Title: British Policy in the Illinois Country, 1763-1768
Author: Carter, Clarence Edwin
Language: English
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                BRITISH POLICY IN THE ILLINOIS COUNTRY
                               1763-1768

                                  BY
                         CLARENCE EDWIN CARTER
                 A. M., 1906 (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN)

                                THESIS
         SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
                                FOR THE
               DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY

                                IN THE
                            GRADUATE SCHOOL
                                OF THE
                        UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
                                 1908



  UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

  June 1 1908

  THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY
  Clarence Edwin Carter, A.M.

  ENTITLED British Policy in the Illinois Country, 1763-1768

  IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS
  FOR THE DEGREE OF Doctor of Philosophy in History

  Evarts B Greene

  HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF History.



BRITISH POLICY IN THE ILLINOIS COUNTRY

1763-1768


  CHAPTER I.—Introductory Survey.

  CHAPTER II.—The Occupation of Illinois.

  CHAPTER III.—Status of the Illinois Country in the Empire.

  CHAPTER IV.—Trade Conditions in Illinois, 1765-1775.

  CHAPTER V.—Colonizing schemes in the Illinois.

  CHAPTER VI.—Events in the Illinois Country, 1765-1768.

  BIBLIOGRAPHY.—



CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY SURVEY.


In 1763 Great Britain was confronted with the momentous problem of
the readjustment of all her colonial relations in order to meet the
new conditions resulting from the peace of Paris, when immense areas
of territory and savage alien peoples were added to the empire. The
necessity of strengthening the imperial ties between the old colonies
and the mother country and reorganizing the new acquisitions came to
the forefront at this time and led the government into a course soon
to end in the disruption of the empire. Certainly not the least of the
questions demanding solution was that of the disposition of the country
lying to the westward of the colonies, including a number of French
settlements and a broad belt of Indian nations. It does not, however,
come within the proposed limits of this study to discuss all the
different phases of the western policy of England, except in so far as
it may be necessary to make more clear her attitude towards the French
settlements in the Illinois country.

The European situation leading to the Seven Years War, which ended so
disastrously to French dominion, is too familiar to need repetition.
That struggle was the culmination of a series of continental and
colonial wars beginning towards the close of the seventeenth century
and ending with the definitive treaty of 1763. During the first quarter
of the century France occupied a predominating position among the
powers. Through the aggressiveness of Louis XIV and his ministers
her boundaries had been pushed eastward and westward, which seriously
threatened the balance of power on the continent. Until 1748 England
and Austria had been in alliance against their traditional enemy, while
in the Austrian Succession France had lent her aid to Prussia in the
dismemberment of the Austrian dominions,—at the same time extending
her own power in the interior of America and India. In the interval of
nominal peace after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, preparations
were begun for another contest. The astute diplomacy of Kaunitz won
France from her traditional enmity and secured her as an open ally for
Maria Theresa in her war of revenge.[1] While the European situation
was giving occasion for new alignments of powers, affairs in America
were becoming more and more important as between France and England.
Here for over a century the two powers had been rivals for the
territorial and commercial supremacy.

In North America the pioneers had won for her the greater part of
the continent,—the extensive valleys of the St. Lawrence and the
Mississippi with all the land watered by their tributaries. The
French claim to this region was based almost entirely upon discovery
and exploration, for in all its extent less than one thousand
people were permanently settled. Canada at the north and the region
about New Orleans on the extreme south containing the bulk of the
population, while throughout the old Northwest settlements were few and
scattering.[2] Trading posts and small villages existed at Vincennes
on the Wabash River, at Detroit on a river of the same name, at
St. Joseph near Lake Michigan and other isolated places. Outside of
Detroit, the most important and populous settlement was situated along
the eastern bank of the Mississippi, in the southwestern part of the
present state of Illinois. Here were the villages of Kaskaskia, St.
Phillippe, Prairie du Rocher, Chartres village and Cahokia, containing
a population of barely two thousand people.

In contrast to this vast area of French territory and the sparseness
of its population were the British colonies, with more than a million
people confined to the narrow strip between the Alleghany mountains and
the Atlantic ocean. These provinces were becoming comparatively crowded
and many enterprising families of English, Scotch Irish, and German
extraction were pushing westward towards the mountains. Each year saw
the pressure on the western border increased; the great unoccupied
valley of the Ohio invited homeseekers and adventurers westward in
spite of hostile French and Indians. By the fifth decade the barriers
were being broken through by constantly increasing numbers, and the
French found their possession of the West and their monopoly of the fur
trade seriously threatened.

To prevent such encroachments the French sought to bind their
possessions together with a line of forts extending from the St.
Lawrence down the Ohio valley to the Gulf of Mexico. It had indeed been
the plan of such men as La Salle, Iberville, and Bienville to bring
this territory into a compact whole and limit the English colonies to
the line of mountains. New Orleans and Mobile gave France command of
the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi River; Louisburg, Niagara, and
Frontenac afforded protection for Canada. The weak point for France was
the Ohio valley, in the upper part of which Virginia and Pennsylvania
settlers had already located. Celoron, who went down the Ohio in 1749,
burying plates of lead to signify French dominion, warning English
settlers and traders, and persuading the Indians to drive out the
invaders of their hunting grounds, saw the inevitableness of the
conflict. The American phase of the final struggle for colonial empire
was to begin in this region.[3]

In the early years of the war Great Britain and her ally met with
serious reverses every where, and it seemed probable that France would
be able to hold her line of defense in America. The French colonies,
however, were fundamentally weak. Being wholly dependent upon the
mother country, when the latter became absorbed in the continental
struggle to the exclusion of her interests in her colonial possessions,
defeat was inevitable. By 1758 the tide was turning in America; this,
together with the victories of Clive in India and Frederick the Great
at Rossbach and Leuthen, started France on her downward road to ruin
as a world power, and with the transference of the American struggle
to Canada by the capture of Montreal and Quebec the war was at an end.
In 1762 the financial condition of France became so desperate that
Choiseul was anxious for peace and he found George III and Lord Bute
ready to abandon their Prussian ally, and even to give up the fruits
of some of the brilliant victories of 1762 which brought Spain to her
knees.[4]

The definitive treaty of Paris was signed February 10, 1763,[5] by
the terms of which France ceded to Great Britain all of Canada and gave
up her claim to the territory east of the Mississippi River, except the
city of New Orleans, adding to this the right of the free navigation of
the Mississippi. Spain received back Havana ceding Florida to England
in return. A few weeks before signing the definitive treaty, France, in
a secret treaty with Spain ceded to her the city of New Orleans and the
vast region stretching from the Mississippi towards the Pacific. Thus
was France divested of practically every inch of territory in America.

The French colony in the Illinois country had been originally
established with the view of forming a connecting link between the
colonies in Louisiana on the south and Canada at the northeast. La
Salle himself had recognized the possible strategic value of such
an establishment from both a commercial and military standpoint.[6]
Before any settlements had even been made on the lower Mississippi,
he and his associates had attempted in 1682 the formation of a colony
on the Illinois River, near the present site of Peoria.[7] This the
first attempt at western colonization was a failure. The opening of the
following century saw the beginning of a more successful and permanent
colony, when the Catholic missionaries from Quebec established their
missions at Kaskaskia and Cahokia,[8] near the villages of the Illinois
Indians. They were soon followed by hunters and fur traders, and
during the first two decades of the eighteenth century a considerable
number of families immigrated from Canada, thus assuring the permanancy
of the settlement.

Meanwhile the contemporaneous colony of Louisiana had grown to some
importance, and in 1717, when the Company of the West assumed control
of the province, the Illinois country was annexed. Prior to this time
it had been within the jurisdiction of Quebec. This gave the Illinois
country a period of prosperity, many new enterprizes being undertaken.
Shortly after its annexation to Louisiana, Pierre Boisbriant was given
a commission to govern the Illinois country, and among his instructions
was an order to erect a fort as a protection against possible
encroachments from the English and Spanish. About 1720 Fort Chartres
was completed and became thereafter the seat of government during the
French regime. In 1721 the Company of the West divided Louisiana into
nine districts,[9] extending east and west of the Mississippi River
between the lines of the Ohio and Illinois rivers. In 1732 Louisiana
passed out of the hands of the Company of the West Indies, and,
together with the Illinois dependency, became a royal province.[10] It
remained in this status until the close of the Seven Years War. During
this period its relation with Louisiana had become economic as well as
political, all of its trade being carried on through New Orleans, and
the southern colony often owed its existence to the large supplies of
flour and pork sent down the river from the Illinois country.[11]



CHAPTER II.

THE OCCUPATION OF ILLINOIS.


By the treaty of Paris the title to the Illinois region passed to Great
Britain, but Fort Chartres was not immediately occupied. Detachments
of British troops had taken possession of practically every other post
in the newly ceded territory as early as 1760. The occupation of the
forest posts of Green Bay, Mackinac, St. Joseph, Ouitanon, Detroit,
Fort Miami, Sandusky, Niagara and others seemed to indicate almost
complete British dominion in the West. The transfer of the Illinois
posts, however, remained to be effected, and although orders were
forwarded from France in the summer of 1763 to the officers commanding
in the ceded territory to evacuate as soon as the English forces
appeared,[12] almost three years elapsed before this was accomplished;
for soon after the announcement of the treaty of cession, that broad
belt of Indian tribes stretching from the fringe of the eastern
settlements to the Mississippi rose in open rebellion.[13] This
unexpected movement had to be reckoned with before any thought of the
occupation of the Illinois could be seriously entertained.

Of the two great northern Indian families, the Iroquois had generally
espoused the English cause during the recent war, while the Algonquin
nations, living in Canada, and the Lake and Ohio regions, had supported
the French. At the close of the war the greater portion of the French
had sworn fealty to the English crown; but the allegiance of their
allies, the Algonquins, was at best only temporary. It was thought
that, since the power of France had been crushed, there would be no
further motive for the Indian tribes to continue hostilities; but from
1761 there had been a growing feeling of discontent among the western
Indians. So long as France and Great Britain were able to hold each
other in check in America, the Indian nations formed a balance of
power, so to speak, between them. England and France vied with each
other to conciliate the savages and to retain their good will. As soon,
however, as English dominion was assured, this attitude was somewhat
changed. The fur trade under the French had been well regulated, but
its condition under the English from 1760 to 1763 was deplorable.[14]
The English traders were rash and unprincipled men[15] who did not
scruple to cheat and insult their Indian clients at every opportunity.
The more intelligent of the western and northern Indians perceived
that their hunting grounds would soon be overrun by white settlers
with a fixed purpose of permanent settlement.[16] This was probably
the chief cause of the Indian uprising. There remained in the forests
many French and renegade traders and hunters who constantly concocted
insidious reports as to English designs and filled the savage minds
with hope of succor from the King of France.[17] Many of the French
inhabitance had since 1760 emigrated beyond the Mississippi, because,
as the Indians thought, they feared to live under English rule.[18]
This doubtless contributed something toward the rising discontent of
the savages. Finally the policy of economy in expenses, which General
Amherst entered upon, by cutting off a large part of the Indian
presents, always so indispensable in dealing with that race, augured
poorly for the Indians's future.

On the part of the mass of the Indians the insurrection was probably
a mere outbreak of resentment; but Pontiac, the great chief of the
Ottawas, had a clearer vision. He determined to rehabilitate French
power in the west and to reunite all the Indian nations into one great
confederacy in order to ward off the approaching dangers. During the
years 1761-1762 the plot was developed. In 1762 Pontiac dispatched
his emissaries to all the Indian nations. The ramifications of the
conspiracy extended to all the Algonquin tribes, to some of the
nations on the lower Mississippi and even included a portion of the
Six Nations. The original aim of the plot was the destruction of the
garrisons on the frontier, after which the settlements were to be
attacked. The attack on the outposts, beginning in May, 1763, was
sudden and overwhelming; Detroit, Fort Pitt, and Niagara alone held
out, the remainder of the posts falling without an attempt at defense.
Had the proclamation of 1763, which aimed at the pacification of the
Indians by reserving to them the western lands, been issued earlier
in the year, this devastating might have been avoided. Peaceful
pacification was now out of the question. During the summers of 1763
and 1764 Colonel Bouquet raised the siege of Fort Pitt, penetrated into
the enemy's country in the upper Ohio valley region and completely
subdued the Shawnee and Delaware tribes upon whom Pontiac had placed
every dependence. Previous to Bouquet's second campaign, Colonel
Bradstreet had advanced with a detachment along the southern shore of
Lake Erie, penetrating as far west as Detroit, whence companies were
sent to occupy the posts in the upper lake region. In the campaign
as a whole the Bouquet expedition was the most effective. After the
ratification of a series of treaties, in which the Indians promised
allegiance to the English crown, the eastern portion of the rebellion
was broken.

It now remained to penetrate to the Illinois country in order to
relieve the French garrison. Pontiac had retired thither in 1764,
after his unsuccessful attempt upon Detroit; there he hoped to rally
the western tribes and sue for the support of the French. But as we
shall see, his schemes received a powerful blow upon the refusal of the
commandants to countenance his pleas.

To what extent Pontiac was assisted by French intriguers in the
development of his plans may never be positively known. As has already
been pointed out, French traders were constantly among the Indians,
filling their minds with hopes and fears. That the plot included French
officials may be doubted; although Sir William Johnson and General
Gage seemed convinced that such was the case.[19] Their belief,
however, was based almost wholly upon reports from Indian runners,
whose credibility as witnesses may well be questioned. A perusal of the
correspondence of the French officials[20] residing in Illinois and
Louisiana, and their official communications with the Indians during
this period goes far to clear them of complicity in the affair.[21]

General Gage, who succeeded Amherst as commander-in-chief of the
British army in America in November, 1763, was convinced that the early
occupation of the western posts was essential,[22] since it would in
a measure cut off the communication between the French and Indian
nations dwelling in that vicinity. The Indians, finding themselves
thus inclosed would be more easily pacified. But the participation in
the rebellion of the Shawnee and Delaware tribes of the upper Ohio
river region precluded for a time the possibility of reaching the
Mississippi posts by way of Fort Pitt, without a much larger force than
Gage had at his command in the east; and the colonies were already
avoiding the call for troops.[23] The only other available route
was by way of New Orleans and the Mississippi River whose navigation
had been declared open to French and English alike by the treaty of
Paris. Little opposition might be expected from the southern Indians
toward whom a much more liberal policy had been pursued than with the
northern tribes. Presents to the value of four or five thousand pounds
had been sent to Charleston in 1763 for distribution among the southern
nations which counter-acted in a large measure the machinations of the
French traders from New Orleans.[24] The Florida ports, Mobile and
Pensacola, were already occupied by English troops, and Gage and his
associates believed, that with the co-operation of the French Governor
of Louisiana a successful ascent could be made.[25]

Accordingly in January, 1764, Major Arthur Loftus, with a detachment
of three hundred and fifty-one men from the twenty-second regiment
embarked at Mobile for New Orleans, where preparations were to be made
for the voyage.[26] A company of sixty men from this regiment were to
be left at Fort Massac on the Ohio River, while the remainder were to
occupy Kaskaskia and Fort Chartres.[27] At New Orleans boats had to be
built, supplies and provisions procured, and guides and interpreters
provided.[28] The expedition set out from New Orleans February 27.
Three weeks later the flotilla was attacked by a band of Tonica Indians
near Davion's Bluff, or Fort Adams,[29] about two hundred and forty
miles above New Orleans. After the loss of several men in the boats
composing the vanguard, Loftus ordered a retreat, and the expedition
was abandoned. Depleted by sickness, death and desertion the regiment
made its way from New Orleans back to Mobile.[30]

Major Loftus placed the blame for the failure of his expedition upon
Governor D' Abadie and other French officials at New Orleans.[31] There
is probably sufficient evidence, however, to warrant the conclusion
that his accusations against the Governor were without foundation.
The correspondence of D' Abadie, Gage, and others indicates that
official aid was given the English in making their preparations for
the journey,[32] and letters were issued to the commandants of the
French posts on the Mississippi to render the English convoys all the
assistance in their power[33]. There may have been some justification
for the suspicion of Loftus that the intriguers were at work, for the
French as a whole were not in sympathy with the attempt; the success
of the English meant the cessation of the lucrative trade between New
Orleans and Illinois. They were no doubt delighted at the discomfiture
of the English officer, for when some of the chiefs engaged in the
ambuscade entered New Orleans they were said to have been publicly
received.[34]

Granting, however, the machinations of the French, the reason for
the failure of Loftus may be found in part in the almost total lack
of precautions adopted before undertaking the journey. Governor D'
Abadie had given the English officer warning of the bad disposition
of a number of tribes along the Mississippi River, among whom Pontiac
had considerable influence, and had assured him that unless he carried
presents for the Indians, he would be unable to proceed far up the
river.[35] The policy of sending advance agents with convoys of
presents for the Indians was successful the following year when the
Illinois posts were finally reached from the east; but no such policy
was adopted at this time.[36] No action was taken to counter-act any
possible intrigues on the part of the French. D' Abadie's advice
was not heeded, and his prophecy was fulfilled. General Gage in his
official correspondence implied that he did not think sufficient care
had been exercised to insure success, and expressed his belief that if
Loftus would make use of the "necessary precautions" he might get up
to the mouth of the Ohio with little interruption.[37] This want of
judgement, therefore, accounts in a large degree for the unfortunate
termination of the plans of an approach from the south.

The news of the defeat of Loftus had two results. First, it gave
Pontiac renewed hope that he might be able to rally again the western
and northern Indians, and, with French assistance, block the advance
of the English. In the second place it led General Gage to determine
upon an advance from the east, down the Ohio River, which was made
practicable by the recent submission of the Delaware Indians.

Meanwhile the Illinois country in 1764 presented an anomalous
situation. St. Ange was governing, in the name of Louis XV, a country
belonging to another king. He was under orders to surrender the place
as soon as possible to its rightful owner; but the prospect for such an
event seemed remote. He was surrounded by crowds of begging, thieving
savages; and the emissaries of the greatest of Indian chieftains,
Pontiac, were constantly petitioning for his active support against
the approaching English. A considerable portion of the French traders
of the villages were secretly, and sometimes openly, supporting the
Indian cause, which added greatly to the increasing embarrasment of the
commandant. So distressing became the situation that Neyon de Villiers,
St. Ange's predecessor, called the latter from Vincennes on the Wabash,
and left the country in disgust, taking with him to New Orleans sixty
soldiers and eighty of the French inhabitants.[38] He had shortly
before indignantly refused to countenance the proposals of Pontiac, and
had begged the Indians to lay down their arms and make peace with the
English.[39]

The news of Loftus' defeat aroused Pontiac the thought of the
possibility of meeting and repelling the advance from the east as
it had been met and repelled in the south. In spite of the news of
the defeat of his allies by Bouquet and the report that preparations
were being made by his victorious enemy to advance against him,
Pontiac determined to make a last supreme effort. By a series of
visits among the tribes dwelling in the Illinois, on the Wabash and
in the Miami country, he succeeded in arousing in them the instinct
of self-preservation, in firing the hearts of all the faltering
Indians and in winning the promise of their co-operation in his plan
of defense. He was in this temper when he met and turned back Captain
Thomas Morris in the Miami country early in the autumn of 1764. Morris
had been sent by Bradstreet from the neighborhood of Detroit with
messages to St. Ange in the Illinois country, whence he was to proceed
to New Orleans.[40] After being maltreated and threatened with the
stake, Morris effected an escape and made his way to Detroit.[41] It
was during his interview with Pontiac that the latter informed Morris
of the repulse of Loftus, of the journey of his emissaries to New
Orleans to seek French support, and of his determination and that of
his Indian allies to resist the English to the last.[42]

A few months later, in February, 1765, there arrived at Fort Chartres
an English officer, accompanied by a trader named Crawford. They were
probably the first Englishmen to penetrate thus far into the former
French territory since the beginning of the war.[43] They had been sent
from Mobile by Major Farmer, the commandant at that place, to bring
about the conciliation of the Indians in the Illinois.[44] Instead of
following the Mississippi, they worked their way northward through the
great Choctaw and Chicksaw nations to the Ohio, descended the latter
to the Mississippi and thence to the Illinois villages.[45] Although
St. Ange received them cordially[46] and did all in his power to
influence the savages to receive the English,[47] the mission of Ross
was a failure. The Indians had nothing but expressions of hatred and
defiance for the English; even the Missouri and Osages from beyond
the Mississippi had fallen under the influence of Pontiac.[48] Ross
and his companion remained with St. Ange nearly two months; but about
the middle of April they were obliged to go down the river to New
Orleans.[49]

During the winter of 1764-1765 preparations were made to send a
detachment of troops down the Ohio from Fort Pitt to relieve Fort
Chartres. To pave the way for the troops Gage dispatched two agents
in advance. He selected George Croghan, Sir William Johnson's deputy,
for the delicate and dangerous task of going among the Indians of
that country to assure them of the peaceful attitude of the English,
to promise them better facilities for trade and to accompany the
promise with substantial presents.[50] The second agent was Lieutenant
Fraser,[51] whose mission was to carry letters to the French commandant
and a proclamation for the inhabitants.[52] January 24, 1765, Fraser
and Croghan set out from Carlisle, Pennsylvania,[53] followed a few
days later by a large convoy of presents.[54] During the journey, the
convoy was attacked by a band of Pennsylvania borderers,[55] and a
large part of the goods destined for the Indians were destroyed,[56]
together with some valuable stores which certain Philadelphia merchants
were forwarding to Fort Pitt for the purpose of opening up the trade
as early as possible.[57] Croghan therefore found it necessary to
tarry at Fort Pitt to replenish his stores and to await the opening of
spring.[58] But another matter intervened which forced him to postpone
his departure for more than two months. A temporary defection had
arisen among the Shawnee and Delaware Indians.[59] They had failed to
fulfil some of the obligations imposed upon them by Bouquet in the
previous summer, and there was some fear lest they would not permit
Croghan to pass through their country. His influence was such, however,
that, in an assembly of the tribes at Fort Pitt, he not only received
their consent to a safe passage, but some of their number volunteered
to accompany him.[60]

Meanwhile Lieutenant Fraser, Croghan's companion, decided to proceed
alone, inasmuch as Gage's instructions to him were to be at the
Illinois early in April.[61] On March 23 he departed, accompanied
by two or three whites and a couple of Indians,[62] and reached the
Illinois posts in the latter part of April, shortly after the departure
of Lieutenant Ross and his party. Here Fraser found many of the
Indians in destitution and some inclined for peace.[63] Nevertheless,
instigated by the traders and encouraged by their secret supplies,
the savages as a whole would not listen to Fraser; they threatened
his life, and threw him into prison, and he was finally saved by the
intervention of Pontiac himself.[64] Fraser felt himself to be in a
dangerous situation; unable to hear from Croghan, whom he was expecting
every day, and daily insulted and maltreated by the drunken savages,
he took advantage of his discretionary orders and descended the
Mississippi to New Orleans.[65] Although the French traders continued
to supply the Indians with arms and ammunition, and buoy up their
spirits by stories of aid from the king of France, Pontiac himself
was being rapidly disillusioned. He had given Fraser the assurance that
if the Indians on the Ohio had made a permanent peace, he would do
likewise.[66] St. Ange continued to refuse the expected help,[67] and
when the news came of the failure of the mission to New Orleans and of
the transfer of Louisiana to Spain, the ruin of the Indian cause was
complete.

Having adjusted affairs with the Indians at Fort Pitt, Croghan set out
from there on May 15th with two boats, accompanied by several white
companions and a party of Shawnee Indians.[68] In compliance with
messages from Croghan, representatives of numerous tribes along the
route met him at the mouth of the Scioto and delivered up a number of
French traders who were compelled to take an oath of allegiance to
the English crown, or pass to the west of the Mississippi.[69] The
only other incident of importance on this voyage was the attack of
the Kickapous and Mascoutin Indians near the mouth of the Wabash on
June 8th,[70] which contributed greatly to the success of the mission.
After the attack in which two whites and several Shawnees were killed,
the assailants expressed their profound sorrow, declaring that they
thought the party to be a band of Charokees with whom they were at
enmity.[71] Nevertheless, they plundered the stores and carried Croghan
and the remainder of the party to Vincennes, a small French town on
the Wabash. Croghan was now separated temporarily from his companions
and carried to Fort Ouiatanon, about 210 miles north of Vincennes. The
political blunder of the Kickapous in firing upon the convoy now became
apparent;[72] they were censured on all sides for having attacked
their friends the Shawnees, since the latter might thus be turned into
deadly enemies.[73] During the first week of July deputations from all
the surrounding tribes visited Croghan, assuring him of their desire
for peace and of their willingness to escort him to the Illinois where
Pontiac was residing.[74] July 11th, Maisonville, whom Fraser had a
few weeks before left at Fort Chartres, arrived at Ouiatanon with
messages from St. Ange requesting Croghan to come to Fort Chartres to
arrange affairs in that region.[75] A few days later Croghan set out
for the Illinois, attended by a large concourse of savages; but he had
advanced only a short distance when he met Pontiac himself who was on
the road to Ouiatanon. They all returned to the fort where, at a great
council, Pontiac signified his willingness to make a lasting peace and
promised to offer no further resistance to the approach of the English
troops.[76] There was now no need to go to Fort Chartres; instead
Croghan turned his steps toward Detroit, where another important Indian
conference was held in which a general peace was made with all the
western Indians.[77]

Immediately after effecting an accomodation with Pontiac at Ouiatanon,
Croghan sent an account of the success of his negotiations to Fort
Pitt.[78] Here Captain Stirling with a detachment of about one hundred
men of the 42d or Black Watch regiment, had been holding himself in
readiness for some time, waiting for a favorable report before moving
to the relief of Fort Chartres. Although the 34th regiment under Major
Farmer was supposed to be making its way up the Mississippi to relieve
the French garrison in Illinois, General Gage would not depend upon
its slow and uncertain movements.[79] Upon receipt of the news, on the
24th of August, Stirling left Fort Pitt[80] and began the long and
tedious journey. Owing to the season of the year the navigation of the
Ohio was very difficult, forty-seven days being required to complete
the journey.[81] The voyage, on the whole, was without incident until
about forty miles below the Wabash River. Here Stirling's force
encountered two boats loaded with goods, in charge of a French trader,
who was accompanied by some thirty Indians and a chief of the Shawnees,
who had remained in the French interest.[82] On account of the
allegations of a certain Indian that his party had planned to fire on
the English before they were aware of the latters' strength, Stirling
became apprehensive lest the attitude of the Indians had changed since
Croghan's visit. He therefore sent Lieutenant Rumsey, with a small
party by land from Fort Massac to Fort Chartres, in order to ascertain
the exact situation and to apprise St. Ange of his approach.[83] Rumsey
and his guides, however, lost their way and did not reach the villages
until after the arrival of the troops.[84] Sterling arrived on the 9th
of October; and it is said that the Indians and French were unaware of
his approach until he was within a few miles of the village, and that
the Indians upon learning of the weakness of the English force, assumed
a most insolent and threatening attitude.[85] On the following day St.
Ange and the French garrison were formally relieved,[86] and with this
event, the last vestige of French authority in North America, except
new Orleans, passed away.



CHAPTER III.

STATUS OF THE ILLINOIS COUNTRY IN THE EMPIRE.


Before entering upon the more detailed study of events in the Illinois
country during the period of the British occupation, it is necessary
to take into consideration certain general aspects of the subject
which will enable us to understand more clearly the bearing of those
events. The relation of that country to the empire and the view held
by British statesmen of the time relative to its status are problems
which naturally arise and demand solution. What was the nature of the
government imposed upon the French in Illinois after its occupation? Is
the hitherto prevailing opinion that the British government placed the
inhabitants of those villages under a military government any longer
tenable? Was the government de jure or de facto?

The treatment received by the settlements in the Northwest and West
in general was fundamentally different in nature from that accorded
other portions of the new empire. By the terms of the Proclamation
of 1763,[87] civil governments were created for the provinces of
Quebec, East Florida, West Florida, and Grenada, while all the western
territory outside the prescribed limits of those colonies, including
a large portion of southern Canada of today, was reserved as a vast
hunting ground for the Indian nations. No mention whatsoever is made
in the Proclamation concerning the settled portions of the West and
since it is, therefore, impossible to ascertain in this document their
governmental status, we will examine the official correspondence of the
ministry which immediately proceeded the issuance of the Proclamation
to find, if possible, what the directors of the British colonial policy
had in mind.

When the question of the Proclamation was under discussion by the
Ministry in the summer of 1763, two opposing views with reference
to the West were for a time apparent in the ministry. It appears to
have been the policy of Lord Egremont, at that time Secretary for the
Southern Department, which included the management of the colonies, to
place the unorganized territory within the jurisdiction of some one of
the colonies possessing a settled government, preferably Canada.[88]
It was at least his aim to give to the Indian country sufficient
civil supervision so that criminals and fugitives from justice from
the colonies might be taken. That he did not intend to extend civil
government to the villages or any of the French inhabitants of the
West seems clear: his only reference is to the "Indian country" and to
"criminals" and "fugitives from justice."

Lord Shelburne, President of the Board of Trade and a member of the
Grenville ministry, and his colleagues were of the opinion that the
annexation of the West to Canada might lend color to the idea that
England's title to the West came from the French cession, when in
fact her claim was derived from other sources; that the inhabitants
of the province to which it might be annexed would have too
great an advantage in the Indian trade; and finally that such an
immense province could not be properly governed without a large
number of troops and the governor would thus virtually become a
commander-in-chief.[89] Shelburne then announced his plan of giving
to the commanding general of the British army in America jurisdiction
over the West for the purpose of protecting the Indians and the fur
trade.[90] Lord Halifax, who succeeded to Egermont's position at the
latter's death in August, 1763, fell in with Shelburne's views. But
the commission to the commanding general does not appear to have been
issued; for Hillsborough, who succeeded Shelburne as President of the
Board of Trade in the autumn of 1763, favored a different policy. There
is nothing, however, to indicate that Shelburne and his advisers had
any thought of the government of the French colonies. There is no hint
in any of this correspondence that the ministry had any idea of the
existence of the several thousand French inhabitants of the West.[91]

There remain one or two documents in which we might expect to find some
reference to the government of the French settlers. The authors of that
part of the Proclamation of 1763 which provided for the reservation
of the Indian lands and the regulation of the trade,[92] had in
contemplation the formation of an elaborate plan comprehending the
management of both in the whole of British North America.[93] It was
left to Hillsborough, Shelburne's successor as President of the Board
of Trade, to direct the formulation of the plan, which was finished
in 1764. The details of this program will be taken up in a later
chapter,[94] and it will therefore suffice to note the presence or
absence of any provisions for the French. The chief object of the plan
seems to have been to bring about a centralization in the regulation
of the trade and the management of the Indians, and in no place is
there any intimation that its provisions have any application to the
government of the French residing at the various posts.[95]

Turning to another source we find a document addressed directly to the
inhabitants of the Illinois country, dated in New York, December 30,
1764 and signed by General Thomas Gage.[96] Mention has already been
made in another connection of the unsuccessful mission of Lieutenant
Fraser to Illinois in the spring of 1765, when he carried this
proclamation to the inhabitants. But its contents were not announced
until the entry of Captain Sterling in October of that year. This
proclamation related solely to guarantees by the British government
of the right of the inhabitants under the treaty of Paris: freedom of
religion, the liberty of removing from or remaining within English
territory and the requirements as to taking the oath of allegiance made
up its contents. As to whether the inhabitants were to enjoy a civil
government or be ruled by the army there is no intimation.

Laying aside the barren papers of 1763-1765 and giving attention to the
documentary material after those dates proves much more productive.
We are thereby enabled to arrive at some pretty definite conclusions.
Fortunately there were a few men in authority during that period who
had some interest in the interior settlements, and who, from their
official positions realized the difficulties of the problem. Such
men have left expressions of opinion and stray bits of information
which leave us in little doubt as to the governmental status of the
Illinois country. General Thomas Gage, Sir William Johnson, and Lord
Hillsborough are perhaps the most representative examples. Gage, who
was commander-in-chief of the American army throughout this period,
with headquarters in New York City, was in direct communication both
with his subordinates in Illinois and the home authorities. He was in
a position to know, in general, the state of affairs in the West
as well as to keep in touch with ministerial opinion. Sir William
Johnson, by virtue of his office as Superintendent of Indian affairs
for the northern district, was in a peculiarly strategic position
to acquire information. His Indian agents were stationed at all the
western posts and he was in constant correspondence with the Board of
Trade relative to Indian and trade conditions. From the ministry itself
the correspondence of Lord Hillsborough best reflects the prevailing
opinion of the government. He was one of the few governmental
authorities who took any considerable interest in the western problem
and information coming from him must, therefore, have some weight.

That the British commandant of the fort in the Illinois country had no
commission to govern the inhabitants, except perhaps that power, which,
in the absence of all other authority, naturally devolves upon the
military officer, seems amply clear from a recommendation transmitted
by General Gage to his superior shortly after the occupation of Fort
de Chartres. "If I may presume to give my opinion further on this
matter, I would humbly propose that a Military Governor should be
appointed for the Ilinois (sic) as soon as possible. The distance of
that Country from any of the Provinces being about 1400 Miles, making
its Dependance upon any of them impractical, and for its Vicinity to
the French Settlements, no other than a Military Government would
answer our purpose."[97] In the following year he took a similar point
of view in a communication to his co-laborer in America: "I am quite
sensible of the irregular behavior of the Traders and have intimated to
his Majesty's Secretary of State what I told the Board of Trade four
or five years ago: That they must be restrained by Law, and a Judicial
Power invested in the officer Commanding at the Posts to see such Law
put in force. And without this, Regulations may be made, but they will
never be observed."[98]

With the condition of comparative anarchy in the Illinois country
during this period and indeed at all the western posts and throughout
the Indian country the authorities seemed unable to combat
successfully. Had all the regulations outlined in the plan for the
management of Indian affairs,[99] been put into operation the Indian
department would have been able to cope more successfully with that
phase of the situation. But neither military nor Indian departments had
legal authority to take any action whatsoever. As Johnson, in speaking
of his inability to handle the situation for lack of sufficient power,
declared in 1767 that "the authority of commissaries is nothing, and
both the Commanding Officers of Garrisons and they, are liable to
a civil prosecution for detaining a Trader on any pretence."[100]
Probably more emphatic still the commanding general four years later
in writing of the disturbances, said: "And I perceive there has been
wanting judicial powers to try and determine. There has been no way
to bring Controversys & Disputes properly to a determination or
delinquenents to punishment."[101]

There is probably some justification for the current belief that the
government placed the inhabitants under a military rule, inasmuch as
the actual government proved in the last analysis to be military.
But that the British ministry consciously attached the interior
settlements to the military department is far from the truth. Such a
system was probably contemplated by no one, particularly between the
years 1763 and 1765 when the re-organization of the new acquisitions
was under discussion. The greater part of the new territory was the
seat of the fur trade and the desire for the development of that
industry controlled in the main the policy of the ministry relative
to the disposition of the peltry districts and the interests of the
settlements were completely ignored. Secretary Hillsborough, who
helped formulate the western policy in 1763 and 1764 doubtless gave
the most adequate explanation when in 1769, he wrote: "With regard to
the Posts in the interior Country considered in another view in which
several of your letters have placed them; I mean as to the settlements
formed under their protection, which, not being included within the
jurisdiction of any other Colony are exposed to many Difficulties
& Disadvantages from the Want of some Form of Government necessary
to Civil Society, it is very evident that, if the case of these
Settlements had been well known or understood at the time of forming
the conquered Lands into Colonies, some provision would have been
made for them, & they would have been erected into distinct Governments
or made dependent upon those Colonies of which they were either the
offspring, or with which they did by circumstances and situation, stand
connected. I shall not fail, therefore, to give this matter the fullest
consideration when the business of the Illinois Country is taken
up."[102]

That the occupation of Fort Chartres became anything more than
temporary was due to the necessity of being prepared to crush a
possible uprising of the savages and to repel the constant invasion of
the French and Spanish traders[103] from beyond the Mississippi, whose
influence over the Indians, it was feared, would be detrimental to the
peace of the empire. In its policy of retrenchment owing to the trouble
with the colonies, the government at various times contemplated the
withdrawal of the troops, but each time the detachment was allowed to
remain the sole reason given was to guard that portion of the empire
against the French and Indians.

In the course of this inquiry relative to the legal status of Illinois
no mention has been made of the extension or non-extension of English
law and custum to the West after its cession. This is one of the more
important general aspects of the western problem and deserves some
attention inasmuch as it may throw some light on the legal position of
the settlements. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the
great era of English colonization, the necessity of fixing definitely
the legal status of the colonies called forth a series of judicial
opinions and legal commentaries; it is to these we have to look to
determine the theory held regarding the application of English law
to the colonies and particularly to conquered provinces. In general
it may be said that Blackstone represents the usual view taken by
jurists during these two centuries. In his commentaries published in
1765 he declared that "in conquered or ceded countries, that have
already laws of their own, the king may indeed alter and change those
laws, but till he actually does change them, the ancient laws of the
country remain.[104]" This opinion is supported by the authority of
Lord Mansfield in his decision in the case of Campbell vs Hall,[105]
rendered in 1774, which involved the status of the island of Granada, a
conquered province. He laid down in this decision the general principle
that the "laws of a conquered country continue in force until they are
altered by the conquerer. The justice and antiquity of this maxim are
incontrovertible:——"[106]

The Proclamation of 1763 which had definitely extended the laws of
England to the new provinces,[107] made no such provisions for the
West, nor did the crown ever take such action. We may, therefore, lay
down the general principle that the British Government was obliged
to govern her new subjects in this region according to the laws
and customs hitherto prevailing among them; any other course would
manifestly be illegal. The commanding general of the army in America
and his subordinates, who were embarrassed by the presence of this
French settlement for which no provision had been made by the ministry,
and who found it necessary to assume the obligation of enforcing some
sort of order in that country, had no power to displace any of the
laws and customs of the French inhabitants. It will be pointed out in
succeeding chapters that this general principle, while adhered to in
many respects, was not uniformly carried out.

It is apparent from the foregoing considerations that the government
of the Illinois people was de facto in nature. It had no legal
foundations. Every action of the military department was based on
expediency; although this course was in general acquiesced in by the
home authorities, all the officials concerned were aware that such a
status could not continue indefinitely. But it did continue for about a
decade, during which time the inhabitants were at the mercy of some six
or seven different military commandants. In 1774, however, Parliament
passed the Quebec Act, which provided, among other things, for the
union of all the western country north of the Ohio River, and which but
for the cataclysm of the American revolution meant civil government for
the whole region.



CHAPTER IV.

TRADE CONDITIONS IN ILLINOIS, 1765-1775.


The peltry trade had been one of the elements which had accentuated,
throughout the eighteenth century, the difficulties between France and
England in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. It was the chief support
of the French government in Canada and now that the English were in
undisputed possession of the great peltry districts it became apparent
that the management of the trade deserved most serious consideration.
It was becoming of increasing importance to the manufacturing monopoly
of the mother country, and therefore, in the minds of English
statesmen, deserved far more attention than did the few thousand French
colonists scattered throughout the West. The desire to increase this
branch of commerce dictated in a large measure those clauses in the
Proclamation of 1763 which forbade the formation of settlements or the
purchase of lands within the Indian reservation, but at the same time
declared that the trade with the Indians should be free and open to
all English subjects alike. Again, the plan proposed in 1764 related
solely to the management of the Indians and to the regulation of the
trade with a view to making the English monopoly of intrinsic value to
the empire. Even towards the close of the period under consideration
there is little or no change of policy so far as official utterances
are concerned. In 1772 in a report to the crown, the Lords of Trade
made the following declaration: "The great object of colonization upon
the continent of North America has been to improve and extend the
commerce and manufactures of this kingdom. It does appear to us that
the extension of the fur trade depends entirely upon the Indians being
undisturbed in the possession of their hunting grounds, and that all
colonization does in its nature and must in its consequence operate to
the prejudice of that branch of commerce. Let the savages enjoy their
deserts in quiet. Were they driven from their forests the peltry trade
would decrease."[108]

Under the French regime the western Indians and their trade had been
managed with greater success than had the tribes living under English
influence. The success of France was due largely to her policy of
centralization combined of course with the genial character of the
French fur trader and the influence of the missionary. The English,
on the contrary, had managed their relations with the Indians through
the agency of the different colonies, without a semblance of union or
co-operation: each colony competed for the lion's share of the trade, a
policy which resulted disastrously to the peace of the empire.

In 1755 the English government under the influence of Halifax,
president of the Board of Trade, took over the political control of
the Indians, and superintendents were appointed by the crown to reside
among the different nations.[109] A little later in 1761 the purchase
of Indian lands was taken out of the hands of the colonies and placed
under the control of the home government.[110] No further change is
to be noted until after the issue of the war was known, when the
whole question was taken under consideration. The most important step
yet taken respecting the Indian and his concomitant, the fur trade,
appeared in the Proclamation of 1763, issued in October following the
treaty of cession. Some of its provisions for the West have already
been noted. In addition to reserving for the present the unorganized
territory between the Alleghany mountains and the Mississippi River
for the use of the Indians, the government guaranteed the Indians
in the possession of those lands by announcing in the Proclamation
that no Governor or Commander-in-chief would be allowed to make land
grants within their territory, and further all land purchases and
the formation of settlements by private individuals without royal
consent were prohibited. Trade within this reservation was made,
however, free to all who should obtain a license from the Governor or
Commander-in-chief of the colony in which they resided.[111]

The policy was now for the central government to take the Indian
trade under its management; and in the course of the year following
the issuance of the Proclamation an elaborate plan was outlined by
Hillsborough[112] comprehending the political and commercial relations
with all the Indian territory.

According to the proposed scheme[113] British North America was to be
divided, for the purpose of Indian management, into two districts,
a northern and a southern, each under the control of a general
superintendent or agent appointed by the crown: the Ohio River being
designated as the approximate line of division. In the northern
district, with which we are here concerned, the regulation of such
Indian affairs as treaties, land purchases, questions of peace and
war, and trade relations were to be given into the hands of the
superintendent who was to be entirely free from outside interference:
without his consent no civil or military officer could interfere with
the trade or other affairs of any of the Indian tribes. Three deputies
were to be appointed to assist the superintendent and at each post a
commissary, an interpreter, and a smith were to reside, acting under
the immediate direction of the superintendent and responsible only
to him for their conduct. For the administration of justice between
traders and Indians and between traders themselves, the commissary
at each post was to be empowered to act as justice of the peace in
all civil and criminal cases. In civil cases involving sums not
exceeding ten pounds an appeal might be taken to the superintendent.
The Indian trade was to be under the direct supervision of the general
superintendent. Traders who desired to go among the Indians to ply
their trade could do so by obtaining a license from the province from
which they came. The region into which the trader intended to go was
to be clearly defined in the license and each had to give bond for
the observance of the laws regulating the trade. The superintendent,
together with the commissary at the post and a representative of the
Indians were to fix the value of all goods and traders were forbidden
to charge more than the price fixed; for the still better regulation
of the trade, it was to be centered about the regularly fortified and
garrisoned forts. Regulations for the sale of land were also proposed;
outside the limits of the colonies no individual or company could
legally purchase land from the Indians unless at a general meeting of
the tribe presided over by the superintendent.

The plan thus outlined by the ministry was never legally carried into
effect, although the superintendents used the outline as a guide in
their dealings with the Indians. The original intention had been to
levy a tax on the Indian trade to defray the expense of putting the
scheme into operation, but it was found that the budget was already too
greatly burdened; and the Stamp Act disturbance which soon followed
illustrated the possible inexpediency of imposing such a duty.[114]

The foregoing considerations serve to indicate the importance the
ministry attached to the Indian trade in general. But what of the
trade in the Illinois country? This region had been one of the great
centers of the Indian trade under the French regime; and, in addition,
the French inhabitants had been one of the main supports of New
Orleans since its foundation early in the century. The commercial
connection between the Illinois villages and New Orleans had never been
broken, and at the time of the occupation of Illinois in 1765 French
fur traders and merchants still plied their traffic up and down the
Mississippi River. Now that the title to this trade center passed to
England it was expected that the volume of trade would be turned
eastward from its southerly route. The necessity for this was patent if
any solid benefits were to accrue to the empire from the cession.[115]

The home and colonial authorities early saw the importance of the
redirection of the trade. They hoped and expected that a trade would be
opened with the Indians in and about the Illinois country immediately
after the active occupation by the English troops.[116] A large number
of individual traders were early aware of this and representatives of
some of the large trading corporations of the East were also preparing
to take advantage of the early opening of the trade. In 1765 Fort Pitt
became the great rendezvous for this element, and when the army reached
Fort Chartres in October, 1765, it was followed as soon as the season
of the year would permit, by the traders with their cargoes to exchange
for the Indians' furs. Among the more important figures was George
Morgan,[117] a member of the firm of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan
of Philadelphia,[118] and the firm's personal representative at the
Illinois, where he first appeared early in 1766,[119] remaining there
the greater part of the next five years.[120] Other representatives
of this company left Fort Pitt in March of the same year with a large
cargo of goods, which reached Fort Chartres during the summer.[121]
Firms such as Franks and Company of Philadelphia and London and Bently
and Company of Manchac also traded extensively in the Illinois during
the following years: all the larger British companies becoming rivals
for that portion of the Indian trade which the English were able to
command.

Other and perhaps greater sources of profit to the English merchants
lay in the privilege of furnishing the garrison with provisions[122]
and the Indian department with goods for Indian presents.[123]
Although the houses of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, and Franks and
Company were usually competitors for the former privileges, the latter
company generally had the monopoly.[124] On the other hand, Baynton,
Wharton, and Morgan derived their greatest profits from the sale of
enormous quantities of goods to the government through the Indian
department for distribution among the Indians accustomed to assemble
at the Illinois.[125] But whether all these houses received profits
commensurate with the risks undertaken is problematical.[126] In the
Indian trade, in which all the merchants were interested, they not
only had to compete with each other and with independent English
traders, but with the French and Spanish who had not ceased to ply
their trade among their old friends the Indians. This continuance of
foreign traders in British territory was probably the most serious
problem in the trade situation. Not only did it affect English traders
but the interests of the empire itself were seriously threatened by the
presence within its limits of unlicensed foreign traders.

It is therefore evident that the close of hostilities between France
and England in 1763 and the formal transfer of Canada and the West to
Great Britain by no means closed the intense rivalry between the fur
trading elements of the two nations for predominance in the western
trade: it rather accentuated it. As has already been suggested, France,
until cession of the West, had naturally possessed the sphere of
influence among the savages of the Mississippi Valley and Canada, and
consequently the monopoly of the fur trade accrued to her subjects. In
the upper Ohio river region and among the tribes bordering on or living
within the limits of the English colonies, the British, during the
first half of the eighteenth century, were either strong rivals of the
French or were completely dominant. And it was generally expected that
after the cession of the West the British would inherit the influence
of the French among the Indians and succeed to the monopoly of the fur
trade just as Great Britain had succeeded to the sovereignty of the
territory itself. But the Conspiracy of Pontiac, due in large part to
the machinations of the French traders, postponed for a considerable
period the entry of the British traders, during which time the French
became more strongly entrenched than ever in the affections of the
savages.

The character of the French fur traders has already been noted. Their
methods had from the beginning been different from those pursued by
their neighbors and rivals: they lived among the Indians, affected
their manners, treated them kindly and respectfully, and supplied all
their wants, while the missionary, the connecting link between the
two races, was ever present. This association of religion was one of
the causes of the success of the French in gaining such a permanent
foothold in the affections of the Indians, but was entirely absent
in the British relation with that race. The English traders were in
general unscrupulous[127] in their dealings with the savages and
deficient of that tact which enabled Frenchmen to overcome the natural
prejudice of the Indian and acquire an interest with him which would
be difficult to sever. In that section of the Indian country where
the influence of Great Britain was such that her traders could go
among the Indians, there was always considerable dissatisfaction on
account of the methods employed by the large number of independent
and irresponsible traders. Many carried large quantities of rum, some
dealing in nothing else.[128] English traders frequently attended
public meetings of Indians, gave them liquor during the time for
business and defrauded them of their furs.[129] This abuse was one
of the great causes of complaint against British traders.[130]
Indeed, wherever they participated in the trade, its condition was
deplorable. Many of the independent traders had little or no credit so
that the legitimate merchants suffered as well as the Indians.[131]
They adopted various expedients to draw trade from each other, one
of which was to sell articles below first cost, thus ruining a large
number of traders.[132] Fabrications dangerous to the public were
frequently created to explain the price and condition of goods.[133]
But probably more injurious still to imperial interests, was the fact
that whole cargoes of goods were sometimes sold by English firms to
French traders thus enabling the latter to engross a great part of the
trade,[134] depriving the empire of the benefit of the revenue accruing
from the importation of furs into England. This practice was probably
followed to a greater degree in the farther West, where the French
continued to have a monopoly in the trade.

It had been expected that the Illinois villages would be the center of
trade for the English side of the upper Mississippi Valley just as it
had been one of the centers during the French regime.[135] But, except
for the few tribes of Illinois Indians in the immediate vicinity,
very few savages found their way to these posts for trading purposes.
English traders, on the other hand, did not trust themselves far
beyond this narrow circle.[136] But their French and Spanish rivals
from Louisiana, many of whom formally lived in the Illinois, carried
on a trade in all directions, both by land and by water.[137] They
ascended the Ohio, Wabash, and Illinois rivers[138] and crossed the
Mississippi River above the Illinois River, plying their traffic among
the tribes in the region of the Wisconsin and Fox rivers.[139] This
was probably the most productive area in the Mississippi Valley in the
supply of fur bearing animals. The Mississippi River from its junction
with the Illinois northward was also considered especially good for the
peltry business: the otter, beaver, wolf, cervine, and marten were to
be found in abundance.[140] But the British traders dared not venture
into that quarter. The loss of this trade, however, can scarcely be
attributed to their misconduct, for the French had never allowed it
to pass from their own hands. The latter continued to intrigue with
the Indians throughout the greater part of this period just as they
had prior to 1765. As we have seen they pointed out to the savages how
they would suffer from the policy of economy practiced by the British
government.[141] Thus by giving presents and circulating stories and
misrepresentations the French subjects of Spain attempted to checkmate
every move of the English.[142] The Indians were constantly reminded
of the bad designs on the part of the English, and were encouraged
with unauthorized promises of aid in case they took up the hatchet in
defense of their hunting grounds.[143]

This state of affairs continued throughout the greater part of the
period, although it was probably modified to some extent after 1770,
for in that year O'Reilly, the Spanish governor of Louisiana, issued an
order to all the commandants in that colony to prohibit the inhabitants
crossing the river in the pursuit of trade and whenever any excesses
were committed satisfaction was to be given the English commandant
according to the laws of nations.[144]

During the first years of the British occupation there was considerable
friction in the contact between the two alien peoples in the Illinois
villages. In spite of the fact that the French who remained became
subjects of Great Britain there was for several years sharp competition
between the English and French residents in the vicinity of the
villages.[145] The latter were on terms of friendship with the savages
and could go into any part of the country without difficulty and those
Indians who came to Fort Chartres to trade generally preferred to deal
with their trusted friends. The French often carried the packs of
furs thus obtained across the river to St. Louis or transported them
directly to the New Orleans market. Although the British merchants
were occasionally to pool their interests with French residents, such
cases were exceptional prior to 1770. In that year, however, General
Gage informed the home government that "the competition between his
Majestys' old and new Subjects is greatly abated & must by degrees
subside, for if carried to extremes it would be very prejudicial to
both."[146]

We have seen in the foregoing study how the British traders were
handicapped in the prosecution of the trade by their French rivals.
Naturally the large quantities of furs and skins obtained by such
contraband traders as well as by the French residents of Illinois were
taken directly to New Orleans and there embarked for the ports of
France and Spain. These foreign interlopers, however, only followed
the course they had long been accustomed to take. On the other hand it
was expected by the government that the traders who carried English
manufactured goods down the Ohio River would return by the same route
with their cargoes of peltry for the purpose of transporting them to
England. In this the aim of the ministry miscarried. English traders
and merchants followed the line of least resistance: the route down
the Mississippi to New Orleans was easier and quicker than up the
Ohio and across the country to the sea-coast.[147] Moreover, the New
Orleans market was attractive, for peltries sold at a higher price
there than in the British market.[148] The tendency of the English
traders and merchants to follow this course was discovered soon after
the occupation.[149] In a communication to Secretary Shelburne in 1766
Gage informed the government that "it is reported that the Traders in
West Florida carry most of their Skins to New Orleans, where they sell
them at as good a price as is given in London. As I had before some
Intelligence of this, the Officer commanding at Fort Pitt had Orders
to watch the Traders from Pensilvania (sic) who went down the Ohio in
the Spring to Fort Chartres; & to report the quantity of Peltry they
should bring up the Ohio in the Autumn. He has just acquainted me
that the traders do not return to his Post, that they are gone down
the Mississippi with all their Furrs and Skinns under the pretense of
embarking them at New Orleans for England."[150] A few weeks later
he wrote again in a similar strain: "That Trade will go with the
stream is a maxim found to be true from all Accounts that have been
received of the Indian Trade carried on in that vast Tract of Country
which lies in the Back of the British Colonies; and that the peltry
acquired there is carried to the Sea either by the River St. Lawrence
or River Mississippi."[151] Gage seemed to believe that the part
which went down the St. Lawrence would be transported to England; but
that the peltry passing through New Orleans would never enter a British
port.[152] "Nothing but prospect of a superior profit or force will
turn the Channel of Trade contrary to the above maxim."[153]

It seems impossible to figure exactly what the loss to imperial
interests was under these conditions.[154] Furs and skins, however
being among the enumerated commodities[155] some loss certainly accrued
to British shipping and to the government through loss of the duty, as
well as to English manufacturers. While practically no peltries reached
the Atlantic ports from the Illinois region, enormous quantities were
carried to New Orleans. The few who have left any estimate of the
amount of peltries exported to New Orleans agree in general that from
500 to 1000 packs were shipped annually from Illinois. According to
the usual estimate 500 packs were worth in New Orleans about 3500
pounds sterling.[156] At New Orleans, where the western trade finally
centered, it was estimated that peltries worth between 75,000 and
100,000 pounds sterling were sent annually to foreign ports.[157]

It became apparent to those in a position to understand the situation
that those solid advantages which the Government had expected would
accrue in return for the expense of maintaining establishments in the
West would not be forthcoming, unless some effective though expensive
measures be taken. The rivalry of the French who monopolized the larger
part of the trade and who naturally followed their old road to New
Orleans, and the action of the English traders in turning the channel
of their trade down the stream effectually deprived the empire of any
benefits. Conditions grew no better as the years went by. In 1767 we
find General Gage complaining that "as for the Trade of the Ilinois,
and in general of the Mississippi, we may dispose of some manufactures
there, but whilst Skins and Furrs bear a high price at New Orleans, no
Peltry gained by our manufactures, will ever reach Great Britain, and
if our Traders do not return with the Produce of their Trade to the
Northern Provinces, by way of the Ohio or Lakes, it will not answer to
England to be at much expence about the Mississippi."[158] Not only
were the officials in America, who were in close touch with western
affairs, convinced of the impossibility of obtaining any immediate
commercial benefits from the country, but one of the leading members
of the ministry, Lord Hillsborough, Secretary for the colonies, took a
similar view, in an argument against the planting of western colonies.
"This Commerce cannot (I apprehend) be useful to Great Britain
otherwise than as it furnishes a material for her Manufactures, but
it will on the contrary be prejudicial to her in proportion as other
Countries obtain that material from us without its coming here first; &
whilst New Orleans is the only Post for Exportation of what goes down
the Mississippi, no one will believe that that town will not be the
market for Peltry or that those restrictions, which are intended to
secure the exportation of that Commodity directly to G. Britain, can
have any effect under such circumstances."[159] Though there seems to
have been a unanimity of opinion respecting the commercial inutility of
the Illinois and surrounding country under existing conditions, there
were those, however, who believed that with the adoption of certain
measures the western country could be made of intrinsic commercial
value. Whether any adequate steps could have been taken to turn the
channel of trade eastward and to exclude foreign traders is uncertain.

The original intention of the British government had been to use
Fort Chartres to guard the rivers in order to prevent contraband
trading;[160] but its inefficiency was soon apparent.[161] Although
well constructed, its location was not strategic; it commanded nothing
but an island in the river.[162] An indication to the Indians of
British dominion[163] and a place of deposit for English merchants
was about the sum total of its efficiency.[164] In order to make the
Illinois country effective as a bulwark against foreign aggression and
to keep the trade in English hands, thus insuring material advantages
to the empire, it seemed imperative to many who were familiar with
the situation to adopt measures looking toward the closure of those
natural entrances into the country, the mouths of the Illinois and
Ohio rivers.[165] Almost all the correspondence of the time relating
to Illinois, contains references to the practicability of erecting
forts at the junctions of the Illinois and Ohio rivers with the
Mississippi; in most cases this was insisted upon as the only measure
to be adopted to make the country of value.[166] All were further in
agreement that until such plan was carried out no benefits would arise
from the possession of that territory. Suggestion were also offered
relative to the erection of a fort on the Mississippi River above its
junction with the Illinois for the protection of that section of the
country.[167] Perhaps the most novel suggestion emanated from General
Gage, who declared that in order to gain all the advantages expected it
would be necessary to amalgamate all the little French villages lying
between the Illinois and Ohio rivers into one settlement, which would
also be the centre of the military establishment; detachments could
then be sent out to guard the rivers and prevent British merchants
from descending the stream to New Orleans and also watch for foreign
interlopers.[168]

But these suggestions one and all failed to receive recognition from
the government. One of the main reasons for this non-action may well be
summed up in a statement of Hillsborough's, who appears by 1770 to have
become somewhat pessimistic regarding the prospect of any immediate
advantages from the western trade. He declared in that year that "Forts
& Military Establishments at the Mouths of the Ohio & Illinois Rivers,
admitting that they would be effectual to the attainment of the objects
in view, would yet, I fear, be attended with an expence to this Kingdom
greatly disproportionate to the advantage proposed to be gained.——"[169]

The failure of the government to manage successfully the western trade
previous to 1770 was not the only reason the ministry hesitated to
do any thing further. Any measure would have meant the expenditure
of large sums of money with no absolute certainty of an adequate
return. The problem of the western trade confronted the ministry at
a most unfortunate time. Questions of graver import were arising and
demanding immediate attention. Instead of seeking new schemes upon
which to lavish money, every opportunity was seized upon to curtail
expenses. The government failed to put into full operation the plan
of 1764 because of the added financial burden it would entail and in
1768 the management of the Indian Trade was transferred from the crown
to the colonies to further reduce the budget. The western question
had become subordinated to that of the empire. Furs were important
to the manufacturing monopoly of Great Britain, but at this time of
rising discontent and dissatisfaction in the colonies any new projects
entailing further expense were out of the question.



CHAPTER V.

COLONIZING SCHEMES IN THE ILLINOIS.


Although prior to the Seven Years War France was in nominal possession
of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, the English colonies on the
sea-board viewed that territory in a different light. The old sea to
sea charters still possessed a potential value in the eyes of British
colonists and little or no respect was accorded the claims of France.
Gradually toward the middle of the century the more enterprising and
farsighted of the colonists, who appreciated the future value of the
region, began to lay plans for its systematic exploitation. As early
as 1748, shortly after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Ohio Company,
composed of London merchants and Virginia land speculators obtained
from the crown a grant of land south of the Ohio river. This was the
precursor of several companies formed for similar purposes. In 1754 the
question of western expansion had become of sufficient importance to
engage the attention of the Albany Congress, the plans for the creation
of western colonies were discussed by that body.[170] The following
year Samuel Hazard of Philadelphia outlined a proposition looking
toward the formation of a western colony,[171]—probably the first which
comprehended the Illinois country.

The treaty of cession of 1763 gave a new impulse to the colonizing
spirit which had lain dormant during the early years of the war. The
English now believed that they were free to occupy at will the
unsettled lands as far westward as the Mississippi River. Early in the
summer of 1763, before the British ministry had had time to consider
and determine its policy toward the new acquisitions, there was formed
an organization known as the Mississippi Land Company,[172] for the
purpose of planting a colony in the Illinois and Wabash regions. In
this scheme some of the most prominent inhabitants of Virginia and
Maryland were interested,[173]—indeed membership in the organization
was drawn almost entirely from those two colonies and from London. The
Company was eventually to be composed of fifty members who were to
contribute equally towards the maintenance of an agent in England, to
whom was intrusted the duty of soliciting from the crown a grant of two
million five hundred thousand acres of land[174] on the Mississippi and
its tributaries, the Wabash and Ohio rivers. The proposed grant was
to be "laid off within the following bounds beginning upon the East
side of the Rivers Mississippi one hundred and twenty miles above or
to the northward of the confluence of the River Ohio therewith. Thence
by a line to strike the river Wabash or St. Ireon eighty miles above
the union of Ohio and Wabash, and abutting on the main branch of the
River Cherokee or Tennessee one hundred fifty mile above the junction
of Cherokee River with Ohio and proceeding thence Westerly in a line
to strike the River Mississippi seventy miles below the union of Ohio
with that River; thence upon the said River to the beginning."[175]
The subscribers were to be free to retain their lands twelve years
or more at the pleasure of the crown without the payment of taxes on
quit rents. Within the same period also the company was to be obliged
to settle two hundred families in the colony, unless prevented by
Indians or a foreign enemy.[176] In order to insure against any such
interruption, it was hinted that the government might establish and
garrison two forts,—one at the confluence of the Cherokee[177] and Ohio
rivers, and the other at the mouth of the Ohio.[178]

In their petition the memorialists enumerate the advantages they expect
the empire to receive in case the land be granted, special emphasis
being laid on two points of view,—commerce and defence. "The Increase
of the people, the extension of trade and the enlargement of the
revenue are with certainty to be expected, where the fertility of the
soil, and mildness of the climate invite emigrants (provided they can
obtain Lands on easy terms) to settle and cultivate commodities most
wanted by Great Britain and which will bear the charges of a tedious
navigation, by the high prices usually given for them,—such as Hemp,
Flax, Silk, Wine, Potash, Cochineal, Indigo, Iron, &c., by which means
the Mother Country will be supplied with many necessary materials,
that are now purchased by foreigners at a very great expense."[179]

From the point of view of both trade and defense, the company proposed
"that by conducting a trade useful to the Indians on the borders of the
Mississippi they will effectually prevent the success of that cruel
policy, which has ever directed the French in time of peace, to prevail
with the Indians their neighbors to lay waste the frontiers of your
Majestie's Colonies thereby to prevent their increase."[180]

Lastly, the establishment of a buffer colony would effectually prevent
the probable encroachments of the French from the West side of the
Mississippi, and cut off their political and commercial connection with
the Indians. They would "thereby be prevented from instigating them to
War, and the harrassing the frontier Counties as they have constantly
done of all the Colonies."[181]

The plan received its first official check in the year of its
inception, when in October, 1763, the British ministry announced its
western policy in a proclamation according to which all the territory
lying north of the Floridas and west of the Alleghanies was reserved
for the use of the Indians.[182] Thereafter the colonial governors were
forbidden to issue patents for land within this reservation without the
consent of the crown.[183] However, the enounciation of this policy
did not deter this and similar companies from pressing their claims
upon the Board of Trade. The more far-sighted of the Americans
had probably correctly interpreted the proclamation as temporary in
character and as promulgated to allay the alarm of the savages.[184]
The Mississippi company therefore continued to solicit the grant until
1769, when it was decided that on account of the temper of the ministry
towards America, it would be advisable to allow the matter to rest
for a time in the hope that a change in the government would bring a
corresponding change in policy.[185] But at no time does it appear that
the promoters of the colony received the slightest encouragement from
those in authority.[186]

About the time of the Mississippi company in 1763, General Charles
Lee[187] outlined a scheme for the establishment of two colonies, one
on the Ohio River below its junction with the Wabash, and the other
on the Illinois River.[188] It was his plan to organize a company
and petition the crown for the necessary grants of land.[189] A
portion of the settlers were to be procured in new England, and the
remainder from among Protestants of Germany and Switzerland.[190] In
narrating the probable advantages which he thinks would be derived
from such settlements, Lee takes practically the same point of view
as the Mississippi company, adding the suggestion that a new channel
of commerce would be opened up through the Mississippi River and
the Gulf of Mexico.[191] This proposal suffered the same fate as
its contemporary in being objected by the ministry, whose policy of
allowing no settlements in the country beyond the mountains had been
too recently adopted.[192]

Thus far there seems to be no indication that the above mentioned
colonizing schemes received encouragement from any one in close touch
with the government. Apparently the authors of those projects did not
have the ear of those members of the ministry, whose general attitude
gave some ground for the belief that in the end plans for western
settlements would be adopted. The most prominent among these was Lord
Shelbourne, whose personal attitude favored carving the West into
colonies. Possibly his friendship with Dr. Franklin influenced him in
part to throw the weight of his prestige in favor of a new plan for a
colony, promoted this time by prominent merchants and land speculators
of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. It was in 1766 that the
next definite scheme appeared, although it is probable that there
were many others, for during those years half of England was said to
have been "New Land mad as every body there had their eyes fixt on
this Country."[193] Pamphlet literature was printed and disseminated
throughout England America from 1763 on advocating the feasibility
of settling the new lands,[194] which doubtless had considerable
influence. It is hardly probable that the few definite propositions
of which we have recorded were the only schemes projected during this
period.[195]

The plan of 1764 had its origin we may safely say as 1764. In January
of that year the Board of Trade received a communication from one of
the promoters of the plan, George Croghan, who was then in England,
asking their Lordships "whether it would not be good policy at this
time while we certainly have it in our power to secure all the
advantages we have got there by making a purchase of the Indians
inhabiting the Country along the Mississippi from the mouth of the Ohio
up to the sources of the River Illinois, and there plant a respectable
colony, in order to secure our frontiers, and prevent the French from
any attempt to rival us in the Fur trade with the Natives, by drawing
the Ohio and Lake Indians over the Mississippi which they have already
attempted by the last accounts we have from Detroit."[196]

The tentative proposition thus suggested by Croghan to the Board
was in essence the same plan that he and his associates developed
two years later. In its general outline there is no intimation that
Croghan intended at this time to include the cultivated lands of the
French inhabitants of Illinois who might leave that country.[197] But
Sir William Johnson, his superior in the Indian department in America
and his constant associate in colonizing enterprizes, writing to the
two years subsequently, gave as his opinion that "some of the present
Inhabitants may possibly incline to go home, and our Traders will I
dare say chuse to purchase their rights, this may be the foundation
for a Valuable Colony in that Country, —-—, this may be effected in
time, & large cessions obtained of the Natives."[198] This idea of
basing the colony in part upon the lands vacated by the French was a
few weeks later taken up and emphasized by General Gage. He declared
that there was only one way to obviate the difficulties in Illinois
on account of lack of provisions for the army as well as to form at
the least expense a barrier against probable incursions of foreigners
from Louisiana. That method must be to "grant the lands deserted by the
French, which I presume forfeited, as well as other Lands unsettled,
using necessary Precautions to avoid Disputes with the Indians, to
the British Settlers."[199] While Croghan, Johnson, and Gage were
thus advocating the purchase of the French claims and some additional
Indian lands with the view of forming a buffer colony, Governor William
Franklin of New Jersey and some Philadelphia merchants, all friends of
the Indian agent Croghan, were promoting the same scheme, and on March
29th, 1766, Governor Franklin drew up[200] a formal sketch.[201] "A
few of us, from his (Croghan's) encouragement, have formed a Company,
to purchase of the French, settled at the Illinois, such lands as
they have a good title to, and are inclined to dispose of. But as I
thought it would be of little avail to buy lands in the Country,
unless a Company were established there, I have drawn some proposals
for that purpose, which are much approved of by Col. Croghan and the
other gentlemen concerned in Philadelphia, and are sent by them to Sir
William Johnson for his sentiments, and when we receive them, the whole
will be forwarded to you. It is proposed that the Company shall consist
of twelve, now in America, and if you like the proposals, you will
be at liberty to add Yourself, & such other gentlemen of character &
fortune in England, as you may think will be most likely to promote the
undertaking."[202]

Franklin's letter to his father explains very clearly the steps in the
development of the plan up to that time. It is necessary, however, to
examine other sources in order to ascertain details concerning the
proposition. The Articles of Agreement as outlined by Governor Franklin
contains the tentative proposal that application be made to the crown
for a grant in the Illinois country of 1,200,000 acres or "more if to
be procured."[203] Provision was also made in the original draft for
ten equal shareholders, the stipulation to be subject to change in case
others desired to enter the company.[204] The original draft was sent
to Sir William Johnson who was requested to consider the proposals and
make any alterations he saw fit.[205] The articles were then to be
returned to Governor Franklin, with Johnson's recommendations to the
ministry.[206] Through Franklin the papers were to be forwarded to Dr.
Franklin in London, to whom was intrusted the task of negotiating with
the ministry.[207]

In his recommendations Johnson urged upon the ministry the adoption
of the proposals and in addition offered a number of suggestions
among which the following are of interest.[208] 1. The crown should
purchase from the Indians all their right to the territory in the
Illinois country. 2. A civil government should be established. 3. The
proposed land grants should be laid out in townships according to the
practice in New England. 4. Provincial officers and soldiers who served
in the French war should receive grants. 5. The mines and minerals
should belong to the owners of the land in which they may be found,
except royal mines, from which the crown might receive a fifth. 6. In
every township 500 acres should be reserved for the maintenance of a
clergyman of the Established Church of England. 7. Finally the lands of
the colony were suggested as follows:—From the mouth of the Ouisconsin
(or Wisconsin) River down the Mississippi agreeable to Treaty, to the
Forks, or Mouth of the Ohio. Then up the same River Ohio to the River
Wabash, thence up the same River Wabash to the Portage at the Head
thereof. Then by the said Portage to the River Miamis and down the said
River Miamis to Lake Erie. Thence along the several Courses of the said
Lake to Riviere al Ours (or Bear River) and up the said River to the
Head thereof, and from thence in a straight Line, or by the Portage of
St. Josephs River & down the same River to Lake Michigan then along the
several Courses of the said Lake on the South and West Side thereof
to the point of Bay Puans, and along the several Courses on the East
Side of the said Bay to the Mouth of Foxes River, thence up to the Head
thereof and from thence by a Portage to the Head of Ouisconsin River,
and down the same to the Place of Beginning.

Benjamin Franklin exerted every effort to advance the project in
England, but with little success. Lord Shelburne, who was at this
time Secretary of State for the southern department, was also ready
and anxious to see the new colony established, and he was able to
influence the ministry to take a favorable view. Others in authority,
however, and particularly members of the Board of Trade, were opposed
to the proposition.[209] In 1768, the Board, under the presidency
of Hillsborough, reported adversely and the question of the Illinois
colony was dropped. Attention of land speculators was now called to the
new Vandalia colony in the upper Ohio region.



CHAPTER VI.

EVENTS IN THE ILLINOIS COUNTRY, 1765-1768.


In the foregoing chapters an attempt has been made to point out
certain general aspects relating to the West and to the Illinois
country, with special reference to the governmental status of the old
French settlements after the conquest, the extension of the English
law to the conquered territory, some of the problems of the Indian
and trade relations, and finally attention has been called to some
of the projects for the colonization of the Illinois country after
1763. What were the actual events taking place in the Illinois after
the occupation has always been problematical. Previous writers have
almost without exception dismissed with a sentence the first two
or three years of the period. Indeed the whole thirteen years of
British administration have generally been crowded into two or three
paragraphs. Although the available historical material relating to
the material to the period in general has recently been considerably
augmented, there yet remain gaps which must be bridged before a
complete history of the colony under the British can be written.

Among the first duties of the British commandant after taking formal
possession of Fort de Chartres in October, 1765, was to announce to
the inhabitants the contents of Gage's proclamation. It is only from
this document that we know anything of the status of the individual
inhabitants of Illinois. One of its leading features was a clause
granting to the French the right of the free exercise of the Roman
Catholic religion "in the same manner as in Canada,"[210] which was
the fulfillment on the part of the British government of the pledge
stipulated in the IVth article of the treaty of Paris, containing the
following clause: "Brittanick Majesty agrees to grant the liberty
of the Catholic religion to the inhabitants of Canada; he will
consequently give the most precise and effectual orders, that his new
Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion,
according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, as far as the
laws of Great Britain permit."[211] This provision appertained to the
whole western territory as well as to Canada proper. Prior to the
treaty of cession the Illinois and Wabash settlements were subject to
the jurisdiction of Louisiana, while approximately the country north
of the Fortieth parallel had been within the limits of Canada. But
in the treaty all the territory lying between the Alleghanies and
the Mississippi river was described as a dependency of Canada. The
government was thus commited to religious toleration within the whole
extent of the ceded territory. This meant, however, that only the
religious privileges of the church had been secured, for the clause in
the treaty, "as far as the laws of Great Britain permit," meant that
papal authority would not be tolerated within the British empire.

Other clauses provided that all the inhabitants of Illinois who
had been subjects of the king of France, might if they so desired,
sell their estates and retire with their effects to Louisiana. No
restraint would be placed on their emigration, except for debt or
on account of criminal processes.[212] This was also a fulfillment of
the pledges made in the treaty of Paris.[213] All the inhabitants who
desired to retain their estates and become subjects of Great Britain
were guaranteed security for their persons and effects and liberty of
trade.[214] Finally they were commanded to take the oath of allegiance
and fidelity to the crown in case they remained on British soil.[215]

When Captain Sterling proceeded to Kaskaskia to post the proclamation
and to administer the oaths of allegiance for which he was empowered
by the commanding general, he was confronted by an unexpected movement
on the part of the inhabitants. A petition was presented signed by the
representative French of the village, asking for a respite of nine
months in order that they might settle their affairs and decide whether
they wished to remain under the British government or withdraw from
the country.[216] At first Sterling refused to grant the request.[217]
According to the terms of the Paris treaty the inhabitants of the ceded
territory had been given eighteen months in which to withdraw, the time
to be computed from the date of the exchange of ratifications.[218] The
limit had long since expired, and it was therefore beyond the power of
Sterling or his superior General Gage to grant legally an extension of
time.[219] When, however, the commandant perceived that unless some
concessions were granted, the village would be immediately depopulated,
he extended the time to the first of March, 1766, with the provisions
that a temporary oath of allegence be given,[220] and that all desiring
to leave the country should give in their names in advance.[221] To
this tentative proposition the French in Kaskaskia agreed on condition
that Sterling forward to the commanding general a petition, in which
they ask for the longer time.[222] An officer was dispatched to the
villages of Prairie du Rocher, St. Phillipe, and Cahokia where similar
arrangements were made.[223]

The machinery of civil government in operation under the French regime
had become badly deranged during the French and Indian war and when the
representatives of the English government entered the country affairs
were in a chaotic state. The commandant of the English troops had of
course no authority to govern the inhabitants. But he found himself
face to face with conditions which made immediate action imperative.
Practically the only civil officers Sterling found on the English side
of the river were Joseph La Febevre, who acted as Judge, Attorney
General and Guardian of the Royal Warehouse, and Joseph Labuxiere,
was Clerk and Notary Public.[224] But those men retired with St. Ange
and the French soldiers to St. Louis shortly after the arrival of
the English.[225] This brought the whole governmental machinery to a
standstill, and the English commander was forced to act. He determined
to appoint a judge and after consulting the principal inhabitants of
the villages, selected M. La Grange, who was intrusted "to decide
all disputes according to the Laws and Customs of the Country,"
with liberty to appeal to the commandant in case the litigants were
dissatisfied with his decision.[226] The captains of militia seem to
have retained their positions under the British, their duties being
practically the same as in the French regime. Each village or parish
had its captain who saw to the enforcement of decrees and other civil
matters as well as looking after the local militia.[227] The office
of royal commissary continued and James Rumsey, a former officer
in the English army was appointed to this position.[228] But who
was to continue the duties of the old French commandants with both
his civil and military functions? Obviously the most logical person
was the commanding officer of the English troops stationed at the
fort, with the difference that the former held a special commission
for the performance of these duties, while the latter had no such
authorisation. A further and more fundamental difference lay in
the fact that formerly the French had the right to appeal to the
Superior Council at New Orleans, while apparently no such corresponding
safeguard was given them by the new arrangement.

Sterling did not long retain command of the post[229] for in December
he was superseded by Major Robert Farmer,[230] his superior in rank,
who arrived from Mobile with a detachment of the 34th regiment, after
an eight months voyage. Their arrival was exceedingly welcome to
Sterling and his men since they were becoming greatly embarrassed for
lack of provisions, ammunition, and presents for the Indians.[231]
When they left Fort Pitt in August, it had not been thought necessary
to transport more than sixty pounds of ammunition inasmuch as Fort
de Chartres was expected to yield a sufficient supply, and both Gage
and Sterling believed that Croghan, with his cargo of supplies, would
be awaiting the arrival of the troops at the Illinois.[232] Neither
expectation was realized. Croghan was back in the colonies prior to
Sterling's arrival at the post, and when the fort was transferred, it
yielded neither ammunition nor other supplies in sufficient quantity to
meet the needs of the troops.[233]

An assembly of three or four thousand Indians had been accustomed to
gather at the fort each spring to receive annual gifts from the French.
But the English had made no provisions for such a contingency, which,
coupled with the weakness of the garrison and the recent hostility of
the Indians, would probably lead to serious complications. A possible
defection of the Indians, therefore, necessitated a large supply of
military stores[234] which it was possible to obtain from the French
merchants in the villages. The latter agreed to furnish the soldiers
with ammunition, on the condition that other provisions would also
be purchased,[235] for which the English alleged they charged an
exorbitant price.[236] Sterling was compelled to acquiesce, for the
merchants had sent their goods across the river where he could not get
at them.[237]

The large supply of provisions which the colony had produced in former
years seems to have decreased, at any rate it fell far short of the
expectations of the English officers. One officer writes at this time
that "they have indeed but little here, and are doing us a vast favor
when they let us have a Gallon of French brandy at twenty Shillings
Sterling, and as the price is not as yet regulated the Eatables is in
the same proportion."[238] The wealth of colony had been considerably
impaired since the occupation on account of the exodus of a large
number of French who disobeyed the order of Sterling that all who
desired to withdraw should give in their names in advance. Taking
their cattle, grain and effects across the ferries at Cahokia and
Kaskaskia, they found homes at St. Louis and St. Genevieve on the
Spanish side.[239] Probably a large part of the emigrants left in
the hope that in Louisiana they might still enjoy their ancient laws
and privileges,[240] and others from fear lest the Indians, who were
now assuming a threatening attitude, might destroy their crops and
homes.[241]

The acute situation of the garrison brought on by the dearth of
supplies continued through the winter and spring of 1765 and 1766.[242]
Farmer estimated that all the provisions available amounted to no more
than fifty thousand pounds of flour and 1250 pounds of corn meal,[243]
upon which the garrison could barely subsist till the following July;
and a portion of this stock would have to be given to the Indians,
since representatives of the Indian department had not yet appeared.
These circumstances obliged Major Farmer to send Sterling and his
troops to New York by way of the Mississippi river and New Orleans
instead of up the Ohio river in accordance with Gage's orders.[244] In
response to a series of urgent requests for assistance, Gage employed
a force of Indians to transport a cargo to the Illinois,[245] which
reached Fort Chartres during the early summer of 1766, by which time
also representatives of the English merchants at Philadelphia had
arrived with large stores of supplies.[246] Henceforth we hear nothing
further of a shortage of provisions in the Illinois, for not only did
the English merchants import large supplies from the East, but cargoes
were brought up the Mississippi from New Orleans by the French;[247]
and for a time the English government itself transported the necessary
provisions from Fort Pitt.[248]

Late in the summer of 1766 Farmer was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel
Reid, who arrived during the summer from Mobile with another detachment
of the thirty-fourth regiment.[249] Reid soon became obnoxious to
the people on account of his tyrannical acts, many of which have been
recorded in Colonel George Morgan's letter book. His administration
of affairs, however, continued over a period of two years. In 1768 he
was relieved by Colonel John Wilkins who ruled the French for the next
three years.



BIBLIOGRAPHY.


Alden, George Henry, New Governments West of the Alleghany Mountains
before 1780. University of Wisconsin Bulletin, II. Madison, 1889.

Alvord, C. W., Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763. Mich. Pion. & Hist.
Colls.

Bancroft, George, MSS Collection of, N. Y. Pub. Lib.

Beer, G. L., British Colonial Policy, New York, 1907.

Brown, Henry, Hist. of Ill., New York, 1844.

Butler, Mann, Hist. of Ky., Louisville, 1834.

Canadian Archives, Report concerning for the year 1906. Ottawa.

Chatham Papers, Pub. Rec. Office, London.

Coffin, V., The Province of Quebec and the American Revolution.
University of Wisconsin Bulletin, I. Madison, 1896.

Franklin, Benjamin, Works of, Ed. by John Bigelow. 10 Vols. New York,
1888.

Gayarre, C., Hist. of La. 3 Vols., New Orleans, 1903.

Harding, Julia Morgan, Geo. Morgan: His Family and Times. Washington
(Pa.) Observer, May 21, 1904.

Hinsdale, B. A., The Old Northwest. New York, 1888.

Historical MSS Commission's Reports. London.

Johnson, Sir William, MSS Collections of, 26 Vols. New York State
Library, Albany.

Kaskaskia Records: British Period. MS Collection, University of
Illinois.

Kingsford, W., Hist. of Canada. 10 Vols. Toronto, 1887-1890.

Morgan, George, MS Letter Book. Nov. 1766 to July 1768.

Monette, J. W., Hist. of the Miss. Valley. 2 Vols. New York, 1848.

New York, Documents relating to the Colonial History of. Edited by E.
B. O'Callaghan, 11 Vols. Albany, 1856-1857.

Parkman, F., MS Collection, Mass. Hist. Soc. Lib.

Parkman, F., Conspiracy of Pontiac, 2 Vols. Boston, 1903. Wolfe and
Montcalm. Boston, 1903.

Public Record Office, London: Mil. Corr., Series America & West Indies;
Home Office Papers; Chatham Papers.

Sioussat, St. George L., The English Statutes in Maryland. J. H. U.
Studies, XXI, Baltimore, 1903.

Stone, H. R., Life and Times of Sir William Johnson. 2 Vols. Albany,
1865.

Thwaites, R. G., Early Western Travels, 1784-1846. Cleveland, 1904.

Terrage, Mare de Villiers, Les Dernièrs Années de la Louisiane
Française. Paris, 1903.

Winsor, J., Narrative and Critical History of America. 8 Vols. Boston
and New York, 1889.

The Westward Movement, 1763-1798. Boston & New York, 1897.

The Mississippi Basin, Boston & New York, 1898.



FOOTNOTES:

[1] Perkins, _France under Louis XV_, II, pp. 1-83.

[2] Parkman, _Montcalm and Wolfe_, I, pp. 1-39.

[3] Parkman, _Montcalm and Wolfe_, I, pp. 39-67.

[4] Hunt, _Pol. Hist. of England_, X, pp. 23-40.

[5] Text of treaty in Chalmers, _Collections of Treaties_, I, 467-483.
Canadian Archives, 1907 _Report_, 73-84. Hildreth, _Hist. of U. S._,
501-503.

[6] Parkman, _La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West_, 312.

[7] Ibid., 312.

[8] Cahokia was founded in 1699 by the priests of the Seminary of
Foreign Missions.

[9] Winsor, _Narr. and Crit. Hist._ V, 43.

[10] Ibid., 49.

[11] Ibid., 53.

[12] Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 272-273.

[13] For the Indian rebellion the best secondary accounts are: Parkman,
_Conspiracy of Pontiac_, 2 vols., passim. Kingsford, _Hist. of Can._,
1-112. Poole, The West, in Winsor, _Narr. & Crit. Hist. of Amer._, VI.,
684-700. Winsor, _Miss. Basin_, 432-446. Bancroft, _Hist. of U. S._,
IV., 110-133. (Ed. of 1852, containing references.)

[14] Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, I, 182.

[15] Johnson to Lords of Trade, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII, pp 929, 955,
960, 964, 987.

[16] Johnson to Amherst, July 11th, 1763, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII, 532.

[17] Johnson to Amherst, July 11th, 1763. _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII, 532.

[18] Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, I, 181, quoting from a letter
of Sir William Johnson to Gov. Colden, Dec. 24, 1763. Winsor, _Miss.
Basin_, 433.

[19] Johnson to Lords of Trade, July 1, 1763, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII,
525. Johnson to Amherst, July 8, 1763, Ibid., 531. Johnson to Lords of
Trade, Dec. 26, 1764, Ibid., 688-689. Gage to Bouquet, June 5, 1764,
Can. Arch., Series A, Vol. 8, p 409. Gage to Bouquet, Oct. 21, 1764,
Ibid., p 481. Johnson to Gov. Colden, Jan. 22, 1765, Johnson MSS, X,
No. 99.

[20] _Can. Arch. Report_, 1905, I, 470. Neyon to Kerlerc, Dec. 1, 1763,
Bancroft Coll., Lenox Lib. Extract from letters of M. D'Abaddie, Jan.,
1764, _Can. Arch. Report_ I, 471. D'Abaddie to the French minister,
1764, Ibid., 472.

[21] This is the view taken by Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II,
279, and by Bancroft, _Hist. of U. S._, V, 133, 136. But Kingsford,
in his _Hist. of Can._, V, 25, takes an opposite view. He says that
the "high character claimed for Pontiac cannot be established." "He
can be looked upon in higher light, than the instrument of the French
officials and traders." On page 6 he declares that "there is no
evidence to establish him as the central figure organizing this hostile
feeling."

[22] Gage to Halifax, July 15, 1764, Bancroft Coll., Eng. & Am.,
1764-1765. Winsor, _Miss. Basin_, 444, 456. Winsor, _Narr. & Crit.
Hist. of Am._ VI, 702.

[23] Beer, _British Col. Policy_, 263. Kingsford, _Hist. of Can._, V,
68.

[24] Winsor, _Miss. Basin_, 633. Ogg, _Opening of Miss._, 301.

[25] Bouquet to Amherst, Dec. 1, 1763, Can. Arch., Ser. A, Vol. IV, p
413. Gage to Bouquet, Dec. 22, 1763, Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 341.

[26] Lt. Col. Robertson to Gage, March 8, 1764, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am.,
1764-1765, De Villers, _Les dernièrs Années de la Louisiana_, 180.

[27] Robertson to Gage, Mar. 8, 1764.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Loftus to Gage, April 9, 1764, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.
Gage to Halifax, May 21, 1764, Ibid. Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_,
88, 283, 285. Kingsford, _Hist. of Can._, V, 69-74. Winsor, _Narr. and
Crit. Hist. of Am._, VI, 701, 702, Gayarre, _Louisiana_, II, 102-103.

[30] Loftus to Gage, April 9, 1764, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.
De Villers, _Les dernières Années de la Louisiana_, 182-184.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Robertson to Gage, Mar. 8, 1764, Ibid. "Account of what happened
when the English attempted to take possession of Illinois by way of
the Mississippi," from Paris documents, Can. Arch. Report, 1905, I,
407-411. Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 284, note 1, containing
a letter from Gage thanking D' Abadie for his efforts in behalf of the
English.

[33] Extract from the correspondence of D' Abadie with the French
commandants, Jan., 1764. _Can. Arch. Report_, 1905, I, 471. Parkman,
who made a careful study of the correspondence in the French archives,
came to the conclusion that the French officials may be exonerated.
Winsor holds a similar view in his _Mississippi Basin_, 452. See also
Cayarre, _Louisiana_, II, 101. Kingford, in his _Hist, of Can._, V,
69-74, places no dependence in D' Abadie's statements. On the other
hand he bases most of his argument upon a letter of Loftus which he
quotes at length, but gives no hint as to its location, date, &c. It is
evidently not the letter written to Gage, which is quoted above.

[34] Loftus to Gage, April 9th, 1764, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.

[35] Gage to Halifax, April 14th, 1764, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII, 619.

[36] This has reference to those tribes along the Mississippi River who
were in direct communication with Pontiac and the French. The great
Cherokee and Chicksaw nations were favorable to the English.

[37] Gage to Bouquet, May 21, 1764, Can. Arch., Ser. A, Vol. 8, p 393.
Gage to Halifax, May 2d, 1764, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765. Gage
to Haldimand, May 27, 1764, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 21, 662. Gage to
Halifax, July 13, 1764, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.

[38] Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, Winsor, _Miss. Basin_, 454.

[39] St. Ange to D' Abadie, Aug. 16, 1764, _Can. Arch. Report_, 1905,
I, 471. Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 279-280.

[40] The original journal kept by Morris during his journey is
reprinted in Thwaites, _Early Western Travels_, I, 198-208. There is
also a biographical sketch in the same volume. Correspondence relating
to the Morris mission is to be found in the Bouquet Collection, Can.
Arch., Ser. A, Vol. 8, pp 475-491. For a good account of the incident,
see Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 198-208, and Kingsford,
_Hist. of Canada_, V, 8.

[41] This incident illustrates the practical failure of Bradstreet's
campaign against the Indians in the Lake region. While he retook the
posts, his terms were so easy that the Indians were not in the least
awed by the proximity of his army.

[42] Thwaites, _Early Western Travels_, I, 305.

[43] Ross to Farmer, Feb. 21, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.
Gage to Halifax, Aug. 10, 1765, Ibid.

[44] Ross to Farmer, May 25, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.
H. Gordon to Johnson, Aug. 10, 1765, Johnson MSS, Vol. XI, No. 73.

[45] Ross to Farmer, May 25, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid. Copy of Council held at the Illinois in April, 1765, Home
Office Papers, Dom., Geo. III, Vol. 3, No. 4(1). Public Rec. Office.
Copy of minutes of Council, April 4, 1765, in _Can. Arch. Report_,
1905, I, 473. See also De Villiers, _Les dernières Années de la
Louisiana_, p. 220.

[49] Ross to Farmer, May 25, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.

[50] Johnson to Gage, June 9, 1764, Johnson MSS, Vol. XIX, No. 111.
Johnson to Lords of Trade, Dec 26, 1764, N. Y. Col. Docs., VII, 689.
Bouquet to Gage, Jan. 5, 1765, Can. Arch., Ser. A, Vol. VII, p 111.
Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 291-292. Winsor, _Narr. & Crit.
Hist, of Am._, VI, 702. Croghan is one of the most interesting figures
of the period. He had entire charge, as Sir William Johnson's deputy,
of the Indians in the Ohio river region and was thoroughly conversant
with western affairs. For biographical sketch see Thwaites, _Early
Western Travels_, I, 47-52, or _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII.

[51] Gage to Bouquet, Dec. 24, 1764, Can. Arch., Ser. A, Vol. VIII,
p 499. Ibid., Dec. 30, 1764, Ibid. This distinction is not generally
made. Writers have usually inferred that Fraser simply accompanied
Croghan in an unofficial capacity. See, however, Winsor, _Miss. Basin_,
456. Ogg, in _Opening of the Mississippi_, 310, places Fraser's journey
a year previous to Croghan's, which is obviously an error.

[52] Gage to Johnson, Feb. 2, 1765, Parkman Coll., Pontiac:—Miscell.,
1765-1778.

[53] Jos. Calloway to B. Franklin, Jan. 23, 1765, Sparks MSS, XVI, 54,
55.

[54] Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 292.

[55] The frontiersmen could not understand the significance of giving
valuable presents to the Indians.

[56] Johnson to Lords of Trade, May 24, 1765, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII,
716. Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 292-297.

[57] Johnson to Lords of Trade, May 24, 1765, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII.
716.

[58] Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 297.

[59] Johnson to Lords of Trade, Jan. 16, 1765, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII,
694.

[60] Croghan's Journal of his transactions, from Feb. 28 to May 12,
1765, MS in Parkman Collection. Johnson to Burton, June 6, 1765,
Johnson MSS, X, No. 263.

[61] Croghan's Journal of his transactions, from Feb. 28 to May 12,
1765, MS in Parkman Collection.

[62] Maisonville, a Frenchman, and one Andrew, an interpreter were
among the whites. Shawnee and Seneca Indians also accompanied the
party. Note the error in Kingsford, _Hist. of Can._, V, 116, wherein
Sinnot is said to have accompanied Fraser. Sinnot had been sent about
the same time from the south by Indian agent Stuart. On arriving at
the Illinois his goods were plundered and he was finally forced to
flee to New Orleans. Johnson to Lords of Trade, Sept. 28, 1765, _N. Y.
Col. Docs._, VII, 765. Ibid., Nov. 16, 1765, Ibid., p 776. Apparently
Sinnott must have arrived at Illinois after Fraser's departure for
New Orleans, since Croghan implies that the former was still at Fort
Chartres while he was a captive at Vincennes. See Croghan's Journal as
printed in the _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII, 780.

[63] Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 300.

[64] Fraser to Gage, May 15, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.
Fraser to Crawford, May 20, 1765, _Mich. Pion. Colls._, X, 216-218.
Fraser to Gage, May 26, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765. Gage
to Johnson, Aug. 12, 1765, Parkman Coll., Pontiac, Miscell., 1765-1778.

[65] Fraser to Gage, June 16, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.
Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 302. De Villiers, _Les dernières
Années de la Louisiana Française_, 220-221. Reports were current in
the East that Fraser and his party had been killed by the Indians. See
Gage to Johnson, June 17, 1765, Myers Coll., N. Y. Pub. Lib. Johnson to
Lords of Trade, July, 1765, Johnson MSS, Vol. XI, No. 43. One of the
party, Maisonville, remained in the Illinois. Thwaites, _Early Western
Travels_, I, 146.

[66] Fraser to Campbell, May 20, 1765, _Mich. Pioneer Colls._, X,
216-218.

[67] St Ange to D' Abadie, _Can. Arch. Report_, 1905, I, 471.

[68] A party of traders under the leadership of one Crawford preceeded
Croghan. They were, however, cut off before reaching the Illinois.
Shuchburgh to Johnson, July 25, 1765, Johnson MSS, Vol. XI, No. 56.

[69] Thwaites, _Early Western Travels_, I, 131. Parkman, _Conspiracy of
Pontiac_, II, 304. The chief sources of information for this journey
are Croghan's Journals, most of which have been printed in Thwaites,
_Early Western Travels_, I, 126-166. For secondary accounts see,
Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 304-315. Kingsfords, _Hist. of
Can._, V, 116-120. Winsor, _Narr. & Crit. Hist. of Am._, VI, 704.
Ibid., _Miss. Basin_, 456-457.

[70] Thwaites, _Early Western Travels_, I, 131. Gage to Conway, Sept.
23, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765. Parkman, _Conspiracy of
Pontiac_, II, 304.

[71] Thwaites, _Early Western Travels_, I, 139.

[72] Croghan to Murray, July 12, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am.,
1764-1765. Gage to Conway, Sept. 23, 1765, Ibid.

[73] Croghan to Murray, July 12, 1765, Ibid. Thwaites, _Early Western
Travels_, I, 146.

[74] Croghan to Murray, July 12, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am.,
1764-1765. Thwaites, _Early Western Travels_, I, 144-145. Johnson to
Lords of Trade, July, 1765, Johnson MSS, Vol. XI, No. 43.

[75] Thwaites, _Early Western Travels_, I, 145-146.

[76] Ibid. Jas. Macdonald to Johnson, July 24, 1765, Johnson MSS, Vol.
XI, No. 50. Thos. Hutchins to Johnson, Aug. 13, 1765, Johnson MSS, Vol.
XI, No. 97. Gage to Conway, Sept. 23, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am.,
1764-1765.

[77] Thwaites, _Early Western Travels_, I, 154-166. Johnson to Wallace,
Sept. 18, 1765, Johnson MSS, Vol. XI, No. 56. Gage to Conway, Sept. 25,
1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am,, 1764-1765. Johnson to Lords of Trade,
Sept. 28, 1765, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII, 766. Gage to Conway, Nov. 9,
1765. Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.

[78] Gage to Conway, Sept. 23, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.
Johnson to Wallace, Sept. 18, 1765, Johnson MSS, Vol. XI, No. 56.
Johnson to Lords of Trade, Sept. 28, 1765, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII, 766.

[79] Gage to Conway, Sept. 23, 1765, Ban. Coll., Eng. & Am., 1764-1765.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Stirling to Gage, Oct. 18, 1765, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. Ind.
Vol. 122.

[82] Sterling to Gage, Oct. 18, 1765, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. Ind.
Vol. 122.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid. Sterling asserts that although Croghan claimed to have made
a peace with all the Illinois chiefs, he is assured that not one was
present at the peace conference in Ouiatanon, and that his own sudden
appearance at the village was the real cause of his success. Sir
William Johnson, in a letter to Croghan, Feb. 21, 1766, (Johnson MSS,
Vol. XII, No. 60.) casts doubt upon the representation of Sterling.
He says that it is easy to account for his motives, and that he has
written Gen. Gage fully upon the subject. The letter referred to has
probably been destroyed; at any rate it is not in any of the large
collections.

[86] Sterling to Gage, Oct. 18, 1765, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. Ind.,
Vol. 122. Eidington to ——, Oct. 17, 1765, Catham Papers, Vol. 97,
Pub. Rec. Office. Gage to Johnson, Dec. 30, 1765, MS letter in Pa.
Hist. Soc. Lib. Gage to Barrington, Jan. 8, 1766, Pub. Rec. Office,
A. & W. Ind., Vol. 122. Gage to Conway, Jan. 16, 1766, Ibid. Johnson
to Lords of Trade, Jan. 31, 1766, _N. Y. Col. Docs._., X, 1161 ff.
Capt. Sterling relates in his letter to Gage that he had considerable
difficulty in persuading St. Ange to surrender his ammunition and
artillery stores. The latter claimed he had positive orders to
surrender only the fort and a few pieces of artillery.

As to the time of Sterling's arrival, Parkman, II, 314, says he arrived
in the early part of winter, while Nicollet, in his sketch of St.
Louis, states that the fort was reached in mid-summer. From the above
references, there can be no doubt as to the exact date.

[87] Text of the Proclamation in _Can. Arch. Report_, 1906, pp 119-123.
For discussion as to the origin of the various clauses, see Alvord,
_Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763_, in _Mich. Pion. & Hist. Coll._

[88] Egremont to Lords of Trade, July 14, 1763. _Can. Arch. Report_,
1906, p 108.

[89] Egremont to Lords of Trade, Aug. 5, 1763, C. A. Rep., 1906, pp
110-111.

[90] "We would humbly propose, that a Commission under the Great
Seal, for the Government of this Country, should be given to the
Commander-in-chief of Your Majesty's Troops for the time being adapted
to the Protection of the Indians and the Fur Trade of Your Majesty's
subjects." Ibid., p 111.

[91] They could not have been ignorant of the existence of such
colonies in the ceded territory, for Sir William Johnson, who was
familiar with western conditions, was in constant correspondence with
the ministry, and such works as the _Histoire de Louisiana_ by Du
Pratz, published in 1758, were doubtless familiar to English statesmen.

[92] See post Ch. V.

[93] Dartmouth to Cramahé, Can. Arch. Ser. Q., Vol. IX, p 157.

[94] See post Ch. V.

[95] It is very curious that no reference occurs in Art. XV of the
Plan, which dealt with civil matters. "That for the maintaining peace
and good Order in the Indian Country, and bringing Offenders in
criminal Cases to due Punishment, the said Agents or Superintendents,
as also the Commissaries at each Post, and in the Country belonging
to each Tribe, be empowered to act as Justices of the Peace in their
respective Districts and Departments, with all powers and privileges
vested in such Officers in any of the Colonies; and also full power of
Committing Offenders in Capital Cases, in order that such Offenders may
be prosecuted for the same; And that, for deciding all civil actions,
the Commissaries be empowered to try and determine in a Summary way
all such Actions, as well between the Indians and Traders, as between
one Trader and another, to the amount of Ten Pound Sterling, with the
Liberty of Appeal to the Chief Agent or Superintendant, or his Deputy,
who shall be empowered upon such appeal to give Judgement thereon;
which Judgement shall be final, and process issued upon it, in like
manner as on the Judgement of any Court of Common Pleas established in
any of the Colonies."

[96] Brown, _Hist. of Ill._, 212-213. See post Ch. VII.

[97] Gage to Sec. Conway, March 28, 1766. B. T. Papers, Vol. XX, Pa.
Hist. Soc. Lib.

[98] Gage to Johnson, Jan. 24, 1767, Johnson MSS, XIV, No. 28.

[99] See post Ch. IV.

[100] Review of the Trade and Affairs of the Indians in the Northern
District of America, _ N. Y. Col. Docs._, Vol. VII, 964.

[101] Gage to Hillsborough, Aug. 6, 1771, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
Vol. 128. Two years before he had written: "Two persons are confined
in Fort Chartres for murther, and the Colonel (Wilkins) proposes to
send them to Philadelphia, about fifteen hundred miles, to take their
Tryall." Gage to Hillsborough, Oct. 7, 1769, Pub. Rec. Office, A. W.
I., Vol. 125.

[102] Hillsborough to Gage, Dec. 9, 1769, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
Vol. 124.

[103] "The situation and particular circumstances of the Ilinois (sic)
Country, and the use, if that Country is maintained, if guarding the
Ohio and Ilinois Rivers at or near their junctions with the Mississippi
has been set forth to your Lordship in my letter of the 22d of Feb.
last. It is upon that plan the Regiment is posted in the Disposition
in the Ilinois Country." Gage to Shelburne, April 3, 1767, Pub. Rec.
Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 123.

[104] Blackstone, _Commentaries_, (3d ed., Cooley) _Introduction_, sec.
4, 107.

[105] Text of the decision in _Can. Arch. Report_, 1906, pp 366-370.

[106] Other important leading cases, such as Calvin's case in 1607
and the case of Blanckard vs Galdy in the 18th century, involving
the status of Jamaica, have the same bearing. See Sioussat, English
Statutes in Maryland, J. H. U. Studies, XXI, 481-487.

[107] _Can. Arch. Report_, 1906, 120-121.

[108] _Franklin's Works_, (Sparks Ed.) IV, 303-323. "I conceive that
to procure all the commerce it will afford and at as little expense to
ourselves as we can is the only object we should have in view in the
interior Country for a century to come." Gage to Hillsborough, Nov. 10,
1770, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 126. It may be noted, however,
that some members of the government had serious doubts as to this
policy. Such men as Shelburne favored an early opening of the country
to colonization.

[109] Alvord, _Gen. of the Proc. of 1763_, _Mich. Pion. & Hist. Coll._,
Vol.

[110] Alvord, _Gen. of Proc. of 1763_, _Mich. Pion. & Hist. Coll._

[111] _Can. Arch. Report_, 1906, p 122.

[112] See supra ch. III.

[113] _Can. Arch. Report_ 1904, pp 242-246. The plan is here presented
in full.

[114] _Franklin's Works_, V, 38. Coffin, _Quebec Act and the American
Revolution_, p 415, quoting from Knox, _Justice and Policy of the
Quebec Act_, London, 1774.

[115] The failure to successfully carry out this plan would of course
leave the country a dead weight on the empire.

[116] Johnson MSS, Vol. X, No. 190.

[117] Morgan notes something more than mere mention, since he plays an
important role in the affairs of the Illinois country from 1765-1771.
He was born in Philadelphia in 1741 and was educated at Princeton
college. Through the influence of his father-in-law, James Baynton, he
was admitted to the firm of Baynton and Wharton and in 1765 became the
western representative of the firm. After his experiences in Illinois,
Morgan served the Revolutionary cause in the capacity of Indian agent.
He died in 1810. See _Biography of Col. George Morgan_, by Julia Morgan
Harding, in the _Washington (Pa.) Observer_, May 21, 1904.

[118] This company had traded extensively among the Indians on the
Penn. border prior to 1765. During the Indian wars the firm lost
heavily and it was in an attempt to retrieve its fortune that a branch
house was established in the Illinois Country.

[119] Morgan's MS Letter Book.

[120] Morgan's MS Letter Book.

[121] Five batteaus loaded with goods under the command of John
Jennings, sailed from Fort Pitt, March 9, 1765. Joseph Dobson to
Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, March 9, 1765, MS letter, Pa. Hist. Soc.
Lib.

[122] Morgan's MS Letter Book.

[123] Ibid.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Gage wrote in 1770 that the "Company from Philadelphia
(Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan) failed in the Ilinois trade." Gage to
Hillsborough, Dec. 7, 1770, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 128.

[127] See Ch. II for references.

[128] Johnson to Hillsborough, Aug. 14, 1770, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VIII,
224. See extract from "Ponteach or the Savages of North America: A
Tragedy," in Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, II, 344 ff.

[129] Johnson to Hillsborough, Aug. 14, 1770, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VIII,
224.

[130] Johnson to Hillsborough, Aug. 14, 1770, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VIII,
292.

[131] Johnson to Lords of Trade, Sept. 1767, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VII,
964-965.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Ibid.

[135] The British were not so well situated to command the trade as the
French had been. The Illinois post had always been the center for the
trade of the Missouri river region, but after the cession of Illinois
to England and the Foundation of St. Louis by La Clede in 1764, the
latter place became the centre for the trade of that region.

[136] Information of the State of Commerce given by Capt. Forbes, 1768,
Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 125.

[137] Gordon's Journal down the Ohio, 1766, MS in Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib.
Phym to Johnson, April 15, 1768, Johnson MSS, Vol. 25, No. 109.

[138] Gage to Hillsborough, April 24, 1768, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W.
I., Vol. 124 Gage to Shelburne, April 24, 1768, Pub. Rec. Office, A. &
W. I., Vol. 124.

[139] Gage to Hillsborough, Nov. 10, 1770, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W.
I., Vol. 126 Huchin's Remarks upon the Illinois country, 1771, MS in
Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib. It may be noted also that during the French regime
the French-Canadians traded extensively in this region. See Gage's
Report on the State of the Government of Montreal.

[140] Wilkins to Barrington, Dec. 5, 1769, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W.
I., Vol. 124.

[141] Johnson to Carleton, Jan. 27, 1767, C.A., Ser. Q, Vol. IV, p 115.

[142] Johnson to Hillsborough, Feb. 18, 1771, _N. Y. Col. Docs._, VIII,
263.

[143] Gage to Hillsborough, Apr. 24, 1768, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W.
I., Vol. 124.

[144] Order for O'Reilly, Jan. 27, 1770, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
Vol. 126.

[145] Information of the State of Commerce, in the Illinois Country,
given by Captain Forbes, 1768, Pub. Rec. Office, Vol. 125. Morgan's MS
Letter Book.

[146] Gage to Hillsborough, Nov. 10, 1770, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W.
I., Vol. 126.

[147] Gage to Shelburne, Jan. 17, 1767, B. T. Papers, Vol. 27, Pa.
Hist. Soc. Lib.

[148] Gage to Shelburne, Dec. 23, 1766, B. T. Papers, Vol. 27, Pa.
Hist. Soc. Lib. Johnson to Gage, Jan. 29, 1767, Johnson MSS, Vol. XIV,
No. 35. Gage to Shelburne, Feb. 22, 1767, B. T. Papers, Vol. XXII, Pa.
Hist. Soc. Lib. Gage to Johnson, Jan. 25, 1767, Johnson MSS, Vol. XIV,
No. 28. George Phym to Johnson, Apr. 15, 1768, Johnson MSS, Vol. XXV,
No. 109. Gage to Dartmouth, May 5, 1773, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
Vol. 128. Gage wrote in 1766 that skins and furs bore a price of ten
pence per pound higher at New Orleans than at any British market. Gage
to Conway, July 15, 1766, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 122.

[149] Gage to Conway, July 15, 1766, Pub. Rec. Office, A. &W. I., Vol.
122.

[150] Gage to Shelburne, Dec. 23, 1766, B. T. Papers, Vol. XXVII, Pa.
Hist. Lib.

[151] Ibid., Feb. 22, 1767, B. T. Papers, Vol. XXII, Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib.

[152] Gage to Shelburne, Feb. 22, 1767, B. T. Papers, Vol. XXII, Pa.
Hist. Soc. Lib.

[153] Ibid., "As long as Skinns and Furrs bear a high price at New
Orleans they will never be brought to a British Market. The Indian
Trade in general from the observations I have made, will always go
with the stream, and the whole will either go down the St. Lawrence
or Mississippi Rivers." Gage to Johnson, Jan. 25, 1767, Johnson MSS,
XIV, No. 28. "I am entirely of your opinion concerning the Trade, &c
by way of the Mississippi whilst the Traders find better markets at
New Orleans." Johnson to Gage, Jan. 29, 1767, Johnson MSS, Vol. XIV,
No. 35. Also Johnson to Gage, Feb. 24, 1767, Johnson MSS, XIV, No. 67.
"So long as New Orleans is in the hands of another power, the whole
produce of the western country must center there. For our merchants
will always dispose of their peltry or whatever the country produces,
at New Orleans where they get as good a price as if they were to ship
them off." Phym to Johnson, Mobile, April 15, 1768, Johnson MSS, Vol.
XXV, No. 109. "The Traders from these Colonies say it will answer to
carry Goods down the Ohio, but that it will not answer to return with
their Peltry by the same route, as they can get to Sea at so much less
expense, & greater expedition by means of Rapidity of the Mississippi,
and pretend that they have Ships at New Orleans to transport their
Peltry to England." Gage to Shelburne, Jan. 17, 1767, B. T. Papers,
Vol. XXVII, Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib. "The Peltry gained by the Traders
from Canada, whether on the Mississippi or on the Ouabache we may be
satisfied generally goes down the St. Lawrence River to Quebec: it has
been the usual track of those Traders from the beginning, & there is
no reason to suspect the contrary now. But the British Traders at the
Ilinois who carry their Goods above three hundred miles by land before
they have the convenience of Water or Carriage cannot afford to return
the same way, with the produce of their Trade." Gage to Hillsborough,
Nov. 10, 1770, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 126. That this state
of affairs continued through most of the period is evident from the
following: "The Trade of the Mississippi, except that of the upper
parts from whence a portion may go to Quebec, goes down that River; and
has, as well as everything we have done on the Mississippi, as far as
I have been able to discover tended more to the Benefit of New Orleans
than of ourselves. And I conceive it must be the case, as long as the
Commodities of the Mississippi bear a better price at New Orleans
than at a British Market." Gage to Dartmouth, May, 5, 1773, Pub. Rec.
Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 128.

[154] It is necessary to ascertain the cost of maintaining the military
establishments and the Indian department in the West, and the amount of
peltries imported into England. I already have some figures on this but
not enough upon which to base any statement.

[155] Beer, _British Colonial Policy_, 222.

[156] Hutchins, Remarks on the Country of the Illinois, MS in Pa. Hist.
Soc. Lib. Hutchins gives an account of the exports from Illinois from
Sept. 1769 to Sept. 1770. In that year 550 packs of peltries were sent
from Illinois, while from the Spanish side 835 packs were exported.
Wilkins, the commandant at Fort Chartres at this time, makes a somewhat
higher estimate, but the two agree in essentials.

[157] Gage estimated it at 80,000 pounds sterling. Gage to Shelburne,
Jan. 17, 1767. B. T. Papers, Vol. XXVII. Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib. "New
Orleans remits one hundred thousand pounds Sterling worth of Peltry
annually for France." Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to McLeane, Oct. 9,
1767, B. T. Papers, Vol. XXVI, Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib.

[158] Gage to Johnson, Jan. 19, 1767, Johnson MSS, Vol. XIV, No. 23,
Captain Forbes, commandant at Fort Chartres during part of 1768, wrote
to Gage: "As I am very sensible of the immense expence this Country is
to the Crown & the little advantage the Public has hitherto reaped by
the trade with the savages, & the reason is that the inhabitants have
continued to send their Peltry to New Orleans which is shipped from
thence to Old France & all the money that is laid out for the Troops
and Savages is immediately sent to New Orleans, for which our Subjects
get French Manufactures. I hope, Sir, you will excuse me when I observe
to Your Excellency, that the Crown of Great Britain is at all the
expence & that France reaps the advantages." Forbes to Gage, April 15,
1768, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 124. Commandant Wilkins wrote
the same year, "the French of New Orleans are the sole gainers in this
Trade and the public suffer greatly thereby." Wilkins to Gage, Sept.
13, 1768, Pub. Rec. Office.

[159] Hillsborough to Gage, July 31, 1770, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W.
I., Vol. 126.

[160] Gage to Shelburne, April 3, 1767, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
Vol. 123.

[161] Gage to Johnson, Feb, 8, 1767, Johnson MSS, Vol. XIV, No. 44.

[162] "It has not the least command of the River, owing to an Island
which lies exactly opposite to it, & the Channel is entirely on the
other side for a great part of the year. This is impassable from a
sand bar which runs across even for small boats, & the French & their
contraband goods, forcing an illicit Trade, to our great disadvantage &
a certain and very considerable loss to his Majesty's Revenue." Wilkins
to Barrington, Dec. 5, 1767, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 123.

[163] Gordon's Journal, 1766, MS in Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib. Gage to
Johnson, Feb. 8, 1767, Johnson MSS, XIV, No. 44. Hillsborough to Gage,
July 31, 1770, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 126.

[164] Gage to Hillsborough, Jan. 16, 1768, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W.
I., Vol 124.

[165] Gage to Shelburne, April 3, 1767, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
Vol. 123. Johnson to Lords of Trade, Sept. 1767, N. Y. Col. Docs. Vol.
VII, 974.

[166] Gage to Conway, July 15, 1766, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I. Vol.
122. Gordon's Journal down the Ohio, 1766, MS in Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib.
Gage to Johnson, Jan. 25, 1767, Johnson MSS, XIV, No. 28. Ibid., Feb.
8, 1767, Johnson MSS, XIV, No. 44. Gage to Shelburne, Jan. 17, 1767,
B. T. Papers, Vol. XXVII, Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib. Gage to Shelburne, April
3, 1767, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 123. Johnson to Lords of
Trade, Sept. 1767, N. Y. Col. Docs., VII, 974. Phym to Johnson, April
15, 1768, Johnson MSS, XXV, No. 109. Wilkins to Gage, Sept. 13, 1768,
Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 125. Wilkins to Harrington, Dec. 5,
1769, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 123. Gage to Hillsborough,
Nov. 10, 1772, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 126.

[167] Gordon's Journal down the Ohio, 1766, MS in Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib.

[168] Gage to Hillsborough, June 16, 1768, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W.
I., Vol. 124.

[169] Hillsborough to Gage, July 31, 1770, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W.
I., Vol. 126.

[170] Alden, _Governments West of the Alleghanies before 1789_, pp No
attempt is made in my study to add any new contribution to the period
preceding 1763.

[171] Ibid., 7-11.

[172] Original Articles of Agreement of the Mississippi Co. Chatham
Papers, Vol. 97, Pub. Rec. Office. Another copy, in the handwriting
of Washington, is in the Lib. of Congress. No mention is made in the
original articles relative to the exact location of the proposed
colony. Most of the information concerning the project comes from a
collection of papers relating to the company, in the handwriting of
William Lee, which I found in a miscellaneous collection of the Earl of
Chatham's papers, in the Pub. Rec. Office.

[173] Some of the original members of the company were George, Samuel
and John Washington, and several of the Lees and Fitzhughs. There were
38 charter members, but provision was made for 50.

[174] Articles of Agreement, Chatham Papers, Vol. 97. Each member was
to have fifty thousand acres. Ibid.

[175] Memorial to the crown, prepared at a meeting of the company at
Belleview, Va., Sept. 9, 1763.

[176] Ibid. Articles of Agreement.

[177] Tennessee River.

[178] Memorial to the crown, Sept. 9, 1763. Four years later this
suggestion was withdrawn at the suggestion of their London agent,
Thomas Cumming. Letter to Cumming, March 1, 1767. Catham Papers, Vol.
97. Some of the members declared their determination to become early
settlers in the new colony. Memorial to the crown, Sept. 9, 1763.
Petition to the crown, Dec. 16th, 1768, Butler, _Hist. of Ky._, 381-383.

[179] Memorial to the crown, Sept. 9th, 1763, Chatham Papers, Vol. 97.

[180] Ibid.

[181] Letter of the company to Thomas Cumming, Sept. 26th, 1763.

[182] Can. Arch., _Report for 1906_, p 122. See ch. III.

[183] Ibid.

[184] "I can never look upon that proclamation in any other light (but
this I say between ourselves), than as a temporary expedient to quiet
the minde of the Indians, and must fall, of course, in a few years,
especially when those Indians are consenting to our occupying the
lands." Washington to Crawford, Sept. 21, 1767. Writings of Washington,
II, 220-221. (Ford ed.)

[185] Letter of William Lee, London, May 30, 1769, Chatham Papers, Vol.
97.

[186] I have found no account of any further activity on the part of
the company. In 1774 a copy of the correspondence was sent to the Earl
of Chatham, which may have been done in the hope that his interest
might be aroused in the undertaking. The bundle of papers contains the
following indorsement: "Mississippi Cos. papers, sent to the Right
Honble William Earl of Chatham, on Saturday the 20th of April 1774."
Charles Lee, in speaking of this undertaking, said: "Another society
solicited for lands on the lower part of the Illinois, Ohio or on the
Mississippi: this was likewise rejected; but from what motives it is
impossible to define, unless they suppose that soldiers invested with a
little landed property, would not be so readily induced to act as the
instruments of the oppression of their fellow subjects, as those whose
views are solely turned, if not reduced, to farther promotion; and if
reduced, to full pay." The Lee Papers, N. Y. Hist. Soc. Colls., VII, 98.

[187] The Charles Lee of Revolutionary fame.

[188] Lee Papers, _N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll._, VII, 214. Sparks, Life of
Lee, Sparks Bio. Ser., IV, 19.

[189] Lee Papers, VII, 214.

[190] Ibid.

[191] Ibid.

[192] Ibid.

[193] Croghan to Johnson, Mar. 30, 1766, Johnson MSS, XII, No. 127

[194] Alden, New Government West of the Alleghanies before 1780, p 12.
Mr. Alden notes a pamphlet published in London entitled "Advantages
of a Settlement upon the Ohio in North America," and another pamphlet
issued at Edinburgh in 1763 entitled "Expediency of Securing our
American Colonies." In the same connection the following is of
interest: "As the happy possession of the Illinois Country is the
Subject of much conversation, both in England & America, we beg leave
to inclose,—a small pamphlet, wrote lately on a very interesting
point—towit, The Establishment of a Civil Government there: The Author,
has borrowed some of his Sentiments from Monsr. De Prats." Baynton,
Wharton, & Morgan to Johnson, Mar. 30, 1766, Johnson MSS, Vol. XII, No.
128.

[195] George Croghan who was in London in 1764 wrote: "There is a talk
of setleing a Colony from the mouth of the Ohio to the Ilinois, which
I am tould Lord Halifax will Desier my opinion of in a few Days. Mr.
pownal tould me yesterday that I would be soon sent for attend the
board of Trade. what Meshures they will Take Lord knows but nothing is
talkt of but Oconomy," Crogan to Johnson. Mar. 10, 1764, Johnson MSS,
VIII.

[196] N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 605. As appears from the above note Croghan
was to have been summoned before the Board of Trade to answer questions
relative to a new colony. Whether he was finally called upon for his
testimony is not known.

[197] Later, however, he adopted this idea. Croghan to Johnson, March
30, 1766, Vol. XII, No. 127.

[198] Johnson to Lords of Trade, Jan. 31, 1766, N.Y. Col. Docs., VII,
809. When Croghan was preparing to go to the Illinois in 1766 in order
to pacify the Indians, Johnson wrote him as follows: "As soon as I hear
farther from the General I shall write you and send the Instructions
in which I shall insert an Article directing you to enquire into the
French bounds & Property at the Illinois. I have no objection to what
you propose on that subject there, and as the French are now said to be
retiring fast, you will have the better opportunity of making a good
Choice on which the value will chiefly depend." Johnson to Croghan,
Mar. 28, 1786, Johnson MSS, XII, 126.

[199] Gage to Conway, Mar. 28, 1766, B. T. Papers, Vol. XX. Pa. His.
Soc. Lib. He explained further "that Lands should be granted without
delay, by any Person authorized properly to do it; but no Fees are to
be taken by the Person who grants, or by Secretarys, Clerks, Surveyors,
or other Persons whatever; that no large tracts should be given, but
the Lands granted in Farms, consisting of an Hundred & Fifty or Two
Hundred Acres of good Land, unless to Half Pay Officers, who might have
Four or Five Hundred Acres. People may be tempted on these Advantages
to transport themselves with a Year's Provisions, Seed, Corn and Tools
for Husbandry, down the Ohio. The Lands shall be held of the King on
condition of Military Service, & such other obligations as shall be
convenient." To anticipate somewhat, the details thus outlined by Gage
are in striking contrast to those proposed by the active promoters of
the colony.

[200] Croghan to Johnson, Mar. 30, 1766. Johnson MSS, XII, No. 127.

[201] Articles of Agreement, MS copy in Pa. His. Soc. Lib. The signers
of the original draught were: William Franklin, Sir William Johnson per
George Croghan, George Croghan, John Baynton, Samuel Wharton, George
Morgan, Joseph Wharton, Sr., Joseph Wharton, Joseph Hughes and Joseph
Galloway. Gage declined being concerned in the project, although his
attitude doubtless contributed something towards it. Johnson to Gov.
Franklin, June 20, 1766, MS letter in AM. Antiq. Soc. Lib.

[202] William Franklin to B. Franklin, Apr. 30, 1766, Printed in
Bigelow's Life of Franklin, 538, "Inclosed is the proposals Drawn up
by governor franklin for yr honours perusal and such Amendments or
Alterations as you may judge necessary," Croghan to Johnson, March 30,
1766, Johnson MSS, XII, No, 127.

[203] Articles of Agreement, Penn. Hist. Soc. Lib. This was a new
contribution to the original plans of Croghan, Johnson, and Gage. It
was probably Franklin's own suggestion, as we have seen that he himself
drew up the sketch.

[204] Articles of Agreement. Croghan writing to Johnson said: "itt is
likewise preposed to aply for a Grant of 1200,000 Acres to the crown
in that Country and to take into this Grant two or three Gentlemen
of fortune and Influence in England and Governor franklin and those
other Gentlemen desire to know whome your honour would chouse to be
concerned, & that you wold write to them if you should nott name ye
whole you wold chouse they Designe to Save y. Nomination of such as you
dont to Dr. franklin who they prepose to send the proposals to he is
much attended to by ye Ministry and certainly can be of Service in this
affair." March 30, 1766, Johnson MSS, XII, No. 127.

[205] Croghan to Johnson, March 30, 1766, Johnson MSS, XII, No. 127.
Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to Johnson, June 6, 1766, Johnson MSS,
Vol. XII, 197.

[206] Croghan to Johnson, Mar. 30, 1766. Johnson to Baynton, Wharton,
and Morgan, June 20, 1766, Johnson MSS, XII, No. 214. Johnson to
William Franklin, July 8, 1766, Johnson Papers, Am. Antiq. Soc. Lib.

[207] Croghan to Johnson, Mar. 30, 1766. Johnson to William Franklin,
June 20, 1766, Johnson Papers, Am. Antiq. Soc. Lib. Johnson to B. W. &
M. June 20, 1766, Johnson MSS, XII, No. 204.

[208] Johnson to Conway, July 10, 1766, B. T. Papers, Pa. Hist. Soc.
Lib.

[209] See letters of Franklin to his son, in Franklin's Works, IV,
136-145.

[210] _Brown, Hist. of Ill._, 212-213.

[211] Can. Arch., _Report, 1907_, p 75.

[212] Brown, _Hist. of Ill._, 213.

[213] Can. Arch., _Report for 1907_, p 75.

[214] Brown, _Hist. of Ill._, 213.

[215] Ibid.

[216] Sterling to Gage, Oct. 18th, 1765, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.
122.

[217] Ibid.

[218] Can. Arch., _Report for 1907_, p 86.

[219] Butler, _Treaty Making Power_, I.

[220] Sterling to Gage, Oct. 18, 1765, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
Vol. 122.

[221] Ibid. Farmer to Gage, Dec. 19, 1765, B. T. Papers, Vol. 20, Penn.
Hist. Soc. Lib.

[222] Petition of inhabitants to Gage, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
Vol. 122. The petition is signed by such prominent men as La Grange,
who acted for a time as civil judge under the British; Rocheblane,
who became the last British commandant in Illinois; Blouin, a wealthy
merchant and later a prominent advocate of a civil government, J. B.
Beanvais, Charleville and others. Gage granted their request without
waiting for an answer from London, thus indorsing the action of his
subordinate. Gage to Conway, Jan. 16, 1766, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W.
I., Vol. 122.

[223] Sterling to Gage, Oct. 18, 1765, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
Vol. 122.

[224] Sterling to Gage, Dec. 15, 1765, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
Vol. 122.

[225] Ibid.

[226] Ibid.

[227] Ibid. Cahokia Records, British Period.

[228] Sterling to Gage, Oct. 18, 1765, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
Vol. 122, N. Y. Col. Docs. X, 1161.

[229] Monette, in Hist. of the Valley of the Mississippi, I, 411,
says that "Capt. Stirling died in December, St. Ange returned to Fort
Chartres, and not long afterward Major Frazer, from Fort Pitt arrived
as commandant." Billou, in Annals of St. Louis, I, p 26, makes the
same assertion. The statement is an error, since Sterling served in
the Revolutionary war, and lived until 1808. Frazer never commanded at
Fort Chartres. See Winsor, Narr. & Crit. Hist. VI, 706. For a sketch
of Sterling's career see N. Y. Col. Docs. N. Y. Col. Docs., VII, 706,
and Dic. of Nat. Biog. Vol.

[230] For sketch of Farmer's life see N. Y. Col. Docs. N. Y. Col.
Docs., VII, 786.

[231] Farmer to Gage, Dec. 15 & 19, 1765, B. T. Papers, Vol. 20, Pa.
Hist. Soc. Lib. Johnson to Lords of Trade, Mar. 22, 1766, N. Y. Col.
Docs. VII, 816. Gage to Conway, Mar. 28, 1766, B. T. Papers, Vol. 20,
Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib. Campbell to Johnson, Mar. 29, 1766, Park. Coll.,
Pontiac, Miscell. 1765-1778. Farmer to Gage, Mar. 11, 1766, Home
Office Papers, Vol. 20, No. 41, Pub. Rec. Office. In the letter just
cited Farmer blames Gov. Johnstone of West Florida for his long delay
in starting for the Illinois and for the scant supply of provisions
he carried. It appears that Farmer had planned to start early in the
spring of 1765, but he alleges that Johnstone questioned his right to
take provisions from the store, and in many other ways delayed his
departure for several weeks.

[232] Sterling to Gage, Oct. 18, 1765, P.R. Office, A. & W. I., Vol.
122.

[233] Letter of Eidington, Oct. 12, 1765, Catham Papers, Pub. Rec.
Office.

[234] Ibid.

[235] Ibid.

[236] Ibid., Stirling to Gage, Oct. 18, 1765, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W.
I., Vol. 122.

[237] Sterling to Gage, Oct. 18, 1765, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I.,
122.

[238] Letter of Eidington, Oct. 12, 1765, Catham Papers, Pub. Rec.
Office, Vol. 122.

[239] Sterling to Gage, Dec. 15, 1765, Chatham Papers, Pub. Rec.
Office, Am. & W. I., Vol. 122.

[240] Fraser to Gage, Dec. 16, 1765, B. T. Papers, Vol. 20, Pa. Hist.
Soc. Lib. Farmer alleged that St. Ange, who acted as commandant at St.
Louis after his retirement from Fort Chartres, instigated many of the
French to cross over, and that other residents of the Spanish side
endeavoured to frighten the inhabitants of Illinois by representing
Major Farmer as a rascal who would deprive them of their former
privileges.

[241] Memorial of the inhabitants to Gage, Oct. 1765, Pub. Rec. Office,
Am. & W. I., Vol. 122. Fraser to Gage, Dec. 16, 1765, B. T. Papers,
Vol. XX, Pa. Hist. Soc. Lib. The movement of the inhabitants across the
river was considerable during the early years of the occupation. In the
summer of 1765, there were approximately 2000 whites on the English
side. Fraser to Gage, May 15, 1765, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol.
122. Three years later, in 1768, the approximate number was 1000. See
for this, State of the Settlements in the Illinois Country, Pub. Rec.
Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 125.

[242] Farmer to Gage, Dec. 16, 1765, B. T. Papers, Vol. 20, Pa. Hist.
Soc. Lib. Ibid., March 19, 1766, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol. 122.

[243] Ibid., Dec. 16 & 19, B. T. Papers, Vol. 20. Farmer had just
received word that Col. Reid was on his way to the Illinois from
Mobile, with about fifty men and just enough provisions for the
journey, he was depending upon receiving further supplies at Fort
Chartres. Ibid.

[244] Farmer to Gage, Dec. 16 & 19, 1765, B. T. Papers Vol. XX, Pa.
Hist. Soc. Lib.

[245] Gage to Conway, June 24, 1766, Pub. Rec. Office, A. & W. I., Vol.
122.

[246] Ibid., July 15, 1766. Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan to Gage, Aug.
10, 1766, Johnson MSS, Vol. XIII, No.30.

[247] See supra ch. IV.

[248] George Morgan's Letter Book. MS copy.

[249] The exact date of the change is not known. The first document
that appears with Reid's signature as commandant is dated Sept. 8th.
Johnson MSS, Vol. XIII, No. 104. Major Farmer was expecting his
successor's arrival some time in July or August. Farmer to Gage, Mar.
9th, 1766, Pub. Rec. Office, Am. & W. I., Vol. 122.



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  │ _like this_.                                                      │
  │                                                                   │
  │ Footnotes were moved to the end of the text and numbered in one   │
  │ continuous sequence.                                              │
  │                                                                   │
  │ Other notes and corrections:                                      │
  │ p. 3: sparceness changed to sparseness. (The sparseness of its    │
  │ population.)                                                      │
  │ p. 10: Boquet changed to Bouquet. (Previous to Bouquet’s second   │
  │ campaign.)                                                        │
  │ p. 19: Missing footnote 56 tag added by the transcriber.          │
  │ p. 20: Sinnot and Sinnot: Variants unchanged.                     │
  │ p. 21: sefuse changed to refuse. (St. Ange continued to refuse.)  │
  │ p. 33: delinquenents unchanged. (A determination to delinquenents │
  │ to punishment.)                                                   │
  │ p. 42: Missing footnote 118 tag added by the transcriber.         │
  │ p. 44: effect changed to affect. (Not only did it affect English  │
  │ traders.)                                                         │
  │ p. 46: Missing footnote 133 tag added by the transcriber.         │
  │ p. 55: Missing footnote 164 tag added by the transcriber.         │
  │ p. 77:  The wealth of colony changed to The wealth of the colony. │
  │ Variants unchanged: Ilinois and Illinois.                         │
  │ p. 38, footnote 109, page 58, footnote 170, and p. 76, footnote   │
  │ 229: Incomplete references, page numbers missing.                 │
  └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘





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