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Title: The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire; a history of the Osmanlis up to the death of Bayezid I (1300-1403)
Author: Gibbons, Herbert Adams
Language: English
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THE FOUNDATION OF THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
[Illustration: CONQUESTS OF MURAD & BAYEZID
IN THE BALKAN PENINSULA & OF BAYEZID IN ASIA MINOR]
THE FOUNDATION
OF
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
A HISTORY OF THE OSMANLIS UP TO THE DEATH OF BAYEZID I
(1300-1403)
BY
HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, PH.D.
SOMETIME FELLOW OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
NEW YORK THE CENTURY CO. 1916
PREFACE
Four years of residence in the Ottoman Empire, chiefly in
Constantinople, during the most disastrous period of its decline, have
led me to investigate its origin. This book is written because I feel
that the result of my research brings a new point of view to the student
of the twentieth-century problems of the Near East, as well as to those
who are interested in fourteenth-century Europe. If we study the past,
it is to understand the present and to prepare for the future.
I plead guilty to many footnotes. Much of my text is controversial in
character, and the subject-matter is so little known that the general
reader would hardly be able to form judgements without a constant--but I
trust not wearisome--reference to authorities.
The risk that I run of incurring criticism from Oriental philologists on
the ground of nomenclature is very great. I ask their indulgence. Will
they not take into consideration the fact that there is no accepted
standard among English-speaking scholars for the transliteration of
Turkish and Slavic names? Wherever possible, I have adopted the spelling
in general usage in the Near East, and in English standard lexicons and
encyclopaedias. When a general usage cannot be determined, I have
frequently been at a loss.
There was the effort to be as consistent in spelling as sources and
authorities would permit. But where consistency was lacking in
originals, a consistent transliteration sometimes presented difficulties
with which I was incompetent to cope. Even a philologist, with a system,
would be puzzled when he found his sources conflicting with each other
in spelling, and--as is often the case--with themselves. And if a
philologist thinks that he can establish his system by transliterating
the _spoken_ word, let him travel from Constantinople to Cairo overland,
and he will have a bewildering collection of variants before he reaches
his journey’s end. I was not long in Turkey before I learned that
_Osman_ and _Othman_ were both correct. It depended merely upon whether
you were in Constantinople or Konia! After you had decided to accept the
pronunciation of the capital, you were told that Konia is the Tours of
Turkey.
My acknowledgements to kind friends are many. I am grateful for the
year-in and year-out patience and willingness of the officials of the
Bibliothèque Nationale during long periods of constant demand upon their
time and attention. Professors John De Witt, D.D., LL.D., of Princeton
Theological Seminary, Duncan B. Macdonald, Ph.D., of Hartford
Theological Seminary, and Edward P. Cheyney, Ph.D., LL.D., of the
University of Pennsylvania, have read portions of the manuscript, and
have made important and helpful suggestions. The whole manuscript has
been read by Professors Talcott Williams, LL.D., of Columbia University,
and R. M. McElroy, Ph.D., of Princeton University, who have not
hesitated to give many hours to discussion and criticism of the theory
that the book presents.
Above all, I am indebted for practical aid and encouragement in
research and in writing, from the inception of the idea of the book
until the manuscript went to press, to my wife, with her Bryn Mawr
insistence upon accuracy of detail and care for form of narrative, and
to Alexander Souter, D.Litt., Regius Professor of Humanity in Aberdeen
University, my two comrades in research through a succession of happy
years in the rue de Richelieu, rue Servandoni, and rue du Montparnasse
of the queen city of the world.
H. A. G.
PARIS, _September 1, 1915_.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PAGE
OSMAN: A NEW RACE APPEARS IN HISTORY 11
CHAPTER II
ORKHAN: A NEW NATION IS FORMED AND COMES INTO
CONTACT WITH THE WESTERN WORLD 54
CHAPTER III
MURAD: THE OSMANLIS LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN
EMPIRE IN EUROPE 110
CHAPTER IV
BAYEZID: THE OSMANLIS INHERIT THE BYZANTINE
EMPIRE 180
APPENDIX A
TRADITIONAL MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE ORIGIN OF THE
OSMANLIS AND THEIR EMPIRE 263
APPENDIX B
THE EMIRATES OF ASIA MINOR DURING THE FOURTEENTH
CENTURY 277
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 303
BIBLIOGRAPHY 319
INDEX 369
MAPS
PAGE
1. CONQUESTS OF MURAD AND BAYEZID IN THE BALKAN
PENINSULA AND OF BAYEZID IN ASIA MINOR _Frontispiece_
2. THE EMIRATE OF OSMAN 31
3. THE EMIRATES OF OSMAN AND ORKHAN 67
4. THE EMIRATE OF MURAD 113
5. TIMUR’S INVASION OF ASIA MINOR 247
6. THE EMIRATES OF ASIA MINOR IN THE FOURTEENTH
CENTURY 278
CHAPTER I
OSMAN
A NEW RACE APPEARS IN HISTORY
I
The traveller who desires to penetrate Asia Minor by railway may start
either from Smyrna or from Constantinople. The Constantinople terminus
of the Anatolian Railway is at Haïdar Pasha, on the Asiatic shore, where
the Bosphorus opens into the Sea of Marmora. Three hours along the Gulf
of Ismidt, past the Princes’ Islands, brings one to Ismidt, the ancient
Nicomedia, eastern capital of the Roman Empire under Diocletian. It is
at the very end of the gulf. From Ismidt, the railway crosses a fertile
plain, coasts the western shore of Lake Sabandja, and enters the valley
of the Sangarius as far as Lefké. Here it turns southward, and mounts
rapidly the course of the Kara Su, a tributary of the Sangarius, through
the picturesque town of Biledjik, to a plateau, at the north-western end
of which is Eski Sheïr, seven hours distant from Ismidt. Eski Sheïr is
the ancient Dorylaeum. It was here that Godfrey de Bouillon in 1097 won
from the Turks the victory that opened for his Crusaders the way through
Asia Minor.
From Eski Sheïr there are two railway lines. One, running eastward, has
its terminus at Angora, the ancient Ancyra, after thirteen hours of
rather slow running. The other, the main line, runs south to Afion Kara
Hissar, where the line from Smyrna joins it, and then south-west to
Konia, the ancient Iconium, which is the western terminus of the new
Bagdad Railway. The time from Eski Sheïr to Konia is fifteen hours.
From Lefké or from Mekedjé, near the junction of the Kara Su and the
Sangarius, one can drive in four hours west to Isnik (ancient Nicaea),
or in twelve hours to Brusa, which lies at the foot of Keshish Dagh
(Mount Olympus). Between Lefké and Eski Sheïr, where the railway begins
to mount above the river-bed of the Kara Su, is Biledjik. Between Eski
Sheïr and Biledjik is Sugut. West from Eski Sheïr, six hours on horse
across one low mountain range, lies Inoenu. South from Eski Sheïr, a day
by carriage, is Kutayia. There is a short branch line of the Anatolian
Railway to Kutayia from Alayund, two and a half hours beyond Eski Sheïr
on the way to Konia.
If one will read the above paragraphs with a map before him, he will
readily see that this country, the extreme north-western corner of Asia
Minor, corresponds roughly to the borderland between the Roman provinces
of Phrygia Epictetus and Bithynia, and is near to Constantinople. Eski
Sheïr, Sugut, and Biledjik are close to Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia.
Owing to the convenient waterways furnished by the Gulfs of Mudania and
Ismidt, Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia have always been within a day’s
sail of Constantinople, even in the periods of primitive navigation.
From the hills behind Eski Sheïr, Mount Olympus is the commanding
landmark of the western horizon. From Constantinople, Mount Olympus is
easily distinguishable even in dull weather.
It was this country, adjacent to Constantinople, and separated from the
rest of Asia Minor by rugged mountain ranges and the dreary, treeless
plateau stretching eastward towards the Salt Desert, which gave birth to
the people who, a century after their appearance, were to inherit the
Byzantine Empire and to place their sovereigns upon the throne of the
Caesars.
II
At the end of the thirteenth century, Asia Minor, so long the
battleground between the Khalifs and the Byzantines, almost entirely
abandoned by the latter for a brief time to the Seljuk emperors of Rum,
who had their seat at Konia, then again disturbed by the invasion of the
Crusaders from the west and the Mongols from the east, was left to
itself. The Byzantines, despite (or perhaps because of!) their
re-establishment at Constantinople, were too weak to make any serious
attempt to recover what they had lost to the Seljuk Turks. The Mongols
of the horde of Djenghiz Khan had destroyed the independence of the
Sultanate of Konia, and had established their authority in that city.
But they made no real effort to bring under their dominion the districts
north-west and west of Konia to which they had logically fallen heir.
At the beginning of the fourteenth century, we find two Christian
kingdoms, Trebizond and Little Armenia, or Cilicia, at the north-eastern
and south-eastern extremities of the peninsula. In the north-western
corner, the Byzantines retained Philadelphia, Brusa, Nicaea, Nicomedia,
and the districts in which these cities were located--a narrow strip
along the Hellespont, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus. Asia Minor,
without even a semblance of centralized authority, was to him who could
gain and who could hold.
Had there been in Asia Minor in the latter half of the thirteenth
century a predominant element, with an historical past and with a strong
leader, we might have seen a revival of the sultanate of Konia. Or we
might have seen a revival of Hellenism, a grafting, perhaps, on fresh
stock, which would have put new foundations under the Byzantine Empire
by a reconquest of the Asiatic themes. But the Mongols and the Crusaders
had done their work too well. The Latins at Constantinople, and the
Mongols in Persia and Mesopotamia, had removed any possibility of a
revival of either Arab Moslem or Greek Christian traditions.
Sixty years of Latin rule at Constantinople, and in the lower portion of
the Balkan peninsula, had demonstrated the futility of any further
effort on the part of western Europe to inherit the Eastern Roman
Empire. The Mongols, the strongest cohesive military power at that time
in the world, had not been won to Christianity, and thus inspired with a
desire to re-establish for themselves the succession of the Caesars in
the Levant.[1] The Italians, imbued with the city ideal which had been
so fatal to the ancient Greeks, and divided into factions in their
cities, were beginning a bitter struggle for commercial supremacy in the
East that was to lose its vital importance from the discoveries of Vasco
da Gama, Columbus, and Magellan, and to render them impotent before the
Osmanlis after centuries of misdirected energy and useless sacrifice.
The last great crusade had passed by Asia Minor to spend itself in a
losing fight against the one remaining Moslem power.
As in other critical periods of history, then, an entirely new people,
with an entirely new line of sovereigns, must work out its destiny in
this abandoned country, or--to state what actually did happen--must
come, with a strength and prestige gained in Europe, to subdue it and to
possess it.
From the eighth to the thirteenth centuries a number of new ethnic
elements had entered Asia Minor. Except along the range of the Taurus
and in the valleys of rivers which emptied into the Aegaean Sea, the
Greek element, or more specifically, the Hellenic organization of
imperial institutions, had gone back to the coast cities from which it
had originally come. The progress of Moslem conquest, after driving
before it into Asia Minor the more zealous and militant Armenian and
Syrian Christians, had brought a considerable immigration, partly
Syrian, partly Arab, and varying in faith. The earlier Turks, who came
largely by way of Persia, with a period of settlement in that country,
belonged to the great Seljuk movement. They were nominally Moslems, and
very quickly became an indigenous element, because they had settled
themselves permanently in every place that had been opened up to Turkish
immigration by the Seljuk armies. So firmly rooted did they become that,
when the fortunes of war allotted again temporarily some of the places
which they inhabited to the Crusaders and to the Nicaean Byzantines,
they did not dream of moving out. This was the best country they had
ever seen and they had no intention of leaving it. When the Osmanlis
captured Brusa and Nicaea, they found many Moslems who had been there
for three generations. Simple-minded, tolerant of others, totally
unconscious of the privileges as well as of the obligations of an
organized society, the Turks of the earlier immigration neither opposed
nor aided in the political changes which have so frequently been the lot
of Asia Minor since their coming. This holds true of the Anatolian Turks
of the present day, and will be so as long as they remain illiterate and
uninstructed.
In the first quarter of the thirteenth century there was another great
migration towards Asia Minor, towards rather than into the peninsula,
because it partly scattered itself in the mountains of Armenia and
partly turned southward, going over the Taurus and Amanus ranges into
Cilicia and Syria. Some got as far as Egypt. The earlier Seljuk invasion
had been that of settlers following a victorious army. This invasion was
that of refugees fleeing before a terrible foe. For Djenghiz Khan and
his Mongol horde had come out of central Asia, and all who could, even
the bravest, fled before him. The lesson had been quickly learned that
to resist him meant certain death. Because it was a migration of
families, with all their worldly possessions, and because they had to
hurry and did not know where they were going, the great bulk of them did
not advance far.[2]
Most of the bands, after settling for some years in the mountains of
Armenia and in the upper valley of the Euphrates, were tempted by the
death of Djenghiz Khan to return home. The steep mountains and narrow
valleys of Rum had dissuaded them from trying for better luck farther
west. It was too much up hill and down dale for their cattle.[3] The
resolute and adventurous pushed on into Asia Minor, although in doing so
they must have lost or have left behind most of their women and children
and flocks. For they were small warrior bands, bent upon enlisting in
the army of Alaeddin Kaï Kobad, the last illustrious sultan of the Konia
Seljuk line--illustrious because he had not yet met the Mongols and was
looked upon by the fugitives as a possible saviour and avenger. Even if
they had not the intention of putting themselves under the protection of
Alaeddin when they set their faces westward, they must needs have come
into contact with him. For of the two roads into Asia Minor from
Armenia, the upper one lay through Sivas and Angora, and the lower
through Caesarea, Akseraï, and Konia. Whichever route they took would
lead them through the Seljuk dominions.
It is doubtful if Alaeddin viewed the appearance of these fighting
bands with any other emotion than that of alarm. In spite of their
undoubted skill as fighters, the Seljuk Sultan did not dare to enroll
many of them in his army. If he were defeated in battle, or if he should
die, he knew well that such vigorous mercenaries might upset his line.
He could rely upon their fidelity neither against the Kharesmians with
whom he was at that time fighting (many of them were from that Sultan’s
country), nor against the Mongols with whom he must soon measure his
strength. So he followed the policy dictated by prudence. Resisting the
temptation of using them in his own army, he granted to their leaders as
fiefs districts on the frontiers of his rapidly diminishing empire which
were hardly his own to give, where they would have to work out their own
salvation by mastering local anarchy in their respective ‘grants’, or,
like the Israelites of Canaan, fight for what had been allotted to them,
against the Byzantine Emperors of Nicaea.
Under these circumstances, the tribe of destiny would be that which
occupied the grant nearest Constantinople and the remnant of the
Byzantine Empire. The Turkish tribe which settled on the borders of
Bithynia, either by the direction and with the permission of Alaeddin
Kaï Kobad,[4] or independently of the Seljuks of Konia,[5] was that
whose first historic chief was Osman, the father of the Osmanlis.
With the other Turkish tribes, which succeeded in establishing
independent emirates, the Osmanlis did not come into contact until the
reign of Orkhan. So it is unnecessary to trace their fortunes here.[6]
III
There are no Ottoman sources to which the historian may go for the
origin of the Ottoman people and royal house, or for their history
during the fourteenth century. They have no written records of the
period before the capture of Constantinople.[7] Their earliest
historians date from the end of the fifteenth century, and the two
writers to whom they give greatest weight wrote at the end of the
sixteenth and the early part of the seventeenth century.[8] From the
point of view, then, of recording historical facts, one hesitates in our
day to follow the example of von Hammer, by setting forth at length,
after a scientific collation, the legends which the simple-minded
Osmanlis have always accepted without question. The Byzantines give us
nothing worthy of credence about the origin of the Osmanlis, for the
reason that they had no means of getting authoritative information. As
for the early European writers, their testimony is valuable only as a
reflection of the idea which Christendom had of the Osmanlis when they
were becoming a menace to European civilization.[9]
On the other hand, these legends are not to be ignored, as they have
been by the latest authoritative writer on Ottoman history.[10] Where
authenticated facts are lacking, traditions must be examined and
carefully weighed. This is essential when we are considering the origins
of a people. For no race has ever recorded its birth. The beginnings of
a people are so insignificant that they remain unnoticed in general
history until the attention of others is attracted to them by their own
achievements.
Who were the people that took upon themselves the name of Osman, their
chief, and whom we must, from the moment of their very first encounters
with the Byzantines, clearly distinguish from the other groups of
Anatolian Turks that had gathered around other leaders? Did they, at the
beginning of Osman’s career, have any distinct national consciousness?
Did they have any past? Did they start the foundation of a state with a
definite goal before them? Was there any other cause for their amazing
growth and success than the mere fact that they had the most fortunate
geographical position, on the confines of a decaying empire?
With the purpose, then, of suggesting an answer to some of these
questions, and paving the way for an answer to the others later on, what
the Osmanlis accept concerning their origin and their history before
1300 must be set forth and examined.[11]
In the year of the Hegira 616,[12] ‘because there was no more rest to be
found in all Persia’ for the Turks who had been forced out of the
Khorassan[13] by the approach of Djenghiz Khan, ‘all the wandering
Turks, fifty thousand families, followed their leader, Soleiman
Shah,[14] and set out for Rum. Then was Alaeddin I, son of Kaï Kosrew,
the builder of Konia, entered upon the rule of Rum. These fifty thousand
nomad families journeyed several years in the neighbourhood of Erzerum
and Erzindjian, changing from winter to summer quarters and plundering
the unbelievers who lived there. But ... finally ... Soleiman Shah
marched again towards his homeland, with the intention of passing
through the district of Aleppo. As they came to the neighbourhood of
Djaber, they wanted to venture across the Euphrates. Soleiman Shah drove
his horse into the river to seek a ford. The bank was rocky, so the
horse slipped and fell into the river with Soleiman Shah. His end was
regarded as a warning (decision) of destiny: it appeared to be the
command of God.... A part of these Turks remained to dwell there....
There was a division among the followers of Soleiman Shah. Some of them,
who now carry the name of Turcomans of Syria, went into the wilderness.
Others went towards Rum, and became ancestors of the nomad tribes who
still wander in Rum.
‘Soleiman Shah at his death left four sons: Sonkur tigin, Gundogdu,
Ertogrul, the champion of the faith,[15] and Dundar. Some of the Turks
followed these four brothers, turned themselves again in the direction
of Rum, and came to the ... source of the Euphrates. While Ertogrul and
Dundar remained there with about four hundred nomad families, the two
other brothers turned back again to their home.’ Ertogrul marched
farther into Rum, and settled near Angora at the foot of Karadjadagh.
From there he wandered to Sultan Oejoenu.[16]
Neshri now tells a story which is repeated by later Ottoman historians
as a fact. Neshri says that he heard this story from a ‘trustworthy’
man, who had heard it from the stirrup-holder of Orkhan, who, in turn,
had heard it from his father and his grandfather. This is worthy of
mention, for it is one of the very few instances where an Oriental
historian has taken the trouble to connect his facts with what might be
termed an original source:
‘As Ertogrul, with about four hundred men, was marching into Rum, Sultan
Alaeddin[17] was engaged in a fight with some of his enemies. As they
came near, they found that the Tartars were on the point of beating
Sultan Alaeddin. Now Ertogrul had several hundred excellent companions
with him. He spoke to them: “Friends, we come straight upon a battle. We
carry swords at our side. To flee like women and resume our journey is
not manly. We must help one of the two. Shall we aid those who are
winning or those who are losing?” Then they said unto him, “It will be
difficult to aid the losers. Our people are weak in number, and the
victors are strong!” Ertogrul replied, “This is not the speech of bold
men. The manly part is to aid the vanquished. The prophet says that he
shall come to the helpless in time of need. Were man to make a thousand
pilgrimages, he finds not the reward that comes to him when at the right
moment he turns aside affliction from the helpless!” Thereupon Ertogrul
and his followers immediately grasped their swords, and fell upon the
Tartars ... and drove them in flight. When the Sultan saw this he came
to meet Ertogrul, who dismounted, and kissed the Sultan’s hand.
Whereupon Alaeddin gave him a splendid robe of honour and many gifts for
his companions. Then gave he to the people of Ertogrul a country by name
Sugut for winter and the mountain range of Dumanij[18] for summer
residence. From this decides one rightly that the champion of the faith,
Osman, was born at Sugut. Then was Karadja Hissar, like Biledjik, not
yet captured, but was subject to Sultan Alaeddin. These were three
districts.’
Some time later, Ertogrul, acting as commander of the advance-guard of
Alaeddin’s army, defeated a force of Greeks and their Tartar
mercenaries, in a three days’ battle, and pursued them as far as the
Hellespont. Ertogrul’s force consisted of four hundred and forty-four
horsemen, which he commanded in person. After this battle Alaeddin
bestowed upon Ertogrul as fief the district of Eski Sheïr, comprising
Sugut on the north, and Karadja Hissar on the south, of Eski Sheïr.
Karadja Hissar was reported captured after an elaborate siege and
assault by Ertogrul when he first came into the country. But it is again
mentioned as one of the first conquests of Osman from the Christians
after his father’s death.[19] None of the Ottoman historians records any
progress of conquest during the long years of Ertogrul’s peaceable
existence. When he died, in 1288, Osman was thirty years old. He gave to
his son less than the Ottoman historians claim was his actual grant from
Alaeddin I. If their own records of Osman’s conquests after 1289 are
correct, we must believe that his tribe possessed only Sugut and a
portion of the mountain range lying directly west. When Ertogrul died,
they had no other village--not even a small mountain castle.
IV
After Ertogrul’s death there was an amazing change. Osman and his
villagers began to attack their neighbours, extend their boundaries,
and form a state. We cannot go on to a consideration of these events
without mentioning some traditions of this period which furnish us with
a clue to the explanation of this sudden change of a very small pastoral
tribe, leading a harmless sleepy existence in the valley of the Kara Su,
into a warlike, aggressive, fighting people.
Osman once passed the night in the home of a pious Moslem. Before he
went to sleep his host entered the room, and placed on a shelf a book,
of which Osman asked the title. ‘It is the Koran,’ he responded. ‘What
is its object?’ again asked Osman. ‘The Koran’, his host explained, ‘is
the word of God, given to the world through his prophet Mohammed.’ Osman
took the book and began to read. He remained standing, and read all
night. Towards morning he fell asleep exhausted. An angel appeared to
him, and said, ‘Since thou hast read my eternal word with so great
respect, thy children and the children of thy children shall be honoured
from generation to generation.’[20]
In Itburnu, a village not far from Eski Sheïr, and also not far from
Sugut, lived a Moslem cadi, who dispensed justice and legal advice to
those of his faith in that neighbourhood. He had a daughter, Malkhatun,
whose hand was demanded in marriage by Osman. But the sheik Edebali, for
a period of two years, persisted in refusing his consent to this
union.[21] Finally, Osman, when sleeping one night in the home of
Edebali, had a dream.
He saw himself lying beside the sheik. A moon arose out of the breast
of Edebali, and, when it had become full, descended and hid itself in
his breast. Then from his own loins there began to arise a tree which,
as it grew, became greener and more beautiful, and covered with the
shadow of its branches the whole world. Beneath the tree he saw four
mountain ranges, the Caucasus, the Atlas, the Taurus, and the Balkans.
From the roots of the tree issued forth the Tigris, the Euphrates, the
Nile, and the Danube, covered with vessels like the sea. The fields were
full of harvests, and the mountains were crowned with thick forests. In
the valleys everywhere were cities, whose golden domes were invariably
surmounted by a crescent, and from whose countless minarets sounded
forth the call to prayer, that mingled itself with the chattering of
birds upon the branches of the tree. The leaves of the tree began to
lengthen out into swordblades. Then came a wind that pointed the leaves
towards the city of Constantinople, which, ‘situated at the junction of
two seas and of two continents, seemed like a diamond mounted between
two sapphires and two emeralds, and appeared thus to form the precious
stone of the ring of a vast dominion which embraced the entire world.’
As Osman was putting on the ring he awoke.[22]
When this dream was told to Edebali, he interpreted it as a sign from
God that he should give his daughter to Osman in order that these
wonderful things might be brought about for the glory of the true faith.
So the marriage was arranged.[23]
That Osman and his people were good Moslems themselves, and of Moslem
ancestry, is not questioned by the Ottoman and Byzantine writers, and
seems to have been accepted as a matter of fact by the European
historians who have written upon the history of the Ottoman Empire.[24]
But it seems very clear that Osman and his tribe, when they settled at
Sugut, must have been pagans. There is no direct mention, in any
historical record, of the conversion to Islam of the tribes from the
Khorassan and other transoxanian regions which, in the beginning of the
thirteenth century, appeared on the confines of Asia Minor. The earlier
Turkish invaders entered the country only after they had already for
generations been in contact with Arabic Islam. Although they displayed
no great knowledge of or zeal for their religion and were free from the
fanaticism of the Saracens, the Seljuks were certainly Moslems.
But the Turks of the later immigration, from whom Osman sprang, had
never come to any great extent under the influence of Islam, even though
they had settled for some generations on the frontiers of Persia. If we
accept the testimony of the Osmanlis themselves concerning their descent
from Soleiman Shah, who had left Mahan with fifty thousand families, we
have a clear indication of their being non-Moslems from Neshri’s account
of the dispersion of this horde after the death of Soleiman Shah. He
says that some were ancestors of the Syrian Turcomans and others of all
the wandering tribes in Rum--the habitual nomads of his own day. The
testimony of travellers from the twelfth century onwards is overwhelming
in support of the pagan character of these tribes.[25]
The various Turkish tribes which entered Asia Minor at the same time as
that of Osman, and had penetrated into the western part of the
peninsula, soon found themselves in a Moslem atmosphere. They were few
in number. Nothing was more natural for them than to adopt the faith of
their Seljuk kinsmen. This they did, for exactly the same reason that
the Bulgarians, although they had originally a tendency towards Islam,
adopted Christianity.[26] It was so natural that it passed without
comment. These Turks were primarily warriors, indifferent to deep
religious feeling and conviction. So they could take on a new faith--if
we can say that they ever had a faith before--without any trouble or
without any noise being made over it. Between 800 and 1000 the Seljuks
changed their religion three times.[27] At the sack of Mosul, in 1286,
the Turks and Turcomans made no distinction between Moslem and
Christian, massacring the men and carrying off the women of both sects
alike.[28]
The tractability of the Turks, as of the Tartars and Mongols, in the
matter of religion was noted by every traveller, and was so well known
in western Europe that strenuous efforts were made by the popes at
various times from Djenghiz Khan to Gazan Khan to bring these Asiatic
hordes into the Christian fold. A united Christendom, even a united
Rome, might have seen its missionary work crowned with success.
Of the village and castle chieftains with whom Osman at the beginning of
his career lived on friendly terms, almost every one was a Christian.
His lot was cast with them. He was cut off from the decaying Seljuk
dominion of Konia. He had practically no intercourse with the other
Turkish emirs of Asia Minor.[29] His only serious foes were the Mongols,
pagans like himself, who had, at the very year of his birth, given what
seemed a death-blow to Islam in destroying the Khalifate at Bagdad in
1258, and who were, when Osman began his active career, plotting with
the Franks of the Holy Land to aid them against the Egyptian
sultanate--the last strong bulwark of Islam.
We see, then, the tremendous importance of these dreams of Osman, of his
meeting with Edebali, and of his marriage with Malkhatun. We cannot
regard these events in any other light than as recording, in a truly
Oriental way, his conversion to Islam. The interpretation of the dream
of the Holy Book strikes one immediately. Except in Seadeddin, the
religious significance of the moon and tree dream is overshadowed by the
romance of Osman and Malkhatun. Let us give to sheik Edebali his proper
place in history as the great missionary of Islam, who found for his
faith in its hour of dire need a race of swordbearers worthy of the task
of reconstituting the Khalifate and of spreading once more the name of
Mohammed in three continents.
It was the conversion of Osman and his tribe which gave birth to the
Osmanli people, because it welded into one race the various elements
living in the north-western corner of Asia Minor. The new faith gave
them a _raison d’être_. This conversion, and not the disappearance of
the Seljuks of Konia,[30] is the explanation of the activity of Osman
after 1290, as in sharp contrast with the preceding fifty years[31] of
easy, slothful existence at Sugut.
Ertogrul and Osman, village chieftain at Sugut, had lived the life of a
simple, pastoral folk, with no ambition beyond the horizon of their
little village. No record exists of any battle fought, of any conquest
made. Turks had already made their appearance in raids against the coast
cities of Asia Minor, upon the islands of the Aegaean Sea, and even in
the Balkan peninsula. But they were not the Turks of Osman. Until the
students of the later Byzantine Empire, and of the Italian commercial
cities in their relations with the Levant, make a clear distinction
between Turk and Osmanli, there will always be confusion upon this
point. Ertogrul had about four hundred fighting men.[32] There is no
reason to believe that Osman had more. His relations with his neighbours
were those of perfect amity.[33] There is no question of believer and
unbeliever.
Suddenly we find Osman attacking his neighbours and capturing their
castles. During the decade from 1290 to 1300 he extends his boundaries
until he comes into contact with the Byzantines. His four hundred
warriors grow to four thousand. We begin to hear of a people called, not
Turks, but Osmanlis, after a leader whose own name first appears at the
same time as that of his people.[34] They are foes of Greeks and Tartars
alike. They are definitely allied to Islam. They possess a missionary
spirit and a desire to proselytize such as one always finds in new
converts. Their unity among themselves, and their distinctively
different character from that of the other Turks of Asia Minor, becomes,
during the first sixty years of the fourteenth century, so marked that
Europe is forced to recognize them as a nation. Being more in the
presence of Europe than the other groups of Asia Minor, the Europeans
begin to call them simply Turks, and to take them as representing all
the Turks of Anatolia.
But they had never called themselves Turks until they got the habit of
doing so through the influence of European education upon their higher
classes, and because of the awakening since 1789 of the sentiment of
nationality among the subject Christian races. Mouradjea d’Ohsson, who
understood the Osmanlis better than any other European writer of his
day, wrote in 1785: ‘The Osmanlis employ the term “Turk” in referring to
a coarse and brutal man. According to the Osmanlis, the word Turk
belongs only to the peoples of the Turkestan and to those vagabond
hordes who lead a stagnant life in the deserts of the Khorassan. All the
peoples submitted to the Empire are designated under the name
“Osmanlis”, and they do not understand why they are called Turks by
Europeans. As they attach to this word the idea of the most marked
insult, no foreigner in the Empire ever allows himself to use it in
speaking to them.’[35]
V
Nor were the Osmanlis, until the reign of Bayezid, one hundred years
later, the strongest military and political factor in Asia Minor. The
Turkish emirates of Sarukhan, of Kermian, and especially of Karaman,
could match the Osmanlis in extent of territory and ability to defend
it.[36] We shall see later how the Osmanlis conquered their Anatolian
neighbours by a prestige won in Europe and by soldiers gathered in
Europe. One of the principal tasks of this book is to correct the
fundamental misconception of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, which
has persisted to this day.[37] It seems to be a pretty generally
accepted idea that the Osmanlis were a Turkish Moslem race, who invaded
Asia Minor, and, having established themselves there, pushed on into
Europe and overthrew the Byzantine Empire. Nothing could be farther from
the truth. The Osmanlis were masters of the whole Balkan peninsula
before they had subjugated Asia Minor as far as Konia!
Osman and his people have no history until they come in contact with the
Byzantines. The Ottoman chroniclers, and the Byzantine and European
historians who have followed them, give at some length the early
conquests of Osman. But the accounts are fantastical, obscure, and
frequently contradictory. It is the story of a village chieftain, who
succeeded in imposing his authority upon his neighbours over an
increasingly wider area, until a small state was formed. But it is not
the same story as that of the other emirs who built up independent
states in the old Seljuk provinces. For Osman founded his principality
in territory contiguous to Constantinople, and by attacking
[Illustration: EMIRATE OF OSMAN]
and conquering the last fragments of the Byzantine possessions along and
in the hinterland of the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora. Osman’s
opponents were all Christians. Had he attacked his Turkish neighbours
first, had he gone south and east instead of north and west, in building
up his state, there would never have been a new race born to change the
history of the world.
It is impossible to state with any degree of certitude the conquests of
Osman before 1300. The record of village warfare, with its names of
localities which even the most celebrated Ottoman geographer could not,
three centuries later, identify,[38] is of no importance whatever. The
extent of Osman’s principality, when he and his people first appear in
history, was very insignificant. In 1300 he had succeeded in submitting
to his authority a part of ancient Phrygia Epictetus and Bithynia, whose
four corners were: south-east, Eski Sheïr; south-west, the eastern end
of Mount Olympus; north-east, the junction of the Kara Su and the
Sangarius; north-west, Yeni Sheïr. In 1299 Osman took up his residence
in Yeni Sheïr. This was the outpost of his principality, in a position
of extreme importance, about half-way between Brusa and Nicaea.[39] In
sixty years the tribe of Osman had advanced sixty miles from Eski Sheïr,
the old city, to Yeni Sheïr, the new city.[40] They held undisputed
sway only in the valley of the Kara Su,[41] and their important villages
and castles, Biledjik,[42] Itburnu, Inoenu, Sugut, AÏnegoel,[43] Karadja
Hissar,[44] Yundhissar, and Yar Hissar,[45] were all within a day’s
journey of each other.
In 1301, twelve years after Osman began to form his state, he fought his
first battle, and came into direct contact with the Byzantine Empire. At
Baphaeon,[46] near Nicomedia, the heterarch Muzalon, with 2,000 men,
attempted to check a raid the Osmanlis were making into the fertile
valley whose products contributed so greatly to the well-being of
Nicomedia. It was midsummer, just before the gathering of the
harvests.[47] In a pitched battle, the unarmoured horsemen of Osman
charged so speedily and so impetuously that they broke through the heavy
line of their opponents, and the Greek commander’s retreat was covered
only by the opportune arrival of Slavic mercenaries.[48] The Osmanlis
were too few in number to follow up this victory. It is hardly probable
that they made any attack on Nicomedia.[49] But they laid waste all the
districts into which they dared to venture.
VI
At this same time the emirs whose possessions bordered on the Aegaean
Sea began to press hard upon the Greek coast cities and those few cities
of the interior, such as Magnesia, Philadelphia, and Sardes, which still
acknowledged the authority of Byzantium. In the spring of 1302, Michael
IX Palaeologos came to Asia Minor to take command of the Slavic
mercenaries. At first the Turks were in consternation, if we can believe
Pachymeres, but when they saw the unwillingness of Michael to fight,
they grew bold, and compelled the Emperor to take refuge in Magnesia.
Michael’s unwillingness was not due to lack of courage, but because he
could not rely upon his Slavs. As true mercenaries, they were fighting
for pay, and there was no gold to give them. Michael’s father, the old
Emperor Andronicus II, had not sent him any money. In Constantinople the
Venetians were threatening to depose Andronicus; the almost annual
ecclesiastical quarrels, which form so large and wearisome and
disastrous a place in the last century and a half of Byzantine history,
were embarrassing him; and the treasury was empty. Even if there had
been money to send, it would have been a perilous undertaking, for the
Turkish pirates were swarming in the Sea of Marmora, and had even seized
the Princes’ Islands, which are within sight of the Imperial City.
When they saw that neither pay nor booty was forthcoming, and that they
were engaged in a hopeless struggle, the mercenaries forced Michael to
allow them to return to Europe. This was the last genuine personal
effort on the part of a successor of the Caesars to save the Asiatic
themes. It ended in ignominious failure. Not one battle had been fought.
The withdrawal of the Slavs was followed by an exodus of Greeks to the
Aegaean coast, and from there to Europe. Pachymeres claims that this
exodus was general. But we cannot accept the testimony of Pachymeres as
altogether trustworthy on this point. Many Greeks, for reasons which are
set forth later, remained in the coast districts of Asia Minor, and they
did not leave, to any noticeable extent, the territory in which Osman
was operating. The Turks, however, made a raid into all the islands
along the Aegaean littoral, and crossed over into Thrace, where for two
years the fields could not be cultivated.[50]
At this critical moment, had there been any united action on the part of
the Turkish emirs, Constantinople would probably have fallen an easy
prey to their armies and to their fleets. But each emir was acting for
himself, and was as much an enemy of his Turkish rivals as he was of the
Byzantine emperors. There is no instance in which any two of them joined
forces, and acted together. Throughout the fourteenth century the armies
defending the Byzantine Empire contained almost as many Turks as those
attacking it.
To the east and to the west Andronicus II, utterly unable to defend
himself, looked for aid. From this time on to the fall of Constantinople
the history of the Byzantine Empire becomes what the history of the
Ottoman Empire has been during the last hundred years. It is the story
of an uninterrupted succession of bitter internal quarrels, of attacks
by former vassals upon the immediate frontiers of its shrunken
territory, of subtle undermining by hostile colonies of foreigners whose
one thought was commercial gain, and of intermittent, and in almost all
cases selfishly inspired, efforts of western Europe to put off the fatal
day.
In the east, Andronicus expected much of Ghazan Khan. Were not the Turks
of Asia Minor vassals of the Mongol overlord? Andronicus sent envoys to
Ghazan to offer him the hand of a young princess who passed at
Constantinople as his natural daughter. Ghazan received them cordially,
accepted the proffered marriage alliance, and promised to exercise a
pressure upon the Turks of western Asia Minor.[51] This promise,
however, was not followed by any serious action. The Mongols were never
more than mere raiders in Asia Minor.[52] Before this marriage could be
consummated, Ghazan Khan died. The young princess was offered to and
accepted by his successor. It was a useless sacrifice. For in this first
decade of the fourteenth century the long struggle between Christian and
Moslem to win the Mongols ended, temporarily at least, in the conversion
of the Khans to Islam.[53]
From the west, Andronicus received aid of the most disastrous sort. When
Ferdinand of Aragon made peace with Charles d’Anjou, King of Sicily, in
1302, he got rid of his troublesome mercenaries by sending them to serve
the Byzantine Empire. Roger de Flor, typical soldier of fortune, who
could not be matched in his generation for daring, insolence, rapacity,
cruelty, and Achillean belief in his own invulnerability, arrived at
Constantinople with eight thousand Catalans and Almogavares, the former
heavy-armed plainsmen and mariners, the latter light-armed mountaineers
of northern Spain. They were true prototypes of the soldiers of Alva and
Cortes. Roger was made Grand Duke, and married to Princess Marie, niece
of Andronicus.
Almost immediately after their arrival, the Catalans became engaged in
such bloody conflicts with the Genoese of Galata, and robbed and
murdered the Greeks with such alacrity, that Andronicus hastened to turn
them loose in Asia. Roger established himself in the peninsula of
Cyzicus. Here his Catalans fell immediately to plundering the
inhabitants of the country, who soon found that they had passed from
Scylla to Charybdis, and carried heartrending tales of lust and greed
and massacre to Constantinople.[54] The one Greek general who was doing
anything noteworthy against the Turks was relieved of his spoils of war
by Roger.
In 1305, by a swift march to the relief of Philadelphia, which was being
besieged by Alisur, prince of Karamania, Roger and his Catalans showed
what they could do, if they would. The Turks were compelled to raise the
siege. Roger pursued them to the source of the Sangarius.[55] But, on
the way, the Catalans deprived their Greek allies of any portion of the
rich spoils, and massacred the Slavic mercenaries who dared to argue
with them.[56] Gregoras says, probably with reason, that Roger could
have reconquered the whole of Asia Minor for the Byzantines.[57] But
that country seemed to attract him as little as it had attracted the
Mongols. He was no Crusader, glad and eager to undergo the terrible
hardships which military operations among mountains and on arid plateaus
demanded. There was no motive to make the effort worth while. So he left
the Turks to themselves and went to Gallipoli, where he let it be known
that the Catalans were preparing an expedition to repeat the Fourth
Crusade.
In fear for his life as well as for his throne, Andronicus sent an envoy
to offer Roger the ‘government of the Orient’, general command of all
the troops in Asia, and twenty thousand pieces of gold. For full measure
he added enough wheat to nourish the Catalans for a year. The
‘government of the Orient’ was as empty and meaningless a gift as the
supposed ‘grants’ of the Seljuk Sultan Alaeddin to the Turkish nomad
chieftains. The only troops who could go into Asia and accomplish
anything were already under Roger’s command. But the gold, which might
have worked a charm, was left behind, as the envoy was afraid to bring
it. Roger scorned the emperor’s offer. Ten days later he repented, and
accepted from Emperor Andronicus thirty thousand pieces of gold, one
hundred thousand measures of wheat, and the title of Caesar. In return
for these princely gifts he had only to promise to lead three thousand
men against the Turks.
But a host of Spaniards, long before the discovery of America, were
already in search of ‘El Dorado’. They poured into Gallipoli on every
merchant ship from the West, and made the Byzantines begin to fear Roger
more than they feared the Turks. The remedy was getting to be worse than
the evil! Before leaving for his campaign, Roger rashly went to
Adrianople to pay his respects to the young Emperor Michael IX, who was
holding his court there. On the threshold of Michael’s bedchamber, like
the Duke of Guise at Blois, he was stabbed to death. A massacre of his
attendants followed.
A train of evils fell upon Macedonia and Thrace as a result of the
assassination of Roger de Flor. Michael soon had reason to regret this
ill-advised deed. Not only did the Catalans, in their first access of
fury, avenge the death of their great leader and their comrades by
unspeakable cruelties and by the destruction of every village which they
came upon, not only did they defeat the young emperor in open battle and
almost capture him as he fled from the field, but they invited over from
Asia Minor into Macedonia all the Turks who could be induced to come.
At Gallipoli the Catalans tried to form a state. It failed owing to
dissensions among their leaders. Their raids into Thrace had so ruined
that country that they themselves began to starve. So they started upon
an odyssey into Macedonia, where the common soldiers, wearied of the
civil strife engendered by their leaders, who were continually ordering
them to cut each other’s throats, decided to make an end of these costly
personal jealousies. They killed the nobles who led them, and marched
south into Thessaly. Gauthier de la Brienne committed the imprudence of
seeking their aid in Athens. In 1310 they killed Brienne, set up in
Athens a military democracy, and started to revive the Peloponnesian
Wars.[58]
The further fortunes of the Grand Catalan Company do not come within the
limits of our work. Roger and the Catalans, for that matter, were never
in direct contact with the Osmanlis. But it was necessary to give a
brief statement of their services to the Byzantine Empire in order that
we might have a proper appreciation of their services to the Ottoman
Empire. When they withdrew into Thessaly they had left the Turks behind
them in Thrace and Macedonia. To the unhappy emperor who had received
them nine years before as saviours of the Empire, this was their legacy.
Owing to the adroit leadership of their chief, Halil, and to the
impotence of Michael, whose Slavic mercenaries had deserted him and
withdrawn into Bulgaria, these Turks were soon able to throw Macedonia
and Thrace into so great anarchy that communication by land between
Salonika and the capital was no longer safe.[59] And yet Halil had only
eighteen hundred men under his command! In 1311, shortly after the
Catalans had left, Halil concluded with Andronicus and Michael an
agreement by which he and his companions in arms were to have a
safe-conduct and free passage across the Hellespont. But the Greeks, in
violation of one of the most important points of this arrangement,
attempted to take from the Turks their booty. Halil, instead of quitting
European soil, sent for reinforcements. The imperial army suffered a
decisive defeat, and Michael fled, having abandoned his personal
baggage. In insolent triumph, Halil adorned himself with the imperial
insignia.[60] All the region around the Hellespont and the Gulf of Saros
remained for three years without cultivation. So desperate did the
situation become that Michael was compelled to seek aid of the Genoese
and the Serbians. In 1314 the Turks of Halil were entrapped near
Gallipoli and massacred. But at what a price! The Serbians, whose
co-operation had won the day for the Greeks, saw eastern Macedonia and
the open sea. They liked it. New troubles began to brew for the
Byzantines.
There were other long-standing troubles threatening from abroad. In the
East, the Mongols had overrun southern Russia, and were as great a
nightmare to Andronicus as the Goths had formerly been to Valens. The
rulers of Constantinople did not hesitate to purchase security on the
Black Sea by truces, which were sealed with the sacrifice of purple-born
princesses to pagan harems, and by humble protestations of friendship to
khans who treated the imperial ambassadors as the envoys of a
vassal.[61]
In the West, another sword of Damocles was hanging over the emperors of
Byzantium. We must remember that the Greeks had been in possession of
their capital again only since 1260, and that the heirs of the Frankish
emperors still cherished the dream of a Latin re-establishment at
Constantinople. In 1305, on the very day Clement V mounted the papal
throne, Philippe le Bel of France discussed with Charles de Valois the
question of retaking Constantinople.[62] The following year Clement V
exhorted the Venetians to co-operate in the conquest of the Byzantine
Empire.[63] Because they had grievances against Andronicus which had
already almost brought them to an open rupture,[64] the Venetians
readily lent ear to the Pope’s project. A treaty of alliance was
concluded between Venice and Charles de Valois, who had the powerful
backing of the King of France.[65] In 1307 Clement V wrote to Charles II
of Naples urging him to reconquer Constantinople.[66] But the Pope’s
interest was soon diverted by the project of a crusade to support
Armenia and Cyprus against the Egyptians.[67] Philippe le Bel turned his
attention to the spoliation of the Knights Templars and to the important
ecclesiastical questions arising out of the movement to rehabilitate the
memory of the unfortunate Boniface VIII.
Until the death of Philippe le Bel, in 1314, however, Andronicus and
Michael always felt that there might at any moment be a repetition of
the Fourth Crusade. In seeking the reasons for the almost unhampered
progress of Osman against Nicomedia, Nicaea, and Brusa, it must not be
forgotten that the Byzantine emperors did not have even the moral
support of Christendom in their losing fight.
VII
During this first decade of the fourteenth century, the Byzantines had
lost control of practically all the Aegaean Sea, and had to struggle
for a passage through the Sea of Marmora. After the recent Balkan War,
the Sublime Porte presented a memorandum to the Powers, in which it was
stated that the possession of Rhodes, Lesbos, and Chios was absolutely
essential to a maintenance of Ottoman power in Asia Minor. History, from
the time of the ancient Persian wars to the present day, confirms this
point of view. So, before taking up the progress of Osman’s conquests,
it is important to note that during the years of Osman’s conflict with
the Byzantines Chios and Rhodes passed out of their hands.
In 1303 Roger de Flor had prepared the way for the Turks in Chios by
sacking the island. What he did not destroy or carry off fell to the
Turks when they raided the island the following year. ‘Andronicus saw
that he was no longer able to defend Chios against the Turks because of
the cowardice of his governors. The Turks already considered themselves
masters of Asia Minor and the majority of the islands.’[68] So he made
Benedetto of Phocaea lord of Chios, and the island was lost to the
Byzantines. The Giustiniani family kept Chios until the Ottoman
conquest.
The emir of Menteshe invaded Rhodes about 1300.[69] But he did not
succeed in entirely conquering it. For ten years Greek and Turk
struggled for the mastery of this gateway to the Aegaean Sea. Then
suddenly an outside foe arrived and made the double conquest of
Christian and Moslem alike. The Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, driven
from the Holy Land by the Egyptian conquest, had tired of their refuge
in Cyprus.[70] After vainly endeavouring to negotiate with
Constantinople for the transfer of the proprietary rights of the island
to their order, they attacked and conquered Rhodes with the
encouragement of Philippe le Bel and the Pope. This great event, equally
disastrous to Turk and Greek, happened on August 15, 1310. For more than
two centuries they were able to maintain at Rhodes a citadel and outpost
of Christianity in a part of the world which was rapidly becoming _in
partibus infidelium_.[71]
The emir of Menteshe made a strenuous effort to recapture Rhodes. The
Hospitallers, attacked before they had time to repair and strengthen the
fortifications of the island, were saved only by the timely arrival and
heroism of Amadeus of Savoy. This is said to be the origin of the arms
of Savoy, which are perpetuated on the flag of modern Italy, and of the
motto of the sovereigns of Piedmont--F E R T, _Fortitudo Eius Rhodum
Tenuit_.[72] The historians of Rhodes, as well as the chroniclers of the
House of Savoy, declare that Osman was the leader of the Turks who
attacked Rhodes in 1310 or 1311,[73] and that he was instigated by the
Genoese.[74]
VIII
But while Osman was, in the minds of these and other later historians,
supposed to be attacking Rhodes and making himself master of Asia
Minor, he stayed within the narrow limits of his little principality,
from which he never issued forth, as far as we know, during his
circumscribed career. For he had, within a day’s journey of his
residence, the imperial cities of Brusa and Nicaea, whose walls were far
too strong for the infant Osmanlis. A little more to the north-west, in
a position of unrivalled strategic importance, defending the logical[75]
waterway to Constantinople from the valley of the Sangarius, lay
Nicomedia.
After the battle of Kuyun Hissar (Baphaeon) we hear nothing of Osman
until 1308. This year is memorable for several events of great
importance. The first of these is the capture of Ak Hissar, the fortress
guarding the place where the Sangarius finishes its descent and enters
the plain behind Nicomedia. This was the last barrier opposing the
progress of the Osmanlis through the narrow peninsula which stretches
out between the Gulf of Nicomedia and the Black Sea to form the extreme
north-western corner of Asia. Owing to the terrible misfortunes which
had fallen upon the Byzantines through the Catalans, no effort seems to
have been made to use Nicomedia as a base of operations for defending
this peninsula. So before the year was out the Osmanlis appeared for the
first time on the Bosphorus. In the years following the fall of Ak
Hissar the Osmanlis slowly but thoroughly extended their authority until
they were in possession of the harbours and fortresses of the Black Sea
littoral between the mouth of the Sangarius and the Bosphorus.
In the same year Kalolimni, an island of the Marmora, which lies near
the mouth of the Gulf of Mudania, was occupied by Kara Ali.[76] By this
the water-route from Brusa to Constantinople, and one of the two routes
from Nicaea to Constantinople, were obstructed.[77] Kalolimni has the
honour of being the first Ottoman island and the only one captured
during the chieftainship of Osman. The investment of Brusa from the land
side now began. So alarmed was the commandant that he sent Osman a
‘gift’ of money to purchase peace,[78] thus inaugurating the humiliating
precedent which the mightiest emperors and kings of Christendom came in
time to follow.
It was in 1308, also, that Osman captured Tricocca,[79] which cut off
the communication by land between Nicaea and Nicomedia. While he was
engaged in dealing with Nicaea and Brusa, a danger threatened Osman from
the east. A horde of Tartars was hovering along the confines of his
state.[80] Some of them sacked Karadja Hissar at the time of the fair,
and were prevented from marching on Eski Sheïr only by the timely
arrival of Orkhan, who defeated them through the superiority of his
cavalry. Instead of massacring his prisoners, Orkhan, as was the
invariable custom of his father with the Greeks, offered the raiders
Islam and Ottoman nationality.[81] It was in this way that the Osmanlis
increased in numbers.
After 1308 the energies of the Osmanlis seem to have been directed
against Nicaea and Brusa. The fall of Brusa is the only other event
recorded during the lifetime of Osman. Just when and how Brusa fell
cannot be stated with precision. We shall find the same difficulty later
in connexion with the fall of Nicaea and Nicomedia. The Turkish
traditions, as Seadeddin gathered them, state that Osman besieged Brusa
with a great army in 1317. He erected a fortress near Kaplidja, and put
his nephew, Ak Timur, in charge of it. A second fortress, either erected
by Osman or captured by him, was put in care of Balaban, ‘his most
faithful follower.’ Kaplidja, now known as Tchekirdje, celebrated for
its hot baths,[82] is on a ridge not more than a mile from the citadel
of Brusa. It commands the approach from the port of Brusa, not far from
where the road must cross the river. Traditional remains of the second
fortress are still to be seen on a foothill of Mount Olympus, about two
miles south-east of the citadel.
Of the actual fall of Brusa there is no definite statement in Seadeddin
except that the city surrendered to Orkhan, who brought the news to his
dying father. As Osman died in 1326, there is a gap of nine years to be
accounted for between the investment of the city and its capture. To one
who has studied the contour of this country and the nearness of the two
fortresses to the citadel of Brusa it is clear either that Brusa was
surrounded or fell very soon after the Osmanlis settled garrisons at the
gates of the city, or that some _modus vivendi_ was arranged between the
Osmanlis and the local garrison during those years. A decade has been
the conventional period for legendary sieges since Homer sang of Troy.
From the Byzantine contemporary writers one gains the impression, which
is probably a correct one, that Brusa was simply abandoned to the
Osmanlis. There was no assault, and no bitter struggle outside the
walls of the city.[83] The Greek commander, discouraged by the apparent
inability or unwillingness[84] of the emperors to come to his relief,
surrendered the city. Deeply disgusted, as he had every reason to be,
Evrenos became a Moslem, and cast his fortunes with the Osmanlis. Many
of the leading Greeks followed his example. For, while the people of
Brusa through long years were straining every nerve to preserve their
city and to maintain the honour of Byzantium in Asia, the elder
Andronicus and his grandson, Andronicus III, were engaged in trying to
destroy each other. It was a sordid civil strife with no redeeming
feature. Neither emperor had the slightest conception of patriotism or
of personal honour or of the sacredness of family ties. From this time
onward the Palaeologi put themselves on record as one of the most
iniquitous families that have ever disgraced the kingly office. When
Constantine, one hundred and twenty-seven years later, fell with the
walls of his city, his death was a striking illustration of the wrath of
God upon the fourth generation of those who had hated and despised Him.
In the same year that Brusa fell, and with the same fate imminent for
Nicaea and Nicomedia, young Andronicus celebrated with great pomp his
wedding. The Hippodrome, in sight of Mount Olympus, was the scene of a
gay tournament in which young Andronicus distinguished himself by
breaking more lances than any of his courtiers. From his imperial
throne, the elder Andronicus looked on, and turned over in his head
various schemes for making his grandson’s bride a widow. After the
wedding festivities, while Andronicus was taking his bride to Demotika,
he was set upon by a band of roving Turks, at whose hands he and
Cantacuzenos both received wounds. When he reached Demotika, he learned
that his grandfather was preparing another war against him.[85] Is it
any wonder that the Greeks of Asia Minor were not averse to becoming
Moslems and helping in the founding of a new nation to inherit
Constantinople? There is one more charge which must be recorded against
the elder Andronicus. When a crusade for the stemming of the Moslem
invasion was planned by Marino Sanudo, Andronicus not only refused to
co-operate, but he would not even consent to interrupt his friendly
relations with the Sultan of Egypt.[86]
IX
Osman spent his life in endeavouring to capture the three Byzantine
cities which were all within a day’s journey of his birthplace. When we
consider how near he was at the very beginning of the struggle, and how
weak and demoralized the Byzantines had become, we realize that we have
to do with no impetuous invasion of an Asiatic race, sweeping before it
and destroying an effete civilization. It is the birth of a new race
that we are recording--a race formed by the fusion of elements already
existing at the place of birth. The political unity of the Byzantine
Empire had been destroyed by enemies from without and from within. The
social unity, which had been secured by the one bond of a common
religion that imposed upon the people its standards and dominated every
phase of their life, was disappearing. For when the Eastern Church lost
its spiritual life, it lost its hold on the Levantine Christians, who
were centuries ahead of the West in intellectual development. The time
for its reformation had come and passed without a Savonarola, a Luther,
or a Calvin. Nor was there any Loyola to fight for the ancient faith.
The Church was unable to absorb the pagan invaders, as primitive Latin
Christianity had done, by an irresistible moral superiority.[87] The
appeal of Islam was greater than that of Christianity. Pagan and
Christian alike, then, in their conversion to a new, fresh faith, joined
in the formation of a new race. This is the story of Osman and of the
people who took his name.[88]
The legends which inevitably surround the founders of nations have
buried the personality of Osman, and make an estimate of his character
difficult. We must reject entirely the appreciations of the Ottoman
historians. None has yet arisen of his own people who has attempted to
separate the small measure of truth from the mass of fiction that
obscures the real man in the founder of the Ottoman Empire. He is
represented by the same writers as a powerful prince and as a simple
peasant; as the master of Asia Minor and as the village chieftain
fighting for very existence with his neighbours a few miles away; as
reading the Koran and as illiterate; as the cruel and imperious murderer
of his uncle Dundar for opposing a plan of campaign in his council of
war and as the merciful, clement conqueror; as the Moslem fanatic who
ordered the mutilation of dying infidels on the battlefield and as the
wise ruler who dispensed justice to Moslem and Christian with no
distinction of creed; as depositing his treasures of gold and silver in
the castle of a neighbour and as leaving at his death only a robe, a
salt-cellar, a spoon, and a few sheep.
In the absence of contemporary evidence and of unconflicting tradition,
we must form our judgement of Osman wholly upon what he accomplished. He
certainly was not the son of a prince. He did not become in his day more
than the ruler of a very small domain. He did not compass within his
lifetime the task at his very threshold--the subjection of the three
imperial cities. It was certainly not by astounding successes on the
battlefield that he made people flock to him and form around him the
nucleus of a state. And this state, although it did not come enough in
contact with the outside world to have money of its own,[89] grew
steadily year after year. The way his state was formed was the assurance
of its permanence and of its great future. It is also an indication of
the real greatness of the man who formed it.
Osman was founder of one of the greatest empires the world has ever
known, of a people unique in history through the blending of wild
Asiatic blood with the oldest as well as the newest European stock, of a
royal family which claims the distinction of six hundred years of
uninterrupted male succession. When we place these results over against
the limited field in which he worked, and acknowledge our lack of any
outstanding deeds in Osman’s life by which these results can be
explained, we find ourselves in the presence of a combination of a
character and a cause which reminds us of William of Orange and England.
Osman was a man of compelling personality, whom men loved to serve, even
when their own ability matched or was superior to his. The families of
the Michaelogli and Marcozogli were founded by Christian companions of
Osman, who became Moslem only after long association with him. Michael,
Marco, and other leaders, including Osman’s own son, made for themselves
more distinguished military careers than Osman. But they always worked
for their leader. Their harmony and loyalty is in striking contrast to
that of the Byzantine and Catalan captains. Osman was great enough to
use masterful men. He never needed to assert his superiority, as
mediocre men always love to do, by getting rid of possible rivals and
surrounding himself with lesser stars. He was able to hold himself, as
well as others, in check. He was patient and he was thorough. We know
the founder by his foundation.
Then there was the cause. The giants of the forward march of Islam were
dead. The tide had seemed to turn. Pagans ruled in Asia. Africa was
asleep. In 1309 the Faithful in Spain were receiving their first serious
reverse. Osman brought to his new religion the simple faith and the
fresh enthusiasm of the neophyte. He was a reincarnation of his great
namesake and the other early Khalifs. The prayer which Seadeddin puts in
Osman’s mouth illustrates his character:
O Lord, make upright my thoughts and just my designs.
Exalt the faith and the Religion, and destroy those who rise up
against it.
Scatter the hosts of the enemy, and bring to confusion evil men.
Make my sword the lantern of Thy holy faith, and the guiding torch
of my warriors.
Give unto me a glorious name, and victory against mine
adversaries.
Watch me with Thine eyes, and show me the way of Thy holy will.
Make me a true observer of the laws of Mohammed, and sustain me in
the shock of battle.
Osman was a fanatic, if by fanatic is meant one who is stirred with
religious zeal and makes his religion the first and prime object in his
life. But he was not intolerant, nor were his immediate successors. Had
he started to persecute Christians, the Greek Church would have taken a
new lease of life, and Osman could not have gained the converts who made
possible the Ottoman race.
Attila, Djenghiz Khan, Timur, the greatest conquerors of the stock from
which Osman came, utilized a race already made. They were leaders of a
united people. In spite of their dazzling exploits, they were mere
raiders, and their empires were the territories of an unassimilated path
of conquest. Osman’s work was more enduring than theirs, more
far-reaching in its results. For he was building in silence while they
were destroying with a blast of trumpets. We may place him with them,
perhaps above them, for which of them gave his name to a people?
CHAPTER II
ORKHAN
A NEW NATION IS FORMED AND COMES INTO CONTACT WITH THE WESTERN WORLD
I
The greatest inheritance that a father can leave to his son is
uncompleted work, especially if the work present difficulties of a
formidable character, which must be met and overcome immediately. No man
is born great. No man has greatness thrust upon him. History recognizes
only the category of achievement. Facing an unfinished task is the best
spur.
Osman died at the moment of the surrender of Brusa. He left to Orkhan
the inheritance of Nicaea and Nicomedia unconquered; a state without
laws, coinage, and definite boundaries; a people just beginning to
awaken to a national consciousness; and hostile neighbours far more
powerful than himself.[90] Orkhan found himself without seaport, ships,
or sailors. His fighting men were regarded among his Turkish rivals as
poor material for an army.[91] Even the chieftainship of the Osmanlis
had not come to him by mere right of birth.[92] He had been chosen
because of his ability to lead and to attract men. Now that Brusa had
fallen into the hands of the Osmanlis, more was demanded in their emir
than personal charm and daring in battle. He must establish his right to
the chieftainship by making a viable state. This could be done only by
the addition of Nicaea and Nicomedia to his dominions, and by the
transformation of his followers into a nation.
Nowhere are the Ottoman historians more unsatisfactory than in their
accounts of the reign of Orkhan. They fail to describe--much less to
explain--the evolution of their race during these thirty-five years from
a heterogeneous band of adventurers into a nation. Several of the
Ottoman historians write so admirably of later periods that we must
attribute this failure as much to their lack of sources of information
as to their inability to measure up to the demands of the modern mind
which never asks how without adding why. The re-writing of history in
the twentieth century is not actuated by belief in superior ability. Our
new and wider point of view is gained from the advantage we have had in
securing and comparing sources which were inaccessible to those who have
gone before us. If, in this chapter, Byzantine sources are largely used,
it is because we are writing the history of a people who built their
nation directly upon the ruins of the Byzantine Empire, and because the
Byzantine sources are contemporary; while the earliest Ottoman
historians wrote more than a century later than this period.[93]
The reign of Orkhan is divided into two parts by the events of the year
1344. From 1326 to 1344 he was occupied in subduing the territory of
which he had been tentative master at the death of Osman, in forming
his nation, and in organizing his army. From 1344 until his death in
1360, his energies were bent chiefly upon getting a foothold in
Macedonia and Thrace.
II
The first task which imposed itself upon Orkhan was the subjection of
Nicaea and Nicomedia. Just as the walls of Brusa had defied him to the
end, those of Nicomedia and Nicaea were equally impregnable to the kind
of army he could assemble. Whether it was that neither Byzantine nor
Turk nor Slav nor Bulgarian were of the stock who would spend themselves
scaling walls and battering down gates, or that the weapons of those
days were more favourable for the purpose of defence than of assault,
cannot be determined. But the curious fact remains that during this
century there are few instances of cities taken by storm. Captures were
effected for the most part by capitulation or by treachery.
Complete investment and consequent threatened starvation did not occur
in the case of Brusa. Nor did Nicaea and Nicomedia surrender from
starvation. This is the place, rather than at the end of the last
chapter, to give two of the long list of reasons for surrender which
Neshri puts into the mouth of the commandant and the leading citizens of
Brusa.[94] For they state equally plainly and convincingly the case of
Nicaea and Nicomedia.
The economic reason was that the inhabitants saw the Osmanlis settling
themselves in all the country round about the three cities, and
undisturbed in their permanent occupation of these regions by any
aggressive movement from Constantinople. Nicomedia, although
advantageously located for commerce, was not a port of call on the great
trade route. It depended for its well-being upon an unrestricted
communication with the interior. Brusa and Nicaea were manufacturing
cities, whose prosperity was due to the use of raw materials produced in
the vicinity, and to the ability to market the manufactured products.
While food was still procurable, trade and business languished. When the
Greeks saw that the Osmanlis had come in their midst to remain, and were
not mere raiders like the Seljuk Turks, they realized that the
alternative to submission was ruin.
The moral reason I have already touched upon in relation to Brusa. If
there had been any hope of relief from the intolerable economic
conditions under which they were living, the Nicaeans and Nicomedians
might have resisted indefinitely, and maintained a gallant struggle for
love of God and country. Their successful resistance, continued through
many weary years, is a remarkable testimony to their religious zeal and
to their patriotism. It was not until they felt themselves deserted by
their brothers of blood and religion that they finally yielded. The
Osmanlis did not prevail over them in battle. Their walls were not
stormed. Their gates held fast. They were not starved out. They were
abandoned by the Byzantines. So they became Osmanlis.
III
To understand the how and why of the fall of these cities and of the
mingling of victor and vanquished in one race, we must review the
history of the Byzantines during the years immediately following the
death of Osman.
The loss of Brusa did not cause any cessation in the suicidal strife
between Andronicus and his grandson. After the brilliant marriage
festivities of which we have already spoken, young Andronicus took his
bride to Demotika, where, in the summer of 1327, he planned to surprise
and oust his grandfather.[95] He was not content to wait for the old
man’s death. Nor was he deterred from reopening the civil war by the
thought of the imminent danger of the Byzantine cities in Bithynia. Old
Andronicus, informed of his grandson’s intention, forbade his entrance
to the capital, and negotiated with the Serbians to attack him from the
rear.[96] This was a deliberate invitation to the Serbians, who were
rapidly becoming dangerous enemies of the Empire, to enter Byzantine
territory.
The appeal of young Andronicus to be allowed to come to Constantinople
to justify himself was answered by an imperial rescript ordering the
Patriarch to ‘strike out the rebel’s name from public prayers’. The
Patriarch refused.[97] More than that, His Holiness threatened to
unfrock any priest who would obey the imperial command. Old Andronicus
had the Patriarch deposed by a packed synod of his creatures, and thrown
into prison.[98]
War broke out. After an unsuccessful attempt to surprise
Constantinople,[99] young Andronicus besieged the army of his
grandfather and the Serbians in Serres. They did not care to risk a
battle, so he marched on Salonika, which he captured through the
connivance of its inhabitants.[100] Macedonia and Thrace, with the
exception of two or three fortresses, fell into his hands without a
struggle.[101]
Stephen, Kral of Serbia, now turned a deaf ear to the old emperor’s
reiterated appeals for further aid. In his desperation, old Andronicus
called in the Bulgarians, to whom he would have betrayed
Constantinople, had not young Andronicus appeared in time to anticipate
this culminating infamy of the older Palaeologos. A Venetian fleet,
which was besieging the city, retired, because its commander did not
want to appear to take sides either for or against the younger emperor.
Friends inside left a gate open. Young Andronicus entered and appeared
suddenly at the palace. The Patriarch was re-established. Old Andronicus
was deposed and imprisoned.[102]
The old man, after having become, as Gregoras charitably puts it, ‘blind
through tears’,[103] retired to a monastery, and died there in great
poverty.[104] Like many others of the Palaeologi, Andronicus II had no
redeeming trait of character, no single good deed to his credit.
Stranger to every natural affection, he died as he had lived, hating his
own flesh and blood, striving to ruin his country, mocking God by the
very monk’s garb that he wore.
The first care of young Andronicus, after ridding himself of his
grandfather and rival, was to march on Adrianople, where, according to
Cantacuzenos, he forced Michael Asan of Bulgaria to make peace by the
display of his ‘fine army’.[105] Either the Bulgarians were very weak at
this time, or the ‘fine army’ of Andronicus III melted away quickly. For
in the spring of the following year, 1329, Andronicus had to ‘gather
hastily’[106] an army, when for the first time he felt it his duty to go
to the aid of beleaguered Nicaea. He crossed the Bosphorus, and joined
the battle with the Osmanlis at Pelecanon, now Maltepé, on the north
shore of the gulf of Nicomedia, a few miles from Chalcedon, the modern
Haïdar Pasha.
The battle of Pelecanon is passed over in silence by the Ottoman
historians as too insignificant to mention. But it is of the utmost
importance in showing why the Nicaeans surrendered their city to Orkhan.
Cantacuzenos, who took part in this battle, gives a long story in which
the result of the battle he is compelled to record belies all that goes
before it. The Byzantines, according to Cantacuzenos, were eminently
successful in repelling the attacks of the Osmanlis. On all sides the
Greeks won, and killed hundreds of their opponents, while their own
losses were slight. After inflicting this defeat upon Orkhan, Andronicus
proposed, at nightfall, that the army withdraw to Constantinople! Some
of his ardent warriors continued, however, to engage the enemy.
Andronicus, surprised with only a few followers around him, was wounded,
and escaped capture only by a hasty retreat. He was carried in a litter
to Scutari, where he did not wait for news of his army. A caïque
conveyed him safely home. Thus the successors of the Caesars abandoned
Asia for ever.
Old Andronicus, in his hour of humiliation, did not hesitate to strike
one more blow against his country. Spies of his in the army spread the
rumour that the young emperor was dead. The imperial troops fled. They
abandoned all their baggage, and were massacred by the Osmanlis, who
hunted them down in the hills from which the fugitives could see the
dome of St. Sophia.[107]
When we contrast the long story of the civil war between Andronicus and
his grandfather, the armies gathered, the money expended, the energy
displayed with this one pitiful attempt to aid the three great cities
of Bithynia, there is no need for further speculation as to why these
cities fell into the hands of the Osmanlis. No wearers of the imperial
purple had ever made a more dismal showing: old Andronicus plotting to
demoralize the army of his country by false rumours, and young
Andronicus making such rumours possible by being the first to flee from
the field after receiving a slight wound. It is no wonder that
Cantacuzenos records that after this battle Nicaea fell into the hands
of the Osmanlis.[108] It is altogether natural, too, that the
inhabitants of Nicaea should refuse, as those of Brusa had done, to
profit by the terms of the capitulation, and leave for
Constantinople.[109] Their trades, silk-weaving and pottery, were
dependent upon local materials, which they could not get elsewhere.
There had been nothing to inspire in them that devotion to a faith which
made the Huguenots long afterwards leave all without hesitation after
the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.
Hadji Khalfa says that in the seventeenth century the walls of Nicaea
were entirely ruined.[110] The condition of these walls to-day (for they
have not been repaired in modern times) contradicts this statement. It
has been the claim of the Osmanlis that Nicaea was reduced by fighting.
If this were true the walls must have suffered. It is also the common
belief[111] that Nicaea, at the time of the Ottoman conquest, and for
some time after, was a prosperous city.[112] But Ibn Batutah, who
visited Nicaea within five or six years after its change of ownership,
wrote that its walls were intact, that the sole entrance to the city was
by a road built up like a bridge and so narrow that horsemen could not
pass on it, and that the walls were surrounded by a wide deep moat
filled with water. One had to reach the gate by a pont-levis, which was
in working order and used at the time of his visit. The city itself was
in ruins and occupied only by a small number of men in the service of
Orkhan. He was told that Orkhan had besieged the city ten years, and
Osman before him twenty years. As the famous traveller was an honoured
guest in the palace of Orkhan, where Orkhan’s wife was living at the
time, and where the emir himself came for a few days during the forty
days which Ibn Batutah spent in Nicaea, his testimony is certainly
worthy of credence.[113]
That Nicaea, while preserving its admirable fortifications, should have
decreased so rapidly in importance and population during the seventy
years between the return of the Byzantine emperors to Constantinople and
the Ottoman occupation, is explainable only by three suppositions: that
a majority of the inhabitants had died off, that they had emigrated, or
that they had gradually joined their fortunes with the people of Osman.
We find in Byzantine annals no record of a disastrous plague or of a
large emigration of potters and porcelain workers and weavers to the
capital or elsewhere from Nicaea. There was little fighting. The
Osmanlis had not yet learned to massacre. What are we to believe, then,
concerning the large population of this so recently flourishing city?
It is hardly a conjecture to affirm that the Nicaeans must have cast
their fortunes with that steadily growing band whose firm conviction,
forced upon them against their will and in violence to centuries-old
traditions and sentiments, was that the old structure of society could
not be repaired, and that there must be an entirely new building upon
the old foundation. This conviction did not come suddenly or to all at
once. It was a gradual dawning and awakening which caused the ranks of
the Osmanlis to become greater every year. Before the end of Orkhan’s
reign the nucleus of Asiatic adventurers which had gathered around Osman
in the little village of Sugut had grown to half a million. It could not
have been by natural increase. It could not have been by the flocking in
of nomads from the East. Orkhan was cut off from contact with the
Asiatic hinterland. His rivals of Karaman, Satalia, Aïdin, and Sarukhan
would have attracted adventurers from the outside before himself. Orkhan
formed his nation out of the elements on the ground. These were mostly
Greek. Nicaea is but an illustration of the way in which the new race
was born and the new nation formed.
This conviction that no good could come from Constantinople went farther
than a transference of allegiance from the Palaeologi to the family of
Osman. Mohammed was substituted for Christ. What a momentous
significance there is in the records of the Greek Orthodox Church that
in 1339 and again in 1340 the Patriarch sent an impassioned appeal to
the Nicaeans that they should not abjure the Christian faith![114] At
that very moment when the ecclesiastics of Constantinople were espousing
the rival claims of unworthy aspirants to the imperial purple and were
anathematizing each other in supporting trivial theological arguments,
Christians were adopting the new Credo: ‘I believe in one God, and
Mohammed is his prophet!’ in the city of the Nicene Creed.
We may place the surrender of Nicomedia in 1337 or 1338.[115] This was
the last Byzantine possession in the Ottoman corner of Asia Minor. The
fall of Aïdos and Semendria on the hills behind Scutari had opened the
way to the Bosphorus. Yalova, renowned for its baths, and Hereké, where
Constantine the Great died, gave the Osmanlis undisputed control of the
entrance to the Gulf of Nicomedia and secure possession of the city
where Diocletian had made a new capital for the Roman Empire.
IV
Orkhan had now accomplished the first part of the great task left
unfinished by Osman. But, before he could proceed to the establishment
of laws for his new state, it was necessary for him to consolidate and
strengthen his position in relation to his formidable neighbours.
Dangers threatened from the east and from the south. In 1327 Timurtash,
a son of Choban, who was Mongol governor of Rum, pushed his raids as far
as the Mediterranean, which the Mongol arms had not hitherto reached. He
fought in turn Greeks and Turks.[116] Fortunately for Orkhan, the emir
of Kermian, whose capital was Kutayia, had appeared so unpromising to
the eyes of Timurtash that the Mongols had not come northward. But they
were an ever imminent source of danger to the emirs of Asia Minor, and
to Orkhan among them, until 1335, when the death of Bahadur Khan, just
the year before the birth of Timur, caused the disintegration of the
Mongol power in western Asia.[117]
The Mongol menace had contributed to the undisturbed operations of
Orkhan against the Byzantines. Immediately upon its removal he was
threatened by the other Turkish emirs. It was a critical moment for
Orkhan, whose territories had not yet reached the proportions of a large
state, like those of Omar of Aïdin and Mohammed of Sarukhan. Singly they
might have crushed Orkhan. United they certainly would have done so. But
here again the Byzantines contributed to their own downfall.
In 1329, at Phocaea, Andronicus had conducted his first negotiations
with the emirs of Aïdin and Sarukhan.[118] This unsuccessful attempt to
embroil the Anatolian emirs with each other was a pitiful confession of
weakness on the part of Andronicus. It did no harm to Orkhan. But it
called the attention of these emirs to the impotence of Andronicus, and
led to a series of petty raids in Macedonia and Thrace. Emboldened by
the ease of initial successes, Mohammed of Sarukhan in 1333 led in
person an expedition of seventy-five ships against the Macedonian coast.
Andronicus was too weak to oppose his landing.[119] In the same year
Turkish pirates seized for a short time Rodosto, on the Sea of Marmora,
only a few hours’ sail from Constantinople.[120] The following year the
emperor was compelled to put an army in the field to save Salonika from
the Turks.[121]
These attentions from his proposed allies did not prevent Andronicus
from seeking aid in the same quarters in 1336 when he was besieging the
Genoese of Phocaea. Mohammed sent twenty-four ships, numerous troops,
and all the provisions necessary to sustain the imperial army. The net
gain to Andronicus from this expedition was the empty acknowledgement
from Cattaneo of Phocaea, who was not afraid of Andronicus but did not
want to be bothered by him and his Turkish allies, that he would hold as
a ‘fief of the empire’ what Andronicus, even with the help of the Turks,
could not take from him![122]
This momentary diversion of the attention and energies of his neighbours
was most propitious for Orkhan. Andronicus had rendered him good
service. It gave to Orkhan an opportunity of enlarging and rounding out
his dominions without incurring opposition that would not only have
prevented him from carrying out his schemes but might also have
destroyed him. Orkhan had been waiting for this moment. In 1333, the
Turcoman emir of Mysia had died. His younger son had taken refuge with
Orkhan, and promised in return for aid in dispossessing his brother to
surrender to the Osmanlis Balikesri and three other border cities.
Orkhan could not act immediately. He contented himself with advising the
elder brother to divide his dominions with Tursun. Tursun went to
negotiate in person, and was killed by his brother. This was shortly
before the expedition to Phocaea. Orkhan was now ready. He put in the
field an expedition, ostensibly to punish the assassination of his
protégé Tursun, and was so successful that he forced the emir of Karasi
to give up Pergamos and go into exile in Brusa.[123] In another
expedition, which probably occurred in
[Illustration: THE EMIRATES OF OSMAN AND ORKHAN]
1337 at the earliest,[124] Orkhan added Mikhalitsch, Ulubad, and
Kermasti to his dominions. He was now virtually master of Mysia.
This was the extent of Orkhan’s conquests in Asia Minor. It is necessary
to emphasize this point, owing to the erroneous idea which has so long
been accepted and which has found its way into many modern writers.[125]
No corroboration can be found for the statement of Cantacuzenos that
Soleiman captured Angora from the Tartars in 1354.[126] Aside from this,
neither Byzantines nor Osmanlis report any further conquests of Orkhan
in Asia Minor. From the fact that there is a complete silence as to
their fate, it is reasonable to suppose that the Osmanlis during the
last decade of Orkhan’s reign destroyed the independence of several
little states of which Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin report the existence
between 1334 and 1349.[127] But these were all in a general sense either
included in Mysia (Karasi) or in the territory which Orkhan is popularly
supposed to have inherited from Osman.[128]
After the Mysian expedition and the fall of Nicomedia, Orkhan may be
regarded as the acknowledged sovereign of a definite state. We have good
contemporary testimony to his character, his power and his reputation at
this period just before he became an active factor in deciding the
destinies of the Byzantine Empire.
Ibn Batutah calls him the ‘lord of Brusa, son of Osman the Little,
powerful and rich among the Turcoman kings, in treasures, cities and
soldiers’. He never ceased making the tour of the hundred castles he
possessed. In each of these he would pass several days to repair them
and inspect their situation. It was common report that he never spent a
whole month in a city, not even in Brusa. He was all the time fighting
and besieging the infidels. It was his indomitable energy which seems to
have impressed the traveller from Morocco. The absolute lack of
slothful, indifferent acquiescence in the will of God of these
latter-day Turkish converts was naturally a source of continual surprise
to this doctor of Islam, fresh from his observation of races who had
been for hundreds of years in the faith of Mohammed.[129]
Shehabeddin is less complimentary. He says: ‘Orkhan has under his
domination fifty cities and a still larger number of castles. His army
consists of 40,000 horsemen, and an almost innumerable host of
foot-soldiers. But these troops are not warlike, and their number is
more formidable in appearance than in reality. This prince shows himself
very pacific in regard to his neighbours, and always ready to help his
allies. However, he is engaged in continual wars and is always at odds
with many enemies. If he gains little from these struggles, it is
because his soldiers do not serve him well, his subjects are not well
disposed towards him, and several of his neighbours live in open
hostility to him. I am told that the Osmanlis are treacherous men, whose
hearts know only hatred and whose heads are filled with base
thoughts.’[130] In another place Shehabeddin records that Orkhan has in
the field 25,000 horsemen who are fighting daily the prince of
Constantinople. ‘The Greek emperor is eager to buy the goodwill of
Orkhan by paying him a monthly tribute.’ Orkhan sends expeditions into
Europe, ‘where waves of blood flow’.[131]
V
The first Ottoman legislation, and the organization of the army, is
attributed by tradition to Orkhan’s brother, Alaeddin, rather than to
the emir himself. The story goes that Alaeddin was a man of peace, and
did not engage in war.[132] He refused to accept the generous offer of
Orkhan to share the states of Osman, when their father died. Not only
would he not accept a division of the chieftainship, but he also refused
to share the personal possessions of Osman. Then Orkhan said, ‘Since you
will not rule, be my vizier, and bear the burdens of the organization of
the state.’ Thus was created the office of Grand Vizier, which has
played so important a part in Ottoman history.[133]
In the various lists, which were compiled at a much later date, Alaeddin
is given as the first Grand Vizier. That this office, in its accepted
form, was created during the reign of Orkhan is altogether improbable.
The story of the affectionate relationship between Orkhan and Alaeddin,
and the sharing of duties by them, is, like the story of Ertogrul’s
receiving the promise after reading the Koran, a reminiscence of
patriarchal days. The dream with its promise harks back to Jacob and the
ladder.[134] The relation between Orkhan and Alaeddin reminds one too
strongly of Moses and Aaron to be accepted without reserve. One has only
to turn to the twentieth Sura of the Koran to find the connexion and the
suggestion: ‘And Moses answered, Lord, give me a vizier of my family,
Aaron, my brother. Gird up my loins by him, and make him my colleague in
the business: that we may praise thee greatly, and remember thee often;
for thou regardest us.’[135]
What a contrast between this idyllic story of Orkhan and Alaeddin, and
the killing of Yakub by Bayezid on the battlefield of Kossova fifty
years later!
Alaeddin was also the first Osmanli to receive the title of pasha. He is
always spoken of as Alaeddin pasha. This same title was conferred on
Soleiman, the eldest son of Orkhan. The oldest son of Murad proving a
traitor, and there being no other son mature enough, Murad transferred
the title to Kara Khalil. This word, which came from the Persian, was
thus early deflected by the Ottoman sovereigns from its original
significance, the title of the eldest son of the ruler.[136] It soon
came to be bestowed upon high military and civil dignitaries. Similarly,
the rank of vizier passed immediately out of the imperial family.
That Alaeddin could have accomplished the work attributed to him by the
Ottoman historians, the making of laws and the organization of the army,
is impossible for three reasons. The time for this great work was too
short and not a propitious period: Alaeddin died seven years after his
father, in 1333,[137] before Orkhan was firmly established in his
sovereignty; the statement is incompatible with what we know of the
character of Orkhan; finally, the organization of the state and of the
army must have been the result of a slow development through many years,
and its perfection belongs to the middle or latter part of Orkhan’s
career, years after Alaeddin pasha’s death.
The whole scheme of an Islamic state is theocratic. Its laws, its
customs are founded directly upon the Koran and the interpretation of
the Koran by the early ‘fathers’ of Mohammedanism. There is no civil law
as distinct from ecclesiastical law.[138] The judges and the lawyers
belong to the clergy. Orkhan’s problem was exceedingly difficult.
Whether they were Turkish converts or Greek renegades, the Osmanlis were
all on common ground in their entire ignorance of the art of building a
Moslem state. It is idle to speculate upon the early legislation of the
Osmanlis, for there are no records. But it is probable that the Osmanlis
did not at this early time make any attempt to establish a body of laws
in conformity with the Koran. Where the _Sheri’at_ (the sacred law) was
understood, and where it was applicable to local conditions, it was
naturally used. But, side by side with the sacred Moslem law, existed
the old Byzantine code. This was used by the Osmanlis until they were
firmly seated in Constantinople. Only then did they acquire a complete
system of Moslem canon law. It is within the scope of a work covering a
later period than that included in this volume to point out the strong
Byzantine and moderate Turkish influences in the _Kanunnamé_ of Mohammed
the Conqueror.
VI
For dealing with Ottoman subjects and with those who might be conquered
in war, certain principles were, however, adopted by the Osmanlis in the
time of Orkhan. The foremost of these was complete religious toleration.
This made possible, to a large measure it explains, the development of
the Osmanlis into a powerful empire.
The propagation of Islam by the sword under the early Khalifs, the
sudden and unparalleled spread of the new religion from the Arabian
desert to Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain, until the hordes of the
invaders were stopped by Charles Martel at Tours, the terrible ravages
of the Moslem corsairs in the Mediterranean--here were the sources of
the deep impression of fanaticism and cruelty that the rise of Islam and
the followers of Mohammed had made upon an equally fanatical and cruel
Europe. That the recrudescence of the Islamic movement under the
Osmanlis was represented in the same colours by the early European
writers is explicable when we consider their lack of unbiased
information and their confusion of the Osmanlis with the Asiatic
conquerors, such as Attila and the Huns, Djenghiz Khan and the Mongols,
Timur and the Tartars. We must take into account, too, the fact that
these historians wrote at a time when the Osmanlis were beginning to be
perverted by fanatical Arab influences, and were a real menace to the
peace of Europe. From the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, ‘the
Turk’ was a monster of iniquity and cruelty, from whom even the distant
English in the security of their island home prayed to be
delivered.[139] The recent history of the Ottoman Empire has
unfortunately contributed much to keep alive this impression.
In spite of the accumulated evidence which on the surface points to a
contrary conclusion, the Osmanli is not and never has been a religious
fanatic like the Arab Moslem.[140] He is not by nature zealous or
enthusiastic, nor is he by nature cruel. Docile, tractable, gentle, in a
word, lovable--this is the verdict of the traveller who has had an
opportunity of knowing that portion of the Moslem population of the
Ottoman Empire which is popularly called Turkish. Other influences of
their religion than hatred for the Christian have prevented the Osmanlis
from winning and keeping a place among the civilized peoples of the
world. Whatever one may claim in abstract theory for the Koran and the
whole body of Moslem teaching, its practical concrete results have been
ignorance, stagnation, immorality, subserviency of womanhood,
indifference, paralysis of the will, absence of incentive to altruism.
These are the causes of the irremediable decay of every Mohammedan
empire, of every Mohammedan people.
The government and the ruling classes of the Ottoman Empire are
negatively rather than positively evil. There is nothing inherently bad
about the Osmanli. He is inert, and has thus failed to reach the
standards set by the progress of civilization. He lacks ideals, and has
thus shocked the enlightened conscience of the modern world. By the law
of the survival of the fittest, he has been cast aside.
But when we compare the early Osmanlis with the Byzantines and with the
other elements in the Balkan peninsula, it is the Osmanlis who must be
pronounced the fittest. They were fresh, enthusiastic, uncontaminated,
energetic. They had ideals: they had a goal. As it is with the
individual, so it is with the nation. Ideals are lost when the goal is
reached. Decay sets in when the struggle for existence ceases.
Pressed on the one side by his Turkish neighbours and on the other by
the danger of including in his dominions a large and unassimilated mass
of Christians, Orkhan was wise enough to desist from any attempt at
forcible conversion. But some _modus vivendi_ had to be arranged. A mere
raider would have massacred and destroyed, and the empire he built
would not have outlived the century of its birth. Orkhan was neither
raider nor invader. He lived in the country of his father and of his
grandfather. Many of his lieutenants--certainly his ablest
ones[141]--were descendants of the oldest stock in Asia Minor. His
nation, if it was to be a nation, depended upon at least a partial
assimilation of the Byzantines. As his dominions increased, it became
clear that there had to be some distinction between Moslem and Christian
other than a profession of faith. He must devise some reward, which
would be so attractive that the Christians, especially the higher
classes among them, would change their faith in order to secure its
benefits. This was the problem.
Orkhan solved this problem by establishing a system of rewards for
military service, and then by restricting military service to Moslems.
He divided the land he had conquered among his faithful warriors, and
let it be known that in future conquests a large portion of the
territory won, outside of the cities, would be bestowed upon soldiers
who took part in his campaigns. These lands were to be held as military
fiefs. The only obligation was that of military service, which could be
performed either by actually putting into the field a number of men in
proportion to the land held or by paying a sum sufficient to replace the
quota by hired troops. So far this was but an adaptation of the European
feudal system. But it was superior to the European system in that the
holdings were small and that there was through two centuries an
ever-present opportunity of winning new holdings.
Except in Albania and Bosnia, where the old nobility were to preserve
their lands by conversion to Islam, there were no local traditions to
prevent such a scheme by necessitating the dispossession of former great
landowners. The Seljuks, the Crusaders, and the Mongols in Asia Minor,
the Catalans, the Bulgarians, the Serbians and the civil wars between
the emperors in Macedonia and Thrace, the hangers-on of the Fourth
Crusade in Thessaly, Greece, and the Aegaean Islands, had made so clean
a sweep of the old aristocracy, attached to the soil, that Orkhan’s idea
was feasible. Through these small holdings and through the rapid
increase of conquered territory, the Ottoman sultans were able, almost
from the beginning, to exercise an absolute sovereignty over their
expanding dominions, and to prevent the rise of a class of nobles. The
Ottoman Empire has never known an hereditary nobility. In the later
conquests, the Sublime Porte sometimes granted life rights of
governorship, with a tacit understanding that the succession should go
to the son, to local chieftains or to large landowners. But these
concessions were in regions never fully conquered, and remote from
Constantinople. Those to whom these privileges were given had no part in
the central government and no rank outside of their immediate locality.
In place of military service, every adult Christian paid a special
head-tax, to be used for the support of the army. The Christian was
exempt from military service; the Mussulman was exempt from taxes.[142]
This head-tax was heavy, and so gauged as to keep the Christian, unless
he lived in a city, in economic dependence upon the Moslem landowner. As
a general rule, during the first century and a half of Ottoman conquest,
those who held to the old faith went to the cities and large towns. The
Moslem thus became, without any attempt at forcible conversion or need
to massacre, the undisputed possessor of the country districts.
Aside from the onerous head-tax, there were grave inequalities for the
Christian in matters of law and in intermarriage. After the fall of
Constantinople, Mohammed the Conqueror gave the Christians a large
measure of self-government by putting them in _millets_ (nations) under
the headship of the ecclesiastical authorities. But the inequality in
the matter of intermarriage has never been done away with. A Moslem may
marry a Christian woman, but a Christian is forbidden to marry a
Mohammedan woman. In the earliest days, when there was neither racial
nor religious antipathy and Christian and Moslem lived in close social
intercourse, this law was a powerful proselytizing agency. It furnished
a temptation to a change of faith which, whenever it arose, was far
stronger than the temptation of lands, of power, of economic
independence, or of civil equality.
The moment one professed Islam he became an Osmanli. Religion has always
been the test of nationality in the Ottoman Empire.[143] The Osmanlis
increased from the thousands to the millions, in Macedonia, in Thrace,
and in Asia Minor. Ancestry was quickly forgotten in the midst of
ever-changing conditions and the founding of a new social order. It is
still a characteristic of the Osmanli that he has no surname. The most
widely-read English writer of the seventeenth century on the ‘Turks’
emphasized the mixture of blood in the Osmanli, when he wrote: ‘At
present the blood of the Turks is so mixed with that of all sorts of
Languages and Nations, that none of them can derive his Lineage from
the ancient blood of the Saracens.’[144]
A majority of the Byzantines whom Orkhan, Murad, and Bayezid conquered
must have become Osmanlis. Once the change of religion was made, the
development of the new race was not difficult. There was much in common
between the Turk of Asia Minor and the Byzantine. An Armenian
contemporary wrote of them as if they were alike.[145] The Greeks did
not take to heart the new régime,[146] for the fiscal evils of the
Byzantine system reconciled them in advance to a change. Nothing could
be worse than that which they had suffered.[147]
Of course, the love of woman, the desire for adventure, hope of economic
independence through rewards of land and removal of onerous taxes,
disgust with the Byzantine administration and with the lack of support
from their rulers and ecclesiastical authorities--these influences did
not cause the conversion of all the Christians. In the cities, where the
inequality and the inconvenience of remaining true to the old faith was
minimized, and where Christianity has always been able to make itself
felt and heard,[148] there was no great temptation to a change of
religion. After the Osmanlis became stronger, and entered into the
aggressive period of conquest, they resorted to other means to swell
their numbers. The institution of the Janissaries, and the permission to
enslave those whom they conquered, gave the Osmanlis more potent and
immediately pressing arguments.
From the completion of the conquest of Bithynia by Orkhan, the Osmanlis
can be called a distinct race with a national consciousness and a desire
for expansion. They can be distinguished from the Turks of the emirates
of Asia Minor and from the Byzantines. The Turk did not absorb the
Greek, nor did the Greek absorb the Turk. Both had taken a new religion,
and if the Turkish language was adopted, it was rather the customs and
laws of the Byzantines which prevailed until the influence of the Arabs,
enhanced as it was with the prestige of centuries of Islam, gained the
ascendancy over Turkish and Byzantine tradition alike. But this did not
occur until the Osmanlis invaded Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia at the
beginning of the sixteenth century.
It must be remembered that the Greeks were not the only element added to
the Turkish stock. The adoption of the Turkish language by the Osmanlis
was due not only to the fact that from the beginning it was the military
and governmental language, but to its being the simplest and most
vigorous medium of communication for the different peoples who became
Osmanlis.
Calling the Osmanlis Turks, and regarding them as invaders upon the soil
of Europe, is an historical error which has persisted so long that the
Osmanlis themselves have fallen into it! They have always distinguished
themselves from the Turks. This is proved by their own use of that word
to describe a people as different from themselves as were the Greeks.
Evliya effendi spoke of the ‘harsh language of the Turks’, and said of
Turbeli Koïlik, which was conquered by Osman in 1312, ‘Though its
inhabitants are Turks, it is a sweet town.’[149] Hadji Khalfa regarded
the Turks as synonymous with the Tartars, and an altogether foreign
race.[150]
Whether their tolerance was actuated by policy, by genuine kindly
feeling, or by indifference,[151] the fact cannot be gainsaid that the
Osmanlis were the first nation in modern history to lay down the
principle of religious freedom as the corner-stone in the building up of
their nation. During the centuries that bear the stain of unremitting
persecution of the Jew and the responsibility for official support of
the Inquisition, Christian and Moslem lived together in harmony under
the rule of the Osmanlis. This was generally, though not universally,
the case throughout the fourteenth century in the Turkish emirates of
Asia Minor.[152]
VII
The army of Osman consisted entirely of volunteer horsemen, who were
called _akindjis_. They wore no specified uniform. But they were superb
riders and moved together ‘like a wall’--an expression that has come
down to the present day in Ottoman military drills.[153] When Osman
planned a campaign, he sent criers into the villages to proclaim that
‘whoever wanted to fight’ should be at a certain place on a certain day.
Orkhan was the organizer of the Ottoman army. He and his successor
Murad laid the foundations of a military power which was without rival
for two centuries. Although there is no ground for the claim of many
historians that the Osmanlis were a hundred years ahead of Europe in
organizing a standing army,[154] they were certainly pioneers in the
complete organization of an army on a permanent war footing. Orkhan
understood well the principle _qui se laisse payer se laisse commander_
thirty years before Charles V of France.
His irregular infantry (_azabs_) were placed in the front when battle
was engaged.[155] It made little difference how many of these were
killed, or whether they made a good show. They served to draw the first
fire of the enemy. When the enemy’s energy was exhausted or when he was
led to pursue the fleeing azabs, thinking the victory his, he came upon
the second line, which consisted of paid, disciplined troops. These were
accustomed to fighting together, were acquainted with their leaders’
commands and strategy, and had a tremendous advantage over the usual
mercenaries of the period in that they served a cause to which their
lives were devoted and a sovereign whose interests were identical with
their own. Whether this were due to training begun in the days of
adolescence, or to the knowledge that bravery would be rewarded not by
booty alone (always an uncertain quantity which the ordinary mercenary
invariably begins to think of securing before his fighting work is
really accomplished), but by promotion in the service and substantial
gifts of land, the result was the same.
The corps of salaried soldiers were called Kapu-Kali Odjaks, and their
service was centred in the person of their sovereign. They were supposed
to be continually ‘at the door of the Sultan’s tent’. The Sultan paid
them regularly and personally. They served him regularly and personally.
When they went into the field with a commander other than the Sultan,
the commander was regarded, during the term of his commission, as in the
place of the Sultan.[156] There came to be seven of these _odjaks_: the
_janissaries_, the _adjami-oghlular_ (novices), the _topjis_
(field-artillerymen), the _djebedjis_ (smiths), the _toparabadjis_
(artillery and munition drivers), the _khumbaradjis_
(siege-artillerymen), and the _sakkas_ (water-carriers).[157] It is
impossible to state just when these distinctive corps arose, but they
are the logical development of Orkhan’s _Eulufeli_, the year-in and
year-out soldiery who followed arms as a definite profession and enjoyed
a regular salary fixed by law.
The _akindjis_, cavalry scouts and yet more than that, served as an
advance-guard, and opened up the country to be conquered. The greatest
dangers and the richest rewards fell to them. They were recruited from
among the holders of military fiefs (_timarets_). Guides (tchaousches)
and regular paid corps of cavalry (_spahis_) completed the organization.
It may be that Orkhan had learned a valuable lesson from his observation
of the Catalans and of the early Turkish invaders in Europe. For he
arranged his organization in such a way that the army would depend
directly upon him, and not upon subordinates who might be led to put
their personal interests above those of their chief. With the exception
of the _akindjis_, whose loyalty was secured by their fiefs, there were
no irregular bands raised and led by adventurers. Unity was the first
striking characteristic of the Ottoman army.
The second characteristic was readiness. We have already seen how
Andronicus III ‘gathered in haste’ the army which he tried to oppose to
the Osmanlis. Lack of time for preparation is the excuse for many a
Byzantine disaster. An early and competent traveller wrote that the
Osmanlis knew beforehand just when the Christian armies were coming and
where they could be met to the best advantage. For they were always on a
war footing, and their _tchaousches_ and spies knew how and where to
lead. ‘They can start suddenly, and a hundred Christian soldiers would
make more noise than ten thousand Osmanlis. When the drum is sounded
they put themselves immediately in march, never breaking step, never
stopping till the word is given. Lightly armed, in one night they travel
as far as their Christian adversaries in three days.’[158]
VIII
The fall of Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia did not cause alarm in Europe.
The rise of the Osmanlis had scarcely been noticed, even by the
Byzantines! The Turkish pirates in the Aegaean, who had no connexion
whatever with the Osmanlis,[159] were becoming, however, a menace to the
commerce of the Venetians and Genoese and to the sovereignty of the
remaining Latin princes of Achaia and of the islands. In one of Marino
Sanudo’s letters we find the following significant passage: ‘Marco
Gradenigo, writing to me from Negropont (Euboea) on September
eighteenth, 1328, declares that unless some remedy be found against the
Turks, who have marvellously increased in numbers, Negropont and all
the islands of the Archipelago will be infallibly lost.’[160]
In 1327 Andronicus II wrote to Pope John XXII, calling his attention to
the Turks as a danger to Christendom, and appealing for aid.[161]
Nothing was done at this time. The Byzantines were schismatics, and
France at least was more intent upon a recovery of the Holy Land than
upon checking the advance of the Moslem corsairs.[162]
Andronicus III, in 1333, followed the example of his grandfather by
making another overture to John XXII. He did not scruple to dangle
before the Pope the bait of a reunion of the Churches.[163] The same
year Venice urged Cyprus and Rhodes to join in a coalition against the
Turks.[164] The only practical outcome of the efforts of the popes, the
Venetian senate, and the Byzantine emperors to raise a crusade during
the reign of Orkhan was the capture of Smyrna, in October 1344. Omar
bey, emir of Aïdin, had been caught napping.[165] Smyrna remained in
possession of the Knights of Rhodes until it was taken by Timur in
1403.[166]
The futile agitation in Europe against the reawakening of Islam did not
in any way hurt Orkhan. On the contrary it helped him greatly. Just as
the petty conflict of Andronicus III with Phocaea in 1336 had diverted
Orkhan’s powerful southern neighbours, this interference of the Pope,
and the activity of Rhodes and Venice, contributed to the prosperity and
growth of the Osmanlis by striking a blow at his most dangerous rivals,
the Emirs of Sarukhan, Aïdin, and Hamid. After 1340 Orkhan was ready to
extend his dominion into Europe. He did not have long to wait.
IX
Orkhan had one rival whose goal was similar to his own. Stephen Dushan,
kral of Serbia, was openly aspiring to the imperial throne. Byzantium
had no more formidable enemy than this warrior king, who in twenty-five
years led thirteen campaigns against the Greeks.[167] The memory of his
ephemeral empire has been cherished by the Serbians to this day. In
their folk-lore Stephen Dushan and his deeds are immortalized. The halo
of romance still surrounds the man and his conquests. It is in vain that
historical science has demonstrated the purely temporary character of
Stephen’s conquests. It is in vain that he has been divested of the
glamour of the chronicles and songs, and pictured in conformity with
fact. To the Serbian peasant he is Saint Stephen, the glorious Czar, who
brought the Serbian Empire to its zenith. All the cities in which this
adventurer and raider set foot are claimed in the twentieth century as a
legitimate part of ‘Greater Serbia’. Men have engaged in a bloody war
and have died for this fiction.[168]
Stephen Dushan demands our attention because he is the one man who could
have anticipated the Osmanlis in winning the inheritance of the Caesars.
A statement of his career is necessary before we take up the narration
of the events which led to the invasion of the Balkan peninsula by the
Osmanlis.
Stephen came into prominence in 1330 during the war which his father,
Urosh, made upon Bulgaria. Czar Michael had repudiated the Serbian
princess Anna in order to marry a sister of Andronicus III. The
Bulgarians were badly beaten. Stephen received for his brilliant part in
the campaign the province of Zenta. Although he was only twenty-three,
his ambition to rule was already awakened. Dissatisfied, he demanded a
half of his father’s possessions. Urosh refused. Stephen marched against
him, dethroned him, and imprisoned him. According to some authorities,
he had Urosh killed.[169] Whether he actually ordered the assassination
or not, he profited by the crime.
During the first decade of his reign, Stephen gathered a majority of the
Serbian-speaking peoples under his rule, pushed down to the Dalmatian
coast, and asserted Serbian supremacy over a large portion of the
territory which his race had hitherto contested with the Bulgarians. His
appearance on the Adriatic led to a nominal alliance with Venice.[170]
In 1340 he began the invasion of lower Macedonia. When the valley of the
Vardar was conquered, he attacked Serres. This city fell into his
possession. He now considered himself ready for the advance on
Constantinople. Drunk with success, he crowned himself at Serres[171]
‘King by the grace of God of Serbia, of Albania, and of the maritime
region, prince of the Bulgarian empire, and master of almost all the
Roman empire’.[172] A few months later he changed the title to ‘emperor
and autocrat of Serbia and Romania’.[173]
The relations between Stephen and Venice during the period between 1345
and 1350 show how easily an alliance between the Serbians and the
Venetians might have been concluded. It was a critical time for Orkhan.
Had Stephen Dushan, with the help of the Venetians, attacked
Constantinople before 1350, the Osmanlis would have lost their goal.
After his coronation, the ‘Roman emperor’ sent an embassy to Venice to
secure the Senate’s aid for the definite purpose of acquiring
Constantinople.[174] In 1347 the Senate, in response to a second
overture, congratulated Stephen on having been crowned ‘emperor of
Constantinople’, but regretted the impossibility of aiding him. There
was a truce between Venice and the Byzantine Empire, and they were at
that moment engaged in a war with Zara.[175] However, like typical
merchants, they consented to sell arms to Stephen.[176]
In January 1348 the Senate congratulated Stephen upon his exploits,[177]
and later in the same year granted him three, then four, galleys.[178]
This seems to be the extent of the help rendered by Venice to Stephen
Dushan. The success of Stephen in subjugating Thessaly, and his progress
farther south until, in 1349, the Serbian flags waved on the mainland
opposite the Venetian castle of Ptelion in Euboea, alarmed the
Venetians. The Senate complained of the piracy of the Serbians in the
Aegaean, and tried to re-establish peace between Serbians and
Greeks.[179] Stephen became more insistent and the Senate more
reluctant. On April 13, 1350, the Senate considered several demands made
upon them by an envoy of ‘Stephen Dushan, emperor of Serbia and Romania,
despot of Arta and count of Wallachia’. Among them were Venetian
citizenship for himself, his wife and his son, a conference with the
Doge at Ragusa, and substantial aid for the attack upon Constantinople,
‘when he shall have conquered the ten parts of Romania outside of
Constantinople.’[180] The chart of citizenship was accorded. But he was
informed that the Doge never left Venice during his tenure of office,
and that there was a treaty of friendship with the Byzantines which
prevented Venice from joining in an attempt to capture the imperial
city.[181]
Convinced that he could expect no substantial assistance from Venice,
Stephen planned to work the old trick of the Byzantine emperors. The
Serbians were already excommunicated by the Greek Orthodox Church.
Stephen negotiated with the Pope for the return of the Serbians into the
Roman fold.[182]
When war arose between Venice and Genoa, Stephen sent envoys to Orkhan
to propose a union of the Serbian and Ottoman armies for a campaign
against Constantinople. The marriage of his daughter to Orkhan’s son
was to seal the alliance. Orkhan accepted this proposal. An embassy was
immediately sent to Stephen to arrange the details of the alliance. But
Cantacuzenos determined to prevent this change of Orkhan’s allegiance by
a most drastic measure. He did not fear the anger of Orkhan as greatly
as he feared a union between Orkhan and Dushan. The Ottoman envoys were
ambushed. Some were killed. Those who escaped, together with the
presents destined for Stephen, were taken to Demotika.[183]
Neither Stephen nor Orkhan tried to reopen the negotiations. They
realized that their ambitions were too nearly identical to permit a
harmonious agreement as to a division of the spoils. Macedonia was as
hard to divide in the fourteenth century as it is in the twentieth.
After 1351 Stephen watched to see what effect the war between Venice and
Genoa was going to have upon his fortunes. He also intrigued, as Orkhan
was doing, in the civil war of the Byzantines. These were his Capuan
days. They were fatal to the fame of Stephen--outside of the Serbian
folk-lore! The first expedition of Orkhan’s son Soleiman, in 1353, so
alarmed Stephen that he tried to become reconciled to the Orthodox
Church. He sent an embassy to Constantinople, but the patriarch refused
his blessing until Stephen had renounced the title of emperor and his
conquests east of the Vardar.[184] Stephen could not do this. Nor could
he wait longer. If he did not strike quickly, the Osmanlis would be in
his path. He took what was now a gambler’s chance. With eighty thousand
men he started for Constantinople. Death claimed him on the second day
of the march.[185] The Serbian Empire did not outlive its founder.
X
The public life of John Cantacuzenos was contemporary almost to the year
with that of Stephen Dushan. He was associated with Andronicus III in
the capacity of grand chancellor and confidential adviser throughout the
decade which saw the loss of Nicaea and Nicomedia. Shortly after he had
succeeded in deposing his grandfather, Andronicus III was taken with a
violent fever. His crime-stained mind could not rid itself of the idea
that he was going to die, even after he had become convalescent. He
solicited Cantacuzenos to assume the imperial purple. He wanted to
abdicate and take monk’s orders. A drink from a miraculous spring gave
him a new grip on life.[186] For eleven years he lived on, in every
crisis irresolute, in every disaster unkingly, bending always before the
stronger will of Cantacuzenos. In 1341, at the early age of forty-five,
his worthless life ended. His legacy to the Empress Anna and his child
heir was the guardianship of his ‘friend and counsellor, John
Cantacuzenos’. The grand chancellor accepted the regency with
alacrity.[187]
Three months after the death of Andronicus III, Cantacuzenos crowned
himself emperor at Demotika. He put the imperial crown also upon the
head of his wife Irene, a Bulgarian princess. Neither in Constantinople
nor in Adrianople were the pretensions of Cantacuzenos admitted. The
widow of Andronicus, Anna of Savoy, refused to acknowledge the usurper.
In Adrianople the inhabitants called in both Bulgarians and Turks to
defend them against Cantacuzenos.[188] The Bulgarian Czar took sides
secretly against his son-in-law.
The year 1342 saw the Byzantines engaged in another terrible civil war.
The self-appointed emperor did not hesitate to go to Pristina and offer
to Stephen Dushan Macedonia as far as Serres in exchange for Serbian aid
against the Palaeologi.[189]
When the Serbian assistance proved unsatisfactory, Cantacuzenos called
in the Turks of Aïdin. Omar, with 83 ships and 29,000 soldiers, came to
his aid, but, because of the severe cold, returned to Asia before
anything could be accomplished.[190] He came back in the spring of 1343
with 290 vessels and helped Cantacuzenos to enter Salonika. In the fall
of this year Cantacuzenos led his Turkish mercenaries into Thrace. Anna
appealed in vain to Venice to exercise a pressure upon the Turks and
Serbians, so that they would no longer support her rival.[191] In
desperation she gave Alexander of Bulgaria nine strongholds in the
Rhodope Mountains in exchange for a few thousand soldiers. She resorted
also to bribing the Turks in Cantacuzenos’s service, and made overtures
to Orkhan.
The crusade of 1344 against the Turks of Aïdin, which resulted in the
capture of Smyrna, prevented Cantacuzenos from continuing to receive
substantial aid from Omar, who died four years later in an attempt to
win back Smyrna.[192] Stephen Dushan, as we have already seen, was
laying claim to the Byzantine throne himself. Cantacuzenos could turn
only to the Osmanlis.
It was in January 1345 that Cantacuzenos made his infamous proposal to
Orkhan. In exchange for six thousand soldiers he was to give his
daughter Theodora to the Ottoman emir.[193] Orkhan now turned a deaf ear
to the appeals of Anna. This was a better offer. The Osmanlis crossed
into Europe. With their help Cantacuzenos got possession of all the
coast cities of the Black Sea except Sozopolis, besieged Constantinople,
ravaged the neighbourhood of the capital, and won Adrianople.[194]
It was only by threatening to change to the side of the Palaeologi that
Orkhan secured the fulfilment of the bargain. In May 1346 Theodora
became his bride.[195] A few days later, while Cantacuzenos was
besieging the capital with the soldiers for whom he had paid so dearly,
the beleaguered city was awakened by an ominous event. The eastern
portion of the Church of St. Sophia had fallen.[196]
Throughout the year 1346 Constantinople was invested by Cantacuzenos and
his mercenaries. The aristocratic party was almost openly championing
the cause of the usurper, while Anna relied upon the democratic party
and the Genoese. As for the clergy, they and the bulk of the population
were more interested in the ecclesiastical trial of Barlaam for the
Bogomile heresy[197] than in the civil war. In February 1347, while the
Synod was in the act of condemning Barlaam, and Anna was confined to her
bed with a serious illness, partisans of Cantacuzenos left the Golden
Gate open. The ‘faithful friend and counsellor’ of Andronicus III
entered without opposition. The garrison had been bribed, and prevented
the Genoese from coming to the rescue of the empress. She yielded only
when the palace of the Blachernae was attacked.
Anna agreed to recognize Cantacuzenos and Irene as co-rulers, and to a
union of the families by the betrothal of Helen, daughter of
Cantacuzenos, to the young John Palaeologos. John, who was fifteen,
protested against marrying the thirteen-year-old Helen. His mother
overruled his objections. In May the marriage took place in the church
of the Blachernae, as St. Sophia was still in ruins. This ceremony was
followed by the coronation of the two emperors, John Cantacuzenos and
John Palaeologos, and the three empresses, Anna, Irene, and Helen.[198]
Five rulers for the remnant of the Byzantine Empire! At that very moment
in France, the Marquis de Montferrat, heir to the Latin emperors of
Constantinople, was planning with the Pope to drive out both
Cantacuzenos and Palaeologos.[199]
Orkhan was well satisfied with this entering wedge. He was now
son-in-law of one emperor and brother-in-law of the other. His wife
Theodora was granddaughter of the Bulgarian Czar. He had open to him
also a marriage alliance with Stephen Dushan. The gods were first making
mad.
Cantacuzenos was compelled immediately to seek aid again of Orkhan.
While he had been expending his energies against Constantinople, Stephen
Dushan had made great strides in Macedonia. At Scutari, where Orkhan had
come to congratulate his father-in-law upon the happy issue of the
struggle for the imperial purple, Cantacuzenos asked for six thousand
Osmanlis to dislodge the Serbians from the coast cities of Macedonia.
Orkhan sent the soldiers willingly. He must, however, have given them
secret instructions, for after having taken immense booty they returned
to Nicomedia without having captured for Cantacuzenos a single one of
the cities held by Stephen.[200]
XI
It is impossible to believe that Cantacuzenos from this time onwards did
not realize the danger to which he had exposed the state and the noose
into which he had put his neck. The papal archives and the writings of
Cantacuzenos himself reveal the fact that as early as 1347 Cantacuzenos
had appealed to the Pope to unite the western princes in a crusade
against the Osmanlis,[201] that these negotiations were renewed in
1349[202] and 1350,[203] and that in 1353 a last definite appeal was
made to Clement by Cantacuzenos for relief against those whom he had
invited into Europe to fight his battles.[204]
The five years between 1348 and 1353 gave rise to three events which
were fatal to the Byzantine Empire. They made possible the permanent
foothold of the Osmanlis in Europe. A man’s own efforts and a man’s
ability are not the sole factors in his success. Work and genius avail
nothing where opportunity is lacking. Circumstances over which he has no
control contribute largely to the making of a man. Orkhan, at this
culminating stage of his career, when he was ready to lead his people
into the promised land, was aided by the ‘black death’, the war between
Venice and Genoa, and the conflict between John Cantacuzenos and John
Palaeologos.
The ‘black death’ was first heard of in the Euxine ports. It reached
Constantinople in 1347, and spread to Europe the following year. In
Italy it was universal, and lasted three years. From 15 to 20 per cent.
of the total population died.[205] In the maritime cities that had been
in close contact with the East, the duration of the epidemic was longer
and the mortality higher. The moral and economic effect was great
throughout Europe. Men looked with horror upon this inexplicable malady,
which struck down every fifth person. It gave no warning. There were few
recoveries. For years after the last case was recorded there was nervous
fear of its return. Communications with the Levant had been partially
cut off.[206] Full intercourse was not resumed until after Orkhan and
the Osmanlis were rooted in Macedonia and Thrace. Orkhan had no crusade
to fear as long as there lingered in the minds of the European peoples
the memory of this scourge. The bravest and most adventurous were
unwilling to fight the angel of death.
Plagues continued to visit the coast cities of the Balkan peninsula and
Asia Minor from time to time during the rest of the fourteenth and the
first thirty years of the fifteenth century. Between 1348 and 1431, nine
great plagues are recorded.[207] These dates coincide with the most
aggressive period of Ottoman conquest. As the city population was very
largely Greek and Christian, we cannot over-estimate the importance of
these epidemics. They were a valuable auxiliary in enabling the Osmanlis
to advance and assimilate without formidable opposition.
The ‘black death’ had hardly run its course in Italy when the commercial
rivalries of Genoa and Venice culminated in a bitter war, that lasted
for two years, with varying fortunes, until the battle of Lojera in 1353
broke the sea-power of Genoa. After five centuries of independence the
Genoese were compelled to put themselves under the protection of Milan.
The hatred engendered by this struggle is revealed in the archives of
the two republics. They left unturned no stone to destroy each other.
The history of Venice and Genoa during the fourteenth century reads like
that of Sparta and Athens. The scene of the conflict is the same: the
motive, the spirit, and the result are identical. Venice gained no
material advantage from the war. She had long been alive to the menace
of the Osmanlis.[208] She had been warned by Petrarch of the certain
danger which a war with Genoa would entail, whether its outcome were
favourable or unfavourable.[209]
The Ottoman and Byzantine historians are silent concerning the relations
of the Osmanlis with the Genoese during this war. That the Genoese asked
for and received aid from Orkhan is certain. There had been a convention
beforehand between the Osmanlis and the Genoese of Pera.[210] Both
against the Greeks and against the Venetians the assistance of Orkhan
must have been substantial.[211] It was remembered with gratitude forty
years later.[212]
The triumphal entry into Constantinople and the sanction of the Church
upon his imperial office did not end the troubles of Cantacuzenos. The
first to turn against him was his own son Matthew, who also wanted to be
emperor. Cantacuzenos appeased him for a time by giving him a portion of
Thrace. Then the Genoese of Pera, dissatisfied with the lowering of the
customs tariff to other nations, burned the Greek galleys and arsenals,
and attacked Constantinople. Cantacuzenos had to leave a sick-bed at
Demotika to hurry to save the city. The Greek fleet was destroyed by the
Genoese. The army of Cantacuzenos failed in an attack upon Galata. Peace
was concluded only when the unhappy emperor agreed to sell more land on
the Golden Horn to the Genoese, and restore them in the customs tariffs
to their former place as ‘most favoured nation’.[213]
In 1349 Cantacuzenos called again upon Orkhan to send soldiers to him in
Europe. Twenty thousand Ottoman cavaliers, under the command of Matthew,
marched against Salonika, which was on the point of giving itself to
Stephen Dushan. Cantacuzenos, with the young emperor John, went by sea.
Orkhan, as on the last occasion, secretly worked against his
father-in-law. After Cantacuzenos had already sailed, he recalled the
horsemen who were with Matthew. It was fortunate for Cantacuzenos that
he met at Amphipolis a Turkish fleet which was about to land a force of
raiders to ravage the country, and persuaded the commander to join with
him in a demonstration against Salonika. Otherwise the expedition would
have been a fiasco. As it was, Salonika surrendered. The army of
Cantacuzenos ascended the Vardar as far as Uskub, which was
reoccupied.[214]
It would be too wearisome to go into all the details of the civil war
between Cantacuzenos and John Palaeologos. Involved in it are the
intrigues of Stephen Dushan of Serbia and Alexander of Bulgaria, and
the attitude of Venice and Genoa. At first it seemed as if Cantacuzenos
would be crushed. The partisans of Palaeologos besieged Matthew in the
citadel of Adrianople. The Genoese of Galata, in spite of the strong
Venetian fleet whose co-operation, however, with the Greeks was
lukewarm,[215] compelled Cantacuzenos to cede Silivria and Heraclea,
besides increasing their Galata lands.[216] In the fall of 1352 the
Venetians and Bulgarians declared openly for Palaeologos.[217]
In desperation Cantacuzenos fell back for the last time upon the
Osmanlis. He robbed the churches of the capital to pay Orkhan for twenty
thousand soldiers, and promised him a fortress in the Thracian
Chersonese.[218] With this help he recaptured Adrianople, and relieved
Matthew, who was still holding the citadel. The Serbians were beaten by
Orkhan’s eldest son, Soleiman, near Demotika. All of Thrace and most of
Macedonia returned to the allegiance of Cantacuzenos.[219]
In 1353 Cantacuzenos seemed to have recovered all the lost ground, and
to be at the height of his fortunes. John Palaeologos, abandoned by his
partisans, was in exile at Tenedos. An attempt to win back
Constantinople by intrigue failed. Cantacuzenos, now practically sole
ruler, felt that it was time to establish a new imperial line. He had
Matthew proclaimed co-emperor.[220] In his prosperity he forgot about
Orkhan, who had put him where he was, he forgot that he had invited the
Osmanlis into Europe and had shown them the fertile valleys of Macedonia
and Thrace, that their fighting men had passed along the military roads
of the empire under the command of himself and his son, that he had
mustered Ottoman armies under the walls of Salonika, of Adrianople, of
Demotika, and even of Constantinople.
XII
The Ottoman historians place the first invasion of European territory by
the Osmanlis in the year of the Hegira 758 (1356), and state that
Soleiman crossed the Hellespont one moonlight night with three hundred
warriors, and seized the castle of Tzympe, between Gallipoli and the
Aegaean Sea end of the strait.[221] It is represented as a romantic
adventure, prompted by a dream in which Soleiman saw the moonbeams make
a tempting path for him from Asia into Europe.[222] The earlier western
historians give a variety of dates. Some ascribe the first crossing to
Murad.[223] Several claim that the Osmanlis were transported by two
small Genoese merchant ships, and that there were sixty thousand of
them! The Genoese received a ducat per head. All the calamities of the
‘Turks’ were brought upon Europe by the avarice of the Genoese.[224]
We can reject these stories without hesitation, just as we can reject
the date which the Ottoman historians give.[225] The Osmanlis had been
fighting in Europe since 1345. They had come over in large numbers on
different occasions. There is nothing mysterious or romantic about their
first foothold in Europe. In 1352 Cantacuzenos had promised to Orkhan a
fortress in the Thracian Chersonese. Tzympe may have been given to
Soleiman, or it was taken by him when the promise of Cantacuzenos was
not fulfilled. He did not have to cross secretly from Asia. The Ottoman
soldiers were already at home in Europe, and Soleiman had been their
leader in several expeditions.
Shortly after the occupation of Tzympe, one of those earthquakes which
occur so often in the Thracian Chersonese destroyed a portion of the
walls of Gallipoli. This was Soleiman’s opportunity. He occupied the
city, repaired the breaches, and called over from Bithynia the first
colony of Osmanlis. Other colonies followed rapidly, as the soldiers of
Soleiman took Malgara, Bulaïr (the key of the peninsula),[226] and the
European littoral of the Sea of Marmora as far as Rodosto. The
advance-guard of the Osmanlis appeared within a few miles of
Constantinople; and ‘conducted themselves as masters’.[227] This
colonization was so quickly and easily effected that one is led to
believe that these colonists were for the most part renegade Greeks
returning to their former homes.
Cantacuzenos now reaped the full harvest of his policy. The patriarch
Callixtus refused to consecrate Matthew. He reproached Cantacuzenos for
having delivered Christians into the hands of the infidels, and accused
him of having given to Orkhan the money sent by a Russian prince for the
restoration of St. Sophia.[228] Compelled to flee for his life to the
Genoese in Galata, the patriarch decided to declare for Palaeologos.
When Cantacuzenos chose a new patriarch, Philotheus, who consented as
price of office to consecrate Matthew, Callixtus excommunicated him.
Philotheus returned the compliment. Then Callixtus sailed for Tenedos to
join John Palaeologos.[229]
Cantacuzenos, feeling the precariousness of his position at
Constantinople just at the moment when he thought he had triumphed over
every obstacle to his ambition, bitterly reproached Orkhan for not
having kept faith with him. He offered to buy back Tzympe for ten
thousand ducats, and asked Orkhan to order the Osmanlis to leave
Gallipoli. Orkhan accepted the ransom for Tzympe, knowing well that he
could reoccupy this fortress when he wanted to.[230] As for Gallipoli,
he declared that he could not give back what God had given him. Was it
not the will of God rather than force of arms that had opened the gates
of Gallipoli to him? Cantacuzenos sought an interview with his
son-in-law, for he thought that gold might induce the Osmanlis to
withdraw. A meeting was arranged in the Gulf of Nicomedia. When the
emperor arrived at the rendezvous, a messenger from Orkhan reported that
his master was ill and could not come.[231] No way was left open for
further negotiations. The rupture was complete.
After his return to Constantinople, Cantacuzenos sent envoys to the
Serbians and to the Bulgarians to urge a defensive alliance of the
Balkan Christians. They answered, ‘Defend yourself as best you can.’ A
second embassy met with the response from Czar Alexander: ‘Three years
ago I remonstrated with you for your unholy alliances with the Turks.
Now that the storm has broken, let the Byzantines weather it. If the
Turks come against us, we shall know how to defend ourselves.’[232]
The indignation of the Greeks against the man who had sacrificed them to
his inordinate ambition reached the breaking-point in November 1354. The
inhabitants of Constantinople declared for John Palaeologos.
Cantacuzenos was forced to barricade himself in his palace. Protected by
Catalans and other mercenaries, he tried to temporize. He offered to
abdicate if Matthew were allowed to retain the title of emperor with the
governorship of Adrianople and the Rhodope district. Encouraged by a
lull in the storm of popular feeling, he had the audacity to make an
‘appeal to patriotism’, as he himself put it. He urged the people to
support him in an expedition to retake the provinces conquered by the
Serbians and the Osmanlis. This exhibition of effrontery was greeted
with cries of scorn. Cantacuzenos was publicly accused of wishing to
deliver Constantinople to Orkhan. A second revolution forced his
abdication. He became a monk. Irene took the veil.[233]
John Palaeologos returned from exile, and restored Callixtus to the
patriarchal throne. It took several years of fighting and negotiating to
compel Matthew’s abdication. Not until 1358 did John V become undisputed
ruler of the remnant of the empire in Macedonia and Thrace.[234] But the
mischief was done. The Osmanlis had put their foot as settlers on
European soil.
Cantacuzenos lived for thirty years in the monastery of Mistra, near old
Sparta. It was long enough for him to see the irreparable injury that
his ambition had caused to his country, and to realize how he had
destroyed the people to rule over whom he had sacrificed every higher
and nobler instinct. Cantacuzenos has had a fair trial before the bar of
posterity. For many long years, far removed from the turmoil of the
world, were spent in the building up of his brief of justification. He
left a history of his life and times. So he pleads for himself. But even
if we did not have the testimony of Gregoras, and of the archives of the
Italian cities and of the Vatican, to supplement the story of
Cantacuzenos, he would stand condemned by his own record of facts.
Cantacuzenos had far more natural ability than Andronicus II and
Andronicus III. During the long and arduous struggle to satisfy his
personal ambition, he showed himself a keen, courageous, resourceful
leader. At the beginning of his career he was in a position of
commanding influence. His country was facing a crisis which would have
called forth the best and noblest in one who loved his race, his
religion, and his fatherland. But John Cantacuzenos loved only himself.
The legacy of the widow and helpless child of the friend who had trusted
and honoured him gave to Cantacuzenos the opportunity for developing
true greatness in the fulfilment of that highest of missions--a sacred
trust. But Cantacuzenos saw only the opportunity for taking advantage of
a dead man’s faith.
To say that Cantacuzenos was the cause of the downfall of the Byzantine
Empire would be to ignore other forces working to the same end, and to
put too great an emphasis upon the power of an individual human will to
shape the destinies of the world. However, in the stage of world
history, leaders of men are the personification of causes. We group
everything around them. The character and acts of Cantacuzenos reveal
the fatal weakness in the Balkan peninsula of his day. The Ottoman
conquest was possible because there was no consciousness of religious or
racial commonweal. How could this larger devotion, this larger sense of
duty and obligation, be expected in men who were not influenced, much
less constrained, by ties of blood and personal friendship?
XIII
Cantacuzenos ceased to be a factor in Byzantine affairs in 1355. But the
Greeks could not rid themselves as easily of Orkhan. The Osmanlis had
come to stay.
It is impossible to establish with any degree of certainty the conquests
of Soleiman pasha in the hinterland of the Gulf of Saros and of the Sea
of Marmora. But we know that he captured Demotika, and cut off
Constantinople from Adrianople by occupying Tchorlu.[235] If these
important places were retaken by the Byzantines after the premature
death of Soleiman, it was only for a brief time. At the beginning of the
reign of Murad the Osmanlis were firmly ensconced along the coasts of
Thrace, and had made some permanent progress into the interior.
There was a sudden and full awakening on the part of the Greeks to the
knowledge that the Ottoman invasion of 1354 was an irreparable disaster.
A year before Soleiman pasha settled his Moslem colonies in the Thracian
Chersonese, the inhabitants of Philadelphia had felt themselves so
completely abandoned by their emperors that they had appealed directly
to the Pope for aid, promising to return to the Roman communion.[236] At
the approach of the Osmanlis in Thrace, the country population had fled
to Constantinople, abandoning everything. Those who had money to
emigrate elsewhere did so immediately. They had no hope of a change in
the fortunes of their country.[237]
The annalists of the Byzantine Empire record no heroic, bitter
resistance to the army of Soleiman pasha. There was no mayor of the
palace, no Joan, to revive the confidence of the people in their rulers,
or to replace the family that had proved its unfitness. The Greeks had
feared Cantacuzenos, and had attributed their hopeless condition to his
alliance with the Osmanlis. But they could not have greater confidence
in John Palaeologos. For he made no effort, not even in the smallest
way, to demonstrate that he was different from his weak and disloyal
forbears.
The Byzantines feared also the intrigues of the Genoese, who were as
persistent in their efforts to undermine the integrity of the Byzantine
Empire, as are the foreigners to-day engaged in commerce in the Levant
to weaken and destroy the authority of the Ottoman Empire.[238] The
banishment of Cantacuzenos could not save them from the Osmanlis.
Palaeologos could not save them. They could not save themselves. The
only way which occurred to them of preventing the Ottoman conquest was
to give themselves to some Christian power. There were actually plans on
foot to offer the remnant of the empire to Venice, to Hungary, even to
Serbia![239]
In France, during the fourteenth century, the Turks were not regarded as
a permanent factor in the Near East. Western Asia Minor was not called
‘Turquie’ or ‘Turquemanie’, but ‘the land which the Turks hold’.[240]
There was no such illusion among the Italians. They accustomed
themselves very rapidly to the idea that the Osmanlis, if not the
Turkish tribes, were in Asia Minor and the Aegaean to stay.
The immigration across the Hellespont in 1354 was not looked upon by
those who were acquainted with the weakness and impotence of the
Byzantines as a raid or as a temporary affair. For several years the
Genoese had thought it to their advantage to seek the friendship of
Orkhan.[241] In 1355 two far-sighted Venetians wrote the whole truth to
the Senate. They did not mince matters. Matteo Venier, baily at
Constantinople, warned the Senate in the strongest terms about the
menace of Ottoman aggrandizement.[242] Marino Falieri went farther. He
pointed out that the Byzantine Empire must inevitably become the booty
of the Osmanlis, and urged his countrymen to get ahead of them.[243]
Prophetic words and daring suggestion. Had Venice at this time had a
Dandolo of the stamp of the intrepid blind Doge who diverted the Fourth
Crusade to wreak his vengeance upon his mutilators, Islam might have
been kept out of Europe.
When John Palaeologos resumed the throne of his fathers, he found
himself as much at the mercy of Orkhan as Cantacuzenos had been. His
dependence is revealed in the story of Halil. Halil, son of Orkhan and
Theodora, was captured by pirates in 1357, and taken to Phocaea. Orkhan
held his brother-in-law responsible for this kidnapping, and called upon
him to rescue his nephew. In February 1358, while the Osmanlis under
Soleiman pasha were advancing in Thrace, we see John V, at the behest
of Orkhan, spending what strength and energy he had in the siege of
Phocaea. Later, when he went back to Constantinople, Orkhan peremptorily
ordered him to return to direct in person the siege. John started out,
and met his fleet, which had become anxious about his absence and had
given up the siege. He could not persuade the galleys to turn back with
him. So he wrote to Orkhan begging to be excused from continuing an
undertaking beyond his power to carry through successfully.
Orkhan was inflexible. He had now become the overlord of the Byzantine
emperor. In March 1359 the successor of Constantine went as a vassal to
meet his Ottoman suzerain at Scutari. He appeased the wrath of Orkhan
only by agreeing to pay a half of Halil’s ransom, and by signing a
treaty of peace that was a virtual acceptance of the new _status quo_ in
Thrace. The peace was to be sealed by the betrothal of his ten-year-old
daughter to Halil. It was as errand boy of Orkhan that John V made one
more trip to Phocaea, paid one hundred thousand pieces of gold for
Halil, and brought him to Nicaea. There the betrothal of the Christian
princess to her Moslem cousin was celebrated by splendid fêtes.[244]
John Cantacuzenos introduced the Osmanlis into Europe. John Palaeologos
accepted their presence in Thrace without a struggle. There is little
choice between these two Johns.
XIV
Orkhan died at the end of this memorable decade.[245] If to Osman is
given the honour of being father of a new people, the greater honour of
founding the nation must be ascribed to Orkhan.[246] Few men have
accomplished a greater work and seen more sweeping changes in two
generations. According to popular legend, Orkhan won his spurs as a
warrior, and a bride to boot, at the capture of Biledjik, when he was
twelve years old. His life was spent in fighting and in making permanent
the results of his fighting. He was as simple in his tastes as his
father had been. At Nicaea he distributed soup and bread to the poor
with his own hands.[247]
There seems to be no basis for the characterization of Orkhan which the
early western historians handed down to posterity. He was neither
vicious nor cruel nor deceitful. His three striking characteristics were
those which mark all men who have accomplished a great work in history,
oneness of purpose, inexhaustible energy, and an unlimited capacity for
detail. He began life as a village lad of an obscure tribe. After a
public career of sixty years he died, the brother-in-law of the emperor
of Byzantium, the friend and ally of Genoa, and potentially master of
Thrace. The purpose of his life is summed up in the sentence we find
upon his coins: ‘May God cause to endure the empire of Orkhan, son of
Osman.’
CHAPTER III
MURAD
THE OSMANLIS LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN EMPIRE IN EUROPE
The use of Ottoman mercenaries in the Byzantine civil wars was fatal to
the Empire. From the very fact that they were Osmanlis and mercenaries,
the auxiliaries of Cantacuzenos were dangerous allies for a man who
claimed to be fighting for his fatherland. The fertile valleys which
Bulgarian and Serbian had so long disputed with Greek fired the
imagination of these ambitious adventurers. The conquest of Macedonia
and Thrace seemed to them as feasible as it was worth while. For they
had a revelation of the weakness of the Balkan peoples that could have
come to them in no other way. It was as if Cantacuzenos had said to
Orkhan and his followers: Here is our country. You see how rich it is.
You see how we hate each other, race striving with race, faction with
faction. We have no patriotism. We have no rulers or leaders actuated by
other than purely selfish motives. Our religion means no more to us than
does our fatherland. Here are our military roads. We give you the
opportunity of becoming acquainted with the easiest routes, of learning
the best methods of provisioning. We initiate you into the art of
besieging our cities and our strongholds. Under our guidance, you
discover the vulnerable places in the walls of our fortresses.
Murad had not enjoyed training in leadership and responsibility to fit
him for his sudden accession to the chieftainship of the Osmanlis. He
had been overshadowed by the heir apparent, and never dreamed of ruling.
Soleiman pasha, brilliant captain and idol of the army, would not have
brooked a rival in popular favour. When Orkhan died, two months after
the fatal fall of his eldest son at Bulaïr, Murad was elevated to the
emirship before he had had time to adjust himself to his new fortunes.
But he could not pause to get his bearings. The army was on the march.
The conquest of Thrace had already been started.
Osman and Orkhan were able to build up a race and a nation without
notice and, consequently, without hindrance. For their little corner of
Asia Minor had been abandoned by the Byzantines. Since the days when
Nicaea became the capital of the empire, after the Latin conquest of
Constantinople, its commercial relations with Europe were interrupted.
None knew or cared about the rise of the Osmanlis until they appeared in
Thrace. Orkhan had assured himself of his inheritance by patient
waiting. Of Murad immediate action was demanded.
The actual European conquests of Orkhan, outside of the Thracian
Chersonese, had been negligible. But Europe was excited over the capture
of Gallipoli. Murad had little to fear from a union of the indigenous
Balkan elements. Greek and Serbian and Bulgarian hate each other far
worse than they hate the Osmanli. This fact of history, demonstrated so
forcibly by the events of the year 1913, was known and appreciated at
its full value by the earliest of the Ottoman conquerors. There was,
however, just cause for apprehension of the intervention of Hungary in
conjunction with the Serbians, or of Venice in conjunction with the
Byzantines. Murad’s success depended upon his ability to gain an
immediate and vital foothold in the Balkan peninsula.
This foothold was obtained in the epoch-making campaign of 1360-1.
Astounding success attended the initial efforts of Murad. If he were not
himself a trained and seasoned warrior, he had a precious legacy of
generals in whom he could put implicit trust. Realizing his own
inexperience, he created Kara Khalil Tchenderli vizier, and allowed
himself to be guided by the judgement of this tried friend and servant
of his grandfather and his father. To Lalashahin, companion of Soleiman
in the capture of Tzympe, was given the title of beylerbey, and chief
command of the army in Thrace. Adrianople was the goal. To Evrenos bey
Murad entrusted a second army, whose mission was to prevent an attack
from the Serbians in the west.[248]
Tchorlu was the first objective point, because its capture would protect
the rear of the army operating against Adrianople. This city, only
forty-six miles from Constantinople, offered a stubborn resistance, and
had to be taken by assault. The commandant was decapitated, the garrison
massacred, and the walls razed.[249] The Osmanlis saw to it that the
fate of the defenders of Tchorlu was heralded far and wide, so that it
might serve as a lesson to other cities before which their armies
appeared. Evrenos bey, pushing forward on the left, occupied
Demotika,[250] and then Gumuldjina. This operation gave to the Osmanlis
control of the basin of the Maritza River, and removed the danger of a
Serbian attack. A column on the right moved up the coast of the Black
Sea and captured Kirk Kilisse, a position of extreme strategic
importance in preventing a possible Bulgarian attempt to relieve
Adrianople by bringing an army through the mountainous country between
the river and the sea.[251]
After the capture of Tchorlu, Murad advanced to Lule Burgas on the north
bank of the Ergene, where he effected a junction with the armies of
Evrenos and Lalashahin. The decisive battle was fought between Bunar
Hissar and Eski Baba, to which point the defenders of Adrianople had
[Illustration: THE EMIRATE OF MURAD]
advanced.[252] The Byzantines and Bulgarians were defeated. The Greek
commandant of Adrianople, with a portion of his army, managed to flee
down the Maritza to Enos.[253] it is one of the remarkable coincidences
of history that the Osmanlis should have won the first battle which
opened up to them their glorious future in Europe in exactly the same
place that was to witness five hundred and fifty years later their last
desperate stand in the Balkan peninsula.
Deserted by their commandant, and overwhelmed by the disaster of Eski
Baba, the inhabitants of Adrianople opened their gates to the
Osmanlis.[254] Murad installed Lalashahin in Adrianople, and took up his
own head-quarters in Demotika,[255] where he built a palace and a
mosque. Lalashahin, before settling down in Adrianople, carried his
victorious arms up the valley of the Maritza as far as Philippopolis,
which he fortified strongly. A stone bridge was built across the
river.[256] The occupation of Philippopolis not only gave to the
Osmanlis an advantageous base of operations against the Bulgarians, but
also brought them the most fruitful source of revenue they had yet
enjoyed. It enabled them to levy taxes upon the rice-growing industry.
Bulgarians and Serbians were both dependent upon the harvests of the
rice fields around Philippopolis.
II
In fifteen months the Osmanlis had become masters of the principal
strategic points in Thrace. This great campaign, undertaken and carried
through under the spur of necessity, was an auspicious beginning for the
reign of Murad and for the supremacy of the Osmanlis in the Balkan
peninsula. Europe was suffering from another visitation of the Black
Death.[257] The Balkan nations were completely demoralized. So unpopular
was John Palaeologos in his own capital that Murad contemplated entering
into a conspiracy with some Byzantine traitors to have John assassinated
and complete the conquest of the empire.[258] If he did enter fully into
this plot, it was as fortunate for him that the undertaking failed as it
was for the Bulgarians in 1912 that their columns did not pierce the
lines of Ottoman defence at Tchataldja. For the disaster that follows a
too extended and too rapid subjugation of unassimilated masses is as
sudden as it is irreparable. Durable empire-building is governed by a
law of homogeneity.
The Osmanlis were still a race of limited numbers, and at the beginning
of their existence as a nation. The process of assimilating the racial
elements in conquered territories, begun by Osman when he first left the
village of Sugut, could not be arrested; for the existence of the
Ottoman state depended upon its continuance. The Greek of Bithynia had
lived with Turk and Moslem for two centuries, and had found him a good
neighbour. There was neither racial antipathy nor abhorrence of the
religion of Mohammed to overcome. Nor had there been the hatred and
dread of the conquered on the one side and the arrogance of the
conqueror on the other. The Anatolian Greeks had been accustomed for
generations to the economic and political conditions that finally caused
the majority of them to cast their fortunes with the rising star of the
Osmanlis.
The problem of assimilating the Christians, who formed the total
population of the Balkan peninsula, was a new one. Here were huge and
compact masses of Christians, who had come suddenly under the yoke of
the Osmanlis in the first two years of Murad’s reign. They did not know
their new masters. They did not know Islam. Benevolent assimilation by
voluntary conversion seemed no longer possible. A radical change in the
attitude of the Osmanlis towards the question of religion was demanded.
Wholesale massacre was impracticable, for the Osmanlis had no reserve of
colonists to call upon to replace the indigenous elements. Their
position was still too precarious to allow them to draw freely from
their adherents in the corner of Asia Minor under their dominion. To win
the Macedonians and Thracians by forcible conversion was not feasible.
It required the expenditure of all his military resources for Murad to
hold what he had conquered. He could not add police duty to his already
superhuman burden. Even had he thought of this method of conversion, he
would have been deterred by the nightmare of a crusade.
Murad and his counsellors solved the problem of assimilation by
sanctioning the reduction of captives to slavery, and by creating the
corps of janissaries.
A law was promulgated which gave to the Osmanli soldier absolute right
to the possession of prisoners, unless they consented to profess and
practise Islam. Prisoners were regarded as booty. They could be kept for
domestic or agricultural labour, or sold in the open market, subject to
the government’s equity of one in five. The disgrace, even more than the
hardships, of slavery was so keenly felt by the Greeks[259] that many
for whom there was no other way preferred a change of religion to loss
of freedom. The right to make slaves of prisoners was efficacious in
providing wives and concubines for the conquerors, who were practically
without women of their own. The widows of the fallen, and the daughters
of Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgarians, became the instruments of
increasing the Ottoman race. In the hundred years from Murad I to
Mohammed II, the Osmanlis became in blood the most cosmopolitan and
vigorous race the world had known since the days of the Greeks and
Romans. Greek, Turkish, Serbian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Armenian,
Wallachian, Hungarian, German, Italian, Russian, Tartar, Mongol,
Circassian, Georgian, Persian, Syrian, and Arabian--this was the
ancestry of the Osmanlis who, under Soleiman the Magnificent, made the
whole world tremble. In richness of blood the only parallel to the
Osmanlis in modern times is the present population of the United States
and Canada.
But this indirect method of conversion as an alternative to slavery did
not immediately increase the masculine element among the Osmanlis. In a
city taken by assault the more virile portion of the male population was
killed off, and those who remained were able to buy life and freedom.
Male slaves were an embarrassment to the ever-moving armies of Murad.
Ransom money was welcomed by the captors. In many cities the inhabitants
surrendered without a struggle, and were secured in their freedom by the
terms of capitulation. In rural districts the threat of slavery was
little felt. The Osmanlis had neither time nor strength to put out the
drag-net. Everywhere in the Balkans refuge in the mountains is easy.
Then, too, the loss of cultivators would have made the highly prized
timarets worthless, and would have caused a famine in foodstuffs or a
diminution of taxes on harvests. Another means of bringing pressure to
bear upon the Christians had to be devised.
The famous corps of the janissaries was, according to the Ottoman
historians, a creation of Orkhan.[260] As a bodyguard of slaves, cut
off from their families and educated and trained to serve nearest the
person of the sovereign, the janissaries may have originated with
Orkhan. If so, it was but the adoption of the idea already put into
practice by the sovereigns of Egypt in the organization of the
Mamelukes.[261] But as an agency of forcible conversion by the
incorporation of Christian youths in the Ottoman army, there is no
evidence of its existence before Murad. In fact, historians are agreed
that the janissaries were recruited only from the Christian population
in Europe.[262] So Orkhan could hardly have conceived this scheme. The
problem of which it was a solution did not arise until after Orkhan’s
death.
That the corps of the janissaries was an agency for forcible conversion,
and was not created in order to increase the strength and efficiency of
the Ottoman army, is proved by the records we have of the number of
janissaries in the early days of Ottoman history. Murad and Bayezid are
represented as having a thousand or less janissaries. In the confusion
of the ten years of civil strife among the sons of Bayezid, the
janissaries played no part. There were only twelve hundred janissaries
in the time of Mohammed the Conqueror,[263] and twelve thousand when the
Ottoman Empire was at its zenith under Soleiman the Magnificent.[264]
But Mahmud II counted one hundred and forty thousand in his army.[265]
These figures show that this most celebrated of Ottoman military
organizations did not become a powerful factor until the period of
decadence. The janissaries were not, as has been commonly represented,
the principal element of the Osmanlis’ fighting strength in the wars of
conquest of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Their great rôle in
Ottoman history was that of maintainers and defenders of conquests
already made. In organizing the janissaries, Murad was certainly
influenced by the desire of forming a bodyguard on whose loyalty and
devotion he could rely implicitly. But his principal purpose was to
emasculate the Christian elements in Macedonia and Thrace, which were
too fanatical or too ignorant to see of their own accord that
self-interest should lead them to renounce their nationality and their
religion.
Murad’s law of drafting (_devchurmé_) provided that in each conquered
district in Europe the privilege of exemption from military service
through the payment of the capitation tax (_kharadj_) should be denied
to Christian youths. The Osmanlis reserved the right to select at
discretion Christian boys, who were taken from home and kindred and
brought up in the Mohammedan religion. They were trained for service as
the Sultan’s bodyguard. They depended directly upon the sovereign, who
paid them according to a definite scale. Their insignia were the pot and
the spoon, and their officers received names which symbolized the
functions of the camp kitchen.[266]
One is compelled to dissent from the consensus of opinion of European
historians on the organization of the janissaries. Their scathing
criticisms are best summed up in the words of a French historian: ‘It is
the most fearful tribute of human flesh that has ever been levied by
victors upon the vanquished.... It justifies the execration of which the
Osmanlis have been the object on the part of Europeans during centuries.
Let us add that, by this strange mode of recruiting, the Osmanlis have
found, at the same time, the means of taking away from the Christian
populations their most virile element, and of doubling their troops
without putting arms into the hands of the conquered.’[267]
The actual number of janissaries under arms refutes the latter part of
this criticism, when it is applied to any one of the Ottoman sovereigns
of the period of conquest. As for putting arms into the hands of the
conquered, we shall see that both Murad and Bayezid availed themselves
of the services in war of their Christian subjects, led by their own
princes. The tearing away of boys from their homes, and the loss of
their Christian heritage, is a shock to humanitarian and religious
sensibilities. But we must judge the Osmanlis of Murad and Bayezid by
the Christians of their own century. When we compare the methods of
conquest of the Osmanlis with those of the Spaniards against the Moors,
of the English against the French and Scotch, of the Italians against
each other, we must concede that Murad devised a humane, clever, and
highly successful scheme in the institution of the janissaries.
The ignorant Balkan peasantry--especially the Slavic elements--prized
their sons far more highly than their daughters. Recruiting for the army
was a greater blow to them than recruiting for the harem. It was the
strong, sturdy son who was chosen. This touched the pocket-book as well
as the heart-strings. The Anatolian Greek, especially of the cities,
had been deterred from becoming a Moslem more by a lack of eagerness to
assume military obligations than by a zeal for his ancestral faith. The
Macedonian Greek, the Bulgarian, and the Serbian regarded the bearing of
arms as a natural obligation. Fighting was a part of living. Better the
faith of Mohammed, then, than the loss of the son’s help with the
harvest. That there were wholesale conversions to Islam as a result of
the threat to apply the law of _devchurmé_ is a logical inference from
the fact that Murad never mustered more than a thousand janissaries.
III
The Byzantine Empire did not recover, even temporarily, from the effect
of Murad’s first campaign in Europe. The fall of Demotika and
Adrianople, followed so closely by that of Philippopolis, removed within
eighteen months the last hope of retrieving the fortunes of the empire.
There were still many places remaining to the Byzantines in Thrace. But
the surrender of the fortresses in the valleys of the Ergene and the
Maritza had destroyed the military prestige of the Byzantines, and
foreshadowed the speedy subjugation of the whole country. The loss of
the revenues of Thrace and of the great plain south of the main Balkan
range reduced the imperial treasury to dependence upon the port duties
and city taxes of Salonika and Constantinople. For ninety years the
shadow of the empire remained. But whatever power, whatever influence
was left to the successors of Constantine, it was rather in western
Europe than in the Balkan peninsula. The impress of one thousand and
thirty years of continuous existence from the renaming of old Byzantium
to the fall of Adrianople was too deep to vanish in a few years. The
decay had been going on for centuries. The final extinction would of
necessity take several generations.
The complete abasement of the Byzantines is revealed in the treaty that
John V Palacologos was compelled to conclude with Murad shortly after
the capture of Philippopolis. In the fall of 1362 or the spring of 1363,
John bound himself to refrain from any attempt to win back what he had
lost in Thrace, either by a separate attack or by joining the Serbians
or other enemies of the Osmanlis. In addition he promised to aid Murad
against his Anatolian enemies, the Turkish emirs.[268]
After this treaty was signed, Murad withdrew to Brusa in order to
provide for the organization of the new possessions that had come to him
by a successful expedition against Angora. His letters, written at this
time to announce to his Anatolian neighbours and to the Moslem princes
of Asia the victories in Thrace, show clearly that he did not yet feel
himself strong enough to assume the position of overlord to the other
great emirs of Asia Minor. While he was in Brusa, in the spring of 1363,
an event happened which led Murad to make the momentous decision that
shaped the destinies of the Ottoman Empire. The first coalition against
the Osmanlis was formed in Europe.
IV
After the fall of Philippopolis, the Greek commandant had succeeded in
escaping, and took refuge with Kral Urosh V of Serbia.[269] He pointed
out to Urosh most eloquently the paucity of numbers of the Osmanlis,
their insecure position, and the danger that would overwhelm the
Serbians if they waited until the Osmanlis were firmly grounded in
Thrace. Urged by Pope Urban V, the princes of Wallachia and Bosnia,
together with King Louis of Hungary, joined the Serbians in upper
Macedonia. Under the guidance of the Greek refugee, they started on a
swift march to win back Adrianople. It was an expedition undertaken as
a crusade. The allies mustered at least twenty thousand.
Lalashahin had hardly more than twelve thousand men under his command,
and a portion of these were scattered in the captured cities. Murad, who
had started to return to Thrace as soon as he had heard the news, was
detained by the necessity of capturing a fortress on the Sea of Marmora,
near Cyzicus, which was in the hands of a turbulent band of
second-generation Catalans, whom he feared to leave behind him.[270]
They were suspected of plotting with his southern rivals to organize a
movement against his Anatolian possessions.
If the Greeks had had the power or the will to co-operate with the
crusaders, the Ottoman domination in Thrace would have ended even more
suddenly than it had begun. But they made no move. In fact, one of the
Byzantine historians charges John Palaeologos with aiding the
Osmanlis![271] Lalashahin was able to draw from the garrisons of the
recently occupied cities, and to send forward to meet the crusaders some
ten thousand men under Hadji Ilbeki. It was the intention of Lalashahin
to have this army act wholly on the defensive. If only Hadji Ilbeki
could prevent their passing the Maritza, they would be turned southward
towards Enos. By that time he felt sure that he could rely upon one of
three things happening: dissensions would arise among the crusaders, the
Greeks would be alarmed by the Serbian approach to Enos and the sea and
attack the crusaders, or Murad would have time to bring his army across
the Dardanelles. The one purpose of Lalashahin was to prevent the
invasion of Thrace and the investment of Adrianople.
But Hadji Ilbeki did better than keep the crusaders from crossing the
river. They had already crossed, and had celebrated the unopposed
passage of the Maritza by an evening of feasting. Hadji Ilbeki surprised
them as they were sleeping in a drunken stupor.[272] Without hesitation
he fell upon them like a Gideon. Seized with panic, the crusaders were
driven back into the river. Those who escaped massacre and drowning fled
precipitately. There was no attempt to rally. In the little town of
Mariazell, on the northern frontier of Styria near the foot of the
Semmering Alps, there stands a votive church built by Louis out of
gratitude to the Virgin for having saved him from death in this
battle.[273]
Lalashahin, instead of rewarding the daring of his lieutenant, which had
saved the Osmanlis from an irreparable disaster, was consumed with
jealous fury. His only thought when he received the news was that Hadji
Ilbeki had robbed him of the glory of so great a victory. He had his too
successful subordinate poisoned.[274]
The sudden and complete collapse of the first crusade organized against
the Osmanlis did not give to Murad any false sense of security. He saw
in the successful meeting of this danger, which had threatened to
destroy him, not the opportunity for exultation and for the relaxation
of effort, but the spur for straining still further every nerve to learn
and profit by the lesson. The battle of the Maritza was a warning to
Murad. The danger would be renewed, and renewed soon. It was now for him
to make the choice between remaining an Asiatic emir and becoming a
European sovereign, between endeavouring to impose first his authority
on the other emirs of Asia Minor and the conquest of the Balkan
peninsula. Were the Osmanlis to be on the offensive in Europe or in
Asia?
Murad decided to build his empire in the Balkan peninsula. It was not
that he coveted less the mountains and valleys of Asia Minor. It was not
that his ambitions failed to extend to the Taurus. But he had the vision
to realize that the Ottoman race could not subjugate the Turkish
elements in Asia Minor by a gradual assimilation of those elements
alone. The race had to grow, as it began, by the incorporation of the
various Christian elements, which alone possessed the finesse, the
knowledge of government, the organizing capacity necessary to cope with
the problems of facing Europe and inheriting the Byzantine Empire. From
Europe, Asia Minor and more could be conquered: from Asia, no portion of
Europe could be conquered.
The Osmanlis do not possess written records of the reign of Murad. There
is no source to which we can go to read what Murad thought or what
others of his day thought or said that he thought. But we know his mind
from his actions. There is no cause for doubt on this point. After the
first campaign in Thrace, Murad had returned to Brusa, and dated his
letters from there. He began to plan an aggressive campaign against his
neighbours. But after the battle of the Maritza, he abandoned Brusa for
Demotika, and three years later, in 1366, Adrianople became the first
real capital of the Ottoman Empire.
In spite of all that has been written about the unique position of Brusa
in Ottoman history, it is no more to the Osmanlis than is Saint-Denis to
the French or Winchester to the English. The Osmanlis have never really
been at home in Constantinople. Historically and architecturally
speaking, they have been under the shadow of a greater past.
Adrianople, although always a city of importance since the days of
Hadrian, reached its greatest splendour and glory under the Ottoman
sultans. Here were planned, and from here started, the expeditions
westward and eastward, which increased in strength, in efficiency, and
in inspiring terror as the circle gradually widened, until the star and
crescent appeared under the walls of Vienna and Cairo, on the shores of
Italy and in the heart of Persia. No student of Ottoman annals can fail
to support the contention of the Sublime Porte after the last Balkan
war, that Adrianople is to the Osmanlis their sacred city. From
Lalashahin to Shukri pasha, the proudest and most precious memories of
the Osmanlis are in Adrianople, whose great mosque, still awe-inspiring
and altogether admirable in its decay, is typical both of what has been
and what is.
The decision of Murad was accepted by his successors. Even after the
capture of Constantinople, many an Ottoman sultan felt more at home in
Adrianople than in the imperial city. For more than a century the
Osmanlis directed their energies almost exclusively to European
conquests. Whatever they accomplished in Asia was the indirect result of
their stupendous successes in Europe. From first to last, the extension
of Ottoman sovereignty over the Moslems of Asia was by means of a
soldiery gathered and war-hardened in Europe, themselves Christian or of
Christian ancestry, in whose veins ran the blood of Greek and Roman, of
Goth and Hun, of Albanian and Slav.
V
In 1365, Murad received from the outside world the first acknowledgement
of his commanding position as heir apparent of the Byzantine Empire. It
was an overture from the flourishing republic of Ragusa, on the
Dalmatian coast, for a treaty guaranteeing freedom of trade in the
Ottoman dominions to the merchants of Ragusa. In return for
unrestricted commercial privileges, the republic offered to pay a large
sum annually, which the givers called a grant, but which was invariably
accepted by the recipients as tribute.[275] However it may have been at
the beginning, the grant soon became tribute, for after some years the
existence of Ragusa depended upon purchasing the benevolence of the
Ottoman sultans. As the helplessness of the Ragusans increased, the
tribute became larger. If we except the convention between the Genoese
and Orkhan, of whose provisions and character we know nothing, the
Ragusan commercial treaty is the first of the long series of treaties by
which European cities and nations purchased the right to trade in the
Ottoman Empire and to sail the high seas. Since in most cases the
Osmanlis pledged themselves to nothing except to refrain from robbing
merchants or from preventing their trading, the gifts exacted were
nothing less than blackmail. After the sea-power of the Osmanlis had
been broken, the Barbary corsairs inherited the privileges of this
system which had been started in so small a way by the Ragusans.
Murad could not write. When the treaty with Ragusa was brought for his
signature, he put his hand in the ink and made the impression of his
fingers upon the paper. This is the origin of the _tughra_, which has
ever since been the official signature of the house of Osman.[276]
VI
When Murad was settling himself in Adrianople, and laying plans for the
conquest of Macedonia and Bulgaria, he was menaced by a new crusade.
Despite its futile ending, or better, for that very reason, the
expedition of Amadeo of Savoy in 1366 commands our attention. For it
furnishes, as does the expedition of Admiral Boucicaut from Genoa in
1399, a striking illustration of how easily the growing Ottoman power
might have been crushed by a resolute body of crusaders with a single
aim, and of how impossible it was to secure that oneness of purpose,
owing to the ingrained animosity of the East and West, of the Greek and
Catholic Churches.
In 1361, when Lorenzo Celsi was elevated to the dogeship of Venice, the
Senate had made overtures to John Palaeologos for an alliance against
Murad.[277] This plan was frustrated by the successes of the Osmanlis in
Thrace. The Venetians held back, and allowed John to suffer the
humiliation of signing the treaty that made him a vassal of Murad. In
the crusade that ended in the disaster of the Maritza, the Venetian
participation was half-hearted, and it proved valueless. The Venetians
were not even on hand to prevent Murad from crossing the Dardanelles. In
fact, there is every reason to believe that they now began to look upon
the Osmanlis as a valuable tool in checkmating the ambition of Louis of
Hungary to inherit the shortlived empire of Stephen Dushan.[278]
When he saw that Murad had come into Thrace to stay, and that there was
no hope from the Venetians, John Palaeologos turned to the Hungarians.
He made a secret visit to Buda to enlist the aid of Louis, and made the
usual promise that the Byzantines would return to the Roman fold.[279]
On his return he passed through the principality of Sisman, who had just
inherited the lower portion of Bulgaria. Sisman, either at the
suggestion of Andronicus Palaeologos, who wanted to succeed his father,
or in the hope of winning favour with Murad, detained the emperor in
the fortress of Nicopolis on the Danube.[280]
Amadeo VI of Savoy was one of the princes who had taken the cross from
Pope Urban V at Avignon on Holy Friday, 1363, for the crusade that never
materialized. The receipt of a letter from Louis of Hungary, informing
him of the imprisonment of his cousin (John’s mother was a princess of
Savoy), and pointing out the rapid spread of Ottoman power, caused
Amadeo to yield to the Pope’s continued and urgent solicitations.[281]
With some fifteen hundred soldiers, he embarked for the East on fifteen
galleys. After a stop at Negropont and Mitylene to get reinforcements,
Amadeo entered the Hellespont, and captured Gallipoli without
difficulty. The Osmanlis fled by night, abandoning the fortress.[282]
But the Savoyards made no attempt to follow up this victory, or even to
keep Gallipoli. Instead of attacking the infidels, they sailed into the
Black Sea, and started a vigorous campaign against the Bulgarians.
Sozopolis and Burgas were captured, and several other important
fortresses to the north. The bravery of the crusaders was rivalled only
by their cruelty. Their bloodlust made such an impression upon the
Bulgarians that they wanted nothing to do with Franks bearing the cross.
When the Savoyards laid siege to Varna, Sisman gave up his prisoner to
save the city.
John Palaeologos was borne back triumphantly to Constantinople. But
friction soon arose. When Amadeo urged upon his kinsman the necessity
of paying the price of his rescue and of the continued support of the
crusaders by fulfilling his promise to return to the Roman Church, he
met with stubborn refusal on the part of emperor and patriarch alike. In
wild rage, Amadeo withdrew to Pera, and began to fight the Greeks by sea
and land. The Constantinopolitans were so frightened that ‘they did not
dare to show their head out of doors’. Pressed on all sides by Osmanli
and Bulgarian, as well as by his deliverers, the wretched John saw no
other way out than to promise openly to abjure his errors and swear
allegiance to the Pope.
Having wrung this promise from those whom he had come to defend, Amadeo
sailed away to Rome, where he reported to the Pope in full consistory
‘how at his request the emperor of Constantinople and his people desired
to submit to the obedience and belief of the Holy Roman Church in hope
that the Church would aid them against the infidels who were too
strongly oppressing them’.
Urban and the cardinals listened without great interest to the Count of
Savoy’s recital of his success in preparing the ground for a reunion of
the churches. The story was getting to be an old one. John’s overture
was received with suspicion. Urban had got the same promise in the
spring of 1366 in a letter from Louis, which reported the interview John
had sought at Buda.[283] To the envoy of Louis, who had arrived in
Avignon just as Urban was starting for Rome, the Pope gave a letter
commanding the King of Hungary to put off his crusade until the union of
the churches was actually accomplished.[284]
VII
What lay behind the eagerness of Urban, at the beginning of his reign,
to revive the crusades? Was he burning with holy zeal to recover the
sepulchre of Christ from the hands of the Moslems? Was his heart set on
protecting Cyprus and Rhodes? Had he determined to leave no stone
unturned to protect the Byzantines and other eastern Christians from the
encroachment and persecution of Murad? His letters indicate that his
chief interest was the recovery of the lost power and glory of the
papacy. There is the same revelation in the letters of his immediate
successor, Gregory XI. These two popes had no catholic vision. They
tried to keep their position as arbiters between France and England and
Spain at Avignon, and at the same time to inherit the temporal power of
the decaying Holy Roman Empire by circumventing the Visconti of Milan.
The great schism in the Western Church, which so aided Murad and Bayezid
in laying solidly the foundations of an empire in Europe, was the
outcome of the short-sighted and purely selfish policy of these two
popes. How far from the truth it is to represent them as courageously,
whole-heartedly, and persistently endeavouring to awaken the interest
and attention of Europe in the peril from the East!
The fall of Adrianople and of Philippopolis should have been a warning
to Urban. He read in it, however, not a glorious opportunity to
demonstrate the solidarity of Christendom by driving the Moslems out of
Europe and rescuing fellow Christians from apostasy, slavery, and death,
but an occasion to force the schismatic Greeks to return to the Roman
communion. Of the popes of the fourteenth century, Urban had the
greatest chance to prove himself a worthy champion of Christ and
civilization. For it was during his reign that the Osmanlis began their
conquests and their proselytizing in Europe. At the beginning they could
easily have been checked. But it never occurred to Urban that there was
a common interest of Christendom higher than and outside of the Roman
Church.
The fault lay not wholly with Urban and with Gregory. They reflected the
spirit of their age. But it does no credit to their personal character
nor to the high position which they held to say that they were the
victims, rather than the masters, of the prevailing bigotry and
ignorance of their generation. In the fourteenth century, the West had
already begun to try to impose its commerce, its customs, its laws, and
its religion upon the East. There was not, nor has there ever been
since, a sympathetic ‘give and take’ between Occident and Orient. In a
mint, if the coin when stamped does not correspond exactly to the mould,
it is rejected. Similarly the West, when it tries to put every eastern
people through its mould and finds no exact correspondence, rejects.
Hence, on the one side, the scorn of the ‘I am better than thou’: on the
other side, a hatred born not only of fear and of conviction of
inferiority, but of a sense of injustice which is none the less vital
from a knowledge that the wrong is not, and will not be, righted.
Amadeo of Savoy, uncivilized, fanatical through ignorance, the fertile
breeding-ground of fanaticism, true and unchanged descendant of the
Fourth Crusaders, was a prophetic figure at Constantinople in 1366. He
represented the only possible type of deliverer for Byzantium. But
deliverance on his terms the Greeks would not accept. Death or Islam
were preferable. And who can blame them? Two years before Amadeo’s
expedition, the Greeks of Crete had risen in rebellion against their
Venetian overlords because an attempt had been made to impose upon them
the Latin faith and rites.[285] When they were hunted down and massacred
for refusing to worship after the western fashion, not only Pope Urban,
but also Petrarch, wrote to the Doge congratulating him upon his valiant
and successful efforts to save the Church of Christ in Crete![286]
In a letter to Pope Urban, Petrarch spoke with approval of the policy of
using the Ottoman menace to stamp out the Eastern heresy. ‘The Osmanlis
are merely enemies,’ he wrote, ‘but the schismatic Greeks are worse than
enemies. The Osmanlis hate us less, for they fear us less. The Greeks,
however, both fear and hate us with all their soul.’[287] These words of
Petrarch epitomize the feeling between the Eastern and Western Churches
during his own day, and, if what one can see with his own eyes in
Jerusalem and elsewhere is a fair example, up to the twentieth
century.[288]
If the European nations regarded the adherents of the Orthodox Church
(the term Greek in its religious sense must be taken to include all the
Balkan races) as ‘worse than enemies’, that is, than the Osmanlis, it is
equally true that the Osmanlis found from 1350 to 1500 that the hatred
of the Balkan races for the Latin Church was their most potent ally, not
only in the actual conquest, but in reconciling the conquered to their
fate. One does not want to detract from the genius of the early Ottoman
sovereigns and from the reputation for superb fighting ability so
honestly won by the Ottoman armies. But it must not be forgotten that
each separate race in the Balkans preferred the rule of the Osmanlis to
that of their neighbours, and that the one point in which the Balkan
races were of the same mind was that Ottoman domination was preferable
to that of the Hungarians and the Italians. For every crusade was a
scheme for religious propaganda and territorial aggrandizement, in just
the same spirit as in modern times the nations of Europe have exploited
the misery of Ottoman Christians for the purpose of securing
concessions.
In spite of the fact that John Palaeologos was informed by the Patriarch
Philotheus that a mixed council of clergy and government officials,
presided over by the empress, had been held in June 1376, and had
decided against the reunion of the churches,[289] John persisted in his
negotiations with the Pope. Urban did all that he could to facilitate
the visit of the Byzantine emperor to Rome.[290] But at the same time he
was writing to the Venetians and to the Dalmatian cities to protect the
Catholics of Cattaro against the Serbian and Albanian heretics,[291] and
was encouraging Louis in his suicidal campaign against the Bulgarians.
In 1369, John Palaeologos left the government of Constantinople to his
elder son Andronicus, and set out for Rome, where, on October
eighteenth, he made his profession of faith in the presence of four
cardinals, and confirmed it by a golden bull. The next morning, at St.
Peter’s, he formally abjured the errors of the Orthodox Church before
the high altar, with his hands in those of the Pope.[292] The Pope
accepted him as a ‘son of the Church’, promised that he should be
relieved of the Turk, and gave him letters earnestly recommending his
cause to the princes of Christendom.[293]
Urban V was quick to use the prestige which he believed the adhesion of
John Palaeologos had given him. He announced broadcast the happy
consummation of his efforts, stating that the Byzantine emperor had done
homage to the Vicar of Christ in St. Peter’s.[294] But letters sent
during the same winter to the Greek clergy, urging them to accept the
action of their emperor,[295] and other letters from his secret
correspondence of this year, indicate how little faith he had in the
Emperor’s sincerity or ability to fulfil his promises. Was the
abjuration in St. Peter’s a farce, in which Emperor and Pope allowed
themselves to trifle with holy things, each for the sake of his
immediate advantage?
John had hoped that his adhesion to the Roman Church would bring to him
grants of money, ships, and men from the Latin princes, and that an army
would rally around him to fight the Osmanlis. But not only did he return
from France ‘with empty hands’, but he was detained at Venice because of
debts owing to merchants. In vain he begged Andronicus to send the money
for his release. The son who had four years before been charged with
being party to his father’s imprisonment in Bulgaria was no more filial
at this humiliating crisis. He answered that there was no money in the
treasury, and that he could get nothing from the clergy. But his younger
son, Manuel, brought from Salonika the ransom.[296]
John Palaeologos returned to his capital poorer than when he left. He
brought no help from Europe, and he had bound himself publicly by oath
to an obligation which he had known he could not fulfil. He had broken
faith with Murad, who during these years had been growing more and more
powerful. There was nothing for him to do but to make himself tributary
to Murad in order that he might enjoy ‘up to the end of his life’ his
last possessions in peace.[297] Three years later, in 1373, when his
ambassador John Lascaris failed in a second attempt to get aid from the
Western princes,[298] the Byzantine emperor recognized Murad as his
suzerain, promised to do military service in person in Murad’s army, and
gave to him his son Manuel as hostage.[299]
Urban died a few months after John’s visit to Rome. Gregory XI, who
succeeded him in December 1370, had little hope of carrying on further
negotiations with the Eastern Church; for the Greek ecclesiastics were
stubborn in their determination to maintain the absolute independence of
the patriarchate. The Genoese and Venetians were fighting bitterly in
Cyprus. In 1371, Gregory made a strong appeal to France, England,
Venice, and Flanders to co-operate with Genoa in saving the last
Christians of the Holy Land.[300] There was no response.
That Gregory realized clearly the peril to Christendom in the advance of
Murad’s armies is shown in two remarkable letters written to Louis of
Hungary in May and November 1372. His words were prophetic. He urged
Louis to resist the Osmanlis before they advanced farther into Europe.
They had already entered Serbia. He trembled to think what would happen
if they pushed through Albania and secured a port on the Adriatic.
Unless Louis entered without delay into an alliance with his Christian
neighbours, how could he protect his own kingdom and all Christendom
from the Mohammedan peril.[301] Seconding this warning to the King of
Hungary, the Pope commanded the Hungarian and Slavic archbishops to
preach the crusade in Hungary, Poland, and the Dalmatian cities.
Everywhere special boxes were placed in the churches for collecting
funds. A tithe was levied on the monasteries and abbeys of Hungary and
Dalmatia. Louis, with five of his most powerful nobles, took the cross,
and swore to the Pope that he would put an army in the field within a
year.[302] Louis asked Venice for triremes, but when the Venetians found
that he intended them to be a donation for ‘the common cause’, they
found that they could not build them.[303] Padua declined an invitation
to guarantee the cost of construction. The Hungarians did not fulfil
their promises. In fact, there is no evidence that they made any effort
to acquit themselves of their oath.
When John Palaeologos made a last desperate appeal to the Pope, before
he entered into his third and final compact with Murad, Gregory, in
receiving the imperial envoy, burst into tears, and promised that he
would save Constantinople, if only the Byzantine emperor would cause his
people to renounce their heresies and return to the Roman Church. In
1375, he wrote once more to Louis to inform him that Constantinople was
in danger of capture from Murad.[304] Letters in the same year to Edward
of England pictured the Ottoman advance and the peril of Christendom,
urged a general war against the Osmanlis, and asked for a subsidy to
provide galleys ‘to prevent the crossing into Europe of more Turks,
because Constantinople is in imminent danger’.[305] The letters of
Gregory XI to the Christian princes prove conclusively that the full
import of Murad’s early successes was understood by the Pope and was
impressed upon both secular and ecclesiastical authorities throughout
Europe.
But both John and Gregory lost heart. Neither was able to fulfil the
compact made in Rome. Gregory could not unite Christendom to relieve the
Byzantines. John could not persuade the Byzantines to renounce, as he
had done, the ‘Greek heresies’. So, as we have seen, he became Murad’s
vassal.[306] The Pope, involved in the quarrel of Emperor Charles IV and
the Duke of Bavaria with the Marquis of Brandenburg, and anxious over
the outcome, for the papacy, of the continual unrest in the Italian
cities, returned from Avignon to Rome in 1378. He died a few months
later.[307] The struggle arising from the election of Gregory’s
successor gave birth to the ‘Great Schism’. This left Murad a free hand
in subjugating the Balkan peninsula.
VIII
The sources of information for the movements from the outside for the
relief of the Balkan Christians, and for the religious and political
quarrels of the Byzantines, are so numerous and so detailed that one is
embarrassed by too much material. Many interesting facts cannot even be
mentioned. But when we come to the beginning of the Ottoman conquest in
Europe under Murad and Bayezid, we find ourselves in the midst of what
an eminent Slavic historian has called ‘the most obscure and difficult
period of South-Slavic history’.[308] The chroniclers, whether they be
Slavic, Rumanian, or Ottoman, are so contradictory and so lacking in
explicit statement that we cannot speak with certainty of the sequence
of events. The Byzantine chroniclers, verbose to the point of weariness
in detailing petty and trifling quarrels and happenings, are almost
silent concerning the momentous events that marked the ruin of their
empire. It is difficult to unravel the twisted skeins, and find a thread
to carry the story of the conquest from 1366 to 1389. When it is
impossible to choose between contradictory records, the geography of the
field of action, with which one can gain a first-hand knowledge, must
be the final factor in determining the sequence of conquest between the
adoption of Adrianople by Murad as his capital and the downfall of the
Serbians at Kossova.
The occupation of Adrianople and Philippopolis was as severe a blow to
the Bulgarians as to the Byzantines. In spite of the fact, however, that
Greek and Bulgarian had a common interest in driving the Osmanli from
Thrace, or at the very least in checking his advance, there was no move
made at this time for an alliance. On the contrary, even when the
Osmanlis were engaged in the Thracian campaign, war arose between John V
and Alexander. The Byzantines captured Anchiale, and tried desperately
to take Mesembria by assault.[309] The Greek patriarch wrote to Czar
Alexander, reminding him of the sacredness of harmony and the necessity
of accord at that critical moment, but the letter was not backed by the
good faith and good will of the Byzantine emperor. Neither John nor
Alexander attempted to give assistance to the Serbian and Hungarian
crusade that ended so disastrously on the banks of the Maritza.
The conquest of Bulgaria up to the main Balkan range imposed itself upon
Murad as a corollary to the Ottoman dominion in Thrace, and the
undisturbed possession of Adrianople and Philippopolis. For the
Bulgarians, through centuries of varying fortunes, had grown accustomed
to fighting for the right to live in Thrace. Often had they been beaten
back to the Balkans, and as often pressed forward again to the Ergene.
To win and lose Adrianople and other Thracian cities was old history
with them. They always came back. Between 1362 and 1365, Murad had
experience with Bulgarian persistence and tenacity of purpose. They were
masters again of Kirk Kilisse, Midia, Bunar Hissar, and Viza when Murad
made his change of capital from Brusa to Adrianople. Yamboli had been
strongly fortified by Alexander. Bulgaria seemed as formidable and as
forbidding to Murad’s dream of empire as the emirates of Asia Minor.
Fortune again favoured the Osmanlis. Czar Alexander died in 1365,[310]
leaving three heirs. To John Sisman fell middle and southern Bulgaria
from the Danube to the Rhodope Mountains and the Bulgarian pretensions
in Thrace. Old Tirnovo was his capital. Stracimir inherited western
Bulgaria, with Widin for capital, and the Bulgarian pretensions to the
valley of the Vardar and western Macedonia. (The Bulgarian remnant of
eastern Macedonia was in the hands of an independent Bulgarian prince,
Constantine, whose stronghold was Kustendil.) Dobrotich became master of
the Dobrudja and the upper Black Sea coast, where Bulgarian, Cuman and
Alan lived together with hardly any distinguishing characteristics.
The division of Bulgaria, at the moment when union was essential, proved
fatal. The sons of Alexander never joined to face the common danger. So
marked was the division of Alexander’s kingdom that thirty years after
the conquest the conquered territories were known as ‘the three
Bulgarias’.[311]
Stracimir, jealous because Sisman seemed to have received the lion’s
share of Alexander’s inheritance, did not hesitate to make overtures to
Murad, offering to co-operate with the Osmanlis against his brother and
to share the portion of Sisman with them.[312] Before any agreement
could be made, however, Stracimir found himself face to face with a
terrible danger in the west, which soon caused him to forget both Sisman
and Murad. Louis of Hungary had interpreted his crusader’s commission
as an authorization to ‘make war against the heretics’. It was a pretext
to get possession of Widin, which was essential to his ambitious project
of adding Serbia to his kingdom. He attacked the Bulgarians on the
ground that they were enemies of the Church and must be forced to
acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. Widin was captured and Stracimir
imprisoned.[313] Stracimir’s dominions were flooded with Franciscan
missionaries, who were backed by a brutal soldiery in their
proselytizing efforts.[314] Two hundred thousand Bulgarians abjured the
orthodox heresy, and were re-baptized in the Latin rite. This forcible
conversion, which was purely a political matter, was as objectionable to
the Bulgarians as to the Cretans. They hated ‘with a perfect hatred’ the
Franciscans whom Pope Urban had sent, and the cause for which they
stood.
At the first opportunity, the Bulgarians of the west called in Sisman
and Vadislav of Wallachia. The Hungarians were driven out of Widin and
the Franciscans in the city massacred.[315] Louis was powerful enough to
wreak terrible vengeance. In 1370, Widin fell once more into his hands.
The Bulgarians of the western Balkans were subjected to such a
relentless persecution that they welcomed the Moslem conquest to secure
freedom of worship. Urban had incited Louis to this war, and had
congratulated him upon his laudable zeal in converting the
heretics.[316]
We have already spoken of the punishment that came to Sisman as a result
of the detention of John Palaeologos. The Italian crusaders on the Black
Sea coast were as powerful an aid to Murad’s empire-building as were the
Hungarian crusaders on the western frontier. The successors of Louis
reaped the bitter fruits of his insane policy. Louis and Amadeo of Savoy
contributed in no little measure to make possible the conquests of
Murad. When Amadeo withdrew from Bulgaria, he left the cities he had
captured to the Greeks. Sisman was compelled to expend his energy in
recapturing them. But Murad had already anticipated him in the important
fortress of Sozopolis, which commanded the entrance to the port of
Burgas.[317]
Shortly after the Ottoman occupation of Sozopolis, the Bulgarians were
everywhere dispossessed in Thrace, and the capture of Yamboli[318]
forced Sisman to follow the example of John Palaeologos. He became a
vassal of Murad. His sister Mara entered Murad’s harem, but with the
stipulation that she be allowed to retain her Christian faith.
Murad gladly gave his new ally and brother-in-law a strong Ottoman army
to co-operate in the attack upon the Hungarians. The Osmanlis helped in
driving Louis out of Widin. Sisman, like Cantacuzenos, first guided the
Osmanlis through the heart of his country. It was under the leadership
of Sisman that they saw the Danube, their river of destiny. When Sisman,
even with the help of the Osmanlis and Wallachians, could not gain
possession of Stracimir’s inheritance, he returned to Tirnovo. There he
learned that Lalashahin was planning an expedition westward, which
seemed to be intended against Sofia.
Sisman now realized that his position was critical and that the fate of
Bulgaria was at stake. In the early spring of 1371, he hurried into the
Rilo Mountains and sent out an appeal to the Serbian kral who was at
that time ruling in eastern Macedonia. Then he went to the relief of
Ishtiman, which was already menaced by the Osmanlis. Failing in this
effort, Sisman fell back to Samakov, where he was joined by the
Serbians. Lalashahin led his army from Ishtiman into the valley of the
Isker. The two krals joined battle with him in the plain of Samakov.
The Ottoman victory was decisive.[319] The Serbians and Bulgarians fled
into the recesses of Musalla, the highest mountain in the Balkan
peninsula, and of Popova Shapka. Sisman disappeared after the
battle.[320] The way to Sofia was open. All Bulgaria lay at the feet of
the conqueror. It is from the battle of Samakov that we must date the
destruction of an independent Bulgaria.
But Murad was not yet ready to follow up this decisive victory. The only
immediate result of the battle of Samakov was the submission of
Constantine, Bulgarian prince of Kustendil, in the upper valley of the
Struma. After the fall of Samakov, his position was untenable.
Constantine hurried to Murad’s camp, and did homage to the conqueror.
Murad gave back to him as vassal his principality.[321] With the wisdom
that marked every successive step of his progress in Europe, Murad
refrained from advancing beyond Samakov. He ordered Lalashahin to lead
the army into Macedonia, and to join Evrenos in the advance towards the
Vardar.
IX
The dramatic death of Stephen Dushan, in 1355, just as he was starting
upon the expedition against Constantinople for which his whole life had
been a preparation, is recorded in the previous chapter. Stephen’s son
was so unfit to inherit the aspirations and carry on the work of his
father that he was called in derision by his people Nejaki, the
weakling.[322] The nobles and generals of Stephen Nejaki ignored him.
Each man seized what territory he could hold and defend against his
neighbour. There was anarchy in Macedonia and Serbia. The dissolution of
Stephen Dushan’s conquests resulted in a bloody and destructive civil
war between cities and factions.[323] The dowager Czarina managed to
preserve a semblance of prestige, if not of authority, at Serres. But
the ‘empire’ was no more. As local rulers, Serbians stayed in the
principal cities of Macedonia. There was undoubtedly a Serbian element
in the village population. Many villagers, however, who acknowledged the
overlordship of Stephen’s warriors and other Serbian nobles, did not
know then, _any more than they know now_, to what race they themselves
belonged. This has always been the Macedonian problem.
The defeat of the crusaders on the banks of the Maritza in 1363 had been
a defensive battle on the part of the Osmanlis. There was no attempt to
invade Macedonia. While Murad was occupied in the subjugation of Thrace
and of southern Bulgaria, several efforts were made by the Byzantines to
come to an understanding with the Serbians. In 1364, the patriarch
Callixtus went to Serres to see Stephen’s widow, who had retired to a
convent. His purpose was to form an alliance. Soon after reaching
Serres, Callixtus succumbed to the hardships of the journey.[324] His
effort came to nothing. That Stephen’s son still held to the pretensions
of his father and had no intention of treating with the Byzantines, is
demonstrated by a bull, dated from Pristina in 1365, in which he calls
himself ‘emperor of the Servians and of the Greeks’.[325]
Stephen Urosh, the ‘weakling’, died in 1367.[326] Uglesa, who usurped
the kralship of Serres and shared the ‘empire’ of Stephen Dushan with
his brothers and fellow adventurers, Vukasin and Goiko,[327] sent an
embassy to the patriarch Philotheos declaring that he would annul the
bull of 1352, by which Dushan had created an autocephalous Serbian
Church,[328] and would cause all the Serbians to return to the Orthodox
allegiance.[329] After three years of negotiation, precious time wasted
with trifling formalities, the reconciliation and union of the Serbian
and Greek Churches was effected.[330] But, if we are to believe the
authorities of Orbini, Uglesa, while he was negotiating with the Greeks
of Constantinople, had levied tribute upon the Greeks of Salonika, and
would have made himself master of Salonika, had not his untimely death
prevented the consummation of the great Serbian dream.[331]
At the time of the reconciliation with the Orthodox Church, Uglesa had
completed a plan of united action with his two brothers to oppose the
Ottoman invasion of Macedonia.[332] Uglesa had been informed that a
great army was gathered in Adrianople, which awaited the return of Murad
from Bulgaria to commence its march. Four weeks after the negotiations
with the Byzantines had been successfully concluded, in the early summer
of 1371, the Serbian army reached the Maritza at Cernomen,[333] between
Adrianople and Svilen.[334] This battle has been confused with the
earlier battle of 1363, and it is impossible to separate the accounts of
the two actions.[335] The Osmanlis were again victorious. Uglesa and
Goiko were drowned in the Maritza. Vukasin escaped from the field of
battle only to be killed by his servant for the gold chain he wore
around his neck.[336]
The battle of Cernomen lost Macedonia to the Serbians. The three princes
were killed. Most of the Serbian adventurers who had been the companions
of Stephen Dushan, and who had profited by his Macedonian conquests,
disappeared. The Osmanlis had no opposition in penetrating to the valley
of the Vardar.
The monk Isaias of Serres has left a graphic contemporary picture of the
Ottoman invasion of Macedonia. ‘Like the birds of Heaven, the
Ishmaelites spread themselves over the land, and never ceased murdering
the inhabitants or carrying them off into slavery. The country was empty
of men, of cattle, and of the fruits of the fields. There was no prince
or leader: there was no redeemer or saviour among the people. All faded
away before the fear of the Ishmaelites, and even the brave hearts of
heroic men were transformed into weak hearts of women. Rightly were the
dead envied by the living.’[337]
The invasion of Macedonia in 1371-2 was as rapid and decisive a campaign
as the invasion of Thrace had been ten years before. Kavalla, Drama and
Serres were occupied by Khaïreddin and Evrenos.[338] Drama and Serres
were colonized, their churches converted into mosques, and they soon
became the residence of the owners of the timarets granted in eastern
Macedonia. These two cities have always been the strongholds of the
Mohammedan element in Macedonia, and the residence of the great Moslem
landowners. The cities and villages in the valleys of the Mesta and the
Struma acknowledged Murad as sovereign, and submitted without resistance
to Ottoman laws and Ottoman taxation.[339] Where-ever it was safe to do
so, Murad seized the lands, and appointed Ottoman governors. In
districts where pacification would have proved a difficult task, he
allowed Serbian chiefs to rule as his vassals.
With the same impetuosity that had carried them to the foothills of the
Rhodope Mountains after the capture of Adrianople, the Osmanlis crossed
the Vardar in 1372, and pushed their arms into Old Serbia, Albania,
Bosnia, and even to the mountains of Dalmatia, from which they could see
the Adriatic.[340] Other adventurous bands, eager to attract the
attention, the commendation, and the rewards of Murad, followed the
footsteps of the Catalans, traversed Thessaly, and appeared in the
plains of Attica.[341]
Murad destroyed the Macedonian empire of Stephen Dushan without great
effort. The Serbians remaining east of the Vardar, nobles and peasants,
became Ottoman subjects. In upper Serbia, they rallied round one of
their number, Lazar Gresljanovitch, whom they formally elected as
successor of the Serbian kings. But Lazar was so weak that he did not
take the title of emperor (_tzar_) or of king (_kral_), but called
himself merely prince (_knez_).[342] To secure the existence of his
kingdom or principality, he sought peace with Murad, and, following the
example of the Byzantine and Bulgarian rulers, became vassal and
tributary of the Ottoman emir.[343]
X
Before the end of the year 1372, it was recognized that the Osmanlis had
come into the Balkans to stay. The conquest of Macedonia east of the
Vardar, following so closely upon the subjugation of southern Bulgaria
and the completion of the Thracian conquest, gave to Murad a
preponderant position in the Balkan peninsula. The Byzantine emperor and
the Bulgarian and Serbian princes were his tributaries. Wallachia,
Bosnia, Albania, Epirus, Thessaly, Attica and the Peloponnesus were now
on the confines of the Ottoman Empire, and menaced by Ottoman invasion.
In Europe, Murad was credited with having the intention of invading
Hungary. It was reported that he had made an alliance with the Tartars
of Russia to attack Hungary. The Tartars were to cross the Carpathians
by way of Moldavia into Transylvania, while Murad was to work his way up
the valley of the Danube.[344] Murad may have dreamed of such a project,
just as he had thought of making a supreme effort to enter
Constantinople after his first Thracian campaign. But, if he did, he was
deterred by the same well-grounded fear of moving too fast. Ten years
before he had refrained from committing a fatal error. He would continue
to make haste slowly. The early Osmanlis were not raiders. They were
empire-builders. They succeeded because they never forgot that their
greatest problem was that of assimilation. When they extended their
conquests beyond the area of possible assimilation, the period of decay
automatically commenced.
The decade following the Macedonian campaign of 1371-2 was spent in
ottomanizing southern Bulgaria and eastern Macedonia, in completing the
assimilation of Thrace, in reorganizing the army, and in a rearrangement
of the system of distributing the timarets or military fiefs. Royal
domains were created, and lands were set aside for the support of the
mosques and other religious institutions in the form of inalienable
endowments (_vakufs_).
The only move of Murad against the Hungarians was to send five thousand
archers, upon the request of the Senate, to help the Venetians in their
war against Louis.[345]
After the Macedonian campaign, Murad turned his attention once more to
Byzantium. John, when he returned from his unsuccessful trip to Rome,
placated Murad by sending his third son, Theodore, to serve in the
Ottoman army. In 1373, John, passing over Andronicus, raised Manuel to
the imperial purple as co-emperor. The disloyalty of his eldest son in
the question of the emperor’s ransom from his Venetian creditors made it
natural that John should have selected Manuel to rule with him.
John was not wrong in his estimate of the character of Andronicus. The
disappointed prince entered into a conspiracy with Saoudji, son of
Murad, who had been entrusted with the command of the Thracian army
while his father was occupied in Anatolia. John and Manuel, according to
some accounts, were also in the field with Murad. So the moment was
propitious. The two sons raised the standard of revolt against their
fathers.[346] Murad, who hated his own son and feared him, crossed
immediately into Thrace. The army which was supporting the cause of the
young princes abandoned them, and the rebels fled to shut themselves up
in Demotika.[347]
Faced with starvation, the inhabitants of Demotika opened the gates of
their city to Murad. He exacted a most atrocious vengeance. The garrison
were bound hand and foot and thrown into the river. The young Osmanlis
and Greeks who had been led astray by the princes, were put to death.
Wherever possible Murad compelled fathers to act as executioners of
their sons. He set the example by tearing out Saoudji’s eyes, and then
cutting off his head.[348]
It has been generally written that Murad intended that the same
punishment should be meted out to Andronicus. For the sake of
appearances, he did order John Palaeologos to have his son’s eyes put
out. But there was no order for execution. John Palaeologos consented to
the blinding of Andronicus and of his grandson and namesake, who was
only five years old.[349] The operation was not successfully performed.
Both Andronicus and his son, even if temporarily blinded, recovered
their eyesight. Some have explained this by stating that they were
healed by a Genoese physician.[350] There is recorded a beautiful story
that Andronicus owed the restoration of his sight to the empress, his
mother, who visited him daily in the tower of Anemas and was prodigal in
her efforts to heal him. He was in despair for some months, until one
day he saw a lizard climbing on a wall.[351]
If Murad had really desired the death or total blindness of Andronicus,
he could easily have secured this result. While punishing his own son,
however, he saw to it that Andronicus escaped the consequences of the
same crime. Here we have a revelation of the far-sightedness and
cold-bloodedness of Murad. He killed his own son, because he feared his
rivalry. He spared the son of John Palaeologos in order to perpetuate
the rivalry between the emperor and his son. To have killed or
incapacitated Andronicus would have been from his view-point an act of
folly rather than of justice; for Andronicus, brilliant, adventurous,
magnetic, was at the same time a worthy exemplar of the name he bore, a
name that stood for the acme of unscrupulous conduct and contempt for
ties of blood. Murad had only to wait, and history would repeat itself.
Internal dissensions in the family of the Palaeologi had made the
fortunes of Orkhan. Murad had no intention of getting rid of Andronicus,
in whom he saw the means of still further enmeshing the Byzantine
emperors.[352]
The Byzantine historians record for the year 1374 another event, which
illustrates the power of Murad over John Palaeologos. Manuel, who had
resumed the government of Salonika, tried to induce the inhabitants of
Serres to recover their liberty by massacring the Ottoman garrison and
the Ottoman colonists. Serres, in spite of its prominent place in recent
Serbian history, was regarded by the Byzantines (as it still is by the
Greeks of to-day) as a city of their compatriots. We have no means of
establishing the grounds upon which Manuel believed it possible to
restore the Byzantine authority in the country between the Struma and
the Vardar. The sequel indicates that it was a wild and unfounded hope
of a desperate man, and shows how thoroughly in two years the Osmanlis
had become masters of the situation in Macedonia.
Murad, warned in time of the project, sent Khaïreddin pasha with a large
army to Serres. The Greeks implicated in the plot were promptly
executed, and Khaïreddin moved against Salonika. At the approach of the
army, Manuel fled by sea to Constantinople. John Palaeologos was so
frightened that he did not dare to receive in the imperial city the
beloved son whom he had raised to the dignity of co-emperorship. Manuel
then went to Lesbos, whose Genoese lord was his uncle by marriage. But
the fear of Murad had reached the Aegaean Sea. The fugitive was turned
away. Staking all upon the issue, Manuel went to Brusa and threw himself
at Murad’s feet. The time was not yet ripe to destroy the Palaeologi.
Murad pardoned Manuel, and sent him back to Constantinople. It was only
after Manuel had presented a letter from Murad, confirming the fact that
forgiveness had been granted, that the emperor of Byzantium dared to
receive his son and heir within the walls of Constantinople.[353]
Pressed by the Venetians, John made in 1375 the mistake of giving them,
in exchange for three thousand ducats and the jewels which had been
pledged for his debts after the visit to Rome, the island of
Tenedos.[354] The strategic importance of Tenedos was so vital that the
Genoese could not allow this island to fall into the hands of their
rivals. It is an axiom as old as history that who holds Tenedos controls
the entrance and exit to the Dardanelles. Until the Black Sea dries up
and the wheat-fields of Russia fail to yield, there will be a ‘question
of the Straits’.
The news of this grant to Venice meant but one thing to the Genoese.
There was feverish activity at Genoa. A fleet was manned, ostensibly for
the purpose of maintaining the Levant colonies against the Turks.[355]
Pope Gregory XI allowed the archbishop of Genoa to raise enormous sums
by questionable means for equipping and increasing the fleet.[356]
Instead of using this fleet to free the Aegaean and the Black Sea from
the ever-increasing Turkish pirates, or to attack the Osmanlis, the
Genoese admiral sailed to Constantinople. Aided by the Genoese of Galata
and by Bayezid, Andronicus had escaped from the tower of Anemas. When
the fleet arrived from Genoa, he gave to its admiral a golden bull,
awarding Tenedos to Genoa.[357] To Murad he offered his sister in
exchange for help.[358] The old story was repeated. After a month’s
siege, Andronicus, by the aid of his Ottoman and Genoese supporters,
entered Constantinople. His father and his two brothers, Manuel and
Theodore, were imprisoned in the Tower of Anemas, where he and his son
had been shut up for two years.[359] The foresight of Murad in regard to
Andronicus was justified.
While Andronicus was besieging Constantinople, John V managed to send
word to the inhabitants of Tenedos to resist the Genoese and give
themselves to the Venetians. If this were not possible, they were to
abandon the island to the Turks rather than allow the Genoese to occupy
it.[360]
After a year’s imprisonment, the emperor, through the wife of his
jailer, succeeded in perfecting with Venetians residing in
Constantinople a plan of escape. But its execution was deferred when
John discovered that his sons, who were confined to separate rooms,
could not be included in the rescue. Later, the efforts of the Venetians
were renewed upon the solemn promise that Tenedos should revert to
Venice. The plot was discovered. The Venetians, availing themselves of
the lucky chance that a Venetian fleet had just arrived in the Golden
Horn from the Black Sea, fled from Constantinople, abandoning John
Palaeologos to his fate.[361] Andronicus IV was solemnly crowned in St.
Sophia sole emperor of Byzantium.
After two more years of imprisonment,[362] John and his sons succeeded
in escaping in June 1379. They got across the Bosphorus, and took refuge
with Bayezid, who was again watching the course of events at Scutari.
Murad, still playing the game of pitting father against son, drove a
hard bargain. Andronicus must be pardoned once more, and given the
government of several cities, probably including Salonika.[363] John and
Manuel, as a price for freedom and restoration to the imperial throne,
agreed to pay an annual tribute of thirty thousand pieces of gold,
furnish a contingent of twelve thousand soldiers to the Ottoman army,
and surrender to the Osmanlis Philadelphia, the last Byzantine
possession in Asia.[364] When the Philadelphians refused to assent to
this shameful transaction, John and Manuel joined the Ottoman army and
fought against their last Christian subjects in Asia to force upon them
the Moslem yoke.[365]
Thus did Murad hold to the lips of John Palaeologos the cup of
humiliation, nay, more, of degradation, until he drained the last bitter
dregs. We do not need to pass judgement upon John and Manuel. It is
sufficient to say that they drank and did not die!
The question of Tenedos brought Venice and Genoa into their most bitter
conflict of the century. The Visconti of Milan were allied to the
Venetians, while the Hungarians attacked them by land.[366] After
initial successes, the great Venetian admiral Pisani was beaten
decisively in 1379. The Genoese captured Chioggia, and held Venice at
bay in her own lagoons. It was the timely arrival of Charles Zeno and
the fleet from the Levant that saved the Adriatic republic.[367] In
1381, peace was made through the intermediary of Count Amadeo of Savoy,
on condition that the Senate surrendered Tenedos to Amadeo, who
guaranteed to demolish the fortress within two years. It was also a
stipulation of the treaty of Turin that Andronicus IV be recognized as
heir to John V.[368] Did the influence of Murad reach as far as the
peace negotiations in the capital of far-off Savoy? The Count of Savoy
fulfilled his promise. In 1383, the fortifications of Tenedos were
rased, and the inhabitants of the island removed to Crete and
Negropont.[369]
The war over Tenedos had kept open the Straits, but it helped Murad in
an inestimable degree to tighten the grip of the Osmanlis upon Thrace
and Macedonia. The Italian republics thought no more of driving the
Osmanlis out of Europe. From now on until they themselves see their
possessions wrested from them and their commerce in the Levant ruined by
the successors of Murad, the Venetians and Genoese are suitors for
favours at the door of the tent of the Moslem conqueror.
XI
While the struggle between the Palaeologi and the Venetian war with
Genoa and Hungary were strengthening Murad’s position in Europe, he
began to turn his attention, for the first time since the expedition
against Angora at the beginning of his reign, to the expansion of
Ottoman authority in Asia Minor. The antipathy of the South Slavs for
the Hungarians, the anarchy among the Serbians, the lack of leadership
among the Bulgarians, and the civil strife in the Byzantine imperial
family made the period from 1376 to 1381 peculiarly appropriate for
initiating a movement against the emirates on the confines of his own
state. Murad felt for the moment secure in Macedonia and Thrace. The
inhabitants of the conquered countries could do nothing. There were no
prospects of a crusade. Through the rapid increase of the Ottoman race
during the first fifteen years in Europe, and through the vassalage of
the Christian princes, which compelled them to furnish contingents for
war, Murad now had money and soldiers to confront his nearer Anatolian
rivals.
In 1360, after the capture of Angora and the defeat of the Galatian
village chiefs,[370] Murad did not lose his head. He was wise enough to
fear an attack on Kermian. Now he had only to threaten, thanks to the
prestige and actual power he had gained in Europe. The emir of Kermian
was too prudent to risk a war with the son of the rival whom he had
despised. In order to preserve his independence and at the same time his
pride, he agreed to give his daughter in marriage to Bayezid. The
territories which Murad coveted, and was ready to try to take by force,
went with her as her marriage portion. It was a munificent dot. The
western and northern part of Kermian became Ottoman. The most important
city in the new territory was Kutayia, the ancient Cotýaeum, a strategic
point of great value. Its remarkable citadel of countless towers is
still standing.
The marriage of the emir of Kermian’s daughter to Bayezid was celebrated
at Brusa with much splendour. For the first time we hear of the Osmanlis
interested in matters of court and luxury. The simple warriors, who had
known nothing but the village council and the camp fire, were becoming
accustomed to the more formal and more complex life of the Greek cities.
With every victory and every extension of sovereignty, with every
addition to the army and to the body of civilian officials, the distance
between the sovereign and his people was widened. The ceremonial evolved
by the Ottoman court was that of Byzantium; the customs of the higher
classes, who were just beginning to realize their self-made rank, were
Byzantine, even to the veiling of women.[371] The Osmanlis had not yet
come into touch with the Arabs or Egyptians. If they received anything
from the Persians, it was by way of Constantinople.
The Ottoman occupation of Kutayia was a grave blow to the security of
the emirates of Tekke and Hamid. The emir of Hamid saw the hopelessness
of a struggle. He compounded with his pride by ‘selling’ to Murad, in
1377, the territory between Tekke, Kermian, and Karamania. Several
cities, including Sparta and Kara-Agatch, became Ottoman, but most
important of all, Ak Sheïr, which brought the Osmanlis to the frontier
of Karamania.
The purchase of this important territory extended the Ottoman state
south to the border of Tekke. In 1378, Murad made his only conquest by
arms from a rival emir in Asia. He invaded Tekke, and annexed the
districts at the south and south-west of the lake region. But he did not
cross the mountains to the Mediterranean, so the emir of Tekke still
retained Adalia, and Alaya was undisturbed.
For three years Murad devoted his energies to the pacification and
assimilation of these slices of Kermian, Hamid and Tekke. But none of
the three principalities had been extinguished. And Sarukhan, Aïdin and
Menteshe were untouched. There was still much to be accomplished in
western Asia Minor. But Murad preferred to return to Adrianople. He
would increase his power and prestige in Europe, recruit his armies in
the Balkans, and then come once more into Anatolia.
XII
To assure to the Osmanlis their preponderant position in the Balkan
peninsula, the possession of three cities was necessary. The capture of
Sofia meant the extension of Ottoman sovereignty over Bulgaria to the
Danube. Nish was the key to Serbia. Monastir was indispensable, if the
Osmanlis intended to be more than raiders west of the Vardar.
In 1380, Murad ordered the advance to the Vardar. Istip was captured,
and colonized in the same thorough way as had been done at Drama and
Serres. A large army under Timurtash crossed the Vardar, took Monastir
by assault through the marshes, and pushed north to Prilep.[372]
Monastir and Prilep became frontier fortresses of the empire. The
conquest of Macedonia was now complete. These cities were excellent
bases of operation against the Albanians to the west and the Epirotes to
the south-west.
During the reign of Murad, the Osmanlis did not attempt a subjugation
of Albania and Epirus. They were, however, invited into these countries
by native princes.
Thomas, despot of Janina, used Ottoman mercenaries against the Souliotes
in 1382.[373] Two years later, after the assassination of Thomas, the
Albanians besieged Janina with Ottoman aid.[374] The civil war that
arose around the widow of Thomas prepared the way for the Osmanlis to
extend their rule to the Gulf of Arta.
In 1385, Khaïreddin pasha, who had occupied Okrida, the ancient
ecclesiastical seat of the Bulgarians, a day’s journey west of Monastir,
was invited by Charles Thopia, lord of Durazzo, to aid him in his war
against Balsa, the most powerful Frankish prince of Albania. Khaïreddin
was glad of the opportunity afforded by this overture. He crossed the
mountains to Elbasan, and then turned southward to meet Balsa. The first
battle of the Osmanlis in Albania was fought in the salt-wastes of
Savra, on the left bank of the river Devol. The Osmanlis faced fighting
men who were fully their equals in courage, in resourcefulness, in
strength, and in willingness to engage in a hand-to-hand struggle to
death. The issue was long in doubt, and the victory costly. Balsa and
his ally and guest, Ivanitch, son of krai Vukasin, were killed.[375] The
Osmanlis gained one important result from this battle. Albanian
renegades joined their army in great numbers.[376] From that day to this
the Albanian element in the Ottoman army, especially among its officers,
has been a source of strength which cannot be over-estimated.
It is doubtful if the Osmanlis withdrew from Albania, even temporarily,
after the battle of Savra; for in 1388 the princess of Valona (Avlona)
was so hard pressed by the Osmanlis that she put her domains under the
protection of Venice.[377]
In northern Albania, the invaders captured Croia and Scutari in 1386.
Scutari was given back by Murad in exchange for the addition of a member
of the ruling family of Zenta to his harem. From Croia, also, the
Osmanlis withdrew. Murad did not want to excite and alarm Venice at the
moment when Philippe de Mézières was preaching so vigorously and
successfully a new crusade.[378]
The plain in which four tributaries join the Isker is the very heart of
the Balkan peninsula, almost equidistant from the Adriatic, the Aegaean,
and the Black Sea. Here the three great ranges of the West Balkan, the
Central Balkan, and the Rhodope Mountains converge, and three important
rivers find their source. The Struma flows south through Macedonia, the
Isker north-east through a canyon of the Balkans into the Danube, and
the Nisava north-west into the Morava. In the middle of the southern
border of this plain, under the shadow of a lofty mountain, lies Sofia.
The way to Sofia had been opened by the battle of Samakov. But its
occupation was not the next logical step to Murad until the valleys of
the Vardar and the Struma had been conquered. The occupation of Sofia
was a temptation splendidly resisted in 1371. In 1381 it was a
necessity. For it opened the path to trans-Balkan Bulgaria and to
Serbia, and Murad was now ready to extend his conquest to the Danube by
way of the Isker and the Morava.
The Slavic chronicles are silent concerning the fall of Sofia. From the
late Ottoman accounts, it would seem that the city was intermittently
besieged for several years. Then a young Osmanli, who had entered the
city as refugee, and had become the confidant and falconer of its
commandant, betrayed him. He urged his master in a chase some distance
in front of his followers, and fell upon him in a mountain gorge. The
commandant was bound to his horse, and taken a prisoner to Ishtiman.
Indje Balaban, son of the general of Osman who had besieged Brusa for
ten years, brought his army from Philippopolis, and paraded the
commandant, garrotted, under the walls of Sofia. The Bulgarians,
discouraged and despairing of aid, surrendered.[379] We can be certain
neither of the name of the Bulgarian commandant nor of the date of the
surrender. But it was probably in 1385.[380] Bulgaria up to the main
Balkan range was now Ottoman territory.
The fall of Nish, in the summer of 1386, marked the next extension of
Murad’s empire.[381] The Serbians did not yield without a struggle, as
the Bulgarians had done. Nish was taken by assault. Lazar secured peace
only by increasing the amount of his tribute and adding one thousand
cavaliers to his contingent in the Ottoman army.[382]
Nish was sixteen days by carriage from Constantinople. Murad was now
master of four-fifths of the great Roman highway from Belgrade to the
Bosphorus; for Tchorlu, Demotika, Adrianople, Philippopolis, Ishtiman,
Sofia, and Nish were in his hands. Nish was also the point where the
road from Belgrade to Salonika turned southward. Practically all but the
last day’s journey of the road across the Balkan peninsula from
Constantinople to Durazzo on the Adriatic was Ottoman territory. In Asia
Minor, Murad held the ancient highway from Constantinople to Trebizond
as far as Angora, and the road which the pilgrims and Crusaders,
Jerusalem-bent, had travelled as far as Ak Sheïr. From Angora to Nish
took twenty-five days; from Constantinople to Durazzo seventeen
days.[383] Twenty-five years before, when Murad came to the
chieftainship of the Osmanlis, the Ottoman dominions could have been
traversed in any direction in three days.
XIII
The treaty concluded between the Byzantines and Genoese in 1386 affords
a striking illustration of Murad’s power after the Nish campaign. This
treaty, whose text has been preserved, was signed by John and Andronicus
Palaeologos, the podesta of Pera, and the Genoese ambassador. John
Palaeologos bound himself to live in peace with his son Andronicus, and
to move his army against all the enemies of Genoa ‘except Morat bey and
his Turks’. The Genoese in turn promised to defend Constantinople
‘against all enemies of whatever nationality except the said Morat bey
and his Turks, who acted according to the will of the said Morat bey’!
Throughout the treaty, Murad is carefully excepted on both sides.[384]
Genoa made a formal treaty with Murad in 1385. Favours were granted to
the Osmanlis who did business in Pera, in return for liberty to Genoese
merchants to reside and conduct business in the states of Murad. The
treaty recalls the friendship of the Genoese for Orkhan, and speaks of
Murad as ‘the magnificent and powerful lord of lords, Moratibei, grand
admiral[385] and lord of the admirals of Turchie’.[386] But in the very
next year Genoa secretly joined an offensive league with Cyprus, Scio
(Chios) and Mytilene ‘against that Turk, son of unrighteousness and
evil, and also of the Holy Cross Morat bey, and his sect, who are
attempting so grievously to attack the Christian race’.[387]
In the first year of Murad’s reign, the Venetian energy had become so
sapped by prosperity and luxury that the Senate passed a sumptuary
law.[388] The recent triumph over Genoa had given them a belief in
their invincibility. Their self-sufficiency, and the growing
disinclination to lay aside the pen and ledger for the sword and shield,
were alarming symptoms of decay. The lesson of the Genoese at Chioggia
was needed to teach the Venetians that the struggle for existence never
ceases.
In spite of their vital interest in the development of the Levant, and
the power that their wealth gave them in a generation when fighting
strength could be purchased so easily, Venice made no effort to oppose
the progress of Ottoman conquest. On the contrary, in 1368, long before
an invasion of Albania was imminent, the Senate negotiated with the
Osmanlis for the reddition of Scutari. This project was again taken up
in 1384, in a tentative way, during negotiations to fix the
customs-duties of Venetian merchant-vessels.[389] Following the example
of Ragusa and Genoa, Venice concluded, in 1388, a commercial treaty with
Murad.[390]
The traffic of the Italian republics with the Moslems had been denounced
by Gregory X in 1272, by Boniface VIII in 1299, by Urban V in 1366, and
by Gregory XI in 1372.[391] In vain the popes exhorted; in vain they
threatened interdict and excommunication; in vain they held up to
execration the abominable slave traffic. Trade interests alone decided
the policies of the maritime cities. Their citizens never hesitated to
cut each other’s throats for the opportunity of selling goods. To them
the crusades were a purely commercial proposition. More than once the
archives of Venice reveal the approval of the Senate upon the action of
merchants who warned Moslem princes of the crusaders’ intentions.
Guillaume d’Adam declared with reason that the Saracens maintained their
supremacy in the Holy Land and Egypt through the support of the traders,
who furnished them with Christian slaves to keep up their armies.[392]
Genoa passed laws in 1315 and in 1340 against the slave traffic of the
Black Sea,[393] but these laws were never enforced.[394]
Venice and Genoa turned a deaf ear to papal remonstrances and to papal
appeals for aid in crusades against the Osmanlis. For the sake of
preserving their commerce, they flattered Murad, and aided him,
indirectly at least, to subjugate the Christians of the Levant. Their
children of the third and fourth generation paid to the descendants of
Murad the penalty of their greed. They lost their commerce in trying to
save it.
XIV
It was not until 1387 that Murad believed himself strong enough to
measure arms with Karamania. His son-in-law, Alaeddin, whose name is
reminiscent of the earlier glory of Konia, was emir of the most powerful
state in Anatolia. The Ottoman historians have represented Alaeddin’s
resistance of the encroachment of the Osmanlis, and his defiance of
Murad, as rebellion, and have been blindly followed in this by most of
the European historians. Such a conception of the conflict between the
Osmanlis and the Karamanlis is far from the truth. There is no record of
when and how Karamania had become subject to Murad. In fact, up to 1387,
Murad had not yet extended his sovereignty over all of Tekke and Hamid,
the states which bordered Karamania on the west.
Neither Alaeddin himself nor his predecessors had ever acknowledged the
suzerainty of the house of Osman. From the standpoint of the
Karamanians, the Ottoman emir was not even _primus inter pares_ of the
Turkish princes in Anatolia. Osman had probably not been known by name
to the founder of the house of Karaman. Orkhan never came into direct
contact with the Karamanlis. Murad, at the beginning of his reign, had
indirectly gained an advantage over the emir of Karaman in the
successful issue of his expedition against the Phrygian chiefs and the
capture of Angora. Fifteen years later his accessions of territory in
Kermian, Hamid, and Tekke brought him into rivalry with Alaeddin. But it
was the prestige and power gained by Murad in European conquests that
made him a rival to be reckoned with. The first acknowledgement of his
growing strength was the marriage alliance between the houses of these
two emirs. Alaeddin, however, did not by this marriage constitute
himself a vassal of his father-in-law. The letters of Murad to Alaeddin
in the collection of Feridun are couched in terms of equality.
Murad rallied his army at Kutayia for the first great Ottoman campaign
in Asia. He could not muster enough Osmanlis to undertake so formidable
a feat as the invasion of Karamania, and had to rely upon large
contingents of Greeks and Serbians, who were sent to him, in accordance
with their conventions, by his vassals, the emperor John and the kral
Lazar.[395] The Balkan soldiers, under the command of Bayezid, formed
the left wing of the Ottoman army.
Battle was joined in the great plain before Konia, which has so often
been the scene of Ottoman triumphs and reverses. The Ottoman historians
declare that Alaeddin was defeated, largely through the bravery of
Timurtash, and represent the battle of Konia as a decisive victory,
which ‘put down the rebellion’. According to them, Alaeddin ‘sued for
peace’. Murad ‘forgave’ him, because he was moved by the tearful
pleadings of his daughter, Alaeddin’s wife.[396]
But the net result of the costly expedition was the reconciliation of
the two emirs. The only result recorded by the Ottoman historians is
that Alaeddin kissed Murad’s hands! Murad withdrew to Kutayia without
annexing any portion of the Karamanian emirate, without booty, and
without promise either of tribute or military contingents for the
European wars. Had Murad actually accomplished more than merely holding
his own in the battle of Konia, the campaign would not have ended so
profitlessly. Granting the Ottoman victory, Murad’s conduct after the
battle is inconsistent with his whole life and character. We are
compelled to discard the story of a decisive victory. It must be that
Murad, who had been able to reduce to vassalage the Byzantines, the
Bulgarians, and the Serbians, found himself unable, even with the help
of his European allies, to break the power of this rival Anatolian emir.
XV
During the Karamanian campaign, Murad adopted the policy of treating
non-combatants in a friendly fashion. Strict orders were given to
refrain from violence and looting. Murad hoped to win the Karamanlis by
kindness, and to pave the way for a later assimilation. It was the first
campaign undertaken against fellow Moslems. The Serbian contingent, who
cared nothing for the success of this policy, and who claimed that they
had been promised booty in return for their services, did not obey the
order. A number of them were summarily executed.[397]
When the survivors returned to their homes in the spring of 1388, they
complained bitterly of the way they had been treated, and declared that
service in the Ottoman army, for the Christian all risk and no gain, was
nothing less than a slavery leading to death. This discontent gave Lazar
the opportunity for which he had long been looking. He decided to profit
by the resentment of the Serbians against Murad,[398] and make a supreme
effort to free Serbia from the menace of the Ottoman yoke, which had
grown very real since the capture of Nish.
The Slavs of upper Serbia and of Bosnia realized the imminence of an
Ottoman invasion, and they were now ready--or at least they appeared to
be ready--to rally around Lazar. Up to this time the Serbians had never
recognized Lazar as the leader of the race.
The pan-Serbian alliance was made possible by the adhesion of Tvrtko,
kral of Bosnia. He had come into prominence after the battle of Cernomen
as a supporter of Lazar against the sons of Vukasin and other Serbian
chieftains who were dissatisfied with the election of Lazar. But in
return for his aid, he got under his control a large part of upper
Serbia, including Milesevo, which was the burial-place of St. Sava,
apostle to the Serbians. In 1376, he crowned himself ‘king of Bosnia and
Serbia’ on the tomb of St. Sava, placing upon his head the two crowns,
and changing his name to Stephen. Neither Louis of Hungary nor Lazar was
consulted by Tvrtko, and he took no measures to secure their assent to
his pretensions. After his coronation, he conquered Cattaro, and fought
successfully with Balza of Albania.[399]
In 1383 Tvrtko had become so powerful on the Dalmatian coast that the
Senate recognized him as ‘king of Serbia, Bosnia and the Riviera’, and
bestowed upon him the privilege of Venetian citizenship.[400] It was
evidently the intention of Venice to favour Tvrtko as an opponent to
Louis of Hungary, who had himself taken in 1382 the title of ‘king of
Serbia, Dalmatia and Bulgaria’.[401] Venice lost her grip upon or
interest in the east coast of the Adriatic for a few years immediately
following the treaty of Turin. We have already seen how in 1384 the
Senate professed a willingness to treat with the Osmanlis on the basis
of giving up Scutari. In 1385 they became indifferent to currying
further the favour of Tvrtko, and sent an embassy to press him for the
payment of money due to Venice.[402] Tvrtko continued to consolidate his
position on the Dalmatian coast, until the capture of Nish influenced
him to aid Lazar against the Osmanlis.
It was not a moment too soon. An Ottoman army had already crossed the
Vardar and was marching forward for the invasion of Bosnia. Thirty
thousand Serbians and Bosnians under the command of Tvrtko and Lazar met
the invading army at Plochnik, in the valley of the Toplika. Of twenty
thousand Osmanlis scarcely one-fifth escaped death or captivity.[403]
The Bosnians successfully opposed two other Ottoman armies at Rudnik and
Biletchia.[404]
A delirium of joy spread through the Slavic population of the Balkans at
the news of the battle of Plochnik. The uninterrupted chain of thirty
years of Ottoman victories had been broken. The slavery and horror of
military service with the Osmanlis, price of their vassalage, so vividly
depicted by the survivors of the Karamanian campaign, had made the Slavs
desperate. This victory, following closely upon the moral revolt against
the Osmanlis, gave them hope. The South Slavs are like children in the
extremes of their emotions. Tears to laughter--laughter to tears: easily
despairing, as easily hopeful, and from as little cause. The slightest
reverse brings distrust in their ability to cope with forces that have
once successfully opposed them. Slight success brings overwhelming
confidence, and leads to colossal mistakes of judgement. With this trait
of character is coupled an intuitive distrust of one’s neighbour, of the
disinterestedness of his motives, and an intuitive resentment of ‘the
other fellow’ doing something better than you do it. This makes
impossible solidarity and _esprit de corps_. The South Slavic character
explains the series of events which brought the Serbians to their final
and irretrievable disaster.
Around Lazar the Serbian nobles rallied as they had never rallied
before. Kral Tvrtko of Bosnia, George Kastriota of Albania, and the
minor princes of Albania and Serbia joined in an alliance against the
Osmanlis. The two remaining successors of Alexander of Bulgaria, Sisman
and Ivanko, son of Dobrotich, threw off their allegiance to Murad, and
promised contingents for the common struggle. The prince of Wallachia
assured Lazar of the co-operation of the Rumanians.
Venice, fearing lest Murad fall upon the Peloponnesus to seek vengeance
for the defeat of Plochnik, tried to form a league of all the Greek and
Frankish lords in the Morea and central Greece.[405] As far as one can
judge from the records, the effort of Venice was an intention rather
than an action. It did not get beyond the paper stage. The Senate gave
to the Slavic alliance no encouragement more substantial than words. On
the other hand, some of the border nobles of the Hungarian banats, of
their own volition, informed Lazar of their intention to co-operate in
an offensive movement against the Osmanlis.
XVI
Murad did not set his army in motion against the Serbians immediately
after the disaster at Plochnik. There was none of that feverish haste
which had characterized his movements when he received the news of the
Serbian and Hungarian crusade in 1363. For while the victory had aroused
in the Balkan Christians a determination that they must drive the
Osmanlis out of Europe, and a feeling that they could accomplish this
end, its immediate result had been merely to repel the projected Ottoman
invasion of Bosnia. Ali pasha disposed of sufficient forces to hold the
conquests that had already been made. Murad had come to know the people
with whom he was dealing. It was not so much to recruit his own army as
to give the allies time to fall out with each other that Murad remained
in Asia during the early months of 1388. To strike in the first flush of
enthusiasm and buoyant hope would have brought him face to face with a
united enemy. If he waited, he knew from past experience with the Balkan
princes that the poison of jealousy would permeate the ranks of his
ostensibly united enemies. The Osmanlis never made a mistake of
judgement in dealing with Balkan alliances until the autumn of 1912.
Far from planning an offensive movement against the Serbians, Murad
allowed Evrenos of Yanitza to lead a band of Ottoman mercenaries into
the Morea, at the invitation of Theodore Palaeologos, to support the
authority of the Byzantine Empire against the Frankish barons.[406] At
the same time he ordered Ali pasha to cross the Balkans into northern
Bulgaria.
Ali pasha started from Adrianople in the spring of 1388 with thirty
thousand men to complete the conquest of Bulgaria. He crossed the
Balkans by the pass north of Aïtos, which has ever since been called by
the Osmanlis Nadir Derbend from the neighbouring town of Nadirkeuy.[407]
Provadia was taken by surprise in the night. Shuman and the villages
around it were next conquered. After an unsuccessful attack upon Varna,
the Osmanlis retraced their steps through Provadia and Shuman, following
the line of the modern railway from Varna to Sofia. Tirnovo, the ancient
capital of Bulgaria, capitulated after a short struggle.
Sisman withdrew to the Danube through the valley of the Osma, and shut
himself up in the fortress of Nicopolis. Owing to the ease of
provisioning from the river side, it was impossible to starve him out.
Ali pasha was compelled to call upon Murad, who had just crossed over
from Asia to Thrace. When Murad arrived before Nicopolis, Sisman sued
for peace. The conditions of Murad, that he pay the tribute due from the
previous year and allow an Ottoman garrison to occupy the fortress of
Drster as gage of future good conduct, were gladly accepted.
No sooner had Murad started southward than Sisman decided upon a final
desperate resistance. He refused to give up Drster. But he had forgotten
that Ali pasha was master of Shuman and the route to Varna. The Osmanlis
took Drster by storm. Many villages along the Danube between Rustuk and
Nicopolis fell into the hands of the Osmanlis. Ali pasha besieged Sisman
for a second time in Nicopolis. The revelation of his own weakness and
of the strength of the Osmanlis was a crushing blow to Sisman. He
surrendered without conditions, and was taken, with his wife and
children, to Murad’s camp. For reasons which the chroniclers do not
indicate, Sisman was able to secure forgiveness and restoration to his
former position as vassal prince of Bulgaria. But the Osmanlis were now
installed in north-central Bulgaria up to the Danube River. Shuman and
Nicopolis were Ottoman fortresses. Sisman had been rendered impotent to
give effective aid in the great alliance.[408]
XVII
Not all the Christians were loyal to the cause of Balkan freedom. In
their conquest of the Balkan peninsula, it is remarkable that the
Osmanlis never fought a battle without the help of allies of the faith
and blood of those whom they were putting under the Moslem yoke. At the
beginning of this chapter, it has been shown that there is no historical
basis for the assertion that the Osmanlis conquered the Balkan states by
the use of the janissaries. But they did have Christian aid of a far
more powerful kind than the janissaries could have given them. The old
fiction of the janissaries won for the Balkan people the sympathies of
western Europe. The truth concerning the Christian aid which the Moslem
conquerors received alienates rather than wins our sympathies.
When, in the spring of 1389, Murad found himself ready to exact
vengeance for Plochnik, and started from Bulgaria on his punitive
expedition, he was joined by Constantine of Kustendil, by the Serbian
Dragash, to whom he had given Serres as fief, and even by the sons of
Vukasin, the Serbian kral who had been killed in 1371 at Cernomen.[409]
Balsa, prince of Zenta (upper Albania), postponed his march to join the
allies, and entered secretly into correspondence with Murad through a
Serbian nobleman in the Ottoman camp. Lazar knew of this treachery. He
knew also that some of his own lieutenants had in all probability
arranged to sell him out to the Ottoman emir.[410]
Kossovapol, the plain of the blackbirds, is the name given to the valley
of the Sitnika River (an upper tributary of the Morava) west of Pristina
and south of Mitrovitza.[411] Here the decisive battle for Serbian
independence was fought on June 20, 1389.[412]
Serbian chronicles state that Murad had enjoined upon his soldiers that
they should neither destroy nor sack the rich castles, villages, and
cities of this region after the battle. Only four castles in all were
destroyed.[413] This command shows that Murad was confident of the
outcome. He was fighting for the possession of this country, for the
wealth and the prestige that it would give him. He had no intention of
destroying what he knew would be his to enjoy, nor did he desire to
alienate the Serbian peasantry by unnecessary harshness. Here, as
elsewhere, new Osmanlis rather than Ottoman subjects were the
_desiderata_: they could be won only by kindness. Since the clemency of
the Osmanlis in dealing with the vanquished after the battle is frankly
recorded by the Serbians themselves, we cannot doubt that the wise and
far-seeing provisions of the conqueror were carried out.
Of Kossova much has been written. It was the culminating event in that
legendary period of Serbian history which had begun fifty years before
with the exploits of Stephen Dushan. Lazar, Serbian chieftain with no
long line of royal ancestors behind him, with no great weight of
authority among his contemporaries, who began his career by craven
submission to Murad and, after eighteen years in which no deed to his
credit is recorded, survived a crushing defeat to be executed on the
field of battle--this is the Charlemagne of Serbian poetry. On the
anniversary of Kossova, the Serbians pray for his soul. As a saint, he
gets many more candles at his shrine than his namesake of Bethany who
was raised from the dead. Such is legend in history. But what amazes one
is the curious fact that the very folksongs that glorify Saint Lazar and
lament Kossova reveal a frank and true picture of the events, and prove
how little warrant there is for the legend!
The Serbians despaired of their cause before the battle. The enormous
number of the enemy dismayed them.[414] Rumours of treachery were
current in the allied camp. Their lack of courage, and the spirit of
distrust of each other’s good faith, is strikingly voiced in the oration
of Lazar at a banquet the evening before the battle. He pleaded for a
courage and confidence which he himself did not feel. He openly accused
his son-in-law, Milosh Obravitch, of treason. Gloom and hopelessness had
settled over the Serbian camp, reflected from leaders to the common
soldiery. The battle was already lost. For victory is never won by those
who feel that they are going to lose.[415]
The battle was begun by the Osmanlis. Murad sent forward an advance
guard of two thousand archers.[416] The allies responded with a charge
in which the left wing of the Ottoman army was broken through by Lazar.
For a while the issue seemed in doubt. Bayezid held out against the
impetuosity of the Serbians, but the Osmanlis made no attempt to take
the offensive. At this critical juncture, when the battle was by no
means decided, Vuk Brankovitch, another son-in-law of Lazar, quietly
withdrew from the field with twelve thousand men. This desertion, which
had probably been arranged for with Murad, so weakened the Serbians that
they broke and fled. Lazar and many of his leading noblemen, and
thousands of his soldiers, were taken prisoners. It was not a fight to
the bitter end.[417]
Murad won the battle of Kossova at the cost of his own life. From the
story which Clavijo de Gonzáles heard fifteen years later, one might
infer that Murad was killed in the course of the battle, and that the
fighting was renewed around his body.[418] It was then that Bayezid cut
down Lazar with his own sword. Pray declared that the two sovereigns
were mortally wounded in a personal combat.[419] The Ottoman historians
believed that Murad met his death when walking across the field after
the battle. A wounded Serbian soldier, who was believed to be dead, rose
with a supreme effort to his knees and thrust his sword into Murad as he
passed.
According to the Serbian songs, whose testimony the Byzantine historians
corroborate, and whose story has been followed by some Osmanlis as well,
Murad was assassinated after the battle, or perhaps while the battle was
in progress, by Milosh Obravitch. Stung by the unjust accusation of
treason in the speech of Lazar on the eve of the battle,[420] Milosh
determined to prove his loyalty beyond any question. He got through the
Ottoman ranks as a deserter, of whom there must have been many on that
fatal day. His claim of high rank, which was attested by his princely
bearing, secured for him an audience with Murad. When he was face to
face with the emir, he plunged his dagger into the destroyer of his
country’s liberties. It is a commentary on the Serbian character that
this questionable act has been held up to posterity as the most saintly
and heroic deed of national history.
In the seventeenth century it was believed, and this belief has been
reproduced as a fact by some modern writers on the Ottoman Empire, that
the custom of holding a foreign ambassador’s arms when he entered the
presence of the sultan, originated from a regulation to prevent the
recurrence of such a crime.[421] Like many other Ottoman customs,
however, this consistorial ceremony is found among the usages of the
Byzantine court,[422] and has persisted in some oriental courts to the
present day. It has been explained on the ground that ‘a stranger before
the sovereign is so overwhelmed by the effulgence of his rays that he
cannot stand without support’.[423]
The statements of the numbers engaged in the battle of Kossova are so
conflicting that it is impossible to determine how many men took part in
the action, or which side was the stronger. The Serbian folksongs dwell
upon the tremendous number of the enemy, while the Ottoman historians
report that the Osmanlis mustered so few in comparison with the reported
strength of the Serbians that there was serious question before the
battle of the advisability of taking so great a risk as to engage a foe
whose numerical advantage was so marked. Including the prisoners, who
were massacred when Murad’s death was learned by the soldiers, the
Serbians calculated their loss at seventy-seven thousand killed, while
only twelve thousand of the Osmanlis fell. One important fact we do
know. The loss of life during the battle and subsequent massacre on the
part of the Serbian nobility was so great that the nation, for the third
time within thirty years, found itself without leaders.
Tvrtko hurried away from Kossova so fast that he did not realize how
overwhelming had been the defeat. In fact, when he learned of the death
of Murad, he wrote to Florence announcing the glorious victory won under
his leadership, and the death of the arch enemy of Christendom.[424] The
Florentines, therefore, celebrated the news of Kossova with a _Te Deum_
in the cathedral. Either this perverted account also reached France, or
too great significance was placed upon the death of Murad, for Charles
VI went to Notre Dame to render thanks to God in all solemnity for what
had happened at Kossova![425] The Serbians themselves were not deceived.
To them, Kossova was the death-knell to independence. The Hungarians,
also, awoke immediately to a sense of the danger that threatened them.
XVIII
For thirty years Murad had guided the destinies of the Osmanlis with a
political sagacity surpassed by no statesman of his age. It is only
because we know so much more of Mohammed the Conqueror and of Soleiman
the Magnificent that Murad has never received his proper place as the
most remarkable and most successful statesman and warrior of the house
of Osman. When we measure the difficulties which confronted him, the
problems which he solved, and the results of his reign, against the
deeds of his more dazzling successors, we see how easily he stands with
them, if not above them. The transformation effected in his lifetime is
one of the most wonderful records in all history. His conquests were to
endure for five centuries, until the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878: some of
them have survived the cataclysm of the recent Balkan wars.
His energy and zeal for fighting, so like his father’s, and yet put to
the test of being extended over a field of action far wider than his
father ever dreamed of, did not flag. He never had a disagreement with
any of his generals or administrators. His system of conquest and of
government, unsupported by tradition or the background of a gradual
growth, fitted every condition for which it had been framed. His
treatment of the Greeks showed superb skill in estimating their
character. Although an infidel and enemy of Christ in the eyes of the
Byzantine ecclesiastics, he handled them so much better than the popes
that he won their sympathies. No more striking proof of his complete
success in a problem of assimilation, at once racial as well as
religious, can be found than the letter of the Orthodox patriarch
written to Pope Urban VI in 1385, in which it is stated that Murad left
to the Church entire liberty of action.[426] In the records of the Greek
patriarchate from 1360 to 1389,[427] one does not find a single instance
of complaint received of ill treatment of the priesthood by the
Osmanlis.
Osman gathered around him a race, Orkhan created a state, but it was
Murad who founded the empire.
CHAPTER IV
BAYEZID
THE OSMANLIS INHERIT THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE
I
The death of Murad was immediately avenged upon the battle-field by the
execution of the prisoners of noble birth. Practically all the Serbian
aristocracy that had remained loyal to Lazar and the national cause
perished.
In the midst of this bloody work, Bayezid sent servants to seek out his
brother Yakub, who had distinguished himself during the battle, and was
being acclaimed by his soldiers. Yakub was taken to Bayezid’s tent, and
strangled with a bowstring.[428] The new emir justified this crime by a
verse conveniently found for him by his theologians in the Koran: ‘So
often as they return to sedition, they shall be subverted therein; and
if they depart not from you, and offer you peace and restrain their
hands from warring against you, take them and kill them wheresoever ye
find them.’[429] They declared that the temptation to treason and revolt
was always present in the brothers of the ruler, and that murder was
better than sedition. These doctors of the law might better have pointed
out to Bayezid the admonition of the Prophet: ‘But his soul suffered him
to slay his brother, and he slew him: wherefore he became of the number
of those who perish.’[430] For the abominable practice of removing
possible rival claimants by assassination, thus begun on the field of
Kossova, was elevated to the dignity of a law by Mohammed II,[431] and
has been until our own times a blot upon the house of Osman.
Bayezid, however, was only following the example of Christian princes of
his own century. Pedro of Castille killed his brother Don Fadrique;[432]
Andronicus III Comnenos of Trebizond, killed his two brothers, Michael
and George;[433] and Andronicus III Palaeologos assassinated his brother
when his father was dying.[434]
An order was issued from the battle-field of Kossova to the Kadi of
Brusa, enjoining him to keep secret the death of Murad, and to appear to
be occupied only with public rejoicing for the victory ‘won from the
_Hungarians_’. With this order, Bayezid forwarded the bodies of his
father and brother for secret burial at Brusa.[435]
Agents of the Italian cities came to seek Bayezid after the battle to
congratulate him, and to ask for the confirmation of the commercial
privileges granted by Murad. Bayezid showed himself proud and distant.
He declared that after he had conquered Hungary he would ride so far
that he would come to Rome and there give his horse oats to eat upon the
altar of St. Peter’s.[436] A change of attitude towards Europe is
strikingly revealed in this boast. Murad, in spite of crusades projected
against him, had been careful not to draw upon himself the attention,
much less the ill-will, of the western Christian princes. He was
aggressive, but never any more so than he needed to be for the moment at
hand: and he was never aggressively Mohammedan. Bayezid, from the very
beginning of his reign, took no pains to conceal his enmity to
Christendom, and his desire to pose as the champion of Islam. He sought
alliances with the Sultan of Egypt[437] and other Moslem rulers, and
placed the utmost importance upon the extension of Ottoman sovereignty
in Asia Minor.
II
After the bloodthirst of Kossova had been satisfied and his father’s
death avenged, Bayezid was eager to enter into friendly relations with
Stephen Bulcovitz, son and heir of Lazar. He felt that the Serbians had
learned their lesson, and that they would be more helpful to him as
allies than as crushed and sullen foes. He needed their aid in the
Anatolian campaign which he was contemplating, and they were essential
to the safety of his European possessions as a buffer against the
Hungarians, who he knew would take the opportunity of his absence in
Asia to move down the Danube. So he treated Stephen and the surviving
Serbians with great kindness. Stephen received all the privileges that
had belonged to his father.[438] The Serbians were assured of an
equitable share of the booty in the campaigns in which they would
engage. On the other hand, Stephen agreed to allow Bayezid an annual
tribute, secured by the revenues of the silver mines, to command a
contingent in person in the Ottoman army, and to give his sister to the
Ottoman emir.[439] Kossova was forgiven on both sides.
Bayezid took Despina, daughter of Lazar, as wife by a formal marriage
act, which was read in the mosque of Aladja Hissar, near Krutchevatz,
at the foot of Mount Iastrebatz, twenty miles north-west of Nish.[440]
This was the last marriage ever contracted by a sovereign of the house
of Osman.[441] It sealed an alliance that proved very advantageous to
Bayezid. Throughout his life he was devoted to Despina, and his
brother-in-law Stephen in turn was a devoted and steadfast friend. The
Serbians were faithful allies to the Osmanlis, and fought with them at
Nicopolis and Angora. On his side, Bayezid kept the allegiance of the
Serbians by giving them opportunities for winning booty in the raids
against the Albanians, Dalmatians, and Hungarians, and by favouring the
Orthodox Church. When we see how complacently and cheerfully the
Serbians--except the poets--took upon themselves the Ottoman yoke, we
must believe that Kossova was regarded as a terrible calamity only by
the generations of after centuries, who found the Ottoman rule harder
than it had been for their ancestors.
Bayezid placed a strong Ottoman colony in Uskub, and settled Moslems in
the country between Uskub and Nish.[442] There were probably many also
who saw that conversion was to their advantage. However that may be,
Bayezid never had any trouble from the Serbians during his reign.
Stephen Tvrtko, kral of Bosnia, did not consider Kossova a defeat.
Seeing that his great enemy Murad and his great rival Lazar had found
death on the battle-field, and that the Osmanlis did not follow up
their victory, this view-point was natural. After Kossova, Tvrtko
increased in power and prestige. He called himself king of Bosnia,
Serbia, Croatia, and Dalmatia. Like Stephen Dushan, he was planning ‘for
great things’ when he died in March, 1391, after a reign of thirty-eight
years.[443]
Shortly before his death, Tvrtko had successfully resisted an Ottoman
invasion with the help of a Hungarian army sent to him by Sigismund. His
successor, Stephen Dabitcha, however, departed from this wise policy. He
quarrelled with the Hungarians, and played into Bayezid’s hand by
opposing Sigismund in his final effort to stem the tide of Ottoman
invasion. The Bosnians paid to the full the penalty of their king’s
folly. In 1398, Bosnia was invaded by a great army of Osmanlis and
Serbians, who ‘destroyed almost all the country and led away the people
into slavery’.[444] In spite of the sweeping assertion of the
chronicler, this must have been only a raid. For, from 1398 to 1415, the
Bosnians, still independent, were fighting with Ragusa and Hungary. In
1415, they voluntarily allied themselves with the Osmanlis, and repeated
the same old story of the other Balkan races. Mohammed I was called in
to help them against the Hungarians.[445] The Osmanlis came, and they
remained.
III
In the second year of his reign, after he had arranged a suitable
_status quo_ with the Serbians of upper Macedonia, Bayezid began that
policy of aggrandizement in Asia Minor which led finally to his
downfall. His first encroachment was against Isa bey of Aïdin. Isa was
too weak to oppose Bayezid single-handed. Instead of seeking to ally the
independent emirs against the Osmanlis, Isa thought he could save
himself with less risk by becoming a vassal of Bayezid. He was compelled
to give up Ayasoluk, and make Tyra his capital. Bayezid almost
immediately broke faith with Isa, and exiled him to Brusa or Nicaea,
where he died.[446] His two sons, Isa and Omar, managed to escape to the
court of Timur, who was rapidly becoming the most powerful Moslem ruler
in Asia.
The occupation of Ephesus aroused momentarily Bayezid’s ambition to take
possession of Smyrna. In 1391, he did in fact make some efforts to
overpower the garrison, which was greatly weakened by pestilence.[447]
Later he occupied the passes around Smyrna to prevent the entrance of
provisions.[448] But Smyrna, like Constantinople, could not be starved
out so long as the Osmanlis were not masters of the sea. Bayezid never
pressed this mild form of siege to a definite assault. His hands were
too full elsewhere. An unsuccessful assault against Smyrna would have
destroyed his prestige in the new territory of Aïdin, which was not any
too securely his by the suppression of its ruling family. Perhaps, also,
he realized that Smyrna, more than any other place in the Levant except
Rhodes, had become the city of promise to the Roman Church. He did not
want to stir up an active resistance on the part of the chevaliers of
Rhodes, for they might easily be induced to lend aid to the emirs whom
he was destroying.
Sarukhan and Menteshe, during the reign of Murad, had lost the most
virile element of their population in corsair expeditions. The Turks of
whom one reads as the roving and raiding adventurers in the Aegaean and
Mediterranean during the fourteenth century were largely from these
emirates. Decades of outgo without a corresponding income in fighting
men so depleted the maritime emirates that they were not in a position
to withstand Bayezid as they had done his father and grandfather. Their
population was seafaring, and their princes were traders rather than
warriors. When the armies of Bayezid invaded Sarukhan and Menteshe, the
two emirs attempted no resistance. They took refuge with Bayezid, emir
of Kastemuni, and abandoned their emirates to the Osmanlis.[449]
The result of the acquisition of Sarukhan, Aïdin, and Menteshe was the
immediate appearance of the Osmanlis upon the Aegaean Sea. This is the
beginning of the Ottoman naval power, which did not, however, have any
development during the reign of Bayezid. The first Ottoman naval
expedition started out in the late autumn of 1390. Sixty vessels made a
descent upon Chios, and devastated the island. Negropont (Euboea) and
the coast of Attica suffered the ravages of the raiders.[450] Bayezid
now forbade the exportation of grain from Asia to Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios,
and Rhodes. But he was hardly yet in a position to enforce this embargo.
The Christians of the Aegaean islands and of the eastern Mediterranean
soon learned that a new design, which had before been lacking, animated
the Turkish expeditions. It was the desire not so much for booty as for
the permanent possession of land. Everywhere they went, the Osmanlis
went as settlers. They fought for homes and wives.
In the south, Bayezid took Adalia, the last city of the emir of Tekke.
It was in 1391 that the Osmanlis won this seaport, their first on the
Mediterranean. If we except the southern ports of the Peloponnesus, a
whole century passed before they added another on the Mediterranean.
Following up the pretext furnished him by a complaint against Alaeddin
from his vassal, the emir of Hamid, Bayezid determined to measure his
forces against the Karamanlis. As had been the case in the previous
similar expeditions under his father, four years before, Bayezid called
out the levies of his European Christian vassals. Among those who
responded to the call was Manuel Palaeologos, who passed the winter of
1390-91 in the Ottoman camp at Angora. There he wrote his famous
dialogues on the Christian religion, purporting to be discussions with a
Moslem professor of theology.[451]
Bayezid invaded Karamania, and laid siege to Konia. Alaeddin, who had
fled to the Taurus Mountains to escape being shut up in the city, saw
soon that Konia could hold out against Bayezid for an indefinite period.
The Ottoman emir was far from his base of supplies, and nervous about
what was happening in Europe. So, when Alaeddin asked for terms of
peace, Bayezid agreed to withdraw from Konia, if Alaeddin would formally
cede to him the north-western corner of his dominions, including the
cities of Aksheïr and Akseraï, which were already in the hands of the
Osmanlis.[452] Bayezid left Timurtash as governor of the new
acquisitions, and returned to Adrianople.
While Bayezid was occupied in Bulgaria, in 1392, in his first defensive
campaign against Sigismund, Alaeddin decided upon a supreme effort to
wrest from Bayezid the hegemony of Asia Minor. He reoccupied the ceded
cities, and attacked by surprise the Ottoman army in Kermian. Timurtash
was taken prisoner. One column of the Karamanlis set out for Angora, and
the other for Brusa.
Bayezid earned for himself the nickname _yildirim_ (thunderbolt) by the
rapidity with which he transported his army into Anatolia.[453] Fresh
from a victory over the Hungarians, supported by the trained and
hardened soldiery of his Christian vassals, Greeks, Serbians,
Bulgarians, and Wallachians, his sudden appearance at Brusa caused
Alaeddin to try once more to treat with the rival who was rapidly
becoming more powerful than himself. He released Timurtash, and
suggested a return to the _status quo_ of the previous year.
Bayezid was not only convinced that a decisive struggle was now
advisable: he was also quick to see that for the first time the
advantage was all on the side of the Osmanlis. Instead of meeting the
enemy in the heart of his own country, after a long journey across
wind-swept plateaux where food was scarce, it was the enemy this time
who had made the journey and was far from home. Defeated, there would be
no retreat possible for Alaeddin.
With characteristic celerity, Bayezid sent forward an army under
Timurtash. Battle was joined in the plain of Ak Tchaï (the white river).
One cannot determine the exact location, but it was probably in Kermian
not far from Kutayia, for that is where the two retreating columns of
the Karamanlis would naturally have formed a junction. Alaeddin and his
sons Ali and Mahommed were taken prisoners. When Alaeddin was brought
before him, Timurtash could not restrain his anger until Bayezid
arrived. He remembered only that the one defeat of his long and
brilliant career had been administered by Alaeddin. Its disgrace, and
his feeling towards the emir of Karamania, was in no way palliated by
the fact that Alaeddin had voluntarily released him. Timurtash ordered
the prisoner to be hanged. When Bayezid arrived, his brother-in-law was
dead. He was overjoyed that his rival had been removed so conveniently,
and without any responsibility falling upon himself.
Karamania lay open before the invaders. The Osmanlis occupied Ak Seraï,
Konia, and Laranda. There was no organized resistance. But it is a
curious disregard of facts to record, as most historians have done,[454]
that the result of this campaign was the permanent incorporation of
Karamania in the Ottoman Empire.[455] The battle of Ak Tchaï had been
decisive only to the extent that thereafter the Osmanlis, and not the
Karamanlis, were to be the dominant race in Asia Minor. Konia and other
eastern Karamanian cities were occupied by the Osmanlis after the battle
because their ruler had been killed and his sons taken into captivity.
Had Alaeddin escaped from the field, he might have organized a
successful resistance to the Ottoman invaders. Bayezid conquered
Karamania by the battle of Ak Tchaï no more than Napoleon conquered
Prussia by Jena or von Moltke France by Sedan. To enter and occupy for
a while the capital of a country does not mean that the country is
‘incorporated’ in the domains of the successful invader. The immediate
restoration of the Karamanian dynasty after the advent of Timur proves
how superficial had been the Ottoman occupation. While they were no
longer able to be a political factor in western Asia Minor, the
Karamanlis continued until after the fall of Constantinople--for seventy
years after the battle of Ak Tchaï--to defy successfully the efforts of
the Osmanlis to destroy their independence and amalgamate them.[456]
Burhaneddin, who had set up for himself a principality north-east of
Karamania along the Halys River, which included Caesarea and Sivas, was
the next rival on the east to be attacked. Burhaneddin is reported to
have had twenty to thirty thousand followers.[457] This seems to be an
exaggeration, for we read that he did not resist the Ottoman invasion.
At the approach of Bayezid, he retired into the mountains of Armenia
near Kharput. Here he was either killed by Kara Yuluk, founder of the
famous White Sheep dynasty, or put to death by order of Bayezid.[458]
His emirate was shared by Bayezid and Kara Yuluk, the Ottoman emir
taking Tokat, Caesarea, and Sivas. There is no certainty as to the date
of this expedition. From the events which followed, it most probably
took place in 1395, the year before Nicopolis.[459]
Kastamuni, practically coterminous with the Roman province of
Paphlagonia, stood between the Ottoman possessions and the Black Sea. In
the campaign of 1393, Samsun and the cities of the interior between
Samsun and Angora, were captured by the Osmanlis. When the Ottoman army
advanced to attack Kastamuni, Bayezid offered to allow the emir to
become his vassal, if he would surrender to him the emirs of Sarukhan
and Menteshe. Whether the lesser Bayezid was unwilling to violate the
laws of hospitality, or put little faith in the promises of the
conqueror after the fate which had overtaken the emir of Aïdin, it is
impossible to say. He and his guests fled to the court of Timur. The
occupation of Sinope gave the Osmanlis an excellent port on the south
coast of the Black Sea.
Bayezid was now master of the greater part of Anatolia, but master only
in name. He had not assimilated these conquests. As later events proved,
the inhabitants of these territories were still loyal to their former
rulers.
IV
After his return from the first Anatolian campaign, Bayezid ordered a
general advance along the northern and north-western frontiers. One band
invaded Bosnia, but did not make much headway. Three bands entered
Hungary, and initiated the system of rapid raiding that in time reached
as far as Germany, and made the ‘Turks’ the nightmare of Slavic,
Teutonic, and Italian Europe. The first battle on Hungarian soil was
fought at Nagy-Olosz, in Syrmia, not far from Karlovitz, where three
centuries later the Osmanlis signed the death-warrant of their
_Weltpolitik_.
The Danube was crossed also near Silistria. Before the terrible
akindjis could penetrate far into his country, the hospodar Mircea
surrendered, or was made prisoner. After a short exile at Brusa, he
regained his liberty by consenting to the payment of a tribute of three
thousand ducats, thirty horses, and twenty falcons.[460] He agreed to
help Bayezid against the Hungarians, who had long been asserting a
sovereignty over Wallachia, and in return Bayezid promised to settle no
Moslems and build no mosques north of the Danube. In the first Hungarian
invasion, Bayezid received more valuable aid from the Wallachians than
from his janissaries. There were no better fighters in the Balkan
peninsula than these descendants of the soldiers of Trajan. The
interference of Sigismund prevented an Ottoman invasion of Moldavia,
whose hospodars remained altogether independent of the Osmanlis until
the reign of Mohammed the Conqueror.[461]
When Louis of Hungary died, he left two daughters. The younger, Hedwig,
was chosen as queen of Poland by the Polish nobles. Her marriage with
Jagello of Lithuania, who was converted to Christianity and baptized
under the name of Ladislas, definitely separated the crowns of Poland
and Hungary, and had a far-reaching influence upon the subsequent
fortunes of the Osmanlis. The crown of Hungary fell to Mary, whose
succession was questioned by Charles of Durazzo, king of Naples, the
nearest male heir. His invasion of Dalmatia, in 1385, brought into
Hungary Sigismund, second son of Charles IV of Luxemburg, the German
Emperor. For Sigismund was betrothed to Mary, but had been slow to take
upon himself the rôle of bridegroom, owing to his disappointment over
Hedwig’s election by the Poles. Now he entered into the struggle for the
Hungarian crown. In 1387, it was placed upon his head. The union between
Poland and Hungary was broken, but the fortunes of Hungary and Bohemia,
to which throne Sigismund succeeded by blood, were joined in a way that
has never been broken to the present time. The outside connexions of the
new Hungarian king were a most important factor in the growth of the
Ottoman Empire. A strong and vigorous king, whose sole interest lay in
the crown of Hungary, might have prevented the spread of the Osmanlis.
In fact, after Bayezid’s death, he might easily have destroyed the
Ottoman power in Europe. But Sigismund, called in 1411 to the larger
rôle of Holy Roman Emperor, became engrossed in the Hussite controversy
and the Church councils to end the great schism. While retaining the
crown of Hungary, he allowed the Osmanlis to make the preparations which
were to end in the Moslem subjugation of that kingdom.
In the early days, when Sigismund’s interests lay in his newly-acquired
Hungarian crown, he was alive to the menace of the Osmanlis. He sent a
message to Bayezid, demanding by what right he was interfering with
Bulgaria, which was a country under Hungarian protection. Bayezid made
no response to the address of the king’s ambassador. He merely pointed
to the weapons hanging in his tent, and gave a sign that the audience
was over.
Sigismund understood, and accepted the challenge. In 1392, he invaded
Bulgaria, won an initial battle from the Osmanlis, who would have been
annihilated had it not been for their new allies, the Wallachians, and,
after a long siege, took Nicopolis on the Danube.[462] By this time
Bayezid was able to send a large army into Bulgaria. When Sigismund
realized how numerous were the forces coming against him, he saw that
his victory bade fair to be nothing more than the acquisition of a
prison. Before the Osmanlis could surround him, he wisely abandoned
Nicopolis. The retreat became a rout.[463] It was on the return from
this expedition that Sigismund met Elisabeth Morsinay, in the county of
Hunyadi. From their union was born the great champion, who, while his
imperial father was engrossed in theological disputes and the complex
interests of the empire, battled bravely against Mohammed I and Murad
II.
The expedition of 1392 demonstrated to Sigismund that Bayezid was a foe
worthy of a European ruler, that he must be checked if Hungary were to
be saved, and that the Hungarians could not again take the offensive
against the Osmanlis without aid from western Europe. For the
pretensions of Louis to the overlordship of the Balkan States, and the
heartless propaganda of the Catholic faith, thinly disguising Louis’s
inordinate ambitions, had turned the Balkan peoples against Hungary and
‘crusaders’ from the west. They chose rather to stand on the side of
their Moslem enslavers.
Sigismund’s invasion of Bulgaria determined Bayezid to put an end to the
arrangement concluded just before Kossova between Murad and Sisman.
Bulgaria, like Thrace and Macedonia, was to be an integral part of the
empire, and to become converted to Islam and ottomanized, in so far as
that was possible. For Sisman, who had re-established himself in his old
capital, was too uncertain an ally to be trusted in the event of
another Hungarian invasion. In the spring of 1393, an army under
Soleiman Tchelebi, Bayezid’s oldest son, to whom this was the first
command, surrounded Tirnovo. The bulk of Soleiman’s army was composed of
Macedonian Christians and renegades of the first generation. In
midsummer,[464] after a three months’ siege, Tirnovo was taken by storm
from the side of the old castle, which is still, in part, standing.[465]
The inhabitants who escaped fire and sword were carried into captivity
in Anatolia. Among them was the patriarch Euthymius.[466]
This was the end of the independence of Bulgaria and of the national
church. The loss of the church was a more serious blow than the loss of
independence. For the Bulgarian nationality suffered an eclipse of
centuries. Under the laws of Mohammed the Conqueror for the
‘self-government’ of the Christian elements of the empire, the
Bulgarians were included in the Greek _millet_ (nation). Enemy to every
influence, every movement that tended to lessen its temporal power, the
Greek patriarchate of Phanar never wearied in its endeavours, and never
withheld its approval of the foulest means, to stamp out the Bulgarian
national spirit. One cannot visit the old monastery of Rilo without
realizing that the Bulgarian sufferings have been more acute from
Christian priests than from Moslem governors. One cannot follow the
trail of unending persecution in the mute witness of unchurched
communities from Monastir to the Black Sea through Macedonia and Eastern
Rumelia, and to the Danube, through Bulgarian Serbia and trans-Rhodopian
Moesia, without sympathizing with the Bulgarian aspirations of 1913, and
without comprehending the wild rage and hatred that drove an ordinarily
clear-headed and impassive people into the second Balkan war.[467]
When Tirnovo fell, Sisman was not found in his palace. His fate was a
mystery even when Schiltberger went through Bulgaria with the crusaders
three years later. Schiltberger believed that he died in captivity.[468]
His son, Alexander, became a Moslem to save his life, and was given the
governorship of Samsun.[469] He was killed fighting under the Ottoman
flag, in 1420, in the rebellion of Dédé-Sultan. The royal family of
Bulgaria had no other heirs.
Silistria, Nicopolis, Widin, and the other Danube fortresses were
strongly garrisoned and fortified.[470] By conversion and immigration
the Moslem population was cultivated, and grew rapidly on this northern
frontier of the empire.
V
The battle of Kossova did not immediately affect Constantinople. Bayezid
was intent upon arranging the new _status quo_ in Serbia. After he had
assured himself that Sigismund was not ready to attack him, he passed
over into Asia Minor. There he devoted all his energies to the
destruction of the Turkish emirates.
The old family feud of the Palaeologi continued.[471] In April 1390,
John, the son of Andronicus, entered Constantinople, and set himself up
as emperor in opposition to his grandfather and uncle. But upon Manuel’s
return from Asia in September, he was compelled to flee.[472] The
obligations of Manuel as Ottoman vassal were stronger than the
exigencies of his precarious position at Constantinople. Although his
father was in an enfeebled condition and the danger of a return of his
nephew was very real, Manuel left again in November to follow Bayezid in
the war against Karamania.
We have a striking record from Manuel’s own pen of his humiliation.
Proper food was too dear for the purse of the heir of Constantine the
Great. He was on the verge of starvation. In sharp contrast to his own
wretchedness, he describes the barbaric splendour of the court of
Bayezid, and the feasting in which he was too insignificant to have a
share. The Osmanlis treated him with studied insolence and
contempt.[473]
While Bayezid was in Karamania, the old emperor repaired the walls of
his capital. Churches were torn down in order to rebuild the towers on
either side of the Golden Gate. They were given an ornate appearance to
disguise the purpose of their having been repaired. Bayezid, informed
through his couriers, sent word to John that the towers must be rased
without delay, or Manuel would lose his eyes. The old emperor made haste
to obey. Before the demolition was finished, he died in the arms of
Eudoxia Comnena, whom he had taken for his mistress after having asked
her hand for his son. Gout and debauchery rather than grief and
humiliation ended his ignoble life; for he was only sixty-one, and, like
his father and grandfather, had never opposed the Osmanlis with enough
energy to undermine his constitution.[474]
When Manuel, in the spring of 1391, returned to Brusa, he learned of his
father’s death, and of the threat that had been made concerning himself.
Escaping in the night, he fled to Constantinople.
An ultimatum soon followed from Bayezid. Beyond the acknowledgement of
vassalage and the payment of an increased tribute, Bayezid demanded the
establishment of a kadi in Constantinople to judge the Moslem
inhabitants. Upon the heels of his messenger came the Ottoman army. The
Greeks of southern Thrace who had remained Christian were exterminated
or carried off into slavery in Asia. Like locusts, the Osmanlis swarmed
in all directions, and no village missed their notice up to the very
walls of Constantinople.[475] The first Ottoman siege of Constantinople
began.
The close investment of the city ended after seven months. Bayezid,
needing his army in Bulgaria to oppose Sigismund, consented to lift the
siege on still harder conditions than had first been imposed. Manuel
authorized the establishment of a Mohammedan tribunal in the Sirkedji
quarter, and to give seven hundred houses within the city walls to
Moslem settlers. Half of Galata, from the Genoese Tower to the Sweet
Waters, was ceded to Bayezid, who placed there a garrison of six
thousand. The tribute was once more increased, and the Ottoman treasury
was allowed a tithe on the vineyards and vegetable gardens outside of
the city.[476] From the minarets of two mosques, the call to prayer
echoed over the imperial city, which, from this time, began to be called
by the Osmanlis Istambul.[477] This was the city of promise.
From 1391 until the advent of Timur, Constantinople was blockaded on the
land side.[478] The Galata garrison and the posts at Kutchuk and Buyuk
Tchekmedje were always alert to bully and harass travellers and
provision sellers.
The Grand Vizier, Ali pasha, used the grandson and namesake of John V
Palaeologos to make trouble for Manuel. It was in his blood to become
the willing tool of the Osmanlis. In 1393, Ali pasha tried to get the
inhabitants of the city to depose Manuel in order that John, as heir of
the older son of the late emperor, might take the place which was
rightfully his.[479] Two years later John actually attacked the city
with Ottoman troops, but was repulsed.[480]
The overtures of Manuel for aid and money from Christian princes were
received with little enthusiasm. On account of the schism in the Latin
Church, Manuel could look for no papal support. Venice refused his offer
to sell Lemnos.[481] The time had passed when the Senate set even the
slightest monetary value upon a Byzantine deed of sale to an Aegaean
island.
In 1395, at Serres, Bayezid held his first court as heir of the Caesars.
He summoned before him Manuel and Theodore and John, the son of
Andronicus. Theodore, who had been ruling in the Morea (Peloponnesus),
sole remaining Byzantine theme, was charged with having encroached upon
the rights of the lord of Monembasia. The few remaining Serbian princes
were also present. Bayezid contemplated ridding himself altogether of
the Byzantine imperial family. In fact, he ordered the death of all the
Palaeologi. Ali pasha succeeded in putting off the execution long enough
for Bayezid to change his mind. The sentence was revoked, but warning
was given by cutting off the hands and putting out the eyes of several
Byzantine dignitaries. The Palaeologi, and Constantinople, had been
saved only by the intervention of a creature of Bayezid’s, who did not
want to see the imperial family perish and the imperial city fall
because these ghosts of princes were a source of revenue to him!
The peril at Serres had been so real that the Byzantine and Serbian
princes plotted immediately to throw off the Ottoman yoke, and swore to
each other that they would never again answer a summons from Bayezid.
The compact was sealed by the marriage of Irene, daughter of
Constantine Dragash, to Manuel.[482] But Dragash died shortly after the
marriage,[483] and Vuk Brankovitch died three years later.[484] They
were the last of the Serbians of Dushan’s following in Macedonia. The
disaster of Nicopolis soon crushed the hopes of the conspirators.
VI
Urban VI, the first Roman pope of the Great Schism, did practically
nothing against the Osmanlis. He sent, in 1388, two armed galleys for
the defence of Constantinople, and issued letters broadcast promising
indulgences to all who would take part in a crusade.[485] But he did not
work for a league of the states which recognized him. His successor,
Boniface IX, whose reign covered the same period as that of Bayezid, was
too occupied in combating the Angevin party in Naples, and in trying to
preserve intact the papal states and cities, to pay much attention to
the Ottoman menace.
In 1391, Boniface urged George Stracimir, who called himself king of
Rascia (Serbia), to conquer Durazzo from the ‘schismatics’, and
commanded the Catholic archbishop of Antivari to prevent the Christians
of Macedonia and Dalmatia from allying themselves with the
Osmanlis.[486] Idle words these were, revealing at once the
short-sighted policy of Boniface and his bigotry. For the Osmanlis, in
the spring of 1393, were threatening Durazzo.[487] With warring
Christian sects, their success was certain.
In Greece the interference of the Latin popes was becoming more and more
bitterly resented. Ecclesiastics and laymen alike resented proselytizing
and the invariable introduction of a bargaining clause in every appeal
for western aid. In March 1393, Dorotheus, metropolitan of Athens and
exarch of Greece, who had been justly charged by the Duke of Athens with
wanting to introduce into his duchy the Osmanlis, was a fugitive at
Constantinople. Tried on the charge brought against him by the Duke, a
synod of eight bishops acquitted him.[488] This action was indicative of
the feeling throughout the Eastern Church,--better the Osmanlis than the
Franks with their Catholic missionaries. Even the changed attitude of
Bayezid towards Christianity did little to modify this sentiment.
Although France was supporting the Avignon papacy, Boniface wrote in
1394 to Charles VI, asking him to help Sigismund or at least to allow
his subjects to fight under the Hungarian standards.[489] In the course
of the same year he twice ordered a crusade to be preached.[490] This
was, however, rather an attempt to take under his wing, and give
sanction to, a secular movement to help Hungary than an initiative which
had originated the movement. For most of Sigismund’s allies were
adherents of the other papacy.
At Avignon, Benedict XIII, a Spaniard, mounted the throne in 1394. His
influence with the Duke of Burgundy, who dominated the insane French
king, was almost as negligible as that of his Roman rival.
Philippe de Mézières, who had taken up the work of Marino Sanudo, and
gave his life to the promotion of a crusade, left Cyprus in 1378, and
settled in Paris, where he preached and wrote impassioned appeals to
Christendom to rescue the Holy Sepulchre. His ‘Order of the Passion’,
which was to furnish a race of fighters against the Moslem holders of
Jerusalem, had replaced the celibate vow of the earlier orders by a vow
of marital fidelity, so that ‘defenders of the Holy Sepulchre’ might be
propagated, and trained from infancy for their mission. The whole idea
of Philippe de Mézières was an anachronism. The age of the crusades had
passed. After 1390 the new order fell into oblivion.[491] Like Marino
Sanudo, Philippe de Mézières had actually contributed to the
aggrandizement of the Osmanlis; for he turned the minds of those who
were moved by his appeals from the real menace of Islam to a quixotic
and wholly useless dream. The crusades had only emphasized the axiom of
history that Syria, including Palestine, must be held either through
Mesopotamia or through Egypt.
Against the Osmanlis as against the Moslems of the Holy Land, the Church
was no longer able to move Europe. The Nicopolis crusade was undertaken
and carried through by secular agencies. It had neither religious motive
nor religious backing.
The interest of Hungary in checking the progress of Ottoman conquest was
hardly second to that of Venice and Genoa. To the two Italian republics,
who had not hesitated to stake their very existence a decade before upon
the mastery of the Aegaean Sea and the free passage of the Dardanelles,
one would suppose that the battle of Kossova would have been a salutary
warning, and that they would have seen the necessity of opposing the
Osmanlis to the full extent of their resources. The archives of these
cities, however, during the entire reign of Bayezid, reveal a record of
double-dealing and insincere diplomacy which was as futile and
disastrous as it was shameful.
Immediately upon hearing the news of Kossova, the Venetian Senate sent
to Andrea Bembo, who had been negotiating with Murad, a letter
instructing him as to the course he should follow in view of the death
of Murad. He was to seek out the son who had survived, or, if both sons
were alive, to be very cautious until one son had killed or defeated the
other. In the meantime, he was to make overtures to both, telling each
one, without letting the other know, that the Senate ‘had heard of the
death of his father, and on that account had great sorrow. For we have
always regarded him as a most particular friend, and we loved him and
his state. Likewise we have heard of his happy elevation to the power
and lordship of his country, concerning which we have been very happy,
because, in like manner as we have sincerely loved the father, we love
and are disposed to love the son and his dominion, and to regard him as
a particular friend.’ Then Bembo was to speak of the commercial
privileges desired by the Senate, and to disclaim the action of the
Venetian admiral, Pietro Zeno, who had attacked the galleys of
Murad.[492]
Immediately upon hearing which son had become the successor of Murad,
the Senate sent Francesco Quirini to Bayezid with gifts to secure the
renewal of the commercial treaty concluded several years before with
Murad. Bayezid readily offered to protect Venetian commerce, but he
gave no guarantee.[493]
The appearance of the Osmanlis on the Aegaean Sea, and their sacking of
Chios, Negropont,[494] and Attica, greatly alarmed the Senate. Fear was
expressed for the safety of the Venetian fortresses in Negropont and
Crete.[495] All garrisons were ordered, provisioned, and
reinforced.[496] In 1393, forgetting their sincere love for Bayezid, the
Senate decided to treat with Sigismund for an offensive alliance against
the Osmanlis.[497] So it cannot be believed that the Venetians did not
see the growing danger.
In September of the next year they responded favourably, although
vaguely, to a letter in which Sigismund notified them that in the coming
springtime he would ‘go against the Turks to their loss and
destruction’.[498] But when, in May 1396, a Hungarian embassy arrived in
Venice to announce the readiness for a forward movement, and to secure
the promised aid, Venice pledged herself only to the extent of four
galleys, and that on condition that Rhodes, Chios, and Mytilene would
co-operate with the Venetians.[499] A high-sounding letter was sent to
Tommaso Monicego, ordering him to move against the Osmanlis ‘for the
preservation of the city of Constantinople and for the honour of the
republic’.[500] Too weak and too inexperienced to withstand the hardened
mariners of Italy, the Osmanlis disappeared from the sea for the moment.
Their navy was only six years old, and could not yet match itself
against the _ghiaours_. Monicego fought no battle, for there was no
enemy to oppose him. But he made no effort to hinder the passage of the
Osmanlis from Asia to Europe and from Europe to Asia. The sincerity of
the naval co-operation in the Nicopolis crusade is open to the gravest
suspicion.[501]
While the Senate was putting off Sigismund with assurances and promises
that never materialized, they continued to treat with Bayezid and
Manuel. In September 1394, the Osmanlis appeared in the Adriatic at the
mouth of the Boyana, and seized Venetian subjects there. The danger to
Durazzo was imminent, for the Osmanlis were now masters of the valley of
the Drin. When the Senate deliberated on measures for securing the
release of the prisoners and for the defence of Durazzo, they decided to
make representations rather than threats to Bayezid.[502] He naturally
paid no attention to the Venetians. They did not intend to apply force,
so he continued the subjugation of Albania and Greece.
To Manuel the Senate wrote a letter in 1394, recommending him ‘to trust
in God, to trust in the measures which the Christian princes would know
how to take, to write to the pope and to these (the Christian princes),
promoting a general alliance’.[503] But one finds in the deliberations
of the Senate no speech or motion or letter from which one could infer
that they themselves had any hope whatever of the efficacy of the
procedure suggested to Manuel. In fact, within six months, in spite of
the imminence of the Hungarian offensive campaign that was to ‘drive the
Turks out of Europe’, the Senate actually decided to send ambassadors
to Bayezid to urge upon him the advisability of an accord with the
Byzantine emperor.[504] It was only because the crusade of Sigismund was
already launched, and they realized the uselessness of it, that they
gave up this questionable _démarche_, and discussed measures for the
safety of the Venetian fleet, and for preventing Constantinople from
falling into Bayezid’s hands without coming into any open rupture with
the Osmanlis.[505] Did Venice, while ostensibly co-operating with the
crusaders, fear that a victory at Nicopolis would bring about the
hegemony of Hungary in the Balkan peninsula, and secretly wish for the
success of the Osmanlis?
As for Genoa, no other policy was considered than that of outbidding
Venice for Bayezid’s favour. Fulsome congratulations upon his succession
were sent to Bayezid. In the autumn of 1390, a Genoese embassy appeared
at Adrianople to remind Bayezid of the traditional friendship of the
Consulta for his father and grandfather. Their assurances were backed up
by valuable gifts.[506] While cultivating the friendship of the
Osmanlis, the Consulta levied a compulsory tax upon all the communes
where they could enforce their authority for the purpose of increasing
the Genoese fleets in the Aegaean Sea and at Constantinople.[507] A
watchful eye was kept on the Venetians and the Osmanlis. Neither
Sigismund nor Manuel received real aid from Genoa.
For the necessary outside support and assistance in the crusade which
appeared to him indispensable for the safety of Hungary, Sigismund had
to look elsewhere than to the divided papacy, and to the republics of
Venice and Genoa. Whether Sigismund’s fears of the ability of the
Osmanlis to destroy Hungary were well founded is open to question. But
there is no doubt that his activity prevented the capture of
Constantinople in the early years of the reign of Bayezid.
VII
As early as 1384, the French Court was aware of the remarkable progress
of the Ottoman conquest. The character and ambitions of Murad were
presented to the boy-king Charles VI in a striking way. He was told that
Murad, in a dream, had seen Apollon, one of his false gods, who offered
him a crown of gold before which were prostrated thirteen princes of the
Occident.[508] This childhood impression was revived in 1391, when
Charles was at the zenith of his emancipation under the Marmousets. He
received an embassy of pilgrims from the Holy Land, who brought news of
a defeat they had experienced while fighting with the King of Hungary
‘against the Turks of Lamorat Baxin’. When Charles asked them about the
genealogy and antecedents of the prince, whose name they confused with
that of his father, they knew nothing of him except that he was ‘a
vassal of the King of Persia’.
But of his character and ambitions they made a statement which we are
justified in quoting, because it throws light upon the notions
prevailing in the minds of the French aristocracy who went to their
death at Nicopolis. ‘He was’, said the pilgrims, ‘a man of wisdom and
discretion, who feared God according to the superstitious traditions of
the Turks ... humane towards the conquered, because he oppressed them
very little with exactions, and did not expel them from their lands so
long as they were willing to promise allegiance under an annual tribute,
however small. He kept his promises, and permitted them to live under
their own laws.... His seal was so respected in his army that whoever
saw it fell upon his knees. He had interpreters and spies in Europe to
instruct him about the kings and their policies. _He told the pilgrims
that he would come to France after he had finished with Austria._’[509]
The chronicler from whom this report is taken added that Charles was
much excited by this threat. He was anxious to make peace with England,
in order that he could accept the challenge of Bayezid, and go to fight
him in single combat at the head of his army. But Charles, in the
following year, so completely lost his mental balance that he could no
longer maintain any personal power, and fell under the influence of the
princes of the lilies. But his sympathies remained steadfastly attached
to every scheme for fighting the Osmanlis.
In the spring of 1395, the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy, uncles of the
king, who had for the moment all the power of the French crown in their
hands, received at Lyons ambassadors from Sigismund, who came to demand
aid against the Osmanlis. Philip of Burgundy was greatly interested in
this mission. It is extremely improbable that he had any interest
whatever in the Christians of the Balkan peninsula, the aggrandizement
of Hungary, or even the preservation of Constantinople from Moslem
sacrilege. But, since Flanders, Artois, and the county of Burgundy had
come to him through his wife on the death of Louis le Mâle, Philip had
begun to dream of establishing a new kingdom in Europe. It was the dream
which was to plunge France into the most bitter of her civil wars, to
call forth Jeanne d’Arc from the seclusion of Domrémy, and end in the
death of his great-grandson under the walls of Nancy.
Philip had every reason in the world to aid the project of Sigismund.
Apart from the fact that his immediate hold over the insane king,
Charles VI, would be strengthened by the absence from France of the
energetic scions of noble families, who, if successful in the struggle
against Bayezid, might push on to the Holy Land and find permanent
interests--or a grave--there, Sigismund was well worth cultivating. The
elder brother of the king of Hungary, Wenceslaus, was Roman emperor, but
insecure in his position. At that very moment, Wenceslaus was
negotiating with Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti to create him Duke of Milan
in exchange for his support.[510] Galeazzo was the father-in-law of
Louis of Orleans, younger brother of the French king, and Philip’s
formidable rival. The future of the Valois of Burgundy demanded an
_entente_ with the German imperial family. As this could not be
concluded with Wenceslaus, and as Wenceslaus might at any moment be
deposed, it was policy for Philip of Burgundy to come into close contact
with Sigismund, whose future in Bohemia and in the empire Philip
foresaw. At the very least, by lending aid to Sigismund, Philip had an
excellent chance of getting Luxemburg, which was essential to the
consolidation of the new Burgundy in the Netherlands.
As earnest of the aid which would be forthcoming the following year, the
Duke of Burgundy allowed the Comte d’Eu to proceed immediately to
Hungary with some nobles and six hundred horsemen.[511] After the
Hungarian envoys had gone through the formality of an audience with the
king at Paris, they returned to Sigismund bearing a letter in which
Philip promised substantial aid in cavaliers and mercenaries, under the
command of his own elder son, Jean Valois, Comte de Nevers.
From England, the Netherlands, Savoy, Lombardy, and all parts of
Germany, Sigismund received assurances that the cream of chivalry would
flock to his standards, and that he could rely upon Europe to back him
in the expedition which was to drive Bayezid out of Europe.
VIII
The crusade which ended in the disaster of Nicopolis is one of the most
interesting events of the close of the Middle Ages, not only by reason
of the historical importance of those who took part in it, but also
because it was the last great international enterprise of feudal
chivalry. It is the end of an epoch in the history of Europe. So
widespread was the interest in Sigismund’s call to arms against the
Osmanlis that there came to meet him at Buda in the spring of 1396 not
only the French volunteers, but also scions of noble families from
England, Scotland, Flanders, Lombardy, Savoy, Bohemia, and all parts of
Germany and Austria. The English war in Normandy had ceased, Milan was
supreme in northern Italy, and for the moment there was peace in the
Holy Roman Empire. It was a favourable time to attract adventurers to
unknown lands.
This expedition furnishes the most absorbing pages in the last portion
of Froissart;[512] it is mentioned in more or less detail in a number of
other French, Italian, German, and Latin chronicles. Several
participants have left graphic accounts of the gathering of the
chevaliers, the march down the Danube, the battle and its aftermath of
massacre, the captivity and ransom of the prisoners. The archives of
Dijon and Lille tell the cost of the fitting out of the French
contingent and of the ransom of the prisoners. For this crowning event
in Bayezid’s career, we have more source material than for any episode
of Ottoman history until the fall of Constantinople.[513]
The French chevaliers numbered about a thousand. They were accompanied
by six or seven thousand attendants and mercenaries. They gathered at
Dijon, under the command of Jean de Nevers, the oldest son of Duke
Philip of Burgundy, and grandson of King John, who had been captured in
the battle of Poitiers. He was only twenty-two, and had just won his
knighthood. The fact, though, that he was heir to Burgundy, and a prince
of the royal blood, gave him the command. Philip charged the Sieur de
Coucy, one of the boldest and most experienced warriors in France, to
have an eye on the boy, and to guide the expedition with his
counsel.[514]
Prominent among the French chevaliers were Philippe d’Artois, Constable
of France, Henri and Philippe de Bar, cousins of the king, the Sieur de
Coucy, Guillaume de la Trémouille, Jacques Bourbon de Vienne, admiral of
France and prince of the royal blood, Boucicaut, marshal of France, the
Sieur de Saint-Pol, and three Flemish princes who were the brothers of
Jean de Nevers’s mother. The heir to the duchy of Bavaria was anxious to
join the French chevaliers, but was restrained by the wise words of Duke
Albert: ‘William, since you have the desire to travel and go to Hungary
and Turkey, and carry arms against people and countries which have never
done anything to us, and you have no reason for going there, except the
vainglory of this world, let John of Burgundy and our cousins of France
do their enterprises, and you do yours, and go into Friesland and
conquer our inheritance ... and in doing this I shall help you.’[515]
The chevaliers travelled through Germany and Bohemia, and were
hospitably received by the Duke of Austria. ‘On the way they spoke of
Amorath-Bacquin[516] and admired little his power.’ When they reached ‘a
city called Buda, the king made them a great reception and good cheer,
and indeed he ought to have done so, for they had come far to see him
and bear arms for him’.[517] At Buda they found the other chevaliers who
had responded to the invitation of Sigismund, among whom were the
Bastard of Savoy,[518] Frederick of Hohenzollern, grand prior of the
Teutonic Order, Philibert de Naillac, grand master of Rhodes, with a
contingent of chevaliers of Saint-John, the Elector Palatine, and John,
Burgrave of Nürnberg, ancestor of the House of Brandenburg.[519] A
scholarly biographer of Henry IV of England has recorded that he, as
Count of Lancaster, was one of the participants in the Nicopolis
expedition.[520] This error has found its way into one, at least, of our
most reliable modern historians.[521] Although the successor of Richard
II was not, as a matter of fact, at Nicopolis,[522] the blood of the
Nicopolis crusaders is in the veins of the British royal house, as in
that of practically every ruling family of Europe.
Sigismund claimed to have been assured by Bayezid that the Osmanlis
would invade Hungary in the spring of 1396. When there were no signs of
an Ottoman invasion, the crusaders decided that, as Bayezid did not come
to seek them, they had best take advantage of the summer months to go
and find the arch-enemy of Christendom.[523] Arrangements had been made
with Mircea, voïevode of Wallachia, to break with the Osmanlis and join
the coalition. Manuel, who had been invited to co-operate with the
invaders, prepared secretly to declare against Bayezid.[524]
According to the chronicles, the invasion of Bulgaria was rather a
picnic than a serious military operation. This was true, at least, for
the western chevaliers, who had brought with them wine and women in
plenty. Their baggage contained all the luxuries to which they were
accustomed at home. The French auxiliaries travelled from Buda to the
Danube by way of Transylvania and Wallachia, crossing the Carpathians
through the pass between Brassó (Karlstadt) and Sinaia.
The Hungarians, following the Danube, spread out into Serbia, pillaging
and murdering the inoffensive Christian population more thoroughly than
Ottoman akindjis would have done.[525] In spite of a lack of opposition,
they persisted in acting as if they were in the enemy’s country. Widin
surrendered without a struggle, and Orsova after five days.[526] In
September, the armies joined before the fortress of Nicopolis, whose
surrender to the Osmanlis three years before had marked the
disappearance of Bulgarian independence. They were destined to go no
farther.[527]
For sixteen days Sigismund and his allies encamped in front of Nicopolis
without giving assault.[528] They had no idea of the whereabouts of
Bayezid. It was believed among the French (whose ignorance of geography
and of distances equalled ours of modern times) that Bayezid was in
Egypt, gathering a great army of all the Moslem world to oppose the
triumphant march of the crusaders. One reads in Froissart that Bayezid
was ‘in Cairo in Babylonia [_sic_] with the sultan to get men’, that he
left the sultan there and rallied his forces at Alexandria and Damascus,
that ‘under the command and prayers of the khalif of Bagdad and Asia
Minor’, whose mandate went forth ‘to Persia, to Media, and to Tarsus’,
Bayezid received a ‘mass of Saracens and miscreants’, and that in his
army were ‘people of Tartary, Persia, Media, Syria, Alexandria, and of
many far-off countries of the miscreants’.[529]
Sigismund made a speech to the chevaliers from western and central
Europe, in which he declared: ‘Let him come or not come, in the summer
which will return, if it pleases God, we shall get through the kingdom
of Armenia and shall pass the Bras Saint-George and shall go into Syria
and shall get from the Saracens the gates of Jaffa and Beirut and
several other [cities] to go down into Syria, and we shall go to conquer
the city of Jerusalem and all the Holy Land. And if the Sultan, with all
the strength he can muster, comes before us, we shall fight him, and
there will be no going away without the battle, in God’s pleasure.’
Froissart naïvely adds immediately after his report of this speech: ‘But
it turned out very much in another way.’[530]
It certainly did. Bayezid, who had been directing the siege of
Constantinople, knew no more about the khalif and the sultan and the
‘far-off countries of the miscreants’ than did Froissart. Neither he nor
his ancestors had ever had dealings with the Moslem princes of Asia.
Persians, ‘Saracens’ and Egyptians were lacking in his army. He
gathered together his trained warriors, called upon his Christian
vassals for their quotas, and set forth over the well-known route to the
Danube. From several recent campaigns, he and his soldiers were
thoroughly familiar with the country through which they passed, and in
which the people were less afraid of him than they were of the
Christians who had come to deliver them. When, after two weeks’ march,
he pitched his camp near Nicopolis, he was simply returning to a place
where twice before the Ottoman arms had been victorious.
Sigismund was dismayed at the prompt appearance of Bayezid with an army
which was reported to him in numbers varying from one hundred and twenty
thousand to two hundred thousand. In spite of his brave words to the
chevaliers, Sigismund knew the worth of the Osmanlis as fighting-men,
and that they could not be brushed aside by a few impetuous cavalry
charges. So he begged Jean de Nevers and his companions to consult with
him, and to formulate a definite plan of action. He suggested, and won
over to this opinion the Sieur de Coucy, who was the most experienced
warrior among the chevaliers, that a reconnaissance be made first of all
to determine Bayezid’s position and intentions. Then, if Bayezid was
actually moving to the attack, or on the point of moving, it would be
the part of wisdom for the westerners to allow the foot-soldiers of
Hungary and the Wallachians to sustain the first attack. The valiant
horsemen and western mercenaries should form a second line, whether it
be in attack or defence.
The chevaliers were furious at this suggestion. Philippe d’Artois, Comte
d’Eu and Grand Constable of France, who knew Sigismund best from longer
association with him, suspected him of an attempt to rob the chevaliers
of the glory of defeating Bayezid. ‘Yes, yes,’ he cried, ‘the king of
Hungary wants to have the flower of the day and the honour. We have the
advance-guard, and already has he given it to us. So he wants to take it
away from us and have the first battle. Whoever believes in this, I
shall not.’ Then turning to the chevalier who carried his banner, he
called out, ‘Forward banner, in the name of God and of Saint George, for
they will see me to-day a good chevalier’.[531] This action was
contagious. Without knowing where the enemy was, without thinking where
or how far they were going, without waiting to agree upon a concerted
action with the bulk of their army, the French, German, and English
noblemen rushed forward to make the last charge of European chivalry
against the followers of Mohammed.
The outposts of Bayezid, taken by surprise, were cut down. The Osmanlis
who surrendered were massacred without mercy. Imagining that they were
winning a great victory, and that they were breaking through the only
obstacle between them and the Holy Sepulchre, the chevaliers rode to
death and disgrace. In the picturesque language of Rabbi Joseph, ‘they
said “Aha! aha!”. But their joy was quickly gone, for the horsemen of
Bayezid and his hosts and chariots came against them, in battle array,
like the moon when she is new.’[532]
The chevaliers had put all their strength of man and horse into the
charge. Their swords ran blood. They thought the day was theirs, when
suddenly they found themselves confronting the army of Bayezid. As was
his invariable custom, Bayezid had sent out to meet the attack of the
chevaliers, when he heard that they had commenced the battle, his
worthless untrained levies to be cut down by the enemy and exhaust their
strength. With deliberation he drew his trusted divisions in battle
array in an advantageous position, which he had ample time to choose.
His soldiers were intact and fresh. The Ottoman bowmen aimed their
arrows at the horses of the chevaliers. Unhorsed and quickly surrounded
by sixty thousand soldiers, there was nothing for the proudest warriors
in Europe to do but surrender to the foe whom they had despised.
As far as the chevaliers were concerned, the battle was over in three
hours. Jacques Bourbon, admiral of France, lay on the field with the
banner of Notre-Dame clasped tightly in his hands. Guy de la Trémouille,
Philippe de Bar, and others of the noblest blood of France, Flanders,
Bavaria, and Savoy were killed in the charge. But the greater part of
the high-born auxiliaries of Sigismund were prisoners in the camp of
Bayezid. So handsomely were they accoutred that the Osmanlis believed
them all to be princes of the Occident, and saved them for Bayezid to
determine their fate.[533]
When Sigismund learned that the chevaliers had disregarded his advice,
and had already ridden forth to find the army of Bayezid, he was greatly
worried, for he knew the tactics of Bayezid, and feared the worst. He
said to the grand master of Rhodes, ‘We shall lose the day through the
great pride and folly of these French: if they had only believed me, we
had forces in plenty to fight our enemies’.[534]
From a comparison of the chronicles, one does not get a clear idea of
what happened after the failure of the assault of the chevaliers. A
battle in which the bulk of the forces on either side were engaged
undoubtedly followed. But it is impossible to state whether Sigismund
followed up the way opened for him through the Ottoman lines by the
French charge, or whether the Hungarians and their auxiliaries were on
the defensive. Froissart and Morosini infer that Sigismund did not
attempt to fight after the failure of the chevaliers, and it was
believed in western Europe that the disaster of Nicopolis was due to the
failure of Sigismund to support the chevaliers rather than to their own
folly. The Hungarians and their king were bitterly denounced by the
French survivors.[535] On the other hand, Schiltberger, who took part in
the battle, declares that the king of Hungary was advancing in force,
and that Bayezid was preparing to retreat, when the Osmanlis received
sudden and substantial support from the krai of Serbia.[536]
The Serbians were so completely under Ottoman control after the battle
of Kossova, that they made no attempt to throw off the yoke of
Bayezid.[537] In Asia Minor as in the Balkan peninsula, against the
Karamanians and Tartars as against the crusaders, at Nicopolis as at
Angora, the Serbian auxiliaries were faithful supporters of Bayezid.
Nicopolis was certainly won with the aid of the Christians of the Balkan
peninsula. It was not only the Serbian reinforcements which won the day
for the Osmanlis. As soon as Mircea of Wallachia saw how the battle was
going, he quickly withdrew from the field, and got his forces across the
Danube before the panic started.
Whether the action of Mircea was actuated by treasonable motives or not
is open to debate. He may have honestly believed that it was a case of
_sauve qui peut_. If so, his action was not more reprehensible than that
of Sigismund himself. The future Holy Roman Emperor, who was to play so
important a part in the history of Europe during the early decades of
the fifteenth century, forgot his bold words of the previous week: ‘And
if the Sultan, with all the strength he can muster, comes before us, we
shall fight him, and there will be no going away without the battle, in
God’s pleasure.’ Sigismund and the grand master of Rhodes hurried to the
Danube, got away in a small boat,[538] and boarded one of the galleys of
Monicego, the Venetian admiral. Abandoning his army and his allies to
their fate, the king of Hungary sailed for home. He had the shame, if he
felt it at all, when passing through the Dardanelles, of seeing the
chevaliers and other prisoners of Nicopolis paraded before his eyes. One
of these prisoners wrote: ‘The Osmanlis took us out of the tower of
Gallipoli, and led us to the sea, and one after the other they abused
the king of Hungary as he passed, and mocked him, and called to him to
come out of the boat and deliver his people: and this they did to make
fun of him, and skirmished a long time with each other on the sea. But
they did not do him any harm, and so he went away.’[539]
Sigismund went to Modon, and then back to Hungary. This was the king who
had boasted that he would not only turn the Osmanlis out of Europe, but
that he had enough lances to support the sky, should it fall upon his
army.[540] Although his manhood had been put to the test, and had been
found wanting, he was saved to play a great, if unenviable, part in the
closing events of the Middle Ages.[541]
After Sigismund’s escape, his great army, which was to redeem the Holy
Sepulchre, fled before the Osmanlis. Those who were not killed, or
drowned in the Danube, retreated through Wallachia. Froissart describes
graphically the hardships of the French, German, English, Scotch,
Bohemian, and Flemish crusaders in their painful march across the
Carpathian Mountains. The chevaliers could secure a bare sustenance.
Their pages and men-at-arms were stripped of their clothes and beaten by
the peasants. It was not until they got into western Hungary that they
felt themselves safe.[542]
On the day following the battle of Nicopolis, Bayezid rode from his camp
to inspect the battle-field.[543] Orders had been given that the bodies
of the nobles who had fallen be put in a place apart from the common
dead, so that the identity of those who had lost their lives might be
ascertained. An especial search for the body of Sigismund was ordered.
The Hungarian king was not among the captives: it did not occur to
Bayezid that he had fled. When Bayezid saw how heavy had been his
casualties, and learned the story of the massacre of prisoners by the
chevaliers after they had ridden through the Ottoman outposts, he could
not control his anger. A general massacre of the prisoners was ordered.
Only because Bayezid hoped for a great ransom for the grandson of the
French king was Jean de Nevers saved. There was in the suite of the
Comte de Nevers a Picard chevalier who knew a little Turkish. Through
him Jean was able to communicate with Bayezid, and to save twenty-four
chevaliers who would bring heavy ransom. Among these were the Comte
d’Eu, the Comte de la Marche, the Sieur de Coucy, Henri de Bar, and
Boucicaut. But they were all forced to stand beside Bayezid and watch
the massacre of their companions.
Because of his youth, for none under twenty years was killed,
Schiltberger was spared to leave a description of this terrible
massacre. ‘Then I saw the lord Hannsen Greiff, who was a noble of
Bavaria, and four others, bound with the same cord. When he saw the
great revenge that was taking place, he cried with a loud voice, and
consoled the horse- and foot-soldiers who were standing there to die.
“Stand firm”, he said, “when our blood this day is spilt for the
Christian faith, and we by God’s help shall become the children of
Heaven.” He knelt, and was beheaded together with his companions. Blood
was spilled from morning until vespers, and when the king’s counsellors
saw that so much blood was spilled and that still it did not stop, they
rose and fell upon their knees before the king, and entreated him for
the sake of God that he would forget his rage, that he might not draw
down upon himself the vengeance of God, as enough blood was already
spilled. He consented, and ordered that they should stop, and that the
rest of the people should be brought together, and from them he took his
share, and left the rest to his people who had made them prisoners. The
people that were killed on that day were reckoned at ten thousand
men.’[544]
So ended the last crusade.
IX
Immediately after the battle, Bayezid sent part of his army across the
Danube to hunt down the fugitives and to punish Mircea. This force was
defeated by the Wallachians in the plain of Rovine, and withdrew into
Bulgaria.[545]
Other columns mounted the Danube through the Iron Gates, retaking on the
way the fortresses captured by the crusaders, and made a raid into
Styria. Everywhere the akindjis carried fire and death. The country was
laid waste. Peterwardein was burned, and sixteen thousand Styrians were
carried off into slavery in Macedonia and Anatolia.[546]
This invasion of Hungary made a deep impression upon the Slavic and
Teutonic races, who believed that it was the beginning of a Moslem
conquest of central Europe. The flagellants and the dancing processions
of the plague days of 1348 and 1359 were revived. For a moment, even the
Venetian Senate feared that Bayezid had led in person his army into
Hungary, and was engaged in an aggressive movement that might bring the
Osmanlis to the head of the Adriatic.[547]
But Bayezid was not carried away by the ease of his victory. He let well
enough alone. For the moment, he had absorbing interests in the ransom
of his prisoners, the developments in the Greek peninsula, the question
of Constantinople, and the temptation to licentious pleasures that had
come to him with success.
X
Bayezid announced his victory from the battle-field to the Kadi of
Brusa, and later, from Adrianople, to the Moslem princes of Asia.[548]
To the Sultan of Egypt and other rulers he sent gifts of prisoners to
corroborate his letters.[549]
The intercession of Jean de Nevers had saved the more illustrious of the
surviving French chevaliers. They were taken to Brusa. While not treated
royally, they were allowed to hunt, and were given opportunities to see
the grandeur of Bayezid.[550] But they were not kept together long. For
some months, the heir to the Duchy of Burgundy was separated from his
companions, and could talk with them only by the special permission of
Bayezid. Some of them were sent to Mikhalitch, where Philippe d’Artois,
grand marshal of France, died.[551] Enguerran de Coucy, worn out with
anxiety for his family and the disgrace that had come to him at the
close of his brilliant career, soon followed the Comte d’Artois to the
grave.
In the meantime, Jacques Helly was sent by Bayezid to Paris to
communicate to the Duke of Burgundy and the other relatives of the
captives the conditions for their ransom--two hundred thousand pieces of
gold, delivered to Bayezid at Brusa. Froissart describes the feeling
aroused at Paris by the first news of the disaster. The stories of the
survivors were not believed, and the bearers of bad news narrowly
escaped hanging or drowning. An order of the king’s council forbade any
man to mention Nicopolis. The anxiety of the families of the chevaliers
was not set at rest until Jacques Helly reached Paris on Christmas
night, three months after the battle. Only then was it known who had
been saved for ransom. What was joy to some was a crushing blow to
others. Not since the battle of Poitiers had such a calamity come to the
noble families of France. There was great lamentation throughout the
kingdom. Chief among the mourners was the Duchess of Burgundy, who had
lost her three brothers, and whose son was in the hands of Bayezid.[552]
While Jacques Helly was in France, Marshal Boucicaut was given
permission to go to Constantinople to try to raise the ransom. He spent
the Lenten season of 1397 there without success.[553] The Duke of
Burgundy resorted to every expedient to raise the enormous sum demanded
by Bayezid. For the ransom of his son ‘great taxes were laid upon all
the kingdom, and a large amount of money was gathered and transported to
Turkey, which was a great and irreparable loss’.[554] It was not
forgotten for many years. A decade later it was used as one of the
indictments against the Duc d’Orléans, who met his death through the
man he had helped to ransom.[555]
When, a year after the battle of Nicopolis, the money was at last
delivered to Bayezid through the intermediation of Gattilusio of
Mytilene and the Genoese, Venetian, and Cypriote merchants who traded
with the Osmanlis, Bayezid gave the chevaliers their liberty. To the
Comte de Nevers, he said: ‘John, I know well and am informed that you
are in your country a great lord. You are young, and, in the future, I
hope you will be able to recover, with your courage, from the shame of
this misfortune which has come to you in your first knightly enterprise,
and that, in the desire of getting rid of the reproach and recovering
your honour, you will assemble your power to come against me and give me
battle. If I were afraid of that, and wanted to, before your release I
would make you swear upon your faith and religion that you would never
bear arms against me, nor those who are in your company here. But no:
neither upon you nor any other of those here will I impose this oath,
because I desire, when you will have returned to your home and will have
leisure, that you assemble your power and come against me. You will find
me always ready to meet you and your people on the field of battle. And
what I say to you, you can say in like manner to those to whom you will
have the pleasure of speaking about it, because for this purpose was I
born, to carry arms and always to conquer what is ahead of me.’[556]
It is not true, however, as one would suppose and as Froissart records,
that ‘these lofty words were always remembered by Jean de Nevers and
his companions so long as they lived’. The French chevaliers went to
Rhodes, and then home by way of the Adriatic. The Comte de Nevers took
to himself a title which he had not earned, unless one confuses folly
with valour. To the end of his days, he was known as _Jean sans Peur_.
He never burned with a desire to wipe out the disgrace of Nicopolis, but
spent his whole life as a factional leader in the civil wars of France.
After a career which continued as ingloriously as it had begun, he was
stabbed to death on the Bridge of Montereau in 1420--tardy vengeance for
his own openly acknowledged instigation of the murder of the Duc
d’Orléans.
XI
There is recorded the capture of Thebes by the Turks in 1363,[557] and
the surrender of Patras in Thessaly to the Osmanlis in 1381.[558] The
first Ottoman army, however, to enter Greece went to the Morea in 1388,
upon the invitation of Theodore Palaeologos, to support his waning power
as despot against the indigenous Greeks and the Frankish lords. The
Osmanlis under Evrenos carried devastation everywhere they went, and did
little to help Theodore.[559] They were soon recalled by Murad to
co-operate in the Kossova campaign. When Theodore was hard pressed, in
1391, by Amadeo of Savoy and the Venetians, he turned again to the
Osmanlis. Once more Evrenos came to the Morea, and helped to destroy the
coast towns.[560]
After the famous council of Ottoman vassals at Serres, in 1395,
Theodore, who was one of the princes summoned by Bayezid to Serres, was
compelled to sign the cession of Argos and Monembasia to the Osmanlis.
He was then thrown into prison, and Bayezid contemplated having him
assassinated. But before the cities could be delivered to the Ottoman
emissaries, Theodore escaped, and declared the cession null and
void.[561] The first impulse of Bayezid was to send an army upon the
heels of Theodore. This punitive expedition was postponed on account of
the activity of Sigismund, and the necessity of defending the northern
frontiers against the Hungarians.[562]
In the spring of 1397, while Bayezid was superintending the construction
of a mosque at Karaferia in Macedonia, he received a visit from the
Greek bishop of Salona, who laid before him a formal accusation of
adultery, sorcery, and oppression against Helena Cantacuzenos, who had
been ruling the Duchy of Salona with her paramour after the death of her
husband, Louis Fadrique. The bishop invited Bayezid to enter Greece,
depicting to him the wonderful hunting he would have in a country full
of game.[563]
The promise of good sport with the falcon was not needed. It had long
been Bayezid’s intention to extend his sovereignty into the Greek
peninsula. He had against Theodore not only the old count from Serres,
but also the complicity of the Morean despot in the Nicopolis crusade.
At the head of his army, he set out upon the first Ottoman invasion of
Greece. In Thessaly, Larissa, Pharsala, and other strongholds
surrendered without striking a blow. For thirty years the Greeks of
Thessaly had felt that the Ottoman conquest was inevitable. When
Bayezid crossed the pass of Thermopylae without opposition, Helena
hurried to meet him. She offered her principality, her daughter, and
herself to the conqueror. Bayezid did not want the duchess. She was set
at liberty immediately. But the beautiful grand-daughter of John
Cantacuzenos was sent to his harem. The duchy of Salona, in which was
the shrine of Apollo, with all of Phocis, Doris, and Locris, was added
to Thessaly, and made an Ottoman province.[564]
Bayezid by this time had tired of the campaign. He felt an irresistible
call to return to the pleasures of the court. His military interests
were beginning more and more to be centred upon an extension of his
power in Asia Minor--the policy that was soon to prove his undoing. But
there remained Theodore and the Morea to be dealt with. He left Yakub
and Evrenos, with an army of fifty thousand, in charge of the invasion
of the Peloponnesus.
Yakub struck south to Coron and Modon. The environs of Modon were
pillaged and burned. He defeated Theodore at Megalopolis, and forced him
to become a tributary of the Osmanlis. In the meantime, Evrenos had held
in check the papal mercenaries at Corinth, and had then taken Argos by
assault, with a terrible loss of life, and a booty of fourteen thousand
male captives. Because the Venetians could so easily reinforce and
reprovision it from the sea, the siege of Nauplia was abandoned. The two
commanders, when October came, gave their soldiers licence to pillage
wherever they could as a reward for their services, and afterwards
withdrew to Macedonia.[565]
The population of the historic city of Argos was deported into Anatolia,
and Moslem colonies settled in the north-eastern corner of the
Peloponnesus. This was part of the general plan of Bayezid after
Nicopolis. His successes in Asia Minor had made possible, for the first
time, a movement of an unmixed Turkish element from Anatolia into the
Balkan peninsula. While these colonists were arriving in Argos, there
was a similar immigration to Adrianople, Eski Zagora, Philippopolis, and
Sofia.[566]
Bayezid is credited by the Ottoman chroniclers with the capture of the
two great cities of Hellenism, Athens and Salonika. Nowhere else than in
the Ottoman historians can one find a record of the acquisition of
Athens in 1397 by the Osmanlis. If it were true, one would certainly
find this event in the Venetian archives, for Venice was particularly
interested in Athens at this time.[567] Had the Osmanlis entered Athens,
would they have restored it to the Acciajoli family? The fate of Argos
in the same campaign makes this unlikely. Athens remained in Christian
hands until after the fall of Constantinople.[568]
As for Salonika, one finds authority for its capture by the Osmanlis
after the attempt of Manuel to retake Serres,[569] after a four years’
siege, in 1387,[570] and in 1391 by Bayezid himself.[571] But since
there is neither record nor explanation of how the city returned to the
Byzantines, even the temporary occupation of so rich and important a
maritime city, and so strongly defended,[572] during the reigns of Murad
and of Bayezid, is hardly possible. For in 1403 Salonika was sold by the
Byzantines to the Venetians,[573] and was not captured by the Osmanlis
until 1430.
Even if we cannot give to Bayezid the honour of the acquisition of
Athens and Salonika, or of the conquest of the Morea, his campaign of
1397 was the beginning of the subjugation of Greece. Important districts
had been added to the empire, and a permanent foothold gained in the
Morea. The maritime character of the peninsula, however, made
impracticable its complete conquest, until the Osmanlis were able to
hold their own against the Italians and Greeks upon the sea.
XII
The blockade of Constantinople, in spite of all the concessions that
Manuel had made to Bayezid,[574] had become an active and pressing siege
before the Nicopolis expedition. In 1394, Bayezid had given orders from
Adrianople to pursue the siege vigorously.[575] But it was not until the
spring of 1396 that Bayezid contemplated seriously the taking of the
city by assault. He was diverted by the coming of the crusaders to
Nicopolis. After Sigismund and his allies had been defeated, Bayezid
returned to Constantinople and called upon Manuel to surrender the city.
The Constantinopolitans, stunned by the disaster which had attended the
Christian arms on the Danube, urged Manuel to yield, in order that they
might be free from the calamities that would follow a successful
assault. But Manuel had been cheered by the arrival of six hundred
chevaliers and a small gift of money from France. He resisted his
people, and gave no answer to Bayezid.[576] He married his eldest son
John to the daughter of the Russian prince Vassili, whose dowry was in
gold pieces.[577] An inventory was made of the treasures of St.
Sophia.[578] Through the Patriarch, Manuel tried to get the Russian and
Polish Christians interested in the fate of the seat of orthodoxy.[579]
From Europe came the usual promises of aid. It is a merciful
dispensation of Providence that men ground their hopes upon desires
rather than upon realities. Manuel was merely human when he continued to
receive strength and inspiration from what experience should have taught
him were will-o’-the-wisps. Henry of Lancaster was projecting a new
crusade;[580] but his energies were very soon directed towards a crown
rather than a cross. The Duc d’Orléans, in response to a letter from
Manuel to King Charles VI, answered for his insane brother by promising
to come in person to the relief of Constantinople. Almost immediately
afterwards he accepted rich presents from Bayezid.[581]
Venice, in 1397, urged Manuel and the Genoese of Pera, ‘for the honour
of Christianity’ and because the alternative ‘would be to the peril and
shame of Christianity’, not to treat with Bayezid. This advice was
weakened by a saving clause at the end of the letter to the effect that,
if the Constantinopolitans and Perotes did treat with Bayezid, they
should include Venice, for ‘it would be too risky for the Venetians to
be at war alone with the Turks’.[582] Although Venice sent ten galleys
to Constantinople, and Genoa five galleys,[583] the republics followed
consistently their policy of flattering Bayezid, and trying to make him
believe that their dispositions towards him were altogether
friendly.[584]
At the time that he summoned Manuel to deliver Constantinople, Bayezid
fortified the gulf of Nicomedia, and built at Scutari the castle called
Guzel Hissar.[585] About the same time, the castle of Anatoli Hissar was
built at the mouth of the Sweet Waters of Asia, the narrowest point on
the Bosphorus. When Clavijo passed through the Bosphorus, in 1403, he
spoke of this castle as strongly built and strongly fortified, in
prophetic contrast to the ruined Byzantine fortress directly opposite on
the European shore.[586]
Perhaps it was because of the advice of Ali Pasha, who told him that the
taking of Constantinople would bring upon him a really effective
European intervention, or because he preferred to expend his energies in
the Greek peninsula and in Asia Minor, that Bayezid did not carry out
his threat to Manuel. These are the common explanations of the failure
to follow up the victory of Nicopolis with the extinction of the
Byzantine Empire.[587] As far as the Greeks were concerned, the
inheritance of the Caesars was his. He had successfully defended against
Europe what he had won. Constantinople could have been taken by assault.
In fact, from his spies within the city, Bayezid knew that the
inhabitants were favourable to surrender, and would probably force the
hand of Manuel, if the Osmanlis made a show of beginning the assault.
Bayezid must have been deterred from this enterprise, however, by the
realization of his inability to hold the city without having the mastery
of the sea.
One of Bayezid’s chief claims to greatness as a statesman is the way in
which he handled Venice and Genoa. At any time during his reign, the
Italian republics could have cut him off from Asia if he were in Europe,
or from Europe if he were in Asia. Bayezid was master of most of the
Balkan peninsula and of half of Anatolia; but he did not control the
path from one portion of his empire to the other. Since he had come to
the throne, Genoa had fallen under the influence of France. There was a
strong anti-Ottoman sentiment in the Venetian Senate, which at any
instant might crystallize into open hostility.[588] Europe was for the
moment stirred over the fate of the Nicopolis crusaders. Bayezid knew
that this was not the time to take Constantinople.
Then, too, after the great victories of Kossova and Nicopolis, and his
successful campaign against Karamania, Bayezid allowed himself to
succumb to the insidious temptations that assail the warrior when he
passes from the tent to the palace. It was not astonishing that the
pleasures of the table and of the harem proved irresistible to him.
Bayezid, who had the best qualities of his age, allowed himself to
become debauched by indulgence in shameful and unspeakable vices. His
brilliant mental and physical qualities began to suffer the inevitable
eclipse. His example was contagious. For, as the Osmanlis say, ‘the fish
begins to corrupt at the head’.
XIII
In April 1398, and again in March 1399, Boniface IX ordered to be
preached throughout Christendom a crusade for the defence of
Constantinople.[589] His appeals fell on deaf ears. Wenceslaus was
approaching the end of his power in the empire, Richard of England was
fighting for his throne, Florence was in a struggle with the Visconti,
the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of Orleans were disputing the regency
in France. Only Venice and Genoa were vitally interested in the fate of
Constantinople.
Because Genoa had put itself under the guardianship of the Duke of
Orleans, brother of Charles VI of France, and son-in-law of Duke
Giovanni Visconti of Milan, the interests of her Pera colony demanded
some attention from the powerful Valois and Visconti families. This made
possible the sole response to the appeals of Manuel and the Pope, the
expedition of Marshal Boucicaut.
In the summer of 1399, a force of ten thousand Osmanlis, after coming
into more or less open conflict with the Genoese of Galata, attempted to
enter Constantinople. The defenders were few; for the inhabitants, as at
the time of the final siege in 1453, were more likely to be found in the
bazaars than on the city walls. They had little desire to prolong a
condition which was paralysing their business activities. Clavijo, who
visited Constantinople four years later, was informed that the attack
failed only because of the lack of skill and energy shown by the
Osmanlis.[590] Until they had cannon to help them, the Osmanlis never
displayed fighting ability in an assault upon fortifications. At this
critical moment, aid arrived from Europe.
Boucicaut was the only one of the prisoners of Nicopolis that accepted
the challenge of Bayezid. He did not forget the biting words of the
audience at Brusa at the time of their release. On June 26, 1399, with
four ships and two armed galleys, he set sail from Aiguesmortes. His
force of twelve hundred chevaliers and foot-soldiers had much more
cohesion and experience than the volunteers who gathered round Jean de
Nevers at Dijon three years before. He was joined at Tenedos by several
Genoese and Venetian galleys. After a victory in the Dardanelles over
seventeen Ottoman galleys, the first recorded naval combat of the
Osmanlis, Boucicaut reached Constantinople ‘just in time to save the
city’. He was received with great joy by Manuel, and given the rank of
Grand Constable.[591]
For several weeks, Boucicaut and his followers spread terror among the
Osmanlis in the Gulf of Nicomedia and the Bosphorus. The Ottoman
sailors, no match for the Provençals and Italians, took to cover. An
assault on Nicomedia failed, but the fearless marshal made several raids
into the interior,[592] and against the Ottoman settlements on the
shores of the Marmora and gulfs of Nicomedia and Mudania. His one
notable success was against Riva, near the Black Sea entrance of the
Bosphorus, on the Asiatic shore.[593] After the castle had been stormed,
and the garrison put to the sword, Boucicaut attained the objective of
his raid. In the mouth of the river Riva, from which the town takes its
name, were hidden the Ottoman galleys and smaller vessels, which had
taken refuge there when Boucicaut first appeared in the Golden Horn. All
the Ottoman shipping was destroyed by fire.
In order to remove the danger to which Constantinople was subjected by
the presence of John Palaeologos, son of Andronicus, at Silivria,
constantly intriguing with the Osmanlis, Boucicaut urged Manuel to
become reconciled with his nephew. He went, himself--it was less than a
day’s sail--to fetch John to Constantinople.[594]
This intervention of Boucicaut in the quarrels of the Palaeologi was
more helpful than his military aid. The expeditions in the neighbourhood
accomplished little against Bayezid. The chronicler of Boucicaut would
have been astonished had he known that Bayezid considered the exploits
of Boucicaut’s chevaliers and sailors of too little importance to
notice. Bayezid cared only that the Italian republics did not come out
openly against him, and lend to the crusaders the powerful and decisive
aid which they could have given. The enterprise of Boucicaut
demonstrated, however, the impotence of the Osmanlis on sea, and how
easily a united effort of Christendom, or of Venice and Genoa alone,
could have limited the activities of Bayezid to either Europe or Asia.
When John had been installed as co-emperor, Boucicaut pointed out to
Manuel that his force was exhausted, and that he would have to return to
France to find recruits. According to some authorities, this action was
due to the inability or unwillingness of Manuel to pay the adventurers
of Boucicaut for their services in his behalf.[595] Men of their kidney
were not fighting for fun or for a cause, and there was no booty to be
had from Ottoman sailors and fishermen. Before he left Constantinople,
Boucicaut secured the consent of Venice, Genoa, and the chevaliers of
Rhodes to his suggestion that Manuel do homage to Charles VI for his
empire. This honour the advisers of the French monarch refused to
accept. They did not want the king of France bound by the obligation of
protecting a vassal whose position was so precarious.
Boucicaut did not return. His restless energy found outlet later in
Cyprus, where, as French governor of Genoa, he forced the Cypriotes to
raise the siege of Famagusta,[596] and in pillaging the Syrian ports,
where his adventurers did far more damage to the Italian merchants than
to the Saracens.[597] Even had he returned to Constantinople, and with
the highest motives personally, his followers would certainly have done
the Constantinopolitans more harm than good, as had been the case with
the Catalans, and, when money was not forthcoming, have ended by being
in open conflict with those of whom they were posing as the defenders.
XIV
It was a bitter humiliation for Manuel to share the imperial throne with
the nephew whom he hated and distrusted. With him, the case of John was
one of ‘like father, like son’, and certainly John had never given the
emperor any cause to think that he was more patriotic, more loyal than
Andronicus. But there was a strong party in the city in favour of John,
and his association in governing Constantinople would remove the pretext
of righting a wrong, which Bayezid had so skilfully used to interfere in
the politics of what was now no more than a city empire.
When France refused to receive him as a vassal, Manuel decided upon a
voyage in person to solicit the intervention of Europe. In spite of his
misgivings, he felt that this was the only way of salvation left. His
own sons were too young to raise to the purple, and Theodore had his
hands full in the Morea. There was nothing to do but to leave the
government in John’s care.
On December 10, 1399, Manuel embarked on a Venetian galley to make his
supreme appeal to Europe. He stopped at Modon to leave the empress and
his sons with Theodore. The despot of the Morea was opposed to the
project. He told the emperor how the chevaliers of Rhodes, in
conjunction with the Pope, were trying to get possession of the last
theme of the empire, and that this scheme would have been successful had
it not been for the Greek hatred and fear of the Catholic Church. He
declared that Manuel, like their father, was embarking upon a hopeless
voyage. Not only that, but he would run a risk of losing his empire
entirely by leaving it in charge of John, who was more friendly to
Bayezid and the Osmanlis than to his own family and race.[598]
Manuel would listen to no remonstrances, to no arguments. He said that
his position was like that of Esther before she went in to the king: ‘If
I perish, I perish.’ With that optimism which was one of his most
redeeming traits, Manuel bade farewell to his family, and set out for
Venice.
In the only city of Europe that could rival his own capital in
splendour, he received a reception worthy of the cause for which he had
come. The Senate, as usual, promised much. But they had by this time
become thoroughly won over to the policy of _quod vi armorum potest
fieri, fiat arte et sagacitate_, to quote the words of a contemporary
record in their archives.[599] At Padua, Vicenza, and Milan, Manuel
received an imperial ovation. Giovanni Visconti, shocked at the wretched
appearance of the emperor’s suite, gave him money to be used for apparel
fitting to the successor of Constantine and his companions.[600]
There was no attempt to arrange a conference with Boniface IX. Manuel,
at this stage of his career, could not play the hypocrite so easily as
his father had done. In fact, his orthodoxy was beyond suspicion. He did
not hesitate in Paris to celebrate high mass according to the eastern
rite, and never allowed the reunion of the churches to be the basis of
his solicitations. In 1399, Boniface IX wrote a long burning letter to
the Bishop of Chalcedon, his nuncio in Hungary, ordering him to preach
and cause to be preached a crusade against the Osmanlis for the relief
of Constantinople.[601] In 1400, he had ordered a crusade, with increase
of indulgences.[602] But, when the Byzantine Emperor came to Italy,
Boniface seemed to be more interested in the Kingdom of Naples than in
the Kingdom of God.
From contemporary records, the reception of Manuel Palaeologos in France
and in England was all that the proudest and most important sovereign of
Christendom could wish for. This shadow of an emperor, who ten years
before had been a retainer at the court of Bayezid too insignificant to
be bidden to the emir’s table, and who was not even undisputed ruler of
a single city, was treated by Charles VI and Henry IV as if he actually
held the dominions entrusted by Constantine to his successors. This was
especially true in England, where barons and peasants, in spite of the
crusades, were still uncouth and ignorant. To them the East stood for a
superior civilization, to which they must bow. There was a glamour in
the name of Constantinople and in Manuel’s imperial title. Perhaps, even
if they had realized the straits to which Manuel was reduced, it would
have been the same; for it was not to the intrinsic worth or power of
the man, but to the ten centuries of glory which he represented, that
they did homage. The cry of AVE IMPERATOR had outlived the empire.
Manuel did not appreciate this. Because his optimism could not grasp
the difference between what costs and what does not cost, he allowed
himself to be cradled with false hopes for two years.
Henry IV had personally great sympathy with the mission of Manuel; for
in Africa he had borne arms against the Moslems with the cross upon his
breast, and, until he succeeded Richard II, it had always been his dream
to lead a crusade. He understood the peril of Constantinople, and in a
letter from Westminster, in January, 1401, he called the attention of
the Archbishop of Canterbury to the necessity of helping Manuel, in
order that Constantinople might not be lost, and authorized a collection
in all the churches of his realm.[603] But Henry was not secure upon his
throne. In France, the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans were still
struggling for the power that the insane king was unable to wield.
Manuel waited two years in western Europe. While he was making his heart
sick with deferred hope, the great events that were to change the
personal fortune of Bayezid, if not that of his family and his race,
were shaping themselves in the East. It was a Moslem prince who was to
afford a respite to Constantinople.
After Manuel left for the west, only the small force of chevaliers under
Châteaumorand, who had remained behind from the crusaders of Boucicaut,
saved Constantinople. The inhabitants of the city were so hungry that
they slipped over the walls by cords, and surrendered themselves to the
Osmanlis. John did nothing. There was no money in the imperial treasury.
The crusaders got their own provisions by raids on the Asiatic shore of
the Bosphorus, and by intercepting galleys. After the shock of the fall
of Sivas, Bayezid realized that he must expend the best of his force and
energy in solidifying his conquests in Europe and Asia, and in raising a
larger army to combat Timur, if he threatened again to invade Anatolia.
Although the siege was not pushed with vigour, the city was on the point
of yielding. The miserable John made a treaty to give up the city,
should Bayezid beat Timur.[604] Even the patriarch Matthew was supposed
to have an understanding with Bayezid to retain his position if the city
were taken. In a proclamation, which vividly depicted the misery of the
city, afflicted by six years of siege and famine, Matthew urged the
inhabitants to repent of their crimes, and defended himself from the
charge of having treated with Bayezid.[605]
Not only against Constantinople was Bayezid preparing the final blow. In
the Morea, the Greeks feared for the safety of Modon, where Manuel had
left his family.[606] Since 1399, the Venetian Senate had been alarmed
by the gradual Ottoman conquest of Albania, and finally for the safety
of Corfu, because the Osmanlis had appeared in force in the
Adriatic.[607]
In the early spring of 1402, Ottoman activities ceased in the Balkan
peninsula, and every soldier that could be mustered--Christian as well
as Moslem--was hurried into Asia Minor; for a greater than Djenghiz Khan
was marching westward.
XV
When the Tartars first saw iron, and their strongest warriors failed to
bend it, they thought there must be a substance under the surface. So
they called it _timur_, which means something stuffed or filled.[608] It
soon became a custom to name their great leaders Timur. But even among
primitive peoples the qualities of leadership have not necessarily
included purely physical strength. Many Samsons among the Tartars
received the distinction of being called Iron. None of them made an
indelible mark upon the history of the world, save the great Timur, who
had his left arm and left leg partially paralysed.[609] At the height of
his career, when his hordes marched against Bagdad, he was too weak to
sit upon a horse, and was carried in a litter.[610]
Timur claimed descent from the grand vizier of Djagataï, son and
successor of Djenghiz Khan. He came to the throne of Khorassan, with
residence at Samarkand, in 1369. In thirty years, while Murad and
Bayezid were winning an empire in the Balkan peninsula, Timur became
master of the greater part of the Moslem world. Persia, Armenia, the
upper valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, the steppes between the
Caspian and Black Seas, Russia from the Volga to the Don and Dnieper,
Mesopotamia, the coasts of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, and
western and northern India was his path of conquest.
After he had captured Sivas, Bayezid had not been able to curb the
altogether natural impulse that led him into the valley of the
Euphrates. In his way stood Kara-Yussuf, a Turcoman prince of Kharput,
who was to be, after Timur’s death, the founder of the famous dynasty of
the Black Sheep.[611] In 1399, Bayezid had put his son Soleiman,
assisted by several of his ablest generals, in charge of an advance
movement to the east. Sivas was the base of operations.
Kara-Yussuf, who had a claim upon Timur’s protection because he had
guided him on his first expedition into Armenia, appealed to the Tartar
court. Before Timur could remonstrate, Kara-Yussuf was captured by the
Osmanlis. When Timur learned this, his anger was for the first time
directed specifically against Bayezid. There were old complaints against
Bayezid. The refugee emirs had not lived at his court for years without
impressing upon Timur their woes and the injustice that had been done to
them. But Timur was busy with other plans and other conquests. Bayezid’s
former activities had not directly touched him.
In his memoirs, Timur records that he tried first to bring Bayezid to
reason. ‘I wrote to him a letter of which this is the substance: Praise
to God, master of heaven and earth, who has submitted to my authority
several of the seven climates and who has allowed the potentates and
masters of the world to bend their neck under my yoke. God have mercy
upon his humble servant, who knows the limits which are prescribed for
him and who does not cross them by a single step. All the world knows
your origin, and it is not fitting for a man of your extraction to
advance the foot of pride; for you will be able to throw yourself into
the abyss of affliction and of misfortune: resist the suggestions of
miserable counsellors.... Refrain from opening to confusion and to evils
the door of your empire. Send me Kara-Yussuf: if not, by the coming
together of our two armies all that is hidden under the veil of destiny
will be uncovered to you.’[612]
Instead of paying attention to this letter, Bayezid deliberately
committed another overt act by summoning Taharten, emir of Erzindjian,
whom he knew to be a vassal of Timur, to appear at the Ottoman court,
bringing his treasures with him! When Timur again remonstrated with
Bayezid and reminded him of his duty ‘gently and like a friend’, Bayezid
responded by summoning Timur to appear before him, and threatening to
deprive him of his harem if he refused to come. In order to express his
contempt for the Tartar conqueror, Bayezid placed his own name first in
letters of gold, and Timur’s name underneath in small black
letters.[613]
Why Bayezid took this tack in dealing with Timur is inexplicable. It is
impossible to believe that he underrated the power of Timur. One can
only suppose that his informants and advisers, to whom Timur alluded in
the first warning to Bayezid, urged upon the Ottoman emir the
improbability of a Tartar invasion of Asia Minor; for, even after the
terrible lesson of 1400, when Bayezid had two years of respite, he took
no steps to placate Timur or to prepare adequately against an invasion.
He went on blindly to his doom, and displayed none of the consummate
diplomatic and military skill that had made the first eight years of his
reign among the most brilliant of all Ottoman history.
When Timur saw that Bayezid would not even treat with him, he took the
field immediately. Soleiman sent an appeal to Bayezid, who was in
Thessaly.[614] There was no response. With feverish haste, Soleiman
attempted to put into condition the defences of Sivas, whose strong
walls had been admirably constructed by the Seljuk Sultan Alaeddin
Kaïkobad
[Illustration: TIMUR’S INVASION OF ASIA MINOR]
one hundred and sixty years before.[615] He then went boldly forth to
meet the Tartars, but, when he realized that his twenty thousand
horsemen could not hold their own against Timur, he withdrew to the
north-west, abandoning the city to its fate.[616]
It took Timur eighteen days of incessant attack to weaken the defences
of Sivas. The walls were sapped, and piles driven under them, which were
smeared with pitch and set on fire. Only after several of the towers had
fallen did the garrison agree to surrender upon Timur’s promise that
their lives should be spared and the whole city preserved. As far as the
Moslems were concerned, this promise was partially fulfilled. They were
allowed to pay for their freedom. The city, however, was pillaged and
burned, and its Christian inhabitants were sold into slavery. Three or
four thousand Armenian horsemen, who had been bravest and most stubborn
in the defence, were buried alive in the moats.[617]
The destruction of Sivas was in August, 1400.[618] The conduct of Timur
after this victory lends colour to the supposition that it was not at
all in his mind to subdue Asia Minor and overthrow the Ottoman Empire.
He had come not to conquer, but merely to give Bayezid a salutary
lesson. Instead of continuing his westward march, Timur withdrew to the
Euphrates, and spent the next eighteen months in the famous campaigns
that ended in the destruction of Damascus and Bagdad.
XVI
In the winter of 1401-2, fresh from his triumphs in Syria and
Mesopotamia, Timur paused for several months on the confines of Asia
Minor. He had not yet made up his mind to attack Bayezid.
Through a Dominican friar, who had been trying to convert him, he wrote
to Charles VI of France, whom he believed to be the most powerful king
of the Occident, making to him a proposal for sharing the world, such as
no European sovereign had put before him again until Alexander met
Napoleon on the raft at Tilsit.[619] There was also an exchange of gifts
and embassies with Genoa. The Genoese ambassador pointed out to Timur
the necessity of destroying Bayezid. When the Tartar embassy went to
Pera, the standard of Timur was flown in its honour from the Galata
tower.[620] Even the distant king of Castile had two ambassadors in the
camp of Timur, who were privileged to witness the battle of Angora from
the Tartar side.[621]
The fall of Sivas was the first set-back of Bayezid’s career. It came to
him as a heavy blow, if we are to believe the Ottoman chroniclers. But
it did not result in spurring him on to immediate military and
diplomatic effort, as such a calamity would certainly have done in the
early days of his reign. He had become a voluptuary, debauched mentally
and physically. His pride and self-confidence had increased in inverse
ratio to his ability to make good his arrogant assumptions.
Negotiations were reopened between the two great sovereigns of Islam.
The letters became more menacing on the part of Timur and more insulting
on the part of Bayezid.[622] Timur’s earlier admiration for Bayezid as
champion of the Prophet against the infidels, and his earlier reluctance
to make war against a nation of his own faith, had disappeared in the
course of his last conquests. The fire at Damascus was one indication of
Timur’s religious indifference: his willingness to treat with Christian
Europe was another. At last determined to humble Bayezid, Timur brought
his huge army into camp near Sivas. He did not, however, definitely
decide upon the invasion of Ottoman territory until he heard that
Bayezid was starting for Tokat.
To strike at Bayezid directly was impracticable, owing to the hardships
that his large army would encounter in traversing the thickly wooded and
mountainous country between him and the region in which his spies
reported the Ottoman army to be. He followed the valley of the Halys to
Caesarea. By keeping to the water-courses his army was enabled to live
off the land. It was just harvest time, and the soldiers gathered in all
the grain in the valley of the Halys and its tributaries. It took six
days to get to Caesarea, and four days more to reach Kirsheïr. In the
meantime, the advance guard of the Osmanlis had fallen back from Tokat
and Amassia to Angora. By a reconnaissance from Kirsheïr, Timur learned
that the bulk of the Ottoman forces were at Angora. Three days more
brought him to the Ottoman outposts.[623]
There was no further parley. Timur saw in Bayezid an enemy that must be
crushed. He had every confidence in his star. Bayezid had hardly
recovered from the awakening which came when he realized that Timur was
actually marching against him. His resourcefulness, his coolness, his
marvellous judgement had left him. His soldiers were exhausted by forced
marches in the hot midsummer sun, for it was the last week of July.[624]
He could have withdrawn for several days to the mountains to recuperate,
and let Timur do the seeking. Then Timur would have expended his
strength in an attack upon Angora under the broiling sun. Timur could
not have left Angora uncaptured behind him, or have moved westward in
pursuit of the Osmanlis without waiting to replenish his food supply.
But Bayezid, eager and lacking in self-control, as men sometimes are
from the presentiment of disaster rather than the confidence of success,
decided upon an immediate battle. This was just what Timur wanted.
Bayezid’s second mistake was in putting his Tartar allies in the first
line. He did this in accordance with the established Ottoman tactics,
that the enemy be allowed to expend his strength upon the untrained
rabble, and to reach the second line exhausted. But he had not taken
into consideration the fact that these Tartars were kin to his enemy,
and could easiest desert when placed in front.[625] A third mistake was
in taking the offensive rather than waiting for Timur to attack;[626]
for Bayezid had the advantage in being able to choose his position. From
Nicopolis to Plevna, Tchataldja and Gallipoli, the Osmanlis have always
shown their fighting qualities best in a defensive action.
There was nothing the matter with Bayezid’s army. Like the empire he had
been building, it was composed of all the Moslem and Christian elements
of Asia Minor and the Balkan peninsula. With the exception of the
Tartars, they were loyal to Bayezid, and had become accustomed to
fighting together with a discipline and bravery fully equal to, if not
superior to, that of Timur’s veteran warriors from central Asia. The
right wing was under Stephen Lazarevitch, brother-in-law and faithful
friend of Bayezid. In addition to Serbian horsemen, Stephen’s command
contained the other European contingents, Moslem as well as
Christian.[627] In the left wing were the troops of Anatolia, led by
Soleiman Tchelebi, Bayezid’s eldest son. The emir himself was in the
centre, surrounded by his janissaries and his three sons, Mustafa, Isa,
and Musa. To Mohammed, whose reliability and judgement Bayezid esteemed
second only to Soleiman’s among his sons, was entrusted the rear
guard.[628]
Elephants were used on both sides. Timur’s first line threw balls of
Greek fire into the midst of the archers who were covering the Ottoman
advance. The desertion of the Tartar auxiliaries, who formed a quarter
or more of Bayezid’s total strength, decided the battle before the
fighting really started.[629] When Bayezid saw that he could not prevent
the Tartars from going over to Timur, he ordered the left wing to
advance to the attack.
Fifteen thousand men fell in a vain effort to pierce the Tartar lines.
The slaughter was so great that Soleiman was unable to rally his
forces.[630] When they broke and fled, the offensive movement of the
Osmanlis was at an end. Bayezid, now on the defensive, was driven back
step by step. His retreat was cut off. With his bodyguard and the
refugees from other battalions, he made a gallant fight upon a small
hill, holding off the enemy for hours.[631] Long after nightfall, when
the main forces of Timur’s army, who had been pursuing the Osmanlis,
returned to the scene of victory, they learned that the Ottoman
sovereign was still fighting on the hill. There was no more hope for
Bayezid. The last of the defenders were overwhelmed. ‘The Thunderbolt
continued to wield a heavy battle-ax. As a starving wolf scatters a
flock of sheep, he scattered the enemy. Each blow of his redoubtable ax
struck in such a way that there was no need of a second blow.’[632] At
last, as he tried to withdraw over the hill, he was overpowered,[633]
his hands were bound behind his back, and he was sent to Timur’s tent.
With Bayezid, his son Musa and several of his highest officials, one of
whom was Timurtash, were taken prisoners. Mustafa disappeared. Soleiman,
Mohammed, and Isa succeeded in escaping.[634]
The battle of Angora is memorable in Ottoman annals as the only crushing
defeat experienced by the Osmanlis in the first three centuries of their
history, and as the one instance where a sovereign of the house of Osman
has been captured. But it cannot be placed among the memorable conflicts
that have changed the course of history; for it did not affect the
fortunes of the nation that won or of the nation that lost. It was not
like Kossova and Nicopolis.
XVII
Bayezid was brought before his conqueror at midnight, when Timur was
seeking relaxation from the strain of the combat in his favourite game
of chess with his son, Shah-Rokh. Bayezid had lost nothing of his
haughty spirit, and did not try to win the good graces of Timur. He was
never more the sovereign than in this moment of humiliation. So
impressed was Timur with the manner and bearing of his prisoner, that he
accorded him every honour due to his rank.
But this spirit of generosity quickly passed. Whether it was because
Bayezid tried to escape or that Timur feared an attempt at rescue as he
marched farther into Ottoman territory, Timur’s attitude soon changed.
To break Bayezid’s spirit he began to mock him and treat him with
contempt. He ordered him to be put in chains at night, and to be carried
on the march in a litter with bars, which was nothing less than a
cage.[635] At Brusa, Bayezid’s harem was taken from him. It has been
recorded that Timur went so far as to use his unfortunate rival as a
footstool for mounting his horse and at the table, and that Bayezid was
compelled to witness the degradation of his wife, the Serbian princess
Despina, who in a state of nudity served the Tartar conqueror with wine
at his feasts.[636]
This disgraceful treatment, coupled with the fact that his sons made no
attempt to bring another army to fight for their father’s freedom or
even to ransom him, at last broke the spirit of Bayezid. For nine months
he had been held up to ridicule in the Tartar army. He had seen his
harem violated. He had seen Timur pass with ease from one portion of the
Ottoman possessions in Asia to another. Smyrna, which he had never been
able to attack, fell before the Tartars. The Turkish emirs whom he had
dispossessed were settled again in their states. When Bayezid learned
that he was to be taken to Konia, and then to Samarkand, his mind gave
way. He died of apoplexy at Ak Sheïr.[637] Timur allowed Musa to take
his father’s body to Brusa for burial.[638] He had by this time lost
interest in the Osmanlis and Asia Minor, and was dreaming of new fields
of conquest.
Bayezid died a victim not ‘to his destiny’, as the Ottoman historians
put it, but to his vices, and to his abandonment of the policy of his
predecessors, that assimilation should keep pace with territorial
aggrandizement. There never need have been an Angora. Timur had no
inclination to invade the Ottoman dominions. Bayezid goaded him into it.
Even if the test of an Angora had been necessary, Bayezid would have
sustained it and weathered the Tartar storm, had he been the same man he
was at Nicopolis. In facing a Tartar invasion, the advantage was all on
Bayezid’s side. He failed because his mental and physical faculties,
which rivalled, if they did not surpass, those of any man of his age,
had become impaired by a life of debauchery.
XVIII
After the victory at Angora, the Tartar hordes swept across Asia Minor.
Timur sent his grandson, Mohammed-Sultan, in pursuit of Soleiman, who
succeeded in escaping from Brusa just as the Tartar horsemen arrived at
the gates of the city. The Tartars stabled their horses in the mosques,
while the city was ransacked for its treasures and its young girls. Fire
followed pillage.[639] The sons of Alaeddin of Karamania were set free,
and Bayezid’s wives and daughters, with one exception, were sent to
Timur, who had established his residence at Kutayia.
In the search for Soleiman, of whose movements he was in ignorance,
Mohammed-Sultan sent soldiers north to Gemlik and Nicaea, and west to
Mikhalitch and Karasi. These cities were pillaged, and their inhabitants
reduced to slavery. When Mohammed-Sultan learned that Soleiman had
escaped to Europe, he sent an embassy to him demanding unconditional
surrender. There was no reply. The question of invading Europe was
referred to Timur. In the meantime, the advance guard of the Tartars
devastated the country which was the cradle of the Ottoman race, while
their commander celebrated at Yeni Sheïr his marriage to the eldest
daughter of Bayezid. Thus were united the families of Timur and his
vanquished foe.[640]
Mohammed-Sultan went into winter quarters at Magnesia.[641] Timur left
Kutayia in charge of Shah-Rokh, and moved on to Ephesus. He recalled the
columns which had been devastating western Asia Minor, and concentrated
his forces against Smyrna. What Bayezid had been unable to accomplish in
seven years, Timur did in two weeks.[642] The assault of Smyrna was
carried on with unceasing energy, and every possible measure was taken
to bring it to a speedy conclusion. The walls were undermined, and
bridges built out over the water in order that an attack might be made
from the side of the sea. When the fortress which crowns the hill behind
the city was entered from the land side, the chevaliers of Rhodes fought
their way down to their galleys. With lance and sword and oar they beat
off the despairing inhabitants who would have swamped their boats. All
except a thousand succeeded in escaping. These were decapitated, and of
their heads Timur built a pyramid to commemorate his victory.[643]
Timur returned to Ephesus. As he approached the city, children came out
to meet him, singing songs to appease his wrath. ‘What is this noise?’
he asked. When his attendants told him, he ordered his horsemen to ride
over the children. They were trampled to death.[644]
Smyrna fell in December, 1402. Timur spent the rest of the winter in
Ephesus. He destroyed the work of Bayezid in Asia Minor by restoring to
the deposed emirs or their heirs the emirates of Karamania, Tekke,
Menteshe, Sarukhan, Aïdin, Kastemuni, and Erzindjian. When he saw that
the sons of Bayezid were ready to quarrel about the succession of their
father, he began to treat with Isa, Musa and Mohammed, encouraging in
each the hope of recognition as sole heir. To Soleiman he sent a
diploma, investing him with the Ottoman possessions in Europe as Tartar
vassal.[645]
Timur enjoyed the position he had won of arbiter of the destinies of the
Ottoman Empire. The princes of Europe were now seeking his favour more
insistently than before Angora. Henry IV of England wrote to him most
cordially, and expressed the hope that he would be converted and become
the champion of Christianity.[646]
Manuel Palaeologos, who had learned from the Venetian Senate the news of
Bayezid’s defeat at Angora, hurried home from Europe.[647] He banished
John to Lemnos, expelled the Ottoman colonists from Constantinople, and
closed their tribunal.[648] To Timur he sent an embassy offering to
acknowledge his suzerainty, and expressing his willingness to pay to him
the tribute that had been given to Bayezid. But when Timur responded
with an order to prepare a fleet to help the Tartar hordes to pass into
Europe, Manuel was seized with panic. Smyrna had just fallen, and he
felt that a similar fate was now reserved for Constantinople. An
ambassador was sent to Rome and Venice to implore the immediate aid of
the Vatican and the Senate.[649]
Timur, however, had become tired of Asia Minor and the western campaign.
He had no constructive policy. He never attempted to organize his
conquests into a world empire. Like the earlier conquerors of his race,
Timur was a raider. Satiety came with destruction and victory, that is,
satiety for the particular conquest in which he was engaged. So he
turned his back on Constantinople and the glittering possibilities of a
European invasion. He wanted to return to Samarkand to enjoy the fruits
of his victories. Perhaps his character was only the reflection of that
of his followers.
The march had hardly started when Bayezid died at Ak Sheïr, in March,
1403. From this moment Timur forgot all about the Osmanlis. After a
brief sojourn at Konia, he left Asia Minor. Within two years he died of
fever while on his way to conquer China.[650]
XIX
After Angora the Ottoman army could have been annihilated; for Timur
sent his victorious Tartars hot upon the heels of the refugees. Not only
did they follow Soleiman to the Sea of Marmora, and the divisions which
had retreated to the Bosphorus, but they pursued closely the main body
of the army, which, to the number of possibly forty thousand, had fled
along the customary line of march to the Dardanelles.[651] There Greeks
and Latins vied in helping the refugees to cross.[652] A Venetian
eye-witness of the crossing of the Bosphorus wrote that the Venetians in
good faith offered to join with the Genoese in refusing to transport the
Osmanlis who were crowded upon the Asiatic shore. But the Genoese
started secretly to ferry them over to Europe, with the aid of the
Greeks. Then the Venetians, fearing to lose favour with the Osmanlis,
started in to help.[653] This testimony is corroborated by Clavijo, who
visited Constantinople in the following year. He adds that Timur was
disgusted with the way the Greeks and Latins failed to co-operate with
him in destroying the Ottoman army.[654]
The astonishing fact is then clearly demonstrated that Greeks,
Venetians, and Genoese made no effort to take advantage of their great
opportunity. Nor did they, during the ten years of civil war that
followed the death of Bayezid, make any move, in concert or separately,
to drive the Osmanlis out of Europe. When it was not yet certain what
Timur would do in regard to Asia Minor, or even whether he would invade
Europe,[655] the Venetians and Genoese established with Soleiman at
Adrianople the same friendly relations that they had been so careful to
maintain with his father, and fought each other in the Bosphorus. Pope
Boniface was straining every nerve to help Ladislas of Sicily to win the
crown of Hungary against Sigismund,[656] who, alone of the princes of
Europe, had his hands been free, might have contested the Balkan
peninsula with the warring factions of the Osmanlis.
The decade of civil war among the sons of Bayezid passed without
interference from the outside world, and without a single uprising on
the part of the subjugated Balkan Christians. The house of Osman,
although divided against itself, did stand. In 1413, Mohammed I,
triumphing over his brothers, became sole sovereign of the Osmanlis. The
crisis was over, and the career of conquest, interrupted for the moment
by Timur, was resumed.
Nicopolis had proved that the Osmanlis could hold against Europe what
they had won. Angora had proved that they were too firmly rooted in the
Balkan peninsula and in north-western Asia Minor, as an indigenous race
and as a nation, to be destroyed by the misfortunes of their dynasty.
Since the test of possession is ability to hold, in foul weather as well
as in fair, who can deny that the Osmanlis under Bayezid had inherited
the Byzantine Empire?
APPENDIX A
TRADITIONAL MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE ORIGIN OF THE OSMANLIS AND THEIR
EMPIRE
What has been said in this book on the origin of Ottoman power and the
foundation of the empire is so different from statements which have
found acceptance up to this time, that I am under the obligation to
justify my position by a more technical discussion, and by a fuller
citation of authorities, than has been given in Chapter I. I shall deal
with these misconceptions singly.
1. THAT OSMAN WAS A PRINCE OF ILLUSTRIOUS BIRTH.
Chalcocondylas is responsible for the first and widest diffusion of this
error in western Europe. He claims that Osman is the great-grandson of
Duzalp, ‘chief of the Oghuzes’; grandson of Oguzalp, who, aspiring to
succeed his father, reached ‘in a brief time the highest fame in Asia’;
and son of Ertogrul, who, in 1298,[657] with his fleet, devastated the
Peloponnesus, Euboea, and Attika.[658] Closely allied to the account of
Chalcocondylas is that of Hussein Hezarfenn.[659] According to Ali
Muhieddin,[660] Seadeddin,[661] and Hadji Khalfa,[662] the grandfather
of Osman was Soleiman Shah, prince or bey of Mahan in the Khorassan, who
was compelled to leave his country at the approach of Djenghiz Khan, and
lived seven years in Armenia. As he was returning home, he was drowned
in the Euphrates. Two of his sons, Ertogrul and Dundar, turned back into
Asia Minor, and were, through the kindness of the Seljuk Sultan,
Alaeddin I, given a residence near Angora, and, later, on the confines
of Bithynia. Neshri places the time of residence in Armenia as 170
years, and declares that Soleiman Shah was leader of 50,000
families.[663] Practically all of the European historians who have
written later than the publication in Europe of Chalcocondylas, Ali and
Seadeddin have followed closely these authorities.[664]
The western writers, whose works appeared before the translation and
publication of the eastern historians, or who followed earlier western
authorities, are either vague or uncertain concerning the parentage of
Osman,[665] or give an entirely different story of the rise of his
family. He is supposed to be the son of a Tartar shepherd, called
Zich,[666] who rises to fame at the court of Alaeddin I by defeating in
single combat a Greek cavalier that had killed many of the favourites of
the Seljuk Sultan.[667] According to others, who give nearly the same
story, the name of Osman’s father is ‘the madman Delis, a
shepherd’.[668] For his success in killing the Greek, the Sultan rewards
him with the castle of Ottomanzich, which is often confused with Sugut,
and is claimed to be the origin of Osman’s name.[669] By another story,
which is asserted to be the invention of Mohammed II, who thus wanted to
legitimatize in the eyes of the world his claim to the throne of the
Caesars, Osman is the descendant of a certain Isaac Comnenus, a member
of the imperial Byzantine family, who fled to the court of the Seljuks
of Konia, and became a Moslem.[670]
In this, as in the discussion of other misconceptions which follow, we
are not at all justified in throwing out categorically the testimony of
the early western writers every time that they conflict with the eastern
authorities, or in ignoring them entirely, as Hammer, Zinkeisen, and
Jorga have done. We must remember that Chalcocondylas and all the
Ottoman historians are _very late_, that they cite no sources upon which
to base their assertions or inferences, and that they write with the
intention to please, and under the necessity of pleasing, the Ottoman
court, at a time when its rulers had become so powerful that they could
not brook the recording of an humble origin for their royal house. The
extravagant descriptions of Seadeddin, for example, when he speaks of
Osman’s court, and his expressions such as ‘laying his petition humbly
at the feet of his royal master’, &c., seem much out of place in a
narrative about primitive and exceedingly plain and simple people. The
western writers claim to have sources for information which are as early
and as good as those of Ali and Seadeddin. Some of them certainly
had.[671] We cannot claim for these writers that their stories be
accepted as fact. But we can claim that they be accepted as an honest
reflection of late fifteenth-and early sixteenth-century opinion
concerning the founder of the Ottoman royal house--opinion derived from
stories which were current in Constantinople at that time, and which,
for lack of definite history, were circulated among the Osmanlis
themselves up to a very much later period.[672]
The later western historians have taken, without critical examination,
the Ottoman accounts of the origin of their royal family, as they have
of the relationship with the Seljuks of Konia, practically at their face
value. But it is not hard to prove a good case against the Ottoman
historians.
The story of Soleiman Shah, prince of Mahan and leader of 50,000
families, living and ruling in the neighbourhood of Erzerum between 1224
and 1232, is very easy to disprove. The name of Mahan is often given to
two cities, Dinewer and Nehawend.[673] It is rather the designation of a
plain in which these two cities lay. In 1229, Sultan Djelaleddin, after
his defeat by the Mongols at Mughan, passed the winter in the plain of
Mahan. A certain Izzeddin was lord of the fortress there. He had been
rebellious _some years before_, but was ‘now serving Djelaleddin
devoutly’.[674] In the history of Djelaleddin, I find absolutely no
mention of a Soleiman Shah in connexion with Mahan or any other place in
that region. With 50,000 families, Soleiman Shah would have been a
factor in Armenia between 1224 and 1232. For that is precisely the time
when Djelaleddin, Sultan of Kharesm, his logical suzerain or his enemy,
was struggling with the Seljuks of Konia in that very region! In 1229,
Djelaleddin was at Erzindjian, and ravaged the whole country.[675] At
the same time, a cousin of Alaeddin I, a very powerful ruler, Rokneddin,
was lord of Erzerum, and was strong enough to be at enmity at the same
time with Djelaleddin’s invading army and with Alaeddin of Konia.[676]
Other Arabic historians, and the Seljuk historian of this period,
confirm the history of Mohammed-en-Nesawi in its leading points, but
they, no more than the historian of Djelaleddin, make any mention
whatever of a Soleiman Shah, or of an Ertogrul.[677] Nor is Soleiman
Shah and his family mentioned in any of the Arabic genealogies prior to
the seventeenth century, although these exist in great numbers.[678]
There is only one Ottoman genealogy prior to the tables of Hadji
Khalfa.[679]
The best authority on the western Turks, the late Léon Cahun,
conservator of the Mazarine Library in Paris, declares that the Turkish
tribes of the time of the purported Soleiman Shah and Ertogrul had no
family ties. They knew no rank other than that of a man higher up in the
army. In inheritance, the younger son got the land, and the older sons
the movable possessions of the father. There were no family names; there
are none to this day. The Turks who came into Asia Minor were without
name or family. They wandered far and sold their services to get
established family ties.[680]
There is one more testimony concerning the humble origin of the Ottoman
royal house. The different historians of the relations between Timur and
Bayezid I all speak of the taunt flung by Timur at Bayezid concerning
the Ottoman ruler’s lack of royal ancestors.[681] Bayezid never made any
response to this taunt, and confined his boasting, which was by no means
of a modest sort, to his own and his father’s achievements, and to his
power as a European ruler.
We cannot establish the ancestry of Osman. It is altogether probable
that he had none of note, but was what Americans would call ‘a self-made
man’.
2. THAT OSMAN BEGAN HIS CAREER AS A VASSAL OF ALAEDDIN III, SULTAN OF
ICONIUM, UPON WHOSE DEATH, IN OR ABOUT 1300, OSMAN AND NINE OTHER
TURKISH PRINCES DIVIDED THE INHERITANCE OF THE SELJUCIDES; THAT OSMAN
PROVED MORE POWERFUL THAN THE OTHER PRINCES, AND FOUNDED AN EMPIRE UPON
THE RUINS OF THE SELJUCIDE EMPIRE.
When I call this statement, in its entirety, a misconception, I realize
that I am attacking the idea of the founding of the Ottoman Empire which
has been voiced by the most eminent historians and has an accepted and
unquestioned place in textbooks and encyclopaedias, and in general
histories.
In a French translation of Chalcocondylas, published in 1662, under the
woodcut of Osman, we find these four lines:
‘De simple Capitaine en des Pays déserts,
Près du grand Saladin la Fortune m’attire;
Et là de ses débris je fonde cet Empire,
Qui menace aujourd’huy d’engloutir l’Univers.’
I quote this verse because it seems to me to express concisely the
commonly accepted idea of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, as I
find it written everywhere. Hammer, whose eighteen volumes contain a
wealth of material upon the Ottoman Empire not elsewhere to be found,
and who shows remarkable erudition as well as care and critical powers,
perpetuates the tales about Ertogrul and Osman and the court of Konia.
He makes the categorical statement, ‘The empire of the Seljuks broke up,
and on its ruins arose that of Osman’.[682] Creasy has popularized the
opinion of Hammer in the English-speaking world.[683] Lane-Poole, who
has written the only general history of the Ottoman Empire in English in
our generation, has tacitly accepted the common tradition.[684]
Zinkeisen and Jorga, the only later historians whose names can be
coupled for scholarly work with that of Hammer, are most unsatisfactory
in their failure to take up critically the Ottoman traditions of the
early days of the Empire.[685] Leunclavius, the sole writer in Western
Europe before Hammer, whose work might be called ‘scientific’, discusses
exhaustively and compares critically all authorities existing at his
time (1590) on most minute points of early Ottoman history, but is
almost silent on the grave inconsistencies and contradictions arising
from the question of the relation between the Osmanlis and the Seljuks
of Konia.[686] There is the same silence in Cantemir and his
translators.[687] The latest Ottoman historian says: ‘Osman’s military
and political career naturally divides itself into two parts, that in
which he was vassal of Alaeddin, and that in which he became
sultan.’[688] An Oriental whose work has enjoyed great vogue in France
declares: ‘Osman pursued through every obstacle the realization of his
plan, which consisted in founding upon the ruins of the Seljuk Empire a
great, free, and independent state.’[689]
I find one German scholar who, briefly touching upon the foundation of
Osman’s power, rejects or ignores the connexion with the Seljuks of
Konia; but he goes further afield, and makes the astonishing statement
that Osman conquered Bagdad, allowed the Khalifs only spiritual power,
called himself Sultan, and became master of the Moslem world, thereby
connecting the Mongol conquest of Mesopotamia with the Mameluke conquest
of Egypt, and attributing it all to Osman![690]
If we had good ground for rejecting the princely origin of Osman, our
justification for impugning and discarding the connexion of Osman with
the Seljuks of Konia is stronger still.
Kaï Kobad Alaeddin, the only Sultan to whom the name of Alaeddin is
given by common consent,[691] died in 1236.[692] He was succeeded by Kaï
Khosrew II, Giazzeddin, or Ghizatheddin, who was Sultan at the time of
the great Mongol invasion of Asia Minor. In the spring of 1243, Erzerum
was sacked without having received any help from Konia. Some months only
after this event did Kaï Khosrew move. He was defeated at Mughan, near
Erzindjian, in a decisive battle,[693] and fled to Angora, abandoning
his baggage. Erzindjian fell next. Then Kaï Khosrew withdrew to Sivas,
and from that city sent an embassy to the Mongols, making his submission
and promising an annual tribute of four hundred thousand pieces of
silver. The Mongol armies penetrated as far as Smyrna. Everywhere
submission was complete, although no effort was made to provide a new
government for the conquered regions in the western part of the
peninsula. The Emperor of Trebizond became a vassal of the Mongols.[694]
The battle of Mughan cost the Seljuk Empire its independence.[695] After
1246, when Kaï Khosrew died, the situation of the Seljuks of Konia is
depicted by Shehabeddin in these words: ‘The princes of the family of
Seljuk kept only the title of sovereign, without having any authority or
any power. There was left to them only that which concerned their own
person and their houses, the insignia of royalty, and sufficient money
for expenses of an indispensable necessity. The power belonged to Tartar
governors, who managed everything without opposition. It was in the name
of the princes of the family of Djenghiz Khan that the public prayer
was made, and that gold and silver money was struck.[696] When the
dynasty of the Seljucides had arrived at the last degree of weakness ...
races of Turks seized a large part of these countries.... The Turks
recognized the pre-eminence of the prince of Kermian.’[697] There is not
a word of any possible Ottoman supremacy even in his own day, fifty
years later. Every source on the latter half of the thirteenth century
which I have consulted corroborates the testimony of Shehabeddin.[698] I
have space to give only a few of the facts which I have gathered
concerning the fortunes of the Sultans of Konia during the period
1246-1300, when Ertogrul and Osman are pictured by the Ottoman
historians, and by the European historians who have followed them, as
basking in the sunshine of Seljuk imperial favour.
After the death of Kaï Khosrew, the empire was divided between his three
sons, who, however, seemed to rule in common as vassals of the Mongols,
for their names were asserted to appear together on coins in 1249.[699]
During the decade after the conquest, the Mongols overran western Asia
Minor. We read that Sultan Rokneddin went with the Mongol general,
Baïchu, into winter quarters _in Bithynia_,[700] and that Baïchu
received orders from Khulagu Khan in 1257 to pillage the entire Seljuk
dominions. In 1264, Abulfeda gives Rum, with its capital as Konia, among
the provinces ruled by Khulagu.[701] Bibars, Sultan of Egypt, succeeded
in occupying Konia for a brief time in 1276.[702] In 1278, Abaka Khan
opened negotiations with Haython, king of Little Armenia, with the view
of making him Sultan of Rum. In 1282, Bibars, writing to Ahmed Khan,
says: ‘At this moment Konghurataï’ (a Mongol general) ‘is in the land of
Rum, _which is subject to you and pays you taxes_.’[703] In 1283,
Ghizatheddin, who was ruling with the merest semblance of royalty in
Konia, was deposed by Ahmed Khan, exiled to Erzindjian, and replaced by
Masud. There was anarchy everywhere in Asia Minor at this time.[704] The
distinguished French Orientalist, M. Huart, who studied in Konia itself
the inscriptions of the Seljuk Sultans, could find nothing after this
period to indicate that the two final sultans who followed Ghizatheddin
were more than playthings of the Mongols.[705]
The testimony of Marco Polo is most precious to us here. When he passed
through this country in 1271 he says that Konia, Sivas, Caesarea and
many other cities of ‘Turquemanie’ were subject to the Tartars, who
imposed their rule there.[706] It was his impression that the Turcomans
were subject to local rulers, and responded to no central authority.
The last days of the Seljuks are most obscure. Masud ruled until 1296,
when he was deposed by Ahmed Khan. For two years there was no ruler.
Whether Firamurs ever ruled is a matter of doubt.[707] The last Sultan
is generally given as Kaï Kobad, who remained Sultan for four or ten
years.[708] However, there was no Sultan actually ruling as sovereign in
Konia either in 1290 or in 1300. Neither Masud nor Kaï Kobad could have
given Osman feudal rights or a charter of independence. There was no
dissolution of the Seljuk Empire in 1300. In all except mere name, it
had become extinct before Osman was born.
The Mongol conquerors never extended their political system to western
Asia Minor. But, from 1246 to 1278, the Anatolians, Moslem and Christian
alike, were in constant terror of the Mongol hordes. After 1276, the
Mongols were too occupied with the Mamelukes of Egypt, and with the
dissensions arising in the eastern part of their great empire, to pay
much attention to the remote Turkish tribes of Rum. During the last
quarter of the thirteenth century, there was no change in the _status
quo_ of the Seljuks at Konia that affected in any way the fortunes of
these tribes. We can explain their rise into independent principalities,
not by the disappearance of the Seljuk Sultans, but by the diversion of
Mongol energy to other quarters.
Among early western writers there was great divergency of opinion about
the number of the ‘Seljuk heirs’. I have found them represented as
one,[709] three,[710] four,[711] five,[712] and seven.[713] Pachymeres,
if we can trust the text of the Bonn edition,[714] is the earliest
writer to mention the traditional number of ten.[715] When the Seljuk
Empire fell before the Mongols, it had no heirs in Asia Minor. During
the latter half of the thirteenth century and the first quarter of the
fourteenth century (1250-1325) an innumerable number of village
chieftains endeavoured to form states. There were many more than ten.
The states which existed at the beginning of the reign of Orkhan I have
put into another appendix.[716]
There is no record of Osman having attacked his Turkish neighbours. The
testimony of the best Ottoman authorities is categorical on this point.
Orkhan extended his father’s dominions very little to the south: not at
all towards the east. Murad’s activities in Asia Minor were the least
successful part of his career, and were by no means permanent.
Sherefeddin Ali, whom we may regard as the best contemporary source for
the end of the fourteenth century, states explicitly: ‘Bayezid reduced
under his dominion a large portion of the country of Rum, that is to
say, the provinces of Aïdin, of Menteshe, of Kermian and of Karamania, a
thing which his ancestors had never been able to bring to an end.’[717]
In view of the facts of the case, it is strange that the idea of Osman
as the powerful heir of the Seljuks, who mastered the other aspirants to
that honour, has had such a long lease of life through centuries. Many
of the early writers made Osman master of all Asia Minor.[718] It is
commonly recorded that he captured Sivas.[719] One writer placed in that
city his capital.[720] Another credited him with the capture of
Konia.[721] Misinformation of this sort was given to Charles VI of
France by returning pilgrims,[722] and, a century and a quarter later,
to Frances I.[723] The early idea of the Osmanlis as an Asiatic people,
of large numbers,[724] who conquered Asia Minor and then overthrew the
Byzantine Empire,[725] has persisted to this day. One of the sanest
Ottoman writers of modern times, who has brought wide knowledge and
judgement to bear upon the history of the Ottoman army, is led astray by
this misconception. He says, ‘It was the Arabic and Persian states that
the Ottoman Empire had to fight _before_ _any other_’. So it is natural
that he should be puzzled by finding in the military museum at
Constantinople early Ottoman weapons on Byzantine and European models.
He explains this by saying that these weapons were not used by the
Osmanlis, but must have been captured, for the Osmanlis, naturally,
would use Persian and Arabic models![726]
But Colonel Djevad is not more in error than the two greatest French
authorities on Ottoman architecture. Saladin, in his summary of Ottoman
history, instructs his readers as follows: ‘Alaeddin III, conquered by
the Mongols, abandoned the sovereignty to Osman.... When the Osmanlis
penetrated into Anatolia ... in proportion to the extension westward of
the Ottoman Empire, we shall see the influence of Byzantine architecture
increase.... Little by little, as the Turks approached Constantinople,
this impregnation of the influence of Byzantium had an increasingly
greater importance in the development of Ottoman art.’[727] This
misconception of the origin of the Osmanlis leads him to state: ‘It is
then indispensable to study the Seljuk monuments of Konia, which have
_necessarily_ served as models to the first Ottoman monuments.’[728]
From his premisses, Saladin has argued rightly. But his historical facts
are wrong. Even if they were not, his conclusion could still be proved
wrong. The refutation of his statement exists in the two earliest
Ottoman buildings, the school and the kitchen for the poor at Nicaea,
the date of whose construction Seadeddin places in 1331.[729] Both of
these are typically Byzantine. In Brusa there is no Ottoman building of
the Seljuk type which can be proved to have been constructed prior to
Mohammed I (1413-21).[730] Parvillée, to whom the whole world owes a
debt of gratitude for his able reconstruction of the precious historic
monuments of Brusa, starts his scholarly work on Ottoman architecture in
the fifteenth century with these words: ‘Towards the end of the
thirteenth century the Seljuk Empire disappeared. On its ruins arose
that of Osman.’ He not only follows Hammer: he uses his very words![731]
From the historical point of view, I maintain that the Byzantine
influence was an indissoluble factor in the evolution of Ottoman
architecture from the very beginning. In this I am supported, from the
expert architect’s point of view, by the two German authorities on this
subject.[732] The Seljuk, Arab, and Persian influences entered in at a
considerably later period.
There exists in tradition and in law an intimate connexion between the
House of Osman and the Grand Tchelebi of Konia. This has been pointed to
as a confirmation of the hypothesis that the Ottoman sovereigns derived
their authority originally from the Seljuks of Rum. I do not deny the
force of tradition. In the absence of early records, the beginning of
this connexion must remain a moot question. But the evidence from
outside sources makes reasonable my doubt as to the existence of this
connexion before the reign of Mohammed I or Murad I.
There are two other arguments which might be adduced in this appendix,
the questions of Osman’s title as an independent ruler, and of the
chieftainship as an elective office among the Turkish tribes. But both
of these have already been discussed in the text and the foot-notes of
the chapter on Orkhan.
APPENDIX B
THE EMIRATES OF ASIA MINOR DURING THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
In order to support the contention of this book, that the Ottoman Empire
was founded (in the durable sense of that word) upon the ruins of the
Byzantine Empire _as it existed at the time of Osman_ (1300), and gained
its power and prestige in the Balkan peninsula rather than in Asia
Minor, there must be set forth, as far as it is possible to do so within
the limits of an appendix, an _exposé_ of the extent and power of the
other emirates of Asia Minor during the fourteenth century. Such a
review is useful, not only to prove the argument, but also to enable the
reader to follow intelligently the development of Ottoman power; for
there are difficulties attendant upon the writing and the reading of a
history where the geographical names are unfamiliar. The writer is faced
with the dilemma of making his work meaningless or uninteresting:
meaningless if he fails to enlighten his readers as to the places and
peoples whom he mentions; uninteresting if he interrupts his narrative
with technical, encyclopaedic explanations.
A special map accompanies this appendix. The list of emirates contains
after each name a number in brackets, which refers to the map. As in
almost all cases the geographical limits are vague, the general position
only of each emirate can be given. To put in definite boundary lines
would be mere conjecture. Then, too, at different times during the
fourteenth century, independent emirates overlapped each other.
Sometimes they were confined to single cities or villages.
In preparing this appendix, I am indebted to several modern scholars
whose work is most suggestive.[733] But I believe that this
[Illustration: THE EMIRATES OF ASIA MINOR IN THE 14^{TH} CENTURY]
is the first attempt to compare the Asiatic possessions of Osman,
Orkhan, Murad, and Bayezid with those of their Turkish rivals for the
purpose of illustrating the slow growth of the Ottoman Empire in Asia
Minor, and the first time that contemporary sources have been drawn upon
for this purpose.
From the eleventh to the thirteenth century, we are able to reconstruct
the political status of Asia Minor, in a general way, from the
narratives of pilgrims and the experiences of the Crusaders. From the
beginning of the fifteenth century on to the present day, we have a
wealth of sources for the history of Asia Minor in the writings of
European travellers, which are valuable not only for their geographical
indications and their observations on the life of the people, but also
for their testimony in corroborating or disproving the statements of
Oriental historians, who are so often lacking in precision and
verisimilitude. For the fourteenth century, however, reliable European
sources are lacking.
This lacuna is filled by the travel records of two Moslems of more than
ordinary intelligence and powers of observation.
The long-lost manuscript of the travels of Ibn Batutah was one of those
important finds that made the French occupation of Algeria so memorable
an event in the annals of the advancement of learning. Its translation
into French in 1843 made accessible for the first time a contemporary
source of the highest value for the political and social life of the
whole Moslem world during the first half of the fourteenth century. For
Ibn Batutah travelled from his home in Morocco to the confines of China.
He lived a while in each country that he visited, and wrote from the
sympathetic and understanding point of view of a member of the Moslem
clergy. Ibn Batutah visited Asia Minor between 1330 and 1340.[734]
Shehabeddin was an Arabic writer from Damascus,[735] who died in 1349.
He wrote a voluminous work of twenty volumes, called _Footpaths of the
Eyes in the Kingdoms of Different Countries_.[736] He was a contemporary
of Ibn Batutah. Shehabeddin did not enjoy the advantage of visiting
personally the many emirates of western Asia Minor, as did Ibn Batutah;
but he states that he has based his record of these countries upon the
eye-witness information furnished to him by word of mouth by Sheik
Haïdar of Sir Hissar.[737] The agreement between Ibn Batutah and
Shehabeddin on the state of affairs in Asia Minor during the first half
of the fourteenth century is so general that one can claim for their
statements, which are, in large part, the basis of this appendix, most
substantial grounding.
The other sources are the Byzantine historians, the chronicler of the
Catalans, the Catalan Map of 1375,[738] the annalist of Trebizond, the
points of contact with the Cypriotes, the chevaliers of Rhodes, the
Italian traders, the Osmanlis and the Mongols and Tartars. For a few of
the emirates there are coins extant. Inscriptions on public edifices,
such as mosques, pious foundations, baths and fountains, are
unfortunately lacking, not only for the history of the Turkish emirates
but for the Osmanlis as well.[739]
In the list that follows, twenty-six of the emirates existed during the
reign of Orkhan, between the years 1330 and 1350. They are mentioned
either by Ibn Batutah or by Shehabeddin, in most cases by _both_, as
independent in their day. The others are either earlier or later than
Orkhan’s reign, and comprise a portion of earlier emirates, from which
they had become detached. After the Turkish emirates, given
alphabetically, are placed the non-Turkish independent states in Asia
Minor.
Adalia: _see_ Satalia
Adana (1)
Afion Kara Hissar: _see_ Karasar
Aïdin (2)
Akbara (3)
Akridur (4)
Akseraï (5)
Aksheïr (6)
Alaïa (7)
Altoluogo: _see_ Ayasoluk
Angora (8)
Armenia: _see_ Little Armenia (44)
Arzendjian: _see_ Erzindjian
Attaleia: _see_ Satalia
Ayasoluk (9)
Balikesri (10)
Berkeri (Birgui, Berki): _see_ Aïdin
Borlu (11)
Brusa (12)
Caesarea (13)
Cilicia: _see_ Little Armenia (44) and Adana (1)
Daouas: _see_ Tawas
Denizli (14)
Djanik: _see_ Kaouïa
Egherdir: _see_ Akridur
Ephesus: _see_ Ayasoluk
Erzindjian (15)
Fukeh (16)
Germian: _see_ Kermian
Gul Hissar (17)
Guzel Hissar: _see_ Aïdin
Halik (Halicarnassus): _see_ Fukeh
Hamid (18)
Iakshi(19)
Ionia: _see_ Aïdin
Kaïseriya: _see_ Caesarea
Kandelore: _see_ Alaïa
Kaouïa (20)
Karamania (21)
Karasar (22)
Karasi (23)
Kastemuni (24)
Keredeh (25)
Kermasti (26)
Kermian (27)
Konia: _see_ Karamania
Kul Hissar: _see_ Gul Hissar
Kutayia: _see_ Kermian
Ladik (Laodicea): _see_ Denizli
Larenda: _see_ Karamania
Limnia (28)
Lydia: _see_ Sarukhan
Magnesia: _see_ Sarukhan
Marash (29)
Marmora (30)
Menteshe (31)
Milas: _see_ Fukeh
Miletus: _see_ Palatchia
Mikhalitch (32)
Nazlu (33)
Nicaea (34)
Palatchia (35)
Pamphylia: _see_ Tekke
Pergama: _see_ Karasi
Sarukhan (36)
Satalia (37)
Sinope (38)
Sis: _see_ Adana
Sivas (39)
Sulkadir: _see_ Marash
Tawas (40)
Tekke (41)
Theologos: _see_ Ayasoluk
Tokat (42)
Tralles: _see_ Aïdin
Ulubad (Lopadion) (43)
Little Armenia (44)
Trebizond (45)
Phocaea (46)
Smyrna (47)
Byzantine possessions (48)
Cypriote possessions (49)
Mongol and Tartar possessions (50)
Rhodian possessions (51)
Egyptian possessions (52)
Catalan possessions (53)
The material that can be gathered about these Turkish emirates, the two
independent Christian states, and the spheres of influence of outside
Christian and Moslem states in Asia Minor in the fourteenth century,
would make a book in itself. In this appendix I desire to give only
enough to indicate the relative strength and vitality of each state. It
must be borne in mind that my object is not to write the history of
these emirates, or of Asia Minor as a whole, during the fourteenth
century, but _to demonstrate how little of Asia Minor was really
incorporated in the Ottoman possessions at the time that, and during the
thirty years after, the capital of the new empire was established in
Adrianople_.
ADANA (1)
In the Taurus Mountains, on the northern limits of Lesser Armenia, and
to the south-east of Karamania, the Turcoman tribes through whom Marco
Polo passed seemed to him to enjoy an independent existence. Up to the
time of Murad I, they formed no state, but between 1373 and 1375 the
family of Ramazan took the chieftainship. When the Mamelukes destroyed
the Armenian kingdom (1375), the Ben-Ramazan dynasty established itself
at Adana, on the Sarus, in the fertile Cilician plain.[740] The
Ben-Ramazan emirs managed to keep from being absorbed either by the
Karamanians or the Egyptians. After the complete subjugation of
Karamania by the Osmanlis, they submitted to Selim I about 1510, under
the stipulation, however, that the emir, Piri pasha, should hold office
for life as vali of Adana and Sis. Sis was frequently coupled with Adana
in the title of the Ben-Ramazan.
AÏDIN (2)
Aïdin comprised the greater part of Ionia, with a portion of Lydia, if
we take its boundaries to be those of the present vilayet of the same
name. It comprised, at the time of its greatest extent, Smyrna, Ephesus,
and Tralles. Smyrna was captured by the crusaders in 1344. Ephesus was
at times independent under the name of Ayasoluk. Tralles, called Guzel
Hissar, and sometimes also Birgui or Berki, was the capital of Aïdin in
the time of Orkhan. Later, Ayasoluk, and, last of all, Tira, were the
successive capitals.
The emirate was founded by Aïdin, a contemporary of Osman, who was
succeeded by his son Mohammed about 1330. Ibn Batutah regarded Mohammed
as a very powerful prince, who was especially strong on the sea. His
eldest son, Omar, who succeeded him in 1341, met death in an
unsuccessful attempt to recapture Smyrna in 1348. His relations with
Cantacuzenos are given in the chapter on Orkhan. Isaac, fourth of the
line, reigned from 1348, until he was dispossessed by Bayezid in 1390.
He died in exile at Nicaea. His sons, Isaac II and Omar II, were placed
again on the throne in 1403. The line of Aïdin became extinct soon
after. A usurper, Djuneïd, Ottoman governor of Smyrna, managed to keep
the power until he was assassinated in 1425. It was not until then that
Aïdin definitely passed into the hands of the Osmanlis.
After the death of Aïdin, the founder of the dynasty, the territory of
the emirate seems to have suffered some diminution, aside from the loss
of Smyrna. One of the sons, Soleiman, married a daughter of Orkhan,
while another, Khidr, ruled independently at Ayasoluk, which was lost
for a time to Rhodes twenty years later. Under Omar, the Turks of Aïdin
were very active in the Aegaean Sea, and made large invasions of Thrace
and Macedonia in 1333 and 1334. They co-operated with the Genoese of
Phocaea against the Greeks and the Osmanlis, and were at times allied
with the emirates of Sarukhan and Menteshe, with whom they are
frequently mixed by the Byzantine historians. The western historians
almost invariably gave credit to the Osmanlis for the maritime exploits
of these emirates during the fourteenth century.[741]
AKBARA (3)
At some time before 1340, a certain Demir Khan, son of Karasai, emir of
Pergama, ruled in Akbara, whose location is given by Shehabeddin as
‘south of Brusa and Sinope, and north of Mount Kasis’. This emirate was
probably destroyed by Orkhan in the expedition of 1339-40. It was a
region along the borders of Mysia and Phrygia, which had been able to
resist the encroachments of Kermian owing to the mountainous character
of the country.[742]
AKRIDUR (4)
This city was at the south end of the lake of the same name (to-day
called Egherdir), and was within the limits of the emirate of Hamid.
But, like Nazlu, it had frequently a wholly independent existence, and
both Shehabeddin and Ibn Batutah, as well as other writers, mention its
emirs as if independent of the emir of Hamid, and these rulers are given
from the families of Tekke and Hamid. The Osmanlis first reached the
northern end of Lake Egherdir in 1379, and incorporated Akridur about
1390.[743]
AKSERAÏ (5)
This is the ancient Archelaïs, and is three days north-east of Konia on
the road to Kaïsariya (Caesarea). In the time of Ibn Batutah, it was one
of the most beautiful and most solidly built cities of Asia Minor, and
was ruled by the emir Artin, possibly an Armenian, who was vassal of the
Mongol ruler of Persia. Later, Ak Seraï was incorporated in Karamania,
to which it belonged at the time that the Osmanlis, under Bayezid, first
entered it.[744]
AKSHEÏR (6)
Aksheïr, between Kutayia and Konia, belonged alternately to Kermian and
Karamania--perhaps at times it recognized the suzerainty of the emir of
Hamid. Its position made it a border city, prey to the changing
fortunes of the Osmanlis and Karamanlis for thirty years. In 1377, when
Murad compelled the emir of Hamid to sell a portion of his dominions, he
regarded Aksheïr as having been in Hamid. It was, however, at that time
practically independent, using the rival pretensions of the emirs to the
east, west, and south as a means of preserving a precarious
autonomy.[745]
ALAÏA (7)
This city was sometimes called Kandelore, a corruption of its ancient
name Coracesium. Its fortunate position at the east side of the Gulf of
Adalia enabled it to play an important part in the commercial history of
the eastern Mediterranean for a century and a half. In the time of Ibn
Batutah and Shehabeddin, Yussuf, brother of the emir of Karamania, was
its ruler. During the fourteenth century Alaïa was more or less
dependent upon Karamania, but sometimes upon Tekke. For many years it
paid tribute to Cyprus, and negotiated its affairs independently of both
Karamania and Tekke. In 1444 its prince, Latif, meditated a raid upon
Cyprus, from which he was deterred only by the defeat of the Egyptians
before Rhodes. In 1450 Latif concluded a treaty of peace with the
Cypriotes through the medium of Rhodes. His successor, Arslan bey, got
help from Cyprus against Mohammed II. Alaïa was subdued by the Osmanlis
only in 1472.[746]
ANGORA (8)
The history of Angora during the first half of the fourteenth century is
obscure. It depended upon none of the emirates which arose after the
break-up of the Seljuk Empire of Konia. Throughout Phrygia there were
small village chieftains, such as Osman had been at Sugut. Angora may
have acknowledged Kermian for a short period, but the proprietors of
that region resisted the efforts of Karamania to incorporate them. The
fortress of Angora was captured at the beginning of the reign of Murad,
but it was not until Bayezid broke the power of Kermian and Karamania
that the country round about the city became ottomanized.[747]
AYASOLUK (9)
This is the Ottoman corruption of Altoluogo, the Genoese name for the
Byzantine Theologos (ἅγιος θεολόγος--St. John) which occupied nearly the
same site as the ancient Ephesus. This city has caused much confusion to
writers. It was captured from the Greeks by Sasan, who ruled there as
its first Turkish emir in 1308.[748] Later it seems to have fallen into
the hands of Aïdin, and became the principal commercial city of his
flourishing emirate. The emir’s coins were for a time struck there, but
later when Guzel Hissar (Tralles) was capital of Aïdin, Ayasoluk was
practically independent under a younger brother of Mohammed, and uncle
of Omar. In 1365 the chevaliers of Rhodes had evidently made a serious
attempt to cut into the hinterland of Aïdin from Smyrna, for they struck
coins at Ayasoluk. Its later history is that of Aïdin and Palatchia.
Timur directed the operations against Smyrna from Ephesus in December
1402.[749]
BALIKESRI (10)
This city is to the south-west of Brusa, on the road to Pergama. It
would naturally be included in the emirate of Karasi, but had an
independent sovereign, Demir-Khan, when Ibn Batutah visited it. It was
annexed by the Osmanlis after the deposition of the emir of Balikesri.
The exact date of this acquisition cannot be determined.[750]
BORLU (11)
An inland district south-west of Kastemuni and north of Angora, possibly
the same as Boli, where Ali, a son of Soleiman padishah, of Kastemuni
and Sinope, ruled as independent sovereign between 1330 and 1340.[751]
BRUSA (12)
The descriptions of Orkhan’s realm, which to Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin
was the emirate of Brusa, as it was seen through the eyes of his
contemporaries, have been cited in the text of this book. Until the end
of the reign of Murad, the Ottoman possessions were small enough to be
distinguished under the name of Brusa, where the Osmanlis established an
emirate at the death of Osman.
CAESAREA (13)
This important city, in the east of Asia Minor, on the confines of
Armenia, was during the first half of the fourteenth century under the
control of the Mongols, and, for a very few years, acknowledged the
overlordship of Karamania. But, for the thirty years coincident with the
reign of Murad, it had emirs of its own, as had Tokat and Sivas. For we
know that Burhaneddin, through whose misfortunes Bayezid became involved
with Timur, had been kadi of the emir of Caesarea, on whose death he
divided ‘with two other emirs’ his dominions. Caesarea fell into the
power of the Osmanlis between 1392 and 1398.[752]
DENIZLI (14)
This emirate was on the site of Laodicea on the Lycus, and was called
Ladik by the Arabs, and Denizli, or Denizlu, by the Turks. Mount Cadmus
and Hieropolis were also within its limits. It was at the upper end of
the Maeander Valley, bounded on the west and north by Aïdin, and on the
south by Menteshe and Tawas. In the fourteenth century, the city of its
emir was probably on the Maeander and not on the Lycus. Shehabeddin
compared the gardens of Ladik, or Denizli, to those of Damascus. No
higher praise could have come from his lips. We know nothing of its
later history. About 1350 it was probably absorbed by Aïdin or
Menteshe.[753]
ERZINDJIAN (15)
Erzindjian, like Erzerum, was subject to the Mongols in the early part
of the reign of Orkhan. There was a prince named Aïnabey ruling there in
1348, however, who, with two generals of Hamid, attacked Trebizond.[754]
Coins were struck in the name of Alaeddin of Karamania in Erzindjian in
the decade following 1350. But coins of Mohammed Artin, emir of
Erzindjian, were struck there about 1360.[755] Bayezid pushed his
conquests a day beyond Erzindjian to the castle of Kemath. He did not,
however, conquer Erzindjian; for we have its emir, a vassal of Timur,
appealing to his overlord for aid, when Bayezid summoned him to appear
at Angora, bringing the treasures of his dependencies with him. His
authority extended to and included Erzerum about 1400.[756]
FUKEH (16)
Ibn Batutah calls this country Milas. There were in fact two cities,
Fukeh and Milas, under one sovereign at the time of Ibn Batutah and
Shehabeddin. As Milas was near the site of Halicarnassus, or on that
site, and was sometimes called Halik, the geographical position of this
emirate, on the coast opposite Cos, is immediately grasped. It was
dependent, in a certain sense, upon Menteshe, and was later absorbed by
Menteshe. Orkhan was the emir about 1330. Some years later, Shehabeddin
estimated that the emir of Fukeh had fifty cities and ten thousand
horsemen. The last vestige of the independence of Fukeh was destroyed by
the Rhodians with whom they were continually in conflict, and who got a
foothold on the mainland and built a castle at Halik in 1399.[757]
GUL HISSAR (17)
At the time of Ibn Batutah, Mohammed Tchelebi, brother of the emir of
Akridur, was established here on the border of Pamphylia and Caria,
between Satalia and the Maeander River.[758] The fact that in such a
position an independent prince could maintain himself as late as
1330--perhaps later--demonstrates that the emirates of Tekke, Menteshe,
and Hamid must have been of very slow growth, like that of Brusa, and
that these Turkish emirs who were rivals of the house of Osman evolved
slowly, just as the Osmanlis did. The fiction of a tenfold division of
the Seljuk dominions becomes very apparent when we consider the position
of Gul Hissar (often called Kul Hissar), Alaïa, Tawas, and Fukeh--to
cite instances only from the south-western corner of Asia Minor.
HAMID (18)
This emirate, of very late development in comparison with those of
Sarukhan and Aïdin, was formed by the absorption of a number of little
states--each hardly more than a village. The emir of Hamid started by
incorporating Akridur and Nazlu. During the last decade of the reign of
Orkhan, Hamid grew rapidly, until it extended from Aksheïr to the
western end of the Taurus. It was entirely an inland emirate, and had
little chance of resisting the Osmanlis under Murad. The last emir
willed his dominions to Murad in 1381, but the country had to be
conquered step by step. Bayezid made it an Ottoman province in
1391.[759]
IAKSHI (19)
A small emirate north-west of Sarukhan, on the sea-coast opposite
Mitylene. It is mentioned only by Shehabeddin, and for the purpose of
fixing the boundaries of Sarukhan.[760]
KAOUÏA (20)
This is the modern Djanik, on the Black Sea between Samsun and Sinope.
It had an independent line of four emirs, and probably maintained its
independence until after the Ottoman conquest of Kastemuni.[761]
KARAMANIA (21)
Until after the campaign of 1386, Karamania was a far more powerful
emirate in Asia Minor than that of the Osmanlis. The Karamanlis were
the actual successors of the Seljuks, and maintained themselves in
Konia. While the Osmanlis were confined to a very small corner of
Anatolia, the Karamanian dominions extended from the Euphrates and the
Amanus to the Gulf of Adalia, on both slopes of the Taurus. Except in
the maritime emirates of the Aegaean Sea, the Karamanlis and their emir
were the great power in the peninsula of Asia Minor. Their independence
was not broken by Bayezid, for they recovered their former glory after
the intervention of Timur, and successfully withstood Mohammed I, Murad
II, and Mohammed II. As in the latter half of the fourteenth century,
the Karamanian emirs of the first half of the fifteenth century were
allied by marriage with the house of Osman, but refused to do homage to
the Ottoman sovereigns.[762]
Limits of space prevent mentioning here the many grounds upon which the
Karamanians were able to and did keep their independence in the face of
both Constantinople and Cairo. It was only at the end of the fifteenth
century that we find the fiction of the Karamanian vassalage to the
Osmanlis and of the connexion between the Seljuks and the Osmanlis
appearing in the Ottoman chronicles, which on this count are, as I have
pointed out elsewhere, wholly unreliable. It is astonishing that their
version of the rise of the Osmanlis in Asia Minor has been accepted for
so many centuries by western historians.[763]
KARASAR (22)
An abbreviation of Kara Hissar. This is probably the modern Afion Kara
Hissar, a picturesque town between Eski Sheïr and Konia on southern
limit of the emirate of Kermian, of which its prince was a vassal. Its
importance was in its location at the junction point of the roads from
the north-west and west into Karamania.
KARASI (23)
The emirate which lay between the possessions of Orkhan and Sarukhan was
called, after the founder of its dynasty, Karasi. Its capital was
Pergama. There is a discrepancy between the accounts of Shehabeddin and
Ibn Batutah, the forming making Pergama subject to Balikesri, and the
latter giving Balikesri as independent. Ottoman historians make
Balikesri the northernmost city of the emirate of Karasi. The limits of
Karasi, outside of the immediate vicinity of Pergama, cannot be
determined. There were several small independent emirates in the
hinterland of the lower end of the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles.
The emir of Karasi was an ally of Aïdin and Sarukhan in the first
coalition formed to combat the growing power of the Osmanlis. Karasi was
the first emirate to be destroyed by the Osmanlis, and the only one of
importance incorporated under Orkhan. This was because it lay nearest to
the Ottoman emirate.[764]
KASTEMUNI (24)
This emirate, at its zenith, comprised practically all of the ancient
Roman province of Paphlagonia. It was formed by Ali Omar bey, who
started as lord of the inland city of Kastemuni, and whose son Abdullah,
in the lifetime of Osman, drove Ghazi Tchelebi from Sinope. The emirate
had many vicissitudes and changes in dynasty. In the time of Ibn
Batutah, Soleiman padishah was the sovereign, and had extended his rule
from Heraclea on the Black Sea coast almost to Trebizond. His son Ali
ruled at Borlu, and another son Ibrahim Shah, who succeeded Soleiman,
contested Samsun with the emperor of Trebizond. Ibrahim was the younger
son, and was designated as his successor by Soleiman. Under the third
dynasty of Kastemuni, the ben-Isfendiar, the emirate was at the height
of its power. Its fleets swept the Black Sea, and did much harm to the
Greeks of Trebizond and the Genoese of Kaffa. Kaouïa was absorbed, and
its eastern boundaries included Osmandjik. The emirs of Menteshe and
Aïdin took refuge here, and the refusal of the emir of Kastemuni,
Bayezid, to give them up, led to the invasion of 1392. Bayezid and the
fugitive princes fled to Timur, who restored them after the battle of
Angora. Isfendiar, son of Bayezid, managed to retain Sinope, and a large
portion of the interior, for thirty years. He was father-in-law of the
Ottoman sultan, Murad II. When Clavijo visited Sinope in 1404 Isfendiar
had forty thousand men to put in the field against the Osmanlis. It was
not until after the fall of Constantinople that Kastemuni finally lost
its independence.[765] As the history of this emirate is involved with
that of Sinope, see also below under Sinope.
KEREDEH (25)
This was a small emirate, sometimes called also Kerdeleh, between
Kastemuni and Boli, which was absorbed by the Osmanlis in the latter
part of the reign of Orkhan. It was already in danger of Ottoman
aggression when Ibn Batutah visited it on his way from Brusa to
Kastemuni.[766]
KERMASTI (26)
On the Adranos River, one day south of Mikhalitch, and two days west of
Brusa, this city was conquered by Orkhan in his first campaign after the
fall of Nicomedia.[767]
KERMIAN (27)
Kermian, or Guermian, took its name from a Turcoman chief who held
Kutayia about 1300. It was the earliest definite emirate which arose in
western Asia Minor after the dissolution of the Seljuk Empire.
Shehabeddin wrote: ‘Turkish tribes seized the greater part of the Seljuk
possessions. The Turks recognized the pre-eminence of the emir of
Kermian.’ The great fortress which still crowns the hill of Kutayia is
supposed to have been erected by Kermian.[768] Kermian’s son Ali became
master of all of Phrygia, possibly at one time including Angora in his
emirate. Orkhan wrote to Ali as equal to equal, and gave him the title
of ‘emir of Anatolia’.[769] Ali had forty thousand horsemen and seven
hundred castles and villages. He was the equal of the emir of Karamania
and more powerful than Orkhan.
Kermian was the first of the larger emirates to feel the change which
the successes in the Balkan peninsula had made in the fortune of the
Osmanlis. A granddaughter of the older Ali, and great-granddaughter of
Kermian, was married to Bayezid, and Murad compelled the emir of Kermian
to cede the north-western portion of his estates as his daughter’s
_dot_. When Bayezid made his first campaign against Karamania he annexed
the remainder of Kermian. The emir, his brother-in-law Yakub, fled to
Timur, and was restored. The Osmanlis definitely incorporated Kermian in
their empire in the second decade of the fifteenth century.[770]
LIMNIA (28)
A small emirate in the mountains between Trebizond and Erzindjian, whose
emir, Tasheddin, married the daughter of the emperor of Trebizond in
1379. In 1386, Tasheddin could put an army of twelve thousand men into
the field. There were several other very small Turkish emirates around
Trebizond. Not enough, however, is known of them to make it worth while
to mention them.[771]
MARASH (29)
An independent emirate was established here after the fall of the
Lusignans in Cilicia, which was also known by the name of the founder of
the dynasty, Sulkadir. It maintained its independence against the
Karamanians, Egyptians, and Osmanlis until 1515, when its last prince
fell in a battle with Selim.[772]
MARMORA (30)
An emirate on the borders of the Sea of Marmora, between Cyzicus and the
Dardanelles, which had struggles and alliances with the Catalans,
Byzantines, and Turks of Balikesri. It became a vassal state of Karasi,
and was ruled from Pergama. After the destruction of Karasi, its
territory was shared by the Catalans of Bigha and by Orkhan.[773]
MENTESHE (31)
Like Hamid, Menteshe was of late formation. The chief who gave his name
to this emirate was a contemporary of Orkhan, and was sometimes known by
the same name. He was allied by marriage to Soleiman, son of Aïdin,
through whom he gained the former possessions of Aïdin south of the
Maeander River. The emirate probably started at Mughla, and did not have
much importance until it had absorbed Tawas and most of Fukeh. The emir
of Menteshe possessed great influence during the latter part of Orkhan’s
reign and the reign of Murad, and, like Aïdin and Sarukhan, the Turks of
Menteshe, through their trading, were more in contact with the outside
world than were the Osmanlis. Their port, known to the Venetians as
Palatchia, was the ancient Miletus. The emirate of Menteshe suffered
decline in the latter days of Murad’s reign through the Venetian
usurpation at Palatchia. At the time of Bayezid’s invasion, the emir
fled to Sinope and then to Timur. The emirate was restored by Timur, and
was not definitely incorporated in the Ottoman empire until the reign of
Murad II.[774] (_See_ Fukeh, Palatchia, and Tawas.)
MIKHALITCH (32)
This was one day west of Brusa and a day south of Mudania. After the
fall of Brusa, Turkish or Byzantine rulers maintained themselves in
Mikhalitch until the expedition of Orkhan against Karasi. After that it
became Ottoman.[775] Some of the prisoners held for ransom after
Nicopolis were detained in Mikhalitch, and one of the most illustrious
of them died there.[776]
NAZLU (33)
This was a small emirate east of Denizli, which was absorbed by Hamid
about 1350.[777]
NICAEA (34)
Shehabeddin says that Nicaea was the centre of an emirate whose ruler
possessed eight cities, thirty fortresses and an army of eight thousand
horsemen. The emir was Ali, a brother and neighbour of Sarukhan. I have
been unable to identify this place.[778]
PALATCHIA (35)
Like Ayasoluk in relation to Aïdin, Palatchia, the ancient Miletus, in
relation to Menteshe was at times independent, and at times the capital
and seaport of the emirate. Clavijo confused Palatchia with Ayasoluk,
and claimed that Timur summered (he means wintered) there. In another
place he speaks of having travelled with a brother of Alamanoglu,
brother of the emir of Altoluogo _and_ Palatchia.[779] When Menteshe had
his capital at Mughla, there was undoubtedly another emir at Palatchia,
who might also have been the man spoken of above as emir of Fukeh. But
there can be no certainty on this point. Venice, from 1345 to 1405--and
later--was interested in Palatchia, and had a consul and large
commercial interests there. Different negotiations and treaties, in
which the Osmanlis do not figure, attest the interest of Venice, and the
independence--at least from the Osmanlis--of Palatchia throughout the
fourteenth century.[780] Cyprus and Rhodes at times tried to get the
supremacy of Palatchia.[781]
SARUKHAN (36)
Sarukhan was throughout the fourteenth century an emirate of far more
importance than its rather restricted territory would seem to indicate.
This was largely on account of the high qualities of its rulers and the
daring of its sailors. It extended from the Gulf of Smyrna on the south
to the Aegaean coast opposite Mitylene on the north, and was wedged in
between Aïdin and Karasi. The hinterland was indefinite, and did not
matter much as the Turks of Sarukhan were first and last mariners. They
were the most important factor in the triple alliance against Orkhan in
1329 and 1336. After the Ottoman occupation of Pergama, and the
disappearance of Karasi, they held the Osmanlis back for a hundred years
(with the exception of the few years of Bayezid’s invasion). They were
frequently in alliance with the Genoese of Phocaea and the Byzantines,
and hired out as mercenaries and for transporting troops and food to
Christian and Moslem alike. The long lease of life which Philadelphia
enjoyed as a city of the Byzantine Empire is witness of their friendly
relations with the Greeks throughout the reigns of Osman, Orkhan, and
Murad.[782] Magnesia was capital of this emirate. It was not destroyed
until Smyrna fell into the hands of the Osmanlis in 1425.[783]
SATALIA (37)
Satalia is listed as an emirate separately from Tekke for the same
reason that Ayasoluk is given separately from Aïdin, Palatchia
separately from Menteshe, and Sinope separately from Kastemuni. It began
and ended as a separate and independent emirate, with its own lord. Its
history is treated below under Tekke. The modern name of Satalia is
Adalia, from _Attaleia_, and gives its name to the gulf on the southern
coast of Asia Minor. Nicolay has confused Satalia with Ayas, the ancient
Issos.[784]
SINOPE (38)
An emirate was founded about 1307 in Sinope by the last descendant of
the Seljuks of Rum, who was known as Ghazi Tchelebi[785] who in 1313,
in co-operation with the Greeks of Trebizond, attacked Kaffa. But in
1318 we find the Turks of Sinope burning almost all of the city of
Trebizond, and in 1323 massacring the Genoese colony in their own city.
Soon after this the emir of Kastemuni conquered Sinope.[786] The Turks
of Sinope were to the Black Sea what those of Sarukhan were to the
Aegaean. In 1361 they nearly captured Kaffa.[787] Their later history is
that of Kastemuni.
SIVAS (39)
The history of Sivas between the time of the Mongol withdrawal and the
aggression of the Osmanlis is not known. But that it must have had
independent princes can be inferred from the story of how Kadi
Burhaneddin came to rule there (cf. above under Caesarea). Its
disastrous conquest by the Osmanlis, and then by Timur, has been told in
the chapter on Bayezid’s reign.
TAWAS (40)
This was a maritime emirate extending east into Lycia and west as far as
the mainland opposite Rhodes. It was the only one of the early emirates
to possess islands. Its pirates were true descendants of those whom
Pompey opposed, and were continually in conflict with the Rhodians and
Cypriotes. Tawas was absorbed by Tekke and Menteshe, but not before
1340.[788]
TEKKE (41)
Tekke grew up into a powerful emirate in Pamphylia and Lycia. Its
expansion to the north was stopped by the Taurus, and to the west by
Alaïa and Karamania. Tawas, which it later absorbed, Menteshe, Rhodes,
and Cyprus were its other great rivals. Its history is centred around
the city of Adalia, then called Satalia, in which there were merchants
of the larger Italian cities. Adalia was taken from the emirs of Tekke
in 1361, but they regained it when the Genoese were threatening
Famagusta in 1373. The Osmanlis, under Murad, crossed the Taurus by way
of Sparta, into Tekke, but failed to capture Adalia. It remained
independent until 1450.[789]
TOKAT (42)
This city was either under the Mongols or independent throughout the
fourteenth century. Its fortunes were similar to those of Caesarea and
Sivas.
ULUBAD (43)
This city, between Bithynia and Mysia, was conquered by Osman, and then
lost. It came again into the power of the Osmanlis in Orkhan’s campaign
of 1339. A relative or ally of Andronicus III lived there.[790]
INDEPENDENT CHRISTIAN STATES
There were two Christian states in Asia Minor during the fourteenth
century.
LITTLE ARMENIA (44), so called to distinguish it from the classical
Armenia of the upper Euphrates valley and the mountains between Asia
Minor and the Azerbaïdjan, was a portion of Cilicia in the south-eastern
corner of Anatolia, south of the Taurus mountains. A dynasty of Armenian
kings, who had successfully held off the Seljuks of Konia, and had
maintained its position in the fourteenth century by siding with the
Mongols and Tartars against the Egyptians, was overthrown between 1360
and 1374 in three invasions by the Egyptians, who made Tarsus their
frontier fortress.[791] Ahmed ben Ramazan, however, in 1379 established
a Turkish emirate at Adana, which survived throughout the fifteenth
century. The Osmanlis were masters of a portion of Hungary before their
power was felt in Cilicia.
TREBIZOND (45), in the north-eastern corner of the peninsula, in the
country where Mithridates in his kingdom of Pontus had defied the
Romans, came into no contact with the Osmanlis during the century. Nor
was it the object of aggression on the part of Timur.[792] It resisted
successfully, with its Greek and Laze population, on land and sea, the
attacks of the Turks of its hinterland and of Sinope.
TERRITORIES DEPENDING ON OUTSIDE STATES
At the mouth of the Gulf of Smyrna, on the northern promontory, was the
Genoese self-governing colony of PHOCAEA (46), of which much has been
said in the chapter on the reign of Orkhan. Phocaea had many
vicissitudes, but maintained its independence as a Latin colony
throughout the fourteenth century, and knew how to turn aside the
possible aggression of Timur. It was never even temporarily dependent
upon the Osmanlis.[793]
SMYRNA (47) was wrested from the emir of Aïdin by the crusaders of 1344,
and, for the rest of the fourteenth century was a Christian city,
independent of the Osmanlis and the Turkish emirs alike. It was Timur
who brought it again under Moslem control. But it did not pass to the
Osmanlis for many years after this reconquest.
The Byzantines, after they had been driven out of Bithynia and Mysia,
managed to maintain PHILADELPHIA (48), through their friendship with
Sarukhan, until the end of Murad’s reign.
The CYPRIOTES (49) exercised a powerful influence in the southern
portions of Asia Minor throughout the fourteenth century. As we have
seen, they held Adalia for some years. In 1360, the emirs of southern
Anatolia were so divided and opposed to each other, and needed so
greatly the help of Cyprus against the Karamanians, whom they feared
much more than the Osmanlis, that they became for many years tributary
to Cyprus.[794] The Cypriotes were also interested in Cilicia.
In 1327, the year after Osman’s death, the power of the MONGOLS (50)
reached for a few years the Mediterranean. After Bahadur Khan’s death,
in 1335, the Mongol Empire was divided up. Suzerainty in Asia Minor fell
to the Sultan of Irak (Persia), who, until Timur’s coming, fought with
the Karamanians for some of the most important cities of eastern
Anatolia. When Ibn Batutah went through the peninsula, Erzerum,
Erzindjian, Sivas, Caesarea, Amassia, Nigdeh, and Ak Seraï were ‘cities
of the Sultan’.[795]
The chevaliers of RHODES (51) did not come into Asia Minor until 1310,
when they won from the Turks and Greeks the island which was to give
them their most commonly used name. They were continually in conflict
with Tawas, Alaïa, Adalia, Tekke, Menteshe, Fukeh, and Aïdin. But they
never came into contact with the Osmanlis until after the fall of
Constantinople. On the mainland, the chevaliers helped to take Smyrna in
1344, and defended it against the Turks for sixty years. They wrested
Ayasoluk from Aïdin for a while about 1365. Several times they gained a
foothold in Fukeh and Menteshe, and in the last year of the century
established a fortress at Halik (Halicarnassus).[796]
The Mamelukes of EGYPT (52) were not only interested in Cilicia, and
held that country from 1360 to 1379, and at other times, but also
invaded Karamania on different occasions. They reached Konia at the end
of the thirteenth century, the beginning of the fifteenth century, and
again, under Ibrahim pasha, twice in the third decade of the nineteenth
century. During the reign of Murad I, the Egyptians called Cilicia up to
the Taurus _Bab-el-Mulk_, the Royal Gateway. Konia was entered by an
Egyptian Sultan in 1418. The Karamanians of that day, who, according to
the Ottoman historians, were vassals of the Osmanlis, had no interest in
or fear of Mohammed I. They were engaged in a civil war which led to
Egyptian intervention.[797] If Konia and the rest of Karamania was under
the Osmanlis, why was there not Ottoman intervention in the quarrel
between Mohammed and Ali for the Karamanian throne?
Last of all, the CATALANS (53), whose history is given in the chapter on
Osman, did not all leave Asia Minor with the ‘Grand Company’. Throughout
the reign of Orkhan the principality established at Cyzicus left its
traces in the Marmora and Dardanelles coast and hinterland. Nothing more
strikingly illustrates the lack of Ottoman activity in Asia Minor during
Orkhan’s day, even at the very threshold of Bithynia, than the fact that
he left the Catalans in possession of Bigha at his death. Murad, in
1363, although his presence was urgently needed on the Maritza to defend
his new conquest of Adrianople against a Serbian invasion, was compelled
to delay for months to eject the Catalans from Bigha.[798]
CONCLUSION
_Orkhan’s emirate, then, was but one of more than thirty independent
states which existed in Asia Minor during the decade from 1330 to 1340._
During his lifetime, and the lifetime of his father Osman, the other
better-known emirates had been slowly forming by the absorption of small
independent villages and cities. Although several of the emirates that
have been given above were ephemeral, and some of them duplicated
practically the same territory at different periods in the fourteenth
century, others, such as Aïdin, Kermian, Karamania, Sarukhan, and Tekke,
were far more powerful in Asia Minor than Orkhan or than Murad. That
Bayezid had not crushed the life out of the larger emirates is proved by
the ease with which they were revived by Timur, and by their survival
during the first half of the fifteenth century.
Karamania, for one, remained powerful and flourishing long after the
political life of the Balkan states had become extinct. Karamania
demanded one hundred years of strenuous effort on the part of the
conquerors of the Byzantine Empire before it could be subjugated. _The
Osmanlis crossed the Balkans more than a century before they crossed the
Taurus._
This exposé was written in order to show:
1. That Osman fell heir to no part of the Seljuk dominions;
2. That the Seljuks had many more heirs than the traditional ten;
3. That Osman and Orkhan carved their state out of the remnants of the
Byzantine possessions along the upper end of the Sea of Marmora and in
the Valley of the Sangarius--a very small portion indeed of Asia Minor;
4. That Murad, the wonderful conqueror of the Balkan peninsula, was only
one of several rulers in Asia Minor, and not the most powerful of these,
and that there were large portions of Asia Minor with which neither he
nor his successor Bayezid came into contact at all;
5. That neither Bayezid, with his tremendous prestige in Europe, nor his
brilliant successors of the fifteenth century, gained undisputed
possession of Asia Minor. The Osmanlis were not masters of Asia Minor
until long after their inheritance of the Byzantine Empire was regarded
in Europe as a _fait accompli_.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES
I. Approximate Dates in the Legendary Period.
II. Important Events in the First Century of Ottoman History.
III. Progress of Ottoman Congress under the First Four Sovereigns.
IV. Comparative Table of Rulers.
V. The Fourteenth Century in Byzantine History.
VI. Relations between Venice and Genoa and the Levant from 1300 to 1403.
VII. The Popes and the Moslem Menace in the Fourteenth Century.
I. THE LEGENDARY PERIOD
1219--Soleiman Shah, with 50,000 nomad Turkish families, settles in
neighbourhood of Erzindjian.
1224--Soleiman Shah is drowned in the Euphrates. Ertogrul and Dundar,
two of his sons, settle near Angora.
1230-40--Ertogrul establishes himself in the valley of the Kara Su,
north-west of Kutayia.
1259--Osman is born at Sugut.
1289--Ertogrul dies.
Osman captures Karadja Hissar and Biledjik.
1290--Osman kills his uncle Dundar.
1290-9--Osman, having extended his possessions westward, founds an
emirate, and takes up his residence at Yeni Sheïr.
II. IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE FIRST CENTURY OF OTTOMAN HISTORY
1299--Osman, Turkish emir in the valley of the Kara Su, makes Yeni
Sheïr, between Brusa and Nicaea, his residence.
1301--Osman defeats the Byzantine heterarch Muzalon at Baphaeon, near
Nicomedia.
1308--Kalolimni, island in the Sea of Marmora, is occupied. Ak Hissar
and Tricocca are captured.
1317--Investment of Brusa begins.
1326--Brusa surrenders. Osman hears the news on his death-bed at Yeni
Sheïr.
1329--Byzantines under Andronicus III are defeated at Pelecanon
(Maltepé).
Nicaea surrenders.
1333--Alaeddin pasha, brother of Orkhan and first vizier, dies.
Death of Bahadur Khan removes the Mongol menace.
1337 or 1338--Nicomedia surrenders.
1338--Karasi, first of the Turkish emirates to be absorbed, is
incorporated in Orkhan’s state.
_c._ 1338--Osmanlis reach the Bosphorus at Haïdar Pasha.
1343--Empress Anna makes overtures to Orkhan for aid against
Cantacuzenos.
1345--Orkhan accepts proposal of alliance with Cantacuzenos.
First Osmanlis cross to Europe to fight for Cantacuzenos against Anna.
1346--Orkhan marries Theodora, granddaughter of the Bulgarian czar and
daughter of Cantacuzenos, who is besieging Constantinople with Ottoman
aid.
1348--The ‘Black Death’ ravages Europe.
1349--Cantacuzenos calls again upon Orkhan for aid. Twenty thousand
Ottoman horsemen are sent to help in preventing Salonika from falling
into Serbian hands.
_c._ 1351--First convention between Orkhan and the Genoese.
1353--Soleiman pasha, Orkhan’s elder son, in response to the third
appeal of Cantacuzenos for Ottoman aid, brings an army into Thrace,
helps in the recapture of Adrianople, and defeats the Serbians at
Demotika. For this aid, a fortress on the European shore of the
Dardanelles, probably Tzympe, is given to Orkhan.
1354--An earthquake, which damaged the walls of Gallipoli, enables the
Osmanlis of Soleiman pasha to capture the city. Orkhan refuses to give
up Gallipoli, breaks with Cantacuzenos, and orders the Osmanlis in the
Hellespont to extend their conquest in the direction of Constantinople.
_c_. 1357--Demotika and Tchorlu are captured for the first time by the
Osmanlis under Soleiman pasha.
1358--Soleiman pasha dies from the fall of a horse at Bulaïr.
1359--Orkhan dies, and is succeeded by Murad.
1360-1--Conquest of Thrace.
1361--Second serious ‘Black Death’ plague in Europe.
_c._ 1362--Murad creates corps of ‘janissaries’.
1362 (1363)--John V Palaeologos binds himself by treaty to recognize
Murad’s conquests in Thrace, and to give him military aid against the
Turkish emirs of Asia Minor.
1363--Serbian and Hungarian crusaders are defeated on the banks of the
Maritza.
Murad takes up his residence in Demotika.
1365--Ragusa makes commercial treaty with Osmanlis, promising tribute.
1366--Adrianople becomes the first capital of the Ottoman Empire.
Amadeo of Savoy’s crusade; captures Gallipoli, but soon abandons it
again.
1369--Capture of Yamboli forces Sisman of Bulgaria to become, like the
Byzantine Emperor, a vassal of Murad.
1371--Battle of Samakov gives the Osmanlis control of the passes into
the Plain of Sofia.
Battle of Cernomen opens up Macedonia to the Ottoman conquest.
1372--Moslem colonization of Macedonia, at Drama, Kavalla, Serres, and
Veles, gives the Osmanlis a position of preponderance in the Balkan
peninsula.
1373--John Palaeologos, failing to receive aid from the West, becomes
Ottoman vassal.
1374--Unsuccessful conspiracy of Manuel to recover Serres causes Ottoman
siege of Salonika.
1379--John and Manuel agree to increase their tribute of gold and
soldiers, and to surrender Philadelphia, the last Byzantine possession
in Asia, for Ottoman aid in ousting Andronicus IV from Constantinople.
1384--Osmanlis aid Thomas in besieging Janina.
1385--First Ottoman invasion of Albania.
Battle of Savra destroys Balsa’s power.
Osmanlis occupy Sofia.
1386--Osmanlis capture Croia and Scutari, but return these fortresses to
prince of Zenta.
The fall of Nish makes Lazar of Serbia Ottoman vassal.
1387--Genoa concludes formal treaty with Murad.
Murad, with army containing Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian contingents,
defeats Alaeddin of Karamania at Konia, but has to withdraw without
tangible results.
1388--Venice concludes commercial treaty with Murad.
1388--Osmanlis are defeated by Serbians and Bosnians at Plochnik, thus
preventing invasion of Bosnia.
League of Serbians, Bosnians, Bulgarians, Wallachians, and Albanians
formed against the Osmanlis.
First Ottoman army enters Greece upon invitation of Theodore Palaeologos
to fight against the Franks.
1389--Osmanlis destroy Serbian independence at Kossova.
Murad is assassinated on the battle-field. Bayezid succeeds to the
throne, and has his brother Yakub strangled.
BAYEZID (1389-1403).
1387--Bayezid marries sister of Stephen, son of Lazar, and makes
Serbians his allies.
1390--First Ottoman naval expedition makes raid on Chios, Negropont, and
Attika.
First Ottoman raids into Hungary.
1391--Second invasion of Karamania, followed by siege of Konia, results
in cession by Alaeddin of north-western portion of Karamania.
First Ottoman siege of Constantinople.
1392--First defensive campaign against Sigismund is fought in Bulgaria.
Hearing that Timurtash had been defeated by Karamanlis, Bayezid
transports army to Asia, and destroys Alaeddin’s army at Ak Tchaï. The
Osmanlis are now the dominant race in Asia Minor.
1394--Osmanlis first appear in the Adriatic at the mouth of the Boyana.
1395--Bayezid summons Ottoman vassals to his court at Serres.
Ottoman siege of Constantinople becomes pressing.
1396--Crusade of Western chivalry, co-operating with Sigismund of
Hungary, meets with disaster at Nicopolis in Bulgaria.
Ottoman invaders of Wallachia are defeated at Rovine, but in raids into
Hungary Peterwardein is burned, and sixteen thousand Styrians carried
off into captivity.
1397--First Ottoman invasion of Greece. In the Peloponnesus, Argos is
taken by assault.
After defeat at Megalopolis, Theodore becomes Ottoman vassal.
1397-9--Movement of Moslem Anatolian population into the Balkan
peninsula.
1398--Osmanlis and Serbians make destructive raid on Bosnia.
1400--Timur captures and destroys Sivas.
1402--Timur defeats and makes prisoner Bayezid at Angora, overruns Asia
Minor, occupies Brusa, and takes Smyrna from the Christians by storm.
1403--Timur withdraws to Samarkand.
Bayezid, still a prisoner, dies on the homeward march at Ak Sheïr. His
sons dispute the succession.
III. PROGRESS OF OTTOMAN CONQUEST UNDER THE FIRST FOUR SOVEREIGNS
OSMAN (1299-1326)
1299--Osman, local chieftain at Sugut, has extended his conquests from
the valley of the Kara Su westward to Yeni Sheïr.
1308--Kalolimni, island in the Sea of Marmora, becomes first Ottoman
maritime possession.
Ak Hissar, at the entrance to plain of Nicomedia, and Tricocca, which
ensured land communication between Nicaea and Nicomedia, are captured.
1308-16--Sovereignty is extended over the peninsula between the Gulf of
Nicomedia and the Black Sea, almost up to the Bosphorus.
1317--Fortresses are erected near gates of Brusa.
1326--Brusa surrenders.
ORKHAN (1326-59)
1329--Occupies Nicaea.
1330-8--Conquest of shores of Gulf of Nicomedia up to Scutari on the
Bosphorus.
1334-8--Conquest of emirate of Karasi.
1337-8--Occupies Nicomedia.
_c._ 1339--Acquires Mikhalitch, Ulubad, and Kermasti.
1353--Cantacuzenos cedes fortress on European shore of Hellespont.
1354--Gallipoli is occupied.
1354-8--The Osmanlis occupy the Thracian, Chersonese, and the European
shore of the Sea of Marmora as far as Rodosto. Demotika is captured, and
Constantinople cut off from Adrianople by the occupation of Tchorlu.
MURAD (1359-89)
1360--Captures Angora and suppresses independence of village chieftains
between Eski Sheïr and Angora.
1360-1--Conquers Thrace from the Maritza River to the Black Sea,
including Adrianople.
1361--Lalashahin captures Philippopolis.
_c._ 1362--Creation of the corps of janissaries.
1362 or 1363--John V Palaeologos binds himself by treaty to recognize
Murad’s conquest of Thrace, and to give him military aid against the
emirs of Asia Minor.
1366-9--Conquest of Maritza Valley up to the Rhodope Mountains, and of
Bulgaria, up to the main Balkan range.
1370-1--Occupies the fortresses and passes in the Rhodope and Rilo
ranges.
1371-2--Conquers Macedonia up to the Vardar River.
_c._ 1376--Portion of emirate of Kermian, including Kutayia is annexed
as _dot_ of the emir’s daughter, in marriage arranged with Bayezid.
1377--Emir of Hamid sells to Murad territories between Tekke, Kermian,
and Karamania. The acquisition of Ak Sheïr brings the Osmanlis to the
frontier of Karamania.
1378--Conquers Tekke, except Adalia and Alaya.
1380--Conquers Macedonia, west of the Vardar. Prilep and Monastir become
Ottoman frontier fortresses.
1385--Occupies Okhrida.
Plain of Sofia and upper valley of the Struma River are conquered.
1386--Valleys of the Morava and Nisava are conquered, and Nish falls.
1388--Invasion of northern Bulgaria reduces Sisman to more humiliating
vassalage. The Osmanlis retain the fortresses of Shuman and Nicopolis.
BAYEZID (1389-1403)
1391--Captures Adalia, first Ottoman seaport on the Mediterranean.
Ak Sheïr and Ak Seraï ceded by Karamania.
1393--Bulgaria, to the Danube, becomes Ottoman territory.
1393-5--Conquers Samsun, Caesarea, and Sivas, and annexes emirate of
Kastemuni.
1397--Conquers Thessaly, Doris, Locris, and the north-eastern corner of
the Peloponnesus.
1398-9--Gradually occupies Southern Albania and a part of Epirus.
IV. COMPARATIVE TABLE OF RULERS
BYZANTINE EMPIRE[799]
_The Palaeologi_
ANDRONICUS II (the Old), 1282-1328.
MICHAEL IX (co-emperor), 1295-1320.
ANDRONICUS III (the Young), 1328-41, by whose second wife, Anna of
Savoy, was born
JOHN V, 1341-01, whose three sons were:
ANDRONICUS IV (co-emperor), 1355-?
MANUEL II, 1391-1425.
Theodore, despot of the Morea, 1359-.
The son of Andronicus IV was
JOHN VII (co-emperor), 1399-1403.
_The Cantacuzeni_
JOHN VI, regent, 1341-7, co-emperor, 1347-55, two of whose daughters
married Orkhan and John V, and whose son was
MATTHEW, co-emperor, 1355-6.
HUNGARY
LOUIS THE GREAT, 1342-82 (King of Poland, 1370-82).
His two daughters were:
Hedwig, to whom fell the crown of Poland, and who married Jagello of
Lithuania, who became King of Poland under the Christian name of
Ladislas V.
Mary, to whom fell the crown of Hungary, 1382-92.
Mary married
SIGISMUND of Luxemburg in 1386, who became sole ruler of Hungary after
Mary’s death, and, later, Holy Roman Emperor.
HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE
_House of Luxemburg_
CHARLES IV (I as King of Bohemia), 1355-78.
His two sons were:
WENCESLAUS, who succeeded to the imperial crown on the death of his
father and was deposed in 1400;
and SIGISMUND, King of Hungary, who was elected emperor in 1410.
FRANCE
PHILIPPE IV, _le Bel_, 1285-1314, and his sons
LOUIS X, PHILIPPE V, and CHARLES IV, last of the Capetians. 1314-28.
PHILIPPE VI VALOIS, 1328-50.
JEAN, 1350-64.
CHARLES V, 1365-80.
CHARLES VI, 1380-1422.
Philippe de Bourgogne, son of King Jean, and father of Jean de Nevers,
and Louis d’Orléans, second son of Charles V, were vying with each other
for the control of their insane nephew and brother, Charles VI, during
the reign of Bayezid.
ENGLAND
EDWARD I, 1270-1307.
EDWARD II, 1307-27.
EDWARD III, 1327-77
(took the title of King of France in 1339).
RICHARD III, 1377-99.
Deposed in 1399, and succeeded by
HENRY IV (of Lancaster).
V. THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY IN BYZANTINE HISTORY
1300--The emir of Menteshe invades Rhodes.
1301--First Byzantine defeat at hands of Osmanlis at Baphaeon.
1302--Michael IX takes command of Slavic mercenaries in Asia Minor: they
force him to allow their return to Europe.
Roger de Flor arrives at Constantinople with eight thousand Catalans,
and is married to a niece of Andronicus.
1303--Catalans sack the island of Chios.
1305--Death of Ghazan Khan frustrates Byzantine hopes of a Mongol attack
upon the emirs of Asia Minor.
Catalans compel the emir of Karamania to lift the siege of Philadelphia,
but quarrel with Greeks and Slavic mercenaries. Roger exacts title of
‘Caesar’ from Andronicus, and is later assassinated by Michael IX at
Adrianople.
1306-9--Catalan ‘Grand Company’ forms state at Gallipoli.
1310--Catalans leave for Greece, and set up military democracy in
Athens.
The Knights of St. John of Jerusalem capture Rhodes.
1311--The emir of Menteshe fails in attempt to recapture Rhodes.
1311-14--Turkish freebooter Halil defies the Emperor in the Thracian
Chersonese, and is finally defeated with the help of the Serbians.
1317--Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomaedia begin to be menaced.
1326--Brusa falls. Andronicus III, on his wedding trip from
Constantinople to Demotika, is set upon and wounded by raiding Turks.
1327-8--Andronicus III plots to oust his grandfather, who, in turn,
invites Serbians to attack young Andronicus in the rear; young
Andronicus besieges army of his grandfather and Serbians at Serres, and
captures Salonika. Old Andronicus calls upon Bulgarians, but before
their aid arrives, young Andronicus succeeds in entering Constantinople
and deposing his grandfather.
1329--Andronicus III is defeated at Pelecanon by Orkhan in an attempt to
relieve Nicaea. Nicaea surrenders.
Andronicus III, at Phocaea, tries to incite emirs of Aïdin and Sarukhan
to attack Orkhan.
1333--Turks of Sarukhan make a raid on Macedonia, while their vessels
enter the Sea of Marmora and seize Rodosto.
1334--Andronicus is compelled to send army to save Salonika from raiding
Turks.
1336--Andronicus asks Turkish emirs to help him in siege of Genoese at
Phocaea.
1337 or 1338--Nicomedia and the last Byzantine possessions in
north-western corner of Asia Minor are conquered by the Osmanlis.
1340--Stephen Dushan crosses the Vardar, captures Serres, and crowns
himself there as ‘master of almost all the Roman Empire’.
1341--After death of Andronicus III, Cantacuzenos crowns himself at
Demotika.
1342--Civil war between Cantacuzenos and widow and son of Andronicus
III, during which both sides make overtures to Osmanlis, Serbians, and
Bulgarians.
1345--Cantacuzenos receives aid from Orkhan, and pays for it by marrying
his daughter to the Ottoman emir.
1347--Dushan crowns himself Emperor of Constantinople. Agreement between
John Cantacuzenos and John Palaeologos to share Byzantine throne.
Black Death plague reaches Constantinople.
1349--Cantacuzenos calls Osmanlis into Europe again to save Salonika
from the Serbians.
1349-53--Civil war between Cantacuzenos and Palaeologos.
Palaeologos flees to Tenedos.
1353--The Osmanlis, who had been helping Cantacuzenos against
Palaeologos, capture Gallipoli, and invade Thrace.
1354--Cantacuzenos, having vainly appealed to the Pope, Venice,
Bulgaria, and Serbia to aid him against the Osmanlis, is deposed by
popular revolution in Constantinople, and becomes a monk.
John Palaeologos recalled from exile.
1355--Dushan dies on his way to attack Constantinople.
1354-8--Palaeologos succeeds finally in subduing Cantacuzenos’ son
Matthew.
1358--While Osmanlis are advancing in Thrace, John V, at command of
Orkhan, is besieging Phocaea.
1361--Adrianople and Philippopolis captured by the Osmanlis.
1363--John V signs treaty of vassalage to Murad.
1366--John V journeys to Buda to enlist aid of Louis of Hungary, and on
return journey is made prisoner by Sisman in Bulgaria.
1373--John V, seeing that his visit to Rome and his appeals to western
princes are of no avail, recognizes Murad as his suzerain, promises to
do military service in Murad’s army, and gives his son Manuel as
hostage.
Thrace and Macedonia are practically lost, and the Byzantine Empire has
become merely the city state of Constantinople.
1374--As the result of a rebellion undertaken by Andronicus together
with the son of Murad against the two fathers, John V consents to
deprive his son Andronicus of his sight, and shuts him up in the Tower
of Anemas.
1375-89--Civil war between John and Manuel and Andronicus, in which
Venice, Genoa, and Osmanlis play a decisive part. John and Manuel
purchase Ottoman aid at the price of giving up Philadelphia, the last
Byzantine possession in Asia Minor.
1391--Manuel, serving as vassal in Ottoman army, is threatened with loss
of eyes, if Emperor John does not demolish the towers on the walls of
Constantinople, which he has rebuilt. He obeys and dies soon after.
Manuel escapes from Brusa upon learning of his father’s death. His
flight is followed by the first Ottoman siege of Constantinople.
1396--Bayezid contemplates taking Constantinople by assault, but is
deterred by arrival of crusaders in Hungary.
1397--Siege of Constantinople is renewed, after Nicopolis.
1399--Crusade of Boucicaut helps Byzantines temporarily.
1400-2--Manuel, having made peace with his nephew John, sails for Italy
and spends two years in fruitless endeavour to get aid from western
princes.
1401--John makes treaty to give up Constantinople, if Bayezid should win
from Timur.
1402--After Bayezid’s defeat at Angora, Manuel returns to
Constantinople.
John is banished to Lemnos, and Ottoman colonists expelled from
Constantinople. Overtures are made to Timur.
1403--Manuel recognizes Soleiman as successor of Bayezid, and renews
treaty with him.
VI. RELATIONS BETWEEN VENICE AND GENOA AND THE LEVANT FROM 1300 TO 1403
1328--Venetian sovereignty of Negropont is menaced by Turkish pirates.
1344--Venice aids Cyprus and Rhodes in the capture of Smyrna.
1345-50--Dushan negotiates frequently with Venice for aid in capturing
Constantinople.
1351-3--War between Venice and Genoa. Sea power of Genoa is broken at
battle of Lojera. Genoese are assisted by Orkhan.
1355--Matteo Venier and Marino Faleri warn the Senate that the Byzantine
Empire must inevitably become the booty of the Osmanlis, unless Venice
gets ahead of them.
1361--Venetian Senate make overtures to John V for alliance against
Murad, but withdraw when they see the rapid success of Murad’s campaign
in Thrace.
1370-1--Venice and Greece are engaged in a struggle for economic
supremacy in Cyprus.
1375--John V gives Tenedos to the Venetians. The Genoese come into
conflict with the Venetians over economic privileges at Constantinople.
1379-81--Venice and Genoa go to war over the question of Tenedos and the
Byzantine succession to the throne. In the Peace of Turin, it is
provided that Tenedos remain unfortified, and that Andronicus IV be
recognized the heir to John V.
1386--Genoese make treaty with Byzantines.
1387--Genoese make commercial treaty with Osmanlis.
1388--Venetians make commercial treaty with Osmanlis.
1389--Venice and Genoa renew treaties with Bayezid.
1393--Venice decides to treat with Sigismund of Hungary for defensive
alliance against Osmanlis.
1396--Venetian aid in Nicopolis crusade is half-hearted.
1397--Venice urges Genoese of Pera not to treat with Bayezid, and makes
accord with Genoa to aid Byzantines.
1401--Venice and Genoa engaged in another sea struggle for supremacy in
the Levant.
1402--Both Venetians and Genoese aid Osmanlis, fleeing from Timur after
Angora, to cross into Europe. They renew their treaties with Osmanlis,
recognizing Soleiman as Bayezid’s successor.
VII. THE POPES AND THE MOSLEM MENACE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
1306--Clement V exhorts the Venetians to co-operate with Charles de
Valois in the reconquest of Constantinople.
1307--Clement V urges Charles II of Naples to re-conquer Constantinople,
but his interest is diverted by a project of a crusade to support Cyprus
and Cilician Armenia against the Egyptians.
1309--Papal court transferred from Rome to Avignon.
1310--Clement V encourages Knights of St. John to drive both Greeks and
Turks out of Rhodes.
1327--John XXII does not respond to appeal of Andronicus II to aid
Byzantium against the Turks.
1333--Similar unsuccessful overture is made by Andronicus III.
1334--Papal effort to form crusade against Turks results in the capture
of Smyrna.
1347--Marquis de Montferrat, heir to the Latin Emperors, makes agreement
with Clement VI to conquer Constantinople.
At the same time appeals are received at Rome from Cantacuzenos for
union of western princes against Osmanlis.
1349, 1350, 1353--Cantacuzenos makes three more overtures to Clement VI
and Innocent VI.
1352--Inhabitants of Philadelphia appeal to Pope for aid, promising
return to Roman communion.
1363--Urban V on Holy Friday gives the cross to several princes of the
Occident.
1366--Urged by Urban, Amadeo of Savoy sails for the crusade against the
Osmanlis. He spends his efforts in releasing John V from the Bulgarians,
and abandons the Byzantines when they refuse to return to the Roman
Church. Urban writes to Louis of Hungary to put off his crusade until
the union of the Churches is accomplished.
Urban V denounces the traffic of the Italian Republics with Moslems.
1369--Emperor John V, at Rome, abjures errors of Orthodox Church, and
receives from Pope letters, recommending that Christian princes come to
his aid.
1371--Gregory XI makes appeal to Christian nations to co-operate with
Genoa in saving the last Christians of the Holy Land.
1372--Gregory urges Louis of Hungary to resist the Osmanlis before they
advance farther into Europe, and orders a crusade to be preached in
Hungary, Poland, and Dalmatia.
1373--Gregory, receiving the last envoy from John V, bursts into tears,
and says that he will save Constantinople, if only the Byzantine Emperor
will cause his people to renounce their heresies and return to the Roman
Church.
1378--The Great Schism.
1388--Urban VI sends two armed galleys for the defence of
Constantinople, but is unsuccessful in raising crusade.
1391--Boniface IX stirs up trouble between Latin and Greek Christians in
the Balkan peninsula.
1398 and 1399--Boniface IX orders crusade to be preached throughout
Christendom for the defence of Constantinople.
1399--Boucicaut, the only one to respond, goes to the aid of
Constantinople.
1402--Smyrna is lost to Timur.
1403--The strife between rival Popes, Benedict XIII and Boniface IX,
makes impossible a papal effort to take advantage of the civil strife
between the sons of Bayezid, after Timur’s abandonment of his conquests
in Asia Minor.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY
NOTE
The Classified Bibliography contains only the names of authors.
Following the classification, the books and editions are given in detail
under the authors’ names in alphabetical order.
I shall be grateful for corrections and amplifications. The work on this
bibliography has been done largely in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris,
and I have been handicapped by the lack of a complete catalogue.
No attempt whatever has been made to follow a definite system of
spelling of Oriental and Slavic names, for arbitrary changes in spelling
on my part would confuse the reader who desires to find in a library
catalogue the authors given. I have retained the spelling (except in
rare instances where there were divergencies in different editions of
the same book) of the author’s name as given by himself or by his editor
or publisher. As far as the letter ‘G’, I have made the spelling conform
to that of the General Catalogue of the Bibliothèque Nationale. Beyond
‘G’, there is, as yet, no norm.
=Bibliographers of Printed Books.=
Apponyi; Auboyneau; Boecler; Chevalier; Dherbelot de Molainville;
Eichhorn; Fabricius; Fevret; Fitzclarence; Fraehn; Franke; Hadji Khalfa;
Halle; Houtsma et al.; Oesterly; Omont; Pogodin; Potthast; Welter;
Zenker.
=Bibliographers of Oriental MSS.=
Ahlwardt; Ali Hilmi; Apponyi; Auboyneau; Blochet; Browne; Cusa; De
Goeje; De Jong; Derenbourg; Dorn; Dozy; Fevret; Flügel; Hadji Khalfa;
Karamianz; Lampros; Pertsch; Rieu; Rosen; Schéfer; Slane; Smirnow;
Sprenger; Welter.
=Numismatists.=
Blau; Djevdet; Engel; Friedländer; Ghalib; Karabacek; Lane-Poole;
Lavoix; Makrisi; Pinder; Schlumberger; Serrure; Stickel.
=Chronographers.=
Aladdin Ali; Arabantinos; Assemanus; Hadji Khalfa; Knaus; Loeb; Mas
Latrie; Mullach; Müller; Muralt; Rasmussen; Strzygowski; Wüstenfeld;
_Chronicon Breve_ (in Ducas).
=Collections of Contemporary Records.=
OTTOMAN: Feridun, Collection of.
The authenticity of the documents in this collection cannot be
definitely established.
BYZANTINE: Dieterich; Miklositch; Müller; Predelli; Sathas.
HUNGARIAN, SLAVIC, and RAGUSAN: Daničić; Fejér; Gelčić; Jorga; Ljubić;
Makusev; Miklositch; Miltitz; Müller; Noradounghian; Racki; Safařík
(Schaffarik); Sathas; Thallóczy; Theiner; Wenzel. (_See also under_
Kossova _and_ Nicopolis.)
VENETIAN: Alberi; Brown; Fejér; Jorga; Ljubić; Makusev; Miklositch;
Minotto; Müller; Noiret; Noradounghian; Predelli; Racki; Romanin; Rymer;
Safařík; Sathas; Testa; Thomas.
PAPAL (Avignon and Rome): Baluze; Bosquet; Dudik; Jorga; Romanin;
Theiner; Werunski.
The literature about the individual popes, and the collections of
documents published, registers, letters, etc., are so numerous, that I
cannot include even a selection here. The reader is referred to
Chevalier’s _Répertoire des sources historiques du Moyen Âge_, where,
under each pope, will be found the most complete and most recent
bibliographical references.
GENOESE (including Pera Colony): Belgrano; Jorga; Miklositch; Müller;
Noradounghian; Olivieri; Predelli; Testa.
OTHER ITALIAN CITIES: Jorga; Müller.
FRENCH: Boislisle; Bongars; Bouchon; Charrière; Delaville Leroulx;
Dorez; Garnier; Jorga; Kunstmann; Leuridan; Lot; Molinier; Moranvillé;
Potansque; Raimboult; Roncière; Tarbé.
ENGLISH: Rymer.
=Contemporary Chronicles.=
BYZANTINE: Cantacuzenos; Nicephoros Gregoras; Pachymeres; Panaretos (for
Trebizond).
CATALAN: Moncada; Muntaner. (_See also_ Frenzel.)
FRENCH: Enguerran de Monstrelet; Eustache des Champs; Froissart; Gilles;
Marche; Nangis; Ursins; Wavrin; Anon.: Cronicorum Karoli Sexti;
Chronique du duc Loys de Bourbon; Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denis;
Chronique des quatre premiers Valois; Livre des faicts de Jean le
Maingre, dit Bouciquaut; Relation de la Croisade de Nicopolis (serviteur
de Gui de Blois). (_See also under the Editors_: Bellaguet; Géraud;
Godefroy; Kervyn de Lettenhove; Lacabane; Lemaitre.)
HEBREW: Joseph ben Joshua.
MOREA: Chronique de Morée; Breve Chronicon (see Ducas).
ORIENTAL: Aboulpharadji; Hayton.
RUMANIAN: Urechi.
SAVOY: Anon. Anciennes Chroniques.
SERVIAN: Abbey of Tronosho; Chronicle of Pek.
VENICE: Bonincontrius; Caroldo; Guazzo; Villani (3).
=Venetian Archives (History and Guides to).=
Alberi; Baschet; Cecchetti; Mas Latrie; Toderini.
The archives for the fourteenth century are listed in the Alphabetical
Bibliography.
=Travellers and Geographers=. (Those in italics are contemporary or nearly
contemporary.)
ASIA MINOR: _Abulfeda_; Ainsworth; Baedeker; _Belon_; _Bergeron_;
_Bertrandon de la Broquière_; Bruun; Busbecq; Chardin; Cholet; Cuinet;
Edrisi; Evlia Tchelebi; Fresne-Canaye; Ghillebert de Launoy; Hadji
Khalfa; Hellert; Houzeau; Huart; Huber; _Ibn Batutah_; Macarius;
_Mandeville_; _Marco Polo_; Michelant; Mostras; Naumann; _Nicolay_;
Ortellius; Ramsay; Rennell; Sarre; _Schiltberger_; Seiff; _Shehabeddin_;
Sidi Ali Ibn Hussein; Tavernier; Tchihatcheff; Texeira; Texier;
Trémeaux; Vivien de St. Martin.
Ibn Batutah is the best contemporary authority.
CONSTANTINOPLE AND BALKAN PENINSULA: _Abulfeda_; Baedeker; Belgrano;
_Belon_; _Bergeron_; Boué; Bruun; Busbecq; _Clavijo_; Hadji Khalfa;
Hammer; Hellert; Huber; Jireček; Macarius; Manutio; Miklositch; Mostras;
_Nicolay_; Olivieri; Ortellius; Sathas; _Schiltberger_; Sefert; Sidi Ali
Ibn Hussein; Tafel; Tozer.
Clavijo is the best contemporary authority for Constantinople in the
latter part of the reign of Bayezid.
I have listed only those whose works I have referred to, or who seem to
me to have intimate, direct bearing on the subject. Many others,
however, could be consulted to advantage. _See_ Potthast, _Bibliotheca
Historica Medii Aevi_, ii. 1734-5.
=Seljuk Historians.=
Ahmed Ibn Yusuf; Houtsma (editor); Ibn-Bibi; Mirkhond (Mirkhwand).
=Early Arabic, Persian, and Armenian Historians.=
Ahmed Ibn Yusuf; Ahmed Ibn Yahia; Hayton; Ibn al Tiktaka; Ibn Khaldun;
Khondemir; Makrisi; Mirkhond (Mirkhwand); Mohammed-en-Nesawi;
Reshideddin; Texeira; Anon. _Derbend Namé_.
=Ottoman Historians and Chroniclers.=
Abdul Aziz; Ahmed Jaudat; Alaeddin Ali (Ibn Kadi Said); Ali (Mustafa Ibn
Ahmed); Ashik-pasha-zadé (Ahmed Ibn Yahia); Atha; Ayas Pasha;
Djelaleddin, Mustapha; Djemaleddin; Djemaleddin-al-Kifty; Djevad bey,
Ahmed; Fehmi; Feridun, Collection of; Geropoldi, Antonio (trans.);
Hadji Khalfa; Hezarfenn, Hussein; Ibn Ali Mohammed Al-Biwy; Idris,
Mevlana (of Bitlis); Kheirullah; Kourbaddinmakky; Mohammed Ferid bey;
Moukhlis Abderrahman; Mustafa; Nedim; Neshri; Nichandji pasha Mehmet;
Said; Seadeddin; Tahir-Zade; Anon. _Mira-ari-tarikh_.
No authenticated Ottoman records exist for the fourteenth century. The
nearest writers to events are Ashik-pasha-zadé, Idris, Mouklis
Abderrahman and Neshri. The historian enjoying the greatest reputation
for authority is Seadeddin.
=Western writers on Ottoman Empire before 1600.=
Adelman; Aenaeus Sylvius; Alhard; Aretinus (Leonardo Bruni); Augustinus
Caelius; Aventinus; Bertellus; Boecler; Bongars; Busbequius; Cambini;
Camerarius; Campana; Cervarius; Chytraeus; Clavijo; Corregiaio; Cousin
(Cognatus); Crusius; Cuspianus; Donado da Lezze; Drechsler; Egnatius;
Foglietta; Foscarini; Geuffraeus; Giorgievitz; Giovio; Gycaud (ed.);
Hoeniger; Konstantynowicz; Lonicerus; Menavino; Montalbanus; Pfeiffer;
Podesta; Postellus; Ramus; Reusner; Richer; Sabellicus; Sansovino;
Schiltberger; Secundinus; Spandugino; Traut; Anon. _Series Imp. Turc._
and _Tractatus de ritu et moribus Turc._
Most of the early western books are in Latin, but the authors are Greek,
Italian, French, German, Spanish, Austrian, and Polish. The majority of
them are as early as, if not earlier than, the first Ottoman
chroniclers.
Clavijo and Schiltberger are contemporary and eye-witness authorities
for the reign of Bayezid. Konstantynowicz’s book claims to be the
memoirs of a janissary in the reign of Murad II.
Busbequius, Donado da Lezze, Geuffraeus, Giorgievitz, Menavino,
Spandugino, and the author of _Tractatus de ritu_ gained their
information first-hand from living in Turkey.
=General Western Ottoman Historians= (seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries).
Cantemir (a Rumanian); De la Porte; Du Verdier; Febvre; Formanti;
Gibbon; Knolles; Mignot; Ohsson; Petits de la Croix; Ricaut; Sagredo;
Schulz; Servi; Vanel.
=General Western Ottoman Historians= (nineteenth century).
Castellan; Collas; Creasy; Dräseke; Ebeling; Errante; Fehmi (a Turk);
Ganem (a Syrian); Hammer; Hertzberg; Jonquière; Jorga; Jouannin; La
Garde de Dieu; Lamartine; Lane-Poole; Lavallée; Lüdemann; Rambaud;
Salaberry, de; Wirth; Wüstenfeld; Zinkeisen.
Hammer and Zinkeisen wrote the exhaustive and authoritative histories of
the nineteenth century. The splendid work of Professor Jorga, of the
University of Bucarest, belongs to our own twentieth century, and is the
most important contribution of contemporary scholarship to the history
of the Balkan peninsula under Ottoman domination. But none of these
three authoritative historians pays particular attention to the actual
foundation of the Ottoman Empire. Dräseke and Rambaud have only touched
upon the problems involved in reconstructing the fourteenth century
period.
=Mongol and Tartar History.=
Aboul-Ghazi-Bahadour; Bonaparte; Bretschneider; Cahun; Chavannes; Dorn;
Erdmann; Guignes; Hammer; Hirth; Howorth; Khondemir; Mohammed en Newasi;
Reshideddin; Vambéry; Wolff.
=Byzantine Empire and Frankish and Italian Greece.=
Ameilhon; Arabantinos; Berger de Xivrey; Byzantine Historians (_see
under_ Alphabetical Bibliography, on p. 367); Curtius; Djelal; Ducange;
Finlay; Florinsky; Gibbon; Gregorovius; Hammer; Hase; Hertzberg; Hody;
Hopf; Kampouroglou; Karamzin; Lampros; Lüdemann; Migne; Miller; Moncada;
Moniferratos; Mullach; Müller; Muntaner; Niebuhr; Paparregopoulos;
Parisot; Rodd; Sathas; Stritter; Tafel; Tozer. (_See also_ Slavs of
Balkan Peninsula.)
=Collections of Byzantine writers.=
Bonn (Niebuhr); Migne; Paris (Louvre) and Venice.
=Historians and Chroniclers of Rumania.=
Cantemir; Costin; Hasdeu; Miller; Picot; Urechi; Xénopol.
Costin and Urechi are nearest the events.
=Slavs of Balkan Peninsula.=
Borchgrave; Daničić; Dlugosz; Drinov; Engel; Florinsky; Guérin-Songeon;
Jireček; Kállay; Kanitz; Konstantynowicz; Miller; Orbini; Pray; Pučić;
Raić; Ranke; Safařík (Schaffarik); Thallóczy. (_See also under_ Kossova
_and_ Nicopolis.)
No contemporary writers.
=Hungary= (including biographers of Sigismund).
Acsady; Aschbach; Beckmann; Bonfinius; Engel; Fessler; Furnhaber;
Fvaknói; Kern; Kupelwieser; Levec; Maélath; Maurer; Pór; Pray; Sambucus;
Schoenherr; Schwandtner; Szálay; Szentkláráy; Szilagyi; Theiner;
Thurocz; Vambéry; Wenzel. (_See also under_ Kossova _and_ Nicopolis.)
=Venice.=
Agostini; Barbaro; Bembo; Berchet; Bonincontrius; Caresino; Caroldo;
Cicogna; Dandolo; Daru; Guazzo; Hazlitt; Hodgson; Mas Latrie; Romanin;
Sanuto; Sismondi; Villani; Anon. _Cronica Dolfina_.
=Genoa.=
Belgrano; Canale; Giustiniani; Sauli; Sismondi; Stella.
=Other Italian cities.=
Cambiano; Datta; Gattaro; Guichenon; Müller; Sismondi; Anon. _Anciennes
Chroniques de Savoye_ and _Monumenta Pisana_.
=Collections of Italian writers.=
Muratori; Tartini.
=Rhodes.=
Bosio; Caoursin; Vertot.
=Cyprus.=
Bustron; Macairas; Mas Latrie.
Papal Archives, Guide to Brom.
=Papal relations and Crusades against Turks.=
Baluze; Bernino; Boislisle; Bongars; Bosio; Bosquet; Caoursin;
Cribellus; Datta; Delaville Leroulx; Dozy; Dräseke; Eubel; Jorga;
Kunstmann; Lardito; Lot; Le Quien; Mas Latrie; Mézières; Molinier;
Paris; Petrarca; Postansque; Raimboult; Raynaldus; Sanudo; Stewart;
Theiner; Thomas; Torez; Wylie.
_See_ note above _under_ Collections of Contemporary Papal Records.
=Kossova.=
Avril; Mijatovitch; Novakovitch; Pavitch.
=Nicopolis.=
Brauner; Froissart; Kiss; Koehler; Rez; Schiltberger; Szentkláráy; Anon.
_Relation ... par un serviteur de Gui de Blois_.
=Relating to Timur.=
Abderrezzah; Arabshah; Clavijo; Hayton; Hussein Abu Halib; Langlès;
Mexia; Mezdob; Moranvillé; Nazmi Zadé; Perondino; Sherefeddin; Silvestre
de Sacy; White; Anon. Dominican Friar and Memoirs of Tamerlane.
Arabshah, Clavijo, Sherefeddin, the Dominican friar and the Memoirs
(possibly) are contemporary.
=Art and Architecture.=
Djelal; Franz; Karabacek; Kuhnel; Lavoix; Migeon; Parvillée; Saladin.
=Literature and Languages and Oriental Ethnology.=
Alberi; Aristov; Dethier; Dieterici; Donner; Dufresne; Fejér; Huart;
Jacob; Koelle; Krumbacher; Kúnos; Liliencron; Miklositch; Mordtmann;
Mullach; Nemeth; Pavitch; Rémusat; Toderini; Vambéry. (_See also under_
Kossova _and_ Nicopolis.)
=Commercial History.=
Charrière; Cornet; Delaville Leroulx; Depping; Heyd; Jorga; Mas Latrie;
Pigeonneau; Schanz; Tafel.
=Black Death.=
Covino; Hecker.
Covino is a contemporary.
II. ALPHABETICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Zenker, in his _Bibl. Orientalis_, Leipzig, 1846-61, wrongly calls
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Starts with Urban V, 1362.
BERTELLUS, PETRUS. _Imperatorum Osmanidarum Historia._ Vicenza, 1699.
‘Paulus Iovius ne comparandus quidem ad hunc.’ Boecler, p. 103.
BERTRANDON DE LA BROQUIÈRE. _Le voyage d’outremer_, 1422-33, éd. par C.
Schéfer. Paris, 1892, la. 8vo.
BLAU, O. _Die orientalischen Münzen des Museums der k. hist.-arch.
Gesellschaft zu Odessa._ Odessa, 1876, 4to.
BLOCHET, E. _Cat. des MSS. orientaux Schéfer._ Paris, 1900. _Cat. des
MSS. orientaux Decourdemarche_, Paris, 1909.
BOECLER, JO. HENRY. _Commentarius Historico-Politicus de Rebus
Turcicis...._ Buda, 1717, 16mo.
In bibliography gives 317 titles of books on Turkey publ. up to 1704,
but no oriental titles, and no MSS.
BOISLISLE, DE. ‘Projet de Croisade du premier duc de Bourbon.’ In
_Bulletin de la Soc. d’hist. de France_ for 1872.
BOJNIČIĆ, IVAN. German trans. of Klaić.
BONAPARTE, Prince ROLAND. _Documents de l’époque mongole des 13e et
14e siècles._ (Documents lithographed.) Paris, 1895, la. fol.
BONER, JÉRÔME. German trans. of Bonfinius.
BONFINIUS, ANTONIUS. _Rerum Hungaricarum Decades Quatuor (373-1495)._
Basel, 1568, fol. Hanover, 1606, fol. German trans. by Jérôme Boner,
Basel, 1545, fol.
BONGARS, JACQUES (editor). _Gesta Dei per Francos, sive orientalium
expeditionum historia 1095-1420._ Hanover, 1611. 2 vols. fol.
BONINCONTRIUS, LAURENTIUS. _Annales ab 1360 ad 1458._ In Muratori, xxi.
1-162. Milan, 1732, fol.
BORCHGRAVE, ÉMILE DE. ‘L’emp. Étienne Douchan de Serbie et la péninsule
balkanique au XIVe siècle.’ In _Bulletin de l’Acad. royale de
Belgique_, 8e série, viii. 264-92, 416-45. Brussels, 1884, 8vo.
BOSIO, IACOMO. _Dell’ istoria della ... religione ... e militia di S.
Giovanni Gierosolimitano._ Rome, 1594-1602. 3 vols. fol. Other editions,
Rome, 1621; Rome and Naples, 1629-34; of vol. iii, Rome, 1676, and
Naples, 1695.
Vol. ii, from 1292 to 1522.
BOSQUET, FRANÇOIS. _Pontificum Romanorum Avigniensium historia ab 1305
ad 1394._ Paris, 1632, 8vo. (Documented.)
BOUCHÉ-LECLERQ, A. French trans. of Curtius.
BOUCICAUT, MARÉCHAL DE. _See_ Anon., _Livre des faicts_.
BOUÉ, AMI. 1. _Turquie d’Europe._ Paris, 1840. 4 vols. 8vo.
2. _Recueil d’itinéraires dans la Turquie d’Europe._ Vienna, 1854. 2
vols. 8vo.
BRATUTTI, VINCENTE. Italian trans. of Seadeddin.
BRAUNER, ALOIS. _Die Schlacht bei Nicopolis._ Breslau, 1876, 8vo.
BRETSCHNEIDER, E. 1. _Notes on Chinese Mediaeval Travellers to the
West._ Shanghai, 1875, 8vo.
2. _Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources_, fragments
towards the knowledge of the geography and history of central and
western Asia from the 13th to the 17th cent. (In Trübner’s Oriental
series.) London, 1888. 2 vols. 8vo.
BRIOT. French trans. of Ricaut.
BROM, GISBERT. _Guide aux Archives du Vatican._ 2nd ed. Rome, 1911, la.
8vo.
BROWN, RAWDON L. _Calendar of State Papers ... in archives and
collections of Venice, and in other libraries of northern Italy._
London, 1864. Vols. i (1202-1509), xx, la. 8vo.
BROWNE, E. G. _Cambridge Oriental MSS. Cat._, Cambridge, 1900. _Handlist
of Gibb Col. of Turkish Books_, ibid., 1906.
BRUNS, R. J. Latin trans. of Abulfaradj in collab. with Kersch.
BRUUN, PHILIPP. 1. _Constantinople, ses sanctuaires et ses reliques au
comm. du XVe siècle._ Extraits du voyage de Clavijo. Trans. from
Spanish. Odessa, 1883, 8vo.
2. ‘Geogr. Bemerkungen zu Schiltbergers Reisen.’ In _Sitzungsberichte
der k. Bayer. Akad. der Wiss._, 1869, Munich, vol. ii.
These notes, translated into English and revised, are given in Telfer’s
trans. of Schiltberger.
BUCHON, J. A. C. Editor of Froissart; Ducange; and anon., _Livre des
faicts de Bouciquaut_. French trans. of Muntaner.
BURY, J. B. Editor of Gibbon.
BUSBECQ, OGIER GHISELEN DE. 1. _A. G. Busbequii omnia quae extant._
Leyden, 1633, fol.
2. _Epistolae Turcicae._ Amsterdam, Elzevir, 1660, 12mo.
3. _Life and Letters of_, ed. by C. T. Forster and F. H. B. Danniell.
London, 1881. 2 vols. 8vo.
4. _De re militari adversus Turcas instituenda consilium._ In Folieta,
pp. 25-76.
BUSTRON, FLORIA. _Cronica_ (1191-1489). Island of Cyprus. In Italian.
Ed. by Comte de Mas Latrie, in _Mélanges historiques_, v. 1-532. Paris,
1886, 8vo. Also in Sathas, _Bibl. graeca medii aevi_, vol. ii. Venice,
1873, la. 8vo.
CABASILAS, S. Editor of Martin Crusius.
CAHUN, LÉON. _Introduction à l’histoire de l’Asie: Turcs et Mongols._
Paris, 1896, 8vo.
CAMBIANO, GIUSEPPE. ‘Historico discorso.’ In _Mon. Hist. Patria
Scriptorum_, i. 930-1421.
Excellent for relations of Piedmont with the Levant up to 1560.
CAMBINI, ANDREA. _Commentario della origine de’ Turchi et imperio della
casa ottomanna._ Florence, 1527, 12mo (2nd ed. s. l., 1537). Also
published in Sansovino, pp. 141-81.
CAMERARIUS, JOACHIMUS. _De rebus turcicis commentarii duo accuratissimi,
a filiis ... collecti ac editi._ Frankfort, 1598, fol.
CAMPANA, CESARE. _Compendio historico ... con un sommario dell’origine
de’ Turchi, e vite di tutti i prencipi di casa ottomanna...._ Venice,
1597, 8vo.
CANALE, MICHEL GIUSEPPE. _Nuova istoria della repubblica di Genova._
Florence, 1858-64. 4 vols. 16mo.
CANTACUZENOS, JOHN. _See under_ Byzantine Historians.
CANTEMIR, DEMETRIUS. _Istoria imperiului Ottomanu._ Rumanian trans. from
Latin, by Joseph Hodosiu. Bucharest, 1876. 2 vols. la. 8vo. Eng. trans.
from orig. MS. by N. Tindal, London, 1734, 2 vols. 4to. French trans.,
Paris, 1734; German, Hamburg, 1735.
CAOURSIN, GUILLAUME. _Historia ... von Rhodis...._ Strassburg, 1513,
fol. Also found in his _Opera_, Ulm, 1496, fol. Anon. English trans.
under title: _History of Turkish Wars with Rhodians, Venetians_, &c....
written by Will Caoursin and Khodja Afendy, a Turk. London, 1683, 8vo.
CARESINO, RAPHAEL. Continued Dandolo’s _Cronica_ in Muratori, vol. xii.
CARLI, GIO. RINALDO. Italian trans. of Hadji Khalfa’s Chronological
Tables.
CAROLDO, GIOVANNI GIACOMO. _Chronique vénétienne._ Bibl. Nat., Paris,
MS. anc. fonds, 9959-63. Extracts from years 1362-4 are printed in
_Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_ (1873), xxxiv. 68-72.
CASTELLAN, A. L. _Mœurs, usages, costumes des Othomans et abrégé de leur
histoire._ Paris, 1812. 6 vols., 18mo.
CECCHETTI, B. Collaborator with T. Toderini.
CERVARIUS, LUDOVICUS. _De Turcarum Origine, Moribus et Rebus Gestis
commentarii._ Florence, 1590, 8vo.
CHALCOCONDYLAS, LAONICUS. Λαονίκου Χαλκοκονδύλοὺ ’Αθηναίου ἀπόδειξις
ἱστοριῶν δέκα Greek-Latin editions, _see_ Byz. Hist, at end of
bibliography. French trans. by Blaise de Vigénaire. Paris, 1662. 2 vols.
fol. Latin trans. by C. Clauser and recension by I. Bekker (for Bonn
edition).
I have found the Latin trans. very incorrect in many places: there are
frequent glosses. (See Appendix A, first footnote.)
CHAMPS, EUSTACHE DES. _[Oe]uvres inédites de ..._, ed. by Tarbé. Paris,
1849, 8vo (vol. i).
CHARDIN, JEAN. _Voyage en Perse et autres lieux de l’Orient._ Amsterdam,
1711. 10 vols. 12mo.
CHARRIÈRE, ERNEST. _Négociations de la France dans le Levant_, ou
_Correspondances, mémoires et actes diplomatiques des ambass. de France
à Constantinople, ... Venise, Raguse_, &c. Paris, 1848-60. 4 vols. 4to.
CHAUVIN, VICTOR. French trans. of Dozy’s Essay on Islam.
CHAVANNES, ÉDOUARD. _Documents sur les Tou-kioue occidentaux._ With map
showing disposition of Turkish tribes of Central Asia. Petrograd, 1903,
4to.
CHAZAUD, P. P. Editor of _Chronique du duc Loys de Bourbon_.
CHEVALIER, ULYSSE. _Répertoire des sources historiques du Moyen Age._
(Nouvelle édition, augmentée.) Paris, 1905-7. 2 vols. la. 8vo.
Most complete reference work in existence for bibliography of 14th
Century Popes.
CHOLET, Comte ARMAND-PIERRE. _Voyage en Turquie d’Asie._ With map.
Paris, 1892, 8vo.
CHYTRAEUS, DAVID. 1. _Historia ecclesiarum in Graecia._ Francfort, 1583,
fol.
2. _Narratio belli cyprii inter Venetos et Turcas._ In Foglietta, pp.
96-111.
CICOGNA, E. A. _Storia dei Dogi di Venezia._ 3rd ed. Venice, 1867. 2
vols. fol.
CLAUSER, C. Latin trans. of Chalcocondylas.
CLAVIJO, RUY GONZÁLES DE. 1. _Historia del gran Tamerlan, e itinerario y
enarracion del Viage de la Embaxada que Gonzalez le hizó, por mandada
del muy poderoso Señor Rey Don Henrique el Tercero de Castilla._
Seville, 1582, fol. Madrid, 1782, 4to. English trans., by Clements R.
Markham, in Hakluyt series, London, 1859, 4to. Russian trans., by L.
Sreznavski, Petrograd, 1881, 8vo.
2. Extracts from above, describing Constantinople in 1403, translated
into French with notes by Bruun, Philip, under whom it is listed.
COGNATUS. _See_ Cousin.
COLLAS, LOUIS. _Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman._ Paris, 1862, 16mo.
Republished 1880, 1898. Fourth edition, revised by E. Driault, Paris,
1913, 32mo.
COLOTENDI. French trans. of Texeira.
CORREGIAIO, DON MARCO U. _Della vera maniera del vincere il Turco._
Padova, 1571, 12mo.
COURNAND, Abbé. French trans. of Abbé Toderini.
COUSIN, GILBERT. _Gilberti Cognati Chronicon Sultanorum et principum
Turciae serie continua usque ad Solymannum magnum._ Frankfort, 1558,
8vo.
Best consulted in vol. i, pp. 399 f., of _Opera in 3 tomos digesta_,
Basel, 1562, fol.
COVINO, SYMON DE. Bibl. Nat., Paris, MSS., fonds latin 8369-70:
contemporary account of the Black Death of 1348 by a Paris physician,
mostly in form of a hexameter poem.
CREASY, SIR EDWARD S. _History of the Ottoman Turks._ New ed. London,
1877, 12mo.
This abridgement of von Hammer has no historical value. It contains,
however, an admirable chapter by Creasy himself on the legislation of
Mohammed II.
CRIBELLUS, LEODRISIUS. _De expeditione Pii papae II in Turcas libri
duo._ In Muratori, xxiii. 21-80.
From MS. in secret archives.
CRUSIUS, MARTIN. _Turco-Graeciae libri octo_ ... quibus Graecorum status
sub imperio Turcico in politia et ecclesia ... describitur.... Edidit S.
Cabasilas. Basel, 1584, fol.
Book I contains political hist. of Constantinople from 1391 to 1578.
CUINET, VITAL. _La Turquie d’Asie._ Paris, 1890-5. 4 vols. la. 8vo.
CURTIUS, ERNEST. _Griechische Geschichte._ 6th ed. Berlin, 1887-9, 3
vols. 8vo. French trans. of 5th ed., by A. Bouché-Leclercq, Paris,
1883-4. 5 vols. 8vo. Greek trans. by S. P. Lampros, Athens, 1898-1901.
(Βιβλιοθήκη Μαρασλῆ.) 6 vols. 8vo.
The last volume, in all editions, covers our period.
CUSA, S. _Ex codicum orient. qui in R. Bibl. Panormi asservantur
catalogo._ Panorma, 1878, 8vo.
CUSPIANUS, JOHANNES. 1. _De Turcarum origine, religione et tyrannide._
Leyden, 1654, 12mo (1st ed., Antwerp, 1541, fol.).
2. _Oratio protreptica: qua Christiani ad bellum Turcicum excitantur._
1527. In Camerarius, fol. ed. of Frankfort, 1598.
CZINÁR, M. Index to Fejér’s _Codex Diplomaticus_.
DANDOLO, ANDREA. _Cronica._ (Venetian history from earliest times to
1339. Continued by Raphael Caresino up to 1388.) In Muratori, xii.
1-524.
DANIČIĆ, GJURO. _Rječik iz kniřevnich starina srpskich_ (Dictionary of
the minor Old Servian Chronicles). Belgrade, 1863-4. 3 vols. 8vo.
DANIELL, F. H. B. Collab. with Forster in editing and trans. Busbecq.
DARU, PIERRE ANTOINE. _Histoire de Venise._ Paris, 1819. 7 vols. 8vo.
DATTA, P. _Spedizione in Oriente di Amadeo VI conte di Savoia._ Turin,
1826, 8vo.
DAVY, MAJOR WILLIAM. English trans. of Prof. White’s ed. of Persian text
of Timur’s memoirs.
DAWSON. English trans. of Nicolay’s _Voyages_.
DÉFRÉMÉRY, CHARLES. Editor of Mirkhond’s _Hist. of Sultans of Kharesm_;
and French trans. of Khondemir and Ibn Batutah.
DE GOEJE, M. J., and DE JONG, P. _Catalogus codicum orient Bibl. Acad.
Lugduno-Batavae._ Leyden, 1865. 3 vols. 8vo.
DE LA PORTE, Abbé(?). _Tableau de l’Emp. ottoman_, où on trouve tout ce
qui concerne la religion, la milice, le gouv. civil, et les grandes
charges et dignités de l’Empire. Frankfort, 1757, 12mo.
DELAVILLE LEROULX, J. _La France en Orient au XIVe siècle._ Paris,
1868. 2 vols. 8vo.
Vol. ii contains ‘pièces justificatives’ and admirable bibliography.
DEPPING, J.-B. _Histoire du commerce entre le Levant et l’Europe depuis
les Croisades jusqu’à la fondation d’Amérique._ Paris, 1830. 2 vols.
8vo.
DERENBOURG, HARTWIG. _Les manuscrits arabes de l’Escurial._ Paris, 1884.
(Uncompleted.)
DESCHAMPS, EUSTACHE. _Œuvres inédites d’Eustache Deschamps._ Éd. par P.
Tarbé. Reims, 1849, 2 vols. 8vo.
Volume i. 164-6 contains the remarkable ballads on the battle of
Nicopolis.
DESMAISONS, BARON. Trans. into French and edited Abul-Ghazi.
DETHIER, P.-A. (in collab. with Mordtmann). _Epigraphie von Byzanz und
Konstantinopel_ (up to 1453). Vienna, 1864, 4to.
DHERBELOT DE MOLAINVILLE. _Bibliothèque orientale._ Paris, 1697, fol.
DIETERICH, KARL. _Byzantinische Quellen zur Länder-und Völkerkunde
(5.-15. Jhd.)._ Leipzig, 1912. 2 vols. 4to.
Selections, translated into German. In our field, at least, not well
chosen, and of little value to the serious student.
DIETERICI, FRIEDRICH HEINRICH. _Chrestomathie ottomane_, précédée de
tableaux grammaticaux et suivie d’un glossaire turco-français. Berlin,
1854, 8vo.
DIEZ, H. F. VON. German trans. of Sidi-Ali.
DJELAL, ESSAD. _Constantinople de Byzance à Stamboul_: traduit du turc
par l’auteur. Paris, 1909, la. 8vo.
Very unsatisfactory from historical and archaeological point of view for
early Ottoman and Byzantine periods: but the second part gives an
interesting study of Ottoman architecture of the post-conquest period.
DJELALEDDIN, MUSTAPHA. _Les Turcs anciens et modernes._ Constantinople,
1869, 8vo.
DJEMALEDDIN. _Osmanli Tarikh._ (Ott. hist. with bibliographical notice
of the Ottoman historians.) Constantinople, 1896, 8vo.
DJEMALEDDIN-AL-KIFTY. MS. of Seljuk hist. up to 1245 in Konia. Kasan
MS., no. 155.
DJEVAD bey, AHMED (Colonel). _État militaire ottoman, depuis la
fondation de l’Emp. jusqu’à nos jours...._ Trans. into French by Georges
Macrides. Only volume which has appeared is: _Le Corps des Janissaires
depuis sa création jusqu’à sa suppression_. Constantinople, 1882, 8vo.
With album 4to containing 311 pictures and designs.
Col. Djevad is the only writer who has used the oldest documents in the
Ottoman Ministry of War.
DJEVDET, Effendi. ‘Coup d’œil sur les monnaies musulmanes.’ Trans. from
Turkish by Barbier de Meynard in _Journal asiatique_ for 1862, p. 183.
DJUVARA, T. J. _Cent projets de partage de la Turquie, 1281-1913._
Paris, 1913, 8vo.
DLUGOSZ, JOHANN. _Historiae polonicae libri XII._ Ed. by J. G. Krauss,
with extra book, also in Latin, containing extracts from other early
Polish writers. Leipzig, 1711-12. 2 vols. fol.
DOCHEZ, LOUIS. French trans., abridged, of Hammer.
DOMENICHI, LUDOVICO. Italian trans. of Giorgievitz.
DONADO DA LEZZE. _Historia turchesca._ (1300-1514.) Edited, with notes
in Rumanian, by Dr. I. Ursu. Bucharest, 1909, 8vo.
This is a collation of two MSS., Bibl. Nat., fonds ital. 1238, and Arch.
Nat. Fr., Aff. étrangères, Turquie, no. 2, fol. 410-517.
DONNER, O. _Sur l’origine de l’alphabet turc._ In the
Suomalais-Ugrilaisen Seuran Aikakanskirja (Journal of the Finno-Ougrian
Society), xiv. Helsingfors, 1896, 8vo.
DOREZ, LÉON. Editor of fragments of Sanudo the Elder in conjunction with
Roncière, and translator into French of Morosini’s _Cronica_.
DORN, B. 1. _Muhammedanische Quellen zur Geschichte der südlichen
Küstenländer des Kaspischen Meeres._ Shireddin, Ali ben Shemseddin and
Abul Fallah Fumeni, trans. and annotated by Dr. Dorn. 4th volume
contains short stories of Khans by Persian, Arabic, and Turkish writers.
Petrograd and Leipzig, 1850-8. 4 vols. 8vo.
2. _Die Sammlung von morgenl. HSS. zu St. Petersburg._ (Including Kasan
MSS.) Petrograd, 1866, 8vo.
DOZY, REINHART P. A. 1. _Essai sur l’hist. de l’Islamisme._ Trans. from
Dutch by Victor Chauvin. Leyden, 1879, 8vo.
2. _Cat. Cod. orient. Bibl. Acad. Lugd. Batav._ Leyden, 1851-77. 6 vols.
8vo.
DRAESEKE, J. 1. ‘Michel VII’s attempt to reunite the Churches.’
_Zeitschrift für wissensch. Theologie_, 1891.
2. ‘Der Uebergang der Osmanen nach Europa im XIV. Jahrhundert.’ In
_Neues Jahrbuch für das klassische Altertum_, xxxi, p. 7, fol.
DRECHSLER, WOLFGANG. _Chronicon Saracenicum et Turcicum._ With additions
by Reiskius and Bosio. Leipzig, 1689, 8vo. The original Chronicon is
printed in Sansovino, i. 207-17, and in Augustinus Caelius, pp. 73-90.
DRINOV, M. S. _The origin of the Bulgarians and the commencement of
their history._ (In Bulgarian.) Philippopolis, 1839, 8vo.
DUCANGE, CHARLES. 1. _Historia Byzantina._ Paris, 1680, fol. Ibid., ed.
par Buchon, Paris, 1826. 2 vols. 8vo.
2. _Histoire de Constantinople sous les emp. français._ Paris, 1659,
fol.
DUCAS, JOHANNES. _See under_ Byz. Historians.
DUDIK, B. _Auszüge aus päpstlichen Regesten für Oesterreichs Geschichte,
von 1308-1604._ In _Archiv für Oest. Gesch._, xv, 185 f.
DUFRESNE, C. _Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae graecitatis._
Paris, 1682, 2 vols. fol. Leyden, 1688. 2 vols. fol.
DU PONT, Mlle. Editor of Wavrin’s _Chronique d’Engleterre_.
DU VERDIER, GILBERT SAULNIER. _Histoire générale des Turcs._ With
Sultans’ portraits. Paris, 1653. 2 vols. 12mo; 3rd ed. 1662. Paris,
1665. 3 vols. 12mo. Lyon, 1682. 3 vols. 12mo. Ital. trans. by Ferdinando
Servi, with additions from 1647 to 1662. Venice, 1662, 4to.
EBELING, FRIED. WILHELM. _Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa._
Leipzig, 1854, 8vo.
ECKHARDT, FRANZ. German trans. of Thallóczy, L.
EDRISI, MOHAMMED (Sherif). _Géographie_, traduite par A. Jaubert, Paris,
1836-40. 2 vols. 4to. Latin trans. by Gabriel Sionita and John
Hesronita. Paris, 1619, 4to.
Arabic title: ‘The jewels touching the division of the countries.’ Hadji
Khalfa, no. 12734, fol. 2142-3, says this work was composed for Roger of
Sicily.
EGNATIUS, JO. BAPTISTA. _De origine Turcarum._ Paris, 1539, 12 mo.
EICHORN, J. G. _Repertorium für biblische und morgenländische
Litteratur._ Leipzig, 1777-86. 9 vols. 8vo.
ENGEL, ARTHUR (in collaboration with Raymond Serrure). _Traité de
numismatique du moyen âge._ Paris, 1891-1905. 3 vols., la. 8vo.
Vol. iii contains for our period coins of Balkan States, pp. 1399-1427;
of Byz. Emp. and Trebizond, pp. 1408-9; and of emirates of Asia Minor,
pp. 1421-2.
ENGEL, JOHANN CHRISTIAN VON. 1. _Geschichte des Ungrischen Reichs und
seiner Nebenländer._ Halle, 1797-1804. 5 vols. 4to. I. Geschichte des
alten Pannoniens und der Bulgarey (1797). II. Staatskunde und Gesch. von
Dalmatien, Croatien und Slawonien (1798). III. Gesch. von Servien und
Bosnien (1801). IV. Gesch. der Moldau und Walachey (2 vols., 1804).
2. _Geschichte des Freystaates Ragusa._ Vienna, 1807, 8vo.
ENGUERRAN DE MONSTRELET. _Chronique._ Ed. by Douël d’Arcq. (Vol. i.)
Paris, 1857, 8vo.
ERDMANN, FRANZ VON. _Temudschin der unerschütterliche._ Life of Djenghiz
Khan. Leipzig, 1862, 8vo.
Pp. 172-84 contain translation of Resheddin, giving account of tribes of
Asia at accession of D. K., which Erdmann had previously published as a
trans. at Kasan, 1841.
ERRANTE, VINCENZO. _Storia dell’ Impero osmano._ Rome, 1882-3. 2 vols.
16mo.
EUBEL, CONRAD. _Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi, sire Summorum
pontificum, ... cardinalium, ecclesiarum antistitum series, ab anno 1198
ad annum 1431 perducta._ Regensburg, 1898, 1901. 2 vols. 4to.
EUSTACHE DESCHAMPS. _Œuvres inédites._ Vol. i. Ed. by Tarbé, Paris,
1849, 8vo.
EVLIA TCHELEBI. 1. _Muntakhabat._ Extracts from his voyages relating to
Constantinople. Bulak (Cairo), 1848, 8vo.
2. _Siyyah Nameh._ Constantinople, various editions. Narratives of
Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Trans. by Joseph von Hammer.
London, 1834-50. 2 vols. 4to.
FABRICIUS, J. A. _Bibliotheca latina mediae et infimae aetatis._
Hamburg, 1734-46. 6 vols. 8vo. Florence, 1856. 6 vols. 8vo. (A reprint
of Mansi’s 1754 Padua edition.)
FALLMERAYER, JAKOB P. Editor of Michel Panaretos.
FEBVRE, MICHELE. _Teatro della Turchia_, dove si rappresentano i
disordini di essa, il genio, la natura et i costumi di 14 nazioni che
l’habitano.... Milan, 1681, 4to. Venice, 1684, 4to. French trans. by
author, Paris, 1682, 4to.
FEHMI, YOUSSOUF. _Histoire de la Turquie._ Paris, 1909, 8vo.
FEJÉR, GYÖRGY. 1. _Codex diplomaticus ecclesiasticus et civilis
Hungariae._ Buda, 1829-44. 43 vols. 8vo. Chron. tables by K. Knaus,
Buda, 1862, 8vo. Index by M. Czinár, Buda, 1866, 8vo.
2. _Croatiae ac Slavoniae cum regno Hung. nexus et relationes._ Buda,
1839, 8vo.
3. _A Kunok eredete._ (The Cumani.) Pest, 1850, 8vo.
4. Editor of Pray’s _Commentarii_.
FERIDUN, Collection of. Letters and answers of Ottoman Sultans to
eastern monarchs and to their own subjects. Paris, MS. anc. fonds turc,
Bibl. Nat., 79. Printed in Constantinople, 1847, 2 vols. fol. For list
of letters, with description of contents, see Langlès, in _Notices et
Extraits_, v. 668-9.
FESSLER, IGNAZ AURELIUS. _Geschichte von Ungarn._ German trans. from
Hungarian by Ernest Klein. 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1867-83. 5 vols. 8vo. (Vol.
ii contains 1301-1457.) Publ. 1869.
FEVRET, A. Collab. with G. Auboyneau in compiling bibliography for
Ottoman History.
FINLAY, GEORGE. _History of Greece from the Conquest by the Romans to
1864._ Edited by H. F. Tozer. Oxford, 1877. 7 vols. 8vo. (Vol. iv
contains mediaeval Greece and the empire of Trebizond.)
FIORINI, VITTORIO. Editor of new edition of Muratori.
FIRNHABER, FRIEDRICH. ‘Beiträge zur Geschichte Ungarns.’ In the _Archiv
zur Kunde österreichischer Geschichtsquellen_, 1849.
FITZCLARENCE, GEORGE (assisted by A. Sprenger). _Kitab Fihrist
al-Koutoub._ (A catalogue of Arabic, Persian and Turkish books relating
to the art of war and to history.) S. l., _c._ 1840, 8vo.
FLORINSKY, P. T. 1. _Joujnie Slaviane i Visantia vo vloroi tchetverti
XIV veka._ (The South Slavs and Byzantium in the 2nd quarter of the 14th
cent.) 2nd ed. Petrograd, 1882. 2 vols. 8vo.
2. The Younger Andronicus and John Cantacuzenos (in Russian). Journal of
the Ministry of Public Instruction, Petrograd. July 1879.
FLÜGEL, GUSTAV. 1. _Die arab., pers. und türk. Handschriften der k.-k.
Hofbibl. zu Wien._ Vienna, 1865-7. 3 vols. 8vo.
2. Latin trans. of Hadji Khalfa’s bibliographical lexicon.
FOGLIETTA, UBERTO. 1. _De causis magnitudinis Imperii Turcici._ Leipzig,
1594, 12mo. (1st ed., Rome, 1574.)
2. _Historia Genuensium libri XII._ Genoa, 1585, 4to.
FORMANTI, NERIOLAVA. _Raccolta delle historie delle vite degl’
imperatori ottomani sino a Mehemet IV regnante...._ Venice, 1684, 4to.
FORSTER, C. T. Ed. and trans. Busbecq in collab. with Daniell.
FOSCARINI, LUDOVICO. Writings against the Turks found in Agostini, i.
65-107.
FRACASSETTI, J. Editor of Petrarch’s Letters: Italian trans. of the
_Senilium_.
FRAEHN, C. 1. _Indications bibl. relatives ... à la litt.
historico-géograph. des Arabes, des Persans et des Turcs._ Petrograd,
1845, 8vo (Russian and French in parallel columns).
2. Fraehn was the first editor of Abul-Ghazi.
FRANCK, SEBASTIAN. German trans. of anon. _Tractatus de ritu et moribus
Turcarum_.
FRANKE, O. _Beiträge aus chinesischen Quellen zur Kenntnis der
Türkvölker und Skythen Zentralasiens._ In Abhandlungen der K. preuss.
Akad. der Wissenschaften. Berlin, 1904, 4to.
FRANZ pasha, JULIUS. _Die Baukunst des Islam._ 3rd vol. of 3rd part of
the _Handbuch der Architektur_. Darmstadt, 1887, la. 8vo.
FRENZEL, C. _Ramon Muntaner._ Berlin, 1852, 8vo. Halle, 1854, la. 8vo.
FRESNE-CANAYE. _Voyage du Levant._ Edited by H. Hauser. Paris, 1897,
4to.
FRIEDLÄNDER, JULIUS (in collab. with Pinder). _Beiträge zur älteren
Münzkunde._ Berlin, 1851.
FROISSART. _Chroniques._ 1. J. A. C. Buchon, ed. Paris, 1835. 3 vols.
8vo.
2. Luce, S., ed. up to 1377. Paris, 1869-82. 8 vols. 8vo. Continued and
finished by Gaston Raynaud. Paris, 1884-99. 3 vols. 8vo.
3. Kervyn de Lettenhove, ed. Bruxelles, 1870-77. 25 vols. 8vo. Vol. xv
(1871), 1393-6; vol. xvi (1872), 1397-1400.
GAGNIER, J. Latin trans. of Pocock MS. of Abulfeda.
GALLAND, ANTOINE. Translations in MS. in Bibl. Nat., Paris, of
Seadeddin, of Mirkhond’s Hist. of Djenghiz Khan, and of Abderrezzah (2
separate translations).
GANEM, HALIL. _Les Sultans ottomans._ Paris, 1901. 2 vols. 8vo.
GARNIER, J. _Chambre de comptes de Bourgogne_, in ‘Inventaire-Sommaire
des archives départementales, Côte-d’Or, arch, civ.’ Dijon, 1878.
GATARO, ANDREA. _Historia Padovana_, 1311-1506. In Muratori, xvii.
1-944.
GAUDIER, JOHANNES. German trans. of Ali Muhieddin.
GELČIĆ, JOSEPH. 1. _Monumenta Ragusina._ Libri reformationum Tomus v
(1301-36). In _Mon. spect. hist. Slavorum merid._, vol. xxix. Agram,
1897, 4to.
2. Collab. with Thallóczy in _Relat. Ragus. cum regno Hung._
GÉRAUD, HERCULE, Ed. _Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis de 1113 à
1300._ Paris, 1843, 8vo.
GEROPOLDI, ANTONIO. _Bilancia historico-politica dell’ impero ottomano_,
&c. Venice, 1686, 4to. Contains: Annali de’ Sultani Osmanidi scritti dal
Gran Cancellier ALI: portati da C/poli all’imp. Ferdinando l’anno 1551
da Girolamo Bek da Leopoldstorf: Per ordine di Cesare tradotti in
tedesco da Giovanni Gaudier Interprete Cesareo, in Latino da Giovanni
Leunclavio, etc. Corretti poi, e confrontati con nuovi MSS. dall’
Auttore.
This is Ali Muhieddin. _See under_ Ali (Mustafa Ibn Ahmed) above, and
note accompanying. _Also under_ Zenker.
GEUFFRAEUS, ANTONIUS (or GEUFFROY). (Cheval. de S. Jean de Jérusalem.)
_Briefve description de la court du Grant Turc et ung sommaire du règne
des Othmans...._ Paris, 1543, 4to. (Reprinted in Schéfer’s ed. of
Spandugino.) Latin trans. by W. Godelevoeus in _Historia Belli Cyprii_
and in Petro Bizara, _Bellum Pannonicum_, Basel, 1573, 1578, 1596.
German trans. by Nicolaus H. von Tauber, Basel, same dates. English
trans. by R. Grafton, London, 1546. Italian trans., Florence, 1551.
GHALIB, ISMAIL. Imperial Museum: Catalogue of old Moslem coins. (In
Turkish.) Constantinople, 1894, 8vo.
GHILLEBERT DE LANNOY. _Œuvres de ----, Voyageur, diplomate et moraliste_
... recueillies et publiées par Ch. Potvin. Notes géogr. et carte par
J.-C. Houzeau. Louvain, 1878, 8vo.
GIBBON, EDWARD. _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire._ Ed. J. B. Bury.
London, 1896-1900. 7 vols. 8vo.
GIORGIEVITZ, BARTOLOMEO. 1. _Prophetia de maometani et altre cose
turchesche._ Trans. by L. Domenichi. Florence, 1548, 12mo.
2. Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Italian trans., in Lonicerus, vol. i.
3. _De origine imperii Turcarum eorumque administ. et disciplina._
Wittenberg, 1560, fol. Reprinted 1562. Also in Lonicerus, vol. i. Trans.
into Dutch, 1544. (For editions, _see_ Hauser ed. of Fresne-Canaye, p.
318.)
GIOVIO, PAOLO. 1. _Commentario delle cose de’ Turchi...._ Addressed to
Emperor Charles V. Rome, 1535; Venice, 1540; in Sansovino, pp. 226-45.
2. _Origo Turcici imperii, vitae omnium Turc. imperatorum, ordo ac
disciplina Turcarum militiae exactissime conscripta._ Ex Italico Latinus
factus Francisco Bassianate interprete. Paris, 1539, 12mo.
3. _Vida del Gran Tamerlan._ Spanish trans. by Gaspar de Baeca, in
Clavijo.
GIUSTINIANI, AGOSTINO. _Annali della repubblica di Genova._ Genoa, 1537,
fol. Modern edition, Genoa, 1855. 2 vols. 8vo.
GODEFROY, THÉODORE. Editor of Jean d’Ursins and of _Le Livre des faits
de Boucicaut_.
GODELEVOEUS, W. Latin trans, of Geuffracus.
GOESANUS. _See_ Ramus, Johannes.
GOLIUS, JACOB. Editor of Elzevir edition of text of Arabshah.
GONZÁLES. _See_ Clavijo.
GREGORAS, NICEPHOROS. _See under_ Byzantine Historians, p. 367.
GREGOROVIUS, FERDINAND. _Geschichte der Stadt Athen im Mittelalter, von
der Zeit Justinian’s bis zur türk. Eroberung._ Stuttgart, 1889. 2 vols.
la. 8vo. Greek trans., with notes, by Lampros, S. P., Athens, 1904. 2
vols. 8vo. (In Βιβλιοθήκη Μαρασλῆ.)
GREIFFENHAG, ANDRÉ MÜLLER. Latin trans. of Hayton.
GRIGORIEFF. French trans. of Khondemir.
GUAZZO, MARCO. _Cronica._ Venice, 1553, fol.
GUÉRIN-SONGEON. _Histoire de la Bulgarie depuis ses origines jusqu’à nos
jours_ (485-1913). Paris, 1913, 8vo.
GUICHENON, S. _Histoire généalogique de la royale maison de Savoye_
(999-1643). Lyons, 1660, 3 vols. 4to.
GUIGNES, JOSEPH DE. _Histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs et des
Mongols._ Paris, 1756-8. 5 vols. 4to.
GUYARD, STANISLAS. Collab. with Reinaud in French trans. of Abulfeda.
GYCAUD, B. (publisher). _La Généalogie du Grand-Turc, ... avec l’origine
des princes_, &c. Lyon, 1570, fol.
HADJI KHALFA, MUSTAFA IBN ABDALLAH, KIATIB TCHELEBI. 1. _Djihannuma_
(mirror of the world). A Universal geography, but does not include
Europe. Uses 19 Arabic sources, but principally Abulfeda. Printed in
Turkish, Constantinople, 1732, fol. Latin trans. in MS. by Mathias
Norberg, at Lund, Sweden (_see_ Toderini, iii. 135). French trans. in
MS. by M. Armain, in Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds français, nouv. acq., nos.
888-9, with exhaustive index, and splendid introduction on life and work
of Hadji Khalfa.
2. Geography of Balkan peninsula, trans. by Hammer under title _Rumeli
und Bosna_, Vienna, 1812.
3. _Kitab Kyachfaddyunoun an atamy alkontoub alfounoun_: The Clearing of
doubts concerning the names of books and sciences. A bibliographical
dictionary, in Arabic, containing 13,494 titles, and referring to 25,614
works. Latin trans. from Vienna, Paris, and Berlin MSS. by Gustavus
Flügel. London, 1835-42. 3 vols. 4to. French trans. in MS. in Bibl.
Nat., Paris, fonds arabe, 4462-4, by Petits de la Croix, 3 vols. la.
fol., with minute index. M. de la Croix rightly boasted of his work that
it was ‘traduit, recueilly et redigé avec grand travail, et grande
assiduité et exactitude’. Arabic original in parallel columns.
4. _Tuhfatu’l-Kibar fi Esfari’l-Bihar._ History of the Maritime Wars of
the Osmanlis. Publ. at Constantinople, with 7 maps, 1729, fol. A French
translation of this printed edition by La Rocque is in the Leyden
Library, MSS. orientaux, no. 1599. It is called: ‘Histoire des conquêtes
des Ottomans sur les Chrétiens tant dans la mer Noire que dans la mer
Méditerranée avec les noms des places et les circonstances des
victoires.’ First part trans. into English by James Mitchell. London,
1831, 4to.
5. _Takvimi-Tevarikh._ Chronological Hist., in Turkish, Persian, and
Arabic. Constantinople, 1733, fol. Italian trans. by Rinaldo Carli,
Venice, 1697, 4to.
Zenker, following Reiske, regards Carli’s trans. as incorrect and
unfaithful. But Toderini, iii. 145, vigorously defends Carli from this
charge. Hadji Khalfa, in _Dict. Bibl._, no. 3474, fol. 553, calls this
work of his ‘the erection of histories’, and describes how he compiled
it.
HALLE, J. _Hungarica et Turcica ... betreffende Bücher und HSS._, &c.
Kat. XXXV. Munich, 1907.
169 titles before 1550 listed.
HAMMER, JOSEPH VON. 1. _Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs._ Pest,
1827-34. 10 vols. 8vo. French trans. by Hellert, in collab. with author.
Paris, 1843. 18 vols. 8vo and atlas, la. fol. French abridged trans. by
Dochez, Paris, 1844. 3 vols., la. 8vo. Also Italian trans. by Antonelli,
Venice, 1829. Concise English abridgment by Creasy.
2. Trans. of Hadji Khalfa’s geography of Balkans under title: _Rumeli
und Bosna_.
3. English trans. of Evlia Tchelebi’s voyages.
4. _Geschichte der Goldenen Horde._ Buda-Pest, 1840.
5. _De byzantinae historiae ultimis scriptoribus ex historia Osmanica
elucidandis._ In _Commentationes_ of Kön. Akademie der Wiss., Göttingen,
1823-7.
6. Study on Ahmed-ibn-Yahia-ibn-Ashik pasha, in _Journ. asiatique_, vol.
iv.
HARTMANN, R. Editor of _Encyclopédie de l’Islam_. See Houtsma _et al._
HASDEU. _Istoria critica a rominilor._ Bucharest, 1875, 8vo.
HASE, C. B. _See_ Manuel II Palaeologos.
HAUSER, H. Editor of Fresne-Canaye’s _Voyage_.
HAYTON, FRÈRE JEHAN. 1. _Le Livre des merveilles et des royaumes._
Illuminated MS. Bibl. Nat., fonds fr., no. 2810 réserve. A trans. into
French by Nicolas Salcon, who received the story from the author’s own
mouth. _Les Fleurs des histoires de la terre dorient compillées par
frère Hayton ... cousin du Roy Darménie, par le commandement du Pape. La
première partie contient la sit. des royaulmes dorient environ 1300._
Paris, 1475, 4to. Also in Bergeron.
2. _Historia Tartarorum._ In MS. Leyden, fonds latin, no. 66; Oxford,
cod. Ashmol., no. 342.
HAZLITT, WM. C. _The Venetian Republic._ New ed. London, 1900. 2 vols.
8vo.
HECKER, J. F. K. _Der schwarze Tod im 14ten Jahrhundert._ Berlin, 1832.
HELLERT, J. J. Trans. into French and edited Hammer. Made atlas to go
with his translation.
HELMOLDUS OF BUZOVIA. _Chronica Slavorum, seu Annales._ Edited by Reiner
Reineccius. Frankfort, 1581, fol.
All except first two books written by Arnold of Lübeck. About Slavs of
central Europe in relation to Holy Roman Empire. Helmoldus’s chronicle
ends 1150.
HERTZBERG, GUSTAV FERDINAND. _Geschichte der Byzantiner und des
Osmanischen Reiches bis gegen Ende des 16ten Jahrhunderts._ Berlin,
1883, 8vo.
HESRONITA, JOHN. Latin trans. of Edrisi in collab. with Gabriel Sionita.
HEYD, WILHELM. 1. _Beiträge zur Geschichte des Levantehandels im 14.
Jahrh._, in Festschrift zur 4. Säcular-Feier der Universität zu
Tübingen.
2. _Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter_, Stuttgart, 1879. 2
vols. 8vo. French trans. by Furcy-Raynaud, Paris, 1885-6. 2 vols. la.
8vo.
HEZARFENN, HUSSEIN. _Kanounnamé._ Dated 1673. MS. col. I. L. O. St.
Petersburg, no. 10. French trans. by Petits de la Croix, under title
‘État général de l’Emp. ott., par un solitaire Turc’. Paris, 1695. 3
vols. 12mo.
Petits de la Croix does not give Hezarfenn as author, but I find in M.
de la Croix’s MS. index to Hadji Khalfa’s bibliographical lexicon, in
the Bibl. Nat., Paris, in vol. iii. fol. 186, in his own handwriting,
the statement that Hezarfenn is the ‘solitaire Turc’.
HIRTH, F. _China and the Roman Orient_: researches into their ancient
and mediaeval relations as represented in old Chinese records. Leipzig
and Munich, 1885, 8vo.
HODGSON, FRANCIS C. _Venice in the 13th and 14th Centuries._ London,
1910, 12mo.
HODOSIU, JOSEPH. Rumanian translator of Cantemir.
HODY, H. _De Graecis illustribus._ London, 1742.
HOENIGER, NICHOLAUS VON KOENIGSHOFEN. _Der türckischen Historien und
wahrhafften Geschichten, Thaten, Handtlungen, Krieg, Schlachten, Sieg,
Belagerungen und Eroberung zu Wasser und zu Landt aller Staetten,
etc.... bis auff das Jahr 1578._ Basel, 1578, fol.
For 16th cent. in history, but reflects German ideas of the Osmanlis and
their origin. The author calls the Prophet Mohammed ‘eyn Engel des
Teufels’.
HOLMES, GEORGE. Editor of 3rd ed. of Rymer.
HOPF, K. 1. _Griechenland im Mittelalter und der Neuzeit._ Parts 85 and
86 of Ersch and Gruber’s _Allgemeine Encyklopädie_. Leipzig, 1870. 2
vols. 4to.
A marvel of erudition, but marred by poor printing and lack of index.
2. _Les Giustiniani, dynastes de Chios._ Trans. into French by E. A.
Vlasto. Paris, 1888, 12mo.
3. _Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten_, in _Sitzungsberichte der Wiener
Akademie_, xxxii. Vienna, 1859, 8vo.
4. _Chroniques gréco-romanes._ Berlin, 1873, la. 8vo.
HOUDAS, O. Ed. and trans. Mohammed-en-Nesawi.
HOUTSMA, TH. 1. Editor of Seljuk texts, including Ibn Bibi.
2. Article on Seljuks in _Encycl. Britan._
This has hardly been changed in the new edition, so reference to 9th ed.
is satisfactory.
3. Editor, in collaboration with Basset, Arnold and Hartmann, of new
_Encyclopédie de l’Islam_.
HOUTSMA, BASSETT, ARNOLD, HARTMANN, Editors. _Encyclopédie de l’Islam._
Dictionnaire géographique, ethnographique et biographique des peuples
musulmans, publié avec le concours des principaux orientalistes, par Th.
Houtsma, R. Bassett, T. W. Arnold et R. Hartmann. Leyden, 4to. Vol. i
(A-D) appeared in 1913.
HOUZEAU, J.-C. Notes géogr. and map for Ghillebert de Lannoy’s _Voyage_.
HOWORTH, HENRY H. _History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th
Century._ London, 1876-88. 4 vols. 8vo. (Lacks index.)
HUART, CLÉMENT. 1. _Konia: la ville des Derviches Tourneurs._ Paris,
1897, 8vo.
2. Paper on ‘Épigraphie arabe d’Asie Mineure’, in the _Revue sémitique_,
Paris, 1895, 8vo.
HUBER, MAJOR R. Map of Ottoman Empire, with administrative divisions and
military routes. Constantinople, 1901.
HUSSEIN (un solitaire Turc). _See_ Hezarfenn.
HUSSEIN ABU HALIB. Persian trans. of Mongol or Turkish MS. found in the
Yemen, which purported to contain the autobiographical memoirs of Timur.
_See under_ Anonymous, p. 366 ad fin.
IBN AL TIKTAKA. _History of the Islamic Empire_ (in Arabic). Ed. by W.
Ahlwardt. Gotha, 1860, 8vo.
IBN ALI MOHAMMED AL-BIWY. _Dourar-al-Othman._ ‘The precious pearls
touching the source and origin of the Ottoman House.’ Hadji Khalfa, in
_Dict. Bibi._, fol. 867.
This is the _only_ Ottoman genealogy mentioned by Hadji Khalfa, although
he gives more than sixty Arabic titles of genealogies.
IBN BATOUTAH (ABU ABDULLAH). Arabic text of Voyages, edited and
translated into French by C. Défréméry and B. R. Sanguinetti. Paris,
1853-9. 4 vols. 4to.
Vol. ii, 1854, pp. 255-353, gives Voyage through Asia Minor.
IBN BIBI (NASREDDIN YAHIA). _Seljuk-Namé._ Persian original lost. An
abridgement, in Persian, of the original is no. 1185 of the Schéfer MSS.
in the Bibl. Nat., Paris, and has been edited and published by Th.
Houtsma, in his _Recueil de Textes relatifs à l’hist. des Selj._, vol.
iv, Leyden, 1892, 8vo. M. Schéfer translated several chapters of this
MS. into French in _Bibl. de l’École des langues viv. orientales_, série
3, vol. v, Paris, 1889, 8vo. Turkish translation, as contained in Warner
MS. 419, Leyden, and MS. turc 92, Bibl. Nat., Paris, edited by Houtsma
in _Recueil_ above cited, vol. iii, Leyden, 1891, 8vo. M. Houtsma
promised a French translation, but it has never been forthcoming.
This is the work of which Nöldeke speaks in _Zeitschrift der D. M. G._,
xiii. 170 (1859), as an unidentified work by an Ottoman historian of the
reign of Murad II. As a matter of fact it is merely a translation, and
was not written by an Osmanli.
IBN KHALDOUN. _Universal History._ The Prolegomena, Arabic text, are
edited by Quatremère in _Notices et Extraits_, vol. xvi (1858), and
translated by Baron de Slane in vol. xvii (1859). German abridged trans,
by Thornberg in _Nova acta Reg. Soc._, vol. xii, Leipzig, 1844.
IDRIS, Mevlana (of Bitlis). _Ilesht-Bihisht._ The Eight Heavens.
One of the two earliest extant Ottoman histories. Written in Persian for
Bayezid II about 1500. There is no translation, and complete MSS. are
rare. But one has access, not only to the facts recorded and opinions of
Idris, but also to his wonderful imagery, for Seadeddin has copied him
copiously and, in fact, embodied many literal translations of Idris in
his ‘Crown of Histories’.
JACOB, GEORG. _Türkische Bibliothek._ Folk-stories. Berlin, 1904-5. 3
vols. 8vo.
JAUBERT, A. M. Editor of Mirkhond’s _Djenghiz Khan_; and French
translator of Edrisi’s Geography.
JIREČEK, CONST. JOSEPH. 1. _Geschichte der Bulgaren._ Prague, 1876, 8vo.
2. _Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Konstantinopel, und die
Balkanpässe._ Prague, 1877, 8vo.
JONQUIÈRE, Vte A. DE LA. _Histoire de l’Empire ottoman._ Paris, 1881,
8vo. New edition, revised and enlarged, with excellent maps. Paris,
1914. 2 vols. 8vo.
JORGA, N. 1. _Notes et Extraits pour servir à l’hist. des croisades au
XVe siècle._ Paris, 1899-1902. 3 vols. 8vo. I. Comptes de la colonie
de Péra. Documents pol. des Arch, de Venise et Gênes jusqu’à 1436. II.
Archives de Vienne, du Vatican, de Naples, Florence et Raguse jusqu’à
1453. (Mostly Ragusa.) III. Venise et Gênes de 1436 a 1453. Traités, ...
projets et exhortations,--opuscules jusqu’à 1453.
2. _Philippe de Mézières et la croisade au XVIe siècle._ Fascic. 110,
2e série, _Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_, vol. xviii. Paris, 1896,
8vo.
3. _Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches nach den Quellen dargestellt._
Gotha, 1908-13. 5 vols. 8vo. In Allgemeine Staatengeschichte, I, 37
_Werke_. (Vol. i up to 1451.)
JOSEPH BEN JOSHUA, Rabbi (Sephardic). Chronicles (in Hebrew). Venice,
1554; Amsterdam, 1730. English trans, by C. H. F. Biallobotzky. London,
1835-6. 2 vols. 8vo.
JOUANNIN, J. M. _La Turquie._ In collaboration with Jules Van Gaver.
Paris, 1840, 8vo. (Coll. _Univers pittoresque_.)
JOURDAIN, A. L. M. French trans. of Mirkhond.
JOVIUS, PAULUS. _See_ Giovio, Paolo.
KÁLLAY, BENJAMIN VON. _Geschichte der Serben von den ältesten Zeiten bis
1815._ Trans. into German by J. H. Schwicker. Buda-Pest, Vienna, and
Leipzig, 1878-9. 2 vols. 8vo. (Einleitung ‘bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrh.’,
i. 1-173.)
KAMPOUROGLOU, D. G. Ιστορια τῶν Άθηναίων· Τουρκοκρατία. Vol. i. Athens,
1899.
KANITZ, FELIX. _Das Königreich Serbien und das Serbienvolk von der
Römerzeit bis zur Gegenwart._ (Monographien der Balkanstaaten, vol. i.)
Leipzig, 1904, 4to.
KARABACEK, J. _Das angebliche Bilderverbot des Islams._ Vienna, 1876.
KARAMIANZ, N. _Verzeichnis der arabischen Hss. der K. Bibl. zu Berlin._
Berlin, 1888, 4to.
KASEM BEY, MIRZA A. Trans. and ed. of Derbend Namé.
KATONA, ST. _Historia critica Regum Hungariae._ Buda-Pest and
Klausenburg, 1779-1817. 42 vols. 8vo.
KEEN, MRS. A. English trans. of von Ranke’s _Serbien_.
KEENE, H. Editor and reviser of Beale’s _Oriental Biographical
Dictionary_.
KERN, TH. VON. Editor of Anon. _Chronik aus Kaiser Sigmunds Zeit_.
KERSCH. Latin trans., in collab. with Bruns, of Abulfaradj.
KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE. Editor of most complete edition of Froissart.
KHALFIN, IBRAHIM. Turkish trans. of anon. memoirs of Timur.
KHEIRULLAH. Hist. of Ottoman Emp. from foundation to Ahmed I (in
Turkish). Constantinople, 1854. 2 vols. 8vo.
KHONDEMIR. _Habib Essher._ History of the Mongols, in Persian. French
trans. by Grigorieff. Petrograd, 1834, 8vo. Also partly trans. by Ch.
Défréméry in _Journal asiatique_, Paris, 1852, no. 2.
KISS, K. _A’ Nikapolyi ülkoset._ Thesis of Magyar Academy. Buda, 1855,
8vo.
KLEIN, ERNEST. German trans. of Fessler.
KNAUS, F. Chronological Tables for Fejér.
KNOELLE, S. W. ‘On Tartar and Turk.’ In _Journal of Royal Asiatic
Society_, New Series, xiv. 125-59. London, 1882, 8vo.
KNOLLES, RICHARD. _The general Historie of the Turkes to the rising of
the othoman family, with all the expeditions of the Christian princes
against them. Together with the lives and conquests of the othoman kings
and emperors._ 5th ed., with continuation from 1621 to 1638. 30
portraits. London, 1638. 2 vols. fol.
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KOLLAR, A. F. Latin trans. of Seadeddin.
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Trans. into French by Théodore d’Okszu. But I could find no copy of this
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The author of this book took no trouble whatever to get at the facts of
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LANE-POOLE, STANLEY. 1. _Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British
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This book contains an amplification of a paper on the successors of the
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LEBEAU, CHAS. _See_ Ameilhon, H. P.
LEBEUF, Abbé. Collab. with P. Paris in a paper on Philippe de Mézières.
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opt. max. D. D. jussuque Caes. a Joanne Gaudier dicto Spiegel,
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redditos illustravit et auxit usque ad annum 1588. Cum omnium
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A translation of Ali, and not of Seadeddin, as has been erroneously
believed.
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1 and 2 are reprinted in vol. clix of Migne’s _Patrologia Graeca_,
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Von Hammer, in his monumental work, is far more indebted to Leunclavius
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LONGNON, JEAN. Editor of anon. _Chronique de Morée_.
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MACAIRAS, LÉONCE. Cyprus Chronicle, Greek text with French trans., by E.
Miller and C. Sathas. Paris, 1881-2. 2 vols., la. 8vo. The text alone is
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(From 1193 to 1458.)
MACARIUS, Patriarch of Antioch. Travels of. Trans. from Arabic into
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trans., with Arabic text, by O. G. Tychsen. Rostock, 1797. French trans.
by A. I. Silvestre de Sacy, Paris, 1797, 12mo.
MAKUSEV, W. 1. _Italjanskie archiwy i chranjaschtschiessja w nich
materialy alja slavanskoi istorii._ (Italian archives and chronicles,
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MANAVINO. Italian trans. of Lonicerus.
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MANGER, SAMUEL HENRY. Latin trans. of Arabshah.
MANUTIO, ANTONIO (?). _Viaggi fatti da Venezia alla Tana ... et in
C/poli; con la descrittione ... di Città, Luoghi, etc. Contains, fol.
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MARCHE, OLIVIER DE LA. _Mémoires._ Ed. by Beaune and d’Arbaumont. Vol.
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MARCO POLO. _Le Livre de Marco Polo, citoyen de Venise ... rédigé en
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MARKHAM, CLEMENTS R. English trans. of Clavijo.
MARSDEN, WILLIAM. English trans. of Marco Polo.
MAS LATRIE, Comte RENÉ DE. 1. _Histoire de Chypre sous les Lusignans._
Paris, 1852-61. 3 vols. 8vo.
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Minor in the 14th cent., in the _Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_.
I desire to acknowledge my indebtedness to 3 and 4 of Comte de Mas
Latrie in my study of the emirates of Asia Minor.
5. ‘Liste des princes et seigneurs de divers pays, dressées pour
l’expédition des lettres de la chancellerie du doge de Venise au XIVe
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MAURER, CASPAR. _Ungarische Chronica oder Beschreibung von allen
ungarischen christlichen Königen, wie auch Kriegs-Empörungen,
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12mo.
MENAVINO, GIOVANNI ANT. _I cinque libri delle leggi, religione e vita
dei Turchi e della corte e d’alcune guerre del gran Turco._ Florence,
1518 and 1551. Venice, 1548. Also in Sansovino, i. 107-36. German trans.
by Heinrich Müller. Frankfort, 1563, fol.
Menavino was brought up as a slave-page in the serail of Bayezid II.
MESSERSCHMID, D. G. German trans. of Abul-Ghazi.
MEXIA, PEDRO. _Petri Messiae von Sibilia vilualtige beschreibung,
Christenlicher und Heidnischer Keyseren, Kunigen, weltweiser Manneren
gedachtnuszwirdige Historien, löbliche geschicht...._ Basel, 1564, fol.
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Mexia’s account of Timur is reprinted in Seville ed. of Clavijo.
MÉZIÈRES, PHILIPPE DE. _Epistre lamentable et consolatoire sur le_
_fait de la desconfiture_ (Nicopolis). In Kervyn de Lettenhove’s ed. of
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See Appendix BB in Wylie’s _History of Henry IV_, iv. 323-6; also _Bibl.
de l’École des Chartes_ for 1873, and _Académie des Inscriptions_, xvi.
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vii, fol. 47 vº.
MICHELANT, HENRI (in collab. with Gaston Raynaud). _Itinéraires à
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XIe, XIIe et XIIIe siècles._ Geneva, 1882, 8vo. (_Archives de
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MIGEON, GASTON. Manuel de l’Art musulman: II. _Les Arts plastiques et
industriels._ Paris, 1907, 8vo.
MIGNE, J.-P. _Patrologiae Graecae cursus completus._ Contains the
Byzantine historians, Ali Muhieddin and Leunclavius.
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la paix de Belgrade en 1740._ Paris, 1771. 3 vols. 12mo.
MIJATOVITCH, ELODIE LAWTON. _Kossova: an attempt to bring Servian
national songs at the battle of Kossova into one poem._ London, 1881,
12mo.
This is a translation, following Pavitch in general lines.
MIKLOSITCH, FRANZ. 1. _Monumenta Serbica._ Vienna, 1858.
2. In collab. with Müller. _Acta et diplomata Graeca res Graecas
Italicasque illustrantia._ Vienna, 1865-70. 4 vols.
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1315-1402._ Vienna, 1860-62. 2 vols. 8vo. (Also republished as volume ii
of No. 2 above.)
4. _Bildung der slavischen Personen: Bildung der Ortsnamen aus
Personennamen._ Vienna, 1858, 4to.
MILES, COLONEL. English trans. of Abul Ghazi.
MILLER, E. Edited and trans., in collab. with Sathas, the chronicle of
Macairas.
MILLER, WILLIAM. 1. _The Balkans: Rumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and
Montenegro._ (In ‘Story of Nations’ series.) London, 1896, 8vo.
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London, 1908, 8vo.
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seculum XV. summatim regesta._ Venice, 1870-74. 3 vols. 8vo.
MIRKHOND or MIRKHWAND. 1. Life of Djenghiz Khan. Persian text edited by
Am. Jaubert. Paris, 1841, 4to. Three separate trans. into French by
Galland are in the Bibl. Nat., Paris, in MS. fonds fr., 6080-83.
2. The History of the Ismaelians of Persia has been trans. into French
by Jourdain.
3. A Latin trans. of the History of the Seljucides was published at
Giessen, 1837.
4. The Persian text of the Hist. of the Sultans of the Kharesm was
edited by Défréméry, Paris, 1842, 8vo.
MITCHELL, JAMES. English trans. of first part of Hadji Khalfa’s
_Maritime Wars_.
MOHAMMED FERID bey. _Tarikh eddaulet il-Osmaniyeh._ Hist. of Ott. Emp.
(in Arabic). 2nd ed., Cairo, 1896, 8vo.
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8vo.
MOLINIER, A. _MSS. de P. de Mézières_, in _Archives de l’Orient latin_,
i. 335-64 (Paris, 1883), or, separately, Genoa, 1881, 8vo.
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y Griegos._ Madrid, 1885, la. 8vo. Barcelona, 1842, la. 8vo. Also in
_Tesoro de autores illustres_, vol. iii, and _Biblioteca de Autores
Españoles_, vol. xxi.
MONIFERRATOS, ANTONIOS. Διπλοματικαὶ Ένέργειαι Μανουὴλ βʹ Παλαιολόγου ἐν
Έὐρώπῃ καὶ Άρίᾳ.] Athens, 1913, 8vo.
MONSTRELET. _See_ Enguerran de Monstrelet.
MONTALBANUS, JOHANNES BAPTISTA. _De Turcarum moribus commentarius._
Leyden, 1643, 32mo. Ibid., 1654, 16mo. This work was first published
more than a century earlier in the _De origine_, &c., of Cuspianus.
MORANVILLÉ, HENRI. ‘Mémoires sur Tamerlan et sa Cour.’ _Bibl. de l’École
des Chartes_, lv. 433-64. Paris, 1894.
Reprint, in full, of the memoir of the Dominican Friar who brought
letter of Timur to Charles VI, after MSS. in Bibl. Nat., fonds fr. 5624
and 12201. Text of this letter is reprinted and commented upon by A. I.
Silvestre de Sacy in _Acad. des Inscriptions_ (1822), vi. 470-522.
Together with Clavijo and Schiltberger, the Dominican Friar gives
contemporary evidence of highest value for the battle of Angora.
MORDTMANN, J. H. 1. ‘Beiträge zur osmanischen Epigraphik. I: Inschrift
von Mihalitsch.’ _ZDMG._ (1911), lxv. 101-6.
2. Collab. with P.-A. Déthier in _Epigraphie von Byzanz und
Konstantinopel_.
MOREL-FATIO, A. _Chronique de Morée aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles._
Text, with French trans. Paris, 1911, 8vo.
MORIS, M. French trans. of Diez’s German rendering of Sidi Ali.
MOSTRAS, C. _Dictionnaire géographique de l’Empire ottoman._ St.
Petersburg, 1873, la. 8vo.
MOUKHLIS ABDERRAHMAN. _Enis out Moussamirin._ Schéfer MS., quoted by him
in Bertrandon de la Broquière, p. 170, n. 3, for the first Ottoman
operations around Adrianople.
MULLACH, A. _Conjecturen._ Berlin, 1852. (Corrects narrative of Ducas.)
MULLER, G. _Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll’ Oriente
cristiano e coi Turchi fino all’ anno 1531._ Florence, 1879, 4to.
MÜLLER, JOSEPH. 1. ‘Byzantinische Analekten,’ pp. 336-419, in vol. ix of
the _Sitzungsberichte der k.-k. Akademie der Wissenschaften_,
hist.-phil. Kl., Vienna, 1852, la. 8vo.
2. ‘Über einige byzantinische Urkunden von 1324-1405.’ In vol. vii of
_Sitzungsberichte_, &c.
3. In collab. with Miklositch, _Acta et dipl. Graeca_, &c.
4. In collab. with Miklositch, _Acta patriarchatus C/politani_.
MUNTANER, RAMON. _Cronica o descripcio dels fets é hazanayes del inclyt
rey Don Jaime_, etc. Trans. from Catalan into French by Buchon. Paris,
1827. 2 vols. 8vo. German trans. in _Bibl. des lit. Vereins_, vol. viii.
Stuttgart, 1844, 8vo. German trans. by K. Fr. W. Lanz, Leipzig, 1842. 2
vols. la. 8vo. _See also_ FRENZEL.
MURALT, ÉDOUARD DE. _Essai de Chronographie byzantine (1057-1453)._
Basel and Geneva, 1871-3. 2 vols. 8vo.
There is a wealth of erudition and research in this work. The
bibliography, however, is very unsatisfactory, and one is frequently
puzzled in verifying important references. Muralt confuses Arabshah with
Sherefeddin, puts Ibn Batutah at 1320, and Shehabeddin at 1331.
MURATORI, LUDOVICO ANTONIO, editor. _Rerum Italicarum Scriptoree._
Milan, 1732-51. 28 vols., la. fol. (For Florentine writers _see_
Tartini.)
A new edition of Muratori, including Tartini, has just been completed by
a body of Italian scholars, working at Rome under the direction of
Vittorio Fiorini.
MUSTAFA IBN MOHAMMED KHOSREU-ZADE (Mevlana). Turkish trans. of
Koutbaddinmakky.
NANGIS, GUILLAUME DE. _Chronique latine de 1113 d 1300._ Paris, 1843,
8vo.
NAUMANN, EDMUND. _Vom goldenen Horn zu den Quellen des Euphrat._ Munich
and Leipzig, 1893, 8vo.
NAZMI ZADÉ. Turkish trans. of Arabshah.
NEDIM. _Munedjem-Bachi._ Ottoman Hist, up to Mohammed IV. In 3 vols.
NEMETH, JULIUS. ‘Die türkisch-mongolische Hypothese.’ In _Zeitschrift d.
deutschen morgenl. Ges._ (1912), lxvi. 549-76.
Against the hypothesis.
NESHRI. The Vienna Codex, Hist. Osm. 15, is partly trans. by Th. Nöldeke
in _ZDMG._, vols. xiii and xv (1859 and 1861). xiii. 176-218 contains
the beginnings of the Ottoman family and its history up to death of
Osman, xv. 333-80 contains Bayezid I. József Thúry, in _Török Magyarkori
Történelmi Emlékek_, series 3, vols. i and ii, has translated most of
Neshri. Budapest, 1893.
NICEPHOROS GREGORAS. _See under_ Byzantine Historians.
NICHANDJI pasha, MEHMET (the Little). Brief Hist. of Ott. Emp. up to
1560. In MS. Col. I. L. O., Petrograd.
NICOLAY, NICOLAS DE. _Les quatre Livres des navigations et
pérégrinations orientales._ Lyon, 1567, fol. German trans., Nürnberg,
1572; Italian, Antwerp, 1576; ibid., Venice, 1580; English, by Dawson,
London, 1585; Dutch, c. 1590.
NIEBUHR, B. G. Editor of _Corpus Script. Hist. Byzantinae_.
NIKIOU, JEAN DE. _Chronique_, trad. française du texte éthiopien, par H.
Zotenberg. _Notices et Extraits_, vol. xxiv, 1re partie, pp.
343-587.
NOIRET, HIPPOLYTE. _Documents inédits pour servir à l’hist. de la
domination vénétienne en Crète de 1380 à 1485, tirés des Arch. vén._
Paris, 1892, 8vo.
NÖLDEKE, TH. German trans. of portions of Neshri.
NORADOUNGHIAN, GABRIEL. _Recueil d’actes internationaux de la Sublime
Porte avec les Puissances étrangères._ Tome i, 1300-1789. Paris, 1879,
8vo.
In Turkey there are no Archives d’état before the 17th cent. From 1307
to 1534 in this volume the editor merely refers to other books. His
compilation is of no value until 1535 for furnishing source material for
Ottoman History.
NORBERG, MATTHIAS. Latin trans. of Hadji Khalfa’s _Djihannuma_.
NOVAKOVITCH, STOJAN. _Kosova, Srbske narodne pjesmé o boju na Kosova._
Belgrade, 1871, 8vo; also Agram, 1872, and Belgrade, 1876.
Attempt to bring fragments of folksong into one narrative of battle of
Kossova.
OESTERLY, HERMANN. _Wegweiser durch die Literatur der
Urkundensammlungen._ Berlin, 1882. 2 vols. la. 8vo.
OHSSON, IGNACE MOURADJA D’. 1. _Tableau général de l’Empire ottoman._
Paris, 1788-1824. 7 vols. 8vo.
This work, interrupted by the Revolution and the author’s death, was
completed, after d’Ohsson’s notes, by his son Charles. Vols. v-vii
appeared in 1824.
2. _Histoire des Mongols depuis Ghengiz Khan jusqu’à Timour Bey._
Amsterdam, 1852. 4 vols. 8vo.
OKSZA, THÉODORE D’. Editor and French trans. of Konstantynowicz.
OLIVIERI, A. _Carte e chronache manoscritte per la storia genovese
esistenti nella bibl. della R. Università ligure._ Genoa, 1855, 8vo.
OMONT, HENRI. _Documents sur l’imprimerie à Constantinople au XVIIIe
siècle._ In the _Revue des Bibliothèques_, Paris, July-September, 1895.
ORBINI, DOM MAURO. _Il Regno degli Slavi, hoggi corrottamente detti
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ORTELLIUS, ABRAHAMUS. 1. _Synonymia Geographica...._ Antwerp, 1578, 4to.
2. _Theatrum orbis terrarum._ Antwerp, 1579, la. fol.
3. _Thesaurus geographicus ... nomina_, &c. Antwerp, 1587, fol.
PACHYMERES. _See under_ Byzantine Historians, p. 367.
PAGANO, C. _Delle imprese e del dominio dei Genovesi nella Grecia._
Genoa, 1846, 8vo.
PALAEOLOGOS, MANUEL. _Dialogi XXVI cum Persa quodam de Christianae
religionis veritate._ Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds grec, no. 1253.
C. B. Hase, in _Notices et Extraits_, vol. viii, 2e partie, pp.
309-82, gives interesting critical account of this MS., with Greek text
and Latin trans. of first two dialogues. The dialogues were with a
Moslem Hodja, probably in 1390, when Man. Pal. was serving in the
Ottoman army at Angora.
Most valuable description of Bayezid’s court and eloquent testimony to
the humiliation of the Byzantine imperial family.
For other works of M. Palaeologos, see Migne, _Patrologia Graeca_, clvi.
82-580.
PANARETOS, MICHAIL. Περὶ τῶν τῆς Τραπεζοῦντος βασιλέων τῶν Μεγάλων
Κομνηνῶν. Chronological account of Trebizond (1204-1386), with a
continuation to 1424.
Edited by J. F. Tafel, in the _Opuscula_ of Eusthasius of Thessalonika,
pp. 362-70, Frankfort, 1832, 4to. Also by Fallmerayer, in Abhandlung der
k. Bayerischen Akad. der Wissenschaften, Munich, 1844, 8vo.
PAPARREGOPOULOS, K. Ιστορία τοῦ Έλληνικοῦ ἔθνους ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων
χρόνων μέχρι τῶν νεωτέρων. Athens, 1865-74. 5 vols. 8vo. 4th edition,
revised by P. Karolides, Athens, 1903.
PARIS, P. (In collab. with Abbé Lebeuf.) ‘La Vie et les Voyages de
Philippe de Mézières.’ _Mém. de l’Académie des Inscriptions_, nouv.
série, vol. xv, 1re partie, pp. 359-98.
PARISOT, VAL. _Cantacuzène, homme d’état et historien, ou examen
critique comparatif des ‘Mémoires’ de J. C. et des sources
contemporaines._ Paris, 1845, 8vo.
PARVILLÉE. _Architecture et décoration turques au XVe siècle._ With
preface by Viollet-le-Duc. Paris, 1874, la. fol.
It was Parvillée who, under Ahmed Vewfik pasha, restored the monuments
of Brusa.
PAUTHIER, M. G. Editor of Marco Polo.
PAVITCH, A. _Narodne Pjesme o boju na Kosova, 1389._ In Mem. of the
Acad. of Sciences and Arts of Agram. Agram, 1877, 8vo.
A critical essay on the national songs of the Servians, followed by a
narrative in verse, combining the songs which deal with Kossova.
PERONDINO, PIETRO (Pratense). _Magni Tamerlanis Scytharum imperatoris
vita._ Florence, 1553, fol.; Basel, 1556, fol.
PERTSCH, WILHELM. _Verzeichniss der türkischen Hss. der k. Bibl. zu
Berlin._ Berlin, 1899.
PETITS DE LA CROIX. 1. _Abrégé de l’hist. ottomane._ Paris, 1768. 2
vols. 12mo.
2. French trans. of Hussein Hezarfenn.
3. French trans. in MS. of Hadji Khalfa’s lexicon under title
_Dictionnaire bibliographique_. In the Bibl. Nat., Paris.
4. French trans. of Sherefeddin’s hist. of Timur.
PETRARCA, FRANCESCO. _Epistolae de rebus familiaribus et variae...._
Stud. et cura J. Fracassetti. Florence, 1859-63. 3 vols. 8vo. Italian
trans. of _Senilium_ by the same author. Florence, 1869-70. 2 vols.
12mo.
PFEIFFER, DAVID. _Imperatores Turcici, Libellus de Vita, Progressu et
rebus gestis principum...._ Basel, before 1550, 12mo. Reprinted under
title _Imperatores Ottomannici_, Basel and Wittenberg, 1587, 8vo.
Eulogy of Ottoman sultans in verse.
PHRANTZES, GEORGE. _See under_ Byz. Historians.
PICOT, ÉMILE. 1. Editor and French trans. of Urechi’s Rumanian
chronicle.
2. _Généalogie de la famille Brankovitch_, in _Columna lui Traianu_, new
series, 4th year, Jan.-Feb. 1883, pp. 64 f. Bucharest, 8vo.
PIGEONNEAU, HENRI. _Histoire du commerce de la France._ Vol. i. Paris,
1885, 8vo.
PINDER, M. Collab. with Friedländer in numismatic work.
POCOCK, EDWARD. Editor and English translator of Abulfaradji.
PODESTA, JO. BAPTISTA. 1. Trans. from the Turkish _De gestis
Tamerlanis_.
2. _Translatae Turcicae Chronicae._ Pars prima, continens originem
Ottomanicae stirpis, undecimque eiusdem stirpis Imperatorum gesta, iuxta
traditionem Turcarum. Omnia a praenominato authore ex originali Turcico
in Latinam, Italicam et Germanicam linguam translata. Nürnberg, 1672,
fol. But only into Latin.
A trans. from diff. MSS. of Ali. But Bratutti’s trans. of Scadeddin has
been used for interpolations and corrections or additions.
POGODIN, P. _Übersicht der Quellen zur Geschichte der Belagerung von
Byzanz durch die Türken._ Journal of the Ministry of Public Instruction,
St. Petersburg, August 1889.
POLO, MARCO. _See_ Marco Polo.
PÓR, A. (in collab. with G. Schönherr.) Volume covering period 1301-1429
in Szilagyi’s _A Magyar Nemzet Története_. (History of the Hungarian
Nation.) Budapest, 1895, la. 8vo.
POSSINUS, PETRUS, S. J. Notes to Pachymeres.
POSTANSQUE, A. _De libro secretorum fidelium crucis._ (For Marino
Sanudo.) Montpellier, 1854, 8vo.
POSTELLUS, GUILLAUME. 1. _De la Republique des Turcz ... exposant la
manière de lever et nourir ceulx dont on en guerre se serft, avec son
origine, estatz, Revenu et Domeyne, en brief._ Dédié à François Premier.
Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. fonds fr., no. 6073. (Written c. 1520.)
Published: Poitiers, 1560, 8vo.
2. _De originibus Gentium Orientalium, maxime Turcarum._ Basel, 1540,
8vo.
This Latin text differs from 1, so I have listed it as a separate work.
POTTHAST, A. _Bibliotheca Historica Medii Aevi._ Berlin, 1896. 2 vols.
4to.
Vol. ii. 1047-1735 contains a very suggestive (but not thorough)
_Quellenkunde für die Geschichte der europäischen Staaten während des
Mittelalters_.
POTVIN, CHARLES. Editor of Ghillebert de Lannoy.
PRAY, GEORGE. 1. _Annales regum Hungariae, ab an. 997 ad an. 1564
deducti._ Vienna, 1754-74. 5 vols. 8vo. (Vol. ii, 1301-1457.)
2. _Commentarii historici de Bosniae, Serviae ac Bulgariae, tum
Valachiae, Moldaviae ac Bessarabiae, cum regno Hungariae nexu._ Edited,
with documents, by G. Fejér. Buda, 1837, 8vo.
PREDELLI, RICCARDO. 1. (In collaboration with Thomas.) _Diplomatarium
Veneto-Levantinum, sive acta et diplomata res Venetas, Graecas atque
Levantinas illustrantia a 1300 ad 1454._ Venice, 1880, 1899. 2 vols.
4to.
2. Editor of _I libri commemoriali della republica di Venezia regesti._
Vols. 1-3 (1081-1375), in _Monumenti storici della deput. Veneta_,
series I, Venice, 1876, 8vo.
PUČIČ, MEDO. _Spomenitzi Srbski od 1395 do 1423._ Belgrade, 1859.
* * * * *
QUATREMÈRE, ÉTIENNE. French trans. of Shehabeddin, Makrisi, and
Reshideddin (unfinished). Editor of the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun.
* * * * *
RAČKI, FRANCIS. _Documenta historiae Croatiae periodum antiquam
illustrantia._ Agram, 1877.
RAIČ. _Hist. variorum Slavorum, imprimis Bulgarorum, Chrobatorum et
Serborum._ Buda, 1823.
RAIMBOULT, MAURICE. ‘Les dessous d’un traité d’alliance en 1350.’
_Bulletin historique et philologique_, Paris, 1902.
Notice on two documents: 1. Latin text of project of treaty between
Pope, Cyprus, Venice, and Rhodes, of which Mas Latrie, _Hist. de
Chypre_, ii. 217, published the text after _Commemoriali_, vols. iv and
v. 2. Unpublished Provençal text of letter which set forth in detail
difficulties of getting this treaty signed, from MS. in Arch. des
Bouches-du-Rhône, Fonds de Malte, liasse 86.
RAMBAUD, ALFRED. ‘L’Europe du Sud-Est: Fin de l’Empire grec.--Fondation
de l’Empire ottoman (1282-1481).’ In Lavisse et Rambaud, _Histoire
générale_, iii. 789-868. Paris, 1894, la. 8vo.
RAMSAY, SIR W. M. _Historical Geography of Asia Minor_, with 5 maps.
London, 1890, la. 8vo.
RAMUS, JOHANNES (GOESANUS). _De Rebus Turcicis libri tres._ Louvain,
1553, 12mo. The first book of the three is by Secundinus.
RANKE, LEOPOLD VON. _History of Servia and the Servian Revolution._
Trans. by Mrs. A. Keen. London, 1858, 16mo.
First chapter contains an illuminating résumé of relations between
Byzantium and Serbia in middle of 14th cent.
RASMUSSEN, JANUS LASSEN. _Annales islamismi, sive tabulae
synchronistochronologicae Chaliforum et regum orientis et occidentis._
Copenhagen, 1825, sm. 4to. Contains, pp. 61-134, trans. of Ahmed ben
Yussuf, _Historia Turcarum, Karamanorum, Selgiukudarum, Asiae Minoris_,
&c.
RAYNALDUS, ODERICUS. _Annales ecclesiastici ... Baronii ... ab anno
1198._ Tomes xiii-xxi. Rome, 1646-77. 9 vols. fol. Lucca, 1746-56. 15
vols. fol.
There have been so many editions, abridgements, and translations of the
_Annales_ that I have given my references to this work _under the year_,
so that any edition might be consulted.
RAYNAUD, GASTON. Editor of Froissart, and, with Michelant, of the
Jerusalem Itineraries.
RAYNAUD, FURCY. French trans. of Heyd’s _Levantehandelsgeschichte_.
REINAUD, J. T. French trans. of Abulfeda.
REINECCIUS, REINER. Editor of Helmoldus and Arnold of Lübeck.
REISKE, JO. JACOB. Latin trans. of Abulfeda and Chronological Tables of
Hadji Khalfa; editor of Drechsler.
RÉMUSAT, ABEL. _Recherches sur les langues tartares._ Paris, 1820, 4to.
RENNELL, J. _Treatise of the Comparative Geography of Western Asia._
Vol. i. Asia Minor. London, 1831, 8vo.
RESHIDEDDIN, FADHL ALLAH. _Djami ut Tevarikh._ Hist. of the Mongols of
Persia. Quatremère trans. into French the first part, Paris, 1836, la.
fol. Erdmann trans. into German the review of the various tribes of Asia
at accession of Djenghiz Khan, with account of their origin. Kasan,
1841. In his German life of Timur, pp. 172-84, Erdmann practically
repeats this portion verbatim.
The earlier portion of Abul-Ghazi is practically an abridgement of
Reshid.
REUSNER, NICHOLAS. _Epistolarum Turcicarum variorum et diversorum
authorum libri XIV._ Frankfort, 1598-9. 4 vols. 4to.
‘in quibus Epistolae de rebus Turcicis summorum pontificum, imperatorum,
regum, principum ... ad nostra tempora leguntur.’
REZ, PETER VON. Lament for defeat of Nicopolis, in Liliencron.
RICAUT, PAUL. _A History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire
containing the Political maxims of the Turks, their religion_, &c. 5th
ed. London, 1682, fol. 6th ed., ibid., 1693. 2 vols. 8vo. French trans.
by Briot. Amsterdam, 1678, 16mo; 1696, sm. 8vo, with 16 engravings.
Italian trans. by Costi Belli. 2nd ed. Venice, 1673, 4to.
RICHER, CHRISTOPHER. _De rebus Turcarum ad Franciscum Gallorum regem
Christianissimum._ Paris, 1540, 8vo. (Liber I. De origine Turcarum et
Ottomanni imperio. Liber III. De Tamerlanis et Parthi rebus gestis.)
RICOLDUS. _See_ my note to Anon. _De ritu et moribus Turcarum._
RIEU, C. P. H. 1. _Catalogue of Persian MSS. in British Museum._ London,
1879-83. 3 vols.
2. Supplement to above. London, 1895.
3. _Catalogue of Turkish MSS. in the British Museum._ London, 1888.
RODD, SIR RENNELL. _The Princes of Achaia and the Chronicles of Morea: a
Study of Greece in the Middle Ages._ London, 1907. 2 vols. 8vo.
Excellent map of mediaeval Greece.
ROMANIN, SAMUELE. _Storia documentata di Venezia._ Venice, 1853-61. 10
vols. 8vo.
For attempts of Venice in 14th cent. to league Christians against the
Turks, vols. iii and iv.
RONCIÈRE. Editor, in collab. with Dorez, of fragments of Marino Sanudo.
ROSEN, BARON VICTOR. 1. _Notices sommaires des MSS. arabes du Musée
asiatique._ Petrograd, 1881.
2. _Remarques sur les MSS. orientaux de la col. de Marsigli à Bologna._
Paris, 1884, 4to.
RYMER, THOMAS. _Foedera, conventions, literae ... acta publica inter
reges Angliae et alios ... ab 1101 ... ad nostra ... tempora._ Editio
tertia. Revised from original MSS. in Tower of London, by George Holmes.
London, 1739-45. 12 vols., la. fol.
* * * * *
SABELLICUS, ANTONIUS. In Lonicerus, fol. 105-12.
SAFAŘÍK, IVAN. 1. _Elenchus actorum spectantium ad historiam Serborum et
reliquorum Slavorum meridionalium ... quae in archivo Venetiarum
reperiuntur._ Belgrade, 1858, 4to.
The notes are in Servian, but with Latin translation.
2. _Acta archivii Veneti spectantia ad historiam Serborum._ Belgrade,
1860.
SAFAŘÍK, PAUL JOSEPH. _Slovanské Starořitnosti._ Prague, 1837, 4to.
Trans. under title _Slawische Alterthümer_ by Moses von Aehrenfeld, with
notes by Heinrich Wuttke. Leipzig, 1843-4. 2 vols. 8vo.
SAGREDO, GIOVANNI. _Memorie istoriche de’ monarchi ottomani._ Venice,
1676, fol.; 1688, 4to.
The first of modern writers who, though acquainted with Ottoman
‘sources’, deliberately prefers to follow the Byzantine writers who were
contemporary.
SAGUNDINO, NICHOLAS. _See_ Secundinus.
SAID. _Ghulcheni-Méarif._ Hist. of Ott. Emp. from foundation to 1774. In
2 vols.
SALABERRY, DE. _Hist. de l’Emp. ott. depuis sa fondation jusqu’à ...
1792._ Avec des pièces justificatives. Paris, 1813. 4 vols. 8vo.
SALADIN, H. Manuel d’Art musulman. Vol. i. _L’architecture._ Paris,
1907, 8vo.
SALCON, NICOLAS. French trans. of Hayton.
SAMBUCUS, JOANNES (of Tirnovo). _Reges Ungariae ab anno 401-1567
uersibus descripti._ In Bonfinius, fol. 891-6.
SANGINETTI, B. R. French trans., in collab. with Ch. Défréméry, of Ibn
Batutah.
SANSOVINO, FRANCESCO. 1. _Gli annali turcheschi o vero vita de’principi
della casa athomana._ First edition. Venice, 1568, 4to. Edition from
which I quote is Venice, 1573, 4to.
2. _Historia universale dell’ origine et imperio de’ Turchi, nella quale
si contengono la origine, etc., de’ Turchi._ Venice, 1654. 2 vols., la.
8vo.
A collection of various writers on the Ottoman Empire.
SANUTO, MARINO (TORSELLO). 1. Memorial to King of France urging crusade,
1321. Written in French. In Bongars, _Gesta Dei per Francos_, ii. 5.
2. Letters published by Dorez and Roncière in _Bibl. de l’Ecole des
Chartes_ (1895), lvi. 34-44.
3. _Secreta fidelium crucis._ In Bongars, vol. ii. _See also_ thesis of
Postansque, and study by Kunstmann. Four books, written between 1306 and
1321, urging a crusade. Book III trans. into English by Aubrey Stewart,
in Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Society, vol. xii, London, 1896, 8vo.
SANUTO, MARINO (THE YOUNGER). 1. _Vite de’ Duchi di Venezia._ (1421-93.)
In Muratori, xxii. 399-1252.
2. _Diarii._ Ed. by Gugl. Berchet. Venice, 1877-1900. 56 vols. 4to.
I have given the younger Sanuto’s work here, because he is so often
confused with the elder.
SARRE, FRIEDRICH. _Reise in Kleinasien, Sommer 1895. Forschungen zur
seldjukischen Kunst und Geographie des Landes._ 76 Tafeln. Map by
Kiepert. Berlin, 1896, la. 8vo.
SATHAS, C. N. 1. _Documents inédits relatifs à l’hist. de la Grèce au
moyen âge (1400-1500)._ Paris, 1880-1. 2 vols. 4to. Maps of Crete, the
Aegean, and Sea of Marmora in 15th cent. I. contains Canc. Secreta, 208
doc., from 1402 to 1500; II. Misti, 549 doc., from 1400 to 1412.
2. Τουρκοκρατουμένη Έλλάς. Athens, 1869.
3. Edited and trans., in collab. with Miller, the Cyprus chronicle of
Macairas.
4. _Bibliotheca graeca medii aevi._ 6 vols. I-III, Venice, 1872-3;
IV-VI, Paris, 1874-7.
SAULI, LUIGI. _Della colonia Genovesi in Galata._ Turin, 1831. 2 vols.
8vo.
The valuable information in these volumes is practically without dates,
and there is no index.
SCHAFFARIK, JANKO. _See_ Safařík, Ivan.
SCHÉFER, CHARLES. French trans. of portion of Ibn Bibi. Editor, with
copious notes, of Bertrandon de la Broquière, Spandugino, and a portion
of Geuffraeus. His collection of oriental MSS. has recently enriched the
Bibliothèque Nationale. The catalogue of his library, published in 1903
by H. Welter, Paris, is an addition to the bibliography of Oriental
history, geography, and philology.
SCHILTBERGER, JOHANNES. _Gefangenschaft in der Turckey._ Frankfort,
1557, 4to. Best modern German edition is: Ed. by K. Fr. Neumann under
title _Reisen des Johannes Schiltberger._ Munich, 1859, 8vo. (Hammer
used earlier reprint of Munich MS., _Reise in den Orient_, Munich,
1813.) English trans. by J. Buchan Telfer, R.N., with notes by Prof. P.
Bruun of Odessa, published by the Hakluyt Society, London, 1879, 8vo,
under title _The Bondage and Travels of Johann Schiltberger_.
SCHLUMBERGER, G. _Numismatique de l’Orient latin._ Paris, 1878, 4to.
SCHMITT, JOHN, Editor. The chronicle of Morea. Τὸ Χρονικὸν τοῦ Μορέως.
(From the Copenhagen and Paris MSS.) London, 1904, 8vo.
SCHÖNHERR, G. Collab., with Pór, A., in the latest authoritative
Hungarian history covering the 14th century.
pp. 478-90: Monnaies d’Imitation à légendes latines frappées par les
princes ou émirs turcomans du Saroukhan, d’Aïdin, et de Mentesché.
SCHULZ, C. G. _Geschichte des osmanischen Reichs._ Leipzig, 1772, 8vo.
SCHWANDTNER, J. G., editor. _Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum veteres ac
genuini._ Tomus i. Vienna, 1746, fol.
SCHWICKER, J. H. German trans. of Kállay.
SEADEDDIN, MOHAMMED BEN HASSAN (KHODJA EFFENDI). _Tajul-Tevarikh._ The
Crown of Histories. Constantinople, 1862. 2 vols. 4to. Of this most
celebrated Ottoman historian, whose chronicle covers from the origin of
the family, there are translations as follows:
1. BRATUTTI, VICENZO. _Cronica dell’ origine e progressi della casa
ottomana, composta da Saidino Turco._ Parte prima, Osman-Mohammed I,
Vienna, 1649, 12mo. Parte secunda, Murad II and Mohammed II, Madrid,
1652.
Hammer uses this translation.
2. KOLLAR, A. F. _Seadeddini annales Turcici usque ad Murad II._ Turcice
et Latine cura Ad. Fr. Kollar a Kerestan. Vienna, 1755 fol.
3. SEAMAN, WM. _The Reign of Sultan Orkhan, translated from Hodja
effendi._ London, 1652, 8vo.
4. _History of the Turkish war with Rhodians, Venetians, Egyptians,
Persians and other nations, written by Will Caoursin and Khodja Afendy,
a Turk._ London, 1683, 8vo.
This is an anon. trans. of Caoursin’s _Historia Rhodi_ and Seadeddin’s
recital of the siege of Rhodes under Mohammed II.
5. GALLAND, ANTOINE. _Histoire ottomane, écrite par Saadud-din Mehemed
Hassan, plus connu chez les Turcs sous le nom de Cogia Efendi, mise en
françois par Antoine Galland, Professeur et Lecteur royal en langue
arabe._ A translation in MS. of Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds turc, 64. Vol.
i, up to Murad II, is lacking. Vol. ii is in the Bibl. Nat. under fonds
fr., 6074. A third volume, fonds fr., 6075, contains Bayezid II and
Selim I.
Zinkeisen used this translation. But Jorga, i. 150, n. 1, is in error in
believing that Zinkeisen had access to complete trans. This has been
lacking since 18th cent. The whole comment of Jorga is confusing. He
mixes Seadeddin with Neshri, and follows Zenker’s erroneous statement
that Leunclavius’s _Annali_ is a trans. of Seadeddin.
6. The story of the capture of Constantinople by Mohammed has been
translated into French by Garcin de Tassy, Paris, 1826, and by Michaud,
in his _Bibl. des Croisades_, vol. iii; into English by Gibb, Glasgow,
1879; and, in part, into German by Krause, _Die Eroberungen von
Konstantinopel im XIII. und XV. Jahrhundert_, Halle, 1870, 8vo.
SEAMAN, WILLIAM. English translator of portion of Seadeddin.
SECUNDINUS, NICOLAUS. _Liber de familia Autumanarum ad Eneam,_ _Senarum
episcopum._ Fol. 133-41 of MS. Latin 414 of K. Bibl., Munich. Published
as Liber I in Johannes Ramus, which see.
This letter, written to Aenaeas Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius II, from
Naples, is one of the first western accounts of the Osmanlis. In the
title-page of ‘De rebus Turcicis’, printed 1553, Secundinus is called
‘vetustissimo autore’.
SEFERT, M. _La Dalmatie, y compris ... Patras, Athènes._ Manuel de
voyageur avec 88 gravures et 32 cartes et plans. Guide illustré
Hartleben, no. 64. Vienna and Leipzig, 1912, 12mo.
SEIFF, J. _Reisen in der asiatischen Türkei._ Leipzig, 1875.
SERVI, FERDINANDO. _Compendium Historiae Turcicae._ Venice, 1689. This
is a trans. into Latin, then Italian, of Du Verdier. Some bibliographers
have treated this as an original work.
SHEHABEDDIN, ABUL ABBAS AHMED. _Mesalek al absar fi memalek alamsar._
Footpaths of the eyes in the Kingdoms of the different Countries.
Existing fragments, which include Asia Minor, trans. into French by
Quatremère, in _Notices et Extraits_, xiii. 152-384, from MS. in Bibl.
Nat., Paris, fonds arabe, no. 2325.
Quatremère in discussing whether S. is from Damascus, Marash or Morocco,
has overlooked Hadji Khalfa, Lex. Bibl., no. 10874, fol. 1832, who
unhesitatingly calls him ‘écrivain de Damas’.
SHEREFEDDIN ALI (YEZDI). _Zéfer Namé._ But MS. in Bibl. Nat., Paris,
reads _Kitabi fatih namehi Emir Timour_ (a Life of Timur by his own
secretary). Trans. into Turkish by Mohammed ben al Agemi. Trans. into
French by Petits de la Croix, under title _Histoire de Timourbec, connu
sous le nom du Gran Tamerlan, empereur des Mongols et Tartares_. Paris,
1722. 4 vols. 12mo. No index. Another edition of same, Delft, 1723. 4
vols. 8vo.
Muralt, in the bibliography of his _Chronographie byzantine_, has fallen
into the error of identifying Sherefeddin with Arabshah.
SHIREDDIN. _See_ Dorn.
SIDAROUSS, S. _Les Patriarcats dans l’Empire Ottoman et spécialement en
Égypte._ Paris, 1907, la. 8vo.
SIDI ALI IBN HUSSEIN (Khatib Roumi). The Mirror of the Countries.
Narration of Voyages. German trans. of Diez, trans. into French by
Moris, with foreword on life and times of Sidi Ali. Paris, 1827, 8vo.
SILVESTRE DE SACY, A. I. French trans. of Makrisi’s _Numismatics_.
Editor of letter of Dominican Friar. _See_ note under Moranvillé, Henri
de.
SIONITA, GABRIEL. Latin trans. of Edrisi in collab. with John Hesronita.
SISMONDI, J. C. L. SISMONDE DE. _Histoire des républiques italiennes du
moyen âge._ Paris, 1809. 8 vols. 12mo. New ed., Paris, 1840. 10 vols.
8vo.
SLANE, G. DE. 1. _Catalogue des bibliothèques de Constantinople._ In MS.
Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe, no. 4474.
2. _Cat. des MSS. arabes de la Bibl. Nat., Paris._ 2 vols., 1883 and
1895. Still in MS.
3. Trans. into French Ibn Khaldun’s _Prolegomena_.
SMIRNOW, W. D. Collections scientifiques de l’Inst. des Langues
orientales du Ministère des aff. étrang. Vol. viii, _Manuscrits turcs_.
Petrograd, 1897, 8vo.
SOLAKZADÉ. Hist. Ott. Emp. from beginning to Soleiman II, in 1 vol.
SPANDUGINO, TEODORO. _I commentari di Teo. Spandugino Cantacusino,
gentil’huomo Constantinopolitano. Costumi e leggi de’ Turchi: origine
de’ Prencipi Turchi._ Lucca, 1550. Florence, 1551. Also in Sansovino,
pp. 107-36, 182-206. Charles Schéfer has published and edited an early
French MS. trans. of above: _Petit traicté de l’origine des Turcqz_.
Paris, 1896, 8vo.
Excellent for erudite display of bibliographical knowledge, but
Schéfer’s comments on chronicle are disappointing, and his chronology is
inaccurate.
SPIEGEL. _See_ Jo. Gaudier.
SPRENGER, A. _See_ Fitzclarence, George.
SREZNAVSKI, L. Russian trans. of Clavijo.
STELLA, GIORGIO. _Annales Genuenses._ (1298-1409.) Continued by ‘Frater
Johannes’ to 1435. In Muratori, xvii. 947-1318.
STEWART, AUBREY. English trans. of portion of _Secreta fidelium crucis_
of Marino Sanuto (Torsello).
STEWART, CHARLES. English trans. of anon. Memoirs of Timur.
STRITTER, J. G. _Memoriae populorum, olim ad Danubium, Pontum Euxinum,
paludem Maeotidem, Caucasum, mare Caspium et inde magis ad septentriones
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Numerous writers have gone to Stritter, and quoted from him, in citing
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STRZYGOWSKI, JOSEF. _Die Calendarbilder des Chronographen vom Jahre 354,
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SZALAY, LADISLAS. _Geschichte Ungarns._ Trans. from Hungarian by
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WÜSTENFELD, FERDINAND. 1. _Vergleichungs-Tabellen der muhammedanischen
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berechnet und im Auftrage und auf Kosten der Deutschen Morgenländischen
Gesellschaft._ Leipzig, 1854, 4to.
This is reproduced in Mas Latrie’s _Trésor de Chronologie_, &c., pp.
549-622.
2. _Geschichte der Türken mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des
vermeintlichen Anrechts derselben auf den Besitz von Griechenland._
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A book full of inaccuracies and misleading statements: altogether
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WUTTKE, HEINRICH. Editor of German trans. of P. J. Safařík.
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YAHIA, NASREDDIN. _See_ Ibn Bibi.
YALE, H. English trans. of Marco Polo.
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pp. 178-81 contain exposé of Bosno-Serbo-Croatian relations at time of
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ZENKER, J. TH. _Bibliotheca Orientalis._ Leipzig, 1848-61. 2 vols. 4to.
Vol. i contains: Arabic, Persian, and Turkish books from invention of
printing to 1840; vol. ii, a supplement of preceding up to 1860, and
books on Christian Orient.
Compiled in haphazard fashion: very incomplete: most important works are
omitted: in giving translations Seadeddin is confused with Ali.
ZINKEISEN, JOHANN WILHELM. _Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs in
Europa._ Gotha, 1840-63. 7 vols. 8vo. In Allgemeine Staatengeschichte,
I, 15 _Werke_. Vol. i up to 1453.
Jorga’s recent work is 37 in the same series.
ZOLLIKOFER, LUCAS. German trans. of Pedro Mexia.
ZOTENBERG, H. French trans. of Jean of Nikiou.
ANONYMOUS
_Acta patriarchatus Constantinopolitani_ (1315-1402). In Miklositch and
Müller, _Acta et diplomata_, vol. i.
_Anciennes Chroniques de Savoye._ Cols. 1-382 in _Monumenta Historiae
Patriae_: Scriptores, vol. i.
Contemporary account of Amadeo’s expedition to the Levant.
_Chronik aus Kaiser Sigmunds Zeit (1126-1434)._ Edited by Th. von Kern,
in _Die Chroniken der deutschen Städte_, Nürnberg, i. 344-414. Leipzig,
1862, 8vo.
_La Chronique du duc Loys de Bourbon._ Ed. by P. P. Chazaud, Paris,
1876, 8vo.
_Chronique de Morée._ Edited for Soc. Hist. France by Jean de Longnon.
Paris, 1911, 8vo.
_See also_ Rodd, Sir Rennell, Schmitt, John, and Morel-Fatio, A.
_Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denis._ Edited by Bellaguet, in Coll.
des Doc. inédits sur l’hist. de France, XVII, tome ii. 504. Paris,
1839-52. 6 vols. 4to.
Nicopolis expedition, ii. 425-30, 483-532.
_Chronique des quatre premiers Valois._ (1327-93.) Edited by S. Luce.
Paris, 1861, 8vo.
_Cronica Dolfina._ Bibl. Marc., Venice, MS. ital., class 7, no. 794.
_Derbend Namé._ English trans. with Turkish text, by Mirza A. Kazem bey.
St. Petersburg, 1851, 4to.
The Dominican Friar’s Account of Timur. _See_ Moranvillé, Henri, and
Silvestre de Sacy, A. I.
Έπιρωτικά (Epirotica). _Historia Epiri a Michaele Nepote Duce
conscripta._ Six fragments, forming pp. 207-79, in _Historia et Politica
Patriarchica Constantinopoleos_. (In _Corpus Script. Byz._) Bonn, 1849,
8vo.
_La Généalogie du Grand-Turc_ (Lyon ed.). _See_ Gycaud.
_Livre des faicts du bon messire Jean le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut._ Bibl.
Nat., fonds fr., no. 11432. Th. Godefroy edited and published this MS.,
Paris, 1620, 4to. Modern editions: Collection Petitot, VI and VII;
Michaud et Poujoulat, II; and Buchon, _Choix de chroniques_ (Panthéon
littéraire), III. Paris, 1853.
_Memoirs of Timur._ Supposed to be an autobiography in Djagatai Turkish,
MS. of which was discovered in the Yemen.
1. Persian trans. by Abu Halib Hussein. The text was edited by Professor
White, and publ. by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1783, with a trans.
into English by Major Davy. A second English trans. was made by Charles
Stewart, under title _Mulfuzat timüry_ or autobiographical memoirs of
the Moghul emp. Timur. London, 1830, 4to.
2. French trans. from Persian by L. Langlès, under title _Instituts
politiques et militaires de Tamerlan_, écrit par lui-même. Paris, 1787,
8vo.
_Mira-ari tarikh Osmani._ (Ottoman history.) Constantinople, 1876, 8vo.
_Monumenta Pisana._ In Muratori, xv. 973-1088.
_Relation de la Croisade de Nicopolis par un serviteur de Gui de Blois._
The two MSS. in the Library of the Duc d’Arenbourg and the Ashburnham
collection are published by Kervyn de Lettenhove, in his edition of
Froissart, xv. 439-508; xvi. 413-43.
_Series Imperatorum Turcicorum._ In Foglietta, _de Originibus_.
_Tractatus de ritu et moribus Turcarum._ Cologne, c. 1488; Wittenberg,
with preface by Martin Luther, 1530; German trans. by Sebastian Franck,
without place, 1530; augmented edition of Franck’s trans., Berlin, 1590.
The same work under title _Tractatus de ritu, moribus et multiplicatione
nequitiae Turcarum_, Paris, 1514, 8vo.
By a Christian slave under Murad II. Rambaud, _Hist. gén._, iii. 867,
cites an edition of Paris, 1509, 4to, which he attributes to Ricoldus.
But I do not find this name in other editions.
SERBIAN CHRONICLES
Chronicle of the Abbey Tronosha. Chronicle of Pek, quoted by
Mijatovitch.
BYZANTINE HISTORIANS
1. _Historiae byzantinae scriptores._ Louvre ed. Paris, 1645-1711. 38
vols. fol. Venice, 1727-33. 23 vols.
2. _Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae._ Ed. by Niebuhr. Bonn,
1828-78. 49 vols. 8vo.
3. _Patrologia Graeca._ Ed. by Migne. Paris, 1857-66, 161 vols. 4to.
The writers who deal with the 14th cent. are:
1. Pachymeres (1258-1308). Bonn, 1835. 2 vols. 8vo. Rome, 1660.
2. Nicephorus Gregoras (1204-1351). Bonn, 1855. Paris, 1702, 2 vols.
3. Johannes VI Cantacuzenos (1320-57). Bonn, 1828-32. 3 vols. 8vo.
Paris, 1645. Migne, ciii-civ.
4. Manuel I Palaeologos (1388-1407). Migne, clvi. 82-582.
5. Chalcocondylas, Laonicus (1298-1462). Bonn, 1843. Paris, 1650. Migne,
vol. clix.
6. Ducas, Johannes (1341-1462). Bonn, 1834. Migne, clvii. 750-1166.
Paris, 1649. Chronicon Breve--added to Ducas.
7. Phrantzes, George (1259-1477). Bonn, 1838. Migne, vol. clvi. Vienna,
1796.
8. Panaretos, Michail (1204-1386). For Trebizond. _See_ editions under
his card.
9. Historia Epirotica. Bonn, 1849. (In vol. xxiii.)
VENETIAN ARCHIVES
Original MS. collections referred to in my book:
I. _Commemoriali._ A transcription of miscellaneous acts, bulls, &c.,
1295-1787. 33 vols. la. fol. Vols. i-ix, 1295-1405. i, 1295-8. ii,
1309-16. iii, 1317-26. iv, 1325-43. v, 1342-52. vi, 1353-8. vii,
1358-62. viii, 1362-76. viii (2), 1376-97. ix, 1395-1405. The
_Commemoriali_ have been edited by Riccardo Predelli. _See also_ Thomas.
II. _Misti_ (Deliberationes mixtae). ‘Continentes res terrestres et
maritimas.’ 1293-1440. First 14 volumes (1293-1331) were burned in 1574
or 1577, but indices have been preserved in the Rubricarii. 60 vols.
fol. xv-xxxii, 1332-67; xxxiii-xli, 1368-88; xlii-xlix, 1389-1413.
Rubricarii. Indices of the Misti. 4 vols. i, 1293-1368 (32 registers);
ii, 1368-89 (9 registers); iii, 1389-1413 (9 registers).
III. _Secreti_ (Deliberationes secretae). For foreign affairs.
1345-1401. Numbered by letters. 19 vols., A to S, of which only four
remain. A and B, 1345-50; R (now called E), March 1388-97; and L, May
1373-Feb. 1376. One feels deeply the loss of these records, especially
of S, which went from April 1397 to Feb. 1400.
IV. _Patti._ 7 registers of treaties from 883 to 1496.
V. _Liber Albus._ Treaties, privileges, &c., with the Levant
(principally for commerce) up to 1348.
VI. _Libri Secretorum Consilii Rogatorum_, commonly called ‘Cons. Rog.’.
A continuation of the Secreti from April 10, 1401, to Feb. 26, 1476.
These volumes bear Arabic numerals, not letters. There are 27 registers,
of which no. 1 contains the Anatolian campaign of Timur and the downfall
of Bayezid.
In the classified bibliography, the collections in which documents from
Venetian records have been published are grouped.
INDEX
Adalia, 158, 296, 297-8.
Adana, 74, 282, 296, 298-9.
Adrianople, 39, 91, 100, 103, 112, 114, 121, 123, 125-6,
171-87, 207, 231-2, 261;
unique place of, in Ottoman history, 139.
Afion Kara Hissar, 11, 290.
Aïdin, 65, 86, 158, 185-6, 191, 228, 283, 286, 291;
Ottoman absorption of, 185, 259, 274, 287.
Akbara, 69, 284.
Akridur, 284, 288-9.
Ak Seraï, 16, 162, 187, 189, 237, 284, 300.
Ak Sheïr, 154, 187, 260, 284-5.
Ak Tchaï, battle of, 188-90.
Alaïa, 285, 289.
Albania, Ottoman invasions of, 147, 159-60, 170, 183, 206, 243.
Albanian nobility, conversion of, to Islam, 76.
Albanians, value of, in Ottoman army, 159.
Alaeddin Kaï Kobad, composition of army of, 16-17;
connexion with Osmanlis, 20-2, 264, 266, 269;
fortifies Sivas, 246.
---- of Karamania, 165-7, 187-90, 288;
sons of, set free by Timur after Angora, 257.
---- pasha (brother of Orkhan), 70-2.
Alexander of Bulgaria, 103, 138-9, 170.
Ali pasha (grand vizier of Bayezid), 171-2, 199-200, 234.
Altoluogo, 286.
Amadeo of Savoy, crusade of, 128, 130;
proselytizing zeal of, aids conquests of Murad, 141-2;
intervenes to make peace between Venice and Genoa, 155;
hostility to Theodore Palaeologos, 228.
Amassia, 250, 300.
Anatoli Hissar, 234.
Anatolia (_see_ Asia Minor).
Angora, 16, 68, 155, 162, 188, 191, 250, 259, 264, 285-6, 288;
battle of, 251-5, 262;
capture of, by Osmanlis, 68, 156.
Anna of Savoy, 91-4, 129.
Argos, population of, deported to Anatolia, 230.
Armenia, Little, kingdom of (_see_ Cilicia).
Armenians, bravery and massacre of, at Sivas, 248.
Asia Minor, railways in, 11-12;
new ethnic elements in, 14-15;
obscure geographical names in, 32;
exodus of Greeks to coast of, 35;
Catalans in, 36-8, 123, 301;
importance of Aegaean islands for control of, 43;
not conquered by early Osmanlis, 68-9, 300-2;
Black Death in, 96;
Crusaders’ road through, 162;
Bayezid nominal master of greater part of, 191;
Timur invades, 257-60;
Mongol invasions of, 270-3, 300;
Turkish emirates in, 277-301.
Athens, Osmanlis in, 231.
Attika, Ottoman invasions of, 147, 186, 205.
Ayasoluk, 185, 283, 286, 295.
Bagdad, 244, 249, 269.
Balikesri, 66, 69, 286, 291, 294.
Balkan Christians prefer Ottoman rule to that of Catholics, 133, 194, 240.
---- peninsula, distance between cities of, 162;
Moslem immigration into, 196, 230-91;
Venetian fear of Hungarian hegemony in, 207;
Ottoman activities cease in, 243.
Balsa of Albania, 159.
Baphaeon, battle of, 34, 45.
Bayezid, assassinates Yakub upon his accession, 180;
marries daughter of Lazar, 183;
conquers Anatolian emirates, 184-91, 274;
invests Smyrna, 185;
completes conquest of Bulgaria, 195;
receives privileges in Constantinople,
199;
propitiated by Venetians and Genoese, 204-5, 207;
continues subjugation of Albania and Greece, 230, 243;
defeats crusaders at Nicopolis, 216-24;
invades the Morea, 228-32;
settles Anatolian Turks in Balkan peninsula, and pushes
siege of Constantinople after Nicopolis, 230-4;
extends conquests to valley of the Euphrates, and comes
into contact with Timur, 244;
defies Timur, 246;
defeated by Timur at Angora, 251-5;
taken prisoner and humiliated, 253-6;
dies at Ak Sheïr, 256;
arrogance of, 181-2, 209, 227, 246, 249;
origin of nickname _Yildirim_, 188;
contemporary western conception of, 208;
change of character after success, 225, 235, 249, 257;
claims to greatness as a statesman, 235;
humble origin of, 245, 267;
wrong tactics at Angora, 251-2;
discussion of cage story, 255-6;
durability of conquests of, 262.
Bayezid, sons of, confusion of western writers concerning
identity of, 246, 252;
fate of, after Angora, 255;
fight for succession, 259.
Belgrad, 162.
Bigha, Catalan colony of, 123, 294, 301.
Biledjik, 11, 12, 22, 33.
Black Death, 95-6, 115.
---- Sheep, dynasty of, 245.
Bogomile heresy, 93.
Boli, 286, 292.
Borlu, 286.
Bosnia, Ottoman invasions of, 147, 184, 191.
(_See also_ Tvrtko.)
Bosnian nobility, conversion to Islam, 75.
Bosphorus, 32, 45, 59, 233-4, 237, 260-1.
Boucicaut, crusade of, 128, 236-9;
in Nicopolis campaign, 212-23;
tries to raise ransom at Constantinople, 226;
crusaders left behind by, save Constantinople, 242.
Brusa, 12, 13, 22, 32, 45, 46, 54, 84, 122, 125, 152,
185, 188, 198, 225, 257, 275-6, 286-7;
captured by the Osmanlis, 46-8;
place in Ottoman history, 125.
Buda, John Palaeologos at, 130;
Nicopolis crusaders at, 211.
Bulaïr, 101, 111.
Bulgaria, incorporated in Ottoman Empire, 195.
Bulgarians, early propagation of Islam among, 26;
refuse to aid Byzantines against Osmanlis, 103;
first conflict with Osmanlis in Thrace, 111-14;
make John Palaeologus prisoner, and are attacked by
Savoyard crusaders, 129-30;
struggle against Osmanlis in Thrace, 139-40;
resist Hungarian attempts to convert them to Catholic faith, 141;
lose Sofia, 161;
Ottoman invasion and conquest, 171-3, 194-5;
aid Osmanlis in Karamanian campaign, 188;
oppressed by Greek patriarchate, 195-6.
Bunar Hissar, 112, 139.
Burgas, 129, 142.
Burhaneddin of Caesarea, 190, 287, 297.
Byzantine architecture, influence of, upon Ottoman, 275-6.
---- emperor, glamour of title in Western Europe, 241.
Byzantines, civil dynastic strife among, 35, 47-9, 57-61
91-4, 98-105, 149-54, 197-200, 237-9, 259;
first contact with Osmanlis, 34;
receive aid from Catalans, 37-40;
seek aid of Genoese and Serbians, against Turks, 41;
menaced again by western schemes of conquest, 42;
lose Bithynia to Osmanlis, 45-9;
defeated by Osmanlis at Pelecanon, 59-61;
weakness of opposition of, to Orkhan, 106;
abasement of, before Murad, 122;
fail to cooperate with other Balkan Christians against Osmanlis, 123, 139;
make treaty with Genoese, 162;
reduced to city state of Constantinople, 232-4, 242-3;
aided by Boucicaut’s crusade, 236-9, 242;
fail to take advantage of defeat of Bayezid by Timur,
and help Ottoman armies in retreat to Europe, 261.
Caesarea, 16, 190, 248, 272, 284, 287, 300.
Callixtus, patriarch, 101-3, 144.
Cantacuzenos, Helen, 94.
----, Irene, 91, 94, 103.
----, John, wounded by Turks, 48;
at battle of Pelecanon, 60;
prevents marriage alliance between Orkhan and Dushan, 90;
usurps imperial purple, 91;
marries daughter to Orkhan, 93;
forces widow of Andronicus III to recognize him as
co-emperor, and marries daughter to John Palaeologus, 93-4;
asks aid of Orkhan against Dushan, 98;
dynastic war with John Palaeologus, in which Osmanlis help him, 99-102;
forced to abdicate, and becomes monk, 103;
character of, 104-5;
responsibility for introducing Osmanlis into Europe,
92-5, 97-100, 102-3, 105-10;
grand-daughter of, in harem of Bayezid, 230.
----, Matthew, turns against father, 98;
Patriarch Callixtus refuses to consecrate as co-emperor, 101-2;
forced by John Palaeologus to abdicate, 103.
----, Theodora, wife of Orkhan, 93-4, 98, 107.
Catalans, aid Byzantines in Asia Minor, 37-8;
form state at Gallipoli, 39;
go to Thessaly, 40;
sack Chios, 43;
mercenaries of Cantacuzenos, 103;
remnants of, at Bigha, 123, 301.
Cattaro, 134.
Charles IV (Holy Roman Emperor), 138.
---- of Durazzo, 192.
---- VI of France, rejoices over death of Murad, 178;
opposes Bayezid, 202, 208-9, 233;
insanity of, 202, 209, 242;
receives Manuel Palaeologus, 241;
Timur proposes to share world with, 249;
misinformed about origin and power of Osmanlis, 208-9, 274.
---- Thopia, lord of Durazzo, 159.
Chios, 43, 163, 186, 205.
Chivalry, last effort of, in crusade against Bayezid,
211-14, 217-20, 222-4, 225-8.
Christians in Ottoman Empire, civil status of, 77-8.
Cilicia, 13, 271, 282, 293, 298-9, 300.
Constantine, Bulgarian prince of Kustendil, 140, 143, 173.
Constantinople, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 24, 36, 41, 79, 91,
100, 121, 125, 148-9, 162, 196-200, 205-7, 232-4,
235-9, 241-3, 259-60.
Corfu, Venetians alarmed about safety of, 243.
Croia, 160.
Crusaders, road of, to Jerusalem, 162.
Crusades, end of, 13, 14, 203;
perversion of, in 14th century, 143.
----, Nicopolis the last, 203.
Cypriotes, join league against Murad, 163;
fighting Genoese, 239;
relations with Rhodes and Anatolian emirates, 285, 290, 295, 297, 299-300.
Damascus, 240, 250, 279, 287.
Dardanelles, 22, 128, 261, 291, 293;
‘question’ of, 152, 203, 237.
Demotika, 48, 57, 90, 91, 99, 100, 105, 112, 114, 121, 125, 150.
Despina, daughter of Lazar, marries Bayezid, 183;
disgraced by Timur, 256.
Djagataï, 244.
Djenghiz Khan, 13, 16, 26, 41, 53, 74, 243-4, 256, 264, 270.
Dobrotich, 140, 170.
Drama, 146, 158, 161.
Durazzo, 159, 162, 201-2, 206.
Dushan, Stephen, 86-90, 94, 98-9, 143, 201.
Edebali, Sheik, 23-4, 27.
Egherdir, 284, 288.
Elbassan, 159.
_Emir_, confused by contemporary western writers with Murad, 213;
transcribed into ‘admiral’, 163.
Enos, 114, 123.
Ephesus, 258-9, 283.
Epiros, Ottoman invasion of, 159.
Ertogrul, father of Osman, 20-2, 28, 263-4, 267.
Erzerum, 20, 266, 270, 288, 300.
Erzindjian, 20, 246, 248, 259, 266, 270, 272, 288, 293, 300.
Eski Baba, 112.
---- Sheïr, 11, 12, 22, 32, 290.
Evrenos, general of Murad, 112, 143, 146.
----, general of Osman, 48, 76.
---- of Yanitza, 171, 228, 230.
Famagusta, 239, 298.
Flor, Roger de, 37-9, 43.
Fratricide, Ottoman legal sanction of, 180-1.
Gallipoli, 39, 41, 100-3, 111, 129, 221.
Genoese, aid Michael IX, 41;
supposed to have instigated Turkish attack on Rhodes, 44;
help Osmanlis, 97-8, 100, 107, 165;
fight with Venetians for Tenedos, 152-5;
make treaty with Byzantines in 1386, 162;
make treaty with Osmanlis in 1385, and join league
against them in 1386, 163;
fail to aid Nicopolis crusade, 207;
under protection of France, 236;
encourage Timur to attack Bayezid, 249;
help Ottoman army to cross to Europe after Angora, 261;
wars with Venetians, 96-7, 152-5, 262;
at Kaffa, 294.
Ghazan Khan, 26, 36-7.
Grand vizier, origin of office, 71.
Greece, conquests of Osmanlis in, 171, 186, 228-30, 232.
Gul Hissar, 69, 288-9.
Gumuldjina, 112.
Guzel Hissar, 283, 286.
Hadji Ilbeki, 123-4.
Halicarnassus, 288, 300.
Hamid, 86, 157, 165-6, 187, 284-5, 289.
Hedwig of Hungary, becomes Queen of Poland, 192.
Henry IV of England, not at Nicopolis, 214;
turns from crusades to efforts for English crown, 233;
receives Manuel Palaeologus, 241;
wants to help to save Constantinople, 242;
tries to convert Timur to Christianity, 259.
Hungarians, first conflict with Osmanlis, 122-4;
aid of, solicited by John Palaeologus, 128-30;
urged by Gregory XI to fight Osmanlis, 136-7;
attack Bulgarians,
and are driven back, 141;
attack Venice, 154;
border nobles co-operate with Serbians at Kossova, 170.
Hungary, first Ottoman raid into, 183-4;
first battle of Osmanlis on soil of, 191;
separation of crown of, from Poland, 192;
interest of, in checking progress of Osmanlis, 203-4;
hegemony of, in Balkans feared by Venice, 207;
Ottoman invasion of, after Nicopolis, 224.
Hunyadi, 194.
Ibn Batutah, 69, 277-80.
Ishtiman, 142, 160-2.
Islamic state, theocratic conception of, 72-3.
---- teaching, concrete results of, 75.
Ispahan, 259.
Istip, 158, 160-2.
Italians, city ideal of, 14.
Jagello of Lithuania, converted and becomes Ladislas of Poland, 192.
Janina, 159.
Janissaries, institution of, 80, 117-21;
number of, in early Ottoman history, 118-19, 253;
rôle of, in early history not important, 119-20, 173.
Jean de Nevers, 210, 212, 218, 223, 225-8.
Jeanne d’Arc, 106, 209.
Jews, cruelty of Tartars to, at Brusa, 267.
Kaffa, 165, 264, 291.
Kaouïa, Ottoman absorption of, 69.
Karamania, 165-7, 187-90, 259, 274, 285, 289-90, 300-2.
Karamanlis, power of, in fifteenth century, 190, 290, 301-2.
Kara Khalil Tchenderli, 112.
---- Yuluk, 190.
---- Yussuf, 244-5.
Karasi, 66, 69, 257, 286, 291, 294.
Kastemuni, 191, 259, 291-2, 297.
Kastriota, George, 170.
Kavalla, 146, 161.
Keraïtes, 14.
Keredek, Ottoman absorption of, 69.
Kermasti, 68, 292.
Kermian, 156, 166, 188, 271, 274, 284, 285, 292-3.
Khaïreddin, 146, 159.
Kharesmians, 17.
Kharesm, distinct from Khorassan, 19.
Kharput, 190, 244.
Khorassan, 19, 25, 244, 264.
Kirk Kilissé, 112, 139.
Kir Sheïr, 250.
Koësé, Michail, 52, 76.
Konia, 6, 11, 13, 16, 166-7, 187, 189, 260, 270-2, 274, 284, 290-300.
Kossova, battle of, 174-8, 203-4;
regarded as victory by Bosnians, Italians and French, 178.
Kustendil, 140, 143, 173.
Kutayia, 12, 22, 34, 156-7, 166-7, 188, 257-8, 284, 292.
Lalashahin, 111, 114, 123-4, 126, 142-3.
Laodicea, 287.
Lazar, election of, 148;
tributary to Murad, 149;
increases tribute after fall of Nish, 162;
sends contingent to Murad for Anatolian campaign, 166;
dies at Kossova, 177.
Lemnos, 269.
Louis of Hungary, defeated by Osmanlis, 124;
attacks Bulgarians, 141;
prejudices Christians of Balkans against Catholic
faith by attempts of forcible conversion, 141, 194;
ignored by Tvrtko of Bosnia, 168-9;
death, and contest over succession of, 192.
Lulé Burgas, 112.
Macedonia, Ottoman conquest of, 145-9, 158-9.
Macedonians, uncertainty of, regarding nationality, 144.
Maeander River, caution concerning identity of, 294.
Magnesia, 258.
Malkhatun, wife of Osman, 23-4, 27, 275.
Mamelukes, in Asia Minor, 282, 293, 300-1.
Marash, 279, 293.
Maritza, battle of, 122-4, 144.
Marko, 52, 76.
Marmora, Ottoman absorption of, 69.
Marriage, reason for abandonment of, by Ottoman sultans, 183, 256.
Mary of Hungary, marries Sigismund, 193.
Matthew, patriarch, 243.
Megalopolis, battle of, 230.
Menteshe, 158, 185-6, 191, 259, 274, 283, 287-8, 289, 294, 297, 300;
emir of, invades Rhodes, 43-4.
Messembria, 139.
Mézières, Philippe de, agitation of, for crusade, 160, 203.
Michael Asan, conflict with Byzantines, 59;
repudiates Serbian marriage alliance, 87.
Midia, 139.
Mikhalitch, conquered by Osmanlis, 68;
Nicopolis prisoners at, 225, 294;
Timur’s army reaches, 257;
emirate of, 294.
Miletus, 294, 295.
Mircea of Wallachia, promises to co-operate with Lazar against Osmanlis, 170;
defeated by Osmanlis, and helps Bayezid against Hungarians, 192;
negotiates with Bayezid to desert crusaders, 214;
withdraws from Nicopolis during battle, 221;
defeats invading Ottoman army, 224.
Modon, 230, 240, 243.
Mohammed I, becomes undisputed Ottoman sultan, 262;
building activity of, 275-6;
Karamanians not dependent upon, 301.
---- II (the Conqueror), legislation of, 72-3, 195;
desire of, to connect origin of family with Byzantine imperial family, 265.
---- Sultan, grandson of Timur, 251-2.
Monastir, 158-9, 195.
Mongols, invasion of Asia Minor, 13, 16, 17, 36-7, 300;
attempts of Christian missionaries to convert, 14, 26;
connexion with Byzantines, 36-7, 41, 65;
exposure of women symbol of conquest among, 256.
Morea, 170-1, 228-32, 240, 243.
Mughla, 294, 295.
Murad, first European conquests, 111-15;
creates corps of janissaries, 117-20;
decides to build Ottoman empire in Balkan peninsula,
and makes Adrianople his capital, 125;
extension of conquests in Bulgaria, 138-43, 159-61;
conquers Macedonia, 145-9, 158-9;
extends sovereignty in Asia Minor, 155-8, 274;
treaties with Ragusa, Venice, and Genoa, 126-7, 163-4;
first conflict with Karamania, 165-7;
reaches Danube by further conquests in Bulgaria, 172;
destroys Serbian independence, and is killed, in battle
of Kossova, 175-7;
method of assimilating Balkan Christians, 115-21;
policy in empire-building, 125;
organization of conquered territories, 147-9;
policy in Byzantine dynastic quarrels, 149-55;
anxious not to alarm Venice, 160;
kindness to non-combatants, 167;
policy towards Serbian league, 171;
character of, 178-9;
confused with Bayezid by western travellers and writers, 208-13;
contemporary western conception of, 208.
Musalla, highest mountain in Balkan peninsula, 143.
Mytilene, 163, 205.
Nagy Olosz, battle of, 191.
Nauplia, 230.
Nazlu, 284, 289, 295.
Nicaea, 12, 13, 32, 45-6, 54, 84, 111, 185, 257, 275;
captured by the Osmanlis, 56-7, 61-3;
emirate of, 295.
Nicomedia, 11, 12, 13, 32, 45-6, 54, 84, 111, 185;
captured by the Osmanlis, 63-4.
Nicopolis, 172-3, 193-4, 196;
crusade and battle of, 203, 206, 208-24;
identification of, 215;
significance of battle of, 262;
ransom of prisoners taken at, 225-8.
Nilufer, wife of Orkhan, 25, 62.
Nish, 158, 161-2, 183-4.
Okhrida, 159.
Orkhan, first battles of, 46;
adds Nicaea and Nicomedia to his emirate, 56-7, 61-4;
defeats Byzantines at Pelecanon, 60-1;
completes conquest of Bithynia, 64;
invades and annexes portions of neighbouring emirates, 66-8, 291-2, 294;
invited by Cantacuzenos to aid him against Anna, and
receives Cantacuzenos’s daughter as bride, 92-4;
invited again by Cantacuzenos into Europe to aid him
against John Palaeologus, 98-9;
first conquests in Europe, 100-6;
has Byzantines at his mercy, 107-8;
Ottoman historians unsatisfactory in accounts of reign of, 65;
contemporary statements as to power of, 69-70;
legislation of, 70-3;
policy of towards Christians, 75-80;
organization of army of, 81-4;
death of, and estimate of his character, 109;
extent of emirate of, 301-2.
Orsova, 215.
Orthodox Christians, animosity against Catholics and
unwillingness for reunion of Churches, 128, 132-4, 141, 194.
---- Church, loses hold on Levantine Christians, 49;
oppresses Bulgarians, 195-6.
Orthography, oriental, 5-6.
Osman, birth of, 22;
conversion, marriage, and dream of, 23-9;
principality of, in 1300, 32;
first battle with Byzantines, 34;
conquests of, from Byzantines, 45-9;
legends concerning power and character of, 50-2, 263-76;
reincarnation of early khalifs, 52;
elected as chief of tribe, 55;
army of, 81;
parentage of, 263-5, 267;
relation of with Anatolian Turkish emirs, 17, 44-5, 273-4, 300-2;
error of attributing coinage to, 51.
Osmandjik, 265, 291.
_Osmanli_, connotation of this word, 29, 50, 78, 80-1.
Osmanlis, originate on border of Bithynia, 19, 25, 28, 30-2;
complete conquest of Bithynia, 62-4, 80;
become a distinct race, 78-81;
first invasion of Europe, 100;
advance into Thrace, 101;
conquer Thrace, 121-6, 149;
conquer Bulgaria, 139, 143, 149, 160-1, 171-3, 193-6;
conquer Macedonia, 144, 149, 158-9, 183;
conquer Servia, 161-2, 173-8, 182;
conquer Thessaly, 147, 228-30, 232;
invade Albania, 147, 159-60, 183, 206, 243;
invade Attika, 147, 186, 205;
invade Bosnia, 147, 184;
invade Hungary, 183-4, 191, 224;
invade Wallachia, 192, 224;
invade the Morea, 171, 228-30, 232;
conquests of, in Greece, 171, 186, 228-30, 232;
absorb Anatolian Turkish emirates, 66-9, 155-8, 185-7, 190-1, 274;
invade Karamania, 165-7, 187-90, 290;
besiege Constantinople, 198-9, 232-4, 236;
naval raids of, 186, 205;
first cross the Danube, 191-2;
first cross the Vardar, 147;
contemporary western misconception of their character, 216-17, 247;
composite blood of, 115-17, 126;
character of, 74-5;
distinct from other Anatolian Turks, 19, 28, 31, 78-9,
115, 126, 217, 228, 283;
tolerance of, 74, 81, 115, 179;
rule of, preferred by Balkan Christians to that of
Catholics, 133, 141, 194-5;
not raiders, but colonists, 149, 186;
not feared by Europe until they appeared in Thrace, 111.
Ottoman architecture, Byzantine influence in, 275-6.
---- army, organization of, 81-4;
Christian elements in, 166, 173, 184, 187-8, 217, 252.
---- ceremonial of holding ambassadors’ arms in audience with Sultan, 178.
---- historians, unsatisfactory accounts of reign of Orkhan, 65.
---- history, lacks early sources, 17, 265.
---- legislation, beginning of, 71-3.
---- navy, beginning of, 186;
weakness in reign of Bayezid, 205-6, 234, 237-8.
Palaeologos, Andronicus II, looks to Mongols and Catalans
for aid against Turks, 35-7;
bestows title of Caesar on Roger de Flor, 39;
menaced by Mongols, Venice, and French princes, 41-2;
civil strife with grandson, 48, 57-9;
refuses to co-operate in crusade planned by Marino Sanudo, 49;
seeks aid of papacy against Turks, 85.
----, Andronicus III, set upon by Turks on wedding journey, 48;
captures Salonika, 58;
deposes grandfather, 59;
defeated by Osmanlis at Pelecanon, and abandons Nicaea, 59-61;
invites aid of Anatolian emirs in siege of Phocaea, 65-6, 86;
makes overtures to John XXII, 85;
marries sister to Czar Michael of Bulgaria, 87;
on death-bed entrusts empress and son and heir to care of Cantacuzenos, 91;
assassinates brother, 181.
----, Andronicus IV, charged with suggesting to Bulgarians
that they keep his father prisoner, 128;
rebels against father, and is imprisoned, 149-51;
escapes, imprisons father and brothers, and gives Tenedos to Genoese, 153;
treaty with Genoese, 163.
----, John V (I), under guardianship of Cantacuzenos, 91;
forced to marry daughter of Cantacuzenos, and to accept
father-in-law as co-emperor, 94;
exiled by Cantacuzenos to Tenedos, 99;
returns from exile, and forces John and Matthew Cantacuzenos
to abdicate, 103;
at the mercy of Orkhan, 106-8;
unpopularity of, with Byzantines, 115;
treaties of, with Murad, 122, 128, 136;
fails to send aid to Balkan crusaders at Maritza, 122;
tries to get aid from Venetians against Osmanlis, 128;
goes to Buda to seek aid from Louis of Hungary, and is
made prisoner by Bulgarians, 128-9;
release secured by Amadeo of Savoy, and promises to
submit to Roman Church, 129-30;
visits Rome, and becomes Catholic, 134-5;
last desperate appeal to Pope, 137;
war with Alexander of Bulgaria, 139;
passes over Andronicus, and raises Manuel to imperial purple, 149;
blinds son Andronicus at Murad’s command, 150;
refuses to receive fugitive Manuel at Constantinople for fear of Murad, 152;
gives Tenedos to Venetians, 153;
aids Osmanlis to conquer Philadelphia, last Byzantine
possession in Asia, 154, 197;
treaty with Genoese, 152-3;
ignominious death of, 198.
Palaeologus, John VII (II), rebels against grandfather and uncle, 197;
co-operates with Osmanlis against Manuel, 199-200, 237-8, 243;
becomes co-emperor with Manuel, 238-9;
banished by Manuel to Lemnos, 259.
----, Manuel II (I), ransoms father from Venetian merchants, 135;
serves in Ottoman army, 136, 149, 154, 187, 197;
made co-emperor by father, 149;
fails in conspiracy to drive Osmanlis from Serres, and
has to seek pardon of Murad at Brusa, 151-2, 231;
gives Bayezid privileges in Constantinople, 199;
fails to enlist support of Pope and Western princes, 200, 206, 233, 239;
marries son to Russian princess, 232;
receives aid from Boucicaut, 236-9;
accepts John VII as co-emperor, 238;
unsuccessful visit to Europe, 240-3;
expels Osmanlis from Constantinople, and offers to become
vassal of Timur, 259;
appeals to Rome and Venice for aid against Timur, 260.
----, Michael IX, unsuccessfully opposes Turks in Anatolia, 35;
at Adrianople, 39;
flees before Turks of Halil, 40.
----, Theodore, serves in Ottoman army, 149;
imprisoned by Andronicus IV, 153;
summoned, as ruler of the Morea, to do homage to Bayezid
at Serres, 171, 200, 229;
invites Osmanlis to enter the Morea to aid him against Frankish lords, 228;
defeated by Osmanlis at Megalopolis, 230;
tries to dissuade Manuel from trip to western Europe, 240.
Palatchia, 286, 294-5.
Papacy, and Eastern crusades, 41, 85;
invited to intervene to save Constantinople from Osmanlis, 95;
tries to raise crusades against Osmanlis, 122, 129, 132,
136-8, 141, 153, 201-2, 235-6, 241;
consistently denounces traffic of Italian republics with Moslems, 154.
(_See also under_ Popes.)
_Pasha_, origin of this title, 71-2.
Pergama, 284, 286, 291, 294.
Petrarch, hatred of schismatics, 133.
Philadelphia, 13, 34, 105, 154, 296, 299.
Philippe d’Artois, 212, 217-18, 223, 225.
---- de Bourgogne, 202, 209-10, 212, 218, 226, 236, 242.
---- le Bel, plans to retake Constantinople, 41-2;
aids in conquest of Rhodes, 44.
Philippopolis, 114, 122, 139, 161-2, 231.
Phocaea, Byzantines and Anatolian emirs besiege, 66, 283, 296;
John Palaeologus attacks at command of Orkhan, 107-8;
not dependent upon Osmanlis, 299.
Plochnik, battle of, 169.
Popes:
Gregory X, 164.
Boniface VIII, 164.
Clement V, 41-2, 44.
John XXII, 85.
Clement VI, 95.
Urban V, 122, 129-32, 134-6, 141, 164.
Gregory XI, 136-8, 153, 164.
Urban VI, 201.
Boniface XI, 201-2, 235, 262.
Benedict XIII, 202, 235-6, 241.
Popova Shapkah, 143.
Prilep, 158.
Princes’ Islands, 35.
Pristina, 92, 144.
Ragusa, first Christian state to make tributary treaty with Osmanlis, 127.
_Raïa_, meaning of the word, 77.
Rhodes, 43-4, 186, 205;
grand master of, at Nicopolis, 219, 221;
chevaliers of (_see_ Saint John, Knights of).
Rhodope Mountains, 140, 143, 147.
Rilo, monastery of, 195.
Riva, 237.
Rodosto, 65, 101.
Rumeli Hissar, 234.
Rustchuk, 172.
Saint John, Knights of, conquer Rhodes, 43;
resist Turks, 44, 283;
capture Smyrna, 85, 283;
conspire with Pope to seize the Morea, 240;
lose Smyrna to Timur, 258;
relations with Cyprus and Anatolian emirates, 285-6, 295, 297, 299-300.
---- Sophia, mosque of, 60, 93, 94, 102, 154, 233.
Salona, duchy of, conquered by Bayezid, 229-30.
Salonika, 40, 58, 65, 79, 92, 98, 100, 121, 145, 181, 231.
Samakov, battle of, 142-3, 160.
Samarkand, 244, 251, 256, 260.
Samsun, 191, 196, 291.
Sangarius, 11, 12, 32, 38, 45, 302.
Sarukhan, 65, 86, 158, 185-6, 191, 228, 259, 283, 291, 295-6.
Savoy, origin of armies of, 44.
(_See also_ Amadeo and Anna.)
Savra, battle of, 159.
Scutari (in Albania), 160.
Scutari (on the Bosphorus), 60, 64, 94, 108, 234.
Seljuk architecture, influence upon Ottoman, 275-6.
Seljuks, invasions of Asia Minor, 15-16;
changes of religion, 26.
---- of Rum, contest Asia Minor with Byzantines, 13;
relations with Osmanlis, 20-2, 32, 268-76;
subject to Mongols, 270-2;
end of dynasty, 297.
Serbian Church, autocephalous, 144-5.
---- empire of Stephen Dushan, 86-90.
Serbians, illusions of, concerning their fourteenth-century
empire, 86, 90, 175, 201;
first enter Macedonia to help Byzantines against Turks, 41;
aid Andronicus II against his grandson, 58;
conflict with Orthodox Church, 89-90, 144-5;
refuse to aid Byzantines against Osmanlis, 102;
defeated by Osmanlis at Maritza, 122-4;
anarchy among chieftains of, in Macedonia, 144;
defeated by Osmanlis at Cernomen, and lose Macedonia, 145-8;
become subject to Osmanlis, 160-2;
help Murad in Karamanian campaign, and are punished for looting, 167;
form league against Murad, and are defeated at Kossova, 168-78;
treachery of their nobles, 173;
cast fortunes definitely with Osmanlis, 182-3;
aid Bayezid in Karamanian campaign, 188;
last of Dushan’s following disappear in Macedonia, 201;
fidelity of, to Bayezid at Nicopolis, 220;
fight in Ottoman army at Angora, 252.
Serres, 58, 144, 147, 152, 158, 161, 200, 229.
Shah-Rokh, son of Timur, 255, 258.
Shehabeddin, 69, 277-80.
Shuman, 172.
Sigismund, first invasion of Bulgaria, 188, 193-5;
becomes king of Hungary, and sends threat to Bayezid, 193;
tries to get support of Italian republics against Bayezid, 205-7;
leads Nicopolis crusade, 210-24;
boastfulness of, before Nicopolis, 216;
flees from battle-field, 220-1;
character of, 193, 222.
Silistria, 196.
Silivria, 237.
Sinope, 191, 291-2, 296, 297.
Sis, 282.
Sisman, John, 128, 140-3, 170, 172-3, 194-6.
Sivas, 190, 270, 272, 274, 287, 297, 300;
destruction of, by Timur, 243, 245-8.
Slavery, Greek abhorrence of, 116;
connivance of Italian republics in, 165.
Smyrna, 11, 79, 85, 185, 258-60, 270, 283, 286, 299-300.
Sofia, 142, 158, 160-2, 172, 231.
Soleiman pasha, son of Orkhan, 100-1, 105, 108, 111.
Soleiman Shah, grandfather of Osman, 20, 266.
---- tchelebi, son of Bayezid, 195, 245-8, 252-3, 257-61.
South Slavs, character of, 170.
Sozopolis, 129, 142.
Stambul, origin of name, 199.
Stephen Lazarevitch, kral of Serbia, vassal and
brother-in-law of Bayezid, 182-3;
fights for Osmanlis at Nicopolis, 220;
and at Angora, 253.
Stracimir, 140-1.
Sugut, 12, 22, 25, 33, 63, 115, 285.
Taharten, emir of Erzindjian, 246.
Tarsus, 24, 216, 298.
Taurus Mountains, 24, 125, 187, 289, 298, 300-2.
Tchataldja, 115.
Tchorlu, 105, 112, 162.
Tekke, emirate of, 158, 165-6, 186-7, 285, 289, 297-8.
Tenedos, importance of, to control Dardanelles, 152;
struggle of Venice and Genoa for, 152-5;
John VII Palaeologus banished to, 236.
Thessaly, Ottoman conquest of, 147, 228-30.
Thingizlu, 69.
Thomas, despot of Janina, 159.
Timur, origin of name, and conquests of, 244;
charges against Bayezid, 190, 245-6;
destroys Sivas, 247-8;
makes overtures to Occidental princes, 249;
invades Asia Minor, and crushes Bayezid at Angora, 250-4;
degrades Bayezid and Despina, 255-6;
pushes to Aegaean Sea, and captures Smyrna, 257-60;
death of, 260;
infirmity of, 244;
lacked constructive policy in conquests, 257, 260-1;
restores Anatolian emirs deposed by Bayezid, 257, 259,
283, 288, 290, 292-3, 294.
Timurtash, 142, 158, 166, 187, 188-9, 254.
Tirnovo, 140, 142, 172, 194-6.
Tokat, 190, 250, 287, 298.
Trebizond, 13, 162, 270, 280, 288, 291, 293, 297, 299.
_Tughra_, origin of, 127.
Turin, treaty of, 155.
Turk, connotation of word in Ottoman Empire, 78-81, 228;
lacks family ties and family name, 267.
Turkey, connotation of word in fourteenth century, 107.
Turkish chieftainship elective rather than hereditary, 54, 276.
---- raids in Aegaean Sea, Macedonia and Thrace, 36-40,
65, 84, 185-6, 261, 283.
---- emirates of Asia Minor stronger than Osmanlis, 30, 274, 290, 301-2.
---- refugees from Thrace in 1912, 16.
---- women not veiled in fourteenth century, 157.
Turks, character of Anatolian, 15.
Tvrtko, kral of Bosnia, 168-70, 178, 183-4, 201.
Ulubad, 68, 298.
Uskub, 88, 174, 183.
Valona, 159.
Varna, 129, 172.
Venetians, interfere in Byzantine dynastic quarrels, 35;
invited by Clement V to co-operate in reconquest of Byzantine Empire, 42;
menaced in Aegaean by Turks, 84;
relations with Stephen Dushan, 88-90;
wars with Genoese, 96-7, 152-5, 262;
urged by fellow countrymen to oppose Orkhan, 107;
fail to protect Byzantines against Murad, 128;
detain John Palaeologus because of debts, 135;
refuse to contribute seriously to crusade against Osmanlis, 137;
struggle with Genoa for Tenedos, 152-5;
sapped by prosperity, 163;
make commercial treaty with Murad, 164;
opposition to Hungarians, 169;
indifference to Murad’s conquests, 170;
refuse to buy Lemnos from Byzantines, 200;
fail to aid in Nicopolis crusade, 203-7;
in Athens and Salonika, 230-1;
prefer to curry favour with Bayezid rather than defend Constantinople, 233;
reception of Manuel Palaeologus and their pacifist policy, 240;
alarm over appearance of Osmanlis on Adriatic, 243;
help Ottoman army tocross to Europe after Angora, 261;
at Palatchia, 294-5.
Visconti, Giovanni Galeazzo, 131, 210, 236, 240.
Viza, 139.
Vukasin, 145-6, 159, 173.
Wallachia, Ottoman invasions of, 192, 224.
Wallachians, aid Bulgarians against Hungarians, 141;
aid Osmanlis against Hungarians, 192;
worth of, as soldiers, 192;
aid Osmanlis in Bulgaria, 193;
withdraw during battle of Nicopolis, 221;
successfully resist Ottoman invasion after Nicopolis, 225.
Wenceslaus, 210, 235.
Western Europe, inability to understand Eastern Europe, 132-3.
White Sheep, dynasty of, 190, 245.
Widin, 140, 141, 142, 196, 215.
Yakub, killed by brother Bayezid after Kossova, 180.
Yakub, general of Bayezid, 230.
Yamboli, 140, 142.
Yeni Sheïr, 28, 32, 34, 258, 275.
Printed in England at the Oxford University Press
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The Keraites, a tribe of large numbers, established on the frontier
of China, were Christians in the early times: Resheddin, Quatremère
edition, i. 93. The Council of Lyons sent missionaries to Mongols in
the reign of Innocent IV, 1245. For account of missions to Mongols in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries see Howorth, i. 68 f., 189-92;
ii. 183 _n._; iii. 72-5, 278-81, 348-55, 576-80: also documents of the
Ming period, trans. by Hirth, p. 65.
[2] I have witnessed a similar migration, when the Bulgarians broke
into Thrace in October 1912. The progress of the fleeing Turks, even on
the plains, was painfully slow, and the mortality was frightful.
[3] Neshri (Nöldeke’s translation), in _Zeitschrift der deutschen
morgenländischen Gesellschaft_, xiii. 190.
[4] Seadeddin, _Casa Ottomana_ (Bratutti trans.), i. 6.
[5] Neshri, xiii. 190.
[6] See Appendix B for these emirates.
[7] There is a collection of State papers in Persian, Arabic and
Turkish, Feridun (Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. turc, 79), which contains some
letters and decrees of the earliest sultans, but there is no proof of
the authenticity of these documents.
[8] Neshri and Idris, end fifteenth century; Seadeddin, end sixteenth
century; Hadji Khalfa, seventeenth century. See Bibliography.
[9] In the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, I have examined, as far as I
know, all the books concerning Turkey printed before 1600. See list in
Bibliography.
[10] Jorga, _Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches_ (in the _Geschichte
der europaïschen Staaten_), published 1908-13, preface and i. 152-3.
[11] Up to the death of Ertogrul (1288), I follow Neshri, _ZDMG._,
xiii. 188-98, unless otherwise specified. Direct quotation is indicated
by quotation marks.
[12] A.D. 1219. Evliya effendi, i. 27, gives A.H. 600;
Seadeddin and Hadji Khalfa, A.H. 619; Drechsler, _Chron.
Saracenorum_, A.H. 610.
[13] Or Kharesm? Schéfer, in preface to his translation of Riza Kouly’s
embassy to Kharesm, _Bibl. de l’École des langues viv. orientales_,
1re série, vol. iii., says that Kharesm in part was identical
with Khorassan. But Shehabeddin, trans. by Quatremère in _Notices et
Extraits_, xiii. 289, declares that Kharesm is a country distinct from
Khorassan. Hadji Khalfa, _Djihannuma_, MS. fr., Bibl. Nat., Paris,
nouv. ac., no. 888, p. 815, supports this opinion. The very fact that
these writers are so careful to make this assertion shows, however,
that there was much confusion as to these terms. According to Vambéry,
Kharesm is still in Djagatai Turkish, the diplomatical and political
name for the modern Khanate of Khiva. Howorth, _History of Mongols_,
ii. 78, says that the Turkish tribes remained in these countries after
the Mongol conquest. Is this the Organa or Urgheuz of Marco Polo?
[14] Hussein Hezarfenn, ii. 287, and Chalcocondylas (_Patr. Graec._,
Migne, vol. clix), 21, call the father of Ertogrul Oguzalp. For
critical discussion see Appendix A.
[15] This title is invariably given by Neshri to every ruler in the
direct line of Osman, just as he calls the Christian opponents of the
Osmanlis unbelievers.
[16] Probably Sultan Inoenu, anticipating the later name of this
district.
[17] Sagredo, the Italian historian, whose work was greatly esteemed by
Gibbon, makes the curious error of calling Alaeddin ‘Lord of Aleppo and
Damascus’.
[18] ‘A great mountain situated between Kutayia and Brusa’: Hadji
Khalfa, _Djihannuma_, fol. 1975; ‘The paths up this mountain are so
difficult that one on foot has a thousand pains to reach the top’:
ibid., fol. 1850.
[19] Rasmussen, _Annales Islamici_, p. 41, confuses this city with
Kutayia, and gives its capture by Ertogrul under date of 1285.
[20] Thus in Ali and Neshri. Seadeddin attributes this dream to
Ertogrul. But the confusion between Ertogrul and Osman is marked in all
the Ottoman historians.
[21] The Ottoman historians give as reason for the refusal the social
difference between his daughter and the ‘young prince’. This is an
excellent illustration of how, writing in the zenith of Ottoman
prosperity, the historians lost their sense of proportion or were
actually compelled to write in flattering terms of the founder of their
royal house.
[22] Hammer, i. 67, in relating this dream, has transcribed with
fidelity and felicity the Persian poetry of Idris.
[23] Leunclavius, _Pandectes_, p. 113, following Ali, attributes the
moon dream to Ertogrul, and places it at Konia. Boecler, _Commentarius
de rebus turcicis_, pp. 104-5, following Chalcocondylas, does likewise,
but relates the Koran dream of Osman. Seadeddin, p. 11, makes the
dream distinctly religious, and while not mentioning the love story
or Malkhatun by name, infers that Osman receives intimation of his
marriage with Edebali’s daughter only through Edebali’s interpretation
of the dream. This failure to mention Malkhatun is all the more
significant when we see later how much attention Seadeddin gives to
Nilufer. Evliya effendi, ii. 19, says that through the marriage of
Osman to Malkhatun, the Ottoman sultans became descendants of the
Prophet!
[24] I should except from this statement Rambaud, who, in _Hist.
générale_, iii. 822-4, states that the conversion of the Osmanlis
to Islam took place during the chieftainship of Osman. The general
character of the work to which he was contributing, and the limits
of space, did not allow him to give any reasons in support of this
position. Vanell, _Histoire de l’Empire ottoman_, p. 357, says that
Ertogrul was a pagan until he became converted through reading the
Koran.
[25] From personal acquaintance with them, I can testify that these
nomads (Yuruks) have remained up to the twentieth century with only the
most vague idea of Mohammed and with no idea at all of the Koran and
the ritual observances of Islam.
[26] See Shehabeddin, MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., fonds arabe 2325, fol. 69
vº-70 rº, citing Mesoudi and earlier writers for the propagation of
Islam among the Bulgarians.
[27] Cf. Cahun’s masterly contribution to _Hist. générale_, ii. 887.
[28] Abul Faradj, _Chronicon Syr._, pp. 606-8.
[29] The Ottoman historians mention none, either of friendship or
enmity, during the entire life of Osman.
[30] The improbable connexion between Ertogrul and Osman and the
Seljuk sovereigns of Konia has been accepted without question by
European historians, on the strength of the assertions of the
Ottoman historians. This is curious, because the evidence against
this connexion is overwhelming. The Seljuk Empire of Rum lost its
independence at the battle of Erzindjian, 1244 (cf. Heyd, _Histoire
du commerce dans le Levant_, i. 534). Neshri himself confesses that
after this date ‘now remained only the bare name of the Seljuk Kings’:
_ZDMG._, xiii. 195. In view of the established facts of history, it
is astonishing that European historians should have up to this time
perpetuated, and given their sanction to, a fiction which was invented
for the purpose of helping Mohammed II to incorporate Karamania in his
empire! The limits of a footnote forbidding the adequate discussion
of this question and the citation of the authorities, I must refer my
readers to Appendix A.
[31] Neshri, _ZDMG._, xiii. 196, says seventy years. But in his
reckoning he constantly contradicts himself. _Sheïr_ means city, _eski_
old, and _yeni_ new.
[32] All the Ottoman historians agree upon this number.
[33] ‘The unbelievers and believers of that land honoured Ertogrul and
his son’: Neshri, p. 197. That Christians lived everywhere without
molestation in the midst of non-converted Turkish tribes is asserted by
Heyd, ii. 65.
[34] It is altogether likely that Osman received his name at the time
of his conversion. Is it not significant that his father, his brothers,
his son even, as well as most of his warriors, had purely pagan Turkish
names?
[35] _Tableau de l’Empire ottoman_, iv. 373.
[36] See Appendix B.
[37] During the late war with the Balkan allies, the newspapers of the
world spoke of ‘driving the Turks back to Asia, where they belong’, and
of the re-establishment of the Ottoman capital at Brusa or Konia!
[38] See Armain’s translation of the _Djihannuma_ (Mirror of the
World), a universal geography by Hadji Khalfa, in the Bibl. Nat.,
Paris, MS., fonds français, nouv. ac., nos. 888-9. The section on Asia
Minor, although written in some detail, does not contain many of the
names which we find in the Ottoman historians. I wish to register a
protest against inflicting on students and readers of history lists of
names that can have no possible meaning to them. I have omitted from
this work the names of places and persons upon which I can get no light.
[39] Hadji Khalfa, op. cit., fol. 1917, makes an error in giving the
distance from Brusa to Yeni Sheïr as two days. I have driven from Brusa
to Nicaea in one day of not fast going. Yeni Sheïr is on the main road
between these cities, six hours from Brusa and four hours from Nicaea.
[40] The early European historians make the wildest statements about
Osman’s field of action. Many of them call Ottomanjik, a place
four days or five north-east of Eski Sheïr, his first conquest:
Cuspianus (Antwerp ed., 1541), p. 6; Spandugino, in Sansovino, p.
143; Egnatius, p. 28. Cf. Hadji Khalfa, op. cit., fol. 1789. But this
place was not captured by the Osmanlis until the reign of Bayezid:
Evliya, op. cit., ii. 95. Paulo Giovio, an Italian historian greatly
esteemed in his day, puts among the notable conquests of Osman the
city and district of Sivas, as does also Rabbi Joseph, in his famous
_Chronicles_, Eng. trans. of Biallobotzky, ii. 505. Donado da Lezze,
_Historia Turchesca_, Rumanian edition of Ursu, pp. 4 and 5, makes him
conqueror of Rum, province of Sivas, Phoenicia, ‘et altri luoghi’!
Cuspianus, _De Turcarum Origine_, quotes Donado da Lezze almost
literally. Richer, _De Rebus Turcarum_, written for the information
of Francis I of France, says, p. 11: ‘Circiter 1300, Ottomannus
impune invitis omnibus _summam imperii_, quod ante partitum tenebant
factiosi magistratus, _occupavit_, seseque Asiae minoris sive Anatoliae
_imperatorem_ nominare sit aggressus. _Syvam_, quae eadem cum Sebaste
est, _expugnavit_, et oppida ad Euxinum posita _non pauca_ cepit.’ (The
italics are mine.) Hussein Hezarfenn, one of the Ottoman historians
whose work has been most widely read and quoted in Europe, says of
Ertogrul, _who never saw the sea_, ‘He equipped several ships, with
which he made a raid into the Aegaean Sea, pillaged the islands,
descended upon Greece, penetrated up to the Peloponnesus, and returned
to his home (_the little village of Sugut!_) laden down with wealth
and followed by a great army composed of experienced warriors of all
sorts of nations whom the renown of his bravery and his good fortune
attracted to his service: which increased so greatly his reputation in
Asia that Sultan Alaeddin even found it to his advantage to cultivate
him’: trans. of _Petits de la Croix_, ii. 288-9.
[41] I am not sure that I am justified in using the expression
‘undisputed sway’ even for this small territory. Pachymeres, IV. 30,
pp. 345-7, speaks of a certain Soleiman pasha, who was threatening
Nicomedia in 1303; and V. 23, p. 427, of Alisur retiring to the
Sangarius after Roger had relieved Philadelphia in 1307.
[42] Probably the first conquest of Osman. This city, on the Kara Su,
is still a thriving place. Its situation is most picturesque. The
author of the _Arabic History of the Kurds_ (Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS.
of Ducaurroy, fol. 151 rº, 152 rº) makes Biledjik the city granted to
Ertogrul by Alaeddin, and declares that he captured Sugut (Sukidjeh)
from the ‘infidels of Tekkur’.
[43] Angelcoma of the Byzantines.
[44] The only conquest of Osman not in the direction of Byzantium.
Hadji Khalfa, op. cit., fol. 1851.
[45] ‘Situated between Yeni Sheïr, Brusa, and Aïnegoel. They count one
day from Yeni Sheïr to Yar Hissar by the road which goes to Kutayia’:
Hadji Khalfa, fol. 1917.
[46] The Ottomans name this place Kuyun Hissar. See Schéfer edition of
Spandugino, p. 16 _n._
[47] Pachymeres, IV. 25, p. 327, says the battle was fought July 27.
Jorga, _Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches_, i. 157, is in error in
placing date June 27; Hammer, i. 190, and Jorga both give year 1301.
Muralt, _Chronographie Byzantine_, ii. 480, has this battle under 1302.
[48] Pach., IV. 25, p. 335.
[49] Cantemir, Rumanian ed., i. 20, seems to infer that Osman attacked
Nicomedia after this battle. He is certainly wrong in stating that
Osman captured Kutayia. See pp. 274, 292-3.
[50] Pach., V. 9; Gregoras, VII, i, p. 214.
[51] Pach., in Stritter, _Memoriae Populorum_, iii. 1086-7; D’Ohsson,
_Histoire des Mongols_, iv. 315. Andronicus made a second appeal
in 1308, and gave his own sister, Marie, who is known to later
Mongol historians as ‘Despina Khatun’, to Mohammed Khodabendah Khan,
after Khodabendah’s conversion to Islam: ibid., iv. 536; Hertzberg,
_Geschichte der Byzantiner und des Osmanischen Reiches_, p. 461.
[52] I can find no justification for Howorth’s statement, ‘This
alliance seems to have had a restraining influence upon the Turks’, in
his _History of the Mongols_, iii. 464.
[53] See _Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes_, vi. 318, where the date
of this momentous event is given as ‘vers 1305’.
[54] Pach., V. 14, pp. 399-400; 21, pp. 410, 417.
[55] Pach., V. 23, pp. 426-8; Greg., VII. 3, p. 221.
[56] Pach., V. 21, p. 423; Greg., loc. cit.
[57] Greg., loc. cit. Cf. Muralt, after Latin authorities, ii. 487.
[58] Pachymeres, Books V, VI, and VII; Gregoras, Book VII, _passim_,
and Phrantzes, Book I; Moncada, _Expedicion de los Catalanes_;
Muntaner, in _Bibliothek des lit. Vereins zu Stuttgart_, vol. viii.
For their later adventures there is an excellent account in Finlay,
_History of Greece_, iv. 146-56.
[59] Andronicus wrote to his empress, urging her not to try to return
to Constantinople from Salonika by land: Pach., VII. 12, p. 586;
Chalcocondylas (ed. Bonn), I, p. 19.
[60] Greg. VII. 8, pp. 254-8; Chalc., I, p. 19; Jorga, op. cit., i.
160, speaks of ‘die schöne mit Perlen und Edelsteinen geschmückte
_Krone_’ of Michael. Was it not rather a turban? See Hammer, i. 364,
note x.
[61] ‘The emperor of Constantinople fears the anger of the Khan of
Kapdjak and is eager to disarm him by protestations of submission and
efforts to obtain a continuance of the truce. Things have always been
on this footing since the children of Djenghiz Khan began to reign in
this country’: Shebabeddin, Paris MS., fol. 70 rº.
[62] Ducange, _Hist. de Constantinople sous les Emp. Français_, map
section, p. 46.
[63] Ducange, _Hist. de Constantinople sous les Emp. Français_, map
section, p. 54.
[64] The Venetians were jealous of the growing power of Genoa and the
hostility shown to Venetian merchants at Constantinople. See Appendix
B. Also Heyd, _Handelsgeschichte des Mittelalters_, i. 366.
[65] Ducange, ibid., p. 57; Buchon, _Collection des chroniques nat.
fr._, p. lv.
[66] Muralt, _Chronographie Byzantine_, ii. 493, no. 21, _n._
[67] A rabble without arms actually arrived at Marseilles. The ships
were prevented from leaving Brindisi by a storm. Cf. Iacomo Bosio,
_Della Historia della Religione_, ii. 1. At the very moment this effort
to start a crusade was ending in dismal failure, the two kings on whose
behalf it was planned were engaged in a bitter quarrel! Clement V,
_Epistola Comm._ vii. 773-4, 787.
[68] Les Giustiniani, _Dynastes de Chios_, Vlasto’s French translation
of Hopf’s great monograph, p. 8.
[69] Mas-Latrie, _Histoire de Chypre_, ii. 602.
[70] Mas-Latrie, op. et loc. cit.; Heyd, French edition, i. 537.
[71] A splendid field for historical research, which, as far as I
know, has never yet been touched, is the compilation, from the Vatican
records, of the dates for the extinction of the dioceses of the early
Christian world in Africa and Asia. When did the bishops of these
dioceses begin to be appointed and consecrated _in partibus_?
[72] Bosio, op. cit., ii. 37; Abbé Vertot, _Histoire des Chevaliers de
Malte_, i. 106.
[73] See Bosio, ii. 37 f., and Vertot, i. 101 f. With a view to
glorifying the Order, and also the Duke of Savoy, this fiction has been
fabricated and perpetuated. Even such a serious work as that of Muralt
gives, upon the strength of Raynaldus, who merely quotes Bosio, Osman
as leader of this attack upon Rhodes: see _Chronographie Byzantine_,
ii. 507. During the recent war between Italy and Turkey, when it was
a question of Rhodes, more than one leading Italian newspaper revived
this story of the founder of the Italian royal house defeating the
founder of the Ottoman royal house. There is, of course, no foundation
whatever for the statement.
[74] So Clement V evidently believed. See his letter to the Genoese in
_Epistola Comm._ vii. 10.
[75] That the Sangarius used to run into the Gulf of Nicomedia instead
of into the Black Sea is the opinion of many geographers, ancient as
well as modern. There have been a number of projects to connect the
Sangarius, Lake Sabandja, and the Gulf of Nicomedia by canals that
would give a deep waterway across the plain and prevent the frequent
overflooding which has always been a source of loss to cultivators in
that region.
[76] Idris, quoted by Hammer, i. 192.
[77] Brusa is three hours by carriage from its port on the southern
side of the Gulf of Mudania, or one hour by narrow-gauge railway. One
can reach Nicaea either from the Gulf of Mudania or that of Nicomedia.
[78] Pach., VII. 18, pp. 597-9.
[79] Pach., VII. 25, p. 620. The Turks call this castle Hodjahissar.
[80] Ibid., loc. cit. But Pachymeres puts the number of these Tartars
as 30,000, which must be at least a tenfold exaggeration.
[81] Seadeddin, translation Brattuti, p. 27. Bratutti, whose
transcription of Turkish names is often unintelligible to me, calls
Karadja Hissar ‘Codgia’.
[82] Ibn Batutah, _Voyages_, ii. 320, speaks of buildings which must
have been erected at these baths by Orkhan within the decade following
the capture of Brusa. Earlier buildings, according to him, were
constructed ‘by a Turcoman king’: ibid., p. 318. Tchekirdje is still a
favourite resort for foreigners as well as for natives.
[83] Cantacuzenos and Gregoras.
[84] Greg., IX. 2, p. 401.
[85] Cant., I. 42, pp. 204-6, 208; Greg., VIII. 15, p. 384; Greg., IX,
c. 1, pp. 390-2, says it was the young Andronicus who first planned to
break again with his grandfather. However that may be, the impression
among the Greeks in Asia Minor who were endeavouring to hold back the
enemies of the empire must have been the same!
[86] Greg., IX. 1, p. 392.
[87] In the volume on ‘L’Ancien Régime’ in Taine’s _Origines de la
France contemporaine_, pp. 3-6, there is a wonderful analysis of the
effect of early Latin Christianity upon the pagan mind. The Greek
Church of the fourteenth century could produce no such impression.
[88] From the earliest Ottoman times to the present day religion and
nationality have not been divorced. Osmanli and Moslem were synonymous
terms, just as to-day in the Balkan peninsula, where the Ottoman
Empire was really founded, Turk and Moslem are synonymous terms. When
once this is understood, the student and traveller is freed from his
preconceived notion that the ‘Turks’, as that expression is to-day
understood in Turkey, are an Asiatic race, who have held the country as
conquering invaders.
[89] Jorga, i. 162, is mistaken in saying, ‘überall wurden die
Goldmünzen Osmans gern angenommen.’ Hadji Khalfa says that Osman struck
no money. Also Colonel Djevad bey, _Histoire militaire de l’Empire
ottoman_, i. 95. Save several silver pieces, which are not proven
genuine, of the collection of Abbé Sestini (Salaberry, _Hist. de l’Emp.
ott._, iv. 193), I can find record in numismatic collections of no
money of Osman. For discussion of this question see Hammer, i. 117, who
cites several Ottoman historians against coinage before Orkhan, and
Toderini, _Historia della letteratura ottomana_, French trans., iii.
183.
[90] Appendix B, on the Emirates of Asia Minor during the Fourteenth
Century, contains the identification and description of these
neighbours.
[91] See Shehabeddin, Paris MS., 139 vº, which is cited in part on p.
70.
[92] The chieftainship among the Turks was elective rather than
hereditary. The Armenian Haython, who had excellent opportunities for
observing their customs at this period, wrote: ‘Puisque les Turcs
pristrent la seigneurie de Turquie, ilz ordonnerent un seigneur entre
eulx, lequel ilz appelerent le Soudan’: MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds
français, 2810, fol. 230 vº. Hussein Hezarfenn says (ii. 287-9) that
Ertogrul succeeded his father by election and, in turn, manœuvred
to secure the election of Osman. Evliya effendi, i. 27, declares
that Osman was elected chief. This is also stated by Barletius, in
Lonicerus, vol. ii, fol. 231-2; Spandugino; Cantemir (Rumanian ed.), i.
19; and Vanell, p. 359. Cf. Chalcocondylas (ed. Migne), col. 24.
[93] For dates see Bibliography.
[94] Nöldeke’s translation, in _Zeitschrift der deutschen
morgenlândischen Gesellschaft_, xiii. 214-17.
[95] Gregoras, IX. 1, pp. 390-2. But Cantacuzenos, I. 42, pp. 208-15,
maintains that young Andronicus heard that his grandfather was
preparing a _coup_ before he thought of taking any action himself.
[96] Cant., I. 44, pp. 215-16; Greg., IX. 1, p. 392; Phrantzes, I. 6,
p. 35.
[97] Cant., I. 4-5, pp. 216-23; Greg., IX. 1, p. 396.
[98] Cant., I. 50, pp. 248, 252; Greg., IX. 3, pp. 405-7.
[99] Cant., ibid.; Greg., IX. 3, pp. 407-9.
[100] Cant., I. 52, pp. 260-2; Greg., IX. 4, pp. 409-10; Cant., I. 53,
pp. 267-70.
[101] Cant., I. 55, pp. 277, 281-2; Greg., IX. 4, p. 414.
[102] Cant., I. 55-II. 1, pp. 277-312; Greg., IX. 4-8, pp. 411-32; Phr.
I. 6, p. 35.
[103] IX. 8, p. 431.
[104] Cant., II. 28, p. 473; Greg., IX. 14, p. 461, and X. 1, p. 474.
[105] II. 3, p. 324.
[106] Cantacuzenos uses this same expression concerning the collecting
of the army with which Andronicus III repelled an invasion of seventy
Turkish vessels in the autumn of the same year. Cf. II. 13, p. 390.
[107] I have gathered the account of this battle from Cant., II.
6-8, pp. 341-60; Greg., IX. 9, pp. 433-5; Phr., I. 7, pp. 36-7;
Chalcocondylas (ed. Migne), I. 11, col. 32. It is interesting to note
how much space Cantacuzenos gives in contrast to the brevity of the
other writers.
[108] II, c. 8, 363. Seadeddin, Neshri, and Idris agree with Gregoras,
IX. 13, p. 458, in putting the fall of Nicaea in 1330 or 1331. Gregoras
euphemistically says the city was ‘pillaged by the Turks’. But
Leunclavius, on the authority of Ali, gives A.H. 734, which would be
1333 or 1334.
[109] Phr., I. 7.
[110] In _Djihannuma_, Paris MS., fol. 1934.
[111] When I was in Nicaea in 1913, the imam of the Yeshil Djami told
me that there were seventy thousand houses at the time of the Ottoman
conquest. This is the local tradition.
[112] Hammer, i. 146, makes this claim.
[113] Ibn Batutah, ii. 322-3. For discussion of the value of Ibn
Batutah’s testimony see Appendix B and Bibliography.
[114] Miklositch-Müller, Act. LXXXII, anno 1339, and Act. XCII, anno
1340.
[115] There is no way of establishing the date of the fall of
Nicomedia. The Ottoman historians report that it was added to the
dominions of Orkhan in 1326, the year of his accession and of the fall
of Brusa. It is best here to follow the unanimous testimony of the
Byzantine sources, which is in accord with the natural inference that
Nicomedia fell some time after Nicaea: Greg., XI. 6, p. 545; Phr.,
I. 8, p. 38. Hammer cannot disregard the testimony of Gregoras here.
He ingenuously suggests that the city might have been lost by the
Osmanlis, and recaptured. Cantacuzenos (II. 24, p. 446, and 26, p. 459)
says that Andronicus III went twice to the aid of Nicomedia in 1331,
but he does not record the loss of either Brusa or Nicomedia. In the
collection of Feridun, Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. anc. fonds turc 79, there
is a diploma appointing Soleiman governor of Nicomedia in 1332, but the
authenticity of the earlier pieces in this collection is open to grave
suspicion (cf. Bibliography).
[116] Howorth, iii. 613.
[117] Canale, i. 215.
[118] Not an actual defensive alliance against Orkhan, as Schlumberger,
_Numismatique de l’Orient latin_, p. 480, supposes. See Cant., II. 13,
pp. 388-90; Phr., I. 8, p. 37.
[119] Cant., II. 28, pp. 470-3.
[120] Ibid., 22, p. 435.
[121] Ibid., 25, pp. 455-6.
[122] Cant. II., 29-30, pp. 480-4; Greg., XI. 2, p. 530.
[123] Hammer, quoting Ashikpashazadé, i. 150-1.
[124] Mordtmann, in _ZDMG_. (1911), lxv. 105, basing his statement,
like Hammer, on Ashikpashazadé, Vatican MS., fol. 33, gives
A.H. 735, 737, or 740. The earliest of these dates is
precluded by the testimony of Ibn Batutah, who found these places still
independent about A.H. 735. A.H. 737
might be possible, if we decide that Orkhan accomplished everything
during the one expedition against Pergama. Mordtmann, still quoting
Ashikpashazadé, says that these three cities were held by relatives
of the Palaeologi. If this be true, it goes to prove that there must
have existed all along in the reigns of Osman and Orkhan quasi-friendly
relations between Moslem and Christian. There was certainly no
religious fanaticism during this period of Ottoman history.
[125] ‘Les Osmanlis avaient étendu leur domination en Asie Mineure et
absorbé les états dont l’indépendance avait jusqu’alors empêché l’unité
politique de l’Empire musulman!’ Delaville-Leroulx, _France en Orient
au XIVe siècle_, i. 118. ‘Osmans Sohn Orkhan Kleinasien unterworfen
hatte’: Wüstenfeld, _Geschichte der Türken_, p. 16. ‘Orkan s’impadroni
di quasi tutta la Natolia’: Alberi, in preface (viii) to series III,
vol. i, of _Relazione Ven. Amb._ One of the earliest western historians
gives Orkhan’s ambition as ‘solus cupiens in minore Asia regnare’:
Cervarius, p. 5. Even Hammer, i. 150, is considerably ahead of time
in saying, in one of his chapters on Orkhan, ‘Les hordes ottomanes se
précipitèrent du haut de l’Olympe comme une avalanche, franchissant
montagnes et vallées, ajoutant à leurs possessions les neuf royaumes
nés des débris de l’Empire seljukide, inondant Asie Mineure depuis
l’Olympe jusqu’au Taurus.’ Hammer does not mean to give this wrong
impression, but one has to read very closely not to get it. See
discussion of this error in Appendix B.
[126] Cant., IV. 37, p. 284. Is it on the strength of this evident
error of a Greek writer that Evliya effendi, ii. 229, says ‘Orkhan
captured Angora from the Prince of Kutayia of the Kermian family’?
Hussein Hezarfenn, following Chalcocondylas, is an example of an
Ottoman historian basing his statements on a Greek authority.
[127] For the time of Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin see Appendix B, p.
279. Mas-Latrie, _Trésor de Chronologie_, col. 1796, after careful
collation of Shehabeddin and Ibn Batutah, comes to the conclusion
that Orkhan added the emirates of Balikesri, Marmara, Akbara, Kaouïa,
Keredek, Kul Hissar, and Thingizlu to his state between 1349 and 1360.
This, too, is discussed in Appendix B.
[128] Marmara, for example, is given by the Ottoman historians as a
conquest made by Osman. See Hammer, i. 89. But it is mentioned as an
independent principality by Shehabeddin, in _Notices et Extraits des
MSS. de la Bibl. du roi_, xiii. 358, 366.
[129] Ibn Batutah, ii. 321-2.
[130] Shehabeddin, Paris MS., fonds arabe 2325, fol. 139 vº-140 rº.
[131] Ibid., fol. 125 vº.
[132] Hammer, i. 110-11, says that Alaeddin, ‘stranger to the
profession of arms, occupied himself solely with the cares of state’,
but on p. 133 he has Alaeddin commanding the troops in battle while
Orkhan watches from the top of a hill!
[133] For the derivation of vizier, with the double meaning of
burden-bearer and the one who aids, see Ibn Khaldun, _Prolegomena_, in
_Notices et Extraits_, xx. 4.
[134] Gen. xxviii. 11-18.
[135] Sale’s translation, c. 20, verse 30, p. 234.
[136] Col. Djevad bey, p. 20, _n._ 2. Col. Djevad claims that von
Hammer’s derivation of the word ‘pasha’ from the Persian is wrong.
But he gives no reason which would satisfy the philologist when he
asserts that this word is essentially Turkish. Nor does he attempt to
explain its original meaning. ‘Pasha’ is probably a shortened form of
‘padishah’. See _Century Dictionary_, v. 4228.
[137] According to the biographer of Brusa, cited by Hammer, i. 146,
_n._ 4.
[138] I do not understand what Hammer means when he says, i. 116, that
the _Kanunnamé_ must be taken in the sense of political rather than
ecclesiastical law. The two cannot be separated in Islam. Or, perhaps,
it is better to say that there is no political law. The very word
_Kanun_ was taken from the Greeks, was used by them for ecclesiastical
law, and its adoption by the Osmanlis (at a much later period than
Orkhan) serves to emphasize the fact that there was no other land of
law conceivable than the law of the Church. The word _Kanun_ had of
course other meanings, but in its collective legal sense it seems
to have stood only for rules or laws that had to do with things
ecclesiastical or religious. See the various meanings of this word in
A. Souter’s _Text and Canon of the New Testament_ (London, 1913), pp.
154-5.
[139] This petition is in the Litany of the Prayer Book of Edward VI.
Cf. Schaff, _Church History_, iv. 151.
[140] I do not mean to assert that religious feeling has played no part
in the massacres of our own day. But these massacres were arranged
by the government, who incited the Moslems to attack their Christian
neighbours, inflaming the ignorant mind more by an appeal to racial
hatred, to loot, to lust, than to defence of the sacred faith. In the
Armenian massacres it was represented to the ignorant village Moslem
that the Armenians were plotting to set up an independent government or
to betray the fatherland to some European power. I was in Adana during
the terrible massacre of 1909, and make this statement from personal
experience and observation.
[141] Michail Koëzé, Marco, and Evrenos were Greeks. Cf. Leunclavius,
_Pandectes_, p. 125.
[142] Up to the time of the Tanzimat, in 1849, Christians were called
_raïas_. The original meaning of _raïa_ was a flock, and was not a
term of contempt, but a recognition of the fact that Christians were a
taxable asset to the nation, at so much per head.
[143] In western Asia Minor, in Macedonia and Thrace, up to the present
day the convert to Islam, no matter of what race, is immediately
classified before the law as a Turk. When the Sublime Porte, after
the reoccupation of Adrianople in the summer of 1913, laid a memorial
before the Powers, it was claimed that the large majority of the
population of the vilayet of Thrace was ‘Turkish’. This word had
absolutely no racial significance. Every Mohammedan in Thrace, no
matter what his race or language, would be considered a Turk. The
Young Turks, when they established the Constitution in 1908, tried to
revive the word ‘Osmanli’ as a term including all Ottoman subjects. But
they not only failed to convince the nation--they failed to convince
themselves--that a Christian could really be an Osmanli, with the full
rights and privileges enjoyed by the Moslems.
[144] Ricaut, ed. 1682, p. 148. For confusion of the name ‘Turk’ with
‘Saracen’ by early western writers, see _Chronique latine de Guillaume
de Nangis_, Géraud ed., i. 46, 86-8; _Mémoires d’Olivier de la Marche_,
Beaune and d’Arbaumont ed., i. 22-5, iv. 83; _Gilles le Muisit_,
Lemaître ed., p. 196. The mistake of Ricaut is common with many of the
fifteenth-to seventeenth-century writers on the Crusades.
[145] Matthew of Edessa (Urfa), fol. 8 of MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds
arménien, No. 95, quoted in _Notices et Extraits_, ix, 1^[ère] partie,
p. 281, speaks of ‘les calamités que des peuples barbares et corrompus,
tels que les Turcs et les Grecs, LEURS SEMBLABLES, ont
causées’.
[146] This was true even of the conquest of Constantinople, which
caused much more dismay and regret in Europe than among the Greeks. See
the remarkable letter of Francis Fielphus to Mohammed II in _Bibl. de
l’École des langues vivantes orientales_, série 3, xii. 63-6, 211-14.
[147] Cf. Rambaud in _Hist. Générale_, ii. 816.
[148] In Constantinople, Smyrna, Salonika, and the lesser coast
cities of the Ottoman Empire, as well as in many of the cities of the
interior, one feels the atmosphere of Sabbath rest much more on a
Sunday than on a Friday.
[149] Evliya effendi, ii. 241.
[150] In the _Djihannuma_, p. 951.
[151] In a popular Anatolian love-song, there is the line, ‘Benim
sevdijimie din var iman yok’, ‘She whom I love has religion, but not
a bit of faith’, which illustrates the lack of deep religious feeling
in the Osmanli. In this he is like the Greek, and different from the
Slav, the Persian and Arab. See Kúnos, _Zeitschrift der deutschen
morgenländischen Gesellschaft_, liii. 237.
[152] At Balikesri the sultan Dambur told Ibn Batutah that ‘the men
follow the religion of their king’: ii. 317. Here was the principle of
_cuius regio eius religio_ two centuries before Augsburg!
[153] Col. Djevad bey, pp. 18-19.
[154] Edward III of England had created a sort of obligatory military
service. His organized infantry took part in the Battle of Crécy, 1346.
Lavisse-Rambaud, _Hist. générale_, iii. 76.
[155] Halil Ganem, i. 39.
[156] This still holds. In October 1912, on the Seraskerat Square in
Constantinople, I saw Sultan Mehmed V give over the command of the army
for the Balkan War to Nazim pasha.
[157] Col. Djevad bey, p. 18.
[158] Bertrandon de la Broquière, Schéfer ed., pp. 220-1.
[159] This statement needs especial emphasis, as many historians have
followed Chalcocondylas and Bosio in attributing the corsair fleets to
Osman and Orkhan. An instance of a careful modern historian making this
error is found in Romanin, _Historia documentata di Venezia_, iii. 147,
where he says, ‘La lega ... per raffrenare l’ognor erescente potenza
_ottomana_.’
[160] In Bongars, _Gesta Dei per Francos_, ii. 313.
[161] This letter, from the manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale,
Paris, is published in _Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_ (1906), lxvii.
587. Other documents on this mission, ibid. (1892), liii. 254-7.
[162] See papers of H. Lot in _Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_, 4e
série (1859), v. 503-9, and (1875) xxxvi. 588-600. Also Bosio, ii. 58.
[163] Raynaldus, Ann. 1334, pp. 17-19. As the repetition of all the
negotiations in connexion with papal attempts for crusades cannot be
included in the text of my book, I refer the reader to the section on
papal negotiations in the Chronological Tables.
[164] Deliberation of Senate, November 18, 1333, in _Misti_, XVI, fol.
40.
[165] Raynaldus, Ann. 1344, p. 11; Stella (in Muratori), col. 1080;
Dandolo, p. 418; Greg., II, p. 686; Cant., III, p. 192; _Mon. Hist.
Patr._ x. 757; _Misti_ for 1344, fol. 30; Rymer, _Acta Publica_, vol.
ii, part IV, p. 172; _Commemorialia_, iv. 80.
[166] For relations of Rhodes with Smyrna from 1347 onwards, see Bosio,
_passim_, but especially ii. 80 and 118-19.
[167] Serbian chronicles, quoted by von Kállay, _Geschichte der
Serben_, i. 66.
[168] In the fratricidal war of July 1913, the ignorant Serbian
peasants really believed that they were fighting to take from the
Bulgarians ‘the sacred soil of the fatherland’, as their newspapers and
addresses to the soldiers called Macedonia. The name of St. Stephen was
invoked when they went into battle.
[169] Orbini, _Il Regno degli Slavi_, p. 259, gives a circumstantial
account of the assassination. He says that Stephen gave the order to
men who strangled the old king in his cell at midnight. This does not
prevent Orbini from saying later of Stephen ‘fu huomo molto pio’!
Borschgrave, p. 266, is not certain of Stephen’s connivance.
[170] J. Schafarik, _Elenchus actorum spectantium ad historiam
Serborum_, XXV-XXVII.
[171] I find no documentary authority for the often repeated statement
that this coronation took place at Skoplje (Uskub or Scopia). At the
time of the recent Balkan War, the Serbians, in order to preserve their
friendly relations with Greece, supported the Uskub theory. But see
Ljubić, _Monumenta spectantia ad hist. Slavorum meridionalium_, ii.
278, 279, 326; _Commemorialia_, IV; _Secreta Rog._, A. 33.
[172] ‘Stephanus, D. G. Serviae ... Albaniae, maritimae regionis rex,
Bulgariae imperii princeps et fere totius imperii Romaniae dominus’:
Ljubić, ii. 278.
[173] Ibid., ii. 326.
[174] Ibid., loc. cit.
[175] _Secr. Rog._, A. 33.
[176] _Misti_, xxiv. 12.
[177] Ibid., xxiv. 110.
[178] _Secr. Rog._, II, B. 4; _Misti_, xxiv. 103.
[179] Cf. _Misti_, xxv. 7, 10. Fiorinsky, _The South Slavs and
Byzantium in the second quarter of the Fourteenth Century_, quoted by
Borchgrave in _Bulletin de l’Académie royale de Belgique_ for 1884,
8e série, iv. 429-30.
[180] _Commem._ iv. 172.
[181] _Misti_, xxvi. 16-22; _Commem._ iv. 157.
[182] MS. Vatican 3765, quoted by Raynaldus, ann. 1347, XXX.
[183] Fiorinsky, p. 207.
[184] Engel, _Geschichte von Serbien_, 285-6; Müller, _Beiträge Byz.
Chron._, p. 406 _n._
[185] Cant., IV. 43, p. 315; Greg., XXVII. 50, p. 557; von Kállay, i.
69.
[186] Cant., II. 9, pp. 363-70; Greg., XII. 3, p. 582; Ducas, p. 6.
[187] Cant., II. 1, pp. 14-18; 40, p. 560; and III. 4, p. 91; Greg.,
IX. 11, pp. 560-8; XII. 2, p. 576.
[188] Cant., II. 24-7, pp. 145-67; Greg., XII. 11-16, pp. 608-26; Phr.
I. 9, p. 40; Ducas, 6, p. 24, to 7, p. 26.
[189] Cantacuzenos tries to make out that this was a justifiable
arrangement, as this district had already been conquered by Stephen
Dushan. But Ducas, 6, p. 26, and 8, p. 30, declares that Cantacuzenos
sacrificed the empire to the Serbians.
[190] Cant., III. 57, pp. 347-8; Greg., XIII. 4, pp. 648-52.
[191] _Misti_, xxi. 35.
[192] Greg., XVI. 6, pp. 834-5; Ducas, 7, p. 29; Clement VI, _Epp.
Secr._ vii. 99. ’Άμυρ is either ‘Emir’ or ‘Omar’.
[193] Cant., III. 31, p. 498; Ducas 9, pp. 33-4; Chalc., I, p. 24.
[194] Cant., III. 81, pp. 501-2; 84, pp. 518-19; 85, pp. 525-9.
[195] Cant., III. 95, pp. 585-9; Greg., XV. 5, pp. 762-3; Ducas, 9, p.
35.
[196] Greg., XV. 2, p. 749.
[197] For the action against Barlaam spoken of here, see Muralt, ii.
575, No. 17; p. 576, No. 22; p. 578, No. 37.
[198] Cant., III. 98, p. 604, to IV. 4, p. 29; Greg., XV. 9, p. 781, to
11, p. 791; Ducas, 9, p. 37, to 10, p. 38.
[199] Cant., IV. 1, p. 12, to 2, p. 19.
[200] Cant., IV. 4, p. 30; 5, p. 32; 20, p. 147.
[201] Cant., IV. 9, pp. 53-7.
[202] Raynaldus, ann. 1349, XXXI.
[203] Clement VI, _Epp. Secr._ viii. 248-50.
[204] Cant., IV. 13, p. 85.
[205] Marco Guazzo, _Cronica_, p. 269; Stella, _Annales Genuenses_, in
Muratori, xvii, col. 1090.
[206] MS. Vatican 2040, cited by Muralt, ii. 618: Petrarch, _Epp. fam._
vii. 7. For historical and medical importance of the black death,
see Hecker, _Der schwarze Tod im 14ten Jahrhundert_ (Berlin, 1832).
MSS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds latin 8369-70, contain an interesting
contemporary account, mostly in hexameter verse, by Symon de Cavino, a
Paris physician.
[207] _Breve Chronicon_ at end of Ducas, cited by Finlay, _History of
Greece_, iv. 409 _n._
[208] In 1340 Venice had refused a loan of ships and money to Edward
III of England on the ground that she needed all her resources ‘to
guard against the Turkish danger about to become universal’: Wiel, p.
204.
[209] On March 17, 1351, Petrarch addressed from Padua to Doge Andrea
Dandolo a letter of remonstrance and warning against engaging in a war
with Genoa. This letter is quoted in Hazlitt, iii. 122.
[210] The Genoese archives contain a treaty between the Byzantine
Empire and Genoa, dated May 6, 1352, which says: ‘debbono eziandio
ritenersi per valide e ferme le convenzioni e la pace stipulata dai
genovesi con Orcan bey.’ Belgrano, _Atti della Società Ligure di Storia
Patria_, xiii. 124.
[211] The Signory of Genoa, writing to the Podesta of Pera, March
21, 1356, said: ‘Nobis, vobis ac omnibus ianuenibus est notorium et
manifestum quantum bonum et gratias habuimus a domino Orchano amirato
Turchie ad destructionem et mortem tam venetorum quam grecorum tempore
guerre nostre’: ibid., p. 127.
[212] In the treaty of 1387 with Murad, the Genoese said: ‘quam inter
recolendam memoriam magnifici domini Orchani patris sui ex una parte et
illustrem Commune Ianue ex altera’: ibid., p. 147.
[213] Cant., IV. 11, pp. 68-77; Greg., XVI. 6, p. 835, to XVII. 7, p.
865.
[214] Cant., IV. 16-17, pp. 104-5, 108-11, 114-30; 19, pp. 133-5; 22,
p. 156; Greg., XVI. 1, p. 795; XVIII. 2, p. 876. Phr., I. 9, p. 40,
gives this as the time Cantacuzenos married his daughter to Orkhan.
[215] Cant., IV. 30, pp. 218-20; Greg., XXVI. 19, p. 86, and 22, p. 88.
For explanation of action of Venetian admiral, Pisani, see histories of
Daru and Romanin.
[216] Villani, _Historia Venetiana_ (Muratori), xiv. 200; Canale,
_Nuova istoria di Genova_, i. 222.
[217] Cant., IV. 33, pp. 246-7; 36, p. 266. Cantacuzenos had tried to
get the Bulgarians to attack Stephen Dushan in 1351. Cf. Cant., IV. 22,
pp. 162-6.
[218] Greg., XXVII. 30, pp. 150-1.
[219] Cant., IV. 36, pp. 265-6; Greg., XXVII. 55, p. 171, and XXVIII.
3, pp. 177-8; Cant., IV. 34, pp. 247-50; Greg., XXVIII. 7, pp. 181-2.
[220] Cant., IV. 34, pp. 250-3; 36, p. 266; Greg., XXVIII. 19, p. 188.
[221] About two hours on horse from Gallipoli.
[222] Seadeddin, i. 58-63.
[223] Gilbert Cousin, _Opera_, i. 390 (evidently copying Drechsler),
and Egnatius, _de Origine Turcarum_ (Paris, 1539), p. 29, give date
A.D. 1363. But do they not follow Phr., I. 26, p. 80?
[224] Donado de Lezze, p. 7, and Paolo Giovio, both ardent Venetians,
and Rabbi Joseph, i. 245, give the names of these vessels, though
differently. Nicolas de Nicolay, who passed through the Hellespont
in 1551, says that this story of the Genoese was a tradition of the
locality. He locates the castle of Tzympe a few miles from the Aegaean
end of the strait! _Les quatre livres des navigations_ (1587 ed.), p.
58. Sauli, _Della Colonia Genovese in Galata_, ii. 44-5, vigorously
defends the Genoese against this calumny.
[225] There is no room for doubt about this date. Cf. Cant., IV. 38,
pp. 277-80; Greg., XXXIII. 67, p. 220, and XXVIII. 40-2, pp. 202-4;
Villani, p. 105; _Byz. Annalen_, ed. Müller, in _Sitzungs-Berichte der
Wiener Akademie_, ix. 392; Muralt, _Chronographie Byz._, ii. 643.
[226] This place figured in the recent Balkan War. It was here that the
Osmanlis stationed their army for the defence of the Dardanelles.
[227] Greg., XXIX. 26, p. 241.
[228] Greg., XXVIII. 30, pp. 195-201.
[229] Cant., IV. 37, pp. 270-2; 38, p. 276; Greg., XXIX. 17-18, pp.
234-6; 49, p. 257.
[230] At least, Cantacuzenos, IV. 38, p. 276, claims that he ransomed
Tzympe.
[231] Cant., IV. 38, p. 283.
[232] Rumanian Chronicle, cited by Gregorović, _Relations of Serbia
with her Neighbouring States, principally in the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Centuries_, Kazan, 1859, in an appendix.
[233] Cant., IV. 39-43, pp. 284-307; Greg., XXIX. 27-30, pp. 242-3.
[234] Cant., IV. 49, pp. 358-60.
[235] Tchorlu was the head-quarters of the Ottoman General Staff during
the first month of the Balkan War. After the battle of Lulé Burgas, it
became the head-quarters of the Bulgarians. From here the attack upon
the defences of Constantinople was directed.
[236] Muralt, ii. 640, No. 10, _n._
[237] Greg., XXIX. 34, pp. 224-6.
[238] During the five years following the proclamation of the
Constitution in 1908, I lived, and travelled extensively, in the
Ottoman Empire. Rarely did I meet a foreigner engaged in business there
who had the slightest sympathy with the Osmanlis in their aspirations
or in their successive crushing misfortunes. This is not a criticism,
but merely the record of a fact.
[239] Schafarik, CVII.
[240] The expression ‘la terre que les Turcs tiennent’ is always used
to designate Asia Minor in the opinion which the council of the French
King Philippe de Valois gave concerning the route to be followed in the
abortive crusade of 1332. See Archives Nationales, Paris, P. 2289, pp.
711-12.
[241] See p. 97, and notes 3 and 4 on that page.
[242] Quoted from the Cancelleria Secreta by Romanin, iv. 232.
[243] This letter is reproduced by Jireček, _Geschichte der Bulgaren_,
p. 309.
[244] Greg., XXXVII. 52, p. 558; 59-63, pp. 561-3; 67-9, pp. 565-6;
XXXVI. 6-8, pp. 504-9; Cant., IV. 44, p. 320.
[245] The generally accepted date of Orkhan’s death is 1359 or 1360,
following Ottoman sources. But Jireček, a careful and able scholar, p.
321, n. 10, is inclined to accept March 1362. There is great confusion
about this period. I think that the Ottoman date is undoubtedly correct
here.
[246] ‘Der eigentliche Begründer der osmanischen Macht war Orchan’,
Fessler, _Geschichte von Ungarn_, ii. 151.
[247] Col. Djevad bey, p. 254.
[248] Seadeddin, i. 80.
[249] Seadeddin, i. 82; Hadji Khalfa, _Rumeli_, p. 19.
[250] But Matteo Villani, in Muratori, xiv. 672, who is followed by
Leunclavius, says that Demotika was abandoned to Orkhan in November
1361.
[251] Cf. marginal note in Barberini MS. of Pachymeres, cited by
Muralt, ii. 663, No. 9.
[252] Seadeddin, i. 84-5; Hadji Khalfa, _Rumeli_, p. 22.
[253] All the Ottoman historians.
[254] MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds turc, No. 79, p. 25; Leunclavius,
_Annales_, p. 30; Seadeddin, i. 85.
[255] Muklis Abderrahman Efendy, quoted by Schéfer, in his edition of
Bertrandon de la Broquière, p. 170, _n._ 3.
[256] Seadeddin, i. 89; Hadji Khalfa, _Rumeli_, p. 52.
[257] Villani tells of its terrible ravages in 1360 ‘ricominciata in
diversi paesi del mondo’, Muratori, xiv. 653, 688-90, 727.
[258] Ibid., pp. 649-50. He declares that Murad had been ‘molte volte
tentato di vincere Constantinopoli’.
[259] Cf. Finlay, iv. 45, 169.
[260] Seadeddin, i. 42. Hammer, i. 384-5, n. viii, says that Ottoman
historians are unanimous in this assertion as against Byzantine
sources. Col. Djevad bey, the modern Ottoman authority on military
history, is disappointing and unconvincing in his discussion of
this question. On p. 25 he gives 726 (1326) for the date, and on p.
78 730 (1329). He cites no sources, for there are none, and has to
admit, p. 54, that Murad I made the laws for the janissaries. Among
early European historians there is much divergency. Spandugino, p.
185, attributes their origin to Osman, and the name from the village
of Sar: they are ‘the young men of Sar’. Ricaut, ed. 1682, p. 357,
also attributes to Osman. Reineccius, influencing the Latin editor
of Chalcocondylas (see ed. Migne, p. 26, _n._ 11), makes Osman the
founder, and derives the name from ‘Januae’: they are the _custodes
corporis_. Leuncl., _Pandectes_, p. 129, discusses these theories
without coming to any conclusion. Giovio, Geuffraeus, and Nicolay, p.
83, attribute origin to Murad II. Certainly it was not earlier than his
day that the janissaries attracted attention in Europe. D’Ohsson, vii.
311, asserts that there was no definite organization until Mohammed II.
Mignot, i. 119-20, is in favour of the theory that Murad I created this
corps.
[261] Seignobos, in _Hist. générale_, ii. 334.
[262] Col. Djevad bey, p. 251, says that Anatolian Christians were
exempt to give time to recuperate ‘after the exhausting struggles of
generations’. But exhausting struggles had been no less frequent and
no less severe in the Balkan peninsula. Gibbon’s suggestion, that the
levies were made in Europe because Moslem and Christian Anatolians
were not apt for war, shows how completely the great English historian
missed the _raison d’être_ of the janissaries.
[263] Hammer, i. 126.
[264] Col. Djevad bey, p. 90.
[265] Ibid.
[266] Ibid., pp. 55-6; Ducas, p. 16; Leunel., _Annales_, p. 34; Ricaut,
pp. 358-9.
[267] Lavallée, i. 190-1.
[268] Phr., I. 26, p. 86; Chalc., I, p. 25. Cf. Michaud, _Hist. des
Croisades_, v. 275.
[269] Seadeddin, i. 91.
[270] This colony was at Bigha. See Appendix B, p. 301.
[271] Phr., I. 26, p. 80.
[272] Katona, x. 393.
[273] Chale., I, p. 30, and the chronicle of Rabbi Joseph, i. 240,
confuse this battle with that of Cernomen, near the same place and
with the same result, in 1370. But there were certainly two distinct
battles. Louis of Hungary took part in the first, as is shown by the
date recorded at Mariazell and by a diploma in Fejér, _Cod. Dipl.
Hung._, 9e partie, vii. 212. Cf. Aschbach, _Geschichte Kaiser
Sigmunds_, I. 87. The account in Vambéry’s _Hungary_, Story of Nations
Series, p. 171, is wholly wrong.
[274] Seadeddin, i. 94.
[275] Miltitz, ii. I^{ère} partie, 166.
[276] Col. Djevad bey, p. 97, _n._ 1; Engel, _Geschichte Rag._, p.
141; Hammer, i. 231, 405. But this was also Timur’s ordinary method
of signing ordinances: cf. Shereffeddin, iv. 55. The document, with
the marks of Murad’s hand, is preserved in the museum of the Communal
Palace at Ragusa.
[277] Villani, x. 30.
[278] Cf. Hazlitt, iii. 216.
[279] Urban V, _Epp. secr._ iv. 114.
[280] ‘Il le print por prisonnyer, et le destint a cause de ce que le
roy de Bourgarye sy sestoit accorde et alyez secrettement avecques le
turc’: _Chronicques de Savoye_, col. 300.
[281] Cf. Jireček, _Geschichte der Bulgaren_, p. 325.
[282] Cibrario, _Storia di Savoya_, iii. 193. But I have followed
closely the account of the expedition as given in the anonymous French
chronicle, cols. 299-319, in _Monumenta Historiae Patriae_, Turin,
1840, vol. i. There is a modern book by Datta. Cf. also Delaville le
Roulx, i. 148 f.
[283] Urban V, _Epp. secr._ iv. 124.
[284] Ibid., iv. 240.
[285] Greg., XXV. 17, p. 41.
[286] Urban V, _Epp. secr._ ii. 230; Petrarch, _Senilia_, iv. 2.
[287] ‘Nescio enim an peius sit amisisse Hierusalem an ita Bizantion
possidere. Ibi enim non agnoscitur Christus, hic neglegitur dum sic
colitur. _Illi_ (Turcae) _hostes, hi scismatici peiores hostibus_: illi
aperte nostrum Imperium detractant: hi verbo Romanam ecclesiam matrem
dicunt: cui quam devoti filii sint, quam humiliter Romani pontificis
iussa suscipiant, tuus a te ille datus patriarcha testabitur. _Illi
minus nos oderunt quam minus metuunt. Isti autem totis nos visceribus
et metuunt et oderunt._’ _Senilia_, vol. vii.
[288] In the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem, and in the Church
of the Holy Nativity, Bethlehem, anarchy--even bloodshed--is prevented
only by the constant vigilance of the Ottoman military authorities.
If one asks the Latin and Greek priests in Jerusalem, they will admit
without shame that this statement is true.
[289] Miklositch-Müller, _Acta et diplomata graeca_, CLXXXIV.
[290] _Epistolae secretae_, vi. 1-10.
[291] Ibid., vi. 3.
[292] The date of this visit is certain from the formal act of
abjuration, which is given in full in Raynaldus, ann. 1369, XI. Ducas,
c. 11, and Chalc., I, p. 25, are in error in placing this voyage later.
Berger de Xivrey, _Mém. de l’Acad. des Inscriptions_, xix, 2e
partie, p. 35, suggests that the Byzantine historians have confused
this voyage with that of Manuel, thirty years later.
[293] _Epp. secr._, viii. 37, 38, 80.
[294] By an encyclical: _Epp. secr._, viii. 4. Cf. also his letters to
the doges of Venice and Genoa, ibid., p. 24.
[295] Ibid., viii. 55.
[296] Phr., I. 22, pp. 52-3; Chalc., I, pp. 50-1; Morosini, p. 13.
[297] Phr., I. 11, p. 46.
[298] Gregory XI, _Epp. secr._ iii. 36, 58.
[299] Chalc., I, pp. 51-2.
[300] Raynaldus, ann. 1371, VIII.
[301] _Epp. secr._, ii. 32, 87. Similar letter to Louis in December
1375, ibid. v. 46. Other letters reprinted in Fejér, 9e partie, iv.
583 4; v. 54-6; vi. 155-6.
[302] Bernino, pp. 15-20.
[303] Fejér, 9e partie, iv. 427-8.
[304] Ibid., v. 52-3.
[305] Rymer, _Acta Publica_, III, part 3, pp. 38-40.
[306] On December 12, 1374, Gregory XI wrote to John from Avignon,
predicting that his ‘alliance with Murad’ would bring about the
destruction of the empire: _Epistolae secretae_, iv. 68.
[307] Raynaldus, ann. 1378, XIX.
[308] Jireček, _Geschichte der Bulgaren_, p. 317.
[309] Cant. IV, 50, pp. 362-3.
[310] Although Engel says 1353, others 1356, and the Rumanian chronicle
1371, there can be no question that 1365 is the correct date; for both
Byzantine and Ottoman historians speak of Alexander as Bulgarian Czar
in 1364, and do not mention him later, while Sisman and his brothers
come immediately into prominence.
[311] Schiltberger, Neumann ed., p. 93.
[312] Orbini, pp. 472-3.
[313] Bonfinius, II. 10.
[314] Fessler, _Geschichte von Ungarn_, ii. 152.
[315] Wadding, _Annales minorum_, ann. 1369, XI.
[316] _Epp. secr._, VI. 131, 136.
[317] Called Ishebol by the Ottoman historians.
[318] By the second division of the Ottoman army under Timurtash. Murad
himself had captured Sozopolis. Cf. Jireček, p. 326.
[319] Seadeddin, i. 104. He does not give the name of the Serbian kral.
[320] The peasantry around Samakov will point out to you the ridge,
south-east of the modern town, over which he vanished. They believe
that Sisman haunts the foothills of the Rhodope mountains, and rides
headless in the night down into the plain. This tradition, and the
statement of Ducange, viii. 289, that Sisman died in 1373 in Naples,
makes possible the theory that there were three successive Sismans
connected with the Ottoman conquest of Bulgaria.
[321] Hadji Khalfa, _Rumeli_, p. 38.
[322] von Kállay, _Geschichte der Serben_, i. 152.
[323] Ibid., i. 152-9; Jireček, op. cit., 319-20; Ljubić, _Monumenta
spect. ad hist. Slav. merid._, iv. 189.
[324] Cant. IV., 50, pp. 360-2; Müller, _Chron. Byz._, under 1364.
[325] Miklositch, _Acta Serbica_, CLIII.
[326] Ibid., CLX.
[327] Sons of a poor Dalmatian nobleman: Ducange, _Familiae Byz._ viii.
294.
[328] At Ipek, with an independent patriarch: Engel, _Geschichte von
Serbien_, p. 279.
[329] Miklositch-Müller, _Acta gr._, CLXII; MS. Wiener Bibl., Gesch.
gr., No. 47, fol. 290.
[330] Ibid., CLX; ibid., fol. 286.
[331] Orbini, p. 275.
[332] Engel, op. cit., pp. 321 f. For documented details, Müller, ed.
_Byz. Analekten_, pp. 359-64, 405-6, based on Vienna MS. referred to
above.
[333] Now called Cermen or Tchirman.
[334] Svilengrad, now the frontier station of Bulgaria, was known from
1361 to 1913 as Mustapha Pasha. Before the recent Balkan war, it was
the frontier railway station of Turkey.
[335] But there were certainly two distinct battles here, in 1363 and
in 1371. See p. 124, _n._ 2, above.
[336] Ducange, op. cit., p. 294; Bialloblotszky’s translation of Rabbi
Joseph, i. 240; Klaić, p. 199; Jireček, pp. 329-30. Zinkeisen, i. 224,
confuses this battle with the one fought in 1363.
[337] In Miklositch, _Chrestomathia palaeoslav._, p. 77.
[338] Phr., I. 26, p. 80, gives the capture of these cities in the same
campaign as that in which Monastir was acquired, with 1386 as date. But
the Serbian chronicles are so explicit here that we can follow them
without hesitation, especially as they are seconded by the Ottoman
historians. Cf. Hammer, i. 241, and Zinkeisen, i. 229.
[339] Pope Gregory XI, writing to Louis of Hungary, May 14, 1372,
informed him that the Osmanlis had conquered some parts of Greece,
‘subactis quibusdam magnatibus Rasciae, tum in eis dominantibus’.
Rascia was Servia. Theiner, _Monumenta Hungarica_, ii. 115.
[340] Gregory XI, _Epp. secr._ ii. 32-3.
[341] According to Amilhau and Jireček, who rely on Reynaldus, ann.
1364, XXVIII, this first invasion of the Greek peninsula took place in
1363. But the Turks referred to in that year, probably of the perennial
corsair type, could not have been Osmanlis. They were from Aïdin or
Sarukhan.
[342] Klaić, _Geschichte Bosniens_, p. 200.
[343] Hammer, i. 242, 409, places the first relations of Lazar with
Murad after the fall of Nish, which he erroneously puts in 1376. See
below, p. 161, _n._ 3.
[344] Gregory XI, _Epp. secr._ iii. 42.
[345] June 15, 1373: Andrea Gataro, in Muratori, xvii, col. 176.
[346] Ducas, 12, pp. 43-4; Phr., I. 11, pp. 49-50.
[347] Chalc., I, pp. 42-3. But Murad, according to the Collection of
Feridun, when he wrote to the Prince of Karamania, stated that Saoudji
had been conquered in a pitched battle: MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds
turc, No. 79, p. 30.
[348] Letter just cited; Chalc., I, pp. 44-5; Phr., I. 12, p. 51.
Saoudji is called Kontouz by Ducas, Mosis by Phrantzes, and Saouzis by
Chalcocondylas. I cannot find the reading Siaous which Hammer, i. 412,
and _n._ lix, attributes to Chalcocondylas.
[349] Chalc., I, p. 46; II, p. 69; Phr., I. 12, p. 51; Duc., 12, p. 44.
[350] Canale, ii. 16.
[351] Clavijo de Gonzáles, 15 vº and 16 rº.
[352] So Phrantzes thinks, I. 12, p. 51: ταύτην ὠμότητα καὶ ἀπανθρωπίαν
ὁ ’Αμουράτης ἐποίησεν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ πάντα καλῶς πολιτευόμενος.
[353] Chalc., I, pp. 46-7; Phr., I. 11, pp. 47-9.
[354] Romanin, iii. 255. This project, according to Cicogna, _Istoria
di Venezia_, vi. 95, was first broached to John at the time of his
visit to Venice in 1370.
[355] Raynaldus, ann. 1376, XXIII.
[356] _Epp. secr._, vi. 236.
[357] Ducas, 12, p. 45.
[358] Caresino, in Muratori, xii.
[359] Ducas, 12, p. 45; Chalc., II, p. 63; and Phr., I. 13, p. 54, say
that Bayezid had given him 1,000 men, and had often advised him to have
his father and brothers assassinated. Cf. Muralt, ii. 706.
[360] Sauli, ii. 57.
[361] Quirino, _Vita di Zeno_, cited by Muralt, ii. 707, Nos. 6-9.
[362] Ducas, 12, p. 45.
[363] The fortunes of Salonika at this period are obscure. See p. 231,
below.
[364] Chalc., II, p. 63; Phr., I. 13, pp. 55-6.
[365] Chalc., II, p. 64. But Ducas, 4, p. 19, says that Bayezid
captured this city.
[366] Bonlinius, II. 10; Sanudo, _Vite de’ Duchi_, in Muratori, xxii,
col. 680.
[367] An excellent brief account of this war is found in Wiel’s _Story
of Venice_, pp. 227-37.
[368] The Genoese forced John V to make peace with Andronicus in
November 1382: Sauli, ii. 260.
[369] Cicogna, op. cit., vi. 97; Romanin, iii. 301.
[370] Hadji Khalfa, _Djihannuma_, fol. 1852; Evliya effendi, ii. 229.
[371] The testimony of Ibn Batutah, who travelled extensively among
the Turks in Anatolia, southern Russia, and elsewhere between 1325 and
1340, is conclusive on this point. ‘Whenever we stopped in a house of
this country (Anatolia), our neighbours of both sexes took care of
us: _the women were not veiled_ ...’: ii. 256. ‘I was witness of a
remarkable thing, that is, of the consideration which the women enjoy
among the Turks: they hold, in fact, a rank more elevated than that of
the men.... As for the women of the lower classes, I have seen them
also. One of them will be, for example, in a cart drawn by horses. Near
her will be three or four young girls.... The windows of the cart will
be open and you can see the women’s faces: _for the women of the Turks
are not veiled_.... Often the woman is accompanied by her husband, whom
whoever sees him takes for one of her servants’: ii. 377-9. No student
can have any doubt whatever upon the position of Turkish women during
the fourteenth century. As among all vigorous peoples, the women of the
Osmanlis held a high place, and were never secluded. It was not until
Murad II that even the sovereign had a harem. The Moslem conception of
the inferiority of women was not prevalent among the Osmanlis until
after the reign of Soleiman the Magnificent. Immediately it became
prevalent, the race began its decline.
So universal did veiling become in the seventeenth century that it
was adopted by Christian and Jewish women in Turkey as well. See Père
Febre, _Théâtre de la Turquie_ (1682), pp. 164-5. Père Febre spoke from
personal experience ‘dans la plupart des lieux de la Turquie’.
[372] Hadji Khalfa, _Rumeli_, p. 96.
[373] _Historia epirotica_, Bonn ed., p. 228.
[374] Ibid., pp. 230-1.
[375] Ducange, viii. 292.
[376] Jireček, op. cit., 340.
[377] _Misti_, XL. 154.
[378] See below, p. 203.
[379] Silvestre de Sacy, in _Mém. de l’Acad. des Inscript._, vii.
327-34. But the commandant could hardly have been carried by his
falconer in such a fashion as far as Philippopolis. The Ottoman
historians probably forgot that Ishtiman, at the mouth of the pass, on
the road to Philippopolis from Sofia, contained an Ottoman garrison.
[380] According to the anonymous _Ein gantz neu Reysebuch von Prag auss
biss gen Constantinopel_, Nürnberg, 1622, p. 33, Sofia was captured in
1362. Hadji Khalfa, _Rumeli_, p. 51, with whom Schéfer, ed. Bertrandon
de la Broquière, p. 202 n., seems to agree by citing, says Sofia
capitulated in 780 (1378). Seadeddin, i. 125, is followed by Hammer, i.
250, Klaić, p. 237, and others in fixing the date as 1382. But these
same authorities give 1375 and 1376 for Nish, which is altogether
impossible. Phr., I. 26, p. 80, seems to place the capture of Sofia
for 1385. This is the most reasonable date. It is consistent both with
the topography of the places in question and with Murad’s methods of
campaigning, as exemplified by all his conquests, to place the taking
of Sofia close to the end of his reign, and within a year or two
before the capture of Nish. To corroborate this date, letters in the
collection of Feridun can be cited. Indje Balaban’s letter to Murad,
announcing the acquisition of Sofia, is not dated. But immediately
after it is the response of Murad, in which he gives to Indje Balaban
for life the government of the new province, and states that he is
sending him a fine horse and robes of honour because of his success.
This letter is dated from Adrianople in the middle of the month of
Redjeb, 788, which corresponds to 1386 in our era. These letters are in
MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds turc, No. 79, pp. 31-2.
[381] Nish, from its geographical position, could not have fallen
in 1375, as Chalcocondylas says. Hammer, i. 241, and Zinkeisen, i.
230, show an amazing nonchalance in transporting the Osmanlis from
Kavalla, Drama, and Serres in the course of this one year, 1375. Engel,
_Geschichte von Serbien_, p. 341, who, according to Hammer, ‘deceives
himself by thirteen years in placing the capture of Nish in 1388’, is
eleven years nearer the truth than Hammer! Strumnitza, from a diploma
delivered in the name of the Serbian empress Eudoxia (Müller, _Acta
Serbica_, CXXXI), was independent in 1379. Sofia did not fall before
1382. How, then, could Nish have been an Ottoman fortress from 1375?
[382] Von Kállay, i. 166.
[383] For distances between cities in the Balkan peninsula, see
Jireček’s important and interesting work, _Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad
nach Konstantinopel und die Balkanpässe_, p. 122. Jireček, for time of
transit, depends upon Hadji Khalfa.
[384] Text in Sauli, ii. 260-8.
[385] _armiratus_ or _amiratus_, then _amiralus_, of which we have made
admiral, originally had nothing whatever to do with the sea. It is a
corruption of _emir_.
[386] ‘Magnificus et potens dominus, dominus Moratibei, magnus
armiratus et dominus armiratorum Turchie’: the whole text is reproduced
from the Genoese archives by Belgrano, in _Atti della Società Ligure
di Storia_, xiii. 146-9, and by Silvestre de Sacy, in _Notices et
Extraits_, xi. 58-61. Cf. Canale, ii. 59.
[387] ‘Contra illum Turcum filium iniquitatis et nequiciae, ac Sancte
Crucis inimicum, Moratum bey et eius sectam, cristianum genus sic
graviter invadere conantes.’ The text of this treaty is also in
Belgrano, ibid., xiii. 953-65.
[388] Text in Romanin, iii. 386-9. There was an earlier law of similar
nature enacted in 1334.
[389] Cf. Delaville Leroulx, i. 159-60.
[390] Romanin, iii. 331.
[391] _Bullarum_, III, part 2, pp. 4, 92, 338; Urban V, _Epp. secr._
iii. 25, iv. 256; Gregory XI, _Epp. secr._ ii. 32-3, v. 88-9, 311;
Philippe de Mézeray, p. 19; Raynaldus, ann. 1372, XXIX. In 1425 Martin
V repeated the anathema against those who sold Christian slaves to the
Turks: _Bullarum_, III, part 2, p. 454.
[392] MS., Bibl. de Bâle, A 1, 28, fols. 232-54, cited by Delaville
Leroulx, i. 70, n. 2. Adam’s project was a revival of Sanudo’s attempt
to ruin Moslem trading.
[393] _Monumenta historiae patriae_, i. 320; iii. 336, 371.
[394] In 1432 Bertrandon de la Broquière met at Damascus one of these
Genoese of Kaffa, who sold slaves to the Sultan of Egypt: _Voyage_,
Schéfer ed., p. 68.
[395] Chalc., I, p. 53; Phr., I. 26, p. 81. Cf. Hertzberg, p. 503.
[396] Seadeddin, i. 130-2, draws here upon Idris and Neshri, and has
been followed by all the Ottoman historians down to the present day.
[397] Col. Djevad, pp. 62-3. He speaks of Alaeddin bey ‘ayant levé
l’étendard de la révolte’, and calls the punishment of the Serbians in
this campaign the chief cause of Kossova.
[398] Chalc., I, p. 53; Phr., I. 26, p. 81.
[399] Up to 1383, in outlining the career of Tvrtko, I have followed
Klaić, pp. 201-3.
[400] Schaffarik, _Acta archivii Veneti_, &c., CXLI.
[401] In a letter of April 1, published in Ljubić, iv. 185-6.
[402] _Misti_, xxxix. 113.
[403] Klaić, p. 237; Jireček, p. 341. But von Kállay, i. 166,
attributes this victory to George Kastriota of Albania.
[404] Orbini, p. 361.
[405] Hopf, in Ersch-Gruber, _Allgemeine Encycl._, lxxxvi. 49.
[406] _Chronique de Morée_, p. 516. Evrenos is called Branezis. This is
not the Evrenos heretofore mentioned, but another Christian renegade,
of Macedonia. Cf. Finlay, iv. 233 _n._
[407] Jireček, _Die Heerstrasse_, &c., p. 147.
[408] Leunclavius (1611 Frankfort ed.), pp. 268-76. Jireček,
_Geschichte der Bulgaren_, pp. 341-2, points out that Seadeddin and
Leunclavius, whom Zinkeisen, i. 252-5, follows, are in error in
representing the Bulgarians as wholly subdued in 1388.
[409] Mijatovitch, from Serbian sources, p. 13.
[410] Ibid., pp. 16-17.
[411] The railway between Mitrovitza and Skoplje (before the Balkan
War Uskub) passes through the plain of Kossova. When this railway is
connected through the former Sandjak of Novi Bazar with the Austrian
(?) railways in Bosnia, Kossovapol will be on one of the great
transcontinental routes.
[412] The date June 15 is fixed by the Serbian chronicles and songs and
by unbroken tradition. Also by Tvrtko’s letter to Florence. But Tvrtko,
in another letter to the inhabitants of Trau in Dalmatia, gives June 20
(Pray, _Annales_, ii. 90). Seadeddin stands alone in placing the death
of Murad on the 4th Ramazan (August 27). The other Ottoman historians,
as well as Chalcocondylas, Ducas, and the anonymous _Hist. Epirot._,
speak of these events occurring ‘in the springtime’.
[413] _Chron. of Abbey of Tronosha_, section 54, p. 84, and _Chron. of
Pek_, p. 53: cited by Mijatovitch, p. 12 n.
[414]
‘Sans arrêter, pendant quinze jours pleins,
J’ai cheminé le long des hordes turques,
Sans en trouver ni la fin ni le nombre.’--A. d’Avril, p. 36.
[415] Orbini, pp. 314-15. See also the Serbian songs about Kossova,
which are accessible in the form of a continuous narrative in French
by Adolphe d’Avril, and in English by Mme Mijatovitch, based on the
composite poems of Stoyan Novakovich and A. Pavich.
[416] Solakzadé, cited by Col. Djevad bey, p. 196. The bow was used as
an offensive arm by the Osmanlis until the middle of Murad II’s reign.
[417] Seadeddin, i. 147-52; Chalc., I, p. 53; Ducas, 3, pp. 15-16;
_Hist. Epir._, p. 234; the Serbian chants; Bonincontrius, col. 52; and
the modern writers, Hertzberg, pp. 503-7; Jireček, pp. 342-4; Fessler,
ii. 254; von Kállay, i. 166; Klaić, pp. 236-40. Most illuminating of
all is Rački, in Croatian, in _Jugoslav. Akademie_, iii. 92 f.
[418] Clavijo de Gonzáles, fol. 27 rº.
[419] _Annales_, ii. 186.
[420] This speech, from the chronicle of Monk Pahomye, is given in
Mijatovitch, p. 17.
[421] Busbecq, English ed., i. 153; cf. Ricaut, ed. of 1682, p. 159.
[422] Const. Porphyr., i. 394, 396, 405.
[423] Howorth, ii. 796, commenting on Stoddard’s audience with the Emir
of Bukhara.
[424] Text in _Mon. spect. hist. Slav. Merid._, i. 528-9.
[425] _Chronique du Religieux de St.-Denis_ (ed. Bellaguet), ii. 391.
[426] MS., Wiener Bibl., Gesch. gr., 48.
[427] As far as such records are accessible in the great collection of
Miklositch and Müller. The statement of Ducas, 23, p. 137, about the
persecutions of Christians by Murad, is without any foundation.
[428] Phr., I. 26, p. 82; Chalc., I, p. 59; Duc., 3, p. 16; also the
Ottoman historians.
[429] Sura IV, verse 94 (Sale trans., p. 64).
[430] Sura V, verse 53 (ibid., p. 77).
[431] Hammer, iii. 302-4. Rambaud, _Histoire générale_, iii. 831, is
mistaken in attributing this law to Bayezid.
[432] Ruled 1350 to 1369.
[433] In 1330. Panaretos, p. 7.
[434] In 1320 at Salonika: Greg., VII. 13, p. 271.
[435] Month of Shaban, a.h. 791: MS. turc, Bibl. Nat., Paris, No. 79,
pp. 35, 40. Cf. Langlès, in _Notices et Extraits_, v. 672.
[436] Froissart, IV. c. 47, in Kervyn ed., xv. 216-17. Froissart calls
Bayezid ‘Amoruth-Baquin’, confusing him with Murad. See below, p. 213,
_n._ 2.
[437] Abul Yussif ibn Taghry, _Elmanhal Essafy_, Bibl. Nat., Paris,
fonds arabe, No. 748, ii, fol. 70.
[438] Vuk Brankovitch, as the reward of his treason, received half of
Lazar’s inheritance, however, with Pristina as capital. His family
continued as Ottoman vassals, with varying fortunes, for a hundred
years.
[439] Ducas, 4, p. 6.
[440] Kantitz, _Serbien_, pp. 254 f.
[441] Busbequius was informed at Constantinople that marriage had been
abolished in the Ottoman royal family because Bayezid took to heart the
disgrace of Despina by Timur. But Ricaut, p. 296, thinks that it was
because of dowry expense and the desire of the Ottoman sovereigns to
keep free from family alliances. Naturally, the difference of religion
in time prevented the Osmanlis from finding brides for their sovereigns
among the European royal families. If they married among their
subjects, there was always fear of intrigues in the wife’s family. At a
time when family alliances meant so much in Europe, the Ottoman Empire
suffered greatly from this disability.
[442] Seadeddin, i. 158.
[443] Klaić, p. 248. I think Romanin, iii. 331, has confused Stephen
Bulcovitch with Stephen Tvrtko. For it is difficult to understand what
he means by the ‘pace vergognosa’ with Venice.
[444] Old Servian chronicle, quoted by Klaić, p. 271: ‘quasi totaliter
destruxerunt Bosniam et populum abduxerunt.’
[445] Klaić, pp. 324-5.
[446] Accounts differ as to the place. There is some doubt as to
whether the independence of Aïdin was totally destroyed before
the restoration of Isa’s sons by Timur. Cf. Schlumberger, p. 484;
Mas-Latrie, _Trésor de Chronologie_, col. 1800. Hammer, i. 300, cites
no authorities for his statements about this usurpation.
[447] Bosio, ii. 143.
[448] Ibid., ii. 148.
[449] There is the same dearth of information about the details of
the destruction of the power of the emirs of Sarukhan and Menteshe as
there is about Aïdin. Hammer says simply, ‘Les principautés de S. et M.
furent incorporées à l’empire ottoman,’ i. 300. He gives no authorities.
[450] Ducas, 13, p. 47.
[451] _Dialogi XXVI cum Persa quodam de Christianae religionis
veritate_, Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds grec, No. 1253: partly printed in
_Notices et Extraits_, vol. viii, 2e partie, and in Migne, 156, pp.
111-74. In _Notices et Extraits_, loc. cit., C. B. Hase has given an
interesting critical account of the dialogues, and the circumstances
under which they were written.
[452] Seadeddin, i. 163. In Hammer, i. 301, in the sentence ‘quoique,
depuis la paix renouvelée avec lui par Orkhan, les deux nations eussent
continuellement vécu dans des relations de sincère amitié’, is not
Murad meant instead of Orkhan?
[453] Evliya effendi, ii. 21, tells how Bayezid passed _seven times in
one year_ from Anatolia to Wallachia.
[454] In matters relating to the progress of Ottoman conquest in Asia
Minor, French, German, and British writers have been content to repeat,
without critical comment, what they have culled from Leunclavius or
the translations of Seadeddin. In many cases, they have gone back no
farther than Hammer, and have transcribed, often literally, Hammer’s
words. Hammer himself, in this early period of Ottoman history, in
spite of his attainments as an orientalist, has relied mainly on
Leunclavius, and on Bratutti’s Italian translation of Seadeddin.
[455] ‘La principauté _fut pour toujours réunie à l’empire_,’ Hammer,
i. 308. In speaking of this second campaign, Hammer starts by saying,
‘Le prince de Karamanie avait de nouveau _levé l’étendard de la
révolte_’. This is hardly the expression to use for the action of an
independent prince. Alaeddin had never made himself the vassal of the
Ottoman emirs.
[456] Striking testimony to the later power of the Karamanlis is given
by Bertrandon de la Broquière, who visited the court of Ibrahim with
the Cypriote ambassador in 1443: cf. Schéfer’s edition of his voyage,
pp. 108-20. See Appendix B below, where the relations of the Osmanlis
with the emirates of Asia Minor during the fourteenth century are
discussed in detail, with fuller citation of authorities.
[457] Howorth, iii. 749.
[458] Sherefeddin, iii. 256, who is the only contemporary authority,
says that Bayezid put him to death. This was one of the charges made by
Timur against Bayezid.
[459] The earliest possible date could be 1393. Perhaps the Osmanlis
first appeared near Sivas at this time. But Bayezid would hardly have
undertaken so long and perilous an expedition before his position was
secure in Karamania. Sherefeddin gives the more likely date 1395, while
Ibn-Hedjir places the death of Burhaneddin in 1396.
[460] So d’Ohsson fils, vii. 442, says, but gives date 1390. Hammer
more correctly puts it in 1391. Xénopol, in his authoritative and
carefully documented history, gives a little different account of
Mircea’s early relations with Bayezid, and attributes to Mircea a
larger influence in the calculations of Murad than he deserves. But the
exposition of Mircea’s policy in relation to Poland, Hungary, and the
Osmanlis, as given by Xénopol, cannot be overlooked or disregarded by
the student of this period.
[461] ‘Pierre Aron fut le premier des hospodars qui paya un tribut
aux Turcs’: Costin’s _Hist. de la Moldavie_, p. 367, in _Notices et
Extraits_, vol. xi.
[462] Phr., I. 13-14, pp. 58-9, and 26, p. 82; Bonfinius, iii. 2;
_Chron. Anon. de St.-Denis_; Chron. of Drechsler; Campana, fol. 8
(but gives date 1393). Leuncl., _Annales_, p. 51, following Ottoman
sources, speaks only of Sigismund’s defeat. This earlier victory and
the disastrous retreat are mentioned also in several of the French
chronicles which relate the expedition of 1396.
[463] Engel, _Gesch. von Ungarn_, ii. 368, who draws on all the earlier
Hungarian authorities.
[464] Russian source cited by Muralt, vol. ii, No. 10 n.
[465] Cf. Baedeker, _Konst. und Kleinasien_, 2. Aufl., p. 46.
[466] Jireček, _Gesch. der Bulgaren_, pp. 347-9, gives Slavic sources
for this date, and quotes Camblak’s graphic description of the terrible
sacking of the city, the massacre, and the destruction of the churches.
[467] In Czech, the word _jazyk_ signifies _language_ as well as
_nation_ (cf. Lützow, _Life and Times of Master John Hus_, p. 239).
This illustrates the Slavic conception of nationality, and explains
in a nutshell the Austro-Hungarian and Balkan problems. To the Slav,
there can be no other test of nationality. The Bulgarian propaganda in
Macedonia, carried on through the church and the schools, has been the
resurrection of the nation through the language. The Greeks have used
the Orthodox Church to combat and stifle this movement. They claim as
Greeks all members of the Orthodox Church, while the Bulgarians claim
that Bulgarophones, even if not attached to the exarchate, belong to
the Bulgarian nation.
[468] Schiltberger, Neumann ed., p. 65. On this question cf. Jireček,
op. cit., pp. 350-2; Miller, p. 189; and illuminating note of Rambaud,
in _Hist. générale_, iii. 832 _n._ Also p. 143 of this book and
accompanying foot-note.
[469] Schiltberger, op. et loc. cit.
[470] These cities, or rather, their fortresses, were captured and
evacuated several times by the Osmanlis, especially Widin.
[471] Hammer, at the beginning of the reign of Bayezid, i. 295-7,
relates the history of the quarrel between Andronicus and his father
and Manuel, the rescue from the Tower of Anemas, &c., as if these
events happened in 1389 and 1390, and gives the capture of Philadelphia
for 1391. He has been led astray here by the story of Ducas, and by the
fact that the Byzantine historians speak of Bayezid instead of Murad
in connexion with the negotiations for restoration. By the internal
evidence in the Byzantine historians themselves, the chronology of this
period cannot be decided. But, by reading Phrantzes and Chalcocondylas
in the light of Quirino, the continuation of Dandolo, and the archives
of the colony of Pera, and also by piecing out the length of time of
these events and matching them with Bayezid’s occupations during the
first two years of his reign, it is not difficult to decide to place
the Andronicus _versus_ John and Manuel struggles just before the
Chioggia war. At any rate, Andronicus died ten years before the date
Hammer gives to these events!
[472] Poem cited by Muralt, ii. 738, No. 1.
[473] MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds grec, No. 1253, fol. 198 vº.
[474] John V Palaeologos was of those who, in the words of Bernino (p.
9), ‘consumavasi vanamente il tempo più in dolersi delle calamità che
in repararle’.
[475] Ducas, 13, pp. 25-49 _passim_; Chalc., II, pp. 66, 81-2.
[476] Evliya effendi, i. 29-30; ii. 21, who repeats the persistent
Ottoman tradition of his day, that is also found in Hadji Khalfa and
Nazmi Zadé. Cf. the Genoese accounts of Pera in Jorga’s scholarly
_Notes à servir_, &c. i. 42. According to Schéfer, in his edition of
Bertrandon de la Broquière, p. 165, there was a provision that slaves
escaping to Constantinople should be given back, but we cannot be
sure that this stipulation was made under Bayezid I. The date of the
installation of the cadi, &c., is open to question. Some authorities
place it after Nicopolis.
[477] Shehabeddin, fol. 72 rº, writes _Istanbul_; Sherefeddin, iv. 37,
is transcribed by Petits de la Croix _Istanbol_; Arabshah, p. 124,
transcribed by Vattier _Estanbol_. Wylie, i. 156, _n._ 2, gives the
time-worn popular derivation from εἰς τὴν πόλιν; also Telfer, in his
edition of Schiltberger, p. 119. Why go so far afield? _Istambul_ is a
natural contraction of Constantinople. As the Greeks pronounced this
long word, the syllables _stan_ and _pol_ bore the stress, and were
naturally put together for a shortened form. As for the initial _I_,
which has troubled the philologists, its explanation is easy to one who
knows the Osmanlis. They cannot to this day pronounce an initial _St_
without putting _I_ before it.
[478] Neshri, trans. Nöldeke, _ZDMG._, xv. 345; Seadeddin, i. 189;
Saguntinus, p. 187; Drechsler, p. 228, says: ‘octo annos vexatur et
obsidetur.’
[479] Duc., 13, p. 50.
[480] Muralt, ii. 753, No. 29.
[481] _Secr. Cons. Rog._, III, E 84.
[482] Chalc., II, pp. 80-1; Phr., I. 13, pp. 57-8; 26, p. 82.
[483] Miklositch, _Acta Serbica_, CCIV. Hammer, i. 341, calls this
Constantine ‘fils de Twarko’, meaning Stephen Tvrtko, I suppose. But I
cannot find that the Bosnian king had such a son, or any reason, if he
had, why this son should have been at Serres.
[484] Ibid., CCXXIII. For the later kings of the dynasty which Vuk
founded, see Picot’s careful article in _Columna lui Traianu_, new
ser., Jan.-Feb. 1883, p. 64 f.
[485] _Epp. cur._, ii. 64.
[486] _Epp. cur._, ii. 103-4. Urban VI in 1387 had written a letter
from Lucca inciting the Frankish princes to a war against ‘schismatics’
in Achaia.
[487] _Secr. Cons. Rog._, iii, E 74.
[488] Miklositch-Müller, _Acta Graeca_, CCCCXXXV.
[489] Chalc., II, p. 75; Duc., 13, p. 73.
[490] Chalc., loc. cit.; _Epp. cur._, ii. 300-1, 311; iii. 261.
[491] Cf. Jorga, in _Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_, 2e série,
110e fascic.; Molinier, MSS. de P. de Mézières, in _Arch. de
l’Orient Latin_, i. 335-64; Del. Leroulx, i. 201-8.
[492] ‘Nostra dominatio audiverat de morte ipsius dom. Morati, de
qua maximam displicentiam habuerat, quia semper eum habuimus in
singularissimum amicum, et dileximus eum et statum suum. Similiter
audivimus de felici creatione sua ad imperium et dominium ipsius patris
sui, de quo nos fuerimus valde letati, quia sicut sincere dileximus
patrem, ita diligimus et diligere dispositi sumus filium et suum
dominium et habere ipsum in singularem amicum’ ... &c.: _Misti_, xli.
24, reprinted in full in Ljubić, iv. 269-70.
[493] Ibid., xlii. 58-9; the treaty is in _Commem._, viii. 150. Cf.
Romanin, iii. 330.
[494] Euboea is called Negropont, the Peloponnesus Morea, Lesbos
Mytilene, while Crete is frequently called Candia and Chios Scio, in
mediaeval and modern times.
[495] _Misti_, xlii. 55.
[496] Ibid., xliii. 156.
[497] _Secr. Cons. Rog._, iii. E 81.
[498] ‘Ire contra dictos Turchos ad damnum et destructionem suam’:
ibid., p. 94, cited in Ljubić, iv. 335-6.
[499] _Misti_, lxiv. 140.
[500] Ibid., lxiv. 156.
[501] We must reject the statement of Morosini, MS. Wiener Bibl., fol.
135 rº, that Bayezid ‘entered in arms in the Strait of Romania with
so many galleys that one could not navigate in the strait’, and doubt
the opinion that Monicego, with his forty-four Venetian and Genoese
galleys, had to force the Bosphorus, and contributed powerfully ‘a la
destrucion del dito Turcho’.
[502] _Misti_, xliii. 29.
[503] Ibid., xliii. 5: ‘confidasse in Dio, confidasse nei provedimenti
che saprebbero à fare i principi christiani, scrivesse al Papa e a
questi promovendo una lega generale’.
[504] Ibid., xliv. 108.
[505] Ibid., xliv. 128.
[506] Belgrano, pp. 152-3.
[507] _Lib. iurium_, ann. 1392, fol. 474, in Turin archives, printed in
_Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_ (1857), 4e série, iii. 451-2.
[508] _Religieux de St.-Denis_, ed. Bellaguet, i. 319-21.
[509] _Chronicorum Karoli Sexti_, ed. Bellaguet, i. 709-11. The
relations of the ambassadors of Sigismund with the Duke of Burgundy and
with Charles VI are found in _Religieux de Saint-Denis_.
[510] On September 13, 1395, in the presence of ambassadors from all
parts of Christendom, and also ‘del gran Turco, del Rè de’ Tartari, del
gran Soldano, del gran Tamerlano e di molti altri Principi infedeli
e ribelli alla Fede christiana’, who were treated like Christians
and lodged at the expense of ‘il Signore di Milano’, Galeazzo was
solemnly raised to ducal rank and invested with the Duchy of Milan by
Wenceslaus: Andrea Gataro, in Muratori, xvii, col. 820.
[511] _Mémoires de Madame de Lussan_, iii. 5.
[512] The references to Froissart which follow are given from vol. xv
of Kervyn de Lettenhove’s edition, and the references to Schiltberger
from the English translation in the Hakluyt Society series, vol. lviii,
unless otherwise specified.
[513] See the sources and references for Nicopolis grouped in the
classified bibliography. Although the citations in the text of my
narrative are mostly from Froissart and Schiltberger, all chronicles
and contemporary sources available have been used in the preparation
of this section, especially Bellaguet’s edition of _Religieux de
Saint-Denis_, ii. 425-30, 483-522 (Bellaguet’s notes, however, on these
sections are very disappointing).
[514] Froissart, pp. 218, 221, 223.
[515] Ibid., pp. 227-8, 230, 394-8. A complete list of the chevaliers,
compiled from sources, is found in Buchon, and, in much more complete
and accurate form, in Delaville Leroulx, ii. 78-86.
[516] Froissart, and other earlier writers, have several ways of
designating Bayezid. Froissart calls him Amorath-Baquin (p. 216),
Amorath (p. 226), le roy Basaach, dit l’Amourath-Bacquin(p. 230),
l’Amourath-Bacquin many times, and l’Amourath three times in one
paragraph (p. 311). Chroniclers and writers of the fifteenth century
were continually confusing Bayezid with Murad (cf. Cuspianus,
Secundinus, Sylvius Aeneas, Donado da Lezze, Paolo Giovio, _et
al._). From the different ways Froissart designates Bayezid, it is
very clear that he is not mixing him with Murad, but that by ‘dit
l’Amourath-Bacquin’ he means ‘_l’émir-pacha_’. The fact that he uses
the definite article so frequently and says several times ‘l’Amourath’
is proof positive of this. His transcription of the title _emir_, and
that of many other western writers, led later historians to think the
chroniclers meant Murad! It is merely a coincidence that the words are
so similar. Froissart, however, would be capable of mistaking Murad
for Bayezid. On p. 216 he calls Sigismund Henry, and on p. 334 Louis!
Olivier de la Marche (éd. Beaune et d’Arbuthnot), i. 83-4, speaks twice
of ‘Lamourath-bahy’. Here, too, there is not a confusion of Murad and
Bayezid. He, like Froissart, means to say ‘l’amiral-pacha’. On ‘amiral’
for ‘emir’ see above, p. 163, _n._ 2.
[517] Froissart, pp. 230-1, 242.
[518] Donado da Lezze, p. 9.
[519] Leunclavius, _Hist. Musul. Turc._, preface, p. 14, speaks of
how grateful Sigismund was later for the services rendered to him
personally by the Burgrave in the Nicopolis campaign, and that the
friendship formed then led to the later advancement of the house of
Brandenburg.
[520] Wylie, i. 6, 158, quoting Ducas, 13, and _Venetian State Papers_
(Brown), i. 85. Ducas knew nothing of Nicopolis, while the Venetian
reference is based on a misapprehension.
[521] Lavisse, _Histoire de France_, iv. 311: ‘on l’avait vu à la
bataille de Nicopoli sur les bords de la Baltique avec les chevaliers
_teutoniques_.’ Lavisse has evidently mixed up the Nicopolis expedition
with the earlier Prussian one in which Henry did take part. His
statement on the same page that Henry IV took part in the Boucicaut
expedition is another error.
[522] Conclusive proof of the whereabouts of Henry in the summer of
1396 is found in the letter ‘escript ... le xxe jour d’augst’. This
letter is in Arch. Nat., Paris, J. 644: 35^{11}. For the expeditions in
which Henry _did_ take part, when he was Henry of Derby, see vol. lii
of the Camden Society, edited by Lucy Toulmin Smith, London, 1894, 4to.
[523] Froissart, p. 244.
[524] Phr., I. 14, p. 59; Bontinius, III. 2.
[525] Engel, _Geschichte der Bulgaren_, p. 468. According to the
authority who has made the most exhaustive study of the Nicopolis
expedition, Sigismund disposed of 120,000 men in all, including the
western allies: Kiss, in _À Nikápolyi ülkozet_, p. 266. Kiss’s estimate
is corroborated by the _Cronica Dolfina_, which says that Sigismund
had one hundred thousand men under arms in 1394. Sanuto quotes this in
Muratori, xxii, col. 762. Cf. also Hungarian Nat. Archives, Dipl. 8201,
8212, 8214, 8493, 8541.
[526] Schiltberger, p. 2.
[527] Bruun, in his _Geographische Anmerkungen zum Reisebuch von
Schiltberger_ (_Sitz.-Ber. k. Bay. Akademie_, 1869, ii. 271), tried to
prove that the battle was fought, not at Nicopolis on the Danube, but
near the ancient Nicopolis of Trajan’s foundation. But in his notes to
the English translation of Schilt., Hakluyt, lviii. 108-9, he assents
to the contention which Kanitz makes in _Donau-Bulgarien_, ii. 58-70,
that the battle was near Nicopolis-on-the-Danube. An examination of
the chronicles corroborates Kanitz’s hypothesis over against the
ingenuous argument of Jireček. Some historians have been so unmindful
of geographical considerations as to put the battle at the ancient
Nicopolis _ad Haemum_, of which Ortellius, p. 225, speaks.
[528] Schiltberger, p. 2.
[529] Froissart, pp. 251, 262-3, 310, 329. ‘Miscreant’, of course, in
its original sense.
[530] Ibid., p. 310.
[531] Ibid., pp. 311-17; _Relig. de St.-Denis_, pp. 490-7.
Schiltberger, p. 3, attributes this initiative to Jean de Nevers, whom,
like many other writers on Nicopolis, he calls, by anticipation, Duke
of Burgundy. Cf. Donado da Lezze, p. 9, who says: ‘Il signor Carlo,
_prima_ Duca di Borgogna.’ Also Morosini, p. 6. Sigismund is frequently
spoken of as German emperor at the time of Nicopolis. Cf. Chalc.,
ed. Migne, col. 76: ἡγουμένου Σιγισυούνδου Ῥωμαίων βασιλέως τε καὶ
αὐτοκράτορος.
[532] Rabbi Joseph, i. 252.
[533] Froissart, pp. 313-16; _Relig. de St.-Denis_, pp. 490 f.; Rabbi
Joseph, p. 253; Schiltberger, p. 3; Seadeddin, i. 184; Neshri, in
_ZDMG._, xv. 345-8. Cf. authorities cited in Bibliography.
[534] Froissart, p. 317. Hermann de Cilly and the Burgrave of Nürnberg
are said by some authorities to have thrown themselves in front of
Sigismund, and to have saved him and carried him off to the boat.
[535] The bitterness against and contempt for the Hungarians is
expressed in the following verses:
‘Nichopoly, cité de payennie,
Au temps là où li sièges fut grans,
Fut delaissés par orgueil et folie;
Car les Hongres qui furent sur les champs
Avec leur roy, fuitis et récréans,
Leur roy meisme enmainent par puissance,
Sans assembler.’
_Œuvres inédites d’Eustache des Champs_, ed. Tarbé, 1849, i. 166.
[536] Schiltberger calls him ‘der hertzog auss der Sirifey, der genant
despot’: _Bibl. des Lit. Vereins_ (Tübingen), clxxii. 4.
[537] Cf. Miller, in Story of Nations Series, pp. 290-1.
[538] Belonging to the grand master of Rhodes: Froissart, p. 317.
But Morosini, p. 15, and others, say that he went directly on board
Monicego’s galley. It is a pity that Hammer, in his description of the
battle of Nicopolis, relied so much on such an unreliable third-hand
authority as Abbé Vertot. Skentkláráy, _À dunai hajóhadak törtenéte_,
says that Jean de Vienne commanded the galleys.
[539] Schiltberger, p. 6.
[540] Bonfinius, one of the earliest Hungarian historians, recorded
that Sigismund had boasted that he would not only turn the Osmanlis out
of Europe, but also that with the army under his command, if the sky
fell, it could be held up on their lances: _Decades_, ii. 403.
[541] ‘Sigismund was cruel and sensual, perjured and frivolous,
rapacious and dissolute, fierce and pusillanimous, a byword and object
of horror to the Bohemians, hated and despised by the Germans, a
warning to all rulers. His companion, John XXIII, lewd and murderous, a
simonist and an infidel, was a true comrade for Sigismund in all evil
deeds’: Dr. Flajshans, in _Mistr Jan Hus_: quotation translated by
Count Lützow, _John Hus and his Times_, pp. 137-8.
[542] Froissart, pp. 330-1.
[543] But not until he ‘regracioit les dieux et les déesses selon la
loy où il creoit et que les paiens croient’: Froissart, p. 321. The
ignorance among the western chroniclers of everything pertaining to the
Osmanlis--or the wider circle of Mohammedan peoples--was appalling.
[544] Schiltberger, p. 5. Cf. Froissart, pp. 322-8; _Relig. de
St.-Denis_; _Chronique de Boucicaut_; _Chronique des 4 premiers
Valois_, éd. Luce, p. 326; and the other chronicles and secondary
authorities given in Bibliography.
[545] Xénopol, in _Hist, générale_, iii. 882, whose writings furnish
the most reliable and most accessible data for Rumanian history, allows
his patriotism to get the better of his judgement when he writes that
this unimportant skirmish was a complete defeat inflicted upon Bayezid,
and that ‘le Sultan court jusqu’à Adrinople’! Xénopol makes no attempt
to explain the battle of Nicopolis, and Mircea’s action in and after
the battle.
[546] Schiltberger, p. 6. Chalc., II, pp. 76-80, who exaggerates the
raid to the point of saying that Bayezid reached the environs of Buda.
[547] _Secr. Cons. Rog._, iii. 134-5. _Mém. d’Olivier de la Marche_
(éd. Beaune et d’Arbuthnot), i. 199-200, reads as if Bayezid had
actually taken possession of Hungary.
[548] MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds turc, No. 79, pp. 61 f. (collection
of Feridun). For wrong date, see Langlès, in _Acad. des Inscriptions_,
iv. 673-4.
[549] Schiltberger, p. 7, who would have been chosen himself for Egypt
but for the fact that he had been wounded.
[550] Froissart, p. 341; Rabbi Joseph, p. 254.
[551] Froissart, p. 345. In xvi. 40, Froissart makes a mistake in
saying that the body of the Comte d’Eu was ‘en ung sarcus rapporté
en France et ensevely en l’eglise Saint-Laurent d’Eu, et là gist
moult honnourablement’. The tomb in St. Laurent is merely a memorial.
Philippe was buried in the chapel of a monastery in Galata, where,
seven years later, Clavijo, fol. 17 vº, saw his burial-spot, but
unmarked. His tomb is described by Bulladius, who saw it in 1647, in
his notes to Bonn ed. of Ducas, p. 560. Cf. Mordtmann, _Beiträge zur
osmanischen Epigraphik_, I, in _ZDMG._ (1911), lxv. 103.
[552] Froissart, xv. 329, 332, 342 f., 355-8; xvi. 16.
[553] Godefroy, _Hist. de Boucicaut_ (1620 ed.), i. 16; Ducas, p. 52.
[554] _Chronique d’Enguerran de Monstrelet_ (ed. Douet d’Areq), i.
332-3; Froissart, xvi. 57-9.
[555] Jean de Nevers, as Duc de Bourgogne and leader of the faction
against the king’s brother, openly accepted the responsibility of the
assassination of the Duc d’Orléans. This was the beginning of the
Burgundy-Armagnac civil war, which delivered France to the English
until Jeanne d’Arc appeared to awaken the French to a feeling of
nationality.
[556] Froissart, xvi. 47. For ransom, ibid., pp. 37-8, and Rabbi
Joseph, i. 254; also _Livre des faicts_ of Boucicaut, _passim_.
[557] Raynaldus, ann. 1364, No. XXVIII. Jireček, _Gesch. der Bulg._,
p. 323, says that at this time ‘Osmanen erschienen in Attika’. He has
mistaken roving Turkish corsairs of Sarukhan or Aïdin for the Osmanlis.
It must have been these Turks who attacked Thebes.
[558] For the deliverance of the grand master of Rhodes, Jean Ferdinand
d’Hérédia: Ducange, viii. 296.
[559] _Chron. Breve_ at end of Ducas, p. 516.
[560] Ibid. According to Finlay, iv. 233, he captured Akova. Cf.
Muralt, ii. 741, citing Guichenon MS., and Ducange, viii. 39, 296.
[561] Phr., I. 16, p. 62; 26, p. 83; Chalc., II, pp. 67-9.
[562] Muralt, under 1395 and 1397, gives the same expedition. From
internal evidence of Byzantine historians, one might put the Morean
expeditions in either or both of these years. But cf. _Chron. Breve_,
p. 516, and the silence of the Ottoman historians on an expedition in
1395.
[563] Chalc., II, p. 67; Seadeddin, i. 192.
[564] Chalc., II, p. 67; Seadeddin, i. 192.
[565] _Chron. Breve_, p. 516; Phr., I. 16, p. 62; Chalc., II, pp. 97-9.
[566] Seadeddin, i. 193.
[567] The Venetians seized Athens in 1395, and sent Antonio Contareno
to act as governor.
[568] Hammer describes the capture of Athens in 1397 in i. 350, and
again in 1456 in iii. 51.
[569] Gibbon and Hammer follow Chalcocondylas in this error. Cf. Berger
de Xivrey, in _Mém. de l’Acad. des Inscr._, vol. xix, partie 2, pp.
29-30.
[570] Seadeddin, i. 180.
[571] Ducas, 13, p. 50; Chalc., II, p. 59; Idris.
[572] The land walls of Salonika, still standing, are eloquent proof
of the difficulty which confronted their assailants before the days of
cannon.
[573] Phr., I. 17, p. 64.
[574] See p. 199. There is serious difference of opinion as to just
when these concessions were made.
[575] Feridun collection, letter from Adrianople, ordering kadis to
prepare for siege of Constantinople: Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds turc, No.
79, p. 60.
[576] Ducas, 14, p. 53; Canale, ii. 62. Leunclavius, _Annales_, p. 52,
puts this in 1391/2.
[577] Karamzin (Russian ed. of 1819), v. 164.
[578] Miklositch-Müller, _Acta Graeca_, DCXXXVI.
[579] Ibid., DXIV, DXV, DXVI.
[580] Froissart, xvi. 132-3.
[581] _Religieux de Saint-Denis_, ii. 559-62, 564.
[582] _Secreta Consilii Rogatorum_, E iii. 138, 146, printed in Ljubić,
iv. 404.
[583] Ibid., p. 137.
[584] _Misti_, xliv. 210, xlv. 443; Belgrano, _Arch. Gen._, 1396-1464,
pp. 175 f.
[585] Ducas, 14, p. 53; Chalc., II, p. 80; Sherefeddin, iv. 38.
[586] ‘El Cuirol castello de Grecia está despoblado y destruydo y el
dela Turquia está poblado’: Seville ed., 1582, fol. 17 v°. Busbecq,
i. 131, wrote: ‘stand two castles opposite each other, one in Europe
and the other in Asia.... The former was held by the Turks a long
time before the attack on Constantinople.’ Busbecq was, of course,
misinformed, as Rumeli Hissar was built in 1452. It is still standing
in excellent preservation. Anatoli Hissar, of which only one tower
remains intact, was built between 1392 and 1397. There is no way of
determining the exact date. But Saladin, in _Manuel de l’Art Musulman_,
i. 482, displays his usual inaccuracy concerning facts of Ottoman
history, when he gives 1420 as the date for Anatoli Hissar.
[587] Phr., I. 14, p. 60; Chalc., II, p. 83; Ducas, 14, p. 53.
[588] Venice contemplated action against the Osmanlis with the aid of
France, Hungary, and Genoa. Cf. _Secr. Cons. Rog._, E iii. 137-44.
[589] _Epp._, v. 26, 99, 293-5.
[590] Edition of Seville, 1582, fol. 16 v°-17 r°.
[591] My account of this expedition is taken from MS. Bibl. Nat.,
Paris, fonds fr., No. 11432, _Livre des faicts du bon messire Jean le
Maingre, dit Bouciquaut_. For printed editions, see Bibliography.
[592] The chronicler makes the most astonishing assertions as to these
raids, saying that the chevaliers reached Ak-Seraï! He evidently had no
idea of local geography. I have been unable to identify several of the
places mentioned.
[593] I have walked in one day from Riva to a point on the Bosphorus
not many miles above Constantinople. When one reads the history of the
Osmanlis in the country of their origin, the fact that from the very
beginning of their history they were practically within sight of the
imperial city is vividly impressed upon one.
[594] The Byzantine historians give little attention to Boucicaut, and
are in contradiction with his chronicler on this point. Phr., 15, p.
61, says that John, who had been in the court of Bayezid, fled to his
uncle because he had been slandered to Bayezid, and was afraid for his
life; and Chalc., II, p. 84, that it was John who commanded the 10,000
Osmanlis against the city, and that Manuel shared the throne with him
in order to save the city. Muralt, ii. 762, is a year in advance of the
actual date.
[595] _Chron. de Saint-Denis_ and Juvenal d’Ursins. But these are
really the same source, according to Lacabane, _Bibl. de l’École des
Chartes_, ii. 62.
[596] Foglieta and Stella, in Muralt, ii. 778, No. 61.
[597] Sanudo, in Muratori, xxii. pp. 794-8.
[598] Chalc., II, pp. 83-4; Ducas, 14, pp. 54-6. For Rhodes and the
Pope in the Morea, Phr., I. 16, p. 63; Bosio, ii. 154.
[599] September 10, 1400, in _Misti_, xlv. 33.
[600] _Livre des faicts_, fol. 53 r°-55 r°, and Wylie, pp. 159-65.
Wylie has collated admirably the sources on Manuel’s visit.
[601] Text is published in Theiner, ii. 170-2.
[602] _Epp._, v. 300-2; vi. 92.
[603] ‘Cum Dom. summus Pontifex advertens quod perfidus ille Baysetus
Princeps Turchorum, manu potenti et brachio extento in Christianum
Populum maxima feritate extitit debachatus ad Exterminium Civitatis
Constantinopolitanae et universitatis Populi Christiani _nisi eius
nephanda propositio resistatur_, omnes et singulos qui, pro Liberatione
et Subsidione Manuelis Imp. Cpni et dictae Civitatis suae, Manus
adiutrices porrexerint ...’ etc.: Rymer, vol. iii, part 4, pp. 195-6.
[604] Clavijo, who visited Constantinople the following year, reports
this, fol. 7 v°.
[605] Miklositch-Müller, _Acta_, DCXXVI.
[606] Strikingly shown in letter of April 20, 1402: _Canc. Secr._, i.
58.
[607] _Misti_, xlv. 19-23, 25-6, 29-30, 35, 87; xlvi. 37. Several of
these are published in Ljubić, iv. 579, 590.
[608] Knoelle, in _Journal R. A. S._ (1822), xiv. 125; Nöldeke, in
_ZDMG._ (1859), xiii. 185, _n._ 6.
[609] ‘Toutesfoiz il a la main senestre et pié senestre comme impotent
et ne s’en puet aidier, car il a les nerfs coppez’: Dominican Friar, p.
463. ‘Infirmus, ut dicitur, a cingulo infra’: Stella, in Muratori, vol.
xvii. col. 1194. Cf. Sherefeddin, i. 55, 381. The English corruption
Tamerlane is from Timurlenk, the latter syllable signifying lameness.
[610] Sherefeddin, ii. 222.
[611] There is an excellent account of the dynasties of the Black and
White Sheep, with list, following Mirkhand, in Teixera, ii. 24-39,
69-70. For the later activities of Kara-Yussuf, Teixera, ii. 355; de
Guignes, iii. 302.
[612] Langlès translation, p. 260.
[613] Ibid., pp. 258-62; Sherefeddin, iii. 255-62; Clavijo de Gonzáles,
fol. 25 r°-26 v°.
[614] Chalcocondylas and Raynaldus are wrong in calling him Ertogrul,
and in stating that he was killed in the subsequent siege. Sherefeddin,
iii. 267, calls him Mustafa, and Schiltberger, p. 18, Mohammed. That
it was Soleiman is proved by the agreement of the Ottoman historians
with Arabshah, p. 124, and with Clavijo, fol. 26 r°, whose ‘Musulman
Tchelebi’ is Soleiman.
[615] Hadji Khalfa, _Djihannuma_, vol. ii, fol. 1776.
[616] Clavijo, fol. 26 r°; Arabshah, p. 125.
[617] Clavijo, fol. 26 v°-27 r°; Arabshah, p. 125; Sherefeddin, iii.
267-9; Dominican Friar, p. 264; Schiltberger, p. 18. Schiltberger says
21 days, and 5,000 horsemen buried, and 9,000 virgins carried off by
the Tartars.
[618] It is impossible to understand why Muralt, with all the
authorities he had at hand, places the taking of Sivas in 1395:
_Chronographie Byzantine_, ii. 753, No. 26. The contemporary
authorities cited above establish the date. Cf. also letter from
Crete, in Jorga, _Notes à servir_, &c., i. 106, _n._ 3. There is a
full discussion of the proper dating of the Ottoman aggression against
Sivas, Caesarea, and Erzindjian, and the probability of two Ottoman
campaigns, one before and one after Nicopolis, in Bruun’s note to the
Hakluyt edition of Schiltberger, pp. 121-2.
[619] The letters exchanged between Charles VI and Timur are preserved
in the French archives. The Turkish text of these letters, with Latin
translation, is published by Charrière, introd., i. 118-19.
[620] Stella, in Muratori, xvii. 1194.
[621] ‘En la qual batalla se acaescieron Payo de Soto Mayor e Hernan
Sanchez de Palaçuelos Embaxadores’: Clavijo, fol. 1 r°, col. 2.
[622] Letters of Timur and Bayezid in Arabic and Persian in Feridun
collection, MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, ancien fonds turc, pp. 65-91. Cf.
Langlès, in _Notices et Extraits_, iv. 674, for list and dates of
these. Sherefeddin, iii. 396-416.
[623] Sherefeddin, iv. 1-6. For description of route from Sivas to
Angora, Hadji Khalfa, _Djihannuma_, ii. fols. 1803-4. Timur’s own
account of his march and the battle of Angora is very brief: ‘Je pris
moi-même le chemin d’Ancouriah. Bayezid, suivi de 400,000 hommes, tant
cavaliers que fantassins, vint à ma rencontre; on livra la bataille, et
je la gagnai. Ce Prince vaincu fut pris par mes troupes, et amené en
ma présence. Enfin ... je retournai victorieux à Samarcande’: Langlès
trans., p. 264.
[624] A great deal has been written about the date of Angora, but all
authorities agree in putting it between July 20 and July 28, 1402. Cf.
_Art de vérifier les Dates_, i. 193; Silvestre de Sacy, in _Mémoires
de l’Académie des Inscriptions_, vi. 488-95; Moranvillé, in _Bibl. de
l’École des Chartes_, lv. 437-8. A few early western writers have given
1397 and 1403, while Petits de la Croix, in his French translation of
Sherefeddin, is a decade too late in all his dates. The latter part
of July 1402 is fixed by all contemporary authorities on this battle.
Abu’l-Mahasin, in his history of the reign of the Egyptian sultan
Barkok, states that the greater part of Bayezid’s army perished by
thirst before his capture.
[625] On the nationality of the Tartars who betrayed Bayezid at Angora,
see the latter part of the note of Bruun on the ‘White Tartars’ in the
Hakluyt ed. of Schiltberger, pp. 114-17.
[626] From the account of the Dominican Friar, pp. 458-9, it seems
clear that Bayezid was the aggressor until after Soleiman’s command had
been cut to pieces.
[627] Sherefeddin, iv. 8-12; Dominican Friar, p. 458.
[628] Afterwards Mohammed I. Many western writers have confused him
with his nickname of Kiritchelebi (Girigilibi in Rabbi Joseph, i. 257,
and a variety of spellings in other early writers), and made him thus
his own father, to account for the later Sultan Mohammed.
[629] In this battle I have used Sherefeddin, Arabshah, Dominican
Friar, in _Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_, lv. 437-68, Schiltberger,
Clavijo, and the invaluable letters in Marino Sanuto, Muratori, xxii.
794-7. The authorities for Angora and Timur are classified in the
bibliography below.
[630] Sherefeddin, iv. 15, says the carnage in this battle was seven
times greater than in any of Timur’s previous victories. The Dominican
Friar, p. 459, puts the Ottoman losses at 40,000.
[631] Schiltberger, p. 21, says that he retreated to this hill with
1,000 horsemen. Hammer is in error in saying that Bayezid ‘resisted
like a hero at the head of his _ten thousand_ janissaries with whom he
had occupied the slope of a hill’: ii. 91. There were never as many as
ten thousand janissaries enrolled in the Ottoman army until a century
after Bayezid’s death. See above, p. 119. In oriental historians
numbers are almost invariably exaggerated at least tenfold.
[632] Solak-zadé, p. 63. Sherefeddin and Arabshah bear witness to
Bayezid’s personal courage.
[633] The Ottoman historians explain the capture of Bayezid by the fact
that he was unhorsed. Some say that he was mounted on an inexperienced
horse. A great deal was written about the battle of Angora at a much
later date, but, as in describing the battles of Kossova and Nicopolis,
I have limited myself to contemporary sources.
[634] Mustafa’s fate was never cleared up. Mohammed and Isa fled naked,
according to the Dominican Friar, p. 450.
[635] I am unable to agree with Alberi, _Rel. Ven. Ambasc._, 3rd
ser., vol. i, preface viii., ‘Secondo migliori testimonianze deve
rigettarsi per falsa la tradizione’, and Bruun, Notes to Hakluyt ed. of
Schiltberger, p. 21 _n._, ‘We are forced to conclude, after Hammer’s
searching inquiries, that there is no truth whatever in the story
of Bayezid having been confined by Timur in an iron cage’. Hammer’s
arguments, ii. 96-101, do not seem to me at all convincing. From the
philological point of view, they have been refuted by Weil, _Gesch. der
Chalifen_, ii. 92. From the historical point of view, there is just
as strong evidence for as against the litter with bars, which could
hardly have been any different from a cage. If one argues that Timur
did not subject his prisoner to this indignity, and advances that the
cage was really nothing more than a closed litter, such as was used for
ladies of the imperial harem, he is merely substituting one indignity
for another. From the character of Bayezid, one would infer that the
humiliation of being shut up like a lion in a cage would have been less
than that of being put into a harem litter like a woman, for whom the
conqueror had contempt rather than fear. There is no mention of the
iron cage in Schiltberger, Clavijo, and the Dominican Friar. But their
silence signifies nothing. They are excellent witnesses for the battle
of Angora itself, but knew little or nothing of what happened in Asia
Minor after Angora. One might just as well argue from Schiltberger’s
silence that Timur did not capture Smyrna! Nor does Sherefeddin mention
the humiliation of Bayezid, and the iron cage. But the story is given
in Arabshah, p. 210, who must be reckoned with as a contemporary
source. If, as de Salaberry, iv. 200-1, claims, the iron cage story was
inserted in Arabshah by his Ottoman editor and translator, Nazmi-zadé,
it only goes to show that the careful Ottoman students of his time
believed the story. The Ottoman historians, who are _without exception_
too late to be regarded as sources, and who had reasons for making
the degradation of the Ottoman sovereign as slight as possible, show
their knowledge of the early and contemporary character of this record
by trying to controvert it, and prove that Bayezid was carried on a
litter rather than in a cage, e. g. Seaddedin, i. 230. That the common
tradition among the Osmanlis, outside of the court chroniclers who were
compelled to uphold at all costs the dignity of the house of Osman, was
in favour of the cage story is proved conclusively by Ali Muhieddin,
Migne ed., col. 597, who is earlier than Seadeddin, and by Evliya
effendi, i. 29-30; ii. 21-22, who gives the story just as we find it
in Arabshah and the western writers. Sagredo, who follows Spandugino,
vigorously defends the cage story as opposed to the litter of the
Ottoman court chroniclers, and says that Bayezid died from striking
his head against the bars of his cage, pp. 25-6. In Lonicerus, fol.
12 vº, is a picture of the cage. It is mentioned by Guazzo, fol. 275
vº; Donato da Lezze, p. 10; Paolo Giovio; Geuffry, p. 283; Campana,
fol. 8 vº; Egnatius, p. 30; Rabbi Joseph, i. 256; Sanuto, in Muratori,
xxii. 791; Bonincontrius, col. 88; Formanti; and Timur’s early western
biographer, Perondino, p. 31, who, fifty years before Seadeddin, wrote
that Timur compelled Bayezid’s wife Despina to wait nude upon him and
his guests at table. The story is also found in Ducas, chapter 26.
[636] Perondino, p. 31; Sagredo, p. 26; Campana, fol. 8 vº; Raynaldus
and Spandugino; _Lettres d’un Solitaire turc_, i. 106-7. Exposure
of women was a common symbol of conquest among the Mongols. It was
a formal ceremony at the sack of Pekin and Djenghiz Khan’s sack of
Samarkand.
[637] Many authorities declare that Bayezid committed suicide by
striking his head against the bars of his cage, being unable to support
the sight of his wife’s disgrace. The humiliation to which Despina was
subjected was often given in later times by the Osmanlis themselves as
a reason why the house of Osman does not contract marriages. See above,
p. 183, and note.
[638] Sherefeddin, iv. 65-7; Chalc., III, pp. 162-5; Duc., 17, pp.
77-8; Phr., 1. 26, p. 85; and the Ottoman historians.
[639] The Dominican Friar says that the Jews of Brusa sent a delegation
of rabbis to inform Mohammed-Sultan that their religion was the same as
his. He answered that their law was a good one, and that they should
assemble all their people in the chief synagogue. He promised that no
harm would come to them. When the Tartars entered the city, they sealed
fast the doors of this synagogue, and set fire to it.
[640] Sherefeddin, iv. 37-48; Duc., 16, pp. 66-7.
[641] Seadeddin, i. 235.
[642] Sherefeddin, iv. 47, 52.
[643] Accounts of the capture of Smyrna: Sherefeddin, iv. 47-53;
Chalc., III, p. 161; Duc., 18, p. 78; Hadji Khalfa, _Djihannuma_, fol.
1949; Arabshah, ii. 24. For date, _see_ M. de Ste. Croix, in _Acad. des
Inscriptions_, 2e série, ii. 566, 569.
[644] Ali Muhieddin, Leuncl. trans., in Migne, _Patr. Graec._, clix.,
596. Schiltberger, p. 27, relates a similar massacre of children after
the capture of Ispahan.
[645] Ducas, 18, p. 79.
[646] ‘Would that the day might dawn in which your Highness would
profess the religion of Christ, and stand up in power as the champion
of the Christian Church against the enemies of the cross.’ In the
London archives, however, this passage, while legible, is cancelled.
So it may not have gone in the copy of the letter sent to Timur. Cf.
Wylie’s _Henry IV_, i. 316 and _n._ 4.
[647] _Misti_, xlvi. 47.
[648] Ducas, 18, p. 78; Phr., I, 15, p. 62.
[649] Phr., loc. cit.; Innocent VII, _Epp._, i. 212-13.
[650] Wylie, i. 321, says Timur died February 19, 1405, on authority
of Schiltberger. But this date is in Brunn’s note, p. 133, and not in
Schiltberger’s narrative. According to Clavijo, fol. 57 rº, Timur died
November 18, 1404, while Arabshah, p. 248, says ‘17 Saghan, 807’, which
would be in February 1405. For his abandonment of Asia Minor, Chalc.,
III, p. 182; Duc., 17, p. 76; Sherefeddin, iv. 88-95.
[651] Stella, in Muratori, xvii. 1195.
[652] Sanuto, in Muratori, xxii. 791, quoting an eye-witness.
[653] Gerardo Sagredo, quoted by Sanuto, ibid., p. 796. He admits that
this action was foolish and ruinous.
[654] ‘El Emperador de Constantinopola e los Genoueses de la ciudad do
Pera, en lugar do tener lo que con el Tamurbec auian puesto, dexaron
passar los Turcos de la Grecia en la Turquia e desque fuera vencido
aqueste Turco passauan ellos mismos a los Turcos con sus fustes de la
Turquia en la Grecia de los que venian fuyendo, e por esta ocasion
tenia mala voluntad el Tamurbec a los Christianos de que se fallaron
mal los de sa tierra.’ Clavijo, fols. 26 vº-27 rº.
[655] ‘Qui s’ensuivra Dieu le sache. Témir Bey tout seul scet son
propos et non aultre qui vive’: Dominican Friar, p. 459.
[656] _Epp._, vii. 144-60.
[657] The dates given under the Latin columns in Chalcocondylas are
almost invariably wrong and are responsible for much of the confusion
of European historians in the matter of chronology. Chalcocondylas
himself is full of mistakes, and knew very little about the history of
Byzantium and the Osmanlis in the fourteenth century. But he is not
as bad as his Latin translator, whom the historians have followed.
In order to trace some of the errors, I collated the Greek text of
Chalcocondylas with the Latin translation through the first two books
of his history, which cover the period 1300-1403. The glosses and
the inexact translations are many. For example of glosses, in I. c.
4 B, ‘quos Tartaros nominant’ after Scythis; I. c. 7 C, ‘Orthogulus
adhibitus in colloquium’, at beginning of third sentence; I. c. 10 C,
‘ex tribus, Orchanes nomine’, after ‘filius eius natu minimus’; I. c.
12 C, ‘circiter viginti duo’ in the sentence ‘Orchanes cum regnasset
annos mortem obiit’. For a very unfaithful translation compare Latin
with Greek original in I. c. 27, the end of A and beginning of B. In I.
c. 28 C ἓξ καὶ τριάκοντα is translated ‘triginta _septem_’! The letters
cited refer to column position in Migne edition.
[658] Chalcocondylas (in Migne), I. 6, p. 22.
[659] Trans. Petits de la Croix, ii. 287-9.
[660] _Annales Turcici_, in Migne, _Patr. Graec._, clix. 579.
[661] Bratutti trans., i. 4.
[662] _Chronological Tables_, Italian trans. of Carli Rinaldo.
[663] _Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft_, xiii.
188-9.
[664] For editions, translators and dates of publication, see
Bibliography.
[665] Egnatius, cited by Cuspianus, 12, says: ‘Ottomannus obscuro loco
et parentibus agrariis natus’. Nicolaus Euboicus, Saguntinus Episcopus,
Sylvius Aeneas, and Andreas a Lacuna say that Osman, of obscure
beginnings, arose through oppressing neighbours, Moslem as well as
Christian. Ab. Ortellius says, ‘Tam Graecis quam Turcis repugnantibus
cited by Leunclavius, _Pandectes_, 99. Bosio, ii. 37, declares, ‘Osman
first came out of Persia’. Similar vagueness in Haeniger; Geuffroi,
266; Sagredo; Manutio, 3; Cuspianus, 11, 42; Barletius, in Lonicerus,
iii. folios 231-2; Vanell, 356; Cervarius; Richer, 11.
[666] De Sacy, in _Notices et Extraits_, xi. 56, foot-note 1, in his
discussion of the text of a treaty between Genoese of Kaffa and Janko,
Lord of Solkat, where this word also occurs, suggests that it is an
altered form of ‘sheik’.
[667] Formanti: Donado da Lezze, 4; Paulo Giovio, Ven. ed. of 1541, 3;
Vertot, ii. 97; Rabbi Joseph, ii. 503; Guazzo, 257 vº; Ortellius in
Leunclavius, _Pandectes_, 99; Lonicerus, 10 Spandugino, 182-4. Also
Evliya effendi, i. 27.
[668] ‘Il Pazzo Delis, pecoraio’, Spandugino, 184. Leunclavius,
_Pandectes_, 103, says that Alaeddin poisoned Delis.
[669] Formanti; Donado da Lezze, 4; Cuspianus, 48; ibid., Ant. ed., 6;
Spandugino, in Sansovino (ed. 1654), 243; Egnatius, 28. Also travels of
Busbecq, Eng. ed., i. 137, and the Ottoman Evliya, ii. 95.
[670] This story in full in Formanti, 2-3; Vertot, ii. 97-8;
Spandugino, 183. Leunclavius, in _Pandectes_, 103, says that Nicetas
Choniates mentions such a renegade Comnenus, but calls him Isaac.
[671] The author of _Tractatus de rilibus_, who was a slave captured
by Murad II, for example. Also Spandugino, a native of Constantinople,
and relative of the Cantacuzenos and Notaras families. Also Donado da
Lezze. See the prefaces of editions of Charles Schéfer, of Spandugino;
and of Professor Ursu, of Donado da Lezze.
[672] Evliya effendi, a learned member of the Moslem Ulema of
Constantinople, who travelled widely in the seventeenth century in the
Ottoman Empire, is continually making statements which show that he
had a very hazy notion of early Ottoman history. This is true also of
Hadji Khalfa, the famous bibliographer, in his _Djihannuma_, a work
which I have tested and found incomplete and unreliable both in its
geographical and historical information about the region which gave
birth to Osman and his tribe.
[673] Houdas, p. 374, foot-note 1.
[674] Mohammed en Nesawi, p. 374.
[675] Ibid., 394.
[676] Ibid., 209, 328.
[677] Shehabeddin, 230-9, 263-72, 289-91, in describing Khorussan,
Armenia, and the strife between Djelaleddin and Alaeddin, makes no
mention of Soleiman Shah or Ertogrul, or of a formidable invasion
such as 50,000 families, under one ruler, would certainly have been
regarded. Nor is there mention of the 50,000 and their leader in
Ibn-Bibi, Seljuk chronicler of this period.
[678] Hadji Khalfa, in index of his Bibliography, iii. folios 133-5,
speaks of more than sixty Arabic genealogies known to him, but in his
chronological tables he cites none of them for early Ottoman genealogy.
[679] _Dourar-al-Othman_, ‘the precious pearls touching the original
source of the Ottoman house’, by Ibn Ali Mohammed-al-Biwy. No date or
indication of contents. Hadji Khalfa in _Dictionnaire bibliographique_,
Paris MS., i. folio 867.
[680] _Introduction à l’histoire d’Asie: Turcs et Mongols_, _passim_.
[681] There is a letter of this sort to Bayezid, quoted in Timur’s
_Institutes_. Also a letter, given by Sherefeddin, iii. 259-63, near
the beginning of which he says: ‘But you whose true origin ends in a
Turcoman sailor, _as all the world knows_.’
[682] ‘L’empire des Seljucides s’écroula, et sur ses ruines surgit
celui d’Osman,’ Hammer, i. 83.
[683] i. 7-13.
[684] In the Story of the Nations Series. This book does not do credit
to the name of the great scholar whom Orientalists and numismatists
universally honour.
[685] In the _Allgemeine Staatengeschichte_, Werk 15 (1840-63) and Werk
37 (1908-13).
[686] Leunclavius, _Pandectes_. This work will be found in all large
libraries, because it is reprinted in volume 159 of Migne’s _Patrologia
Graeca Latine_, 715-922.
[687] For translations of Cantemir, see Bibliography. The Rumanian
translator, Dr. Hodosiu, has reprinted the notes of the various editors
of Cantemir, which makes his edition the most valuable.
[688] Youssouf Fehmi, _Histoire de la Turquie_, Paris, 1908, p. 11.
[689] Halil Ganem, _Les Sultans ottomans_, Paris, 1901, i. 24.
[690] ‘Osman verband sich mit der Leibwache in Bagdad, eroberte
die Stadt, setzte sich auf den Thron, wodurch er der Beherrscher
aller Muhammedaner wurde, und liess dem Chalifen nur die nichts
bedeutende geistliche Oberhoheit in Bagdad; er nannte sich Sultan,
d. h. Herrscher, und starb 729 (1328 n. Chr.).’ Prof. F. Wüstenfeld,
_Geschichte der Türken_, &c., Leipzig, 1899, pp. 15-16.
[691] Reineccius thought that this name must be common to all the
Sultans of Konia. It does not appear for others than Kaï Kobad II in
the Arabic genealogies. Leunclavius is so confused by the discrepancy
here that he concludes that the Ottoman historians must have given
the name indiscriminately to all the Sultans! (_Pandectes_, 106).
Hadji Khalfa, _Djihannuma_, folio 1790, speaking of Amassia, says
that its fortress was repaired by ‘Sultan Alaeddin the Seljucide’. It
is typically Ottoman to be vague about names as well as about dates.
Hadji Khalfa frequently speaks of an Ottoman Sultan, whose name is
duplicated, without any following ordinal. There is often no clue in
the context to identify the Sultan to whom he refers.
[692] As the year of the Hegira began in June in 1240, there is the
alternative of reckoning the Christian era a year later during the
middle period of this century. But I have not thought necessary to
indicate this alternative each time.
[693] Villani, book VI, c. 32, in Muratori, xiii, col. 175, describes
this battle; also _Vie de Saint Louis_, by Le Nain de Tillemont (ed.
Gaulle), iii. 4.
[694] Abulfeda; Howorth, iii. 47.
[695] This is the opinion of two of the ablest modern scholars, Heyd,
i. 534, and Sarre, p. 41.
[696] I can find no record of coins to controvert this statement.
Lane-Poole, _Mohammedan Coins in the Bodleian Library_, 41, gives only
one coin of the Bodleian collection after 641 of the Hegira, and to
this he assigns the date A.H. 663 with a question mark.
[697] MS. Bib. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe, 583, folio 144 rº and vº.
[698] The lists of coins in I. Ghalib Edhem’s _Monnaies turcomanes_
also bear eloquent testimony to the disappearance of Seljuk vassal
dynasties during this period.
[699] I have not heard of such a coin existing to-day, but make the
statement on the strength of Abulfaradj, _Chronicon Syr._, 527-8.
[700] Abulfaradj, ibid., 542-3; Howorth, iii. 69.
[701] Abulfeda, v. 15-16, under date of A.H. 662.
Villani (in Muratori, xiii), VII. c. 40, column 261-2, describes how
Abaka Khan chased the Saracens (_sic_) from ‘Turchia’, and also the ‘Re
d’Erminia’, who ‘lasciò a’ Tartari la Turchia’.
[702] Huart, _Souvenirs de voyage_, 164, speaks of the battle, but does
not mention occupation of Konia.
[703] Abulfaradj, _Chronicon Arab._, 365-7; d’Ohsson, _Histoire des
Mongols_, ii. 570-80; Howorth, iii. 295.
[704] Howorth, iii. 315.
[705] _Konia, Ville des Derviches tourneurs_, 177.
[706] ‘Ils sont souspost an Tartar de Levant, qui y met sa seigneurie.’
Edition of Pauthier, 37. For status of this country at the beginning
of the thirteenth century, see _Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard le
Trésorier_ (ed. Mas-Latrie, Paris, 1871), pp. 377, 381.
[707] Hadji Khalfa naïvely solves this doubt by rolling Masud and Kaï
Kobad into one and the same person. _Djihannuma_, folio 1752 _bis_.
[708] There is no way of reaching certainty on this point. Rasmussen,
_Annales Islamici_, pp. 34-8, reflects the confusion which attended
the scholar of the early nineteenth century who wanted to make a
chronological table of the later Seljuk Sultans. The two best modern
tables are to be found in Sarre and Huart, scholars who became
interested in the Seljuk problem through their archaeological travels
in Asia Minor. The best account of the Seljuks is that of Houtsma in
the _Encyclopaedia Britannica_. It is to be regretted that Professor
Houtsma has not published the French translation of Ibn Bibi, which he
promised in his introduction to the 4th volume of the Leyden series of
Seljuk texts. Three years ago, Professor Sir William Ramsay, who knows
Konia better than any European scholar, told me that he felt there was
rich reward for the research student in the Seljuk period. The history
of the Seljuks of Konia has yet to be written.
[709] Osman was the sole heir according to Boecler: also Donado da
Lezze, 4.
[710] ‘Osman, Karaman, and Assam. Karaman retired to Syria and Assam to
Persia. The house of Osman always persecuted the descendants of these
two latter.’ Geuffroi, 267. Also Cuspianus, 11, and Haeniger.
[711] Spandugino, Lonicerus, and Egnatius.
[712] Mignot, 33.
[713] _Tractatus de moribus_; Vanell, i. 351-2; Sagredo; Cervarius;
Cuspianus, 46.
[714] The historian must use the Bonn editions with caution. There are
frequent glosses in the Latin translations of Byzantine texts. See
foot-note on p. 263.
[715] Pachymeres, ii. 589.
[716] See Appendix B, which is really a continuation of this argument.
[717] _Vie de Timour_, iii. 255.
[718] ‘Osman possessed all Anatolia, which he called Osmania: he came
to be called Lord of Asia Minor,’ Formanti, 4; ‘Osman made himself
master of all Anatolia without any difficulty,’ Spandugino; ‘Osman
seized Cappadocia, Galatia, and Bithynia,’ Cuspianus, 10; ‘master of
Syria as well as of Asia Minor,’ Donado da Lezze, 5.
[719] Formanti; Geuffroy; Donado; Cuspianus; Giovio Paulo; Richer;
Guazzo, 257 vº.
[720] Rabbi Joseph, ii. 505.
[721] Mignot, 33.
[722] _Chronique de Saint-Denis_ (Ed. _Soc. Hist. de France_), i. 319,
709.
[723] Richer, whom I have already quoted in Chapter I.
[724] ‘Cette nation nombreuse, pleine de confiance dans ses forces,
et brûlant du désir de soumettre à sa domination toute la chrétienté,
avait quitté les confins de Perse.’ _Chronique de Saint-Denys_, i. 709.
[725] ‘Quod cum ante complures annos florens illud Orientis imperium
everterit et in Occidentis non exigua spacia invaserit, atque
oppresserit quod reliquum nobis factum est, omni vi suo intolerabile
iugum ditionemque redigere studet.’ Domini de la Vuo, _Disputatio de
bello turcico_, bound in with Camerarius, p. 94, in Bibl. Nat., Paris,
Imprimés, no. J 860.
[726] Col. Djevad bey, 192-3.
[727] H. Saladin, _Manuel de l’architecture musulmane_, 437-40.
[728] Ibid., 437. On p. 479, Saladin makes another curious statement
to the effect that in 1300 the Osmanlis employed architects who had
fortified the Seljuk strongholds. I have never been able to find in my
reading or from observation of Ottoman constructions any authority for
such an assertion.
[729] i. 50. The _medressé_ is, as Seadeddin says, to the right after
you enter the Yeni Sheïr gate. The _imaret_ is near the Yeshil Djami,
which is the oldest Ottoman mosque extant, dating from 1378. The imam
of the Yeshil Djami told me that the imaret was built by Osman’s wife,
Malkhatun. According to Seadeddin, however, Malkhatun died before Osman!
[730] Parvillée, p. 6, says that the Oulou-Djami, which is attributed
to Murad I in Brusa by popular consent, was not finished until the
reign of Mahomet I.
[731] Cf. preface of Parvillée; and Hammer, i. 83.
[732] W. Lübeke, _Geschichte der Architektur_ (6te Auflage), i. 425;
Franz-Pasha, _Die Baukunst des Islams_ (third volume of part 2 of
_Handbücher der Architektur_), 52, 67.
[733] Mas-Latrie, _Trésor de Chronologie_, and papers on commercial
relationship between Cyprus and Asia Minor in _Bibl. de École des
Chartes_; Lane-Poole, ‘Successors of the Seljuks in Asia Minor,’
_Journ. Royal Asiatic Soc._, 1882, new series, xiv. 773-80 (Lane-Poole
did not avail himself of the precious indications in Ibn Batutah
and Shehabeddin, but trusted altogether to Gibb’s translation of
Seadeddin’s unreliable chronology. Seadeddin did not have access
to as good source-material as Lane-Poole himself!); Clément Huart,
‘Épigraphie arabe d’Asie Mineure,’ _Revue sémitique_, 1894-5.
[734] Muralt, in the bibliography of his _Chronographie Byzantine_,
puts Ibn Batutah at 1320. There can be no doubt about this being an
error, for when Ibn Batutah visited the Ottoman domains, Orkhan was
ruling, and Nicaea had been captured. I put 1340 as latter limit,
because Ibn Batutah speaks of some places captured by Orkhan before
1340 as being still independent.
[735] Quatremère, in _Notices et Extraits_, xiii. 152-3, cannot reach a
definite conclusion as to whether Shehabeddin is from Damascus, Marash,
or Morocco. But I find that Hadji Khalfa, _Dict. Bibl._, Paris MS.,
fol. 1832, under no. 10874, records him as a ‘writer of Damascus’.
[736] Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe 2325. For Quatremère trans. see
Bibliography.
[737] Ibid., fol. 123 vº.
[738] _Notices et Extraits_, xiv, partie 2, to face p. 77.
[739] See discussion of source-material in Bibliography.
[740] If one asks why Adana and Marash are included in this _résumé_,
it must be remembered that these are regions which might legitimately
be included in Asia Minor as a portion of the latter Konia Seljuk
dominions which we are discussing. In the division of the Roman Empire
in the fifth century, Cilicia is given under _Diocesis Oriens_ rather
than under _Diocesis Asiana_ with the rest of Asia Minor. To regard
Cilicia as belonging to Syria was common up to the days of Mehemet
Ali. Ibn Khaldun, _Notices et Extraits_, xix. 1^{ère} partie, p. 143,
speaks of Adana as being ‘at the extremity of Syria’, while Cilicia is
included in Syria in Abdul Ali Bakri’s description of Africa, Bibl.
Nat., Paris, fonds arabe no. 2218, p. 103. Both the Latin and Orthodox
Churches made Cilicia depend ecclesiastically upon Antioch: cf. Le
Quien, _Oriens Christianus_, ii. col. 869, iii. col. 1181. But, in
modern times, we have come to regard this region as a portion of Asia
Minor.
[741] Shehabeddin, 339, 369; Ibn Batutah, ii. 295-310; Cant. ii. 28,
pp. 470-3; 25, p. 455, iii. 192; Greg. xvi. 6, p. 834; Ducas, 7, pp.
29-30; 18, p. 79; Schlumberger, _Numismatique de l’Orient latin_,
481-5; for Venice’s share in crusade against Smyrna, Romanin, iii. 147;
for complete list of princes, Karabeck, in _Numismatische Zeitschrift_,
Vienna, 1877, ix. 207.
[742] Shehabeddin, 365.
[743] Ibn Batutah, ii. 267. Shehabeddin, 360, gives Akridur under Hamid.
[744] Ibn Batutah, ii. 285.
[745] Leunclavius, _Ann._, v. 40; Hadji Khalfa, _Djihannuma_, fol.
1769; Sarre, 21. Cf. struggles between Murad and Bayezid and the
Karamanlis, pp. 165-7, 187-90 above.
[746] Bosio, ii. 221-2, 237-8; Mas-Latrie, _Hist. de Chypre_, iii. 175,
335. Cf. authorities for Karamania, Tekke, and Satalia, and _Bibl. de
l’École des Chartes_, 2e série, i. 326, 328, 498, 505; ii. 138-41.
[747] Not in 1354 by Soleiman, as Cant. iv. 37, p. 284, infers. Hadji
Khalfa, _Djihannuma_, fol. 1852-6.
[748] Pachymeres, vii. 13, p. 589.
[749] How does Schlumberger reconcile the continuance of Ayasoluk,
or Ephesus, as capital of Aïdin with the Rhodian conquest? Cf. Wood.
_Discoveries at Ephesus_, pp. 12, 183, for coins which prove that the
chevaliers held the city in 1365. Cf. Palatchia, for treaty made by
Venice with an independent prince here in 1403. Ibn Batutah states
expressly that Guzel Hissar, or Birgui, was the capital of Aïdin.
[750] Ibn Batutah, ii. 317. Evliya effendi, ii. 19, distinguishes
between Balikesri and Karasi in his enumeration of the conquests of
Orkhan.
[751] Ibn Batutah, ii. 340.
[752] Sherefeddin, iii. 256; Howorth, iii. 749.
[753] Shehabeddin, 338, 358, 366; Ibn Batutah, ii. 275, 277; Reclus,
_Géog. univ._, ix. 633, 645; Baedeker, _Kleinasien_, 2. Aufl., 390.
Mas-Latrie, _Trésor de Chronologie_, makes an error in extending the
northern boundary of Denizli, which he calls Thingizlu, to the emirate
of Marmora.
[754] Panaretos, 13.
[755] Lane-Poole, _Mohammedan Coins in British Museum_, 21-4, 35;
ibid., _Mohammedan Coins in Bodleian Library_, 12.
[756] Hadji Khalfa, _Djihannuma_, fol. 1119; Sherefeddin, iii. 257.
[757] Ibn Batutah, ii. 279; Shehabeddin, 370; Bosio, ii. 4.
[758] Ibn Batutah, ii. 270.
[759] Ibn Batutah, ii. 267; Hammer, xvii. 98; Sarre, 21. See also under
Akridur, and Nazlu.
[760] Shehabeddin, 339.
[761] Shehabeddin, 363; Ibn Batutah, ii. 326-9; Hammer, xvii. 99.
[762] ‘Ledit Karaman haioit fort le Grant Turc, dont il eust la sœur.’
Bertrandon de la Broquière, Schéfer ed., 120. Bertrandon visited the
court of the emir of Konia in 1443 with a Cypriote ambassador.
[763] In time of Osman and Orkhan, Nicolay, 148-9; Howorth, iii.
428; Byzantine historians in Stritter, iii. 1092; Anon., _Hist. de
Géorgie_, i. 642; Shehabeddin, 346, 375; Ibn Batutah, ii. 284 (calls
them emirs of Larenda); Hammer, i. 262 fol.; Rasmussen, 116; Feridun
letters, Bibl. Nat., fonds turc, no. 79, p. 1. In time of Murad and
Bayezid, Feridun letters, ibid., pp. 18-20, 30, 33-4, and references
in text of this book. For fifteenth century, from re-establishment
by Timur, Sherefeddin, iv. 33; Bertrandon de la Broquière, 118-20;
Mas-Latrie, _Hist. de Chypre_, iii. 3; _Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_,
2e série, i. 326, 510; ii. 138; Sanuto, in Muratori, xxii. 962. For
coins, Lane-Poole, _Bodleian Collection_, 12; _British Museum_, 21-6.
The power of Karamania in the fifteenth century will be discussed in a
later volume.
[764] Shehabeddin, 350, 357, 372. Cf. Hertzberg, 471.
[765] Shehabeddin, 361; Ibn Batutah, ii. 343-7; _Bibl. de l’École des
Chartes_, 2e série, i. 325; Hammer, i. 90, 309-11; Clavijo, 20 vº.
[766] Ibn Batutah, ii. 339.
[767] Ashikpashazadé, Vatican MS., 33.
[768] Hadji Khalfa, _Djihannuma_, 617, 1807-9. It is curious that Hadji
Khalfa does not mention the famous potteries of Kutayia.
[769] Persian letter in collection of Feridun, Bibl. Nat., fonds turc
no. 79, p. 18.
[770] Shehabeddin, Paris MS., fonds arabe no. 583, fol. 144 rº-vº; Ibn
Batutah, ii. 270-1; Hammer, ii. 133, xvii. 98; Schéfer, preface to his
edition of Bertrandon de la Broquière, lxi. For expedition of Bayezid
against, Phr. i. 26, p. 82; Ducas, 18-19; Chalc. ii, pp. 64-6.
[771] Panaretos, 49, 52.
[772] Hammer, v. 28.
[773] Shehabeddin, 358, 366. In speaking of the propinquity of Denizli
and Marmora, one wonders if Mas-Latrie has not confused the Scamander
and Maeander rivers. Both of these rivers are called Menderes in
Turkish.
[774] Its last emir died without issue in 1425. M. de Ste. Croix, in
_Acad. des Inscriptions_, nouv. série, ii. 569-75; Hammer, i. 300-1,
xvii. 98; Ducas, 18, p. 79; Lane-Poole, _Coins in British Museum_, 33-4.
[775] Mordtmann, in _Zeitschrift d. m. G._, lxv (1911), p. 105.
[776] See above, p. 225.
[777] Shehabeddin, 360.
[778] Shehabeddin, 367.
[779] Clavijo, fol. 6 vº, 60 vº.
[780] Mas-Latrie, in _Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_, 5e série, v.
219-31, quoting _Pacta_, vi. 129 vº, and _Commem._, ii. 231, iii. 374.
[781] Cf. St. Pierre de Thomas, in Bollandist Coll.
[782] The currency of Byzantine money among the maritime emirates
of Asia Minor demonstrates this. See Makrisi, 7, and Stickel, in
_Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft_, viii. 837-9.
[783] Shehabeddin, 339, 360, 368-9; Ibn Batutah, ii. 313; _Commemor._,
ii. 231; Greg. xi. 2, p. 530; xv. 5, p. 763; Cant. ii. 29-30,
pp. 480-4; iii. 96, pp. 591-6; Ducas, 18, p. 79; Hadji Khalfa,
_Djihannuma_, fol. 1820; for relations of Genoese and Byzantines
with, Sauli, i. 256-7; for coins, Schlumberger, 479-81; Lane-Poole,
_Bodleian_, 12; _British Museum_, 31-2.
[784] ‘Aussi y est Satalie, située en rivages maritimes de Cilicie:
d’où a prins son nom le Goulphe de Satalie, anciennement appelé Issa:
et a présent la Iasse et en cest endroit Alexandre vainquit Daire ...’
Nicolay, 148. This passage, which shows Adalia confused with Adana,
would have helped Bruun in his note on p. 123 of the Hakluyt edition of
Schiltberger.
[785] In Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. fonds turc no. 62, there is a marginal
note in Armand’s handwriting which terminates thus: ‘La dynastie des
Seljuks de Rum finit en la personne de Kaï Kobad, fils de Feramorg,
fils de Kaï Kaous le 14e qui aye regné qui fut exterminé lui
et _toute sa race_ par Gazankhan.’ This view was taken by several
Orientalists of Armand’s day, but there is good authority for Ghazi
Tchelebi’s ancestry.
[786] Fallmerayer, _Originalberichte_, ii. 15, 319; Stella, cited by
Muralt, ii. 533; Ibn Batutah, ii. 343.
[787] Matteo Villani, in Muratori, xiv. 663.
[788] Shehabeddin, 359; Ibn Batutah, ii. 277.
[789] Shehabeddin, 371; Ibn Batutah, 258-9, 265; Bustron, _Chronique
de Chypre_, 296; Mas-Latrie, _Trésor_, col. 1802; Matteo Villani, in
Muratori, xiv, col. 662; Urban V, _Epp. secr._, i. 161; Rasmussen, 45;
Schiltberger, 19. (I cannot agree with Bruun that Adana is meant, for
there is no reason to believe that the Osmanlis crossed the Taurus into
Cilicia for more than one hundred years after the events Schiltberger
was describing. See above, p. 296, _n._ 3.)
[790] See note for Mikhalitch.
[791] Weil, iv. 504-624; Heyd, passim under Tarsus, Lajazzo, Adana, and
Alexandretta; Mas-Latrie, _Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_, vi. 310-11;
Le Nain de Tillemont (éd. Gaulle), iii. 9; iv. 459; Abulfaradj, _Chron.
Syr._, 572; Bertrandon de la Broquière (éd. Schéfer), introd., lv. 90-1.
[792] Finlay, iv. 386-92; Panaretos, _passim_.
[793] Ibn Batutah, ii. 314; Cant. ii. 13, pp. 388-90; Phr. i. 8, p. 37;
Greg. xi. 9, p. 554; Sauli, i. 256-7. See also in text of this book
under Orkhan.
[794] Matteo Villani, in Muratori, xiv. 650, under spring of 1360,
says: ‘E per tante guerre e divisioni de’ Turchi gli paesi loro erano
rotti e in grande tribulazione. E per questa cagione i Greci havieno
minore persecuzione da loro. E più ciò fu materia al Re di Cipro di
fare l’impresa sopra loro con honore e vittoria grande.’ Mas-Latrie, in
_Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_, 2e série, ii. 122-3, says that the
Karamanian army was defeated before Gorhigos in 1361, and that Cyprus,
then at the height of its power, was able to impose tribute on the
emirs of Asia Minor.
[795] Ibn Batutah, ii. 288-95.
[796] See above under Smyrna, Aïdin, Menteshe, Fukeh, and Tawas. Also
in text of book, p. 44.
[797] Cf. Weil, iv. _passim._
[798] See above, p. 123.
[799] The ordinals following the names of Byzantine emperors are a
cause of confusion, as there is no universal agreement as to the
method of numbering. Some historians count by sovereigns _of the same
family_ bearing a particular name (i. e. John I Palaeologos and John II
Palaeologos), while others number by the imperial line as a whole (i.
e. John V Palaeologos, John VI Cantacuzenos, John VII Palaeologos). I
have used the second system.
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