A History of Greek Economic Thought

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Title: A History of Greek Economic Thought
Author: Trever, Albert Augustus
Language: English
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A History of Greek Economic Thought

The University of Chicago

A HISTORY OF GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS
AND LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ALBERT AUGUSTUS TREVER

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
1916

Published August 1916

Composed and Printed By
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

PREFACE

The need of a reinterpretation of Greek economic theory in the light of
our modern humanitarian economy is presented in the introduction to this
work. If this volume may, in some degree, meet such a need, by awakening
the classicist to the existence of important phases of Greek thought
with which he is too unfamiliar, and by reminding the economist of the
many vital points of contact between Greek and modern economy, our labor
will have been amply repaid. There are doubtless errors both in
citations and in judgment which will not escape the critic’s eye. We
trust, however, that the work is, on the whole, a fair representation of
the thought of the Greeks in this important field. In the course of our
study, we have naturally been obliged to make constant reference to the
actual economic environment of the Greeks, as a proper background for
their theories. It is therefore our purpose to publish, at some future
date, a general history of economic conditions in Greece, which may
serve as a companion to this volume.

We gladly take this opportunity to express our gratitude to Professor
Paul Shorey, of the University of Chicago, for his suggestion of the
subject of this work, as also for his many helpful criticisms and
suggestions during the course of its preparation.

LAWRENCE COLLEGE, APPLETON, WIS.

November 1, 1915

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 7

1. Previous works on Greek economic thought.

2. Scope, purpose, method.

3. General characteristics of Greek economic thought.

II. ECONOMIC IDEAS BEFORE PLATO, AND REASONS FOR THE UNDEVELOPED
CHARACTER OF GREEK ECONOMICS 14

III. PLATO 22

1. General standpoint.

2. Theory of value.

3. Wealth: theory; moral attitude.

4. Production.

_a_) Agriculture.

_b_) Capital.

_c_) Labor and industry:

(1) Plato’s attitude toward.

(2) Division of labor.

(3) Slavery.

5. Money: theory; moral attitude; interest.

6. Exchange: theory; criticism of Plato’s negative attitude.

7. Population.

8. Distribution: theory; attitude toward laboring classes.

9. Communistic and socialistic ideas.

_a_) Reasons for such tendencies in Greek thought.

_b_) _Republics_ before Plato: Hippodamas; Phaleas.

_c_) Plato’s _Republic_.

_d_) Plato’s _Laws_.

IV. XENOPHON 63

1. Double standpoint.

2. Theory of value.

3. Wealth: practical interest in.

4. Production.

_a_) Theory; positive interest.

_b_) Agriculture.

_c_) Capital.

_d_) Labor and industry.

(1) Positive interest in its development.

(2) Division of labor.

(3) Slavery.

5. Money: theory; in favor of unlimited increase.

6. Exchange: proposed means for its free development.

7. Population.

8. Distribution: attitude toward masses.

9. Socialistic tendencies in the _Revenues_.

V. THE ORATORS—DEMOSTHENES, ISOCRATES 77

VI. ARISTOTLE 81

1. Attitude toward matters economic; domestic and public economy.

2. Theory of value.

3. Wealth: theory; negative attitude toward.

4. Production: theory; negative standpoint.

_a_) Agriculture.

_b_) Capital: theory; negative interest.

_c_) Labor and industry.

(1) Negative attitude.

(2) Division of labor.

(3) Slavery.

5. Money: origin; theory; interest; reasons for the negative
attitude of Aristotle and other Greek philosophers.

6. Exchange: theory; tariff; criticism of “chrematistik.”

7. Population.

8. Distribution: theory; attitude toward masses.

9. Communism and socialism.

_a_) Negative criticism of Plato’s _Republic_ and other systems.

_b_) Positive theory.

VII. MINOR PHILOSOPHERS, CONTEMPORARIES OR SUCCESSORS OR PLATO AND
ARISTOTLE 125

1. The Academy, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Crantor.

2. Theophrastus.

3. _Economica_; the pseudo-Aristotelian _Economica_.

4. Cyrenaics: Aristippus; Bion.

5. Epicureans.

6. Cynics: Antisthenes; Diogenes; Crates.

7. Pseudo-Platonic _Eryxias_.

8. Teles.

9. Stoics: Zeno; Aristo; Cleanthes; Chrysippus; Plutarch.

10. Communistic tendencies after Aristotle.

VIII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE OR GREEK
ECONOMICS 146

BIBLIOGRAPHY 151

INDEX 157

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

For a complete list of scholars who have devoted more or less attention
to the economic ideas of Greek thinkers, the reader is referred to the
bibliography at the conclusion of this work. On the surface, the list
appears to be reasonably extensive. It will be observed, however, that
the majority of the works are not of recent date; that many of them deal
largely with the practical phase of economics; that most of the larger
works on economic history treat Greek economic and social theory in a
merely incidental manner, and that nearly all are written from the
general standpoint of the economist rather than with the more detailed
analysis of the classicist. The work of Souchon, the most extensive,
careful, and satisfactory discussion of the subject, is no exception to
this latter rule, and since his standpoint is too exclusively that of
the older English economists, his criticism of the Greek theories is not
always sufficiently sympathetic. The monumental volumes of Poehlmann
have treated Greek social theories thoroughly, but the chief interest of
the author is rather in the actual social conditions, and his work is
marred by a constant overemphasis of the analogy between ancient and
modern capitalism and socialistic agitation. Moreover, there is no book
in the English language, on Greek economic thought, that treats the
subject in anything more than the cursory manner of Haney and Ingram.[1]
There is, thus, still a place for a work of this type in the English
language, written from the standpoint of the classicist, but with a view
also to the needs of twentieth-century students of economics.

The present work aims to fulfil such a need. Its scope differs quite
essentially from all other accounts of Greek theory previously
published, in that our purpose is not merely to consider the extent to
which the Greek thinkers grasped the principles of the orthodox economy
of Ricardo and Mill. We shall also endeavor to ascertain how far they,
by the humanitarian and ethical tone of their thinking, anticipated the
modern, post-Ruskin economy, which makes man, not property, the supreme
goal, and recognizes the multiplicity of human interests and strivings
that belie the old theory of the “economic man.” Our verdict as to the
importance of the Greek contribution to economic thought is thus likely
to be somewhat more favorable than that which is usually rendered.

We purpose also to emphasize more than is often done the important fact
that Greek theory is essentially a reflection of Greek economic
conditions, and that a true interpretation of the thought depends upon a
clear understanding of the economic history of Greece. However, as we
shall see, this by no means implies that the anti-capitalistic theories
of the Socratics are evidence of an undeveloped state of commerce and
industry in fifth- and fourth-century Athens.

The method of presentation is primarily chronological. Thus the ideas of
each thinker can be discussed in a more thorough and unitary manner, and
more in relation to the contemporary economic conditions that gave rise
to them. Moreover, despite some practical advantages of the topical
method, it savors too much of an artificial attempt to force the Greek
thinkers on the procrustean rack of the concepts of modern economy.

The general characteristics of Greek economic thought have often been
enumerated. They may be restated with advantage, at this point, together
with some additions and needed criticisms.

1. _Simplicity._—The theory of economics as a separate science never
developed in Greece. The consideration of economic problems was
incidental to the pursuit of politics and ethics. In so far as Greek
thinkers treated such subjects, their theories reflect the comparative
simplicity of their economic environment. Without prejudging the issue
as to the actual extent of capitalism in ancient Athens, we need only to
think away the vast international scope of our modern commercial
problems, our giant manufacturing plants with their steam and electric
power, our enormous wealth and its extreme concentration, the untold
complexity of modern business and finance, the vast territorial expanse
of modern nations, almost all our luxuries and commonplace comforts, to
begin to appreciate something of this ancient simplicity.[2] However, as
a direct result of this limitation, the Greeks were led to deal with
their problems more in terms of men than in terms of things, and thus
their economic vision was sometimes clearer and truer than our own.
Aristotle struck the keynote in Greek economic thought in stating that
the primary interest of economy is human beings rather than inanimate
property.[3]

2. _Confusion of private and public economy._—As a result of this
simplicity, the terms οἰκονομία and οἰκονομική were, both in derivation
and largely in usage, referred to household management rather than to
public economy.[4] Domestic and public economy were regularly defined as
differing merely in extent.[5] Aristotle, however, distinctly criticizes
the confusion of the two.[6] Moreover, there is no warrant for the
frequent assertion that Greek thinkers never rose above the conception
of domestic economy. Xenophon’s treatise on the _Revenues of Athens_,
and Aristotle’s entire philosophy of the state are a sufficient answer
to such generalizations. The statement of Professor Barker that
“political economy,” to Aristotle, would be a “contradiction in terms,”
is extreme.[7] There is also a certain important truth in the Greek
confusion, which has been too generally missed by modern critics and
statesmen—that the public is a great property-holder, and that politics
should be a business which requires the application of the same economic
and ethical laws as are admitted to govern in private affairs.

3. _Confusion of economics with ethics and politics._—The assertion that
Greek economic theory was confounded with ethics and politics has become
a commonplace. The economic ideas of Greek thinkers were not arrived at
as a result of a purposeful study of the problems of material wealth.
All economic relations were considered primarily from the standpoint of
ethics and state welfare. “The citizen was not regarded as a producer,
but only as a possessor of wealth.”[8] Such statements are too commonly
accepted as a final criticism of Greek thinkers. Though the confusion
was a source of error, and caused Greek economic thought to be one-sided
and incomplete, yet some important considerations should be noted.

_a_) The Socratic philosophers are our chief source for the economic
ideas of the Greeks. Too sweeping conclusions should not, therefore, be
drawn from them as to the general attitude of the Greeks. Xenophon is
much freer from the ethical emphasis than the other Socratics.
Thucydides is entirely free from it, and very probably his standpoint
came much nearer being that of the average Athenian citizen.

_b_) The confusion was not merely with individual ethics, for Greek
moral philosophy always had the welfare of the state for its goal.
Indeed, the basal reason for this close union of economics, ethics, and
politics is the true idea that the state should rise above internal
strife, and unite all in a care for the common interest.[9]

_c_) The standpoint of the Greek philosophers is certainly no more to be
criticized than is that of the so-called orthodox political economy.[10]
They represent two extremes. If the Greek theory did not give to wealth
its full right, and was open to the charge of sentimentalism, the
Ricardian doctrine, with its “economic man,” which eliminated all other
ideals and impulses, was an unreal and pernicious abstraction. Of the
two errors, the Greek is the less objectionable, and is more in accord
with the trend of economic thought today. The best economists are now
insisting more and more on the Greek idea that economic problems must be
considered from the standpoint of the whole man as a citizen in society.
Modern political economy “has placed man as man and not wealth in the
foreground, and subordinated everything to his true welfare.” “Love,
generosity, nobility of character, self-sacrifice, and all that is best
and truest in our nature have their place in economic life.”[11] “The
science which deals with wealth, so far from being a ‘gospel of Mammon,’
necessarily begins and ends in the study of man.”[12] “Es soll kein
Widerspruch zwischen Ethik und Volkswirtschaft bestehen, es soll das
Sittengesetz für die Wirtschaft gelten und in ihr ausgeführt
werden.”[13] Such strong statements taken at random from modern
economists should serve to temper our criticism of the Greek confusion.
Plato’s definition of economics, as suggested by one of the most recent
historians of economic thought,[14] could easily be accepted by many a
modern scholar: “Economics is the science which deals with the
satisfaction of human wants through exchange, seeking so to regulate the
industries of the state as to make its citizens good and happy, and so
to promote the highest well-being of the whole.” The contention of the
Socratics, that all economic operations must finally root in the moral,
that all economic problems are moral problems, and that the province of
economics is human welfare, is thus a dominant twentieth-century idea.
And just as the ethical interest of the Greek philosophers caused them
to emphasize the problems of distribution and consumption, so these are
the phases of economics that receive chief consideration today. To be
sure, modern thought appreciates more fully the complementary truth that
all our social and moral problems root essentially in economic
conditions, though this too was by no means overlooked by Plato and
Aristotle.

4. _Ascetic tendency._—It cannot be denied, however, that, as a result
of the overemphasis on the ethical, Greek economic thought was hampered
by a certain asceticism. But this was also an outgrowth of pessimistic
tendencies in Greek philosophy itself. Moreover, the ascetic ideas of
the philosophers cannot be accepted as the common attitude of Athenian
citizens, any more than Thoreau can be recognized as a criterion of the
economic thought of his day in New England.[15] Asceticism was certainly
foreign to the mind of Pericles and Thucydides. In the course of our
discussion, also, we shall find that it represents, after all, only one
phase of the thought of the philosophers themselves.

5. _Socialistic tendency._—Since Greek economy was chiefly interested in
the problems of distribution, it tended toward socialism, both in theory
and in practice. This was also a natural outgrowth of the fact that
individual interests were subordinated to public welfare. Though the
latter half of the fifth century witnessed a great individualistic
movement in Greece, and though individualism and independence are often
named as prominent Greek characteristics, yet these terms did not
constitute a basal political principle, even in the free Athenian
democracy, in the same sense as they do with us today. The life of the
Greek citizen was lived far more for the state, and was more absolutely
at the disposal of the state, than is true in any modern democracy. In
Greece, politics was thus the social science of first importance, and
the supreme purpose of all human activity was to make good citizens.
State interference or regulation was thus accepted as a matter of
course, and the setting of prices, rigid regulation of grain commerce,
exploitation of the rich in the interest of the poor, and public
ownership of great material interests such as mines were not
revolutionary ideas, but common facts in Greek life.[16] The tendency of
the theorists was therefore naturally toward centralization of power in
the hands of the state, and an exaggerated idea of the omnipotence of
law.[17] Yet despite the error inherent in it, this socialistic tendency
of Greek economic thought had its basal truth, which is becoming an
axiom of modern economics and statesmanship—the belief that private
property is not a natural right, but a gift of society, and hence that
its activities should be controlled by society, and made to minister to
public welfare. Indeed, we have by no means escaped the error of the
Greek thinkers, for one of the most common mistakes of statesmen and
political theorists today is an overestimate of the effectiveness of
law.

Footnote 1:

F. Wilhelm (_Rhein. Mus._, XVII, No. 2 [1915], 163, n. 2) says: “Eine
Geschichte der theoretischen Behandlung der Oekonomik bei den Griechen
ist noch zu schreiben.” The present work was undertaken in the year
1911.

Footnote 2:

Cf. Zimmern, _Greek Commonwealth_, pp. 211 ff.; but the statement on
p. 222 is extreme: “where competition and unemployment are unknown
terms, where hardly anyone is working precariously for money wages or
salary.”

Footnote 3:

Cf. Roscher, _Ansichten der Volkswirtschaft_ (1878), I, chap. i, p. 7;
Ar. _Pol._ 1259_b_18-21.

Footnote 4:

Cf. Plato _Rep._ 498A; Xen. _Econ._, a treatise on household
management; Ar. _Pol._ i. p. 3, on the divisions of οἰκονομία; chap.
8, on whether finance (χρηματιστική) is a part of οἰκονομική;
pseudo-Ar. _Economica_; cf. _infra_, p. 63, nn. 5 and 6; p. 82, n. 1;
p. 128, for fuller discussion.

Footnote 5:

Xen. _Mem._ iii. 4. 6 ff., especially 12; _Econ._ xx; Plato _Pol._ 259
B-C; cf., on this passage, Espinas, _Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII
(1914), 105; cf. Ruskin: “Economy no more means saving money than it
means spending money. It means the administration of a house” (_A Joy
Forever_, I, 8, Allen ed., London, 1912, Vol. XVI, 19). We shall
frequently quote from this monumental edition of Ruskin.

Footnote 6:

_Pol._ i. 1. 2: ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἵονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ
οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν.

Footnote 7:

_Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle_, p. 357; cf. Zmavc,
_Zeitschr. f. d. gesammt. Staatswissenschaft_, 1902, pp. 59 f., and
his references to Boeckh, Meyer, and Beloch; Kautz, _Die Gesch. d.
Entwickelung der National Ökonomik_, p. 133, n. 5; for note on the
authorship of the _Revenues_, cf. _infra_, p. 63, n. 2.

Footnote 8:

Ingram, _History of Political Economy_, p. 12; cf. Souchon, _Les
Théories économiques dans la Grèce antique_, p. 34.

Footnote 9:

Cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, pp. 31 ff.

Footnote 10:

Cf. V. Brants, _Xenophon Economiste_, reprint from _Revue Catholique
de Louvain_, 1881, pp. 4 ff.

Footnote 11:

Ely, _Studies in Historical and Political Science_, 2d series, pp. 48
ff., especially p. 64, where he states that it is a return to the
Greek view.

Footnote 12:

Ely, _Outlines of Economics_, 1908, pp. 4 ff.; cf. Seligman,
_Principles of Economy_, (1905), pp. 4 ff., especially p. 14, where he
even quotes the sentences of Ruskin with approval: “There is no wealth
but life”; “Nor can anything be wealth except to a noble person”
(_Unto This Last_, IV, 77 [Vol. XVII, 105]). All citations will be
from the Allen library edition unless otherwise stated.

Footnote 13:

Schoenberg, _Handbuch der polit. Econ._ (1890), I, 56.

Footnote 14:

Haney, _History of Economic Thought_, p. 52; cf. Ely, _op. cit._, p.
48, n. 1, cited in n. 1, above, for a similar definition based on
Plato.

Footnote 15:

Kautz (_op. cit._, p. 57) goes to the extreme of saying that antiquity
represents “die Negation der ökonomischen Interessen und der
wirtschaftlichen Arbeit.”

Footnote 16:

Even abolition of debts and redivision of lands were not unknown in
Greek history. Grote (_History of Greece_, III, 105 f. and notes)
denies this, but the heliastic oath, which he cites (Dem. _Adv.
Timoc._ 746, and Dio Chrysost. Or. xxxi. 332), proves that such
measures were agitated, or there would be no reason for protective
measures. Cf. _infra_, Plato (_Laws_, 736E), who takes this for
granted. Cf. Solon’s Fragments; Isoc. (_Panath._ 259) says that it
would be hard to find a Greek state, except Sparta, that has not
fallen into “the accustomed accidents,” viz., στάσιν, σφαγάς, φυγὰς
ἀνόμους, ἁρπαγὰς χρημάτων, χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς, γῆς ἀναδασμόν, etc.

Footnote 17:

Cf. _infra._ for citations and qualifications.

CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC IDEAS BEFORE PLATO, AND REASONS FOR THE UNDEVELOPED CHARACTER
OF GREEK ECONOMICS

As stated above, the economic ideas of the Greeks were unsystematized
and inextensive.[18] The extant literature previous to Plato presents
only incidental hints on matters economic. Hesiod, in interesting
antithesis to classical thinkers, emphasizes the dignity and importance
of manual labor.[19] The contrast, however, is not so great as it
appears, for the labor which he dignifies is agricultural. He constantly
urges its importance as the chief source of wealth.[20] On the other
hand, he opposes the commercial spirit that was beginning to be rife in
his age, and decries the evil of unjust gains.[21] His mention of the
fact of competition between artisans of the same trade is of interest
for the development of industry in Greece.[22] His _Erga_ was, in a
sense, the forerunner of the later _Economica_ in Greek literature.

Solon proved by his reforms that he had some sane economic ideas as to
the importance of labor, industry, commerce, and money in the
development of the state. He also showed some insight into the solution
of the problem of poverty. His ideas, however, are not definitely
formulated in his extant fragments, and belong rather to economic
history.[23] The _Elegies_ of Theognis are full of moral utterances on
wealth, emphasizing its temporary nature as compared with virtue.[24]
Pythagoras and his followers have often been given a prominent place in
the history of communism, but this is probably due to a false
interpretation.[25] It is likely, however, that he opposed the evils of
luxury, and moralized on the relation between wealth and virtue.[26]
Democritus wrote a work on agriculture.[27] Like the other philosophers,
he taught that happiness was to be sought in the gold of character,
rather than in material wealth.[28] To his mind, poverty and wealth
alike were but names for need and satiety (κόρου).[29] Wealth without
understanding was not a safe possession, depending for its value on
right use.[30] The amassing of wealth by just means, however, was
good,[31] though unjust gains were always a source of evil.[32]
Excessive desire for wealth was worse than the most extreme poverty.[33]
It is possible also that Democritus held to a mild form of the social
contract theory of the origin of society.[34] Heraclitus complained
bitterly of the unwisdom of the masses and their merely material view of
life.[35] He made the common antithesis between material and spiritual
wealth,[36] and observed the fact that gold is a universal medium of
exchange.[37] Hippodamas of Miletus and Phaleas of Chalcedon proposed
new plans for the distribution of wealth, but we have the barest outline
of their theories from Aristotle.[38] Their systems will be discussed in
a following chapter.

The Sophists, true to their character as philosophers of extreme
individualism, developed a new theory of the origin of society. The
already current term φύσις, “nature,” which had been accepted as a
sufficient reason for the state’s existence, was now opposed to “law,”
νόμος, as natural to artificial. The Sophists argued that, in a
primitive state of nature, perfect individualism was the rule. Men did
injustice without restraint. The weaker, however, being in the majority,
and finding it to their disadvantage to compete with the strong, agreed
neither to do nor to suffer injustice, and constrained the stronger
minority to co-operate in their decision. Thus arose the social contract
whereby nature gave up its real instinct for an artificial convention
(συνθήκη), and thus society came into being.[39] The theory, at first,
though untrue, was not intended to be destructive of moral foundations,
but was opposed rather to the traditional idea of the laws of a state as
the “decrees of a divinely inspired lawgiver.”[40] In the hands of men
like Thrasymachus[41] and Callicles,[42] however, it became a means of
denying that the life according to nature was bound by any laws which
the strong need observe, and that might was the only final law.

In line with their radical individualism, the Sophists were also
pioneers in the more cosmopolitan spirit that characterized the Cynics
and Stoics. They taught the doctrine of the fundamental worth and
relationship of men,[43] and thus, with the Cynics, started the attack
upon the theory that upheld slavery as a natural institution.[44] Little
further is known of their other social or economic ideas. Protagoras
wrote a work on “wages,” but it was probably an argument relative to the
acceptance of pay by Sophists.[45] In any event, this fact that the
Sophists were so ready to be enriched through their lectures is clear
evidence that their teaching on wealth was not the negative doctrine of
the other Greek philosophers.[46] Prodicus seems to have scorned menial
labor as morally degrading, though he agreed with Hesiod in his doctrine
of the dignity of all work that is noble.[47] He emphasized the
necessity of labor in the production of material good,[48] and, like
Democritus, was the forerunner of the Socratics in his insistence upon
right use as a criterion of wealth.[49] Hippias prided himself on his
accomplishment in many arts,[50] and thus probably did not share the
prejudice of the philosophers against manual labor.

Euripides, though markedly individualistic, like the Sophists, shows
traces of the older use of nature to explain the necessity of the state.
He draws a parallel between the social order and the order of nature, by
which law and government are justified, and the right of the middle
class of farmers to rule is upheld.[51] He emphasizes the importance of
agriculture, and the dignity of the peasant farmer (αὐτουργός), who
works his own land, as the stay of the country.[52] This latter accords
well with his cosmopolitan spirit, which he shares with the Sophists. He
opposes the artificial distinctions of birth,[53] slavery,[54] and the
traditional Greek idea of the inferiority of woman.[55] His attitude
toward wealth is that of the moral philosopher rather than that of the
Sophist.[56]

Thucydides reveals considerable insight into economic problems, though
he does not deal with them directly. Roscher declares that the Greek
historian contributed as much as any other writer to give him the
elements of his science, since he alone, of all Greek writers, did not
confuse his economic ideas with ethics.[57] He recognizes the place of
labor in production, and the importance of material wealth as the basis
for all higher development.[58] He also has some appreciation of the
true nature of capital. In his description of the undeveloped condition
of early Greece, which lived from hand to mouth, he writes like a modern
economist describing primitive conditions in Europe in contrast to the
capitalism of his own day.[59] Cornford’s attempt[60] to discredit
Thucydides as a historian, and to show that he missed the true cause,
economic, of the Peloponnesian War, is not convincing. Cornford both
exaggerates the influence of commercial interests in fifth-century
Athens and belittles the economic insight of Thucydides. The Greek
writer is, however, like Herodotus, a historical source for the actual
economic conditions in Greece, rather than an economic theorist.

Aside from the fragmentary hints presented above, Greek economic thought
begins with the Socratics, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, and is
continued, in a very incidental way, in the orators, and in the Stoics
and their contemporaries. As we shall see, however, even in the
Socratics, no real science of wealth is developed, in the modern sense.
The reason for this lack, which is most commonly emphasized since it is
closest at hand, is that the phenomena of actual production were but
slightly developed. This explanation is well summarized by Haney[61] as
follows: (_a_) that economic relations between individuals and states
were far simpler than now; (_b_) that international commerce was not
encouraged by ancient states, whose ideal was rather national exclusion;
(_c_) that public finance was then very limited and unimportant; (_d_)
that division of labor was not extensive; (_e_) that the relative lack
of security of life and property discouraged exchange and saving; (_f_)
that in all these respects, the situation is analogous to that of
mediaeval Europe.

There is certainly much force in this general reason. The development of
economic thought must, of course, depend upon the actual conditions
under which the thinkers live. We have already admitted also the vast
difference between the present economic complexity and the simplicity in
ancient Greece. The foregoing summary of Haney, however, is misleading.
Though the ideal of Sparta was national exclusion, it was surely not
that of Athens and some other Greek states. All extant records agree
that Athens, at least, the home of the economic theorists, encouraged
international commerce by every means in her power. The division of
labor, while insignificant compared with the minute division of modern
mechanical industry, was by no means inextensive, as is evidenced by the
fact that this is a point on which Greek thinkers show especial insight.
The notion that Greek industry was chiefly limited to household economy,
and that the era of capitalism had not yet dawned, has long ago been
refuted by Meyer and others. The alleged insecurity of life and
property, while relatively true, is exaggerated for Athens, at least.
Above all, the common attempt to draw an analogy between classical
Greece and mediaeval Europe economically is due to an utter
misconception. The period of Greek economic history, which corresponds
to that of the Middle Ages, is rather the era of economic awakening,
between the middle of the ninth and the end of the sixth century
B.C.[62]

Other reasons for the limited development of Greek economic thought are:

_a_) The dominance of the state over the individual citizen, which fact
caused political rather than economic speculation to absorb the
attention of Greek thinkers. It is stated that the importance of the
individual must be recognized before a science of economics can
develop.[63] This reason is also usually overemphasized.

_b_) The general prejudice in Greece against industry, labor for
another, and finance for its own sake. That such a prejudice existed to
some degree, arising from the old aristocratic feeling, moral
objections, the reflex influence of slavery, the spirit of independence,
and the belief that leisure was necessary for the proper performance of
the duties of citizenship, is generally admitted. The commonly assumed
universality of this feeling is, however, open to grave question. The
prejudice against skilled labor was probably limited to the moral
philosophers, and perhaps to the more aristocratic portion of the
citizens, and we shall see in another chapter that the hostile attitude
of the philosophers themselves has been considerably exaggerated. The
evil effects of slavery also could not have been so marked in Greece,
before the age of machinery. Moreover, as Meyer has pointed out, a
prejudice against manual labor is evident among the more favored classes
in most European countries today, yet it does not appear to retard the
advance of industry in the least.[64]

_c_) The approval of conquest as a legitimate source of wealth. This is
somewhat true as applied to the state, but it certainly is irrelevant
for the individual citizen of fifth-century Athens. To appeal to
Aristotle’s list of legitimate employments as evidence of this is to
misinterpret his meaning, for he is thinking of a primitive life, not of
contemporary Greece.[65]

_d_) Economic facts are a commonplace of daily life, and familiarity
breeds contempt.[66] This statement contradicts the first reason given
by Haney. Moreover, it is somewhat unfortunate as applied to Greece,
since the very opposite reason is given for the prominence of political
speculation—the commonness of practical politics.

_e_) Perhaps the strongest reason for the comparative unimportance of
Greek economic thought is usually not emphasized. It is the patent fact
that almost our only extant sources are the Socratic philosophers, who
represent avowedly a direct moral reaction against the commercial spirit
and money-greed of their age.[67] Thus the limited development of Greek
economics, so far from being an evidence of primitive economic
conditions in Greece, is a direct argument for the opposite. To be sure,
a man with the scientific mind of Aristotle would scarcely have failed
to gain a clearer apprehension of certain fundamentals of economics than
he did, had his economic environment been more complex. Yet the fact
remains that he and Plato are moral prophets, protesting against that
very capitalism whose existence many modern historians have sought to
deny to their age.

Footnote 18:

Cf. _infra_ for qualifications. Zimmern (_op. cit._, p. 227) rightly
insists: “In spite of what is often said, Greece did produce
economists.”

Footnote 19:

_Erga_ 308, 314, 397 f., 311 (ἔργον δ᾽ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ᾽
ὄνειδος), 310, 303-6, 413. Any material in Homer applies rather to a
history of economic conditions. Cf., however, _Il._ xiii. 730-32; iii.
65; xxiii. 667 on specialization of gifts.

Footnote 20:

Cf. _Erga_ and _Theogony_ 969-75; cf. n. 2.

Footnote 21:

Cf. n. 2 above; a common theme of seventh- and eighth-century poets;
cf. e.g., Sappho (Bergk-Hiller, _Lyr. G. Vet._ [1897], I, 204, fr. 79
[45]); ὁ πλοῦτος ἄνευ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐκ ἀσίνης πάροικος. Cf. also III,
168, fr. 49 (50), Alcaeus.

Footnote 22:

_Erga_ 25 f.

Footnote 23:

Cf. his poems, especially fr. xiii. 43 ff.; Ar. _Ath. Pol._ x. 1;
Plut. _Solon_ 15, 22-24; Kautz, _op. cit._, pp. 114 f. and note, on
Solon and the other lawgivers; Gilliard, _Quelque Réformes de Solon_.
Cornford (_Thucydides Mythhistoricus_, p. 66) thinks he was “on the
verge” of discovering the law that exports must balance imports.

Footnote 24:

_Elegies_ 1117 f., 227 ff., 1157 f., 181 f., 267 ff., 173 ff., 351
ff., 393 ff., 523 ff., 621 f., 199 ff., 753, 145 f., 559 f., etc.

Footnote 25:

On this error, cf. _infra_, on communism before Plato.

Footnote 26:

Cf. Kautz, _op. cit._, p. 114; Jamblichus, _De Pyth. vit._, chap. xii,
p. 58; chap. xvi, p. 69.

Footnote 27:

Diels, _Frag. d. Vorsokratiker_ (1912), II, 20, 69.

Footnote 28:

_Ibid._, p. 95, fr. 171; p. 73, fr. 40.

Footnote 29:

_Ibid._, p. 119, fr. 283.

Footnote 30:

_Ibid._, p. 77, fr. 77; cf. Stob. _Flor._ 94. 24; χρημάτων χρῆσις ξὺν
νόῳ μὲν χρήσιμον εἰς τὸ ἐλευθέριον εἶναι καί δημοφελέα· ξὺν ἀνοίῃ δὲ
χορηγίῃ ξυνή. Cf. Xenophon and Plato, _infra_, on value and wealth.

Footnote 31:

_Ibid._, p. 78, fr. 78.

Footnote 32:

_Ibid._, p. 105, frs. 200, 218, 221.

Footnote 33:

_Ibid._, fr. 219; p. 106, fr. 224. The ethical fragments of
Democritus, cited above, may be spurious. Cf. Mullach, _Frag. Phil.
Gr._, I, 138; Zeller (_Gesch. d. Gr. Phil._ I, 2, 925, n. 1) leaves
the question open. Diels (_op. cit._, II, 1912) cites the above
passages under the “echte fragmente,” though some are starred.

Footnote 34:

Cf. Barker, _op. cit._, p. 37.

Footnote 35:

Diels, _op. cit._, I, 83, fr. 29; οἱ δὲ πολλὸι κεκόρηται ὁκώσπερ
κτήνεα.

Footnote 36:

_Ibid._, p. 82, fr. 22; cf. Clem. Alex. _Strom._ iv. 2. p. 565, and
his comment.

Footnote 37:

Diels, _op. cit._, I, 95, fr. 90: πυρὸς ἀνταμείβεται πάντα καὶ πῦρ
ἀπάντων, ὥσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσὸς.

Footnote 38:

_Pol._ ii; cf. _infra_ for details.

Footnote 39:

Cf. Glaucon’s tentative argument presenting the Sophist theory, _Rep._
358E ff., very similar to that of Hobbes. Cf. Barker’s (_op. cit._,
pp. 27 ff.) excellent presentation of the rise of this theory and its
causes.

Footnote 40:

Cf. A. Dobbs, _Philosophy and Popular Morals in Ancient Greece_
(1907), p. 48. For examples, cf. Hippias, cited below, n. 6, or
Lycophron, opposed by Aristotle, cited below in Aristotle’s criticism
of socialism (_Pol._ 1280_b_10-12).

Footnote 41:

_Rep._ i, and the story of Gyges, _Rep._ ii.

Footnote 42:

_Gorg._ 482E ff., though Callicles was hardly a Sophist.

Footnote 43:

E.g., Hippias in _Protag._ 337C, where he says that men are related
(συγγενεῖς, οἰκείους) by nature, not by law, and that the law is a
tyrant of men that does much violence contrary to nature (παρὰ τὴν
φύσιν).

Footnote 44:

Cf. Alcidamas frag., cited _infra_ on Aristotle’s theory of slavery,
and Ar. _Pol._ i. 3. 1253_b_20-23; Lycophron (pseudo-Plut. _Pro. Nob._
18. 2) denies the reality of the distinction between noble and
ill-born. Cf. also on Euripides, _infra_. On the development of the
opposition to slavery in Greece, cf. Newman, _Pol. of Arist._, I, 139
ff.

Footnote 45:

Diog. L. ix. 55: δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ. Cf. Diels, _op. cit._, II, 220,
231; Croiset, _Hist. de la Litt. Gr._, IV, 54. Souchon (_op. cit._, p.
23, n. 1) thinks that it may have taught the dignity of all labor. Cf.
also Plato (_Sophist_ 232 D): τὰ πρωταγόρεια ... περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων τεχνῶν. Gomperz (_Die Apologie der Heilkunst_, p. 33) infers
that Protagoras had published a _Gesammtapologie der Künste_. Cf.
_Pol._ 299C, and Diog. L. ix. 8. 55.

Footnote 46:

Cf. Plato _Protag._ 328B, where Protagoras states his rule as to
charges for his lectures. Cf. Zeller, _op. cit._, I, 2, 1080 ff., on
the earnings of the Sophists. Cf. Plato _Euthyd._ 304C: ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ
χρηματίζεσθαί φατον διακωλύειν οὐδέν.

Footnote 47:

Plato _Charm._ 163 B-D on Hesiod.

Footnote 48:

Xen. _Mem._ ii. 1. 21-34, the story of Heracles (28).

Footnote 49:

Pseudo-Platon. _Eryxias_ 397 D-E, discussed _infra_.

Footnote 50:

_Hippias Minor_ 368 D, where he is presented as the jack of all
trades. Cf. _infra_ for the antithetic attitude of Plato.

Footnote 51:

_Orestes_ 917-22; _Supplices_ 399-456, 238-45; _Phoenissae_ 535-51
(Dindorf), cited by Dümmler, _Proleg. zu Platons Staat_ (1891), to
show that there are traces of a political treatise of the school of
Antiphon in Euripides. Cf. Barker, _op. cit._, p. 25 and note.

Footnote 52:

_Orestes_ 917 ff.; cf. also the noble character of the peasant
(αὐτουργός) in the _Electra_, who is a noble soul (252 f.), and who
speaks the prologue, though he is only a secondary person in the play.
Cf. also 367-82.

Footnote 53:

Fr. 345 (Nauck), the unjust man is ignoble (δυσγενής), though better
born than Zeus; frs. 54 (Alex.), 514 (Melanippe), 8 (Electra); cf. n.
1 above, and _infra_. He puts worthy sentiments into the mouths of
slaves and dresses his nobles in rags.

Footnote 54:

_Ion_ 854; ἐν γάρ τι τοῦς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει || τὀύνομα; frs.
828 (Phrixus), 515 (Melanippe) (Nauck); _Helena_ 730; cf. Decharme,
Euripide et l’esprit de son théâtre, pp. 162 ff.

Footnote 55:

His finest portrayals are noble women. He was no woman-hater, but
freely presented both sides of female character. Cf. _Medea_ 230 ff.
and other such passages complaining of woman’s lot; fr. 655
(_Protes._), advocating community of wives. Cf., however, Decharme,
_op. cit._, 133 ff.

Footnote 56:

Cf. Nauck, frs. 642 (Polyidus), 55, 56 (Alex.), 95 (Alcmene), 143
(Andromeda), 326 and 328 (Danae); cf. Decharme, _op. cit._, pp. 163
ff. and notes; Dobbs, _op. cit._, p. 78, n. 5.

Footnote 57:

_Op. cit._, p. 7: “Ich auch in volkswirtschaftlicher Beziehung von
keinen Neuern mehr als von ihm gelernt habe.” Cf. Kautz, _op. cit._,
pp. 123 ff.

Footnote 58:

Thuc. ii. 40. 1; i. 70. 8; ii. 40. 2; etc.

Footnote 59:

Thuc. i. 2.

Footnote 60:

_Thucydides Mythhistoricus_ (1907); cf. Shorey’s critical review,
_Dial_, July-December, 1907, pp. 202 ff.; also W. Lamb, _Clio
Enthroned_ (1914), especially pp. 34-67. Lamb’s citations of
Thucydides (pp. 35 f.), present sufficient evidence of the Greek
historian’s economic insight.

Footnote 61:

_Op. cit._, pp. 18 f.

Footnote 62:

“Die wirtschaftliche Entwickelung des Alterthums,” _Kleine Schriften_,
1910; cf. also Beloch, _Zeitschr. f. Socialwiss_., II, 21 ff.;
“Griechische Geschichte,” _ibid._; Poehlmann, _Geschichte des antiken
Socialismus und Kommunismus_, I (2d ed., 1912, _Geschichte der
sozialen Frage und des Socialismus in der antiken Welt_). Citations
from Poehlmann throughout the book are to this work unless otherwise
specified. He exaggerates the development of capitalism. Meyer and
Beloch are also somewhat misleading in their use of the modern terms
for Greek conditions. Francotte (_L’Industrie dans la Grèce ancienne_
[1900]) is more conservative. For the older extreme conservative view,
cf. the works of Rodbertus and Bücher. Cf. _infra_ for further notice
of the subject.

Footnote 63:

Haney, _op. cit._, p. 17.

Footnote 64:

For a full discussion of the Greek attitude toward labor, with
citations from ancient and modern authors, cf. _infra_, p. 29, n. 4;
pp. 32 ff., and notes; pp. 47 ff. and notes; pp. 69 f. and notes; pp.
93 ff. and notes.

Footnote 65:

_Pol._ i. 8. 1256_b_2.

Footnote 66:

Haney, _op. cit._, p. 17.

Footnote 67:

Emphasized by Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 593 f. Our citations will
always be from the second edition, 1912.

CHAPTER III
PLATO

As seen above, Plato was the first great economic thinker of Greece.[68]
Plato, however, was primarily interested in neither economics nor
politics, but in moral idealism. He is pre-eminent, even among the
Socratics, for this. All his economic thought is a direct outgrowth of
it, and is shot through with its influence. Yet, despite this fact, he
exhibits considerable insight into some of the basal principles of
economics,[69] and his entire _Republic_ is founded upon an essentially
economic theory of society. He traces its origin to mutual need,[70] and
makes little of the innate social impulse, so prominent in Aristotle’s
analysis.[71] He is the predecessor of Aristotle, however, in opposing
the social contract doctrine of the Sophists with its interpretation of
law as mere convention, by a natural theory of social origins. To his
thought, the very foundations of society are established in eternal
justice. They are not the result of mere convention, nor altogether the
work of inspired lawgivers, but a complex product of natural and
artificial elements.[72]

VALUE

Strictly speaking, Plato’s contribution to a theory of economic value
and a definition of wealth is practically nil. In his discussion of just
price, he merely hints at the fact of exchange value. He implies that,
since goods exchange according to definite proportions, they should have
a common quality capable of measurement, and that just price corresponds
to this.[73] He offers no suggestion as to the nature of this quality,
except that, in stating that “the artisan knows what the value of his
product is,” he seems to be thinking of labor, or cost of production, as
the chief element in value.[74]

In other passages, he insists on the doctrine taught previously by
Democritus,[75] and later by Xenophon and other philosophers, that
so-called goods depend for their value upon the ability of the possessor
to use them rightly.[76] This idea is represented in modern thought
especially by Ruskin.[77] The theory is, of course, true of absolute
value, and, in a sense, even of economic value, in that “all
exchangeableness of a commodity depends upon the sum of capacity for its
use.”[78] It cannot be made a criterion of economic value, though the
allied idea, implied by Plato and urged by Ruskin, that the innate
quality of the thing, its capacity for good or harm, is a real element
in economic value, is being recognized today. This is evident in the
increasing hostility toward such so-called commodities as opium and
intoxicating liquors. Since we have begun to define political economy in
terms of human life rather than in terms of property, Ruskin’s
definition of wealth is more acceptable: “the things which the nature of
humanity has rendered in all ages, and must render in all ages to come
... the objects of legitimate desire.”[79]

WEALTH

Plato has much to say of wealth, though he deals with it strictly from
the standpoint of the moralist. We look in vain for a clear definition,
or for a consistent distinction of economic wealth from other goods. His
terms are πλοῦτος, used of both material and spiritual wealth; χρήματα,
often interpreted literally of “useful things,” as the basis of the
subjective doctrine of value discussed above; κτήματα, “possessions,”
and such words as χρυσός and ἀργύριον. His use of these terms,
especially the first, is ambiguous. At times he means material goods
only; again, like Ruskin, he includes every human good, intellectual and
moral as well;[80] again he means “excessive wealth.”[81] As a result of
his conception of value, he includes in material wealth all those
objects that depend for their worth upon wise use and character in the
possessor.[82] Material wealth is regularly placed last by Plato, as
inferior to all other goods of soul or body, a mere means, and not an
end in itself,[83] for virtue does not come from property, but property
and all other goods from virtue.[84] Material goods should be the last
thing in one’s thought,[85] and the fact that people universally put
them first is the cause of many ills to state and individual alike.[86]
Wealth is not blind, if only it follows wisdom.[87] The things usually
called goods are not rightly so named, unless the possessor be just and
worthy.[88] To the base, on the other hand, they are the greatest
evil.[89] In all of this, Plato is the forerunner of Ruskin, with his
characteristic assertions: “Only so much as one can use is wealth,
beyond that is illth”; and “Wealth depends also on vital power in the
possessor.”[90]

Plato especially inveighs against excessive wealth and luxury.[91] Men
are urged not to lay up riches for their children, since great wealth is
of no use to them or the state.[92] The prime object of good legislation
should not be, as is commonly supposed, to make the state as rich as
possible,[93] since excessive wealth and luxury decrease productive
efficiency,[94] are incompatible with the highest character or
happiness, being based on both unjust acquisition (κτῆσις) and unjust
expenditure (ἀναλώματα),[95] produce degeneration in individual and
nation,[96] and are the direct cause of war[97] and civic strife.[98]
Were it feasible, he would prefer to go back to the simpler life of
earlier times, before luxury and the inordinate desire for riches had so
dominated all society.[99] Of course he realizes that such a return is
impossible, but he has little hope of any other escape from the evils.
He is thus led to express the belief that the fewer wants the better, a
doctrine common also to Ruskin, Carlyle, and Thoreau.[100]

However, Plato has no prejudice against moderate wealth. His sermons are
directed against excessive commercialism, which puts money before the
human interest,[101] thereby causing injustice, degenerate luxury,
vicious extremes of wealth and poverty, political graft, individual
inefficiency, and wars both within and without the state. Though his
philosophy leads to asceticism, and his attitude toward wealth seems, on
the surface, to breathe this spirit, yet Plato is not an ascetic in his
doctrine of wealth, as is often wrongly asserted. He describes the true
attitude as that which partakes of both pleasures and pains, not
shunning, but mastering them.[102] He recognizes an assured competency
to be practically a prerequisite for the development of the good
life,[103] while, on the other hand, he considers poverty to be an evil
only second to excessive wealth.[104]

To be sure, Plato’s demand for a limitation of private and national
wealth, and his general negative attitude are, if interpreted rigidly,
unfruitful and economically impossible.[105] It is not business that
should be curbed, but bad business.[106] Individual or nation cannot
become too prosperous, provided there is a proper distribution and a
wise consumption of wealth, and Plato’s idea that great prosperity is
incompatible with this goal can hardly be accepted by modern economists.

Nevertheless, there is much of abiding truth in his doctrine of wealth.
Aside from the profound moral value of his main contention, we may state
summarily several points in which he remarkably anticipated the thought
of the more modern humanitarian economists: (1) in the fact that
excessive private wealth is practically impossible without corresponding
extremes of poverty, and that such a condition is a most fruitful cause
of dissension in any state; (2) in the fact that extremes of wealth or
poverty cause industrial inefficiency; (3) in the prevalent belief that
no man can gain great wealth by just acquisition, since, even though he
may have done no conscious injustice, his excessive accumulation has
been due to unjust social conditions; (4) in the growing belief that
expenditures of great private fortunes are not likely to be helpful
either to individual or to community, but are too liable to be marked by
foolish luxury and waste that saps the vitality of the nation; to Plato,
such are mere drone consumers of the store (τῶν ἑτοίμων ἀναλωτής, ...
κηφήν);[107] in this, he was a forerunner of Ruskin, who opposed the old
popular fallacy that the expenditures of the wealthy, of whatever
nature, benefit the poor;[108] (5) in the dominant note in economic
thought today, so emphasized by Plato and Ruskin, that the prime goal of
the science is human life at its best—as Ruskin states it, “the
producing as many as possible full-breathed, bright-eyed, and
happy-hearted human creatures”;[109] (6) in the fact that the national
demand for unlimited wealth is now recognized, as Plato taught, always
to have been the most fruitful cause of international differences; (7)
in the fact, which is receiving ever-greater recognition by modern
economists and statesmen, that the innate quality of the object for good
or harm must be considered in a true definition of economic wealth.[110]

PRODUCTION

Plato seems to have had little positive interest in the problems of
production. He was too much engrossed with suggesting means for limiting
excessive acquisition. He was, however, quite apt in his use of
illustrations from industrial life.[111] He was also apparently the
first to give a real classification of trades,[112] as follows:
furnishers of raw materials (πρωτογενὲς εἶδος), makers of tools
(ὅργανα), makers of vessels for conserving products (ἀγγεῖα), makers of
vehicles (ὅχημα), manufacturers of clothing and means of defense
(προβλήματα), workers in fine arts (παίγνιον), producers of food
(θρέμμα)—a fairly inclusive catalogue for that age; if commerce and the
learned professions were included. But some of the classes overlap,
since they follow no necessary principle of division. He divided
productive arts into co-operative (συναιτίους), which provide tools for
manufacture, and principal (ἀιτίας), which produce the objects
themselves.[113] They were further divided into productive arts
(ποιητικαί), which bring something new into existence, and acquisitive
(κτητικαί), which merely gain what already exists. In the latter class,
he placed all commerce, science, and hunting.[114] Plato would thus
appear to exclude commerce and the learned professions from the true
sphere of production. This, however, is only apparent, in so far as
legitimate exchange is concerned. He clearly understood that the
merchant and retailer save the time of the other workers,[115] and that
they perform a real service to the community, in that they make
necessary exchange convenient and possible.[116] He thus recognized them
as producers of a time and place value, and he cannot be accused of the
physiocratic error, which denied productivity to all workers except
those who produce directly from natural resources.[117] His distinction
of productive and acquisitive arts can, furthermore, hardly be
interpreted as intending to limit production to the material merely,
though learning is relegated to the acquisitive class. Such an
interpretation would be out of harmony with the whole trend of his
thought.[118] His further classification of productive agencies as
creative (ἕνεκα τοῦ ποιεῖν τι) or preventive (τοῦ μὴ πάσχειν)[119]
substantiates this, for many of the preventive agencies are intellectual
and scientific.

The general attitude of Plato toward economic production may be inferred
from his insistence upon the thorough application of the division of
labor for the perfection of industry.[120] He evidently recognized it as
the necessary basis of all higher life. We have seen above, also that
one of his chief objections to excessive wealth or poverty was the fact
that they caused inefficiency in production.

_Agriculture._—Of the three factors that enter into production—land,
labor, and capital—the most important in the mind of the Greek thinkers
was land. The relative prominence of agriculture was partly the cause of
this, but in the case of the philosophers, their ethical passion, their
idea of the necessity of leisure for personal development, and their
conservative attitude toward industry and commerce were the chief
motives that impelled them to urge their contemporaries back to the
simple life of the farm.[121] The aristocratic feeling, still strong in
European countries, that landed property is the most respectable,
probably also had some influence, though land was not so distinctively
in the hands of the upper classes in Attica.

Though the praise of agriculture was a characteristic feature of Greek
literature in all periods, it was not at first a conscious economic
theory.[122] Later, toward the end of the fifth century, it became a
definite ethico-economic doctrine of the philosophers, as a criticism of
their times, and as an appeal to what was deemed to be the more
healthful life of the earlier days.

Plato does not devote so much attention to this theme as do Xenophon and
Aristotle. His standpoint, however, is practically the same, though his
tendency toward the physiocratic error is not so marked. In his second
state, he orders that agriculture shall be the only means of
money-making,[123] and he even strikes the modern note of conservation,
in his directions for the care of land, waters, springs, and
forests.[124] On this point, he and the other Greek thinkers accord well
with the economy of the past decade with its urgent preachment, “Back to
the land,” though the modern watchword has, of course, a more economic
emphasis.

_Capital._—Though the function of capital, aside from natural resources,
was a familiar fact in the Athenian life of the fifth and fourth
centuries B.C.,[125] there is scarcely any consideration of it by the
theorists before Aristotle. Plato has no definition of capital, nor
indeed scarcely any recognition of the fact of its existence.[126] His
emphasis on the virtue of economy, however, and his criticism of those
who spend the “stored wealth,” imply the idea that wealth should be used
not merely for enjoyment, but also for productive purposes.[127] His
strictures upon interest show that he has but slight appreciation of the
productive function of money-capital.[128]

_Labor and industry._—On the other hand, Plato has considerable insight
into the rôle of labor in production. To be sure, he shares with the
other philosophers a certain prejudice against manual labor as degrading
to freemen.[129] The mechanical arts call forth reproach.[130] Free
citizens should not be burdened with such ignoble occupations,[131] and
any person who disobeys this rule shall lose his civic rights until he
gives up his trade.[132] Agriculture alone shall be open to them, and
only so much of this as will not cause them to neglect their higher
welfare.[133] However, this prejudice has been read into some passages
in Plato by a forced interpretation. The assertion of Socrates,[134]
that craftsmen have not temperance (σωφροσύνη), since they do other
people’s business, is made merely to draw Critias into the argument. The
statement that all arts having for their function provision for the body
are slavish,[135] does not necessarily imply prejudice against physical
labor. Such arts are slavish, to Plato, because they have no definite
principle of service as gymnastics has. He is merely illustrating the
point that it is an inferior type of statesmanship that works without a
definite principle for the highest political welfare. The idea,
expressed in the _Politics_,[136] that the masses (πλῆθος) cannot
acquire political science is a criticism against unprepared
statesmanship rather than against labor. Indeed, Plato asserts the same
of the wealthy.[137]

Moreover, the following facts should be observed: that the prejudice of
Plato against the manual arts is chiefly limited to the _Laws_; that
even there his prejudice is primarily against retail trade rather than
against industry;[138] that in so far as a real hostility exists, its
true source is not in any opposition to labor or industry _per se_, but
rather in the political belief that only as citizens have leisure for
politics can prepared statesmen take the place of superficial
politicians,[139] and in the moral feeling that constant devotion merely
to the physical necessities of life causes men to neglect the primary
purpose of their existence.[140]

Modern scholars have usually been extreme in their interpretation of
Plato on this point.[141] Such unwarranted generalizations as the
following are common: “Il ne découvre dans les professions qui tendent
au lucre qu’égoisme, bassesse d’esprit, dégradation des sentiments.”
“Platon et Aristote voient dans le commerce et dans l’industrie deux
plaies de la société; ils voudraient les extirper à’fond, si cela était
possible.”[142] One of the worst misinterpretations has been perpetrated
by Roscher, in inferring from the _Republic_ (372 ff.) that Plato “das
Leben der Gewerbetreibenden als ein Leben thierischen Behaglichkeit
schildert, sie wohl mit Schweinen vergleicht.”[143] Such absurdities are
unfortunately not rare, though they might be avoided by a careful
reading, even in a translation.[144]

It should not be overlooked either that Plato’s utterances on labor are
by no means all negative. Skilled labor is recognized in several of the
minor dialogues as fulfilling an actual need in civilization. Laborers
are represented as having their part in knowledge and virtue,[145] and
are admitted to be the necessary foundation of all human
well-being.[146] A positive interest is also manifested by Plato in
labor and the proper development of the arts in both the _Republic_ and
the _Laws_. He constantly harps on the necessity of each doing his
fitting work, and doing it well, and in his opinion happiness consists
in this rather than in idleness.[147] Indeed, that each one perform well
the task for which nature has fitted him is the definition of justice
itself.[148] The indolent rich man is a parasite and a drone, a disease
of the state. This is Plato’s favorite figure in both the _Republic_ and
the _Laws_, a figure that is suggestive of Hesiod, the pioneer champion
of labor.[149] He is even ready to admit that it is, after all, not the
kind of labor but the character of the workman that ennobles or degrades
any work.[150] In fine, his attitude toward the mechanical arts is
similar to that of Ruskin, who also thinks that manual labor is
degrading.[151] But as with Plato, the chief secret of his prejudice
lies in the fact that laborers usually do their work mechanically,
without thought. He believes that “workmen ought often to be thinking,
and thinkers ought often to be working.” He is willing to classify all
work as liberal on this basis, the only distinction being the amount of
skill required.[152] However, in agreement with Plato’s idea, he would
set the roughest and least intellectual to the roughest work, and this
he thinks to be “the best of charities” to them.[153] With Plato, he is
also convinced that, under actual conditions of labor, the degradation
is very difficult to avoid, and therefore he would emphasize chiefly
agricultural labor, where education of head and hand are more fully
realized.[154]

It is, however, in Plato’s constant insistence upon the principle of the
division of labor, as a prerequisite for any success in the mechanical
arts or elsewhere, that he reveals insight into, and interest in,
productive labor. This is the basal idea in the _Republic_. It is also
one of the chief regulations in the _Laws_, where its direct application
to the artisan is a clear evidence that he appreciates the economic
significance of the principle.[155] To him, it is the foundation of all
human development. Society finds its source in mutual need (ἡ ἡμετέρα
χρεία). Man is not self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης). Reciprocity is necessary
even in the most primitive state.[156] Out of this necessary dependence
arises the division of labor, a beneficent law, “since the product is
larger, better, and more easily produced, whenever one man gives up all
other business, and does one thing fitting to his nature, and at the
opportune time.”[157]

The basis of this law Plato finds in the fact of the diversity of
natures, which fits men for different tasks.[158] In this he differs
from Adam Smith, who believes that the differences of natural talents in
men are much less than is generally supposed. Smith makes the propensity
to barter the source of specialization, which, in turn, is based on the
interdependence of men. He thus considers the diversities in human
nature to be the effect rather than the cause of the division of
labor.[159] Plato, however, is probably nearer the truth, since the very
reason for mutual interdependence is diversity of nature.[160]

The advantages of specialization, according to Plato,[161] are four, as
stated above. It enables one to accomplish more work with greater ease,
more skilfully, and at the proper season. The second and fourth of these
are not mentioned by Adam Smith, but he notes the resulting increase in
opulence for all the people, and the development of inventive genius. He
also observes that the division of labor causes the growth of capital,
and that this in turn increases specialization.[162] Of course Plato
could not appreciate the important fact of the influence of the division
of labor on the development of inventive genius, since he lived before
the age of machinery.

Plato is also a forerunner of Adam Smith in his recognition of the fact
that the division of labor depends for its advance upon a great increase
in the size and complexity of the state.[163] It means a multiplication
of trades, a development of industry,[164] the entrance of the retail
trader (κάπηλος),[165] and the invention of money as a means of
exchange.[166] The necessity of the division of labor between states is
also recognized. It is impossible to establish a city where it will not
be in need of imports (ἐπεισαγωγίμων). International trade therefore
arises, and with it are born the merchant (ἔμπορος) and the sailor
class, together with all those who are engaged in the labor of the
carrying trade.[167] Thus Plato, the idealist, and reputed enemy of
trade and industry, develops them directly out of the basal principle of
his _Republic_. He appreciates the necessity of a full-fledged industry
and commerce to the existence even of a primitive state, and his
hostility to them is actually directed only against what he terms their
unnatural use.[168] Moreover, in his opinion, one function of the
division of labor should be to limit them to the performance of their
proper tasks, and keep them from degenerating into mere money-making
devices. It should also result in limiting such vocations to the less
capable classes since the rulers should be artisans of freedom.[169]

It would take us too far afield to discuss the diverse ways in which
Plato uses his principle. We may observe in passing, however, that
he applies it to war, in his interesting criticism of the
citizen-soldier;[170] to the finer arts, even when they are quite
similar to each other;[171] to politics, as noted above; to justice
and the moral life in general;[172] and to the intellectual life, in
his unsparing criticism of the superficial versatility and
dilettantism of the contemporary Athenian democracy, which trusts
the government to any incompetent, professes to be able to imitate
everything, and makes the many-sided Sophist (πολλαπλοῦς) the man of
the hour.[173] Though he begins with the development of the
principle as an economic fact, his primary interest in it is as a
moral and intellectual maxim. The fact that the cobbler sticks to
his last is only a symbol (εἴδωλον) of justice.[174] Nevertheless
Plato does appreciate to a remarkable degree the economic bearings
of the law, and his discussion of it is notably scientific and
complete.[175] He sometimes pushes its application to an extreme,
though such instances are perhaps meant in a playful Socratic
vein.[176] At least, like Ruskin, he understands that extreme
specialization must produce narrow and one-sided men, and that
progress revolts against its too rigid application.[177] He is aware
too that the division of labor breaks down in the case of the poor
unemployed of the state, since they have no special work.[178]

SLAVERY

Plato is not blind to the ethical aspects of the problem of slavery. In
his first healthy state (ὑγιείνη), slavery and war are conspicuously
absent, and it is the natural inference that the author believed these
to be necessary evils of the more complex state.[179] He appreciates the
dangers of absolute power, even in private life, and believes that few
men can stand the strain.[180] He conceives human nature as a unity that
defies absolute division into separate classes.[181] Though he does not
renounce slavery in the _Republic_, he would limit, it to the barbarians
and to those who seem unfit for the higher life.[182] It plays a
remarkably small part in his first state, and it would seem that his
idealism is here struggling against what he feels to be an economic
necessity. In the _Laws_, he frankly accepts the necessity, and puts
even agriculture, as well as the other industries, into the hands of
slaves.[183] However, they are not to be treated as animals, but as
rational men, in whom a proper usage may develop a certain degree of
morality and ambition for good work.[184] To be sure, his purpose is
economic rather than ethical—to make the slaves satisfied with their
lot, and thus better producers.[185] He makes no mention of freedom as a
reward for good behavior, though he elsewhere provides for the existence
of freedmen in the state, and stipulates that they shall not become
richer than their former masters.[186]

MONEY

As Plato was the first of extant Greek thinkers to grasp the principle
of the division of labor, so he was the first to give any hint as to the
origin of money. He states that it came into use by reason of the growth
of necessary exchange, which in turn resulted from increased division of
labor.[187]

The function of money he defines somewhat indefinitely by the term
“token of exchange,”[188] an expression suggestive of Ruskin’s
definition “a ticket or token of right to goods.”[189] It seems to imply
that money is not itself a commodity to be trafficked in. In the Laws,
he specifies more clearly the functions of this symbol. It acts as a
medium of exchange and as a measure of value.[190] The latter office is
performed by reason of the fact that money is a common denominator of
value, changing products from incommensurable (ἀσύμμετρον) and uneven
(ἀνώμαλον) to commensurable and even.[191]

Since Plato did not consider money to be a commodity to be bought and
sold, and since he did not appreciate its productive function as
representative capital, his theory of interest was superficial. His
attitude toward it was somewhat similar to that of many people today
toward speculation in futures in the stock market, as a practice
contrary to public interest and policy. The application of the term
τόκος to interest by Plato[192] and Aristotle, as though interest were
the direct child of money, is probably only a punning etymology, and not
intended seriously. It can therefore hardly be used, as it often is, to
prove the superficiality of the theory of the Socratics. Plato, however,
would have no money-making by usury,[193] nor indeed any loaning or
credit at all, except as an act of friendship.[194] Such contracts
should be made at the loaner’s own risk,[195] and held legal only as a
punishment for breaking other contracts.[196] He calls the usurer a bee
that inserts his sting, money, into his victims, thereby beggaring them
and enriching himself.[197]

Such strictures against interest were common in mediaeval Europe,
reappeared in Ruskin,[198] and are implied in the present opposition, in
some quarters, to so-called “unearned income.”[199] The motive in
mediaeval times, however, was distinctively religious, and was also
partly due to the absence of a developed capitalism. With Ruskin and
modern theorists, on the other hand, the objection is, at bottom,
socialistic. The motive of the Socratics was essentially moral and
political.

Plato’s other error concerning money, as above observed, was that it
need possess no intrinsic value for domestic use. He looked upon gold
and silver as causes of degeneration in state and individual,[200] and
would therefore have put a ban on them for use within the state.[201] To
his mind, a mere state fiat was sufficient to give currency and
value.[202] This doctrine has also often recurred in the history of
economic thought, as in Ruskin and the Greenback party of a generation
ago.[203] The error, however, was not so grave in Plato’s case, for he,
at least, recognized the need of the precious metals for international
purposes.[204] Moreover, in his proposed state of such limited extent,
the problem would have been far simpler, and he would have distinguished
between actual conditions and possibilities in Greece and his admittedly
more or less utopian ideal.

EXCHANGE

Exchange in Greek economy held a very minor place, compared with its
dominant importance in modern theory. It was discussed chiefly in a
negative manner, as the object of the moral and aristocratic prejudice
of Greek thinkers. We find, however, some appreciation of its true place
in the economic life of a state. Plato divides trade, ἀλλαγή or
ἀγοραστική, into αὐτοπωλική, which sells its own products, αὐτουργῶν,
and μεταβλητική, which exchanges the products of others. He further
divides the latter into καπηλική, the exchange within the state, which
he calls one-half of all the exchange, and ἐμπορική, foreign
commerce.[205] He finds its origin in the division of labor, and in the
mutual interdependence of men and states.[206] He understands the
necessity of the reciprocal attitude in international, as well as in
private, exchange, and thus has a clearer insight than the mercantilists
and some modern statesmen. A state must raise a surplus of its own
products, so as to supply the other state from which it expects to have
its own needs satisfied.[207]

Since a tariff on imports played little part in Greek life, except in so
far as it was imposed for sumptuary or war purposes,[208] the perplexing
modern problem of the protective tariff scarcely came within the horizon
of Greek thinkers. Plato would prohibit the import of certain luxuries,
as a moral safeguard. He divides merchandise into primary and secondary
products, and would not permit the import of the latter.[209] Elsewhere,
however, he legislates against imposts upon either imports or exports,
though unconscious of the significance of his suggestion.[210]

He appreciated something of the function of exchange in society. It
performed a very important service, as a mediator between producer and
consumer.[211] Like money, it served to equalize values, and thus acted
as an aid to the satisfaction of needs.[212] When limited to this
primary function, it was of advantage to both parties to the
exchange,[213] and merchants and retailers had then a real part in the
production of values.[214]

The sweeping assertion is too often made that the Greek people were
hostile to trade, and therefore that their theorists were especially
opposed to it. We have already seen how false this idea is for the
Greeks themselves,[215] but it also needs a great deal of qualification
in the case of their writers. Their hostility is directed especially
against the more petty business of retail trade (καπηλική) rather than
against the extensive operations of the merchant (ἔμπορος). But their
opposition even to this is not entirely undiscriminating. We have seen
that Plato clearly understands the necessity of exchange to the life of
the state.[216] He admits that even retail trade is not necessarily
evil.[217] The chief reason why it appears so is because it gives free
opportunity for the vulgar greed of unlimited gain, which is innate in
man.[218] If the noblest citizens, who are governed by rational
interests, should become retailers and innkeepers, the business would
soon be held in honor.[219]

Plato, however, would limit exchange to its primary function as defined
above.[220] Like Ruskin, he believes that, whenever it is pursued merely
for private gain, it becomes a source of degeneration to individual and
state. It is then akin to the fraudulent or counterfeit pursuits
(κιβδήλοις).[221] The retailers in well-ordered states are generally the
weakest men, who are unable to undertake other work.[222] The rulers in
the _Republic_ must keep themselves entirely free from the trammels of
trade, lest they become wolves instead of shepherds,[223] though Plato
is grappling here with a very real problem that still faces us—how to
prevent graft among public servants.[224] In the _Laws_, retail trade is
entirely prohibited to citizens,[225] and permitted only to metics and
strangers,[226] and, indeed, only to those whose corruption will be of
least injury to the state.[227] These aliens are not to be permitted to
gain overmuch wealth,[228] and they must depart from the state, after
twenty years’ residence, with all their belongings.[229] Retail trade,
even in their hands, must be strictly limited to the demands of the
state,[230] and confined to the market-place for the sake of
publicity.[231] All exchange must be honest, dealing with unadulterated
products (ἀκίβδηλον).[232] There shall be no dickering over sales, but
only one price shall be set upon goods each day. If this is not
accepted, the goods must be removed from sale until the following
day.[233] If possible, the executors of the laws should try to fix a
just schedule of prices, to allow of moderate gain, and should see that
this is observed by the retailers.[234] As a climax to all these
precautions, Plato would have the rulers take pains to devise means
whereby the retailers shall not degenerate into unbridled shamelessness
and meanness of soul.[235] Under such limitations, he has faint hopes
that retail trade may be freed of its stigma, so as to do least harm to
those who pursue it, and to benefit the whole state.[236]

It need not be observed that this attitude of Plato toward trade and
commerce is alien to the spirit of economic progress, and that no
advanced civilization could be developed on such a basis. His profuse
legislation, too, as above outlined, strikes a modern as naïve and
visionary.[237] No man, however, is more aware of this than Plato
himself. He should be judged, not in a spirit of rigid literalism, but
with a sympathetic criticism which tries to understand the psychological
reasons for his attitude. His suggestions are not offered as a proposed
scheme for actual legislation,[238] but rather in the spirit of the
moralist, who, observing that almost inevitable evils accompany retail
trade and commercialism, with human nature as it is, and that commerce,
the servant of man, has become his master, sees almost the only hope of
escape in its limitation to what is barely necessary. The age-long
problem of a greedy commercialism, which is blind to the appeal of all
other goods when profits are at stake, Plato certainly saw clearly, and
outlined with the hand of a master. The problem faces us still, in a
form even more acute, but the protests of Plato, Ruskin, and Carlyle are
bearing positive fruit today, in a political economy that takes as its
supreme goal human life at its best.

But aside from these generalities, a sympathetic study of Plato’s
thought on exchange reveals an insight into certain specific points, of
interest to modern economics, which are commonly overlooked. His protest
against the former axiom of economics, that the prime purpose of trade
is profit, and that the mere fact that goods change hands, necessarily
increases the wealth of a country, is substantially correct.[239]
Commerce for commerce’ sake is a clear case of mistaking the means for
the end, and is contrary to sound economics as well as ethics. The
objections of Plato and Ruskin[240] against the principle too generally
accepted by business and economy of the past, at least tacitly, that “it
is the buyer’s function to cheapen and the seller’s to cheat,” are being
recognized today as worthy of consideration.

The anxiety of Plato over the effect of trades or professions upon
character is well worthy of modern imitation, and this is, to a
considerable extent, an economic as well as a moral question.
Zimmern[241] has well observed: “Our neglect to study the effect of
certain modern professions upon character, when we are always insisting,
and rightly, upon the importance of a character-forming education, is
one of the strangest lapses, due to the sway of nineteenth-century
economics.”

As we have seen, one of the chief purposes of Plato in his limitation of
commerce was to eliminate graft from the government. Though his remedy
was not acceptable, yet his remarkable appreciation of a very grave
problem that still faces us should be recognized. Furthermore, no better
solution for it has ever been offered than the separation of politics
from big business. This was the underlying principle of his suggestion,
and it is in accord with the trend of modern statesmanship.

Another impelling motive of Plato in his stringent legislation was to
render impossible the development of extremes of wealth or poverty in
the state. Again, we should credit him with having clearly appreciated
the problem, though we may criticize his attempted solution. The great
commercial prosperity of today has made the situation vastly more acute,
and still economics has no satisfactory solution to offer. After all, in
the light of modern tendencies toward the regulation of industry and
commerce, some of Plato’s ideas do not seem so “grandfatherly,” but
rather prophetic, and in accord with sound economy. His legislation
against the sale of adulterated products,[242] and in favor of publicity
in business,[243] and state supervision of prices[244] has a startlingly
modern ring.

POPULATION

The problem of population and food supply, which disturbed Malthus and
some of the other English economists, was also a cause of concern to
Greek thinkers. This might well be expected, since it is a recognized
fact that the source of the grain supply was always a matter of grave
concern to Athens and many other Greek cities.[245] Plato states the
problem clearly and hints at a solution, when he says that the natural
increase of population in his state shall not exceed the economic basis
for it.[246] In the _Laws_, he suggests specific means for preserving
the proper number by restraining over-productive people, and by
encouraging the opposite.[247] If such general provisions should not
prove sufficient, he would then resort to colonization.[248] On the
other hand, should population be greatly depleted by war or disease, he
would even open the doors of citizenship to the undesirable
classes.[249] His interest in the problem of population, however, is
primarily moral and social rather than economic. Moreover, in antithesis
to Malthus, he limits his consideration to a very small, artificially
constructed state. With the narrow political vision of a Greek, he
thinks that the production of a _multitude_ of “happy-hearted” men in a
state is impossible.[250]

DISTRIBUTION

As stated in the Introduction, the economic interest of Greek thinkers
was particularly alive in the fields of distribution and consumption. It
is here that they are especially interesting and suggestive.[251]
However, they dealt very little with the important principles of
distribution as laid down by modern economists. Theories of the several
elements that enter into distribution—wages, profits, and rent—are for
the most part conspicuously absent.[252]

The problem of distribution is also hardly considered from the modern
standpoint. We look in vain for a treatment of the modern dominant
question of the relation between capital and labor. Moreover, the Greek
theories of distribution are, on the whole, not the outgrowth of the
sentiment of human sympathy for the poor and the common laborer, which
is so prevalent today. The purpose seems to be to guard against
dishonesty rather than oppression from either contracting party.[253]
This lack in Greek theory is not strange, in an age when slaves took the
place of machinery, so that capital and labor were largely united in
them, while the majority of free laborers worked directly for the
public, or on the land.[254] The goal of the theorists, therefore, is
the conservation of the state rather than the relief of any class of the
citizenship.

Plato discusses the importance of a proper distribution of wealth in the
_Republic_, but the point that looms large to him is the fact that
excessive wealth or poverty is likely to endanger the stability of the
state.[255] As seen above, also, some of his regulations in the _Laws_
seem to strike a modern note. He would have a state commission fix
prices,[256] would permit the state to limit the freedom of
inheritance,[257] and perhaps even intervene in securing a just
wage.[258] Yet in all of this, the dominant motive is to avoid civic
discord.

Before proceeding to the larger subject in distribution, Plato’s theory
of private property, we will discuss briefly his attitude toward the
laboring classes.[259] It is commonly asserted that the Greek
philosophers had little or no regard for the masses. As usually
expressed, however, the statement is very unfair, and especially to
Plato. Such extreme assertions as the following are frequent: “They [the
masses] are of no account altogether.”[260] Plato in the _Republic_
“voue à l’ignominie, au mépris, à la misère, à la servitude éternelle la
classe des ouvriers.”[261] “Für die des Erwerb obliegenden Personen
bedarf es keiner Erziehung.”[262] “Plato, in treating of the ideal
state, deems it not worth while to concern himself with the trading and
artisan classes.”[263] “Und im übrigen will er sie [the masses], wie es
scheint, durchaus sich selbst überlassen.”[264]

To be sure, as above admitted, the interest of Greek thinkers was not
marked by the modern sentiment of sympathy for the laborer. Their
writings are characterized by a certain aristocratic feeling, and they
do not emphasize the worth or importance of the masses. Yet they are far
from being indifferent or hostile to them.

Aristotle himself was the first to make this false criticism of
Plato.[265] But the author of the _Republic_ foresaw that he might be
misinterpreted, and excused himself for his indefiniteness in the
details of the ideal state.[266] Moreover, Aristotle’s criticism is not
borne out by a study of the _Republic_. Plato implies with sufficient
clearness that his communistic regulations are limited to the two upper
classes.[267] It is not true either, as Aristotle asserts,[268] that
there is a rigid caste system in the _Republic_. The very opposite
principle is laid down.[269] The myth of the three metals presents an
aristocracy based strictly on intellectual and moral excellence. No
arbitrary obstacle hinders either the degradation or the rise of any
individual from his class. It depends entirely upon the possession of
the gold of character and mentality, for which all may strive. Moreover,
the life of the so-called first caste is literally dedicated to the best
service of the rest. If this be aristocracy, we cannot have too much of
it.[270]

Neither is Aristotle’s criticism warranted, that Plato makes the
happiness of the whole state something different from the sum of its
parts.[271] He merely states the principle, universally true, that no
class has a right to expect to be happy at the expense of the whole
state, and that, in the long run, the prosperity of each is bound up in
the prosperity of all. Indeed, he puts the very objections of Aristotle
and Grote into the mouth of Adeimantus, and answers them satisfactorily,
in his illustration of the painted statue.[272] There could hardly be a
better example of Plato’s lofty ideal, that each part is to contribute
its share toward the utility, beauty, and happiness of the whole, and
that through this cooperation each realizes the highest quantum of
happiness for himself. This doctrine of mutual interdependence is the
basal principle of Christianity, taught by Jesus and Paul in a
strikingly similar figure of the body and its members,[273] though
naturally Plato’s idea of brotherhood is narrower in scope.

The common assertion that Plato has no regard for the artisan class,
then, is unwarranted.[274] The entire _Republic_ is built upon the
opposite principle, to prevent exploitation of the lower by the upper
classes; and his comparison of good and evil rulers to shepherd dogs and
wolves[275] is a precursor of the famous passages of Milton and Ruskin
on the same theme. All classes of citizens in the state are
brothers.[276] The rulers are saviors (σωτῆρας), allies, shepherds
(ποίμενες), nurses (τροφέας), paymasters, and friends.[277] This happy
unity (ὁμόνοια), or harmony (ξυμφωνία), of all classes is to Plato the
highest goal toward which the true statesman should strive,[278] and the
point of next highest importance to the communism of the guards is the
proper regulation of wealth and poverty for the artisans.[279] The mere
fact that he does not believe the artisans to be capable of political
independence by no means indicates that he is indifferent to their
social or economic welfare. It is to conserve this that he would put the
government into the hands of the most capable,[280] and, in any event,
the artisans are not to be held in subjection so much by external force
as by their own free self-restraint.[281] This, in itself, is sufficient
evidence that Plato intended to include the third class in his lower
scheme of education, a fact borne out also by other passages.[282]

It must be admitted that a somewhat different spirit pervades the
_Laws_, where he seems to have despaired of the lofty ideal of the
_Republic_. He relegates the working classes to non-citizenship. But
here, also, he is still anxious that they shall have the sort of
education that befits their station,[283] and that justice be done
them.[284] He also provides against the existence of beggary in the
state.[285] Whatever may be said of his aristocratic spirit, therefore,
he cannot be justly accused of the gross indifference of the early
nineteenth-century economy and of modern capitalism toward either masses
or public, in their concern for material wealth.[286]

COMMUNISTIC AND SOCIALISTIC IDEAS

The Greek theory of distribution was employed chiefly in the criticism
of the institution of private property, and in the suggestion of more or
less communistic systems to succeed it. This tendency, however, was not
like the modern either in motive or in general type. Modern socialism
aims to be scientific, and professes to build a scientific system on a
basis of economic laws. Greek socialism had no such aim. It did not lay
claim to any relation to economic law, but frankly presented itself for
what it was, a politico-moral sentiment. Other points of distinction
will be observed as we proceed, but this primary one must not be
overlooked, if either the spirit or the meaning of the Greek social
theory is to be understood.

Two considerations made the communistic sentiment a normal one to the
Greek democrat. (_a_) The institution of private property had not become
so thoroughly imbedded in the very foundations of society as it has
today. The custom of family tenure was not entirely forgotten, and in
some backlying districts may well have been still in vogue.[287] In some
states, also, a part of the land was probably still held in common by
the citizenship. The frequent establishment of cleruchies in conquered
territories, in which the land was regularly assigned by lot, and the
ever-recurring revolutions, which usually resulted in confiscation of
the land in favor of the victorious party, must have assisted materially
in unsettling the confidence of the Greeks in private property as a
basal institution of society. The actual existence of a polity like that
of Sparta, where private ownership does not seem to have been so
absolute,[288] doubtless also exerted its influence on the imagination
of Greek thinkers. (_b_) As is generally recognized, the Greek, far more
than the modern, took for granted the subordination of the individual
citizen to the state. We have also seen that he tended to magnify the
power of legislation as sufficient to encompass any reform, even in the
face of economic laws. To him, therefore, the demand that the state be
made the dispenser of private property did not seem unnatural.[289] We
should be on our guard, however, against exaggerating the extent of this
sentiment among the Greek writers, or against reading into them the
modern socialistic doctrines.

A consideration of the predecessors of Plato in social speculation may
be conveniently introduced at this point, before we proceed to the
discussion of the _Republic_. Some have thought to find traces of
communism in Homer. The evidence of any real communism, however, is very
slight, and the frankly individualistic spirit of the poems is against
it. Moreover, this is a problem that concerns the economic conditions
rather than the theory.[290] Little is definitely known of Pythagoras
and his school, but it is improbable that he either taught or practiced
a real communism.[291]

As for Hippodamas of Miletus, it is difficult to gain a clear idea of
his ideal state from Aristotle’s meager description,[292] but it seems
not to have been markedly socialistic. He divides his body of ten
thousand citizens into artisans, farmers, and soldiers.[293] He makes a
corresponding triple division of the land—sacred, to provide for the
expense of worship; public, for the support of the soldiers; private, to
be owned and worked by the husbandmen.[294] Thus only the farmers are to
own land, and the question as to who shall work the land for the
military class is left in obscurity.[295] It seems likely that
Hippodamas intended that the farmers should work all the land, and own
one-third of it for their own support. His system contains some
communistic elements, as the fact that two-thirds of the land is public,
but it is certainly not socialistic in spirit and purpose. The prime
interest of Hippodamas was very probably not in a system to supplant
private property, but rather in a plan of assured support for the
priestly and military classes.[296]

Phaleas of Chalcedon, according to Aristotle’s description, approaches
much nearer to the modern socialistic idea.[297] Aristotle makes him a
type of those thinkers who lay chief stress on the right system of
property as the necessary basis of civic peace.[298] His central tenet
is equality of possessions and of education for all the citizens,[299]
but he seems to have specified only landed property.[300] This demand,
though only landed property is included, seems to strike a truly modern
socialistic note. But nowhere better than here may we see the gulf that
separates ancient and modern socialism. The avowed interest of Phaleas
is not in the masses. The artisans are all to be public slaves.[301] His
interest is rather in the classes, and not even in these primarily, but
rather in the state itself. His entire system has for its fundamental
motive the avoiding of civic discord in the state.[302]

The ideal state of Plato’s _Republic_ has often been presented by
socialists and other modern writers as the great prototype of all
socialistic doctrine. We must consider to what extent such a view is
justified. In his famous myth of the three metals, Plato divides his
citizens into three classes—rulers, auxiliaries, and farmers and
artisans.[303] His avowed purpose here, as indeed throughout his
_Republic_, is to secure the highest degree of happiness for all the
citizens.[304] In order to gain this end, he provides for a most
thoroughgoing system of communism, including all property, both for
production and for consumption, except such as is necessary for the
immediate need.[305] He extends it even to the common possession of
wives and children,[306] that all private interests may be reduced to a
minimum.[307] He provides further for a common work[308] and
education[309] for men and women.

Such, in brief, is the system proposed in the _Republic_.[310]
Superficially considered, it would seem to be the parent of modern
socialism and communism. There is, however, actually but slight
similarity between them. The so-called communism of Plato extends only
to the first two classes, which can include but a small minority of the
citizenship.[311] Thus the masses, with whom modern socialism is
especially concerned, are not directly touched by his system. Again, the
primary motive of Plato’s communism is not the modern motive at all. His
thought is not to secure a just share for all in the products of
industry. Though he recognizes the importance of providing against the
evils of extremes of wealth and poverty,[312] the motive is not the
material interest of any class. It is an intense desire for unity and
for escape from civic strife in the state,[313] for provision against
graft, corruption, and tyranny in the rulers,[314] and for insuring as
efficient work as possible.[315] Like Ruskin, Plato is no democrat.
Equality is not in his thought.[316] Unlike many a modern socialist, he
realizes that absolute arithmetical equality is impossible, and that if
gained it would be the greatest injustice. He knows that the true
equality must be proportional, demanding not that each receive exactly
the same, but that each receive his due.[317] His third class,
comprising a large majority of the citizens, is practically without
political activity, a fact in marked contrast to the modern
social-democratic spirit. His emphasis is not economic and material, as
is that of modern socialism, but political and moral.[318]

In fine, the _Republic_ contains some socialistic elements. Plato’s
restriction of the freedom of the individual so as to subserve the
interest of the whole,[319] his tendency to magnify the power of law in
the face of economic principles and of human nature,[320] his interest
in the welfare of the common people, his declaration against inequality
of fortune, his denial of the right of private property for the upper
classes, and his proposed community of wives and children, a measure too
radical for the better type of modern socialism,[321] all seem
socialistic in trend.

The tendency to magnify the power of law, and the submission of
individual to state interest, however, were characteristics of Greek
civilization, and not distinctly Platonic or socialistic. His interest
in the welfare of the masses, as we have seen, was not primarily
economic, but had for its ulterior motive the preservation of the peace
of the state. His denial of private property and family interests to the
guards, and his opposition to extreme wealth or poverty were, as seen
above, devoid of socialistic motive. Moreover, in his hostility to
retail trade, he was not moved by the modern socialistic demand for
immediate contact between producer and consumer. The conditions that
called forth such a demand were not then in existence,[322] as is also
true of the modern agitation for a proper distribution of the profits of
industry. Above all, Plato made no pretense to any economic basis for
his communism, but presented it as a moral and political ideal. The
_Republic_ cannot therefore be classified as truly socialistic either in
motive or in general plan.[323]

In any event, there is nothing in common between the high moral idealism
of Plato’s so-called communism and the crass materialistic communism
that is the subject of Aristophanes’ satire in the _Ecclesiazusae_.
Dietzel[324] has well pointed out that the latter is extremely
individualistic, atheistic, and immoral, demanding all from the state
with no return; that the _Republic_, on the other hand, demands the
loftiest morality and renunciation, and is a direct protest against such
tendencies in Athens as are attacked by the comic poet. As he shows, the
two are as far apart as are the watchwords, “All for self,” and “All for
all.”

Plato’s idea that society is the exact counterpart of the individual in
the large, however, is quite analogous to the modern comparison of
society to an organism.[325] Both are wrong in attempting to press the
analogy too far, yet they contain a truth of profound importance, which
is at the foundation of the marked change in the spirit of economics in
recent years. It is the notion of solidarity, which demands that the
individual shall no longer seek the content of his being in himself
alone, but also in the conditions that shall produce the highest life
for the commonwealth.

In the _Laws_, Plato reluctantly abandons some of the utopian
suggestions of the _Republic_ for a more practical legislation,[326]
though his ideal is really unchanged. Communism of property and of the
family are both discarded even for the rulers, as feasible only for a
supernatural order of beings.[327] As a noble ideal, however, it still
hovers before him.[328] Private property is permitted to the
citizens,[329] but under protest, and if practicable, Plato would like
to prohibit it, as the primary root of all social disturbance and
corruption.[330] He would advocate, therefore, a return to the old
régime of family tenure, somewhat on the model of the Spartan
system.[331] He would also hamper this by limitations so as to make it
no real ownership at all. The land is to be practically state property,
over which the citizens exercise merely the right of use.[332] It is to
be divided into lots of equal value, corresponding exactly to the number
of citizens.[333] Natural disadvantages shall be compensated for by an
increase in the size of the lot, and part of each allotment shall be
near, and part at a distance from the city, that all may be on an equal
footing, and alike ready to defend against invasion.[334] In order that
no citizen may lose his lot, and no man may possess more than one, very
stringent regulations are advised.[335] No lot may be purchased or
sold,[336] confiscated,[337] or divided by will to more than one
heir,[338] and no citizen, in any manner whatsoever, may become owner of
more than one lot.[339] The living of the other members of the family is
arranged for by a provision for a general distribution of the product of
the soil, in imitation of the Cretan law.[340] The annual product of
grain and cattle shall be divided into three equal parts, one for
citizens, one for their servants, and one for the artisans, metics, and
strangers. The first two parts shall not be subject to sale, but each
head of a family shall receive from them enough to nourish his family
and slaves.

It is evident from all these regulations that Plato’s citizens do not
actually own their lots, but merely enjoy the usufruct of them from the
state on certain conditions. He takes away with one hand what he gives
with the other. Under such a system all his precautionary measures could
not have prevented the growth of an even more oppressive poverty, unless
the growth of population could be checked.

The regulations limiting the acquisition or possession of personal
property are even more stringent, though here an absolute equality is
not attempted. He seeks, however, to prevent the rise of inequality of
fortunes, at the very threshold, by making undue acquisition difficult
or even impossible for the citizens. All money-making occupations are
practically closed to them[341]—trade,[342] the mechanical arts,[343]
and even agriculture, so far as their own personal work is concerned.
The latter is given over to slaves,[344] the arts and trade to aliens,
with strict limitations to be enforced by the officers of the
market.[345] As seen above, two-thirds of the farm products are not to
be subject to commercial dealings.[346] The loan of money at interest is
forbidden, and he who disobeys will risk the loss of both principal and
interest.[347] A bulky coinage of baser metal is provided for the daily
use of private citizens, such as will not pass current in another
country.[348] No dowries are to be given or received,[349] and there
shall be no hoarding, but the entire produce of the lots must be
annually distributed for consumption among the whole population of the
state.[350] To make assurance doubly sure, Plato prohibits his citizens
from owning personal property above four times the value of the
lot,[351] or four minas.[352] Any amount in excess of this must be
handed over to the state on pain of severe fine for disobedience.[353]
This is to be accomplished by the regulation that all property except
the lot must be publicly registered, and failure to fulfil this
obligation entails the loss of all but the original lot, and public
disgrace.[354]

In all this drastic limitation of property rights, Plato’s chief motive
is to render excessive wealth or poverty impossible,[355] and to
harmonize the citizenship by reducing all inequalities to a
minimum.[356] This he purposes to accomplish, not merely by the
foregoing restrictions, but also by means of a common education,[357]
and by the institution of the _sussitia_.[358] He makes the road to
comparative equality easier than in his first state by relegating all
the third class, the artisans, merchants, and farmers, outside the pale
of citizenship.[359] The actual difference, however, is not so great as
it might appear. In the _Republic_ there is equality in the upper class,
while in the _Laws_ there is comparative equality among the citizens who
comprise only the upper class. In neither case is there a real equality
in the whole state. Plato is well aware that only approximate equality
can be attained, and that differences not only in property, but also in
birth, virtue, strength, and beauty, are bound to exist.[360] He would
therefore have taxes and distributions unequal in the same ratio, so as
to avoid dissatisfaction and dispute.[361] The difficulties incident to
such a scheme of legislation he would obviate by starting a new state in
virgin soil.[362]

Souchon[363] recognizes the Plato of the _Laws_ as a true socialist, and
points to his attempt to prevent all inequality, and to his extreme
state intervention as characteristic elements of socialism. Plato
certainly does approach nearer to a real socialism in the _Laws_ than in
the _Republic_. In addition to the points noted by Souchon, there may be
observed the application of the system of equality to the whole
citizenship, though at the cost of shutting out all the workers; the
strong sense of the social function of property;[364] the practical
denial of real private ownership of land; the demand for publicity in
business, which is one of the chief suggestions for the regulation of
corporations today;[365] the active interest in the conservation of
natural resources, which, while not socialistic, lies in the direction
of greater social control;[366] and the fact that distribution of the
products of industry is made practically a function of the state.[367]
The demand for equality and unity is also somewhat analogous to the
modern socialistic hostility to competition, which Ruskin calls the “law
of death.”[368] It may be added further that Plato’s description of the
economic strife in his day is slightly suggestive of the criticism of
capitalism by modern socialism.[369] However, the basal motive of Plato
is, again, not that of modern socialism. His aim is still primarily
moral and political rather than material,[370] and he exhibits less
interest in the welfare of the laborers than he does in the
_Republic_.[371] Moreover, his demand for equality is prompted by
exactly the same motive as was active in the _Republic_, not to
ameliorate the condition of the laborer, whom he has relegated to
slavery, but to avoid the hated civic discord (διάστασις) and to
preserve the unity of the state.[372] The equality too, is in no sense
analogous to that sought by modern socialism, for, as seen above, it is
merely equality within a class, comprising the aristocratic minority of
the state, and does not touch the working masses at all.[373] In fine
then, though there are perhaps enough truly socialistic elements in the
_Laws_ to warrant the classification of Souchon, yet if Plato’s ideal
were realized, it would be mainly a restoration of the old economic
régime in Greece, based on agriculture and the family tenure of
property. Such an ideal, modern socialists would doubtless fail to
recognize as having much in common with their own.[374]

Footnote 68:

To judge by Xen. _Mem._, this might have been said of Socrates had he
been a writer.

Footnote 69:

Robin (_Platon et la science sociale_, p. 239) makes him the
forerunner of the triple division of economics—production, exchange,
distribution—but this is hardly warranted.

Footnote 70:

_Rep._ 369 B-C.

Footnote 71:

_Pol._ i. chap. 2. But in the _Laws_, Plato’s theory of origins is
more social, tracing society back to clan and family.

Footnote 72:

Cf. _Laws_ 889 D-E, 709 B-D, and Robin, _op. cit._, pp. 224 f.; also
the entire argument of the _Republic_ on justice.

Footnote 73:

_Laws_ 921B. The word is ἀξία.

Footnote 74:

_Ibid._: γιγνώσκει γὰρ ὅγε δημιουργὸς τὴν ἀξίαν.

Footnote 75:

Cf. p. 15, n. 7 above.

Footnote 76:

_Euthydemus_ 280B-E, 281B, D, 288E-289A; _Meno_ 88D-E.

Footnote 77:

_Unto This Last_, IV, 62: “Useful articles that we can use”; 64:
“Wealth is the possession of the valuable by the valiant” (Vol. XVII,
86 ff.); _Fors Clavigera_, Letter 70 (Vol. XXVIII, 712 ff.); _Munera
Pulveris_, I, 14 (Vol. XVII, 154); II, 35 (Vol. XVII, 166 f.). Plato’s
economic ideas greatly influenced Ruskin. Cf. _infra_, p. 149, n. 2.
Cf. also Vol. XXXVIII, 112; XXXIX, 411, of Ruskin. He says, in the
preface to _Unto This Last_ (Vols. XVII, XVIII), that his “real
purpose is to give ... a logical definition of wealth,” which has
“often been given incidentally in good Greek by Plato and Xenophon.”
Cf. _ibid._, n. 1, for other such references.

Footnote 78:

_Ibid._

Footnote 79:

Cf. above note and _Mun. Pul._, II, 30, notes; _Fors Clav._, Letter
70, 3 (Vol. XXVII, 713), the “good things.”

Footnote 80:

_Fors Clav._, Lett. 70, 8 f. (Vol. XXVIII, 718 ff.), where he refers
to Plato’s _Laws_ 727A.

Footnote 81:

Cf. _infra_ for citations.

Footnote 82:

Cf. p. 23 and notes.

Footnote 83:

_Laws_ 697B, 631C, 728A, 870B; _Apol._ 29D-E.

Footnote 84:

_Apol._ 30B; also _Laws_ 743E; _Gorg._ 451E; cf. Ruskin, _Fors Clav._,
Lett. 70, 6 and 11 (Vol. XXVIII, 717), where he cites _Laws_ 726-728A,
on the value of the soul. He also cites _Laws_ 742-743 and _Rep._ 416E
(cf. _Mun. Pul._ [Vol. XVII, 89, 148]).

Footnote 85:

_Laws_ 743E.

Footnote 86:

831C-D. Ruskin (_Crown of Wild Olive_, 83, Vol. XVIII, 456 f.) cites
_Critias_ 120E ff., in urging the same idea. He also cites Plato’s
myth of the metals, _Rep._ 416E, in similar vein (_Mun. Pul._, III,
89, Vol. XVII, 211).

Footnote 87:

631C cited by Ruskin, _Mun. Pul._, III, 88 (Vol. XVII, 210).

Footnote 88:

661A, 661B; _Rep._ 331A-B.

Footnote 89:

_Laws_ 661B; _Hipp. Maj._ 290D; _Menex._ 246E.

Footnote 90:

_Mun. Pul._, II, 35 ff.; he refers to both Xenophon and Plato as being
right on this point. Cf. _Fors. Clav._, I, 8 (Vol. XXVII, 122); _Unto
This Last_, 64 (Vol. XVII, 89).

Footnote 91:

_Rep._ 550D, 373D: ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀφῶσιν αὑτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν
ἄπειρον ὑπερβάντες τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄρον. On ἄπειρος cf. _infra_
under Aristotle. Cf. Dobbs, _op. cit._, pp. 202 f. and note, on the
evil results of excessive wealth and poverty in the Greece of that
age. Like Ruskin, _Mun. Pul._, VI, 153 and note (Vol. XVII, 277), who
cites _Laws_ 736E; _Aratra Pentelici_, IV, 138 (Vol. XX, 295 f.) on
money as the root of all evil, citing _Laws_ 705B.

Footnote 92:

_Laws_ 729A.

Footnote 93:

742D.

Footnote 94:

_Rep._ 421D.

Footnote 95:

_Laws_ 742E, especially πλουσίους δ᾽ αὒ σφόδρα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀδύνατον.
For the modern application of this doctrine, cf. _infra_; cf. also
743A, C; _Rep._ 550E, 551A.

Footnote 96:

_Rep._ 422; cf. 372E ff. on the φλεγμαίνουσα state.

Footnote 97:

373E; _Phaedo_ 66C. Compare the modern doctrine that lasting peace is
impossible under the present economic system.

Footnote 98:

_Laws_ 744D: διάστασις; also a basal idea of the _Republic_.

Footnote 99:

This is the spirit of the _Republic_ throughout, but cf. especially
369C-374D, and p. 25, n. 7.

Footnote 100:

_Laws_ 736E: καὶ πενίαν ἡγουμένους εἶναι μὴ τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐλάττω
ποιεῖν, ἀλλὸ τὸ τὴν ἀπληστίαν πλείω. Cf. _infra_ on Xenophon for
similar ideas. Carlyle, _Sartor Resartus_, chapter on “Everlasting
Yea”: “The fraction of life can be increased in value not so much by
increasing your numerator as by lessening your denominator.” Ruskin,
_Time and Tide_, II, 5 ff. (Vol. XVII, 319 ff.); cf. 320, n. 1, for
other references. Thoreau: “A man is wealthy in proportion to the
number of things he can let alone”—an overemphasized truth.

Footnote 101:

So Socrates (_Apol._ 41E, 29D-E) and Jesus (Matt. 6:33).

Footnote 102:

_Laws_ 634A.

Footnote 103:

_Rep._ 329E-330A, 330D-331B; cf. also the prayer of _Phaedrus_ 279C:
τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε ἅγειν δύναιτ᾽ ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων;
_Laws_ 679B; _Gorg._ 477E: τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀππαλλάττει; οὐ
χρηματιστική; cf. also 452C.

Footnote 104:

Cf. preceding notes; also _Rep._ 421D-E; _Laws_ 744D.

Footnote 105:

Bonar (_Philosophy and Political Economy_, pp. 13 f.) criticizes
_Rep._ 400-402 for not seeing that unlimited wealth is necessary for
the realization of the highest art and beauty.

Footnote 106:

Plato also emphasizes this, _Laws_ 743E, 870B: οὐ χρὴ πλουτεῖν ζητεῖν
τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἐσόμενον, ἀλλὰ δικαίως πλουτεῖν καὶ σωφρόνως; 660E;
though he implies that unlimited wealth is necessarily evil.

Footnote 107:

_Rep._ 552B-D; cf. Robin, _op. cit._, p. 243, n. 1, on κηφήν.

Footnote 108:

In _Mun. Pul._, III, 91 (Vol. XVII, 213), he makes Circe’s swine a
type of false consumption; cf. _Fors Clav._, Letter 38 (Vol. XXVIII,
30 ff.); _Mun. Pul._, Pref., 16 (Vol. XVII, 139 f.); _Queen of the
Air_, III, 124 ff. (Vol. XIX, 404 ff.); _Pol. Econ. of Art_, I, 48 ff.
(Vol. XVI, 47 ff.); _Unto This Last_, IV, 76 (Vol. XVII, 102); Mill
also attacked this idea.

Footnote 109:

_Unto This Last_, II, 40 (Vol. XVII, 56); cf. also _Mun. Pul._, II, 54
(Vol. XVII, 178 f.).

Footnote 110:

Discussed above.

Footnote 111:

Cf. _Pol._ 281D-283A, for an excellent description of the weaving
industry; also _Crat._ 388C ff.; _Phileb._ 56B, on carpentry.

Footnote 112:

_Pol._ 287D-289B; cf. Espinas, _op. cit._, pp. 35 f.; “L’Art économie
dans Platon,” _Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII (1914), 106 ff.

Footnote 113:

_Pol._ 281D-E; cf. also _Phaedo_ 99A-B; _Phileb._ 27A; _Timaeus_
46C-D.

Footnote 114:

_Sophist._ 219A-D. Bonar’s (_op. cit._, p. 20) criticism of this on
the ground that learning may produce something new, while the arts may
merely change the shape of things, takes Plato too seriously. We have
here only a characteristic Platonic generalization. Cf. Shorey, _Unity
of Plato’s Thought_ (1903), p. 64, n. 500, on the foregoing passages
from _Sophist._ and _Pol._; cf. Robin, _op. cit._, pp. 231 f.

Footnote 115:

_Rep._ 371C.

Footnote 116:

_Laws_ 918B-C, especially πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εὐεργέτης πᾶς ὃς ἂν οὐσίαν
χρημάτων ὡντινωνοῦν, ἀσύμμετρον οὔσαν καὶ ἀνώμαλον, ὁμαλήν τε καὶ
σύμμετρον ἀπεργάζεται.

Footnote 117:

Cf. DuBois, _Precis de l’histoire des doctrines économiques dans leurs
rapports avec les faits et avec les institutions_, pp. 45-47,
comparing Plato and Aristotle on this point. _Laws_ 743D and Plato’s
attitude on agriculture (cf. _infra_) might seem to point the other
way. Cf. _infra_, p. 41, nn. 7-10. Espinas (_Revue des études
Grecques_, XXVII [1914], 247, n. 1) is extreme in calling him a
physiocrat. The term would more nearly apply to Aristotle.

Footnote 118:

Ar. (_Pol._ vi [iv]. 1291_a_12-19) so interprets him, because he finds
the origin of the state in physical needs (_Rep._ 369C ff.), but this
is a carping criticism. Blanqui is hardly fair to Plato on this point
(_Histoire de l’économie politique en Europe_, p. 88). Cf. above, p.
22, n. 4, on Plato’s other theory of origins.

Footnote 119:

_Pol._ 279C.

Footnote 120:

Cf. _infra_ and Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 574.

Footnote 121:

As we shall see, the third reason has been exaggerated for the
philosophers. On the favorable attitude to labor at Athens, cf. V.
Brants, _Revue de l’instruction publique in Belg._, XXVI (1883), 108
f., 100 f.; he distinguishes between the _doctrine philosophique_ and
the _doctrine politique_. So also Guiraud, _La main-d’œuvre
industrielle dans l’ancienne Grèce_ (1900), pp. 36-50; Zimmern, _op.
cit._, pp. 382 ff., 256-72. For the older view of general prejudice
against free labor in Greece, cf. Drumann, _Arbeiter und Communisten
in Griechenland u. Rom_ (1860), pp. 24 ff. Francotte (_L’Industrie_)
takes the more conservative position. Cf. _infra_ for further notice
of this problem.

Footnote 122:

Hesiod _Erga_; _Theog._ 969-975, though even here it is opposed to
commerce.

Footnote 123:

_Laws_ 743D, but he would even limit this, so that it may not become a
sordid occupation.

Footnote 124:

_Laws_ 760E-761C, 763D. Ruskin cites this in _Fors Clav._; cf. Vol.
XXIX, 546.

Footnote 125:

Cf. pp. 19 f., and notes; cf. also p. 106, n. 1. The extensive
commerce of Athens necessitated the presence of a comparatively large
amount of money capital, and a large amount was also invested in
slaves. For further notice, cf. _infra_, p. 68, nn. 8 ff., on the
terms.

Footnote 126:

But cf. _Laws_ 742C (κεφάλαιον), and _infra_, under Xenophon, on the
terms for capital.

Footnote 127:

Cf. _Rep._ 552B, and p. 27. Kautz (_op. cit._, p. 119) overemphasizes
this; cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 91, n. 2, who observes, however,
that Plato, by his insistence upon collectivism in landed property
implies that “la terre est toujours un capital, et que la fortune
mobilière ne l’est jamais.”

Footnote 128:

Cf. _infra_ on money.

Footnote 129:

On the general attitude toward labor in Athens, cf. p. 30, n. 4. On
Plato’s regard for the laborer, cf. _infra_, under distribution.

Footnote 130:

_Rep._ 590C, but only for him whose higher nature (τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου
εἴδος) is naturally weak, though the implication is that this is
characteristic of the artisans. Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 49 f.

Footnote 131:

_Laws_ 842D, 806D-E, 741E, 846D, 919D.

Footnote 132:

847A.

Footnote 133:

743D.

Footnote 134:

_Charm._ 163A-C.

Footnote 135:

_Gorg._ 517D-518E.

Footnote 136:

292E, 289E-290A.

Footnote 137:

_Ibid._ 300E.

Footnote 138:

Cf. _Rep._ 371C for a contrast in his attitude toward the two; cf.
Bonar, _op. cit._, pp. 21 f.

Footnote 139:

_Laws_ 846D, 847A. Ruskin (_Fors Clav._, Letter 82, 34 [Vol. XXIX, 253
f.]) contrasts the fevered leisure that results from extreme
money-making with the true leisure, citing _Laws_ 831.

Footnote 140:

_Laws_ 743D. The aristocratic Greek feeling of independence against
selling one’s powers to another, and the fact of the frank acceptance
of slavery, by most contemporary thinkers, as the natural order, also
exerted some unconscious influence.

Footnote 141:

Cf. _infra_ for citations from Zeller, and Poehlmann’s able, but
somewhat extreme, defense of Plato (_op. cit._, II, 36 ff.). He cites
Adam Smith, _Wealth of Nations_, V, I, Pt. 2, art. 2, in similar vein
to Plato, on the ill-effects of mechanical labor, despite his
undoubted interest in the industrial arts.

Footnote 142:

Francotte, _L’Industrie_, I, 246, in reference to the _Laws_.

Footnote 143:

_Op. cit._, p. 26, n. 2.

Footnote 144:

Eisenhart (_Geschichte der Nationalökonomie_, p. 5) also says that
Plato calls “Volkswirtschaft gerade zu den Staat der Schweine.”
Dietzel (“Beiträge zur Geschichte des Socialismus und des
Kommunismus,” _Zeitschrift für Literatur und Geschichte der
Staatswissenschaften_, p. 397, n. 1) criticizes both the foregoing.

Footnote 145:

_Sympos._ 209A; _Phileb._ 56C.

Footnote 146:

_Protag._ 321E.

Footnote 147:

_Rep._ 420E, 421C; _Laws_ 779A, 807A-E, 808C. The passages in the
_Laws_ apply particularly to the work of the soldier and the citizen.
Cf. Ruskin, _Unto This Last_, I, 22 (Vol. XVII, 40) for a similar idea
that the function of the laborer is not primarily to draw his pay, but
to do his work well.

Footnote 148:

_Rep._ 433A.

Footnote 149:

_Rep._ 552A, C, 564E; cf. _Laws_ 901A, where he refers to the passage
in Hesiod’s _Erga_ 304: κηφηνέσσι κοθούροις. Cf. p. 27, n. 1, above.
Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 87 f.) points to Plato’s demand that woman
be freed, so that the total number of free workers may be increased,
but Plato is thinking only of the ruling class.

Footnote 150:

_Laws_ 918B-919C, referring to retail trade; but if he could admit it
for this, he surely could for the industries. Cf. Aristotle’s passage
on liberal and illiberal work (_Pol._ 1337_b_5-22).

Footnote 151:

_Mun. Pul._, V, 105 and note (Vol. XVII, 234 f.), where he refers to
Plato’s diminutive, ἄνθρωπίσκοι, as applied to laborers (_Rep._ 495C;
_Laws_ 741E); _Time and Tide_, 103 (Vol. XVII, 402), 127 (p. 423 and
note); _Crown of Wild Olive_, 2 (Vol. XVIII, 388), on the furnace;
_Lectures on Art_, IV, 123 (Vol. XX, 113); on the evil effects of arts
needing fire, as iron-working, where Xen. _Econ._ iv. 2, 3 is cited.
He makes frequent reference to the Greek attitude, e.g., Vol. XVIII,
241, 461, and above. But he was not absolutely opposed to machinery;
cf. _Cestus Aglaia_, 33 for what is called the finest eulogy of a
machine in English literature. He even anticipated the great future
mechanical development (_Mun. Pul._, 17).

Footnote 152:

_Stones of Venice_ (Vol. X, 201); cf. also IV, 6 (Vol. XI, 202 f.),
where he cites Plato _Alc._ I. 129.

Footnote 153:

_Fors. Clav._, VII, 9 (Vol. XIX, 230).

Footnote 154:

Cf. Vol. XXVII, Intro., p. lxv.

Footnote 155:

_Rep._ 370A-C and many other passages. Cf. _infra_; _Laws_ 846E-847A.
Cf. _infra_ on the unfair interpretation of _Rep._ 421A by Zeller and
others. Plato implies by the passage merely that specialization is
more important for the statesman than for the cobbler (421C).

Footnote 156:

_Rep._ 369C. Adam Smith makes this the basal fact of exchange (_Wealth
of Nations_, I, ii).

Footnote 157:

_Rep._ 370C: πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ρᾷον, ὅταν ἑἶς
ἓν κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἐν καιρῷ σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ. He first
states the principle less plausibly as a literary device, _Rep._ 369C;
cf. 433A.

Footnote 158:

_Rep._ 370C, B.

Footnote 159:

_Op. cit._, I, chap. ii.

Footnote 160:

So Herbert Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_ (1900), III, 342-49. Cf.
also Ruskin, _Fors Clav._, IV, 15 (Vol. XXVIII, 160).

Footnote 161:

_Rep._ 370B-C, 374B-E.

Footnote 162:

_Op. cit._, I, chap. 1. Plato implies the increase in wealth. Haney
(_op. cit._, p. 41) observes that Plato thought especially of the
advantages of division of labor to the state, rather than to the
individual. Cf. further _Wealth of Nations_, II, Intro.

Footnote 163:

_Rep._ 370C-371B; cf. DuBois, _op. cit._, p. 37.

Footnote 164:

_Rep._ 370C-D.

Footnote 165:

371C.

Footnote 166:

371B; _Laws_ 918B.

Footnote 167:

_Rep._ 370E-371A. In the _Laws_, he does not extend the principle to
international trade. Cf. Bonar, _op. cit._, p. 17.

Footnote 168:

Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 185 f.) notes a contradiction between
Plato’s insistence upon the division of labor and his desire for the
simple life. But the philosopher is aware of this, and knows that the
simpler ideal is impossible. Cf. V. Brants, _Revue de l’instr. pub. en
Belg._, XXVI (1883), 102-4, on the fact of the extensive division of
labor in Athenian industry.

Footnote 169:

δεμιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας; _Rep._ 395C, 434A-D; cf. also 420B-421B. In
the _Laws_, the artisans and traders are non-citizens (846D, 847A,
918B-C), not because of prejudice primarily, but for the sake of
better government.

Footnote 170:

_Rep._ 374B-E.

Footnote 171:

395A-B; cf. Adam’s note to 395A, explaining _Sympos._ 223D, where
Plato asserts the opposite. He thinks Plato is speaking ideally in the
_Republic_ passage, but here of the actual fact. But cf. Shorey,
_Unity_, etc., p. 78, n. 597.

Footnote 172:

_Rep._ 433A-B, D, 434A-D, 432A, 443-444A, 396D-E; _Charm._ 161E. In
his broad application of the law, he has advanced beyond Adam Smith.
Cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 81 and n. 2.

Footnote 173:

_Rep._ 397E-398A.

Footnote 174:

443C-D; cf. Nettleship _Lectures on the Republic of Plato_, p. 71.

Footnote 175:

Oncken observes (_Geschichte der Nationalökonomie_, pp. 34-36) that
while Smith drew from the law the idea of freedom of trade and
industry, Plato inferred the strictest subordination of these to the
will of the state, and that he also based the caste system on the
principle. For the alleged caste system, cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p.
82, and infra, under distribution. Aristotle’s state implies even a
more rigid separation of the capable few. On Plato’s insight into
economic principles, cf. Robin, _op. cit._, pp. 229 ff. He criticizes
Guiraud for belittling the value of Plato’s social ideas, and urges
that he should be judged, not by the worth of his proposed remedies,
but by his scientific insight (p. 252).

Footnote 176:

_Rep._ 395A-B; 374E, 395B; εἰς σμικρότερα κατακερματίσθαι.

Footnote 177:

_Apol._ 21C-22E; cf. _Rep._ 495D-E, though it applies rather to the
evil effects of the banausic life. Cf. Bonar, _op. cit._, p. 16.
Ruskin (_Stones of Venice_, VI, 16 [Vol. X, 196]), says: It is “not
the labor that is divided but the men—divided into segments of men.”
It stunts their faculties.

Footnote 178:

_Rep._ 552A.

Footnote 179:

396C-373E; cf. Bonar, _op. cit._, p. 27.

Footnote 180:

579D.

Footnote 181:

Cf. Zimmern, _op. cit._, p. 389, note; _Laws_ 777B: δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ
δύσκολόν ἐστι τὸ θρέμμα ἄνθρωπος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν διόρισιν, τὸ
δοῦλόν τε ἔργῳ διορίζεσθαι καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ δεσπότην οὐδαμῶς
εὕχρηστον ἐθέλει εἶναι τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι. On his alleged caste system,
cf. above, n. 2, and _infra_.

Footnote 182:

_Rep_. 469C; cf. _Pol._ 309A.

Footnote 183:

_Laws_ 806D. For Ruskin on slavery, cf. _infra_ on Aristotle.

Footnote 184:

_Laws_ 776D-777E. Espinas (_Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII [1914],
256) observes that Plato adopts the mean between the two extremes in
his attitude to slaves.

Footnote 185:

Cf. Xen. _Ath. Pol._ i. 10-12 on the easy life of slaves in Athens,
and Zimmern, _op. cit._, pp. 382 f., who points out that this resulted
from economic necessity. Cf. 777C-D; _cf._ _Rep._ 578D-579A on the
dangers and troubles arising from extensive slave-holding.

Footnote 186:

Laws 915A ff., another striking evidence of the actual status of
freedmen and slaves in Athens.

Footnote 187:

Rep. 371B. The word is νόμισμα, something established by usage, hence
“current coin,” not necessarily suggestive of intrinsic worth, as are
χρήματα and the metals. Cf. Ar. _Clouds_ 248 for a play on the word,
θεοὶ ἡμῖν νόμισμ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι. Cf. the simile, _Frogs_ 720, and _Phaedo_
69A, for an analogy between it and wisdom.

Footnote 188:

Rep. 371B: ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς.

Footnote 189:

_Fors Clav._, IV, 11, note (Vol. XXVIII, 134 f.); cf. also Vol. XVII,
50, 194 f.

Footnote 190:

742A-B: νόμισμα δ᾽ ἕνεκα ἀλλαγῆς; 918B: ἐξευπορεῖν καὶ ὁμαλότητα ταῖς
οὐσίαις, referring directly to traders.

Footnote 191:

_Laws_ 918B.

Footnote 192:

_Rep._ 553E; for Aristotle, cf. _infra_.

Footnote 193:

_Laws_ 743D.

Footnote 194:

849E.

Footnote 195:

742C, 915D-E; _Rep._ 556A-B; _Laws_ 850A.

Footnote 196:

921C, an obol per month.

Footnote 197:

_Rep._ 555E.

Footnote 198:

_Fors. Clav._, notes to Letter 43, 14 (Vol. XXVIII, 121 f.), notes to
Letter 81, 16 (Vol. XXIX, 212), where he refers to Plato and
Aristotle; _Mun. Pul._, IV, 98, note (Vol. XVII, 220), where he
absolutely condemns it; On the Old Road, Vol. XXXIV, 425, on usury,
ends with a citation from the Laws 913C; ἃ μὴ κατέθου, μὴ ἀνέλη.

Footnote 199:

E.g. J. Scott Nearing’s recent book on _Income_.

Footnote 200:

_Laws_ 679B, 831C; _Rep._ 545B ff., 548B. Cf. Ruskin on the evils
arising from money, Vol. XX, 295 f.

Footnote 201:

_Laws_ 743D, 742A-B, 801B.

Footnote 202:

742A.

Footnote 203:

Ruskin, _Mun. Pul._, I, 25. He thinks it is a relic of a barbarism
that will disappear as civilization develops.

Footnote 204:

_Laws_ 742A-B.

Footnote 205:

_Sophist._ 223C-D; cf. _Pol._, 289E for the triple division of
commercials, κάπηλοι, ἔμποροι, and ἀργυραμοίβοι; cf. _Phaedo_, 69A for
a figurative use of ἀλλαγή.

Footnote 206:

_Rep._ 370A-E, home; 370E-371E, foreign; cf. Adam Smith’s idea above.

Footnote 207:

370E-371A; Cornford (_op. cit._, p. 66) wrongly asserts that Plato did
not know the law that exports must balance imports. Cf. _op. cit._, p.
37.

Footnote 208:

Boeckh, _Die Staataushaltung der Athener_, I, pp. 382 ff.; Zimmern,
_op. cit._, 1st ed., p. 317. But cf. Brants, _Xenophon Economiste_, p.
18, n. 2 and references, on the protectionist tendency of the
commercial policy of Athens.

Footnote 209:

_Laws_ 847C; Souchon (_op. cit._, p. 102) sees in this a mercantile
trend, but the purposes are entirely different.

Footnote 210:

847B.

Footnote 211:

_Rep._ 371C-D.

Footnote 212:

_Laws_ 918B-C.

Footnote 213:

_Rep._ 369C.

Footnote 214:

On the relation of exchange to production, cf. above, p. 28.

Footnote 215:

Pp. 19 ff.

Footnote 216:

P. 41 and notes.

Footnote 217:

_Laws_ 918B.

Footnote 218:

918D.

Footnote 219:

918E.

Footnote 220:

P. 41 and notes.

Footnote 221:

_Laws_ 918A, 920C. He seems to feel that trade as regularly pursued is
a form of cheatery, in which one gains what the other loses. Cf.
Ruskin, _Unto This Last_, I, 22 (Vol. XVII, 40 f.); IV, 66 ff. (Vol.
XVII, 90 ff.); _Mun. Pul._, IV 95 ff. (Vol. XVII, 217 ff.), where he
refers to _Rep._ 426E, on the difficulty of curing this disease of
traders; cf. Vol. XVII, _Intro._, p. xlvi, citing Xen. _Mem._, iii. 7.
5, 6, on those who are “always thinking how they may buy cheapest and
sell dearest.”

Footnote 222:

_Rep._ 371C.

Footnote 223:

416A-417A.

Footnote 224:

Cf. 415E, χρηματιστικάς in contrast to στρατιωτικάς.

Footnote 225:

741E, 743D, 919D.

Footnote 226:

920A.

Footnote 227:

919D.

Footnote 228:

915A-B, though it applies especially to freedmen.

Footnote 229:

850B-C, and n. 1, above.

Footnote 230:

919C.

Footnote 231:

849D-E, 850A, 915D; cf. _infra_ on this and the other regulations in
their application to modern economics.

Footnote 232:

916D-E; cf. 917.

Footnote 233:

917B-D.

Footnote 234:

920B-C. Plato’s market regulations would exclude all selfish
competition and all gain, beyond mere return for labor expended, from
exchange, and would base it upon a mutual spirit of reciprocity. Thus
here, as often, he is the model for Aristotle, who usually fails to
recognize his debt. Espinas (_Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII
[1914], 246) is hardly in accord with the modern spirit in declaring
that competition is the social bond, and that Plato misconceives the
nature of this bond.

Footnote 235:

920A-B, 919D.

Footnote 236:

_Laws_ 920C.

Footnote 237:

Zimmern (_op. cit._, p. 280, n. 1) calls it “grandfatherly.”

Footnote 238:

But cf. Robin, _op. cit._, p. 212, n. 1, who argues that many of his
suggestions are based on actual legislation in Athens or elsewhere in
Greece. Cf. also Hermann, _Ges. Abh._ (1849), pp. 141, 153, 159, whom
he cites; J. Schulte, _Quomodo Plato in legibus publica Atheniensium
instituta respexerit_ (1907, dissertation), and the bibliography cited
there. But he deals very little with Plato’s economic and social laws.

Footnote 239:

Plato saw that it might add a time and place value (p. 41, and notes).

Footnote 240:

Cf. above, p. 42, n. 7; also _Fors Clav._, Letters 45, 82; _Crown of
Wild Olive_, II, 75 f. (Vol. XVIII, 450 f.). He argues that there
should be no profit in exchange, beyond merely the payment for the
labor involved in it. He insists that “for every plus in exchange
there is a precisely equal minus.” Cf. _infra_ on Aristotle for a
similar idea, pp. 107 ff.

Footnote 241:

_Op. cit._, p. 278, n. 2; cf. above, pp. 42 f.

Footnote 242:

Cf. p. 43.

Footnote 243:

_Ibid._

Footnote 244:

_Ibid._ Cf. Ruskin’s more socialistic idea that all retailers be made
salaried officers (_Time and Tide_, XXI, 134 [Vol. XVII, 427]).

Footnote 245:

Cf. e.g., Dem. _De corona_ 87; _Cont. Lept._ xx. 31; _Cont. Andr._
xxii. 15; _Cont. Lacrit._ xxxv. 50; Lysias xxii; Hdt. vii. 102; Thuc.
iii. 86, and many other passages. For modern discussions, cf. Droysen,
_Athen und der Westen_ (1882), pp. 41 ff.; Grundy, _Thucydides and the
History of His Age_ (1911), pp. 58-95; Zimmern, _op. cit._, 1st ed.,
pp. 349 ff.; Gernet, “L’Approvisionment d’Athènes en blé,” _Mélanges
d’histoire, ancienne_, 1909; Beloch, _G. G._, I, 406 f.; _Bevölkerung
im Alterthum_ (1898), p. 30, etc.

Footnote 246:

_Rep._ 372C: οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας.

Footnote 247:

_Laws_ 740D; but his specific methods for carrying out his difficult
suggestion, if he had any to offer, were probably impracticable,
judging by his discussion of women and children in the _Republic_.
Ruskin’s suggestions for meeting the problem are colonization,
reclamation of waste lands, and discouragement of marriage (_Unto This
Last_, IV, 80 [Vol. XVII, 108]).

Footnote 248:

_Laws_ 740E; Ar. (_Pol._ 1265_b_6-12) unfairly criticizes him for
limiting the amount of property, and making it indivisible, while
failing to provide against a too high birth-rate.

Footnote 249:

741A.

Footnote 250:

Cf. Ruskin, cited above, p. 27.

Footnote 251:

For the Greek term, cf. _infra_ on Aristotle.

Footnote 252:

Cf., however, Xen. _Mem._ ii. 7. 12-14, discussed _infra_, which may
be a suggestion of a theory of profits.

Footnote 253:

_Laws_ 921A-D, discussed on p. 39, n. 8; cf. also 847B.

Footnote 254:

The passages above cited, n. 1 above, need not imply labor for
capitalists. It does not appear that there was ever a considerable
body of free citizen laborers at Athens, who worked for capitalists,
though the number of free workers, aside from labor on the farms, was
fairly large. Cf. _C.I.A._ for records of such labor on the buildings
of the acropolis; Boeckh, _op. cit._, I, 58: “Der geringere war durch
seine Umstände so gut als der arme Schutzverwandte oder Sklave zur
Handarbeit genöthigt.” On the favorable attitude toward free labor at
Athens, cf. above, p. 29, n. 4. Poehlmann (_op. cit._, _in loc._)
takes the opposite view as to the number of free laborers for
capitalists.

Footnote 255:

_Rep._ 552B-D, a characteristic passage; _Gorg._ 507E; _Laws_ 757B.

Footnote 256:

920C.

Footnote 257:

740B ff., 923; but his purpose is to keep the allotments intact.

Footnote 258:

847B: μισθῶν δὲ αὐτοῖς περὶ καὶ τῶν ἀναιρέσεων τῶν ἔργων, καὶ ἐάν τις
αὐτοὺς ἕτερος ἢ κεῖνοί τινα ἄλλον ἀδικῶσι, μέχρι δραχμῶν πεντήκοντα
ἀστυνόμοι διαδικαζόντων, etc.; perhaps a strained interpretation.

Footnote 259:

On his attitude to industry, cf. pp. 32 ff.

Footnote 260:

Bonar, _op. cit._, p. 29.

Footnote 261:

Bussy, _Histoire et Réfutation du Socialisme_ (1859), p. 119.

Footnote 262:

Oncken, _op. cit._, p. 34.

Footnote 263:

Haney, _op. cit._, p. 16.

Footnote 264:

Zeller, _Phil. Gr._, II, 1 (1889), 907; cf. also above, pp. 32 f.
Historians of economic thought generally state the case extremely;
e.g., Kautz, _op. cit._, p. 59; Blanqui, _op. cit._, p. 45; Souchon
also, to some extent. Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 36-108) errs in the
opposite way.

Footnote 265:

Pol. ii. 5. 1264_a_11-17, 36-38; 1264_b_11-13.

Footnote 266:

423D: ὡς δόξειεν ἄντις; also 425D, both cited by Poehlmann.

Footnote 267:

415E-417B, 420A-421C admit of no other interpretation. Cf. 421C, how
he turns to the next related point (τοῦ τούτου ἀδελφόν) the question
of the effect of wealth or poverty on the artisans (τοὺς ἄλλους
δημιουργούς). Cf. also _infra_ for other citations.

Footnote 268:

_Pol._ 1264_a_36-38, repeated by many moderns.

Footnote 269:

_Rep._ 415B-C.

Footnote 270:

Cf. the undiscriminating statement of Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 41: “Et
il n’y a guère eu, au cours de l’histoire de la science politique, de
conception plus aristocratique que le mythe fameux des trois races
d’or, d’argent et d’airain.”

Footnote 271:

_Pol._ 1264_b_15-25, repeated by Grote and others.

Footnote 272:

_Rep._ iv. beg.-421C.

Footnote 273:

I Cor. 12:14 ff.; for other evidence of Plato’s interest in all
classes, cf. 519E ff., and the entire argument against Thrasymachus,
Book I.

Footnote 274:

_Rep._ 421A, cited by Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 1, 907, as evidence of
this, states merely that it is more important that there be efficient
rulers than efficient cobblers. Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 36-108,
a masterly defense of the _Republic_ on this point, criticizing both
Zeller and Gomperz. He errs on the other side, however, as e.g., p.
96, where he infers from _Rep._ 462C that Plato intended his communism
to apply to the whole people.

Footnote 275:

416A-B, 417B.

Footnote 276:

415A, introducing the alleged aristocratic myth.

Footnote 277:

463B, 417B, 416A, 547C.

Footnote 278:

431E-432A, 443E, 423D.

Footnote 279:

421C-E, cited on p. 48, n. 8. Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 91.

Footnote 280:

590C.

Footnote 281:

431D-E, 434C.

Footnote 282:

378B, E, 377B, insisting upon proper stories for all children;
915E-520A, implying that the artisans shall share in all benefits of
the state up to their capacity.

Footnote 283:

643B-C.

Footnote 284:

847B, 921C-D.

Footnote 285:

936B-C.

Footnote 286:

Mill is an exception, but despite his thoroughgoing definitions of
economics.

Footnote 287:

Cf. Ar. _Pol._ ii. 1266_b_17-24.

Footnote 288:

On the Spartan system, cf. Guiraud, _La Prop. fonc._, pp. 41 f.;
Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 75-98, both of whom oppose the more extreme
theory of communism in Sparta.

Footnote 289:

On this general subject, cf. Guiraud, _La Prop. fonc._, 573 f.; cf. S.
Cognetti de Martiis, _Socialismo Antico_ (1889), pp. 515-17, on
socialistic tendencies in Greek constitutions and politics.

Footnote 290:

E.g., Esmein, _Nouvelle Revue historique_, 1890, pp. 821 ff. For a
refutation, cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, 1st ed., pp. 20 ff.; Guiraud,
_op. cit._, p. 37; Souchon, _op. cit._, pp. 135 f.

Footnote 291:

For a refutation of the common error, cf. Zeller, _op. cit._, I, 1,
317, n. 1, and 318, n. 2; Guiraud, _op. cit._, pp. 574 f. and 7-11;
Souchon, _op. cit._, pp. 136-39 and notes. The earliest witnesses for
Pythagorean communism, Epicurus, in Diog. L. x. 2, and Timaeus of
Tauromenium, _ibid._, viii. 10 are remote from his time and
untrustworthy. The later writers (Diog. L. viii. 10; Aul. Gell. i. 9.
12; Hippolytus _Refut._ i. 2. 12; Porphyry _Vit. Pyth._ 20; Jamblichus
_De Pyth. vit._ 30, 72, 168, 257, etc.; Photius, under κοινά) quoted,
and made the tradition general. The older writers know nothing of the
tradition. Moreover, some passages give evidence of private property
among the Pythagoreans (Diog. L. viii. 1. 15, 39). The origin of the
tradition has been plausibly assigned to a misunderstanding of the
proverb κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων and to the doctrine of moral helpfulness
among the Pythagoreans. S. Cognetti de Martiis (_op. cit._, pp.
459ff.) calls it _socialismo cenobito_.

Footnote 292:

_Pol._ ii. 8. Hippodamas the Pythagorean, cited by _Stob. Flor._ xliii
(xli). 92 f., should not be confused with him. The former wrote in the
Dorian dialect, and differs materially in his ideas. His three classes
are rulers, soldiers, and all laborers, including merchants and
farmers. He says nothing of the division of the land or who shall own
it, but provides that the third class furnish a living to the rest.
But cf. Robin, _op. cit._, p. 228, n. 1, who identifies them.

Footnote 293:

_Pol._ 1267_b_31-33. Cf. Cornford’s visionary article (_Class.
Quart._, VI [1912], 246 ff.), in which he seeks to prove that the
tripartite psychology of Plato’s _Republic_ is an inference from this
triple division of society. Cf. a similar idea of Pohlenz, _Aus Platos
Werdezeit_ (1913), pp. 229 ff.

Footnote 294:

ii. 8. 1267_b_33-36.

Footnote 295:

1268_a_34 ff.

Footnote 296:

So Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 141, who makes him an individualist.

Footnote 297:

_Pol._ ii. 7.

Footnote 298:

1266_a_37 f.

Footnote 299:

1266_a_40: φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν;
1266_b_31-33, to be realized in an old state, partly by allowing only
the rich to give dowries and only the poor to receive them;
1266_b_2-4.

Footnote 300:

Ar. (1267_b_10) criticizes him for this.

Footnote 301:

1267_b_15; cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 7 f.

Footnote 302:

1266_a_37 f.; 1267_a_1 f. Aristotle’s account of these writers, as of
Plato, is incomplete and unsatisfactory.

Footnote 303:

_Rep._ 415A; cf. above, pp. 48 ff. on this and the following note.

Footnote 304:

420B-C.

Footnote 305:

416D-E, 458C; cf. also _Critias_ 112B-C, where common houses, common
meals, and the prohibition of gold and silver are presented as an
ideal.

Footnote 306:

457D.

Footnote 307:

462B-C.

Footnote 308:

451D-455D. Poehlmann points to this doctrine of the _Ebenbürtigkeit_
of women as an advanced ground even for Christianity.

Footnote 309:

451E.

Footnote 310:

Guiraud (_La Prop. fonc._, p. 578) distinguishes these elements in
Plato’s system, _Republic_ and _Laws_: exclusive right of property
vested in the state; use of land granted to a part of the citizens;
distribution of the product among all the citizens; obligation to
work, tempered by equality of service; inequality of classes, and
equality of men in each class; heredity of profession, corrected by
selection of talents.

Footnote 311:

Cf. pp. 48 f. and notes. Even Aristotle admits (1264_a_33) that Plato
makes his husbandmen absolute owners of their lots, on condition of
paying rental. The rulers alone (μόνοις) are to keep themselves from
silver or gold (417A). Cf. Book IV, beg.: οἶον ἄλλοι ἄγρούς τε
κεκτημένοι καὶ οἰκίας οἰκοδομούμενοι, etc.; 420A, 416D-E, 458C,
464B-D, where the community is applied to the guards only, and 464A-D,
where the same is true of family communism. Doubtless he would have
extended it farther, had he thought it feasible (462B-C), but
Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 569 f.; II, 96 f.) overemphasizes this
demand of Plato. Adler (_Geschichte des Socialismus und Kommunismus
von Plato bis zur Gegenwart_, p. 44), DuBois (_op. cit._, p. 40),
Oncken (_op. cit._, p. 34), Souchon (_op. cit._, 148); Malon (_op.
cit._, pp. 90 f.), Shorey (_Class. Phil._, October, 1914, art. on
“Plato’s Laws”) all agree with the foregoing conclusion. Francotte
(_L’Industrie_, II, 258 ff.) leaves the question open, but (261 f.)
observes that the third class is at least restrained from extremes of
wealth and poverty.

Footnote 312:

421D, 421E-422E.

Footnote 313:

_Ibid._, the fundamental idea of the _Republic_. L. Stein (_Sociale
Frage_, p. 164) rightly says: “Denn der Kommunismus Platons ist seinem
Schoepfer nicht Zweck, sondern blosses paedagogisches Mittel.”

Footnote 314:

415E-416A, 417B, 420D, 421A, 421C. He would also avoid vulgarization
of the rulers through trade (416E-417A).

Footnote 315:

421D.

Footnote 316:

Ruskin thinks that inequality of possessions, in itself, does not
necessarily mean either evil or good for a nation (_Unto This Last_,
II, 31 [Vol. XVII, 46 f.]); he argues that each is born with an
absolutely limited capacity, and calls the idea of natural equality of
men “radical blockheadism” (_Fors Clav._, VIII, Letter 95, 6 [Vol.
XXIX, 496]); cf. _Unto This Last_, III, 54 (Vol. XVII, 74); _Modern
Painters_, III, Pt. IV, chap. x, 22 (Vol. III, 189); _Seven Lamps of
Architecture_, IV, 28 (Vol. VIII, 167); _Fors Clav._, II, Letter 14, 4
and note (Vol. XXVII, 248); _Stones of Venice_, III, 4 (Vol. XI, 260),
all of which emphasize its impossibility. He strongly opposes
socialism, cf. above, and _Mun. Pul._, 21 (Vol. XVII, 144), though his
economic ideas contained essentially the germ of modern socialistic
doctrine.

Footnote 317:

Cf. his ironical criticism of democratic equality in Athens, 558C:
ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα; _Laws_ 757B-D,
744B-C; cf. _infra_ for Aristotle’s idea. Cf. p. 61, n. 1 for further
notice of these passages.

Footnote 318:

Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 553, n. 3) is extreme in asserting that
Plato’s account of the growth of the proletariat, and the rise of
class struggles (Book VIII) contains “alle wesentlichen Züge des
Bildes, welches die moderne Plutokratie gewährt,” and (560), “Das
vierte Jahrhundert v. Chr. hat uns den Kampf vorgekämpft in welchem
wir selbst mittenhineinstehen.”

Footnote 319:

Pohlenz (_op. cit._, p. 240) makes his socialism a reaction against
the individualism of Pericles, but makes the extreme assertion: “Die
Grundlage auf der Plato seinen Idealstaat aufbaut, ist der strengste
Socialismus.”

Footnote 320:

Cf. p. 43, n. 10. He evidently recognizes his ideas on the family and
on the philosopher-king as utopian; cf. also 425D-E; but Poehlmann
(_op. cit._, II, 144-52) opposes this view. Cf. Shorey, _Class.
Phil._, October, 1914, pp. 357 f., on the idea of law in the _Laws_
and _Politics_.

Footnote 321:

When advocated, it has not been with the lofty motive of Plato.

Footnote 322:

Poehlmann ((_op. cit._, I, 579, 598) admits this. Guiraud (_La Prop.
fonc._, p. 594) points out that the analogy with modern socialism is
difficult, owing to the modern abolition of slavery, great extent of
states, and large increase in personal property.

Footnote 323:

So Souchon, (_op. cit._, pp. 145 ff.); Guiraud (_La Prop. fonc._, p.
638) well says: “Si ces derniers [modern socialists] reussissaient à
appliquer leurs projects, les sociétés qui sortiraient de leurs mains
n’auraient pas la moindre ressemblance avec la société hellenique.”
Cf. also _ibid_., p. 594, where he distinguishes between Plato and
modern socialists. Francotte (_L’Industrie_, II, 250, n. 1) makes the
_Republic_ essentially socialistic, though he admits that it has not
the modern aim (p. 255). Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 123-43) makes it a
“Koinzidenz der beiden Prinzipien” (p. 143). Wolf (_Gesch. d. Ant.
Kommun. u. Individ._, p. 96) distinguishes Plato’s two aims as a
strong community spirit, and a strong central authority, devoid of
selfish interest. Cf. S. Cognetti de Martiis, (_op. cit._, pp.
524-89), on the _Socialismo filosofico of the Republic_.

Footnote 324:

_Vierteljahrschrift f. Staats u. Volkswirtschaft_, I, 375 ff. Of
course Aristophanes may have caricatured Plato as he did Socrates in
the _Clouds_. However, since both were opposed to extreme
individualism, and since the comedy was written before the _Republic_,
it is improbable. But cf. Drumann, _Arbeiter u. Communisten in
Griechenland u. Rom_ (1860), pp. 133 f., who thinks the poet was
satirizing the oral discussions of Plato. Pohlenz (_op. cit._, pp.
223-28) argues for an earlier edition of the _Republic_, and states
that, though the comedy is not a direct satire on the _Republic_, yet
its numerous specific ideas and expressions that are similar to
Plato’s warrant the conclusion that the poet followed Plato. Cf. also
S. Cognetti de Martiis, (_op. cit._, pp. 541-61), on the relation of
the two.

Footnote 325:

434D-E, and the entire plan of the _Republic_. Cf. Poehlmann, (_op.
cit._, I, 527 ff.; also II, 210 f.), on Plato’s idea of a
pre-established harmony between individual and common good.

Footnote 326:

Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 205 ff.) suggests that this change resulted
from Plato’s experiences with Dionysius of Syracuse, but it may be
easily accounted for by the natural conservatism of age. Cf. Shorey,
_Class. Phil._, IX (1914), 353.

Footnote 327:

739D, 740A.

Footnote 328:

739C-E, 807B.

Footnote 329:

737E, 741C.

Footnote 330:

831C-D, though it refers to the love of wealth, 807B, 713E.

Footnote 331:

Cf. Guiraud (_La Prop. fonc._, pp. 582 f.); cf. _infra_ for details.

Footnote 332:

740-741A, 923A-B, a remarkable passage, which declares that they are
not full owners either of themselves or their property, but that they
belong to the whole race, past, present, and future (ξύμπαντος δέ τοῦ
γένους ὑμῶν τοῦ τε ἔμπροσθεν και τοῦ ἔπειτα ἐσομένου), and especially
to the state.

Footnote 333:

737E, 745C-E.

Footnote 334:

745C-E.

Footnote 335:

740B.

Footnote 336:

741B-C.

Footnote 337:

745A, 855A-B, 754E-755A, 744E.

Footnote 338:

740B, 923C. If the family is large, the women are to be married off,
and the men adopted by the childless (740C). Personal property may be
willed to the other children (923D); cf. also above, pp. 45 f. and
notes.

Footnote 339:

740C, 741B-D.

Footnote 340:

847E-848C.

Footnote 341:

741E.

Footnote 342:

847D, 919D.

Footnote 343:

846D, 847A, 919D.

Footnote 344:

806E.

Footnote 345:

920A; cf. above, on exchange.

Footnote 346:

849C.

Footnote 347:

Cf. p. 39 and notes.

Footnote 348:

Cf. p. 40 and notes.

Footnote 349:

742C.

Footnote 350:

Cf. p. 59 and notes.

Footnote 351:

744E. The entire wealth will thus vary from the bare lot to five times
its value. Cf. Jowett, _Dialogs of Plato_, 3d ed., V, 127, though the
division into four classes might mean that the highest was only four
times the lot value. Espinas (_Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII
[1914], 237) accepts the former interpretation.

Footnote 352:

54D-E. The value of the lot was thus only a mina.

Footnote 353:

744E, 745A.

Footnote 354:

745A, 754D-E (which requires it only for the excess), 755A. Espinas
(_op. cit._, pp. 118 ff.) emphasizes the ascetic tendency of his
regulations.

Footnote 355:

729A ff., 919B, 936B-C, against beggars.

Footnote 356:

744B-E, and above notes.

Footnote 357:

Book VII.

Footnote 358:

780B; women and children separate, 806E; on its Cretan origin, 625E
ff.

Footnote 359:

846D, 847A, D, 919D, 806E.

Footnote 360:

744B; cf. pp. 55 f. on equality; cf. 757B-D, contrasting the mere
arithmetical equality (τὴν ἀριθμῷ ἴσην), which is easily realized, and
the true equality, which is very difficult. This latter apportions to
each in accord with his nature (πρὸς τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν). The two are
almost opposites (ἐναντιαῖν). Espinas (_op. cit._, p. 236) thinks that
the division into property classes in the _Laws_ is an attempt to
realize this principle.

Footnote 361:

744B.

Footnote 362:

736C-D, 704.

Footnote 363:

_Op. cit._, p. 143; cf. also pp. 163-65, where he compares it to
modern collectivism; cf. p. 162; also Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 295.

Footnote 364:

923A; cf. 877D, and much of the legislation on property, above.

Footnote 365:

Cf. pp. 59 f. and notes. The modern analogy is not close, yet in each
case the aim is to prevent undue gains whereby the public is
oppressed.

Footnote 366:

Cf. p. 30, n. 3.

Footnote 367:

Cf. p. 59 and notes. The socialistic tendency to overemphasize the
power of law is also strong here as in the _Republic_. But cf. p. 36,
n. 4, and _Laws_ 807B, 746A-B, 747B.

Footnote 368:

_Time and Tide_, IX, 5-9. Modern Painters, V, Pt. 8, chap. i, 6 (Vol.
VII, 207). Espinas (_Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII [1914], 246)
calls this Platonic denial of “conflict of interest” in trade “le
thème éternel de la chimère socialiste.”

Footnote 369:

Laws 626E: τὸ πολεμίους εἶναι πάντας πᾶσιν; cited by Poehlmann, _op.
cit._, I, 557; but he exaggerates the analogy.

Footnote 370:

Cf. 742D-E, 743D-E, 729A, and the remarks on retail trade, 918B-919E,
870B; cf. also, above, on wealth.

Footnote 371:

As seen above, they are all slaves or strangers. A direct comparison
is hardly possible, since in the _Republic_, the masses are the
majority of the citizens, while in the _Laws_, there are none.

Footnote 372:

744D; cf. Shorey, _Class. Phil._, IX (1914), 363: “Plato’s object,
however, is not socialistic equalization of the ‘good things’ of life,
but the enforced disinterestedness of the rulers, and the complete
self-realization of every type of man, in limitation to his own proper
sphere and task.”

Footnote 373:

Cf. pp. 55 and 60, on equality; also note 4, above.

Footnote 374:

Francotte (_L’Industrie_, II, 250) suggests that _l’étatisme_,
“nationalism,” would be a more applicable term for the _Laws_. He
distinguishes this from socialism, as being not so thoroughgoing a
limitation of the individual as is the “socialism” of the _Republic_.
Cf. Shorey, _Class. Phil._, IX (1914), 358, on the famous
“communistic” passage in _Laws_ 739C: ὄντως ἐστὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, etc.
He calls it a “rhetorical exaltation of that ideal unity of civic
feeling, which Demosthenes upbraids Aeschines for not sharing.” For
further communistic ideas of Plato, cf. his incomplete romantic story
of Atlantis in the _Critias_. The ideal is similar to that of the
larger works. Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 348 ff.

CHAPTER IV
XENOPHON

Xenophon was a man of affairs, whose interests touched the practical
life of the world on many sides, as is evidenced by the broad scope of
his extant works. He was also, however, a pupil of Socrates. In his
economic thought, therefore, he vacillates between the positive interest
of the practical economist and the negative criticism of the
Socratics.[375] On the whole, his practical bent dominates, and is
especially exhibited in his essay on the _Revenues of Athens_,[376] as
also in the fact that he was the first writer to produce a work devoted
entirely to economics.[377] The spirit of the moral philosopher, on the
other hand, is prominent wherever the influence of Socrates is felt, as
in the first chapters of the _Economicus_ and in the _Memorabilia_. When
the Socratic ideal dominates, he, in common with other Greek thinkers,
confuses economics with ethics, and private with public economy.[378] He
makes the science of economy deal with the management of private
estates,[379] and believes with Plato and Ruskin that the same qualities
are necessary for the successful handling of the affairs of either house
or state.[380]

VALUE

Xenophon insists strongly on utility or serviceableness as a necessary
quality of property (χρήματα, κτήματα). By this, however, he means
primarily, not potential utility in the object, but ability of the owner
to use rightly.[381] Even exchangeability does not insure value in
anything, unless the seller can use to advantage that which he receives
in return.[382] This idea of value is true enough from the ethical
standpoint, and should not be left out of account, as is being
recognized by modern economists. But to attempt to build a theory of
economic value on such a basis, as Ruskin does,[383] would result in
hopeless confusion. Value is not merely an individual and moral, but
also a social and economic, fact.

A hint of exchange value is given in the implied classification of goods
as usable or salable.[384] But there is no discrimination between useful
things in the economic and uneconomic sense. In the _Revenues_, on the
other hand, when free from Socratic influence, Xenophon makes a positive
contribution to the theory of value. He observes that the exchange value
of goods varies with supply and demand, and that this law is, in a
sense, self-regulative by the fact that workmen tend to enter other
fields of activity whenever any industry becomes unprofitable through an
oversupply of its products.[385]

WEALTH

The double standpoint of Xenophon is well illustrated in his doctrine of
wealth. On the one hand, he values it highly, and tries to deduce
practical rules for its increase and enjoyment.[386] On the other hand,
like Socrates and Plato, he makes derogatory comparisons between
economic and spiritual wealth.[387] As in the case of value, he offers
no clear definition of economic wealth (κτῆσις). It is defined
indiscriminately as “whatever is useful to life,” and “useful” is
“everything that anyone knows how to use.”[388] But, as seen above, this
is a purely subjective notion, and is only one element in economic
wealth.[389] He also defines it (χρήματα) as “the excess of goods over
needs,” making it a merely relative term:[390] but here again the
thought is ethical rather than economic, an attempt to teach the
somewhat ascetic principle that a man’s riches are measured by the
paucity of his wants.[391] The hostile or indifferent attitude to wealth
is also assumed in the comparison of it with so-called mental wealth and
wisdom[392] and in the implication that it involves many cares.[393] The
idea so prominent in Plato, however, that the acquisition or expenditure
of great wealth is not consistent with justice, is not emphasized by
Xenophon. He calls that man happiest who has best succeeded in just
acquisition, and who uses his wealth in the best manner.[394]

PRODUCTION

The Greeks had no specific word for production, as we have, since
industry, though well developed, was not a dominant feature of Greek
life, and economics had not become a separate science. The word ἐργασία,
meaning “labor” or “business,” served the purpose. The term was used of
productive labor,[395] of building or manufacturing,[396] of work in raw
materials,[397] most commonly of agriculture,[398] of industries in
general,[399] of the trades, commerce, or other business for
money-making,[400] and of a guild of laborers.[401] The term ἡ ποιητικὴ
τέχνη, “the productive art,” which approaches more nearly to a specific,
technical expression, was also used.[402] Thus, though there is no
clear-cut term for production, the statement of Zimmern[403] that the
Greeks had no better word for “business” than ἀσχολία, “lack of
leisure,” is hardly warranted.

Xenophon was far more interested than Plato or Aristotle in the problem
of practical production. His shrewd discussion of agriculture, and his
urgent appeal to Athens to increase her revenues by systematic
exploitation of the mines, and by the encouragement of industry and
commerce, reveal a mind awake to economic advantage. Though at times he
seems almost to make war and agriculture the only true means of
production, it is evident that he has a live interest in all means of
acquisition.[404] Toward the theory of production, however, his
contribution is not large. In the _Economics_, he recognizes the
importance of labor and natural resources in production, and in the
_Revenues_, he sees the necessity of capital.[405] But naturally, like
Aristotle and the southern planter, he confuses capital with labor, in
the person of the slave.[406] The fable of the dog and the sheep reveals
a knowledge of the machinery of production, and some insight into the
proper relation between the employer and the laborer.[407] Xenophon’s
distinct contribution to future economic thought, however, consists in
his appreciation of the fact that economic production has its definite
limits; that the same ratio of profits cannot be increased indefinitely
by the constant addition of more labor and capital, but that these must
be proportioned to the greatest possible return.[408] To be sure, he
does not appreciate the scientific significance of the principle. His
purpose is rather to emphasize the danger of overproduction, and he even
fails to grasp the necessary application of this danger to the silver
mines. However, as the enunciator of the principle, he may be called the
forerunner of the doctrine of diminishing returns.

As seen above, special emphasis was laid by Xenophon upon natural
resources as an element in production, both in land and in the mines.
His great interest in and eulogy of agriculture as the basal industry,
upon which all other sources of wealth depend,[409] have caused him to
be classed with the physiocrats of modern time but such an
interpretation is hardly warranted. Without doubt, agriculture is, in
his opinion, the supremely honorable occupation. It shares with war the
right to be placed above all other vocations.[410] It permits the
maximum of leisure and physical development, and is not unworthy of the
personal attention of a prince.[411] It is the most pleasant, most
productive,, most dignified, of callings; the best exercise for the
athlete, the finest school for education in patriotism and justice, and
it offers the greatest opportunity for the exercise of hospitality to
men and reverence to gods.[412] Indeed, it is the first of all
occupations for an honorable and high-minded man to choose.[413] Here we
have the highest eulogy of agriculture in Greek literature. It is in
essence a sound statement, and offers a needed message for today.

Though Xenophon recognized the practical importance of capital in
industrial enterprises,[414] he developed no theory of it in his
writings. He appreciated, however, the value of being able to keep a
surplus.[415] The term ἀφορμή, as used by him of the provision of raw
material for weaving, probably signified nothing more than it would have
done to any Athenian business man of his time.[416] The word originally
meant a “starting-point,” especially in war.[417] Later, it signified
the “means” or “resources” with which one begins a project,[418]
especially in business. It was an easy step from this general business
use to the meaning, “financial capital” of a banker.[419] Other terms
for capital were ἐνεργά, used of interest-bearing capital in antithesis
to ἀργά, of goods merely for use;[420] κάρπιμα, “goods that yield a
produce,” as opposed to ἀπολαυστικά, “goods to be enjoyed,”[421] which
is suggestive of Mill’s[422] definition, “that part of his possessions
... which he designs to employ in carrying on fresh production,” and of
his two kinds of capital, “circulating” and “fixed”; ποιητικά, “things
for further production,” as opposed to πρακτικά, “things merely for
use”;[423] κεφάλαιος, of capital as opposed to interest or income.[424]
The term ἔρανος, also, since it came to mean a “contribution of money,”
was often used of a loan, and therefore approached the signification of
“money capital.”[425]

Xenophon is considerably more favorable to labor and the industrial life
than are the other Socratics. He quotes Socrates with apparent approval,
that to do something well is well-being, while he who does nothing well
is neither good for anything nor beloved of God.[426] Work is far better
than idleness. It produces more happiness, makes the laborer more
temperate and just, and is the _sine qua non_ for the independent
life.[427] This is a strong plea for industry, and is especially
significant, since it refers primarily, to manufacture rather than to
agriculture. The reference, however, is to women workers, whose loss of
leisure would not be an injury to the state. Each person is encouraged
to provide for himself, and to do his work in the best possible
manner,[428] and the maxim of Epicharmus, “For labor, the gods sell all
goods to us,” is heartily approved.[429] All the foregoing passages are
Hesiodic in their insistence upon the value of industry.[430] But apart
from his evident acceptance of the doctrine of Socrates, as quoted
above, Xenophon exhibits a positive interest in labor. His attitude
toward the advancement of industry and commerce is thoroughly modern,
except that he does not contemplate the employment of free citizen
labor.[431] He emphasizes labor almost as strongly as natural resources
as an important factor in production. He believes also that industrial
thrift and prosperity are the best means of realizing a more quiet and
orderly state.[432]

Even the practical Xenophon, however, is not free from the
moral-aristocratic prejudice against mechanical arts (βαναυσικαί) for
the better class of citizens. He admits that they are justly spoken
against, and held in ill-repute, since they tend to weaken the laborer
both in body and in soul.[433] The artisans have no leisure to give
either to their friends or to the state, and in a warlike state the
citizens cannot be thus employed.[434] The artisan is also servile
because of his ignorance of the higher moral sentiments (τὰ καλὰ καὶ
ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια).[435] All this sounds like Plato, but Xenophon
differs, in that he is in no wise opposed to the unlimited development
of industry and commerce, provided the drudgery of it may be done by
non-citizens.

The principle of the division of labor is clearly stated by him, but
here again he differs from Plato in that his prime interest is practical
and economic rather than moral. He presents it as the reason why royal
dishes are superior in flavor to others, and makes the acute observation
that the division of labor is not so fully applied in the small city,
because there are not enough consumers to support a man in one trade. In
the large city, on the other hand, the consumers are so numerous that
even the trades themselves are divided and subdivided. Thus much greater
skill is developed, and better results realized, for he who spends his
time in work of the narrowest compass (βραχυτάτῳ) must accomplish this
in the best manner.[436] He does not specify the advantages of the
division of labor to industry, except that it results in greater skill,
but he reveals especial insight in stating so clearly the relation of
the market to the development of the principle.[437] In this, he is the
forerunner of Adam Smith, who observes that a minute division of trades
cannot exist except in the larger cities, especially in coast and river
towns.[438] The assertion of Haney,[439] that the Greeks referred only
to a “simple separation of employments,” is certainly unwarranted in the
light of this passage, for Xenophon expressly distinguishes here the
simple from the more complex subdivision. He says that some are employed
on men’s shoes, others on women’s; some do the sewing (νευρορραφῶν),
others do the cutting (σχίζων), and that the same also is true in the
manufacture of clothing.[440] This passage is also an evidence that the
development of industry in fourth-century Athens must have been
extensive. Xenophon also, like Plato, observed the fact that the
diversity in the natures of men is the basis for the division of
labor,[441] though he did not follow him in his doctrine that men and
women should have the same work.[442]

Unlike Plato, the idealist, Xenophon, the practical man of affairs,
takes the institution of slavery for granted, seemingly unconscious of
any ethical or economic problems involved.[443] However, as a matter of
common-sense, he advises that slaves be treated with consideration. He
would give them a proper degree of liberty,[444] and arouse them to do
their best[445] by a fair system of rewards and punishments. In the case
of those slaves who hold positions of trust, he advises that their
affections should be won by kindly treatment, and even by making them
sharers in the prosperity of the household.[446] Slavery is, of course,
a condition most irksome to the free-born. The unfortunate Eutheros
would almost prefer starvation.[447]

MONEY

In his treatise on the _Revenues of Athens_, Xenophon shows some
appreciation of the theory of money. He appears to take for granted that
money must have intrinsic value. At least, he understands that silver is
a commodity whose value is affected by its use as such, as well as by
its employment for currency.[448] He also apprehends the value of a
silver currency for international commerce.[449] His naïvely
enthusiastic argument for the indefinite increase of the stock of
silver, however, is suggestive of the mercantile fallacy, which
identified money with wealth.[450] But perhaps he is merely using for
practical purposes of argument the fact that the Athenians were
accustomed to look upon silver as the metal for fixed and constant
value.[451] In any event, he sees that the increase of silver must be
attended by a corresponding increase in business activity, if its value
is not to depreciate,[452] and he cannot be accused of the error of the
mercantilists, that a country is impoverished by the export of
money.[453] He must also have understood clearly the importance of
stability of value in a currency, since he deems it necessary to show
that the increased output of silver will not decrease its value, and
that silver is the least changeable of the monetary metals.[454] Despite
his enthusiasm for his thesis, which causes him to exaggerate the
stability of silver, he does not fail to grasp the direct effect of
supply and demand upon it,[455] just as upon gold[456] and other
commodities.[457] He shows also some understanding of the quantitative
theory of the relation between gold and silver.[458] It need hardly be
added that, in strong contrast to Plato, his attitude toward the
precious metals, especially silver, is very favorable.[459]

EXCHANGE

Xenophon presents no theory of exchange,[460] though he is frankly
interested in the advance of commerce and trade. In his opinion, the
greater their development, the better it is for the city of Athens.[461]
He is full of practical suggestions to stimulate commercial
activity.[462] So assured is he of the prime importance of extensive
commerce to a nation, that, in the spirit of modern commercialism, he
insists upon the necessity of peace for its sake.[463] To his mind,
increased trade means not only material advantage, but social and
political as well, in that greater prosperity, more labor, and a better
distribution will mean greater satisfaction, and hence less danger of
revolution in the state.[464] He entertains none of the prejudice of the
other Socratics against the money-makers’ art, a fact which may well be
a warning against the too ready acceptance of their attitude as the
usual verdict of the Athenian citizens.[465] In his practical
suggestions for the development of commerce there is a hint of the
protective principle. He advises that certain advantages be granted to
shipowners so as to induce them to increase their shipping.[466] But the
purpose is not to limit the advantage to Athenian merchantmen, nor to
restrict import trade. It is rather the opposite. He would enrich the
city by tribute on both imports and exports, imposed for sumptuary and
revenue purposes,[467] and would also develop a public merchant-marine
for rent to merchants, as a further source of income.[468]

POPULATION

In antithesis to Plato and Aristotle, the problem of population has no
difficulties for Xenophon. He does not deem it advisable to set a limit
on the population of the state. On the contrary, he conceives it as one
of the advantages of his plan in the _Revenues_, that thereby the city
would become very populous, and thus land about the mines would soon be
as valuable as that in the city itself.[469]

DISTRIBUTION

Xenophon is far less concerned about the problem of distribution than
Plato. He has no suggestions as to wages, profits, or prices, no ideal
state where an equitable distribution shall be realized, no yearnings
after equality, or complaints against the evils of extreme wealth or
poverty. Like Plato, he would avoid civic discord in the state,[470] but
by the increase of production and exchange rather than by their
limitation. In Socrates’ parable of the dog and the sheep, he presents a
suggestion of a theory of profits, but his plea is for the employer
instead of the laborer. The right of the former to share in the profits
of the business is based on his service as overseer of the work, and as
protector of the workmen.[471]

Our author does not definitely reveal his attitude toward the poorer
masses, but it seems probable that he had little interest in them,
except in so far as their condition might affect the fortunes of the
state. He was, of course, opposed to giving them full political
rights,[472] and would probably have preferred a system such as that in
Plato’s _Laws_, where all free citizens have sufficient income so that
they can give their time largely to the state, and where all laborers
are slaves. He did not think of suggesting that the poorer citizens work
in the mines, or even that aliens do so, but suggested rather that each
citizen have the income from three state slaves.[473]

While Xenophon is not usually considered among the socialists of Greece,
he approaches perhaps even nearer than Plato to one phase of modern
socialism. Like Plato, he opposes the extreme individualism of the
political and private life of his day.[474] He also reveals the Greek
feeling of the social obligation of private property.[475] Again, as do
Plato and modern socialists, he magnifies the power of law to transform
economic or social conditions.[476] But in advocating the modern
doctrine of the socialization of industry, with an economic, and not a
moral or political, motive, he has advanced beyond either Plato or
Aristotle, and approaches modern socialism.[477] As seen above, however,
his economic motive is not interest in the welfare of the masses, for by
his scheme they would all be slaves. He desires only to abolish poverty
among the citizens.[478] He would have the state become entrepreneur,
not merely in one, but in many branches of industry. State merchant
shipping,[479] public ownership of slaves,[480] public exploitation of
the mines,[481] public buildings near the mines, for rental to
strangers,[482] are all in his plan. The rich must finance the scheme,
but their profit will be 18, 36, or even 200 per cent.[483] Companies
are to be organized so as to obviate individual risk.[484] Thus will
poverty be no more, plenty for all will reign, and there will be an era
of prosperity and security for the state.[485]

His thesis is, in a word, that what private capital can accomplish for
the enrichment of itself alone, state capital can accomplish to better
advantage for the enrichment of the whole citizenship,[486] a doctrine
which strikes a truly modern socialistic note.

Footnote 375:

We shall not try to distinguish between the actual ideas of Xenophon
and those which he reports objectively as Socratic.

Footnote 376:

On the Xenophontine authorship of the _Revenues_, cf. Croiset, _op.
cit._, IV, 393 and notes; Christ, _Griechische Literatur-Geschichte_,
4th ed., pp. 367 f. and notes. Other authorities are cited there.

Footnote 377:

The οἰκονομικός, at least, the first extant, devoted to private
economy, and especially agriculture, but revealing practical interest
in the details of the production of wealth. Cf. _infra_ for further
discussion of _Economica_ in Greek literature.

Footnote 378:

For some qualifications, cf. above, Introduction.

Footnote 379:

_Econ._ i. 2: οἰκονόμου ἀγοθοῦ εἶναι οἰκεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον; cf. 3:
τὸν ἄλλου δὲ οἶκον. οἶκον is used of one’s entire property (5).

Footnote 380:

_Mem._ iii. 4. 6; cf. further above, p. 9, n. 4. Cf. Ruskin, _Pol.
Econ. of Art_, I, 12: “Precisely the same laws of economy, which apply
to the cultivation of a farm or an estate, apply to the cultivation of
a province or an island.” Cf. the story in Hdt. v. 29 on this idea.
Espinas (_Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII [1914], 111) contrasts
Xenophon, to whom the royal administration is a greatly expanded
private economy, with Plato’s absorption of all private economy by the
state.

Footnote 381:

_Econ._ i. 7-15; cf. 10: ταύτα ἄρα ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἐπισταμένῳ χρῆσθαι
αὐτῶν ἑκάστοισ χρήματα ἐστι, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ οὐ χρήματα. Cf. p. 23
and notes on Plato and Ruskin. H. Sewall (“Theory of Value before Adam
Smith,” _Publications of the American Economic Association_, II, Part
III, p. 1) says that the conception of value (ἀξία) as a quality
inherent in the thing was not questioned, but Xenophon seems to
question it here. As she observes, n. 1, the term originally meant
“weight,” at first weight in money, as well as actual worth.

Footnote 382:

i. 11 f.

Footnote 383:

_Unto This Last_, beginning; cf. preceding n. 1; Ruskin took _Xen.
Econ._ as the foundation on which he built all his own economic
studies. Cf. _Unto This Last_, Pref., Vol. XVII, pp. xlix and 18; Vol.
XXXI, Introd.; pp. xv ff. It was the first in his _Bib. Pastorum_. Cf.
his Preface to his translation of the _Economicus_; _Arrows of the
Chace_, Vol. XXXIV, 547; _Letters_, II (Vol. XXXVII, 350). In _Mun.
Pul._, IV, 105 (Vol. XVII, 230); also on pp. 288 and 88, he refers to
Xenophon’s “faultless” definition of wealth, citing _Mem._ ii. 3. 7.
Cf. also Vol. XXXI, pp. xvii and 27. Fontpertuis (“Filiation des idées
économiques dans l’antiquité,” _Jour. des écon._, September, 1871, p.
361) thinks this is at bottom the true theory of value.

Footnote 384:

_Econ._ i. 2: ἀποδιδομένοις μὲν οἱ αὐλοὶ χρήματα, μὴ αποδιδομένοις δὲ
ἀλλὰ κεκτημένοις οὔ, τοῖς μὴ ἐπισταμένοις αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι. Brants
(_Xen. Econ._, p. 8) overemphasizes this.

Footnote 385:

_Rev._ iv. 6-10, a remarkable passage, though he fails to include
silver in the law. Cf. Kautz, _op. cit._, p. 129; Kaulla, _Die
geschichtliche Entwickelung der modernen Werttheorien_, p. 2.

Footnote 386:

Especially in the story of Isomachus (_Econ._), and the _Revenues_.

Footnote 387:

Cf. _infra_; also Espinas, _Histoire des doctrines economiques_, p.
20.

Footnote 388:

_Econ._ vi. 4; cf. i. 7 ff., cited above, p. 64, n. 1.

Footnote 389:

P. 64 and notes. Büchsenschütz (_Besitz und Erwerb_, p. 15) criticizes
it as too broad, including spiritual goods; too narrow, including only
what one can use.

Footnote 390:

In _Econ._ ii. 2-8, Socrates’ comparison of himself with the wealthy
Critoboulos; _Hiero_ iv. 6-10; _Mem._ iv. 2. 37 f.; i. 6. 1-10, where
Socrates defends his own simple life, especially 10: ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐνόμιζον
τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι. If meant in the economic sense,
this would approach a definition of capital, as “excess of goods over
needs.”

Footnote 391:

Cf. p. 25, n. 11, on the similar modern doctrine.

Footnote 392:

_Symp._ iii. 8 and iv. 34-44, given as the doctrine of Antisthenes,
the Cynic, though with apparent approval; _Mem._ iv. 2. 9.

Footnote 393:

_Econ._ xi. 9.

Footnote 394:

_Cyrop._ viii. 2. 23.

Footnote 395:

_Mem._ ii. 7. 7; _Rev._ iv. 29.

Footnote 396:

Thuc. vii. 6. 2, of walls; _Gorg._ 449D, ἱματίων; _Theaet._ 146D,
ὑποδημάτων; Xen. _Econ._ vii. 21, ἐσθῆτος.

Footnote 397:

Hdt. i. 68; _Charm._ 173E; Thuc. iv. 105.

Footnote 398:

Ar. _Frogs_ 1034; Isoc. _Areop._ 30.

Footnote 399:

Isoc. _Areop._, 146_d_, cited _infra_ on the terms for capital; _Ad
Nicocl._ 18C.

Footnote 400:

_Mem._ iii. 10. 1; Dem. xxxiii. 4.

Footnote 401:

_C.I.A._ 3924: ἡ ἐργασία τῶν βαφέων.

Footnote 402:

Ar. _N. Eth._ vi. 4. 2 ff.

Footnote 403:

_Op. cit._, 1st ed., p. 55.

Footnote 404:

_Econ._, especially chaps. v-vii; iv. 4; _Mem._ ii. 1. 6; _Econ._ v.
17: εὒ μὲν γὰρ φερομένης τῆς γεωργίας ἔρρωνται καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι
ἄπασαι, ὅπου δ᾽ ἂν ἀναγκασθῇ ἡ γῆ χερσεύειν, ἀποσβέννυνται καὶ αἱ
ἄλλαι τέχναι σχεδόν τι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, a very true
statement, which does not belittle other industries.

Footnote 405:

_Ibid._ v. 2; iii. 15. 11, 16; _Rev._ i. 2 ff., etc.

Footnote 406:

_Pol._ i. 8 and 9.

Footnote 407:

_Mem._ ii. 7. 13 f., from Socrates. Cf. _infra_ under distribution, on
this.

Footnote 408:

_Rev._ iv. 5-7; Cossa, _op. cit._, p. 148; Kautz, _Histoire des
doctrines économiques_, p. 127; Fontpertuis, _op. cit._, p. 367.

Footnote 409:

_Econ._ v. 17, cited on p. 66, n. 11, perhaps the strongest statement
of the economic importance of agriculture in Greek writers. Ruskin
follows Xenophon in his high appreciation of agriculture. He thinks it
should be largely done by the upper classes (_Mun. Pul._, 109 [Vol.
XVII, 235]); cf. also Vol. VII, 341, 429; Vol. X, 201.

Footnote 410:

_Econ._ iv. 4; cf. _Rev._ v. and _Cyrop._ iii. 2. 17, which favor
peace for the sake of economic advance.

Footnote 411:

_Econ._ iv. 8 to end of chapter, especially 21.

Footnote 412:

_Econ._, v. 1; 2-16; vi. 9-10; cf. Fontpertuis, _op. cit._, pp. 362 f.

Footnote 413:

_Econ._ vi. 8.

Footnote 414:

Cf. _Revenues_.

Footnote 415:

_Econ._ ii. 10, περιουσίαν. Brants thinks (_Xen. Econ._, p. 13) that
the theory is implied in his principle of sparing (_Mem._ ii. 7).
Blanqui (_op. cit._, I, 81) emphasizes _Econ._ i. 7-15 as defining
productive and unproductive wealth, but this merely distinguishes
wealth from non-wealth, from the standpoint of consumption.

Footnote 416:

_Mem._ ii. 7. 11 f.

Footnote 417:

Thuc. i. 90. 2.

Footnote 418:

Cf. n. 1, although Liddell and Scott cite the passage as having the
meaning of “capital”; _Mem._ iii. 12. 4, where it need mean no more
than wealth; _Econ._ i. 1. 16; Dem. xxxvi. 54: πίστις ἀφορμὴ πασῶν
ἐστὶ μεγίστη πρὸς χρηματισμόν. Here πίστις is almost called capital.
Cf. p. 106, n. 3.

Footnote 419:

Dem. xxxvi. 11: καίτοι εἰ ἢν ἰδία τις ἀφορμὴ τουτῳῖ πρὸς τῇ τραπέζῃ;
xiv. 36; Lysias fr. 2. 2, p. 343, ed. Thalheim; _Rev._ iii. 9 and 12
and iv. 34 are also used of large financial undertakings; cf.
Harpocration’s definition; ὅταν τις ἀργύριον δῷ ἐνθήκην, ἀφορμὴ
καλεῖται ἰδίως παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς; for the term in Ar. _Pol._ vi.
1320_a_35-1320_b_17 cf. _infra_. Cf. Isoc. _Areop._ 146_d_ for a
similar passage.

Footnote 420:

Dem. xxvii. 8 and 13.

Footnote 421:

Ar. _Rhet._ i. 5. 7.

Footnote 422:

Laughlin, ed., 1907, pp. 66 and 93.

Footnote 423:

Ar. _Pol._ 1254_a_1 ff.; cf. _infra_ on Aristotle (“Production”);
pseudo-Ar. _Econ._ ii. 1346_b_14.

Footnote 424:

Plato _Laws_ 742C; Dem. xxvii. 75.

Footnote 425:

Lycurg., p. 150, 22: τοὺς ἐράνους διενεγκεῖν; Dem. xxi. 184 f.; cf.
Dem. lix. 8 for the interesting figurative use, τὸν αὐτὸν ἔρανον
ἀποδοῦναι, “to pay him in his own coin”; also Lycurg., p. 168, 143.

Footnote 426:

_Mem._ iii. 9. 14 f.; cf. Brants, _Xen. Econ._, p. 10, for passages on
Xenophon’s attitude to labor.

Footnote 427:

_Mem._ ii 7. 7 f. Guiraud (_La Main-d’œuvre indust._, p. 46) thinks
that this passage is a good commentary on Pericles’ oration (Thuc.
ii). Both see in labor, not an inevitable evil, but a good. Guiraud
holds that this was the general attitude in Athens. Cf. this chapter,
pp. 36-50, on “Opinions des Grecs sur le travail.”

Footnote 428:

_Mem._ ii. 8. 1-5.

Footnote 429:

ii. 1. 20.

Footnote 430:

Cf. Döring, _Die Lehre des Socrates als soziales Reform-System_, pp.
387 ff.

Footnote 431:

_Rev._, especially i. 2 ff. and iv; _Econ._ v. 2; iii. 15; ii. 16;
Kautz, _op. cit._, p. 126. But cf., on the other hand, Xen. _Laced.
Pol._ on the restrictions in Sparta against acquisition of wealth by
trade and arts; cf. also (Xen.). _Rep. Ath._ ii. 11 ff.

Footnote 432:

_Rev._ iv. 51.

Footnote 433:

_Econ._ iv. 2; vi. 5-7; agriculture and war are not included.

Footnote 434:

iv. 3.

Footnote 435:

_Mem._ iv. 2. 22.

Footnote 436:

_Cyrop._ viii. 2. 5 f.; cf. also ii. 1. 21, of military labor.

Footnote 437:

Cf. p. 70.

Footnote 438:

_Op. cit._, I, iii.

Footnote 439:

_Op. cit._, p. 40; cf. also Dühring, _Kritische Geschichte der
Nationalökonomie und des Socialismus_, p. 22.

Footnote 440:

_Cyrop._ viii. 2. 5 f., cited above.

Footnote 441:

_Mem._ iii. 9. 3.

Footnote 442:

_Econ._ viii.

Footnote 443:

_Econ._ iii. 4; v. 16; ix. 11; xiii; _Rev._ iv. 17 ff.

Footnote 444:

_Econ._ iii. 4.

Footnote 445:

v. 16; xiii.

Footnote 446:

_Econ._ ix. 11; cf. p. 38, n. 4, on the actual status of slaves at
Athens.

Footnote 447:

_Mem._ ii. 8. 4.

Footnote 448:

_Rev._ iii. 2: ὅπου γὰρ ἂν πωλῶσιν αὐτὸ, πανταχοῦ πλεῖον τοῦ ἀρχαίου
λαμβάνουσιν.

Footnote 449:

_Ibid._; cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 114.

Footnote 450:

_Rev._ iv, especially 7-12; Haney (_op. cit._, chap. iv) and Simey
(“Economic Theory among the Greeks and Romans,” _Economic Review_,
October, 1900, p. 472) point to _Rev._ iii. 2 as distinguishing
between money and wealth, but this hardly balances the above passage.
_Econ._ i. 12-14 means merely that silver is not wealth unless
properly used.

Footnote 451:

So Brants, _Xen. Econ._, p. 21; cf. Lenormant _é La Monnaie dans
l’antiquité_, I, 179; III, 3.

Footnote 452:

_Rev._ iv. 8.

Footnote 453:

_Rev._ iii. 4; v. 3; iii. 2; cf. Ingram, _History of Political
Economy_, p. 15; Kautz, _op. cit._, p. 129; Roscher, p. 12.

Footnote 454:

_Rev._ iv. 5-11.

Footnote 455:

iii. 2; and iv. The demand will increase with the supply.

Footnote 456:

iv. 10: χρυσίον ὅταν πολὺ παραφανῇ, αὐτὸ μὲν ἀτιμότερον γίγνεται, τὸ
δὲ ἀργύριον τιμιώτερον ποιεῖ.

Footnote 457:

iv. 5-7.

Footnote 458:

iv. 10.

Footnote 459:

iv, especially 7-9, 11; he has no word against them. _Lac. Pol._ vii
shows that he favors their free use.

Footnote 460:

Brants (_Xen. Econ._, pp. 17 f.) says that he grasped both bases of
exchange, division of labor, and natural diversity of products, but he
bases it on _Rep. Ath._ ii. 12. 3.

Footnote 461:

_Rev._ iii., especially 5; _Hiero_ ix. 9; ἐμπόρια ὠφέλει πόλιν.

Footnote 462:

iii. 3. 4. 12 f.

Footnote 463:

iii. 4; v-vi.

Footnote 464:

vi. 1.

Footnote 465:

_Econ._ ii. 18: χρηματιστής; cf. iii, where Socrates teaches the art.
Cf. above, p. 17, on the Sophists’ attitude.

Footnote 466:

_Rev._ iii. 4.

Footnote 467:

iii. 5.

Footnote 468:

iii. 14.

Footnote 469:

iv. 50.

Footnote 470:

_Rev._ vi. 1.

Footnote 471:

_Mem._ ii. 7. 12-14. Poehlmann’s attempt to turn the argument about,
so as to favor the laborer, is strained (_op. cit._, I, 288), though
the passage may be a sidelight on the economic conditions in early
fourth-century Athens. Cf. _Mem._ ii. 8. 4-5, where, as Poehlmann
(_op. cit._, I, 286 f.) points out, the free laborer was coming to
feel himself to be on the same status with the slave.

Footnote 472:

Cf. e.g., his opposition to the free democracy of Athens, for evidence
of which we do not need to depend upon the _Ath. Pol._

Footnote 473:

_Rev._ iv. 17; cf. p. 70; but p. 69 might point the other way.

Footnote 474:

_Mem._ iv. 4. 16; ἄνευ δὲ ὁμονοίας οὐτ᾽ ἂν πόλις εῦ πολιτευθείν οὐτ᾽
οἶκος καλῶς, οἰκηθείν.

Footnote 475:

_Econ._ xi. 9, 13.

Footnote 476:

Cf. how naïvely he takes for granted the feasibility of his schemes in
the _Revenues_. Cf. the opening sentence of the work, “As are the
governors [προστάται], so are the governments [πολιτείας]” cited by
Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 299) as the illusion of socialism; but it
might easily be expressed by a conservative. Plato (_Rep._ 544D)
expresses a similar idea.

Footnote 477:

_Rev._ iii and iv.

Footnote 478:

iv. 33. The mines were already publicly owned, for the most part, but
they were privately worked. Cf. Ardaillon, _Les Mines du Laurion dans
l’antiquité_ (Paris, 1897).

Footnote 479:

iii. 14.

Footnote 480:

iv. 17.

Footnote 481:

iv.

Footnote 482:

iv. 49.

Footnote 483:

iii. 9 f.

Footnote 484:

iv. 30-32.

Footnote 485:

iv. 33; 49-52; vi. 1. Cf. the excellent résumé of the whole plan by
Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 299 ff.), though he reads into it too much
of the modern socialistic spirit; e.g., 306-8, he makes it an example
of the so-called psychological necessity by which socialism develops
out of capitalism.

Footnote 486:

Cf. especially iv. 14: τῆς μέντοι πόλεως πάνυ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τὸ
αἰσθανομένην πολλοὺς πλουτιζομένους ἕξ αὐτῆς ἰδιώτας μὴ μιμεῖσθαι
τούτους.

CHAPTER V
THE ORATORS—DEMOSTHENES, ISOCRATES

Though the Attic orators constitute a very important source for our
knowledge of economic conditions in Athens, they furnish but little
definite material for a history of Greek economic thought. From the
standpoint of theory, their chief value consists in the fact that they
all reveal a positive interest in wealth and all the phenomena of
practical economy. In this respect, they present a striking contrast to
the negative attitude of the Socratics, and thus serve to correct our
conception of the economic ideas of the average Athenian citizen.
Specific consideration need be given only to Demosthenes and Isocrates.

The positive interest of Demosthenes in commerce and finance has already
been indicated by some passages,[487] and this fact is so evident
throughout all his orations that further citations are unnecessary.
Instead, we may note briefly some slight hints in him of the negative
moral attitude of the philosophers. He emphasizes the dominating
influence of money in warping the judgments of men.[488] He praises the
simple life of the previous generation, and criticizes in contrast the
private luxury of his own day.[489] According to him, it is considered
to be rare for a business man to be both diligent (φιλεργόν) and honest
(χρηστόν).[490] In his assertion that poverty compels freemen to turn to
menial work (δουλικά) and that many freewomen (ἀσταί) have been driven
by the stress of the times to such vocations,[491] some aristocratic
prejudice against common labor seems to be implied. A similar attitude
toward traders and money-dealers is at least suggested by his question
as to what is the worst (πονηρότατον) element in the state.[492] His
scornful mention of Stephanus as one who loans money at interest, and
takes advantage of another’s need,[493] is a slight reminder of the
philosophic prejudice against interest, though here he is doubtless
emphasizing loans for consumption merely, at an exorbitant rate.[494]
But these traces of the Socratic attitude toward wealth are of very
little significance, in the face of the evident economic interest that
characterizes all the orations of Demosthenes.

Isocrates may, in a sense, be reckoned among the Socratics, and he
exhibits more of their spirit in relation to wealth than do any of the
other orators. He would have men strive for honest character rather than
for wealth, since it is not always gain to acquire and loss to spend.
The result depends rather upon the occasion and virtue.[495] Noble
character is of more value than great riches,[496] for good reputation
is not purchasable (ὠνητή) with money, but is itself the source of
material possessions, and it is immortal, while wealth is only
temporal.[497] Material and spiritual wealth are thus contrasted in true
Socratic manner;[498] right use is emphasized,[499] and the common
insatiety and injustice of money-makers is opposed.[500] Folly and
license are named as the usual accompaniments of wealth, in contrast to
the moderation that characterizes the poor and lowly.[501] But, like
Plato, Isocrates considers neither luxury nor penury to be the ideal
condition,[502] and clearly appreciates the evil effect of poverty in
arousing discontent and civic strife in the state.[503]

But despite this moralizing tendency, he agrees with the other orators
in appreciating highly the economic importance of the manual arts.[504]
He points also, with apparent pride, to the extensive commerce of Athens
as compared with that of other states,[505] and one of his chief
arguments for peace is that thereby the city will be filled with
merchants and strangers and metics.[506] This entire plea for peace,
which he bases so largely on economic advantage, has a decidedly modern
ring. He understood well the importance of industrial development in the
general prosperity of a democracy. In almost Aristotelian language, he
pictures how in the good old days the rich were accustomed to give the
poor a start in business (ἀφορμή), either in agriculture, trade, or the
arts.[507] This positive economic interest is further evidenced by his
emphasis upon the increased skill that results from the application of
the division of labor.[508]

Isocrates, like Plato, was especially opposed to civic strife and the
extreme individualistic communism that demanded a redivision of lands
and abolition of debts.[509] In the ideal past of his dreams, there were
no extremes of wealth and poverty, private property was safe, and
revolutions did not rend the state. Now, on the other hand, all is
changed. Sparta is the only state that has not been torn by the bitter
party strife.[510] He contrasts the high regard in which the wealthy
were held in his boyhood with the present jealous discontent. To be
known as a wealthy man now is almost equivalent to being considered
criminal and is a thing for which to apologize.[511] This attitude
toward the rich, of which Isocrates complains, is significant in the
light of similar tendencies in our own democracy today.

Again, in agreement with Plato and Aristotle, Isocrates opposes the
doctrine of mere arithmetical equality, and insists that the true
equality apportions to each what befits his capacity.[512] But though he
is hostile to the crasser type of communism, he makes the chief
characteristic of the ideal past a noble community feeling and spirit of
co-operation. In that happy time, the common weal was first in the
thought of all, each had regard for others’ interests, the poor were not
jealous of the rich, and the rich assisted the poor.[513] At times, he
even approaches the modern humanitarian sentiment for the submerged
classes. He defines true national prosperity as a condition in which no
citizen is lacking the means of livelihood,[514] and thinks the poor
might well be pardoned for their indifference to public welfare, in
their anxiety over the daily means of subsistence.[515] He also states
the somewhat socialistic principle so emphasized by Plato, that the
character of the state will be like that of the ruler.[516]

Footnote 487:

E.g., p. 106, n. 3, citing _Or._ xxxvi. 44 on πίστις.

Footnote 488:

_Peace_ 12, though the emphasis is on bribery.

Footnote 489:

_Olynth._ iii. 25 f.; _Cont. Aristoc._ xxiii. 207 f.; _Or._ xiii. 29
f. (Dem.), though the emphasis in all is upon patriotism. In these
passages, he idealizes the past in the manner of Isocrates; cf.
_infra_, p. 143. n. 8.

Footnote 490:

_Or._ xxxvi. 44, _For Phormio_.

Footnote 491:

_Or._ lvii 45.

Footnote 492:

_Cont. Aristoc._ 146; _Cont. Aristog._ xxv. 46, his scornful
figurative use of the term κάπηλος.

Footnote 493:

_Cont. Steph._ i. 70: ἀλλὰ τοκίζων καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συμφορὰς καὶ
χρειὰς εὐτυχήματα σαυτοῦ νομίζων.

Footnote 494:

_Olynth._ i. 15, referring to those who borrow money at high interest,
and thus lose their property, may also be noted. Cf. pp. 105 f. and
notes.

Footnote 495:

_Nicocl._ 3. 50, against injustice in money-making.

Footnote 496:

_Ibid._ 59.

Footnote 497:

_Cont. Nicocl._ (2). 32; _Peace_ 32; cf. p. 26, n. 1, for Plato’s
idea.

Footnote 498:

Cf. also _Paneg._ 76.

Footnote 499:

_Cont. Nicocl._ (2). 4.

Footnote 500:

_Peace_ 7; moderation in money-making is most difficult for most men;
cf. also 34 and 93 f.

Footnote 501:

_Areop._ 4.

Footnote 502:

_Cont. Nicocl._ 2; _Panath._ 184.

Footnote 503:

_Areop._ 51, 53, 83; νῦν δὲ πλείους εἰσίν οἱ σπανίζοντες τῶν ἐχόντων,
a striking commentary on the economic conditions in the Athens of his
day. In 44, poverty is called a source of crime. All these passages
idealize the past.

Footnote 504:

_Paneg._ 29, 33, 40; _Areop._ 74. But cf. _Panath._ 29 for a hint of
prejudice against them.

Footnote 505:

_Paneg._ 42.

Footnote 506:

_Peace_ 20 f.

Footnote 507:

_Areop._ 32 f.; cf. _infra_, p. 97, n. 6, for a fuller interpretation
of Aristotle’s passage; cf. _Letter to Timoth._ 3; _Areop._ 44.

Footnote 508:

_Bousiris_ 16.

Footnote 509:

_Areop._ 35.

Footnote 510:

_Panath._ 259; _Paneg._ 79; cf. also citations on poverty, above.

Footnote 511:

_Or._ 15. 159 f.

Footnote 512:

_Areop._ 21 f.

Footnote 513:

_Areop._ 35: αἱ δὲ χρήσεις κοιναί; 31 f., 51; for further mention of
these idealizations of ancient Athens and Sparta, cf. _infra_, p. 143,
n. 8.

Footnote 514:

_Areop._ 53.

Footnote 515:

_Ibid._ 83: ὁπόθεν τὴν ἀεὶ παροῦσαν ἡμέραν διάξουσιν.

Footnote 516:

_Cont. Nicocl._ 31: ὅτι τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἢθος ὁμοιοῦται τοῖς
ἄρχουσιν.

CHAPTER VI
ARISTOTLE

In the writings of Aristotle, we find a much richer source for a history
of Greek economic thought. Though no extant work of his is devoted to
economics, he left a multitude of writings on diverse subjects, as a
monument to his wonderful versatility and tireless industry.[517] Of
these, the _Politics_ and the _Ethics_ are especially fruitful in
economic ideas, though, as in the case of Plato, such material is
incidental to the main discussion. His general attitude toward wealth
and some of its problems, we shall find to be often substantially in
agreement with that of Plato. His economic vision was prejudiced by the
same ethico-aristocratic spirit. Yet his practical, scientific mind
caused him to deal with many economic questions more extensively, more
directly, and more incisively than is true of any other Greek thinker.
Caution must be observed, however, against reading into his statements
more meaning than he purposed to convey. He was not the creator of the
science of political economy,[518] though his apprehension of many of
the chief concepts of economics was probably clearer than has often been
admitted by modern economists.[519]

At the very threshold of economic speculation, Aristotle advanced beyond
Plato and Xenophon, in that he perceived the fallacy in the confusion of
household and public economy. He saw that they differed, not only in
size or numbers, but in essential type.[520] In his later discussion of
wealth, however, he overlooked his distinction, and fell into the old
Greek confusion.

VALUE

The extent of Aristotle’s contribution to the theory of value has been
very diversely estimated.[521] In a classic passage of the _Politics_,
he distinguishes between the two uses of an object, the direct use for
which it was produced, and the indirect as an article for exchange.[522]
This has often been heralded as an anticipation of Adam Smith’s
distinctions between value in use and value in exchange.[523] Such an
interpretation, however, is hardly warranted.[524] The entire emphasis
of Aristotle in the passage is upon use rather than upon value. The
exchange use is declared subordinate, and the context shows that the
purport of the statement is to teach the uneconomic doctrine that
exchange (μεταβλητική) is an artificial use, especially when pursued for
gain.

Moreover, the passage fails to develop the definition further by
distinguishing between economic utilities that involve a cost of
production, and other necessities that are devoid of exchange value
because of their universality.[525] Need is recognized as an element in
exchange value,[526] but it is not differentiated from economic demand
that has the means to purchase. All that can safely be said of this
statement of Aristotle, therefore, is that he accidentally hit upon a
basal distinction, which, had it been his purpose, he might have used as
starting-point for the development of the modern theory of value.

Certain other passages from his writings reveal a clearer apprehension
of the distinction. In the _Rhetoric_, he states the principle that
exchange value is measured by rarity, though this may not be a criterion
of the actual value of the commodity to life.[527] The latter is
measured by its necessity or practical utility.[528]

A paragraph from the _Nicomachaean Ethics_, though it does not treat the
problem directly, is also an evidence of Aristotle’s insight into the
elements of economic value.[529] It has been strangely slighted by most
historians of economic thought, though its significance has been
recognized by editors of the _Ethics_.[530] It grows out of his
discussion of fair exchange, which is a part of the larger subject of
justice. He observes that a proportional equality (κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν
ἴσον) between diverse products must exist before exchange can take
place,[531] since the labor involved in their production is not
equal.[532] This equality he obtains through a proportion, in which the
objects of exchange stand in inverse ratio to the producers.[533] The
equalization of the commodities is thus based, according to Aristotle,
upon an estimate of the labor or cost of production in each case.[534]
Again, he points out that the standard by which all products are
measured is need or demand (χρεία) for reciprocal services,[535] thereby
making demand a social fact dependent upon organized society. It is, in
his thought, the “common denominator of value” which finally determines
the actual basis on which all goods are exchanged or services rendered.
Elsewhere Aristotle’s conception of value is more individualistic, like
that of Xenophon and Plato, but Haney[536] overlooks this passage in
asserting that his notion of value is “purely subjective.” It is not
merely “equal wants” that are considered, as he states, but equal costs
as well.[537] This demand, or common measure of value, is expressed in
terms of money (νόμισμα).[538]

It is clear then, from this passage in the _Ethics_, that Aristotle
understood that economic value is determined by demand, as measured in
money, and by labor invested or cost of production.[539] This latter
element, of course, involves the condition that the product be limited
in supply, though this is not expressly stated.[540] To be sure, the
interest of the moral philosopher is also paramount here,[541] as in the
_Politics_ passage. The thought is centered on fair exchange, as a phase
of justice, rather than upon the problem of value. Nevertheless, his
discussion reveals a clear insight into demand and cost of production as
the two most important elements in economic value.[542]

WEALTH

Since Aristotle had a better apprehension of the theory of value than
other Greek thinkers, we may expect him also to define more clearly the
concept of wealth. In the _Politics_, he names the following attributes
of genuine (ἀληθινός) wealth (πλοῦτος): necessary to life; useful to
persons associated in a household or a state; capable of accumulation
(θησαυρισμός); limited in extent (οὐκ ἄπειρος).[543] According to
Mill,[544] from the “economic” standpoint, wealth is “all useful and
agreeable things” of a “material nature” possessing “exchange value”;
and, to have exchange value, they must be “capable of accumulation.”

In comparing these two definitions, it should be recognized at the
outset that Aristotle’s term “genuine” does not mean “truly economic,”
as it might in Mill, but rather “legitimate wealth” as distinguished
from that gained from false finance (χρηματιστική);[545] also that his
“necessary to life” and “limited in extent” are not used in the economic
but in the moral sense, as opposed to luxury and extreme interest in
money-making. Mill’s “all useful and agreeable things” presents a marked
contrast to this in spirit. Aristotle’s “useful” means “what subserves
the final good” (πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωήν), while Mill’s means “things that give
sensations of comfort or pleasure.” Thus Aristotle’s wealth is
necessarily limited, while Mill’s is unlimited, since, as Barker
observes, “only an infinity of wealth can satisfy an infinity of
need.”[546] It will be seen from the following discussion, however, that
Aristotle includes more than “necessary things” in his category of
economic wealth. He does not specify “material things,” as does Mill,
but it seems probable that this is his meaning.[547] In all the passages
where he enumerates the different kinds of wealth, only material things
are included, except slaves, who are counted as mere tools.[548] One of
these passages specifically excludes intellectual wealth by defining
property as a “separable instrument.”[549] The use of the term for value
(ἀξία) probably implies the same limitation.[550] Though Aristotle does
not mention exchange value specifically, it is clearly implied in his
definition. “Things useful for the association of a state” and things
“capable of accumulation” must have exchange value, thus excluding
illimitable utilities such as air and light.[551] His use of κτῆμα,
“possession,” and his recognition of cost of production and economic
demand as the main factors in determining value,[552] are further
evidence of this. Moreover, as seen above, in the _Ethics_, he clearly
makes exchange value an attribute of all wealth.[553]

From our comparison of the two definitions, then, it is evident that,
though Aristotle is antithetical to Mill in putting the ethical interest
first, and though his definition is not so scientifically specific, yet
the two agree in recognizing the qualities of materiality, exchange
value, and possibility of accumulation as necessary attributes of
wealth. We shall see below, also, that the Greek philosopher was the
forerunner of the orthodox English economists in criticizing the common
confusion of money with wealth.[554]

But, despite his grasp of the leading principles in the economics of
wealth, he takes the same negative moral attitude toward wealth as does
Plato, though his hostility is also directed primarily against the
spirit that commercializes life and makes unlimited wealth the _summum
bonum_. To his mind, this idea that wealth is the sum of all goods is
almost the necessary accompaniment of the possession of superfluous
wealth, but it is especially characteristic of the new-rich (νεωστὶ
κεκτημένοις).[555] Yet Aristotle is too practical to be ascetic. He
realizes that leisure (σχολή) is necessary for moral development and for
good citizenship, and that this cannot be enjoyed except on a basis of
sufficient wealth. A fair competency is therefore desirable for the best
life,[556] for men should live not only temperately, but liberally.[557]
Poverty produces civic strife and crime.[558] Wealth in the absolute
sense (ἁπλῶς) is always good, though it may not always be fitted to a
certain individual, or be property used by him.[559] Each, therefore,
should choose what is good for himself, and use it accordingly.[560] All
this sounds saner than the subjective notion of wealth taught by Plato.
But right here is the secret of the difficulty as Aristotle sees it.
Just because all external wealth is good in the absolute sense, the
popular error has arisen that it is the final cause (αἰτία) of all
happiness,[561] whereas the actual relation of wealth to happiness is
the same as that of the lyre to the tune. There can be no music without
the intervention of the musician.[562] External goods are therefore not
of primary importance to life. The goods of the soul should be placed
first,[563] for the virtues of life are not gained and preserved by
material wealth, but vice versa,[564] and the men of high character and
intelligence are most happy, even though their wealth is moderate.[565]
The common attitude of the money-maker that wealth is unlimited is
contrary to nature.[566] Genuine wealth cannot be unlimited,[567] since
external goods are strictly defined by their utility for a certain
thing. Excessive wealth thus either harms the owner, or is, at least,
useless to him.[568] Neither can wealth be rightly made the _summum
bonum_, for it is really not an end at all, but only a collection of
means to an end (ὀργάνων πλῆθος).[569] The inevitable result of making
it the end and measure of all is moral degeneration.[570] If the highest
interests of life are to be preserved, it must always be kept
subservient. First things must be placed first, both by the
individual[571] and by the state.[572]

PRODUCTION

It is often asserted that Aristotle denied the very existence of a
problem of production.[573] This statement has been based primarily on
certain passages in the _Politics_.[574] These passages, however, are
not a denial of the importance of production. Their purport is merely to
show that the chief aim of life is not to produce or to provide wealth,
but to use it for the advancement of life’s highest interest. From this
standpoint, both acquisition (κτητική) and production (ποιητική) are
subordinate arts.[575] So far is Aristotle from giving no place to
production, that a later chapter of the _Politics_ is devoted to the
consideration of the scheme of supply, including production.[576] To be
sure, he does not lay much emphasis on genuine production in his
enumeration. Industry is barely mentioned, while agriculture is
discussed in detail. His “free-holder” is a consumer of the gifts of
nature, rather than a real producer.[577] He classifies the truly
productive employments that work for themselves (αὐτόφυτον) as those of
the nomad, the farmer, the brigand, the fisherman, and the hunter, and
makes those that live by barter (ἁλλαγῆς) or trade (καπηλείας)
parasitic.[578]

In another passage, finance, strictly defined (οἰκειατάτη), is limited
to all forms of agriculture, and even the hired labor (μισθαρνία) of
industry is included in unnatural finance.[579] Aristotle has thus often
been compared to the physiocrats, who distinguished between creative and
parasitic classes of workers, upheld the “natural” order as the ideal,
and eulogized agriculture and the “extractive” industries as the only
productive ones. As Souchon[580] has observed, however, the resemblance
is only superficial. Yet the fact that he fails to see that exchange is
productive of a time and place value, and the fact that he includes
hired labor, skilled and unskilled, among the unnatural activities, are
sufficient evidence that he had only a superficial grasp of the
principles of production.[581] But the frequent assertion that he
includes brigandage and war among the productive arts is unwarranted,
for he classifies them only among the acquisitive means.[582]

Aristotle almost outdoes Plato in his subordination of all production to
ethics, though he keeps their respective aims more distinct. According
to him, the productive arts are not ends in themselves. They are means
to the supreme end of the moral life, whose first interest is not in
production, but in right action.[583] As seen in our discussion of
Plato, such a doctrine is not fruitful, economically. If interpreted too
rigidly, it stifles commerce and industry. Yet, at bottom, it holds a
great truth which modern economists are emphasizing—the fact that wealth
and production alike must be subordinated to the general individual and
social good. Moreover, the philosopher should not be interpreted in too
hard-and-fast a manner. Barker is extreme in his statement that the
economic theory of Aristotle is a mere treatise on “the ethics of family
life” and that “the fundamental characteristic of his idea of production
is a reactionary archaism, which abolishes all the machinery of
civilization in favor of the self-supporting farm and a modicum of
barter.”[584] Bonar’s assertion is also unwarranted, that “Aristotle
thinks it beneath the dignity” of his discourse to give the practical
details of agriculture and industry “more than a cursory notice.”[585]
Such details were not germane to the plan of his work, and would
certainly be considered out of place in a modern general text on
economics. Aristotle’s economic doctrine, as a whole, is certainly far
broader in scope than the family, and, while based upon ethics, is
something more than an ethical treatise. As seen above, he recognizes
the necessity of a moderate acquisition of wealth, both for the
prosperous state and for the virtuous man, and demands only that the
human interest be put first.[586]

_Agriculture._—Of the factors that enter into production, Aristotle is,
like the other Socratics, most interested in natural resources. He
emphasizes especially the agricultural life. To his mind, it is the only
true foundation of “natural finance,” since the financial means should
be provided in nature herself.[587] Natural finance (οἰκειατάτη) is made
to include only a proper knowledge of the care of land, cattle, bees,
fowl, and other natural resources.[588] It is natural, since it does not
earn at the expense of others, as do retail trade and other methods of
false finance. Aristotle also reveals his interest in agriculture by
giving a bibliography of the subject. He names Charetides of Paros,
Apollodorus of Lemnos, “and others on other branches”—a hint that many
such works on practical economics may be lost to us.[589] However, his
interest, even in this primary industry, is not of a practical nature,
like that of Xenophon. He relegates it to the non-citizen classes, along
with commerce and the mechanical arts.[590]

_Capital._—Aristotle is the only Greek thinker who has given a clear
definition of capital. After defining the slave as an instrument
(ὅργανον), in order to distinguish still more sharply, he differentiates
between the two kinds of wealth—that which is used for consumption, and
that which is employed for further production.[591] As an example of the
former, he uses the bed and the dress, and of the latter the weaver’s
comb (κερκίς).[592] He points out that all wealth is produced for
consumption, but that part of it is consumed indirectly in manufacture.
Here is an approach to Adam Smith’s[593] definition of capital, as “that
part of a man’s stock which he expects to afford him revenue.”
Unfortunately, however, the Greek fails to pursue his distinction
farther. The theme of his thought is, after all, not capital or
production either, but the status of the slave, though, from his
standpoint, the slave is capital. He proceeds with the very uneconomic
assertion that life consists in action (πρᾶξις), not in production
(ποίησις),[594] and concludes with the real goal of his argument, that
the slave is an assistant (ὑπερέτης), or an animate instrument in the
realm of action, not of production.[595] The slave is therefore an
instrument to increase the life or action of his master, who himself is
not represented as a producer, but as a consumer of the present stock.
Thus what bids fair to be a fruitful distinction ends in a denial of the
primary importance of production. The purpose of Aristotle is here
similar to that in some passages of Ruskin[596] and Adam Smith,[597] to
emphasize consumption rather than production.

In another passage, he repeats his definition of capital in different
terms. Goods are classified as for “purposes of production” or for “mere
enjoyment,”[598] but here again no theory of capital is developed. Yet
these two definitions are sufficient evidence that he advanced beyond
his predecessors in his apprehension of the meaning of the term.[599]
His division of production and finance, however, into the natural or
limited, which deals only with natural resources,[600] and the
unnatural, which is unlimited, and includes commerce, usury, and even
industry,[601] reveals a mind neither greatly interested in capital, nor
clear as to its true economic importance. His assertion in the
_Ethics_[602] that the prodigal (ἄσωτος) benefits many by his reckless
expenditures, and that parsimoniousness (ἀνελευθερία) is a worse evil
than prodigality also shows that he did not sufficiently emphasize the
importance to society of economy, the mother of stored capital. On this
point, Plato has the saner view,[603] and the extreme attitude of
Aristotle is certainly not characteristic of the Greeks in general.[604]
His failure to grasp the true theory of interest is a further evidence
of his superficial apprehension of the function of money capital. He
does not see, with Adam Smith, that money represents so much stored
capital, potentially productive, and that “since something can
everywhere be made by the use of money, something ought everywhere to be
paid for the use of it.”[605] In justice to him, however, it should be
observed that, though he failed to see the importance of unlimited
economic progress through constant increase in the capitalistic stock,
there is after all a sense in which he was right. There is a natural
limit to just acquisition, and it is especially with the individual in
relation to wealth that he is dealing. He is thus, with Plato, a
forerunner of the present tendency in economics, which is inclined to
set a limit to the amount that one can justly earn in a lifetime by his
own work.[606]

_Labor and industry._—Aristotle’s attitude to labor, the third factor in
production, is similar to that of Plato, though he lays greater emphasis
on the evil physical and moral effect of the “banausic” arts. They are
defined as those that “render men unfit for the practice of
virtue.”[607] They not only cause the body to degenerate,[608] but,
being “mercenary” employments, they also vulgarize the soul.[609] The
occupations that require the most physical labor are the most
“slavish.”[610] The life of artisans and laborers is mean (φαῦλος) and
has no business with virtue.[611] The citizen youth should be taught
none of the illiberal pursuits of the tradesmen.[612] No citizen should
enter into industrial labor or retail trade, since they are ignoble
(ἀγεννής) and hostile to virtue.[613] Even all the agricultural work
must be performed by slaves, that the citizens may have leisure for
personal development and for service to the state.[614] In addition to
his other objections to retail trade and the arts, Aristotle considers
them to be naturally unjust, since they take something from him with
whom they deal.[615] Indeed, the productive classes have but slight
recognition in his ideal state. They seem to be tolerated only as a
necessary evil, and are in a state of limited slavery ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ
δουλείαν. Virtue is even less possible for them than for slaves, and
they lead a less tolerable life.[616] All hired labor belongs to the
category of “false finance” which degrades individual and state
alike.[617] The state that produces a multitude of mechanics and but few
hoplites can never be great.[618]

Here we have the very antithesis of the modern commercial standpoint.
However, the truth is not all with the moderns, for a highly developed
commerce and industry and the general prosperity of the mass of the
people are not always necessarily coincident. Moreover, it is hardly
fair to interpret Aristotle too rigidly. He understood well the
necessity of craftsmen and all other industrial workers to the
state.[619] The burden of his attack was directed against retail trade.
Like Plato’s his prejudice had a moral and political root,[620] and was
arrayed against the extreme application to labor, and against its false
purpose, rather than against labor itself. He insisted that even
intellectual work, when carried to an extreme, and pursued with the
wrong aim, might become equally demoralizing.[621]

Here is a doctrine which our modern age, that would place even education
on a bread-and-butter basis, and that tends to kill initiative and
vision by extreme specialization, might well consider. Even Latin
literature, when taught as it too often is, merely as a syntactical
grind to prepare teachers to pursue the same folly is no more one of the
humanities than is industrial chemistry.[622] Furthermore, Aristotle and
Plato are doubtless right in their belief that a necessary extreme
application to physical labor to earn the daily bread inevitably
prevents mental and moral development and the proper performance of the
duties of citizenship. And our modern democracies with their boasts of
universal suffrage are still something of a farce, as long as economic
conditions are such that the mass of the population has left no time to
think of anything, except how to provide the bare physical necessities.
Aristotle’s insistence upon leisure for the life of the citizen is no
demand for aristocratic indolence.[623] Neither is it Jowett’s
“condition of a gentleman,” or merely the idealized notion of an
“internal state” in which “the intellect, free from the cares of
practical life, energizes or reposes in the consciousness of truth.” It
is rather a demand for release from material cares, so as to insure the
highest degree of activity in self-development and political
service.[624]

It may well be observed too, that Aristotle, the special champion of
slavery, and reputed scorner of physical labor for freemen, exhibits a
real interest in industry, in unguarded moments. One of his arguments
against communism is that it would take from the citizen the desire to
work.[625] He repudiates the life of indolence, and finds happiness in
action.[626] He considers a practical knowledge of agriculture as
essential to the successful economist,[627] and defines the just as
those who live upon their own resources or labor, instead of making
profit from others, especially the farmers, who live from the land which
they cultivate.[628] We have seen above also that he makes labor one of
the prime factors that determine value, and thus the most important
element in production.[629] Moreover, he shows that he has a practical
grasp of the importance of productive employment for the citizens of a
democracy. He advises the rich to furnish plots of land (γήδια) to the
poor, from the public revenues, or else that they give the poor a start
(ἀφορμή) in other business, and thus turn them to industry.[630]

On the division of labor, Aristotle adds little to Plato’s and
Xenophon’s theory. He agrees with Xenophon against Plato that it implies
a necessary distinction between the work of men and women.[631] He also
applies the principle more extensively, so as to include all nature,
whereas Plato seems to limit its application to man. Nature (ἡ φύσις) he
observes, does not produce things like the Delphian knife, in a
poverty-stricken manner (πενιχρῶς) to serve many purposes, but each for
a single purpose (ἓν πρὸς ἓν).[632] Like Plato, he makes the principle
of reciprocity (τὸ ἴσον ἀντιπεπονθός) out of which the division of labor
arises, the saving element in the state.[633] He is also fully as
emphatic in his application of the law to politics and citizenship.[634]

SLAVERY

We have seen that the references to slavery in Xenophon and Plato are
incidental, and reveal a certain unconscious naïveté as to the actual
social problem involved. By Aristotle’s day, however, the criticisms of
the Sophists had shaken the foundations of all traditional institutions,
and their thesis that slavery is contrary to nature had become through
the Cynics a prominent social theory.[635] The thought on the subject
had crystallized into two leading doctrines—one including benevolence in
justice, and hence denying the right of slavery; and the other
identifying justice with the rule of the stronger, and hence upholding
slavery as based on mere force.[636] The practical Aristotle, an
upholder of slavery, not from tradition, but through conscious belief in
its economic necessity, thus takes his stand midway between the two
opposing theories. He champions the old view of natural slavery, but
rejects the basis of mere force for that of morality and
benevolence.[637] His thesis is that slavery is a natural and necessary
relation in human society, not accidental or conventional. The slave,
being property, which is a multitude of instruments (ὀργάνων πλῆθος), is
an animate instrument (ὄργανον ἔμψυχον) conducive to life (πρὸς
ζωήν).[638] He is just as necessary to the best life of the citizen as
are inanimate instruments, and will be, until all tools work
automatically, like the mythical figures of Daedalus or the tripods of
Hephaestus.[639] The slave is a servant in the realm of action (πρᾶξις),
not of production (ποίησις). He is not a producer of commodities
(ποιητικός), but of services (πρακτικός),[640] and just as property is
merely a part or member (μόριον) belonging wholly to something else, so
the slave, as property, belongs entirely to his master, and has no true
existence apart from him.[641] From these facts, the whole nature and
power of the slave are evident. One who, though a human being, is merely
property is a natural slave, since he is naturally not his own master,
but belongs to another, in whom he finds his true being.[642] As Barker
has observed, this conclusion of the first part of Aristotle’s argument
is inevitable if we admit his premises of the identity of “instruments”
and property, but this is an unreal identity.[643] “Natural” (φύσει) is
the saving word in his argument, but “human” (ἄνθρωπος) refutes it, as
the philosopher practically admits later.

He now proceeds to ask the question whether this “natural” slave of his
hypothesis actually exists, for whom such a relation is just, or whether
all slavery is contrary to nature, as some allege. He answers in the
affirmative. The principle of rule and subjection he declares to be a
foundation law of all life.[644] Men are constituted for either
condition from birth, and their development follows this natural
bent.[645] This law may be observed in inanimate things,[646] in the
natural subordinate relation of the body to the soul, of domestic
animals to man, of female to male, of child to parent, and of subjects
to rulers.[647] Thus all who are capable only of physical service hold
the same relation to higher natures as the body holds to the soul, and
are slaves by nature.[648] This is the only relation for which the slave
is naturally fitted, since he can apprehend reason without himself
possessing it, being midway between animals and truly rational men.[649]
Usually also nature differentiates both the bodies and the souls of
freemen and slaves, suiting them to their respective spheres and
functions.[650]

This relation of slavery, Aristotle argues, is not only natural and
necessary, but also beneficial for those who are so constituted.[651]
Just as the body is benefited by the rule of the soul, and domestic
animals by the rule of man, so it is distinctly to the advantage of the
“natural slave” to be ruled by a rational master. This is universally
true, wherever one class of persons is as inferior to another as is the
body to the soul.[652]

The philosopher’s frank admissions, in which he opposes the doctrine
that slavery is founded on mere force, are fatal to his first argument
on the natural slave. He admits that nature does not always consummate
her purpose; that the souls of freemen are sometimes found in the bodies
of slaves, and vice versa;[653] that it is difficult to distinguish the
quality of the soul, in any event;[654] that the claim that slavery is
neither natural nor beneficial has in it a modicum of truth, as there
are sometimes merely legal slaves, or slaves by convention;[655] that
slavery based on mere might without virtue is unjust;[656] that captives
of war may be wrongly enslaved;[657] that only those who actually
deserve it, should meet this fate;[658] that the accidents of life may
bring even the noblest of mankind into slavery;[659] and that only
non-Greeks are ignoble and worthy of it.[660] He even insists that the
terms “slave-master,” “freeman,” “slave,” when rightly used, imply a
certain virtue or the lack of it, and therefore that to be justly a
master, one must be morally superior.[661] The question of the
possession of the higher virtues by slaves is recognized by him to be a
difficult problem, for an affirmative answer breaks down his distinction
of “natural” slave, yet it seems paradoxical to deny these virtues to
him as a human being.[662] Nor can the difficulty be avoided by positing
for the slave a mere difference in degree of virtue, for the distinction
between ruler and subject must be one of kind.[663] In any event,
temperance and justice are necessary even for good slave service.[664]
Aristotle therefore evades the difficulty, and begs the question by
concluding that both master and slave must share in virtue, but
differently, in accord with their respective stations.[665]

With this admission, he places slaves on a higher plane than free
artisans, in that he denies virtue to such classes, since it cannot be
produced in them, except as they are brought into contact with a
master.[666] He thus makes slavery a humanitarian institution, and the
slave a real member of the family.[667] But the admission most fatal to
his theory is in agreeing that the slave _qua_ man may be a subject of
friendship,[668] and in advocating his manumission as a reward for good
behavior. With this, the attempted distinction between him, _qua_ slave
and _qua_ man, utterly breaks down, and the existence of natural slaves
is virtually denied.[669] Thus the great champion of slavery in the
ancient world, by his very defense of it, repudiates its right as a
natural institution. His actual conception of the relation is, indeed,
not far from the ideal of Plato, a union for the best mutual service of
rulers and ruled, in which the slave receives from his master a moral
exchange value for his physical service.[670]

There is a certain economic and moral truth, also, in the attitude of
Aristotle toward slavery, that, as Ruskin has observed,[671] higher
civilization and culture must have a foundation of menial labor, and
that the only justification of such a situation is in the assumption
that some are naturally fitted for the higher, and some for the lower,
sphere.[672] Such modern laborers are not technically slaves, but
Aristotle would insist that they are in a still worse condition, since
they are deprived of the humanizing and moralizing influences of a
rational master. The plausibility of such a contention would be well
illustrated by the wretched condition of multitudes of negroes after the
Civil War, as also by the hopeless life of a large portion of the modern
industrial army. Moreover, the economic slavery of many of the common
toilers today is less justifiable than the domestic slavery advocated by
Aristotle, for it too often means a life of indolence and
self-indulgence for the masters, instead of that Greek leisure which
gave opportunity for higher activity.[673]

MONEY

To the theory of money Aristotle makes a substantial contribution. He
agrees with Plato that money found its origin in the growth of necessary
exchange, which in turn resulted from an increased division of labor.
Unlike Plato, however, he gives a detailed history of the development of
money.[674] Before its invention, all exchange was by barter.[675] But
with the growth of commerce, barter became difficult, and a common
medium of exchange was agreed upon.[676] Something was chosen that was a
commodity, having intrinsic value (ὁτῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὄν) and that was
easy to handle (εὐμεταχείριστον) in the business of life such as iron,
silver, or other metal.[677] It was first uncoined, defined merely by
size and weight.[678] Finally, to avoid the inconvenience, it was given
a stamp (χαρακτήρ) representative of the quantity (σημεῖον τοῦ
πόσου).[679] Thus arose the use of money as a convenience in necessary
exchange, but once having arisen, it became the foundation of false
finance and retail trade, which are pursued as a science of gain.[680]
All this accords well with the facts as now accepted, yet how utterly
different is Aristotle’s standpoint from that of the modern historian of
economic institutions is revealed by his last statement, and indeed by
the setting of the entire passage. His history of money is merely
incidental to his purpose of showing that money is the parent and the
very life of the false finance which he decries.

He is also more explicit than the other Greek theorists on the function
of money. He clearly recognizes the two functions noted by Plato,[681]
but he deals with them in a much more detailed manner. His discussion
grows out of his theory of distributive justice presented in the
_Ethics_.[682] Money was introduced as the exchangeable representative
of demand (ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας),[683] since diverse products must be
reduced to some common denominator.[684] It is thus a medium of
exchange, acting as a measure of all inferior and superior values, by
making them all commensurable (συμβλητά).[685]

The other important function of money recognized is as a guaranty
(ἐγγυητής) of future exchange. It represents the abiding, rather than
the temporary, need, and is thus a standard of deferred payments.[686]
The importance of money in the fulfilment of these functions is great,
in the opinion of Aristotle. The possibility of fair exchange, or indeed
the very existence of organized society depends upon it.[687]

He is also clearer than Plato and Xenophon in his definition of the
relation between money and wealth. He severely criticizes the current
mercantilistic theory of his day, which identified wealth with a
quantity of current coin (νομίσματος πλῆθος).[688] He immediately
follows this, however, with a more extended presentation of the opposite
error of the Cynics, that money is mere trash (λῆρος), depending for its
value entirely upon convention (νόμῳ). This theory, he points out, is
based on the fact that, if money ceased to be recognized as legal
tender, it would be useless; that it satisfies no direct necessity; and
that one might starve like Midas, though possessed of it in
superabundance.[689]

Aristotle is here somewhat ambiguous as to his own attitude toward this
doctrine. He fails to object that money does not necessarily become
valueless when it ceases to be legal tender, and that a similar argument
might be used to prove that clothing is not wealth. Instead, he uses the
idea as a means of refuting the opposite error, which is more obnoxious
to him, and on the basis of it he plunges into his discussion of the
true and false finance.[690] This, together with a passage in the
_Ethics_, might point to the conclusion that he agreed with the doctrine
of the Cynics on money. He states that it was introduced by agreement
(κατὰ συνθήκην); that, owing to this, it is called νόμισμα, because its
value is not natural but legal; and that it may, at any time, be changed
or made useless.[691] In the light of other evidence, however, it seems
probable that he here meant to emphasize merely the fact that the
general agreement of a community is necessary before anything can be
used as a symbol of demand. In stating that it may be made useless, he
probably referred to money itself, rather than the material of it, which
is, of course, true. His determined opposition to the mercantile theory
of money, as the basis of false finance, caused him to appear to
subscribe to the opposite error. That, in actual fact, he did recognize
the necessity of intrinsic value as an attribute of money is clearly
evidenced by another passage, where he specifies it. He says that the
material chosen as money was a commodity and easy to handle.[692] This
can mean only that it is subject to demand and supply, like any other
object of exchange. This inference is substantiated by another passage,
which declares that the value of money fluctuates, like that of other
things, only not in the same degree.[693] Moreover, in his enumeration
of the diverse kinds of wealth, money is regularly included.[694] It
seems evident, therefore, that he did not fall a victim of either error,
but recognized that, though money is only representative wealth, yet it
is itself a commodity, whose value changes with supply and demand, like
other goods.[695] Since he understood the use of money as a standard of
deferred payments, he also saw clearly the necessity of a stable
monetary standard.[696]

Though Aristotle defines money as representative wealth, like Plato, he
fails to apprehend its meaning as representative, and therefore
productive capital.[697] In his eyes, such a use of money is unjust and
contrary to nature. He counts usury (τοκισμός) to be a large part of
that false finance, which turns money from its true function to be made
an object of traffic.[698] Those who lend small sums at a high rate of
interest are contemptible,[699] and petty usury (ἡ ὀβολοστατική) is the
most unnatural and violent form of chrematistik, since it makes money
reproduce money.[700] It is to be observed, however, that his criticism
is directed chiefly against petty interest, and that he does not appear
to be thinking of “heavy loans on the security of a whole cargo, but of
petty lendings to the necessitous poor, at heavy interest.”[701] Though
his entire account of false finance exhibits an animus against the
precious metals, as its basal cause, and as the source of individual and
national degeneration,[702] yet he clearly appreciates their necessary
function in the state, and his hostility is actually directed against
the spirit of commercialism. Money, the means, has usurped the place of
the end, until domestic and public economy alike have come to mean only
the vulgar art of acquisition.[703]

The usual explanation of the fact that the Greek theorists failed to
grasp the fact of the productive power of money is that loans were
almost entirely for consumption, and hence seemed like an oppression of
the poor.[704] This explanation, however, does not accord with the facts
of Athenian life, at least for Aristotle’s day. It is clear from the
_Private Orations_ of Demosthenes that there did exist an extensive
banking and credit system for productive purposes in the Athens of his
time.[705] Moreover, the hostility to interest and credit was not the
rule, but the exception, for Demosthenes and not the philosophers should
be accepted as voicing public opinion on this point. He considered
credit to be of as much importance as money itself in the business
world,[706] and declared one who ignored this elementary fact to be a
mere know-nothing.[707] Indeed, the money-lenders were, to him, the very
foundation of the prosperity of the state.[708] The prejudice of Plato
and Aristotle represent merely the exceptional attitude of the pure
moralist, who because of the questionable tactics of money-lenders, and
the injustice and greed in some phases of contemporary business life,
became critics of all money-making operations.[709]

EXCHANGE

Aristotle, in both the _Politics_ and the _Ethics_, deals at
considerable length with the subject of exchange.[710] He states that it
arose out of the natural situation (κατὰ φύσιν) and defines this as “the
fact that men had more of some commodities and less of others than they
needed.”[711] At first, all exchange was by barter (ἀλλαγή) and there
was no trading except for specific need.[712] The development of an
international commerce of import and export was made possible by the
invention of money. It is this significant fact that furnishes the line
of division between the old natural economy and the era of commerce and
finance, when exchange and money have become the tools for unlimited
individual enrichment.[713]

His theory of exchange and just price grows out of his application to
exchange of his definition of corrective justice, as a mean between two
extremes of injustice.[714] Trade is just when each party to it has the
exact equivalent (ἴσον) in value with which he began. Exchange is a mean
between profit and loss, which themselves have no proper relation to its
true purpose.[715] This does not mean that the traders must receive the
same in return (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ᾽ ἰσότητα), but an equivalent, or
proportional requital (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν).[716] It is this
fact of proportional requital that makes exchange, and indeed human
society, possible.[717] The meaning is illustrated by a proportion in
which the producers bear the same relation to each other as their
products.[718] By joining means and extremes, the exchangers are brought
to a basis of proportional equality (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον).[719]
Thus is determined how many shoes, the shoemaker’s product, must be
given for a house, the builder’s product, and the prices of the two
commodities are justly settled, with relation to each other.[720] It is
very necessary for just exchange, that such proportional equality be
effected before the requital or actual transfer takes place. Otherwise
one will gain both superiorities (ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς), and equality
becomes impossible,[721] since the cost of production of things is very
diverse.[722] Indeed, the arts themselves could not exist, unless the
advantage to the consumer were similar in quantity and quality to the
cost to the producer.[723]

The common element in diverse products that makes them commensurable is
need, or demand (ἡ χρεία), for reciprocal services.[724] But on the
basis of the need of the moment, or under the régime of barter, just
exchange would be practically impossible, since the concrete needs of A
and B, at any given moment, are not likely to correspond. In such a
case, exchange would be a gross disregard of the cost of production.
This has been avoided by the introduction of money as a substitute for
demand,[725] a symbol of general, rather than specific need. Thus just
exchange becomes possible, for money, as the representative of general
need, is always equally in demand by all, and, as the common denominator
of value, it alone renders it possible for proportional amounts of each
product to be exchanged.[726]

Aristotle’s basal premise in this theory of fair exchange, that unless
an equal quantum of value is received by each party, one must lose what
the other gains, has been severely criticized by Menger.[727] He objects
that the determining consideration in exchange is not the equal value of
exchanged goods. On the contrary, men trade only when they expect to
better their economic condition. “Um ihres economischen Vortheils
willen, nicht um gleiches gegen gleiches hinzugeben; sondern um ihre
Bedürfnisse so vollständig als unter den gegebenen Verhältnissen dies
zulässig ist zu befriedigen.” Each gives the other only so much of his
own goods as is necessary to secure this end, and it is this competition
in open market that fixes prices. Barker[728] also criticizes Aristotle
on the ground that he takes no account of demand in his theory of just
price. He states that if the cost of production were the only element to
be considered, the doctrine might be correct, but with the entrance of
demand, one may buy at a low price and sell at an advance without
injustice.

Of course, the bald theory that, in exchange, one necessarily loses what
the other gains, is untenable. Yet there is still something to be said
for Aristotle. He recognized, as well as Menger, that exchange, as
pursued by the retailers, did not square with his idea of just price.
This is the very reason why he objects to retail trade. He is presenting
exchange, not as it is, but as he believes it should be pursued. His
doctrine, in a nutshell, is that the primary purpose of exchange is
profit, _defined as economic satisfaction of mutual needs_, not profit
in dollars and cents. The equality that he seeks, too, is not so much an
equality of value in obols and drachmas, but that each shall receive an
equal quantum of economic satisfaction. This is the true standpoint at
bottom, and when, as is common, the mere purpose of money-making
dominates in the pursuit of exchange, the profit is too often at the
expense of the other party. Such exchange certainly does not mean
economic advance or general prosperity. It merely makes possible an
increase in the inequalities of wealth and poverty. There is much of
fallacy in the prevalent idea that business necessarily increases the
wealth of a state. Ruskin, though like Aristotle extreme and one-sided
in his view, struck at the root of this error. He also declared that the
result of exchange should be advantage, not profit, and repudiated the
idea that the mere fact that goods change hands necessarily means
general enrichment.[729] The central truth in their protest needed to be
spoken, though both erred in not sufficiently recognizing that the labor
involved in exchange creates an added time and place value, and
therefore has a right to be called productive. They also failed to
observe the fact of the necessary risk involved in the business of
exchange, which should be repaid with a fair additional profit. For the
cornering of markets and the manipulation of prices, for the sake of
individual enrichment, modern economists and statesmen, with Aristotle
and Ruskin, are fast coming to have only words of protest.

Moreover, contrary to Barker’s assertion, demand, as an element of
price, is prominent throughout this discussion of Aristotle. He objects,
however, to allowing the effect of demand to overcome unduly the cost of
production, thus causing inequality and injustice. According to his
idea, each receives the equivalent in value of what he gives, in the
sense that it is a resultant of the proportionate influence of both cost
and need.[730] We may, nevertheless, observe an excellent example of
inconsistency in the fact that, despite his insistence upon just
exchange, he appears to treat monopoly as a legitimate principle of
finance for both men and states,[731] though his intention in the
passage may have been to discuss actual conditions, rather than to
idealize.

Naturally, the philosopher shows no concern for a tax on imports as a
means of building up the industry and commerce of his state, since he is
especially desirous of limiting both. However, he is not blind to the
advantages of export and import trade for a nation,[732] but would
regulate them with an ethical, rather than an economic purpose.[733] His
doctrine of exchange as a form of production has been discussed
above,[734] and will be touched upon further in the following pages. His
general criticism of what he terms “false finance” or “chrematistik”
(χρηματιστική) remains for more extended treatment.

We have seen that he recognizes the necessity of a limited form of
exchange, free from the purpose of gain, and considers such trading to
be natural and in accord with that interdependence which nature
demands.[735] He calls it the very bond of the social organization,[736]
and even considers international commerce to be necessary for the
prosperity of a state.[737] We have also seen that he goes so far as to
advise the rich in a democracy to give the poor a start in
business,[738] but that exchange, in its prevalent form, is to him a
method of cheatery, in which one gains what the other loses.[739]

On the basis of this prejudice, he builds his argument for domestic
economy (οἰκονομική) as opposed to false finance.[740] We will therefore
consider his entire theory of this relation at this point, for the term
“chrematistik,” though more inclusive than exchange (μεταβλητική), has
trade in either goods or money (καπηλική) as its predominating element,
and the two terms are often used by him as synonyms. He employs the word
χρηματιστική in several significations—usually of unnatural finance, or
the art of money-making by exchange of goods or money; sometimes as
synonymous with κτητική, the general term for the entire business of
acquisition, including both natural and unnatural finance;[741] again,
of the natural finance, which is a part of domestic economy. His
confusion results partly from his futile attempt to separate landed
property from general industry and commerce.

His main contention is that there is a vital distinction between
domestic economy, whether of householder (οἰκονόμος) or statesman, and
the art of acquisition or finance, as usually pursued. The primary
function of the art of finance is to provide, while that of domestic
economy is to use what is provided.[742] There are, however, many
methods of acquisition (κτητική; χρηματιστική), some of which truly
belong to the sphere of domestic economy.[743] The provision of all that
is furnished by nature herself, as necessary to human existence, then,
if not already at hand (ὑπάρχειν), belongs properly to domestic
economy.[744] It both uses and provides genuine wealth, such as is
limited in amount (οὐκ ἄπειρος) yet sufficient for independence
(αὐτάρκεια) and the good life.[745] But the use of such wealth is its
chief business.[746] The other kind of acquisition, which is unlimited,
or chrematistik, is contrary to nature, and is not in the province of
domestic economy.[747] This unnatural finance, since it deals chiefly in
the exchange of money and other commodities, may be termed retail trade
(καπηλική).[748] Though itself false, it is a logical outgrowth (κατὰ
λόγον) of the true form of exchange that is limited to actual needs[749]
as a result of the invention of money.[750] But the real reason for its
pursuit is to satisfy an evil and unlimited desire for material
things.[751] It produces money merely through the exchange of money
(δι1α χρημάτων μεταβολῆς),[##] and its beginning and end is unlimited
currency.[752]

This false form of acquisition is often confused with necessary
exchange, because both deal with money.[753] Their aims, however, are
quite diverse. The latter treats the accumulation of money (αὔξησις) as
a means, while the former treats it as the supreme end of life.[754] In
fine, then, Aristotle teaches that necessary chrematistik has to do with
the supply and use of life’s necessities, is natural (κατὰ φύσιν or
οἰκειοτάτη) and limited,[755] its prime function being the proper
disposal of products.[756] It is an honorable pursuit,[757] dependent
chiefly upon fruits and animals,[758] and involves a practical knowledge
of stock (κτηνή), farming, bee-culture, trees, fish, and fowl.[759] The
false finance, on the other hand, is unnatural, dishonorable, and
enriches at the expense of another.[760] Its chief business is commerce
(ἐμπορία), including sea-trade (ναυκληρία), inland trade (φορτηγία), and
shop-trade, (παράστασις).[761] It also comprises usury (τοκισμός) and
hired labor, both skilled and unskilled (μισθαρνία ἡ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων
τέχνων ἡ δὲ ἀτεχνῶν).[762]

Aristotle also distinguishes a third type of finance (χρηματιστική)
which shares in the nature of both those above described. It deals with
natural resources and their products, but with things which, though
useful, are not fruits (ἀκάρπιμα), such as wood-cutting (ὑλοτομία) and
mining in all its branches (μεταλλευτική).[763] The meaning may be best
apprehended if, with Ashley,[764] we observe that οἰκονομική is
characterized, not only by direct acquisition of nature’s products, but
also by a personal use of the same, while the unnatural finance has
neither of these qualities. The medium kind, then, is like the former,
in that it involves direct acquisition of natural resources, but like
the latter, in that it does not acquire for directly personal use, but
for exchange. It consists, therefore, not so much in the arts
themselves, as in the exchange that is based on them.

In the discussion of the so-called false finance, Aristotle thus reveals
a markedly hostile attitude to any extensive development of exchange.
The middleman is considered to be a parasite and necessarily degenerate
by the very fact of his business.[765] As seen above, his criticism was
doubtless directed chiefly against the mean and dishonest spirit in the
actual retail trade and money-loaning of his day.[766] Yet here also,
just as in the _Ethics_ passage above discussed, his prejudice blinds
him to the fact that exchangers may be real producers, and that, after
all, even the alleged false finance is not unlimited, but that it is
distinctly bounded by economic demand.[767] Still worse, he includes
hired labor of every kind under unlimited acquisition, merely because it
has some of the other qualities of that type of economy, though it
certainly does not tend to unlimited enrichment even as much as
agriculture.[768] However, he should be given credit of being a
forerunner of the modern humanitarian economy, which insists that the
final goal of all economics should be proper consumption, and that
acquisition must be relegated to its true place as a means, the supreme
end being human welfare.[769]

POPULATION

Aristotle exhibits an interest in the problem of population in relation
to subsistence in his criticism of Plato for limiting the amount of
property and making it indivisible, while failing to provide against a
too high birth-rate.[770] He states the principle that, if property is
to be limited, there must be a corresponding limitation on the increase
of population,[771] and that the let-alone policy must be followed by
increased poverty.[772] He therefore criticizes the Spartan law, for
encouraging the largest possible families.[773] It is evident, however,
that, as in the case of Plato, his interest in the problem is prompted
chiefly by a moral and political motive. It arises merely from his
desire to limit individual acquisition, in a small state, artificially
constructed, and is to him in no sense a question of world
food-supply.[774]

DISTRIBUTION

In the _Ethics_ passage discussed above,[775] Aristotle approaches a
scientific theory of distribution. He observes that just distribution
will be a mean between two extremes of unfairness.[776] Unlike some
moderns, however, he realizes that this will not mean equal shares for
all. There must be the same ratio between the persons, or services, and
the things.[777] In the “mutual exchange of services,” the law must be
proportional requital.[778] In other words, each should receive an
equivalent to what he contributes.[779] Distribution must thus proceed
according to a certain standard of worth or desert (κατ᾽ ἀξίαν
τινά).[780] If the individuals are unequal, their shares cannot be
equal, and it is a prolific source of dispute, whenever equals receive
unequal shares, or unequals receive equal.[781] On the other hand,
Aristotle recognizes that it is a difficult matter to determine this
standard, by which just distribution is to proceed.[782] At this point,
again, he shows clearly that his paramount interest in the problem is
not economic. He names four possible standards—freedom, wealth, noble
birth, and general excellence—all of which are distinctly political in
their reference.[783]

Though he insists on a fair distribution of wealth to the citizens, he
can hardly be said to exhibit as much interest in the welfare of the
common people as does Plato. He had not a very ideal conception of human
nature in general. He would have thought it not only impracticable, but
undesirable to give his doctrine of leisure any extensive application.
As seen above, he includes all hired labor under false finance, and
relegates all industry, including agriculture, to the slaves and
strangers. The life of mechanic and commercial alike is to him
ignoble.[784] He advises that measures be taken to hold the workers in
submission and obedience.[785] His unfair criticism of Plato’s
_Republic_, however, on the ground that it fails to emphasize
sufficiently the welfare of the parts of the state, and that it does not
distinguish clearly enough the status of the commons, reveals a spirit
that does not entirely disregard the masses.[786] His demand that no
citizen shall lack subsistence,[787] his provision of the _sussitia_ for
all,[788] his insistence that, in the market, mere economic
self-interest shall not rule,[789] and his emphasis on the importance of
a strong middle class in the state,[790] all show that, in the interest
of the perpetuity of the state at least, he had some regard for the
economic well-being of all classes. It would be wrong to infer from his
suggestions for the aid of the masses in a democracy, that he would
offer similar advice for the ideal state. Moreover, his chief emphasis
in the passage is upon the idea of Mill, that mere hand-to-mouth help of
the poor is wasteful, and that what is needed is to aid them to become
economically independent.[791] Nevertheless his suggestion does show
that he saw clearly the relation that exists in a democracy between the
economic condition of the masses and the stability of the state.[792] He
says that the genuine friend of the people (ἀληθινῶς δημοτικός) will see
that the masses are not very poor, for the best assurance of the abiding
welfare of the state is the solid prosperity of the great majority of
the population. He therefore advises the rich to contribute money for
furnishing plots of land or capital for small business enterprises to
the needy poor.[793] However, while the advice seems, on the surface, to
favor the commons, it is really a prudent suggestion to the upper
classes, appealing to their selfish interest to avoid by this method the
danger of a discontented proletariat.[794] Nevertheless, the general
economic attitude of Aristotle would warrant including him, with the
other Greek thinkers, in the statement of Roscher: “Die hellenische
Volkswirtschaftslehre hat niemals den grossen Fehler begangen, über dem
Reichtume die Menschen zu vergessen, und über der Vermehrung der
Menschenzahl, der Wohlstand der einzelnen gering zu achten.”[795]

Aristotle makes clear his attitude toward the institution of private
property and other related questions, both in his criticism of other
thinkers, and in his own positive suggestions for the ideal state.
Through his objections to the systems of Phaleas and Plato, he has
acquired the reputation of being the great defender of private property
in Greece. We shall see the extent to which this interpretation of him
is correct. Our consideration of his theory may be summarized under
certain topics which are fundamental to the problem of distribution.

He admits that the doctrine of economic equality may have some wisdom in
it.[796] The attempt to equalize possessions may tend slightly to
prevent civic discord.[797] Yet it is liable to arouse sedition on the
part of the exploited classes,[798] and such relief measures will
satisfy the masses only for a time, for they are notoriously
insatiate.[799] In his opinion, therefore, the saner remedy is
equalization of desires rather than of property,[800] which must be
realized by proper education and a right constitution, whereby the upper
classes shall not oppress, and the masses shall be held in check. We
have here still a valid argument against the more radical type of
socialism. It is suggestive of the modern doctrine of private property
as a public trust,[801] and presents clearly the antithesis between the
attitude of Greek thinkers and that of the modern social democracy.[802]

Aristotle argues further that equalization of property would be
powerless to prevent anything more than the merely petty crimes, for the
grossest ones are the result of inordinate desire, rather than of
inability to provide life’s necessities.[803] Moreover, there are many
other natural inequalities of life what would remain to arouse
discontent.[804] This is a sensible observation that has often been
overlooked by modern radical socialists, though its author might have
objected further that such personal diversities would also render an
abiding equality of property impossible. His previous argument, however,
that immorality and crimes are the result of inordinate desire, rather
than of economic need, might be answered today by the results of
investigations upon the relation of wages to morality.

The doctrine of communistic equality, as preached by some theorists in
fifth- and fourth-century Greece, and as satirized by Aristophanes,[805]
had no appeal for Aristotle. It was, to him, merely a thinly veiled
individualism. He saw through the selfish partisanship of both oligarchs
and democrats, and recognized that all men are poor judges in matters
that concern themselves.[806] The excessive individualism of the radical
democrat of his day, which permitted the majority to confiscate the
property of the minority in the name of a false equality, was as hateful
to him as it was to Plato.[807] As seen above, he insisted that economic
or political equality should not be demanded, except on the basis of
equality of service.[808] Exploitation by the radical democracy was, in
his eyes, as bad as the rule of a tyrant,[809] and the ruthless
individualism of the classes was no better.[810] Like Plato, he would
oppose to both of these the common interest, and would unite both masses
and classes in the aim to realize the highest moral life for the
individual through the state.[811] He refuted the Sophist’s theory of
social contract and of justice as a mere convention.[812] As Stewart has
observed he realized that “more powerful causes than the mere perception
of material advantage brought men into social union and keep them in
it.”[813] Each citizen, he held, is not his own master, but all belong
to the state. Each is a member (μόριον) of the social body, and the
concern of each is naturally relative to the good of the whole.[814]

Aristotle’s further criticisms, of minor significance, on the
suggestions of Phaleas and Plato for equality of possessions are as
follows: They have taken no precautions to regulate population
accordingly.[815] They set no proper limit between luxury and penury for
individual possessions.[816] Plato’s system is not thoroughgoing, since
it allows inequalities in personal property, a criticism also valid
against his own proposals.[817] Phaleas failed to include personal
property in his system of equality.[818] Such strictures seem to proceed
from his pedantic desire to criticize inconsistency. However, he may
have apprehended more clearly than did Plato the danger of the press of
poverty that must eventually result from a system like that of the
_Laws_.[819]

Our author is also strong in his denial of either the wisdom or
feasibility of the communism in the _Republic_.[820] He argues that
Plato’s proposed family communism is based upon the false principle that
a state must be composed of like elements,[821] and shows that it must
fail to accomplish its end of harmony, for Plato’s “all” must mean all
collectively.[822] But this must result, if realized, in a decrease of
devotion,[823] and thus in a lack of the very harmony sought,[824] since
one of the chief sources of attachment in the world is exclusive
ownership.[825] He would deem such a measure, therefore, more fitting
for the third class, since a weakening of their ties of affection might
result in greater submission to the rulers,[826] another striking
evidence of the gulf that separates the ideal of Greek political thought
from the spirit of modern democracy.

Moreover, he considers Plato’s assumption that a state, to be a unity,
must be devoid of all private interests, to be gratuitous,[827] and
argues that the common possession of anything is more likely to cause
strife than harmony.[828] In his opinion, the present system of private
property, if accompanied by a right moral tone and proper laws, combines
the advantages of both common and individual ownership.[829] The tenure
of property should therefore be private, but there should be a certain
friendly community in its actual use.[830] Thus will be avoided the
double evil of strife and neglect, which must result from
dissatisfaction and lack of personal interest under communism.[831] He
offers as a substitute for the Platonic doctrine, then, his own ideal of
reciprocal equality (τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός) as the real cement of
society.[832] In any event, he asserts, the present evils do not result
from private property, but from the depravity of human nature
(μοχθηρίαν),[833] and the aim should be to improve this by moral and
intellectual culture, rather than to attempt amelioration by the
establishment of an entirely new system.[834] The latter method would
result, even if successful, not only in escape from some of the present
evils, but also in the loss of the present advantages of private
tenure.[835]

The foregoing arguments all show remarkable practical insight, and have
been common in the modern criticism of socialism. The objection that
individual effort and industry would be paralyzed if bereft of the
stimulus of personal interest and ownership, while a general fact of
human nature, need not be valid against a system where each has
opportunity to develop up to his capacity. There is certainly little to
impel the great mass of people to industry under an individualistic
system, except the proverbial wolf at the door. But Aristotle is not
thinking of the masses. The objection that the evils result from human
nature, not from the economic system, may well be pondered by modern
socialists and doctrinaire reformers, yet this very fact is an
additional reason why the system should be reformed so as to curb such
wrong tendencies. The emphasis upon education as a cure for the existing
ills is wise, and it might well be more fully recognized by modern
socialists, though both Aristotle and later critics of proposed social
reforms are wrong in implying that the two methods are mutually
exclusive. The warning that, by giving up the régime of private
properly, we should not only be rid of its evils, but also lose its
advantages, should be pondered by agitators against the existing
economic system. Modern socialists might also learn much from Aristotle
and the other Greek thinkers in regard to the true social ideal, as not
primarily materialistic and selfish, but moral and social. On the whole,
it may be observed that Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s alleged
communism in the _Republic_ would be far more applicable against modern
socialism.

As to the _sussitia_, Aristotle proposes a system similar to that of
Plato’s _Laws_.[836] He harshly criticizes the Spartan method, which
required every citizen, rich and poor alike, to contribute to the common
meals on pain of loss of citizenship.[837] He praises, on the other
hand, the Cretan system, which permitted the entire citizenship,
including women and children, to be nourished at the common table, at
public expense.[838]

We have seen that Plato, in the _Laws_, while apparently granting
private property in land, really denies this, since he makes the product
of the land practically public property.[839] Aristotle, despite his
strictures against communism, advocates a system of land tenure quite
similar. His limitation of the freedom of donation or testament,
purchase or sale; his demands that the lot shall never leave the family,
that it shall always be handed down by legitimate succession, and that
no citizen shall ever be allowed to hold more than one allotment, are
all Platonic, and make him unquestionably an advocate of family, rather
than of private ownership of land.[840] His collectivism is more direct
than that of the _Laws_, since he makes part of the land entirely
public, to defray the expense of worship and the common meals.[841] The
assignment of lots to the citizens is on the same terms as in the
_Laws_, with the exception that the owners are masters of the product of
their lots.[842] Despite his criticism of Plato’s division of
homesteads, he has the same plan.[843] As in the _Laws_, only citizens
are landowners, and this includes only the governing and military
classes,[844] while all husbandmen are to be public or private
slaves.[845] Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle does not attempt to avoid
undue inequalities in personal property.[846] He sets no maximum above
which limit goods must be confiscated, nor does he, as Plato, establish
a rigorous system of laws to hamper trade and to make money-making
operations practically impossible. He recognizes that such regulations
are not feasible, and his legislation is therefore more considerate of
human nature, despite the fact that his hostility to the ideal of
commercialism is even more pronounced than is that of Plato.[847]

It is evident from the preceding outline of Aristotle’s negative and
positive doctrine on the matter of private property that his system is
in substantial agreement with that of Plato’s second state.[848] Besides
the points of similarity noted above, he agrees with his predecessor in
emphasizing strongly the power of the state over the life of the
citizens. Both insist that the citizen belongs, not to himself, but to
the state, and can realize his best life only through the state.[849]
Thus Aristotle is far from being a defender of private property in the
absolute sense. On the other hand, his emphasis upon the social
obligation of individual possession is, if not socialistic, at least
very modern. He is certainly a much better socialist than the alleged
communist of the _Republic_, whom he criticizes so severely. Like the
Plato of the _Laws_, he is a semi-collectivist. As Barker has
observed,[850] Aristotle thought in terms of land, while modern
socialism thinks in terms of capital and labor. Both standpoints involve
social ownership and the limitation of the individual, and in this
respect the Greek thinker was socialistic in tendency. But despite their
social spirit and their trend toward nationalism, which is so strong in
all progressive countries today, neither he nor Plato was a socialist,
in the modern sense, in spirit or in aim.[851] Any attempts at direct
comparison with modern socialism, therefore, are likely to be fanciful
and confusing. Whatever analogy there is between them is of a very
general nature and should not be pressed.[852]

Footnote 517:

Cf. _infra_ for the _Economica_, which is generally recognised to be
from a later member of the Peripatetic school, about 250-200 B.C.; cf.
Susemihl, _Economica_, Intro. to the ed.; Croiset, _op. cit._, IV,
710; Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 2, 944 ff. Moreover, it deals chiefly
with the practical phase of economics. On the other hand, we shall
cite _Eud. Eth._ and _Mag. mor._ under Aristotle, since, though later
than him, they merely imitate his thought, in so far as they touch
economics. For the numerous and diverse writings ascribed to
Aristotle, cf. Christ, _op. cit._, IV [1905], 684 ff.

Footnote 518:

B. St. Hilaire (preface to his French translation of the _Politics_,
pp. 4-11) calls him “le créateur de l’économie politique.” Zmavc
(_Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos._ [1899], pp. 407 ff.) also tends to
overestimate him.

Footnote 519:

Zmavc (_ibid_, and also _Zeitschr. f. d. gesammt. Staatswiss._ [1902],
pp. 48 ff.) emphasizes this fact.

Footnote 520:

_Pol._ i. 1. 1252_a_7-13, cited on p. 9, n. 5, a criticism of Plato’s
_Politics_ 258E-259C; on the truth in this confusion, cf. p. 10. Even
Adam Smith said: “What is wise with a family can hardly be foolish
with a great kingdom.”

Footnote 521:

Besides St. Hilaire and Zmavc, cited above, among those favorable are
Cossa, _Hist. des doctrines economiques_, p. 149; Blanqui, _op. cit._,
I, 49, 86. More reserved are Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 127; DuBois, _op.
cit._, p. 50; Haney, _op. cit._, pp. 47 f.; unfair interpretation,
Dühring, _op. cit._, pp. 20 f.

Footnote 522:

i. 9. 1257_a_6-9: ἑκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσίς ἐστιν ἀμφότεραι
δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ᾽ αὑτό, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δ᾽ οὐκ
οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος οἱον ὑποδήματος ἥ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική.

Footnote 523:

_Wealth of Nations_, I, chap. iv.

Footnote 524:

Cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 127; Haney, _op. cit._, p. 47.

Footnote 525:

Unless this is implied in κτήματος, 1257_a_6, as ἔστι γὰρ ἡ
μεταβλητικὴ πάντων (14 f.) might seem to indicate. Zmavc (_Archiv._,
etc., p. 410) points to 1253_b_33-39, on the automatic tripods of
Hephaestus, as implying it, but if so it was unintended by Aristotle.
But cf. _infra_, pp. 84 and 86, n. 4, where it is recognized.

Footnote 526:

1257_a_11; 5-19, but not specifically stated, and the term χρεία does
not occur here.

Footnote 527:

i. 7. 14: καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδήρου
ἀχρηστότερος ὤν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τε ἄφθονον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις
ὑπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει· ὅθεν λέγεται ἄριστον
μὲν ὕδωρ. Cf. Pind. _Ol._ i. 1 and Cope-Sandys ed. of Ar. _Rhet._ (I,
pp. 130 f., 1877).

Footnote 528:

_Ibid._

Footnote 529:

V, v. 8-14. 1133_a_5-1133_b_10 ff.

Footnote 530:

E.g., Stewart.

Footnote 531:

1133_a_5-12; 15 f.; 18; cf. _Eud. Eth._ vii. 10. 1243_b_28-38.

Footnote 532:

_N. Eth._ 1133_a_5-12, etc., 12 f.: οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι το
θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου. The emphasis seems to be on quality of
labor, as suggested by κρεῖττον. Cf. both ὅσον and οἷον (15) and p. 84
n. 3.

Footnote 533:

_Ibid._ 7-10; by joining means and extremes together, the
proportionate exchange is effected. Cf. also 1133_b_4 ff.; 1133_a_32
f. As observed by Ritchie (Palgrave’s _Dictionary_, art. “Aristotle”)
and H. Sewall (_op. cit._, p. 3, n. 2), the proportion is clearer to
moderns if we make our standard one hour of labor of each workman
instead of the men themselves.

Footnote 534:

Stewart (_Notes to N. Eth._ I, 449) suggests that this gives what the
economists call “natural value,” but that the market value oscillates
from this because of supply and demand.

Footnote 535:

1133_a_25-27; 1133_b_6 f. Cf. p. 34, n. 5, for Plato’s use of the
term.

Footnote 536:

_Op. cit._, pp. 47 f.

Footnote 537:

Cf. the discussion and notes above; also 1133_a_15 f., where both
elements seem to be recognized, though the meaning of the passage is
disputed. Cf. _infra_, p. 108, n. 3.

Footnote 538:

1133_a_19 ff.; 29; 1133_b_10 ff., cited _infra_, on money. It clearly
distinguishes the quality of exchangeableness. Cf. iv. 1. 1119_b_26
f., cited _infra_, n. 7. Cf. pp. 38 f. for Plato’s theory.

Footnote 539:

So Stewart, _op. cit._, _in loc._; Zmavc, _Archiv._, etc., p. 415, who
criticizes Karl Marx (_Kapital_, 4th ed., I, 26) for denying this.
Barker (_op. cit._, p. 379) says that Aristotle did not recognize the
“seller’s cost of production”; but cf. 384, where he implies the
opposite.

Footnote 540:

But cf. his definition of wealth, pp. 85 f.

Footnote 541:

Bonar (_op. cit._, p. 40) criticizes him for this. The words ἀξία and
τίμη are not used in the passage, but for the former in a very dear
economic sense, cf. iv. 1. 1119_b_26-27; χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων
ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται.

Footnote 542:

For further discussion of this _Ethics_ passage, cf. _infra_ on money,
exchange, and distribution. _Mag. mor._ i. 33. 1193_b_19-1194_b_2
repeats the idea, citing Plato _Rep._ on the exchange of the four
producers in his primitive state.

Footnote 543:

i. 8. 1256_b_28-32. The term ἄπειρος, as applied to wealth, is used by
Plato and Aristotle of undue love of money (_Rep._ 373D, 591D; _Laws_
870A); for Aristotle, cf. passage above and _infra_. There is a sense,
even from the economic standpoint, in which wealth is not unlimited.

Footnote 544:

_Prin. of Pol. Econ._, preliminary remarks, and Book I, chap. iii, 3.

Footnote 545:

On this term in Plato and Aristotle, cf. _infra_ under exchange.

Footnote 546:

_Op. cit._, p. 374; cf. _infra_ on the moral attitude of Aristotle to
wealth.

Footnote 547:

His unfair criticism of Plato seems to argue otherwise (_Rep._ 369C
ff.; _Pol._ 1291_a_12-19), but cf. _infra_.

Footnote 548:

ii. 7. 1267_b_10 ff.; 1254_a_16 f.; _Rhet._ i. 5. 1361_a_12 ff.

Footnote 549:

_Pol._ 1254_a_16 ff.: κτῆμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστὸν, similar
to Walker’s term “transferability” (_Pol. Econ._, 3d ed., p. 5); cf.
Mill, _op. cit._, preliminary remarks on the term.

Footnote 550:

_N. Eth._ iv. 1. 1119_b_26 f., cited on p. 84, n. 7.

Footnote 551:

Cf. the discussion above on value; cf. Mill, _op. cit._, Book I, chap,
iii, 3, on the quality of “storableness” as an attribute of wealth.
Newman (_Pol. of Ar._, II, note to 1256_b_26 ff.) asks if θησαυρισμός
can be applied to slaves and cattle, and if the definition can include
land. These are all included; cf. n. 1, above.

Footnote 552:

_Pol._ i. 9. 1257_a_6 and 14 f., and the discussion above of _N. Eth._
1133_a_5 ff.

Footnote 553:

Cf. n. 3.

Footnote 554:

Cf. Smith, _op. cit._, IV, for criticism of this basal confusion of
the mercantile theory.

Footnote 555:

_Rhet._ B. 16. 1390-91.

Footnote 556:

_Pol._ i. 8. 1256_b_31 f.; _N. Eth._ i. 8. 1099_a_31-33, especially
ἁδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα; 1101_a_14
f., in the definition of the εὐδαίμων man.

Footnote 557:

_Pol._ iii. 6. 1265_a_32 f.: ἐλευθέρως; _N. Eth._ iii., chaps. 13-14
on σωφροσύνη, and iv, chaps. 1, 2, on ἐλευθεριότης and ἀσωτία; but
display of wealth is vulgar (iv. 2. 1123_a_19-22). Ruskin (_Stones of
Venice_, VIII, 69 [Vol. X, 389]) refers to Aristotle on liberality.

Footnote 558:

ἡ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καί κακουργίαν.

Footnote 559:

v. 1. 1129_b_3; so _Mag. mor._ B. 3. 1199_b_6-9, 14-35; cf. _N. Eth._
i. 8. 1098_b_31 ff. for a similar distinction between habit (ἕξις) and
practice (χρῆσις) of virtue.

Footnote 560:

v. 1. 1129_b_4-6; cf. _Pol._ i. 10. 1258_a_23-27 on the duty of the
weaver or statesman; iv (vii). 15. 1334_a_36 f.; 13. 1332_a_22 f.

Footnote 561:

_Pol._ 1332_a_25 f.

Footnote 562:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 13. 1332_a_26 f.

Footnote 563:

_N. Eth._ i. 8. 1098_b_12-15; cf. _Pol._ 1323_a_25 f.; _Rhet._ i. 5.
1360_b_25 ff.; also _Mag. mor._ A. 3. 1184_b_1-5 and _Eud. Eth._ ii.
1. 1218_b_32.

Footnote 564:

_Pol._ 1323_a_40 f.; cf. Jesus’ sentence, “Seek ye first,” etc.; cf.
also 1323_b_19 f.; also pp. 24 ff., Plato.

Footnote 565:

_Pol._ 1323_b_, 1-6.

Footnote 566:

_N. Eth._ i. 5. 1096_a_5 f.: ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιος τίς ἐστιν. Cf.
also _Pol._ 1256_b_28-32, discussed above, and i., chaps. 8 and 9,
discussed under exchange.

Footnote 567:

Cf. n. 2.

Footnote 568:

_Pol._ 1323_b_7-11, and discussion above.

Footnote 569:

1256_b_36; _N. Eth._ i. 5. 1906_a_6 f.; χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν;
7. 1097_a_27: δῆλον ὡς οὔκ ἐστι πάντα τέλεια.

Footnote 570:

_Pol._ i. 9. 1258_a_2 ff.; cf. also _Mag. mor._ B. 3. 1200_a-b_.

Footnote 571:

1258_a_10-14, similar to Plato _Rep._ i. on the arts and their
function; cf. a similar passage from _Isocrates_ (_Paneg._ 76) on the
virtues of the Persian War heroes.

Footnote 572:

_Pol._ iii. 9. 1280_a_25-32; the chief ambition of a state is not τῶν
κτημάτων χάριν, but εῦ ζῆν. Cf. above on the similar preachments of
Plato, for their relation to modern economic ideas and conditions. Cf.
Plato _Crito_ 48B: οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εῦ ζῆν.

Footnote 573:

Cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 69; for Greek terms for production, cf. p.
66 and notes.

Footnote 574:

i. 10. 1258_a_19-38; 4. 1254_a_7: ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις ἐστιν.

Footnote 575:

10. 1258_a_33 ff., τῆς ὑπερετικῆς, impossible for the economist, but
true, for the moralist; cf. p. 69 for his distinction (1254_a_1 ff.)
between ὄργανα ποιητικά and κτῆμα πρακτικόν.

Footnote 576:

i. 2.; on both the above, cf. Newman, _op. cit., in loc._

Footnote 577:

Cf. especially 1258_a_34 ff.: μάλιστα δὲ, καθάπερ εἴρεται πρότερον,
δεῖ φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν. Cf. Susemihi and Hicks, _Pol. of Ar._, I
(1894), Intro., p. 30.

Footnote 578:

1256_a_40 ff., αὐτόφυτος, “self-existent,” with ἔργασία, as here,
equals αὐτουργία, “agriculture.”

Footnote 579:

1258_b_9-27.

Footnote 580:

_Op. cit._, pp. 96, 98 f., n. 1; cf. Haney, _op. cit._, p. 47; Kautz,
_op. cit._, p.138; Ingram, _op. cit._, p. 18. The physiocrats thought
that commerce and industry increased the value of raw materials only
enough to pay for labor and capital expended. Commerce was an
expensive necessity, a tax on agriculture. For a good summary, cf.
Haney, pp. 138 ff. Quesnay (_Tableau Econ._ [1776]) followed Xenophon
(_Econ._ v. 17) as his motto. But the motive of the physiocrats was
economic, not moral and political, as was that of Aristotle.

Footnote 581:

_Pol._ 1258_b_21 ff.; probably implied also in 1256_a_40 ff.; but cf.
vi (iv). 4. 1291_a_1 ff., where the mechanic and hired laborer are
counted among the necessary parts of the state.

Footnote 582:

1256 ff.; 1256_b_23 f. To him, production is a branch of acquisition.
Cf. p. 28, on Plato’s use of the terms.

Footnote 583:

1258_a_19-38; 1254_a_7, cited on p. 88, n. 10.

Footnote 584:

_Op. cit._, pp. 358, 375 f.

Footnote 585:

_Op. cit._, p. 39, on the basis of _Pol._ 1258_b_34 f.: τὸ δὲ κατὰ
μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ
ἐνδιατρίβειν. φορτικόν may mean merely “tiresome,” not “vulgar.”

Footnote 586:

Cf. Zmavc, _Archiv._, etc., p. 431; cf. passages cited _infra_, on the
attitude of Aristotle to labor; cf. vi (iv). 4. 1291_a_1 ff.,
especially ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον
οἰκεῖσθαι.

Footnote 587:

_Pol._ 1258_a_34-38, cited on p. 89, n. 2.

Footnote 588:

1258_b_9-21.

Footnote 589:

_Ibid._ 40 ff.; cf. Newman, _op. cit._, II, 204, on the statements of
Varro _De re rustica_ i. 1. 8 and _Columella_ i. 1. 7 that Aristotle
and Theophrastus wrote on agriculture. Cf. also (Plato) _Axiochus_
368C.

Footnote 590:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 9. 1329_a_1 f.

Footnote 591:

1254_a_1 ff.; cf. pp. 68 and 88 for Greek terms.

Footnote 592:

1254_a_2-4.

Footnote 593:

_Op. cit._, ii, chap. i.

Footnote 594:

_Pol._ 1254_a_7; cf. p. 88, n. 10.

Footnote 595:

_Pol._ 1254_a_8 ff. He thinks chiefly of the domestic slave.

Footnote 596:

_Unto This Last_, p. 61, an unjust criticism of Mill; _ibid._, IV, 78:
“Production is primarily for the mouth, not for the granary.”

Footnote 597:

_Op. cit._, IV, chap. viii: “Consumption is the sole end and purpose
of all production; ... and the interest of the producer ought to be
attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of
the consumer.”

Footnote 598:

For reference and Greek terms, cf. p. 68.

Footnote 599:

For his term ἀφορμή cf. p. 68, n. 8, and _infra_. It probably was a
mere business word to him. DuBois (_op. cit._, p. 38) thinks that he
had a very clear idea of its significance.

Footnote 600:

_Pol._ 1258_b_12-21; cf. 1258_a_37 f.

Footnote 601:

_Ibid._ 21-27, and entire chaps., 8-11. For terms, cf. _infra_.

Footnote 602:

iv. 1121_a_29; 1122_a_14 f.; cf. the stress on δόσις and χρῆσις rather
than on κτῆσις and λῆψις, 1120_a_8-13; _b_14-16, and Stewart’s notes,
I, 323.

Footnote 603:

_Rep._ 552B, discussed above.

Footnote 604:

Souchon (_op. cit._, p. 121) seems to think it was.

Footnote 605:

_Pol._ 1258_b_8, but cf. p. 39 and _infra_ on this word τόκος. Cf.
also Ar. _Clouds_ 20; 1285 ff.; A. Smith, _op. cit._, II, chap. iv.

Footnote 606:

Souchon (_op. cit._, p. 97) is hardly fair to Aristotle on this point,
but cf. also p. 96, n. 1; cf. Ruskin, _Time and Tide_, XV, 81 (Vol.
XVII, 388); _Mun. Pul._, Pref., 21 (Vol. XVII, 144); _ibid._, VI, 139
(p. 264); _ibid._, 153 and note (p. 277), which cites _Laws_ 743C, on
the doctrine that the just are neither rich nor poor.

Footnote 607:

_Pol._ v (viii). 2. 1337_b_8-11. The terms for mechanical labor are
τέχνη, of ability through practice; δημιουργός, of one who works for
the people, rather than for himself or one other; βάναυσος, originally
of work by the fire, but later the common term for mechanical labor,
usually with a derogatory sense in the philosophers; cf. βαναυσία,
“vulgarity,” _N. Eth._ iv. 4. 1122_a_31; βάναυσος, “vulgar man,”
_ibid._ 1123_a_19; _Etymol. mag_; Schol. to Plato _Rep._ 495E; Pollux
i. 64. 50; Hesychius, _s.v._ The Greeks did not clearly distinguish
the finer from the mechanical arts; cf. Büchsenschütz, _op. cit._, p.
266; _Pol._ vi (iv). 4. 1291_a_1 ff., where all are included under
βάναυσον. Cf. Cope-Sandys, _Ar. Rhet._, 2d ed., I, 9, 27, note. Cf.
above, p. 33, n. 7, for Ruskin’s attitude.

Footnote 608:

_Pol._ 1337_b_12; 1258_b_37.

Footnote 609:

1337_b_13 f.

Footnote 610:

1258_b_38 f.

Footnote 611:

vii (vi). 4. 1319_a_26-28.

Footnote 612:

v (viii). 2. 1337_b_5-7.

Footnote 613:

iv (vii). 9. 1328_b_37-41; cf. iii. 5. 1277_b_33 ff.

Footnote 614:

1329_a_1; 1330_a_25-31.

Footnote 615:

1330_a_25-31; cf. also the pseudo-_Econ._ i. 2. 1343_a_26 ff.

Footnote 616:

i. 3. 1260_a_40 ff.; cf. _infra_ for discussion of this idea.

Footnote 617:

1258_b_25-27; _Rhet._ i. 9. 27, 1367_a_; ἐλευθέρον γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς
ἄλλον ζῆν. His entire argument for the slave as a mere “instrument”
(cf. _infra_) shows the same attitude. Stewart (_op. cit._, II, 316)
says that he failed to see that labor is “an essential function of the
social organism, something καλόν and not merely ἁναγκαῖον.”

Footnote 618:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 4. 1326_a_22-24.

Footnote 619:

1328_b_19-23; vi (iv). 1291_a_1-3.

Footnote 620:

1329_a_1; i. 11. 1258_b_38 f.

Footnote 621:

v (viii). 2. 1337_b_15-22, especially 17 f.: ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν
καὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκεν πράττει τις ἣ μανθάνει.

Footnote 622:

The difference in employments and studies is largely one of method and
aim. The most humanizing pursuit becomes ἀνελεύθερον and βάναυσον, if
followed to an extreme or with a sordid purpose, merely. Cf. Plato
_Laws_ 918B-919C, and the criticism of the superficial method and
merely vocational motive in mathematical study (_Rep._ 525C ff.). Cf.
above, p. 33, n. 7, for Ruskin’s idea on this point.

Footnote 623:

Aristotle also has the aristocratic idea of labor as robbing a freeman
of his independence, _Pol._ v (viii). 1337_b_15-22; _Rhet._ 1367_a_,
cited on p. 94, n. 9.

Footnote 624:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 9. 1328_b_39 ff.; _N. Eth._ x. 7. 1177_b_4; cf.
Jowett, _Ar. Pol._, I, 144, cited by Stewart, _op. cit._, II, 446.

Footnote 625:

_Pol._ ii 3. 1261_b_33-38.

Footnote 626:

1325_a_31-33.

Footnote 627:

1258_b_12-20.

Footnote 628:

_Rhet._ ii. 4. 9. 1381_a_, where the word αὐτουργοί is used; cf. above
on Euripides.

Footnote 629:

Cf. above on value, and _N. Eth._ v. 8-9. 1133_a_5-18.

Footnote 630:

_Pol._ vii (vi). 6. 1320_a_38 ff.; cf. p. 92, n. 6.

Footnote 631:

i. 12. 1259_b_1 ff.

Footnote 632:

1252_b_1 ff.; cf. Adam’s note to _Rep._ 370B; Susemihl and Hicks’s
note to _Pol._ 1252_b_3, for an exception to the rule (_De part.
Anim._ iv. 6. 11. 683_a_22). ἀλλ᾽ ὅπου μὴ ἐνδέχεται καταχρῆται τῷ αὐτῷ
ἐπὶ πλείω ἔργα.

Footnote 633:

_Pol._ ii 1261_a_30 f.; _N. Eth._ v. 5.

Footnote 634:

_Pol._ 1261_a_37-39; 1328_b_ ff. Fontpertuis (_op. cit._, p. 359)
accounts for the comparative superficiality of the Greek theory of
labor by the fact that their political constitution diminished its
importance, but cf. our introduction. Capitalistic employment of free
labor was probably not extensive.

Footnote 635:

Cf. above, p. 16, n. 6; p. 17, n. 1.

Footnote 636:

On the theory of the Sophists, cf. above, pp. 16 f. On the Cynics, cf.
_infra_; also Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 2, 376; Ar. _Pol._ 1253_b_20-23.
Barker (_op. cit._, p. 359), who has a very clear and discriminating
criticism of Aristotle’s theory of slavery, also states that slavery
had been attacked by the “logic of events”—e.g., the enslavement of
Athenians in Sicily, and the freeing of Messenian Helots, during the
Theban supremacy, by which Greek freemen had become slaves and Greek
slaves had become free. Cf. _Pol._ 1255_a_ ff., especially 17 f. and
21-23, for the two theories.

Footnote 637:

The _locus classicus_ for his theory is _Pol._ i. 4-7. 1253_b_14 ff.;
13. 1259_b_21 ff. For good criticisms, cf. Wallon, _Histoire de
l’esclavage dans l’antiquité_, 2d ed., pp. 372 ff.; and Barker, _op.
cit._, 1. Cf. also Newman, _op. cit._, I, 143 ff.

Footnote 638:

_Pol._ i. 8. 1256_b_36; 1253_b_32.

Footnote 639:

_Ibid._ 33-39. Aristotle would have been satisfied with electricity.

Footnote 640:

1254_a_8, cited on p. 88, n. 10. This relieves the severity of the
doctrine, since it shows that he thinks chiefly of domestic slavery.
But in his proposed state, all industry is manned by slaves. Cf. iv
(vii). 1330_a_25-31.

Footnote 641:

_Pol._ 1254_a_9-13; cf. _Eud. Eth._ 1241_b_17-24.

Footnote 642:

1254_a_13-17.

Footnote 643:

_Op. cit._, p. 362.

Footnote 644:

1254_a_28-31; 1254_b_15. As Wallon (_op. cit._, p. 391) points out,
his radical error is a constant confusion of hypothesis with reality.

Footnote 645:

1254_a_23-24.

Footnote 646:

_Ibid._ 33 f.

Footnote 647:

_Ibid._ 30-40; 1254_b_10-13; 1253_b_7; 18 f., cf. _Eud. Eth._
1241_b_17 ff.

Footnote 648:

1254_b_16-19.

Footnote 649:

_Ibid._ 20-26.

Footnote 650:

_Ibid._ 26 ff.

Footnote 651:

1254_a_21 f.

Footnote 652:

1254_b_6-10; 11 f.; 16-20; 1255_b_6-15; a doctrine emphasized by
Plato, _Rep._ 590D; _Laws_ 645B, 714A, 818A, 684C, as also by Carlyle
and Ruskin; cf. Shorey, _Class. Phil._, IX (1914), 355 ff. Though
Ruskin believed that natural slavery was the inevitable lot of many
men, he did not uphold negro slavery, _Mun. Pul._, v, 133 (Vol. XVII,
256 f.); Time and Tide, p. 149 (Vol. XVII, 438). But he pointed to the
white economic slavery as equally bad, _Stones of Venice_, II (Vol. X,
193); Time and Tide, p. 105 (Vol. XVII, 403); _Crown of Wild Olive_,
119; _Cestus Aglaia_, p. 55.

Footnote 653:

1254_b_32-34; 1255_b_5 ff.

Footnote 654:

1254_b_38 f.

Footnote 655:

1255_a_3-7.

Footnote 656:

_Ibid._ 19-21 and next note.

Footnote 657:

_Ibid._ 24 f.

Footnote 658:

_Ibid._ 25 f.: καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον
εἶναι.

Footnote 659:

_Ibid._ 26-28.

Footnote 660:

_Ibid._ 33 ff.

Footnote 661:

1255_b_20-22. Barker (_op. cit._, p. 369, n. 1) well observes that
this is a challenge of the right of slavery, not an argument for it,
and that it may have impressed his contemporaries so. Cf. Ruskin: “So
there is only one way to have good servants; that is to be worthy of
being well served.” (_Letters on Servants and Houses_, Vol. XVII,
5-18, App. V); cf. also pp. 520 ff.

Footnote 662:

1259_b_26-28.

Footnote 663:

_Ibid._ 36-38.

Footnote 664:

_Ibid._ 39-41.

Footnote 665:

1260_a_2-4; 14-16; cf. 33 ff., which sets a limit on the slave’s
virtue.

Footnote 666:

1260_a_39-42; 1260_b_2 f. Cf. Ruskin, _Fors Clav._, III, Letter 28,
14, on the virtue of the “menial” condition.

Footnote 667:

Cf. Barker, _op. cit._, p. 370.

Footnote 668:

_N. Eth._ 1161_b_1-10, especially 5: ᾗ μὲν οῦν δοῦλος, οὔκ ἐστι φιλία
πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος.

Footnote 669:

Cf. his reference to Cleisthenes’ gift of Athenian citizenship to many
slaves; also his own emancipation, by will, of five of his own slaves
(Diog. L. V. 1. 9).

Footnote 670:

Cf. Barker, _op. cit._, p. 370.

Footnote 671:

_Sesame and Lilies_, end of lecture on “Kings’ Treasuries”; cf. _Fors
Clav._, VII, 9 (Vol. XXIX, 230); _Mun. Pul._, 130, note; cf. _Fors
Clav._, III (Vol. XXVII, 515 f.). Lett. 28, 13 ff., on the workman as
a serf.

Footnote 672:

Barker, _op. cit._, 368.

Footnote 673:

On the servile condition of the modern laborer, cf. Ruskin as above; a
common idea also of Carlyle and of many modern economic writings.

Footnote 674:

_Pol._ 1257_a_31 ff., praised for its exactness and insight. Cf.
Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 585; Dühring (_op. cit._, p. 23) belittles
it. Newman (_op. cit._, II, 184) points to ξενικωτέρας as implying
that the increased distance between buyers and sellers also caused the
origin of money.

Footnote 675:

_N. Eth._ v. 5. 1133_b_26-28.

Footnote 676:

_Pol._ 1257_a_31-36; ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ
εἰσάγεσθαι ὦν ἐνδεεῖς καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὦν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάνκης ἡ τοῦ
νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις, etc.

Footnote 677:

_Ibid._ 36-38; εὐμεταχείριστον could mean “malleability,” but probably
not, since he considers coinage to be an afterthought.

Footnote 678:

_Ibid._ 38 f.

Footnote 679:

_Ibid._ 39-41.

Footnote 680:

1257_b_1-5.

Footnote 681:

As a symbol of exchange (ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς) it is a medium of
exchange and a measure of value (_Rep._ 371B; _Laws_ 742A-B, 918B).

Footnote 682:

v. 8. 1133_a_18-1133_b_28.

Footnote 683:

1133_a_29.

Footnote 684:

_Ibid._ 5-19; 25; 27 f.; 1133_b_10, etc.

Footnote 685:

1133_a_19-22, 25 f.; 1133_b_16; 22; ix. 1164_a_1 f.; _Pol._
1258_b_1-5, μεταβολῆς χάριν; 1257_a_30 ff. Stewart (_op. cit._, I, 416
ff.) thinks that the author meant to apply the corrective
(διορθωτικόν) function of justice also to money, in that it makes
exchange more fair and uniform. As evidence, he points to _N. Eth._
1131_a_18 ff. and 1133_a_19-22, where the functions of justice and
money are defined in similar terms. Cf. also his interesting remarks
on the dianemetic function, which prompts exchange and distribution.

Footnote 686:

1133_b_10-13.

Footnote 687:

_Ibid._ 15-18: οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης αλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, etc.

Footnote 688:

_Pol._ 1257_b_8 f.

Footnote 689:

1257_b_10-18; for the theory of the Cynics, cf. _infra_, especially on
_Eryxias_. Cf. Newman, _op. cit._, II, 188, note, and his reference to
Macaulay’s note on the margin of his edition of the _Politics_.

Footnote 690:

1257_b_19 ff.; cf. the transitional sentence, 18, a slight hint that
he accepts the theory.

Footnote 691:

_N. Eth._ v. 5. 1133_a_29-31; cf. 1133_b_20 f., ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, cf.
_infra_, where the pseudo-_Economica_ takes it for granted.

Footnote 692:

_Pol._ 1257_a_36 f., cited on p. 102.

Footnote 693:

_N. Eth._ v. 5. 1133_b_13 f.: οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ
βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον.

Footnote 694:

Cf. p. 86, n. 1, for passages.

Footnote 695:

Blanqui (_op. cit._, pp. 36, 88), Ingram (_op. cit._, p. 18), DuBois
(_op. cit._, p. 51 and n. 1), Zmavc (_Zeitschr. f. d. ges.
Staatswiss._ [1902], pp. 76 f.), Palgrave’s _Dictionary_ (art.
“Aristotle,” p. 54), all admit this conclusion. Barker (_op. cit._, p.
380) says that the idea is hinted at. Souchon (_op. cit._, pp. 110 f.)
accepts the other view, stating that this was his purpose, to show the
folly of making merely imaginary goods the goal of all life.

Footnote 696:

Cf. _N. Eth._ v. 5. 1133_b_13 f.

Footnote 697:

_Pol._ 1257_b_5-8, and the whole of 1257_b_; 1258_b_1-5.

Footnote 698:

1258_b_25.

Footnote 699:

_N. Eth._ 1121_b_34: καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ. Cf. Zell’s
translation.

Footnote 700:

_Pol._ 1258_b_1-8; but cf. p. 39 on this point. The etymology should
not be taken seriously. Ruskin cites Aristotle on this point. Cf.
above, p. 39, n. 10.

Footnote 701:

Cf. Barker, _op. cit._, p. 385 and n. 2, where he criticizes Poehlmann
for his idea that Aristotle “is attacking a great credit system,” and
“is enunciating a gospel of socialism.” But cf. _infra._

Footnote 702:

_Pol._ 1257_b_5 ff.

Footnote 703:

_Ibid._ 33 ff.; for further discussion of chrematistik, cf. _infra._

Footnote 704:

Cf. Haney, _op. cit._, p. 49: “In Athens, the circulation of capital
was inconsiderable, and money was not lent for productive purposes as
often as for the purpose of relieving distress”; Souchon, _op. cit._,
p. 93, though (pp. 106 f.) he recognizes the other side.

Footnote 705:

Cf. Paley and Sandys ed., especially _Or._ xxxvi; Isoc.
_Trapeziticus_; Boeckh, _op. cit._, I, 160 ff.; V. Brants, “Les
operations de banque dans la Grèce antique,” _Le Muséon_, I, 2,
196-203; Koutorga, _Le trapézites_, (Paris, 1859); cf. also E. Meyer,
_Kleine Schriften_.

Footnote 706:

_Or._ xx. 25.

Footnote 707:

_Or._ xxxvi. 44: εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι πίστις ἀφορμὴ τῶν πασῶν ἐστὶ
μεγίστη πρὸς χρηματισμόν, πᾶν ἂν ἀγνοήσειας.

Footnote 708:

_Ibid._ 57 ff.

Footnote 709:

Cf. p. 105, n. 7, on Souchon; E. Boehm von Bawerk (_Capital und
Capitalzins_, [1900] I, 17 f.) says: “Die Geschäftsleute und Praktiker
standen sicher auf der zinsfreundlichen Seite.” He accounts for the
fact that almost the only passages against interest are in the
philosophers by the inference that to uphold interest was superfluous,
and to oppose it was useless. Poehlmann exaggerates both the degree of
credit operations, and the prejudice of Aristotle.

Footnote 710:

For the Greek terms, cf. p. 40.

Footnote 711:

_Pol._ 1257_a_15-17.

Footnote 712:

_Ibid._ 22-28; _N. Eth._ v. 5. 1133_b_26-28.

Footnote 713:

_Pol._ 1257_a_30 ff. These two periods of οἰκονομική and χρηματιστική
correspond well to the German terms _Naturalwirtschaft_ and
_Geldwirtschaft_. Kautz (_op. cit._, p. 137, n. 4) says that this
antithesis was about as dear to Aristotle as it is to moderns. For the
terms, cf. _infra._

Footnote 714:

_N. Eth._ v. 4. 1132_b_11-1133_b_28; cf. also under value and money,
above; cf. _Mag. mor._ i. 33. 1193_b_19 ff.

Footnote 715:

1132_b_11-20; cf. _Rep._ 369B-C; 370B, for a similar idea of Plato.

Footnote 716:

1132_b_33.

Footnote 717:

_Ibid._ 32-34, especially τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πίλις; 17
f.; Stewart, _op. cit._, I, 449.

Footnote 718:

1133_a_5-10, cited on p. 83, nn. 2-7; cf. _Eud. Eth._ vii. 10.
1243_b_28-38.

Footnote 719:

1133_a_10 f.

Footnote 720:

Cf. p. 83, n. 7. The less valuable product must make up in quantity
what it lacks in quality. The proportion thus becomes, γεωργός :
σκυτοτόμος : : _x_ pairs of shoes : a quantity of grain of equal value
(1133_a_32 f.). Cf. other methods of statement, 1133_b_4 f., 22
Stewart, _op. cit._, I, 453 f.

Footnote 721:

1133_b_1-4.

Footnote 722:

1133_a_11 f.; 16-18: ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων. Cf. _Rep._ 369C, 370B; Ar.
_Pol._ 1261_a_22 for a similar idea. Stewart (_op. cit._, I, 464 f.),
following Jackson, interprets, on the basis of 1132_a_33, the buyer’s
two advantages to be, if he buys too cheaply, the part of the article
still unpaid for, and the money he should have paid for it. Cf.
_ibid._ pp. 455-67 for other interpretations.

Footnote 723:

1133_a_15 f.: ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ
οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἔπασχε τοῦτο και τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. I follow
Jackson, note, pp. 97 f.; Rassow, _Forsch._, p. 18 (Peters’ trans., p.
154, n. 2), in accepting this difficult passage as an integral part of
its context, and in interpreting it as above, though aside from the
context, it would hardly bear this meaning. Stewart (_op. cit._, I,
455 ff.) thinks it is an interpolation or note, referring merely to
the mechanical fact in the arts that material is receptive to the
impression.

Footnote 724:

1133_a_18 f.; 25-28; 1133_b_6-8; 19 f.; cf. _Rep._ 369C.

Footnote 725:

1133_a_19-29; cf. Stewart’s excellent comments, _op. cit._, I, 459 ff.

Footnote 726:

1133_b_14-16; 20-22: τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα; e.g., if a house
is equal to five minae and a bed is worth one, five beds equal one
house (23-26).

Footnote 727:

_Handwörterbuch der Staatswwissenschaft_, art. “Geld,” 2d ed., Bd. IV,
82 f.

Footnote 728:

_Op. cit._, p. 384.

Footnote 729:

Cf. citations above, p. 42, n. 7, and p. 44, n. 2. Cf. DuBois, _op.
cit._, p. 46.

Footnote 730:

Cf. Haney, _op. cit._, p. 48.

Footnote 731:

_Pol._ 1259_a_2 f.; 33-35.

Footnote 732:

iv (vii). 6. 1327_a_25-30.

Footnote 733:

_Rhet._ i. 4. 7: περὶ τῶν εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγομένων, as among the
subjects for a statesman’s consideration; cf. also 11.

Footnote 734:

Pp. 89 and notes.

Footnote 735:

_Pol._ 1257_a_28-30; vi (iv). 4. 1291_a_4-6; 1291_b_19 f.; vii (vi).
7. 1321_a_6, all seem to take retail and wholesale trade in the state
for granted. But it is not named in the list of necessary callings in
the ideal state, 1328_b_24 ff.; 5 ff.; cf. also 1329_a_40 ff. Of
course the citizens are not to engage in it (1328_b_37 ff.).

Footnote 736:

_N. Eth._ v. 8. 1132_b_4 f.; 1133_a_27; all of chap. 8; cf. above, on
just exchange.

Footnote 737:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 6. 1327_a_25-28.

Footnote 738:

vii (vi). 5. 1320_a_39: ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας. Cf. p. 96.

Footnote 739:

Cf. discussion above of just exchange.

Footnote 740:

_Pol._ i. chaps. 8-11. Ruskin does not seem to have used the term
“chrematistik,” and he has no reference to this passage, though, as
seen above, he has much to say in the same general spirit.

Footnote 741:

_Pol._ 1256_a_11 f.; cf. p. 40 on Plato’s terms for trade. For the
word χρηματιστική, cf. _Rep._ 415E, contrasted to soldiers; _Gorg._
477E, the art that frees from poverty; 452C; _Euthyd._ 304C, of the
Sophists; Xen. _Econ._ ii. 18, where no prejudice is implied.

Footnote 742:

_Pol._ i. 8. 1256_a_10-12; but cf. _N. Eth._ i. 1. 1094_a_9: τέλος
οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος; and _Pol._ iii. 4. 1277_b_24 f.: ἐπεὶ καὶ
οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτᾶσθαι τῆς δὲ
φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν. An American economist would hardly make the
latter distinction. Newman (_op. cit._, II, 166) thinks that in these
two passages he states the actual condition, but cf. _infra_, where
Aristotle admits a degree of acquisition in domestic economy.

Footnote 743:

1256_a_15 ff.

Footnote 744:

1256_b_26-39.

Footnote 745:

_Ibid._ 30-37; cf. above on the definition of wealth.

Footnote 746:

1258_a_19 ff. He would combat the common idea that the first business
of economics is to provide unlimited revenue (1259_a_35; 1254_a_1 f.)

Footnote 747:

1256_b_40-42; 1257_a_4 f.; 17 f.; cf. _Eud. Eth._ iii. 4. 1232_a_6-9.

Footnote 748:

1257_b_1 f.; 9 f.

Footnote 749:

1257_a_18 f., 28-30; 1257_b_19 f.; 31 ff.

Footnote 750:

1257_a_31 ff. Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 599) cites Schaeffle, _Bau und
Leben des sozialen Körpers_, I, 256, that this analysis of the change
from natural to capitalistic economy holds “im Kern die ganze moderne
Kritik des Kapitals,” but the standpoint of the two is essentially
different.

Footnote 751:

1258_a_1-14. Extreme desire demands superfluity (ὑπερβολή).

Footnote 752:

1257_b_20 f.

Footnote 753:

_Ibid._ 23 ff.

Footnote 754:

_Ibid._ 35 f. The two uses overlap (ἐπαλλάττει).

Footnote 755:

_Ibid._ 36-39.

Footnote 756:

1258_a_16-18.

Footnote 757:

_Ibid._ 19 ff. The other function is secondary (ὑπερετική).

Footnote 758:

_Ibid._ 39 f.

Footnote 759:

_Ibid._ 37 f.

Footnote 760:

1258_b_12-21.

Footnote 761:

_Ibid._ 1 f.; cf. 1256_a_40 ff., where καπηλεία is opposed to
αὐτόφυτον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν.

Footnote 762:

1258_b_20-23.

Footnote 763:

_Ibid._ 25-27. This contrasted yet overlapping relation between the
two kinds of finance is well represented by Haney, _op. cit._, 46. Cf.
also Ashley, _op. cit._, p. 340, for a synopsis of the divisions of
κτητική.

Footnote 764:

1258_b_27-33.

Footnote 765:

_Op. cit._, pp. 333 ff., more satisfactory than Jowett’s idea that the
intermediateness consists either in exchange for money of the direct
products of the earth, or else that wood-cutting and mining are
themselves the intermediate form; or than Newman’s (_op. cit._, II,
202 f.) theory that it consists in the fact that in this type wealth
is sought, not from fruits or animals, but from things, just as
exchange seeks wealth from other men or from money, as Ashley shows.
However, two questions still remain unanswered: why Aristotle has
three forms in chap. 11 and only two elsewhere; and why the terms,
ἀκάρπων, wood-cutting, and mining are so prominent, if their relation
to the thought is only incidental.

Footnote 766:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 1328_b_39 ff.; 1327_a_29-31.

Footnote 767:

This was a common Greek feeling (Dem. xxv. 46).

Footnote 768:

But he seems to recognize it elsewhere (_N. Eth._ v. 8).

Footnote 769:

Cf. DuBois, _op. cit._, p. 48.

Footnote 770:

Cf. the entire criticism of chrematistik, and especially 1257_b_40-42,
the contrast between ζῆν and εὐ ζῆν. On this point, cf. above, pp. 109
f. and 87 ff. Zmavc (_Zeitschrift_, etc., p. 52), rightly states that
even Adam Smith made his economic theory a subordinate part of his
practical philosophy.

Footnote 771:

An unfair criticism, as seen above.

Footnote 772:

_Pol._ 1266_b_8-14; iv (vii). 1335_b_22 ff.

Footnote 773:

1265_b_6-12.

Footnote 774:

1270_a_40 ff.

Footnote 775:

Cf. iv (vii). 4. 1326_a_25-30, especially, τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν
πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς οὐδεμίαν ὁρῶμεν οὖσαν ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος. Cf.
entire chapter.

Footnote 776:

1130_b_ ff.; cf. under value, money, and exchange. The terms are
διανομή or ἡ τῶν κοινῶν διανομή.

Footnote 777:

1131_a_11.

Footnote 778:

_Ibid._ 21: καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἱσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἶς. Cf. above, pp. 55
f. and 60 f., on Plato’s idea of equality; cf. _infra_ for further
comments on Aristotle.

Footnote 779:

1132_b_32 f.; cf. pp. 107 ff. and notes for a more detailed
discussion, and for Greek expressions.

Footnote 780:

1131_b_27-32: ἡ διανομὴ ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι
πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα. Cf. _Mag. mor._ i. 33. 1193_b_36 ff.
Stewart (_op. cit._, I, 432) says that the expression ἡ τῶν κοινῶν
διανομή must mean more than distribution by some central authority,
for the most important form of it is the distribution of wealth,
operating under economic laws that regulate wages and profits.

Footnote 781:

1131_a_24-26.

Footnote 782:

_Ibid._ 22-24. For Plato, cf. pp. 55 f.

Footnote 783:

_Ibid._ 26-29.

Footnote 784:

_Ibid._; _Pol._ iii. 1280_a_7 ff.; 1282_b_23 ff.

Footnote 785:

Cf. above, pp. 113, and 93 ff. on labor.

Footnote 786:

_Pol._ ii. 4. 1262_b_2 f.

Footnote 787:

1264_a_11-17; 36-38; 1264_b_11-13, all discussed above under Plato.

Footnote 788:

iv (vii). 1329_b_41 ff.

Footnote 789:

1271_a_29-37; 1272_a_12-21.

Footnote 790:

_N. Eth._ v. chaps. 4-5, discussed above.

Footnote 791:

_Pol._ vi (iv). 1295_b_35 ff.

Footnote 792:

v (vi). 1320_a_33 ff.; cf. pp. 95 f.; cf. especially 35: τεχναστέον
οὖν ὅπως, ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος, and 1267_b_3 ff. on the
insatiety of the masses. He believed that the state doles for mere
consumption aggravated the evil—a very sane doctrine which our city
charity organizations are prone to overlook.

Footnote 793:

Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 339 f., on this passage.

Footnote 794:

Cf. above, n. 4 above, and pp. 95 f.

Footnote 795:

1320_a_36: ἐπεὶ δὲ συμφέρει τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, and 34, τοῦτο γὰρ
αἴτιον τοῦ μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν; viz., undue poverty of the
masses.

Footnote 796:

_Op. cit._, p. 7; cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 600, on this point.

Footnote 797:

_Pol._ ii. 7. 1266_b_14-25, as advocated by Phaleas; cf. above. Cf.
_infra_ for Aristotle’s advocacy of equality in landed property.

Footnote 798:

1267_a_37-39.

Footnote 799:

_Ibid._ 39-41.

Footnote 800:

1267_b_1-4; vii (vi). 1320_a_31; cf. p. 117 on this idea. He does not
consider the rise in the cost of living.

Footnote 801:

1266_b_28-30.

Footnote 802:

Cf. Bonar, _op. cit._, p. 45.

Footnote 803:

Aristotle, like Plato, strongly emphasizes education as a great cure
for the ills of the state (1310_a_15 ff.). It should be common to all
citizens, and be publicly supervised (1336_a_22 ff.).

Footnote 804:

1267_a_13-17.

Footnote 805:

1266_b_38-1267_a_2.

Footnote 806:

_Ecclesiazusae._ Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 403) argues that such ideas
were widespread in Greece.

Footnote 807:

_Pol._ iii. 9. 1280_a_14-21: σχεδὸν δ᾽ οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ
τῶν οἰκείων. Cf. 7-31, his discriminating remarks on equality in
general.

Footnote 808:

vii (vi). 5; iii. 10; cf. Haney _op. cit._, p. 45.

Footnote 809:

Cf. above on fair exchange; also p. 116 and notes.

Footnote 810:

vi (iv). 4. 1292_a_4-38.

Footnote 811:

vii (vi). 3. 1318_b_1-5, especially οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν
φροντίζουσιν; cf. iii. 9. 1280_a_, especially 22-30, on the false idea
of equality on both sides.

Footnote 812:

i. 1: ζῷον πολιτικόν; 1280_a_31 ff.; 1252_b_30 f.; cf. all of chap. 9
to 1281_a_10.

Footnote 813:

1280_b_10-12, against Lycophron; cf., above, p. 16; καὶ ὁ νόμος
συνθήκη καὶ ... ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οἵος ποιεῖν
ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας.

Footnote 814:

_Op. cit._, II, 304.

Footnote 815:

_Pol._ v (viii). 1. 1337_a_27-30, a remarkable passage, suggestive of
Plato and of St. Paul’s analogy of the body. Aristotle paints vividly
the antithesis between political and economic equality, whereby there
grows up a state within a state (1295_b_13 ff.), for he believes with
the author of _Eud. Eth._ vii. 10. 1242_a_, that man is not only a
πολιτικόν, but also an οἰκονομικόν ζῷον. Cl. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I,
276 ff.

Footnote 816:

1266_b_8-14; 1265_a_38-42; unfair to Plato, as seen above.

Footnote 817:

1266_b_24-28; 1265_a_28-38.

Footnote 818:

1265_b_22 ff.

Footnote 819:

1267_b_9-13.

Footnote 820:

Cf. his criticism of the Spartan system, 1270_a_40 ff.

Footnote 821:

On its wisdom, cf. _infra_; on its feasibility, cf. 1263_b_29: πάμπαν
ἀδύνατος.

Footnote 822:

1261_a_16-1261_b_15.

Footnote 823:

1261_b_30-32; 24-28.

Footnote 824:

32-35.

Footnote 825:

1262_b_4-24.

Footnote 826:

22-24.

Footnote 827:

1262_a_40-1262_b_3.

Footnote 828:

1263_b_30 ff., and preceding note.

Footnote 829:

1263_a_11-16.

Footnote 830:

22-26; 39 f.

Footnote 831:

26-30, citing the proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. Cf. 1329_b_14 ff. _N. Eth._
viii; 8 f. on φιλία; _Pol._ 1252_b_29; 1280_a_25; cf. Xen. _Laced.
Pol._ vi. 3-4.

Footnote 832:

Cf. preceding note, and 1261_b_32 ff.

Footnote 833:

1261_a_30 f. _N. Eth._ v. 5.

Footnote 834:

1263_b_22 f.

Footnote 835:

37-42. But Plato used both methods.

Footnote 836:

1263_b_27-29; e.g., besides the personal satisfaction (1263_a_40 f.),
the opportunity for liberality (1263_b_11-13).

Footnote 837:

iv (vii). 10. 1330_a_5 ff. He would make part of the land public. In
the _Laws_, the expense is met by making the product public.

Footnote 838:

1271_a_29-37.

Footnote 839:

_Ibid._ 28 f.; 1272_a_12-21.

Footnote 840:

Cf. above on socialism in the _Laws_.

Footnote 841:

_Pol._ ii. 1270_a_21 f.; viii (v). 1309_a_23-25, though rather a
measure for an oligarchy; vii (vi). 1319_a_8-13, for a democracy, also
against mortgage on land; cf. Guiraud, _La Prop. fonc._, p. 591. Like
Plato, he opposes free disposal of dowries (1270_a_23-25).

Footnote 842:

Cf. p. 122, n. 1.

Footnote 843:

1330_a_9-23.

Footnote 844:

1265_b_24-26.

Footnote 845:

iv (vii). 1329_a_18-21.

Footnote 846:

1330_a_25-31; 1328_b_40; 1329_a_2; cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, pp. 169
f., on his system as compared with that of the _Laws_.

Footnote 847:

Cf. p. 120, n. 5; but cf. viii (v). 1308_b_16-19 for a recognition of
the desirability of such a regulation.

Footnote 848:

Cf. above, his criticism of chrematistik, _Pol._ i. chaps. 8-10.

Footnote 849:

So Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 167; cf. above for differences in detail.

Footnote 850:

Cf. pp. 119 f.; 1280_b_35 ff. He does not overlook the complement of
this principle, that the prosperity of the whole involves that of the
parts (iv [vii]. 1328_b_37 ff.; 1329_a_18-21), his unjust criticism of
Plato on this point. Zmavc (_Zeitschrift_, etc., p. 56, n. 3) rightly
observes that there is more truth in this Greek doctrine of the
relation of the individual to the state than moderns are prone to
recognize.

Footnote 851:

_Op. cit._, p. 391.

Footnote 852:

Francotte (_L’Industrie_, II, 250) strongly emphasizes their extreme
limitation of the individual. Souchon (_op. cit._, p. 170) refers to
them as precursors of Marx, though he recognizes the difference in
their aim.

CHAPTER VII
MINOR PHILOSOPHERS, CONTEMPORARIES OR SUCCESSORS OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

The minor philosophers, contemporaries or successors of the Socratics,
present in their extant fragments some ideas on wealth and other
economic problems that are worthy of note. For purposes of convenience,
we shall group them all here, though some of them would chronologically
precede one or both of the greater philosophers. The successors of Plato
in the Academy, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Crantor,[853] carried
forward the teaching of the Socratics on wealth, as opposed to the more
extreme doctrine of the Cynics and Stoics.[854] There was, however,
probably less emphasis on matters economic in their writings, since
their prime interest was in practical individual ethics rather than in
the political morality of Plato and Aristotle, though Xenocrates is
known to have written an _Economicus_.[855]

Theophrastus,[856] the first and greatest successor of Aristotle in the
Peripatetic school, was the author of a treatise on wealth, of which we
know only the name.[857] He also probably dealt somewhat with economic
subjects in his _Ethics_ and _Politics_, but only slight fragments of
either work are extant. He reveals slightly greater regard for the
importance of external goods than Aristotle, perhaps because of his
special love for the quiet and leisure of the scholar’s life.[858] There
is, however, no evidence that he went so far as to ascribe a positive
value to wealth as such. On the contrary, he advises that one render
himself independent of it by living a simple life,[859] and urges
against vulgar display.[860] Like Aristotle, he prefers moderate
wealth,[861] and finds its chief value in the fact that it enables one
to have the distinction of giving splendid gifts to the people.[862] He
approaches the cosmopolitan spirit of the Stoics in his emphasis upon
the natural relationship of all men,[863] a result of the broadening
vision due to the unification of Greece under the Macedonian Empire.
There is nothing of interest from other members of the Peripatetic
school, except the _Eudemian Ethics_ and _Magna moralia_, which were
included in our discussion of Aristotle, and the pseudo-Aristotelian
_Economica_, which will be discussed in the following pages.

THE ECONOMICA

_Economica_ were one of the characteristic types of Greek literature,
after the _Economicus_ of Xenophon.[864] They discussed wealth from the
ethical standpoint, dealt largely with domestic, rather than public,
economy, and considered questions of human relations, such as slavery
and the married life. They are, in general, imitations of Xenophon and
of Aristotle’s _Politics_, and add very little of interest to the
economic theory of the Socratics. Aside from the work, falsely ascribed
to Aristotle, to be discussed below, _Economica_ were written by
Antisthenes,[865] Xenocrates,[866] Philodemus,[867] Metrodorus of
Lampsacus,[868] Hierocles,[869] Dio Chrysostom,[870] Plutarch,[871] and
the New-Pythagoreans,[872] Bryson,[873] Callicratidas,[874]
Periktione,[875] and Phintys.[876]

The pseudo-Aristotelian _Economica_[877] require no extended discussion,
since most of the material that is of interest in them is an imitation
of Aristotle’s _Politics_ and Xenophon’s _Economics_. Book i is largely
a repetition of some of Aristotle’s theories of domestic economy, the
marriage relation, and slavery, with a few unimportant additions and
slight differences.[878] Book ii is almost entirely composed of
practical examples of how necessary funds have been provided by states
and rulers.

The most distinctive point about the doctrine of the first book is its
separation of οἰκονομική from πολιτική as a special science.[879] The
author agrees with Aristotle, however, that it is the function of
economics both to acquire and to use, though without his specific
limitations upon acquisition.[880] He distinguishes four forms of
economy—acquiring, guarding, using, and arranging in proper order.[881]
Elsewhere, he makes a different classification on another
basis—imperial, provincial, public, and private.[882] These are each
further subdivided, the first including finance, export and import
commerce, and expenditures.[883]

Agriculture is especially eulogized by the author, in the spirit of
Xenophon and Aristotle. It is the primary means of natural acquisition,
the others being mining and allied arts whose source of wealth is the
land.[884] It is the most just acquisition, since it is not gained from
men, either by trade, hired labor, or war,[885] and it contributes most
to manly strength.[886] Retail trade and the banausic arts, on the other
hand, are both contrary to nature,[887] since they render the body weak
and inefficient (ἀχρεῖα).[888]

The work agrees with Aristotle, against Plato, in his doctrine that men
and women are essentially different in nature, and hence that their work
should be distinct.[889] No attempt is made to justify slavery, though
Aristotle is followed in his advice to grant emancipation, as a special
reward for faithfulness.[890] The author of Book ii seems to have taken
for granted the Cynic theory that money need have no intrinsic value, at
least for local purposes. Coinage of iron,[891] tin,[892] bronze,[893]
the arbitrary stamping of drachmas with a double value,[894] are all
offered apparently as a proper means of escape from financial
difficulty. Like Aristotle, he accepts monopoly as a shrewd and
legitimate principle of finance.[895] Elsewhere, however, in striking
contrast to such uneconomic suggestions, the author states the important
economic principle that expenditures should not exceed income.[896] In
accord with Greek usage, he is familiar with a tax on exports for
revenue and as a means of guarding against depletion of supply.[897]

CYRENAICS

The Cyrenaics were the forerunners of the Epicureans in their more
liberal attitude toward wealth. Aristippus,[898] the founder of the
school, was a man of the world, who believed in enjoying life as it
came.[899] He held that pleasure was always a good, and that all else
was of value only as a means of realizing this end.[900] If consistent,
therefore, he must have valued highly moderate wealth. His principle
that one should aim to realize the highest degree of pleasure with the
least economic expenditure is somewhat analogous to the modern economic
doctrine of the smallest means.[901] Bion of Borysthenes became a
Cyrenaic in his later life, but his satires are almost entirely
lost.[902]

EPICURUS AND HIS SCHOOL

Epicurus, though the apostle of hedonism, and heir of the Cyrenaics,
taught a doctrine of wealth somewhat similar to that of the Stoics.[903]
His “happiness” consisted in living a simple and prudent life. He taught
that spiritual wealth is unlimited, and that the wise are contented with
things easy to acquire (εὐπόριστα);[904] that external wealth, on the
other hand, is limited,[905] and that it is not increase of possessions
but limitation of desires that makes truly rich.[906] He believed the
simplest food to be best,[907] both for pleasure and for health, that
many wealthy find no escape from ills,[908] that he who is not satisfied
with little will not be satisfied with all,[909] and that contented
poverty is the greatest wealth.[910] In accord with his teaching, he
seems to have lived very simply.[911] However, he did not go to the
extreme of the Cynics and Stoics, but taught that the wise will have a
care to gain property, and not live as beggars.[912] He exhibits no
tendency toward communism, but rather toward the extreme individualism
of the Sophists, and was in sympathy with their social contract
theory.[913] Later Epicureanism degenerated by taking the hedonistic
principle of its founder too literally. Like the Sophists, the school
has influenced modern economic thought through its conception of
justice, as a mere convention for mutual advantage.[914]

CYNICS

The Cynics developed the negative attitude of the Socratics toward
wealth to its extreme in asceticism. Their doctrine was subversive of
all economic interest. Antisthenes, the founder of the school, was a
contemporary of Plato, a Sophist in his youth, but later associated with
the Socratic circle. He appears prominently in the _Symposium_ of
Xenophon.[915] He urged a return to nature in the literal sense.[916]
His book on the nature of animals (περὶ ζώων φύσεως) probably presented
examples from the animal world as models for natural human living. Like
many writers of his time and later, he idealized the life of primitive
and barbarous peoples.[917] In utter antithesis to Aristotle,[918] he
declared city life and civilization to be the source of all injustice,
luxury, and corruption. In his opinion, Zeus punished Prometheus, not
because he envied men any good, but because the discovery of fire was
the source (ἀφορμή) of all effeminacy and luxury for men.[919] Material
wealth was, to him, if not an absolute evil, something about which men
should be entirely indifferent, for in essence, good and evil could have
only a moral reference.[920] The craving for wealth or power was a vain
illusion. Nothing was good for a man except what was actually his
own,[921] and this was to be found only in the soul.[922] Wealth without
virtue was not only worthless, but a fruitful source of evil,[923] and
no lover of money could be either virtuous or free.[924] He thus
advanced beyond the Socratic doctrine of ability to use as the criterion
of value.

However, though despising wealth, Antisthenes upheld the dignity of free
labor. He believed it to be a good by which alone virtue is gained, the
source of independence.[925] Like the rest of the Cynics, he was thus
doubtless opposed to slavery. The Cynic principle that all diversities
in men, except differences in moral character, were merely accidental
was a direct argument against slavery.[926] It is also probable that he
held the Cynic doctrine that intrinsic value in money is
unnecessary.[927]

Diogenes of Sinope, “the philosopher of the proletariat,” became more
famous than Antisthenes, owing to his eccentric personality.[928] He
carried the Cynic doctrine of wealth to its _reductio ad absurdum_ by
applying it literally in his own life. His repudiation of wealth and
civilization was even more emphatic than that of his predecessor. He
taught that wealth without virtue is worse than poverty.[929] Lovers of
wealth are like men afflicted with the dropsy, always athirst for
more.[930] The desire for money is the very source and center
(μητρόπολιν) of all ills.[931] Virtue cannot dwell either in a wealthy
state or in a wealthy house.[932] Poverty better accords with it, and is
no real cause of suffering.[933] Truly noble men despise wealth and are
above being troubled by poverty and other so-called ills.[934]

Diogenes was doubtless opposed to slavery and taught that under proper
conditions of the simple life there would be no reason for it.[935] In
his opinion, the truly free were not slaves, even though they might be
in a state of servitude, but the mean-spirited were slavish even though
free.[936] He wrote a _Republic_ in which he seems to have advocated
fiat money to take the place of the hated gold and silver[937] and to
prevent the extensive accumulation of movable wealth. He also advocated
the community of wives and children,[938] and perhaps some system of
land tenure other than private ownership.[939] Crates, the poet of the
Cynics,[940] expresses similar sentiments of scorn for wealth, supreme
regard for virtue,[941] and glorification of poverty,[942] Menippus and
Monimus left little of economic interest.

“ERYXIAS”

The pseudo-Platonic dialogue, _Eryxias_, is of special interest for our
study, since it is the only extant work in Greek literature which deals
directly and exclusively with the problem of wealth.[943] The work
presents nothing new, however, which had not already been observed by
the Socratics. The statement of Heidel,[944] that it is “distinctly the
most valuable contribution of antiquity to the science of political
economy,” is therefore an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the essay is
worthy of more notice than it has usually received in histories of
ancient economic thought.[945] Whatever consideration has been given to
it has been largely devoted to the question of its origin. It reveals
points of contact with Plato, the later Socratics, and especially with
Antisthenes, the Cynic, with whom the author seems to have been most in
sympathy.[946]

The two theses that form the goal of the _Eryxias_ are that the wisest
men are in reality the wealthiest, and that material wealth is an evil,
since they who possess most of it are the most needy of all, and hence
most depraved.[947] The keynote of the dialogue is the question of
Socrates concerning the wealthy Sicilian, “What sort of a man was he
reputed to be in Sicily?”[948] The double thesis is illustrated
concretely by Socrates, the wisest, and the Sicilian, the richest but
worst of men. The first idea is prominent in Euthydemus,[949] and
elsewhere in Plato and Xenophon.[950] The second is a favorite doctrine
of the Cynics and Stoics,[951] though the general thought may be traced
back to Socrates.[952]

Some insight is exhibited by the author into the problem of value. Like
Xenophon, he defines property (χρήματα) as that which is useful, and
thus recognizes this element in value.[953] He also distinguishes
general from economic utility.[954] In answer to the question in respect
to what particular use wealth possesses utility, he states tentatively
that it is with respect to bodily needs,[955] an idea suggestive of the
organon theory of Aristotle. By this, he doubtless means food, clothing,
and shelter, which have the quality of rarity. This, however, is only a
step in the argument, which has for its goal the thesis that
intellectual attainments constitute the most important part of one’s
wealth, and possess a very real economic value.[956] The author thus
agrees with Plato, Xenophon, the Cynics, and the Stoics, in his emphasis
upon spiritual goods. The distinction between value in use and value in
exchange and the necessary dependence of the latter upon the former are
also suggested in the statement that nothing can have economic value
except as there is a demand for it. The money that passes current in one
state may be valueless in another, as also would be the mansion of the
wealthy Polytion to Scythian nomads, since there would be no demand for
them.[957]

The _Eryxias_ has no clear or satisfactory definition of wealth. It is
recognized that wealth must be defined before its character as good or
evil can be determined, but the final answer nowhere appears.[958] In
this vagueness of result, one is strongly reminded of some of Plato’s
minor dialogues. There is also a certain ambiguity throughout the work,
similar to that observed in Plato,[959] between wealth in its strict
economic sense and excessive wealth. We may gather from the course of
the argument, however, that the author would define wealth as consisting
of things that possess utility, and are subjects of economic demand,
whether external, physical, or intellectual goods.

The attitude of the _Eryxias_ toward wealth is an extreme version of
that with which we have become familiar in the Socratics, and is best
characterized as Cynic. As seen above, the author considers external
wealth to be an absolute second to wisdom,[960] since wisdom is not only
itself a means of providing material needs,[961] but also and especially
because through it alone does any material wealth become truly
valuable.[962] When the latter is made the _summum bonum_, it becomes
the greatest evil. Like Plato, Jesus, and Ruskin, he insists that the
kingdom of wisdom be given the first place,[963] for things derive their
good or evil quality from the character or knowledge of the user.[964]
The ironical account of how the Greek fathers, even of the best classes
(τῶν μεγίστων δοκούντων) urge their boys to seek wealth, since without
this they are of no account, is almost in the language of Pastor
Wagner’s condemnation of the extreme commercialism of this age.[965]
Material goods, when unwisely used, are a fruitful source of ills,[966]
and excessive wealth is always evil.[967] However, the political motive,
which prompted the hostility of Plato and Aristotle to excessive wealth,
is absent from the _Eryxias_.

Thus far the attitude of the author does not differ very essentially
from that of the Socratics, but toward the end of the dialogue the
doctrine is distinctly taught that wealth is an evil _per se_. He argues
that one’s needs are most numerous in a state of sickness, when he is in
his worst condition.[968] One is at his best, on the other hand, when he
has fewest and simplest needs.[969] But those who have most property are
sure to need the largest provision for the service of the body.[970]
Thus the richest, as being the most needy, are the most depraved
(μοχθηρότατα διακείμενοι) and the most unhappy, and therefore external
wealth is essentially evil.[971] Such a characteristically Cynic
doctrine is essentially ascetic, and subversive of the very foundations
of economics.

The _Eryxias_ hints at a definition of capital in the distinction
between the direct consumption of wealth and its use for further
production.[972] But it is far from the author’s purpose to define
capital, and he makes nothing of the distinction. The relation of money
to wealth is also dealt with incidentally. Like Aristotle, he criticizes
the definition of wealth as “the possession of much money,”[973] on the
ground that the money of one country may not pass current in another,
and hence cannot be true wealth.[974] This is suggestive of the Cynic
theory of fiat money, since the examples used are those of the worthless
currency of Carthage, Sparta, and Ethiopia.[975] But the argument proves
too much, since it would be equally as effective against counting the
house of Polytion as true wealth. There is, moreover, a peculiar shift
in this part of the dialogue between money and property. The theory of
the author is further upheld by the argument that a condition can be
conceived in which our bodily needs might be supplied without silver or
gold, in which case these metals would be worthless.[976] However, the
necessity of intrinsic value for international currency is
recognized,[977] and it seems hardly probable that the purpose of the
dialogue was to contend that money is never wealth, since the very
implication of the argument is that current money is wealth.[978]

TELES

The fragments of Teles exhibit the same extreme asceticism of the Cynics
in relation to wealth.[979] His main thesis is that the possession of
money does not free from want and need.[980] Many who have great
possessions do not use them, because of stinginess and sordidness.[981]
But if wealth is not used, it is useless, and cannot free from need or
want.[982] Here we meet a different application of the criterion of
“use” from that with which we have become familiar in the Socratics, the
_Eryxias_, and Ruskin. It is based on refusal, rather than inability to
use, though the other idea is in the background. The author argues
further that wealth does not free from need, because the wealthy life is
always insatiate (ἄπληστος),[983] and wealth does not change the
disposition,[984] by which change alone the life can be freed from need
and slavery.[985] To try to accomplish this by wealth is like attempting
to cure a patient of dropsy by stuffing him with water until he
bursts.[986] Counsel is given, therefore, not to turn one’s sons to the
acquisition of wealth, but to study under Crates, who can set them free
from the vice of insatiety.[987]

Poverty, on the other hand, does not change the disposition of the
temperate man for the worse[988] There is nothing distressing or painful
about it,[989] for Crates and Diogenes were poor and yet passed their
life in ease.[990] It is no harder to endure old age in poverty than in
wealth, but all depends upon the disposition.[991] Poverty deprives the
life of no positive good, but furnishes the opportunity of gaining
good,[992] since it is conducive to the contemplative life of
philosophy, while wealth is an obstacle to this.[993] It is the poor,
rather than the wealthy, who have leisure.[994] They are also obliged to
be strong (καρτερεῖν), while the wealthy become effeminate, since they
have no impetus to work.[995] Thus poverty, when accompanied with
justice, should be more highly honored than wealth.[996] The author
concludes that it is therefore best to despise wealth and turn to the
life of philosophy, for this develops generosity instead of stinginess,
and contentment instead of insatiety. Such a life uses what is on hand,
and lives content with present blessings (τοῖς παροῦσι).[997] The marked
contrast between this ascetic philosophy of poverty and the saner
teaching of Plato, who was as much opposed to poverty as to excessive
wealth, is patent.

STOICS

The Stoics were the natural descendants in thought of the Cynics, whom
they resemble closely in their attitude toward external goods. According
to their definition, a good must have an unconditioned value
(_absolutum_, αὐτελές). Whatever exists merely for the sake of something
else, or is of value only in comparison to something else, is not a
good.[998] A similar doctrine was held concerning evil. Thus spiritual
goods were counted to be the only true wealth,[999] and he who had the
right attitude toward all,[1000] and used all rightly, was thought to be
the spiritual owner of all.[1001]

Zeno, the founder of the school,[1002] classified both wealth and
poverty among the so-called “indifferents” (ἀδιάφορα),[1003] as neither
good nor evil _per se_. Like the Cynics, he eulogized poverty, though
not to such an extreme degree.[1004] He went with them only so far as to
insist that wealth and poverty have no value, except in relation to the
proper spiritual attitude.[1005]

In his argument that temples are not especially holy places, since they
are the work of artisans (βαναύσων), Zeno exhibits the common negative
attitude of the philosophers toward manual labor.[1006] His doctrine on
money and exchange was also the negative teaching of the moralist,
though his statements on these matters have special reference to an
ideal future.[1007] His attitude on the problem of distribution is not
altogether clear, though he wrote a _Republic_,[1008] in which he seems
to have presented some communistic ideas. Like his followers, he looked
to the time when the whole world should be one state, where artificial
differences were no more, and all men were brothers.[1009] His state is
utopian and anarchistic, without temple, court, gymnasium, money, or
exchange. All are to wear the same clothing, and there shall be no
artificial modesty.[1010] Community of wives, at least for the wise, was
also probably among his utopian schemes,[1011] though it is very
unlikely that he held the doctrine in the crass form as reported.[1012]
His state is somewhat suggestive of the Christian ideal, as a unitary
whole, a world-cosmos, united by love.[1013]

There is a peculiar mixture of individualistic and social conceptions in
the philosophy of the Stoics. In their pictures of an ideal future
world-state, they advanced beyond Plato and other thinkers, who limited
their communities to the small city-state. In calling their state a
“cosmos” also, they gave a positive social content to the narrow
individualism of the Cynics.[1014] Moreover, as seen above, their ideal
undoubtedly contained some communistic elements. However, according to
the fundamental tenet of Stoicism, as expressed by Zeno,[1015] that only
the wise can be free and citizens, we are still faced with the old
duality and anti-socialistic ideal. The Stoics, like the Cynics, were
after all essentially individualistic, and were probably believers in
private ownership, though they dreamed of a future golden age of
altruism, when private property would be no longer necessary.[1016]

Chrysippus, the greatest of the Stoics,[1017] continued and expanded the
principle that virtue is the only absolute good, and that all other
things are indifferents, depending for their worth upon right use.[1018]
But since the wise alone are capable of right use of externals, they
alone are truly wealthy.[1019] They are wealthy, even though beggars,
and noble though slaves.[1020] They are not eager for wealth[1021] yet
they are good economists, since they know the proper source,[1022] time,
method, and extent of money-making. The worthless, on the other hand,
are most needy, even though wealthy.[1023] Chrysippus seems to have
advanced still farther, in teaching the negative doctrine that wealth is
an evil, since it may come from an evil source,[##] an idea suggestive
of the modern theory of “tainted money.” Naturally, he with the other
Stoics, was in sympathy with the Socratics, in objecting to the use of
one’s knowledge for purposes of money-making.[1024]

The cosmopolitan attitude of the Stoics caused them to be opposed to the
theory of slavery as a natural institution.[1025] They taught that
enforced service is no evidence of slavery,[1026] but that the real
slaves are the ignoble and foolish.[1027] The wise, on the other hand,
alone are free, though they are slaves to countless masters.[1028]

Chrysippus, like Zeno, probably had dreams of a future ideal state,
where the highest eternal law would rule and individual strivings would
be lost in the care for the common weal.[1029] If he taught family
communism, it was doubtless in a Platonic form.[1030]

Utopian social theories after the time of Aristotle were by no means
limited to those of Zeno and Chrysippus. As Souchon has observed,[1031]
the period between the end of the fourth and the beginning of the second
centuries was especially favorable to such speculation. The skeptical
criticism of the Sophists had prepared the following generations to call
in question the most elementary social principles. Ideal states, such as
those of Phaleas and Plato, had opened the way for future imitations.
The conquests of Alexander had broadened the vision of the Greek, so
that he no longer thought in terms of Plato’s circumscribed city, but
rather in terms of a world-state. Moreover, the utter political
confusion and unstable economic conditions of the time aroused the more
serious-minded to dream of an ideal past or golden age; to idealize the
simple, “natural” life of the so-called “pious” barbarian nomads,[1032]
or even of the animal world, as opposed to the “artificial” conditions
of civilization; and to exaggerate the virtues and communistic character
of the old Spartan constitution.[1033] The social theories were largely
Stoic in tendency, and thus present a strange combination of
individualistic and communistic ideas.[1034]

Dichaearchus of Messana, a pupil of Aristotle, described an original
paradise, when men lived in accord with nature. In that golden age, they
did not depend upon animals for food, but subsisted on fruits. Neither
did they have any possessions to arouse hate and strife, until the evil
of private property developed, and caused the degeneration of human
society.[1035]

Ephorus,[1036] a disciple of Isocrates, represented the second tendency.
He eulogized the life of the “milk-fed” (γαλακτόφαγοι), barbarian nomads
of the north as true to nature and righteous.[1037] Their piety and
simple life precluded the social ills that arise from individual
ownership,[1038] for their communism even extended to the family, and
all composed one brotherhood.[1039]

The third tendency is evident in the writings of Isocrates,[1040]
Ephorus,[1041] Polybius,[1042] Plutarch,[1043] and was probably common
to many other thinkers whose works are no longer extant.[1044] They
idealized the ancient Spartan society, as a model of complete communism,
which provided full equality and freedom for the citizens. It was free
from the evils of luxury, excessive wealth, poverty, civic strife,
commerce, and money-greed, a condition where all the citizens were wise,
and where the Stoic ideal of independence (αὐτάρκεια) was fully
realized.[1045]

It was but a step from this to the projection of these bizarre
idealizations of the past and of primitive life into the present and
future. They took the form of ideal utopias such as that of Zeno,[1046]
or of romantic descriptions, purporting to portray ideal conditions as
actually existing, such as found their model in Plato’s
_Atlantis_.[1047] For a full discussion of this type of literature, the
reader may consult Poehlmann’s work.[1048] We need give it only cursory
notice here.

Theopompus, a pupil of Socrates, described a “Meropian” land.[1049] His
aim, however, was probably the entertainment of the reader, rather than
social reform, as is evidenced by the fantastic nature of his stories.
They picture not only ideal communistic conditions, but also a state of
the wicked (πονηρόπολις), and crassly emphasize the alleged free-love of
the Etruscans.[1050]

The Cimmerian state of Hecataeus, an idealization of the kingdom of the
Pharaohs, had a more serious social purpose.[1051] It describes a state
in which all conquered lands are equally divided among the citizens, and
where landed property cannot be sold. The people are free from greed of
gain, civic strife, and all the ills that follow it. The ideal is not
the greatest increase of wealth, but the development of the citizens to
the highest social ideal.[1052]

Euhemerus wrote a “Sacred Chronicle” (ἱερὰ ἀναγραφή)[1053] of an ideal
society on an island near India, ruled by a priestly aristocracy. Here,
labor was held in high regard. The artisans were in the priestly class,
the farmers were second, and the herdsmen were on an equality with the
soldiers.[1054] All land and other means of production were common,
except the house and garden (κήπου).[1055] The land was not worked
collectively, but farmers and herdsmen alike brought their products to a
common storehouse for common consumption.[1056] Thus neither money nor
commercial class was necessary.

Jambulus, in his “Sun State,”[1057] outdoes even Euhemerus in his
communistic ideas. He describes a sort of paradise of sun-worshipers at
the equator. Here the trees never fail of ripe fruit, and the citizens
never lose their strength and beauty. The whole social and economic life
is under communistic régime. There is collective ownership of all the
means of production, and each must take his turn at each kind of
work.[1058] The communism extends also to the family.[1059] Thus Greek
economic and social speculation, which always contained socialistic
elements, ends in a communism for the whole citizenship, so thorough as
to include both products and means of production, and to demand a
leveling even of the natural inequalities that result from the different
kinds of work.

Footnote 853:

Third century B.C.; cf. Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 1, 986 ff.

Footnote 854:

Cic. _De fin._, iv. 18. 49; Plut. _Adv. Stoicos_, p. 1065: οἱ τοῦ
Ξενοκράτους καὶ Σπευσίππου κατηγοροῦντες ἐτὶ τῷ μὴ τὴν ὑγείαν
ἀδιάφοραν ἡγεῖσθαι μηδὲ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀνωφελές. On Crantor, cf. _Ap.
Sext. Emp._ (Bekker, p. 538, ll. 4 ff.); on the above, cf. Heidel,
_Pseudo-Platonica_ (dissertation, Chicago, 1896), p. 60, n. 5; cf.
also _Def._ 140, of Speusippus (Mullach, _op. cit._, III, 80): πλοῦτος
κτῆσις σύμμετρος πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν.

Footnote 855:

For discussion of all the _Economica_, cf. _infra_.

Footnote 856:

Born _ca._ 370 B.C. (Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 2, 807, n. 1), a
voluminous writer, from whom a substantial amount is extant, notably
his _Characters_.

Footnote 857:

περὶ πλούτου (_Aspas. in Eth._ 451; and Cic. _De officiis_ ii. 16.
56).

Footnote 858:

Cf. Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 2, 856.

Footnote 859:

Stob. _Flor._ iv. 283, No. 202, ed. Mein.: ὁ αὐτὸς (Theophrastus)
ἔλεγεν ὀφείλομεν ἑαυτοὺς ἐθίζειν ἀπὸ ὀλίγων ζῆν, etc.

Footnote 860:

_Theophrasti Opera_, ed. Wimmer, iii. 231. fr. 86 f.; Plut. _Lycurg._
10.

Footnote 861:

Theoph. _Op._ iii. 182. fr. 78: οὐδὲν πλέον ἔχουσιν οἱ πλούσιοι τῶν
μέτρια κεκτημένων, etc. (Plut. _Cupid. Divit._ 527).

Footnote 862:

Cic. _De officiis_ ii. 16. 56.

Footnote 863:

Porph. _De abstin._ iii. 25.

Footnote 864:

Cf. above on Xenophon.

Footnote 865:

Cf. _infra_ on Cynics; Diog. L. vi. 1. 16; not extant.

Footnote 866:

Diog. L. iv. 12; not extant.

Footnote 867:

περὶ οἰκονομίας; for fragments, cf. ed. Jensen (Teubner). He was an
Epicurean; cf. M. Hoderman, “Quaestionum Oeconomicarum Specimen,”
_Berliner Studien f. Class. Phil._, XVI, 4 (1896), 38 f., for a
summary statement of his teaching.

Footnote 868:

Diog. L. x. 11. 24: περὶ πλούτου; probably opposed to the Cynic ideas
on wealth. Cf. Hoderman, _op. cit._, 37 and note.

Footnote 869:

For the few fragments, cf. Stob. lxxxv. 21 (Vol. III, p. 150, ed.
Mein.), of Stoic tendency. Cf. F. Wilhelm, “Die Oeconomica der
Neupythagoreer,” _Rhein. Mus._, XVII, 2 (1915), 162.

Footnote 870:

For frag., cf. Stob. _Flor._ xlii. 12 (Vol. II, p. 78, ed. Mein.); 46
(Vol. II, p. 366); lxxiv. 59 (Vol. III, p. 362); lxxxv. 12 (Vol. III,
p. 138); of Stoic tendency, though the fragments may not be from him.
Cf. Wilhelm, _op. cit._, p. 162; Hoderman, _op. cit._, pp. 40 f.

Footnote 871:

Cf. his _Conjugalia moralia_, which, though it does not bear the name
_Economica_, is similar in content to them. Cf. Hoderman, _op. cit._,
p. 43; cf. also his essay, Περὶ Φιλοπλουτίας, which moralizes on the
folly of inordinate desire for wealth, in the Stoic vein, e.g., ed.
Bern., Vol. III, 524D, p. 357: πενία γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἀπληστία τὸ
πάθος αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλοπλουτία.

Footnote 872:

Jamblichus (_Vit. Pyth._ 72. 89. 169 f.) says that among the followers
of Pythagoras were those who were called οἰκονομικοί. They date from
about the middle to the end of the second century B.C. Cf. Wilhelm,
_op. cit._, pp. 161-224.

Footnote 873:

Cf. Stob. v. 28. 15 (p. 680, 7 ff., ed. Wachs.); called οἰκονομικός.
Wilhelm (_op. cit._, p. 164, n. 3) thinks that the entire essay may be
extant in a Hebrew translation. Bryson was Peripatetic in tendency. He
makes a third division of slaves, in addition to κατὰ φύσιν and κατὰ
νόμον; viz., κατὰ τρόπον τᾶς ψυχᾶς. He also gives a catalogue of
vocations, similar to that of Xen. _Econ._ i. 1-4, and raises the
question as to the function of economics.

Footnote 874:

Cf. Stob. v. 28. 16 (p. 681, 15 ff.); iv. 22. 101 (p. 534, 10 ff.); v.
28. 17 (p. 684, 16 ff.); v. 28. 18 (p. 686, 16 ff., ed. Wachs.): περὶ
τᾶς τῶν οἰκήιων εὐδαιμονίας; composed largely of negative utterances
on the rich, and of observations on the relations of the sexes;
Platonic and Stoic in tendency. Cf. Wilhelm, _op. cit._, pp. 177, 222.

Footnote 875:

Cf. Stob. iv. 25. 50; v. 28. 19 (ed. Wachs.): περὶ γυναικὸς ἁρμονίας
and περὶ γυναικὸς σωφροσύνας; similar to Stoics.

Footnote 876:

Cf. Stob. iv. 23. 61 f. (p. 588, 17 ff., ed. Wachs.);
Stoic-Peripatetic in tendency. The two latter deal chiefly with the
marriage relation. On the general subject of _Economica_, cf. Hoderman
and Wilhelm, as above.

Footnote 877:

Book iii, in Latin, is of later origin, and is of no economic
interest. Book i is perhaps from Eudemus of Rhodes, a pupil of
Aristotle and Theophrastus (Zeller, II, 2, 869 ff.), but Philodemus
(_De vita_ ix) assigns it to Theophrastus (Zeller, II, 2, 944); cf.
Susemihl, introduction to his edition of the _Economica_, 1887. Book
ii is later, but from the Peripatetic school (Zeller, II, 2, 945).

Footnote 878:

Cf. Susemihl, _op. cit._, p. v, n. 1, for a list of parallel passages
from Xenophon and Aristotle.

Footnote 879:

1343_a_1-4, especially ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ ἐκ πολλῶν ἀρχόντων ἐστίν, ἡ
οἰκονομικὴ δὲ μοναρχία. Cf. also 14 f. Cf. Aristotle, above. Zeller
(II, 2, 181, n. 6) points out that _Eud. Eth._ makes a similar
distinction, in that he places economics between ethics and politics.

Footnote 880:

1343_a_8 f., though 25 ff. implies the limitation, κτήσεως δὲ πρώτη
ἐπιμέλεια ἡ κατὰ φύσιν.

Footnote 881:

1344_b_22 ff.

Footnote 882:

ii. 1345_b_13 ff.

Footnote 883:

_Ibid._ 20 ff.: νόμισμα, ἐξαγώγιμα, εἰσαγώγιμα, and ἀναλώματα.

Footnote 884:

1343_a_25-27.

Footnote 885:

_Ibid._ 28-30. Cf. Aristotle, who makes war a natural pursuit.

Footnote 886:

1343_b_2 f.

Footnote 887:

Cf. preceding n. 8.

Footnote 888:

1343_b_3 f.

Footnote 889:

_Ibid._ 26 ff.

Footnote 890:

1344_b_15 f.; 1344_a_23-1344_b_11.

Footnote 891:

1348_b_17 ff.

Footnote 892:

1349_a_33 ff.

Footnote 893:

1350_a_23 ff.

Footnote 894:

1349_b_31 ff. Debasement of the currency was common in the time of the
author.

Footnote 895:

1346_b_24 ff.; 1347_b_3 ff.; cf. At. _Pol._ 1259_a_6-35.

Footnote 896:

1346_a_14-16: τὸ τἀναλώματα μὴ μείζω τῶν προσόδων γίνεσθαι.

Footnote 897:

1352_a_16 ff.; cf. above on the Socratics, under exchange.

Footnote 898:

Of Cyrene (435 B.C.), a pupil of Socrates. No genuine fragments of his
writings are extant. Cf. Zeller, II, 1, 346 ff.

Footnote 899:

Cf. Horace _Ep._ i. 17, 23.

Footnote 900:

Cf. Zeller, II, 1, 346, n. 2, and Xen. _Mem._ ii. 1. 9.

Footnote 901:

Zeller II, 1, 346, n. 2; cf. Oncken, _op. cit._, p. 47, a basal
principle of hedonism.

Footnote 902:

Cf. Hor. _Ep._ ii. 2. 60.

Footnote 903:

342-270 B.C. His theory was far different than the Cyrenaic doctrine
of the pleasure of the moment.

Footnote 904:

Diog. L. x. 130, 144, 146; Stob. _Flor._ xvii. 23.

Footnote 905:

Usener, _Epicurea_ (1887), pp. 300-304, ὤρισται.

Footnote 906:

_Ibid._, p. 302, fr. 473; p. 303, fr. 476.

Footnote 907:

Diog. L. x. 130 f.

Footnote 908:

Usener, p. 304, fr. 479.

Footnote 909:

_Ibid._, p. 302, fr. 473 f.; cf. Stob. _Flor._ xvii. 30.

Footnote 910:

Usener, p. 303, and fragments.

Footnote 911:

Stob. xvii. 34; Seneca _Ep._ 25. 4 f.; Cic. _Tusc. disp._ v. 31.

Footnote 912:

Diog. L. x. 119; Philod. _De vit._ ix. cols. 12 ff., 27, 40.

Footnote 913:

Cf. Barker, _op. cit._, p. 37; cf. above on Sophists; also Dunning,
_Political Theories Ancient and Mediaeval_ (1913), pp. 103 f.

Footnote 914:

Cf. Hasbach, _Allgemeine philosophische Grundlagen der Pol. Econ._
(1890), pp. 76 and 36 f.; Dunning, as above.

Footnote 915:

For his life, cf. Zeller, II, 1, 280 ff., and Diog. L. vi. A few
fragments of his philosophical dialogues are extant. Cf. above, p.
126, n. 7. for his _Economicus_. He and Diogenes are discussed at this
point, since the Cynic movement as a whole is logically
post-Aristotelian.

Footnote 916:

Diog. L. vi. 1. 15; cf. Gomperz, _op. cit._, II, 117 and note, with
citations from Dio of Prusa; also Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 1, 325 f.
and note, who thinks Plato’s ironical “city of pigs” (_Rep._ ii) may
well have been a reference to the ideas of Antisthenes.

Footnote 917:

Cf. preceding note, and _infra_, on later ideal states.

Footnote 918:

_Pol._ i. 1253a1-4: ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, etc.

Footnote 919:

Dionis Prus. _Opera_ (ed. Arnim, 1893, or vi. 25 f.), ascribed to
Diogenes, but it was also the idea of Antisthenes. Cf. Gomperz, _op.
cit._, II, 118; compare Rousseau.

Footnote 920:

Diog. L. vi. 104.

Footnote 921:

_Ibid._ vi. 12; cf. chap. 9, 105.

Footnote 922:

Xen. _Symp._ iv. 34, 34-43, on the advantages and disadvantages of the
two kinds of wealth; iii. 8; _Econ._ i. 7 f.; ii. 2 f.

Footnote 923:

Xen. _Symp._ iv. 35

Footnote 924:

Mullach, _op. cit._, II, p. 289, fr. 86: φιλάργυρος.

Footnote 925:

Diog. L. vi. 2, καὶ ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου
Ἡρακλέους καὶ τοῦ κύρου. Heracles, the toiler, was their patron saint.
Antisthenes is said to have written two dialogues called Heracles
(Diog. L. vi. 2. 18), but Zeller, (_op. cit._, II, 1, 307, n. 4)
thinks only one was genuine.

Footnote 926:

Cf. _infra_ on Diogenes. Ar. _Pol._ 1253b20-22 probably refers to the
Cynics, as holding it to be κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲ δίκαιων, and βίαιων. Cf.
Newman, _op. cit._, I, 140, n. 2, on this. He cites Strabo, p. 15;
110, on the opposition of the Cynic Onesicritus to slavery. Cf. above,
pp. 97 ff.; Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 1, 280 ff., 323 f.

Footnote 927:

Cf. _infra_ on Diogenes and _Eryxias_; Ar. _Pol._ 1257_b_10, probably
Cynic.

Footnote 928:

412-323 B.C.; cf. Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 1, 280 ff.

Footnote 929:

Mullach, _F.Ph.G._, II, 326, fr. 276; cf. Diog. L. vi. 47: τὸν
πλούσιον ἀμαθῆ, πρόβατον εἶπε χρυσόμαλλον.

Footnote 930:

Mullach, II, 302, fr. 27; 327, fr. 285; cf. _infra_ on Teles, for like
idea.

Footnote 931:

Mullach, II, 316, fr. 168; Chrysost. _Homil._ lxiv in Matthew points
to Paul’s parallel, I Tim. 6: 10: ῥἰζα γὰρ πάντων τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἡ
φιλαργυρία.

Footnote 932:

Mullach, II, 305, fr. 63.

Footnote 933:

_Ibid._ fr. 66; 65.

Footnote 934:

_Ibid._ fr. 61; p. 327, fr. 285.

Footnote 935:

Gomperz, _op. cit._, II, 133; Zeller (_op. cit._, II, 1, 323 f.) is
not sure that the Cynics taught a positive anti-slavery doctrine, but
cf. p. 132, n. 2.

Footnote 936:

Diog. L. vi. 66, 74 f.; cf. Epict. _Dissert._ iii. 24. 67.

Footnote 937:

_Athen._ iv. 159_c_; Διογένης δ᾽ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ νόμισμα εἶναι
νομοθετεῖ ἀστραγάλους.

Footnote 938:

Diog. L. vi. 72: ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖν τὰς γυναῖκας, etc.
Aristotle (_Pol._ ii. 7. 1266_a_34) names Plato as its sole advocate,
but cf. Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 1, 321 f., n. 4, and Gomperz, _op.
cit._, II, 132, though they think that he did not hold it in the
extreme form stated by Diogenes Laertius.

Footnote 939:

There is no specific evidence, though it would accord well with his
other teachings. Cf. Gomperz, _op. cit._, II, 132.

Footnote 940:

Called “Thebaios”; flor. _ca._ 328 B.C.; cf. Diog. L. vi. 87.

Footnote 941:

Mullach, _F. Ph. G._, II, 334, fr. 6; 338, frs. 38, 39; cf. also Diog.
L. vi. 86.

Footnote 942:

Cf. _The Beggar’s Wallet_, an amusing parody of the _Odyssey_ (von
Arnim, _Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa_ [1898], 255 ff.) Gomperz
(_op. cit._, II, n. 545 to p. 125) doubts its genuineness for Crates,
but thinks it is from a Cynic source; cf. also _infra_ on Teles.

Footnote 943:

The pseudo-Aristotelian _Economics_ is a possible exception. The
_Economics_ of Xenophon has a broader theme, and the _Revenues_ is for
practical purposes.

Footnote 944:

_Pseudo-Platonica_, p. 59.

Footnote 945:

It is given mere passing mention in Boeckh, _op. cit._, I, 693;
Hoderman, _op. cit._, p. 9; Francotte, _L’Industrie_, II, 310, n. 1;
Cossa, _op. cit._, p. 146; Oncken, _op. cit._, p. 37; Bonar, _op.
cit._, p. 11, n. 1; Kautz, _op. cit._, p. 121; Simey, _op. cit._, p.
474; Hagen, _Observationum oec. pol. in Aesch. dialog., qui Eryx.
inscribitur_ (dissertation, 1822). The latter has not been examined.

Footnote 946:

On its origin, cf. Otto Schrohl, _De Eryx. qui fertur Platonis_
(dissertation, 1901) which gives a full bibliography, pp. 5 ff.;
Heidel (_Pseudo-Platonica_, p. 61), following Steinhart (Mueller, VII,
14), attributes it to a later Socratic, in sympathy with Antisthenes;
p. 69, n. 3, he thinks it grew out of _Euthyd._ 288E ff.; for other
points of contact, cf. Schrohl, 10 ff.

Footnote 947:

On the first, cf. 393A-394E, 402E-403C; on the second, cf. 396E-397D,
405C-406B.

Footnote 948:

Cf. preceding n. 3.

Footnote 949:

278E-282.

Footnote 950:

Cf. above, _in loc._

Footnote 951:

For Stoics, cf. _infra_.

Footnote 952:

Xen. _Mem._ i. 6, especially end: ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι
θεῖον εἶναι, etc.; cf. Schrohl, _op. cit._, pp. 26-28.

Footnote 953:

400E, 401A.

Footnote 954:

401A: ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ τῶν χρησίμων, ἐπειδή γε οὐ πάντα. Cf. also 400E.

Footnote 955:

401B, 401E.

Footnote 956:

402E, 393E-394E, and the general thesis that the wisest are richest.

Footnote 957:

400A-E, 394D, arguing that economic demand might make a man’s wisdom
more valuable than another’s house.

Footnote 958:

399E.

Footnote 959:

Cf. 399E, where Eristratos defines πλοῦτος as τὰ χρήματα πολλὰ
κεκτῆσθαι.

Footnote 960:

393A, 393D-394A; cf. above, pp. 24 ff. and notes for Plato and others.

Footnote 961:

394D-E, 402E.

Footnote 962:

393E, 396E-397E, 403E, the insistence upon ability to use, so common
in Plato, Xenophon, and Ruskin.

Footnote 963:

394D-E, which reads like a passage from the New Testament.

Footnote 964:

397E.

Footnote 965:

396C: ἂν μέν τι ἕχῃς, ἄξιός του, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὐδενός. Cf. _The Simple
Life_: “He who has nothing is nothing.” Cf. Eurip. fr. 328, Danae
(Nauck): κακὸς δ᾽ ὁ μὴ ἔχων, οἱ δ᾽ ἔχοντες ὄλβιοι.

Footnote 966:

396E-397E; cf. _infra_, the Stoic doctrine of “indifferents”; but they
included health and wealth in the same class, while the _Eryxias_ does
not. Cf. Diog. L. vii. 103; cf. a similar passage in the _Euthydemus_;
cf. Schrohl, _op. cit._, p. 34.

Footnote 967:

396E-397E, as above; 393A.

Footnote 968:

405D.

Footnote 969:

405E.

Footnote 970:

406B.

Footnote 971:

_Ibid._, but cf. 134, n. 8, where Socrates approaches this asceticism.

Footnote 972:

403E, distinguishing the materials of a house, the tools by which they
are provided, and the tools for building. Cf. Plato and Aristotle, _in
loc._, for a like distinction.

Footnote 973:

399E.

Footnote 974:

400A-E.

Footnote 975:

400A-B. Heidel (_op. cit._, p. 61) points to his “ostentatious display
of learning” here.

Footnote 976:

402B-C, 404A-B.

Footnote 977:

400E.

Footnote 978:

400C-E, especially ὅσα μέν ἄρα τυγχάνει χρήσιμα ὄντα ἡμῖν ταῦτα
χρήματα, though at this point the term has been made to include all
wealth; cf. also 402C: ἀλλὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴν (χρήματα) οἷς τὰ χρήσιμα οἶοί
τ᾽ ἐσμὲν ἐκπορίζεσθαι.

Footnote 979:

Cf. _Teletis Reliquiae_, ed. Hense, Freiburg, 1889. The ancient source
is Stobaeus. Teles, a Cynic of Megara, wrote about 240 B.C. Cf. Hense,
_op. cit._, XXI-XXXV; Gomperz, _op. cit._, II, 129 ff. Fr. iv. A, pp.
24 ff., and iv. B, p. 34, are of special economic interest.

Footnote 980:

Fr. IV, A, pp. 24 ff.

Footnote 981:

Fr. IV, A, p. 24: δι᾽ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ ῥυπαρίαν.

Footnote 982:

_Ibid._ 27; cf. the example of the Φορκίδες, who have an eye, but do
not use it; cf. also the quotation from the “ancients” on the
distinction between χρήματα, “used wealth,” and κτήματα, “wealth
merely possessed” (ll. 13 f.).

Footnote 983:

P. 32, the unsated life will not be satisfied even with immortality,
since it cannot become Zeus. L. 13 ff., kings are always in want,
σπανίζουσιν. Cf. Xen. _Symp._ iv. 36.

Footnote 984:

P. 26, ll. 4 f., 6-12; p. 31.

Footnote 985:

P. 28, ll. 13-29.

Footnote 986:

P. 29, ll. 6 ff.

Footnote 987:

P. 29; cf. pp. 30 f.; p. 26, ll. 11 f.

Footnote 988:

P. 26.

Footnote 989:

Fr.; Περὶ αὐταρκείας; p. 9: καὶ τί ἔχει δυσχερὲς ἣ ἐπίπονον ἡ πενία.

Footnote 990:

_Ibid._

Footnote 991:

_Ibid._ Cephalus in _Rep._ i gives a more balanced judgment.

Footnote 992:

_Ibid._, pp. 6 f., citing Bion on the answer of poverty to her
accusers. Cf. Aristoph. _Plutus_ 558 f. on the power of poverty, cited
by Ruskin, _Aratra Pentel._, IV, 139 (Vol. XX, 296).

Footnote 993:

Fr. iv. B, p. 34, he attacks the opposite thesis.

Footnote 994:

_Ibid._, ll. 5 f.; p. 35, good doctrine for a tramp; p. 34.

Footnote 995:

_Ibid._, ll. 13 ff.

Footnote 996:

_Ibid._, pp. 36 f., a comparison of Aristides and Callias.

Footnote 997:

Fr. iv. A, p. 28, purporting to be the answer of Crates as to what he
would gain by being a philosopher.

Footnote 998:

Cf. _infra_; also Cic. _De fin._ iii. 10. 33 f.; Zeller, _op. cit._,
III, 1, 214.

Footnote 999:

Cic. _Paradox._ 6, on the thesis that only the wise are rich.

Footnote 1000:

Seneca _Benef._ vii. 3. 2 f.; 6. 3; 8. 1.

Footnote 1001:

Diog. L. vii. 125. On both the citations above, cf. Zeller, III, 1,
251.

Footnote 1002:

Called Citieus, born 320 B.C., of Semitic descent.

Footnote 1003:

_Stoic Vet. Fr._, ed. Arnim, 1905, I, 47, fr. 190 (Stob. _Ecl._ ii. 7.
5, pp. 57 f., ed. Wachs.); Diog. L. vii. 101 f., 103-5.

Footnote 1004:

Von Arnim, _op. cit._, p. 53, fr. 220; Cic. _De fin._ v. 84: “At Zeno
eum (mendicum) non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est.”

Footnote 1005:

Von Arnim (p. 52, fr. 216 [Stob. _Ecl._ ii. 7. 11_g_, pp. 991., ed.
Wachs.]) cites Zeno as placing among the goods of the σπουδαῖος man
the fact that he is οἰκονομικός and χρηματιστικός, while the φαῦλοι
are opposite; cf. also p. 100.

Footnote 1006:

Von Arnim, p. 61, fr. 264 (Clem. Alex. _Strom._ v. 12. 76, p. 691_p_).

Footnote 1007:

Von Arnim, p. 62, fr. 268 (Diog. L. vii. 33): νόμισμα δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἀλλαγῆς
ἕνεκεν οἴεσθαι δεῖν κατασκευάζειν οὔτ᾽ ἀποδημίας ἕνεκεν. Oncken (_op.
cit._, p. 48) thinks that the Stoics were forerunners of the
physiocrats.

Footnote 1008:

Plut. _De Alex. Fort._ i. 6: ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ ...
Ζήνονος. He says that it agreed in principle with the states of Plato
and Lycurgus. Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 341 ff., but cf. _infra_,
p. 140 f. Cf. n. 2, above. Ar. _Pol._ ii. 4. 1266_a_: εἰσὶ δέ τινες
πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄλλαι, etc., shows that a series of ideal states had
preceded his, though he says Plato’s was the most radical.

Footnote 1009:

_Plut. De Alex. Fort._ i. 6.

Footnote 1010:

Diog. L. vii. 33, 131; cf. nn. 3 and 5 above.

Footnote 1011:

Diog. L. vii. 131; 33.

Footnote 1012:

Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 342, n. 1.

Footnote 1013:

Cf. above, n. 5; _Athen._ xiii. 561_c_.

Footnote 1014:

Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 11, n. 8; also 346.

Footnote 1015:

Diog. L. vii. 33.

Footnote 1016:

On this double tendency in the Stoics, and reasons therefore, cf.
Souchon (_op. cit._, pp. 173 f.); Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 342 f.,
and I, 111) and Wolf (_op. cit._, pp. 116 ff.) exaggerate their
socialistic tendency. For further discussion, cf. _infra_. Cf. L.
Stein, _Soc. Frage_, pp. 171-80.

Footnote 1017:

280-206 B.C. Aristo and Cleanthes, successors of Zeno, also emphasized
similar doctrines in relation to wealth. Cf. von Arnim, I, p. 89, frs.
396, 397, 398, from Aristo; _ibid._, p. 137, fr. 617, from Cleanthes.

Footnote 1018:

_Ibid._, II, 79, fr. 240; III, 28, fr. 117; p. 29, frs. 122, 123; p.
32, fr. 135.

Footnote 1019:

_Ibid._, III, 156, fr. 598; p. 159, fr. 618; p. 155, fr. 593.

Footnote 1020:

_Ibid._, p. 155, fr. 597.

Footnote 1021:

_Ibid._, p. 160, fr. 629, “Lucro autem numquam sapiens studet.”

Footnote 1022:

_Ibid._, p. 169, fr. 623: μόνον δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνορα χρηματιστικὸν
εἶναι, γινώσκοντα ἀφ᾽ ὧν, χρηματιστέον, καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ μέχρι
πότε.

Footnote 1023:

Von Arnim, III, 168, fr. 674.

Footnote 1024:

_Ibid._, p. 36, frs. 151, 152, “Bonum ex malo non fit: divitiae fiunt:
fiunt autem ex avaritia divitiae ergo non sunt bonum” (Seneca _Ep._
87. 22).

Footnote 1025:

Von Arnim, p. 172, fr. 686 (Stob. _Ecl._ ii. 7, p. 109, 10): ....
λόγους κατηλεύειν, οὐ φαμένων δεῖν ἀπὸ παιδείας παρὰ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων
χρηματίζεσθαι.

Footnote 1026:

Von Arnim, p. 86, fr. 352: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως δοῦλος οὐδείς; p.
87, fr. 358; cf. p. 141, n. 7, above.

Footnote 1027:

_Ibid._, fr. 357.

Footnote 1028:

_Ibid._, 89, fr. 365; p. 86, frs. 356, 354.

Footnote 1029:

_Ibid._, p. 86, fr. 355; p. 88, fr. 362; p. 89, 364. Cf. Espinas,
_Hist. des doctrines èconomiques_, 56 f., on the Stoics’ attitude
toward labor and slavery: “Ni les Cyniques ni les Stoiciens ne
méprisaient le travail”; “La seule servitude déshonorante est celle
des passions et du vice.”

Footnote 1030:

Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 342 f. and notes), citing von Arnim, III,
77, fr. 314, ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεύς, etc., thinks Chrysippus’
principle of the law of reason as king of all is anti-individualistic.
He cites also Cic. _De fin._ iii. 19 (64), where the individual seems
to be made to exist for the sake of the whole. But cf. above, p. 140
f. and notes.

Footnote 1031:

Cf. Diog. L. vii. 131, and above, p. 140, nn. 7 f.

Footnote 1032:

_Op. cit._, p. 171.

Footnote 1033:

Cf. above, on Cynics and Stoics, and _infra_; cf. even in Plato,
_Laws_ 679A-B.

Footnote 1034:

The Socratics were the pioneers in this regard also. On the
unhistorical character of the alleged early communism in Sparta, cf.
Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 75 ff. and 100 f.; on this triple tendency
in the post-Aristotelian social thought, cf. _ibid._, pp. 99 ff., on
“Der Sozialstaat der Legende und das sozialistische Naturrecht”; also
Souchon, p. 172.

Footnote 1035:

Cf. above, p. 140.

Footnote 1036:

Cf. Porphyry _De abstin._ iv. 1. 2; Mueller, _F.H.G._, II, 233. His
Βίος Ἑλλάδοσς was a history of the degeneration of Greek civilization
from the primitive ideal. Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 109 and n. 1,
on his influence on Rousseau, who refers to him. Cf. _ibid._, n. 2,
for a similar idea of a golden age in Theoc. xii. 15.

Footnote 1037:

On his social ideas, cf. Poehlmann, I, 113 ff.

Footnote 1038:

Strabo vii, p. 463 (_F.H.G._, I, 256, fr. 76).

Footnote 1039:

Nic. Damasc. (_F.H.G._, III, fr. 123): διὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου κοινότητα καὶ
δικαιοσύνην. Cf. also _ibid._, I, 257, fr. 78, Ephorus.

Footnote 1040:

_Ibid._; also fr. 76: πρός τε ἀλλήλους εὐνομοῦνται κοινὰ πάντα ἔχοντες
τά τε ἄλλα καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τέκνα καὶ τὴν ὅλην συγγένειαν.

Footnote 1041:

_Panathen._ 178: ἀλλὰ παρὰ σφίσι μὲν αὐτοῖς ἰσονομίαν καταστῆσαι καὶ
δημοκρατίαν τοιαύτην, οἵαν περ χρὴ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἄπαντα τὸν χρόνον
ὁμονοήσειν; also 153; for an idealized picture of early Athenian life,
cf. _Paneg._ 79; _Areop._ 31; 32, 35, 44, 83; cited by Poehlmann, _op.
cit._, I, 136 f.

Footnote 1042:

Cf. Polybius vi. 45, and Poehlmann’s note (I, 122).

Footnote 1043:

Book vi. 10; 48; etc.; cf. Poehlmann, as above.

Footnote 1044:

Cf. his _Lycurgus_, especially 8, 9, 10, 3, 25, 30, 31.

Footnote 1045:

Cf. Poehlmann, I, 122 and n. 3.

Footnote 1046:

Cf. above, notes p. 143, nn. 4-6. especially 6.

Footnote 1047:

Cf. above, p. 140.

Footnote 1048:

Cf. above, p. 62, n. 6.

Footnote 1049:

_Op. cit._, II, 359 ff., though he has been too ready to see in them a
direct analogy to modern socialism.

Footnote 1050:

Book viii of his _Philipp. Histories_ (_Athen._ xii. 517_d_ ff.).

Footnote 1051:

Cf. Poehlmann, I, 362 ff.

Footnote 1052:

Mueller, _F.H.G._, II, 392, fr. 13; cf. 386 ff.

Footnote 1053:

Diod. i. 6. 93; 4, a platonic ideal.

Footnote 1054:

_Ibid._ v. 45. 3 ff.

Footnote 1055:

_Ibid._ 45. 3.

Footnote 1056:

Diod. v. 45. 5; 46. 1 shows that the artisans were included in the
communism.

Footnote 1057:

_Ibid._ 45. 4: τοὺς κάρπους ἀναφέρουσιν εἰς τὸ κοινόν, etc.; though
prizes were given for excellence in farming.

Footnote 1058:

_Ibid._ ii. 55-60.

Footnote 1059:

_Ibid._ 59.6: ἐναλλάξ δὲ αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀλλήλοις διακονεῖν, τοὺς δὲ
ἁλιεύειν, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὰς τέχνας εἶναι, ἄλλους δὲ περὶ ἄλλα τῶν
χρησίμων ἀσχολεῖσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐκ περιόδου κυκλικῆς λειτουργεῖν, πλὴν
τῶν ἤδη γεγηρακότων. Cf. p. 34, n. 1, above, on Ruskin’s idea that all
should do some head and some hand work. Poehlmann (II, 391, n. 2)
compares it to the socialism of Bebel. The implication that Plato’s
state is distinguished from this, as a society of citizens who do not
work (402 f.), is hardly fair. The proper distinction is rather that
Plato insists that each citizen do the particular kind of work for
which he is best fitted. It is needless to ask which had the saner
view, from the economic or any other standpoint. Jambulus’ repudiation
of the division of labor in the interest of equality is certainly one
of the most radical measures ever suggested in the history of
communism.

CHAPTER VIII
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE OF GREEK ECONOMICS

Our conclusions as to the importance and influence of Greek economic
thought have been fully presented in the previous discussion. A brief
summary of the results, however, may be of advantage now, at the close
of our survey. As seen above, despite the fact that Greek thought in
this field was incidental to moral and political speculation, and
despite a certain philosophic prejudice and limited economic vision, the
contribution is by no means merely negative. We have seen that it
included a recognition by one or more Greek thinkers of such important
principles as the following: that society finds its origin in mutual
need, and in the natural development of clan and family, not in the
artificial social contract; that the state is a great business
association, in which about the same economic laws apply as in private
economy; that the final goal of economics is not property but human
welfare; that the criteria of economic value are intrinsic utility,
economic demand, and cost of production; that wealth must possess the
quality of storableness; that true wealth consists only of commodities
that minister to human welfare; that the three factors in production are
land, labor and capital; that money originated in necessary exchange;
that it serves as a medium of exchange, a standard of value, and a
ticket of deferred payments; that it should possess intrinsic value,
which is more stable than that of other commodities; that it should not
be confused with wealth, but should be understood in its true function
as representative wealth; that credit must play an exceedingly important
part in business operations as representative capital; that agriculture
is the basal industry, on which all others must depend; that the
division of labor is the fundamental principle at the foundation of all
exchange; that it results in certain important economic advantages, and
that its extensive application depends upon large commercial
development; that reciprocity is the fundamental principle in exchange,
as also in the social structure; that exchange performs a legitimate
social function in creating time and place values; that industrial
expansion is limited by a law of diminishing returns; that the primary
purpose of exchange should not be profit, but satisfaction of economic
need; that commerce merely for its own sake does not necessarily
increase the national store, but may produce only economic inequalities;
that extremes of wealth and poverty cause industrial inefficiency,
social strife, and crime; that excessive individual wealth is not
usually compatible with just acquisition or just expenditure; that it
also necessarily implies corresponding extremes of poverty; that the
commercial spirit in nations is the chief cause of international
differences; that the goal of economics is consumption rather than
production, and that foolish consumption results in great economic
waste; that all economic problems are moral problems; that private
property is not a natural right, but a gift of society, and therefore
that society may properly control its activities; that there is a
certain unity in human nature, which is opposed to the doctrine of
natural slavery; that the individual should have opportunity for
personal development in accord with his capacities, aside from the mere
struggle for physical existence; that true economic equality does not
demand equal shares for all, but shares proportioned to capacities and
services; and that gifts of charity merely for consumption are fruitful
causes of poverty and indolence.

Besides the recognition of such principles, we have seen that many
practical suggestions for the amelioration of economic and social
conditions, which are being seriously presented today, were first
proposed by Greek thinkers. Measures for the divorce of government from
big business, state control of natural monopolies, conservation of
natural resources, state supervision of trade and commerce, including
regulation of prices and rates, publicity in business, pure food laws,
and the socialization of industry and its products were all first
proposed by Greeks. On the other hand, we have seen that practically all
the modern stock arguments against socialism were long ago presented by
Aristotle, and that the ideal of the Greek socialist was not primarily
materialistic and selfish, as the modern, but moral and social.

Such a list of positive economic principles and practical suggestions
should surely give the Greeks some claim to recognition in the field of
economic thought. But they should be judged primarily, not by their
positive contribution to economic theory or by the practical nature of
their suggestions for legislation, but rather by the extent to which
they realized the existence of the great economic and social problems,
which are still crying for a solution. From this standpoint, we have
seen that Plato and Aristotle especially reveal remarkable economic
insight. Moreover, there still remains the outstanding fact that the
Greeks were the forerunners of the moral, humanitarian, and social
emphasis in present-day economy. This alone should give to them a
distinct place in the evolution of economic thought, and should make it
impossible for Souchon to conclude: “Ces mépris [of G. B. Say] sont pour
nous apparaître plus justifiés que les admirations de Roscher.”[1060]

The influence of Greek thought upon later economic theory, however,
seems not to have been very direct or extensive, probably owing to the
incidental nature of their speculation. To be sure, mediaeval economic
thought presents, in many respects, an unbroken continuity with the
Greek. In their emphasis on the moral, in their doctrines on usury, just
price, importance of agriculture, exchange for profit, and in their
general conservative attitude toward money and commercial development,
mediaeval thinkers are very similar to the Socratics.[1061] Doubtless
much of this similarity may be traced to the direct influence of
Aristotle, as is especially evident in the work of Thomas Aquinas and
Nicholas Oresme.[1062] To a considerable extent, however, the economic
ideas of the Middle Ages were a direct outgrowth of the economic and
religious conditions under which the writers lived.[1063] In the
following centuries, some Greek influence may be traced in Adam Smith,
in the physiocrats,[1064] in utopian writers such as More, and in
eighteenth-century thinkers like Rousseau.

It is usually asserted that the economic thought of the past century has
been practically unaffected by Greek ideas. But our previous discussion
has clearly shown that Plato and Xenophon, at least, dominated the
economic thinking of Ruskin. If further evidence is needed, it is
necessary only to turn to the names of Greek thinkers in the index to
the monumental new edition of his works, which we have frequently cited
above. He frankly and enthusiastically presents himself as an apostle of
a “Greek theory of economics.”[1065] But despite some of his utopian and
extravagant ideas, he is being ever more recognized by authorities in
economics as having been one of the chief factors in the development of
political economy to its present moral and humanitarian emphasis.[1066]
His repudiation of the abstract “economic man,” his insistence upon
human, moral, and social ideals in economics, his attempt to broaden the
definition of economic value and wealth by emphasizing true utility, his
constant stress upon proper consumption rather than upon production, his
demand that all have opportunity up to their capacity, his opposition to
the _laissez-faire_ policy in economics and politics, his emphasis upon
right education, all have borne rich and abiding fruit in the last few
decades, and these are all distinctively Greek ideas, as we have seen
above. Thus indirectly, through Ruskin, Greek economic thought has
exerted a potent influence upon the evolution of nineteenth-century
economics, and thus there is much truth in the words of Wagner, as
quoted by Oncken,[1067] not merely for German, but for all modern
economy: “Es ist im Grunde uralter wahrhaft classischer Boden, auf den
jetzt die deutsche ökonomische und soziale Theorie und Praxis sich
bewusst wieder stellen.” Souchon’s characterization of Greek economy as
“morale étatisme”[1068] could well be applied to much in the economic
thought of today.

Footnote 1060:

_Op. cit._, p. 195; Roscher is, of course, extreme in his
appreciation.

Footnote 1061:

Cf. Brants, _Les théories écon. au XIII et XIV siècle_; Espinas,
_Histoire des doctrines économiques_, pp. 72 ff.; Haney, _op. cit._,
pp. 69 ff.

Footnote 1062:

In his _De origine, natura, jure, et mutationibus monetarum_
(fourteenth century). On their dependence upon Aristotle, cf. Zmavc,
_Zeitschr. f. d. gesammt. Staatswiss._, 1902, pp. 54 and 77 f.; and
_Archiv f. d. Gesch. der Phil._, 1899, 407 ff.

Footnote 1063:

Cf. Souchon, pp. 199 f., who observes that the Greek moral goal was
perfection of the individual through the state, while that of the
Middle Ages was individual salvation to another world.

Footnote 1064:

Cf. Oncken, _op. cit._, p. 38.

Footnote 1065:

He calls Plato the “master of economy” (_Fors Clav._ [Vol. XXVIII,
717]); cf. also Vol. XXXVIII, 112 on his Platonic discipleship. He
says (_Arrows of the Chace_, Vol. XXXIV, 547): “The economy I teach is
Xenophon’s”; cf. also Vol. XXXVII, 550, Letter to Professor Blackie,
II: “My own political economy is literally only the expansion and
explanation of Xenophon’s.” Cf. Vol. XXXI, Intro., pp. xv ff.; Vol.
XVII, pp. xlix and 18; cf. his preface to his translation of the
_Economicus_; cf. also E. Barker, _Pol. Thought in England from
Herbert Spencer to the Present Day_ (“Home University Library”), pp.
191-96, who emphasizes this Greek influence. Cf. above, p. 23, n. 5;
64, n. 3.

Footnote 1066:

Barker, cited above, in n. 2, also emphasizes this fact. Cf. the
edition of Ruskin above cited, Introduction to Vol. XVII, an excellent
discussion of Ruskin’s economic ideas and their influence, for a
bibliography (p. cxii) and citations from many modern economists on
the subject; e.g., the notable address in 1885, in recognition of his
work, signed by a number of leading English economists; the striking
citations from Ingram; from Stimson (_Quarterly Journal of Economics_,
II [1888], 445), that the future political economy will make its
bricks for building “from Ruskin’s earth rather than from Ricardo’s
straw”; from the late regius professor of modern history at Oxford,
“The political economy of today is the political economy of John
Ruskin, and not that of John Bright or even of John Stewart Mill.”

Footnote 1067:

P. 46, n. 3 (Wagner, _Die Akad. Nat.-oek. und der Socialismus_, 1895).

Footnote 1068:

_Op. cit._, p. 201.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following bibliography includes: (_a_) histories of economic
thought; almost all of these have only a cursory chapter on Greek
theory, and several of them deal largely with economic conditions; (_b_)
histories of socialism and social theory, to which the foregoing
statement applies to a large extent; (_c_) chapters in works on
different phases of Greek economic history; (_d_) other works of a more
general type, which deal more or less extensively with Greek economic or
social ideas; (_e_) articles and dissertations; (_f_) editions of Greek
authors that are of special interest for our subject. It is manifestly
impossible to name many of these latter, and we shall content ourselves
with the mention of a few that have proved especially helpful. The works
are listed in alphabetical order, for greater convenience in reference,
and those of chief interest are starred.

Adam, James (The Republic of Plato, 1902).

Adler, G. _Geschichte des Socialismus und Kommunismus von Plato bis zur
Gegenwart_ (1899), pp. 6-52. On Greek.

Alesio. “Alcune riflessioni intorno ai concetti del valore
nell’antichità classica,” _Archivio Giuridico_, 1889.

Ashley, W. J. “Aristotle’s Doctrine of Barter,” _Quarterly Journal of
Economy_, 1895. An interpretation of Ar. _Pol._ i. 1258_b_27 ff.

Barker, E. _Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle_ (1906), pp.
357-404.*

Blanqui, M. _Histoire de l’économie politique en Europe_ (1842; 4th ed.,
1860), I, 33-92. Somewhat indiscriminate in appreciation of Greek
thinkers.

Bonar. _Philosophy and Political Economy_ (1893).*

Brants, V. _Xenophon Economiste_, reprint from _Revue Catholique de
Louvain_, 1881.*

Bussy, M. _Histoire et Réfutation du Socialisme depuis l’antiquité,
jusqu’à nos jours_ (1859). Superficial and prejudiced.

Cossa, L. _Histoire des doctrines économiques_ (1899) (trans. from the
Italian of 1876), pp. 144-50.*

——. “Di alcuni studii storici sulle teorie economiche dei Greci,” _Saggi
di Economia Politica_, 1878, pp. 3-14.

De Sam-Cognazzi. _Analisi dell economia publica e privata degli antichi_
(1830).

Du Mesnill-Marigny. _Histoire de l’économie politique des anciens
peuples_ (1878, 3 vols.). Superficial.

De Villeneuve-Bargemont. _Histoire de l’économie politique_ (Paris,
1841, 2d ed.), I. Chiefly on the facts.

Dietzel. “Beiträge zur Geschichte des Socialismus und des Kommunismus,”
_Zeitschrift für Literatur und Geschichte der Staatswissenschaften_, I
(1893), 373 ff.*

Döring, A. _Die Lehre des Socrates als soziales Reform-System_ (1895).

DuBois, A. _Précis de l’histoire des doctrines économiques dans leurs
rapports avec les faits et avec les institutions_ (1903), pp. 23-53. A
good partial bibliography.*

Dühring, E. _Kritische Geschichte der Nationalökonomie und des
Socialismus_ (3d ed., 1879), pp. 19-25.

Dunning, W. A. _Political Theories Ancient and Mediaeval_ (New York,
1913). Economic material only incidental.

Eisenhart, H. _Geschichte der Nationalökonomie_ (2d ed., 1891). Mostly
on economic history.

Espinas. _Histoire des doctrines économiques_ (1891), chap, i.*

——. “L’art économique dans Platon,” _Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVI
(1914), 105-29, 36-65.*

Ferrara, J. “L’economica politica degli antichi,” _Journal de Statis. de
Palerme_, 1836.

Fontpertuis, F. de. “Filiation des ideés économiques, dans l’antiquité,”
_Journal des écon._, September, 1871 ff.*

Francotte, H. _L’Industrie dans la Grèce ancienne_ (Brussels, 1900).
Sections on Greek theories of labor and socialism.*

Glaser. “De Aristotelis doctrina de divitiis” (dissertation, 1850),
_Jahrb. für Gesellschafts- und Staatswissenschaft_, 1865.

Göttling. _De Notione servitutis apud Aristotelem_ (dissertation, Jena,
1821).

Grote, G. _Plato_ (4 vols.).

——. _Aristotle_ (2 vols.).

Guiraud, P. _La main-d’œuvre industrielle dans l’ancienne Grèce_ (1900),
pp. 36-50. On theory.*

——. _La propriété foncière en Grèce jusqu’à la conqûete Romaine_ (1893),
pp. 573-612. On socialistic ideas.*

——. _Etudes économiques sur l’antiquité_ (1905), chap. i. On the
importance of economic questions in Greece.*

Hagen. _Observationum oeconomico politicarum in Aeschinis dialogum qui
Eryxias inscribitur_ (dissertation, 1822).

Haney, L. W. _History of Economic Thought_ (1911), pp. 39-52.*

Heidel, W. A. _Pseudo-Platonica_ (dissertation, Chicago, 1896), pp.
59-61. On Eryxias.

Herzog, C. “Communismus und Socialismus in Alterthum,” _Beilage zur
allgemeine Zeitung_, 1894, No. 166. Conservative on the influence of
socialism in the ancient world.

Hildebrand, B. _Xenophontis et Aristot. de oeconomia publico doctrinae
illustrantur_ (dissertation, Marburg, 1845). Part on Aristotle not
published.

Hoderman, M. “Quaestionum oeconomicarum specimen,” (dissertation,
Berlin, 1896), _Berlin Studien für class. Philol. und Arch._, XVI, No.
4. On the so-called _Economica_.

Ingram, J. K. _History of Political Economy_ (1907), pp. 7-26.*

Jowett and Campbell. _Republic of Plato_ (3 vols., 1894).

Kaulla, R. _Die geschichtliche Entwickelung der modernen Werttheorien_
(1906), pp. 3 f. On Aristotle.

Kautsky, K. _Die Geschichte des Socialismus in Einzeldarstellungen_
(1897), I, 1.

Kautz. _Theorie und Geschichte der national Oekonomie_ (Wien, 2d ed.,
1860), pp. 102-43.*

Knies, Karl. _Die politische Economie vom geschichtlichen Standpunkt_
(1883). Of but slight interest for ancient theory.

Loos, I. A. “Studies in the _Politics_ of Aristotle and the _Republic_
of Plato,” _Bull. of the University of Iowa_, 1899.

Mabille. “Le communisme et le féminisme à Athènes.” _Mémoires de
l’académie de Dijon_, 4 série, t. 7, pp. 317 ff. (Paris, 1900).

Martiis, S. de. _Cognetti_ (Socialismo antico, Turin, 1899).*

Menger, Karl. Art. “Geld,” _Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaft_ (2d
ed.), IV, 82 ff.

Newman. _The Politics of Aristotle_ (Oxford, 1877, 4 vols.).*

Oncken, A. _Geschichte der Nationalökonomie_ (1902), I, 27-49.

Palgrave’s _Dictionary_. Art. “Aristotle.” This and the above-named
article on “Geld” will serve as sufficient notice of the several
Dictionaries of Political Economy, to which other references might be
made.

Platon, G. “Le socialisme en Grèce,” _Devenir Social._, January, 1897
ff.

Poehlmann, R. _Geschichte des antiken Socialismus und Kommunismus_
(München, 1893-1901, 2 vols.; 2d ed., 1912, _Geschichte der sozialen
Frage und des Socialismus in der antiken Welt_). A thorough treatment of
Greek socialistic tendencies both in theory and in practice, though it
exaggerates the development of capitalism in Greece, and draws analogies
too freely between ancient and modern socialism. Our citations are from
the second edition.*

——. “Die Anfänge des Sozialismus in Europa,” _Sybel’s Hist.
Zeitschrift_, Bd. 79, H. 3, pp. 385-451.

Rambaud, J. _Histoire des Doctrines économiques_ (Paris, 1902).

Regnier, M. _L’économie politique et rurale des Grecs_.

Robin, L. “Platon et la science sociale,” _Revue de metaphysique et de
morale_, March, 1913 (reprint by Armand Colin, Paris).*

Roscher. “Ueber das Verhältniss der national Oekonomik[**
Nationalökonomie] zum klassischen Alterthume,” _Ansichten der
Volkswirtschaft_, I (1878), 1-50.*

Roscher. _De doctrinae oeconomico politicae apud Graecos primordiis_
(Leipzig, 1866).

Salvio, G. Salomo. _Il concetto della schiavitu secundo Aristotile_
(Rome, 1881).

——. _Communismo nella Grecia antiqua_ (Padua, 1883).

Schneider. _Die staatswirtschaftlichen Lehren des Aristotles_
(dissertation, Neu Puppin, 1873).

Schrohl, O. _De Eryxias qui fertur Platonis_ (dissertation, 1901).
Chiefly on the authorship of the _Eryxias_.

Schulte, J. _Quomodo Plato in legibus publico Atheniensium instituta
respexerit_ (dissertation, 1907).

Sewall, H. “Theory of Value before Adam Smith,” _Publication of American
Economic Association_, II, Part 3. Four pages on Aristotle.

Shorey, Paul (“Plato’s _Laws_,” _Classical Philology_, October, 1914).

Simey, Miss E. “Economic Theory among the Greeks and Romans,” _Economic
Review_, October, 1900.

Souchon, A. _Les Théories économiques dans la Grèce antique_ (1898; a 2d
ed. in 1906, but slightly changed).*

Stein, Ludwig. _Das erste Auftauschen der sozialen Frage bei den
Griechen_ (dissertation, Bern, 1896).

——. _Die soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie_ (Stuttgart, 1903, 2d
ed.), pp. 150-82.

——. “Die staatswissenschaftliche Theorie der Griechen vor Arist. und
Platon,” _Zeitschrift für die gesammte Wissenschaft_, 1853, pp. 115-82
(Tübingen).

Stewart. _Notes to Ar._, _Nic. Ethics_ (2 vols.).*

St. Hilaire, B. Preface to translation of the _Politics_ of Arist.

Thill, J. _Die Eigenthumsfrage im klassischen Alterthum_ (Luxembourg,
1892).

Thomissen. _Histoire du socialisms depuis l’antiquité jusqu’à la
constitution française du 14 jan., 1852._

Trinchera, F. _Storia critica dell’ economia publia (epoca antica)_
(Naples, 1873).

Vanderkindere, L. “Le Socialisms dans la Grèce antique,” _Revue de
l’Université de Brussels_, I, 4, pp. 241-46.

Vogel, G. _Die Oekonomik des Xenophon; eine Vorarbeit für die Geschichte
der griechischen Oekonomik_ (Erlangen, 1895).

Walcker, K. _Geschichte der Nationalökonomie und des Socialismus_
(Leipzig, 1902).

Wallon. _Histoire de l’esclavage dans l’antiquité_ (Paris, 1879, 2d
ed.). One chapter on theories of slavery.

Wolf, H. _Geschichte des antiken Sozialismus und Individualismus_
(1909). A merely popular treatment.

Wilhelm, F. “Die _Oeconomica_ der Neupythagoreer,” _Rhein. Mus._, XVII,
No. 2 (1915), 162 ff.

Zmavc, J. “Die Werttheorie bei Arist. und Thos. Aquino,” _Archiv für die
Geschichte der Philosophie_ (Berlin, 1899), pp. 407 ff.*

Zmavc, J. “Die Geldtheorie und ihre Stellung innerhalb der Wirtschaft
und staatswissenschaftliche Anschauungen des Arist.,” _Zeitschrift für
die ges. Staatswissenschaft_, 1902, pp. 48-79.*

As stated, a large number of the foregoing list deal chiefly with actual
conditions, rather than with theory. Besides these, many other works on
phases of Greek economic history are cited in the course of our
discussion, the names of which, with page-references, may be found in
the index. All other works that are incidentally cited are also listed
there. For an excellent presentation of the political economy of John
Ruskin, and a selected bibliography on his work as a social and economic
reformer, cf. the Library Edition of his works, from which we have often
cited (George Allen, London, Introduction to Vol. XVII, 1905;
bibliography, p. cxii).

INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND AUTHORS

Acquisition, 25, 27, 29, 59, 66, 78, 88, 89, 90, 93, 105, 111-15, 128,
138, 144, 147. _See also_ Chrematistik; Exchange.

Adam, 36, 96, 151.

Adler, 55, 151.

Aeschines, 62.

Agriculture, 14 f., 18, 29 f., 31, 34, 38, 59, 63, 66-68, 79, 89-91,
93, 96, 114, 116, 128, 145 f., 148.

Alcaeus, 14.

Alcidamas, 17.

Alesio, 151.

Antisthenes, 65, 126, 131 f., 134.

Apollodorus, 91.

Aquinas, 148.

Ardaillon, 75.

Aristippus, 129.

Aristo, 141.

Aristophanes, 57, 66, 93, 119, 138.

Aristotle, 9, 12, 16, 17, 19, 21 f., 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 37, 39, 43,
44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 66, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 79,
81-124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 136, 137, 140, 142,
143, 147, 148.

Ashley, 113 f., 151.

Athenaeus, 133, 140.

Aulus Gellius, 52.

Barker, 9, 15, 16, 17, 84, 85, 90, 97, 98, 100, 101, 104, 105, 108,
110, 124, 130, 149, 151.

Barter, 35, 101, 106, 108, 113.

Bawerk, E. Boehm von, 106.

Bebel, 145.

Beloch, 9, 20, 45.

Bergk, 14.

Blanqui, 29, 48, 68, 82, 104, 151.

Boeckh, 9, 41, 47, 106, 134.

Bonar, 26, 28, 32, 36, 37, 48, 84, 90, 118, 134, 151.

Bright, 149.

Bryson, 126.

Bücher, 20.

Büchsenschütz, 65, 93.

Bussy, 48, 151.

Callicles, 16.

Callicratidas, 126.

Capital, 18, 30, 35, 47, 65, 67, 68 f., 91-93, 104, 117, 124, 137, 146.
_See also_ the Greek index for term.

Capitalism, 7, 8, 18, 19, 20, 21, 30, 40, 47, 62, 96, 106, 112.

Carlyle, 25, 44, 99, 101.

Caste system in Plato’s _Republic_, 37, 48 f.

Charetides, 91.

Chrematistik, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 123, 124. _See also_
Acquisition; Exchange.

Christ, W., 63, 81.

Chrysippus, 141 f.

Cicero, 125, 126, 130, 139, 142.

Civic strife, 13, 25, 26, 54, 55, 62, 74, 78, 79, 87, 118, 144, 147.

Cleanthes, 141.

Clement Alex., 15, 140.

Cognazzi, De, 151.

Collectivism, 31, 61, 123, 124.

Columella, 91.

Commerce. _See_ Exchange.

Communism. _See_ Socialism.

Communism of family, 18, 54, 55, 56, 117, 120, 133, 140, 142, 143, 145.

Competition, 14.

Conservation, 30, 147.

Consumption, 27, 46, 68, 91, 92, 105, 113, 114, 137, 145, 147, 149.

Cope, 83, 93.

Cornford, 14, 18, 41, 53.

Cossa, 67, 82, 134, 151.

Crantor, 125.

Crates, 133, 138, 139.

Credit, 39, 105, 106, 146. _See_ the Greek index for term.

Croiset, 17, 63, 81.

Cynics, 16, 97, 103, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131-33, 134, 135, 136,
137, 139, 141.

Cyrenaics, 129, 130.

Decharme, 18.

Democritus, 15, 17, 23.

Demosthenes, 13, 45, 62, 66, 68, 69, 77 f., 105, 106, 114.

Dichaearchus, 143.

Diels, 15, 17.

Dietzel, 32, 57, 152.

Diminishing returns, 67, 146.

Dio Chrysostom, 13, 126, 130, 131, 132.

Diodorus, 145.

Diogenes, 131, 132 f., 138.

Diogenes Laertius, 17, 52, 100, 126, 127, 130, 131, 132, 133, 136, 139,
140, 141, 142.

Distribution, 12, 46 f., 51, 57, 74, 84, 102, 115-17, 118, 140. _See
also_ the Greek index for term.

Distributive justice, 102, 107.

Dobbs, 16, 25.

Doering, 69, 152.

Droysen, 45.

Drumann, 29, 57.

DuBois, 28, 35, 55, 82, 92, 104, 109, 114, 152.

Dühring, 71, 82, 101, 152.

Dümmler, 17.

Dunning, 130, 152.

_Economica_, 9, 14, 63, 69, 81, 94, 125, 126 f., 127-29, 131, 133.

Economic demand, 34, 64, 70, 72, 82, 83, 84, 86, 104, 108, 109, 110,
135, 146. _See also_ the Greek index.

Economy:
and asceticism, 12, 25, 60, 65, 131, 136, 137, 139;
and ethics, 10, 18, 21, 29, 63, 81, 90, 146, 148, 149;
domestic and public, 9, 63, 81 f., 111, 112, 113, 126, 146;
influence of Greek, 8, 146-50;
mediaeval, 39, 148;
modern, 8, 11 f., 27, 44, 115;
Ricardian, 8, 10, 11, 50.

Education, 50, 54, 95, 118, 121, 122, 149.

Eisenhart, 32, 152.

Ely, 11.

Ephorus, 143.

Epictetus, 133.

Epicurus, Epicurean, 52, 126, 129, 130.

Equality, 55 f., 60 f., 62, 79 f., 83, 109, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121,
145, 147.

Eryxias, 17, 103, 132, 133-37.

Esmein, 52.

Espinas, 9, 28, 29, 38, 43, 60, 61, 63, 65, 142, 148, 152.

Eudemian ethics, 81, 83, 87, 98, 107, 112, 120, 125, 128.

Eudemus, 127.

Euhemerus, 144 f.

Euripides, 17 f., 96, 136.

Exchange:
Greek attitude toward, 14, 32, 33, 41-45, 56, 59, 66, 70, 73 f., 77,
79, 82, 91, 92, 94, 105, 109, 110, 111-15, 116, 123, 128, 140,
143, 145, 147, 148;
regulations for, 43, 123;
theory of, 35 f., 38, 40, 41, 83, 84, 89, 102, 104, 106-110, 115,
119, 128, 146, 147.
_See also_ Chrematistik; Acquisition; and the Greek index for terms.

Ferrara, 152.

Fontpertuis, 64, 67, 68, 96, 152.

Francotte, 20, 29, 32, 55, 57, 62, 124, 134, 152.

Gernet, 45.

Gilliard, 14.

Glaser, 152.

Göttling, 152.

Gold, 15, 40, 54, 133, 137.

Gomperz, 17, 49, 131, 133, 137.

Grain supply, 45.

Grote, 13, 49, 152.

Grundy, 45.

Guiraud, 29, 37, 51, 52, 54, 57, 58, 69, 123, 152.

Hagen, 134, 152.

_Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaft_, 108.

Haney, 7, 11, 19, 20, 21, 35, 48, 71, 72, 82, 84, 89, 105, 110, 113,
119, 148, 152.

Harpocration, 68.

Hasbach, 130.

Hecataeus, 144.

Heidel, 125, 133, 134, 137, 152.

Hense, 137.

Heraclitus, 15.

Hermann, 43.

Herodotus, 19, 45, 63, 66.

Herzog, 152.

Hesiod, 14, 17, 30, 33.

Hesychius, 93.

Hierocles, 126.

Hildebrand, 153.

Hippias, 16, 17.

Hippodamas of Miletus, 15, 52;
the Pythagorean, 52.

Hippolytus, 52.

Hobbes, 16.

Hoderman, 126, 127, 134, 153.

Homer, 14, 52.

Horace, 129.

Individualism, 16, 56, 57, 75, 79, 119, 122, 130, 140 f., 142, 143.

Industry, 14, 29, 32, 35, 36, 47, 66, 69 f., 79, 90, 92, 95, 111, 116.
_See also_ Labor; Production.

Ingram, 7, 10, 72, 89, 104, 149, 153.

Interest, 31, 39 f., 59 f., 78, 92, 93, 105, 106, 148. _See also_
Capital; Capitalism; and the Greek index for terms.

Isocrates, 13, 66, 68, 77-80, 88, 106, 143.

Jackson, 108.

Jamblichus, 15, 52, 127.

Jambulus, 145.

Jesus, 26, 49, 87, 136.

Jowett, 60, 95, 114, 153.

Just price, 23, 107, 108, 140.

Kaulla, 65, 153.

Kautsky, 153.

Kautz, 9, 12, 14, 15, 18, 31, 48, 65, 67, 70, 72, 89, 107, 134, 153.

Knies, 153.

Koutorga, 106.

Labor:
attitude toward, 14, 17, 20, 29, 31-34, 37, 59, 69 f., 77, 79, 89,
91, 93-96, 116, 128, 132, 142;
division of, 19, 29, 33, 34-47, 38, 41, 70 f., 73, 79, 96, 145, 146;
in production, 18, 31, 47, 67, 83, 84, 96, 108, 110, 146. _See also_
Production; Laborer; and the Greek index.

Laborer, attitude toward, 47-50, 74, 101, 116, 117, 145.

Lamb, 18.

Land tenure:
in Aristotle’s state, 122 f.;
in Greece, 51;
in Plato’s _Laws_, 58 f., 62, 122;
in other writers, 133, 144.

Law, overestimate of, 13, 51, 56, 61, 75.

_Laws_, historical basis of Plato’s, 43 f.

Leisure, 29, 87, 94, 95, 101, 116. _See also_ the Greek index.

Lenormant, 72.

Liberality, 87, 121.

Loos, 153.

Lychophron, 16, 17, 119.

Lycurgus, 69, 140, 143.

Lysias, 45, 68.

Mabille, 153.

Macaulay, 103.

_Magna Moralia_, 81, 84, 87, 88, 125.

Malthus, 45 f.

Malon, 55.

Martiis, De, 52, 57, 153.

Marx, 84, 124.

Menger, 108 f., 153.

Mercantilism, 41, 72, 86, 103, 104.

Mesnil-Marigny, Du, 151.

Metrodorus, 127.

Meyer, 9, 20, 21, 106.

Mill, 8, 27, 50, 68, 85, 86, 92, 117, 149.

Mines, mining, 13, 66, 67, 74, 75, 128.

Money:
and wealth, 72, 86, 103, 104, 135, 137, 146;
attitude toward, 73, 106, 105, 140, 141, 145, 148;
function, 15, 38 f., 41, 84, 101 f., 103, 106, 108, 113, 115, 146;
history of, 35, 38, 101 f., 112, 146;
intrinsic value of, 40, 72, 102, 103, 104, 135, 137, 146;
materials, 40, 60, 72, 105, 129;
stability, 72, 104, 146. _See also_ Interest; Gold; Silver;
Mercantilism; and the Greek index.

Monopoly, 110, 129, 147.

More, 149.

Mueller, 143.

Mullach, 15, 125, 131, 132, 133.

Nationalism, 62, 124.

Nauck, 17 f.

Nearing, 40.

Nettleship, 37.

Newman, 17, 86, 89, 91, 97, 101, 103, 112, 114, 132, 153.

New Pythagoreans, 127.

Nic. Damasc., 143.

Oncken, 37, 48, 55, 129, 134, 140, 149, 150, 153.

Oresme, 148.

Paley-Sandys, 106.

Palgrave’s _Dictionary_, 104, 153.

Pericles, 12.

Periktione, 126.

Peters, 108.

Phaleas, 16, 53, 118, 120, 142.

Philodemus, 126, 127, 130.

Phintys, 126.

Photius, 52.

Physiocratic tendencies, 28 f., 30, 41, 89, 110, 140, 149. _See also_
Exchange; Production.

Pindar, 83.

Plato, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22-62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70,
71, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95,
96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 104, 106, 107, 108, 111, 115, 116, 118, 119,
120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136,
137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 144, 145, 148, 149.

Platon, G., 153.

Plutarch, 125, 126, 127, 140, 143 f.

Poehlmann, 7, 20, 21, 29, 32, 33, 36, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54,
55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 74, 75, 76, 101, 105, 106, 112, 117, 119,
120, 124, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 153.

Pohlenz, 53, 56, 57.

Pollux, 93.

Polybius, 143 f.

Population, 45 f., 59, 74, 115, 120.

Porphyry, 52, 126, 143.

Poverty, 14, 15, 27, 47, 48, 50, 55, 56, 59, 60, 74, 75, 78, 79, 87,
109, 115, 120, 130, 132, 133, 138, 139, 140, 144, 147.

Prices, regulation of, 43, 45, 47, 108, 110, 147.

Private property. _See_ Socialism.

Prodicus, 17.

Production, 27-37, 66-69, 74, 83, 88-93, 96, 146, 149. _See also_
Industry; Physiocratic tendencies; and the Greek index.

Profits, 46, 74, 109, 110, 116.

Protagoras, 17.

Publicity, 45, 60, 61, 147.

Pythagoras, 15, 52.

Quesnay, 89.

Rambaud, 153.

Rassow, 108.

Reciprocity, 34, 41, 96, 146.

Regnier, 153.

Ricardo. _See_ Ricardian economy.

Ritchie, 83.

Robin, 22, 27, 28, 37, 43, 52, 153.

Rodbertus, 20.

Roscher, 9, 18, 32, 72, 148, 153.

Rousseau, 131, 143, 149.

Ruskin, 9, 11, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40,
42, 44, 45, 46, 55, 61, 63, 64, 67, 87, 92, 93, 95, 99, 100, 101,
105, 109, 110, 111, 135, 137, 138, 145, 149, 150, 154.

Salvio, 154.

Sappho, 14.

Say, 148.

Schaeffle, 112.

Schneider, 154.

Schoenberg, 11.

Schrohl, 134, 136, 154.

Schulte, 43 f., 154.

Seligman, 11.

Seneca, 130, 139, 141.

Sewall, 64, 83, 154.

Shorey, 18, 28, 36, 55, 56, 58, 62, 99, 154.

Silver, 40, 54, 65, 72, 133, 137.

Simey, 72, 134, 154.

Slavery, 16, 18, 21, 32, 37 f., 62, 67, 70, 86, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97-101,
123, 126, 128, 129, 132, 133, 142, 147.

Smith, Adam, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 64, 71, 75, 82, 86, 91, 92, 93,
115, 149.

Social contract, 15, 16, 22, 119, 130, 146.

Social origins, 22, 34, 119 f., 146.

Socialism and communism, 12 f., 45, 51, 53, 79, 147, 151;
in Aristotle, 96, 105, 118-24;
in Greece, 12 f., 51, 143;
in _Laws_, 58-62;
in _Republic_, 48, 49, 50, 54-58;
in Xenophon, 75 f.;
in other writers, 15, 52-54, 79 f., 130, 140 f., 142-45.

Socrates, 22, 26, 31, 57, 63, 67, 69, 73, 74, 129, 134, 136, 144.

Solon, 13, 14.

Sophists, 16, 17, 18, 22, 36, 73, 97, 111, 119, 130, 131, 142.

Souchon, 7, 10, 17, 31, 36, 37, 41, 48, 49, 52, 53, 55, 57, 62, 72, 82,
88, 89, 93, 104, 106, 123, 124, 141, 142, 143, 148, 150, 154.

Spencer, 35.

Speusippus, 125.

Stein, 55, 140, 154.

Steinhart-Mueller, 134.

Stewart, 83, 84, 92, 94, 95, 102, 107, 108, 116, 119, 154.

St. Hilaire, 81, 82, 154.

Stimson, 149.

Stobaeus, 15, 52, 126, 127, 130, 137, 139, 141.

Stoics, 16, 19, 125, 126, 127, 130, 134, 135, 136, 139-42, 143, 144.

St. Paul, 49, 120, 132.

Strabo, 132, 143.

Susemihl, 81, 89, 96, 127, 128.

Sussitia, 60, 117, 122 f.

Tariff, 41, 73, 110, 129.

Teles, 132, 133, 137-39.

Theocritus, 143.

Theognis, 14.

Theophrastus, 91, 125, 126, 127.

Theopompus, 144.

Thill, 154.

Thomissen, 154.

Thoreau, 12, 25, 26.

Thrasymachus, 16.

Thucydides, 10, 12, 18, 45, 66, 68, 69.

Timaeus, 52.

Trinchera, 154.

Usener, 130.

Utility, 22 f., 64, 65, 83, 88, 134, 135, 138, 146, 149.

Value, 22 f., 64 f., 82-84, 85, 96, 115, 134 f., 149. _See also_ the
Greek index.

Vanderkindere, 154.

Varro, 91.

Villeneuve-Bargemont, De, 152.

Vogel, 154.

von Arnim, 133, 139, 140, 141, 142.

Wages, 17, 46, 47, 74, 116.

Wagner (Pastor), 136.

Wagner, 150.

Walcker, 154.

Walker, 86.

Wallon, 97, 98, 154.

War, 25, 27, 36, 37, 66, 67, 70, 73, 79, 128, 147.

Wealth:
attitude toward, 15, 17, 18, 24-27, 48, 50, 55, 56, 60, 65 f., 77,
78, 79, 81, 86-88, 109, 125 f., 127, 129, 130, 131 f., 133-37, 138
f., 139 f., 141, 144, 146, 147;
defined, 24, 27, 65, 85 f., 91, 112, 133, 146, 149.
_See also_ the Greek index.

Wilhelm, 7, 127, 154.

Wolf, 57, 141, 154.

Xenocrates, 125, 126.

Xenophon, 9, 10, 15, 17, 19, 22, 23, 25, 30, 38, 42, 46, 63-76, 81, 84,
89, 91, 96, 97, 111, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136,
138, 149.

Zell, 105.

Zeller, 15, 17, 32, 34, 48, 49, 52, 81, 97, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131,
132, 133, 139.

Zeno, 139 f., 141, 142, 144.

Zimmern, 9, 14, 29, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44 f., 45, 66.

Zmavc, 9, 81, 82, 84, 90, 104, 115, 124, 148, 154.

INDEX OF GREEK TERMS

ἀγοραστική, 40.

ἀδιάφορα, 125, 139.

αἰτίας, 28.

ἀλλαγή, 38, 39, 40, 41, 89, 106, 140.

ἀξία, 23, 64, 84, 86.

ἄπειρος, 25, 85, 112.

ἀπολαυστική, 40, 68.

ἀργύριον, 24, 72.

ἀσχολία, 66.

αὐτάρκεια (αὐτάρκης), 34, 112, 138, 144.

αὐτοπωλική, 40.

αὐτουργός, 18, 40, 89, 96.

αὐτόφυτον, 89, 113.

ἀφορμή, 68, 79, 92, 96, 106, 111, 131.

βάναυσος (βαναυσικαί, βαναυσία), 70, 93, 95, 113, 140.

δημιουργός, 23, 36, 48, 93.

διανομή, 115, 116.

διορθωτικόν, 102.

ἐγγυητής, 103.

εἰσαγώγιμα (ἐπεισαγωγίμων), 35, 110, 128.

ἔμπορος (ἐμπορική, ἐμπορία), 35, 41, 42, 73, 111, 113.

ἐνεργά, 69. (ἀργά, 68.)

ἐξαγώγιμα (ἐξαγομένων), 110, 128.

ἔρανος, 68.

ἐργασία, 66, 89, 90, 113.

εὐμεταχείριστον, 102.

θησαυρισμός, 85, 86.

ἰσότης, 56.

κάπηλος (καπηλική, καπηλεία), 35, 40, 41, 42, 78, 89, 111, 112, 113,
141.

κάρπιμα, 68.

κατά τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, 83.

κεφάλαιος, 30, 69.

κίβδηλος (ἀκίβδηλος), 42, 43.

κτήματα, 24, 64, 82, 85, 88, 138.

κτῆσις, 25, 65, 92, 125, 128.

κτητική, 28, 88, 111, 112, 113.

μεταβλητική, 40, 82, 111.

μισθαρνία, 89, 113.

ναυκληρία, 113.

νόμισμα, 38, 39, 84, 102, 103, 128, 133, 140.

νόμος, 16, 103, 119, 127, 142.

ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς, 102.

ὀβολοστατική, 105.

οἰκειατάτῃ, 91, 113.

οἰκονομική (οἰκονομία, οἰκονόμος), 9, 107, 111, 112, 114, 126, 128,
140.

ὄργανον, 86, 88, 91, 97.

παράστασις, 113.

πίστις, 68, 77, 106.

πλοῦτος, (πλούσιον) 24, 85, 112, 125, 127, 132, 135.

ποίησις, (ποιητική), 28, 69, 88, 92, 97.

πρᾶξις, (πρακτική), 69, 88, 92, 97.

στάσις, (διάστασις), 13, 25, 62, 87.

συμβλητά, 102.

συναιτίους, 28.

σχολή, 87.

τέχνη, 66, 93, 113, 145.

τίμη, 84.

τὸ ἴσον ἀντιπεπονθός (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν), 96, 107, 121.

τόκος (τοκισμός), 39, 93, 105, 113.

φορτηγία, 113.

φύσις, 16, 36, 89, 96, 98, 106, 113, 127, 128, 131, 132, 142.

χρεία, 34, 82, 84, 102, 108.

χρήματα, 15, 24, 25, 28, 38, 64, 65, 84, 112, 134, 135, 137, 138.

χρηματιστική (χρηματιστής), 9, 26, 42, 73, 85, 88, 106, 107, 110, 111,
112, 113, 140, 141.

χρυσός (χρυσίον), 24, 72, 83.

Transcriber’s Notes:

Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected.

Typographical errors were silently corrected.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "A History of Greek Economic Thought" ***

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