Title: How The Nations Waged War - A companion volume to "How the War Began"
Author: Kennedy, J. M. (John McFarland)
Language: English
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  WAR BOOKS

  HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR



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  HOW THE WAR BEGAN
  By W.L. COURTNEY. LL.D., and J.M. KENNEDY

  THE FLEETS AT WAR
  By ARCHIBALD HURD

  THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN
  By GEORGE HOOPER

  THE CAMPAIGN ROUND LIEGE
  By J.M. KENNEDY

  IN THE FIRING LINE
  By A. ST. JOHN ADCOCK

  GREAT BATTLES OF THE WORLD
  By STEPHEN CRANE
  Author of "The Red Badge of Courage."

  BRITISH REGIMENTS AT THE FRONT
  The story of their Battle Honours.

  THE RED CROSS IN WAR
  By Miss MARY FRANCES BILLINGTON

  FORTY YEARS AFTER
  The Story of the Franco-German War. By H.C. BAILEY.
  With an Introduction by W.L. COURTNEY, LL.D.

  A SCRAP OF PAPER
  The Inner History of German Diplomacy.
  By E.J. DILLON

  HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR
  A companion volume to "How the War Began," telling how the world faced
  Armageddon and how the British Army answered the call to arms.
  By J.M. KENNEDY

  AIR-CRAFT IN WAR
  By S. ERIC BRUCE

  FAMOUS FIGHTS OF INDIAN NATIVE
  REGIMENTS

  THE TRIUMPHANT RETREAT TO PARIS
  THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE

  _OTHER VOLUMES IN PREPARATION_


  PUBLISHED FOR THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
  BY HODDER & STOUGHTON, WARWICK SQUARE,
  LONDON, E.C.



  HOW THE NATIONS
  WAGED WAR

  _A companion Volume to "How the War Began"
  telling how the World faced Armageddon, and how
  the British Empire answered the call to arms_

  BY
  J.M. KENNEDY

  HODDER AND STOUGHTON
  LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
  MCMXIV



CONTENTS


  CHAPTER I

                                                         PAGE

  The "Scrap of Paper"--Sir Edward
  Grey's further Statement--The
  Houses of Parliament and Belgium--Indian
  Troops--The German
  White Book                                               7


  CHAPTER II

  German Press Campaign--Disseminating
  False News--The Secret Press
  Society--Sir E. Goschen's Report--A
  Suppressed Telegram                                     44


  CHAPTER III

  Position of Italy--German Intrigues--The
  Triple Alliance--Turkey's Activity--Plans
  for Attacking Egypt--A
  British Warning                                         78


  CHAPTER IV

  Polish Independence--The Tsar's Rescript--Japanese
  Action--Germany in the Far East--Samoa and Togoland    100


  CHAPTER V

  French Government leaves Paris--Triple
  Entente Declaration--An
  Important French Protest to the
  Powers--Aid from Dominions and
  India--South Africa's Expedition--The
  King's Proclamations                                   121


  CHAPTER VI

  The Economic Position--Moratorium
  Extension--Great Britain's Oversea
  Trade--Germany's Commerce--Question
  of Food Supplies--Importance
  of the Balkans--"Petrograd"                            165



CHAPTER I

 The "Scrap of Paper"--Sir Edward Grey's further Statement--The Houses
 of Parliament and Belgium--Indian Troops--The German White Book.


SINCE the first volume of this series appeared, additional particulars
respecting the diplomatic negotiations preceding the outbreak of war
have been made known; and to these, with some further details which
have not hitherto been sufficiently emphasized, the attention of the
public may now be usefully directed.

On August 27th, the Foreign Office issued an important dispatch
from Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward
Grey, respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German
Government. It is dated London, August 8th, and contains a complete
account of the Ambassador's final interviews with Herr von Jagow, the
German Foreign Minister; with Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary
of State; and with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor.
It was in the course of the interview with the latter that the
Chancellor referred to the Treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of
Belgium, in a phrase which had become notorious, as a "scrap of paper."
The document giving Sir E. Goschen's dispatch is as follows:

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the
4th inst.,[1] I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and
inquired, in the name of his Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial
Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von
Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must
be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the
frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated.
Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government
had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance
into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get
well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive
blow as early as possible.

It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the
more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity
of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through
without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss
of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up
their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great
German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of
troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this _fait accompli_ of
the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily
understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether
there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences,
which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he
had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same
date,[2] and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained,
I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office, and informed the
Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the
assurance by twelve o'clock that night that they would proceed no
further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their
advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the
Imperial Government that his Majesty's Government would have to take
all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and
the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as
themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other
answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that
the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the
Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency
a written summary of your telegram, and, pointing out that you had
mentioned twelve o'clock as the time when his Majesty's Government
would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible
consequence which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at
the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied
that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer
must be the same.

I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This
interview took place at about seven o'clock. In a short conversation
which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the
crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which
had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through
Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden
end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret
and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the
circumstances and in view of our engagements, his Majesty's Government
could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it
might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing
him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His
Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty
minutes. He said that the step taken by his Majesty's Government was
terrible to a degree; just for a word--"neutrality," a word which in
war time had so often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper,
Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired
nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that
direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the
policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession
to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done
was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was
fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain
responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.

I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the
same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for
strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to
advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would
wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life
and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her
solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if
attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence
could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future?
The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been
kept? Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his
Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly
be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his
Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our
action, and so little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from
adding fuel to the flame by further argument.

As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining
Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment
he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our
efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this
was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at
the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and
cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding
our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had
spread, and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if
we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which
unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow workers. He
would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the Embassy, and
drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was
handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before nine p.m. It
was accepted by that office, but apparently never dispatched.[3]

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State,
came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly
official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he
asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a
declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international
law as he was known to be must know as well as or better than I what
was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where
diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war
had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my
instructions, of which I given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that
his Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by
twelve o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer
they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required.
Herr von Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of
war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance
required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr von Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet,
issued by the _Berliner Tageblatt_, was circulated stating that Great
Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this
news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before
his Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent
to guard the Embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the
mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration
as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and
the landing of cobble-stones into the drawing-room where we were
all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I
telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr
von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force
of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the
street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct
unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and
expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that
the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he
had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of
Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not
been authorized by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked
him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be
issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was
in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force
of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the Embassy, as he had
thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract
attention and perhaps lead to disturbances.

It was the "pestilential _Tageblatt_," which had somehow got hold of
the news, and had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that
the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles
thrown from the Embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was
able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever),
and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which
had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry
impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no
apology could have been more full and complete.

Another remarkable passage in the Dispatch is that in which Sir E.
Goschen describes the Kaiser's indignation and his resolve to divest
himself of his English titles:

On the following morning, August 5th, the Emperor sent one of his
Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message: "The Emperor
has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the
occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you
will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his
people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other
nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that
you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British
Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has
occurred he must now at once divest himself of these titles."

This resolve was made known in a manner which indicated that the
attitude of the English Government was keenly felt at Potsdam. "I would
add," remarks the Ambassador, "that the above message lost none of its
acerbity by the manner of its delivery."

The Dispatch continues:

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through
this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow
and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about eleven
o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports--which
I had earlier in the day demanded in writing--and told me that he
had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should
follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that
I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen;
they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route,
only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to
this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no
repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night, as full
precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their
power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather
a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr
von Jagow, couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in
packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong
force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter
Station, while the Embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the
station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever,
and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and
French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on
behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered
for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the
Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier, and was exceedingly
kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds, which thronged the
platforms at every station where we stopped, from insulting us; but
beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting
gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious
journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should
like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable
behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible.
One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I
cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval
and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled
to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside,
and inside, hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and
assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel
most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support,
often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so
readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all
by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by
the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on
entering and leaving the Embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to
see me to ask how he could help us, and to make arrangements for the
safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from
extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and
his calmness and _savoir-faire_ and his firmness in dealing with the
Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British
subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and
able hands.

At the sitting of the House of Commons on August 26th, Mr. Keir Hardie
exhibited a tendency to quibble and to show his own country in a wrong
light. His interference on this occasion was, from his point of view,
fruitless; but it had the advantage of enabling the Foreign Secretary
to make an effective reply. In his statement, Sir Edward Grey dealt
with a few points which, although not at all obscure, were all the
better for emphasizing. The temper of the House is sufficiently well
indicated by the cheers and interruptions recorded in the following
report:

Mr. KEIR HARDIE (Lab., Merthyr Tydvil) inquired of the Foreign
Secretary whether the suggestions for a peace settlement made by
the German Ambassador, together with his invitation to the Foreign
Secretary to put forward proposals of his own, which would be
acceptable as a basis for neutrality, were submitted to and considered
by the Cabinet; and, if not, why proposals involving such far-reaching
possibilities were thus rejected.

Sir E. GREY: These were personal suggestions made by the Ambassador
on August 1st, and without authority, to alter the conditions of
neutrality proposed to us by the German Chancellor in No. 85, in the
White Paper.[4] The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the
next morning--that is Sunday, August 2nd--the conditions on which we
could remain neutral, and came to the conclusion that respect for the
neutrality of Belgium must be one of these conditions. The German
Chancellor had already been told, on July 30th, that we could not
bargain that away.

On Monday, August 3rd, I made a statement in the House, accordingly.[5]
I had seen the German Ambassador again, at his own request, on Monday,
and he urged me most strongly, though he said that he did not know the
plans of the German military authorities, not to make the neutrality
of Belgium one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was
a day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the morning,
and I had no time to record the conversation. Therefore, it does not
appear in the White Paper; but it was impossible to withdraw that
condition--(loud cheers)--without becoming a consenting party to the
violation of the treaty, and subsequently to a German attack on Belgium.

After I spoke in the House we made to the German Government the
communication described in No. 153 in the White Paper, about the
neutrality of Belgium.[6] Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply
to that communication had not been received when the White Paper was
printed and laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete the
White Paper.[7]

I have been asked why I did not refer to No. 123 in the White Paper
when I spoke in the House on August 3rd.[8] If I had referred to
suggestions to us as to conditions of neutrality, I must have referred
to No. 85--the proposals made, not personally by the Ambassador, but
officially by the German Chancellor, which were so condemned by the
Prime Minister subsequently.[9] This would have made the case against
the German Government much stronger--(cheers)--than I did make it in my
speech. I deliberately refrained from doing that then.

Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the German
Ambassador, as distinct from communications made on behalf of his
Government. He worked for peace, but real authority at Berlin did not
rest with him and others like him, and that is one reason why our
efforts for peace failed. (Loud cheers.)

Mr. KEIR HARDIE: May I ask whether any attempt was made to open up
negotiations with Germany, on the basis of the suggestions here set
forth by the German Ambassador?

Sir E. GREY: The German Ambassador did not make any basis of
suggestions. It was the German Chancellor who made the basis of
suggestions. The German Ambassador, speaking on his own personal
initiative, and without authority, asked whether we would formulate the
conditions on which we would be neutral. We did go into that question,
and the conditions were stated in the House and made known to the
German Ambassador. (Cheers.)

Mr. KEIR HARDIE (who rose amidst cries of "Order," "Oh, oh!" and "Sit
down"): May I ask whether the German authorities at Berlin repudiated
these suggestions of their Ambassador in London, and whether any effort
at all was made to find out how far the German Government would have
agreed to the suggestions put forward by their Ambassador? (Cries of
"Don't answer.")

Mr. T.M. HEALY (Ind. Nat., Cork, N.E.): Before the right hon. gentleman
answers that, may I ask him if the Socialists in the Reichstag are
asking any questions like this? (Loud and prolonged general cheers.)

Sir E. GREY, who was greeted with cries of "Don't answer," said: I
should like to have no misunderstanding on this. (Loud cheers.) The
German Ambassador did not make to us suggestions different to those
which his Government made. He never suggested to us that the German
Government would be able to agree to the condition of the neutrality of
Belgium. On the contrary he did suggest to me that we should not put
that condition forward because he was afraid his Government would not
be able to accept it. (Cheers.)

Mr. PRINGLE (R., Lanarkshire, N.W.): Is my right hon. friend aware
that Mr. Keir Hardie is constantly representing in the country that
these proposals were actually made by the German Government to England?
(Hear, hear.)

Sir. E. GREY: That was one of the reasons why I thought it very
desirable to answer very explicitly. (General cheers.)

Mr. KEIR HARDIE: On a point of personal explanation I entirely
repudiate the statement made by Mr. Pringle.

Mr. PRINGLE: I have to say in answer to that personal imputation that
my authority is a letter written by Mr. Hardie in the _Ardrossan and
Saltcoats Herald_ last Saturday. (Cheers.)

Mr. KEIR HARDIE: Those who cheer have not seen the letter. (Cries of
"Sit down.")

Mr. PRINGLE: Coward.

Mr. KING (R., Somerset, N.) asked the Foreign Secretary whether he
intended to lay upon the table copies of the German memorandum and the
official statements of other foreign Governments showing the different
explanations of the origin of the war which had been published by the
various Governments concerned in the European war.

Sir E. GREY: I have received no official explanation of the nature
referred to, except such as appear in our White Paper recently
published.

Mr. KING also asked whether Sir E. Grey was aware that the German
Government had presented gratis to certain American citizens copies
of a pamphlet, written in English, called "Germany's Reasons for War
with Russia"; and whether, with a view of permitting an answer to this
publication, he would obtain a copy and place it in the Library.

Sir E. GREY replied that he had given instructions for a copy of the
document in question to be placed in the Library at the disposal of
members.

On page 147 of this volume appears a reference to the German White
Book, which was issued at Berlin on August 3rd. This White Book was
intended to show that war with Russia was inevitable, and it was
brought down to August 1st. In other words, while it dealt more or less
adequately with the situation as between Russia and Germany, it threw
no light on the ultimate causes which led to war with this country.
The Memorandum of this German White Book has already been summarized
(p. 147-8) and two telegrams--one from the Kaiser to the Tsar on July
31st, and the Tsar's reply of the same date--have been quoted on p.
148-9. The _Manchester Guardian_ of August 24th contained translations
of telegrams which had been exchanged previously by the two Emperors on
the preceding days, _i.e._, from July 28th to July 30th, as follows:

The Kaiser to the Tsar.

  _July 28th, 10.45 p.m._

I HEAR with the utmost disquietude of the impression created in
your realm by Austria-Hungary's proceedings against Servia. The
unscrupulous agitation which has for years been carried on in Servia
has led to the appalling crime of which the Grand Duke Franz Ferdinand
was the victim. The spirit which animated the murder of their own king
and queen is still supreme in that country. Doubtless you will agree
with me that we two, that you as well as I, and all sovereigns have a
common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for the
hideous deed should receive the punishment they deserve.

On the other hand, I am far from overlooking the difficulties you and
your government may find in opposing the tendency of public opinion.
Remembering the hearty friendship which for long has bound us two
securely together, I am throwing the whole of my influence into the
scale to induce Austria-Hungary to seek for an open and satisfactory
understanding with Russia. I confidently hope for your assistance in my
endeavours to put aside all the difficulties that may arise.

Your sincerely devoted friend and cousin,

  (Signed) William.

The Tsar to the Kaiser.

  Peterhof Palace,
  _July 29th, 1.0 p.m._

I REJOICE that you are back in Germany. I beg you earnestly to help
me at this grave moment. A shameful war has been declared on a weak
country, and there is immense indignation in Russia, which I fully
share. I foresee that I shall very soon be unable to hold out longer
against the pressure exercised upon me, and shall be compelled to adopt
measures which will lead to war. To obviate such a misfortune as a
European war, I implore you, in the name of our old friendship, to do
all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far.

  (Signed) Nicholas.

The Kaiser to the Tsar.

  _July 29th, 6.30 p.m._

I HAVE received your telegram, and share your wish for the maintenance
of peace. But I cannot, as I said in my first telegram to you, regard
Austria-Hungary's action as a "shameful war." Austria-Hungary knows
by experience that Servia's promises are wholly unreliable if merely
written on paper. In my view Austria-Hungary's action is to be regarded
as an attempt to secure guarantees that Servia's promises shall be
really translated into action. I am strengthened in this view by the
declaration of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary aims at no
territorial acquisitions at Servia's expense. I think, therefore, that
it is entirely possible for Russia to maintain the rôle of a spectator
of the Austro-Servian war without dragging Europe into the most awful
war it has ever experienced. I believe that a direct understanding
between your government and Vienna is possible and desirable, and, as
I already telegraphed to you, my government has done all in its power
to further such an understanding. Military measures on Russia's part,
which Austria-Hungary could view as a threat, would naturally hasten
a misfortune which we both wish to avoid, and would undermine the
position of mediator which I have readily assumed in response to your
appeal to my friendship and help.

  (Signed) William.

The Kaiser to the Tsar.

  _July 30th, 1.0 a.m._

MY Ambassador is instructed to draw the attention of your government
to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation: I said the
same to you in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has only mobilised
against Servia, and only a part of its army. If, as appears from
your communication and that of your government, Russia is mobilising
against Austria-Hungary, the rôle of mediator which you entrusted to
me in friendly wise, and which I accepted at your express request, is
jeopardised, if not rendered impossible. The whole burden of decision
now rests upon your shoulders, the responsibility for war or peace.

  (Signed) William.

The Tsar to the Kaiser,

  Peterhof,
  _July 30th, 1.20 p.m._

FROM my heart I thank you for your speedy reply. I am this evening
sending Tatisheff with instructions. The military measures now coming
into operation were decided upon five days ago for reasons of defence
against Austria's preparations. Most heartily do I trust that these
measures will in no way influence your position as mediator, which I
value highly. We need your strong pressure on Austria to secure an
understanding with us.

  (Signed) Nicholas.

The two final telegrams have been given on pp. 148-150 of "How the War
Began."

On July 28th, a confidential communication was sent by the Imperial
Chancellor to the Governments of the various Federal States of Germany.
After recapitulating the story of the quarrel between Austria and
Servia, it proceeds as follows:

There are certain Russian voices accordingly who hold that it is a
self-evident right and the business of Russia to intervene actively on
Servia's behalf in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.
The _Novoye Vremya_ actually thinks that the responsibility for the
European conflagration that would result from such action on the
part of Russia can be thrown upon Germany, in so far as Germany
does not cause Austria-Hungary to give way. But here the Russian
Press is looking at things upside down. It was not Austria-Hungary
which started the conflict with Servia, but Servia, which, by its
unscrupulous encouragement of Greater Servian aspirations, even within
Austria-Hungary, endangered the very existence of the Monarchy, and
created a condition of things which finally found expression in the
atrocious deed of Sarajevo. If Russia believes it must intervene in
the conflict on behalf of Servia, its right is no doubt good, so
far as it goes. But in doing so it must know that it thereby takes
over as its own all Servia's endeavours to undermine the existence
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that on it will rest the sole
responsibility if the Austro-Servian business, which all the other
great Powers desire to localise, leads to a European war. Russia's
responsibility is clear, and the heavier in that Count Berchtold has
officially informed Russia that there is no intention of territorial
acquisition at Servia's expense, or any tampering with the continued
existence of the Servian kingdom--merely a desire for peace from the
Servian machinations which imperil its existence.

The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clear. The
final goal of the agitation carried on by the Pan-Slavists against
Austria-Hungary is, by breaking down the Danube Monarchy, to burst or
weaken the Triple Alliance, and subsequently to isolate the German
Empire completely. Our own interest, therefore, calls us to the side
of Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the duty of preserving Europe, so far as
may be possible, from universal war, likewise directs us to support
the endeavour to localise the conflict, thereby adhering to that
straight line of policy which we have now pursued with success for
forty-four years in the interest of the maintenance of European peace.
If, however, contrary to what we hope, the interference (Eingreifen)
of Russia causes an extension of the conflagration, faithful to our
alliance, we should have to support the neighbour Monarchy with the
whole might of the Empire. Only under compulsion shall we grasp the
sword, but if we do, it will be with the calm consciousness that we are
guiltless of the disaster which a war must bring upon the peoples of
Europe.

This "calm consciousness" does not seem to have been disturbed by the
reflection that in the spring of 1913, when Europe appeared to be
settling down to a period of peace and prosperity after the Tripoli
and Balkan wars, the German Government suddenly startled the whole
world by imposing a special war levy of £50,000,000, and by increasing
the peace strength of the German army to 870,000 men. Under the
Quinquennial Army Law of 1905, the peace footing of the German army was
largely increased and reached a total of 505,839 men in 1911. A new
Quinquennial Law was voted by the Reichstag in 1911, and if it had been
carried into effect the army would have had the strength of 515,221 in
1915-6. This, one would have thought, was surely a sufficient peace
establishment; but in 1912 a still further Army Law provided for new
units and also for increases in the peace effective. Hardly were the
provisions of this law being applied when the special measure of 1913
was passed. The German army, in other words, rose from a peace strength
of 505,000 men (excluding the one-year volunteers) in 1911 to a peace
strength of about 512,000 in 1912, and a peace strength of 870,000
in the spring of 1914. There were no corresponding increases in any
European army to call for this drastic strengthening of the German
forces. Indeed, the French army had rather become reduced in numbers
in consequence of the two years' service; and the Balkan States were
exhausted. The Servia which had advanced against Turkey in the autumn
of 1912 was a very much more powerful country than the Servia with
which Austria picked a quarrel in 1914.

We were never told why this great increase in the German army was
rendered necessary; nor did we learn why, at almost the same time, the
Austrian Government voted huge sums for enlarging its land and sea
forces. There was a vague reference in the Reichstag to the balance
of military power. But, if the Balkan war had altered the military
power of Europe, it had altered that power to the advantage of the
Triple Alliance. The Balkan States, the perpetual menace of the
Danube Monarchy, if we are to credit the statements made at Vienna,
were exhausted after their campaigns, first against Turkey and then
against one another. Austria herself had had her way with regard to
Albania, and Russia had given up her project of securing an outlet on
the Adriatic for Servia. Italy, the third partner in the Triplice, was
beginning to recover from the effects of the Tripoli war; and France
and England wished for nothing better than to be let alone.

If we received but little information regarding the strengthening
of the German army, assuredly we had been receiving less for years
previously regarding the construction of strategic railways on the
German border where it meets Belgium and Luxemburg. An examination of a
detailed map of this district will show the most careless observer that
the strong German fortresses and garrison towns of Cologne, Coblenz,
and Germersheim, are connected with the western frontiers by railway
lines the only possible use of which must have been the transportation
of troops and munitions of war. There is certainly no trade in western
Germany demanding such a large number of tracks running east and west;
and it was only by means of these railways that Germany was able to
throw a million men across the frontier in less than forty-eight hours
after war broke out. The pacific intentions of France may be judged
from the fact that the lines on the French side of the frontier run for
the most part north and south.

One or two such items may pass. But when we consider them _seriatim_,
we are bound to admit that Germany has shown consistent provocation
for more than a decade. We may leave out of account, perhaps, the
Kruger telegram and the German desire to assist Spain against the
United States in 1898, not to mention the attitude of Germany at the
time of the Boer war. There remains an entire series of provocations;
the preamble to the first German Navy Act (1900), in which England as
the enemy is all but mentioned by name; the visit of the Kaiser to
Tangier; the bullying indulged in by the German representatives at the
Algeciras Conference; the trouble almost forced on France over the
Morocco question in 1907; the determined attitude taken up by the
Kaiser against all Europe at the time of the Turkish revolution and the
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria, in 1908-9; the stringent
terms of the Potsdam Agreement with Russia in 1910; the sending of
the _Panther_ to Agadir in 1911; the intractable attitude of the
Wilhelmstrasse over the settlement of the Balkan question in 1912-13.
With some effort, perhaps, any one of these incidents--and these are
only a few of the more important--might be explained away with a veneer
of plausibility; but, taken together, they are overwhelming in their
proof that the German Empire has been a hotbed of unrest in Europe,
not merely for the last two or three years, but for the last twenty.
Where Germany led Austria followed; and numerous were the threats
and imprecations levelled at Italy through the pliable medium of the
semi-official Press because Rome did not always see eye to eye with
Berlin and Vienna.

The remaining telegrams and other documents quoted by the _Manchester
Guardian_ need not detain us long. From the dispatches of the German
Ambassador at St. Petersburg to his Government at Berlin, it is clear
that the Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonoff, laid the entire blame
at the door of Austria. No impartial statesman, as we can see from
our own White Paper, attempted to justify an ultimatum that demanded a
reply within forty-eight hours. The following messages, however, are
worth noting, and they help to complete our own official documents:

From the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

  _July 27th._

The military attaché reports conversation with War Minister:

Sazonoff has asked the latter to explain the situation to me. The
Minister of War gave me his word of honour that no mobilisation order
had as yet been given. Certain preparatory measures had been taken;
that was all: no reservists had been called up, no horses commandeered.
If Austria crossed the Servian frontier mobilisation would take place
in the military districts touching upon Austria: Kieff, Odessa, Moscow,
Kazan. Under no circumstances in those on the German front, Warsaw,
Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was earnestly desired. On my
inquiry as to the purpose of mobilisation against Austria he shrugged
his shoulders and referred to diplomacy. I said to the Minister that
we did justice to their friendly intentions towards us, but that even
mobilisation directed solely against Austria would be regarded as
highly threatening.

On July 28th--by which date Germany must have nearly completed her
arrangements for invading France through Belgium--we find the Foreign
Minister informing the Ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, that
Germany is ready to co-operate with the other Powers in mediating
between Austria and Russia; and on July 29th France is warned that
Germany may be compelled to declare martial law. On July 31st the
ultimatum was sent to St. Petersburg and a similar warning to Paris.

The following message was sent to St. Petersburg on August 1st:

In case the Russian Government should not give a satisfactory answer
to our demand, your Excellency will at five o'clock this afternoon
(Central European time) hand it the following declaration, in French:
"Since the beginning of the crisis the Imperial Government has
endeavoured to bring about a peaceful solution. In conformity with the
wish expressed to him by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, his Majesty
the Emperor of Germany, in agreement with England, was endeavouring to
act as mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when
Russia, without waiting for the results of his efforts, proceeded to
mobilise the whole of its land and sea forces.

"As the result of this threatening step, for which no motive was
afforded by any miltary preparation on Germany's part, the German
Empire found itself face to face with a serious and imminent danger.
If the Imperial Government had failed to parry this danger it would
have compromised the security and even the existence of Germany.
Consequently the German Government found itself compelled to address
the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and
to insist on the cessation of the said military acts. Russia having
refused the satisfaction of this demand, and having shown by this
refusal that its action was directed against Germany, I have the honour
to inform your Excellency, by my Government's command, as follows:

"His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, raises the gage in the
Empire's name and regards himself as in a state of war with Russia.
(_Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire,
relève le défi et se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie._)

"Please demand your papers and protection and put your affairs under
the protection of the American Embassy."

       *       *       *       *       *

Among the numerous indications of loyalty which reached Great Britain
from her oversea dominions and colonies, those from India were
not the least striking and demonstrative. As many of the Indian
princes offered not merely money, but also men, it was decided that
representative contingents of Indian soldiers should take their places
on the battlefield side by side with their fellow-subjects from these
Islands and the Dominions. The announcement was made in the House of
Lords on August 28th by Earl Kitchener in the following words:

"In addition to reinforcements that will shortly proceed from this
country, the Government have decided that our Army in France shall be
increased by two divisions and a cavalry division, besides other troops
from India.

"The first division of those troops is now on its way. I may add that
all wastage in the Army in France has been immediately filled up, and
there are some 12,000 men waiting for that purpose on the lines of
communication."

       *       *       *       *       *

To Lord Kitchener's brief announcement the Secretary for India added an
explanation which the public welcomed with feelings of gratification.

"It has been deeply impressed upon us," he said, "from what we have
heard from India, that the wonderful wave of enthusiasm and loyalty
which is now passing over that country is, to a great extent, based
upon the desire of the Indian people that Indian soldiers should stand
side by side with their comrades of the British Army in repelling the
invasion of our friends' territories and the attacks made upon them."

       *       *       *       *       *

Hardly less enthusiasm had been aroused on the previous day, August
27th, when Mr. Asquith moved:

"That an Address be presented to his Majesty praying him to convey to
his Majesty the King of the Belgians the sympathy and admiration with
which this House regards the heroic resistance offered by his army and
people to the wanton invasion of his territory, and an assurance of the
determination of this country to support in every way the efforts of
Belgium to vindicate her own independence and the public law of Europe."

       *       *       *       *       *

In supporting his motion the Prime Minister delivered an eloquent and
moving speech, in the course of which he said:

"Very few words are needed to commend to the House the Address the
terms of which will shortly be read from the Chair. The war which is
now shaking to its foundations the whole European system originated in
a quarrel in which this country had no direct concern. We strove with
all our might, as everyone now knows, to prevent its outbreak, and when
that was no longer possible to limit its area. It is all-important,
and I think it is relevant to this motion, that it should be clearly
understood when it was and why it was that we intervened.

"It was only when we were confronted with the choice between keeping
and breaking solemn obligations, between the discharge of a binding
trust and of shameless subservience to naked force, that we threw away
the scabbard.

"We do not repent our decision.

"The issue was one which no great and self-respecting nation, certainly
none bred and nurtured as ourselves in this ancient home of liberty
could, without undying shame, have declined. We were bound by our
obligations, plain and paramount, to assert and maintain the threatened
independence of a small and neutral State. Belgium had no interest
of her own to serve, save and except the one supreme and over-riding
interest of every State, great or little, which is worthy of the name,
the preservation of her integrity and of her national life.

"History tells us that the duty of asserting and maintaining the great
principle, which is, after all, the well-spring of civilisation and of
progress, has fallen once and again at the most critical moment in the
past to States relatively small in area and in population, but great
in courage and resolve, to Athens and Sparta, the Swiss cantons, and
not least gloriously three centuries ago to the Netherlands. Never,
sir, I venture to assert, has the duty been more clearly and bravely
acknowledged, and never has it been more strenuously and heroically
discharged than during the last weeks by the Belgian King and the
Belgian people.

"They have faced without flinching, and against almost incalculable
odds, the horrors of an irruption, devastation, of spoliation, and of
outrage. They have stubbornly withstood and successfully arrested the
inrush, wave after wave, of a gigantic and overwhelming force. The
defence of Liège will always be the theme of one of the most inspiring
chapters in the annals of liberty. The Belgians have won for themselves
the immortal glory which belongs to a people who prefer freedom to
ease, to security, even to life itself. We are proud of their alliance
and their friendship. We salute them with respect and with honour.
We are with them heart and soul, because by their side and in their
company we are defending at the same time two great causes--the
independence of small States and the sanctity of international
covenants--and we assure them, as I ask the House in this Address to
do, in the name of this United Kingdom and of the whole Empire, that
they may count to the end on our whole-hearted and unfailing support."

       *       *       *       *       *

The reception which this speech met with was unmistakable; and the
motion was voted unanimously.

Mr. Bonar Law, in seconding, spoke with great feeling of the shameful
atrocities committed upon the Belgian people by the German soldiery,
and, in the Upper House, Lord Crewe, referring to the same theme,
observed that no country ever outraged humanity without sooner or
later paying for it: "It must be our part to see that the sword is not
sheathed till these great wrongs are redressed to the full."

Lord Lansdowne spoke of the "incalculable value" of the two or three
weeks gained by the heroic defence of Belgium; and Mr. Redmond, in a
few glowing sentences, bore witness to the generous enthusiasm which
had been excited in Ireland. There was no sacrifice, he said, which
Ireland was not willing to make for Belgium, and he suggested that,
instead of the loan of £10,000,000 which had been proposed, the Belgian
people should be asked to receive the money as a gift.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: In this telegram, which is quoted in full on p. 178 of
"How the War Began," Sir Edward Grey reproduced the appeal of the King
of the Belgians to King George for diplomatic intervention, and asked
for an assurance that the German demand on Belgium for permission to
pass troops over Belgian territory would not be persisted in.]

[Footnote 2: This was the British ultimatum, in which Sir Edward Grey
recapitulated the circumstances connected with the German occupation of
Belgian territory and demanded an answer by midnight. Quoted in full on
page 180-1 of "How the War Began."]

[Footnote 3: This telegram, says a footnote to the dispatch, never
reached the Foreign Office.]

[Footnote 4: This letter has been quoted in full on p. 106 of "How the
War Began."]

[Footnote 5: Sir Edward Grey's speech appears _ibid._, p. 150 foll.]

[Footnote 6: This refers to Sir Edward Grey's telegram to Sir E.
Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, which is given on p. 178 of "How
the War Began."]

[Footnote 7: Sir E. Goschen's report has been given at the beginning of
this chapter.]

[Footnote 8: Quoted on p. 136-7 of "How the War Began." In this
dispatch to Sir E. Goschen, Sir Edward Grey states that he refused to
give any undertaking even if the French colonies were respected, saying
that England must keep her hands free.]

[Footnote 9: See footnote No. 1.]



CHAPTER II

 German Press Campaign--Disseminating False News--The Secret Press
 Society--Sir E. Goschen's Report--A Suppressed Telegram.


IT has been indicated in the preceding volumes in this series that the
plans of the German Government had been very well thought out before
the campaign was undertaken. When hostilities had been engaged only
a few weeks, evidence came to hand from many parts of the world that
the determination of the Kaiser and his advisers to wage war was no
sudden whim, no definite stroke of policy dependent upon unexpected
circumstances. For example, the proclamations issued by the German
consuls in South Africa summoning reservists to the colours had been
printed in Germany, it was ascertained, and sent out about the end
of April or the beginning of May--in other words, some two months
before the assassination of the heir-apparent to the Austrian throne,
which was the nominal cause of the dispatch of the Austrian Note and
consequently of the general European War.

Again, certain German merchant vessels in Australasian waters were
observed on July 30th--_i.e._ the day before Germany declared war on
Russia--to begin conveying wireless messages to one another in code.
It was commented upon at the time that this was an unusual practice,
especially as these steamers, with equal suddenness, refused to answer
the wireless messages of British vessels. In other words, two or three
days before the campaign was actually opened, means were found of
notifying German vessels on the other side of the world that peace was
about to be broken.

Nor were these the only preparations. Those who are interested in
modern German history will well remember that practically every book
relating to Bismarck's career emphasises time and again the use he
made of all sections of the Press, independently of party and even of
country. His agents, even before the war with Austria in 1866, and,
of course, for long afterwards, were at all times endeavouring to
bribe, cajole, or persuade newspaper editors in Germany, Russia, Italy,
France, England, America and even Turkey and the Balkan States, to
insert this or that article or paragraph, tending to assist in some
way the achievement of the aims for the time being of the Monarch's
most trusted adviser. Bismarck carried this employment of the Press
to a very high degree of perfection; and readers of Busch's anecdotes
in particular will recollect how often the unfortunate amanuensis was
scolded for not writing what he had been told to write in the manner of
the particular paper for which his article was intended.

This was one of the most useful diplomatic and political legacies
bequeathed by the great Chancellor to the Germany of our own
generation, and it is hardly necessary to add that both before and
during the present war full advantage has been taken of it. It is
no exaggeration whatever to say that in every country of importance
throughout the world the most strenuous endeavours were made by the
German Press agents to disseminate Germany's point of view--to show at
the beginning that both Germany and Austria, particularly Germany, were
two innocent but ill-used countries which were reluctantly compelled
to go to war with their powerful neighbours, as, if they had remained
inactive a day longer, they would have risked their very existence
as independent States; and to show later on that, with the help of
Providence, the German armies were winning remarkable victories all
along the line.

Indeed, if we were to believe the German Press Bureau, the mere fact
that the Fatherland had entered the lists was sufficient to cause panic
among her enemies. Before the campaign had been in progress three days,
the world was solemnly informed from German sources that a revolution
had broken out in Paris, and that the President had fled from the
city; that a similar revolution was breaking out in Russia, and that
the Tsar's throne was in danger; and that the British Expeditionary
Force could not be landed in France as the Channel was held by
German warships and submarines. Subsequently we were told that Lord
Kitchener's appeal for half a million men had utterly failed; that the
British Fleet dare not venture to leave the coast on account of German
warships and German mines, and that innumerable British merchantmen
had been captured or sunk by German cruisers in the Atlantic, in the
Pacific, and in the Mediterranean.

If these idle stories seem to us to be merely ridiculous, let it be
remembered that they were retailed as solemn facts to newspapers in
Italy, the Balkans, Turkey, Egypt and South America. Fully aware of the
power of the newspaper, and determined that Germany's prestige should
not be lost, the Berlin Government made the most complete preparations
for fighting with the pen as well as with the sword; and it is rather
unfortunate that this very common-sense example was not followed or
had not been thought of by England, France, or Russia. One example
may be given. As we now know, and as even the Germans themselves
have admitted, the fighting which took place on the Mons-Charleroi
line resulted in stalemate. The Germans were practically fought to
a standstill, and the allied forces, in accordance with their own
pre-arranged plan of campaign, effected gradually and in good order
their retreat to their original base. German prisoners admitted that
the small British force which had the noble but exceedingly arduous
task of defending the left wing of the French army inflicted damage on
the enemy out of all proportion to their numbers. The coolness of the
British soldiers under a heavy fire, their intrepidity in hand-to-hand
fighting, and the almost incredible accuracy of their markmanship were
commented upon no less by their allies than by their foes.

Contrast this with the German version, which was circulated wherever
a newspaper could be induced to print it. It was said that a great
battle, lasting several days, had taken place in the neighbourhood of
Mons, that the French had been driven back several miles with heavy
loss, and that the "contemptible" British Expeditionary Force had been
all but annihilated. This version was communicated to the Italian
Press, and a suitable correction did not make an appearance until five
days had elapsed. When the correction did appear, one Italian newspaper
headed the news with the significant announcement: "Telegrams from
London reach us in four days; telegrams from Berlin in two hours."

The result of this feature of this Press campaign was that many
countries with which the Allies wished to stand well, such as Italy,
Turkey, Spain, and Servia, continually received the impression that
the German cause, German might, and German organisation were about to
triumph in 1914 as they had in 1870. To some extent the scheme did
not succeed. When, for instance, unrest was noticed among the natives
in the French sphere of interest in Morocco, the Spaniards in the
neighbouring sphere offered voluntarily to put it down, as France had
withdrawn many of her troops. In Italy, again, the feeling in favour of
the Allies had been so pronounced from the very beginning that not even
telegrams from Berlin could shake it. In Turkey, on the other hand, it
was difficult, if not, indeed, impossible, to have the German "news"
corrected; and the utmost endeavours were openly made by German agents
to induce the Turks to strike at the Allies either by an invasion
of Egypt, an attack on Suez Canal shipping, or a raid into Southern
Russia. It is significant enough that when the German battleship
_Goeben_ eluded the British squadron in the Mediterranean, she sought
shelter, not in any of the ports of Germany's ally, Austria--which at
the time were not beyond her reach--but under the shelter of Turkish
forts in the Dardanelles. This incident is referred to in a subsequent
chapter.

Although small and not very important items of news appeared from time
to time in the British and French Press respecting the operations of
the German Press Bureau (a department of the Foreign Office), it was
not until early in September that anything like a complete account
of the ramifications of this Bureau was made known. On September
3rd a White Paper was issued containing dispatches from Sir E.
Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. These
communications began in February, 1914, and continued until June.
They showed conclusively that a secret undertaking had been entered
into which had for its object the influencing of the Press of foreign
countries, partly in the interest of German exporters and partly
in order that German influence generally might be spread. It is, of
course, impossible to quote at all fully from these very interesting
dispatches of Sir E. Goschen, but one or two of them may be mentioned.
In his first dispatch, sent on February 27th, our Ambassador at Berlin
enclosed the following report:

For some time past a variety of schemes had been ventilated in the
Press with the object of improving German prestige abroad. It was
said that in certain foreign parts Germany was being persistently
and wrongfully abused, that she could obtain no fair hearing because
the Press of those distant countries was in hands hostile to any
German enterprise, and because the telegraphic agencies serving those
countries were equally biassed. An "_Association for World-Commerce_"
was to have remedied this evil by a persistent pro-German propaganda
in the countries most bitterly complained of. It was hoped that the
necessary funds could have been raised by contributions from all the
trading and industrial societies interested in the German export trade,
and, in view of the supreme importance to Germany of her export trade,
it was intended that agents of the Association should be sent and
stationed abroad to assist the exporting industries by timely advice
and an active policy generally, such as private individuals could
pursue more effectively than officials. The opportunity for realising
this scheme seemed to offer itself under the following circumstances.
A plan was being prepared to start a German-American Economic Society.
Similar societies with an application to other countries already
exist--_e.g._, a German-Argentine Society, a German-Canadian Society,
a German-Russian Society, etc. The foundation of a German-American
Society had been advocated in connection with the revision of the
American tariff which gave German industries new chances of an
intensified export to the United States. As was natural in any matters
dealing with German-American affairs, M. Ballin, of the Hamburg-America
Line, was approached to take the matter in hand. He consented. Under
his inspiration the idea of a German-American Society was abandoned and
the idea of a World Society was substituted. A preliminary meeting was
held at which the various German-foreign societies were represented;
there were present also representatives of the "Central Association
of German Industrials," and of its great rival, the "Federation of
Industrials," as well as of most of the leading industrial firms.
Internal dissensions, however, soon appeared, and several important
members sent in their resignations. The details of the foundation were
to have been settled at a meeting convened for February 26th; to-day
the whole scheme stands prorogued _sine die_. If it is ever realised
its plan will have to be considerably altered. In the meantime the
original plan of a German-American Society has been revived. This
society is, in fact, to be constituted in Berlin early in March in the
form originally intended.

It would seem strange had M. Ballin so readily accepted defeat.
The explanation lies in the fact that, at the request of a very
highly-placed person, his interest has been transferred to another more
delicate and more or less secret organisation, devised to undertake
those duties of M. Ballin's would-be "Weltverein," which concerned the
German reputation abroad. A short time ago, a meeting, of which the
secret has been well kept, was convened in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, of which Dr. Hamann, the notorious head of the Press Bureau of
the German Foreign Office, was the originator and at which the Foreign
Secretary himself was present. The meeting was attended by members
of the leading industrial concerns of this country: the North German
Lloyd, the Hamburg-America Company, the Deutsche Bank, the Disconto
Gesellschaft, the Allgemeine Electrizitätsgesellschaft, Siemens and
Halske, the Schuckert Works, Krupp, the Cruson Works, etc. They formed
a private company with the purpose of "furthering the German industrial
prestige abroad"--a conveniently vague purpose. The company will be
financed by private subscriptions and by a Government grant. The sum
at first suggested as a necessary revenue from private subscription
was £12,500, but the company present at the first meeting was so
enthusiastic that it definitely promised annual subscriptions amounting
to £25,000. The Government will add £12,500 per annum--the whole
Secret Service Fund, in fact, at the disposal of the Imperial Foreign
Office for similar purposes (_e.g._, for the payment of subsidies to
certain papers abroad). The company has entered into an agreement with
the _Agence Havas_ that the latter will in future only publish news
concerning Germany if supplied through _Wolff's Telegraphen-Bureau_.
The latter will receive its German news exclusively from the new
company.

The company intends to make a similar arrangement with Reuter's
Telegraphic Bureau for those foreign countries in which Reuter
controls telegraphic communications. If Reuter declines, the _Deutsche
Kabelgesellschaft_, a smaller German news agency supplying telegrams
from certain countries (_e.g._, Mexico) and working in agreement with
Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau, is to be financed by the new company to run
a service in competition to Reuter's. All the concerns represented at
the meeting have furthermore agreed to pay into the company's hotchpot
the very vast sums which they are accustomed to spend abroad for
their advertisements in foreign papers. The total of this item alone
is believed to be not less than £25,000 per annum--so the annual sum
available for the purpose of the new company will reach a total of
£50,000 to £75,000. The company will in future issue the advertisements
of its members only to those foreign papers which publish German
information originating exclusively from the new company, which is to
be regarded as the only authentic source of information concerning
Germany and all things German. This information they are to receive
free of cost or at a nominal sum--so that the willing foreign papers
will derive very material benefits from their collaboration with the
company, viz., lucrative advertisements and free matter written in
the language of the country in which the papers are published. The
foreign Press is to be watched by the company's agents appointed in the
various foreign centres. Any incorrect reports are to be telegraphed
home and corrected by telegrams issued by the company. The countries
in which the system is to be immediately inaugurated are chiefly the
South American States and those of the Far East, but the system is to
embrace all countries outside Europe. The German cable rates for Press
telegrams are to be reduced in the interests of the new company. It is
difficult to say whether the evil which the new company is to remedy
really exists, or exists to any perceptible extent, but it is certain
that a very influential private company has been called into existence
with every official encouragement commanding an enormous revenue for
the purposes of a pro-German newspaper propaganda. Whether the evil
exists or not--the money will be spent on secret service to popularise
Germany abroad. It does not seem to have occurred to the promoters of
the scheme that they are preparing the ground for a vast system of
international blackmail--hardly a proper way to reach the desired end.

       *       *       *       *       *

That a reduction in cable rates was actually in contemplation is seen
from the Ambassador's next dispatch on the subject, as follows:

  Berlin,

  _April 3rd, 1914_.

SIR,--In my despatch of the 27th February last concerning the secret
foundation of a German society to supply the foreign Press of certain
countries with news favourable to Germany and German interests, it was
foreshadowed that German cable rates for Press telegrams would probably
be reduced in the interests of the new society.

I have the honour now to report that, in fact, reduced rates for
telegrams to the United States, Canada, Argentine, Chile, Peru, and
the German colonies are to come into operation as from April 1st,
1914. These telegrams, which are to be officially known as week-end
telegrams, will be admitted at a reduced rate between Saturday midnight
and Sunday midnight, to be delivered on Monday or Tuesday respectively.
These week-end telegrams must have reached the cable station at Emden
before midnight on Saturday, but can be handed in at any telegraph
office in the course of the week.

The rates, which in some cases represent a reduction to one-fourth of
the usual rates fixed, are:

                                  Pfennigs
                                  per word.

  To New York, Canada, Argentina,
    Chile, Peru (minimum charge
    for each telegram 20 M.)          80

  To Togo and Cameroons (minimum
    charge 18 M.)                     90

  To German South-West Africa
     (minimum charge 15 M.)           75

Negotiations are pending for extending the week-end telegram service to
other distant countries.

Telegrams sent to the United States or Canada are sent at the reduced
rate only to New York or Montreal respectively; thence they are
forwarded either free of charge, by letter, or at the local telegram
rates per word by telegram.--I have, etc.,

  W.E. Goschen.

       *       *       *       *       *

Within a month this system--for the intrinsic merits of which there is
everything to be said--was extended; and Sir E. Goschen wrote to the
Foreign Minister:

  Berlin,

  _May 2nd, 1914_.

SIR,--With reference to my despatch of the 3rd ultimo, I have the
honour to report that, according to an announcement in the _North
German Gazette_, the system of reduced rates for what are called
"week-end telegrams" is to be extended as from the 1st instant to
Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State, Transvaal, South and
North Rhodesia, Nyassaland, British India, Burma, Ceylon, Malacca,
Penang, Singapore, and Labuan, under the conditions described in my
above-mentioned despatch.

The rates are as follows:

                                        Pfennigs
                                        per word.

  To Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free
    State, Transvaal                      70

  To South Rhodesia, Malacca, Penang,
    Singapore, and Labuan                 80

  To North Rhodesia and Nyassaland        95

  To British India, Burma, and Ceylon     50

--I have, etc.,

  W.E. Goschen.

Early in June a remarkable article on the subject appeared in a
well-known German trade organ, the _Deutsche Export Revue_, which not
only admitted the existence of the scheme, but confirmed the previous
statement of the Ambassador, that it was being largely subsidised by
the Imperial German Foreign Office. On this point Sir E. Goschen's
dispatch and the article he encloses are illuminating:

  Berlin,

  _June 9th, 1914_.

SIR,--I had the honour, in my despatch of the 27th February last,
to explain a scheme under which a society had been founded with the
object of supplying the foreign Press, by telegraph, with information
favourable to Germany generally and to German industrial enterprise in
particular. I have since transmitted lists of the countries to which,
under the name of "week-end telegrams," the cable rates have been very
considerably reduced to assist the propaganda of the said society.

I to-day have the honour to forward a translation of a cutting from the
_Deutsche Export Revue_, of the 5th June, 1914, in which the existence
of the scheme is, for the first time, as far as I know, admitted in
public print.

The _Deutsche Export Revue_, which is published in Berlin, is a weekly
periodical devoted to the interests of the German export trade. It is
regarded as well informed, and enjoys a good reputation generally.

The article confirms the various particulars set out in my despatch;
it confirms more especially the fact that the Imperial Foreign Office
is supporting the scheme with an annual subscription of £12,500 paid
out of its secret service fund. It supplies a list of the members of
the society, the names of the directors, etc. The last paragraph of the
article merits special attention on account of a certain refreshing
ingenuousness.

I am informed that the order has gone forth from high official
quarters not to reproduce or in any way to refer to this article, as
its inadvertent publication is not unnaturally considered extremely
inopportune and embarrassing.--I have, etc.,

  W.E. Goschen.

       *       *       *       *       *

The article is as follows:

Our readers will remember that one of the items in the programme of
the German Association for World Commerce was the establishment of a
news service abroad on generous lines. Whilst the other parts of the
Association's programme met with hostile criticism as soon as they
became known, the proposed service for the supply of news abroad was
greeted with general sympathy, as such activity promised to have a
useful effect on our foreign relations. The failure to organise the
Association for World Commerce seemed unhappily to render it doubtful
whether the organisation of the news service could be realised. It
is all the more gratifying that, according to information which has
reached us from well-informed quarters, the scheme for a German news
service in foreign countries has by no means been abandoned, but that,
on the contrary, an extensive organisation is actually doing work in
the desired direction.

A German syndicate was very quietly formed a few weeks ago for the
purposes of this foreign news service. It uses the organisation of
a news agency already in existence; its activity is gradually to be
extended over the whole globe. Its main object will be to reply in an
appropriate form to the prejudiced news concerning Germany and to the
attacks made upon her, and by the judicious publication of newspapers
inspiring the necessary articles to spread abroad the knowledge of the
true state of German industry and of Germany's cultural achievements.

We are in a position to give the following information concerning the
organisation of the enterprise. It is presided over by a directorate,
consisting of three men, viz.: Privy Councillor von Borsig, "Landrath"
Roetger (retired), and Herr Schacht, a director of the Deutsche Bank.

A special administrative board, the main duty of which it is to make
suggestions as to the organisation and the methods of reporting
comprises among others: Professor Duisburg, of the dye works, "Bayer";
Herr Hagen, of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Commercial Councillor
Hasenclever, of Remscheid; Herr Hermann Hecht, of Berlin; Director
Heineken, of the North German Lloyd; Director Helfferich, of the
Deutsche Bank; Director Huldermann, of the Hamburg-America Line;
Director Kosegarten, of the "Deutsche Waffen-und-Munitions-Fabrik";
Herr von Langen, of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Privy Councillor
Rathenau; Director Reuter, of the Maschinen Fabrik, Duisburg; Director
Salomonsohn, of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Privy Councillor von
Siemens; Herr Edmond Bohler, Hamburg, etc.

The management will be entrusted to two managers, Herr Asch and Dr.
Hansen. The former has for years edited several foreign news agencies;
the latter is known to the readers of the _Deutsche Export Revue_
through a series of articles dealing with the question of a supply of
news covering the whole world.

For the present the enterprise has taken the form of a loose syndicate
constituted for three years, which is, later on, to be replaced by a
more systematic form of organisation. The annual subscription payable
by the firms which are members amounts to a minimum of £50. It is a
significant fact that the Imperial Foreign Office has voted a grant of
£12,500 towards the expenses of the syndicate, provided the same amount
is contributed by German industrial houses. As the subscriptions and
the contributions by the latter already exceed the sum of £12,500, the
contribution from the Foreign Office funds seems secured. As every
firm subscribing a sum of £50 has a vote, or, rather, as for every £50
subscribed the subscriber receives a vote, it may be expected that the
Imperial Foreign Office will have a powerful and decisive influence
upon the management of the syndicate generally and upon the development
of the news service in particular.

We further learn that efforts are now being made to induce the joint
German and Foreign Economic Societies to join the syndicate, as these
societies embrace pre-eminently merchants and manufacturers interested
in the German foreign trade. These societies, it is true, appear to be
still divided in their opinion concerning the new enterprise--at least,
so far no definite decision has been arrived at.

It is believed that an increasing membership will make it possible
to establish a reserve fund out of subscriptions and voluntary
contributions received, so that, later on, the interest of the reserve
fund may suffice to defray the expenses of the news service. It is
also hoped that the foreign Press may eventually be induced to pay for
the news supplied. Finally, it is intended to send journalists to the
various countries who are there to busy themselves in favour of German
interests in the manner indicated above.

The task which the syndicate has set itself is in itself worthy of
acknowledgment. But only the future can show whether the task can
be accomplished in the manner indicated. We are of opinion that
good results could be achieved, and perhaps with greater success,
by utilising the German Legations and Consulates abroad, if ample
funds for this purpose were placed at the disposal of the official
Departments. At the same time, the joint German and Foreign Economic
Societies might well, as indeed some of them already do, work quietly
for a better appreciation abroad of the state of German industry and
of German cultured progress. The intended despatch of journalists we
believe, however, in any case to be a mistake, as it would certainly
soon become common talk in the editorial offices in the several places
abroad that they represent a syndicate officially supported by the
German Empire. If such things are intended, it would be better to
fall back upon gentlemen who are already in touch with the respective
editorial offices, and who could serve German interests without
attracting so much attention as would journalists sent out for the
purpose.

       *       *       *       *       *

The reference to Press agencies in Sir E. Goschen's original report
brought forth prompt contradictions from those chiefly affected.
On September 6th the Press Bureau in London officially issued the
following important declaration on behalf of the Foreign Office:

Conclusive evidence produced by the "Agence Havas" has satisfied the
Foreign Office that the statement occurring in the recently-published
report forwarded by His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, that the
"Agence Havas" had agreed in future to publish news concerning Germany
only if supplied through "Wolff's Telegraphen Bureau," is not correct.

Such an arrangement appears to have been intended by the German
organisation; but it is not one which the "Agence Havas" ever even
contemplated.

It is with great satisfaction that the Foreign Office has been enabled
to give publicity to this correction.

       *       *       *       *       *

Messrs. Reuter also disclaimed all connection with the proceedings of
the German Government, as will be seen from the following letter which
appeared in the _Daily Telegraph_ of September 7th:

To the Editor of "The Daily Telegraph."

SIR,--In consequence of the long connection which the Press Association
has had with Reuter's Telegraph Company (Limited), I considered it my
duty to at once communicate with Baron de Reuter respecting the White
Paper which was published yesterday morning. I asked three questions:

(1) Whether Reuter's Company were aware that proceedings of the kind
referred to by Sir Edward Goschen were contemplated by Dr. Hamann, the
head of the Press Bureau of the German Foreign Office;

(2) Whether Reuter's Company had been approached either through Wolff's
Bureau or in any other way; and

(3) Whether, before the publication of the White Paper, any
communication had been made to Reuter's Company by the Foreign Office.

In view of the public interest attaching to this question, it seems
desirable that the public at large, as well as the Press, should
be placed in possession of the facts of the case. Accordingly, in
agreement with Baron de Reuter, I append his reply:

DEAR MR. ROBBINS,--In reply to your letter of to-day calling my
attention to the Parliamentary Paper issued in this morning's
papers, concerning the manoeuvres of the Berlin Press Bureau and the
Kabelgesellschaft, I beg to say that the version put about by the said
Press Bureau, and reported by the British Ambassador, does not tally
with the facts within my knowledge.

In the first place, the Wolff Bureau looked on the Kabelgesellschaft
as a competitor likely to supplant the older agency, because the
latter had incurred disfavour with the authorities owing to its
inability to induce the "Agence Havas" to publish, more particularly
in South America, the news issued by the Press Bureau. So far from
Havas agreeing to circulate the news, it was precisely because
of the opposition to such a course by the French agency that the
Kabelgesellschaft was taken under the special protection of the Berlin
Press Bureau and the higher authorities in the background. In proof of
this statement I have a letter from the director of the Wolff Bureau
stating that the activity of the Kabelgesellschaft was aimed in the
first instance at the "Agence Havas."

As for our agency, we have never had any communication, direct or
indirect, with the Kabelgesellschaft, still less has any proposal
in their name, or on their behalf, ever been submitted for our
consideration. The fact, however, that for many months--I may even say
years--past the German Press, at the bidding and under the inspiration
of the political wirepullers, circulated unblushing falsehoods and
calumnies about our agency, presumably to weaken its prestige in the
contemplated competition, points to their intelligent anticipation of
the refusal which any overtures from their side would have met with
from us.

Finally, permit me to add that we had no knowledge of the intended
publication of this Parliamentary paper.--Yours faithfully,

  (_Signed_) Herbert de Reuter.

Yours faithfully,

  E. Robbins, Manager.
  Press Association (Ltd.), 14, New Bridge Street,
  London, E.C., Sept. 5th.

       *       *       *       *       *

What the German Press is really capable of when adequately inspired
may be seen from a comparison of the semi-official organs the German
Government published on Monday, August 31st, in places so far apart
as Hamburg, Frankfurt-on-Main, and Wiesbaden. In these papers, and in
identical phraseology, appeared the "report" of a speech alleged to
have been delivered by Mr. John Burns in the Albert Hall, London, on
August 14th. It will be remembered that Mr. Burns, with Lord Morley and
Mr. Trevelyan, withdrew from the Government early in the month, and the
fabricated speech was officially given out in Germany as Mr. Burns's
own explanation of his reasons for resigning. Even in its translated
form the speech is remarkable in its way as showing that it must have
in the first place been written by someone who was very familiar with
the oratorical style of the right honourable gentleman; and attempts
were made here and there to imitate Mr. Burns's occasional tendency
to lapse into epigram and vigorous short sentences. For example, the
phrase: "I will give it as my firm opinion that England's greatness
shows itself in time of peace; her weakness in time of war," is
certainly delivered in Mr. Burns's best vein, however greatly the
sentiment may differ from his ideas. There would, of course, be no
point in quoting from this speech, which, as was quite obvious when
the English translation made its appearance, had never been delivered;
but one passage should be given as an example of German thoroughness:
"We destroyed Napoleon's fleet at Trafalgar; a few days later Napoleon
gained his most glorious (sic) victory at Austerlitz and brought Europe
to her knees. Of what use was our overthrow of Napoleon at sea compared
with his unexampled successes on land? We merely pricked him with a
pin--he overthrew Europe untroubled by our victories."

The argument here, it will be noticed, is exceedingly plausible; and
the attributing of such an idea to Mr. Burns might almost appear to
be convincing to Germans and Austrians who knew little of his eight
years' record as an administrator and a great deal about his record as
a Labour leader. Once again, too, there is an attempt at Mr. Burns's
vigorous style. The full "speech" was reported in the English Press
on September 7th, and was, of course, immediately repudiated on being
shown to Mr. Burns.

If the German Press, however, can be used occasionally for reporting
things that people did not say, it can be used with equal facility for
suppressing important statements actually made. For example, a Reuter
telegram from Copenhagen on September 7th quoted a statement taken from
the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, and published at Copenhagen
by the German semi-official news agency. This statement dealt with
Sir Edward Grey's declaration regarding his conversations with Prince
Lichnowsky, the former German Ambassador to Great Britain, made in the
House of Commons on August 28th:

The _Norddeutsche_ says: "According to reports received here Sir E.
Grey recently declared in the House of Commons that the correspondence
exchanged between Great Britain and Germany before the war, as
published by the German Government, was incomplete, that Prince
Lichnowsky had withdrawn his report on the well-known telephone
conversation by a telegram sent immediately he was informed that a
misunderstanding existed, and that this telegram was not published.
_The Times_, probably on this basis of official information, made the
same assertion, and added the comment that the telegram was suppressed
by the German Government in order to enable it to accuse England of
perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace. We declare in answer to this
that no such telegram is in existence beyond the telegram already made
public.

"Prince Lichnowsky sent only the following telegrams:

(Sent at 1.15 p.m. on August 1st.)

"'Sir E. Grey's private secretary has just been here to inform me
that the Minister desires to make me proposals concerning England's
neutrality, even in case we have to go to war with France and Russia. I
shall see Sir E. Grey this afternoon.'

II.

(Sent at 5.30 on the same afternoon.)

"'Sir E. Grey has just submitted the following declaration, which has
been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet: "The German Government's
answer respecting Belgium's neutrality is unusually regrettable, since
the neutrality of Belgium is a matter affecting the feelings of this
country. If Germany could see her way to give a similar positive answer
to that which has been given by France it would contribute greatly to
relieve the anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, it
would be extremely difficult to restrain public temper if Belgium's
neutrality should be disregarded by one of the belligerents while the
other respected it."

"'To my question whether on condition that we respected Belgian
neutrality he could give a definite declaration concerning Great
Britain's neutrality, the Minister replied that this was not possible,
but this question would play a big rôle in the present temper of the
people. If we disregarded Belgium's neutrality in a war with France a
revulsion of sentiment would certainly set in, which would render it
difficult to maintain friendly neutrality. For the present there was no
intention of proceeding to hostilities against us. It was desired to
avoid this if it were in any way possible. It was, however, difficult
to draw the line marking how far we might go, before there would be
intervention from here. He (Sir E. Grey) kept adverting to Belgian
neutrality, and said this question would play a great rôle. He had
considered whether, in case of a Russian war, we and France might not
simply remain armed against each other without either one attacking.

"'I asked him whether he was in a position to declare that France would
enter into a pact to that effect. Since we neither desired to destroy
France nor acquire portions of her territory, I believed we could
enter into such an agreement which would assure us Great Britain's
neutrality.

"'The Minister said he would go into the matter. He did not overlook
the difficulties of restraining the military element on both sides to
inactivity.'

III.

(Sent at 8.30 p.m.)

"'My opinion of early to-day is altered. Since no positive English
proposal whatever is at hand, further steps along the lines of my
instructions are useless.'"

The _Norddeutsche_ comments: "As will be observed, these telegrams
contain no intimation that there had been any misunderstanding, and
nothing touching on the English allegations concerning a clearing-up of
any alleged misunderstandings."

       *       *       *       *       *

The above statement, added the Agency, does not meet the specific
statement of Sir Edward Grey in the Commons, which was as follows:

It was reported to me one day that the German Ambassador had suggested
that Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria,
and also engage not to attack France if we would remain neutral and
secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that if the German
Government thought such an arrangement possible I was sure we could
not secure it. It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant
was that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany went
to war with Russia. This was quite a different proposal, and as I
supposed it in all probability to be incompatible with the terms of the
Franco-Russian Alliance, it was not in my power to promise to secure
it. Subsequently the Ambassador sent for my private secretary, and
told him that, as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he sent
a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the
first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first telegram has been
published; this second telegram does not seem to have been published.

This system of spreading false news was extended to the United States,
and its effect there will be duly dealt with in this volume. It should
be added here that a German Press Bureau was also set up at The Hague,
partly in order to influence the people of Holland, and partly that
German-Americans passing through Holland on their way back to America
might be suitably informed. One of the special correspondents at The
Hague wrote:

The bureau apparently is to be run on a most elaborate scale by
very clever men. To counter this the British Consul-General has
been issuing bulletins, but for such services the amount of money
available in a British department is small, whereas German ventures
for supplying "truths" have always limitless resources. To show how
dangerous the German Press campaign in Holland already is I may mention
that the German Consulate in Rotterdam has posted up throughout the
town the audacious statement that "notwithstanding all reports to the
contrary, it is hereby officially and openly declared that thousands of
dum-dum bullets have been found on the British and French prisoners.
The denials of the British Government are in contradiction to the
statements of their officers, who have declared upon their word of
honour that such ammunition was also issued for their revolvers." It
is suggested that the names of the officers should have been demanded,
but it is felt that if the British authorities here did so the Germans
would not have hesitated to name several distinguished prisoners, and
they would have had no chance of refuting the charge until the end of
the war.

This alone shows how cleverly Germany seeks to poison the minds
especially of Holland and America. The danger will increase when the
Press Bureau opens. The Dutch Government, I am assured, has striven and
is striving to be absolutely correct in its attitude towards England
and Germany.

There may have been cases in which Belgians, driven mad by their
sufferings, have been guilty of outrages, but the German charge as a
whole is absolutely untrue. On the other hand, the Belgian Government
at Antwerp has, I am assured, convincing proof that the German troops
have been guilty of every crime and brutality.

Belgians of the highest rank who recently visited The Hague describe
the spirit of Antwerp as splendid. The Belgian Prime Minister is
proving himself a second Kitchener. He holds undisputed sway, and is
absolutely trusted by everyone.

       *       *       *       *       *

The same correspondent added that it would be impracticable to try
to starve Germany out by blockading the Dutch Coast, as hardly any
foodstuffs were being sent to Germany through Holland.

       *       *       *       *       *

The campaign of mendacity organised by Germans in the United States was
also carried into Canada. The _Montreal Star_ stated that on August
20th a well-known Montreal lawyer received a letter from a prominent
German resident of New York in which was given as an authenticated
fact, which the British censors had suppressed, the story of the
sinking of seven British Dreadnoughts by German torpedo-boats. A
banker was assured by a German acquaintance in New York that Germany
had officially announced the destruction of an English seaport--name
not given--by bombs from a Zeppelin. Another lawyer was asked
confidentially to suggest the best means of getting this "news" from
German sources to the Montreal public.

A Montreal citizen sent to the _Canadian Gazette_ the following
paragraph from the New _Yorker Staats Zeitung_, as circulated in Canada:

 New York, _August 18th_.--We have very favourable news from private
 letters concerning the Zeppelin airships. The question has often
 been asked: "Where are the Zeppelins, and what are they doing?" The
 following information received in a private letter speaks for itself:

 "Every night the Zeppelin airships go out to the North Sea, and when
 they return there is an English battleship destroyed. Nineteen English
 battleships have been destroyed so far."



CHAPTER III

 Position of Italy--German Intrigues--the Triple Alliance--Turkey's
 Activity--Plans for Attacking Egypt--A British Warning.


THE war had hardly begun before Italy officially announced her
intention of remaining neutral. From German sources rumours were
circulated to the effect that dissension had arisen in the Italian
Cabinet between Signor Salandra (the Prime Minister) and the Marchese
di San Giuliano (the Foreign Minister). These rumours, however, proved
to be unfounded, and certainly the Italian Government presented
not only a correct attitude but a united front both to the Triple
Entente and to her partners in the Triple Alliance. It may be briefly
mentioned why Italy, although nominally one of the members of the
Triplice--Germany, Austria and Italy--should nevertheless have chosen
to remain inactive while her nominal allies were engaged in fighting
Servia, Russia, France, England, Belgium, and Montenegro.

After her defeat by Germany in 1870, France found herself for a long
time unable to exercise any great influence over European politics.
Indeed, the first administrators of the Third Republic were encouraged,
or rather compelled, by Bismarck to seek an outlet for their
superfluous energies in other parts of the world; and it is from the
conclusion of the Franco-German War that we may date the real beginning
of the French colonial empire. The remarkable success of the French
efforts in Algiers, Tunis, and other parts of Northern and Central
Africa aroused the jealousy of the Germans very early in the present
century; but two decades previously Italy had become exasperated by
the French invasion and absorption of Tunis, which gave to France not
merely a very strong position in the Mediterranean but the use of many
safe harbours.

Eager to seize the advantage of having a powerful ally in the
Mediterranean, Germany and Austria, who had just previously entered
into a dual alliance, made overtures to Italy, and the dual became
a Triple Alliance in 1883. The measure was merely a political one.
It benefited none of the parties to it economically; and Italy, by
invading Tripoli in 1911, withdrew from it by that very act. It was, of
course, obvious that such a step on the part of Italy rendered her in
some measure dependent upon the French goodwill. Apart from this fact,
the alliance had never been popular among the Italian people, who had
no very great affection for Germans and intensely disliked Austrians.
Memories of the Austrian onslaught of 1866 were still very strong when
the alliance was formed; and they are almost as strong to-day. There is
still a powerful political group in Italy known as the Irredentists;
and it may be said that at a time of political crisis, especially when
Austria and Germany are involved, the whole nation becomes irredentist.
The party takes its name from those fairly considerable sections of
what was once Italian territory and where Italian is still spoken, but
which are now in the possession of other Powers. These territories,
known as _Italia Irredenta_ ("Unredeemed Italy") include the Southern
Tyrol (the "Trentino") Görz, Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia; and also
the Swiss Canton of Tessin (Ticino), Nice, Corsica and Malta.

The Italian expedition to Tripoli in 1911 caused intense
dissatisfaction, which was but ill-concealed, in Germany and Austria.
Both the Teutonic countries in the partnership objected to their
nominal ally increasing her power in the Mediterranean--Germany because
such an action would "lock up" many thousands of Italian troops in
Tripoli who might be wanted elsewhere, and Austria because she feared
that such a movement might indicate a desire on the part of the
Italian people to expand in yet other directions. Although some of the
so-called Italia Irredenta is held by England and some by France, the
animosity of the Irredentists, as of the Italian nation as a whole,
is directed exclusively against Austria, and in recent years cordial
relations have sprung up between Italy and France. Between Italy and
England, of course, relations have always been friendly, and not least
so since the days of Garibaldi. The enthusiastic demonstrations held
by the Italians in London and Paris after the declaration of war to
show their sympathy with the Allies was a striking manifestation of the
trend of Italian feeling generally.

Further, there were at least two other reasons why Italy showed no
willingness to help her partners in the war. When the Italian army
was taking possession of Tripoli coast line under the protection of
the Italian fleet, the Austrian Government, under various pretexts,
concentrated large masses of troops in the direction of the Italian
frontier. Nothing came of this move, but it caused great resentment in
Italy at the time. Again, when the first Balkan War came to an end,
an acute European crisis arose over the possession of Albania. In
this westernmost possession of Turkey, Austrian and Italian interests
predominated, and Russia's attempt to secure a pathway to the sea for
Servia were ineffectual. After much argument it was finally resolved
that Albania should be proclaimed an independent state, and after a
long search a Teutonic nobleman, the Prince of Wied, was found willing
to assume the crown.

As is well known, Albania from the very first was in a turbulent
condition, and various causes rendered the tenure of the Prince of
Wied's kingship highly uncertain. In the first place, the century-old
jealousy among the ruling chiefs made it difficult to form a cabinet on
the western model; and in the second place the Greeks felt that they
had a right to the Epirus--that province of uncertain boundaries lying
to the north of Greece and to the south of Albania and inhabited by
people of an unmistakable Greek stamp known as the Epirotes. As soon
as the independence of Albania was announced, the Epirotes, under one
of their best known public men, M. Zographos, rose in revolt, and for
several months carried on an intermittent warfare against the newly
constituted Albanian Government.

It was openly asserted in the Austrian Press that the Epirotes were
being aided by Greece, who wished to recover the province; but there
was another group who held that the insurgents were deriving their
assistance from Italy, who wished by this means to destroy the
authority of the Austrians in the northern part of Albania. Italian
interests in Albania, as had always been emphasised, converged on the
important harbour known as Vallona Bay, which lies almost directly
opposite Brindisi. After the outbreak of the present war, this group
strongly urged that Italy was merely holding back for the time being
in order that she might at a subsequent date make a raid on this
part of Albania and annex the territory she desired. The importance
of Vallona Bay will be shown by a glance at the map. Austria's only
exit to the open sea lies through the Straits of Otranto, which are
about forty-five miles wide at the narrowest points, viz: Otranto
on the Italian side and Cape Glossa at the mouth of Vallona Bay on
the opposite side. It is obvious that if Italy had both these points
strongly fortified, it would be practically impossible for an Austrian
fleet to pass through.

Whatever Italy's ultimate designs may be--and they are not clear at the
time of writing--the fact remains that down to the middle of September,
she had taken no steps in the direction of swerving from the neutrality
which she had proclaimed at the beginning of the war.

Throughout August various hints were given as to what Italy might lose
by not joining her Allies and what she might gain if she did join them.
It soon became evident, however, even to the German Press, that Italy,
whatever she did, would certainly not come into the firing line with
Germany and Austria; and from about the middle of August onwards the
inspired German Press confined itself to expressing the hope that their
partner's Government would not at least join the other side. On August
14th, for example, the _Vossische Zeitung_ said: "After several years
of alliance the very minimum that Germany can demand from Italy is a
neutrality, not half-hearted, but having Germany's real welfare in
view." This was the tone adopted by the other semi-official organs of
the Government about this time.

This change of tone in the German Press, which at first seemed to take
it for granted that Italy would join her Allies enthusiastically, must
have been due either to forgetfulness or to an entire misconception
of the Italian nation. If, to take an inconceivable hypothesis, the
Italian Government had wished to go to war on behalf of Germany against
the wishes of the Italian people, and if, further, Italy, like Germany,
had been composed of a powerful ruling caste and a well-drilled
population, no doubt the Italian army would have invaded France. Unlike
Germany, however, Italy is composed of peoples whose nature are of a
more independent character, and whose form of government is entirely
different.

As soon as war broke out, it was clear that the sympathies of the
Italian people were wholly on the side of England, France, and Russia,
and that it was the wish of the people, if it became necessary to draw
the sword, to wield it in such a way as to recover Italia Irredenta,
which happened to be under Austrian rule.

It should be remarked that Italy's obligations under her treaty of
alliance with Germany and Austria did not compel her to take part in
any war unless the war were a purely defensive one; and the Government
at Rome made it clear from the first that it regarded the action of
Austria towards Servia, and the action of Germany towards France and
Belgium, as aggressive.

In spite of reiterated assurances of neutrality, it was persistently
rumoured, particularly in Paris, that Italy would declare war on
Austria at almost any moment. Although no general mobilisation
order was issued at Rome, it was understood that several classes of
reservists had been called up. It was indeed felt that any action which
Italy might take ought to be taken soon. Well-known military and naval
experts, such as Admiral Mahan, expressed the view that Italy "would do
well to make her strength felt early."

On August 29th an incident was reported which seemed to show that the
decisive step might come at any time. On the previous day information
was received at Malta to the effect that Herr von Bitzow, who had
been acting as German Consul at Tripoli, had been carrying on an
anti-Italian propaganda among the natives; and it was even alleged that
he had issued a secret manifesto urging them to make demonstrations.
The Italian Government, with more than its usual promptitude, had
the offending Consul arrested and removed to Italy, at the same time
lodging a protest with the German Foreign Office. No more was heard of
this incident at the time; but, as may easily be imagined if it had
occurred at any other juncture it would have brought about an acute
crisis within the radius of the Triple Alliance.

How the situation was developed was made clear from a long statement
sent to London, by a circuitous route, by the Rome correspondent
of _The Daily Telegraph_, and published on September 5th. He said
that the Italian fleet was fully mobilised, and was ready for all
eventualities. The battle fleet was concentrated at Taranto, under the
able and energetic command of the Duke of the Abruzzi. No decree had
been issued for the complete mobilisation of the army; but six classes
of reservists had been called out. The calling out of fifteen classes
would be tantamount to a general mobilisation. Very careful and very
thorough preparations were being made. Troops were being slowly and
methodically concentrated on the Austrian frontier. Those stationed
on the French frontier, except the ordinary peace garrisons and
depôt troops, had already been transferred. Any idea of Italy acting
against France was out of the question; but these preparations did not
necessarily mean war with Austria.

The Italian Government, clearly enough, was fully alive to the
situation. Italy wished to bide her time till the psychological moment
arrived. That moment had not yet arrived. In any case, the Government
was anxious not to precipitate events until after the Conclave electing
the new Pope had finished its labours.

All sailings of the Veloce transatlantic liners were suspended at this
time. This was regarded as significant, as transports would not be
needed unless Italy were contemplating landing troops either in Albania
or on Austrian soil.

       *       *       *       *       *

The correspondent added:

If Italy goes to war with Austria it will be a popular war. The
Government knows well that if Germany and Austria win they will bear
as great a grudge against Italy for remaining neutral as they would if
she threw in her lot against them. It is most important, therefore,
that Italy should see to it that Germany and Austria do not win. If,
on the other hand, the Triple Entente and their allies win, all Italy
can hope for on the conclusion of hostilities is the cession of Trent
and the protectorate of Central Albania, with Valona as a reward for
her neutrality. Whereas if Italy threw in her lot against Germany and
Austria she could hope to recover Trieste and to establish a sound
military reputation into the bargain. Moreover, if Italy remains
neutral she is likely to experience before long grave economic and
social unrest. Italy is very hardly hit by the war. There is a great
deal of unemployment. All this would be forgotten if she went to war;
and although the problems would recur after the peace, there is much
to be said for putting off the evil hour till after the new settlement.

All these facts point to the conclusion that Italy will eventually
go to war with Austria. But the moment has not arrived yet. She will
have no difficulty in finding a pretext. She may find one in Albania,
or in the treatment of Italians in Trieste. The Government may plead
the irresistible pressure of public opinion. There is no need for
Italy to feel any shame at turning against her old allies, as there is
no disguising the fact that she had remained a member of the Triple
Alliance for purely time-serving purposes. When she does act, she will
act with vigour.

The Marchese di San Giuliano has been for some time in very poor
health. He is better again now, and is back in Rome. Among a certain
section of the public and of the Press he has been called upon to
resign. A more decisive and clearer policy is demanded. But, as a
matter of fact, he is likely to remain at his post, as it is felt
that there is no man able to fill it of his experience and capacity.
The country as a whole has confidence in him. The same may be said of
the Prime Minister, Signor Salandra. Since he has been at the head of
affairs he has made something of a reputation, and he is known to be
a sound economist. The financial position of Italy is not rosy, but
there is every reason to hope that the critical period through which
she is now passing will be successfully negotiated. Her entry into the
war would not materially augment her difficulties on this score.

       *       *       *       *       *

Hardly less important than the German negotiations with Italy--first,
with regard to participation, and, secondly, with regard to
neutrality--were the German negotiations with Turkey. It will be
recalled that Germany has for nearly two generations had considerable
interests in the Turkish Army, both in Europe and in Asia; and it was
to a German officer, General von der Goltz Pasha, that the Ottoman
Army owed such organisation as it had when Turkey was invaded by the
troops of the Balkan League in 1912. On the retirement of General von
der Goltz, the Turks asked for further military "advice" and assistance
from Berlin, and in reply to their request the German Government "lent"
them another experienced officer, General Liman von Sanders (whom
several North and South American papers confused with General Leman,
the defender of Liège). It was commented upon at the time as curious
that when General Liman von Sanders took up his appointment a year or
so ago, he brought with him 200 German colonels as assistants, whom he
placed at the head of Turkish regiments, together with several officers
of lesser rank. The Turkish Army thus became, for all practical
purposes, a German war machine, led by Germans, officered by Germans,
supplied with German rifles, ammunition and artillery, and liable to
march when the word of command was given to the Turkish Government by a
German diplomatist.

Europe was astonished to learn early in August that Turkey had decided
to mobilise. As the result of an energetic protest by the British and
French Ambassadors at Constantinople, it was explained that the measure
was purely precautionary, and that the Porte did not intend to take
any active steps. There the matter was left for a day or two, when the
incident of the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ occurred. The former was one
of Germany's largest cruisers, and the latter a smaller one of less
importance. Both these vessels, in company with a third, had spent a
few days after the opening of the war in bombarding undefended towns
in Algiers and Tunis. A combined French and English squadron gave
chase, and the result was that a German cruiser was sunk. In spite of
the efforts of the pursuers, the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ escaped,
first of all to Italian waters, and then after a short pause to the
Dardanelles.

As Turkey was a neutral country, international law required that the
two cruisers should be either dismantled or sent away. Neither of
these courses was adopted. Instead it was announced that the Turkish
Government had decided to buy the _Goeben_--the _Breslau_ was not
mentioned, but was presumed to be included in the purchase--in view of
the fact that two battleships which had been in process of completion
for Turkey in British dockyards, had been seized by our Admiralty
for possible use against Germany. Turkey complained that this would
alter the balance of naval power as between herself and Greece, to the
advantage of the latter.

Even legal experts were at variance as to whether Turkey was justified
as a neutral country in purchasing the warships of a belligerent.
Politically speaking, this was a matter of small consequence.
Diplomatists, knowing the close relations existing between Turkey and
Germany, were inclined rather to ask whether this alleged purchase was
not merely an excuse for assuring the safety of an expensive warship,
which would certainly have been sunk either by a French or by a British
squadron on emerging from the Dardanelles. Up to the time of going to
press that question has not been satisfactorily answered.

The Constantinople Correspondent of _The Daily Telegraph_ reported that
just before he left Constantinople on August 4th, the Germans there
spread all kinds of wild rumours which were given the imprint of their
Embassy--such, for example, as that M. Poincaré had been assassinated,
that civil war had broken out in France, that the Germans had entered
Belgium triumphantly, and that their arrival in Paris was imminent.
Moreover, the German and Austrian diplomatists told Turkey confidently
that the German and Austrian armies would very soon be both in Paris
and Warsaw. They held out to the Turks various alluring propositions,
such as the suppression of the capitulations, the crushing of the
Russian "Colossus," and so on, in order to induce the Turks not to
proclaim their neutrality, but rather to adopt a hostile attitude
towards Russia and consequently to the Triple Entente. In face of the
superhuman efforts made by the German and Austrian agents the diplomacy
of the Triple Entente remained inactive.

The German military mission under General Liman von Sanders, on its
side, commenced an agitation parallel with that of Austro-German
diplomacy among the Turkish officers, most of whom had received their
training and education in Germany. However, the Grand Vizier, Djavid
Bey, Talaat Bey, and Djemal Pasha, but not Enver Pasha, struggled
to secure in the Council of Ministers the triumph of the policy of
strictest neutrality, persuaded that for Turkey it was preferable to
maintain an attitude of prudent expectation and not to enter into
any engagement. Experience had shown them that their Balkan enemies,
for the moment divided among themselves, would probably end by
reconstituting their alliance and falling on the Turks, and agreeing
among themselves as to the partition of Turkey in Europe. These
considerations prevailed, and the Ottoman Government proclaimed strict
neutrality, while taking all military and naval precautions which
events dictated. This was solemnly declared by Talaat Bey and Djavid
Bey in Parliament on Sunday, August 2nd.

By August 31st, however, the situation had again become grave. It
was stated that Turkey might declare war at any moment--it was only
a matter of a few days, and it might be less. All the efforts of the
Powers of the Triple Entente had failed, and the situation at the
Turkish Embassy in London was admitted to be extremely grave. The
arrival of the _Panther_ at Smyrna was thought to be the concluding
incident in Turkey's preparations, as it was understood that the
vessel, like the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, was to be bought by Turkey.

The military party at Constantinople, headed by Enver Pasha, was now
practically dominant, and it was declared that if the Grand Vizier
raised objections he would be replaced. This party had come to the
conclusion, in which it was carefully supported by Germany, that the
time was ripe for throwing its full fighting force into the balance
and securing the restoration of Macedonia--at any rate of the whole
Salonika district, as well as the islands which were conquered by
Greece in the war.

German officers and men in large numbers were now pouring into
Constantinople to help the Turkish army and navy in the coming
campaign. Germany was practically taking over the control of the fleet
as well as of the army, and it was thought that Turkey would thus be
able to meet the Greek navy on the open sea. Turkey, too, apparently
counted on the fact that if she declared war the Balkan States would
quarrel among themselves. On the contrary, it was held in Triple
Entente circles that the Balkan Alliance against her, which had been so
successful in the first war, would be once again called into existence.

Moreover, the intervention of Turkey into the sphere of hostilities,
although nominally directed against Greece only, would have been
regarded as a declaration of war by the Powers of the Triple Entente.
They would have lent the Balkan Powers the support of their fleets in
the Mediterranean, in which case they would soon have disposed of all
the Turkish and German ships.

The British Government was fully aware, as were all the other Allies,
of the gravity of the situation, and of the fact that attempts would be
made to create trouble in Egypt, in India, and elsewhere. They warned
Turkey that in starting on any such campaign she would be signing her
own death-warrant.

The suggestion that an attempt would be made to stir up an insurrection
in Egypt was certainly plausible, though it may be pointed out that the
German diplomatists at the same time made another suggestion which, if
carried out, would have been equally effective or ineffective. Although
England is practically mistress of Egypt, Egypt is nevertheless in all
strictness not British territory, but Turkish territory, administered
by British officials. It might, therefore, have been argued with some
show of reasonableness that any movement of troops against Egypt on the
part of Turkey could not be construed by us in an unfriendly sense, as
Turkey would, after all, merely be moving troops from one part of her
own territories to another.

The second German suggestion was that the Turkish Army Corps at Bagdad
might be moved towards the Persian Gulf with the object of quelling the
risings in the neighbourhood of Koweit, which is in an almost perpetual
state of unrest. It happens that the Persian Gulf has always admittedly
been an English sphere of influence, and that the small Province of
Koweit, governed by a Sheik, was not unconnected with the proposed
termination of the Bagdad Railway. The status of the Sheik of Koweit
has always been obscure and was supposed to have been "regulated" by
the Anglo-Turkish agreement, the details of which were under discussion
when war broke out. It might conceivably be urged that here again
Turkey could move masses of troops to another part of her own territory
and thus strike indirectly on Great Britain.

In reply to these statements and the dishonourable implications which
they conveyed, both the Turkish Ambassadors in London and Paris and the
Turkish Department for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople gave explicit
assurances that Turkey would not take any step inconsistent with her
neutrality. It must be remembered that ever since the revolution in
1908, Turkey had received very little practical assistance from
Germany, apart from the tinkering with her army. The best advisory
officials and all the money were supplied to the Ottoman Government
by France and Great Britain. Further, it was believed that, even in
the face of German bribes and threats, Turkey would hold back if only
out of regard for the stability of her rather precarious empire of
Thrace in Asia Minor. In view of a possible Turkish participation in
the war, Russia had taken the precautionary measure of massing, it was
said, more than half a million troops on the Turkish frontier; and if
the Turks had intervened on behalf of Germany, it was believed that
Roumania and Greece would take the field on behalf of England, France,
and Russia. The position of Bulgaria was fully realised to be more
doubtful, as out of all the countries constituting the Balkan League,
Bulgaria had profited least as the result of the campaign in 1912-13;
and she had vainly appealed for some kind of "compensation" to both
groups of the Great Powers.

On September 4th, Roumania, it was announced for the first time,
had joined the Great Powers in warning Turkey that a breach of her
neutrality would be fraught with disastrous consequences to the
Ottoman Empire. In view of the questions at issue between Turkey and
Greece, delegates met at the Roumanian capital, Bucharest, to discuss
matters. On September 6th, however, the Ambassadors representing
France, England, and Russia at Constantinople deemed it advisable once
more to warn the Austrian Government, and it was stated that many
European families in Constantinople were beginning to leave the city,
as it seemed probable that war was about to be declared. It was clear
from the diplomatic intelligence which came through that the Turkish
Government had itself decided for neutrality, but was being swayed in
its decision by the German Ambassador at Constantinople, Baron von
Wanggenheim.

It need hardly be added that during this period of grave tension,
German Press agents were busy in the Balkans generally. Extraordinary
reports were sent to the newspapers in Athens, Sofia, and Bucharest,
with the customary object of showing that Germany was winning in every
direction and would eventually be the strongest Power in Europe. The
German Minister in Athens declared at the end of August that no German
port had been blockaded by the British Fleet, and that the North Sea
was still open for German commerce.



CHAPTER IV

 Polish Independence--The Tsar's Rescript--Japanese Action--Germany in
 the Far East--Samoa and Togoland.


IF German diplomacy had been at work, assuredly diplomatists on the
other side had not been idle. One of the most dramatic announcements
in connection with the war was that contained in the Tsar's rescript
undertaking that, in the event of a Russian victory, the remains of the
Kingdom of Poland, which had been divided among Germany, Austria, and
Russia, would be united under the kingship of the Tsar.

 "Poles!" said the rescript. "The hour has struck in which the fervent
 dream of your fathers and forefathers can be realised.

 "A century and a half ago the living body of Poland was torn in
 pieces, but her soul has not perished. It lives on in the hope that
 the hour of the renaissance of the Polish nation, of its fraternal
 reconciliation with Great Russia, will come.

 "Russian troops bring you the glad tidings of this reconciliation.

 "May the frontiers be obliterated which split up the Polish nation.
 May it unite itself under the sceptre of the Russian Tsars.

 "Under this sceptre Poland will be born anew, free in her faith, her
 speech, and her self-government.

 "One thing only Russia expects from you--like regard for the rights of
 the nationalities with which history has connected you.

 "With open heart, with outstretched, brotherly hand, Great Russia
 approaches you. She believes that the sword which overthrew the enemy
 at Gruenwald has not rusted.

 "From the shores of the Pacific to the northern seas the Russian war
 forces are moving forward.

 "The dawn of a new life is opening upon you. May the Sign of the Cross
 shine forth from this dawning symbol of sufferings and resurrection of
 nations."

The Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaievitch, Commander-in-Chief of the
Russian Forces, also issued an order making it known to the active army
and the whole population of the Empire that Russia was waging war in
consequence of the challenge thrown down by the common enemy of all
Slavs.

The order proceeds:

 "The Poles in Russia and those of Germany and Austria who show their
 loyalty to the Slav cause will have the special protection of the
 Russian Army and Government in so far as their personal and material
 security is concerned.

 "Any attempt to interfere with the personal rights of Poles who have
 not been guilty of acts hostile to Russia will be punished with all
 the severity of martial law."

The moment was ripe for the issue of such a proclamation, for it
naturally tended to unite the Poles on the side of Russia. It was
not, however, a proclamation drawn up on the spur of the moment and
published in August for the sake of its immediate effect. As soon
as the news was known in Paris, M. Gabriel Hanotaux, writing in the
_Figaro_, made a remarkable announcement in connection with the Tsar's
rescript granting self-government to all three Polands. M. Hanotaux
revealed the fact that the Tsar himself, as long ago as eighteen years,
then a young Sovereign, confided to him his dream of reviving Poland.

"In this memorable interview, of which I took down every detail, he
himself broached the painful subject, and said, 'I know what my duties
are towards our Slav brethren of Poland.' For eighteen years I did
not breathe a word of this interview, but I can speak now. Since then
I followed the gradual and wise demonstrations of the Imperial will.
At various intervals pacifying measures, too often hampered by the
bureaucracy and by certain parties at Court, proved that the Emperor
had not lost sight of his purpose. When lately, against the wish of
the Council of the Empire, he promulgated _proprio motu_ an ukase
announcing that his Imperial Majesty wished Poland to preserve the
official use of her tongue and the right to direct recourse to the
supreme authority, I felt that the moment of realization was at hand."

On the same subject, Mr. Sidney Whitman, another well-known authority,
writing to the _Pall Mall Gazette_ (August 21st), said:

SIR.--It may not be known to the generality of your readers that the
Tsar's intention to resuscitate the kingdom of Poland--at least as
far as regards Russian Poland--is by no means a new project. It was
already entertained by the Emperor Alexander I., but came to nothing.
It is matter of common knowledge that Polish autonomy was one of the
items in the programme of the Zemstow Congress in Moscow in 1905 and
was unanimously supported by the Polish delegates. Of less common
knowledge, however, is the fact that some of the most distinguished of
the Russian delegates were also in favour of it. When I was in that
city in November, 1905, as special correspondent of the _New York
Herald_, I had occasion to discuss this question with Prince Eugene
Troubetzkoi, Alexander Gutschkoff, and Prince Paul Dolgoroukow, the
Marshal of the Moscow nobility.

Prince Troubetzkoi's words to me were as follows:

"In my opinion, Poland must receive a form of self-government, the
exact nature of which, however, in view of the peculiar conditions
which exist through the close proximity of Austrian and Prussian
Poland, can only be the subject of careful consideration. The question
has been discussed from two different points of view by the members of
the Zemstow Congress; they are unanimous, however, with regard to one
point, which is that no rupture or break in the unity of the Russian
Empire shall take place."

During a stay in Warsaw a few days previously I found, much to my
surprise, that the antagonism of the educated Poles towards the
Russian régime was much less marked than towards Prussia and even
towards Austria, where, as everybody knows, the Galician Poles are
more liberally treated than either in Russia or Prussia. I also found
unanimity among the same class of people with regard to the view that
for economical reasons alone Poland could not afford to be cut off from
the Russian Empire, in which the Poles find the best market for their
industry, which has made great strides in the course of the present
generation. Another consideration in favour of Poland retaining its
connection with Russia is that the Russian Empire opens up a wide field
for good careers to the more intelligent of the Poles in nearly every
sphere of life.

These features seem to speak in favour of the ultimate realization of
the Tsar's project in face of victory in the present war.

       *       *       *       *       *

This rescript regarding Poland, of course, was different from the
Tsar's Imperial manifesto to the Russian people, which met with such an
enthusiastic response. This manifesto was issued on Sunday, August 2nd,
to justify Russia's armed opposition to Germany, and it said:

By the grace of God, we, Nicholas II., Emperor and Autocrat of all the
Russias, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., to all our
faithful subjects make known that Russia, related by faith and blood to
the Slav peoples and faithful to her historical traditions, has never
regarded their fates with indifference. The fraternal sentiments of the
Russian people for the Slavs has been awakened with perfect unanimity
and extraordinary force these last few days, when Austria-Hungary
knowingly addressed to Servia claims inacceptable for an independent
State.

Having paid no attention to the pacific and conciliatory reply of the
Servian Government, and having rejected the benevolent intervention of
Russia, Austria made haste to proceed to an armed attack and began to
bombard Belgrade, an open place. Forced by the situation thus created
to take the necessary measures of precaution, we ordered the Army and
Navy to be put on a war footing, while using every endeavour to obtain
a peaceful solution of the _pourparlers_ begun, for the blood and
property of our subjects are dear to us.

Amid friendly relations with Germany and her ally Austria, contrary
to our hopes in our good neighbourly relations of long date and
disregarding our assurances that the measures taken were in pursuance
of no object hostile to her, Germany began to demand their immediate
cessation. Having been rebuffed in this demand, she suddenly declared
war on Russia. To-day it is not only the protection of the country
related to us and unjustly attacked that must be carried out, but we
must also safeguard the honour, dignity, and integrity of Russia and
her position among the Great Powers.

While these diplomatic steps were being taken in the West, our Allies
in the Far East were not idle. Before, however, reference is made to
the action taken by Japan at an early stage in the war, a brief account
may be given of Germany's varied interests and scattered possessions in
the Far East.

Early in November, 1897, two missionaries from the Fatherland were
waylaid and killed by professional robbers in a remote part of the
Province of Shantung. It was a regrettable incident, for which China,
in the ordinary way, would have made any amends in her power, but it
offered Germany an opportunity she had long desired of acquiring a
naval base on easy terms on the Yellow Sea.

A few days after the murder of the missionaries, the Kaiser's Pacific
Squadron anchored in Kiao-Chau, an ultimatum being sent to the Chinese
general to leave with his troops within three hours. He did so under
protest; the German flag was hoisted, and after negotiations with Pekin
the matter was settled in March, 1898, by the leasing of the bay and
adjacent territory to the Emperor for ninety-nine years, a period which
everyone at the time concluded would be indefinitely extended. It was
this lease, obtained in so flagrant a way, which Japan was so soon to
tear up.

Facing the Yellow Sea, about 350 miles in a direct line south-east of
Pekin, and almost opposite the southern extremity of Korea, the bay
of Kiao-Chau is less than two miles wide at its entrance. Within it
extends over an area of something like 150 square miles of deep water,
affording at all times a safe anchorage for ships of any size. The
German naval base of Tsing-Tau stands on the north-east shore, at the
outlet of the bay, which is entirely surrounded by hills from 400ft. to
600ft. high, most of them offering admirable sites for fortifications.

If the defensive works, planned when the place was seized, have been
carried out and fully armed, the harbour must present formidable
obstacles to a sea attack, while the land approaches are guarded by a
series of fortifications across the head of the peninsula. The garrison
consists of 5,000 German marines and a small force of Chinese soldiers,
the remainder of the white population being very inconsiderable.

Described as the key to Northern China, Kiao-Chau, besides its value
as a harbour of refuge for warships, is of considerable commercial
importance. The district inland under German authority abounds in
mineral and metalliferous wealth, an abundant supply of good coal being
not the least of its riches. The local native industries are chiefly
connected with fruits and vegetables, silk culture, brewing, and
soap-making. Two years ago the imports amounted in value to £5,746,900
and the exports to £4,014,750. In the winter months the harbour is the
natural outlet for the trade of Northern China, a railway 272 miles
long, from Tsing-Tau to Poshan, having much increased its value in this
direction.

Besides Tsing-Tau, Germany owns many scattered possessions in the
Pacific, all of which it may be thought desirable to take charge of,
if not by reason of their actual worth, yet to prevent their use as
wireless stations or hiding-places for commerce-destroying cruisers.

One of the most important Teutonic properties in the Southern
Pacific stretches along the northern coast of eastern New Guinea.
When it was taken over by the Berlin Government in 1884, it received
the name of Kaiser Wilhelm Land, its new owners entertaining high
expectations as to its future, though the Australians greatly disliked
the establishment of a German colony so close to their shores. The
territory shares the fertility of all other Pacific regions. The
cultivated area is probably about 50,000 acres, and susceptible of
almost indefinite extension.

Coco, sago, and other palms are largely grown; ebony wood and bamboo
is exported in large quantities, as well as copra and mother-of-pearl
shells, which the natives collect for exchange against European goods.
The hills are densely wooded with tropical vegetation, but in the
clearings a good many cattle and goats are kept. With Long and Dampier
Islands, German New Guinea is 70,000 square miles in extent, and has a
population of 530,000 natives, besides 700 whites, of whom 90 per cent.
come from the Fatherland.

In the same year that Germany absorbed the above-mentioned colony at
the back-door of the Australian continent, she also took over the
closely adjoining Bismarck Archipelago, containing 20,000 square miles.
Here again the soil is fertile from the seashore up to the mountain
ranges, where gold in paying quantities has been found. The islands,
which are of very varied sizes, export cotton, coffee, copra, and
rubber, the latter chiefly grown by a white population numbering under
500. The natives, with a considerable intermixture of Chinese, number
188,000. The seat of the Government, both for the Archipelago and
Kaiser Wilhelm Land, is Herbertshöhe, in the main island.

Still further to the south-east a part of the Solomon group is under
the Teutonic flag, including the considerable islands of Bougainville
and Buka, both doing a large trade in sandal wood, tortoiseshell, and
other tropical products. The Caroline, Ladrone, and Pelew Islands, in
all 160 square miles, and the Marshall Islands, 160 square miles in
extent, all form part of the German New Guinea Protectorate. Amongst
the largest of these is Babelthuap, the remainder ranging downwards in
size to uninhabited coral or volcanic rocks scattered about the waste
of Pacific waters. Their total white population is not more than 1,500.

In the Samoan group Germany was, until early in September, a neighbour
of the United States, her possessions here including Savaii and Upolu.
She obtained them in November, 1899. The former has an area of 660
and the latter of 340 square miles, the native inhabitants being
respectively 12,800 and 20,600, the Europeans numbering about 500. All
the islands are extremely productive, copra and cocoa beans being chief
articles of export, while a considerable trade in rubber has lately
arisen. Wireless stations exist at Apia, the capital, as at Nauru, in
the Marshall Islands.

Some time after the outbreak of war an expedition was sent against
Samoa from New Zealand, and on Thursday, September 3rd, a message
reached the Governor at Wellington to the effect that the German
Governor of Samoa had surrendered, and had been sent with other
prisoners to Fiji. The landing of troops was carried out with great
expedition, and the Union Jack was hoisted at half-past twelve on the
afternoon of August 29th.

In the middle of August it was thought desirable that Japan should
move, and the decision to this effect was announced on the evening of
August 17th in the following statement by the Press Bureau:

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, having been in
communication with each other, are of opinion that it is necessary for
each to take action to protect the general interests in the Far East
contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping especially in
view the independence and integrity of China, as provided for in that
agreement.

It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the
Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be
necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor beyond
Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, or to any foreign territory
except territory in German occupation on the continent of Eastern Asia.

Two days before this the following ultimatum was delivered by Japan to
Germany, through the medium of the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin:

We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation
to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance of peace in
the Far East, and to safeguard general interests as contemplated in the
Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain.

In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the
establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial
Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give advice
to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two
propositions:

(1) Withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters the German
men-o'-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those
which cannot be withdrawn.

(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15th, to the Imperial
Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire
leased territory of Kiao-Chau, with a view to the eventual restoration
of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the
event of its not receiving, by noon on August 23rd, an answer from the
Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the
above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan will
be compelled to take such action as it may deem necessary to meet the
situation.

Some anxiety was felt lest this step should not meet with approval
in the United States, in view of the anti-Japanese feeling there;
but following a conference between President Wilson and Mr. Bryan,
President Wilson said to newspaper men that the Government had
assurances from Japan that the latter would preserve the territorial
integrity of China in the event of Germany forcing war on Japan by
rejecting the Japanese ultimatum. The President said no reason was
apparent for the belief that Japan would try to draw the United States
into the conflict, and that America would preserve its neutrality;
but, at the same time, would insist that Japan should do everything
to preserve the integrity of China. The action of Japan created no
surprise in Washington, as it had been expected.

No reply was given by the German Government, and in consequence the
Japanese proceeded to invest Kaio-Chau. Within a couple of weeks they
had occupied seven small islands in the neighbourhood of the German
concession, and had removed over 1,000 mines from the adjacent waters.
The case for Japan was stated explicitly at a special session of the
Japanese Diet which began on Saturday, September 5th. A full account
of the proceedings is contained in the following Reuter's telegram from
Tokyo:

Count Okuma, the Premier, said he believed that the reasons leading to
the convoking of a special session would be thoroughly understood. He
asked for the support of Parliament, and said the army and navy were
doing their full duty. He asked the Diet to pass the extraordinary
Budget framed in connection with the war.

Baron Kato, in his speech, reviewed the events leading up to the
war between Japan and Germany, and the breaking off of diplomatic
relations with Austria. He first outlined the situation in Europe,
showing that force of circumstances had decided Great Britain to
participate in the war. Continuing, he said, "Early in August the
British Government asked the Imperial Government for assistance under
the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. German men-of-war and armed
vessels were prowling around the seas of Eastern Asia, menacing our
commerce and that of our ally, while Kiao-Chau was carrying out
operations apparently for the purpose of constituting a base for
warlike operations in Eastern Asia. Grave anxiety was thus felt for the
maintenance of peace in the Far East.

"As all are aware," he added, "the agreement and alliance between
Japan and Great Britain has for its object the consolidation and
maintenance of general peace in Eastern Asia and the maintenance of
the independence and integrity of China as well as the principle of
equal opportunities for commerce and industry for all nations in that
country, and the maintenance and defence respectively of territorial
rights and special interests of contracting parties in Eastern Asia.
Therefore, inasmuch as we were asked by our ally for assistance at
a time when commerce in Eastern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain
regard alike as one of their special interests, is subjected to
a constant menace, Japan, who regards that alliance as a guiding
principle of her foreign policy, could not but comply to the request to
do her part."

"Germany's possession of a base for powerful activities in one corner
of the Far East," the Minister added, "was not only a serious obstacle
to the maintenance of permanent peace but also threatened the immediate
interests of the Japanese Empire." "The Japanese Government," Baron
Kato continued, "therefore resolved to comply with the British request
and if necessary to open hostilities against Germany. After the
Imperial sanction had been obtained I communicated this resolution to
the British Government and a full and frank exchange of views between
the two Governments followed and it was finally agreed between them to
take such measures as were necessary to protect the general interests
contemplated in the agreement and the alliance. Japan had no desire
or inclination to become involved in the present conflict, only she
believed she owed it to herself to be faithful to the alliance and to
strengthen its foundation by insuring permanent peace in the East and
protecting the special interests of the two allied Powers."

"Desiring, however, to solve the situation by pacific means the
Imperial Government on August 15th gave the following advice to the
German Government. (Here the Minister quoted the text of the Japanese
ultimatum.) Until the last moment of the time allowed, namely, until
August 23rd, the Imperial Government received no answer and in
consequence the Imperial rescript declaring war was issued the next
day."

Baron Kato briefly referred to Austria-Hungary, with whom, as she had
only the most limited interests in the Far East, Japan desired to
maintain peaceful relations as long as possible. At the same time it
appeared that Austria-Hungary also desired to avoid complications. "In
fact, as soon as Japan and Germany entered into a state of war," the
Foreign Minister went on to say, "Austria-Hungary asked for the consent
and good offices of the Imperial Government to permit the _Kaiserin
Elizabeth_, the only Austrian man-of-war in the Far East likely to
force a state of war, to go to Shanghai and there to disarm. I was
about to communicate to the Austrian Ambassador the fact that Great
Britain and Japan did not entertain any objections to the disarming of
the _Kaiserin Elizabeth_, when suddenly on August 27th the Austrian
Ambassador informed me that in consideration of Japan's action against
Germany his Government instructed him to leave his post, and diplomatic
relations were broken off."

In conclusion Baron Kato said, "When the relations of Japan and Germany
reached the point of rupture the Imperial Government asked the American
Government if in case of need it would be good enough to undertake the
protection of Japanese subjects and interests in Germany. This request
the American Government promptly complied with and subsequently upon
the rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and Austria-Hungary
the Imperial Government again appealed for American protection for
Japanese subjects and interests in Austria-Hungary, when the American
Government gave the same willing consent. I desire to avail myself of
this opportunity to give expression to the sincere appreciation of the
Imperial Government of the courtesy so kindly extended by the American
Government."

Finally Baron Kato concluded by saying, "While regretting that Japan
has been compelled to take up arms against Germany, I am happy to
believe that the army and navy of our illustrious sovereign will not
fail to show the same loyalty and valour which distinguished them in
the past, so that all may be blessed by early restoration of peace."

       *       *       *       *       *

That the war was being carried a stage further was seen from the
following announcement, made by the Press Bureau on August 26th:

The Secretary of State for the Colonies learns from Temporary
Lieutenant-Colonel Bryant, our officer commanding in German Togoland,
that the German wireless telegraph installation at Kamina has been
destroyed by enemy, and that they sent this (Wednesday) afternoon
a flag of truce, offering, if given all the honours of war, to
capitulate, and stipulating for specific terms. He replied that they
were not in a position to ask for terms, and that they must surrender
unconditionally. He told them that we always respected private
property, and that there would be as little interference as possible
with the trade of the country and the private interests of firms.

He has advanced, and has occupied the crossing at River Amu. The German
answer is expected to-night or early to-morrow morning.

[Later]

In continuation of the statement issued to-day from the Colonial
Office, the Secretary of State for the Colonies announces that he has
received information from the officer commanding the troops in Togoland
that Togoland has surrendered unconditionally, and that the Allied
Forces will enter Kamina at eight a.m. to-morrow (Thursday) morning.

       *       *       *       *       *

It was officially stated that the British Force engaged consisted of
a detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment of the West African Frontier
Force, under the command of Temporary Lieutenant-Colonel F.C. Bryant,
R.A.

The destruction of the German wireless station in Togoland practically
isolated German South-West Africa from Germany. This station in
Togoland was built at Kamina, 1913-14, and was designed to act as a
halfway station for the big station at Windhoek, the capital of German
South-West Africa. The latter station--the station at Daressalam
also having been destroyed--could now only "speak" to Nauen to take
orders from Berlin when the conditions are extremely favourable, as,
notwithstanding the great altitude on which the Windhoek station is
built, direct communication with Germany was not possible, the stations
being equipped on the telephone system, more than one day in ten, and
then only for a few "spasmodic" minutes per day.



CHAPTER V

 French Government leaves Paris--Triple Entente Declaration--An
 Important French Protest to the Powers--Aid from Dominions and
 India--South Africa's Expedition--The King's Proclamations.


TOWARDS the end of August, although the long line of the Allied Forces
remained unbroken, the commanders had thought it advisable to fall
back in the direction of Paris, so that the left wing of the allied
troops could rest on Paris, and their right wing on the great fortress
of Verdun. Paris, being itself a strongly fortified town, formed an
admirable western base for the operations of the defending armies.

It was not, of course, expected that the invaders would succeed in
entering Paris, as the capital could be defended not merely by its
own strong ring of fortresses, but by the left wing of the army. If,
however, as was certainly expected, battles were to wage round the
capital, the work of the Government would have become impossible and
difficulties might be experienced by the Cabinet in keeping itself in
communication with the commander-in-chief. It was therefore decided
that the capital should be removed to some other city, just as the
Belgian capital had been transferred from Brussels to Antwerp. Tours
was at first spoken of as the new seat of government, but the final
choice rested on Bordeaux, a well-situated seaport and a city of
really excellent communications to all parts of the country. Early in
September, therefore, it was decided that the transfer should take
place, and on September 3rd the President of the Republic and all his
Ministers addressed the following Proclamation to the country:

People of France

For several weeks sanguinary combats have taken place between our
heroic troops and the enemy's army. The bravery of our soldiers has
gained for them at several points marked success, but to the north the
pressure of the German forces has compelled us to retire.

This situation imposes upon the President of the Republic and the
Government the painful decision that in order to watch over the
national safety the duty of the authorities is to leave Paris. Under
the command of an eminent leader a French army full of courage and
energy will defend the capital and the patriotic population against
the invader, but the war must be continued at the same time on the rest
of the territory without peace or truce, without stay or weakness.
The sacred struggle for the honour of the nation and reparation for
violated right will continue.

None of our armies has been broken. If some have sustained too
perceptible losses the gaps will be immediately filled from the depôts,
and the call for recruits assures us for the morrow new resources in
men and energy to endure and to fight.

That must be the watchword of the Allied British, Russian, Belgian, and
French Armies--to endure and to fight, whilst on the sea the British
aid us to cut the communications of our enemies with the world, to
endure and to fight, whilst the Russians continue to advance to deal a
decisive blow at the heart of the German Empire.

To the Government of the Republic belongs the duty of directing this
stubborn resistance everywhere for French independence. To give
this formidable struggle all its ardour and all its efficacy it is
indispensable that the Government should remain free to act on the
demand of the military authorities. The Government is removing its
residence to a point where it can remain in constant relations with the
whole of the country. It requests Members of Parliament not to hold
aloof, in order to form before the enemy a united alliance.

The National Government does not leave Paris without having assured the
defence of the city and the entrenched camp by all the means in its
power. The Government knows there is no need to advise the Parisian
population to calmness, resolution and coolness.

Frenchmen, be worthy in these tragic circumstances! We shall obtain a
final victory; we shall obtain it by untiring will, by endurance and
tenacity.

A nation which does not desire to perish and which, wishing to live,
recoils neither before sufferings nor sacrifices is certain to conquer.

Two days afterwards an important declaration, signed by the
representatives of England, Russia and France, was issued in London and
in the other capitals. By this declaration the Governments concerned
agreed not to conclude peace separately during the war. The following
is the text of the declaration as issued by the Press Bureau on the
afternoon of September 5th:

Declaration

The undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective
Governments, hereby declare as follows:

The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to
conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments
agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the
Allies will demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement
of each of the other Allies. In faith whereof, the undersigned have
signed this Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in London in triplicate this 5th day of September, 1914.

  (L.S.) E. GREY

  (His Britannic Majesty's Secretary
  of State for Foreign
  Affairs).

  (L.S.) PAUL CAMBON

  (Ambassador Extraordinary and
  Plenipotentiary of the French
  Republic).

  (L.S.) BENCKENDORFF

  (Ambassador Extraordinary and
  Plenipotentiary of His Majesty
  the Emperor of Russia).

  Paris, _September 4th_.

The adherence of Japan to this declaration was subsequently notified.
Belgium could not participate in it for technical reasons, her
neutrality being "guaranteed."

On the same day the French Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a
strongly-worded communication to the Powers with reference to the
German atrocities in Belgium and France. This communication was as
follows:

The numerous violations of international law by the Germans have led
the Government of the Republic to address to the representatives of the
Powers in Paris memoranda which are intended to set forth indisputable
facts. These are selected merely as examples, and we could not bring to
the notice of the Powers every act contrary to the laws of war of which
we receive accounts day by day. This first series of memoranda will
suffice to establish the two following classes of facts:

First, the armies and Government of Germany profess the deepest scorn
for international law and for treaties solemnly recognised by Germany.

Secondly, the devastations of the invaded countries (incendiarism,
murder, pillage, and atrocities) appear to be systematically pursued by
order of the leaders, and are not due to acts of indiscipline.

It is necessary to emphasise this two-fold characteristic of the
German proceedings. They constitute a negation of every human and
international law, and bring back modern warfare, after centuries of
civilisation, to the methods of barbarian invasions. We are confident
that such facts will arouse the indignation of neutral States, and
will help to make clear the meaning of the struggle which we are
carrying on for the respect of law and the independence of nations.

To the communiqué were attached ten separate memoranda, setting forth
various specific charges against the Germans.

The first memorandum dealt with the dispatch of wounded prisoners and
similar atrocities.

A report from the Commander-in-Chief of the eastern armies, dated
August 10th, stated that a considerable number of wounded had been
finished off by shots fired point-blank into their faces, while others
had been deliberately stamped and tramped upon. The Bavarian infantry
systematically burned villages through which they had passed, although
there had been no artillery fire which could provoke such measures.

The second memorandum detailed the circumstances of the bombardment
of Pont-à-Mousson, an unfortified place, in violation of The Hague
Convention, and the use of dum-dum bullets by the Germans was dealt
with in the third memorandum. On August 10th, after an engagement,
a French surgeon found a clip containing five cartridges with
cylindro-conical bullets, the noses of which had been filed. Similar
bullets were found in the bodies of French soldiers, and were forwarded
to the Ministry of War.

In the fifth memorandum the German allegation that the civilian
population had taken part in the war was strongly denied, and was
declared to be nothing but a pretext put forward to justify the
atrocities committed by the German troops and give them the appearance
of reprisals. From the beginning of the war the Germans had made a
practice of burning undefended villages and of assassinating the
inhabitants, and evidence of this was to be found in letters and
notebooks taken from Germans, dead or prisoners.

A notebook found on a corpse of a German lieutenant contained the
following remark: "We have fired the church of Villerupt and shot the
inhabitants. We pretended that scouts had taken refuge in the tower of
the church and had fired on us from there. The fact was, it was not the
inhabitants of Villerupt, but Customs officers and forest guards who
fired on us."

The sixth memorandum gave detailed evidence in support of the charge
that a systematic devastation of the country had been ordered by the
German leaders. Letters found on German soldiers made it clear that the
burning of villages and the shooting of the inhabitants were general
measures, and that the orders were given by superior officers.

Attention was called to this violation of The Hague Convention, and it
was pointed out that it was on the proposal of the German delegates at
the second Hague Conference that an article was inserted declaring that
the belligerent guilty of such violation should be liable to pay an
indemnity.

In the remaining memoranda information was given as to the destruction
of villages in the region of Paris, the murder of Red Cross nurses, and
the burning of Affleville, under circumstances of particular brutality.

The statement concluded: "The Government of the Republic, respecting
international conventions which it has ratified, protests against those
violations of international law, and holds up to reprobation before the
opinion of the world the behaviour of an enemy who respects no rule and
goes back on his signature affixed to international agreements."

It was observed with immense satisfaction, not merely throughout the
British Empire, but by our allies in the field, that Britain in her
oversea possessions was quick to come forward with offers of help as
soon as the situation on the Continent became known. In Canada, for
example, the Government voted large supplies of wheat, cheese and so
forth for the troops, and also undertook to raise two contingents,
each 20,000 strong, to take part in the campaign. Patriotic funds were
started in all the large towns throughout the Dominion, and the women
of Canada raised funds for a supplementary naval hospital.

Similar measures were taken by the Australian Government, and both
Ministers and ex-Ministers declared that Australia would offer "the
vigour of her manhood, the bounty of her soil resources, her economic
organisation, all she possesses to the last ear of corn and the last
drop of blood." This quotation is taken from a speech by Mr. Millen,
the Commonwealth Minister of Defence, speaking at Melbourne on August
23rd. Similar utterances were delivered by his colleagues and by the
Parliamentary Opposition. An appeal to Australians to form an Imperial
Expeditionary Force resulted in an almost immediate reply from 20,000
volunteers.

Offers of help on a proportionate scale came from New Zealand and South
Africa; and the South African Government took steps both to guard the
Union from German raids and to co-operate with the Imperial troops in
any movement that might be made against the adjacent German colonies.
A later and momentous step by the South African Union, taken at the
request of the Imperial Government, was notified in the subjoined
communications from Reuter's Agency:

  Cape Town,
  _Sept. 9th, 1914_.

A special session of Parliament, necessitated by the situation arising
from the war, and the mobilisation of the Defence forces, was opened
to-day by Lord Buxton.

The Governor-General's first act was to read a personal message from
the King, acknowledging the many proofs of loyalty displayed by South
Africa in common with the rest of the Empire, and of its determination
to play a part in the great conflict forced upon Great Britain. His
Majesty relies with confidence upon the people of South Africa to
maintain and to add fresh lustre to the splendid traditions of courage,
determination, and endurance which they have inherited.

At the evening session of the House of Assembly General Botha moved the
following resolution:

 This House, fully recognising the obligations of the Union as
 a portion of the British Empire, respectfully requests the
 Governor-General to convey a humble address to his Majesty, assuring
 him of its loyal support in bringing to a successful issue the
 momentous conflict which has been forced upon him in defence of
 the principles of liberty and international honour, and of its
 whole-hearted determination to take all measures necessary for
 defending the interests of the Union and co-operating with His
 Majesty's Imperial Government to maintain the security and integrity
 of the Empire, and further humbly requesting His Majesty to convey
 to His Majesty the King of the Belgians its admiration for and its
 sincere sympathy with the Belgian people in their heroic stand for the
 protection of their country against the unprincipled invasion of its
 rights.

General Botha, who spoke with deep feeling, was followed with the most
earnest attention by a thronged House. The Premier said that never had
the Parliament of South Africa assembled at a more critical time. He
emphasised that the Imperial Government had informed the Government
that certain war operations in German South-West Africa were considered
to be of strategic importance. The Imperial Government added that if
the Union Government could undertake these operations they would be
regarded as of great service to the Empire. The Empire to which South
Africa belonged was involved in one of the greatest and cruellest wars
which had ever befallen humanity.

General Botha continued: "The Government, after careful consideration,
decided to comply with the request in the interests of South Africa as
well as of the Empire. There could only be one reply to the Imperial
Government's request.

"To forget their loyalty to the Empire in this hour of trial would
be scandalous and shameful, and would blacken South Africa in the
eyes of the whole world. Of this South Africans were incapable. They
had endured some of the greatest sacrifices that could be demanded
of a people, but they had always kept before them ideals, founded on
Christianity, and never in their darkest days had they sought to gain
their ends by treasonable means. The path of treason was an unknown
path to Dutch and English alike.

"Their duty and their conscience alike bade them be faithful and true
to the Imperial Government in all respects in this hour of darkness and
trouble. That was the attitude of the Union Government; that was the
attitude of the people of South Africa. The Government had cabled to
the Imperial Government at the outbreak of war, offering to undertake
the defence of South Africa, thereby releasing the Imperial troops for
service elsewhere. This was accepted, and the Union Defence Force was
mobilised."

With regard to the operations in South-West Africa, General Botha
declared that there could be only one response to the Imperial
Government's wishes, unless they wished to contemplate a situation much
more serious than that which now confronted them.

He wished them to understand the seriousness of the position, and to
accept the responsibility which they would be called upon to accept. He
placed himself with confidence in the hands of the House. General Botha
detailed the German entry into Union territory at Nakob (Nauby). This
force was entrenched in kopjes in Union territory at the present time.
He also described an affair at Scuitdrift in August. In addition to
this, armed German forces were on the Union frontier in large numbers
before there was any question of Union mobilisation.

The Premier said he quoted the foregoing to show the hostile attitude
adopted by Germans in the neighbouring territory. He next referred to
the White Paper on the diplomatic proceedings on the eve of war. These
documents, he declared, showed that if ever Great Britain entered upon
a war with clean hands it was this war.

Great confidence had been reposed in the people of South Africa. They
had received a Constitution under which they could create a great
nationality. Great Britain had given them this Constitution, and
ever since had regarded them as a free people and as a sister State.
As an example of how the Imperial Government treated them, General
Botha said that last July the Union Government wanted to raise a loan
of £4,000,000. They had raised only £2,000,000. As things were, it
would be fatal to go into the money market just now, so the Imperial
Government had now come to the assistance of the Union Government, and
had lent the Union £7,000,000. That was the spirit of co-operation and
brotherhood which invariably animated the Imperial towards the Union
Government.

In his judgment it was the duty of the House to see that every effort
was put forth to bring the country successfully and honourably out of
this war, and that South Africa issued from it, not as a divided, but
as a united, people.

Sir Thomas Smartt, leader of the Opposition, heartily congratulated
General Botha on his speech, and assured the Government of the most
cordial support of the Opposition.

  London,
  _Sept. 9th_.

Reuter's Agency learns from an authoritative source that the line to
be followed by the Union Government of South Africa, as outlined in
General Botha's speech, has been well known in official circles for
some time. From the outset there has been the closest touch between
the Imperial and the Union Governments, both as regards the general
attitude of the latter and the military requirements in view of the war
with Germany. On the outbreak of war a brief but significant telegram
was received from General Botha, containing merely the words, "We will
do our duty."

What this implies as regards the neighbouring German colony cannot, for
obvious reasons, be stated in detail at this stage. It may be declared,
however, that the news of the crossing of the Orange River by two
German forces spread like wildfire through South Africa and caused a
feeling of the greatest indignation, and, without any suggestion from
the Imperial Government, steps were at once taken--and have since been
completed--for effectually dealing with German South-West Africa.

It was on the initiative of General Botha's Government that, on the
outbreak of war with Germany, the Union Government telegraphed to
London suggesting that the garrison of Imperial troops should be
withdrawn, and offering the whole military resources of South Africa
for the defence of the Union, including the native territories.

It had by this time become apparent that this meant not only defence,
but also offensive operations against the adjoining German colony of
326,000 square miles in extent, with its garrison and fortifications.
What this involved was perfectly well known to the authorities, who
were aware of the large quantities of cannon, arms, and ammunition that
had been poured into the country in the vain hope that the Boers would
join the Germans when trouble arose.

The South African Government does not expect a "walk-over," but it is
prepared for all eventualities. It has been a matter of the greatest
gratification to the Union Government that, at this juncture, the
Imperial Government offered to give South Africa all the financial
assistance needed. In this connection it should be explained that all
defence measures and warlike operations are being undertaken at the
expense of the Union Government. The offer of the Imperial Government,
which is of great value in view of the moratorium, is to lend what
money may be necessary for the time being for war purposes.

At home, too, by way of showing how united the nation was at this
critical time, it should be mentioned that after a two days'
conference, the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress,
issued, on September 3rd, an important manifesto to trade unionists of
the country on the war. It stated that the committee was especially
gratified at the manner in which the Labour party in the House of
Commons had responded to the appeal made to all political parties to
give their co-operation in securing the enlistment of men to defend the
interests of their country, and heartily endorsed the appointment upon
the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee of four members of the party,
and the placing of the services of the national agent at the disposal
of that committee to assist in carrying through its secretarial work.

       *       *       *       *       *

The manifesto proceeded:

The Parliamentary Committee are convinced that one important factor in
the present European struggle has to be borne in mind, so far as our
own country is concerned, namely, that in the event of the voluntary
system of military service failing, the country in this its time of
need, the demand for a national system of compulsory military service
will not only be made with redoubled vigour, but may prove to be so
persistent and strong as to become irresistible.

 The prospect of having to face conscription, with its permanent and
 heavy burden upon the financial resources of the country, and its
 equally burdensome effect upon nearly the whole of its industries,
 should in itself stimulate the manhood of the nation to come forward
 in its defence, and thereby demonstrate to the world that a free
 people can rise to the supreme heights of a great sacrifice without
 the whip of conscription.

Another factor to be remembered in this crisis of our nation's history,
and most important of all so far as trade unionists and Labour in
general are concerned, is the fact that upon the result of the
struggle in which this country is now engaged rests the preservation
and maintenance of free and unfettered democratic government which in
its international relationship has in the past been recognised, and
must unquestionably in the future prove to be the best guarantee for
the preservation of the peace of the world.

 The mere contemplation of the overbearing and brutal methods to which
 people have to submit under a Government controlled by a military
 autocracy--living, as it were, continuously under the threat and
 shadow of war--should be sufficient to arouse the enthusiasm of the
 nation in resisting any attempt to impose similar conditions upon
 countries at present free from military despotism.

But if men have a duty to perform in the common interest of the
State, equally the State owes a duty to those of its citizens who are
prepared--and readily prepared--to make sacrifices in its defence and
for the maintenance of honour. Citizens called upon voluntarily to
leave their employment and their homes for the purpose of undertaking
military duties have a right to receive at the hands of the State
a reasonable and assured recompense, not so much for themselves as
for those who are dependent upon them, and no single member of the
community would do otherwise than uphold a Government which in such an
important and vital matter took a liberal, and even generous, view of
its responsibilities towards those citizens who come forward to assist
in the defence of their country.

We respectfully commend this suggestion to the favourable consideration
of the Government of the day.

Long life to the free institutions of all democratically-governed
countries.

  J.A. Seddon, Chairman
  W.J. Davis, Vice-Chairman
  A. Evans
  H. Gosling
  J. Hill
  J. Jenkins
  W. Matkin
  W. Mosses
  J.W. Ogden
  J. Sexton
  A. Smith
  H. Smith
  J.B. Williams
  J.H. Williams

  C.W. Bowerman, Secretary.

A manifesto on the same lines was issued by Mr. Ben Tillett, on behalf
of the Dockers' Union. Mr. Ben Tillett was usually regarded as being
the leader of one of the extreme sections of the Labour movement; but
his manifesto, which reads as follows, lacked nothing in patriotism:

Every resource at our command must be utilised for the purpose of
preserving our country and nation. Every able-bodied man must either
fight, or be ready to defend his country. Every family of those men who
go to the front must be guaranteed a competence and food.

We first of all propose that all able-bodied men should shoulder the
responsibilities this war imposes; that local units of men having
worked and lived together constitute units of a thousand each, for the
better purpose of training and preparation. That these units of our
members or of trades unionists from a given area be registered.

Kaiserism and militarism should receive its death blow in this
Armageddon. Our traditions at least stand for the best, our limitations
and inequalities are largely of our own making; and will be so long as
the workers are contented slaves, under a vicious wage system.

I want to see our own men drilled daily, even if the War Office
cannot help us. There are plenty of open spaces, many of our men are
ex-soldiers, they could help in the drilling. Municipal authorities
and employers could help. Employed and unemployed could help; the War
Office should help those who can enlist, subject to guarantees from the
Government, giving protection to the families left behind.

       *       *       *       *       *

It subsequently appeared that the preliminary steps taken by the
South African Government were timely enough. _The Daily Telegraph's_
Johannesburg correspondent, telegraphing on September 1st, said that
the authorities had been perturbed by a number of serious reports to
the effect that Germans were interfering with the natives, and inciting
them to seditious gatherings. This action assumed such a character as
to demand instant action. Alleged German missionaries were even sowing
the seeds of discontent in the natives' minds against British rule,
magnifying the temporary German success in Europe. It was suggested
that the Government might turn the searchlight on all German mission
stations in British South Africa. Intelligent natives had been informed
that the Germans were "coming soon," when the natives would be given
big pay, plenty of drink, and no passes would be necessary. They were
also advised to go home, the evident purpose being to paralyse the
mining industry.

On August 31st the English newspapers contained an important interview
given by Mr. Winston Churchill to Mr. Willian G. Shepherd, the
representative of the United Press Associations of America. The text of
the interview, in Mr. Shepherd's own words, is as follows:

On my asking Mr. Churchill about the cause of the war, he handed me
the celebrated White Paper of Sir Edward Grey's negotiations, saying:
"There is our case, and all we ask of the American people is that they
should study it with severe and impartial attention."

I then asked what was the underlying cause apart from the actual steps
which had led to the rupture. He replied in effect that the war was
started and was being maintained by the Prussian military aristocracy,
which set no limits to its ambition of world-wide predominance. In a
word, it is the old struggle of 100 years ago against Napoleon. The
grouping of forces is different; the circumstances are different; the
occasion is different; the man, above all, is different--happily.
But the issue is the same. We are at grips with Prussian militarism.
England stands right in the path of this evergrowing power. Our
military force is perhaps small, but it is good and it will grow; our
naval and financial resources are considerable; and with these we stand
between this mighty army and a dominion which would certainly not be
content with European limits.

I asked whether the end of the war would see some abatement of the
struggle of armaments. Mr. Churchill replied:

 That depends on the result. If we succeed, and if, as the result of
 our victory, Europe is rearranged, as far as possible, with regard to
 the principle of nationality, and in accordance with the wishes of the
 people who dwell in the various disputed areas, we may look forward
 with hope to a great relaxation and easement. But if Germany wins it
 will not be the victory of the quiet, sober, commercial elements in
 Germany, nor of the common people of Germany with all their virtues,
 but the victory of the blood and iron military school, whose doctrines
 and principles will then have received a supreme and terrible
 vindication.

"I cannot understand," he continued, "why Germany has not been
contented with her wonderful progress since the Battle of Waterloo. For
the last half century she has been the centre of Europe; courted by
many; feared by many; treated with deference by all. No country has had
such a reign of prosperity and splendour, yet all the time she has been
discontented; solicitous of admiration; careless of International Law;
worshipping force and giving us all to understand that her triumphs in
the past and her power in the present were little compared to what she
sought in the future.

"And now the great collision has come, and it is well that the
democratic nations of the world--the nations, I mean, where the
peoples own the Government, and not the Government the people--should
realise what is at stake. The French, English, and American systems of
government by popular election and parliamentary debate with the kind
of civilisation which flows from such institutions are brought into
direct conflict with the highly efficient Imperialist bureaucracy and
military organisation of Prussia. That is the issue. No partisanship is
required to make it plain. No sophistry can obscure it."

I asked whether the democracy of the United States, apart from the
moral issues involved, had any direct interests in the result of the
war.

"You are the judges of that," replied the First Lord. "You do not
require me to talk to you of your interests. If England were to be
reduced in this war, or another which would be sure to follow from it
if this war were inconclusive, to the position of a small country like
Holland, then, however far across the salt water your country may lie,
the burden which we are bearing now would fall on to your shoulders.

"I do not mean by that that Germany would attack you, or that if
you were attacked you would need to fear the result so far as the
United States was concerned. The Monroe Doctrine, however, carries
you very far in South as well as North America; and is it likely that
victorious German militarism, which would then have shattered France
irretrievably, have conquered Belgium, and have broken for ever the
power of England, would allow itself to be permanently cut off from
all hopes of that oversea expansion and development with which South
America alone can supply it?

"Now the impact is on us. Our blood which flows in your veins should
lead you to expect that we shall be stubborn enough to bear that
impact. But if we go down and are swept in ruin into the past, you are
the next in the line.

"This war is for us a war of honour; of respect for obligations
into which we have entered; and of loyalty towards friends in
desperate need. But now that it has begun it has become a war of
self-preservation. The British democracy, with its limited monarchy,
its ancient Parliament, its ardent social and philanthropic dreams,
is engaged for good or for ill in deadly grapple with the formidable
might of Prussian autocratic rule. It is our system of civilisation and
government against theirs. It is our life or theirs.

"We are conscious of the greatness of the times. We recognise the
consequence and proportion of events. We feel that, however inadequate
we may be, however unexpected the ordeal may be, we are under the eye
of history, and, the issue being joined, England must go forward to the
very end."

While I was speaking to Mr. Churchill a telegram came in from Belgium
announcing the total destruction of the town of Louvain as an act
of military execution. Handing it to me, he said: "What further
proof is needed of the cause at issue? Tell that to your American
fellow-countrymen. You know," he added, "I am half American myself."

       *       *       *       *       *

The most remarkable demonstration of enthusiastic loyalty, however,
came from India. It was no surprise to those acquainted with the
conditions in our great Asiatic Empire to know that all classes and
creeds were united in their devotion to the British Crown; but it was
evident from the comments which followed the statements in Parliament
on September 9th that the munificent offers made to the Viceroy had
astonished the whole world. By the middle of August it was known that
many Indian Chiefs had been addressing inquiries to the Viceroy in the
spirit of the ruler of the ancient State of Rewa, who wrote: "What
orders from His Majesty for me and my troops?"

On September 9th, the Marquis of Crewe, the Secretary of State for
India, in the House of Lords, and Mr. Charles Roberts, Under-Secretary
of State for India, in the House of Commons, read telegrams from the
Viceroy summarising the offers of the Indian chiefs. Amid glowing
excitement and enthusiasm, the Houses learned that Sir Pertab Singh
despite his seventy years "would not be denied his right to serve the
King-Emperor," and that he was taking with him among his troops his
young nephew, the Maharaja of Cooch Behar, a boy of sixteen. The State
of Nepal sent seven battalions of Gurkhas, and there were many other
offers of men, money, and jewels. The following long cablegram sent
by the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India on September 8th
describes the offers of service:

Following is a summary of offers of service, money, etc., made in India
to the Viceroy. The rulers of the Native States in India, who number
nearly 700 in all, have with one accord rallied to the defences of the
Empire and offered their personal services and the resources of their
States for the war.

From among the many Princes and nobles who have volunteered for active
service, the Viceroy has selected the Chiefs of Jodhpur, Bikaner,
Kishangarh, Rutlam, Sachin, Patiala, Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of
Jodhpur, the Heir-Apparent of Bhopal and a brother of the Maharaja of
Cooch Behar, together with other cadets of noble families. The veteran
Sir Pertab would not be denied his right to serve the King-Emperor,
in spite of his 70 years, and his nephew, the Maharaja, who is but 16
years old, goes with him.

All these have, with the Commander-in-Chief's approval, already joined
the Expeditionary Forces. The Maharaja of Gwalior and the Chiefs of
Jaora and Dholpur, together with the Heir-Apparent of Palanpur,
were, to their great regret, prevented from leaving their States.
Twenty-seven of the larger States in India maintain Imperial Service
troops, and the services of every corps were immediately placed at the
disposal of the Government of India on the outbreak of war.

The Viceroy has accepted from twelve States contingents of cavalry,
infantry, sappers, and transport, besides a camel corps from Bikaner,
and most of them have already embarked. As particular instances of
generosity and eager loyalty of the Chiefs, the following may be
quoted: Various Durbars have combined together to provide a hospital
ship, to be called "The Loyalty," for the use of the Expeditionary
Forces. The Maharaja of Mysore has placed Rs.50 lacs at the disposal
of the Government of India for expenditure in connection with the
Expeditionary Force.

The Chief of Gwalior, in addition to sharing in the expense of the
hospital ship, the idea of which was originated with himself and the
Begum of Bhopal, has offered to place large sums of money at the
disposal of the Government of India and to provide thousands of horses
as remounts. From Loharu, in the Punjab, and Las Bela and Kalat, in
Baluchistan, come offers of camels with drivers, to be supplied and
maintained by the Chiefs and Sardars.

Several Chiefs have offered to raise additional troops for military
service should they be required, and donations to the Indian Relief
Fund have poured in from all States. The Maharaja of Rewa has offered
his troops, his treasury, and even his private jewellery, for the
service of the King-Emperor. In addition to contributions to the Indian
Fund, some Chiefs, namely, those of Kashmir, Bundi, Orchha, Gwalior and
Indore, have also given large sums to the Prince of Wales' Fund.

The Maharaja of Kashmir, not content with subscribing himself to the
Indian fund, presided at a meeting of 20,000 people held recently at
Srinagar, and delivered a stirring speech, in response to which large
subscriptions were collected.

Maharaja Holkar offers, free of charge, all horses in his State army
which may be suitable for Government purposes. Horses also offered by
Nizam's Government, by Jamnagar and other Bombay States. Every chief
in the Bombay Presidency has placed the resources of his State at the
disposal of Government, and all have made contributions to the relief
fund.

Loyal messages and offers also received from Mehtar of Chitral and
tribes of Khyber Agency as well as Khyber Rifles.

Letters have been received from the most remote States in India, all
marked by deep sincerity of desire to render some assistance, however
humble, to the British Government in its hour of need.

Last, but not least, from beyond the borders of India have been
received generous offers of assistance from the Nepal Durbar; the
military resources of the State have been placed at the disposal of
the British Government, and the Prime Minister has offered a sum of
Rs.3 lakhs to the Viceroy for the purchase of machine guns or field
equipment for British Gurkha regiments proceeding over-seas, in
addition to large donations from his private purse to the Prince of
Wales' Fund and the Imperial Indian Relief Fund.

To the 4th Gurkha Rifles, of which the Prime Minister is honorary
colonel, the Prime Minister has offered Rs.30,000 for the purchase of
machine guns in the event of their going on service.

The Dalai Lama of Tibet has offered 1,000 Tibetan troops for service
under the British Government. His Holiness also states that Lamas
innumerable throughout the length and breadth of Tibet are offering
prayers for success of British Army and for happiness of souls of all
victims of war.

The same spirit has prevailed throughout British India. Hundreds of
telegrams and letters received by Viceroy expressing loyalty and desire
to serve Government, either in the field or by co-operation in India.
Many hundreds also received by local administrations. They come from
communities and associations, religious, political, and social, of all
classes and creeds, also from individuals offering their resources or
asking for opportunity to prove loyalty by personal service. Following
may be mentioned as typical examples:

The All-India Moslem League, the Bengal Presidency Moslem League, the
Moslem Association of Rangoon, the trustees of the Aligarh College,
the Behar Provincial Moslem League, the Central National Mohammedan
Association of Calcutta, the Khoja Community and other followers of Aga
Khan, the Punjab Moslem League, Mohammedans of Eastern Bengal, citizens
of Calcutta, Madras, Rangoon, and many other cities, Behar Landholders'
Association, Madras Provincial Congress, Taluqoars of Oudh, Punjab
Chiefs' Association, United Provinces Provincial Congress, Hindus of
the Punjab, Chief Khalsa Diwan representing orthodox Sikhs, Bohra
Community of Bombay, Parsee Community of Bombay.

Delhi Medical Association offer field hospital that was sent to Turkey
during Balkan War; Bengalee students offer enthusiastic services for
an ambulance corps, and there were many other offers of medical aid;
Zemindars of Madras have offered 500 horses, and among other practical
steps taken to assist Government may be noted the holding of meetings
to allay panic, keep down prices, and maintain public confidence and
credit. Generous contributions have poured in from all quarters to
Imperial Indian Relief Fund.

       *       *       *       *       *

The Secretary of State for India further announced that, in addition to
the offers of service and assistance in connection with the war, which
had been made in India to the Viceroy, the following offers had been
received from Chiefs and others residing in this country:

Their Highnesses the Maharaja and the Maharani Maji Sahiba of
Bharatpur: (1) The whole resources of their State; (2) Two motor-cars
and a chauffeur, with all expenses; (3) Rs.2,000 to the Indian Relief
Fund.

His Highness the Raja of Akalkot: Personal service in the field.

His Highness the Raja of Pudukota: "All I possess"; expresses his
anxiety to serve in any capacity. Has placed his motor-car at the
disposal of Government, and is returning to India to raise, subject to
approval, a regiment of his subjects to release a Regular regiment.

His Highness the Gaekwar of Baroda: All his troops and resources.

Mir Ghulam Ali Khan of Khairpur: Personal service in the field.

       *       *       *       *       *

The British Indian residents in this country of every class and creed,
added the official statement, had been forward with loyal and generous
offers of personal services and help.

At the same time the India Council issued a summary of the proceeding
in the Viceroy's Council, from which it was evident that all the
members, Hindus and Mohammedans, were eager to emphasise the fact that
the various sections of the populace they represented wished to do
all in their power to help the Empire at such a critical period. The
text of the passage of Lord Hardinge's speech in the Viceroy's Council
dealing with the dispatch of troops from India to the seat of war was
as follows:

It is no longer a secret that India has already dispatched two splendid
divisions of infantry to Europe and one cavalry brigade, while three
more cavalry brigades will follow immediately. That we have been in a
position to send over 70,000 combatants to fight for the Empire across
the seas is a source of pride and satisfaction to India as a whole,
and with the knowledge that practically all the ruling chiefs have
placed their military forces and the resources of their States at the
disposal of the Government, it is clear that we are not at the end of
our military resources.

Among the chiefs selected to accompany the expeditionary force are the
Maharaja Sir Pertab Singh, the Maharajas of Bikanir, Patiala, Rutlam,
Kishengarh, and Jodhpur, the Nawabs of Jaora, Sachin, and Bhopal, and
also the Malik Umar Hayat.

       *       *       *       *       *

Steps were taken to circulate the announcement widely throughout the
world; and Lord Lansdowne, in welcoming the offer in the House of
Lords, remarked:

Few in this country realise how great a thing it is that these ruling
chiefs should come forward in this way to assist us. I wonder how many
realise that the Maharaja of Mysore rules over a population which
exceeds that of Sweden, that the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior has more
subjects than the King of Denmark, that the Nizam of Hyderabad governs
a people three times as numerous as the people of Ireland.

It is no small thing that these rulers should have come forward without
exception and given practical proof of their desire to help. On behalf
of those who sit on this side of the House I congratulate the Marquis
of Crewe on the manner in which the India Office has been supported at
this critical time, and I congratulate the Viceroy, to whom, at the
moment when he must have had many sad preoccupations, the response of
the people of India must have brought consolation and encouragement.

Our cordial thanks ought also to be conveyed to the people of India
and to the loyal chiefs who have stood by us in so conspicuous a manner.

       *       *       *       *       *

In response to the offers of help, the King was pleased to issue the
following message:

To the Governments and Peoples of My Self-Governing Dominions

During the past few weeks the peoples of My whole Empire at Home and
Overseas have moved with one mind and purpose to confront and overthrow
an unparalleled assault upon the continuity of civilisation and the
peace of mankind.

The calamitous conflict is not of My seeking. My voice has been cast
throughout on the side of peace. My Ministers earnestly strove to allay
the causes of strife and to appease differences with which My Empire
was not concerned. Had I stood aside when in defiance of pledges to
which My Kingdom was a party the soil of Belgium was violated and her
cities laid desolate, when the very life of the French nation was
threatened with extinction, I should have sacrificed My honour and
given to destruction the liberties of My Empire and of mankind. I
rejoice that every part of the Empire is with Me in this decision.

Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and
peoples is the common heritage of Great Britain and of the Empire.

My peoples in the Self-governing Dominions have shown beyond all doubt
that they wholeheartedly endorse the grave decision which it was
necessary to take.

My personal knowledge of the loyalty and devotion of My Oversea
Dominions had led me to expect that they would cheerfully make the
great efforts and bear the great sacrifices which the present conflict
entails. The full measure in which they have placed their services and
resources at My disposal fills Me with gratitude, and I am proud to be
able to show to the world that My Peoples Oversea are as determined
as the People of the United Kingdom to prosecute a just cause to a
successful end.

       *       *       *       *       *

The DOMINION of CANADA, the COMMONWEALTH of AUSTRALIA, and the
DOMINION of NEW ZEALAND have placed at My disposal their naval forces,
which have already rendered good service for the Empire. Strong
Expeditionary forces are being prepared in Canada, in Australia, and
in New Zealand for service at the Front, and the UNION of SOUTH AFRICA
has released all British Troops and has undertaken important military
responsibilities, the discharge of which will be of the utmost value to
the Empire. NEWFOUNDLAND has doubled the numbers of its branch of the
Royal Naval Reserve and is sending a body of men to take part in the
operations at the Front. From the Dominion and Provincial Governments
of Canada large and welcome gifts of supplies are on their way for the
use both of My Naval and Military Forces and for the relief of the
distress in the United Kingdom which must inevitably follow in the wake
of war. All parts of My Oversea Dominions have thus demonstrated in the
most unmistakable manner the fundamental unity of the Empire amidst all
its diversity of situation and circumstance.

       *       *       *       *       *

To the Princes and Peoples of India, the King-Emperor sent a special
message. The first two paragraphs were identical in wording with
those in the message sent to the Dominions. The message to India then
continued:

Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and
peoples is the common heritage of England and of India.

Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the
populations of My Empire in defence of its unity and integrity, nothing
has moved me more than the passionate devotion to My Throne expressed
both by My Indian subjects, and by the Feudatory Princes and the Ruling
Chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their
resources in the cause of the Realm. Their one-voiced demand to be
foremost in the conflict has touched My heart, and has inspired to the
highest issues the love and devotion which, as I well know, have ever
linked My Indian subjects and Myself. I recall to mind India's gracious
message to the British nation of goodwill and fellowship, which greeted
My return in February, 1912, after the solemn ceremony of My Coronation
Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and a
noble fulfilment of the assurance given by you that the destinies of
Great Britain and India are indissolubly linked.

       *       *       *       *       *

At the very beginning of the struggle, Germany had made a determined
effort to win the friendship of the United States. From the great
American Republic the great European autocracy wanted three things:
moral support, money, and assistance in rescuing the German mercantile
marine. German shipping to the amount of hundreds of thousands of tons
was imprisoned in American ports; to venture outside would have been
to court disaster from the strong squadrons of the British and French
cruisers in the Atlantic. It was therefore suggested by the numerous
Germans in New York and Washington, and by Germans who had become
naturalised Americans, that with a view to the restoration of American
shipping it would be a good plan to purchase from Germany the numerous
German liners lying idle in American waters. The scheme did not make
sufficient progress for any definite amount of money to be mentioned;
but it was stated that the value of the steamers was estimated at
£20,000,000--a sum which would have been very useful to Germany in
carrying on the campaign.

Acting under instructions from their Governments, protests were lodged
at Washington by the British and French Embassies against this proposed
transfer of German merchant shipping to a neutral flag. Legally the
transfer would have been objectionable; and in any case the scheme was
supported in America almost entirely by financiers of German extraction
and was bitterly opposed by all American shipowners and shipbuilders.
It is satisfactory to state that the New York correspondent of _The
Daily Telegraph_, cabling on September 1st, said that the American
Government had decided not to buy the German vessels, but would confine
itself to purchasing neutral ships only.

Apart from this matter, the sympathies of the United States, in spite
of the fact that some 30,000,000 of its inhabitants were of German
extraction, were favourable to the Allies and not to the Teutonic
Powers. The German case was set forth in many American newspapers
with all the force of which the German Press Bureau was capable; and
many well-known German professors used their influence to show that
the struggle was one between culture and barbarism, the culture being
represented by Germany and the barbarism by Russia. Whatever sympathy
such statements as these aroused at first was speedily transferred to
the other side when the American public began to hear, not merely of
the German atrocities in Belgium, but of the brutal manner in which
the neutrality of small and friendly countries such as Belgium and
Luxembourg had been violated by the invaders. The German Ambassador at
Washington, Count Bernstorff, was kept busy explaining why "strictness"
was necessary in warfare; but no one took kindly to his explanation
regarding the burning of Louvain, viz.: "War is not an afternoon
tea-party."

By the end of August, some of the American papers began to wonder
why the German Press agents in America were able to flood the Press
with what they alleged to be the only trustworthy news respecting the
situation at the front. It was said that this news was being sent by
wireless to the German Embassy at Washington by way of the Sayville
Wireless Station. An investigation at Washington disclosed the
interesting fact that the Sayville Wireless Station could not possibly
be in direct communication with Germany, as the distance was too great.
The German Ambassador's explanation was that the messages were being
relayed by German warships; but this was not credited, as it was known
that very few German warships were in the Atlantic and that they were
being kept continually on the move by the British and French Fleets.

Various organisations, both in Germany and in the United States,
attempted to appeal to American sentiments by issuing pamphlets
containing alleged facts regarding the campaign. The influence of
these pamphlets, however, was a great deal more than balanced by the
Chancellor's contemptuous reference to the "scrap of paper," described
in the first chapter of this book.

Furthermore, it was pointed out in the American Press that Germany, so
far as her social and military system was concerned, represented the
antithesis of American ideals, and that a victory for Germany would
inevitably lead to the imposition of her strict military system upon
the world in general. Again, as a result of the falling off in imports
from England, France, and Germany, the American customs receipts
declined very considerably, and it was announced early in September
that it would be necessary, in view of this falling off, to raise some
£20,000,000 by internal taxation. The American Press promptly blamed
the Kaiser for thus inconveniencing the financial arrangements of
the United States, and the feeling against Germany in America became
stronger than ever.

By way of climax, a striking expression of opinion came from one
of the best-known American educationalists, Professor W.G. Hales.
Professor Hales communicated his views to the London correspondent of
the _New York Times_, in which paper they appeared on September 7th.
He advocated an immediate declaration of war by the United States
against Germany for the latter's violation of The Hague Conventions,
particularly in its use of floating mines and its destruction of
Louvain.

"What has always been wanted," continued Professor Hales, "is a
sanction for the pacts of nations. There could be no more splendid
sanction than the declaration of a great nation outside the immediate
conflict that, where she is a party, they shall, so far as lies in her
power, be kept sacred.

"Germany has confessed enough. Louvain has been blotted out. For the
German planting of mines in the open sea alone it is our duty to
declare war. The facts have changed the whole aspects of things, since
President Wilson's plea for patience was made. We should ourselves
guarantee the commerce of neutrals and of the allied nations, leaving
the English Fleet free to do its separate work. We should, by this mere
act of declaration, shut off food from Germany. We should take our part
in the great struggle instead of smugly sitting by while the world's
work is done by other nations. Even Germany would then know that her
plot against humanity had been both judged and doomed. The insolent
cry, 'Deutschland über Alles', provides no exception for the United
States. At the moment of Germany's success we must transform ourselves
into a nation whose first business is war. Through South America she
would strike at us next.

"I have been all my life a fighter for peace, but I appeal to President
Wilson, the Senate, and my private fellow-citizens, of whatever
descent, to end the system of aggression and defence by arms, and to
replace it with international law and international police."



CHAPTER VI

 The Economic Position--Moratorium Extension--Great Britain's Oversea
 Trade--Germany's Commerce--Question of Food Supplies--Importance of
 the Balkans--"Petrograd."


IN the midst of military, diplomatic, and political turmoil, the
responsible departments of the Government paid very necessary attention
to finance. In the course of an interesting speech in the House of
Commons on August 26th, Mr. Lloyd George showed that he was looking
after the financial and commercial welfare of the country. His speech
ranged over a variety of subjects, and he indicated that the new £1
and 10s. notes would in time be regarded as a recognised part of the
regular currency, and that they would not be entirely supplanted by
the coming issue of certificates. As to the latter, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer stated that their object was really to create credit.
This might be considered, if taken literally, a somewhat dangerous
statement; but the hope was generally expressed that care would be
taken in granting these certificates and preventing their over issue.
As this speech was of considerable importance, a quotation from the
official reports is given below:

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said he did not know why there should
be any scarcity of silver. It was not due to any shortage of the issue
from the mint, and it looked as if there had been some hoarding, a very
stupid thing. When the public got more accustomed to the 10s. and £1
notes there would be less difficulty in getting silver. With regard to
the design of the new notes they would be totally different from the
designs of the Scottish notes, some of which were beautiful.

They had had to consider a good many things, such, for instance,
whether the notes would be easily forgeable. Then they must have a
watermark which could be easily seen. For these reasons they had had to
disregard the very artistic designs of the Scottish notes. It was much
more difficult to imitate simplicity. Therefore, they had decided in
favour of the simple note because once they had started this currency
it might very well become quite popular and part of the regular
currency.

With regard to the certificates the object was really that they should
rather create credit without issuing the actual notes. It was purely
a certificate that the banks were entitled to so much currency. They
need not draw upon it, although they could, and the knowledge that
they had got so much credit at the Treasury enabled them to make their
arrangements for financing the trade of the country.

A question raised by Sir A. Markham with regard to the clearing
of German notes touched a very difficult, dangerous, and delicate
operation. The real danger was that somehow or other bills which were
due for this country to Germany might be honoured. For that reason they
had to take very great care that the transaction was not one-sided. He
hoped to be able in the course of the next few days to set up some form
of machinery that would attempt the operation, but they must take very
good care that they were not financing the enemy. Certificates would
only cover the case of banks; they would not cover insurance companies.

Proceeding, Mr. Lloyd George said that with regard to the general
question it was certainly desirable that a statement should be made as
to the arrangements entered into by the Government with regard to the
finance of the country, and he hoped in the course of a few days to do
so.

There were two or three very special difficulties as to which he had
not, personally, been able to make up his mind. The first was with
regard to the moratorium. A number of hon. gentlemen thought it ought
to be brought to a speedy termination. (Cries of "No," and "Hear,
hear.") He would tell the House what had been done on the subject.
He had issued a questionaire to some of the leading traders of the
country; he had not merely consulted bankers in the City of London. Up
to three o'clock that day he had received something like 8,000 replies
to the question which he had put. They were in the proportion of
something like 4,500 in favour of bringing the moratorium to an end on
September 4th, to 3,500 in favour of extending it.

Bankers and financing houses were almost unanimously in favour of
extending it.

Retail traders were in favour of putting an end to it, but only by a
majority.

Manufacturers, he should say, were two to one in favour of bringing it
to an end, but the one-third represented very important interests in
the manufacturing world. They were very much afraid that if it were
brought to an end there might be a crash. It was therefore a thing that
could not be decided altogether by a majority.

Merchants, both in the foreign and home trades, were in favour of an
extension of the moratorium.

He was inclined to consider whether it was possible to get a limited
moratorium, which would protect those particular interests without
interfering with those who would rather have no moratorium at all.
While about 10,000 forms of inquiry had been issued, that did not
represent all that had been done. He had endeavoured to ascertain
the opinions of bakers, butchers, and other retailers through their
societies. The result was that they were hopelessly divided on the
subject. The Government would have to come to a decision within the
next few days.

As an instance of different points of view, he might mention that at a
meeting of traders at the Treasury last week, one gentleman said that
as a colliery proprietor he would like to bring the moratorium to an
end, but as a merchant he would like it to continue. He agreed that the
steps which had been taken with regard to the discontinuing of bills
involved risks, but this was a time when they must take risks; they
must keep up the credit of the country, so that they might not find
at the end of the war that the important business which they had been
transacting for the whole civilised world had passed away to some other
country.

A good deal depended on the banks. The Government had done for the
banks as much as they could have expected. But the Government did not
do it in order to strengthen the banks' finances or to increase their
business, but to enable them to finance the trade of the country. If
the Government and the country were prepared to take risks, the banks
must take risks. He agreed that a very considerable number of banks had
behaved admirably. He thought that the action of other banks had been
due to timidity and over-caution. They had to think about their own
depositors. He did not think they were considering their shareholders
or the price of their shares, but they considered themselves to be
trustees of their depositors.

The time had come, however, when the banks ought to make advances with
the credit of the State behind them. He had called the attention of
the banks to complaints he had received, and had said that unless the
traders received the usual and even greater facilities for carrying on
in this special emergency, he had no doubt the House of Commons would
take action which would place behind the trade of the country the
necessary credit. He was glad to be able to say that the banks had come
to the conclusion, after careful consideration, that they could finance
business much more liberally than they were able to do during the first
fortnight.

An hon. member had called attention to the fact that the foreign
exchanges had broken down, and that the bridge had not been quite
repaired. That was true. It had been a very sudden snap of
communications. He hoped every day for improvement, but if it was
necessary to take any further action in order to expedite matters, then
he might have to come to the House of Commons. But he did not think
it was. The discounting of bills would have the effect that the banks
would find it necessary in their own interest to use the liberated cash
for the purpose of financing trade.

       *       *       *       *       *

Later, on September 8th, Mr. Lloyd George, replying to a deputation
from the Association of Municipal Corporations at the Treasury,
referred to the important part which finance would play in the war. In
the course of his speech he said:

In my judgment the last few hundred millions may win this war. This is
my opinion. The first hundred millions our enemies can stand just as
well as we can; but the last they cannot, thank God; and therefore I
think cash is going to count much more than we can possibly imagine at
the present moment. We are only at the beginning now. Of course if we
have great victories and smashing victories that is all right, but then
they may not come yet. We may have fluctuations, and things may last
long.

We are fighting a very tough enemy, who is very well prepared for the
fight, and he will probably fight to the very end before he will accept
the only conditions upon which we can possibly make peace, if we are
wise.

We financed Europe in the greatest war we ever fought, and that is what
won. Of course, British tenacity and British courage always come in,
and they always will; but let us remember that British cash told too.
When the others were absolutely exhausted we were getting our second
breath, and our third and our fourth, and we shall have to spend our
last before we are beaten. I want the municipalities to remember that.

Our trade is not going. The seas are ours, and they will remain
ours. We shall get not merely our own trade, except that of European
countries, but we shall get a good deal of the enemy's trade as well,
and, of course, there is always the business which is necessary in
order to keep the war going. So that there will be a great deal of
employment in the ordinary course of business.

       *       *       *       *       *

While we are on this subject of finance and economics, it may be well
to refer briefly to Germany's position. It was known that Germany
alone among the European Powers kept a well filled war chest. It was
understood that up to 1913, the war reserve amounted to £6,000,000
in gold. Under the new Army Law of 1913, it was stipulated that
this reserve should be trebled. There was reason to believe that in
addition the German Government had put aside for the purposes of the
present war about £30,000,000 out of the £50,000,000 which it had been
hoped to raise by last year's special war levy. Although some of this
cash was spent on preparing the new Army Corps, and possibly also
in strengthening the fortresses, it was generally believed that the
greater part of it was kept in reserve to meet the initial expenses of
the present campaign.

In addition to this, of course, large sums were obtained from Belgium
in the form of war levies. The Province of Brabant, for example,
was mulcted to the extent of £18,000,000, Brussels to the extent
of £10,000,000, Liège £2,000,000, and smaller towns in proportion.
From the cities on the French border, as well as from various towns
in Belgium, large supplies of stores and food were also demanded,
sometimes in addition to money and sometimes as a substitute.

These amounts, large as they are, would not seem sufficient to carry on
the war for any great length of time. Some calculations were made by
Paris Correspondents of the _Daily Telegraph_ at the outbreak of the
campaign. The minimum cost was estimated there at £400,000,000.

The figures given by military writers coincided and agreed that about
8,500,000 men were under arms for land warfare. To these must be added
340,000 seamen. If the Balkan War were taken as an example, the cost of
each man mobilised amounts to 10s. a day. This gives about £4,400,000
daily, or £132,000,000 monthly.

This figure is, however, considerably short of the mark, because it
does not take into account the maintenance of the armies and fleets.

The German Reichstag authorised extraordinary expenditure to the
extent of £250,000,000 to be obtained by a loan, and a further sum of
£14,000,000 to be drawn on the gold and silver reserve of the Empire.

It is now well known that the tax of 5 per cent. on the stock of notes
issued by the Reichsbank over and above its reserve in metal has been
suppressed. The German Government will therefore secure the loan
required by an issue of bank notes uncovered by a reserve of gold and
silver.

This issue reminds one of the assignats of the first French Revolution,
of which a few samples are kept as curious heirlooms in French
families.

It was stated in Paris that the Austrian army on a war footing cost
the Empire £800,000 a day, but the Austrian Treasury was emptied by
the mobilisation during the Balkan wars, which drained the financial
resources of the Empire for more than a year, and it is hard to see
where the Austrian Monarchy can find the large sums required to keep
the Imperial and Royal armies and navy during the present war.

There were many reasons that might be brought forward to show how Mr.
Lloyd George was justified in asserting that England could stand the
financial strain better than Germany. One great factor was responsible
for this, namely, the command of the sea. It is true that during the
war our trade with Germany, Russia, and France must be practically at a
standstill. There are even pessimists who say that our general European
trade must be severely crippled until the campaign is over. Even if we
assume this to be the case, however, there is, relatively speaking,
no cause for despondency. Our exports last year were valued at over
£525,000,000. If most of these exports had been sent to European
countries, there might possibly be some ground for concern. Of the huge
total, however, the countries with which we are at war, Germany and
Austria, took exports from us to the value of only £45,000,000; and
our exports to every European country, including Germany and Austria,
amounted to less than £180,000,000.

Expressed in other words, this means that roughly speaking, one-third
of our exports went to European countries, and two-thirds to countries
in other parts of the world. We have thus about two-thirds of our
ordinary export trade to come and go on--thanks to our command of the
sea--and, thanks to our command of the sea also, the oversea commerce
of Germany and Austria has for the time being completely broken down.
In view of this fact, the significance of which has hardly yet been
generally appreciated, it is possible for us at the present time
to capture, if not all, at least a large proportion of orders from
oversea countries which in the ordinary way would be given to German
or Austrian firms. It would be foolish to say, of course, that our
economic life can proceed as usual during a European war in which we
are involved; but it cannot be too emphatically pointed out that our
economical conditions here are, or can at least be made, infinitely
superior to those prevailing in the countries with which we are at war,
or even in Russia or France. German commerce is ruined; our commerce
can be made almost normal.

Take another point. We have a very large income from our investments
abroad, which are valued at rather more than £4,000,000,000. It is
estimated that our yearly income from this source is £200,000,000,
and, in addition, for services rendered internationally, our bankers,
brokers, shipping firms, and so on, receive an additional sum of
£150,000,000. That is to say, in exchange not for goods but for
services, we receive from various nations about £350,000,000 every
year. True, a large proportion of this sum is derived from investments
in countries affected by the war; and, on account of the war, many
of these normal returns have fallen off. It must nevertheless be
remembered that much of this large income comes to us from countries
which are only slightly, if at all, affected by the dislocation--from
India, for instance; Spain, the United States, all our own oversea
dominions, and South America. Our interests in Central and South
America alone are valued at £1,300,000,000.

There are other points to be remembered in connection with our position
as traders. At least ten million men in France, Russia, and Germany
have now been withdrawn from industry and are engaged in war. The
effect of this on the remainder of the adult population and on normal
production is naturally very considerable. In this country we have not
as yet found it necessary to withdraw such large numbers of men from
their ordinary work. Practically half a million men have joined the
second army, and another half-million are asked for. The withdrawal
of a million men from our industries is not likely to be seriously
felt, especially as many thousands of these men will be taken from
non-productive occupations. There is, therefore, no reason why we
should not continue our normal export trade as well as--though of
course to a smaller extent--our carrying trade.

And now for a glance at Germany's exports. In 1912 they amounted
to £440,000,000, and of this figure £106,000,000 represented raw
material, and no less than £295,000,000 manufactured articles. Such
things as clocks, toys, musical instruments, paints, paper, glassware,
iron and steel goods, gloves, hardware, and cutlery were poured into
every country in the world. We ourselves took £70,000,000 worth of
this stuff; India £6,000,000 worth; Australia £7,000,000; and Canada
and South Africa about £3,000,000 worth each. To Argentina, in 1912,
went German goods valued at nearly £13,000,000, and to the United
States manufactured articles worth nearly £12,000,000. These are a
few instances; the consular reports and Board of Trade statistics
will furnish several others. A determined attempt must now be made to
secure this trade. We shall, of course, have to compete with the United
States, where for two or three years past eager attention has been paid
to the possibilities of developing the South American market.

Germany, it must be remembered, did not enter upon this campaign
without taking into consideration her own economic position, and
especially her food supplies. Whether she was able to carry out the
plans she knew she ought to carry out is another matter. The advanced
state of her mobilisation at the time she declared war on Russia and
France made it quite clear that her decision to put her fortunes to the
test of the sword had not been taken in a day. Not even the perfect
Prussian military machine could have thrown so many troops against the
frontiers of France and Belgium at short notice, and it is certain
that the Berlin Government, in addition to giving its attention to the
organisation of the fighting forces, must have seriously considered the
question of the nation's food supply. Yet the circumstantial reports
which have filtered through relating to "food riots" in the capital and
other large towns indicate that this important matter--perhaps because
it is civil rather than military--has not had the consideration to
which it is entitled.

Germany is, indeed, in an unfortunate position if her food supply is
running short at this early stage of the campaign. So seldom in the
history of our own country have our trade routes been blocked for even
a short time that it is not easy for us to realise the situation of a
country which is dependent for a large proportion of its daily bread
upon foreign countries and happens to be cut off from communication
with them.

The latest figures show that Germany imported agricultural products
and foodstuffs in 1913 to the value of £351,836,900. These figures
show but a slight deviation from those of 1912 and 1911, a deviation
which changes in the population easily explain. Even when we make every
allowance for wines and various luxuries which are classified under
this heading, we shall be on the safe side in saying that Germany
must import necessary foodstuffs every year to the value of not less
than £180,000,000. This is a huge total, and it is accounted for by
the fact, which has caused some concern already to German statesmen,
that from an almost purely agricultural country Germany has, since the
Franco-German War, developed at a remarkable rate into an industrial
country. The producer has left the farm for the factory, and though one
result has been a vast increase in the wealth of the German Empire,
another has been to leave the Empire more and more dependent upon
foreign countries for its supplies of the necessaries of life.

Germany obtains a great deal of her meat, wheat, eggs, barley, coffee,
maize, butter, etc., from beyond her borders. In 1913, for example,
Russia sent her grain and cereals to the extent of 3,600,000 tons,
valued approximately at £30,000,000. In 1912 Argentina exported to her
grain and livestock products worth nearly £11,000,000. From Hungary
she received last year cereals valued at £4,000,000; and even little
Roumania contributed £1,000,000 worth of wheat to the total.

       *       *       *       *       *

The following short table, giving the import figures for 1911 and 1913,
will show to what extent Germany is indebted to foreign countries for
some common grain and cereal products:

  ---------------+-------------+-------------
                 |    1911.    |    1913.
  ---------------+-------------+-------------
                 |
                 |(£ sterling.)|(£ sterling.)
  Wheat          |   19,943,750|   21,472,850
  Barley         |   23,105,250|   20,347,750
  Maize          |    4,336,000|    5,309,600
  Rye            |    3,800,600|    4,100,200
  Oats           |    3,742,800|    3,946,300
  Rice           |    4,408,200|    3,926,000
  Cocoa          |    2,775,300|    2,796,000
  Coffee         |   12,578,450|   12,450,500
  Eggs           |    8,567,900|    4,504,800
  ---------------+-------------+-------------

With her coast blockaded by the British Fleet; France, Belgium, and
Russia hostile; and squadrons of the Navy alert for prizes in the
Mediterranean and the Atlantic, it is not likely that Germany can rely
upon any imports of food until the war is over. Austria-Hungary, at
grips with Servia, will require for her own use all the food she can
get, even if the Straits of Otranto were open. The hostility of Servia
prevents any possibility of food being imported via Greece.

On this point a remarkable article, obviously inspired, and showing
clearly enough why the Teutonic Powers were paying so much attention
to the Balkans, appeared in the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ so far back as
January 7th, 1914. The writer said:

The countries comprising the Triple Alliance are changing daily from
agricultural States to industrial States; and they are more and more
compelled to depend upon the uninterrupted importation of their raw
materials. A war with England, France, and Russia at the same time
appears, fortunately, to be ever more improbable; but the possibility
of such a conflict cannot be excluded, and far-seeing statesmen must
reckon with it. The Triple Alliance countries, which are compelled to
have recourse to large armies, cannot hope to compete successfully
with the fleets of England and France on the high seas. In the event
of a struggle, therefore, our oversea imports would, in a short time,
be done away with, and our industries would languish for want of raw
material. As things stand to-day, it is not merely the lack of wheat
and meat that would drive the country to destruction. Coal and iron and
heaven knows what else have also become essential to us. Where, then,
shall the Triple Alliance countries look for their raw material if the
sea routes are cut off? There is only one means of land communication,
and it leads through Roumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey into Asia Minor.
It follows that the Triple Alliance can never see this route barricaded
by hostile States; the Triplice must keep this route open at all
costs.... The German military mission in Constantinople is not merely
helping to reorganise the Turkish army out of pure joy; it must, at the
same time, serve both Turkey and the German Empire. One should also
take notice of the determination of Germany and Austria not to consent
to the proposal for the inter-nationalisation of the stretch of the
Orient Railway between Adrianople and Constantinople. The States lying
between the eastern border of Hungary and Asia Minor have, indeed, no
choice; they must be the friends and allies of the Triple Alliance; or
they must reckon with the unflinching hostility of the Triple Alliance
in any conflict which threatens their independence. Austria, too,
has no choice. Either the countries on the Lower Danube must be her
friends, or she must seek to annihilate them. It is as Napoleon said:
"the Power that commands Constantinople can command the whole world,
provided that it can maintain itself there." And when Bismarck said
that the whole Balkan Peninsula was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian
grenadier, he could not have foreseen that this territory would one
day become so essential a route for German imports that we should not,
if necessary, shirk a conflict with Russia to maintain our freedom of
trade there.

       *       *       *       *       *

Servia, in this astonishing declaration, was not mentioned by name;
but the hint to both her and Russia was sufficiently broad. Germany
and Austria are cut off completely by the hostility of Servia; and,
if Russia had not intervened, it is clear that this "means of land
communication" would have been kept free from a "barricade," if any
Power had thought of putting one up. In this connection it may be
recalled that the White Paper relating to the European Crisis (Cd.
7,467) contains a significant telegram from Mr. H.D. Beaumont, of the
International Financial Commission, to Sir Edward Grey:

  Constantinople,
  _July 29th, 1914._

I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably
beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I
gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here,
who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonika under Greek
administration, and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could
count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.

The reference in the telegram was, of course, to the Bagdad concession;
for Germany expected to be able to develop Asia Minor with the object
of making it a country capable of furnishing the large proportion of
foodstuffs and raw material which now enter Germany, from Russia,
Argentina, Canada, France, and Great Britain. All the treaties
and conventions relating to the concession specify this almost in
so many words. Hence the desperate anxiety of Germany and Austria
to secure Salonika as a port and to bring the Balkan States under
Teutonic influence; since a single unfriendly nation--Servia, for
instance--would have been an effective "barricade." The plan has failed
and the failure has trebled the price of food in Austria and doubled it
in Germany. Neither Government reckoned with a stern resistance; and
the failure to do so has already led both countries well on the way to
starvation.

Two instance of the bitterness with which the campaign was waged on
both sides may be mentioned as a fitting conclusion to this volume.
While the war was responsible for a good deal, one would hardly have
expected it to affect the text of a Wagnerian music-drama. Yet the
_Vossische Zeitung_ gravely stated that "having regard to the fact that
our ally, Austria-Hungary, and especially Hungary, is fighting so
bravely by our side, Wagner's text to 'Lohengrin' was slightly altered
at the opening performance in the Royal Opera House." In Wagner's own
version Henry the Fowler sings, "Herr Gott, bewahr uns vor dem Ungarn
Wut" ("Lord God, protect us from Hungaria's rage"). Knüpfer, who
undertook the rôle, deleted the word "Ungarn" and substituted "Feinde"
("enemy")! The alteration is said to have been wildly applauded.

To balance this there is a Russian step to be referred to. On September
2nd the _Telegraph's_ correspondent in the Russian capital announced
that St. Petersburg was no more. An Imperial decree made it known that
in future the Russian capital was to be called Petrograd. The change
was in the air for some time. The German-sounding name of the city had
long been a strange anomaly, and with the outbreak of war there was a
widespread demand that it should be altered.

Among the Slav alternatives proposed were Petrogorod, Petrovsk,
Petroff, and Sviato Petrovsk. The appellation actually selected is by
no means novel in its use. There was a time when old-fashioned people
pretty generally spoke of Petrograd, and not of Petersburg. The name
now officially adopted for the capital is also applied to it in the
works of Pushkin, Lermontoff, Alexei, Tolstoi, and Nekrasoff.

Dr. Dillon, commenting on the telegram, added:

What's in a name? The Russians hold that there is a good deal in it,
else they would not have chosen the present moment to reconsider a
proposal made many times during the past thirty-five years to change
that of their capital on the Neva. The city heretofore known as
St. Petersburg is in future to be called Petrograd. This apparent
innovation is in reality a return to the old name which Peter the
Great's second capital had borne from the beginning. All the old
books published in that city during the latter part of Peter's reign
and those of his immediate successors bear the word Petrograd on the
title-pages. Grad and Gorod are two forms of the same word which means
city or town. Etymologically it connotes an enclosed space, and belongs
to the same root as the English word garden. It occurs in hundreds
of Slav geographical names, as, for instance, in Novgorod--"new
town"--Ivangorod, Elizabetgrad, Euxinograd. Constantinople itself is
often called in Russian the "Emperor's city," Tsaregrad.

During the reigns of the Empresses Catherine, Anna, and Elizabeth the
mania for adopting foreign names was rife in Russia, and on many
places known in old Russian history German names were bestowed, most of
which remain to this day.

After the Treaty of Berlin, when Count Ignatieff, who had been Russia's
Ambassador in Constantinople, became at first Minister of the Interior
and then President of the Slavonic Society, he, Komaroff, and a number
of other Slavophiles inaugurated a movement in favour of altering those
German names to their Russian equivalents, or to the original Slav
appellations wherever there were any such. Before making the suggestion
public Count Ignatieff asked me to draw up a list of those towns and
cities, and to open a Press campaign in favour of the movement in
the columns of the Press organ of the Imperial Russian Academy, the
_Peterburgskya Vedomosti_, on the staff of which I was then a leader
writer. I did so. But this attempt to Russify geographical names met
with little support and encountered fierce opposition. The comic papers
in particular made fun of it, and asked whether we would not include
Oranienbaum--a summer residence near St. Petersburg--in our list, and
call it Apelsinsk, or, say, in English "Orange-insk," and a number
of other absurd translations were suggested for the benefit of the
Slavophile reformers.

But the campaign was not wholly unsuccessful. The Emperor Alexander
III., when he heard of it, is said to have remarked: "There is no need
of going to extremes. But the cities which played a part in Russian
history and had purely Russian names ought to have those names restored
to them. And in this list we should include the university city of
Dorpat and the city of Dunaburg. Henceforth they shall be known as
Yurevo and Dvinsk." Among Russian Germans there was a great outcry
at this "profanation," and most German prints and books--even those
published in the Russian Empire--continued to refer to those towns
as Dorpat and Dunaburg. But to-day they are known only as Yurevo and
Dvinsk.

And now St. Petersburg has been added to the list.

In time, no doubt, Peterhof, Oranienbaum, Yekaterinburg, Orenburg, and
a host of other places will also be rechristened, and Count Ignatieff's
proposal will be fully carried out.


_Wyman & Sons Ltd., Printers, London and Reading._





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