging in tactics of
disturbance which finally culminated in physical attacks upon members of
the Reichstag and upon visitors, and were using terroristic measures to
assure their election (_L-83_).
Von Papen not only had the opportunity to observe early manifestations
of Nazi violence and irresponsibility. He fully understood the true
character of the Nazi menace before 1933 and publicly condemned it.
At the time of the German elections in the summer of 1932, von Papen,
President Hindenburg, and certain other German leaders were hoping that
the rising Nazi menace would be dissipated by providing for National
Socialist participation in a rightist-centrist government. Hitler
refused all overtures inviting such participation, even when suggested
by President Hindenburg himself, insisting upon assuming the
chancellorship without obligation to other parties. Hitler’s refusal at
this time to collaborate with Hindenburg and Papen marked the beginning
of a series of public declarations in which von Papen revealed a clear
understanding of Nazi methods and objections. Thus, on the occasion of
his Munster speech of 28 August 1932 von Papen declared:
“The licentiousness emanating from the appeal of the leader of
the National Socialist Movement does not comply very well with
his claims to governmental power.”
* * * * * *
“I do not concede him the right to regard the mere minority
following his banner solely as the German nation, and to treat
all our fellow countrymen as ‘free game’.”
* * * * * *
“I am advocating the constitutional state, the community of the
people, law and order in government. In doing so, it is I, and
not he, who is carrying on the struggle against the domination
of parties, against arbitrarianism and injustice, a struggle
which millions of his supporters had been wholeheartedly longing
for years to fight.”
* * * * * *
“I am firmly determined to stamp out the smouldering flame of
civil war, to put an end to political unrest and political
violence, which today is still such a great obstacle to the
positive work representing the sole task of the State.”
(_3314-PS_)
Writing in the September 1932 issue of the periodical “_Volk und
Reich_,” von Papen declared:
“The present situation clearly shows that party domination and
State leadership are concepts incompatible with one another. It
is conceivable theoretically that a party might gain the
majority in parliament and claims the government (State
leadership) for itself. The NSDAP has proclaimed this
theoretical possibility as its practical goal and has come very
close to attaining it. It is to be hoped that the leaders of
this movement will place the nation above the party and will
thus lend a visible expression to the faith of millions looking
for a way out of the spiritual and material distress of the
nation provided also by the leadership of the State.”
* * * * * *
“* * * The hope in the hearts of millions of national socialists
can be fulfilled only by an authoritarian government. The
problem of forming a cabinet on the basis of a parliamentary
coalition has again been brought into the field of public
political discussion. If such negotiations, in the face of
growing distress, are conducted with the motif of destroying the
political opponent by the failure of his governmental activity,
this is a dangerous game against which one cannot warn enough.
In the last analysis such plans can mean nothing else but a
tactics which counts on the possibility that matters get worse
for the people and that the faith of millions will turn into the
bitterest disappointment, if these tactics only result in the
destruction of the political adversary. It is within the nature
of such party-tactical maneuvers that they are veiled and will
be disclaimed in public. That, however, cannot prevent me from
warning publicly against such plans, about which it may be
undecided who is the betrayer and who the betrayed one; plans,
though, which will certainly cheat the German people out of
their hope for improvement of their situation. Nothing can prove
more urgently the necessity for an authoritarian government than
such a prospect of maneuvers of a tactical game by the parties.”
(Papen article quoted in “Frankfurter Zeitung”, 2 Sept. 1932, p.
2).
In his Munich speech on 13 October 1932 von Papen was especially clear:
“The essence of conservative ideology is its being anchored in
the divine order of things. That too is its fundamental
difference compared with the doctrine advocated by the NSDAP.
The principle of ‘exclusiveness’ of a political ‘everything or
nothing’ which the latter adheres to, its mythical
Messiah-belief in the bombastic Fuehrer who alone is destined to
direct fate, gives it the character of a political sect. And
therein I see the unbridgeable cleavage between a conservative
policy born of faith and a national-socialist creed as a matter
of politics. It seems to me that today names and individuals are
unimportant when Germany’s final fate is at stake. What the
nation demands is this: it expects of a movement which has
written upon its banner the internal and external national
freedom that it will act, at all times and under all
circumstances, as if it were the spiritual, social and political
conscience of the nation. If it does not act that way; if this
movement follows merely tactical points of view,
democratic-parliamentarian points of view, if it engages in the
soliciting of mass support using demagogic agitation and means
of proletarian class struggle—then it is not a movement any
more, it has become a political party.
“And, indeed, the Reich was almost destroyed by the political
parties. One simply cannot, on one side, despise mercilessly
masses and majorities, as Herr Hitler is doing, and on the other
hand surrender to parliamentarian democracy; surrender to the
extent of adopting resolutions against one’s own government
together with Bolshevists.”
* * * * * *
“In the interest of the entire nation we decline the claim to
power by parties which want to own their followers body and
soul, and which want to put themselves, as a party or a
movement, over and above the whole nation.” (_3317-PS_)
In a series of interviews and speeches in the fall of 1932 von Papen
castigated the Nazi party for its ambitions to achieve a total and
centralized control of Germany. He contrasted its objectives and methods
to his own “conservatism” and emphasized its incompatibility with the
preservation of the “federalistic” type of government to which he was
committed. His public pronouncements in this connection were clearly
reflected in the contemporary press:
“Von Papen claimed that it had been his aim from the very
beginning of his tenure in office to build a new Reich for and
with the various states [_Laender_]. The Reich government is
taking a definite federalist attitude. Its slogan is not a
dreary centralism or unitarianism.”
* * * * * *
“Wherever one did hear von Papen express himself in public, one
did hear a chancellor who took special care to be regarded as an
unconditional federalist.” (_3318-PS_)
The Vice Chancellor’s campaign against the Nazis culminated finally in a
radio speech to the German public on 4 November 1932, in which he
severely criticized Nazi political methods. He damned the Nazis’ “pure
party egoism” which resulted in methods described by him as “sabotage”
and as “a crime against the nation.” He accused the Nazis of wanting
complete and permanent power in Germany (_Deutsche Reichsgeshichte in
Dokumenten IV_, p. 523 (Rundfunkrede des Reichkanzlers von Papen)).
Nor was von Papen content merely to make speeches against the Nazis. As
late as November 1932, Papen was prepared to use all the forces at the
command of the state in a supreme effort to suppress the rising Nazi
menace. He was deterred from this purpose only by a failure to secure
the support of his cabinet. The inner struggles of the German cabinet at
this time are recounted by Otto Meissner (in a statement made at
Nurnberg, 28 November 1945), Chief of the Chancery of Reichspresident
Hindenburg.
“Papen’s reappointment as Chancellor by President Hindenburg
would have been probable if he had been prepared to take up an
open fight against the National Socialists, which would have
involved the threat or use of force. Almost up to the time of
his resignation, Papen and some of the other ministers agreed on
the necessity for pressing the fight against the Nazis by
employing all the resources of the State and relying on Article
48 of the Constitution, even if this might lead to armed
conflict. Other ministers, however, believed that such a course
would lead to civil war.
“The decision was provided by Schleicher, who in earlier times
had recommended energetic action against the National
Socialists—even if this meant the use of police and army. Now,
in the decisive cabinet meeting, he abandoned this idea and
declared himself for an understanding with Hitler.
“The gist of Schleicher’s report—which was given partly by
himself, partly by Major Ott, who adduced detailed statistical
material—was that the weakened Reichswehr, which was dispersed
over the whole Reich, even if supported by civilian volunteer
formations, would not be equal to military operations on a large
scale, and was not suited and trained for civil war. The police,
in particular the Prussian police, had been undermined by
propaganda and could not be considered as absolutely reliable.
If the Nazis began an armed revolt, one must anticipate a revolt
of the Communists and a general strike at the same time. The
forces of these two adversaries were very strong. If such a ‘war
against two fronts’ should take place, the forces of the State
would undoubtedly be disrupted. The outcome of a civil war would
be at the least most uncertain.
“In his, Schleicher’s view, it was impossible to take the risks
implied in such a policy. In case of failure, which he believed
likely, the consequences for Germany would be terrible. All
present in the cabinet meeting were deeply impressed by
Schleicher’s statement, and even those who had been in favor of
energetic action against the National Socialists now changed
their mind, so that Papen was isolated and felt himself to be
isolated.
“In the interview which Papen had with Hindenburg after this
meeting, on November 17th 1932 Papen did not conceal his deep
disappointment over Schleicher’s altered position. Although
Hindenburg asked him to make a new attempt to form a government,
Papen stood on his decision to resign and Hindenburg gave in.”
(2) _Despite his appreciation of the Nazi menace, von Papen rigorously
proceeded to conduct negotiations which resulted in placing Hitler and
the Nazi regime in power._ Following his resignation as Chancellor on 17
November 1932 von Papen continued as Chancellor pro-tem until 2 December
1932, when General Schleicher was appointed to replace him (_2902-PS_).
Almost as soon as he vacated the Chancery, von Papen began plotting to
unseat his arch-rival Schleicher. On about 10 December 1932—less than a
month after he was willing to use force to suppress the Nazis—von Papen
requested Kurt von Schroeder, the Cologne banker, to arrange a meeting
between Hitler and von Papen (according to the statement of Schroeder,
made at Nurnberg, 5 December 1945). Schroeder was one of a group of
rightist industrial and financial leaders who had previously been
organized by Hitler’s man, Wilhelm Keppler, to provide means of
bolstering Nazi economic power.
Hitler himself at this time understood von Papen. He knew that Papen’s
ideas were not too different from his own to preclude agreement. He knew
that Papen’s personal rivalry with Schleicher would make Papen amenable
to some agreement whereby Schleicher might be unhorsed and Papen
restored to a position of public prominence. He accordingly asked
Keppler to arrange for a meeting with Papen (reported in an affidavit of
Wilhelm Keppler, executed at Nurnberg, 26 November 1945).
The result of these maneuvers was the now-famous meeting between Hitler
and Papen at banker Schroeder’s Cologne home in January 1933. It was at
this meeting that Hitler and Papen reached an understanding, subject
only to the ironing out of minor details. It was at this meeting that
Papen completely committed himself to go along with Nazi policy.
The events of this day have been described by Kurt von Schroeder (in a
statement referred to above):
“On January 4, 1933, Hitler, von Papen, Hess, Himmler and
Keppler came to my house in Cologne. Hitler, von Papen and I
went to my den where we were closeted in a discussion lasting
about two hours. Hess, Himmler and Keppler did not participate
in this discussion but were in the next room. Keppler, who had
helped arrange this meeting, came from Berlin; von Papen came
alone from his home in the Saar; and Hitler brought Hess and
Himmler with him, as they were traveling with him to Lippe in
connection with the election campaign. The discussion was only
between Hitler and Papen; I personally had nothing to say in the
discussion. The meeting started about 11:30 A.M. and the first
question was raised by Hitler as to why it was necessary to
punish the two Nazis who had killed the Communist in Silesia.
Von Papen explained to Hitler that it had been necessary to
punish these two Nazis, although they had not been put to death,
because the law was on the books and all political offenders
under the law must have some punishment. He further explained to
Hitler that it might be possible to get a pardon from President
Hindenburg to give serious consideration to making Hitler the
Chancellor at the time that Hindenburg met with Hitler and von
Papen and that he had understood that Hindenburg was perfectly
willing to discuss this matter with Hitler at that time. He said
that it came as a great surprise and shock to him when
Hindenburg was unwilling to do so and he felt that someone,
probably von Schleicher, was responsible for the change in
Hindenburg’s point of view. Next, von Papen told Hitler that it
seemed to him the best thing to have the conservatives and
nationalists who had supported him join with the Nazis to form a
government. He proposed that this new government should, if
possible, be headed by Hitler and von Papen on the same level.
Then Hitler made a long speech in which he said if he were made
Chancellor, it would be necessary for him to be head of the
government but that supporters of Papen could go into his
(Hitler’s) government as ministers when they were willing to go
along with him in his policy of changing many things. These
changes he outlined at this time included elimination of Social
Democrats, Communists and Jews from leading positions in Germany
and the restoration of order in public life. Von Papen and
Hitler reached an agreement in principle so that many of the
points which had brought them in conflict could be eliminated
and they could find a way to get together. They agreed that
further details would have to be worked out and that this could
be done in Berlin or some other convenient place.
“I understand they met later with von Ribbentrop and worked out
further details.
“The meeting broke up about 1:30 and the three of us joined
Hess, Himmler and Keppler at lunch, during which there was
general conversation which lasted until about four o’clock when
they, all the guests, departed.”
Having reached an understanding with Hitler, von Papen directed his
energy toward convincing President Hindenburg to allow Hitler to form a
new government. In this task he had to overcome Hindenburg’s fears that
this appointment would lead to domestic oppressions and risk of war
(according to a statement of Otto Meissner, Nurnberg, 28 November 1945).
Von Papen himself subsequently admitted the important role he played in
bringing Hitler to power. At Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938,
immediately after Hitler had forced Schuschnigg to sign the document
which led to the Austrian Anschluss, Hitler turned to Papen and
remarked:
“Herr von Papen, through your assistance I was appointed
Chancellor of Germany and thus the Reich was saved from the
abyss of communism. I will never forget that.”
Papen replied:
“_Ja, wohl, Mein Fuehrer._” (_2995-PS_)
C. _AS VICE-CHANCELLOR, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND PERSONAL
INFLUENCE TO FACILITATE THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI CONTROL OVER GERMANY._
(1) _In the first critical year and a half of Nazi consolidation of
control over Germany, von Papen was second only to Hitler in the Cabinet
which established the legal basis for furtherance of the Nazi program._
As Vice-Chancellor, van Papen was the only member of the government
empowered to act for the Fuehrer in his absence.
(2) _Von Papen actively participated in the general abolition of civil
liberties by promoting legislation which paved the way for the Nazi
police state._ At the first meeting of Hitler’s Cabinet, there was
intensive discussion concerning the possibility of securing passage of
an Enabling Law which in practical effect would liquidate the Reichstag
and make the Nazi Cabinet the supreme law-making power of the Reich. The
conspirators, including von Papen, at this meeting clearly indicated
that they did not at the time hold sufficient power to achieve this
measure by normal constitutional methods (_351-PS_).
Seizing the Reichstag fire as a pretext, the Cabinet forthwith arranged
for the suspension of those fundamental civil liberties (including
freedom of speech, press, assembly and association) which would protect
citizens who dared to oppose the plans of the conspirators. The
suspension of civil liberties was accomplished by issuance of a
Presidential decree, which presumably, according to German usage, was
proposed to the Reich President by the Cabinet and countersigned by
those Ministers whose departments were involved (_1390-PS_; _2050-PS_).
This basic law was only the first of a series which placed the
individual dissenter at the mercy of the Nazi state. As if to underscore
explicitly the basic policy behind this legislation, von Papen
personally signed the decree which implemented this legislation by
creating Special Courts to enforce its provisions. This decree abolished
rights, including the right of appeal, which had previously
characterized the administration of justice by the German judicial
system. It thus constituted also the first legislative measure for the
Nazification of the German judiciary (_2076-PS_).
The subsequent creation of the dreaded _Volksgericht_ and the wholesale
Nazification of the German system of criminal law was merely the logical
development of these earlier steps. This too was achieved by decree of
the Cabinet in which von Papen was Vice-Chancellor (_2014-PS_).
(3) _Von Papen actively participated in substitution of the Nazi Cabinet
for the Reichstag as Germany’s supreme law-giving authority,
notwithstanding his doubts as to the advisability of giving Hitler such
extensive power._ Von Papen actively participated in the Cabinet
deliberations concerning the proposed so-called Enabling Act, and
concerning the means by which it might be made law (_351-PS_; _2962-PS_;
_2963-PS_).
The enactment of this law deprived the Reichstag of its legislative
functions, so that legislative as well as executive powers were
concentrated in Hitler and his Cabinet (_2001-PS_).
Enactment of the law was made possible only by the application of Nazi
pressure and terror against the potential opponents of this legislation,
and by taking advantage of the Presidential decree of 28 February 1933,
suspending constitutional guarantees of freedom. (See section 2 of
Chapter VII on the Acquisition of Totalitarian Political Control.)
As if to indorse the methods by which this legislation was enacted, von
Papen personally signed the Amnesty Decree of 21 March 1933, liberating
all persons who had committed murder between 30 January and 21 March
1933 against anti-Nazi politicians, writers, and Reichstag Deputies
(_2059-PS_).
Von Papen participated in this program notwithstanding the fact that he
foresaw at that time the implications of granting to Hitler the complete
powers conferred by the Enabling Act. He has so testified (in an
interrogation at Nurnberg, 3 September 1945):
“Q. After Hitler became Chancellor, when for the first time did
you have any doubts about the wisdom of having allowed him to
become Chancellor?
“A. Well, that’s difficult to say. I mean the first doubt
certainly I had when the Reichstag gave in to his request for
the law, to enable him to rule the country without parliament.”
(4) _Von Papen not only participated in the seizure by the cabinet of
supreme power for the Nazis, but as a member of the cabinet participated
in the systematic elimination of all potential enemies of the Nazi
conspiracy._ The Reichstag fire and the ensuing suppression of civil
liberties marked the beginning of the destruction of all rival political
parties. The immediate elimination of the legally elected Communist
members from the Reichstag was merely the forerunner of the rapid and
complete liquidation of all political parties other than the National
Socialists (_2403-PS_; _1396-PS_; _2058-PS_; _1388-PS_). By these
measures the suppression of all democratic opposition became complete,
within one year of the time when von Papen was warning his countrymen of
the dangers of authoritarianism.
Having substituted the autocracy of the Hitler cabinet for the
democratic force of the Reichstag, the cabinet proceeded immediately to
enact a series of laws abolishing the states and coordinating them with
the Reich (_2004-PS_; _2005-PS_; _2006-PS_). The enactment of these
laws, which had been clearly indicated by point 25 of the Party program,
removed all possible retarding influences which the German federal
States might have exerted against the overwhelming centralization of
power in Hitler’s Reich Cabinet.
The importance of this step, as well as the role played by Papen, is
reflected in an exchange of letters between Reichs President Hindenburg,
von Papen in his capacity as Reichskommissar for Prussia, and Reichs
Minister Goering. The exchange occurred in connection with the recall of
the Reichskommissar and the appointment of Goering to the post of
Minister President of Prussia. In tendering his resignation, on 7 April
1933, von Papen wrote to Hitler:
“With the draft of the law for the coordination of the states
with the Reich, passed today by the Reich Chancellor,
legislative work has begun which will be of historical
significance for the political development of the German state.
The step taken by the Reich Government, which I headed at the
time, is now crowned by this new inter-locking of the Reich.
You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now, as once Bismarck, be able
to coordinate in all points the policy of the greatest of German
states with that of the Reich. Now that the new law enables you
to appoint a Prussian Prime Minister I ask you to inform the
Reich President that I return to his hands my post of Reichs
Commissar for Prussia.” (_3357-PS_)
In transmitting this resignation request to President Hindenburg, Hitler
stated:
“Vice-Chancellor von Papen has sent a letter to me which I
enclose for your information. Herr von Papen already informed me
within the last few days that he agreed with Minister Goering to
resign on his own volition, as soon as the unified conduct of
the governmental affairs in the Reich and in Prussia would be
assured by the new law on coordination of policy in the Reich
and the states [_Laender_].
“On the eve of the day when the new law on the institution of
Reich governors [_Reichs-Statthalter_] was adopted, Herr von
Papen considered this aim as having been attained and he
requested of me to undertake the appointment of the Prussian
Prime Minister, when at the same time he would offer his full
time services in the Reich Government.
“Herr von Papen, in accepting the commission for the Government
of Prussia in these difficult times since 30 January, has
rendered a very meritorious service to the realization of the
idea of coordinating the policy in the Reich and the States. His
collaboration in the Reich cabinet, for which he now offers all
his strength, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him is
such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the
great help I shall thus receive.
“For profound reverence,
“A.H.” (_3357-PS_)
The enactment of this legislation followed repeated declarations in
which Papen had warned his countrymen of the dangers of the exaggerated
degree of centralized authority which would result from abolition of the
federal system. These warnings began before Hitler’s accession to power
and continued by implication in the reassurances which Papen gave in
February 1933 to Bavarian political leaders who expressed their fears of
Nazi centralized authority (_Cuno Horkenbach, Das Deutsche Reich von
1918 bis Heute._ (The German Reich from 1918 until today) (Berlin 1933),
p. 44). As late as 3 March 1933, in an election speech at Stuttgart, von
Papen warned that:
“Federalism saves us from centralism, that organizational form
which concentrically draws all the vital forces of a people to
one point, as a mirror will do with the rays of the sun. No
people is less suited for being governed centralistically than
the German people.” (_3313-PS_)
Less than one month after its seizure of the legislative power, the
cabinet of which von Papen was a member enacted the first of a series of
laws aimed at establishing firm Nazi control over the entire civil
service and judiciary (_2012-PS_; _1400-PS_; _1398-PS_). Having been a
public servant himself, von Papen was aware of the far-reaching effect
of these first legislative and administrative steps in attaining full
totalitarian control over the entire governmental machinery of Germany.
The cabinet of which von Papen was a member embarked upon a state policy
of persecution of the Jews. The first organized act in this program was
the boycott of Jewish enterprises on 1 April 1933, which was approved by
the entire cabinet. This was followed by a series of laws beginning the
systematic elimination of the Jews from public and professional life in
Germany. (See Section 7 of Chapter VII on the Program for Persecution of
Jews.)
All these suppressive measures were in line with long-standing basic
objectives of the NSDAP to which von Papen had agreed in his January
conference with Hitler and von Schroeder.
(5) _To complete its suppression of all rival influences, the Cabinet of
which von Papen was a member enacted a series of decrees which
strengthened the Nazi movement by conferring upon it a para-governmental
status._ Followers of the Party, through a decree signed personally by
von Papen, were granted amnesty “for penal acts committed in the
material revolution of the German People, in its preparation of the
fight for the German soil” (_2059-PS_). The perpetrators of Nazi
terrorism were thereby placed above the law, and a pattern was
established for the subsequent handling of Nazi excesses.
This cabinet enacted measures which gave legal protection to the status
and symbols of the Party and its formations (_1652-PS_; _2759-PS_).
This cabinet enacted a series of measures to assure the Nazi movement’s
spiritual control over Germany (_2029-PS_; _2030-PS_; _2415-PS_;
_2083-PS_; _2078-PS_; _2088-PS_).
Having first outlawed all political parties other than the NSDAP, the
cabinet of which von Papen was a member formally decreed that:
“1. After the victory of the National Socialistic Revolution,
the National Socialistic German Labor Party is the bearer of the
concept of the German State and is inseparably the state.
“2. It will be a part of the public law. Its organization will
be determined by the Fuehrer.” (_1395-PS_).
Having granted para-governmental status to the Nazi party, and having
assured legal unity of the Party’s Fuehrer and the Reich’s Chancellor,
the Nazis next step was to combine in the same person the Presidency of
the German Reich. This was accomplished by merging the offices of
President and Chancellor, by means of a decree signed by von Papen
(_2003-PS_). An important consequence of this law was to give to Hitler
the supreme command of the German armed forces, always a perquisite of
the Presidency (_2050-PS_).
(6) _Despite disagreements as to detail, von Papen fundamentally agreed
with basic Nazi objectives and publicly endorsed the regime for which he
shared responsibility as Vice Chancellor._ Von Papen’s basic political
philosophy was not so divergent from Nazism as to preclude an easy
bridging of the gap. In 1932, while still Chancellor, von Papen had been
willing to head a government in which Nazism would be strongly
represented. By January 1933 he found it possible—as a price for his
restoration to a position of public prominence—to submerge his
differences with Hitler and to direct his energies to the installation
of a Nazi regime (see B above).
In addition to his participation as a cabinet member in the process of
Nazifying Germany, von Papen’s devotion to the Nazi cause was repeatedly
demonstrated throughout this period by public statements and acts both
by himself and by Hitler. Thus, as noted above in connection with his
role in the elimination of the _Laender_ as a political force, von Papen
wrote Hitler in April 1933, that
“You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now, as once Bismarck, be able
to coordinate in all points the policy of the greatest of German
states with that of the Reich,”
And Hitler on that occasion took notice of Papen’s services by declaring
that
“His collaboration in the Reich cabinet, for which he now offers
all his strength, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him
is such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the
great help I shall thus receive.” (_3357-PS_).
And again on 2 November 1933, speaking from the same platform with
Hitler and Gauleiter Terboven, in the course of the campaign for
Reichstag election and the referendum on Germany’s withdrawal from the
League of Nations, von Papen declared:
“Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of
national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I have
tried to support with all my strength the work of the national
socialist movement and its leader; and just as I at the time of
taking over the chancellorship have advocated to pave the way to
power for the young fighting liberation movement, just as I on
January 30 was selected by a gracious fate to put the hands of
our chancellor and Fuehrer into the hand of our beloved field
marshal, so do I today again feel the obligation to say to the
German people and all those who have kept confidence in me:
“The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep
distress a leader who will lead it, through all distresses and
weaknesses, through all crisis and moments of danger, with the
sure instinct of the statesman into a happy future.”
* * * * * *
“Let us in this hour say to the Fuehrer of the new Germany that
we believe in him and his work.” (_3375-PS_).
By this time as noted above, the cabinet of which Papen was a member had
abolished the civil liberties which were a condition to any effective
protest against Nazism, had sanctioned political murder committed in aid
of Nazism’s seizure of power, had substituted itself for the Reichstag
as Germany’s supreme law-making authority, had destroyed all rival
political parties, had enacted the basic laws for abolition of the
political influence of the _Laender_, had provided the legislative basis
for purging the civil service and judiciary of anti-Nazi elements, had
embarked upon a state policy of persecution of the Jews, had legislated
Nazi influence into the cultural life of the German nation, and had
taken its first steps toward conferring a para-governmental status upon
the Nazi party and its principal formations.
Even after von Papen’s Marburg speech of June 1934, in which he again
showed some understanding of the dangers of Nazism, he remained a pillar
of Nazi policy and influence. Thus Hitler himself, in attempting to
justify the Blood Purge of 30 June 1934, tacitly admitted that Papen was
still considered a loyal member of the regime:
“The allegations [of foreign newspapers] that Vice-Chancellor
von Papen, Reichsminister Seldte, or other gentlemen of the
Reich Cabinet had entertained connections with the rebels is
refuted by the fact that one of the first intentions of the
rebels was to assassinate these men.” (_Hitler Reichstag_
address, 18 July 1934, as quoted in _Das Archiv_, Vol. IV, pp.
495, 507.)
The Fuehrer thus made a tacit bid for the continuing loyalty of von
Papen. Von Papen’s subsequent career demonstrated that this was not a
vain expectation. He left the vice-chancellorship only to assume the new
task of special emissary of the Fuehrer to Austria. But before leaving,
while still Vice Chancellor, von Papen signed the decree combining the
positions of President and Reichs Chancellor on 1 August 1934, and on 5
August 1934 he delivered the document—the so-called Hindenburg
Testament—which purported to confer the revered president’s dying
blessing upon Hitler and the Nazi regime (_Notice concerning delivery of
Hindenburg’s testament by Vice Chancellor von Papen, Das Archiv_, Vol.
V, page 648).
D. _AS GERMANY’S MOST FAMOUS CATHOLIC LAYMAN AND AS NEGOTIATOR OF THE
VATICAN CONCORDAT, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI CONTROL OVER GERMANY AND IN
NAZI PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION._
(1) _Immediately upon Nazi seizure of power within Germany, von Papen
endeavored to weld German Catholicism into a powerful body of support
for the Nazi state._ When Naziism seized control of Germany in January
1933, its relations with the church were at a low ebb. The period of the
Reichstag elections of July and November 1932 was marked by certain
widely circulated anti-Nazi pronouncements of the German bishops,
especially in such Catholic papers as _Germania_, _Koelnische
Volkszeitung_, and the _Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung_. These bishops
discerned the fundamental incompatibility between the Church and the
Nazis’ own declarations of State policy. They accordingly publicly
stigmatized the Nazi movement as anti-Christian, forbade the Catholic
clergy to participate in any ceremonies (such as funerals) in which the
Nazi Party was officially represented, refused the sacraments to Party
officials, and in several pastorals expressly warned the faithful
against the danger to German Catholicism created by the Party
(_3389-PS_).
Immediately upon seizure of power, the main concern of the new regime
was to liquidate political opposition. Achievement of this objective was
predicated upon the strategy of “divide and rule”. A first step in this
strategy was to convince conservatives that the efforts of the
government were being directed primarily against the Communists and
other forces of the extreme Left, and that their own interests would
remain safe in Nazi hands as long as they would consent to refrain from
political activity. The result was a brief but active period of
rapprochement between Church and Party. Von Papen was a leader in this
strategy. The minutes of the Reich cabinet meeting of 15 March 1933
contain the following notation in connection with discussions on the
Enabling Act:
“The Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar for the State of
Prussia said it is of decisive importance to integrate into the
new State the masses standing behind the Parties. He said that
the question of coordination of political Catholicism into the
new State is of special importance.” (_2962-PS_)
Eight days later, speaking at the second meeting of the Reichstag of
1933, on 23 March 1933, Hitler asked for adoption of the Enabling Act.
In this speech he declared:
“While the government is determined to carry through the
political and moral purging of our public life, it is creating
and insuring prerequisites for a truly religious life. The
government sees in both Christian confessions the factors most
important for the maintenance of our Folkdom. It will respect
agreements concluded between them and the states. However, it
expects that its work will meet with a similar appreciation. The
government will treat all other denominations with equal
objective justice. However, it can never condone that belonging
to a certain denomination or to a certain race might be regarded
as license to commit or tolerate crimes. The Government will
devote its care to the sincere living together of Church and
State.” (_3387-PS_).
The immediate effect of this assurance was action by the conference of
German bishops, meeting in Fulda on 28 March 1933. This conference
lifted restrictions imposed on members of the church adhering to the
Nazi movement. In a cautious statement which placed full faith and
credit in the Papen-inspired Hitler assurances, the bishops declared:
“The high shepherds of the dioceses of Germany in their dutiful
anxiety to keep the Catholic faith pure and protect the
untouchable aims and rights of the Catholic Church have adopted,
for profound reasons, during the last years, an oppositional
attitude toward the National Socialist movement, through
prohibitions and warnings, which was to be in effect as long and
as far as those reasons remained valid.
“It must now be recognized that there are official and solemn
declarations issued by the highest representative of the Reich
Government—who at the same time is the authoritarian leader of
that movement—which acknowledge the inviolability of the
teachings of Catholic faith and the unchangeable tasks and
rights of the church, and which expressly assure the full value
of the legal pacts concluded between the various German States
and the Church.
“Without lifting the condemnation of certain religious and
ethical errors implied in our previous measures, the Episcopate
now believes it can entertain the confidence that those
prescribed general prohibitions and warnings may not be regarded
as necessary any more.” (_3389-PS_)
This action opened the door for mass Party adherence by practicing
Catholics. All those German Catholics who were inclined to adopt Nazi
political views and had hesitated only because of the anti-Nazi attitude
of the hierarchy hastened now to join the victorious party of the
“National Revolution”. This tendency was marked by a tremendous and
sudden burst of activity by the so-called “bridge-builders,” who rushed
to close the gap between the Church and the Nazi State. Von Papen, who
only a short time before had been willing to use armed force to suppress
the Nazis, was foremost among these “bridge-builders”, who not only
claimed an ideological affinity between the Nazi system and the alleged
anti-liberal character of Catholic politics, but affirmatively
apologized for excesses of the State which even then had begun to shock
the world.
Existing agencies were used for this purpose. Thus, the Union of
Catholic Germans (_Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher_), of
which von Papen was president, insisted in its program that the church,
like the Nazi movement itself, was guided by the leadership principle
(Cuno Horkenbach, _Das Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis Heute_ (The German
Reich from 1918 Until Today) (Berlin 1935), pp. 436, 504). The same
organization, in the course of the election campaign which preceded
adoption of the Enabling Act, had bitterly criticized the Catholic
political opposition to Marxism and urged that Catholics “by all means
vote unanimously the National Socialist ticket”, because “We Catholics
do not wish to be denied to march in the lead in this election campaign”
(Election Appeal, _Voelkischer Beobachter_, 23 February 1933, p. 2).
Later, on the eve of the Nazis’ first anti-Jewish boycott, this same
organization played its part in the extensive campaign replying to
foreign newspaper reports concerning atrocities committed against German
Jews. On 1 April 1933 it published through the Prussian News Service, an
“Appeal to all Christians”, viewing “with great indignation” this
“irresponsible campaign against Germany” which “continues in spite of
official German declarations and corrections”. This “Appeal”
characterized the foreign reports as “intentional lies and
falsifications” and “a reckless, crafty campaign of destruction
conducted by the Jewish world alliance and moneyed powers against the
right of self-determination of all peoples and against the entire
Christian civilization”. It called upon “the Christians of all
countries, irrespective of denominations, to form a world-wide front of
defense against that Jewish conspiracy disturbing the true peace”
(“_Appeal to All Christians_”, _Voelkischer Beobachter_ (People’s
Observer), 30 March 1933, p. 2).
Notwithstanding the force of these activities, this Nazification by
existing agencies was not deemed adequate to the task of organizing
Catholic lay support. The result was the creation, in early April 1933,
under the sponsorship of von Papen, of a new “Bund” of Catholic Germans
called “Cross and Eagle” (“_Kreuz und Adler_”) which made it its task
“to contribute enthusiastic devotion to the upbuilding of the future
Reich” (Gerd Ruehle, _Das Dritte Reich_ (The Third Reich), p. 250).
This whole program of rapprochement between Church and Party manifests
the Papen “touch”—the same quality of handiwork which had manifested
itself in Hitler’s accession to power and which later was to reappear in
Austria: First, gentle hints by Papen as to strategy, followed within
eight days by reassurances in Hitler’s Reichstag speech. Next, again
following merely by days, the formal lifting of the restrictions on Nazi
membership by the leaders of the Church of which von Papen was the most
famous lay member. Finally, again within a few days, the open campaign
by which Papen-sponsored organizations endeavoured to align Church and
Party. The close timing of these events was not a coincidence.
(2) _Having achieved initial successes in consolidating Catholic support
within Germany, von Papen undertook international consolidation of
Nazi-Church relationships by negotiation of a Concordat with the
Vatican._ The program of rapprochement and the public declarations
bridging the gap between the Church and the Nazi movement were merely
advertising media by which Nazi-minded Catholics were herded into the
movement, and slogans by which the conspirators might placate the
Catholic hierarchy. Throughout this period there continued an
undercurrent of anti-Catholic activity. A thorough job was done in
purging Reich, state, and municipal administrations of officials
appointed for their adherence to the Centre or Bavarian People’s
parties. Former leaders of those parties, including priests, joined
Communists and Social Democrats in the concentration camps, and the
campaign of hatred against the “black” was resumed. By April 1933 the
bishops were making appeals for clemency toward former civil servants,
who, they pointed out, were not able to join the celebration of national
awakening because they had been dismissed from positions in which they
had given their best to the community of the German people. And on 31
May 1933, a meeting of the Bavarian bishops adopted a solemn statement
directed against the tendency of attributing to the State alone the
right of educating, organizing, and leading ideologically the German
youth (_Dismissal of Catholics_, Excerpts from _Voelkischer Beobachter_,
February-March 1933; _Excerpt, Voelkischer Beobachter_, 19 April 1933
(Munich ed.), p. 2).
By this maintenance of a certain amount of pressure against Catholic
interests, the hierarchy was reminded of the dangers of not coming to a
definite agreement with the Nazi State. The stage was thus set for von
Papen’s negotiation of a Concordat with the Vatican.
At the time of these activities, the government of which von Papen was
Vice Chancellor had already launched its program to mold the state
machinery into the Nazi image. The Enabling Act had become law, and the
general outlines of the Nazi State were already manifest.
Notwithstanding the doubts created in his mind by Hitler’s insistence
upon the Enabling Act, von Papen undertook negotiations with the
Vatican. In fact, he since has claimed that these fears gave rise to the
negotiation of the Concordat (Interrogation at Nurnberg, 3 Sept. 1945):
“I became alarmed, you remember, somewhere in June when I went
to Rome to negotiate a concordat because I certainly feared that
the particular powers of the Hitler Party would create
difficulties on the religious side. So that with the consent of
Hitler I went to Rome to make that concordat.”
It is clear, however, that these alleged fears of the Enabling Act were
not fears at all. They were merely an understanding of the threat they
carried to all persons and instrumentalities antagonistic to the Nazi
system. Von Papen understood the significance of these developments.
What he actually feared was that the rest of the world would also
understand Nazi methods and would erect barriers to the consummation of
the plans of the conspirators. The situation plainly called for a
neutralizing of these potential barriers to Nazi plans. One method of
achieving this result at that time was the negotiation of solemn
agreements whereby other powers would commit themselves to a policy of
non-intervention by either armed or moral force.
When von Papen concluded the Concordat with the Vatican, the political
objectives of furthering the purposes of the Nazi conspiracy were thus
foremost in his mind. Even at that time, in the first half of 1933, von
Papen had in mind, in concluding this Concordat, not only the
consolidation of Catholicism behind the Nazi regime within Germany, but
also the psychological build-up of the Austrians in preparation for
Anschluss. Von Papen’s own words eloquently characterize these
manoeuvres (monograph entitled “Austria” written at Nurnberg, 1945):
“Although the ‘_Heimwehr_’ movement [in Austria] had brought
these patriotic elements together before this, and had fought
with them to free the country from strong Socialistic pressure,
yet they were armed only from the standpoint of domestic
politics and remained aloof from all ambitions for a greater
Germany. The cause lay mostly in the Catholic nature of the
country, and in the strong influence of the clergy in political
leadership. The Reich was considered a bulwark of Protestantism,
despite its twenty million Catholics. The anti-clerical wave,
which was dominant in the Reich under the leadership of Prussia,
itself led by Socialists, appeared to have verified the fears of
the Austrian clergy. For in spite of Catholics at the head of
the Reich—Wirth, Marx, Bruening—the Centre Party had always
put through its cultural demands by logrolling with the
Socialists. There were at least two Socialist officials,
university professors or teachers for every Catholic appointee.
In contrast to the obviously badly functioning Weimar
Constitution, there was an effort in Austria, under clerical
leadership and with the strong support of the Vatican, to
develop into a corporate state.
“Those were serious obstacles on both sides. When, after the
seizure of power of the NSDAP in 1933, as the first remedy
against a new ‘_Kulturkampf_’, I safely concluded the Concordat
of the New Reich with the Holy See, my thoughts at the time were
not focused only on the Reich. For a peaceful evolution of the
German-Austrian question it was of the greatest importance that
the doubts of the clergy on the Austrian side be completely
eliminated.”
* * * * * *
“It was my first purpose in the diplomatic field to deprive the
Austrian problem of its European character, and to develop it
gradually into an exclusively internal problem between the Reich
and Austria.
“It therefore had to be my primary aim to convince the Vatican
that a union could not endanger the Vatican’s interests. A
Concordat of the Reich with the Vatican had been my first
attempt to prevent religious difficulties arising from Nazism’s
revolutionary doctrine; the attempt had obviously failed. Under
the growing influence of his Party, Hitler sabotaged the
Concordat. Rome was deeply disappointed and in the greatest
excitement.”
On 20 July 1933 the Reich Concordat with the Vatican was signed by von
Papen as representative of the Nazi Government of Germany. This
instrument was an international treaty which purported to give the
church an official guarantee of all the church rights it had sought. In
addition it purported to confer freedom for Catholic organizations,
maintenance of parochial schools, and preservation of the general
influence of the church on the education of the German Catholic youth.
Among the 33 articles of the Concordat, 21 treated exclusively the
rights and prerogatives accorded to the church. Reciprocation consisted
only in a pledge of loyalty by the clergy to the Reich Government and a
promise that Catholic religious instruction would emphasize the
patriotic duties of the Christian citizen and insist on a loyal attitude
toward the Fatherland. Since it had always been the practice of the
Catholic church to abide by established governments and to promote
patriotic convictions among the faithful, these stipulations of the
Concordat were no more than legalizations of an existing custom. They
were no more than a guarantee of goodwill betokening harmonious
Church-State relations (_2655-PS_).
(3) _The signing of the Concordat was only an interlude in the church
policy of the Nazi Conspirators, which was a policy of reassurances and
repression._ The signing of the Concordat merely marked the beginning of
evasions and violations of both its spirit and letter. The ink was
hardly dry before it became necessary for the Vatican to complain about
a false interpretation of the text, made by the Nazi government in its
own favour. (See Section 6 of Chapter VII on Suppression of the
Christian Churches.)
By action taken only ten days after the signing of the Concordat, and
despite its provision for the continuance of the Catholic Youth
Association, simultaneous membership in the Hitler Jugend and the
Catholic Youth Association was forbidden, and the campaign to smash the
latter organization thereby commenced (_2456-PS_).
These first steps were merely a foretaste of a long series of violations
which were to commence almost immediately and eventually to result in
papal denunciation and serious excesses committed against the clergy
(_3280-PS_).
The continuing character of the conspirators’ church policy—and of von
Papen’s participation in it—is further revealed by von Papen’s action
of 19 September 1934, when, as president of the Union of Catholic
Germans (_Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher_), he ordered
dissolution of this organization. By this time the Nazis were dropping
all pretext that rival organizations might be permitted to exist, and
were well along in their plans for the integration of all German
institutions into the Nazi system. The official published announcement
of dissolution is a revealing document:
“Since the Reich Party Leadership through its department for
spiritual peace increasingly and immediately administers all
cultural problems and those concerning the relationship of State
and Churches, the tasks at first delegated to the Union of
Catholic Germans are now included in those of the Reich Party
Leadership in the interest of a stronger coordination.
“Vice-Chancellor von Papen, up to now the Leader of the Union of
Catholic Germans, declared about the Dissolution of this
organization that it was done upon his suggestion, since the
attitude of the national socialist State toward the Christian
and Catholic Church had been explained often and inequivocally
through the leader and chancellor himself.” (_3376-PS_).
E. _AS ENVOY AT VIENNA, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND INFLUENCE
DELIBERATELY TO WEAKEN THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT, AND PARTICIPATED IN THE
POLITICAL PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST
AUSTRIA._
(1) _Von Papen accepted appointment as envoy at Vienna knowing he would
“front” for a Nazi fifth column in Austria._ In July 1934, the Austrian
policy of the Nazi government of Germany was in bad odor throughout the
civilized world. The historical record of this period was written in the
newspaper headlines of the day. A period of Nazi pressure and terror
culminated on 25 July 1934 in an attempted revolutionary putsch, the
murder of the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss, in which the German
Minister, Reith, was implicated. (See Section 3 of Chapter IX on
Aggression Against Austria.) The situation was such as to call for
removal of the German Minister, Reith, and for the prompt substitution
of a man who was an enthusiast for Anschluss with Germany, who could be
tolerant of Nazi objectives and methods, but who could lend an aura of
respectability to official German representation in Vienna. Hitler’s
reaction was immediate. He chose von Papen as quickly as he heard the
news of the Dollfuss murder. Writing of this event in 1945 after his
arrest by Allied authorities, von Papen dramatically describes the
Fuehrer’s response to the situation (monograph on “Austria” referred to
above):
“Suddenly, at three o’clock in the morning, there was a loud
ringing of my doorbell. SS men demanded admission. My son and I
were of the opinion that I was going to be imprisoned. We went
to the front door armed with pistols. Our suspicions were
unfounded. The SS men declared that they had come from the
Chancellery with the order to put through a telephone connection
between Hitler and myself.
“Hitler was in Bayreuth and had been trying for hours without
success to get in touch with me. The connection was made.
“Hitler started, ‘You know of course what has happened in
Vienna. You must go there immediately and try to set things in
order.’
“I replied, ‘I have no idea what has happened in Vienna. I have
just returned from the country and I don’t understand what you
want with me in Vienna. I am in the act of packing my trunk to
leave Berlin once and for all.’
“Hitler, highly excited, gave thereupon a short description of
the dramatic events in Vienna which led to the murder of
Dollfuss, and continued, ‘You are the only person who can save
the situation. I implore you to carry out my request.’”
As a result of this telephone call, von Papen flew immediately to join
Hitler at Bayreuth. There it was clear that the Nazi leadership feared
international repercussions from their Austrian policy and felt
themselves in dire need of a respectable “front” man. Von Papen has
described this meeting:
“There I found Hitler and his entire entourage, excited as an
ant-hill. It was difficult to get anything approaching an exact
picture of the Vienna ‘_Putsch_’ and the role of Hitler’s
promoters. Even if one had come into this gathering in complete
ignorance of the different circumstances involved, one could
have gathered with one look that they had a very bad conscience
and now were fearing the consequences. From the very first
moment I was certain that the immoderate policy of the Austrian
NSDAP under the leadership of Hitler’s condottiere, Habig, had
led to this coup d’etat.
“This was, then, a few days after the 30 June, the second bloody
excess of the Party which had promised to bring Germany by
peaceful means to social tranquility, welfare, and respect. It
was obvious that both events had made a deep impression on the
entire world, and that the governmental methods of the Party
must damage most seriously the political credit of the Reich”.
At this meeting it was Papen himself who drafted the letter of
appointment. This letter was a masterpiece of deceit, calculated to
conceal completely Hitler and Papen’s goal of annexation. It stated:
“As a result of the events in Vienna I am compelled to suggest
to the Reichs-President the removal of the German Minister to
Vienna, Dr. Reith, from his post, because he, at the suggestion
of Austrian Federal Ministers and the Austrian rebels
respectively consented to an agreement made by both these
parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to
Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich Government.
Thus the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an internal
Austrian affair without any reason.
“The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which was
strictly condemned and regretted by the German Government has
made the situation in Europe, already fluid, more acute, without
any fault of ours. Therefore, it is my desire to bring about if
possible an easing of the general situation, and especially to
direct the relations with the German Austrian State, which have
been so strained for a long time, again into normal and friendly
channels.
“For this reason, I request you, dear Mr. von Papen, to take
over this important task, just because you have possessed and
continue to possess my most complete and unlimited confidence
ever since we have worked together in the Cabinet.
“Therefore, I have suggested to the Reichs-President that you,
upon leaving the Reich-Cabinet and upon release from the office
of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on special mission to
the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a limited period
of time. In this position you will be directly subordinated to
me.
“Thanking once more for all that you have at a time done for the
coordination of the Government of the National Revolution and
since then together with us for Germany, I remain.” (_2799-PS_).
The actual mission of von Papen was stated more frankly, shortly after
his arrival in Vienna, in the course of a private conversation with the
American Minister, George S. Messersmith. Mr. Messersmith has described
this meeting:
“When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted
me with ‘Now you are in my Legation and I can control the
conversation’. In the baldest and most cynical manner he then
proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the
borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he
had been charged with the mission of facilitating German
economic and political control over all this region for Germany.
He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was
to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in
Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from
Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the
other states to the South and South East. He said that he
intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain
influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer,
towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because
the German Government was bound on this objective of getting
this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which
could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and
England was not realistic.
“The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the
German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and
of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I
already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless
shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I
got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited
representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit
that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and
destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely
smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and
that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly
about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard
to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute
frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of
their objectives.” (_1760-PS_)
(2) _Von Papen proceeded forthwith to accomplish his mission—the
maintenance of an outward appearance of non-intervention while keeping
appropriate contacts useful in the eventual overthrow of the Austrian
government._ Throughout the earlier period of his mission to Austria,
von Papen’s activity was characterized by the assiduous avoidance of any
appearance of intervention. His true mission was reaffirmed with
clarity, several months after its commencement, when he was instructed
by Berlin that “during the next two years nothing can be undertaken
which will give Germany external political difficulties”. Every
“appearance” of German interference in Austrian affairs “must be
avoided” (_1760-PS_). As von Papen himself stated to Berger-Waldenegg,
the Austrian Foreign Minister:
“Yes, you have your French and English friends now and you can
have your independence a little longer.” (_1760-PS_).
Throughout this period, the Nazi movement was gaining strength in
Austria without openly-admitted German intervention, and Germany needed
more time to consolidate its diplomatic position. These reasons for
German policy were frankly expressed by the German Foreign Minister von
Neurath in conversation with the American Ambassador to France
(_L-150_).
Von Papen accordingly restricted his public activity to the normal
ambassadorial function of cultivating all respectable elements in
Austria and ingratiating himself in these circles—particularly if they
were well-disposed (but not too obviously) to notions of Pan-Germanism.
In these efforts he was particularly careful to exploit his background
as a former professional officer and a Catholic (_1760-PS_).
Meanwhile, however, the Austrian Nazis continued illegal organization in
anticipation of the possibility of securing their objectives by force if
necessary. In these efforts they were aided by Germany, which permitted
the outlawed Austrian Nazis to meet and perfect their plots within
Germany and with German Nazi assistance; which harbored the Austrian
Legion; which made funds available to National Socialists in Austria;
and which established appropriate contact with them through the Reich
Propaganda Ministry and through “respectable” Austrian “front”
personalities (_1760-PS_; _812-PS_). (See also Section 3 of Chapter IX
on Aggression Against Austria.)
Von Papen was fully aware of the existence and activities of these
groups, and of their potentialities in effecting an Anschluss. Thus, in
a report to Hitler dated 27 July 1935, entitled “Reflections on the
Anniversary of Dollfuss’ Death”, he reviewed the activities of these
illegal groups and concluded that National Socialism could “certainly
become the rallying point of all racially German units beyond the
borders”. In this report he declared:
“The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all.
National Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it is
unable to solve this task.” (_2248-PS_).
These sentiments concerning the role of National Socialism were
something more than idle speculation. Von Papen knew that the presence
of the Austrian Legion in Germany in itself produced incidents, and that
the Austrian Nazi movement was dependent on German support. He has so
testified (at an interrogation in Nurnberg, 13 October 1945). In fact,
despite his facade of strict non-intervention, he remained in contact
with subversive and potentially subversive elements within Austria.
Thus, in a report to Hitler dated 17 May 1935 he advised concerning the
Austrian Nazi strategy as proposed by Captain Leopold, leader of the
illegal Austrian Nazis (_2247-PS_). In subsequent statements he has
revealed his _modus operandi_ in the use of his embassy staff. This
method provided him with an opportunity to disclaim responsibility if
these activities should be questioned. Thus, his military attache, Mutz,
“maintained good relations with the Army circles which were inclined
towards National Socialism”. Von Papen’s all-around contact man with the
Austrian Nazis was a member of his staff, Baron von Kettler, who “had
always maintained intimate contact with a group of young Austrian
National Socialists who, as we both agreed, had a conservative coating
and fought for a healthy development within the Party”. The practical
effect of these contacts has been clarified in questioning of von Papen
(at Nurnberg, 8 October 1945):
“* * * A. As I told you, I charged one of my younger people of
the Embassy, von Kettler—he was made the go-between with these
Nazi people, to smooth them down and talk with them. Personally
I had not very much to do with them.
“Q. Well, I know that. That is what you always said. But the
result of your time in Austria was that their interests were
furthered through your office. Whether you did it personally or
somebody working for you did it, I don’t think it is too
important for what we have in mind here tonight; do you?
“A. No.
“Q. Now, isn’t it a fact that their interests were furthered
through your office, if not through you as an individual during
those years that you were there?
“A. Yes, I wanted to know about their doings, you see. I must
have been informed what was going on.”
(3) _Conclusion of the Agreement of 11 July 1936 merely constituted
another step towards Anschluss._ Prior to 1936, sponsorship of political
subversion was not the only pressure applied by Germany in its efforts
to gain control of Austria. The German Government in addition had placed
certain economic barriers against trade between German and Austrian
subjects, the most serious of which was the 1000 mark law, which
crippled the Austrian tourist traffic by levying a 1000 RM tax on any
German citizen crossing the border into Austria. The effect of these
pressures was to induce the Austrian Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg,
to seek from Hitler an agreement to “lift the 1000 Mark barrier he had
levied against Austria and reassure Austria that he had no political
designs concerning our state, Austria” (_2994-PS_).
The result was the agreement of 11 July 1936 between Germany and
Austria, which was negotiated by von Papen as Hitler’s representative.
The published form of this agreement provided:
“Being convinced that they are making a valuable contribution
towards the whole European development in the direction of
maintaining peace, and in the belief that they are thereby best
serving the manifold mutual interests of both German States, the
Governments of the Federal State of Austria and of Germany have
resolved to return to relations of a normal and friendly
character. In this connection it is declared—
“(1) The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of
the Federal State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements
of the German Fuehrer and Chancellor of May 21, 1935.
“(2) Each of the two Governments regards the inner political
order (including the question of Austrian National-Socialism)
obtaining in the other country as an internal concern of that
country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect
influence.
“(3) The Austrian Federal Government will constantly follow in
its policy in general, and in particular towards Germany, a line
in conformity with leading principles corresponding to the fact
that Austria regards herself as a German State.
“By such a decision neither the Rome Protocols of 1934 and their
additions of 1936, nor the relationships of Austria to Italy and
Hungary as partners in these protocols, are affected.
Considering that the detente desired by both sides cannot become
a reality unless certain preliminary conditions are fulfilled by
the Governments of both countries, the Austrian Federal
Government and the German Government will pass a number of
special measures to bring about the requisite preliminary state
of affairs.” (_TC-22_).
More interesting was the secret part of this agreement, the most
important provisions of which have been summarized by Mr. Messersmith:
“Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the
Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in
the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the ‘National
opposition’ a role in the political life of Austria and within
the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all
Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses.”
(_1760-PS_)
Especially interesting was the manner in which this agreement contained
German economic concessions and further solemn assurances regarding
Austrian independence and integrity, on the one hand, alongside
far-reaching political concessions to the Nazi movement (_2994-PS_). The
effect was to place Austria completely at the mercy of German good
faith. Von Papen has correctly described it (in an interrogation at
Nurnberg, 8 October 1945) as “the first step” toward preparation for
Anschluss, notwithstanding his clear understanding at the time that the
Austrian government desired and intended to retain its independence.
The Germans lost no time in making the most of their new opportunities,
solemn assurances notwithstanding. The agreement merely heralded a new
era in “legitimizing” the German fifth column in Austria. Thus, the
immediate amnesty to political prisoners in itself presented serious
police problems. The freedom granted to political demonstrations and
organization by German Nazis made it difficult to police the
propagandizing of Austrians. And the agreement specifically gave the
German Nazis an opening wedge to representation in the Austrian
government. The terroristic activities and pressure of the illegal Nazis
continued without interruption under German sponsorship, until their
hand was strengthened to the point of openly asking for official
recognition (_812-PS_; _1760-PS_; _2994-PS_).
The importance of this agreement to the Germans was underscored by the
promotion of its negotiator from _Gesandter_ to _Botschafter_, at the
time of its signing (Announcement, _Das Archiv_, XXVIII, p. 571).
Von Papen himself participated in this pressure game by maintaining
contact with the illegal Nazis, by trying to influence appointments to
strategic cabinet positions, and by attempting to secure official
recognition of Nazi “front” organizations. Reporting to Hitler shortly
after conclusion of the 11 July 1936 agreement, he succinctly summarized
his program for “normalizing” Austro-German relations under the regime
of the new agreement:
“The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the
present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the
Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National
Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of
utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected
prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of
Finances [_Finanzkontrolle_] at Geneva. The Chancellor of the
League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his
intention, to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the
Interior. As a guiding principle [_Marschroute_] I recommend on
the tactical side, continued, patient psychological
manipulations, with slowly intensified pressure directed at
changing the regime. The proposed conference on economic
relations, taking place at the end of October will be a very
useful tool for the realization of some of our projects. In
discussion with government officials as well as with leaders of
the illegal party (Leopold and Schattenfreh) who conform
completely with the concordat of July 11, I am trying to direct
the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative
representation of the movement in the fatherland front
[_Vaterlaendischen Front_] but nevertheless refraining from
putting National-Socialists in important positions for the time
being. However such positions are to be occupied only by
personalities, having the support and the confidence of the
movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in
Minister Glaise-Horstenau.” (_2246-PS_).
This activity continued through 1937. In fact, by 14 January 1937 the
negotiations with the Austrian Minister of Security and the development
of “front” organizations had proceeded so far that “a very intensive
crisis has arisen for the illegal party” with respect to its future
program. In urging a patient attitude toward these problems, von Papen
appeared less concerned with the legitimacy of their position under the
11 July 1936 agreement than with his fear that
“a too strong and far-reaching connection (with a proposed
conservative ‘German Action’ front organization) would be
understood neither in our own ranks nor could it be of use to
the action itself.” (_2831-PS_)
On the other hand when an Austrian cabinet minister failed to show
sufficient energy to suit von Papen’s purpose, he showed no hesitancy,
under the terms of his 11 July 1936 agreement, to urge replacement by a
more cooperative individual. Thus, von Papen has summarized his efforts
to remove the Austrian Minister of the Interior (monograph “Austria”):
“I had tried to persuade Schuschnigg to appoint another minister
to his cabinet beside Herr von Glaise, who was not very active.
The new minister was to act as trusted liaison man between the
two governments, able to work on innumerable problems directly
without diplomatic intervention. This simplification would also
bring the men on both sides of the fence closer together.”
By the beginning of 1938, the Nazi hand had been so strengthened in
Austria, and the differences and misunderstandings regarding the
agreement of 11 July had become so serious and frequent, that Chancellor
Schuschnigg found it expedient to accept von Papen’s invitation to meet
Hitler at Berchtesgaden, notwithstanding serious misgivings on the part
of Schuschnigg (_2995-PS_). Von Papen showed no hesitancy in extending
this invitation despite the fact that he knew Hitler’s “idea to swallow
Austria”, despite his knowledge of Schuschnigg’s distrust of Hitler, and
despite his own doubts concerning the value of Hitler’s word.
Notwithstanding the situation, he found it possible even to urge
Schuschnigg that Hitler was a man upon whom Schuschnigg could rely. And
in making these representations, he was fully aware of the extent of
German rearmament and of its possible use as a diplomatic pressure
device (according to interrogations, Nurnberg, 19 September and 8
October 1945).
On 11 February 1938, Schuschnigg left for Berchtesgaden to meet Hitler.
At this meeting the severest pressure was exerted to extort far-reaching
concessions from Austria, including reorganization of the cabinet,
appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Security and the Interior,
and a general amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes (_2995-PS_;
_2461-PS_; _1544-PS_; _1780-PS_).
It was at this meeting that Papen urged upon Hitler the appointment of
Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Security and the Interior (according to
monograph “Austria”).
Thoroughly entrenched in the government, the Nazis were now able to
seize upon Schuschnigg’s plebiscite as an excuse to seize power, and to
call for military intervention by Germany (_812-PS_; _2996-PS_). (See
also Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)
Thereafter it was only a matter of hours before Austria became a
province of the Reich—by a law signed by von Papen’s man, Seyss-Inquart
(_2307-PS_).
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO FRANZ VON PAPEN
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 63
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*351-PS │Minutes of First Meeting of Cabinet of│ │
│Hitler, 30 January 1933. (USA 389) │ III │ 270
│ │ │
*812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │
│22 August 1939 and report from │ │
│Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │
│Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │
│events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │
│1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586
│ │ │
1388-PS │Law concerning confiscation of │ │
│Property subversive to People and │ │
│State, 14 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962
│ │ │
1390-PS │Decree of the Reich President for the │ │
│Protection of the People and State, 28│ │
│February 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 83. │ III │ 968
│ │ │
*1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
1396-PS │Law concerning the confiscation of │ │
│Communist property, 26 May 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 293. │ III │ 979
│ │ │
1398-PS │Law to supplement the Law for the │ │
│restoration of the Professional Civil │ │
│Service, 20 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 518. │ III │ 986
│ │ │
1400-PS │Law changing the regulations in regard│ │
│to public officer, 30 June 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 433. │ III │ 987
│ │ │
*1544-PS │Von Papen’s notes, 26 February 1938, │ │
│on his parting visit with Chancellor │ │
│Schuschnigg. (USA 71) │ IV │ 103
│ │ │
1652-PS │Decree of the Reich President for │ │
│protection against treacherous attacks│ │
│on the government of the Nationalist │ │
│movement, 21 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 135. │ IV │ 160
│ │ │
*1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │
│Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. │ │
│(USA 255, USA 324) │ IV │ 208
│ │ │
*1760-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 28│ │
│August 1945. (USA 57) │ IV │ 305
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │
│and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638
│ │ │
2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │
│the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639
│ │ │
2004-PS │Preliminary law for the coordination │ │
│of Federal States under the Reich, 31 │ │
│March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 153. │ IV │ 640
│ │ │
2005-PS │Second law integrating the “Laender” │ │
│with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173. │ IV │ 641
│ │ │
2006-PS │Law for the reconstruction of the │ │
│Reich, 30 January 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 75. │ IV │ 642
│ │ │
2012-PS │First regulation for administration of│ │
│the law for the restoration of │ │
│professional Civil Service, 11 April │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 195. │ IV │ 647
│ │ │
2014-PS │Law amending regulations of criminal │ │
│law and criminal procedure, 24 April │ │
│1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 341. │ IV │ 648
│ │ │
2029-PS │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry│ │
│of Public Enlightenment and │ │
│Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104. │ IV │ 652
│ │ │
2030-PS │Decree concerning the Duties of the │ │
│Reich Ministry for Public │ │
│Enlightenment and Propaganda, 30 June │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 449. │ IV │ 653
│ │ │
2050-PS │The Constitution of the German Reich, │ │
│11 August 1919. 1919 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1383. │ IV │ 662
│ │ │
2058-PS │Decree for the securing of the State │ │
│Leadership, 7 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 462. │ IV │ 699
│ │ │
2059-PS │Decree of the Reich President relating│ │
│to the granting of Amnesty, 21 March │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 134. │ IV │ 701
│ │ │
2076-PS │Decree of the Government concerning │ │
│formation of Special Courts, 21 March │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│pp. 136-137. │ IV │ 705
│ │ │
2078-PS │Decree concerning establishment of │ │
│Ministry for Science, Education and │ │
│Popular Culture, 1 May 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 365. │ IV │ 706
│ │ │
2083-PS │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933.│ │
│1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│713. │ IV │ 709
│ │ │
2088-PS │Decree relating to tasks of Reichs │ │
│Ministry for Education, 11 May 1934. │ │
│1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│375. │ IV │ 718
│ │ │
*2246-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1 │ │
│September 1936, concerning Danube │ │
│situation. (USA 67) │ IV │ 930
│ │ │
*2247-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 17 │ │
│May 1935, concerning intention of │ │
│Austrian government to arm. (USA 64) │ IV │ 930
│ │ │
*2248-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 27 July│ │
│1935, concerning National Socialism in│ │
│Austria. (USA 63) │ IV │ 932
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
2403-PS │The End of the Party State, from │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, │ │
│pp. 55-56. │ V │ 71
│ │ │
2415-PS │First decree for the implementation of│ │
│law relating to The Reich Chamber of │ │
│Culture, 1 November 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 797. │ V │ 89
│ │ │
2456-PS │Youth and the Church, from Complete │ │
│Handbook of Youth Laws. │ V │ 198
│ │ │
*2461-PS │Official German communique of meeting │ │
│of Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February│ │
│1938, published in Documents of German│ │
│Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part I. (GB │ │
│132) │ V │ 206
│ │ │
2512-PS │Hitler’s Testimony Before the Court │ │
│for High Treason, published in │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 26 September │ │
│1931. │ V │ 246
│ │ │
2541-PS │Extracts from German Publications. │ V │ 285
│ │ │
2633-PS │Extracts from Constitutional Law of │ │
│the Greater German Reich, 1939. │ V │ 344
│ │ │
2655-PS │Concordat between the Holy See and the│ │
│German Reich, Article 31. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, pp. 679, │ │
│687-8. │ V │ 364
│ │ │
2742-PS │Passage written by Frick in National │ │
│Socialist Yearbook, 1927, p. 124. │ V │ 383
│ │ │
2759-PS │Law for the protection of Nationalist │ │
│Symbols, 19 May 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 285. │ V │ 394
│ │ │
2771-PS │U. S. State Department, National │ │
│Socialism, published by U. S. │ │
│Government Printing Office, 1943. │ V │ 417
│ │ │
**2799-PS │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 26 │ │
│July 1934, published in Documents of │ │
│German Politics, Vol. II, p. 83, No. │ │
│38. (Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 441
│ │ │
*2830-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 12 │ │
│May 1936, concerning May Rally of │ │
│Freedom Union. (GB 243) │ V │ 496
│ │ │
2831-PS │Letter from Office of Extraordinary │ │
│and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of │ │
│German Government to Reich │ │
│Chancellery, inclosing report on │ │
│Political situation in Austria, 14 │ │
│January 1937. │ V │ 498
│ │ │
2902-PS │Statement of von Papen, 13 November │ │
│1945, prepared by his defense lawyer. │ │
│(GB 233) │ V │ 569
│ │ │
*2962-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │
│15 March 1933. (USA 578) │ V │ 669
│ │ │
*2963-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │
│20 March 1933. (USA 656) │ V │ 670
│ │ │
**2994-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, │ │
│concerning Austrian-German Treaty of │ │
│11 July 1936. (USA 66) (Objection to │ │
│admission in evidence upheld.) │ V │ 703
│ │ │
2995-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, │ │
│concerning his visit to Berchtesgaden │ │
│on 12 February 1938. │ V │ 709
│ │ │
2996-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, │ │
│concerning events of 11 March 1938. │ V │ 713
│ │ │
*3280-PS │Extract from Papal Encyclical “Mit │ │
│Brennender Sorge”, set forth in │ │
│Appendix II, p. 524, of “The │ │
│Persecution of the Catholic Church in │ │
│the Third Reich”. (USA 567) │ V │ 1079
│ │ │
*3313-PS │Von Papen, Appeal to the German │ │
│Conscience, Stuttgart speech of 3 │ │
│March 1933. (GB 240) │ VI │ 1
│ │ │
*3314-PS │Von Papen’s address as Chancellor, 28 │ │
│August 1932, published in Frankfurter │ │
│Zeitung, 29 August 1932. (GB 234) │ VI │ 2
│ │ │
*3317-PS │Von Papen’s address as Chancellor, 12 │ │
│October 1932, published in Frankfurter│ │
│Zeitung, 13 October 1932. (GB 235) │ VI │ 3
│ │ │
*3318-PS │Visit of von Papen as Chancellor in │ │
│Munich, 11 October 1932, published in │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 12 October 1932. │ │
│(GB 241) │ VI │ 4
│ │ │
3357-PS │Exchange of letters, │ │
│Papen-Hitler-Hindenburg, from │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, │ │
│p. 158. (GB 239) │ VI │ 85
│ │ │
*3375-PS │Von Papen’s speech at Essen, 2 │ │
│November 1933, published in │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern │ │
│German Edition, 4 November 1933. (GB │ │
│245) │ VI │ 101
│ │ │
*3376-PS │Dissolution of Union of Catholic │ │
│Germans, published in The Archives, │ │
│September 1934, Vol. VI, pp. 767-768. │ │
│(GB 244) │ VI │ 103
│ │ │
*3387-PS │Hitler Reichstag speech, 23 March │ │
│1933, asking for adoption of Enabling │ │
│Act, from Voelkischer Beobachter, 24 │ │
│March 1933, p. 1. (USA 566) │ VI │ 104
│ │ │
*3389-PS │Fulda Declaration of 28 March 1933, │ │
│from Voelkischer Beobachter, 29 March │ │
│1933, p. 2. (USA 566) │ VI │ 105
│ │ │
3463-PS │Extracts from Dates from the History │ │
│of the NSDAP by Dr. Hans Volz. │ VI │ 165
│ │ │
*D-472 │Ribbentrop’s actions as Foreign │ │
│Minister, from International │ │
│Biographical Archives, 22 April 1943. │ │
│(GB 130) │ VII │ 59
│ │ │
*D-631 │Decree of Reichs president against │ │
│political excesses, 14 June 1932. 1932│ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp. │ │
│297-300. (GB 236) │ VII │ 101
│ │ │
*D-632 │Biography of Papen, from International│ │
│Biographical Archives, 26 October │ │
│1944. (GB 237) │ VII │ 102
│ │ │
D-633 │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 13 │ │
│November 1932. (GB 238) │ VII │ 106
│ │ │
*D-634 │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 16 │ │
│November 1932. (GB 238) │ VII │ 107
│ │ │
*D-635 │Radiogram from von Papen to Board of │ │
│Trade for German-American Commerce, 27│ │
│March 1933. (Translation published in │ │
│New York Times.) (GB 242) │ VII │ 111
│ │ │
*D-660 │Extracts from Hutchinson’s Illustrated│ │
│edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128) │ VII │ 164
│ │ │
*L-83 │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July│ │
│1945. (USA 234) │ VII │ 859
│ │ │
*L-150 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │
│Ambassador Bullitt and von Neurath, │ │
│German Minister for Foreign Affairs, │ │
│18 May 1936. (USA 65) │ VII │ 890
│ │ │
*TC-22 │Agreement between Austria and German │ │
│Government and Government of Federal │ │
│State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB │ │
│20) │ VIII │ 369
19. ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART
Within the Nazi conspiracy Seyss-Inquart became the expert manipulator
and subjugator of countries to be invaded or already invaded by the Nazi
conspirators, first of Austria, later of Poland and The Netherlands. For
the benefit of the Nazi conspirators he enslaved these countries, making
them vassals of the Nazi regime.
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY SEYSS-INQUART._
(1) _Positions Held by Artur Seyss-Inquart in the Order Set Forth
in the Indictment._
(_a_) Member of the NSDAP (Nazi Party), 13 March 1938 to 8 May
1945.
(_b_) General in the SS, 15 March 1938 to 8 May 1945.
(_c_) State Councillor of Austria, May 1937 to 12 February 1938.
(_d_) Minister of Interior and Security of Austria, 16 February
1938 to 11 March 1938.
(_e_) Chancellor of Austria, 11 March 1938 to 15 March 1938.
(_f_) Member of the Reichstag, April 1938 to 8 May 1945.
(_g_) Member of the Reich Cabinet, 1 May 1939 to 1945.
(_h_) Reich Minister without Portfolio, 1 May 1939 to September
1939.
(_i_) Chief of the Civil Administration of South Poland, early
September 1939.
(_j_) Deputy Governor-General of the Polish Occupied Territory, 12
October 1939 to 18 May 1940.
(_k_) Reich Commissar for Occupied Netherlands 18 May 1940 to 8
May 1945. (_2910-PS_)
(2) _Positions Held in Addition to Those Set Forth in the
Indictment._
(_a_) Reich Governor of Austria, 15 March 1938 to 1 May 1939.
(_2910-PS_)
(_b_) President of the German Academy, Munich, 1943. (_3457-PS_)
(3) _Previous Occupations of Seyss-Inquart._
(_a_) Commissioned officer in a Tyrol-Kaiserjaeger Regiment of the
Austrian Army in World War I, 1914-1918.
(_b_) Lawyer in Vienna, Austria. (_3425-PS_)
B. _SEYSS-INQUART USED HIS POSITIONS AND INFLUENCE SO AS TO PROMOTE THE
NAZI SEIZURE AND CONSOLIDATION OF CONTROL OVER AUSTRIA._
(1) _Seyss-Inquart was a member of the Nazi Party and held the rank of
General in the SS._ Seyss-Inquart has admitted that he became a member
of the Nazi Party on 13 March 1938; that he was made a General in the SS
on 15 March 1938, and held both membership and rank until 8 May 1945.
(_2910-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart, in a letter to Goering, on 14 July 1939, asserted that he
had been a member of the Nazi Party since 1931. The following is an
excerpt from that letter:
“Until July 1934, I conducted myself as a regular member of the
Party. And if I had quietly in whatever form paid my membership
dues, the first one according to a receipt, I paid in December
1931.” (_2219-PS_)
In a voluntary statement signed by Seyss-Inquart, with the advice of his
counsel, he discussed his affiliation with the Nazi Party as follows:
“I supported also the National Socialist Party as long as it was
legal, because it declared itself with particular determination
in favor of the Anschluss. From 1932 onward I made financial
contributions to this Party, but I discontinued financial
support when it was declared illegal in 1934.” (_3425-PS_)
In contrast with the foregoing assertions of the defendant,
Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Heinrich Himmler on 19 August 1939 in
which he confirmed the fact that he became a member of the Nazi Party in
1931 and also stated that he continued his membership in the Nazi Party
even after it was declared illegal in Austria. The following is an
excerpt from that letter:
“Concerning my membership in the Nazi Party, I want to state
that I never was asked to enter the Nazi Party but I asked Dr.
Kier in December 1931 to take care of my relation to the Party.
At that time I saw the basis of the solution of the Austrian
question only in the Party. I wrote this already in the year
1929 to Dr. Neubacher to adjust his hopes which he had put in
the Austria-German Volksbund. After that, I paid my membership
fees and, as I remember, direct to the Gau Wien. The payments
were made even after the party was forbidden. Some time later, I
got in direct touch with the _Ortsgruppe_ in Dornbach. The
membership fees were paid by my wife but the Blockwart couldn’t
possibly have any doubt that those payments were for my wife and
myself since the amount of the fees, S 40 [40 Schillings] a
month, was a sure indication of this fact and I was treated in
every respect as a Party member. Besides that, I was, since
1932, a member of the _Steirischen Heimatschutzes Kammerhofer_.
In this organization I made every effort to absorb the
_Steirische Heimatschutz_ in the Party and mainly on account of
my efforts, von Habicht declared that the members of the
_Steirische Heimatschutz_ were members of the Party. That proves
that I felt myself, in every respect, as a member of the Party
and I was regarded as belonging to the Party and as I said
before, already in December 1931.” (_3271-PS_)
(2) _Seyss-Inquart, even before he became a member of the Nazi Party,
belonged to an organization conceived and founded upon principles which
later became those of the Nazi Party._ Seyss-Inquart has stated in
writing that he had been a member of a secret organization known as the
“German Brotherhood” (_Deutsche Gemeinschaft_). This is evidenced by the
following excerpts from his letter to Himmler of 19 August 1939:
“It must be known to you that at the time of the Black-Red
Coalition, there existed an extremely secret organization under
the name of ‘German Community.’ Here met all sorts of
Nationalists and Catholic elements who, at least at that time,
were anti-Semitic and anti-Marxists. Dr. Doelter, who was my
office chief, was one of the leaders of this association and
through him I came into this movement. Dolfuss was also active
here. He was of my age and was a very active anti-Semitic. It is
through success of the activities of this organization that the
Black-Red Coalition was broken and the Marxists never came back
in the government. After the establishment of National
Socialism, this organization was dissolved.” (_3271-PS_)
The secret organization, “German Brotherhood”, (_Deutsche
Gemeinschaft_), was organized to promote the anti-Semitic and anti-Free
Mason doctrines later adopted by the Nazi Party. This fact is evidenced
by Seyss-Inquart’s copy of the minutes of a meeting of this organization
on 28 December 1918 and by its constitution and by-laws, a portion of
which appear in the following quotation:
“The purpose of this organization is the liberation of the
German people from Jewish influences, and combat against Jewry
with all available means. The organization is secret. Since a
contact of the organization with the public can’t be avoided it
has to be done under pretense of unsuspicious purposes and
without showing the actual set-up.” (_3400-PS_)
New members of this organization were required to make a sworn
statement, i.e.:
“As a German man, I assure with my honor, as far as I know,
there is no Jewish blood in my descendency. Furthermore, I am
not connected by marriage with a wife or other companion of
Jewish descendency, and I never will have relation with one of
those. I am not a Free Mason, I assure to be forever a good
member of the Deutsche Gemeinschaft and I will always represent
the interest of the German people against the Jewish people and
I am willing to fight the Jewish people with all my power, any
place and at any time. I promise to obey all orders and decrees
of the leadership of the organization and to preserve complete
secrecy about their institution, about the persons of the
organization, and the events within it, as long as I live.”
(_3400-PS_)
New members were also asked the question: “In case you will be accepted,
are you willing to employ only Aryan physicians, attorneys, and
businessmen?” (_3400-PS_)
(3) _Seyss-Inquart, after the Austrian Nazi Party was declared illegal
in July 1934, posed as a non-member of the Nazi Party but continued to
support it in its activities, principles, and objectives in a subversive
manner._
Seyss-Inquart has stated that:
“Before the Anschluss, I worked for the legal, political
activities of the Austrian Socialists under the conditions laid
down in the Austrian Constitution. * * * From 1932 onwards I
made financial contributions to this party but I discontinued
financial support when it was declared illegal in 1934. From
July 1934 until the year 1936 I supported individual National
Socialists as lawyer and in collaboration with the welfare work
Langoth in Linz. From July 1936 onwards, I endeavored to help
the National Socialists to regain their legal status and finally
to participate in the Austrian Government. * * * I was
sympathetic towards the efforts of the Austrian Nazi Party to
gain political power and corresponding influence because they
were in favor of the Anschluss. * * * On 10 March 1938 I
suggested to Chancellor Schuschnigg, as a solution to the
difficulties resulting from his plebiscite plan, that the
National Socialists be appointed to the Cabinet, after I became
in May 1937 State Councillor and then on 16-2-1938 Minister of
Interior and Security.” (_3425-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart was an official in the Austrian Government, yet he
rendered services, and physical and moral support to the illegal
Austrian Nazi Party during those years, knowing that the radical
elements engaged in terroristic acts.
“During this time, particularly after the Party was forbidden in
July 1934, I knew that the radical element of the Party was
engaged in terroristic activities, such as the attacks on
railroads, bridges, telephone communications, etc. I knew that
the governments of both Chancellors Dolfuss and Schuschnigg,
although they held the same total German viewpoint in principle,
were opposed to the Anschluss then because of the National
Socialist regime in the Reich. I was sympathetic towards the
efforts of the Austrian Nazi Party to gain political power and
corresponding influence, because they were in favor of the
Anschluss. On the day of the unsuccessful ‘putsch,’ 25 July
1934, I was at my home in Stannern near Iglau, Czechoslovakia. I
learned later that the murder of Chancellor Dolfuss on that day
was the outcome of a ‘putsch’ plan, in which SS circles were
mainly involved, to arrest the Chancellor and put in an Austrian
government with National Socialist participation. Eight or ten
days before this unsuccessful ‘putsch’ Chancellor Dolfuss sent
for me. We discussed the disturbances and troubled state of
affairs created in Austria by the radical element of the
Austrian National Socialists. I advised Chancellor Dolfuss to
make an arrangement with Hitler because the Austrian National
Socialists and even this radical element would obey Hitler’s
orders. I conjectured—later I found confirmation—that these
terroristic activities had a certain support from the Reich.
Chancellor Dolfuss told me he would think the matter over and
made a tentative future appointment for a further discussion. I
informed among others, also acquaintances, of this conversation
whom I knew had influence among the Austrian National
Socialists. About one week later Chancellor Dolfuss informed me
that at the moment he had no time for further discussion.”
(_3425-PS_)
(4) _Seyss-Inquart derived personal benefits and political power as the
result of the subversive manipulations and terroristic activities of his
fellow Nazi collaborators._ He was appointed State Councillor of Austria
in May 1937, and Minister of the Interior and Security of that country
as the direct result of Nazi manipulation. These facts he has admitted:
“My appointment as State Councillor was the result of an
agreement between Austria and Germany on 11-7-1936. My
appointment as Minister of the Interior and Security was one of
the results of the conference between Chancellor Schuschnigg and
Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 12-2-1938.” (_3425-PS_)
Another result of the Berchtesgaden conference was that Austrian Nazis
were thereafter allowed openly to demonstrate their conviction, an
advantage which they exploited to the full.
“The Austrian National Socialists must certainly have taken my
appointment as Minister of Interior and Security as an
indication of their right to activity. Still more, however, the
outcome of the agreement of 12-2-1938 allowed them to
demonstrate their convictions. This right they utilized in more
and more widespread demonstrations.” (_3425-PS_)
(5) _Seyss-Inquart used his affiliation with the Nazis to promote the
absorption of Austria into the Greater German Reich, according to plan
as conceived by his fellow Nazi conspirators._ Seyss-Inquart had had a
continuous and constant interest in the union of Austria and Germany for
twenty years, and during all that time worked, planned, and collaborated
with others until the union became an accomplished fact.
“In 1918 I became interested in the Anschluss of Austria with
Germany. From that year on I worked, planned, and collaborated
with others of a like mind to bring about a union. * * * It was
my desire to effect this union of the two countries—in an
evolutionary manner and by legal means. Among my Austrian
collaborators were Dr. Neubacher, City Councillor Speiser, the
University Professor Hugelmann, and Dr. Wilhelm Bauer, Professor
Wettstein and others. Later, during the rise of National
Socialism, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, Dr. Jury, Glaise-Horstenau,
Major Klausner, Dr. Muehlmann, Globotschnigg, and others. * * *
After I became State Councillor, I discussed several times with
von Papen, the German Ambassador, the possibilities of an
understanding between the Austrian government and the Austrian
National Socialists, respectively the Reich. We did not talk of
the Anschluss as an actual program. However, we were both of the
opinion that a successful understanding would bring about in the
course of time the Anschluss by evolutionary means in some form.
The last time I spoke to von Papen was in January 1938 in
Garmisch where I met him by chance.” (_3425-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart contributed his efforts to revive the Austrian Nazi Party
after the unsuccessful “putsch” of July 25, 1934, and to provide relief
for the families of arrested and condemned Nazis. He has described these
activities in the following words:
“The effect of the ‘Putsch’ was a complete catastrophe to the
National Socialist Camp. Not merely the leaders, but party
members were arrested in so far as they did not escape; the
confiscation of their fortunes was announced; the revolt which
led to military actions in Steiriermark, Karnten and
Oberoesterreich did cost victims; the political management was
seriously compromised by the Nazis and above all, a most
sinister looking situation was created in regard to foreign
politics. In any case, the idea of a union had suffered a severe
setback. I was in agreement about the effect with Dr. Neubacher,
and it was our desire to assist easing the tension. Following
this situation I felt urged to take up politics beyond the
question of the ‘Anschluss.’ * * * The former National delegate
to the ‘Langoth’ in Linz was working with Rheintaller. Dr.
Neubacher and myself contacted this circle and met there some
other men whose names I have forgotten, but who later did not
play a particular role. After some time, the lawyer applicant
from Linz, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, joined this circle. He was said to
be an SS man. The main activities consisted in organizing an
institution to succor the needy families of those arrested and
condemned Nazis. * * * As matters calmed down, the Austrian
National Socialists collected themselves again into an illegal
party, the organization was built up for better or worse
according to the old schedule, those who returned from the Reich
were considered to be more ‘in the know’ and authoritative. The
institution of succor, ‘Langoth,’ remained outside the party
organization. But here were also men in the Nazi circles who
considered an absolute dependence on the Reich as politically
wrong and endeavored for an independent Austrian National
Socialist Party. In effect, Dr. Rainer from Karnten belonged to
those, and by his influence the future Gauleiter Klausner who is
now dead; also Globotschnigg was in it, though I doubt he was
sincerely convinced, and also others. Dr. Neubacher took a
keener interest in political affairs and entered into
relationship with the proper Party circles.” (_3254-PS_)
The defendant submitted his plans to Hitler, Hess, and Goering for their
approval, and contacted other German Nazis.
“After my appointment as State Councillor, Wilhelm Keppler, the
German Secretary of State for Austrian affairs, arranged a visit
for me with Hess and Goering. I explained my intentions and
plans to them, namely, the attainment of the legal activity for
the Austrian National Socialist, independent of the Reich Party.
Hess expressed his interest and said to me among other things:
he regretted that I was not one of the original ‘old fighters.’
I believe that at that time Goering had already established
direct connections with the Austrian State Secretary, Guido
Schmid. After my appointment as Minister of Interior and
Security of Austria, I went to Berlin to visit Hitler. I arrived
in Berlin on 17-2-1938 where I was met by Keppler who took me to
Himmler. This visit was not anticipated in my program. Himmler
wanted to talk over police matters, I informed him, however,
that I was not conversant to speak about them. I did not follow
the suggestions which he made. I greeted Hitler with raised
hand—permissible after the agreement of 12-2—advised him,
however, immediately that as Austrian Minister, my
responsibility lay with Austria. I explained to Hitler my plans,
namely: I was to be the living guaranty for Dr. Schuschnigg of
the evolutionary way. The Austria National Socialists must only
conduct their activities according to the Austrian Constitution
and on those lines find their way to the Reich; they must not
make any totalitarian claim nor conduct a cultural struggle. The
leadership of the Austrian National Socialists must be
independent of the Reich and remain responsible to Austria. I
would have, as Minister of Security, to oppose any kind of
illegal activity. Against this the Austrian National Socialist
would be permitted full freedom of activity to work for the
closest cooperation of Austria and Germany. Hitler agreed to my
plans but expressed certain doubts whether Dr. Schuschnigg would
be willing to go so far. During my conference with Hitler,
Keppler and Ribbentrop waited in the ante-room of Hitler’s
office.” (_3425-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart’s fellow Nazi conspirators regarded his position as
Councillor of State in the Austrian Government as most important to
them, because he had a mandate from the German Nazis in power, which he
was attempting to carry out. Because his negotiations with Chancellor
Schuschnigg seemed to be running aground, Seyss-Inquart sent a report of
that fact to Keppler by courier, stating that he felt compelled to
return his mandate, and expressing a desire to discuss the matter before
acting accordingly. Keppler immediately sought advice from Goering in a
letter dated 6 January 1938. On that same day Goering’s secretary was
instructed to telephone instructions to Keppler to do anything to avoid
the resignations of Councillor of State Dr. Seyss-Inquart and State
Minister Glaise von Horstenau. Keppler received this telephone message
on 7 January 1938, and on 8 January 1938 wrote a letter to Seyss-Inquart
informing him of Goering’s instructions and relaying Goering’s request
not to give up the mandate under any circumstances without discussing
the matter with Goering. (_3473-PS_; _3397-PS_)
Despite assertions, in statements since his arrest and indictment, to
the effect that he desired a union of Austria and Germany in an
evolutionary manner and by legal means, Seyss-Inquart has on other
occasions made statements to the contrary. His letter of 14 July 1939 to
Goering is particularly illuminating on this point:
“I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical
regime on its own ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance
to use whatever method he desires. I told myself that this
Austria was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an
iron determination because I and my friends have had to fight
against the whole political church, and Free Masonry, the Jewry,
in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness
which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our
political annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of
the means and tools to carry out his ingenious political
solution for Austria as became evident in the days of March
1938. I have been fully conscious of the fact that I am
following a path which is not comprehensible to the masses and
also not to my party comrades. I have followed it calmly and
would without hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied
that at one point I could serve the Fuehrer as a tool in his
work, even though my former attitude, even now, gives occasion
to very worthy and honorable Party comrades to doubt my
trustworthiness. I have never paid attention to such things
because I am satisfied with the opinion which the Fuehrer and
the men close to him have of me.” (_2219-PS_)
Another statement of the defendant, which throws some light on this
point, is found in his letter to Himmler dated 19 August 1939:
“On November 8, 1938, the Fuehrer invited several political
leaders for supper. The Fuehrer asked me to be next to him. We
discussed the situation in Ostmark. I told him that in
accordance with his order, we started to dissolve the competence
of the Austrian government by giving the powers partly to the
Gauen and partly to the central leaders. But there still would
remain certain affairs which would be common for all Gauen.”
(_3271-PS_)
Furthermore, Seyss-Inquart has made the following statement:
“I was happy that the Anschluss of Austria with the German Reich
had come at last after so many vain endeavors since 1918 because
I was in favor of the Anschluss of Austria with the Reich under
many conditions. I was aware at least to a certain extent of the
harshness of the National Socialist regime, but I was of the
opinion that these two German countries belonged together and
that the German people should solve their own internal affairs
and difficulties. I was convinced that the harshness of the
National Socialist regime chiefly because of its achievement of
the National aim—cancellation of discriminatory peace treaties
and achievement of the right of self-determination—would in
time be surmounted.” (_3425-PS_)
The subversive machinations of the Austrian Nazis to bring about the
absorption of Austria by the Greater German Reich was described in
detail by Dr. Friedrich Rainer, a leading Austrian Nazi and a
collaborator of Seyss-Inquart who became one of Hitler’s Gauleiters, in
a report prepared by him and forwarded to Buerckel. A copy of this
report accompanied by a letter of transmittal was later sent to
Seyss-Inquart by Dr. Rainer. In substance, the report related how the
Nazi party lost a parliamentary battle in 1933, continued its efforts to
force admission of its representatives into the Austrian government, and
finally flowered into the unsuccessful “Putsch” of July 1934, which, in
effect, destroyed the Nazi organization. Following the unsuccessful
“Putsch”, Hitler liquidated the first stage of the battle, and
instructed Franz von Papen to restore normal relationships between the
two countries. Accordingly, a new method of political penetration was
adopted. The result was that Hinterleitner, an Austrian Nazi got in
touch with the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connections with Dr.
Wachter originating from Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising.
Seyss-Inquart also had a good position in the legal field and especially
well established relations with Christian Social politicians. Dr.
Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the “Styrian Heimatschutz” and had
become a Nazi party member when the entire “Styrian Heimatschutz” was
incorporated in the NSDAP. The reason for utilizing Seyss-Inquart
appears in the following excerpt from the covering letter which
accompanied Dr. Rainer’s report to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef
Buerckel, dated 6 July 1939:
“I think the main reason for the fact that the person of Dr.
Seyss-Inquart seemed to Hitler and to public opinion to have
stepped in the limelight in those March days, was that no
position existed in the party which one might have presented
oneself to the public, and that there was no man who had the
guts to let himself be presented. The actual reason was that the
party leadership had to remain secret during the whole illegal
fight, secret even from the Reich German public.” (_812-PS_)
Thus it is clear why Seyss-Inquart was surreptitiously a member of the
Austrian Nazi Party after it was declared illegal in 1934.
Dr. Rainer goes on to report that full recognition of the party
leadership was given by Seyss-Inquart and also that the defendant was in
permanent contact with Captain Leopold, who became a member of the staff
of Hess. After Hinterleitner was arrested, Dr. Rainer became his
successor as leader of the Austrian Nazi Party, and, on 16 July 1936,
Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited Hitler at Obersalzburg, where they
received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the
Fuehrer. Subsequently, on 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in
Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Dr.
Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions
for carrying out the fight. After the agreement between Germany and
Austria on 11 July 1936, Hitler appointed Wilhelm Keppler as Chief of a
mixed commission to supervise the execution of the agreement. At the
same time Keppler was given full authority for the Nazi Party in
Austria. (_812-PS_)
(6) _The activities of Seyss-Inquart and his fellow Nazi conspirators
and collaborators forced the then Austrian government into a critical
situation and a struggle for survival._ As the result of the plans,
maneuvers, and disturbances created by the Nazis in Austria,
Schuschnigg, Chancellor of Austria, accompanied by his State Secretary,
Guido Schmid, conferred with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 12 February
1938. Dr. Muehlmann was also present but not as a member of the
Schuschnigg delegation. At this meeting the possibilities for military
action by Germany against Austria were demonstrated to the Chancellor.
The ultimate result was that Chancellor Schuschnigg had no choice but to
accept the demands of Hitler that the Austrian Nazi Party be legalized;
that amnesty be granted to Austrian Nazis already convicted for illegal
activities; and that Seyss-Inquart be appointed Minister of the Interior
and Security in the Austrian cabinet, (_2995-PS_; _3254-PS_; _3425-PS_;
_2469-PS_; _2464-PS_)
A few days after the Berchtesgaden meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg,
and immediately after his appointment as Minister of the Interior and
Security of Austria, Seyss-Inquart went to Berlin for a conference with
Hitler. Upon arrival in Berlin he was met by Keppler, Hitler’s special
delegate on Austrian affairs, who took him to Himmler. After a short
conference with Himmler, the defendant was conducted to Hitler, to whom
he gave the Nazi salute and with whom he had a conference lasting two
hours and ten minutes. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Keppler
waited in the ante-chamber during the conference. Seyss-Inquart first
offered Hitler an explanation for greeting him with the Hitler salute,
by saying: “I consider him as the Fuehrer of the German people who led
us out of the discriminations of the peace treaties.” During the
conference, he rendered a report to Hitler concerning the Austrian
situation since June of 1934 and presented his own program for Hitler’s
approval. Hitler expressed his approval of the plan but told
Seyss-Inquart that he doubted whether Chancellor Schuschnigg would be
willing to go so far. It seems clear that Hitler’s doubt concerning
Schuschnigg’s approval of the Seyss-Inquart plan referred solely to
Seyss-Inquart’s proposal to allow Austrian Nazis to “conduct their
activities according to the Austrian Constitution and on those lines
find their way to the Reich,” because all other portions of his plan had
previously been adopted as a result of the Berchtesgaden Agreement.
(_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_; _2484-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart has asserted that, upon his return to Vienna after his
conference with Hitler, he reported to Chancellor Schuschnigg the
content of his discussion and urged the Chancellor to make a decision
about the Austrian National Socialist question. He then attended rallies
of the Austrian National Socialists held in various places in Austria to
inform them of the content of his conference with Hitler. Two of the
principal meetings were held at Graz and Linz (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_).
Considerable doubt is cast upon the truth of Seyss-Inquart’s assertions
that he reported the contents of his conference with Hitler to
Chancellor Schuschnigg and in public meetings of the Austrian Nazis, by
a statement contained in a letter written by Seyss-Inquart to Himmler on
19 August 1939. The statement is as follows:
“I had a conversation of over two hours with the Fuehrer on
February 17, 1938, in which I explained to him my point of view.
I would only be able to make statements about the content of
this conversation if the Fuehrer would grant me permission. I
left this discussion as a very sincere man and with a feeling of
great happiness to be of help to the Fuehrer.” (_3271-PS_)
(7) _Finally Chancellor Schuschnigg determined to go before the people
for a decision on the question of Austrian independence._ Chancellor
Schuschnigg planned to hold a plebiscite on that precise question and
fixed 13 March 1938 as a date upon which the plebiscite would be held.
The Chancellor took Seyss-Inquart into his confidence and discussed the
matter of the plebiscite with him. The Chancellor requested
Seyss-Inquart to keep the matter a secret until noon of the next day,
and the defendant promised to do so. Thereafter, Seyss-Inquart prepared
a letter to Schuschnigg objecting to the plebiscite on constitutional
grounds and alleging that the manner in which the plebiscite was to be
held would not allow the Austrians to express their own desires.
Seyss-Inquart admits that a copy of his letter was delivered to Hitler
in Berlin by Globotschnigg. (_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_)
On 9 March 1938, a meeting of the Austrian Nazis was held because they
had learned, through an illegal information service, that a plebiscite
was to be held. Dr. Rainer describes this meeting in the following
language:
“The ‘_Landesleitung_’ received word about the planned
plebiscite through illegal information services on 9 March 1938
at 10 a. m. At the session, which was called immediately
afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this
information only a few hours, but that he could not talk about
it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject.
But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal
information we received was based on truth, and that in view of
the new situation, he had been cooperating with the
‘_Landesleitung_’ from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury,
Rainer, Globotschnigg, and Seyss-Inquart were present at the
first talks which were held at 10 a. m. There it was decided
that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately;
secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be
given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister
Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must
negotiate with the government until clear instructions and
orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer
together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of
it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on
the afternoon of 9 March 1938.” (_812-PS_).
Seyss-Inquart himself admits that he attended this meeting, which was
held at the Regina Hotel, Vienna (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_). The defendant
was informed at this meeting that he would receive a letter from Hitler
by messenger the next morning. (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_).
Early on the morning of 11 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart received Hitler’s
letter. He describes it as having contained several erroneous statements
and containing a demand that a decision should be arrived at before
noon; that in case of rejection the Reich Government would denounce the
agreement of 12 February 1938 and military action must be understood.
According to Seyss-Inquart, Hitler also gave expression to his belief
that there would be disturbances in Austria if Chancellor Schuschnigg
would not relent and that the Reich would come to the help of Austria if
Austria demanded so. Glaise-Horstenau arrived by plane in Vienna early
that same morning with the information that Berlin was greatly excited
and that military steps were in preparation. (_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_)
(8) _Seyss-Inquart then proceeded to carry out Hitler’s orders and to
fulfill the plans made by himself and his fellow Nazi conspirators._ Dr.
Rainer in his report to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, and in
his covering letter dated 6 July 1939, related his version of the
sequence of events during this period and described the precise role of
Seyss-Inquart, as he viewed it. He complained about the fact that Hitler
and the general public seemed to give Seyss-Inquart all the credit for
the annexation of Austria by Germany. The following quotation from this
letter and report is significant:
“Soon after taking over in Austria, Klausner, Globocnik, and I
flew to Berlin to report to Hitler’s deputy, Hess, about the
events which led to our taking over the government. We did this
because we had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps
also Hitler’s own, was that the liberation depended more on
Austrian matters of state rather than the Party. To be more
exact, Hitler especially mentioned Dr. Seyss-Inquart alone; and
public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus
believed him to have played the sole leading role.” (_812-PS_)
Dr. Rainer then proceeded to describe just what happened in those
critical days, and outlined the final instructions given by him for
Friday, 11 March 1938. He explained that three situations might develop
within the following days:
“1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held. In this case, a
great demonstration must be held.
“2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a
demonstration was ordered in taking over the government power.
“3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight. In this case, all
party leaders were ordered to act upon their own initiative,
using all means to capture the position of power.” (_812-PS_)
Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiters.
“On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in
Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with
Seyss-Inquart he went to see the chancellor. At 11:30 a. m. the
‘_Landesleitung_’ had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer,
Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fishboeck and
Muehlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks
with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the
proposal of the two ministers.
“In regard to Rainer’s proposal, von Klausner ordered that the
government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400
hours, signed by legal political, ‘Front’ men, including both
ministers and also State Councillors Fishboeck and Jury, for the
establishment of a voting date in three weeks and a free and
secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.
“On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had
brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of
copies, and a telegram to the Fuehrer calling for help, were
prepared.
“Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions
in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a
session of all ministers for 2:00 p. m. Rainer agreed with
Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer
and the statement to the population at 3:00 p. m. and at the
same time he would start all necessary actions to take over
power unless he received news from the session of the ministers’
council before that time. During this time all measures had been
prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart ’phoned Rainer and informed him
that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had
recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new
plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for
maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers had
resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered: ‘No.’ Rainer informed the
‘Reichskanzlei’ through the German Embassy, and received an
answer from Goering through the same channels that the Fuehrer
will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must
resign. Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and
Muehlmann; talks were had between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg:
Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures
the party wished taken. Rainer’s answer: Reestablishment of the
government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the party, and
calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force.
Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but
very soon the announcement followed that everything might be
threatened by the resistance of Miklas. Meanwhile word arrived
from the German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the
establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a
national majority, the legalization of the party, and permission
for the legion to return, all within the specified time of 7:30
p. m.; otherwise, German troops would cross the border at 8:00
p. m. At 5:00 p. m. Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by
Muehlmann, went to the Chancellor’s office to carry out this
errand.
“Due to the cooperation of the above-mentioned people with group
leader Keppler and other officials of the Reich and due to the
activities of other contact-men in Austria, it was possible to
obtain the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as ‘_Staatsrat_’
[councillor of State] in July 1937. Due to the same facts, the
Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg was forced to take a new so-called
‘satisfactory action’. Through all this a new and stronger
political position was won in the Austrian system. The
National-Socialist Party became acceptable again in the
political field and became a partner with whom one had to
negotiate, even when it was not officially incorporated into
internal Austrian political developments. This complicated
political maneuver, accompanied by the steadily increasing
pressure from the Reich, led to talks between the Fuehrer and
Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg. Here Gruppenfuehrer Keppler
presented the concrete political demands of the fighting
underground movement, which he estimated according to his
personal experiences and the information he received. The
results of these talks were the right of a free acknowledgment
of the National Socialist movement on the one hand and the
recognition of an independent Austrian state on the other hand,
as well as the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of
Interior and Public Safety, as a person who will guarantee to
both sides the proper carrying out of the agreements. In this
way Seyss-Inquart occupied the key position and was in the
center of all obvious political actions. A legal base in the
government was won for the party. This resulted in a paralysis
of the ‘system apparates’ [Schuschnigg government] at a time
when a revolution needed to be carried out. Through this, the
basis for a new attack on the Schuschnigg government was won.
“Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a
government which included, blacks, reds and National Socialists,
and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The
latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to
negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and
therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might
result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette. Director of the cabinet
Huber, Guido Schmid, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor
Stein, Military Attache General Muffe, and the ‘Gruppenfuehrer’
Keppler, who had arrived in the meantime, were also negotiating.
At 7:00 Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation
at 7:30 p. m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint
Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a
German invasion.
“Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet
have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first
be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most
dangerous. It is feared that street fighting will break out any
moment because Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at
3 o’clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the government
palace in order to force the reconstruction of the government.
The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by
Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8:00 p. m.
the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings
and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p. m.
Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of
Austria to take over power in all eight ‘gaus’ of Austria, with
the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all
government representatives who try to resist should be told that
this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
“With this, the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the
complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking
over of all important posts by the party * * *.
“The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the
Fuehrer’s threat of invasion and the legal standing of
Seyss-Inquart in the government. The national result in the form
of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to
the actual seizure of power by the party on one hand, and the
political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on
the other; but both factors may be considered only in the
relation to the Fuehrer’s decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the
Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders
consequently issued by the Fuehrer.” (_812-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart’s own story of the events on 11 March 1938 is not
fundamentally different, although he does show a marked tendency to
minimize his role in the planning, precipitating, and accomplishment of
the annexation of Austria by Germany, in a statement signed by him after
his arrest and indictment:
“At 10 o’clock in the morning Glaise-Horstenau and I went to the
Bundes Chancellery and conferred for about two hours with Dr.
Schuschnigg. We told him of all that we knew, particularly about
the possibility of disturbances and preparations by the Reich.
The Chancellor said that he would give his decision by 1400
hours. While I was with Glaise-Horstenau and Dr. Schuschnigg, I
was repeatedly called to the telephone to speak to Goering. He
informed me, (the demands of the Reich steadily increasing) that
the agreement of 12-2 had been cancelled, and demanded Dr.
Schuschnigg’s resignation and my appointment as Chancellor. I
delivered this information verbally to Dr. Schuschnigg and
withdrew from the conference.
“In the meantime Keppler arrived from Berlin and had a
conference in the Bundes Chancellery, I believe also with
President Miklas. The latter refused to concede to the demands
and sought to find various other solutions. When Keppler arrived
from Berlin he showed me the contents of a telegram which I, as
leader of the provisional Austrian Government, was to send to
Hitler and in which I was to request sending of German troops to
Austria to put down disorders. I refused as I did not want to
establish myself as head of a provisional government, and there
were no disorders in Austria. Keppler repeatedly urged me about
the telegram. Around 6 p. m. I told him that he knew my
standpoint and should do what he wished with Berlin. Keppler, as
I have been able to confirm from records available, understood
my answer and did not send off the telegram at that time. Around
7:30 p. m. a frontier police post announced that German troops
were crossing the frontier. Thereupon Dr. Schuschnigg gave his
well known farewell speech over the radio. Upon requests from
various sides I followed with a speech over the radio, stating
that I was still functioning as Minister of Interior and
Security, requesting preservation of peace and order, and gave
directions that no resistance should be offered the German
troops.
“As I am able to gather from the records available, I was again
requested about 10 p. m. to give my sanction to another somewhat
altered telegram, about which I informed President Miklas and
Dr. Schuschnigg. Finally President Miklas appointed me
Chancellor and a little while later he approved of my proposed
ministers.” (_3425-PS_)
However, Seyss-Inquart displayed undue modesty in this statement. His
letter to Himmler indicates how active he was on 11 March 1938, and
reveals that he was not satisfied with making demands upon Chancellor
Schuschnigg, but also handed an ultimatum to President Miklas:
“It is only possible that Buerckel made a statement that in the
critical hours it was hard to find me. After I had handed an
ultimatum to Miklas which was respited until 5:45 p. m. I took a
recess of about a half hour to catch some fresh air. I conceded
that I was, in a way, exhausted from the things which happened
just a few hours before that and I tried to find recreation in
the fresh air. Besides that I planned to take a look at the
situation on the streets. Furthermore, I wanted to make a phone
call to Berlin, not from the Chancellery, but from some other
place. Phone calls from the Chancellery were always tapped
whereas they were only sometimes tapped from other places. I was
sure they didn’t need me until 5:30 p. m., because the men of
the old system would not make a decision a second earlier than
they had to.” (_3271-PS_)
A stenographic transcript of Goering’s telephone conversation with
Seyss-Inquart confirms the fact that Seyss-Inquart was ordered to demand
Chancellor Schuschnigg’s resignation and the appointment of himself as
Chancellor. (_2949-PS_)
This stenographic record of Goering’s conversations also reveals that
Seyss-Inquart had an agent keep in contact with Goering during the
negotiations with Chancellor Schuschnigg. Seyss-Inquart was given an
order by Goering through this agent to report by 7:30 p. m., 11 March
1938, that he had formed a new government. He was informed that the
foreign political aspect would be handled exclusively by Germany and
that Hitler would talk with him about this matter at a future date.
(_2949-PS_)
In addition the stenographic transcript of these telephone conversations
show that the selection of individual members of the cabinet of the new
government to be established by Seyss-Inquart was to be made by the Nazi
conspirators in Berlin. (_2949-PS_)
At 1726 hours on the night of 11 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart reported to
Goering by telephone as ordered. He reported that President Miklas had
accepted the resignation of Chancellor Schuschnigg but wanted to appoint
a man like Ender to the Chancellorship. He further reported his
suggestion to the President that the Chancellorship be entrusted to
him—Seyss-Inquart—and also reported that “We have ordered the SA and
the SS to take over police duties.” Thereupon Goering ordered
Seyss-Inquart to go with Lt. Gen. Muff to President Miklas and inform
him that if the demands were not met immediately German troops, already
advancing to the frontier, would invade Austria that night and Austria
would cease to exist. An audience with the President was to be demanded.
The invasion would be stopped only if President Miklas entrusted
Seyss-Inquart with the Chancellorship. Seyss-Inquart was also instructed
to call out the National Socialists of Austria all over the country,
because Austrian Nazis should even then be in the streets. Seyss-Inquart
was to report again at 7:30 p. m. (_2949-PS_)
The telegram, already prepared, asking Hitler to send German troops into
Austria, over the defendant Seyss-Inquart’s signature, was transmitted
as ordered and agreed upon. (_2463-PS_)
Even before Seyss-Inquart received his appointment as Chancellor of
Austria he dispatched a telegram using that title. An affidavit of
August Eigruber states as follows:
“On the evening of 11 March 1938 at between 8 and 9 o’clock p.
m. he received two telegrams; one of which came from Dr.
Seyss-Inquart, as Bundes Chancellor of Austria, and the other
from one Dr. Rainer; that the telegram from Dr. Seyss-Inquart
appointed the affiant as temporary _Landeshauptmann_ in Upper
Austria; and that the telegram from Dr. Rainer appointed the
affiant temporary leader of the National Socialist Party in
Upper Austria.” (_2909-PS_)
Schuschnigg presented his resignation, which was accepted by President
Miklas. The appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor came late on the
evening of 11 March 1938. (_2465-PS_)
(9) _Having infiltrated into the Austrian Government of Chancellor
Schuschnigg according to plan, Seyss-Inquart exploited his opportunities
to carry out the plan to its ultimate conclusion, i.e. German annexation
of Austria._ The first act of Seyss-Inquart as the new Chancellor of
Austria was to hold a telephone conversation with Hitler early in the
morning of 12 March 1938. He has described the substance of this
telephone conversation as follows:
“During the morning of 12 March I held a telephone conversation
with Hitler in which I suggested that while German troops were
entering Austria, Austrian troops as a symbol should march into
the Reich. Hitler agreed to this suggestion and we agreed to
meet in Linz, Upper Austria, later on that same day.”
(_3425-PS_)
Thereafter, on 12 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart greeted Hitler on the
balcony of the City Hall of Linz, Upper Austria. In his ensuing speech,
Seyss-Inquart announced that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain,
which provided that “the independence of Austria is inalienable
otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of
Nations,” was no longer operative.
“I then flew to Linz with Himmler, who had arrived in Vienna
from Berlin. I greeted Hitler on the balcony of the City Hall,
and said that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain was now
inoperative.” (_3425-PS_; _L-231_)
In his memorandum entitled “The Austrian Question” Seyss-Inquart
describes his meeting with Hitler as follows:
“In the afternoon, I flew with Himmler to Linz and drove then to
meet Hitler. Hitler entered Linz in the evening. I never saw
such an enthusiasm. The welcome was spontaneous and of no
precedence. In my (welcome) speech I declared that Article 88 of
the St. Germain Treaty was no longer binding.” (_3254-PS_;
_2485-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart then drove back to Vienna on the morning of 13 March 1938.
His Secretary of State for Security begged that he be allowed to resign,
a decision he reached as a result of a conversation with Himmler, which
had caused him to fear for his own personal welfare. Seyss-Inquart then
nominated Kaltenbrunner for State Secretary for Security, and the
nomination was accepted by President Miklas. About noon State Under
Secretary Stuckart of the German Reich Ministry of the Interior brought
a proposal for a reannexation act uniting Austria to Germany, and
announced Hitler’s wish for prompt execution of it. Seyss-Inquart then
called a meeting of his Council of Ministers, and on his proposal the
council adopted the act. (_3254-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart, realizing that if the President of Austria resigned his
office, then he, Seyss-Inquart, would be the successor, went to
President Miklas with the information about the action of the Council of
Ministers. Seyss-Inquart describes this meeting with President Miklas as
follows:
“In the case where the Bund President would, for any reason,
either have resigned his functions or be, for some time, impeded
in fulfilling them, his prerogatives were to go over to the Bund
Chancellor, I went to the Bund President with Dr. Wolff. The
President told me that he did not know whether this development
would be of welfare to the Austrian Nation, but that he did not
wish to interfere and preferred to resign his functions, so that
all rights would come into my hands, according to the
Constitution. The possibility of my dismissal or resignation
were only slightly mentioned and recognized as inopportune in
the prevailing situation.” (_3254-PS_)
President Miklas then resigned and Seyss-Inquart succeeded to his
office. (_2466-PS_)
Thereafter Seyss-Inquart signed the Act uniting Austria with Germany and
hurried back to Linz to report this news to Hitler:
“Then there were some letters exchanged between the Bund
President and myself, confirming our conversation and his
retirement. Thereafter I drove to Linz, where I arrived around
mid-night and reported to the Fuehrer the accomplishment of the
Anschluss Law. Hitler was very much impressed by it; for a while
he remained quiet, then tears dropped from his eyes down his
cheeks. He said then that he was especially happy because his
Motherland had achieved her annexation to the Reich without any
shedding of blood.” (_3254-PS_)
On 14 March 1938 Hitler entered Vienna. On 15 March 1938 there was a
public demonstration in Vienna and Hitler introduced Seyss-Inquart as
“Reich _Statthalter_ for Austria.” Hitler then put him in charge of the
Civil Administration of Austria, while political matters were assigned
to Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, who shortly thereafter was made Reich
Commissar for the Anschluss. (_3425-PS_)
(10) _Despite Seyss-Inquart’s modesty since arrest and indictment, his
fellow Nazi conspirators recognized the importance of his part in the
Austrian Anschluss._
Goering made a speech in Vienna on 26 March 1938 in which he said:
“At this moment [announcement of the plebiscite in Austria] it
has been established that now the decision really came. A
complete unanimity between the Fuehrer and the N. S. confidants
inside of Austria existed. According to their opinion also the
hour of action had come, but they thought they could not use any
more democratic methods in negotiations and they took the law of
action in their own strong hands and forced the others to
retreat. If the N. S. rising succeeded so quickly and thoroughly
without bloodshed, it is first of all due to the intelligent and
decisive firmness of the present Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart
and his confidants. But this too proved the correctness of the
previous continued politics because if our confidants had not
been in the government, this whole course of events would not
have been possible.” (_3270-PS_)
According to Dr. Rainer, Hitler and the general public gave
Seyss-Inquart credit for playing the leading role in the annexation of
Austria by Germany. This is evidenced by the covering letter written by
Dr. Rainer, dated 6 July 1939, to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef
Buerckel:
“We had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps also
Hitler’s own, was that the liberation depended more upon
Austrian matters of state rather than the Party. To be more
exact, Hitler especially mentioned Seyss-Inquart alone; and
public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus
believed him to have played the sole leading role.” (_812-PS_)
In his report to Reich Commissar Buerckel, Dr. Rainer said:
“But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and the
statement of the Fuehrer made to him during his state visit to
Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was the personal trustee of the Fuehrer
and directly responsible to him for the illegal NSDAP in Austria
within the confines of his political sphere. * * * The seizure
of power was the work of the party supported by the Fuehrer’s
threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in
the government.
“The national result in the form of the taking over of the
government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of
power by the Party on one hand and the political efficiency of
Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other.” (_812-PS_)
Hans Frank recognized the importance of the services rendered by
Seyss-Inquart to the Nazi cause in Austria. When Seyss-Inquart was about
to leave Poland to become Reich commissar of the Occupied Netherlands
Territories, Frank extolled him as follows:
“But your name without that is shining like a light through the
history of the Third Reich, since you are the creator of the
National Socialist Austria.” (_3465-PS_)
(11) _The Nazi conspirators within the German Reich evidenced their
intentions of annexing Austria in many ways._ Hitler, on the first page
of Chapter 1 of _Mein Kampf_, said:
“Today it seems to me providential that Fate should have chosen
Braunau on the Inn as my birthplace. For this little town lies
on the boundary between two German states which we of the
younger generation at least have made it our life work to
reunite by every means at our disposal.
“German-Austria must return to the great German Mother Country,
and not because of any economic considerations. No, and again
no: even if such a union were unimportant from an economic point
of view; yes, even if it were harmful, it must nevertheless take
place. One blood demands one Reich. Never will the German Nation
possess the moral right to engage in Colonial politics until, at
least, it embraces its own sons within a single state. Only when
the Reich borders include the very last German, but can no
longer guarantee his daily bread, will the moral right to
acquire foreign soil arise from the distress of our own people.
Their sword will become our plow, and from the tears of war the
daily bread of future generations will grow.”
Seyss-Inquart devoted his efforts to legalize the sale and circulation
of _Mein Kampf_ in Austria. His letter to Keppler, German Secretary of
State for Austrian Affairs, contained the following passage.
“The _Teinfaltstrasse_ is very well informed even if not in
detail about my efforts regarding the re-permission of the book
‘Mein Kampf’.” (_3392-PS_)
Goering and Schacht both told an American diplomat that it was Germany’s
determination to annex Austria and Sudetenland to the Reich. (_L-151)_
One of the missions of von Papen, as German Ambassador to Austria, was
to effect a change in the personnel of the Austrian Cabinet headed by
Chancellor von Schuschnigg and to eliminate anti-Nazi opposition,
particularly in the Ministry of Interior and Security. (_2246-PS_)
The German Reich applied economic pressure upon Austria. One of the
means adopted was the law of 24 March 1933, which required payment of
1,000 Reichs Marks by every German crossing the border into Austria
(_3467-PS_). Kurt von Schuschnigg, former Chancellor of Austria, in his
affidavit of 19 November 1945, described this economic pressure upon
Austria by Germany in the following words:
“* * * During my tenure of office as Federal Chancellor of
Austria, more particularly on the 11th day of July, 1936, I
negotiated with the then existing government of the German
Reich, and with Adolf Hitler, an Agreement more particularly
known as the Agreement of 11 July 1936.
“I further depose and say that prior to the consummation of the
aforesaid Agreement, the German Government had placed certain
economic barriers against trade between Germany and Austria such
as—to-wit—the 1,000 mark barrier which said barrier provided
that any German citizen who crosses the border of Germany into
Austria is obliged to pay to the German Government the sum of
1,000 German Reichs Marks for the privilege thereof—Austria had
been accustomed before this edict of the German Government to
receive into Austria some one hundred thousand visitors from
Germany annually.
“I further state that the aforesaid barrier placed against
Austria was extremely injurious to Austrian agriculture and
industrial interests.” (_2994-PS_)
Jodl stated in his diary that in 1938 the aim of German policy was the
elimination of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The will of resistance in
both countries was undermined by pressure on the government as well as
by propaganda and the fifth column. At the same time German military
preparations for attack were worked out (_1780-PS_). (“Case Otto” was
the code name for the Austrian campaign, and “Case Green” was the code
name for the battle plans against Czechoslovakia.)
Jodl also stated in his diary that when Chancellor von Schuschnigg
announced the proposed plebiscite for 13 March 1938, Hitler was
determined to intervene. Goering, General Reichenau, and Minister
Glaise-Horstenau were called before Hitler. “Case Otto” was to be
prepared, and the mobilization of army units and air forces was ordered
on 10 March 1938. The march into Austria took place on 11 March 1938.
(_1780-PS_).
(12) _Hitler and the Nazi conspirators completed the annexation of
Austria by decree._ On 11 March 1938 Hitler issued a directive regarding
“Case Otto” addressed to the German armed forces, classified Top Secret,
in which he stated that, if other measures proved useless, his
intentions were to invade Austria with armed force. The directive
prescribed operational duties and assigned objectives. It further
provided that resistance was to be broken up ruthlessly with armed
force. (_C-102_)
Later on that same day, at 8:45 p. m., Hitler issued a second directive,
which stated in substance, that the demands of the German ultimatum to
Austria had not been fulfilled, and for that reason the entry of German
armed forces into Austria would commence at daybreak on 12 March 1938.
He directed that all objectives were to be reached by exerting all
forces to the full as quickly as possible. (_C-182_)
On 13 March 1938 Germany in violation of Article 80 of the Treaty of
Versailles, formally incorporated Austria into the Reich by decree and
declared it to be a province of the German Reich. (_2307-PS_)
Officials of the Province of Austria were then required by decree to
take an oath of personal obedience to Hitler. Jews were barred from
taking this oath, and thus could not retain offices and positions
previously held. (_2311-PS_)
Members of the Austrian Army were required to take an oath of personal
allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander. (_2936-PS_)
Compulsory military service was instituted in Austria by law, which
provided the Greater German Reich with additional manpower for its armed
forces. (_1660-PS_)
(13) _Seyss-Inquart participated in the execution of the plans for
aggression against Czechoslovakia._ In an official report to Viscount
Halifax, Basil Newton, an official of the British Government, related
some of the “gangster methods employed by the Reich to obtain its ends
in Czecho-Slovakia.” The part played by Seyss-Inquart was described in
this report in the following words:
“On M. Sidor’s return to Bratislava, after he had been entrusted
with the Government in place of Mgr. Tiso, Herr Buerckel, Herr
Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came at about 10 pm on
the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting
in progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that
they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor
showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and
explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of
Czecho-Slovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to
proclaim her independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise
disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel
for this information, but said that he must discuss the
situation with the Government at Prague.” (_D-571_)
Hitler expressed his intention to crush Czechoslovakia in the following
language:
“‘At Munich I did not take Bohemia and Moravia into the German
territorial sphere [“_Lebensraum_”]. I left the Czechs only
another five months, but for the Slovaks I have some sympathy. I
approved the Award of Vienna in the conviction that the Slovaks
would separate themselves from the Czechs and declare their
independence, which would be under German protection. That is
why I have refused Hungarian demands in respect of Slovakia. As
the Slovaks appear to be agreeing with the Czechs it looks as
though they have not respected the spirit of the Vienna Award.
This I cannot tolerate. To-morrow at mid-day I shall begin
military action against the Czechs, which will be carried out by
General Brauchitsch’ (who was present and to whom he pointed).
‘Germany,’ he said, ‘does not intend to take Slovakia into her
“_Lebensraum_,” and that is why you must either immediately
proclaim the independence of Slovakia or I will disinterest
myself in her fate. To make your choice I give you until
to-morrow mid-day, when the Czechs will be crushed by the German
steam-roller.’” (_D-571_)
Ribbentrop and von Neurath also participated in the execution of the
Nazi plot to obliterate Czechoslovakia as a nation. (_D-571_)
The use of pressure, fifth columnists, and propaganda to undermine
resistance in Czechoslovakia, and the preparation of military plans for
the attack upon that country were all noted by Jodl in his diary.
(_1780-PS_)
Before the annexation of Austria by Germany Seyss-Inquart was in
communication and contact with Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten
German Nazis in Czechoslovakia. On 29 December 1937 Seyss-Inquart wrote
a letter to Henlein in encouraging terms and extended his warmest
sympathy and hope for the success of the Sudeten Germans (_3523-PS_).
Henlein thereafter replied in a letter to Seyss-Inquart dated a few days
after the German annexation of Austria had been accomplished. In this
letter Henlein expressed his pride in the fact that Seyss-Inquart, born
a Sudeten German, had fulfilled the task determined by the Fuehrer in
the most decisive hour of German history. He also thanked Seyss-Inquart
for the effect and influence the developments in Austria would have in
the Sudetenland. (_3522-PS_)
C. _SEYSS-INQUART PARTICIPATED IN THE POLITICAL PLANNING AND PREPARATION
OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS FOR WARS OF AGGRESSION AND WARS IN VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND ASSURANCES SET FORTH IN COUNTS
ONE AND TWO OF THE INDICTMENT._
The German Reichstag came under the control of the Nazi conspirators
with the advent of Hitler into the German Government and became a
willing tool in the hands of Hitler and the conspirators. (See Sections
2, 3, and 4 of chapter VII on the acquisition and consolidation of
totalitarian political control, and terrorization of political
opponents.)
The members of the Reich Cabinet were the accomplices, aiders and
abettors of Hitler and his closest Nazi lieutenants in the political
planning and preparation for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of
International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (See section 3 of
chapter XV on the Reich Cabinet.)
Seyss-Inquart was a member of the Reichstag and of the Reich Cabinet
before the invasion of Poland, and occupied those positions until the
unconditional surrender of Germany. Thus he is equally responsible for
the acts and decisions of the members of those governmental bodies
concerning the political planning and preparation of the Nazi
Conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of
International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment. (_2910-PS_)
D. _SEYSS-INQUART AUTHORIZED, DIRECTED, AND PARTICIPATED IN THE
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AS SET FORTH IN THE INDICTMENT._
(1) _Austria._
(_a_) _Position and authority of Seyss-Inquart._ Seyss-Inquart was
appointed Reich Governor of Austria by Hitler on 15 March 1938, and was
put in charge of the Civil Administration. Austria had then ceased to
exist as an independent nation and was a province of the German Reich.
(_2910-PS_; _3425-PS_)
Goering, as Delegate for the Four-Year Plan, commissioned Seyss-Inquart,
who was then _Reichsstatthalter_ in Austria, jointly with the
Plenipotentiary of the Reich, to consider and take any steps necessary
for the “Aryanization of business and economic life, and to execute this
process in accordance with our laws” (Laws of the Reich). (_3460-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart participated in the drafting of laws for the sequestration
and confiscation of property of the so-called “enemies of the people and
State.” Evidence of this fact is found in the correspondence between
Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Lammers, Chief of the Reichs Chancellery. On 24
October 1938 Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Dr. Lammers stating in
substance that the law providing for the sequestration and confiscation
of the property of enemies of the State was almost completed and ready
for the signature of the Fuehrer, and expressing hope that the signature
would be obtained soon. Dr. Lammers replied to Seyss-Inquart that the
decree would be issued by the Reichsministerof the Interior, a copy of
which had been submitted to Hitler, who had expressed no objections.
(_3448-PS_; _3447-PS_)
The power and authority of Seyss-Inquart with respect to the
sequestration and confiscation of the property of “enemies of the State”
stemmed from a decree empowering the _Reichsstatthalter_ in Vienna, or
the office designated by him, to confiscate property of persons or
societies which had promoted efforts inimical to the people of the
State. This decree also attempted to legalize the confiscation of
property ordered by the Secret State Police prior to the issuance of the
decree. (_3450-PS_) This decree appeared to be a secret law, because it
was not published. Yet its existence as law is evidenced by a letter
written to the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, Himmler,
in January 1939, which shows that the decree was in fact issued on 18
November 1938. (_3449-PS_)
(_b_) _Murder and illtreatment of civilians._ Seyss-Inquart was aware
that so-called enemies of the State were imprisoned in concentration
camps. His knowledge of this matter is evidenced by his claim of credit
for the transfer of his predecessor—Chancellor of Austria, von
Schuschnigg—from one concentration camp to another in south Germany
which was in the path of the armed forces of the United States.
(_3254-PS_)
One of the most notorious concentration camps was Mauthausen, located in
Austria and in existence while Seyss-Inquart was the Reich Governor of
the Province of Austria. As has already been shown, this camp became
noted as an extermination center. (_2176-PS_)
(_c_) _Plunder of public and private property._ Even before the issuance
of the above decree for the sequestration and confiscation of the
property of the so-called enemies of the State, Seyss-Inquart wrote a
letter to Hitler indicating that he had come into possession of from 700
to 900 valuable tapestries. Seyss-Inquart offered to display the most
beautiful pieces so that the Fuehrer might make a selection. In this
same letter Seyss-Inquart expressed his pride and wonder over the manner
in which Hitler had “solved the Sudeten problem.” (_3391-PS_)
While Seyss-Inquart was Reich Governor of the Province of Austria a
large quantity of valuable property, including works of art, belonging
to the so-called enemies of the State, was seized, sequestered, and
confiscated. A partial list of such property is found in a memorandum
which referred to a report of the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the
German Police submitted with a letter dated 10 August 1938 and received
in Berlin 26 September 1938. This inventory listed a total of 162 cases
of confiscation, of which 113 cases had a value of some 93,366,358.24
marks. It is significant that the former owners of this property were
Jews and political opponents of the Nazis. (_3446-PS_)
(2) _Poland._
(_a_) _Position and authority._ Seyss-Inquart was appointed Deputy
Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory by Hitler’s decree of
12 October 1939, which also appointed Hans Frank Governor General of the
Polish Occupied Territory. The official title of the government of
Poland under the Nazi conspirators was the “General Government”
(_3147-PS_). Prior to his appointment as Deputy Governor General of the
Polish Occupied Territory from the early part of September 1939 to 12
October 1939, Seyss-Inquart was Chief of the Civil Administration of
South Poland (_2910-PS_). Seyss-Inquart as Deputy Governor General of
the Polish Occupied Territory was second only to the Governor General,
Frank. (_2233-CC-PS_)
The Chief of the Office of the Governor General of the Polish Occupied
Territory and the Higher SS and Police Leaders were directly subordinate
to the Governor General and his representative. In turn the leaders of
the General and Security Police were subordinated to the Higher SS and
Police Leaders. (_3468-PS_)
According to Hans Frank, Seyss-Inquart organized the General Government
of Poland. When Seyss-Inquart was about to depart to assume his new
duties as Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands, Frank eulogized
Seyss-Inquart as follows:
“In the construction of the General-Government, your name will
forever take a place of honor as originator of this organization
and State system. I express our thanks, Mr. Reichsminister, for
your collaboration and for your creative energy in the name of
all officers, employees, and laborers, of all SS organizations
and the whole police force of the General-Government, and in the
name of the District Chiefs, the Gau and city leaders, in the
name of all otherwise on the order of the Reich and the Fuehrer
her active persons. * * *” (_3465-PS_)
During November 1939 Seyss-Inquart made a tour of inspection in Poland.
While on this tour he gave lectures to the German officials of the
General Government of Poland concerning their duties and German
administrative policy in that country. He told these officials that the
only principal aim of that policy was to satisfy the interests of the
Reich and that they should promote everything of use to the Reich and
hamper all that might damage the Reich. He instructed the officials that
the German Government must utilize the General Government of Poland for
German economic purposes. (_2278-PS_)
(_b_) _Murder and illtreatment of the civilian population of occupied
territories._ While Seyss-Inquart was on the aforesaid tour of
inspection, a Dr. Lasch, who was a District Governor, reported to
Seyss-Inquart that all criminals found in the penitentiaries were shot.
The executions, however, were conducted in closed-off wooded areas and
not in public. (_2278-PS_)
In his report concerning his tour of inspection Seyss-Inquart stated
that the intellectuals of Poland were to a greater part locked up. He
also passed on the suggestion made by District Governor Schmidt to use
the “moorish” country around Cychov, Poland, as a reservoir for Jews
because this measure might have a decimating effect upon the Jewish
population of Poland. (_2278-PS_)
Hans Frank, in his capacity as Governor General of the Polish Occupied
Territory, made an official report to Hitler in which he stated that, in
the course of time, the German rule had led to a substantial
deterioration in the “attitude” of the entire Polish people due to
malnutrition, mass arrests, mass shootings, and rigorous methods used to
obtain forced labor. In this report it was admitted that before 1939 the
food supply of the Polish people was quite adequate to sustain them.
(_437-PS_)
(_c_) _Plunder of public and private property._ During the aforesaid
tour of inspection Seyss-Inquart ordered the seizure of all soap stocks,
and informed the German officials that the seizure of soap and tea was
to be regarded as most important. In addition he ordered a marshalling
of goods such as oil, salt, manures, etc., in monopolies such as
cooperative societies. He also directed that the Polish unemployment
fund in a considerable amount be diverted to the repair of damaged
buildings. (_2278-PS_)
Frank in his report to Hitler stated that there had been a confiscation
of a great part of Polish estates, together with encroachments upon and
confiscation of the assets of industries, trades, professions, and other
private property. (_437-PS_)
(_d_) _Conscription of civilian labor._ Seyss-Inquart, as Deputy
Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory, attended most staff
meetings held by Frank, the Governor General. Among the subjects
discussed and decided upon at those meetings was the conscription and
deportation of vast numbers of Polish nationals to the Reich for forced
labor. Some of these deportees were employed in instruments of war
production in violation of Articles 6, 23h, 46, and 52 of the Hague
Regulations 1907, as well as the Prisoner of War Convention (Geneva
1929). On 11 January 1940 one Frauendorfer reported in the presence of
Seyss-Inquart that daily transports, each carrying 1,000 workers, were
going to the Reich. Thus Seyss-Inquart aided and abetted in these
violations. (_2233-B-PS_)
According to Frank approximately 160,000 agricultural workers and 50,000
industrial workers were conscripted and deported from Poland to the
Reich up to and including 21 April 1940. Because the total quota had
been fixed at 500,000 and because there were not enough “voluntary
enlistments”, solution to the problem was sought in the use of coercive
measures. Seyss-Inquart participated actively in the discussions on this
matter, and thus aided materially in the solution of the problem.
(_2233-N-PS_)
(_e_) _Germanization of occupied territories._ The Nazi government of
the Polish Occupied Territory was determined to make Poland entirely
German. (Evidence of this intention is discussed in Chapter XIII.) In
addition, Frank in his report to Hitler reported that there had been an
expropriation of property and expulsion of Polish nationals therefrom
for German settlements in Poland. (_437-PS_)
(3) _The Netherlands._
(_a_) _Position and authority of Seyss-Inquart._ Seyss-Inquart was
appointed Reich Commissar for the occupied Netherlands territories by
decree of Hitler dated 18 May 1940. This decree made Seyss-Inquart
“guardian of the interests of the Reich” and invested him with “supreme
civil authority.” Seyss-Inquart was made responsible only to Hitler, and
empowered to promulgate laws by decree for the occupied Netherlands
territories. (_1376-PS_; _2910-PS_)
(_b_) _Abrogation and modification of Netherlands legislation not
justified by military necessity._ In his capacity as Reich Commissar of
the occupied Netherlands territories Seyss-Inquart authorized and
directed the abrogation or modification of Netherlands legislation not
demanded or justified by military exigency. This action was in violation
of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, 1907.
The acts abolished included Provincial and Municipal Laws. (_3340-PS_;
_3342-PS_)
Ordinary criminal laws not in conflict with the permissible objectives
of the occupying power were abrogated, suspended, or radically changed.
Administrative courts martial were established by decree of
Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissar which empowered the Leader of the
Superior SS and the Police and Special Agents appointed by the Reich
Commissar to deviate from existing law. This decree also prescribed
harsh penalties for misdemeanors, extending from 10 years to life
imprisonment, and include the death penalty (i) for participation in
“activities likely to disturb or endanger public order and security” and
(ii) for intentional violation of the orders of the Reich Commissar.
(_2111-PS_)
Existing marriage laws were amended by Seyss-Inquart so as to require
approval of the Reich Commissar instead of the consent of parent or
guardian in the case of Dutch girls. The statutory waiting period was
also abolished. Thus, intermarriage of Germans with female persons of
Netherlands nationality were facilitated and promoted. (_3339-PS_)
Existing legislation concerning Netherlands nationality was modified by
Seyss-Inquart so as to favor Germany. (_3341-PS_)
Additional decrees not justified or demanded by the military interests
of the occupant were issued by Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissar. These
decrees amended or superseded and distorted existing laws concerning
press, education, social services, corporate life, trade unionism,
medical care, art, science, and divers phases of the political, social,
economic, and industrial life of the Netherlands. Some of these
enactments, including the discriminatory decrees against the Jews, are
considered in greater detail hereafter. (_1726-PS_)
(_c_) _Germanization of Netherlands Territory._ Seyss-Inquart in his
capacity as Reich Commissar for the occupied Dutch Territory, took
affirmative steps to assimilate the territory under his jurisdiction
politically, culturally, socially, and economically into the German
Reich. This action violated Articles 43, 46, 55, and 56 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles
of criminal law, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such
crimes were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.
The more offensive crimes in the above category, such as economic
exploitation and enforced conscription are considered in detail
elsewhere in this section. Other “Germanization” measures, such as the
decrees promoting marriage between German males and female
Netherlanders, and altering citizenship laws in favor of Germany, have
been previously adverted to.
When he assumed office on 29 May 1940, Seyss-Inquart said in a speech at
The Hague:
“We neither will oppress this land and its people
imperialistically nor will we impose on them our political
convictions. We will bring this about in no other way—only
through our deportment and our example.” (_3430-PS_)
The _bona fides_ of the above statement is belied by a public statement
made by Seyss-Inquart two years later. In a speech at Hengelo on 19 May
1943 he revealed his true purpose:
“Several times it has been held against me that I have let
national socialism come to the fore in all phases in public
life. As far as I am concerned that is no reproach, it is a
historical mission, which I have to fulfill here.” (_3430-PS_)
Full disclosure of Seyss-Inquart’s intentions and actions with respect
to nazification and exploitation of Holland was made in a Top Secret
report prepared by him and sent to Berlin covering the situation in the
Netherlands during the period 29 May to 19 July 1940. This report was
forwarded by Lammers of the Reich Chancellery to Rosenberg.
Seyss-Inquart prefaces the report by describing his mission as not
merely the guarding of Reich interests and maintaining order, but also
the building of close economic ties between the Netherlands and the
Reich. The report catalogues in considerable detail the measures
initiated by Seyss-Inquart, discusses the building up of the NSDAP in
the Netherlands, and adverts to the proposed creation of Nazi
para-military and corresponding organizations. It also mentions the
efforts made to bring about an assimilation of interests between Holland
and Germany in the fields of economics and agriculture, culture, art,
and science. The report points out that the allocation of supplies made,
and financial and currency arrangements prescribed, were favorable to
the Reich; that such transactions were signed by Dutch officials so that
the “appearance of being voluntary” was preserved. (_997-PS_)
(_d_) _Spoliation of property._ In his capacity as Reich Commissar for
the Occupied Netherlands territory Seyss-Inquart authorized, directed,
and participated in the exploitation of the material resources of the
Occupied Netherlands territory for purposes unrelated to the needs of
the Army of Occupation. These acts were all in violation of Article 6
(b) of the Charter and Articles 43, 46-49, 52 of the Hague Regulations,
1907.
These crimes, for which Seyss-Inquart is responsible not only by virtue
of his position as the dominant civil representative of the Reich
Government in the Occupied Netherlands territory but also because of his
direct participation in the initiation and execution of such criminal
policies, took the following form:
Control and exploitation of the Netherlands economy in the interest of
the German total war effort.
Levy of excessive occupation charges on the Netherlands.
Exaction of large sums of money and gold as “external occupation costs,”
or “contributions to the war against Bolshevism.”
Requisitioning of gold and foreign exchange of Dutch nationals for
purposes unrelated to the needs of the occupation army.
Use of German reichsmarks as currency in the Netherlands for purposes
unrelated to the needs of the occupation army, with compulsory free
exchange of such Reichsmarks for gulden by the Netherlands Bank.
(Evidence of the foregoing methods of exploitation of the occupied
Netherlands and correlative enrichment of the Reich is discussed in
Chapter XIII.)
The Nazi conspirators were measurably aided in executing the foregoing
policies in Holland by the cooperation of a local Nazi, Rost van
Tonnigen, who was appointed President of the Netherlands Bank and
Treasurer in the Netherlands Ministry of Finance by Seyss-Inquart in the
spring of 1941. The cooperative spirit with which van Tonnigen
discharged his responsibilities in these posts was disclosed in the
following excerpt from a report of the German Commissar of the
Netherlands Bank:
“The new President of the Netherlands Bank, Mr. Rost van
Tonnigen, is, in contrast to a large part of the leadership,
penetrated in his movements and his official acts by the greater
German thought, and convinced of the necessity of the creation
of a greater European economic space. This ideological attitude
in itself gives him the correct position on financial and
monetary policy questions for his country in relation to the
greater German economic space. Furthermore it makes easier
cooperation with my office, a fact which deserves special
mention in consideration of the frequently observed impossible
conduct of the Netherlands agencies before the entrance into
office of the new President. I consider as a fortunate solution
the fact that the Reichskommissar for the Occupied Dutch Areas
has also entrusted Mr. Rost van Tonnigen with the Treasury of
the Ministry of Finance [_Schatzamt des Finanzministeriums_].
Mr. Rost van Tonnigen took over this office at the end of the
month of April. Thus there is a guarantee that the financial and
monetary policy of the country will be conducted according to
unified points of view.” (_ECR-174_; see also
_Verordnungsblatt_, No. 22, 24 August 1940 (Fourth Order of the
Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands concerning certain
Administrative Measures); _Lemkin_, “Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe,” pp. 455-456.)
In addition to the responsibility which attaches to Seyss-Inquart as a
result of his dominant position in the Netherlands, his appointment of
Nazi-minded individuals to key positions, and his complete knowledge of
and acquiescence in illegal Nazi policies, there is conclusive evidence
of his initiation of such policies. In April 1942 “at the instigation of
the Reich Commissar Seyss-Inquart” the Netherlands began to pay a
“voluntary contribution to the war against Bolshevism” of 50,000,000
gulders per month, retroactive to 1 July 1941, of which ten million per
month was paid in gold. (_ECR-195_)
By 31 March 1944, this contribution amounted to 2,150,000,000 RM.
(_EC-86_)
The alleged “voluntary” character of the contribution is to be taken
with considerable reserve in view of the admission contained in
Seyss-Inquart’s Top Secret report of 29 May to 19 July 1940, that the
voluntary nature of previous financial and economic measures was in
reality fictional. (_997-PS_)
However, the question whether or not the contribution is to be deemed at
the direction of Seyss-Inquart or was in fact “voluntary” is immaterial.
It is manifest that the then President of the Netherlands Bank and
Treasurer in the Ministry of Finance, van Tonnigen, acted in the German
interest and to the detriment of the Netherlands. His acts are
attributable to the responsible head of the German Civil Administration
in the Netherlands and the individual to whom he owed his appointment,
Seyss-Inquart.
(_e_) _Participation in activities of Einsatzstab Rosenberg._
Seyss-Inquart, in his capacity as Reich Commissar for the Occupied
Netherlands territory, also cooperated with and acquiesced in the
activities of the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_ in the territory under his
jurisdiction. He is therefore responsible for his actions in this
regard, which constituted crimes under Article 6 (b) of the Charter and
violations of Articles 46, 47, and 56 of the Hague Regulations, 1907.
(The _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_, which commenced as a research library
project, developed into a systematic program for the wholesale looting
of art treasures and cultural objects in the conquered territories. Its
activities are discussed in Chapter XIV.)
Implication of Seyss-Inquart in the criminal activities of the
_Einsatzstab Rosenberg_ is revealed in a detailed progress report of its
chief Netherlands representative, Schimmer. The first paragraph of this
report states as follows:
“The Working Group Netherland of the _Einsatzstab Reichsleiter
Rosenberg_ began its work in agreement with the competent
representative of the Reichkommissar during the first days of
September 1940. The execution of the post, conforming with the
Fuehrer’s orders, coordinated itself with the liquidation, that
is confiscation, according to civil law, of the various
subversive institutions—as set forth in the circulars of the
OKW, dated 5 July 1940, and of the Chief of the OKW to the
Commander in Chief of the _Wehrmacht_ in France, dated 17
September 1940, as well as to the Commander in Chief of the OKW
in the Netherlands, dated 30 October 1940. The screening of the
material of the various Masonic lodges was taken care of
primarily, and the library and the archives of the following
lodges were sifted and all useful material was packed.”
(_176-PS_)
There follows the specification of some 92 Masonic IOOF Lodges and
Rotary Clubs which were screened and yielded 470 cases of valuable
objects. Also, a large number of libraries and scientific and cultural
institutions were listed with the statement that all books and archives
contained therein were being catalogued preparatory to shipment to
Germany. (_176-PS_)
The report concludes with the following statement indicating close
integration in the Netherlands between Rosenberg’s program of grand
larceny and Seyss-Inquart’s anti-Jewish program, viz:
“The Working Group, in executing the afore-mentioned tasks, is
bound strictly to the pace set by the Reichskommissar for the
handling of the Jewish questions and that of the international
organizations. This pace again is determined by the political
evolution which is taking shape according to decisions made on a
higher level, and which must not be hampered by individual
acts.” (_176-PS_)
Other documents captured from Rosenberg’s files remove any doubt
whatever as to Seyss-Inquart’s full knowledge of the criminal activities
of the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_ in Holland and his participation therein.
On 11 September 1944 Rosenberg informed Seyss-Inquart by letter that
orders had been issued for the seizure and transportation to Germany of
the library of the Social Institute in Amsterdam. (_091-PS_; see also
_1621-PS_, a secret letter from Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) ordering SS
Gen. Rauter in the Hague to seize medical apparatus at the Universities
of Leyden and Utrecht with the aid of Seyss-Inquart.)
(_f_) _Conscription of civilian labor._ In his capacity as Reich
Commissar for the occupied Netherlands territories Seyss-Inquart
authorized and directed the deportation of vast numbers of Netherlands
nationals to the Reich for forced labor in the instruments of German war
production. These acts were all in violation of Articles 6 (b) and (c)
of the Charter; Articles 6, 23h, 46, and 52 of the Hague Regulations,
1907 (_3737-PS_); and the Prisoner of War Convention, Geneva, 1929.
(_3738-PS_)
The deportation program in the Netherlands was initiated on 20 June
1940, five weeks after the occupation of that country. The Germans at
first deported only the unemployed, threatening them with curtailment of
their dole for refusal. Thereafter in 1942 measures were taken to draft
employed workmen. Dutch business concerns were combed in
“Sauckel-actions” for available workers, who were forced to register at
the labor offices. Workmen who refused were prosecuted by the SD,
committed to one of the prisoners’ camps in the Netherlands, and
eventually put to work in Germany. By the end of April 1942 the program
was in full operation, and not less than 22,000 workers were deported
that month. Many Belgian concerns not considered essential were closed
down to release manpower for deportation to Germany or for work in Dutch
industries deemed essential to the German war effort. New measures of a
drastic nature were inaugurated in the spring of 1943. All males between
18 and 35 were forced to register for “_arbeitseinsatz_” (war effort),
which was synonymous with deportation. As time elapsed and the German
military situation deteriorated, the measures taken became increasingly
more ruthless. Whole sections of a town were lined off and people were
seized in the streets or in their homes and transported to Germany. A
total of approximately 431,500 Netherlands workers were deported to
Germany and other foreign countries. (_1726-PS_)
Illustrative of the participation of Seyss-Inquart in the slave labor
program are four proclamations which he caused to be issued, calling up
Dutch civilians between certain ages for forced labor and threatening
them with shooting in the case of noncompliance. (_1162-PS_)
Sauckel, General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, on 5
October 1945 disclosed, under oath, the part played by Seyss-Inquart in
the forced recruitment of Dutch workers for German war production. The
following is an excerpt from an interrogation of Sauckel:
“Q. For a moment I want to turn our attention to Holland. It is
my understanding that the quotas for the workers for Holland
were agreed upon, and then the numbers given to the
Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart to fulfill. Isn’t that correct?
“A. Yes, that is correct.
“Q. After the quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was his
mission to fulfill it with the aid of your representatives, was
it not?
“A. Yes. This was the only possible thing for me to do and the
same applied to the other countries.” (_3722-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart has himself acknowledged under oath his active
participation in deporting 250,000 Netherlands workmen between the ages
of 17 and 42 toward the end of 1944, although he attempted to shift
responsibility by stating that the order was issued by the _Wehrmacht_
and that “I can’t intervene against the _Wehrmacht_.” However, he
admitted:
“I didn’t oppose it. I helped to carry it out in my province.”
(_Transcript of Interrogation of Seyss-Inquart_, afternoon
session, 18 September 1945, pp. 19-20.)
(_g_) _Murder and ill-treatment of civilian population, including
killing of hostages._ Seyss-Inquart, in his capacity as Reich Commissar
for the Occupied Netherlands Territory, authorized and directed the
exaction of collective penalties, murder, and ill-treatment of the
civilian population of the Netherlands, and the killing of hostages. All
these actions constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity within
the meaning of Article 6 (b) and (c) of the Charter, and violated (i)
the Hague Regulations, 1907, Articles 46 and 50, (ii) the laws and
customs of war, (iii) the general principles of criminal law as derived
from the criminal laws of all civilized nations and (iv) the internal
penal laws of Netherlands.
Public utterances of Seyss-Inquart reveal his determination to resort to
ruthless measures for the purpose of intimidating and repressing the
civilian population. In a speech commemorating the 10th Anniversary of
Germany’s coming into power, at Weert on 29 January 1943, before workers
and trades of the NSDAP, he spoke in part as follows:
“I will give my instructions. They must be executed by all. In
the present situation a refusal to execute such instructions
could be regarded only as sabotage. It is also clear, now more
than ever, that every resistance which is directed against this
fight for existence must be suppressed. Some time ago the
representatives of the churches had written to the _Wehrmacht_
commander and to me, and they presented their conception against
the execution of death sentences which the Wehrmacht commanders
announced in the meantime. To this I can only say the following:
The moment in which our men, fathers and sons with iron
determination look towards their fate in the east and
unflinchingly and steadfastly perform their highest pledge, it
is unbearable to tolerate conspiracies whose goal is to weaken
the rear of this eastern front. Whoever dares this must be
annihilated. We must be severe and become even more severe
against our opponents, this is the command of a relentless
sequence of events, and for us perhaps humanly hard, but our
holy duty. We remain human because we do not torture our
opponents, we must remain firm by annihilating them.”
(_3430-PS_)
Endorsement of the policy of holding innocent persons responsible for
the misconduct of others beyond their control is implicit in the
following public statement of Seyss-Inquart made at Weert on 8 January
1945:
“I have given orders to suppress all appearances with a
severeness corresponding to the brutality of the crime. If in
connection with these measures Dutch citizens are affected and
have to undergo difficulties and limitations of special nature,
then they have to seek the cause therefor solely in these
eruptions of the anarchistic mental attitude of a few culprits
and the just-as-criminal-tolerance or apathy within their own
circles.” (_3430-PS_)
Evidence of Seyss-Inquart’s application of this doctrine of vicarious
responsibility is contained in a poster signed by him and warning the
Dutch population to expect reprisals in the event of sabotage. The
poster reads as follows:
“NOTICE
“I consider all inhabitants responsible for the destruction or
damage to railroad installations, waterways with their
installations, telephone cables and Post Offices occurring
within the boundaries of their locality.
“The population of such localities may therefore expect
reprisals in the form of seizure of property and destruction of
houses or groups of houses.
“I therefore advise the population to protect the means of
transportation and communications by means of patrols or other
appropriate measures.
“The Hague 24 Sept 1944
“/s/ Seyss-Inquart
“The Reich Commissar for the
Occupied Netherlands Territories.” (_1163-PS_)
Another poster issued by the Superior SS and Police Chief publicized
with remarkable candor the fact that 12 Netherlanders were executed
“independent of further investigation” as reprisals for the killing of
two Germans. That poster reads as follows:
“NOTICE
“The Superior SS and Police Chief gives notice that on 20
November 1944 Schutzgruppenmann Janssen and on 13 December 1944
the Senior Officer Candidate Guse were shot in the back by
criminal Netherlands elements. Both were robbed of their
pistols.
“Independent of further investigation of the perpetrators, two
houses were blasted and 12 Netherlanders were executed at the
place of one of the crimes as reprisals.
“The Hague, 16 Dec 1944.” (_1163-PS_)
In an interrogation under oath Seyss-Inquart has acknowledged that
Netherlanders were shot as hostages without trial. While he sought to
shift responsibility to the SS he admitted that upon one occasion the SS
called on him to furnish 50 hostages and that he gave five instead, all
of whom were shot. (_Transcript of Interrogation of Seyss-Inquart_, 18
September 1945, p. 20)
Other crimes against humanity are documented in the statement of the
Dutch Government. The vastness of the scale of the commission of such
crimes and the necessary notoriety thereof clearly implicate
Seyss-Inquart as the responsible civil head of the German Government in
the Netherlands territory. (_1726-PS_)
E. _SEYSS-INQUART PARTICIPATED IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY AS SET FORTH IN THE INDICTMENT._
(1) _Austria._
(_a_) _Persecution of the Jews._ While Seyss-Inquart was the Reich
Governor of the Province of Austria, laws were issued against Jews and
against those who opposed the Nazi Regime politically. As has been
shown, this usually took the form of decrees providing for the
sequestration and confiscation of the property of these so-called
“enemies of the State.”
In the early days of November 1938, pogroms against the Jews took place
all over the German Reich, including Austria. These pogroms resulted
from the killing of von Rath, a diplomatic official at the German
Embassy in Paris, by a young Jew named Grynszpan. Jewish synagogues,
homes and shops were smashed and destroyed by fire. Large numbers of
Jews were arrested, jailed, or placed in concentration camps. A partial
report as to what occurred during the 9th and 10th of November 1938 is
found in a letter written by the Reich Commissar for the Reunion of
Austria with the German Reich, Josef Buerckel, to Goering, dated 18
November 1938. This report reveals that the fire department was not
utilized to control the flames consuming Jewish homes, stores, shops,
and synagogues. The school children in Vienna were given an opportunity
to participate in the demonstration “according to the order.” Buerckel’s
report also discloses that enormous quantities of valuables, jewelry,
and merchandise were stolen from the Jews during these pogroms.
(_2237-PS_)
A more detailed description of what happened in Vienna during the 9th
and 10th of November 1938 is found in the stenographic report of a
meeting on “The Jewish Question” under the Chairmanship of Goering
(_1816-PS_). This meeting was held on 12 November 1938. It appears from
this report that altogether 101 synagogues were destroyed by fire, 76
synagogues demolished, and 7,500 stores ruined in the Reich, including
Austria. In this same meeting, a member of the official family of
Seyss-Inquart (Reich Governor of the Province of Austria) related the
efficiency with which the Civil Administration in Austria dealt with the
so-called “Jewish Question.” This official was Fischboeck, and in his
verbal report to Goering he said:
“Your Excellency,
“In this matter we have already a very complete plan for
Austria. There are 12,000 Jewish artisans and 5,000 Jewish
retail shops in Vienna. Before the National Revolution, we had
already a definite plan for tradesmen, regarding this total of
17,000 stores. Of the shops of the 12,000 artisans about 10,000
were to be closed indefinitely and 2,000 were to be kept open.
4,000 of the 5,000 retail stores should be closed and 1,000
should be kept open, that is, were to be Aryanized. According to
this plan, between 3,000 and 3,500 of the total of 17,000 stores
would be kept open, all others closed. This was decided
following investigations in every single branch and according to
local needs, in agreement with all competent authorities, and is
ready for publication as soon as we receive the law which we
requested in September; this law shall empower us to withdraw
licenses from artisans quite independently from the Jewish
Question.” (_1816-PS_)
To this Goering replied:
“I shall have this decree issued today.” (_1816-PS_)
The stenographic report of this meeting further reveals that the
solution of the so-called “Jewish Problem” adopted in Austria by
Seyss-Inquart and his official family was most efficient from the
viewpoint of Nazi objectives. The plan adopted in Austria became a model
for the entire Reich. (_1816-PS_)
A report of the Bureau of Statistics for the Provinces of Austria on the
Jewish population in Vienna and in Austria, dated 15 December 1939,
shows that after the Nazi conspirators assumed power in Austria, the
Jewish population in that country decreased approximately 100,000.
(_1949-PS_)
While the reasons for the decreases in the Jewish population of Austria
would seem to be obvious, yet tangible evidence of at least one reason
is provided by Seyss-Inquart himself in a letter written by him to
Himmler, dated 4 November 1939. In substance Seyss-Inquart, while Deputy
Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory, stated that an
official in Cracow had informed him that there was a plan to send Jews
from Vienna to Poland, whereupon he gave instructions that such action
should be carried out only in cooperation with the SD and by the SD,
since he would not permit wild-cat actions. (_3398-PS_)
(_b_) _Persecution on political grounds._ Seyss-Inquart has supplied
evidence that the SS in Austria was responsible for the murder of
Chancellor Dolfuss on 25 July 1934. (_3425-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart has also supplied evidence that his predecessor as
Chancellor of Austria, von Schuschnigg, had been confined in a
concentration camp after his forced resignation from office. (_3254-PS_)
(2) _Poland._ The manner is which Polish Jews were treated and given
“special handling” by the Nazi conspirators, although a matter of common
knowledge, was described in detail in the “Black Book of Poland.” This
document tells of the establishment of special reservations for the Jews
as well as ghettos in various parts of Poland. The report also relates
how the Jews were starved and exterminated in large numbers. A great
portion of these crimes were committed in Poland by the Nazis while
Seyss-Inquart occupied the position of Deputy Governor General of the
Polish Occupied Territory. (_2613-PS_)
During the time that Seyss-Inquart held this high office in the Nazi
government of Poland, a special decree was issued by Frank, dated 26
October 1939, which required compulsory labor for Jews domiciled in the
General Government of Poland. The decree was to take effect immediately
and the Jews were to be formed in forced labor groups. The execution of
the decree was placed in the hands of the Higher SS and Police Leaders.
(_2613-PS_)
(3) _The Netherlands._ Seyss-Inquart, in his capacity as Reich Commissar
of the occupied Dutch territory, bears full individual responsibility
for the execution in the Netherlands of the Nazi program of persecution
of Jews. Acts against the Jews authorized, directed, or condoned by
Seyss-Inquart, which constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity
as defined in Article 6 (b) and (c) of the Charter, included:
stigmatization; disfranchisement; denial of civil rights, personal
liberty, and economic freedom; religious and cultural persecution; use
of organized “spontaneous violence” against persons and property of
Jews; ghettoization; starvation; enforced labor; enslavement; mass
deportation, and annihilation.
The intentions of Seyss-Inquart with respect to treatment of the Jews is
a matter of record. In a speech before a gathering of all workers and
trades of the NSDAP at Amsterdam on 13 March 1941 he left no doubt as to
where he stood on the Jewish question. He said:
“The Jews are the enemy of national socialism and the national
socialistic Reich. From the moment of their emancipation, their
methods were directed to the annihilation of the common and
moral worth of the German people and to replace national and
responsible ideology with international nihilism. The fatal
meaning of Judaism became completely clear to the German people
during the years of the world war. It was really they, who stuck
the knife in the back of the German army which broke the
resistance of the Germans, and in the year 1918, it was they who
wanted to dissolve and decompose all national tradition and also
moral and religious beliefs of the German people. The Jews for
us are not Dutchmen. They are those enemies with whom we can
neither come to an armistice nor to peace. This applies here, if
you wish, for the duration of the occupation. Do not expect an
order from me which stipulates this, except regulations
concerning police matters. We will beat the Jews wherever we
meet them, and those who join them must bear the consequences.
The Fuehrer declared that the Jews have played their final act
in Europe, and therefore they played their final act.”
(_3430-PS_)
Following his assumption of office in the Netherlands on 29 May 1940,
Seyss-Inquart, pursuant to the authority vested in him as Reich
Commissar Of the Netherlands by the Fuehrer decree of 18 May 1940,
systematically promulgated decrees designed to implement the Nazi
program of persecution and elimination of Jews. He promulgated a law
which prohibited the Jewish ritual slaughter of animals in the
Netherlands Occupied Territories, thus making it impossible for devout
orthodox Jews to live in accordance with their religious dietary laws.
(_2705-PS_)
Other anti-Semitic decrees of a like nature, all of which were signed by
Seyss-Inquart and published in the _Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzen
niederlandischen Gebiete_ (VOBL), may be summarized as follows:
_Publication Date and No. _Summary of Subject Matter_
of VOBL_
_3333-PS, Order to register all businesses belonging to
Verordnungsblatt_, No. Jews, joint stock corporations including
33, p. 546, 26 Oct 1940. either one Jewish partner or one Jewish
member in their Board of Directors, or those
of which more than 25% of the capital stock
belong to Jews or those in which half of all
votes are to be exercised by Jews, or in
general, businesses which in fact are placed
under predominatingly Jewish influence.
Section 4 defines the quality of a Jew.
Property situated abroad is to be embodied in
the declaration of registration. Failure
wilfully of declaration is punished by
imprisonment not exceeding 5 years and by a
fine not exceeding 100,000 gulders or either
of these penalties, while the same due to
negligence entails an imprisonment not
exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding
10,000 florins; in addition confiscation of
the property concerned may be ordered.
_3334-PS_, Prohibition to employ German citizens or
_Verordnungsblatt_, No. persons of cognate blood in Jewish households
42, p. 701, 27 Dec 1940. under a penalty not exceeding one year
imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 guilders or
either of these penalties.
_3323-PS_, Registration of all persons of part or full
_Verordnungsblatt_, No. Jewish blood.
6, p. 19, 13 Jan 1941.
Sec. 2 defines as a Jew any person one of
whose grandparents was a full-blooded Jew.
Any grandparent who belonged or belongs to
the Jewish religious community is considered
as such. Failure to register entails an
imprisonment not exceeding 5 years and the
confiscation of property (Sec. 10).
_3325-PS_, Limitation of registration of Jewish students
_Verordnungsblatt_, No. in Dutch universities and colleges.
6, p. 99, 14 Feb 1941.
_2112-PS_, Obligation to register real estate, mortgages
_Verordnungsblatt_, No. and real property belonging to Jews, other
34, p. 655, 16 Aug 1941. than farming estates and lands regulated by a
previous ordinance. Power granted to the
Dutch administration of real property to take
over directly or through persons appointed
for the purpose, the management of Jewish
real property, with the right to alienate it
in part or in whole.
_3326-PS_, Freezing of property belonging to Jews who
_Verordnungsblatt_, No. have emigrated from Holland which is located
39, p. 785, 20 Sept 1941. in Holland.
_3334-PS_, Prohibitions to employ a non-Jew in
_Verordnungsblatt_, No. households headed by a Jew or where a Jew is
44, p. 846, 23 Oct 1941. a member of the family, whether permanently
or temporarily but for an unbroken term of
more than four weeks. Any contract contrary
to this provision is inoperative. Penalties
for the employer: imprisonment up to one year
and a fine up to 10,000 florins.
_3328-PS_, No Jew can exercise any profession and trade
_Verordnungsblatt_, No. without authorization from the administrative
44, p. 841, 23 Oct 1941. authorities which may refuse it or set up
special conditions for its exercise.
Administrative authorities may order the
determination or the liquidation of any
employment contract concerning a Jew. Any
employer may terminate a contract with a Jew
by giving notice on the first day of any
calendar month if the general legal
provisions of the contract provide for a
longer term of notice, or if the contract is
to expire normally at a date after 31 Jan
1942. An indemnity ranging from one to six
times the monthly salary of the dismissed Jew
may be, under certain circumstances,
allocated as a settlement of all claims
against the employer.
_3329-PS_, Exclusion of Jews from Dutch Chamber of Arts
_Verordnungsblatt_, No. in which membership is compulsory for all
47, p. 901, 25 Nov 1941. those active in the field of sculpture,
architecture, artisan arts, music,
literature, theater, film industry and the
press. Prohibition for a Jew or a person
related to a Jew to be a member of an
association affiliated with the Chamber of
Arts, to found or to take part in the
foundation of such an association or to
establish a foundation or to take part in its
establishment or to benefit directly or
indirectly from its property where such
associations or foundations are affiliated
with the Chamber of Arts. Penalty: not
exceeding 5,000 florins.
_3325-PS_, Exclusion of Jews from the Dutch
_Verordnungsblatt_, No. _Arbeitsfront_ (N.A.F.).
11, p. 211, 1 May 1942.
_3336-PS_, Compulsory written declaration by Jews of
_Verordnungsblatt_, No. claims of any kind of which they are
13, p. 289, 23 May 1942. beneficiaries to be made at banking firm
Lippman, Rosenthal & Co., Amsterdam. Titles
and other documents proving the claims are to
be delivered to the bank at the time of the
declaration, all rights to such claims being
vested in the above mentioned bank. The
debtor can liberate himself only in the hands
of the bank and by so doing is released. The
declaration embodies also rights on property
or chattels real, participations as in
corporations and partnerships; reversions,
expectancies.
Collections of all kinds of art objects, art
articles, articles of gold, platinum, silver,
as well as polished or rough diamonds,
semi-precious stones and pearls, belonging in
part or in whole, legally or “economically”
to a Jew, must be delivered to said bank,
with exception of wedding rings and those of
a deceased husband, silver watches, used
table silver, provided that each person
belonging to the family of the owner may keep
only a cover consisting of 4 pieces, a knife,
a fork, a spoon and a dessert spoon;
teeth-fillings of precious metals.
A full recapitulation of the crimes perpetrated against the Jews by the
German civil occupation authorities through the instrumentality of
orders, decrees, and laws is contained in the statement of the
Netherlands Government Commissioner for Repatriation. (_1726-PS_)
The above statement is also evidence of the fact that in February 1941
the first mass deportation of Jews from the Netherlands took place. On
that occasion 1000 Jews were arrested and within a few months sent to
Buchenwald and/or Mauthausen. Subsequently their ashes were returned to
their relatives in Holland, against a payment of 75 florins for each.
Deportation continued until September 1943, when the last of the Jews
composed of the Jewish Council were sent to Westerbork (Holland). Of
140,000 registered “full” Jewish Netherlanders, 117,000 were deported to
the East. (_1726-PS_)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 65
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
091-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to │ │
│Seyss-Inquart, 11 September 1944, │ │
│concerning seizure of a library in │ │
│Amsterdam. │ III │ 152
│ │ │
*176-PS │Report on Einsatzstab Rosenberg, │ │
│Working Group Netherlands, signed │ │
│Schimmer. (USA 707) │ III │ 203
│ │ │
*437-PS │Extract from report, 19 June 1943, by │ │
│Frank to Hitler, concerning situation │ │
│in Poland. (USA 610) │ III │ 396
│ │ │
*812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │
│22 August 1939 and report from │ │
│Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │
│Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │
│events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │
│1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586
│ │ │
997-PS │Top secret report by Seyss-Inquart │ │
│concerning the situation in the │ │
│Netherlands—Exploitation and │ │
│Nazification in period 29 May to 19 │ │
│July 1940. │ III │ 641
│ │ │
1162-PS │Four Proclamations calling up Dutch │ │
│civilians for Temporary Forced Labor. │ III │ 817
│ │ │
1163-PS │Posters warning Dutch population of │ │
│reprisals and announcing the shootings│ │
│of hostages. │ III │ 819
│ │ │
1376-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer concerning the │ │
│exercise of Governmental authority in │ │
│the Lowlands, 20 May 1940. 1940 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 778. │ III │ 929
│ │ │
1621-PS │Secret letter from Reichsfuehrer SS to│ │
│General Rauter, 12 November 1942, │ │
│concerning procurement of │ │
│medico-physiological appliances. │ IV │ 136
│ │ │
1660-PS │Decree for registration for active │ │
│service in Austria in the year 1938 of│ │
│16 June 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 631. │ IV │ 171
│ │ │
*1726-PS │Statement of Netherlands Government in│ │
│view of Prosecution and punishment of │ │
│the German Nazi War Criminals. (USA │ │
│195) │ IV │ 227
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
*1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │
│The Jewish Question, under the │ │
│Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, │ │
│12 November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425
│ │ │
1949-PS │Report of Bureau of Statistics for │ │
│Provinces of the Ostmark, 15 December │ │
│1939, concerning Jews. │ IV │ 586
│ │ │
2111-PS │Order of Reich Commissioner for │ │
│Occupied Netherlands Territories │ │
│concerning establishment of │ │
│administrative Courts Martial. 1941 │ │
│Verordnungsblatt, p. 190. │ IV │ 735
│ │ │
2112-PS │Order of the Reich Commissioner for │ │
│Occupied Netherlands Territories │ │
│concerning Jewish Real Estate, 11 │ │
│August 1941. 1941 Verordnungsblatt, p.│ │
│655. │ IV │ 738
│ │ │
*2176-PS │Report on Mauthausen concentration │ │
│camp, by investigating officer, Office│ │
│of Judge Advocate, Third U. S. Army, │ │
│17 June 1945. (USA 249) │ IV │ 836
│ │ │
*2219-PS │Excerpt from letter from Seyss-Inquart│ │
│to Goering, 14 July 1939. (USA 62) │ IV │ 854
│ │ │
2233-B-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part I. │ │
│January-March. (USA 174) │ IV │ 885
│ │ │
*2233-N-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part II. │ │
│April to June. (USA 614) │ IV │ 907
│ │ │
2233-CC-PS │Frank Diary. 1939. Entry of 14 │ │
│December at p. 99. │ IV │ 918
│ │ │
2237-PS │Letter from Reich Commissar for │ │
│Reunion of Austria with the German │ │
│Reich to Goering, 18 November 1938, │ │
│concerning actions against the Jews in│ │
│November 1938. │ IV │ 918
│ │ │
*2246-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1 │ │
│September 1936, concerning Danube │ │
│situation. (USA 67) │ IV │ 930
│ │ │
*2278-PS │Report of Reichsminister Seyss-Inquart│ │
│to the General Government of Poland, │ │
│concerning official tour from 17 to 22│ │
│November 1939. (USA 706) │ IV │ 953
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
**2311-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor│ │
│concerning Administration of the Oath │ │
│to Officials of Province of Austria, │ │
│15 March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 245. (Referred to but not │ │
│offered in evidence.) │ IV │ 1005
│ │ │
*2463-PS │Telegram from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler,│ │
│11 March 1938, published in Documents │ │
│of German Politics,1939, Vol. VI, Part│ │
│1. (USA 703) │ V │ 207
│ │ │
**2464-PS │Official Austrian communique of the │ │
│reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet│ │
│and general political amnesty, 16 │ │
│February 1938, published in Documents │ │
│of German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, │ │
│Part 1. (Referred to but not offered │ │
│in evidence.) │ V │ 208
│ │ │
2465-PS │Announcement of appointment of │ │
│Seyss-Inquart as Federal Chancellor, │ │
│11 March 1938, published in Documents │ │
│of German Politics, 1938, Vol. VI, │ │
│Part 1. (Referred to but not offered │ │
│in evidence.) │ V │ 209
│ │ │
**2466-PS │Official communique of resignation of │ │
│Austrian President Miklas, 13 March │ │
│1938, published in Documents of German│ │
│Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 209
│ │ │
**2469-PS │Official German and Austrian │ │
│communique concerning equal rights of │ │
│Austrian National Socialists in │ │
│Austria, 18 February 1938, published │ │
│in Documents of German Politics, 1939,│ │
│Vol. VI, Part 1. (Referred to but not │ │
│offered in evidence.) │ V │ 210
│ │ │
**2484-PS │Official German communique of visit of│ │
│Austrian Minister Seyss-Inquart to │ │
│Hitler, Berlin, 17 February 1938, │ │
│published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 234
│ │ │
**2485-PS │Address by Federal Chancellor │ │
│Seyss-Inquart from Balcony of City │ │
│Hall at Linz, 12 March 1938, published│ │
│in Documents of German Politics, Vol. │ │
│VI, Part 1, p. 144-145. (Referred to │ │
│but not introduced in evidence.) │ V │ 234
│ │ │
2613-PS │Extracts from “The Black Book of │ │
│Poland”. │ V │ 332
│ │ │
2705-PS │Decree of Reich Commissioner for │ │
│Occupied Netherlands Territories for │ │
│avoidance of cruelty to animals in │ │
│slaughtering, from Official Gazette │ │
│for Occupied Netherlands Territories, │ │
│3 August 1940. │ V │ 374
│ │ │
2909-PS │Affidavit of August Eigruber, 9 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 578
│ │ │
*2910-PS │Certificate of defendant │ │
│Seyss-Inquart, 10 November 1945. (USA │ │
│17) │ V │ 579
│ │ │
**2936-PS │Instruction of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │
│Chancellor concerning the Austrian │ │
│Federal Army, 13 March 1938, published│ │
│in Documents of German Politics, 1938,│ │
│Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 150. (Referred to │ │
│but not offered in evidence.) │ V │ 604
│ │ │
*2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from │ │
│Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA │ │
│76) │ V │ 628
│ │ │
**2994-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, │ │
│concerning Austrian-German Treaty of │ │
│11 July 1936. (USA 66) (Objection to │ │
│admission in evidence upheld.) │ V │ 703
│ │ │
2995-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, │ │
│concerning his visit to Berchtesgaden │ │
│on 12 February 1938. │ V │ 709
│ │ │
3147-PS │The Administration of the Occupied │ │
│Polish Territory, published in The │ │
│Archives, No. 67. │ V │ 910
│ │ │
*3254-PS │The Austrian Question, 1934-1938, by │ │
│Seyss-Inquart, 9 September 1945. (USA │ │
│704) │ V │ 961
│ │ │
3270-PS │Goering’s speech on 27 March in │ │
│Vienna, published in Documents of │ │
│German Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. │ │
│183. (USA 703) │ V │ 1047
│ │ │
*3271-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Himmler, │ │
│19 August 1939. (USA 700) │ V │ 1047
│ │ │
3323-PS │Decree concerning obligation to │ │
│register persons who are entirely or │ │
│partly of Jewish race, from Official │ │
│Gazette for Occupied Dutch │ │
│Territories, 1941. │ VI │ 39
│ │ │
3325-PS │Decree referring to Jewish students, │ │
│published in Official Gazette for │ │
│Occupied Dutch Territories, 1941. │ VI │ 43
│ │ │
3326-PS │Decree concerning blocking of property│ │
│belonging to Jews who emigrated to │ │
│Netherlands, from Official Gazette for│ │
│Occupied Dutch Territories. │ VI │ 44
│ │ │
3328-PS │Decree concerning regulation of │ │
│professional activities of Jews, from │ │
│Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch │ │
│Territories, year 1941. │ VI │ 45
│ │ │
3329-PS │Decree concerning Netherlands Chamber │ │
│of Culture, from Official Gazette for │ │
│Occupied Dutch Territories, year 1941.│ VI │ 48
│ │ │
3333-PS │Decree concerning registration of │ │
│business enterprises, from Official │ │
│Gazette for Occupied Dutch │ │
│Territories, year 1940. │ VI │ 58
│ │ │
3334-PS │Decree concerning employment of │ │
│Germans in Jewish households, from │ │
│Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch │ │
│Territories, year 1940. │ VI │ 62
│ │ │
3336-PS │Order concerning treatment of Jewish │ │
│property, from Official Gazette for │ │
│Occupied Dutch Territories, year 1942.│ VI │ 64
│ │ │
3339-PS │Order concerning marriages of male │ │
│persons of German Nationality in │ │
│Occupied Netherlands Territories, from│ │
│Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch │ │
│Territories, year 1941. │ VI │ 71
│ │ │
3340-PS │First Order concerning extraordinary │ │
│measures of a Constitutional and │ │
│Administrative nature, 1 March 1941, │ │
│from Official Gazette for Occupied │ │
│Dutch Territories, year 1941. │ VI │ 72
│ │ │
3341-PS │Third Order concerning certain │ │
│provision in connection with │ │
│Netherlands Nationality, 8 August │ │
│1941, from Official Gazette for │ │
│Occupied Dutch Territories, year 1941.│ VI │ 73
│ │ │
3342-PS │Eighth Order concerning Special │ │
│Measures affecting Administrative │ │
│Organization, 11 August 1941, from │ │
│Official Gazette of Occupied Dutch │ │
│Territories, year 1941. │ VI │ 74
│ │ │
3391-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, │ │
│30 September 1938. │ VI │ 108
│ │ │
3392-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, │ │
│3 September 1937. │ VI │ 109
│ │ │
*3397-PS │Letter from Keppler to Seyss-Inquart, │ │
│8 January 1938. (USA 702) │ VI │ 115
│ │ │
*3398-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Himmler, │ │
│4 November 1939. (USA 885) │ VI │ 116
│ │ │
3400-PS │Minutes of meeting of German │ │
│Association, 28 December 1918, and │ │
│Constitution and By-Laws thereof found│ │
│in personal files of Seyss-Inquart for│ │
│period of 1918 to 1943. │ VI │ 118
│ │ │
3425-PS │Voluntary statement made by │ │
│Seyss-Inquart with advice of counsel, │ │
│10 December 1945. (USA 701) │ VI │ 124
│ │ │
*3430-PS │Extract from Four Years in Holland, │ │
│1944. (USA 708) │ VI │ 135
│ │ │
3446-PS │Memorandum relating to report and │ │
│letter of Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief │ │
│of the German Police, 13 October 1938.│ VI │ 153
│ │ │
*3447-PS │Letter from Dr. Lammers to │ │
│Seyss-Inquart. (USA 887) │ VI │ 156
│ │ │
*3448-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr. │ │
│Lammers, 23 October 1938. (USA 886) │ VI │ 156
│ │ │
3449-PS │Letter to Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief │ │
│of German Police, January 1939. │ VI │ 157
│ │ │
*3450-PS │Decree of 18 November 1938 concerning │ │
│sequestration and confiscation of │ │
│property of enemies of the State of │ │
│Austria. (USA 888) │ VI │ 157
│ │ │
3457-PS │Extract concerning Seyss-Inquart from │ │
│The Archive, 1943-44, p. 720. │ VI │ 158
│ │ │
*3460-PS │Speech by Goering, from Hermann │ │
│Goering Speeches and Papers. (USA 437)│ VI │ 160
│ │ │
*3465-PS │Speech by Hans Frank, from Frank │ │
│Diary, 1940, Vol. II, pp. 510-511. │ │
│(USA 614) │ VI │ 166
│ │ │
3467-PS │Law on Limitation of travel to │ │
│Republic Austria, 29 May 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 57, p. │ │
│311. │ VI │ 169
│ │ │
*3468-PS │Decree concerning establishment of │ │
│administration of occupied Polish │ │
│territories, from Documents of German │ │
│Politics, 1939, Part 2, pp. 674-682. │ │
│(USA 705) │ VI │ 169
│ │ │
3473-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 6 │ │
│January 1938, giving details of Nazi │ │
│intrigue in Austria. (USA 581) │ VI │ 197
│ │ │
3522-PS │Letter from Konrad Henlein to │ │
│Seyss-Inquart, 17 March 1938. │ VI │ 212
│ │ │
3523-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Henlein, │ │
│29 December 1937. │ VI │ 213
│ │ │
3588-PS │Order concerning exercise of │ │
│Governmental authority in Netherlands,│ │
│29 May 1940, from Official Gazette for│ │
│Occupied Dutch Territories, 1940. │ VI │ 282
│ │ │
*3722-PS │Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 5 October │ │
│1945. (USA 224) │ VI │ 459
│ │ │
3732-PS │Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, 9 October │ │
│1945. │ VI │ 539
│ │ │
*C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │
│operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │
│74) │ VI │ 911
│ │ │
*C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander│ │
│Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017
│ │ │
*D-571 │Official report of British Minister in│ │
│Prague to Viscount Halifax, 21 March │ │
│1939. (USA 112) │ VII │ 88
│ │ │
EC-86 │Report on financial contributions of │ │
│the Occupied Areas. │ VII │ 264
│ │ │
ECR-174 │Report of the Commissar of the │ │
│Netherlands Bank for the month May │ │
│1941, dated 12 June 1941. │ VII │ 726
│ │ │
ECR-195 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │
│Administration of RKK Berlin, 21 April│ │
│1942, concerning Dutch East Help. │ VII │ 747
│ │ │
L-26 │United Nations Information │ │
│Organization Report No. 8, 14 June │ │
│1944 “Conditions in Occupied │ │
│Territories.” │ VII │ 771
│ │ │
L-151 │Report from Ambassador Bullitt to │ │
│State Department, 23 November 1937, │ │
│regarding his visit to Warsaw. (USA │ │
│70) │ VII │ 894
│ │ │
L-231 │Telegram from American Legation in │ │
│Vienna to U. S. Secretary of State, 13│ │
│March 1938. │ VII │ 1093
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
20. CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH
A. _POSITIONS AND HONORS HELD BY VON NEURATH._
He was a member of the Nazi Party from 30 January 1937 until 1945, and
was awarded the Golden Party Badge on 30 January 1937.
He was General in the SS. He was personally appointed _Gruppenfuehrer_
by Hitler in September 1937, and was promoted to _Obergruppenfuehrer_ on
21 June 1943.
He was Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Chancellorship of von
Papen from 2 June 1932, and under the Chancellorship of Hitler from 30
January 1933 until he was replaced by von Ribbentrop on 4 February 1938.
He was Reich Minister from 4 February 1938 until May 1945.
He was President of the Secret Cabinet Council, to which he was
appointed on 4 February 1938.
He was a member of the Reich Defense Council.
He was Reichs Protector for Bohemia and Moravia from 18 March 1939 until
he was replaced by Frick on 25 August 1943.
He was awarded the _Adlerorden_ by Hitler at the time of his appointment
as Reich Protector. Ribbentrop was the only other German to receive this
decoration.
These facts are collected in a document signed by von Neurath and his
counsel (_2972-PS_). Von Neurath comments on certain of these matters.
He says that the award of the Golden Party Badge was made on 30 January
1937 against his will and without his being asked. Yet he not only
refrained from repudiating the allegedly unwanted honor, but after
receiving it attended meetings at which wars of aggression were planned,
actively participated in the forcible annexation of Austria, and
tyrannized over Bohemia and Moravia.
He also contends that his appointment as SS _Gruppenfuehrer_ was also
against his will and without his being asked. But in this connection,
his wearing of the SS uniform, his receipt of the further promotion to
_Obergruppenfuehrer_, and the actions against Bohemia and Moravia must
be considered. In addition, von Neurath says that his appointment as
Foreign Minister was by Reichspresident von Hindenburg. Yet President
von Hindenburg died in 1934, and von Neurath continued as Foreign
Minister until 1938, under the chancellorship first of von Papen and
then of Hitler. He further claims that he was an inactive Minister from
4 February 1938 until May 1945. His activities in this connection will
be mentioned below, particularly with regard to Bohemia and Moravia.
Von Neurath next alleges that the Secret Cabinet Council never sat or
conferred. This Council, of which von Neurath was president, has been
authoritatively described as a select committee of the Cabinet for the
deliberation of foreign affairs, directly subordinated to the Fuehrer
for counsel and assistance (_1774-PS_):
“A Privy Cabinet Council, to advise the Fuehrer in the basic
problems of foreign policy, has been created by the decree of 4
February 1938 * * * This Privy Cabinet Council is under the
direction of Reich-Minister v. Neurath, and includes the Foreign
Minister, the Air Minister, the Deputy Commander for the
Fuehrer, the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of the
Reich-Chancellery, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and Navy
and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The
Privy Cabinet Council constitutes a select staff of
collaborators of the Fuehrer which consists exclusively of
members of the Government of the Reich; thus, it represents a
select committee of the Reich Government for the deliberation on
foreign affairs.” (_1774-PS_)
The formal composition of this body is shown in 2031-PS. Von Neurath
held himself out as a member of this body by communicating with the
British Ambassador on Secret Cabinet Council stationery. (_3287-PS_)
Von Neurath, finally, objects that he was not a member of the Reich
Defense Council. This Council was set up soon after Hitler’s accession
to power, on 4 April 1933 (_2261-PS_). In an affidavit by Frick
(_2986-PS_), this Council is described as follows:
“* * * We were also members of the Reich Defense Council, which
was supposed to plan preparations in case of war which later on
were published by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the
Reich.” (_2986-PS_)
The membership of this Council included the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, who was then von Neurath. This is shown by a document giving
the composition of the Reich Defense Council, and including among
permanent members the Minister for Foreign Affairs (_EC-177_). That
document is dated “Berlin, 22 May 1933,” which was during von Neurath’s
tenure of that office.
The functioning of the Reich Defense Council, with a representative of
von Neurath’s ministry, von Buelow, present, is shown by the minutes of
the 12th meeting on 14 May 1936 (_EC-407_). Under the secret law of 4
September 1938 von Neurath was a member of the Reich Defense Council by
virtue of his presidency of the Secret Cabinet Council. This fact is
shown by the enclosure of a copy of that law in a letter addressed to
von Neurath as Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia on 6 September
1939 (_2194-PS_). It is curious that the Reich Protector for Bohemia and
Moravia denies his membership in the Council when the letter enclosing
the law is one addressed to him. This law describes the tasks of the
Council as follows:
“The task of the Reich Defense Council consists, in peace-time,
of the decision on all measures for the preparation of Reich
defense, and the gathering together of all forces and means of
the nation according to the directions of the Leaders and Reich
Chancellor. The tasks of the Council in wartime will be
especially determined by the Leader and Reich Chancellor.”
(_2194-PS_)
The law also lists the permanent members of the Council, and the seventh
one is the President of the Secret Cabinet Council, who was von Neurath.
B. _VON NEURATH’S PART, AS FOREIGN MINISTER, IN THE CONSPIRACY FOR THE
BREACH OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS._
In assuming the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in Hitler’s
Cabinet, von Neurath assumed charge of a foreign policy committed to
breach of treaties.
The Nazi Party had repeatedly and for many years made known its
intention to overthrow Germany’s international commitments, even at the
risk of war. Sections 1 and 2 of the Party Program (_1708-PS_), which
was published year after year, declared:
“1. We demand the unification of all Germans in the Greater
Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination of
peoples.
“2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in
respect to the other nations; abrogation of the peace treaties
of Versailles and St. Germain.” (_1708-PS_)
An even clearer statement of these goals is contained in Hitler’s speech
at Munich on 15 March 1939, in which he said:
“My foreign policy had identical aims. My program was to abolish
the Treaty of Versailles. It is futile nonsense for the rest of
the world to pretend today that I did not reveal this program
until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. Instead of listening to this foolish
chatter of emigres, these gentlemen would have been wiser to
read what I have written thousands of times.” (_2771-PS_)
If it is “futile nonsense” for foreigners to raise that point, it would
be still more futile for Hitler’s Foreign Minister to suggest that he
was ignorant of the aggressive designs of Nazi policy. The acceptance of
force as a means of solving international problems and achieving the
objectives of Hitler’s foreign policy must have been known to anyone as
closely in touch with Hitler as was von Neurath. This doctrine, for
example, is constantly reiterated in _Mein Kampf_ (_D-660_). (See
Section 6 of Chapter IX on Aggression as a Basic Nazi Idea.)
Hence, by the acceptance and implementation of this foreign policy, von
Neurath assisted and promoted the realization of the illegal aims of the
Nazi Party.
C. _VON NEURATH’S PART, AS FOREIGN MINISTER, IN THE CONSPIRACY TO
CONSOLIDATE NAZI CONTROL OVER GERMANY IN PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSIVE
WAR._
In his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs von Neurath directed the
international aspects of the first phase of the Nazi conspiracy, the
consolidation of control in preparation for war.
From his close connection with Hitler von Neurath must have known the
cardinal points of Hitler’s policy leading up to the outbreak of World
War II, as outlined in retrospect by Hitler in his speech to his
military leaders on 23 November 1939 (_789-PS_). This policy had two
facets: internally, the establishment of rigid control; externally, the
program to release Germany from its international commitments. The
external program had four points:
1. Secession from the disarmament conference;
2. The order to re-arm Germany;
3. The introduction of compulsory military service; and
4. The remilitarization of the Rhineland.
These points were set out in Hitler’s address of 23 November 1939, after
the invasion of Poland:
“* * * I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of
the people and extending it to the armed forces. First,
reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearance of
decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While
reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task, to
release Germany from its international ties. Two particular
characteristics are to be pointed out: secession from the League
of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conference. It
was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that
it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the
number of believers was very small. I was supported by the
nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my
intentions. After that, the order for rearmament. Here again
there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only
a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed
service. After that, militarization of the Rhineland, again a
process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of
people who would trust in me were very small. Then the beginning
of the fortification of the whole country, especially in the
West.” (_789-PS_)
Hitler thus summarized his pre-war foreign policy in four points. Von
Neurath participated directly and personally in accomplishing each of
these four points, at the same time officially proclaiming that these
measures did not constitute steps toward aggression. The first is a
matter of history. When Germany left the disarmament conference von
Neurath sent telegrams, dated 14th October 1933, to the President of the
Conference announcing Germany’s withdrawal (Documents of German
Politics, 1933, vol. I, p. 94). Similarly, von Neurath made the
announcement of Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations on 21
October 1933. (Documents of German Politics, 1933, vol. I). At the same
time, the German government was undertaking far-reaching military
preparation (_C-140_; _C-153_).
The second point regarding German rearmament: When von Neurath was
Foreign Minister, on 10 March 1935, the German Government officially
announced the establishment of the German air force (_TC-44_). On 21 May
1935, Hitler announced a purported unilateral repudiation of the Naval,
Military, and Air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty for
the Restoration of Friendly Relations with the United States
(_2288-PS_). On the same day the Reich Cabinet, of which von Neurath was
a member, enacted the secret Reich Defense Law creating the office of
Plenipotentiary General for War Economy (_2261-PS_), afterwards
described by the _Wehrmacht_ armament expert as “the cornerstone of
German rearmament” (_2353-PS_):
“The latter orders were decreed in the Reich defense law of 21
May 1935, which was supposed to be published only in case of
war, and was already declared valid for carrying out war
preparations. As this law fixed the duties of the armed forces
and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the
fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war
economy organization.” (_2353-PS_)
The third point is the introduction of compulsory military service. On
16 March 1935 von Neurath signed the law for the organization of the
armed forces, which provided for universal military service and
anticipated a vastly expanded German army (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1935, I,
p. 369) (_1654-PS_). This was described by Keitel as the real start of
the large-scale rearmament program which followed.
The fourth point was the remilitarization of the Rhineland. The
Rhineland was reoccupied on 7 March 1936. This action was announced by
Hitler (_2289-PS_), who had also previously given the order for
“Operation Schulung,” directing the military action which was to be
taken if necessary (_C-139_). These were acts for which von Neurath
shared responsibility from his position and from the steps which he
took. Some time later he summed up his views on the actions detailed
above in a speech to Germans abroad, on 29 August 1937:
“The unity of the racial and national will created through
Nazism with unprecedented elan has made possible a foreign
policy through which the bonds of the Versailles Treaty were
slashed, freedom to arm regained, and the sovereignty of the
whole nation reestablished. We have again become master in our
own home, and we have produced the means of power to remain
henceforth that way for all times. The world should notice from
Hitler’s deeds and words that his aims are not aggressive war.”
(_D-449_)
D. _VON NEURATH’S PART, AS FOREIGN MINISTER AND ADVISOR TO THE FUEHRER,
IN THE PLANNING OF WARS OF AGGRESSION._
Both as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as one of the inner circle of
the Fuehrer’s advisors on foreign political matters, von Neurath
participated in the political planning and preparation for acts of
aggression against Austria, Czechoslovakia, and other nations.
(1) _The von Neurath technique._ If von Neurath’s policy may be
described in a sentence it may be summarized as breaking one treaty only
at a time. He himself put it slightly more pompously but to the same
effect in a speech before the Academy of German Law on 30 October 1937:
“* * * Out of the acknowledgment of these elementary facts the
Reich Cabinet has always interceded in favor of treating every
concrete international problem within methods especially suited
for it, not to complicate it unnecessarily by amalgamation with
other problems, and as long as problems between only two powers
are concerned to choose the way for an immediate understanding
between these two powers. We are in a position to state that
this method has fully proved itself good not only in the German
interest, but also in the general interest.” (_D-471_)
The only countries whose interests von Neurath failed to mention in that
speech are the other parties to the various treaties that were dealt
with in that way. The working out of that policy can be seen from a
brief summary of the actions of von Neurath when he was Foreign
Minister, and those of his immediate successor when von Neurath still
purported to have influence.
In 1935 action was directed against the Western Powers, in the form of
the rearmament of Germany. When that was going on another country had to
be reassured. At that time it was Austria, which still had—up to
1935—the support of Italy. Hence, the fraudulent and clearly false
assurance, the essence of the technique in that case, given by Hitler,
on 21 May 1935. (_TC-26_)
Then, in 1936, action was again taken against the Western Powers in the
occupation of the Rhineland. Another fraudulent assurance was made to
Austria in the Treaty of 11 July of that year, (_TC-22_) the deceitful
nature of which is shown by letters from von Papen. (_2246-PS_;
_2247-PS_)
Then, in 1937 and 1938, the Nazis moved on a step and action was
directed against Austria. That action was absorption, finally planned,
at the latest, at the meeting on 5 November 1937 (_386-PS_). The action
was taken on 11 March 1938. Reassurance had to be given to the Western
Powers; hence the assurance to Belgium on 13 October 1937. (_TC-34_)
Less than a year later the object of the aggressive action was
Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland was obtained in September 1938, and the
whole of Bohemia and Moravia was absorbed on 15 March 1939. At that time
it was necessary to reassure Poland; so an assurance to Poland was given
by Hitler oh 20 February 1938 (_2357-PS_), and repeated up to 26
September 1938 (_2358-PS_). The falsity of that assurance is shown in
Section 8 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Poland.
Finally, when the Nazis decided to take action for the conquest of
Poland in the next year, assurance had to be given to Russia. Hence, a
non-aggression pact was entered into with the U.S.S.R. on 23 August
1939. (_TC-25_)
With regard to the foregoing summary, the Latin tag, _res ipsa loquitur_
is apposite. But a frank statement from von Neurath with regard to the
earlier part of it is found in the account of his conversation with the
United States Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt, on 18 May 1936 (_L-150_):
“Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German
Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until ‘the
Rhineland had been digested.’ He explained that he meant that,
until the German fortifications had been constructed on the
French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do
everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak
by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with
regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our fortifications are
constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that
France cannot enter German territory at will, all those
countries will begin to feel very differently about their
foreign policies and a new constellation will develop,’ he
said.” (_L-150_)
The conversation between von Papen as Ambassador and Mr. Messersmith is
much to the same effect. (_1760-PS_)
(2) _Austria._ At the time of the aggression against Austria von Neurath
was Foreign Minister. This included the preliminary stages, during the
early Nazi plottings against Austria in 1934. In this period occurred
the Nazi murder of Chancellor Dolfuss and the ancillary acts which were
afterwards so strongly approved by the German Government. (See Section 3
of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.) Von Neurath was also
Foreign Minister when the false assurance was given to Austria on 21 May
1935 (_TC-26_) and the fraudulent treaty was made on 11 July 1936
(_TC-22_). And von Neurath was Foreign Minister when his ambassador to
Austria, von Papen, was carrying on his subterranean intrigue in the
period from 1935 to 1937. (_2247-PS_; _2246-PS_)
Von Neurath was present when Hitler declared, in a highly confidential
circle, on 5 November 1937, that the German question could only be
solved by force, and that his plans were to conquer Austria and
Czechoslovakia (_386-PS_). Hitler expressed his designs on Austria as
follows:
“* * * For the improvement of our military political position,
it must be our first aim in every case of entanglement by war to
conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to
remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance
westwards.” (_386-PS_)
It is impossible for von Neurath, after that meeting, to say that he was
not acting except with his eyes completely open and with complete
comprehension as to what was intended.
During the _Anschluss_ von Neurath received a note from the British
Ambassador dated 11 March 1938 (_3045-PS_). In reply von Neurath uttered
two obvious untruths. The first:
“* * * It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to
bring about this development, especially the assertion, which
was spread later by the former Chancellor Schuschnigg, that the
German Government had presented the Federal President with a
conditional ultimatum. It is a pure invention.” (_3287-PS_)
According to the German ultimatum, Schuschnigg had to appoint a proposed
candidate as Chancellor and form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals
of the German Government. Otherwise the invasion of Austria by German
troops was held in prospect. (See Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression
Against Austria.) The second untruth:
“The truth of the matter is that the question of sending
military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up
when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram,
already published by the press, to the German Government,
urgently asking for the dispatch of German troops as soon as
possible, in order to restore peace and order and to avoid
bloodshed. Faced with the immediately threatening danger of a
bloody civil war in Austria the German Government then decided
to comply with the appeal addressed to it.” (_3287-PS_)
(As to the inspired nature of the Austrian telegram, see Section 3 of
Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)
All that can be said is that it must have given von Neurath a certain
macabre sort of humor to write that note (_3287-PS_) when the truth was
the opposite, as shown by the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Buerckel
(_812-PS_), the transcripts of Goering’s telephone conversations with
Austria (_2949-PS_), and the entries in Jodl’s diary for 11, 13, and 14
February. (_1780-PS_)
According to Jodl’s diary—the entry for 10 March:
“At 13.00 hours General Keitel informs Chief of Operational
Staff and Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in
London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.” (_1780-PS_)
It is inconceivable when von Neurath had taken over the Foreign Office,
was dealing with the matter and was co-operating with Goering to suit
the susceptibilities of the Czechs, that he should have been so ignorant
of the truth of events as to write that letter (_3287-PS_) in good
faith.
Von Neurath’s position is shown equally clearly by the account which is
given of him in the affidavit of Messersmith (_2385-PS_). Von Neurath’s
style of activity at this crisis is described as follows:
“I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made
these promises were not only the dyed-in-the-wool Nazis, but
more conservative Germans who already had begun to willingly
lend themselves to the Nazi program.
“In an official dispatch to the Department of State from Vienna,
dated October 10, 1935, I wrote as follows:
“‘Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen,
and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are
diplomats of the old school. They are in fact servile
instruments of the regime, and just because the outside world
looks upon them as harmless they are able to work more
effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they
propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the
regime’.” (_2385-PS_)
(3) _Czechoslovakia._ At the time of the occupation of Austria, von
Neurath gave the assurance to M. Mastny, the Ambassador of
Czechoslovakia to Berlin, regarding the continued independence of
Czechoslovakia (_TC-27_). M. Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovakian Foreign
Minister, describes the circumstances as follows:
“I have in consequence been instructed by my Government to bring
to the official knowledge of His Majesty’s Government the
following facts: Yesterday evening (the 11th March)
Field-Marshal Goering made two separate statements to M. Mastny,
the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the
developments in Austria will in no way have any detrimental
influence on the relations between the German Reich and
Czechoslovakia, and emphasizing the continued earnest endeavor
on the part of Germany to improve those mutual relations.”
* * * * * *
“M. Mastny was in a position to give him [Goering] definite and
binding assurances on this subject [Czech mobilization] and
today spoke with Baron von Neurath, who, among other things,
assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still
considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration
Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925.” (_TC-27_)
In view of von Neurath’s presence at the meeting on 5 November 1937,
four months previously, where he had heard Hitler’s views on
Czechoslovakia (_386-PS_), and that it was only six months before the
treaty was disregarded, von Neurath’s assurance is an excellent example
of the technique of diplomacy developed by von Neurath.
On 28 May 1938 Hitler held a conference of important leaders, including
Beck, von Brauchitsch, Raeder, Keitel, Goering, and Ribbentrop, at which
Hitler affirmed that preparations should be made for military action
against Czechoslovakia by October (_388-PS_; _2360-PS_). It is believed,
although not confirmed, that von Neurath attended.
On 4 September 1938 the Government of which von Neurath was a member
enacted a new Secret Reich Defense Law which defined various official
responsibilities, in clear anticipation of war. This law provided, as
did the previous Secret Reich Defense Law, for a Reich Defense Council
as a supreme policy board for war preparations (_2194-PS_). Then came
the Munich agreement of 29 September 1938, in spite of which, on 14
March 1939, German troops marched into Czechoslovakia. (_TC-50_)
On 16 March 1939 the German Government, of which von Neurath was still a
member, promulgated the Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor on
the Establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. (_TC-51_)
During the following week, von Ribbentrop signed a treaty with Slovakia
(_1439-PS_), Article 2 of which reads as follows:
“For the purpose of making effective the protection undertaken
by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall have the
right at all times to construct military installations and to
keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary, in an
area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State
of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the
eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians,
and the Javornik Mountains.
“The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to
assure that the land required for these installations shall be
conveyed to the German armed forces. Furthermore, the Government
of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for
imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops
and the supply of military installations.” (_1439-PS_)
The ultimate objective of Hitler’s policies, disclosed at the meeting at
which von Neurath was present on 5 November 1937 (_386-PS_), is obvious
from the terms of this treaty. It was the resumption of the _drang_ for
_lebensraum_ in the East.
E. _VON NEURATH’S PART, AS PROTECTOR FOR BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA, IN THE
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY._
By accepting and occupying the position of Reich Protector of Bohemia
and Moravia, von Neurath personally adhered to the aggression against
Czechoslovakia. As Protector he further actively participated in the
conspiracy for world aggression, and assumed a position of leadership in
the execution of policies involving violations of the laws of war and
the commission of crimes against humanity.
Von Neurath’s responsibility for these crimes derives from the legal
position which he assumed. Von Neurath assumed the position of Protector
under a sweeping grant of powers. Article V of the act creating the
Protectorate provided:
“1. As trustee of Reich interests, the Leader and Chancellor of
the Reich shall nominate a Reich Protector in Bohemia and
Moravia. His seat of office will be Prague.
“2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Leader and
Chancellor of the Reich and as Commissioner of the Reich
Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance
of the political principles laid down by the Leader and
Chancellor of the Reich.
“3. The members of the Government of the Protectorate shall be
confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be
withdrawn.
“4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all
measures taken by the Government of the protectorate and to give
advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich
and, in case of danger, issue ordinances required for the common
interest.
“5. The promulgation of laws, ordinances and other legal
announcements and the execution of administrative measures and
legal judgments shall be annulled if the Reich Protector enters
an objection.” (_2119-PS_)
At the very outset of the Protectorate, von Neurath’s supreme authority
was implemented by a series of basic decrees. These established the
alleged legal foundation for the policy and program which resulted, all
aimed toward the systematic destruction of the national integrity of the
Czechs. Among these decrees were:
(1) The decree granting “Racial Germans” in Czechoslovakia a supreme
order of citizenship (_2119-PS_);
(2) An act concerning the representation in the Reichstag of Greater
Germany of German Nationals Resident in the Protectorate (13 April
1939);
(3) An order concerning the acquisition of German citizenship by former
Czechoslovakian citizens of German origin (20 April 1939).
Another series of decrees granted “Racial Germans” in Czechoslovakia a
preferred status at law and in the courts:
(1) An order concerning the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction in the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (14 April 1939);
(2) An order concerning the Exercise of Jurisdiction in Civil
Proceedings (14 April 1939);
(3) An order concerning the Exercise of Military Jurisdiction (8 May
1939).
The Ordinance on Legislation in the Protectorate (7 June 1939) also
granted to the Protector broad powers to change by decree the autonomous
law of the Protectorate.
Finally, the Protector was authorized, with the Reich Leader SS and the
Chief of the German Police (Himmler) “to take, if necessary, such
(police) measures which go beyond the limits usually valid for police
measures.” It is difficult to imagine what can be police measures
“beyond the limits usually valid for police measures” in view of the
police measures in Germany between 1933 and 1939. (See Section 4 of
Chapter VII on Purge of Political Opponents and Section 6 of Chapter XV
on the Gestapo and SD.) But presumably such increase was believed to be
possible, and was given to von Neurath to use for coercion of the
Czechs.
The declared basic policy of the Protectorate was to destroy the
identity of the Czechs as a nation and to absorb their territory into
the Reich. This is borne out by a memorandum signed by Lt. Gen. of
Infantry Frederici (_862-PS_), which is headed “The Deputy General of
the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia”. It is
marked Top Secret and dated 15 October 1940. That was practically a year
before von Neurath went on leave, as he puts it, on 27 September 1941.
The memorandum discusses “Basic Political Principles in the
Protectorate,” and copies went to Keitel and Jodl. The memorandum
states:
“On 9 October of this year [1940] the office of the Reich
protector held an official conference in which State Secretary
SS Lt. General K. H. Frank spoke about the following:
“Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the
central authorities of Berlin, have had difficulties about the
solution of the Czech problem.
“After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his
view about the various plans in a memorandum. In this, three
ways of solution were indicated:
“A. German infiltration of Moravia and _reduction of the Czech
nationality to a residual Bohemia_.
“This solution is considered as unsatisfactory, because the
Czech problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue to
exist.
“B. Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical
solution, namely, the deportation of all Czechs. Therefore the
memorandum comes to the conclusion that it can not be carried
out within a reasonable space of time.
“C. Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e. absorption of about half of
the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of
importance by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint.
This will take place among other things, also by increasing the
_Arbeitseinsatz_ of the Czechs in the Reich territory, with the
exception of the Sudeten German border district; in other words,
by dispersing the closed Czech nationality. The other half of
the Czech nationality must be deprived of its power, eliminated
and shipped out of the country by all sorts of methods. This
applies particularly to the racially mongoloid part, and to the
major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be
converted ideologically, and would represent a burden by
constantly making claims for leadership over the other Czech
classes, and thus interfering with a rapid assimilation.
“Elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be
handled roughly and should be eliminated.
“The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx
of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.
“After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen Solution C
(assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech
problem, and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the
Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be
carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich
Protector for years to come. From the above no particular
conclusions are drawn by the Armed Forces. This is the direction
which has always been represented from here.
“In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which was sent to
the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12
July 1939, entitled ‘The Czech Problem’.” (_862-PS_)
That view of the Reich Protector was accepted and formed a basis of his
policy. The result was a program of consolidating German control over
Bohemia and Moravia by the systematic oppression of the Czechs through
the abolishment of civil liberties, and the systematic undermining of
the native political, economic, and cultural structure by a regime of
terror. The only protection given by von Neurath was a protection to the
perpetrators of innumerable crimes against the Czechs. (Proof of this
aspect of von Neurath’s responsibility was left for development by the
Soviet prosecuting staff.)
F. _CONCLUSION._
Von Neurath received many honors and rewards as his worth. It even
appears that Hitler showered more honors on von Neurath than on some of
the leading Nazis who had been with the Party since the very beginning.
His appointments as President of the newly created Secret Cabinet
Council in 1938 was in itself a new and singular distinction. On 22
September 1940 Hitler awarded him the War Merit Cross, First Class, as
Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. He was also awarded the Golden
Badge of the Party, and was promoted by Hitler personally from the rank
of _Gruppenfuehrer_ to _Obergruppenfuehrer_ in the SS, on 21 June 1943.
Von Neurath and Ribbentrop were the only two Germans to be awarded the
_Adlerorden_, a distinction normally reserved for foreigners. Von
Neurath’s seventieth birthday, 2 February 1943, was made the occasion
for most of the German newspapers to praise his many years of service to
the Nazi regime. This service, in the view of the prosecution, may be
summed up in two ways:
(1) He was an internal fifth columnist among Conservative political
circles in Germany. They had been anti-Nazi but were converted in part
by seeing one of themselves, in the person of von Neurath,
wholeheartedly with the Nazis.
(2) His previous reputation as a diplomat made public opinion abroad
slow to believe that he would be a member of a cabinet which did not
stand by its words and assurances. It was most important for Hitler that
his own readiness to break every treaty or commitment should be
concealed as long as possible, and for this purpose he found in von
Neurath his handiest tool.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO CONSTANTIN VON
NEURATH
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 64
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in │ │
│the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 │ │
│November 1937, signed by Hitler’s │ │
│adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 │ │
│November 1937. (USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
*789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,│ │
│23 November 1939, to which all Supreme│ │
│Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572
│ │ │
*812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │
│22 August 1939 and report from │ │
│Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │
│Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │
│events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │
│1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586
│ │ │
*862-PS │Memorandum by General Friderici, │ │
│Plenipotentiary of the Wehrmacht to │ │
│the Reich Protector of Bohemia and │ │
│Moravia, initialled by Keitel, Jodl │ │
│and Warlimont, 15 October 1940, │ │
│concerning plan to Germanize │ │
│Czechoslovakia. (USA 313) │ III │ 618
│ │ │
*1439-PS │Treaty of Protection between Slovakia │ │
│and the Reich, signed in Vienna 18 │ │
│March and in Berlin 23 March 1939. │ │
│1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│606. (GB 135) │ IV │ 18
│ │ │
1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │
│universal military conscription. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ IV │ 163
│ │ │
*1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │
│Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. │ │
│(USA 255, USA 324) │ IV │ 208
│ │ │
*1760-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 28│ │
│August 1945. (USA 57) │ IV │ 305
│ │ │
*1774-PS │Extracts from Organizational Law of │ │
│the Greater German Reich by Ernst │ │
│Rudolf Huber. (GB 246) │ IV │ 349
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
*2031-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │
│Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB│ │
│217) │ IV │ 654
│ │ │
2119-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │
│Chancellor concerning the Protectorate│ │
│of Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939.│ IV │ 751
│ │ │
*2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │
│Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │
│Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │
│enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │
│Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843
│ │ │
*2246-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1 │ │
│September 1936, concerning Danube │ │
│situation. (USA 67) │ IV │ 930
│ │ │
*2247-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 17 │ │
│May 1935, concerning intention of │ │
│Austrian government to arm. (USA 64) │ IV │ 930
│ │ │
2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │
│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │
│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │
│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │
│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │
│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2288-PS │Adolf Hitler’s speech before the │ │
│Reichstag, published in Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, Southern Germany Special │ │
│Edition, No. 142a, 22 May 1935. (USA │ │
│38) │ IV │ 993
│ │ │
*2289-PS │Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag, 7 │ │
│March 1936, published in Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, Berlin Edition, No. 68, 8 │ │
│March 1936. (USA 56) │ IV │ 994
│ │ │
*2353-PS │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic │ │
│Facts for History of German War and │ │
│Armament Economy. (USA 35) │ IV │ 1071
│ │ │
*2357-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 20 │ │
│February 1938, published in Documents │ │
│of German Politics, Part VI, 1, pp. │ │
│50-52. (GB 30) │ IV │ 1099
│ │ │
2358-PS │Speech by Hitler in Sportspalast, │ │
│Berlin, 26 September 1938, from │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich │ │
│Edition, 27 September 1938. │ IV │ 1100
│ │ │
*2360-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 30 │ │
│January 1939, from Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, Munich Edition, 31 January│ │
│1939. (GB 134) │ IV │ 1101
│ │ │
*2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30│ │
│August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23
│ │ │
2541-PS │Extracts from German Publications. │ V │ 285
│ │ │
2771-PS │U. S. State Department, National │ │
│Socialism, published by U. S. │ │
│Government Printing Office, 1943. │ V │ 417
│ │ │
*2852-PS │Minutes of meetings of Council of │ │
│Ministers for Reich Defense. (USA 395)│ V │ 512
│ │ │
*2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from │ │
│Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA │ │
│76) │ V │ 628
│ │ │
*2972-PS │List of appointments held by von │ │
│Neurath, 17 November 1945. (USA 19) │ V │ 679
│ │ │
*2986-PS │Affidavit of the defendant, Wilhelm │ │
│Frick, 19 November 1945. (USA 409) │ V │ 688
│ │ │
*3045-PS │Letter, 12 March 1938, to British │ │
│Embassy enclosing letter from │ │
│Henderson to Neurath, 11 March 1938. │ │
│(USA 127) │ V │ 765
│ │ │
*3287-PS │Letter from von Neurath to Henderson, │ │
│12 March 1938. (USA 128) │ V │ 1090
│ │ │
*C-139 │Directive for operation “Schulung” │ │
│signed by Blomberg, 2 May 1935. (USA │ │
│53) │ VI │ 951
│ │ │
*C-140 │Directive for preparations in event of│ │
│sanctions, 25 October 1935, signed by │ │
│Blomberg. (USA 51) │ VI │ 952
│ │ │
*C-153 │Naval Armament Plan for the 3rd │ │
│Armament Phase, signed by Raeder, 12 │ │
│May 1934. (USA 43) │ VI │ 967
│ │ │
D-449 │Extract from The Archive, 1937, p. │ │
│650. │ VII │ 58
│ │ │
D-471 │Extract from The Archive, October │ │
│1937, p. 921. │ VII │ 59
│ │ │
*D-660 │Extracts from Hutchinson’s Illustrated│ │
│edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128) │ VII │ 164
│ │ │
EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │
│Committee of the Reich Defense held on│ │
│26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328
│ │ │
*EC-407 │Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of Reichs │ │
│Defense Council, 14 May 1936. (GB 247)│ VII │ 462
│ │ │
*L-150 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │
│Ambassador Bullitt and von Neurath, │ │
│German Minister for Foreign Affairs, │ │
│18 May 1936. (USA 65) │ VII │ 890
│ │ │
*TC-22 │Agreement between Austria and German │ │
│Government and Government of Federal │ │
│State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB │ │
│20) │ VIII │ 369
│ │ │
*TC-25 │Non-aggression Treaty between Germany │ │
│and USSR and announcement of 25 │ │
│September 1939 relating to it. (GB │ │
│145) │ VIII │ 375
│ │ │
*TC-26 │German assurance to Austria, 21 May │ │
│1935, from Documents of German │ │
│Politics, Part III, p. 94. (GB 19) │ VIII │ 376
│ │ │
*TC-27 │German assurances to Czechoslovakia, │ │
│11 and 12 March 1938, as reported by │ │
│M. Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister │ │
│to London to Viscount Halifax. (GB 21)│ VIII │ 377
│ │ │
*TC-34 │German Declaration to the Belgian │ │
│Minister of 13 October 1937. (GB 100) │ VIII │ 381
│ │ │
*TC-44 │Notice by German government of │ │
│existence of German Air Force, 9 March│ │
│1935. (GB 11) │ VIII │ 386
│ │ │
*TC-50 │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the │ │
│German people and Order of the Fuehrer│ │
│to the Wehrmacht, 15 March 1939, from │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Part │ │
│VII, pp. 499-501. (GB 7) │ VIII │ 402
│ │ │
TC-51 │Decree establishing the Protectorate │ │
│of Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939.│ │
│(GB 8) │ VIII │ 404
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
21. HANS FRITZSCHE
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY FRITZSCHE IN THE NAZI STATE._
Fritzsche’s Party membership and his various positions in the propaganda
apparatus of the Nazi State are shown in two affidavits made by himself
(_2976-PS_; _3469-PS_). Fritzsche became a member of the Nazi Party on 1
May 1933, and continued to be a member until Germany’s collapse in 1945.
Fritzsche began his service with the staff of the Reich Ministry for
People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda (hereinafter referred to as the
Propaganda Ministry) on 1 May 1933, he remained within the Propaganda
Ministry until the Nazi downfall in the spring of 1945.
Before the Nazis seized political power in Germany, and beginning in
September 1932, Fritzsche was head of the Wireless News Service
(_Drahtloser Dienst_), an agency of the Reich Government, which at that
time was the government of von Papen. After the Wireless News Service
was incorporated into Dr. Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry in May 1933,
Fritzsche continued as its head until 1938. Upon entering the Progapanda
Ministry in May 1933, Fritzsche also became head of the news section of
the Press Division of the Propaganda Ministry. He continued in this
position until 1937. In the summer of 1938 Fritzsche was appointed
deputy to Alfred Ingemar Berndt, who was then head of the German Press
Division. (The German Press Division, in the Indictment, is called the
“Home Press Division.” Since “German Press Division” seems to be a more
literal translation, it is referred to as the German Press Division
throughout this section. It is sometimes otherwise known as the Domestic
Press Division.) This Division, as will be later shown, was the major
section of the Press Division of the Reich Cabinet.
In December 1938 Fritzsche succeeded Berndt as the head of the German
Press Division. Between 1938 and November 1942, Fritzsche was promoted
three times. He advanced in title from Superior Government Counsel to
Ministerial Counsel, then to _Ministerialdirigent_, and finally to
_Ministerialdirektor_.
In November 1942 Fritzsche was relieved of his position as head of the
German Press Division by Dr. Goebbels. In its place he accepted from Dr.
Goebbels a newly created position in the Propaganda Ministry, that of
Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of the Greater German
Radio. At the same time he also became head of the Radio Division of the
Propaganda Ministry. He held both these positions in radio until the
Nazi downfall.
There are two allegations in the Indictment concerning Fritzsche’s
positions for which no proof is available. The first unsupported
allegation states that Fritzsche was Editor-in-Chief of the official
German News Agency, _Deutsche Nachrichten Buero_. The second unsupported
allegation states that Fritzsche was head of the Radio Division of the
Propaganda Department of the Nazi Party. Fritzsche, in his affidavit,
denies having held either of these positions, and these two allegations
must fall for want of other proof.
B. _FRITZSCHE’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO CONSOLIDATE NAZI CONTROL OVER
GERMANY AND TO LAUNCH WARS OF AGGRESSION._
In one of his affidavits (_3469-PS_), which contains numerous statements
in the nature of self-serving declarations, Fritzsche states that he
first became a successful journalist in the service of the Hugenberg
Press, the most important chain of newspaper enterprises in pre-Nazi
Germany. The Hugenberg concern owned papers of its own, but it was
important primarily because it served newspapers which principally
supported the so-called “national” parties of the Reich, including the
NSDAP.
In paragraph 5 of this affidavit (_3469-PS_), Fritzsche relates that in
September 1932, when von Papen was Reich Chancellor, he was made head of
the Wireless News Service, replacing an official who was politically
unbearable to the Papen regime. The Wireless News Service was a
government agency for spreading news by radio. Fritzsche began making
radio broadcasts at about this time, with a success which Goebbels
recognized and later exploited on behalf of the Nazi conspirators.
On the evening of the day when the Nazis seized power, the 30 January
1933, two emissaries from Goebbels visited Fritzsche. One of them was
Dressler-Andrees, head of the Radio Division of the NSDAP; the other was
an assistant of Dressler-Andrees named Sadila-Mantau. These two
emissaries notified Fritzsche that although Goebbels was angry with
Fritzsche for writing an article critical of Hitler, still Goebbels
recognized Fritzsche’s public success on the radio. They stated further
that Goebbels desired to retain Fritzsche as head of the Wireless News
Service on certain conditions: (1) that Fritzsche discharge all Jews;
(2) that he discharge all other personnel who would not join the NSDAP;
(3) that he employ with the Wireless News Service the second Goebbels’
emissary, Sadila-Mantau. Fritzsche refused all these conditions except
the hiring of Sadila-Mantau. (_3469-PS_)
Fritzsche continued to make radio broadcasts during this period in which
he supported the national National Socialist coalition government then
still existing.
In early 1933 SA troops several times called at the Wireless News
Service and Fritzsche prevented them, with some difficulty, from making
news broadcasts.
In April 1933 Goebbels called Fritzsche to him for a personal audience.
At paragraph 9 of his affidavit (_3469-PS_) Fritzsche has described his
prior relationship with Dr. Goebbels:
“I was acquainted with Dr. Goebbels since 1928. Apparently he
had taken a liking to me, besides the fact that in my press
activities I had always treated the National Socialists in a
friendly way until 1931. Already before 1933, Goebbels, who was
the editor of the ‘_Attack_’ [“_Der Angriff_”] a Nazi newspaper,
had frequently made flattering remarks about the form and
content of my work, which I did as contributor of many
‘National’ newspapers and periodicals, among which were also
reactionary papers and periodicals.” (_3469-PS_)
(1) _Establishment of complete Nazi control over press and radio._ At
the first Goebbels-Fritzsche discussion in early April 1933, Goebbels
informed Fritzsche of his decision to place the Wireless News Service
within the Propaganda Ministry as of 1 May 1933. He suggested that
Fritzsche make certain rearrangements in the personnel so as to remove
Jews and other persons who did not support the NSDAP. Fritzsche debated
with Goebbels concerning some of these steps. During this period
Fritzsche made some effort to place Jews in other jobs.
In a second conference with Goebbels shortly thereafter, Fritzsche
informed Goebbels about the steps he had taken in reorganizing the
Wireless News Service. Goebbels thereupon informed Fritzsche that he
would like to have him reorganize and modernize the entire news services
of Germany within the controls of the Propaganda Ministry. On 17 March
1933, approximately two months before this time, the Propaganda Ministry
had been created by decree. (_2029-PS_) Fritzsche was intrigued by the
Goebbels offer. He proceeded to conclude the Goebbels-inspired
reorganization of the Wireless News Service and, on 1 May 1933, together
with the remaining members of his staff, he joined the Propaganda
Ministry. On this same day he joined the NSDAP and took the customary
oath of unconditional loyalty to the Fuehrer (_3469-PS_).
From this time on, whatever reservations Fritzsche may have had, either
then or later, to the course of events under the Nazis, Fritzsche was
completely within the Nazi camp. For the next 13 years he assisted in
creating and in using the propaganda devices which the conspirators
successfully employed in each of the principal phases of the conspiracy.
From 1933 until 1942 Fritzsche held one or more positions within the
German Press Division. For four years, from 1938 to 1942—the period
when the Nazis undertook military invasions of neighboring countries—he
headed this Division. By virtue of its functions, the German Press
Division became an important and unique instrument of the Nazi
conspirators, not only in dominating the minds and psychology of
Germans, but also as an instrument of foreign policy and psychological
warfare against other nations. Thus, the already broad jurisdiction of
the Propaganda Ministry was extended as follows by a Hitler decree of 30
June 1933:
“The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda has
jurisdiction over the whole field of spiritual indoctrination of
the nation, of propagandizing the State, of cultural and
economic propaganda, of enlightenment of the public at home and
abroad. Furthermore, he is in charge of the administration of
all institutions serving those purposes.” (_2030-PS_)
An exposition of the general functions of the German Press Division of
the Propaganda Ministry is contained in an excerpt from a book by George
Wilhelm Mueller, a Ministerial Director in the Propaganda Ministry.
(_2434-PS_) Paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of Fritzsche’s affidavit contain an
exposition of the functions of the German Press Division, a description
which confirms and adds to the exposition in Mueller’s book. Concerning
the German Press Division, Fritzsche’s affidavit (_3469-PS_) states:
“During the whole period from 1933 to 1945 it was the task of
the German Press Division to supervise the entire domestic press
and to provide it with directives by which this division became
an efficient instrument in the hands of the German State
leadership. More than 2,300 German daily newspapers were subject
to this control. The aim of this supervision and control, in the
first years following 1933, was to change basically the
conditions existing in the press before the seizure of power.
That meant the coordination into the New Order of those
newspapers and periodicals which were in the service of
capitalistic special interests or party politics. While the
administrative functions, wherever possible, were exercised by
the professional associations and the Reich Press Chamber, the
political leadership of the German press was entrusted to the
German Press Division. The head of the German Press Division
held daily press conferences in the Ministry for the
representatives of all German newspapers. Hereby all
instructions were given to the representatives of the press.
These instructions were transmitted daily, almost without
exception, and mostly by telephone, from headquarters by Dr.
Otto Dietrich, Reich Press Chief, in a fixed statement, the
so-called ‘Daily Parole of the Reich Press Chief.’ Before the
statement was fixed the head of the German Press Division
submitted to him—Dietrich—the current press wishes expressed
by Dr. Goebbels and by other Ministries. This was the case
especially with the wishes of the Foreign Office, about which
Dr. Dietrich always wanted to make decisions personally or
through his representatives at the headquarters, Helmut
Suendermann and chief editor Lorenz. The practical use of the
general directions in detail was thus left entirely to the
individual work of the individual editor. Therefore, it is by no
means true that the newspapers and periodicals were a monopoly
of the German Press Division or that essays and leading articles
through it had to be submitted to the Ministry. Even in war
times this happened in exceptional cases only. The less
important newspapers and periodicals which were not represented
at the daily press conferences received their information in a
different way—by providing them either with ready-made articles
and reports, or with a confidential printed instruction. The
publications of all other official agencies were directed and
coordinated likewise by the German Press Division. To enable the
periodicals to get acquainted with the daily political problems
of newspapers and to discuss these problems in greater detail,
the _Informationskorrespondenz_ was issued especially for
periodicals. Later on it was taken over by the Periodical Press
Division. The German Press Division likewise was in charge of
pictorial reporting in so far as it directed the employment of
pictorial reporters at important events. In this way, and
conditioned by the current political situation, the entire
German Press was made a permanent instrument of the Propaganda
Ministry by the German Press Division. Thereby, the entire
German Press was subordinate to the political aims of the
Government. This was exemplified by the timely measuring and the
emphatic presentation of such press polemics as appeared to be
most useful, as shown for instance in the following themes: the
class struggle of the system era; the leadership principle and
the authoritarian state; the party and interest politics of the
system era; the Jewish problem; the conspiracy of World Jewry;
the Bolshevistic danger; the plutocratic Democracy abroad; the
race problem generally; the church; the economic misery abroad;
the foreign policy; and living space [_lebensraum_].”
(_3469-PS_)
This description of Fritzsche’s establishes clearly that the German
Press Division was the instrument for subordinating the entire German
press to the political aims of the Nazi Government.
Fritzsche’s early activities within the German Press Division on behalf
of the conspirators are described in his affidavit (_3469-PS_). In a
conference with Goebbels the following occurred:
“At this time Dr. Goebbels suggested to me, as a specialist on
news technique, the establishment and direction of a section
‘News,’ within the Press Division of his Ministry, in order to
organize fully and to modernize the German news agencies. In
executing this assignment given to me by Dr. Goebbels I took for
my field the entire news field for the German Press and the
radio in accordance with the directions given by the Propaganda
Ministry, at first with the exception of the DNB, German News
Agency.” (_3469-PS_)
The reason why the DNB was excepted from Fritzsche’s field at this time
is that it did not come into existence until 1934.
Later on in his affidavit Fritzsche mentions the sizeable funds put at
his disposal in building up the Nazi news services. Altogether, the
German news agencies received a ten-fold increase in their budget from
the Reich, an increase from 400,000 to 4,000,000 marks. Fritzsche
himself selected and employed the Chief Editor for the Transocean News
Agency and also for the Europa Press. Fritzsche states that some of the
“* * * directions of the Propaganda Ministry which I had to
follow were * * * increase of German news copy abroad at any
cost * * * spreading of favorable news on the internal
construction and peaceful intentions of the National Socialistic
System. * * *” (_3469-PS_)
About the summer of 1934 Funk, then Reich Press Chief, achieved the
fusion of the two most important domestic news agencies, the Wolff
Telegraph Agency and the Telegraph Union, and thus formed the official
German news agency known as DNB. Although Fritzsche held no position
with DNB at any time, nevertheless as head of the news section of the
German Press Division, Fritzsche’s duties gave him official jurisdiction
over the DNB, which was the official domestic news agency of the Reich
after 1934. Fritzsche admits that he coordinated the work of the various
foreign news agencies
“within the inland Europe and overseas foreign countries with
each other and in relationship to DNB” (_3469-PS_).
The Wireless News Service was headed by Fritzsche from 1930 to 1937.
After January 1933 the Wireless News Service was the official instrument
of the Nazi government in spreading news over the radio. During the same
time that Fritzsche headed the Wireless News Service, he personally made
radio broadcasts to the German people. These broadcasts were naturally
subject to the controls of the Propaganda Ministry and reflected its
purposes. The influence of Fritzsche’s broadcasts to the German people,
during this period of consolidation of control by the Nazi conspirators,
is all the more important since Fritzsche was concurrently head of the
Wireless News Service, and thus in control of all radio news.
(2) _Use of propaganda to prepare the way for aggressions_. The use made
by the Nazi conspirators of psychological warfare is well known. Before
each major aggression, with some few exceptions based on expediency,
they initiated a press campaign calculated to weaken their victims and
to prepare the German people psychologically for the attack. They used
the press, after their earlier conquests, as a means for further
influencing foreign politics and in maneuvering for the next following
aggression.
By the time of the occupation of the Sudetenland on 1 October 1938,
Fritzsche had become deputy head of the entire German Press Division.
Fritzsche states that the role of German propaganda before the Munich
Agreement on the Sudetenland was directed by his immediate chief,
Berndt, head of the German Press Division. Fritzsche describes Berndt’s
propaganda as follows:
“He exaggerated minor events very strongly, used sometimes old
episodes as new—and there even came complaints from the
Sudetenland itself that much of the news reported by the German
press was untrustworthy. As a matter of fact, after the great
foreign political success at Munich in September 1938, there
came a noticeable crisis in confidence of the German people in
the trustworthiness of its press. This was one reason for the
recalling of Berndt, in December 1938 after the conclusion of
the Sudeten action and for my appointment as head of the German
Press Division. Beyond this, Berndt, by his admittedly
successful but still primitive military-like orders to the
German Press, had lost the confidence of the German editors.”
(_3469-PS_)
Fritzsche was accordingly made head of the German Press Division in
place of Berndt. Between December 1938 and 1942, Fritzsche, as head of
the German Press Division, personally gave to the representatives of the
principal German newspapers the “daily parole of the Reich Press Chief.”
During this period he was the principal conspirator directly concerned
with the manipulations of the press.
The first important foreign aggression after Fritzsche became head of
the German Press Division was the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia.
Fritzsche describes the propaganda action surrounding the incorporation
of Bohemia and Moravia as follows:
“The action for the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia, which
took place on 15 March 1939, while I was head of the German
Press Division, was not prepared for such a long period as the
Sudeten action. According to my memory, it was in February that
I received the order from the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich,
which was repeated as a request by the envoy Paul Schmidt of the
Foreign Office, to bring the attention of the press to the
efforts for independence of Slovakia and to the continued
anti-German coalition politics of the Prague government. I did
this. The daily paroles of the Reich Press Chief and the press
conference minutes at that time show the wording of the
corresponding instructions. These were the typical headlines of
leading newspapers and the emphatic leading articles of the
German daily press at that time: (1) the terrorizing of Germans
within the Czech territory by arrest, shooting of Germans by the
state police, destruction and damaging of German homes by Czech
gangsters; (2) the concentration of Czech forces on the Sudeten
frontier; (3) the kidnaping, deporting, and persecuting of
Slovakian minorities by the Czechs; that the Czechs must get out
of Slovakia; (4) secret meetings of Red functionaries in Prague.
Some few days before the visit of Hacha, I received the
instruction to publish in the press very emphatically the
incoming news on the unrest in Czechoslovakia. Such information
I received only partly from the German News Agency, DNB. Mostly
it came from the Press Division of the Foreign Office and some
of it came from big newspapers with their own news services.
Among the newspapers offering information was above all the
‘_Voelkischer Beobachter_’ which, as I learned later on,
received its information from the SS Standartenfuehrer Gunter
D’Alquen. He was at this time in Pressburg. I had forbidden all
news agencies and newspapers to issue news on unrest in
Czechoslovakia before I had seen it. I wanted to avoid a
repetition of the very annoying results of the Sudeten action
propaganda, and I did not want to suffer a loss of prestige
caused by untrue news. Thus, all news checked by me was
admittedly full of tendency [_voller Tendenz_] however, not
invented. After the visit of Hacha in Berlin and after the
beginning of the invasion of the German Army, which took place
on 15 March 1939, the German press had enough material for
describing those events. Historically and politically the event
was justified with the indication that the declaration of
independence of Slovakia had required an interference and that
Hacha with his signature had avoided a war and had reinstated a
thousand-year union between Bohemia and the Reich.” (_3469-PS_)
The propaganda campaign of the press preceding the invasion of Poland on
1 September 1939 bears again the handiwork of Fritzsche and his German
Press Division. Fritzsche speaks of the conspirators’ treatment of this
episode as follows:
“Very complicated and changing was the press and propagandists
treatment in the case of Poland. Under the influence of the
German-Polish agreement, it was generally forbidden in the
German press for many years to publish anything on the situation
of the German minority in Poland. This remained also the case
when in the Spring of 1939 the German press was asked to become
somewhat more active as to the problem of Danzig. Also, when the
first Polish-English conversations took place, and when the
German press was instructed to use a sharper tone against
Poland, the question of the German minority still remained in
the background. But during the summer this problem was picked up
again and created immediately a noticeable sharpening of the
situation, namely, each larger German newspaper had for quite
some time an abundance of material on complaints of the Germans
in Poland without the editors having had a chance to use this
material. The German papers, from the time of the minority
discussion at Geneva, still had correspondents of free
collaborators in Kattewitz, Bromberg, Posen, Thorn, etc. Their
material now came forth with a bound. Concerning this the
leading German newspapers, upon the basis of directions given
out in the so-called ‘daily parole’ brought out the following
publicity with great emphasis: (1) cruelty and terror against
Germans and the extermination of Germans in Poland; (2) forced
labor of thousands of German men and women in Poland; (3)
Poland, land of servitude and disorder; the desertion of Polish
soldiers; the increased inflation in Poland; (4) provocation of
frontier clashes upon direction of the Polish Government; the
Polish lust to conquer; (5) persecution of Czechs and Ukrainians
by Poland. The Polish Press replied particularly sharply.”
(_3469-PS_)
The press campaign preceding the invasion of Yugoslavia followed the
conventional pattern. The customary definitions, lies, incitement, and
threats, and the usual attempt to divide and weaken the victim, are
contained in Fritzsche’s description of this propaganda action:
“During the period immediately preceding the invasion of
Yugoslavia, on the 16th of April 1941, the German press
emphasized by headlines and leading articles the following
topics: (1) the planned persecution of Germans in Yugoslavia,
including the burning down of German villages by Serbian
soldiers; also the confining of Germans in concentration camps
and also the physical mishandling of German-speaking persons;
(2) the arming of Serbian bandits by the Serbian Government; (3)
the incitement of Yugoslavia by the plutocrats against Germany;
(4) the increasing anti-Serbian feeling in Croatia; (5) the
chaotic economic and social conditions in Yugoslavia.”
Since Germany had a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, and
because the conspirators wanted the advantage of surprise, there was no
special propaganda campaign immediately preceding the attack on the
U.S.S.R. Fritzsche’s affidavit discusses the propaganda line which was
given the German people in justification of this aggressive war:
“During the night from the 21st to the 22nd of June 1941,
Ribbentrop called me in for a conference in the Foreign Office
Building at about 5 o’clock in the morning, at which
representatives of the domestic and foreign press were present.
Ribbentrop informed us that the war against the Soviet Union
would start that same day and asked the German press to present
the war against the Soviet Union as a preventative war for the
defense of the Fatherland, as a war which was forced upon us
through the immediate danger of an attack of the Soviet Union
against Germany. The claim that this was a preventative war was
later repeated by the newspapers which received their
instructions from me during the usual daily parole of the Reich
Press Chief. I, myself, have also given this presentation of the
cause of the war in my regular broadcasts.” (_3469-PS_)
Fritzsche, throughout his affidavit, constantly refers to his expert
technical assistance to the apparatus of the Propaganda Ministry. In
1939, apparently becoming dissatisfied with the efficiency of the
existing facilities of the German Press Division, he established a new
instrument for improving the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda:
“About the summer of 1939 I established within the German Press
Division a section called ‘Speed-Service.’ * * * At the start it
had the task of checking the correctness of news from foreign
countries. Later on, about the Fall of 1939, this section also
elaborated on collecting materials which were put at the
disposal of the entire German press. For instance, dates from
the British Colonial policy, from political statements of the
British Prime Minister in former times, descriptions of social
distress in hostile countries, etc. Almost all German newspapers
used such material as a basis for their polemics. Hereby was
achieved a great unification within the fighting front of the
German press. The title ‘Speed Service’ was chosen because
materials for current comments were supplied with unusual
speed.” (_3469-PS_)
Throughout this entire period preceding and including the launching of
aggressive wars, Fritzsche made regular radio broadcasts to the German
people under the program titles of “Political Newspaper Review,”
“Political and Radio Show,” and later “Hans Fritzsche Speaks.” His
broadcasts naturally reflected the polemics and the controls of his
Ministry and thus of the conspiracy. Fritzsche, the most eminent member
of Goebbels’ propaganda team, helped substantially in making possible,
both within Germany and without, the conspirators’ plans for aggressive
war.
C. _FRITZSCHE’S USE OF PROPAGANDA TO FURTHER THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
ATROCITIES AND EXPLOIT OCCUPIED TERRITORIES._
Fritzsche incited atrocities and encouraged a ruthless occupation
policy. The results of propaganda as a weapon of the Nazi conspirators
reaches into every aspect of this conspiracy, including the atrocities
and ruthless exploitation in occupied countries. It is likely that many
ordinary Germans would never have participated in or tolerated the
atrocities committed throughout Europe, had they not been conditioned
and goaded by the constant Nazi propaganda. The callousness and zeal of
the people who actually committed the atrocities was in large part due
to the constant and corrosive propaganda of Fritzsche and his official
associates.
(1) _Persecution of the Jews._ With respect to Jews, the Department of
Propaganda within the Propaganda Ministry had a special branch for the
“Enlightenment of the German people and of the world as to the Jewish
question, fighting with propagandistic weapons against enemies of the
State and hostile ideologies.” This quotation is taken from a book
written in 1940 by Ministerial Director Mueller, entitled “The
Propaganda Ministry.” (_2434-PS_)
In his radio broadcasts Fritzsche took a particularly active part in
this “enlightenment” concerning the Jewish question. These broadcasts
were full of provocative libels against Jews, the result of which was to
inflame Germans to further atrocities against Jews. Even Streicher, the
master Jew-baiter of all time, could scarcely outdo Fritzsche in some of
his anti-Jewish incitements. Broadcasts by Fritzsche which were
monitored and translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation are
quite revealing (_3064-PS_). These radio speeches of Fritzsche were
broadcast during the period 1941-1945, which was a period of intensified
anti-Jewish measures.
For instance, in a broadcast on 18 December 1941, Fritzsche declared:
“The fate of Jewry in Europe has turned out as unpleasant as the
Fuehrer predicted in the case of a European war. After the
extension of the war instigated by Jews, this unpleasant fate
may also spread to the New World, for you can hardly assume that
the nations of this New World will pardon the Jews for the
misery of which the nations of the Old World did not absolve
them.” (_3064-PS_)
On 18 March 1941 Fritzsche broadcast as follows:
“But the crown of all wrongly-applied Rooseveltian logics is the
sentence ‘There never was a race and there never will be a race
which can serve the rest of mankind as a master.’ Here too we
can only applaud Mr. Roosevelt. Precisely because there exists
no race which can be the master of the rest of mankind, we
Germans have taken the liberty to break the domination of Jewry
and of its capital in Germany, of Jewry which believed to have
inherited the Crown of secret world domination.” (_3064-PS_)
On 9 October 1941 Fritzsche declared over the radio:
“We know very well that these German victories, unparalleled in
history, have not yet stopped the source of hatred, which, for a
long time, has fed the war mongers and from which this war
originated. The international Jewish-Democratic Bolshevistic
campaign of incitement against Germany still finds cover in this
or that fox’s lair or rat-hole. We have seen only too frequently
how the defeats suffered by the war mongers only doubled their
senseless and impotent fury.” (_3064-PS_)
And on 8 January 1944 Fritzsche broadcast the following:
“It is revealed clearly once more that not a system of
Government, not a young nationalism, not a new and well applied
Socialism brought about this war. The guilty ones are
exclusively the Jews and the Plutocrats. If discussion on the
post-war problems brings this to light so clearly, we welcome it
as a contribution for later discussions and also as a
contribution to the fight we are waging now, for we refuse to
believe that world history will confide its future developments
to those powers which have brought about this war. This clique
of Jews and Plutocrats have invested their money in armaments
and they had to see to it that they would get their interests
and sinking funds; hence they unleashed this war.” (_3064-PS_)
Finally, in a broadcast on 13 January 1945, Fritzsche stated:
“If Jewry provided a link between divergent elements as
Plutocracy and Bolshevism and if Jewry was first able to work
successfully in the Democratic countries in preparing this war
against Germany, it has by now placed itself unreservedly on the
side of Bolshevism which, with its entirely mistaken slogans of
racial freedom against racial hatred, has created the very
conditions the Jewish race requires in its struggle for
domination over other races.”
* * * * * *
“Not the last result of German resistance on the fronts, so
unexpected to the enemy, is the fruition of a development which
began in the pre-war years, the process of subordinating British
policy to far-reaching Jewish points of view. It began long
before this when Jewish emigrants from Germany started their
war-mongering against us from British and American soil.”
* * * * * *
“This whole attempt aiming at the establishment of Jewish world
domination, now increasingly recognizable, has come to a head at
the very moment when the people’s understanding of their racial
origins has been far too much awakened to promise success to the
undertaking.” (_3064-PS_)
All this was designed not only as a justification of prior anti-Jewish
actions, but also as an invitation to further persecution of the Jews.
(2) _Ruthless treatment of peoples of the USSR._ Fritzsche also incited
and encouraged ruthless measures against the peoples of the USSR.
In his regular broadcasts Fritzsche’s incitements against the peoples of
the USSR were often linked to, and were certainly as inflammatory as,
his rantings against the Jews. It is ironic that his propaganda
ascribing atrocities to the peoples of the USSR are accurate
descriptions of some of the many atrocities committed by the German
invaders. Shortly after the invasion of the USSR in June 1941 Fritzsche
broadcast as follows:
“The evidence of letters reaching us from the front, of P. K.
[_Propaganda Kompanie_] reporters and soldiers on leave
demonstrates that, in this struggle in the East, not one
political system is pitted against another, not one view of life
is fighting another, but that culture, civilization, and human
decency make a stand against the diabolical principle of a
sub-human world.”
“It was only the Fuehrer’s decision to strike in time that saved
our homeland from the fate of being overrun by those sub-human
creatures, and our men, women, and children from the unspeakable
horror of being their prey.” (_3064-PS_)
In his broadcast on 10 July 1941 Fritzsche spoke of the alleged inhuman
deeds committed in various areas by the Soviet Union, and he states that
upon seeing the evidence of those deeds one is
“* * * finally to make the holy resolve to give his aid in the
final destruction of those who are capable of such dastardly
acts.”
* * * * * *
“The Bolshevist agitators make no effort to deny that in towns,
thousands, in the villages, hundreds, of corpses of men, women
and children have been found, who had been either killed or
tortured to death. Yet the Bolshevik agitators allege that this
was not done by Soviet Commissars but by German soldiers. Now we
Germans know our soldiers. No German woman, father, or mother
requires proof that their husband or their son cannot have
committed such atrocious acts.” (_3064-PS_)
Evidence to be offered by the Soviet prosecuting staff will prove that
representatives of the Nazi conspirators did not hesitate to exterminate
Soviet soldiers and civilians by scientific mass methods. The
incitements by Fritzsche make him an accomplice in these crimes. His
labeling of the Soviet peoples as members of a “sub-human world” seeking
to “exterminate” the German people, and similar talk, helped fashion the
psychological atmosphere of unreason and hatred which not only made
possible these atrocities in the East, but made them appear a holy duty.
(3) _Exploitation of occupied territories._ Fritzsche encouraged and
glorified the policy of the Nazi conspirators in ruthlessly exploiting
the occupied countries. In his radio broadcast of 9 October 1941 he
stated:
“Today we can only say: Blitzkrieg or no—this German
thunderstorm has cleansed the atmosphere of Europe. It is quite
true that the dangers threatening us were eliminated one after
the other with lightning speed; but in these lightning blows
which shattered England’s allies on the Continent, we saw not a
proof of the weakness, but a proof of the strength and
superiority of the Fuehrer’s gift as a statesman and military
leader; a proof of the German peoples’ force; we saw the proof
that no opponent can stand up to the courage, discipline, and
readiness for sacrifice displayed by the German soldier; and we
are particularly grateful for these lightning, unmatched
victories, because—as the Fuehrer emphasized last Friday—they
give us the possibility of embarking on the organization of
Europe and of lifting of the treasures of this old continent,
already now in the middle of war, without it being necessary for
millions and millions of German soldiers to be on guard,
fighting day and night along this or that threatened frontier;
and the possibilities of this continent are so rich that they
suffice for any need of peace or war.” (_3064-PS_)
In his affidavit, Fritzsche admits having encouraged the exploitation of
foreign countries:
“The utilization of the productive capacity of the occupied
countries for the strengthening of the war potential, I have
openly and gloriously praised, chiefly because the competent
authorities put at my disposal much material, especially on the
voluntary placement of manpower.” (_3469-PS_)
(4) _Control of German radio._ In addition to continuing as the head of
the German Press Division until after the conspirators had begun the
last of their aggression, Fritzsche was also the high commander of the
entire German radio system. In November 1942 Goebbels created a new
position, that of Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of the
Greater German Radio, a position which Fritzsche was the first and the
last to hold. In his affidavit, Fritzsche narrates how the entire German
Radio and Television System was organized under his supervision:
“My office practically represented the high command of German
radio.” (_3469-PS_)
As special Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of the Greater
German Radio, Fritzsche issued orders to all the Reich propaganda
offices by teletype. These were used in conforming the entire radio
apparatus of Germany to the desires of the conspirators.
Goebbels customarily held an eleven o’clock conference with his closest
collaborators within the Propaganda Ministry. When both Goebbels and his
undersecretary, Dr. Naumann, were absent, Goebbels, after 1943,
entrusted Fritzsche with the holding of this eleven o’clock press
conference.
In Goebbels’ introduction to a book by Fritzsche, called “War to the War
Mongers,” he took occasion to praise Fritzsche’s broadcasts in this
fashion:
“Nobody knows better than I how much work is involved in those
broadcasts, how many times they were dictated within the last
minutes to find some minutes later a willing ear by the whole
nation.” (_3255-PS_)
It is clear from Goebbels himself that the entire German nation was
prepared to lend willing ears to Fritzsche, after he had made his
reputation on the radio.
The rumor passed that Fritzsche was “His Master’s Voice” (_Die Stimme
seines Herren_). This is borne out by Fritzsche’s functions. When
Fritzsche spoke on the radio it was plain to the German people that they
were listening to the high command of the conspirators in this field.
D. _CONCLUSION._
Fritzsche was not the type of conspirator who signed decrees, or who sat
in the inner councils planning the overall grand strategy. The function
of propaganda is, for the most part, apart from the field of such
planning. The function of a propaganda agency is somewhat more analogous
to an advertising agency or public relations department, the job of
which is to sell the product and to win the market for the enterprise in
question. Here the enterprise was the Nazi conspiracy. In a conspiracy
which depends upon fraud as a means, the salesmen of the conspiratorial
group are quite as essential and culpable as the master planners, even
though he may not have contributed substantially to the formulation of
all the basic strategy, but rather concentrated on making the execution
of this strategy possible. In this case, propaganda was a weapon of
tremendous importance to this conspiracy. Furthermore, the leading
propagandists were major accomplices in this conspiracy, and Fritzsche
was one of them.
When Fritzsche entered the Propaganda Ministry, which has been called
the most fabulous “lie factory” of all time, and thus attached himself
to the conspiracy, he did so with more of an open mind than most of the
conspirators who had committed themselves at an earlier date, before the
seizure of power. He was in a particularly strategic position to observe
the frauds committed upon the German people and the world by the
conspirators.
In 1933, before Fritzsche took his Party oath of unconditional obedience
and subservience to the Fuehrer, he had observed at first hand the
operations of the storm troopers and the execution of Nazi race actions.
When, notwithstanding, Fritzsche undertook to bring all German news
agencies within Nazi control, he learned from the inside, indeed from
Goebbels himself, the intrigue and lies against opposition groups within
and without Germany. He observed, for example, how opposition
journalists, a profession to which he had previously belonged, were
either absorbed or eliminated. He continued to support the conspiracy.
He learned from day to day the art of intrigue and quackery in the
process of perverting the German nation, and he grew in prestige and
influence as he practiced this art.
Fritzsche learned a lesson from his predecessor, Berndt, who fell from
the leadership of the German Press Division partly because he
over-played his hand by blunt and excessive manipulation of the
Sudetenland propaganda. Fritzsche stepped into the gap caused by the
loss of confidence of both the editors and the German people, and did
his job with more skill and subtlety. His shrewdness and ability to be
more assuring and “to find,” as Goebbels said, “willing ears of the
whole nation,”—these things made him the more useful accomplice of the
conspirators.
Nazi Germany and its press went into war with Fritzsche in control of
all German news, whether by press or radio. In 1942, when Fritzsche
transferred from the field of the press to radio, he was not removed for
bungling, but because Goebbels then needed his talents most in the field
of radio. Fritzsche is not in the dock as a free journalist but as a
propagandist who helped substantially to tighten the Nazi stranglehold
over the German people, who made the excesses of the conspirators
palatable to the German people, who goaded the German nation to fury and
crime against people they were told by him were sub-human.
Without the propaganda apparatus of the Nazi State, the world would not
have suffered the catastrophe of these years, and it is because of
Fritzsche’s role in behalf of the Nazi conspirators, and their deceitful
and barbarous practices, that he is called to account before the
International Military Tribunal.
(See also Section 9 of Chapter VII on Propaganda, Censorship, and
Supervision of Cultural Activities.)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO HANS FRITZSCHE
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 26, 68
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
2029-PS │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry│ │
│of Public Enlightenment and │ │
│Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104. │ IV │ 652
│ │ │
2030-PS │Decree concerning the Duties of the │ │
│Reich Ministry for Public │ │
│Enlightenment and Propaganda, 30 June │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 449. │ IV │ 653
│ │ │
*2434-PS │The Reich Ministry for Enlightenment │ │
│of the People and for Propaganda, │ │
│Berlin 1940, by Georg Mueller. (USA │ │
│722) │ V │ 102
│ │ │
2976-PS │Affidavit of Fritzsche, 19 November │ │
│1945, concerning positions held. (USA │ │
│20) │ V │ 682
│ │ │
*3064-PS │Official British Broadcasting │ │
│Corporation translation of radio │ │
│speeches of Fritzsche. (USA 723) │ V │ 877
│ │ │
*3255-PS │Ministerial Director Hans │ │
│Fritzsche—Leader of Radio, published │ │
│in Radio Archives, Vol. 15, November │ │
│1942, pp. 473-474. (USA 724) │ V │ 992
│ │ │
*3469-PS │Affidavit of Hans Fritzsche, 7 January│ │
│1946. (USA 721) │ VI │ 174
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
1. PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE REICH GOVERNMENT
LEADER AND REICH CHANCELLOR (_Fuehrer und Reichskanzler_)
ADOLPH HITLER
Designated Successors HERMANN GOERING, RUDOLF HESS
(until 1941)
Successor named to form a Government KARL DOENITZ
after the collapse in May 1945
Head of Presidential Chancery OTTO MEISSNER
(_Praesidialkanzlei_) and State
Minister (_Staatsminister_)
REICH CABINET (_Reichsregierung_)
Chancellor (_Reichskanzler_) ADOLF HITLER
Vice-Chancellor FRANZ von PAPEN (until 1934)
Reich Ministers:
Reich Chancery HANS LAMMERS
Air HERMANN GOERING
Armaments and War Production ALBERT SPEER (predecessor,
Todt, Minister for Armaments
and Munitions—until 1942)
Church Affairs HERMAN MUHS, Acting
(predecessor, Hans Kerrl)
Economics WALTER FUNK (predecessors,
Schacht, Schmitt, Hugenberg)
Education BERNARD RUST
Finance LUTZ GRAF SCHWERIN von KROSIGK
Food and Agriculture HERBERT BACKE, Acting
(predecessor, Walter Darré)
Foreign Affairs JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP
(predecessor, Constantin von
Neurath)
Interior HEINRICH HIMMLER (predecessor,
Wilhelm Frick)
Justice OTTO THIERACK (predecessor,
Schlegelberger—acting,
Guertner)
Labor FRANZ SELDTE
Labor Service KONSTANTIN HIERL
Occupied Eastern Territories ALFRED ROSENBERG
Posts WILHELM OHNESORGE
(predecessor, von
Eltz-Ruebenach)
Propaganda PAUL JOSEF GOEBBELS
Transport JULIUS DORPMUELLER
(predecessor, von
Eltz-Ruebenach)
War WERNER von BLOMBERG (until
1938)
Ministers without Portfolio but with KEITEL (predecessor, von
Rank of Reich Minister Brauchitsch until December
1941)
DOENITZ (predecessor, Raeder)
BORMANN (predecessor, Hess)
HANS FRANK
SEYSS-INQUART (predecessor,
Roehm, until 1934)
Ministers after loss of portfolio
FRICK
von NEURATH
SCHACHT
State Ministers acting as Reich Ministers:
Head of the Presidential Chancery MEISSNER
State Minister for Bohemia-Moravia KARL HERMANN FRANK
Other Participants in Cabinet Meetings:
Chief of Foreign Organization of ERNST WILHELM BOHLE
Party
Prussian Minister of State and DR. JOHANNES POPITZ
Finance
Government Press Chief OTTO DIETRICH (predecessor,
Walter Funk)
Reich Youth Leader ARTHUR AXMANN (predecessor,
Baldur von Schirach)
SECRET CABINET COUNCIL (_Geheimer Kabinettsrat_)
President CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH
Secretary HANS LAMMERS
Members JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP,
HERMANN GOERING, PAUL JOSEF
GOEBBELS, ERICH RAEDER,
WILHELM KEITEL, RUDOLF HESS
(until 1941), MARTIN
BORMANN, WALTER von
BRAUCHITSCH
REICH DEFENSE COUNCIL (_Reichsverteidigungsrat_) (Status in 1938)
Chairman ADOLF HITLER
Reich Minister of Air and Supreme HERMANN GOERING
Commander of Air force
(_Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und
Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe_)
Supreme Commander of the Army WALTER von BRAUCHITSCH
(_Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres_)
Supreme Commander of the Navy ERICH RAEDER
(Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine)
Chief of the OKW (_Chef des WILHELM KEITEL
Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht_)
Deputy of the Leader (_Stellvertreter RUDOLF HESS
des Fuehrers_)
Chief of Reich Chancery (_Chef der HANS LAMMERS
Reichskanzlei_)
President of Secret Cabinet Council CONSTANTIN von NEURATH
(_Praesident des Geheimen
Kabinettsrats_)
Plenipotentiary for Reich WILHELM FRICK
Administration
(_Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer die
Reichsverwaltung_)
Plenipotentiary for Economics WALTER FUNK
(_Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer die
Wirtschaft_) and Reich Finance
Minister (_Reichsminister der
Finanzen_)
Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP
(_Reichsminister des Auswaertigen_)
Reich Minister of Interior WILHELM FRICK
(_Reichsminister des Innern_)
Reich Minister for Propaganda PAUL JOSEF GOEBBELS
(_Reichsminister fuer
Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda_)
President of Reich Bank Directory HJALMAR SCHACHT
(_Praesident des
Reichsbankdirektoriums_)
REICH DEFENSE COMMITTEE
(_Reichsverteidigungsausschuss_)
KEITEL, GOERING, SCHACHT,
FUNK, FRICK and Defense
Officials (_RD Referenten_)
MINISTERIAL COUNCIL FOR DEFENSE OF THE REICH (_Ministerrat fuer die
Reichsverteidigung_)
Chairman HERMANN GOERING
Secretary HANS LAMMERS
Plenipotentiary for Reich HEINRICH HIMMLER (predecessor,
Administration Wilhelm Frick)
Plenipotentiary for Economics WALTER FUNK
Chief of OKW WILHELM KEITEL
Deputy of the Fuehrer RUDOLF HESS (followed by Head
of the Party Chancery,
Martin Bormann)
THREE-MAN COLLEGE (_Dreier-Kollegium_)
Plenipotentiary for (War) Economy FUNK (predecessor, Schacht)
Plenipotentiary for Administration HIMMLER (predecessor, Frick)
Chief of the OKW KEITEL (predecessor, Minister
of War—Blomberg)
OFFICE OF THE DELEGATE FOR THE FOUR YEAR PLAN (_Beauftragter fuer den
Vierjahresplan_)
Delegate (_Beauftragter_) HERMANN GOERING
State Secretary and Permanent Deputy PAUL KOERNER
Plenipotentiaries—General
(_Generalbevollmaechtigte_):
Control of Building ALBERT SPEER
Special Chemical Production CARL KRAUCH
Economics in Serbia FRANZ NEUHAUSEN
Metal Mining in the Southeast FRANZ NEUHAUSEN
Armaments ALBERT SPEER
Manpower FRITZ SAUCKEL
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (Administrators directly responsible to Hitler)
Reich Commissioners:
Netherlands (_Reichskommissar fuer ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART
die besetzen niederlaendischen
Gebiete_) Reich Commissioner
Norway (_Reichskommissar fuer die JOSEF TERBOVEN
besetzten norwegischen Gebiete_)
Reich Commissioner
Ostland (_Reichskommissar fuer das HINRICH LOHSE
Ostland_)
Ukraine (_Reichskommissar fuer die ERICH KOCH
Ukraine_)
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
(_Reichsprotektorat Boehmen und
Maehren_) (Czechoslovakia)
Reich Protector WILHELM FRICK (predecessor,
Constantin von Neurath)
State Minister KARL HERMANN FRANK
General Government
(_Generalgouvernement_) (Poland)
Governor-General HANS FRANK
Chiefs of Civil Administration:
Alsace—Chief of Civil Administration ROBERT WAGNER
(_Chef der Zivilverwaltung im
Elsass_)
Bialystok—Chief of Civil ERICH KOCH
Administration (_Chef der
Zivilverwaltung in Bezirk
Bialystok_)
Carinthia and Carniola—Chief of Civil FRIEDRICH RAINER
Administration (_Chef der
Zivilverwaltung in den besetzten
Gebieten Kaerntens und Krains_)
Lorraine—Chief of Civil WILHELM STOEHR (predecessor,
Administration (_Chef der Josef Buerckel)
Zivilverwaltung in Lothringen_)
Lower Styria—Chief of Civil SIEGFRIED UIBERREITHER
Administration (_Chef der
Zivilverwaltung in der
Untersteiermark_)
Luxembourg—Chief of Civil GUSTAV SIMON
Administration (_Chef der
Zivilverwaltung in Luxemberg_)
Military Administration:
Denmark:
Military Commander GEORG LINDEMANN (predecessor,
Hermann von Hanneken)
Plenipotentiary WERNER BEST
France:
Military Commander STUELPNAGEL
Chief of Administration SCHMIDT
Diplomatic Representative OTTO ABETZ
THE REICHSTAG
President HERMANN GOERING
Vice-President HERMANN ESSER
Head of Administration KIENAST
(_Ministerialdirigent_)
POLICE
Reich Leader of SS and Chief of German HEINRICH HIMMLER
Police (_Reichsfuehrer SS und Chef
der Deutschen Polizei_)
Chief of the Order Police (_Chef der WUENNENBERG (predecessor, Kurt
Ordnungspolizei_) Daluege)
Chief of Security Police and SD (_Chef ERNST KALTENBRUNNER
der Sicherheitspolizei und SD_) (predecessor, Reinhardt
Heydrich)
Reich Main Security Office (_Reichssicherheitshauptamt_):
Chief ERNST KALTENBRUNNER
(predecessor, Reinhardt
Heydrich)
Chief of Personnel (Dept. I) ERWIN SCHULZ
Chief of Organization, HAENEL (predecessor, Siegert)
Administration, and Law (Dept. II)
Chief of Security Service (SD) (Dept. OTTO OHLENDORF
III)
Chief of Secret State Police HEINRICH MUELLER
(Gestapo) (Dept. IV)
Chief of Criminal Police (Kripo) PANZINGER (predecessor, Nebe)
(Dept. V)
Chief of Security Service (SD) WALTER SCHELLENBERG
Occupied Territories (Dept. VI)
Chief of Ideological Research (Dept. DITTEL (predecessor, Six)
VII)
Military Office WALTER SCHELLENBERG
2. PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE NAZI PARTY
Leader of the Party (_Fuehrer_) ADOLF HITLER
Deputy of the Fuehrer RUDOLF HESS (until 1941)
(_Stellvertreter des Fuehrers_)
Chief of the Party Chancery and MARTIN BORMANN
Secretary of the Fuehrer (_Leiter
der Partei Kanzlei und Sekretaer
des Fuehrers_)
Chancery of the Fuehrer (_Kanzlei des Fuehrers_):
Head PHILIPP BOUHLER
Chancery of the Party (_Kanzlei der Partei_):
Head MARTIN BORMANN
Deputy Head HELMUT FRIEDRICHS
Heads of Divisions:
Internal Party Affairs HELMUT FRIEDRICHS
Constitutional Law GERHARD KLOEPFER
Finance KARL WINKLER
Personnel WALKENHORST
Reich Party Directorate (_Reichsleitung_):
Chancery of Fuehrer and Party PHILIPP BOUHLER
Censorship
Chancery of the Party MARTIN BORMANN
Colonial Policy FRANZ RITTER von EPP
Ideology and Foreign Policy ALFRED ROSENBERG
Legal Office HANS FRANK (until 1942)
Municipal Policy KARL FIEHLER
Nazi Reichstag Delegation WILHELM FRICK
Organization and Labor Front ROBERT LEY
Party Tribunal WALTER BUCH
Peasantry WALTER DARRE (on leave, Herbert
Backe, acting)
Press Control (political) OTTO DIETRICH
Press Control (economic) MAX AMANN
Propaganda PAUL JOSEF GOEBBELS
Reich Labor Service KONSTANTIN HIERL
SS and Germanization HEINRICH HIMMLER
Treasury FRANZ XAVER SCHWARZ
Youth Education BALDUR von SCHIRACH
Heads of Party Formations:
Elite Guard (SS) HEINRICH HIMMLER
Storm Troops (SA) WILHELM SCHEPMANN (predecessors,
Victor Lutze, Ernest Roehm)
NS Motor Corps (NSKK) ERWIN KRAUS
Hitler Youth (HJ) ARTHUR AXMANN (predecessor, Baldur
von Schirach)
NS Flying Corps (NSFK) (with status ALFRED KELLER
similar to that of a formation)
NS German Student League (NSDSB) GUSTAV-ADOLF SCHEEL
NS University Teachers League GUSTAV-ADOLF SCHEEL
(NSDoB)
NS Women’s League (NSF) GERTRUD SCHOLTZ-KLINK
3. HEADS OF THE ARMED FORCES
Supreme Commander (_Oberster ADOLF HITLER
Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht_)
Highest ranking officer HERMANN WILHELM GOERING
(_Rangaeltester Offizier_) (Reichsmarschall)
C. in C. Army (_Oberbefehlshaber des ADOLF HITLER (predecessors, Walter
Heeres_) von Brauschitsch, Werner von
Fritsch)
C. in C. Navy (_Oberbefehlshaber der KARL DOENITZ (predecessor, Erich
Kriegsmarine_) Raeder)
C. in C. Air Force (_Oberbefehlshaber HERMANN WILHELM GOERING (succeeded
der Luftwaffe_) in 1945 by Robert von Greim)
A. HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES (_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht: OKW_)
Chief of High Command (_Chef des WILHELM KEITEL
Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht_)
Chief of Operation Staff (_Chef des ALFRED JODL
Wehrmachtfuehrungsstabes_)
Deputy Chief WALTER WARLIMONT
B. ARMY HIGH COMMAND (_Oberkommando des Heeres: OKH_)
C. in C. Army (_Oberbefehlshaber des ADOLF HITLER (predecessors, Walter
Heeres_) von Brauchitsch, Werner von
Fritsch)
Chief of Staff, Army (_Chef des HANS KREBS (predecessors, Heinz
Generalstabes des Heeres_) Guderian, Kurt Zeitzler, Franz
Halder and Ludwig Beck)
C. NAVY HIGH COMMAND (_Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine: OKM_)
C. in C. Navy (_Oberbefehlshaber der KARL DOENITZ (predecessor, Erich
Kriegsmarine_) Raeder)
Admiralinspekteur ERICH RAEDER (after 1943)
4. INDEX OF INDIVIDUALS
ABETZ, OTTO
German Ambassador to the Petain Government.
AMANN, MAX
Reich Leader for the Press (Reichsleiter fuer die Presse); President of
the Reich Press Chamber (Praesident der Reichspressekammer); Head of
Central publishing house of the Party (Zentral Verlag, Franz Eher
Nachf.)
ARNIM, JURGEN von
Generaloberst 1941-2; leading Panzer units in Russia, Jan. 1943;
Commander in Tunis; surrendered May 1943.
AXMANN, ARTHUR
Reich Youth Leader (Reichsjugendfuehrer) since 1940.
BACH-ZELEWSKI, ERICH, von dem
General of Police and of Waffen-SS; Chief of Anti-Partisan Units on the
entire Eastern front, 1943-44; in charge of the defense of Warsaw until
it was liberated; commander of a Waffen-SS Corps on the Western front.
BACKE, HERBERT
Acting Reichsminister for Food; in charge of Ministry of Food and
Agriculture; Head of Reichsnaehrstand.
BERGER, GOTTLIEB
Chief of Central Office of SS; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer; General d.
Waffen-SS; Inspector-General of Prisoners of War; head of Policy
Division of Reich Ministry for Eastern Territories.
BEST, DR. WERNER KARL
German Plenipotentiary in Denmark.
BLASKOWITZ, JOHANNES
Generaloberst.
BLOMBERG, WERNER EDWARD FRITZ von
Generalfeldmarschall; Minister of War until Feb. 4, 1938.
BOCK, FEDOR von
Generalfeldmarschall.
BODENSCHATZ, KARL HEINRICH
General in Air Corps; Chief of Staff to Goering.
BOHLE, ERNST WILHELM
Staatssekretaer in Foreign Office; Gauleiter, Head of Foreign
Organization (AO) of NSDAP.
BORMANN, MARTIN
Secretary of the Fuehrer; Head of the Party Chancery; Member of Cabinet
vested with power of Reich Minister; Ministerial Council for Defense of
the Reich; Reichsleiter; Executive Head of the Volkssturm; member of the
Reichstag; SS Gruppenfuehrer.
BOUHLER, PHILIPP
Chief of the Chancery of the Fuehrer; Reichsleiter; Chief of the Party
Censorship Committee for the Protection of NS Literature; Chief of the
Study Group for the German History Book and educational material.
BRANDT, DR. KARL
Reich Commissioner for Health and Medical Services; SS
Standartenfuehrer.
BRAUCHITSCH, WALTER HEINRICH HERMANN ALFRED von
Generalfeldmarschall, Retired December 1941; formerly C. in C. Army
(OKH).
BRUEGMANN, DR. ARNOLD
Chief of the Archives of the Party; Divisional Head in the
Reichsstudentenfuehrung.
BUCH, WALTER
Reichsleiter; Supreme Party Judge; Advisor on Population and Racial
Policy; SS Obergruppenfuehrer.
BUMKE, DR. ERWIN
President of the Supreme Court, Leipzig.
BURGDORFF, WILHELM
General d. Infanterie; Head of Personnel Division, OKH; Chief Military
ADC. to Hitler.
BUSCH, ERNST
Generalfeldmarschall.
CANARIS, WILHELM
Admiral; Head of Intelligence in OKW (Abwehr); removed from post and
executed.
CONTI, DR. LEONARDO
Staatssekretaer and Chief of Health Divisions (Abteilungen III & IV),
Reich Ministry of the Interior; Head of Public Health Department of
Party Reichsleitung.
DALUEGE, KURT
Chef der Ordnungspolizei; (Deputy) Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia;
Generaloberst d. Polizei; SS-Oberstgruppenfuehrer; since 1943 on “long
leave.”
DARRE, WALTER RICHARD OSKAR
Reichsleiter; Reichsbauernfuehrer; Reich Minister for Food and
Agriculture; Head of Reichsnaehrstand; on leave since April 1942.
DIETRICH, DR. OTTO
Staatssekretaer; Chief of Press Divisions in Reich Ministry of
Propaganda; Press Chief of Reichsregierung; Reichsleiter; Reich Press
Chief of NSDAP.
DITTMAR, KURT
Generalleutnant; in Propaganda Division of the OKH; broadcaster of
weekly military commentaries.
DOENITZ, KARL
Grossadmiral and C. in C. of OKM after 1943; previously C. in C. of
Submarine Arm of German Navy; Head of Government formed in May 1945.
DORPMUELLER, DR. JULIUS
Reich and Prussian Minister of Transport; Director-General of German
State Railways.
DORSCH, XAVER FRANZ
Ministerialdirektor in Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production;
Head of Field Command in Organization Todt.
EICHMANN, ADOLF
Head of Dept. IV A4 of RSHA, and Chief of Sub-section “b” thereof
charged with “The Solution of the Jewish Question”.
EPP, FRANZ, RITTER von
Reichsleiter; Reichstatthalter Bayern; SA-Obergruppenfuehrer; Head of
Colonial Policy Office of Party; General der Infanterie.
ESSER, HERMANN
Staatssekretaer and head of Tourists Division in Reich Propaganda
Ministry; Praesident of “Reich Group Tourist Traffic” (Fremdenverkehr);
Vice-President of the Reichstag; State Minister (retd).
FALKENHAUSEN, ALEXANDER von
Generaloberst—Commander of Belgium and Northern France.
FALKENHORST, NIKOLAUS von
Generaloberst—Commander in Norway.
FIEHLER, KARL
Reichsleiter; Chief of the Party Department for Municipal Policy;
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer; Chairman of the Congress of German
Municipalities; Oberbuergermeister Muenchen; Member of the Academy for
German Law.
FISCHER, ERICH
Head of Home Press Division in the Reich Propaganda Ministry; Head of
office for “German Press” in the Press Department of the Government;
Head of Political Press section with Reichspressechef (RL).
FISCHER, HUGO
Head of Culture and Exhibitions sections in Reich Propaganda Department
of RL.
FOSTER, ALBERT
Gauleiter, Reichsstatthalter and Reichsverteidigungskommissar
Danzig-Westpreussen.
FRANK, DR. HANS
Governor-General of Poland; Reichsleiter until 1942; Reich Minister
without portfolio; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer; President of the International
Chamber of Law (1941-42) and of Academy of German Law; Member of the
Reichstag; Leader of National Socialist Lawyers Bund (1933-1942).
FRANK, KARL-HERMANN
German Minister of State with rank of Reich Minister; Hoeherer SS und
Polizeifuehrer “Protectorate” and Sudetenland.
FREISLER, DR. ROLAND
President of the People’s Court; Prussian State Councillor; Member of
the Academy of German Law.
FRICK, WILHELM
Minister of Interior (1933-1943); Reichsprotector of Bohemia and
Moravia; Reichsdirektor of Elections (1933-1943); SS-Obergruppenfuehrer;
Reichsleiter; Head of Nazi Reichstag Delegation; Member of Reich Defense
Council; General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich
(1935-1943); Reichsminister without Portfolio (1943-1945).
FRIEDRICHS, DR. HELMUT
Head of Section for Internal Party affairs in and deputy head of
Chancellery of the Party.
FRITZSCHE, HANS
Ministerialdirektor, Reich Ministry of Propaganda; Plenipotentiary for
the Political Supervision of Broadcasting in Greater Germany; head of
Broadcasting Division in Propaganda Ministry.
FUNK, DR. WALTER
Reich Minister of Economics; Member of the Ministerial Council for
Defense of the Reich; Plenipotentiary for Economics; President of the
Reichsbank; Vice-President of the Reich Chamber of Culture; formerly
Chief of Press of the Reich Government (1933-1937); member of Reichstag
(1932-1933); and State Secretary in the Ministry for Public
Enlightenment and Propaganda (1933-1937).
GLAISE-HORSTENAU, DR. h. c. EDMUND von
General der Infanterie; SA-Gruppenfuehrer; Minister in Seyss-Inquart
Cabinet; German General Plenipotentiary in Austria in 1944.
GLUECKS, RICHARD
Chief of “Amtsgruppe D” in the Economic and Administrative Main Office
(Wirtschafts- and Verwaltungshauptamt) of SS; Commander of Concentration
Camps; SS-Gruppenfuehrer; General-leutnant d. Waffen-SS.
GOEBBELS, DR. PAUL JOSEF
Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda; Member of the
Secret Cabinet Council; Chairman of the Interministerial Committee on
Air-Raid Damage; Reichspropagandaleiter of the NSDAP; Reichsleiter;
President of the Reich Chamber of Culture; Stadtpraesident, Gauleiter,
Reichsverteidigungskommissar of Berlin; Reich Plenipotentiary for Total
War Effort.
GOERING, HERMANN WILHELM
Successor designate No. 1 to Hitler; Reich Minister for Air; President
of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich; member of the
Secret Cabinet Council; Reich Forest Master; Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force; Prime Minister of Prussia; President of the Prussian State
Council; President of the Reichstag; Plenipotentiary for the Four Year
Plan; Head of the “Reichswerke Hermann Goering”; Reichsmarschall;
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer; SA-Obergruppenfuehrer.
GREIM, ROBERT RITTER v.
Generaloberst, C.-in-C. of the Air Force (OKL) 1945.
GROSS, DR. WALTER
Head of Racial Policy Department of the Party; high official in the
Chancery of the Party; Hauptdienstleiter; Head of the Science Division
in Ideology Department (Amt Rosenberg).
GUDERIAN, HEINZ
Generaloberst, Chief of Staff of the Army (OKH).
GUENTHER, DR. HANS K. F.
Professor of racial science at Jena.
HAENEL
Head of Amt II, Reich Main Security Office; SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer.
HALDER, FRANZ
Colonel-General; Chief of Staff of OKH (until summer 1942).
HANNEKEN, HERMANN von
General der Infanterie; Military Commander in Denmark until 1945.
HAUSHOEFER, DR. KARL
Professor; Generalmajor (retd); President of Society for Geopolitics;
Publisher of periodical “Die Geopolitik.”
HENLEIN, KONRAD
Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter Sudetenland; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer;
member of the Reichstag.
HESS, RUDOLF
Successor Designate No. 2 of the Fuehrer; Deputy of the Fuehrer for all
Party affairs; Reich Minister; member of the Reichstag until 1941.
HEYDRICH, REINHARDT
Formerly SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and Chief of the RSHA.
HIERL, KONSTANTIN
Reichsleiter; Reichsarbeitsfuehrer; Reichsminister; member of the
Reichstag; Generalmajor.
HIMMLER, HEINRICH
Reichsfuehrer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei; Reich Commissar for the
Strengthening of German Folkdom; Reich Minister of the Interior;
Reichsleiter; Chief of the Replacement Army; Military Chief of the
Volkssturm.
HITLER, ADOLF
Fuehrer u. Reichskanzler; Fuehrer of NS Party and Movement;
Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht; Commander-in-Chief of Army; Chief
of Cabinet; Chief of Reich Defense Council; Chief of SA.
HOSSBACH, FRIEDRICH
General der Infanterie.
JODL, ALFRED
Colonel-General (1944); Chief of Operation Staff of High Command of OKW
(1939-1945).
JUETTNER, HANS
Head of SS Operational Main Office and Command of the Combat SS;
Permanent Deputy to Himmler as Commander of the Replacement Army;
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer; General d. Waffen-SS.
JUETTNER, MAX
Chief of SA Command and Permanent Deputy of the Chief of Staff; Chief of
Mounted SA; SA-Obergruppenfuehrer; Member of the Reichstag.
KALTENBRUNNER, DR. ERNST
Chief of Security Police and Security Service; Chef des
Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (Reich Security Main Office); Member of the
Reichstag; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer; General der Polizei.
KEITEL, WILHELM
Generalfeldmarschall; Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
(OKW); Member of Cabinet with rank of Reichsminister; Member of Secret
Cabinet Council; Member of Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich;
Member of Reich Defense Council.
KESSELRING, ALBERT
Generalfeldmarschall; C-in-C. South West and Army Group C.
KITZINGER, KARL
General der Flieger.
KLAGGES, DIETRICH
Ministerpraesident, Minister of the Interior, of Finance and of
Education, in Braunschweig; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer.
KLEIST, EWALD von
Generalfeldmarschall.
KLOPPER, DR. GERHARD
Ministerialdirektor; Staatssekretaer and Expert for Government Affairs
in Party Chancery; Oberdienstleiter; SS-Gruppenfuehrer.
KOCH, ERICH
Oberpraesident and Gauleiter of Ostpreussen; Reich Defense Commissioner
for Wehrkreis I; SS-Gruppenfuehrer; Reich Commissioner of Ukraine,
Bialystak.
KOERNER, PAUL
Staatssekretaer to the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan (Goering);
Prussian State Councillor; Chairman, board of directors, Hermann Goering
Werke Saltzgitter; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer.
KRAUCH, DR. KARL
Plenipotentiary of the Board of the Four Year Plan for questions of
chemical production; acting head of the Department for Expansion of
Economic Life (Wirtschaftsaufbau); Chairman, board of directors, I. G.
Farben; Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.
KRAUS, ERWIN
Commander-in-Chief of the NSKK; Inspector for Motor Training in the
Volkssturm; Member of the Reichstag; Plenipotentiary for Motor Transport
in War Industry (under the Four Year Plan).
KREBS, HANS
General der Infanterie; Chief of Staff of OKH.
KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH, ALFRED
President of Friedrich Krupp Company, took over sole ownership in 1943;
Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Reichsvereinigung
Eisen; joined NSDAP in 1936.
KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH, GUSTAV
Chairman of Board of the Friedrich Krupp A.G.; Pioneer of Labor; awarded
Party’s Golden Honor Badge and the Eagle Shield of the Reich.
LAHOUSEN, ERWIN
Generalmajor; Assistant to Admiral Canaris, Head of Intelligence Section
OKW (Abwehr); became Chief of Abwehr Section II in 1939.
LAMMERS, DR. HANS HEINRICH
Reichsminister; Chief of the Reich Chancery; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer;
Member of and Secretary to the Secret Cabinet and the Ministerrat fuer
die Reichsverteidigung; Preussischer Staatsrat; member of the Academy of
German Law.
LANGE, DR. KURT
Commissioner for Currency, Banking, Insurance in Reich Ministry of
Economics; Vice-President of Reichsbank; Deputy President of Deutsche
Gold-Diskont Bank; NSFK-Brigadefuehrer.
LEY, ROBERT
Reichsleiter; Chief, Party Organization; Leader of the German Labor
Front; Reich Housing Commissioner; SA-Gruppenfuehrer.
LINDEMANN, GEORG
Generaloberst; C.-in-C. Denmark beginning of 1945.
LINDEMANN, KARL
President of the Reich Chamber of Commerce; Staatsrat; Chairman Board of
Directors, Atlas Werke AG. and Norddeutscher Lloyd.
LOEHR, ALEXANDER
Generaloberst der Luftwaffe; C.-in-C. of an Army Group in the South
East.
LOHSE, HINRICH
Gauleiter, Oberpraesident, and Reich Defense Commissioner
Schleswig-Holstein; Reich Commissioner “Ostland”; SA-Obergruppenfuehrer;
President of the Nordic Society.
LUETZOW, FRIEDRICH von
Vice-admiral; Radio Commentator on Naval matters.
MACKENSEN, EBERHARD von
Generaloberst.
MANSTEIN, FRITZ, ERICH von LEWINSKY
Generalfeldmarschall, Army Group South (early 43-April 44).
MEISSNER, DR. OTTO LEBRECHT
Staatsminister; Chef der Praesidialkanzlei, curator of Political Academy
(Berlin); president of Italo-German Society; member of the Academy of
German Law.
MEYSSNER, AUGUST
Hoeherer SS and Polizeifuehrer Serbia; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer;
Generalleutnant der Polizei; member of People’s Tribunal.
MILCH, ERHARD
Generalfeldmarschall; Staatssekretaer and permanent deputy to the Reich
Minister of Air; Inspector General of the Air Force; member of the
Armaments’ Council.
MODEL, WALTER
Generalfeldmarschall; G. in C. of an Army Group in the West.
MUELLER, HEINRICH
Heap of Amt IV (Gestapo), Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA);
SS-Gruppenfuehrer; Generalleutnant der Polizei.
MUSSERT, ANTON
Founder of Dutch Nazi Party in 1931; in December 1942 received the title
of “Leader of the Dutch people” from Hitler.
NEUHAUSEN, DR. FRANZ
General Plenipotentiary for Economics in Serbia (under the Four-Year
Plan); Consul-General; Chairman of the Board of the Yugoslav Bank; head
of Military Administration in the South East.
NEURATH, CONSTANTIN H. K. FREIHERR von
Reichsminister without Portfolio (formerly Reichsminister of Foreign
Affairs 1932, 1933, 1938); President of the Secret Cabinet Council;
Member of Reich Defense Council; Reich Protector for Bohemia and
Moravia, 1939-1943.
OHLENDORF, OTTO
Head of Amt III, SD (Security Service) of Reich Main Security Office;
permanent deputy to the Staatssekretaer Reich Ministry of Economics;
SS-Gruppenfuehrer; Generalleutnant d. Polizei.
OHNESORGE, DR. WILHELM
Reich Post Minister.
PAPEN, FRANZ von
Vice-chancellor and member of Cabinet (Feb. 1933-July 1934); Commissar
for Saar District Plebiscite; Minister to Austria; Ambassador with
special mission 1936-1938; Ambassador at large; Ambassador to Turkey
after 1939.
PAULUS, FRIEDRICH
Generalfeldmarschall, captured at Stalingrad.
PEUCKERT, RUDI
Head of Labor Division, Reich Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories;
in charge of Agricultural Manpower under the Plenipotentiary for
Manpower.
PFEIFFER, HANS
Personal Adjutant to the Fuehrer; SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer.
POHL, OSWALD
Chief of Administration and Economic Main Office of SS;
Ministerialdirektor Reich Ministry of the Interior;
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer; General der Waffen SS.
RAEDER, ERICH, DR. h.c.
Grossadmiral and Chief of OKM until 1943; thereafter Admiralinspecteur
of German Navy; wearer of Golden Party Badge of Honor; Member of Cabinet
with rank of Reichsminister; Member of Secret Cabinet Council.
RAINER, DR. FRIEDRICH
Reichsstatthalter, Gauleiter and Reichsverteidigungskommissar of
Kaernten; head of Zivilverwaltung, North-West Yugoslavia; Supreme
Commissioner “Adriatisches Kuestengebiet”; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer.
RASCHER, SIGMUND, DR.
Hauptsturmfuehrer in the Air Forces, later transferred to the SS; in
charge of experiments on human beings at Dachau Concentration Camp.
REINECKE, HERMANN
General der Infanterie; Chief of the General Department of OKW
(Allgemeines Wehrmachtamt); Chief of the NS Political Guidance Staff
OKW; honorary member of the Special Senate of the People’s Tribunal.
REINHARDT, FRITZ
Staatssekretaer and head of Abteilung V, Reich Minister of Finance,
Berlin; expert on Labor Problems, Finance and Taxation in the Party
Chancery; SA Obergruppenfuehrer; Member of Reichstag; Hauptdienst-leiter
of Party.
REINHARDT, GEORG HANS
Generaloberst.
RIBBENTROP, JOACHIM von
Minister for Foreign Affairs (1938-1945); Ambassador to Great Britain
(1936-1938); Ambassador at Large (1935-1938); Special Delegate for
Disarmament Questions (1934-1937); Member of the Secret Cabinet Council;
Member of the Fuehrer’s Political Staff at General Headquarters
(1942-1945); Member of Reichstag; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer.
RICHTHOFEN, WOLFRAM, Frhr. von
Generalfeldmarschall.
RIECKE, HANS-JOACHIM
Head of Food and Agriculture Division, Reich Ministry of Occupied
Eastern Territories; Staatssekretaer in Reich Ministry of Food and
Agriculture; SA-Gruppenfuehrer.
RINTELEN, EMIL von
Minister (Gesandter) (for special duties); deputy head of the political
division, Foreign Office.
ROEHM, ERNST
Reichsminister, Staatskommissar, Staatssekretaer, Staatsrat, Stabs chef
der SA; Shot June 30, 1934 for alleged conspiracy.
ROSENBERG, ALFRED
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories; Reichsleiter; head
of RL Departments for Foreign Policy and for Ideology;
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer; SA-Obergruppenfuehrer.
RUNDSTEDT, KARL RUDOLF GERD von
Generalfeldmarschall.
RUST, DR. BERNHARD
Reich Prussian Minister of Science and Education; SA-Obergruppenfuehrer.
SAUCKEL, FRITZ
Reichsstatthalter, Reich Defense Commissioner and Gauleiter of
Thuringia; Plenipotentiary-general for Manpower (Four Year Plan);
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer; SA-Obergruppenfuehrer; member of Reichstag.
SCHACHT, HJALMAR
Reich Minister without portfolio until 1943; formerly Minister of
Economics, President of the Reichsbank, and General Plenipotentiary for
the War Economy.
SCHELLENBERG, WALTER
Chief of Security Service, Occupied Territories (Amt VI) in Reich Main
Security Office; Chief of Military Office RSHA; SS-Brigadefuehrer.
SCHIRACH, BALDUR von
Reichsleiter for Youth Education; Reichsleiter; Reich Defence
Commissioner; Reichstatthalter; Mayor and Gauleiter of Vienna; Member of
Reichstag; SA-Obergruppenfuehrer; Leader of Hitler Jugend, and Leader of
Youth in the German Reich.
SCHMIDT, DR. PAUL (II)
Chief of the Bureau of the Reich Foreign Minister with the rank of
Gesandter; Ministerialdirigent; attached to Foreign Office, acted as
Hitler’s personal interpreter in all diplomatic negotiations.
SCHMUNDT
Chief of Army Personnel Dept., Generalleutnant, later Hitler’s adjutant.
SCHULZ, ERWIN
Head of Amt I (Personnel) of Reich Main Security Office
(Reichssicherheitshauptamt); SS-Brigadefuehrer.
SCHWARZ, XAVER FRANZ
Reich Treasurer of the Party; Reichsleiter; SS-Oberstgruppenfuehrer;
SA-Obergruppenfuehrer.
SCHWERIN von KROSIGK, LUTZ GRAF
Reich Minister of Finance; Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (since May
1945).
SELDTE, FRANZ
Reich Labour Minister; Labour Minister for Prussia;
SA-Obergruppenfuehrer.
SEYSS-INQUART, DR. ARTUR
Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands; Reich Minister without
portfolio; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer; member of the Reichstag; Minister in
Austrian Cabinet.
SIMON, GUSTAV
Chief of Civil Administration, Luxembourg; Reichsstatthalter,
Reichsverteidigungskommissar and Gauleiter of Moselland.
SPEER, ALBERT
Reichsleiter; Reichsminister for Armaments and War Production; head of
the Organisation Todt; General Plenipotentiary for Armaments in the Four
Year Plan; head of Armaments Office of German High Command; member of
Reichstag; member of Central Planning Board; wearer of Golden Badge of
Honor of Party.
SPERRLE, HUGO
Generalfeldmarschall, Third Air Fleet.
STOEHR, WILHELM
Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter, Westmark.
STRASSER, GREGOR
Leader of Storm Troops (SA) in Lower Bavaria; Reich Organization Leader
until 1932; executed on June 30, 1934.
STREICHER, JULIUS
Gauleiter of Franconia; Editor and Publisher of _Der Stuermer_;
SA-General; member of Reichstag.
STUCKART, DR. WILHELM
Leading Staatssekretaer in Reich Ministry of Interior Territories; Head
of the Abteilung II in this ministry.
STUDENT, KURT
Generaloberst; G. in C. of Army Group “H” on Western Front.
STUMPFF, HANS-JUERGEN
Generaloberst; C.-in-C, of Air Fleet “Reich”; member of the People’s
Tribunal.
TERBOVEN, JOSEF
Gauleiter Essen; Reich Commissioner for Occupied Norway;
SS-Gruppenfuehrer.
THIERACK, DR. OTTO GEORG
Reich Minister of Justice; SS-Brigadefuehrer; SA-Gruppenfuehrer;
President of the Academy for German Law; Head of NS Lawyer’s League.
THOMA, WILHELM RITTER von
General der Panzertruppen.
THOMAS, GEORG
General der Infanterie; head of Economy and Armaments Division, OKW
(until Oct. 1944); member of the Armaments Council.
TODT, FRITZ
Reichsleiter; 1940 Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions; killed in
1942 in crash.
UIBERREITHER, DR. SIEGFRIED
Reichsstatthalter, Reichsverteidigungskommissar and Gauleiter of
Steiermark; Head of Civil Administration in Untersteiermark.
UTIKAL
Staff Official in Rosenberg’s Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories,
Chief of Staff of “Einsatzstab Rosenberg”.
VIETINGHOFF-SCHEEL, OTTO-HEINRICH von
Generaloberst; C.-in-C. “South”.
WAGNER, ROBERT
Reichsstatthalter, Reichsverteidigungskommissar and Gauleiter of Baden;
Chief of Civil Administration in Alsace.
WARLIMONT, WALTER
General; Deputy Chief of Operations Staff of OKW.
WEICHS, MAXIMILIAN, Freiherr, von
Generalfeldmarschall, Commander in Chief, Southeast and Army Group F.
WEIZSAECKER, ERNST FREIHERR von
German Ambassador to the Holy See.
WIEDEMANN, FRITZ
German Consul General in Tientsin and San Francisco; formerly Adjutant
to Hitler.
WINKLER, KARL
Manager of the Party Chancery.
WISLICENY, DIETER
Hauptsturmfuehrer in Slovakia; Specialist on Jewish matters in Slovakia
with Amt IV A4, Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Main Security Office)
1940-1944.
WOLFF, KARL
Supreme SS and Police commander in Italy; Commander of the Italian SS
Legion; General of the Waffen-SS at the Fuehrer’s Headquarters; chief of
the personal staff of the Reichsfuehrung SS; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer.
ZEITZLER, KURT
Generaloberst.
CODE NAMES AND WORDS USED BY THE GERMAN HIGH
COMMAND FOR OPERATIONS AND MEASURES
DURING THE WAR
ACHSE Measures to be taken when Italy declared a
separate armistice.
ADLER Capture of coast between Zara and Fiume.
AFRIKA Two Italo-German convoys from Italy to
Tripoli/Bengasi, end of December 1941.
AIDA Occupation of Egypt and the Suez Canal.
ALARICH Occupation of North Italy and Unoccupied
France.
ALPENVEILCHEN Invasion of Albania.
ANGELHAKEN (_a_ and _b_) Attacks on British ships in the
North Atlantic by Scharnhorst, Gneisenau,
Hipper, etc. December 1940-January 1941.
ANTON Occupation of Unoccupied France, with Italian
cooperation.
ATTILA Occupation of Unoccupied France; renamed
ANTON on 17 June 1942 when land and sea
operations were separated.
AUGSBURG Delay attack, in Operation GELB.
AURORA “Luetzow” operating against UK-Russian
Convoys in 1942.
BARBAROSSA Attack on Russia.
BEOWULF (I & II) Occupation of East Baltic Islands, 5
November 1941.
BERLIN 11 (_a_ and _b_) Attacks on British ships in the
North Atlantic by Scharnhorst, Gneisenau,
Hipper, etc. December 1940-January 1941.
BIRKE Withdrawal of troops from Finland.
BLAUFUCHS Attacks in Baltic Islands and near Finland.
BLUECHER Part of planned attack on Caspian Sea, 1942.
BRAUNSCHWEIG Operation around Stalingrad.
CERBERUS Transfer of “Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and
Prinz Eugen” through the English Channel,
1942.
CHURCHILL Danish fishing vessel “Sursum Corda” spying
on English Coast and later called ERICH.
CORSI/CORSO Part of operation GRUEN.
DANZIG Execute attack, in Operation GELB.
DELPHIN Clearance of Dalmation Islands.
DOMINO “Scharnhorst and Gneisenau” operating against
UK-Russia convoys in 1942. Name changed
from FRONTTHEATER.
DOPPELSCHLAG Scheer and Hipper operating in Arctic, 1942.
EDELWEISS Operation around Baku and Caspian Sea.
EICHE Rescue of Mussolini, 1943.
EISBAER Attack on Cos, 1943.
EISENBAHN Moving of the “Hipper” to Drontheim.
ELISABETH Blockade running, Bay of Biscay, 1943.
EISPALAST “Koeln” operating against UK-Russia convoys.
Name changed to MEIS-ENBALZ, 1942
ERICH See CHURCHILL.
EUROPA Part of operation SEEKRIEG, planned landing
on East English coast.
FELIX Occupation of Canary Islands, North Africa,
and Gibraltar.
FEUERZANGE Combing out certain Adriatic Islands.
FEUERZAUBER Capture of Leningrad.
FISCHREIHER Operations along the Volga, to Astrakan.
FLIEGERPILZ Intended mining of Dardanelles, September
1944.
FREISCHUETZ Capture of Vis and other Adriatic Islands,
1943.
FRISCHES HAFF Defense of Danzig.
FRONTTHEATER See DOMINO.
GANGES Operation in French area.
GELB Invasion of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
GISELA Occupation of Spain.
GRUEN Invasion of Czechoslovakia.
GUSTAV The plan to assassinate Gen. Giraud.
HAIFISCH Attacks diversionary to BARBAROSSA by troops
from Norway against Scotland, 1941.
HARPUNE See HAIFISCH.
HECHT See ANGELHAKEN.
HEFTNADEL See ANGELHAKEN.
HEKTOR Attacks on Arctic convoys.
HERBSTREISE Landing on Scotch Coast; diversion to
SEELOEWE.
HERBSTSTURM Evacuation of Adriatic coast.
HERKULES Attack on Malta, 1942.
HOFFNUNG Naval operations in Baltic and North Sea,
against Convoy P.Q. 19.
HOLZAUGE Meterological expedition to Greenland.
IKARUS Invasion of Iceland—planned 1940.
ILONA Defense measures against an Allied invasion
of Spain, changed from ISABELLA in June,
1942.
ISABELLA See ILONA.
JUNO Norwegian operations, 1940.
KIRSCHBLUETE Voyage of Japanese submarines to Europe.
KONSTANTIN Occupation of Italian-occupied Balkan
territories; changed from PRINZ EUGEN.
KORALLE Unidentified operation circa February 1944.
KAMELIE Projected annexation of Corsica, 1941.
KORSIKA See GANGES.
KURFUERST Projected operation against Gibraltar.
LABYRINTH See GANGES.
LACHSFANG Attack on Murmansk railroad near
Kandalakscha.
LANDWIRT Naval operational group in Mediterranean,
1943-44.
MANDARINE See GANGES.
MARCO POLO Operation involving collaboration with Japan.
MARITA Invasion of Greece, 1941.
MEISENBALZ See EISPALAST.
MERKUR Invasion of Crete, 1941.
META Ship cruising in Swedish water gathering
various information, 1935.
MONSUN Operation involving use of Japanese Bases.
NAUMBURG Capture of Narvik, 6 June 1940.
NORD Operation in Norway.
NORDLICHT Withdrawal of troops from Norway.
NORDMARK Bergen/Shetland Islands operations, 1940.
NORDWEST A planned landing in England.
OLDENBURG The economic counterpart of BARBAROSSA.
OTTO Annexation of Austria, 1938; also frequently
refers to the Spanish Civil War, 1936-38.
PRINZ EUGEN See KONSTANTIN.
REGENBOGEN Attacks against Arctic convoy, P.Q. 20, 1942
and 31 December 1943.
RENNTIER Operation Norway, 1941 (blocking Kola Bay).
RHEINUEBUNG Operations of the Bismarck.
ROESSELSPRUNG Attacks on convoys (P.Q. 17), 1942.
ROT The main effort in the West.
ROTBUCHE Defense of German bases in Estonia.
SAFARI Countermeasures against Danish sabotage.
SCHAMIL Paratrooper attack around Maikop.
SCHLESWIG Part of operation SEEKRIEG (Landing on East
English coast) including attack on
Norwegian convoy, February 1940.
SEELOEWE Invasion of Great Britain.
SILBERFUCHS Operation in Norway, 1941 (cutting off
Murmansk).
SILBERSTREIFEN Naval operations in Baltic and North Sea,
against convoy P.Q. 15.
SK (SEEKRIEG?) Invasion of East Coast of
England.
SONDERSTAB F Military mission to assist Iraq rebellion
1941.
SONNENBLUME Capturing Tripoli and Malta (1941).
SPORTPALAST Transfer of capital ships to Norway.
TAIFUN Autumn 1941 attack against Timoshenko army.
TAMARA Encouraging and preparing revolt of natives
in the Georgian Republic, June 1941.
TANNE Withdrawal of troops from Finland.
TANNE OST (_Aufgabe Hochland_) Occupation of Eastern
Russia.
THESEUS Attack by all arms in North Africa, May 1942.
TIRPITZ Operation against Convoy P.Q. 12, 6-9 March
1942 and return from Narvik to Drontheim on
13 March 1942.
TORERO See GANGES.
WALLENSTEIN See LANDWIRT.
WEISS Invasion of Poland.
WESERUEBUNG Invasion of Norway.
WESTRAUM Defense operation in France, 1944.
WIESENGRUND Attack on Northern Russia.
WIKINGER Attack on fighting vessels, Dogger Bank,
February 1940.
WUNDERLAND Operations in White Sea, August 1942.
ZAREWNA/ZARIN Mining operations, Murmansk Sea, 1942.
DATA CONCERNING CAPTURE OF DEFENDANTS
│ │ │
Name of │Date of internment│Place of internment│ Nation taking
defendant │ │ │ custody
│ │ │
Doenitz │ 23 May 1945│ Flensburg │Joint British &
│ │ │ American
Frank │ 30 April 1945│ Neuhaus, Ober │U. S.
│ │ Bayern │
Frick │ 2 May 1945│ Kempenhausen │U. S.
Fritzsche │ 2 May 1945│ Berlin-Tempelhof │Russia
Funk │ 13 May 1945│ Gastein │U. S.
Goering │ 8 May 1945│ Zell Am See │U. S.
Hess │ 10 May 1941│ Eaglesham, │British
│ │ Scotland │
Jodl │ 23 May 1945│ Flensburg │British & American
Kaltenbrunner │ 9 or 10 May 1945│ Aussee │U. S.
Keitel │ 13 May 1945│ Flensburg │British & American
Raeder │ 16 May 1945│ Potsdam-Babelsberg│Russia
Rosenberg │ 18 April 1945│ Flensburg │British
Sauckel │ 10 May 1945│ Berchtesgaden │U. S.
Schacht │ 5 May 1945│ Pustertal │U. S.
von Schirach │ 5 June 1945│ Schwaz, Austria │U. S.
Seyss-Inquart │ 7 May 1945│ Hamburg │British
Speer │ 23 May 1945│ Gluecksburg │British
Streicher │ 22 May 1945│ Waldring, Tyrol │U. S.
von Neurath │ 4 May 1945│ Brandt bei │France
│ │ Bludenz, │
│ │ Vorarlberg │
von Papen │ 8 April 1945│ Stockhausen │U. S.
von Ribbentrop │ 14 June 1945│ Hamburg │British
Ley (deceased) │ 15 May 1945│ Schleching, │U. S.
│ │ Kufstein │
GLOSSARY OF COMMON GERMAN AND NAZI TITLES,
DESIGNATIONS, AND TERMS, WITH THEIR
OFFICIAL ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation German English
A
_Abschnitt_ Regional unit of SS and SD (about
divisional strength)
Abt. _Abteilung_ Division
_Abteilung German or Home Press Department
Deutsche Presse_
_Abwehr_ Intelligence and
counter-intelligence department
of OKH
ADtsch R. _Akademie fuer Academy for German Law
Deutsches Recht_
_Amt_ Office
AG _Aktien-Gesellscha Joint Stock Company
ft_
_Amtsgericht_ Local Court
_Angriffskrieg_ War of Aggression
_Anklagebehoerde_ Office of Public Prosecutor
_Ausland_ The world outside the borders of
the Reich
AO _Auslands-Organisa Foreign Organization of the NSDAP
tion_
_Auslandsdeutsche_ German citizens residing outside
Germany
APA _Aussenpolitisches NSDAP Bureau for Foreign Affairs
Amt_
aD. _ausser Dienst_ Retired
AA _Auswaertiges Amt_ Ministry for Foreign Affairs
B
_Beauftragter_ Commissioner, delegate
BdF. _Beauftragter des Delegate of the Fuehrer for the
Fuehrers fuer Total Supervision of Intellectual
die Ueberwachung and Ideological Training and
der Education of the Party
gesamtengeistige (Rosenberg)
n und
weltansschaulich
en Schulung und
Erziehung der
NSDAP_
_Beauftragter fuer Delegate for the Four Year Plan
den (Goering)
Vierjahresplan_
BdO. _Befehlshaber der Commander of the Order Police
Ordnungspolizei_
BdS. _Befehlshaber der Commander of the Security Police
Sicherheitspoliz
ei_
_Befehlsleiter_ Rank in Party Administration
_Bereichsleiter_ Rank in Party Administration
Bev. _Bevollmaechtigter Plenipotentiary
_
_Bewegung_ The movement, i.e., the Nazi Party,
including Party formations,
affiliated and supervised
organizations
_Block_ Smallest unit of the Nazi Party,
including several houses
_Blockleiter_ NSDAP leader of a block
_Botschafter_ Ambassador
BDM _Bund Deutscher German Girls’ League (female Hitler
Maedel_ Youth)
BGB _Buergerliches German Civil Code
Gesetzbuch_
C
Ch. _Chef_ Chief, head, commander, superior
_Chef der Head of civil administration (e.g.
Zivilverwaltung_ of an annexed area)
_Chefsache_ Classified document for general
officer only
D
DAF _Deutsche German Labor Front
Arbeitsfront_
DFW _Deutsches German Woman’s Organization
Frauenwerk_ (sub-organization of the NSF)
DGT _Deutscher German Municipal Congress
Gemeindetag_
DHD _Deutscher German Commercial Service (News
Handelsdienst_ Agency)
DNB _Deutsches Official German News Agency
Nachrichtenbuero
_
_Dienstleiter_ Rank in Party administration
_Drang nach Osten_ Drive to the East
_Dreierkollegium_ The College of Three (the two
Plenipotentiaries for War Economy
and Administration, and the Chief
of the OKW)
DPK _Deutsche German Diplomatic and Political
diplomatisch-pol Correspondence (News Agency of
itische the Foreign Office)
Korrespondenz_
DRK _Deutsches Rotes German Red Cross
Kreuz_
E
eh. _ehrenhalber_ Honorary
_Einsatzgruppe_ Special (Gestapo and SD) formation
used for special purposes, e.g.,
executing Nazi race policy,
policing and raiding occupied
areas
_Einsatzstab_ Special Purpose Staff
_Einsatzstab Rosenberg’s staff for looting art
Rosenberg_ treasures
EK _Eisernes Kreuz_ Iron Cross
F
_Freikorps_ Illegal terrorist military
formations of former officers and
ex-servicemen in Germany after
World War I
_Fuehrerbefehl_ Fuehrer Order
_Fuehrererlass_ Fuehrer Edict
_Fuehrerkorps_ Corps of political leaders of the
NSDAP
_Fuehrerprinzip_ Leadership principle of the NSDAP
Fuest. _Fuehrungsstab_ Operational Staff
FdR. _Fuer die True or accurate copy
Richtigkeit_
G
_Gau_ Largest NSDAP unit; 42 in the Reich
and one for all Party groups
outside the Reich
_Gauamtsleiter_ Administrative head of the Party
_Gauleitung_
_Gauleiter_ NSDAP leader of a _Gau_
_Gauleitung_ Center of Party administration in a
_Gau_
_Gaurichter_ Judge in a _Gau_ Party Court
_Gauschatzmeister_ Treasurer of the Party _Gauleitung_
_Geheimer Secret Cabinet Council
Kabinettsrat_
GKos. _Geheime Top Secret (military
Kommandosache_ classification)
_Geheime Top Secret (civil classification)
Reichssache_
Gestapo _Geheime Secret State Police. The political
Staatspolizei_ police system established in
Prussia and extended throughout
the Reich and the occupied
territories.
_Generalbeauftragt Commissioner-General
er_
_Generalbevollmaec Plenipotentiary-General
htigter_
GBA _Generalbevollmaec Plenipotentiary-General for Labor
htigter fuer den Allocation (Sauckel)
Arbeitseinsatz_
_Generalbevollmaec Plenipotentiary-General for War
htigter fuer die Economy (Schacht)
Kriegswirtschaft
_
_Generalbevollmaec Plenipotentiary-General for
htigter fuer die Administration (Frick-Himmler)
Reichsverwaltung
_
GG _Generalgouverneme Government-General (Poland)
nt_
_Generalkommissar_ Commissar-General
Genst. _Generalstab_ General Staff
_Gesandter_ Minister (diplomatic rank)
GmbH. _Gesellschaft mit Limited liability company
beschraenkter
Haftung_
_Gleichschaltung_ The process of compulsory
coordination of German
organizations of all types to
conform to the Nazi racial
pattern and accept Party control.
_Gliederungen der Party Formations
NSDAP_
H
_Hauptstelle_ Main Bureau
H. Gr. _Heeresgruppe_ Army Group
_Herausgeber_ Publisher of a Newspaper or
Publishing Firm
_Herrenvolk_ Master race
HJ _Hitlerjugend_ Hitler Youth
_Hoheitstraeger_ NSDAP bearer of sovereignty within
a specific area of Party
jurisdiction, i.e., a leader of a
Gau, Kreis, Ortsgruppe, Zelle or
Block.
HSSPf. _Hoeherer SS-und Higher SS—and Police Leader
Polizeifuehrer_
I
IA Operations officer or section; cf.
G-3
IB Supply officer or section; cf. G-l
IC Intelligence officer or section;
cf. G-2
iA. _im Auftrag_ By order of (above a signature)
iG. _im Generalstab_ Attached to the General Staff
iV. _in Vertretung_ Per (signature); acting for.
K
KZ _Konzentrationslag Concentration Camp
er_
KdF. _Kraft durch Strength through Joy (German Labor
Freude_ Front subsidiary)
_Kreis_ Largest NSDAP subdivision of a
_Gau_
_Kreisleiter_ NSDAP leader of a _Kreis_
_Kriegsmarine_ German Navy
Kripo _Kriminalpolizei_ Criminal Police
_Kripo-Leitstelle_ Regional Criminal Police office,
directly under Reich Criminal
Police authority
_Kripo-Stelle_ Smaller than _Kripo-Leitstelle_,
but also directly under Reich
Criminal Police authority
L
_Land_ One of the federal states of
Germany (e.g. Prussia, Bavaria,
Saxony, etc.)
_Landesgruppe_ The Nazi Party organization in any
country outside Germany
_Lebensraum_ Living space
_Leiter der Chief of the Party Chancellery
Parteikanzlei_ (Bormann)
Lw. _Luftwaffe_ German Air Corps
M
Mil. Bef. _Militaerbefehlsha Military Commander (commanding
ber_ non-operational troops in
occupied territories)
_Ministerrat fuer Ministerial Council for the Defense
die of the Reich
Reichsverteidigu
ng_
_Ministerialdirekt High Civil Servant (chief of a main
or_ section of a Ministry)
_Ministerialdirige High civil servant, ranking below
nt_ _Ministerialdirektor_
_Ministerialrat_ High civil servant, ranking below
_Ministerialdirigent_
_Mit deutschem With German salute (equivalent to
Gruss_ _Heil Hitler_)
MdR. _Mitglied des Member of the Reichstag
Reichstags_
N
NS _Nationalsozialism National Socialism
us_
NSBO _Nationalsozialist National Socialist Factory Cells
ische Organization
Betriebszellen
Organisation_
NSDAP _Nationalsozialist National Socialist German Workers’
ische Deutsche Party; Nazi Party
Arbeiterpartei_
_Nationalsozialist NS German Students’ Bund
ischer
Deutscher_
_Nationalsozialist NS University Teachers’ Bund
ischer
Dozentenbund_
NSFK _Nationalsozialist NS Flying Corps
isches
Fliegerkorps_
NSF _Nationalsozialist NS Women’s League
ische
Frauenschaft_
NSK _Nationalsozialist NS Official News Agency
ische
Korrespondenz_
NSKK _Nationalsozialist NS Motor Corps
ischer
Kraftfahrkorps_
_Nurnberger Nurnberg anti-Semitic laws
Gesetze_
O
OB _Oberfehlshaber_ Commander in Chief
ObKom. _Oberkommando_ High Command
OKL _Oberkommando der Air Force High Command
Luftwaffe_
OKM _Oberkommando der Navy High Command
Marine_
OKW _Oberkommando der Armed Forces High Command
Wehrmacht_
OKH _Oberkommando des Army High Command
Heeres_
OSAF _Oberste Supreme Command of the SA
SA-Fuehrung_
ORPO _Ordnungspolizei_ Order Police
OT _Organisation Labor Corps organized by Todt
Todt_
_Ortsgruppe_ Largest NSDAP subdivision of a
_Kreis_
_Ortsgruppenleiter NSDAP leader of an _Ortsgruppe_
_
_Ostland_ Baltic countries and White Russia
_Ostmark_ Austria
P
PPK _Parteiamtliche Official Party Examining Commission
Pruefungskommiss for the Protection of National
ion zum Schutze Socialist Publications
des
NS-Schriftums_
Pg. _Parteigenosse_ Party Member (male)
Pgn. _Parteigenossin_ Party Member (female)
_Preussische Prussian Law collection
Gesetzsammlung_
R
_Ratsherr_ Town Councillor
_Reiehsamtsleiter_ Head of a department in the Party
_Reichsleitung_
RAD _Reichsarbeitsdien Reich Labor Service
st_
RAM _Reichsaussenminis Reich Foreign Minister (Ribbentrop)
ter_
RDB _Reichsbund der German Civil Servant’s League
Deutschen
Beamten_
_Reichsdeutsche_ German citizens residing in Germany
RFSS _Reichsfuehrer SS_ Reich Leader of the SS (Himmler)
RGBl. _Reichsgesetzblatt Reich Legal Gazette
_
_Reichshawptamtsle Head of the central departments of
iter_ the Party
_Reichsinnenminist Minister of Interior (Frick,
er_ succeeded by Himmler)
RJF _Reichsjugendfuehr Reich Youth Leadership
ung_
_Reichskriegsminis Reich War Minister
ter_
RKK _Reichskulturkamme Reich Chamber of Culture
r_
_Reichsleiter_ Member of the Supreme Party
Directorate, in general the top
level leader of an NSDAP function
_Reichsleiter fuer Reich Leader of Youth Education
die (von Schirach)
Jugenderziehung_
_Reichsleiter des Head of the Legal Office of the
Reichsrechtsamte Party (Hans Frank)
s_
RL _Reichsleitung_ Supreme Party Directorate
RM _Reichsmark_ The mark; pre-war value about $.40
RMfdbO. _Reichsminister Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern
fuer die Territories (Rosenberg)
besetzten
Ostgebiete_
_Reichsministerium Reich Ministry for Popular
fuer Enlightenment and Propaganda
Volksaufklaerung (Goebbels)
und Propaganda_
_Reichsnaehrstand_ Reich Food Estate (compulsory
association of all persons
engaged in agriculture) (Backe)
_Reichsparteitag_ Reich Party Rally (annual Nazi
Congress at Nurnberg)
RPL _Reichspropagandal Party Propaganda Department
eitung_
_Reichsregierung_ Reich Cabinet
RRG _Reichs-Rundfunkge Reich Broadcasting Corporation
ssellschaft_
RSHA _Reichssichterheit Reich Main Security Office
shauptamt_ (Kaltenbrunner)
RT _Reichstag_ Reich Parliament
_Reichstatthalter_ Reich Governor (of a _Land or
Reichsgau_)
RVR _Reichsvefteidigun Reich Defense Council
gsrat_
_Reichswehr_ The German Army
S
_Schulungslager_ A Party training camp for political
indoctrination
SS _Schulzstaffel_ Elite Corps of NSDAP (black
shirts); personal bodyguard of
the Fuehrer, used for military
and policing purposes
SD _Sicherheitsdienst Security Service; Intelligence and
_ counter-intelligence Agency of SS
SIPO _Sicherheitspolize Security police. This was the name
i_ given to the Gestapo and Kripo
considered jointly
_Staatssekretaer_ Under Secretary of a Ministry and
permanent civil service head of a
ministry
Stalag _Stammlager_ Prisoner of War Camp (for enlisted
men)
_Standartenfuehrer Rank in a Party formation, roughly
_ equivalent to Colonel
_Stapo_ _Gestapo_, Secret Police
_Stapo-Leitstelle_ Regional _Gestapo_ office, directly
under central command of
_Gestapo_
SA _Sturmabteilung_ Storm Troops of NSDAP (brown
shirts)
_Systemzeit_ System Era (Nazi designation of the
Era of Weimar Republic,
1918-1933)
T
TV _Totenkopfverbaend Death-Head units of the SS
e_ (Concentration Camp Guards)
TO _Transozean_ Transocean (News Agency)
TP _Transkontinent Transcontinent Press (News Agency)
Press_
_Treuhaender der Trustee of Labor
Arbeit_
U
_Unterstaatssekret Civil Servant, of a grade lower
aer_ than _Staatssekretaer_
V
VT _Verfuegunstruppen SS Units for Special Tasks
_
_Verlag_ Publishing House
VOBl _Verordnungsblatt_ Ordnance Gazette
_Vierjahrsplan_ Four Year Plan
_Volk_ Folk, people, race: all persons of
German blood
VDA _Volksbund fuer League for Germanism Abroad
das Deutschtum
im Ausland_
_Volksdeutscher_ A person of German blood but of
non-German citizenship residing
abroad, and considered a member
of the German people
_Volksgericht_ People’s Court, Highest Court for
Political Crimes
_Volksgemeinschaft People’s or racial community; the
_ world-wide community composing
all people of German blood
_Volksgenosse_ Racial comrade; a person of German
blood regardless of citizenship
W
WSS _Waffen-SS_ Combat SS
_Wehrkreis_ Military District
_Wehrkreiskommando Military authority in charge of a
_ _Wehrkreis_
_Wehrmacht_ Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and Air
Force)
WFSt _Wehrmacht-Fuehrun Operational Staff of Armed Forces
gsstab_
_Wehrwirtschaftsfu Title awarded to prominent
ehrer_ industrialists for merit in
armaments drive
Wi-Rue _Wehrwirtschafts War Economy and Armament Office (in
und OKW)
Ruestungsamt_
_Weltanschauung_ World-view or philosophy
WHW _Winterhilfswerk_ Winter Relief Organization
WVHA _Wirtschaft-und-Ve Economic and Administration Main
rwaltungs Office (of SS) in charge of
Hauptamt_ Concentration Camps
Z
_Zeitung_ Newspaper
_Zelle_ NSDAP subdivision of an
_Ortsgruppe_
_Zellenleiter_ NSDAP leader of a Party cell
zbV _zur besonderen For special missions or duties
Verwendung_
zV _zur Verfuegung_ At disposal
TABLE OF COMMISSIONED RANKS IN THE GERMAN ARMY,
NAVY, AND SS WITH THEIR EQUIVALENTS IN THE
AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES
│ │ ┃ │
_Germany_ ┃ _United States_
│ │ ┃ │
_Army_ │ _Navy_ │ _SS_ ┃ _Army_ │ _Navy_
│ │ ┃ │
Leutnant │Leutnant zur │Untersturmfueh┃2d Lieutenant │Ensign
│ See │ rer ┃ │
Oberleutnant │Oberleutnant │Obersturmfuehr┃1st Lieutenant│Lieutenant
│ zur See │ er ┃ │ (j.g.)
Hauptmann │Kapitaenleutna│Hauptsturmfueh┃Captain │Lieutenant
│ nt │ rer ┃ │
Major │Korvettenkapit│Sturmbannfuehr┃Major │Lieut.
│ aen │ er ┃ │ Commander
Oberstleutnant│Fregattenkapit│Obersturmbannf┃Lieut. Colonel│Commander
│ aen │ uehrer ┃ │
Oberst │Kapitaen zur │Standartenfueh┃Colonel │Captain
│ See │ rer ┃ │
│ │ Oberfuehrer ┃ │
Generalmajor │Konteradmiral │Brigadefuehrer┃Brig. General │Commodore
Generalleutnan│Vizeadmiral │Gruppenfuehrer┃Major General │Rear Admiral
t │ │ ┃ │
General der │Admiral │Obergruppenfue┃Lieut. General│Vice Admiral
Infanterie, │ │ hrer ┃ │
Artillerie, │ │ ┃ │
etc. │ │ ┃ │
Generaloberst │Generaladmiral│Oberstgruppenf┃General │Admiral
│ │ uehrer ┃ │
Generalfeldmar│Grossadmiral │Reichsfuehrer ┃General of the│Admiral of the
schall │ │ ┃ Army │ Fleet
★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1947——O833GS
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred including missing periods or commas for
periods. American spelling occurs throughout the document. There are
differences in spellings of cities depending on whether the source is
the prosecutor or part of a quoted statement. Multiple occurrences of
the following spellings which differ and are found throughout this
volume are as follows:
Luxemberg Luxembourg
Esthonia Estonia
Kiew Kiev
Czecho-Slovakia Checkoslovakia
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as presented and read into
the record and reflects the actual translations of the various national
documents presented as material for the trial(s). This volume has no
German, Polish, Czech, Russian or other eastern European diacritics,
only French diacritics. As a result, Goering and Fuehrer are spelled
without umlauts throughout.
In preparing this ebook, proofers noted several errors of fact between
the text and the documents being referenced. These are noted in the text
as [_sic_] next to the original text. These are:
Page 141: "The SA Conquors Rastenberg," 26 January, 1936[_sic_]:
p. 7. The correct date was 26 January, =1935=.
Page 196: “_The Purge of 20[_sic_] June 1934._” Should read
“_The Purge of =30= June 1934._”
Page 196: Himmler referred to this same event in his Posen
speech when he is quoted “Just as we did not hesitate on June
20[_sic_] 1934, to do the duty we were bidden . . .” should also
read June =30= 1934.
Page 695: A photograph published in “_Der Stuermer_” in April
1937 . . . “Ritual murder at Polna . . . by the Jews Hilsner,
Erdmann[_sic_], and Wassermann, taken from a contemporary
postcard” . . . The actual “_Der Stuermer_” edition has the
photograph caption “by the Jews Hilsner, =Erbmann=, and
Wassermann . . .”
Page 700: “The fire-brigades, which had been notified
immediately, saw to it that the fire was continued[_sic_] to the
original outbreak.” The actual document states that the fire was
=confined=, and not continued, to the original outbreak.
An attempt has been made to produce this ebook in a format as close as
possible to the original document's presentation and layout.
[The end of _Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Vol. 2)_, by Various.]
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